Daily Papers

Left-behind children (LBCs), numbering over 66 million in China, face severe mental health challenges due to parental migration for work. Early screening and identification of at-risk LBCs is crucial, yet challenging due to the severe shortage of mental health professionals, especially in rural areas. While the House-Tree-Person (HTP) test shows higher child participation rates, its requirement for expert interpretation limits its application in resource-scarce regions. To address this challenge, we propose PsyDraw, a multi-agent system based on Multimodal Large Language Models that assists mental health professionals in analyzing HTP drawings. The system employs specialized agents for feature extraction and psychological interpretation, operating in two stages: comprehensive feature analysis and professional report generation. Evaluation of HTP drawings from 290 primary school students reveals that 71.03% of the analyzes achieved High Consistency with professional evaluations, 26.21% Moderate Consistency and only 2.41% Low Consistency. The system identified 31.03% of cases requiring professional attention, demonstrating its effectiveness as a preliminary screening tool. Currently deployed in pilot schools, \method shows promise in supporting mental health professionals, particularly in resource-limited areas, while maintaining high professional standards in psychological assessment.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

The development of large language models has instilled widespread interest among the researchers to understand their inherent reasoning and problem-solving capabilities. Despite good amount of research going on to elucidate these capabilities, there is a still an appreciable gap in understanding moral development and judgments of these models. The current approaches of evaluating the ethical reasoning abilities of these models as a classification task pose numerous inaccuracies because of over-simplification. In this study, we built a psychological connection by bridging two disparate fields-human psychology and AI. We proposed an effective evaluation framework which can help to delineate the model's ethical reasoning ability in terms of moral consistency and Kohlberg's moral development stages with the help of Psychometric Assessment Tool-Defining Issues Test.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

We describe HypotheSAEs, a general method to hypothesize interpretable relationships between text data (e.g., headlines) and a target variable (e.g., clicks). HypotheSAEs has three steps: (1) train a sparse autoencoder on text embeddings to produce interpretable features describing the data distribution, (2) select features that predict the target variable, and (3) generate a natural language interpretation of each feature (e.g., "mentions being surprised or shocked") using an LLM. Each interpretation serves as a hypothesis about what predicts the target variable. Compared to baselines, our method better identifies reference hypotheses on synthetic datasets (at least +0.06 in F1) and produces more predictive hypotheses on real datasets (~twice as many significant findings), despite requiring 1-2 orders of magnitude less compute than recent LLM-based methods. HypotheSAEs also produces novel discoveries on two well-studied tasks: explaining partisan differences in Congressional speeches and identifying drivers of engagement with online headlines.

Personal narratives are stories authors construct to make meaning of their experiences. Style, the distinctive way authors use language to express themselves, is fundamental to how these narratives convey subjective experiences. Yet there is a lack of a formal framework for systematically analyzing these stylistic choices. We present a novel approach that formalizes style in personal narratives as patterns in the linguistic choices authors make when communicating subjective experiences. Our framework integrates three domains: functional linguistics establishes language as a system of meaningful choices, computer science provides methods for automatically extracting and analyzing sequential patterns, and these patterns are linked to psychological observations. Using language models, we automatically extract linguistic features such as processes, participants, and circumstances. We apply our framework to hundreds of dream narratives, including a case study on a war veteran with post-traumatic stress disorder. Analysis of his narratives uncovers distinctive patterns, particularly how verbal processes dominate over mental ones, illustrating the relationship between linguistic choices and psychological states.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Explainability has become an important topic in computer science and artificial intelligence, leading to a subfield called Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). The goal of providing or seeking explanations is to achieve (better) 'understanding' on the part of the explainee. However, what it means to 'understand' is still not clearly defined, and the concept itself is rarely the subject of scientific investigation. This conceptual article aims to present a model of forms of understanding for XAI-explanations and beyond. From an interdisciplinary perspective bringing together computer science, linguistics, sociology, philosophy and psychology, a definition of understanding and its forms, assessment, and dynamics during the process of giving everyday explanations are explored. Two types of understanding are considered as possible outcomes of explanations, namely enabledness, 'knowing how' to do or decide something, and comprehension, 'knowing that' -- both in different degrees (from shallow to deep). Explanations regularly start with shallow understanding in a specific domain and can lead to deep comprehension and enabledness of the explanandum, which we see as a prerequisite for human users to gain agency. In this process, the increase of comprehension and enabledness are highly interdependent. Against the background of this systematization, special challenges of understanding in XAI are discussed.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand the computational mechanisms underlying neural networks' capabilities in order to accomplish concrete scientific and engineering goals. Progress in this field thus promises to provide greater assurance over AI system behavior and shed light on exciting scientific questions about the nature of intelligence. Despite recent progress toward these goals, there are many open problems in the field that require solutions before many scientific and practical benefits can be realized: Our methods require both conceptual and practical improvements to reveal deeper insights; we must figure out how best to apply our methods in pursuit of specific goals; and the field must grapple with socio-technical challenges that influence and are influenced by our work. This forward-facing review discusses the current frontier of mechanistic interpretability and the open problems that the field may benefit from prioritizing.

We propose leveraging cognitive science research on emotions and communication to improve language models for emotion analysis. First, we present the main emotion theories in psychology and cognitive science. Then, we introduce the main methods of emotion annotation in natural language processing and their connections to psychological theories. We also present the two main types of analyses of emotional communication in cognitive pragmatics. Finally, based on the cognitive science research presented, we propose directions for improving language models for emotion analysis. We suggest that these research efforts pave the way for constructing new annotation schemes, methods, and a possible benchmark for emotional understanding, considering different facets of human emotion and communication.

Human-like personality traits have recently been discovered in large language models, raising the hypothesis that their (known and as yet undiscovered) biases conform with human latent psychological constructs. While large conversational models may be tricked into answering psychometric questionnaires, the latent psychological constructs of thousands of simpler transformers, trained for other tasks, cannot be assessed because appropriate psychometric methods are currently lacking. Here, we show how standard psychological questionnaires can be reformulated into natural language inference prompts, and we provide a code library to support the psychometric assessment of arbitrary models. We demonstrate, using a sample of 88 publicly available models, the existence of human-like mental health-related constructs (including anxiety, depression, and Sense of Coherence) which conform with standard theories in human psychology and show similar correlations and mitigation strategies. The ability to interpret and rectify the performance of language models by using psychological tools can boost the development of more explainable, controllable, and trustworthy models.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Despite extensive standardization, diagnostic interviews for mental health disorders encompass substantial subjective judgment. Previous studies have demonstrated that EEG-based neural measures can function as reliable objective correlates of depression, or even predictors of depression and its course. However, their clinical utility has not been fully realized because of 1) the lack of automated ways to deal with the inherent noise associated with EEG data at scale, and 2) the lack of knowledge of which aspects of the EEG signal may be markers of a clinical disorder. Here we adapt an unsupervised pipeline from the recent deep representation learning literature to address these problems by 1) learning a disentangled representation using beta-VAE to denoise the signal, and 2) extracting interpretable features associated with a sparse set of clinical labels using a Symbol-Concept Association Network (SCAN). We demonstrate that our method is able to outperform the canonical hand-engineered baseline classification method on a number of factors, including participant age and depression diagnosis. Furthermore, our method recovers a representation that can be used to automatically extract denoised Event Related Potentials (ERPs) from novel, single EEG trajectories, and supports fast supervised re-mapping to various clinical labels, allowing clinicians to re-use a single EEG representation regardless of updates to the standardized diagnostic system. Finally, single factors of the learned disentangled representations often correspond to meaningful markers of clinical factors, as automatically detected by SCAN, allowing for human interpretability and post-hoc expert analysis of the recommendations made by the model.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Depression is a common mental disorder. Automatic depression detection tools using speech, enabled by machine learning, help early screening of depression. This paper addresses two limitations that may hinder the clinical implementations of such tools: noise resulting from segment-level labelling and a lack of model interpretability. We propose a bi-modal speech-level transformer to avoid segment-level labelling and introduce a hierarchical interpretation approach to provide both speech-level and sentence-level interpretations, based on gradient-weighted attention maps derived from all attention layers to track interactions between input features. We show that the proposed model outperforms a model that learns at a segment level (p=0.854, r=0.947, F1=0.947 compared to p=0.732, r=0.808, F1=0.768). For model interpretation, using one true positive sample, we show which sentences within a given speech are most relevant to depression detection; and which text tokens and Mel-spectrogram regions within these sentences are most relevant to depression detection. These interpretations allow clinicians to verify the validity of predictions made by depression detection tools, promoting their clinical implementations.

In the context of electroencephalogram (EEG)-based driver drowsiness recognition, it is still challenging to design a calibration-free system, since EEG signals vary significantly among different subjects and recording sessions. Many efforts have been made to use deep learning methods for mental state recognition from EEG signals. However, existing work mostly treats deep learning models as black-box classifiers, while what have been learned by the models and to which extent they are affected by the noise in EEG data are still underexplored. In this paper, we develop a novel convolutional neural network combined with an interpretation technique that allows sample-wise analysis of important features for classification. The network has a compact structure and takes advantage of separable convolutions to process the EEG signals in a spatial-temporal sequence. Results show that the model achieves an average accuracy of 78.35% on 11 subjects for leave-one-out cross-subject drowsiness recognition, which is higher than the conventional baseline methods of 53.40%-72.68% and state-of-the-art deep learning methods of 71.75%-75.19%. Interpretation results indicate the model has learned to recognize biologically meaningful features from EEG signals, e.g., Alpha spindles, as strong indicators of drowsiness across different subjects. In addition, we also explore reasons behind some wrongly classified samples with the interpretation technique and discuss potential ways to improve the recognition accuracy. Our work illustrates a promising direction on using interpretable deep learning models to discover meaningful patterns related to different mental states from complex EEG signals.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

This paper provides an entry point to the problem of interpreting a deep neural network model and explaining its predictions. It is based on a tutorial given at ICASSP 2017. It introduces some recently proposed techniques of interpretation, along with theory, tricks and recommendations, to make most efficient use of these techniques on real data. It also discusses a number of practical applications.

This article details the advances made to a system that uses artificial intelligence to identify alarming student responses. This system is built into our assessment platform to assess whether a student's response indicates they are a threat to themselves or others. Such responses may include details concerning threats of violence, severe depression, suicide risks, and descriptions of abuse. Driven by advances in natural language processing, the latest model is a fine-tuned language model trained on a large corpus consisting of student responses and supplementary texts. We demonstrate that the use of a language model delivers a substantial improvement in accuracy over the previous iterations of this system.

In this paper, we introduce a new approach, called Posthoc Interpretation via Quantization (PIQ), for interpreting decisions made by trained classifiers. Our method utilizes vector quantization to transform the representations of a classifier into a discrete, class-specific latent space. The class-specific codebooks act as a bottleneck that forces the interpreter to focus on the parts of the input data deemed relevant by the classifier for making a prediction. Our model formulation also enables learning concepts by incorporating the supervision of pretrained annotation models such as state-of-the-art image segmentation models. We evaluated our method through quantitative and qualitative studies involving black-and-white images, color images, and audio. As a result of these studies we found that PIQ generates interpretations that are more easily understood by participants to our user studies when compared to several other interpretation methods in the literature.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand model behaviors in terms of specific, interpretable features, often hypothesized to manifest as low-dimensional subspaces of activations. Specifically, recent studies have explored subspace interventions (such as activation patching) as a way to simultaneously manipulate model behavior and attribute the features behind it to given subspaces. In this work, we demonstrate that these two aims diverge, potentially leading to an illusory sense of interpretability. Counterintuitively, even if a subspace intervention makes the model's output behave as if the value of a feature was changed, this effect may be achieved by activating a dormant parallel pathway leveraging another subspace that is causally disconnected from model outputs. We demonstrate this phenomenon in a distilled mathematical example, in two real-world domains (the indirect object identification task and factual recall), and present evidence for its prevalence in practice. In the context of factual recall, we further show a link to rank-1 fact editing, providing a mechanistic explanation for previous work observing an inconsistency between fact editing performance and fact localization. However, this does not imply that activation patching of subspaces is intrinsically unfit for interpretability. To contextualize our findings, we also show what a success case looks like in a task (indirect object identification) where prior manual circuit analysis informs an understanding of the location of a feature. We explore the additional evidence needed to argue that a patched subspace is faithful.

Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such as how models copy or recall factual knowledge. In this work, we propose a formulation of competition of mechanisms, which focuses on the interplay of multiple mechanisms instead of individual mechanisms and traces how one of them becomes dominant in the final prediction. We uncover how and where mechanisms compete within LLMs using two interpretability methods: logit inspection and attention modification. Our findings show traces of the mechanisms and their competition across various model components and reveal attention positions that effectively control the strength of certain mechanisms. Code: https://github.com/francescortu/comp-mech. Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/francescortu/comp-mech.

Depression is a pervasive mental health condition that affects hundreds of millions of individuals worldwide, yet many cases remain undiagnosed due to barriers in traditional clinical access and pervasive stigma. Social media platforms, and Reddit in particular, offer rich, user-generated narratives that can reveal early signs of depressive symptomatology. However, existing computational approaches often label entire posts simply as depressed or not depressed, without linking language to specific criteria from the DSM-5, the standard clinical framework for diagnosing depression. This limits both clinical relevance and interpretability. To address this gap, we introduce ReDSM5, a novel Reddit corpus comprising 1484 long-form posts, each exhaustively annotated at the sentence level by a licensed psychologist for the nine DSM-5 depression symptoms. For each label, the annotator also provides a concise clinical rationale grounded in DSM-5 methodology. We conduct an exploratory analysis of the collection, examining lexical, syntactic, and emotional patterns that characterize symptom expression in social media narratives. Compared to prior resources, ReDSM5 uniquely combines symptom-specific supervision with expert explanations, facilitating the development of models that not only detect depression but also generate human-interpretable reasoning. We establish baseline benchmarks for both multi-label symptom classification and explanation generation, providing reference results for future research on detection and interpretability.

Figurative language (e.g., "he flew like the wind") is challenging to understand, as it is hard to tell what implicit information is being conveyed from the surface form alone. We hypothesize that to perform this task well, the reader needs to mentally elaborate the scene being described to identify a sensible meaning of the language. We present DREAM-FLUTE, a figurative language understanding system that does this, first forming a "mental model" of situations described in a premise and hypothesis before making an entailment/contradiction decision and generating an explanation. DREAM-FLUTE uses an existing scene elaboration model, DREAM, for constructing its "mental model." In the FigLang2022 Shared Task evaluation, DREAM-FLUTE achieved (joint) first place (Acc@60=63.3%), and can perform even better with ensemble techniques, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach. More generally, this work suggests that adding a reflective component to pretrained language models can improve their performance beyond standard fine-tuning (3.3% improvement in Acc@60).

Background: Rapid advancements in natural language processing have led to the development of large language models with the potential to revolutionize mental health care. These models have shown promise in assisting clinicians and providing support to individuals experiencing various psychological challenges. Objective: This study aims to compare the performance of two large language models, GPT-4 and Chat-GPT, in responding to a set of 18 psychological prompts, to assess their potential applicability in mental health care settings. Methods: A blind methodology was employed, with a clinical psychologist evaluating the models' responses without knowledge of their origins. The prompts encompassed a diverse range of mental health topics, including depression, anxiety, and trauma, to ensure a comprehensive assessment. Results: The results demonstrated a significant difference in performance between the two models (p > 0.05). GPT-4 achieved an average rating of 8.29 out of 10, while Chat-GPT received an average rating of 6.52. The clinical psychologist's evaluation suggested that GPT-4 was more effective at generating clinically relevant and empathetic responses, thereby providing better support and guidance to potential users. Conclusions: This study contributes to the growing body of literature on the applicability of large language models in mental health care settings. The findings underscore the importance of continued research and development in the field to optimize these models for clinical use. Further investigation is necessary to understand the specific factors underlying the performance differences between the two models and to explore their generalizability across various populations and mental health conditions.

Along with the great success of deep neural networks, there is also growing concern about their black-box nature. The interpretability issue affects people's trust on deep learning systems. It is also related to many ethical problems, e.g., algorithmic discrimination. Moreover, interpretability is a desired property for deep networks to become powerful tools in other research fields, e.g., drug discovery and genomics. In this survey, we conduct a comprehensive review of the neural network interpretability research. We first clarify the definition of interpretability as it has been used in many different contexts. Then we elaborate on the importance of interpretability and propose a novel taxonomy organized along three dimensions: type of engagement (passive vs. active interpretation approaches), the type of explanation, and the focus (from local to global interpretability). This taxonomy provides a meaningful 3D view of distribution of papers from the relevant literature as two of the dimensions are not simply categorical but allow ordinal subcategories. Finally, we summarize the existing interpretability evaluation methods and suggest possible research directions inspired by our new taxonomy.

Most existing emotion analysis emphasizes which emotion arises (e.g., happy, sad, angry) but neglects the deeper why. We propose Emotion Interpretation (EI), focusing on causal factors-whether explicit (e.g., observable objects, interpersonal interactions) or implicit (e.g., cultural context, off-screen events)-that drive emotional responses. Unlike traditional emotion recognition, EI tasks require reasoning about triggers instead of mere labeling. To facilitate EI research, we present EIBench, a large-scale benchmark encompassing 1,615 basic EI samples and 50 complex EI samples featuring multifaceted emotions. Each instance demands rationale-based explanations rather than straightforward categorization. We further propose a Coarse-to-Fine Self-Ask (CFSA) annotation pipeline, which guides Vision-Language Models (VLLMs) through iterative question-answer rounds to yield high-quality labels at scale. Extensive evaluations on open-source and proprietary large language models under four experimental settings reveal consistent performance gaps-especially for more intricate scenarios-underscoring EI's potential to enrich empathetic, context-aware AI applications. Our benchmark and methods are publicly available at: https://github.com/Lum1104/EIBench, offering a foundation for advanced multimodal causal analysis and next-generation affective computing.

Research in mechanistic interpretability seeks to explain behaviors of machine learning models in terms of their internal components. However, most previous work either focuses on simple behaviors in small models, or describes complicated behaviors in larger models with broad strokes. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting an explanation for how GPT-2 small performs a natural language task called indirect object identification (IOI). Our explanation encompasses 26 attention heads grouped into 7 main classes, which we discovered using a combination of interpretability approaches relying on causal interventions. To our knowledge, this investigation is the largest end-to-end attempt at reverse-engineering a natural behavior "in the wild" in a language model. We evaluate the reliability of our explanation using three quantitative criteria--faithfulness, completeness and minimality. Though these criteria support our explanation, they also point to remaining gaps in our understanding. Our work provides evidence that a mechanistic understanding of large ML models is feasible, opening opportunities to scale our understanding to both larger models and more complex tasks.

With the development of web technology, social media texts are becoming a rich source for automatic mental health analysis. As traditional discriminative methods bear the problem of low interpretability, the recent large language models have been explored for interpretable mental health analysis on social media, which aims to provide detailed explanations along with predictions. The results show that ChatGPT can generate approaching-human explanations for its correct classifications. However, LLMs still achieve unsatisfactory classification performance in a zero-shot/few-shot manner. Domain-specific finetuning is an effective solution, but faces 2 challenges: 1) lack of high-quality training data. 2) no open-source LLMs for interpretable mental health analysis were released to lower the finetuning cost. To alleviate these problems, we build the first multi-task and multi-source interpretable mental health instruction (IMHI) dataset on social media, with 105K data samples. The raw social media data are collected from 10 existing sources covering 8 mental health analysis tasks. We use expert-written few-shot prompts and collected labels to prompt ChatGPT and obtain explanations from its responses. To ensure the reliability of the explanations, we perform strict automatic and human evaluations on the correctness, consistency, and quality of generated data. Based on the IMHI dataset and LLaMA2 foundation models, we train MentalLLaMA, the first open-source LLM series for interpretable mental health analysis with instruction-following capability. We also evaluate the performance of MentalLLaMA on the IMHI evaluation benchmark with 10 test sets, where their correctness for making predictions and the quality of explanations are examined. The results show that MentalLLaMA approaches state-of-the-art discriminative methods in correctness and generates high-quality explanations.

Supervised machine learning models boast remarkable predictive capabilities. But can you trust your model? Will it work in deployment? What else can it tell you about the world? We want models to be not only good, but interpretable. And yet the task of interpretation appears underspecified. Papers provide diverse and sometimes non-overlapping motivations for interpretability, and offer myriad notions of what attributes render models interpretable. Despite this ambiguity, many papers proclaim interpretability axiomatically, absent further explanation. In this paper, we seek to refine the discourse on interpretability. First, we examine the motivations underlying interest in interpretability, finding them to be diverse and occasionally discordant. Then, we address model properties and techniques thought to confer interpretability, identifying transparency to humans and post-hoc explanations as competing notions. Throughout, we discuss the feasibility and desirability of different notions, and question the oft-made assertions that linear models are interpretable and that deep neural networks are not.

Global comparisons of wellbeing increasingly rely on survey questions that ask respondents to evaluate their lives, most commonly in the form of "life satisfaction" and "Cantril ladder" items. These measures underpin international rankings such as the World Happiness Report and inform policy initiatives worldwide, yet their comparability has not been established with contemporary global data. Using the Gallup World Poll, Global Flourishing Study, and World Values Survey, I show that the two question formats yield divergent distributions, rankings, and response patterns that vary across countries and surveys, defying simple explanations. To explore differences in respondents' cognitive interpretations, I compare regression coefficients from the Global Flourishing Study, analyzing how each question wording relates to life circumstances. While international rankings of wellbeing are unstable, the scientific study of the determinants of life evaluations appears more robust. Together, the findings underscore the need for a renewed research agenda on critical limitations to cross-country comparability of wellbeing.

Depression has proven to be a significant public health issue, profoundly affecting the psychological well-being of individuals. If it remains undiagnosed, depression can lead to severe health issues, which can manifest physically and even lead to suicide. Generally, Diagnosing depression or any other mental disorder involves conducting semi-structured interviews alongside supplementary questionnaires, including variants of the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ) by Clinicians and mental health professionals. This approach places significant reliance on the experience and judgment of trained physicians, making the diagnosis susceptible to personal biases. Given that the underlying mechanisms causing depression are still being actively researched, physicians often face challenges in diagnosing and treating the condition, particularly in its early stages of clinical presentation. Recently, significant strides have been made in Artificial neural computing to solve problems involving text, image, and speech in various domains. Our analysis has aimed to leverage these state-of-the-art (SOTA) models in our experiments to achieve optimal outcomes leveraging multiple modalities. The experiments were performed on the Extended Distress Analysis Interview Corpus Wizard of Oz dataset (E-DAIC) corpus presented in the Audio/Visual Emotion Challenge (AVEC) 2019 Challenge. The proposed solutions demonstrate better results achieved by Proprietary and Open-source Large Language Models (LLMs), which achieved a Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) score of 3.98 on Textual Modality, beating the AVEC 2019 challenge baseline results and current SOTA regression analysis architectures. Additionally, the proposed solution achieved an accuracy of 71.43% in the classification task. The paper also includes a novel audio-visual multi-modal network that predicts PHQ-8 scores with an RMSE of 6.51.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

Large neural models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, raising concerns about whether their behavior reliably aligns with human values. Interpretability provides a route to internal transparency by revealing the computations that drive outputs. We argue that interpretability especially mechanistic approaches should be treated as a design principle for alignment, not an auxiliary diagnostic tool. Post-hoc methods such as LIME or SHAP offer intuitive but correlational explanations, while mechanistic techniques like circuit tracing or activation patching yield causal insight into internal failures, including deceptive or misaligned reasoning that behavioral methods like RLHF, red teaming, or Constitutional AI may overlook. Despite these advantages, interpretability faces challenges of scalability, epistemic uncertainty, and mismatches between learned representations and human concepts. Our position is that progress on safe and trustworthy AI will depend on making interpretability a first-class objective of AI research and development, ensuring that systems are not only effective but also auditable, transparent, and aligned with human intent.

People can categorize the same entity at multiple taxonomic levels, such as basic (bear), superordinate (animal), and subordinate (grizzly bear). While prior research has focused on basic-level categories, this study is the first attempt to examine the organization of categories by analyzing exemplars produced at the subordinate level. We present a new Italian psycholinguistic dataset of human-generated exemplars for 187 concrete words. We then use these data to evaluate whether textual and vision LLMs produce meaningful exemplars that align with human category organization across three key tasks: exemplar generation, category induction, and typicality judgment. Our findings show a low alignment between humans and LLMs, consistent with previous studies. However, their performance varies notably across different semantic domains. Ultimately, this study highlights both the promises and the constraints of using AI-generated exemplars to support psychological and linguistic research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans. At present, interpretability is divided into two paradigms: the intrinsic paradigm, which believes that only models designed to be explained can be explained, and the post-hoc paradigm, which believes that black-box models can be explained. At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior. This is important, as false but convincing explanations lead to unsupported confidence in artificial intelligence (AI), which can be dangerous. This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness. First, by examining the history of paradigms in science, we see that paradigms are constantly evolving. Then, by examining the current paradigms, we can understand their underlying beliefs, the value they bring, and their limitations. Finally, this paper presents 3 emerging paradigms for interpretability. The first paradigm designs models such that faithfulness can be easily measured. Another optimizes models such that explanations become faithful. The last paradigm proposes to develop models that produce both a prediction and an explanation.

Understanding emotions is fundamental to human interaction and experience. Humans easily infer emotions from situations or facial expressions, situations from emotions, and do a variety of other affective cognition. How adept is modern AI at these inferences? We introduce an evaluation framework for testing affective cognition in foundation models. Starting from psychological theory, we generate 1,280 diverse scenarios exploring relationships between appraisals, emotions, expressions, and outcomes. We evaluate the abilities of foundation models (GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini-1.5-Pro) and humans (N = 567) across carefully selected conditions. Our results show foundation models tend to agree with human intuitions, matching or exceeding interparticipant agreement. In some conditions, models are ``superhuman'' -- they better predict modal human judgements than the average human. All models benefit from chain-of-thought reasoning. This suggests foundation models have acquired a human-like understanding of emotions and their influence on beliefs and behavior.

The limited availability of psychologists necessitates efficient identification of individuals requiring urgent mental healthcare. This study explores the use of Natural Language Processing (NLP) pipelines to analyze text data from online mental health forums used for consultations. By analyzing forum posts, these pipelines can flag users who may require immediate professional attention. A crucial challenge in this domain is data privacy and scarcity. To address this, we propose utilizing readily available curricular texts used in institutes specializing in mental health for pre-training the NLP pipelines. This helps us mimic the training process of a psychologist. Our work presents CASE-BERT that flags potential mental health disorders based on forum text. CASE-BERT demonstrates superior performance compared to existing methods, achieving an f1 score of 0.91 for Depression and 0.88 for Anxiety, two of the most commonly reported mental health disorders. Our code is publicly available.

This paper introduces a novel approach to data analysis designed for the needs of specialists in psychology of religion. We detect developmental and cross-cultural patterns in children's drawings of God(s) and other supernatural agents. We develop methods to objectively evaluate our empirical observations of the drawings with respect to: (1) the gravity center, (2) the average intensities of the colors green and yellow, (3) the use of different colors (palette) and (4) the visual complexity of the drawings. We find statistically significant differences across ages and countries in the gravity centers and in the average intensities of colors. These findings support the hypotheses of the experts and raise new questions for further investigation.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Embeddings have become a pivotal means to represent complex, multi-faceted information about entities, concepts, and relationships in a condensed and useful format. Nevertheless, they often preclude direct interpretation. While downstream tasks make use of these compressed representations, meaningful interpretation usually requires visualization using dimensionality reduction or specialized machine learning interpretability methods. This paper addresses the challenge of making such embeddings more interpretable and broadly useful, by employing Large Language Models (LLMs) to directly interact with embeddings -- transforming abstract vectors into understandable narratives. By injecting embeddings into LLMs, we enable querying and exploration of complex embedding data. We demonstrate our approach on a variety of diverse tasks, including: enhancing concept activation vectors (CAVs), communicating novel embedded entities, and decoding user preferences in recommender systems. Our work couples the immense information potential of embeddings with the interpretative power of LLMs.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

To increase the availability and adoption of the soundscape standard, a low-cost calibration procedure for reproduction of audio stimuli over headphones was proposed as part of the global ``Soundscape Attributes Translation Project'' (SATP) for validating ISO/TS~12913-2:2018 perceived affective quality (PAQ) attribute translations. A previous preliminary study revealed significant deviations from the intended equivalent continuous A-weighted sound pressure levels (L_{A,eq}) using the open-circuit voltage (OCV) calibration procedure. For a more holistic human-centric perspective, the OCV method is further investigated here in terms of psychoacoustic parameters, including relevant exceedance levels to account for temporal effects on the same 27 stimuli from the SATP. Moreover, a within-subjects experiment with 36 participants was conducted to examine the effects of OCV calibration on the PAQ attributes in ISO/TS~12913-2:2018. Bland-Altman analysis of the objective indicators revealed large biases in the OCV method across all weighted sound level and loudness indicators; and roughness indicators at 5{\%} and 10{\%} exceedance levels. Significant perceptual differences due to the OCV method were observed in about 20{\%} of the stimuli, which did not correspond clearly with the biased acoustic indicators. A cautioned interpretation of the objective and perceptual differences due to small and unpaired samples nevertheless provide grounds for further investigation.

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

This paper explores the intersection of psychology and artificial intelligence through the development and evaluation of specialized Large Language Models (LLMs). We introduce PsychoLex, a suite of resources designed to enhance LLMs' proficiency in psychological tasks in both Persian and English. Key contributions include the PsychoLexQA dataset for instructional content and the PsychoLexEval dataset for rigorous evaluation of LLMs in complex psychological scenarios. Additionally, we present the PsychoLexLLaMA model, optimized specifically for psychological applications, demonstrating superior performance compared to general-purpose models. The findings underscore the potential of tailored LLMs for advancing psychological research and applications, while also highlighting areas for further refinement. This research offers a foundational step towards integrating LLMs into specialized psychological domains, with implications for future advancements in AI-driven psychological practice.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Interpretability and explainability have gained more and more attention in the field of machine learning as they are crucial when it comes to high-stakes decisions and troubleshooting. Since both provide information about predictors and their decision process, they are often seen as two independent means for one single end. This view has led to a dichotomous literature: explainability techniques designed for complex black-box models, or interpretable approaches ignoring the many explainability tools. In this position paper, we challenge the common idea that interpretability and explainability are substitutes for one another by listing their principal shortcomings and discussing how both of them mitigate the drawbacks of the other. In doing so, we call for a new perspective on interpretability and explainability, and works targeting both topics simultaneously, leveraging each of their respective assets.

Translation of perceptual soundscape attributes from one language to another remains a challenging task that requires a high degree of fidelity in both psychoacoustic and psycholinguistic senses across the target population. Due to the inherently subjective nature of human perception, translating soundscape attributes using only small focus group discussion or expert panels could lead to translations with psycholinguistic meanings that, in a non-expert setting, deviate or distort from that of the source language. In this work, we present a quantitative evaluation method based on the circumplex model of soundscape perception to assess the overall translation quality across a set of criteria. As an initial application domain, we demonstrated the use of the quantitative evaluation framework in the context of an English-to-Thai translation of soundscape attributes.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

Understanding how people of various demographics think, feel, and express themselves (collectively called group expression) is essential for social science and underlies the assessment of bias in Large Language Models (LLMs). While LLMs can effectively summarize group expression when provided with empirical examples, coming up with generalizable theories of how a group's expression manifests in real-world text is challenging. In this paper, we define a new task called Group Theorization, in which a system must write theories that differentiate expression across demographic groups. We make available a large dataset on this task, Splits!, constructed by splitting Reddit posts by neutral topics (e.g. sports, cooking, and movies) and by demographics (e.g. occupation, religion, and race). Finally, we suggest a simple evaluation framework for assessing how effectively a method can generate 'better' theories about group expression, backed by human validation. We publicly release the raw corpora and evaluation scripts for Splits! to help researchers assess how methods infer--and potentially misrepresent--group differences in expression. We make Splits! and our evaluation module available at https://github.com/eyloncaplan/splits.

The field of psychology has long recognized a basic level of categorization that humans use when labeling visual stimuli, a term coined by Rosch in 1976. This level of categorization has been found to be used most frequently, to have higher information density, and to aid in visual language tasks with priming in humans. Here, we investigate basic level categorization in two recently released, open-source vision-language models (VLMs). This paper demonstrates that Llama 3.2 Vision Instruct (11B) and Molmo 7B-D both prefer basic level categorization consistent with human behavior. Moreover, the models' preferences are consistent with nuanced human behaviors like the biological versus non-biological basic level effects and the well established expert basic level shift, further suggesting that VLMs acquire cognitive categorization behaviors from the human data on which they are trained.

As mental health care systems worldwide struggle to meet demand, there is increasing focus on using language models to infer neuropsychiatric conditions or psychopathological traits from language production. Yet, so far, this research has only delivered solutions with limited clinical applicability, due to insufficient consideration of ethical questions crucial to ensuring the synergy between possible applications and model design. To accelerate progress towards clinically applicable models, our paper charts the ethical landscape of research on language-based inference of psychopathology and provides a practical tool for researchers to navigate it. We identify seven core ethical principles that should guide model development and deployment in this domain, translate them into ELLIPS, an ethical toolkit operationalizing these principles into questions that can guide researchers' choices with respect to data selection, architectures, evaluation, and model deployment, and provide a case study exemplifying its use. With this, we aim to facilitate the emergence of model technology with concrete potential for real-world applicability.

Gradient descent is the method of choice for training large artificial intelligence systems. As these systems become larger, a better understanding of the mechanisms behind gradient training would allow us to alleviate compute costs and help steer these systems away from harmful behaviors. To that end, we suggest utilizing the circuit perspective brought forward by mechanistic interpretability. After laying out our intuition, we illustrate how it enables us to design a curriculum for efficient learning in a controlled setting. The code is available at https://github.com/facebookresearch/pal.

As the prevalence of mental health challenges, social media has emerged as a key platform for individuals to express their emotions.Deep learning tends to be a promising solution for analyzing mental health on social media. However, black box models are often inflexible when switching between tasks, and their results typically lack explanations. With the rise of large language models (LLMs), their flexibility has introduced new approaches to the field. Also due to the generative nature, they can be prompted to explain decision-making processes. However, their performance on complex psychological analysis still lags behind deep learning. In this paper, we introduce the first multi-task Chinese Social Media Interpretable Mental Health Instructions (C-IMHI) dataset, consisting of 9K samples, which has been quality-controlled and manually validated. We also propose MentalGLM series models, the first open-source LLMs designed for explainable mental health analysis targeting Chinese social media, trained on a corpus of 50K instructions. The proposed models were evaluated on three downstream tasks and achieved better or comparable performance compared to deep learning models, generalized LLMs, and task fine-tuned LLMs. We validated a portion of the generated decision explanations with experts, showing promising results. We also evaluated the proposed models on a clinical dataset, where they outperformed other LLMs, indicating their potential applicability in the clinical field. Our models show strong performance, validated across tasks and perspectives. The decision explanations enhance usability and facilitate better understanding and practical application of the models. Both the constructed dataset and the models are publicly available via: https://github.com/zwzzzQAQ/MentalGLM.

In the current environment, psychological issues are prevalent and widespread, with social media serving as a key outlet for individuals to share their feelings. This results in the generation of vast quantities of data daily, where negative emotions have the potential to precipitate crisis situations. There is a recognized need for models capable of efficient analysis. While pre-trained language models have demonstrated their effectiveness broadly, there's a noticeable gap in pre-trained models tailored for specialized domains like psychology. To address this, we have collected a huge dataset from Chinese social media platforms and enriched it with publicly available datasets to create a comprehensive database encompassing 3.36 million text entries. To enhance the model's applicability to psychological text analysis, we integrated psychological lexicons into the pre-training masking mechanism. Building on an existing Chinese language model, we performed adaptive training to develop a model specialized for the psychological domain. We assessed our model's effectiveness across four public benchmarks, where it not only surpassed the performance of standard pre-trained models but also showed a inclination for making psychologically relevant predictions. Due to concerns regarding data privacy, the dataset will not be made publicly available. However, we have made the pre-trained models and codes publicly accessible to the community via: https://github.com/zwzzzQAQ/Chinese-MentalBERT.

Applying large language models (LLMs) to assist in psycho-counseling is an emerging and meaningful approach, driven by the significant gap between patient needs and the availability of mental health support. However, current LLMs struggle to consistently provide effective responses to client speeches, largely due to the lack of supervision from high-quality real psycho-counseling data, whose content is typically inaccessible due to client privacy concerns. Furthermore, the quality of therapists' responses in available sessions can vary significantly based on their professional training and experience. Assessing the quality of therapists' responses remains an open challenge. In this work, we address these challenges by first proposing a set of professional and comprehensive principles to evaluate therapists' responses to client speeches. Using these principles, we create a preference dataset, PsychoCounsel-Preference, which contains 36k high-quality preference comparison pairs. This dataset aligns with the preferences of professional psychotherapists, providing a robust foundation for evaluating and improving LLMs in psycho-counseling. Experiments on reward modeling and preference learning demonstrate that PsychoCounsel-Preference is an excellent resource for LLMs to acquire essential skills for responding to clients in a counseling session. Our best-aligned model, PsychoCounsel-Llama3-8B, achieves an impressive win rate of 87% against GPT-4o. We release PsychoCounsel-Preference, PsychoCounsel-Llama3-8B and the reward model PsychoCounsel Llama3-8B-Reward to facilitate the research of psycho-counseling with LLMs at: https://hf.co/Psychotherapy-LLM.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.

This work investigates the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in detecting and understanding human emotions through text. Drawing upon emotion models from psychology, we adopt an interdisciplinary perspective that integrates computational and affective sciences insights. The main goal is to assess how accurately they can identify emotions expressed in textual interactions and compare different models on this specific task. This research contributes to broader efforts to enhance human-computer interaction, making artificial intelligence technologies more responsive and sensitive to users' emotional nuances. By employing a methodology that involves comparisons with a state-of-the-art model on the GoEmotions dataset, we aim to gauge LLMs' effectiveness as a system for emotional analysis, paving the way for potential applications in various fields that require a nuanced understanding of human language.

Amidst a shortage of qualified mental health professionals, the integration of large language models (LLMs) into psychological applications offers a promising way to alleviate the growing burden of mental health disorders. Recent reasoning-augmented LLMs have achieved remarkable performance in mathematics and programming, while research in the psychological domain has predominantly emphasized emotional support and empathetic dialogue, with limited attention to reasoning mechanisms that are beneficial to generating reliable responses. Therefore, in this paper, we propose Psyche-R1, the first Chinese psychological LLM that jointly integrates empathy, psychological expertise, and reasoning, built upon a novel data curation pipeline. Specifically, we design a comprehensive data synthesis pipeline that produces over 75k high-quality psychological questions paired with detailed rationales, generated through chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning and iterative prompt-rationale optimization, along with 73k empathetic dialogues. Subsequently, we employ a hybrid training strategy wherein challenging samples are identified through a multi-LLM cross-selection strategy for group relative policy optimization (GRPO) to improve reasoning ability, while the remaining data is used for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to enhance empathetic response generation and psychological domain knowledge. Extensive experiment results demonstrate the effectiveness of the Psyche-R1 across several psychological benchmarks, where our 7B Psyche-R1 achieves comparable results to 671B DeepSeek-R1.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Great research interests have been attracted to devise AI services that are able to provide mental health support. However, the lack of corpora is a main obstacle to this research, particularly in Chinese language. In this paper, we propose PsyQA, a Chinese dataset of psychological health support in the form of question and answer pair. PsyQA is crawled from a Chinese mental health service platform, and contains 22K questions and 56K long and well-structured answers. Based on the psychological counseling theories, we annotate a portion of answer texts with typical strategies for providing support, and further present in-depth analysis of both lexical features and strategy patterns in the counseling answers. We also evaluate the performance of generating counseling answers with the generative pretrained models. Results show that utilizing strategies enhances the fluency and helpfulness of generated answers, but there is still a large space for future research.

Conversational data is essential in psychology because it can help researchers understand individuals cognitive processes, emotions, and behaviors. Utterance labelling is a common strategy for analyzing this type of data. The development of NLP algorithms allows researchers to automate this task. However, psychological conversational data present some challenges to NLP researchers, including multilabel classification, a large number of classes, and limited available data. This study explored how automated labels generated by NLP methods are comparable to human labels in the context of conversations on adulthood transition. We proposed strategies to handle three common challenges raised in psychological studies. Our findings showed that the deep learning method with domain adaptation (RoBERTa-CON) outperformed all other machine learning methods; and the hierarchical labelling system that we proposed was shown to help researchers strategically analyze conversational data. Our Python code and NLP model are available at https://github.com/mlaricheva/automated_labeling.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

State-of-the-art language models (LMs) are notoriously susceptible to generating hallucinated information. Such inaccurate outputs not only undermine the reliability of these models but also limit their use and raise serious concerns about misinformation and propaganda. In this work, we focus on hallucinated book and article references and present them as the "model organism" of language model hallucination research, due to their frequent and easy-to-discern nature. We posit that if a language model cites a particular reference in its output, then it should ideally possess sufficient information about its authors and content, among other relevant details. Using this basic insight, we illustrate that one can identify hallucinated references without ever consulting any external resources, by asking a set of direct or indirect queries to the language model about the references. These queries can be considered as "consistency checks." Our findings highlight that while LMs, including GPT-4, often produce inconsistent author lists for hallucinated references, they also often accurately recall the authors of real references. In this sense, the LM can be said to "know" when it is hallucinating references. Furthermore, these findings show how hallucinated references can be dissected to shed light on their nature. Replication code and results can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/hallucinated-references.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have demonstrated superior performance on a variety of natural language processing (NLP) tasks including sentiment analysis, mathematical reasoning and summarization. Furthermore, since these models are instruction-tuned on human conversations to produce "helpful" responses, they can and often will produce explanations along with the response, which we call self-explanations. For example, when analyzing the sentiment of a movie review, the model may output not only the positivity of the sentiment, but also an explanation (e.g., by listing the sentiment-laden words such as "fantastic" and "memorable" in the review). How good are these automatically generated self-explanations? In this paper, we investigate this question on the task of sentiment analysis and for feature attribution explanation, one of the most commonly studied settings in the interpretability literature (for pre-ChatGPT models). Specifically, we study different ways to elicit the self-explanations, evaluate their faithfulness on a set of evaluation metrics, and compare them to traditional explanation methods such as occlusion or LIME saliency maps. Through an extensive set of experiments, we find that ChatGPT's self-explanations perform on par with traditional ones, but are quite different from them according to various agreement metrics, meanwhile being much cheaper to produce (as they are generated along with the prediction). In addition, we identified several interesting characteristics of them, which prompt us to rethink many current model interpretability practices in the era of ChatGPT(-like) LLMs.

The recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have garnered widespread acclaim for their remarkable emerging capabilities. However, the issue of hallucination has parallelly emerged as a by-product, posing significant concerns. While some recent endeavors have been made to identify and mitigate different types of hallucination, there has been a limited emphasis on the nuanced categorization of hallucination and associated mitigation methods. To address this gap, we offer a fine-grained discourse on profiling hallucination based on its degree, orientation, and category, along with offering strategies for alleviation. As such, we define two overarching orientations of hallucination: (i) factual mirage (FM) and (ii) silver lining (SL). To provide a more comprehensive understanding, both orientations are further sub-categorized into intrinsic and extrinsic, with three degrees of severity - (i) mild, (ii) moderate, and (iii) alarming. We also meticulously categorize hallucination into six types: (i) acronym ambiguity, (ii) numeric nuisance, (iii) generated golem, (iv) virtual voice, (v) geographic erratum, and (vi) time wrap. Furthermore, we curate HallucInation eLiciTation (HILT), a publicly available dataset comprising of 75,000 samples generated using 15 contemporary LLMs along with human annotations for the aforementioned categories. Finally, to establish a method for quantifying and to offer a comparative spectrum that allows us to evaluate and rank LLMs based on their vulnerability to producing hallucinations, we propose Hallucination Vulnerability Index (HVI). We firmly believe that HVI holds significant value as a tool for the wider NLP community, with the potential to serve as a rubric in AI-related policy-making. In conclusion, we propose two solution strategies for mitigating hallucinations.

Empathy requires perspective-taking: empathetic responses require a person to reason about what another has experienced and communicate that understanding in language. However, most NLP approaches to empathy do not explicitly model this alignment process. Here, we introduce a new approach to recognizing alignment in empathetic speech, grounded in Appraisal Theory. We introduce a new dataset of over 9.2K span-level annotations of different types of appraisals of a person's experience and over 3K empathetic alignments between a speaker's and observer's speech. Through computational experiments, we show that these appraisals and alignments can be accurately recognized. In experiments in over 9.2M Reddit conversations, we find that appraisals capture meaningful groupings of behavior but that most responses have minimal alignment. However, we find that mental health professionals engage with substantially more empathetic alignment.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

Mechanistic Interpretability (MI) promises a path toward fully understanding how neural networks make their predictions. Prior work demonstrates that even when trained to perform simple arithmetic, models can implement a variety of algorithms (sometimes concurrently) depending on initialization and hyperparameters. Does this mean neuron-level interpretability techniques have limited applicability? We argue that high-dimensional neural networks can learn low-dimensional representations of their training data that are useful beyond simply making good predictions. Such representations can be understood through the mechanistic interpretability lens and provide insights that are surprisingly faithful to human-derived domain knowledge. This indicates that such approaches to interpretability can be useful for deriving a new understanding of a problem from models trained to solve it. As a case study, we extract nuclear physics concepts by studying models trained to reproduce nuclear data.

We survey a current, heated debate in the AI research community on whether large pre-trained language models can be said to "understand" language -- and the physical and social situations language encodes -- in any important sense. We describe arguments that have been made for and against such understanding, and key questions for the broader sciences of intelligence that have arisen in light of these arguments. We contend that a new science of intelligence can be developed that will provide insight into distinct modes of understanding, their strengths and limitations, and the challenge of integrating diverse forms of cognition.

Recently, the demand for psychological counseling has significantly increased as more individuals express concerns about their mental health. This surge has accelerated efforts to improve the accessibility of counseling by using large language models (LLMs) as counselors. To ensure client privacy, training open-source LLMs faces a key challenge: the absence of realistic counseling datasets. To address this, we introduce Cactus, a multi-turn dialogue dataset that emulates real-life interactions using the goal-oriented and structured approach of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). We create a diverse and realistic dataset by designing clients with varied, specific personas, and having counselors systematically apply CBT techniques in their interactions. To assess the quality of our data, we benchmark against established psychological criteria used to evaluate real counseling sessions, ensuring alignment with expert evaluations. Experimental results demonstrate that Camel, a model trained with Cactus, outperforms other models in counseling skills, highlighting its effectiveness and potential as a counseling agent. We make our data, model, and code publicly available.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

The recent advancements in artificial intelligence highlight the potential of language models in psychological health support. While models trained on data from mental health service platform have achieved preliminary success, challenges persist in areas such as data scarcity, quality, and ensuring a solid foundation in psychological techniques. To address these challenges, this study introduces a novel approach to enhance the precision and efficacy of psychological support through large language models. Specifically, we design a specific prompt derived from principles of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and have generated the CBT QA dataset, specifically for Chinese psychological health Q&A based on CBT structured intervention strategies. Unlike previous methods, our dataset emphasizes professional and structured response. Utilizing this dataset, we fine-tuned the large language model, giving birth to CBT-LLM, the large-scale language model specifically designed for Cognitive Behavioral Therapy techniques. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that CBT-LLM excels in generating structured, professional, and highly relevant responses in psychological health support tasks, showcasing its practicality and quality. The model is available on Hugging Face: https://huggingface.co/Hongbin37/CBT-LLM.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

We have only limited understanding of how and why large language models (LLMs) respond in the ways that they do. Their neural networks have proven challenging to interpret, and we are only beginning to tease out the function of individual neurons and circuits within them. However, another path to understanding these systems is to investigate and develop their capacity to introspect and explain their own functioning. Here, we show that i) contemporary LLMs are capable of providing accurate, quantitative descriptions of their own internal processes during certain kinds of decision-making, ii) that it is possible to improve these capabilities through training, and iii) that this training generalizes to at least some degree. To do so, we fine-tuned GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini to make decisions in a wide variety of complex contexts (e.g., choosing between condos, loans, vacations, etc.) according to randomly-generated, quantitative preferences about how to weigh different attributes during decision-making (e.g., the relative importance of natural light versus quiet surroundings for condos). We demonstrate that the LLMs can accurately report these preferences (i.e., the weights that they learned to give to different attributes during decision-making). Next, we demonstrate that these LLMs can be fine-tuned to explain their decision-making even more accurately. Finally, we demonstrate that this training generalizes: It improves the ability of the models to accurately explain what they are doing as they make other complex decisions, not just decisions they have learned to make via fine-tuning. This work is a step towards training LLMs to accurately and broadly report on their own internal processes -- a possibility that would yield substantial benefits for interpretability, control, and safety.

While the problem of hallucinations in neural machine translation has long been recognized, so far the progress on its alleviation is very little. Indeed, recently it turned out that without artificially encouraging models to hallucinate, previously existing methods fall short and even the standard sequence log-probability is more informative. It means that characteristics internal to the model can give much more information than we expect, and before using external models and measures, we first need to ask: how far can we go if we use nothing but the translation model itself ? We propose to use a method that evaluates the percentage of the source contribution to a generated translation. Intuitively, hallucinations are translations "detached" from the source, hence they can be identified by low source contribution. This method improves detection accuracy for the most severe hallucinations by a factor of 2 and is able to alleviate hallucinations at test time on par with the previous best approach that relies on external models. Next, if we move away from internal model characteristics and allow external tools, we show that using sentence similarity from cross-lingual embeddings further improves these results.

The field of large language models (LLMs) has grown rapidly in recent years, driven by the desire for better efficiency, interpretability, and safe use. Building on the novel approach of "activation engineering," this study explores personality modification in LLMs, drawing inspiration from research like Refusal in LLMs Is Mediated by a Single Direction (arXiv:2406.11717) and Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition (arXiv:2312.06681). We leverage activation engineering to develop a method for identifying and adjusting activation directions related to personality traits, which may allow for dynamic LLM personality fine-tuning. This work aims to further our understanding of LLM interpretability while examining the ethical implications of such developments.

As machine learning systems become ubiquitous, there has been a surge of interest in interpretable machine learning: systems that provide explanation for their outputs. These explanations are often used to qualitatively assess other criteria such as safety or non-discrimination. However, despite the interest in interpretability, there is very little consensus on what interpretable machine learning is and how it should be measured. In this position paper, we first define interpretability and describe when interpretability is needed (and when it is not). Next, we suggest a taxonomy for rigorous evaluation and expose open questions towards a more rigorous science of interpretable machine learning.

Depression poses significant challenges to patients and healthcare organizations, necessitating efficient assessment methods. Existing paradigms typically focus on a patient-doctor way that overlooks multi-role interactions, such as family involvement in the evaluation and caregiving process. Moreover, current automatic depression detection (ADD) methods usually model depression detection as a classification or regression task, lacking interpretability for the decision-making process. To address these issues, we developed InterMind, a doctor-patient-family interactive depression assessment system empowered by large language models (LLMs). Our system enables patients and families to contribute descriptions, generates assistive diagnostic reports for doctors, and provides actionable insights, improving diagnostic precision and efficiency. To enhance LLMs' performance in psychological counseling and diagnostic interpretability, we integrate retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and chain-of-thoughts (CoT) techniques for data augmentation, which mitigates the hallucination issue of LLMs in specific scenarios after instruction fine-tuning. Quantitative experiments and professional assessments by clinicians validate the effectiveness of our system.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

This technical report analyzes the challenge of "hallucinations" (false information) in LLMs applied to law. It examines their causes, manifestations, and the effectiveness of the RAG mitigation strategy, highlighting its limitations and proposing holistic optimizations. The paper explores the ethical and regulatory implications, emphasizing human oversight as an irreplaceable role. It concludes that the solution lies not in incrementally improving generative models, but in adopting a "consultative" AI paradigm that prioritizes veracity and traceability, acting as a tool to amplify, not replace, professional judgment. -- Este informe t\'ecnico analiza el desaf\'io de las "alucinaciones" (informaci\'on falsa) en los LLMs aplicados al derecho. Se examinan sus causas, manifestaciones y la efectividad de la estrategia de mitigaci\'on RAG, exponiendo sus limitaciones y proponiendo optimizaciones hol\'isticas. Se exploran las implicaciones \'eticas y regulatorias, enfatizando la supervisi\'on humana como un rol insustituible. El documento concluye que la soluci\'on no reside en mejorar incrementalmente los modelos generativos, sino en adoptar un paradigma de IA "consultiva" que priorice la veracidad y la trazabilidad, actuando como una herramienta para amplificar, y no sustituir, el juicio profesional.

Despite widespread use of LLMs as conversational agents, evaluations of performance fail to capture a crucial aspect of communication: interpreting language in context -- incorporating its pragmatics. Humans interpret language using beliefs and prior knowledge about the world. For example, we intuitively understand the response "I wore gloves" to the question "Did you leave fingerprints?" as meaning "No". To investigate whether LLMs have the ability to make this type of inference, known as an implicature, we design a simple task and evaluate four categories of widely used state-of-the-art models. We find that, despite only evaluating on utterances that require a binary inference (yes or no), models in three of these categories perform close to random. However, LLMs instruction-tuned at the example-level perform significantly better. These results suggest that certain fine-tuning strategies are far better at inducing pragmatic understanding in models. We present our findings as the starting point for further research into evaluating how LLMs interpret language in context and to drive the development of more pragmatic and useful models of human discourse.

Most interpretability research in NLP focuses on understanding the behavior and features of a fully trained model. However, certain insights into model behavior may only be accessible by observing the trajectory of the training process. We present a case study of syntax acquisition in masked language models (MLMs) that demonstrates how analyzing the evolution of interpretable artifacts throughout training deepens our understanding of emergent behavior. In particular, we study Syntactic Attention Structure (SAS), a naturally emerging property of MLMs wherein specific Transformer heads tend to focus on specific syntactic relations. We identify a brief window in pretraining when models abruptly acquire SAS, concurrent with a steep drop in loss. This breakthrough precipitates the subsequent acquisition of linguistic capabilities. We then examine the causal role of SAS by manipulating SAS during training, and demonstrate that SAS is necessary for the development of grammatical capabilities. We further find that SAS competes with other beneficial traits during training, and that briefly suppressing SAS improves model quality. These findings offer an interpretation of a real-world example of both simplicity bias and breakthrough training dynamics.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Emojis have become a universal language in online communication, often carrying nuanced and context-dependent meanings. Among these, irony poses a significant challenge for Large Language Models (LLMs) due to its inherent incongruity between appearance and intent. This study examines the ability of GPT-4o to interpret irony in emojis. By prompting GPT-4o to evaluate the likelihood of specific emojis being used to express irony on social media and comparing its interpretations with human perceptions, we aim to bridge the gap between machine and human understanding. Our findings reveal nuanced insights into GPT-4o's interpretive capabilities, highlighting areas of alignment with and divergence from human behavior. Additionally, this research underscores the importance of demographic factors, such as age and gender, in shaping emoji interpretation and evaluates how these factors influence GPT-4o's performance.

In the pursuit to understand the intricacies of human brain's visual processing, reconstructing dynamic visual experiences from brain activities emerges as a challenging yet fascinating endeavor. While recent advancements have achieved success in reconstructing static images from non-invasive brain recordings, the domain of translating continuous brain activities into video format remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce NeuroCine, a novel dual-phase framework to targeting the inherent challenges of decoding fMRI data, such as noises, spatial redundancy and temporal lags. This framework proposes spatial masking and temporal interpolation-based augmentation for contrastive learning fMRI representations and a diffusion model enhanced by dependent prior noise for video generation. Tested on a publicly available fMRI dataset, our method shows promising results, outperforming the previous state-of-the-art models by a notable margin of {20.97%}, {31.00%} and {12.30%} respectively on decoding the brain activities of three subjects in the fMRI dataset, as measured by SSIM. Additionally, our attention analysis suggests that the model aligns with existing brain structures and functions, indicating its biological plausibility and interpretability.

Probabilistic models of language understanding are valuable tools for investigating human language use. However, they need to be hand-designed for a particular domain. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) are trained on text that spans a wide array of domains, but they lack the structure and interpretability of probabilistic models. In this paper, we use chain-of-thought prompts to introduce structures from probabilistic models into LLMs. We explore this approach in the case of metaphor understanding. Our chain-of-thought prompts lead language models to infer latent variables and reason about their relationships in order to choose appropriate paraphrases for metaphors. The latent variables and relationships chosen are informed by theories of metaphor understanding from cognitive psychology. We apply these prompts to the two largest versions of GPT-3 and show that they can improve performance in a paraphrase selection task.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

Language Models (LMs) are being proposed for mental health applications where the heightened risk of adverse outcomes means predictive performance may not be a sufficient litmus test of a model's utility in clinical practice. A model that can be trusted for practice should have a correspondence between explanation and clinical determination, yet no prior research has examined the attention fidelity of these models and their effect on ground truth explanations. We introduce an evaluation design that focuses on the robustness and explainability of LMs in identifying Wellness Dimensions (WDs). We focus on two existing mental health and well-being datasets: (a) Multi-label Classification-based MultiWD, and (b) WellXplain for evaluating attention mechanism veracity against expert-labeled explanations. The labels are based on Halbert Dunn's theory of wellness, which gives grounding to our evaluation. We reveal four surprising results about LMs/LLMs: (1) Despite their human-like capabilities, GPT-3.5/4 lag behind RoBERTa, and MedAlpaca, a fine-tuned LLM on WellXplain fails to deliver any remarkable improvements in performance or explanations. (2) Re-examining LMs' predictions based on a confidence-oriented loss function reveals a significant performance drop. (3) Across all LMs/LLMs, the alignment between attention and explanations remains low, with LLMs scoring a dismal 0.0. (4) Most mental health-specific LMs/LLMs overlook domain-specific knowledge and undervalue explanations, causing these discrepancies. This study highlights the need for further research into their consistency and explanations in mental health and well-being.

We introduce Drivelology, a unique linguistic phenomenon characterised as "nonsense with depth", utterances that are syntactically coherent yet pragmatically paradoxical, emotionally loaded, or rhetorically subversive. While such expressions may resemble surface-level nonsense, they encode implicit meaning requiring contextual inference, moral reasoning, or emotional interpretation. We find that current large language models (LLMs), despite excelling at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, consistently fail to grasp the layered semantics of Drivelological text. To investigate this, we construct a small but diverse benchmark dataset of over 1,200 meticulously curated examples, with select instances in English, Mandarin, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Korean. Annotation was especially challenging: each of the examples required careful expert review to verify that it truly reflected Drivelological characteristics. The process involved multiple rounds of discussion and adjudication to address disagreements, highlighting the subtle and subjective nature of the Drivelology. We evaluate a range of LLMs on classification, generation, and reasoning tasks. Our results reveal clear limitations of LLMs: models often confuse Drivelology with shallow nonsense, produce incoherent justifications, or miss the implied rhetorical function altogether. These findings highlight a deeper representational gap in LLMs' pragmatic understanding and challenge the assumption that statistical fluency implies cognitive comprehension. We release our dataset and code to facilitate further research in modelling linguistic depth beyond surface-level coherence.

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

In Marius von Senden's Space and Sight, a newly sighted blind patient describes the experience of a corner as lemon-like, because corners "prick" sight like lemons prick the tongue. Prickliness, here, is a dimension in the feature space of sensory experience, an effect of the perceived on the perceiver that arises where the two interact. In the account of the newly sighted, an effect familiar from one interaction translates to a novel context. Perception serves as the vehicle for generalization, in that an effect shared across different experiences produces a concrete abstraction grounded in those experiences. Cezanne and the post-impressionists, fluent in the language of experience translation, realized that the way to paint a concrete form that best reflected reality was to paint not what they saw, but what it was like to see. We envision a future of creation using AI where what it is like to see is replicable, transferrable, manipulable - part of the artist's palette that is both grounded in a particular context, and generalizable beyond it. An active line of research maps human-interpretable features onto directions in GAN latent space. Supervised and self-supervised approaches that search for anticipated directions or use off-the-shelf classifiers to drive image manipulation in embedding space are limited in the variety of features they can uncover. Unsupervised approaches that discover useful new directions show that the space of perceptually meaningful directions is nowhere close to being fully mapped. As this space is broad and full of creative potential, we want tools for direction discovery that capture the richness and generalizability of human perception. Our approach puts creators in the discovery loop during real-time tool use, in order to identify directions that are perceptually meaningful to them, and generate interpretable image translations along those directions.

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term "explanation" in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors' claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label "understandable AI" to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent's success in using the system, in drawing correct inferences from it.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

Large language models (LLMs) have received much attention and shown their potential in digital health, while their application in mental health is subject to ongoing debate. This systematic review aims to summarize and characterize the use of LLMs in mental health by investigating the strengths and limitations of the latest work in LLMs and discusses the challenges and opportunities for early screening, digital interventions, and other clinical applications in mental health. Following PRISMA guidelines, we examined English articles from PubMed, DBLP Computer Science Bibliography, and IEEE Xplore, published between 1 January 2017, and 1 September 2023, focusing on mental health and LLMs. The review analyzed 32 articles, including mental health analysis using social media datasets (n=13), mental health chatbots (n=10), and other mental health applications (n=9). Findings reveal LLMs' effectiveness in mental health issue detection and the enhancement of telepsychological services through personalised healthcare. Nonetheless, risks like text inconsistencies, hallucinatory content, and the lack of an ethical framework raise concerns about their clinical use. Despite these challenges, the advancement of LLMs underscores their potential as innovative clinical tools, necessitating further research and development. The review emphasizes that LLMs should complement, not replace, professional mental health services.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

According to the World Health Organization, the number of mental disorder patients, especially depression patients, has grown rapidly and become a leading contributor to the global burden of disease. However, the present common practice of depression diagnosis is based on interviews and clinical scales carried out by doctors, which is not only labor-consuming but also time-consuming. One important reason is due to the lack of physiological indicators for mental disorders. With the rising of tools such as data mining and artificial intelligence, using physiological data to explore new possible physiological indicators of mental disorder and creating new applications for mental disorder diagnosis has become a new research hot topic. However, good quality physiological data for mental disorder patients are hard to acquire. We present a multi-modal open dataset for mental-disorder analysis. The dataset includes EEG and audio data from clinically depressed patients and matching normal controls. All our patients were carefully diagnosed and selected by professional psychiatrists in hospitals. The EEG dataset includes not only data collected using traditional 128-electrodes mounted elastic cap, but also a novel wearable 3-electrode EEG collector for pervasive applications. The 128-electrodes EEG signals of 53 subjects were recorded as both in resting state and under stimulation; the 3-electrode EEG signals of 55 subjects were recorded in resting state; the audio data of 52 subjects were recorded during interviewing, reading, and picture description. We encourage other researchers in the field to use it for testing their methods of mental-disorder analysis.

Abductive reasoning is inference to the most plausible explanation. For example, if Jenny finds her house in a mess when she returns from work, and remembers that she left a window open, she can hypothesize that a thief broke into her house and caused the mess, as the most plausible explanation. While abduction has long been considered to be at the core of how people interpret and read between the lines in natural language (Hobbs et al., 1988), there has been relatively little research in support of abductive natural language inference and generation. We present the first study that investigates the viability of language-based abductive reasoning. We introduce a challenge dataset, ART, that consists of over 20k commonsense narrative contexts and 200k explanations. Based on this dataset, we conceptualize two new tasks -- (i) Abductive NLI: a multiple-choice question answering task for choosing the more likely explanation, and (ii) Abductive NLG: a conditional generation task for explaining given observations in natural language. On Abductive NLI, the best model achieves 68.9% accuracy, well below human performance of 91.4%. On Abductive NLG, the current best language generators struggle even more, as they lack reasoning capabilities that are trivial for humans. Our analysis leads to new insights into the types of reasoning that deep pre-trained language models fail to perform--despite their strong performance on the related but more narrowly defined task of entailment NLI--pointing to interesting avenues for future research.

Mental health research through data-driven methods has been hindered by a lack of standard typology and scarcity of adequate data. In this study, we leverage the clinical articulation of depression to build a typology for social media texts for detecting the severity of depression. It emulates the standard clinical assessment procedure Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) and Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) to encompass subtle indications of depressive disorders from tweets. Along with the typology, we present a new dataset of 40191 tweets labeled by expert annotators. Each tweet is labeled as 'non-depressed' or 'depressed'. Moreover, three severity levels are considered for 'depressed' tweets: (1) mild, (2) moderate, and (3) severe. An associated confidence score is provided with each label to validate the quality of annotation. We examine the quality of the dataset via representing summary statistics while setting strong baseline results using attention-based models like BERT and DistilBERT. Finally, we extensively address the limitations of the study to provide directions for further research.

Interpretable machine learning has exploded as an area of interest over the last decade, sparked by the rise of increasingly large datasets and deep neural networks. Simultaneously, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide array of tasks, offering a chance to rethink opportunities in interpretable machine learning. Notably, the capability to explain in natural language allows LLMs to expand the scale and complexity of patterns that can be given to a human. However, these new capabilities raise new challenges, such as hallucinated explanations and immense computational costs. In this position paper, we start by reviewing existing methods to evaluate the emerging field of LLM interpretation (both interpreting LLMs and using LLMs for explanation). We contend that, despite their limitations, LLMs hold the opportunity to redefine interpretability with a more ambitious scope across many applications, including in auditing LLMs themselves. We highlight two emerging research priorities for LLM interpretation: using LLMs to directly analyze new datasets and to generate interactive explanations.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

The research explores the steerability of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly OpenAI's ChatGPT iterations. By employing a behavioral psychology framework called OCEAN (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism), we quantitatively gauged the model's responsiveness to tailored prompts. When asked to generate text mimicking an extroverted personality, OCEAN scored the language alignment to that behavioral trait. In our analysis, while "openness" presented linguistic ambiguity, "conscientiousness" and "neuroticism" were distinctly evoked in the OCEAN framework, with "extroversion" and "agreeableness" showcasing a notable overlap yet distinct separation from other traits. Our findings underscore GPT's versatility and ability to discern and adapt to nuanced instructions. Furthermore, historical figure simulations highlighted the LLM's capacity to internalize and project instructible personas, precisely replicating their philosophies and dialogic styles. However, the rapid advancements in LLM capabilities and the opaque nature of some training techniques make metric proposals degrade rapidly. Our research emphasizes a quantitative role to describe steerability in LLMs, presenting both its promise and areas for further refinement in aligning its progress to human intentions.

A central goal of cognitive modeling is to develop models that not only predict human behavior but also provide insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. While neural network models trained on large-scale behavioral data often achieve strong predictive performance, they typically fall short in offering interpretable explanations of the cognitive processes they capture. In this work, we explore the potential of pretrained large language models (LLMs) to serve as dual-purpose cognitive models--capable of both accurate prediction and interpretable explanation in natural language. Specifically, we employ reinforcement learning with outcome-based rewards to guide LLMs toward generating explicit reasoning traces for explaining human risky choices. Our findings demonstrate that this approach produces high-quality explanations alongside strong quantitative predictions of human decisions.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Due to the self-referencing aspect, consciousness is placed in a unique non-computable position among natural phenomena. Non-computable consciousness was previously analyzed on the basis of self-referential cyclical time. This paper extends the cyclical model of vacuum observation and posits that choice, or the experience of reality, may be expressed as the initial part of the self-referencing loop, while the conscious awareness of the experience is the other part of the loop. In particular, the inseparability of the two sides of the loop is established through the cyclical time process, which bears a resemblance to Heidegger's analysis of existence. The cyclical looping model is also discussed in terms of Wittgenstein's analysis of language as attaching semantic meaning, or continuous or infinite conscious awareness, to physical reality. We also discuss the proposed model of subjectivity and cyclical time - as opposed to objectivity and linear time - which may be considered similar to Hebrew thought.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Seeing is believing, however, the underlying mechanism of how human visual perceptions are intertwined with our cognitions is still a mystery. Thanks to the recent advances in both neuroscience and artificial intelligence, we have been able to record the visually evoked brain activities and mimic the visual perception ability through computational approaches. In this paper, we pay attention to visual stimuli reconstruction by reconstructing the observed images based on portably accessible brain signals, i.e., electroencephalography (EEG) data. Since EEG signals are dynamic in the time-series format and are notorious to be noisy, processing and extracting useful information requires more dedicated efforts; In this paper, we propose a comprehensive pipeline, named NeuroImagen, for reconstructing visual stimuli images from EEG signals. Specifically, we incorporate a novel multi-level perceptual information decoding to draw multi-grained outputs from the given EEG data. A latent diffusion model will then leverage the extracted information to reconstruct the high-resolution visual stimuli images. The experimental results have illustrated the effectiveness of image reconstruction and superior quantitative performance of our proposed method.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks (e.g., image captioning, visual question answering). While broad, their knowledge remains generic (e.g., recognizing a dog), and they are unable to handle personalized subjects (e.g., recognizing a user's pet dog). Human reasoning, in contrast, typically operates within the context of specific subjects in our surroundings. For example, one might ask, "What should I buy for my dog's birthday?"; as opposed to a generic inquiry about "What should I buy for a dog's birthday?". Similarly, when looking at a friend's image, the interest lies in seeing their activities (e.g., "my friend is holding a cat"), rather than merely observing generic human actions (e.g., "a man is holding a cat"). In this paper, we introduce the novel task of personalizing LMMs, so that they can have conversations about a specific subject. We propose Yo'LLaVA, which learns to embed a personalized subject into a set of latent tokens given a handful of example images of the subject. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that Yo'LLaVA can learn the concept more efficiently using fewer tokens and more effectively encode the visual attributes compared to strong prompting baselines (e.g., LLaVA).

Recent works have showcased the ability of LLMs to embody diverse personas in their responses, exemplified by prompts like 'You are Yoda. Explain the Theory of Relativity.' While this ability allows personalization of LLMs and enables human behavior simulation, its effect on LLMs' capabilities remains unclear. To fill this gap, we present the first extensive study of the unintended side-effects of persona assignment on the ability of LLMs to perform basic reasoning tasks. Our study covers 24 reasoning datasets, 4 LLMs, and 19 diverse personas (e.g. an Asian person) spanning 5 socio-demographic groups. Our experiments unveil that LLMs harbor deep rooted bias against various socio-demographics underneath a veneer of fairness. While they overtly reject stereotypes when explicitly asked ('Are Black people less skilled at mathematics?'), they manifest stereotypical and erroneous presumptions when asked to answer questions while adopting a persona. These can be observed as abstentions in responses, e.g., 'As a Black person, I can't answer this question as it requires math knowledge', and generally result in a substantial performance drop. Our experiments with ChatGPT-3.5 show that this bias is ubiquitous - 80% of our personas demonstrate bias; it is significant - some datasets show performance drops of 70%+; and can be especially harmful for certain groups - some personas suffer statistically significant drops on 80%+ of the datasets. Overall, all 4 LLMs exhibit this bias to varying extents, with GPT-4-Turbo showing the least but still a problematic amount of bias (evident in 42% of the personas). Further analysis shows that these persona-induced errors can be hard-to-discern and hard-to-avoid. Our findings serve as a cautionary tale that the practice of assigning personas to LLMs - a trend on the rise - can surface their deep-rooted biases and have unforeseeable and detrimental side-effects.

There has been significant debate in the NLP community about whether or not attention weights can be used as an explanation - a mechanism for interpreting how important each input token is for a particular prediction. The validity of "attention as explanation" has so far been evaluated by computing the rank correlation between attention-based explanations and existing feature attribution explanations using LSTM-based models. In our work, we (i) compare the rank correlation between five more recent feature attribution methods and two attention-based methods, on two types of NLP tasks, and (ii) extend this analysis to also include transformer-based models. We find that attention-based explanations do not correlate strongly with any recent feature attribution methods, regardless of the model or task. Furthermore, we find that none of the tested explanations correlate strongly with one another for the transformer-based model, leading us to question the underlying assumption that we should measure the validity of attention-based explanations based on how well they correlate with existing feature attribution explanation methods. After conducting experiments on five datasets using two different models, we argue that the community should stop using rank correlation as an evaluation metric for attention-based explanations. We suggest that researchers and practitioners should instead test various explanation methods and employ a human-in-the-loop process to determine if the explanations align with human intuition for the particular use case at hand.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) is a psychological assessment tool that decomposes human moral reasoning into five factors, including care/harm, liberty/oppression, and sanctity/degradation (Graham et al., 2009). People vary in the weight they place on these dimensions when making moral decisions, in part due to their cultural upbringing and political ideology. As large language models (LLMs) are trained on datasets collected from the internet, they may reflect the biases that are present in such corpora. This paper uses MFT as a lens to analyze whether popular LLMs have acquired a bias towards a particular set of moral values. We analyze known LLMs and find they exhibit particular moral foundations, and show how these relate to human moral foundations and political affiliations. We also measure the consistency of these biases, or whether they vary strongly depending on the context of how the model is prompted. Finally, we show that we can adversarially select prompts that encourage the moral to exhibit a particular set of moral foundations, and that this can affect the model's behavior on downstream tasks. These findings help illustrate the potential risks and unintended consequences of LLMs assuming a particular moral stance.