new

Get trending papers in your email inbox!

Subscribe

Daily Papers

byAK and the research community

Dec 11

On the Workflows and Smells of Leaderboard Operations (LBOps): An Exploratory Study of Foundation Model Leaderboards

Foundation models (FM), such as large language models (LLMs), which are large-scale machine learning (ML) models, have demonstrated remarkable adaptability in various downstream software engineering (SE) tasks, such as code completion, code understanding, and software development. As a result, FM leaderboards, especially those hosted on cloud platforms, have become essential tools for SE teams to compare and select the best third-party FMs for their specific products and purposes. However, the lack of standardized guidelines for FM evaluation and comparison threatens the transparency of FM leaderboards and limits stakeholders' ability to perform effective FM selection. As a first step towards addressing this challenge, our research focuses on understanding how these FM leaderboards operate in real-world scenarios ("leaderboard operations") and identifying potential leaderboard pitfalls and areas for improvement ("leaderboard smells"). In this regard, we perform a multivocal literature review to collect up to 721 FM leaderboards, after which we examine their documentation and engage in direct communication with leaderboard operators to understand their workflow patterns. Using card sorting and negotiated agreement, we identify 5 unique workflow patterns and develop a domain model that outlines the essential components and their interaction within FM leaderboards. We then identify 8 unique types of leaderboard smells in LBOps. By mitigating these smells, SE teams can improve transparency, accountability, and collaboration in current LBOps practices, fostering a more robust and responsible ecosystem for FM comparison and selection.

  • 5 authors
·
Jul 4, 2024

Improving Language Model Negotiation with Self-Play and In-Context Learning from AI Feedback

We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it would imply the possibility of creating strong AI agents with minimal human intervention. We ask two LLMs to negotiate with each other, playing the roles of a buyer and a seller, respectively. They aim to reach a deal with the buyer targeting a lower price and the seller a higher one. A third language model, playing the critic, provides feedback to a player to improve the player's negotiation strategies. We let the two agents play multiple rounds, using previous negotiation history and AI feedback as in-context demonstrations to improve the model's negotiation strategy iteratively. We use different LLMs (GPT and Claude) for different roles and use the deal price as the evaluation metric. Our experiments reveal multiple intriguing findings: (1) Only a subset of the language models we consider can self-play and improve the deal price from AI feedback, weaker models either do not understand the game's rules or cannot incorporate AI feedback for further improvement. (2) Models' abilities to learn from the feedback differ when playing different roles. For example, it is harder for Claude-instant to improve as the buyer than as the seller. (3) When unrolling the game to multiple rounds, stronger agents can consistently improve their performance by meaningfully using previous experiences and iterative AI feedback, yet have a higher risk of breaking the deal. We hope our work provides insightful initial explorations of having models autonomously improve each other with game playing and AI feedback.

  • 4 authors
·
May 17, 2023

Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 29, 2024

Negotiative Alignment: Embracing Disagreement to Achieve Fairer Outcomes -- Insights from Urban Studies

Urban assessments often compress diverse needs into single scores, which can obscure minority perspectives. We present a community-centered study in Montreal (n=35; wheelchair users, seniors, LGBTQIA2+ residents, and immigrants). Participants rated 20 streets (accessibility, inclusivity, aesthetics, practicality) and ranked 7 images on 12 interview-elicited criteria. Disagreement patterns were systematic in our sample: wheelchair users diverged most on accessibility and practicality; LGBTQIA2+ participants emphasized inclusion and liveliness; seniors prioritized security. Group discussion reduced information gaps but not value conflicts; ratings conveyed intensity, while rankings forced trade-offs. We then formalize negotiative alignment, a transparent, budget-aware bargaining procedure, and pilot it with role-played stakeholder agents plus a neutral mediator. Relative to the best base design under the same public rubric, the negotiated package increased total utility (21.10 to 24.55), raised the worst-group utility (3.20 to 3.90), improved twentieth percentile satisfaction (0.86 to 1.00; min-max normalized within the scenario), and reduced inequality (Gini 0.036 to 0.025). Treating disagreement as signal and reporting worst-group outcomes alongside totals may help planners and AI practitioners surface trade-offs and preserve minority priorities while maintaining efficiency.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 16