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abduction	Abduction	First published Wed Mar 9, 2011; substantive revision Tue May 18, 2021	[ "\nIn the philosophical literature, the term “abduction” is\nused in two related but different senses. In both senses, the term\nrefers to some form of explanatory reasoning. However, in the\nhistorically first sense, it refers to the place of explanatory\nreasoning in generating hypotheses, while in the sense in\nwhich it is used most frequently in the modern literature it refers to\nthe place of explanatory reasoning in justifying hypotheses.\nIn the latter sense, abduction is also often called “Inference\nto the Best Explanation.”", "\nThis entry is exclusively concerned with abduction in the modern\nsense, although there is a supplement on abduction in the historical\nsense, which had its origin in the work of Charles Sanders\nPeirce—see the", "\nSee also the entry on\n scientific discovery,\n in particular the section on discovery as abduction.", "\nMost philosophers agree that abduction (in the sense of Inference to\nthe Best Explanation) is a type of inference that is frequently\nemployed, in some form or other, both in everyday and in scientific\nreasoning. However, the exact form as well as the normative status of\nabduction are still matters of controversy. This entry contrasts\nabduction with other types of inference; points at prominent uses of\nit, both in and outside philosophy; considers various more or less\nprecise statements of it; discusses its normative status; and\nhighlights possible connections between abduction and Bayesian\nconfirmation theory." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Abduction: The General Idea", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Deduction, induction, abduction", "1.2 The ubiquity of abduction" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Explicating Abduction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. The Status of Abduction", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Criticisms", "3.2 Defenses" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Abduction versus Bayesian Confirmation Theory", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nYou happen to know that Tim and Harry have recently had a terrible row\nthat ended their friendship. Now someone tells you that she just saw\nTim and Harry jogging together. The best explanation for this that you\ncan think of is that they made up. You conclude that they are friends\nagain.", "\nOne morning you enter the kitchen to find a plate and cup on the\ntable, with breadcrumbs and a pat of butter on it, and surrounded by a\njar of jam, a pack of sugar, and an empty carton of milk. You conclude\nthat one of your house-mates got up at night to make him- or herself a\nmidnight snack and was too tired to clear the table. This, you think,\nbest explains the scene you are facing. To be sure, it might be that\nsomeone burgled the house and took the time to have a bite while on\nthe job, or a house-mate might have arranged the things on the table\nwithout having a midnight snack but just to make you believe that\nsomeone had a midnight snack. But these hypotheses strike you as\nproviding much more contrived explanations of the data than the one\nyou infer to.", "\nWalking along the beach, you see what looks like a picture of Winston\nChurchill in the sand. It could be that, as in the opening pages of\nHilary Putnam’s book Reason, Truth, and History,\n(1981), what you see is actually the trace of an ant crawling on the\nbeach. The much simpler, and therefore (you think) much better,\nexplanation is that someone intentionally drew a picture of Churchill\nin the sand. That, in any case, is what you come away believing.", "\nIn these examples, the conclusions do not follow logically from the\npremises. For instance, it does not follow logically that Tim and\nHarry are friends again from the premises that they had a terrible row\nwhich ended their friendship and that they have just been seen jogging\ntogether; it does not even follow, we may suppose, from all the\ninformation you have about Tim and Harry. Nor do you have any useful\nstatistical data about friendships, terrible rows, and joggers that\nmight warrant an inference from the information that you have about\nTim and Harry to the conclusion that they are friends again, or even\nto the conclusion that, probably (or with a certain probability), they\nare friends again. What leads you to the conclusion, and what\naccording to a considerable number of philosophers may also warrant\nthis conclusion, is precisely the fact that Tim and Harry’s\nbeing friends again would, if true, best explain the\nfact that they have just been seen jogging together. (The proviso that\na hypothesis be true if it is to explain anything is taken as read\nfrom here on.) Similar remarks apply to the other two examples. The\ntype of inference exhibited here is called abduction or,\nsomewhat more commonly nowadays, Inference to the Best\nExplanation." ], "section_title": "1. Abduction: The General Idea", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAbduction is normally thought of as being one of three major types of\ninference, the other two being deduction and induction. The\ndistinction between deduction, on the one hand, and induction and\nabduction, on the other hand, corresponds to the distinction between\nnecessary and non-necessary inferences. In deductive inferences, what\nis inferred is necessarily true if the premises from which it\nis inferred are true; that is, the truth of the premises\nguarantees the truth of the conclusion. A familiar type of\nexample is inferences instantiating the schema", "\nAll As are Bs.\n\na is an A.\n\nHence, a is a B.\n", "\nBut not all inferences are of this variety. Consider, for instance,\nthe inference of “John is rich” from “John lives in\nChelsea” and “Most people living in Chelsea are\nrich.” Here, the truth of the first sentence is not guaranteed\n(but only made likely) by the joint truth of the second and third\nsentences. Differently put, it is not necessarily the case that if the\npremises are true, then so is the conclusion: it is logically\ncompatible with the truth of the premises that John is a member of the\nminority of non-rich inhabitants of Chelsea. The case is similar\nregarding your inference to the conclusion that Tim and Harry are\nfriends again on the basis of the information that they have been seen\njogging together. Perhaps Tim and Harry are former business partners\nwho still had some financial matters to discuss, however much they\nwould have liked to avoid this, and decided to combine this with their\ndaily exercise; this is compatible with their being firmly decided\nnever to make up.", "\nIt is standard practice to group non-necessary inferences into\ninductive and abductive ones. Inductive inferences\nform a somewhat heterogeneous class, but for present purposes they may\nbe characterized as those inferences that are based purely on\nstatistical data, such as observed frequencies of occurrences of a\nparticular feature in a given population. An example of such an\ninference would be this:", "\n96 per cent of the Flemish college students speak both Dutch and\nFrench.\n\nLouise is a Flemish college student.\n\nHence, Louise speaks both Dutch and French.\n", "\nHowever, the relevant statistical information may also be more vaguely\ngiven, as in the premise, “Most people living in Chelsea are\nrich.” (There is much discussion about whether the conclusion of\nan inductive argument can be stated in purely qualitative terms or\nwhether it should be a quantitative one—for instance, that it\nholds with a probability of .96 that Louise speaks both Dutch and\nFrench—or whether it can sometimes be stated in\nqualitative terms—for instance, if the probability that it is\ntrue is high enough—and sometimes not. On these and other issues\nrelated to induction, see Kyburg 1990 (Ch. 4). It should also be\nmentioned that Harman (1965) conceives induction as a special type of\nabduction. See also Weintraub 2013 for discussion.)", "\nThe mere fact that an inference is based on statistical data is not\nenough to classify it as an inductive one. You may have observed many\ngray elephants and no non-gray ones, and infer from this that all\nelephants are gray, because that would provide the best\nexplanation for why you have observed so many gray elephants\nand no non-gray ones. This would be an instance of an\nabductive inference. It suggests that the best way to distinguish\nbetween induction and abduction is this: both are ampliative,\nmeaning that the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) contained\nin the premises (which is why they are non-necessary inferences), but\nin abduction there is an implicit or explicit appeal to explanatory\nconsiderations, whereas in induction there is not; in induction, there\nis only an appeal to observed frequencies or statistics. (I\nemphasize “only,” because in abduction there may also be\nan appeal to frequencies or statistics, as the example about the\nelephants exhibits.)", "\nA noteworthy feature of abduction, which it shares with induction but\nnot with deduction, is that it violates monotonicity, meaning\nthat it may be possible to infer abductively certain conclusions from\na subset of a set S of premises which cannot be\ninferred abductively from S as a whole. For instance, adding\nthe premise that Tim and Harry are former business partners who still\nhave some financial matters to discuss, to the premises that they had\na terrible row some time ago and that they were just seen jogging\ntogether may no longer warrant you to infer that they are friends\nagain, even if—let us suppose—the last two premises alone\ndo warrant that inference. The reason is that what counts as the best\nexplanation of Tim and Harry’s jogging together in light of the\noriginal premises may no longer do so once the information has been\nadded that they are former business partners with financial matters to\ndiscuss." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Deduction, induction, abduction" }, { "content": [ "\nThe type of inference exemplified in the cases described at the\nbeginning of this entry will strike most as entirely familiar.\nPhilosophers as well as psychologists tend to agree that abduction is\nfrequently employed in everyday reasoning. Sometimes our reliance on\nabductive reasoning is quite obvious and explicit. But in some daily\npractices, it may be so routine and automatic that it easily goes\nunnoticed. A case in point may be our trust in other people’s\ntestimony, which has been said to rest on abductive reasoning; see\nHarman 1965, Adler 1994, Fricker 1994, and Lipton 1998 for defenses of\nthis claim. For instance, according to Jonathan Adler (1994, 274f),\n“[t]he best explanation for why the informant asserts that\nP is normally that … he believes it for duly responsible\nreasons and … he intends that I shall believe it too,”\nwhich is why we are normally justified in trusting the\ninformant’s testimony. This may well be correct, even though in\ncoming to trust a person’s testimony one does not normally seem\nto be aware of any abductive reasoning going on in one’s mind.\nSimilar remarks may apply to what some hold to be a further, possibly\neven more fundamental, role of abduction in linguistic practice, to\nwit, its role in determining what a speaker means by an utterance.\nSpecifically, it has been argued that decoding utterances is a matter\nof inferring the best explanation of why someone said what he or she\nsaid in the context in which the utterance was made. Even more\nspecifically, authors working in the field of pragmatics have\nsuggested that hearers invoke the Gricean maxims of conversation to\nhelp them work out the best explanation of a speaker’s utterance\nwhenever the semantic content of the utterance is insufficiently\ninformative for the purposes of the conversation, or is too\ninformative, or off-topic, or implausible, or otherwise odd or\ninappropriate; see, for instance, Bach and Harnish 1979 (92f), Dascal\n1979 (167), and Hobbs 2004. As in cases of reliance on speaker\ntestimony, the requisite abductive reasoning would normally seem to\ntake place at a subconscious level.", "\nAbductive reasoning is not limited to everyday contexts. Quite the\ncontrary: philosophers of science have argued that abduction is a\ncornerstone of scientific methodology; see, for instance, Boyd 1981,\n1984, Harré 1986, 1988, Lipton 1991, 2004, and Psillos 1999.\nAccording to Timothy Williamson (2007), “[t]he abductive\nmethodology is the best science provides” and Ernan McMullin\n(1992) even goes so far to call abduction “the inference that\nmakes science.” To illustrate the use of abduction in science,\nwe consider two examples.", "\nAt the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was discovered that the\norbit of Uranus, one of the seven planets known at the time, departed\nfrom the orbit as predicted on the basis of Isaac Newton’s\ntheory of universal gravitation and the auxiliary assumption that\nthere were no further planets in the solar system. One possible\nexplanation was, of course, that Newton’s theory is false. Given\nits great empirical successes for (then) more than two centuries, that\ndid not appear to be a very good explanation. Two astronomers, John\nCouch Adams and Urbain Leverrier, instead suggested (independently of\neach other but almost simultaneously) that there was an eighth, as yet\nundiscovered planet in the solar system; that, they thought, provided\nthe best explanation of Uranus’ deviating orbit. Not much later,\nthis planet, which is now known as “Neptune,” was\ndiscovered.", "\nThe second example concerns what is now commonly regarded to have been\nthe discovery of the electron by the English physicist Joseph John\nThomson. Thomson had conducted experiments on cathode rays in order to\ndetermine whether they are streams of charged particles. He concluded\nthat they are indeed, reasoning as follows:", "\n\n\nAs the cathode rays carry a charge of negative electricity, are\ndeflected by an electrostatic force as if they were negatively\nelectrified, and are acted on by a magnetic force in just the way in\nwhich this force would act on a negatively electrified body moving\nalong the path of these rays, I can see no escape from the conclusion\nthat they are charges of negative electricity carried by particles of\nmatter. (Thomson, cited in Achinstein 2001, 17)\n", "\nThe conclusion that cathode rays consist of negatively charged\nparticles does not follow logically from the reported experimental\nresults, nor could Thomson draw on any relevant statistical data. That\nnevertheless he could “see no escape from the conclusion”\nis, we may safely assume, because the conclusion is the best—in\nthis case presumably even the only plausible—explanation of his\nresults that he could think of.", "\nMany other examples of scientific uses of abduction have been\ndiscussed in the literature; see, for instance, Harré 1986,\n1988 and Lipton 1991, 2004. Abduction is also said to be the\npredominant mode of reasoning in medical diagnosis: physicians tend to\ngo for the hypothesis that best explains the patient’s symptoms\n(see Josephson and Josephson (eds.) 1994, 9–12; see also\nDragulinescu 2016 on abductive reasoning in the context of\nmedicine).", "\nLast but not least, abduction plays a central role in some important\nphilosophical debates. See Shalkowski 2010 on the place of abduction\nin metaphysics (also Bigelow 2010), Krzyżanowska, Wenmackers, and\nDouven 2014 and Douven 2016a for a possible role of\nabduction in the semantics of conditionals, and Williamson\n2017 for an application of abduction in the philosophy of logic.\nArguably, however, abduction plays its most notable philosophical role\nin epistemology and in the philosophy of science, where it is\nfrequently invoked in objections to so-called underdetermination\narguments. Underdetermination arguments generally start from the\npremise that a number of given hypotheses are empirically equivalent,\nwhich their authors take to mean that the evidence—indeed, any\nevidence we might ever come to possess—is unable to favor one of\nthem over the others. From this, we are supposed to conclude that one\ncan never be warranted in believing any particular one of the\nhypotheses. (This is rough, but it will do for present purposes; see\nDouven 2008 and Stanford 2009, for more detailed accounts of\nunderdetermination arguments.) A famous instance of this type of\nargument is the Cartesian argument for global skepticism, according to\nwhich the hypothesis that reality is more or less the way we\ncustomarily deem it to be is empirically equivalent to a variety of\nso-called skeptical hypotheses (such as that we are beguiled by an\nevil demon, or that we are brains in a vat, connected to a\nsupercomputer; see, e.g., Folina 2016). Similar arguments have been\ngiven in support of scientific antirealism, according to which it will\nnever be warranted for us to choose between empirically equivalent\nrivals concerning what underlies the observable part of reality (van\nFraassen 1980).", "\nResponses to these arguments typically point to the fact that the\nnotion of empirical equivalence at play unduly neglects explanatory\nconsiderations, for instance, by defining the notion strictly in terms\nof hypotheses’ making the same predictions. Those responding\nthen argue that even if some hypotheses make exactly the same\npredictions, one of them may still be a better explanation of the\nphenomena predicted. Thus, if explanatory considerations have a role\nin determining which inferences we are licensed to make—as\naccording to defenders of abduction they have—then we might\nstill be warranted in believing in the truth (or probable truth, or\nsome such, depending—as will be seen below—on the version\nof abduction one assumes) of one of a number of hypotheses that all\nmake the same predictions. Following Bertrand Russell (1912, Ch. 2),\nmany epistemologists have invoked abduction in arguing against\nCartesian skepticism, their key claim being that even though, by\nconstruction, the skeptical hypotheses make the same predictions as\nthe hypothesis that reality is more or less the way we ordinarily take\nit to be, they are not equally good explanations of what they predict;\nin particular, the skeptical hypotheses have been said to be\nconsiderably less simple than the “ordinary world”\nhypothesis. See, among many others, Harman 1973 (Chs. 8 and 11),\nGoldman 1988 (205), Moser 1989 (161), and Vogel 1990, 2005; see\nPargetter 1984 for an abductive response specifically to skepticism\nregarding other minds. Similarly, philosophers of science have argued\nthat we are warranted to believe in Special Relativity Theory as\nopposed to Lorentz’s version of the æther theory. For even\nthough these theories make the same predictions, the former is\nexplanatorily superior to the latter. (Most arguments that have been\ngiven for this claim come down to the contention that Special\nRelativity Theory is ontologically more parsimonious than its\ncompetitor, which postulates the existence of an æther. See\nJanssen 2002 for an excellent discussion of the various reasons\nphilosophers of science have adduced for preferring Einstein’s\ntheory to Lorentz’s.)" ], "subsection_title": "1.2 The ubiquity of abduction" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nPrecise statements of what abduction amounts to are rare in the\nliterature on abduction. (Peirce did propose an at least fairly\nprecise statement; but, as explained in the supplement to this entry,\nit does not capture what most nowadays understand by abduction.) Its\ncore idea is often said to be that explanatory considerations have\nconfirmation-theoretic import, or that explanatory success is a (not\nnecessarily unfailing) mark of truth. Clearly, however, these\nformulations are slogans at best, and it takes little effort to see\nthat they can be cashed out in a great variety of prima facie\nplausible ways. Here we will consider a number of such possible\nexplications, starting with what one might term the “textbook\nversion of abduction,” which, as will be seen, is manifestly\ndefective, and then going on to consider various possible refinements\nof it. What those versions have in\ncommon—unsurprisingly—is that they are all inference\nrules, requiring premises encompassing explanatory considerations and\nyielding a conclusion that makes some statement about the truth of a\nhypothesis. The differences concern the premises that are required, or\nwhat exactly we are allowed to infer from them (or both).", "\nIn textbooks on epistemology or the philosophy of science, one often\nencounters something like the following as a formulation of\nabduction:", "\nAn observation that is frequently made about this rule, and that\npoints to a potential problem for it, is that it presupposes the\nnotions of candidate explanation and best explanation, neither of\nwhich has a straightforward interpretation. While some still hope that\nthe former can be spelled out in purely logical, or at least purely\nformal, terms, it is often said that the latter must appeal to the\nso-called theoretical virtues, like simplicity, generality, and\ncoherence with well-established theories; the best explanation would\nthen be the hypothesis which, on balance, does best with respect to\nthese virtues. (See, for instance, Thagard 1978 and McMullin 1996.)\nThe problem is that none of the said virtues is presently particularly\nwell understood. (Giere, in Callebaut (ed.) 1993 (232), even makes the\nradical claim that the theoretical virtues lack real content and play\nno more than a rhetorical role in science. In view of recent formal\nwork both on simplicity and on coherence—for instance, Forster\nand Sober 1994, Li and Vitanyi 1997, and Sober 2015, on simplicity and\nBovens and Hartmann 2003 and Olsson 2005, on coherence—the first\npart of this claim has become hard to maintain; also, Schupbach and\nSprenger (2011) present an account of explanatory goodness directly in\nprobabilistic terms. Psychological evidence casts doubt on the second\npart of the claim; see, for instance, Lombrozo 2007, on the role of\nsimplicity in people’s assessments of explanatory goodness and\nKoslowski et al. 2008, on the role of coherence with\nbackground knowledge in those assessments.)", "\nFurthermore, many of those who think ABD1 is headed along the right\nlines believe that it is too strong. Some think that abduction\nwarrants an inference only to the probable truth of the best\nexplanation, others that it warrants an inference only to the\napproximate truth of the best explanation, and still others\nthat it warrants an inference only to the probable\napproximate truth.", "\nThe real problem with ABD1 runs deeper than this, however. Because\nabduction is ampliative—as explained earlier—it will not\nbe a sound rule of inference in the strict logical sense, however\nabduction is explicated exactly. It can still be reliable in\nthat it mostly leads to a true conclusion whenever the premises are\ntrue. An obvious necessary condition for ABD1 to be reliable in this\nsense is that, mostly, when it is true that H best\nexplains E, and E is true, then H is true as well\n(or H is approximately true, or probably true, or probably\napproximately true). But this would not be enough for ABD1 to\nbe reliable. For ABD1 takes as its premise only that some hypothesis\nis the best explanation of the evidence as compared to other\nhypotheses in a given set. Thus, if the rule is to be\nreliable, it must hold that, at least typically, the best explanation\nrelative to the set of hypotheses that we consider would also come out\nas being best in comparison with any other hypotheses that we might\nhave conceived (but for lack of time or ingenuity, or for some other\nreason, did not conceive). In other words, it must hold that at least\ntypically the absolutely best explanation of the evidence is\nto be found among the candidate explanations we have come up with, for\nelse ABD1 may well lead us to believe “the best of a bad\nlot” (van Fraassen 1989, 143).", "\nHow reasonable is it to suppose that this extra requirement is usually\nfulfilled? Not at all, presumably. To believe otherwise, we must\nassume some sort of privilege on our part to the effect that when we\nconsider possible explanations of the data, we are somehow predisposed\nto hit, inter alia, upon the absolutely best explanation of those\ndata. After all, hardly ever will we have considered, or will it even\nbe possible to consider, all potential explanations. As van\nFraassen (1989, 144) points out, it is a priori rather\nimplausible to hold that we are thus privileged.", "\nIn response to this, one might argue that the challenge to show that\nthe best explanation is always or mostly among the hypotheses\nconsidered can be met without having to assume some form of privilege\n(see Schupbach 2014 for a different response, and see Dellsén\n2017 for discussion). For given the hypotheses we have managed to come\nup with, we can always generate a set of hypotheses which jointly\nexhaust logical space. Suppose\nH1,…,Hn are the\ncandidate explanations we have so far been able to conceive. Then\nsimply define Hn+1 := ¬H1\n∧ … ∧ ¬Hn and add this new\nhypothesis as a further candidate explanation to the ones we already\nhave. Obviously, the set\n{H1,…,Hn+1} is exhaustive,\nin that one of its elements must be true. Following this in itself\nsimple procedure would seem enough to make sure that we never miss out\non the absolutely best explanation. (See Lipton 1993, for a proposal\nalong these lines.)", "\nAlas, there is a catch. For even though there may be many hypotheses\nHj that imply Hn+1 and, had\nthey been formulated, would have been evaluated as being a better\nexplanation for the data than the best explanation among the candidate\nexplanations we started out with, Hn+1 itself will\nin general be hardly informative; in fact, in general it will not even\nbe clear what its empirical consequences are. Suppose, for instance,\nwe have as competing explanations Special Relativity Theory and\nLorentz’s version of the æther theory. Then, following the\nabove proposal, we may add to our candidate explanations that neither\nof these two theories is true. But surely this further hypothesis will\nbe ranked quite low qua explanation—if it will be\nranked at all, which seems doubtful, given that it is wholly unclear\nwhat its empirical consequences are. This is not to say that the\nsuggested procedure may never work. The point is that in general it\nwill give little assurance that the best explanation is among the\ncandidate explanations we consider.", "\nA more promising response to the above “argument of the bad\nlot” begins with the observation that the argument capitalizes\non a peculiar asymmetry or incongruence in ABD1. The rule gives\nlicense to an absolute conclusion—that a given hypothesis is\ntrue—on the basis of a comparative premise, namely, that that\nparticular hypothesis is the best explanation of the evidence relative\nto the other hypotheses available (see Kuipers 2000, 171). This\nincongruence is not avoided by replacing “truth” with\n“probable truth” or “approximate truth.” In\norder to avoid it, one has two general options.", "\nThe first option is to modify the rule so as to have it require an\nabsolute premise. For instance, following Alan Musgrave (1988) or\nPeter Lipton (1993), one may require the hypothesis whose truth is\ninferred to be not only the best of the available potential\nexplanations, but also to be satisfactory (Musgrave) or\ngood enough (Lipton), yielding the following variant of\nABD1:", "\nNeedless to say, ABD2 needs supplementing by a criterion for the\nsatisfactoriness of explanations, or their being good enough, which,\nhowever, we are still lacking.", "\nSecondly, one can formulate a symmetric or congruous version of\nabduction by having it sanction, given a comparative premise, only a\ncomparative conclusion; this option, too, can in turn be realized in\nmore than one way. Here is one way to do it, which has been proposed\nand defended in the work of Theo Kuipers (e.g., Kuipers 1984, 1992,\n2000).", "\nClearly, ABD3 requires an account of closeness to the truth, but many\nsuch accounts are on offer today (see, e.g., Niiniluoto 1998).", "\nOne noteworthy feature of the congruous versions of abduction\nconsidered here is that they do not rely on the assumption of an\nimplausible privilege on the reasoner’s part that, we saw, ABD1\nimplicitly relies on. Another is that if one can be certain that,\nhowever many candidate explanations for the data one may have missed,\nnone equals the best of those one has thought of, then the\ncongruous versions license exactly the same inference as ABD1 does\n(supposing that one would not be certain that no potential explanation\nis as good as the best explanation one has thought of if the latter is\nnot even satisfactory or sufficiently good).", "\nAs mentioned, there is widespread agreement that people frequently\nrely on abductive reasoning. Which of the above rules exactly\nis it that people rely on? Or might it be still some further rule that\nthey rely on? Or might they in some contexts rely on one version, and\nin others on another (Douven 2017, forthcoming)? Philosophical\nargumentation is unable to answer these questions. In recent years,\nexperimental psychologists have started paying attention to the role\nhumans give to explanatory considerations in reasoning. For instance,\nTania Lombrozo and Nicholas Gwynne (2014) report experiments showing\nthat how a property of a given class of things is explained\nto us—whether mechanistically, by reference to parts and\nprocesses, or functionally, by reference to functions and\npurposes—matters to how likely we are to generalise that\nproperty to other classes of things (see also Sloman 1994 and Williams\nand Lombrozo 2010). And Igor Douven and Jonah Schupbach (2015a),\n(2015b) present experimental evidence to the effect that\npeople’s probability updates tend to be influenced by\nexplanatory considerations in ways that makes them deviate from\nstrictly Bayesian updates (see below). Douven (2016b) shows that, in\nthe aforementioned experiments, participants who gave more weight to\nexplanatory considerations tended to be more accurate, as determined\nin terms of a standard scoring rule. (See Lombrozo 2012 and 2016 for\nuseful overviews of recent experimental work relevant to explanation\nand inference.) Douven and Patricia Mirabile (2018) found some\nevidence indicating that people rely on something like ABD2, at least\nin some contexts, but for the most part, empirical work on the\nabove-mentioned questions is lacking.", "\nWith respect to the normative question of which of the previously\nstated rules we ought to rely on (if we ought to rely on any\nform of abduction), where philosophical argumentation should be able\nto help, the situation is hardly any better. In view of the argument\nof the bad lot, ABD1 does not look very good. Other arguments against\nabduction are claimed to be independent of the exact explication of\nthe rule; below, these arguments will be found wanting. On the other\nhand, arguments that have been given in favor of abduction—some\nof which will also be discussed below—do not discern between\nspecific versions. So, supposing people do indeed commonly rely on\nabduction, it must be considered an open question as to which\nversion(s) of abduction they rely on. Equally, supposing it is\nrational for people to rely on abduction, it must be considered an\nopen question as to which version, or perhaps versions, of abduction\nthey ought to, or are at least permitted to, rely on." ], "section_title": "2. Explicating Abduction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nEven if it is true that we routinely rely on abductive reasoning, it\nmay still be asked whether this practice is rational. For instance,\nexperimental studies have shown that when people are able to think of\nan explanation for some possible event, they tend to overestimate the\nlikelihood that this event will actually occur. (See Koehler 1991, for\na survey of some of these studies; see also Brem and Rips 2000.) More\ntelling still, Lombrozo (2007) shows that, in some situations, people\ntend to grossly overrate the probability of simpler explanations\ncompared to more complicated ones. Although these studies are not\ndirectly concerned with abduction in any of the forms discussed so\nfar, they nevertheless suggest that taking into account explanatory\nconsiderations in one’s reasoning may not always be for the\nbetter. (It is to be noted that Lombrozo’s experiments\nare directly concerned with some proposals that have been\nmade for explicating abduction in a Bayesian framework; see Section\n4.) However, the most pertinent remarks about the normative status of\nabduction are so far to be found in the philosophical literature. This\nsection discusses the main criticisms that have been levelled against\nabduction, as well as the strongest arguments that have been given in\nits defense." ], "section_title": "3. The Status of Abduction", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nWe have already encountered the so-called argument of the bad lot,\nwhich, we saw, is valid as a criticism of ABD1 but powerless against\nvarious (what we called) congruous rules of abduction. We here\nconsider two objections that are meant to be more general. The first\neven purports to challenge the core idea underlying abduction; the\nsecond is not quite as general, but it is still meant to undermine a\nbroad class of candidate explications of abduction. Both objections\nare due to Bas van Fraassen.", "\nThe first objection has as a premise that it is part of the meaning of\n“explanation” that if one theory is more explanatory than\nanother, the former must be more informative than the latter (see,\ne.g., van Fraassen 1983, Sect. 2). The alleged problem then is that it\nis “an elementary logical point that a more informative theory\ncannot be more likely to be true [and thus] attempts to describe\ninductive or evidential support through features that require\ninformation (such as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’)\nmust either contradict themselves or equivocate” (van Fraassen\n1989, 192). The elementary logical point is supposed to be “most\n[obvious] … in the paradigm case in which one theory is an\nextension of another: clearly the extension has more ways of being\nfalse” (van Fraassen 1985, 280).", "\nIt is important to note, however, that in any other kind of case than\nthe “paradigm” one, the putative elementary point is not\nobvious at all. For instance, it is entirely unclear in what sense\nSpecial Relativity Theory “has more ways of being false”\nthan Lorentz’s version of the æther theory, given that\nthey make the same predictions. And yet the former is generally\nregarded as being superior, qua explanation, to the latter.\n(If van Fraassen were to object that the former is not really more\ninformative than the latter, or at any rate not more informative in\nthe appropriate sense—whatever that is—then we should\ncertainly refuse to grant the premise that in order to be more\nexplanatory a theory must be more informative.)", "\nThe second objection, proffered in van Fraassen 1989 (Ch. 6), is\nlevelled at probabilistic versions of abduction. The objection is that\nsuch rules must either amount to Bayes’ rule, and thus be\nredundant, or be at variance with it but then, on the grounds of\nLewis’ dynamic Dutch book argument (as reported in Teller 1973),\nbe probabilistically incoherent, meaning that they may lead one to\nassess as fair a number of bets which together ensure a financial\nloss, come what may; and, van Fraassen argues, it would be irrational\nto follow a rule that has this feature.", "\nHowever, this objection fares no better than the first. For one thing,\nas Patrick Maher (1992) and Brian Skyrms (1993) have pointed out, a\nloss in one respect may be outweighed by a benefit in another. It\nmight be, for instance, that some probabilistic version of abduction\ndoes much better, at least in our world, than Bayes’ rule, in\nthat, on average, it approaches the truth faster in the sense that it\nis faster in assigning a high probability (understood as probability\nabove a certain threshold value) to the true hypothesis (see Douven\n2013, 2020, and Douven and Wenmackers 2017; see Climenhaga\n2017 for discussion). If it does, then following that rule\ninstead of Bayes’ rule may have advantages which perhaps are not\nso readily expressed in terms of money yet which should arguably be\ntaken into account when deciding which rule to go by. It is, in short,\nnot so clear whether following a probabilistically incoherent rule\nmust be irrational.", "\nFor another thing, Douven (1999) argues that the question of whether a\nprobabilistic rule is coherent is not one that can be settled\nindependently of considering which other epistemic and\ndecision-theoretic rules are deployed along with it; coherence should\nbe understood as a property of packages of both epistemic and\ndecision-theoretic rules, not of epistemic rules (such as\nprobabilistic rules for belief change) in isolation. In the same\npaper, a coherent package of rules is described which includes a\nprobabilistic version of abduction. (See Kvanvig 1994, Harman 1997,\nLeplin 1997, Niiniluoto 1999, and Okasha 2000, for different responses\nto van Fraassen’s critique of probabilistic versions of\nabduction.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Criticisms" }, { "content": [ "\nHardly anyone nowadays would want to subscribe to a conception of\ntruth that posits a necessary connection between explanatory force and\ntruth—for instance, because it stipulates explanatory\nsuperiority to be necessary for truth. As a result, a priori defenses\nof abduction seem out of the question. Indeed, all defenses that have\nbeen given so far are of an empirical nature in that they appeal to\ndata that supposedly support the claim that (in some form) abduction\nis a reliable rule of inference.", "\nThe best-known argument of this sort was developed by Richard Boyd in\nthe 1980s (see Boyd 1981, 1984, 1985). It starts by underlining the\ntheory-dependency of scientific methodology, which comprises methods\nfor designing experiments, for assessing data, for choosing between\nrival hypotheses, and so on. For instance, in considering possible\nconfounding factors from which an experimental setup has to be\nshielded, scientists draw heavily on already accepted theories. The\nargument next calls attention to the apparent reliability of this\nmethodology, which, after all, has yielded, and continues to yield,\nimpressively accurate theories. In particular, by relying on this\nmethodology, scientists have for some time now been able to find ever\nmore instrumentally adequate theories. Boyd then argues that the\nreliability of scientific methodology is best explained by assuming\nthat the theories on which it relies are at least approximately true.\nFrom this and from the fact that these theories were mostly arrived at\nby abductive reasoning, he concludes that abduction must be a reliable\nrule of inference.", "\nCritics have accused this argument of being circular. Specifically, it\nhas been said that the argument rests on a premise—that\nscientific methodology is informed by approximately true background\ntheories—which in turn rests on an inference to the best\nexplanation for its plausibility. And the reliability of this type of\ninference is precisely what is at stake. (See, for instance, Laudan\n1981 and Fine 1984.)", "\nTo this, Stathis Psillos (1999, Ch. 4) has responded by invoking a\ndistinction credited to Richard Braithwaite, to wit, the distinction\nbetween premise-circularity and rule-circularity. An argument is\npremise-circular if its conclusion is amongst its premises. A\nrule-circular argument, by contrast, is an argument of which the\nconclusion asserts something about an inferential rule that is used in\nthe very same argument. As Psillos urges, Boyd’s argument is\nrule-circular, but not premise-circular, and rule-circular arguments,\nPsillos contends, need not be viciously circular (even though\na premise-circular argument is always viciously circular). To be more\nprecise, in his view, an argument for the reliability of a given rule\nR that essentially relies on R as an inferential\nprinciple is not vicious, provided that the use of R does not\nguarantee a positive conclusion about R’s reliability.\nPsillos claims that in Boyd’s argument, this proviso is met. For\nwhile Boyd concludes that the background theories on which scientific\nmethodology relies are approximately true on the basis of an abductive\nstep, the use of abduction itself does not guarantee the truth of his\nconclusion. After all, granting the use of abduction does nothing to\nensure that the best explanation of the success of scientific\nmethodology is the approximate truth of the relevant background\ntheories. Thus, Psillos concludes, Boyd’s argument still\nstands.", "\nEven if the use of abduction in Boyd’s argument might have led\nto the conclusion that abduction is not reliable, one may\nstill have worries about the argument’s being rule-circular. For\nsuppose that some scientific community relied not on abduction but on\na rule that we may dub “Inference to the Worst\nExplanation” (IWE), a rule that sanctions inferring to the\nworst explanation of the available data. We may safely assume\nthat the use of this rule mostly would lead to the adoption of very\nunsuccessful theories. Nevertheless, the said community might justify\nits use of IWE by dint of the following reasoning: “Scientific\ntheories tend to be hugely unsuccessful. These theories were arrived\nat by application of IWE. That IWE is a reliable rule of\ninference—that is, a rule of inference mostly leading from true\npremises to true conclusions—is surely the worst explanation of\nthe fact that our theories are so unsuccessful. Hence, by application\nof IWE, we may conclude that IWE is a reliable rule of\ninference.” While this would be an utterly absurd conclusion,\nthe argument leading up to it cannot be convicted of being viciously\ncircular anymore than Boyd’s argument for the reliability of\nabduction can (if Psillos is right). It would appear, then, that there\nmust be something else amiss with rule-circularity.", "\nIt is fair to note that for Psillos, the fact that a rule-circular\nargument does not guarantee a positive conclusion about the rule at\nissue is not sufficient for such an argument to be valid. A further\nnecessary condition is “that one should not have reason to doubt\nthe reliability of the rule—that there is nothing currently\navailable which can make one distrust the rule” (Psillos 1999,\n85). And there is plenty of reason to doubt the reliability of IWE; in\nfact, the above argument supposes that it is unreliable. Two\nquestions arise, however. First, why should we accept the additional\ncondition? Second, do we really have no reason to doubt the\nreliability of abduction? Certainly some of the abductive\ninferences we make lead us to accept falsehoods. How many\nfalsehoods may we accept on the basis of abduction before we can\nlegitimately begin to distrust this rule? No clear answers have been\ngiven to these questions.", "\nBe this as it may, even if rule-circularity is neither vicious nor\notherwise problematic, one may still wonder how Boyd’s argument\nis to convert a critic of abduction, given that it relies on\nabduction. But Psillos makes it clear that the point of philosophical\nargumentation is not always, and in any case need not be, to convince\nan opponent of one’s position. Sometimes the point is, more\nmodestly, to assure or reassure oneself that the position one\nendorses, or is tempted to endorse, is correct. In the case at hand,\nwe need not think of Boyd’s argument as an attempt to convince\nthe opponent of abduction of its reliability. Rather, it may be\nthought of as justifying the rule from within the perspective of\nsomeone who is already sympathetic towards abduction; see Psillos 1999\n(89).", "\nThere have also been attempts to argue for abduction in a more\nstraightforward fashion, to wit, via enumerative induction. The common\nidea of these attempts is that every newly recorded successful\napplication of abduction—like the discovery of Neptune, whose\nexistence had been postulated on explanatory grounds (see Section\n1.2)—adds further support to the hypothesis that abduction is a\nreliable rule of inference, in the way in which every newly observed\nblack raven adds some support to the hypothesis that all ravens are\nblack. Because it does not involve abductive reasoning, this type of\nargument is more likely to also appeal to disbelievers in abduction.\nSee Harré 1986, 1988, Bird 1998 (160), Kitcher 2001, and Douven\n2002 for suggestions along these lines." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Defenses" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn the past decade, Bayesian confirmation theory has firmly\nestablished itself as the dominant view on confirmation; currently one\ncannot very well discuss a confirmation-theoretic issue without making\nclear whether, and if so why, one’s position on that issue\ndeviates from standard Bayesian thinking. Abduction, in whichever\nversion, assigns a confirmation-theoretic role to explanation:\nexplanatory considerations contribute to making some hypotheses more\ncredible, and others less so. By contrast, Bayesian confirmation\ntheory makes no reference at all to the concept of explanation. Does\nthis imply that abduction is at loggerheads with the prevailing\ndoctrine in confirmation theory? Several authors have recently argued\nthat not only is abduction compatible with Bayesianism, it is a\nmuch-needed supplement to it. The so far fullest defense of this view\nhas been given by Lipton (2004, Ch. 7); as he puts it, Bayesians\nshould also be “explanationists” (his name for the\nadvocates of abduction). (For other defenses, see Okasha 2000, McGrew\n2003, Weisberg 2009, and Poston 2014, Ch. 7; for discussion, see Roche\nand Sober 2013, 2014, and McCain and Poston 2014.)", "\nThis requires some clarification. For what could it mean for a\nBayesian to be an explanationist? In order to apply Bayes’ rule\nand determine the probability for H after learning E,\nthe Bayesian agent will have to determine the probability of H\nconditional on E. For that, he needs to assign unconditional\nprobabilities to H and E as well as a probability to\nE given H; the former two are mostly called “prior\nprobabilities” (or just “priors”) of, respectively,\nH and E, the latter the “likelihood” of\nH on E. (This is the official Bayesian story. Not all of\nthose who sympathize with Bayesianism adhere to that story. For\ninstance, according to some it is more reasonable to think that\nconditional probabilities are basic and that we derive unconditional\nprobabilities from them; see Hájek 2003, and references\ntherein.) How is the Bayesian to determine these values? As is well\nknown, probability theory gives us more probabilities once we have\nsome; it does not give us probabilities from scratch. Of course, when\nH implies E or the negation of E, or when\nH is a statistical hypothesis that bestows a certain chance on\nE, then the likelihood follows “analytically.”\n(This claim assumes some version of Lewis’ (1980) Principal\nPrinciple, and it is controversial whether or not this principle is\nanalytic; hence the scare quotes.) But this is not always the case,\nand even if it were, there would still be the question of how to\ndetermine the priors. This is where, according to Lipton, abduction\ncomes in. In his proposal, Bayesians ought to determine their prior\nprobabilities and, if applicable, likelihoods on the basis of\nexplanatory considerations.", "\nExactly how are explanatory considerations to guide one’s choice\nof priors? The answer to this question is not as simple as one might\nat first think. Suppose you are considering what priors to assign to a\ncollection of rival hypotheses and you wish to follow Lipton’s\nsuggestion. How are you to do this? An obvious—though still\nsomewhat vague—answer may seem to go like this: Whatever exact\npriors you are going to assign, you should assign a higher one to the\nhypothesis that explains the available data best than to any of its\nrivals (provided there is a best explanation). Note, though, that your\nneighbor, who is a Bayesian but thinks confirmation has nothing to do\nwith explanation, may well assign a prior to the best explanation that\nis even higher than the one you assign to that hypothesis. In fact,\nhis priors for best explanations may even be consistently higher than\nyours, not because in his view explanation is somehow related to\nconfirmation—it is not, he thinks—but, well, just because.\nIn this context, “just because” is a perfectly legitimate\nreason, because any reason for fixing one’s priors counts as\nlegitimate by Bayesian standards. According to mainstream Bayesian\nepistemology, priors (and sometimes likelihoods) are up for grabs,\nmeaning that one assignment of priors is as good as another, provided\nboth are coherent (that is, they obey the axioms of probability\ntheory). Lipton’s recommendation to the Bayesian to be an\nexplanationist is meant to be entirely general. But what should your\nneighbor do differently if he wants to follow the recommendation?\nShould he give the same prior to any best explanation that you, his\nexplanationist neighbor, give to it, that is, lower his\npriors for best explanations? Or rather should he give even\nhigher priors to best explanations than those he already\ngives?", "\nPerhaps Lipton’s proposal is not intended to address those who\nalready assign highest priors to best explanations, even if they do so\non grounds that have nothing to do with explanation. The idea might be\nthat, as long as one does assign highest priors to those hypotheses,\neverything is fine, or at least finer than if one does not do so,\nregardless of one’s reasons for assigning those priors. The\nanswer to the question of how explanatory considerations are to guide\none’s choice of priors would then presumably be that one ought\nto assign a higher prior to the best explanation than to its rivals,\nif this is not what one already does. If it is, one should just keep\ndoing what one is doing.", "\n(As an aside, it should be noticed that, according to standard\nBayesian usage, the term “priors” does not necessarily\nrefer to the degrees of belief a person assigns before the receipt of\nany data. If there are already data in, then, clearly, one\nmay assign higher priors to hypotheses that best explain the\nthen-available data. However, one can sensibly speak of “best\nexplanations” even before any data are known. For example, one\nhypothesis may be judged to be a better explanation than any of its\nrivals because the former requires less complicated mathematics, or\nbecause it is stated in terms of familiar concepts only, which is not\ntrue of the others. More generally, such judgments may be based on\nwhat Kosso (1992, 30) calls internal features of hypotheses\nor theories, that is, features that “can be evaluated without\nhaving to observe the world.”)", "\nA more interesting answer to the above question of how explanation is\nto guide one’s choice of priors has been given by Jonathan\nWeisberg (2009). We said that mainstream Bayesians regard one\nassignment of prior probabilities as being as good as any other.\nSo-called objective Bayesians do not do so, however. These Bayesians\nthink priors must obey principles beyond the probability axioms in\norder to be admissible. Objective Bayesians are divided among\nthemselves over exactly which further principles are to be obeyed, but\nat least for a while they agreed that the Principle of Indifference is\namong them. Roughly stated, this principle counsels that, absent a\nreason to the contrary, we give equal priors to competing hypotheses.\nAs is well known, however, in its original form the Principle of\nIndifference may lead to inconsistent assignments of probabilities and\nso can hardly be advertised as a principle of rationality. The problem\nis that there are typically various ways to partition logical space\nthat appear plausible given the problem at hand, and that not all of\nthem lead to the same prior probability assignment, even assuming the\nPrinciple of Indifference. Weisberg’s proposal amounts to the\nclaim that explanatory considerations may favor some of those\npartitions over others. Perhaps we will not always end up with a\nunique partition to which the Principle of Indifference is to be\napplied, but it would already be progress if we ended up with only a\nhandful of partitions. For we could then still arrive in a motivated\nway at our prior probabilities, by proceeding in two steps, namely, by\nfirst applying the Principle of Indifference to the partitions\nseparately, thereby possibly obtaining different assignments of\npriors, and by then taking a weighted average of the thus obtained\npriors, where the weights, too, are to depend on explanatory\nconsiderations. The result would again be a probability\nfunction—the uniquely correct prior probability function,\naccording to Weisberg.", "\nThe proposal is intriguing as far as it goes but, as Weisberg admits,\nin its current form, it does not go very far. For one thing, it is\nunclear how exactly explanatory considerations are to determine the\nweights required for the second step of the proposal. For another, it\nmay be idle to hope that taking explanatory considerations into\naccount will in general leave us with a manageable set of partitions,\nor that, even if it does, this will not be due merely to the fact that\nwe are overlooking a great many prima facie plausible ways of\npartitioning logical space to begin with. (The latter point echoes the\nargument of the bad lot, of course.)", "\nAnother suggestion about the connection between abduction and Bayesian\nreasoning—to be found in Okasha 2000, McGrew 2003, Lipton 2004\n(Ch. 7), and Dellsén 2018—is that the explanatory\nconsiderations may serve as a heuristic to determine, even if only\nroughly, priors and likelihoods in cases in which we would otherwise\nbe clueless and could do no better than guessing. This suggestion is\nsensitive to the well-recognized fact that we are not always able to\nassign a prior to every hypothesis of interest, or to say how probable\na given piece of evidence is conditional on a given hypothesis.\nConsideration of that hypothesis’ explanatory power might then\nhelp us to figure out, if perhaps only within certain bounds, what\nprior to assign to it, or what likelihood to assign to it on the given\nevidence.", "\nBayesians, especially the more modest ones, might want to retort that\nthe Bayesian procedure is to be followed if, and only if, either (a)\npriors and likelihoods can be determined with some precision and\nobjectivity, or (b) likelihoods can be determined with some precision\nand priors can be expected to “wash out” as more and more\nevidence accumulates, or (c) priors and likelihoods can both be\nexpected to wash out. In the remaining cases—they might\nsay—we should simply refrain from applying Bayesian reasoning. A\nfortiori, then, there is no need for an abduction-enhanced Bayesianism\nin these cases. And some incontrovertible mathematical results\nindicate that, in the cases that fall under (a), (b), or (c), our\nprobabilities will converge to the truth anyhow. Consequently, in\nthose cases there is no need for the kind of abductive heuristics that\nthe above-mentioned authors suggest, either. (Weisberg 2009, Sect.\n3.2, raises similar concerns.)", "\nPsillos (2000) proposes yet another way in which abduction might\nsupplement Bayesian confirmation theory, one that is very much in the\nspirit of Peirce’s conception of abduction. The idea is that\nabduction may assist us in selecting plausible candidates for testing,\nwhere the actual testing then is to follow Bayesian lines. However,\nPsillos concedes (2004) that this proposal assigns a role to abduction\nthat will strike committed explanationists as being too limited.", "\nFinally, a possibility that has so far not been considered in the\nliterature is that abduction and Bayesianism do not so much work in\ntandem—as they do on the above proposals—as operate in\ndifferent modes of reasoning; the Bayesian and the explanationist are\ncharacters that feature in different plays, so to speak. It is widely\naccepted that sometimes we speak and think about our beliefs in a\ncategorical manner, while at other times we speak and think about them\nin a graded way. It is far from clear how these different ways of\nspeaking and thinking about beliefs—the epistemology of belief\nand the epistemology of degrees of belief, to use Richard\nFoley’s (1992) terminology—are related to one another. In\nfact, it is an open question whether there is any straightforward\nconnection between the two, or even whether there is a connection at\nall. Be that as it may, given that the distinction is undeniable, it\nis a plausible suggestion that, just as there are different ways of\ntalking and thinking about beliefs, there are different ways of\ntalking and thinking about the revision of beliefs. In\nparticular, abduction could well have its home in the epistemology of\nbelief, and be called upon whenever we reason about our beliefs in a\ncategorical mode, while at the same time Bayes’ rule could have\nits home in the epistemology of degrees of belief. Hard-nosed\nBayesians may insist that whatever reasoning goes on in the\ncategorical mode must eventually be justifiable in Bayesian terms, but\nthis presupposes the existence of bridge principles connecting the\nepistemology of belief with the epistemology of degrees of\nbelief—and, as mentioned, whether such principles exist is\npresently unclear." ], "section_title": "4. Abduction versus Bayesian Confirmation Theory", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Achinstein, P., 2001. The Book of Evidence, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Adler, J., 1994. “Testimony, Trust, Knowing,”\nJournal of Philosophy, 91: 264–275.", "Bach, K. and Harnish, R., 1979. Linguistic Communication and\nSpeech Acts, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.", "Bird, A., 1998. 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Armour-Garb (ed.),\nReflections on the Liar, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress, pp. 325–346." ]	[ { "href": "../epistemology-bayesian/", "text": "epistemology: Bayesian" }, { "href": "../induction-problem/", "text": "induction: problem of" }, { "href": "../peirce/", "text": "Peirce, Charles Sanders" }, { "href": "../scientific-explanation/", "text": "scientific explanation" }, { "href": "../scientific-realism/", "text": "scientific realism" }, { "href": "../simplicity/", "text": "simplicity" }, { "href": "../skepticism/", "text": "skepticism" }, { "href": "../scientific-underdetermination/", "text": "underdetermination, of scientific theories" } ]
abelard	Peter Abelard	First published Tue Aug 3, 2004; substantive revision Fri Aug 12, 2022	[ "\nPeter Abelard (1079–21 April 1142) [‘Abailard’ or\n‘Abaelard’ or ‘Habalaarz’ and so on] was the\npre-eminent philosopher and theologian of the twelfth century. The\nteacher of his generation, he was also famous as a poet and a\nmusician. Prior to the recovery of Aristotle, he brought the native\nLatin tradition in philosophy to its highest pitch. His genius was\nevident in all he did. He is, arguably, the greatest logician of the\nMiddle Ages and is equally famous as the first great nominalist\nphilosopher. He championed the use of reason in matters of faith (he\nwas the first to use ‘theology’ in its modern sense), and\nhis systematic treatment of religious doctrines are as remarkable for\ntheir philosophical penetration and subtlety as they are for their\naudacity. Abelard seemed larger than life to his contemporaries: his\nquick wit, sharp tongue, perfect memory, and boundless arrogance made\nhim unbeatable in debate—he was said by supporter and detractor\nalike never to have lost an argument—and the force of his\npersonality impressed itself vividly on all with whom he came into\ncontact. His luckless affair with Héloïse made him a\ntragic figure of romance, and his conflict with Bernard of Clairvaux\nover reason and religion made him the hero of the Enlightenment. For\nall his colourful life, though, his philosophical achievements are the\ncornerstone of his fame." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Life", "1.2 Works" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Philosophy of Language", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Philosophy of Mind", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Ethics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Theology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary texts in Latin", "Primary texts in English translation", "Selected Secondary Literature in English" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAbelard’s life is relatively well-known. In addition to events\nchronicled in the public record, his inner life is revealed in his\nautobiographical letter Historia calamitatum [“The\nStory of My Troubles”] and in his famous correspondence with\nHéloïse.", "\nAbelard was born into the lesser nobility around 1079 in Le Pallet, a\nsmall town in Brittany near Nantes. He received early training in\nletters, and took to his studies with enthusiasm; his later writings\nshow familiarity with Cicero, Horace, Juvenal, Ovid, Lucan, Seneca,\nand Vergil. Abelard eventually renounced his inheritance, including\nits attendant knighthood, to pursue philosophy. He did so by\ntravelling to study with well-known philosophers, most notably\nRoscelin and William of Champeaux.", "\nDuring the first years of the twelfth century, Abelard felt confident\nenough to set himself up as a lecturer, first at Melun and then at\nCorbeil, competing mainly with William of Champeaux (Paris) for\nstudents and reputation. The strain proved too\nmuch—Abelard’s health failed, and he returned to Brittany\nfor several years.", "\nAbelard returned to Paris sometime between 1108 and 1113 with his\nhealth restored and his ambition intact. He attended William of\nChampeaux’s lectures, and entered into debate with William over\nthe problem of universals. According to Abelard’s report, he\nbested his teacher in debate, and gained his reputation as a\ndialectician of note, teaching at several schools. Around 1113 Abelard\ndecided to study theology; he sought out the most eminent teacher of\ntheology of his day, Anselm of Laon (not to be confused with Anselm of\nCanterbury), and became his student. It was not a good choice:\nAnselm’s traditional methods did not appeal to Abelard, and,\nafter some back-and-forth, Abelard returned to Paris to continue on\nhis own. It would be the last time he studied with anyone.", "\nUpon returning to Paris, Abelard became scholar-in-residence at Notre\nDame, a position he held until his romantic entanglement with\nHéloïse led to his castration, at which point he entered\nthe Benedictine monastery of Saint Denis and Héloïse\nentered the convent of Argenteuil. After his recovery, Abelard resumed\nteaching at a nearby priory, primarily on theology and in particular\non the Trinity. His method of philosophical analysis was seen as a\ndirect challenge to more traditional approaches, and a synod, convened\nin Soissons to examine Abelard’s writings, condemned them and\nrequired Abelard to make a public avowal of faith, an experience he\nfound humiliating; shortly afterwards he was allowed to settle in a\nwild and uninhabited section of land, to devote himself to\ncontemplation.", "\nIt was not to be. Abelard says that poverty forced him to resume\nteaching. He and the students who flocked to him in droves constructed\nan oratory named the Paraclete, where he continued to write, teach,\nand research. This idyll came to an end around 1126, when Abelard\naccepted an invitation to become abbot of the monastery of Saint\nGildas de Rhuys in Brittany; shortly afterwards he handed over the\nParaclete to Héloïse and the other nuns, whose convent had\nbeen expropriated. Abelard found the monks of Saint Gildas difficult\nand obstructive—even dangerous—and he claims that there\nwere several attempts on his life while in residence. During this\nperiod he wrote the Historia calamitatum and corresponded\nwith Héloïse.", "\nBy the mid-1130s Abelard was given permission to return to Paris\n(retaining his rank as abbot) and to teach in the schools on the Mont\nSte.-Genevieve. It was during this time that his theological treatises\nwere brought to the attention of Bernard of Clairvaux, who objected to\nsome of Abelard’s conclusions as well as to his approach to\nmatters of faith. After some inconclusive attempts to resolve their\ndifferences, Abelard asked the archbishop of Sens to arrange a public\ndispute between himself and Bernard on 3 June 1140, to settle their\ndisagreements. Bernard initially refused the invitation on the grounds\nthat one should not debate matters of faith, but then accepted it and,\nunknown to Abelard, arranged to convene another commission of enquiry\nto review Abelard’s works on suspicion of heresy. When Abelard\ndiscovered that there was no debate but instead a kangaroo court, he\nrefused to take part, announcing his intention to appeal to the Pope\ndirectly. He walked out of the proceedings and began travelling to\nRome. The Council condemned nineteen propositions it claimed to find\nin his works and adjourned. Bernard launched a successful campaign\npetitioning the Papal Court before Abelard was out of France; a letter\nfrom the Pope upholding the decision of the Council of Soissons\nreached Abelard while he was at Cluny; Abelard was ordered to silence.\nBy all accounts Abelard complied immediately, even meeting peacefully\nwith Bernard in reconciliation. Peter the Venerable, the abbot of\nCluny, wrote to the Pope about these matters, and the Pope lifted\nAbelard’s sentence. Abelard remained under the protection of\nPeter the Venerable first at Cluny, then at St. Marcel, as his health\ngradually deteriorated. Abelard died on 21 April 1142. His body was\ninterred at the Paraclete, and today is (with Héloïse) in\nPère Lachaise cemetery in Paris.", "\nAbelard’s students were active as kings, philosophers, poets,\npoliticians, theologians, and monks; they include three popes and\nseveral heads of state. Explicit references to Abelard’s\nthinking in the later Middle Ages are few, likely because of the cloud\ncast by the verdict of the Council of Soissons, but it is clear that\nhe had a seminal influence on twelfth-century philosophy and perhaps\non later fourteenth-century speculation as well." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Life" }, { "content": [ "\nThe dates of composition and even the number of Abelard’s\nwritings remain largely obscure and a matter of controversy among\nscholars. One reason for this is that Abelard constantly revised and\nrewrote, so that several distinct versions of a given work might be in\ncirculation; another reason is that several of his writings might\nrepresent ‘teaching notes’ constantly evolving in courses\nand seminars. Hence it is not clear that ‘date of\ncomposition’ is a well-defined notion when applied to the body\nof Abelard’s work that we now possess. Apart from\nAbelard’s correspondence, which can be dated with relative\nprecision, Abelard’s extant work falls into three\ncategories.", "\nThe first category consists of Abelard’s works on\ndialectic—works concerned with logic, philosophy of\nlanguage, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. His two masterworks\nare:", "\nBoth of these works follow the pattern of the logica vetus,\nthe “old logic” inherited from antiquity: Porphyry’s\nintroduction to Aristotle, the Isagoge; Aristotle’s\nCategories and On Interpretation; Boethius’s\nIntroduction to the Categorical Syllogism, Categorical\nSyllogisms, Hypothetical Syllogisms, On Topical\nDifference, and On Division. Abelard’s works cover\nthe material presented in the old logic, though they do so in\ndifferent ways. His Logica\n‘ingredientibus’ is a close textual commentary on\nthe old logic, though only some of it survives, namely the\ncommentaries on the Isagoge, the Categories, On\nInterpretation, and On Topical Differences; his\nDialectica is an independent treatise on dialectic that\ntreats the same material thematically, though neither the beginning\n(covering the Isagoge and the start of the\nCategories) nor the ending (on division and definition) have\nbeen preserved. In addition, there are four lesser works on\ndialectic:", "\nThe first of these is a series of elementary commentaries on the old\nlogic (though again not completely preserved); their simple level has\nled some scholars to think they must come from early in\nAbelard’s career, others to deny that they are Abelard’s\nwork at all. Second, the Logica ‘nostrorum\npetitioni sociorum’ is something of a work-in-progress: it\nassumes knowledge of Abelard’s earlier Logica\n‘ingredientibus’ and discusses advanced points\nnot dealt with there, but for long stretches it is also a\nstraightforward paraphrase of or commentary on Porphyry’s\nIsagoge; it has textual parallels with some of\nAbelard’s other works and shows some knowledge of theology. The\nthird work deals with concepts, or ‘understandings’, from\nboth the point of view of logic (roughly as providing the meanings of\nterms) and from the point of view of the philosophy of mind (as\nvehicles for mental content). The last work may be no more than a\nreport of some of Abelard’s lectures, and is concerned with\nlogical and metaphysical puzzles about wholes and parts.", "\nThe second category consists of Abelard’s works on ethics:", "\nThe Ethics offers an analysis of moral worth and the degree\nof praise or blame that should attach to agents and their actions; it\nbreaks off at the beginning of the second book. The\nConversations is a pair of debates (among characters who\nappear to Abelard in a dream) over the nature of happiness and the\nsupreme good: the Philosopher, who claims to follow only natural\nreason, first debates with the Jew, who follows the Old Law; the\nPhilosopher then debates the Christian, who defends Christian ethics\nfrom a philosophical point of view. Abelard also wrote a slight work\nof practical advice for his son:", "\nMoral advice and edifying sentiments are found in this series of\ndistichs.", "\nThe third category consists of Abelard’s works of philosophical\ntheology. His three main works are devoted to a philosophical analysis\nof the Trinity, the several versions representing successive stages of\nhis thought and his attempts at orthodoxy (each rewritten several\ntimes):", "\nThe first version of the Theology seems to have been the work\ncondemned at the Council of Soisssons, the last the work condemned at\nthe Council of Sens. In addition to these three works, in which\nproblems in philosophical theology are treated thematically, Abelard\nalso wrote several commentaries:", "\nThe first three commentaries are brief, but Abelard’s\ndiscussions of the first verses of Genesis and of\nPaul’s letter are extensive and detailed (the latter also\nrelevant to Abelard’s ethical theory). Abelard also took up\nquestions about faith and reason in a short work:", "\nThis brief inner dialogue, modelled on Augustine’s\nSoliloquies, has “Peter” talking things over with\n“Abelard.” Theological questions of a more practical\nnature were raised by Héloïse in a series of questions she\nasked on her behalf and on behalf of the nuns of the Paraclete:", "\nPractical issues are also addressed in Abelard’s sermons, hymns,\nand lamentations (planctus). Finally, Abelard composed an\nextremely influential theological work that contains no theoretical\nspeculation at all:", "\nAbelard assembles a series of 158 questions, each of which is\nfurnished with patristic citations that imply a positive answer\n(sic) to the question and other patristic citations implying\na negative answer (non). Abelard does not attempt to\nharmonize these apparently inconsistent remarks, but in his preface he\nlays down rules for proper hermeneutic investigation: look for\nambiguity, check the surrounding context, draw relevant distinctions,\nand the like.", "\nAbelard’s students and disciples also record many of his views,\nthough this material has yet to be explored carefully. There are\nreferences in Abelard’s extant works to other works we do not\nhave: Grammatica, “Grammar”; Rhetorica,\n“Rhetoric”; a commentary on Ezekiel written at\nthe beginning of his studies in theology; and others. It is possible\nsome of these works may yet be found." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Works" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAbelard’s metaphysics is the first great example of nominalism\nin the Western tradition. While his view that universals are mere\nwords (nomina) justifies the label, nominalism—or,\nbetter, irrealism—is the hallmark of Abelard’s entire\nmetaphysics. He is an irrealist not only about universals, but also\nabout propositions, events, times other than the present, natural\nkinds, relations, wholes, absolute space, hylomorphic composites, and\nthe like. Instead, Abelard holds that the concrete individual, in all\nits richness and variety, is more than enough to populate the world.\nAbelard preferred reductive, atomist, and material explanations\nwhenever possible; he devoted a great deal of effort to pouring cold\nwater on the metaphysical excesses of his predecessors and\ncontemporaries.", "\nAbelard defends his thesis that universals are nothing but words by\narguing that ontological realism about universals is incoherent. More\nexactly, he holds that there cannot be any real object in the world\nsatisfying Boethius’s criteria for the universal, namely\nsomething present as a whole in many at once so as to constitute their\nsubstance (i.e. to make the individual in which it is present what it\nis). Hence, Abelard concludes, universality is not an ontological\nfeature of the world but a semantic feature of language.", "\nSuppose universals were things in the world, so that one and the same\nitem is completely present in both Socrates and an ass at the same\ntime, making each to be wholly an animal. Abelard points out that then\nthe same thing, animal, will be simultaneously rational (due\nto its role in constituting the species human being) and\nirrational (due to its role in constituting the species ass).\nBut then contraries are simultaneously present in the same thing as a\nwhole, which is impossible.", "\nTo the rejoinder that rationality and irrationality are not actually\npresent in the same thing, Abelard offers a twofold reply. First, he\nrejects the claim that they are present only potentially. Each species\nis actually informed by a contrary, and the genus is actually present\nin each as a whole; hence it is actually informed by one contrary in\none species and by the other in the other; since it is wholly one and\nthe same in each, it is therefore actually informed by contraries, and\nthe contradiction results. Second, Abelard undertakes to establish\nthat contraries will be present not merely in the genus but even in\nthe selfsame individual. For Socrates is (an) animal, and so is\nBrunellus the Ass; but by transitivity—since each is wholly and\ncompletely animal—Socrates is Brunellus, and hence both\nrational and irrational. Put a different way, each is essentially an\nanimal, and furthermore essentially rational and essentially\nirrational.", "\nIf we object to this last piece of reasoning, on the grounds that\nindividuals are unique in virtue of their non-essential features,\nAbelard replies that this view “makes accidents prior to\nsubstance.” That is, the objection claims that individual things\nare individual in virtue of features that contingently characterize\nthem, which confuses things with their features.", "\nProspects are no better for realism if the universal is identified not\nwith a single thing but with a collection of things. Abelard points\nout that collections are posterior to their parts, and, furthermore,\nthe collection is not shared among its parts in the way a universal is\nsaid to be common to many. Nor does it help to try to identify the\nuniversal with the individual in some fashion, for example in claiming\nthat Socrates qua human is taken as the universal human\nbeing; Abelard argues that if the universal really is the\nindividual, then we are stuck with the consequence that either\nindividuals such as Socrates are common to many, or there are as many\nuniversals as there are individuals, each of which is absurd.", "\nAbelard concludes that universality is merely linguistic, not a\nfeature of the world. More precisely, Abelard holds that common nouns\n(such as ‘animal’), verbs, and negative names (such as\n‘not-Socrates’) are correctly predicable of many, and so\ncount as universals. These terms are semantically general, in that\ntheir sense applies to more than one thing, but they do not thereby\nname some general thing; instead, they distributively refer to each of\nthe individuals to which the term applies. For example, the term\n‘animal’ has the sense living substance, which is\ninherently general, and it refers to each individual animal since each\nis a living substance—as Abelard puts it, since each has the\nstatus of being a living substance. But this is to leave the domain of\nmetaphysics for semantics; see the discussion of Abelard‘s\nphilosophy of language in\n Section 4.", "\nAbelard maintains that everything in the world apart from God and\nangels is either form, matter, or a composite of form and matter. The\nmatter of something is that out of which it is made, whether it\npersists in the finished product (as bricks in a house) or is absorbed\ninto it (as flour in bread). Ultimately, all material objects are\ncomposed of the four elements earth, air, fire, and water, but they do\nnot retain their elemental forms in most combinations. In general, the\nform of a material object just is the configuration of its material\nparts: “We call the form strictly what comes from the\ncomposition of the parts.” The form of a statue, for example, is\nits shape, which is no more than the arrangement of its\nmatter—the curve of the nose, the size of the eyes, and so on.\nForms are therefore supervenient on matter, and have no\nontological standing independent of it. This is not to deny that forms\nexist, but to provide a particular explanation of what it is for a\nform to inhere in a given subject, namely for that subject to have its\nmatter configured in a certain way. For example, the inherence of\nshape in the statue just is the way in which its bronze is arranged.\nHence material things are identical with what they are made\nof—with one exception: human beings, whose forms are their\nimmaterial (and immortal) souls. Strictly speaking, since human souls\nare capable of existence in separation form the body, they are not\nforms after all, though they act as substantial forms as long as they\nare joined to the body.", "\nMaterial composites of form and matter, humans excepted, are integral\nwholes made up of their discrete material parts as configured in a\ngiven way. Abelard countenances many types of integral wholes:\ncollections, no matter how their members are selected; structured\ncomposites, whether naturally unified (such as Socrates and his limbs)\nor artificially unified (such as the walls, floor, and roof of a\nhouse); continuous quantities that are homogeneous material\n‘substances,’ namely stuffs, such as water or gold;\ngeometrical objects, such as lines, defined by the relative position\nof their parts; temporal wholes, such as a day and the hours that make\nit up. Most of these wholes are ontologically nothing beyond their\nmaterial parts. Whether structured composites have any independent\nontological standing depends on the status of their organizing\nforms.", "\nAbelard’s theory of substantial integral wholes is not a pure\nmereology in the modern sense, since he holds that there are\nprivileged divisions: just as a genus is properly divided into not\njust any species but its proximate species, so too the division of a\nwhole must be into its principal parts. Intuitively, some wholes have\na natural division that takes precedence over others; a sentence, for\nexample, is divided into words, syllables, and letters, in precisely\nthat order. According to Abelard, the principal parts of a whole are\nthose whose conjunction immediately results in the complete whole. His\nintent seems to be that the nature of the composition (if any) that\ndefines the integral whole also spells out its principal parts. A\nhouse consists of floor, walls, and roof put together in the right\nway. It is an open question whether each principal part (such as the\nwall) requires the existence of all of its subparts (every brick). The\nprincipal parts of a collection, for example, are just each of the\nmembers of the collection, whatever may be the case with any given\nmember’s subparts; the principal parts of an aggregation are the\nmembers located in proximity to one another.", "\nIndividuals have natures, and in virtue of their natures they belong\nto determinate natural kinds. But an individual’s nature is not\nsomething really shared with or common to other individuals;\nAbelard’s refutation of realism has shown that this is\nimpossible. Instead, Abelard takes a natural kind to be a well-defined\ncollection of things that have the same features, broadly speaking,\nthat make them what they are. Why a given thing has some features\nrather than others is explained by how it got that way—the\nnatural processes that created it result in its having the features it\ndoes, namely being the kind of thing it is; similar processes lead to\nsimilar results. On this reading, it is clear that natural kinds have\nno special status; they are no more than discrete integral wholes\nwhose principle of membership is similarity, merely reflecting the\nfact that the world is divided into discrete similarity-classes of\nobjects. Furthermore, such real relations of similarity are nothing\nthemselves above and beyond the things that are similar. The division\ninto natural kinds is, presumably, a ‘shallow fact’ about\nthe world: matters could have been otherwise had God ordained them\ndifferently; fire might be cold, heavy bodies fall upwards, frogs\nreason. If these causal powers were different, then natural kinds\nmight be different as well, or might not have been as sharply\ndifferentiated as they are now. Given how matters stand, natural kinds\ncarve the world at its joints, but they are the joints chosen by\nGod." ], "section_title": "2. Metaphysics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAbelard was the greatest logician since Antiquity: he devised a purely\ntruth-functional propositional logic, recognizing the distinction\nbetween force and content we associate with Frege,\nand worked out a complete theory of entailment as it functions in\nargument (which we now take as the theory of logical consequence). His\nlogical system is flawed in its handling of topical inference, but\nthat should not prevent our recognition of Abelard’s\nachievements.", "\nAbelard observes that the same propositional content can be expressed\nwith different force in different contexts: the content that\nSocrates is in the house is expressed in an assertion in\n‘Socrates is in the house’; in a question in ‘Is\nSocrates in the house?’; in a wish in ‘If only Socrates\nwere in the house!’ and so on. Hence Abelard can distinguish in\nparticular the assertive force of a sentence from its propositional\ncontent, a distinction that allows him to point out that the component\nsentences in a conditional statement are not asserted, though they\nhave the same content they do when asserted—‘If Socrates\nis in the kitchen, then Socrates is in the house’ does not\nassert that Socrates is in the kitchen or that he is in the house, nor\ndo the antecedent or the consequent, although the same form of words\ncould be used outside the scope of the conditional to make such\nassertions. Likewise, the distinction allows Abelard to define\nnegation, and other propositional connectives, purely\ntruth-functionally in terms of content, so that negation, for\ninstance, is treated as follows: not-p is false/true if and\nonly if p is true/false.", "\nThe key to the theory of argument, for Abelard, is found in\ninferentia, best rendered as ‘entailment’, since\nAbelard requires the connection between the propositions involved to\nbe both necessary and relevant. That is, the conclusion—more\nexactly, the sense of the final statement—is required by the\nsense of the preceding statement(s), so that it cannot be otherwise.\nAbelard often speaks of the sense of the final statement being\n“contained” in the sense of the preceding statement(s),\nmuch as we speak of the conclusion being contained in the premisses.\nAn entailment is complete (perfecta) when it holds in virtue\nof the logical form (complexio) of the propositions involved.\nBy this, Abelard tells us, he means that the entailment holds under\nany uniform substitution in its terms, the criterion now associated\nwith Bolzano. The traditional four figures and moods of the\ncategorical syllogism derived from Aristotle, and the doctrine of the\nhypothetical syllogism derived from Boethius, are all instances of\ncomplete entailments, or as we should say, valid inference.", "\nThere is another way in which conclusions can be necessary and\nrelevant to their premisses, yet not be formally valid (not\nbe a complete entailment). The necessary connection among the\npropositions, and the link among their senses, might be a function of\nnon-formal metaphysical truths holding in all possible worlds. For\ninstance, human beings are a kind of animal, so the consequence\n‘If Socrates is a human being, Socrates is an animal’\nholds of necessity and the sense of the antecedent compels that of the\nconsequent, but it is not formally valid under uniform substitution.\nAbelard takes such incomplete entailments to hold according to the\ntheory of the topics (to be forms of so-called topical inference). The\nsample inference above is validated by the topic “from the\nspecies”, a set of metaphysical relations one of which is\nexpressible in the rule “Whatever the species is predicated of,\nso too is the genus” which grounds the inferential force of the\nentailment. Against Boethius, Abelard maintained that topical rules\nwere only needed for incomplete entailment, and in particular are not\nrequired to validate the classical moods of the categorical and\nhypothetical syllogism mentioned in the preceding paragraph.", "\nAbelard spends a great deal of effort to explore the complexities of\nthe theory of topical inference, especially charting the precise\nrelations among conditional sentences, arguments, and what he calls\n“argumentation” (roughly what follows from conceded\npremisses). One of the surprising results of his investigation is that\nhe denies that a correlate of the Deduction Theorem holds, maintaining\nthat a valid argument need not correspond to an acceptable conditional\nsentence, nor conversely, since the requirements on arguments and\nconditionals differ.", "\nIn the end, it seems that Abelard’s principles of topical\ninference do not work, a fact that became evident with regard to the\ntopic “from opposites”: Abelard’s principles lead to\ninconsistent results, a result noted by Alberic of Paris. This led to\na crisis in the theory of inference in the twelfth century, since\nAbelard unsuccessfully tried to evade the difficulty. These debates\nseem to have taken place in the later part of the 1130s, as Abelard\nwas about to become embroiled with Bernard of Clairvaux, and his\nattention was elsewhere." ], "section_title": "3. Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nMuch of Abelard’s philosophy of language is devoted to analyzing\nhow a given expression or class of expressions function logically:\nwhat words are quantifiers, which imply negation, and the like, so\nthat the logic described above may be applied. To do so, he relies on\nthe traditional division, derived from Aristotle, that sees the main\nlinguistic categories as name, verb, and their\ncombination into the sentence.", "\nAbelard takes names to be conventionally significant simple words,\nusually without tense. So understood there are a wide variety of\nnames: proper and common names; adjectives and adverbs; pronouns,\nwhether personal, possessive, reflexive, or relative; conventional\ninterjections such as ‘Goodness!’; and, arguably,\nconjunctions and prepositions (despite lacking definite\nsignification), along with participles and gerundives (which have\ntense). Abelard usually, though not always, treats compound names such\nas ‘street-sweeper’ reductively. Even so his list is not\ngeneral enough to catalogue all referring expressions. In point of\nfact, much of Abelard’s discussion of the semantics of names\nturns on a particular case that stands for the rest: common names.\nThese are at the heart of the problem of universals, and they pose\nparticular difficulties for semantics.", "\nWhen Abelard puts forward his claim that universality is only a\nlinguistic phenomenon, so that universals are “nothing more than\nwords,” he raises the objection that unless common names are the\nnames of common items, they will be meaningless, and so his view is no\nbetter than that of his teacher Roscelin (who held that universals\nwere mere mouth noises). In reply Abelard clearly draws a distinction\nbetween two semantic properties names possess: reference\n(nominatio), a matter of what the term applies to; and sense\n(significatio), a matter of what hearing the term brings to\nmind, or more exactly the informational content (doctrina) of\nthe concept the word is meant to give rise to, a causal notion. A few\nremarks about each are in order.", "\nNames, both proper and common, refer to things individually or\nseverally. A name is linked with that of which it is the name as\nthough there were someone who devised the name to label a given thing\nor kind of thing, a process known as “imposition”\n(modelled on Adam’s naming the animals in Genesis 2:19), rather\nlike baptism. This rational reconstruction of reference does not\nrequire the person imposing the name, the “impositor”, to\nhave anything more than an indefinite intention to pick out the thing\nor kind of thing, whatever its nature may be:", "\nThe inventor [of names] intended to impose them according to some\nnatures or distinctive properties of things, even if he himself did\nnot know how to think correctly upon the nature or distinctive\nproperty of a thing.\n", "\nA name “has a definition in the nature of its imposition, even\nif we do not know what it is.” Put in modern terms, Abelard\nholds a theory of direct reference, in which the extension of\na term is not a function of its sense. We are often completely\nignorant of the proper conceptual content that should be associated\nwith a term that has been successfully imposed.", "\nA proper name—the name of a primary substance—signifies a\nconcrete individual (hoc aliquid), picking out its bearer as\npersonally distinct from all else. Therefore, proper names are\nsemantically singular referring expressions, closely allied to\nindexicals, demonstratives, and singular descriptions (or descriptive\nterms). Common names, by contrast, are semantically allied with\nexpressions that have what Abelard calls “plural\nsignification”. On the one hand, common names are like plural\nnouns; the common name ‘man’ is grammatically singular but\noperates like the plural term ‘men’—each refers to\nevery man, although the plural term signifies individuals as part of a\ncollection, whereas the common name distributively refers to each\nindividual. On the other hand, common names are like terms such as\n‘trio’ or ‘pair’ in that they pick out a\ndeterminate plurality of individuals, but only on an occasion of use,\nsince their extension is variable.", "\nThus a common name distributively refers to concrete individuals,\nthough not to them qua individuals. Instead, it severally\npicks out those individuals having a given nature: ‘human\nbeing’ refers to Socrates and to Plato, in virtue of each of\nthem being human. This is not a shared feature of any sort; Socrates\njust is what he is, namely human, and likewise Plato is what he is,\nnamely human too. Abelard states his deflationary position clearly in\nhis Logica ‘ingredientibus’:", "\nNow it seems we should stay away from accepting the agreement among\nthings according to what is not any thing—it’s as though\nwe were to unite in nothing things that now exist!—namely, when\nwe say that this [human] and that one agree in the human status, that\nis to say: in that they are human. But we mean precisely that they are\nhuman and don’t differ in this regard—let me repeat: [they\ndon’t differ] in that they are human, although we’re not\nappealing to any thing [in this explanation].\n", "\nSocrates and Plato are real; their agreement is real, too, but it\nisn’t to be explained by appealing to any thing—their\nagreement just is their each being human. From a metaphysical point of\nview they have the same standing as human beings; this does not\ninvolve any metaphysically common shared ingredient, or indeed appeal\nto any ingredient at all. That is the sense in which there is a\n“common reason” for the imposition of a common name. ", "\nFor all that signification is posterior to reference, names do have\nsignification as well. Abelard holds that the signification of a term\nis the informational content of the concept that is associated with\nthe term upon hearing it, in the normal course of events. Since names\nare only conventionally significant, which concept is associated with\na given name depends in part on the psychological conditioning of\nlanguage-users, in virtue of which Abelard can treat signification as\nboth a causal and a normative notion: the word ‘rabbit’\nought to cause native speakers of English to have the concept of a\nrabbit upon hearing it. Abelard is careful to insist that the\nsignification is a matter of the informational content carried in the\nconcept—mere psychological associations, even the mental images\ncharacteristic of a given concept, are not part of what the word\nmeans. Ideally, the concept will correspond to a real\ndefinition that latches onto the nature of the thing, the way\n‘rational mortal animal’ is thought to be the real\ndefinition of ‘human being’, regardless of other\nassociated features (even necessary features such as risibility) or\nfortuitous images (as any mental image of a human will be of someone\nwith determinate features). Achieving such clarity in our concepts is,\nof course, an arduous business, and requires an understanding of how\nunderstanding itself works (see the discussion of Abelard’s\nphilosophy of mind in\n Section 5).\n Yet one point should be clear from the example. The significations of\nsome names, such as those corresponding to natural-kind terms, are\nabstractions in the sense that they include only certain features of\nthe things to which the term refers. They do not positively exclude\nall other features, though, and are capable of further determinate\nspecification: ‘rational mortal animal’ as the content of\nthe concept of ‘human being’ signifies all humans,\nwhatever their further features may be—tall or short, fat or\nthin, male or female, and so on.", "\nWhat holds for the semantics of names applies for the most part to\nverbs. The feature that sets verbs apart from names, more so than\ntense or grammatical person, is that verbs have connective force\n(vis copulativa). This is a primitive and irreducible feature\nof verbs that can only be discharged when they are joined with names\nin the syntactically appropriate way, reminiscent of the\n‘unsaturatedness’ of concepts in Frege. Sentences are made\nup of names and verbs in such a way that the meaning of the whole\nsentence is a function of the meaning of its parts. That is,\nAbelardian semantics is fundamentally compositional in nature. The\ndetails of how the composition works are complex. Abelard works\ndirectly with a natural language (Latin) that, for all its\nartificiality, is still a native second tongue. Hence there are many\nlinguistic phenomena Abelard is compelled to analyze that would be\nsimply disallowed in a more formal framework.", "\nFor example, Abelard notes that most verbs can occur as predicates in\ntwo ways, namely as a finite verbal form or as a nominal form combined\nwith an auxiliary copula, so that we may say either ‘Socrates\nruns’ or ‘Socrates is running’; the same holds for\ntransitive predication, for instance ‘Socrates hits Plato’\nand ‘Socrates is hitting Plato.’ Abelard argues that in\ngeneral the pure verbal version of predication is the fundamental\nform, which explains and clarifies the extended version; the latter is\nonly strictly necessary where simple verbal forms are lacking. (The\nsubstantive verb ‘is’ requires special treatment.) Hence\nfor Abelard the basic analysis of a predicative statement recognizes\nthat two fundamentally different linguistic categories are joined\ntogether: the name n and the simple verbal function\nV( ), combined in the well-formed sentence\nV(n).", "\nAbelard argues that sentences (propositiones) must signify\nmore than just the understandings of the constituent name and verb.\nFirst, a sentence such as ‘Socrates runs’ deals with\nSocrates and with running, not with anyone’s understandings. We\ntalk about the world, not merely someone’s understanding of the\nworld. Second, sentences like ‘If something is human, it is an\nanimal’ are false if taken to be about understandings, for\nsomeone could entertain the concept human without\nentertaining the concept animal, and so the antecedent would\nobtain without the consequent. Third, understandings are evanescent\nparticulars, mere mental tokenings of concepts. But at least some\nconsequential sentences are necessary, and necessity can’t be\ngrounded on things that are transitory, and so not on understandings.\nSentences must therefore signify something else in addition to\nunderstandings, something that can do what mere understandings cannot.\nAbelard describes this as signifying what the sentence says, calling\nwhat is said by the sentence its dictum (plural\ndicta).", "\nTo the modern philosophical ear, Abelard’s dicta might\nsound like propositions, abstract entities that are the timeless\nbearers of truth and falsity. But Abelard will have nothing to do with\nany such entities. He declares repeatedly and emphatically that\ndespite being more than and different from the sentences that express\nthem, dicta have no ontological standing whatsoever. In the\nshort space of a single paragraph he says that they are “no real\nthings at all” and twice calls them “absolutely\nnothing.” They underwrite sentences, but they aren’t real\nthings. For although a sentence says something, there is not some\nthing that it says. The semantic job of sentences is to say\nsomething, which is not to be confused with naming or denoting some\nthing. It is instead a matter of proposing how things are, provided\nthis is not given a realist reading. Likewise, the truth of true\nsentences is not a property inhering in some timeless entity, but no\nmore than the assertion of what the sentence says—that is,\nAbelard adopts a deflationary account of truth. A sentence is true if\nthings stand in the way it says, and things make sentences true or\nfalse in virtue of the way they are (as well as in virtue of what the\nsentences say), and nothing further is required. The sentence\n‘Socrates runs’ is true because Socrates runs, which is\nall that can be said or needs to be said." ], "section_title": "4. Philosophy of Language", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAristotelian philosophy of mind offers two analyses of intentionality:\nthe conformality theory holds that we think of an object by having its\nvery form in the mind, the resemblance theory that we do so by having\na mental image in the mind that naturally resembles the object.\nAbelard rejects each of these theories and proposes instead an\nadverbial theory of thought, showing that neither mental images nor\nmental contents need be countenanced as ontologically independent of\nthe mind. He gives a contextual explication of intentionality that\nrelies on a linguistic account of mental representation, adopting a\nprinciple of compositionality for understandings.", "\nThe first Aristotelian analysis takes understanding to be the\nmind’s acquisition of the form of the object that is understood,\nwithout its matter. For an understanding to be about some\nthing—say, a cat—is for the form of the cat to be in the\nmind or intellective soul. The inherence of the form in matter makes\nthe matter to be a thing of a certain kind, so that the inherence of\nthe form cat in matter produces an actual cat, whereas the\n(immaterial) inherence of the form cat in the mind transforms\nthe mind into an understanding of a cat: the mind becomes (formally)\nidentical with its object. Since the ‘aboutness’ of\nunderstanding is analyzed as the commonness or identity of form in the\nunderstanding and the thing understood, we may call this approach the\nconformality theory of understanding. This theory captures\nthe intuition that understanding somehow inherits or includes\nproperties of what is understood, by reducing the intentionality of\nunderstanding to the objective identity of the form in the mind and\nthe form in the world.", "\nThe second Aristotelian analysis takes understanding to be the\nmind’s possession of a concept that is a natural likeness of, or\nnaturally similar to, that of which it is a concept. For an\nunderstanding to be about some thing, such as a cat, is for there to\nbe an occurrent concept in the mind that is a natural likeness of a\ncat. The motivation for calling the likeness “natural” is\nto guarantee that the resemblance between the understanding and what\nis understood is objective, and that all persons have access to the\nsame stock of concepts. (The conformality theory does this by\npostulating the objective existence of forms in things and by an\nidentical process in all persons of assimilating or acquiring forms.)\nWe may call this approach the resemblance theory of\nunderstanding: mental acts are classified according to the distinct\ndegree and kind of resemblance they have to the things that are\nunderstood.", "\nThe resemblance theory faces well-known problems in spelling out the\ncontent of resemblance or likeness. For example, a concept is clearly\nimmaterial, and as such radically differs from any material object.\nFurthermore, there seems to be no formal characteristic of a mental\nact in virtue of which it can non-trivially be said to resemble\nanything else. To get around these difficulties, mediaeval\nphilosophers, like the British Empiricists centuries later, appealed\nto a particular kind of resemblance, namely pictorial resemblance. A\nportrait of Socrates is about Socrates in virtue of visually\nresembling Socrates in the right ways. And just as there are pictorial\nimages that are about their subjects, so too are there mental images\nthat are about things. These mental images, whether they are concepts\nor are contained in concepts, explain the way in which a concept is\n‘about’ an object. For an understanding to be about a cat\nis for it to be or contain a mental image of a cat. The phenomenon of\nmental ‘aboutness’ is explicated by the more familiar case\nof pictorial aboutness, itself reduced to a real relation of\nresemblance.", "\nDespite their common Aristotelian heritage, the conformality theory\nand the resemblance theory are not equivalent. The transformation of\nthe mind through the inherence of a form is not necessarily the same\nas the mind’s possession of a concept. Equally, natural likeness\nor resemblance need not be understood as identity of form; formal\nidentity need not entail genuine resemblance, due to the different\nsubjects in which the form is embodied.", "\nThe standard way to reconcile the conformality theory and the\nresemblance theory is to take the mind’s possession of a concept\nto be its ability to transform itself through the inherence of a form,\nconstruing formal identity as natural likeness, where having a form in\nthe mind that is identical to the form of the object understood just\nis to have a mental image of that very object.", "\nAbelard argues against conformality as follows. Consider a tower,\nwhich is a material object with a certain length, depth, and height;\nassume that these features compose its form, much as the shape of a\nstatue is its form. According to Aristotelian metaphysics, the\ninherence of a form in a subject makes the subject into something\ncharacterized by that form, as for instance whiteness inhering in\nSocrates makes him something white. The forms of the tower likewise\nmake that in which they inhere to be tall, wide, massive—all\nphysical properties. If these forms inhere in the mind, then, they\nshould make the mind tall, wide, and massive, an absurd conclusion:\nthe mind “cannot extend itself in length or width.” Yet it\nis a cardinal thesis of the conformality theory that the mind has the\nidentical form that is possessed by the external object, the tower,\nalthough the form of (say) length is by its very nature physical.\nThus, Abelard concludes, conformality is incoherent.", "\nAbelard’s main objection to the resemblance theory is that\nmental images qua images, like any sign, are inert: they\nrequire interpretation. A sign is just an object. It may be taken in a\nsignificative role, though it need not be. Abelard notes that this\ndistinction holds equally for non-mental signs: we can treat a statue\nas a lump of bronze or as a likeness. Mental images are likewise\ninert. For a sign to function significatively, then, something more is\nrequired beyond its mere presence or existence. But the resemblance\ntheory doesn’t recognize the need to interpret the mental image\nas an image, and thereby mistakenly identifies understanding with the\nmere presence of a mental image in the mind. Abelard concludes that\nmental images have only an instrumental role in thought, describing\nthem as “intermediary signs of things” (intersigna\nrerum). Intentionality derives instead from the act of attention\n(attentio) directed upon the mental image. Proof is found in\nthe fact that that we can “vary the understanding” simply\nby attending to different features of the mental image: the selfsame\nimage—say, a fig tree—can be used to think about this very\nfig tree, or trees in general, or plant life, or my lost love with\nwhom I sat under it, or anything whatsoever. There is no intrinsic\nfeature of the mental image in virtue of which it is about any given\nthing; if there were, Abelard notes, we could determine by inspection\nwhat a sign is about—but we can’t. Mental images,\ntherefore, can’t explain the intentionality of understanding,\nbecause their role is merely instrumental. We think with them, and\ncannot avoid them; but they do not explain intentionality.", "\nAbelard draws the conclusion that intentionality is a primitive and\nirreducible feature of the mind, our acts of attending to things.\nDifferent acts of attention are intrinsically different from one\nanother; they are about what they are about in virtue of being the\nkind of attention they are. Hence Abelard adopts what is nowadays\ncalled an adverbial theory of thought.", "\nGiven that intentionality is primitive, Abelard adopts a contextual\napproach to mental content: he embeds these irreducible acts of\nattention in a structure whose articulation helps define the character\nof its constituent elements. The structure Abelard offers is\nlinguistic, a logic of mental acts: just as words can be said to\nexpress thoughts, so too we can use the articulated logic of language\nto give a theory of understanding. In short, Abelard gives something\nvery like a linguistic account of mental representation or\nintentionality. To this end he embraces a principle of\ncompositionality, holding that what an understanding is about is a\nfunction of what its constituent understandings are about. The unity\nof the understanding of a complex is a function of its logical\nsimplicity, which is characterized by the presence of what Abelard\ncalls “a single dominant conjunction” (the logical\noperator of greatest scope). Hence the understanding of a complex may\nbe treated as a complex of distinct understandings, aggregated in the\nsame thought, with its (logical) structure flowing from the\n‘dominant conjunction’ over the other logical operations\ngoverning its constituent understandings. Abelard’s acts of\nattention thus display the logical structure of the understanding they\nexpress, and thereby give the semantics of written or spoken language.\nMuch of Abelard’s writings on logic and dialectic are given over\nto working out the details as a scheme for explicating mental\ncontent." ], "section_title": "5. Philosophy of Mind", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAbelard takes the rational core of traditional Christian morality to\nbe radically intentionalist, based on the following\nprinciple: the agent’s intention alone determines the moral\nworth of an action. His main argument against the moral relevance of\nconsequences turns on what contemporary philosophers often refer to as\nmoral luck. Suppose two men each have the money and the intention to\nestablish shelters for the poor, but one is robbed before he can act\nwhereas the second is able to carry out his intention. According to\nAbelard, to think that there is a moral difference between them is to\nhold that “the richer men were the better they could become\n… this is the height of insanity!” Deed-centred morality\nloses any kind of purchase on what might have been the case. Likewise,\nit cannot offer any ground for taking the epistemic status of the\nagent into account, although most people would admit that ignorance\ncan morally exculpate an agent. Abelard makes the point with the\nfollowing example: imagine the case of fraternal twins, brother and\nsister, who are separated at birth and each kept in complete ignorance\nof even the existence of the other; as adults they meet, fall in love,\nare legally married and have sexual intercourse. Technically this is\nincest, but Abelard finds no fault in either to lay blame.", "\nAbelard concludes that in themselves deeds are morally indifferent.\nThe proper subject of moral evaluation is the agent, via his or her\nintentions. It might be objected that the performance or\nnonperformance of the deed could affect the agent’s feelings,\nwhich in turn may affect his or her intentions, so that deeds thereby\nhave moral relevance (at least indirectly). Abelard denies it:", "\nFor example, if someone forces a monk to lie bound in chains between\ntwo women, and by the softness of the bed and the touch of the women\nbeside him he is brought to pleasure (but not to consent), who may\npresume to call this pleasure, which nature makes necessary, a fault?\n", "\nWe are so constructed that the feeling of pleasure is inevitable in\ncertain situations: sexual intercourse, eating delicious food, and the\nlike. If sexual pleasure in marriage is not sinful, then the pleasure\nitself, inside or outside of marriage, is not sinful; if it is sinful,\nthen marriage cannot sanctify it—and if the conclusion were\ndrawn that such acts should be performed wholly without pleasure, then\nAbelard declares they cannot be done at all, and it was unreasonable\n(of God) to permit them only in a way in which they cannot be\nperformed.", "\nOn the positive side, Abelard argues that unless intentions are the\nkey ingredient in assessing moral value it is hard to see why\ncoercion, in which one is forced to do something against his or her\nwill, should exculpate the agent; likewise for ignorance—though\nAbelard points out that the important moral notion is not simply\nignorance but strictly speaking negligence. Abelard takes an extreme\ncase to make his point. He argues that the crucifiers of Christ were\nnot evil in crucifying Jesus. (This example, and others like it, got\nAbelard into trouble with the authorities, and it isn’t hard to\nsee why.) Their ignorance of Christ’s divine nature didn’t\nby itself make them evil; neither did their acting on their (false and\nmistaken) beliefs, in crucifying Christ. Their non-negligent ignorance\nremoves blame from their actions. Indeed, Abelard argues that they\nwould have sinned had they thought crucifying Christ was required and\ndid not crucify Christ: regardless of the facts of the case,\nfailing to abide by one’s conscience in moral action renders the\nagent blameworthy.", "\nThere are two obvious objections to Abelard’s intentionalism.\nFirst, how is it possible to commit evil voluntarily? Second, since\nintentions are not accessible to anyone other than the agent,\ndoesn’t Abelard’s view entail that it is impossible to\nmake ethical judgements?", "\nWith regard to the first objection, Abelard has a twofold answer.\nFirst, it is clear that we often want to perform the deed and at the\nsame time do not want to suffer the punishment. A man wants to have\nsexual intercourse with a woman, but not to commit adultery; he would\nprefer it if she were unmarried. Second, it is clear that we sometimes\n“want what we by no means want to want”: our bodies react\nwith pleasure and desire independently of our wills. If we act on such\ndesires, then our action is done “of” will, as Abelard\ncalls it, though not voluntarily. There is nothing evil in desire:\nthere is only evil in acting on desire, and this is compatible with\nhaving contrary desires.", "\nWith regard to the second objection, Abelard grants that other humans\ncannot know the agent’s intentions—God, of course, does\nhave access to internal mental states, and so there can be a Final\nJudgement. However, Abelard does not take ethical judgement to pose a\nproblem. God is the only one with a right to pass judgement. Yet this\nfact doesn’t prevent us from enforcing canons of human justice,\nbecause, Abelard holds, human justice has primarily an exemplary and\ndeterrent function. In fact, Abelard argues, it can even be just to\npunish an agent we strongly believe had no evil intention. He cites\ntwo cases. First, a woman accidentally smothers her baby while trying\nto keep it warm at night, and is overcome with grief. Abelard\nmaintains that we should punish her for the beneficial example her\npunishment may have on others: it may make other poor mothers more\ncareful not to accidentally smother their babies while trying to keep\nthem warm. Second, a judge may have excellent (but legally\nimpermissible) evidence that a witness is perjuring himself; since he\ncannot show that the witness is lying, the judge is forced to rule on\nthe basis of the witness’s testimony that the accused, whom he\nbelieves to be innocent, is guilty. Human justice may with propriety\nignore questions of intention. Since there is divine justice, ethical\nnotions are not an idle wheel—nor should they be, even on\nAbelard’s understanding of human justice, since they are the\nmeans by which we determine which intentions to promote or discourage\nwhen we punish people as examples or in order to deter others.", "\nThere is a sense, then, in which the only certifiable sin is acting\nagainst one’s conscience, unless one is morally negligent. Yet\nif we cannot look to the intrinsic value of the deeds or their\nconsequences, how do we determine which acts are permissible or\nobligatory? Unless conscience has a reliable guide, Abelard’s\nposition seems to open the floodgates to well-meaning\nsubjectivism.", "\nAbelard solves the problem by taking obedience to God’s\nwill—the hallmark of morally correct behaviour, and itself an\ninstance of natural law—to be a matter of the agent’s\nintention conforming to a purely formal criterion, namely the Golden\nRule (“Do to others as you would be done to”). This\ncriterion can be discovered by reason alone, without any special\nrevelation or religious belief, and is sufficient to ensure the\nrightness of the agent’s intention. But the resolution of this\nproblem immediately leads to another problem. Even if we grant Abelard\nhis naturalistic ethics, why should an agent care if his or her\nintentions conform to the Golden Rule? In short, even if Abelard were\nright about morality, why be moral?", "\nAbelard’s answer is that our happiness—to which no one is\nindifferent—is linked to virtue, that is, to habitual morally\ncorrect behaviour. Indeed, Abelard’s project in the\nCollationes is to argue that reason can prove that a merely\nnaturalistic ethics is insufficient, and that an agent’s\nhappiness is necessarily bound up with accepting the principles of\ntraditional Christian belief, including the belief in God and an\nAfterlife. In particular, he argues that the Afterlife is a condition\nto which we ought to aspire, that it is a moral improvement even on\nthe life of virtue in this world, and that recognizing this is\nconstitutive of wanting to do what God wants, that is, to live\naccording to the Golden Rule, which guarantees as much as anything can\n(pending divine grace) our long-term postmortem happiness.", "\nThe Philosopher first argues with the Jew, who espouses a\n‘strict observance’ moral theory, namely obedience to the\nMosaic Law. One of the arguments the Jew offers is the Slave’s\nWager (apparently the earliest-known version of Pascal’s Wager).\nImagine that a Slave is told one morning by someone he doesn’t\nknow whether to trust that his powerful and irritable Master, who is\naway for the day, has left instructions about what to do in his\nabsence. The Slave can follow the instructions or not. He reasons that\nif the Master indeed left the instructions, then by following them he\nwill be rewarded and by not following them he will be severely\npunished, whereas if the Master did not leave the instructions he\nwould not be punished for following them, though he might be lightly\npunished for not following them. (This conforms to the standard payoff\nmatrix for Pascal’s Wager.) That is the position the Jew finds\nhimself in: God has apparently demanded unconditional obedience to the\nMosaic Law, the instructions left behind. The Philosopher argues that\nthe Jew may have other choices of action and, in any event, that there\nare rational grounds for thinking that ethics is not a matter of\naction in conformity to law but a matter of the agent’s\nintentions, as we have seen above.", "\nThe Philosopher then argues with the Christian. He initially maintains\nthat virtue entails happiness, and hence there is no need of an\nAfterlife since a virtuous person remains in the same condition\nwhether dead or alive. The Christian, however, reasons that the\nAfterlife is better, since in addition to the benefits conferred by\nliving virtuously, the agent’s will is no longer impeded by\ncircumstances. In the Afterlife we are no longer subject to the body,\nfor instance, and hence are not bound by physical necessities such as\nfood, shelter, clothing, and the like. The agent can therefore be as\npurely happy as life in accordance with virtue could permit, when no\nexternal circumstances could affect the agent’s actions. The\nPhilosopher grants that the Afterlife so understood is a clear\nimprovement even on the virtuous life in this world, and joins with\nthe Christian in a cooperative endeavour to define the nature of the\nvirtues and the Supreme Good. Virtue is its own reward, and in the\nAfterlife nothing prevents us from rewarding ourselves with virtue to\nthe fullest extent possible." ], "section_title": "6. Ethics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAbelard held that reasoning has a limited role to play in matters of\nfaith. That he gave reasoning a role at all brought him into conflict\nwith those we might now call anti-dialecticians, including\nhis fellow abbot Bernard of Clairvaux. That the role he gave it is\nlimited brought him into conflict with those he called\n“pseudo-dialecticians,” including his former teacher\nRoscelin.", "\nBernard of Clairvaux and other anti-dialecticians seem to have thought\nthat the meaning of a proposition of the faith, to the extent that it\ncan be grasped, is plain; beyond that plain meaning, there is nothing\nwe can grasp at all, in which case reason is clearly no help. That is,\nthe anti-dialecticians were semantic realists about the plain\nmeaning of religious sentences. Hence their impatience with Abelard,\nwho seemed not only bent on obfuscating the plain meaning of\npropositions of the faith, which is bad enough, but to do so by\nreasoning, which has no place either in grasping the plain meaning\n(since the very plainness of plain meaning consists in its being\ngrasped immediately without reasoning) or in reaching some more\nprofound understanding (since only the plain meaning is open to us at\nall).", "\nAbelard has no patience for the semantic realism that underlies the\nsophisticated anti-dialectical position. Rather than argue against it\nexplicitly, he tries to undermine it. From his commentaries on\nscripture and dogma to his works of speculative theology, Abelard is\nfirst and foremost concerned to show how religious claims can be\nunderstood, and in particular how the application of dialectical\nmethods can clarify and illuminate propositions of the faith.\nFurthermore, he rejects the claim that there is a plain meaning to be\ngrasped. Outlining his method in the Prologue to his Sic et\nnon, Abelard describes how he initially raises a question, e.g.\nwhether priests are required to be celibate, and then arranges\ncitations from scriptural and patristic authorities that at least seem\nto answer the question directly into positive and negative responses.\n(Abelard offers advice in the Prologue for resolving the apparent\ncontradictions among the authorities using a variety of techniques:\nsee whether the words are used in the same sense on both sides; draw\nrelevant distinctions to resolve the issue; look at the context of the\ncitation; make sure that an author is speaking in his own voice rather\nthan merely reporting or paraphrasing someone else’s position;\nand so on.) Now each authority Abelard cites seems to speak clearly\nand unambiguously either for a positive answer to a given question or\nfor a negative one. If ever there were cases of plain meaning, Abelard\nseems to have found them in authorities, on opposing sides of\ncontroversial issues. His advice in the Prologue amounts to saying\nthat sentences that seem to be perfect exemplars of plain meaning in\nfact have to be carefully scrutinized to see just what their meaning\nis. Yet that is just to say that they do not have plain meaning at\nall; we have to use reason to uncover their meaning. Hence the\nanti-dialecticians don’t have a case.", "\nThere is a far more serious threat to the proper use of reason in\nreligion, Abelard thinks (Theologia christiana 3.20):", "\nThose who claim to be dialecticians are usually led more easily to\n[heresy] the more they hold themselves to be well-equipped with\nreasons, and, to that extent more secure, they presume to attack or\ndefend any position the more freely. Their arrogance is so great that\nthey think there isn’t anything that can’t be understood\nand explained by their petty little lines of reasoning. Holding all\nauthorities in contempt, they glory in believing only\nthemselves—for those who accept only what their reason persuades\nthem of, surely answer to themselves alone, as if they had eyes that\nwere unacquainted with darkness.\n", "\nSuch pseudo-dialecticians take reason to be the final arbiter of all\nclaims, including claims about matters of faith. More exactly, Abelard\ncharges them with holding that (a) everything can be explained by\nhuman reason; (b) we should only accept what reason persuades us of;\n(c) appeals to authority have no rational persuasive force. Real\ndialecticians, he maintains, reject (a)–(c), recognizing that\nhuman reason has limits, and that some important truths may lie\noutside those limits but not beyond belief; which claims about matters\nof faith we should accept depends on both the epistemic reliability of\ntheir sources (the authorities) and their consonance with reason to\nthe extent they can be investigated.", "\nAbelard’s arguments for rejecting (a)–(c) are\nsophisticated and subtle. For the claim that reason may be fruitfully\napplied to a particular article of faith, Abelard offers a particular\ncase study in his own writings. The bulk of Abelard’s work on\ntheology is devoted to his dialectical investigation of the Trinity.\nHe elaborates an original theory of identity to address issues\nsurrounding the Trinity, one that has wider applicability in\nmetaphysics. The upshot of his enquiries is that belief in the Trinity\nis rationally justifiable since as far as reason can take us we find\nthat the doctrine makes sense—at least, once the tools of\ndialectic have been properly employed.", "\nThe traditional account of identity, derived from Boethius, holds that\nthings may be either generically, specifically, or numerically the\nsame or different. Abelard accepts this account but finds it not\nsufficiently fine-grained to deal with the Trinity. The core of his\ntheory of identity, as presented in his Theologia christiana,\nconsists in four additional modes of identity: (1) essential sameness\nand difference; (2) numerical sameness and difference, which Abelard\nties closely to essential sameness and difference, allowing a more\nfine-grained distinction than Boethius could allow; (3) sameness and\ndifference in definition; (4) sameness and difference in property\n(in proprietate). Roughly, Abelard’s account of\nessential and numerical sameness is intended to improve upon the\nidentity-conditions for things in the world given by the traditional\naccount; his account of sameness in definition is meant to supply\nidentity-conditions for the features of things; and his account of\nsameness in property opens up the possibility of there being different\nidentity-conditions for a single thing having several distinct\nfeatures.", "\nAbelard holds that two things are the same in essence when\nthey are numerically the same concrete thing (essentia), and\nessentially different otherwise. The Morning Star is essentially the\nsame as the Evening Star, for instance, since each is the selfsame\nplanet Venus. Again, the formal elements that constitute a concrete\nthing are essentially the same as one another and essentially the same\nas the concrete thing of which they are the formal constituents:\nSocrates is his essence (Socrates is what it is to be Socrates). The\ncorresponding general thesis does not hold for parts, however. Abelard\nmaintains that the part is essentially different from the integral\nwhole of which it is a part, reasoning that a given part is completely\ncontained, along with other parts, in the whole, and so is less than\nthe quantity of the whole.", "\nNumerical difference does not map precisely onto essential difference.\nThe failure of numerical sameness may be due to one of two causes.\nFirst, objects are not numerically the same when one has a part that\nthe other does not have, in which case the objects are essentially\ndifferent as well. Second, objects are numerically different when\nneither has a part belonging to the other. Numerical difference thus\nentails the failure of numerical sameness, but not conversely: a part\nis not numerically the same as its whole, but it is not numerically\ndifferent from its whole. Thus one thing is essentially different from\nanother when either they have only a part in common, in which case\nthey are not numerically the same; or they have no parts in common, in\nwhich case they are numerically different as well as not numerically\nthe same. Since things may be neither numerically the same nor\nnumerically different, the question “How many things are\nthere?” is ill-formed as it stands and must be made more\nprecise, a fact Abelard exploits in his discussion of the Trinity.", "\nEssential and numerical sameness and difference apply directly to\nthings in the world; they are extensional forms of identity. By\ncontrast, sameness and difference in definition is roughly analogous\nto modern theories of the identity of properties. Abelard holds that\nthings are the same in definition when what it is to be one\nrequires that it be the other, and conversely; otherwise they differ\nin definition.", "\nFinally, things are the same in property when they specify\nfeatures that characterize one another. Abelard offers an example to\nclarify this notion. A cube of marble exemplifies both whiteness and\nhardness; what is white is essentially the same as what is hard, since\nthey are numerically the same concrete thing, namely the marble cube;\nyet the whiteness and the hardness in the marble cube clearly differ\nin definition—but even so, what is white is characterized by\nhardness (the white thing is hard), and conversely what is hard is\ncharacterized by whiteness (the hard thing is white). The properties\nof whiteness and hardness are “mixed” since, despite their\nbeing different in definition, each applies to the selfsame concrete\nthing (namely the marble cube) as such and also as it is characterized\nby the other.", "\nThe interesting case is where something has properties that\n“remain so completely unmixed” that the items they\ncharacterize are different in property. Consider a\nform-matter composite in relation to its matter. The matter out of\nwhich a form-matter composite is made is essentially the same as the\ncomposite, since each is the entire material composite itself. Yet\ndespite their essential sameness, they are not identical; the matter\nis not the composite, nor conversely. The matter is not the composite,\nfor the composite comes to be out of the matter, but the matter does\nnot come to be out of itself. The composite is not the matter, since\n“nothing is in any way a constitutive part of or naturally prior\nto itself.” Instead, the matter is prior to the composite since\nit has the property priority with respect to the composite,\nwhereas the composite is posterior to its matter since it has the\nproperty posteriority with respect to its matter. Now despite\nbeing essentially the same, the matter is not characterized by\nposteriority, unlike the composite, and the composite is not\ncharacterized by priority, unlike the matter. Hence the matter and\ncomposite are different in property; the properties priority\nand posteriority are unmixed—they differ in\nproperty.", "\nNow for the payoff. Abelard deploys his theory of identity to shed\nlight on the Trinity as follows. The three Persons are essentially the\nsame as one another, since they are all the same concrete thing\n(namely God). They differ from one another in definition, since what\nit is to be the Father is not the same as what it is to be the Son or\nwhat it is to be the Holy Spirit. The three Persons are numerically\ndifferent from one another, for otherwise they would not be three, but\nthey are not numerically different from God: if they were there would\nbe three gods, not one. Moreover, each Person has properties that\nuniquely apply to it—unbegotten to the Father,\nbegotten to the Son, and proceeding to the Holy\nSpirit—as well as properties that are distinctive of it, such as\npower for the Father, wisdom for the Son, and\ngoodness for the Holy Spirit. The unique properties are\nunmixed in Abelard’s technical sense, for the Persons differ\nfrom one another in their unique properties, and such properties do\nnot apply to God; the distinctive properties are mixed, though, in\nthat God is characterized by each (the powerful God is the wise God is\nthe good God). Further than that, Abelard holds, human reason cannot\ngo; but reason validates the analysis (strictly speaking only a\n“likeness” or analogy) as far as it can go." ], "section_title": "7. Theology", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Carmen ad Astralabium. Edited by J. M. A.\nRubingh-Bosscher in Peter Abelard: Carmen ad Astralabium, a\nCritical Edition. Groningen: phil. diss. Rijksuniversiteit\n1987.", "Collationes a.k.a. Dialogus inter Philosophum,\nIudaeum, et Christianum. Edited by Giovanni Orlandi, with\nintroduction, translation, and notes by John Marenbon, in Peter\nAbelard: Collationes, Oxford University Press 2001.", "Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos. Edited by\nEligius M. Buytaert in Petri Abaelardi opera theologica.\nCorpus christianorum (continuatio mediaevalis) Vol. 11. Brepols:\nTurnholt 1969, 389–340.", "Dialectica. Edited by L. M. De Rijk in Petrus\nAbaelardus: Dialectica, Assen: Van Gorcum 1970 (second\nedition).", "Epistolae: Ep. 1 edited by Monfrin (see the entry below\nfor the Historia calamitatum); Epp. 2–5 edited by J. T.\nMuckle, Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953) 68–94; Epp.\n6–7, edited by J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 17\n(1955) 241–281; Ep. 8, edited by T. P. McLaughlin, Mediaeval\nStudies 18 (1956) 242–297; Epp. 9–14 edited by E. R.\nSmits in Peter Abelard: Letters IX–XIV, Groningen:\nRijksuniversiteit 1983; Ep. 15 edited by Josef Reiners, BGPTM 8 (1910)\n63–80; Ep. 16, edited by Victor Cousin and Charles Jourdain,\nPetri Abaelardi opera Vol. 1 (Paris 1849) 703–707,\ncorrected against Van Den Eynde, Antonianum 38 (1963) 219;\nEp. 17, edited by Charles Burnett, Mittellateinisch Jahrbuch\n21 (1986), 152–155; Apologia contra Bernardum (Ne iuxta\nBoethianum), edited by Eligius M. Buytaert in CCCM 12\n359–368; Epistola contra Bernardum edited by Raymond\nKlibansky, Medieval and Renaissance Studies 5 (1961),\n1–27; Confessio fidei “Uniuersis” edited by\nCharles Burnett, Mediaeval Studies 48 (1986),\n182–189.", "Ethica seu Scito teipsum. Edited by R. M. Ilgner in\nPetri Abaelardi opera theologica. Corpus christianorum\n(continuatio mediaevalis) Vol. 190. Brepols: Turnholt 2001.", "Expositio orationis dominicae. Edited by Charles Burnett,\n“Expositio orationis dominicae ‘Multorum legimus\norationes’” in Révue Benedictine 95 (1985)\n60–72.", "Expositio symboli Apostolorum. Edited by Victor Cousin\nand Charles Jourdain, Petri Abaelardi opera Vol. 1 (Paris\n1849) 603–615.\n [Available online thanks to the Bibliothèque nationale de France].", "Expositio fidei in symbolum Athanasii. Edited by Victor\nCousin and Charles Jourdain, Petri Abaelardi opera Vol. 1\n(Paris 1849) 615–617.", "Hexaëmeron. Edited by Mary F. Romig with the\nassistance of David Luscombe, in Corpus christianorum continuatio\nmediaevalis Vol.15. Brepols: Turnhout 2004.", "Historia calamitatum. Edited by Jacques Monfrin in\nAbélard, Historia calamitatum: texte et commentaires,\nJ. Vrin: Paris 1974 (fourth edition), 62–109.", "Hymnarius Paraclitensis. Edited by Chrysogonus Waddell in\nHymn Collections from the Paraclete Vol. 2. Trappist\nMonastery, Ky.: Gethsemani Abbey (Cistercian Liturgy series)\n1987.", "Introductiones parvulorum. Edited by Mario Dal Pra in\nPietro Abelardo: Scritti di logica, Firenze 1969 (second\nedition).", "Logica ‘ingredientibus’ (LI):\n\n\n\nLI 1: Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge. Edited by\nBernhard Geyer in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und\nTheologie des Mittelalters 21 (1). Aschendorff: Munster\n1919.\n\nLI 2: Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Edited\nby Bernhard Geyer in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie\nund Theologie des Mittelalters 21 (2). Aschendorff: Munster\n1921.\n\nLI 3: Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione.\nEdited by Klaus Jacobi and Christian Strub, Corpus christianorum\ncontinuatio mediaevalis Vol.206. Brepols: Turnhout 2010.\n\nLI 7: Commentary on Boethius’s De topicis\ndifferentiis. Edited by Mario Dal Pra in Pietro Abelardo:\nScritti di logica, Firenze 1969 (second edition).\n ", "LI 1: Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge. Edited by\nBernhard Geyer in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und\nTheologie des Mittelalters 21 (1). Aschendorff: Munster\n1919.", "LI 2: Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Edited\nby Bernhard Geyer in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie\nund Theologie des Mittelalters 21 (2). Aschendorff: Munster\n1921.", "LI 3: Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione.\nEdited by Klaus Jacobi and Christian Strub, Corpus christianorum\ncontinuatio mediaevalis Vol.206. Brepols: Turnhout 2010.", "LI 7: Commentary on Boethius’s De topicis\ndifferentiis. Edited by Mario Dal Pra in Pietro Abelardo:\nScritti di logica, Firenze 1969 (second edition).", "Logica ‘nostrorum petitioni\nsociorum’. Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge.\nEdited by Bernhard Geyer in Beiträge zur Geschichte der\nPhilosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 21 (4). Aschendorff:\nMunster 1933.", "Planctus. Planctus 1, 4, 6: edited by Peter Dronke,\nPoetic Individality in the Middle Ages (London 1986).\nPlanctus 2, 5: edited by Giuseppe Vecchi, Pietro Abelardo, I\n“Planctus” (Modena 1951). Planctus 3: edited by\nWolfram von den Steinen, Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 4\n(1967), 122–144. There are several modern recordings.", "Problemata Heloïssae cum Petri Abaelardi\nsolutionibus. Edited by Victor Cousin and Charles Jourdain,\nPetri Abaelardi opera Vol. 1 (Paris 1849):\n237–294.", "Sententiae secundum Magistrum Petrum. Edited by Lorenzo\nMinio-Paluello in Twelfth-Century Logic: Texts and Studies\nVol. 2 (Abaelardiana inedita), Roma 1958.", "Sermones. Edited by Paola De Santis in I sermoni di\nAbelardo per le monache del Paracleto, Leuven University Press\n2002. (Mediaevalia Lovaniensa ser. 1, studia 31.)", "Sic et non. Edited by Blanche Boyer and Richard McKeon in\nPeter Abailard: Sic et Non. A Critical Edition. University of\nChicago Press 1977.", "Soliloquium. Edited by Charles Burnett in “Peter\nAbelard’s ‘Soliloquium’: A Critical Edition”\nin Studi Medievali 25 (1984), 857–894.", "Theologia ‘summi boni’. Edited by\nEligius M. Buytaert and Constant Mews in Petri Abaelardi opera\ntheologica. Corpus christianorum (continuatio mediaevalis) Vol.\n13. Brepols: Turnhout 1987.", "Theologia christiana. Edited by Eligius M. Buytaert in\nPetri Abaelardi opera theologica. Corpus christianorum\n(continuatio mediaevalis) Vol. 12. Brepols: Turnhout 1969.", "Theologia ‘scholarium’. Edited by\nEligius M. Buytaert and Constant Mews in Petri Abaelardi opera\ntheologica. Corpus christianorum (continuatio mediaevalis) Vol.\n13. Brepols: Turnhout 1987.", "Tractatus de intellectibus. Edited by Patrick Morin in\nAbélard: Des intellections. Paris: J. Vrin 1994.", "Fairweather, E. R., 1995, A Scholastic Miscellany,\nWestminster: John Knox Press. (Excerpt from Abelard’s commentary\non Romans.)", "King, Peter, 1982, Peter Abailard and the Problem of\nUniversals in the Twelfth Century, Ph.D. Dissertation, Philosophy\nDepartment, Princeton University. (Volumes 2 contains a complete\ntranslation of Abelard’s Tractatus de\nintellectibus.)", "Luscombe, David, 1971, Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. (Complete translation of Abelard’s Ethica.)", "Marenbon, John and Giovanni Orlandi (eds. and trans.), 2001,\nPeter Abelard: Collationes, Oxford: Clarendon. (Complete\ntranslation of Abelard’s Conversations.)", "McCallum, James Ramsay, 1948, Abelard’s Christian\nTheology, Oxford: Blackwell. (Includes substantial selections\nfrom Abelard’s Theologia christiana.)", "Minnis, A. and Scott, A. B. (eds.), 1988, Medieval Literary\nTheory and Criticism 1100–1375, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. (Includes Abelard’s preface to the Sic et\nnon.)", "Payer, Pierre, 1979, Peter Abelard: A Dialogue of a\nPhilosopher with a Jew and a Christian, Toronto: The Pontifical\nInstitute of Mediaeval Studies Publications.", "Radice, Elizabeth, 1974, The Letters of Abelard and\nHeloise, New York: Penguin Books.", "Spade, Paul Vincent, 1994, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem\nof Universals, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.\n(Abelard’s discussion of the problem of universals from his\nLogica ‘ingredientibus’.)", "Spade, Paul Vincent, 1995, Peter Abelard: Ethical\nWritings, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (Complete\ntranslations of Abelard ‘s Ethics and\nConversations.)", "Tweedale, Martin and Bosley, Richard, 1997, Issues in Medieval\nPhilosophy, Peterborough: Broadview Press. (Includes selections\nfrom Abelard on foreknowledge, universals, and ethics.)", "Allen, Julie, 1996, A Commentary on the Second Collatio of\nPeter Abailard’s Dialogus, Ph.D. Dissertation, Philosophy\nDepartment, University of Toronto.", "Arlig, Andrew, 2007, “Abelard’s Assault on Everyday\nObjects”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly,\n81: 209–227.", "–––, 2012, “Peter Abelard on Material\nConstitution”, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie,\n94: 119–146.", "–––, 2013, “Some Twelfth-century\nReflections on Mereological Essentialism”, Oxford Studies in\nMedieval Philosophy, 1: 83–112.", "Astroh, Michael, 2001, “Abelard on Modalities de re\nand de dicto”, in Potentialität und\nPossibilität. Modalaussagen in der Geschichte der\nMetaphysik, Thomas Buchheim, C. H. Kneepkens, and Kuno Lorenz\n(eds.), Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog, 79–95", "Bejczy, I., 2003, “Deeds Without Value: Exploring a Weak\nSpot in Abelard’s Ethics”, Recherches de\nthéologie et philosophie médiévale, 70:\n1–21.", "Binini, Irene, 2022, Possibility and Necessity in the Time of\nPeter Abelard, Leiden/Boston: Brill.", "Blackwell, Daniel, 1988, Non-Ontological Constructs: The\nEffects of Abaelard’s Logical and Ethical Theories on his\nTheology, Berne, Paris, New York: Peter Lang.", "Boler, John, 1963, “Abailard and the Problem of\nUniversals”, The Journal of the History of Philosophy,\n1: 104–126.", "Brower, Jeff, 1998, “Abelard’s Theory of Relations:\nReductionism and the Aristotelian Tradition”, The Review of\nMetaphysics, 51: 605–631.", "–––, 2004, “Trinity”, in The\nCambridge Companion to Abelard, J. Brower and K. Guilfoy (eds.):\n223–257. [Preprint available online]", "Brower, Jeff and Guilfoy, Kevin (eds.), 2004, The Cambridge\nCompanion to Abelard, New York: Cambridge University Press.\n [Introduction available online]\n ", "Freddoso, Alfred, 1978, “Abailard on Collective\nRealism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 75:\n527–538.", "Gracia, Jorge, 1984, Introduction to the Problem of\nIndividuation in the Early Middle Ages, Washington, D.C.:\nCatholic University of America Press.", "Guilfoy, Kevin, 1999, Abelard’s Theory of the\nProposition, Ph.D. Dissertation, Philosophy Department,\nUniversity of Washington.", "–––, 2004, “Mind and Cognition”, in\nJ. Brower and K. Guilfoy (eds.), 200–222.", "Henry, D. P., 1985, “Abelard’s Mereological\nTerminology”, in Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics,\nE. P. Bos (ed.), Ingenium: Nijmegen, 65–92.", "Hause, Jeff, 2007, “Abelard on Degrees of Sinfulness”,\nAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 81:\n251–270.", "Jacobi, Klaus, 1983, “Abelard and Frege: the Semantics of\nWords and Propositions”, in Atti del Convegno Internazionale\ndi Storia della logica, V. Abrusci (ed.), Bologna: Ed. CLUEB,\n81–96.", "–––, 1986, “Peter Abelard’s\nInvestigations into the Meaning and Function of the Speech Sign\n‘Est’”, in The Logic of Being, Simo\nKnuutila and Jaakko Hintikka (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel,\n145–180.", "–––, 2004, “Philosophy of Language”,\nin J. Brower and K. Guilfoy (eds.) 2004, 126–157.", "King, Peter, 1982, Peter Abailard and the Problem of\nUniversals in the Twelfth Century, Ph.D. Dissertation, Philosophy\nDepartment, Princeton University.", "–––, 1992, “Peter Abelard\n(1079–1142)”, in The Dictionary of Literary\nBiography (Volume 115: Medieval Philosophers), Jeremiah Hackett\n(ed.), Detroit/London: Gale Research: 3–14.", "–––, 1995, “Abelard’s Intentionalist\nEthics”, The Modern Schoolman, 72: 213–231.\n [Preprint available online].", "–––, 2004, “Metaphysics”, in The\nCambridge Companion to Abelard, in J. Brower and K. Guilfoy\n(eds.), 65–125.\n [Preprint available online].", "–––, 2007a, “Abelard on Mental\nLanguage”, The American Catholic Philosophical\nQuarterly, 81: 169–187.", "–––, 2007b, “Abelard’s Answer to\nPorphyry”, in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica\nmedievale, 18: 249–70.\n [Preprint available online].", "Kretzmann, Norman, 1982, “The Culmination of the Old Logic\nin Peter Abelard”, in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth\nCentury, R. L. Benson and J. Constable (eds.), Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press, 488–511.", "Lenz, Martin, 2005, “Peculiar Perfection: Peter Abelard on\nPropositional Attitudes”, Journal of the History of\nPhilosophy, 43: 377–386.", "–––, 2007, “Are Thoughts and Sentences\nCompositional? A Controversy between Abelard and a Pupil of Alberic on\nthe Reconciliation of Ancient Theses on Mind and Language”,\nVivarium, 45: 169–188.", "Lewis, Neil, 1987, “Determinate Truth in Abelard”,\nVivarium, 25: 81–109.", "Luscombe, David, 1969, The School of Peter Abelard,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Mann, William, 2004, “Ethics”, in J. Brower and K.\nGuilfoy (eds.), 279–304.", "Marenbon, John, 1997, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2006, “The Rediscovery of Peter\nAbelard’s Philosophy”, Journal of the History of\nPhilosophy, 44: 331–351.", "–––, 2013, Abelard in Four Dimensions: A\ntwelfth-century philosopher in his context and ours, Notre Dame:\nUniversity of Notre Dame Press.", "Martin, Christopher J., 1986, “William’s Wonderful\nMachine”, Journal of Philosophy, 83:\n564–572.", "–––, 1987, “Something Amazing About the\nPeripatetic of Le Pallet”, Argumentation, 1:\n420–436.", "–––, 2001, “Abaelard on Modality: Some\nPossibilities and Some Puzzles”, in Potentialität und\nPossibilität. Modalaussagen in der Geschichte der\nMetaphysik, Thomas Buchheim, C. H. Kneepkens, and Kuno Lorenz\n(eds.), Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog, 97–122", "–––, 2004, “Logic”, in J. Brower and\nK. Guilfoy (eds.), 158–199.", "Mews, Constant, 1987, “Aspects of the Evolution of Peter\nAbelard’s Thought on Signification and Predication”, in\nGilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains, J. Jolivet and A.\nde Libera (eds.), Naples: Bibliopolis.", "–––, 2005, Abelard and Heloise, New\nYork: Oxford University Press.", "Pinziani, Roberto, 2003, The Logical Grammar of Abelard.\nDordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. (Translation of La\ngrammatica logica di Abelardo, Parma 1992.)", "De Rijk, L. M., 1980, “The Semantical Impact of\nAbailard’s Solution of the Problem of Universals”, in\nPetrus Abaelardus: Person, Wirk, und Wirkung, Rudolf Thomas\n(ed.), Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 139–152.", "–––, 1986, “Peter Abailard’s\nSemantics and his Doctrine of Being”, Vivarium, 24:\n85–127.", "Tweedale, Martin, 1976, Abailard on Universals,\nAmsterdam: North-Holland.", "Wilks, Ian, 1993, The Logic of Abelard’s\nDialectica, Ph.D. Dissertation, Philosophy Department, University\nof Toronto.", "–––, 1997, “The Role of Virtue Theory and\nNatural Law in Abelard’s Ethical Writings”,\nProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical\nAssociation, 71: 137–149.", "–––, 1998, “Peter Abelard and the\nMetaphysics of Essential Predication”, Journal of the\nHistory of Philosophy, 36: 356–385.", "–––, 2008, “Peter Abelard and his\nContemporaries”, in Handbook of the History of Logic\n(Volume 2: Medieval and Renaissance Logic), Dov Gabbay and John Woods\n(eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier, 85–155." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle-logic/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: logic" }, { "href": "../mereology-medieval/", "text": "mereology: medieval" }, { "href": "../relations-medieval/", "text": "relations: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../medieval-syllogism/", "text": "syllogism: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../universals-medieval/", "text": "universals: the medieval problem of" }, { "href": "../william-champeaux/", "text": "William of Champeaux" } ]
abhidharma	Abhidharma	First published Mon Aug 16, 2010; substantive revision Wed Jun 1, 2022	[ "\nThe first centuries after Śākyamuni Buddha’s death saw\nthe rise of multiple schools of thought and teacher lineages within\nthe Buddhist community as it spread throughout the Indian\nsubcontinent. These new forms of scholarly monastic communities had\ndistinct theoretical and practical interests and, in their efforts to\norganize, interpret, and reexamine the Buddha’s scattered\nteachings, they developed a particular system of thought and method of\nexposition called Abhidharma (Pali, Abhidhamma). The Sanskrit term\nabhidharma seems to derive from the expression\n“concerning (abhi) the teaching(s) (Skt.,\ndharma, Pali, dhamma).” For the Buddhist\nexegetical tradition, however, the term means approximately\n“higher” or “further” teaching, and it refers\nboth to the doctrinal investigations of the new scholastic movement\nand to the body of texts yielded by its systematic exposition of\nBuddhist thought. This body of literature includes the third of the\n“three baskets” (Skt., tripiṭaka, Pali,\ntipiṭaka) of the Buddhist canon, namely, the\nAbhidharma-piṭaka (Pali,\nAbhidhamma-piṭaka), its commentaries, and later\nexegetical texts.", "\nBoth as an independent literary genre and a branch of thought and\ninquiry, Abhidharma is to be contrasted with Sūtrānta, the\nsystem of the Buddha’s discourses (Skt., sūtras,\nPali, suttas). Unlike the earlier Buddhist discourses that\nare colloquial in nature, the Abhidharma method presents the\nBuddha’s teachings in technical terms that are carefully defined\nto ensure analytical exactitude. In content, Abhidharma is distinctive\nin its efforts to provide the theoretical counterpart to the Buddhist\npractice of meditation and, more broadly, a systematic account of\nsentient experience. It does so by analyzing conscious\nexperience—and in this sense one’s\n“world”—into its constituent mental and physical\nevents (Skt., dharmā, Pali, dhammā,\nhereafter dharmas/dhammas respectively). The overarching\ninquiry subsuming both the analysis of dharmas into multiple\ncategories and their synthesis into a unified structure by means of\ntheir manifold relationships of causal conditioning is referred to as\nthe “dharma theory.” The exhaustive\ninvestigations into the nature and interaction of dharmas\nextended into the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, and ontology,\nand generated doctrinal controversies among different Buddhist\nschools. The Abhidharma analysis of and methods of argumentation about\nthese controversies provided the framework of reference and defined\nthe agenda for the Mahāyāna schools of Madhyamaka and\nYogācāra. As a distinct doctrinal movement, then, Abhidharma\nhad a remarkable impact on subsequent Buddhist thought and gave rise\nto Buddhist systematic philosophy and hermeneutics." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Abhidharma: its origins and texts", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Literary style and genre", "1.2 Abhidharma exegesis: from Dharma to dharmas" ] }, { "content_title": "2. The ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Time: from impermanence to momentariness", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Intrinsic nature: between categorization and ontology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Causation: existence as functioning", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Epistemology: Perception and the theory of the consciousness process", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Sources", "Secondary Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe early history of Buddhism in India is remarkably little known and\nthe attempt to construct a consistent chronology of that history still\nengrosses the minds of contemporary scholars. A generally accepted\ntradition has it that some time around the beginning of the third\ncentury BCE, the primitive Buddhist community divided into two parties\nor fraternities: the Sthaviras (Pali, Theriyas) and the\nMahāsāṅghikas, each of which thenceforth had its own\nordination traditions. Throughout the subsequent two centuries or so,\ndoctrinal disputes arose between these two parties, resulting in the\nformation of various schools of thought (vāda;\nācariyavāda) and teacher lineages\n(ācariyakula) (Vin 51–54; Mhv V\n12–13. See Cousins 1991, 27–28; Frauwallner 1956, 5ff\n& 130ff; Lamotte 1988, 271ff; Wynne 2019, 269–283).", "\nAccording to traditional Buddhist accounts, by the time the\nMahāyāna doctrines arose, roughly in the first century BCE,\nthere were eighteen sub-sects or schools of Sthaviras, the tradition\nancestral to the Theravāda (“advocates of the doctrine of\nthe elders”). The number eighteen, though, became conventional\nin Buddhist historiography for symbolic and mnemonic reasons\n(Obeyesekere 1991) and, in fact, different Buddhist sources preserve\ndivergent lists of schools which sum up to more than eighteen. The\nlikelihood is that the early formative period of the Buddhist\ncommunity gave rise to multiple intellectual branches that developed\nspontaneously due to the geographical extension of the community over\nthe entire Indian subcontinent and subject to the particular problems\nthat confronted each monastic community (saṅgha). Each\nsaṅgha tended to specialize in a specific branch of\nlearning, had its own practical customs and relations with lay\ncircles, and was influenced by the particular territories, economy,\nand use of language and dialect prevalent in its environment. Indeed,\nthe names of the “eighteen schools” are indicative of\ntheir origins in characteristic doctrines, geographical locations, or\nthe legacy of particular founders: for instance,\nSarvāstivāda (“advocates of the doctrine that all\nthings exist”), Sautrāntikas (“those who rely on the\nsūtras”)/Dārṣṭāntikas\n(“those who employ\n examples”),[1]\n and Pudgalavāda (“those who affirm the existence of the\nperson”); Haimavatas (“those of the snowy\nmountains”); or Vātsīputrīyas (“those\naffiliated with Vātsīputra”) respectively. As noted by\nGethin (1998, 52), rather than sects or denominations as in\nChristianity, “at least some of the schools mentioned by later\nBuddhist tradition are likely to have been informal schools of thought\nin the manner of ‘Cartesians,’ ‘British\nEmpiricists,’ or ‘Kantians’ for the history of\nmodern\n philosophy.”[2]", "\nIt is customarily assumed that the multiple ancient Buddhist schools\ntransmitted their own versions of Abhidharma collections, but only two\ncomplete canonical collections are preserved, representing two\nschools: the Sarvāstivāda, who emerged as an independent\nschool from within the Sthaviras around the second or first century\nBCE, became dominant in north, especially northwest India, and spread\nto central Asia; and the Sinhalese Theravāda, a branch of the\nSthaviras that spread out in south India and parts of southeast Asia.\nThese two extant collections comprise the third of the “three\nbaskets” (Skt., tripiṭaka, Pali,\ntipiṭaka) of the Buddhist canon. The exegetical\ntraditions of the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda understand\ntheir respective canonical Abhidharma to consist of a set of seven\ntexts, though each school specifies a different set of texts. The\nSarvāstivādin Abhidharma-piṭaka consists of\nthe Saṅgītiparyāya (Discourse on the\nCollective Recitation), the Dharmaskandha\n(Compendium of Dharmas), the\nPrajñaptiśāstra (Manual of\nConcepts), the Vijñānakāya\n(Compendium of Consciousness), the\nDhātukāya (Compendium of Elements), the\nPrakaraṇapāda (Literary\nExposition), and the Jñānaprasthāna\n(The Foundation of Knowledge). These seven texts survive in\nfull only in their ancient Chinese translations. The Theravādin\nAbhidhamma-piṭaka comprises the\nDhammasaṅgaṇi (Enumeration of\nDhammas), the Vibhaṅga (Analysis),\nthe Dhātukathā (Discourse on Elements),\nthe Puggalapaññatti (Designation of\nPersons), the Kathāvatthu (Points of\nDiscussion), the Yamaka (Pairs), and the\nPaṭṭhāna (Causal Conditions). These\nseven texts are preserved in Pali and all but the Yamaka have\nbeen translated into English.", "\nLater generations composed commentaries on the canonical Abhidharma\nand introduced a variety of exegetical manuals that expound the\nessentials of the canonical systems. These post-canonical texts are\nthe products of single authors and display fully developed polemical\nstances and sectarian worldviews of their respective schools. Much of\nthe Theravāda Abhidhamma system is contained in\nBuddhaghosa’s comprehensive Visuddhimagga (The Path\nof Purification, fifth century CE). More direct introductory\nAbhidhamma manuals are Buddhadatta’s\nAbhidhammāvatāra (Introduction to\nAbhidhamma, fifth century CE) and Anuruddha’s\nAbhidhammatthasaṅgaha (Compendium of the Topics of\nAbhidhamma, twelfth century CE). The Sarvāstivāda\ntradition preserves in Chinese translation three different recensions\nof an authoritative Abhidharma commentary or\nvibhāṣā dated to the first or second century\nCE, the last and best known of which is called the\nMahāvibhāṣā. The\nvibhāṣā compendia document several centuries\nof scholarly activity representing multiple Sarvāstivāda\nbranches, most notably the Sarvāstivādins of Kashmir who are\nknown as Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika. The\nSarvāstivāda manual most influential for later Chinese and\nTibetan Buddhism, however, is Vasubandhu’s\nAbhidharmakośa (Treasury of Abhidharma, fifth\ncentury CE). The Abhidharmakośa’s auto-commentary\ncontains substantial criticism of orthodox Sarvāstivāda\npositions, which later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika\nmasters attempted to refute. Particularly famous in this category is\nthe Nyāyānusāra (Conformance to Correct\nPrinciple) of Saṅghabhadra, a contemporary of Vasubandhu.\nThis comprehensive treatise reestablishes orthodox\nSarvāstivāda views and is considered one of the final\nSarvāstivāda works to have\n survived.[3]", "\nIn sum, the Abhidharma/Abhidhamma texts are by and large compositions\ncontemporary with the formative period in the history of the early\nBuddhist schools, providing the means by which one group could define\nitself and defend its position against the divergent interpretations\nand criticisms of other parties. Although much of the Abhidharma\nmindset and something of its method draw on the\nĀgamas/Nikāyas, i.e., the collections of\nsūtras (Pali, suttas), the main body of its\nliterature contains interpretations of the Buddha’s discourses\nspecific to each school of thought and philosophical elaborations of\nselectively emphasized doctrinal issues. These continued to be refined\nby subsequent generations of monks who contributed to the\nconsolidation of the two surviving Theravāda and\nSarvāstivāda schools." ], "section_title": "1. Abhidharma: its origins and texts", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nScholarly opinion has generally been divided between two alternative\ninterpretations of the term abhidharma, both of which hinge\nupon the denotation of the prefix abhi. First, taking\nabhi in the sense of “with regard to,”\nabhidharma is understood as a discipline whose subject matter\nis the Dharma, the Buddha’s teachings. Second, using\nabhi in the sense of preponderance and distinction,\nabhidharma has also been deemed a distinct, higher teaching;\nthe essence of the Buddha’s teachings or that which goes beyond\nwhat is given in the Buddha’s discourses, in a sense somewhat\nreminiscent of the term “metaphysics” (e.g.,\nDhs-a 2–3; Horner 1941; von Hinüber 1994).\nBuddhist tradition itself differentiates between the\nSūtrānta and Abhidharma methods of instructing the teachings\nby contrasting the Sūtrānta “way of putting\nthings” in partial, figurative terms that require further\nclarification, versus the Abhidharma exposition and catechism that\nexpound the teachings fully, in non-figurative terms (A IV\n449–456; Dhs-a 154). This coincides with additional\ndistinctions the tradition makes between texts that have implicit\nmeaning (Skt., neyārtha, Pali, neyyattha)\nversus those that have explicit meaning (Skt.,\nnītārtha, Pali nītattha) (A\nI 60; Ps I 18), and texts that are expressed in conventional\nterms (Skt., saṃvṛti, Pali, sammuti)\nversus others that are expressed in ultimate terms (Skt.,\nparamārtha, Pali, paramattha) (Vibh\n100–101; Mp I\n 94–97).[4]\n From Abhidharma perspective, the sūtras were conveyed\nin conventional terms whose ultimate meaning required further\ninterpretation.", "\nThe texts of the canonical Abhidharma are works that evolved over\ndecades, if not centuries, out of materials already present in the\nSūtra and Vinaya portions of the canon. This is evidenced in two\ncharacteristics of the genre that can be traced to earlier Buddhist\nliterature. The first is the analytical style of the texts, which\nattempt to summarize meticulously the significant points of the Dharma\nand provide a comprehensive taxonomy of the mental and physical\nfactors that constitute sentient experience. This analytical\nenterprise includes the arrangement of major parts of the material\naround detailed lists of factors and combinations of sets of their\ncategories yielding matrices (Skt., mātṛkā,\nPali, mātikā) of doctrinal topics. Already in the\ncollections of the Buddha’s discourses, certain texts are\narranged according to taxonomic lists, providing formulaic treatment\nof doctrinal items that are expounded elsewhere. Lists were clearly\npowerful mnemonic devices, and their prevalence in early Buddhist\nliterature can be explained partly as a consequence of its being\ncomposed and for some centuries preserved\n orally.[5]\n For instance, one of the four primary Āgamas/Nikāyas, the\ncollection of “grouped” sayings\n(saṃyukta/saṃyutta), groups the Buddha’s\nteachings according to specific topics, including the four noble\ntruths, the four ways of establishing mindfulness, the five\naggregates, the six sense faculties, the seven constituents of\nawakening, the noble eightfold path, the twelve links of dependent\norigination, and others. Similar taxonomic lists form the table of\ncontents of the Vibhaṅga and\nPuggalapaññatti of the Theravāda and the\nSaṅgītiparyāya and Dharmaskandha of\nthe Sarvāstivāda, which are structured as commentaries on\nthose lists.", "\nThe second characteristic of Abhidharma literature is its bent for\ndiscursive hermeneutics through catechetical exposition. The texts\nseem to be the products of discussions about the doctrine within the\nearly Buddhist community. Again, such discussions are already found in\nthe Āgama/Nikāya collections (e.g., M I\n292–305, III 202–257): they often begin with a doctrinal\npoint to be clarified and proceed to expound the topic at stake using\na pedagogical method of question and answer. The texts also record\nmore formal methods of argumentation and refutation of rival theories\nthat shed light on the evolution of the Abhidharma as responding to\nthe demands of an increasingly polemical environment. The process of\ninstitutionalization undergone by Buddhist thought at the time and the\nspread of the Buddhist community across the Indian subcontinent\ncoincided with a transition from oral to written methods of textual\ntransmission and with the rise of monastic debates concerning the\ndoctrine among the various Buddhist schools. Intellectual assimilation\nand doctrinal disputes also existed between the Buddhist monastic\ncommunity and the contemporaneous Sanskrit Grammarians, Jains, and\nBrahmanical schools with their evolving scholastic and analytical\nmovements, which must also have contributed to the Abdhidharma\ndiscursive hermeneutics and argumentative style. The dialectic format\nand the display of awareness of differences in doctrinal\ninterpretation are the hallmarks of the Kathāvatthu and\nthe Vijñānakāya. Later on, post-canonical\nAbhidharma texts became complex philosophical treatises employing\nsophisticated methods of argumentation and independent investigations\nthat resulted in doctrinal conclusions quite far removed from their\ncanonical antecedents.", "\nAbhidharma literature, then, arose from two approaches to discussing\nthe Dharma within the early Buddhist community: the first intended to\nsummarize and analyze the significant points of the Buddha’s\nteachings, the second to elaborate on and interpret the doctrines by\nmeans of monastic disputations (Bronkhorst 2016, 29–46; Cousins 1983,\n10; Dessein 2016, 4–7; Gethin 1992b, 165; Gethin 2022, 227–242)." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Literary style and genre" }, { "content": [ "\nThe Buddha’s discourses collected in the\nĀgamas/Nikāyas analyze sentient experience from different\nstandpoints: in terms of name-and-form (nāma-rūpa),\nthe five aggregates (Skt., skandha, Pali, khandha),\nthe twelve sense fields (āyatana), or the eighteen sense\nelements (dhātu). All these modes of analysis provide\ndescriptions of sentient experience as a succession of physical and\nmental processes that arise and cease subject to various causes and\nconditions. A striking difference between the Sūtrānta and\nthe Abhidharma worldviews is that the Abhidharma reduces the time\nscale of these processes so they are now seen as operating from moment\nto moment. Put differently, the Abhidharma reinterprets the terms by\nwhich the sūtras portray sequential processes as\napplying to discrete, momentary events (Cousins 1983, 7; Ronkin 2005,\n66–78).", "\nThese events are referred to as dharmas (Pali,\ndhammas), differently from the singular\ndharma/dhamma that signifies the Buddha’s teaching(s).\nThe Āgamas/Nikāyas use the form dharmas to convey a\npluralistic representation of encountered phenomena, i.e., all sensory\nphenomena of whatever nature as we experience them through the six\nsense faculties (the five ordinary physical senses plus mind\n[manas]). The canonical Abhidharma treatises, however, draw\nsubtle distinctions within the scope of the mental and marginalize the\ndifferences between multiple varieties of mental capacities. Within\nthis context, dharmas are seen as the objects of a specific\nmental capacity called mental cognitive awareness (Skt.,\nmanovijñāṇa, Pali,\nmanoviññāṇa) that is considered the\ncentral cognitive operation in the process of sensory perception.\nMental cognitive awareness is a particular type of consciousness that\ndiscerns between the stimuli impinging upon the sense faculties and\nthat emerges when the requisite conditions come together.\nDharmas are not merely mental objects like ideas, concepts,\nor memories. Rather, as the objects of mental cognitive awareness,\ndharmas may be rendered apperceptions: rapid\nconsciousness-types (citta) that arise and cease in\nsequential streams, each having its own object, and that interact with\nthe five externally directed sensory modalities (visual, auditory,\netc.) of cognitive awareness. The canonical Abhidharma texts portray\ndharmas, then, as psycho-physical events with diverse\ncapacities by means of which the mind unites and assimilates a\nparticular perception, especially one newly presented, to a larger set\nor mass of ideas already possessed, thus comprehending and\nconceptualizing\n it.[6]", "\nUltimately, dharmas are all that there is: all experiential\nevents are understood as arising from the interaction of\ndharmas. While the analogy of atoms may be useful here,\ndharmas notably embrace both physical and mental phenomena,\nand are generally understood as evanescent events, occurrences, or\ndynamic properties rather than enduring\n substances.[7]\n The Abhidharma exegesis thus attempts to provide an exhaustive\naccount of every possible type of experience—every type of\noccurrence that may possibly present itself in one’s\nconsciousness—in terms of its constituent dharmas. This\nenterprise involves breaking down the objects of ordinary perception\ninto their constituent, discrete dharmas and clarifying their\nrelations of causal conditioning. The overarching inquiry subsuming\nboth the analysis of dharmas into multiple categories and\ntheir synthesis into a unified structure by means of their manifold\nrelationships of causal conditioning is referred to as the\n“dharma theory.”" ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Abhidharma exegesis: from Dharma to dharmas" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe Abhidharma attempts to individuate and determine the unique\nidentity of each dharma yield complex intersecting taxonomies\nof dharmas organized by multiple criteria or sets of\nqualities. Abhidharma texts of different schools proposed different\ndharma taxonomies, enumerating a more or less finite number\nof dharma categories. It is important to remember, though,\nthat the term dharma signifies both any category that\nrepresents a type of occurrence as well as any of its particular\ntokens or instances. The Theravāda introduced a system of\neighty-two dhamma categories, meaning that there are\neighty-two possible types of occurrence in the experiential world, not\neighty-two occurrences. These are organized into a fourfold\ncategorization. The first three categories include the bare phenomenon\nof consciousness (citta) that encompasses a single\ndhamma type and of which the essential characteristic is the\ncognizing of an object; associated mentality (cetasika) that\nencompasses fifty-two dhammas; and materiality or physical\nphenomena (rūpa) that include twenty-eight\ndhammas that make up all physical occurrences\n(Abhidh-av 1). All the eighty-one dhamma types in\nthese three broad categories are conditioned\n(saṅkhata). Conditioned dhammas arise and\ncease subject to numerous causes and conditions and constitute\nsentient experience in all realms of the round of rebirth\n (saṃsāra).[8]\n The eighty-second dhamma that comprises the fourth category\nis unconditioned (asaṅkhata): it neither arises nor\nceases through causal interaction. The single occurrence in this\nfourth category is nirvana (Pali, nibbāna).", "\nThe Sarvāstivāda adopted a system of seventy-five basic\ntypes of dharmas organized into a fivefold categorization.\nThe first four categories comprise all conditioned\n(saṃskṛta) dharmas and include, again,\nconsciousness (citta, one single dharma); associated\nmentality (caitta, encompasses forty-six dharmas);\nand physical phenomena (rūpa, eleven dharmas);\nbut also factors dissociated from thought\n(cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra, fourteen\ndharmas). The last category is mentioned neither in the\nsūtras nor in the Theravāda lists, but is found\npredominantly in northern Indian Abhidharma texts of all periods. The\nspecific dharmas included within it vary, but they are all\nunderstood as explaining a range of experiential events, being\nthemselves dissociated from both material form and thought. The fifth\ncategory in the Sarvāstivāda taxonomy, that of the\nunconditioned (asaṃskṛta), comprises three\ndharmas, namely, space and two states of cessation\n(nirodha), the latter being a term that connotes the\nculmination of the Buddhist path (Cox 1995; 2004A, 553–554).", "\nThe Abhidharma analyzes in great detail each of these categories, thus\ncreating relational schemata whereby each acknowledged experience,\nphenomenon, or occurrence can be determined and identified by\nparticular definition and function. Especially important is the\nanalysis of consciousness or citta, on which much of\nAbhidharma doctrinal thought is built. Consider the Theravāda\nanalysis of consciousness, whose basic principles are shared with the\nother Abhidharma systems.", "\nThe epitome of the operation of consciousness is citta as\nexperienced in the process of sensory perception that, in Abhidharma\n(as in Buddhism in general), is deemed the paradigm of sentient\nexperience. Citta can never be experienced as bare\nconsciousness in its own origination moment, for consciousness is\nalways intentional, directed to a particular object that is cognized\nby means of certain mental factors. Citta, therefore, always\noccurs associated with its appropriate cetasikas or mental\nfactors that perform diverse functions and that emerge and cease\ntogether with it, having the same object (either sensuous or mental)\nand grounded in the same sense faculty. Any given consciousness\nmoment—also signified by the very term citta—is\nthus a unique assemblage of citta and its associated mental\nfactors such as feeling, conceptualization, volition, or attention, to\nname several of those required in any thought process. Each assemblage\nis conscious of just one object, arises for a brief instant and then\nfalls away, followed by another citta combination that picks\nup a different object by means of its particular associated mental\nfactors.", "\nThe classic Abhidhamma scheme as gleaned from the first book of the\nAbhidhamma-piṭaka, the\nDhammasaṅgaṇi, and as organized by the\ncommentarial tradition describes eighty-nine basic types of\nconsciousness moments, i.e., assemblages of citta and\ncetasika (Dhs Book I; Vism XIV\n81–110; Abhidh-av 1–15; Abhidh-s\n1–5). It classifies these basic citta types most\nbroadly according to their locus of occurrence, beginning with the\nsense-sphere (kāmāvacara) that includes forty-five\ncitta types, most prominently those that concern the\nmechanics of perception of sensuous objects; next come eighteen\nform-sphere (rūpāvacara) consciousnesses that\nconcern the mind that has attained meditative absorption\n(jhāna); followed by eight formless-sphere\n(arūpāvacara) consciousnesses that constitute the\nmind that has reached further meditative attainments known as formless\nstates; finally, there are eighteen world-transcending\n(lokuttara) consciousnesses that constitute the mind at the\nmoment of awakening itself: these have nirvana as their object. Within\nthese four broad categories many other classifications operate. For\ninstance, some dhammas are wholesome, others unwholesome;\nsome are resultant, others are not; some are motivated, others are\nwithout motivations. These attribute matrices, writes Cox (2004A,\n552), form “an abstract web of all possible conditions and\ncharacteristics exhibited by actually occurring dharmas. The\nindividual character of any particular dharma can then be\nspecified in accordance with every taxonomic possibility, resulting in\na complete assessment of that dharma’s range of\npossible occurrences.”", "\nVarious scholars have argued that this system reflects a dynamic\nconception of dharmas: that Abhidharma understands\ndharmas as properties, activities, or patterns of\ninterconnection that construct one’s world, not as static\nsubstances (e.g., Cox 2004A, 549ff; Gethin 1992A, 149–150;\nKarunadasa 2010, Ch. 4; Nyanaponika 1998, Ch. 2 & 4; Ronkin 2005,\nCh. 4; Waldron 2002, 2–16). The Abhidharma lists of dharmas are\n“explicitly open” and reflect “a certain reluctance\nand hesitancy to say categorically that such and such is the\ndefinitive list of dharmas” (Gethin 2017, 252), leaving room for\ncontinued debates about what is and is not a dharma. For the\nAbhidharma, as for Buddhism in general, the limits of one’s\nworld are set by the limits of one’s lived experience, and the\ncausal foundation for lived experience is the operation of one’s\ncognitive apparatus. According to the Buddhist path, the nature of\nlived experience as based on one’s cognitive apparatus is to be\ncontemplated by investigating the very nature of one’s mind\nthrough the practice of meditation. From this perspective, Abhidharma\nrepresents the theoretical counterpart to the practice of meditation.\nWithin this context of Buddhist practice, dharmas are\ndistinct (but interrelated) functions, energies, or causally\nsignificant aspects—in this sense\n“components”—of consciousness moments.", "\nThe categorial analysis of dharmas is therefore a meditative\npractice of discernment of dharmas: it is not intended as a\nclosed inventory of all existing dharmas “out\nthere” in their totality, but rather “has a dual\nsoteriological purpose involving two simultaneous processes”\n(Cox 2004A, 551). First, as “evaluative” analysis, the\ndharma typology maps out the constituents and workings of the\nmind and accounts for what makes up ordinary wholesome consciousness\nas opposed to the awakened mind. For instance, consciousness types\nthat arise in a mind that has attained meditative absorption become\nincreasingly refined and may never involve certain tendencies or\ndefilements that might potentially occur in ordinary (even wholesome)\nconsciousness. To watch dharmas as dharmas, writes\nGethin (2004, 536), “involves watching how they arise and\ndisappear, how the particular qualities that one wants to abandon can\nbe abandoned, and how the particular qualities that one wants to\ndevelop can be developed. Watching dhammas in this way one\nbegins to understand […] certain truths\n(sacca)—four to be exact—about these\ndhammas: their relation to suffering, its arising, its\nceasing and the way to its ceasing. And in seeing these four truths\none realizes the ultimate truth—dhamma—about the\n world.”[9]", "\nThe second, “descriptive” soteriological process involved\nin the categorization of dharmas reveals the fluid nature of\nsentient experience and validates the fundamental Buddhist teaching of\nnot-self (Skt., anātman, Pali, anatta). The\nincreasingly detailed enumerations of dharmas demonstrate\nthat no essence or independent self could be found in any phenomenon\nor its constituents, since all aspects of experience are impermanent,\narising and passing away subject to numerous causes and conditions.\nEven the handful dharmas that are categorized as\nunconditioned (that is, having no cause and no effect) are shown to be\nnot-self. The practice of the discrimination of dharmas thus\nundermines the apparently solid world we emotionally and\nintellectually grasp at that is replete with objects of desire and\nattachment. “Try to grasp the world of the\nDhammasaṅgaṇi, or the\nPaṭṭhāna,” Gethin notes (1992B, 165),\n“and it runs through one’s fingers.”", "\nNevertheless, the very notion of the plurality of dharmas as\nthe building blocks or the final units of analysis of sentient\nexperience signifies a considerable shift in the Buddhist\nunderstanding of dharma. Abhidharma thought was gradually\ndrawn into espousing a naturalistic explanation of dharmas as\nthe fundamental constituents of the phenomenal world, increasingly\nassociating dharmas as primary existents. The category of the\nunconditioned within the dharma taxonomy also asserted the\npossibility of enduring or permanent dharmas, in contrast to\nall other dharmas that arise and cease through causal\ninteraction. The Abhidharma exegesis, then, occasioned among Buddhist\ncircles doctrinal controversies that could be termed ontological\naround such issues as what the nature of a dharma is; what,\nin the internal constitution of a dharma, makes it the very\nparticular it is; the manner of existence of dharmas; the\ndynamics of their causal interaction; and the nature of the reality\nthey constitute. The distinctive principles and their ensuing\nontological interpretations constructed by the Buddhist schools were\nlargely shaped by a radical construal of impermanence as\nmomentariness." ], "section_title": "2. The dharma taxonomy: a metaphysics of experience", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nBoth the Sarvāstivāda and the post-canonical Theravāda\nconstructed a radical doctrine of momentariness (Skt.,\nkṣāṇavāda, Pali,\nkhāṇavāda) that atomizes phenomena temporally\nby dissecting them into a succession of discrete, momentary events\nthat pass out of existence as soon as they have originated. Albeit not\na topic in its own right in the Buddha’s discourses, the\ndoctrine of momentariness appears to have originated in conjunction\nwith the principle of impermanence (Skt., anitya, Pali,\nanicca). This idea is basic to the Buddha’s\nempirically-oriented teaching about the nature of sentient experience:\nall physical and mental phenomena are in a constant process of\nconditioned construction and are interconnected, being dependently\noriginated (e.g., A I 286; M I 230, 336, 500;\nS II 26, III 24–5, 96–9, IV 214). The Suttanta\nelaboration on these three interlocking ideas results in a formula\n(A I 152) that states that conditioned phenomena (Skt.,\nsaṃskārā, Pali,\nsaṅkhārā) are of the nature of origination\n(uppāda), “change of what endures”\n(ṭhitassa aññathatta), and dissolution or\ncessation (vaya). This formula is known as the “three\ncharacteristics of what is conditioned”\n(tisaṅkhatalakkhaṇa). The\nSarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika introduced four\ncharacteristics of conditioned phenomena: origination, endurance,\ndecay, and dissolution. These are classified under the dharma\ncategory of “factors dissociated from thought.”", "\nThe Buddhist schools used the characteristics of conditioned phenomena\nas a hermeneutic tool with which to reinterpret impermanence in terms\nof momentariness. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika\nproposed a fully-fledged doctrine of momentariness according to which\nall physical and mental phenomena are momentary. The\nSarvāstivādins use the term “moment”\n(kṣaṇa) in a highly technical sense as the\nsmallest, definite unit of time that cannot be subdivided, the length\nof which came to be equated with the duration of mental events as the\nbriefest conceivable entities. There is no Sarvāstivādin\nconsensus on the length of a moment, but the texts indicate figures\nbetween 0.13 and 13 milliseconds in modern terms (Gethin 1998, 221;\nvon Rospatt 1995, 94–110). This usage presupposes an atomistic\nconception of time, for time is not reckoned indefinitely divisible.\nIndeed, the term kṣaṇa is often discussed in\njuxtaposition to the concepts of material atoms and syllables, which\nare likewise comprehended as indivisible.", "\nWithin the Sarvāstivāda framework, material reality\n(rūpa-dharma) is reduced to discrete momentary atoms,\nand much attention is drawn to ontological and epistemological\nquestions such as whether sense objects are real at any time, or\nwhether atoms contribute separately or collectively to the generation\nof perception. Atomic reality is understood as constantly changing:\nwhat appears to us as a world made up of enduring substances with\nchanging qualities is, in fact, a series of moments that arise and\nperish in rapid succession. This process is not random, but operates\nin accordance with the specific capability and function of each atom.\nThe spirit of this atomistic analysis of material reality applies\nequally to mental reality: consciousness is understood as a succession\nof discrete consciousness moments that arise and cease extremely\n rapidly.[10]\n Thus, the ratio of change between material and mental phenomena in\nany given moment is one to one: they occur in perfect synchronicity\n(Kim 1999, 54). On this point the Sautrāntika agreed with the\nSarvāstivāda.", "\nThe Sarvāstivādins (“advocates of the doctrine that\nall things exist”) were unique in their stance that the\ncharacteristics of conditioned phenomena exist separately as real\nentities within each moment. Their claim, then, is that all\nconditioned dharmas—whether past, present, or\nfuture—exist as real entities (dravyatas) within the\nspan of any given moment. This induced a host of problems, one of\nwhich is that the Sarvāstivāda definition of a moment is\ndifficult to reconcile with its conception as the shortest unit of\ntime (von Rospatt 1995, 44–46 & 97–98). The\nSarvāstivāda replies to this criticism by stating that the\nactivities (kāritra) of the four characteristics of\nconditioned phenomena are sequential: the limits between the birth and\ndissolution of any event are referred to as one moment. This solution,\nhowever, implies that a single event undergoes four phases within a\ngiven moment, which inevitably infringes upon its momentariness (Cox\n1995, 151; von Rospatt 1995, 52ff).", "\nThe Theravādins created their own distinct version of the\ndoctrine of momentariness. They do not seem to have been as concerned\nas the Sarvāstivādins with the ontology and epistemology of\nmaterial and mental realities per se. Rather, they were more\npreoccupied with the psychological apparatus governing the process of\ncognizing of sense data, and hence with the changing ratio between\nmaterial and mental phenomena. The Yamaka of the canonical\nAbhidhamma offers what is probably the first textual occurrence of the\nterm “moment” (khaṇa) in the sense of a\nvery brief stretch of time that is divided into origination and\ncessation instants (Kim 1999, 60–61). Relying on the three\ncharacteristics of conditioned phenomena, the Pali commentaries later\npresent a scheme wherein each moment of every phenomenon is subdivided\ninto three different instants of origination\n(uppādakkhaṇa), endurance\n(ṭhitikkhaṇa) and cessation\n(bhaṅgakkhaṇa) (Spk II 266;\nMp II 252). These are three phases of a single momentary\nphenomenon defined as one single dhamma or consciousness\nmoment. A dhamma occurs in the first sub-moment, endures in\nthe second, and ceases in the third (Karunadasa 2010, 234ff). The\ncommentarial tradition thus analyzes phenomena temporally by\ndissecting them into a succession of discrete, momentary events that\nfall away as soon as they have originated in consciousness. As one\nevent is exhausted, it conditions a new event of its kind that\nproceeds immediately afterwards. The result is an uninterrupted,\nflowing continuum (santāna) of causally connected\nmomentary events. These succeed each other so fast that we conceive of\nthe phenomena they constitute as temporally extended.", "\nThe Theravādins use the term khaṇa as the\nexpression for a brief instant, the dimension of which is not fixed\nbut may be determined by the context. For example,\ncittakkhaṇa refers to the instant taken by one\nmental event. In this basic sense as denoting a very brief stretch of\ntime, the term “moment” does not entail an atomistic\nconception of a definite and ultimate, smallest unit of time, but\nleaves open the possibility that time is infinitely divisible (von\nRospatt 1995, 59–60 & 94–95). Here the three moments\nof origination, endurance, and cessation do not correspond to three\ndifferent entities. Rather, they represent three phases of a single\nmomentary phenomenon and are defined as one single consciousness\nmoment: a dhamma occurs in the first sub-moment, endures in\nthe second sub-moment and perishes in the third one. In this way, the\nTheravādins avoided some of the difficulties faced by the\nSarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, of how to compress the\ncharacteristics of the conditioned into one single indivisible moment\nand of how to account for their ontological status. The\nTheravādins also claimed that only mental phenomena are\nmomentary, whereas material phenomena (e.g., common-sense objects)\nendure for a stretch of time. The Theravādin commentarial\ntradition subsequently elaborated on this proposition and produced a\nunique view of the ratio between material and mental phenomena,\nasserting that a material phenomenon lasts for sixteen or seventeen\nconsciousness moments (Kv 620; Vibh-a 25–28;\nVism XX 24–26; Kim 1999, 79–80 &\n§3.1).", "\nDespite their different interpretations of the concept of\nmomentariness, the early Buddhist schools all derived this concept\nfrom the analysis of impermanence in terms of the dynamics of\ndharmas qua physical and mental events. The equation of a\nmoment with the duration of these transient events as extremely short\noccurrences—even the shortest conceivable—led to the\ndirect determination of the moment in terms of these occurrences. Yet\nthe doctrine of momentariness spawned a host of problems for the\nBuddhist schools, particularly with regard to the status of the\nendurance moment and to the explanation of continuity and conditioning\ninteraction among the dharmas (see section 5 below). If\ndharmas go through an endurance phase or exist as real\nentities within the span of any given moment, how can they be\nmomentary? And if experience is an array of strictly momentary\ndharmas, how can continuity and causal conditioning be\npossible?", "\nOne might argue that the conceptual shift from\n“impermanence” to “endurance” is a result of\nscholastic literalism and testifies to the Abhidharma tendency towards\nreification and hypostatization of dharmas (Gombrich 1996,\n36–37, 96–97 & 106–107). Nevertheless, the\nobject of the doctrine of momentariness is not so much existence in\ntime or the passage of time per se, but rather, in epistemological\nterms and a somewhat Bergsonian sense, the construction of temporal\nexperience. Instead of a transcendental matrix of order imposed on\nnatural events from without, time is seen as an inherent feature of\nthe operation of dharmas. The doctrine of momentariness\nanalyzes dharmas as they transpire through time: as\npsycho-physical events that arise and cease in consciousness and, by\nthe dynamics of their rise and fall, construct time. The sequence of\nthe three times is therefore secondary, generated in and by the\nprocess of conditioned and conditioning dharmas. In fact, the\nconceptual shift from the principle of impermanence to the theory of\nmomentariness is a shift in time scales. While the Sūtrānta\nworldview interprets the three times as referring to past, present,\nand future lives, the Abhidharma sees them as phases that any\nconditioned dharma undergoes each and every moment.\nImpermanence marks dharmas over a period of time, but is also\nencapsulated in every single consciousness moment (Vibh-a\n7–8; Sv 991; Vism XIV 191; Collins 1992, 227)." ], "section_title": "3. Time: from impermanence to momentariness", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nTo preserve the principle of impermanence and explain continuity and\ncausal conditioning in ordinary experience, the Buddhist schools\nintroduced novel interpretations of the nature of dharmas. At\nthe heart of these interpretations is the concept of intrinsic nature\n(Skt., svabhāva, Pali, sabhāva) that plays\na major role in the systematization of Abhidharma thought, is closely\nrelated to the consolidation of the dharma theory, and is\nregarded as that which gave an impetus to the Abhidharma growing\nconcern with ontology.", "\nThe term svabhāva/sabhāva does not feature in the\nsūtras/suttas and its rare mentions in other\nSarvāstivāda and Theravāda canonical texts offer no\naccount of dharma as defined by a fixed intrinsic nature that\nverifies its real\n existence.[11]\n This situation changes significantly in the post-canonical\nliterature, in which svabhāva becomes a standard concept\nextensively used in dharma exegesis. A recurring idea in the\nexegetical Abhidharma literature from the period of the early\nvibhāṣā compendia onward is that\ndharmas are defined by virtue of their\nsvabhāva. For instance, a definition transmitted in the\nAbhidharmakośabhāṣya reads:\n“dharma means ‘upholding,’ [namely],\nupholding intrinsic nature (svabhāva),” and the\nMahāvibhāṣā states that “intrinsic\nnature is able to uphold its own identity and not lose it […]\nas in the case of unconditioned dharmas that are able to\nuphold their own identity” (Cox 2004A, 558–559).\nSimilarly, a definition prevalent in Theravādin Abhidhamma\ncommentaries is: “dhammas are so called because they\nbear their intrinsic natures, or because they are borne by causal\nconditions” (e.g., Dhs-a 39-40; Paṭis-a\nI 18; Vism-mhṭ I 347). The commentaries also regularly\nequate dhammas with their intrinsic natures, using the terms\ndhamma and sabhāva interchangeably. For\nexample, the Visuddhimagga proclaims that\n“dhamma means but intrinsic nature”\n(Vism VIII 246), and the sub-commentary to the\nDhammasaṅgaṇi indicates that “there is no\nother thing called dhamma apart from the intrinsic nature\nborne by it” and that “the term sabhāva\ndenotes the mere fact of being a dhamma”\n(Dhs-mṭ 28 & 94; see also Karunadasa 2010: Ch.\n1).", "\nThese commentarial definitions of dharmas as carrying their\nintrinsic natures should not be interpreted ontologically as implying\nthat dharmas are substances having inherent existence. The\nPali commentaries, cautions Gethin (2004, 533), “are often\nviewed too much in the light of later controversies about the precise\nontological status of dharmas and the Madhyamaka critique of\nthe notion of svabhāva in the sense of ‘inherent\nexistence.’” In fact, defining dharmas as bearing\ntheir intrinsic natures conveys the idea that there is no enduring\nagent behind them. Adding that dharmas are borne by causal\nconditions counters the idea of intrinsic natures borne by underlying\nsubstances distinct from themselves. Just as dharmas are\npsycho-physical events that occur dependently on appropriate\nconditions and qualities, their intrinsic natures arise dependently on\nother conditions and qualities rather than on a substratum more real\nthan they are (ibid; Karunadasa 1996, 13–16;\nNyanaponika 1998, 40–41).", "\nWe must also note that the context within which dharmas are\nrendered in terms of their intrinsic natures is that of\ncategorization, where multiple criteria and qualities are applied to\ncreate a comprehensive taxonomic system that distinguishes the\nparticular character of any given dharma. Cox (2004A:\n559–561) has shown that in the early period of northern Indian\nAbhidharma texts, as represented by the\nŚāriputrābhidharmaśāstra and\nportions of the Mahāvibhāṣā, the concept\nof intrinsic nature develops within the context of the method of\ninclusion (saṃgraha), that is, the process by which the\ninclusion of dharmas within a specific category is to be\napplied. Dharmas are determined (pariniṣpanna)\nby the intrinsic nature that defines them and hence should not be\nconsidered to possess a separately existing intrinsic nature.\n“‘Determination’ implies two further features of\ndharmas […] First, just as categories in a\nwell-structured taxonomic schema are distinct and not subject to\nfluctuation, so also dharmas, as ‘determined,’\nare clearly and unalterably discriminated: they are uniquely\nindividualized and as such are not subject to confusion with other\ndharmas. [Second,] determination by intrinsic nature\nundergoes no variation or modification, and hence, dharmas,\nwhich are in effect types or categories of intrinsic nature, are\nestablished as stable and immutable” (ibid, 562). In\nthe early Sarvāstivāda exegetical texts, then,\nsvabhāva is used as an atemporal, invariable criterion\ndetermining what a dharma is, not necessarily\nthat a dharma exists. The concern here is primarily\nwith what makes categorial types of dharma unique, rather\nthan with the ontological status of dharmas.", "\nNevertheless, from the foregoing categorial theory, the mature\nAbhidharma drew ontological conclusions with regard to the reality of\ndharmas. This transition in the conception of dharma\ncoincided with an inherent ambiguity in the term\nsvabhāva, which is grounded logically and etymologically\nin the term bhāva that came to denote “mode of\nexistence” (ibid, 565–568). In the\nvibhāṣā compendia and contemporaneous texts,\n“the explicit emphasis upon categorization per se\nrecedes in importance as the focus shifts to clarifying the character\nand eventually the ontological status of individual dharmas.\nAccordingly, the term svabhāva acquires the dominant\nsense of ‘intrinsic nature’ specifying individual\ndharmas […] And determining individual\ndharmas through unique intrinsic nature also entails\naffirming their existence, as a natural function both of the\netymological sense of the term svabhāva and of the role\nof dharmas as the fundamental constituents of experience.\nThis then leads to the prominence of a new term that expressed this\nontological focus: namely, dravya” (ibid,\n569). Dravya means “real existence” and, within\nthe Sarvāstivāda framework, dharmas that are\ndetermined by intrinsic nature exist as real entities\n(dravyatas), as opposed both to composite objects of ordinary\nexperience that exist provisionally and to relative concepts or\ncontingencies of time and place that exist relatively. The presence of\nintrinsic nature indicates that a dharma is a primary\nexistent, irrespective of its temporal status, namely, whether it is a\npast, present or future dharma, and hence the\nSarvāstivāda declaration that “all things\nexist.”", "\nThe Theravāda rejected the Sarvāstivāda ontological\nmodel, claiming that dhammas exist only in the present. But\nthe Theravāda Abhidhamma shares with the Sarvāstivāda\nthe same principles of dhamma analysis as a categorial theory\nthat individuates sentient experience. Here, too, the taxonomic\nfunction of sabhāva gave rise to ontological\nconnotations of existence in the characterization of dhammas.\nAs the final units of Abhidhamma analysis, dhammas are\nreckoned the ultimate constituents of experience. “There is\nnothing else, whether a being, or an entity, or a man or a\nperson,” a famous Pali commentarial excerpt proclaims\n(Dhs-a\n 155).[12]\n While this statement is meant to refute the rival Pudgalavāda\nposition of the reality of the person by insisting that there is no\nbeing or person apart from dhammas, there emerges the idea\nthat the phenomenal world is, at bottom, a world of dhammas:\nthat within the confines of sentient experience there is no other\nactuality apart from dhammas and that what constitutes any\ngiven dhamma as a discrete, individualized particular is its\nintrinsic nature. The Theravāda elaborates on the concept of\nsabhāva in juxtaposition to its theory of momentariness,\nand it acquires the sense of what underlies a dhamma’s\nendurance moment and as a point of reference to the moments of\norigination and cessation. Before a dhamma eventuates it does\nnot yet obtain an intrinsic nature and when it ceases it is denuded of\nthis intrinsic nature. As a present occurrence, though, while\npossessing its intrinsic nature, it exists as an ultimate reality and\nits intrinsic nature is evidence of its actual existence as such\n(Dhs-a 45; Vism VIII 234, XV 15). One commentarial\npassage even goes so far as naming this instant “the acquisition\nof a self” (Vism-mhṭ I 343)." ], "section_title": "4. Intrinsic nature: between categorization and ontology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe Abhidharma’s ontological investigations occasioned a host of\ndoctrinal problems that became the subject of an ongoing debate among\nthe Buddhist schools. One primary controversy centered on the\nprinciple of impermanence: if all phenomena are impermanent, the\nSautrāntika challenged the Sarvāstivāda and the\nTheravāda, then dharmas must be changing continuously\nand can neither exist in the past and future nor endure for any period\nof time, however short, in the present. On the other hand, the\nsystematic analysis of experience in terms of momentary\ndharmas required the Abhidharma to provide a rigorous account\nof the processes that govern psychological and physical continuity.\nWhat fuels these processes is causal interaction, but the very notion\nof causation is allegedly compromised by the theory of momentariness.\nIf causes, conditions, and their results are all momentary events, how\ncan an event that has ended have a result? How can an event that\nundergoes distinct stages of origination, endurance, and cessation in\na brief moment have causal efficacy? Notwithstanding their doctrinal\ndifferences, both the Sarvāstivāda and the Theravāda\nAbhidhamma had to confront these challenges, and they did so by\nformulating complex theories of immediate contiguity that grant causal\nefficacy.", "\nThe Sarvāstivāda developed an analysis of causal\nconditioning in terms of intricate interrelations among four types of\ncondition (pratyaya) and six types of cause (hetu).\nAs documented in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya\n(AKB 2.49) based on canonical texts including the\nVijñānakāya, the\nPrakaraṇapāda, and the\nJñānaprasthāna, the four conditions are: 1)\nroot cause (literally “cause as condition,”\nhetupratyaya), reckoned the foremost in inciting the process\nof fruition and origination; 2) immediate antecedent, which holds\nbetween a consciousness moment and its immediately preceding moment in\nthat consciousness series; 3) object support, which applies to all\ndharmas insofar as they are intentional objects of\nconsciousness; and 4) predominance, which facilitates sensory\ndiscriminative awareness, e.g., the faculty of sight’s\npredominance over visual cognitive awareness. The six causes are: 1)\ninstrumentality (kāraṇahetu), deemed the primary\nfactor in the production of a result; 2) simultaneity or coexistence,\nwhich connects phenomena that arise simultaneously; 3) homogeneity,\nexplaining the homogenous flow of dharmas that evokes the\nseeming continuity of phenomena; 4) association, which operates only\nbetween mental dharmas and explains why the elements of\nconsciousness always appear as assemblages of mental factors; 5)\ndominance, which forms one’s habitual cognitive and behaviorist\ndispositions; and 6) fruition, referring to whatever is the result of\nactively wholesome or unwholesome dharmas. The four\nconditions and six causes interact with each other in explaining\nphenomenal experience: for instance, each consciousness moment acts\nboth as the homogenous cause as well as the immediate antecedent\ncondition of the rise of consciousness and its concomitants in a\nsubsequent\n moment.[13]", "\nUnderlying this analysis of causal conditioning is the notion of\nexistence as efficacious action, or karma. Karma, a fundamental\nprinciple in Buddhist thought from its inception, is what fuels the\nrepetitive experience in saṃsāra, the round of\n rebirth.[14]\n In Abhidharma exegesis, the efficacious action or distinctive\nfunctioning of dharmas is understood predominantly as causal\nfunctioning. For the orthodox\nSarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika, the existence of\ndharmas as real entities (dravyatas) is determined\nby both their intrinsic nature and particular causal functioning.\nIntrinsic nature, however, is an atemporal determinant of real\nexistence. What determines a dharma’s spatio-temporal\nexistence is its distinctive causal functioning: past and future\ndharmas have capability (sāmarthya) of\nfunctioning, while present dharmas also exert a distinctive\nactivity (kāritra). Present activity is an internal\ncausal efficacy that assists in the production of an effect within a\ndharma’s own consciousness series. It is this activity\nthat determines a dharma’s present existence and\ndefines the limits of the span of its present moment. Capability, by\ncontrast, is a conditioning efficacy externally directed towards\nanother consciousness series: it constitutes a condition that assists\nanother dharma in the production of its own effect (Cox\n2004A, 570–573; Williams 1981, 240–243). A\ndharma’s present activity arises and falls away, but\npast and future dharmas all have potential for causal\nfunctioning and exist as real entities due to their intrinsic nature.\nFor the Sarvāstivāda, this model—which insists on\nconstant change within the limits of the present moment and implies\nthe existence of dharmas in the three time\nperiods—preserves both the principle of impermanence yet\nexplains continuity and causal efficacy.", "\nThe Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika distinction between a\ndharma’s activity and capability implies that each\ndharma or consciousness moment effects the next moment within\nits series, but it can also act as a contributory condition towards\nproducing a different sort of effect. Activity engenders the next\nmoment within a dharma’s series, while capability\ngenerates a different effect and explains the causal efficacy of past\ndharmas. Williams (1981, 246–247) helpfully notes that\nwe may render this “horizontal” and “vertical”\ncausality, within a consciousness series and transcending it\nrespectively. For example, an instant of visual awareness horizontally\nproduces the next moment of visual awareness and may or may not,\ndepending on other factors such as light and so on, vertically produce\nvision of the object. “It follows that to be present is to have\nhorizontal causality, which may or may not include vertical\ncausality—a fact which serves to remind us that we are dealing\nhere with primary existents which are frequently positioned within the\nsystem in terms of what they do” (ibid). Thus activity\nor horizontal causality—a dharma’s function of\nprecipitating the next moment of its own consciousness\nseries—individuates that dharma as a particular event\nof its kind. A dharma’s capability or vertical\ncausality, by which it facilitates the occurrence of other\ndharmas outside its consciousness series, locates it within\nthe web of interrelations that connects it with the incessant rise and\nfall of other dharmas, and hence further individuates it as\nthat very particular dharma by manifesting its unique quality\nand intensity of operation.", "\nThe Saturāntika and the Theravāda developed alternative\ntheories of causal conditioning in conjunction with their rejection of\nthe Sarvāstivāda ontological model and their claim that\ndharmas exist only in the present. The Sautrāntika\nexplained causal interaction among past and future dharmas by\nreference to the idea of “seeds” (bīja), or\nmodifications in subsequent dharma series. The\nSautrāntika theory of seeds is the precursor of two extremely\nimportant concepts of later Mahāyāna Buddhist thought,\nnamely, the Yogācāra’s concepts of “store\nconsciousness” (ālayavijñāna) and of\nBuddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha) (Cox 1995, 94–95; Gethin\n1998, 222). The Theravāda theory of causal conditioning, as set\nout in the Paṭṭhāna, proposes a set of\ntwenty-four conditional relations (paccaya) that account for\nall possible ways in which a phenomenon may function in conditioning\nthe rise of another phenomenon. The twenty-four conditional relations\nare: 1) root cause (hetupaccaya); 2) object support; 3)\npredominance; 4) proximity; 5) contiguity; 6) simultaneity; 7)\nreciprocity; 8) support; 9) decisive support; 10) pre-existence 11)\npost-existence; 12) habitual cultivation; 13) karma; 14) fruition; 15)\nnutriment; 16) controlling faculty; 17) jhāna – a\nrelation specific to meditation attainments; 18) path – a\nrelation specific to the stages on the Buddhist path; 19) association;\n20) dissociation; 21) presence; 22) absence; 23) disappearance; 24)\n non-disappearance.[15]\n The majority of the Theravāda twenty-four conditions have\ncounterparts in the Sarvāstivāda theory and both systems\nshow various other parallel interests and points of resemblance. The\nlikelihood, then, is that the two systems originated before the two\nschools separated and continued to evolve after their separation\n(Conze 1962, 152–153; Kalupahana 1961, 173).", "\nTheir differences notwithstanding, both the Sarvāstivāda and\nthe Theravāda theories of causal conditioning are based on the\nnotions that dharmas are psycho-physical events that perform\nspecific functions, and that to define what a dhamma is\nrequires one to determine what it does (Gethin 1992A, 150). It turns\nout, then, that the relative positioning of each dharma\nwithin a network of causes and conditions is, first and foremost, a\nmeans for its individuation. Only in a subsidiary sense is this\nnetwork an analysis of causal efficacy. What reappears here is the\ncategorial dimension of the dharma analysis qua a\nmetaphysical theory of mental events in terms of sameness of\nconditional relations. Analogous to the space-time coordinate system\nthat enables one to identify and describe material objects, the\nnetwork of conditional relations may be seen as a coordinate system\nthat locates within it any given dharma, implying that to be\na dharma is to be an event that has a place in that web of\nrelations—an idea reminiscent of Donald Davidson’s\nprinciple of sameness of causes and effects as a condition of identity\nof events (2001 119–120 & 154–161). Two\ndharma instances of the same type would fit into the web of\ncausal conditions in exactly the same way, but would then be\ndistinguished as individual instances on the grounds of their unique\ndegrees and modes of causal efficacy." ], "section_title": "5. Causation: existence as functioning", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn attempting to account for what effects liberating insight and what\nmakes up the awakened mind, Abhidharma inquiries extended into the\nfield of epistemology. We have seen that the Abhidharma’s\nanalysis of sentient experience reveals that what we perceive as a\ntemporally extended, uninterrupted flow of phenomena is, in fact, a\nrapidly occurring sequence of causally connected consciousness moments\nor cittas (i.e., assemblages of citta and\ncaitta/cetasika), each with its particular object. The mature\nAbhidharma thus assimilates the analysis of\nphenomena-in-time-as-constituted-by-consciousness with a highly\ncomplex description of the consciousness process, dissolving the\ncausal relations between ordered successions of consciousness moments\ninto the activity of perception. As previously noted in section 2, for\nthe Abhidharma, as in Buddhist epistemology in general, sensory\nperception is the paradigm of perceptual, sentient experience. Like\nevery instance of consciousness, sensory perception is intentional,\nencapsulated in the interaction among the sense faculties, their\ncorresponding types of discriminative consciousness, and their\nappropriate sense objects. Different Buddhist schools, however, held\ndifferent positions on the distinctive nature of perceptual\nexperience, and on the specific roles of the sense faculties and\nstatus of sense objects in it. The Theravāda Abhidhamma and the\nSarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika both espouse a view that\nproposes a direct contact between perceptual consciousness and its\nsense objects, the latter being understood as sensibilia, for\nwhat we perceive are not objects of common sense but their sensible\nqualities. We may characterize this view as phenomenalist realism\n(Dreyfus 1997, 331 & 336).", "\nThe Theravāda Abhidhamma sets out its theory of the consciousness\nprocess (citta-vīthi) in its commentaries and manuals,\nmainly in the works of Buddhaghosa, Buddhadatta (5th century CE), and\nAnuruddha (10th or 11th century CE), based on earlier descriptions in\nthe Dhammasaṅgaṇi and the\nPaṭṭhāna (Vism XIV 111–124,\nXVII 126–145; Dhs-a 82–106 & 267–287;\nVibh-a 155–160; Abhidh-s 17–21). The\ntheory is not separate from the dhamma taxonomy and the\nanalysis of citta as previously outlined in section 2.\nRather, in congruency with the notion of existence (whether categorial\nor ontological) as functioning, it analyzes sensory perception as\nresulting from particular functions that are performed by the\neighty-nine citta types revealed by the foregoing taxonomy.\nAccording to this analysis, the specific functions in the\nconsciousness flow occur at particular instants of that continuum, as\nthe normal flow of consciousness involves the mind picking up and\nputting down sense objects by means of successive sets of associated\nmental factors. The result is a fairly static account of mental and\nmaterial phenomena as they arise in consciousness over a series of\nconsciousness\n moments.[16]", "\nRestricting the account to the consciousness process of ordinary\nbeings, two types of process are described: five-sense-door processes\n(pañcadvāra) and mind-door processes\n(manodvāra). These may occur in succession, or mind-door\nprocesses may occur independently. Five-sense-door processes account\nfor sensory perception as information is directly received from the\nfields of the five physical sense faculties. Mind-door processes\ninternalize the information received through the sense faculties and\ncharacterize the mind that is absorbed in thought or memory. Objects\nat the “door” of the mind, which is treated in Buddhist\nthought as a sixth sense faculty, may be past, present, or future,\npurely conceptual or even transcendent. Normally, however, the object\nat the mind door will be either a past memory or a concept. If there\nis no perceptual activity, as is the case in deep, dreamless sleep,\nthe mind is in a state of rest called inactive mode\n(bhavaṅga). Throughout one’s life, the same type\nof citta performs this function of the inactive mind that is\nthe natural mode to which the mind reverts. The mind switches from its\ninactive mode to a simple mind-door process when a concept or memory\noccurs and no attention is directed to the other five sense fields.\nThe simplest mind-door process is a succession of the following\nfunctions: 1) adverting to the object of thought: a function that\nlasts one moment and becomes internalized as an object support; 2)\nimpulsion: occurs for up to seven moments and performs the function of\nthe mind’s responding actively to the object with wholesome or\nunwholesome karma; 3) retaining: holding on to the object of the\nconsciousness process for one or two moments.", "\nThe mind switches from its inactive mode to any of the five-sense-door\nprocesses when an object occurs at the “door” of the\nappropriate sense faculty. This process of sensory perception involves\na greater number of functions: 1) disturbed inactive mind: a function\nthat arises due to the stimulus of the sense object. It lasts for two\nmoments, during which sensory contact takes place, i.e., a physical\nimpact of the sense object on the physical matter of the appropriate\nsense faculty; 2) adverting: lasts one moment, during which the mind\nturns towards the object at the appropriate sense “door;”\n3) perceiving: lasts one moment and is the sheer perception of the\nsense object with minimal interpretation; 4) receiving: lasts one\nmoment and performs the intermediary role of enabling transit to and\nfrom the appropriate discriminative consciousness, whether visual,\nauditory, etc.; 5) investigating: lasts one moment and performs the\nrole of establishing the nature of the sense object and of determining\nthe mind’s response to that object that has just been\nidentified; 6) impulsion: same as in the mind-door process; 7)\nretaining: same as in the mind-door process. As an example, visual\nperception involves not only seeing itself, but also a succession of\nmoments of fixing of the visual object in the mind, recognition of its\ngeneral features, and identification of its nature. In both the\nmind-door and five-sense door processes, the sense faculty and its\nsense object condition the arising of a present moment of a\ncorresponding apprehending consciousness, that is, perception here is\nmodeled on simultaneous conditioning. And in both the mind-door and\nfive-sense door processes, when the retaining function ceases, the\nmind reenters its inactive mode.", "\nThe consciousness types that perform most of the functions that make\nup the mind-door and the five-sense-door processes fall into the\ncategory of resultant cittas, that is, those that are the\nresult of past actively wholesome or unwholesome consciousness. This\nmeans that the experience of the sense data presented to one’s\nmind is determined by one’s previous actions and is beyond of\none’s immediate control. Whenever one remembers or\nconceptualizes, sees, hears, smells, tastes, or touches something that\nis desirable or pleasing, one experiences a result of previous\nwholesome consciousness. And vice versa with objects that are\nundesirable or unpleasing and previous unwholesome consciousness\nrespectively. Only in the final stage of the consciousness process,\nwhen the mind has chosen to respond actively to its object in some\nway, actively present wholesome or unwholesome consciousness operates\nand constitutes karma that will bear future results. The Abhidhamma\nthus “provides an exact small-scale analysis of the process of\ndependent arising” (Gethin 1998, 216).", "\nThe Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika proposes a similar\naccount of sensory perception, but argues that the sensory object\nexists as a real entity. The Sautrāntika theory of perception,\nhowever, is rather different. It rests on the Sautrāntika radical\nview of momentariness, according to which there is no real duration\nbut only a succession of infinitesimal moments, and on its view of\ncausation, according to which causes cease to exist when their effects\ncome into existence. The application of these principles to sensory\nperception makes it difficult to explain how perception directly\napprehends sense objects, for it implies that objects have ceased when\ntheir apprehending consciousness arises. The Sautrāntika reply is\nthat consciousness does not have direct access to its sense objects.\nBy contrast to phenomenalist realism, the Sautrāntika view of\nperceptual consciousness may be characterized as representationalism:\nit sees perception as apprehending its objects indirectly, through the\nmediation of aspects (ākāra) representative of\ntheir objects (Dreyfus 1997, 335 & 380–381).", "\nWhat is common to all the three main Abhidharma\ntraditions—Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, and\nSautrāntika—is that they manifest a somewhat similar\nparadigm shift towards reducing the phenomenal, causally conditioned\nworld into the activity of cognition and consciousness. This shift was\npart of a broader movement in Indian philosophy in which Hindu, Jain,\nand Buddhist thinkers turned away from traditional metaphysical\nquestions about the nature of the external world and the self, and\nfocused instead on the study of epistemology, logic, and language.\nTheir purpose was to provide systematic accounts of the nature and\nmeans of valid cognition. Within Buddhist circles, this\nepistemological turn saw the rise of thinkers such as Asaṅga and\nVasubandhu, the founders of the Yogācāra (400–480 CE),\nand, most notably, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (around 500 CE)\nwho developed sophisticated logical and philosophical systems\n(ibid, 15–19). The Abhidharma, then, sets the stage for\nthis epistemological turn. The new emphasis becomes dominant from the\nperiod of the vibhāṣā compendia onward and is\nevident in a shift in the terminology used by the Abhidharma to\ndescribe the nature of dharmas. This terminological shift is\nindicated by the terms “particular inherent\ncharacteristic” (Skt., svalakṣaṇa, Pali,\nsalakkhaṇa) and “general characteristic”\n(Skt., sāmānyalakṣaṇa, Pali,\nsāmānyalakkhaṇa).", "\nThe term lakṣaṇa/lakkhaṇa means a mark, or\na specific characteristic that distinguishes an indicated object from\nothers. The Logicians use this term in the sense of\n“definition” of a concept or logical category. The\nAbhidharma applies it to the practice of the discernment of\ndharmas, distinguishing between multiple generic\ncharacteristics a dharma shares with other dharmas\nand (at least) one particular inherent characteristic that defines a\ndharma as that very individual occurrence distinct from any\nother instances of its type. The post-canonical Abhidharma thus\nassimilates the concept of the particular inherent characteristic with\nthat of intrinsic nature. “Dhammas,” the\nTheravādin commentarial literature states, “are so called\nbecause they bear their particular inherent characteristics”\n(Vibh-a 45; Vibh-mṭ 35; Paṭis-a\nI 79; Vism XV 3), and a particular characteristic “is\nthe intrinsic nature that is not held in common by other\ndhammas” (Vism-mhṭ II 137). Used in\nconjunction or interchangeably with intrinsic nature, the particular\ninherent characteristic constitutes a dhamma’s unique\ndefinition (Vism VI 19, 35). It is an epistemological and\nlinguistic determinant of a dhamma as a knowable instance\nthat is defined by a distinct verbal description.", "\nThe Mahāvibhāṣā of the\nSarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika similarly distinguishes\nbetween a dharma’s particular inherent and generic\ncharacteristics and identifies the former with intrinsic nature, thus\ndiscriminating “levels in the apprehension or discernment of\ndharmas that serve to clarify the ambiguity encountered in\nthe application of the term svabhāva to both individual\ndharmas and to categorial groups” (Cox 2004A, 575). The\ndifference between the analytical description of dharmas in\nterms of their intrinsic nature or their characteristics, notes Cox\n(ibid, 576), is that “whereas intrinsic nature acquires\nits special significance in the context of exegetical categorization,\nthe starting point for the characteristics lies in perspectivistic\ncognition. Ontology is a concern for both systems, but the shift in\nterminology from intrinsic nature to the characteristics reflects a\nconcurrent shift from a category-based abstract ontology to an\nepistemological ontology that is experientially or cognitively\ndetermined.” This new epistemological emphasis looms in through\na modified definition of existence proposed by the mature\nSarvāstivāda exegesis that sees the causal efficacy\nunderlying all existence as cognitive. Representing this development\nin the history of Sarvāstivāda thought is Saṅghabhadra\n(fifth century CE), who states in his\nNyāyānusāra: “to be an object-field that\nproduces cognition (buddhi) is the true characteristic of\nexistence” (ibid). This means that dharmas as\nthe constituents of our experiential world are objectively\nidentifiable through cognition.", "\nIn sum, the Abhidharma project, as evident by the dharma\ntheory and its supporting doctrines, is, at bottom, epistemologically\noriented. Yet the project also intends to ascertain that every\nconstituent of the experiential world is knowable and nameable, and\nthat the words and concepts used in the discourse that develops around\nthe discernment of these constituents uniquely define their\ncorresponding referents. The dharma analysis therefore paves\nthe way for conceptual realism: a worldview that is based on the\nnotion of truth as consisting in a correspondence between our concepts\nand statements, on the one hand, and the features of an independent,\ndeterminate reality, on the other hand. Conceptual realism does not\nnecessarily have implications for the ontological status of this\nreality as externally existing. But to espouse such a position is to\nmake a significant move away from the earliest Buddhist teaching that\npresents the Buddha’s view of language as\n conventional.[17]" ], "section_title": "6. Epistemology: Perception and the theory of the consciousness process", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "[A] Aṅguttara-nikāya", "[Dhs-a] Atthasālinī\n(Dhammasaṅgaṇi commentary)", "[Abhidh-av] Abhidhammāvatāra", "[Abhidh-s] Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha", "[Akb] Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, P. Pradhan,\n(ed.), Patna: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975", "[Kv] Kathāvatthu", "[Dhs] Dhammasaṅgaṇi", "[Dhs-mṭ]\nDhammasaṅgaṇi-mūlaṭīkā\n(Dhammasaṅgaṇi sub-commentary)", "[Nett] Nettippakaraṇa", "[Paṭis] Paṭisambhidāmagga", "[Ps] Papañcasūdanī\n(Majjhima-nikāya commentary)", "[Peṭ] Peṭakopadesa", "[Bv] Buddhavaṃsa", "[M] Majjhima-nikāya", "[Mp] Manorathapūraṇī\n(Aṅguttara-nikāya commentary)", "[Mhv] Mahāvaṃsa", "[Mil] Milindapañha", "[Vin] Vinaya-piṭaka", "[Vibh] Vibhaṅga", "[Vibh-mṭ]\nVibhaṅga-mūlaṭīkā\n(Vibhaṅga sub-commentary)", "[Vism] Visuddhimagga, H.C. Warren (ed.), Harvard Oriental\nSeries, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950", "[Vism-mhṭ]\nVisuddhimagga-mahāṭīkā\n(Visuddhimagga commentary)", "[S] Saṃyutta-nikāya", "[Paṭis-a] Saddhammappakāsinī\n(Paṭisambhidāmagga commentary)", "[Vibh-a] Sammohavinodanī (Vibhaṅga\ncommentary)", "[Spk] Sāratthappakāsinī\n(Saṃyutta-nikāya commentary)", "[Sv] Sumaṅgalavilāsinī\n(Dīgha-nikāya commentary)", "Bronkhorst, J., 2016, “Abhidharma and Indian\nThinking,” in Text, History, and Philosophy: Abhidharma\nAcross Buddhist Scholastic Traditions, B. Dessein & W. Teng\n(eds.), Leiden: Brill, pp. 29–46.", "Collins, S., 1992, “Nirvāṇa, Time, and\nNarrative,” History of Religions, 31:\n215–46.", "Conze, E., 1962, Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of\nBuddhist Philosophy, London: George Allen & Unwin.", "Cousins, L., 1981, “The Paṭṭhāna\nand the Development of the Theravādin Abhidhamma,”\nJournal of the Pali Text Society, 9: 22–46 .", "–––, 1983, “Pali Oral Literature,”\nin Buddhist Studies: Ancient and Modern, P. Denwood and A.\nPiatigorsky (eds.), London: Curzon, pp. 1–11.", "–––, 1991, “The ‘Five Points’\nand the Origins of the Buddhist Schools,” in The Buddhist\nForum II, T. Skorupski (ed.), London: School of Oriental and\nAfrican Studies, University of London, pp. 27–60.", "–––, 2001, “On the Vibhajjavādins:\nthe Mahiṃsāsaka, Dhammaguttaka, Kassapiya and\nTambapaṇṇiya branches of the ancient Theriyas,”\nBuddhist Studies Review, 18: 131–182.", "Cox, C., 1995, Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on\nExistence—an annotated translation of the section on factors\ndissociated from thought from Saṅghabhadra’s\nNyāyānusāra, Tokyo: Studia Philologica Buddhica\nXI, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.", "–––, 2004A, “From Category to Ontology:\nThe Changing Role of Dharma in Sarvāstivāda\nAbhidharma,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 32:\n543–597.", "–––, 2004B, “Mainstream Buddhist\nSchools,” in Encyclopedia of Buddhism, R. Buswell\n(ed.), NY: McMillan, pp. 501–507.", "–––, 2009, “What’s in a Name? School\nAffiliation in an Early Buddhist Gāndhārī\nManuscript,” Bulletin of the Asia Institute, 23:\n53–63.", "Davidson, D., 2001, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford:\nClarendon Press.", "Dessein, B., 2016, “Abhidharma as Rational Inquiry,”\nin Text, History, and Philosophy: Abhidharma Across Buddhist\nScholastic Traditions, B. Dessein & W. Teng (eds.), Leiden:\nBrill, pp. 1–26.", "Dreyfus, G., 1997, Recognizing Reality:\nDharmakīrti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan\nInterpretations, Albany: SUNY Press.", "Frauwallner, E., 1956, The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings\nof Buddhist Literature, trans. L. Petech, Rome: Is. M.E.", "Gethin, R., 1992A, The Buddhist Path to Awakening: A Study of\nbodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā, Leiden: E.J. Brill.", "–––, 1992B, “The\nmātikās: Memorization, Mindfulness, and the\nList,” in In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on\nMindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, J.\nGyatso (ed.), New York: SUNY Press, pp. 149–172.", "–––, 1994, “Bhavaṅga and\nRebirth According to the Abhidhamma,” in The Buddhist Forum\nIII, T. Skorupski and U. Pagel (eds.), London: School of Oriental\nand African Studies, University of London, pp. 11–35.", "–––, 1997, “Cosmology and Meditation: from\nthe Agañña-sutta to the\nMahāyāna,” History of Religions, 36:\n183–217.", "–––, 1998: The Foundations of Buddhism,\nOxford and New York: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2004, “He Who Sees Dhamma Sees\nDhammas: Dhamma in Early Buddhism,” Journal of Indian\nPhilosophy, 32: 513–542.", "–––, 2017, “Body, Mind and Sleepiness: On\nthe Abhidharma Understanding of Styāna and Middha,”\nJournal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist\nStudies, 21: 254–216.", "–––, 2022, “Abhidhamma: Theravāda\nthought in relation to Sarvāstivāda Thought,” in\nRoutledge Handbook of Theravāda Buddhism, S. Berkwitz\n& A. Thompson, (eds.), Oxon and New York: Routledge, pp.\n227–242.", "Gombrich, R., 1996, How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned\nGenesis of the Early Teachings, London and New Jersey: Athlone\nPress.", "–––, 2009, What the Buddha Thought,\nLondon: Equinox.", "Hinüber, Oskar von, 1978, “On the Tradition of\nPāli Texts in India, Ceylon and Burma,” in Buddhism in\nCeylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries\n(Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, I), H. Bechert (ed.),\nGöttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, pp. 48–57.", "–––, 1996, A Handbook of Pāli\nLiterature, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.", "Horner, I.B., 1941, “Abhidhamma abhivinaya,” The\nIndian Historical Quarterly, 17: 291–310.", "Jayatilleke, K., 1963, Early Buddhist Theory of\nKnowledge, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.", "Kalupahana, D., 1961, “A Prolegomena to the Philosophy of\nRelations in Buddhism,” University of Ceylon Review,\n19: 167–194.", "Karunadasa, Y., 1996, The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical\nCornerstone of the Abhidhamma, The Wheel Publications No.\n412/413, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.\n [Preprint available online]", "–––, 2010, Theravāda Abhidhamma: Its\nInquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality, Hong Kong: Centre\nfor Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong, HKU: CBS publication\nseries.", "Kim, W.D., 1999, The Theravādin Doctrine of\nMomentariness: A Survey of its Origins and Development,\nunpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford.", "Kragh, Ulrich T., 2002, “The Extant Abhidharma\nLiterature,” Indian International Journal of Buddhist\nStudies, 3: 123–167.", "Lamotte, E., 1988, History of Indian Buddhism: From the\nOrigins to the Śaka Era, trans. Sara Webb-Boin, Paris:\nLouvain-la-Neuve.", "Norman, K. R., 1983, Pāli Literature: Including the\nCanonical Literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of All the\nHīnayāna Schools of Buddhism, Wiesbaden: Otto\nHarrassowitz.", "Nyanaponika Thera, 1998, Abhidhamma Studies: Buddhist\nExplorations of Consciousness and Time, Boston: Wisdom\nPublications.", "Obeyesekere, G., 1991, “Myth, History and Numerology in the\nBuddhist Chronicles,” in The Dating of the Historical Buddha\nPart 1, H. Bechert (ed.), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and\nRuprecht, pp. 152–82.", "Ronkin, N., 2005, Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a\nPhilosophical Tradition, (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies\nMonograph Series), London and New York: Routledge-Curzon.", "Rospatt, A. von, 1995, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness:\nA Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of this Doctrine up to\nVasubandhu, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.", "Waldron, W., 2002, “Buddhist Steps to an Ecology of Mind:\nThinking about ‘Thoughts without a Thinker’,”\nThe Eastern Buddhist, 34: 1–52.", "–––, 2003, The Buddhist Unconscious: the\nālaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist\nThought, London and New York: Routledge-Curzon.", "Willemen, C., B. Dessein, and C. Cox, 1998,\nSarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism, Leiden:\nBrill.", "Williams, P., 1981, “On the Abhidharma Ontology,”\nJournal of Indian Philosophy, 9: 227–257.", "Wynne, A., 2019, “Theriya Networks and the Circulation of\nthe Pali Canon in South Asia: The Vibhajjavādins\nReconsidered,” in Buddhist Path, Buddhist Teachings: Studies\nin Memory of L.S. Cousins, N. Appleton & P. Harvey (eds.),\nSheffield: Equinox Publishing, pp. 269–283." ]	[ { "href": "../atomism-modern/", "text": "atomism: 17th to 20th century" }, { "href": "../atomism-ancient/", "text": "atomism: ancient" }, { "href": "../consciousness-intentionality/", "text": "consciousness: and intentionality" }, { "href": "../contradiction/", "text": "contradiction" }, { "href": "../dharmakiirti/", "text": "Dharmakīrti" }, { "href": "../epistemology/", "text": "epistemology" }, { "href": "../kyoto-school/", "text": "Japanese Philosophy: Kyoto School" }, { "href": "../madhyamaka/", "text": "Madhyamaka" }, { "href": "../mind-indian-buddhism/", "text": "mind: in Indian Buddhist Philosophy" }, { "href": "../nagarjuna/", "text": "Nāgārjuna" }, { "href": "../saantarak-sita/", "text": "Śāntarakṣita" }, { "href": "../vasubandhu/", "text": "Vasubandhu" } ]
abilities	Abilities	First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020	[ "\nIn the accounts we give of one another, claims about our\nabilities appear to be indispensable. Some abilities are so\nwidespread that many who have them take them for granted, such as the\nability to walk, or to write one’s name, or to tell a hawk from a\nhandsaw. Others are comparatively rare and notable, such as the\nability to hit a Major League fastball, or to compose a symphony, or\nto tell an elm from a beech. In either case, however, when we ascribe\nsuch abilities to one another we have the impression that we are\nmaking claims that, whether they are worth saying or not, are at least\nsometimes true. The impression of truth exerts a pressure towards\ngiving a philosophical theory of ability. It is not an option, at\nleast at the outset, to dismiss all our talk of ability as fiction or\noutright falsehood. A theory of ability can be reasonably expected to\nsay what it is to have an ability in a way that vindicates the\nappearance of truth. Such a theory will deserve the name\n‘philosophical’ insofar as it gives an account, not of\nthis or that range of abilities, but of abilities generally.", "\nThis article falls into three parts. The first part, Sections 1 and 2,\nstates a framework for discussing philosophical theories of ability.\nSection 1 will say more about the distinction between abilities and\nother powers of agents and objects. Section 2 will make some formal\ndistinctions that are helpful for framing any theory of ability. The\nsecond part, Sections 3–5, surveys theories of ability that have\nbeen defended in the philosophical literature. Section 3 concerns\nthe most prominent kind of theory, on which abilities are to be\nunderstood in terms of a hypothetical relating an agent’s actions\nto her volitions. Section 4 concerns theories that are not\nhypothetical in this way, but that nonetheless retain the basic\nreductive orientation of hypothetical theories. Section 5 then\ndiscusses various alternative theories of ability that have been\nproposed in the recent literature. The third part, Section 6, turns to\nthe relationship between a theory of ability and the free will\ndebates. Such debates often involve claims about agents’\nabilities, and many have hoped that getting clearer on abilities\nthemselves could resolve, or at least shed light on, such debates. The\naim of this last section will be to assess whether these hopes are\nreasonable ones." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. A taxonomy", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Dispositions and other powers", "1.2 Demarcating abilities", "1.3 ‘Know how’ and the intelligent powers" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Two fundamental distinctions", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 General and specific abilities", "2.2 Abilities and ability-ascriptions" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Hypothetical theories of ability", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 The conditional analysis", "3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis", "3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Modal theories of ability", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 The modal analysis", "4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations", "4.3 The modal analysis: linguistic considerations" ] }, { "content_title": "5. New approaches to ability", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’", "5.2 Abilities as distinctive powers", "5.3 Other approaches" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Abilities and the free will debates", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nWhat is an ability? On one reading, this question is a demand\nfor a theory of ability of the sort described above. On\nanother reading, however, this question simply asks for a rough guide\nto what sort of things we are speaking of when we speak of\n‘abilities’. So understood, this question is not asking\nfor a theory of ability, but for an explanation of what exactly a\ntheory of ability would be a theory of. This section will\noffer an answer to this question on this second, more modest,\nreading." ], "section_title": "1. A taxonomy", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIt will be helpful to begin by considering a topic that is related to,\nbut nominally distinct from, abilities: dispositions.", "\nDispositions are, at first pass, those properties picked out by\npredicates like ‘is fragile’ or ‘is soluble’,\nor alternatively by sentences of the form ‘x is\ndisposed to break when struck’ or ‘x is disposed\nto dissolve when placed in water.’ Dispositions so\nunderstood have figured centrally in the metaphysics and philosophy of\nscience of the last century (Carnap 1936 & 1937, Goodman 1954),\nand also in influential accounts of the mind (Ryle 1949). They are\nlike abilities in many significant respects, in particular in the fact\nthat they are properties of things that can exist even when not\nmanifested: as a glass may be fragile even when it is not broken, so\nmay a person have the ability to raise her arm even when she is not\nraising her arm.", "\nWhile dispositions have been central to contemporary philosophical\ndiscussions, they do not exhaust the range of the possibilities\ninherent in things. Especially notable, for present purposes, are\nthose that are intimately connected to agency. These include the\nsusceptibility of things to be acted on in certain ways — such\nas the edibility of an apple, or the walkability of a trail —\nthat the psychologist J.J. Gibson called affordances (Gibson, 1979).\nThese include also the powers of action that we ascribe to things, of\nthe kind observed by Thomas Reid: ‘Thus we say, the wind blows,\nthe sea rages, the sun rises and sets, bodies gravitate and\nmove’ (Reid 1788/2010, 16; Reid himself regarded these locutions\nas \"misapplications\" of active verbs, based on erroneous\nviews of the grounds of powers). Finally, and crucially, these include\nthe powers of agents themselves.", "\nIn light of this ontological diversity, it will be useful to have a\nterm that encompasses all the possibilities inherent in things and in\nagents. Let us reserve the word ‘power’ for that general\nclass. Dispositions, as defined above, are a proper subset of powers\nmore generally. Affordances, as sketched above, are another one. And\nabilities, in a sense still to be defined, are yet another.", "\nIt may yet be that dispositions are especially privileged among the\npowers. For instance, they might be more fundamental than the other\npowers, in the sense that other powers may be reduced to them. It has\nbeen proposed, for instance, that affordances may be reduced to\ndispositions (Scarantino 2003). And we will consider in some detail,\nin Section 5.1, the proposal that abilities themselves may be reduced\nto dispositions. But our initial hypothesis is that dispositions are\nsimply one member of the broader family of powers, albeit one that has\nreceived a great measure of attention in the philosophical\nliterature." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Dispositions and other powers" }, { "content": [ "\nAbilities, then, are a kind of power. What kind of power, precisely,\nis an ability? As the term will be understood here, there are two\nadditional conditions that a power must meet in order for it to be an\nability. First, abilities are distinguished by their subjects.\nAbilities are properties of agents, rather than of things that are not\nagents. Objects have dispositions and affordances — as a glass\nis disposed to break when struck, or affords the drinking of liquid\n— but they do not have abilities. Being a power of an agent is\nnot, however, a sufficient condition for being an ability. This is\nbecause agents have powers that are not abilities. Therefore, second,\nabilities need to be distinguished by their objects: abilities relate\nagents to actions.", "\nSome examples may make the need for this second condition clear. Some\npowers, though properties of agents, do not intuitively involve any\nrelation to action. Consider the power of understanding language.\nUnderstanding a sentence, while it is not wholly passive or arational,\nis not typically an action. In contrast, speaking a sentence is. Thus\nthe power to understand French will not be an ability, on the present\ntaxonomy. In contrast the power to speak French will be an ability,\nsince it involves a relation to action. (See van Inwagen 1983,\n8–13.)", "\nSo, as the term will be understood here, an ability is a power that\nrelates an agent to an action. This way of demarcating abilities,\nwhile serviceable for our purposes, is not unproblematic. For it\ninherits the problems involved in drawing the distinction between\nactions and non-actions. First, there is the problem that the domain\nof action is itself a contentious matter. Second, there is the problem\nthat, even if we have settled on an account of action, it is plausible\nthat the domain of action will be vague, so that there are\nsome events that are not definitely actions, but that are not\ndefinitely not actions either. Arguably both of these points about\naction apply, also, to the property of being an agent. If this is\nright, then the present account of ability, which is cashed out in\nterms of agency and action, will be correspondingly contentious and\nvague. Borderline cases may, in the end, generate problems for the\ntheory of ability. But such problems will not be central here. For\ngiving such a theory will be difficult enough even when we focus on\nparadigm cases of agency and action, and so on paradigm cases of\nability.", "\nNote there is a similarity between the present category of ability, as\ndistinct from other powers, and the traditional category of active\npowers, where active powers are those that essentially involve the\nwill (Reid 1788/2000). But it is not clear that these distinctions\noverlap exactly. For example, the power to will itself will clearly be\nan active power. It is less clear whether it will count as an ability,\nfor the answer to that question will turn on the contentious question\nof whether willing is itself an action." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Demarcating abilities" }, { "content": [ "\nSome will expect that an account of ability would also be an account\nof what it is to know how to perform an action, on the\nsupposition that one knows how to perform a certain action just in\ncase one has the ability to perform that action. This supposition,\nwhich we may call the Rylean account of know how (since it is\nmost explicitly defended in Ryle 1949, 25–61), has been called\ninto question by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (Stanley and\nWilliamson 2001). Let us briefly consider Stanley and Williamson’s\nargument and how it bears on the theory of ability.", "\nStanley and Williamson argue, on broadly linguistic grounds, that our\ndefault view of know how ought to be rather different from Ryle’s.\nPart of the argument for this is that standard treatments of embedded\nquestions (‘know who’, ‘know where’, and so\nforth; see Karttunen 1977) suggest a rather different treatment. On\nthis treatment, to know how to A is to know a certain\nproposition. At first pass, in Stanley and Williamson’s\npresentation, for S to know how to A is for\nS to know, of some contextually relevant way of acting\nw, that w is a way for S to A.\nStanley and Williamson develop and defend such a treatment, and offer\nindependent considerations for rejecting Ryle’s own arguments for\nthe Rylean view. On their view, then, to know how to A is\nnot to have an ability.", "\nStanley and Williamson’s arguments are far from widely accepted\n(see Noë 2005), but they tell at the very least against simply\nassuming that an account of ability will also be an account\nof know how. So we will leave questions of know how to one side in\nwhat follows. It is also reasonable to hope that an account of\nability, while it may not simply be an account of know how,\nwill at least shed light on disputes about know how. For so long as we\nlack a theory of what an ability is, the precise content of the Rylean\nview (and of its denial) remains unclear. So it may be that getting\nclear on abilities may help us, perhaps indirectly, to get clear on\nknow how as well. (Additional discussion of these questions may be\nfound in Stanley’s book-length development of his and\nWilliamson’s initial position (Stanley 2011), as well as the\npapers collected in (Bengson and Moffett 2011).", "\nWhatever our view of ability and know how, there is a further question\nat the intersection of these topics that bears consideration. This is\nhow to accommodate those powers of agents that appear to be especially\nclosely connected to practical intelligence, such as skills and\ntalents — which we might collectively call the intelligent\npowers. Are the intelligent powers simply a species of ability,\nor do they demand an independent treatment? There are a number of\nrecent proposals to be considered here. (Robb forthcoming) proposes a\ndispositionalist theory of talent, on which a talent is a disposition\nto maintain and develop a skill. (McGeer 2018) emphasizes the\nsignificance of a distinctive kind of intelligent power, which she\n(following Ryle) calls an ‘intelligent capacity,’ and of\nwhich she too offers a broadly dispositionalist account. These\nproposals suggest a more general program of dispositionalism about the\nintelligent powers, which has suggestive parallels to the\ndispositionalism about ability that we will consider in Section 5.1.\nStill more generally, accurately accounting for the nature of the\nintelligent powers, and the relationship of these to abilities and to\nthe powers more generally, remains an open and intriguing problem." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 ‘Know how’ and the intelligent powers" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIf one wants to give a theory of ability of the sort described at the\noutset, it is helpful for that theory to observe some formal\ndistinctions that have been marked in the literature. This section\ncanvasses two of the most important formal distinctions." ], "section_title": "2. Two fundamental distinctions", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe previous section was primarily concerned with distinguishing\nabilities from other powers. But there is also a distinction to be\nmade within the class of abilities itself. This is the distinction\nbetween general and specific abilities\n(Honoré 1964, Mele 2002).", "\nThe distinction between general and specific abilities may be brought\nout by way of example. Consider a well-trained tennis player equipped\nwith ball and racquet, standing at the service line. There is, as it\nwere, nothing standing between her and a serve: every prerequisite for\nher serving has been met. Such an agent is in a position to\nserve, or has serving as an option. Let us say that such an\nagent has the specific ability to serve.", "\nIn contrast, consider an otherwise similar tennis player who lacks a\nracquet and ball, and is miles away from a tennis court. There is\nclearly a good sense in which such an agent has the ability to hit a\nserve: she has been trained to do so, and has done so many times in\nthe past. Yet such an agent lacks the specific ability to\nserve, as that term was just defined. Let us say that such an agent\nhas the general ability to serve.", "\nThe concern of this article will be general abilities in this sense,\nand unqualified references to ‘ability’ should be read in\nthat way. But specific abilities will also be at issue. This is for at\nleast two reasons.", "\nThe first is one of coverage: many of the proposals that are relevant\nto the understanding of ability, especially the classical\n‘conditional analysis’ (discussed in Section 3.1 below),\nare naturally read as proposals about specific ability in the present\nsense, and a suitably broad conception of ability lets us keep these\nproposals within our domain of discussion.", "\nThe second reason is more properly philosophical. If we accept the\ndistinction between general and specific abilities, then we want for\nour account of ability to accommodate both of them, and ultimately to\nexplain how they are related to each other. For this distinction is\nnot plausibly diagnosed as mere ambiguity; it rather marks off\nsomething like two modes of a single kind of power. There are at least\ntwo kinds of proposals one may make here. One, arguably implicit in\nmany of the ‘new dispositionalist’ approaches to ability,\nis that general ability is in some sense prior to specific ability: to\nhave a specific ability is simply to have a general ability and to\nmeet some further constraint, such as having an opportunity. Another\nproposal (suggested in Maier 2015) is that specific ability is in some\nsense prior to general ability: to have a general ability is simply to\nhave a specific ability under a certain range of circumstances.", "\nThe idea that there is some sort of bipartite distinction to be made\nbetween abilities has been a prominent theme in contemporary work on\nability. It has been endorsed and developed, in different contexts, by\nGlick (2012), Vihvelin (2013), and Whittle (2010). It is an open\nquestion whether the bipartite distinctions in ability introduced by\nthese authors are the same as one another, or the same as the one\nintroduced here. It could be that there are several bipartite\ndistinctions to be made in this area, or that we simply have one\ndistinction under several names." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 General and specific ability" }, { "content": [ "\nMuch philosophical discussion of ability has taken place in the\nformal, as opposed to the material, mode. Thus we are often asked to\ndistinguish senses of ‘ability’, or to think\nabout what ‘can’ means. This subtle shift between\ndiscussing ability and discussing the ascription of ability is often\nharmless. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind the distinction\nbetween these questions, and to mark this distinction explicitly at\nthe outset.", "\nOn the one hand, there are questions about ability itself. The central\nquestion here to give an account of what an ability is, in the sense\nforegrounded at the outset. Subsidiary questions here include, for\nexample, whether abilities may exist when they are unexercised,\nwhether abilities are intrinsic or extrinsic features of their\nbearers, and whether agents have abilities in deterministic worlds.\nThese are, broadly speaking, questions about the metaphysics of\nability.", "\nOn the other hand, there are questions about ability-ascriptions.\nAbilities are characteristically ascribed (in English) with sentences\ninvolving the modal auxiliaries ‘can’ and ‘is able\nto.’ Accordingly, the central question here is to give a\nsemantics for sentences involving those expressions. Subsidiary tasks\ninclude resolving certain open problems in the semantics of these\nexpressions, such as the ‘actuality entailment’ observed\nin (Bhatt 1999), and integrating a semantics for agentive modals with\na semantics for modal expressions more generally. These are, broadly\nspeaking, questions about the semantics of agentive modality.", "\nOn certain conceptions of the philosophical enterprise, the project of\ngiving a theory of ability and that of giving a semantics for\nability-ascriptions are closely connected, and even collapse into each\nother. Nonetheless, there is at least a methodological distinction to\nbe marked here. Having marked that distinction, this discussion will\nprimarily be concerned with the first of these projects, the project\nof giving a theory of ability. Nonetheless, the project of giving a\nsemantics for ability-ascriptions will also frequently be relevant. As\nwith the distinction between general and specific abilities, this is\nfor two reasons, one of coverage and one more properly\nphilosophical.", "\nThe first reason, that of coverage, is the following. Many of the most\nprominent theories of ability defended in the philosophical literature\nhave in fact been, in the first place, theories of\nability-ascriptions. Indeed, the central thought in much work on\nability in the analytic tradition has been a kind of semantic\ndeflationism, on which we may give a semantics for ability-ascriptions\nthat does not quantify over abilities themselves. This is arguably the\nmain theme of the hypothetical theories to be considered in Section 3,\nand the modal theories to be considered in Section 4. Given this\ntendency in thinking about ability, an overview of philosophical work\non ability that neglected the role of ability-ascriptions would be\nseriously incomplete.", "\nThere is also the second, more philosophical, reason. Any account of\nabilities owes us, among other things, an account of\nability-ascriptions. This is perhaps true of philosophical topics\ngenerally, but it is true of ability in particular. Even philosophers\nwho are explicit in their ‘refusal to take language as a\nstarting point in the analysis of thought and modality’ (Lewis\n1986, xi) are prone to make explicit appeal to language when the topic\nturns to ability, as occurs in (Lewis 1976) or (Taylor 1960). This is\nfor any number of reasons, but perhaps especially because it is\ndifficult to even identify the topic under consideration without using\nor mentioning certain phrases, notably ‘can’ and ‘is\nable to.’", "\nHappily, the topic of ability-ascriptions is one on which linguists\nand philosophers have made significant progress. While there has long\nbeen considerable philosophical interest expressions such as\n‘can’ and ‘is able to,’ there is nothing\nrecognizable as a rigorous semantic theory of such terms prior to the\nfoundational work of Angelika Kratzer, recently revised and collected\nin (Kratzer 2012). Kratzer’s work has been central to natural\nlanguage semantics, and its significance for philosophical work is\nstill being appreciated. The question of whether it is correct as an\naccount of the semantics of agentive modality is an open one:\nimportant challenges include (Hackl 1998) and, more recently,\n(Mandelkern, Schultheis, and Boylan, 2017), (Schwarz 2020), and\n(Willer forthcoming). The Kratzer semantics, and a view of ability on\nwhich that semantics plays a foundational role, will be considered in\nsome detail in Section 4. The more methodological point being made\nhere is that any adequate account of ability ought to provide an\naccount of ability-ascriptions, and as such may want to reckon with\nthis ongoing debate in the semantics of modal expressions." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Abilities and ability-ascriptions" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe bulk of theories of ability that have been defended in the\nhistorical and contemporary literature have been what we might call\nhypothetical theories. On such views, to have an ability is\nfor it to be the case that one would act in certain ways if\none were to have certain volitions. One arrives at different theories\ndepending on how one understands the volitions in question and how\nexactly these actions would hypothetically depend on them, but\nnonetheless these views constitute something like a unified family.\nGiven their prominence and unity, it is natural to begin our survey of\ntheories of ability with them." ], "section_title": "3. Hypothetical theories of ability", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe most prominent hypothetical theory of ability is what has come to\nbe called the ‘conditional analysis’. In this section, we\nwill survey that form of analysis, the problems for it, and\nalternatives to it that are supposed to overcome those problems.", "\nThe conditional analysis of ability has at least two aspects. First,\nS has an ability to A just in case a certain\nconditional is true of her. Second, that conditional has the following\nform: S would A if S were to have a certain\nvolition. The precise form such an analysis will take will depend on,\nfirst, how we interpret this conditional and, second, which volition\nfigures in the antecedent.", "\nIt has been standard in the literature, when this first question has\nbeen raised, to understand the conditional as a subjunctive\nconditional (Ginet 1980), and we will assume in what follows that this\nis the best form of the conditional analysis. There has been some\ndisagreement about whether it is a might or a would\nconditional that is relevant (for an account of this distinction, see\nLewis 1973, 21–24), as well as about which volition is relevant.\nIn the following, we will take the relevant conditional to be a\nwould conditional, and the relevant volition to be\ntrying, though nothing will hang on these selections, and the\npoints to be raised would apply also to other forms of conditional\nanalysis, mutatis mutandis.", "\nWe thus arrive at the following form of the conditional analysis:", "\n(CA)\nS has the ability to A iff S would\nA if S tried to A.\n", "\nIf (CA) were true, it would constitute a theory of ability in that it\nwould say under exactly what conditions some agent has the ability to\nperform some action without making reference to the idea of ability\nitself. (Note that a variant on (CA) that is sometimes discussed,\naccording to which S has the ability to A iff\nS could A if S tried to\nA, would not meet this standard, since the\n‘could’ seems to make a claim about S’s\nabilities. So such a view is not really a conditional\nanalysis. Indeed, it is not even clear that it involves a\ngenuine conditional, for reasons discussed in Austin 1970\n(211–213).", "\nThe conditional analysis so understood has been subject to a fair\namount of criticism, which will be reviewed in the following section.\nIt bears noting, however, just how apt an account of ability it seems\nat first pass. It satisfies, at least at first approximation, the\nextensional constraints: there are many actions with respect to which\na typical agent satisfies the relevant conditional, and also many\nactions with respect to which she does not, and these roughly\ncorrespond to her abilities. This imposes a demand even on those who\nwish to reject (CA), namely to explain why, if (CA) is simply\nfalse, it so closely approximates to the truth about abilities.", "\nIts approximate satisfaction of the extensional constraints is also\nplausibly a reason why something like (CA) has found so many\nthoughtful advocates. It is at least strongly suggested, for example,\nby the following remarks from Hume’s Enquiry:", "\nFor what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We\ncannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives,\ninclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow with a\ncertain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no\ninference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For\nthese are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we\ncan only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the\ndeterminations of the will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest,\nwe may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical\nliberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a\nprisoner and in chains. (8.1; Hume 1748, 72)\n", "\nOf course, Hume and many of those who have followed him have been\nattempting to do something rather more than to offer a theory\nof ability. Hume’s intent was to show that disputes over\n‘question of liberty and necessity, the most contentious\nquestion of metaphysics’ have been ‘merely verbal’\n(8.1; Hume 1748, 72). Whatever we may think of this striking claim,\nhowever, there is a dialectical gap between it and the alleged truth\nof (CA). To anticipate a theme that will be central in what follows,\nwe must be careful to distinguish between, on the one hand, the\nadequacy of various views of ability and, on the other, the more\ncontentious metaphysical questions about freedom to which they are\ndoubtlessly related. It is the former that will be our concern in this\nsection." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 The conditional analysis" }, { "content": [ "\n(CA) says that satisfying a certain conditional is both sufficient and\nnecessary for having a certain ability. There are two kinds of\ncounterexamples that may be brought against (CA): counterexamples to\nits sufficiency, and to its necessity. Let us take these in turn.", "\nCounterexamples to the sufficiency of (CA) have been most\nprominent in the literature. Informally, they are suggested by the\nquestion: ‘but could S try to A?’ There\nare a variety of ways of translating this rhetorical question into a\ncounterexample. We may distinguish two: global\ncounterexamples, according to which (CA) might always get the\nfacts about ability wrong, and local counterexamples,\naccording to which (CA) might sometimes get the facts about\nability wrong.", "\nBegin with global counterexamples. Let us say that\ndeterminism is true at our world. Familiar arguments purport\nto show that, if this is the case, then no one has the ability to do\nanything, except perhaps for what she actually does (for several\ndevelopments of such an argument, see van Inwagen 1983, 55–105).\nBut if (CA) is true, then agents would have the ability to perform\nvarious actions that they do not actually perform. For it is plausible\nthat the conditionals in terms of which (CA) analyzes ability would\nstill be true in a deterministic world. But then, since it makes false\npredictions about such a world, which for all we know may be our own,\n(CA) is false.", "\nThe difficulties involved in this sort of counterexample are clear.\nThe proponent of (CA) will reject the arguments for the\nincompatibility of ability and determinism as unsound. Indeed, it is\nprecisely her thought that such arguments are unsound that has\ntypically led her to take ability to be analyzed in terms like those\nof (CA). So global counterexamples, while they may be successful, are\ndialectically ineffective relative to the range of questions\nthat are at issue in the debates over ability.", "\nIt seems, however, that we can show that (CA) is false even relative\nto premises that are shared between various disputants in the free\nwill debates. This is what is shown by local counterexamples\nto (CA). One such example is given by Keith Lehrer:", "\nSuppose that I am offered a bowl of candy and in the bowl are small\nround red sugar balls. I do not choose to take one of the red sugar\nballs because I have a pathological aversion to such candy. (Perhaps\nthey remind me of drops of blood and … ) It is logically\nconsistent to suppose that if I had chosen to take the red sugar ball,\nI would have taken one, but, not so choosing, I am utterly unable to\ntouch one. (Lehrer 1968, 32)\n", "\nSuch an example shows that (CA) is false without assuming anything\ncontentious in debates over freedom. It turns rather on a simple\npoint: that psychological shortcomings, just as much as external\nimpediments, may undermine abilities. (CA), which does not recognize\nthis point, is therefore subject to counterexamples where such\npsychological shortcomings become relevant. We may, if we like,\ndistinguish ‘psychological’ from\n‘non-psychological’ ability, and claim that (CA) correctly\naccounts for the latter (this sort of strategy is suggested, for\nexample, by Albritton 1985). But our ordinary notion of ability, that\nof which we are attempting to give a theory, seems to involve\nboth psychological and non-psychological requirements. And if\nthat is correct, then Lehrer’s example succeeds as a\ncounterexample to (CA) as a theory of our ordinary notion of\nability.", "\nCounterexamples to the necessity of (CA) have been less\nfrequently discussed (though see Wolf 1990), but they also raise\nimportant issues about ability. Consider a case where a good golfer\nmisses an easy putt. Given that this golfer tried to make the putt and\nfailed to, it is false that she would have made the putt if she had\ntried to; after all, she did try it and did not make it.\n(This thought is vindicated by standard views of subjunctive\nconditionals; see Bennett 2003, 239). But, as a good golfer, she\npresumably had the ability to make the putt. So this seems to be a\ncase where one can have an ability without satisfying the relevant\nconditional, and hence a counterexample to the necessity of (CA).", "\nHere the defender of (CA) might avail herself of the distinction\nbetween specific and general abilities. (CA), she might say, is an\naccount of what it is to have a specific ability: that is, to actually\nbe in a position to perform an action. The golfer does lack\nthis ability in this case, as (CA) correctly predicts. It is\nnonetheless true that the golfer has the general ability to\nsink putts like this. But (CA) does not purport to be an analysis of\ngeneral ability, and as such is compatible with the golfer having that\nsort of ability. Again, the plausibility of this response will hang on\nthe viability of the distinction between specific and general\nabilities.", "\nWe have seen that (CA) faces serious problems, especially as a\nsufficient condition for ability, even once we set to one\nside contentious claims about freedom and determinism. If this is\ncorrect, then (CA) must either be modified or rejected outright. Let\nus first consider the prospects for modification." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis" }, { "content": [ "\nThe guiding idea of hypothetical accounts is that abilities are to be\ndefined in terms of what someone would do were he in certain\npsychological conditions. There are a number of ways of developing\nthis idea that do not fit into the form of (CA). At least two such\nproposals deserve attention here.", "\nDonald Davidson takes concerns about the sufficiency of (CA),\nespecially as developed in Chisholm 1964, to tell decisively against\nit. More specifically, he takes the lesson of this problem to be is\nthat:", "\nThe antecedent of a causal conditional that attempts to analyze\n‘can’ or ‘could’ or ‘free to’ must\nnot contain, as its dominant verb, a verb of action, or any verb\nwhich makes sense of the question, Can someone do it?\n(Davidson 1980, 68)\n", "\nDavidson suggests that we may overcome this difficulty at least by\nendorsing:", "\nA can do x intentionally (under the description\nd) means that if A has desires and beliefs that\nrationalize x (under d), then A does\nx. (Davidson 1980, 68)\n", "\nDavidson proceeds to consider a number of further problems for this\nproposal and for the causal theory of action generally, but he takes\nit to suffice at least to overcome standard objections to the\nsufficiency of (CA).", "\nThe trouble is that it is not at all clear it does so. For these\nobjections did not essentially depend on a verb of action figuring in\nthe antecedent of the analyzing conditional. Consider Lehrer’s\ncase again. It seems true that if Lehrer’s imagined agent\nhas desires and beliefs that rationalized that action under the\ndescription ‘eating a red candy’—namely, adopting\nthe analysis of Davidson 1963, a desire for a red candy and a belief\nthat this action is a way of eating a red candy—she would eat a\nred candy. But the trouble is precisely that, in virtue of her\npsychological disability, she is incapable of having this desire, and\nso cannot perform this action intentionally. For this reason it does\nnot seem that Davidson’s proposal successfully overcomes the\nsufficiency problem, at least not on Lehrer’s way of developing\nthat problem.", "\nA second and rather different approach to modifying (CA) has been\ntaken in recent work by Christopher Peacocke. Peacocke accepts that\n(CA) is insufficient in light of counterexamples like Lehrer’s.\nBut he argues that we might supplement (CA) in order to\novercome these difficulties. In the terms of the present discussion,\nPeacocke’s proposal is: S has the ability to A\njust in case: (i) (CA) is true of S and (ii) the\npossibility in which S tries to A is a\n‘close’ one. The closeness of a possibility as it figures\nin (ii) is to be understood, at first pass, in terms of what we can\nreasonably rely on: a possibility is a distant one just in\ncase we can reasonably rely on it not obtaining; otherwise it is a\nclose one (Peacocke 1999, 310). To modify one of Peacocke’s\nexamples, the possibility of toxic fumes being released into a train\ncar that is safely insulated is a distant one; on the other hand, the\npossibility of toxic fumes being released into a train car where they\njust happen to be blocked by a fortuitous arrangement of luggage is a\nclose one.", "\nPeacocke’s thought is that this suffices to overcome the\nsufficiency objection: though Lehrer’s agent satisfies (i), she\ndoes not satisfy (ii): given the facts about his psychology, the\npossibility that he tries to A is not a close one. The\ntrouble, however, is that Peacocke’s proposal is subject to\nmodified versions of Lehrer’s counterexample. Consider an agent\nwhose aversion to red candies is not a permanent feature of her\npsychology, but an unpredictable and temporary ‘mood’.\nConsider the agent at some time when she is in her aversive mood. This\nagent satisfies (i), for the same reason as above, and she also\nsatisfies (ii): given the fragility of her mood, the possibility of\nher trying is a close one in the relevant sense. Yet such an agent\nlacks the ability to eat a red candy, in precisely the same way as she\ndoes in Lehrer’s original example.", "\nIt is an interesting question how we might develop other\n‘supplementation’ strategies for (CA) (such strategies are\nalso suggested by Ginet 1980), though the track record of this method\nof analysis in other domains (for instance, the project of\n‘supplementing’ the analysis of knowledge in terms of\njustified true belief, in response to (Gettier 1963)) does not inspire\nconfidence." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere is a surprising disconnect between the way abilities have been\ndiscussed in the philosophical literature in the tradition of Hume and\nthe way that they have been approached in more recent work in logic\nand linguistics. Here, ability claims are understood as categorical\npossibility claims: claims about what some agent does in some\nnon-actual state of affairs (or ‘possible world’). Let a\nmodal theory of ability be any theory on which claims about\nan agent’s abilities are understood in terms of claims about\nwhat that agent in fact does at some possible world (or set of\nworlds). The idea that some such modal theory of ability must be true\nis a presumption of much formal work on ability and\nability-ascriptions. Yet there are serious challenges to the idea that\nability is in this sense a modality." ], "section_title": "4. Modal theories of ability", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIntuitively, claims about ability are claims about possibility. It is\nin some sense a truism that someone is able to perform some act just\nin case it is possible for her to perform it.", "\nTo develop this purported truism, begin with the thought that for\nS to have an ability to A it is necessary, but not\nsufficient, that it be possible that S does A. This\nclaim will be contentious for various more specialized sorts of\npossibility, such as nomic possibility. But if we may help\nourselves to the idea of possibility simpliciter\n(‘metaphysical possibility,’ on at least one reading\nof that phrase), then this claim appears plausible. (We will survey\nsome historical and contemporary challenges to it below in Section\n4.2.) On the other hand it seems implausible that this sort of\npossibility is a sufficient condition: there are any number of acts\nthat that are metaphysically possible to perform that an agent might\nnonetheless not be able to perform.", "\nThis suggests a natural hypothesis. To have an ability is for it to be\npossible to A in some restricted sense of\npossibility. As nomic possibility is possibility relative to the laws\nof nature, and epistemic possibility is possibility relative to what\nan agent knows, so may ability be possibility relative to some\nindependently specifiable set of conditions.", "\nTo render this hypothesis precisely, we may help ourselves to the\nformal framework of ‘possible worlds,’ which offers an\nelegant and powerful semantics for modal language. On this framework,\na proposition is possible just in case it is true at some possible\nworld. We can then say an agent is able to A just in case she performs\nthat act at some world (or set of worlds) that satisfy some\nindependently specifiable set of conditions.", "\nWe thus arrive at the modal analysis of ability:", "\n(MA) S has the ability to A iff S\ndoes A at some world (or set of worlds) satisfying condition\nC.\n", "\n(MA) is actually not itself an analysis but rather a template for a\ngeneral family of analyses. Different members of this family will be\ndistinguished by the different candidates they might propose for C, as\nwell as whether they quantify over individual worlds or sets of\nworlds. Nonetheless, these analyses demonstrate sufficient theoretical\nunity that they may be viewed, at an appropriate level of abstraction,\nas a single approach to the analysis of ability.", "\nTwo points about (MA) bear noting. First, ‘modal’ here is\nbeing used in a relatively strict and narrow way. Sometimes\n‘modal’ is used loosely to describe phenomena that are\nconnected to possibility (and necessity) in some way or other. As\nnoted above, it is a truism that there is some connection between\nability and necessity, and so that ability is in this loose sense\n‘modal.’ The proponent of (MA) is concerned with modality\nin a stricter sense: she proposes that ability may be analyzed in\nterms of the precise framework of propositions and possible worlds\njust adumbrated. The opponent of (MA), in turn, grants that ability\nhas something to do with possibility but denies that any such analysis\nsucceeds.", "\nSecond, while (MA) has been presented as an alternative to (CA), (CA)\nis arguably just one particular version of (MA). For, as noted above,\n(CA) appeals to a subjunctive conditional, and the standard semantics\nfor the subjunctive conditional (developed in slightly different ways\nin Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis 1973) is told in terms of quantification\nover possible worlds. Specifically (on Stalnaker’s version) a\nsubjunctive conditional is true just in case its consequent is true at\nthe world where its antecedent is true that is otherwise maximally\nsimilar to the actual world. In these terms, (CA) is roughly\nequivalent to the following:", "\n(CAmodal) S has the ability to A\niff S does A at a world at which S tries\nto A that is otherwise maximally similar to the actual world.\n", "\nThis is patently a version of (MA), with ‘S tries\nto A and is otherwise maximally similar to the actual\nworld’ serving as condition C.", "\nIf this is correct, then most discussions of the analysis on ability\nin the twentieth century have focused on a special and somewhat\nidiosyncratic case of a much broader program of analysis, namely the\nprogram of giving a modal analysis of ability. The considerations\nbrought forth in the remainder of this section, in contrast, are\nconcerned with the general case." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 The modal analysis" }, { "content": [ "\nThere are two questions that might be raised for this proposal about\nability. First, does ability indeed admit of some kind of modal\nanalysis? Second, if it does, how exactly are we to spell out the\ndetails of that analysis — in particular, how are we to\narticulate condition C? Let us begin with the first, more basic,\nquestion.", "\nAccording to (MA), performing an act at some possible world (or set of\nworlds) is both necessary and sufficient for having the ability to\nperform that act. One way of challenging this claim is to deny the\nnecessity claim: that is, to argue that it is sometimes the case that\nan agent is able to perform an act that she does not perform at any\npossible world.", "\nThis is an argument that has in fact been made by several authors.\nDescartes, for one, appears to have argued that God is such an agent\n(Curley 1984). A genuinely omnipotent being, one might argue, should\nbe able to perform any act whatsoever, even the impossible ones. This\nview of omnipotence is contentious, but it is not clear that it should\nbe ruled out formally, by the very analysis of ability, as (MA) does.\nSpencer (2017) argues that even non-omnipotent agents may sometimes\nhave the ability to perform acts that they do not perform at any\npossible world.", "\nLet us grant, however, that the possibility of performing an act is a\nnecessary condition for performing that act, and that in this sense an\nattribution of ability entails a possibility claim. One might\nnonetheless resist the view that ability admits of a modal analysis in\nthe manner suggested by (MA).", "\nThat is the kind of argument developed in a prescient discussion by\nAnthony Kenny (Kenny 1975; the presentation of Kenny here is indebted\nto the discussion in Brown 1988). Kenny argues that, if something like\n(MA) is indeed true, then ability should obey the principles that\ngovern the possibility operator in standard modal logics. Kenny claims\nthat ability fails to satisfy the following two principles:", "\n(1) \$A \\to \\Diamond A.\$\n", "\nInformally, (1) expresses the principle that if an agent performs an\naction, then she has the ability to perform this action. This is,\nKenny argues, false of ability.", "\n(2) \$\\Diamond(A \\lor B) \\to (\\Diamond A \\lor \\Diamond B).\$\n", "\nInformally, (2) expresses the principle that if an agent has the\nability to perform one of two actions, then she has the ability to\nperform either the first action or the second action. This is, Kenny\nargues, false of ability.", "\nLet us begin with (1). Kenny claims that this principle is false in\nlight of cases like the following: ‘A hopeless darts player may,\nonce in a lifetime, hit the bull, but be unable to repeat the\nperformance because he does not have the ability to hit the\nbull’ (Kenny 1975, 136). This kind of ‘fluky\nsuccess’ has been extensively discussed in the philosophical\nliterature — perhaps most famously in Austin (1956) — in\norder to make a variety of points. Kenny’s insight is to observe\nthat these simple cases tell against the modal analysis of ability, as\nthey violate an axiom of many modal logics, namely any system as\nstrong as the system T.", "\nA simple response to this point is to deny that T (or\nany stronger logic) is the correct logic for ability. To deny this is\nstill to allow for a treatment of ability within the framework of\npossible worlds. Notably, the modal logic K is one\nthat fails to validate (1). A natural response to Kenny’s first\npoint, then, is to say that K, rather than\nT or some stronger system, is the correct modal logic\nof ability.", "\nThis response is not available, however, in response to Kenny’s\nsecond objection. Recall that objection was that (2) is true of\npossibility but not of ability. Here the retreat to weaker modal\nlogics will not work, since (2) is provable on the weakest standard\nmodal logic, namely K. Yet the parallel claim does\nnot seem true of ability. Kenny gives the following example:", "\nGiven a pack of cards, I have the ability to pick out on request a\ncard which is either black or red; but I don’t have the ability to\npick out a red card on request nor the ability to pick out a black\ncard on request. (Kenny 1975, 137)\n", "\nThis then appears to be a case where S has the ability to\nA or B but lacks the ability to A and lacks\nthe ability to B. So it appears that (2) is false of ability.\nIn light of this Kenny concludes that ‘if we regard possible\nworlds semantics as making explicit what is involved in being a\npossibility, we must say that ability is not any kind of\npossibility’ (Kenny 1975, 140).", "\nTo appreciate Kenny’s conclusion, it is instructive to work\nthrough why precisely this is a counterexample to (MA). Consider an\nagent S who has the ability to pick a red card or a black\ncard, but does not have the ability to pick a red card or the ability\nto pick a black card. According to (MA), S has the ability\nto A iff S does A at some world (or set of\nworlds) satisfying condition C. Consider the case where (MA)\nappeals to a single world, not a set of worlds. If S has the\nability to pick a red card or pick a black card, then by (MA) there is\na world w satisfying condition C where S\npicks a red card or black card. Then either S picks a red\ncard at w or S picks a black card\nat w. Then, applying (MA) now in the other\ndirection, S has the ability to pick a red card or S\nhas the ability to pick a black card. But that, by assumption, is not\nthe case. Since (MA) is the only substantive premise appealed to that\nargument, (MA) must be rejected.", "\nNote that this argument turned essentially on adopting the version of\n(MA) which appealed to a single world, rather than a set of worlds. So\none way of responding to this objection is by appealing to sets of\nworlds in the modal analysis of ability. This is precisely the\nproposal of Mark Brown, who argues that, if we take accessibility\nrelations to hold between a world and a set of worlds, then we\nmay capture talk of ability within a possible worlds framework that is\nbroadly in the spirit of standard views (Brown 1988; see also Cross\n1986). Alternatively, we may take this sort of point to militate in\nfavor of a return to hypothetical theories of ability, since, at least\non Lewis’s view of subjunctive conditionals, it may be that a\ndisjunction follows from a counterfactual claim without either of its\ndisjuncts following from that claim (Lewis 1973, 79–80). Modal\naccounts that appeal to sets of worlds are ‘non-normal’ in\nthe sense that they do not satisfy the axiom K, but\nthey remain true to the letter of (MA) as well as the spirit of modal\nanalyses generally, insofar as they avail themselves only of possible\nworlds and quantification thereover." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations" }, { "content": [ "\nIn the material mode, the modal analysis gives an account of what it\nis to have an ability in terms of quantification over possible worlds.\nIn the formal mode, it gives a semantics for the ascription of ability\n— paradigmatically, sentences involving ‘can’ or\n‘is able to’ — in terms of quantification over\npossible worlds.", "\nThis formal aspect of the modal analysis has been prominent in the\nphilosophical and linguistic literature because the standard semantics\nfor ability ascriptions is an explicitly modal one. This is the view\ndeveloped in a series of papers by Angelika Kratzer (Kratzer 2012).\nKratzer treats expressions such as ‘S\ncan A’ and ‘S is able\nto A’ as possibility claims. That is, ‘S\nis able to A’ is true just in case there is a possible\nworld w meeting certain conditions at which S\ndoes A. The conditions are that (i) w be accessible\ngiven some contextually-specified set of facts (the\nmodal base) and (ii) that w be at least as good,\naccording to a contextually-specified ranking of worlds\n(the ordering source), as any other accessible world. The\nKratzer semantics is thus an instance of the modal analysis on its\nsemantic formulation:", "\n(MAsemantic) ‘S is able to A’\nis true iff S does A at some world (or set of\nworlds) satisfying condition C.\n", "\nA number of objection have been brought against the modal analysis in\nthis latter, formal, aspect.", "\nOne objection prominent in the recent literature (Mandelkern et al.\n2017; Schwarz 2020) is that Kratzer’s semantics, or any analysis\nof the form of (MAsemantic), appears to have trouble\nmarking an intuitive distinction between what someone is able to do\nand what it is possible for her to do. Let us say that an unskilled\ndarts-player is about to throw a dart. She utters:", "\n(3) I am able to hit the bullseye\n", "\nIntuitively, what she says is false: she is not able to hit the\nbullseye, as she is a poor darts-player. Yet there is an accessible\nand perfectly good possible world w at which she hits the\nbullseye — which is just to say, in the object language, that it\nis possible for her to hit the bullseye.", "\nThis case suggests the Kratzer semantics lacks the resources to\ncapture the distinctively agentive force of a sentences such as (3).\nThere are, in addition, a number of other outstanding empirical\nproblems for Kratzer’s semantics for ability modals. One is the\nproblem of accounting for ‘compulsion’ modals such as\n‘I cannot but tell the truth’ (Mandelkern et al. 2017).\nAnother is that of accommodating the ‘actuality\nentailment’ whereby, in many languages, certain ability\nsentences entail that the act in question was actually performed\n(Bhatt 1999; see also Hacquard 2009). Whatever our verdict on\n(MAsemantic), the semantics of ability-ascriptions remains\nan unresolved and potentially rich issue at the boundary of\nlinguistics and the philosophy of action." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 The modal analysis: linguistic considerations" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe foregoing has indicated serious concerns about the adequacy of the\northodox approaches to ability and its ascription: the conditional\nanalysis (CA), and the modal analysis (MA), of which (CA) is arguably\njust a special case. This raises the question of what a\nnon-hypothetical and non-modal account of ability and its ascription\nmight look like.", "\nSince abilities are, as noted in Section 1.1, a kind of power, one\nnatural idea is to analyze abilities in terms of some other kind of\npower. This appeal may proceed in different ways. One is by appealing\nto dispositions, and by analyzing abilities in terms of this\npurportedly better-understood kind of power. Another is by departing\nmore radically from the standard ontology of recent metaphysics, and\nanalyzing ability in terms of some new and distinctive variety of\npower. We will consider these approaches in turn in Sections 5.1 and\n5.2. Finally, in Section 5.3, we will turn to miscellaneous\nalternative approaches to ability, which reject the conditional and\nmodal analyses, but which do not purport to analyze abilities in terms\nof powers either." ], "section_title": "5. New approaches to ability", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIn recent years several authors have revisited the thought that we may\ngive a broadly hypothetical account of ability, without endorsing the\nproblematic claim (CA). This is the view of ability that has been\ndefended by Smith (2003), Vihvelin (2004, 2013), and Fara\n(2008). Following Clarke (2009), we may label this view the\n‘new dispositionalism.’", "\nWhat unifies the new dispositionalists is that they return to the\nconditional analysis of ability in light of two thoughts. The first\nthought is one already noted: that there is a variety of power,\ndispositions, that is similar in many respects to abilities. The\nsecond thought is that there are well-known problems of giving a\nconditional analysis of dispositions, in light of which many\nauthors have been inclined to reject the long-assumed link between\ndispositions and conditionals. Taken together, these thoughts yield a\npromising new line on abilities: that though we ought to reject the\nconditional analysis of abilities, we may yet defend a\ndispositional account of abilities.", "\nWhy ought we reject the conditional analysis of dispositions? Consider\nthe following analysis of the disposition to break when struck:", "\n(CD) x is disposed to break when struck iff S would\nbreak if S were struck.\n", "\nDespite the intuitive appeal of (CD), there appear to be at least two\nkinds of counterexamples to it. First, consider a crystal glass that,\nif it were about to be struck, would transform into steel. This glass\nis disposed to break when struck, but it is not true that it would\nbreak if struck—the transformation renders this false. This is a\ncase of finking, in the language of Martin 1994. Second,\nconsider a crystal glass stuffed with styrofoam packaging. This glass\nis disposed to break when struck, but it is not true that it would\nbreak if struck—the packaging prevents this. This is a case of\nmasking, in the language of Johnston 1992. In light of such\ncases, it seems we ought to reject (CD).", "\nThe bearing of these points on our earlier discussion of the\nconditional analysis is the following. There appear to be quite\ngeneral problems for giving a conditional analysis of powers.\nSo it may be that the failures of the conditional analysis of ability\nwere not due to any fact about abilities, but rather to a shortcoming\nof conditional analyses generally. One way of overcoming this problem,\nif this diagnosis is correct, is to analyze abilities directly in\nterms of dispositions.", "\nSuch an analysis is proposed by Fara 2008, who argues:", "\nS has the ability to A in circumstances C\niff she has the disposition to A when, in circumstances\nC, she tries to A. (Fara 2008, 848)\n", "\nThe similarity of this analysis to the hypothetical analyses canvassed\nearlier are clear. This raises several immediate questions, such as\nwhether this analysis can overcome the problem of sufficiency that\nplagued those approaches (see Fara 2008, 851–852 for an\naffirmative answer, and Clarke 2009, 334–336 for some doubts).\nWhat is most striking about the new dispositionalists, however, is how\nthey bring this sort of account of ability to bear on certain familiar\ncases.", "\nConsider how the new dispositionalism bears on so-called\n‘Frankfurt cases.’ These are cases due to Frankfurt\n1969, where an agent chooses to and performs some action A\nwhile at the same time there is some other action B such\nthat, had the agent been about to choose B, an\n‘intervener’ would have altered the agent’s brain so\nthat the agent would have chosen, and performed, A instead.\nOne question about such cases is whether the agent, in the actual\nsequence of events, had the ability to B. Frankfurt’s\nintuition, and that of most others, is that she did not. Given the\nfurther claim that the agent is nonetheless morally responsible for\ndoing A, this case appears to be a counterexample to the what\nFrankfurt calls the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): an\nagent is morally responsible for Aing only if she had the\nability to perform some action other than A.", "\nThe new dispositionalists disagree. Let us focus on Fara’s\ndiagnosis of the case. The question of whether the agent had the\nability to B turns, for Fara, on the question of whether she\nwas disposed to B when she tried to B. Fara\nclaims that she does have such a disposition. The\npresence of the intervener is, on Fara’s view, like the\naforementioned styrofoam packaging in a crystal glass. It\nmasks the disposition of the glass to break when struck, but\ndoes not remove that disposition. Similarly, Fara argues, the\npresence of the intervener masks the agent’s disposition\nto B when she tries to B, but does not\nremove that disposition. (There is some disagreement among\nthe new dispositionalists about whether this is a case of finking or\nmasking; see Clarke 2009, 340 for discussion). So, pace\nFrankfurt, the agent does have the ability to B after all.\nAnd so we have, in this case at least, no counterexample to PAP.", "\nA natural worry at this point is that the new dispositionalist has\nsimply changed the subject. For it seems clear that, in\na perfectly ordinary sense of ability, Frankfurt’s agent\nlacks the ability to do otherwise. An account of ability\nwhich denies this seems to be speaking of some other concept\naltogether. One way of bringing out what is missing is the idea that\nthere seems to be a connection between my abilities, in the sense of\nability that is relevant to free will, and what is up to me.\nClarke claims that this sort of connection fails on the new\ndispositionalist view of ability:", "\nAlthough the presence of a fink or mask that would prevent one’s\nAing is compatible with having a general capacity (the\nunimpaired competence to A), there is an ordinary sense in\nwhich in such circumstances an agent might well be unable to\nA … If there is something in place that would prevent\nme from Aing should I try to A, if it is not up to\nme that it would so prevent me, and if it is not up to me that such a\nthing is in place, then even if I have a capacity to A, it is\nnot up to me whether I exercise that capacity. (Clarke 2009, 339)\n", "\nThus the objection is that, while the new dispositionalist has perhaps\noffered a theory of something, it is not a theory of\nability.", "\nHow should the new dispositionalist respond? One thought is that we\nare here again encountering the distinction between general and\nspecific abilities. The new dispositionalist might contend that, while\nthe agent in a Frankfurt case may lack the specific ability to do\notherwise, she has the general ability to do otherwise, and that it is\nthis general ability of which the new dispositionalist is giving an\naccount.", "\nThis response, however, postpones a crucial and much broader question.\nThe question is this: should ‘ability’ in (PAP) be\nunderstood as general ability, or specific ability? If general ability\nis what matters, then Frankfurt cases may indeed not tell against\n(PAP), for the agent retains the general ability to do otherwise. If\nit is specific ability that matters, however, the challenge to\n(PAP) stands (see also Whittle 2010). This is a vital question for\nunderstanding the purported connection between agents’ abilities\nand questions of moral responsibility, whatever our verdict on new\ndispositionalism itself. (See Cyr and Swenson 2019 for a helpful\nrecent discussion of these issues)." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’" }, { "content": [ "\nAs noted in Section 1.1, dispositions are simply one member of the\nbroader family of powers, albeit one that has figured prominently in\nrecent metaphysics. An alternative account of abilities might give an\naccount of abilities in terms of some other kind of power, perhaps one\nbetter-suited to the distinctive aspects of abilities.", "\nOne account of this kind is developed in a series of works by Barbara\nVetter (especially Vetter 2015). Vetter proposes that our basic modal\nnotion should be potentiality. On a traditional view (which\nVetter rejects) dispositions involve a dyadic relation between a\nstimulus and a manifestation (for example: a glass is disposed to\nbreak when struck). In contrast, potentials involve a monadic relation\nto a manifestation (for example: a glass has the potential to break).\nThis makes potentials especially well-suited to give an account of\nabilities, which also appear to involve a monadic relation to an act,\nnamely the act denoted by the complement of an ability-ascription (for\nexample: I am able to play tennis). To have an ability, Vetter argues,\nis simply to have a certain kind of potentiality. Vetter also provides\nan explicit semantics for agentive modality in terms of the ascription\nof potentiality (Vetter 2013), which constitutes a systematic\nalternative to (MA).", "\nYet another view is suggested by recent work by Helen Steward\nemphasizing the traditional idea of a ‘two-way power’\n(Steward 2012, Steward 2020; see also Alvarez 2013). Steward argues\nthat actions are exercises of two-way powers — ‘powers\nwhich an agent can exercise or not at a given moment, even holding all\nprior conditions at that moment fixed’ (Steward 2020, 345).\nThese are to be contrasted with one-way powers, which manifest\nwhenever their manifestation conditions are realized, as a fragile\nglass breaks whenever it is struck. Unlike both the new\ndispositionalists on the one hand and Vetter on the other, Steward\nsees a fundamental asymmetry between agents, who are bearers of\ntwo-way powers, and mere objects, who are are bearers only of one-way\npowers. It is natural then to think that what it is to have an ability\nis to have a two-way power of a certain kind, and that a theory of\nability should follow from an account of agency and the two-way\npowers.", "\nWe thus have at least three ‘power-based’ views of\nabilities: the new dispositionalism, Vetter’s potentiality-based\nview, and Steward’s two-way power-based view. It is instructive\nto consider how these three accounts differ with respect to two larger\nphilosophical projects.", "\nOne is the project of giving an analysis of modal language, including\nability-ascriptions, in terms of possible worlds. The new\ndispositionalist rejects (CA) and (MA) but she is still, in principle,\nsympathetic with that project, insofar as she allows that disposition\nascriptions themselves may be ultimately understood in terms of\nquantification over possible worlds. This kind of view is explicitly\nendorsed, for instance, by Smith (2003). In contrast, Vetter is\nexplicitly opposed to this project, while Steward’s view appears\nneutral on this question.", "\nAnother is the project of arguing that agents’ abilities are, or\nare not, compatible with the possibility of determinism. This is a\nquestion we touched on briefly in Section 5.1. As noted there, the new\ndispositionalists are motivated, in part, by the project of arguing\nfor compatibilism. In contrast, Steward is explicitly concerned to\ndefend incompatibilism. (Vetter appears to be neutral on this\nquestion.) The question of how the analysis of ability bears on the\nfree will debates looms over many of these discussions, and we will\nconfront it directly and at some length below in Section 6." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Abilities as distinctive powers" }, { "content": [ "\nStill other approaches to ability reject (CA) and (MA) while rejecting\nalso the thought that some appeal to power — be it a\ndisposition, a potentiality, or a two-way power — is needed to\naccount for abilities.", "\nOne recurrent thought is that, despite the various challenges that\nhave been brought against it, ability is still intimately connected to\nsome kind of relation between an agent’s volitions (tryings,\nintendings) and her actions. One semantically sophisticated\ndevelopment of this thought is Mandelkern et al, 2017, which proposes\nto take as basic a notion of ‘practically available\nactions,’ and to develop in terms of these a semantics for\nagentive modality, one on which conditionals linking volitions to\nactions continue to play an essential role. Another approach, in a\nrecent book-length treatment of ability (Jaster 2020), proposes that\nabilities should be thought of in terms of proportions of cases where\nan agent successfully does what she intends to do (compare the\napproach to dispositions advocated in Manley and Wasserman 2008). Both\nof these approaches are explicit in their denial of (CA), but they\nshare — with the new dispositionalists — the thought that\nthe analysis of ability should somehow appeal to a pattern of\ndependence between volition and action.", "\nThis is not surprising. The conditional analysis is a redoubtable\nproposal, endorsed by many of the major figures in English-language\nphilosophy. In light of that, it seems reasonable to try to discard\nthe letter of (CA), but retain its spirit. For it may be that the\nhistorical failure of (CA) is due to difficulties and oversights that\nour perhaps firmer grasp of technical issues allows us to overcome.\nThis is a sensible and well-motivated project, though it remains to be\nseen whether it will be, in the end, a successful one.", "\nThere remain still other accounts that do not fit easily into the\ntaxonomy provided here. These include primitivist proposals, which\ntake ability or some closely related notion as analytically\nfundamental. One development of this idea is Maier 2015, who proposes,\ncontrary to most authors, that specific ability is fundamentally prior\nto general ability. He argues that we should give an account of\ngeneral ability in terms of specific abilities, which he calls\n‘options’: roughly, an agent has the general ability to A\niff she normally has A as an option. Options, in turn, are primitives.\nMuch here will hang on saying more about options, and in what sense\nthey figure as primitives in the theory of agency.", "\nFinally, an outline of a proposal by David Lewis (dated to 2001 but\nonly recently published as Lewis 2020) offers an altogether different\napproach to ability. Lewis is motivated, like many proponents of (CA),\nby the goal of defending compatibilism, but he takes (CA) to be\nunsatisfactory. He therefore proposes a non-conditional analysis of\nability. His analysis, roughly, is that S has the ability to\nperform an action B just in case there is some basic\naction A such that (i) S’s doing A\nwould cause or constitute S’s doing B and (ii)\nthere is no obstacle to S’s doing A. The\nproblem of giving a theory of ability then becomes the problem of\ngiving a theory of obstacles, something at which Lewis, in his\noutline, makes a beginning. (See Beebee et al 2020 for\nadditional discussion).", "\nLewis’s proposal is an inspiration for further research in at\nleast two ways. First, it indicates that Lewis, a systematic philosopher of modality, saw the\nproblem of giving an analysis of ability as a significant outstanding\nproject. Second, it demonstrates that genuinely novel approaches to\nability remain available, and the project of giving a theory of\nability may yet be in its early stages." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Other approaches" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThus far our questions about abilities have been formal ones: we have\nbeen asking what it is to have an ability without concerning ourselves\nwith the substantive work that a theory of ability might have to do.\nBut there is much work to be had for a theory of ability: abilities\nhave figured as unexplained explainers in a range of philosophical\ntheories, for example in accounts of concepts (Millikan 2000), of\nknowledge (Greco 2009, Sosa 2007), and of ‘knowing what it’s\nlike’ (Lewis 1988). Perhaps the most prominent substantive role\nfor a theory of ability has been the uses to which accounts of\nability have been put in the free will debates. So let us close with a\nbrief survey of what work a theory of ability might be expected to do\nin those debates.", "\nQuestions about abilities have figured most prominently in debates\nover compatibilism. ‘Compatibilism’ is used in many ways,\nbut let us understand it here as the thesis that the ability to\nperform actions one does not perform is compossible with the truth of\ndeterminism, which we may take to be the view that the facts about the\npast and the laws jointly determine the facts about the present and\nall future moments. (We should sharply distinguish this view, which we\nmight call classical compatibilism, from more recent views\nsuch as the ‘semi-compatibilism’ of Fischer and Ravizza\n1998). Insofar as compatibilism, so understood, has been explicitly\ndefended, these defenses have made appeal to theories of ability,\nnotably the conditional analysis and its variants, as well as the\ndispositionalist analysis favored by the new dispositionalists.", "\nIn the discussion of the conditional analysis, we distinguished\nbetween global and local counterexamples to\nhypothetical theories of ability, where the former appealed to the\nfact that any such theory would render ability compatible with\ndeterminism which, according to the objector, it is not. There we\nnoted the dialectical limitations of such counterexamples, namely the\ncontentiousness of their main premise. But compatibilists have often\nbeen guilty of what seems to be the opposite mistake. Namely, they\nhave offered theories of ability which show abilities to be compatible\nwith determinism, and have argued from this to the claim that\nsuch abilities are indeed compatible with determinism.", "\nThe shortcomings of this strategy are nicely diagnosed by Peter van\nInwagen. After surveying the local counterexamples that arise for\nvarious hypothetical theories of ability, van Inwagen imagines that we\nhave arrived at the best possible hypothetical theory of ability,\nwhich he labels ‘the Analysis’. van Inwagen then\nwrites:", "\nWhat does the Analysis do for us? How does it affect our understanding\nof the Compatibility Problem? It does very little for us, so far as I\ncan see, unless we have some reason to think it is correct.\nMany compatibilists seem to think that they need only present a\nconditional analysis of ability, defend it against, or modify it in\nthe face of, such counter-examples as may arise, and that they have\nthereby done what is necessary to defend compatibilism. That is not\nhow I see it. The particular analysis of ability that a compatibilist\npresents is, as I see it, simply one of his premisses; his central\npremiss, in fact. And premisses need to be defended. (van Inwagen\n1983, 121)\n", "\nvan Inwagen’s point is that, provided the incompatibilist has\noffered arguments for the claim that such abilities are\nincompatible with determinism—as, in van Inwagen’s\npresentation, the incompatibilist has—the production of an\nanalysis is as yet no answer to those arguments. For those arguments\nare also arguments, inter alia, against the\ncompatibilist’s favored account of ability.", "\nThere are, then, several obstacles for the compatibilist who wishes to\nappeal to an account of ability in defense of compatibilism. First,\nthere is the general difficulty of actually giving an extensionally\nadequate theory of ability. In addition, we have now turned up a\ncouple of more specific challenges to the compatibilist. There is van\nInwagen’s point just outlined, namely that arguments for the\nincompatibility of abilities and determinism are, inter alia,\narguments against any theory of ability that is congenial to the\ncompatibilist. And, finally, there is the point that we encountered in\nour discussion of the new dispositionalism in Section 5.1, which is\nthat certain platitudes about ability — in particular, those\ninvolved in certain judgments about moral responsibility — may\nbe recalcitrant to compatibilist treatments. Taken together, these\npoints seem to pose a serious obstacle to any theory of ability that\nis both compatible with determinism and in accord with our ordinary\njudgments about what ability requires.", "\nWhat is the compatibilist to say in light of these obstacles? One\nresponse is to make a distinction between two kinds of compatibilist\nproject. (Compare Pryor 2000 on responses to skepticism). One project\nis to convince someone moved by the incompatibilist’s\narguments to retreat from her position. Call this ambitious\ncompatibilism. For precisely the reasons van Inwagen gives, it is\ndoubtful that any theory of ability will suffice for a defense of\nambitious compatibilism. There is another project, however, that the\ncompatibilist might be engaging in. Let us say that, for some reason\nor other, she herself is not convinced by the incompatibilist’s\nargument. She is still left with an explanatory burden, namely to\nexplain, if only to her own satisfaction, how it could\nbe that abilities are compatible with the truth of determinism.\nHere the compatibilist’s aim is not to convince the\nincompatibilist of the error of her ways, but simply to work out a\nsatisfactory conception of compatibilism. Let us call this\nmodest compatibilism. This distinction is not often made, and\nit is not always clear which of these projects classical\ncompatibilists are engaged in. If the latter project is indeed part of\nclassical compatibilism, then we may grant many of the above points\nwhile still granting the theory of ability a central place in defenses\nof compatibilism. For it may be that, though a theory of ability is of\nno use to the ambitious compatibilist, it has a crucial role to play\nin the defense of modest compatibilism.", "\nEven these compatibilist aspirations, however, may be overly\noptimistic, or at least premature. For in surveying theories of\nability we have turned up serious difficulties, for both hypothetical\nand non-hypothetical approaches, which do not appear to turn on issues\nabout determinism. So it may be that the best hope for progress is to\npursue theories of ability while setting to one side the problems\nraised in the free will debates. For given the difficulties posed by\nabilities, and given the significance of theories of ability for areas\nof philosophy quite removed from the free will debates, there is\nsomething to be said for pursuing a theory of ability while embracing,\nif only temporarily, a certain quietism about the puzzles that\ndeterminism may pose." ], "section_title": "6. 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Metaphysics, Book Θ, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Mandelkern, Matthew, Schultheis, Ginger, and Boylan, David, 2017.\n“Agentive Modals,” The Philosophical Review, 126:\n301–343.", "Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan, 2008. “On Linking\nDispositions and Conditionals,” Mind, 117:\n59–84.", "Martin, C.B., 1996. “Dispositions and Conditionals,”\nThe Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 1–8.", "McGeer, Victoria, 2018. “Intelligent Capacities,”\nProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118:\n347–376.", "Mele, Alfred, 2002. “Agents’ Abilities,”\nNoûs, 37: 447–470.", "Millikan, Ruth, 2000. On Clear and Confused Ideas,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Nelkin, Dana, 2011. Making Sense of Freedom and\nResponsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Noë, Alva, 2005. “Against Intellectualism,”\nAnalysis, 65: 278–290.", "Peacocke, Christopher, 1999. 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Potentiality: From Dispositions\nto Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Vihvelin, Kadri, 2004. “Free Will Demystified: A\nDispositionalist Account,” Philosophical Topics, 32:\n427–450.", "–––, 2013. Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why\nDeterminism Doesn’t Matter, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Whittle, Ann, 2010. “Dispositional Abilities,”\nPhilosophers’ Imprint, 10(12).\n[Whittle 2010 available online]", "Willer, Malte, forthcoming. “Two Puzzles About Ability\nCan,” Linguistics and Philosophy, first online\n30 March 2020. doi:10.1007/s10988-020-09296-6", "Wolf, Susan, 1990. Freedom within Reason, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press." ]	[ { "href": "../action/", "text": "action" }, { "href": "../compatibilism/", "text": "compatibilism" }, { "href": "../conditionals/", "text": "conditionals" }, { "href": "../dispositions/", "text": "dispositions" }, { "href": "../incompatibilism-arguments/", "text": "incompatibilism: arguments for" }, { "href": "../knowledge-how/", "text": "knowledge how" }, { "href": "../logic-modal/", "text": "logic: modal" } ]
abner-burgos	Abner of Burgos	First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020	[ "\nAbner of Burgos (Alfonso de Valladolid; c. 1260–1347) was\nperhaps the most important philosopher in the stream of Jewish Spanish\nrabbi-apostates in the 14th and 15th centuries.\nIn the first part of his life, Abner was an Aristotelian Jewish\nphilosopher. However, at the age of 60 (if Pablo de Santa Maria is a\nreliable source) after years of hesitation, he became a Neo-Platonic\nChristian, making him one of the very few philosophers (much less\nphilosopher-rabbis) to change his philosophical opinion (and religion)\nduring the Middle Ages. The majorities of his works are primarily\npolemical, and try to convince his former fellow Jews to become\nChristian, as he did. However, in his polemical writings, Abner built\nan original philosophical critique of both traditional Judaism and the\nAristotelian (and Maimonidean) philosophical interpretation of\nJudaism. Another part of his philosophical aim was a very radical\ninterpretation of Christianity aimed at convincing his Jewish audience\nthat his Christianity was superior to traditional and philosophical\nJudaism. Abner was one of the first philosophical and scientific\ncritics of Aristotle, as well as one of the more radical Neo-Platonic\nthinkers of Christianity during the Middle Ages. His works had a very\nimportant impact on Jewish philosophy at the latter end of the Middle\nAges, and some of his opinions influenced, through Rabbi Hasdai\nCrescas, general Western philosophy." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Works", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. The Trinity and Incarnation", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Determinism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Critics of the Aristotelian science", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. The influence of Abner", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Works by Abner", "Secondary sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThere are not many sources on the life of Abner. The majority of the\nsources are autobiographical passages in his works (especially\nMostrador de Justicia). Abner was born around 1260, probably\nin the Jewish community of Burgos, one of the major communities in\nCastile. While still Jewish, Abner worked as a book trader, a rabbi,\nand he may have been a physician as well. During this time he was the\nhead of a yeshiva (Jewish academy) in Burgos, but we do not know if\nthis yeshiva was a public institution or just a private group of\nstudents that met in his home. We know from a former pupil, Rabbi\nIsaac Pulgar, and from the sources that he utilizes in his works, that\nduring the Jewish period of his life, Abner was a philosopher, being a\npart of the Maimonidean-Averroist trend of Jewish philosophy at the\ntime.", "\nIn spite of the majority opinion of modern\n scholars,[1]\n Abner probably was not a Kabbalist before his conversion to\nChristianity. This mistake is based essentially on two sources: the\nfact that some of Abner’s arguments for the Trinity and Incarnation\ncan be interpreted as deriving from Kabbalistic sources, and the\nexistence of another Rabbi Abner (not a common name for Jews of his\ntime), a Kabbalist whom Rabbi Isaac of Acre cited many times. In my\nopinion, Abner’s argument for the Trinity and Incarnation is not based\non Kabbalistic sources, but stems from his Neo-Platonic and standard\nChristian scriptural\n background.[2]\n Additionally, Abner (the apostate) did not use many important\nKabbalistic\n sources.[3]\n His opinions are not the same as the other Rabbi Abner’s (the one\nthat Rabbi Isaac of Acre quotes), and we can see that the two authors\ndo not share the same background, nor do they use the same sources,\nwith Abner utilizing almost entirely sources taken from the Jewish\nphilosophical and traditional rabbinic\n corpuses.[4]\n almost all of Rabbi Abner’s sources are taken from the commentary of\nNahmanides to the Torah, a book that Abner the apostate almost never\nquoted. ", "\nThe beginning of Abner’s doubts about Judaism began with the incident\nof a false messiah in Avila in 1295. According to Abner, the Jews of\nthe community, which is in North Castile, went outside the city to\nwelcome the messiah, but instead of the messiah they received a\nrainfall of crosses that stuck to their clothes. Some of the Jews who\nwitnessed the miracle went to Abner for advice. This event instilled\nin Abner some doubts about the question of the reason for the ongoing\nexile of Israel and the truth of Judaism. After twenty-two years of\nfeeling ambivalent (i.e., around 1317) Abner wrote about his first\nrevelation in a\n dream.[5]\n In his dream he saw a man that told him to be “a teacher of\nrighteousness” (mostrador de justicia, not\ncoincidentally the name of Abner’s main book) and to bring his people\nto freedom from exile. This dream just accents the uncertainty of the\nJewish Rabbi. After three more years of studies he had a second dream\nwherein he had the same revelation, this time noticing that on the\nclothes the man wore were crosses like the cross of Jesus the\nChristian. This dream prompted him toward his final conversion around\n1320/1321. After his conversion, Abner became the sacristan of the\ncollegiate church of Valladolid and devoted himself to the propagation\nof Christianity amongst his former fellows Jews (he had come to the\nconclusion that conversion to Christianity was the only way to be\nsaved from the Exile). We know he wrote an extended polemicist oeuvre\nand that he took part in the anti-Jewish polemic effort in North\nCastile around 1336–1339. There was a public disputation between\nAbner and a rabbi that occurred probably around 1335–1336 on the\nsubject of the prayer of the Jews against the apostates. This dispute\nwas the main reason for the decree against this part of the Jewish\nprayer (birkatha-minim) by Alfonso XI in 1336. Abner\nprobably died in 1347 or later." ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAbner’s works may be divided into three different categories: polemic,\nscientific and philosophic.", "\nPolemic works: Mostradorde Justicia is the earliest\nand most important work of those writings of Abner that have survived.\nOnly a translation (probably by Abner himself) in Castilian exists\ntoday, whereas the original Hebrew was lost. The book starts with a\nbrief introduction wherein Abner writes about the reasons for his\nconversion (the incident in Avila and his two dreams). The main part\nof the book is a debate between a Christian (the master) and a Jew\n(the rebel). In contrast to other works similar to this type of\npolemic debate, in the Mostrador, the rebel does not become a\nChristian, and despite his losing the debate, the Jew continues to\nbelieve in his ostensibly false religion. The book is divided into ten\nchapters, with each chapter being subdivided into a number of\nparagraphs. Each paragraph is a speech by one of the protagonists of\nthe\n debate.[6]", "\nSummary of the chapters:", "\nResponses to the Blasphemer (Teshuvot la-Meharef): this book\nsurvived both in the original\n Hebrew[7]\n and in a Castilian\n translation.[8]\n This book is a response to the different letters that Abner’s only\nknown student, Rabbi Isaac Pulgar, wrote against his determinist and\nChristian\n writings.[9]\n Abner did not divide this book into formal sections, though the book\ncontains four main subjects presented in a contiguous fashion: (1) an\nintroduction wherein Abner attacks his former pupil on his\nphilosophical position and other personal matters between the two; (2)\nthe Trinity and how it can be based on philosophy, scripture and\nquotes from the Jewish rabbinic literature; (3) the necessary\nexistence of the incarnation of divinity in the world; and (4) a proof\nof the aforementioned Christian beliefs derived from scripture and\nother Jewish sources (Talmud and Midrashim). In this last part, which\ntakes up almost half the book, Abner argues that the messiah had\nalready come and that Christianity is true.", "\nWhile Abner’s arguments regarding the Trinity and Incarnation are\ngenerally more developed in Mostradorde Justicia,\nthe philosophical importance of this work resides with his critique of\nthe Jewish philosopher. Here Abner distinguishes between the regular\nJewish people (that have some hope to become Christian and to be\nsaved) and Jewish philosophers (like Pulgar). The latter are hopeless\nand are left with no religion, mostly due to their opinions that only\nthe people who attain scientific knowledge have some kind of existence\nafter death. Due to their feeling elevated over others, these\nphilosophers have no hope of improving and accepting the truth of\nChristianity. Parts of Abner’s critique of Jewish philosophers in this\nbook most probably influenced Crescas.", "\nLibro de la Ley (Book of the Law). This work\nsurvived only\n fragmentally[10]\n in Castilian. The major argument of Abner in this book is that the\nJewish people forgot the secrets of the Torah, which are manifested by\nthe Christian doctrines, especially the Trinity.", "\nSefer Teshuvot ha-Meshubot (The Book of Responses to the\nApostasies) exists only in\n Hebrew.[11]\n There are three polemic\n letters[12]\n that deal especially with scriptural arguments on the subject of the\ncoming of the\n messiah.[13]" ], "section_title": "2. Works", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe two major subjects of the philosophical polemical works of Abner\nare the Trinity and Incarnation. Abner had an original view on the\nTrinity. In his opinion, one can prove philosophically the reality of\nthe\n Trinity.[14]\n He claimed that only the division of the divine source of the world\ncan explain the diversity of the world. The infinite force of God (the\nfather) would burn the finite matter of the world if it were not for\nsome “transformer” that adapted the divine force to the\nfinitude of matter (the son). Abner distinguished between two parts of\nthe son. The superior son is part of the transcendent divinity. The\ninferior son is the divine essence in all the different parts of the\nworld. The transformer of the divine force and essence is the superior\nson.", "\nRegarding the theory of the divine attributes, Abner also had an\noriginal opinion. He distinguished between the attributes that are the\nessence of God and the attributes that are essential to God. The\nattributes of the essence of God divide themselves only within the\npersonas of the Trinity. The rest of the attributes are only essential\nto God (and could be attributed to any one of the personas). This\ndivision of the divine attributes influenced Rabbi Hasdai Crescas,who\nlater influenced Spinoza.", "\nAbner’s opinion on Incarnation was also very original. According to\nAbner, the essence of God is in the entire world. The world is\ncomposed only of corrupted matter and of divine essence in different\ndegrees of purity. Even the most corrupted matter has inside itself\nsome divine essence. The divine essence gives the corporeal form to\nmatter and produces in it its dimensions. The uniqueness of a human\nbeing is the capacity to purify one’s matter, thereby reaching a\nhigher degree of divine essence. According to Abner, what made Jesus\nunique was that he was born of the highest matter, enabling him to\nunite with the highest degree of divine essence that a human can\nattain. Abner thought that the superior son does not incarnate in this\nworld. Jesus was only the highest degree of the inferior son that is\npresent in the essences of the entire world.", "\nThe opinion of Abner on Incarnation is closely related to his view of\nthe doctrine of Original Sin. In Abner’s opinion, the reason for the\noriginal sin was Adam’s lack of comprehension. Adam thought that his\nintellect, which is an incarnation of divinity in people, was God, and\nhe therefore wrongly concluded that he was God. In order to fix Adam’s\nerror, humanity needed the Torah of Moses, which emphasized the unity\nof God in an exaggerated form and therefore explained (somewhat\ninaccurately) that God does not incarnate in the World at all. Only\nafter this critical step, humanity was able to understand that, though\nthere is divinity in humans, this divinity is not an independent God,\nbut rather a part of the divine essence in the whole world. The Law of\nMoses that came to purify the world from idolatry has some problems.\nIt does not enable the full emancipation of humanity from sin and\nerror. Abner claimed that the negation of the incarnation of God in\nthe world leads to negating the possibility of life after death. The\npossibility of life after death comes from understanding the\nincarnation of divinity in all humans. Negating life after death\ncauses immorality. The Torah has to put up with all these inaccuracies\nin order to achieve its main goal, which is taking humanity out of the\nsin of idolatry (by believing that God is one). The outcome, though\nbetter than its predecessor, is ultimately a lost situation which\nhumanity cannot overcome on its own. For that reason, God sent Jesus\n(who was born with a higher degree of matter and divine essence). Due\nto the divinity within Jesus, his miracles and his resurrection,\npeople are able to understand that within everything in the world\nthere is some divine essence that is part of the inferior son, and\nthat the origin of all the divinity in the world is the superior son.\nThis understanding enables salvation from the original sin and\nrepresents a true understanding of the relation between God and the\nworld. The role of the sacramentental Mass is to remind us of the\ndivine aspect of Jesus’ essence, as well as of all the miracles that\nJesus performed and to continue their influence in our present\ntime.", "\nWe see that this opinion regarding the Trinity and Incarnation\ncontradict the official dogma of the Catholic Church at the time of\nAbner. In his opinion, the incarnation of divinity in Jesus did not\nbypass the regular process of the emanation of the divine essence in\nthe world. Rather, the manifestation of Jesus represented the pinnacle\nof incarnation of divinity, which, though indeed present in the entire\nworld, yet in Jesus occurred in the purest form possible. This opinion\nof Abner, similar to his other philosophical views, was a part of the\nradical Neo-Platonic interpretation of Christianity. The difference\nbetween him and the other Neo-Platonic Christian philosophers, like\nMaster Eckard, is the different sources from which they were\ninfluenced. Abner did not utilize the traditional Neo-Platonic\nChristian sources, like Dionysius the Areopagite. We do not see in any\npart of his work that he was aware of the existence of these sources.\nOn the other hand, Abner did utilize some Arabic and Jewish sources.\nThe origin of his uncommon position on Christianity is found in his\nopposition to the common Aristotelian-Maimonidean-Averroist trend of\nJewish philosophy. Abner, similar to Spinoza after him, thought that\nthe explanations of these thinkers on the question of the creation of\nthe world by a perfect God were not sufficient and ultimately\ninaccurate. In place of these responses, Abner proposed his radical\ninterpretation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, an\ninterpretation that was uninfluenced by the theological Christian\ntradition. " ], "section_title": "3. The Trinity and Incarnation", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nOne of the more important philosophical opinions of Abner was his\ndeterministic\n view.[15]\n Abner devoted his book Ofrenda de Zelos (Minhat\nKena’ot in the original lost Hebrew text), along with other\nworks that have since been lost, to the question of determinism and\nfree\n will.[16]\n In the beginning of this book, Abner describes the opinion of his\nformer pupil Rabbi Isaac Pulgar, who denies God’s foreknowledge of\nhuman decisions. After the explication of this opinion and its\nnegation, Abner explains his deterministic opinion. Abner believed\nthat people have free will in a limited sense, but act in a determined\nway in the broader sense. People are free in their relation to\nthemselves, meaning that if a person is separated from the causes that\ninfluence him or her (e.g., education, society’s influences) while\ndebating between two options, one is then really free to choose either\nof the two options. In this specific case a person can then utilize\nhis or her will and choose freely between the two options. However, if\none takes into account all the causes that influence his or her will,\nwe may conclude that these causes limits that person’s will to only\none of the two options. In the opinion of Abner, people are like wax,\nas follows: Wax may be melted and sculpted into many different shapes.\nHowever, the person who sculpts the wax determines its present form as\nonly one of those options. The same is true about people: In\nthemselves, they have the ability to choose between different\npossibilities, but their relation to the outside world determines\ntheir choices. We can see from this example how strong the determinist\nview of Abner was. It is important to note that Abner defines the will\nof people as an accord between the attractive force and the\nimagination, two forces common to humans and animals.", "\nAbner explains in the same way the meaning of possibility and\naccident. Things are only possible in their relation to themselves. In\nrelation to the entire world and its causality, everything is truly\ndetermined. Accidents are only accidents relative to the seeming\nunlikelihood of their occurrence. However, relative to all the causal\nprocesses of the world, we see that even in the most unusual of\ncircumstances the occurrence of what appears to be an accident in fact\nhad to happen. In short, there are no accidents (according to the\npopular meaning of accident) for Abner.", "\nThis deterministic description of the world (based on rational\narguments) resolves the theological problem of the contradiction\nbetween the free will of people and the foreknowledge of God. In the\nopinion of Abner free will does not really exist. For him, God is the\nfirst cause; He knows all the laws of the world and therefore knows\neverything that He has determined.", "\nThis deterministic description leads to two theological problems. The\nfirst is why God sent commandments to people who cannot truly decide\nwhether to obey them or disobey them. The second question that arises\nis how people can receive reward or punishment for actions and\ndecisions that they do not really have any control over? Abner answers\nthe second question by explaining that forbidden things are naturally\nbad. The punishment of the sinner is not a special act of divine\nprovidence; rather it is the natural consequence of his bad action.\nThis leads us to the answer to the first question. According to Abner,\nthe goal of the Torah is to influence people to do what is right. The\nTorah and prophets (and God who sent them) act in the world in\nconformity to His nature. The only way to influence someone to do\nsomething is to give him enough causes to do it. The Torah is only\nanother cause that influences people to do what is good. Abner\ncompares reward and punishment to a father that obligates his son to\ntake medication. The medicine will always work even if the son takes\nit unhappily. The same is true with regard to all actions of people.\nWhen people do what is right, they believe they will receive a reward,\nwhile if they do what is wrong, they believe they will receive a\npunishment—even if they do not essentially have the choice to do\nanything else. ", "\nIt is interesting to note that this philosophical book that Abner\nwrote at the end of his life, more than twenty years after his\nconversion, is almost without Christian\n references.[17]\n In spite of this, the book is full of references to Jewish sources,\nincluding the Talmud and quotations of Jewish authorities like\n Maimonides.[18]\n We see that Abner, even many years after his conversion, wrote to the\nJewish community and was part of the internal Jewish debate about the\nquestion of determinism. In fact, Abner is the first medieval Jewish\nphilosopher to argue for a deterministic explanation of the world. His\nopinion influenced Rabbi Hasdai Crescas (who paraphrased an important\npart of Ofrenda de Zelos in his major philosophical work\nThe Light of the\n Lord[19]),\n and through him, Spinoza. Some Jewish philosophers, like Rabbi Isaac\nPulgar, Rabbi Mosses from Narbonne, and Rabbi Josef Ben Shem\n Tov[20]\n respond explicitly to the determinist opinion of Abner, such that\nthere is no doubt that his opinion had a major influence on the\ninternal Jewish debate on the question of free will throughout the\n14th and 15th centuries. " ], "section_title": "4. Determinism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAs we stated before, the major work of science of Abner (the New\nPhilosophy) is lost. We can still try to reconstruct some of his\nscientific opinions through some parts of his other works,\nspecifically the existing work Meyasher Aqob, Rabbi Isaac\nPulgar’s brief summary of the lost work, and some scientific passages\nin Mostrador de\n Justicia.[21]", "\nThe first interesting opinion of Abner is his view on prime matter.\nAbner denied a necessary link, which the Aristotelians affirmed,\nbetween bodies and accidents (magnitude, weight, quantity, etc.),\nmaintaining that a body untainted by all these accidents can\nnonetheless have actual existence. He explicated his view in the\ndogmatic context of the question of the rite of\n Mass.[22]\n The rebel’s main philosophical arguments against the Mass are as\nfollows: (1) How can several bodies occupy the same place? (2) How can\nJesus’ body be in the bread and wine without changing them? (3) How\ncan the same body be two different materials at the same time? (4) How\ncan one debase Jesus by eating and digesting him? At the start of his\nanswer Abner emphasizes that the Mass is miraculous. Nevertheless, he\ndoes go on to offer a scientific explanation of transubstantiation.\nFor Abner, everybody has a layer of pure divine existence, to which\nare superadded other forms and accidents; but if the body is stripped\nof all of these accretions it will be reduced to the original divine\nsubstance only. In this state the body will have no boundary,\nquantity, or weight to occupy the universe, and consequently is\ninfinite. This body is the foundation of the entire material world,\nand normally—with the exception of the sacrament of the Mass and\nIncarnation—it does not exist without accidents (at least not in\nthe sublunary world). This matter is identified with the flesh of\nJesus, which has divine existence only, which means that Jesus’ body\nis identified with prime matter.", "\nThe above description eliminates for Abner all of the difficulties\nposed by the rebel. The problem of the co-presence of two bodies in\none place is eliminated, because all bodies, once they have been\nstripped of their form and accidents, incorporate the infinite body of\nJesus, which fills the entire universe. After these forms have been\nremoved, the bread and wine are identified with Jesus’ body. The very\nsame principle eliminates the problem of the simultaneous existence of\nJesus’ body in several places, since his body fills the entire\nuniverse and transcends all definitions of place. Because his body\nalso transcends the definition of quantity, the problem of limited\nquantity is removed as well.", "\nAnother subject about which Abner critiques Aristotelian science is\nthe definition of place and the relation between place and body. In\nthe thought of Aristotle, the definition of place is ‘the limit\nof the encompassing body’. In his opinion, place has an\nimportant role in movement. The definition of a natural movement is\nthe movement of a body to its natural place in the world. Aristotle\nexplains that both the natural place attracts the body and that the\nbody moves on his own to its natural place.", "\nAbner distinguishes between the physical object and extension or\ndimension. According to Abner, dimension is “a simple and subtle\nquantity detached from all movable bodies”; in other words, it\nis space, independent of any physical body. Dimension is measurable\nper se, and is not linked to what occupies it. Nevertheless, Abner’s\ndefinition of place is still associated with body: “place”\nis the dimension occupied by a body, and it is the body that turns it\ninto “place.” According to Abner, the movement of bodies\nis not due to their being attracted to some place where they must rest\nbefore resuming their movement; rather, they move because of the\ninteraction of several forces, quite independent of any particular\nplace. A body that is thrown upward rises, but if it suddenly begins\nto fall because of an opposing force, there would not be a moment of\nrest between the two opposing motions.", "\nThus Abner dismisses Aristotle’s concept that a body is attracted to\nits natural place. Different places are not characterized by different\nqualities (inasmuch as all places are equal and are merely points in\nspace). Hence a body has no cause to move to a particular place and no\nplace is a final cause of its motion.", "\nWe know from Rabbi Isaac Pulgar that Abner also criticized the\nopinions of Aristotle on the possibility of a void and argues for the\nexistence of voids in his lost scientific book The New\nPhilosophy. Because of the influence of Abner on Rabbi Hasdai\nCrescas, we can assume that his criticism is closely related to the\ncriticism of Crescas in the beginning of the first speech of Or\nHashem", "\nAbner wrote his criticism of Artistotelian science at the beginning of\nthe 14th century, approximately the same time that Ockham\nwrote his criticism of this science. In the writing and the thought of\nAbner we do not see any kind of influence of Ockham or of other late\nscholastics (the only scholastic philosopher that he cites is Thomas\nAquinas and there are no quotations from Christian sources on a\nscientific subject). It is interesting to note that the systematic\ncriticism of Aristotelian science started approximately at the same\ntime in the Jewish milieu (with the writings of Abner) and in the\nChristian milieu, with probably no relation one to the other.", "\nAbner’s criticism of Aristotelian science had an important influence\non Crescas’s thought, and through him to Pico Della Mirandola and\ngeneral Western philosophy." ], "section_title": "5. Critics of the Aristotelian science", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nOne must distinguish between two kinds of influence Abner had. Abner\ninfluenced with his polemical works the Jewish-Christian debate until\nthe end of the Middle Ages. Some born-Christians, like Alfonso de\nEspina, and especially Jewish apostates, like Pablo de Santa Maria,\nutilized his polemical works. Against this trend, there are more than\nfive Jewish polemicist works that explicitly answer the polemical\narguments of\n Abner.[23]\n Despite the utilization of Abner in debates, his works had almost no\nphilosophical influence on Christian theology because the Christian\nparticipants in the debates utilized the quotations of the Jewish\nsources by Abner and not his theological arguments as such, which in\ntheir content were very different from the official Catholic\ndogma.", "\nThe second way in which Abner had lasting influence was on the purely\nphilosophical plane. It should be noted that the direct philosophical\ninfluence of Abner was only on the Jewish community. In fact we do not\nsee that any Christian philosophers read the works of Jewish apostates\nin any other forum apart from the purely polemical one. By contrast,\nin the Jewish community the works of Abner had an important impact\nuntil the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. The deterministic\nopinion of Abner is with no doubt one of the major causes to the\nextensive number of works written on this subject in the\n14th and 15th centuries by Jewish philosophers.\nFor the most part, these works were against the opinion of Abner. The\nmost impressive philosophical influence of Abner was on Rabbi Hasdai\nCrescas (died in 1410/1411). Crescas was the main Jewish philosopher\nduring the end of the Middle Ages. Despite their opposite positions in\nthe Jewish-Christian debate (Crescas wrote one of the more\nphilosophical anti-Christian\n works),[24]\n Crescas borrowed some of the major original philosophical opinions of\nAbner, including determinism, the difference between the attributes of\nthe essence and the attributes that are essential, and the criticism\nof Aristotelian science. With regard to this entire subject, Crescas\nmolded his opinion using Abner combined with other sources. In spite\nof this important change, we can clearly see signs of the philosophy\nof Abner in the writing of Crescas, and these signs constitute nearly\nall the post medieval influence of Abner on Jewish and general Western\nphilosophy. " ], "section_title": "6. The influence of Abner", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Meyasher aqob, G. Gluskina (ed. and trans.), Moscow:\nNauka, 1983.", "Ofrenda de zelos y Libro de la ley, W. Mettmann (ed.),\nOpladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990.\n [Available online].", "Mostrador de justicia, W. Mettmann (ed.), Opladen:\nWestdeutscher Verlag, 1996–1997.", "Responses to the Blasphemer (Teshuvot la-Meharef), edited and\ntranslated in J.L. Hecht, The Polemical Exchange between Isaac\nPollegar and Abner of Burgos/Alfonso of Valladolid according to Parma\nMS 2440, Ph.D. Thesis, Skirbal Department of Hebrew and Judaic\nStudies, New York University, 1993.", "Abner Epistles: Rosenthal, J., 1961, “The Third Letter of\nAbner of Burgos”, Studies in Bibliography and Booklore V,\n(Hebrew), pp. 42–51.", "–––, 1964, “From Sefer Alfonso”,\nAbraham Neuman Jubilee Volume, in Hebrew, M. Ben-Horim editor, Leiden:\nBrill, pp. 588–621.", "–––, 1964, “The second Epistle of Abner of\nBurgos”, Abraham Weiss Jubilee Volume, S. Balkin (ed.), New\nYork: Abraham Weiss Jubilee Committee, pp. 483–510.", "–––, 1967, “Excerpts from the Hebrew\nWriting of the Apostate Abner of Burgos”, Mehqarim u-Meqorot, in\nHebrew, 2 volumes, Jerusalem: Ben Zvi, pp. 324–367.", "Baer, Y., 1929, “Abner aus Burgos,”\nKorrespondenzblatt des Vereins zur Gründung und Erhaltung\neiner Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums, 9:\n20–37.", "–––, 1961–1966, A History of Jews in\nChristian Spain, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society.", "Chazan, R., 1984, “Maestre Alfonso of Valladolid and the New\nMissionizing,” Revue des études juives, 143:\n83–94.", "–––, 2000, “Undermining the Jewish Sense\nof Future: Alfonso of Valladolid and the New Christian\nMissionizing,” in Christian, Muslims and Jews in Medieval\nand Early Modern Spain, M. D. Meyerson and D. Edward (eds.),\nIndiana: Indiana University Press, pp. 179–194.", "Gershenzon, S., 1974, “Midrash and Exegesis in the\nChristological Argument of Abner of Burgos,” Hebrew\nAbstracts, 15: 96–100.", "–––, 1984, “A Study of Teshuvot La-Meharef\nby Abner of Burgos,” Ph.D. Thesis, Hebrew Literature in Jewish\nHistory, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America.", "–––, 1984, “A Tale of Two Midrashim: The\nLegacy of Abner of Burgos,” in Approaches to Judaism in\nMedieval Times, D. Blumenthal (ed.), Atlanta: Scholars Press, pp.\n133–145.", "–––, 1986, “The View of Maimonides as a\nDeterminist in ‘Sefer Minhat Qenaot’ by Abner of\nBurgos,” Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish\nStudies (Division C: Jewish Thought and Literature), Jerusalem:\nThe Magnes Press, pp. 93–100.", "Hames, H. J., 2009, “It Takes Three to Tango: Ramon Llull,\nSolomon ibn Adret and Alfonso of Valladolid Debate the Trinity”,\nMedieval Encounters, 15: 199–224. ", "Hecht, J. L., 1993, “The Polemical Exchange between Isaac\nPollegar and Abner of Burgos/Alfonso of Valladolid according to Parma\nMS 2440”, Ph.D. Thesis, Skirbal Department of Hebrew and Judaic\nStudies, New York University.", "Lazar, M., 2003, “Alfonso de valladolid’s Mostrador de\nJusticia: A Polemic Debate Between Abner’s Old and New Self”,\nEdad Media: revista de historia 6, 121–127.", "Ravitzky, A., 1982, “Crescas’ Theory of Human Will:\nDevelopment and Sources,” Tarbiz, 51: 445–470\n(Heb.).", "Rosenthal, J., 1961, “The Third Letter of Abner of\nBurgos”, Studies in Bibliography and Booklore V,\n(Hebrew), pp. 42–51.", "–––, 1964, “From Sefer Alfonso”,\nAbraham Neuman Jubilee Volume, in Hebrew, M. Ben-Horim (ed.),\nLeiden: Brill, pp. 588–621.", "–––, 1964, “The second Epistle of Abner of\nBurgos”, Abraham Weiss Jubilee Volume, S. Balkin (ed.),\nNew York: Abraham Weiss Jubilee Committee, pp. 483–510.", "–––, 1967, “Excerpts from the Hebrew\nWriting of the Apostate Abner of Burgos”, Mehqarim\nu-Meqorot, in Hebrew, 2 volumes, Jerusalem: Ben Zvi, pp.\n324–367.", "Sadik, S., 2008, “Crescas’ critique of Aristotle and the\nlost book by Abner of Burgos”, Tarbiz, 77:\n133–155 (Heb.).", "–––, 2011, “The definition of Place in the\nThought of Abner of Burgos and Rabbi Hasdai,” Jerusalem\nStudies in Jewish Tough, 22: 233–246.", "–––, 2016, “Abner of Burgos and\nPhilosophical Knowledge Transfer: a Summary of his Transfer of\nPhilosophical Knowledge from Judaism to Christianity and from\nChristianity to Judaism”, Medieval Encounters, 22:\n95–112.", "–––, 2020, Ideology of Apostasy – the\nIdeology of Jewish Spaniards who Converted to Christianity,\n(Hebrew), Jerusalem: Magness.", "Sainz de la Maza Vicioso, C. N., 1989, Alphonso de Valladolid:\nEdicion y estudio del manuscrito LAT 6423 de la biblioteca apostolica\nvaticana, Madrid: Madrid Univesity Press.", "–––, 1992, “El converso y judio: Alfonso\nde Valladolid y su libro del zelo de dio,” in Las tres\nculturas en la corrona de Castilla y los sefardies: Junto cultura de\nCastilla y Leon, Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, pp.\n75–81.", "–––, 1992, “El toldot Yeshu Castellano en\nel Maestre Alfonso de Valladolid,” Actas II congreso\ninternacional de la asociacion hispanica de literature medieval\n(Volume 2), Alcala: Ministério de Educação\nNacional, pp. 797–814.", "–––, 1992, “Vi en vision de sueno:\nConversion religiosa y autobiografia onirica en Abner de Burgos, alias\nAlfonso de Valladolid,” Compas de letras: monografias de\nliteraturas espanola, 1: 186–208.", "Schwartz, Y., 2011, “Images of Revelation and Spaces of\nKnowledge, The Jew, the Christian and the Christian-Jew: Jewish\nApostates as Cultural Mediators in Medieval Spain”, in A. Fidora\nand M. Tischler (eds.), Christian North – Moslem South,\nMünster: Aschendorff Verlag, pp. 267–287.", "Shamir, Y, 1972, Rabbi Moses Ha-Kohen of Tordesillas and His\nBook ‘Ezer Ha-emunah – a Chapter in the History of the\nJudeo-Christian Controversy, Coconut Grove, FL: Field Research\nProjects.", "Sirat. C., 1975, “Deux philosophes juifs répondent\nà Abner de Burgos à propos du libre-arbitre humain et de\nl’omniscience divine”, in Mélanges \nAndré Neher, E. Amado Lévy-Valensi (ed.), Paris.\n87–94.", "Szpiech, R. W., 2006, “From Testimonia to\nTestimony: Thirteenth-Century Anti-Jewish Polemic and the\nMostrador de Justicia of Abner of Burgos/Alfonso de\nValladolid,” Ph.D. Thesis, Judaic Studies, Yale University.\n", "–––, 2010, “In Search of Ibn\nSīnā’s ‘Oriental Philosophy’ in Medieval\nCastile,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 20:\n185–206.", "–––, 2010, “The Original is Unfaithful to\nthe Translation: Conversion and Authenticity in Abner of Burgos and\nAnselm Turmeda,” eHumanista, 14: 146–177.", "–––, 2010, “Polemical Strategy and the\nRhetoric of Authority in Abner of Burgos / Alfonso of\nValladolid,” in Late Medieval Jewish Identities,\nMaría Esperanza Alfonso and Carmen Caballero-Navas (eds). New\nYork: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 55–76.", "–––, 2013, Conversion and Narrative –\nReading and Religious Authority in Medieval Polemic,\nPhiladelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 143-173.", "–––, 2014, “Petrus Alfonsi…Erred\nGreatly: Alfonso of Valladolid’s Imitation and Critique of Petrus\nAlfonsi’s Dialogus”, in Petrus Alfonsi and his Dialogus:\nBackground, Context, Reception, Carmen Cardelle de Hartmann and\nPhilipp Roelli (eds.), Florence: Sismel Edizioni del Galluzzo,\n321–348.", "–––, 2018, “L’hérésie absente: karaïsme et\nkaraïtes dans les Oeuvres polémiques d’Alfonso de Valladolid\n(m. v. 1347),” Archives de sciences sociales des religions,\n182 (2018): 191–207.", "–––, 2020, “On the Road to 1391? Abner of\nBurgos/Alfonso of Valladolid on Forced Conversion,” in Coming to\nTerms with Forced Conversion: Coercion and Faith in Pre-Modern Iberia\nand Beyond, Mercedes García-Arenal and Yonatan Glazer-Etan\n(eds.), pp. 175–204, Leiden: Brill." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle-natphil/", "text": "Aristotle, Special Topics: natural philosophy" }, { "href": "../crescas/", "text": "Crescas, Hasdai" }, { "href": "../determinism-causal/", "text": "determinism: causal" }, { "href": "../free-will-foreknowledge/", "text": "free will: divine foreknowledge and" }, { "href": "../god-ultimates/", "text": "God: and other ultimates" }, { "href": "../maimonides/", "text": "Maimonides" }, { "href": "../meister-eckhart/", "text": "Meister Eckhart" }, { "href": "../neoplatonism/", "text": "Neoplatonism" }, { "href": "../ockham/", "text": "Ockham [Occam], William" }, { "href": "../spinoza/", "text": "Spinoza, Baruch" }, { "href": "../trinity/", "text": "trinity" } ]
abrabanel	Judah Abrabanel	First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022	[ "\n\nJudah Abrabanel (ca. 1465–after 1521), also known as Leone Ebreo, is\nan important transitional figure in the history of Jewish\nphilosophy. Common to any transitional figure, however, is the problem\nof contextualization. In the case of Judah Abrabanel, do we regard him\nas the last of the medieval Jewish philosophers or the first of the\nearly modern ones? His work, for example, is certainly in\nconversation with a number of themes found in Renaissance Platonism\nand Humanism. Yet at the same time he freely draws upon the cosmology\nand metaphysics of his Jewish and Islamic predecessors.", "\n\nAbrabanel’s magnum opus, the Dialoghi d’amore\n(“Dialogues of Love”) belongs to the genre of the\ntrattato d’amore (“treatise on love”) that was\nintimately connected to both the Renaissance and the development of\nthe Italian vernacular. Although Abrabanel’s dialogue provides one of\nthe genre’s most important philosophical discussions in this, it\nnonetheless is confined to its literary and stylized form. The work\nitself consists of three dialogues, with the third one providing the\nlongest and most sustained philosophical discussion. Some contend that\nAbrabanel originally composed an introduction to the work and a fourth\ndialogue, neither of which\n survives.[1] \n In essence, the Dialoghi offers the transcript of a\nconversation between two individuals, Philo and Sophia, two courtiers,\nwho discourse on the nature of love as both a sensual and cosmic\nprinciple. Philo, the male character, is portrayed as an\naccomplished philosopher, and Sophia, the female character, as a\nstudent of philosophy. Despite this, Sophia is not just a\nconvenient textual strategy, but becomes a character in her own right,\nsomeone who significantly contributes to the philosophical unfolding\nof the work. Moreover, many of the dialogic exchanges that take place\nbetween Philo and Sophia are very playful, with Philo, on one level,\neither answering Sophia’s questions about love or responding to\nher criticisms; yet, on another level, he physically desires Sophia\nand wishes to consummate this desire. Philo’s desire for Sophia,\nthus, reflects the same desire of God (the superior) for the world\n(the inferior). As a Renaissance artist, then, Abrabanel cleverly and\nartfully weaves the philosophical principles of love, beauty, and\ndesire into the very literary structure of his Dialoghi." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Life", "1.2 Works", "1.3 Dialoghi d’amore and the Question of Language" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Faith, Reason, and Myth", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Beauty and Love", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Philosophy of Beauty", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 The Elevation of Rhetoric, Aesthetics, and the Imagination", "4.2 Cosmology and Metaphysics", "4.3 Psychology and Prophecy" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Philosophy of Love", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Judah’s Recasting of Love as a Philosophical Principle", "5.2 “The Circle of Love” (il circulo degli amari)" ] }, { "content_title": "6. The End of Human Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Reception History and Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Editions", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nThere exists a large debate in the secondary literature concerning the\nplace and role of Jews in Renaissance culture. One group envisages a\nsynthesis between Jewish culture on the one hand, and the ideals of\nthe Renaissance on the\n other.[2] \n Jews, according to this interpretation, could quite easily remain\nJewish while still sharing in the values and culture of non-Jewish\nsociety. Another group, however, maintains that such a synthesis is\nhistorically untenable because Jews remained a small, persecuted\nminority left to the whims of various local\n governments.[3] \n These two approaches leave us with radically different conceptions of\nRenaissance Jewish philosophers. According to the first approach, a\nJewish intellectual could quite easily partake of the ideals and\ncategories of Renaissance Humanism and Neoplatonism. According to the\nsecond approach, however, such a synthesis could never occur, and, as\na result, most Renaissance Jewish thinkers were more indebted to the\nlegacy of Maimonides than the various trajectories of Renaissance\nthought. A more productive approach, however, exists between these\ntwo: The Italian Renaissance provided certain elite Jews with new\nliterary genres, intellectual categories, and educational ideals with\nwhich to mine the depths of their tradition." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nJudah Abrabanel was born in Lisbon, Portugal, sometime between 1460\nand 1470. He was the firstborn of Don Isaac Abrabanel\n(1437–1508), who was an important philosopher in his own right. \nIn addition to their intellectual skills, the Abrabanel family played\nan important role in international commerce, quickly becoming one of\nthe most prominent families in Lisbon.", "\n\nDespite the conservative tendencies in the thought of his father,\nDon Isaac insured that his children received educations that included\nboth Jewish and non-Jewish subjects. Rabbi Joseph ben Abraham ibn\nHayoun, the leading rabbinic figure in Lisbon, was responsible for\nteaching religious subjects (e.g., Bible, commentaries, and halakhic\nworks) to Judah and his brothers. As far as non-Jewish works and\nsubjects were concerned, Judah, like most elite Jews of the fifteenth\ncentury, would have been instructed in both the medieval Arabo-Judaic\ntradition (e.g., Maimonides, Averroes), in addition to humanistic\nstudies imported from\n Italy.[4]", "\n\nBy profession, Judah was a doctor, one who had a very good\nreputation and who served the royal court. In 1483, his father\nwas implicated in a political conspiracy against Joao II, the Duke of\nBraganza, and was forced to flee to Seville, in Spain, with his\nfamily. Shortly after his arrival, undoubtedly on account of his\nimpressive connections and diplomatic skills, Isaac was summoned to the\ncourt of Ferdinand and Isabella, where he was to become a financial\nadvisor to the royal family. Despite his favorable relationship\nwith them, Isaac was unable to influence them to rescind their famous\nedict of expulsion—calling on all Jews who refused to convert\nto Christianity—to depart from the Iberian\nPeninsula.", "\n\nJudah seems also to have been well connected at the Spanish court and\nwas one of the physicians who attended the royal family. After the\nedict of expulsion had been issued, Ferdinand and Isabella requested\nthat he remain in Spain. To do this, however, he still would have had\nto convert to Christianity. Yet, in order to try and keep Judah in\nSpain, a plot was hatched to kidnap his firstborn son, Isaac ben\nJudah. Judah, however, discovered the plot and sent his son, along\nwith his Christian nanny, on to Portugal, where he hoped to meet up\nwith them. Upon hearing that a relative of Isaac Abrabanel had\nre-entered Portugal, Joao II had the young boy seized and forcefully\nconverted to Christianity. It is uncertain whether or not Judah ever\nsaw or heard from his son again. In a moving poem, entitled\nTelunah ‘al ha-zeman (“The Travails of\nTime”), he writes:", "\n\n\n\nTime with his pointed shafts has hit my heart\n\n and split my guts, laid open my entrails,\n\n landed me a blow that will not heal\n\n knocked me down, left me in lasting pain…\n\n He did not stop at whirling me around,\n\n exiling me while yet my days were green\n\n sending me stumbling, drunk, to roam the world…\n\n He scattered everyone I care for northward,\n\n eastward, or to the west, so that\n\n I have no rest from constant thinking, planning—\n\n and never a moment’s peace, for all my\n plans.[5]\n\n", "\n\nLike many of those Jews who refused to convert, Judah and his\nimmediate family, including his father, made their way to Naples.\nThere, Ferdinand II of Aragon, the king of Naples, warmly welcomed the\nAbrabanel family, owing to its many contacts in international\ntrade. In 1495, however, the French took control of Naples, and Judah\nwas again forced to flee, first to Genoa, then to Barletta, and\nsubsequently to Venice. It seems that he also traveled around Tuscany,\nand there is some debate as to whether or not he actually met the\nfamous Florentine Humanist, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (it seems\nunlikely that he did). In 1501, after the defeat of the French in\nNaples, he was invited back to be the personal physician of the\nViceroy of Naples, Fernandez de Córdoba. Among all of these\nperegrinations, Judah found the time to write (but not publish) his\nmagnum opus, the Dialoghi d’amore. He seems to\nhave died sometime after 1521. Other than these basic facts, we know\nvery little of the life of Judah Abrabanel.", "\n\nEspecially enigmatic are the last years of his life, between 1521 when\nhe was requested to give medical attention to Cardinal San Giorgio\nuntil 1535 when Mariano Lenzi published the Dialoghi\nposthumously in Rome. There is some evidence that Judah moved to Rome\nnear the end of his life; some suggest that he fell in with a\nChristian group of Neoplatonists. Indeed, the 1541 edition of the work\nmentions that Judah converted to Christianity (dipoi fatto\nchristiano). This, however, seems highly unlikely as (1) it is\nnot mentioned in the first edition, the one on which all subsequent\neditions and translations were based, and (2) there is no internal\nevidence in the Dialoghi to suggest this. In fact, one of the\ncharacters in the work implies the exact opposite, stating that\n“all of us believe in the sacred Mosaic law” (noi\ntutti che crediamo la sacre legge\n mosaica).[6] \n It seems, then, that either a careless or over-zealous editor\ninserted the phrase “dipoi fatto christiano” into\na later edition of the Dialoghi." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Life" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe only major work that we possess of Judah Abrabanel is the\nDialoghi d’amore. There is some debate as to when the\nwork was actually written. Many point to the year 1501–1502 owing to a\nphrase in the third book: “According to the Jewish tradition, we\nare in the year 5262 from the beginning of creation” (Siamo,\nsecondo la veritá ebraica, a cinque milia ducento sessanta due\ndel principio de la\n creazione).[7] \n The year 5262 of the Jewish calendar corresponds to 1501–1502 of the\nGregorian calendar. Yet, manuscripts other than that based on the 1535\nedition have the date of 5272 (i.e., 1511–1512). This is significant\nbecause many who argue that the Dialoghi could not possibly\nhave been written in Italian point to the fact that Judah would not\nhave been fluent in Italian. Yet, if we assume the 1511–1512 date to\nbe correct this would place him in Italy for close to twenty years,\nmore than enough time to gain proficiency in Italian (especially given\nthe fact that he would have already known at least one Spanish\nvernacular and, as a physician, Latin).", "\n\nWe also know that Judah wrote poetry (see the poem quoted above). In\naddition to his biographical poem, he also composed poetic\nintroductions to three of his father’s last works: Rosh\nAmanah, Zevach Pesach, and Nachalat Avot.", "\n\nFinally, we possess a letter dating to 1566 from one Amatus Lusitanus,\na physician who wrote that he attended to a patient by the name of\nJudah “who was the grandson of the great Platonic philosopher,\nknown as Judah or Leon Abrabanel, who gave to us the most beautiful\ndialogues on love.” Further in this letter, he mentions that\nJudah also composed a work entitled De Coeli Harmonia\n(“On the Harmony of the Spheres”) and that, according to\nthe introduction, he dedicated it to the “divine Pico della\nMirandola.” Unfortunately, this work has not survived. If he\ndedicated to Pico as the letter indicates, it would most likely have\nbeen composed before the Dialoghi and also, based on the\ntitle, it would have been composed in Latin." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Works" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe central question concerning the language of the\nDialoghi’s composition is: How could a Jewish refugee\nfrom Portugal show such facility with Italian, let alone the Tuscan\ndialect, since Judah seems to have spent very little time in\n Tuscany?[8] \n Those who argue\nfor a Latin original point to the fact that (1) he was a physician and\nwould have known Latin, and (2) a phrase by Yosef Shlomo Delmedigo\n(1591–1655) in his Mikhtav Ahuz suggesting that he was going\nto translate Judah’s work from Latin. Those who argue for a\nHebrew original point to another phrase, this time by Claudio Tolemei\n(1492–1556), a non-Jew, which states that Judah composed his treatise\nin sua lingua (“his own language”). \nAlthough, as others have pointed out, such a phrase could quite easily\nrefer to “his own style.”", "\n\nHowever, given the evidence, an Italian original for the work seems\nmost likely since (1) all the manuscripts, including Mariano\nLenzi’s edition of 1535, are in Italian; (2) it seems that Judah\nhad lived in Italy for close to twenty years by the time that he wrote\nthe Dialoghi (more than enough time for someone to gain an\nintimate knowledge of Italian, especially someone proficient in Latin\nand Spanish vernaculars); (3) neither later Jewish authors, e.g.,\nAzaria \n de’Rossi,[9]\n nor non-Jewish authors, e.g., Tullia\n d’Aragona,[10]\nhad any reason to suspect that it was written in a language other than\nItalian; (4) if we assume the later date of 1511–1512, many non-Tuscan\nItalian authors of this period called for the adoption of Tuscan as a\nliterary language, owing primarily to the fact that this was the\nlanguage of Petrarch (1304–1374) and Boccaccio\n (1313–1375);[11]\n and, (5) as for the\nquestion of the Tuscan dialect of the work, many Italian printers of\nthe early sixteenth century “Tuscanized” Italian according\nto set\n criteria.[12]", "\n\nMoreover, many Jewish authors in the fifteenth- and\nsixteenth-centuries increasingly resorted to Romance vernaculars in\norder to attract a Jewish audience (including conversos and\nex-conversos), which no longer understood Hebrew. In\nsixteenth-century Italy, larger trends in rhetoric and the use of\nlanguage increasingly led to the creation of the ideal of a pure\nItalian language. In this regard, Judah becomes an important\ntransitional thinker in the encounter between Judaism and the Italian\nRenaissance. Whereas his father, Don Isaac, could still adapt\nhumanistic themes to his Hebrew writings, which were still primarily in\nconversation with medieval\n thought,[13]\n increasingly in Judah’s generation the only way\nto engage in a full-scale examination of the universal tendencies\nassociated with Humanism was to write in the vernacular.", "\n\nFinally, the very genre of the Dialoghi, that of the\ntrattato d’amore (“treatise on love”), was\nthe product of the Italian vernacular of the late fifteenth and early\nsixteenth centuries. When, for example, Judah discusses the\nconcept of love as a universal or cosmic principle he draws upon, as\nwill be clearer below, a particular vocabulary and set of concepts that\nonly make sense when contextualized within this already\n existing\n discourse.[14]" ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Dialoghi d’amore and the Question of Language" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nTwo features that are new in Judah’s work and, thus, serve to\ndifferentiate his thought from that of his Jewish and Islamic\npredecessors are: (1) his almost complete lack of concern with the\nvenerable antagonism between faith and reason, and (2) his interest in\nelucidating the concomitant intersection between Greek myth and\nJudaism.", "\n\nThe tension between faith and reason had been at the heart of\nmedieval Jewish philosophy. This became especially pronounced in\npost-Maimonidean philosophy, which witnessed the radicalization of a\nnumber of principles (e.g., eternality of the universe, denial of\nbodily resurrection), and which threatened to undermine traditional\nreligious belief. This led to a Kulturkampf between\nthose who thought that non-Jewish learning (i.e., philosophy) had a\nvalid role to play in the Jewish curriculum versus those who claimed\nthat such “foreign” works led to apostasy. The\nreverberations of these conflicts, known collectively as the\n“Maimonidean controversies,” were severe.", "\n\nThe antagonism between faith and reason is immediately palpable in\nthe thought of Judah’s father, who constantly tried to uphold\ntraditional Jewish belief against what he considered to be the\nonslaught of philosophical radicalism. Yet, in the thought of\nJudah this “conflict” between the hitherto venerable\nantagonists virtually disappears. The question we have to ask,\nthen, is why? The most likely reason is to be located in the\nnotion of sophia perennis, which played an important role in\nthe thought of Florentine humanists. According to this doctrine,\nthere exists a unity to all knowledge irrespective of its source. \nAs a result, the rationalism of philosophy could quite easily be\nreconciled with that of revelation because both were regarded as\narticulating the same truth. Evidence of this may be seen in\nJudah’s frequent citation of biblical passages to support\nphilosophical principles and vice versa. Furthermore, because\nJudah is primarily unconcerned with the antagonism between faith and\nreason, he becomes one of the first Jewish philosophers to ignore\nesotericism (viz., that philosophical truths must be kept from\nthe unenlightened) as a philosophical principle. For him,\ntraditional esoteric topics, such as metaphysics, now become part and\nparcel of the beautiful and dramatic unfolding of God’s beauty in\nthe universe, and such topics are open to all (including women, as the\ncharacter of Sophia demonstrates).", "\n\nFurther evidence of Judah’s use of the concept of sophia\nperennis may be witnessed in his orientation towards ancient Greek\nmyth. The “rediscovery” of ancient Greek and Roman\nliterature was one of the hallmarks of the Renaissance, and in the\nthought of Judah we certainly see this, only now with a distinctly\nJewish “twist.” On one level, he wants to show that there\nexists a fundamental identity between Greek myth and the teachings of\nthe Torah. Yet, on a deeper level he wants to argue that the\nGreeks ultimately derived their teachings from the ancient Israelites\nand subsequently corrupted\n them.[15]\n For instance, Judah argues that Plato studied among\nthe ancient Israelites in\n Egypt,[16]\n and that Plato’s myth of the Androgyne, found\nin the Symposium, is actually a Greek plagiarism of a Jewish\nsource:", "\n\n\n\nSophia: The story is beautiful and ornate (la favola è\nbella e ornata), and it is impossible not to believe that it\nsignifies some philosophical beauty (bella filosofia), more\nespecially since it was composed by Plato himself, in the\nSymposium, in the name of Aristophanes. Tell me,\ntherefore, Philo what is the allegory?\n\n\n\nPhilo: The myth was handed down by earlier writers than the\nGreeks—in the sacred writings of Moses, concerning the creation\nof the first human parents, Adam and Eve…it was from [Moses]\nthat Plato took his myth, amplifying and polishing it after Greek\noratory, thus giving a confused account of Hebrew matters (facendo\nin questo una mescolanza inordinate de le cose\nebraiche).[17]\n", "\n\nJudah seeks to accomplish at least two things with passages such as\nthis. First, he claims, polemically, that the Jewish tradition,\nespecially its mythopoeic tradition, is the source of all subsequent\nliterary and philosophical streams of western civilization. Secondly\n(and this is less evident in the above passage than in other ones), he\ntries to wrest Christian-centric interpretations of biblical passages\n(e.g., the Garden of Eden and the concept of original sin), including\nthose offered by thinkers such as Ficino and Pico della\n Mirandola,[18]\n away \nfrom what he considers to be the original intentionality of the\ntext. Rather, he claims that the Jewish version or interpretation of\nsuch texts is actually more in keeping with the spirit of the\nRenaissance than those offered by Christians. The corollary of this is\nthat any individual, Jewish or Gentile, should quite easily be able to\naccept equally the truths of Judaism and those of\n philosophy.[19]" ], "section_title": "2. Faith, Reason, and Myth", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn the thought of Judah Abrabanel, the concepts of beauty\n(bellezza) and love (amore) become technical terms\nthrough which he examines virtually every traditional philosophical\nissue. Frequently, however, his discussion of one of these terms\nis predicated on the existence of the other; as a result, beauty and\nlove are inseparable in the Dialoghi, undoubtedly mirroring\nJudah’s understanding of the way in which these two principles\noperate in the universe. The intimate relationship between these\ntwo principles may be witnessed in his definition of beauty as that\n“which delights the mind that recognizes it and moves it to\nlove” (dilettando l’animo col suo conoscimento, il\nmuove ad \n amare).[20]\n Without Beauty, in other words, the intellect is\nunable to desire something outside of itself and, thus, it is\neffectively unable to cognize. Judah subsequently argues that the lower\nsenses (i.e., taste, smell or touch) cannot grasp Beauty; only the\nhigher senses (e.g., sight and hearing) can—in addition, of\ncourse, to the imagination and the\n intellect.[21] \n Moreover, since Beauty is\nmirrored throughout the universe, physical objects (notes, melodies,\netc.) both participate in and point the way towards this incorporeal\nBeauty:", "\n\nBeauty is only found in the objects of sight (oggetti del\nviso), such as beautiful forms and shapes and beautiful pictures,\nthe perfect symmetry of the parts with the whole, well-proportioned\nlimbs, beautiful colors and clear light, the sun, the moon and the\nstars, and the heavens in all their splendor. This grace exists\nin objects of sight by reason of their spiritual nature, and it is the\ncustom to enter through the clear and spiritual eyes, to delight our\nsoul and move it to a love of such an object; and this is what it is\nthat we call beauty. It is also found in objects of hearing, such\nas beautiful oratory, voices, speech, song music, consonance,\nproportion and harmony. For in the spiritual nature of these\nthings is found grace which moves the soul to delight and to love\nthrough the medium of the spiritual sense of hearing. Thus grace\nand beauty are found among beautiful things that are endowed with a\nspiritual nature (sensi \n spirituali).[22]", "\n\nBased on this and other passages, Judah argues that it is primarily\nby means of the beauty of created things that the individual is able to\napprehend and move towards incorporeal or spiritual Beauty. Love\nis what is ultimately responsible for directing the soul and the\nintellect of the individual to increasingly spiritual matters." ], "section_title": "3. Beauty and Love", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Philosophy of Beauty", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nWe witness the further departure of Judah’s thought from that\nof his predecessors when we examine his discussion of rhetoric and\naesthetics. Medieval Aristotelians tended to locate rhetoric in\nthe trivium (which also included logic and dialectic), and,\nthus, as propaedeutic to “higher” sciences such as\nmetaphysics. In the Renaissance, however, eloquence was equated\nwith wisdom, and the good rhetorician had to be proficient in all\nbranches of human knowledge. This led many Jewish Renaissance\nthinkers to examine not only the classical authors (e.g., Cicero and\nQuintilian), but also to mine the Bible for its use of language and\nstyle. Whereas Maimonides and other Jewish Aristotelians had been\ninterested in biblical rhetoric as a means to reproduce imaginative\nrepresentations of philosophical truths to those unlearned in\nphilosophy, Renaissance thinkers held that rhetoric was the art form\npar excellence, one that enabled the individual to command\nrespect in public\n life.[23]", "\n\nFurthermore, following Maimonides (e.g., Guide I.2), many\nmedieval thinkers envisaged beauty as contingent upon consensus and not\na matter of the intellectual faculty. In the Renaissance, by\ncontrast, beauty was elevated to an ideal that, inter alia,\nmoved the intellect, by means of desire, to either perfect that which\nexists below it or to be perfected by that above. This principle\nwas subsequently shared by philosophers, poets, and visual artists,\nand, quite frequently, there existed a fluid line separating these\nprofessions." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 The Elevation of Rhetoric, Aesthetics, and the Imagination" }, { "content": [ "\n\nAlthough there exists an intimate connection between sensual and\ncosmic beauty it is by means of the latter that Judah frames his\ndiscussion of cosmology, ontology, and psychology. Beauty, to\nreiterate, is what inspires love and desire, and thereby connects all\nlevels of the universe into an interlocking and organic relationship.\nThe result is that everything, both sensual and intelligible, has the\npotential to image and reflect God’s beauty.", "\n\nJudah’s cosmology is a case in point. In the\nDialoghi he presents two distinct accounts of the origin of\nthe universe. This issue—viz., was the universe\ncreated or is it eternal—was one of the touchstones in the\ndebate not only between philosophers and non-philosophers, but also\namong philosophers. At stake in these debates was God’s\nomnipotence and omniscience: If the world was created, then clearly God\nis transcendent to the world as both its Creator and Sustainer; if not,\nthen God’s power to act is potentially curtailed by another\nprinciple’s eternality. In his discussion of these\nmatters, Judah adopts two models: one based on Islamicate Neoplatonism\nand the other on the Plotinian triad.", "\n\nAccording to the first model, Judah argues—citing Ghazali,\nAvicenna and Maimonides—that God in His complete simplicity and\n“by the love of His infinite beauty produces out of Himself alone\nthe first intelligence and mover of the first heaven” (con\nl’amore de la sua immense bellezza immediate da sé sola la\nprima intelligenzia movtrice del primo cielo \n produce).[25] \n The first\nintelligence, in turn, contemplates (1) the beauty of its cause to\nproduce the second intellect, and (2) its own beauty to produce the\nfirst heavenly sphere. This theory of emanation, based on the\nlove of\n beauty,[26]\n pervades the entire universe (both supra- and sub-lunar). The\nActive Intellect, the lowest of the ten heavenly intellects and\nassociated with the sphere of the moon, becomes the intellect of the\ncorporeal world. By contemplating its own beauty it produces the\nforms found in this world, and in contemplating the beauty of its\ncause, it produces human intellects. Following this, Judah offers\na Plotinian account based on a celestial\n triad.[27] \n He now distinguishes between\nthree types of beauty that pervade the cosmos. The first is God\nqua the Source of beauty (l’attore di\nbellezza), the second is beauty itself (bellezza; i.e.,\nintelligible beauty), and the third is the physical universe produced\nby this idea in the intellect of God (il participante di\n bellezza).[28]", "\n\nJudah subsequently uses the latter model, combined with kabbalistic\nembellishment, to interpret the first creation account in Genesis,\nwhere the physical world is now described as the offspring between\nGod, the male principle, and intelligible beauty, now personified as a\n female.[29]\n Corporeal\nbeauty, according to this model, becomes the primogeniture of\nGod’s love for His female consort, wisdom. Since this\nphysical world is intimately connected to God, it cannot be\nnegated. Rather, this world becomes necessary, and this is a\nleitmotiv that runs throughout the work, for humans to make physical\nbeauty “spiritual in our\n intellect.”[30] \n One must, in other words,\norientate oneself towards sensible beauty in such a manner that one\nreverses the ontological chain." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Cosmology and Metaphysics" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe above discussion is directly related to the way in which\nJudah’s envisages both psychology and prophecy. According\nto him, the five external senses divide into (1) those that are\nprimarily material (materiali): touch (tatto), taste\n(gusto), and smell (odorato); and (2) those that are\nincreasingly spiritual (spirituali): hearing (per\nl’audito) and sight (per \n l’occhi).[31] \n It seems that only\nthe latter are able to penetrate behind the purely physical so as to\nabstract the spiritual from the corporeal. Hearing, intimately\nconnected to the Renaissance ideal of rhetoric, consists of the ability\nto discern “fine speeches, excellent reasoning, beautiful verses,\nsweet music, and beautiful and harmonious\n melodies.”[32] \n Sight, ranked just\nabove the faculty of hearing, owing to the primacy that Judah puts on\nvision, deals with “beautiful colors, regular patterns, and light\nin all its varied\n splendor.”[33] \n The senses, thus, function hierarchically as a\nprolegomenon to any form of higher knowledge, with the imagination\nforming the threshold (mezzo) between the senses and the\nintellect.", "\n\nCentral to the unfolding argument in the Dialoghi is the\nconcept of ocular power (forza oculare). In the first\ndialogue, Judah describes two modes of apprehending spiritual\nmatters. The first is through the faculty of sight and the second\nthrough the\n intellect.[34] \n For the eye, like the intellect, is illumined\nby means of light, thereby establishing a relationship between the eye,\nthe object seen, and the space that separates\n them.[35] \n Just as the sun supplies light to the eye, the divine intellect\nillumines the human intellect during the act of intellection. It is\nlight, then, that enables us to “comprehend all the beautiful\nshining objects of the corporeal\n world.”[36]\n Sight becomes the model by which we engage the universe: it is what\nmakes knowledge possible since it is only through vision of tangible\nparticulars that we acquire knowledge of intelligibles.", "\n\nJudah subsequently distinguishes between three types of\nvision. The highest type is that of God’s visual\napprehension of himself; following this is that associated with the\nangelic world, which sees God directly though not on equal terms;\nfinally, there is human vision, which is the weakest of the three types\nand can only visualize the divine\n indirectly.[37] \n The best \nthat most humans can do in this world is to obtain knowledge\nof incorporeal essences through corporeal particulars. Judah does\nadmit, though, that some special individuals are able to unite with\nthe angelic world, which he describes as the Agent Intellect\n(intelleto agente). When such unification\n(copulare) occurs, the individual “sees and desires\ndivine beauty as in a crystal or a clear mirror, but not\ndirectly” (vede e desia la bellezza divine come in uno mezzo\ncristiallino, o sia chiaro specchio, ma non in se stessa\n immediate).[38] \n Judah refers to this act as prophecy. \nLike Maimonides, Judah claims that Moses did not prophesy through the\nimagination, but only through the intellect, which he nevertheless\ndescribes in highly visual terms as beholding “the most beautiful\nfigure of God” (la bellissima figura di \n Dio).[39]", "\n\nIn the third dialogue, Abrabanel further divides the human into a\ntripartite structure consisting of the body (il corpo), the\nsoul (l’anima), and the intellect\n (l’intelletto).[40] \n The soul, which I have interpreted as the\nimaginative faculty because of the properties assigned to\n it,[41]\n is once again the intermediary (mezzo) between the body (and\nthe senses) and the\n intellect.[42]\n Although he does not come right out and define the functioning of the\nsoul in any detail, he does claim that it is indispensable to the\nproper working of the body and the intellect. Moreover, it is\nthis faculty that is in constant danger of being corrupted by unhealthy\ncorporeal desire and, most importantly for the present, it is\nultimately responsible for translating the corporeal into the\nincorporeal and vice versa. This soul, in turn,", "\n\n\nhas two faces (due faccie) , like those of the moon turned\ntowards the sun and the earth respectively, the one being turned\ntowards the intellect above it, and the other toward the body\nbelow. The first face looking towards the intellect is the\nunderstanding with which the soul reasons of universals and spiritual\nknowledge, extracting the forms and intellectual essences from\nparticular and sensible bodies (estraendo le forme ed essenzie\nintellettuali da li particulari e sensibili corpi)…the\nsecond face turned towards the body is sense, which is particular\nknowledge of corporeal things known … These two faces have\ncontrary or opposed notions; and as our soul with its upper face or\nunderstanding makes the corporeal incorporeal (l’incorporeo\nal corporeo), so the lower face, or sensible cognition,\napproaching the objects of sense and mingling with them, draws the\nincorporeal to the\n corporeal.[43]\n" ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Psychology and Prophecy" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "5. Philosophy of Love", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nThe traditional philosophical notion of love, going back at least to\nthe time of Plato, is that love results from the imperfection and\nprivation of that which loves. One loves, in other words, what\none does not possess (see, e.g., Plato, Symposium\n 200a-201e).[44] Accordingly,\n that which is imperfect loves that\nwhich is perfect, and, that which is perfect (i.e., God) neither loves\nnor desires. Aristotle likewise claimed that that which is less\nperfect (e.g., slaves, children, wives and ruled) should have more love\nfor that which is more perfect (e.g., freeborn, parents, husbands, and\nrulers) than vice versa. The First Cause, then, is loved\nbut does not love. This discussion would predominate from Late\nAntiquity to the Middle Ages.", "\n\nJudah’s theory of love, by contrast, was intimately connected\nto the literary interests of humanism and the aesthetic sensibilities\nof Renaissance\n artists.[45] \n As a consequence, Judah faults previous\nthinkers for (1) not ascribing love to God and (2) confining their\ndiscussion of love primarily to that between humans, thereby ignoring\nthe dynamic role of God in relationships based on this principle. \nUsing the name of Plato as a metonym for other philosophers, he is\ncritical of this approach:", "\n\n\nPlato in his Symposium discusses only the kind of love that\nis found in men, which has its final cause in the lover but not in the\nbeloved (terminato ne l’amante ma non ne l’amato),\nfor this kind mainly is called love, since that which ends in the loved\none is called friendship and benevolence (ché quel che si\ntermina ne l’amato si chiama amicizia e\nbenivolenzia). He rightly defines this love as a desire of\nbeauty (desiderio di bellezza). He says that such love\nis not found in God, because that which desires beauty and\ndoesn’t have it is not beautiful, and God, who is the highest\nbeauty, does not lack beauty nor can he desire it, whence he cannot\nhave love, that is, of such a kind (Tale amore dice che non si\ntruova in Dio, però che quel che desia bellezza non\nl’ha né è bello, e a Dio, che è sommo\nbello, non gli manca bellezza né la può desiare,\nonde non può avere amore, cioè di tal\n sorte).[46]\n", "\n\nJudah seeks to provide a corrective to this and, in the process,\noffer what he considers to be a more comprehensive theory of\nlove. In particular, he intertwines love and beauty such that the\nlover of beauty seeks to unite with the source of beauty, something\nthat the lover subsequently seeks to reproduce himself (the lover is\nalways male, according to Judah because it is responsible for\nimpregnating the passive and receptive female principle). This\ncan take the form of God’s creation of the universe, the\nartist’s creation of a work of art, and the philosopher’s\ncomposition of a pleasing work of philosophy. In his discussion\nof love, Judah also departs from other Renaissance thinkers. Whereas\nFicino had equated human love with sensual love between humans, Judah,\ndrawing upon Maimonidean precedents, resignifies human love as, on one\nlevel, that which the intellect has for\n God.[47]", "\n\nPerhaps, Judah’s biggest departure from earlier thinkers is\nhis ascription of love to God. Here, however, his discussion is\nnot entirely new; rather, he picks up on a number of issues discussed\nin the work of Hasdai Crescas (ca. 1340–ca. 1410), the important critic\nof Aristotelianism and Maimonideanism. For Crescas, breaking from\nboth the Platonic and Aristotelian positions, love need not be\nassociated with privation or imperfection:", "\n\n\nInasmuch as it is known that God, may He be blessed, is the sources\nand fountain of all perfection, and in virtue of his perfection, which\nis His essence, He loves the good, as may be seen from His actions in\nbringing into existence the entire universe, sustaining it perpetually,\nand continuously creating it anew, and all be means of His simple will,\nit must necessarily be that the love of the good is an essential\nproperty of perfection. It follows from this that the greater\nperfection [of the lover] the greater will be the love and the pleasure\nin the\n desire.[48]\n", "\n\nLove, for Crescas, is tantamount to God’s creative\nactivity. In the third book of the Dialoghi Judah picks\nup this theme:", "\n\n\nDivine Love (L’amor divino) is the inclination\n(tendenzia) of God’s most beautiful wisdom toward the\nlikeness of His own beauty, to wit, the universe created by Him,\ntogether with its return to union with His supreme wisdom; and His\npleasure is the perfect union of His image with Himself (la\nperfetta unione di sua immagine in se stesso), and of His\ncreated universe with Himself as\n Creator.[49]\n", "\n\nJudah’s subsequent discussion of love, however, departs\nsignificantly from either Crescas or other Renaissance thinkers. \nThis is especially the case when it comes to Judah’s refusal to\nabnegate sensual love. Rather, he celebrates such love as the\ngateway to cosmic or spiritual love. Sensual love, for him,\nbecomes that which orientates the individual towards the Divine. \nUnlike Crescas, however, Judah does not reject the Maimonidean concept\nof God as divine intellect. Furthermore, Judah’s discussion\nfinds no homolog in the thought of Crescas or even Maimonides when it\ncomes to the concept of God’s beauty." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Judah’s Recasting of Love as a Philosophical Principle" }, { "content": [ "\n\nNear the end of the third dialogue, Judah introduces the\n“circle of love,” il circulo degli amari, as\nfollows:", "\n\n\nThe circle of all things (il circulo di tutte) begins from\ntheir first origin, and passing successively through each thing in\nturn, returns to its first origin as to its ultimate end (ultimo\nfine), thus containing every degree of being in its circular form\n(comprendendo tutti li gradi de le cose a modo circulare), so\nthat the point which is the beginning also comes to be the end. \nThis circle has two halves (due mezzi), the first from the\nbeginning to the point most distant from it, the mid-point, and the\nsecond from this mid-point to the beginning\n again.[50]\n", "\n\nThis circle, in other words, begins with the divine, whose love\ncreates and sustains the universe: “each degree of being with\npaternal love procreates its immediate inferior, imparting its being or\npaternal beauty to it, although in a lesser degree as is only\n fitting.”[51]\n This emanative framework, the love of that which is more beautiful for\nthat which is less beautiful, comprises the first half of the\ncircle. Every thing in the universe exists on a hierarchical\nchain of being, from the pure actuality of the divine to the pure\npotentiality of prime matter. Just as the superior desires the\nperfection of the inferior, the inferior desires to unite with the\nsuperior. The first half of the circle spans from God to utter\nchaos, whereas, the second half of this circle works in reverse. \nIt is the love of the inferior for the superior, predicated on the\nformer’s privation and subsequent desire to unite with the\nsuperior." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 “The Circle of Love” (il circulo degli amari)" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe telos of Judah’s system occurs when the intellect\nis “absorbed in the science of the Divine and of things\nabstracted from matter, rejoicing in and becoming enamored of the\nhighest grace and beauty which is in the creator and artificer of all\nthings, so that it attains its ultimate\n happiness.”[52] \n Within this\ncontext, Judah employs a well-known and well-used metaphor in his\ndiscussion of the imaginative faculty, that of the mirror\n (specchio).[53]\n In the medieval Islamicate philosophical tradition,\nfollowing Plotinus, the mirror (Ar. mir’â), is\nfrequently used as an image for the perfected soul, at whose vanguard\nresides the\n intellect.[54] \n Just as the mirror reflects what is placed in\nfront of it, the soul, in a state of perfection, reflects the higher\nprinciples of the universe. Early on in the Dialoghi,\nPhilo asks Sophia, “Do you not see how the form of man is\nimpressed on and received by a mirror, not as a complete human being,\nbut within the limits of the mirror’s powers and capabilities,\nwhich reflect the figure only and not the\n essence.”[55] \n Later, in dialogue\nthree, he argues that it is through our own “intellectual\nmirror” that we apprehend the divine:", "\n\n\nIt is enough for our intellectual mirror (specchio\nintellettuale) to receive and image (figurare) the\ninfinite divine essence (l’immensa essenzia divina)\naccording to the capacity of its intellectual nature; though there is a\nmeasureless gulf fixed between them, so far does its nature fall short\nof that of the object of its\n understanding.[56]\n", "\n\nBy corporealizing the spiritual and spiritualizing the\ncorporeal, the intellect, in tandem with the imagination, enables\nindividuals to gain knowledge of the divine world. Unlike\nMaimonides and other medieval Aristotelians who equated the natural\nworld with impermanence and evil, Judah argues that this world is the\nnatural receptacle of heavenly powers: “Hence earth is the proper\nand regular consort of heaven, whereof the other elements are but\nparamours. For it is upon the earth that heaven begets all on the\ngreater part of its\n progeny.”[57] \n In an interesting passage, Judah, like\nMaimonides before him, compares matter to a\n harlot.[58] \n Yet, unlike Maimonides, he\nreaches a radically different conclusion. For Judah, “it is\nthis adulterous love that beautifies the lower world with such wondrous\nvariety of the fair-formed\n things.”[59] \n In keeping with Judah’s\nclaim that “the lower can be found in the\n higher,”[60]\n this world becomes one\ngigantic mirror that reflects spiritual beauty, and in which one can\ngrasp divine\n intelligibles.[61] \n Just as Philo is enthralled by Sophia’s\nbeauty, the individual, upon contemplating physical objects that are\nbeautiful, apprehends the divine:", "\n\n\n\nGod has implanted His image and likeness in His creatures through\nthe finite beauty imparted to them from His surpassing beauty. \nAnd the image of the infinite must be finite, otherwise it would not be\na copy, but that of which it is the image. The infinite beauty of\nthe Creator is depicted and reflected in finite created beauty like a\nbeautiful face in a mirror and although the image is not commensurate\nwith its divine pattern, nonetheless it will be its copy, portrait, and\ntrue likeness (Si depinge e immagina la bellezza infinita del\ncreatore ne la bellezza finita creata come una bella figura in uno\nspecchio: non però commisura l’immagine il divino\nimmaginato, ma bene gli sará simulacro similitudine e\n immagine).[62]\n", "\n\nIt is ultimately the love of beauty in the soul of the individual,\ncombined with the cognizance that one lacks it in its entirety, that\nmoves not only the soul of the individual, but also the entire\ncosmos. Virtuous love, which Philo answers in response to\nSophia’s fourth question concerning the parents of love, is the\nhighest form of love and, significantly, one can have this for either\ncorporeal or spiritual things. Indeed, Philo intimates that such\nvirtuous love can only emerge from sensible\n phenomena:[63]", "\n\nWhen [the soul] perceives a beautiful person whose beauty is in\nharmony with itself, it recognizes in and through this beauty, divine\nbeauty, in the image of which this person is also\n made.[64]", "\n\nThe goal of Judah’s system is to ascend through this\nhierarchy, that gateway to which is the sensual enjoyment that one\nderives from physical objects. Only after this can one appreciate\nspiritual beauty, an appreciation of which culminates in basking in the\ndivine presence. Judah discusses this process in the following\nmanner:", "\n\n\nWe ought principally to love the higher forms of beauty separated\nfrom formless matter and gross corporeality (amiamo le grandi\nbellezze separate da la deforme material e brutto corpe)\n, such as the virtues and the sciences, which are ever beautiful\nand devoid of all ugliness and defect. Here again we may ascend\nthrough a hierarchy of beauty from the lesser to the greater\n(ascendiamo per le minori a le maggiori bellezze) and from the\npure to the purest leading to the knowledge and love, not only of the\nmost beautiful intelligences, souls and motors of the heavenly bodies,\nbut also of the highest beauty and of the supremely beautiful, the\ngiver of all beauty, life, intelligence and being. We may scale\nthis ladder only when we put away earthly garments and material\naffection (potremo fare quando noi abbandonaremo le vesti corporee\ne le passioni \n materiali)…[65]\n", "\n\nEven though the corporeal was, at the outset of this journey,\nindispensable; the higher one moves up the hierarchy the less important\nthe material becomes. As far as the individual is concerned, the\nhighest felicity resides in the union with God, which the Italian\ndescribes erotically as felice coppulativa:", "\n\n\n\nBecause the love of the human soul is twofold, it is directed not\nonly towards the beauty of the intellect, but also towards the image of\nthat beauty in the body. It happens that at times the love of\nintellectual beauty is so strong that it draws the soul to cast off all\naffection for the body; thus the body and soul in man fall apart, and\nthere follows the joyful death in union with the divine (la morte\nfelice \n coppulativa).[66]\n" ], "section_title": "6. The End of Human Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nOne of the most surprising features concerning the reception history\nof the Dialoghi is that a work of Jewish philosophy would\nsubsequently become a European bestseller among non-Jews. In the\nyears immediately following its Italian publication, the\nDialoghi was translated into virtually every European\nvernacular. This popularity might be the result of the prominent\nrole that grace (grazia) plays in the Dialoghi or the\nfact that Judah frequently stresses the interlocking relationship\nbetween the corporeal and the spiritual, something that seems to have\nresonated with contemporaneous Christian treatments of the incarnation\nin literary\n fiction.[67]", "\n\nThis popularity of the work has led some to posit that Judah\nAbrabanel’s thought is epigonic, responsible for disseminating\nthe thought of “great thinkers” such as Marsilio Ficino\n(1433–1499) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) to a wider\naudience. This essay’s point of departure, however, has\nbeen that the thought of Judah Abrabanel, while dependent upon certain\nfeatures of these earlier thinkers, nevertheless makes significant\ndepartures from them in terms of his construction of an overarching\nsystem that revolves around the twin principles of love and beauty", "\n\nParadoxically, the initial response of Jews to the Dialoghi\nwas for the most part negative. Some of the earliest criticisms,\nespecially those of Saul ha-Kohen Ashkenazi, fault Judah with\nrationalizing kabbalistic principles. Ashkenazi, in a letter to\nDon Isaac Abrabanel, criticizes Judah for his lack of philosophical\nesotericism, and for spending too much time on linguistic matters, such\nas riddles and eloquence. Such antagonism reflects the broader\ncontext of the Maimonidean controversies, in which philosophers sought\nto make philosophy known to a broader Jewish public often by means of\ndramatic dialogues or philosophical novels. Those opposed to the\nAristotelian-Maimonidean paradigm of philosophy often blamed such\ntreatises for weakening the faith of Jews by diminishing their\ncommitment to the halakhah (law) and, thus, making them more\nsusceptible to conversion. Despite such initial criticisms,\nhowever, subsequent generations stressed the interrelationship between\nPlatonism and kabbalah on the one hand, and philosophy and aesthetics\non the other. Notable individuals include Azariah de Rossi (d.\nca. 1578) and Judah Moscato (d. ca. 1594).", "\n\nThe actual influence that the Dialoghi would have on\nsubsequent thinkers is more difficult to judge. Essentially,\nJudah adopted certain trajectories of medieval cosmology and\npsychology, combined them with Renaissance notions of beauty, and\nthereby created a full-blown aesthetics of Judaism. This led him\nto conceive of the universe as a living, dynamic structure, in which\nall levels share in a symbiotic and organic relationship. Unlike\nmany of his medieval predecessors, he did not define this world, the\nworld of form and matter, in terms of privation or its distance from\nthe divine. On the contrary, he envisages this world as the arena\nwherein individuals encounter, through sensual particulars, the beauty\nand love of the divine. Abrabanel’s emphasis, like\nthat of many of his Renaissance contemporaries, on aesthetics and the\nphenomenal world would eventually become an important dimension of\n16th- and 17th -century natural philosophy. We do know, for\nexample, that Baruch Spinoza had a copy of the Dialoghi in his\nlibrary." ], "section_title": "7. Reception History and Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Abrabanel, Judah (Ebreo, Leone). Dialoghi d’amore. Ed.\nSantino Caramella. Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1929.", "–––. Dialoghi d’amore. Tradutione e\nintroduzione ebraica di Menachem Dorman. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute,\n1983.", "–––. Dialogos de amor. Leao Hebreu.\nTraduzido por Giacinto Manuppella. Testo italiano e versao portuguesa,\nnote e documenti. 2 vols. Lisboa: Instituto Nacional de Investigacao\nCientifica, 1983.", "–––. Dialogues d’amour. Trans. into\nFrench attributed to Pontus de Tyard. Edited by T. Anthony Perry,\nChapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974.", "–––. The Philosophy of\nLove. Trans. into English by F. Friedeberg-Seeley and Jean\nH. Barnes and introduction by Cecil Roth. London: Soncino Press,\n1937.", "–––. Dialogues of Love. Trans into\nEnglish by Damian Bacich and Rossella Pescatori. Toronto: University\nof Toronto Press, 2009.", "Altmann, Alexander. 1983. “‘Ars Rhetorica’ as\nReflected in Some Jewish Figures of the Italian Renaissance.”\nJewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century, Bernard Dov\nCooperman (ed.), 1–22. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Ariani, Marco. 1984. Imago fabulosa: mito e allegoria nei “Dialoghi\nD’Amore” di Leone Ebreo. Roma: Bulzoni.", "Bonfil, Robert. 1984. “The Historian’s Perception of the\nJews in the Italian Renaissance: Towards a Reappraisal.”\nRevue des etudes juives, 143: 59–82.", "Burckhardt, Jacob. 1971. La Cultura del Renacimiento en Italia.\nTrad. de J. Ardal. Barcelona: Obras Maestras.", "Damiens, Suzanne. 1971. Amour et intellect chez Leon\nI´Hébreu. Toulouse: Edouard Privat Editeur.", "Davidson, Herbert. 1983. “Medieval Jewish\nPhilosophy in the Sixteenth Century.” Jewish Thought in the\nSixteenth Century. Bernard Dov Cooperman (ed.),\n106–144. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Dorman, Menahem, and Zeev Levy, eds. 1985. The Philosophy of Leone\nEbreo: Four Lectures (Hebrew). Haifa: HaKibbutz Hameuchad.", "Feldman, Seymour. 2003. Philosophy in a Time of Crisis: Don Isaac\nAbravanel, Defender of the Faith. London:\nRoutledge Curzon.", "Garvin, Barbara. 2001. “The Language of Leone Ebreo’s Dialoghi\nd’amorem.” Italia, 13–15: 181–210.", "Gershenzon, Shoshanna. 2000. “Myth and Scripture: the\nDialoghi d’Amore of Leone Ebreo,” in A Crown\nfor a King, 125–145.", "–––. 1992. “The Circle Metaphor on Leone Ebreo’s\n‘Dialoghi d’amore’”.\nDaat, 29: 5–17.", "Guidi, Angela. 2011. Amour et Sagesse. Les Dialogues d’amour\nde Juda Abravanel dans la tradition salomonienne. Leiden:\nBrill.", "Harari, David. 1988. “The Traces of the Missing Fourth Dialogue on\nLove by Judah Abravanel Known as Leone Ebreo”\n(Hebrew). Italia, 7(1–2): 93–155.", "Hughes, Aaron W. 2004. “Transforming the Maimonidean\nImagination: Aesthetics in the Renaissance Thought of Judah\nAbravanel.”\nHarvard Theological Review, 97(4): 461–484.", "–––. 2006. “Epigone, Innovator, or\nApologist: The Case of Judah Abravanel,” in The Dynamics of\nJewish Epigonism, Shlomo Berger and Irene Zweip (eds.),\n109–125. Studia Rosenthalia.", "–––. 2008. The Art of Dialogue in Medieval Jewish\nPhilosophy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.", "–––. 2012. “Translation and the Invention of\nRenaissance Jewish Culture: The Case of Judah Messer Leon and Judah\nAbravanel,” in The Hebrew Bible in Fifteenth-Century Spain:\nExegesis, Literature, Philosophy, and the Arts, Jonathan Decter\nand Arturo Prats (eds.), Leiden: Brill, 245–266.", "Idel, Moshe. 1983. “The Magic and Neoplatonic Interpretation of\nthe Kabbalah,” in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth\nCentury, Bernard Dov Cooperman (ed.), 186–242. Cambridge, MA: Harvard\nUniversity Press.", "–––. 1978. “The Sources of the Circle Images in\nthe Dialoghi D’amore,” Iyyun, 28:\n156–166.", "Ivry, Alfred. 1983. “Remnants of Jewish Averroism in the\nRenaissance,” in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth\nCentury, Bernard Dov Cooperman (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard\nUniversity Press, 243–265.", "Kodera, Sergius. 1995. Filone und Sofia in Leone Ebreos Dialoghi\nd’amore: Platonische Liebesphilosophie der Renaissance und\nJudentum. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.", "Kristeller, Paul O. 1985. “Jewish Contributions to Italian\nRenaissance Culture.” Italia, 4(1): 7–20.", "–––. 1966. Renaissance Philosophy and the Medieval\nTraditions. Pennsylvania: The Archabbey Press.", "Lawee, Eric. 2001. Isaac Abarbanel’s Stance Toward Tradition:\nDefense, Dissent, and Dialogue. Albany: State\nUniversity of New York Press.", "Lesley, Arthur M. 1992. “The Place of the Dialoghi d’Amore\nin Contemporaneous Jewish Thought,” in Essential Papers on Jewish\nCulture in Renaissance and Baroque Italy, David B. Ruderman, (ed.), 170–188. New York: New York University Press.", "–––. 1993. “Proverbs, Figures and Riddles: The\nDialogues of Love as a Hebrew Humanist Composition.”\nMidrashic Imagination: Jewish Exegesis, Thought, and History. Ed\nMichael Fishbane, 204–225. Albany: State University of New York\nPress.", "Levy, Ze´ev. 1993. “On the Concept of Beauty in the\nPhilosophy of Yehudah Abrabanel,” in New Horizons in\nSephardic Studies, Yehida K. Stillman and George K. Zuker (eds.),\n37–44. Albany: State University of New York Press.", "Malard, Constance. 2020. Un Banquet aristotélicien: la\nrenaissance de l’aristotélisme dans les Dialogues d’Amour\nde Léon l’Hébreu (env. 1465–1525). Thèse de\ndoctorat: Philosophie, textes et savoirs: Université Paris sciences\net lettres.\n", "Matula, Jozef. 2020. Leone Ebreo: Renesanc̆ný dialóg medzi láskou a múdrost’ou. Olomouc: Pr̆irozený svĕt.", "Milburn, Alan Ray. 1937. “Leone Ebreo and the\nRenaissance.” Isaac Abrabanel: Six Lectures, J.B. Trend\nand H. Loewe (eds.), 131–156. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Perry, Anthony T. 1980. Erotic Spirituality: The Integrative\nTradition From Leone Ebreo to John Donne. Alabama: University of\nAlabama Press. ", "Pflaum, Heinz. 1926. Die Idee der Liebe: Leone Ebreo: Zwei\nAbhandlungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie in der\nRenaissance. Tubingen: J.C.B.Mohr.", "Pines, Shlomo. 1983. “Medieval Doctrines in Renaissance\nGarb: Some Jewish and Arabic Sources of Leone Ebreo’s\nDoctrine.” Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century,\nBernard Dov Cooperman (ed.), 365–398. Cambridge, MA: Harvard\nUniversity Press.", "Price, A.W. 1997. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle.\nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "Ruderman, David B. 1983. The World of a Renaissance Jew: The Life\nand Thought of Abraham ben Mordechai Farissol.\nCincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press.", "–––. 1988. “Italian Renaissance and Jewish\nThought.” Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms, and\nLegacy, Albert Rabil, Jr. (ed.), vol.1,\n382–433. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.", "Sonne, Isaiah. 1934. Intorno alla vita di Leone Ebreo. Firenze:\nCivilta Moderna.", "Tirosh-Rothschild, Hava. 1990. “Jewish Culture in\nRenaissance Italy: A Methodological Survey,” Italia,\n9(1–2): 63–96.", "–––. 1997. “Jewish Philosophy on the Eve\nof Modernity,” in History of Jewish Philosophy, Daniel\nH. Frank and Oliver Leaman (eds.), 499–573. London and New York:\nRoutledge.", "Zimmels, Bernhard. 1886. Leo Hebraeus: Ein Judischer Philosoph der\nRenaissance: Sein Leben, Seine Werke und Seine Lehren. Breslau:\nWilhem Koebner.", "–––. 1892. Leone Hebreo, Neue Studien. Wien:\nn.p. ", "Zonta, Giusseppe. 1967. Trattati d’amore del Cinquecento. Bari\n: G. Laterza." ]	[ { "href": "../ficino/", "text": "Ficino, Marsilio" }, { "href": "../maimonides/", "text": "Maimonides" } ]
abstract-objects	Abstract Objects	First published Thu Jul 19, 2001; substantive revision Mon Aug 9, 2021	[ "\nOne doesn’t go far in the study of what there is without\nencountering the view that every entity falls into one of two\ncategories: concrete or abstract. The distinction is\nsupposed to be of fundamental significance for metaphysics (especially\nfor ontology), epistemology, and the philosophy of the formal sciences\n(especially for the philosophy of mathematics); it is also relevant\nfor analysis in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind,\nand the philosophy of the empirical sciences. This entry surveys (a)\nattempts to say how the distinction should be drawn and (b) some of\nmain theories of, and about, abstract objects." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 About the Expression ‘Object’", "1.2 About the Abstract/Concrete Distinction" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Historical Remarks", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 The Provenance of the Distinction", "2.2 An Initial Overview of the Contemporary Debate" ] }, { "content_title": "3. What is an Abstract Object?", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 The Way of Example and the Way of Primitivism", "3.2 The Way of Conflation", "3.3 The Way of Abstraction", "3.4 The Way of Abstraction Principles", "3.5 The Ways of Negation", "3.6 The Way of Encoding", "3.7 The Ways of Weakening Existence", "3.8 Eliminativism" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Further Reading", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe abstract/concrete distinction has a curious status in contemporary\nphilosophy. It is widely agreed that the ontological distinction is of\nfundamental importance, but as yet, there is no standard account of\nhow it should be drawn. There is a consensus about how to classify\ncertain paradigm cases. For example, it is usually acknowledged that\nnumbers and the other objects of pure mathematics, like pure sets, are\nabstract (if they exist), whereas rocks, trees, and human beings are\nconcrete. In everyday language, it is common to use expressions that\nrefer to concrete entities as well as those that apparently refer to\nabstractions such as democracy, happiness, motherhood, etc. Moreover,\nformulations of mathematical theories seem to appeal directly to\nabstract entities, and the use of mathematical expressions in the\nempirical sciences seems indispensable to the formulation of our best\nempirical theories (see Quine 1948; Putnam 1971; and the entry on\n indispensability arguments in the philosophy of mathematics).\n Finally, apparent reference to abstract entities such as sets,\nproperties, concepts, propositions, types, and possible worlds, among\nothers, is ubiquitous in different areas of philosophy.", "\nThough there is a pervasive appeal to abstract objects, philosophers\nhave nevertheless wondered whether they exist. The alternatives are:\nplatonism, which endorses their existence, and\nnominalism, which denies the existence of abstract objects\nacross the board. (See the entries on\n nominalism in metaphysics\n and\n platonism in metaphysics.)\n But the question of how to draw the distinction between abstract and\nconcrete objects is an open one: it is not clear how one should\ncharacterize these two categories nor is there a definite list of\nitems that fall under one or the other category (assuming neither is\nempty).", "\nThe first challenge, then, is to articulate the distinction, either by\ndefining the terms explicitly or by embedding them in a theory that\nmakes their connections to other important categories more explicit.\nIn the absence of such an account, the philosophical significance of\nthe contrast remains uncertain, for the attempt to classify things as\nabstract or concrete by appeal to intuition is often problematic. Is\nit clear that scientific theories (e.g., the general theory of\nrelativity), works of fiction (e.g., Dante’s Inferno),\nfictional characters (e.g., Bilbo Baggins) or conventional entities\n(e.g., the International Monetary Fund or the Spanish Constitution of\n1978) are abstract?", "\nIt should be stressed that there may not be one single\n“correct” way of explaining the abstract/concrete\ndistinction. Any plausible account will classify the paradigm cases in\nthe standard way or give reasons for proceeding otherwise, and any\ninteresting account will draw a clear and philosophically significant\nline in the domain of objects. Yet there may be many equally\ninteresting ways of accomplishing these two goals, and if we find\nourselves with two or more accounts that do the job rather well, there\nmay be no point in asking which corresponds to the real\nabstract/concrete distinction. This illustrates a general point: when\ntechnical terminology is introduced in philosophy by means of\nexamples, but without explicit definition or theoretical elaboration,\nthe resulting vocabulary is often vague or indeterminate in reference.\nIn such cases, it usually is pointless to seek a single correct\naccount. A philosopher may find herself asking questions like,\n‘What is idealism?’ or ‘What is a substance?’\nand treating these questions as difficult questions about the\nunderlying nature of a certain determinate philosophical category. A\nbetter approach may be to recognize that in many cases of this sort,\nwe simply have not made up our minds about how the term is to be\nunderstood, and that what we seek is not a precise account of what\nthis term already means, but rather a proposal for how it\nmight fruitfully be used for philosophical analysis. Anyone who\nbelieves that something in the vicinity of the abstract/concrete\ndistinction matters for philosophy would be well advised to approach\nthe project of explaining the distinction with this in mind.", "\nSo before we turn to the discussion of abstract objects in earnest, it\nwill help if we clarify how some of the key terms will be used in what\nfollows." ], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nFrege famously distinguished two mutually exclusive ontological\ndomains, functions and objects. According to his\nview, a function is an ‘incomplete’ entity that maps\narguments to values, and is denoted by an incomplete expression,\nwhereas an object is a ‘complete’ entity and can be\ndenoted by a singular term. Frege reduced properties and relations to\nfunctions and so these entities are not included among the objects.\nSome authors make use of Frege’s notion of ‘object’\nwhen discussing abstract objects (e.g., Hale 1987). But though\nFrege’s sense of ‘object’ is important, it is not\nthe only way to use the term. Other philosophers include properties\nand relations among the abstract objects. And when the background\ncontext for discussing objects is type theory, properties and\nrelations of higher type (e.g., properties of properties, and\nproperties of relations) may be all be considered\n‘objects’. This latter use of ‘object’ is\ninterchangeable with\n ‘entity.’[1]\n Throughout this entry, we will follow this last usage and treat the\nexpressions ‘object’ and ‘entity’ as having\nthe same meaning. (For further discussion, see the entry on\n objects.)" ], "subsection_title": "1.1 About the Expression ‘Object’" }, { "content": [ "\nThough we’ve spoken as if the abstract/concrete distinction must\nbe an exhaustive dichotomy, we should be open to the possibility that\nthe best sharpening of it will entail that some objects are neither\nabstract nor concrete. Holes and shadows, if they exist, do not\nclearly belong in either category; nor do ghosts, Cartesian minds,\nfictional\n characters,[2]\n immanent universals, or tropes. The main constraint on an account of\nthe distinction is that it draws a philosophically significant line\nthat classifies at least many of the standard examples in the standard\nways. It is not a constraint that everything be shoehorned into one\ncategory or the other.", "\nFinally, some philosophers see the main distinction not as between\nabstract and concrete objects but as between abstract objects and\nordinary objects, where the distinction is a modal one\n– ordinary objects are possibly concrete while abstract objects\n(like the number 1) couldn’t be concrete (Zalta 1983,\n1988). In any case, in the following discussion, we shall assume that\nthe abstract/concrete distinction is a division among existing\nobjects, and that any plausible explanation of the distinction should\naim to characterize a distinction among such objects." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 About the Abstract/Concrete Distinction" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Historical Remarks", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe contemporary distinction between abstract and concrete is not an\nancient one. Indeed, there is a strong case for the view that, despite\noccasional exceptions, it played no significant role in philosophy\nbefore the 20th century. The modern distinction bears some resemblance\nto Plato’s distinction between Forms and Sensibles. But\nPlato’s Forms were supposed to be causes par\nexcellence, whereas abstract objects are generally supposed to be\ncausally inert. The original\n‘abstract’/‘concrete’ distinction was a\ndistinction among words or terms. Traditional grammar distinguishes\nthe abstract noun ‘whiteness’ from the concrete noun\n‘white’ without implying that this linguistic contrast\ncorresponds to a metaphysical distinction in what these words stand\nfor. In the 17th century, this grammatical distinction was transposed\nto the domain of ideas. Locke speaks of the general idea of a triangle\nwhich is “neither Oblique nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral,\nEquicrural nor Scalenon [Scalene]; but all and none of these at\nonce,” remarking that even this idea is not among the most\n“abstract, comprehensive and difficult” (Essay,\nIV.vii.9). Locke’s conception of an abstract idea as one that is\nformed from concrete ideas by the omission of distinguishing detail\nwas immediately rejected by Berkeley and then by Hume. But even for\nLocke there was no suggestion that the distinction between abstract\nideas and concrete or particular ideas corresponds to a distinction\namong objects. “It is plain, …” Locke\nwrites, “that General and Universal, belong not to the real\nexistence of things; but are Inventions and Creatures of the\nUnderstanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs,\nwhether Words or Ideas” (III.iii.11).", "\nThe abstract/concrete distinction in its modern form is meant to mark\na line in the domain of objects or entities. So conceived, the\ndistinction becomes a central focus for philosophical discussion\nprimarily in the 20th century. The origins of this development are\nobscure, but one crucial factor appears to have been the breakdown of\nthe allegedly exhaustive distinction between mental and material\nobjects, which had formed the main division for ontologically-minded\nphilosophers since Descartes. One signal event in this development is\nFrege’s insistence that the objectivity and aprioricity of the\ntruths of mathematics entail that numbers are neither material beings\nnor ideas in the mind. If numbers were material things (or properties\nof material things), the laws of arithmetic would have the status of\nempirical generalizations. If numbers were ideas in the mind, then the\nsame difficulty would arise, as would countless others. (Whose mind\ncontains the number 17? Is there one 17 in your mind and another in\nmine? In that case, the appearance of a common mathematical subject\nmatter would be an illusion.) In The Foundations of\nArithmetic (1884), Frege concludes that numbers are neither\nexternal concrete things nor mental entities of any sort.", "\nLater, in his essay “The Thought” (1918), Frege claims the\nsame status for the items he calls thoughts—the senses\nof declarative sentences—and also, by implication, for their\nconstituents, the senses of subsentential expressions. Frege does not\nsay that senses are abstract. He says that they belong to a\nthird realm distinct both from the sensible external world\nand from the internal world of consciousness. Similar claims had been\nmade by Bolzano (1837), and later by Brentano (1874) and his pupils,\nincluding Meinong and Husserl. The common theme in these developments\nis the felt need in semantics and psychology, as well as in\nmathematics, for a class of objective (i.e., non-mental) non-physical\nentities. As this new realism was absorbed into\nEnglish-speaking philosophy, the traditional term\n‘abstract’ was enlisted to apply to the denizens of this\nthird realm. In this vein, Popper (1968) spoke of the\n‘third world’ of abstract, objective entities, in the\nbroader sense that includes cultural products such as arguments,\ntheories, and works of art.", "\nAs we turn to an overview of the current debate, it is therefore\nimportant to remember that the use of the terms platonist\n(for those who affirm the existence of abstract objects) and\nnominalist (for those who deny existence) is somewhat\nlamentable, since these words have established senses in the history\nof philosophy. These terms stood for positions that have little to do\nwith the modern notion of an abstract object. Modern platonists (with\na small ‘p’) need not accept any of the distinctive\nmetaphysical and epistemological doctrines of Plato, just as modern\nnominalists need not accept the distinctive doctrines of the medieval\nnominalists. Moreover, the literature also contains mention of\nanti-platonists, many of whom see themselves as\nfictionalists about abstracta, though this doesn’t help\nif it turns out that the best analysis of fictions is to regard them\nas abstract objects. So the reader should therefore be aware that\nterminology is not always well-chosen and that the terms so used\nsometimes stand for doctrines that are more restricted than the\ntraditional doctrines that go by the same name. Henceforth, we simply\nuse platonism for the thesis that there exists at least one\nabstract object, and nominalism for the thesis that the\nnumber of abstract objects is exactly zero (Field 1980)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 The Provenance of the Distinction" }, { "content": [ "\nBefore we survey the various proposals for drawing the\nabstract/concrete distinction, we should briefly say why the\ndistinction has been thought to matter. Among philosophers who take\nthe distinction seriously, it is generally supposed that while\nconcrete objects clearly exist, abstract entities are problematic in\ndistinctive ways and deny the existence of abstract entities\naltogether. In this section we briefly survey the arguments for\nnominalism and the responses that platonists have offered. If the\nabstract objects are unified as a class, it is because they have some\nfeature that generates what seems to be a distinctive problem—a\nproblem that nominalists deem unsolvable and which platonists aim to\nsolve. Before we ask what the unifying feature might be, it may\ntherefore help to characterize the various problems it has been\nthought to generate.", "\nThe contemporary debate about platonism developed in earnest when\nQuine argued (1948) that mathematical objects exist, having changed\nhis mind about the nominalist approach he had defended earlier\n(Goodman & Quine 1947). Quine’s 1948 argument involves\nthree key premises, all of which exerted significant influence on the\nsubsequent debate: (i) mathematics is indispensable for empirical\nscience; (ii) we should be ontologically committed to the entities\nrequired for the truth of our best empirical theories (all of which\nshould be expressible in a first-order language); and (iii) the\nentities required for the truth on an empirical theory are those in\nthe range of the variables bounded by its first-order quantifiers\n(i.e., the entities in the domain of the existential quantifier\n‘\$\\exists x\$’ and the universal quantifier\n‘\$\\forall x\$’). He concluded that in addition to the\nconcrete entities contemplated by our best empirical science, we must\naccept the existence of mathematical entities, even if they are\nabstract (see also Quine 1960, 1969, 1976).", "\nQuine’s argument initiated a debate that is still alive. Various\nnominalist responses questioned one or another of the premises in his\nargument. For instance, Field (1980) challenged the idea that\nmathematics is indispensable for our best scientific\ntheories—i.e., rejecting (i) above—and thus faced the task\nof rewriting classical and modern physics in nominalistic terms in\norder to sustain the challenge. Others have taken on the somewhat less\ndaunting task of accepting (i) but rejecting (ii) and (iii);\nthey’ve argued that even if our best scientific theories, in\nregimented form, quantify over mathematical entities, this\ndoesn’t entail a commitment to mathematical entities (see\nAzzouni 1997a, 1997b, 2004; Balaguer 1996, 1998; Maddy 1995, 1997;\nMelia 2000, 2002; Yablo 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009; Leng 2010.) Colyvan\n(2010) coined the expression ‘easy-roaders’ for this\nsecond group, since they avoided the ‘hard road’ of\nparaphrasing our best scientific theories in non-mathematical\nterms.", "\nBy contrast, some mathematical platonists (Colyvan 2001; Baker 2005,\n2009) have refined Quine’s view by advancing the so-called\n‘Enhanced Indispensability Argument’ (though see Saatsi\n2011 for a response). Some participants describe the debate in terms\nof a stalemate they hope to resolve (see Baker 2017, Baron 2016, 2020,\nKnowles & Saatsi 2019, and Martínez-Vidal\n& Rivas-de-Castro 2020, for\n discussion).[3]\n ", "\nAside from the debate over Quine’s argument, both platonism and\nnominalism give rise to hard questions. Platonists not only need to\nprovide a theory of what abstract objects exist, but also an account\nof how we cognitively access and come to know non-causal, abstract\nentities. This latter question has been the subject of a debate that\nbegan in earnest in Benacerraf (1973), which posed just such a dilemma\nfor mathematical objects. Benacerraf noted that the causal theory of\nreference doesn’t seem to make it possible to know the truth\nconditions of mathematical statements, and his argument applies to\nabstract entities more generally. On the other hand, nominalists need\nto explain the linguistic uses in which we seem to appeal to such\nentities, especially those uses in what appear to be good\nexplanations, such as those in scientific, mathematical, linguistic,\nand philosophical pursuits (see Wetzel 2009, 1–22, for a\ndiscussion of the many places where abstract types are used\nin scientific explanations). Even though nominalists argue that there\nare no abstracta, the very fact that there is disagreement about their\nexistence suggests that both platonists and nominalists acknowledge\nthe distinction between the abstract and concrete to be a meaningful\none.", "\nOn the platonist side, various proposals have been raised to address\nthe challenge of explaining epistemic access to abstract entities,\nmostly in connection with mathematical objects. Some, including\nGödel (1964), allege that we access abstract objects in virtue of\na unique kind of perception (intuition). Maddy (1990, 1997) developed\ntwo rather different ways of understanding our knowledge of\nmathematics in naturalistic ways. Other platonists have argued that\nabstract objects are connected to empirical entities, either via\nabstraction (Steiner 1975; Resnik 1982; Shapiro 1997) or via\nabstraction principles (Wright 1983; Hale 1987); we’ll discuss\nsome of these views below. There are also those who speak of existent\nand intersubjective abstract entities as a kind of mental\nrepresentation (Katz 1980).", "\nA rather different line of approach to the epistemological problem was\nproposed in Linsky & Zalta 1995, where it is suggested that\none shouldn’t attempt to explain knowledge of abstracta on the\nsame model that is used to explain knowledge of concrete objects. They\nargue that not only a certain plenitude principle for abstract objects\n(namely, the comprehension principle for abstract objects put forward\nin Zalta 1983, 1988—see below) yields unproblematic\n‘acquaintance by description’ to unique abstract objects\nbut also that their approach actually comports with naturalist\nbeliefs. Balaguer (1995, 1998) also suggests that a plenitude\nprinciple is the best way forward for the platonist, and that our\nknowledge of the consistency of mathematical theories suffices for\nknowledge of mathematical objects. And there are views that conceive\nof abstract objects as constituted by human—or, in general,\nintelligent—subjects, or as abstract artifacts (see Popper 1968;\nThomasson 1999).", "\nA number of nominalists have been persuaded by Benacerraf’s\n(1973) epistemological challenge about reference to abstract objects\nand concluded that sentences with terms making apparent reference to\nthem—such as mathematical statements—are either false or\nlack a truth value. They argue that those sentences must be\nparaphrasable without vocabulary that commits one to any sort of\nabstract entity. These proposals sometimes suggest that statements\nabout abstract objects are merely instrumental; they serve only to\nhelp us establish conclusions about concrete objects. Field’s\nfictionalism (1980, 1989) has been influential in this\nregard. Field reconstructed Newtonian physics using second-order logic\nand quantification over (concrete) regions of space-time. A completely\ndifferent tactic for avoiding the commitment to abstract, mathematical\nobjects is put forward in Putnam (1967) and Hellman (1989), who\nseparately reconstructed various mathematical theories in second-order\nmodal logic. On their view, abstract objects aren’t in\nthe range of the existential quantifier at the actual world (hence, we\ncan’t say that they exist), but they do occur in the range of\nthe quantifier at other possible worlds, where the axioms of the\nmathematical theory in question are true.", "\nThese nominalistic approaches must contend with various issues, of\ncourse. At the very least, they have to successfully argue that the\ntools they use to avoid commitments to abstract objects don’t\nthemselves involve such commitment. For example, Field must argue that\nspace-time regions are concrete entities, while Putnam and Hellman\nmust argue that by relying on logical possibility and modal logic,\nthere is no commitment to possible worlds considered as abstract\nobjects. In general, any nominalist account that makes essential use\nof set theory or model-theoretic structures must convincingly argue\nthat the very use of such analytic tools doesn’t commit them to\nabstract objects. (See Burgess & Rosen 1997 for a systematic\nsurvey of different proposals about the existence of abstract\nobjects.)", "\nAnother nominalistic thread in the literature concerns the suggestion\nthat sentences about (posited) abstract objects are quasi-assertions,\ni.e., not evaluable as to truth or falsehood (see Yablo 2001 and\nKalderon 2005). Still others argue that we should not believe\nsentences about abstracta since their function, much like the\ninstrumentalism discussed earlier, is to ensure empirical adequacy for\nobservational sentences (Yablo 1998). This may involve differentiating\nbetween apparent content, which involves posited abstract objects, and\nreal content, which only concerns concrete objects (Yablo 2001, 2002,\n2010, 2014). (For more on these fictionalist accounts, see Kalderon\n2005, Ch. 3, and the entry on\n fictionalism.)", "\nA final group of views in the literature represents a kind of\nagnosticism about what exists or about what it is to be an object, be\nit abstract or concrete. These views don’t reject an external\nmaterial world, but rather begin with some question as to whether we\ncan have experience, observation, and knowledge of objects directly,\ni.e., independent of our theoretical frameworks. Carnap (1950 [1956]),\nfor example, started with the idea that our scientific knowledge has\nto be expressed with respect to a linguistic framework and that when\nwe wish to put forward a theory about a new kind of entity, we must\nhave a linguistic framework for talking about those entities. He then\ndistinguished two kinds of existence questions: internal questions\nwithin the framework about the existence of the new entities\nand external questions about the reality of the framework itself. If\nthe framework deals with abstract entities such as numbers, sets,\npropositions, etc., then the internal question can be answered by\nlogical analysis of the rules of the language, such as whether it\nincludes terms for, or implies claims that quantify over, abstract\nobjects. But, for Carnap, the external question, about whether the\nabstract entities really exist, is a pseudo-question and should be\nregarded as nothing more than the pragmatic question of whether the\nframework is a useful one to adopt, for scientific or other forms of\nenquiry. We’ll discuss Carnap’s view in more detail in\n subsection 3.7.1.", "\nSome have thought that Carnap’s view offers a\ndeflationist view of objects, since it appears that the\nexistence of objects is not language independent. After Carnap’s\nseminal article, several other deflationist approaches were put\nforward (Putnam 1987, 1990; Hirsch 2002, 2011; Sider 2007, 2009;\nThomasson 2015), many of them claiming to be a vindication of\nCarnap’s view. However, there are deflationist proposals that\nrun counter to Carnap’s approach, among them, deflationary\nnominalism (Azzouni 2010) or agnosticism about abstract objects (Bueno\n2008a, 2008b, 2020). Additionally, philosophers inspired by\nFrege’s work have argued for a minimal notion of an object (Rayo\n2013, Rayo 2020 [Other Internet Resources]; and Linnebo\n2018). We’ll discuss some of these in greater detail below, in\nsubsection 3.7.2. A final agnostic\nposition that has emerged is one that rejects a strict version of\nplatonism, but suggests that neither a careful analysis of\nmathematical practice (Maddy 2011), nor the enhanced version of the\nindispensability argument (Leng 2020) suffice to decide between\nnominalism and moderate versions of platonism. Along these lines,\nBalaguer (1998) concluded that the question doesn’t have an\nanswer, since the arguments for ‘full-blooded’ platonism\ncan be matched one-for-one by equally good arguments by the\nanti-platonist.", "\nFor additional discussion about the basic positions in the debate\nabout abstract and concrete objects, see Szabó 2003 and the\nentries on\n nominalism in metaphysics\n and\n platonism in metaphysics,\n nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics and\n platonism in the philosophy of mathematics." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 An Initial Overview of the Contemporary Debate" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAs part of his attempt to understand the nature of possible worlds,\nLewis (1986a, 81–86) categorizes different ways by which one can\ndraw the abstract/concrete\n distinction.[4]\n These include: the way of example (which is simply to list\nthe paradigm cases of abstract and concrete objects in the hope that\nthe sense of the distinction will somehow emerge); the way of\nconflation (i.e., identifying abstract and concrete objects with\nsome already-known distinction); the way of negation (i.e.,\nsaying what abstract objects are by saying what they are not, e.g.,\nnon-spatiotemporal, non-causal, etc.); and the\nway of abstraction (i.e., saying that abstract objects are\nconceptualized by a process of considering some known objects and\nomitting certain distinguishing features). He gives a detailed\nexamination of the different proposals that typify these ways and then\nattempts to show that none of them quite succeeds in classifying the\nparadigms in accord with prevailing usage. Given the problems he\nencountered when analyzing the various ways, Lewis became pessimistic\nabout our ability to draw the distinction cleanly.", "\nDespite Lewis’s pessimism about clarifying the abstract/concrete\ndistinction, his approach for categorizing the various proposals, when\nextended, is a useful one. Indeed, in what follows, we’ll see\nthat there are a number of additional ways that categorize\nattempts to characterize the abstract/concrete distinction and\ntheorize about abstract objects. Even if there is no single,\nacceptable account, these various ways of drawing the distinction and\ntheorizing about abstract objects do often cast light on the questions\nwe’ve been discussing, especially when the specific proposals\nare integrated into a supplementary (meta-)ontological project. For\neach method of drawing the distinction and specific proposal adopting\nthat method acquires a certain amount of explanatory power, and this\nwill help us to compare and contrast the various ideas that are now\nfound in the literature." ], "section_title": "3. What is an Abstract Object?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAccording to the way of example, it suffices to list paradigm\ncases of abstract and concrete entities in the hope that the sense of\nthe distinction will somehow emerge. Clearly, a list of examples for\neach category would be a heuristically promising start in the search\nfor some criterion (or list of criteria) that would be fruitful for\ndrawing the distinction. However, a simple list would be of limited\nsignificance since there are too many ways of extrapolating from the\nparadigm cases to a distinction that would cover the unclear cases,\nwith the result that no clear notion has been explained.", "\nFor example, pure sets are paradigm examples of abstract entities. But\nthe case of impure sets is far from clear. Consider the unit set whose\nsole member is Joe Biden (i.e., {Joe Biden}), the Undergraduate Class\nof 2020 or The Ethics Committee, etc. They are sets, but it is not\nclear that they are abstract given that Joe Biden, the members of the\nclass and committee are concrete. Similarly, if one offers the\ncharacters of Sherlock Holmes stories as examples to help motivate the\nprimitive concept abstract object, then one has to wonder about the\nobject London that appears in the novels.", "\nThe refusal to characterize the abstract/concrete distinction while\nmaintaining that both categories have instances might be called the\nway of primitivism, whenever the following condition obtains:\na few predicates are distinguished as primitive and unanalyzable, and\nthe explanatory power rests on the fact that other interesting\npredicates can be defined in terms of the primitives and that\ninteresting claims can be judged true on the basis of our intuitive\nunderstanding of the primitive and defined notions. Thus, one might\ntake abstract and concrete as primitive notions. It wouldn’t be\nan insignificant result if one could use this strategy to explain why\nabstract objects are necessarily existent, causally ineffiacious,\nnon-spatiotemporal, intersubjective, etc. (see Cowling 2017:\n92–97).", "\nBut closer inspection of this method reveals some significant\nconcerns. To start with, when a distinction is taken as basic and\nunanalyzable, one typically has to offer some intuitive instances of\nthe primitive predicates. But it is not always so easy to do this. For\nexample, when mathematicians take set and membership\nas primitives and then assert some principles of set theory, they\noften illustrate their primitives by offering some examples of sets,\nsuch as The Undergraduate Class of 2020 or The Ethics Committee, etc.\nBut these, of course, aren’t quite right, since the members of\nthe class and committee may change while the class and committee\nremain the same, whereas if the members of a set change, one has a\ndifferent set. A similar concern affects the present proposal. If one\noffers sets or the characters of the Sherlock Holmes novels as\nexamples to help motivate the primitive concept abstract\nobject, then one has to wonder about impure sets such as the unit\nset whose sole member is Aristotle (i.e., \$\\{\\textrm{Aristotle}\\}\$)\nand the object London that appears in the novels." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 The Way of Example and the Way of Primitivism" }, { "content": [ "\nAccording to the way of conflation, the abstract/concrete\ndistinction is to be identified with one or another metaphysical\ndistinction already familiar under another name: as it might be, the\ndistinction between sets and individuals, or the distinction between\nuniversals and particulars. There is no doubt that some authors have\nused the terms in this way. (Thus Quine 1948 uses ‘abstract\nentity’ and ‘universal’ interchangeably.) This sort\nof conflation is however rare in recent philosophy." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 The Way of Conflation" }, { "content": [ "\nAnother methodology is what Lewis calls the way of\nabstraction. According to a longstanding tradition in\nphilosophical psychology, abstraction is a distinctive mental process\nin which new ideas or conceptions are formed by considering the common\nfeatures of several objects or ideas and ignoring the irrelevant\nfeatures that distinguish those objects. For example, if one is given\na range of white things of varying shapes and sizes; one ignores or\nabstracts from the respects in which they differ, and thereby\nattains the abstract idea of whiteness. Nothing in this tradition\nrequires that ideas formed in this way represent or correspond to a\ndistinctive kind of object. But it might be maintained that the\ndistinction between abstract and concrete objects should be explained\nby reference to the psychological process of abstraction or something\nlike it. The simplest version of this strategy would be to say that an\nobject is abstract if it is (or might be) the referent of an abstract\nidea; i.e., an idea formed by abstraction. So conceived, the way\nof abstraction is wedded to an outmoded philosophy of mind.", "\nIt should be mentioned, though, that the key idea behind the way\nof abstraction has resurfaced (though transformed) in the\nstructuralist views about mathematics that trace back to Dedekind.\nDedekind thought of numbers by the way of abstraction.\nDedekind suggested that when defining a number-theoretic structure,\n“we entirely neglect the special character of the elements,\nmerely retaining their distinguishability and taking into account only\nthe relations to one another” (Dedekind 1888 [1963, 68]). This\nview has led some structuralists to deny that numbers are abstract\nobjects. For example, Benacerraf concluded that “numbers are not\nobjects at all, because in giving the properties (that is, necessary\nand sufficient) of numbers you merely characterize an abstract\nstructure—and the distinction lies in the fact that the\n‘elements’ of the structure have no properties other than\nthose relating them to other ‘elements’ of the same\nstructure” (1965, 70). We shall therefore turn our attention to\na variant of the way of abstraction, one that has led a\nnumber of philosophers to conclude that numbers are indeed abstract\nobjects." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 The Way of Abstraction" }, { "content": [ "\nIn the contemporary philosophical literature, a number of books and\npapers have investigated a form of abstraction that doesn’t\ndepend on mental processes. We may call this the way of\nabstraction principles. Wright (1983) and Hale (1987) have\ndeveloped an account of abstract objects on the basis of an idea they\ntrace back to certain suggestive remarks in Frege (1884). Frege notes\n(in effect) that many of the singular terms that appear to refer to\nabstract entities are formed by means of functional expressions. We\nspeak of the shape of a building, the direction of a\nline, the number of books on the shelf. Of course, many\nsingular terms formed by means of functional expressions denote\nordinary concrete objects: ‘the father of Plato’,\n‘the capital of France’. But the functional terms that\npick out abstract entities are distinctive in the following respect:\nwhere \$f(a)\$ is such an expression, there is typically an equation\nof the form:", "\nwhere \$R\$ is an equivalence relation, i.e., a relation that is\nreflexive, symmetric and transitive, relative to some domain. For\nexample:", "\nThe direction of \$a\$ = the direction of \$b\$ if and only if \$a\$\nis parallel to \$b\$", "\nThe number of \$F\\text{s}\$ = the number of \$G\\text{s}\$ if and only\nif there are just as many \$F\\text{s}\$ as \$G\\text{s}\$", "\nThese biconditionals (or abstraction principles) appear to\nhave a special semantic status. While they are not strictly speaking\ndefinitions of the functional expression that occurs on the\nleft hand side, they would appear to hold in virtue of the meaning of\nthat expression. To understand the term ‘direction’ is (in\npart) to know that the direction of \$a\$ and the direction of \$b\$\nare the same entity if and only if the lines \$a\$ and \$b\$ are\nparallel. Moreover, the equivalence relation that appears on the right\nhand side of the biconditional would appear to be semantically and\nperhaps epistemologically prior to the functional expressions on the\nleft (Noonan 1978). Mastery of the concept of a direction presupposes\nmastery of the concept of parallelism, but not vice versa.", "\nThe availability of abstraction principles meeting these conditions\nmay be exploited to yield an account of the distinction between\nabstract and concrete objects. When ‘\$f\$’ is a\nfunctional expression governed by an abstraction principle, there will\nbe a corresponding kind \$K_{f}\$ such that:", "\n\$x\$ is a \$K_{f}\$ if and only if, for some \$y\$, \$x\\! =\\!\nf(y)\$.", "\nFor example,", "\n\$x\$ is a cardinal number if and only if for some concept \$F\$,\n\$x\$ = the number of \$F\\text{s}\$.", "\nThe simplest version of the way of abstraction principles is\nthen to say that:", "\n\$x\$ is an abstract object if (and only if) \$x\$ is an instance of\nsome kind \$K_{f}\$ whose associated functional expression\n‘\$f\$’ is governed by a suitable abstraction\nprinciple.", "\nThe strong version of this account—which purports to identify a\nnecessary condition for abstractness—is seriously at odds with\nstandard usage. Pure sets are usually considered paradigmatic abstract\nobjects. But it is not clear that they satisfy the proposed criterion.\nAccording to a version of naïve set theory, the functional\nexpression ‘set of’ is indeed characterized by a\nputative abstraction principle.", "\nThe set of \$F\\text{s}\$ = the set of \$G\\text{s}\$ if and only if,\nfor all \$x\$, \$x\$ is \$F\$ if and only if \$x\$ is \$G\$.", "\nBut this principle, which is a version of Frege’s Basic Law V,\nis inconsistent and so fails to characterize an interesting concept.\nIn contemporary mathematics, the concept of a set is not introduced by\nan abstraction principle, but rather axiomatically. Though attempts\nhave been made to investigate abstraction principles for sets (Cook\n2003), it remains an open question whether something like the\nmathematical concept of a set can be characterized by a suitably\nrestricted abstraction principle. (See Burgess 2005 for a survey of\nrecent efforts in this direction.) Even if such a principle is\navailable, however, it is unlikely that the epistemological priority\ncondition will be satisfied. That is, it is unlikely that mastery of\nthe concept of set will presuppose mastery of the equivalence relation\nthat figures on the right hand side. It is therefore uncertain whether\nthe way of abstraction principles will classify the objects\nof pure set theory as abstract entities (as it presumably must).", "\nOn the other hand, as Dummett (1973) has noted, in many cases the\nstandard names for paradigmatically abstract objects do not assume the\nfunctional form to which the definition adverts. Chess is an abstract\nentity, but we do not understand the word ‘chess’ as\nsynonymous with an expression of the form ‘\$f(x)\$’,\nwhere ‘\$f\$’ is governed by an abstraction principle.\nSimilar remarks would seem to apply to such things as the English\nlanguage, social justice, architecture, and Charlie Parker’s\nmusical style. If so, the abstractionist approach does not provide a\nnecessary condition for abstractness as that notion is standardly\nunderstood.", "\nMore importantly, there is some reason to believe that it fails to\nsupply a sufficient condition. A mereological fusion of\nconcrete objects is itself a concrete object. But the concept of a\nmereological fusion is governed by what appears to be an abstraction\nprinciple:", "\nThe fusion of the \$F\\text{s}\$ = the fusion of the \$G\\text{s}\$ if\nand only if the \$F\\text{s}\$ and \$G\\text{s}\$ cover one\nanother,", "\nwhere the \$F\\text{s}\$ cover the \$G\\text{s}\$ if and only\nif every part of every \$G\$ has a part in common with an \$F\$.\nSimilarly, suppose a train is a maximal string of railroad carriages,\nall of which are connected to one another. We may define a functional\nexpression, ‘the train of \$x\$’, by means of an\n‘abstraction’ principle: The train of \$x\$ = the train of\n\$y\$ if and only if \$x\$ and \$y\$ are connected carriages. We may\nthen say that \$x\$ is a train if and only if for some carriage \$y\$,\n\$x\$ is the train of \$y\$. The simple account thus yields the\nconsequence that trains are to be reckoned abstract entities.", "\nIt is unclear whether these objections apply to the more sophisticated\nabstractionist proposals of Wright and Hale, but one feature of the\nsimple account sketched above clearly does apply to these proposals\nand may serve as the basis for an objection to this version of the\nway of abstraction principles. The neo-Fregean approach seeks\nto explain the abstract/concrete distinction in semantic\nterms: We said that an abstract object is an object that falls in the\nrange of a functional expression governed by an abstraction principle,\nwhere ‘\$f\$’ is governed by an abstraction\nprinciple when that principle holds in virtue of the meaning\nof ‘\$f\$’. This notion of a statement’s holding in\nvirtue of the meaning of a word is notoriously problematic (see the\nentry\n the analytic/synthetic distinction).\n But even if this notion makes sense, one may still complain: The\nabstract/concrete distinction is supposed to be a metaphysical\ndistinction; abstract objects are supposed to differ from concrete\nobjects in some important ontological respect. It should be possible,\nthen, to draw the distinction directly in metaphysical terms: to say\nwhat it is in the objects themselves that makes some things\nabstract and others concrete. As Lewis writes, in response to a\nrelated proposal by Dummett:", "\n\n\nEven if this … way succeeds in drawing a border, as for all I know\nit may, it tells us nothing about how the entities on opposite sides\nof that border differ in their nature. It is like saying that snakes\nare the animals that we instinctively most fear—maybe so, but it\ntells us nothing about the nature of snakes. (Lewis 1986a: 82)\n", "\nThe challenge is to produce a non-semantic version of the\nabstractionist criterion that specifies directly, in metaphysical\nterms, what the objects whose canonical names are governed by\nabstraction principles all have in common.", "\nOne response to this difficulty is to transpose the abstractionist\nproposal into a more metaphysical key (see Rosen & Yablo\n2020). The idea is that each Fregean number is, by its very\nnature, the number of some Fregean concept, just as each Fregean\ndirection is, by its very nature, at least potentially the\ndirection of some concrete line. In each case, the abstract object is\nessentially the value of an abstraction function for a\ncertain class of arguments. This is not a claim about the meanings of\nlinguistic expressions. It is a claim about the essences or natures of\nthe objects themselves. (For the relevant notion of essence, see Fine\n1994.) So for example, the Fregean number two (if there is such a\nthing) is, essentially, by its very nature, the number that belongs to\na concept \$F\$ if and only if there are exactly two \$F\\text{s}\$.\nMore generally, for each Fregean abstract object \$x\$, there is an\nabstraction function \$f\$, such that \$x\$ is essentially the value\nof \$f\$ for every argument of a certain kind.", "\nAbstraction functions have two key features. First, for each\nabstraction function \$f\$ there is an equivalence relation \$R\$ such\nthat it lies in the nature of \$f\$ that \$f(x)\\! =\\! f(y)\$ iff\n\$Rxy\$. Intuitively, we are to think that \$R\$ is metaphysically\nprior to \$f\$, and that the abstraction function \$f\$ is\ndefined (in whole or in part) by this biconditional. Second,\neach abstraction function is a generating function: its\nvalues are essentially values of that function. Many functions are not\ngenerating functions. Paris is the capital of France, but it is not\nessentially a capital. The number of solar planets, by contrast, is\nessentially a number. The notion of an abstraction function may be\ndefined in terms of these two features:", "\nWe may then say that:", "\n\$x\$ is an abstraction if and only if, for some abstraction\nfunction \$f\$, there is or could be an object \$y\$ such that \$x\\!\n=\\! f(y)\$,", "\nand that:", "\n\$x\$ is an abstract object if (and only if) \$x\$ is an\nabstraction.", "\nThis account tells us a great deal about the distinctive natures of\nthese broadly Fregean abstract objects. It tells us that each is, by\nits very nature, the value of a special sort of function, one whose\nnature is specified in a simple way in terms of an associated\nequivalence relation. It is worth stressing, however, that it does not\nsupply much metaphysical information about these items. It\ndoesn’t tell us whether they are located in space, whether they\ncan stand in causal relations, and so on. It is an open question\nwhether this somewhat unfamiliar version of the abstract/concrete\ndistinction lines up with any of the more conventional ways of drawing\nthe distinction outlined above. An account along these lines would be\nat odds with standard usage, but may be philosophically interesting\nall the same. In any case, the problem remains that this metaphysical\nversion of the way of abstraction principles leaves out\nparadigmatic cases of abstract objects such as the aforementioned game\nof chess." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 The Way of Abstraction Principles" }, { "content": [ "\nAccording to the way of negation, abstract objects are\ndefined as those which lack certain features possessed by\nparadigmatic concrete objects. Many explicit characterizations in the\nliterature follow this model. Let us review some of the options.", "\nAccording to the account implicit in Frege’s writings:", "\nAn object is abstract if and only if it is both non-mental and\nnon-sensible.", "\nHere the first challenge is to say what it means for a thing to be\n‘non-mental’, or as we more commonly say,\n‘mind-independent’. The simplest approach is to say that a\nthing depends on the mind when it would not (or could not) have\nexisted if minds had not existed. But this entails that tables and\nchairs are mind-dependent, and that is not what philosophers who\nemploy this notion have in mind. To call an object\n‘mind-dependent’ in a metaphysical context is to suggest\nthat it somehow owes its existence to mental activity, but not in the\nboring ‘causal’ sense in which ordinary artifacts owe\ntheir existence to the mind. What can this mean? One promising\napproach is to say that an object should be reckoned mind-dependent\nwhen, by its very nature, it exists at a time if and only if\nit is the object or content of some mental state or process at\nthat time. This counts tables and chairs as mind-independent,\nsince they might survive the annihilation of thinking things. But it\ncounts paradigmatically mental items, like a purple afterimage of\nwhich a person \$X\$ may become aware, as mind-dependent, since it\npresumably lies in the nature of such items to be objects of conscious\nawareness whenever they exist. However, it is not clear that this\naccount captures the full force of the intended notion. Consider, for\nexample, the mereological fusion of \$X\$’s afterimage and\n\$Y\$’s headache. This is surely a mental entity if anything is.\nBut it is not necessarily the object of a mental state. (The fusion\ncan exist even if no one is thinking about it.) A more\ngenerous conception would allow for mind-dependent objects that exist\nat a time in virtue of mental activity at that time, even if the\nobject is not the object of any single mental state or act. The fusion\nof \$X\$’s afterimage and \$Y\$’s headache is\nmind-dependent in the second sense but not the first. That is a reason\nto prefer the second account of mind-dependence.", "\nIf we understand the notion of mind-dependence in this way, it is a\nmistake to insist that abstract objects be mind-independent. To strike\na theme that will recur, it is widely supposed that sets and classes\nare abstract entities—even the impure sets whose\nurelements are concrete objects. Any account of the abstract/concrete\ndistinction that places set-theoretic constructions like\n\$\\{\\textrm{Alfred}, \\{\\textrm{Betty}, \\{\\textrm{Charlie},\n\\textrm{Deborah}\\}\\}\\}\$ on the concrete side of the line will be\nseriously at odds with standard usage. With this in mind, consider the\nset whose sole members are X’s afterimage and Y’s\nheadache, or some more complex set-theoretic object based on these\nitems. If we suppose, as is plausible, that an impure set exists at a\ntime only when its members exist at that time, this will be a\nmind-dependent entity in the generous sense. But it is also presumably\nan abstract entity.", "\nA similar problem arises for so-called abstract artifacts,\nlike Jane Austen’s novels and the characters that inhabit them.\nSome philosophers regard such items as eternally existing abstract\nentities that worldly authors merely describe but do not create. But\nof course the commonsensical view is that Austen created Pride and\nPrejudice and Elizabeth Bennett, and there is no good reason to\ndeny this (Thomasson 1999; cf. Sainsbury 2009). If we take this\ncommonsensical approach, there will be a clear sense in which these\nitems depend for their existence on Austen’s mental activity,\nand perhaps on the mental activity of subsequent \nreaders.[5] \nThese items\nmay not count as mind-dependent in either of the senses canvassed\nabove, since Pride and Prejudice can presumably exist at a\ntime even if no one happens to be thinking at that time. (If the world\ntook a brief collective nap, Pride and Prejudice would not\npop out of existence.) But they are obviously mind-dependent in some\nnot-merely-causal sense. And yet they are still presumably abstract\nobjects. For these reasons, it is probably a mistake to insist that\nabstract objects be mind-independent. (For more on mind-dependence,\nsee Rosen 1994, and the entry\n platonism in the philosophy of mathematics.)", "\nFrege’s proposal in its original form also fails for other\nreasons. Quarks and electrons are usually considered neither sensible\nnor mind-dependent. And yet they are not abstract objects. A better\nversion of Frege’s proposal would hold that:", "\nAn object is abstract if and only if it is both non-physical and\nnon-mental.", "\nTwo remarks on this last version are in order. First, it opens the\ndoor to thinking that besides abstract and concrete entities (assuming\nthat physical objects, in a broad sense, are concrete), there are\nmental entities that are neither concrete nor abstract. As mentioned\nabove (section 1.2), there is no need to insist that the distinction\nis an exhaustive one. Second, while the approach may well draw an\nimportant line, it inherits one familiar problem, namely, that of\nsaying what it is for a thing to be a physical object (Crane\nand Mellor 1990; for discussion, see the entry on\n physicalism).\n In one sense, a physical entity is an entity in which physics might\ntake an interest. But physics is saturated with mathematics, so in\nthis sense a great many paradigmatically abstract objects—e.g.\n\$\\pi\$—will count as physical. The intended point is that\nabstract objects are to be distinguished, not from all of the\nobjects posited by physics, but from the concrete objects\nposited by the physics. But if that is the point, it is unilluminating\nin the present context to say that abstract objects are\nnon-physical.", "\nContemporary purveyors of the way of negation typically amend\nFrege’s criterion by requiring that abstract objects be\nnon-spatial, causally inefficacious, or both. Indeed, if any\ncharacterization of the abstract deserves to be regarded as the\nstandard one, is this:", "\nAn object is abstract if and only if it is non-spatial and causally\ninefficacious.", "\nThis standard account nonetheless presents a number of\nperplexities.", "\nFirst of all, one must consider whether there are abstract objects\nthat have one of the two features but not the other. For example,\nconsider an impure set, such as the unit set of Plato (i.e.,\n\$\\{\\textrm{Plato}\\}\$). It has some claim to being abstract because\nit is causally inefficacious, but some might suggest that it has a\nlocation in space (namely, wherever Plato is located). Or consider a\nwork of fiction such as Kafka’s The Metamorphosis. It,\ntoo, has some claim to being abstract because it (or at least its\ncontent) is non-spatial. But one might suggest that works of fiction\nas paradigmatic abstract objects seem to have causal powers, e.g.,\npowers to affect us.", "\nIn the remainder of this subsection, we focus on the first criterion\nin the above proposal, namely, the non-spatial condition. But it gives\nrise to a subtlety. It seems plausible to suggest that, necessarily,\nif something \$x\$ is causally efficacious, then (since \$x\$ is a\ncause or has causal powers) \$x\$, or some part of \$x\$, has a\nlocation in time. So if something has no location in time, it is\ncausally inefficacious. The theory of relativity implies that space\nand time are nonseparable, i.e., combined into a single\nspacetime manifold. So the above proposal might be restated\nin terms of a single condition: an object is abstract if and only if\nit is non-spatiotemporal. Sometimes this revised proposal is the\ncorrect one for thinking about abstract objects, but our discussion in\nthe previous section showed that abstract artifacts and mental events\nmay be temporal but non-spatial. Given the complexities here, in what\nfollows we use spatiotemporality, spatiality, or temporality, as\nneeded.", "\nSome of the archetypes of abstractness are non-spatiotemporal in a\nstraightforward sense. It makes no sense to ask where the cosine\nfunction was last Tuesday. Or if it makes sense to ask, the sensible\nanswer is that it was nowhere. Similarly, for many people, it makes no\ngood sense to ask when the Pythagorean Theorem came to be. Or if it\ndoes make sense to ask, the only sensible answer for them is that it\nhas always existed, or perhaps that it does not exist ‘in\ntime’ at all. It is generally assumed that these paradigmatic\n‘pure abstracta’ have no non-trivial spatial or temporal\nproperties; that they have no spatial location, and they exist nowhere\nin particular in time.", "\nOther abstract objects appear to stand in a more interesting relation\nto spacetime. Consider the game of chess. Some philosophers will say\nthat chess is like a mathematical object, existing nowhere and\n‘no when’—either eternally or outside of time\naltogether. But the most natural view is that chess was invented at a\ncertain time and place (though it may be hard to say exactly where or\nwhen); that before it was invented it did not exist at all; that it\nwas imported from India into Persia in the 7th century; that it has\nchanged over the years, and so on. The only reason to resist this\nnatural account is the thought that since chess is clearly an abstract\nobject—it’s not a physical object, after all!—and\nsince abstract objects do not exist in space and time—by\ndefinition!—chess must resemble the cosine function in its\nrelation to space and time. And yet one might with equal justice\nregard the case of chess and other abstract artifacts as\ncounterexamples to the hasty view that abstract objects possess only\ntrivial spatial and temporal properties.", "\nShould we then abandon the non-spatiotemporality criterion? Not\nnecessarily. Even if there is a sense in which some abstract entities\npossess non-trivial spatiotemporal properties, it might still be said\nthat concrete entities exist in spacetime in a distinctive\nway. If we had an account of this distinctive manner of\nspatiotemporal existence characteristic of concrete objects, we could\nsay: An object is abstract (if and) only if it fails to exist in\nspacetime in that way.", "\nOne way to implement this approach is to note that paradigmatic\nconcrete objects tend to occupy a relatively determinate spatial\nvolume at each time at which they exist, or a determinate volume of\nspacetime over the course of their existence. It makes sense to ask of\nsuch an object, ‘Where is it now, and how much space does it\noccupy?’ even if the answer must sometimes be somewhat vague. By\ncontrast, even if the game of chess is somehow\n‘implicated’ in space and time, it makes no sense to ask\nhow much space it now occupies. (To the extent that this does make\nsense, the only sensible answer is that it occupies no space at all,\nwhich is not to say that it occupies a spatial point.) And so it might\nbe said:", "\nAn object is abstract (if and) only if it fails to occupy anything\nlike a determinate region of space (or spacetime).", "\nThis promising idea raises several questions. First, it is conceivable\nthat certain items that are standardly regarded as abstract might\nnonetheless occupy determinate volumes of space and time. Consider,\nfor example, the various sets composed from Peter and Paul:\n\$\\{\\textrm{Peter}, \\textrm{Paul}\\},\$ \$\\{\\textrm{Peter},\n\\{\\textrm{Peter}, \\{\\{\\textrm{Paul}\\}\\}\\}\\},\$ etc. We don’t\nnormally ask where such things are, or how much space they occupy. And\nindeed many philosophers will say that the question makes no sense, or\nthat the answer is a dismissive ‘nowhere, none’. But this\nanswer is not forced upon us by anything in set theory or metaphysics.\nEven if we grant that pure sets stand in only the most\ntrivial relations to space, it is open to us to hold, as some\nphilosophers have done, that impure sets exist where and when their\nmembers do (Lewis 1986a). It is not unnatural to say that a set of\nbooks is located on a certain shelf in the library, and indeed, there\nare some theoretical reasons for wanting to say this (Maddy 1990). On\na view of this sort, we face a choice: we can say that since impure\nsets exist in space, they are not abstract objects after all; or we\ncan say that since impure sets are abstract, it was a mistake to\nsuppose that abstract objects cannot occupy space.", "\nOne way to finesse this difficulty would be to note that even if\nimpure sets occupy space, they do so in a derivative manner. The set\n\$\\{\\textrm{Peter}, \\textrm{Paul}\\}\$ occupies a location in virtue of\nthe fact that its concrete elements, Peter and Paul, together occupy\nthat location. The set does not occupy the location in its own\nright. With that in mind, it might be said that:", "\nAn object is abstract (if and) only if it either fails to occupy space\nat all, or does so only in virtue of the fact some other\nitems—in this case, its urelements—occupy that\nregion.", "\nBut of course Peter himself occupies a region in virtue of the fact\nthat his parts—his head, hands, etc.—together\noccupy that region. So a better version of the proposal would say:", "\nAn object is abstract (if and) only if it either fails to occupy space\nat all, or does so of the fact that some other items that are not\namong its parts occupy that region.", "\nThis approach appears to classify the cases fairly well, but it is\nsomewhat artificial. Moreover, it raises a number of questions. What\nare we to say about the statue that occupies a region of space, not\nbecause its parts are arrayed in space, but rather because\nits constituting matter occupies that region? And what about\nthe unobserved electron, which according to some interpretations of\nquantum mechanics does not really occupy a region of space at\nall, but rather stands in some more exotic relation to the spacetime\nit inhabits? Suffice it to say that a philosopher who regards\n‘non-spatiality’ as a mark of the abstract, but who allows\nthat some abstract objects may have non-trivial spatial properties,\nowes us an account of the distinctive relation to spacetime,\nspace, and time that sets paradigmatic concreta apart.", "\nPerhaps the crucial question about the ‘non-spatiality’\ncriterion concerns the classification of the parts of space itself. If\nthey are considered concrete, then one might ask where the\nspatiotemporal points or regions are located. And a similar question\narises for spatial points and regions, and for temporal instants or\nintervals. So, the ontological status of spatiotemporal locations, and\nof spatial and temporal locations, is problematic. Let us suppose that\nspace, or spacetime, exists, not just as an object of pure\nmathematics, but as the arena in which physical objects and events are\nsomehow arrayed. It is essential to understand that the problem is not\nabout the numerical coordinates that represent these points and\nregions (or instants and intervals) in a reference system; the issue\nis about the points and regions (or instants and intervals). Physical\nobjects are located ‘in’ or ‘at’ regions of\nspace; as a result, they count as concrete according to the\nnon-spatiality criterion. But what about the points and regions of\nspace itself? There has been some debate about whether a commitment to\nspacetime substantivalism is consistent with the nominalist’s\nrejection of abstract entities (Field 1980, 1989; Malament\n1982). If we define the abstract as the ‘non-spatial’,\nthis debate amounts to whether space itself is to be reckoned\n‘spatial’. To reject that these points, regions, instants,\nand intervals, are concrete because they are not located,\nentails featuring them as abstract. However, to think about them as\nabstract sounds a bit weird, given their role in causal processes.\nPerhaps, it is easier to treat them as concrete if we want to\nestablish that concrete entities are spatiotemporal—or spatial\nand temporal.", "\nThe philosopher who believes that there is a serious question about\nwhether the parts of space-time count as concrete would thus do well\nto characterize the abstract/concrete distinction in other terms.\nStill—as mentioned above—the philosopher who thinks that\nit is defensible that parts of space are concrete might use\nnon-spatiality to draw the distinction if she manages to provide a way\nof accounting for how impure sets relate to space differs from the way\nconcreta do.", "\nAccording to the most widely accepted versions of the way of\nnegation:", "\nAn object is abstract (if and) only if it is causally\ninefficacious.", "\nConcrete objects, whether mental or physical, have causal powers;\nnumbers and functions and the rest make nothing happen. There is no\nsuch thing as causal commerce with the game of chess itself (as\ndistinct from its concrete instances). And even if impure sets do in\nsome sense exist in space, it is easy enough to believe that they make\nno distinctive causal contribution to what transpires. Peter\nand Paul may have effects individually. They may even have effects\ntogether that neither has on his own. But these joint effects are\nnaturally construed as effects of two concrete objects acting jointly,\nor perhaps as effects of their mereological aggregate (itself usually\nregarded as concretum), rather than as effects of some set-theoretic\nconstruction. Suppose Peter and Paul together tip a balance. If we\nentertain the possibility that this event is caused by a set, we shall\nhave to ask which set caused it: the set containing just Peter and\nPaul? Some more elaborate construction based on them? Or is it perhaps\nthe set containing the molecules that compose Peter and Paul? This\nproliferation of possible answers suggests that it was a mistake to\ncredit sets with causal powers in the first place. This is good news\nfor those who wish to say that all sets are abstract.", "\n(Note, however, that some writers identify ordinary physical\nevents—causally efficacious items par excellence—with\nsets. For David Lewis, for example, an event like the fall of Rome is\nan ordered pair whose first member is a region of spacetime, and whose\nsecond member is a set of such regions (Lewis 1986b). On this account,\nit would be disastrous to say both that impure sets are abstract\nobjects, and that abstract objects are non-causal.)", "\nThe biggest challenge to characterizing abstracta as causally\ninefficacious entities is that causality itself is a\nnotoriously problematic and difficult to define idea. It is\nundoubtedly one of the most controversial notions in the history of\nthought, with all kinds of views having been put forward on the\nmatter. Thus, causally efficacious inherits any unclarity\nthat attaches to causality. So, if we are to move the\ndiscussion forward, we need to take the notion of\ncausation—understood as a relation among events—as\nsufficiently clear, even though in fact it is not. Having acknowledged\nthis no doubt naïve assumption, several difficulties arise for\nthe suggestion that abstract objects are precisely the causally\ninefficacious objects.", "\nThe idea that causal inefficacy constitutes a sufficient\ncondition for abstractness is somewhat at odds with standard usage.\nSome philosophers believe in ‘epiphenomenal qualia’:\nobjects of conscious awareness (sense data), or qualitative conscious\nstates that may be caused by physical processes in the brain, but\nwhich have no downstream causal consequences of their own (Jackson\n1982; Chalmers 1996). These items are causally inefficacious if they\nexist, but they are not normally regarded as abstract. The proponent\nof the causal inefficacy criterion might respond by insisting that\nabstract objects are distinctively neither causes nor\neffects. But this is perilous. Abstract artifacts like Jane\nAusten’s novels (as we normally conceive them) come into being\nas a result of human activity. The same goes for impure sets,\nwhich come into being when their concrete urelements are created.\nThese items are clearly effects in some good sense; yet they\nremain abstract if they exist at all. It is unclear how the proponent\nof the strong version of the causal inefficacy criterion (which views\ncausal inefficacy as both necessary and sufficient for abstractness)\nmight best respond to this problem.", "\nApart from this worry, there are no decisive intuitive counterexamples\nto this account of the abstract/concrete distinction. The chief\ndifficulty—and it is hardly decisive—is rather conceptual.\nIt is widely maintained that causation, strictly speaking, is a\nrelation among events or states of affairs. If we say that the\nrock—an object—caused the window to break, what we mean is\nthat some event or state (or fact or condition) involving the\nrock caused the break. If the rock itself is a cause, it is a cause in\nsome derivative sense. But this derivative sense has proved elusive.\nThe rock’s hitting the window is an event in which the rock\n‘participates’ in a certain way, and it is because the\nrock participates in events in this way that we credit the rock itself\nwith causal efficacy. But what is it for an object to\nparticipate in an event? Suppose John is thinking about the\nPythagorean Theorem and you ask him to say what’s on his mind.\nHis response is an event—the utterance of a sentence; and one of\nits causes is the event of John’s thinking about the theorem.\nDoes the Pythagorean Theorem ‘participate’ in this event?\nThere is surely some sense in which it does. The event\nconsists in John’s coming to stand in a certain relation to the\ntheorem, just as the rock’s hitting the window consists in the\nrock’s coming to stand in a certain relation to the glass. But\nwe do not credit the Pythagorean Theorem with causal efficacy simply\nbecause it participates in this sense in an event which is a\ncause.", "\nThe challenge is therefore to characterize the distinctive manner of\n‘participation in the causal order’ that distinguishes the\nconcrete entities. This problem has received relatively little\nattention. There is no reason to believe that it cannot be solved,\nthough the varieties of philosophical analysis for the notion of\ncausality make the task full of pitfalls. Anyway, in the\nabsence of a solution, this standard version of the way of\nnegation must be reckoned a work in progress.", "\nSome philosophers have supposed that, under certain conditions, there\nare numerically different but indiscernible concrete entities, i.e.,\nthat there are distinct concrete objects \$x\$ and \$y\$ that\nexemplify the same properties. If this can be sustained, then one\nmight suggest that distinct abstract objects are always discernible\nor, in a weaker formulation, that distinct abstract objects are never\nduplicates.", "\nCowling (2017, 86–89) analyzes whether the abstract/concrete\ndistinction thus rendered is fruitful, though criteria in this line\nare normally offered as glosses on the universal/particular\ndistinction. As part of his analysis, he deploys two pairs of (not\nuncontroversial) distinctions: (i) between qualitative and\nnon-qualitative properties, and (ii) between intrinsic and extrinsic\nproperties. Roughly, a non-qualitative property is one that involves\nspecific individuals (e.g., being the teacher of Alexander the\nGreat, being Albert Einstein, etc.), while qualitative\nproperties are not (e.g., having mass, having a\nshape, having a length, etc.). Intrinsic properties are\nthose an object has regardless of what other objects are like and\nregardless of its relationships with other objects (e.g., being\nmade of copper). By contrast, an object’s extrinsic\nproperties are those that depend on other entities (e.g., being\nthe fastest\n car).[6]\n ", "\nWith these distinctions in mind, it seems impossible that there be\ndistinct abstract entities which are qualitatively indiscernible; each\nabstract entity is expected to have a unique, distinctive qualitative\nintrinsic nature (or property), which is giving reason for its\nmetaphysical being. This wouldn’t be the case for any concrete\nentity given the initial assumption in this section. Therefore, the\nfollowing criterion of discernability could be pondered:", "\n\$x\$ is an abstract object iff it is impossible for there to be an\nobject which is qualitatively indiscernible from \$x\$ but distinct\nfrom \$x\$.", "\nHowever, one can develop a counterexample to the above proposal, by\nconsidering two concrete objects that are indiscernible with respect\nto their intrinsic qualitative properties. Cowling (2017) considers\nthe case of a possible world with only two perfectly spherical balls,\n\$A\$ and \$B\$, that share the same intrinsic qualitative properties\nand that are floating at a certain distance from each other. So \$A\$\nand \$B\$ are distinct concrete objects but indiscernible in terms of\ntheir intrinsic qualitative\nproperties.[7]\nBut Lewis has pointed out that “if two individuals are\nindiscernible then so are their unit sets” (1986a, 84). If this\nis correct, \$\\{A\\}\$ and \$\\{B\\}\$ would be indiscernible, but (at\nleast for some philosophers) distinct abstract objects, contrary to\nthe discernibility criterion.[8] It is possible to counter-argue that we could\nhappily accept impure sets as concrete; after all, it was always a bit\nunclear how they should be classified. Obviously, this has the\nproblematic consequence of having some sets—pure sets—as\nabstract and other sets—impure sets—as concrete. But the\nidea that abstract objects have distinctive intrinsic natures allows\none to establish a criterion less strong than that of discernibility;\nif an entity has a distinctive intrinsic nature, it cannot have a\nduplicate. So, the next criterion of non-duplication can be put\nforward:", "\n\$x\$ is an abstract object iff it is impossible for there to be an\nobject which is a duplicate of \$x\$ but distinct from \$x\$.", "\nBut there is a more serious counterexample to this criterion, namely,\nimmanent universals. These are purportedly concrete objects, for they\nare universals wholly present where their instances are. But this\ncriterion renders them abstract. Take the color scarlet; it is a\nuniversal wholly present in every scarlet thing. Each of the scarlets\nin those things is an immanent universal. These are non-duplicable,\nbut at least according to Armstrong (1978, I, 77, though see 1989,\n98–99), they are paradigmatically concrete: spatiotemporally\nlocated, causally efficacious, etc. Despite how promising they\ninitially seemed, the criteria of discernibility and non-duplicability\ndo not appear to capture the abstract/concrete distinction." ], "subsection_title": "3.5 The Ways of Negation" }, { "content": [ "\nOne of the most rigorous proposals about abstract objects has been\ndeveloped by Zalta (1983, 1988, and in a series of papers). It is a\nformal, axiomatic metaphysical theory of objects (both abstract and\nconcrete), and also includes a theory of properties, relations, and\npropositions. The theory explicitly defines the notion of an\nabstract object but also implicitly characterizes them using\n axioms.[9]\n There are three central aspects to the theory: (i) a predicate \$E!\$\nwhich applies to concrete entities and which is used to define a modal\ndistinction between abstract and ordinary objects;\n(ii) a distinction between exemplifying relations and\nencoding properties (i.e., encoding 1-place relations); and\n(iii) a comprehension schema that asserts the conditions under which\nabstract objects exist.", "\n(i) Since the theory has both a quantifier \$\\exists\$ and a predicate\n\$E!\$, Zalta offers two interpretations of his theory (1983,\n51–2; 1988, 103–4). On one interpretation, the quantifier\n\$\\exists\$ simply asserts there is and the predicate \$E!\$\nasserts existence. On this interpretation, a formula such as\n\$\\exists x \\neg E!x\$, which is implied by the axioms described\nbelow, asserts “there is an object that fails to exist”.\nSo, on this interpretation, the theory is Meinongian because it\nendorses non-existent objects. But there is a Quinean interpretation\nas well, on which the quantifier \$\\exists\$ asserts\nexistence and the predicate \$E!\$ asserts\nconcreteness. On this interpretation, the formula \$\\exists x\n\\neg E!x\$ asserts “there exists an object that fails to be\nconcrete”. So, on this interpretation, the theory is Platonist,\nsince it doesn’t endorse non-existents but rather asserts the\nexistence of non-concrete objects. We’ll henceforth use the\nQuinean/Platonist interpretation.", "\nIn the more expressive, modal version of his theory, Zalta defines\nordinary objects \$(O!)\$ to be those that might be concrete.\nThe reason is that Zalta holds that possible objects (i.e., like\nmillion-carat diamonds, talking donkeys, etc.) are not concrete but\nrather possibly concrete. They exist, but they are not abstract, since\nabstract objects, like the number one, couldn’t be concrete.\nIndeed, Zalta’s theory implies that abstract objects \$(A!)\$\naren’t possibly concrete, since he defines them to be objects\nthat aren’t ordinary (1993, 404):", "\nThus, the ordinary objects include all the concrete objects (since\n\$E!x\$ implies \$\\Diamond E!x\$), as well as possible objects that\naren’t in fact concrete but might have been. On this theory,\ntherefore, being abstract is not the negation of being\nconcrete. Instead, the definition validates an intuition that\nnumbers, sets, etc., aren’t the kind of thing that could be\nconcrete. Though Zalta’s definition of abstract seems\nto comport with the way of primitivism—take\nconcrete as primitive, and then define abstract as\nnot possibly concrete—it differs in that (a) axioms are\nstated that govern the conditions under which abstract objects exist\n(see below), and (b) the features commonly ascribed to abstract\nobjects are derived from principles that govern the property\nof being concrete. For example, Zalta accepts principles such as:\nnecessarily, anything with causal powers is concrete (i.e., \$\\Box\n\\forall x(Cx \\to E!x)\$). Then since abstract objects are, by\ndefinition, concrete at no possible world, they necessarily fail to\nhave causal powers.", "\n(ii) The distinction between exemplifying and\nencoding is a primitive one and is represented in the theory\nby two atomic formulas: \$F^nx_1\\ldots x_n\$ \$(x_1,\\ldots ,x_n\$\nexemplify \$F^n\$) and \$xF^1\$ \$(x\$ encodes\n\$F^1).\$ While both ordinary and abstract objects exemplify\nproperties, only abstract objects encode\n properties;[10]\n it is axiomatic that ordinary objects necessarily fail to encode\nproperties \$(O!x \\to \\Box \\neg \\exists FxF).\$ Zalta’s proposal\ncan be seen a positive metaphysical proposal distinct from all the\nothers we have considered; a positive proposal that uses encoding as a\nkey notion to characterize abstract objects. On this reading, the\ndefinitions and axioms of the theory convey what is meant by\nencoding and how it works. Intuitively, an abstract object\nencodes the properties by which we define or conceive of it,\nbut exemplifies some properties contingently and others necessarily.\nThus, the number 1 of Dedekind-Peano number theory encodes all and\nonly its number-theoretic properties, and whereas it contingently\nexemplifies the property being thought about by Peano, it\nnecessarily exemplifies properties such as being abstract,\nnot having a shape, not being a building, etc. The\ndistinction between exemplifying and encoding a property is also used\nto define identity: ordinary objects are identical whenever they\nnecessarily exemplify the same properties while abstract objects are\nidentical whenever they necessarily encode the same properties.", "\n(iii) The comprehension principle asserts that for each expressible\ncondition on properties, there is an abstract object that\nencodes exactly the properties that fulfill (satisfy) that\ncondition. Formally: \$\\exists x(A!x \\:\\&\\: \\forall F(xF \\equiv\n\\phi))\$, where \$\\phi\$ has no free \$x\$s. Each instance of this\nschema asserts the existence of an abstract object of a certain sort.\nSo, for example, where ‘\$s\$’ denotes Socrates, the\ninstance \$\\exists x(A!x \\:\\&\\: \\forall F(xF \\equiv Fs))\$ asserts\nthat there is an abstract object that encodes exactly the properties\nthat Socrates exemplifies. Zalta uses this object to analyze the\ncomplete individual concept of Socrates. But any condition \$\\phi\$ on\nconditions on properties with no free occurrences of \$x\$ can be used\nto form an instance of comprehension. In fact, one can prove that the\nobject asserted to exist is unique, since there can’t be two\ndistinct abstract objects that encode exactly the properties\nsatisfying \$\\phi\$.", "\nThe theory that emerges from (i)–(iii) is further developed\nwith additional axioms and definitions. One axiom asserts that if an\nobject encodes a property, it does so necessarily \$(xF \\to \\Box\nxF).\$ So the properties that an object encodes are not relative to\nany circumstance. Moreover, Zalta supplements his theory of abstract\nobjects with a theory of properties, relations, and propositions. Here\nwe describe only the theory of properties. It is governed by two\nprinciples: a comprehension principle for properties and a principle\nof identity. The comprehension principle asserts that for any\ncondition on objects expressible without encoding subformulas, there\nis a property \$F\$ such that necessarily, an object \$x\$ exemplifies\n\$F\$ if and only if \$x\$ is such that \$\\phi\$, i.e., \$\\exists\nF\\Box \\forall x(Fx \\equiv \\phi)\$, where \$\\phi\$ has no encoding\nsubformulas and no free \$F\\text{s}\$. The identity principle asserts\nthat properties \$F\$ and \$G\$ are identical just in case \$F\$ and\n\$G\$ are necessarily encoded by the same objects, i.e., \$F\\! =\\! G\n=_\\mathit{df} \\Box \\forall x(xF \\equiv xG)\$. This principle allows\none to assert that there are properties that are necessarily\nequivalent in the classical sense, i.e., in the sense that \$\\Box\n\\forall x(Fx \\equiv Gx)\$, but which are\n distinct.[11]\n ", "\nSince \$\\alpha\\! =\\! \\beta\$ is defined both when \$\\alpha\$ and\n\$\\beta\$ are both individual variables or both property variables,\nZalta employs the usual principle for the substitution of identicals.\nSince all of the terms in his system are rigid, substitution of\nidenticals preserves truth even in modal contexts.", "\nThe foregoing principles implicitly characterize both abstract and\nordinary objects. Zalta’s theory doesn’t postulate any\nconcrete objects, though, since that is a contingent matter. But his\nsystem does include the Barcan formula (i.e., \$\\Diamond \\exists xFx\n\\to \\exists x\\Diamond Fx\$), and so possiblity claims like\n“there might have been talking donkeys” imply that there\nare (non-concrete) objects at our world that are talking donkeys at\nsome possible world. Since Zalta adopts the view that ordinary\nproperties like being a donkey necessarily imply concreteness, such\ncontingently nonconcrete objects are ordinary.", "\nZalta uses his theory to analyze Plato’s Forms, concepts,\npossible worlds, Fregean numbers and Fregean senses, fictions, and\nmathematical objects and relations generally. However, some\nphilosophers see his comprehension principle as too inclusive, for in\naddition to these objects, it asserts that there are entities like\nthe round square or the set of all sets which are not\nmembers of themselves. The theory doesn’t assert that\nanything exemplifies being round and being square—the\ntheory preserves the classical form of predication without giving rise\nto contradictions. But it does assert that there is an abstract object\nthat encodes being round and being square, and that there is an\nabstract object that encodes the property of being a set that contains\nall and only non-self-membered sets. Zalta would respond by suggesting\nthat such objects are needed not only to state truth conditions, and\nexplain the logical consequences, of sentences involving expressions\nlike “the round square” and “the Russell set”,\nbut also to analyze the fictional characters of inconsistent stories\nand inconsistent theories (e.g., Fregean extensions).", "\nIt should be noted that Zalta’s comprehension principle for\nabstract objects is unrestricted and so constitutes a\nplenitude principle. This allows the theory to provide\nobjects for arbitrary mathematical theories. Where \$\\tau\$ is a term\nof mathematical theory \$T\$, the comprehension principle yields a\nunique object that encodes all and only the properties \$F\$ that are\nattributed to \$\\tau\$ in \$T\$ (Linsky & Zalta 1995,\nNodelman & Zalta\n 2014).[12]\n Zalta’s theory therefore offers significant explanatory power,\nfor it has multiple applications and advances solutions to a wide\nrange of puzzles in different fields of\n philosophy.[13]\n " ], "subsection_title": "3.6 The Way of Encoding" }, { "content": [ "\nMany philosophers have supposed that abstract objects exist in some\nthin, deflated sense. In this section we consider the idea that the\nabstract/concrete distinction might be defined by saying that\nabstract objects exist in some less robust sense than the sense in\nwhich concrete objects exist.", "\nThe traditional platonist conception is a realist one: abstract\nobjects exist in just the same full-blooded sense that objects in the\nnatural world exist—they are mind-independent, rather than\nartifacts of human endeavor or dependent on concrete objects in any\nway. But a number of deflationary, metatontological views, now\nestablished in the literature, are based on the idea that the problems\ntraditional platonists face have to do with “some very general\npreconceptions about what it takes to specify an object” rather than\nwith “the abstractness of the desired object” (Linnebo 2018,\n42). These views suggest that abstract objects exist in some weaker\nsense. Various approaches therefore articulate what may be called the\nways of weakening existence. One clear precedent is due to Carnap 1950\n[1956], whose deflationary approach may go the furthest; Carnap\nrejects the metaphysical pursuit of what “really exists”\n(even in the case of concrete objects) since he maintains that the\nquestion “Do \$X\\text{s}\$ really exist?” are\npseudo-questions (if asked independently of some linguistic\nframework).", "\nBut there are other ways to suggest that abstract objects have\nexistence conditions that demand little of the world. For example,\nLinsky & Zalta (1995, 532) argued that the mind-independence\nand objectivity of abstract objects isn’t like that of physical\nobjects: abstract objects aren’t subject to an\nappearance/reality distinction, they don’t exist in a\n‘sparse’ way that requires discovery by empirical\ninvestigation, and they aren’t complete objects (e.g.,\nmathematical objects are defined only by their mathematical\nproperties). They use this conception to naturalize\nZalta’s comprehension principle for abstract objects.", "\nOther deflationary accounts develop some weaker sense in which\nabstract objects exist (e.g., as ‘thin’ objects). We\nfurther describe some of these proposals below and try to unpack the\nways in which they characterize the weakened, deflationary sense of\nexistence (even when such characterizations are not always\nexplicit).", "\nCarnap held that claims about the “real” existence of\nentities (concrete or abstract) do not have cognitive content. They\nare pseudo-statements. However, he admitted: (a) that there are\nsentences in science that use terms that designate mathematical\nentities (such as numbers); and (b) that semantic analysis seems to\nrequire entities like properties and propositions. Since mathematical\nentities, properties, and propositions are traditionally considered\nabstract, he wanted to clarify how it is possible to accept a language\nreferring to abstract entities without adopting what he considered\npseudo-sentences about such entities’ objective reality.\nCarnap’s famous paper (1950 [1956]) contained an attempt to show\nthat, without embracing Platonism, one can use a language referring to\nabstract entities.", "\nTo achieve these goals, Carnap begins by noting that before one can\nask existence questions about entities of a determinate kind, one\nfirst has to have a language, or a linguistic framework, that\nallows one to speak about the kinds of entity in question. He then\ndistinguishes ‘internal’ existence questions expressed\nwithin such a linguistic framework from ‘external’\nexistence questions about a framework. Only the latter ask whether the\nentities of that framework are objectively real. As we’ll see\nbelow, Carnap thought that internal existence questions within a\nframework can be answered, either by empirical investigation or by\nlogical analysis, depending on the kind of entity the framework is\nabout. By contrast, Carnap regards external questions (e.g., ‘Do\n\$X\\text{s}\$ exist?’, expressed either about, or independent\nof, a linguistic framework) as pseudo-questions: though they appear to\nbe theoretical questions, in fact they are merely practical questions\nabout the utility of the linguistic framework for science.", "\nCarnap’s paper (1950 [1956]) considers a variety of linguistic\nframeworks, such as those for: observable things (i.e., the\nspatiotemporally ordered system of observable things and events),\nnatural numbers and integers, propositions, thing properties, rational\nand real numbers, and spatiotemporal coordinate systems. Each\nframework is established by developing a language that typically\nincludes expressions for one or more kinds of entities in question,\nexpressions for properties of the entities in question (including a\ngeneral category term for each kind of entity in question), and\nvariables ranging over those entities. Thus, a framework for the\nsystem of observable things has expressions that denote such things\n(‘the Earth’, ‘the Eiffel Tower’, etc.),\nexpressions for properties of such things (‘planet’,\n‘made of metal’, etc.), and variables ranging over\nobservables. The framework for natural numbers has expressions that\ndenote them (‘0’, ‘2+5’), expressions for\nproperties of the numbers (‘prime’, ‘odd’),\nincluding the general category term ‘number’), and\nvariables ranging over numbers.", "\nFor Carnap, each statement in a linguistic framework should have a\ntruth value that can be determined either by analytical or empirical\nmethods. A statement’s truth value is analytically determinable\nif it is logically true (or false), or if it’s truth is\ndeterminable exclusively from the rules of the language or on the\nbasis of semantic relationships among its component expressions. A\nstatement is empirically determinable when it is confirmable (or\ndisconfirmable) in the light of the perceived evidence. Note that the\nvery attempt to confirm an empirical statement about physical objects\non the basis of the evidence requires that one adopt the language of\nthe framework of things. Carnap warns us, however, that “this\nmust not be interpreted as if it meant … acceptance of a\nbelief in the reality of the thing world; there is no such\nbelief or assertion or assumption because it is not a theoretical\nquestion” (1950 [1956, 208]). For Carnap, to accept an ontology\n“means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language,\nin other words to accept rules for forming statements and for testing,\naccepting, or rejecting them” (1950 [1956, 208]).", "\nCarnap takes this approach to every linguistic framework, no matter\nwhether it is a framework about physical, concrete things, or a\nframework about abstract entities such as numbers, properties,\nconcepts, propositions, etc. For him, the pragmatic reasons for\naccepting a given linguistic framework are that it has explanatory\npower, unifies the explanation of disparate kinds of data and\nphenomena, expresses claims more efficiently, etc. And we often choose\na framework for a particular explanatory purpose. We might therefore\nchoose a framework with expressions about abstract entities to carry\nout an explication (i.e., an elucidation of concepts), or to\ndevelop a semantics for natural language. For Carnap, the choice\nbetween platonism or nominalism is not a legitimate one; both are\ninappropriate attempts to answer an external pseudo-question.", "\nAs sketched earlier, the truth of such existence claims as\n‘there are tables’ and ‘there are unicorns’,\nwhich are expressed within the framework for observable entities, is\nto be determined empirically, since empirical observations and\ninvestigations are needed. These statements are not true in virtue of\nthe rules of the language. By contrast, existence claims such as\n‘there are numbers’ (‘\$\\exists xNx\$’)\nexpressed within the framework of number theory, or ‘there is a\nproperty \$F\$ such that both \$x\$ and \$y\$ are \$F\$’\n(‘\$\\exists F(Fx \\:\\&\\:\nFy)\$’) expressed within the framework of property\ntheory, can be determined analytically. For these statements either\nform part of the rules of the language (e.g., expressed as axioms that\ngovern the terms of the language) or are derivable from the rules of\nthe language. When these statements are part of the rules that make up\nthe linguistic framework, they are considered analytic, as\nare the existential statements that follow from those\nrules.[14]\n ", "\nAll of the existence assertions just discussed are therefore\ninternal to their respective linguistic frameworks. Carnap\nthinks that the only sense that can be given to talk of\n“existence” is an internal sense. Internal questions about\nthe existence of things or abstract objects are not questions about\ntheir real metaphysical\n existence.[15]\n Hence, it seems more appropriate to describe his view as embodying a\ndeflationary notion of object. For Carnap concludes “the\nquestion of the admissibility of entities of a certain type or of\nabstract entities in general as designata is reduced to the question\nof the acceptability of the linguistic framework for those\nentities” (1950 [1956, 217]).", "\nThus, for each framework (no matter whether it describes empirical\nobjects, abstract objects, or a mix of both), one can formulate both\nsimple and complex existential statements. According to Carnap, each\nsimple existential statement is either empirical or analytic. If a\nsimple statement is empirical, its truth value can be determined by a\ncombination of empirical inquiry and consideration of the linguistic\nrules governing the framework; if the simple existential statement is\nanalytic, then its truth value can be determined simply by considering\nthe linguistic rules governing the framework. Whereas the simple\nexistential statements that require empirical investigation assert the\nexistence of possible concrete entities (like ‘tables’\nor ‘unicorns’), the simple existential statements that are\nanalytic assert the existence of abstract entities. Let us call this\ncriterion for asserting the existence of abstract objects the\ncriterion of linguistic rules.", "\nThe case of mixed frameworks poses some difficulties for the view.\nAccording to the Criterion of Linguistic Rules,", "\n\$x\$ is abstract iff “\$x\$ exists” is analytic in the\nrelevant language.", "\nBut this criterion suggests that impure sets,\nobject-dependent properties, abstract artifacts, and the rest are not\nabstract. For this criterion appears to draw a line between certain\npure abstract entities and everything else. The truth of simple\nexistence statements about \$\\{\\textrm{Bob Dylan}\\}\$ or\nDickens’ A Christmas Carol, which usually are\nconsidered abstract entities, does not depend solely on linguistic\nrules. The same goes for simple and complex existential statements\nwith general terms such as ‘novel’, ‘legal\nstatute’, etc.", "\nIn the end, though, Carnap doesn’t seem to be either a realist\nor nominalist about objects (abstract or concrete). Carnap rejects the\nquestion whether these objects are real in a metaphysical sense. But,\ncontrary to the nominalist, he rejects the idea that we can truly deny\nthe real existence of abstract objects (i.e., a denial that is\nexternal to a linguistic framework). This attitude, which settles the\nquestion of which framework to adopt on pragmatic grounds (e.g., which\nframework best helps us to make sense of the data to be explained), is\nthe reason why we’ve labeled his view as a way of weakening\nexistence. See the entry on\n Carnap\n for further details.", "\nProposals by other philosophers are related to Carnap’s view.\nResnik (1997, Part Two) has put forward a postulational\nepistemology for the existence of mathematical objects. According\nto this view, all one has to do to ensure the existence of\nmathematical objects is to use a language to posit mathematical\nobjects and to establish a consistent mathematical theory for\n them.[16]\n Nevertheless, their existence does not result from their being\nposited. Instead, we recognize those objects as existent because a\nconsistent mathematical theory for them has been developed. Resnik\nrequires both a linguistic stipulation for considering mathematical\nobjects and a coherency condition for recognizing them as existent.\nThomasson (2015, 30–34) advocates for an approach which she\ntakes to be inherited from Carnap. She calls it easy\nontology. Since she is not trying to find ultimate categories or\na definitive list of basic (abstract or concrete) objects, she prefers\na simpler kind of realism (see Thomasson 2015, 145–158). She\nargues that everyday uses of existential statements provide acceptable\nontological commitments when those assertions are supported either by\nempirical evidence or merely by the rules of use that govern general\nterms (e.g., sortal terms); in both cases she says that\n“application conditions” for a general term are fulfilled\n(see Thomasson 2015, 86, 89–95). She, too, therefore offers a\ncriterion of linguistic rules for accepting abstract objects.\nGiven her defense of simple realism, it appears that she takes both\nobservable objects and theoretical entities in science as\nconcrete.", "\nIn what follows, two ways of formulating criteria for the\nabstract/concrete distinction are considered. The views start with the\nidea that our concept of an object allows for objects whose existence\nplaces very few demands on reality over and above the demands imposed\nby claims that do not mention abstract objects. Those philosophers who\nmaintain this philosophical thesis are what Linnebo (2012) calls\nmetaontological minimalists. Their proposals are typically\nput forward in connection with issues in the philosophy of\nmathematics, but then applied to other domains.", "\nParsons (1990), Resnik (1997), and Shapiro (1997) contend that, in the\ncase of mathematical theories, coherence suffices for the existence of\nthe objects mentioned in those\n theories.[17]\n They do not offer an explicit criterion for distinguishing abstract\nand concrete objects. Nevertheless, their proposals implicitly draw\nthe distinction; abstract objects are those objects that exist in\nvirtue of the truth of certain modal claims. In particular, the\nexistence of mathematical objects is “grounded in” pure\nmodal truths. For example, numbers exist “in virtue of”\nthe fact that there could have been an \$\\omega\$-sequence of objects;\nsets exist because there might be entities that satisfy the axioms of\none or another set theory, etc. Since these pure modal truths are\nnecessary, this explains why pure abstract objects exist necessarily.\nIt also explains a sense in which they are insubstantial: their\nexistence is grounded in truths that do not (on the face of it)\nrequire the actual existence of anything at\n all.[18]\n ", "\nLinnebo (2018) advances a proposal about how to conceive abstract\nobjects by revising our understanding of Fregean biconditional\nprinciples of abstraction (see\n subsection 3.4).\n Some philosophers take these Fregean abstraction principles to be\nanalytic sentences. For example, Hale & Wright (2001; 2009)\nconsider the two sides of an abstraction principle as equivalent as a\nmatter of meaning; they ‘carve up content’ in different\nways (to use Frege’s metaphor). But Linnebo (2018, 13–14)\nrejects this view and the view that such biconditional principles are\nanalytic.", "\nHe suggests instead that we achieve reference to abstract (and other\nobjects) by means of a sufficiency operator, \$\\Rightarrow\$,\nwhich he takes to be a strengthening of the material conditional. He\nstarts with conditional principles of the form “if\n\$Rab\$, then \$f(a) \\! =\\! f(b)\$” (e.g., “if \$a\$ and\n\$b\$ are parallel, then the direction of \$a\$ = the direction of\n\$b\$”) and takes the right-hand side to be reconceptualization\nof the left-hand side. He represents these claims as \$\\phi\n\\Rightarrow \\psi\$, where the new operator\n‘\$\\Rightarrow\$’ is meant to capture the intuitive idea\nthat \$\\phi\$ is (conceptually) sufficient\nfor \$\\psi\$, or all that is required for\n\$\\psi\$ is \$\\phi\$. For \$\\phi\$ to be sufficient for\n\$\\psi\$, sufficiency must be stronger than\nmetaphysically implies but weaker than analytically\nimplies (see Linnebo 2018, 15). The notion Linnebo considers is a\n‘species of metaphysical grounding’. Hence, sufficiency\nstatements allow us to conceptualize statements mentioning abstract\nobjects (or other problematic objects) in terms of metaphysically less\nproblematic or non-problematic objects.", "\nIt is important for Linnebo that sufficiency be asymmetric. He\nwouldn’t accept mutual sufficiency, i.e., principles of the form\n\$Rab \\Leftrightarrow f(a) \\! =\\! f(b)\$, since these would imply that\nboth sides are equivalent as a matter of meaning. Instead, the point\nis that the seemingly unproblematic claim \$Rab\$ renders the claim\n\$f(a) \\! =\\! f(b)\$ unproblematic, and this is best expressed by\nsufficiency statements of the form \$Rab \\Rightarrow f(a) \\! =\\!\nf(b)\$, on which the left side grounds the right side. So\nLinnebo’s notion of reconceptualization is not the Fregean\nnotion of recarving of content.", "\nMoreover, in a sufficiency statement, Linnebo doesn’t require\nthat the relation \$R\$ be an equivalence relation; he requires only\nthat \$R\$ be symmetric and transitive. It need not be reflexive, for\nthe domain might contain entities \$x\$ such that \$\\neg Rxx\$ (e.g.,\nin the case of the sufficiency statement for directions, not every\nobject \$x\$ in the domain is such that \$x\$ is parallel with\n\$x\$—being parallel is restricted to lines). Linnebo calls such\nsymmetric and transitive relations unity relations. When a\nsufficiency statement—\$Rab \\Rightarrow f(a) \\! =\\!\nf(b)\$—holds, then new objects are identified. The new objects\nare specified in terms of the less problematic entities related by\n\$R\$; for example, directions become specified by lines that are\nparallel. According to Linnebo, the parallel lines become\nspecifications of the new objects. A unity relation \$R\$ is\ntherefore the starting point for developing a sufficient (but not\nnecessary and sufficient) condition for reference.", "\nSometimes the new objects introduced by conditional principles do not\nmake demands on reality; when that happens, they are said to be\nthin (for example, directions only require that there be\nparallel lines). However, when the new objects introduced by\nsufficiency statements make more substantial demands on reality, the\nobjects are considered thick. Suppose \$Rab\$ asserts \$a\$\nand \$b\$ are spatiotemporal parts of the same cohesive and naturally\nbounded whole. Then \$a\$ and \$b\$ become specifications for physical\nbodies via the following principle: \$Rab \\Rightarrow \\mathrm{Body}(a)\n\\! =\\! \\mathrm{Body}(b)\$. In this case, the principle “makes a\nsubstantial demand on the world” because it requires checking\nthat there are spatiotemporal parts constituting a continuous\nstretch of solid stuff (just looking at the spatiotemporal parts\ndoes not suffice to determine whether they constitute to a body; see\nLinnebo 2018, 45).", "\nHowever, Linnebo does not identify being abstract with being thin\n(2012, 147), for there are thin objects in a relative sense that are\nnot abstract, namely those that make no substantial demands on the\nworld beyond those introduced in terms of some antecedently given\nobjects. The mereological sum of your left hand and your laptop makes\nno demand on the world beyond the demands of its\n parts.[19]\n Instead, he suggests that abstract objects are those that are thin\nand that have a shallow nature. The notion of shallow\nnature is meant to capture “the intuitive idea that any\nquestion that is solely about \$F\\text{s}\$ has an answer that can be\ndetermined on the basis of any given specifications of these\n\$F\\text{s}\$” (2018, 192–195). For example, directions\nhave a shallow nature because any question about directions (e.g., are\nthey orthogonal, etc.?) can be determined solely on the basis of the\nlines that specify them. Shapes have a shallow nature because any\nquestion about them (e.g., are they triangular, circular, etc.?) can\nbe determined solely on the basis of their underlying concrete\nfigures. By contrast, mereological sums of concrete objects are\nnot shallow because there are questions about them that\ncannot be answered solely on the basis of their specifications; for\ninstance, the weight of the mereological sum of your laptop and your\nleft hand depends not only on their combination but also on the\ngravitational field in which they are\n located.[20]\n ", "\nLinnebo thus contrasts abstract objects, which are thin and have a\nshallow nature, with concrete objects, which do not have a shallow\nnature. Linnebo extends this view in several ways. He constructs an\naccount of mathematical objects that goes beyond the way of\nabstraction principles by providing a reconstruction of set\ntheory in terms of ‘dynamic abstraction’ (2018,\nch. 3). This form of minimalism also allows for abstract objects\nof a mixed nature; namely, those that are thin relative to\nother objects. For example, the type of the letter ‘A’ is\nabstract because it is thin and has a shallow nature, but it is thin\nwith respect the tokens of the letter ‘A’.", "\nThis view, as Linnebo himself admits, faces some problems. One of them\nis that the methodologies used by working mathematicians, such as\nclassical logic, impredicative definitions, and taking arbitrary\nsubcollections of infinite domains, seem to presuppose objects that\nare more independent, i.e., objects that don’t have a shallow\nnature (2018, 197; for a discussion of independence, see \nSection 4.1 of the entry on\n platonism in mathematics). \nAnother problem (2018, 195) is that\nin order for an object to count as having a shallow nature,\nan intrinsic unity relation has to be available. An\ninvestigation is required to establish that there is such an intrinsic\nunity relation in each case. It is far from clear that a conditional\nprinciple with an intrinsic unity relation is available for\neach of problematic cases mentioned in this entry, such as chess,\nlegal institutions or the English language. Finally, Linnebo\ndoesn’t discuss the question of whether sets of concrete\nurelements are themselves abstract or concrete. At present, there may\nbe an important question left open by his theory that other theories\nof abstract objects answer." ], "subsection_title": "3.7 The Ways of Weakening Existence" }, { "content": [ "\nWe come finally to proposals that reject the abstract/concrete\ndistinction. We can consider three cases. First, there are the\nnominalists who both reject abstract entities and reject the\ndistinction as illegitimate. They focus on arguing against the\nformulations of the distinction proposed in the literature. A second\ngroup of eliminativists reject real objects of any kind, thereby\ndismissing the distinction as irrelevant; these are the ontological\nnihilists. A final group of eliminativists agree that there are\nprototypical cases of concrete objects and abstract objects, but\nconclude that a rigorous philosophical distinction can’t be made\nclearly enough to have any explanatory power (see Sider 2013, 287).\nThis recalls Lewis’ pessimism (1986a, 81–86) about the\npossibility of establishing a distinction that is sufficiently clear\nto be theoretically interesting." ], "subsection_title": "3.8 Eliminativism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nBerto & Plebani (2015) provide an useful introduction to ontology\nand metaontology. Putnam (1971) makes the case for abstract objects on\nscientific grounds. Bealer (1993) and Tennant (1997) present a\npriori arguments for the necessary existence of abstract\nentities. Fine (2002) systematically studies of abstraction principles\nin the foundations of mathematics. Wetzel (2009) examines the\ntype-token distinction, argues that types are abstract objects while\nthe tokens of those types are their concrete instances, and shows how\ndifficult it is to paraphrase away the many references to types that\noccur in the sciences and natural language. Zalta (2020) develops a\ntype-theoretic framework for higher-order abstract objects (which\nincludes abstract properties and abstract relations in addition to\nordinary properties and relations) and offers both comparisons to\nother type theories and applications in philosophy and linguistics.\nMoltmann (2013) investigates the extent to which abstract objects are\nneeded when developing a semantics of natural language; in this book,\nand also in her article (2020), she defends a\n‘core-periphery’ distinction and suggests that natural\nlanguage ontology contains references to abstract objects only in its\nperiphery. Falguera and Martínez-Vidal (2020) have edited a\nvolume in which contributors present positions and debates about\nabstract objects of different kinds and categories, in different\nfields in philosophy." ], "section_title": "4. Further Reading", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Armstrong, David, 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism\n(Volume I: Nominalism and Realism; Volume II: A Theory of\nUniversals), New York: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 1989, Universals: An Opinionated\nIntroduction, Boulder: Westview Press.", "Azzouni, Jody, 1997a, “Applied Mathematics, Existential\nCommitment and the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Thesis,”\nPhilosophia Mathematica, 3(5): 193–209.", "–––, 1997b, “Thick Epistemic Access:\nDistinguishing the Mathematical from the Empirical,” The\nJournal of Philosophy, 94(9):\n472–484. doi:10.2307/2564619", "–––, 2004, Deflating Existential\nConsequence: A Case for Nominalism, New York: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/0195159888.001.0001", "–––, 2010, Talking About Nothing: Numbers,\nHallucinations and Fictions, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Baker, Alan, 2005, “Are There Genuine Mathematical\nExplanations of Physical Phenomena?” Mind, 114(454):\n223–238.", "–––, 2009, “Mathematical Explanation in\nScience,” British Journal for the Philosophy of\nScience, 60(3): 611–633.", "–––, 2017, “Mathematics and Explanatory\nGenerality,” Philosophia Mathematica, 25(2):\n194–209. doi:10.1093/philmat/nkw021", "Balaguer, Mark, 1995, “A Platonist Epistemology,”\nSynthese, 103(3): 303–325.", "–––, 1996, “A Fictionalist Account of the\nIndispensable Applications of Mathematics,” Philosophical\nStudies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic\nTradition, 83(3): 291–314.", "–––, 1998, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in\nMathematics p. 240, New York: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2020, “Moral Folkism and the\nDeflation of (Lots of) Normative and Metaethics,” in José\nFalguera & Martínez-Vidal (eds.) 2020,\npp. 297–318.", "Baron, Samuel, 2016, “Explaining Mathematical\nExplanation,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(264):\n458–480. doi:10.1093/pq/pqv123", "–––, 2020, “Purely Physical Explananda:\nBistability in Perception,” in Falguera &\nMartínez-Vidal (eds.) 2020, pp. 17–34.", "Bealer, George, 1993, “Universals,” The Journal of\nPhilosophy, 90(1): 5–32. doi:10.2307/2940824", "Benacerraf, Paul, 1965, “What Numbers Could Not Be,”\nPhilosophical Review, 74(1): 47–73.", "–––, 1973, “Mathematical Truth,”\nJournal of Philosophy, 70(19): 661–679.", "Berto, Francesco, and Plebani, Matteo, 2015, Ontology and\nMetaontology: A Contemporary Guide, London; New York: Bloomsbury\nAcademic.", "Bolzano, Bernard, 1837, Wissenschaftslehre, Sulzbach:\nJ. E. v. Seidel.", "Brentano, Franz, 1874, Psychologie Vom Empirischen\nStandpunkt, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.", "Bueno, Otávio, 2008a, “Nominalism and Mathematical\nIntuition,” Protosociology, 25: 89–107.", "–––, 2008b, “Truth and Proof,”\nManuscrito, 31(1): 419–440.", "–––, 2020, “Contingent Abstract\nObjects,” in Falguera & Martínez-Vidal (eds.) 2020,\npp. 91–109.", "Burgess, John P., 2005, Fixing Frege, Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press.", "Burgess, John P., and Rosen, Gideon, 1997, A Subject with No\nObject: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of\nMathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Carnap, Rudolf, 1950 [1956], “Empiricism, Semantics, and\nOntology,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4(11):\n20–40; reprinted with revisions in Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and\nNecessity, expanded edition, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956,\npp. 205–221.", "Chalmers, David, 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Colyvan, Mark, 2001, The Indispensability of Mathematics,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2010, “There Is No Easy Road to\nNominalism,” Mind, 119(474):\n285–306. doi:10.1093/mind/fzq014", "Colyvan, Mark, and Zalta, Edward N., 1999, “Mathematics:\nTruth and Fiction?” Philosophia Mathematica, 7(3):\n336–349. doi:10.1093/philmat/7.3.336", "Cook, Roy, 2003, “Iteration One More Time,” Notre\nDame Journal of Formal Logic, 44(2): 63–92.", "Cowling, Sam, 2017, Abstract Entities, London:\nRoutledge.", "Crane, Tim, and Mellor, D. H., 1990, “There Is No Question\nof Physicalism,” Mind, 99(394): 185–206.", "Dedekind, Richard, 1888 [1963], Was Sind Und Was Sollen Die\nZahlen, Braunschweig: Vieweg und Sohn; English translation,\n“The Nature and Meaning of Numbers”, in R. Dedekind,\nEssays on the Theory of Numbers, Wooster Woodruff Beman (trans.),\nNew York: Dover, 1963, pp. 29–115.", "Donato-Rodríguez, Xavier, and Falguera, José L.,\n2020, “The Nature of Scientific Models: Abstract Artifacts That\nDetermine Fictional Systems,” in Falguera &\nMartínez-Vidal (eds.) 2020, pp. 151–171.", "Dummett, Michael, 1973, Frege: Philosophy of Language,\nLondon: Duckworth.", "Enoch, David, 2011, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of\nRobust Realism, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.001.0001", "–––, 2016, “Indispensability Arguments in\nMetaethics: Even Better Than in Mathematics?” in Uri D.\nLeibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and\nMathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Falguera, José L., and Martínez-Vidal, Concha\n(eds.), 2020, Abstract Objects: For and Against (Synthese\nLibrary: Volume 422), Cham, Switzerland: Springer.", "Field, Hartry, 1980, Science Without Numbers, Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press.", "–––, 1989, Realism, Mathematics and\nModality, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.", "Fine, Kit, 1994, “Essence and Modality,”\nPhilosophical Perspectives, 8:\n1–16. doi:10.2307/2214160", "–––, 2002, The Limits of Abstraction,\nOxford; New York: Clarendon Press.", "–––, 2005, “Our Knowledge of Mathematical\nObjects,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 1,\npp. 89–110, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Frege, Gottlob, 1884, Grundlagen Der Arithmetik, Breslau:\nW. Koebner.", "–––, 1918, “Der Gedanke: Eine Logische\nUntersuchung,” Beiträge Zur Philosophie Des Deutschen\nIdealismus, I: 58–77.", "Goodman, Nelson, and Quine, W. V. O., 1947, “Steps Toward a\nConstructive Nominalism,” The Journal of Symbolic\nLogic, 12(4): 105–122.", "Gödel, Kurt, 1964, “What Is Cantor’s Continuum\nProblem?” in P. Benacerraf & H. Putnam (eds.),\nPhilosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd edition,\npp. 254–270, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Hale, Bob, 1987, Abstract Objects, Oxford:\nBlackwell.", "Hale, Bob, and Wright, Crispin, 2001, The Reason’s\nProper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of\nMathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2009, “The Metaontology of\nAbstraction,” in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman\n(eds.), Metametaphysics, pp. 178–212, New York: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Hellman, Geoffrey, 1989, Mathematics Without Numbers: Towards\na Modal-Structural Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Hirsch, Eli, 2002, “Quantifier Variance and Realism,”\nPhilosophical Issues, 12(1): 51–73.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2002.tb00061.x", "–––, 2011, Quantifier Variance and Realism:\nEssays in Metaontology, New York: Oxford University Press.", "Inwagen, Peter van, 1977, “Creatures of Fiction,”\nAmerican Philosophical Quarterly, 14(4): 299–308.", "–––, 1983, “Fiction and\nMetaphysics,” Philosophy and Literature, 7(1):\n67–77. doi:10.1353/phl.1983.0059", "Jackson, Frank, 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” The\nPhilosophical Quarterly, 32(127): 127–136.\ndoi:10.2307/2960077 ", "Kalderon, Mark Eli, 2005, Fictionalism in Metaphysics,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Katz, Jerrold, 1980, Language and Other Abstract Objects,\nLanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.", "Knowles, Robert, and Saatsi, Juha, 2019, “Mathematics and\nExplanatory Generality: Nothing but Cognitive Salience,”\nErkenntnis. doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00146-x", "Kripke, Saul, 1973 [2013], Reference and Existence: The John\nLocke Lectures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. [These\nlectures were given in 1973 but remained unpublished until 2013.]", "Leibowitz, Uri D., and Sinclair, Neil (eds.), 2016,\nExplanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and\nDispensability, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198778592.001.0001", "Leng, Mary, 2010, Mathematics and Reality, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 2020, “Is There a Fact of the Matter\nAbout the Existence of Abstract Objects?” in Falguera &\nMartínez-Vidal (eds.) 2020, pp. 111–130.", "Lewis, David, 1986a, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:\nBlackwell.", "–––, 1986b, “Events”, in\nD. Lewis, Philosophical Papers (Volume II), Oxford:\nOxford University Press, pp. 241–269. ", "–––, 2007, “Events,” in\nPhilosophical Papers: Volume Ii, pp. 241–269, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Linnebo, 2012, “Metaontological Minimalism,”\nPhilosophy Compass, 7(2):\n139–151. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00471.x", "–––, 2018, Thin Objects: An Abstractionist\nAccount, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199641314.001.0001", "Linsky, Bernard, and Zalta, Edward N., 1995, “Naturalized\nPlatonism Versus Platonized Naturalism,” The Journal of\nPhilosophy, 92(10): 525–555. doi:10.2307/2940786", "Locke, John, 1689, An Essay Concerning Human\nUnderstanding, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Maddy, Penelope, 1990, Realism in Mathematics, New York;\nLondon: Clarendon Press.", "–––, 1995, “Naturalism and\nOntology,” Philosophia Mathematica, 3(3):\n248–270. doi:10.1093/philmat/3.3.248", "–––, 1997, Naturalism in Mathematics,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2011, Defending the Axioms: On the\nPhilosophical Foundations of Set Theory, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Malament, David, 1982, “Review of Field (1980),”\nThe Journal of Philosophy, 79: 523–34.", "Mally, Ernst, 1912, Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen Der\nLogik Und Logistik, Leipzig: Barth.", "Martínez-Vidal, Concha, and Rivas-de-Castro, Navia, 2020,\n“Description, Explanation and Ontological Commitment,” in\nFalguera & Martínez-Vidal (eds.) 2020,\npp. 35–57.", "Meinong, Alexius, 1904, “Über\nGegenstandstheorie,” in A. Meinong (ed.), Untersuchungen Zur\nGegenstandstheorie Und Psychologie [Investigations in Theory of\nObjects and Psychology], pp. 1–51, Leipzig: Barth.", "–––, 1915, Über Möglichkeit Und\nWahrscheinlichkeit. Beiträge Zur Gegenstandstheorie Und\nErkenntnistheorie [on Possibility and Probability. Contributions to\nObject Theory and Epistemology], Leipzig: Barth.", "Melia, Joseph, 2000, “Weaseling Away the Indispensability\nArgument,” Mind, 109(435): 455–479.", "–––, 2002, “Response to Colyvan,”\nMind, 111(441): 75–79.", "Moltmann, Friederike, 2013, Abstract Objects and the Semantics\nof Natural Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2020, “Abstract Objects and the\nCore-Periphery Distinction in the Ontological and the Conceptual\nDomain of Natural Language,” in Falguera &\nMartínez-Vidal (eds.) 2020, pp. 255–276.", "Nodelman, Uri, and Zalta, Edward N., 2014, “Foundations for\nMathematical Structuralism,” Mind, 123(489):\n39–78. doi:10.1093/mind/fzu003", "Parsons, Charles, 1990, “The Structuralist View of\nMathematical Objects,” Synthese, 84(3):\n303–346.", "Parsons, Terence, 1980, Nonexistent Objects, New Haven:\nYale University Press.", "Popper, Karl, 1968, “Epistemology Without a Knowing\nSubject,” in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science\nIii, pp. 333–373, Amsterdam: North Holland.", "Putnam, Hilary, 1967, “Mathematics Without\nFoundations,” The Journal of Philosophy, 64(1):\n5–22.", "–––, 1971, Philosophy of Logic, London:\nHarper; Row.", "–––, 1987, The Many Faces of Realism,\nLa Salle: Open Court.", "–––, 1990, Realism with a Human Face,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Quine, W. V. O., 1948, “On What There Is,” The\nReview of Metaphysics, 2(5): 21–38.", "–––, 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge,\nMA: The MIT Press.", "–––, 1969, Ontological Relativity and Other\nEssays, New York: Columbia University Press.", "–––, 1976, The Ways of Paradox and Other\nEssays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Rayo, Agustín, 2013, The Construction of Logical\nSpace, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Resnik, Michael D., 1982, “Mathematics as a Science of\nPatterns: Epistemology,” Noûs, 16(1):\n95–105. doi:10.2307/2215419", "–––, 1997, Mathematics as a Science of\nPatterns p. 290, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/0198250142.001.0001", "Rosen, Gideon, 1994, “Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What\nIs the Question?” in M. Michael & J. O’Leary-Hawthorne\n(eds.), Philosophy in Mind, pp. 277–319, Dordrecht:\nSpringer.", "–––, 2011, “The Reality of Mathematical\nObjects,” in J. Polkinghorne (ed.), Meaning in\nMathematics, pp. 113–131, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Rosen, Gideon, and Yablo, Stephen, 2020, “Solving the Caesar\nProblem – with Metaphysics,” in A. Miller (ed.),\nLogic, Language and Mathematics: Themes from the Philosophy of\nCrispin Wright, pp. 116–131, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Saatsi, Juha, 2011, “The Enhanced Indispensability Argument:\nRepresentational Versus Explanatory Role of Mathematics in\nScience,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of\nScience, 62(1): 143–154.", "Sainsbury, Mark, 2009, Fiction and Fictionalism, London:\nRoutledge.", "Shapiro, Stewart, 1997, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure\nand Ontology, New York: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/0195139305.001.0001", "Sider, Theodore, 2007, “Parthood,” The\nPhilosophical Review, 116(1):\n51–91. doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-022", "–––, 2009, “Ontological Realism,” in\nD. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. 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Reidel.", "–––, 1988, Intensional Logic and Metaphysics\nof Intentionality, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.", "–––, 1993, “Twenty-Five Basic Theorems in\nSituation and World Theory,” Journal of Philosophical\nLogic, 22: 385–428.", "–––, 2006, “Essence and Modality,”\nMind, 115(459): 659–693.", "–––, 2020, “Typed Object Theory,” in\nFalguera & Martínez-Vidal (eds.) 2020,\npp. 59–88." ]	[ { "href": "../analytic-synthetic/", "text": "analytic/synthetic distinction" }, { "href": "../carnap/", "text": "Carnap, Rudolf" }, { "href": "../fictionalism/", "text": "fictionalism" }, { "href": "../frege/", "text": "Frege, Gottlob" }, { "href": "../mathphil-indis/", "text": "mathematics, philosophy of: indispensability arguments in the" }, { "href": "../nominalism-mathematics/", "text": "mathematics, philosophy of: nominalism" }, { "href": "../nominalism-metaphysics/", "text": "nominalism: in metaphysics" }, { "href": "../object/", "text": "object" }, { "href": "../physicalism/", "text": "physicalism" }, { "href": "../platonism/", "text": "Platonism: in metaphysics" }, { "href": "../platonism-mathematics/", "text": "Platonism: in the philosophy of mathematics" }, { "href": "../states-of-affairs/", "text": "states of affairs" }, { "href": "../types-tokens/", "text": "types and tokens" } ]
essential-accidental	Essential vs. Accidental Properties	First published Tue Apr 29, 2008; substantive revision Mon Oct 26, 2020	[ "\nThe distinction between essential versus accidental\nproperties has been characterized in various ways, but it is\noften understood in modal terms: an essential\nproperty of an object is a property that it must have, while an\naccidental property of an object is one that it happens to\nhave but that it could lack. Let’s call this the basic modal\ncharacterization, where a modal characterization of a\nnotion is one that explains the notion in terms of\nnecessity/possibility. In the characterization just given of the\ndistinction between essential and accidental properties, the use of\nthe word “must” reflects the fact that\nnecessity is invoked, while the use of the word\n“could” reflects that possibility is\ninvoked. The notions of necessity and possibility are interdefinable:\nto say that something is necessary is to say that its negation is not\npossible; to say that something is possible is to say that its\nnegation is not necessary; to say that an object must have a certain\nproperty is to say that it could not lack it; and to say that an\nobject could have a certain property is to say that it is not the case\nthat it must lack it.", "\nMany would say that each individual human could not fail to be human;\nif so, then the basic modal characterization counts the property of\nbeing human as an essential property of each human. And, too, many\nwould say that although someone, say Socrates, is in fact fond of\ndogs, Socrates could have lacked that property; if that is right, then\nthe basic modal characterization counts the property of being fond of\ndogs as an accidental property of Socrates.", " \nA modal characterization of the distinction between essential and\naccidental properties is taken for granted in nearly all work in\nanalytic metaphysics in the latter half of the 20th century. Advocates\nof the modal characterization have included Ruth Barcan Marcus (1967)\nand Saul Kripke (1972/1980), among others. However, some other\ncharacterizations of the distinction (see §2) have recently\ngained currency. It is worth stressing here at the outset that\nalthough there is now some disagreement about how the distinction\nbetween essential and accidental properties is to be drawn, there is\nnevertheless some agreement about cases. Most would agree that however\nthe distinction is drawn, it should come out that being human (or\nbeing human if existent) is an essential property of Socrates while\nbeing fond of dogs is a merely accidental property of Socrates.", "\nEssentialism in general may be characterized as the doctrine\nthat (at least some) objects have (at least some) essential\nproperties. This characterization is not universally accepted (see\n§3), but no characterization is; and at least this one has the\nvirtue of being simple and straightforward. As for specific\nessentialist claims, we have already encountered one—the claim\nthat the property of being human is essential to Socrates. Another\nexample is the claim that Socrates’s biological\norigin—Socrates’s parents, or more particularly, the sperm\nand egg from which Socrates arose—is essential to Socrates. The\nfirst example is a brand of sortal essentialism while the\nsecond is a brand of origin essentialism. Both of these kinds\nof essentialisms have figured prominently in the philosophical\nliterature." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Modal Characterization of the Essential/Accidental Property Distinction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Other Ways of Characterizing the Essential/Accidental Property Distinction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Four Ways of Characterizing Essentialism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Some Varieties of Essentialism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Suspicions about Essentialism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Essentialist Claims in Arguments for Nonidentities", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAccording to the basic modal characterization of the\ndistinction between essential and accidental properties, which is the\ncharacterization given at the outset,", "\n\$P\$ is an essential property of an object \$o\$\njust in case it is necessary that \$o\$ has \$P\$, whereas\n\$P\$ is an accidental property of an object \$o\$\njust in case \$o\$ has \$P\$ but it is possible that\n\$o\$ lacks \$P\$.\n", "\nPutting this into the language of possible worlds that\nphilosophers often adopt,", "\n\$P\$ is an essential property of an object \$o\$\njust in case \$o\$ has \$P\$ in all possible worlds, whereas\n\$P\$ is an accidental property of an object \$o\$ just in\ncase \$o\$ has \$P\$ but there is a possible world in which\n\$o\$ lacks \$P\$.\n", "\nAlthough the basic idea behind the modal characterization is clear\nenough from these statements, a moment’s reflection reveals a\nlittle bit of trouble. Many properties (some philosophers would say\nall properties) are such that in order for an object to\npossess them, that object must exist. According to the basic modal\ncharacterization, any such property, if possessed by a contingently\nexisting object, will be counted as an accidental property of\nthat object. But this seems wrong. Consider the property of being a\ndog. It is plausible (and for present purposes we assume it is true)\nthat an object must exist in order to possess this property. Now\nconsider a particular dog named ‘Emma’, who in fact exists\nbut who might not have existed. There is a possible world in which\nEmma does not exist. And in this world (given our assumption) Emma is\nnot a dog, since Emma does not exist there. So, according to the basic\nmodal characterization, being a dog is an accidental property\nof Emma. But however we characterize the distinction between essential\nand accidental properties, the characterization should not by itself\nrule out the intuitively compelling claim that Emma is\nessentially a dog. So the basic modal characterization seems\nflawed.", "\nIn response to this point, it is tempting to turn to a variant of the\nbasic modal characterization, the existence-conditioned modal\ncharacterization, according to which", "\n\$P\$ is an essential property of an object \$o\$\njust in case \$o\$ has \$P\$ and it is necessary that \$o\$ has \$P\$ if\n\$o\$ exists, whereas \$P\$ is an accidental\nproperty of an object \$o\$ just in case \$o\$ has\n\$P\$ but it is possible that \$o\$ lacks \$P\$ and yet\nexists.\n", "\nBut this formulation too is less than satisfactory. A widely noted\nproblem for this way of drawing the distinction is that it makes\nexistence into an essential property of each object, since no object\ncould lack existence and yet exist. Thus, this characterization of the\nessential/accidental property distinction effectively rules out a\ntheist’s claim that only God has existence as an essential\nproperty. But a good characterization of the distinction should not\nrule on a substantive matter in this way.", "\nArguably neither of these problems is devastating. Those who favor the\nbasic characterization can say that typically when someone claims, for\nexample, that Emma is essentially a dog, what is really meant is not\nthat Emma has essentially the property of being a dog, but\ninstead that Emma has essentially the property of being a dog if\nexistent. Existence will be treated specially on this approach:\nthe claim that an object has existence as an essential property will\nnot be taken as the claim that the object has as an essential property\nthe property of being existent if existent; instead the claim\nwill be taken at face value. Those who favor the existence-conditioned\ncharacterization can say that when someone says that only God has\nexistence as an essential property, what is really meant is that only\nGod has existence as a necessary property, where a necessary\nproperty of an object is a property that the object possesses in all\npossible worlds. (According to the basic modal characterization, an\nessential property is the same as a necessary property.) Both\napproaches may be faulted for making a special case of the property of\nexistence. But that is not perhaps such a great fault, given that\nexistence does seem to be a special case and that it is treated\nspecially in other areas of philosophy as well. (It is perhaps worth\npointing out that according to many philosophers—Kant, Russell,\nand Frege to name three—existence is not a property at all. If\nthis is right, then existence is indeed a very special case.) In what\nfollows, we shall not be concerned with the details arising from the\nneed for some sort of existence condition—either in the\nstatement of the definition of an essential property (as on the\nexistence-conditioned modal characterization) or in the properties\nthat are taken to be essential (as on the basic modal\ncharacterization). There are other ways of explaining the distinction\nbetween essential and accidental properties of objects in modal terms\n(to be discussed in §2), but what we have called the basic\nmodal characterization and the existence-conditioned modal\ncharacterization are the standard ways. Together, usually\nindiscriminately, these amount to what we call the modal\ncharacterization.", "\nThe central notion involved in any modal characterization of the\ndistinction between essential and accidental properties is that of\nmetaphysical necessity/possibility. But, since there are a\nnumber of notions that correspond to the many ways that we use the\nwords ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’, it is\nhelpful to contrast the relevant notion of necessity/possibility with\nsome other notions with which it might be confused.", "\nIf one claims that something is possible, it is sometimes natural to\ntake this to mean that one does not know it to be false. For example,\nsuppose that you ask someone whether Socrates ever went to Sparta and\nshe answers that it is possible. It is natural to understand her as\nsaying that she does not know that Socrates did not go to Sparta.\nThus, the possibility that is expressed here is a kind of\nepistemic possibility (in particular, one according to which\n\$p\$ is epistemically possible for an agent \$X\$ just in\ncase not-\$p\$ is not known by \$X)\$. This notion of\nepistemic possibility is clearly distinct from the notion of\nmetaphysical possibility, since there are cases of epistemic\npossibilities that are not metaphysical possibilities. Of\nGoldbach’s Conjecture (that every even number greater than two\nis the sum of two primes) and its denial, each is epistemically\npossible but one (we know not which) is not metaphysically possible.\nAnd there are cases of metaphysical possibilities that are not\nepistemic possibilities. That there are only two planets in our solar\nsystem is metaphysically possible but not epistemically possible for\nmost of us, given that most of us know that there are not only two\nplanets in our solar system. (This is not to deny that there may be\nsome notions of epistemic possibility—for example, maximally\ncomplete ways the universe can coherently be conceived to\nbe—for which it is at least plausible to suppose that every\nmetaphysical possibility is also an epistemic possibility. Even if\nthis is so, the notions of metaphysical possibility and epistemic\npossibility are distinct.)", "\nIn addition to various notions of epistemic possibility, philosophers\nhave been concerned with three particular notions of possibility that\nare generally regarded as non-epistemic: logical possibility,\nmetaphysical possibility, and physical possibility.\nOn one common view, the physical possibilities are a subset of the\nmetaphysical possibilities, which in turn are a subset of the logical\npossibilities. (But see Fine (2002) for an opposing view.) Here are a\ncouple of examples of things that are logically possible but neither\nmetaphysically nor physically possible: the Eiffel Tower’s being\nred all over and green all over at the same time; the Eiffel\nTower’s being red but not\n extended.[1]\n Here is an example of something that is logically and metaphysically\npossible but not physically possible: the Eiffel Tower’s\ntraveling faster than the speed of light. The Eiffel Tower’s\nbeing both red and not red at the same time is possible in none of the\nsenses while its traveling faster than a speeding bullet is possible\nin all of them.", "\nTo supplement these examples, it would be nice to give\ncharacterizations of the three notions that are free from controversy.\nThat is easier said than done. Nonetheless, we offer some\ncharacterizations that are relatively uncontroversial. Metaphysical\npossibility is often taken as a primitive notion that figures into the\nidea of a physical possibility: a proposition is physically possible\nif and only if it is metaphysically compossible with the laws of\nphysics. (Other nomological possibilities, such as chemical or\nbiological possibility, can be understood similarly.) Assuming that\nthe notion of a\n logical truth\n is understood, then the logical necessities are simply the logical\ntruths, so that the logical possibilities are those things whose\nnegations are not logical truths.", "\nWe end this overview of the modal characterization of the\nessential/accidental property distinction by mentioning a notion that\nis close to, but different from, that of an essential property. It is\neasy to confuse the notion of an essential property—a property\nthat a thing could not lack—with the notion of a\nproperty that a thing could not lose, so it is worth taking a\nminute to reflect on the difference. Of course, any property that a\nperson could not lack is one that that person could not lose, since by\nlosing a property the person comes to lack it. Still, the\n“reverse” does not hold. There are properties that a\nperson could not lose—like the property of having spent\nChristmas 2007 in Tennessee—that are nevertheless not essential\nto that person." ], "section_title": "1. The Modal Characterization of the Essential/Accidental Property Distinction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe modal characterization of an essential property of an object as a\nproperty that an object must possess fits well with (at least\none aspect of) our everyday understanding of the notion of\nessentiality, which often seems simply to be the notion of necessity.\nTo say that something is essential for something else is typically\njust to say that the first is necessary for the second. But however\nwell this account fits with (this aspect of) our everyday\nunderstanding of essentiality, it has some consequences that may be\nsurprising: this characterization classifies the property of being\nsuch that there are infinitely many primes (or, perhaps, being such\nthat there are infinitely many primes if the thing in question is\nexistent) as essential to Socrates (as well as to all other things),\nsince Socrates (like all other things) must have this property.\nSocrates must have this property for the simple reason that it is\nnecessary that there are infinitely many primes. Moreover, this\ncharacterization classifies the property of being the sole member of\nthe unit set \$\\{2\\}\$ as essential to the number 2, given that it is\nnecessary that 2 is the sole member of the unit set \$\\{2\\}\$.", "\nSome philosophers, most prominently Kit Fine (1994), have found these\nresults disturbing. Fine thinks that the notion of an essential\nproperty of a thing should be bound up with the notion of the thing’s nature or what it\nis to be that thing, but, Fine thinks, being such that there are\ninfinitely many primes intuitively has nothing to do with what it\nis to be Socrates. And although it seems that having the number 2\nas its sole member is part of what it is to be the unit set \$\\{2\\}\$, it\ndoes not seem that being this unit set’s sole member is part of\nwhat it is to be the number 2. It is Fine’s view that these\nsorts of properties are counterexamples to the modal\n characterization.[2][3]\n To replace the modal characterization, Fine offers a definitional\ncharacterization of essential properties, according to which the\nessential properties of an object are those of its properties that are\npart of the object’s “definition”. What exactly is a\n“definition” of an object? This is a difficult question.\nAt first sight, it seems to be a category mistake: it is words and\nperhaps concepts—but not objects—that have definitions.\nEven so, it must be admitted that some objects—such as the\nnumber 2 and the unit set \$\\{2\\}\$—do seem to be definable: it is\nplausible to think that the number 2 is defined as being the successor\nof the number 1; and it is plausible to think that the unit set \$\\{2\\}\$ is\ndefined as being the set whose sole member is the number 2. But other\nobjects—such as Socrates—do not seem to admit so readily\nof definition. So even if the notion is understood well enough for\nsome objects (never mind that not everyone would allow that the number\n2, for example, is an object), a major challenge for the advocate of\nthe definitional characterization is to provide a respectable general\nunderstanding of the notion of a definition for an object.", "\nAnother issue bears mentioning inasmuch as the present article\nconcerns the distinction between essential and accidental\nproperties and not merely different ways that one may\ncharacterize what an essential property is. There is a recognized\nanalytic connection between the terms ‘essential property’\nand ‘accidental property’ such that the properties of a\ngiven thing divide exclusively and exhaustively into the categories\nessential and accidental. Although the thought that\na thing’s essential properties are those that are a part of its\ndefinition has caught on in the philosophical literature, the thought\nthat a thing’s accidental properties are those of its properties\nthat are not part of its definition has not. For example, few would\nsay that it is merely accidental to Socrates to be the sole member of\n\$\\{\\text{Socrates}\\}\$. In short, the phrase ‘accidental\nproperty’ tends to be used in the sense of a modally accidental\nproperty.", "\nSeveral philosophers have defended non-standard versions of the modal\ncharacterization in light of Fine’s putative counterexamples.\nEdward Zalta (2006) was among the first. He distinguishes between\nabstract objects (such as numbers and fictional characters) and\nordinary objects (such as Socrates). According to Zalta, every object\nnecessarily exists (whether abstract or ordinary), but ordinary\nobjects are not necessarily concrete. Indeed, an ordinary object such\nas Socrates is concrete in some possible worlds but non-concrete in\nothers. Zalta suggests two separate accounts of essence, one\ncorresponding to abstract objects and the other corresponding to\nordinary objects. Here is Zalta’s account of essence for\nordinary objects, slightly simplified:", "\n\$P\$ is an essential property of an ordinary object\n\$o\$ just in case (1) it is necessary that \$o\$ has\n\$P\$ if \$o\$ is concrete, and (2) it is not necessary that\n\$o\$ has \$P\$.\n", "\nIn all possible worlds, Socrates is such that there are infinitely\nmany primes (whether Socrates is concrete or non-concrete). Thus,\ncondition (2) is not satisfied. Thus, this is not one of\nSocrates’s essential properties. (In Zalta’s terminology,\nthis is not one of Socrates’s strongly essential\nproperties, although Zalta would say that it is one of\nSocrates’s weakly essential properties, since condition\n(1) is satisfied.) Here is Zalta’s account of essence for\nabstract objects:", "\n\$P\$ is an essential property of an abstract object\n\$o\$ just in case it is necessary that \$o\$ encodes \$P\$.\n", "\nOnly abstract objects are capable of encoding properties,\naccording to Zalta. To say that an abstract object encodes a property\nis to say that the property is included in our conception of the\nobject. Thus, the fictional character Sherlock Holmes encodes the\nproperty of being a detective, even though Sherlock Holmes does not\nhave this property. (In Zalta’s terminology, Sherlock Holmes\ndoes not exemplify this property. Sherlock Holmes exemplifies\nproperties such as being created by Arthur Conan Doyle and having been\nportrayed by Jeremy Brett.) According to Zalta, being a detective is\none of Sherlock Holmes’s essential properties. In contrast,\nbeing such that there are infinitely many primes is not one of\nSherlock Holmes’s essential properties, since this property is not\nincluded in our conception of Sherlock Holmes.", "\nThe asymmetry between the essential properties of Socrates, who is an\nordinary object, and {Socrates}, which is an abstract object, is\nexplained: given the theory and definitions proposed, it is not\nessential to Socrates that he is an element of {Socrates}, but it is\nessential to {Socrates} that Socrates is an element of it (see Zalta\n2006, §5, for the details).", "\nFabrice Correia (2007) suggests a different version of the modal\ncharacterization, based on a non-standard conception of modality:", "\n\$P\$ is an essential property of an object \$o\$\njust in case it is locally necessary that \$o\$ has\n\$P\$ if there are facts about \$o\$.\n", "\nIn order to understand this characterization, we must first understand\nCorreia’s non-standard conception of modality, inspired by\nArthur Prior (1957). Philosophers typically regard possible worlds as\ngiving a complete description of a possible state of the universe.\nThese are what Correia calls globally possible worlds.\nLocally possible worlds form a broader class. They include\nall the globally possible worlds, but also strictly\nlocally possible worlds, which are incomplete and do not include\nfacts about certain objects. A strictly locally possible world is\n“a globally possible world in miniature” (2007, pp.\n72–73). Correia suggests that there are strictly locally possible\nworlds in which there are facts about Socrates but no facts about\nprime numbers. Thus, it is not locally necessary that\nSocrates has the property of being such that there are infinitely many\nprimes. Thus, this is not one of Socrates’s essential\nproperties.", "\nIn a series of papers, Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (2007a, 2007b,\n2013) have defended a version of the modal characterization that\nrelies on their non-standard conception of counterfactuals:", "\n\$P\$ is an essential property of an object \$o\$\njust in case (1) it is necessary that \$o\$ has \$P\$ if\n\$o\$ exists, and (2) if nothing had \$P\$, then \$o\$\nwould not exist.\n", "\nIn order to understand this characterization, we must first understand\nBrogaard and Salerno’s non-standard conception of\ncounterfactuals. According to Brogaard and Salerno, counterfactuals\nwith impossible antecedents (“counterpossibles”) can be\nfalse (rather than being “vacuously true,” as standard\naccounts would have it). For example, Brogaard and Salerno would say\nthat the following counterfactual is false: If nothing had the\nproperty of being such that there are infinitely many primes, then\nSocrates would not exist. Since this counterfactual is false,\ncondition (2) is not satisfied. Thus, Socrates is not essentially such\nthat there are infinitely many primes.", "\nAnother account, defended by Nathan Wildman (2013) and suggested by Sam Cowling (2013), appeals to David Lewis’s (1983, 1986) distinction between sparse\nproperties and abundant properties:", "\n\$P\$ is an essential property of an object \$o\$\njust in case (1) it is necessary that \$o\$ has \$P\$ if\n\$o\$ exists, and (2) \$P\$ is a sparse property.\n", "\nAs Wildman and Cowling point out, there are several ways of cashing\nout the distinction between sparse properties and abundant properties\n(see Schaffer (2004) for a thorough discussion). The basic idea is\nthat sparse properties are somehow more fundamental than abundant\nproperties (they somehow “carve nature at the joints”).\nWhat is important is that on any plausible account of the distinction,\nthe properties invoked by Fine will not count as sparse properties.\nThus, condition (2) will not be satisfied.", "\nDavid Denby (2014) defends a similar version of the modal\ncharacterization, appealing to the more familiar distinction between\nintrinsic properties and extrinsic properties:", "\n\$P\$ is an essential property of an object \$o\$\njust in case (1) it is necessary that \$o\$ has \$P\$ if\n\$o\$ exists, and (2) \$P\$ is an intrinsic property.\n", "\nRoughly, an intrinsic property is a property that an object possesses\nin isolation, while an extrinsic property is a property that\nan object possesses only in relation to other objects. Again\nthere are different ways of cashing out this distinction. But again\nthe important point is that on any plausible account of the\ndistinction, the properties invoked by Fine will not count as\nintrinsic properties. Thus, condition (2) will not be\n satisfied.[4]\n ", "\nIn addition to the modal characterization and the definitional\ncharacterization, there is yet another way of characterizing the\nnotion of an essential property. It agrees with the definitional\ncharacterization that the modal characterization is too liberal in\nwhat it counts as essential, but it avoids appeal to the notion of a\ndefinition of an object. On the explanatory characterization,\nthe essential properties of an object are the object’s deepest\nexplanatory properties—those properties that figure\nfundamentally into explanations of the object’s possessing the\nother properties it does. (For example, having six protons might count\nas an essential property of a carbon atom because this property\nfigures fundamentally into explanations of its possession of other\nproperties, like its bonding characteristics.) This sort of account\nthreatens to make the essential/accidental property distinction\nrelative, since what counts as explanatorily primary seems to depend\non the interests and abilities of the explainers. Some advocates of the explanatory characterization, such as Meghan Sullivan (2017), are willing to accept that the distinction is relative in some sense. Others, such as\nIrving Copi (1954) and Michael Gorman (2005), hold that there is a\nmore “metaphysical” and less “epistemic”\nunderstanding of the notion of explanation, according to which one\nthing explains another thing just in case there is a certain\nmind-independent relation that holds between them. Just as the\nadvocate of the definitional characterization is challenged to provide\na respectable understanding of the relevant notion of definition, the\nadvocate of the explanatory characterization is challenged to provide\n(or to borrow from the philosophy of science) a respectable\nunderstanding of the relevant notion of explanation.", "\nThe distinction between accidental and essential properties is, at\nleast on the most basic version of each account, both exclusive and\nexhaustive. (On some more refined versions of these accounts, the\ndistinction remains exclusive, but not exhaustive. Exhaustiveness is\nlost when certain properties—like the property of being such\nthat there are infinitely many primes—are not counted as\nproperties to which the essential/accidental distinction applies. See\nthe discussion of Della Rocca (1996a) in §3.) In addition, it\nseems that the root of each of the characterizations goes back at\nleast to the work of Aristotle. (For the modal characterization, see\nTopics 102b5ff; for the definitional, see\nMetaphysics 1031a12; and for the explanatory, see\nPosterior Analytics 74b5ff. For more on the notion of essence\nin Aristotle’s work, see the entry on\n Aristotle’s Metaphysics.)\n It is not clear whether these three characterizations should properly\nbe thought of as competing characterizations of a single notion or\ninstead as ways of trying to capture three related, but different, and\nequally legitimate, notions. (A similar point has been made by Livingstone-Banks (2017) and Cowling(2013).) Since the modal characterization has been so common, and since the distinction between essential and accidental properties, which is the topic of this entry, is almost always understood modally, it will dominate the remainder of this entry." ], "section_title": "2. Other Ways of Characterizing the Essential/Accidental Property Distinction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere are at least four fairly standard ways of characterizing\nessentialism, and by considering two extreme views, we can easily see\nthe differences among these four characterizations. According to the\nfirst extreme view—one that it is natural to call maximal\nessentialism", "\nall of any given object’s properties are essential to it.\n", "\nAccording to the other extreme view—one that it is natural to call\nminimal essentialism", "\nthere are virtually no limits to the ways in which any given object\nmight have been different from the way that it actually is, so that\nthe only essential properties of an object are what we might think of\nas its trivial essential properties—properties like being either\n\$F\$ or non-\$F\$ (for any property \$F\$) and being\nself-identical.\n", "\nShould so-called minimal essentialism really count as a form of\nessentialism? And should so-called maximal essentialism really count\nas a form of essentialism? There are four positions in logical space\nwith respect to these questions: yes and yes; yes and no; no and yes;\nand no and no. Each of these positions is occupied by some reasonably\nprominent characterization of\n essentialism.[5]", "\nThe first position—according to which both “minimal\nessentialism” and “maximal essentialism” count as\ngenuine forms of essentialism—is occupied by the\ncharacterization of essentialism that was offered at the outset:", "\nthe doctrine that (at least some) objects have (at least some)\nessential properties.\n", "\nWe are inclined to think that this simple and straightforward\ncharacterization is the most common understanding of essentialism,\nalthough it is rarely explicitly stated. (Mackie (2006, p. 1) provides\nan example of someone who does explicitly use this\ncharacterization.)", "\nThe second position—according to which “minimal\nessentialism” but not “maximal essentialism” counts\nas a genuine form of essentialism—is occupied by the\ncharacterization that Quine (1953b/1976, pp. 175–6) very\nfamously offered:", "\nthe doctrine that some of the attributes of a thing (quite\nindependently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at\nall) may be essential to the thing, and others accidental.\n", "\nIn more formal terms, essentialism, Quine (1953b/1976, p. 176) says,\nis the doctrine that there are true sentences of this form:\n\$\\exists x(\\Box Fx \\amp Gx \\amp{\\sim}\\Box Gx)\$ (where\n‘\$\\Box\$’ may be read as ‘it is necessary\nthat’). According to “maximal essentialism” any\ngiven object has only essential properties. It has no accidental ones.\nThat means that according to “maximal essentialism”, there\nwill be no properties to “go in for” the\n‘\$G\$’ in Quine’s sentence schema; and so,\n“maximal essentialism” is no form of essentialism at all\non Quine’s characterization.", "\nThe third position—according to which “maximal\nessentialism” but not “minimal essentialism” counts\nas a form of essentialism—is occupied by the characterization of\nessentialism as", "\nthe view that (at least some) objects have (at least some) non-trivial\nnecessary properties.\n", "\nDella Rocca (1996a) thinks of essentialism in this way, and so counts\n“maximal essentialism” but not “minimal\nessentialism” as a form of essentialism. (It is natural to\nsuppose that Della Rocca thinks that essential properties are\nnon-trivial necessary properties, so that he can say things\nlike, “Essentialism is the view that some objects have some\nessential properties.” If this is what Della Rocca thinks, then\non his view, either the essential/accidental distinction is not exhaustive—since trivial necessary properties, like being such that there are infinitely many primes, are neither accidental nor essential—or the distinction is exhaustive but being such that there are infinitely many primes is counted an accidental property, contrary to intuition.)", "\nThe fourth position—according to which neither “minimal\nessentialism” nor “maximal essentialism” counts as a\nform of essentialism—is occupied by the characterization of\nessentialism as", "\nthe view that the accidental/essential property distinction is robust\nin the sense that (at least some) objects have (at least some)\nnon-trivial essential properties and (at least some) objects have (at\nleast some) accidental properties.\n", "\nYablo (1998) has this characterization in mind, and so he\ncharacterizes both “minimal essentialism” and\n“maximal essentialism” as forms of anti-essentialism.", "\nIn the remainder of this entry, essentialism will be understood in the\nfirst of the four ways—so maximal essentialism and minimal\nessentialism will both be viewed as forms of essentialism." ], "section_title": "3. Four Ways of Characterizing Essentialism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nA variety of particular forms of essentialism have been advocated.\nStarting at one extreme, there is maximal essentialism. Although\nLeibniz famously held this view, it nearly goes without saying that\nthis view has had relatively few adherents. According to a less\nextreme and correspondingly more popular form of essentialism,\norigin essentialism, an object could not have had a radically\ndifferent origin than it in fact had. The view that a particular table\ncould not have been originally made from completely different material\nthan the material from which it was actually originally made and the\nview that a person could not have originated from a different sperm\nand egg than those from which he or she actually originated are both\nforms of origin essentialism. Origin essentialism has been defended by\nKripke (1972/1980) Salmon (1981), and Forbes (1985), among others.\nAccording to another moderate form of essentialism, sortal\nessentialism, an object could not have been of a radically\ndifferent kind—at least for certain kinds—than it in fact\nis. Both the view that being human (or being human if existent) is an\nessential property of Socrates and the view that Socrates could not\nhave been a credit card account are forms of sortal essentialism. The\nmildest form of essentialism is minimal essentialism. Mackie (2006)\noffers a sustained defense of roughly this view.", "\nIn addition to these sorts of claims about the essential properties of\nordinary individuals, claims about the essential properties of natural\nkinds have figured prominently in the literature, since Kripke\n(1972/1980) and Putnam (1975) made essentialist claims concerning, for\nexample, cats and water. The core intuitions are that in any possible\nworld anything that is not an animal is not a cat and that in any\npossible world anything that is not composed of molecules of\nH2O is not water. Since we discovered empirically that cats\nare animals (and not, for example, robots) and that water is\nH2O (and not some other type of molecule), each of these\nclaims asserts a necessary a posteriori connection between\ntwo properties. In the first case, what is asserted is that it is\nnecessary that anything that is a cat is an animal. In the second\ncase, what is asserted is that necessarily anything that is (a sample\nof) water is composed of molecules of\n H2O.[6]\n It is natural to construe these claims on the model of the\nessentialist claims we have so far considered: it is essential to a\nparticular object, namely the species cat, to be such that\nall of its instances are also instances of the kind animal; it is\nessential to a particular object, namely the kind water, to\nbe such that all samples of it are composed of molecules of\nH2O. Notice that one may hold that cats are essentially\nanimals in the sense that there is a necessary a posteriori\nconnection between the property of being a cat and the property of\nbeing an animal, without holding that any particular cat is\nessentially an animal. In other words, from the fact that it is\nnecessary that every individual that is a cat is an animal, it does\nnot follow that every individual that is in fact a cat is such that\nnecessarily it is an animal. In still other words, this type of\nessentialism about natural kinds does not entail sortal\nessentialism.", "\nIt is perhaps worth mentioning that similar remarks apply to the case\nof a necessary a priori connection between properties. It is\na necessary a priori truth that all mathematicians are\nrational. Following our model, we can say that it is essential to\nthe kind mathematician to be such that all of its instances\nare also instances of the kind rational (thing). It does not\nfollow that Andrew Wiles, who is in fact a mathematician, could not\nfail to be rational—in which case he would also fail to be a\nmathematician. To give an even more perspicuous example, it is a\nnecessary a priori truth that all bachelors are unmarried. It\ndoes not follow that Michael, who is in fact a bachelor, could not be\nmarried.", "\nPhilosophers have thought not only about whether an object has this or\nthat particular property essentially but also about whether an object\nhas a special kind of essential property, an individual\nessence, a property that in addition to being essential to the\nobject is also unique to it in the sense that having that property is\nmodally sufficient for being that object (that is, it is not possible\nthat something distinct from that object has that property). A trivial\nexample of an individual essence is a haecceity or\nthisness of an object, the property of being (identical to)\nthat very object. Some have defended the claim that there are\nsubstantive examples of individual essences. Leibniz famously held\nthat there are, and that they can be given by purely qualitative\n(general) properties. Forbes (1985) also holds that there are\nsubstantive individual essences, but he disagrees with Leibniz that\nthey can be given by purely qualitative properties. Instead, he\nthinks, an individual essence involves non-purely qualitative\n(singular) properties: for example, Socrates’s essence involves\noriginating from the particular sperm and egg from which he actually\noriginated. For more on modal sufficiency principles, see the", "\n Supplement on Arguments for Origin Essentialism.\n " ], "section_title": "4. Some Varieties of Essentialism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn §3, we passed over without comment the parenthetical phrase\nfrom Quine’s characterization of essentialism. Adding that\nphrase to the first view of essentialism from §3 yields:", "\nessentialism is the doctrine that (at least some) objects have\nindependently of how they are referred to (at least some)\nessential properties.\n", "\nThe added phrase stresses that the essentialist thinks that it at\nleast makes sense to ask of an object (“in itself”)\nwhether it must have a particular property. Skeptics about\nessentialism have doubted the very intelligibility of such a question.\nHere is one prominent thought behind such anti-essentialism. (See\nQuine 1960, pp. 195–200.) Since it is necessary that seven plus two is\ngreater than seven, when the number nine is referred to as\n‘seven plus two’ it is essentially greater than seven.\nBut, since it is not necessary that the number of planets is greater\nthan seven, when the number nine is referred to as ‘the number\nof planets’ it is not essentially greater than seven. The point\nis supposed to be that it makes no sense to say of the number nine,\nindependently of any way of referring to it, that it is or is not\nessentially greater than seven. Similarly, an anti-essentialist might\nsay that when a person who is both a mathematician and a cyclist is\nthought of as a mathematician, being rational is essential to him,\nwhile being two-legged is not; but when the very same person is\nthought of as a cyclist, then although being two-legged is essential\nto him, being rational is not. Again, the point is supposed to be that\nit makes no sense to say of the very person who is the mathematical\ncyclist, independently of any way of thinking about him, that he is or\nis not essentially rational (or two-legged). According to the\nanti-essentialist, asking whether Andrew Wiles (who we may suppose is\na cycling mathematician) could fail to be rational is like asking\nwhether Andrew Wiles is taller than—both questions demand\nanother relatum. Could he fail to be rational, relative to what\nway of referring to him? Is he taller than whom?", "\nIn response the essentialist will point out that the\nanti-essentialist’s thought does not square very well with\nintuition. Consider the object that is referred to by all these\nphrases: ‘nine’, ‘seven plus two’, ‘the\nnumber of planets’. Could that very object have failed\nto be greater than seven? Intuitively the question seems intelligible,\nand the answer seems to be that it could not have failed to be greater\nthan seven. According to intuition then, the very object that is\nreferred to by ‘the number of planets’ (which is the very\nsame object that is referred to by ‘seven plus two’ and\n‘nine’) is essentially greater than seven. Intuition also\nhas it that the claim that the number of planets is greater than seven\nis not itself necessary. To add some jargon: Intuition has it that the\nclaim that it is necessary that the number of planets is greater than\nseven is true read de re (“of the thing”), but\nfalse read de dicto (“of the dictum” or “of\nthe statement”). (The de re reading is this: the number\nof planets has the property of being necessarily greater than seven.\nThe de dicto reading is this: the claim that the number of\nplanets is greater than seven has the property of being necessary.)\nThe essentialist is pointing out that the anti-essentialist’s argument\nasserts that the latter intuition undermines the former, but does not\nsay why." ], "section_title": "5. Suspicions about Essentialism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAssuming that we have knowledge of some essentialist claims, how might\nwe account for that knowledge? For the purposes of the present\ndiscussion, let us assume that we know that being such that there are\ninfinitely many primes, being human, and originating from sperm\n\$s\$ and egg \$e\$ are essential properties of Socrates.\nThe first example is different from the last two in that it seems that\nwe can know a priori that being such that there are\ninfinitely many primes is essential to Socrates whereas it seems that\nwe can know only a posteriori that being human and\noriginating from \$s\$ and \$e\$ are also essential to\nhim.", "\nWhile it is a vexed philosophical issue just how to account for a\npriori knowledge of necessary truths such as logical truths,\nmathematical truths, and the homelier necessary truths like the truth\nthat nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time,\naccounting for our knowledge of the necessary truth that Socrates is\nsuch that there are infinitely many primes, does not seem to be\nproblematic in some extra special way. If we had a good account of our\na priori knowledge of the necessary truth that there are\ninfinitely many primes, then it would take little more to account for\nour knowledge of the necessary truth about Socrates that he is such\nthat there are infinitely many primes.", "\nKripke (1972/1980) suggests that our knowledge of some other\nessentialist claims is based in part on a bit of a priori\nknowledge and in part on a bit of empirical knowledge. For example,\nour knowledge that originating from \$s\$ and \$e\$ is\nessential to Socrates is based in part on our a priori\nknowledge that every organism has its origin essentially and in part\non our empirical knowledge that Socrates (is an organism that)\noriginated from \$s\$ and \$e\$. (Similarly our knowledge\nthat Socrates is essentially human appears to be based in part on our\na priori knowledge that everything has its kind essentially\nand in part on our empirical knowledge that Socrates is (of the kind)\nhuman.) Thus, our knowledge of the claim that originating from\n\$s\$ and \$e\$ is essential to Socrates should be no more\nproblematic epistemologically than our knowledge of the two claims on\nwhich it is based and our knowledge of the validity of the argument\nfrom those two claims. As we have already mentioned, although there\nare difficult philosophical issues concerning our knowledge of logical\ntruths, our knowledge of the validity of the argument in question does\nnot seem to add any special problems of its own. Similarly, although\nthere are philosophical issues concerning empirical knowledge, our\nknowledge that Socrates originated from \$s\$ and \$e\$ does\nnot appear to add any special problems. However our a priori\nknowledge that every organism has its origin essentially does seem to\nhave special problems over and above the problems associated with\naccounting for our a priori knowledge of logic, mathematics,\nand the homelier necessary truths. The latter claims are generally\nsupported by universally held intuitions or by arguments that are\nuniversally accepted whereas the former, like most philosophical\nclaims, is supported by a less robust intuition and by a more\ncontroversial argument. To see in some detail how philosophers have\ngone about defending origin essentialism, see the", "\n Supplement on Arguments for Origin Essentialism.\n ", "\nFor more about arguments for sortal essentialism, see Wiggins (1980)\nand Mackie (2006, chapters 7 and 8). The entry on\n the epistemology of modality\n is useful on general issues in modal epistemology." ], "section_title": "6. The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nLeibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, according\nto which, if “two” things are identical, then they share\nall their properties, can be used to argue for various claims of\nnonidentity. If you know, for example, that Charles is a philosophy\nmajor and that Yoko is not, then you can safely infer that Charles is\nnot identical to Yoko. Essentialist claims have played a role in some\nprominent Leibniz Law arguments for nonidentity theses. A certain\nbrand of mind-body dualism may be argued for in the following way:\n\$X\$ is essentially a thinking thing; \$X\$’s body is\nnot essentially a thinking thing; so \$X\$ is not (identical to)\n\$X\$’s body. A similar argument can be given for the\nconclusion that a statue is not identical with the lump of material\n(wax, clay, marble, or what have you) that constitutes it. Consider a\nhuman-shaped statue—call it ‘Goliath’—and the\nlump of wax that composes it—call it\n‘Lump\$_1\$’. Goliath, we may imagine, is throughout\nits entire existence composed of Lump\$_1\$ while\nLump\$_1\$ throughout its entire existence composes Goliath. In\nthis case, Goliath and Lump\$_1\$ are spatiotemporally\ncolocated, which is just to say that they occupy the exact same\nspatial region at any given time whenever either of them exists. This\nbeing the case, they share most of their properties: Goliath weighs 17\nkilograms and so does Lump\$_1\$; Goliath has a white surface\nand so does Lump\$_1\$; and so on. In fact, it may seem curious\nthat we are writing as though there are two things at all.\nWhy not say simply that Goliath and Lump\$_1\$ are identical?\nWell, it at least seems that a pretty straightforward\nargument—one that relies on essentialist\nclaims—establishes their nonidentity:", "\nThe plausibility of the two premises seems undeniable, given that we\nthink, for example, that if the room containing\nGoliath/Lump\$_1\$ were to get really hot (hot enough to melt\nthe wax) and then to cool again (so that what was left was a lump of\nwax in the shape of something like a mountain), then Goliath would be\ndestroyed while Lump\$_1\$ would still exist. And the reasoning\nlooks impeccable: if Goliath were Lump\$_1\$, then each would\nhave to have all of the same properties as “the other”;\nsince they have different properties, they must not be identical. (Few\nthings in philosophy are as uncontroversial as Leibniz’s Law of\nthe Indiscernibility of Identicals, though there has been some dispute\nabout the proper way of formulating it.) Figuring out how to reconcile\nour intuitions that (1) and (2) are true with our tendency to think\nthat Goliath and Lump\$_1\$ are not really two things but just\none is a version of the problem of material constitution.\nThere are a wide variety of ways to deal with this problem. A\n“two-thinger”—one who thinks that there really are\ntwo things, a statue and a lump of wax, in one\nlocation—may simply eschew the tendency to identify Goliath and\nLump\$_1\$. Other responses suggest that there is something\namiss with Leibniz Law arguments for nonidentities when there is this\nkind of an appeal to essential properties: Della Rocca (1996c) holds\nthat such arguments are question begging; Lewis (1971) and Noonan\n(1991) hold that they are invalid; and Burke (1994) and Rea (2000)\nhold that in any such argument, at least one of the premises is false.\nFor those who are interested, Rea (1997) is a good place to start to\ndelve more deeply into this problem." ], "section_title": "7. Essentialist Claims in Arguments for Nonidentities", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Adams, R., 1979, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive\nIdentity”, Journal of Philosophy, 76: 5–26.", "Bennett, D., 1969, “Essential Properties”, Journal\nof Philosophy, 66: 487–499.", "Bennett, K., 2004, “Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the\nGrounding Problem”, Philosophical Studies, 118:\n339–371.", "Brody, B., 1967, “Natural Kinds and Real Essences”,\nJournal of Philosophy, 64: 431–446.", "–––, 1973, “Why Settle for Anything Less\nthan Good Old-Fashioned Aristotelian Essentialism”,\nNoûs, 7: 352–365.", "Brogaard, B. and J. 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Francescotti (ed.),\nBerlin: De Gruyter, 87–109.", "Dunn, J. M., 1990, “Relevant Predications 3: Essential\nProperties”, in Truth or Consequences, J. M. Dunn and\nA. Gupta (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 77–95.", "Fine, K., 1994, “Essence and Modality: The Second\nPhilosophical Perspectives Lecture”, Philosophical\nPerspectives, 8: 1–16.", "–––, 1995. “Senses of Essence”, in\nModality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan\nMarcus, W. Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, pp. 53–73.", "–––, 2002, “The Varieties of\nNecessity”, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002, 253–281.", "–––, 2005, Modality and Tense: Philosophical\nPapers, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2007, “Response to Fabrice\nCorreia”, Dialectica, 61: 85–88.", "Forbes, G., 1983, “Thisness and Vagueness”,\nSynthese, 54: 253–259.", "–––, 1984, “Two Solutions to Chisholm’s\nParadox”, Philosophical Studies, 46:\n171–187.", "–––, 1985, The Metaphysics of Modality,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 1986 “In Defense of Absolute\nEssentialism”, in French et al. 1986, 3–31.", "–––, 1992, “Worlds and States of Affairs:\nHow Similar Can They Be?”, in Language, Truth, and\nOntology, K. Mulligan (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic\nPublishers, 118–132.", "–––, 1997, “Essentialism”, in A\nCompanion to the Philosophy of Language, B. Hale and C. Wright\n(eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 515–533.", "–––, 2002, “Origins and Identities”,\nin Individuals, Essence, and Identity, A. Bottani et al.\n(eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 319–340.", "French, P., T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), 1986, Midwest\nStudies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism, Minneapolis:\nUniversity of Minnesota Press.", "Gendler, T. and J. Hawthorne (eds.), 2002, Conceivability and\nPossibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Gibbard, A., 1975, “Contingent Identity”, Journal\nof Philosophical Logic, 4: 187–221.", "Gorman, M., 2005, “The Essential and the Accidental”,\nRatio, 18: 276–289.", "Hawthorne, J. and T. Gendler, 2000 “Origin Essentialism: The\nArguments Reconsidered”, Mind, 109: 285–298.", "Kaplan, D., 1979, “Transworld Heir Lines”, in The\nPossible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality,\nM. Loux (ed.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 88–109.", "–––, 1986, “Opacity”, in The\nPhilosophy of W.V. Quine, L. Hahn and P. Schilpp (eds.), La\nSalle: Open Court, 229–289.", "Kment, B., 2014, Modality and Explanatory Reasoning,\nOxford: Oxford University Press Press.", "Kripke, S., 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in\nSemantics of Natural Language, D. Davidson and G. Harman\n(eds.), Dordrecht: D. 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(ed.), 1997, Material Constitution: A Reader,\nLanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.", "Robertson, T., 1998, “Possibilities and the Arguments for\nOrigin Essentialism”, Mind, 107: 729–749.", "Rohrbaugh, G., and L. deRosset, 2004, “A New Route to the\nNecessity of Origin”, Mind, 113: 705–725.", "Romero, C., 2019, “Modality is not Explainable by\nEssence”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 69:\n121–141.", "Salmon, N., 1979, “How Not to Derive Essentialism\nfrom the Theory of Reference” Journal of Philosophy,\n76: 703–725.", "–––, 1981, Reference and Essence,\nPrinceton: Princeton University Press", "–––, 1986, “Modal Paradox: Parts and\nCounterparts, Points and Counterpoints”, in Midwest Studies\nin Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism, P. 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Craig (ed.), London:\nRoutledge, 417–422.", "Zalta, E., 2006, “Essence and Modality”,\nMind, 115: 659–693.", "Zylstra, J., 2019, “Essence, Necessity, and Definition”,\nPhilosophical Studies, 176: 339–350." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle-metaphysics/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: metaphysics" }, { "href": "../descartes-modal/", "text": "Descartes, René: modal metaphysics" }, { "href": "../identity-indiscernible/", "text": "identity: of indiscernibles" }, { "href": "../identity-transworld/", "text": "identity: transworld" }, { "href": "../leibniz-modal/", "text": "Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: modal metaphysics" }, { "href": "../logic-modal/", "text": "logic: modal" }, { "href": "../logical-truth/", "text": "logical truth" }, { "href": "../material-constitution/", "text": "material constitution" }, { "href": "../modality-epistemology/", "text": "modality: epistemology of" }, { "href": "../natural-kinds/", "text": "natural kinds" }, { "href": "../possible-objects/", "text": "possible objects" }, { "href": "../possible-worlds/", "text": "possible worlds" }, { "href": "../sorites-paradox/", "text": "Sorites paradox" }, { "href": "../substance/", "text": "substance" } ]
action	Action	First published Wed Jan 11, 2023	[ "\n[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by\nJuan Piñeros Glasscock and Sergio Tenenbaum\nreplaces the\n former entry on this topic by the previous author.]\n", "\nThere is an important difference between activity and passivity: the\nfire is active with respect to the log when it burns it (and the log\npassive with respect to the fire). Within activity, there is also an\nimportant difference between the acts of certain organisms and the\nactivities of non-living things like fire: when ants build a nest,\nor a cat stalks a bird, they act in a sense in which the fire\ndoes not. Finally, there is a long-standing tradition in philosophy\ngoing back at least as far as Plato and Aristotle that recognizes an\nimportant distinction between the acts that (non-human) animals in\ngeneral are capable of, and the special sorts of actions that human\nbeings do intentionally, such as going to the store, making phone\ncalls, protesting an injustice, or knitting a sweater. This tradition\nviews the latter group as practical manifestations of our rational\ncapacities.", "\nAlthough this entry largely follows suit in focusing on intentional\nhuman action as a manifestation of reason, we flag from the start that\nthere are other philosophical traditions that call this assumption\ninto question. For example, Japanese (as well as Buddhist)\nphilosophers have discussed the possibility of action without the need\nof a self (Kasulis 2019, section 5.3). And on one reading of the\nDaode Jing, the highest forms of human agency are, in some\nsense, beyond reason. This is one way to understand the notion of\nwuwei, or “nonaction,” which describes an ideal way of\nacting that is neither unconscious or involuntary, nor purposeful or\ngoal-oriented (cf. Hansen 2020, section 9.4 and Wong 2021, section\n4.1). Similarly, the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi may\npresent a view of human action as going beyond thought and reason. By\nceasing to think about his action, Butcher Ding, appears to achieve\nsuch a sublime level of harmony with his activity as to obviate the\nneed for effort (3.2). On one reading, Zhuangzi is presenting a\nnon-intellectualist account of skill, not unlike that defended by\nDreyfus and Dreyfus (2004) as the highest form of expertise (Ivanhoe\n1993). On a more radical reading, the Inner Chapters do not present a\nhigher form of skill, but rather a more radical notion, Dao\n(way), opposing skill (Schwitzgebel\n 2019).[1]", "\nThe entry is divided in eight sections. Section 1 discusses the\nquestion “What is an action?”. Section 2 examines a\nclassic account of intentional action in terms of causation,\nassociated with Donald Davidson’s work. Section 3 considers the\nchallenge that extended actions—actions that take more than an\ninstant to accomplish—pose for such a theory, as explored\nespecially in Michael Bratman’s work, and different reactions to\nthis challenge. Section 4 considers the notion of practical knowledge,\nas presented by Elizabeth Anscombe, which has served as the basis for\nthe most important rival account to causal theories. Section 5\nexplores foundational questions about the ontology of action. Section\n6 considers the question: does action have a constitutive\naim–something it aims at just by being an intentional action?\nSection 7 considers whether omissions are actions, and, if so, how\nvarious accounts might accommodate this. Finally, Section 8 explores\nwhether animals can act intentionally." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. About the Question: What is an Action?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Causalism and Causal Theories of Action", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Davidson’s Predecessors and the Central Arguments in the Debate", "2.2 Davidson on the Nature of Intentional Actions", "2.3 Mental states as the causal explanans of actions", "2.4 The Problem of Causal Deviance" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Extended Action", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Practical Knowledge", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 The Nature of Practical Knowledge", "4.2 Arguments for a knowledge condition", "4.3 Objections to the knowledge condition", "4.4 Weakening the knowledge condition", "4.5 The possibility of practical knowledge" ] }, { "content_title": "5. The Ontology of Actions", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Events, processes, and more", "5.2 The Individuation of Action", "5.3 The Debate Over Basic Action", "5.4 Making, Acting, and the Varieties of Agency" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Constitutive Aim", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Motivations and Different Versions of the View", "6.2 Objections" ] }, { "content_title": "7. Omission", "sub_toc": [ "7.1 Different Ways of Not Acting", "7.2 Agency, Omissions, and Refrainings", "7.3 Intentional Omissions and the Causal Theory of Action" ] }, { "content_title": "8. Animal Action", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe central question in philosophy of action is standardly taken to\nbe: “What makes something an action?” However, we obtain\ndifferent versions of the question depending on what we take as the\ncontrast class from which actions are to be differentiated. The\ndifferent questions in turn encode important presuppositions. First,\nwe may understand the question as asking us to differentiate between\nintentional action and the notions of acting and activity considered\nabove (cf. Hyman 2015). Most commonly, however, the question is taken\nin terms of Wittgenstein’s classic formulation: “What is\nleft over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact\nthat I raise my arm?” (1953 [2010], §621). A common, though\ncontested, reading of this passage is this: there are certain events\nof an arm’s going up that are actions, and some that are not\n(e.g. if someone tickles me in my sleep). What further factor does the\naction have that the event resulting from tickling lacks?", "\nMany historical as well as contemporary thinkers hope to answer just\nthis question. A simple answer, common in the early modern period\n(e.g. Descartes 1641 AT VII 57; Hobbes 1651/1668, i.6; Hume 1739–1740\nT II.3.iii; SB 413–18), is that what distinguishes actions from other\nevents is that they are the causal outcomes of desires, volitions, or\nacts of will. A modern version of this view, considered below, appeals\ninstead to intentions, regarded as distinctive mental states. Despite\nthe intuitiveness of these “standard” answers, there have\nbeen increasing worries that they are based on disputable assumptions.\nFirst, there is an assumption about the metaphysical category to which\nactions belong. Although it is natural to take them as events, some\nphilosophers have argued that there are good reasons to group them\nunder a different category. Second, the common reading of\nWittgenstein’s question presupposes what has been called\n“additive” or “decompositional” conceptions of\naction (Ford 2011; Lavin 2015, 2013; cf. Boyle 2016): it is assumed\nthat an account of action can be given in terms of distinct, and\nsimpler components. However, a number of authors have argued that this\nreductive project is bound to fail (Anscombe 1995; Vogler 2001;\nO’Brien 2012; Levy 2013; Horst 2015; Valaris 2015; Della Rocca\n2020, ch.4).", "\nIt has also been contended that philosophers who offer the standard\nanswers make important methodological assumptions. These philosophers\napproach questions about agency as though they were on par with\nscientific questions to this extent: they seek mechanistic, or causal\nexplanations of agency, explanations that can be grasped from an\nobjective perspective. However, drawing inspiration from Kant, some\nphilosophers contend that philosophy of action should be done from the\nagential perspective (Nagel 1989; Korsgaard 2009; Bilgrami 2012;\nSchapiro 2021); and other philosophers drawing from Aristotle and\nFrege have argued for similar views (Thompson 2008; Lavin 2013; Ford\n2017). From a different standpoint, the standard methodology has been\ncriticized as not being scientific enough. It has been argued that\ncertain empirical results disprove some of the basic assumptions\nbehind these answers. For example, Libet’s experiments have been\ntaken to suggest that intentions are causally ineffective, and that to\nunderstand the true causes of action we would have to focus on neural\nprocesses (‘action potentials’) about which we could only\nlearn through standard scientific methods (Libet 1985; Libet et al.\n1993). Although these radical views are now widely held to be based on\nfaulty conceptual and empirical grounds (e.g. Mele. 2010; Levy 2005;\nBrass, Furstenberg, and Mele 2019), surprising scientific results\ncontinue to challenge commonly held views in philosophy of action (see\ne.g. Wegner 2002 and Nahmias 2014 for critical discussion of recent\nfindings).", "\nIn this entry we draw from the work of philosophers working through\ndifferent methodological paradigms. We will not bring up these\ndifferences again, but they may be worth keeping in mind as we\nconsider the various debates below." ], "section_title": "1. About the Question: What is an Action?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nPossibly the most widespread and accepted theory of intentional action\n(though by no means without its challengers) is the causal theory of\naction, a theory according to which something counts as an intentional\naction in virtue of its causal connection to certain mental states. In\nfact, this view is often dubbed (following Velleman 1992) the\n‘standard story of action’. Although other philosophers\nproposed similar views before, the contemporary causal theory of\naction, or “causalism,” was pioneered by Donald Davidson,\nespecially the essays collected in Davidson (2001a). Davidson has\ncontributed to many topics in the philosophy of action, such as action\nindividuation, the logical form of action sentences, the relation\nbetween intention and evaluative judgments, among others, but here we\nwill focus mostly on his arguments for, and his formulation of, the\ncausal theory of action. In Action, Reasons, and Causes\n(ARC), Davidson provides an account of the nature of rationalizing\nexplanations of actions, or what is often called ‘intentional\nexplanations’. Such explanations explain the action by providing\nthe reason why the agent acted. ARC tries to understand how a reason\ncan explain an action. The two central theses of ARC, or modified\nversions of them, became subsequently widely, though certainly not\nuniversally, accepted. The first thesis is that the explanation of an\naction involves a “primary reason”: a belief and a desire\npair that rationalizes the action by expressing the end pursued in the\naction (desire) and how the agent thought the action would accomplish\nthis end (instrumental belief). So, for instance, in “Larry went\nto Gus the Barber because he wanted a haircut”, Larry’s\naction is explained by a desire (his wanting a haircut) and a belief,\nleft implicit in this case (his believing that he could get a haircut\nby going to Gus the Barber). The second central thesis is that the\nprimary reason is also the cause of the action." ], "section_title": "2. Causalism and Causal Theories of Action", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nDavidson’s view in ARC is presented against a number of\nphilosophers (mostly influenced by Wittgenstein), who, on his view,\ntake action explanations to provide a different kind of understanding\nthan causal explanations (for a sympathetic overview of this\nWittgenstein-inspired work, see Sandis 2015). Some of the identified\ntargets of the paper (such as Melden 1961) are clearly arguing for the\nviews Davidson rejects. Others (such as Anscombe 1957 and Ryle 1949)\ndo not clearly embrace the theses Davidson objects to, or at least not\nall of them. These philosophers took intentional explanations to\ndisplay how an action is made intelligible or justified. So Melden\nsays that “citing a motive [gives] a fuller characterization of\nthe action; it [provides] a better understanding of what the [agent]\nis doing” (Melden 1961, 88). Similarly, Anscombe’s special\nsense of the question “Why?’, discussed below (section\n4.1), is supposed to pick out the particular way in which actions are\nexplained. This claim is not one that Davidson denies; according to\nDavidson, in intentional explanations, or\n‘rationalizations’, ”the agent is shown in his Role\nof Rational Animal … There is an irreducible … sense in\nwhich every rationalization justifies: from the agent’s point of\nview there was, when he acted, something to be said for the\naction.“ (Davidson 1963, 690–1). But Melden, and other\nWittgensteineans, argue that this kind of explanation cannot be a\ncausal explanation. Melden’s central argument is the\n”logical connection“ argument. According to Melden, since\nthe supposedly causal antecedents of an action (mental items such as\ndesires and intentions) are logically related to the intentional\naction (I would not count as intentionally signalling a turn if I did\nnot desire/intend to signal a turn), the explanation of the action in\nterms of such mental items cannot be an explanation in terms of\n”Humean causes“. After all, Humean causation connects\nevents that are logically independent.", "\nDavidson’s ARC exposes a crucial fallacy with Melden’s\nargument (similar problems had been pointed out by Annette Baier (then\nAnnette Stoop) in Stoop 1962). Accepting Hume’s account of\ncausal relations does not commit us to the view that any description\nof a cause is logically independent of any description of its effect.\nAn event can only be described as ”sunburning“ if it is\ncaused by exposure to the sun, but this does not mean that the cause\nof a sunburn is not a ”separate entity“ from the sunburn.\nWe can describe an event as ”The event that caused X“\nwithout thereby refuting Humeanism about causation. Davidson argues\nthat, on the contrary, the mental items cited in an action explanation\ncan only explain the action if they are also the cause of the action\n(the second central thesis of ARC). In our example above, Larry might\nhave had other belief-desire pairs that rationalized his action of\ngoing to the barber. For instance, Larry might also have wanted a\nbottle of cream soda and believed that he could procure such an item\nat Gus the Barber. However, he did not (we may stipulate) go there\nbecause he wanted cream soda but because he wanted a haircut (and\nbelieved he could get one at Gus the Barber). The only way we can\nexplain the difference between potentially rationalizing, but\nnon-explanatory belief-desire pairs, is that the belief-desire pair\nthat genuinely explains the action, the primary reason, also causes\nthe action. The question of how non-causal theories can distinguish\nbetween merely potentially explanatory reasons for an action from the\nreasons that actually explain it became known as\n”Davidson’s Challenge“ to non-causal theories of\naction (Mele 1992; Mele 2013)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Davidson’s Predecessors and the Central Arguments in the Debate" }, { "content": [ "\nAlthough initially presented as an account of the nature of action\nexplanation, Davidson’s account also contains the basic\nstructure of an understanding of human action: according to Davidson,\na true action statement (of the form ”x φ-ed“) denotes\nan event, and more specifically, a bodily movement. A bodily movement\nis an action if, and only if, the event is an intentional action\n(Davidson 1971). Davidson does not say this\n explicitly,[2]\n but clearly on his view, an event is an intentional action under a\ncertain description, if and only if, there is a true rationalizing\nexplanation of the event under this description. Davidson (1971)\n(following Anscombe) points out that ”x φ-ed\nintentionally“ creates an intensional context; that is whether\nan action is intentional depends on how the action is described. To\nuse Davidson’s example, if I flip a switch, I also turn on the\nlight, and alert the burglar. On Davidson’s view ”flipping\nthe switch“, ”turning on the light“, and\n”alerting the burglar“ are all descriptions of the same\naction. The ”accordion effect“ (so dubbed by Feinberg\n1965), characteristic of human action, makes it the case that the\ncausal consequences of an intentional action provide further\ndescriptions of human actions. If my flipping the switch caused the\nlight to go on and the burglar to be alerted, then I also turned the\nlight on and alerted the burglar. However, only the first two are\nintentional actions. On Davidson’s view, all these descriptions\nare descriptions of the same action; alerting the burglar is an action\nin virtue of the fact that these same bodily movements, under a\ndifferent description, are a case of intentional action (flipping the\nswitch). Thus Davidson concludes that, ”we never do more than\nmove our bodies: the rest is up to nature“ (Davidson 1971, 23).\nWe can see now how the claims developed in these papers provide us\nwith a theory of action: an action is a bodily movement such that,\nunder some description, the bodily movement is causally explained by a\nprimary reason.", "\nThis also gives us the barebones of a causal theory of action:\naccording to ”causalists“, intentional action is explained\nin terms of mental states that are the causal antecedents, or\nconcomitants, of the agent’s behaviour or bodily movement.\nSubsequent to Davidson, causalists have aimed to provide reductive\nexplanations: intentional action is identified with behaviour or\nbodily movement (or in less ”ambitious“ versions of the\nview, a more general form of action, see Setiya 2011) whose causal\nantecedents (or concomitants) are certain specified mental states.\nAlthough Davidson himself is often portrayed as proposing a reductive\nanalysis, he never presents any of his views as fulfilling such\nambition and expresses skepticism that such analysis is possible given\nthe problem of deviance (see below)." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Davidson on the Nature of Intentional Actions" }, { "content": [ "\nThe idea that an action is rationalized by its mental states is still\nvery popular; much less so is the view that the only relevant states\nare beliefs and desires (though see Sinhababu 2017 for a modern\ndefense of this simple ”Humean“ account). As Bratman\n(1987) argues, desires do not have the conduct-controlling and\nsettling functions characteristic of intentions, and thus intentions\nseem to be better placed to be at the center of an account in which\nintentional actions are constituted by their causal genesis. My desire\nto have my teeth cleaned, when conjoined with my belief that in order\nto get my teeth cleaned I need to go to a dentist, will not result in\nmy moving towards the dentist until I actually intend to go\nto the dentist. In fact, when Velleman comes to dub this kind of\ncausal theory of action ”the standard story of action“, he\nexplicitly describes the view as one in which intention plays a\ncentral role between the ”primary reason“ and the action.\nIn the standard story, the agent’s ”desire for the end,\nand his belief in the action as a means … jointly cause an\nintention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding\nmovements of the agent’s body.“ (Velleman 1992, 461).\nDavidson (1970b) himself came to accept that intentions play an\nimportant role in the causation and constitution of action and that\nintentions could not be reduced to beliefs or desires. But common to\nall these views is the idea that human actions are events that bear\nthe right kind of causal relation to certain mental states or events\nof the agent that also explain the action.", "\nOne alternative to the causal view understands agency as a form of\nirreducible agent-causation. Chisholm (1964) presents a classic\nversion of the view; Alvarez and Hyman (1998) presents a radically\ndifferent version which denies that agents cause the actions\nthemselves; Mayr (2011) develops a version of the view that, unlike\nChisholm’s version, tries to show that human agency is not\nessentially different from other forms of substance causation that we\nfind in the natural world. A second alternative sees intentional\nexplanations as teleological rather than causal explanations (Wilson\n1980; Cleveland 1997; Schueler 2003; Sehon 2005); that is, an\nintentional explanation cites the goal, the purpose, or the reason for\nwhich the agent acted rather than the antecedent causes of\nthe action. Defenders of this view also try to provide an\nunderstanding of the teleological structure of intentional action that\ndenies that teleological explanations reduce to causal explanations;\nthey are instead a sui generis form of explanation. One way\nthis view can meet Davidson’s Challenge is to argue that the\ntruth of certain counterfactuals distinguishes potential reasons from\nthe actual reasons. For instance, it could be true that even though\nthe fact that the asparagus was delicious was a potential reason for\nMary to eat asparagus, she would not have eaten them if they were not\nhealthy and she would have eaten them even if they were not delicious\n(Löhrer and Sehon 2016); such counterfactuals, on this view, are\nnot grounded on causal relations between mental states and the bodily\nmovements, but on the teleological structures that constitute\nintentional action. Finally, the causal account also contrasts with\nthe neo-Aristotelian view in which human action is constituted,\nroughly, by a special form of practical knowledge (Anscombe 1957); on\nthis view, in intentional action, ”knowledge is the [formal]\ncause of what it understands“ (see section 4 of this entry)." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Mental states as the causal explanans of actions" }, { "content": [ "\nLet us take the following as the general form of a (reductive) causal\ntheory of action:", "\nAn event (bodily movement) B is an intentional action if and\nonly if it is an event caused by mental states [S1,\n… Sn].\n", "\nWe can immediately see how to generate counterexamples to any such\nformula: find cases in which there is a causal path from\n[S1, …, Sn] to B, but not\nthrough the ”normal“ causal path that would presumably\ngive rise to the bodily movement in a genuine case of action. This is\nthe problem of deviance for the causal theory of action; Davidson\nhimself was among the first who provided classical examples of such\ncausal deviance for his own account of action (but Frankfurt\n1978’s presentation of the problem was particularly\ninfluential):", "\nA climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of\nholding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his\nhold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This\nbelief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his\nhold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen his\nhold, nor did he do it intentionally. (Davidson 1973, 153–4)\n", "\nThis is a case of what is often called ”primary deviance“\n(Mele and Moser 1994), in which the bodily movements in question are\nnot even actions, but the causal theory seems to imply they are. In\ncontrast, in cases of ”secondary deviance’’, the\ntheory misdescribes one of the consequences of the action as\nintentional when it clearly is not. The same Davidson paper provides\nan example of the latter:", "\nA man may try to kill someone by shooting at him. Suppose the killer\nmisses his victim by a mile, but the shot stampedes a herd of wild\npigs that trample the intended victim to death. Do we want to say the\nman killed his victim intentionally? (Davidson 1973, 152–3)\n", "\nThere are very many attempts to solve the problem of causal deviance\nfor a causal theory of action and we cannot cover in detail any of\nthem or mention all of them; here we’ll just list a few\ninfluential strategies (and, of course, some solutions incorporate\nmore than one of these strategies). The first appeals to the notion of\na “proximate cause” (Mele 1992) such that an action is\nintentional only if, for instance, the formation of an intention to\nφ is the proximate cause of your φ-ing. Another family of\nsolutions appeal to sensitivity and feedback conditions (Peacocke\n1979; Bishop 1989; Smith 2012): the climber’s bodily movements\nwould not count as an intentional action because they would not be\nsensitive to variations in conditions and information on what needs to\nbe done (the climber would not release their hands differently if the\nrope turned out to be stickier or would not change their behaviour if\nthey were to realize that the rope had a safety latch fastened to\ntheir hips). A different type of approach (though with some relevant\nsimilarities to the latter) takes the central problem for the\nDavidsonian approach, the reason why the problem of deviance is\nendemic to Davidson’s causalism, to be the attempt to understand\naction in terms of its causal antecedents, rather than its\nsustaining causes. For Frankfurt (1978) the relevant causal\nmechanisms involved must be guiding the action. Given that action is a\nform of purposive behaviour, we cannot hope to understand what\ndistinguishes action from mere bodily movements by focusing on what\nprecedes the action, rather than by what happens while\nthe agent is acting. As Setiya puts it:", "\nIn the case of basic action, the crucial concept is that of\nguidance: when an agent intentionally φs, he\nwants to φ, and this desire not only causes but continues\nto guide behaviour towards its object. (It is this condition that\nfails in Davidson’s example). (Setiya 2007, 32)\n", "\nIn the case of secondary deviance, a seemingly promising approach is\nto require that a “non-basic” action counts as intentional\nonly if (roughly) it follows the agent’s plan (Mele and Moser\n1994). Davidson’s killer’s plan to kill his enemy did not\ninvolve a stampede, and thus it should not count as intentional\naction.", "\nAnother strategy has been developed by “empirically\ninformed” philosophers, who hold that attention to the details\nof control mechanisms implemented at the cognitive level yields a\nresponse to the deviance problem. For example, it has been argued that\ncases of deviance involve lack of attention (Wu 2016), failures at the\nfine-grained level of motor (as opposed to distal and proximal)\nintentions (Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2019), or failures in the causal\npathways responsible for flexible agency (Shepherd 2021).", "\nNeedless to say, there is no agreed upon solution to the problem of\ndeviance (for general skepticism about the possibility of a solution\nsee Anscombe 1995; Vogler 2001; O’Brien 2012; Levy 2013; Horst\n2015; Valaris 2015); on the other hand, philosophers have also argued\nthat competing accounts suffer from problems that parallel the problem\nof deviant causation for theories of action (Paul 2011b)." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 The Problem of Causal Deviance" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDavidson’s work focuses mostly on “punctual\nactions”, actions that take place very quickly, and that have\nalready occurred. A typical example of an action for Davidson will be\ndescribed by a sentence like “α flicked the\nswitch” (see Davidson 1971). Flicking a switch happens almost\ninstantaneously; moreover, when I describe my action as “flicked\nthe switch”, the sentence picks up a completed event in which\nthe action is already done. And flicking a switch, buttering toast,\netc. are actions typically performed from beginning to end without\ninterruption. In sum, Davidson’s typical examples of actions are\nshort-lived, continuous, and completed actions. Davidson’s\nconception of an intention follows a similar pattern, focusing on\nintentions that are executed in actions that follow the aforementioned\npattern. At first, Davidson takes intentions in (short-lived) action\nto be primary, and later (Davidson 1970b) expands the model to\nprospective intention (intentions for a future action), but still\nfocusing mostly on intentions for a simply executed action that\nhappens to lie in the future. However our actions often extend through\nlong stretches of time, and seem to rely on future-directed intentions\nthat govern very complex plans and activities. Moreover, we only seem\nto have a completed action when we are no longer engaged in the\nrelevant activity (when it is true that I’ve crossed the street\nI am no longer engaged in the activities that constitute or are means\nto having crossed the street); agency arguably manifests itself only\nin action in progress (I am engaged in these activities while I am\ncrossing the street). By keeping our focus on completed action,\nwe risk losing sight of another seemingly essential feature of human\naction: that it extends through time under the guidance of the agent.\nOf course, this kind of initial focus on nearly momentary, completed\nactions does not necessarily mean that the theory cannot accommodate\nextended action that requires complex planning or action in progress\n(or any form of agency that necessarily stretches through time). But a\nnumber of philosophers have tried to either expand, modify, or reject\nDavidson’s theory to account for extended agency or action in\nprogress, or to argue that a proper theory of action should focus on\nthe nature and structure of action in progress (Thompson 2008; Ford\n2018). This section will focus on extended agency of the former kind,\nand the relevance of action in progress will be discussed in section\n4.", "\nMichael Bratman’s work (Bratman 1987; 1999a; 2007; 2018, among\nothers) was seminal in arguing for the importance of intentions,\npolicies, and plans (all of which he classifies as intentions or\nplanning states) in our understanding of how limited rational beings\ncoordinate their actions through time and can pursue ends and projects\nthrough extended periods of time. Bratman’s planning theory of\nagency starts from rejecting Davidson’s account of intention,\nand replacing it with a new understanding of the function (and nature)\nof intentions and planning states. Davidson had identified intention\nwith an “all-out” or unconditional judgment, “which,\nif we were to express it in words, would have a form like ”This\naction is desirable’“ (Davidson 1970b, 55); that is, an\nintention is a distinctive kind of evaluative judgment (”this\naction is good“ or ”this action is desirable“). On\nthis view, to intend to φ is to have φ-ing as the conclusion\nof one’s practical reasoning. Bratman finds this view\nproblematic in many ways, but arguably his most important objection to\nDavidson’s view is that Davidson’s theory of intention\nmisses out one of the ”two faces“ of intentions.\nIntentions, on Bratman’s views, are tied not only to intentional\naction but also to coordinating plans (Bratman 1987); Davidson’s\nidentification of intentions with certain evaluative judgments seems\nincapable of making room for the latter ”face“. However,\nthis role of future-directed intentions in planning and\ncoordinating action through time is essential to agency. Among our\nfuture-directed intentions, there are very specific intentions to,\nsay, make huevos rancheros for brunch later today, but also more\ncomplex plans and projects (my plan to write a book on tricycles is\nalso a specific, though not significantly filled out, intention for a\nspecific action or set of actions), and policies (my policy to\nexercise once a week is a ”repeatable“, general, intention\nto perform various futures\n actions).[3]", "\nFuture-directed intentions have for Bratman at least two important\nfunctions in our deliberation: they have a settling function and a\ncoordination function. Suppose I am deciding where I am spending my\nnext vacation, and let us assume that I narrow it down to two\npossibilities: Poughkeepsie and Daytona Beach. At some point,\ntypically much before my first vacation day, I will form an intention\nto go on one of these specific vacations (say to Daytona Beach), and\nthis intention is independent of forming an evaluative judgment in\nfavour of either option; I might be convinced that they are equally\ndesirable, but I can only take one vacation a year. Forming the\nintention to go to Daytona Beach settles the question for me\nand ends deliberation on the matter. Since there is intrinsically no\nlimit on how long I could spend deliberating, this settling function\nperforms an important role in managing the cognitive resources of\nlimited beings like us. But future-directed intentions also perform an\nimportant coordinating function in our extended agency. Going on\nvacation is a complex endeavour and we cannot successfully engage in\nthis action without prior planning. If I am going to Daytona Beach, I\nneed to plan how long I will stay, and what I will do when I am there,\nmake hotel reservations, etc. These plans will also require more\nconcrete plans as these actions unfold (if I plan to have snacks with\nme for the Indy-500, I need to plan which snacks, and then plan on\nwhere and when I will get them, and then plan on how I will get to the\nchosen grocery store, and so forth). Our capacity to form these\ndifferent types of future-directed intentions (plans, policies, and\nmore specific future-directed intentions) allows us to engage in these\ncomplex forms of extended agency (to be ”planning agents“\nin Bratman’s words). In order to perform these functions,\nfuture-directed intentions must resist reconsideration and be stable\nthrough time. If I keep changing my mind after I form the intention to\ntravel to Daytona Beach, my intention will not have settled the issue\nor foreclosed further deliberation. And it will also make both\nintrapersonal and interpersonal coordination impossible: if I expect I\nwill change my mind, there’ll be no point in making hotel\nreservations at Daytona Beach. Moreover, these functions impose\ncoherence constraints on my intentions: lack of means-ends coherence,\nfor instance, will similarly prevent future-directed intention from\nfunctioning properly.", "\nThus, Bratman, as well as a number of other philosophers afterwards\n(for instance, Holton 2004; Holton 2009; Yaffe 2010; Paul 2014),\nsuggest that an account of planning agency reshapes our understanding\nof agency and practical rationality. Bratman (1987) argues, for\ninstance, that certain dispositions for nonreconsideration are\nessential to understanding the rationality of limited agents like\nourselves. Holton (2004; 2009) extends Bratman’s account to\nanother function of a future-directed intention: resisting temptation\nwhen we expect preferences and judgment shifts. We achieve this,\naccording to Holton, by forming resolutions: intentions to\nremain firm in our intentions, which are harder to reconsider than\nsimple desires or (first-order) intentions. (See Paul 2011a for some\nskepticism about this extension.)", "\nBratman also tries to expand his planning theory to explain the\nrationality of acting on a future-directed intention even in cases in\nwhich judgment or preference shifts might seem to justify acting\notherwise. In earlier work, Bratman (1999b) appeals to a\n”no-regret“ condition; roughly, a requirement that we\nshould not reconsider or revise an intention if we’ll regret\nhaving done so at the conclusion of our planned actions. In later\nwork, Bratman (2018) appeals to the end of self-governance, an end\nthat is typically shared by human agents, to explain the rationality\nof sticking to one’s intentions in face of temptation (for\nsomewhat similar ideas in the context of cooperation, see Velleman\n1997). According to Bratman, self-governance is a form of agency in\nwhich the agent acts from a standpoint that is truly his own; a\nself-governing agent is guided ”by attitudes that constitute\nwhere he stands“ (Bratman 2018,\n 159).[4]\n On this view, self-governance has both a synchronic and diachronic\nform. Synchronic self-governance requires a coherent practical\nstandpoint at a time that can constitute where the agent stands in a\ncoherent manner, while diachronic self-governance requires a coherent\nstandpoint across different times when the agent’s plans stretch\nthrough an extended period. Since typically planning agents also have\nself-governance as one of their ends, the need for such a coherent\nstandpoint generates reasons to conform to a requirement not to revise\nintentions not only in cases of temptation, but also in cases in which\nan agent forms a future-directed intention to choose one of a number\nof alternatives that are either indifferent or incommensurable. Even\nthough in such cases an agent has sufficient reasons to act\ndifferently than she intends (since other options are just as good or\nat least on a par), self-governance requires that she preserves a\ncoherent standpoint over time (for a different way to justify\nnormative reasons against ”brute shuffling“ in terms of\nself-governance, see Paul 2014; for skepticism about some of these\nrequirements against brute shuffling, see Ferrero 2010; Nefsky and\nTenenbaum 2022).", "\nAlthough these challenges to Davidson’s original theory of\naction are different from the challenges that focus on the nature of\naction in progress, some philosophers argue that they are not\nunrelated. Tenenbaum (2018; 2020) argues that understanding better the\nnature of intentional action as actions that are always\nextended through time, and the nature of the instrumental reasoning\ninvolved in intentional action in progress, makes Bratman’s\nappeal to a sui generis state of future-directed intention\nsuperfluous in our understanding of practical rationality. On this\nview, there is no difference between the rational requirements\ngoverning the various phases of an action in progress and the\nrequirements governing the execution of a plan that contains various\nsteps, or of a general intention that contains various instances (and\nthus purported requirements that are specific to future-directed\nintentions turn out to be redundant or spurious).", "\nOn a somewhat different vein, some philosophers have challenged the\nview that there is a significant metaphysical ”break“\nbetween a prior intention and an action in progress. From the time I\ndecide to make an omelet, to the time the finished product is on my\nplate, my agency unfolds in various stages and phases in pursuit of\nthis end: I plan to make an omelet, I check which ingredients I need,\nI make sure that I leave myself enough time to go to the store while\nengaged in other activities in the morning, I buy the milk, go back\nhome, melt the butter, break the eggs, drop them on the pan, and so\nforth. These are all parts, or phases, of the unfolding of the\nactivity that, if nothing untoward happens, will result in my having\nmade an omelet. Although we can impose various breaks and divide the\nprocess into ”intending“, ”preparing“,\n”making the omelet“, these breaks are largely arbitrary\nfrom the point of view of the activity itself (Thompson 2008; Moran\nand Stone 2009; Ferrero 2017; Russell 2018); a metaphysics of\nintention that emphasizes differences risks losing sight of the\ncontinuity of the phenomena (for criticisms of these deflationary\nideas about the differences between the various phases of the\nactivity from intending to doing, see Yaffe 2010; Paul 2014)." ], "section_title": "3. Extended Action", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWhereas the central notion in Davidson’s theory of intentional\naction was that of causation, the central one in\nAnscombe’s is that of practical knowledge. In a famous\npassage, she appears to define intentional action as an event that\nmanifests practical knowledge:", "\n[W]here (a) the description of an event is of a type to be formally\nthe description of an executed intention (b) the event is actually the\nexecution of an intention (by our criteria) then the account given by\nAquinas of the nature of practical knowledge holds: Practical\nknowledge is ‘the cause of what it understands’, unlike\n‘speculative’ knowledge, which ‘is derived from the\nobjects known’. (Anscombe 1957, §48)\n", "\nOnly recently practical knowledge has received sustained interest in\nphilosophy of action. Much of the resulting work aims to clarify and\ndefend Anscombe’s view (Moran 2004; Thompson 2008, 2011; Haddock\n2011; Rödl 2011; Small 2012; Wolfson 2012; Marcus 2012;\nStathopoulos 2016; Campbell 2018; Marcus 2018; Frey 2019; Valaris\n2021); but several critics question her arguments, as well as\napplication of the notion to the definition of intentional action\n(e.g., Houlgate 1966; Grice 1971; Paul 2009b; 2011b). In response, a\nnumber of scholars who still find inspiration in Anscombe have sought\nto accommodate the criticisms by giving up on some of her most\nambitious claims. This section concentrates on contemporary debates\nabout practical knowledge stemming from Anscombe’s discussion,\nbut we start by briefly examining its origins in ancient Greek and\nmediaeval philosophy." ], "section_title": "4. Practical Knowledge", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe idea that there is a distinctively practical form of knowledge\ntraces back to Aristotle, who distinguished different ways ”by\nvirtue of which the soul possesses truth“ (EE\n5.3/NE 6.3). There are three theoretical forms by which a\nscientist grasps the truth: knowledge (epistêmê),\nwisdom (sophia), and comprehension (nous). Practical\nknowledge comes in two varieties: the knowledge of the skilled person\nabout what she makes—skill (technê), and the\nknowledge of the virtuous person about her actions—practical\nwisdom (phronêsis).", "\nAristotle’s account of practical knowledge is complex, and our\nfocus shall lie on three points of particular significance. First,\nAristotle claimed that skill is the ”cause“\n(aitia) of the things produced by it. For instance, he\nclaimed that the craft of building is the cause of the house\n(Phys. 2.5, 196b26). Second, Aristotle imposed epistemic\nconditions on voluntary and, a fortiori, intentional action: according\nto him, to act voluntarily one must know, among other things, what one\nis doing, to whom, and why (NE 3.1 1111a3–6; EE 2.9\n1225a36–b10). Third, Aristotle identified a distinctive kind of\nreasoning associated with practical knowledge, a form of reasoning\ntraditionally rendered ”practical syllogism“ (though see\nSegvic 2011). Such reasoning begins from a certain good and its\nconclusion is an action. For instance, on the basis of thinking that\nwalks are good after lunch, and that he has eaten lunch, a man might\ntake a walk (DMA 7, 701a13–14). (For more on ancient\nviews on action, see Parry 2021.)", "\nSeveral mediaeval philosophers built on these Aristotelian ideas,\nespecially to understand God’s knowledge of creation (see\nSchwenkler 2015). Anscombe (1957)’s account of practical\nknowledge draws on this tradition. She first characterizes intentional\naction as that to which a special sense of the question\n”Why?“ applies, the sense that requests a reason for\naction (§5). Later, Anscombe appeals to Aristotle’s notion\nof practical reasoning to connect the notion of reason for action and\nthe deliberative structure by which an agent determines how to attain\na goal by acting (§33ff.). What the question ”Why?“\nreveals, then, is the rational ”order“ of means-to-ends\nthat define practical reasoning, and the answers reveal the\ndescriptions under which the action is intentional.", "\nTo illustrate with her famous example of a man pumping water\n(§23): A man is moving his arms up and down. Why? Because he is\noperating a pump. Why? Because he is pumping water. Why? Because he is\npoisoning the inhabitants of the house (you see, the water is\npoisoned). Why? Because he wants to kill them to bring world peace.\nThe question ”Why?“ has application only inasmuch as the\nagent recognizes himself as acting under the corresponding\ndescriptions expressed by his answers. As Anscombe notes, if the man\nwere asked ”Why are you pumping water?“ and he replied,\n”I was not aware I was doing that“, then he would not be\nacting intentionally under that description (§6; §42). The\ndescriptions that manifest the agent’s understanding of what she\nis doing are therefore intrinsic to the action: an action does not\ncount as intentional under a description unless the agent grasps the\naction as such (under that description). Such grasp, therefore, cannot\nbe a separate occurrence (§42).", "\nThis reveals at least one important sense in which practical knowledge\nis the ”cause of what it understands“. It is the formal\ncause because the agent’s grasp determines what the action is\n(an intentional action with a determinate content). In turn, this\nshows why, in the phrase Anscombe borrows from Aristotle’s\nMagna Moralia, ”the mistake is in the\nperformance“ when it doesn’t conform to the judgment\n(§32): qua formal cause, the knowledge sets the standard for what\nis known. Whether, like Aristotle, Anscombe holds that practical\nknowledge is also an efficient cause is a complex, and disputed\nquestion (see Setiya 2016a for skepticism, and Piñeros\nGlasscock 2020a for endorsement).", "\nOne last important aspect of Anscombe’s conception of practical\nknowledge is the contention that an agent knows what she is doing\n”without observation“ (1957, §8). This is because,\nintuitively, whereas I need to look at what is being written on the\nboard to know what someone else is writing, I don’t need to look\nat what I am doing to know what I am writing. Beyond\nintuitive examples, however, it has proven difficult to explain what\nnon-observational knowledge\n is.[5]\n Nevertheless, there are three points on which there is wide\nagreement. First, the class of practical knowledge is a proper\nsubclass of the class of non-observational knowledge, one that also\nincludes, for instance, knowledge of our limbs’s position\n(§§9–10). Second, to say that knowledge is non-observational\nis minimally to say that it is non-inferential. Third, and finally,\nthe non-observational character of this knowledge is of the sort\ntraditionally associated with mental states. Hence, one of the most\nremarkable theses of Intention is that public\nhappenings—actions—could be known in the distinctive way\ntraditionally reserved for internal mental states, so that there would\nbe ”spontaneous knowledge of material reality“ (Rödl\n2007, 121)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 The Nature of Practical Knowledge" }, { "content": [ "\nAnscombe presents several arguments for the claim that to act\nintentionally an agent must know what she is doing (call this the\n”knowledge condition’), and further arguments have been\npresented in the literature. This section surveys four influential\narguments.", "\nOne argument has already been mentioned: If a person is asked,\n“Why are you φ-ing?” and she (sincerely) replies,\n“I didn’t realize I was φ-ing” then she\nwasn’t φ-ing intentionally. It would seem to follow that a\nperson must know what she is doing if acting intentionally. However,\nthis argument is unsound. First, the expression “I didn’t\nrealize…” is colloquially used to express complete lack\nof awareness, rather than mere ignorance (Schwenkler 2019, 189). At\nmost, then, the argument would show that the action cannot be\ncompletely beyond the agent’s purview. Second, even if the\nperson’s state is in fact knowledge after the question\nis asked, this may be a conversational effect: By asking “Why\nare you φ-ing?”, the speaker intimates that the agent is\nφ-ing. This puts the agent in a position to know this, but not in\na way that is tied to her agency.", "\nA more promising argument, suggested by Anscombe and endorsed by some\nof her followers in some form (Setiya 2007; Marušić and\nSchwenkler 2018), appeals to the connection between action and\nassertion. It can be stated thus:", "\nPremise 2 is the standard claim that knowledge is the norm of\nassertion (Unger 1975; Slote 1979; Williamson 2000; DeRose 2002;\nReynolds 2002; Hawthorne 2004). Premise 1 may also look innocuous;\nbut, as we shall see, there may be cases that speak against it.", "\nThere are two more influential arguments inspired by Anscombe that\nhave been used to defend the connection with knowledge. The first\nbegins with the observation that a process in progress bears a\nnon-accidental connection to its completion (Thompson 2011; Small\n2012; Wolfson 2012; Valaris 2021). If a house is burning, it would not\nbe an accident if it is burnt later; and if you are writing a letter,\nit won’t be an accident if it is written later. What\ndistinguishes intentional action is that the non-accidental connection\nobtains in virtue of the agent’s representation—her\nintention—to act in some way. That the agent is writing a\nletter—even while she takes a break, cooks a snack, and goes to\nthe bathroom—is true precisely because she represents herself as\nwriting a letter, and this representation guides her proceedings.\nIntentions, in other words ground what Falvey (2000) calls the\n“openness of the progressive”: the fact that “a\nperson may be doing something, in a suitably broad sense, when at the\nmoment she is not doing anything, in a more narrow sense, that is for\nthe sake of what she is doing in the broad sense” (p.22).\nSuppose, then, that an agent is intentionally φ-ing. Then it is\ntrue that she represents herself as doing so, the representation is\ntrue, and non-accidentally so. It is a short step to the conclusion\nthat she knows that she is φ-ing.", "\nThe final argument is based on the claim that intentional action is\naction for a reason (Thompson 2013). An agent must therefore be in a\nposition to give an answer fitting the schema:", "\nNow, Thompson (2008) has argued that the most basic way of filling\nthis schema is one where actions themselves occupy the ψ-position\n(i.e. where actions are given as reasons). For instance:", "\nSo, in what sort of relation must an agent stand to the fact that she\nis pumping water for a sentence like (2) to be true? Hyman (1999;\n2015) has argued that the relation must be knowledge (though see Dancy\n2000, ch.6). If, then, every intentional action description is one\nthat the agent could substitute for ψ in (1), it follows that\nagents must know what they are doing when acting intentionally." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Arguments for a knowledge condition" }, { "content": [ "\nDavidson argued that the knowledge condition, and even a weaker belief\ncondition, is vulnerable to counterexamples:", "\n[I]n writing heavily on this page I may be intending to produce ten\nlegible carbon copies. I do not know, or believe with any confidence,\nthat I am succeeding. But if I am producing ten legible carbon copies,\nI am certainly doing it intentionally. (Davidson 1970b, 92)\n", "\nIn this case, Davidson argued that the agent is making 10 carbon\ncopies intentionally despite not believing that he is (never mind\nknowing); and some recent empirical results appear to support this\nverdict (Vekony 2021). Hence, it seems that agents can φ intentionally without\neven believing that they are φ-ing.", "\nFor a long time, this and similar examples (e.g. Bratman 1987, 37,\nMele 1992, ch.8) were taken as decisive refutations in the literature,\nbut their force has been contested recently (Thompson 2011; Small\n2012; Wolfson 2012; Stathopoulos 2016; Beddor and Pavese 2021; Pavese\nforthcoming). The impetus for many of these responses stems from\nThompson’s work on the importance of aspect for action-theory.\nIn particular, actions in progress display what Falvey (2000) has\ncalled “openness”, which corresponds to the inaptly-named\n“imperfective paradox” in the linguistic literature (more\nbelow): Someone can be doing something and never get around to have\ndone it (e.g. I can be crossing the street, but never cross it). It is\nthus possible for someone to know that they are φ-ing even if they\ndon’t, in fact, get to have φ-ed. To apply these\nconsiderations to Davidson’s argument, we need to distinguish\nbetween two cases. First, the normal case where the agent intends to\nmake 10 carbon copies, but has the opportunity to correct and continue\non if things go wrong (e.g. if he initially only makes 5, but then\nmakes 5 more). Second, the one-shot case where the agent must make 10\ncarbon copies in one go (say, because he is competing in a copy-making\ntournament). In the normal case, it appears like the agent may know\nthat he is making 10 carbon copies (even if he doesn’t know that\nhe will complete the 10 in one go). So it raises no problems for the\nknowledge condition. What, then, of the one-shot case? Although here\nit may be granted that the agent doesn’t know that he is making\n10 carbon copies, it is questionable whether he is making 10 carbon\ncopies intentionally. The reason is that if he were to make\n10 carbon copies as a result of pressing as hard as he can, this would\nbe too much an accidental result of his performance. But, as we saw\n(see section 2.4), accidentality is incompatible with intentional\naction. Hence, in the normal case the agent acts intentionally while\nknowing, while in the one-shot case he doesn’t even act\nintentionally.", "\nIt is contentious whether the foregoing response works (see Kirley\nforthcoming, for criticism), but it shows that Davidson’s\nexample is far from decisive. However, other examples appear to be\nimmune from this type of response. For instance, Schwenkler (2019)\npresents a case of an agent who is trying to fill a cistern in the\nkind of environment where doubts that he is doing so are appropriate\n(e.g. where he is filling up one of many cisterns, but he knows\nseveral of them are broken, but not which). Suppose, however, that he\nis in fact filling up the cistern (it is not broken). If he does so to\npoison the inhabitants of the house, Anscombe’s question\n“Why?” appears to have application, which means that he is\nfilling up the cistern intentionally, even though the best he could\nsay is that “he thinks” he is doing so (Schwenkler 2019,\n188–9; cf. Vekony, Mele, and Rose 2021; Shepherd & Carter\nforthcoming).", "\nThe key difference between this case and the carbon copier is that the\nagent remains fully in control of her action: the fact that he is\nfilling up the cistern by moving his arms so and so is no accident.\nSo, there is no reason to dispute the action’s status as\nintentional. Still, whatever belief the person might have is unsafe,\nas nearby beliefs (such as those relating to the other faucets) are\nfalse. Hence, it isn’t knowledge.", "\nBuilding on similar considerations, Piñeros Glasscock (2020b)\npresents a version of Williamson (2000)’s anti-luminosity\nargument, aiming to show that the knowledge condition is incompatible\nwith a safety principle, to the effect that to constitute knowledge, a\nrepresentation could not easily be wrong. He argues that since agents\ncan slowly transition from φ-ing to not-φ-ing through changes\nso small as to outstrip the agent’s discriminating capacities,\nagents must sometimes find themselves in situations where they are\nacting intentionally but either lack the confidence to possess\nknowledge, or, if they have it, it is misplaced. Either way, they do\nnot know.", "\nTogether, these arguments force defenders of the knowledge condition\ninto an uncomfortable position: if they wish to uphold the knowledge\ncondition, they must reject safety for practical knowledge. However,\nthis threatens to undermine the point of counting this as knowledge,\ngiven how epistemically frail it can be. On the other hand, it has\nbeen argued that a suitable understanding of the knowledge condition\nmay evade these worries (Beddor and Pavese 2021; Valaris 2021)." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Objections to the knowledge condition" }, { "content": [ "\nThe knowledge condition remains a controversial thesis in philosophy\nof action; but even those who reject it tend to hold that the\nconnection between intentional action and knowledge is not accidental.\nThus, there is a growing literature that aims to capture an important\nconnection between knowledge and intentional action in weaker terms.\nThese views can be categorized according to the term for which they\nrecommend modification, whether (i) the practical state, (ii) the\nepistemic state, or (iii) the nature of the connection between them.\n(Naturally, since these are all compatible, some scholars recommend\nmore than one revision.)", "\nThough regarded as Anscombe’s central opponent, Davidson himself\nrecommended a version of (i). According to him, although agents need\nnot know what they are doing under every description under which they\nact intentionally, they must know what they are doing under at\nleast one description under which the action is intentional\n(Davidson 1971, 51). The carbon copier, for instance, may not know\nthat he is making 10 carbon copies, but he would have to know that he\nis making carbon copies, or that he is moving his hands, etc.\nArguably, the idea that practical knowledge is restricted to knowledge\nof actions in progress is also a weakening of the thesis,\nsince Anscombe appears to include also knowledge of future actions\n(§§51–2) and of completed actions such as the knowledge that\nI wrote my name on the board (§48) or even of what is\nwritten (§19). Indeed, it has been argued that\nimperfective and perfective knowledge are interdependent (Haase 2018).\nFinally, other weakenings include the view that agents must know what\nthey intend (Fleming 1964), what they are trying to do/that they are\ntrying (Searle 1985; cf. Grice 1971), or what basic actions they are\nperforming (Setiya 2008; 2009; 2012). Since Anscombe’s thesis is\nstrictly stronger than these, it follows that they will avoid certain\nproblems that hers faces. However, it is not clear that such retreats\nhelp avoid the general problem, and restricting the thesis to more\nimmediate occurrences—basic actions, intentions, or\nattempts—risks losing on the aforementioned feature that makes\nAnscombe’s view so interesting: the idea that we might bear the\nsame intimate epistemic connection to something external as we bear to\nparts of our mental lives (Piñeros Glasscock 2020b).", "\nViews that fall under (ii) have been influentially defended by several\nauthors (Grice 1971; Harman 198;1997; Setiya 2007; 2008; 2009; 2012;\nVelleman 2001; Tenenbaum 2007; Ross 2009; Clark 2020). A popular\nversion of this view rejects a knowledge condition in favor of a\nbelief condition (Setiya 2007; Velleman 2001; Ross 2009; Clark 2020):\nif the agent φs intentionally [intends to φ], she believes\nthat she is φ-ing [believes that she will φ]. Such a view is\narguably better supported by some of Anscombe’s own arguments\n(such as the argument in terms of conversation dynamics above); and it\nseems to preserve a special place for actions as occurrences that are\npublic but to which our minds bear a special epistemic relation.\nHowever, it has been argued that such views also suffer from problems,\nand fail to avoid counterexamples with the same structure as\nDavidson’s carbon copier, even though they are explanatorily\nweaker (Bratman 1991; Paul 2009a; 2009b; Levy 2018). Since authors\nlike Setiya see the avoidance of counterexamples as a central payoff\nof the weakenings, it is unclear whether they are worth the costs in\nexplanatory value.", "\nFinally, views that fall under (iii) aim to show that even if there\nisn’t a relation of entailment between action and\npractical knowledge, there might yet be an interesting connection\nbetween them. For instance, some authors have argued that agents\nnormally or generally know what they are doing\n(Peacocke 2003; O’Brien 2007; Gibbons 2010; Schwenkler 2015;\n2019; Piñeros Glasscock 2020b); or that the kind of knowledge\nthat agents have of their intentional action has special properties,\nsuch as being first-personal knowledge (Dunn 1998; Moran 2001; 2004;\nO’Brien 2007; Marcus 2012; Schwenkler 2019)." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Weakening the knowledge condition" }, { "content": [ "\nRegardless of whether one adheres to the knowledge condition (or some\nweakened version of the view), it is generally agreed that agents\ncan have a special kind of knowledge by exercising their\npractical capacities in intentional action. However, what makes our\npractical capacities suitable source of knowledge? Anscombe devoted\nlittle attention to this question, but an answer to it could be the\nkey to working out a version of (iii) in the previous section.", "\nHere is a simple answer: A person can know that p (e.g. that\nshe (herself) is walking), on the basis of exercising her will,\nbecause when she does so successfully p is true. Two related\nproblems immediately arise for this simple account. First, truth is\ninsufficient for knowledge. Minimally, epistemic warrant is also\nneeded, but the simple account does not give even a hint as to how\nsuch warrant could be acquired through agency (Newstead 2006). Second,\nthere are notorious cases that seem to meet the conditions provided by\nthe simple answer, but where there isn’t knowledge. One case is\nlucky wishful thinking (Langton 2004), e.g., if partly on the basis of\noptimistic thinking I luckily pull off a jump I would not normally\nmake. Another is pessimistic thinking (Harman 1986; 1997), e.g., if I\ntrip partly on the basis of thinking that I will trip. In neither case\ndo I possess knowledge on the basis of my thoughts, despite the\nthoughts bringing about the truth of their contents. At best,\ntherefore, the simple answer is incomplete, and must be supplemented\nwith a story that explains how it is that the characteristic thoughts\nof the agent differ from wishful and pessimistic thoughts, such as to\nprovide epistemic warrant.", "\nAn influential account of this sort was provided in foundational work\nby Velleman (1989). Simplifying somewhat, Velleman argues that human\nbeings have a core desire to know themselves. Like any desire, this\none will motivate agents to satisfy it. In addition, they have the\ncapacities to (a) have thoughts about what they are doing and will do,\nand (b) have thoughts that are self-referential, e.g. <this very\nthought won’t make me famous>. Suppose, then, that someone\nhas the thought <I will go to the store in virtue of this\nthought>. Then, given the desire to know herself, the agent will be\nmotivated to make this thought true. Hence, thought structures of this\nsort (‘intentions’) will give the agent reasons to believe\nthat what she intends will be true.", "\nSeveral worries have been raised against Velleman’s view. One is\nthat it makes dubious empirical claims, theorizing about the mind from\nthe armchair. In response, Velleman (2000a) has provided empirical\nsupport for his more contentious psychological claim, that humans have\na deep desire for self-knowledge. Another worry is that this epistemic\nmechanism still looks too much like wishful thinking, believing that\nsomething is the case just because one wants it to be so (Langton\n2004; see Setiya 2008; Velleman 2014 for replies). Finally, it is\nunclear why, if an agent realizes that the content of her intention is\nnot realized, she must make it true that it is, rather than simply\ngive up the belief (that she will act in a certain way). After all, we\ncan pursue the aim of knowing ourselves both by ensuring that beliefs\nabout ourselves are true and by giving up beliefs about\nourselves that are false.", "\nWorries of this sort led Velleman to distinguish\n“directive” from “receptive” cognition\n(Velleman 2000, ch.7); but it has led others to consider the\nalternative view that practical knowledge is a standard form of\ninferential knowledge (Grice 1971; O’Shaughnessy 1980, 2003;\nPaul 2009a). On the most sophisticated inferentialist account, due to\nPaul (2009a), agents take advantage of the special knowledge they have\nof their intentions to make inferences about what is happening and\nwill happen. Given that intentions are reliably executed, such\ninferences reliably yield knowledge. A more radical inferentialist\nalternative, suggested by authors like Carruthers (2011) on the basis\nof empirical evidence, is that we know our actions on the basis of the\nsame processes by which we know others’ minds: we essentially\npredict what actions are most likely to happen, given what else we\nknow about others’ motives and beliefs—it’s just\nthat we know a lot more about our own minds. (Similar views about\nself-knowledge in general are defended by Gopnik 1993, and have their\norigin in Ryle 1949. For criticisms, see Boyle 2022; Levy 2022.)", "\nInferentialist accounts give up on a feature that was central to\nAnscombe’s understanding of practical knowledge, its immediate\ncharacter (see e.g. O’Brien 2007). However, Paul (2009a) argues\nthat the appearance of immediacy can be explained by the fact that\ninferences “can take place rapidly and automatically at a\nnon-conscious level, without the mindful entertaining of premises or\nfeeling of drawing a conclusion” (p.10). Yet, several challenges\nhave been raised against inferentialist accounts, including: (i) that\nthey can’t explain the tight nexus between intentional action\nand practical knowledge (Setiya 2007, 2008, 2009); (ii) that they\ncan’t explain the first-personal character of practical\nknowledge (Wilson 2000; Schwenkler 2012); and (iii) that they at best\ngive us alienated, observational knowledge (Piñeros Glasscock\n2021).", "\nThere are, finally, several non-inferentialist stories about how\npractical knowledge is possible. Some accounts appeal to knowledge-how\nor skill as the state by which an intention ensures that its content\nis not only true but also justified, so as to amount to knowledge\n(Setiya 2012; Small 2012; Valaris 2021). Another view, due to\nO’Brien (2007), explains practical knowledge in terms of the\nexercise of deliberative capacities. The agent knows what she is doing\nbecause the selection of an action is done via the exercise of\ncapacities that narrow options in terms of the practical possibilities\nof the agent. Others take practical knowledge to be inferential, but\nthe inference in question is practical inference. On this view,\npractical knowledge is warranted by the practical considerations that\nconstitute the agent’s practical reasoning (Harman 1997;\nTenenbaum 2007; Ross 2009; Marušić and Schwenkler 2018;\nCampbell 2018; Frey 2019). Finally, some have tried to show that\naccounts of epistemic warrant or entitlement designed to explain how\nwe can directly believe on the basis of perception might explain how\nwe can directly believe on the basis of our wills (Peacocke 2003;\nNewstead 2006; Piñeros Glasscock 2020a). As this brief and\nincomplete summary indicates, there is not yet anything close to a\nconsensus about how best to explain the epistemic standing for\npractical knowledge." ], "subsection_title": "4.5 The possibility of practical knowledge" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWhat are actions? The traditional answer is: they are events\nof a certain sort (e.g. events with a distinctive causal history).\nThat, at any rate, is the letter of the views found in Anscombe\n(1957), Davidson (1963; 1967a; 1967b; 1985), and much subsequent\nliterature. However, some scholars have recently argued that\nAnscombe’s position is better captured by the claim that actions\nare processes, and that there are philosophical advantages to\nthis view. Yet, others take actions to be something else altogether.\nThis section explains what this dispute is about, and explores some of\nits implications for other ontological debates such as the\nindividuation of action. It then considers further important questions\nabout the metaphysics of action, such as whether there must be basic\nactions, and whether Action constitutes a unified\ncategory." ], "section_title": "5. The Ontology of Actions", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThere are several reasons to categorize actions as events. A central\none concerns their connection to causation (Davidson 1967a; Goldman\n1970). Actions are directly implicated in causal relations: modifying\nDavidson’s example (pp.4–5), the burglar’s entering my\nhouse might cause me to turn on the light, which in turn might cause\nhim to be startled. On the widespread assumption that events are the\nprimary causal relata, it would follow that actions, such as my\nturning on of the light, are events.", "\nAnother argument for the event view is that it explains common\ninference patterns. As Davidson (1967b) noted, sentences attributing\nactions to agents admit of adjectival drop. Thus, a sentence like (3)\nentails (4), which in turn entails (5):", "\nDavidson suggested that the best way to account for these inferential\nrelations is to assume that at the level of logical form these\nsentences quantify over events. So understood, the logical form of\n(3)–(5) would be as\n follows:[6]", "\nThe entailment relations are then easily explained through the\nclassical rules for conjunction and existential quantification. This\nanalysis, which has been highly influential in formal semantics,\nappears to entail that actions are events, entities with a\nspatiotemporal location (since they admit of spatiotemporal\nmodifiers), that possess the properties denoted by adverbial modifiers\n(such as who was engaged in them, or what the object of the action\nwas).", "\nFinally, perhaps the most straightforward reason to hold that actions\nare events, is that this fits naturally with the way we speak about\nthem. For instance, we say, “The event we observed last night\nturned out to be a theft”, or “The murder of that woman\nwas a sad event”.", "\nAgainst this view, a number of scholars have recently argued that\nactions (in the sense of concern for philosophy of action) are instead\nprocesses (Mourelatos 1978; Stout 1997; Hornsby 2012; Steward\n2012; Charles 2018). To understand this claim, we first need to\nexplain what the distinction amounts to. We can introduce it at an\nintuitive level in terms of the aspectual distinction between the\nfollowing two sentences:", "\n(6) refers to an ongoing occurrence in the midst of development. As\nsuch, many of its properties are still indeterminate and may change\nover time. It may be happening in the bathroom in a matter of seconds\nif Donald stays there; but he could take a break, forget about it, and\ncontinue on with it several minutes later in the kitchen. Moreover,\nthe manner in which it takes place can change as it occurs: it may\nspeed up (if Donald is suddenly in a hurry) or slow down (if Donald is\ndistracted by a noise), and he may start doing it more mindfully, or\ndistractedly. Indeed, however Donald is doing the buttering,\nit may happen that he never ends up having buttered the toast\n(a nearby scream might cause him to drop it in the toilet halfway\nthrough). This is sometimes called the “imperfective\nparadox”: in general, ⌜x is φ-ing⌝ does\nnot entail ⌜x has φ’d⌝. By contrast, the event\nitself, denoted by (7), cannot speed up or slow down, nor change the\nmanner in which it is done, since it is already complete. This is why\nit has a determinate temporal-spatial location in terms of which some\nhave sought to individuate it (Lemmon 1967; Quine 1985; Davidson\n1985). By contrast, processes do not have an essential\ntemporal-spatial location: the same process of buttering that is now\ntaking place at 12:01 could culminate in a minute or in an hour.", "\nThe most straightforward reason to think that actions are processes is\nthat actions appear to have these properties, as is indicated by the\nexamples used in the previous paragraph (Stout 1997; Steward 2012;\nCharles 2015; 2018). Thus, one’s action can speed up or slow\ndown, be done in one way or another at different times in its history,\nand may culminate at different times. Indeed, an ongoing action may\nnever be completed.", "\nThe connection between imperfective aspect and processes provides\nfurther impetus for the view that actions are processes (the argument\nto follow is based on Michael Thompson’s ideas (2008,\n122–30), though he rejects the view that actions are processes,\nunderstood as particulars (pp.134–7)). After all, it seems essential\nto actions that they can enter into rationalizing explanations\n(Anscombe 1957; Thompson 2008; Wiland 2013; Ford 2015; 2017), and such\nexplanations can easily be given in imperfective language. To see\nthis, consider again Anscombe’s case of a man who operates a\nlever to pump poisoned water to a house, with the plan of killing the\ninhabitants (Anscombe 1957, §23). We could represent his thoughts\nas follows: “I am moving the lever up and down because\nI am pumping water to the house because I am poisoning its\ninhabitants.” Indeed, such formulations seem to express\ncanonical answers to Anscombe’s special question\n“Why?” (Thompson 2008; Wiland 2013; Ford 2015). However,\nwe cannot capture the same thoughts without imperfective expressions\n(Thompson 2008). The train of thought that goes, “I have moved\nthe lever up and down because I have pumped the water\nbecause I have poisoned the inhabitants of the house”\nmakes it sound like the man is acting on a conditional promise to move\nthe lever if the men are killed by his hand. This suggests that\nwhereas processes can directly enter into the kinds of rationalizing\nexplanations definitive of intentional action, events cannot (except,\nperhaps, derivatively), which in turn suggests that actions are\nprocesses.", "\nFinally, it has been suggested that the process view can better\naccommodate the type of direct guidance that Frankfurt identified as\nessential to intentional action (see above, section 2.4). It seems\nattractive to explain the nature of this direct guidance in terms of\nhow substances in general cause changes by engaging in certain\nprocesses (Hornsby 2012), or in terms of the different ways in which\nan agent can manifest her agency in a process (slower, faster, more or\nless skillfully) (Charles 2018). And, as Steward (2012) suggests, this\nmight give a substantial role to the agent in the explanation of\naction. By contrast, since events have settled natures and\nspatial-temporal properties, it seems that the agent can at best\ninteract with them in the indirect way in which she interacts with\nother objects, such as a car.", "\nIt is only recently that an alternative to the event view has been\nclearly formulated and defended. As such, much work remains to be done\nin this area, and even among defenders of the process view there are\nimportant disagreements. One important disagreement is over whether\nprocesses are particulars (Galton 2006; Steward 2012; Charles 2018) or\nnot (Stout 1997; Crowther 2011; Hornsby 2012; Crowther 2018; cf.\nThompson 2008). Another disagreement is about whether a unique thing\nis a process and an event (at different times) (Steward 2012; Charles\n2018), or whether the process and the event are distinct things (Stout\n1997; Crowther 2011; Hornsby 2012; Charles 2015; Crowther 2018).", "\nRegardless of how these questions are answered, a remaining challenge\nis to explain the unity between processes and events, the\nfact that there is a non-accidental connection between the process of\nbuttering, and the event of one’s having buttered the toast that\nresults if the action is successful (Haase 2022). Moreover, it is\nworth noting that although the process-view is the most important\nalternative available to the events-view, other proposals have been\nadvanced recently, including the view that actions are thoughts\n(Rödl 2007; 2011; Marcus 2012; Valaris 2020). For example, Marcus\nholds that to act intentionally just is to judge that the action is to\nbe done." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Events, processes, and more" }, { "content": [ "\nThe example of the pumper displays another important Anscombean thesis\n(endorsed by Davidson, see section 2.2 above): that a single event can\ninstantiate different properties in terms of which it can be\ndescribed. Thus, the same action is at once a moving of the\nhands, a pumping of water, and a poisoning.\nThis was important for Anscombe because she held that actions are\nintentional only under some descriptions: for instance, even if the\npumper’s energetic moves scare a nearby squirrel, the action\nwould not be intentional under the description scaring of a\nsquirrel.", "\nThe most influential alternative to this “coarse-grained”\naccount is a “fine-grained” account that individuates\nactions (and events, more generally) in terms of their properties (Kim\n1966; 1969; 1973; 1976; Goldman 1970). On this view, A and\nB are the same action just in case A has all and\nonly the properties that B has; and for each set of such\nproperties, there is an event. Since moving one’s hands, pumping\nwater, and poisoning are distinct properties, this view entails that\nthe pumper’s moving of his hands, his pumping of the water, and\nhis poisoning of the inhabitants are distinct actions.", "\nAnscombe complained that treating these as different actions would be\nlike treating the author of David Copperfield and the author\nof Bleak House as different men, rather than a single author,\nDickens (Anscombe 1979, 222). Indeed, the fine-grained view has\nsimilar counterintuitive implications. Consider: the properties of\npumping water, pumping water while smiling, and pumping water at noon,\nare all different properties. So, the man who pumped water at noon\nwhile smiling would have engaged in three different pumpings according\nto the fine-grained view.", "\nMoreover, the view threatens to undermine some basic inferences we are\ninclined to make about actions (Katz 1978). For instance, it seems\nobvious that from:", "\nWe can infer:", "\nBut, similarly, it seems that from:", "\nWe can infer:", "\nHowever, on the fine-grained view the inference to (11) is invalid\nsince the two descriptions in (11) must refer to distinct events.\nHence the defender of the fine-grained view is forced to reject a\nseemingly innocuous inference pattern.", "\nThese are serious problems, and it is not clear that defenders of the\nfine-grained view can do more than bite the bullets. However, it has\nbeen argued that the coarse-grained account has similarly\ncounterintuitive implications (Goldman 1970; Thomson 1971). To see\nwhy, consider the following two sentences (true of the imagined\npumper):", "\nWe can paraphrase them using gerundival expressions as follows:", "\nNow, suppose we assume the claim that:", "\nThen, by substitution, we arrive at the absurd:", "\nIt is natural to think that (14) is the culprit; but to hold that\nclaims such as (14) are false seems to amount to rejecting the\ncoarse-grained view of action individuation.", "\nOne possible response would be to hold that the contexts ⌜φ\nhappens* before ψ⌝ and ⌜φ causes* ψ⌝\n(the * marks tenselessness) are intensional in the φ and ψ\npositions (Anscombe 1969). If so, substitution of co-referents may\nchange truth value in these contexts. Alternatively, one could attempt\nto explain these results pragmatically: the sentences sound odd in the\nsame way as it sounds odd to say that “a man married his\nwidow’, even though it is true (the man married her\nbefore she was a widow, of course!) (cf. Anscombe 1979).\nHowever, these are controversial semantic theses (for further\nintensionalist treatments, see Achinstein 1975; McDermott 1995;\nWasserman 2004; for extensionalist treatments, see e.g., Davidson\n1967a; Strawson 1985; Rosenberg and Martin 1979; Schaffer 2005; for an\nexcellent review of research on causal contexts more generally,\nincluding pragmatic effects, see Swanson 2012).", "\nA different response is suggested by the view that actions are\nprocesses. That view enables us to treat action descriptions as\nsometimes characterizing the different stages of the action (cf.\nRussell 2018). Then, appealing to Anscombe’s insight that we\nshould treat claims about actions in parallel with claims about\npersons, we could say that the moving of one’s hands precedes\nand causes the poisoning in an analogous way as the acorn precedes and\ncauses the oak. But just as there is a single organism in the latter\ncase, there is a single action in the former, even though it seems at\nbest paradoxical to say that I caused myself to exist, or that the oak\ncaused the acorn.", "\nFinally, the coarse- and fine-grained views obviously do not exhaust\nthe conceptual landscape. A number of philosophers have offered\nindividuation principles stricter than those advanced by\ncoarse-grained theorists, but laxer than those advanced by\nfine-grained theorists (e.g. Ginet 1990). Charles (1984), for example,\nargues that Aristotle would individuate actions in terms of\ncapacities. This allows us to say that the moving of one’s hands\nis the same action as the moving of one’s hands quickly (since a\nsingle capacity is thereby actualized), even though it is a different\naction from the poisoning, which actualizes a different set of\ncapacities. The challenge for this view is to provide an account of\nthe individuation of capacities independent of the account of the\nindividuation of actions." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 The Individuation of Action" }, { "content": [ "\nConsideration of cases like that of the pumper naturally raises a\nquestion about their structure: what kind of shape could such\na rationalizing explanation take? Could it go on forever? To answer\nthis, consider the pumper once more, and suppose he poisons the\ninhabitants of the house. It is true, then, that he poisoned the\ninhabitants of the house by pumping water, and he did this by moving\nhis hands. Because the poisoning and the pumping are done by doing\nsomething else, they are called ”non-basic“ actions.\nHowever, it has been argued that there must be at least some actions\nthat are ”basic’“, done not by doing anything else.\nOtherwise, we appear to be caught in various forms of a vicious\nregress.", "\nFor example, if to do A one must do B, and to do\nB one must do C, and so on ad infinitum,\ndoing anything would seem to require doing an infinite number of\nthings. More worrying, the beginning of action seems to be\n”logically out of reach“ for the agent, since there is\nalways something else that she would have to do before she begins to\ndo anything (Danto 1979, 471). Again, it seems that for an agent to\nknow what she is currently doing, she needs to know how to do the\nthings by which she does it; but unless there is something that she\ncan know how to do just by doing it, it will be impossible for her to\nknow what she is doing at all (Hornsby 2013).", "\nArguments of this sort convinced most scholars that there must be\nbasic actions (though see Baier 1971 and Sneddon 2001 for early\ndissent). The debate then centered on which actions are\nbasic. Many scholars held that simple bodily movements, like moving a\nfinger or raising an eyebrow, were basic, while others held that they\ncould be more complex (tying one’s shoes), or that they must be\nsimpler: perhaps only mental actions, or tryings were basic. After\nall, I move my finger by attempting to move it; and we need to\ndistinguish between the attempt and the movement, since sometimes the\nattempt occurs without the movement (e.g. if my fingers are suddenly\nparalized) (Prichard 1945: Hornsby 1980; O’Shaughnessy 1980; see\nCleveland 1997, ch.5 for criticism).", "\nAs several scholars have noted, part of what is at issue in this\ndebate are different notions of basicness, corresponding to different\nunderstandings of the clause ”by doing something else“\n(Baier 1971; Annas 1978; Hornsby 1980). It is common to draw a\nthree-fold distinction: (i) know-how basicness; (ii) causal basicness;\nand (iii) teleological basicness. An action is know-how basic iff\nthere is no other (type of) action by which the agent knows how to do\nthe one in question. An action is causally basic iff there is no other\n(token) action that causes it. An action is teleologically basic iff\nthere is no other (token) action by means of which the agent does it.\nTo illustrate in a way that highlights the differences, consider\npitching a baseball. Arguably, this action is know-how basic, since\nthe pitcher may not know a more basic action by which to do it: of\ncourse, the agent may know how to move her hands independently, but\nshe may be unable to move her hands in the particular way in which she\ndoes when she throws the baseball unless she were actually throwing\nthe baseball. Whether the action is causally basic depends on whether\nwe think there is another action that causes it, such as the\npitcher’s moving of his hands. Finally, and independently of the\nquestion of causation, the action appears to be teleologically\nnon-basic, since the moving of his hands is certainly both a means and\nan action by which the pitcher pitches. The consensus for many years\nwas that there must be basic actions in all three senses.", "\nHowever, this widespread consensus about teleological basicness has\nrecently been called into question by Michael Thompson and other\ndefenders of ”naive“ action theory (Thompson 2008,\n107–119). Thompson considers the case of a person, P,\nwho has pushed a stone from point α to ω. Let β be\nthe halfway point between α and ω. It seems that if\nP pushed the stone from α to ω intentionally,\nthen he pushed the stone from α to β intentionally. Now,\nlet γ be the halfway point between α and β. Once\nagain, it seems that P pushed the stone from α to\nγ intentionally. And so on. It seems, then, that there will\nalways be a further action by which P pushed the stone. In\nother words, there is no basic action. Moreover, as a number of\nauthors have noted (Small 2012; Lavin 2013), the argument can be\ngeneralized for virtually every action, since it can be presented in\nterms of a series of time-segments (instead of place-segments), and\nvirtually every action takes place over time. (For critical\ndiscussion, see Ford 2018.)", "\nBuilding on this argument, Lavin (2013) presents a further challenge\nto the view that there must be (teleological) basic action.\nLavin’s argument centers on the relation of the agent to her\nactions. Consider first a non-basic action, like poisoning the\ninhabitants of the house. The agent’s relation to this action is\nitself an agential matter, since the agent poisons the inhabitants by\ndoing something else intentionally (operating the pump). Now consider\nan arbitrary basic action, A. By definition, the agent\ndoesn’t do A by doing anything else. However, this is\nan action that occurs through time, so, presumably there are\nhappenings h1, h2, …,\nhn by which A takes place. But since\nh1, h2, …, hn are\nmere happenings, this means that the agent relates to A\nnon-agentially. Now, Lavin grants that it may be possible sometimes\nfor us to relate to our actions non-agentially; but it would be\nalarming if this was necessarily the case, as defenders of basic\naction are committed to hold. It would mean that agents are\nnecessarily alienated from their actions, in the way labourers are\nalienated from their labour in Marx’s critique of capitalism. In\nturn, Lavin argues that this would make it impossible for agents to\nhave self-knowledge of their own actions, since self-knowledge is\ngrounded on our agential relation.", "\nThere is a growing literature responding to Thompson’s and\nLavin’s challenges, both refining the arguments, or presenting\nobjections to it (Setiya 2012; Hornsby 2013; Lynch 2017; Frost 2019;\nSmall 2019). This is not surprising, since the debate about basic\nactions has important repercussions for other questions about the\nnature of intentional action. For example, Lavin (2013) holds that\ndefenders of (teleologically) basic action are committed to a\n”decompositional account“ of agency (see section 1). After\nall, if there are basic actions, we may be able to give an account of\nwhat makes something an action in terms of the non-agential relation\nan agent bears to her basic actions. Moreover, Ford (2017; 2018) notes\nthat Thompson’s argument suggests a novel way to pursue action\ntheory, one that defines action not in terms of reasons for\naction but, in the first instance, in terms of the means by which\nan action is pursued.The latter, Ford holds, better captures the\nagential perspective: in the context of deliberation, what the agent\nasks is How to pursue a particular course of action, rather\nthan Why she is doing something. Finally, the debate may have\nrepercussions for our understanding of the relation between skill and\nintentional action. For example, both Frost and Small suggest that at\nthe most fundamental level, our agency depends on our exercise of\npractical skills by which we enter an instrumental order\nwithout consciously representing that order at the level of\npropositional thought (Small 2012; 2019; Frost 2019)." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 The Debate Over Basic Action" }, { "content": [ "\nNearly all contemporary philosophers treat intentional action\nas a unified category. Despite the many differences between moving a\nfinger, running, hammering a nail, fixing a fridge, eating a sandwich,\nacting justly, keeping a promise, and marrying someone, all of these\nare treated as equally belonging to a single type: acting. The\nassumption is supported by natural language. After all, these are all\nlegitimate answers to the question ”What are you\ndoing?’.", "\nAristotle provides us with an alternative view that has had immense\ninfluence in philosophy. Throughout his writings, Aristotle\ndistinguishes between “making” or “producing”\n(poíêsis) on the one hand, and\n“acting proper” (praxis) on the other (an early\nversion of the distinction appears in Plato’s Charmides\n163a–c). The two are distinguished by their success conditions\n(EE 5.2/NE 6.2 1139b1–4; EE 5.5/NE\n6.5 1140b6–7). The success conditions for makings are external\nto them: one succeeds at making insofar as something external to the\nmaking obtains (the product). By contrast, the success conditions for\nproper actions are the actions themselves. This is why we pursue them\nfor their own sake (ib.). By this standard, the activities of\nhammering a nail, or fixing a fridge count as makings, because the\nhammering is successful insofar as something external takes place: a\nnail is hammered in a wall, or a fridge is fixed. Precisely because\nthe success conditions are external, it is possible to succeed at\nmaking something by luck (EE 5.4/NE 6.4\n1140a17–20). By contrast, Aristotle would regard acting justly,\nkeeping a promise, or marrying someone as proper actions. To succeed\nat these actions consists in doing the actions well. A coerced\nmarriage is not a successful marriage. Hence, these actions cannot be\ndone by luck. This distinction underlies the aforementioned\ndistinction between two forms of human excellence in the practical\nsphere: skill (technê) is excellence at making\n(EE 5.4; NE 6.4 1140a6–23), and practical\nwisdom (phronêsis) is excellence at acting proper\n(EE 5.5/ NE 6.5 1140a25–30 et passim).", "\nAlthough the distinction is barely mentioned in analytical philosophy,\nit has influenced other traditions, such as the Marxist one. From his\nearliest writings, Marx accepts an Aristotelian threefold analysis of\nlabour in terms of the labourer, the process of labouring, and its\nproduct. Marx implicitly rejects the distinction between action proper\nand production, in favour of a dichotomy of his own between different\nforms of productions. This is because for Marx the characteristic\nactivity of the human species is conscious free labouring: an activity\nthat has no end beyond itself (it does not seek anything beyond the\nliving activity that such labouring consists in) (Marx 1844a; 1844b;\n1867). This is what Aristotle took as the distinguishing feature of\nproper actions, done for their own sake. One of Marx’s central\ncriticisms of capitalist societies is that it prevents humans from\nengaging in such an activity. In capitalist societies, the labourer,\nthe labour process, and the product all become commodities that serve\nas mere means for the enjoyment of the owner of labour and product\n(“the capitalist”). Members of capitalist societies are,\nin this sense, alienated (Marx 1844b; 1867). As such, capitalist\nsocieties make it impossible for humans to engage in their most\nfundamental life activity of free production, an activity that the\nMarxist tradition came to designate as “praxis” (Petrovic\n1983), reappropriating the quite different Aristotelian notion.", "\nPerhaps the most influential modern version of a distinction among\ntypes of practical activity is drawn by Arendt (1998). Arendt\ndistinguishes between three kinds of practical activities: labour,\nwork, and action. The most basic of these is labour, which\nArendt conceives as simply an extension of our animal lives: a\n“metabolism” (Marx’s phrase) between the human\nanimal and the world, characterized by a cycle of consumption and the\nproduction of goods to be consumed, and aiming at meeting our basic\nbiological needs (p.69). Since this is a cycle, Arendt suggests that\nthere is no sense of speaking here of means and ends: there is no fact\nof the matter as to whether the production of goods is for the sake of\nconsumption, or the consumption for the sake of production (p.145;\n155). Means and ends enter at the next level of practical activity,\nwork (the Aristotelian poíêsis). Like\nAristotle, Arendt takes the aim of working to be the finished work,\nthe product, whether it be a work of art, like a painting, a tool,\nlike a knife, or a way to safeguard living, like a house. The central\nimportance of work lies in its ability to produce lasting products\nthat lie beyond the activity of the producer (p.136; 144). Arendt\ncontends that these products can begin to shape an objective\nworld of objects that stands against the humans who produce\nthem. However, the world does not emerge in its fullness except by way\nof the third level of practical activity, action (the\nAristotelian praxis). Action is the means by which humans\nreveal themselves in the public sphere, a revelation needed to give\nreality to a personality that otherwise remains entirely unactualized\nin subjectivity. It is thus essentially communicative, and depends on\nother humans to whom one might make herself known (pp.38–49; 95;\n202–7); and it depends, given its essential ephemeral nature,\nfor its permanence in the continued existence of a polity that may\npreserve words and deeds in more enduring forms, like sculptures and\ntales. Ungoverned by either the natural laws of labor, or by the norms\narising from a particular aim, action is for Arendt unproductive,\nfree, and unpredictable. It is the distinguishing activity of human\nbeings as such (p.177; 204–6).", "\nThe three-fold distinction serves as the basis for Arendt’s\ncriticisms of both ancient writers, including Aristotle, and modern\nwriters, including Marx. She criticizes Aristotle both for\ninconsistently assimilating action too much to work/production in his\nanalysis of benefaction as producing a work (ergon) (p.196),\nand for subordinating it to theory (22–23). She criticizes\nMarx’s subsumption of practical activity in general under labour\nfor its failure to provide meaning. She notes that Marx ends in the\nparadoxical position of concluding that that the aim of labour is\nfreedom from labour, even though this is the activity he takes as\ndefinitive of humanity. In other words, Marx ends up concluding that\nthe aim of human life is to do away with human life (p.89; 103; 105).\nFor Arendt, however, this is not merely a theoretical deficiency, but\na manifestation of a broader social tendency that goes back to Plato:\nthe tendency to try to make action proper into that which is\nnot—whether work or labour—to control what is essentially\nunpredictable and free.", "\nThe problems of subsuming practical activity in general to making find\nechoes in some contemporary thinkers. For example, Thompson (2008),\nfollowing Baier (1970) and Mueller (1979), criticizes attempts like\nCastañeda’s (1970) and Chisholm’s (1970) of\nconstruing actions in terms of a schemas such as ‘bringing it\nabout that p’; such propositional complexes, according\nto critics, threaten to undermine the practical form of the thought\nthey mean to capture (cf. Hornsby 2016, Wilson 1980, pp.111–117 for\nfurther discussion). Arendt herself thought that this tendency\nunderlay the attraction of utilitarianism, but she argued that, like\nMarxism, that view was incapable of ever giving further meaning to our\npractical endeavours (p.105). Korsgaard concludes with equal severity\nthat given a distinction between praxis and poíêsis,\n“utilitarianism is not a moral theory, for utility is a property\nof [productions], not actions” (2009, p.18n26).", "\nRegardless of what one thinks of these arguments, it is evident that\nthe question whether practical activity comes in varieties, as\nAristotle and Arendt thought, is potentially of enormous\nsignificance." ], "subsection_title": "5.4 Making, Acting, and the Varieties of Agency" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe question of what, if anything, is the constitutive (or formal) aim\n(or end) of intentional actions is a question about whether there is\nanything that all actions necessarily pursue, irrespective of their\nparticular ends. Some philosophers (Setiya 2016b) deny that there is a\nconstitutive aim of acting or that there is something that every\naction as such aims at. On this view, there is no such thing as an aim\ncontained in acting as such; each action just aims at its particular\nend. On the other hand, many philosophers try to derive important\nconsequences for ethics from the idea that action or agency has a\nconstitutive aim. However, we will leave aside the examinations of\nthese claims and focus only on the question as it pertains to the\ncharacterization of agency. (Cf. Bagnoli 2017; 2022.)" ], "section_title": "6. Constitutive Aim", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nWhat could motivate the idea that actions have a constitutive aim\nabove and beyond the particular ends they pursue? An important\nconsideration is that, arguably, only by appealing to a constitutive\naim, can we evaluate actions and have a proper standard of practical\nreason. Much in the same way that the aim of belief (generally thought\nto be “truth” or “knowledge”) might provide a\nstandard for theoretical reasoning and correct belief, a constitutive\naim of action would provide a standard for practical reasoning and\nsuccessful action. More specifically, it seems that some actions are\nsuccessful in achieving their particular ends and yet are cases of\npractical failures in some deeper way, exhibiting what appears like\npractical irrationality or at least some form of practical ignorance.\nSuppose I have dreamt all my life to move to Seattle, and I finally\nsecured a position in the city. However, as I arrive in Seattle and\ntry to arrange my life, my life in Seattle is a great disappointment;\neven though there is nothing important that I found out about Seattle\nthat I didn’t know already, I completely regret having pursued\nthis end. Although I achieved my aim of moving to Seattle, my actions\nseem to have failed in an important way; arguably, I manifested my\nagency in a defective way.", "\nOf course, one can explain my disappointment in many ways that do not\nseem to presuppose a constitutive aim of action: there were other ends\nthat I had that conflict with moving to Seattle and I hadn’t\nfully appreciated this beforehand. Perhaps I no longer care about the\nthings that made me want to move to Seattle; moving to Seattle was a\nmeans to ends I had abandoned and didn’t realize that it made no\nlonger sense to pursue this end. But it is unclear that these\nobservations will suffice; it seems that none of this might have\nhappened and yet my move to Seattle was still a practical failure.", "\nLet us take a concrete example: suppose the constitutive aim of action\nis happiness (see Frey 2019 for an argument that this is a view held\nby Aquinas). On this view, then, every action (directly or indirectly)\naims at happiness, and the realization of an end that does not result\nin happiness is a shortcoming of my agency. Therefore, if my going to\nSeattle did not contribute to my happiness, or if, worse, it\ncontributed to undermining it, then it was a defective case of agency.\nThis failure is often thought to parallel the kind of internal failure\ninvolved in false beliefs: such beliefs supposedly fail to meet a\nstandard internal to theoretical cognition.", "\nAnother, related, way to motivate the idea that action has a\nconstitutive aim focuses on the standpoint of deliberation. When\ndeliberating about what to do, it seems that I need to find an answer\nto the question “what to do” or “whether to\nφ” (Hieronymi 2005; 2006; Shah 2008); in the good case, my\naction expresses an adequate answer to this question. But how could I\ngo about answering these questions if action did not have a\nconstitutive aim; if there’s nothing that could count as the\ncorrect way of answering this question? Similarly, from the point of\nview of action explanation, some answers seem to provide an\nintelligible explanation of action while others seem to invite the\nquestion “but why would you aim at (want) that?”\nIf you ask me “Why are we eating the jello?”,\n“Because it is blue” seems to invite further questions,\nwhile “Because I find the taste pleasant” brings the\ninquiry to an end. Anscombe argues that the search for further\nexplanations ends when we hit a “desirability\ncharacterization”, something that is not just conceived as good\nbut “really … one of the many forms of the\ngood” (Anscombe 1957, §40).", "\nThere seems to be a parallel structure in the case of belief: in\ndeliberating about what to believe, it seems that I must be similarly\nguided by an ideal of correct belief (Shah and Velleman 2006). In\nfact, philosophers who accept that there is a constitutive aim of\naction often compare action and belief (Velleman 1992; 1996; Tenenbaum\n2007; 2012; 2018b; Schafer 2013). Belief is supposed to have truth as\nits constitutive aim, and just as belief is held, at least in the good\ncase, in accordance with this constitutive aim (as Hume 1748 said,\n“a wise man … proportions his belief to the\nevidence”), intentional agency is guided by its constitutive\naim.", "\nThere are various proposals of what the constitutive aim of an action\nmight be. Perhaps the most traditional version of this view is the\nidea that the good is the constitutive aim of agency, possibly going\nback to Socrates (Protagoras 351a–8e; Gorgias\n467c–8d). The notion of “good” involved here can be\nvery thin, meaning no more than “considering matters\naright” (Williams 1981) in the realm of practical reason; such\nviews are versions of the thesis often called “the guise of the\ngood” (Tenenbaum 2007; Clark 2010; Schafer 2013). According to\nthe guise of the good, if I φ intentionally, then I must take\nφ-ing to be good. Arguably some other versions of the constitutive\naim of agency are specifications of the thin notion of\n“good” or “human good” (see Boyle and Lavin\n2010). Other constitutive aims that have been defended in literature\nare self-understanding or autonomy (Velleman 1989; 1992; 1996; 2009),\nself-constitution (Korsgaard 1996; 2008; 2009), and the will to power\n(Katsafanas 2013)." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Motivations and Different Versions of the View" }, { "content": [ "\nA number of challenges have been raised in the literature to the claim\nthat there must be a constitutive aim of action. First, suppose we\naccept the causal theory of action: an intentional action just is the\neffect of a “primary reason”. On such a view, it seems\nthat an intentional action is constituted by its causal antecedents,\nrather than by a necessary aim that one has in acting. However, causal\ntheories are not incompatible with constitutivism. Since on these\nviews, some of the causal antecedents of the action will be conative\nstates (like an intention), the question of whether intentional action\nhas a constitutive aim will depend on whether the conative state has a\nconstitutive aim or whether a specific conative state must always\nfigure on the genesis of intentional action. For instance, in\nVelleman’s early work (for instance, Velleman 1989), intentional\naction was an action that was caused by a desire for self-knowledge,\nand the content of such a desire was thus the constitutive aim of\nagency. Smith (2013; 2015; 2019) also develops a form of\nconstitutivism that endorses the standard story of action.", "\nSetiya raises a couple of important challenges to the idea that action\nhas a constitutive aim. According to Setiya (2007), any theory of\naction needs to account for the fact that practical knowledge (or a\nbelief condition in his version; see section 4 of this entry) is\nessential to intentional action. However, the belief condition seems\nto be conceptually independent of any constitutive aim of action, and\nthus accepting that both are constitutive of intentional action\namounts to postulating an unexplained necessary connection.", "\nSecondly, Setiya (2010) relies on the distinction between an\nexplanatory reason and a normative reason to argue against the\n“guise of the good” (see Alvarez 2017 for a detailed\naccount of the distinction); his argument there could be extended to\nother proposals for the constitutive aim of action. An intentional\naction is an action done for an explanatory reason, namely, a\nreason that explains why the agent acted as she did, in\nAnscombe’s special sense of the question ‘Why’.\nHowever, Setiya points out that an explanatory reason need not be a\nnormative reason; in fact, any reason that the agent believes\nto be her reason to act can be an explanatory reason, even if the\nobject of such a reason is not good in any way. But since the reasons\nthat explain intentional action need not be good in any way, it seems\nfalse that the agent must act only on reasons that she regards to be\ngood in some way, and thus that she aims at the good in acting.", "\nPhilosophers have tried to answer these challenges. One can argue that\na knowledge or belief condition, to the extent that it is valid, is\nexplained by the constitutive aim of action. Moreover, perhaps the\npossibility of a third-person explanation of an action in terms of\nexplanatory reasons whose objects are not good in any way is\ncompatible with the fact that from the first-person point of view,\nthese objects must have been regarded to be good in some way. So even\nif the fact that Rugen kills his father explains why Inigo Montoya\nkilled Rugen without providing a normative reason for it, it still\nmight be the case that avenging his father must have appeared good\nto Inigo Montoya in some way if he killed Rugen intentionally\n(see Tenenbaum 2012).", "\nAnother well-known challenge to the idea that actions have a\nconstitutive aim is David Enoch’s “schmagency”\nobjection (Enoch 2006; 2011); in this context, the objection raises\nthe possibility that for any purported constitutive aim, one could\nspurn such an aim and merely “schmact” or be a mere\n“schmagent”—someone who behaves just like an agent\nexcept for having the constitutive aim of agency. Enoch’s\nobjection, however, is specifically concerned with attempts to derive\nnormative consequences from the constitutive aim of action (for\nfurther discussion, see Bagnoli 2017; 2022)." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Objections" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "7. Omission", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe scope of our inactivity is vast; at each moment, there are many\nthings I don’t do. Right now, I am not competing in the\nOlympics, not writing poetry, not swimming in the English Channel, not\nflying over the moon, or taking a journey to the center of the earth.\nHowever, none of the things could be plausibly described as cases of\nomissions or refrainings; it would be odd if I were told that I was\nrefraining from competing in the Olympics or omitting to fly over the\nmoon. Philosophers often describe cases of omissions as cases of my\nfailing to do something that I was somehow “supposed to\ndo” (Bach 2010). Only some of my omissions are intentional or\neven voluntary: if my alarm does not go off and I miss my class\nbecause I overslept, I omitted to teach but not intentionally. On the\nother hand, if I fail to show up because I am protesting my\nuniversity’s salary cuts, my omission was intentional.\nIntentional omissions and (intentional) refrainings are generally\ntaken to be the only possible candidates for being instances of agency\namong not-doings (see Vermazen 1985 for an expression of this idea).\nThus, we will focus on these cases. The categories of intentional\nomissions and refraining are not necessarily identical. If I refrain\nfrom striking my opponent in a fit of anger, it seems wrong to say\nthat I omitted to strike her as there is no sense in which I was\n“supposed to” strike my opponent." ], "subsection_title": "7.1 Different Ways of Not Acting" }, { "content": [ "\nSuppose all the Faculty at State University are upset about the\nrecently announced cuts, and each of them express their\ndissatisfaction but in different ways: Mary wears a T-shirt that says\n“No More Cuts”, Terry writes a letter to the local paper,\nand Larry simply decides not to go to the department’s holiday\nparty. It seems that in all these cases, the Faculty members are\nmanifesting their agency—they are all equally expressing their\ndissatisfaction with the cuts—even if Larry does so by\n(intentionally) not doing something. Such cases of\nrefrainings and intentional omissions seem paradigmatic instances of\nagency and yet they do not seem to be cases of action: after all, the\nagent did nothing. But how could the absence of an action be a\nmanifestation of agency? One might be tempted to avoid any puzzling\nconclusions by simply denying that omissions are absences; by, for\ninstance, proposing that Larry’s intentional omission consists\nin doing whatever acting he did instead of engaging in the\nomitted action. So if he goes to the bar instead of going to the\nholiday party, Larry omits to go to the party by going to the\nbar and so his going to the bar and his omitting to go to the party\nare the same event. However, this view immediately encounters\ndifficulties as it seems that I can intentionally omit to do things\nwithout engaging in any positive act. I can refrain from laughing at\nmy enemy’s jokes just by staying still and I can intentionally\nomit things even while asleep (Clarke 2014): indeed, instead of going\nto the bar, Larry could have omitted to go to the party by simply\nsleeping through it.", "\nEarly attempts to explain how an agent might intentionally\nnot do something, without claiming that intentional omissions\nand refraining are actions, go back at least to Ryle (1973); Ryle\nargues that negative “actions” are not actions, but what\nhe calls “lines of actions’, a category that also includes\ngeneral policies such as ”Take only cold baths“. More\nrecently, Alvarez (2013) argues that the fact that omissions and\nrefrainings can also manifest agency is a consequence of the fact that\nthe power to act (intentionally) is a two-way power: a power to either\ndo or not do something. Thus, when I refrain from driving my\ncar, I manifest my agency not by engaging in an action, but rather by\nsettling on not driving it (See Steward 2012; 2020 for\nfurther defense of the idea of agency as a two-way power)." ], "subsection_title": "7.2 Agency, Omissions, and Refrainings" }, { "content": [ "\nIf we accept that omissions are absences, or at least that they are\nnot events, the possibility of intentional omissions seem to present a\nchallenge to the causal theory of action. After all, if agency can be\nmanifested without any events being present, it is difficult to see\nhow agency can be explained in the terms of the standard story of\naction (that is, in terms of the causal history of the bodily\nmovements that manifest our agency). Hornsby (2004) argues that the\nfailure of the standard causal theory to account for omissions is\nsymptomatic of its more general failure to locate the agent in an\naccount of intentional action that reduces agency to causal\nconnections between non-agential happenings.", "\nThere are at least two ways in which causal theorists try to answer\nthese charges. One possibility is to argue that even though\nintentional omissions are absences, what makes them intentional is\nthat facts about their causal history are analogous to the facts about\ncausal history that make ”positive actions“ instances of\nagency (Clarke 2010; 2014). On this view, just as positive actions are\ncaused by an intention, intentional omissions are cases in which the\nnon-obtaining of a certain event is similarly explained by an\nintention. However, Sartorio (2009) argues that intentional omissions\npose a serious challenge even to this broader understanding of the\nstandard causal theory of action. Sartorio argues that intentional\nomissions are often not best explained by other events (such as the\nformation of an intention), but by the non-occurrence of\ncertain events (the best explanation of why I omitted to help my\nfriend move might be that I omitted to form the intention to\nhelp them, rather than that I did form the intention not to help\nthem). Another strategy to make omissions compatible with the standard\ncausal theory is to try to show that omissions are events, while\navoiding the questionable view that the omission must be identified\nwith what the agent intentionally did at the time of the omission\n(Payton 2021)." ], "subsection_title": "7.3 Intentional Omissions and the Causal Theory of Action" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nFrom the start, our focus has been on the intentional actions of fully\ndeveloped rational agents. However, this raises the question: what\nabout other beings, such as (non-human) animals? Can they act? If so,\ndo they act in the same way as fully developed humans do? (Similar\nquestions arise for children and robots, but our focus shall be on the\ngrowing literature on animal agency.)", "\nAt first sight, the question may seem uninteresting: Of course,\nanimals can act! This seems to be a core commitment of our linguistic\npractices regarding animals, as we can truthfully assert claims like\nthe following:", "\nThese sentences seem to attribute to animals the capacity to take\nmeans for remote ends, the capacity to desire objects and act in\npursuit of these desires, and the capacity to employ their thoughts\nabout their surroundings in the service of such pursuits. Unless we\nare skeptics about the folk-psychological concepts involved in these\nascriptions, then, we should hold that animals are agents (but see\nGodfrey-Smith 2003, who holds that these folk concepts may be\nparticularly problematic when applied to animals). It is not\nsurprising, then, that Aristotle defined animal life in terms of the\ncapacity for a type of action, movement in place (DA 432a),\nor that Kant attributes a faculty of desire to all animals, through\nwhich they actualize their representations (KpV9).", "\nDespite all this, even Aristotle hedges on the ascription of action to\nanimals: although he grants that they are capable of voluntary\n(hekusion) action (DMA 11, 703b2 et passim;\nNE 3.1, 1111a), he also says that only mature human beings\nare capable of action proper (praxis) (NE 3.1,\n1111b). This is because action proper requires the capacity for\ndeliberation, which animals lack. A modern version of this view is\ndefended by Stoecker (2009), who argues that agency presupposes the\ncapacity to act on the basis of ”arguments“ understood as\ngrounds on which one might (reasonably) act. Similar reasons for\nskepticism about animal agency were influentially advanced by Davidson\n(1982; 2003). For, as we saw, Davidson takes it that intentional\naction is action for a reason; but acting for a reason requires\npossession of beliefs. Yet, Davidson held that ascription of belief\nmakes sense only to beings who possess the concept of belief, which in\nturn requires the capacity for higher-order thought. Since Davidson\nassumed that animals possess neither concepts nor the capacity for\nhigher-order thought, he concluded that animals are not capable of\nintentional action. (Davidson, to our knowledge, does not address the\nquestion whether animals are capable of acting simpliciter. However,\nhe seems committed to saying that animals cannot act at all, given\nthat he defines actions in terms of intentional actions: for him an\naction is an event that is intentional under a certain description,\nsee Davidson 1971).", "\nWe can abstract from these considerations a more general form of\nargument for skepticism about animal agency, captured by the following\nschema:", "\nThis schema is useful as a way to categorize sources of skepticism\nabout animal agency, and different responses offered in the\nliterature, depending on which premises are called into question.", "\nA prominent way of criticizing the argument is to call premise 1 into\nquestion. For example, Steward (2009) criticizes Davidson’s view\nthat agency requires the capacity to act for reasons (Premise 1 in\nDavidson’s argument). Her objection is based on empirical\nresearch suggesting that agency ascriptions are developmentally prior\nto propositional attitude ascriptions. She argues that implicit in\nthese earlier ascriptions is a less demanding account of agency that\npresupposes more basic object-directed attitudes (as well as other\ncapacities, such as subjectivity and agential control). Since animals\npossess these features, there is an important sense in which they act.\nOther arguments in a similar vein include Dretske’s (1999)\nargument to the effect that agency presupposes only the capacity for\nrepresenting the world (understood, roughly, as a learned response\nwhose operations are shaped by the environment through experience),\nand the idea defended by Korsgaard (2018), Sebo (2017), and Schapiro\n(2021) that animals act on the basis of simpler, perceptual-like,\nrepresentations.", "\nOther scholars grant the basic links between agency and reasons or\nmeans-ends reasoning but question further presuppositions of the\nargument. For example, some scholars grant that actions must be done\nfor a reason, but hold that (some) animals meet this condition, since\nthey are capable of having non-conceptual thoughts (Hurley 2003); they\ncan engage in certain forms of inference in virtue of a non-linguistic\nsensitivity to inferential relations; and at least some of them (like\nchimpanzees) manifest a distinctive kind of sensitivity to reasons\nthat doesn’t presuppose higher-order thought (Glock 2009; Arruda\nand Povinelli 2016). Using a similar strategy, Camp and Shupe (2017)\ngrant that action presupposes the capacity to distinctively represent\nmeans and ends but argue that the features presupposed by such a\ncapacity are more minimal than skeptics about animal agency assume:\nfor example, they may include metacognitive resources that keep track\nof a state without representing it as such.", "\nFinally, there are scholars who argue—largely based on empirical\nfindings—against premise 2 on the grounds that animals possess\nthe very capacities denied by skeptics of animal agency. For example,\nKaufmann (2015) argues that chimpanzees are capable of a fairly\nsophisticated form of planning that meets the constraints of\nBratman’s account of planning agency. They are thus capable of\nacting, even though they lack conceptual representations. The question\nwhether some animals (and, if so, which) have beliefs has also been\nthe subject of debate on the basis of empirical research. While both\nearly and recent studies appeared to support the Davidsonian view that\nanimals lack beliefs (Heyes and Dickinson 1990; Marticorena et al.\n2011, Horschler, MacLean, and Santos 2020;), later research\ncomplicates the question (de Waal 2016; Krupenye et al. 2016).", "\nThus far, we have examined ways in which defenders of animal agency\ncan play defense, by criticizing different parts of the argument for\nanimal skepticism. When playing offense, defenders of animal agency\ncommonly appeal to our common ways of speaking and thinking about\nanimals, which, as noted, provide prima facie good grounds to ascribe\nthem agency. In addition, it has been noted that the heightened\nconditions on agency commonly used to exclude animals would have\ncounterintuitive effects for human actions. After all, many\nof our human intentional actions (such as habitual actions) do not\nseem to involve higher-order thought, or previous deliberation (a key\ninsight that leads Hyman 2015 to distinguish different senses of\n”acting’).", "\nMoreover, several authors grant that full-fledged intentional human\naction is special, but argue that we must recognize a more basic form\nof agency for animals. (This appears to be the view favoured by\nAnscombe (1957), who held that animals could act intentionally,\nalthough not in the language-dependent way that humans could, where we\ncan draw a significant distinction between the action itself and an\nexpression of intention. See Gustafsson 2016; Marcus 2021). The need\nto recognize a more basic form of agency can be motivated by noting\nthat otherwise the development of full-fledged human agency becomes\ndevelopmentally mysterious, both at the inter- and intra-species\nlevel. Thus, unless we can ascribe agency to non-rational animals, it\nwill be hard to explain how rational capacities might emerge in humans\nat the evolutionary level; and unless we ascribe agency to human\ninfants, it will be hard to explain how conceptual capacities emerge\n(Cussins 1992; MacIntyre 1999; Lovibond 2006; Steward 2009; Fridland\n2013).", "\nIn light of all these considerations, animal agency skepticism is\nnowadays a moribund view, with few defenders. However, even granting\nthat animals are agents, important questions remain about the nature\nof this agency, and its connection to intentional or rational agency.\nIndeed, as scholars continue to investigate the topic in an\nempirically informed way, we may need to draw further distinctions to\ncapture the richness of the forms of agency that are manifested across\ndifferent species and stages of development in the animal kingdom." ], "section_title": "8. 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action-perception	Action-based Theories of Perception	First published Wed Jul 8, 2015	[ "Action is a means of acquiring perceptual information about the\nenvironment. Turning around, for example, alters your spatial\nrelations to surrounding objects and, hence, which of their properties\nyou visually perceive. Moving your hand over an object’s surface\nenables you to feel its shape, temperature, and texture. Sniffing and\nwalking around a room enables you to track down the source of an unpleasant\nsmell. Active or passive movements of the body can also generate\nuseful sources of perceptual information (Gibson 1966, 1979). The\npattern of optic flow in the retinal image produced by forward\nlocomotion, for example, contains information about the direction in\nwhich you are heading, while motion parallax is a “cue”\nused by the visual system to estimate the relative distances of\nobjects in your field of view. In these uncontroversial ways and\nothers, perception is instrumentally dependent on action. According to\nan explanatory framework that Susan Hurley\n(1998) dubs the\n“Input-Output Picture”, the dependence of perception on\naction is purely instrumental:", "The action-based theories of perception, reviewed in this entry,\nchallenge the Input-Output Picture. They maintain that perception can\nalso depend in a noninstrumental or constitutive way on\naction (or, more generally, on capacities for object-directed motor control). This\nposition has taken many different forms in the history of philosophy\nand psychology. Most action-based theories of perception in the last\n300 years, however, have looked to action in order to explain how\nvision, in particular, acquires either all or some of\nits spatial representational content. Accordingly, these are\nthe theories on which we shall focus here.", "We begin in Section 1 by discussing\nGeorge Berkeley’s Towards a New Theory of Vision\n(1709), the historical locus classicus of action-based\ntheories of perception, and one of the most influential texts on\nvision ever written. Berkeley argues that the basic or\n“proper” deliverance of vision is not an arrangement of\nvoluminous objects in three-dimensional space, but rather a\ntwo-dimensional manifold of light and color. We then turn to a\ndiscussion of Lotze, Helmholtz, and the local sign\ndoctrine. The “local signs” were felt cues for the mind to\nknow what sort of spatial content to imbue visual experience with. For\nLotze, these cues were “inflowing” kinaesthetic feelings\nthat result from actually moving the eyes, while, for Helmholtz, they\nwere “outflowing” motor commands sent to move the\neyes.", "In Section 2, we discuss sensorimotor\ncontingency theories, which became prominent in the 20th\ncentury. These views maintain that an ability to predict the sensory\nconsequences of self-initiated actions is necessary for\nperception. Among the motivations for this family of theories is the\nproblem of visual direction constancy—why do objects\nappear to be stationary even though the locations on the retina to\nwhich they reflect light change with every eye movement?—as well\nas experiments on adaptation to optical rearrangement devices (ORDs)\nand sensory substitution.", "Section 3 examines two other\nimportant 20th century theories. According to what we shall\ncall the motor component theory, efference copies\ngenerated in the oculomotor system and/or proprioceptive feedback from\neye-movements are used together with incoming sensory inputs to\ndetermine the spatial attributes of perceived\nobjects. Efferent readiness theories, by contrast,\nlook to the particular ways in which perceptual\nstates prepare the observer to move and act in relation to\nthe environment. The modest readiness theory, as we\nshall call it, claims that the way an object’s spatial\nattributes are represented in visual experience can be modulated by\none or another form of covert action planning. The bold\nreadiness theory argues for the stronger claim that\nperception just is covert readiness for action.", "In Section 4, we move to\nthe disposition theory, most influentially\narticulated by Gareth Evans (1982, 1985), but more recently defended\nby Rick Grush (2000, 2007). Evans’ theory is, at its core, very\nsimilar to the bold efferent readiness theory. There are some notable\ndifferences, though. Evans’ account is more finely articulated\nin some philosophical respects. It also does not posit a reduction of\nperception to behavioral dispositions, but rather posits that certain\ncomplicated relations between perceptual input and behavioral provide\nspatial content. Grush proposes a very specific theory that is like\nEvans’ in that it does not posit a reduction, but unlike\nEvans’ view, does not put behavioral dispositions and sensory\ninput on an undifferentiated footing." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Early Action-Based Theories", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Movement and Touch in the New Theory Of Vision", "1.2 Objections to Berkeley’s Theory", "1.3 Lotze, Helmholtz, and the Local Sign Doctrine" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Sensorimotor Contingency Theories", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Efference and Visual Direction Constancy", "2.2 The Reafference Theory", "2.3 The Enactive Approach" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Motor Component and Efferent Readiness Theories", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 The Motor Component Theory (Embodied Visual Perception)", "3.2 The Efferent Readiness Theory" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Skill/Disposition Theories", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "Two doctrines dominate philosophical and psychological discussions\nof the relationship between action and space perception from the\n18th to the early 20th century. The first\nis that the immediate objects of sight are two-dimensional manifolds\nof light and color, lacking perceptible extension in\ndepth. The second is that vision must be\n“educated” by the sense of touch—understood as\nincluding both kinaesthesis and proprioceptive position sense—if\nthe former is to acquire its apparent outward, three-dimensional\nspatial significance. The relevant learning process is associationist:\nnormal vision results when tangible ideas of distance (derived from\nexperiences of unimpeded movement) and solid shape (derived from\nexperiences of contact and differential resistance) are elicited by\nthe visible ideas of light and color with which they have been\nhabitually associated. The widespread acceptance of both doctrines\nowes much to the influence of George Berkeley’s New Theory\nof Vision (1709).", "The Berkeleyan approach looks to action in order to explain how\ndepth is “added” to a phenomenally two-dimensional visual\nfield. The spatial ordering of the visual field itself, however, is\ntaken to be immediately given in experience (Hatfield & Epstein\n1979; Falkenstein 1994; but see Grush 2007). Starting in the\n19th century, a number of theorists, including Johann\nSteinbuch (1770–1818), Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), Hermann\nvon Helmholtz (1821–1894), Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), and\nErnst Mach (1838–1916), argued that all abilities for\nvisual spatial localization, including representation of up/down and\nleft/right direction within the two-dimensional visual field, depend\non motor factors, in particular, gaze-directing movements of the eye\n(Hatfield 1990: chaps. 4–5). This idea is the basis of the\n“local sign” doctrine, which we examine\nin Section 2.3." ], "section_title": "1. Early Action-Based Theories", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "There are three principal respects in which motor action is central\nto Berkeley’s project in the New Theory of Vision\n(1709). First, Berkeley argues that visual experiences convey\ninformation about three-dimensional space only to the extent that they\nenable perceivers to anticipate the tactile consequences of actions\ndirected at surrounding objects. In §45 of the New\nTheory, Berkeley writes:", " …I say, neither distance, nor things placed at\na distance are themselves, or their ideas, truly perceived by\nsight…. whoever will look narrowly into his own thoughts, and\nexamine what he means by saying, he sees this or that thing at a\ndistance, will agree with me, that what he sees only suggests to his\nunderstanding, that after having passed a certain distance, to be\nmeasured by the motion of his body, which is perceivable by touch, he\nshall come to perceive such and such tangible ideas which have been\nusually connected with such and such visible ideas. ", "And later in the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human\nKnowledge (1734: §44):", " …in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we\napprehend by them distance and things placed at a distance, do not\nsuggest or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance, but\nonly admonish us what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at\nsuch and such distances of time, and in consequence of such or such\nactions. …[V]isible ideas are the language whereby the\ngoverning spirit … informs us what tangible ideas he is about\nto imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our own\nbodies.", "The view Berkeley defends in these passages has recognizable\nantecedents in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human\nUnderstanding (1690: Book II, Chap. 9,\n§§8–10). There Locke maintained that the immediate\nobjects of sight are “flat” or lack outward depth; that\nsight must be coordinated with touch in order to mediate judgments\nconcerning the disposition of objects in three-dimensional space; and\nthat visible ideas “excite” in the mind movement-based\nideas of distance through an associative process akin to that whereby\nwords suggest their meanings: the process is ", " performed so constantly, and so quick, that we take\nthat for the perception of our sensation, which is an idea\nformed by our judgment. ", "\nA long line of philosophers—including Condillac (1754), Reid\n(1785), Smith (1811), Mill (1842, 1843), Bain (1855, 1868), and Dewey\n(1891)—accepted this view of the relation between sight and\ntouch.", "The second respect in which action plays a prominent role in\nthe New Theory is teleological. Sight not only derives its\nthree-dimensional spatial significance from bodily movement, its\npurpose is to help us engage in such movement adaptively:", " …the proper objects of vision constitute an\nuniversal language of the Author of nature, whereby we are instructed\nhow to regulate our actions, in order to attain those things, that are\nnecessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also to\navoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. It is by their\ninformation that we are principally guided in all the transactions and\nconcerns of life. (1709: §147)", "Although Berkeley does not explain how vision instructs us\nin regulating our actions, the answer is reasonably clear from the\npreceding account of depth perception: seeing an object or scene can\nelicit tangible ideas that directly motivate self-preserving\naction. The tactual ideas associated with a rapidly looming ball in\nthe visual field, for example, can directly motivate the subject to\nshift position defensively or to catch it before being struck. ", "The third respect in which action is central to the New\nTheory is psychological. Tangible ideas of distance are elicited\nnot only by (1) visual or “pictorial” depth cues such as\nobject’s degree of blurriness (objects appear increasingly\n“confused” as they approach the observer), but also by\nkinaesthetic, muscular sensations resulting from (2) changes in the\nvergence angle of the eyes (1709: §16) and (3) accommodation of\nthe lens (1709: §27). Like many contemporary theories of spatial\nvision, the Berkeleyan account thus acknowledges an important role for\noculomotor factors in our perception of distance." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Movement and Touch in the New Theory Of Vision" }, { "content": [ "Critics of Berkeley’s theory in the 18th and\n19th centuries (for reviews, see Bain 1868; Smith 2000;\nAtherton 2005) principally targeted three claims:", "Most philosophers and perceptual psychologists now concur with\nArmstrong’s (1960) assessment that the “single\npoint” argument for claim (a)—“distance being a line\ndirected end-wise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund\nof the eye, which point remains invariably the same, whether the\ndistance be longer or shorter” (Berkeley 1709: §2)—conflates\nspatial properties of the retinal image with those of the objects of\nsight (also see Condillac 1746/2001: 102; Abbott 1864: chap. 1). In\ncontrast with claim (a), we should note, both contemporary\n“ecological” and information-processing approaches in\nvision science assume that the spatial representational contents of\nvisual experience are robustly three-dimensional: vision is no less a\ndistance sense than touch.", "Three sorts of objections targeted on claim (b) were\nprominent. First, it is not evident to introspection that visual\nexperiences reliably elicit tactile and kinaesthetic images as\nBerkeley suggests. As Bain succinctly formulates this objection: ", " In perceiving distance, we are not conscious of\ntactual feelings or locomotive reminiscences; what we see is a visible\nquality, and nothing more. (1868: 194)", "Second, sight is often the refractory party when conflicts with\ntouch arise. Consider the experience of seeing a three-dimensional\nscene in a painting: “I know, without any doubt”, writes\nCondillac,", " that it is painted on a flat surface; I have touched\nit, and yet this knowledge, repeated experience, and all the judgments\nI can make do not prevent me from seeing convex figures. Why does this\nappearance persist? (1746/2001: I, §6, 3)", "Last, vision in many animals does not need tutoring by touch before\nit is able to guide spatially directed movement and action. Cases in\nwhich non-human neonates respond adaptively to the distal sources of\nvisual stimulation ", " imply that external objects are seen to be\nso…. They prove, at least, the possibility that the opening of\nthe eye may be at once followed by the perception of external objects\nas such, or, in other words, by the perception or sensation of\noutness. (Bailey 1842: 30; for replies, see Smith 1811:\n385–390)", "\nHere it would be in principle possible for a proponent of\nBerkeley’s position to maintain that, at least for such animals,\nthe connection between visual ideas and ideas of touch is innate and\nnot learned (see Stewart 1829: 241–243; Mill 1842:\n106–110). While this would abandon Berkeley’s empiricism\nand associationism, it would maintain the claim that vision provides\ndepth information only because its ideas are connected to tangible\nideas.", "Regarding claim (c), many critics denied that the supposed\n“habitual connexion” between vision and touch actually\nobtains. Suppose that the novice perceiver sees a remote tree at\ntime1 and walks in its direction until she makes contact\nwith it at time2. The problem is that the perceiver’s\ninitial visual experience of the tree at time1 is not\ntemporally contiguous with the locomotion-based experience of the\ntree’s distance completed at time2. Indeed, at\ntime2 the former experience no longer exists. “The\nassociation required”, Abbott thus writes, ", " cannot take place, for the simple reason that the\nideas to be associated cannot co-exist. We cannot at one and the same\nmoment be looking at an object five, ten, fifty yards off, and be\nachieving our last step towards it. (1864: 24)", "Finally, findings from perceptual psychology have more recently\nbeen leveled against the view that vision is educated by\ntouch. Numerous studies of how subjects respond to lens-, mirror-, and\nprism-induced distortions of visual experience (Gibson 1933; Harris\n1965, 1980; Hay et al. 1965; Rock & Harris 1967) indicate\nthat not only is sight resistant to correction from touch, it will\noften dominate or “capture” the latter when intermodal\nconflicts arise. This point will be discussed in greater depth\nin Section 3 below." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Objections to Berkeley’s Theory" }, { "content": [ "Like Berkeley, Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) and Hermann von\nHelmholtz (1821–1894) affirm the role played by active movement\nand touch in the genesis of three-dimensional visuospatial\nawareness:", " …there can be no possible sense in speaking of\nany other truth of our perceptions other than practical\ntruth. Our perceptions of things cannot be anything other than\nsymbols, naturally given signs for things, which we have learned to\nuse in order to control our motions and actions. When we have learned\nto read those signs in the proper manner, we are in a condition to use\nthem to orient our actions such that they achieve their intended\neffect; that is to say, that new sensations arise in an expected\nmanner (Helmholtz 2005 [1924]: 19, our\nemphasis). ", "Lotze and Helmholtz go further than Berkeley in maintaining that\nbodily movement also plays a role in the construction of the\ntwo-dimensional visual field, taken for granted by most previous\naccounts of vision (but for exceptions, see Hatfield 1990: ch. 4).", "The problem of two-dimensional spatial localization, as Lotze and\nHelmholtz understand it, is the problem of assigning a unique,\neye-relative (or “oculocentric”) direction to every point\nin the visual field. Lotze’s commitment to\nmind-body dualism precluded looking to any physical\nor anatomical spatial ordering in the visual system for a solution to\nthis problem (Lotze 1887 [1879]: §§276–77). Rather,\nLotze maintains that every discrete visual impression is attended by a\n“special extra sensation” whose phenomenal character\nvaries as a function of its origin on the retina. Collectively, these\nextra sensations or “local signs” constitute a\n“system of graduated, qualitative tokens” (1887 [1879]:\n§283) that bridge the gap between the spatial structure of the\nnonconscious retinal image and the spatial structure represented in\nconscious visual awareness.", "What sort of sensation, however, is suited to play the\nindividuating role attributed to a local sign? Lotze appeals to\nkinaesthetic sensations that accompany gaze-directing movements of the eyes (1887 [1879]:\n§§284–86). If P is the location on the retina\nstimulated by a distal point d and F is the fovea,\nthen PF is the arc that must be traversed in order to align\nthe direction of gaze with d. As the eye moves through\narc PF, its changing position gives rise to a corresponding\nseries of kinaesthetic\nsensations p0, p1, p2,\n…pn, and it is this consciously\nexperienced series, unique to P, that\nconstitutes P’s local sign. By contrast, if Q\nwere rather the location on the retina stimulated by d, then\nthe eye’s foveating movement through arc QF would\nelicit a different series of kinaesthetic\nsensations k0, k1, k2,\n…kn unique to Q.", "Importantly, Lotze allows that retinal stimulation need not\ntrigger an overt movement of the eye. Rather, even in the absence of\nthe corresponding saccade, stimulating point P will elicit\nkinaesthetic sensation p0, and this sensation\nwill, in turn, recall from memory the rest of the series with which it\nis associated p1,\n…pn. ", " Accordingly, though there is no movement of the eye,\nthere arises the recollection of something, greater or smaller, that\nmust be accomplished if the stimuli at P and Q,\nwhich arouse only a weak sensation, are to arouse sensations of the\nhighest degree of strength and clearness. (1887 [1879]:\n§285)", "\nIn this way, Lotze accounts for our ability to perceive multiple\nlocations in the visual field at the same time.", "Helmholtz 2005 [1924]\nfully accepts the need for local signs in two-dimensional spatial\nlocalization, but makes an important modification to Lotze’s\ntheory. In particular, he maintains that local signs are not feelings\nthat originate in the adjustment of the ocular musculature, i.e., a\nform of afferent, sensory “inflow” from the eyes, but\nrather feelings of innervation (Innervationsgefühlen)\nproduced by the effort of the will (Willensanstrengung) to\nmove the eyes, i.e., a form of efferent, motor\n“outflow”. In general, to each perceptible location in the\nvisual field there is an associated readiness or impulse of the will\n(Willensimpuls) to move eyes in the manner required in order\nto fixate it. As Ernst Mach later formulates Helmholtz’s view:\n“The will to perform movements of the eyes, or the innervation\nto the act, is itself the space sensation” (Mach 1897 [1886]:\n59).", "Helmholtz favored a motor outflow version of the local sign\ndoctrine for two main reasons. First, he was skeptical that afferent\nregistrations of eye position are precise enough to play the role\nassigned to them by Lotze’s theory (2005 [1924]:\n47–49). Recent\nresearch has shown that proprioceptive inflow from ocular muscular\nstretch receptors does in fact play a quantifiable role in estimating\ndirection of gaze, but efferent outflow is normally the more heavily\nweighted source of information (Bridgeman 2010; see\n Section 2.1.1 below).", "Second, attempting a saccade when the eyes are paralyzed or\notherwise immobilized results in an apparent shift of the visual scene\nin the same direction (Helmholtz 2005 [1924]: 205–06; Mach 1897\n[1886]: 59–60). This finding would make sense if efferent\nsignals to the eye are used to determine the direction of gaze: the\nvisual system “infers” that perceived objects are moving\nbecause they would have to be in order for retinal stimulation to\nremain constant despite the change in eye direction predicted on the\nbasis of motor outflow.", "Although Helmholtz was primarily concerned to show that “our\njudgments as to the direction of the visual axis are simply the result\nof the effort of will involved in trying to alter the adjustment of\nthe eyes” (2005 [1924]: 205–06), the evidence he adduces also implies that efferent\nsignals play a critical role in our perception of stability in the\nworld across saccadic eye movements. In the next section, we trace the\ninfluence of this idea on theories in the 20th century." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Lotze, Helmholtz, and the Local Sign Doctrine" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "Action-based accounts of perception proliferate diversely in\n20th century. In this section, we focus on the reafference\ntheory of Richard Held and the more recent enactive approach of\nJ. Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë. Central to both accounts is\nthe view that perception and perceptually guided action depend on\nabilities to anticipate the sensory effects of bodily movements. To\nbe a perceiver it is necessary to have knowledge of what O’Regan\nand Noë call the laws of sensorimotor\ncontingency—“the structure of the rules governing the\nsensory changes produced by various motor actions”\n(O’Regan & Noë 2001: 941).", "We start with two sources of motivation for theories that make\nknowledge of sensorimotor contingencies necessary and/or sufficient\nfor spatially contentful perceptual experience. The first is the idea\nthat the visual system exploits efference copy, i.e., a copy\nof the outflowing saccade command signal, in order to distinguish\nchanges in visual stimulation caused by movement of the eye from those\ncaused by object movement. The second is a long line of experiments,\nfirst performed by Stratton and Helmholtz in the 19th century,\non how subjects adapt to lens-, mirror-, and prism-induced\nmodifications of visual experience. We follow up with objections to\nthese theories and alternatives." ], "section_title": "2. Sensorimotor Contingency Theories", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "The problem of visual direction constancy (VDC) is the problem of\nhow we perceive a stable world despite variations in visual\nstimulation caused by saccadic eye movements. When we execute a\nsaccade, the image of the world projected on the retina rapidly\ndisplaces in the direction of rotation, yet the directions of\nperceived objects appear constant. Such perceptual stability is\ncrucial for ordinary visuomotor interaction with surrounding the\nenvironment. As Bruce Bridgeman writes,", " Perceiving a stable visual world establishes the platform on which all other visual\nfunction rests, making possible judgments about the positions and\nmotions of the self and of other objects. (2010: 94)", "The problem of VDC divides into two questions (MacKay 1973): First,\nwhich sources of information are used to determine whether\nthe observer-relative position of an object has changed between\nfixations? Second, how are relevant sources of\ninformation used by the visual system to achieve this\nfunction?", "The historically most influential answer to the first question is\nthat the visual system has access to a copy of the efferent or\n“outflowing” saccade command signal. These signals carry\ninformation specifying the direction and magnitude of eye movements\nthat can be used to compensate for or “cancel out”\ncorresponding displacements of the retinal image.", "In the 19th century, Bell (1823), Purkyně (1825), and\nHering (1861 [1990]), Helmholtz (2005 [1924]), and Mach (1897 [1886])\ndeployed the efference copy theory to illuminate a variety\nof experimental findings, e.g., the tendency in subjects with partially\nparalyzed eye muscles to perceive movement of the visual scene when\nattempting to execute a saccade (for a review, see Bridgeman 2010.)\nThe theory’s most influential formulation, however, came from\nErich von Holst and Horst Mittelstädt in the early\n1950s. According to what they dubbed the “reafference\nprinciple” (von Holst & Mittelstädt 1950; von Holst\n1954), the visual system exploits a copy of motor directives to the\neye in order to distinguish between exafferent visual\nstimulation, caused by changes in the world, and reafferent\nvisual stimulation, caused by changes in the direction of gaze:", " Let us imagine an active CNS sending out orders, or\n“commands” … to the effectors and receiving signals\nfrom its sensory organs. Signals that predictably come when nothing\noccurs in the environment are necessarily a result of its own\nactivity, i.e., are reafferences. All signals that come when\nno commands are given are exafferences and signify changes in\nthe environment or in the state of the organism caused by external\nforces. … The difference between that which is to be expected\nas the result of a command and the totality of what is reported by the\nsensory organs is the proportion of exafference…. It is only\nthis difference to which there are compensatory reflexes; only this\ndifference determines, for example during a moving glance at movable\nobjects, the actually perceived direction of visual objects. This,\nthen, is the solution that we propose, which we have termed the\n“reafference principle”: distinction of reafference and\nexafference by a comparison of the total afference with the\nsystem’s state—the\n“command”. (Mittelstädt\n1971; translated by\nBridgeman et al. 1994: 251).", "It is only when the displacement of the retinal image differs from\nthe displacement predicted on the basis of the efference copy, i.e.,\nwhen the latter fails to “cancel out” the former, that\nsubjects experience a change of some sort in the perceived scene\n(see Figure 1). The relevant upshot is that VDC\nhas an essential motoric component: the apparent stability of an\nobject’s eye-relative position in the world depends on the\nperceiver’s ability to integrate incoming retinal signals with\nextraretinal information concerning the magnitude and direction of\nimpending eye movements.", "The foregoing solution to the problem of VDC faces challenges on\nmultiple, empirical fronts. First, there is evidence\nthat proprioceptive signals from the extraocular muscles make a\nnon-trivial contribution to estimates of eye position, although the\ngain of efference copy is approximately 2.4 times greater (Bridgeman\n& Stark 1991). Second, in the autokinetic\neffect, a fixed luminous dot appears to wander when the field of\nview is dark and thus completely unstructured. This finding is\ninconsistent with theories according to which retinotopic location and\nefference copy are the sole determinants of eye-relative\ndirection. Third, the hypothesized compensation\nprocess, if psychologically real, would be highly inaccurate since\nsubjects fail to notice displacements of the visual world up to 30% of\ntotal saccade magnitude (Bridgeman et al. 1975), and the\nlocations of flashed stimuli are systematically misperceived when\npresented near the time of a saccade (Deubel\n2004). Last, when image displacements concurrent with\na saccade are large, but just below threshold for\ndetection, visually attended objects appear to\n“jump” or “jiggle” against a stable background\n(Brune and Lücking 1969; Bridgeman 1981). Efference copy\ntheories, however, as Bridgeman observes,", " do not allow the possibility that parts of the image\ncan move relative to one another—the visual world is conceived\nas a monolithic object. The observation would seem to eliminate all\nefference copy and related theories in a single stroke. (2010:\n102)", "The reference object theory of Deubel and Bridgeman denies\nthat efference copy is used to “cancel out” displacements\nof the retinal image caused by saccadic eye-movements (Deubel et al.\n2002; Deubel 2004;\nBridgeman 2010). According to\nthis theory, visual attention shifts to the saccade target and a small number\nof other objects in its vicinity (perhaps four or fewer) before eye\nmovement is initiated. Although little visual scene information is\npreserved from one fixation to the next, the features of these objects\nas well as precise information about their presaccadic, eye-relative\nlocations is preserved. After the eye has landed, the visual system\nsearches for the target or one of its neighbors within a limited\nspatial region around the landing site. If the postsaccadic\nlocalization of this “landmark” object succeeds, the world\nappears to be stable. If this object is not found, however,\ndisplacement is perceived. On this approach, efference copy does not\ndirectly support VDC. Rather, the role of efference copy is to\nmaintain an estimate of the direction of gaze, which can be integrated\nwith incoming retinal stimulation to determine the static,\nobserver-relative locations of perceived objects. For a recent,\nphilosophically oriented discussion, see Wu 2014.", "A related alternative to the von Holst-Mittelstädt model is\nthe spatial remapping theory of Duhamel and Colby\n(Duhamel et al. 1992; Colby et al. 1995). The role\nof saccade efference copy on this theory is to initiate an updating of\nthe eye-relative locations of a small number of attended or otherwise\nsalient objects. When post-saccadic object locations are sufficiently\ncongruent with the updated map, stability is perceived. Single-cell\nand fMRI studies show that neurons at various stages in the\nvisual-processing hierarchy exploit a copy of the saccade command\nsignal in order to shift their receptive field locations in the\ndirection of an impending eye movement microseconds before its\ninitiation (Merriam & Colby 2005; Merriam et al.\n2007). Efference copy indicating an impending saccade 20° to the\nright, in effect, tells relevant neurons: ", " If you are now firing in response to an\nitem x in your receptive field, then stop firing\nat x. If there is currently an item y in the region\nof oculocentric visual space that would be coincident with your\nreceptive field after a saccade 20° to the right, then start\nfiring at y. ", "\nSuch putative updating responses are strongest in parietal cortex and\nat higher levels in visual processing (V3A and hV4) and weakest at\nlower levels (V1 and V2)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Efference and Visual Direction Constancy" }, { "content": [ "In 1961, Richard Held proposed that the reafference principle could\nbe used to construct a general “neural model” of\nperception and perceptually guided action. Held’s\nreafference theory goes beyond the account of\nvon Holst and Mittelstädt in three main\nways. First, information about movement parameters\nspecified by efference copy is not simply summated with reafferent\nstimulation. Rather, subjects are assumed to acquire knowledge of\nthe specific sensory consequences of different bodily\nmovements. This knowledge is contained in a hypothesized\n“correlational storage” area and used to determine whether\nor not the reafferent stimulations that result from a given type of\naction match those that resulted in the past (Held 1961:\n30). Second, the reafference theory is not\nlimited to eye movements, but extends to “any motor system that\ncan be a source of reafferent visual\nstimulation”. Third, knowledge of the way\nreafferent stimulation depends on self-produced movement is used for\npurposes of sensorimotor control: planning and controlling\nobject-directed actions in the present depends on access to\ninformation concerning the visual consequences of performing such\nactions in the past.", "The reafference theory was also significantly motivated by studies\nof how subjects adapt to devices that alter the relationship between\nthe distal visual world and sensory input by rotating, reversing, or\nlaterally displacing the retinal image (for helpful guides to the\nliterature on this topic, see Rock 1966; Howard & Templeton 1966;\nEpstein 1967; and Welch 1978). We will refer to these as optical\nrearrangement devices (or ORDs for short).", "The American psychologist George Stratton conducted two\nexperiments using a lens system that effected an 180º\nrotation of the retinal image in his right eye (his left eye was kept\ncovered). The first experiment involved wearing the device for 21.5\nhours over the course of three days (1896); the second experiment\ninvolved wearing the device for 81.5 hours over the course of 8 days\n(1897a,b). In both cases, Stratton kept a detailed diary of how his\nvisual, imaginative, and proprioceptive experiences underwent\nmodification as a consequence of inverted vision. In 1899, he\nperformed a lesser-known but equally dramatic three-day experiment,\nusing a pair of mirrors that presented his eyes with a view of his own\nbody from a position in space directly above his head\n(Figure 2).", "In both experiments, Stratton reported a brief period of initial\nvisual confusion and breakdown in visuomotor skill: ", " Almost all movements performed under the direct\nguidance of sight were laborious and embarrassed. Inappropriate\nmovements were constantly made; for instance, in order to move my hand\nfrom a place in the visual field to some other place which I had\nselected, the muscular contraction which would have accomplished this\nif the normal visual arrangement had existed, now carried my hand to\nan entirely different place. (1897a: 344)", "\nFurther bewilderment was caused by a “swinging” of the\nvisual field with head movements as well as jarring discord between\nwhere things were respectively seen and imagined to be: ", " Objects lying at the moment outside the visual field\n(things at the side of the observer, for example) were at first\nmentally represented as they would have appeared in normal\nvision…. The actual present perception remained in this way\nentirely isolated and out of harmony with the larger whole made up by\n[imaginative] representation. (1896: 615)", "After a seemingly short period of adjustment, Stratton reported a\ngradual re-establishment of harmony between the deliverances of sight\nand touch. By the end of his experiments on inverted vision, it was\nnot only possible for Stratton to perform many visuomotor actions\nfluently and without error, the visual world often appeared to him to be\n“right side up” (1897a: 358) and “in normal\nposition” (1896: 616). Just what this might mean will\nbe discussed below in Section\n2.2.6.", "Another influential experiment was performed by Helmholtz (2005\n[1924]: §29), who practiced reaching to targets while wearing\nprisms that displaced the retinal image 16–18° to the\nleft. The initial tendency was to reach too far in the direction of\nlateral displacement. After a number of trials, however, reaching\ngradually regained its former level of accuracy. Helmholtz made two\nadditional discoveries. First, there was an intermanual transfer\neffect: visuomotor adaptation to prisms extended to his\nnon-exposed hand. Second, immediately after removing the prisms from\nhis eyes, errors were made in the opposite direction, i.e., when\nreaching for a target, Helmholtz now moved his hand too far to the\nright. This negative after-effect is now standardly used as a\nmeasure of adaptation to lateral displacement.", "Stratton and Helmholtz’s findings catalyzed a research\ntradition on ORD adaptation that experienced its heyday in the 1960s\nand 1970s. Two questions dominated studies conducted during this\nperiod. First, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for\nadaptation to occur? In particular, which sources\nof information do subjects use when adapting to the various\nperceptual and sensorimotor discrepancies caused by ORDs? Second,\njust what happens when subjects adapt to perceptual\nrearrangement? What is the “end product” of the relevant\nform of perceptual learning?", "Held’s answer to the first question is that subjects must\nreceive visual feedback from active movement, i.e., reafferent\nvisual stimulation, in order for significant and stable\nadaptation to occur (Held & Hein 1958; Held 1961; Held &\nBossom 1961). Evidence for this conclusion came from experiments in\nwhich participants wore laterally displacing prisms during both active\nand passive movement conditions. In the active movement condition, the\nsubject moved her visible hand back and forth along a fixed arc in\nsynchrony with a metronome. In the passive movement condition, the\nsubject’s hand was passively moved at the same rate by the\nexperimenters. Although the overall pattern of visual stimulation was\nidentical in both conditions, adaptation was reported only when\nsubjects engaged in self-movement. Reafferent stimulation, Held\nand Bossom concluded on the basis of this and other studies,", " is the source of ordered contact with the environment\nwhich is responsible for both the stability, under typical conditions,\nand the adaptability, to certain atypical conditions, of\nvisual-spatial performance. (1961: 37)", "Held’s answer to the second question is couched in terms of\nthe reafference theory: subjects adapt to ORDs only when they have\nrelearned the sensory consequences of their bodily movements. In the\ncase of adaptation to lateral displacement, they must relearn the way\nretinal stimulations vary as a function of reaching for targets at\ndifferent body-relative locations. This relearning is assumed to\ninvolve an updating of the mappings from motor output to reafferent\nsensory feedback in the hypothesized \"correlational storage\" module\nmentioned above.", "The reafference theory faces a number of\nobjections. First, the theory is an extension of von\nHolst and Mittelstädt’s reafference principle, according to\nwhich efference copy is used to cancel out shifts of the retinal image\ncaused by saccadic eye movements. The latter was specifically intended\nto explain why we do not experience object displacement in the world\nwhenever we change the direction of gaze. There is nothing, at first\nblush, however, that is analogous to the putative need for\n“cancellation” or “discounting” of the retinal\nimage in the case of prism adaptation. As Welch puts it, “There\nis no visual position constancy here, so why should a model originally\ndevised to explain this constancy be appropriate?” (1978:\n16).", "Second, the reafference theory fails to explain\njust how stored efference-reafference correlations are supposed to\nexplain visuomotor control. How does having the ability to anticipate\nthe retinal stimulations that would caused by a certain type of hand\nmovement enable one actually to perform the movement in question?\nWithout elaboration, all that Held’s theory seems to explain is\nwhy subjects are surprised when reafferences generated by their\nmovements are non-standard (Rock 1966: 117).", "Third, adaptation to ORDs, contrary to the theory,\nis not restricted to situations in which subjects receive reafferent\nvisual feedback, but may also take place when subjects receive\nfeedback generated by passive effector or whole-body movement (Singer\n& Day 1966; Templeton et al. 1966; Fishkin\n1969). Adaptation is even possible in the complete absence of motor\naction (Howard et al. 1965; Kravitz & Wallach\n1966).", "In general, the extent to which adaptation occurs depends not on\nthe availability of reafferent stimulation, but rather on the presence\nof either of two related kinds of information concerning “the\npresence and nature of the optical rearrangement” (Welch 1978:\n24). Following Welch, we shall refer to this view as the\n“information hypothesis”.", "One source of information present in a displaced visual array\nconcerns the veridical directions of objects from the observer (Rock\n1966: chaps. 2–4). Normally, when engaging in forward\nlocomotion, the perceived radial direction of an object straight ahead\nof the observer’s body remains constant while the perceived\nradial directions of objects to either side undergo constant\nchange. This pattern also obtains when the observer wears prisms that\ndisplace the retinal image to side. Hence, “an object seen\nthrough prisms which retains the same radial direction as we approach\nmust be seen to be moving in toward the sagittal plane” (Rock\n1966: 105). On Rock’s view, at least some forms of adaptation to\nORDs can be explained by our ability to detect and exploit such\ninvariant sources of spatial informational in locomotion-generated\npatterns of optic flow.", "Another related source of information for adaptation derives from\nthe conflict between seen and proprioceptively experienced\nlimb position (Wallach 1968; Ularik & Canon 1971). When this\ndiscrepancy is made conspicuous, proponents of the information\nhypothesis have found that passively moved (Melamed et al.\n1973), involuntarily moved (Mather & Lackner 1975), and even\nimmobile subjects (Kravitz & Wallach 1966) exhibit significant\nadaption. Although self-produced bodily movement is not necessary for\nadaptation to occur, it provides subjects with especially salient\ninformation about the discrepancy between sight and touch (Moulden\n1971): subjects are able proprioceptively to determine the location of\na moving limb much more accurately than a stationary or passively\nmoved limb. It is the enhancement of the visual-proprioceptive\nconflict rather than reafferent visual stimulation, on this\ninterpretation, that explains why active movement yields more\nadaptation than passive movement in Held’s experiments.", "A final objection to the reafference theory\nconcerns the end product of adaptation to ORDs. According to\nthe theory, adaptation occurs when subjects learn new rules of\nsensorimotor dependence that govern how actions affect sensory\ninputs. There is a significant body of evidence, however, that much,\nif not all, adaptation rather occurs at the proprioceptive\nlevel. Stratton, summarizing the results of his experiment on\nmirror-based optical rearrangement, wrote:", " …the principle stated in an earlier\npaper—that in the end we would feel a thing to be wherever\nwe constantly saw it—can be justified in a wider sense than\nI then intended it to be taken…. We may now, I think, safely\ninclude differences of distance as well, and assert that the spatial\ncoincidence of touch and sight does not require that an object in a\ngiven tactual position should appear visually in any particular\ndirection or at any particular distance. In whatever place the tactual\nimpression’s visual counterpart regularly appeared, this would\neventually seem the only appropriate place for it to appear in. If we\nwere always to see our bodies a hundred yards away, we would probably\nalso feel them there. (1899: 498, our emphasis)", "On this interpretation, the plasticity revealed by ORDs is\nprimarily proprioceptive and kinaesthetic, rather than\nvisual. Stratton’s world came to look “right side\nup” (1897b: 469) after adaptation to the inverted retinal image\nbecause things were felt where they were visually perceived\nto be—not because, his “entire visual field flipped\nover” (Kuhn 2012 [1962]: 112). This is clear from the absence of a visual negative\naftereffect when Stratton finally removed his inverting lenses at\nthe end of his eight-day experiment: ", " The visual arrangement was immediately recognized as\nthe old one of pre-experimental days; yet the reversal of everything\nfrom the order to which I had grown accustomed during the past week,\ngave the scene a surprising, bewildering air which lasted for several\nhours. It was hardly the feeling, though, that things were upside\ndown. (1897b: 470)", "\nMoreover, Stratton reported changes in kinaesthesis during\nthe course of the experiment consistent with the alleged\nproprioceptive shift: ", " when one was most at home in the unusual\nexperience the head seemed to be moving in the very opposite\ndirection from that which the motor sensations themselves would\nsuggest. (1907: 156)", "On this view, the end product of adaptation to an ORD is a\nrecalibration of proprioceptive position sense at one or more points\nof articulation in the body (see the entry on\n bodily awareness). As\nyou practice reaching for a target while wearing laterally displacing\nprisms, for example, the muscle spindles, joint receptors, and Golgi\ntendon organs in your shoulder and arm continue to generate the same\npatterns of action potentials as before, but the proprioceptive and\nkinaesthetic meaning assigned to them by their\n“consumers” in the brain undergoes change: whereas before\nthey signified that your arm was moving along one path through the\nseven-dimensional space of possible arm configurations (the human arm\nhas seven degrees of freedom: three at the wrist, one at the elbow,\nand three at the shoulder), they gradually come to signify that it is\nmoving along a different path in that kinematic space, namely, the one\nconsistent with the prismatically distorted visual feedback you are\nreceiving. Similar recalibrations are possible with respect to sources\nof information for head and eye position. After adapting to laterally\ndisplacing prisms, signals from receptors in your neck that previously\nsignified the alignment of your head and torso, for example, may come\nto signify that your head is turned slightly to the side. For\ndiscussion, see Harris 1965, 1980 and Welch 1978: chap. 3." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 The Reafference Theory" }, { "content": [ "The enactive approach defended by J. Kevin O’Regan and Alva\nNoë (O’Regan & Noë 2001; Noë 2004, 2005, 2010;\nO’Regan 2011) is best viewed as an extension of the reafference\ntheory. According to the enactive approach, spatially contentful,\nworld-presenting perceptual experience depends on implicit knowledge\nof the way sensory stimulations vary as a function of bodily\nmovement. “Over the course of life”, O’Regan and\nNoë write, ", " a person will have encountered myriad visual\nattributes and visual stimuli, and each of these will have particular\nsets of sensorimotor contingencies associated with it. Each such set\nwill have been recorded and will be latent, potentially available for\nrecall: the brain thus has mastery of all these sensorimotor\nsets. (2001: 945)", "\nTo see an object o as having the location and shape\nproperties it has it is necessary (1) to receive sensory stimulations\nfrom o and (2) to use those stimulations in order to retrieve\nthe set of sensorimotor contingencies associated with o on\nthe basis of past encounters. In this sense, seeing is a\n“two-step” process (Noë 2004: 164). It is important\nto emphasize, however, that the enactive approach distances itself\nfrom the idea that vision is functionally dedicated, in whole or in\npart, to the guidance of spatially directed actions:\n“Our claim”, Noë writes, ", " is that seeing depends on an appreciation of the\nsensory effects of movement (not, as it were, on the practical\nsignificance of sensation)…. Actionism is not committed to the\ngeneral claim that seeing is a matter of knowing how to act in respect\nof or in relation to the things we see. (Noë 2010:\n249)", "The enactive approach also has strong affinities with\nthe sense-data tradition. According to Noë, an\nobject’s visually apparent shape is the shape of the 2D patch\nthat would occlude the object on a plane perpendicular to the line of\nsight, i.e., the shape of the patch projected by the object on the\nfrontal plane in accordance with the laws of linear\nperspective. Noë calls this the object’s\n“perspectival shape” (P-shape). An object’s visually\napparent size, in turn, is the size of the patch projected by the\nobject on the frontal plane. Noë calls this the object’s\n“perspectival size” (P-size). Appearances are\n“perceptually basic” (Noë 2004: 81) because in order\nto see an object’s actual spatial properties it is necessary\nboth to see its 2D P-properties and to understand how they would vary\n(undergo transformation) with changes in one’s point of\nview. This conception of what it is to perceive objects as voluminous\nspace-occupiers is closely to akin to views defended by Russell\n(1918), Broad (1923), and Price (1950). It also worth mentioning that\nthe enactive approach has strong affinities to views in the\nphenomenological tradition that are beyond the scope of this entry\n(but for discussion, see Thompson 2005; Hickerson 2007; and\nthe entry on phenomenology).", "Assessment of the enactive approach is complicated by questions\nconcerning the nature of P-properties. First, there is a tendency on the\npart of its main proponents to speak interchangeably of consciously\nperceived P-properties (or ‘looks’), on the one hand, and\nproximal sensory stimulations, on the other. Noë, e.g.,\nwrites:", " The sensorimotor profile of an object is the way\nits appearance changes as you move with respect to it\n(strictly speaking, it is the way sensory stimulation varies\nas you move). (2004: 78, our emphasis)", "It is far from clear how these different characterizations are to be\nrelated, however (Briscoe 2008; Kiverstein 2010). P-properties,\naccording to the enactive approach, are distal, relational properties\nof the objects we see: “If there is a mind/world divide…\nthen P-properties are on the world side of the divide” (2004:\n83). Moreover, Noë clearly assumes that they are visible:\n“P-properties are themselves objects of sight, that is, things\nthat we see” (2004: 83). Sensory stimulations, by contrast, are\nproximal, subpersonal vehicles of visual perception. They are not\nobjects of sight. Quite different, if not incommensurable, notions\nof sensorimotor profile and, so, of sensorimotor\nknowledge would thus seem to be implied by the two\ncharacterizations.", "There is also an ambiguity with the “-motor” in\n“sensorimotor knowledge”. On the one hand, Noë argues\nthat perception is active in the sense that perceivers require\nknowledge of the proximal, sensory effects of movement. E.g., in order\nto see an object’s shape and size it is necessary to have\ncertain anticipations concerning the way in which retinal stimulations\ncaused by the object would vary as a function of her point of\nview. “This perspectival aspect”, Noë writes,\n“marks the place of action in perception” (Noë 2004:\n34). On this conception there is no commitment to the view that vision\nis for the guidance of action, that vision constitutively has\nsomething to do with adapting animal behavior to the spatial layout of\nthe distal environment (Noë 2004: 18–19). Rather, vision is\nactive in the sense that it involves learned expectations concerning\nthe ways in which sensory stimulations would be\n“perturbed” by possible bodily movements (Noë 2010:\n247–248).", "On the other hand, Noë adverts to a more world-engaging\nconception of sensorimotor knowledge in order to explain our visual\nexperience of P-properties: ", " variation in looks reveals how things are. But what of\nthe looks themselves, what of P-properties? Do we see them by\nseeing how they look? This would threaten to lead to infinite\nregress…. (2004: 87)", "\nThe solution to the regress problem is that seeing an object’s\nP-properties involves a kind of practical know-how. A tilted plate,\ne.g., looks elliptical and small from here because one has to move\none’s hand in a certain way in order to indicate its shape and\nsize in the visual field (2004: 89). Whereas seeing an object’s\nintrinsic properties, according to the enactive approach, requires\nknowledge of the way P-properties would vary as a function of\nmovement, seeing P-properties involves knowing how one would need to\nmove one’s body in relation to what one sees in order to achieve\na certain goal.", "While this seems to suggest that the first kind of sensorimotor\nknowledge is asymmetrically dependent on the latter, Noë\nmaintains that just the opposite is the case. “I do not wish to\nargue”, he writes,", " that to experience something as having a certain\n[P-shape] is to experience it as affording a range of possible\nmovements; rather I want to suggest that one experiences it as having\na certain P-shape, and so as affording possible movements, only\ninsofar as, in encountering it, one is able to draw on one’s\nappreciation of the sensorimotor patterns mediating (or that might be\nmediating) your relation to it. (2004: 90)", "\nThe problem with this suggestion, however, is that it leads the\nenactive approach directly back to the explanatory regress that the\nsecond, affordance-detecting kind of sensorimotor knowledge was\nintroduced to avoid.", "The enactive approach rests its case on three main sources of\nempirical support. The first derives from experiments\nwith optical rearrangement devices (ORDs), discussed\nin Section 2.2 above. Hurley and Noë (2003)\nmaintain that adaptation to ORDs only occurs when subjects relearn the\nsystematic patterns of interdependence between active movement and\nreafferent visual stimulation. Moreover, contrary to the\nproprioceptive change theory of Stratton, Harris, and Rock, Hurley and\nNoë argue that the end product of adaptation to inversion and\nreversal of the retinal image is genuinely visual in nature: during\nthe final stage of adaptation, visual experience “rights\nitself”.", "In Section 2.2 above, we reviewed empirical\nevidence against the view that active movement and corresponding\nreafferent stimulation are necessary for adaptation to\nORDs. Accordingly, we will focus here on Hurley and Noë’s\nobjections to the proprioceptive-change theory. According to the\nlatter, “what is actually modified [by the adaptation process]\nis the interpretation of nonvisual information about positions of body\nparts” (Harris 1980: 113). Once intermodal harmony is restored,\nthe subject will again be able to perform visuomotor actions without\nerror or difficulty, and she will again feel at home in the visually\nperceived world.", "Hurley and Noë do not contest the numerous sources of empirical\nand introspective evidence that Stratton, Harris, and Rock adduce for\nthe proprioceptive-change theory. Rather they reject the theory on the\nbasis of what they take to be an untoward epistemic implication\nconcerning adaptation to left-right reversal: ", " while rightward things really look and feel\nleftward to you, they come to seem to look and feel\nrightward. So the true qualities of your experience are no longer\nself-evident to you. (2003: 155)", "The proprioceptive-change theory, however, does not imply such\nradical introspective error. According to proponents of the theory,\nexperience normalizes after adaptation to reversal not because things\nthat really look leftward “seem to look rightward” (what\nthis might mean is enigmatic at best), but rather because the subjects\neventually become familiar with the way things look when\nreversed—much as ordinary subjects can learn to read\nmirror-reversed writing fluently (Harris 1965: 435–36). Things\nseem “normal” after adaptation, in other words, because\nsubjects are again able to cope with the visually perceived world in a\nfluent and unreflective manner.", "A second line of evidence for the enactive approach\ncomes from well-known experiments on tactile-visual sensory\nsubstitution (TVSS) devices that transform outputs from a\nlow-resolution video camera into a matrix of vibrotactile stimulation\non the skin of one’s back (Bach-y-Rita 1972, 2004) or\nelectrotactile stimulation on the surface of one’s tongue\n(Sampaio et al. 2001).", "At first, blind subjects equipped with a TVSS device experience its\noutputs as purely tactile. After a short time, however, many subjects\ncease to notice the tactile stimulations themselves and instead report\nhaving quasi-visual experiences of the objects arrayed in space in\nfront of them. Indeed, with a significant amount of supervised\ntraining, blind subjects can learn to discriminate spatial properties\nsuch as shape, size, and location and even to perform simple\n“eye”-hand coordination tasks such as catching or batting\na ball. A main finding of relevance in early experiments was that\nsubjects learn to “see” by means of TVSS only when they\nhave active control over movement of the video camera. Subjects who\nreceive visual input passively—and therefore lack any knowledge of\nhow (or whether) the camera is moving—experience only\nmeaningless, tactile stimulation.", "Hurley and Noë argue that passively stimulated subjects do not\nlearn to “see” by means of sensory substitution because\nthey are unable to learn the laws of sensorimotor contingency that\ngovern the prosthetic modality: ", " active movement is required in order for the subject\nto acquire practical knowledge of the change from sensorimotor\ncontingencies characteristic of touch to those characteristic of\nvision and the ability to exploit this change skillfully. (Hurley\n& Noë 2003: 145)", "An alternative explanation, however, is that subjects who do not\ncontrol camera movement—and who are not otherwise attuned to how\nthe camera is moving—are simply unable to extract\nany information about the structure of the distal scene from\nthe incoming pattern of sensory stimulations. In consequence they do\nnot engage in “distal attribution” (Epstein et al.\n1986; Loomis 1992; Siegel\n& Warren 2010): they do not perceive through the changing\npattern of proximal stimulation to a spatially external scene in the\nenvironment. For development of this alternative explanation in the\ncontext of Bayesian perceptual psychology, see Briscoe\nforthcoming.", "A final source of evidence for the enactive\napproach comes from studies of visuomotor development in the absence\nof normal, reafferent visual stimulation. Held & Hein 1963\nperformed an experiment in which pairs of kittens were harnessed to a\ncarousel in a small, cylindrical chamber. One of the kittens was able\nto engage in free circumambulation while wearing a harness. The other\nkitten was suspended in the air in a metal gondola whose motions were\ndriven by the first harnessed kitten. When the first kitten walked,\nboth kittens moved and received identical visual stimulation. However,\nonly the first kitten received reafferent visual feedback as the\nresult of self-movement. Held and Hein reported that\nonly mobile kittens developed normal depth\nperception—as evidenced by their unwillingness to step over the\nedge of a visual cliff, blinking reactions to looming objects, and\nvisually guided paw placing responses. Noë (2004) argues that\nthis experiment supports the enactive approach: in order to develop\nnormal visual depth perception it is necessary to learn how motor\noutputs lead to changes to visual inputs.", "There are two main reasons to be skeptical of this\nassessment. First, there is evidence that passive\ntransport in the gondola may have disrupted the development of the\nkittens’ innate visual paw placing responses (Ganz 1975:\n206). Second, the fact that passive kittens were\nprepared to walk over the edge of a visual cliff does not show that\ntheir visual experience of depth was abnormal. Rather, as\nJesse Prinz (2006)\nargues, it may only indicate that they “did not have enough\nexperience walking on edges to anticipate the bodily affordances of\nthe visual world”.", "The enactive approach confronts objections on multiple fronts. We\nfocus on just three of them here (but see Block 2005; Prinz 2006;\nBriscoe 2008; Clark 2009: chap. 8; and Block\n2012). First, the approach is essentially an\nelaboration of Held’s reafference theory and, as such, faces\nmany of the same empirical obstacles. Evidence, for example, that\nactive movement per se is not necessary for perceptual\nadaptation to optical rearrangement\n(Section 2.2.1) is at variance\nwith predictions made by the reafference theory and the enactive\napproach alike.", "A second line of criticism targets the alleged\nperceptual priority of P-properties. According to the enactive\napproach, P-properties are “perceptually basic” (Noë\n2004: 81) because in order to see an object’s intrinsic, 3D\nspatial properties it is necessary to see its 2D P-properties and to\nunderstand how they would undergo transformation with variation in\none’s point of view. When we view a tilted coin, critics argue,\nhowever, we do not see something that looks—in either\nan epistemic or non-epistemic sense of “looks”—like\nan upright ellipse. Rather, we see what looks like a disk that is\npartly nearer and partly farther away from us. In general, the\napparent shapes of the objects we perceive are not 2D but have\nextension in depth (Austin 1962; Gibson 1979; Smith 2000; Schwitzgebel\n2006; Briscoe 2008; Hopp 2013).", "Support for this objection comes from work in mainstream vision\nscience. In particular, there is abundant empirical evidence that an\nobject’s 3D shape is specified by sources of spatial information\nin the light reflected or emitted from the object’s surfaces to\nthe perceiver’s eyes as well as by oculomotor factors (for\nreviews, see Cutting & Vishton 1995; Palmer 1999; and Bruce et\nal. 2003). Examples include binocular disparity, vergence,\naccommodation, motion parallax, texture gradients, occlusion, height\nin the visual field, relative angular size, reflections, and\nshading. That such shape-diagnostic information having once been\nprocessed by the visual system is not lost in conscious visual\nexperience of the object is shown by standard psychophysical methods\nin which experimenters manipulate the availability of different\nspatial depth cues and gauge the perceptual effects. Objects, for\nexample, look somewhat flattened under uniform illumination conditions\nthat eliminate shadows and highlights, and egocentric distances are\nunderestimated for objects positioned beyond the operative range of\nbinocular disparity, accommodation, and vergence. Results of such\nexperimentation show that observers can literally see the difference\nmade by the presence or absence of a certain cue in the light\navailable to the eyes (Smith 2000; Briscoe 2008).", "According to the influential dual systems model (DSM) of visual\nprocessing (Milner & Goodale 1995/2006; Goodale & Milner\n2004), visual consciousess and visuomotor control are supported by\nfunctionally and anatomically distinct visual subsystems (these are\nthe ventral and dorsal information processing\nstreams, respectively). In particular, proponents of the DSM maintain\nthat the contents of visual experience are not used by motor\nprogramming areas in the primate brain:", "The visual information used by the dorsal stream for\nprogramming and on-line control, according to the model, is\nnot perceptual in nature …[I]t cannot be accessed\nconsciously, even in principle. In other words, although we may be\nconscious of the actions we perform, the visual information used to\nprogram and control those actions can never be experienced. (Milner\n& Goodale 2008: 775–776)", "A final criticism of the enactive approach is that\nit is empirically falsified by evidence for the DSM (see the\ncommentaries on O’Regan & Noë\n2001; Clark 2009:\nchap. 8; and the essays collected in Gangopadhyay et al.\n2010): the bond it posits between what we see and what we do is much\ntoo tight to comport with what neuroscience has to tells us about\ntheir functional relations.", "The enactivist can make two points in reply to this\nobjection. First, experimental findings indicate that there are a\nnumber of contexts in which information present in conscious vision is\nutilized for purposes of motor programming (see Briscoe 2009 and\nBriscoe & Schwenkler forthcoming). Action and perception are not as sharply dissociated as\nproponents of DSM sometimes claim.", "Second, the enactive approach, as emphasized above, rejects the\nidea that the function of vision is to guide actions. It ", " does not claim that visual awareness depends on\nvisuomotor skill, if by “visuomotor skill” one means the\nability to make use of vision to reach out and manipulate or\ngrasp. Our claim is that seeing depends on an appreciation of the\nsensory effects of movement (not, as it were, on the practical\nsignificance of sensation). (Noë 2010: 249)", "\nSince the enactive approach is not committed to the idea that seeing\ndepends on knowing how to act in relation to what we see, it is not\nthreatened by empirical evidence for a functional dissociation between\nvisual awareness and visually guided action." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 The Enactive Approach" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "At this point, it should be clear that the claim that perception\nis active or action-based is far from\nunambiguous. Perceiving may implicate action in the sense that it is\ntaken constitutively to involve associations with touch (Berkeley\n1709), kinaesthetic feedback from changes in eye position (Lotze 1887\n[1879]), consciously experienced “effort of the will”\n(Helmholtz 2005 [1924]), or\nknowledge of the way reafferent sensory stimulation varies as a\nfunction of movement (Held 1961; O’Regan & Noë \n2001; Hurley &\nNoë 2003).", "In this section, we shall examine two additional conceptions of the\nrole of action in perception. According to the motor component\ntheory, as we shall call it, efference copies generated in\nthe oculomotor system and/or proprioceptive feedback from\neye-movements are used in tandem with incoming sensory inputs to\ndetermine the spatial attributes of perceived objects (Helmholtz 2005 [1924]; Mack 1979;\nShebilske 1984, 1987; Ebenholtz 2002). Efferent readiness\ntheories, by contrast, appeal to the particular ways in which\nperceptual states prepare the observer to move and act in\nrelation to the environment. The modest readiness\ntheory, as we shall call it, claims that the way an\nobject’s spatial attributes are represented in visual experience\nis sometimes modulated by one or another form of covert action\nplanning (Festinger et al. 1967; Coren 1986; Vishton et\nal. 2007). The bold readiness theory argues for\nthe stronger, constitutive claim that, as J.G. Taylor puts its,\n“perception and multiple simultaneous readiness for action are\none and the same thing” (1968: 432)." ], "section_title": "3. Motor Component and Efferent Readiness Theories", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "As pointed out in Section 2.3.2, there\nare numerous, independently variable sources of information about the\nspatial layout of the environment in the light sampled by the eye. In\nmany cases, however, processing of stimulus information requires or is\noptimized by recruiting sources of auxiliary information from outside\nthe visual system. These may be directly integrated with incoming\nvisual information or used to change the weighting assigned to one or\nanother source of optical stimulus information (Shams & Kim 2010;\nErnst 2012).", "An importantly different recruitment strategy involves combining\nvisual input with non-perceptual information originating in the\nbody’s motor control systems, in particular, efference copy,\nand/or proprioceptive feedback from active movement\n(kinaesthesis). The motor component theory, as we\nshall call it, is premised on evidence for such motor-modal\nprocessing.", "The motor component theory can be made more concrete by examining\nthree situations in which the spatial contents of visual experience\nare modulated by information concerning recently initiated or\nimpending bodily movements:", "The motor component theory is a version of the view that perception\nis embodied in the sense of Prinz 2009 (see\nthe entry on embodied cognition).\n Prinz explains that", "embodied mental capacities, are ones that depend on\nmental representations or processes that relate to the\nbody…. Such representations and processes come in two forms:\nthere are representations and processes that represent or respond to\nbody, such as a perception of bodily movement, and there are\nrepresentations and processes that affect the body, such as motor\ncommands. (2009: 420; for relevant discussion of various senses of\nembodiment, see Alsmith and Vignemount 2012)", "\nThe three examples presented above provide empirical support for the\nthesis that visual perception is embodied in this sense. For\nadditional examples, see Ebenholtz 2002: chap. 4." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 The Motor Component Theory (Embodied Visual Perception)" }, { "content": [ "Patients with frontal lobe damage sometimes exhibit pathological\n“utilization behaviour” (Lhermitte 1983) in which the\nsight of an object automatically elicits behaviors typically\nassociated with it, such as automatically pouring water into a glass and\ndrinking it whenever a bottle of water and a glass are present\n(Frith et al. 2000: 1782). That normal subjects often do not\nautomatically perform actions afforded by a perceived object, however, does not mean\nthat they do not plan, or imaginatively rehearse, or otherwise\nrepresent them. (On the contrary, recent neuroscientific findings\nsuggest that merely perceiving an object often covertly prepares the motor\nsystem to engage with it in a certain manner. For overviews, see\nJeannerod 2006 and Rizzolatti 2008.)", "Efferent readiness theories are based on the idea that covert\npreparation for action is “an integral part of the perceptual\nprocess” and not “merely a consequence of the\nperceptual process that has preceded it” (Coren 1986:\n394). According to the modest readiness theory, as we\nshall call it, covert motor preparation can sometimes influence the\nway an object’s spatial attributes are represented in perceptual\nexperience. The bold readiness theory, by contrast,\nargues for the stronger, constitutive claim that to perceive an\nobject’s spatial properties just is to be prepared or\nready to act in relation to the object in certain ways (Sperry\n1952; Taylor 1962, 1965,\n1968).", "A number of empirical findings motivate the modest readiness\ntheory. Festinger et al. 1967 tested the view that visual\ncontour perception is ", " determined by the particular sets of preprogrammed\nefferent instructions that are activated by the visual input into a\nstate of readiness for immediate use. (p. 34)", "\nContact lenses that produce curved retinal input were placed on the\nright eye of three observers, who were instructed to scan a\nhorizontally oriented line with their left eye covered for 40\nminutes. The experimenters reported that there was an average of 44%\nadaptation when the line was physically straight but retinally curved,\nand an average of 18% adaptation when the line was physically curved\nbut retinally straight (see Miller & Festinger 1977, however, for\nconflicting results).", "An elegantly designed set of experiments by Coren 1986 examined the\nrole of efferent readiness in the visual perception of direction and\nextent. Coren’s experiments support the hypothesis that the\nspatial parameter controlling the length of a saccade is not the\nangular direction of the target relative to the line of sight, but\nrather the direction of the center of gravity (COG) of all the stimuli\nin its vicinity (Coren & Hoenig 1972; Findlay\n1982). Importantly, ", " the bias arises from the computation of the saccade\nthat would be made and, hence, is held in readiness, rather\nthan the saccade actually emitted. (Coren 1986: 399)", "The COG bias is illustrated in Figure 3. In\nthe first row (top), there are no extraneous stimuli\nnear the saccade target. Hence, the saccade from the point of fixation to\nthe target is unbiased. In the second row, by\ncontrast, the location of an extraneous stimulus (×) results in\na saccade from the point of fixation that undershoots its target, while in\nthe third row the saccade overshoots its\ntarget. In the fourth row, changing the location of\nthe extraneous stimulus eliminates the COG bias: because the\nextraneous stimulus is near the point of fixation rather than the saccade\ntarget, the saccade is accurate.", "The COG bias is evolutionarily adaptive: eye movements will bring\nboth the saccade target as well as nearby objects into high acuity\nvision, thereby maximizing the amount of information obtained with\neach saccade. Motor preparation or “efferent readiness” to\nexecute an undershooting or overshooting saccade, Coren found,\nhowever, can also give rise to a corresponding illusion of\nextent (1986: 404–406). Observers, e.g., will perceptually\nunderestimate the length of the distance between the point of fixation\nand the saccade target when there is an extraneous stimulus on the\nnear side of the target (as in the second row\nof Figure 3) and will perceptually overestimate\nthe length of the distance when there is an extraneous stimulus on the\nfar side of the target (as in the third row of Figure\n3).", "According to Coren, the well known Müller-Lyer illusion can be\nexplained within this framework. The outwardly turned wings in\nMüller-Lyer display shift the COG outward from each vertex, while\nthe inwardly turned wings in this figure shift the COG inward. This\ninfluences both saccade length from vertex to vertex as well as the\napparent length of the central line segments. The influence of COG on\nefferent readiness to execute eye movements, Coren argues (1986:\n400–403), also explains why the line segments in the\nMüller-Lyer display can be replaced with small dots while leaving\nthe illusion intact as well as the effects of varying wing length and\nwing angle on the magnitude of the illusion.", "The modest readiness theory holds that the way an\nobject’s spatial attributes are represented in visual experience\nis sometimes modulated by one or another form of covert action\nplanning. The bold readiness theory argues for a\nstronger, constitutive claim: to perceive an object’s spatial\nproperties just is to be prepared or ready to act in relation\nto the object in certain ways. We begin by examining\nJ.G. Taylor’s “behavioral theory” of perception\n(Taylor 1962, 1965, 1968).", "Taylor’s behavioral theory of perception identifies\nthe conscious experience of seeing an object’s spatial\nproperties with the passive activation of a specific set of learned or\n“preprogrammed” motor routines:", " [P]erception is a state of multiple simultaneous\nreadiness for actions directed to the objects in the environment that\nare acting on the receptor organs at any one moment. The actions in\nquestion have been acquired by the individual in the course of his\nlife and have been determined by the reinforcing contingencies in the\nenvironment in which he grew up. What determines the content of\nperception is not the properties of the sensory transducers that are\noperated on by stimulus energies from the environment, but the\nproperties of the behaviour conditioned to those stimulus\nenergies…. (1965: 1, our emphasis)", "According to Taylor’s theory, sensory stimulation gives rises\nto spatially contentful visual experience as a consequence of\nassociative, reinforcement learning: we perceive an object as having\nthe spatial attribute G when the types of proximal sensory\nstimulation caused by the object have been conditioned to the\nperformance of actions sensitive to G (1962: 42). The\nconscious experience of seeing an object’s distance,\ne.g., is constituted by the subject’s learned readiness to\nperform specific whole body and limb movements that were reinforced\nwhen the subject previously received stimulation from objects at the\nsame remove. In general, differences in the spatial content of a\nvisual experience are identified with differences in the\nsubject’s state of “multiple simultaneous readiness”\nto interact with the objects represented in the experience.", "The main problem with Taylor’s theory is one that besets\nbehaviorist theories of perception in general: it assumes that for any\nvisible spatial property G, there will be some distinctive\nset of behavioral responses that are constitutive of perceiving the\nobject as having G. The problem with this assumption, as\nMohan Matthen (1988) puts it, ", " there is no such thing as the proper\nresponse, or even a range of functionally appropriate responses, to\nwhat perception tells us. (p. 20, see also Hurley 2001:\n17)" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 The Efferent Readiness Theory" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "The last approach we shall discuss has roots in, and similarities\nto, many of the proposals covered above, but is most closely aligned\nwith the bold readiness theory. We will follow Grush (2007) in calling\nthis approach the disposition theory (see Grush 2007: 394,\nfor discussion of the name). The primary proponent of this position is\nGareth Evans, whose work on spatial representation focused on\nunderstanding how we manage to perceive objects as occupying locations\nin egocentric space.", "The starting point of Evans’ theory is that the\nsubject’s perceptual systems have isolated a channel of sensory\ninput, an “information link”, through which she receives\ninformation about the object. The information link by itself does not\nallow the subject to know the location of this object. Rather, it is\nwhen the information link is able to induce in the subject appropriate\nkinds of behavioral dispositions that it becomes imbued with spatial\nimport:", " The subject hears the sound as coming from\nsuch-and-such a position, but how is the position to be specified?\nPresumably in egocentric terms (he hears the sound as up, or\ndown, to the right or to the left, in front or behind). These terms\nspecify the position of the sound in relation to the observer’s\nown body; and they derive their meaning in part from their complicated\nconnections with the subject’s actions. (Evans 1982:\n155)", "This is not a version of a motor theory (e.g., Poincaré\n1907: 71). The behavioral responses in question are not to be\nunderstood as raw patterns of motor activations, or even muscular\nsensations. Such a reduction would face challenges anyway, since for\nany location in egocentric space, there are an infinite number of\nkinematic configurations (movements) that would, for example, effect a\ngrasp to that location; and for any kinematic configuration, there are\nan infinite number of dynamic profiles (temporal patterns of muscular\nforce) that would yield that configuration. The behavioral responses\nin question are overt environmental behavior:", " It may well be that the input-output connections can\nbe finitely stated only if the output is described in explicitly\nspatial terms (e.g., ‘extending the arm’, ‘walking\nforward two feet’, etc.). If this is so, it would rule out the\nreduction of the egocentric spatial vocabulary to a muscular\nvocabulary. But such a reduction is certainly not needed for the point\nbeing urged here, which is that the spatial information embodied in\nauditory perception is specifiable only in a vocabulary whose terms\nderive their meaning partly from being linked with bodily\nactions. Even given an irreducibility, it would remain the case that\npossession of such information is directly manifestable in behaviour\nissuing from no calculation; it is just that there would be\nindefinitely many ways in which the manifestation can occur. (Evans\n1982: 156)", "Also, on this proposal, all modalities are in the same boat. As\nsuch the disposition theory is more ambitious than most of the\ntheories already discussed, which are limited to vision. Not only is\nthere no reduction of perceptual spatial content to a “muscular\nvocabulary”, there is also no reduction of the spatial content\nof some perceptual modalities to that of one or more others—as\nthere was for Berkeley, who sought to reduce the spatial content of\nvision to that of touch, and whose program forced a distinction\nbetween two spaces, visual space and tangible space:", " The spatial content of auditory and\ntactual-kinaesthetic perceptions must be specified in the same\nterms—egocentric terms. … It is a consequence of this\nthat perceptions from both systems will be used to build up a unitary\npicture of the world. There is only one egocentric space, because\nthere is only one behavioural space. (Evans 1982:\n160)", "Relatedly, for Evans it is not even the case that spatial\nperceptual content, for all modalities, is being reduced to\nbehavioral dispositions. Rather, perceptual inputs and behavioral\noutputs jointly and holistically yield a single behavioral\nspace:", " Egocentric spatial terms are the terms in which the\ncontent of our spatial experiences would be formulated, and those in\nwhich our immediate behavioural plans would be expressed. This duality\nis no coincidence: an egocentric space can exist only for an animal in\nwhich a complex network of connections exists between perceptual input\nand behavioural output. A perceptual input—even if, in some\nloose sense, it encapsulates spatial information (because it belongs\nto a range of inputs which vary systematically with some spatial\nfacts)—cannot have a spatial significance for an organism except\nin so far as it has a place in such a complex network of input-output\nconnections. (Evans 1982: 154)\n\n Egocentric spatial terms and spatial descriptions of bodily\nmovement would, on this view, form a structure familiar to\nphilosophers under the title “holistic”. (Evans 1982: 156,\nfn. 26)", "This last point and the associated quotes address a common\nmisconception of the disposition theory. It would be easy to read the\ntheory as providing a proposal of the following sort: A creature\ngets sensory information from a stimulus, and the problem is to\ndetermine where that stimulus is located in egocentric space; the\nsolution is that features of that sensory episode induce dispositions\nto behavior targeting some egocentric location. While this sort\nof thing is indeed a problem, it is relatively superficial. Any\ncreature facing this problem must already have the capacity\nto grasp egocentric spatial location contents, and the problem is\nwhich of these ready-at-hand contents it should assign to the\nstimulus. But the disposition theory is addressing a deeper question:\nin virtue of what does this creature have a capacity to grasp\negocentric spatial contents to begin with? The answer is that the\ncreature must have a rich set of interconnections between sensory\ninputs (and their attendant information links) and dispositions for\nbehavioral outputs.", "Rick Grush (2000, 2007) has adopted Evans’ theory, and\nattempted to clarify and expand upon it, particularly in three areas:\nfirst, the distinction between the disposition theory and other\napproaches; second, the neural implementation of the disposition\ntheory; and finally the specific kinds of dispositions that are\nrelevant for the issue of spatial experience.", "The theory depends on behavioral dispositions. Grush (2007) argues\nthat there are two distinctions that need to be made: first, the\norganism might possess i) knowledge of what the consequences (bodily,\nenvironmental, or sensory) of a given action will be; or ii) knowledge\nof which motor commands will bring about a given desired end state\n(of the body, environment, or sensory channels) (Grush 2007: 408). I\nmight be able to recognize that a series of moves someone shows me\nwill force my grandmaster opponent into checkmate (knowledge of the\nfirst sort, the consequences of a given set of actions), and yet not\nhave been anywhere near the skill level to have come up with that\nseries of moves on my own (knowledge of the second sort, what actions\nwill achieve a desired effect). Sensorimotor contingency theorists\nappeal to knowledge of the first sort—though as was discussed\nin Section 2.3.1, Noë flirts with\nappealing to knowledge of the second sort to explain the perceptual\ngrasp of P-shapes; to the extent he does, he is embracing a\ndisposition theoretic account of P-shapes. Disposition theorists, and\nbold readiness theorists (Section\n3.2.2) appeal to\nknowledge of the second sort. These are the dispositions of the\ndisposition theory: given some goal, the organism is disposed to\nexecute certain actions.", "This leads to the second distinction,\nbetween type-specifying and detail-specifying\ndispositions. Grush (2007: 393) maintains that only the latter are\ndirectly relevant for spatial perception. A type-specifying\ndisposition is a disposition to execute some type of behavior\nwith respect to an object or place. For example, an organism might be\ndisposed to grasp, bite, flee, or foveate some object. This sort of\ndisposition is not relevant to the spatial content of the experience\non the disposition theory. Rather, what are relevant are\ndetail-specifying dispositions: the specifics of how I am disposed to\nact to execute any of these behavior types. When reaching to grab the\ncup to take a drink (type), do I move my hand like so (straight ahead,\nsay), or like such (off to the right)? When I want to foveate or\norient towards (behavior type) the ant crawling up the wall, do a I\nmove my head and eyes like this, or like that?", "This latter distinction allows the disposition theory to answer one\nof the main objections to the bold readiness theory (described at the\nend of section 3.2.2) that there is no single\nspecial disposition connected to perceiving any given object. That is\ntrue of type-specifying dispositions, but not of detail-specifying\ndispositions. Given the ant’s location there is indeed a very\nlimited range of detail specifying dispositions that will allow me to\nfoveate it (though this might require constraints on possible actions,\nsuch as minimum jerk or other such constraints).", "Grush (2007; 2009) has proposed a detailed implementation of the disposition\ntheory in terms of neural information processing. The proposal\ninvolves more mathematics than is appropriate here, and so a quick\nqualitative description will have to suffice (for more detail, see\nGrush 2007; 2009). The basic idea is that relevant cortical areas learn\nsets of basis functions which, to put it very roughly, encode\nequivalence classes of combinations of sensory and postural signals\n(for discussion, see Pouget et al. 2002). For example, many\ncombinations of eye orientation and location of stimulation on the\nretina correspond to a visual stimulus that is directly in front of\nthe head. Sorting such bodily postural information (not just eye\norientation, but any postural information that affects sensation,\nwhich is most) and sensory condition pairs into useful equivalence\nclasses is the first half of the job.", "What this does is encode incoming information in a way that renders\nit ready to be of use in guiding behavior, since the equivalence\nclasses are precisely those for which a given kind of motor program is\nappropriate. The next part corresponds to how this information, so\nrepresented, can be used to produce the details of such a motor\nprogram. For every type of action in a creature’s\nbehavioral repertoire (grasp, approach, avoid, foveate, bite, etc.)\nits motor areas have a set of linear coefficients, easily implemented\nas a set of neural connection strengths, and when these are applied to\na set of basis function values, a detailed behavior is specified. For\nexample, when a creature senses an object O1, a\nset of basis function values B1 for that stimulus\nis produced. If the creature decides to execute overt\naction A1, then the B1 basis\nfunction values are multiplied by the coefficient corresponding\nto A1. The result is an instance of behavior\ntype A1 executed with respect to\nobject O1. If the creature had decide instead to\nexecute action A2, with respect\nto O1, the B1 basis function\nvalues would have been multiplied by the A2 set of\ncoefficients, and the result would be a motor behavior\nexecuting A2 on object O1.", "Accordingly, the disposition theory has a very different account of\nwhat is happening with sensory substitution devices than Susan Hurley and Alva\nNoë (see Section 2.3.2 above). On the\ndisposition theory, what allows the user of such a device to have\nspatial experience is not the ability to anticipate how the sensory\ninput will change upon execution of movement as the sensorimotor\ncontingency theory would have it. Rather, it is that the\nsubject’s brain has learned to take these sensory inputs\ntogether with postural signals to produce sets of basis functions that\npoise the subject to act with respect to the object that is causing\nthe sensory signals (see Grush 2007: 406).", "One objection to disposition theories is what Hurley has called The Myth of the\nGiving:", " To suppose that … the content of intentions\ncan be taken as unproblematically primitive in explaining how the\ncontent of experience is possible, is to succumb to the myth of the\ngiving. (Hurley 1998: 241)", "The idea behind this objection is that one is simply shifting\nthe debt from one credit card to another when one takes as problematic\nthe spatial content of perception, and then appeals to motor behavior\nas the supplier of this content. For then, of course, the question\nwill be: Whence the spatial content of motor behavior?", "The disposition theory, however, does not posit any such unilateral\nreduction (though Taylor’s bold readiness theory arguably does,\nsee Section 3.2.2 above). As discussed above,\nEvans explicitly claims that the behavioral space is holistically\ndetermined by both behavior and perception. And on Grush’s\naccount spatial content is implemented in the construction of basis\nfunction values, and these values coordinate transitions from\nperceptual input to behavioral output. As such, they are highly\nanalogous to inferences whose conditions of application are given in\nsensory-plus-postural terms and whose consequences of application\nmanifest in behavioral terms. The import of the states that represent\nthese basis function values is no more narrowly motor than the meaning\nof a conditional can be identified with its consequent (or its\nantecedent, for that matter) in isolation.", "Another very common objection, one that is often leveled at many\nforms of motor theory, has to do with the fact that even paralyzed\npeople, with very few possibilities for action, seem capable in many\ncases of normal spatial perception. Such objections would, at a minimum,\nplace significant pressure on any views that explain perceptual\ncontent by appeal to actual behavior. It is also easy to see how even\nhypothetical behavior would be called into question in such cases,\nsince in many such cases behavior is not physically\npossible. Grush’s theory (2007), right or wrong, has something\nspecific to say about this objection. Since spatial content is taken\nto be manifested in the production of basis function values in the\ncortex, the prediction is that any impairments manifesting farther\ndown the chain, the brain stem or spinal cord, for example, need have\nno direct effect on spatial content. So long as the relevant brain\nareas have the wherewithal to produce sets of basis function values\nsuitable for constructing a motor sequence (if multiplied by the\naction-type-specific coefficients), then the occasioning perceptual\nepisode will have spatial content." ], "section_title": "4. 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qm-action-distance	Action at a Distance in Quantum Mechanics	First published Fri Jan 26, 2007	[ "\n\nIn the quantum realm, there are curious correlations between the\nproperties of distant systems. An example of such correlations is\nprovided by the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bohm experiment. The\ncorrelations in the EPR/B experiment strongly suggest that there are\nnon-local influences between distant systems, i.e., systems between\nwhich no light signal can travel, and indeed orthodox quantum\nmechanics and its various interpretations postulate the existence of\nsuch non-locality. Yet, the question of whether the EPR/B correlations\nimply non-locality and the exact nature of this non-locality is a\nmatter of ongoing controversy. Focusing on EPR/B-type experiments, in\nthis entry we consider the nature of the various kinds of non-locality\npostulated by different interpretations of quantum mechanics. Based on\nthis consideration, we briefly discuss the compatibility of these\ninterpretations with the special theory of relativity." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Bell's theorem and non-locality", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. The analysis of factorizability", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Action at a distance, holism and non-separability", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Action at a distance", "4.2 Holism", "4.3 Non-separability" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Holism, non-separability and action at a distance in quantum mechanics", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Collapse theories", "5.2 Can action-at-a-distance co-exist with non-separability and holism?", "5.3 No-collapse theories" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Superluminal causation", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Superluminal signaling", "sub_toc": [ "7.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for superluminal signaling", "7.2 No-collapse theories", "7.3 Collapse theories", "7.4 The prospects of controllable probabilistic dependence", "7.5 Superluminal signaling and action-at-a-distance" ] }, { "content_title": "8. The analysis of factorizability: implications for quantum non-locality", "sub_toc": [ "8.1 Non-separability, holism and action at a distance", "8.2 Superluminal signaling", "8.3 Relativity", "8.4 Superluminal causation", "8.5 On the origin and nature of parameter dependence" ] }, { "content_title": "9. Can there be ‘local’ quantum theories?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "10. Can quantum non-locality be reconciled with relativity?", "sub_toc": [ "10.1 Collapse theories", "10.2 No-collapse theories", "10.3 Quantum causal loops and relativity" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe quantum realm involves curious correlations between distant\nevents. A well-known example is David Bohm's (1951) version of\nthe famous thought experiment that Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen\nproposed in 1935 (henceforth, the EPR/B experiment). Pairs of particles\nare emitted from a source in the so-called spin singlet state and rush\nin opposite directions (see Fig. 1 below). When the particles are\nwidely separated from each other, they each encounter a measuring\napparatus that can be set to measure their spin components along\nvarious directions. Although the measurement events are distant from\neach other, so that no slower-than-light or light signal can travel\nbetween them, the measurement outcomes are curiously\n correlated.[1]\n That is, while the outcome of each of the distant spin measurements\nseems to be a matter of pure chance, they are correlated with each\nother: The joint probability of the distant outcomes is different from\nthe product of their single probabilities. For example, the\nprobability that each of the particles will spin clockwise about the\nz-axis in a z-spin measurement (i.e., a measurement\nof the spin component along the z direction) appears to be\n½. Yet, the outcomes of such measurements are perfectly\nanti-correlated: If the left-hand-side (L-) particle happens to spin\nclockwise (anti-clockwise) about the z-axis, the\nright-hand-side (R-) particle will spin anti-clockwise (clockwise)\nabout that axis. And this is true even if the measurements are made\nsimultaneously.", " \n\n\n\n\n\nFigure 1: A schematic illustration of the EPR/B\nexperiment. Particle pairs in the spin singlet state are emitted in\nopposite directions and when they are distant from each other\n(i.e., space-like separated), they encounter measurement apparatuses\nthat can be set to measure spin components along various\ndirections.\n\n", "\n\nThe curious EPR/B correlations strongly suggest the existence of\nnon-local influences between the two measurement events, and indeed\northodox ‘collapse’ quantum mechanics supports this\nsuggestion. According to this theory, before the measurements the\nparticles do not have any definite spin. The particles come to possess\na definite spin only with the first spin measurement, and the outcome\nof this measurement is a matter of chance. If, for example, the first\nmeasurement is a z-spin measurement on the L-particle, the\nL-particle will spin either clockwise or anti-clockwise about the\nz-axis with equal chance. And the outcome of the\nL-measurement causes an instantaneous change in the spin properties of\nthe distant R-particle. If the L-particle spins clockwise\n(anti-clockwise) about the z-axis, the R-particle will\ninstantly spin anti-clockwise (clockwise) about the same axis. (It is\ncommon to call spins in opposite directions ‘spin up’ and\n‘spin down,’ where by convention a clockwise spinning may\nbe called ‘spin up’ and anti-clockwise spinning may be\ncalled ‘spin down.’)", "\n\nIt may be argued that orthodox quantum mechanics is false, and that\nthe non-locality postulated by it does not reflect any non-locality in\nthe quantum realm. Alternatively, it may be argued that orthodox\nquantum mechanics is a good instrument for predictions rather than a\nfundamental theory of the physical nature of the universe. On this\ninstrumental interpretation, the predictions of quantum mechanics are\nnot an adequate basis for any conclusion about non-locality: This\ntheory is just an incredible oracle (or a crystal ball), which provides\na very successful algorithm for predicting measurement outcomes and\ntheir probabilities, but it offers little information about ontological\nmatters, such as the nature of objects, properties and causation in the\nquantum realm.", "\n\nEinstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935) thought that quantum mechanics is\nincomplete and that the curious correlations between distant systems\ndo not amount to action at a distance between them. The apparent\ninstantaneous change in the R-particle's properties during the\nL-measurement is not really a change of properties, but rather a\nchange of knowledge. (For more about the EPR argument, see the entry\non the EPR argument, Redhead 1987, chapter 3, and Albert 1992, chapter\n3. For discussions of the EPR argument in the relativistic context,\nsee Ghirardi and Grassi 1994 and Redhead and La Riviere 1997.) On this\nview, quantum states of systems do not always reflect their complete\nstate. Quantum states of systems generally provide information about\nsome of the properties that systems possess and information\nabout the probabilities of outcomes of measurements on them, and this\ninformation does not generally reflect the complete state of the\nsystems. In particular, the information encoded in the spin singlet\nstate is about the probabilities of measurement outcomes of spin\nproperties in various directions, about the conditional probabilities\nthat the L- (R-) particle has a certain spin property given that the\nR- (L-) particle has another spin property, and about the\nanti-correlation between the spins that the particles may have in any\ngiven direction (for more details, see section 5.1). Thus, the outcome\nof a z-spin measurement on the L-particle and the spin\nsinglet state (interpreted as a state of knowledge) jointly provide\ninformation about the z-spin property of the R-particle. For\nexample, if the outcome of the L-measurement is z-spin\n‘up,’ we know that the R-particle has z-spin\n‘down’; and if we assume, as EPR did, that there is no\ncurious action at a distance between the distant wings (and that the\nchange of the quantum-mechanical state of the particle pair in the\nL-measurement is only a change in state of knowledge), we could also\nconclude that the R-particle had z-spin ‘down’\neven before the L-measurement occurs.", "\n\nHow could the L-outcome change our\nknowledge/ignorance about the R-outcome if it has no influence on it?\nThe simplest and most straightforward reply is that the L- and the R-\noutcome have a common cause that causes them to be correlated, so that\nknowledge of one outcome provides knowledge about the\n other.[2]\n Yet, the question is whether the predictions of orthodox quantum\nmechanics, which have been highly confirmed by various experiments,\nare compatible with the quantum realm being local in the sense of\ninvolving no influences between systems between which light and\nslower-than-light signals cannot travel (i.e., space-like separated\nsystems). More particularly, the question is whether it is possible to\nconstruct a local, common-cause model of the EPR/B experiment, i.e., a\nmodel that postulates no influence between systems/events in the\ndistant wings of the experiment, and that the correlation between them\nare due to the state of the particle pair at the source. In 1935,\nEinstein, Podolsky and Rosen believed that this is possible. But, as\nJohn Bell demonstrated in 1964, this belief is difficult to\nuphold." ], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn a famous theorem, John Bell (1964) demonstrated that granted some\nplausible assumptions, any local model of the EPR/B experiment is\ncommitted to certain inequalities about the probabilities of\nmeasurement outcomes, ‘the Bell inequalities,’ which are\nincompatible with the quantum-mechanical predictions. When Bell proved\nhis theorem, the EPR/B experiment was only a thought experiment. But\ndue to technological advances, various versions of this experiment have\nbeen conducted since the 1970s, and their results have overwhelmingly\nsupported the quantum-mechanical predictions (for brief reviews of\nthese experiments and further references, see the entry on Bell's\ntheorem and Redhead 1987, chapter 4, section 4.3 and ‘Notes and\nReferences’). Thus, a wide consensus has it that the quantum\nrealm involves some type of non-locality.", "\n\nThe basic idea of Bell's theorem is as follows. A model of the EPR/B\nexperiment postulates that the state of the particle pair together\nwith the apparatus settings to measure (or not to measure) certain\nspin properties determine the probabilities for single and joint\nspin-measurement outcomes. A local Bell model of this experiment also\npostulates that probabilities of joint outcomes factorize into the\nsingle probabilities of the L- and the R- outcomes: The probability of\njoint outcomes is equal to the product of the probabilities of the\nsingle outcomes. More formally, let λ denote the pair's state\nbefore any measurement occurs. Let l denote the setting of\nthe L-measurement apparatus to measure spin along the l-axis\n(i.e., the l-spin of the L-particle), and let r\ndenote the setting of the R-measurement apparatus to measure spin\nalong the r-axis (i.e., the r-spin of the\nR-particle). Let xl be the outcome of a\nl-spin measurement in the L-wing, and let\nyr be the outcome of a r-spin measurement\nin the R-wing; where xl is either the L-outcome\nl-spin ‘up’ or the L-outcome l-spin\n‘down,’ and yr is either the R-outcome\nr-spin ‘up’ or the R-outcome r-spin\n‘down.’ Let Pλ l\nr(xl & yr) be\nthe joint probability of the L- and the R-outcome, and\nPλ\nl(xl) and\nPλ\nr(yr) be the single\nprobabilities of the L- and the R-outcome, respectively; where the\nsubscripts λ, l and r denote the factors that\nare relevant for the probabilities of the outcomes\nxl and yr. Then, for any\nλ, l, r, xl and\n yr:[3]", "\n\nFactorizability\n Pλ l r(xl\n & yr) =\n Pλ l(xl)\n ·\n Pλ r(yr).\n", "\n\n(Here and henceforth, for simplicity's sake we shall denote events and\nstates, such as the measurement outcomes, and the propositions that\nthey occur by the same symbols.)", "\n\nThe state λ is typically thought of as the pair's state at the\nemission time, and it is assumed that this state does not change in\nany relevant sense between the emission and the first measurement. It\nis (generally) a different state from the quantum-mechanical pair's\nstate ψ. ψ is assumed to be an incomplete state of the pair,\nwhereas λ is supposed to be a (more) complete state of the\npair. Accordingly, pairs with the same state ψ may have different\nstates λ which give rise to different probabilities of outcomes\nfor the same type of measurements. Also, the states λ may be\nunknown, hidden, inaccessible or uncontrollable.", "\n\nFactorizability is commonly motivated as a locality condition. In\nnon-local models of the EPR/B experiment, the correlations between the\ndistant outcomes are accounted for by non-local influences between the\ndistant measurement events. For example, in orthodox quantum mechanics\nthe first spin measurement on, say, the L-particle causes an immediate\nchange in the spin properties of the R-particle and in the\nprobabilities of future outcomes of spin measurements on this particle.\nBy contrast, in local models of this experiment the correlations are\nsupposed to be accounted for by a common cause—the pair's\nstate λ (see Fig. 2 below): The pair's state and the\nL-setting determine the probability of the L-outcome; the pair's\nstate and the R-setting determine the probability of the\nR-outcome; and the pair's state and the L- and the\nR-setting determine the probability of joint outcomes, which (as\nmentioned above) is simply the product of these single probabilities.\nThe idea is that the probability of each of the outcomes is determined\nby ‘local events,’ i.e., events that are confined to its\nbackward light-cone, and which can only exert subluminal or luminal\ninfluences on it (see Figure 3 below); and the distant outcomes are\nfundamentally independent of each other, and thus their joint\nprobability factorizes. (For more about this reasoning, see sections 6\nand 8-9.)", "\n\n\n\n\n\nFigure 2: A schematic common-cause model of the EPR/B\nexperiment. Arrows denote causal connections.\n\n", "\n\n\n\n\n\nFigure 3: A space-time diagram of a local model of\nthe EPR/B experiment. The circles represent the measurement events,\nand the cones represent their backward light cones, i.e., the\nboundaries of all the subluminal and luminal influences on them. The\ndotted lines denote the propagation of the influences of the pair's\nstate at the emission and of the settings of the measurement\napparatuses on the measurement outcomes.\n\n", "\n\nA Bell model of the EPR/B experiment also postulates that for each\nquantum-mechanical state ψ there is a distribution ρ over all\nthe possible pair states λ, which is\nindependent of the settings of the apparatuses. That is, the\ndistribution of the (‘complete’) states λ depends on\nthe (‘incomplete’) state ψ, and this distribution\nis independent of the particular choice of measurements in the L- and\nR-wing (including the choice not to measure any quantity). Or\nformally, for any quantum-mechanical state ψ, L-settings\nl and l′, and R-settings r and\nr′:", "\n λ-independence \n ρψ l r(λ) =\n ρψ l′ r(λ) =\n ρψ l r′(λ) =\n ρψ l′ r′(λ) =\n ρψ(λ)\n", "\n\nwhere the subscripts denote the factors that are potentially\nrelevant for the distribution of the states λ.", "\n\nAlthough the model probabilities (i.e., the probabilities of outcomes\nprescribed by the states λ) are different from the\ncorresponding quantum-mechanical probabilities of outcomes (i.e., the\nprobabilities prescribed by the quantum-mechanical states ψ),\nthe quantum mechanical probabilities (which have been systematically\nconfirmed) are recovered by averaging over the model probabilities.\nThat is, it is supposed that the quantum-mechanical probabilities\nPψ l\nr(xl & yr),\nPψ l(xl)\nand\nPψ r(yr)\nare obtained by averaging over the model probabilities\nPλ l\nr(xl & yr),\nPλ l\n(xl) and\nPλ r(yr),\nrespectively: For any ψ, l, r, xl and yr,", "\n Empirical Adequacy \n Pψ l r(xl\n & yr) = \n ∫λ Pλ l r(xl \n & yr) ·\n ρψ l r(λ)\n\nPψ l(xl) \n =\n ∫λ Pλ l(xl )\n ·\n ρψ l(λ)\n\nPψ r(yr) \n =\n ∫λ Pλ r(yr)\n ·\n ρψ r(λ).[4]\n", "\n\nThe assumption of λ-independence is very plausible. It\npostulates that (complete) pair states at the source are uncorrelated\nwith the settings of the measurement apparatuses. And independently of\none's philosophical view about free will, this assumption is strongly\nsuggested by our experience, according to which it seems possible to\nprepare the state of particle pairs at the source independently of the\nset up of the measurement apparatuses.", "\n\nThere are two ways to try to explain a failure of\nλ-independence. One possible explanation is that\npairs' states and apparatus settings share a common cause, which\nalways correlates certain types of pairs' states λ with\ncertain types of L- and R-setting. Such a causal hypothesis will be\ndifficult to reconcile with the common belief that apparatus settings\nare controllable at experimenters' will, and thus could be set\nindependently of the pair's state at the source. Furthermore,\nthinking of all the different ways one can measure spin properties and\nthe variety of ways in which apparatus settings can be chosen, the\npostulation of such common cause explanation for settings and\npairs' states would seem highly ad hoc and its existence\nconspiratorial.", "\n\nAnother possible explanation for the failure of λ-independence\nis that the apparatus settings influence the pair's state at the\nsource, and accordingly the distribution of the possible pairs' states\nλ is dependent upon the settings. Since the settings can be\nmade after the emission of the particle pair from the source, this\nkind of violation of λ-independence would require backward\ncausation. (For advocates of this way out of non-locality, see Costa\nde Beauregard 1977, 1979, 1985, Sutherland 1983, 1998, 2006 and Price\n1984, 1994, 1996, chapters 3, 8 and 9.) On some readings of John\nCramer's (1980, 1986) transactional interpretation of quantum\nmechanics (see Maudlin 1994, pp. 197-199), such violation of\nλ-independence is postulated. According to this interpretation,\nthe source sends ‘offer’ waves forward to the measurement\napparatuses, and the apparatuses send ‘confirmation’ waves\n(from the space-time regions of the measurement events) backward to\nthe source, thus affecting the states of emitted pairs according to\nthe settings of the apparatuses. The question of whether such a\ntheory can reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics is a\ncontroversial matter (see Maudlin 1994, pp. 197-199, Berkovitz 2002,\nsection 5, and Kastner 2006). It is noteworthy, however, that while\nthe violation of λ-independence is sufficient for circumventing\nBell's theorem, the failure of this condition per se does not\nsubstantiate locality. The challenge of providing a local model of the\nEPR/B experiment also applies to models that violate\nλ-independence. (For more about these issues, see sections 9\nand 10.3.)", "\n\nIn any case, as Bell's theorem demonstrates, factorizability,\nλ-independence and empirical adequacy jointly imply the Bell\ninequalities, which are violated by the predictions of orthodox quantum\nmechanics (Bell 1964, 1966, 1971, 1975a,b). Granted the systematic\nconfirmation of the predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics and the\nplausibility of λ-independence, Bell inferred that\nfactorizability fails in the EPR/B experiment. Thus, interpreting\nfactorizability as a locality condition, he concluded that the quantum\nrealm is non-local. (For further discussions of Bell's theorem,\nthe Bell inequalities and non-locality, see Bell 1966, 1971, 1975a,b,\n1981, Clauser et al 1969, Clauser and Horne 1974, Shimony\n1993, chapter 8, Fine 1982a,b, Redhead 1987, chapter 4, Butterfield\n1989, 1992a, Pitowsky 1989, Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger 1989,\nGreenberger, Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger 1990, Mermin 1990, and the\nentry on Bell's theorem.)" ], "section_title": "2. Bell's theorem and non-locality", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nFollowing Bell's work, a broad consensus has it that the\nquantum realm involves some type of non-locality (for examples, see\nClauser and Horne 1974, Jarrett 1984,1989, Shimony 1984, Redhead 1987,\nButterfield 1989, 1992a,b, 1994, Howard 1989, Healey 1991, 1992, 1994,\nTeller 1989, Clifton, Butterfield and Redhead 1990, Clifton 1991,\nMaudlin 1994, Berkovitz 1995a,b, 1998a,b, and references\n therein).[5]\n But there is an ongoing controversy as to its exact nature and its\ncompatibility with relativity theory. One aspect of this controversy\nis over whether the analysis of factorizability and the different ways\nit could be violated may shed light on these issues. Factorizability\nis equivalent to the conjunction of two conditions (Jarrett 1984,\n1989, Shimony\n 1984):[6]", "\nParameter independence. The probability of a distant\nmeasurement outcome in the EPR/B experiment is independent of the\nsetting of the nearby measurement apparatus. Or formally, for any\npair's state λ, L-setting l, R-setting r,\nL-outcome xl and R-outcome\nyr:\n\n\n PI\n \n \n Pλ l\nr(xl) =\nPλ l(xl)\n and \n Pλ l\nr(yr) =\nPλ r(yr).\n \n \n \n ", "\nOutcome independence. The probability of a distant\nmeasurement outcome in the EPR/B experiment is independent of the\nnearby measurement outcome. Or formally, for any pair's state\nλ, L-setting l, R-setting r, L-outcome\nxl and R-outcome yr:\n\n\n \n \n Pλ l\nr(xl / yr) =\nPλ l\nr(xl)\n and \n Pλ l\nr(yr / xl) =\nPλ l\nr(yr)\n \n\n \n \n \n\n \n Pλ l\nr(yr) > 0\n \n Pλ l\nr(xl) > 0,\n \n \n \n ", "\n or more generally,\n\n \n OI\n Pλ l\nr(xl & yr) =\nPλ l\nr(xl) ·\nPλ l\nr(yr).\n \n\n", "\n\nAssuming λ-independence (see section 2), any empirically\nadequate theory will have to violate OI or PI. A common view has it\nthat violations of PI involve a different type of non-locality than\nviolations of OI: Violations of PI involve some type of\naction-at-a-distance that is impossible to reconcile with relativity\n(Shimony 1984, Redhead 1987, p. 108), whereas violations of OI involve\nsome type of holism, non-separability and/or passion-at-a-distance that\nmay be possible to reconcile with relativity (Shimony 1984, Readhead\n1987, pp. 107, 168-169, Howard 1989, Teller 1989).", "\n\nOn the other hand, there is the view that the analysis above (as\nwell as other similar analyses of\n factorizability[7])\n is immaterial for studying quantum non-locality (Butterfield 1992a,\npp. 63-64, Jones and Clifton 1993, Maudlin 1994, pp. 96 and 149) and\neven misleading (Maudlin 1994, pp. 94-95 and 97-98). On this\nalternative view, the way to examine the nature of quantum\nnon-locality is to study the ontology postulated by the various\ninterpretations of quantum mechanics and alternative quantum\n theories.[8]\n In sections 4-7, we shall follow this methodology and discuss the\nnature of non-locality postulated by several quantum theories. The\ndiscussion in these sections will furnish the ground for evaluating\nthe above controversy in section 8." ], "section_title": "3. The analysis of factorizability", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Action at a distance, holism and non-separability", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nIn orthodox quantum mechanics as well as in any other current quantum\ntheory that postulates non-locality (i.e., influences between distant,\nspace-like separated systems), the influences between the distant\nmeasurement events in the EPR/B experiment do not propagate\ncontinuously in space-time. They seem to involve action at a\ndistance. Yet, a common view has it that these influences are due to\nsome type of holism and/or non-separability of states of composite\nsystems, which are characteristic of systems in entangled states (like\nthe spin singlet state), and which exclude the very possibility of\naction at a distance. The paradigm case of action at a distance is the\nNewtonian gravitational force. This force acts between distinct\nobjects that are separated by some (non-vanishing) spatial distance,\nits influence is symmetric (in that any two massive objects influence\neach other), instantaneous and does not propagate continuously in\nspace. And it is frequently claimed or presupposed that such action at\na distance could only exist between systems with separate states in\nnon-holistic universes (i.e., universes in which the states of\ncomposite systems are determined by, or supervene upon the states of\ntheir subsystems and the spacetime relations between them), which are\ncommonly taken to characterize the classical\n realm.[9]", "\n\nIn sections 4.2 and 4.3, we shall briefly review the relevant\nnotions of holism and non-separability (for a more comprehensive\nreview, see the entry on holism and nonseparability in physics and\nHealey 1991). In section 5, we shall discuss the nature of holism and\nnon-separability in the quantum realm as depicted by various quantum\ntheories. Based on this discussion, we shall consider whether the\nnon-local influences in the EPR/B experiment constitute action at a\ndistance." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Action at a distance" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIn the literature, there are various characterizations of holism.\nDiscussions of quantum non-locality frequently focus on property\nholism, where certain physical properties of objects are not determined\nby the physical properties of their parts. The intuitive idea is that\nsome intrinsic properties of wholes (e.g. physical systems) are not\ndetermined by the intrinsic properties of their parts and the\nspatiotemporal relations that obtain between these parts. This idea can\nbe expressed in terms of supervenience relations.", "\n Property Holism. Some objects have intrinsic\nqualitative properties and/or relations that do not supervene upon the\nintrinsic qualitative properties and relations of their parts and the\nspatiotemporal relations between these parts.", "\n\nIt is difficult to give a general precise specification of the terms\n‘intrinsic qualitative property’ and\n‘supervenience.’ Intuitively, a property of an object is\nintrinsic just in case that object has this property in and for itself\nand independently of the existence or the state of any other object. A\nproperty is qualitative (as opposed to individual) if it does not\ndepend on the existence of any particular object. And the intrinsic\nqualitative properties of an object O supervene upon the\nintrinsic qualitative properties and relations of its parts and the\nspatiotemporal relations between them just in case there is no change\nin the properties and relations of O without a change in the\nproperties and relations of its parts and/or the spatiotemporal\nrelations between them. (For attempts to analyze the term\n‘intrinsic property,’ see for example Langton and Lewis\n1998 and the entry on intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties. For a review\nof different types of supervenience, see for example Kim 1978,\nMcLaughlin 1994 and the entry on supervenience.)", "\n\nPaul Teller (1989, p. 213) proposes a related notion of holism,\n‘relational holism,’ which is characterized as the\nviolation of the following condition:", "\n Particularism. The world is composed of\nindividuals. All individuals have non-relational properties and all\nrelations supervene on the non-relational properties of the\nrelata.", "\n\nHere, by a non-relational property Teller means an intrinsic property\n(1986a, p. 72); and by ‘the supervenience of a relational\nproperty on the non-relational properties of the relata,’ he\nmeans that ‘if two objects, 1 and 2, bear a relation R\nto each other, then, necessarily, if two further objects,\n1′ and 2′ have the same non-relational properties, then\n1′ and 2′ will also bear the same relation R to\neach other’ (1989, p. 213). Teller (1986b, pp. 425-7) believes\nthat spatiotemporal relations between objects supervene upon the\nobjects’ intrinsic physical properties. Thus, he does not\ninclude the spatiotemporal relations in the supervenience basis. This\nview is controversial, however, as many believe that spatiotemporal\nrelations between objects are neither intrinsic nor supervene upon the\nintrinsic qualitative properties of these objects. But, if such\nsupervenience does not obtain, particularism will also be violated in\nclassical physics, and accordingly relational holism will fail to mark\nthe essential distinction between the classical and the quantum\nrealms. Yet, one may slightly revise Teller's definition of\nparticularism as follows:", "\n Particularism. The world is composed of\nindividuals. All individuals have non-relational properties and all\nrelations supervene upon the non-relational properties of the relata\nand the spatiotemporal relations between them.", "\n\nIn what follows in this entry, by relational holism we shall mean a\nviolation of particularism." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Holism" }, { "content": [ "\n\nLike holism, there are various notions of non-separability on offer.\nThe most common notion in the literature is state non-separability,\ni.e., the violation of the following condition:", "\n State separability. Each system possesses a\nseparate state that determines its qualitative intrinsic properties,\nand the state of any composite system is wholly determined by the\nseparate states of its subsystems.", "\n\nThe term ‘wholly determined’ is vague. But, as before, one\nmay spell it out in terms of supervenience relations: State\nseparability obtains just in case each system possesses a separate\nstate that determines its qualitative intrinsic properties and\nrelations, and the state of any composite system is supervenient upon\nthe separate states of its subsystems.", "\n\nAnother notion of non-separability is spatiotemporal non-separability.\nInspired by Einstein (1948), Howard (1989, pp. 225-6) characterizes\nspatiotemporal non-separability as the violation of the following\nseparability condition:", "\n Spatiotemporal separability. The contents of any\ntwo regions of space-time separated by a non-vanishing spatiotemporal\ninterval constitute two separate physical systems. Each separated\nspace-time region possesses its own, distinct state and the joint state\nof any two separated space-time regions is wholly determined by the\nseparated states of these regions.", "\n\nA different notion of spatiotemporal non-separability, proposed by\nHealey (see the entry on holism and nonseparability in physics), is\nprocess non-separability. It is the violation of the following\ncondition:", "\n Process separability. Any physical process\noccupying a spacetime region R supervenes upon an assignment\nof qualitative intrinsic physical properties at spacetime points in\nR." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Non-separability" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe quantum realm as depicted by all the quantum theories that\npostulate non-locality, i.e., influences between distant (space-like\nseparated) systems, involves some type of non-separability or\nholism. In what follows in this section, we shall consider the nature\nof the non-separability and holism manifested by various\ninterpretations of quantum mechanics. On the basis of this\nconsideration, we shall address the question of whether these\ninterpretations predicate the existence of action at a distance. We\nstart with the so-called ‘collapse theories.’" ], "section_title": "5. Holism, non-separability and action at a distance in quantum mechanics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nIn orthodox quantum mechanics, normalized vectors in Hilbert spaces\nrepresent states of physical systems. When the Hilbert space is of\ninfinite dimension, state vectors can be represented by functions, the\nso-called ‘wave functions.’ In any given basis, there is a\nunique wave function that corresponds to the state vector in that\nbasis. (For an entry level review of the highlights of the\nmathematical formalism and the basic principles of quantum mechanics,\nsee the entry on quantum mechanics, Albert 1992, Hughes 1989, Part I,\nand references therein; for more advanced reviews, see Bohm 1951 and\nRedhead 1987, chapters 1-2 and the mathematical appendix.)", "\n\nFor example, the state of the L-particle having z-spin\n‘up’ (i.e., spinning ‘up’ about the\nz-axis) can be represented by the vector \|z-up>\nin the Hilbert space associated with the L-particle, and the state of\nthe L-particle having z-spin ‘down’ (i.e.,\nspinning ‘down’ about the z-axis) can be\nrepresented by the orthogonal vector, \|z-down>. Particle\npairs may be in a state in which the L-particle and the R-particle\nhave opposite spins, for instance either a state\n\|ψ1> in which the L-particle has z-spin\n‘up’ and the R-particle has z-spin\n‘down,’ or a state \|ψ2> in which the\nL-particle has z-spin ‘down’ and the R-particle\nhas z-spin ‘up.’ Each of these states is\nrepresented by a tensor product of vectors in the Hilbert space of the\nparticle pair:\n \|ψ1>\n = \|z-up>L\n\|z-down>R and \|ψ2> =\n\|z-down>L\n\|z-up>R; where the subscripts L and R\nrefer to the Hilbert spaces associated with the L- and the R-particle,\nrespectively. But particle pairs may also be in a superposition of\nthese states, i.e., a state that is a linear sum of the states\n\|ψ1> and \|ψ2>, e.g. the state\nrepresented by", "\n \n \n \|ψ3>\n = \n 1/√2 (\|ψ1>\n− \|ψ2>)\n \n\n\n\n = \n1/√2\n(\|z-up>L\n\|z-down>R\n− \|z-down>L\n\|z-up>R).\n\n\n ", "\n\nIn fact, this is exactly the case in the spin singlet state. In this\nstate, the particles are entangled in a non-separable state (i.e., a\nstate that cannot be decomposed into a product of separate states of\nthe L- and the R-particle), in which (according to the\nproperty-assignment rules of orthodox quantum mechanics) the particles\ndo not possess any definite z-spin (or definite spin in any\nother direction). Thus, the condition of state separability fails: The\nstate of the particle pair (which determines its intrinsic qualitative\nproperties) is not wholly determined by the separate states of the\nparticles (which determine their intrinsic qualitative properties). Or\nmore precisely, the pair's state is not supervenient upon the\nseparable states of the particles. In particular, the superposition\nstate of the particle pair assigns a ‘correlational’\nproperty that dictates that the outcomes of (ideal) z-spin\nmeasurements on both the L- and the R-particle will be\nanti-correlated, and this correlational property is not supervenient\nupon properties assigned by any separable states of the particles (for\nmore details, see Healey 1992, 1994). For similar reasons, the spin\nsinglet state also involves property and relational holism; for the\nabove correlational property of the particle pair also fails to\nsupervene upon the intrinsic qualitative properties of the particles\nand the spatiotemporal relations between them. Furthermore, the\nprocess that leads to each of the measurement outcomes is also\nnon-separable, i.e., process separability fails (see Healey 1994 and\nthe entry on holism and nonseparability in physics).", "\n\nThis correlational property is also ‘responsible’ for the\naction at a distance that the orthodox theory seems to postulate\nbetween the distant wings in the EPR/B experiment. Recall (section 1)\nthat Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen thought that this curious action at\na distance reflects the incompleteness of this theory rather than a\nstate of nature. The EPR argument for the incompleteness of the\northodox theory is controversial. But the orthodox theory seems to be\nincomplete for a different reason. This theory postulates that in\nnon-measurement interactions, the evolution of states obeys a linear\nand unitary equation of motion, the so-called Schrödinger\nequation (see the entry on quantum mechanics), according to which the\nparticle pair in the EPR/B experiment remains in an entangled\nstate. This equation of motion also dictates that in a spin\nmeasurement, the pointers of the measurement apparatuses get entangled\nwith the particle pair in a non-separable state in which (according to\nthe theory's property assignment, see below) the indefiniteness of\nparticles’ spins is ‘transmitted’ to the pointer's\nposition: In this entangled state of the particle pair and the\npointer, the pointer lacks any definite position, in contradiction to\nour experience of perceiving it pointing to either ‘up’ or\n‘down.’", "\n\nThe above problem, commonly called ‘the measurement\nproblem,’ arises in orthodox no-collapse quantum mechanics from\ntwo features that account very successfully for the behavior of\nmicroscopic systems: The linear dynamics of quantum states as\ndescribed by the Schrödinger equation and the property assignment\nrule called ‘eigenstate-eigenvalue link.’ According to the\neigenstate-eigenvalue link, a physical observable, i.e., a physical\nquantity, of a system has definite value (one of its eigenvalues) just\nin case the system is in the corresponding eigenstate of that\nobservable (see the entry on quantum mechanics, section\n4). Microscopic systems may be in a superposition state of spin\ncomponents, energies, positions, momenta as well as other physical\nobservables. Accordingly, microscopic systems may be in a state of\nindefinite z-spin, energy, position, momentum and various\nother quantities. The problem is that given the linear and unitary\nSchrödinger dynamics, these indefinite quantities are also\nendemic in the macroscopic realm. For example, in a z-spin\nmeasurement on a particle in a superposition state of z-spin\n‘up’ and z-spin ‘down,’ the position\nof the apparatus’s pointer gets entangled with the indefinite\nz-spin of the particle, thus transforming the pointer into a\nstate of indefinite position, i.e., a superposition of pointing\n‘up’ and pointing ‘down’ (see Albert 1992,\nchapter 4, and the entry on collapse theories, section 3). In\nparticular, in the EPR/B experiment the L-measurement causes the\nL-apparatus pointer to get entangled with the particle pair,\ntransforming it into a state of indefinite position:", "\n \|ψ4> = 1/√2\n(\|z-up>L \n\|z-down>R\n\|up>LA − \n\|z-down>L \n\|z-up>R \n\|down>LA)", "\n\nwhere \|up>LA and\n\|down>LA are the states of the L-apparatus\npointer displaying the outcomes z-spin ‘up’ and\nz-spin ‘down,’ respectively. Since the above type\nof indefiniteness is generic in orthodox no-collapse quantum\nmechanics, in this theory measurements typically have no definite\noutcomes, in contradiction to our experience.", "\n\nIn order to solve this problem, the orthodox theory postulates that in\nmeasurement interactions, entangled states of measured systems and the\ncorresponding measurement apparatuses do not evolve according to the\nSchrödinger equation. Rather, they undergo a\n‘collapse’ into product (non-entangled) states, where the\nsystems involved have the relevant definite properties. For example,\nthe entangled state of the particle pair and the L-apparatus in the\nEPR/B experiment may collapse into a product state in which the\nL-particle comes to possess z-spin ‘up,’ the\nR-particle comes to possess z-spin ‘down’ and the\nL-apparatus pointer displaying the outcome z-spin\n‘up’:", "\n \|ψ5> = \n\|z-up>L \n\|z-down>R\n\|up>LA.", "\n\nThe problem is that in the orthodox theory, the notions of\nmeasurement and the time, duration and nature of state collapses remain\ncompletely unspecified. As John Bell (1987b, p. 205) remarks, the\ncollapse postulate in this theory, i.e., the postulate that dictates\nthat in measurement interactions the entangled states of the relevant\nsystems do not follow the Schrödinger equation but rather undergo\na collapse, is no more than ‘supplementary, imprecise, verbal,\nprescriptions.’", "\n\nThis problem of accounting for our experience of perceiving definite\nmeasurement outcomes in orthodox quantum mechanics, is an aspect of the\nmore general problem of accounting for the classical-like behavior of\nmacroscopic systems in this theory.", "\n\nThe dynamical models for state-vector reduction were developed to\naccount for state collapses as real physical processes (for a review\nof the collapse models and a detailed reference list, see the entry on\ncollapse theories). The origin of the collapse models may be dated to\nBohm and Bub's (1966) hidden variable theory and Pearle's (1976)\nspontaneous localization approach, but the program has received its\ncrucial impetus with the more sophisticated models developed by\nGhirardi, Rimini and Weber in 1986 (see also Bell 1987a and Albert\n1992) and their consequent development by Pearle (1989) (see also\nGhirardi, Pearle and Rimini 1990, and Butterfield et al. 1993).\nSimilarly to orthodox collapse quantum mechanics, in the GRW models\nthe quantum-mechanical state of systems (whether it is expressed by a\nvector or a wave function) provides a complete specification of their\nintrinsic properties and relations. The state of systems follows the\nSchrödinger equation, except that it has a probability for\nspontaneous collapse, independently of whether or not the systems are\nmeasured. The chance of collapse depends on the ‘size’ of\nthe entangled systems—in the earlier models the ‘size’\nof systems is predicated on the number of the elementary particles,\nwhereas in later models it is measured in terms of mass densities. In\nany case, in microscopic systems, such as the particle pairs in the\nEPR/B experiment, the chance of collapse is very small and\nnegligible—the chance of spontaneous state collapse in such\nsystems is cooked up so that it will occur, on average, every hundred\nmillion years or so. This means that the chance that the entangled\nstate of the particle pair in the EPR/B experiment will collapse to a\nproduct state between the emission from the source and the first\nmeasurement is virtually zero. In an earlier L-measurement, the state\nof the particle pair gets entangled with the state of the\nL-measurement apparatus. Thus, the state of the pointer of the\nL-apparatus evolves from being ‘ready’ to measure a\ncertain spin property to an indefinite outcome. For instance, in a\nz-spin measurement the L-apparatus gets entangled with the\nparticle pair in a superposition state of pointing to ‘up’\nand pointing to ‘down’ (corresponding to the states of the\nL-particle having z-spin ‘up’ and having\nz-spin ‘down’), and the R-apparatus remains\nun-entangled with these systems in the state of being ready to measure\nz-spin. Or formally:", "\n \|ψ6> = 1/√2\n(\|z-up>L \n\|up>AL \n\|z-down>R − \n\|z-down>L \n\|down>AL \n\|z-up>R) \n\|ready>AR", "\n\nwhere, as before, \|up>AL and\n\|down>AL denote the states of the L-apparatus\ndisplaying the outcomes z-spin ‘up’ and\n‘down’ respectively, and \|ready>AR\ndenotes the state of the R-apparatus being ready to measure\nz-spin. In this state, a gigantic number of particles of the\nL-apparatus pointer are entangled together in the superposition state\nof being in the position (corresponding to pointing to)\n‘up’ and the position (corresponding to pointing to)\n‘down.’ For assuming, for simplicity of presentation, that\nthe position of all particles of the L-apparatus pointer in the state\nof pointing to ‘up’ (‘down’) is the same, the\nstate \|ψ6> can be rewritten as:", "\n \|ψ7> = 1/√2\n(\|z-up>L \n\|up>p1 \n\|up>p2 \n\|up>p3 … \n\|z-down>R −\n \n \n \n \|z-down>L \n\|down>p1 \n\|down>p2 \n\|down>p3 … \n\|z-up>R) \|ready\n>AR", "\n\nwhere pi denotes the i-particle of the\nL-apparatus pointer, and \|up>pi\n(\|down>pi) is the state of the\ni-particle being in the position corresponding to the outcome\nz-spin ‘up’\n (‘down’).[10]\n The chance that at least one of the vast number of the pointer's\nparticles will endure a spontaneous localization toward\nbeing in the position corresponding to either the outcome\nz-spin ‘up’ or the outcome z-spin\n‘down’ within a very short time (a split of a micro\nsecond) is very high. And since all the particles of the pointer and\nthe particle pair are entangled with each other, such a collapse will\ncarry with it a collapse of the entangled state of the pointer of the\nL-apparatus and the particle pair toward either", "\n \|z-up>L \|up>p1 \|up>p2\n\|up>p3 … \n\|z-down>R\n ", "\n or", "\n \|z-down>L \|down>p1 \|down>p2\n\|down>p3 … \n\|z-up>R.", "\n Thus, the pointer will very quickly move in the direction of pointing\nto either the outcome z-spin ‘up’ or the outcome\nz-spin ‘down.’", "\n\nIf (as portrayed above) the spontaneous localization of particles were\nto a precise position, i.e., to the position corresponding to the\noutcome ‘up’ or the outcome ‘down,’ the GRW\ncollapse models would successfully resolve the measurement\nproblem. Technically speaking, a precise localization is achieved by\nmultiplying \|ψ7> by a delta function centered on the\nposition corresponding to either the outcome ‘up’ or the\noutcome ‘down’ (see the entry on collapse theories,\nsection 5 and Albert 1992, chapter 5); where the probability of each\nof these mutually exhaustive possibilities is ½. The problem is\nthat it follows from the uncertainty principle (see the entry on the\nuncertainty principle) that in such localizations the momenta and the\nenergies of the localized particles would be totally uncertain, so\nthat gases may spontaneously heat up and electrons may be knocked out\nof their orbits, in contradiction to our experience. To avoid this\nkind of problems, GRW postulated that spontaneous localizations are\ncharacterized by multiplications by Gaussians that are centered around\ncertain positions, e.g. the position corresponding to either the\noutcome ‘up’ or the outcome ‘down’ in the\nstate \|ψ7>. This may be problematic, because in\neither case the state of the L-apparatus pointer at (what we\ncharacteristically conceive as) the end of the L-measurement would be\na superposition of the positions ‘up’ and\n‘down.’ For although this superposition\n‘concentrates’ on either the outcome ‘up’ or\nthe outcome ‘down’ (i.e., the peak of the wave function\nthat corresponds to this state concentrates on one of these\npositions), it also has ‘tails’ that go everywhere: The\nstate of the L-apparatus is a superposition of an infinite number of\ndifferent positions. Thus, it follows from the eigenstate-eigenvalue\nlink that the position observable of the L-apparatus has no definite\nvalue at the end of the measurement. But if the position observable\nhaving a definite value is indeed required in order for the\nL-apparatus to have a definite location, then the pointer will point\nto neither ‘up’ nor ‘down,’ and the GRW\ncollapse models will fail to reproduce the classical-like behavior of\nsuch\n systems.[11]", "\n\nIn later models, GRW proposed to interpret the quantum state as a\ndensity of mass and they postulated that if almost all the density of\nmass of a system is concentrated in a certain region, then the system\nis located in that region. Accordingly, pointers of\nmeasurement apparatuses do have definite positions at the end of\nmeasurement interactions. Yet, this solution has also given rise to a\ndebate (see Albert and Loewer 1995, Lewis 1997, 2003a, 2004, Ghirardi\nand Bassi 1999, Bassi and Ghirardi 1999, 2001, Clifton and Monton 1999,\n2000, Frigg 2003, and Parker 2003).", "\n\nThe exact details of the collapse mechanism and its characteristics in\nthe GRW/Pearle models have no significant implications for the type of\nnon-separability and holism they postulate—all these models\nbasically postulate the same kinds of non-separability and holism as\northodox quantum mechanics (see section 5.1.1). And action at a\ndistance between the L- and the R-wing will occur if the L-measurement\ninteraction, a supposedly local event in the L-wing, causes some local\nevents in the R-wing, such as the event of the pointer of the\nmeasurement apparatus coming to possess a definite measurement outcome\nduring the R-measurement. That is, action at a distance will occur if\nthe L-measurement causes the R-particle to come to possess a definite\nz-spin and this in turn causes the pointer of the R-apparatus\nto come to possess the corresponding measurement outcome in the\nR-measurement. Furthermore, if the L-measurement causes the R-particle\nto come to possess (momentarily) a definite position in the R-wing,\nthen the action at a distance between the L- and the R-wing will occur\nindependently of whether the R-particle undergoes a spin\nmeasurement.", "\n\nThe above discussion is based on an intuitive notion of action at a\ndistance and it presupposes that action at a distance is compatible\nwith non-separability and holism. In the next section we shall provide\nmore precise characterizations of action at a distance and in light of\nthese characterizations reconsider the question of the nature of\naction at a distance in the GRW/Pearle collapse models." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Collapse theories" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe action at a distance in the GRW/Pearle models is different from\nthe Newtonian action at a distance in various respects. First, in\ncontrast to Newtonian action at a distance, this action is independent\nof the distance between the measurement events. Second, while\nNewtonian action is symmetric, the action in the GRW/Pearle models is\n(generally) asymmetric: Either the L-measurement influences the\nproperties of the R-particle or the R-measurement influences the\nproperties of the L-particle, depending on which measurement occurs\nfirst (the action will be symmetric when both measurements occur\nsimultaneously). Third (and more important to our consideration), in\ncontrast to Newtonian action at a distance, before the end of the\nL-measurement the state of the L-apparatus and the R-particle is not\nseparable and accordingly it is not clear that the influence is\nbetween separate existences, as the case is supposed to be in\nNewtonian gravity.", "\n\nThis non-separability of the states of the particle pair and the\nL-measurement apparatus, and more generally the fact that the\nnon-locality in collapse theories is due to state non-separability, has\nled a number of philosophers and physicists to think that wave\ncollapses do not involve action at a distance. Yet, the question of\nwhether there is an action at a distance in the GRW/Pearle models (and\nvarious other quantum theories) depends on how we interpret the term\n‘action at a distance.’ And, as I will suggest below, on a\nnatural reading of Isaac Newton's and Samuel Clarke's\ncomments concerning action at a distance, there may be a peaceful\ncoexistence between action at a distance and non-separability and\nholism.", "\n\nNewton famously struggled to find out the cause of\n gravity.[12]\n In a letter to Bentley, dated January 17 1692/3, he said:", "\n\nYou sometimes speak of Gravity as essential and inherent to Matter.\nPray do not ascribe that Notion to me, for the Cause of Gravity is what\nI do not pretend to know, and therefore would take more Time to\nconsider it. (Cohen 1978, p. 298)", "\n\nIn a subsequent letter to Bentley, dated February 25, 1692/3, he\nadded:", "\n\nIt is inconceivable that inanimate Matter should, without the\nMediation of something else, which is not material, operate upon, and\naffect other matter without mutual Contact…That Gravity should\nbe innate, inherent and essential to Matter, so that one body may act\nupon another at a distance thro’ a Vacuum, without the Mediation\nof any thing else, by and through which their Action and Force may be\nconveyed from one to another, is to me so great an Absurdity that I\nbelieve no Man who has in philosophical Matters a competent Faculty of\nthinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an Agent\nacting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this Agent be\nmaterial or immaterial, I have left to the Consideration of my\nreaders. (Cohen 1978, pp. 302-3)", "\n\nSamuel Clarke, Newton's follower, similarly struggled with the\nquestion of the cause of gravitational phenomenon. In his famous\ncontroversy with Leibniz, he\n said:[13]", "\n\nThat one body attracts another without any intermediate means, is\nindeed not a miracle but a contradiction; for 'tis supposing\nsomething to act where it is not. But the means by which two bodies\nattract each other, may be invisible and intangible and of a different\nnature from mechanism …", "\n\nAnd he added:", "\n\nThat this phenomenon is not produced sans moyen, that is\nwithout a cause capable of producing such an effect, is undoubtedly\ntrue. Philosophers therefore can search after and discover that cause,\nif they can; be it mechanical or not. But if they cannot discover the\ncause, is therefore the effect itself, the phenomenon, or the matter of\nfact discovered by experience … ever the less true?", "\n\nNewton's and Clarke's comments suggest that for them\ngravity was a law-governed phenomenon, i.e., a phenomenon in which\nobjects influence each other at a distance according to the Newtonian\nlaw of gravity, and that this influence is due to some means which may\nbe invisible and intangible and of a different nature from mechanism.\nOn this conception of action at a distance, there seems to be no reason\nto exclude the possibility of action at a distance in the quantum realm\neven if that realm is holistic or the state of the relevant systems is\nnon-separable. That is, action at a distance may be characterized as\nfollows:", "\n\nAction at a distance is a phenomenon in which a\nchange in intrinsic properties of one system induces a change in the\nintrinsic properties of a distant system, independently of the\ninfluence of any other systems on the distant system, and without\nthere being a process that carries this influence contiguously in space\nand time.\n ", "\n\nWe may alternatively characterize action at a distance in a more\nliberal way:", "\n\nAction* at a distance is a phenomenon in which a\nchange in intrinsic properties of one system induces a change in the\nintrinsic properties of a distant system without there being a process\nthat carries this influence contiguously in space and time.\n ", "\n\nAnd while Newton and Clarke did not have an explanation for the action\nat a distance involved in Newtonian gravity, on the above\ncharacterizations action at a distance in the quantum realm would be\nexplained by the holistic nature of the quantum realm and/or\nnon-separability of the states of the systems involved. In particular,\nif in the EPR/B experiment the L-apparatus pointer has a definite\nposition before the L-measurement and the R-particle temporarily comes\nto possess definite position during the L-measurement, then the\nGRW/Pearle models involve action at a distance and thus also action\nat a distance. On the other hand, if the R-particle never comes to\npossess a definite position during the L-measurement, then the\nGRW/Pearle models only involve action at a distance." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Can action-at-a-distance co-exist with non-separability and holism?" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIn 1952, David Bohm proposed a deterministic, ‘hidden\nvariables’ quantum theory that reproduces all the observable\npredictions of orthodox quantum mechanics (see Bohm 1952, Bohm,\nSchiller and Tiomno 1955, Bell 1982, Dewdney, Holland and Kyprianidis\n1987, Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 1992a, 1997, Albert 1992,\nValentini 1992, Bohm and Hiley 1993, Holland 1993, Cushing 1994, and\nCushing, Fine and Goldstein 1996; for an entry level review, see the\nentry on Bohmian mechanics and Albert 1992, chapter 5).", "\n\nIn contrast to orthodox quantum mechanics and the GRW/Pearle\ncollapse models, in Bohm's theory wave functions always evolve\naccording to the Schrödinger equation, and thus they never\ncollapse. Wave functions do not represent the states of systems.\nRather, they are states of a ‘quantum field (on configuration\nspace)’ that influences the states of\n systems.[14]\n Also, particles always have definite positions, and the positions of\nthe particles and their wave function at a certain time jointly\ndetermine the trajectories of the particles at all future times. Thus,\nparticles’ positions and their wave function determine the\noutcomes of any measurements (so long as these outcomes are recorded\nin the positions of some physical systems, as in any practical\nmeasurements).", "\n\nThere are various versions of Bohm's theory. In the\n‘minimal’ Bohm theory, formulated by Bell\n (1982),[15]\n the wave function is interpreted as a ‘guiding’ field\n(which has no source or any dependence on the particles) that\ndeterministically governs the trajectories of the particles according\nto the so-called ‘guiding equation’ (which expresses the\nvelocities of the particles in terms of the wave\n function).[16]\n The states of systems are separable (the state of any composite\nsystem is completely determined by the state of its subsystems), and\nthey are completely specified by the particles’\npositions. Spins, and any other properties which are not directly\nderived from positions, are not intrinsic properties of\nsystems. Rather, they are relational properties that are determined by\nthe systems’ positions and the guiding field. In particular,\neach of the particles in the EPR/B experiment has dispositions to\n‘spin’ in various directions, and these dispositions are\nrelational properties of the particles— they are\n(generally) determined by the guiding field and the positions of the\nparticles relative to the measurement apparatuses and to each\nother.", "\n\n \n \nFigure 4. The EPR/B experiment with Stern-Gerlach\nmeasurement devices. Stern-Gerlach 1 is on, set up to measure the\nz-spin of the L-particle, and Stern-Gerlach 2 is off. The\nhorizontal lines in the left-hand-side denote the trajectories of six\nL-particles in the spin singlet state after an (impulsive)\nz-spin measurement on the L-particle, and the horizontal\nlines in the right-hand-side denote the trajectories of the\ncorresponding R-particles. The center plane is aligned orthogonally to\nthe z-axis, so that particles that emerge above this plane\ncorrespond to z-spin ‘up’ outcome and particles\nthat emerge below this plane correspond to z-spin\n‘down’ outcome. The little arrows denote the\nz-spin components of the particles in the\n‘non-minimal’ Bohm theory (where spins are intrinsic\nproperties of particles), and are irrelevant for the\n‘minimal’ Bohm theory (where spins are not intrinsic\nproperties of particles).\n\n", "\n\nTo see the nature of non-locality postulated by the minimal Bohm\ntheory, consider again the EPR/B experiment and suppose that the\nmeasurement apparatuses are Stern-Gerlach (S-G) magnets which are\nprepared to measure z-spin. In any run of the experiment, the\nmeasurement outcomes will depend on the initial positions of the\nparticles and the order of the measurements. Here is why. In the\nminimal Bohm theory, the spin singlet state denotes the relevant state\nof the guiding field rather than the intrinsic properties of the\nparticle pair. If the L-measurement occurs before the R-measurement,\nthe guiding field and the position of the L-particle at the emission\ntime jointly determine the disposition of the L-particle to emerge\nfrom the S-G device either above or below a plane aligned in the\nz-direction; where emerging above (below) the plane means\nthat the L-particle z-spins ‘up’\n(‘down’) about the z-axis and the L-apparatus\n‘pointer’ points to ‘up’ (‘down’)\n(see Fig. 4 above). All the L-particles that are emitted above the\ncenter plane aligned orthogonally to the z-direction, like\nthe L-particles 1-3, will be disposed to spin ‘up’; and\nall the particles that are emitted below this plane, like the\nL-particles 4-6, will be disposed to spin ‘down.’\nSimilarly, if the R-measurement occurs before the L-measurement, the\nguiding field and the position of the R-particle at the emission time\njointly determine the disposition of the R-particle to emerge either\nabove the z-axis (i.e., to z-spin ‘up’)\nor below the z-axis (i.e., to z-spin\n‘down’) according to whether it is above or below the\ncenter plane, independently of the position of the L-particle along\nthe z-axis.", "\n\nBut the z-spin disposition of the R-particle changes\nimmediately after an (earlier) z-spin measurement on the\nL-particle: The R-particles 1-3 (see Fig. 4), which were previously\ndisposed to z-spin ‘up,’ will now be disposed to\nz-spin ‘down,’ i.e., to emerge below the center\nplane aligned orthogonally to the z-axis; and the R-particles\n4-6, which were previously disposed to z-spin\n‘down,’ will now be disposed to z-spin\n‘up,’ i.e., to emerge above this center plane. Yet, the\nL-measurement per se does not have any immediate influence on\nthe state of the R-particle: The L-measurement does not influence the\nposition of the R-particle or any other property that is directly\nderived from this position. It only changes the guiding field, and\nthus grounds new spin dispositions for the R-particle. But these\ndispositions are not intrinsic properties of the R-particle. Rather,\nthey are relational properties of the R-particle, which are grounded\nin the positions of both particles and the state of the guiding\n field.[17] \n(Note that in the particular case in which the L-particle is emitted\nabove the center plane aligned orthogonally to the z-axis and\nthe R-particle is emitted below that plane, an earlier z-spin\non the L-particle will have no influence on the outcome of a\nz-spin on the R-particle.)", "\n\nWhile there is no contiguous process to carry the influence of the\nL-measurement outcome on events in the R-wing, the question of whether\nthis influence amounts to action at a distance depends on the exact\ncharacterization of this term. In contrast to the GRW/Pearle collapse\nmodels, the influence of the L-measurement outcome on the intrinsic\nproperties of the R-particle is dependent on the R-measurement: Before\nthis measurement occurs, there are no changes in the R-particle's\nintrinsic properties. Yet, the influence of the L-measurement on the\nR-particle is at a distance. Thus, the EPR/B experiment as depicted by\nthe minimal Bohm theory involves action* at a distance but not action\nat a distance. ", "\n\nBohm's theory portrays the quantum realm as deterministic. Thus, the\nsingle-case objective probabilities, i.e., the chances, it assigns to\nindividual spin-measurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment are\ndifferent from the corresponding quantum-mechanical probabilities. In\nparticular, while in quantum mechanics the chances of the outcomes\n‘up’ and ‘down’ in an earlier L- (R-) spin\nmeasurement are both ½, in Bohm's theory these chances are\neither one or zero. Yet, Bohm's theory postulates a certain\ndistribution, the so-called ‘quantum-equilibrium\ndistribution,’ over all the possible positions of pairs with the\nsame guiding field. This distribution is computed from the\nquantum-mechanical wave function, and it is typically interpreted as\nignorance over the actual position of the pair; an ignorance that may\nbe motivated by dynamical considerations and statistical patterns\nexhibited by ensembles of pairs with the same wave function (for more\ndetails, see the entry on bohmian mechanics, section 9). And the\nsum-average (or more generally the integration) over this distribution\nreproduces all the quantum-mechanical observable predictions.", "\n\nWhat is the status of this probability postulate? Is it a law of\nnature or a contingent fact (if it is a fact at all)? The answers to\nthese questions vary (see Section 7.2.1, Bohm 1953, Valentini 1991a,b,\n1992, 1996, 2002, Valentini and Westman 2004, Dürr, Goldstein and\nZanghì 1992a,b, 1996, fn. 15, and Callender 2006).", "\n\nTurning to the question of non-separability, the minimal Bohm theory\ndoes not involve state non-separability. For recall that in this\ntheory the state of a system does not consist in its wave function,\nbut rather in the system's position, and the position of a composite\nsystem always factorizes into the positions of its subsystems. Here,\nthe non-separability of the wave function reflects the state of the\nguiding field. This state propagates not in ordinary three-space but\nin configuration space, where each point specifies the configuration\nof both particles. The guiding field of the particle pair cannot be\nfactorized into the guiding field that governs the trajectory of the\nL-particle and the guiding field that governs the trajectory of the\nR-particle. The evolution of the particles’ trajectories,\nproperties and dispositions is non-separable, and accordingly the\nparticles’ trajectories, properties and dispositions are\ncorrelated even when the particles are far away from each other and do\nnot interact with each other. Thus, process separability fails.", "\n\nIn the non-minimal Bohm\n theory[18],\n the behavior of an N-particle system is determined by its\nwave function and the intrinsic properties of the particles. But, in\ncontrast to the minimal theory, in the non-minimal theory spins are\nintrinsic properties of particles. The wave function always evolves\naccording to the Schrödinger equation, and it is interpreted as a\n‘quantum field’ (which has no sources or any dependence on\nthe particles). The quantum field guides the particles via the\n‘quantum potential,’ an entity which is determined from\nthe quantum field, and the evolution of properties is fully\n deterministic.[19]", "\n\nLike in the minimal Bohm theory, the non-separability of the wave\nfunction in the EPR/B experiment dictates that the evolution of the\nparticles’ trajectories, properties and dispositions is\nnon-separable, but the behavior of the particles is somewhat different.\nIn the earlier z-spin measurement on the L-particle, the\nquantum potential continuously changes, and this change induces an\nimmediate change in the z-spin of the R-particle. If the\nL-particle starts to spin ‘up’ (‘down’) in the\nz-direction, the R-particle will start to spin\n‘down’ (‘up’) in the same direction (see the\nlittle arrows in Fig.\n 4).[20]\n Accordingly, the L-measurement induces instantaneous action at a\ndistance between the L- and the R-wing. Yet, similarly to the minimal\nBohm theory, while the disposition of the R-particle to emerge above\nor below the center plane aligned orthogonally to the\nz-direction in a z-spin measurement may change\ninstantaneously, the actual trajectory of the R-particle along the\nz-direction does not change before the measurement of the\nR-particle's z-spin occurs. Only during the R-measurement,\nthe spin and the position of the R-particle get correlated and the\nR-particle's trajectory along the z-direction is dictated by\nthe value of its (intrinsic) z-spin.", "\n\nVarious objections have been raised against Bohm's theory (for a\ndetailed list and replies, see the entry on Bohmian mechanics, section\n15). One main objection is that in Bohmian mechanics, the guiding\nfield influences the particles, but the particles do not influence the\nguiding field. Another common objection is that the theory is involved\nwith a radical type of non-locality, and that this type of\nnon-locality is incompatible with relativity. While it may be very\ndifficult, or even impossible, to reconcile Bohm's theory with\nrelativity, as is not difficult to see from the above discussion, the\ntype of non-locality that the minimal Bohm theory postulates in the\nEPR/B experiment does not seem more radical than the non-locality\npostulated by the orthodox interpretation and the GRW/Pearle collapse\nmodels. ", "\n\nModal interpretations of quantum mechanics were designed to solve the\nmeasurement problem and to reconcile quantum mechanics with\nrelativity. They are no-collapse, (typically) indeterministic\nhidden-variables theories. Quantum-mechanical states of systems\n(which may be construed as denoting their states or information about\nthese states) always evolve according to unitary and linear dynamical\nequations (the Schrödinger equation in the non-relativistic\ncase). And the orthodox quantum-mechanical state description of\nsystems is supplemented by a set of properties, which depends on the\nquantum-mechanical state and which is supposed to be rich enough to\naccount for the occurrence of definite macroscopic events and their\nclassical-like behavior, but sufficiently restricted to escape all the\nknown no-hidden-variables theorems. (For modal interpretations, see\nvan Fraassen 1973, 1981, 1991, chapter 9, Kochen 1985, Krips 1987,\nDieks 1988, 1989, Healey 1989, Bub 1992, 1994, 1997, Vermaas and Dieks\n1995, Clifton 1995, Bacciagaluppi 1996, Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo 1996,\nBub and Clifton 1996, Hemmo 1996b, Bacciagaluppi and Dickson 1999,\nClifton 2000, Spekkens and Sipe 2001a,b, Bene and Dieks 2002, and\nBerkovitz and Hemmo 2006a,b. For an entry-level review, see the entry\non modal interpretations of quantum theory. For comprehensive reviews\nand analyses of modal interpretations, see Bacciagaluppi 1996, Hemmo\n1996a, chapters 1-3, Dieks and Vermaas 1998, Vermaas 1999, and the\nentry on modal interpretations of quantum theory. For the\nno-hidden-variables theorems, see Kochen and Specker 1967,\nGreenberger, Horne and Zeilinger 1989, Mermin 1990 and the entry on\nthe Kochen-Specker \n theorem.)[21]", "\n\nModal interpretations vary in their property assignment. For\nsimplicity, we shall focus on modal interpretations in which the\nproperty assignment is based on the so-called Schmidt\nbiorthogonal-decomposition theorem (see Kochen 1985, Dieks 1989, and\nHealey 1989). Let S1 and S2 be\nsystems associated with the Hilbert spaces\nHS1 and\nHS2, respectively. There exist bases\n{\|αi>} and\n{\|βi>} for\nHS1 and\nHS2 respectively such that the state of\nS1+S2 can be expressed as a\nlinear combination of the following form of vectors from these\nbases:", "\n \|ψ8\n>S1+S2 =\n∑i ci\n\|αi>S1 \n\|βi>S2.", "\n\nWhen the absolute values of the coefficients ci\nare all unequal, the bases\n{\|αi>} and\n{\|βi>} and the above\ndecomposition of \|ψ8\n>S1+S2 are\nunique. In that case, it is postulated that S1 has\na determinate value for each observable associated with\nHS1 with the basis\n{\|αi>} and\nS2 has a determinate value for each observable\nassociated with HS2 with the basis\n{\|βi>}, and \|ci\|2\nprovide the (ignorance)\nprobabilities of the possible values that these observables may\n have.[22]\n For example, suppose that the state of the L- and the R-particle in\nthe EPR/B experiment before the measurements is:", "\n \|ψ9> = (1/√2+ε) \n\|z-up>L\|\nz-down>R − (1/√2-ε′) \n\|z-down>L\|\nz-up>R ", "\n\nwhere 1/√2 >> ε,ε′,\n(1/√2+ε)2+(1/√2-ε′)2\n= 1, and (as before) \|z-up>L\n(\|z-up>R) and \|\nz-down>L (\|\nz-down>R) denote the states of the L- (R-)\nparticle having z-spin ‘up’ and z-spin ‘down’,\n respectively.[23]\n Then, either the L-particle spins ‘up’ and the R-particle\nspins ‘down’ in the z-direction, or the\nL-particle spins ‘down’ and the R-particle spins\n‘up’ in the z-direction. Thus, in contrast to the\northodox interpretation and the GRW/Pearle collapse models, in modal\ninterpretations the particles in the EPR/B experiment may have\ndefinite spin properties even before any measurement occurs.", "\n\nTo see how the modal interpretation accounts for the curious\ncorrelations in EPR/B-type experiments, let us suppose that the state\nof the particle pair and the measurement apparatuses at the emission\ntime is:", "\n\|ψ10> = ((1/√2+ε)\n\|z-up>L\n\|z-down>R −\n(1/√2−ε′)\n\|z-down>L\n\|z-up>R)\n\|ready>AL\|ready>AR\n ", "\n\nwhere \|ready>AL\n(\|ready>AR) denotes the state of the\nL-apparatus (R-apparatus) being ready to measure z-spin. In\nthis state, the L- and the R-apparatus are in the definite state of\nbeing ready to measure z-spin, and (similarly to the state\n\|ψ9>) the L- and the R-particle have definite\nz-spin properties: Either the L-particle has z-spin\n‘up’ and the R-particle has z-spin\n‘down,’ or the L-particle has z-spin\n‘down’ and the R-particle has z-spin\n ‘up,’[24] \n where the probability of the realization of each of these\npossibilities is approximately 1/2. In the (earlier) z-spin\nmeasurement on the L-particle, the state of the particle pair and the\napparatuses evolves to the state:", "\n \|ψ11> = ((1/√2+ε) \n\|z-up>L\|up>AL\|\nz-down>R − (1/√2-ε′) \n\|z-down>L\|down>AL\|\nz-up>R) \|ready>AR\n ", "\n\nwhere (as before) \|up>AL and\n\|down>AL denote the states of the L-apparatus\npointing to the outcomes z-spin ‘up’ and\nz-spin ‘down’, respectively. In this state,\neither the L-particle has a z-spin ‘up’ and the\nL-apparatus points to ‘up,’ or the L-particle has\nz-spin ‘down’ and the L-apparatus points to\n‘down.’ And, again, the probability of each of these\npossibilities is approximately 1/2. The evolution of the properties\nfrom the state \|ψ10> to the state\n\|ψ11> depends on the dynamical laws. In almost all\nmodal interpretations, if the particles have definite z-spin\nproperties before the measurements, the outcomes of z-spin\nmeasurements will reflect these properties. That is, the evolution of\nthe properties of the particles and the measurement apparatuses will\nbe deterministic, so that the spin properties of the particles do not\nchange in the L-measurement and the pointer of the L-apparatus comes\nto display the outcome that corresponds to the z-spin\nproperty that the L-particle had before the measurement. If, for\nexample, before the measurements the L- and the R-particle have\nrespectively the properties z-spin ‘up’ and\nz-spin ‘down’, the (earlier) z-spin\nmeasurement on the L-particle will yield the outcome ‘up’\nand the spin properties of the particles will remain\nunchanged. Accordingly, a z-spin measurement on the\nR-particle will yield the outcome ‘down’. Thus, in this\ncase the modal interpretation involves neither action at a distance\nnor action* at a distance.", "\n\nHowever, if the measurement apparatuses are set up to measure\nx-spin rather than z-spin, the evolution of the\nproperties of the L-particle and the L-apparatus will be\nindeterministic. As before, the L-measurement will not cause any change\nin the actual spin properties of the R-particle. But the L-measurement\noutcome will cause an instant change in the spin dispositions of the\nR-particle and the R-measurement apparatus. If, for example, the\nL-measurement outcome is x-spin ‘up’ and the\nL-particle comes to posses x-spin ‘up,’ then the\nR-particle and the R-apparatus will have respectively\nthe dispositions to possess x-spin ‘down’ and to\ndisplay the outcome x-spin ‘down’ on a\nx-spin measurement. Thus, like the minimal Bohm theory, the\nmodal interpretation may involve action* at a distance in the EPR/B\nexperiment. But, unlike the minimal Bohm theory, here spins are\nintrinsic properties of particles.", "\n\nIn the above modal interpretation, property composition fails: The\nproperties of composite systems are not decomposable into the\nproperties of their subsystems. Consider, again, the state\n\|ψ10>. As ‘separated’ systems (i.e., in\nthe decompositions of the composite system of the particle\npair+apparatuses into the L-particle and the R-particle+apparatuses\nand into the R-particle and the L-particle+apparatuses) the L- and the\nR-particle have definite z-spin properties. But, as\nsubsystems of the composite system of the particle pair (e.g. in the\ndecomposition of the composite system of the particle pair+apparatuses\ninto the particle pair and the apparatuses), they have no definite\nz-spin properties.", "\n\nA failure of property composition occurs also in the state \n\|ψ11>, where the L- and the R-particle have\ndefinite z-spin properties both as ‘separated’\nsystems and as subsystems of the particle pair (though in contrast with \n\|ψ10>, in \|ψ11> the range\nof the possible properties of the particles as separated systems and\nas subsystems of the pair is the same). For nothing in the above property\nassignment implies that in \|ψ11> the spin\nproperties that the L-particle has as a ‘separated’ system\nand the spin properties that it has as a subsystem of the particle pair\nbe the same: The L-particle may have z-spin ‘up’\nas a separated system and z-spin ‘down’ as a\nsubsystem of the particle pair.", "\n\nFurthermore, the dynamics of the properties that the L-particle\n(R-particle) has as a separated system and the dynamics of its\nproperties as a subsystem of the particle pair are generally\n different.[25]\n Consider, again, the state \|ψ10>. In the (earlier)\nz-spin measurement on the L-particle, the spin properties\nthat the L-particle has as a separated system follow a deterministic\nevolution — the L-particle has either z-spin\n‘up’ or z-spin ‘down’ before and\nafter the L-measurement; whereas as a subsystem of the particle pair,\nthe spin properties of the L-particle follow an indeterministic\nevolution — the L-particle has no definite spin properties\nbefore the L-measurement and either z-spin ‘up’\n(with approximately chance ½) or z-spin\n‘down’ (with approximately chance ½) after the\nL-measurement.", "\n\nThe failure of property composition implies that the quantum realm as\ndepicted by the above version of the modal interpretation involves\nstate non-separability and property and relational holism. State\nseparability fails because the state of the particle pair is not\ngenerally determined by the separate states of the particles. Indeed,\nas is easily shown, the actual properties that the L- and the\nR-particle each has in the state \|ψ9> are also\ncompatible with product states in which the L- and the R-particle are\nnot entangled. Property and relational holism fail because in the\nstate \|ψ9> the properties of the pair do not\nsupervene upon the properties of its subsystems and the spatiotemporal\nrelations between them. Furthermore, process separability fails for\nsimilar reasons. ", "\n\nThe failure of property composition in the modal interpretation\ncalls for explanation. It may be tempting to postulate that the\nproperties that a system (e.g. the L-particle) has, as a separated\nsystem, are the same as the properties that it has as a subsystem of\ncomposite systems. But, as Bacciagaluppi (1995) and Clifton (1996a)\nhave shown, such property assignment will be inconsistent: It will be\nsubject to a Kochen and Specker-type contradiction. Furthermore, as\nVermaas (1997) demonstrates, the properties of composite systems and\nthe properties of their subsystems cannot be correlated (in ways\ncompatible with the Born rule).", "\n\nFor what follows in the rest of this subsection, the views of\ndifferent authors differ widely. Several variants of modal\ninterpretations were developed in order to fix the problem of the\nfailure of property composition. The most natural explanation of the\nfailure of property composition is that quantum states assign\nrelational rather than intrinsic properties to systems (see Kochen\n1985, Bene and Dieks 2002, and Berkovitz and Hemmo 2006a,b). For\nexample, in the relational modal interpretation proposed by Berkovitz\nand Hemmo (2006a,b), the main idea is that quantum states assign\nproperties to systems only relative to other systems, and properties\nof a system that are related to different systems are generally\ndifferent. In particular, in the state \|ψ10> the\nL-particle has a definite z-spin property relative to the\nR-particle, the measurement apparatuses and the rest of the universe,\nbut (as a subsystem of the particle pair) it has no definite\nz-spin relative to the measurement apparatuses and the rest\nof\n universe.[26]\n On this interpretation, the properties of systems are highly\nnon-local by their very nature. Properties like pointing to\n‘up’ and pointing to ‘down’ are not intrinsic\nto the measurement apparatuses. Rather, they are relations between\nthe apparatuses and other systems. For example, the property of the\nL-apparatus pointing to ‘up’ relative to the particle\npair, the R-apparatus and the rest of the universe is not intrinsic to\nthe L-apparatus; it is a relation between the L-apparatus and the\nparticle pair, the R-apparatus and the rest of the universe. As such,\nthis property is highly non-local: It is located in neither the L-wing\nnor any other subregion of the universe. Yet, due to the dynamical\nlaws, properties like the position of pointers of measurement\napparatuses, which appear to us to be local, behave like local\nproperties in any experimental circumstances, and accordingly this\nradical type of non-locality is unobservable (for more details, see\nBerkovitz and Hemmo 2006b, sections 8.1 and 9).", "\n\nAnother way to try to explain the failure of property composition is\nto interpret the properties of composite systems as holistic,\nnon-decomposable properties. On this interpretation, the\nz-spin ‘up’ property that the L-particle has as a\nsubsystem of the particle pair in the state \|ψ9> is\ncompletely different from the z-spin ‘up’\nproperty that the L-particle has as a separated system, and the use of\nthe term ‘z-spin up’ in both cases is misleading\n(for more details, see Berkovitz and Hemmo \n 2006a).[27]", "\n\nThe relational and holistic interpretations of properties mark a\nradical shift from the standard interpretation of properties in\northodox quantum mechanics. Other advocates of the modal interpretation\nhave chosen not to follow this interpretation, and opted for a modal\ninterpretation that does not violate property composition. While the\nproperty assignment above does not assume any preferred partition of\nthe universe (the partition of the universe into a particle pair and\nthe rest of the universe is as good as the partition of the universe\ninto the L-particle and the rest of the universe), proponents of\nproperty composition postulated that there is a preferred partition of\nthe universe into ‘atomic’ systems and accordingly a\npreferred factorization of the Hilbert space of the universe. This\npreferred factorization is supposed to be the basis for the\n‘core’ property assignment: Properties are prescribed to\natomic systems according to a property assignment that is a\ngeneralization of the bi-orthogonal decomposition property\n assignment.[28]\n And the properties of complex systems are postulated to be\ncompositions of the properties of their atomic systems (see the entry\non modal interpretations of quantum theory, section 2, and\nBacciagaluppi and Dickson 1999). The challenge for this atomic modal\ninterpretation is to justify the assumption that there is a preferred\npartition of the universe, and to provide some idea about how such\nfactorization should look like.", "\n\nFinally, while the modal interpretation was designed to solve the\nmeasurement problem and reconcile quantum mechanics with special\nrelativity, it faces challenges on both accounts. First, in certain\nimprefect measurements (where there are imprefections in the coupling\nbetween the measured system and the pointer of the measurement\napparatus and/or the pointer and the environment), modal\ninterpretations that are based on the Schmidt\nbiorthogonal-decomposition theorem (and more generally the spectral\ndecomposition theorem) fail to account for definite measurement\noutcomes, in contradiction to our experience (see Bacciagaluppi and\nHemmo 1996 and Bacciagaluppi 2000). For versions of the modal\ninterpretations that seem to escape this problem, see Van Fraassen\n(1973, 1991), Bub (1992, 1997), Bene and Dieks (2002) and Berkovitz\nand Hemmo (2006a,b). Second, as we shall see in section 10.2, a number\nof no-go theorems challenge the view that modal interpretations could\nbe genuinely relativistic.", "\n\nIn 1957, Everett proposed a new no-collapse interpretation of orthodox\nquantum mechanics (see Everett 1957a,b, 1973, Barrett 1999, the entry\non Everett's relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics, the\nentry on the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and\nreferences therein). The Everett interpretation is a no-collapse\ninterpretation of quantum mechanics, where the evolution of quantum\nstates is always according to unitary and linear dynamical equations\n(the Schrödinger equation in the non-relativistic case). In this\ninterpretation, quantum states are fundamentally relative. Systems have\nrelative states, which are derivable from the various branches of the\nentangled states. For example, consider again \|ψ11>. ", "\n \|ψ11> = (1/√2+ε) \n\|z-up>L\|up>AL\|\nz-down>R \|ready>AR\n− (1/√2-ε′) \n\|z-down>L\|down>AL\|\nz-up>R \|ready>AR.\n ", "\n\nIn this quantum-mechanical state, the L-apparatus is in the state of\npointing to the outcome z-spin ‘up’\nrelative to the L-particle being in the state z-spin\n‘up,’ the R-particle being in the state z-spin\n‘down’ and the R-apparatus being ready to measure\nz-spin; and in the state of pointing to the outcome\nz-spin ‘down’ relative to the L-particle\nbeing in the state z-spin ‘down,’ the R-particle\nbeing in the state z-spin ‘up’ and the\nR-apparatus being ready to measure z-spin. Likewise, the\nL-particle is in the state z-spin ‘up’ relative\nto the L-apparatus being in the state of pointing to the outcome\nz-spin ‘up,’ the R-particle being in the state\nz-spin ‘down’ and the R-apparatus being ready to\nmeasure z-spin; and in the state z-spin\n‘down’ relative to the L-apparatus being in the state of\npointing to the outcome z-spin ‘down,’ the\nR-particle being in the state z-spin ‘up’ and the\nR-apparatus being ready to measure z-spin. And similarly,\nmutatis mutandis, for the relative state of the R-particle\nand the R-apparatus.", "\n\nEverett's original formulation left the exact meaning of these\nrelative states and their relations to observers’ experience and\nbeliefs open, and there have been different Everett-like\ninterpretations of these states. Probably the most popular reading of\nEverett is the splitting-worlds interpretation (see DeWitt 1971,\nEverett's relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics, Barrett\n1999, and references therein). In the splitting-worlds interpretation,\neach of the branches of the state \|ψ11> refers to a\ndifferent class of worlds (all of which are real) where the states of\nthe L-apparatus, R-apparatus and the particles are all separable:\nClass-1 worlds in which the L-particle is in the state z-spin\n‘up,’ the R-particle is in the state z-spin\n‘down,’ the L-apparatus is in the state of pointing to the\noutcome z-spin ‘up’ and the R-apparatus in the\nstate of being ready to measure z-spin; and class-2 worlds in\nwhich the L-particle is in the state z-spin\n‘down,’ the R-particle is in the state z-spin\n‘up,’ the L-apparatus is in the state of pointing to the\noutcome z-spin ‘down’ and the R-apparatus is in\nthe state of being ready to measure z-spin. More generally,\neach term in state of the universe, as represented in a certain\npreferred basis, reflects the states of its systems in some class of\nworlds; where the range of the different classes of worlds increases\nwhenever the number of the terms in the quantum state (in the\npreferred basis) increases (this process is called\n‘splitting’).", "\n\nThe splitting-worlds reading of Everett faces a number of challenges.\nFirst, supporters of the Everett interpretation frequently motivate\ntheir interpretation by arguing that it postulates the existence of\nneither a controversial wave collapse nor hidden variables, and it\nleaves the simple and elegant mathematical structure of quantum\nmechanics intact. But, the splitting-worlds interpretation adds extra\nstructure to no-collapse orthodox quantum mechanics. Further, this\ninterpretation marks a radical shift from orthodox quantum\nmechanics. A scientific theory is not constituted only by its\nmathematical formalism, but also by the ontology it postulates, the\nway it depicts the physical realm and the way it accounts for our\nexperience. The many parallel worlds ontology of the splitting-worlds\ninterpretation and its account of our experience are radically\ndifferent from the ontology of the intended interpretation of orthodox\nquantum mechanics and its account for our experience. Second, relative\nstates are well defined in any basis, and the question arises as to\nwhich basis should be preferred and the motivation for selecting one\nparticular basis over others. Third, in the splitting-worlds\ninterpretation each of the worlds in the universe may split into two\nor more worlds, and the problem is that (similarly to the collapse in\northodox collapse quantum mechanics) there are no clear criteria for\nwhen a splitting occurs and how long it takes. Fourth, there is the\nquestion of how the splitting-worlds interpretation accounts for the\nstatistical predictions of the orthodox theory. In the Everett-like\ninterpretations in general, and in the splitting-worlds interpretation\nin particular, all the possible measurement outcomes in the EPR/B\nexperiment are realized and may be observed. Thus, the question\narises as to the meaning of probabilities in this interpretation. For\nexample, what is the meaning of the statement that in the state\n\|ψ10> (see section 5.3.2) the probability of the\nL-measurement apparatus pointing to the outcome ‘up’ in an\nearlier z-spin measurement on the L-particle is\n(approximately) ½? In the splitting-worlds interpretation the\nprobability of that outcome appears to be 1! Furthermore, setting\naside the problem of interpretation, there is also the question of\nwhether the splitting-worlds interpretation, and more generally\nEverett-like interpretations, can account for the particular values of\nthe quantum probabilities of measurement outcomes. Everett claimed to\nderive the Born probabilities in the context of his\ninterpretation. But this derivation has been controversial. (For\ndiscussions of the meaning of probabilities, or more precisely the\nmeaning of the coefficients of the various terms in quantum states, in\nEverett-like interpretations, see Butterfield 1996, Lockwood 1996a,b,\nSaunders 1998, Vaidman 1998, Barnum et al. 2000, Bacciagaluppi 2002,\nGill 2003, Hemmo and Pitowsky 2003, 2005, Wallace 2002, 2003, 2005a,b,\nGreaves 2004 and Saunders 2004, 2005.) ", "\n\nOther readings of Everett include the many-minds interpretation\n(Albert and Loewer 1988, Barrett 1999, chapter 7), the\nconsistent-histories approach (Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990), the\nEverett-like relational interpretation (Saunders 1995, Mermin 1998)\nand (what may be called) the many-structures interpretation (Wallace\n2005c). While these readings address more or less successfully the\nproblems of the preferred basis and splitting, except for the\nmany-minds interpretation of Albert and Loewer the question of whether\nthere could be a satisfactory interpretation of probabilities in the\ncontext of these theories and the adequacy of the derivation of the\nBorn probabilities are still a controversial issue (see Deutsch 1999,\nWallace 2002, 2003, Lewis 2003, Graves 2004, Saunders 2004, Hemmo and\nPitowsky 2005, and Price 2006).", "\n\nWhat kind of non-locality do Everett-like interpretations involve?\nUnfortunately, the answer to this question is not straightforward, as\nit depends on one's particular reading of the Everett\ninterpretation. Indeed, all the above readings of Everett seem to treat\nthe no-collapse wave function of the universe as a real physical entity\nthat reflects the non-separable state of the universe, and accordingly\nthey involve state non-separability. But, one may reasonably expect\nthat different readings depict different pictures of physical reality\nand accordingly might postulate different kinds of non-locality. Thus,\nany further analysis of the type of non-locality postulated by each of\nthese readings requires a detailed study of their ontology (which we\nplan to conduct in future updates of this entry).", "\n\nFor example, the question of action at a distance in the EPR/B\nexperiment may arise in the context of the splitting-worlds interpretation,\nbut not in the context of Albert and Loewer's many-minds\ninterpretation. Albert and Loewer's interpretation takes the bare\nno-collapse orthodox quantum mechanics to be the complete theory of the\nphysical realm. Accordingly, the L-apparatus in the state \n\|ψ11> does not display any definite outcome. Yet,\nin order to account for our experience of a classical-like world, where\nat the end of measurements observers are typically in mental states of\nperceiving definite outcomes, the many-minds interpretation appeals to\na dualism of mind-body. Each observer is associated with a continuous\ninfinity of non-physical minds. And while the physical state of the\nworld evolves in a completely deterministic manner according to the\nSchrödinger evolution, and the pointers of the measurement\napparatuses in the EPR/B experiment display no definite outcomes,\nstates of minds evolve in a genuinely indeterministic fashion so as to\nyield an experience of perceiving definite measurement outcomes. For\nexample, consider again, the state \|ψ10>. While\nin a first z-spin L-measurement, this state evolves\ndeterministically into the state \|ψ11>, minds of\nobservers evolve indeterministically into either the state of\nperceiving the outcome z-spin ‘up’ or the state of\nperceiving the outcome z-spin ‘down’ with the\nusual Born-rule probabilities (approximately 50% chance for each of\nthese outcomes). Since in this state the L-particle has no definite\nspin properties and the L-apparatus points to no definite measurement\noutcome, and since in the later z-spin measurement on the\nR-particle the R-particle does not come to possess any definite spin\nproperties and the R-apparatus points to no definite spin outcome, the\nquestion of whether there is action at a distance between the L-particle and the\nL-apparatus on the one hand and the R-particle and the R-apparatus on\nthe other does not arise." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 No-collapse theories" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn all the above interpretations of quantum mechanics, the failure of\nfactorizability (i.e., the failure of the joint probability of the\nmeasurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment to factorize into their\nsingle probabilities) involves non-separability, holism and/or some\ntype of action at a distance. As we shall see below,\nnon-factorizability also implies superluminal causal dependence\naccording to certain accounts of causation.", "\n\nFirst, as is not difficult to show, the failure of factorizability\nimplies superluminal causation according to various probabilistic\naccounts of causation that satisfy Reichenbach's (1956, section 19)\nprinciple of the common cause (for a review of this principle, see the\nentry on Reichenbach's principle of the common cause).", "\n\nHere is why. Reichenbach's principle may be formulated as follows:", "\n\nPCC (Principle of the Common Cause). For any\ncorrelation between two (distinct) events which do not cause each\nother, there is a common cause that screens them off from each other.\nOr formally: If distinct events x and y are\ncorrelated, i.e.,\n\n \n (Correlation) \n P(x & y) \n≠ P(x) · P(y),\n \n\n\n\nand they do not cause each other, then their common cause,\nCC(x,y), screens them off from each other, i.e.,\n\n \n(Screening Off) \n \n \n PCC(x,y)(x/y) =\nPCC(x,y)(x)\n PCC(x,y)(y)\n ≠ 0\n \n\n \n PCC(x,y)(y/x) =\nPCC(x,y)(y)\n PCC(x,y)(x) ≠ \n 0.[29]\n \n \n\n\n\n\nAccordingly, CC(x,y) renders x and\ny probabilistically independent, and the joint probability of\nx and y factorizes upon\nCC(x,y):\n\n \n PCC(x,y)(x & y) =\nPCC(x,y)(x) ·\nPCC(x,y)(y).\n \n\n", "\n\nThe above formulation of PCC is mainly intended to cover cases in\nwhich x and y have no partial, non-common causes. But\nPCC can be generalized as follows:", "\n\n\nPCC. The joint probability of any distinct,\ncorrelated events, x and y, which are not causally\nconnected to each other, factorizes upon the union of their partial\n(separate) causes and their common cause. That is, let\nCC(x,y) denote the common causes of\nx and y, and PC(x) and\nPC(y) denote respectively their partial causes. Then,\nthe joint probability of x and y factorizes\nupon the Union of their Causal Pasts (henceforth, FactorUCP),\ni.e., on the union of PC(x), PC(y)\nand CC(x,y):\n\n\n\n FactorUCP \nPPC(x) PC(y)\n CC(x,y)\n (x & y) =\nPPC(x)\n CC(x,y) (x) ·\nPPC(y) \nCC(x,y) (y).\n\n\n\n\n", "\n\nLike PCC, the basic idea of FactorUCP is that the objective\nprobabilities of events that do not cause each other are determined by\ntheir causal pasts, and given these causal pasts they are\nprobabilistically independent of each other. As is not difficult to\nsee, factorizability is a special case of FactorUCP. That is, to obtain\nfactorizability from FactorUCP, substitute λ for\nCC(x,y), l for\nPC(x) and r for\nPC(y). FactorUCP and the assumption that the\nprobabilities of the measurement-outcomes in the EPR/B experiment are\ndetermined by the pair's state and the settings of the\nmeasurement apparatuses jointly imply factorizability. Thus, given this\nlater assumption, the failure of factorizability implies superluminal\ncausation between the distant outcomes in the EPR/B experiment\naccording to any account of causation that satisfies FactorUCP (for\nsome examples of such accounts, see Butterfield 1989 and Berkovitz\n1995a, 1995b, section 6.7, \n 1998b).[30]", "\n\nSuperluminal causation between the distant outcomes also exists\naccording to various counterfactual accounts of causation, including\naccounts that do not satisfy FactorUCP. In particular, in Lewis's\n(1986) influential account, counterfactual dependence between distinct\nevents implies causal dependence between them. And as Butterfield\n(1992b) and Berkovitz (1998b) demonstrate, the violation of\nFactorizability involves a counterfactual dependence between the\ndistant measurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment.", "\n\nBut the violation of factorizability does not imply superluminal\ncausation according to some other accounts of causation. In\nparticular, in process accounts of causation there is no superluminal\ncausation in the EPR/B experiment. In such accounts, causal dependence\nbetween events is explicated in terms of continuous processes in space\nand time that transmit ‘marks’ or conserved quantities\nfrom the cause to the effect (see Salmon 1998, chapters 1, 12, 16 and\n18, Dowe 2000, the entry on causal processes, and references\ntherein). Thus, recalling (sections 1, 2, 4 and 5) that none of the\ninterpretations of quantum mechanics and alternative quantum theories\npostulates any (direct) continuous process between the distant\nmeasurement events in the EPR/B experiment, there is no superluminal\ncausation between them according to process accounts of causation." ], "section_title": "6. Superluminal causation", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nWhether or not the non-locality predicted by quantum theories may be\nclassified as action at a distance or superluminal causation, the\nquestion arises as to whether this non-locality could be exploited to\nallow superluminal (i.e., faster-than-light) signaling of information.\nThis question is of particular importance for those who interpret\nrelativity as prohibiting any such superluminal signaling. (We shall\nreturn to discuss this interpretation in section 10.)", "\n\nSuperluminal signaling would require that the state of nearby\ncontrollable physical objects (say, a keyboard in my computer)\nsuperluminally influence distant observable physical phenomena (e.g. a\npattern on a computer screen light years away). The influence may be\ndeterministic or indeterministic, but in any case it should cause a\ndetectable change in the statistics of some distant physical\nquantities.", "\n\nIt is commonly agreed that in quantum phenomena, superluminal\nsignaling is impossible in practice. Moreover, many believe that such\nsignaling is excluded in principle by the so-called ‘no-signaling\ntheorem’ (for proofs of this theorem, see Eberhard 1978,\nGhirardi, Rimini and Weber 1980, Jordan 1983, Shimony 1984, Redhead\n1987, pp. 113-116 and 118). It is thus frequently claimed with respect\nto EPR/B experiments that there is no such thing as a Bell telephone,\nnamely a telephone that could exploit the violation of the Bell\ninequalities for superluminal signaling of\n information.[31]", "\n\nThe no-signaling theorem demonstrates that orthodox quantum\nmechanics excludes any possibility of superluminal signaling in the\nEPR/B experiment. According to this theory, no controllable physical\nfactor in the L-wing, such as the setting of the L-measurement\napparatus, can take advantage of the entanglement between the systems\nin the L- and the R-wing to influence the statistics of the measurement\noutcomes (or any other observable) in the R-wing. As we have seen in\nsection 5.1.1, the orthodox theory is at best incomplete. Thus, the\nfact that it excludes superluminal signaling does not imply that other\nquantum theories or interpretations of the orthodox theory also exclude\nsuch signaling. Yet, if the orthodox theory is empirically adequate, as\nthe consensus has it, its statistical predictions obtain, and\naccordingly superluminal signaling will be excluded as a matter of\nfact; for if this theory is empirically adequate, any quantum theory\nwill have to reproduce its statistics, including the exclusion of any\nactual superluminal signaling.", "\n\nBut the no-signaling theorem does not demonstrate that superluminal\nsignaling would be impossible if orthodox quantum mechanics were not\nempirically adequate. Furthermore, this theorem does not show that\nsuperluminal signaling is in principle impossible in the quantum realm\nas depicted by other theories, which actually reproduce the\nstatistics of orthodox quantum mechanics but do not prohibit in theory\nthe violation of this statistics. In sections 7.2-7.3, we shall\nconsider the in-principle possibility of superluminal signaling in\ncertain collapse and no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics.\nBut, first, we need to consider the necessary and sufficient conditions\nfor superluminal signaling." ], "section_title": "7. Superluminal signaling", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nTo simplify things, in our discussion we shall focus on\nnon-factorizable models of the EPR/B experiment that satisfy\nλ-independence (i.e., the assumption that the distribution of\nthe states λ is independent of the settings of the measurement\napparatuses). Superluminal signaling in the EPR/B experiment would be\npossible in theory just in case the value of some controllable\nphysical quantity in the nearby wing could influence the statistics of\nmeasurement outcomes in the distant wing. And in non-factorizable\nmodels that satisfy λ-independence this could happen just in\ncase the following conditions obtained:", "\n Controllable probabilistic dependence. The\nprobabilities of distant measurement outcomes depend on some nearby\ncontrollable physical quantity. \n ", "\n λ-distribution. There can be in theory an ensemble of particle pairs the states of which deviate from the quantum-equilibrium distribution; where the quantum-equilibrium distribution of pairs' states is the distribution that reproduces the predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics.", "\n\nFour comments: (i) In controllable probabilistic dependence, the term\n'probabilities of measurement outcomes' refers to the model\nprobabilities, i.e., the probabilities that the states λ\nprescribe for measurement outcomes. \n\n \n\n(ii) Our discussion in this entry focuses on models of the EPR/B\nexperiment in which probabilities of measurement outcomes depend only\non the pair's state λ and the settings of the measurement\napparatuses to measure certain properties. In such models, parameter\ndependence (i.e., the dependence of the probability of the distant\nmeasurement outcome on the setting of the nearby measurement\napparatus) is a necessary and sufficient condition for controllable\nprobabilistic dependence. But, recall (footnote 3) that in some models\nof the EPR/B experiment, in addition to the pair's state and the\nsetting of the L- (R-) measurement apparatus there are other local\nphysical quantities that may be relevant for the probability of the L-\n(R-) measurement outcome. In such models, parameter dependence is not\na necessary condition for controllable probabilistic dependence. Some\nother physical quantities in the nearby wing may be relevant for the\nprobability of the distant measurement outcome. (That is, let α\nand β denote all the relevant local physical quantities, other\nthan the settings of the measurement apparatuses, that may be relevant\nfor the probability of the L- and the R-outcome, respectively. Then,\ncontrollable probabilistic dependence would obtain if for some pairs'\nstates λ, L-setting l, R-setting r and local\nphysical quantities α and β, Pλ\nl r α β(yr) ≠\nPλ l r\nβ(yr) obtained.) For the relevance\nof such models to the question of the in-principle possibility of\nsuperluminal signalling in some current interpretations of quantum\nmechanics, see sections 7.3 and 7.4. \n\n \n\n(iii) The quantum-equilibrium distribution will not be the same in all\nmodels of the EPR/B experiment; for in general the states λ\nwill not be the same in different models. \n\n \n\n(iv) In models that actually violate both controllable probabilistic\ndependence and λ-distribution, the occurrence of controllable\nprobabilistic dependence would render the actual distribution of\nλ states as non-equilbrium distribution. Thus, if controllable\nprobabilistic dependence occurred in such models, the actual\ndistribution of λ states would satisfy\nλ-distribution. ", "\n\nThe argument for the necessity of controllable probabilistic\ndependence and λ-distribution is straightforward. Granted\nλ-independence, if the probabilistic dependence of the distant\noutcome on a nearby physical quantity is not controllable, there can\nbe no way to manipulate the statistics of the distant outcome so as to\ndeviate from the statistical predictions of quantum\nmechanics. Accordingly, superluminal transmission of information will\nbe impossible even in theory. And if λ-distribution does not\nhold, i.e., if the quantum-equilibrium distribution holds, controllable\nprobabilistic dependence will be of no use for superluminal\ntransmission of information. For, averaging over the model\nprobabilities according to the quantum-equilbrium distribution, the\nmodel will reproduce the statistics of orthodox quantum\nmechanics. That is, the distribution of the λ-states will be\nsuch that the probabilistic dependence of the distant outcome on the\nnearby controllable factor will be washed out: In some states the\nnearby controllable factor will raise the probability of the distant\noutcome and in others it will decrease this probability, so that on\naverage the overall statistics of the distant outcome will be\nindependent of the nearby controllable factor (i.e., the same as the\nstatistics of orthodox quantum mechanics). Accordingly, superluminal\nsignaling will be impossible.", "\n\nThe argument for the sufficiency of these conditions is also\nstraightforward. If λ-distribution held, it would be possible\nin theory to arrange ensembles of particle pairs in which controllable\nprobabilistic dependence would not be washed out, and accordingly the\nstatistics of distant outcomes would depend on the nearby controllable\nfactor. (For a proof that these conditions are sufficient for\nsuperluminal signaling in certain deterministic hidden variables\ntheories, see Valentini 2002.)", "\n\nNote that the necessary and sufficient conditions for superluminal\nsignaling are different in models that do not exclude in theory the\nviolation of λ-independence. In such models controllable\nprobabilistic dependence is not a necessary condition for superluminal\nsignaling. The reasoning is as follows. Consider any empirically\nadequate model of the EPR/B experiment in which the pair's state and\nthe settings of the measurement apparatuses are the only relevant\nfactors for the probabilities of measurement outcomes, and the\nquantum-equilibrium distribution is λ-independent. In such a\nmodel, parameter independence implies the failure of controllable\nprobabilistic dependence, yet the violation of λ-independence\nwould imply the possibility of superluminal signaling: If\nλ-independence failed, a change in the setting of the nearby\nmeasurement apparatus would cause a change in the distribution of the\nstates λ, and a change in this distribution would induce a\nchange in the statistics of the distant (space-like separated)\nmeasurement outcome. ", "\n\nLeaving aside models that violate λ-independence, we now turn\nto consider the prospects of controllable probabilistic dependence and\nλ-distribution, starting with no-collapse interpretations." ], "subsection_title": "7.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for superluminal signaling" }, { "content": [ "\n\nBohm's theory involves parameter dependence and thus controllable\nprobabilistic dependence: The probabilities of distant outcomes depend\non the setting of the nearby apparatus. In some pairs' states\nλ, i.e., in some configurations of the positions of the particle\npair, a change in the apparatus setting of the (earlier) say\nL-measurement will induce an immediate change in the probability of\nthe R-outcome: e.g. the probability of R-outcome\nz-spin ‘up’ will be 1 if the L-apparatus is set\nto measure z-spin and 0 if the L-apparatus is switched off\n(see section 5.3.1). Thus, the question of superluminal signaling\nturns on whether λ-distribution obtains.", "\n\nNow, recall (section 5.3.1) that Bohm's theory reproduces the quantum\nstatistics by postulating the quantum-equilibrium distribution over\nthe positions of particles. If this distribution is not an accidental\nfact about our universe, but rather obtains as a matter of law,\nsuperluminal signaling will be impossible in principle. Dürr,\nGoldstein and Zanghì (1992a,b, 1996, fn. 15) argue that, while\nthe quantum-equilibrium distribution is not a matter a law, other\ndistributions will be possible but atypical. Thus, they conclude that\nalthough superluminal signaling is not impossible in theory, it may\noccur only in atypical worlds. On the other hand, Valentini (1991a,b,\n1992, 1996, 2002) and Valentini and Westman 2004) argue that there are\ngood reasons to think that our universe may well have started off in a\nstate of quantum non-equilibrium and is now approaching gradually a\nstate of equilibrium, so that even today some residual non-equilibrium\nmust be\n present.[32] \n Yet, even if such residual non-equilbrium existed, the question is\nwhether it would be possible to access any ensemble of systems in a\nnon-equilbrium distribution. ", "\n\nThe presence or absence of parameter independence (and accordingly the\npresence or absence of controllable probabilistic dependence) in the\nmodal interprtation is a matter of controversy, perhaps due in part to\nthe multiplicity of versions of this interpretation. Whether or not\nmodal interpretations involve parameter dependence would probably\ndepend on the dynamics of the possessed properties. At least some of\nthe current modal interpretations seem to involve no parameter\ndependence. But, as the subject editor pointed out to the author, some\nthink that the no-go theorem for relativistic modal interpretation due\nto Dickson and Clifton (1998) implies the existence of parameter\ndependence in all the interpretations to which this theorem is\napplicable. Do modal interpretations satisfy λ-distribution?\nThe prospects of this condition depend on whether the possessed\nproperties that the modal interpretation assigns in addition to the\nproperties prescribed by the orthodox interpretation, are\ncontrollable. If these properties were controllable at least in\ntheory, λ-distribution would be possible. For example, if the\npossessed spin properties that the particles have at the emission from\nthe source in the EPR/B experiment were controllable, then\nλ-distribution would be possible. The common view seems to be\nthat these properties are uncontrollable. " ], "subsection_title": "7.2 No-collapse theories" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIn the GRW/Pearle collapse models, wave functions represent the most\nexhaustive, complete specification of states of individual\nsystems. Thus, pairs prepared with the same wave function have always\nthe same λ state — a state that represents their\nquantum-equilbrium distribution for the EPR/B experiment. Accordingly,\nλ-distribution fails. Do these models involve controllable\nprobabilistic dependence?", "\n\nRecall (section 5.1.2) that there are several models of state\nreduction in the literature. One of these models is the so-called\nnon-linear Continuous Stochastic Localization (CSL) models (see Pearle\n1989, Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini 1990, Butterfield et al. 1993, and\nGhirardi et al. 1993). Butterfield et al. (1993) argue that in these\nmodels there is a probabilistic dependence of the outcome of the\nR-measurement on the process that leads to the (earlier) outcome of\nthe L-measurement. In these models, the process leading to the\nL-outcome (either z-spin ‘up’ or z-spin\n‘down’) depends on the interaction between the L-particle\nand the L-apparatus (which results in an entangled state), and the\nspecific realization of the stochastic process that strives to\ncollapse this macroscopic superposition into a product state in which\nthe L-apparatus displays a definite outcome. And the probability of\nthe R-outcome depends on this process. For example, if this process is\none that gives rise to a z-spin ‘up’ (or renders\nthat outcome more likely), the probability of R-outcome\nz-spin ‘up’ is 0 (more likely to be 0); and if\nthis process is one that gives rise to a z-spin\n‘down’ (or renders that outcome more likely), the\nprobability of R-outcome z-spin ‘down’ is 0 (more\nlikely to be 0). The question is whether there are controllable\nfactors that influence the probability of realizations of stochastic\nprocesses that lead to a specific L-outcome, so that it would be\npossible to increase or decrease the probability of the R-outcome. If\nsuch factors existed, controllable probabilistic dependence would be\npossible at least in theory. And if this kind of controllable\nprobabilistic dependence existed, λ-distribution would also\nobtain; for if such dependence existed, the actual distribution of\npairs' states (in which the pair always have the same state, the\nquantum-mechanical state) would cease to be the quantum-equilbrium\ndistribution." ], "subsection_title": "7.3 Collapse theories" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIn section 7.3.1, we discussed the question of the in-principle\ncontrollability of local measurement processes and in particular the\nprobability of their outcome, and the implications of such\ncontrollability for the in-principle possibility of superluminal\nsignaling in the context of the CSL models. But this question is not\nspecific to the CSL model and (more generally) the dynamical models\nfor state-vector reduction. It seems likely to arise also in other\nquantum theories that model measurements realistically. Here is\nwhy. Real measurements take time. And during that time, some physical\nvariable, other than the state of the measured system and the setting\nof the measurement apparatus, might influence the chance (i.e., the\nsingle-case objective probability) of the measurement outcome. In\nparticular, during the L-measurement in the EPR/B experiment, the\nchance of the L-outcome z-spin ‘up’\n(‘down’) might depend on the value of some physical\nvariable in the L-wing, other than the state of the particle pair and\nthe setting of the L-measurement apparatus. If so, it will follow from\nthe familiar perfect anti-correlation of the singlet state that the\nchance of R-outcome z-spin ‘up’\n(‘down’) will depend on the value of such variable (for\ndetails, see Kronz 1990a,b, Jones and Clifton 1993, pp. 304-305, and\nBerkovitz 1998a, section 4.3.4). Thus, if the value of such a variable\nwere controllable, controllable probabilistic dependence would\nobtain." ], "subsection_title": "7.4 The prospects of controllable probabilistic dependence" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIf superluminal signaling were possible in the EPR/B experiment in any\nof the above theories, it would not require any continuous process in\nspacetime to mediate the influences between the two distant\nwings. Indeed, in all the current quantum theories in which the\nprobability of the R-outcome depends on some controllable physical\nvariable in the L-wing, this dependence is not due to a continuous\nprocess. Rather, it is due to some type of ‘action’ or (to\nuse Shimony's (1984) terminology) ‘passion’ at a distance,\nwhich is the ‘result’ of the holistic nature of the\nquantum realm, the non-separability of the state of entangled systems,\nor the non-separable nature of the evolution of the properties of\nsystems. " ], "subsection_title": "7.5 Superluminal signaling and action-at-a-distance" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn sections 5-7, we considered the nature of quantum non-locality as\ndepicted by theories that violate factorizability, i.e., the assumption\nthat the probability of joint measurement outcomes factorizes into the\nsingle probabilities of these outcomes. Recalling section 3,\nfactorizability can be analyzed into a conjunction of two conditions:\nOI (outcome independence)—the probability of a distant\nmeasurement outcome in the EPR/B experiment is independent of the\nnearby measurement outcome; and PI (parameter independence)—the\nprobability of a distant measurement outcome in the EPR/B experiment\nis independent of the setting of the nearby measurement\napparatus. Bohm's theory violates PI, whereas other mainstream quantum\ntheories satisfy this condition but violate OI. The question arises as\nto whether violations of PI involve a different kind of non-locality\nthan violations of OI. So far, our methodology was to study the\nnature of quantum non-locality by analyzing the way various quantum\ntheories account for the curious correlations in the EPR/B\nexperiment. In this section, we shall focus on the question of whether\nquantum non-locality can be studied in a more general way, namely by\nanalyzing the types of non-locality involved in violations of PI and\nin violations of OI, independently of how these violations are\nrealized." ], "section_title": "8. The analysis of factorizability: implications for quantum non-locality", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nIt is frequently argued or maintained that violations of OI involve\nstate non-separability and/or some type of holism, whereas violations\nof PI involve action at a distance. For notable examples, Howard\n(1989) argues that spatiotemporal separability (see section 4.3)\nimplies OI, and accordingly a violation of it implies spatiotemporal\nnon-separability; Teller (1989) argues that particularism (see section\n4.3) implies OI, and thus a violation of it implies relational holism;\nand Jarrett (1984, 1989) argues that a violation of PI involves some\ntype of action at a distance. These views are controversial,\nhowever.", "\n\nFirst, as we have seen in section 5, in quantum theories the\nviolation of either of these conditions involves some type of\nnon-separability and/or holism.", "\n\nSecond, the explicit attempts to derive OI from separability or\nparticularism seem to rely (implicitly) on some locality conditions.\nMaudlin (1998, p. 98) and Berkovitz (1998a, section 6.1) argue that\nHoward's precise formulation of spatiotemporal separability embodies\nboth separability and locality conditions, and Berkovitz (1998a,\nsection 6.2) argues that Teller's derivation of OI from particularism\nimplicitly relies on locality conditions. Thus, the violation of OI\nper se does not imply non-separability or holism.", "\n\nThird, a factorizable model, i.e., model that satisfies OI, may be\nnon-separable (Berkovitz 1995b, section 6.5). Thus, OI cannot be simply\nidentified with separability.", "\n\nFourth, Howard's spatiotemporal separability condition (see section\n4.3) requires that states of composite systems be determined by the\nstates of their subsystems. In particular, spatiotemporal separability\nrequires that joint probabilities of outcomes be determined as some\nfunction of the single probabilities of these outcomes. Winsberg and\nFine (2003) object that as a separability condition, OI arbitrarily\nrestricts this function to be a product function. And they argue that\non a weakened formalization of separability, a violation of OI is\ncompatible with separability. Fogel (2004) agrees that Winsberg and\nFine's weakened formalization of separability is correct, but argues\nthat, when supplemented by a certain ‘isotropy’ condition,\nOI implies this weakened separability condition. Fogel believes that\nhis suggested ‘isotropy’ condition is very plausible, but,\nas he acknowledges, this condition involves a nontrivial measurement\n context-independence.[33]", "\n\nFifth, as the analysis in section 5 demonstrates, violations of OI\nmight involve action at a distance. Also, while the minimal Bohm\ntheory violates PI and arguably some modal interpretations do not, the\ntype of action at a distance they postulate, namely action at a\ndistance (see section 5.2), is similar: In both cases, an earlier\nspin-measurement in (say) the L-wing does not induce any immediate\nchange in the intrinsic properties of the R-particle. The\nL-measurement only causes an immediate change in the dispositions of\nthe R-particle—a change that may influence the behavior of the\nR-particle in future spin-measurements in the R-wing. But, this change\nof dispositions does not involve any change of local properties in the\nR-wing, as these dispositions are relational (rather than intrinsic)\nproperties of the R-particle. Furthermore, the action at a distance\npredicated by the minimal Bohm theory is weaker than the one\npredicated by orthodox collapse quantum mechanics and the GRW/Pearle\ncollapse models; for in contrast to the minimal Bohm theory, in these\ntheories the measurement on the L-particle induces a change in the\nintrinsic properties of the R-particle, independently of whether or\nnot the R-particle undergoes a measurement. Thus, if the R-particle\ncomes to possess (momentarily) a definite position, the EPR/B\nexperiment as described by these theories involves action at a\ndistance — a stronger kind of action than the action* at a\ndistance predicated by the minimal Bohm theory." ], "subsection_title": "8.1 Non-separability, holism and action at a distance" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIt was also argued, notably by Jarrett 1984 and 1989 and Shimony 1984,\nthat in contrast to violations of OI, violations of PI may give rise\n(at least in principle) to superluminal signaling. Indeed, as is not\ndifficult to see from section 7.1, in theories that satisfy\nλ-independence there is an asymmetry between failures of PI and\nfailures of OI with respect to superluminal signaling: whereas\nλ-distribution and the failure of PI are sufficient conditions\nfor the in-principle possibility of superluminal signaling,\nλ-distribution and the failure of OI are not. Thus, the\nprospects of superluminal signaling look better in parameter-dependent\ntheories, i.e., theories that violate PI. Yet, as we have seen in\nsection 7.2.1, if the Bohmian quantum-equilbrium distribution obtains,\nthen Bohm's theory, the paradigm of parameter dependent theories,\nprohibits superluminal signaling. And if this distribution is obtained\nas a matter of law, then Bohm's theory prohibits superluminal\nsignaling even in theory. Furthermore, as we remarked in section 7.1,\nif the in-principle possibility of violating λ-independence is\nnot excluded, superluminal signaling may exist in theories that\nsatisfy PI and violate OI. In fact, as section 7.4 seems to suggest,\nthe possibility of superluminal signaling in theories that satisfy PI\nbut violate OI cannot be discounted even when λ-independence is\nimpossible." ], "subsection_title": "8.2 Superluminal signaling" }, { "content": [ "\n\nJarrett (1984, 1989), Ballentine and Jarrett (1997) and Shimony (1984)\nhold that superluminal signaling is incompatible with relativity\ntheory. Accordingly, they conclude that violations of PI are\nincompatible with relativity theory, whereas violations of OI may be\ncompatible with this theory. Furthermore, Sutherland (1985, 1989)\nargues that deterministic, relativistic parameter-dependent theories\n(i.e., relativistic, deterministic theories that violate PI) would\nplausibly require retro-causal influences, and in certain experimental\ncircumstances this type of influences would give rise to causal\nparadoxes, i.e., inconsistent closed causal loops (where effects\nundermine their very causes). And Arntzenius (1994) argues that all\nrelativistic parameter-dependent theories are impossible on pain of\ncausal paradoxes. That is, he argues that in certain experimental\ncircumstances any relativistic, parameter-dependent theory would give\nrise to closed causal loops in which violations of PI could not\nobtain. ", "\n\nIt is noteworthy that the view that relativity per se is\nincompatible with superluminal signaling is disputable (for more\ndetails, see section 10). Anyway, recalling (section 8.2), if\nλ-distribution is excluded as a matter of law, it will be\nimpossible even in theory to exploit the violation of PI to give rise\nto superluminal signaling, in which case the possibility of\nrelativistic parameter-dependent theories could not be discounted on\nthe basis of superluminal signaling.", "\n\nFurthermore, as mentioned in section 7.1 and 7.4, the in-principle\npossibility of superluminal signaling in theories that satisfy PI and\nviolate OI cannot be excluded a priori. Thus, if relativity\ntheory excludes superluminal signaling, the argument from superluminal\nsignaling may also be applied to exclude the possibility of some\nrelativistic outcome-dependent theories. ", "\n\nFinally, Berkovitz (2002) argues that Arntzenius's argument for the\nimpossibility of relativistic theories that violate PI is based on\nassumptions about probabilities that are common in linear causal\nsituations but are unwarranted in causal loops, and that the real\nchallenge for these theories is that in such loops their predictive\npower is undermined (for more details, see section 10.3). " ], "subsection_title": "8.3 Relativity" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIn various counterfactual and probabilistic accounts of causation\nviolations of PI entail superluminal causation between the setting of\nthe nearby measurement apparatus and the distant measurement outcome,\nwhereas violations of OI entail superluminal causation between the\ndistant measurement outcomes (see Butterfield 1992b, 1994, Berkovitz\n1998b, section 2). Thus, it seems that theories that violate PI\npostulate a different type of superluminal causation than theories\nthat violate OI. Yet, as Berkovitz (1998b, section 2.4) argues, the\nviolation of PI in Bohm's theory does involve some type of\noutcome dependence, which may be interpreted as a generalization of\nthe violation of OI. In this theory, the specific R-measurement\noutcome in the EPR/B experiment depends on the specific L-measurement\noutcome: For any three different directions x, y,\nz, if the probabilities of x-spin ‘up’\nand y-spin ‘up’ are non-zero, the probability of\nR-outcome z-spin ‘up’ will generally depend on\nwhether the L-outcome is x-spin ‘up’ or\ny-spin ‘up’. Yet, due to the determinism that\nBohm's theory postulates, OI trivially obtains. Put it another way, OI\ndoes not reflect all the types of outcome independence that may exist\nbetween distant outcomes. Accordingly, the fact that a theory\nsatisfies OI does not entail that it does not involve some other type\nof outcome dependence. Indeed, in all the current quantum theories\nthat violate factorizability there are correlations between distant\nspecific measurement outcomes — correlations that may well be\ninterpreted as an indication of counterfactual superluminal causation\nbetween these outcomes." ], "subsection_title": "8.4 Superluminal causation" }, { "content": [ "\n\nParameter dependence (PI) postulates that in the EPR/B experiment the\nprobability of the later, distant measurement outcome depends on the\nsetting of the apparatus of the nearby, earlier measurement. It may be\ntempting to assume that this dependence is due to a direct influence\nof the nearby setting on the (probability of the) distant outcome. But\na little reflection on the failure of PI in Bohm's theory, which is\nthe paradigm for parameter dependence, demonstrates that the setting\nof the nearby apparatus per se has no influence on the\ndistant measurement outcome. Rather, it is because the setting of the\nnearby measurmenent apparatus influences the nearby measurement\noutcome and the nearby outcome influences the distant outcome that the\nsetting of the nearby apparatus can have an influence on the distant\noutcome. For, as is not difficult to see from the analysis of the\nnature of non-locality in the minimal Bohm theory (see section 5.3.1),\nthe setting of the apparatus of the nearby (earlier) measurement in\nthe EPR/B experiment influences the outcome the nearby measurement,\nand this outcome influences the guiding field of the distant particle\nand accordingly the outcome of a measurement on that particle.", "\n\nWhile the influence of the nearby setting on the nearby outcome is\nnecessary for parameter dependence, it is not sufficient for it. In\nall the current quantum theories, the probabilities of joint outcomes\nin the EPR/B experiment depend on the settings of both measurement\napparatuses: The probability that the L-outcome is l-spin\n‘up’ and the R-outcome is r-spin ‘up’\nand the probability that the L-outcome is l-spin\n‘up’ and the R-outcome is r-spin\n‘down’ both depend on (l − r),\ni.e., the distance between the angles l and r. In\ntheories in which the sum of these joint probabilities is invariant\nwith respect to the value of (l − r),\nparameter independence obtains: for all pairs' states λ,\nL-setting l, and R-settings r and r′,\nL-outcome xl, and R-outcomes\nyr and yr′ :", "\n(PI) \nPλ l r(xl & \nyr) + \nPλ l r(xl &\n¬yr) =\nPλ l r′ (xl \n& yr′ ) +\nPλ l r′ (xl \n& ¬yr′ ).\n ", "\n\nParameter dependence is a violation of this invariance condition." ], "subsection_title": "8.5 On the origin and nature of parameter dependence" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe focus of this entry has been on exploring the nature of the\nnon-local influences in the quantum realm as depicted by quantum\ntheories that violate factorizability, i.e., theories in which the\njoint probability of the distant outcomes in the EPR/B experiment do\nnot factorize into the product of the single probabilities of these\noutcomes. The motivation for this focus was that, granted plausible\nassumptions, factorizability must fail (see section 2), and its\nfailure implies some type of non-locality (see sections 2-8). But if\nany of these plausible assumptions failed, it may be possible to\naccount for the EPR/B experiment (and more generally for all other\nquantum phenomena) without postulating any non-local influences. Let\nus then consider the main arguments for the view that quantum\nphenomena need not involve non-locality.", "\n In arguments for the failure of factorizability, it is presupposed\nthat the distant measurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment are real\nphysical events. Recall (section 5.3.3) that in Albert and Loewer's\n(1988) many-minds interpretation this is not the case. In this\ninterpretation, definite measurement outcomes are (typically) not\nphysical events. In particular, the pointers of the measurement\napparatuses in the EPR/B experiment do not display any definite\noutcomes. Measurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment exist only as\n(non-physical) mental states in observers' minds (which are\npostulated to be non-physical entities). So sacrificing some of our\nmost fundamental presuppositions about the physical reality and\nassuming a controversial mind-body dualism, the many-minds\ninterpretation of quantum mechanics does not postulate any action at a\ndistance or superluminal causation between the distant wings of the\nEPR/B experiment. Yet, as quantum-mechanical states of systems are\nassumed to reflect their physical states, the many-minds theory does\npostulate some type of non-locality, namely state non-separability and\nproperty and relational holism.", "\n Another way to get around Bell's argument for non-locality in the\nEPR/B experiment is to construct a model of this experiment that\nsatisfies factorizability but violates λ-independence (i.e.,\nthe assumption that the distribution of all the possible pairs' states\nin the EPR/B experiment is independent of the measured quantities). In\nsection 2, we mentioned two possible causal explanations for the\nfailure of λ-independence. The first is to postulate that\npairs' states and apparatus settings share a common cause, which\ncorrelates certain types of pairs' states with certain types of\nsettings (e.g. states of type λ1 are correlated with\nsettings of type l and r, whereas states of type\nλ2 are correlated with settings of type\nl′ and r′, etc.). As we noted, thinking\nabout all the various ways one can measure properties, this\nexplanation seems conspiratorial. Furthermore, it runs counter to one\nof the most fundamental presuppositions of empirical science, namely\nthat in experiments preparations of sources and settings of\nmeasurement apparatuses are typically independent of each other. The\nsecond possible explanation is to postulate causation from the\nmeasurement events backward to the source at the emission time. (For\nadvocates of this way out of non-locality, see Costa de Beauregard\n1977, 1979, 1985, Sutherland 1983, 1998, 2006 and Price 1984, 1994,\n1996, chapters 3, 8 and 9.) Maudlin (1994, p. 197-201) argues that\ntheories that postulate such causal mechanism are\ninconsistent. Berkovitz (2002, section 5) argues that Maudlin's line\nof reasoning is based on unwarranted premises. Yet, as we shall see in\nsection 10.3, this way out of non-locality faces some\nchallenges. Furthermore, while a violation of λ-independence\nprovides a way out of Bell's theorem, it does not necessarily imply\nlocality; for the violation of λ-independence is compatible\nwith the failure of factorizability. ", "\n\nA third way around non-locality is to ‘exploit’ the\ninefficiency of measurement devices or (more generally) measurement\nset-ups. In any actual EPR/B experiment, many of the particle pairs\nemitted from the source fail to be detected, so that only a sample of\nthe particle pairs is observed. Assuming that the observed samples are\nnot biased, it is now generally agreed that the statistical\npredictions of orthodox quantum mechanics have been vindicated (for a\nreview of these experiments, see Redhead 1987, section 4.5). But if\nthis assumption is abandoned, there are perfectly local causal\nexplanations for the actual experimental results (Clauser and Horne\n1974, Fine 1982b, 1989a). Many believe that this way out of\nnon-locality is ad hoc, at least in light of our current\nknowledge. Moreover, this strategy would fail if the efficiency of\nmeasurement devices exceeded a certain threshold (for more details,\nsee Fine 1989a, Maudlin 1994, chapter 6, Larsson and Semitecolos 2000\nand Larsson 2002). ", "\n\nFinally, there are those who question the assumption that\nfactorizability is a locality condition (Fine 1981, 1986, pp. 59-60,\n1989b, Cartwright 1989, chaps. 3 and 6, Chang and Cartwright 1993).\nAccordingly, they deny that non-factorizability implies non-locality.\nThe main thrust of this line of reasoning is that the principle of the\ncommon cause is not generally valid. Some, notably Cartwright (1989)\nand Chang and Cartwright (1993), challenge the assumption that common\ncauses always screen off the correlation between their effects, and\naccordingly they question the idea that non-factorizability implies\nnon-locality. Others, notably Fine, deny that correlations must have\ncausal explanation. ", "\n\nWhile these arguments challenge the view that the quantum realm as\ndepicted by non-factorizable models for the EPR/B experiment\nmust involve non-locality, they do not show that viable\nlocal, non-factorizable models of the EPR/B experiment (i.e., viable\nmodels which do not postulate any non-locality) are possible. Indeed,\nso far none of the attempts to construct local, non-factorisable\nmodels for EPR/B experiments has been successful. " ], "section_title": "9. Can there be ‘local’ quantum theories?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe question of the compatibility of quantum mechanics with the\nspecial theory of relativity is very difficult to resolve. (The\nquestion of the compatibility of quantum mechanics with the general\ntheory of relativity is even more involved.) The answer to this\nquestion depends on the interpretation of special relativity and the\nnature of the exact constraints it imposes on influences between\nevents. ", "\n\nA popular view has it that special relativity prohibits any\nsuperluminal influences, whereas theories that violate factorizability\nseem to involve such influences. Accordingly, it is held that quantum\nmechanics is incompatible with relativity. Another common view has it\nthat special relativity prohibits only certain types of superluminal\ninfluence. Many believe that relativity prohibits superluminal\nsignaling of information. Some also believe that this theory prohibits\nsuperluminal transport of matter-energy and/or\naction-at-a-distance. On the other hand, there is the view that\nrelativity per se prohibits only superluminal influences that\nare incompatible with the special-relativistic space-time, the\nso-called ‘Minkowski space-time,’ and that this\nprohibition is compatible with certain types of superluminal\ninfluences and superluminal signaling (for a comprehensive discussion\nof this issue, see Maudlin, 1994, 1996, section\n 2).[34]\n ", "\n\nIt is commonly agreed that relativity requires that the descriptions\nof physical reality (i.e., the states of systems, their properties,\ndynamical laws, etc.) in different coordinate systems should be\ncompatible with each other. In particular, descriptions of the state of\nsystems in different foliations of spacetime into parallel spacelike\nhyperplanes, which correspond to different inertial reference frames,\nare to be related to each other by the Lorentz transformations. If this\nrequirement is to reflect the structure of the Minkowski spacetime,\nthese transformations must hold at the level of individual processes,\nand not only at the level of ensembles of processes (i.e., at the\nstatistical level) or observed phenomena. Indeed, Bohm's theory,\nwhich is manifestly non-relativistic, satisfies the requirement that\nthe Lorentz transformations obtain at the level of the observed\nphenomena. ", "\n\nHowever, satisfying the Lorentz transformations at the level of\nindividual processes is not sufficient for compatibility with\nMinkowski spacetime; for the Lorentz transformations may also be\nsatisfied at the level of individual processes in theories that\npostulate a preferred inertial reference frame (Bell 1976). Maudlin\n(1996, section 2) suggests that a theory is genuinely relativistic\n(both in spirit and letter) if it can be formulated without ascribing\nto spacetime any more, or different intrinsic structure than the\nrelativistic\n metrics.[35]\nThe question of the compatibility of\nrelativity with quantum mechanics may be presented as follows: Could a\nquantum theory that does not encounter the measurement problem be\nrelativistic in that sense? " ], "section_title": "10. Can quantum non-locality be reconciled with relativity?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nThe main problem in reconciling collapse theories with special\nrelativity is that it seems very difficult to make state collapse\n(modeled as a real physical process) compatible with the structure of\nthe Minkowski spacetime. In non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the\nearlier L-measurement in the EPR/B experiment induces a collapse of the\nentangled state of the particle pair and the L-measurement apparatus.\nAssuming (for the sake of simplicity) that measurement events occur\ninstantaneously, state collapse occurs along a single spacelike\nhyperplane that intersects the spacetime region of the L-measurement\nevent—the hyperplane that represents the (absolute) time of the\ncollapse. But this type of collapse dynamics would involve a preferred\nfoliation of spacetime, in violation of the spirit, if not the letter\nof the Minkowski spacetime. ", "\n\nThe current dynamical collapse models are not genuinely\nrelativistic, and attempts to generalize them to the special\nrelativistic domain have encountered difficulties (see, for\nexample, the entry on collapse theories, Ghirardi 1996, Pearle 1996,\nand references therein). A more recent attempt to address these\ndifficulties due to Tumulka (2004) seems more promising.", "\n\nIn an attempt to reconcile state collapse with special relativity,\nFleming (1989, 1992, 1996) and Fleming and Bennett (1989) suggested\nradical hyperplane dependence. In their theory, state collapse occurs\nalong an infinite number of spacelike hyperplanes that intersect the\nspacetime region of the measurements. That is, in the EPR/B experiment\na collapse occurs along all the hyperplanes of simultaneity that\nintersect the spacetime region of the L-measurement. Similarly, a\ncollapse occurs along all the hyperplanes of simultaneity that\nintersect the distant (space-like separated) spacetime region of the\nR-measurement. Accordingly, the hyperplane-dependent theory does not\npick out any reference frame as preferred, and the dynamics of the\nquantum states of systems and their properties can be reconciled with\nthe Minkowski spacetime. Further, since all the multiple collapses are\nsupposed to be real (Fleming 1992, p. 109), the predictions of\northodox quantum mechanics are reproduced in each reference\nframe. ", "\n\nThe hyperplane-dependent theory is genuinely relativistic. But the\ntheory does not offer any mechanism for state collapses, and it does\nnot explain how the multiple collapses are related to each other and\nhow our experience is accounted for in light of this multiplicity.", "\n\nMyrvold (2002b) argues that state collapses can be reconciled with\nMinkowski spacetime even without postulating multiple different\ncollapses corresponding to different reference frames. That is, he\nargues with respect to the EPR/B experiment that the collapses induced\nby the L- and the R-measurement are local events in the L- and the\nR-wing respectively, and that the supposedly different collapses\n(corresponding to different reference frames) postulated by the\nhyperplane-dependent theory are only different descriptions of the\nsame local collapse events. Focusing on the state of the particle\npair, the main idea is that the collapse event in the L-wing is\nmodeled by a (one parameter) family of operators (the identity\noperator before the L-measurement and a projection to the collapsed\nstate after the L-measurement), and it is local in the sense that it\nis a projection on the Hilbert space of the L-particle; and similarly,\nmutatis mutandis, for the R-particle. Yet, if the quantum\nstate of the particle pair represents their complete state (as the\ncase is in the orthodox theory and the GRW/Pearle collapse models),\nthese collapse events seem non-local. While the collapse in the L-wing\nmay be said to be local in the above technical sense, it is by\ndefinition a change of local as well as distant (spacelike)\nproperties. The operator that models the collapse in the L-wing\ntransforms the entangled state of the particle pair—a state in\nwhich the particles have no definite spins—into a product of\nnon-entangled states in which both particles have definite spins, and\naccordingly it causes a change of intrinsic properties in both the L-\nand the R-wing.", " \n\nIn any case, Myrvold's proposal demonstrates that even if state\ncollapses are not hyperplane dependent, they need not be incompatible\nwith relativity theory." ], "subsection_title": "10.1 Collapse theories" }, { "content": [ "\n\nRecall (section 5.3) that in no-collapse theories, quantum-mechanical\nstates always evolve according to a unitary and linear equation of\nmotion (the Schrödinger equation in the non-relativistic case),\nand accordingly they never collapse. Since the wave function has a\ncovariant dynamics, the question of the compatibility with relativity\nturns on the dynamics of the additional properties —the\nso-called ‘hidden variables’— that no-collapse\ntheories typically postulate. In Albert and Loewer's many-minds theory\n(see section 5.3.3), the wave function has covariant dynamics, and no\nadditional physical properties are postulated. Accordingly, the theory\nis genuinely relativistic. Yet, as the compatibility with relativity\nis achieved at the cost of postulating that outcomes of measurements\n(and, typically, any other perceived properties) are mental rather\nthan physical properties, many find this way of reconciling quantum\nmechanics with relativity unsatisfactory. ", "\n\nOther Everett-like interpretations attempt to reconcile quantum\nmechanics with the special theory of relativity without postulating\nsuch a controversial mind-body dualism. Similarly to the many-minds\ninterpretation of Albert and Loewer, and contrary to Bohm's theory and\nmodal interpretations, on the face of it these interpretations do not\npostulate the existence of ‘hidden variables.’ But\n(recalling section 5.3.3) these Everett-like interpretations face the\nchallenge of making sense of our experience and the probabilities of\noutcomes, and critics of these interpretations argue that this\nchallenge cannot be met without adding some extra structure to the\nEverett interpretation (see Albert and Loewer 1988, Albert 1992,\npp. 114-5, Albert and Loewer 1996, Price 1996, pp. 226-227, and\nBarrett 1999, pp. 163-173); a structure that may render these\ninterpretations incompatible with relativity. Supporters of the\nEverett interpretation disagree. Recently, Deutsch (1999), Wallace\n(2002, 2003, 2005a,b) and Greaves (2004) have suggested that\nEverettians can make sense of the quantum-mechanical probabilities by\nappealing to decision-theoretical considerations. But this line of\nreasoning has been disputed (see Barnum et al. 2000, Lewis\n2003b, Hemmo and Pitowsky 2005 and Price 2006). ", "\n\nModal interpretations constitute another class of no-collapse\ninterpretations of quantum mechanics that were developed to reconcile\nquantum mechanics with relativity (and to solve the measurement\nproblem). Yet, as the no-go theorems by Dickson and Clifton (1998),\nArntzenius (1998) and Myrvold (2002) demonstrate, the earlier versions\nof the modal interpretation are not genuinely compatible with\nrelativity theory. Further, Earman and Ruetsche (2005) argue that a\nquantum-field version of the modal interpretation (which is set in the\ncontext of relativistic quantum-field theory), like the one proposed\nby Clifton (2000), would be subject to serious challenges. Berkovitz\nand Hemmo (2006a,b) develop a relational modal interpretation that\nescapes all the above no-go theorems and to that extent seems to\nprovide better prospects for reconciling quantum mechanics with\nspecial relativity. " ], "subsection_title": "10.2 No-collapse theories" } ] } ]	[ "Albert, D. (1992), Quantum Mechanics and Experience,\nCambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.", "Albert, D. and Loewer, B. (1988), “Interpreting the\nmany-worlds interpretation”, Synthese\n77, 195-213. ", "––– (1995), “Tails of Schrödinger's\ncat”, in R. Clifton (1996b), pp. 81-92.", "Alexander, H. G. (1956) (ed), The Leibniz-Clarke\nCorrespondence, Manchester: Manchester University Press\n(new reprint, 1998).", "Arntzenius, F. 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(2003), “Quantum life: interaction,\nentanglement and separation”, Journal of Philosophy\n100, 80-97." ]	[ { "href": "../bell-theorem/", "text": "Bell’s Theorem" }, { "href": "../intrinsic-extrinsic/", "text": "intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties" }, { "href": "../physics-holism/", "text": "physics: holism and nonseparability" }, { "href": "../qm/", "text": "quantum mechanics" }, { "href": "../qm-bohm/", "text": "quantum mechanics: Bohmian mechanics" }, { "href": "../qm-collapse/", "text": "quantum mechanics: collapse theories" }, { "href": "../qm-everett/", "text": "quantum mechanics: Everett’s relative-state formulation of" }, { "href": "../kochen-specker/", "text": "quantum mechanics: Kochen-Specker theorem" }, { "href": "../qm-manyworlds/", "text": "quantum mechanics: many-worlds interpretation of" }, { "href": "../qm-modal/", "text": "quantum mechanics: modal interpretations of" }, { "href": "../qt-epr/", "text": "quantum theory: the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument in" }, { "href": "../physics-Rpcc/", "text": "Reichenbach, Hans: common cause principle" }, { "href": "../wesley-salmon/", "text": "Salmon, Wesley" }, { "href": "../supervenience/", "text": "supervenience" }, { "href": "../qt-uncertainty/", "text": "Uncertainty Principle" } ]
possibilism-actualism	The Possibilism-Actualism Debate	First published Mon Nov 28, 2022	[ "\nActualism is a widely-held view in the metaphysics of\nmodality that arises in response to the thesis of\npossibilism. To understand the motivations for possibilism,\nconsider first that most everyone would agree that things might have\nbeen different than they are in fact. For example, no one has free\nsoloed the Dawn Wall route up El Capitan in Yosemite National Park\nand, given the almost superhuman physical ability and mental strength\nthe feat would require and, more importantly, the massive risk it\nwould entail, it is exceedingly unlikely that anyone ever will. But it\nis surely possible that someone pulls it off—the Dawn\nWall has, after all, been successfully free climbed, so a free solo is\nnot beyond sheer human\n capacity.[1]\n Thus, the following assertion (expressed in a somewhat stilted but\nunambiguous logical form for purposes here) is true:", "\nAgain, the current Pope (as of November 2022) Jorge Bergoglio,\nalthough childless, might have well have had children; instead of the\npriesthood, he could have chosen, say, tango dancing as his profession\nand married his longtime dance partner. So it is true that", "\nPossibilism emerges from the question of the truth conditions\nfor such possibilities, the question of what it is about reality that\naccounts for their truth value. The assertion that there are\ntigers, for example, is true because reality, in fact, contains\ntigers; the assertion that someone has free soloed the Dawn Wall or is\nBergoglio’s child is false because reality, in fact, contains no\nsuch things. But what accounts for their possibility? That\nis, what is it about reality that accounts for the truth of\n (1)\n and\n (2)?", "\nIn the case of\n (1),\n the answer is easy: there are, in fact, many people who could free\nsolo the Dawn Wall—notably, Tommy Caldwell and Kevin Jorgeson,\nthe two who first free-climbed it. But it is at least\nlogically possible that any human being do so—for any\ngiven person, it is easy to imagine perfectly consistent (if perhaps\nidealized and utterly improbable) scenarios in which they are\nmassively healthier, stronger, and more skilled than they actually are\nand, so endowed, free solo the Dawn Wall. Thus,\n (1)\n is true because:", "\nA bit more generally (and philosophically) put,\n (1)\n is true in virtue of the modal properties of actually\nexisting things, that is, equivalently put, in virtue of properties\nthey could have had and, indeed, would have had if\nonly things had been different in certain ways. Crucially, the same\nappears not to be so in the case of\n (2).\n For on the reasonable assumption that", "\nit follows straightaway that no actually existing thing could have\nbeen Bergoglio’s child. Hence, the parallel to\n (3),\n viz.,", "\nappears to be false. Unlike\n (1),\n then, it appears that we cannot provide truth conditions for\n (2)\n of the same satisfyingly straightforward sort as (3).[3]", "\nPossibilists claim that we can: we must simply broaden our\nunderstanding of reality, of what there is in the broadest\nsense, beyond the actual, beyond what actually\nexists, so that it also includes the merely possible. In\nparticular, says the possibilist, there are merely possible people,\nthings that are not, in fact, people but which could have\nbeen. So, for the possibilist,\n (4)\n is true after all so long as we acknowledge that reality also\nincludes possibilia, things that are not in fact\nactual but which could have been; things that do not in\nfact exist alongside us in the concrete world but which could\nhave. Actualism is (at the least) the denial of\npossibilism; to be an actualist is to deny that there are any\npossibilia. Put another way, for the actualist, there is no\nrealm of reality, or being, beyond actual existence; to be is to\nexist, and to exist is to be actual. In this article, we will\ninvestigate the origins and nature of the debate between possibilists\nand actualists." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Focus of the Debate", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Origins and Nature of ", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Possibilism and the Bi-Modal Conception of Being", "2.2 Possibilism Without Bi-Modalism" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Possibilism and Possible World Semantics", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Basic Possible World Semantics", "3.2 SQML: A Deductive System for SQML", "3.3 Possibilism, Necessitism, and Logical Truth" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Actualist Responses to the Possibilist Challenge", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Kripke Semantics and Its Logic", "4.2 Haecceitism", "4.3 Strict Actualism", "4.4 Perspectivalism" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe debate between possibilists and actualists is at root\nontological. It is not—fundamentally, at least—a\ndebate about meaning, or the proper linguistic primitives of our modal\ndiscourse, or the model theory of certain formal languages, or the\npermissibility of certain inferences. It is a disagreement over\nwhat there is, about the kinds of things that reality\nincludes. Characterizing the nature of the debate precisely, however,\nis challenging. As noted in the preceding introduction, the debate\ncenters around the question of whether, in addition to such things as\nyou and me, reality includes possibilia, such as\nBergoglio’s merely possible children, the children he does not\nactually have but could have had if only things had\ngone rather differently. Clearly, if there are such things in\nsome sense, they differ from us rather dramatically: a merely possible\nchild is not actually anyone’s child and indeed, we are\ninclined to say, does not actually exist at all and, hence,\nis not actually conscious but only could have been, does not actually\nhave a body but only could have had one, and so on. As we will see in\nmore detail in the following section, in many historical and more\ncontemporary discussions, this alleged difference is characterized in\nterms of distinct ways, or modes, of being, and it\nwill be useful, for now, to continue to frame the debate in these\nterms. Specifically, on this bi-modal conception of the\ndebate, on the one hand, there is the more substantial and robust mode\nof actuality (or, often, existence) that you and I\nenjoy. And, on the other hand, there is the more rarefied mode\n(sometimes called subsistence) exhibited by things that fail\nto be\n actual.[4]\n While (as we will see) there has been some disagreement over the\nlocation of abstract objects like the natural numbers in this scheme,\nwhat uniquely distinguishes possibilia on the bi-modal\nconception is that, for the possibilist, they are\ncontingently non-actual:", "\nIt is clarifying to represent matters more formally. Accordingly,\nwhere \$\\sfA!\$ is the actuality predicate, we have:", "\nAs noted in the above introduction, in its simplest form, actualism is\njust the denial of possibilism: there are no mere possibilia.\nHowever, the actualist’s denial is meant to be stronger: that\npossibilism is false is not a mere historical accident; rather, for\nthe actualist, not only are there not in fact any possibilia,\nthere couldn’t be any:", "\nor, again, more formally:", "\nFor the actualist, then, the possibilist’s purported mode of\ncontingent non-actuality, or mere possibility, is empty:\nnecessarily, anything that could have been actual already\nis actual. Otherwise put, necessarily, there are no\ncontingently non-actual\n things.[5]", "\nActualism is quite clearly the preferred common sense position here:\non a first hearing, the idea that the Pope’s unborn children\ndwell in some shadowy corner of reality is to most ears ludicrous on\nits face—and defending against this common sense intuition\nremains arguably the central challenge facing the possibilist. But the\nmotivations for possibilism are surprisingly strong. We have already\nnoted what is perhaps the strongest of these: possibilism yields a\nstraightforward, unified semantics for our modal discourse. By\nappealing to possibilia, the possibilist can provide\nsatisfying truth conditions for otherwise semantically problematic\nmodal statements like\n (2)\n along the lines of those for\n (1)\n that ground their intuitive truth in the modal properties of\nindividuals. As we might also put it: possibilism provides\n truthmakers\n for such statements as\n (2)\n that actualism is apparently unable to supply. But a powerful second\nmotivation is that possibilism falls out as a consequence of\nthe most natural quantified modal logic. In particular, in that logic,\n (4)\n is an immediate logical consequence of\n (2).\n (We will spell out these motivations further in the following two\nsections.) These motivations in turn present a twofold \nchallenge for the actualist:", "\nWhat makes the possibilism-actualism debate so interesting is that,\nwhile actualism is the overwhelming metaphysical choice of most\nphilosophers, there is no easy or obvious way for the actualist to\nmeet these challenges. We will explore a number of attempts in this\nessay." ], "section_title": "1. The Focus of the Debate", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. The Origins and Nature of Possibilia", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nTo fully appreciate what is at issue in the possibilism-actualism\ndebate, as well as its framing in those terms, it is important to see\nits origins—more generally, the origins of the bi-modal\nconception of being—in the ancient, and vexing, philosophical\nproblem of\n non-existent objects.\n Inklings of the bi-modal conception arguably trace back to the dawn\nof western philosophy in the goddess’s enigmatic warning to\n Parmenides\n not to be deceived by the “unmanageable” idea “that\nthings that are not\n are”.[6]\n It finds clearer expression in Seneca’s description of the\nStoics, for whom being included both physical objects and\n“incorporeals”\n(ἀσώματα) that “have a\nderivative kind of reality” (de Harven 2015: 406):", "\n\n\nThe Stoics want to place above this [the existent] yet another, more\nprimary genus…. Some Stoics consider “something”\nthe first genus, and I shall add the reason why they do. In nature,\nthey say, some things exist, some do not exist. But nature includes\neven those which do not exist—things which enter the mind, such\nas centaurs, giants, and whatever else falsely formed by thought takes\non some image despite lacking substance. (Seneca, Letters\n58:13–15, quoted in Long & Sedley 1987: 162; see also Caston\n1999.)\n", "\nThe Stoics’ motivation for their bifurcation of\n“nature” was clearly to explain the\n intentionality\n of our thought and discourse, our apparent ability to think and talk\nas coherently about the creatures of mythology and fiction as about\nordinary physical existents. Later variations broadened the\nStoics’ realm of incorporeal intentional objects to include\npossibilia. In the early medieval period, the Islamic\nMutazilite theologians distinguished between thing\n(shayʹ) and existent (mawjūd)) to\ncomport with two passages of the Quʹran (16:40, 36:82) suggesting\nthat God commands non-existent things into existence\n(Wisnovski 2003: 147). Avicenna (1926: 54-56) under the influence of\nthe Mutazilates, was more explicit still that these non-existent\nthings are possibilia:", "\n\n\nIt is necessary with respect to everything that came into existence\nthat before it came into existence, it was in itself possibly\nexistent. For if it had not been possibly existent in itself, it never\nwould exist at all. Moreover, the possibility of its existence does\nnot consist in the fact that an agent could produce it or that an\nagent has power over it. Indeed, an agent would scarcely have power\nover it, if the thing itself were not possible in\n itself.[7]\n ", "\nSimilar ideas were espoused by a number of other prominent medieval\nphilosophers including\n Giles of Rome,\n Henry of Ghent,\n John Duns Scotus,\n William of Ockham, and\n Francisco Suarez.[8]", "\nAlthough the grounds of possibility and intentionality were prominent\nthemes in the modern\n period,[9]\n the idea of explaining them in terms of any sort of bifurcation of\nbeing largely receded until the early nineteenth century beginning,\nnotably, with the remarkable work of\n Bernard Bolzano.\n Specifically, in his work on the ground of possibility, Bolzano\ndeveloped a sophisticated bi-modal account of being on which\neverything there is divides into those things\n(Dinge) with Wirklichkeit, usually rendered\n“actuality” by Bolzano’s\n translators,[10]\n and those with Bestand, typically rendered\n“subsistence”. Importantly, for Bolzano as well as for\nmany of his successors, to be actual (wirklich) is to be part\nof the causal order and, hence, typically at any rate, to occupy a\nposition in space and time—in a word (as commonly understood),\nto be\n concrete.[11]\n Subsistence, by contrast, is the mode of being shared by non-concrete\nobjects, which in particular for Bolzano included both\npossibilia and abstracta like numbers and\npropositions. Unlike abstracta, however, Bolzano’s\npossibilia are only contingently subsistent,\ncontingently non-concrete, and, hence, are capable of\nWirklichkeit:", "\n\n\n[I]n addition to those things that have actuality\n(Wirklichkeit)…there are others that have mere\npossibility (bloße Möglichkeit), as well as those\nthat could never make the transition to actuality, e.g., propositions\nand truths as such (an sich). (Bolzano 1837: §483, pp.\n184–5)\n", "\nMotivated chiefly to provide a ground for intentionality, several\ndecades later,\n Alexius Meinong\n (1904b [1960], 1907) famously postulated a rich class of non-existent\nobjects to explain our apparent ability to conceive and talk about,\nnot only creatures of myth and fiction, but impossible objects like\nthe round square. Roughly, in Meinong’s theory, for any class of\n“ordinary” properties (konstitutorische\nBestimmungen) there is an intentional object\n(Gegenstand) having exactly those\n properties.[12]\n Presumably, then, although he did not broach the issue of possible\nobjects\n directly,[13]\n among these objects would be those having (perhaps among others) the\nproperty being a possible child of Bergoglio. However,\nimportantly, although he broadly accepted Bolzano’s bi-modal\ndivision of being into concrete and subsistent\n objects,[14]\n Meinong ascribed no variety of being whatsoever to his intentional\nobjects, not even the subsistence (Bestand) enjoyed by\nabstracta like mathematical objects and\n propositions.[15]\n Although strongly influenced by Meinong, the early Russell (1903)\nspurned the idea that intentional objects are being-less but not the\nobjects themselves, save for impossibilia like the round\nsquare. Rather, he simply moved them all into the subsistent realm\nalongside the objects of mathematics, reserving the “world of\nexistence” for “actual objects” in the\nspatio-temporal causal order (ibid., pp. \n449–50):[16]", "\n\n\nBeing is that which belongs to…every possible object\nof thought….Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and\nfour-dimensional spaces all have being, for if they were not entities\nof a kind, we could make no propositions about them. Thus being is a\ngeneral attribute of everything, and to mention anything is to show\nthat it is….Existence, on the contrary, is the\nprerogative of some only amongst beings….[T]his distinction\n[between being and existence] is essential, if we are ever to deny the\nexistence of anything. For what does not exist must be something, or\nit would be meaningless to deny its existence; and hence we need the\nconcept of being, as that which belongs even to the non-existent.\n", "\nRussell’s thoroughgoing modal skepticism led him to exclude\npossibilia from his non-existent\n objects.[17]\n Nonetheless, were he to have admitted them into his ontology, the\nsubsistent realm would be their natural place in his bifurcated\nontology. Quine (1948: 22), in the voice of his fictional possibilist\nmetaphysician Wyman—and undoubtedly influenced at the time by\nrecent work of C. I. Lewis (1943) and Rudolf Carnap\n (1947)[18]—made\n exactly this move in a justly famous and widely-cited paper that\nplayed a pivotal role in both framing the philosophical issues and\nfixing modern terminology:", "\n\n\nPegasus…has his being as an unactualized possible. When we say\nof Pegasus that there is no such thing, we are saying, more precisely,\nthat Pegasus does not have the special attribute of actuality. Saying\nthat Pegasus is not actual is on a par, logically, with saying that\nthe Parthenon is not red; in either case we are saying something about\nan entity whose being is unquestioned. (1948: 22)\n", "\nTo be a mere possibile, then, according to Wyman, is to be\nunactualized, i.e., it is, unqualifiedly, to be but\nto fail to exemplify “the special attribute of actuality”;\nit is to subsist rather than to exist (Quine 1948:\n 23).[19]\n But perhaps equally important for fixing the nature of the modern\npossibilism-actualism debate was Quine’s explicit break from his\nnineteenth and early twentieth century predecessors on the ontological\nstatus of abstracta; speaking now in his own voice, he\nsays:", "\n\n\nIf Pegasus existed he would indeed be in space and time, but only\nbecause the word “Pegasus” has spatio-temporal\nconnotations, and not because “exists” has spatio-temporal\nconnotations. If spatio-temporal reference is lacking when we affirm\nthe existence of the cube root of 27, this is simply because a cube\nroot is not a spatio-temporal kind of thing, and not because we are\nbeing ambiguous in our use of “exist”. (1948: 23)\n", "\nFor Quine, that is, their necessary non-concreteness notwithstanding,\nabstract objects exist no less robustly than we and, hence, in the\ncontext of the possibilism-actualism debate, are fully\n actual.[20]\n A particular advantage of this view of abstracta for the\ndebate is that, assuming that there could be no necessarily\nnon-actual objects, possibilia are the only things lacking\nactuality in the possibilist’s universe and, hence, actualism\ncan take a particularly common and familiar form:", "\nThat is, more formally put once again:", "\nBut the most important consequence of this wholesale shift in the\nontological status of abstracta is that it opened the door to\nperhaps the most prominent form of contemporary actualism—dubbed\n(rather tendentiously) ersatz modal realism by David Lewis\n(1986: §3.1)—on which modal phenomena are understood in\nterms of abstracta of various sorts and, hence, in terms of\nactually existing things only, as per\n Act.[21]\n (Ersatz modal realism is discussed in more detail in\n §4.2\n and\n §4.4\n below and in §2.2 of the Encyclopedia’s entry on\n possible worlds.)", "\nOne final matter requires attention. Quine’s choice of Pegasus\nas his paradigmatic possibile in the above quote highlights\nthe fact that even relatively modern discussions often conflate the\ntwo motivations for non-existent objects and, consequently, conflate\nfictional objects and possibilia, and this leads to an\nimportant confusion about the nature of possibilia that is\nimportant to avoid. It is particularly evident in another well-known\nQuinean passage. Returning to his own voice, in an attempt to show\nthat possibilism is ultimately incoherent, Quine asks a series of\nrhetorical questions, beginning with the following:", "\n\n\nTake, for instance, the [merely] possible fat man in that doorway;\nand, again, the [merely] possible bald man in that doorway. Are they\nthe same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many\npossible men are there in that doorway? (1948: 23)\n", "\nThat is, on this characterization of possibilism, a merely possible\nF is something that (contingently) fails to be actual but,\nnonetheless, like a Meinongian intentional object, is\nactually an F—a merely possible man in that\ndoorway has the property of being in the given doorway; hence the\npurportedly unanswerable questions about whether or not he is\nidentical with the indefinitely many other merely possible but\nsomewhat differently described men who can also be said to occupy the\nsame space. However, as Linsky and Zalta (1994: 445) emphasize, a\nmerely possible F needn’t (and indeed typically\nwon’t) be an F. Rather, a merely possible F is\n(typically) something that is not in fact an F but\nrather only could be an\n F.[22]\n In particular, a merely possible bald man in that doorway is neither\nbald, nor a man, nor in that doorway—indeed, it has the\ncomplements of all those properties. Rather, it is only something that\ncould have those properties.", "\nWith that problem corrected, this Quinean framing has by and large\nbecome the dominant conception of the possibilism-actualism\ndistinction in the contemporary\n literature.[23]" ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Possibilism and the Bi-Modal Conception of Being" }, { "content": [ "\nWe have characterized actualism as, first and foremost, the denial of\npossibilism, defined as the thesis\n (Poss)\n that there are things that contingently fail to be actual. Following\nthe historical precedents just detailed, actuality has been depicted\nas the more robust of two purported modes of being. However, work by\nLinsky and Zalta (1994, 1996) and Williamson (1998, 2013) casts doubt\nupon the viability of the possibilism-actualism distinction under this\nbi-modal conception. Williamson questions its coherence: what,\nexactly, is the nature of the “robustness” that allegedly\ndistinguishes actuality from the merely possible; as Williamson (2013:\n23ff) puts it: “being actual had better be actually doing\nsomething harder than just being…. But what is that harder\nthing…?” Convinced there is no cogent answer to the\nquestion, Williamson proposes scotching the possibilism-actualism\ndistinction entirely in favor of an allegedly much clearer distinction\nbetween necessitism and contingentism, that is,\nbetween the thesis that, necessarily, all things exist necessarily\n(\$\\Box\\forall \\sfx \\Box\\exists \\sfy\\,\\sfy=\\sfx\$) and its denial.\n(This distinction will be discussed in greater detail\n below.)[24]", "\nLinsky and Zalta (1994: §4) do not so much question the coherence\nof the possibilism-actualism distinction (under the bi-modal\nconception) as dissolve\n it.[25]\n Specifically, they show that, for all that the thesis\n (Act)\n that, necessarily, everything is actual tells us, there is nothing to\nprevent avowed possibilists like\n themselves[26]\n from simply rejecting the idea that Bergoglio’s merely possible\nchildren “have a [mode] of being that is less than the\nfull-fledged existence” that we enjoy, and insisting instead\nthat they too are fully actual and, hence, exist as robustly as we\n do.[27]\n It’s just that we, by sheer happenstance, are concrete\nand they are not; we, that is, happen to exist in the spatio-temporal\ncausal order and they do not. But things might just as well have been\nthe other way ’round: existence-wise, we are all on an\nontological par. There are thus no possibilia in the sense of\n Poss\n at all; necessarily, everything is actual, as per\n Act.\n On this telling, then, Linsky and Zalta and their ilk all turn out to\nbe fully-fledged actualists, their ontological commitments\nnotwithstanding.", "\nClearly, however, even if one is skeptical of the bi-modal conception,\nthe core of the intended debate remains: whether or not to countenance\nthe likes of Bergoglio’s possible children. In response to those\nwho do, actualists define themselves simply as those who do not. The\nhistorical trajectory sketched above explains why the debate has often\ncome to be framed in terms of distinct modes of\nbeing—actuality and mere possibility. But this\nbi-modal framing is inessential: when the intended debate is kept in\nthe foreground, “actuality”, for the actualist, is best\nunderstood simply as a placeholder for whatever it is that allegedly\ndistinguishes the likes of us (and abstract objects such as the\nnumbers) from the likes of Bergoglio’s merely possible children.\nLinsky and Zalta (1994: §4) and Williamson (2013: §1.2)\nthemselves, in fact, just re-introduce what is essentially\nBolzano’s characterization of possibilia: they are\ncontingently non-concrete. On this characterization,\npossibilism can take a form that clarifies the debate without any\nmention of modes of being and, hence, avoids the above critiques:", "\nor, more formally, where \$\\sfC!\$ is concreteness:", "\nAccordingly, actualism becomes:", "\nor, more formally:", "\nSo on this framing, for the possibilist, what allegedly distinguishes\nthe likes of us (and the likes of the natural numbers) from\npossibilia in the sense of PossC is:\nnot being contingently non-concrete. Taking this, then, to be\nwhat “actuality” signifies, with a bit of propositional\nlogic, we have:", "\nThat is, on this framing, to be actual is to be either concrete or\nnecessarily non-concrete; or, more simply put, it is to be either\nconcrete or abstract. It is a straightforward exercise to show that,\nunder this definition of actuality, PossC is\nequivalent to the original definition\n Poss\n and that ActC is equivalent to the principle\n Act\n that, necessarily, everything is\n actual.[28]", "\nOf course, possibilists who are more inclined toward the bi-modal\nconception will still prefer the original framing of the debate in\nterms of a primitive notion of actuality as per Poss\nand Act. But even the most committed bi-modalist will\nagree that contingent non-concreteness is at least necessarily\ncoextensive with mere possibility and, hence, its complement with\nactuality. So, for those skeptical of the original framing, nothing\nessential to the debate is lost if it is simply understood in terms of\nconcreteness as per PossC and\nActC.", "\nNote on David Lewis. The influential and highly\noriginal late twentieth century philosopher\n David Lewis\n also rejected bi-modalism and famously defended a view that is often\ncharacterized as a variety of possibilism. In fact, Lewis’s\npossibilism is orthogonal to the classical possibilism-actualism\ndebate under discussion in this entry. See the supplemental document\n Classical Possibilism and Lewisian Possibilism\n for details." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Possibilism Without Bi-Modalism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nPossibilism would almost surely not be taken as seriously as it is\nwere it not for the dramatic development of possible world semantics\nfor modal logic in the second half of the twentieth century. For it\nnot only enables the possibilist to formulate truth modal conditions\nwith particular clarity and cogency, it yields a natural and elegant\nquantified modal logic, known as SQML, in which possibilism’s\nfundamental metaphysical principles fall out as logical truths. In\norder to appreciate the cogency of possibilism, therefore, it is\nimportant to understand basic possible world semantics." ], "section_title": "3. Possibilism and Possible World Semantics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nPossible world semantics is built upon\n Tarski’s\n (1936, 1944) epochal theory of truth in the first half of the\ntwentieth century. Tarski’s theory provided a rigorous account\nof the fundamental semantic connections between the languages of\nclassical logic and non-linguistic reality that determine the truth\nconditions for the sentences of those languages. By generalizing\nTarski’s theory to modal\n languages,[29]\n possible world semantics promised an equally rigorous account of the\nsemantic connections between those languages and modal\nreality, and thereby an equally rigorous account of modal truth\nconditions. It is illuminating therefore to start with an account of\nTarskian semantics.", "\nGiven a standard first-order language \$\\scrL\$ with the truth\nfunctional operators \$\\neg,\\,\\to,\$ a distinguished identity\npredicate \$=,\$ and the universal quantifier \$\\forall,\$ a\nTarskian interpretation \$\\calI\$ for \$\\scrL\$\nspecifies a nonempty set \$D\$—the universe of\n\$\\calI\$—for the quantifiers of \$\\scrL\$ to range over and\nassigns appropriate semantic values to the terms (i.e., the\n(individual) constants and variables) and predicates of \$\\scrL\$.\nSpecifically, to each term \$\\tau\$ of \$\\scrL,\$ \$\\calI\$ assigns a\nreferent \$\\tau^\\calI \\in D\$ and, to each n-place predicate\n\$\\pi\$ of \$\\scrL,\$ \$\\calI\$ assigns a set \$\\pi^\\calI \\subseteq\nD^n\$ of n-tuples of members of \$D,\$ often referred to as\nthe extension of \$\\pi\$ in\n \$\\calI\$.[30]\n The extension \$=^\\calI\$ assigned to the identity predicate, of\ncourse, is always stipulated to be the “real” identity\nrelation for \$D,\$ i.e., the set \$\\lbrace\\langle a,a\\rangle:a \\in D\\rbrace\$.\nThose assignments to the terms and predicates of \$\\scrL,\$ in turn,\ncompletely determine the truth values of all the formulas of \$\\scrL\$\nby means of a familiar set of recursive clauses. To facilitate the\nquantificational clause, let \$\\calI[\\frac{\\nu}{a}]\$ be the\ninterpretation that assigns the individual \$a\$ to the variable\n\$\\nu\$ and is otherwise exactly like \$\\calI\$. This apparatus then\ndelivers a\n compositional\n theory of meaning for \$\\scrL,\$ that is, an account on which the\nmeaning (in this case, the truth value) of a complex formula is\ndetermined by its grammatical structure and the meanings of its\nsemantically significant parts and hence, ultimately, in the Tarskian\ncase, by the semantic values assigned to the terms and predicates of\nthe language:", "\nClauses for the other standard truth-functional operators and the\nexistential quantifier under their usual definitions follow\nstraightaway from these clauses. In particular, where", "\nit follows that:", "\nA set \$\\Sigma\$ of formulas of \$\\scrL\$ is said to be\nsatisfiable if there is an interpretation for \$\\scrL\$ in\nwhich every member of \$\\Sigma\$ is true. A formula \$\\varphi\$ is\nvalid, or a logical truth—written\n\$\\vDash\\varphi\$—if it is true in every interpretation for\n\$\\scrL\$.", "\nThe above definitions yield a logic, in one standard sense: a\nclass of formal languages for which we’ve provided a model\ntheoretic semantics that determines a rigorous notion of logical\n truth.[31]\n And the logic they define is classical (first-order) predicate\nlogic.", "\nStrictly speaking, truth in an interpretation is a purely mathematical\nrelation between the formulas of a formal language and rigorously\ndefined mathematical objects of a certain type. However, in practice,\nmost formal languages are applied languages and this will\nenable us to define an objective notion of truth simpliciter\nfor classical predicate logic. More specifically, an applied formal\nlanguage \$\\scrL\$ is designed to clearly and unambiguously formalize\na range of discourse about some real world domain (e.g., the stars and\nplanets, the US electorate on 6 November 2020, the natural numbers,\netc)—call this the intended domain of \$\\scrL\$. Hence,\neach constant of \$\\scrL\$ symbolizes a name in the given discourse\nand each predicate of \$\\scrL\$ symbolizes a predicate of the\n discourse.[32]\n An interpretation \$\\calI\$ for \$\\scrL\$ will be intended,\nthen, just in case its universe \$D\$ comprises exactly the\nindividuals in the intended domain of \$\\scrL\$ and \$\\calI\$ assigns\nto the constants and predicates of \$\\scrL\$ the actual semantic\nvalues of the names and natural language predicates they are meant to\nsymbolize. The compositional truth condition of a sentence \$\\varphi\$\nin an intended interpretation thus traces \$\\varphi\$’s\ntruth value down to the basic\natomic facts on which it ultimately depends or, as we might put it,\nthe atomic facts on which its truth value is grounded. Thus,\na sentence \$\\varphi\$ of an applied language \$\\scrL\$ will be\ntrue just in case it is true\$^\\calI,\$ for some intended\ninterpretation \$\\calI\$ for \$\\scrL\$.", "\nIntuitively, a Tarskian interpretation of an applied non-modal\nlanguage represents a possible world, a way in which the properties\nand relations expressed by the predicates of the language might be\nexemplified by the things in the universe of the interpretation. The\nidea underlying possible world semantics is simply to interpret a\nmodal language \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ by bringing a collection of Tarskian\ninterpretations together to represent a modal space of many possible\nworlds in a single interpretation of\n \$\\scrL_\\Box\$.[33]\n So let \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ be the result of adding the modal operator\n\$\\Box\$ to some standard first-order language \$\\scrL\$. As with a\nTarskian interpretation of \$\\scrL,\$ an SQML interpretation\n\$\\calM\$ for \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ specifies a nonempty set \$D\$ to\nserve as its universe. Also as in Tarskian semantics, \$\\calM\$\nassigns each term \$\\tau\$ of \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ a semantic value\n\$\\tau^\\calM \\in D\$. Additionally, however, \$\\calM\$ specifies a\nnonempty set \$W\$—these are typically called the set of\n“possible worlds” of \$\\calM\$ but can be any nonempty\nset. One member \$w^\\ast\$ of \$W\$ is designated as the “actual\nworld” of \$\\calM\$. To give substance and structure to these\n“worlds”, \$\\calM\$ then assigns extensions to the\npredicates of \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ relative to each\nworld—that is, for every n-place predicate \$\\pi\$ of\n\$\\scrL\$ and each world \$w \\in W,\$ \$\\calM\$ assigns a set\n\$\\pi_w^\\calM \\subseteq D^n\$ of n-tuples of members of\n\$D,\$ the extension of \$\\pi\$ at\n \$w\$;[34]\n in particular, the extension \$=_w^\\calM\$ of the identity predicate\nat all worlds \$w\$ is stipulated to be \$\\lbrace\\langle a,a\\rangle:a \\in\nD\\rbrace\$. In this way \$\\calM\$ represents the different ways that\nthe properties and relations expressed by those predicates can change\n(or not) from world to world.", "\nGiven an SQML interpretation \$\\calM,\$ then, the Tarskian truth\nconditions above are generalized by relativizing them to worlds as\nfollows: for any possible world \$w\$ of \$\\calM\$ (the world of\nevaluation),", "\nPutting the clause for universally quantified formulas together with\nthe clause for negated formulas and the definition\n ∃Def\n of the existential quantifier, we have", "\nAnd to these, of course, is added the critical modal case that\nexplicitly interprets the operator \$\\Box\$ to be a quantifier over\npossible worlds:", "\nThe possibility operator \$\\Diamond\$ is defined as usual in terms of\n\$\\Box\$:", "\nThat is, intuitively, to say that a statement is possible is just to\nsay that its negation isn’t necessary. The structural similarity\nbetween \$\\Diamond\\textbf{Def}\$ and ∃Def\nshould be unsurprising given that, semantically, the necessity\noperator \$\\Box\$ is literally a universal quantifier over the set of\nworlds. Accordingly, it follows from \$\\Diamond\\textbf{Def}\$ and the\nsemantic clause for necessitations that", "\nWe say that a formula \$\\varphi\$ of \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ is true\nin an SQML interpretation \$\\calM\$ for \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ if it is\ntrue\$_{w^\\ast}^\\calM\$, i.e., true in\n\$\\calM\$ at the “actual world” \$w^\\ast\$ of \$\\calM\$.\nSatisfiability and logical truth are defined exactly as they are\n above\n for classical predicate logic, albeit relative to modal languages\n\$\\scrL_\\Box\$ and the preceding notion of truth in an SQML\ninterpretation; in particular, a formula \$\\varphi\$ of \$\\scrL_\\Box\$\nis logically true if it is true in every SQML interpretation. The\nlogic so defined is, of course, SQML.", "\nThe definition of truth simpliciter above for formulas of an\napplied non-modal language \$\\scrL\$ stems from the fact that a\nTarskian interpretation \$\\calI\$ for \$\\scrL\$ can take the things in\n(some relevant chunk of) the actual world and represent how they\nactually exemplify the properties and relations expressed by the\npredicates of \$\\scrL\$. But if we can represent the actual world (or\na relevant chunk of it) by means of an intended Tarskian\ninterpretation, then there is no reason that we can’t represent\na merely possible world in which those same things exist but\nhave different properties and stand in different relations and, hence,\ndefine objective notions of truth at a world and of truth\nsimpliciter for the formulas of a modal language as well,\nthat is, notions of truth that are not simply relative to formal,\nmathematical interpretations but, rather, correspond to objective\nmodal reality. So let \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ be an applied modal language\nwhose individual constants and predicates represent those in some\nordinary range of modal discourse and let \$D\$ be its intended\ndomain. Say that \$\\calM\$ is an intended interpretation of\n\$\\scrL_\\Box\$ if", "\nThen, where \$\\calM\$ is an intended interpretation of \$\\scrL_\\Box,\$\nwe can say that a formula \$\\varphi\$ of \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ is true\nat a world \$w\$—true\$_w\$—just\nin case \$w \\in W\$\nand \$\\varphi\$ is true\$_w^\\calM\$, and\nthat \$\\varphi\$ is true just in case it is true\$_{w^\\ast}\$." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Basic Possible World Semantics" }, { "content": [ "\nIdeally, a logic \$\\mathfrak L\$ has a sound and complete proof\ntheory, that is, an accompanying deductive system whose\ntheorems—the formulas provable in the system—are exactly\nthe logical truths of \$\\mathfrak\n L\$.[36]\n There is such a system for SQML—for convenience, we’ll\nrefer to it by setting “SQML” in italics: SQML.\n(We will follow this convention for logics generally.)", "\n“SQML” is an acronym for “simplest quantified modal\nlogic”, and it is so-called because it is a straightforward\namalgam of the most popular and semantically least complicated\npropositional\n modal logic\n S5 and\n classical first-order logic\n (with\n identity)—FOL,\n for\n short.[37]\n The deductive system SQML, accordingly, is an amalgam of the\ncorresponding deductive systems S5 and\n FOL.[38]\n S5 builds on the foundation of classical propositional\nlogic—PL, for short—whose deductive system PL\ntakes every instance of the following schemas as its axioms and Modus\nPonens as its inference rule:", "\nOn top of this foundation the system S5 adds the rule of\nNecessitation and every instance of the following three schemas:", "\nK is a fundamental principle common to all the modal\nlogics we will survey here: if a conditional is necessary, then its\nconsequent is necessary if its antecedent is. T\nexpresses that necessity implies truth, and 5\nexpresses that what is possible is not a mere matter of happenstance;\nno possibility could have turned out to be impossible; or again: what\nis possible in the actual world is possible in every world. The basic\nnormal deductive system K is the result of adding\n(every instance of) K and the rule of Necessitation\nto PL; the system T is the result of adding all\ninstances of T to K; and the system\nS5 is the result of adding all instances of\n5 to\n T.[39]", "\nTwo important principles (that is, every instance of them) can be\nproved in\n S5:[40]", "\n4 says of necessities what 5 says\nabout possibilities: necessity is not a matter of happenstance; the\nnecessary truths of our world are necessary in every world.\nB says that anything that is in fact the case had to\nhave been possible; the truths in our world are, at the least,\npossibilities in every other world.", "\nSchemas T, 5, 4,\nand B all have common equivalent forms it is useful\nto note:", "\nWe obtain the full deductive system SQML by adding the\nquantificational and identity axioms of FOL and the rule of\nGeneralization to S5:", "\nProofs and Theorems\n\nThe notions of proof and theoremhood are defined as usual; we define\nthem generally as they will apply to each of the deductive systems\ndiscussed in this entry. Specifically, for any deductive system\nS, a proof in S is a finite sequence of\nformulas of the language \$\\scrL\$ of S—\$\\scrL_\\Box,\$\nin the case of SQML—such that each formula is either an\naxiom of S or follows from preceding formulas in the sequence\nby a rule of inference of S. A proof is a proof of\nthe formula occurring last in the sequence. A formula \$\\varphi\$ of\n\$\\scrL\$ is a theorem of S—\$\\vdash_{S}\n\\varphi\$—if there is a proof of it in S. And if\n\$\\Gamma\$ is a set of formulas of \$\\scrL,\$ then \$\\varphi\$ is a\ntheorem of \$\\Gamma\$ (in S)—\$\\Gamma \\vdash_{S}\n\\varphi\$—if, for some finite subset\n\$\\{\\psi_1,\\ldots,\\psi_n\\}\$ of \$\\Gamma,\$ \$\\psi_1 \\to (\\ldots \\to\n(\\psi_n \\to \\varphi)\\ldots)\$ is a theorem of S.", "\nAs the role of an individual constant in a theorem of SQML is\nessentially indistinguishable from that of a free variable, it is\nuseful to note the following:", "\nMetatheorem: Let \$\\psi\$ be a formula of\n\$\\scrL_\\Box\$ that contains an individual constant \$\\kappa\$ of\n\$\\scrL_\\Box\$ and let \$\\nu\$ be a variable that doesn’t occur\nin \$\\psi\$. Then if \$\\psi\$ is a theorem of SQML, so is\n \$\\forall\\nu\\psi^\\kappa_\\nu.\$[42]", "\nThe metatheorem justifies the following derived rule of inference,\nwhere \$\\varphi,\$ \$\\kappa,\$ and \$\\nu\$ are as indicated there:", "\nThat is, informally put, if a formula containing an individual\nconstant is a theorem, we can effectively generalize on it as if it\nwere a free variable." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 SQML: A Deductive System for SQML" }, { "content": [ "\nIn addition to the degree of clarity it brings to the issues, a\ncompelling reason for expressing the possibilism-actualism debate in\nformal terms is how starkly it illustrates the inextricable link\nbetween logic and metaphysics, in particular, the dramatic impact our\nmetaphysical choices have on quantified modal logic. Arguably the best\nknown illustration of this is seen in the validity of the inference\nfrom\n (2)\n to\n (4)\n in SQML and, more generally, in the validity of the Barcan\n Formula:[43]", "\nThat is, informally, if there could be something satisfying\nany given description \$\\varphi,\$ then there is something\nthat could satisfy that description, a thing that is\npossibly \$\\varphi.\$ The validity of BF in\nSQML rests on two facts:\n first,\n that in the model theory of SQML (as in all varieties of possible\nworld semantics), the possibility operator \$\\Diamond\$ is literally\nan existential quantifier ranging over all possible worlds; and\n second,\n that, in evaluating an existentially quantified formula\n\$\\exists\\nu\\varphi\$ at a possible world \$w,\$ the initial\noccurrence of \$\\exists\\nu\$ in the formula ranges unrestrictedly over\nall individuals. Hence, switching the order of adjacent occurrences of\n\$\\Diamond\$ and \$\\exists\\nu\$ in a formula will not alter its truth\nvalue; to say that some world and some object are thus and so is to\nsay no more and no less than that some object and some world are thus\nand\n so.[44]\n And this is what warrants, in particular, the inference from\n (2)\n to\n (4).\n Letting “\$\\sfB\$” represent the predicate “is\nBergoglio’s child”, the logical form of\n (2)\n is \$\\Diamond\\exists \\sfx\\, \\sfB\\sfx\$. Expressed semantically in\nSQML: some world and some individual are such that, in that world,\nthat individual is Bergoglio’s child. But that is to say no more\nand no less than that some individual and some world are such that, in\nthat world, that individual is Bergoglio’s child, \$\\exists\n\\sfx\\,\\Diamond \\sfB\\sfx,\$ i.e.,\n (4).", "\nIn its validation of BF, then, SQML underwrites in\ngeneral, and as a matter of logic, the possibilist’s thesis that\nde dicto modal truths like\n (2)\n asserting simply that there could be things that are thus\nand so are in fact grounded in de re modal truths\nabout the modal properties of individuals, i.e., the properties they\nhave at some or all possible\n worlds.[45]\n If, as in the case of\n (2),\n that appears to commit us to things like merely possible human\nbeings, things that, for actualists anyway, intuitively do not in any\nsense exist, things that in no sense are, so much the worse\nfor actualist intuitions; or so says the possibilist.", "\nBF is not the only controversial logical truth of\nSQML or even, perhaps, the most controversial one. Another is its\nconverse:", "\nThat is, informally, if there is, in fact, something that\ncould satisfy a given description \$\\varphi,\$ then it is\npossible that something satisfy that description. CBF\nis valid for exactly the same reason that BF is: the\norder of adjacent occurrences of \$\\exists\$ and \$\\Diamond\$ in a\nformula does not alter its logical content.", "\nTo see why CBF is controversial, especially for\ntypical actualists, note that most all of us believe that there are\ncontingent beings, things that reality might just as well have lacked\nas to have contained, things like you and me that simply might have\nfailed to be identical to anything:", "\nHowever, CBF is incompatible with the existence of\ncontingent beings! For, as an instance of CBF we\nhave", "\nHence, by MP, we can infer", "\nwhich says that there could be something that is distinct from\neverything (including, in particular, itself) and that, of course, is\nlogically impossible. Hence, CB is logically false in\nSQML and so it is a logical truth of SQML that there are no contingent\nbeings, i.e., that, rather, everything is necessarily identical with\nsomething:", "\nIndeed, since logical truths in SQML are all necessary,\nN is itself a necessary truth:", "\nSo SQML yields not only possibilism (given BF and\n (2)\n and its ilk) but necessitism, that is, the thesis that\neverything there is and, indeed, everything there ever could be, is a\nnecessary\n being;[46]—you,\n me, the Eiffel Tower, Bergoglio’s possible children, merely\npossible members of exotic species that never in fact evolved, merely\npossible suns that never formed, etc. Otherwise put: everything there\ncould possibly be already is and, moreover, could not have\nfailed to be.", "\nAlthough it is a logical truth of SQML, necessitism is not\nanalytically entailed by possibilism. There is, in particular, nothing\nin the idea of a mere possibile that demands its necessity,\nnothing that rules out worlds from which it might be altogether\nabsent, worlds (in addition to those in which it is either concrete or\nnon-concrete) in which nothing is identical to it. This might lead one\nto wonder whether SQML, by building necessitism into its logical\nfoundations, has (from a possibilist perspective) gotten the logical\ncart before the philosophical horse. On reflection, however, it is\nclear that necessitism is, not only a natural complement to\npossibilism, but an essential component of it. For, as we’ve\nseen, the central justification for possibilism is that it provides\ntruthmakers for modal propositions like\n (2);\n it grounds them in the modal properties of individuals. If the\npurported truthmakers for those propositions could fail altogether to\nbe, if it could be that there are no such things, then, for\nall we know, it might just as well be that there are in fact\nno such things and, hence, that there are no truthmakers for\n (2)\n and its ilk after all; and with that, possibilism’s central\nphilosophical justification collapses. Necessitism closes the door on\nthis prospect: both possibilia and actually existing things\nalike are necessary\n beings.[47]", "\nAt first sight, of course, necessitism is a shocking philosophical\ndoctrine. For, most compellingly, the urgent intuition of our own\ncontingency—that at one time in the past we did not exist and\nthat at another in the not too distant future we will forever cease to\nbe—is a central element of our lived human experience. But by\nnecessitism, not only have we always existed and will so continue\nforever into the future, we—no less than God and the number\n17—could not have failed to be. The possibilist, however, will\nrespond that the worry here has badly conflated existence in the sense\nof being, in the sense of mere identity with something, and\nexistence in the sense of actuality. More specifically, the\nworry has confused two corresponding notions of contingency, viz.,\ncontingency as the possibility of absolute non-being, i.e.,", "\nand contingency as the possibility of non-actuality, i.e.,", "\nAs per SQML, says the possibilist, contingency∃\nis a\nlogical impossibility. However, they continue, contingency\$\\sfA!\$\ncomports fully\nwith our lived experience and, in fact, is all that our experience\nwarrants: our sense of our own contingency is rooted in our possible,\nindeed imminent, non-actuality and, hence, in the fact that, in the\nnot-too-distant future, we shall forever cease to be actual.\nWe shall thus forever cease to be conscious, to be embodied, to love\nand be loved, etc.; nothing distinctive of our human existence will\nsurvive. That something identical to each of us—a mere\npossibile, a featureless point in logical space—remains\nat worlds and times where we are non-actual offers no existential\nsolace. (See Williamson 2013: Ch. 1, esp section 3, 6, and 8 for\nrelated reflections on necessitism.)", "\nThe actualist, of course, in denying possibilism, i.e., in denying\nthat there could be any contingently non-concrete objects, allows no\ndaylight between being, existence, and actuality: to be is to exist\nand to exist to be actual. Hence, for the actualist,\ncontingency∃, the possibility of non-being, is the\nonly concept of contingency on the table. As contingency in this sense\nis a logical impossibility according to SQML, the actualist clearly\nneeds an alternative quantified modal logic tuned to their\nmetaphysical sensibilities.", "\nSQML thus throws the twofold challenge\nthat possibilism presents to\nactualism into stark relief. The notion of an intended SQML\ninterpretation of an applied modal language, with its single domain of\nactual and merely possible individuals and its recursive account of\ntruth at a world, vividly traces the semantic dependence of complex\npropositions down to the individuals on which their truth values are\ngrounded. And the corresponding deductive system SQML\nprovides the possibilist with a clean, complete framework in which to\nrepresent their reasoning. In the remaining sections of this entry we\nwill look at prominent actualist responses to the two-fold possibilist\nchallenge." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Possibilism, Necessitism, and Logical Truth" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere are any number of representatives of, and variations on,\nactualism. For brevity, I will focus on several particularly important\naccounts. We will begin with a close look at the extraordinarily\ninfluential work of Saul Kripke. Although Kripke himself does not\nappear to have been particularly motivated by any great commitment to\nactualism, both his version of possible world semantics and its\ncorresponding deductive system capture important elements of the\nactualist perspective." ], "section_title": "4. Actualist Responses to the Possibilist Challenge", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nGiven the controversial consequences of SQML, it seems clear that\nactualists need an alternative quantified modal logic on which\nBF, CBF, and \$\\Box\\textbf{N}\$ fail\nto be logically true; ideally, it will also have a sound and complete\ndeductive system in which, consequently, those principles are not\nderivable as theorems. The system of Kripke 1963b satisfies both of\nthese desiderata and, hence, meets the second element of the\npossibilist’s two-fold challenge; as we will see, whether it\nmeets the first—a satisfying account of the truth conditions for\nmodal propositions like\n (2)—is\n a more delicate matter.", "\nJust as necessitism is not analytically entailed by possibilism, its\ndenial—i.e., that there at least could be contingent (i.e.,\nhenceforth, contingent∃) beings—is not\nanalytically entailed by actualism. An actualist could consistently\nmaintain that, necessarily, everything is necessarily identical with\nsomething and hence in particular, given their rejection of contingent\nnon-concreta, that, necessarily, every concrete thing is\nnecessarily identical to some concrete thing—put another way,\nthat, necessarily, if something is concrete at any time at all, it is\nnecessarily and eternally concrete.\n (Spinoza\n might be ascribed such a view, insofar as\n God-or-Nature\n is taken to be concrete and is, ultimately, the only concrete thing.)\nFor typical actualists, however, it is fundamental to their view that\nthere are in fact many contingent beings, many things that could have\nfailed to be identical with anything; reality could have altogether\nlacked many things that just happen to exist. A natural (if, as\nwe’ll see, not entirely unproblematic) way of expressing this is\nto say that there are possible worlds where at least some things in\nthe actual world are simply absent; more generally, it is to say that\nwhat exists—that is, for the actualist, what there is\nin the broadest sense—varies from world to world. This\nfundamental actualist intuition is at the heart of Kripke’s\nsemantics for quantified modal languages.", "\nRecall that an SQML interpretation \$\\calM\$ for a first-order modal\nlanguage \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ specifies nonempty sets \$D\$ and\n\$W\$—the “individuals” and “worlds” of\n\$\\calM\$—along with a distinguished element \$w^\\ast\$ of\n\$W,\$ the “actual” world of the interpretation; it then\nassigns a denotation \$\\tau^\\calM \\in D\$ to each term \$\\tau\$ and an\nextension \$\\pi_w^\\calM \\subseteq D^n\$ to each n-place\npredicate \$\\pi\$ at each world \$w\$. A Kripke\ninterpretation \$\\calK\$ of \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ is exactly like an\nSQML interpretation except for one modification that reflects the\nfundamental actualist intuition noted above, viz., the addition of a\nfunction \$\\textit{dom}\$ that assigns to each world \$w\$ of\n\$\\calK\$ a subset \$D_w\$ of \$D\$—intuitively, of\ncourse, the individuals that exist in \$w\$. No restrictions\nare placed on the domain of any world; any set of individuals,\nincluding the empty set, will do, although it is required that \$D =\n\\bigcup\\{\\textit{dom}(w):w \\in W\\},\$ i.e., that \$D\$ consists of\nexactly the individuals that exist in some\n world.[48]", "\nThe definition of truth at a world in a Kripke interpretation\n\$\\calK\$ is defined exactly as it is for an SQML interpretation\n\$\\calM\$ except for the quantified clause, where the difference\nbetween Kripke interpretations and SQML interpretations just noted\ncomes to the fore. Specifically, when a quantified formula\n\$\\forall\\nu\\varphi\$ is evaluated at a world \$w,\$ the quantifier\nranges only over \$\\textit{dom}(w),\$ the set of objects in the domain\nof \$w\$. Thus, the modal clause in the definition of truth at a world\nis revised as follows:", "\nAnd, accordingly:", "\nThe definitions of truth, satisfiability and logical truth are\nunchanged. Call the logic determined by Kripke semantics KQML.", "\nA Note on “Serious”\nActualism. KQML takes over the semantics of predicates from SQML \nwithout modification: by the above condition \$\\pi_w^\\calK \\subseteq D^n,\$\nthe extension \$\\pi_w^\\calK\$ that a Kripke interpretation \$\\calK\$\nassigns to a predicate at a world consists of arbitrary\nn-tuples of individuals in \$D.\$ However, as Kripke himself\n(1963b, p. 86, fn 1) notes,", "\n\n\n[i]t is natural to assume that [a predicate] should be false\nin a world…of all those individuals not existing in that\nworld….\n", "\nMany actualists strongly agree, for the following reason: predicates\nexpress properties and relations. Hence, if a (1-place) predicate\n\$\\pi\$ is true of an individual \$a\$ at a world \$w,\$ it means that\n\$a\$ exemplifies the property that \$\\pi\$ expresses at\n\$w\$. But (these actualists continue) it is surely an undeniable\nmetaphysical principle—dubbed serious actualism by\nPlantinga (1983)—that an object must exist, must be\nidentical with something, in order to exemplify properties; an object\ncannot both be utterly absent from a world and yet have properties\nthere. To rule this prospect out in Kripke’s model theory, then,\nrather than allowing an n-place predicate’s extension\nat a world to contain arbitrary n-tuples of individuals, we\nneed to restrict \$\\pi\$’s\nextension at \$w\$ to n-tuples of individuals in\n\$w\$. More formally put, we need to replace the offending condition\n\$\\pi_w^\\calK \\subseteq D^n\$ with the more felicitous condition\n\$\\pi_w^\\calK \\subseteq \\textit{dom}(w)^n.\$", "\nHowever, others (notably Pollock (1985) and Fine (1985)) respond that,\nwhile most properties and relations obviously entail\nexistence—being a horse, say, or being taller\nthan—it is far from clear that all do. Notably, if I fail\nto exist at a world, then that in some sense clearly seems to\ncharacterize me at that world and what else is\ncharacterization than property exemplification? Thus (these\nphilosophers continue), it seems entirely reasonable to say that, at\nworlds in which I fail to exist, I have the property\nnon-existence, as well as the complements of all the\ndistinctly human properties noted\nabove—non-consciousness, non-embodiment, etc.,\nmy nonexistence\n notwithstanding.[49]\n So for these philosophers, the condition \$\\pi_w^\\calK \\subseteq\nD^n\$ on the assignment of extensions to predicates is fine as it\nstands.", "\nSerious actualism—also known as property actualism\n(Fine 1985), the (modal) existence requirement (Yagisawa\n2005; Caplan 2007) and the being constraint (Williamson 2013:\n§4.1)—is a substantive logical and philosophical issue.\nHowever, as it is for the most part a domestic dispute among\nactualists, it is largely orthogonal to the possibilism-actualism\ndebate proper. Consequently, it will not be pursued here in any\ngreater depth. For further discussion in addition to the references\nabove see Plantinga 1985 (which contains replies to Pollock and Fine),\nSalmon 1987, Menzel 1991 and 1993, Deutsch 1994, Bergmann 1996 and\n1999, Hudson 1997, Stephanou 2007, Hanson 2018, and Jacinto\n 2019.[50]", "\nAll three of the controversial logical truths of\nSQML—BF, CBF, and\n\$\\Box\\textbf{N}\$—are invalid in KQML, that is, in KQML, they\nare not logically true. The key in each case is KQML’s\nmodification of the way that quantified formulas are evaluated at\nworlds. As we saw in\n §3.3\n above, the validity of BF in SQML—its truth in every\ninterpretation—depends essentially on the fact that, in\nevaluating an existentially quantified formula \$\\exists\\nu\\varphi\$\nat an arbitrary possible world \$w,\$ the initial occurrence of\n\$\\exists\\nu\$ in the formula ranges unrestrictedly over all\nindividuals. In KQML, by contrast, the range of the initial quantifier\n\$\\exists\\nu\$ is restricted to \$\\textit{dom}(w),\$ to the\nindividuals that exist in \$w\$. And, because what exists can vary\nfrom world to world, this renders BF invalid: from\nthe fact that some world and some individual existing in that\nworld are thus and so it certainly does not follow that some\nindividual existing in the actual world and some world are\nthus and so. Notably, while in some worlds there are children of\nBergoglio, nothing here in the actual world is a child of Bergoglio in\nany world, i.e., \$\\Diamond\\exists \\sfx\\, \\sfB\\sfx\$ is true and\n\$\\exists \\sfx\\Diamond \\sfB\\sfx\$ is false. Hence, the\nBF instance", "\nexpressing the inference from\n (2)\n to\n (4)\n is false as\n well.[51]\n (See the preceding note for a more formal demonstration of the\ninvalidity of BF.)", "\nAs we also saw in\n §3.3,\n CBF entails the principle N that\neverything (i.e., everything there happens to be) is\nnecessarily identical to something. And, obviously, so too does the\nfull necessitism principle \$\\Box\$N. But N\nis clearly invalid in KQML: because world domains can vary, an\nindividual \$a\$ in the actual world might not exist in another world,\ni.e., it might be that nothing is identical to \$a\$ in some\n worlds.[52]\n Hence, since N is invalid in KQML, so are\nCBF and\n \$\\Box\$N.[53]", "\nAs noted in\n §3.2,\n the deductive system SQML is sound and complete for\nSQML—all and only the logical truths of SQML are provable in\nSQML, including the three controversial principles\nBF, CBF, and \$\\Box\$N.\nSince, as we just saw in the previous section, those principles are\nall invalid in KQML, to formulate a sound and complete deductive\nsystem of his own, Kripke had to modify SQML rather severely\nto block the derivation of those principles without also blocking any\nof KQML’s valid formulas.", "\nKripke’s solution is nicely illustrated by means of a (somewhat\ncompressed) proof in SQML of\n BF\n (the structure of which will be shared by the proof of any\nnon-trivial instance of BF):", "\nIt is clear where the problem lies: the universal instantiation schema\nQ2 is invalid in KQML! To see this in the particular\ncase of line 1, suppose that \$\\forall \\sfx \\Box \\neg \\sfB\\sfx\$ is\ntrue in (i.e., true at the “actual world” of) a given\nKripke interpretation \$\\calK\$ with individuals \$D\$ and worlds\n\$W\$. Then, by\n the quantificational clause\n in the definition of truth at a world in Kripke’s semantics,\neverything that exists in the “actual world” \$w^\\ast\$ of\n\$\\calK\$ is not in the extension of \$\\sfB\$ at any world \$u\$ in\n\$W,\$ i.e., for all \$a \\in \\textit{dom}(w^\\ast)\$ and for all \$u\n\\in W,\$ \$a \\notin \\sfB^\\calK_{u}\$. Recall, however, that the value\n\$\\sfx^\\calK\$ assigned to \$\\sfx\$ can be anything in the set \$D\$\nof individuals of \$\\calK\$; in particular, \$\\sfx^\\calK\$ might not\nexist in \$w^\\ast\$ and, hence, might well be in the extension of\n\$\\sfB\$ at some other world of \$\\calK,\$ in which case \$\\Box\\neg\n\\sfB\\sfx\$ will be false in\n \$\\calK.\$[56]", "\nHere we begin to see the logical challenge that confronts the\nactualist: a logically valid principle of SQML—in this case, a\nstandard principle of classical logic—is rendered invalid when\nwe attempt to revise our modal semantics so as to accommodate\nactualist intuitions. The challenge is then how (or whether) to revise\nthe principle in question, and this in turn often requires a choice\nbetween several competing possibilities, each of which may require\nfurther revisions still. Kripke himself avoids several options that\nmight suggest themselves in light of the invalidity of\nQ2 in KQML. For instance, taking a lead from Prior\n(1957: 33–35), an actualist might argue that\nterms—individual constants and variables (when they occur\nfreely)—are directly referring expressions like proper names and\ndemonstratives and, hence, that an accurate model theoretic\nrepresentation of actualism should require that the value\n\$\\tau^\\calK\$ that \$\\calK\$ assigns to an arbitrary term \$\\tau\$\nshould be restricted to the domain of the actual world \$w^\\ast\$ of\n\$\\calK\$—one cannot, after all, refer to individuals that\ndon’t actually exist. This modification of KQML would indeed\npreserve the validity of Q2 but at the cost of\ninvalidating Nec—notably, it would render the\ninference from line 1 to line 2 in the above proof invalid. For, while\nline 1 might now be true at the actual world \$w^\\ast\$ of an\narbitrary interpretation \$\\calK\$ because we’ve stipulated that\n\$\\sfx^\\calK\$ exist in \$w^\\ast,\$ that very fact could well render\nline 1 false at some other world \$u\$: \$\\forall \\sfx \\Box \\neg\n\\sfB\\sfx\$ might be true at \$u\$ but our actually existing individual\n\$\\sfx^\\calK,\$ although not in the extension of \$\\sfB\$ in the\nactual world, might well be in its extension at \$u\$. So, under the\nproposed modification, the question for the actualist instead becomes\nhow to modify Nec—perhaps by limiting how it\napplies to formulas involving individual constants and free variable\noccurrences in some\n way.[57]", "\nThe most common actualist response to the invalidity of\nQ2, rather than to try to preserve it by modifying\nthe semantics of KQML, is simply to replace it with its\n free logical\n counterpart (see, e.g., Fine 1978, Menzel 1991):", "\nThat is, what is true of everything—i.e., everything that\nactually exists—will be true of anything in particular\nif it is actual. Unlike Q2,\nFQ2 is valid in KQML as it stands and, moreover,\nevery instance of it is necessary: what is true of everything in a\ngiven world will be true of anything in particular if it is\nidentical with something in that world. Hence, FQ2\nraises no problems for Nec. And, critically,\noutfitted with FQ2 instead of Q2, it\nis no longer possible to prove\n BF.[58]", "\nHowever, Kripke (1963b, p. 89, note 1) is loath to adopt a solution\nthat, like the ones just suggested, involves “revising\nquantification theory or modal logic”. So instead Kripke opts\nfor another that he borrows from Quine. In his account of\nquantification, Quine (1951: §15) points out that any occurrence\nof a name in an ordinary logical truth is inessential to its truth:\nwhat is said of the referent of the name could just as well be said of\nanything. Thus, it is not in virtue of any distinctive properties of\nGod or Socrates that the following proposition is true:", "\nor, more formally:", "\n(\$\$), that is, would have been true no matter what\n“God” and “Socrates” refer to. If anything,\nthen, names obscure the grounds of logical truth. Hence, the\ndiscerning logical eye sees name occurrences in the likes of (\$\$)\nas implicitly quantified variables and, hence, sees the completely\ngeneral logical form that underlies\n it:[59]", "\nThe same goes for free variable occurrences—semantically,\nvariables are essentially names, so free variable occurrences in\nlogical truths should also be seen as implicitly universally\nquantified. Hence, properly expressed, the axioms of a\nlogical system, a system designed to have all and only\nlogical truths as its theorems, should be purely general and, hence,\nshould be purged of individual constants and free variable\noccurrences. In particular, universal instantiation, properly\nexpressed, will replace the instantiated term \$\\tau\$ in the\nconsequent of\n Q2\n with a universally quantified variable:", "\nAccordingly, line 1 of the proof of BF requires an\ninitial universal quantifier to bind the free occurrence of\n\$\\sfx\$:", "\nApplication of Nec to line 1* now yields only", "\nand the intended proof to BF* stalls out. To continue\nalong the lines of the SQML proof above we would need to be able to\nswap the initial necessity operator \$\\Box\$ in line 2* with the\nuniversal quantifier to infer", "\nThat is, we would need to be able to prove the relevant instance\nof", "\nBut, as the label indicates, this is just an equivalent form of\nCBF and, as Kripke (1963b, 88–9) notes,\nattempting to prove it under the proposed revision\nKQ2 of Q2 stalls out for the same\n reason.[60]", "\nThe necessitism principle \$\\Box\$N meets a similar fate. A\nstandard proof of \$\\Box\$N in SQML begins with an instance\nof Q2 and proceeds as follows:", "\nBut with KQ2 replacing Q2,\ncritically, we are unable to wedge the necessity operator in between\nthe two quantifiers; we can only get the likes of the following:", "\nand line 6 is unproblematically valid in KQML: it is simply the\ninnocuous triviality that everything in a given world is identical to\nsomething in that world—not, as \$\\Box\$N\nwould have it, in every world.", "\nTwo further important modifications to the framework of SQML follow\nfrom Kripke’s Quinean conception of the purely general nature of\nlogical truth. First, individual constants have no place; since there\nare no individual constants in any axioms, there are none in any\ntheorems. Hence, it is not possible to reason with them in\nKripke’s system. Consequently, Kripke restricts his semantics to\nlanguages with no individual\n constants.[61]\n Second, under the Quinean conception, the manner in which quantifiers\nand modal operators are introduced into proofs needs serious revision.\nFor example, the proposition \$\\forall \\sfx(\\sfF\\sfx \\to \\sfF\\sfx)\$\nis valid in KQML. In SQML, it is proved by deriving the\ntautology \$\\sfF\\sfx \\to \\sfF\\sfx\$ and applying the rule of\nGeneralization:", "\nBut axioms can’t have free variables under the Quinean\nconception and, hence, that proof is not available. Likewise, the\nde re validity \$\\forall \\sfx\\,\\Box(\\Box \\sfF\\sfx \\to\n\\sfF\\sfx)\$ is proved in SQML by applying the rule of\nNecessitation to the T instance \$\\Box \\sfF\\sfx \\to\n\\sfF\\sfx\$ and then generalizing:", "\nBut again, for the same reason, this proof is also unavailable.", "\nKripke’s solution here—once again borrowing from Quine\n(1951)—jettisons both Gen and\nNec and cleverly incorporates the desired effects of\nboth rules directly into his specification of the logical axioms of\nhis deductive system—which, of course, we will call\nKQML. To express the solution clearly, say that a formula is\nclosed if it contains no free variable occurrences, and\ndefine a closure of a formula \$\\varphi\$ to be any closed\nformula resulting from prefixing a (possibly empty) string of\nuniversal quantifiers and necessity operators, in any order, to\n\$\\varphi\$. Then, given a language \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ without any\nindividual constants, any closure of any instance of any of\nthe following schemas is an axiom of KQML:", "\nShould the serious actualism constraint be enforced, we add:", "\nAs noted, KQML’s sole rule of inference is\nMP, Modus Ponens. Accordingly, a proof\nin KQML is a finite sequence of formulas of \$\\scrL_\\Box\$\nsuch that each is either an axiom of KQML or follows from\npreceding formulas in the sequence by MP.", "\nCrucially, then, with regard to such KQML validities as \$\\forall\n\\sfx(\\sfF\\sfx \\to \\sfF\\sfx)\$ and \$\\forall \\sfx\\,\\Box(\\Box \\sfF\\sfx\n\\to \\sfF\\sfx)\$ that are derivable in SQML by applications of\nGen and Nec, instances of\nthe above schemas can contain free variable occurrences. So, in\nparticular, \$\\forall \\sfx(\\sfF\\sfx \\to \\sfF\\sfx)\$ is a closure of\nthe propositional tautology \$\\sfF\\sfx \\to \\sfF\\sfx,\$ and \$\\forall\n\\sfx\\,\\Box(\\Box \\sfF\\sfx \\to \\sfF\\sfx)\$ is a closure of the\nT instance \$\\Box \\sfF\\sfx \\to \\sfF\\sfx\$ and, hence,\nboth validities are axioms (hence theorems) of KQML.", "\nWith these modifications in place, Kripke is able to demonstrate that\nhis deductive system KQML is sound and complete for closed\nformulas relative to his semantics. Soundness, in particular, tells us\nthat no invalid formula is provable in the system. Hence, since\nBF, CBF, and \$\\Box\\textbf{N}\$ are\nall invalid in KQML, soundness guarantees that they are all unprovable\nin KQML.", "\nOn the face of it, KQML provides the actualist with a powerful\nalternative to SQML. However, one might well question its actualist\ncredentials. Specifically, despite the invalidity of the\nactualistically objectionable principles BF,\nCBF, and \$\\Box\$N, it is questionable\nwhether KQML has escaped ontological commitment to\npossibilia, for the following reason. KQML provides us with a\nformal semantics for (constant-free) modal languages \$\\scrL_\\Box\$\nand, in particular, an account of how the truth value of a given\nformula \$\\varphi\$ of \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ is determined in an\ninterpretation by the meanings assigned to its semantically\nsignificant component parts, notably, the meanings of its predicates.\n As noted above\n in our exposition of SQML, truth-in-a-model is not the same as truth\nsimpliciter. However, given an\n applied modal language\n \$\\scrL_\\Box,\$ we were able to define a notion of modal truth\nsimpliciter for formulas of \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ in terms of truth\nin an intended interpretation, an interpretation \$\\calM\$\nfor \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ comprising the very things that the language is\nintuitively understood to be “about”. Thus, when \$\\calM\$\nis an intended SQML interpretation, the things it is about are the\nhonest-to-goodness actual and merely possible individuals in the\ndomain \$D\$ of \$\\calM\$ and the honest-to-goodness possible worlds\nof \$W\$. In particular, if our applied language is one in which\n\$\\Diamond\\exists \\sfx\\, \\sfB\\sfx\$ is meant to express that Bergoglio\nmight have had children, \$D\$ will include at least some of his\nmerely possible children and \$W\$ will contain a world in which some\nof them are, in fact, his children and hence concrete and,\nhence, in which they are actual in the sense of\n A!Def.\n There is thus, more generally, for each world \$w \\in W,\$ the set\n\$D_w\$ of things in \$D\$ that are actual in \$w\$. Note, however,\nthat, in light of this, we can transform \$\\calM\$ into a KQML\ninterpretation \$\\calK_\\calM\$ simply by defining a function \$\\mathit\ndom\$ that, for each world \$w \\in W,\$ returns exactly the set\n\$D_w\$. However, that is simply a formal modification that affects\nthe evaluation of quantified formulas at worlds; it does not alter\n\$\\calK_\\calM\$’s ontological\ncommitments, which are still exactly those of \$\\calM\$. But there\nseems no other way to construct a notion of an intended\nKripke interpretation that will yield the right truth values for\npropositions like\n (2).\n From this perspective, the invalidity of BF,\nCBF, and \$\\Box\$N in KQML—in\nparticular, their falsity in an intended Kripke interpretation\n\$\\calK_\\calM\$—results from a simple adjustment of the\nsemantical apparatus with no substantive change in the metaphysics. So\ninstead of a genuinely actualist alternative to the possibilist\ncommitments of SQML, KQML appears to remain no less steeped in\nthem—the denizens of other worlds that are not in the domain of\nthe actual world simply fail to be actual in the sense of\n A!Def.\n Of course, this metalinguistic fact cannot be expressed in\n\$\\scrL_\\Box\$—even if one adds the actuality predicate to\n\$\\scrL_\\Box,\$ due to the quantifier restrictions in the semantics of\nKQML, the assertion that there are things that aren’t actual,\n\$\\exists \\sfx\\, \\neg \\sfA!\\sfx,\$ will be false in \$\\calK_\\calM\$ at\nevery world. But that does not make the possibilist commitments of\n\$\\calK_\\calM\$\n disappear.[63]", "\nAn option for the actualist here, perhaps, is simply to deny that\nKripke interpretations have any genuine metaphysical bite. Rather, the\nrole of Kripke’s possible world semantics is simply to get the\nintuitive validities right; soundness and completeness proofs for\nKQML then demonstrate that the system preserves those\nintuitive validities and, hence, that it is a trustworthy vehicle for\nreasoning directly about the modal facts of the matter. The formal\nsemantics proper is just a useful device toward this end. However, on\nthe face of it, anyway, this instrumentalist take on Kripke’s\nsemantics is an uncomfortable one for the actualist. Consider ordinary\nTarskian semantics for classical first-order logic FOL. Intuitively,\nthis semantics is more than just a formal instrument. Rather, an\nintended interpretation for a given applied language \$\\scrL\$ shows\nclearly how the semantic values of the relevant parts of a formula of\n\$\\scrL\$—the objects, properties, relations, etc. in the world\nthose parts signify—contribute to the actual truth value of the\nsentence. The semantics thus provides insight into the\n“word-world” connection that explains how it is that\nsentences of natural language can express truth and falsity, how they\ncan carry good and bad information. The possibilist is able to\ngeneralize this understanding of the semantics of first-order\nlanguages directly to modal languages \$\\scrL_\\Box\$. The embarrassing\nquestion for the actualist who would take the proposed instrumentalist\nline on Kripke’s semantics is: what distinguishes Kripkean\nsemantics from Tarskian? Why does the latter yield insight into the\nword-world connection and not the former? Actualists owe us either an\nexplanation of how Kripke’s semantics can be understood\nnon-instrumentally without entailing possibilism or a plausible\ninstrumentalist answer to the possibilist challenge. The former option\nis explored in\n §4.2,\n the latter in\n §4.3\n and\n §4.4." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Kripke Semantics and Its Logic" }, { "content": [ "\nOne of the best known responses to the possibilist challenge was\ndeveloped by Alvin Plantinga (1974, 1976). Plantinga’s response\n(more or less as fleshed out formally by Jager (1982)) requires no\nsignificant modifications to KQML beyond explicitly adopting the\n serious actualism\n condition discussed at the end of\n §4.1.1.[64]\n Rather, his response has almost entirely to do with the metaphysics\nof intended interpretations, or what he calls applied\nsemantics. More specifically, he claims to provide an\nactualistically acceptable ontology for constructing intended\ninterpretations for applied languages.", "\nTo appreciate Plantinga’s account, note first that a challenge\nto actualism that we have not focused on hitherto is the nature of\n possible worlds\n themselves. The main reason for this is simply that the basic\nsemantic argument for possibilia laid out in the Introduction\nto this entry does not assume or require them. If, however, one takes\npossible world semantics of some ilk seriously, so that possibility\nand necessity are correlated in some manner with truth at some or all\npossible worlds, then, insofar as possibilia are said to\nexist in non-actual possible worlds, such worlds are\nthemselves reasonably classified as some variety of\npossibilia themselves, some variety of merely possible,\nnon-existent object. Hence, because Plantinga takes possible world\nsemantics seriously, the first task he sets for himself is to define\npossible worlds in an actualistically acceptable way.", "\nPlantinga defines a possible world to be a state of affairs\nof a certain sort. A state of affairs for Plantinga is an abstract,\nfine-grained, proposition-like entity characteristically referred to\nby sentential gerunds like the earth’s being smaller than\nthe\n sun.[65]\n Some states of affairs obtain and others do not: the\nearth’s being smaller than the sun obtains;\nseven’s being the sum of three and five does\n not.[66]\n Importantly, all states of affairs are necessary beings irrespective\nof whether or not they obtain. A state of affairs \$s\$ is\npossible if it possibly obtains; \$s\$ includes\nanother state of affairs \$s'\$ if, necessarily, \$s\$ obtains only if\n\$s'\$ does and \$s\$ excludes \$s'\$ if it is not possible\nthat both \$s\$ and \$s'\$ obtain; \$s\$ is maximal if, for\nany state of affairs \$s',\$ \$s\$ either includes or excludes \$s'\$.\nA possible world, then, is a maximal possible state of\naffairs; and the actual world is the possible world that, in\nfact, obtains. It is easy to show that, under those definitions, a\nstate of affairs is a possible world just in case it possibly includes\nall and only the states of affairs that obtain. Since worlds are\nstates of affairs and, for Plantinga, states of affairs are all\nactually existing abstract entities, their existence is consistent\nwith actualism, as desired.", "\nThe core of Plantinga’s answer to the possibilist challenge is\nthe notion of an (individual) essence, an idea that traces\nback clearly at least to\n Boethius.[67]\n Plantinga defines the\n essential properties\n of an object to be those properties that it couldn’t possibly\nhave lacked without simply failing to exist\n altogether.[68]\n A bit more formally put: \$P\$ is essential to \$a\$ just in case,\nnecessarily, if \$a\$ exists (i.e., for an actualist like Plantinga,\nif something is identical to \$a\$), then \$a\$ has \$P\$.\nIntuitively, the essential properties of an object are the ones that\nmake the object “what it is”. For example, on at least\nsome conceptions of human persons, being human is essential\nto Bergoglio while being Catholic isn’t—there is\n(on these conceptions) no possible world containing Bergoglio in which\nhe fails to be human but many in which he, say, becomes a Buddhist\nmonk or is a lifelong atheist. A property is an essence of an object\n\$a,\$ then, just in case (i) it is essential to \$a\$ and (ii)\nnothing but \$a\$ could have exemplified it; and a property\nis an essence simpliciter just in case it is possibly an\nessence of something.", "\nA critical, and distinctive, element of Plantinga’s account is\nthat there are many unexemplified essences, i.e., essences that are\nnot, in fact, the essences of anything, specifically, those\nhe dubs haecceities. Haecceities are “purely\nnonqualitative” properties like being Plantinga, or\nperhaps, being identical with Plantinga, that do no more than\ncharacterize an object \$a\$ as that very thing. Pretty\nclearly, haecceities are essences: Plantinga, for example, could not\nhave existed and failed to have the property being Plantinga\nand it is not possible that anything else have that property. And,\nimportantly, qua abstract property, like all essences,\nbeing Plantinga exists necessarily, whether exemplified or\nnot—although, of course, had it not been exemplified, it\nwouldn’t have had the name “being Plantinga”, or any\nname at all, for that matter.", "\nAs we saw in\n §4.1.3\n above, the problem with KQML for actualists is that an intended\nKripke interpretation for an applied modal language \$\\scrL_\\Box\$\nappears to involve commitment to possibilia no less than\nSQML—to get the truth values of propositions like\n (2)\n right, an intended Kripke interpretation \$\\calK\$ for \$\\scrL_\\Box\$\nwill still have to include mere possibilia like\nBergoglio’s merely possible children; indeed, but for the\naddition of the domain function \$\\textit{dom}\$ on worlds tacked on\nto invalidate the problematic validities of SQML, \$\\calK\$ will be\nindistinguishable from an intended SQML interpretation of\n\$\\scrL_\\Box\$. Plantinga’s diagnosis, roughly put, is that\nKripke’s semantics gets the structure of the modal\nuniverse right but that it needs his worlds and haecceities to realize\nthat structure in an actualistically acceptable way. Specifically, an\nintended haecceitist interpretation \$\\calH\$ for an applied\nmodal language \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ is a Kripke interpretation that\nspecifies sets \$D\$ and \$W\$ as usual, but \$W\$ is a sufficiently\nexpansive set of Plantinga’s maximal possible states of affairs\nand \$D\$ a corresponding set of haecceities. The domain function\n\$\\textit{dom}\$ as usual will map each possible world \$w\$ to a\nsubset of \$D,\$ i.e., to a set of haecceities that Plantinga refers\nto as the essential domain of \$w\$. This is the set of\nhaecceities that are exemplified in \$w,\$ where a haecceity\n\$h\$ is exemplified in \$w\$ just in case \$w\$ includes the state of\naffairs \$h\$’s being\nexemplified. Otherwise put, the essential domain\n\$\\textit{dom}(w)\$ of \$w\$ consists of those haecceities that would\nhave been exemplified if \$w\$ had obtained. Since, as noted above,\nhaecceities are necessary beings that exist even if unexemplfied, they\ncan serve as actually existing “proxies” for the\nindividuals there would have been had \$w\$ obtained (Bennett\n2006). In this way, Plantinga’s haecceitist interpretations can\nrepresent the possibilist’s non-actual worlds and their\nmerely possible inhabitants without incurring any possibilist\ncommitments.", "\nBecause an intended haecceitist interpretation \$\\calH\$ for an\napplied language \$\\scrL_\\Box\$ is a Kripke interpretation (with the\nserious actualism constraint enforced), every variable \$\\nu\$ is, as\nusual, assigned a member \$\\nu^\\calH\$ of the set \$D\$ of individuals\nof \$\\calH,\$ i.e., a haecceity, and every predicate \$\\pi\$ is\nassigned a set \$\\pi_w^\\calH\$ of n-tuples of haecceities in\nthe essential domain of \$w,\$ for each world \$w \\in W\$. Monadic\natomic formulas, in particular, are evaluated as usual: \$\\pi\\nu\$ is\ntrue\$_w^\\calH\$ just in case \$\\nu^\\calH\n\\in \\pi_w^\\calH\$. However, although the formal truth\nconditions in \$\\calH\$ for atomic formulas do not differ from those\ndefined for atomic formulas in an intended SQML interpretation\n\$\\calM,\$ it is important to understand that, in these different\ncontexts, those formally identical truth conditions represent starkly\ndifferent metaphysical conditions. Specifically, in an intended SQML\ninterpretation \$\\calM,\$ that \$\\nu^\\calM \\in \\pi_w^\\calM\$ indicates\nthat, at \$w,\$ the (perhaps merely possible) object \$\\nu^\\calM\$\nexemplifies the property \$P_\\pi\$ expressed by \$\\pi\$. By contrast,\nin an intended haecceitist interpretation \$\\calH,\$ that \$\\nu^\\calH\n\\in \\pi_w^\\calH\$ indicates, not that \$h\$ exemplifies\n\$P_\\pi\$ at \$w,\$ but that it is coexemplified with\n\$P_\\pi\$ at \$w\$. Thus, for example, the truth condition for\n (2)—formalized\n as \$\\Diamond\\exists \\sfx\\, \\sfB\\sfx\$—in an intended\nhaecceitist interpretation \$\\calH\$ is obviously not that\nthere is a possible world in which some haecceity \$h\$ is one of\nBergoglio’s children—haecceities are properties and,\nhence, necessarily non-concrete—but, rather, that", "\nLikewise for n-place atomic formulas generally:\n\$\\rho\\nu_1\\ldots\\nu_n\$ is true at \$w\$ just in case the haecceities\n\$\\nu_1^\\calH, \\ldots, \\nu_n^\\calH,\$ respectively, are coexemplified\nwith the relation \$R_\\rho\$ that \$\\rho\$ expresses in \$w\$.\nPlantinga’s haecceitism thus delivers the same sort of\nsystematic, compositional account of the truth conditions for modal\npropositions as possibilism but without the commitment to unactualized\npossibilia.", "\nIt is important to be clear on the fact that coexemplification at a\nworld is primitive here, and not definable in terms of\nexemplification. Of course, if a (monadic) atomic formula \$\\pi\\nu\$\nis in fact true in an intended haecceitist interpretation\n\$\\calH,\$ i.e., if it is true at the actual world \$w^\\ast,\$ then\nthere is an object that exemplifies both \$\\nu^\\calH\$ and\n\$P_\\pi\$—notwithstanding the fact that this implication is not\nitself represented in \$\\calH,\$ since \$\\textit{dom}(w^\\ast)\$ only\ncontains haecceities, not the objects that exemplify them. However, it\nis critical not to generalize this implication and take the\ncoexemplification of two properties—notably, a haecceity \$h\$\nand some property \$P\$—at a world \$w\$ to imply that\nthere is something that exemplifies them at \$w\$. For if that were\nso, then the truth conditions for the likes of\n (2)\n would once again entail that there are possibilia, and\nPlantinga could rightly be accused of being committed to them—he\nsimply ignores them in his haecceitist model theory. But the\ncorrect implication is this: if \$\\pi\\nu\$ is true\$_{w}^\\calH\$,\nso that \$\\nu^\\calH\$ is\ncoexemplified with \$P_\\pi\$ at \$w,\$ then, had \$w\$\nobtained, there would have been an individual that would\nhave exemplified both \$\\nu^\\calH\$ and \$P_\\pi\$. Importantly,\nthough, the fact that \$\\nu^\\calH\$ is coexemplified with \$P_\\pi\$ at\n\$w\$ stands on its own; it does not hold in virtue of the\ncorresponding counterfactual. Indeed, the dependency goes in the other\ndirection: that there could have been an individual with \$P_\\pi\$\n(and would have been had \$w\$ obtained) is true in virtue of the fact\nthat some (actually existing) haecceity is possibly coexemplified with\n\$P_\\pi\$.", "\nPlantinga’s haecceitist account illustrates an important point\nabout most forms of actualism that is sometimes a source of confusion,\nnamely, that most actualists are also modalists. That is,\nmost actualists take the English modal operators\n“necessarily”, “possibly”, and the like,\ncollectively, to be primitive and, hence, not to be definable in terms\nof non-modal notions. On the face of it, however, insofar as the\nformal operators \$\\Box\$ and \$\\Diamond\$ are taken to symbolize\ntheir English counterparts, defining the modal operators would appear\nto be exactly what possible world semantics purports to do. For,\nunlike\n the classical connectives and quantifiers,\n in basic possible world semantics the modal operators are not\ninterpreted homophonically. That is, they are not interpreted\nwith the very natural language operators they are intended to\nrepresent—a necessitation \$\\Box\\psi,\$ in particular, is not\ndefined to be true in an interpretation just in case \$\\psi\$ is\nnecessarily true in it. Rather, in basic possible world\nsemantics, the necessity operator is interpreted as a restricted\nuniversal quantifier: a necessitation \$\\Box\\psi\$ is true in an\ninterpretation \$\\calM\$ just in case \$\\psi\$ is true at every\npossible world of \$\\calM\$. However, whether or not that proves\nto be a definition of the necessity operator depends on what\none takes a possible world to be.\n David Lewis\n famously\n defined possible worlds\n to be (typically) large, scattered concrete objects similar in kind\nbut spatio-temporally unconnected to our own physical universe. Under\nsuch an understanding of possible worlds, possible world semantics\narguably provides a genuine definition of the modal operators on which\nthe truth conditions assigned to modal formulas do not themselves\ninvolve any modal\n notions.[69]\n As it is sometimes put, such a definition is\n“eliminative” or “reductive”—modal\nnotions are eliminated in the semantics in favor of quantification\nover (non-modal) worlds.", "\nPlantinga’s haecceitist semantics is decidedly not of this sort.\n Recall,\n in particular, that Plantinga defines a possible world to be a\nmaximal possible state of affairs. Spelling this definition out\nexplicitly in the truth condition for necessitations (under an\nintended haecceitist interpretation \$\\calH\$) then yields:", "\n\n\n\$\\Box\\psi\$ is true if and only if \$\\psi\$ is true at all states of\naffairs \$w\$ such that (i) for all states of affairs \$s,\$ either,\nnecessarily, \$w\$ obtains only if \$s\$ does or,\nnecessarily, \$w\$ obtains only if \$s\$ doesn’t, and\n(ii) possibly, \$w\$ obtains.\n", "\nClearly, the truth condition here interprets the modal operator\n\$\\Box\$ homophonically and, hence, on pain of circularity, cannot be\ntaken to provide any kind of eliminative analysis of the modal\noperator \$\\Box.\$ But, as we’ve detailed at length, such an\nanalysis is not Plantinga’s goal. Rather, his account is meant\nto show how the truth conditions for atomic formulas in an intended\ninterpretation serve to ground propositions like\n (2)\n in the modal properties of haecceities. (His truth conditions are\nthus perhaps better thought of as grounding conditions.)\nGiven such an interpretation, then, the truth conditional clauses of\nPlantinga’s theory yield non-eliminative but philosophically\nilluminating equivalences that reveal the connections between\nthe statements expressible in a basic modal language \$\\scrL_\\Box\$\nand the deeper metaphysical truths of his\n theory.[70]", "\nHaecceities are thus the key to Plantinga’s answers to both\nprongs of possibilism’s\n twofold challenge to actualism.\n First, Plantinga’s haecceitist semantics delivers a\ncompositional theory of truth conditions that grounds general de\ndicto modal propositions like\n (2)\n systematically in the modal properties of individuals of a certain\nsort—specifically, coexemplification relations that haecceities\nstand in with other properties at possible worlds. Second, his\nhaecceitist semantics enables him to adopt KQML (with the serious\nactualism constraint) without modification and, hence, to have a\nrobust quantified modal logic that has no possibilist commitments." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Haecceitism" }, { "content": [ "\nAs robust as the haecceitist solution is, many actualists find that it\ngrates against some very strong intuitions, especially about the\nnature of properties. \nBut there is a deeper issue dividing the haecceitists from other\nactualists. To clarify, consider that many propositions are\nsingular in form. That is, unlike general propositions like\nall whales are mammals, some propositions are “directly\nabout” specific individuals—for example, the proposition\nMarie Curie was a German citizen. Call the individuals a\nsingular proposition is directly about the subjects of the\nproposition. Singular propositions are typically expressed by means of\nsentences involving names, pronouns, indexicals, or other devices of\ndirect reference. As we’ve seen, possibilists believe that there\nare singular propositions whose subjects are not actual, viz.,\npropositions about mere possibilia: for the possibilist,\nrecall,\n (2)\n is grounded in singular propositions of the form \$a\$ is\nBergoglio’s child, for possibilia \$a\$.\nSimilarly, haecceitists like Plantinga, although actualists in the\nstrict sense, also believe there are singular possibilities that are\nin a derivative but clear sense directly about things that don’t\nexist, viz., those possibilities involving unexemplified haecceities\nlike \$h\$ is coexemplified with being Bergoglio’s\nchild. Say that a strict actualist is an actualist who\nrejects the idea that there are, or even could be, singular\npropositions that are directly about things that do not exist in\neither the possibilist’s or the haecceitist’s sense. It\nfollows that, had some actually existing individual \$a\$ failed to\nexist, there would have been no singular propositions about \$a\$; or,\nas Prior puts it, there would have been no facts about \$a,\$\nnot even the fact that \$a\$ fails to exist (see, e.g., Prior 1957:\n48–49); or again: singular propositions supervene on\nthe individuals they are about. For the strict actualist, then,\nnecessarily, all propositions are either wholly general or, at most,\nare directly about existing individuals only.", "\nSo understood, the strict actualist rejects the intuition that drives\nboth possibilism and haecceitism, viz., that de dicto modal\npropositions like\n (2)\n are grounded ultimately in the modal properties of, and relations\namong, individuals of some ilk. Rather, our illustrative statement\n (2)\n is, ultimately, brute; it is true simply because it is possible that\n(or there is a world at which) something is Bergoglio’s child,\nfull stop, as there is nothing to instantiate the quantifier; there is\nnothing such that, possibly (or, at some world), it is\nBergoglio’s child.", "\nHow then do things stand for the strict actualist with respect to the\nfirst element of the possibilist’s two-fold challenge? The\nanswer of course depends entirely on what one takes to be a\n“systematically and philosophically satisfying” account of\nthe truth conditions for modal assertions like\n (2).\n Possibilists (and their haecceitist and eliminitivist counterparts)\nclearly consider preservation of Tarski-style compositionality\n(formalized in an appropriate notion of an intended\ninterpretation) to be essential for meeting this element of the\nchallenge: one must ultimately be able to ground the truth of complex\nmodal statements in the modal properties of (perhaps nonactual,\nperhaps abstract) individuals. But it is not at all clear that the\nstrict actualist must agree. They might well rather simply reject this\ndemand and insist instead that\n (2)\n and its like stand on their own and do not need the sort of grounding\nthat possibilists insist upon. Since this is simply a consequence of\nthe rejection of possibilia and their actualist proxies, from\nthe strict actualist perspective, it is a philosophically satisfying\nresult. The apparent loss of Tarski-style compositionality is, for the\nstrict actualist, a price worth\n paying.[71]\n From this perspective, possible world semantics can with some\njustification be seen as nothing more than a useful but ontologically\ninert formal instrument, an evocative but ultimately dispensable\nphilosophical\n heuristic.[72]\n In that case, the only serious challenge that possibilism raises for\nthe strict actualist is the formulation of an actualistically kosher\nquantified modal deductive system whose basic principles\nintuitively reflect strict actualist sensibilities. We turn now to two\nof the best known accounts. (We will follow common practice and refer\nto a deductive system with or without a corresponding formal model\ntheory as a\n logic.[73])", "\nIt was Arthur Prior who, in 1956, first proved that\nBF is a theorem of SQML (without identity).\nClearly aware of its possibilist and necessitist implications, Prior\nsought to develop a logic consistent with strict actualism and, hence,\na logic in which BF, CBF, and\n\$\\Box\$N all fail. The result was his deductive system\n\$Q\$. The first installment—the propositional component\n(Prior 1957: chs. IV and\n V[74])—arrived\n only a year later; quantification theory with identity was added a\ndecade later (Prior 1968b, 1968c).", "\nRecall that the central intuition driving strict actualism is that,\nnecessarily, a singular proposition supervenes on the individuals it\nis about—call these individuals the subjects of the\nproposition—and, hence, that, necessarily, there is simply no\ninformation, no singular propositions, about things that fail to\nexist; if \$p\$ is a singular proposition about \$a,\$ then,\nnecessarily, \$p\$ exists only if \$a\$ does. Conversely, necessarily,\nif all the individuals \$p\$ is about exist, then so does \$p\$. Prior\nexpressed this connection between singular propositions and their\nsubjects in terms of formulas and their constituent singular terms,\ni.e., their constituent individual constants and free variables. And,\nin formulating \$Q\$, instead of the existence or nonexistence of\npropositions, Prior typically spoke of the “statability”\nor “unstatability” of the formulas that express\n them.[75]\n Specifically, let \$\\varphi\$ be a formula and \$p_\\varphi\$ the\nsingular proposition \$\\varphi\$ expresses. Intuitively, then, for\nPrior, \$\\varphi\$ is statable, or formulable,\nat a world \$w\$ if and only if \$p_\\varphi\$ exists at \$w\$\nand, hence, if and only if all of \$p_\\varphi\$’s\nsubjects exist at \$w\$.\nThus, where \$a_\\tau\$ is the denotation of a singular term\n\$\\tau\$:", "\nHence, in particular, if any of the \$a_{\\tau_i}\$ fails to exist at\n\$w,\$ then \$\\varphi\$ is unstatable there.", "\nSo far, there is little for any strict actualist to take issue with in\nPrior’s framing of the issues here. However, Prior makes a\ncritical inference about unstatability that distinguishes his logic\nstarkly from other varieties of strict actualism (call it\nPrior’s Gap Principle):", "\nThe logical implications of Gap are dramatic. Note\nfirst that the usual interdefinability of necessity and possibility\nfails. To see this for the particular case of SQML’s\n \$\\Diamond\\textbf{Def}\$,\n consider, say, the obvious truth that Bergoglio is not a subatomic\nparticle—say, a proton, \$\\neg \\sfP\\sfb\$. Since Bergoglio is a\ncontingent being, there are worlds where he doesn’t exist.\nHence, there are worlds where \$\\neg \\sfP\\sfb\$ fails to be statable\nand thus, by Gap, where it is neither true nor false\nand thus in particular where it is not true. It follows that \$\\neg\n\\sfP\\sfb\$ is not necessary, \$\\neg\\Box\\neg \\sfP\\sfb.\$ But,\nobviously, \$\\Diamond \\sfP\\sfb\$ does not follow; assuming that\nBergoglio is essentially human, it is not possible that he is a\nproton. So \$\\Diamond\\textbf{Def}\$ will not do. By the same token, if\nBergoglio is essentially human, it is impossible that he fail to be\nhuman, \$\\neg\\Diamond\\neg \\sfH\\sfb\$. For \$\\neg \\sfH\\sfb\$ is\nobviously not true in worlds where he exists, and in worlds where he\ndoesn’t, it is not statable and hence, by Gap\nagain, neither true nor false and thus again not true. But \$\\Box\n\\sfH\\sfb\$ does not follow; for \$\\sfH\\sfb\$ is also not statable,\nhence not true, in Bergoglio-free worlds. So necessity cannot be\ndefined as usual in terms of possibility—impossible falsehood\ndoes not imply necessary truth. Rather, necessity is impossible\nfalsehood plus necessary statability. Otherwise put: if a\nstatement \$\\varphi\$ couldn’t be false, then in order for it to\nbe necessarily true, the proposition it expresses must necessarily\nexist.", "\nTo capture this implication of Gap formally, and to\naxiomatize the logic of strict actualism (under Gap)\ngenerally, Prior makes basically two changes to the language\n\$\\scrL_\\Box\$—call this language \$\\scrL_{Q}\$. First, for\nreasons that will become evident shortly, he takes \$\\Diamond\$ rather\nthan \$\\Box\$ as a primitive operator. Secondly, he adds a new\nsentential operator \$\\text S\$ for necessary statability\n(“n-statability”) to \$\\scrL_\\Box\$. It is also\nuseful to think of impossible falsehood as a sort of weak\nnecessity signified by its own operator:", "\nNecessity proper—or strong necessity—is then\ndefinable in \$\\scrL_Q\$ as indicated in terms of weak necessity and\nn-statability:", "\nAxiom Schemas for Necessary Statability", "\nPrior’s first axiom for n-statability is that it is not\na property a statement \$\\varphi\$ could lack if it could have it all;\notherwise put: if the proposition that \$\\varphi\$ expresses\ncould exist necessarily, then it does exist\nnecessarily:", "\nPrior’s next two axioms for n-statability express\nprinciple S above. The first captures the\nleft-to-right direction that, intuitively, expresses the supervenience\nof propositions on their subjects: a statement \$\\varphi\$ is\nn-statable only if the things referred to in \$\\varphi\$ are\nnecessary beings. Prior could in fact express that the object\nsignified by an individual constant \$\\sfa\$ is necessary in the usual\nfashion as \$\\Box\\exists \\sfx\\,\\sfx=\\sfa\$ but, given\n\$\\Box\$Def\$_Q\$, this unpacks rather cumbersomely to \$\\rS\n\\exists \\sfx\\,\\sfx=\\sfa \\land ◼\\exists \\sfx\\,\\sfx=\\sfa\$. However,\nas we will see, in the context of \$Q\$ this is equivalent simply\nto \$\\rS \\exists \\sfx\\,\\sfx=\\sfa.\$ For convenience, Prior shortens\nthis to \$\\rS \\sfa\$; more\n generally:[76]", "\nNow say that a term \$\\tau\$ occurring in a formula \$\\varphi\$ is\nfree in \$\\varphi\$ if \$\\tau\$ is either an individual\nconstant or a variable with a free occurrence in \$\\varphi,\$ and say\nthat \$\\varphi\$ is singular if some term is free in it and\nwholly general otherwise. Given this, Prior axiomatizes the\nleft-to-right direction of principle S as\nfollows:", "\nThat is, a singular assertion \$\\varphi\$ is n-statable only\nif each individual that it names is a necessary being.", "\nPrior’s final axiom for n-statability is essentially\nthe converse: if all the individuals that \$\\varphi\$ names are\nnecessary, then \$\\varphi\$ is n-statable. A simple\nconvention enables us clearly to express this axiom (and others below)\nschematically. Let \$\\theta\$ be any formula of \$\\scrL_{Q}\$; then,\nfor any \$n \\ge 0,\$", "\nIt is useful to note that, under this convention, when \$n \\gt 0,\$\n\$\\rS \\tau_1\\ldots\\tau_n \\to \\theta\$ is equivalent to \$(\\rS\n\\tau_1\\,\\land\\,\\ldots\\,\\land\\,\\rS \\tau_n) \\to \\theta,\$ and that, when\n\$n=0,\$ \$\\rS \\tau_1\\ldots\\tau_n \\to \\theta\$ is just \$\\theta.\$[77]\n Given this, we can express Prior’s final axiom for\nn-statability as follows:", "\nNote in particular that it follows from\nS3—specifically, from the case\n\$n=0\$—that every wholly general formula is\nn-statable.", "\nBy S2 and S3 together, then, a\nformula \$\\varphi\$ is n-statable if and only if all of its\ncomponent free terms are. Or, more informally put: the proposition\nthat \$\\varphi\$ expresses exists necessarily if and only if all of\nits subjects do.", "\nGiven the axioms for \$\\text S\$ we can lay out the rest of\nPrior’s system \$Q\$. For its non-modal foundations,\n\$Q\$ takes every propositional tautology (not just its closures,\nas in KQML) to be an axiom and follows SQML in\nadopting standard classical axioms for quantification and identity.\nHowever, the non-modal fragment of the system itself is not\nquite classical. For reasons we will discuss below, it\nincludes a modified version of modus ponens that renders some\nclassical first-order validities unprovable.", "\n\$Q\$ also has its own version of\n Gen,\n which, recall, allows us to universally generalize on constants as if\nthey were free variables:", "\n\$Q\$ preserves the classical assumption that all names denote\nsomething: for any term \$\\tau\$ other than the variable \$\\nu,\$\n\$\\exists \\nu\\,\\nu =\\tau\$ is a theorem; in the special case where\n\$\\nu\$ is \$\\sfy\$ and \$\\tau\$ is \$\\sfa\$:", "\nHowever, because of the qualification in MP\$_{Q}\$, the\nintuitively weaker classical theorem that something exists—more\nexactly, that something is self-identical, \$\\exists \\sfy\\,\n\\sfy=\\sfy\$—is not provable. The usual proof in\nclassical predicate logic runs along the above lines:", "\nIn classical logic, of course, \$\\exists \\sfy\\, \\sfy=\\sfy\$ is\nimmediate from lines 4 and 5 by MP. However,\nMP\$_{Q}\$ only yields", "\nThat is, in \$Q\$, that something exists only follows from the\nself-identity of some particular object if that object is a\nnecessary being, an object that exists in every possible world. We\nwill be able to appreciate Prior’s motivations here (explained\n below)\n once Q’s underlying propositional modal logic is in\nplace.", "\n\$Q\$’s propositional modal axiom schemas are structurally\nidentical to those of SQML, but with weak necessity in place\nof strong\n necessity:[78]", "\nLikewise its rule of necessitation; because some logical truths are\nnot n-statable and, hence, not true in every\nworld—notably, singular logical truths like Prior, if a\nlogician, is a logician, \$\\sfL\\sfp \\to \\sfL\\sfp\$—we can\nonly infer that an arbitrary logical truth is weakly necessary, false\nin no world:", "\nPrior touted \$Q\$ as a “modal logic for contingent\nbeings” (1957: 50). It is therefore a rather awkward theorem of\n\$Q\$ that there are no contingent beings in the strong,\nactualist sense of\n Cont\$_{\\exists}\$:\n since, for any term \$\\tau\$ other than \$\\sfy,\$ \$\\exists \\sfy\\,\n\\sfy=\\tau\$ is a theorem of \$Q\$, by Nec\$_{Q}\$ (and\n \$◼\$Def)\n it is weakly necessary, \$\\neg\\Diamond\\neg\\exists \\sfy\\,\\sfy=\\tau,\$\nand the problematic theorem", "\n\$\\forall \\sfx\\, \\neg\\textsf{Contingent}_{\\exists}(\\sfx)\$", "\nfollows directly by Gen\$\\astQ\$ and\nCont\$_\\exists\$. However, Prior (1967: 150)\nargues that there is still a robust way of expressing the intuitive\ncontingency of an object \$x,\$ viz., that \$x\$’s\nexistence is not (strongly)\nnecessary, i.e. (where \$\\sfx\$ denotes \$x\$), that \$\\exists \\sfy\\,\n\\sfy=\\sfx\$ is not true in all worlds: \$\\neg\\Box\\exists \\sfy\\,\n\\sfy=\\sfx\$. But in the context of \$Q\$ this is equivalent to\nsaying simply that \$\\exists \\sfy\\, \\sfy=\\sfx\$ is not\nn-statable, \$\\neg\\rS \\exists \\sfy\\, \\sfy=\\sfx\$.\nAccordingly, given\n SDef,\n we have:", "\nAs noted above, for Prior, the prospect of logical truths that are not\nnecessarily statable renders the general principle of necessitation\nunsound. Rather, strong necessity only follows for those logical\ntruths that are n-statable; this is usefully expressed as a\nderived rule of\n inference:[79]", "\nSince wholly general formulas are all n-statable, another\nimportant derived rule is immediate:", "\nOf course, if in fact there is a (strongly) necessary\nbeing—Allah, say—then, by S3, some\nsingular logical truths—e.g., something exists if Allah\nexists, \$\\exists \\sfx\\,\\sfx=\\sfa \\to \\exists\n\\sfx\\,\\sfx=\\sfx\$—will be n-statable and, hence,\n(strongly) necessary. But no such truths are provably\nn-statable in \$Q\$, as \$\\rS \\tau\$ is not a theorem of\n\$Q\$, for any term \$\\tau\$ and, hence, by S2,\nneither is \$\\rS \\varphi\$ for any formula \$\\varphi\$ in which\n\$\\tau\$ is free. Thus, not only are all wholly general theorems\nprovably necessary as per Nec\$^{}_{Q},\$ they are the only\nprovably necessary logical truths of \$Q\$.", "\nThe unprovability of \$\\rS \\tau\$ in \$Q\$ and, hence, more\ngenerally, \$Q\$’s inability to prove the existence of any\nnecessary beings is the key difference between \$Q\$ and\nSQML and, more specifically, it is what justifies the\ninapplicability of the full necessitation principle\nNec to formulas containing free terms, since some of\nthose terms might refer to contingent beings. This is, in particular,\nthe key to blocking the controversial theorems of SQML, as\ntheir proofs all depend essentially on such an application of\n Nec.[80]\n Indeed, \$Q\$ is essentially just SQML shorn of its\nnecessitism. If, as Prior (1967: 155) observed, we restore it by\nruling out the prospect of contingent beings explicitly,", "\n\$Q\$ simply collapses into\n SQML.[81]\n (The reader can quickly verify that N\$_Q\$ and the\nnecessitist principle \$\\Box\$N are equivalent in\n\$Q\$.) More exactly put: for any formula \$\\varphi\$ of\n\$\\scrL_\\Box,\$ \$\\varphi\$ is a theorem of SQML if and only\nif it is a theorem of \$Q\$ + N\$_{Q}\$ and hence if and only if\n\$\\forall \\sfx\\rS\\sfx \\to \\varphi\$ is a theorem of \$Q\$. In\nparticular, both BF and CBF fall out\nas entirely unproblematic theorems under the assumption of\nnecessitism:", "\nIt is important to emphasize the profound philosophical difference\nbetween Prior’s \$Q\$ and the necessitist’s\nSQML that is reflected in the preceding observations. As\nwe’ve seen, \$Q\$ was deeply motivated by Prior’s\nstrict actualism; this is most clearly seen in his introduction of the\nn-statability operator \$\\rS\$ and the axioms\nS1–S3 expressing the necessary\nontological dependence of propositions on their subjects. But, in\nstark contrast to the necessitist’s SQML, Prior’s\nmetaphysical predilections are not baked into \$Q\$—unlike\nthe necessitist, he has only made them consistent with his\nlogic; his axioms for \$\\rS\$ and his distinction between strong and\nweak necessity only have purchase if N\$_{Q}\$ is explicitly\ndenied. For Prior, both necessitism and strict actualism are\nsubstantive philosophical theses and, hence, the choice between\nthem—i.e., whether or not to adopt N\$_{Q}\$ as a\nproper axiom of a philosophical theory—is left as a\nmatter for pure metaphysics, not logic, to decide.", "\nThis sentiment also lies behind Prior’s restricted version\nMP\$_{Q}\$ of MP. As noted above,\nMP\$_{Q}\$ prevents the derivation of \$\\exists\n\\sfy\\,\\sfy=\\sfy\$ from the likes of \$\\exists \\sfy\\,\\sfy=\\sfa\$. But\nif \$\\exists \\sfy\\,\\sfy=\\sfy\$ were provable, then, since it\nis wholly general, it would follow by Nec\$^{*}_{Q}\$ that it\nis strongly necessary, \$\\Box\\exists \\sfy\\,\\sfy=\\sfy,\$ that is,\ninformally put, it would be a theorem of \$Q\$ that, in every\npossible world, there is at least one thing. Again, though, that there\ncouldn’t be an empty world, that it couldn’t have been the\ncase that nothing exists, is a substantive metaphysical thesis that\nlogic is better off leaving undecided. Prior’s restriction in\nMP\$_{Q}\$ ensures that this is in fact the case in\n\$Q\$." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Strict Actualism" } ] } ]	[ "Adams, Marilyn McCord, 1977, “Ockham’s Nominalism and\nUnreal Entities”, The Philosophical Review, 86(2):\n144–176. doi:10.2307/2184004", "–––, 1987, William Ockham,\n(Publications in Medieval Studies / Medieval Institute, University of\nNotre Dame 26), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.", "Adams, Robert Merrihew, 1974 [1979], “Theories of\nActuality”, Noûs, 8(3): 211–231. 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actualism-possibilism-ethics	Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics	First published Mon May 20, 2019	[ "\nSuppose that you have been invited to attend an ex-partner’s\nwedding and that the best thing you can do is accept the invitation\nand be pleasant at the wedding. But, suppose furthermore that if you\ndo accept the invitation, you’ll freely decide to get inebriated\nat the wedding and ruin it for everyone, which would be the worst\noutcome. The second best thing to do would be to simply decline the\ninvitation. In light of these facts, should you accept or decline the\ninvitation? (Zimmerman 2006: 153). The answer to this question hinges\non the actualism/possibilism debate in ethics, which concerns the\nrelationship between an agent’s free actions and her moral\nobligations. In particular, it focuses on whether facts about how an\nagent would freely act in certain contexts play any role in\ndetermining the agent’s moral obligations. Historically, the\ndebate has primarily arisen in the work of impartial consequentialists\nwith an interest in deontic logic. However, its relevance is not\nlimited to such versions of consequentialism. The debate concerns the\nscope of acts that are relevant options for the agent, which is an\nissue that cuts across, and has substantive implications for, a wide\nrange of normative ethical views. As such, the debate brings into\nfocus issues of central importance for any normative ethical\ntheory." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Historical Origins of the Debate", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Some Background Assumptions", "1.2 An Argument that Utilitarianism is Formally Incoherent", "1.3 Replies and the Rise of the Actualism/Possibilism Debate" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Possibilism", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 The Crux of the Debate", "2.2 Professor Procrastinate", "2.3 Possibilism (and Actualism) Defined", "2.4 Possibilism, Actualism, and the Relevant Sense of “Ability”", "2.5 Objections to Possibilism" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Actualism", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 The Problem of Jointly Unfulfillable Obligations for Some Forms of Actualism", "3.2 Preliminary Formulations of Actualism", "3.3 A Contextualist Formulation of Actualism", "3.4 Objections to Contextualist Actualism", "3.5 Objections to All Forms of Actualism" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Securitist Views", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 A Synchronic Actualist-Possibilist Case", "4.2 Fully Specified Immediate Options", "4.3 Kinds of Control Over Immediate Options" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Non-Primary Obligations", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. The Maximalism/Omnism Debate", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Historical Origins of the Debate", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nFor contingent historical reasons, this debate has unfolded in such a\nway that the following background assumptions are made in the\nliterature. First, likely for ease of exposition, everyone writes as\nif counterfactual determinism is true (Goldman 1976: 469; Greenspan\n1978: 77). That is, it is assumed that there are facts about how an\nagent would (not simply might) act in any given\nsituation. This assumption, however, is not necessary for the purposes\nof the debate (Portmore 2011: 56 fn. 1). Second, since everyone writes\nas if both counterfactual determinism is true and as if agents can act\nin a way in which they do not in fact act, those in the debate seem to\nassume compatibilism. Interestingly, the concerns raised by the\nactualism/possibilism debate still arise even if libertarianism about\nfree will is assumed (Portmore 2011: 167 fn. 21). Describing the\ndebate in libertarian terms, however, does add an extra layer of\ncomplexity to the discussion. Third, some form of maximizing\nconsequentialism is generally assumed, again, likely for ease of\nexposition. The debate actually arises for any normative ethical\ntheory that holds that there are at least pro tanto reasons\nto bring about the good, and so the importance of this debate extends\nfar beyond forms of maximizing consequentialism (Bales 1972; Goldman\n1976: 458 fn. 13). Fourth, the various positions in the debate are\nunderstood in terms of objective, rather than\nsubjective, obligations, though the same issues arise with\nrespect to both. Objective obligations are those determined by all of\nthe normatively relevant facts, which include facts of which the agent\nmay be unaware. By contrast, subjective obligations are determined by\nthe agent’s epistemic state (such as her beliefs, or beliefs\nthat would be supported by her evidence) concerning the normatively\nrelevant facts (cf. Zimmerman 1996: 10–20; Portmore 2011:\n12–23). Following the norms of the literature, these assumptions\noperate in the background of this encyclopedia entry as well. However,\nnone actually need to be made in order for the debate to get off the\nground." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Some Background Assumptions" }, { "content": [ "\nThe historical origins of the debate may be traced back to work by\nLars Bergström and Hector-Neri Castañeda. In his A\nProblem for Utilitarianism (1968), Castañeda argues that,\ngiven a few standard assumptions, utilitarianism is formally\nincoherent. His argument may be stated rather straightforwardly.\nFirst, Castañeda assumes a principle of deontic logic known as\n“ought distributes through conjunction”. This principle\nholds that if an agent S ought to do both A and\nB, then S ought to do A and S ought to do\nB (1968: 141). The term “ought” is used in a\nvariety of different ways in the ethics literature. However, when it\nis used in the formulation of views in the actualism/possibilism\nliterature, it should be understood as denoting the ought of moral\nobligation. This idea may be represented more formally as \nOught Distributes Through Conjuction:\n", "\nIn other words, if an agent is obligated to perform a set of acts, then\nthat agent is obligated to perform each of the acts in that set. ", "\nSecond, Castañeda considers a principle he refers to as (U),\nwhich he takes to be a basic commitment of all existing forms of\nutilitarianism.", "\n\nSome who have responded to Castañeda, such as Zellner (1972:\n125), took (U) not only to be a commitment of utilitarianism, but a\nformulation of act-utilitarianism itself. Now, here’s the\nsupposed problem. According to Castañeda, (ODC) and (U)\ngenerate contradictory prescriptions. To see why he believed this,\nsuppose that an agent S’s performing the conjunctive\nact-set \$\\langle A \\lamp B\\rangle\$ brings about a greater balance of\ngood over bad than any alternative act-set (singleton or plural)\nthat S can perform. It is supposed to follow from (U)\nthat S is obligated to perform \$\\langle A \\lamp\nB\\rangle\$. Now, given (ODC), it follows that S is obligated to\nperform \$\\langle A\\rangle\$ and that\nS is obligated to perform \$\\langle B\\rangle\$. But,\nCastañeda claims, given (U), performing \$\\langle A\\rangle\$\nwould result in more net good than performing any alternative,\nincluding \$\\langle B\\rangle\$. Moreover, given (U), performing\n\$\\langle B\\rangle\$ would also result in more net good than\nperforming any alternative, including \$\\langle A\\rangle\$. Hence the\nsupposed contradiction. Performing \$\\langle A\\rangle\$ cannot result\nin both more good and less good than performing \$\\langle B\\rangle\$.\nThis consequence may be illustrated with an example, drawn from\nWestphal (1972: 83–84). ", "\nNaturally, the act-set of ⟨opening the window & shutting\nthe door⟩ is the best that Tom can do in the circumstances he\nis in at the start on the warm day in question. Given\nCastañeda’s argument, Tom is obligated to ⟨open\nthe window⟩ and he is obligated to ⟨shut the\ndoor⟩. But if he is obligated to do each of them, then\n⟨opening the window⟩ must produce more net good than any\nalternative and ⟨shutting the door⟩ must produce more\nnet good than any alternative. But, Castañeda claims, each of\nthese acts cannot be uniquely optimific." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 An Argument that Utilitarianism is Formally Incoherent" }, { "content": [ "\nCastañeda’s short article spawned a number of replies\nwith various proposed solutions. Castañeda himself argued that\nthe problem stemmed from the “only if” clause in\n (U)\n and concluded that it should be removed. However, he believed that,\neven once this clause has been removed, it remains an open question\nwhether utilitarianism could identify necessary conditions for\nobligatory actions (1968: 142).", "\nThe most numerous, and influential, replies were written by Lars\nBergström, who argued that the contradiction arises only if it is\nassumed that \$\\langle A\\rangle\$ and \$\\langle B\\rangle\$ are\nalternatives in the relevant sense. He argued that \$\\langle\nA\\rangle\$ and \$\\langle B\\rangle\$ are not, in fact, alternatives\nsince they are compatible (Bergström 1968b: 43). Notably, this is\nan issue of which Bergström was clearly aware of in his (1966:\nch. 2) book in which he argued that “two actions can reasonably\nbe regarded as alternatives (in the morally relevant sense) only if\nthey are incompatible or mutually exclusive”. If, by hypothesis,\nS is obligated to perform \$\\langle A \\lamp B\\rangle\$, then\n\$\\langle A\\rangle\$ and \$\\langle B\\rangle\$ must be compatible and\nso are not alternatives (1968b: 44). The subsequent literature\nconsisted of a back-and-forth between Bergström and\nCastañeda that primarily revolved around identifying the\nmorally relevant set of alternatives and Bergström’s\nattempts to formulate a utilitarian principle that avoids\nCastañeda’s objection (Bergström 1968a,b, 1971,\n1973, 1976; Castañeda 1968, 1969, 1972). As will be shown in\nthe subsequent sections, the issue of identifying the morally relevant\nset of alternatives forms the crux of the actualism/possibilism\ndebate.", "\nDag Prawitz (1970) and Fred Westphal (1972) both suggested revising\n (U)\n by indexing actions to the time they would need to be performed in\norder to bring about the uniquely optimific outcome. So, if performing\nthe joint act \$\\langle A \\at t_1 \\lamp B \\at t_2\\rangle\$ would\nresult in the greatest net amount of good, then S is obligated\nto perform \$\\langle A \\at t_1\\rangle\$ and to perform \$\\langle B \\at\nt_2\\rangle\$ and, Westphal claims, this avoids the contradiction. At\n\$t_1\$, \$\\langle A\\rangle\$ supposedly is the act that\nwould produce the greatest net amount of good in comparison to any\nother act performable at \$t_1\$. At \$t_2\$, \$\\langle B\\rangle\$\nsupposedly is the act that would produce the greatest net\namount of good in comparison to any other act performable at \$t_2\$.\nFinally, from among the performable act-sets that might occur from\n\$t_1\$–\$t_2\$, \$\\langle A \\lamp B\\rangle\$ is the\nact-set that would produce the greatest net amount of good. Thus, each\nact is the uniquely optimific act at the time it is performed, or so\nWestphal claims. Notably, Prawitz (1968, 1970) and Westphal (1972)\neach argue that an act is permissible if and only if it is part of an\nact-set that, if performed, would bring about the greatest net good of\nany of the acts available to the agent. In making this argument,\nPrawitz and Westphal were giving what may be considered the earliest\ndefenses of possibilism. However, they did not yet refer to this view\nas possibilism. ", "\nWhile possibilism itself remains a viable view in the literature,\nHarold Zellner demonstrated that Prawitz’s and Westphal’s\nresponses did not solve the specific problem Castañeda\nidentified for utilitarianism. This is because, while performing\n\$\\langle A \\at t_1 \\lamp B \\at t_2\\rangle\$ may be uniquely\noptimific, it does not follow that performing either of these\nindividual acts at their respective times would be uniquely optimific.\nFor instance, performing \$\\langle A \\at t_1\\rangle\$ may not be\nuniquely optimific if the agent would not perform \$\\langle B\n\\at t_2\\rangle\$if she first performs \$\\langle A \\at t_1\\rangle\$.\nZellner (1972: 125)\nillustrates this with the following case. ", "\nAgain, it would be best if Tom ⟨commutes to campus &\nteaches⟩, second best if he ⟨plays Cupid⟩, and\nworst if he ⟨commutes to campus & skips class⟩.\nThus, the value of the act-sets may be ranked from best to worst as\nfollows.", "\nZellner points out that, since Tom would \$\\langle{\\sim}B\\rangle\$ if\nhe were to \$\\langle A\\rangle\$, the value of performing \$\\langle\nA\\rangle\$ is not uniquely optimific even though the value of\nperforming \$\\langle A \\lamp B\\rangle\$ is uniquely optimific. Thus,\nin such cases,\n (U)\n combined with\n (ODC)\n still generates contradictions, even if each act is indexed to their\nrespective times. Zellner argued that, to solve the problem, (U)\nshould be rejected because it is inconsistent with a supposedly basic\nprinciple of inference, referred to as (NI), which holds that if an\nagent is obligated to perform \$\\langle A\\rangle\$ and her performing\n\$\\langle A\\rangle\$ entails her performing \$\\langle B\\rangle\$, then\nshe is obligated to perform \$\\langle B\\rangle\$ (1972: 125). This\nrule is sometimes referred to as Normative Inheritance or as\nPermissibility is Closed Under Implication. It may be\nrepresented more formally in the Standard Deontic Logic system as\n(Feldman 1986: 41):", "\nThis literature on the coherence of utilitarianism directly gave rise\nto the actualism/possibilism literature. Most importantly, (i) it made\nsalient the importance of determining the relevant act-alternatives\navailable to the agent and (ii) cases such as Teach, Play\nCupid, or Skip Class raised questions about the\nrelationship between an agent’s free actions and her moral\nobligations. As will be illustrated in the next section, actualists\nand possibilists are divided over cases with this exact structure." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Replies and the Rise of the Actualism/Possibilism Debate" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Possibilism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nSuppose someone is trying to determine whether she is obligated to\nteach a summer school course that students would greatly benefit from,\nbut only if taught well. Do facts about how an agent would teach the\ncourse (e.g., well or poorly) have any role in determining whether she\nis morally obligated to teach the course? Actualists answer in the\naffirmative and possibilists in the negative. Possibilists hold that\nthe deontic status of an act \$\\phi\$ depends on facts about how an\nagent could act were she to \$\\phi\$. So, according to\npossibilists, what determines whether she should teach the summer\nschool course is whether she could teach it well,\nirrespective of whether she would teach it well. Actualists,\nby contrast, hold that the deontic status of an act \$\\phi\$ depends,\nin part, on facts about how an agent would act (under certain\nconditions) were she to \$\\phi\$. So, according to actualists, roughly\nwhat matters in determining whether one should teach the summer school\ncourse is whether she would teach it well, irrespective of\nwhether she could teach it well." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 The Crux of the Debate" }, { "content": [ "\nThese views, and their differences, can best be understood by\nconsidering the standard case in the literature, viz. Professor\nProcrastinate. Holly M. Smith (formerly Holly S. Goldman)\nprovides the original version of this case in her (1978:\n185–186) essay, and variations of it appear throughout the\nliterature (Jackson & Pargetter 1986: 235; Carlson 1995: 124;\nVorobej 2000: 131–132; Portmore 2011: 180, 2019: ch. 5;\nTimmerman 2015: 1512; Timmerman & Cohen 2016: 673–674;\nCariani 2016: 400). ", "\nThe value of the act-sets that Procrastinate can perform are ranked\nfrom best to worst as follows.", "\nFurthermore, Procrastinate would \$\\langle{\\sim}b\\rangle\$ regardless\nof whether she would \$\\langle a\\rangle\$. In other words, the\nfollowing counterfactuals are true.", "\nOn a rough definition, according to actualism, Procrastinate is\nobligated to decline to review the paper because what would\nactually happen if she were to decline is better than what\nwould actually happen if she were to agree to review the\npaper. By contrast, according to possibilism, Procrastinate is\nobligated to agree to review the paper because doing so is part of the\nbest series of possible actions that Procrastinate can\nperform over her life. Now that we’ve covered how these views\ngenerally come apart, we will focus on the more precise formulations\nof these views in subsequent sections. It should also be noted that\ncounterfactuals like (1) and (2) are assumed to be true at least\npartly in virtue of Procrastinate’s imperfect moral character.\nHowever, such counterfactuals can also be true as a result of an\nagent’s ignorance, as a result of lacking the dexterity to\nperform an act, and as a result of an agent’s inability to\ncomprehend some future act (Goldman 1978:198; Bykvist 2002: 50). For\nthe purposes of this entry, we will focus on an agent’s\nimperfect moral character since this factor seems to be the driving\nforce behind many points of disagreement between actualists and\npossibilists." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Professor Procrastinate" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIn its simplest form, possibilism is the view that an agent is\nobligated to perform an act just in case it is part of the best series\nof acts she can perform over the course of her life. It may be defined\nmore formally as follows.", "\nAccording to possibilism, the act-sets that have their deontic status\ndirectly (i.e., they do not have their deontic status in virtue of the\ndeontic status of any other act-set) are the act-sets that agents can\nperform over the course of their entire lives, which we will refer to\nas maximal act-sets (Åqvist 1969). Moreover, any non-maximal\nact-set has its deontic status indirectly (i.e., its deontic status is\ndetermined by the deontic status of a maximal act-set of which it is a\npart). In Professor Procrastinate, assuming that\nProcrastinate cannot perform any acts after doing either \$\\langle\nX\\rangle\$, \$\\langle Y\\rangle\$, or \$\\langle Z\\rangle\$,\npossibilists hold that Procrastinate is obligated to \$\\langle\na\\rangle\$ because the best maximal act-set she can perform over the\ncourse of her life includes \$\\langle X\\rangle \$, and \$\\langle\nX\\rangle \$-ing requires \$\\langle a\\rangle\$-ing.", "\n\nPossibilism has been given slightly different definitions in the\nliterature. However, unlike the different definitions of actualism\ndiscussed in the next section, typical definitions of possibilism are\nessentially synonymous. Patricia Greenspan (1978) does not offer a\nformal definition of possibilism, but defends the view by way of\nrejecting Holly Goldman’s actualist principle, referred to as\n(G1). Greenspan does so in the process of defending her (1975) view\nin a related debate concerning whether ought-statements should be\ndated differently from their objects and about whether they hold from\ndifferent temporal standpoints. Fred Feldman defines possibilism in\nterms of possible worlds. Feldman refers to his theory as (MO). As he\ncharacterizes (MO), what S is morally obligated to do,\n“as of a time, t”, is ", "\n\n\nto see to the occurrence of a state of affairs, p, iff p\noccurs in some world accessible to S at t, and it is not\nthe case that \${\\sim}p\$ occurs in any accessible world as good as\n(or better than) that one. (Feldman 1986: 38)\n", "\n\nMichael Zimmerman defines possibilism in the simpler, standard sense\ngiven above (2006: 153; 2017: 119). However, he also develops and\ndefends (MO)-inspired formulations of possibilism. In his (1996) book,\nhe provides a formulation of what he refers to as “world\npossibilism” (WP) that invokes the notion of “deontic\nvalue” instead of “intrinsic value”, so as to\nprevent the formulation of possibilism from assuming impartial\nconsequentialism. In his (2006: 166) essay, he defends a prospective\nversion of (WP), where the value in question is the expected value of\nall the acts an agent can intentionally perform, which he refers to as\n“adjusted core prospective value”.", "\n\nThere are other views that deviate from the above standard definitions\nof possibilism. Carlson (1995: 99–109; 1999) defends a view that\nbears resemblance to possibilism in which the sole obligatory act-set\nis a unique minimally specific invariably optimal act-set. At t\nan act-set is optimal for an agent S just in case its outcome\nis at least as good as any other act-set that is performable for\nS at t. An invariably optimal act-set is one which is\noptimal no matter what S does at t. An invariably\noptimal act-set is minimally specific just in case it is not a proper\npart of some other invariably optimal act-set available to S. A\nminimally specific invariably optimal act-set is unique just in case\nthere is no other minimally specific invariably optimal act-set\navailable to S. Thus, in contrast to standard formulations of\npossibilism, no act-set that is a proper part of a unique minimally\nspecific invariably optimal act-set has a deontic status. Vorobej\n(2000) defends a view he refers to as “prosaic\npossibilism”, which may be considered an intermediary between\npossibilism and actualism. In his (2009) article, which contains an\nargument against possibilism, Woodard defines the view in terms of\nnormative reasons for action rather than moral obligations. As a final\nexample, in his (2016) article, Vessel proposes what he takes to be a\n“possibilist variant” of a view known as moral securitism,\nwhich will be discussed in\n section 4.\n The first possibilist definition given in this section, however,\ncaptures the standard understanding of possibilism and the commitments\nof its proponents, including Greenspan (1978), Thomason (1981),\nHumberstone (1983), Feldman (1986: 38), and Zimmerman (1990; 1996:\n190; 2006; 2008: ch. 3; 2017). On this definition, Procrastinate is\nobligated to agree to review the paper since it is part of the best\nseries of acts that she can perform over the course of her life.", "\n\nIn contrast to possibilism, standard forms of actualism hold that\nProcrastinate is obligated to decline to review the paper because what\nwould actually happen if Procrastinate were to do this is better than\nwhat would actually happen if she were to agree to review the paper.\nFor, what would happen if Procrastinate were to decline the invitation\nis that the student would receive a second-rate job offer. However, if\nshe were to agree to review the paper then she would not review it and\nthe student would receive no job offer. A simple, but not\nunproblematic, version of actualism holds the following:", "\nOne problem with this definition is that it blurs together the\nintrinsic value of the consequences of an act and the deontic value of\nthat act. An actualist’s stance with respect to the relationship\nbetween these different types of value depends upon her preferred\nnormative ethical theory. We will discuss more precise and informative\ndefinitions of actualism in\n section 3.\n However, the above definition suffices to illustrate the primary\ndifference between actualism and possibilism." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Possibilism (and Actualism) Defined" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIt is natural to initially diagnose the disagreement between\nactualists and possibilists as a disagreement about which act-sets\nagents can perform. However, the actualism/possibilism debate\ncuts across debates about the relevant sense(s) of “can”.\nActualists and possibilists may agree with one another about which\nact-sets agents can perform in any given case. At bottom, their\ndisagreement concerns which acts, from among the acts the agent can\nperform, are normatively relevant options for the agent. Less\nabstractly, actualists and possibilists may agree that Procrastinate\ncan \$\\langle X\\rangle\$, \$\\langle Y\\rangle\$, or \$\\langle\nZ\\rangle\$. After all, by stipulation, she can \$\\langle a\\rangle\$\nand if she \$\\langle a\\textrm{-s}\\rangle\$, then by stipulation she\ncan \$\\langle b\\rangle\$ and if she does that, then she will have\nperformed \$\\langle X\\rangle \$. Procrastinate can \$\\langle\nX\\rangle\$, though one may still wonder whether she has the relevant\nkind of ability to \$\\langle X\\rangle \$. That is, one may\nwonder whether \$\\langle X\\textrm{-ing}\\rangle\$ is a relevant\noption for the agent. It is this question that divides\nactualists and possibilists. Goldman (1976: 453 and 1978: 153)\ninitially suggested that \$\\langle X\\textrm{-ing}\\rangle\$ is a\nrelevant option for the agent, appealing to the following\naccount of ability.", "\n\nInterestingly, Goldman (1978) later rejects this account of ability\nafter considering cases where, at \$t_1\$, the agent can \$\\langle\na\\rangle\$, but would not \$\\langle b\\rangle\$ and thus would not\n\$\\langle X\\rangle \$, regardless of her intentions at \$t_1\$. Such\ncases are ones where it’s possible for the agent to \$\\langle\nX\\rangle\$, but Goldman argues that it would be “pointless to\nuse this account of ability when assessing the range of activities\nwhich a moral principle should assess”. This is because agents\n“could not make practical use of” prescriptions to perform\nsuch alternatives. These types of cases will be discussed in more\ndetail the next section. For now, the important takeaway is that while\nan agent can perform such conjunctive act-sets in the sense\npicked out by Ability 1, there may be times before the agent\nacts during which she cannot ensure that she will perform these\nact-sets. So, while it’s possible for Procrastinate to \$\\langle\nX\\rangle\$ by intending to \$\\langle a\\rangle\$ at \$t_1\$ and then\nintending to \$\\langle b\\rangle\$ at \$t_2\$, it may also be true\nthat, at \$t_1\$, Procrastinate would not \$\\langle b\\rangle\$ at\n\$t_2\$ no matter what she intends to do at \$t_1\$. In light of such\ncases, Goldman proposes the following account of ability. ", "\nSo, for any given act-set, actualists and possibilists will agree\nabout whether an agent has Ability 1, Ability 2, or\nboth to perform that act-set and thus will agree about each sense in\nwhich agents can perform these act-sets. Yet, they will disagree about\nwhich sense of ability picks out the morally relevant set of options\nfor an agent. Possibilists (e.g., Feldman 1986; Zimmerman 1996),\nhybridists (Timmerman & Cohen 2016), and some actualists (e.g.,\nJackson & Pargetter 1986; Jackson 2014) take Ability 1 to\nbe a morally relevant sense of ability. Most actualists and all\nsecuritists (e.g., Portmore 2011, 2018) will take Ability 2,\nor something close to it, to be the morally relevant sense of\nability." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Possibilism, Actualism, and the Relevant Sense of “Ability”" }, { "content": [ "\nPossibilism has a lot going for it. Most notably, it generates the\nintuitively correct moral verdicts in a wide range of cases. It\npreserves\n (ODC),\n (S), and related, similarly attractive, principles in deontic\nlogic (Goldman 1978: 80; Feldman 1986: 41–44; Zimmerman 1990:\n58–60; Zimmerman 2006: 154–155; Vessel 2009; Kiesewetter\n2018). It is thought to avoid the main objection leveled against\nactualism. That is, since possibilism requires agents to perform the\nbest act-set they can over the course of their lives, it is\nnot thought to let agents off the hook too easily. It also\navoids the other objections leveled against actualism discussed in the\nnext section. Also, see Zimmerman (1996: fn. 72 & fn. 122 and\n2017: ch. 3) for a nice review of some of possibilism’s\nadditional, lesser appreciated, virtues. While there is much to be\nsaid in favor of possibilism, it also faces certain challenging\nobjections.", "\nPerhaps the primary objection to possibilism is that it can generate\nobligations that, if acted on, would result in the worst possible\noutcome. Versions of this objection have been raised throughout the\nliterature, (Goldman 1976: 469–70; Sobel 1976: 202–203;\nFeldman 1986: 52–57; Almeida 1992: 461–462; Woodard 2009:\n219–221; Portmore 2011: 211; Ross 2012: 81–82; Gustafsson 2014: 593; Timmerman\n& Cohen 2016: 674). Possibilism generates\nthis consequence because it implies that facts about how agents would\nfreely act play no role in determining deontic verdicts. So, this\npotentially objectionable consequence of possibilism is a product of a\ncore commitment of the view.", "\nTo illustrate the issue, consider Professor Procrastinate\nagain. According to possibilism, Procrastinate is obligated to\n⟨agree to review the paper & review the paper⟩ and\nthus is obligated to ⟨agree to review the paper⟩.\nHowever, if Procrastinate were to act on her obligation to\n⟨agree to review the paper⟩, she would ⟨not\nreview the paper⟩, thereby bringing about the worst possible\noutcome. This may not sound so counterintuitive in Professor\nProcrastinate where the worst outcome isn’t tragic. Yet,\nthis objection has more intuitive force in high-stakes variants.\nSuppose that no matter what Procrastinate were to intend today, she\nwould freely ⟨not review the paper⟩ if she\n⟨agrees to review the paper⟩. Suppose furthermore that\nif Procrastinate were to ⟨not review the paper⟩, then\nthe student would not receive any job offers and commit suicide.\nPossibilism still renders the verdict that Procrastinate is obligated\nto ⟨agree to review the paper⟩ and it renders this\nverdict no matter how terrible the consequences of ⟨agreeing to\nreview the paper⟩ happen to be. This objection to possibilism\nmay be stated more precisely as follows. ", "\n\nPossibilists have responded by suggesting that the intuitive force of\nthis objection stems from failing to appreciate the distinction\nbetween conditional and unconditional obligations. The possibilist\nobligation is meant to pick out agents’ unconditional\nobligations and it supposedly is not problematic for agents to have\nunconditional obligations that, if acted upon, would result in the\nworst possible outcome (Greenspan 1978: 81; Zimmerman 2017:\n126–128). So, while it’s true that possibilism entails\nthat Procrastinate has an unconditional obligation to ⟨agree to\nreview the paper⟩ in virtue of her unconditional obligation to\n⟨agree to review the paper & review the paper⟩, it\nmay also be true that she has a conditional obligation to\n⟨decline to review the paper⟩ given that she would\n⟨not review the paper⟩ if she were to ⟨agree to\nreview the paper⟩. More generally, possibilists can respond by\nholding that agents have an unconditional obligation to do the best\nthey can, but incur conditional obligations to bring about the next\nbest outcome if they won’t bring about the best\noutcome. The distinction between conditional and unconditional\nobligations will be further explored in\n section 5.", "\nA closely related objection appeals to considerations about moral\nadvice (Goldman 1976: 470; Greenspan 1978: 81; Feldman 1986:\n55–57). Suppose that Procrastinate asks her friend whether she\nshould \$\\langle a\\rangle\$. Knowing that Procrastinate would almost\ncertainly fail to \$\\langle b\\rangle\$ if she were to \$\\langle\na\\rangle\$, it seems that her advisor ought to advise Procrastinate to\n\$\\langle{\\sim}a\\rangle\$. The basic idea is that since\nProcrastinate’s advisor ought to tell Procrastinate to\n\$\\langle{\\sim}a\\rangle\$, Procrastinate is, contrary to what\npossibilists claim, obligated to \$\\langle{\\sim}a\\rangle\$.", "\n\nPossibilists who accept that one ought to advise Procrastinate to\n\$\\langle{\\sim}a\\rangle\$ will deny that this suggests that\nProcrastinate truly has an obligation to \$\\langle{\\sim}a\\rangle\$.\nRather, they’ll hold that Procrastinate’s advisor has an\nobligation to advise Procrastinate to do something she is obligated to\nrefrain from doing. Possibilists will point out that\nProcrastinate’s advisor, just like Procrastinate, is obligated\nto do the best she can. In this case, doing the best she can requires\nadvising Procrastinate to \$\\langle{\\sim}a\\rangle\$ since\nProcrastinate won’t \$\\langle a \\lamp b\\rangle\$ no matter what\nProcrastinate’s advisor says. Thus, the best\nProcrastinate’s advisor can do is to get Procrastinate to\n\$\\langle{\\sim}a \\lamp{\\sim}b\\rangle\$ and that requires telling\nProcrastinate that she ought to \$\\langle{\\sim}a\\rangle\$. Erik\nCarlson gives this response in his (1995: 127) article. Fred Feldman\ngives this response in his (1986: 57) book and puts the point\nthusly.", "\n\n\n\nWhen we give moral advice, we morally ought to advise in the best way\nwe can. That is, we should advise in the way we advise in the best\nworld open to us. When things go smoothly, our advice will be\ntrue…But when things go awry, we may find that to advise in the\nbest possible way, we must give false advice. Reflection on a more\nextreme case should make this clear. Suppose an ornery child always\ndoes the opposite of what we tell him to do. Suppose we know that he\nought to turn right, and that hundreds of lives depend upon it. Should\nwe tell him to turn right? Obviously not.\n", "\nBoth Holly Goldman (1976: 469–470) and Christopher Woodard\n(2009) argue that possibilism is committed to an implausible asymmetry\nbetween moral and prudential reasons, whereas actualism treats such\nreasons symmetrically. To motivate this objection, Woodard asks one to\nconsider an intrapersonal case of prudence that is structurally\nidentical to typical actualist/possibilist cases.", "\nSuppose each option is equally morally good. However, the\nprudential value of the act-sets may be ranked from best to\nworst as follows.", "\nAgain, the following counterfactuals are true.", "\nPrudentially, what ought Smith to do? Woodard suggests that\nintuitively Smith prudentially ought to \$\\langle{\\sim}A\\rangle\$,\nwriting that it’s hard ", "\n\n\nto believe that the fact that [Smith] would choose \${\\sim}B\$ were\n[she] to choose A is irrelevant to whether [Smith] should\nchoose A or not. (2009: 221) \n", "\nHowever, if possibilists treat prudential reasons in the same way they\ntreat moral reasons, they would be committed to holding that Smith\nprudentially ought to \$\\langle A\\rangle\$ even though this would\nresult in her wasting her money on a plane ticket she wouldn’t\nuse. In light of intuitive judgments about prudential cases, Woodard\nconcludes that unless ", "\n\n\nthere is a sharp asymmetry between prudential and moral\noughts…the parallel [case concerning moral reasons also]\naffects Smith’s moral obligation to choose A or\n\${\\sim}A\$. \n", "\nWoodard’s thought is\nthat prudential cases support actualist judgments and, to avoid\npositing an implausible asymmetry between moral and prudential\nreasons, we should think actualism is true in moral cases as well.", "\nIt’s worth noting that this sort of question about prudential\ncases arises in the rational choice literature. The analogous question\nconcerns whether rationality requires one to choose suboptimal courses\nof action by predicating one’s present behavior on what will\nseem most attractive to one at a later time (see McClennen 1990: ch.\n8–9; Gauthier 1994). The subsequent literature suggests that\nintuitions about prudential cases are at least mixed.", "\nIn response to Woodard, possibilists could again appeal to the\ndistinction between unconditional and conditional (prudential)\nobligations. Perhaps what Smith is unconditionally prudentially\nobligated to do is ⟨purchase the plane ticket & board the\nplane⟩ and thus has an unconditional obligation to\n⟨purchase the plane ticket⟩. However, given that she\nwouldn’t ⟨board the plane⟩ if she were to\n⟨purchase the plane ticket⟩, she may incur a conditional\n(prudential) obligation to ⟨not purchase the plane\nticket⟩. Given that she won’t do what she prudentially\nought to do, she conditionally ought to do the next best thing.", "\nZimmerman’s response is to deny that there is an asymmetry,\narguing that what “matters, according to possibilism, is what\none can control” (2017: 128). In other words, both prudential\ncases and moral cases are treated symmetrically in the sense that what\nmatters for any case, according to possibilism, concerns what\nis under an agent’s control. To illustrate, in contrast to this\npurely prudential case, consider a similar case in which Smith’s\nnot boarding the plane will result in result in her friend, Fred,\nbeing deeply disappointed that he and Smith will not get an\nopportunity to catch up in person. In both of these cases,\nSmith’s control with respect to performing \$\\langle A \\lamp\nB\\rangle\$ is exactly the same. So, according to Zimmerman, it\ndoesn’t matter that, in either case, Smith would in fact\n\$\\langle{\\sim}B\\rangle\$ if she were to \$\\langle A\\rangle\$; Smith\nis still obligated to perform \$\\langle A \\lamp B\\rangle\$, and, a\nfortiori, perform \$\\langle A\\rangle\$. Zimmerman may be right\nthat possibilists are not committed to treating moral and prudential\nreasons differently. However, by treating them symmetrically, it may\nstill be true (as Goldman and Woodard suggest) that possibilists are\ncommitted to counterintuitive verdicts in certain prudential cases, as\nillustrated in Plane Tickets. ", "\nThe objections considered in this section are some of the most\ninfluential or instructive objections that apply to possibilism,\ngenerally construed. However, they do not exhaust the objections that\nmay be levelled against the view. Even if possibilists are able to\nprovide adequate responses to these objections, other considerations\nmay count in favor of an alternative view. In the next section, we\nturn to possibilism’s main competitor: actualism." ], "subsection_title": "2.5 Objections to Possibilism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nWhen it comes to cases concerning agents who are disposed to act\nwrongly, actualists consider their possibilist counterparts to be\noverly idealistic by theorizing about our moral obligations without\nconsidering the moral imperfections that result in our failing to do\nthe best that we can. According to actualists, the specific way in\nwhich our imperfections need to be considered is by taking into\naccount the truth-value of certain counterfactuals of freedom, i.e.,\ncertain facts about what we would freely do if we were in some\ncircumstances. The only counterfactuals that are relevant to our\nobjective obligations are ones in which the circumstances in the\nantecedent are fully described (Jackson 1985: 178, 186; Jackson &\nPargetter 1986: 240). This is because strengthening the antecedent of\na counterfactual, i.e., adding information to the antecedent, can\nalter the counterfactual’s truth-value (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis\n1973).", "\n\nMost, if not all participants, in the actualist-possibilist debate\nseem to assume that the agents have the ability at one time to perform\nan act that they would not in fact perform at a later time if they\nwere in the relevant circumstances. For example, although Professor\nProcrastinate can ⟨agree to review the paper & write the\nreview⟩, she would, as a matter of fact, ⟨not write the\nreview⟩ if she were to ⟨agree to review the\npaper⟩. In other words, she would do something (not write)\nother than what she can do (write). By holding fixed the fact that\nProcrastinate would ⟨not write the review⟩ even if she\nwere to ⟨agree to review the paper⟩, it follows from\nactualism that Procrastinate ought to ⟨decline to review the\npaper⟩, even though she can ⟨agree to review the paper\n& write the review⟩. This is because actualism roughly\nstates that an agent ought to \$\\phi\$ just in case \$\\phi\$-ing would\nresult in a better outcome than any other alternative to \$\\phi\$-ing.\nRecall the generic definition offered in the previous section.", "\n\nNow, what would happen if Procrastinate were to ⟨decline to\nreview the paper⟩ is better than what would happen if\nProcrastinate were to ⟨agree to review the paper⟩. As\nthis example illustrates, the value that actualists assign to an\noption is determined by what would happen if that option were\nperformed, rather than by being a member of the best act-set that the\nagent can perform over time. ⟨Agreeing to review the\npaper⟩ is part of the best act-set that is presently available\nto Procrastinate. But the value of ⟨agreeing to review the\npaper⟩ is less than the value of ⟨declining to review\nthe paper⟩ because of what would happen if these respective\noptions were to be performed. ", "\n\nBeyond this minimal agreement among all versions of actualism that\nProfessor Procrastinate ought (given certain descriptions of the case)\nto ⟨decline to review the paper⟩, actualists diverge on\nother substantial issues concerning the scope of our obligations.\nHolly S. Goldman and Jordan Howard Sobel independently developed and\narticulated the first versions of actualism. We will begin by\nintroducing Goldman’s formulation which is motivated in part by\nthe need to avoid prescribing jointly unfulfillable obligations." ], "section_title": "3. Actualism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nThe above formulation of actualism is subject to the problem of\njointly unfulfillable obligations. That is, it generates multiple\nobligations such that it is impossible for the agent to fulfill all of\nthem. For example, Procrastinate is obligated to ⟨decline to\nreview the paper⟩ because this would result in a better outcome\nthan the outcome that would follow ⟨agreeing to review the\npaper⟩. On the other hand, Procrastinate is obligated to\n⟨agree to review the paper & write the review⟩\nbecause doing so would have a better outcome than the outcome of\n⟨declining to review the paper & not reviewing the\npaper⟩. This is a problem for Jackson and Pargetter’s\nversion of actualism, to be discussed below. Goldman’s and\nSobel’s versions of actualism are formulated precisely to avoid\nthis problem. To see how Goldman avoids this problem, consider the\nfollowing formulation of actualism that Goldman (1976: 471) considers\nand rejects:", "\n\nThe basic idea behind (G) is captured in the aforementioned rough\ndefinition of actualism. Here are the details. “\$A_i\$”\nmay apply to a single act or a sequence of acts over time. The main\nproblem that Goldman finds with (G) is that even if \$A_i\$ satisfies\n(1) and (2), (G) does not take into account the following sort of\ncase: “\$A_i\$” refers to a sequence of acts over time,\nthe following counterfactual is true: “if the agent were to\nperform the first half of \$A_i\$, then the agent would not perform\nthe second half of \$A_i\$”, and the sequence of acts that would\nfollow the performance of the first half of \$A_i\$ would be worse\nthan the sequence of acts that would follow an alternative to the\nfirst half of \$A_i\$. (G) implies that in this sort of case the agent\nhas jointly unfulfillable obligations at the same time t, viz.\nan obligation at t to perform \$A_i\$ and an obligation at\nt to refrain from performing the first half of \$A_i\$. For\nexample, according to (G) Procrastinate ought to ⟨agree to\nreview the paper & write the review⟩ from\n\$t_1\$–\$t_2\$ because the sequence of acts that would follow\nthis act sequence from \$t_2\$ is better than any sequence from\n\$t_2\$ which would follow any alternative act sequence at\n\$t_1\$–\$t_2\$, including the alternative of ⟨declining\nto review the paper & not writing the review⟩ from\n\$t_1\$–\$t_2\$. But, on the other hand, according to (G)\nProcrastinate ought to ⟨decline to review the paper⟩ at\n\$t_1\$ because the sequence of acts that would follow this from\n\$t_1\$ is better than any sequence from \$t_1\$ which would follow\nany alternative act at \$t_1\$, including the alternative of\n⟨agreeing to review the paper⟩. Obviously, it cannot be\nthe case that both obligations are fulfilled.", "\nGoldman (1976: 467) illustrates the possibility of jointly\nunfulfillable obligations with the following example.", "\nAlthough ⟨going to the office⟩ is a prerequisite for the\nbest outcome (viz. the outcome that follows ⟨voting for a\nlanguage requirement⟩), ⟨going to the office⟩\nwould, in fact, result in the worst outcome (viz. the outcome that\nfollows ⟨discouraging the student from seeking psychiatric\naid⟩). ⟨Staying home⟩ rather than ⟨going to\nthe office⟩ would result in a better outcome (viz. the outcome\nof ⟨writing lecture notes⟩). Here is Goldman’s\nchart, which summarizes Jones’s predicament:", "\nAs a matter of stipulation, the act-set which would follow the act-set\nthat terminates with ⟨voting for the language\nrequirement⟩ at \$t_3\$ is better than the act-set which would\nfollow any other \$t_1\$–\$t_3\$ act-set available to Jones at\n\$t_1\$. So\n (G)\n implies that, at \$t_1\$, Jones ought to do the best she can.\nHowever, (G) also implies that, at \$t_1\$, Jones ought to\n⟨stay home⟩ at \$t_1\$ rather than ⟨go to the\noffice⟩ at \$t_1\$. This is because both acts are performable\nfor Jones at \$t_1\$, and the act sequence which would follow\n⟨staying home⟩ is better than the act sequence which\nwould follow ⟨going to the office⟩. So, according to\n(G), Jones has at least two obligations that are jointly\nunfulfillable, A: ⟨going to the office, then going to\nthe faculty meeting, then voting for the language requirement⟩,\nand B: ⟨staying home⟩. Jones cannot perform both\n\$\\langle A \\lamp B\\rangle\$. There is no possible scenario in which\nboth obligations are fulfilled." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 The Problem of Jointly Unfulfillable Obligations for Some Forms of Actualism" }, { "content": [ "\n\nTo avoid the problem of jointly unfulfillable obligations, Goldman\n(1976: 473) proposes the following version of actualism:", "\n\nUnlike\n (G),\n (G1) assesses an act’s deontic status in a procedural manner,\nstarting with the options that are immediately available to the agent,\nand then proceeding to the next immediately available options. To\nillustrate, part (A) of (G1) tells us to first evaluate all of the\noptions that are immediately performable for Jones at \$t_1\$, and\nthose options are either ⟨going to the office⟩ or\n⟨staying home⟩. The latter option is obligatory because\nit would result in a better act-set than the act-set that\nwould result if Jones were to ⟨go to the office⟩. Part\n(B) of (G1) tells us that, as of \$t_1\$, Jones ought to perform an\nimmediate successor to ⟨staying home⟩ at \$t_1\$ that\nwould result in a better sequence of acts than any alternative option\nthat is an immediate successor to ⟨staying home⟩ at\n\$t_1\$. So, at \$t_1\$, Jones ought to ⟨stay home and then do\nresearch for lectures⟩ from \$t_1\$–\$t_2\$. Similarly,\nat \$t_1\$, Jones ought to perform an act-set that terminates with\n⟨writing lecture notes⟩ at \$t_3\$, given the assumption\nthat the act-set that would follow ⟨writing the lecture\nnotes⟩ at \$t_3\$ is better than the act-set that would follow\n⟨fixing lunch⟩ at \$t_3\$.", "\n\nThe application of\n (G1)\n to the case of Jones explains why (G1) does not imply the\npossibility of jointly unfulfillable obligations. Although what would\nhappen if Jones were to ⟨go to the faculty meeting⟩ at\n\$t_2\$ is better than what would happen if she were to do anything\nelse at \$t_2\$ that, as of \$t_1\$, she can do, Jones is nevertheless\nnot obligated at \$t_1\$ to ⟨go to the faculty\nmeeting⟩ at \$t_2\$. This is because if Jones were to perform\none of the acts required for ⟨going to the faculty\nmeeting⟩, viz. ⟨going to the office⟩, then the\nworst outcome would occur. As of \$t_1\$, any act that precludes\n⟨staying home⟩ at \$t_1\$ is impermissible.", "\n\nJordan Howard Sobel (1976: 196) similarly defends a version of\nactualism that avoids jointly unfulfillable obligations:", "\nA life L is a sequence of acts over time, or, in the\nterminology of this article, an act-set over time, such that this\nact-set is not contained in some other act-set that an agent S\ncan perform over time. Hence, a life is identical to the\npossibilist’s notion of a maximal act-set. A life L is\nsecurable for S at time t if at \$t\$ \$S\$ can immediately\nperform the first moment of x, x is in L, and if\nx were to occur, then L would occur (Sobel 1976: 199).\nAn obligatory life is determined in part by the set of immediately\nperformable fully specific minimal acts available to the agent. A\nminimal act is one whose completion cannot be stopped by the agent\nonce it is initiated. As such, all instantaneous acts are minimal acts\n(if there are any such acts). Moreover, a minimal act is fully\nspecific just in case it is not entailed by two or more minimal acts\navailable to the agent.", "\nLike\n (G1),\n and unlike\n (G),\n (S) does not imply that Jones ought to do the best she can over time\nin the sense affirmed by possibilists. This is because, according to\n(S), all lives that contain ⟨voting for the language\nrequirement⟩ are not securable for Jones at \$t_1\$. At\n\$t_1\$, there is no fully specific minimal act that Jones can\nimmediately perform such that if Jones were to perform it then Jones\nwould perform a sequence of acts that includes ⟨voting for the\nlanguage requirement⟩. Similarly, ⟨writing the\nreview⟩ is not securable for Procrastinate at \$t_1\$ because,\nat \$t_1\$, there is no fully specific minimal act that Jones can\nimmediately perform such that, if Jones were to perform it, then Jones\nwould ⟨write the review⟩." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Preliminary Formulations of Actualism" }, { "content": [ "\nIn contrast to the views of Goldman and Sobel, other forms of\nactualism embrace the possibility of jointly unfulfillable obligations\nwhile simultaneously resisting the claim that actualism implies the\npossibility of obligation dilemmas, i.e., scenarios in which all of\nthe options available to an agent over time result in a failure to\nfulfill at least one obligation. Consider Frank Jackson and Robert\nPargetter’s (1986: 233) formulation of actualism.", "\n\n\n[T]he values that should figure in determining which option is best\nand so ought to be done out of a set of options are the values of what\nwould be the case were the agent to adopt or carry out the\noption, where what would be the case includes of course what the agent\nwould simultaneously or subsequently in fact do: the (relevant) value\nof an option is the value of what would in fact be the case were the\nagent to perform it.\n", "\nJackson and Pargetter (1986: 244–245) maintain that there are\ndifferent sets of options out of which different obligations arise.\nFor instance, from the set of all \$t_1\$–\$t_3\$ act-sets\navailable to Jones at \$t_1\$, the option with the highest value\nconsists of the act-set that includes ⟨Jones’s voting for\nthe language requirement⟩ at \$t_3\$. Therefore, out of the\n\$t_1\$–\$t_3\$ act-set, at \$t_1\$ Jones is obligated to\n⟨go to the office, then go to the faculty meeting, and then\nvote for the language requirement⟩. This is because what would\nhappen if this act-set were to occur is better than what would happen\nif some other \$t_1\$–\$t_3\$ act-set were to occur. But on the\nother hand, from the set of immediately performable acts available to\nJones at \$t_1\$, the option with the highest value consists of\nJones’ ⟨staying home⟩ because what would happen if\nJones were to ⟨stay home⟩ is better than what would\nhappen if Jones were to ⟨go to the office⟩. Therefore,\nout of the performable \$t_1\$ acts, at \$t_1\$ Jones is obligated to\n⟨stay home⟩. Like\n (G),\n Jackson and Pargetter’s view does not assess an act’s\ndeontic status in the procedural manner with which Goldman’s\n (G1)\n or Sobel’s\n (S)\n assesses an act’s deontic status. Moreover, like (G), Jackson\nand Pargetter’s view implies the possibility of obligations that\ncannot be jointly fulfilled. We will henceforth refer to their view as\ncontextualist actualism because what an agent is obligated to do\ndepends on the set of options being considered within a certain\ncontext." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 A Contextualist Formulation of Actualism" }, { "content": [ "\nThe possibility of jointly unfulfillable obligations initially seems\nto imply the possibility of obligation dilemmas, i.e., scenarios in\nwhich all of the options available to an agent over time result in a\nfailure to fulfill at least one obligation. But this is not the case\ngiven the assumption taken for granted in the actualist-possibilist\ndebate: that agents have control over the truth-value of certain\ncounterfactuals. In other words, agents can perform certain acts, and\nif they were to do so, then certain counterfactuals that are in fact\ntrue would instead be false. For example, Procrastinate can\n⟨agree to review the paper & then write the review⟩.\nIf she were to do this, then the following counterfactual that is\nfalse would be true instead: “If Procrastinate were to\n⟨agree to review the paper⟩, then she would\n⟨write the review⟩”. Moreover, if this\ncounterfactual were true, then Procrastinate would not be obligated to\n⟨decline to review the paper⟩. This is because, in this\ncounterfactual scenario, what would follow from ⟨declining to\nreview the paper⟩ would be worse than what would follow from\n⟨agreeing to review the paper⟩. ", "\nJackson and Pargetter rightly conclude from this that Procrastinate\ncan avoid violating any obligation because if Procrastinate\nwere to do something that she can do, viz. ⟨agree to review the\npaper & then write the review⟩, then Procrastinate\nwouldn’t be obligated to ⟨decline to review the\npaper⟩ in the first place, and thus there would be no\nunfulfilled obligations (Jackson 1985: 194; Jackson & Pargetter\n1986: 242–243; Louise 2009: 330; Jackson 2014: 636). In this\nsense, according to contextualist actualism, the obligation to\n⟨agree to review the paper & then write the review⟩\noverrides the obligation to ⟨decline to review the\npaper⟩. More generally, at time t an agent can do\nsomething over time such that, if it were done, then their primary\nobligation would be fulfilled, and the agent would not have any\nunfulfilled obligations from t onwards. Jackson and\nPargetter’s view is more similar to possibilism in comparison to\nstandard formulations of actualism insofar as Jackson and Pargetter\nagree with possibilists about an agent’s obligation to perform\nthe same maximal act-set. The difference between contextualist\nactualism and possibilism is that the former view affirms the\nexistence of additional obligations that arise from sets of options\nthat do not include this maximal act-set.", "\nJackson and Pargetter (1986: 246–249) believe that incompatible\nprescriptions are objectionable only when they arise from the same set\nof alternatives. But their view never generates incompatible\nprescriptions out of the same set of alternatives. Out of the set of\nalternatives of ⟨agreeing to review the paper⟩ at\n\$t_1\$ or ⟨declining to review the paper⟩ at \$t_1\$,\n⟨declining to review the paper⟩ is obligatory. But out\nof the \$t_1\$–\$t_2\$ alternatives available to Procrastinate\nat \$t_1\$, ⟨agreeing to review the paper and then writing the\nreview⟩ is the obligatory option. Hence, according to\ncontextualist actualism, as long as actualism does not prescribe\nincompatible obligations from the same set of alternatives,\nincompatible prescriptions are unproblematic. Still, one might object\nthat their view is not action-guiding in the sense that their theory\ndoes not say whether the overriding obligation takes priority over the\nother obligations (cf. Jackson 2014: 636).", "\nBy relativizing obligations to different sets of options,\ncontextualist actualism is subject to the so-called lumping problem.\nThis is the problem of lumping alternatives to an option O into\na single alternative (not-O) (Wedgwood 2009\n [Other Internet Resources, OIR];\n Ross 2012; Cariani 2016). Here is an example. Suppose that the\nfollowing increasingly worse options are available to an agent\nA: ⟨go to work⟩, ⟨gamble at home⟩,\n⟨kill someone at home⟩. Suppose furthermore that the\nfollowing four counterfactuals are true.", "\nIn that case, what would happen if A were to ⟨gamble at\nhome⟩ is better than what would happen if A were to\n⟨not gamble at home⟩. For, if A were to\n⟨not gamble at home⟩, then A would ⟨kill\nsomeone at home⟩. Now, when we consider A’s\noptions to be ⟨gambling at home⟩ or ⟨not gambling\nat home⟩, contextualist actualism implies that A ought\nto ⟨gamble at home⟩. This should seem very implausible,\neven by actualists’ own lights, because what would actually\nhappen if A were to ⟨go to work⟩ is better than\nwhat would happen if A were to make any other choice at the\ntime in question. Those who find this result counterintuitive have\nsuggested that an obligatory act O must have a higher value\nthan all of the non-supererogatory options available to the agent,\nrather than only having a higher value than not-O. In response\nto this worry, Jackson and Pargetter can remind us that it is also\ntrue that A ought to ⟨go to work⟩ out of a\ndifferent set options, viz. ⟨going to work⟩,\n⟨gambling at home⟩, and ⟨killing someone at\nhome⟩. ", "\nThe relativization of obligations to different sets of options has led\nJackson and Pargetter to reject the “ought distributes over\nconjunction” (ODC) principle (1986: 247). Recall that ODC holds\nthat if an agent S ought to do both A and B, then\nS ought to do A and S ought to do B\n(Castañeda 1968: 141). While they accept that Procrastinate\nought to ⟨agree to review the paper & then write the\nreview⟩, they deny that Procrastinate ought to ⟨agree to\nreview the paper⟩. Similarly, their view implies that Jones\nought to ⟨go to the office, then go to the faculty meeting, and\nthen vote for the language requirement⟩. However, Jones ought\nnot to ⟨go to the office⟩ since Jones ought to\n⟨stay home⟩." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 Objections to Contextualist Actualism" }, { "content": [ "\nGoldman’s\n (G1)\n and Sobel’s\n (S)\n enjoy the theoretical and practical virtue of simplicity by\nprescribing a single obligatory act sequence at a time rather than\nmultiple, jointly unfulfillable prescriptions at a time. But this\ntheoretical virtue comes at the cost of a possibilist objection: their\nviews allow agents to avoid incurring moral obligations simply in\nvirtue of having an imperfect moral character, and this allows agents\nto, morally speaking, get off the hook too easily (Jackson &\nPargetter 1986: 240; Zimmerman 1996: 193–194, 2006: 156;\nPortmore 2011: 207; Baker 2012: 642–43; Timmerman 2015;\nTimmerman & Cohen 2016; Cohen & Timmerman 2016). For example,\n\nProcrastinate avoids incurring an obligation to comment on a\nstudent’s paper simply because she is disposed to behave badly.\nActualism is committed to this even in cases in which an agent is\ndisposed to behave badly just because they intend to behave badly.\nBut, possibilists claim, agents cannot avoid incurring an obligation to \$\\phi\$\nsimply because they intend to \$\\phi\$ poorly. More generally,\npossibilists claim that being disposed to do wrong does not allow one\nto avoid incurring obligations to do good.", "\nProponents of\n (G1)\n or\n (S)\n may retort by reminding us that this apparently problematic\nimplication is the result of taking into account the relevant\ncounterfactuals, and that not taking them into account is too costly.\nWhile Procrastinate’s ⟨agreeing to review the\npaper⟩ is part of the best act-set that she can perform over\ntime, it is also part of the worst act-set that she can perform over\ntime, and the worst act-set would be performed if Procrastinate were\nto ⟨agree to review the paper⟩ (Jackson & Pargetter\n1986: 237). Similarly, Jones’ ⟨going to the\noffice⟩ is part of the best act-set that she can perform over\ntime, but it is also part of the worst act-set that she can perform\nover time, and the worst act-set would be performed if Jones were to\n⟨go to the office⟩.", "\nContextualist actualism can, in a sense, sidestep this possibilist\nobjection since contextual actualists agree with possibilists that an\nagent ought to do the best that she can over time, and, in addition,\nthey consider this obligation to override all other obligations in the\naforementioned sense (Jackson 1985: 194; Jackson & Pargetter 1986:\n242–243; Jackson 2014: 636). Possibilists may not be satisfied\nwith this response. Since possibilists accept ODC, they infer that\nProcrastinate is obligated to ⟨agree to review the\npaper⟩ from the fact that Procrastinate is obligated to\n⟨agree to review the paper & then write the review⟩.\nContextualist actualism denies that Procrastinate is obligated to\n⟨agree to review the paper⟩ at the cost of rejecting\nODC.", "\nAll of these versions of actualism face a second possibilist\nobjection: they prescribe bad behavior that the agent can easily avoid\n(Wedgwood 2009\n [OIR];\n Ross 2012: 75–76). For example, Procrastinate can easily avoid\n⟨declining to review the paper⟩ by ⟨agreeing to\nreview the paper⟩ and, once Procrastinate ⟨agrees to\nreview the paper⟩, she can easily ⟨write the\nreview⟩. Nevertheless, all of these versions of actualism\nmaintain that Procrastinate should ⟨decline to review the\npaper⟩ rather than ⟨agree to review the paper⟩.\nOther extreme actualist-possibilist scenarios highlight the force of\nthis objection. Suppose that the following act-set is the best one\navailable to a mass murderer M at \$t_1\$: ⟨kill no\n\none⟩ at \$t_1\$ and ⟨kill no one⟩ at \$t_2\$.\n\nSuppose, however, that the best immediately available option for\nM is ⟨killing someone at \$t_1\$⟩ because of the\ntruth of the following two counterfactuals: “if M were to\n⟨kill someone⟩ at \$t_1\$, then M would\n⟨kill no one⟩ at \$t_2\$”, “if M were\nto ⟨kill no one⟩ at \$t_1\$, then M would\n⟨kill ten people⟩ at \$t_2\$”. Possibilists claim\nthat M should ⟨kill no one⟩ from\n\$t_1\$–\$t_2\$ and thus that M should ⟨kill no\none⟩ at \$t_1\$. Actualists, however, claim that M\nshould ⟨kill someone⟩ at \$t_1\$. Contextualist\nactualism at least allows one to say that although ⟨killing\nsomeone⟩ at \$t_1\$ is obligatory, doing this violates\nM’s obligation to ⟨kill no one⟩ from\n\$t_1\$–\$t_2\$. Goldman and Sobel’s versions cannot\naccommodate this appeasing judgment.", "\nIt is worth noting that possibilism is thought to be subject to a\nrelated problem. While it doesn’t allow agents to avoid incurring\nmoral obligations for having a vicious moral character, it does allow\nagents to avoid incurring moral obligations to curtail their vicious\nmoral character (Timmerman and Swenson 2019). To illustrate the\nproblem, suppose that one of the optimific act-sets Apathetic Andy can\nperform over time includes ⟨playing video games tonight and\ndonating his expendable income to charity tomorrow⟩. Andy is,\nhowever, quite apathetic. As such, he won’t ⟨donate his\nexpendable income to charity tomorrow⟩ unless he first\n⟨reads work by Peter Singer tonight⟩. If he\n⟨plays video games tonight⟩, he will merely reinforce\nhis selfish nature and ⟨use his expendable income to purchase\nmore video games tomorrow⟩. Here’s the catch. The other\noptimific act-set Apathetic Andy can perform is to ⟨read work\nby Peter Singer tonight and donate his expendable income to charity\ntomorrow⟩. Moreover, if Andy ⟨reads work by Peter Singer\ntonight⟩, he would ⟨donate his expendable income to\ncharity tomorrow⟩. Performing this optimific act-set won’t be\npleasant for Andy, though, since he finds reading philosophy to be\ntedious. Here’s the problem. Possibilism renders the verdict that Andy\nis permitted to ⟨play video games tonight⟩, which would\nnot only result in a suboptimal outcome, but also exacerbate (rather\nthan curtail) his bad moral character. By contrast, actualism entails\nthat Andy is obligated to improve his moral character by\n⟨reading work by Peter Singer tonight⟩, and actualism\nthus ensures that Andy would ⟨donate his expendable income to\ncharity tomorrow⟩. So, both possibilism and actualism seem to\nlet agents with vicious moral characters off the hook too easily,\nalbeit in different circumstances and in different ways.", "\nIn the next section we will consider an additional objection to\nactualism that has led to the development of views that may be\nconsidered intermediaries of actualism and possibilism. According to\nthese views, a counterfactual is relevant to an agent’s present\nobligation only if the agent presently lacks a specific kind of\ncontrol over the truth-value of that counterfactual." ], "subsection_title": "3.5 Objections to All Forms of Actualism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nRecall that the kinds of actualist-possibilist scenarios that we have\nbeen discussing—the cases of Professor Procrastinate\nand the case of Jones—are diachronic cases in the sense\nthat they concern different acts that are performed across different\nmoments of time, rather than at the same time. For example, in the\ncase of Professor Procrastinate, one of the relevant\ncounterfactuals is that if she were to ⟨agree to review the\npaper⟩ at \$t_1\$, then she would ⟨not write the\nreview⟩ at \$t_2\$. The act in the antecedent and the act in\nthe consequent are indexed to different times. On the surface, it may\nappear that a diachronic case would yield the same results as a\nsynchronic case, i.e., a case that involves the performance of\ndifferent acts at the same time. But as Goldman (1978) shows, a\nsynchronic actualist-possibilist scenario yields new difficulties for\nactualism, including Goldman’s (1976)\n (G1),\n and the way to address these difficulties is by incorporating a\ncontrol condition over the truth-value of certain counterfactuals." ], "section_title": "4. Securitist Views", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nConsider Goldman’s (1978: 186) case, which we’ll call\nTraffic 1:", "\nAccording to Goldman, it seems that Jones should\n⟨accelerate⟩ at t since Jones is going to\n⟨change lanes⟩ at t, and ⟨accelerating\n& changing lanes⟩ at t would result in a better\noutcome than that of ⟨not accelerating & changing\nlanes⟩. But now consider this case:", "\nIn Traffic 2 Jones ⟨changes lanes and doesn’t\naccelerate⟩ at t. It seems that Jones should ⟨not\nchange lanes⟩ at t since she is going to ⟨not\naccelerate⟩ at t. But it also seems that Jones should\n⟨accelerate⟩ at t since she is going to\n⟨change lanes⟩. We have arrived at the verdict that in\nTraffic 2 Jones should ⟨not change lanes⟩ and\nthat Jones should ⟨accelerate⟩. This verdict is\nextremely counterintuitive since this would result in colliding with\nthe back of the truck, which is the worst possible outcome. ", "\nAccording to Goldman, the lesson to be gleamed from synchronic\nactualist-possibilist cases is this: In determining what we are\nobligated at t to do at t, we should not hold fixed\nfacts about what we are freely doing at t. Moreover, such synchronic\ncounterfactuals do not determine in any way what an agent is obligated\nto do at any time. Consequently, the kind of immediate act-set that is\na candidate for being obligatory is the fully specific simultaneous\nact-set that is immediately available to Jones. A performable fully\nspecific simultaneous act-set is one such that one cannot also perform\nany other act-set at the relevant time. Goldman (1978: 190) calls such\nact-sets maximal conjunctive acts, but this entry will stick with the\nterminology of a fully specific simultaneous act-set in order\nto avoid ambiguation with other notions of act-sets at issue in this\npaper. Let’s suppose that the (immediate) fully specific\nsimultaneous act-sets available to Jones are ranked from best to worst\nas follows. ", "\nAccording to Goldman, given options (1)–(4), Jones should\nobviously perform (1). Moreover, notice that if Jones were to\nperform (1), then the following synchronic counterfactual that is in\nfact true in Traffic 2 would be false instead: “if\nJones were to ⟨not accelerate⟩ at t, then at\nt Jones would ⟨change lanes⟩”. So, given\nthe intuition that Jones is obligated to perform (1) and that doing so\nwould alter the truth-value of certain synchronic counterfactuals, we\nshould not hold fixed the truth-value of such synchronic\ncounterfactuals when theorizing about an agent’s obligation to\nperform some immediate fully specific simultaneous act-set. To\naccommodate this judgment, Goldman’s (1978) revised view\nincorporates a control condition over the truth-value of such\nsynchronic counterfactuals." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 A Synchronic Actualist-Possibilist Case" }, { "content": [ "\nGoldman’s revised view still adopts the insight behind\n (G1)\n that, in order to avoid the possibility of jointly unfulfillable\nobligations, an obligatory act-set (or, as Goldman calls it, a sequence\nof acts) must be such that it would occur if the agent were to\nimmediately perform the first act of the act-set, and the agent can\nperform this first act of the act-set. Goldman’s revised view\n(1978: 202) is referred to as “4”, but we will refer to\nit as (G+) here:", "\n\nUnlike\n (G1) ,\n Goldman’s revised view requires the first act to be a fully\nspecific simultaneous act-set. Moreover, the kind of act-set that\nshould be directly assessed is a maximal sequence. S\nhas the ability at \$t_1\$ to perform X only if S has\nthe ability at \$t_1\$ to immediately (at \$t_1)\$ perform the first\nfully specific simultaneous act-set in \$X.\$ Goldman’s (1978:\n201) notion of a maximal sequence is different from the\npossibilist’s aforementioned notion of a maximal act-set which\nextends to the end of one’s life. For, according to Goldman\n(1978: 193–195), at t an agent can perform an act-set\nover time if and only if, if at t the agent wanted to perform\nthis act-set, then the agent would do so over time. This implies that\nthe performable act-set over time must be such that the agent can, at\nt, form an intention to perform this act-set over time that\nwould be causally efficacious if the intention were formed.\nGoldman’s notion of a maximal sequence is thus more restricted.\nThat is, a maximal sequence X is an act-set available to an\nagent at t is such that, at t, the agent can form an\nintention to perform X, and no other act-set that at t\nthe agent can intend to perform is a proper part of X. So,\nhenceforth, we will refer to Goldman’s notion of a maximal\nsequence as an intentionally maximal act-set, and this is to\nbe distinguished from a maximal act-set.", "\nRecall that, according to Ability 2, an agent S has\nthe ability to immediately perform the first fully specific act-set in\nan intentionally maximal act-set if and only if S would perform\nthis fully specific act-set if S wanted to do so, and by\nextension we may assume Jones can perform each of (1)–(4). Under\nthis assumption,\n (G+)\n implies that although Jones would ⟨change lanes⟩ if she\nwere to ⟨not accelerate⟩, Jones nevertheless ought to do\nsomething that requires her to ⟨not accelerate⟩, viz.\n⟨not change lanes & not accelerate⟩. To see how (G+)\ndiffers from the versions of actualism in\n section 3,\n consider the following version of Professor\nProcrastinate:", "\nAccording to\n (G+)\n Procrastinate is obligated at \$t_1\$ to perform an intentionally\nmaximal act-set M that includes ⟨accepting the request\nand commenting⟩ because there is an immediate fully specific\nact-set available to Procrastinate at \$t_1\$ such that if it were\nperformed then M would occur, and M is the best\nintentionally maximal act-set that is securable for Procrastinate at\n\$t_1\$. By contrast, according to\n (G1)\n Procrastinate is obligated at \$t_1\$ to ⟨not accept the\nrequest⟩ because this would result in the performance of\nact-set M* that includes ⟨not commenting⟩ at\n\$t_2\$, and M* is better than the act-set M that\nwould occur if Procrastinate were to ⟨accept the\nrequest⟩ at \$t_1\$ because M includes\n⟨accepting & not commenting⟩.", "\nOne might suspect that a modified version of\n (G1)\n that focuses exclusively upon decisions rather than overt bodily acts\ncan handle synchronic actualist-possibilist cases, such as\nProfessor Procrastinate. But this isn’t so because it\nis possible for the following two counterfactuals to be true:", "\nEven though (i) is true, the best thing that Procrastinate can do\ninvolves ⟨deciding to accept the request⟩, viz.\n⟨deciding to accept the request & commenting⟩ at\n\$t_1\$. This shows that whether we assess an agent’s\nobligations in terms of decisions or overt bodily acts, the acts that\nare to be directly assessed are fully specific simultaneous act-sets,\nwhich is precisely what\n (G+)\n accomplishes.", "\nContextualist actualism and Goldman’s provisional but rejected\nprinciple\n (G)\n similarly imply that Jones is obligated at \$t_1\$ to perform (1)\nrather than any of (2)–(4) since these views permit a\ncandidate obligatory act to be fully specific. But these views do not\nrequire a candidate obligatory act to be fully specific, and\nthus these views also have the peculiar implication that in\nTraffic II Jones is obligated to ⟨accelerate⟩\nand Jones is obligated to ⟨not change lanes⟩." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Fully Specified Immediate Options" }, { "content": [ "\nThus far, we have seen that synchronic actualist-possibilist cases\nsuggest that, first and foremost, an agent has an obligation to\nperform a fully specific immediate act rather than a\nless-than-fully-specific immediate act. As a result, synchronic\ncounterfactuals do not even partly determine an agent’s\nobligation to perform some fully specific immediate act. This still\nleaves open a question about the ability that an agent must possess in\norder to be able to perform some immediate (fully specific) act in the\nrelevant sense. Goldman’s (1978: 195, 204–205) Ability\n2, for instance, is a version of the conditional analysis of\nabilities. The conditional analysis of abilities remains suspect by\nsome on the grounds that an agent does not have direct control over\ntheir desires. Given this, one may infer that facts about what an\nagent would do if she had different desires is irrelevant to her\nabilities (Lehrer 1968; Curran 1995: 82). Nevertheless, since many\nparticipants in the actualist-possibilist debate take for granted that\nthe ability to do otherwise is compatible with facts about what an\nagent will do or would do under certain circumstances, a number of\npeople have followed Goldman (1978) by taking the relevant kind of\ncontrol to be one that does not hold fixed all facts about the\nagent’s psychological makeup. See, for instance, the views of\nDoug Portmore (2011) and Jacob Ross (2012).", "\nPortmore (2011) understands the relevant kind of control an agent must\nhave over an option in terms of scrupulous securability. A\nset of acts (i.e., an act-set) is scrupulously securable by an agent\nonly if there is some set of intentions and some set of permissible\nbackground attitudes (including beliefs and desires), such that if the\nagent had these intentions and attitudes, then the agent would perform\nthat act-set (2011: 165). The sorts of attitudes Portmore (2011: 167)\nhas in mind are judgment-sensitive attitudes, i.e., attitudes that are\nsensitive to judgments about reasons (Scanlon 1998: 20). ", "\nThis form of control is similar to the conditional analysis insofar as\nthe agent does not need to possess the relevant intentions and\nattitudes required to perform an act in order to have an ability to\nperform that act. It just has to be the case that if the agent were to\nhave such intentions and attitudes, then the agent would perform the\nrelevant act. Portmore’s (2011: 166–167) exact account of\ncontrol is as follows:", "\n\n\nA set of acts, \$α_j\$, is, as of \$t_i\$, scrupulously\nsecurable by S if and only if there is a time, \$t_j\$, that\neither immediately follows \$t_i\$ or is identical to \$t_i\$, a set\nof acts, \$α_i\$, (where \$α_i\$ may, or may not, be\nidentical to \$α_j\$), and a set of background attitudes,\nB, such that the following are all true: (1) S would\nperform \$α_j\$ if S were to have at \$t_i\$ both\nB and the intention to perform \$α_i\$; (2) S has\nat \$t_i\$ the capacity to continue, or to come, to have at \$t_j\$\nboth B and the intention to perform \$α_i\$; and (3)\nS would continue, or come, to have at \$t_j\$ B (and,\nwhere \$α_i\$ is not identical to \$α_j\$, the intention\nto perform \$α_i\$ as well) if S both were at \$t_i\$\naware of all the relevant reason-constituting facts and were at\n\$t_j\$ to respond to these facts/reasons in all and only the ways\nthat they prescribe, thereby coming to have at \$t_j\$ all those\nattitudes that, given those facts, she has decisive reason to have and\nonly those attitudes that she has, given those facts, sufficient\nreason to have.\n", "\nPortmore (2011: 177) understands a set of acts \$α_j\$ to be a\nmaximal act-set in a similar vein to both a possibilist’s notion\nof a maximal act-set and Sobel’s notion of a life. The set of\nacts “\$α_i\$” is not identical to\n“\$α_j\$” when, e.g., one lacks the ability at\n\$t_j\$ to form an intention to perform “\$α_j\$”,\nalthough the agent would in fact perform \$α_j\$ if the agent\nwere to form at \$t_j\$ the intention to perform \$α_i\$. For\nexample, earning a PhD may be presently scrupulously securable for an\nagent, although she is presently unable to form an intention to do all\nof the things that are required to attain a PhD at least because she\ncannot presently intend to write about an idea in her dissertation\nthat she has not yet studied (Portmore 2011: 169). So, whenever\n\$α_j\$ and \$α_i\$ are not identical, part (1) says that\nS would perform some act-set if S were to intend to\nperform some other act-set (along with certain background\nattitudes).", "\nPart (2) of the above definition states that an agent must have a\ncapacity (or an ability) to have certain attitudes and intentions.\nThis allows one to sidestep the difficulties that have been posed for\nthe conditional analysis of abilities (cf. Portmore 2011: 168). Part\n(3) states that the agent’s attitudes must be permissible. To\nillustrate, suppose that the only way in which Doug can ensure at 2 pm\nthat he will eat a healthy meal rather than pizza at 6 pm is by having\nthe irrational belief that his life depends upon eating a healthy meal\nat 6 pm. Since it seems that he is not obligated to have such a\nbelief, it follows that, at 2 pm, Doug is not obligated to eat a\nhealthy meal at 6 pm since there is no combination of intentions and\npermissible attitudes (as opposed to impermissible attitudes) that\nDoug can have at 2 pm, such that if he were to have them at 2 pm then\nhe would eat a healthy meal at 6 pm (Portmore 2011:\n164–165).", "\nPortmore (2011: 222) pairs this notion of control with the following\naccount of rational permissibility that applies to moral\npermissibility when there are moral reasons to act:", "\nSecuritism employs a top-down approach by using normative principles\nto directly assess the deontic status of maximal act-sets and then\nextending the same deontic status to non-maximal act-sets that are\ncontained in the relevant maximal act-set (Portmore 2011: 179). This\napproach reaps the benefits of Goldman’s\n (G+)\n of avoiding jointly unfulfillable obligations and of denying that any\nsynchronic counterfactuals even partly determine an agent’s\nobligations.", "\nPortmore’s securitism—and by extension other views that\nhold fixed facts that are not presently up to the agent in some\nsense—has been criticized on the grounds that it does not\ngenerate an obligation to do the best one can in the sense at issue in\nAbility 1, and thus securitism sometimes requires agents to\nperform terrible and vicious acts, and it allows one to avoid\nincurring an obligation in light of vicious or immoral dispositions\n(Timmerman 2015; Vessel 2016).", "\nRoss (2012: 84) similarly maintains that an agent can immediately\nperform an act that requires some attitude that the agent does not in\nfact have, although Portmore’s and Ross’s views diverge in\ncertain cases. Here is Ross’s view (2012: 91):", "\nIn essence, MWSS is the view that “at any given time, an agent\nis obligated, at every future time, to be currently satisfying a\nwide-scope version” of Smith’s\n (G+)\n or Portmore’s securitism (Ross 2012: 91). Ross believes that\nonly MWSS can account for each of the four conditions of his core idea\n(2012: 89, 91).", "\nTo see how these views diverge, consider the following case which is\nsimilar to a case described by Ross (2012: 87–88): at \$t_1\$\nSally has the ability to immediately form an intention to ⟨not\nkill anyone five years later at \$t_5\$⟩, although\n⟨killing no one at \$t_5\$⟩ is not scrupulously\nsecurable for Sally at \$t_1\$. On the other hand, killing exactly one\nperson or killing exactly two persons at \$t_5\$ are both scrupulously\nsecurable for Sally at \$t_1\$. According to Portmore’s\nsecuritism, one of the objectively morally permissible maximal set of\nacts that is scrupulously securable by Sally at \$t_1\$ involves\nkilling one person at \$t_5\$. However, at \$t_5\$, not killing anyone\nis scrupulously securable for Sally, and thus at \$t_5\$ Sally is\nobligated to not kill anyone at \$t_5\$. These stipulations in\nRoss’s case are derived from the fact that at \$t_1\$ Sally has\nan impeccable moral character that will be corrupted through no fault\nof her own (by being kidnapped by Satanists). But her moral character\nis not corrupted to such an extent that she is unable at \$t_5\$ to\nrefrain from killing anyone. To emphasize, at \$t_1\$ the best\nefficacious intention that Sally can form involves killing one person\nat \$t_5\$ whereas at \$t_5\$ the best efficacious intention that\nSally can form involves killing no one at \$t_5\$. Portmore’s\nsecuritism thus prescribes an act at some future time, but then does\nnot prescribe that act once that time is present.", "\nRoss (2012: 87–89) wishes to avoid this implication.\n MWSS\n does not imply that at \$t_1\$ Sally is obligated to kill exactly one\nperson at \$t_5\$ because whether Sally kills exactly one person at\n\$t_5\$ causally depends upon her intentions at \$t_1\$. So, Sally\nsatisfies the following conditional by not satisfying the first part\nof the antecedent: (if whether Sally refrains from killing exactly one\nperson at \$t_5\$ does not causally depend on the intentions she will\nhave after \$t_1\$, and if all her maximally preferable, directly\nsecurable options involve killing exactly one person at \$t_5\$, then\nshe kills exactly one person at \$t_5)\$. Instead, MWSS implies that\nat \$t_1\$ (and at \$t_5)\$ Sally is obligated not to kill anyone\nbecause she satisfies the following conditional only by satisfying its\nconsequent: (if whether Sally kills no one at \$t_5\$ does not\ncausally depend on the intentions she will have after \$t_5\$, and if\nall her maximally preferable, directly securable options involve not\nkilling anyone at \$t_5\$, then she kills no one at \$t_5)\$.", "\nA proponent of securitism may reply that there’s simply nothing\nSally can do at \$t_1\$ that allows her to secure not killing anyone\nat \$t_5\$, and thus having an obligation at \$t_1\$ not to kill\nanyone at \$t_5\$ concedes too much to possibilism. For, one of the\ncore intuitions driving securitist views is that we should treat our\nnon-securable futures in the same way we treat the futures of other\nagents; we should hold such futures fixed when determining our present\nmoral obligations. This thought has led to an expansive discussion of\nthe way in which actualist-possibilist scenarios raise fundamental\nquestions about agency and how we are to conceive of our present\nselves in relation to our future selves (Louise 2009; Baker 2012)." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Kinds of Control Over Immediate Options" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe discussion up until this point has centered around making sense of\nthe general notion that an agent ought to do the (non-supererogatory)\nbest that she is able to do. But some theories hold that an\nagent’s moral life is more complex than this because an\nagent’s ability to do less than the (non-supererogatory) best is\nalso obligatory is some non-primary sense. This approach is motivated\nin part by the thought that some wrong actions are better than others.\nMichael McKinsey (1979: 391–392) develops this approach,\ndefending a view with multiple levels of obligation. His view may be\nformulated as follows:", "\nWhile McKinsey’s formulation of (LO) is rather complicated, the\nbasic idea is quite simple. According to (LO), an agent\nS’s primary obligation is identical to the obligation\nthat possibilists believe S has. Additionally, for every\nmaximal act-set M (or a life) that, at t, S can\nperform, if M is not identical to the best maximal act-set\nthat, at t, S can perform, but is better than the\nmaximal act-set that S will in fact perform, then at t\nS has a moral obligation to perform M. To illustrate,\nconsider this case:", "\n\n (LO)\n implies that there are three levels of obligations that Ben fails to\nfulfill: his primary obligation to refrain from pressing any button,\nhis secondary obligation to press the first button, and his tertiary\nobligation to press the second button. If Ben were to instead press\nthe second button, then Ben would have failed to fulfill only two\nobligations, viz. the primary obligation to refrain from pressing a\nbutton, and the secondary obligation to press the first button. ", "\nMcKinsey’s\n (LO)\n is, in one sense, in agreement with possibilism because an\nagent’s primary obligation is identical to a possibilist\nobligation. Moreover, even though (LO) can generate jointly\nunfulfillable obligations, (LO) agrees with Jackson and\nPargetter’s contextualist actualism that if, in the terminology\nof (LO), an agent fulfills her primary obligation, then it’s not\nthe case that the agent violates any non-primary obligations because\nthe agent simply does not have any non-primary obligations. For\nexample, if Ben refrains from pressing any button, then according to\n(LO) it’s not the case that Ben had a secondary obligation to\npress the first button, and thus no non-primary obligations are\nviolated. McKinsey’s (LO) is, in a sense, also in agreement with\n(non-contextualist) versions of actualism. For example,\nProcrastinate’s obligation according to non-contextualist\nversions of actualism is to ⟨decline to review the paper &\nnot review the paper⟩, and, according to McKinsey, this is\nProcrastinate’s secondary obligation because this act-sequence\nis the second best maximal act-sequence (or a part of the second best\nmaximal act-sequence) that Procrastinate can perform over time. ", "\nGoldman (1978: 205–208) holds that there are exactly two orders\nof obligations, one primary and one secondary, and that it is better\nto fulfill one’s secondary obligation rather than to violate\nboth obligations. Primary obligations are governed by Goldman’s\n (G+),\n and secondary obligations are governed by principles such as\nGoldman’s (1976)\n (G1)\n which, as we have seen in\n section 4,\n does not take into account an agent’s moral character that\ndetermines the truth-value of certain synchronic counterfactuals. For\nexample, in the case of Professor Procrastinate,\nProcrastinate’s primary obligation is to ⟨agree to review\nthe paper & review the paper⟩ because there is an\nimmediately performable, fully specific simultaneous act-set such\nthat, if performed, would result in ⟨agreeing & reviewing\nthe paper⟩. By contrast, Procrastinate’s secondary\nobligation is to ⟨decline to review the paper & not review\nthe paper⟩ because Procrastinate’s moral character is\nsuch that if Procrastinate were to ⟨agree to review⟩ at\n\$t_1\$, then Procrastinate would harm the student by falsely\npromising to review at \$t_2\$. Procrastinate’s moral character\nis taken into account by her secondary obligation, but not her primary\nobligation. As Goldman (1986: 205) notes, it is sometimes useful to\nreason in a way that holds fixed our actual moral character, and\npositing secondary obligations allows us to reason in this way.\nZimmerman (1986: 70) also subscribes to non-primary obligations and\nmotivates this position in part on the basis of considerations about\ndetachment and conditional obligations." ], "section_title": "5. Non-Primary Obligations", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe issues raised by the actualist/possibilist debate are relevant for\na number of other debates in philosophy as well. As has already been\ndiscussed, whether actualism, possibilism, or some intermediary view\nis correct has direct import for various principles in deontic logic,\nthe correct formulation of act-consequentialism, and for analogous\nquestions in the philosophy of action. The actualism/possibilism\ndebate, however, is perhaps most closely connected to the\nmaximalism/omnism debate. These debates are deeply interrelated. While\nboth concern questions about the scope of the agent’s options,\nthe maximalism/omnism debate focuses on certain questions about how to\nassess these options. Maximalists and omnists disagree about whether\nall options should be assessed in terms of their own goodness, or\nwhether some options should be assessed in relation to the goodness of\nother options. Maximalists and omnists disagree about which facts\nground the reasons to perform the relevant options and, as will be\nillustrated shortly, are concerned with a wider range of cases than\nthose in the actualism/possibilism debate.", "\nThe maximalism/omnism debate concerns cases where the performance of\none option entails (or implies) the performance of another. Cases such\nas Professor Procrastinate are but one example.\nProcrastinate’s ⟨accepting the invitation and writing the\nreview⟩ entails ⟨accepting the invitation⟩. Not\nall examples share Procrastinate’s structure, however. Many\nexamples concern different ways of performing the same option in\ndifferent (e.g., more or less precise, better or worse) ways. For\ninstance, ⟨drinking a Coke⟩ entails ⟨drinking a\nsoda⟩, ⟨visiting Uppsala⟩ entails\n⟨visiting Sweden⟩, and ⟨kicking someone very\nhard⟩ entails ⟨kicking someone⟩.", "\nNow, the central question in the debate concerns how the moral\nproperties of an option O are related to the moral properties\nof the options entailed by performing O. This abstract question\ncan be made clearer by considering an example. Suppose that I have\ngood reason to ⟨drink a soda⟩ and good reason to\n⟨drink a Coke⟩. Those in the maximalism/omnism debate\nare interested in whether the reason I have for performing one these\noptions grounds the reason I have for performing the other. Is it the\ncase that I have reason to ⟨drink a soda⟩ in virtue of\nmy having reason to ⟨drink a Coke⟩ or vice versa? Or is\nthere no grounding relation between my reason(s) to perform these\noptions?", "\nOmnists hold that all options should be directly assessed in terms of\ntheir own goodness. Omnism may be defined more precisely as\nfollows.", "\nIn this debate, a maximal option is simply understood as one that is\nnot entailed by any other option, aside from itself (Brown 2018: 752).\nMore precisely, a maximal option may be understood as “an option\nthat is maximally normatively specific in the sense that it is\nentailed only by normatively equivalent options”, where two\noptions are normatively equivalent if and only if they are equivalent\nin terms of all of the normatively relevant considerations (Portmore\n2017a: 428, 2017b: 2955). Any option that is not a maximal option will\nbe a non-maximal option.", "\nTo illustrate, suppose that hedonistic act-utilitarianism is true. To\nkeep things simple, suppose that the maximal options available to an\nagent S are ⟨drink a Coke⟩, ⟨drink nothing\nwhile smiling⟩, ⟨drink nothing while frowning⟩,\nand ⟨drink a Pepsi⟩. Suppose furthermore that\n⟨drinking a Coke⟩ would generate 5 hedons,\n⟨drinking nothing while smiling⟩ would generate 1 hedon,\n⟨drinking nothing while frowning⟩ would generate 0\nhedons, and ⟨drinking a Pepsi⟩ would generate 10 dolors\n(or −10 hedons). The non-maximal options available to S\ninclude ⟨drinking a soda⟩ and ⟨drinking\nnothing⟩. Finally, suppose that the following counterfactuals\nare true.", "\nAccording to omnism, whether it is permissible for S to\n⟨drink a soda⟩ depends on whether ⟨drinking a\nsoda⟩ would result in maximizing hedonic utility. Given the\ntruth of (1), it wouldn’t, so omnism entails that\n⟨drinking a soda⟩ is wrong. Likewise, according to\nomnism, whether it is permissible for S to ⟨drink a\nCoke⟩ depends on whether S’s ⟨drinking a\nCoke⟩ would result in maximizing hedonic utility. It does, so\nomnism entails that ⟨drinking a Coke⟩ is permissible\n(and obligatory).", "\nUnlike omnists, maximalists hold that only maximal options should be\nassessed in terms of their own goodness. They believe that all\nnon-maximal options should only be assessed in terms of the goodness\nof the relevant maximal options of which they are a part. Maximalism\nmay be defined more precisely as follows.", "\nAssuming hedonistic act-utilitarianism once again, according to\nmaximalism, the deontic status of the maximal options depends on the\noutcome of performing each option. According to maximalism, then,\n⟨drinking a Coke⟩ would be obligatory and every other\nmaximal option would be impermissible. So, with respect to maximal\noptions, maximalism and omnism generate the same deontic verdicts. But\nnow consider what maximalists say about non-maximal options. This is\nthe point of contention between maximalists and omnists. By contrast\nwith the omnist’s ascription of wrongness to ⟨drinking a\nsoda⟩, the maximalist holds that ⟨drinking a\nsoda⟩ is obligatory. This is because the obligatory maximal\noption is ⟨drink a Coke⟩ and S cannot perform the\nmaximal option of ⟨drinking a Coke⟩ without performing\nthe non-maximal option of ⟨drinking a soda⟩. The\nnon-maximal act ⟨drink nothing⟩, on the other hand, is\nentailed by an impermissible act, namely ⟨drink nothing while\nsmiling⟩. So, maximalism entails that ⟨drinking\nnothing⟩ is impermissible.", "\nInterestingly, omnism has typically been assumed in the literature. It\nmay have only operated as an unquestioned background assumption until\nthe groundbreaking work of Bergström (1966) and Castañeda\n(1968). Goldman (1978) and Bykvist (2002) defend distinct variants of\nmaximalism. Since then, there have been a few arguments against\nmaximalism (cf. Gustafsson 2014). Omnism seems to be considered the\ndefault position, though new arguments against omnism and in favor of\nmaximalism have started to appear in the literature recently (Portmore\n2017a,b, forthcoming; Brown 2018). Much of the debate revolves around\ntheProblem of Act Versions. Following Brown (2018: 754) and\nPortmore (forthcoming: ch. 4), this problem may be explained by\nconsidering the following three jointly inconsistent principles.", "\n\nEach of these principles seems quite plausible when considered in\nisolation. Principle (1) simply holds that an agent ought to perform\nthe best option available to her. Assuming hedonistic\nact-utilitarianism, the best option(s) will be whichever one(s)\nmaximize(s) hedonic utility. Principle (2) holds that if an agent is\nobligated to perform \$\\langle A \\rangle\$ and her performing\n\$\\langle A \\rangle\$ entails her performing \$\\langle B \\rangle\$,\nthen she is obligated to perform \$\\langle B \\rangle\$. So, if an\nagent is obligated to ⟨drink a Coke⟩ and\n⟨drinking a Coke⟩ entails ⟨drinking a\nsoda⟩, then that agent is obligated to ⟨drink a\nsoda⟩. ", "\nPrinciple (3) holds that there are cases where an agent\nS’s obligatory option (e.g., a maximal option) entails\nanother option (e.g., a non-maximal option) that, if performed, would\nnot result in S performing the obligatory maximal\noption. Performing the best option of ⟨drinking a Coke⟩\nentails that S ⟨drink a soda⟩. But what would in\nfact happen if S were to ⟨drink a soda⟩ is that\nS would ⟨drink a Pepsi⟩ and ⟨drinking a\nPepsi⟩ is not S’s best option. That is, in fact,\nthe worst option.", "\nMaximalists have objected to omnism on the grounds that it, in\nconjunction with (2) and (3), entails a contradiction (Portmore\nforthcoming: ch. 4). Given omnism, S is obligated to\n⟨drink a Coke⟩ because performing that act is\nS’s best option. S’s ⟨drinking a\nCoke⟩ entails S’s ⟨drinking a soda⟩.\nSo, given (2), S is also obligated to ⟨drink a\nsoda⟩. However, recall that this case illustrates principle\n(3). If S were to ⟨drink a soda⟩, S would\n⟨drink a Pepsi⟩. Given this, ⟨drinking a\nsoda⟩ would not result in S performing her best option.\nSo, omnism also entails that it is impermissible for S to\n⟨drink a soda⟩. Hence the contradiction. Omnism combined\nwith (2) and (3) entail both that S is obligated to\n⟨drink a soda⟩ and that it’s impermissible for\nS to ⟨drink a soda⟩. To avoid this contradiction,\nomnists must give up (2) or (3). Omnists such as Jackson and Pargetter\nhave given up (2).", "\nMaximalists reject omnism, which allows them to consistently accept\n(2) and (3), principles thought to have strong independent motivation.\nMaximalists, then, give up (1) to avoid the contradiction. According\nto the maximalist, sometimes agents are obligated to perform\nnon-maximal options (e.g., ⟨drink a soda⟩) that are not\ntheir best option in virtue of the fact that they are obligated to\nperform their best maximal option (e.g., ⟨drink a Coke⟩)\nand performing their best maximal option entails performing a\nsuboptimal non-maximal option. In short, the maximalist responds to\nthe Problem of Act Versions by giving up (1), while omnists\nrespond by giving up (2). As may already be clear, some motivations\nfor, and against, omnism parallel those of actualism, while some\nmotivations for, and against, maximalism parallel those of securitism\nand possibilism. Whichever considerations settle one of these debates\nwill likely settle (or at least significantly bear on) the other." ], "section_title": "6. The Maximalism/Omnism Debate", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe actualism/possibilism (and the maximalism/omnism) debate in ethics\ngrew out of a debate concerning the problem that identifying act\nalternatives poses for act-consequentialism. The debate, in its\npresent form, may be traced back to the work of Holly Goldman’s\nand Jordan Howard Sobel’s independent articulations, and\ndefenses of, actualism. Early forms of actualism held that whether an\nagent is obligated to perform an act roughly depends on whether what\nwould happen if the agent performed that act is better than\nwhat would happen if the agent were to perform any alternative act at\nthe time in question. Contrast this with possibilism, which holds that\nwhether an agent is obligated to perform an act depends on whether\nthat act is part of the best maximal act-set the agent could\n(not would) perform over the course of her life. These are\nthe “extreme” versions of actualism and possibilism\nrespectively. To handle cases concerning synchronic acts, and to avoid\nhaving her view prescribe incompatible obligations, Goldman amended\nactualism by building a control condition into the definition in her\n(1978) essay. This revised actualism,\n (G+),\n along with Sobel’s\n (S),\n only holds fixed the acts of an agent that are not presently under\nthe agent’s control. This change proved influential and inspired\nvarious versions of this view, which came to be collectively referred\nto as securitism. Securitist views occupy a middle ground between\n“extreme” forms of actualism and possibilism. A variety of\nother views do too, including McKinsey’s (1979)\nlevels-of-obligation view and Carlson’s (1995, 1999) view. There\nis not yet a consensus about which view, if any, is the most\nplausible. Of course, this should not be surprising since the\nactualism/possibilism (and the maximalism/omnism) debate is,\nrelatively speaking, still quite new." ], "section_title": "7. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Almeida, Michael J., 1992, “The Paradoxes of Feldman’s\nNeo-Utilitarianism”, Australasian Journal of\nPhilosophy, 70(4): 455–468. doi:10.1080/00048409212345331", "Åqvist, Lennart, 1969, “Improved Formulations of\nAct-Utilitarianism”, Noûs, 3(3): 299.\ndoi:10.2307/2214553", "Baker, Derek, 2012, “Knowing Yourself–And Giving Up On\nYour Own Agency In The Process”, Australasian Journal of\nPhilosophy, 90(4): 641–656.\ndoi:10.1080/00048402.2011.617761", "Bales, Eugene, 1972, “Utilitarianism, Overall Obligatoriness\nand Deontic Logic”, Analysis, 32(6): 203–205.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/32.6.203", "Bergström, Lars, 1966, The Alternatives and Consequences\nof Actions: An Essay on Certain Fundamental Notions in Teleological\nEthics, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.", "–––, 1968a, “Discussion: Alternatives and\nUtilitarianism”, Theoria, 34(2): 163–170.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1968.tb00348.x", "–––, 1968b, “Utilitarianism and Deontic\nLogic”, Analysis, 29(2): 43–44.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/29.2.43", "–––, 1971, “Utilitarianism and Alternative\nActions”, Noûs, 5(3): 237.\ndoi:10.2307/2214666", "–––, 1973, “On the Coherence of\nAct-Utilitarianism”, Analysis, 33(3): 98–102.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/33.3.98", "–––, 1976, “On the Formulation and\nApplication of Utilitarianism”, Noûs, 10(2):\n121–144. doi:10.2307/2214572", "Brown, Campbell, 2018, “Maximalism and the Structure of\nActs”, Noûs, 52(4): 752–771.\ndoi:10.1111/nous.12181", "Bykvist, Krister, 2002, “Alternative Actions and the Spirit\nof Consequentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 107(1):\n45–68. doi:10.1023/A:1013191909430", "Cariani, Fabrizio, 2016, “Consequence and Contrast in\nDeontic Semantics”, Journal of Philosophy, 113(8):\n396–416. doi:10.5840/jphil2016113826", "Carlson, Erik, 1995, Consequentialism Reconsidered,\nDordrecht: Kluwer.", "–––, 1999, “Consequentialism,\nAlternatives, and Actualism”, Philosophical Studies,\n96(3): 253–268. doi:10.1023/A:1004239306956", "Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 1968, “A Problem for\nUtilitarianism”, Analysis, 28(4): 141–142.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/28.4.141", "–––, 1969, “Ought, Value, and\nUtilitarianism”, American Philosophical Quarterly,\n6(4): 257–275.", "–––, 1972, “On the Problem of Formulating\na Coherent Act-Utilitarianism”, Analysis, 32(4):\n118–124. doi:10.1093/analys/32.4.118", "Cohen, Yishai and Travis Timmerman, 2016, “Actualism Has\nControl Issues”, Journal of Ethics and Social\nPhilosophy, 10(3): 1–19. doi:10.26556/jesp.v10i3.104", "Curran, Angela, 1995, “Utilitarianism and Future Mistakes:\nAnother Look”, Philosophical Studies, 78(1): 71–85.\ndoi:10.1007/BF00989819", "Feldman, Fred, 1986, Doing the Best We Can, Boston: D.\nReidel Publishing Company.", "Gauthier, David, 1994, “Assure and Threaten”,\nEthics, 104(4): 690–721. doi:10.1086/293651", "Goldman, Holly S. 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M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other,\nCambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.", "Sobel, Jordan Howard, 1976, “Utilitarianism and Past and\nFuture Mistakes”, Noûs, 10(2): 195.\ndoi:10.2307/2214575", "Stalnaker, Robert C., 1968, “A Theory of\nConditionals”, in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical\nTheory, (American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, 2),\nOxford: Blackwell, pp. 98–112.", "Thomason, Richmond H., 1981, “Deontic Logic and the Role of\nFreedom in Moral Deliberation”, in New Studies in Deontic\nLogic, Risto Hilpinen (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands,\n177–186. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8484-4_8", "Timmerman, Travis, 2015, “Does Scrupulous Securitism\nStand-up to Scrutiny? 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adaptationism	Adaptationism	First published Thu Jul 22, 2010	[ "“Adaptationism” refers to a family of views about the\nimportance of natural selection in the evolution of organisms, in the\nconstruction of evolutionary explanations, and in defining the goal of\nresearch on evolution. Advocates of adaptationism or\n“adaptationists” view natural selection among\nindividuals within a population as the only important cause of the evolution\nof a trait; they also typically believe that the construction of\nexplanations based solely on natural selection to be the most fruitful\nway of making progress in evolutionary biology and that this endeavor\naddresses the most important goal of evolutionary biology, which is to\nunderstand the evolution of adaptations. An important alternative\napproach, “pluralism”, invokes historical contingency and\ndevelopmental and genetic constraints, in addition to natural\nselection, as important causes of the evolution of a trait. Advocates\nof pluralism, or “pluralists” often also argue that the\nattempt to construct a natural-selective explanation of a trait is not\nthe most fruitful way to make explanatory progress and that\nunderstanding adaptation is just one of several important questions in\nevolutionary biology. The “debate” over adaptationism is\ncommonly understood to be the back-and-forth between adaptationists\nand pluralists.", "\n\nBiologists and philosophers have recently made three important\ncontributions that have led to better understanding of this\ndebate. First, they have delineated the differences among various\n“flavors” of adaptationism; this has helped clarify the\nbiological and philosophical stakes of the debate. Second, they have\nclarified standards of evidence for and against adaptationist claims;\nthis provides a clearer understanding of how to structure an empirical\ntest of a claim about natural selection and what implications the\nresults of the test have in regard to adaptationism. This\nclarification has the potential, not yet fully realized, to improve\nboth the practice of science and the philosophical understanding of\nthis practice. Third, there is improved understanding of the potential\nrole of non-selective influences on trait evolution." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. History", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Different Flavors of Adaptationism", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Empirical Adaptationism", "2.2 Explanatory Adaptationism", "2.3 Methodological Adaptationism" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Testing and Standards of Evidence", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Testing adaptationism", "3.2 Testing adaptive hypotheses", "3.3 Common ancestry and adaptation" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Do optimality models describe evolution?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Are constraint hypotheses genuine rivals to adaptive hypotheses?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Concluding Remarks", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\n The debate over adaptationism is often\ntraced back to a 1979 paper by Stephen Gould and Richard Lewontin,\ncalled “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm:\nA Critique of the Adaptationist Programme,” or simply the\n“Spandrels” paper. This paper is important but, in\nfact, this debate traces back to the nineteenth century, with elements\nof adaptationism or pluralism as currently understood being present in\nthe work of Henry Bates, William Bateson, Charles Darwin, Ernst\nHaeckel, Herbert Spencer, Alfred Wallace, and August Weissman, among\nothers (see Mayr 1982 and Ruse 2003 for some of the historical\nbackground).", "\n\n In the early twentieth century, views that\nwe now call adaptationism and pluralism were enunciated by biologists.\nAmong them were two of the then (and now) most influential evolutionary\nbiologists: Ronald Fisher and Sewall Wright. The central idea of\nFisher's important 1930 book “The Genetical Theory of\nNatural Selection” is that natural selection is the only\nimportant influence on trait evolution. This is the central text of\nadaptationism; indeed, it has an honored place in the minds of most\nevolutionary biologists, no matter what their position on adaptationism\n(compare Grafen 2003 and Kimura 1983). Issued again in 1958 in a\nrevised edition and in 1999 in a variorum edition, this book has\ngarnered over 8,400 journal citations; over 7,600 have occurred\nsince 1975 (Web of Science, June 2010).", "\n\n Sewall Wright's pluralist view\nof evolution was presented in several places, with his 1931 paper\n“Evolution in Mendelian Populations” and the 1977 book\n“Evolution and the Genetics of Populations, Volume 3 Experimental\nResults and Evolutionary Deductions” being the best known. The\npaper has received over 3,400 citations; over 3,000 have occurred since\n1975, while the book has received over 800 citations since 1977 (Web of\nScience, June 2010).", "\n\n These works by Fisher and Wright are\ncanonical contributions to the field of evolutionary biology. They were\nbased partially on prior claims and counterclaims about the influence\nof natural selection and of non-selective forces on trait evolution,\nespecially in species such as land snails that have easily\ndistinguishable trait variation (see Millstein 2007a). In turn, these\nworks stimulated continuing claims and counterclaims. The mid-1970s\nexplosion of citations reflects the fact that the number of biologists\nstudying ecology and evolution increased markedly as compared to the\nearly 1960s and that evolutionary biology gained separate departmental\nstatus at many universities; these changes were in part caused by the\nincreased societal awareness and concern at that time about pollution\nand the impact of humans on the environment. There were two central but\nmainly disjunct scientific developments that energized the\nproliferation and refinement of adaptationist and of pluralist views\nduring this period. The first was the extensive development of\n“strategic” claims in evolutionary ecology, which in the\ncase of a given trait, say, the allocation of energy to male and to\nfemale offspring (e.g., Hamilton 1967; see also Charnov 1982), provides\nan explanation as to why the observed trait is locally optimal. Such a\nclaim invokes only natural selection as an important causal explanation\nof the trait. The second development was the neutral theory in\npopulation genetics, which posits that natural selection plays little\nor no role in determining DNA and protein sequence variation in natural\npopulations (e.g., Kimura 1968, 1983). The former development generated\nlittle initial controversy, while the latter development immediately\ngenerated lasting controversy (see Dietrich 1994).", "\n\n It is this combination of social,\ninstitutional, and scientific developments that formed the background\nto Gould and Lewontin's 1979 paper, which can be best understood\nas an important but not singular event in a long-standing debate in\nevolutionary biology. It is neither the beginning of the debate over\nadaptationism nor something much narrower, e.g., little more than\n“the attempted intellectual lynching” of sociobiology, cf.,\nQueller (1995); see also Pigliucci and Kaplan (2000). Such claims are\nat best historically incorrect." ], "section_title": "1. History", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n Recent work in the philosophy of biology\n(Orzack and Sober 1994a, Sober 1996, Amundson 1988, 1990, Godfrey-Smith\n2001) has helped uncover three “flavors” of adaptationism;\nthese reflect differences in beliefs among current professional\ndevelopers and users of evolutionary arguments. They represent\ncommitments about the state of nature, about the way to do science, and\nabout what is important to study.", "\n\n The first flavor, “empirical”\nadaptationism, is the view that natural selection is ubiquitous, free\nfrom constraints, and provides a sufficient explanation for the\nevolution of most traits, which are “locally” optimal, that\nis, the observed trait is superior to any alternative that does not\nrequire “redefining” the organism (Orzack and Sober 1994a).\nThis is a claim about the realized influence of natural selection on\nthe evolution of traits as compared to other evolutionary\ninfluences.", "\n\n The second flavor,\n“explanatory” adaptationism, is the view that explaining\ntraits as adaptations resulting from natural selection is the central\ngoal of evolutionary biology. This is a claim about the greater\nimportance of some kinds of explanations. Opinions differ as to whether\nthis is a scientific claim or an aesthetic claim (see below).", "\n\n The third flavor,\n“methodological” adaptationism, is the view that looking\nfirst for adaptation via natural selection is the most efficient\napproach when trying to understand the evolution of any given\ntrait. This could be true even if adaptations are rare (although\na substantial majority of biologists believe that adaptations are\ncommon). The belief that adaptations are common is quite\ndifferent from the claim that only natural selection need be invoked in\norder to explain these adaptations.", "\n\n The flavors of adaptationism are logically\nindependent. The truth of one claim does not necessarily imply the\ntruth of the other claims. For example, it could be true that most\ntraits are adaptations that can be explained by invoking no more than\nnatural selection (the first flavor) but still be false that it is most\nfruitful to look first for adaptation (the third flavor). In fact,\nrealized intellectual stances are more circumscribed in that most\nadaptationists are advocates of empirical, explanatory, and\nmethodological adaptationism (e.g., Charnov 1982, Dawkins 1976, Maynard\nSmith 1978). In addition, there are many biologists who are advocates\nof explanatory and methodological adaptationism, but who explicitly\nreject empirical adaptationism (e.g., Mayr 1983). On the other hand,\nsome biologists reject all three flavors of adaptationism (e.g.,\nCarroll 2005, Wagner et al. 2000, West-Eberhard 2003). There are many\ninstances of competing adaptationist and pluralist explanations of the\nsame biology. For example, Cain and Sheppard (1954) and Lamotte (1959)\nfamously present competing explanations of morphological traits in land\nsnails; Ackermann and Cheverud (2004) test adaptationist and\npluralist explanations of the diversification of morphological\nevolution of humans and their ancestors; Millstein (2007b)\nillustrates the differences between adaptationism and pluralism by\npresenting the same biology (of a heat-shock protein) from both\nperspectives.", "\n\n Distinguishing among the flavors of\nadaptationism was an important advance in our biological and\nphilosophical understanding. These flavors of adaptationism differ in\ntheir practical implications for evolutionary biology. We now\ndiscuss each in detail." ], "section_title": "2. Different Flavors of Adaptationism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\n Godfrey-Smith (2001, page\n336) defined empirical adaptationism as follows: “Natural\nselection is a powerful and ubiquitous force, and there are few\nconstraints on the biological variation that fuels it. To a large\ndegree, it is possible to predict and explain the outcome of\nevolutionary processes by attending only to the role played by\nselection. No other evolutionary factor has this degree of causal\nimportance.”", "\n\n This definition captures two\nimportant beliefs of adaptationists. The first is that natural\nselection governs all important aspects of trait evolution and that\nother evolutionary influences will be of little consequence at least\nover the long term. The second is that the order in nature is a\nconsequence of natural selection. Parker and Maynard Smith (1990) is an\nimportant example of this approach.", "\n\n Empirical adaptationism is typically regarded as descriptive of the\nevolution of directly observable traits such as leg length (e.g.,\nVella 2008). A dizzying variety of traits has been analyzed from the\nperspective of empirical adaptationism; many specific examples can be\nfound in Hardy (2002), Stephens et al. (2007), and Westneat\nand Fox (2010). Many proponents of empirical adaptationism concede\nthat important aspects of the evolution of DNA and protein sequences\nare little influenced by natural selection.", "\n\n The important methodological\nimplication of empirical adaptationism stems from the causal power that\nit assigns to natural selection: an apparent discrepancy between data\nand the predictions of an optimality model should be resolved by\nrejection of that model and development of a new model. This is\njustified by an appeal to our “always” imperfect knowledge\nof nature (e.g. see Cain 1989). This contrasts with the pluralist\nperspective: such a discrepancy might well provide evidence against\nnatural selection.", "\n\n Many views counter to empirical\nadaptationism have been enunciated. Some dispense with natural\nselection entirely (or nearly so), such as in the study of molecular\nevolution, where there are neutral evolutionary explanations for many\nfeatures of the genome (e.g., Lynch 2007b). Some retain natural\nselection within populations as an important evolutionary force but\nendorse the importance of other forces (e.g., Crespi 2000, Goodwin\n2001, Carroll 2005), while others go further and invoke natural\nselection among populations or species along with natural selection\nwithin populations (Gould 2002, Jablonski 2008)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Empirical Adaptationism" }, { "content": [ "\n\n Godfrey-Smith (2001, page 336) defined\nexplanatory adaptationism in this way: “The apparent design of\norganisms, and the relations of adaptedness between organisms and their\nenvironments, are the big questions, the amazing facts in\nbiology. Explaining these phenomena is the core intellectual mission of\nevolutionary theory. Natural selection is the key to solving these\nproblems; selection is the big answer. Because it answers the\nbiggest questions, selection has unique explanatory importance among\nevolutionary factors.”", "\n\n Explanatory adaptationism is viewed\nby its proponents (e.g., Dawkins 1976, Dennett 1995, and Griffiths\n2009) as important because it organizes research to understand how\nnatural selection underlies the world around us. To this extent, it can\nbe viewed as an untestable aesthetic claim, instead of as a scientific\nclaim. At minimum, it is a claim as to the proper goal of science as a\nmanifestation of human reason and enlightenment. Amundson (1988, 1990)\nclaims that explanatory adaptationism is a stance about the natural\nworld and the products of scientific inquiry, instead of being a view\nabout biology or how best to do science. However, explanatory\nadaptationism may have normative implications for evolutionary\nbiologists, if adopting it is necessary in order to construct sensible\nexplanations in developmental biology and physiology (Griffiths\n2009). Viewed as an aesthetic claim, explanatory adaptationism\nhas no practical implications for science, but it does have\nimplications for the public debate about the relevance of biology to\nour image of humanity. In particular, Dennett and Dawkins argue\nthat this perspective counters the natural theological argument from\ndesign and vindicates a secular humanist perspective.", "\n\n Biologists not advocating explanatory\nadaptationism view the central mission of evolutionary biology\ndifferently. For example, many systematists believe that\ndescribing the history of life is the central mission of evolutionary\nbiology; in doing so, one might be agnostic about the evolutionary\nforces influencing this history (see Hull 1988 and Felsenstein 2004 for\nfurther details)." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Explanatory Adaptationism" }, { "content": [ "\n\n Godfrey-Smith (2001, page 337) defined\nmethodological adaptationism in this way: “The best way for scientists\nto approach biological systems is to look for features of adaptation\nand good design. Adaptation is a good ‘organizing concept’\nfor evolutionary research.”", "\n\n This is a claim about the efficiency of\ntools. No matter how incorrect it may ultimately be to invoke natural\nselection as a sufficient explanation for a trait, it is the most\ndirect way possible to find the true causal explanation of a trait.\nMethodological adaptationism differs markedly from empirical\nadaptationism in that the former acknowledges the possibility that\nnatural selection may ultimately prove not to have the most influence\non a given trait's evolution. In addition, a methodological\nadaptationist can accept that an apparent discrepancy between data and\nthe predictions of a model of natural selection may be resolved by\nconcluding that the trait is little influenced by natural selection,\ninstead of by concluding that the model is incorrect.", "\n\n One potential argument against\nmethodological adaptationism is that a mixture of distinct approaches\nis superior at advancing knowledge as compared to a single approach\n(Kitcher 1993). Allowing for a division of cognitive labor could be a\ngood thing; perhaps evolutionary biology benefits from an array of\nmethodological strategies with differing degrees of risk. This\ncontrasts with the view that multiple approaches with conflicting\nassumptions are a hindrance.", "\n\n Views counter to methodological\nadaptationism range from strong views that deny that adaptation is a\ngood guiding concept to weaker views that privilege different\nexplanations. For example, Gould and Lewontin's (1979)\nargument for considering constraint-based “Bauplan”\nexplanations before or along side selective explanations is an example\nof methodological anti-adaptationism." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Methodological Adaptationism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n An important part of the\nadaptationism debate concerns the testing of adaptive and non-adaptive\nhypotheses. The belief that scientific practice in evolutionary\nbiology does not adhere to the proper standards of evidence motivates\nmany of the critiques of adaptationism. This concern has been taken\nseriously by some evolutionary biologists; for example, Rose and Lauder\n(1996) claimed that a central task of contemporary evolutionary biology\nis to articulate a “post-Spandrels adaptationism,” a task\nthat involves improving testing methods by including comparative and\nmolecular data, conducting careful long-term studies in both the\nlaboratory and the wild, and incorporating a more comprehensive\nunderstanding of development and constraint.", "\n\n We now discuss testing of\nadaptationism itself and the associated implications for testing\nevolutionary hypotheses generally, and the sort of epistemic\ndifficulties that must be overcome. We highlight how the debate\nhas led to increased understanding of the importance of phylogenetic\nmethods, of the viability of optimality models as tools for testing\nadaptive hypotheses, and of whether constraint hypotheses are rivals to\nadaptive hypotheses or provide the backdrop against which we test\nhypotheses about the evolutionary process." ], "section_title": "3. Testing and Standards of Evidence", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\n Orzack and Sober (1994a, 1994b, 1996,\n2001) (see also Orzack 2008) proposed an approach for testing\nempirical adaptationism. In their view, the truth of empirical\nadaptationism is a possible outcome of testing of optimality models, as\nopposed to being something that is decided a priori.", "\n\n Their proposal, the “Adaptationism Project”, involves\nassembling specific kinds of analyses of traits in order to assess the\nrelative frequency and importance of natural selection across the\nbiological realm. In order to contribute to the ensemble test, an\nanalysis must include an assessment of the quantitative fit of the\noptimality model and of the within-population heterogeneity of fit to\nthe predictions (see below and Orzack and Sober 1994a for why these\nassessments are required). At present, there are very few trait\nanalyses that contain these elements; after an extensive literature\nreview, Orzack and Sober identified only Brockmann and Dawkins (1979),\nBrockmann et al. (1979), Orzack and Parker (1990), and\nOrzack et al. (1991) as analyses that contain the required\nassessments.", "\n\n Of course, to conduct an ensemble test,\nimportant methodological difficulties must be confronted, including how\nto choose populations and species to analyze, and how many cases are\nnecessary to provide an adequate test. The name “Adaptationism\nProject” is an acknowledgement of a parallel to the “Human\nGenome Project”; both are carried out by a consortium of\ninvestigators and require advance organization of the process by which\nknowledge is gathered (instead of just occurring willy-nilly).\nThis is an ambitious project but one that is achievable, cf., the\n“Genome 10K” project, which is also an effort to create an\nunprecedented data ensemble (Genome 10K 2009).", "\n\n Ensemble tests have a long\nprecedent in biology and evolutionary biology, although none appear to\nhave been prospectively organized. For example, we have the ensemble\nconclusion that “almost all” speciation occurs via\ngeographical isolation (Mayr 1963) or that the genetic code is\n“nearly” universal (Crick 1968). Either or both of these\nclaims could be true but the present empirical knowledge that generated\neither one is not even remotely close to being based on a sample of\norganisms that could be taken to be representative of all species.", "\n\n Empirical adaptationism is both\na claim about the relative frequency of natural selection across\nevolutionary histories and about the power of natural selection to\novercome constraints and contingency. Orzack and Sober's\n(1994a,b) ensemble test of the truth of empirical adaptationism is\nstructured in the following way for any given trait, T. In order to\ncontribute to the ensemble test, the analysis of the trait must allow\nthe investigator to confirm one of the following hypotheses about the\npower of natural selection:", "\n\n(U) Natural selection played some role in the evolution of T. (U\ndenotes ubiquitous since\nthis proposition applies to most traits.)\n\n\n\n(I) Natural selection was an important cause of the evolution of T.\n(I denotes important.)\n\n\n\n(O) Natural selection is a sufficient explanation of the evolution\nof T, and T is locally \noptimal. (O denotes optimal.)\n\n", "\n\n Orzack and Sober claimed that\nempirical adaptationism is a generalization of (O), namely that natural\nselection is a sufficient explanation for most (nonmolecular) traits\nand those traits are locally optimal.", "\n\n Orzack and Sober provided a specific\nprotocol to assess whether O is true for a particular trait. It\ninvolves comparing the predictive accuracy of a “censored”\nevolutionary model, one that invokes only natural selection, and an\nalternative “uncensored” model that invokes additional\nevolutionary influences such as genetic drift (random trait change\ncaused by population number being finite), or constraints caused by the\nway the trait is determined genetically or developmentally. If\nthe censored model is quantitatively accurate and there is no\nwithin-population heterogeneity of fit to predictions and the\nuncensored model fails in either regard, then one can infer that\nnatural selection is a sufficient explanation for trait T.\nOptimality models embody proposition (O) in that natural selection is\nassumed to be the only important influence on the focal trait's\nevolution; the result is assumed to be the evolution of a trait that\nmaximizes individual fitness. Of course, an optimality model, like any\nevolutionary model, must include background assumptions and constraints\nthat anchor the “local” analysis of the focal trait.\nHowever, given these assumptions, natural selection is assumed to act\nwithout constraint on the trait.", "\n\n There is some controversy over the\nprotocol for testing whether natural selection is a sufficient\nexplanation of a trait. Brandon and Rausher (1996) objected that\nlocal optimality is a distinct claim and so tests for the importance of\nnatural selection should not use optimality models, whose use they\nequate to “theft”, which they believe means that such\nmodels are generically incompatible with universal aspects of the\nbiology of organisms. They also take issue with how the\npredictive accuracy of censored and uncensored models should be\nassessed. Godfrey-Smith (2001) makes the observation that the\ncensored and uncensored test models typically have different\ncomplexity. More complex models usually fit the data better, but\nrisk obscuring the underlying trend or comprising predictive\naccuracy—there may be a problem of over-fitting lurking here\n(see, e.g., Gauch 2003 for an overview of the curve-fitting\nproblem).", "\n\n Extending this framework to molecular\ntraits, where completely neutral evolution is a plausible explanation,\nrequires expanding the set of hypotheses about natural selection.\nIt now should include:", "\n\n(N) Natural selection played no role in evolution of T. (N\ndenotes neutral.)\n\n", "\n\nSome argue that N is rarely, if ever, true (e.g., Gillespie 1991),\nwhereas others argue otherwise (e.g., Kimura 1983, Lynch 2007a).\nAn ensemble test involving molecular traits would help resolve this\ncontroversy. In addition, the notion of optimality at the\nmolecular level must be made precise. A molecular trait needs to have\nan identified phenotypic consequence. The endeavor to identify such a\nconsequence will likely always involve a combination of very detailed\nmolecular, biochemical, and phenotypic analyses. However, despite the\ndifficulty of the needed analyses, there are claims as to the\noptimality of various molecular traits. A canonical example is the\nclaim that triosephosphate isomerase, an enzyme involved in glycolysis\nin animals, fungi, plants, and some bacteria, is catalytically\n“perfect” (Albery and Knowles 1976); this is a claim that\nhypothesis O is true. For molecular traits, the assessment of the\ninfluence of natural selection, i.e., distinguishing between hypothesis\nN and hypotheses U and I, is facilitated by the degeneracy of the\ngenetic code and the existence of non-coding regions in the genome. We\nexpect heterogeneity of the realized influence of natural selection\namong sites in the genome, and differences in evolutionary rates\nbetween sites where a DNA base change alters the protein sequence and\nthose sites that it does not (see examples in Graur and Li 2000,\nKreitman and Akashi 1995, Nielsen 2005, and Yang 2006)." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Testing adaptationism" }, { "content": [ "\n\n The debate over\nadaptationism contains claims and counterclaims about what hypotheses\nshould be included in an analysis of the adaptiveness of a trait.\nThis is crucial because assessments of evidentiary support depend on\nwhat hypotheses we consider (see Sober 1990, Earman 1992). We\nmust consider all the relevant hypotheses in order to provide good\nevidence for a hypothesis (Stanford 2006, Forber 2010). One\ncommon pluralist complaint is that adaptationists neglect this standard\nof evidence. Such an inclusive standard is essential because many\ndifferent evolutionary trajectories can lead to the same outcome.\nAs Gould and Lewontin (1979) wrote, “One must not confuse the\nfact that a structure is used in some way…with the primary\nevolutionary reason for its existence and conformation”. In\naddition, subtle differences in evolutionary history may lead to\ndifferent evolutionary outcomes (Beatty and Desjardins 2009). Thus, we\ncannot conclude that natural selection played an important role in the\nevolution of some trait just because we have a plausible adaptive\nhypothesis in mind. Indeed, finding suitable evidence for an\nadaptive (or non-adaptive) hypothesis is difficult because we lack good\nepistemic access to evolutionary history. This lack of access is\na premise of Gould and Lewontin's critique, and it motivates\ntheir call to evaluate testing methods in evolutionary biology,\nespecially those methods that consider only adaptive hypotheses with no\nregard for non-adaptive rivals. Biologists have continued to develop\nnew testing methods that do this (see, e.g., Rose and Lauder 1996,\nHansen et al. 2008).", "\n\n This aspect of the adaptationism debate is\nconnected with a general epistemological issue in philosophy of\nscience: underdetermination of theory by evidence. Evolutionary\nhypotheses are typically underdetermined by available evidence.\nIn principle, rival hypotheses make different commitments about the\nnature of evolutionary history, but in practice these hypotheses are\nempirically indistinguishable given the available evidence.\nPhilosophers argue about the consequences of this underdetermination\nfor our understanding of biological science (Turner 2005, Stanford\n2006). Yet, there is agreement that the problem of underdetermination\nshould be addressed by developing and using tests that discriminate\nbetween rival hypotheses.", "\n\n Evidentiary relations depend on what\nhypotheses we compare, and so good testing methods should include all\nrival hypotheses. If we fail to include a relevant rival, say,\none that emphasizes developmental constraint, then we may not have\nfound sufficient evidence for the adaptive hypothesis. Failing to\ncontrast adaptive and non-adaptive explanations weakens any\nadaptationist analysis (Forber 2009).", "\n\n Evolutionary hypotheses make a\nvariety of commitments about development, ecology, genetics, and\nhistory. As a result, an adaptive hypothesis makes contact with\nevolutionary history only in conjunction with a number of auxiliary\nhypotheses. The most convincing case for an adaptive hypothesis will\ninclude a variety of evidence, especially independent data that confirm\nthe different facets of an evolutionary hypothesis (Lloyd 1988).\nSober's (2008) analysis of a testing protocol for evolutionary\nhypotheses makes clear the role of auxiliary hypotheses and assesses\nthe evidentiary import of different observed outcomes. He provides an\nanalysis of whether and how fit between an optimality model and the\nobserved population mean favors natural selection over genetic\ndrift." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Testing adaptive hypotheses" }, { "content": [ "\n\n The adaptationism debate has helped clarify the importance of\ncomparative methods for testing adaptive hypotheses.", "\n\n The relatedness among species due to common\nancestry can reduce the amount of seemingly independent evidence one\nhas for or against any evolutionary hypothesis. Species with a recent\ncommon ancestor may have inherited the same trait from the ancestor, as\nopposed to evolving it independently of one another. Comparative\nmethods help one assess the extent to which a set of related species\nprovide independent evidence for or against a given evolutionary\nhypothesis (Harvey and Pagel 1991). The general awareness of the need\nto use such methods stems primarily from the initially narrower debate\nthat took place within systematics in the 1960s and 1970s over how to\ncreate classifications of organisms that are “scientific”\nand as such, are transparent recipes that are accessible to others,\ninstead of being “private” and non-scientific. This debate\ngenerated tremendous controversy (Hull 1988) and it spurred on the\ndevelopment of methods to statistically correct for dependence among\nspecies' trait values when assessing an adaptive hypothesis\n(Felsenstein 1985, Harvey and Pagel 1991). In addition, it became more\nwidely understood that a claim that one trait evolved in response to\nanother is enormously strengthened by phylogenetic confirmation; the\nhistory of trait acquisition must be consistent with the hypothesis\n(see Maddison 1990 and references therein).", "\n\n These developments are salutary in\nthat they show biologists how to better test adaptive hypotheses and\nhave clarified the phylogenetic assumptions that are necessary to test\nadaptive hypotheses (Sober and Orzack 2003). As such, they are a\nmethodological improvement that has generally gained a positive\nreception among philosophers of biology (e.g., Sterelny and Griffiths\n1999). Many biologists agree, but controversy continues. Some\nacknowledge the potential importance of comparative methods but point\nto limitations that may reduce their usefulness (Reeve and Sherman\n2001, Leroi et al. 1994). As such, these critiques are consistent with\nmethodological adaptationism. Others view any allusion to potential\nnon-adaptive influences on trait evolution to be mistaken; in their\nview, the importance of phylogenetic methods is that they help reveal\ncomplete history of natural selection on the trait (Grafen 1989). As\nsuch, this is a critique consistent with the espousal of empirical\nadaptationism." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Common ancestry and adaptation" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n Claims and counterclaims about the use of\noptimality models for understanding evolution are a central part of the\ndebate over adaptationism, although some believe that there is no\nnecessary connection between optimality modeling and adaptationism\n(Potochnik 2009). While many biologists believe that optimality\nmodels are useful, whether evolution by natural selection tends to\nproduce optimal traits is controversial (see, e.g., Dupré\n1987).", "\n\n Optimality models put the contingencies of\nhistory and developmental and genetic constraints in to the background\nso as to focus on natural selection. Much work in evolutionary\ngame theory embodies this approach. Most game-theoretic models are used\nto describe the evolution by natural selection of strategic behavior to\na local optimum called an evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard Smith\n1982) (but see Orzack and Hines 2005 and Huttegger 2010 among\nothers). This approach has the assumption that there is direct\nselection on the trait under analysis. This is often justified on the\ngrounds that there exists a “good fit” between the trait\nand its current function (Maynard Smith 1978) or that natural selection\nis ubiquitous in nature (Mayr 1983). The Spandrels paper targeted\nthese general arguments for optimality models.", "\n\n Biologists have discovered many ways in\nwhich the genetic details of trait determination and/or ecological\ndetails of the population can prevent the evolution of optima. For\nexample, interaction between loci (linkage or pleiotropy) can prevent\nthe optimal phenotype from being fixed in a population, and thereby\nprevent the maximization of mean fitness (Moran 1964). Such a deviation\nfrom the state of highest fitness is called genetic load. The standard\nadaptationist response is that genetic and ecological constraints are\neliminated over evolutionary time by the introduction of new genetic\nvariation via mutation (Parker and Maynard Smith 1990).", "\n\n While this controversy has been divisive\n(Schwartz 2002), there are prospects for a synthesis. First,\nEshel and Feldman (2001) distinguished between “short-term\nevolution”, the evolutionary dynamics of a fixed set of\ngenotypes, and “long-term evolution”, bouts of short-term\nevolution interspersed with introductions of new genetic\nvariation. They noted (page 162) that “long-term evolution\nproceeds by an infinite sequence of transitions from one fixed set of\ngenotypes to another fixed set of genotypes, with each of these sets\nsubject to short-term evolution…” Optima are often\nnot accessible in the short-term due to constraints on available\nvariation. However, genetic variation may be introduced over the long\nterm so that the population eventually reaches an optimum. The\nsubstantive point is that we now understand how apparent short-term\nimpediments to optimality can be resolved over the long term. Mutations\nmust appear at the right time and the ecology must remain stable over\nthe long term; whether these conditions are met frequently enough in\nnature to justify the optimality approach is an empirical issue (see\nalso Hammerstein 1996). The second prospect for synthesis is\nWilkins and Godfrey Smith's (2009) proposal that the truth of\nempirical adaptationism, and the concomitant application of optimality\nmodels, depends on the intended “grain” of resolution of\nthe evolutionary analysis. At a fine grain of resolution, when there\nare few peaks in the adaptive landscape, most observed populations may\nbe on or near these peaks. Adaptationism is appropriate at this\nresolution. If we “zoom out” and look at a grand landscape\nover large regions of morphospace, the situation changes. At a\nvery coarse grain of resolution, much of morphospace is empty and\nconstraints often explain why certain regions remain unexplored by\nbiological evolution. Adaptationism is inappropriate at this\nresolution.", "\n\n Finally, the focus on optimality modeling\nin connection to adaptationism has led to a precise statement of how\nthe nature of fit between data and the predictions of an optimality\nmodel influence the degree of evidentiary support for the adaptive\nhypothesis (Orzack and Sober 1994a, b). Qualitative agreement by\nitself is not sufficient to accept the hypothesis of local optimality.\nInstead, quantitative agreement and an assessment of nature of possible\nbetween-individual heterogeneity of fit to model predictions are\nrequired in order to have evidence for optimality; without both of\nthese test components, acceptance of the hypothesis of optimality is\nnot warranted (see above)." ], "section_title": "4. Do optimality models describe evolution?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n One issue in the debate over\nadaptationism and optimality models concerns whether constraint\nhypotheses count as genuine alternatives to adaptive hypotheses.\nGould and Lewontin (1979) view constraint hypotheses as competing with\nadaptive hypotheses as explanations of traits. Advocates of optimality\nmodels (e.g., Maynard Smith 1978, Roughgarden 1998) take the set of\nevolutionary constraints to be a background commitment of any\noptimality model. The constraint set may include developmental\nand genetic constraints on variation and transmission, but it is\nnatural selection that drives evolution and so explains the trait given\nthose constraints. Advocates of optimality models treat\nconstraints as presupposed by adaptive hypotheses. A concern of\nmany critics of adaptationism is that this treatment of constraints\nundervalues their role in explaining evolutionary form and novelty.", "\n\n Developmental processes may limit the spectrum of evolutionary\ntrajectories available to a lineage. Maynard Smith et\nal. (1985, page 266) defined a developmental constraint as\n“a bias on the production of variant phenotypes or a limitation\non phenotypic variability caused by the structure, character,\ncomposition, or dynamics of the developmental system.” More\nrecently, the definition of constraint has become more nuanced (see,\ne.g., Wagner and Altenberg 1996, Winther 2001).", "\n\n Part of the controversy over\nconstraints can be resolved by distinguishing between “constraint\non adaptation” and “constraint on form” (Amundson\n1994). In the former, certain trajectories are less likely\nbecause they require populations to leave local optima or\n“peaks” in the adaptive landscape. In this case,\nnatural selection limits the potential evolutionary trajectories.\nIn the latter case, certain trajectories are unavailable due to the\nstructure of the current developmental system.", "\n\n Advocates of optimality models often argue\nthat building and testing such models provides the best way to identify\nand discover evolutionary constraints, and that these constraints can\nthen be used to build better optimality models (Amundson 1994, Seger\nand Stubblefield 1996). Many biologists that analyze the\nevolution of development or “evo-devo” use a different set\nof molecular and morphological investigative techniques to uncover\nrobust and important developmental constraints (see, e.g., Müller\nand Newman 2003, Kirschner and Gerhart 2005). They object that\nthe concept of optimality is a poor tool for answering their research\nquestions. The recognition of two kinds of constraints resolves\nthis dispute. We see then that optimality modeling usually\nentails the incorporation of or the discovery of constraints on\nadaptation, whereas studies of evolution and development investigates\nconstraints on form. A full understanding of evolutionary history\nrequires a synthesis of these approaches.", "\n\n Developmental and genetic constraint\nhypotheses do not invoke causal processes in the same way that adaptive\nhypotheses do. Can such different hypotheses compete with one another?\nThis aspect of the adaptationism debate connects biology to an\nimportant puzzle about the nature of causation and explanation.\nIf explanation amounts to identifying causes, then constraints must be\ncauses to explain evolutionary outcomes. But how can impediments\nhave a causal influence on the evolutionary trajectory of a\nlineage? One possible answer is that they don't have any\ncausal influence—they are merely the background against which\nnatural selection operates. Such a view treats causes as part of\na process, or involving some kind of energy transfer (Dowe 2008).\nThis view of causation vindicates the adaptationist view that the\nconstraint set is presupposed by any respectable adaptive\nhypothesis. For adaptationists, new constraints simply mean that\nwe need to build new models. Testing is then just a matter of\ncomparing different adaptive hypotheses that have different\nconstraints. The other possible answer is that constraints\ndo have a causal influence on evolution because they prevent\nevolutionary trajectories from attaining some outcomes. This view\nis consistent with counterfactual and interventionist approaches to\ncausation, such as the comprehensive one defended by Woodward (2003),\nand vindicates the approach of treating constraints as genuine\nalternatives to adaptive hypotheses.", "\n\n Linking this debate to\nphilosophical ideas about causation can help us evaluate whether\nevolutionary constraints count as genuine alternatives.\nConstraints are defined as biases or limitations on the\nproduction of variation. From the perspective of causation, this\nis a heterogeneous combination. Constraints that bias a lineage\ntowards certain evolutionary trajectories look like productive\nprobabilistic causes, and avoid certain conceptual entanglements that\nface boundaries or limitations. Innovations in the developmental makeup\nof an organism can make new changes and subsequent evolutionary\ntrajectories more likely, a hallmark of a causal factor. This helps\nclarify the importance of evolutionary innovation. Innovations that\nproduce biases may be crucial to explaining major evolutionary\ntransitions, such as the emergence of multicellularity (Sterelny 2008).\nWhen certain changes make new evolutionary outcomes more likely\nthey are part of the explanation of those new outcomes. Such\nbiases count as probabilistic causal influences since they change the\nprobability of a lineage taking certain evolutionary trajectories\n(Hitchcock 2008).", "\n\n Whether boundaries count as causes, and\nthereby explain evolutionary outcomes, is more problematic. A\nprevailing view within evolutionary biology is that constraints must\ncount as causal influences, whatever our account of causation (whether\nit be by prevention or by omission, see Woodward 2003 for discussion).\nGould and Lewontin (1979) adopted this position. Sansom (2003) argued\nthat the debate over the evolutionary importance of constraint amounts\nto an issue about the relative causal contributions of constraint and\nnatural selection to evolutionary outcomes. The causal\ncontribution of constraint can be assessed by using comparative data in\norder to compare evolutionary outcomes of lineages with and without the\nconstraint of interest. If there is a difference, then the\nconstraint has an identifiable causal influence, all other things being\nequal. Pigliucci and Kaplan (2000, 2006) proposed a test protocol\nbased on transition matrices in which probabilities of evolutionary\nchange are specified under natural selection and under one or more\ncompeting constraint hypotheses, so as to test natural selection\nagainst constraint. More philosophical analysis is required to assess\nthe viability of this approach.", "\n\n Whatever the position on whether\nconstraints count as causes, the lesson to be taken from this part of\nthe adaptationism debate is that it is essential to precisely specify\nthe rival evolutionary hypotheses. There are many examples of such\nprecise specification in the biological literature. For example, Frank\n(1985) and Stubblefield and Seger (1990) analyzed the influence on sex\nratio optima of different constraints on the information available to\nparents; Lloyd (2005) described the evidentiary support for\nexplanations of the evolution of the female orgasm. Lloyd's\nanalysis supports Symons' (1979) proposal that the female orgasm\nexists because of a developmental constraint in combination with strong\nselection for the male orgasm. If males fail to achieve orgasm\nthen no reproduction occurs. The tissue responsible for the male\norgasm appears early in human development, long before sexual\ndimorphism occurs, and this tissue is found in both male and female\nsexual organs. This example contains competing hypotheses that have\ncommitments about boundaries and about natural selection. The\nSymons constraint explanation invokes a feature of development and\nindirect selection on a different trait, whereas the adaptive\nhypothesis does not incorporate the developmental constraint and\ninstead, posits a direct role for selection.", "\n\n There is room for reconciliation\nhere. As adaptationists point out, any evolutionary hypothesis\nmust assume some constraints, so the accusation that optimality models\nfail to include constraints is incorrect. But pluralists are\nright to argue that in some cases constraints may play a significant\nrole in the evolution of some trait, and that the correct evolutionary\nexplanation may not even include natural selection for the trait.", "\n\n Constraints are often understood as\nbiases or limitations on potential evolutionary trajectories. How do we\nidentify potential trajectories? This will depend on how biology\nprovides counterfactual information. We cannot appeal solely to\nrealized evolutionary history, since not all potential trajectories\nhave occurred. Evo-devo research on novelty provides one of the\nbest strategies for exploring potential evolutionary trajectories\n(Wagner 2000, 2001a,2001b, Muller and Wagner 2003, Calcott 2009).\nAs the causal mechanisms underlying development are better understood,\nwe will gain a better grasp on the nature of constraints and how they\nexplain evolutionary outcomes." ], "section_title": "5. Are constraint hypotheses genuine rivals to adaptive hypotheses?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n Why should biologists and philosophers care\nabout the debate over adaptationism? This debate has been and will\ncontinue to be important to biologists because it helps clarify how to\ndo better evolutionary biology. Despite this, a minority of\ncurrently-active biologists contribute to the debate about\nadaptationism, and many ignore it or disparage it. For a variety of\nreasons, many of the important points that have arisen from the debate,\nsuch as how to structure empirical tests of adaptive hypotheses and\noptimality models, go unheeded. For example, claims for local\noptimality continue to appear that lack a specification of even a\nsingle alternative hypothesis to the adaptive hypothesis. This lack\ninevitably leaves ambiguous the status of the adaptive hypothesis. In\naddition, standards for rejection of the (only) adaptive hypothesis\ncontinue to be rarely delineated if at all.", "\n\n The debate over adaptationism will continue\nto be important to philosophers of biology because much will be gained\nby a more informed understanding of the use of hypotheses about natural\nselection by biologists. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a general\ntendency to misunderstand the conceptual commitments of users of\noptimality models. More recently, there has been a growing\nunderstanding of the variety of conceptual commitments held by users of\nsuch models, especially that the use and development of an optimality\nmodel need not bind the user to a blind acceptance of the claim that\nnatural selection is all powerful." ], "section_title": "6. Concluding Remarks", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Ackermann, R. R., and J. M. 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addams-jane	Jane Addams	First published Wed Jun 7, 2006; substantive revision Thu Jul 7, 2022	[ "\nJane Addams (1860–1935) was an activist, community organizer,\ninternational peace advocate, and social philosopher in the United\nStates during the late 19th century and early 20th century. However,\nthe dynamics of canon formation resulted in her philosophical\nwork being largely ignored until the\n 1990s.[1]\n Addams is best known for her pioneering activism in the social\nsettlement movement—the radical arm of the progressive movement\nwhose adherents so embraced the ideals of progressivism that they\nchose to live as neighbors in oppressed communities to learn from and\nhelp the marginalized members of society. Although her contemporaries\nwidely lauded her activism and accomplishments, commentators typically\nmapped Addams’ work onto conventional gender understandings:\nmale philosophers such as John Dewey, William James, and George\nHerbert Mead were regarded as providing original progressive thought,\nwhile Addams was seen as brilliantly administering their theories.\nRecent work by feminist philosophers and historians has revealed that\nAddams was far more than a competent practitioner. Her dozen published\nbooks, and over 500 articles display a robust intellectual interplay\nbetween experience and reflection in the American pragmatist\ntradition. The near half-century that she lived and worked as the\nleader of the Chicago social settlement, Hull House, allowed her to\nbring her commitment to social improvement, feminism, diversity, and\npeace into reflective practice. These experiences provided the\nfoundation for an engaging philosophical perspective. Addams viewed\nher settlement work as a grand epistemological endeavor, but in the\nprocess, she never forgot her neighbors’ humanity. Addams was a public\nphilosopher who was not afraid to get her hands dirty.", "\nAddams’ philosophy combined feminist sensibilities with an\nunwavering commitment to social improvement through cooperative\nefforts. Although she sympathized with feminists, socialists, and\npacifists, Addams refused to be labeled. This refusal was pragmatic\nrather than ideological. Addams’ commitment to social cohesion\nand cooperation prompted her to eschew what she perceived as divisive\ndistinctions. Active democratic social progress was so essential to\nAddams that she did not want to alienate any group of people from the\nconversation or the participation necessary for effective inclusive\ndeliberation. Addams carefully varied her rhetorical approach to\nengaging a variety of constituencies, which makes identifying her\nsocial philosophy challenging. Accordingly, Addams did not intend to\nengage in philosophical narratives removed from social improvement,\nnor did she intend to pursue social activism without theorizing about\nthe broader implications of her work. In this respect, through her\nintegration of theory and action, Addams carried pragmatism to its\nlogical conclusion through her integration of theory and action,\ndeveloping an applied philosophy immersed in social action. Thus\nAddams’ writing is replete with examples from her Hull House\nexperience addressing atypical topics for philosophic discourse, such\nas garbage collection, immigrant folk stories, and prostitution. It is\neasy for those steeped in traditional philosophy to dismiss\nAddams’ writings as non-philosophical if the full sweep of her\nprojects and subsequent analysis is not considered. For those who\npersevere, Addams offers a rich social and political philosophy built\non respect and understanding that is refreshing in its faith in the\npotential for collective progress.", "\nIdentifying Jane Addams as a philosopher requires appreciating the\ndynamic between theory and action reflected in her writing.\nFurthermore, Addams was a voracious reader and purveyor of the\nintellectual ideas of her time, such as evolutionary theory.\nTherefore, her writing is nuanced, with references that require a\ncontextual understanding of pertinent ideas of the time. Reading\nAddams, one finds a wellspring of nascent feminist philosophical\ninsight. Addams’ ethical philosophy was guided by the notion of\nsympathetic knowledge that she described as “the only way of\napproach to any human problem” (NCA 7). Sympathetic knowledge is\na mingling of epistemology and ethics: knowing one another better\nreinforces the common connection of people such that the potential for\ncaring and empathetic moral actions increases. Addams not only\ntheorized about this idea, but she lived it. Sympathetic knowledge\nunderwrote Addams’ approach to the diversity and staggering\npoverty (HHM) that she confronted in the immigrant neighborhood\nsurrounding Hull House and allowed her to develop a precursor to\ncontemporary feminist standpoint epistemology. Addams’\nleadership among the American pragmatists in understanding the poor\nand oppressed resulted in a more radical form of pragmatism than Dewey\nand James, a social philosophy imbued with a class and gender\nconsciousness." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Influences", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Addams’ Standpoint Epistemology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Radical Meliorism ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Socializing Care", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Literature", "Selected Secondary Literature on Addams’ Philosophy", "Biographies" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nCompared to the many biographical accounts of Addams’ life, relatively\nfew comprehensively consider her philosophy. However, her\nphilosophical insights are closely tied to her life experiences which\nare briefly recounted below.", "\nLaura Jane Addams was born in Cedarville, Illinois, on September 6,\n1860. She grew up in the shadow of the Civil War and during a time\nwhen Darwin’s Origin of the Species achieved widespread\ninfluence. Her childhood reflected the material advantage of being the\ndaughter of a politician and successful mill owner, John Addams. When\nJane was two years old, her mother, Mary, died giving birth to her\nninth child. Subsequently, the precocious Addams doted upon her father\nand benefited emotionally and intellectually from his attention.\nAlthough John Addams was no advocate of feminism, he desired higher\neducation for his daughter. Therefore, he sent her to the\nall-women’s institution, Rockford Seminary (renamed later\nRockford College) in Rockford, Illinois. As a result, Addams became\npart of a generation of women that were among the first in their\nfamilies to attend college. At Rockford, she experienced the\nempowerment of living in a women-centered environment, and she\nblossomed as an intellectual and a social leader. Her classmates and\nteachers acknowledged this leadership. Ultimately, Addams spearheaded\nan effort to bring baccalaureate degrees to the school and, after\nserving as class valedictorian, received the first one.", "\nLike many women of her time, Addams’ prospects after college\nwere limited. She made a failed attempt at medical school and then,\nprecipitated by her father’s death, slipped into a nearly decade-long\nmalaise over the direction of her life. At first, the energy and\nspirit of her undergraduate college experience did not translate into\nany clear career path, given that she had rejected both marriage and\nreligious life. Moreover, Addams’ malady was somewhat analogous\nto the unidentified illness that her later acquaintance, Charlotte\nPerkins Gilman (as described in The Yellow Wallpaper),\nsuffered. As a member of the privileged class, her soul searching\nincluded a trek to Europe, which Addams made twice during this period.\nOn the second trip, she visited Toynbee Hall, a pioneering Christian\nsettlement house in London, which was to inspire her in a direction\nthat propelled her toward international prominence (TYH 53).", "\nToynbee Hall was a community of young men committed to helping the\npoor of London by living among them. After engaging the leaders of\nToynbee Hall, Addams was rejuvenated by the idea of replicating the\nsettlement in the United States. She enlisted a college friend, Ellen\nGates Starr, in the plan. However, identifying their vague idea as a\n“plan” is a bit of hyperbole. There were very few specific\nblueprints for what the settlement would be other than a good neighbor\nto oppressed peoples. Nevertheless, Addams found a suitable\nlocation in a devastatingly poor Chicago immigrant neighborhood, and\non September 18, 1889, Hull House opened its doors. Working amidst one\nof the most significant influxes of immigrants the United States has\never known, Hull House got off to a slow start as neighbors did not\nknow what to make of the residents and their intentions. However,\nAddams and Starr built trust, and in a short time, Hull\nHouse became an incubator for new social programs and a magnet\nfor progressives wanting to make society a better place. Without\nformal ideological or political constraints, the settlement workers\nresponded to the neighborhood’s needs by starting project after\nproject. The list of projects created at Hull House is astounding,\nincluding the first little theatre and juvenile court in the United\nStates and the first playground, gymnasium, public swimming pool, and\npublic kitchen in Chicago. In addition, the work of Hull House\nresidents would result in numerous labor union organizations, a labor\nmuseum, tenement codes, factory laws, child labor laws, adult\neducation courses, cultural exchange groups, and the collection of\nneighborhood demographic data. Hull House was a dynamo of progressive\ninitiatives, all of which Addams oversaw.", "\nThe reputation of the settlement rapidly grew, and women, primarily\ncollege-educated, came from all over the country to live and work\nat Hull House. Although Hull House was co-educational, it was a\nwoman-identified space. There were male residents at Hull House, some\nof whom later became prominent leaders. However, the policies,\nprojects, decision-making, and methodologies of the Hull House\ncommunity were gynocentric—foregrounding women’s\nexperience, analysis, and concerns. Furthermore, although a few\nresidents were married, most were single, and some were in committed\nrelationships with other women. Given the drastic shifts in sexual\nmores in the twentieth century, the contemporary understanding of what\nit means to be lesbian cannot straightforwardly be mapped onto the\nlate and post-Victorian eras. Still, it can be argued that Hull\nHouse was a lesbian-friendly space. Addams set the tone for this\nidentification with her own long-term intimate relationships with\nwomen, first with Starr and then with Mary Rozet Smith (Brown,\n2004).", "\nFrom the outset of its operation, Addams theorized about the nature\nand function of Hull House. The language she used reflected her\nphilosophical approach. For example, in one published essay, Addams\ndescribes the application and reorganization of knowledge as the\nfundamental problem of modern life and then claims that settlements\nare like applied universities: “The ideal and developed\nsettlement would attempt to test the value of human knowledge by\naction, and realization, quite as the complete and ideal university\nwould concern itself with the discovery of knowledge in all\nbranches” (FSS 187). This kind of reflective analysis and wider\nthematization of her work and the social settlement work was a\nhallmark of Addams’ writing. Because of her insightful\nreflections on the Hull House community, Addams became a popular\nauthor and sought-after public speaker. Eventually, she extended her\ncosmopolitan analysis to race, education, and world peace issues.\nFor Addams, local experiences were always a springboard for political\ntheorizing.", "\nAddams became one of the most respected and recognized individuals in\nthe nation. She played a crucial role in numerous progressive\ncampaigns. Addams was a founding figure in the National Association\nfor the Advancement of Colored People, the American Civil Liberties\nUnion, and the Women’s International League for Peace and\nFreedom. Her popularity was such that when Theodore Roosevelt sought\nthe presidential nomination of the Progressive Party in 1912, he asked\nJane Addams to second the nomination, the first time a woman had\nparticipated in such an act. There was a gendered dimension to this\npopularity, however. Addams had challenged the borders of the public\nand private spheres through her work at Hull House. Still, her\nforays into masculine domains were masked by the “social\nhousekeeping” characterization of the settlement activism. After\nWorld War I broke out in Europe, her outspoken pacifism and refusal to\nendorse the war or the U.S. entry into it was more gender role\ntransgression than the public could tolerate from a woman.\nAddams’ popularity fell, and she became the victim of vicious\ngender-specific criticism. Biographer Allen Davis reports that one\nwriter indicated that what Addams needed to disabuse her of her\npacifism was “a strong, forceful husband who would lift the\nburden of fate from her shoulders and get her intensely interested in\nfancy work and other things dear to the heart of women who have homes\nand plenty of time on their hands” (240). A reporter for the\nLos Angeles Times quipped,", "\nIf Miss Addams and her peace mission are a sample of women in world\naffairs, I want to take it all back. I am sincerely sorry I voted for\nsuffrage. (Davis, 253)\n", "\nHer new role as social outcast and critic allowed the public\nphilosopher in Addams to reflect on the nature of citizenship and\npatriotism in her many books and articles—some of which had\ndifficulty getting into print because she was perceived as\nanti-American. Although she had written on peace early in her public\ncareer (NIP), from 1914 through the end of her life, Addams’\npublications became decidedly more focused on issues of peace and war,\nincluding two books exclusively dedicated to the topic (WH, PBT) and\nseveral books with sections devoted to the nature and politics of war\n(LRW, STY, MFJ). Although initially criticized, Addams’ pacifist\ntenacity was ultimately lauded with the Nobel Peace Price (1931). In\nthe last years of her life, she spent less time at Hull House and more\ntime working for world peace and an end to racism. Addams died of\ncancer on May 21, 1935, leaving a tremendous intellectual legacy that\nhas yet to be fully explored." ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAddams was well-read and could claim numerous and varied influences.\nHowever, Addams was no one’s protégé. Addams chose\nintellectual resources that resonated with her notion of sympathetic\nknowledge in bringing about social progress. A few significant\ninfluences are recounted here. Addams read Thomas Carlyle’s\n(1795–1881) work while she was attending Rockford Seminary.\nCarlyle’s social morality held a particular appeal to Addams. He\nbelieved the universe was ultimately good and moral and led by a\ndivine will that worked through society’s heroes and leaders.\nCarlyle wrote biographies of social saviors that came in the form of\npoets, kings, prophets, and intellectuals, mixing in commentary that\nexplicated his moral philosophy. However, Carlyle’s heroes\nreflect the evolution of society, as different contexts require\ndifferent leadership. These heroes can recognize the social dynamics\nat work and use them for the benefit of others. Carlyle’s heroes\nevolved. For Carlyle, everyone has a public duty and needs to find\nthemselves or realize their place in the world and what their work on\nbehalf of society should be. Because of his emphasis on powerful\nindividuals, Carlyle was not particularly fond of democracy. Although\nAddams shed Carlyle’s notion of individualistic heroism and his\ndisdain for democracy, she retained the valorization of moral action\nthroughout her career. Furthermore, Carlyle’s morality was\ngrounded in social relations: to be moral is to be in right relation\nwith God and others. Carlyle’s relational ethic is a precursor to\nAddams’ notion of sympathetic knowledge.", "\nAddams was also influenced by John Ruskin (1819–1900), who\ntheorized that art and culture reflected the moral health of society.\nAlthough Ruskin maintained a certain elitism in his view that great\npeople produced great art, he also saw such great cultural works as a\nmanifestation of the well-being of society as a whole. The plight of\nthe oppressed was tied to a sense of the aesthetic. Indeed,\nAddams’ valorization of art and culture, as exhibited in the\nappearance and activities of Hull House resonates with Ruskin’s\naesthetics. For Addams, “Social Life and art have always seemed\nto go best at Hull House” (STY 354). Addams viewed art and\ncultural activities as reinforcing essential human bonds (DSE 29).\nRuskin also influenced Arnold Toynbee and other future settlement\nworkers by identifying the problems in large industrial cities and\ncalling for reforms foreshadowing the safety nets typical of later\nwelfare states. Ruskin valued labor as a noble means of\nself-actualization. This became a crucial concept for Addams as she\nsought meaningful labor for those in the Hull House neighborhood. For\nexample, Addams expresses sympathy for laborers who skipped work or\ncame in late for work because “all human interest has been\nextracted from it” (SYC 129). Although Addams valued\nRuskin’s moral imagination, the concept of labor, and ideas\nabout transforming the city through infusing culture, she rejected his\nromanticization of the preindustrial past. With a strong belief in\nsocial progress, Addams did not desire a return to a previous era. For\nAddams, society should grow and adapt to its conditions, even\nregarding moral philosophy.", "\nLeo Tolstoy (1828–1910) was another type of hero to Addams.\nUnlike Carlyle, Tolstoy did not valorize individuals standing out from\nthe crowd as exemplary moral paragons who wield socially ordained\npositions of power. Instead, he valued solidarity with the common\nlaborer. Addams’ vast intellectual curiosity made such extremes\nin influences possible. Addams read Tolstoy’s works from the\ntime she graduated from college until the last years of her life, and\nshe often praised his writing in articles and book reviews.\nTolstoy’s emphasis on working for and with the oppressed while\nwriting novels and essays that influenced a wider audience resonated\nwith Addams’ work and writings. However, Tolstoy was a moral\nidealist. He left everything behind to take up the plow and work as a\ntypical farm laborer. Addams was moved by Tolstoy’s account,\nand—typical of her self-critical, thoughtful approach--she\nquestioned her leadership role in the social settlement, but only for\na short time.", "\nMotivated by Tolstoy’s troubling moral challenge to work in\nsolidarity with the common laborer, Addams sought him out while she\nwas on vacation (and recovering from typhoid) in Europe in 1896. The\nmeeting made a lasting impression on Addams (TYH 191–195).\nTolstoy came in from working the fields to be introduced to Addams and\nher partner Mary Rozet Smith. The meeting began with Tolstoy\nquestioning Addams’ fashion choice because the sleeves of her\narms, consistent with the style of the time, had “enough stuff\non one arm to make a frock for the girl” (TYH 192). Tolstoy was\nconcerned that the trappings of material wealth alienated Addams from\nthose she was working with. This criticism continued when Tolstoy\nlearned that part of Hull House’s funding came from\nAddams’ estate, which included a working farm: “So you are\nan absentee landlord? Do you think you will help the people more by\nadding yourself to the crowded city than you would by tilling your own\nsoil?” (TYH 192) The remarks humbled Addams, and, on her return\nto Hull House, she was determined to take up more direct labor by\nworking in the new Hull House bakery. However, reality demonstrated\nhow Tolstoy’s idealism was incompatible with her work in social\nsettlements: “The half dozen people invariably waiting to see me\nafter breakfast, the piles of letters to be opened and answered, the\ndemand of actual and pressing human wants—were these all to be\npushed aside and asked to wait while I saved my soul by two\nhours’ work at baking bread?” (TYH 197)", "\nTheoretically, the shared experience of common labor would break down\nclass distinctions. Addams had experienced such camaraderie at Hull\nHouse, and she never stopped appreciating Tolstoy’s social\ncriticism. However, she saw the value of intelligent leadership.\nSomeone had to organize the clubs, arrange for philanthropic support,\nand chair the meetings. Addams found Tolstoy’s labor demand to\nbe self-indulgent to a certain extent. If she engaged in the labor of\nthe poor exclusively, she might alleviate her upper-class guilt.\nStill, she would no longer be working holistically toward changing the\nstructure of society. Addams’ philosophy of civic activism\nvalued engagement through ongoing presence and listening. Indeed, Hull\nHouse had a very flat and responsive organizational structure.\nNevertheless, Tolstoy’s absolutist moral demands failed to\nconsider context—a hallmark of Addams’ approach.", "\nAddams found Tolstoy’s pacifism inspiring. She admired how\nTolstoy sympathized with revolutionaries in the 1870s but did not\ncompromise his moral convictions because of these sympathies. Tolstoy\noffered a doctrine of non-resistance that sought to substitute moral\nenergy for physical force. Addams once again did not accept\nTolstoy’s pacifist ideas uncritically. For example, she\nquestioned the clarity of the categories (moral energy versus physical\nforce) that Tolstoy created in his doctrine of non-resistance (TYH\n195). Addams also asked whether Tolstoy reduced social issues too\nsimplistically, albeit eloquently. Despite her less than pleasant\nmeeting with him, Addams cited Tolstoy as a positive moral example\nthroughout her life. However, like all her influences, she could not\naccept Tolstoy’s philosophy uncritically. Addams had to adapt\nand infuse her insight to make it work for the society she was a part\nof.", "\nAs previously mentioned, Toynbee Hall was an inspiration for Hull\nHouse, and Canon Barnett (1844–1913), who served as\n“warden” of the settlement for over twenty years, was the\ninspirational force. Before his service at Toynbee Hall, Barnett\nworked as Vicar of St. Judes, Whitechapel. He instituted many\nimprovements to the slums surrounding the Church, including building\neducational and recreational programs. It was St. Judes that students\nfrom Oxford would visit, working to help improve conditions for\nresidents of the surrounding community, all the while engaging in\ndiscussions about how to institute social reforms. One of those\nstudents was Andrew Toynbee.", "\nBarnett describes a threefold rationale for the development and growth\nof settlements: First, a general distrust that government-sponsored\ninstitutions could care for the poor. In particular, government and\nprivate philanthropy appeared to be failing the masses. Second,\nBarnett viewed the need for information as spurring the rise of\nsettlements. Barnett believed there was widespread curiosity regarding\noppression that he could satisfy with documented observations\nregarding the circumstances of the poor. Finally, Barnett notes a\ngroundswell of fellowship not driven by traditional “Charities\nand Missions” but by fundamental humanitarianism. Settlements\nprovided an outlet for these fellow feelings.", "\nAddams was familiar with Barnett’s writings and often referred\nto them. For example, when Addams wrote “The Function of the\nSocial Settlement,” Barnett’s philosophy played a\nprominent role. She agrees that settlements should not be\nmissions because if they become too ideological, they will fail to be\nresponsive to their neighbors (FSS 344–345). However, despite\nacknowledging that the term “settlement” was borrowed from\nLondon, she finds differences between the philosophies of Toynbee Hall\nand Hull House: “The American Settlement, perhaps has not so\nmuch a sense of duty of the privileged toward the unprivileged of the\n‘haves’ to the ‘have nots,’ to borrow Canon\nBarnett’s phrase, as a desire to equalize through social effort\nthose results which superior opportunity may have given the\npossessor” (FSS 322–323). Addams is very concerned about a\nsense of moral superiority attributed to settlement work. She always\neschewed the notion that she was a charitable “lady\nbountiful.” Instead, she wanted to learn about others to develop\nthe proper sympathies and strategies for assisting—sympathetic\nknowledge. For Addams, Hull House always combined epistemological\nconcerns with moral ones.", "\nWhen Addams’ philosophy is considered, if at all, it is usually\nassociated with the work of John Dewey (1859–1952). This\nassociation is appropriate given their friendship and mutual\ninterests; however, her intellectual deference to Dewey is often\noverstated. Dewey is considered one of the greatest American\nphilosophers. His name, along with William James, Charles Sanders\nPeirce, and Josiah Royce, is included in the traditional list of\nfounding fathers of what is labeled American Pragmatism. His work\nappealed to Addams because they shared many of the same commitments,\nincluding the value of a robust democracy as well as the importance of\neducation that engaged the student’s experience. Addams and\nDewey were intellectual soul mates from the moment they met in 1892.\nDewey visited Hull House shortly after it opened and before he moved\nto Chicago to teach at the University of Chicago. Following the\nmeeting, Dewey expressed to Addams an appreciation for Hull\nHouse’s work, and he would become a frequent visitor. There was\nmuch intellectual cross-fertilization between Hull House and the\nUniversity of Chicago and vice versa. Historian Rosalind\nRosenberg describes Addams as a de facto adjunct professor at\nthe University of Chicago. Mary Jo Deegan documents that Addams\ntaught many college courses through the Extension Division of the\nUniversity of Chicago for a decade. In addition, she refused offers to\njoin the undergraduate and graduate faculty (Deegan, 1988).\nFurthermore, Dewey assigned Addams’ books in his courses. Addams\nand Dewey worked together personally and politically. When Hull House\nwas incorporated, Dewey became one of the board members. He often\nlectured to the Plato Club, Hull House’s philosophy group. Dewey\ndedicated his book Liberalism and Social Action to Addams.\nDewey named one of his daughters in her honor, and Addams wrote the\neulogy for Dewey’s son Gordon (EBP).", "\nAlthough Dewey and Addams gained celebrity status in their lifetime,\ntheir fame and legacies are characterized much differently. Dewey is\nframed as the great intellectual—a thinker—and Addams was\nthe activist—a doer. As contemporaries, they represent classic\narchetypes of gender: the male as mind generating theory and the woman\nas body experiencing and caring. However, there is much evidence that\nsuch characterizations are inaccurate. Both John Dewey and his\ndaughter, Jane, credit Jane Addams for developing many of his\nimportant ideas, including his view on education, democracy, and,\nultimately, philosophy (Schlipp, 1951). Despite the lack of\nattribution in Dewey’s written work, many scholars document\nAddams’ significant influence (Davis, 1973; Deegan, 1988;\nFarrell, 1967; Lasch, 1965; Linn, 2000; Seigfried, 1996)", "\nOvershadowed by Addams’ relationship with the celebrity\nphilosopher, Dewey, was her strong tie to George Herbert Mead\n(1863–1931), who is considered the father of “symbolic\ninteractionism,” an approach to social inquiry that emphasizes\nhow symbols create meaning in society. Mead’s work on\ndevelopment through play and education influenced Addams, but, as with\nDewey, the influence was mutual. Addams maintained a long-term close\npersonal relationship with Mead and his wife, Helen Castle Mead. They\noften dined together and visited one another’s families. Like\nAddams’, Mead’s intellectual legacy is not altogether\nsettled. Sociologists have recognized his works as significant, but\nmany philosophers have overlooked him.", "\nMead and Addams worked on several projects together, including\npro-labor speeches, peace advocacy, and the Progressive Party. When\nAddams was publicly attacked for not supporting the U.S. entry into\nWorld War I, Mead defended her though he disagreed with her position.\nLike Dewey, Mead was a frequent lecturer at Hull House. Also, like\nDewey, Mead could not help but be impressed with Addams’\nintellect. In 1916, Mead advocated awarding Addams an honorary\ndoctorate from the University of Chicago. The faculty supported the\naward, but the administration overturned the decision (eventually\nmaking the award in 1931).", "\nAddams also maintained a friendship with William James\n(1842–1910), whose work she cites on many occasions. James was a\npragmatist whose vision of urban improvement would have been shared by\nAddams. James and Addams both valued experience, and among the\n“professional” pragmatists his writing style is\nclosest to Addams’ in terms of its readability and use of\ntangible examples.", "\nAddams influenced and was influenced by the “Chicago\nSchool,” an active collaboration of cross-disciplinary scholars\nat the University of Chicago, including Dewey, Mead, James Hayden\nTufts, Robert E. Park, and others who had a significant impact on\nphilosophy, psychology, and sociology. Although she was often\nfrustrated with the abstract trajectory of the university, Addams\nembraced reflective analysis. Through her Hull House experience,\nAddams took many opportunities to theorize about the interchange\nbetween theory and practice. For a time, American philosophy,\nsociology, and social work existed in a symbiotic harmony—each\nnot differentiated from the other but benefiting from the interchange.\nUnfortunately, since the early 20th century when Mead,\nDewey, and Addams were together in Chicago, the intellectual genealogy\nof American philosophy, sociology, and social work has more\ndrastically diverged to a point where the crossover is less likely and\nperhaps less welcome. Lost in the compartmentalization of these\ndisciplines is how Jane Addams played a role in each.", "\nIn addition to the Romantics (Carlyle and Ruskin), the social\nvisionaries (Barnett and Tolstoy), and the pragmatists (Dewey and\nMead), Addams was influenced by the great collection of feminist minds\nwho came to work at the social settlement. Hull House has been\ndescribed in many different ways, reflecting the complexity and\ndiversity of its functions. Perhaps an overlooked descriptor is as a\npragmatist feminist “think tank.” Although the\n“Metaphysical Club” has taken on a mythical status among\nsome in American philosophical circles (Menand, 2001), the\nintellectual, social, and political impact of the Hull House residents\ndwarfs that of the Cambridge intellectuals. Hull House residents\ndined, slept, did domestic chores, and engaged in social activism\ntogether. They also discussed and debated ethics, political theory,\nfeminism, and culture while immersed in their tasks and stimulated by\nthe many speakers and visitors to Hull House. The prolonged contact\nshared gender oppression and common mission made for a unique\nintellectual collective that not only fostered action but also\ntheory.", "\nOstensibly, Hull House was the first co-educational settlement. Addams\nrecognized the need for male residents so that men in the neighborhood\ncould better relate to Hull House endeavors. However, it was clear to\nvisitors and residents that Hull House was a woman’s space. Hull\nHouse boasted some of the era’s great minds and change agents. Alice\nHamilton (1869–1970), a physician who trained in Germany and the\nU.S. and is credited with founding the field of industrial medicine,\nlived at Hull House for 22 years. She went on to teach at Harvard,\nbecoming a nationally recognized social reformer and peace activist.\nJulia Lathrop (1858–1932) was a Vassar graduate who, in 1912,\nafter residing at Hull House for 22 years, became the first woman to\nhead a federal agency, the Children’s Bureau, which, in terms of\nconduct, she modeled after Hull House. Rachel Yarros\n(1869–1946), a twenty-year resident at Hull House, was also a\nphysician who taught at the University of Illinois. The university\ncreated a position for Yarros to recognize her tremendous contribution\nto social hygiene and sex education. Author and feminist theorist\nCharlotte Perkins Gilman (1860–1935) was a resident for a short\ntime. Gilman thought highly of Addams but had no stomach for\nsettlement existence amongst the oppressed. However, Gilman’s\ngroundbreaking work on gender and economics likely influenced Addams.\nSophonisba Breckinridge (1866–1948) graduated from Wellesley and\nobtained a Ph.D. in political science and a J.D. from the University\nof Chicago. Her most significant contribution was in the area of\nsocial work education. Edith Abbott (1876–1957) and her sister\nGrace Abbott (1878–1939) joined Hull-House about the time as\nBreckinridge (1907). Edith Abbott would obtain a Ph.D. in Political\nEconomy from the University of Chicago, while Grace Abbott earned a\nPh.D. from Grand Island College in Nebraska. Edith would have an\nacademic career at the University of Chicago prior to her appointment\nas Chief of the Children’s Bureau after Julia Lathrop’s\ndeparture. Mary Kenney (1864–1943) became a vital labor\norganizer for Samuel Gompers’ American Federation of Labor and\ninfluenced Addams’ sensitivity to the plight of organized labor,\nsomething that all progressives did not share. Bessie Abramowitz\nHillman, a Russian immigrant who attended classes at Hull House,\nfounded the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) in 1910 at\nthe age of 20 and guided it for 60 years. Hillman referred to the\nsettlement as “a House of Labor”, and she worked with and\nadmired Addams until the latter’s passing. Another resident who became\na significant labor leader was Alzina Stevens. She headed the Dorcas\nFederal Labor Union and became a member of the Council of Women’s\nTrade Unions of Chicago. Addams worked with and cultivated numerous\nlabor leaders during this nascent time of the American labor movement.\nThese are only a few of the more well-known residents, but numerous\nfeminists used their Hull House experience as a springboard to careers\nin social reform or professions of various sorts. Addams engaged the\nresidents of Hull House in conversation and deliberation such that\nthey influenced her thoughts and she theirs.", "\nAlthough Hull House was replete with extraordinary minds, no one was\nlikely to be as intellectually challenging to Addams as Florence\nKelley (1859–1932). A Cornell graduate, Kelley translated\nFriedrich Engels’ The Condition of the Working Class in\nEngland and Karl Marx’s Free Trade into English.\nShe was an active member of the Socialist Labor Party until the\nleadership, threatened by Kelley’s aggressive style, expelled\nher. A single mother with three children, Kelley found a home at Hull\nHouse, where she opened an employment center and began researching\nsweatshops for the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics. Kelley would\nlater become the general secretary of the new Consumer’s League,\nan organization dedicated to using consumer pressure to ensure that\nsafe and high-quality goods were manufactured. Kelley was one of the\nmost distinguished social reformers of the early 20th\nCentury.", "\nAt Hull House, Kelley altered the dynamics of the resident community.\nShe brought a sense of class consciousness along with great strength\nof conviction. After Kelley’s arrival (and Mary Kenny’s\ncoming a year prior) Hull House became more deeply involved in\nsupporting the labor movement, which men heretofore dominated. Kelley\nalso learned from Addams, who she admired throughout her life. Perhaps\nthe legacy of the many accomplishments of the Hull-House residents\nsuffered because of the fame of their leader. Still, given the\nopportunity, each expressed their admiration and gratitude to Addams\nfor making Hull House the hotbed of ideas and action. Addams was the\nmost visible leader of a remarkable group of educated activists whose\nmutual respect allowed intellectual growth to flourish.", "\nFinally, a few other influences are worthy of mention. Although she\nwas not personally religious, Addams’ Christian roots left their\nmark. Addams was exceptionally well versed in the Christian bible and\nhad attended several religious courses during her time at Rockford\nSeminary. Addams occasionally used religious language to help get her\nmessage out to Christian constituencies. Addams was also well\nacquainted with Greek philosophy and referenced Socrates, Plato, and\nAristotle in her work. Addams was attracted to the ability of Greek\nphilosophers to move between personal and social concerns rather than\ncompartmentalizing their philosophical analysis. Some have suggested\nthat Addams was influenced by Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and the\npositivists (Misheva 2019). Comte, who coined the term\n“sociology,” believed sciences need their own logic drawn\nfrom experience rather than Descartes’s a priori universal\nrationalism. Addams would have been attracted to his ideas about\nsocial progress and his development of a religion of humanity. Addams\nalso read a great deal of literature, which influenced her ideas\nconcerning culture and sometimes seeped into her analysis, as it does\nwhen she uses Shakespeare’s King Lear to understand\nlabor-management relations. Although she did not believe that reading\nwas a substitute for direct experience, she did suggest more than once\nthat reading great works of fiction as a means of developing a\nsympathetic understanding.", "\nThe scholarship of philosopher Marilyn Fischer has revealed how\nsignificant social evolutionary thinking was for Addams. The\nOrigin of the Species was published in 1859, a year prior to\nAddams’ birth. By the time Addams became a public intellectual,\nevolutionary thinking had not only become influential but was being\napplied to social phenomena as an explanatory narrative. Fischer\ndescribes, “Recognizing Addams’s use of social\nevolutionary discourse, set within imaginative forms, reveals the\nlogic and sensibility of her layered ethical analysis” (Fischer\n2019, 13).", "\nAlthough Addams had a wide variety of influences, as we have seen, she\nwas not a derivative thinker, as many commentators suggest. She drew\nupon a number of great theorists to develop her ideas about social\nmorality but never dogmatically followed in anyone’s footsteps.\nAll the while, she influenced many others as she made her unique\ncontributions to American and feminist philosophy." ], "section_title": "2. Influences", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAlthough writing long before the term “standpoint\nepistemology” was named by feminist philosophers, Addams can be\nconsidered a forerunner of standpoint epistemology, given her\ncommitment to sympathetic knowledge. Feminist philosophers have\nattended to the impact of context on theory more than mainstream\nphilosophers. Although there are lively debates within feminist\nphilosophical circles regarding the nature of objectivity, many,\nincluding Dorothy Smith, Nancy Hartsock, Hilary Rose, Alison Jaggar,\nand Sandra Harding, have developed the notion that knowledge is indeed\nsituated. In particular, feminist standpoint theorists valorize the\nperspectives and theories derived from oppressed societal positions,\nsuch as women’s experiences. Harding describes a feminist\nstandpoint as something to achieve rather than a passive perspective.\nAll women have lived experience in a woman’s body and therefore\nhave a woman’s perspective. Still, a feminist standpoint\nrequires an effort at stepping back to gain a holistic picture of\npower struggles. Through the understanding of the perspectival aspect\nof knowledge claims, standpoint epistemology can create libratory\nknowledge that can be leveraged to subvert oppressive systems. One of\nthe challenges of standpoint theory is how to give voice to multiple\npositions without falling back on hierarchies that favor certain\nstandpoints over others.", "\nJane Addams demonstrates an appreciation for the spirit of standpoint\ntheory through her work and writing at Hull-House. Despite the\nprivileged social position she was born into, her settlement avocation\nimmersed her in disempowered communities. Addams poetically describes\nher moral mandate to meet, know, and understand others: “We know\nat last, that we can only discover truth by a rational and democratic\ninterest in life, and to give truth complete social expression is the\nendeavor upon which we are entering. Thus the identification with the\ncommon lot that is the essential idea of Democracy becomes the source\nand expression of social ethics. It is as though we thirsted at the\ngreat wells of human experience because we know that a daintier or\nless potent draught would not carry us to the end of the journey,\ngoing forward as we must in the heat and jostle of the crowd”\n(DSE 9). One might object that although these are admirable\nsentiments, they are still spoken by an outsider. What constitutes an\noutsider? Addams lived the better part of a half-century in the\ndiverse immigrant neighborhood of Hull House in Chicago. She\ndidn’t return home to the suburbs or return to a university\noffice with her data. She lived and worked amongst the crime, civic\ncorruption, prostitution, sweatshops, and other community ills. When\nthey started Hull House, Addams and Starr were involved\noutsiders—an oddity that neighbors looked upon suspiciously.\nHowever, time, proximity, and an earnest desire to learn and help won\nthe trust and respect of the neighborhood. The outsiders became\ninsiders. When Addams wrote or spoke about single women laborers,\nchild laborers, prostitutes, or first and second-generation\nimmigrants, she employed first-hand knowledge gained from her social\ninteractions. Addams leveraged her Hull House experiences to give\nvoice to standpoints marginalized in society. Simultaneously, she\nworked to provide the oppressed their own voice through college\nextension courses, English language courses, and social clubs that\nfostered political and social debate. Addams was self-conscious about\nspeaking for others: “I never addressed a Chicago audience on\nthe subject of the Settlement and its vicinity without inviting a\nneighbor to go with me, that I might curb my hasty generalization by\nthe consciousness that I had an auditor who knew the conditions more\nintimately than I could hope to do” (TYH 80). Addams did not try\nto arrive at universal moral truths but recognized that the standpoint\nof Hull House neighbors mattered.", "\nIn an 1896 article in The American Journal of Sociology,\n“A Belated Industry,” Addams addresses the plight of women\nin domestic labor. These were the most powerless of laborers:\npredominantly women, many of them immigrants with limited English\nlanguage skills and in a job that afforded little legal protection or\norganizing possibilities. Addams begins the article with a footnote\nclaiming that her knowledge of domestic laborers comes from her\nexperience with the Woman’s Labor Bureau, one of the many Hull\nHouse projects. Addams goes on to address the powerlessness of\ndomestic work, particularly as it entails isolation and a highly\ninequitable power relationship: “The household\nemployé[sic] has no regular opportunity for meeting other\nworkers of her trade, and of attaining with them the dignity of\ncorporate body” (ABI 538). Addams identifies the gendered\ndimension of this oppressive work: “men would … resent\nthe situation and consider it quite impossible if it implied the\ngiving up of their family and social ties, and living under the roof\nof the household requiring their services” (ABI 540). Addams\nextrapolates her experience of these workers to imaginatively inhabit\na standpoint and give them voice. She explicitly claims as much,\n“An attempt is made to present this industry [domestic labor]\nfrom the point of view of those women who are working in households\nfor wages” (ABI 536). Addams repeatedly recognized the\nexperiences of oppressed peoples that she came to know to have\ntheir concerns acknowledged in the social democracy she was trying to\nfoster.", "\nAddams believed recognizing alternative standpoints was important in\npromoting social progress through sympathetic understanding.\nAccordingly, if a voice is given to individuals inhabiting\nmarginalized positions in society, it fosters the possibility of\nbetter understanding between people and actions that can lead to\nimproving their lot. Addams engaged in the tricky balance of honoring\nstandpoints while simultaneously seeking connections and continuities\nto build upon. This is exemplified in Addams’ books on young\npeople, Youth and the City Streets, and elderly women,\nThe Long Road of Woman’s Memory. The latter work is a\ntreatise on memory based on the memories of first-generation immigrant\nwomen. Rather than grounding her theory upon the experiences of famous\nwomen theorists or writers—and Addams knew most of the prominent\nwomen of her day—Addams based her analysis on the women who were\nher neighbors at Hull House. Addams not only grounded her\nphilosophical work in experience but in the experiences of those on\nthe margins of society. Addams puts experience before theory. She did\nnot begin by positing a theory about these women. Instead, she retold\nmany stories she had heard from them and then drew out conclusions\nabout the function of memory. For Addams, theory follows experience.\nAddams was in the minority among her peers in philosophy or feminism\nto believe that working-class immigrant women not only should be given\na voice but also had something important to contribute to the\ncommunity of ideas.", "\nAn example of Addams’ application of feminist standpoint theory\n(or at least a forerunner of it) can be seen in the “Devil\nBaby,” which recounts what transpired after three Italian women\ncame to Hull House to see a possessed infant. One can form a whimsical\nimage from Addams’ account, “No amount of denial convinced\nthem that he was not there, for they knew exactly what he was like\nwith his cloven hoofs, his pointed ears, and diminutive tail; the\nDevil Baby had, moreover, been able to speak as soon as he was born\nand was shockingly profane” (LRW 7–8). This would be an\namusing anecdote if it stopped there, but Addams described a six-week\nperiod when Hull House was inundated with stories about the alleged\nDevil Baby. Visitors even offered Hull House residents money to see\nthe creature despite adamant responses that there was no such baby.\nMultiple versions of how the Devil Baby arose in the neighborhood, and\neventually the hysteria made the newspapers. One version of the story\nclaimed that the Devil Baby was the offspring of an atheist and a\ndevoted Italian girl. When the husband tore a holy picture from the\nwall claiming that he would rather have a devil in the house, his wish\nwas granted in the form of his coming child (LRW 8). Although a\nfascinating social phenomenon, the Devil Baby story has little\napparent philosophical importance. It would be easy to dismiss those\nwho perpetuated the story as simpletons caught up in the hysteria. Not\nfor Jane Addams. She applied a familiar approach by refusing to pass\njudgment, listening carefully, and developing a sympathetic\nunderstanding. Addams actively worked to grasp their subject\nposition.", "\nAlthough Addams dismissed the “gawkers” who came to see\nthe Devil Baby as a sensationalist-seeking mob, she wanted to\nunderstand the older women who had perpetuated the myth:\n“Whenever I heard the high eager voices of old women, I was\nirresistibly interested and left anything I might be doing in order to\nlisten to them” (LRW 9). She found women who were solemn and\nhighly animated about the Devil Baby. They used the appearance of the\nDevil Baby and the excitement it created as an opportunity to discuss\nimportant and troubling matters of their life. Addams, who never\nsought simple answers to complex issues, found a convergence of class,\nrace, and gender dynamics fueling the Devil Baby phenomenon. These\nimmigrant women were in unfamiliar surroundings and had to adjust to\nforeign ideas and practices. They had been alienated by their\nchildren, who adapted to the new country more quickly, keeping the old\nways at arm’s length. Many of these women also had been victims\nof domestic abuse long before such acts had a distinct label. One\nwoman tells Addams, “My face has this queer twist for now nearly\nsixty years; I was ten when it got that way, the night after I saw my\nfather do my mother to death with his knife” (LRW 11). For these\nforgotten and beaten women, the Devil Baby represented a connection to\na past that made more sense to them: one that had clear moral\nimperatives. Another woman tells Addams, “You might say\nit’s a disgrace to have your son beat you up for the sake of a\nbit of money you’ve earned by scrubbing—your own man is\ndifferent—but I haven’t the heart to blame the boy for\ndoing what he’s seen all his life, his father forever went wild\nwhen the drink was in him and struck me to the very day of his death.\nThe ugliness was born in the boy as the marks of the Devil was born in\nthe poor child up-stairs” (LRW 11). Addams’ recounting of\ntale after tale of violence provides a depressing view of immigrant\nwomen’s lives at the turn of the century. For women who had\nlived such a hard life, the Devil Baby provided a momentary\nopportunity for resistance. Husbands and children would listen to them\nand temporarily forsake beating them for fear of divine retribution as\nevinced by the Devil Baby. Addams describes memory as serving to\n“make life palatable and at rare moments even beautiful”\n(LRW 28). Although this is a specific explanatory analysis, it\ndemonstrates how Addams sought connections among the personal stories:\n“When these reminiscences, based upon the diverse experiences of\nmy people unknown to each other, point to one inevitable conclusion,\nthey accumulate into a social protest …” (LRW 29). Addams\nproceeds to view the Devil Baby in light of the women’s movement\nand the fight against oppression. Given the position of the old women,\nthe Devil Baby was the vehicle of resistance and an opportunity for\nAddams to interject feminist analysis." ], "section_title": "3. Addams’ Standpoint Epistemology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nMeliorism is a hallmark of pragmatist philosophy, which we can see in\nAddams’ work with a more radical character than among other American\npragmatists. If “radical” is defined as challenging\nexisting power structures, Jane Addams was the least elitist and\nthe most radical of the American philosophers of her era. Addams\nconsistently took and eloquently supported inclusive positions that\nsought the benefit of society. While pragmatists typically advocated\nfor social progress, Addams radicalized the extent of that social\nprogress. Rather than defining progress by the best and brightest\nachievements, Addams advocates the betterment of all in what she calls\n“lateral progress.” For Addams, lateral progress meant\nthat social advancement could not be declared through the\nbreakthroughs or peak performances of a few but could only\nauthentically be found in social gains held in common. Addams employs\nmetaphor to explain the concept:", "\n\n\nThe man who insists upon consent, who moves with the people, is bound\nto consult the feasible right as well as the absolute right. He is\noften obliged to attain only Mr. Lincoln’s “best\npossible,” and often have the sickening sense of compromising\nwith his best convictions. He has to move along with those whom he\nrules toward a goal that neither he nor they see very clearly till\nthey come to it. He has to discover what people really want, and then\n“provide the channels in which the growing moral force of their\nlives shall flow.” What he does attain, however, is not the\nresult of his individual striving, as a solitary mountain climber\nbeyond the sight of the valley multitude, but it is underpinned and\nupheld by the sentiments and aspirations of many others. Progress has\nbeen slower perpendicularly, but incomparably greater because\nlateral.\n\n\nHe has not taught his contemporaries to climb mountains, but he has\npersuaded the villagers to move up a few feet higher. (AML 175)\n", "\nWhether one refers to them as “robber barons” or\n“captains of industry,” the rise of commerce in the United\nStates was defined by the winners of the game: those who amassed\nwealth. The wealthy enjoyed tremendous progress in healthcare,\neducation, and material well-being. Addams was not satisfied with\nnarrow social development and redefined progress according to the\ncommon person’s experience. This redefinition continues to elude\nus today as class disparity in the United States grows. Ironically,\nAddams is often chastised for expounding middle-class values, which\nwas her point of reference as she started Hull House.\nStill, Addams’ experiences pushed her to understand and\nappreciate the immigrant poor in the neighborhood more fully.", "\nAddams applied the idea of lateral progress to numerous issues. When\nshe discusses the role of labor unions, she argues that in their\nattempt to improve conditions for all workers, unions are fulfilling a\nvital function that society has abrogated. Addams, who had a track\nrecord of supporting labor, makes it clear that she does not view\ncollective bargaining as an end in itself. Instead, Addams views\nunions as trailblazers who obtain working conditions that eventually\nbenefit everyone in society: “trade unions are trying to do for\nthemselves what the government should secure for all its citizens;\nhas, in fact, secured in many cases” (FSS 456). Addams is not\ninterested in improving the lot of one group of workers over another.\n“Any sense of division and suspicion is fatal in a democratic\nform of government, for although each side may seem to secure most for\nitself when consulting only its own interests, the final test must be\nthe good of the community as a whole” (FSS 461). For Addams,\nunions are important in as much as they improve working conditions,\nraise wages, reduce hours and eliminate child labor for all\nAmericans—lateral progress.", "\nAlthough the first chapter of Addams’ Democracy and Social\nEthics is ostensibly a critique of charity workers and their\npreconceived notions of the needs of the destitute, it also reveals\nAddams’ disposition toward the poor and the oppressed. She\ndecries the historical position of blaming the victim:\n“Formerly, when it was believed that poverty was synonymous with\nvice and laziness and that the prosperous man was the righteous man,\ncharity was administered harshly with a good conscience; for the\ncharitable agent really blamed the individual for his poverty, and the\nvery fact of his own superior prosperity gave him a certain\nconsciousness of superior morality” (DSE 11–12). Such a\njudgment serves to separate the wealthy from the poor. Accordingly,\nthe rich can make progress intellectually, materially,\ntechnologically, etc., while the poor are thought to be left behind\nprimarily due to their own actions. Addams argues that the poor are\noften victims of circumstance and that it is society’s responsibility\nto first understand marginalized people and then develop means for\ntheir participation in lateral progress.", "\nCharity, although a good, is not lateral progress. While noble, a\ntemporary transfer in wealth does not constitute real progress in\nalleviating economic disparity. Addams never viewed herself as a\ncharity worker, nor did she characterize the work of Hull House as\ncharity: “I am always sorry to have Hull House regarded as\nphilanthropy” (ONS 45). Addams sought lateral progress that\ncould be brought about by the collective will and manifested through\nsocial institutions. She believes there would be no need for\nsettlements if “society had been reconstructed to the point of\noffering equal opportunity for all” (ONS 27). Addams is not\nadvocating a laissez-faire capitalism version of equal\nopportunity that is abstract and rights-based. Free market economics\ninfluences modern understandings of democracy as merely assuring the\nadequate opportunity to participate. Addams’ approach to equal\nopportunity is set in a context of vibrant democracy where citizens\nand social organizations look out for one another because they all\nhave a stake in lateral progress or what today might be termed\ndemocratic socialism.", "\nAddams’ radical pragmatism ultimately had a feminist dimension.\nShe continually gave voice to women’s experiences, addressed\nwomen’s issues, and saw a vibrant social democracy as only\npossible if there was full participation by both men and women. When\nit came to issues such as women’s suffrage, Addams manifests a\nfeminist pragmatism. “If women had no votes with which to select\nthe men upon whom her social reform had become dependent, some\ncherished project might be so modified by uninformed legislatures\nduring the process of legal enactment that the law, as finally passed,\ninjured the very people it was meant to protect. Women had discovered\nthat the unrepresented are always liable to be given what they do not\nwant by legislators who merely wish to placate them” (STY\n89–90). Note that Addams does not argue the application of\nabstract human rights, but she instead makes a functional claim about\nthe role of voting in proper democratic representation. It is not that\nAddams opposes rights, but she will continually opt for pragmatist\narguments on feminist issues. Her male pragmatist colleagues were\nsympathetic to feminist positions but did not make the claims as\nforcefully or consistently as Addams (Seigfried, 1996).", "\nAddams’ notion of lateral progress exemplifies again how she has\nbeen misrepresented as merely a reformer. Radical discourse, a la\nMarx, has been associated with the call for extreme changes in social\ninstitutions and systems. Although such changes may be arguably\ndesirable, they entail upheaval that will disrupt social relationships\nat significant potential personal cost. Addams sought substantial\nsocial progress through mutual agreement and tapping into communal\nintelligence. Her radical vision refused to give up on the individuals\nin society and their caring relationships. Mixing theoretical notions\nof social change with concrete experiences of community organizing,\nAddams was a caring radical. Addams was interested in ameliorating\nsocial problems, but that does not preclude a broadly construed\nradical edge to her social philosophy." ], "section_title": "4. Radical Meliorism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAn analysis of Addams’ moral philosophy suggests at least three\nclaims about her relationship to feminist care ethics avant la\nlettre. One, Addams’ approach to the important social\nissues of her day reflected the relationality and contextualization\nthat are important to what is called care ethics today. Two, although\nAddams employed caring in response to the needs of others, she\ncontributes an active, even assertive, dimension to care ethics not\ncommonly found in feminist theory. Third, Addams advocates what might\nbe called “socializing care”: systemically instantiating\nthe habits and practices of care in social institutions.", "\nAlthough care is a simple and widely invoked word, many feminist\ntheorists have invested it with a particular meaning as it applies to\nethics. The original motivation for developing care ethics was an\nacknowledgment that traditional forms of morality, in particular\nprinciple-based and consequence-based ethics, did not adequately\naddress the richness of the human condition. These approaches bracket\nout emotions, relationships, temporal considerations, reciprocity, and\ncreativity to focus on immediate adjudication of moral conflicts.\nAccordingly, the use of rules or consequences can become a\nreductionist and formulaic response resulting in shortsighted answers\nto complex and systemic issues. For care ethicists, principles can be\nuseful, but a concern for interpersonal connection tempers them.\nPrinciples and consequences can be important in moral\ndeliberation, but care theorists seek a more robust and complex sense\nof morality that cannot ignore the context and people involved. For\nexample, the claim that people who spray-paint graffiti on a building\nought to be punished because they have damaged someone else’s\nproperty (rule/principle violation) will likely receive widespread\nassent. Care ethicists do not necessarily deny such an assertion, but\nthey want to know more. The person doing the spray-painting is a human\nbeing whose motivations and circumstances may reveal other variables\nnot sufficiently addressed by the mere recognition of rule violations.\nSystemic issues involving social opportunities, discrimination, or\nlack of voice may have contributed to this behavior. Care ethicists\nshift the moral focus from abstract individuals and their actions to\nconcrete, situated people with feelings, friends, and\ndreams—persons who can be cared about. Care ethics demands\neffort, experience, knowledge, imagination, and empathy to effectively\nunderstand the totality of the moral context. The result is not an\nexoneration of personal responsibility but a richer understanding of\nthe human condition where we are all actors and acted upon.", "\nAddams consistently moves beyond formulaic moral accounts of\nprinciples or consequences to apply a kind of care ethics to her\nexperiences in the Hull House neighborhood. Proximity is once again\ncrucial as she has direct experience with individuals, providing the\nresources for a caring response. However, as a philosopher, Addams\nextrapolates her experiences to theorize about others of similar\ncircumstances. For example, in The Spirit of Youth and the City\nStreets Addams addresses juvenile delinquency. She recounts\ncharges against young men who were brought before the Juvenile Court\nin Chicago (which Hull House had helped establish). These charges were\ncategorized by type, such as stealing, which included the pilfering of\npigeons, blankets, and a bicycle. Another category was disorderly\nconduct which included picking up coal from railroad tracks, throwing\nstones at railroad employees, and breaking down a fence. There was\nalso vagrancy, which included loafing, sleeping on the streets all\nnight, and wandering (SYC 56–57). Addams does not deny the\nseriousness of some of these infractions, but she does not rush to\njudgment, instead choosing to investigate the context further. She\ntalks to the young men and asks them about their motivations. She\nidentifies a listlessness, a desire for adventure not quieted by what\nthe city has to offer: “their very demand for excitement is a\nprotest against the dullness of life, to which we ourselves\ninstinctively respond” (SYC 71). Addams views the city as built\naround the possibility of factory production but ignores the needs of\nfuture workers. Among “juvenile delinquents,” Adams\nfinds many young people who simply seek adventure and excitement\nbecause their lives have little of it. Had Addams merely abstracted\nyouth as a category of individuals who seem prone to break the law,\nshe could have easily found principles to judge them negatively.\nHowever, Addams saw them as humans, many of whom she witnessed growing\nup in the neighborhood, and she cared for them beyond the alienating\nlabel of “troubled youth.”", "\nMore than merely prefiguring care ethics, Addams infuses a high social\nresponsibility standard into this moral approach. Addams advocates a\nduty of social awareness and engagement, thus creating the potential\nfor care. Many care ethicists are wary of the notion of duty as it has\nbeen traditionally formulated. Moral duties have historically entailed\nclaims regarding actions that a person is required to offer on behalf\nof another. Because the “other” is an abstract other and\nthe requirements are universalized (I must act in such a way in all\ncases), duties toward others have tended toward moral minimums of\nobligation. For example, a moral obligation to act is present if\nsomeone’s life is in peril and minimal effort is required to\nprevent it, such as an infant drowning in 3 inches of bathwater.\nAlthough such cases get widespread agreement, it becomes more\nchallenging to ascertain what obligation one has to distant others\nwith unclear expectations of success. For example, many Americans have\ndisposable income that could save the life of someone in a\npoverty-stricken country on a distant continent; do they have a moral\nobligation to give them money, and to what extent? Addams constructs\nthe duty to care differently. Hers is an epistemological demand.\nAddams claims that good citizens actively pursue knowledge of\nothers—not just facts but a more profound\nunderstanding—for the possibility of caring and acting on their\nbehalf: “if we grow contemptuous of our fellows, and consciously\nlimit our intercourse to certain kinds of people whom we have\npreviously decided to respect, we not only tremendously circumscribe\nour range of life, but limit our scope of ethics” (DSE 8). For\nAddams, care ethics must be actively pursued, not passively fostered.\nAddams’ language is more assertive than much of the current care\nethics discourse.", "\nFinally, Addams extends care ethics to the public realm. She is not\ncontent to compartmentalize personal and social morality. Caring is\nwhat she desires for democracy and its various institutions. Addams\nviews the residents of social settlements, for example, as having\n“an opportunity of seeing institutions from the\nrecipient’s standpoint” because they are not distant\ninstitutions but neighbors. She finds this perspective significant and\nbelieves that it should ultimately “find expression in\ninstitutional management” (OVS 39). Furthermore, she\ndifferentiates the epistemological project of the settlement from the\nuniversity in language that acknowledges a caring element: “The\nsettlement stands for application as opposed to research; for emotion\nas opposed to abstraction, for universal interest as opposed to\nspecialization” (FSS 189). While social settlements epitomize a\ndemocratic endeavor for Addams, she applies the same caring values to\nother institutions. The creation of the juvenile courts in Chicago\nrepresented an example of caring because it mandated contextualized\nregard for the context of young people. The creation of adult\neducation that addressed tangible and contemporary issues also\ndemonstrated a caring regard for the needs of Hull-House neighbors.\nPerhaps most of all, the comportment of the Hull-House residents\nmanifested care ethics in their willingness to listen, learn and\nrespond. Addams viewed socializing care as participating in a rich\nideal of democracy." ], "section_title": "5. Socializing Care", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Bryan, Mary Lynn McCree, Barbara Bair, and Maree De Angury (eds.),\nThe Selected Papers of Jane Addams (Volume 1: Preparing to\nLead, 1860–1881), Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press,\n2003.", "–––. The Selected Papers of Jane\nAddams (Volume 2: Venturing into Usefulness, 1881–88),\nUrbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2009.", "Bryan, Mary Lynn McCree, Barbara Bair, Maree De Angury, and Ellen\nSkerrett (eds.), The Selected Papers of Jane Addams (Volume\n3: Creating Hull-House and an International Presence, 1889-1900),\nUrbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2018.", "Condliffe Lagemann, Ellen (ed.), Jane Addams On\nEducation, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994.", "Cooper Johnson, Emily (ed.), Jane Addams: A Centennial\nReader, New York: Macmillan, 1960.", "Davis, Allen F. (ed.), Jane Addams on Peace, War, and\nInternational Understanding, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.,\n1976", "Elshtain, Jean Bethke (ed.), The Jane Addams Reader, New\nYork: Basic Books, 2002.", "Fischer, Marilyn, and Judy D. Whipps (eds.), Jane\nAddams’ Writings on Peace, 4 volumes, Bristol: Thoemmes\nPress, 2003 (facsimile edition).", "–––. Jane Addams’ Essays and\nSpeeches, New York: Continuum, 2005.", "Lasch, Christopher (ed.), The Social Thought of Jane\nAddams, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1965.", "Cracraft, James, 2012. Two Shining Souls: Jane Addams, Leo\nTolstoy, and the Quest for Global Peace, Lanham, MD: Lexington\nBooks.", "Deegan, Mary Jo, 1988. Jane Addams and the Men of the\nChicago School, 1892–1918, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction\nBooks.", "Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 2002. Jane Addams and the Dream of\nAmerican Democracy, New York: Basic Books.", "Fischer, Marilyn, 2004. On Addams, Belmont, CA:\nWadsworth.", "Fischer, Marilyn. 2019. Jane Addams’s Evolutionary\nTheorizing: Constructing ‘Democracy and Social\nEthics’. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.", "Fischer, Marilyn, Carol Nackenoff, and Wendy Chmielewski (eds.),\n2009. Jane Addams and the Practice of Democracy,\nBelmont, CA: Wadsworth.", "Hamington, Maurice, 2004. Embodied Care: Jane Addams,\nMaurice Merleau-Ponty, and Feminist Ethics, Urbana, IL:\nUniversity of Illinois Press.", "–––. 2009. The Social Philosophy of\nJane Addams, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.", "–––. (ed.), 2010. Feminist\nInterpretations of Jane Addams, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania\nState University Press.", "Hamington, Maurice, and Celia Bardwell-Jones (eds.),\n2012. Contemporary Feminist Pragmatism, London:\nRoutledge.", "Lasch, Christopher, 1965. The Social Thought of Jane\nAddams, Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.", "Misheva, Vessela, 2019. “Jane Addams and the Lost Paradigm\nof Sociology.” Qualitative Sociology Review 15:2,\n216-228.", "Schaafsma, David, 2015. Jane Addams in the\nClassroom, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.", "Schlipp, Paul Arthur, 1951. The Philosophy of John Dewey,\nNew York: Tudor Publishing.", "Schneiderhan, Erik, 2015. The Size of Others’\nBurdens: Barack Obama, Jane Addams, and the Politics of Helping\nOthers, Stanford: Stanford University Press.", "Seigfried, Charlene Haddock, 1996. Pragmatism and Feminism:\nReweaving the Social Fabric, Chicago: University of Chicago\nPress.", "Shields, Patricia, 2017. Jane Addams: Progressive Pioneer\nof Peace, Philosophy, Sociology, Social Work and Public\nAdministration, New York: Springer.", "Shields, Patricia, Maurice Hamington, and Joseph Soeters (eds.),\n2022. Oxford Handbook of Jane Addams, New York: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Brown, Victoria Bissell, 2004. The Education of Jane\nAddams, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.", "Davis, Allen F., 1973. American Heroine: The Life and\nLegend of Jane Addams, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Diliberto, Gioia, 1999. A Useful Woman: The Early Life of\nJane Addams, New York: Scribner.", "Farrell, John C., 1967. Beloved Lady: A History of Jane\nAddams’ Ideas on Reform and Peace, Baltimore: The John\nHopkins Press.", "Joslin, Katherine, 2004. Jane Addams: A Writer’s\nLife, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.", "Knight, Louise, 2005. Citizen: Jane Addams and the\nStruggle for Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago\nPress.", "–––. 2010. Jane Addams: Spirit in\nAction for Democracy, New York: W.W. Norton.", "Linn, James Weber, 2000. Jane Addams: A Biography,\nUrbana, IL: University of Illinois Press." ]	[ { "href": "../dewey/", "text": "Dewey, John" }, { "href": "../dewey-political/", "text": "Dewey, John: political philosophy" }, { "href": "../femapproach-pragmatism/", "text": "feminist philosophy, approaches: pragmatism" }, { "href": "../feminism-ethics/", "text": "feminist philosophy, interventions: ethics" }, { "href": "../feminism-femhist/", "text": "feminist philosophy, interventions: history of philosophy" }, { "href": "../feminist-social-epistemology/", "text": "feminist philosophy, interventions: social epistemology" }, { "href": "../feminism-class/", "text": "feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on class and work" }, { "href": "../james/", "text": "James, William" }, { "href": "../mead/", "text": "Mead, George Herbert" }, { "href": "../peirce/", "text": "Peirce, Charles Sanders" }, { "href": "../royce/", "text": "Royce, Josiah" } ]
adorno	Theodor W. Adorno	First published Mon May 5, 2003; substantive revision Mon Oct 26, 2015	[ "\n\nTheodor W. Adorno was one of the most important philosophers and\nsocial critics in Germany after World War II. Although less well known\namong anglophone philosophers than his contemporary Hans-Georg\nGadamer, Adorno had even greater influence on scholars and\nintellectuals in postwar Germany. In the 1960s he was the most\nprominent challenger to both Sir Karl Popper's philosophy of science\nand Martin Heidegger's philosophy of existence. Jürgen Habermas,\nGermany's foremost social philosopher after 1970, was Adorno's student\nand assistant. The scope of Adorno's influence stems from the\ninterdisciplinary character of his research and of the Frankfurt\nSchool to which he belonged. It also stems from the thoroughness with\nwhich he examined Western philosophical traditions, especially from\nKant onward, and the radicalness to his critique of contemporary\nWestern society. He was a seminal social philosopher and a leading\nmember of the first generation of Critical Theory.", "\n\nUnreliable translations hampered the initial reception of Adorno's\npublished work in English speaking countries. Since the 1990s,\nhowever, better translations have appeared, along with newly\ntranslated lectures and other posthumous works that are still being\npublished. These materials not only facilitate an emerging assessment\nof his work in epistemology and ethics but also strengthen an already\nadvanced reception of his work in aesthetics and cultural theory." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Biographical Sketch", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Dialectic of Enlightenment", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Critical Social Theory", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Aesthetic Theory", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Negative Dialectics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Ethics and Metaphysics after Auschwitz", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nBorn on September 11, 1903 as Theodor Ludwig Wiesengrund, Adorno lived\nin Frankfurt am Main for the first three decades of his life and the\nlast two (Müller-Doohm 2005, Claussen 2008). He was the only son\nof a wealthy German wine merchant of assimilated Jewish background and\nan accomplished musician of Corsican Catholic descent. Adorno studied\nphilosophy with the neo-Kantian Hans Cornelius and music composition\nwith Alban Berg. He completed his Habilitationsschrift on\nKierkegaard's aesthetics in 1931, under the supervision of the\nChristian socialist Paul Tillich. After just two years as a university\ninstructor (Privatdozent), he was expelled by the Nazis,\nalong with other professors of Jewish heritage or on the political\nleft. A few years later he turned his father's surname into a middle\ninitial and adopted “Adorno,” the maternal surname by which he is best\nknown.", "\n\nAdorno left Germany in the spring of 1934. During the Nazi era he\nresided in Oxford, New York City, and southern California. There he\nwrote several books for which he later became famous, including\nDialectic of Enlightenment (with Max Horkheimer),\nPhilosophy of New Music, The Authoritarian\nPersonality (a collaborative project), and Minima\nMoralia. From these years come his provocative critiques of mass\nculture and the culture industry. Returning to Frankfurt in 1949 to\ntake up a position in the philosophy department, Adorno quickly\nestablished himself as a leading German intellectual and a central\nfigure in the Institute of Social Research. Founded as a free-standing\ncenter for Marxist scholarship in 1923, the Institute had been led by\nMax Horkheimer since 1930. It provided the hub to what has come to be\nknown as the Frankfurt School. Adorno became the Institute's director\nin 1958. From the 1950s stem In Search of Wagner, Adorno's\nideology-critique of the Nazi's favorite composer; Prisms, a\ncollection of social and cultural studies; Against\nEpistemology, an antifoundationalist critique of Husserlian\nphenomenology; and the first volume of Notes to Literature, a\ncollection of essays in literary criticism. ", "\n\nConflict and consolidation marked the last decade of Adorno's life.\nA leading figure in the “positivism dispute” in German sociology,\nAdorno was a key player in debates about restructuring German\nuniversities and a lightning rod for both student activists and their\nright-wing critics. These controversies did not prevent him from\npublishing numerous volumes of music criticism, two more volumes of\nNotes to Literature, books on Hegel and on existential\nphilosophy, and collected essays in sociology and in aesthetics.\nNegative Dialectics, Adorno's magnum opus on epistemology and\nmetaphysics, appeared in 1966. Aesthetic Theory, the other\nmagnum opus on which he had worked throughout the 1960s, appeared\nposthumously in 1970. He died of a heart attack on August\n6, 1969, one month shy of his sixty-sixth birthday." ], "section_title": "1. Biographical Sketch", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nLong before “postmodernism” became fashionable, Adorno and Horkheimer\nwrote one of the most searching critiques of modernity to have emerged\namong progressive European intellectuals. Dialectic of\nEnlightenment is a product of their wartime exile. It first\nappeared as a mimeograph titled Philosophical Fragments in\n1944. This title became the subtitle when the book was published in\n1947. Their book opens with a grim assessment of the modern West:\n“Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of\nthought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and\ninstalling them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth radiates\nunder the sign of disaster triumphant” (DE 1, translation\nmodified). How can this be, the authors ask. How can the progress of\nmodern science and medicine and industry promise to liberate people\nfrom ignorance, disease, and brutal, mind-numbing work, yet help\ncreate a world where people willingly swallow fascist ideology,\nknowingly practice deliberate genocide, and energetically develop\nlethal weapons of mass destruction? Reason, they answer, has become\nirrational.", "\n\nAlthough they cite Francis Bacon as a leading spokesman for an\ninstrumentalized reason that becomes irrational, Horkheimer and Adorno\ndo not think that modern science and scientism are the sole culprits.\nThe tendency of rational progress to become irrational regress arises\nmuch earlier. Indeed, they cite both the Hebrew scriptures and Greek\nphilosophers as contributing to regressive tendencies. If Horkheimer\nand Adorno are right, then a critique of modernity must also be a\ncritique of premodernity, and a turn toward the postmodern cannot\nsimply be a return to the premodern. Otherwise the failures of\nmodernity will continue in a new guise under contemporary conditions.\nSociety as a whole needs to be transformed.", "\n\nHorkheimer and Adorno believe that society and culture form a\nhistorical totality, such that the pursuit of freedom in society is\ninseparable from the pursuit of enlightenment in culture (DE xvi).\nThere is a flip side to this: a lack or loss of freedom in\nsociety—in the political, economic, and legal structures within\nwhich we live—signals a concomitant failure in cultural\nenlightenment—in philosophy, the arts, religion, and the\nlike. The Nazi death camps are not an aberration, nor are mindless\nstudio movies innocent entertainment. Both indicate that something\nfundamental has gone wrong in the modern West.", "\n\nAccording to Horkheimer and Adorno, the source of today's disaster is\na pattern of blind domination, domination in a triple sense: the\ndomination of nature by human beings, the domination of nature within\nhuman beings, and, in both of these forms of domination, the\ndomination of some human beings by others. What motivates such triple\ndomination is an irrational fear of the unknown: “Humans believe\nthemselves free of fear when there is no longer anything unknown. This\nhas determined the path of\ndemythologization … . Enlightenment is mythical fear\nradicalized” (DE 11). In an unfree society whose culture pursues\nso-called progress no matter what the cost, that which is “other,”\nwhether human or nonhuman, gets shoved aside, exploited, or destroyed.\nThe means of destruction may be more sophisticated in the modern West,\nand the exploitation may be less direct than outright slavery, but\nblind, fear-driven domination continues, with ever greater global\nconsequences. The all-consuming engine driving this process is an\never-expanding capitalist economy, fed by scientific research and the\nlatest technologies.", "\n\nContrary to some interpretations, Horkheimer and Adorno do not\nreject the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Nor do they provide a\nnegative “metanarrative” of universal historical decline. Rather,\nthrough a highly unusual combination of philosophical argument,\nsociological reflection, and literary and cultural commentary, they\nconstruct a “double perspective” on the modern West as a historical\nformation (Jarvis 1998, 23). They summarize this double perspective in\ntwo interlinked theses: “Myth is already enlightenment, and\nenlightenment reverts to mythology” (DE xviii). The first thesis allows\nthem to suggest that, despite being declared mythical and outmoded by\nthe forces of secularization, older rituals,\nreligions, and philosophies may have contributed to the process of\nenlightenment and may still have something worthwhile to contribute.\nThe second thesis allows them to expose ideological and destructive\ntendencies within modern forces of secularization,\nbut without denying either that these forces are progressive and\nenlightening or that the older conceptions they displace were\nthemselves ideological and destructive.", "\n\nA fundamental mistake in many interpretations of Dialectic of\nEnlightenment occurs when readers take such theses to be\ntheoretical definitions of unchanging categories rather than critical\njudgments about historical tendencies. The authors are not saying that\nmyth is “by nature” a force of enlightenment. Nor are they claiming\nthat enlightenment “inevitably” reverts to mythology. In fact, what\nthey find really mythical in both myth and enlightenment is the thought\nthat fundamental change is impossible. Such resistance to change\ncharacterizes both ancient myths of fate and modern devotion to the\nfacts.", "\n\nAccordingly, in constructing a “dialectic of enlightenment” the\nauthors simultaneously aim to carry out a dialectical enlightenment of\nenlightenment not unlike Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Two\nHegelian concepts anchor this project, namely, determinate negation\nand conceptual self-reflection. “Determinate negation” (bestimmte\nNegation) indicates that immanent criticism is the way to wrest\ntruth from ideology. A dialectical enlightenment of enlightenment\n“discloses each image as script. It teaches us to read from [the\nimage's] features the admission of falseness which cancels its power\nand hands it over to truth” (DE 18). Beyond and through such\ndeterminate negation, a dialectical enlightenment of enlightenment\nalso recalls the origin and goal of thought itself. Such recollection\nis the work of the concept as the self-reflection of thought (der\nBegriff als Selbstbesinnung des Denkens, DE 32). Conceptual\nself-reflection reveals that thought arises from the very corporeal\nneeds and desires that get forgotten when thought becomes a mere\ninstrument of human self-preservation. It also reveals that the goal\nof thought is not to continue the blind domination of nature and\nhumans but to point toward reconciliation. Adorno works out the\ndetails of this conception in his subsequent lectures on Kant (KC),\nethics (PMP), and metaphysics (MCP) and in his books on Husserl (AE),\nHegel (H), and Heidegger (JA). His most comprehensive statement occurs\nin Negative Dialectics, which is discussed later." ], "section_title": "2. Dialectic of Enlightenment", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nDialectic of Enlightenment presupposes a critical social\ntheory indebted to Karl Marx. Adorno reads Marx as a Hegelian\nmaterialist whose critique of capitalism unavoidably includes a\ncritique of the ideologies that capitalism sustains and requires. The\nmost important of these is what Marx called “the fetishism of\ncommodities.” Marx aimed his critique of commodity fetishism against\nbourgeois social scientists who simply describe the capitalist economy\nbut, in so doing, simultaneously misdescribe it and prescribe a false\nsocial vision. According to Marx, bourgeois economists necessarily\nignore the exploitation intrinsic to capitalist production. They fail\nto understand that capitalist production, for all its surface “freedom”\nand “fairness,” must extract surplus value from the labor of the\nworking class. Like ordinary producers and consumers under capitalist\nconditions, bourgeois economists treat the commodity as a fetish. They\ntreat it as if it were a neutral object, with a life of its own, that\ndirectly relates to other commodities, in independence from the human\ninteractions that actually sustain all commodities. Marx, by contrast,\nargues that whatever makes a product a commodity goes back to human\nneeds, desires, and practices. The commodity would not have “use value”\nif it did not satisfy human wants. It would not have “exchange value”\nif no one wished to exchange it for something else. And its exchange\nvalue could not be calculated if the commodity did not share with other\ncommodities a “value” created by the expenditure of human labor power\nand measured by the average labor time socially necessary to produce\ncommodities of various sorts. ", "\n\nAdorno's social theory attempts to make Marx's central insights\napplicable to “late capitalism.” Although in agreement with Marx's\nanalysis of the commodity, Adorno thinks his critique of commodity\nfetishism does not go far enough. Significant changes have occurred in\nthe structure of capitalism since Marx's day. This requires revisions\non a number of topics: the dialectic between forces of production and\nrelations of production; the relationship between state and economy;\nthe sociology of classes and class consciousness; the nature and\nfunction of ideology; and the role of expert cultures, such as modern\nart and social theory, in criticizing capitalism and calling for the\ntransformation of society as a whole.", "\n\nThe primary clues to these revisions come from a theory of\nreification proposed by the Hungarian socialist Georg Lukács in\nthe 1920s and from interdisciplinary projects and debates conducted by\nmembers of the Institute of Social Research in the 1930s and 1940s.\nBuilding on Max Weber's theory of rationalization, Lukács argues\nthat the capitalist economy is no longer one sector of society\nalongside others. Rather, commodity exchange has become the central\norganizing principle for all sectors of society. This allows commodity\nfetishism to permeate all social institutions (e.g., law,\nadministration, journalism) as well as all academic disciplines,\nincluding philosophy. “Reification” refers to “the structural process\nwhereby the commodity form permeates life in capitalist society.”\nLukács was especially concerned with how reification makes human\nbeings “seem like mere things obeying the inexorable laws of the\nmarketplace” (Zuidervaart 1991, 76).", "\n\nInitially Adorno shared this concern, even though he never had\nLukács's confidence that the revolutionary working class could\novercome reification. Later Adorno called the reification of\nconsciousness an “epiphenomenon.” What a critical social theory really\nneeds to address is why hunger, poverty, and other forms of human\nsuffering persist despite the technological and scientific potential to\nmitigate them or to eliminate them altogether. The root cause, Adorno says,\nlies in how capitalist relations of production have come to dominate\nsociety as a whole, leading to extreme, albeit often invisible,\nconcentrations of wealth and power (ND 189–92). Society has come to be\norganized around the production of exchange values for the sake of\nproducing exchange values, which, of course, always already requires a\nsilent appropriation of surplus value. Adorno refers to this nexus of\nproduction and power as the “principle of exchange”\n(Tauschprinzip). A society where this nexus prevails is an\n“exchange society” (Tauschgesellschaft).", "\n\nAdorno's diagnosis of the exchange society has three levels:\npolitico-economic, social-psychological, and cultural. Politically and\neconomically he responds to a theory of state capitalism proposed by\nFriedrich Pollock during the war years. An economist by training who\nwas supposed to contribute a chapter to Dialectic of\nEnlightenment but never did (Wiggershaus 1994, 313–19), Pollock\nargued that the state had acquired dominant economic power in Nazi\nGermany, the Soviet Union, and New Deal America. He called this new\nconstellation of politics and economics “state capitalism.” While\nacknowledging with Pollock that political and economic power have\nbecome more tightly meshed, Adorno does not think this fact changes the\nfundamentally economic character of capitalist exploitation. Rather,\nsuch exploitation has become even more abstract than it was in Marx's\nday, and therefore all the more effective and pervasive.", "\n\nThe social-psychological level in Adorno's diagnosis serves to\ndemonstrate the effectiveness and pervasiveness of late capitalist\nexploitation. His American studies of anti-Semitism and the\n“authoritarian personality” argue that these pathologically extend “the\nlogic of late capitalism itself, with its associated dialectic of\nenlightenment.” People who embrace anti-Semitism and fascism tend to\nproject their fear of abstract domination onto the supposed mediators\nof capitalism, while rejecting as elitist “all claims to a qualitative\ndifference transcending exchange” (Jarvis 1998, 63).", "\n\nAdorno's cultural studies show that a similar logic prevails in\ntelevision, film, and the recording industries. In fact, Adorno first\ndiscovered late capitalism's structural change through his work with\nsociologist Paul Lazarsfeld on the Princeton University Radio Research\nProject. He articulated this discovery in a widely anthologized essay\n“On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening”\n(1938) and in “The Culture Industry,” a chapter in Dialectic of\nEnlightenment. There Adorno argues that the culture industry\ninvolves a change in the commodity character of art, such that art's\ncommodity character is deliberately acknowledged and art “abjures its\nautonomy” (DE 127). With its emphasis on marketability, the culture\nindustry dispenses entirely with the “purposelessness” that was\ncentral to art's autonomy. Once marketability becomes a total demand,\nthe internal economic structure of cultural commodities\nshifts. Instead of promising freedom from societally dictated uses,\nand thereby having a genuine use value that people can enjoy, products\nmediated by the culture industry have their use value\nreplaced by exchange value: “Everything has value only\nin so far as it can be exchanged, not in so far as it is something in\nitself. For consumers the use value of art, its essence, is a fetish,\nand the fetish—the social valuation [gesellschaftliche\nSchätzung] which they mistake for the merit [Rang]\nof works of art— becomes its only use value, the only quality\nthey enjoy” (DE 128). Hence the culture industry dissolves the\n“genuine commodity character” that artworks once possessed\nwhen exchange value still presupposed use value (DE\n129–30). Lacking a background in Marxist theory, and desiring to\nsecure legitimacy for “mass art” or “popular\nculture,” too many of Adorno's anglophone critics simply ignore\nthe main point to his critique of the culture industry. His main point\nis that culture-industrial hypercommercialization evidences a fateful\nshift in the structure of all commodities and therefore in the\nstructure of capitalism itself." ], "section_title": "3. Critical Social Theory", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nPhilosophical and sociological studies of the arts and literature make\nup more than half of Adorno's collected works (Gesammelte\nSchriften). All of his most important social-theoretical claims\nshow up in these studies. Yet his “aesthetic writings” are\nnot simply “applications” or “test cases” for\ntheses developed in “nonaesthetic” texts. Adorno rejects\nany such separation of subject matter from methodology and all neat\ndivisions of philosophy into specialized subdisciplines. This is one\nreason why academic specialists find his texts so challenging, not\nonly musicologists and literary critics but also epistemologists and\naestheticians. All of his writings contribute to a comprehensive and\ninterdisciplinary social philosophy (Zuidervaart 2007).", "\n\nFirst published the year after Adorno died, Aesthetic Theory\nmarks the unfinished culmination of his remarkably rich body of\naesthetic reflections. It casts retrospective light on the entire\ncorpus. It also comes closest to the model of “paratactical\npresentation” (Hullot-Kentor in AT xi-xxi) that Adorno, inspired\nespecially by Walter Benjamin, found most appropriate for his own\n“atonal philosophy.” Relentlessly tracing concentric circles,\nAesthetic Theory carries out a dialectical double\nreconstruction. It reconstructs the modern art movement from the\nperspective of philosophical aesthetics. It simultaneously\nreconstructs philosophical aesthetics, especially that of Kant and\nHegel, from the perspective of modern art. From both sides Adorno\ntries to elicit the sociohistorical significance of the art and\nphilosophy discussed.", "\n\nAdorno's claims about art in general stem from his reconstruction of\nthe modern art movement. So a summary of his philosophy of art\nsometimes needs to signal this by putting “modern” in\nparentheses. The book begins and ends with reflections on the social\ncharacter of (modern) art. Two themes stand out in these\nreflections. One is an updated Hegelian question whether art can\nsurvive in a late capitalist world. The other is an updated Marxian\nquestion whether art can contribute to the transformation of this\nworld. When addressing both questions, Adorno retains from Kant the\nnotion that art proper (“fine art” or “beautiful\nart”—schöne Kunst—in Kant's\nvocabulary) is characterized by formal autonomy. But Adorno combines\nthis Kantian emphasis on form with Hegel's emphasis on intellectual\nimport (geistiger Gehalt) and Marx's emphasis on art's\nembeddedness in society as a whole. The result is a complex account of\nthe simultaneous necessity and illusoriness of the artwork's autonomy.\nThe artwork's necessary and illusory autonomy, in turn, is the key to\n(modern) art's social character, namely, to be “the social\nantithesis of society” (AT 8).", "\n\nAdorno regards authentic works of (modern) art as social monads. The\nunavoidable tensions within them express unavoidable conflicts within\nthe larger sociohistorical process from which they arise and to which\nthey belong. These tensions enter the artwork through the artist's\nstruggle with sociohistorically laden materials, and they call forth\nconflicting interpretations, many of which misread either the\nwork-internal tensions or their connection to conflicts in society as a\nwhole. Adorno sees all of these tensions and conflicts as\n“contradictions” to be worked through and eventually to be resolved.\nTheir complete resolution, however, would require a transformation in\nsociety as a whole, which, given his social theory, does not seem\nimminent.", "\n\nAs commentary and criticism, Adorno's aesthetic writings are\nunparalleled in the subtlety and sophistication with which they trace\nwork-internal tensions and relate them to unavoidable sociohistorical\nconflicts. One gets frequent glimpses of this in Aesthetic\nTheory. For the most part, however, the book proceeds at the level\nof “third reflections”—reflections on categories employed in actual\ncommentary and criticism, with a view to their suitability for what\nartworks express and to their societal implications. Typically he\nelaborates these categories as polarities or dialectical pairs.", "\n\nOne such polarity, and a central one in Adorno's theory of artworks\nas social monads, occurs between the categories of import\n(Gehalt) and function (Funktion). Adorno's account of\nthese categories distinguishes his sociology of art from both\nhermeneutical and empirical approaches. A hermeneutical approach would\nemphasize the artwork's inherent meaning or its cultural significance\nand downplay the artwork's political or economic functions. An\nempirical approach would investigate causal connections between the\nartwork and various social factors without asking hermeneutical\nquestions about its meaning or significance. Adorno, by contrast,\nargues that, both as categories and as phenomena, import and function\nneed to be understood in terms of each other. On the one hand, an\nartwork's import and its functions in society can be diametrically\nopposed. On the other hand, one cannot give a proper account of an\nartwork's social functions if one does not raise import-related\nquestions about their significance. So too, an artwork's import\nembodies the work's social functions and has potential relevance for\nvarious social contexts. In general, however, and in line with his\ncritiques of positivism and instrumentalized reason, Adorno gives priority\nto import, understood as societally mediated and socially significant\nmeaning. The social functions emphasized in his own commentaries and\ncriticisms are primarily intellectual functions rather than\nstraightforwardly political or economic functions. This is consistent\nwith a hyperbolic version of the claim that (modern) art is society's\nsocial antithesis: “Insofar as a social function can be predicated for\nartworks, it is their functionlessness” (AT 227).", "\n\nThe priority of import also informs Adorno's stance on art and\npolitics, which derives from debates with Lukács, Benjamin, and\nBertolt Brecht in the 1930s (Lunn 1982; Zuidervaart 1991,\n28–43). Because of the shift in capitalism's structure, and because of\nAdorno's own complex emphasis on (modern) art's autonomy, he doubts\nboth the effectiveness and the legitimacy of tendentious, agitative,\nor deliberately consciousness-raising art. Yet he does see politically\nengaged art as a partial corrective to the bankrupt aestheticism of\nmuch mainstream art. Under the conditions of late capitalism, the\nbest art, and politically the most effective, so thoroughly works out\nits own internal contradictions that the hidden contradictions in\nsociety can no longer be ignored. The plays of Samuel Beckett, to whom\nAdorno had intended to dedicate Aesthetic Theory, are\nemblematic in that regard. Adorno finds them more true than many\nother artworks.", "\n\nArguably, the idea of “truth content” (Wahrheitsgehalt) is\nthe pivotal center around which all the concentric circles of Adorno's\naesthetics turn (Zuidervaart 1991; Wellmer 1991, 1–35 ; Jarvis 1998,\n90–123). To gain access to this center, one must temporarily suspend\nstandard theories about the nature of truth (whether as\ncorrespondence, coherence, or pragmatic success) and allow for\nartistic truth to be dialectical, disclosive, and\nnonpropositional. According to Adorno, each artwork has its own import\n(Gehalt) by virtue of an internal dialectic between content\n(Inhalt) and form (Form). This import invites\ncritical judgments about its truth or falsity. To do justice to the\nartwork and its import, such critical judgments need to grasp both the\nartwork's complex internal dynamics and the dynamics of the\nsociohistorical totality to which the artwork belongs. The artwork has\nan internal truth content to the extent that the artwork's import can\nbe found internally and externally either true or false. Such truth\ncontent is not a metaphysical idea or essence hovering outside the\nartwork. But neither is it a merely human construct. It is historical\nbut not arbitrary; nonpropositional, yet calling for propositional\nclaims to be made about it; utopian in its reach, yet firmly tied to\nspecific societal conditions. Truth content is the way in which an\nartwork simultaneously challenges the way things are and suggests how\nthings could be better, but leaves things practically unchanged: “Art\nhas truth as the semblance of the illusionless” (AT 132)." ], "section_title": "4. Aesthetic Theory", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAdorno's idea of artistic truth content presupposes the\nepistemological and metaphysical claims he works out most thoroughly\nin Negative Dialectics. These claims, in turn, consolidate\nand extend the historiographic and social-theoretical arguments\nalready canvassed. As Simon Jarvis demonstrates, Negative\nDialectics tries to formulate a “philosophical materialism” that\nis historical and critical but not dogmatic. Alternatively, one can\ndescribe the book as a “metacritique” of idealist philosophy,\nespecially of the philosophy of Kant and Hegel (Jarvis 1998,\n148–74; O'Connor 2004). Adorno says the book aims to complete what he considered his\nlifelong task as a philosopher: “to use the strength of the\n[epistemic] subject to break through the deception [Trug] of\nconstitutive subjectivity” (ND xx).", "\n\nThis occurs in four stages. First, a long Introduction (ND 1–57)\nworks out a concept of “philosophical experience” that\nboth challenges Kant's distinction between “phenomena” and\n“noumena” and rejects Hegel's construction of\n“absolute spirit.” Then Part One (ND 59–131)\ndistinguishes Adorno's project from the “fundamental\nontology” in Heidegger's Being and Time. Part Two (ND\n133–207) works out Adorno's alternative with respect to the\ncategories he reconfigures from German idealism. Part Three (ND\n209–408), composing nearly half the book, elaborates\nphilosophical “models.” These present negative dialectics\nin action upon key concepts of moral philosophy\n(“freedom”), philosophy of history (“world\nspirit” and “natural history”), and\nmetaphysics. Adorno says the final model, devoted to metaphysical\nquestions, “tries by critical self reflection to give the\nCopernican revolution an axial turn” (ND xx). Alluding to Kant's\nself-proclaimed “second Copernican revolution,” this\ndescription echoes Adorno's comment about breaking through the\ndeception of constitutive subjectivity.", "\n\nLike Hegel, Adorno criticizes Kant's distinction between phenomena and\nnoumena by arguing that the transcendental conditions of experience\ncan be neither so pure nor so separate from each other as Kant seems\nto claim. As concepts, for example, the a priori categories of the faculty of\nunderstanding (Verstand) would be unintelligible if they were\nnot already about something that is nonconceptual. Conversely, the\nsupposedly pure forms of space and time cannot simply be nonconceptual\nintuitions. Not even a transcendental philosopher would have access to\nthem apart from concepts about them. So too, what makes possible any\ngenuine experience cannot simply be the “application” of a priori\nconcepts to a priori intuitions via the “schematism” of the\nimagination (Einbildungskraft). Genuine experience is made\npossible by that which exceeds the grasp of thought and\nsensibility. Adorno does not call this excess the “thing in itself,”\nhowever, for that would assume the Kantian framework he\ncriticizes. Rather, he calls it “the nonidentical” (das\nNichtidentische).", "\n\nThe concept of the nonidentical, in turn, marks the difference between\nAdorno's materialism and Hegel's idealism. Although he shares Hegel's\nemphasis on a speculative identity between thought and being, between\nsubject and object, and between reason and reality, Adorno denies that\nthis identity has been achieved in a positive fashion. For the most\npart this identity has occurred negatively instead. That is to say,\nhuman thought, in achieving identity and unity, has imposed these upon\nobjects, suppressing or ignoring their differences and diversity.\nSuch imposition is driven by a societal formation whose exchange\nprinciple demands the equivalence (exchange value) of what is\ninherently nonequivalent (use value). Whereas Hegel's speculative\nidentity amounts to an identity between identity and nonidentity,\nAdorno's amounts to a nonidentity between identity and nonidentity.\nThat is why Adorno calls for a “negative dialectic” and\nwhy he rejects the affirmative character of Hegel's dialectic (ND\n143–61).", "\n\nAdorno does not reject the necessity of conceptual identification,\nhowever, nor does his philosophy claim to have direct access to the\nnonidentical. Under current societal conditions, thought can only have\naccess to the nonidentical via conceptual criticisms of false\nidentifications. Such criticisms must be “determinate negations,”\npointing up specific contradictions between what thought claims and\nwhat it actually delivers. Through determinate negation, those aspects\nof the object which thought misidentifies receive an indirect,\nconceptual articulation.", "\n\nThe motivation for Adorno's negative dialectic is not simply\nconceptual, however, nor are its intellectual resources. His\nepistemology is “materialist” in both regards. It is\nmotivated, he says, by undeniable human suffering—a fact of\nunreason, if you will, to counter Kant's “fact of reason.”\nSuffering is the corporeal imprint of society and the object upon\nhuman consciousness: “The need to let suffering speak is a\ncondition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity that weighs upon\nthe subject … ” (ND 17–18). The resources available\nto philosophy in this regard include the “expressive” or\n“mimetic” dimensions of language, which conflict with\n“ordinary” (i.e., societally sanctioned) syntax and\nsemantics. In philosophy, this requires an emphasis on\n“presentation” (Darstellung) in which logical\nstringency and expressive flexibility interact (ND 18–19,\n52–53). Another resource lies in unscripted relationships among\nestablished concepts. By taking such concepts out of their established\npatterns and rearranging them in “constellations” around a\nspecific subject matter, philosophy can unlock some of the historical\ndynamic hidden within objects whose identity exceeds the\nclassifications imposed upon them (ND 52–53, 162–66).", "\n\nWhat unifies all of these desiderata, and what most clearly\ndistinguishes Adorno's materialist epistemology from “idealism,”\nwhether Kantian or Hegelian, is his insisting on the “priority of the\nobject” (Vorrang des Objekts, ND 183–97). Adorno regards as\n“idealist” any philosophy that affirms an identity between subject and\nobject and thereby assigns constitutive priority to the epistemic\nsubject. In insisting on the priority of the object, Adorno repeatedly\nmakes three claims: first, that the epistemic subject is itself\nobjectively constituted by the society to which it belongs and without\nwhich the subject could not exist; second, that no object can be fully\nknown according to the rules and procedures of identitarian thinking;\nthird, that the goal of thought itself, even when thought forgets its\ngoal under societally induced pressures to impose identity on objects,\nis to honor them in their nonidentity, in their difference from what a\nrestricted rationality declares them to be. Against empiricism,\nhowever, he argues that no object is simply “given” either, both\nbecause it can be an object only in relation to a subject and because\nobjects are historical and have the potential to change.", "\n\nUnder current conditions the only way for philosophy to give priority\nto the object is dialectically, Adorno argues. He describes dialectics\nas the attempt to recognize the nonidentity between thought and the\nobject while carrying out the project of conceptual\nidentification. Dialectics is “the consistent consciousness of\nnonidentity,” and contradiction, its central category, is “the\nnonidentical under the aspect of identity.” Thought itself forces this\nemphasis on contradiction upon us, he says. To think is to identify,\nand thought can achieve truth only by identifying. So the semblance\n(Schein) of total identity lives within thought itself,\nmingled with thought's truth (Wahrheit). The only way to\nbreak through the semblance of total identity is immanently, using the\nconcept. Accordingly, everything that is qualitatively different and\nthat resists conceptualization will show up as a contradiction. “The\ncontradiction is the nonidentical under the aspect of [conceptual]\nidentity; the primacy of the principle of contradiction in dialectics\ntests the heterogeneous according to unitary thought\n[Einheitsdenken]. By colliding with its own boundary\n[Grenze], unitary thought surpasses itself. Dialectics is the\nconsistent consciousness of nonidentity” (ND 5).", "\n\nBut thinking in contradictions is also forced upon philosophy by\nsociety itself. Society is riven with fundamental antagonisms, which,\nin accordance with the exchange principle, get covered up by\nidentitarian thought. The only way to expose these antagonisms, and\nthereby to point toward their possible resolution, is to think against\nthought—in other words, to think in contradictions. In this way\n“contradiction” cannot be ascribed neatly to either thought or\nreality. Instead it is a “category of reflection”\n(Reflexionskategorie) , enabling a thoughtful confrontation\nbetween concept (Begriff) and subject matter or object\n(Sache): “To proceed dialectically means to think in\ncontradictions, for the sake of the contradiction already experienced\nin the object [Sache], and against that contradiction. A\ncontradiction in reality, [dialectics] is a contradiction against\nreality” (ND 144–45).", "\n\nThe point of thinking in contradictions is not simply negative,\nhowever. It has a fragile, transformative horizon, namely, a society\nthat would no longer be riven with fundamental antagonisms, thinking\nthat would be rid of the compulsion to dominate through conceptual\nidentification, and the flourishing of particular objects in their\nparticularity. Because Adorno is convinced that contemporary society\nhas the resources to alleviate the suffering it nevertheless\nperpetuates, his negative dialectics has a utopian reach: “In view of\nthe concrete possibility of utopia, dialectics is the ontology of the\nfalse condition. A right condition would be freed from dialectics, no\nmore system than contradiction” (ND 11). Such a “right condition”\nwould be one of reconciliation between humans and nature, including\nthe nature within human beings, and among human beings\nthemselves. This idea of reconciliation sustains Adorno's reflections\non ethics and metaphysics." ], "section_title": "5. Negative Dialectics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nLike Adorno's epistemology, his moral philosophy derives from a\nmaterialistic metacritique of German idealism. The model on “Freedom”\nin Negative Dialectics (ND 211–99) conducts a metacritique of\nKant's critique of practical reason. So too, the model on “World\nSpirit and Natural History” (ND 300–60) provides a metacritique of\nHegel's philosophy of history. Both models simultaneously carry out a\nsubterranean debate with the Marxist tradition, and this debate guides\nAdorno's appropriation of both Kantian and Hegelian “practical\nphilosophy.”", "\n\nThe first section in the Introduction to Negative Dialectics\nindicates the direction Adorno's appropriation will take (ND\n3–4). There he asks whether and how philosophy is still\npossible. Adorno asks this against the backdrop of Karl Marx's\nTheses on Feuerbach, which famously proclaimed that\nphilosophy's task is not simply to interpret the world but to change\nit. In distinguishing his historical materialism from the sensory\nmaterialism of Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx portrays human beings as\nfundamentally productive and political organisms whose interrelations\nare not merely interpersonal but societal and historical. Marx's\nemphasis on production, politics, society, and history takes his\nepistemology in a “pragmatic”\ndirection. “Truth” does not indicate the abstract\ncorrespondence between thought and reality, between proposition and\nfact, he says. Instead, “truth” refers to the economic,\npolitical, societal, and historical fruitfulness of thought in\npractice.", "\n\nAlthough Adorno shares many of Marx's anthropological intuitions, he\nthinks that a twentieth-century equation of truth with practical\nfruitfulness had disastrous effects on both sides of the iron curtain.\nThe Introduction to Negative Dialectics begins by making two\nclaims. First, although apparently obsolete, philosophy remains\nnecessary because capitalism has not been overthrown. Second, Marx's\ninterpretation of capitalist society was inadequate and his critique\nis outmoded. Hence, praxis no longer serves as an adequate basis for\nchallenging (philosophical) theory. In fact, praxis serves mostly as a\npretext for shutting down the theoretical critique that transformative\npraxis would require. Having missed the moment of its realization (via\nthe proletarian revolution, according to early Marx), philosophy today\nmust criticize itself: its societal naivete, its intellectual\nantiquation, its inability to grasp the power at work in industrial\nlate capitalism. While still pretending to grasp the whole, philosophy\nfails to recognize how thoroughly it depends upon society as a whole,\nall the way into philosophy's “immanent truth” (ND\n4). Philosophy must shed such naivete. It must ask, as Kant asked\nabout metaphysics after Hume's critique of rationalism, How is\nphilosophy still possible? More specifically, How, after the collapse\nof Hegelian thought, is philosophy still possible? How can the\ndialectical effort to conceptualize the nonconceptual—which Marx\nalso pursued—how can this philosophy be continued?", "\n\nThis self-implicating critique of the relation between theory and\npractice is one crucial source to Adorno's reflections on ethics and\nmetaphysics. Another is the catastrophic impact of twentieth-century\nhistory on the prospects for imagining and achieving a more humane\nworld. Adorno's is an ethics and metaphysics “after Auschwitz”\n(Bernstein 2001, 371–414; Zuidervaart 2007, 48–76). Ethically, he\nsays, Hitler's barbarism imposes a “new categorical imperative” on\nhuman beings in their condition of unfreedom: so to arrange their\nthought and action that “Auschwitz would not repeat itself, [that]\nnothing similar would happen” (ND 365). Metaphysically, philosophers\nmust find historically appropriate ways to speak about meaning and\ntruth and suffering that neither deny nor affirm the existence of a\nworld transcendent to the one we know. Whereas denying it would\nsuppress the suffering that calls out for fundamental change,\nstraightforwardly affirming the existence of utopia would cut off the\ncritique of contemporary society and the struggle to change it. The\nbasis for Adorno's double strategy is not a hidden ontology, as some\nhave suggested, but rather a “speculative” or “metaphysical”\nexperience. Adorno appeals to the experience that thought which “does\nnot decapitate itself” flows into the idea of a world where “not only\nextant suffering would be abolished but also suffering that is\nirrevocably past would be revoked” (403). Neither logical positivist\nantimetaphysics nor Heideggerian hypermetaphysics can do justice to\nthis experience.", "\n\nAdorno indicates his own alternative to both traditional metaphysics\nand more recent antimetaphysics in passages that juxtapose resolute\nself-criticism and impassioned hope. His historiographic, social\ntheoretical, aesthetic, and negative dialectical concerns meet in\npassages such as this:", "\nThought that does not capitulate before\nwretched existence comes to nought before its criteria, truth becomes\nuntruth, philosophy becomes folly. And yet philosophy cannot give up,\nlest idiocy triumph in actualized unreason [Widervernunft]\n… Folly is truth in the shape that human beings must accept\nwhenever, amid the untrue, they do not give up truth. Even at the\nhighest peaks art is semblance; but art receives the semblance\n… from nonsemblance [vom\nScheinlosen] … . No light falls on people and\nthings in which transcendence would not appear\n[widerschiene]. Indelible in resistance to the fungible world\nof exchange is the resistance of the eye that does not want the\nworld's colors to vanish. In semblance nonsemblance is promised (ND\n404–5). ", "Addressing such passages is crucial in the ongoing assessment of\nAdorno's philosophy." ], "section_title": "6. Ethics and Metaphysics after Auschwitz", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "The Adorno Reader, ed. B. O'Connor, Oxford: Blackwell,\n2000.", "Can One Live after Auschwitz?: A Philosophical Reader,\ned. R. Tiedemann, trans. R. Livingstone et al., Stanford: Stanford\nUniversity Press, 2003.", "The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture,\ned. J. M. Bernstein, London: Routledge, 1991.", "Essays on Music: Theodor W. Adorno, ed. R. D. Leppert,\ntrans. S. H. Gillespie et al., Berkeley: University of California\nPress, 2002.", "Benhabib, S., 1986, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the\nFoundations of Critical Theory, New York: Colombia University\nPress.", "Benzer, M., 2011, The Sociology of Theodor Adorno,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Bernstein, J. M., 1992, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation\nfrom Kant to Derrida and Adorno, University Park: Pennsylvania\nState University Press.", "–––, 2001, Adorno: Disenchantment and\nEthics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "––– (ed.), 2010, Art and Aesthetics after\nAdorno, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Boucher, G., 2013, Adorno Reframed: Interpreting Key Thinkers\nfor the Arts, London: I. B. Tauris.", "Bowie, A., 2013, Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy,\nCambridge, Mass.: Polity.", "Brittain, C. C., 2010, Adorno and Theology, London:\nT. & T. Clark.", "Brunkhorst, H., 1999, Adorno and Critical Theory,\nCardiff: University of Wales Press.", "Buck-Morss, S., 1977, The Origin of Negative Dialectics;\nTheodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute,\nNew York: Free Press.", "Bürger, P., 1984, Theory of the Avant Garde,\ntrans. M. Shaw, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ", "Burke, D. A., et al. (eds.), 2007, Adorno and the Need in\nThinking: New Critical Essays, Toronto: University of Toronto\nPress.", "Claussen, D., 2008, Theodor W. Adorno: One Last Genius,\ntrans. R. Livingstone, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University\nPress.", "Cook, D., 2004, Adorno, Habermas, and the Search for a\nRational Society, New York: Routledge.", "–––, 2011, Adorno on Nature, Durham,\nUK: Acumen.", "––– (ed.), 2008, Theodor Adorno: Key\nConcepts, Durham, UK: Acumen.", "de Vries, H., 2005, Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular\nReason in Adorno and Levinas, trans. G. Hale, Baltimore: Johns\nHopkins University Press.", "Foster, R., 2007, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience,\nAlbany: State University of New York Press.", "Frankfurter Adorno Blätter, 1992–2003,\ned. Theodor W. Adorno Archiv, Munich: Edition Text +\nKritik. (Published annually, more or less.)", "Freyenhagen, F., 2013, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy:\nLiving Less Wrongly, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Gibson, N. C., and A. Rubin, (eds.), 2002, Adorno: A Critical\nReader, Oxford: Blackwell.", "Geuss, R., 2005, Outside Ethics, Princeton: Princeton\nUniversity Press.", "Habermas, J., 1987, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity:\nTwelve Lectures, trans. F. Lawrence, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT\nPress.", "Hammer, E., 2005, Adorno and the Political, New York:\nRoutledge.", "–––, 2015, Adorno’s Modernism: Art,\nExperience, and Catastrophe, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Hansen, M. B., 2012, Cinema and Experience: Siegfried\nKracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno, Berkeley:\nUniversity of California Press.", "Heberle, R. J. (ed.), 2006, Feminist Interpretations of\nTheodor Adorno. University Park: Pennsylvania State University\nPress.", "Hellings, J., 2014, Adorno and Art: Aesthetic Theory contra\nCritical Theory, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave\nMacmillan.", "Hohendahl, P. 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Ziarek (eds.), 2008, Adorno and\nHeidegger: Philosophical Questions, Stanford: Stanford University\nPress.", "Martinson, M., 2000, Perseverance without Doctrine: Adorno,\nSelf-Critique, and the Ends of Academic Theology, Frankfurt am\nMain: Peter Lang.", "McArthur, J., 2013, Rethinking Knowledge within Higher\nEducation: Adorno and Social Justice, New York: Bloomsbury\nAcademic.", "Menke, C., 1998, The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity\nin Adorno and Derrida, trans. N. Solomon, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT\nPress.", "Morgan, A., 2007, Adorno’s Concept of Life, New\nYork: Continuum.", "Morris, M., 2001. Rethinking the Communicative Turn: Adorno,\nHabermas, and the Problem of Communicative Freedom, Albany: State\nUniversity of New York Press.", "Müller-Doohm, S., 2005, Adorno: A Biography,\ntrans. Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge: Polity Press.", "Nicholsen, S. W., 1997, Exact Imagination, Late Work: On\nAdorno's Aesthetics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.", "O'Connor, B., 2004, Adorno's Negative Dialectic: Philosophy\nand the Possibility of Critical Rationality, Cambridge, Mass.:\nMIT Press.", "–––, 2013, Adorno, London:\nRoutledge.", "Paddison, M., 1993, Adorno's Aesthetics of Music, New\nYork: Cambridge University Press.", "Pensky, M., (ed.), 1997, The Actuality of Adorno: Critical\nEssays on Adorno and the Postmodern, Albany: State University of\nNew York Press.", "Rensmann, L., and S. Gandesha (eds.), 2012, Arendt and Adorno:\nPolitical and Philosophical Investigations, Stanford, Calif.:\nStanford University Press.", "Rose, G., 1978, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the\nThought of Theodor W. Adorno, London: Macmillan Press.", "Ross, N. (ed.), 2015, The Aesthetic Ground of Critical Theory:\nNew Readings of Benjamin and Adorno, Lanham, MD: Rowman &\nLittlefield.", "Schweppenhäuser, G., 2009, Theodor W. Adorno: An\nIntroduction, Durham: Duke University Press.", "Sherman, D., 2007, Sartre and Adorno: The Dialectics of\nSubjectivity, Albany: State University of New York Press.", "Sherratt, Y., 2002, Adorno's Positive Dialectic,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Shuster, M., 2014, Autonomy after Auschwitz: Adorno, German\nIdealism, and Modernity, Chicago: The University of Chicago\nPress.", "Vogel, S., 1996, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in\nCritical Theory, Albany: State University of New York Press.", "Vries, H. de, 2005, Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular\nReason in Adorno and Levinas, trans. G. Hale., Baltimore: Johns\nHopkins University Press.", "Wellmer, A., 1991, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on\nAesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism, trans. D. Midgley,\nCambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.", "–––, 1998, Endgames: The Irreconcilable\nNature of Modernity; Essays and Lectures, trans. D. Midgley,\nCambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.", "Whitebook, J., 1995, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in\nPsychoanalysis and Critical Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT\nPress.", "Wiggershaus, R., 1994, The Frankfurt School: Its History,\nTheories, and Political Significance, trans. M. Robertson,\nCambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.", "Witkin, R. W., 2003, Adorno on Popular Culture, New York:\nRoutledge.", "Zuidervaart, L., 1991, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The\nRedemption of Illusion, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.", "Zuidervaart, L., et al., 1998, “Adorno, Theodor\nWiesengrund,” Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, Vol. 1,\npp. 16–32, ed. M. Kelly, New York: Oxford University Press;\nsecond edition, 2014.", "Zuidervaart, L., 2007, Social Philosophy after Adorno,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Zuidervaart, L., 2014, “Theodor Adorno,” Oxford\nBibliographies in Philosophy, ed. D. Pritchard, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress, \nabridged version available online" ]	[ { "href": "../benjamin/", "text": "Benjamin, Walter" }, { "href": "../contradiction/", "text": "contradiction" }, { "href": "../critical-theory/", "text": "critical theory" }, { "href": "../domination/", "text": "domination" }, { "href": "../enlightenment/", "text": "Enlightenment" }, { "href": "../habermas/", "text": "Habermas, Jürgen" }, { "href": "../hegel/", "text": "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich" }, { "href": "../hegel-dialectics/", "text": "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: dialectics" }, { "href": "../heidegger/", "text": "Heidegger, Martin" }, { "href": "../horkheimer/", "text": "Horkheimer, Max" }, { "href": "../husserl/", "text": "Husserl, Edmund" }, { "href": "../identity/", "text": "identity" }, { "href": "../kant/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel" }, { "href": "../lukacs/", "text": "Lukács, Georg [György]" }, { "href": "../marx/", "text": "Marx, Karl" }, { "href": "../popper/", "text": "Popper, Karl" }, { "href": "../postmodernism/", "text": "postmodernism" }, { "href": "../truth/", "text": "truth" }, { "href": "../weber/", "text": "Weber, Max" } ]
advance-directives	Advance Directives and Substitute Decision-Making	First published Tue Mar 24, 2009	[ "\n\nThere is a rough consensus in medical ethics on the requirement of\nrespect for patient\n autonomy:\nphysicians must ultimately defer to patients' own decisions about the\nmanagement of their medical care, so long as the patients are deemed to\nhave sufficient mental capacity to make the decisions in question. For\npatients who lack the relevant decision-making capacity at the time the\ndecision is to be made, a need arises for surrogate decision-making:\nsomeone else must be entrusted to decide on their behalf. Patients who\nformerly possessed the relevant decision-making capacity might have\nanticipated the loss of capacity and left instructions for how future\nmedical decisions ought to be made. Such instructions are called an\nadvance directive. One type of advance directive simply designates who\nthe surrogate decision-maker should be. A more substantive advance\ndirective, often called a living will, specifies particular principles\nor considerations meant to guide the surrogate's decisions in various\ncircumstances, for example, “Do not prolong my life if I enter\npersistent vegetative state,” or “I am a fighter: do not\ndiscontinue life-sustaining treatment no matter what happens to\nme.”", "\nThis general framework opens up a number of ethical issues. I shall set\naside here a foundational issue that is a subject of its own\nencyclopedia article: What are the criteria for\n decision-making capacity?\n These must be specified before we can establish, on any\ngiven occasion, whether there would be any need at all for\ndecision-making by a third party (with the aid of an advance directive\nor not). Assuming we have settled, using the appropriate criteria, that\nsurrogate decision-making is indeed called for, the following main\nissues arise:", "\n\nThis article focuses on philosophical contributions to the last two\nsets of questions." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The orthodox legal view", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Challenges to the orthodox view regarding the never competent", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Conflicts across time in the formerly competent", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Threshold of authority approach", "3.2 Challenge I: Appeal to the forward-looking perspective of decision-making", "3.3 Challenge II: Exercise of will as the point of autonomy", "3.4 Challenge III: Loss of personal identity", "3.5 Challenge IV: Severance of prudential concern" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn legal contexts, two general standards or approaches to question\nQ2 have been developed:", "\n\n\nThe Substituted Judgment standard: The surrogate's task is to\nreconstruct what the patient himself would have wanted, in the\ncircumstances at hand, if the patient had decision-making capacity.\nSubstantive advance directives are here thought of as a helpful\nmechanism for aiding the application of Substituted Judgment. The\nmoral principle underlying this legal standard is the principle of\n respect\n for \n autonomy,\n supplemented by the idea that when a patient is not currently capable\nof making a decision for himself, we can nonetheless respect his\nautonomy by following or reconstructing, as best we can, the\nautonomous decision he would have made if he were able. In a subset\nof cases, a substituted judgment can implement an actual earlier\ndecision of the patient, made in anticipation of the current\ncircumstances; this is known as precedent autonomy.\n\n\nThe Best Interests standard: The surrogate is to decide based\non what, in general, would be good for the\npatient. The moral principle underlying this standard is the principle of\n beneficence.\nThis legal standard has traditionally assumed a quite generic view of\ninterests, asking what a \"reasonable\" person would want under the\ncircumstances and focusing on general goods such as freedom from pain,\ncomfort, restoration and/or development of the patient's physical and\nmental capacities. This is because the Best Interests standard has\nmainly been employed when there is little or no information about the\npatient's specific values and preferences. However, the concept of\nbest interests is simply the concept of what is best for the\nperson. There is no reason why, in principle, the Best Interests\njudgment could not be as nuanced and individual as the best theory of\n well-being\n dictates.\n\n", "\n\nIn practice, the main difference between the two standards is often\nthought to be this. Substituted Judgment endeavors to reconstruct the\nsubjective point of view of the patient — i.e., the patient's\nown view of his interests — whenever such reconstruction is a\nviable possibility. By contrast, the Best Interests standard allows\nfor a more generic view of interests, without having to rely on the\nidiosyncratic values and preferences of the patient in question.", "\nThe applicability of these standards depends on the context in which\nthe lack of decision-making capacity occurs. Let us distinguish two\ngroups of patients:", "\n\nFormerly Competent: Patients who used to have the relevant\n decision-making capacity,\n but lost it, for example, due to Alzheimer's disease or\nother medical problems (or procedures such as surgical anesthesia)\nundermining normal brain functioning.\n\n\nNever-been Competent: Patients who have never had the\nrelevant decision-making capacity, either because the capacity has not\nyet developed (as in children), or because of a permanent brain\ndeficiency such as severe congenital mental retardation.\n", "\n\nThe Substituted Judgment standard seems well-suited to the\ncircumstances of the formerly competent patients since, in their case,\nthere are past values or patterns of decision-making that could\npotentially serve as a basis for the reconstructed decision on the\npatient's behalf. Furthermore, according to the current orthodoxy,\nprevalent especially in the law, Substituted Judgment is the preferred\nsolution for formerly competent patients because it promises to preserve respect for\n autonomy\n as an overriding moral consideration trumping concerns with\n beneficence.\nThe picture is this. If, ordinarily, we ought to respect patient\nautonomy rather than impose our own judgments on patients, we ought to\nrespect autonomy even after the patient has lost decision-making\ncapacity; and we can do so by following or reconstructing, as best we\ncan, the autonomous decision the patient would have made himself when\nfaced with the current circumstances. In short, in dealing with\nsomeone who used to be competent, the widely accepted primacy of\nrespect for autonomy over beneficence calls for Substituted\nJudgment. And this means that we should use the Substituted Judgment\nstandard whenever possible and fall back on the Best Interests\nstandard only when we lack sufficient information about the patient's\nprior wishes and values to make Substituted Judgment practicable.", "\n\nBy contrast, for the “never-been competent” patients, the\nSubstituted Judgment standard does not seem applicable (e.g., Cantor 2005):\nif the patient has never been able to make autonomous decisions in\ncircumstances such as the current one, it seems impossible to\nreconstruct what the patient's decision would have been. For these\npatients, the Best Interests standard is the only option.", "\n\nWhen combined, these orthodox views generate one unified simple\nordering of priority among the several standards and mechanisms for\nsurrogate decision-making, an ordering found in answers to Q2 and Q2a\nprevailing in the literature (e.g., Brock 1995):", "\n\nIs this orthodox view correct?" ], "section_title": "1. The orthodox legal view", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nConcerning patients who have never been competent, the orthodox view,\nas it is typically interpreted, may be misleading in certain cases. By\nrecommending the Best Interests standard as opposed to the Substituted\nJudgment standard, the orthodox view may help create the impression\nthat, for those who have never had decision-making capacity, only a\none-size-fits-all objective assessment of their interests, based on\ngeneric goals such as prolonging life or avoiding pain, is\navailable. However, a person may lack decision-making capacity but\nnonetheless possess the proper starting points of decision-making, so\nthat a surrogate could still reconstruct deeply personal and\nidiosyncratic choices on the person's behalf. Consider a child or a\nmildly retarded patient who lacks the capacity to make a sophisticated\nmedical decision because she cannot fully grasp the complex\nconsequences of the available options, or because, if left to her own\ndevices, she would merely choose impulsively. Yet, very meaningful and\npersonally distinctive issues may be at stake for this individual: for\ninstance, alternative treatments may differently impact her\nrelationships with loved ones or differently affect her ability to\ncontinue participating in deeply valued activities such as painting or\ndancing. In such cases, to best serve the interests of the patient,\nsurrogates arguably need to reconstruct the subjective point of view\nof the patient, and not just fall back on generic choices that\n“a reasonable person” would make under the\ncircumstances. In short, sometimes — especially in dealing with\npatients with rich inner lives whose decision-making is nevertheless\nimpaired — the application of the Best Interests standard may\nlook an awful lot like an exercise of Substituted Judgment.", "\n\nIt is only with regards to patients who do not even possess the\nstarting points of decisions — for example, infants or more severely\nbrain damaged individuals — that the idea of reconstructing the\nindividual's own point of view as a basis for a decision does not even\ncoherently apply, and the more generic application of the Best\nInterests standard is called for.", "\n\nNonetheless, this is only a challenge to the narrow way in which the\nBest Interests standard has typically been employed: a more nuanced\ninterpretation of the orthodox view can handle the cases of the\nnever-competent appropriately. The application of Best Interests can,\nin many instances, procedurally resemble the application of\nSubstituted Judgment because, on any reasonable theory of\n well-being,\na large part of what counts as good for a person is attaining what she\nvalues or succeeding in what she cares about. It is thus not\nsurprising that reconstructing the individual's viewpoint is an\nimportant part of a nuanced interpretation of Best Interests. Yet,\neven though in employing the Best Interests standard one usually must\ntake very seriously the subject's own viewpoint, one is not thereby\nrecreating the autonomous choice the person would have made. This is\nparticularly clear for those who have never been competent: one cannot\nbe respecting their autonomy (at least not on the usual understanding\nof autonomous choice), since they have never had autonomy. Moreover,\neven in undertaking to respect their \"starting points of\ndecision-making,\" one would not treat these starting points as\nentirely decisive. An individual who has never been competent may\nvalue something that would be terribly destructive to her other values\n(and be incapable of realizing this), and so, to protect her, the Best\nInterests standard would have to focus on those other values. So here\nagain the application of the Best Interests standard diverges from\nwhat would most plausibly count as a reconstruction of the subject's\nown autonomous choice. Given that Substituted Judgment is grounded in\nrespect for autonomy, it is thus clear why, according to the orthodox\nview, Substituted Judgment makes no sense for the never-competent, and\nwhy the orthodox view prescribes for them the Best Interests standard,\nalbeit interpreted in a suitably broad way.", "\n \nAs already noted, different views on how to apply the Best Interests\nstandard roughly correspond to different theories of\n well-being. \nHowever, theories of well-being are normally developed with an\nordinary fully-capacitated human being in mind, so, when applied to\nthose whose incompetence is due, in part, to substantial deviations\nfrom this paradigm, some theories need to be adjusted to accommodate\nhuman beings who do not at the time, or ever, possess the paradigm\ncapacities these theories presume (for example, the capacity to\nexperience the pleasures of the intellect, or the capacity to\ndesire). The understanding of well-being and the specifics of applying\nthe Best Interests standard in such cases must be tailored to the\ndetails of each particular real-life condition — and to the\ncorresponding levels of mental functioning. Interests of children,\nincluding infants, have received some attention in the literature\n(Buchanan and Brock 1990, ch.5, Schapiro 1999); similar tailor-made\nanalyses are needed for individual mental illnesses and brain\ndeficits." ], "section_title": "2. Challenges to the orthodox view regarding the never competent", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe orthodox view regarding the formerly competent faces deeper\nchallenges. In giving priority to Advance Directives and Substituted\nJudgment, the orthodox view overlooks the possibility that the earlier\ncompetent self and the current incompetent self may have conflicting\ninterests. Advance Directives and Substituted Judgment are best suited\nfor the contexts for which they were first developed in the law\n— conditions involving loss of consciousness such as persistent\nvegetative state — where the patient in the current incompetent\nstate cannot have interests potentially different from the interests\nof the person he used to be. However, loss of decision-making capacity\noften comes about in less drastic, yet permanent conditions, which can\nleave the current incompetent patient with what seem to be powerful\nnew interests in his new phase of life. Classic cases of this sort\noccur in Alzheimer's disease, other forms of dementia, and\nstroke. Before the loss of capacity, typically, the patient had\nnumerous interests associated with his rich mental life and with a\ncorrespondingly complex set of values. Once mental deterioration\nprogresses, the patient's universe of interests shrinks and new\ninterests may become dominant. Sometimes the two sets of interests can\ncome into conflict. Imagine, for example, a fully competent patient\nwho, in anticipation of developing Alzheimer's disease, espouses a\nstrong conviction, perhaps documented in an advance directive, that\nshe does not wish to have her life prolonged in a demented state. She\ndeeply identifies with her intellect, and thus views life with\ndementia as terribly degrading. But once she develops dementia, her\nidentification with her intellect drops out as a concern, so she loses\nthe corresponding desire not to prolong her life. In the meantime, she\nis still capable of simple enjoyments — she likes gardening or\nlistening to music — and perhaps can even carry on meaningful\nhuman attachments. Her current, truncated set of interests does seem\nto favor continued life. Such scenarios raise difficult questions of\nhow the interests of the earlier and current self ought to be balanced\nin surrogate decision-making. Privileging advance directives and\nrecreating the judgment of the earlier self via substituted judgment\nare no longer the obvious solutions, given this conflict.", "\nMuch of the philosophical literature on surrogate decision-making has\nfocused on conflicts of this kind. There are subtle differences,\nthough, in how this conflict is conceptualized — more\nspecifically, in how the interests of the earlier self are viewed\n— sometimes stemming from differences in what is taken as a\nparadigm example of the conflict. On one view, the relevant interests\nof the earlier self are autonomy interests: what matters is that the\nchoices of the earlier self be heeded. With this emphasis, the\nconflict is between the autonomy of the earlier self and the\nwell-being of the current self. On an alternative conception, the\ninterests of the earlier self are well-being interests: what matters\nis that the earlier self fares well overall. The conflict, then, is\nbetween the well-being of the earlier self and the well-being of the\ncurrent self. One may also consider both aspects of the conflict as\nrelevant. The arguments below apply to all three interpretations of\nthe conflict." ], "section_title": "3. Conflicts across time in the formerly competent", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nOne way to rescue the idea that the former self and its interests\nought to have priority is to appeal to the special authority\nof the former self over the current self. The grounds of this authority\nare cashed out differently in different views, but the basic thought is\nthat the former self's superior capacities give her standing to govern\nthe current self. Once the current self falls below a certain threshold\nof capacity, her interests in her current state are so marginal as to\nno longer be authoritative for how she ought to be cared for, and the\ninterests of the earlier self trump.", "\nSeveral lines of argument have been used to establish the authority of\nthe earlier self over the current self. One is to deny altogether the\nindependence of the current self's interests. On this interpretation,\nthe conflict described above is merely apparent. Once the current self\nfalls below the relevant threshold of capacity, she is incapable of\ngenerating her own independent interests, and, despite superficial\nappearances to the contrary, her fundamental interests are really\ndefined by the earlier self. The interests of the current self are\nstraightforwardly not authoritative since they are merely apparent\ninterests. Further, even were we to accept that the current self has\nher own independent interests, there are other reasons to see those\ninterests as lacking authority. If one insists on the priority of\nrespect for autonomy over beneficence, or if one views the capacity\nfor autonomy as the essential core of a person, the interests of the\nearlier self will be seen as having authority over the current self\nbecause only the earlier self is capable of autonomy. Ronald Dworkin's\nanalysis combines all of these lines of argument (Dworkin 1993).", "\nDifferent versions of the threshold approach propose somewhat\ndifferent thresholds for when the current interests of a formerly\ncompetent individual cease to be authoritative. It is usually accepted\nthat the mere loss of decision-making capacity is insufficient\n(Dworkin 1993, 222-29). Decision-making capacity is context-specific\nand depends on the complexity of the pertinent information that the\ndecision-maker needs to process. A person may lose the ability to make\nvery complex medical decisions, while still being able to decide\nperfectly well about simpler everyday matters. Lapses of this nature\nwould not give the surrogate a license to discount the current\nwell-being of the individual in favor of what mattered to him\nearlier. By contrast, transformations that could leave authority with\nthe past self must involve a more global loss of capacity such that\none can no longer generate, in any context, interests of a special,\nmorally weighty type. In crossing this threshold, one ceases to be a\nbeing of a certain morally privileged kind: for instance, one ceases\nto be an autonomous individual, or one turns from a person into a\nnonperson. If an autonomous individual loses his capacity for autonomy\naltogether — the thought then goes — he may have some\nlocal (possibly merely illusory) interests associated with the\nnon-autonomous self, but his affairs ought to be conducted in\naccordance with his earlier wishes expressive of his autonomy. Or, in\nthe parallel version, if a person turns into a nonperson, he may have\nsome local (possibly illusory) interests as a nonperson, but his\naffairs ought to be conducted so as to advance the interests of the\nperson he used to be.", "\nWithin this basic framework, several variants are possible, depending\non what one takes to be the essential characteristics of a person, or,\nif one accepts the capacity for autonomy as the essence of personhood,\ndepending on what one takes to be the core aspects of autonomy.\nRonald Dworkin's influential work defends the capacity for autonomy as\nthe relevant threshold, with autonomy interpreted as “the\nability to act out of genuine preference or character or conviction or\na sense of self” (Dworkin 1993, 225). If an individual has lost\nthe capacity for autonomy so understood, this view dictates that her\ncurrent interests (illusory or not) have no authority over decisions\non her behalf, and surrogates ought to cater to her former interests,\nfrom before the loss.", "\n\nIt is, however, important to notice that the capacity for autonomy, as\ninterpreted by Dworkin, comprises two distinct abilities: (1) the\nability to espouse a “genuine preference or character or\nconviction or a sense of self” — what may be called, for\nshort, the ability to value — and (2) the ability to act out of\none's sense of conviction, that is, the ability to enact one's values\nin the complex circumstances of the real world. In many brain\ndisorders these two abilities come apart. For example, a patient in\nthe middle stages of Alzheimer's disease may retain genuine values\n— she may hold on to family ties or to the conviction that\nhelping others is good — and yet, due to a rapid\ndeterioration of short-term memory, she may be perpetually confused\nand unable to figure out how to enact these values in the concrete\ncircumstances of her life. The set of values such a patient retains\nwould typically be a curtailment of the original set, introducing the\npotential for conflict between the interests of the earlier and\ncurrent self. For example, earlier, the person may have valued\nindependence above all else, and so was adamantly against having her\nlife prolonged if she developed Alzheimer's disease. Now, in moderate\nstages of Alzheimer's, she has lost her commitment to independence,\nbut still values emotional connections to family members, and thus has\na strong interest in continuing to live. On Dworkin's approach to\ndecisions on this individual's behalf, her current interests are not\nallowed to override her earlier interests because she has lost her\nstanding as an autonomous agent: due to her confusion, she is unable\nto act on her commitment to the family ties or on any other values\n— she is unable to run her life by her own lights, that is, to\ngovern herself. However, on an alternative view (Jaworska 1999), what\nmatters most for autonomy and personhood are the starting points of\nautonomous decision-making: the genuine values that the person still\nholds. So long as an individual is capable of valuing, she remains a\nbeing of a morally privileged type, and interests stemming from her\nvalues have the authority to dictate how the individual ought to be\ntreated. The person need not be able to enact her values on her own\n— it is part of the surrogate's role to assist with this\ntask. In short, on this alternative view, the capacity to value marks\nthe morally crucial threshold above which the current interests of a\nformerly competent individual remain authoritative for the surrogate's\ndecisions and the conflicting interests of the earlier self can be set\naside.", "\n\nThe two views I have just discussed share the underlying idea of a\nthreshold of capacity beyond which an individual's current interests\nlose authority. This idea has been challenged in several ways." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Threshold of authority approach" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe most straightforward challenge emphasizes that decision-making\ninherently involves a present- and future-oriented perspective: the\nsurrogate must make the best decision for the patient in front of him\nabout how to manage this patient's life from now on. The patient may\nhave had different interests in the past, but how can these be\nrelevant to current decisions, which can only affect the present and\nfuture but not the past? This approach may accept it as unfortunate\nthat the patient's past interests were left unfulfilled, but insists\nthat this unfortunate fact cannot be remedied, and that there is no\nuse in catering to bygone interests in current decision-making\n(Dresser 1986).", "\n\nAn advocate of the threshold view, such as Dworkin, would emphasize\ntwo points in response:", "\n\nFirst, past interests can often be satisfied in the present. Dworkin\ndistinguishes between what he calls “experiential” and\n“critical” interests (Dworkin 1993, 201-08). Experiential\ninterests are, roughly, interests in having desirable felt\nexperiences, such as enjoyment (and in avoiding undesirable\nexperiences, such as boredom). These interests are indeed tied to the\npresent: there is no point in trying to satisfy one's past\nexperiential interest in a specific enjoyment (for instance, in\nplaying with dolls), if one at present has no hope of still deriving\nenjoyment from what one used to enjoy in the past. By contrast,\ncritical interests are not tied to the experience of their\nsatisfaction; these are interests in having what one values or cares\nabout become a reality, such as a parent's interest in the success and\nprosperity of his child or a sailor's interest in preserving his\nbeautiful wooden boat. According to Dworkin, such interests can be\nmeaningfully satisfied even if they belong in the past: for example,\neven after the sailor dies, it makes sense to preserve the boat he\ncared about and do so for his sake. Similarly, according to Dworkin,\nit makes sense to satisfy a formerly competent person's critical\ninterests, such as the interest in avoiding the indignity of dementia,\nfor her sake, even if she has ceased to understand those critical\ninterests now.", "\n\nSecond, on a view like Dworkin's, the past critical interests of an\nindividual who formerly possessed the capacity for autonomy are, in a\ncrucial sense, still her interests in the present, even if she can no\nlonger take an interest in them. This is an essential element of the\nclaim that the patient's earlier autonomous self has authority over\nher current non-autonomous self. The thought is this. For any person,\nthe interests she has autonomously defined for herself are her most\nimportant interests. And this is so even for an individual who has\nlost her capacity for autonomy or her personhood: so long as the\nindividual survives the loss as numerically the same entity, her\ninterests stemming from autonomy (or the subset of them that can still\nbe satisfied) remain her most important interests, even if she can't\nespouse them now, and they are, in this sense, “past.”\nThus, Dworkin offers a powerful rationale for why satisfying\n“past” interests can still matter, and matter very deeply,\nin the present." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Challenge I: Appeal to the forward-looking perspective of decision-making" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe versions of the threshold view that see the capacity for autonomy\nas the relevant threshold can be challenged by approaches that cast\nthe requirements of the capacity for autonomy as being so minimal\nthat any individual capable of generating independent\ninterests in his deteriorated state counts as autonomous. On such\napproaches, conflicts between earlier interests grounded in autonomy\nand later interests no longer so grounded become impossible, and the\nclaim of authority of the earlier autonomous self over the current\nnon-autonomous self loses its bite: the threshold of autonomy is so\nlow as to cease to mark any contestable difference in authority. Seana\nShiffrin's response to Dworkin can be interpreted as a view of this\nsort (Shiffrin 2004). Shiffrin sees a key point of autonomy in the\nability to exercise one's own will: the ability to control one's\nexperiences through the enactment of one's own choice. Shiffrin\nemphasizes that so long as an individual has this ability, its\nexercise calls for protection, and this is a crucial part of what we\nprotect when we respect autonomy. On this picture, so long as an\nindividual is able to make choices, have preferences, exhibit a will,\netc., there is a rationale for catering to his current interests, and\nso his current interests have authority to override interests espoused\nin the past.", "\n\nThe proponent of the threshold view may, in response, acknowledge\nthe importance of the ability to control one's experience through acts\nof will, but still insist that a more robust capacity for autonomy —\nfor example, a capacity that involves expression of values and not just\nmere preferences — has moral importance of an altogether different\norder. This difference can then support the position that, in cases of\nconflicts between an earlier self capable of such robust autonomy and a\ncurrent self merely capable of exercises of will, the earlier self\nretains authority and her interests ought to be heeded." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Challenge II: Exercise of will as the point of autonomy" }, { "content": [ "\n\nAccording to the threshold views, the earlier self has authority to\ndetermine the overall interests of the patient because the current\nself has lost crucial abilities that would allow it to ground these\noverall interests anew. This picture assumes that the earlier and\ncurrent self are stages in the life of one entity, so that, despite\nthe talk of local interests associated with each life-stage, there is\nan underlying continuity of interests between the two. But this is a\nvery substantial assumption, and it has been contested by appeal to an\ninfluencial account of the metaphysics of\n personal identity\n over time, the psychological continuity account. Roughly,\nthe idea is that, in the wake of a drastic transformation of one's\npsychology such as Alzheimer's disease, one does not survive as\nnumerically the same individual, so whatever interests one's\npredecessor in one's body may have had are not a suitable basis for\ndecisions on behalf of the new individual who has emerged after the\ntransformation (Dresser 1986). The lack of identity between the earlier\nand current self undercuts the authority of the former over the\nlatter.", "\n\nThis approach works best in cases in which we can assume that the\nnew entity emerging after the psychological transformation is still a\nperson: the interests of the earlier self cannot dictate how the\ncurrent self ought to be treated because it would be a clear violation\nof the rights of persons to allow one person to usurp the affairs of\nanother. (Some may doubt whether loss of numerical identity without\nloss of personhood is even possible in any real-life cases of dementia\nor brain damage, but the theoretical point still holds.) What, though,\nif the psychological deterioration is indeed severe enough to strip the\nresulting entity of the capacities of a person?", "\n\nSome might see the loss of personhood as a particularly clear-cut\nsign of a change in numerical identity: if the current self is not even\na person, surely the current self cannot be the same person as the\nearlier self. However, as David DeGrazia has emphasized, this line of\nreasoning rests on an undefended (and controversial) assumption that we\nare essentially persons (DeGrazia 1999). For if we are not essentially\npersons — but, rather, for example, conscious minds of some other,\nless complex kind — an individual may very well lose the properties of\na person without any threat to his numerical survival.", "\n\nNonetheless, even if we are not essentially persons, on the\npsychological view of our identity, we are essentially defined by our\npsychological properties. If these properties change drastically\nenough, the old individual ceases to exist and a new individual comes\ninto existence. And the transformation of a person into a nonperson\ndoes seem to be a drastic psychological transformation. Thus, even if\nDeGrazia is right that loss of numerical identity does not\nautomatically follow from loss of personhood, it is certainly\npossible, and perhaps even likely, on the psychological view of our\nidentity, that a transformation of a person into a nonperson would\ninvolve such a profound psychological alteration as to result in a\nnumerically new being. How should we adjudicate conflicts between the\nearlier and the current individual in such cases?", "\n\nOn one view, if a person turns into a new individual in the later\nstages of dementia, this by itself undercuts the authority of the\nearlier person over her successor, regardless of whether the successor\nis a person or not. After all, why should an altogether different\nindividual dictate how the current self is to be treated? However, more\nnuanced positions can also be found in the literature. Buchanan and\nBrock (1990) see the authority of the earlier self in cases of loss of\nnumerical identity as crucially dependent on whether the current self\nis still a person. They accept that if the current self is a person, it\nwould be a violation of her rights as a person to allow another\nindividual to commandeer her affairs. However, if the current self is\nno longer a person, he lacks the same rights. And, as Buchanan and\nBrock see it, the earlier self has “something like a property\nright… to determine what happens to [his] nonperson successor”\n(166). That is, if one ceases to exist by turning into a nonperson, one\nretains a quasi-property right to control the resulting nonperson,\npresumably in much the same way that, when one ceases to exist by\nturning into a corpse, one has a quasi-property right to control the\nresulting corpse. Hence, on this approach, even if the earlier and\ncurrent self are distinct individuals, the earlier self has the\nauthority to determine what happens to the current self, so long as the\ncurrent self has been stripped of personhood. In this way, the idea of\na threshold of capacity beyond which the earlier self gains authority\nto dictate the current self's affairs is resurrected, despite the\nassumption that the earlier and current self are not the same\nindividual. But, this time, the basis of the authority is different: it\nis not grounded in the continuity of overall interests between the two\nselves, but rather in the earlier self's quasi-property right. Note,\nthough, that the claim that quasi-property rights could extend to\nrights over successors who are nonetheless conscious beings is\ncontroversial and requires further defense." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 Challenge III: Loss of personal identity" } ] } ]	[ "Brock, D., 1995, “Death and Dying: Euthanasia and Sustaining\nLife: Ethical Issues,” in Encyclopedia of Bioethics (Volume\n1), W. Reich (ed.), New York: Simon and Schuster, 2nd\nedition, pp. 563-72.", "Buchanan, A. E. and Brock, D. W., 1990, Deciding for Others:\nThe Ethics of Surrogate Decision-Making, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Cantor, N., 2005, “The Bane of Surrogate Decision-Making:\nDefining the Best Interests of Never-Competent Persons,” The\nJournal of Legal Medicine, 26(2): 155-205.", "DeGrazia, D., 1999, “Advance Directives, Dementia, and\n‘the Someone Else Problem’,” Bioethics, 13(5):\n373-91.", "DeGrazia, D., 2005, Human Identity and Bioethics,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Dresser, R., 1986, “Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients:\nConceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law,” Arizona\nLaw Review, 28(3): 373-405.", "Dworkin, R., 1993, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion,\nEuthanasia, and Individual Freedom, New York: Knopf.", "Jaworska, A., 1999, “Respecting the Margins of Agency:\nAlzheimer's Patients and the Capacity to Value,” Philosophy and\nPublic Affairs, 28(2): 105-138.", "Jaworska, A., unpublished, “Vanishing Persons and the\nAuthority of the Former Self: Dilemmas in Alzheimer's Disease.”", "McMahan, J., 2002, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at\nthe Margins of Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Schapiro, T., 1999, “What is a Child?” Ethics,\n109(4): 715-738.", "Shiffrin, S. V., 2004, “Advance Directives, Beneficence, and\nthe Permanently Demented.” in Dworkin and His Critics with\nReplies by Dworkin, J. Burley (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell,\npp. 195-217." ]	[ { "href": "../personal-autonomy/", "text": "autonomy: personal" }, { "href": "../principle-beneficence/", "text": "beneficence, principle of" }, { "href": "../decision-capacity/", "text": "decision-making capacity" }, { "href": "../legal-obligation/", "text": "legal obligation and authority" }, { "href": "../paternalism/", "text": "paternalism" }, { "href": "../identity-personal/", "text": "personal identity" }, { "href": "../identity-ethics/", "text": "personal identity: and ethics" }, { "href": "../respect/", "text": "respect" }, { "href": "../well-being/", "text": "well-being" } ]
giles	Giles of Rome	First published Fri Dec 21, 2001; substantive revision Wed Dec 18, 2019	[ "\n\nGiles of Rome (who died in 1316 as archbishop of Bourges) was one of\nthe most productive and influential thinkers active at the end of the\n13th century, who played a major role also in the political events of\nhis time. Giles of Rome was an extremely prolific author and left a\nvery large corpus of writings, encompassing commentaries on Aristotle,\ntheological treatises, questions, and sermons. In the last couple of\ndecades, a research group originally led by Francesco Del Punta\n(Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy; died in 2013) has been\ndevoting a lot of energy to the project of publishing his Opera\nOmnia and deepening our knowledge of his thought. Although this\ngroup has produced extremely significant results, enriched by the\ncontributions of other scholars, an assessment of Giles’ whole work is\nstill in progress. For this reason, the present entry only aims at\nproviding insight into an ongoing process of research." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Logic and Rhetoric", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Natural Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Between Philosophy and Medicine", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Ethics and Political Theory", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Sources", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nBorn in Rome most probably in the fifth decade of the thirteenth\ncentury, Giles was the first outstanding theologian of the relatively\nrecently founded Order of the Augustinian Hermits. Nothing more is\nknown about his origins: the statement that he belonged to the famous\nRoman family of the Colonna seems to go back to Jordan of Saxony’s\nLiber Vitasfratrum (second half of the 14th century), but is\ncompletely missing from contemporary, 13th-century sources. From Giles’\nwill we know that he was sent to Paris to study in the convent of his\nOrder. At the beginning he must have followed the courses either of a\nsecular master or of a theologian belonging to a different Order, as\nthe Augustinian friars did not have a regent master at the time.\nProbably he was a pupil of Aquinas’ in the years 1269–1272. He\ncommented on the Sentences at the beginning of the 1270s. In following\nyears he most probably wrote also a large number of his commentaries on\nAristotle.", "\n\nThe year 1277 marked a turning-point in his career: Giles was\ninvolved in the condemnation of the heterodox Aristotelianism issued by\nthe Parisian bishop Etienne Tempier, although the process against him\nmust be distinguished from the famous decree of the 7 of March 1277, as\nRobert Wielockx has shown. After 1277 Giles must have abandoned Paris,\nbut his presence is attested in Italy not earlier than 1281. Before\nleaving Paris he completed his De regimine principum, which is\ndedicated to the young Philip, the future Philip the Fair.", "\n\nBetween 1281 and 1284 Giles played an important role in the\ngovernment of his Order, taking part in various chapters held in Italy.\nAt the provincial chapter of Tuscania (nowadays in Lazio, Italy) in\n1285 he acted as vicar of the prior general of his Order, Clement of\nOsimo.", "\n\nIn 1285, Giles’ doctrine was examined again; after recanting only a\npart of what had been previously condemned in 1277, he was allowed to\nteach again; by 1287 he is referred to as a master of theology. His\nuniversity quodlibeta go back to this period, from the academic year\n1285/86 to 1292/93 (Pini 2006, Wielockx 2014). This success enhanced\nGiles of Rome’s authority even more in his Order, whose general\nchapter of Florence decreed that Giles’ works (even future ones)\nshould be considered as the official doctrine of the Order, to be\ndefended by all Augustinian bachelors and masters. In 1292, at the\nGeneral Chapter of Rome he was elected prior general of his Order.", "\n\nBenedict Caetani’s election to the papal see marked a further\nradical change in his career, as Boniface VIII appointed him archbishop\nof Bourges in 1295. As a matter of fact, Giles was very often absent\nfrom his see, spending extended periods of time at the papal curia. In\nhis De renuntiatione, he defended the legitimacy of\nCelestine’s abdication, and, consequently, of Boniface’ s\nelection. When the contrast between Boniface VIII and Philip IV reached\nits most critical point, he continued to side staunchly with the pope.\nAn important sermon defending the papal position has been\ndiscovered by Concetta Luna, and Giles’ De ecclesiastica\npotestate undoubtedly ranks among the sources of Unam\nSanctam.", "\n\nGiles’ prestige decreased after Boniface’ death, and even more\nwith the rise of Clement V to the papal throne. Before being elected\npope, Betrand de Got, as archbishop of Bourdeaux, had had serious\nconflicts with Giles. This unfavorable change, however, did not prevent\nGiles from playing a significant role in the debates of his time.\nAround 1305–6 he took part in a commission which examined and condemned\nthe eucharistic doctrine of John of Paris, a former adversary of Giles’\nduring the conflict between Philip the Fair and Boniface. In the\ndiscussions concerning the Templars which eventually led to the\nsuppression of the Order, Giles sided with Philip the Fair, attacking\nthe Templars and devoting a whole tract, Contra exemptos, to\nthe thesis that their exemption from episcopal jurisdiction was the\ncause of their abuses (Jordan 2005). During the Council of Vienne Giles was asked to\ndraw a list of errors extracted from the works of Peter John Olivi:\nthree of them were officially condemned by the Council. On December 22,\n1316 he died at the papal Curia at Avignon (For further details see Del\nPunta-Donati-Luna 1993, Briggs 2016).", "\nRelying on manuscript evidence and other sources, Giorgio Pini (2005)\ncould identify which kind of theological and philosophical works Giles\nread, studied and had copied for himself during his long intellectual\ncareer. Pini distinguishes three main periods. In the first one,\nbefore 1277, quite unsurprisingly, he reads Aquinas (not only the\nCommentary on the Sentences of the Dominican master, but also his\nlater works), Aristotle (e. g. in these years Giles owns and annotates\na copy of the Nicomachean Ethics), Avicenna and Averroes. He\nis also very well acquainted with the works of Ps. Denis the\nAeropagite. In the second period (1277–1285), when forced to leave the\nacademic milieu, Giles widens his interests. He studies many works of\nAnselm’s (while most theologians of his time were very selective in\ntheir knowledge of this author), and makes acquaintance with works by\nAugustine, such as Confessions and Soliloquia, that were\nquite unusual readings for an academic theologian. In the this period\n(from his return to the Parisian Faculty of Theology [1285] to his\ndeath) Giles studies almost entirely the available works by Augustine\nand acquires also rare treatises by Proclus. Giles’ increasing\nattention for Augustine is mirrored in his mature works and will\ninfluence also the theological orientation of his own Order in the\nfollowing decades (Pini 2012)." ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAfter René Antoine Gauthier identified in the master Guillaume\nArnauld the real author of the Lectura supra logicam veterem\nattributed to Giles of Rome (Tabarroni 1988), interest in logical\nworks focused mainly on his Commentaries on the Sophistici\nElenchi and on Posterior Analytics. In his treatment of\nthe fallacia figurae dictionis Giles proves to be a brilliant\nand original representative of “modistic logic”, who bases\nhis solutions mainly on the semantics of intentiones\n(Tabarroni 1991). This does not imply, however, that he always agrees\nwith the Modists. One of the most relevant disagreements regards\nsignification. He doesn’t think that signification is the essential\nform of the linguistic sign. On the contrary, sharing a a much more\nwidespread view in his times, to him, the signification of\ne.g. a name is a concept (or more precisely a definition),\nwhich in turn signifies the thing. This signification is not natural,\nbut conventional. The linguistic sign signifies in a natural way only\nits mental image, which is essential to human acts of speech (Marmo\n2016). Alessandro Conti (1992) investigated Giles’ Commentary on\nPosterior Analytics as an example of his theory of truth,\nwhich brings to completion Aquinas’ shift from Augustine’s influence\nto the Aristotelian approach. Bertagna (2002–2004) investigated\nthe structure of this commentary, while Longeway (2002) and Corbini\n(2002) drew scholars’ attention to Giles’ epistemic logic. Giles of\nRome also authored the most important Commentary on the Rhetoric of\nthe Latin medieval tradition, which earned him the honorific title of\nexpositor of this book and influenced all later medieval\ncommentaries. Costantino Marmo studied Giles’ approach to the\ndifferent translations to which he had access and showed how he\ndeveloped Aquinas’ theory of passions in commenting on the relevant\nportions of Aristotle’s text (Marmo 1991), trying to solve some\nproblems left open by Aquinas. It has been suggested that Giles\nconsiders rhetoric to be a sort of “logic” of ethics and\npolitics: this brilliant interpretation needs, however, further\ndevelopment and articulation (Staico 1992). Janet Coleman (2000) also\nmaintained that Aristotle’s rhetorical method determines the substance\nof Giles’ De regimine principum, but one should also take\ninto account also Lidia Lanza’s (2001) remarks. Marmo (2016) pointed\nout that if rhetoric is the modus sciendi more apt to moral\nsciences, this does not imply that it contributes to moral or\npolitical knowledge, since this is derived from the principles proper\nof ethics or politics." ], "section_title": "2. Logic and Rhetoric", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nTraditionally, Giles was described as a “faithful”\ndisciple of Aquinas’. Nowadays such a judgment is not accepted\nby scholars. After Concetta Luna argued persuasively in favor of the\nauthenticity of the Reportatio, it became clear that Giles,\nalready in the first stages of his career, develops his positions\ntaking Aquinas’ teaching as a starting point for his own\nreflection, but criticizes and corrects the doctrines of the Dominican\nmaster in many aspects. Luna could also establish that Giles reworked\nhis Lectura on the Sentences (handed down to us as a\nreportatio) into an ordinatio only for the first two\nbooks. However, while the first book was completed shortly after the\nLectura, that is, during the years 1271–1273, the\nsecond book had to wait for completion until 1309. Luna gathered\nimpressive evidence suggesting that the Ordinatio of the\nthird book that goes under the name of Giles is, in fact,\nspurious. Broadly speaking, Giles’ “philosophical\nproject” tends to discuss critically Aquinas’ position in\norder to improve the solutions he offered, without, however, trying to\ndiscard them radically. Recently, Katherine König-Pralong showed\nthat this is the case for the debate about the natural desire for\nknowledge: although defended in in the context of a discussion with\nHenry of Ghent, Giles’ position does not coincide with that of\nAquinas. According to him, in fact, human beings possess a natural\ndesire for knowledge that is satisfied by a limited understanding of\nseparate substances (König-Pralong 2014). The same holds true\nalso for one of the most famous topics of his discussion with Henry of\nGhent, the distinction between “essence” and\n“existence”. In this case, Giles radicalizes\nAquinas’ doctrine of the real distinction, asserting that\nexistence must be conceived as a “res addita”\n[thing added] to essence (Pickavé 2016). Although the final\nresult of his theory was considered closer to Avicenna’s\nsolution than to that of Aquinas, Giles nevertheless develops it\nstarting from Aquinas’ own position (Wippel 1981), as emerges\nalready from his Questions on the Metaphysics (Conti 2014). The\nconnection of this issue with the discussion with Henry of Ghent about\nthe concept of “creation” was investigated in depth by\nGiorgio Pini (1992), who could show how Giles, while defending Aquinas\nand thereby the possibility of using some Aristotelian principles in\nan orthodox account of creation, goes beyond the positions of the\nDominican master, e. g. asserting the identity of\n“esse” and “creatio”(see\nalso Porro 2014, Cross 2016). Giles advocated the compatibility of\nAristotelian doctrine with Christian faith also in his commentary on\nthe short treatise De bona fortuna attributed to Aristotle,\nbut in reality consisting in a compilation of passages taken from the\nEthica eudemia and the Magna moralia. The\ninterpretation of the concept of “bona fortuna” in those\ntexts implied problemas connected with contingency, necessity and the\ninterplay between divine causality and natural events. As\nValérie Cordonnier (2104) showed, Giles’ solution was\nattacked by Henry of Ghent as leading to necessitarism.", "\n\nAs to the debate about the unicity of substantial form, Giles’\nposition evolves during time. If we leave aside the Errores\nphilosophorum, since the authenticity of this work has been\ncontested with serious arguments (Bruni 1935, Koch 1944, Donati 1990b,\nLuna 1990), we can notice that Giles changes his position from the\nContra gradus et pluralitatem formarum (between the end of\n1277 and the beginning of 1278), where he, against Henry of Ghent\ndenies plurality of forms for every compound (Wilson 2014), to later\nworks, where he takes a more cautious stance in particular concerning\nman. The principle of individuation is identified, as in Aquinas, with\n“materia signata quantitate”, that is, matter designated\nby its dimensions. According to Giles, who criticizes also Richard of\nMediavilla on this point, matter is pure potentiality and therefore\ncannot be distinguished into different kinds. For this reason, he\ncannot accept Aquinas’ doctrine that the incorruptibility of celestial\nbodies derives from the peculiar nature of their matter (Donati\n1986). In Giles’ opinion celestial bodies are not incorruptible\nbecause their matter is different from the matter of sublunar bodies,\nbut rather because their quantitas materiae cannot change its\ndeterminate dimensions. This is but one application of Giles’ famous\ndoctrine of “indeterminate dimensions”. Modifying\nAverroes’ doctrine in this respect, Giles argues that a portion of\nmatter, in order to be able to receive a form, needs to possess\nalready a sort of quantity. Such quantity, however, should not be\nidentified with the determinate dimensions a body possesses, but is\nrather a quantitas which remains the same during processes\nsuch as rarefaction and condensation. Giles’ notion of\nquantitas materiae, which is not only generically extension\nor three-dimensionality, but seems to represent an unchangeable given\n“amount” of matter pertaining to a body, has been\nconsidered comparable, some differences notwithstanding, to the modern\nnotion of mass (Donati 1988, Donati-Trifogli 2016).", "\n\nAfter the condemnation of 1277, a significant change can be noticed in\nGiles’ position also in his solution of the problem of the eternity of\nthe world. At the beginning of his career he admitted the theoretical\npossibility of the eternity of the world, although rejecting\nAristotle’s arguments proving the actual eternity of the world. Later\nhe shifted to a more “ Augustinian” stance, rejecting the\nhypothesis of a creation “ab aeterno” and\nadmitting that it is possible to prove the temporality of creation,\nalthough he finds that no conclusive argument has been advanced so far\n(but see also Cross 2016). Giles was much more steadfast in his\nopposition to another major tenet of “Averroistic”\ndoctrine, that is the unicity of the possible intellect. He maintained\nthat the possibility of actual knowledge on the part of the individual\ndepends necessarily on the fact that each body is informed by its own\nintellective soul, which is its form. For the same reasons Giles also\nrejected the unicity of the agent intellect, a doctrine he attributed\nto Avicenna (Del Punta-Donati-Luna 1993, Conolly 2007).", "\nGiles’ account of knowledge is indebted to Aquinas, but, again,\nreveals many original features. In the first place, he insists on a\nstrictly causal interpretation — be it direct or via a medium\n— of the cognitive process, both at the level of sensory and\nintellectual acts. Secondly, the Augustinian master doesn’t conceive\nof the role of “intelligible species” or formales\nexpressiones as he often writes, as essential to the process of\ncognition in itself. As Giorgio Pini (2016) has shown, the\nintelligible species is necessary only when the object cannot be\npresent in the intellect directly. Admittedly, this direct presence is\npossible only in the beatific vision (after death) and most probably\nin the cognition angels have of themselves. For human knowledge in\nthis life, on the contrary, intelligible species fulfill a necessary\nfunction, as causal proxies, as Pini (2016) writes, mediating between\nthe object and the cognitive power. Difficulties for Giles’ account\nemerge especially when it comes to defining the ontological status of\nthe species. The interpretation of cognition in terms of causation\nseems in fact to imply, according to Giles’ own presuppositions, that\nthe species belongs to the same kind of the thing it represents. On\nthe other hand, the intelligible species is in the intellect, and this\npresence is explained in terms of inherence of an accident (the\nspecies) in a substance. Giles himself is aware of this difficulty,\nsince in one passage he claims that such species are in themselves\nneither substances nor accidents. They can, however, be\n“reduced” to the kind to which the represented thing\nbelongs. Pini (2016) is right in pointing out that Giles’ answer seems\nto raise more problems than it can solve." ], "section_title": "3. Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ " Studies concerning Giles’ natural philosophy focused mainly on his\ntreatment of some pivotal concepts of Aristotle’s Physics. Cecilia\nTrifogli opened new perspectives in this field, devoting her attention\nto the notions of place and motion (especially in the void, see\nTrifogli 1992), underlining that “Giles’ emphasis on the\nrole of place in the description of motion seems to lead to a\nquantitative and relational notion of place. Giles, however, does not\ncompletely substitute the Aristotelian notion of place for that of\nplace as distance. Place as distance is only one of the two notions of\nplace which appear in his commentary. The other, which is related to\nmaterial place, assumes an intrinsic connection between place and the\nlocated body that cannot be founded on distance alone” (Trifogli\n1990a, 350). Giles’ distinction was referred to as an opposition\nbetween material place (the limit of the containing body) and formal\nplace (distance from the fixed points of the universe)\n(Donati-Trifogli 2016). Trifogli also investigated Giles’ notions of\ntime and infinity, emphasizing that his whole approach to natural\nphilosophy is distinguished by a tendency towards a metaphysical\ninterpretation of Aristotelian concepts, as opposed to a physical and\nquantitative one (Trifogli 1990b, 1991). For example, Giles conceives\nof time not as a quantity pertaining to every kind of motion, but\nrather as the same thing as motion, seen under a different aspect. His\nconcept of time rests in fact essentially on a broad notion of\nsuccession, which allows him on one hand to retain the unity of the\nconcept of time, but, on the other hand, to acknowledge the existence\nof different times (Trifogli 1990b, Donati-Trifogli 2016) Giles\ndistinguishes between two kinds of duration: extrinsic duration is the\ntime of celestial motion, and is obviously one in number. Intrinsic\nduration depends on the different motions taking place in the\nsublunary world and is therefore plural (Donati-Trifogli 2016). A\nsimilar attitude emerges also from the analysis of Giles’ controversy\non angelic time with Henry of Ghent (Porro 1988, Porro 1991, but see\nalso Faes de Mottoni 1983). Both authors thought that the time in\nwhich angels exist, unlike sublunar time, is a discrete succession of\ninstants. Giles and Henry disagreed, however, on the relationship\nexisting between angelic and sublunar time. In particular, Henry\nrejected Giles’ thesis that more instants of angelic time can\ncorrespond to one and the same instant of sublunar time. This\ndifference of opinion rested in part on diverging concepts of angelic\nmotion, which can be istantaneous according to Henry, but not\naccording to Giles." ], "section_title": "4. Natural Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn 2008, Romana Martorelli Vico published the first critical edition\nof Giles’ De formatione corporis humani in utero. With this\nwork, completed between 1285 and 1295, Giles took a stance in the much\ndebated question of the respective roles of male and female parents in\nconception. The Galenist view, going back to Hippocrates, was that\nboth male and female contributed sperm, so that the offspring could\nhave characteristics from both parents. On the contrary, Aristotle had\nheld that only the male alone contributed sperm containing an active\nand formal principle to conception, while the female provided only the\nmatter of the fetus. Giles was well acquainted with these different\npositions and with the efforts to reconcile the diverging approaches\nof medici and philosophi, which could be traced back to\nAvicenna. Leaning on Averroes’ Colliget, however, Giles\nrejected any attempt to attribute a formal role to the female sperm,\neven if it is conceived as subordinate to the male one. On the contrary\nhe maintained that it can contribute only in a passive way to\nconception, while what was called “female sperm”, i.e., the\nvaginal secretion, has a subservient, helpful but by no means necessary\nfunction. It helps the male sperm to inseminate female matter, but does\nnot add anything essential to the new being. In this way, Giles\nintended to stress the superiority of the philosophical, theoretical\napproach to such problems with respect to the traditions of medical\nlearning, even when the latter seemed to be supported by empirical evidence\n(Hewson 1975; Martorelli Vico 1988). Empirical evidence such as the\nresemblance of the offspring to the mother was e.g., explained away as\nan example of stronger resistance of female matter to the action of\nform (Martorelli Vico 2002). After conception the human embryo begins a\ndevelopment which goes through different stages. Comparing these stages\nto the embryos of various animals Giles, like Thomas Aquinas, supported\nan interpretation of the fetal development which would be exploited\nmany centuries later by the so-called “recapitulation\ntheory” (Hewson 1975, 99). Giles maintained, however, that\n“the organic fetal body is not to be called a pig, a bear, or a\nmonkey, but something immediately disposed to becoming man”\n(Hewson 1975, 100). This position apparently implies that human life\ndoes not fully begin at the moment of conception. Although such a\nthesis can be brought to bear on the moral judgment concerning\nabortion, Giles does not seem interested in tackling from this point of\nview an issue which would become central for what nowadays is called\nbioethics." ], "section_title": "5. Between Philosophy and Medicine", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn the debate on the respective roles of intellect and will in the\ndetermination of human action Giles’ position underwent an evolution,\nwhile he seems to be in search of an intermediate position, a sort of\ncompromise between the theory of Henry of Ghent and that of Geoffrey\nof Fontaines. Giles maintains, in fact, that will is a passive potency\nand can not “move” itself, but always needs an object, a\n“bonum apprehensum”. This starting point however, does not\nrule out its freedom, because will, even if is moved\n“moved” by its object, can determine itself and other\npotencies with regard to action. This view of Giles’ is consistent\nwith his mature interpretation of the relationship existing between\nknowledge and will in the sinner. Committing a sin implies an\nignorance of the real good, but this ignorance is not the primary\ncause of the wrong behavior, because it is an effect of the will,\nwhich, affected by malicia, corrupts the judgment of the\nreason (Macken 1977, Eardley 2003, Pini 2006, Eardley 2016, but see\nalso Cross 2016).", "\n\nGiles of Rome exerted considerable influence also in other fields of\nethics, such as the theory of virtues. The most developed expression of\nhis position is not to be found in a Commentary on Aristotle, but\nrather in his De regimine principum, the most successful\n“mirror of princes” of medieval political thought, which is\nstill conserved in more than 300 manuscripts in its original Latin\nversion, to which many translations in European vernaculars must be\nadded. Written most probably between 1277 and 1280 the De\nregimine is acknowledged to be one of the most successful attempts\nat mediating Aristotle’s practical philosophy, and in particular his\n“ethical and political language” to the Latin West. Giles\nwas the first to structure a mirror of princes in three books along the\nlines of a scheme — ethica-oeconomica-politica — which\nplayed an important role in the reception of Aristotle’s moral and\npolitical philosophy in the Middle Ages (Lambertini 1988). The author\ntakes great care to give the impression that he is mainly relying on\nAristotle’s text, providing numerous quotations from the\nNichomachean Ethics, from the Politics and from the\nRethoric. Scholars should not overlook, however, that his\nreception of Aristotle is not as direct as it can seem and that Giles\nis deeply influenced by a tradition in the interpretation of\nAristotle’s practical philosophy. In this tradition Aquinas plays a\nvery important role for Giles, so that, while Aristotle is the\nauthority who is quoted on almost every occasion, it is the unnamed\nAquinas who, with his Sententia libri Politicorum, De\nregno, Summa Theologiae, exerts a really decisive\ninfluence on De regimine. While discussing particular topics,\nGiles skillfully adapts Aristotle to his own purposes. This emerges\nwith clarity in the first book, devoted to ethics, where Giles’\nclassification of virtues is heavily dependent on the Summa\nTheologiae and, therefore, on Aquinas’ reinterpretation of the\nAristotelian heritage. For example, Giles here defines\nprudentia as a virtus media, sharing the nature of\nmoral as well as of intellectual ones, a doctrine which can by no\nmeans be traced back to the Stagirite (Lambertini 1991, 1992, 1995,\n2000). In the second book Giles deals with the ethics of man as head\nof the family, covering many topics, from children rearing and\neducation to the rule over servants. To this purpose, he exploits a\nwide range of sources, and also medicine authors (Lambertini 1988,\nMartorelli Vico 2008). As Giles wrote his De regimine, the\npseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica were not yet available in\ntraslation to the Latin West; still, he managed to discuss also\neconomic topics, as far as they are relevant for the household of a\nroyal family or for a high-class household in general. Here he condemns\nusury, criticizes other economic practices as not suitable for a\nprince, and insists on the primary role agricolture should play\n(Lambertini 2015) ", "\n\nThe most famous example of this selective attitude towards\nAristotle’s works, however, belongs rather to the field of political\ntheory. In the third book of De regimine Giles wants to prove\nthat monarchy is the absolutely best form of government. The first\narguments he puts forward in favor of monarchy are not taken from\nAristotle’s Politics, but from Aquinas’ De regno.\nThen some arguments against monarchy which could be read in the\nPolitics are presented as objections that Aristotle puts forth\nfor subsequent refutation. At the end, Giles states squarely that\nAristotle supports monarchy as the absolutely best form of monarchy and\ncorroborates his assertion with an argument, which, in the\nPolitics, actually goes in the opposite direction (Lambertini\n1990). One could provide several other examples to show that\nthe De regimine succeeded in presenting itself as a\nsimplified exposition and explanation of Aristotle’s thought in\npractical philosophy, but at the same time transmitted to Giles’\nreaders a strongly biased interpretation of the Stagirite. The fact\nthat the De regimine was often used as a tool to have easier\naccess to Aristotle’s political theory deeply influenced, therefore,\nthe way the Latin West read and understood\nAristotle’s Politics in the Late Middle Ages (e.g. Lambertini\n2017). Recent codicological studies on the diffusion of De\nregimine’ manuscripts do in fact show that many possessors\nof the manuscripts most probably used them for study (See Opera\nOmnia I.1/11, Catalogo dei manoscritti, De regimine;\nBriggs 1999). Giles’ De regimine was also translated into\ndifferent vernaculars (Perret 2011, Papi 2016). Graham McAleer (1999)\npointed to the fact that Giles’ Commentary on the Sentences has been\nalmost neglected as a source for Giles’ political philosophy. Studying\ndistinction 22 and 44 of the II book, he found that in these texts\nGiles’ account of the origin of political authority among human beings\nafter the Fall diverges from what one can read in De regimine\nprincipum and reveals a profound influence by Augustine, while\nAristotle does not play the important role he had in Giles’ mirror for\nprinces. One should also take into consideration that\nGiles’ Ordinatio of the second book was completed in 1309,\nthat is at least 25 years after De regimine and could witness\nto an evolution in Giles’ thought. As a matter of fact, the much\nearlier reportatio does not tackle such issues at all\n(Lambertini 2014).", "\n\nWhile in the De regimine Giles carefully avoids any\nreference to the thorny problem of the relationship between secular and\necclesiastical power, his later writings which are relevant for\npolitical theory deal first and foremost with ecclesiological problems.\nThis holds true for his treatise De renuntiatione papae\n(1297–1298) where Giles defends the lawfulness of Celestine’s\nabdication against the arguments put forward by the Colonna cardinals\nin their first appeal against Boniface VIII. From the point of view of\nthe history of political thought it is relevant that Giles argues that\npapal power, although of divine origin, is conferred on a particular\nindividual by a human act, namely, by the election of the cardinals.\nHere Giles is countering the Colonna arguments that papal dignity\ncannot cease to reside in a pope until he dies, because the pontificate\ndepends on God’s will, and stresses the fact that divine intention in\nthis case becomes effective through the mediation of human agents, that\nis, through the consent of the electors and of the elected. A\njurisdiction which is given by the consent of men, however, can also be\nremoved by their consent through a reverse procedure. This does not\namount to saying that the pope can be deposed (except in case of\nheresy), because, according to Giles, the pope is above the law and has\nno earthly authority above him. He can however, depose himself, that\nis, abdicate. Just as for his election the consent of his electors and\nof the elected was necessary, so also for the removal of the pope from\noffice his consent is decisive (Eastman 1989, 1990, 1992). In this way\nGiles could dismiss arguments against the validity of Celestine’s\nabdication without admitting the possibility that the pope can be\ndeposed, e. g., by the Council, as Boniface’s adversaries\nmaintained.", "\n\nMuch better known than De renuntiatione is Giles’ De\necclesiastica potestate, a treatise also composed in defense of\nBoniface VIII. Most probably in 1302, Giles systematically expounded in\nthis work the views on the relationship between regnum and\nsacerdotium he had already put forward in a re-discovered\nsermon held at the papal curia (Luna 1992, Lambertini 2006). The main\ntenet of his fully fledged argumentation is that the pope, supreme\nauthority of the Church but also of the whole of mankind, is the only\nlegitimate origin of every power on earth, be it exercised — as\njurisdiction — on persons, or — as property — on\nthings. In his plenitude of power, the pope possesses an absolute\nsupremacy both in the ecclesiastical and in the temporal sphere, and\ndelegates the exercise of the temporal “sword” to lay\nsovereigns only in order to fulfill most properly his higher religious\nduties. Any authority that does not recognize its dependence on the\npapal power is but usurpation. In Giles’ view, there is no space even\nfor a partially autonomous temporal order. Coherently, Giles maintains\nthat no property rights are valid if they are not legitimated by papal\nauthority. Interestingly enough, such a claim is also supported by\nhis account of the origin of property, according to which property is\nnot a natural institution, but only the consequence of human\nagreements, which lack any legitimacy unless they are recognized by\nthe supreme religious power (Miethke 2000, Homann 2004, Krüger\n2007). Scholarly discussion about De ecclesiastica potestate\nis still open. Karl Ubl (2004) argues with strong arguments against\nprevious assumptions, that Giles wrote in reaction to John of\nParis’ De regia potestate et papali. While previous\nscholarship stressed the affinity in form and content between De\necclesiastica potestate and the famous Bull Unam\nsanctam, Francisco Bertelloni (2004) holds that one should not\noverlook profound differences between the concepts of papal power that\ninspire the two texts." ], "section_title": "6. Ethics and Political Theory", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "De ecclesiastica potestate, R. Scholz (ed.), Weimar 1929\n(New critical edition and revised English translation in\nR. W. Dyson, Giles of Rome’s On Ecclesiastical Power. A Medieval\nTheory of World Government., New York 2004", "De differentia ethicae, politicae et rhetoricae, ed. G.\nBruni, The New Scholasticism, 6 (1932): 5–12.", "De renuntiatione papae, ed. J. R. Eastman,\nLewinston-Queenston-Lampeter 1992.", "Errores philosophorum, J. Koch (ed.), Milwaukee,\nWisconsin 1944.", "Priuncipium super Sententias, C. Luna (ed.), “Il\nprincipum super Sententias di Egidio Romano e un principium super\nSententias anonimo”, La filosofia medievale tra\nantichità ed età moderna. Saggi in memoria di Francesco\ndel Punta, A. Bertolacci, A. Paravicini Bagliani e M. Bertagna\n(edd.), Firenze 2017, 381–410. ", "Quaestio de medio demonstrationis, J. Pinborg (ed.),\n“Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie an der\nArtistenfakultät”, Die Auseinandersetzungen an der\nPariser Universität im XIII. Jahrhundert.\n(Miscellanea medievalia, 10), ed. A. Zimmermann, Berlin-New\nYork 1976, 240–268.", "Quaestio de subiecto theologiae, C. Luna (ed.),\n“Una nuova questione di Egidio Romano ‘De subiecto\ntheologiae’”, Freiburger Zeitschrift für\nPhilosophie und Theologie 37 (1990), pp. 397–439.", "Super librum I Sententiarum (reportatio), C. Luna (ed.),\n“Fragments d’une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur\nle premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 et\nParis, B. N. Lat. 15819”, Revue des sciences philosophiques\net théologiques, 74 (1990), 205–254; 437–456.", "Super librum III Sententiarum (reportatio), C. Luna (ed.),\n“La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano sul libro III delle\nSentenze e il problema dell’autenticità dell’Ordinatio”,\nDocumenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, I\n(1990), 113–225, II (1991) 75–146.", "Super librum IV Sententiarum (reportatio), C. Luna (ed.),\n“La lecture de Gilles de Romes sur le quatriéme livre des\nSentences. Les extraits du Clm. 8005”, Recherches de\nThéologie ancienne et médievale, LVII (1990),\n183–255.", "Theoremata de esse et essentia, H. Hocedez (ed.), Louvain\n1930.", "Of the planned critical edition, Aegidii Romani Opera\nomnia, Firenze 1985– have already appeared: \n\n \n III, 1, Apologia, ed. R. Wielockx, Firenze 1985\n III, 2, Reportatio Lecturae super\nlibros I-IV Sententiarum,Reportatio monacensis, C. Luna (ed.),\nFirenze 2003\n II, 13, De formatione humani corporis in utero,\nR. Martorelli Vico (ed.), Firenze 2008\n I.1/1, Catalogo dei manoscritti, Città del Vaticano,\nBiblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, B. Faes de Mottoni and C.\nLuna (eds.), Firenze 1987.\n I.1/3, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Francia\n(Dipartimenti), F. Del Punta and C. Luna (eds.), Firenze\n1987.\n I.1/3, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Francia\n(Dipartimenti), C. Luna (ed.), Firenze 1988.\n I.1/2, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Italia (Firenze,\nPadova, Venezia), F. Del Punta and C. Luna (eds.), Firenze\n1988.\n I.1/2** Catalogo dei manoscritti, Italia (Assisi-Venezia),\nF. Del Punta, B. Faes de Mottoni and C.Luna (eds.), Firenze 1998.\n I.1/5, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Repubblica Federale\ndi Germania (Monaco), B. Faes de Mottoni (ed.), Firenze\n1990.\n I.1/11, Catalogo dei manoscritti, De regimine principum\n(Città del Vaticano- Italia), F. del Punta and\nC. Luna (eds.), Firenze 1993\n I.6 Repertorio dei sermoni, C. Luna (ed.), Firenze\n1990.\n \n ", "III, 1, Apologia, ed. R. Wielockx, Firenze 1985", "III, 2, Reportatio Lecturae super\nlibros I-IV Sententiarum,Reportatio monacensis, C. Luna (ed.),\nFirenze 2003", "II, 13, De formatione humani corporis in utero,\nR. Martorelli Vico (ed.), Firenze 2008", "I.1/1, Catalogo dei manoscritti, Città del Vaticano,\nBiblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, B. Faes de Mottoni and C.\nLuna (eds.), Firenze 1987.", "I.1/3, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Francia\n(Dipartimenti), F. Del Punta and C. Luna (eds.), Firenze\n1987.", "I.1/3*, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Francia\n(Dipartimenti), C. Luna (ed.), Firenze 1988.", "I.1/2, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Italia (Firenze,\nPadova, Venezia), F. Del Punta and C. Luna (eds.), Firenze\n1988.", "I.1/2** Catalogo dei manoscritti, Italia (Assisi-Venezia),\nF. Del Punta, B. Faes de Mottoni and C.Luna (eds.), Firenze 1998.", "I.1/5*, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Repubblica Federale\ndi Germania (Monaco), B. Faes de Mottoni (ed.), Firenze\n1990.", "I.1/11, Catalogo dei manoscritti, De regimine principum\n(Città del Vaticano- Italia), F. del Punta and\nC. Luna (eds.), Firenze 1993", "I.6 Repertorio dei sermoni, C. Luna (ed.), Firenze\n1990.", "Bertagna, M., 2002–2004. “La divisio textus nel\ncommento di Egidio Romano. Parte I”, Documenti e Studi sulla\ntradizione filosofica medievale, XIII: 283–371;\n“Parte II”, ibid. XIV: 263–326; “Parte\nIII”, ibid. XV: 439–486.", "Bertelloni, F., 2004. “Sobre las fuentes de la bula Unam\nSanctam (Bonifacio VIII y el De ecclesiastica potestate de Egidio\nRomano)”, Pensiero Politico Medievale, II: 89–122.", "Briggs, Ch. F., 1999. Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum.\nReading and Writing Politics at Court and University, c.\n1275-c.1525, Cambridge et alibi.", "–––, 2016. “Life, Works and Legacy”, in\nA Companion to Giles of Rome, Ch. F. Briggs and P. S. Eardley\n(eds.), Leiden–Boston, 6–33.", "Bruni, G., 1935. “Di alcune opere inedite e dubbie di Egidio\nRomano”, Recherches de théologie ancienne et\nmédiévale, 7: 174–196.", "Coleman, J., 2000. Political Thought. From the Middle Ages to\nthe Renaissance, Oxford and Malden, 64–71.", "Conolly, B. F., 2007. “Averroes, Thomas Aquinas and Giles of\nRome on How Man Understands”, Vivarium, 44: 69–92.", "Conti, A. D., 1992. “Conoscenza e verità in Egidio\nRomano”, Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica\nmedievale, III: 305–361.", "–––, 2014. “Giles of Rome’s Questions on the\nMetaphysics”, in A Companion to the Latin medieval\nCommentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, F. Amerini and\nG. Galluzzo (eds.), Leiden-Boston, 255-275.", "Corbini, A., 2002. “L’oggetto della conoscenza scientifca nei\ncommenti di Tommaso d’Aquino e di Egidio Romano agli Analitici\nSecondi”, Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica\nmedievale, XIII: 231–284.", "Cordonier, V., 2014. “Introduction”,\nin L’aristotélisme exposé. Aspects du\ndébat philosophique entre Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome,\nV. Cordonier and T. Suarez-Nani (eds.), Fribourg, XI-XXXII.", "–––, 2014. “Une lecture critique de la\nthéologie d’Aristote: Le Quodlibet VI, 10 d’Henri\nde Gand comme réponse à Gilles de Rome”,\nin L’aristotélisme exposé. Aspects du\ndébat philosophique entre Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome,\nV. Cordonier and T. Suarez-Nani (eds.), Fribourg, XI-XXXII.", "Cross, R., 2016. “Theology”, A Companion to Giles\nof Rome, Ch. F. Briggs and P. S. Eardley (eds.),\nLeiden–Boston, 34–72.", "Del Punta, F., Donati, S., and Luna, C., 1993. “Egidio\nRomano”, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 42,\nRoma, 319–341.", "Donati, S., 1986. “La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia\ndei corpi celesti. Discussioni sulla natura dei corpi celesti alla fine\ndel tredicesimo secolo”, Medioevo, XII: 229–280.", "–––, 1988. “La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate\nin Egidio Romano”, Medioevo, XIV: 149–233.", "–––, 1990a. “Ancora una volta sulla nozione di\nquantitas materiae in Egidio Romano”, Knowledge and the\nSciences in Medieval Philosophy, Proceedings of the Eighth\nInternational Congress of Medieval Philosophy (SIEPM), II, S.\nKnuttila, R. Työrinoja, and S. Ebbesen (eds.), Helsinki.", "–––, 1990b. “Studi per una cronologia delle opere di\nEgidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti\naristotelici”, Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica\nmedievale, I: 1–112.", "Donati, S. and Trifogli, C., 2016, “Natural\nPhilosophy”, in A Companion to Giles of Rome,\nCh. F. Briggs and P. S. Eardley (eds.), Leiden–Boston,\n73–113.", "Eardley, P. S., 2003. “Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Romes on\nthe Will”, The Review of Metaphysics, 56: 835–862", "–––, 2016. “Ethics and Moral Psychology”,\nin A Companion to Giles of Rome, Ch. F. Briggs and\nP. S. Eardley (eds.), Leiden–Boston, 212–254.", "Eastman, J. R., 1989. Papal Abdication in Later Medieval\nThought, Lewinston-Queenston-Lampeter.", "–––, 1990. “Giles of Rome and Celestine V: The\nFranciscan Revolution and the Theology of Abdication”, The\nCatholic Historical Review, 76: 195–211", "–––, 1992. “Giles of Rome and His Fidelity to\nSources in the Context of Ecclesiological Political Thought as\nExemplified in De renuntiatione papae”, Documenti e\nStudi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, III:\n145–165.", "Faes de Mottoni, B., 1983. “Mensura im Werk De mensura\nangelorum des Aegidius Romanus”, Mensura, Mass, Zahl,\nZahlensymbolik im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Medievalia, 16/1),\nA. Zimmermann (ed.), Berlin-New York, 86-102.", "Hewson, M. A., 1975. Giles of Rome and the medieval Theory of\nConception: a Study of the ‘De formatione corporis humani in\nutero’, London.", "Homann, E., 2004. Totum posse, quod est in ecclesia,\nreservatur in summo pontifice. Studien zur politischen Theorie bei\nAegidius Romanus, Wuerzburg.", "Koch, J., 1944. Introduction to Giles of Rome, Errores\nPhilosophorum, J. Koch (ed.), J. O. Riedl (trans.),\nMilwaukee, Wisconsin.", "Koenig-Pralong, C., 2014. “Le désir naturel de\nconnaitre. Autour des Questions métaphysiques attibuées\na Gilles de Rome”, in L’aristotélisme\nexposé. Aspects du débat philosophique entre Henri de\nGand et Gilles de Rome, V. Cordonier and T. Suarez-Nani (eds.),\nFribourg, 1–28.", "Krueger, H., 2007. Der Traktat “de ecclesiastica\npotestate” dea Aegidius Romanus. Eine spaetmittelalterliche\nHerrschaftskonzeption des paepstlichen Universalismus,\nKoeln-Weimar-Wien.", "Jordan, W. C., 2005, Unceasing Strife, Unending Fear,\nPrinceton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.", "Lambertini, R., 1988. “A proposito della costruzione\ndell’Oeconomica in Egidio Romano”, Medioevo, XIV:\n315–370.", "–––, 1990. “Philosophus videtur tangere tres\nrationes. Egidio Romano lettore ed interprete della Politica nel terzo\nlibro del De regimine Principum”, Documenti e studi sulla\ntradizione filosofica medievale, I: 277–325.", "–––, 1991. “Il filosofo, il principe e la\nvirtú. Note sulla ricezione e l’uso dell’Etica Nicomachea nel De\nregimine principum di Egidio Romano”, Documenti e studi sulla\ntradizione filosofica medievale, II: 239–279.", "–––, 1992. “Tra etica e politica: la prudentia del\nprincipe nel De regimine di Egidio Romano”, Documenti e Studi\nsulla tradizione filosofica medievale, III: 77–144.", "–––, 1995. “The Prince in the Mirror of\nPhilosophy. About the Use of Aristotle in Giles of Rome’s De regimine\nprincipum”, Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle\nAges, Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Medieval\nPhilosophy, Ottawa, 17–22 August 1992, B. C. Bazán, E.\nAndújar, and L. G. Sbrocchi (eds.), New York-Ottawa-Toronto,\n1522–1534.", "–––, 2000. “Von der iustitia generalis zur\niustitia legalis. Die Politisierung des Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes im 13.\nJahrhundert am Beispiel des Aegidius Romanus”, Geistesleben\nim 13. Jahrhundert (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 27), J. A. Aertsen\n(ed.), A. Speer, Berlin-New York, 131-145.", "–––, 2006. “Il sermo De potestate domini\npapae di Egidio Romano e la difesa di Bonifacio VIII: acquisizioni e\nprospettive della storiografia piu recente”, Le culture di\nBonifacio VIII. Atti del Convegno organizzato nell’ambito delle\nCelebrazioni per il VII Centenario della morte, Bologna 13–15\ndicembre 2004, Roma, 93–108.", "–––, 2014. “Nature and the origins of Power. An\nExamination of Selected Commentaries on the Sentences (thirteenth and\nFourteenth Centuries)”, in La nature comme source de la morale au\nMoyen Age, M. van der Lugt (ed.), Firenze, 95–111.", "–––, 2015. “Wealth and Money according to Giles\nof Rome”, in Reichtum im späten Mittelalter, P. Hesse and\nP. Schulte (eds.), Stuttgart, 39–53.", "–––, 2017. “Praeesse regimine politico:\nsu di un segmento di linguaggio politico aristotelico nel De regimine\nprincipum di Egidio Romano”, La filosofia medievale tra\nantichità ed età moderna. Saggi in memoria di Francesco\ndel Punta, A. Bertolacci, A. Paravicini Bagliani e M. Bertagna\n(edd.), Firenze, 363–380.", "Lanza, L., 2001. “La Politica di Aristotele e il De regimine\nprincipum di Egidio Romano”, Medioevo e Rinascimento\n15: 19–75; now in Lanza, L., 2013. Ei autem qui de politia\nconsiderat…Aristotele nel pensiero politico medievale,\nBarcelona–Madrid, 233–292.", "–––, 2003. “Aegidius Romanus”, Compendium\nAuctorum Latinorum Medii Aevi (500–1500), Firenze, 63–73.", "Lezcano, R., 1995. Generales de la Orden de San Agustin.\nBiografias – Documentacion – Retratos, Roma, 30–50.", "Longeway, J. L., 2002, “Aegidius Romanus and Albert the Great vs\nThomas Aquinas on the highest sort of demonstration (demonstratio\npotissima)”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica\nmedievale, XIII: 373–434.", "Luna, C., 1988. “Essenza divina e relazioni trinitarie nella\ncritica di Egidio Romano a Tommaso d’Aquino”, Medioevo,\nXIV: 3–69.", "–––, 1990. “La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano\nsul libro III delle Sentenze e il problema dell’autenticità\ndell’Ordinatio”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione\nfilosofica medievale, I: 113–225.", "–––, 1991a. “La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano\nsul libro III delle Sentenze e il problema dell’autenticità\ndell’Ordinatio” (secona parte), Documenti e studi sulla\ntradizione filosofica medievale, II: 75–146.", "–––, 1991b. “Théologie trinitaire et\nprédication dans les sermones de Gilles de Rome”,\nArchives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen\nAge, 58: 99–195.", "–––, 1992. “Un nuovo documento del conflitto tra Bonifacio\nVII e Filippo il Bello: il discorso ‘De potentia domini\npape’ di Egidio Romano”, Documenti e studi sulla\ntradizione filosofica medievale, III: 167–243; 491–559.", "Macken, R., 1977. “Heinrich von Gent im Gespräch mit\nseinen Zeitgenossen über die menschliche Freiheit”,\nFranziskanische Studien, 59, 125–182.", "Marmo, C., 1991. “Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari:\nEgidio Romano e Tommaso d’Aquino sulle passioni dell’anima”,\nDocumenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, II:\n281–315", "–––, 1998. “L’utilizzazione delle traduzioni latine\ndella Retorica nel commento di Egidio Romano (1272–1273)”, La\nRhétorique d’Aristote. Tradition et commentaires de\nl’antiquité au XVIIe siècle, G.\nDahan and I. Rosier-Catach (eds.), Paris, 111-134.", "–––, 2016. “Logic, Rhetoric, and Language” in\nA Companion to Giles of Rome, Ch. F. Briggs and P. S. Eardley\n(eds.), Leiden–Boston, 212–254.", "Martorelli Vico, R., 1988. “Il De formatione corporis humani\nin utero’di Egidio Romano. Indagine intorno alla metodologia\nscientifica”, Medioevo, XIV: 291–313.", "–––, 2002. “Medicina e filosofia. Per una\nstoria dell’embriologia medievale nel XIII e XIV secolo”,\nNapoli, 47–62.", "–––, 2008. “Fondamenti biologici di uno ‘Speculum\nPrincipis’: il ‘De regimine principum’ di Egidio Romano”, in I\nsaperi nelle corti. Knowledge at the Courts = Micrologus 16:\n257–270.", "McAleer, G., 1999. “Giles of Rome on political\nauthority”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 60:\n21–36.", "Miethke, J., 2000. De potestate papae. 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Eardley\n(eds.), Leiden–Boston, 212–254.", "Pini, G., 1992. “La dottrina della creazione e la ricezione\ndelle opere di Tommaso d’Aquino nelle Quaestiones de esse et essentia\n(qq. 1–7) di Egidio Romano”, Documenti e studi sulla\ntradizione filosofica medievale, III: 271–304.", "–––, 2005. “Le letture dei maestri dei frati\nagostiniani: Egidio Romano e Giacomo da Viterbo”, Libri,\nbiblioteche e letture dei frati mendicanti (secoli XIII-XIV),\nAtti del XXXI Convegno Internazionale (Assisi, 7–9 ottobre 2004),\nSpoleto, 79–114.", "–––, 2006. “Giles of Rome”, in Theological\nQuodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century, Leiden\n– Boston, 233–286.", "–––, 2012. “Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of\nRome as Master of the Order”, in Philosophy and Theology in\nthe Studia of the Religious orders and at Papal and Royal Courts,\nK. Emery, Jr., W. J. Courtenay and S. M. Metzger (eds.), Turnhout,\n409–25. ", "–––, 2016. “Cognition”, inin A Companion to\nGiles of Rome, Ch. F. Briggs and P. S. Eardley (eds.),\nLeiden–Boston, 212–254.", "Porro, P., 1988. “Ancora sulle polemiche tra Egidio Romano\ned Enrico di Gand: due questioni sul tempo angelico”,\nMedioevo, XIV: 71–105.", "–––, 1991. “Ex adiacentia temporis: Egidio\nRomano e la categoria ‘quando’”, Documenti e\nstudi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, II: 147–181.", "–––, 2014. “Prima rerum creatarum est esse: Henri de\nGand, Gilles de Rome et la quatrième proposition du De\ncausis”, in L’aristotélisme exposé. Aspects du\ndébat philosophique entre Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome,\nV. Cordonier and T. 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skepticism-ancient	Ancient Skepticism	First published Wed Feb 24, 2010; substantive revision Wed Sep 21, 2022	[ "\nThe Greek word skepsis means investigation. Literally, a\n“skeptic” is an inquirer. Not all ancient philosophers\nwhom in retrospect we call “skeptics” refer to themselves\nas such. Nevertheless, they all embrace ways of life that are devoted\nto inquiry. Ancient skepticism is as much concerned with belief\nas with knowledge. As long as knowledge has not been attained, the\nskeptics aim not to affirm anything. This gives rise to their most\ncontroversial ambition: a life without belief.", "\nAncient skepticism is, for the most part, a phenomenon of\nPost-Classical, Hellenistic philosophy. The Academic and Pyrrhonian\nskeptical movements begin roughly in the third century BCE, and end\nwith Sextus Empiricus in the second century CE. Hellenistic philosophy\nis a large-scale conversation, not unlike philosophy today. The\nskeptics (among them Pyrrho, Timon, Arcesilaus, Carneades,\nAenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus) do engage with Pre-Socratic\nphilosophy, Socrates, Protagorean relativism, Plato, and perhaps\nAristotle. But their contemporary and principal interlocutors are\nEpicureans, Stoics, Cynics, and Megarian logicians (cf. Long 2006, ch.\n4 and 5)." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Central Questions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Skeptical Ideas in Early and Classical Greek Philosophy", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Early Greek Philosophy", "2.2 Plato", "2.3 Aristotle" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Academic Skepticism", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Arcesilaus", "3.2 Carneades", "3.3 Later Academic Skepticism" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Pyrrhonian Skepticism", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Early Figures: Pyrrho and Timon", "4.2 Aenesidemus, the Ten Modes, and Appearances", "4.3 Agrippa, and the Five Modes", "4.4 Sextus Empiricus" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Ancient and Modern Skepticism: Transitions", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Augustine: Re-Conceiving Skepticism in a Theological Framework", "5.2 Skepticism About Induction", "5.3 Subjectivity, and Other Minds", "5.4 External World Skepticism" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Sources", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe core concepts of ancient skepticism are belief, suspension of\njudgment, criterion of truth, appearances, and investigation.\nImportant notions of modern skepticism such as knowledge, certainty,\njustified belief, and doubt play no or almost no role. This is not to\nsay that the ancients would not engage with questions that figure in\ntoday’s philosophical discussions. Ancient debates address\nquestions that today we associate with epistemology and philosophy of\nlanguage, as well as with theory of action, rather than specifically\nwith the contemporary topic of skepticism. They focus on the nature of\nbelief, the relationship of belief to speech and action, and the\nmental states of inquiry (on the role of ancient skepticism throughout\nthe history of Western philosophy up to today, cf. Lagerlund 2020; on\nthe relation between ancient skepticism and philosophical debates\ntoday, cf. Machuca and Reed 2018, Vlasits and Vogt 2020, and Machuca\n2022).", "\nFrom the point of view of the ancient skeptics, assertions are\nexpressions of dogmatism. And yet, the best-known ancient skeptic,\nSextus Empiricus, wrote extensively. Can the skeptics say anything\nmeaningful about their philosophy without asserting anything about how\nthings are (Bett 2013, 2019)? Skeptical writings have a peculiar\nformat, one that comes with its own challenges: the skeptics aim to\ndescribe their philosophy tout court, as they practice it,\nwithout laying out any particular theories or doctrines. Skeptical\nideas have been charged with a family of objections: they might be\nself-refuting, inconsistent, self-contradictory, and so on (Castagnoli\n2010). Another line of objection is associated with Hume, namely that\n“nature is always too strong for principle.” As Hume puts\nit, “a Pyrrhonian cannot expect that his philosophy will have\nany constant influence on the mind” (part 2 of section 12,\n“Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy,” An\nEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding, London, 1748). It is one\nthing for skepticism to be coherent. It is another thing for it to be\nlikely that anyone, no matter how much they rehearse skeptical\narguments in their mind, will succeed in adhering to it (Johnson\n2001), as ancient Pyrrhonist philosophers claimed to be able to\ndo.", "\nLike later epistemologists, the ancient skeptics start from questions\nabout knowledge. But discussion quickly turns to beliefs (Fine 2000).\nThe Greek term translated here as belief, doxa, can also be\ntranslated as opinion. The root of doxa is dokein,\nseeming. In a belief, something seems so-and-so to someone. But there\nis also an element of judgment or acceptance. The relevant verb,\ndoxazein, often means ‘to judge that something is\nso-and-so.’ Hellenistic discussions envisage three attitudes\nthat cognizers take to impressions (how things seem to them): assent,\nrejection, and suspension of judgment (epochê).", "\nSuspension is a core element of skepticism: the skeptic suspends\njudgment. However, if this means that the skeptic forms no beliefs\nwhatsoever, then skepticism may be a kind of cognitive suicide.\nArguably, belief-formation is a basic feature of human cognitive\nactivity. It is not clear whether one can lead an ordinary human life\nwithout belief, or indeed, ancient opponents of the skeptics say,\nwhether one can even survive. Perhaps even the simplest actions, such\nas eating or leaving a room without running into a wall, involve\nbeliefs (Annas-Barnes 1985, 7; Burnyeat 1980). It is also hard to say\nwhether someone who succeeded in not forming any beliefs could\ncommunicate with others, whether they could engage in philosophical\ninvestigation, or whether they could even think at all.", "\nThe ancient skeptics are well aware of these objections. The most\nwidely discussed charge is that they cannot act without belief\n(Apraxia Charge). In response, the skeptics describe their actions\nvariously as guided by the plausible, the convincing, or by\nappearances. The notion of appearances gains great importance in\nPyrrhonian skepticism, and poses difficult interpretive questions\n(Barney 1992). When something appears so-and-so to someone, does this\nfor the skeptics involve some kind of judgment on their part? Or do\nthey have in mind a purely phenomenal kind of appearing? The skeptical\nproposals (that the skeptic adheres to the plausible, the convincing,\nor to appearances) have in common their appeal to something less than\nfull-fledged belief about how things are, while allowing something\nsufficient to generate and guide action.", "\nHowever, the claim that ancient skepticism is about belief, while\nmodern skepticism is about knowledge, needs to be qualified. Ancient\nskepticism is not alone in being concerned with belief. Descartes\nspeaks repeatedly of demolishing his opinions (for example,\nMed 2:12, AT 7:18; cf. Broughton, 2002,\n33–61). Contemporary epistemology often pays equal attention to\nthe notions of both belief and knowledge. The distinctive focus\nof ancient skepticism on belief becomes clearer once we consider a\nthird concept that figures centrally in ancient discussions: the criterion\nof truth. The skeptics and their opponents discuss how one\nrecognizes a true impression as true. Are there some evident things\n(some kind of impressions), which can be used as standards or\ncriteria, so that nothing is to be accepted as true if it is not in\nagreement with these evident things? The Stoics and Epicureans\nformulate theories that conceive of such criteria. The skeptics\nrespond critically to their proposals. Accordingly, the conception of\na criterion of truth assumes as central a role in ancient debates as\ndoes the notion of knowledge in modern discussions. This debate\nincludes in-depth analysis of sense perception and its relation to\nbelief. According to Epicurus, all sense perceptions are true, but\njudgments based on these perceptions are true or false (Striker 1977,\nVogt 2017). The Stoics explore differences between sense perception,\nillusion, and hallucination (Vasiliou 2019). Their account of the\ncriterion of truth starts from perceptual impressions that qualify, or\nfail to qualify, as cognitive (Shogry 2018). The Stoics propose that\nwe should accept only cognitive impressions, and accordingly we should\nonly form beliefs based on a subset of true perceptual\nimpressions.", "\nDiscussion of the criterion of truth arguably also covers some of the\nground that is later discussed in terms of certainty. The Stoics say\nthat a particular kind of impression is the criterion of truth: the\ncognitive impression. Cognitive impressions make it clear through\nthemselves that they reveal things precisely as they are. This notion\nis an ancestor to the later conception of clear and distinct\nimpressions, and thus, to discussions of certainty.", "\nConsider next the notion of doubt. Doubt is often considered the\nhallmark of skepticism. So how can it be that ancient skepticism is\nnot about doubt (Corti 2010, Vogt 2014a)? Insofar as ‘to\ndoubt’ means no more than ‘to call into question,’\nthe ancient skeptics might be described as doubting things. However,\nskeptical investigation as Sextus Empiricus describes it does not\ninvolve doubt (I shall focus here on Pyrrhonism; on Cicero’s use\nof dubitari, see Section 3.3). Skeptics find themselves\nstruck by the discrepancies among impressions. This experience is\ndescribed as turmoil (Machuca 2019). They aim to resolve this\ndisturbance by settling what is true and what is false among them. But\ninvestigation leads them to suspension of judgment, which brings its\nown peace of mind (Outlines of Skepticism [= PH]\n1.25–30). Where in this account should we locate doubt? Is the\ninitial turmoil the ancient skeptic experiences a kind of doubt? Are\nthe ancient skeptic’s investigations a kind of doubting? Should\nwe describe suspension of judgment as a kind of doubt? All three\nstages may resemble doubt, at least insofar as the ancient skeptics\nhave not settled on answers to the questions they investigate. But all\nthree stages are also different from doubt as it is conceived in later\nepistemology. The ancient skeptics do not describe themselves as\nmaking an active effort at doubting what ordinarily they would\nbelieve, as some philosophers in the Cartesian tradition have it.\nInstead the ancient skeptics find themselves in turmoil because of\ndiscrepancies in how things strike them. Moreover, the progression\nthat ancient skeptics describe differs from the doubt-belief model\nthat later thinkers tend to employ. The ancient skeptics improve their\npsychological condition by moving from turmoil to suspension of\njudgment, not by removing doubt. It seems best, then, to refrain from\ninvoking the modern conception of doubt as at all fundamental in the\nreconstruction of ancient Greek skepticism.", "\nSome of the distinctness of ancient skepticism lies in the fact that\nit is developed by philosophers who genuinely think of themselves as\nskeptics. In later epistemology, skepticism is largely construed from\nthe outside. In particular, early modern skepticism is, for the most\npart, conceived by philosophers who aim to refute it. But ancient\nskepticism is explored by skeptics, and that is, by philosophers who\nintend their lives to be reflective of their philosophy (Cooper 2012\nch. 5.5–7; Bett 2013b). Socrates raises the challenge that it\nmight be truly bad (for one’s life, for the state of one’s\nsoul, and so on) to base one’s actions on unexamined beliefs.\nFor all one knows, these beliefs could be false, and without\ninvestigation, one does not even aim to rid oneself of false belief,\nwhich is admittedly a bad thing for one’s soul. Only an examined\nlife is worth living (Cooper 2007). Once we take this challenge\nseriously, as the ancient skeptics do, we embark on a kind of\ninvestigation that is seen as directly relevant to our lives. Our\nbeliefs are assumed, at this pre-skeptical phase, to be guiding our\nactions. Confidence in unexamined views seems misplaced. Others\nregularly disagree with us. In favor of each view, some arguments\ncan be adduced, some practices invoked, some experiences cited. These\nconflicting arguments, practices and experiences need to be examined.\nBut that just raises further views that are in conflict. As a\nconsequence, suspension of judgment on every such question looks\nrationally mandatory. But it is also rational to persist in\ninvestigation. The skeptic is committed to a search for the truth, on\nvirtually all questions, even if this search repeatedly and\npredictably leads to suspension of judgment (Cooper 2012)." ], "section_title": "1. The Central Questions", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Skeptical Ideas in Early and Classical Greek Philosophy", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe early Greek philosophers develop distinctions between reality and\nappearances, knowledge and belief, and the non-evident and the\nevident. These distinctions form the framework in which skepticism can\nbe conceived. The idea that truth is seen and knowledge gained from\nsome perspective outside of the ordinary ways of mortal life, and that\nmortals rely on something lesser, be it the hear-say of fame, or\nsigns, or appearances, runs through much of early Greek thought.\nHowever, few early Greek thinkers seem to have had skeptical or\nproto-skeptical inclinations. Xenophanes and Democritus are perhaps\nthe most prominent apparent exceptions.", "\nXenophanes famously insists that all conceptions of the gods are\nanthropomorphic and culturally contingent (DK 21B14, B15). The\nEthiopians pray to gods who look like Ethiopians, the Thracians to\ngods who look like Thracians (B16). If horses and cows had hands, the\nhorses would draw pictures of gods that look like horses, and the cows\nwould draw gods as cows (B15). Xenophanes puts forward a number of\ntheological theses of his own. But he says that no man will know the\nclear truth about such matters. He makes a point that has lasting\nrelevance in discussions of skepticism: even if someone succeeded in\nsaying something that actually is the case, he himself would not know\nthis. Thus, all is belief (120: B34) (cf. Sassi 2011 on\ninterpretations of Xenophanes that influence the history of\nskepticism).", "\nAtomism—a theory which thrives in Hellenistic times as the\nphysical theory of Epicureanism, and is thus an interlocutor of\nskepticism—leads into difficult epistemological questions. The\natomist can argue that sense perceptions are explicable as complex\nevents, initiated by objects each one made up of a lot of atoms\nfloating in the void, from which atoms proceed and traverse the\nintervening space, and affect the senses. It is certain objects, made\nup by the atoms proceeding from the objects in question (filmy images)\nthat we actually perceive. We neither perceive ‘real\nreality’ (atoms and void), nor even macroscopic objects and\ntheir properties (for example, a square tower). Democritus seems to\nhave argued along these lines (SE M 7.135–9; cf. fr. 9,\nSE M 7.136; Theophrastus, De Sensibus 2.60–1,\n63–4), and accordingly his atomist view of perception can be\nseen as grounding a kind of proto-skepticism.", "\nDemocritus’ student Metrodorus of Chios says at the beginning of\nhis book On Nature “None of us knows anything, not even\nthis, whether we know or we do not know; nor do we know what ‘to\nnot know’ or ‘to know’ are, nor on the whole,\nwhether anything is or is not” (Cicero, Acad. 2.73;\ntrans. Lee (2010) = DK 70B1; SE M 7.48, 87–8; Eusebius,\nPraep. evang. 14.19.9). This formulation reflects awareness\nof the fact that a simpler statement than the one reported in Cicero,\nsuch as “there is no knowledge,” can be turned against\nitself. In particular, Metrodorus recognizes the role that\nunderstanding concepts plays in any such statement. Does its proponent\nknow something, merely by virtue of understanding what the terms she\nuses in her philosophizing refer to? Sextus presents Metrodorus’\npronouncement as related to an enigmatic idea that he ascribes to two\nother philosophers, the Democritean Anaxarchus of Abdera and the Cynic\nMonismus (SE M 7.87–88). Both are said to have likened existing\nthings to a stage-painting. This comparison, which Burnyeat captures\nin the catch-phrase “all the world’s a\nstage-painting,” is open to a range of interpretations (Burnyeat\n2017). For Monismus, Burnyeat argues, it is likely to have had a\nmoralistic upshot, along the lines of “all is vanity.” In\nDemocritean philosophy, and insofar as later skepticism recalls the\nsaying, it is bound to be a proposal in epistemology (or possibly\nepistemology and metaphysics).", "\nThe 5th century sophists develop forms of debate which are\nancestors of skeptical argumentation (Bett 2020b). They take pride in\narguing in a persuasive fashion for both sides of an issue and\nin developing an agonistic art of refuting any claim put forward.\nFurther, the sophists are interested in the contrast between nature\nand convention. The formative roles of custom and law were discussed\nby some of the earliest Greek authors (consider Pindar’s\n“law is king” and its many interpretations, for example in\nHerodotus). The sophists explore the idea that, if things are\ndifferent for different cultures, there may be no fact of the matter\nof how those things really are. The skeptics engage with both legs of\nthe distinction between nature and convention. Pyrrhonian skepticism\nemploys an argument to the effect that, if something is by nature\nF, it is F for everyone (affects everyone as\nF) (see sections 4.2 and 4.4). Pyrrhonism further associates\nconvention with appearances, so that the sceptic, by adhering to\nappearances, can lead an ordinary life (see section 4). However, the\ncontrast between nature and convention does not figure importantly in\nancient skepticism, and there is no skeptical school that would\nconfine itself to ‘moral’ skepticism, or skepticism about\nvalues.", "\nSextus Empiricus, whose writings provide the most detailed extant\naccount of Pyrrhonian skepticism, emphasizes how strongly the skeptics\ndepart from all other philosophers. As he presents it, the\nPre-Socratics who put forward some of the views cited above are what\nhe calls dogmatists. They make claims about nature, reality,\nknowability, and so on. The second-most detailed extant account of\nPyrrhonian skepticism is offered by Diogenes Laertius, in his\nLives of Eminent Philosophers 9.61–116. It contains a\nlarge number of references to early Greek poets and Pre-Socratic\nphilosophers, suggesting that these early thinkers formulate ideas\nthat are similar to skeptic ideas (§§61–73). It is\ncontroversial whether the skeptics Diogenes has in mind claim this\nancestry. Alternatively, other philosophers may have charged the\nskeptics with sharing ideas with non-skeptical thinkers, thereby\ndeparting from their non-dogmatic approach (Warren 2015). Either way,\ntwo observations seem relevant. Contrary to a classic assessment of\nDiogenes’ report by Jonathan Barnes (1992), the sections of text\nin which connections are made between early Greek thought and\nskepticism may be worth exploring. Moreover, scholars may have paid\ntoo little attention to skepticism’s ancestry in poetry (Clayman\n2009). Pyrrho seems to have referred to Homer as a proponent of ideas\nhe approves of, ideas about change, the status of human rationality\nand language, and more." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Early Greek Philosophy" }, { "content": [ "\nThe Socrates of Plato’s Apology tries to solve a\npuzzle. The Delphic oracle says that no one is wiser than Socrates.\nBut Socrates does not think himself wise. He calls into question the\ntruth of neither the oracle’s pronouncements nor his\nself-perception. Accordingly, he must figure out how both are\nconsistent with each other. In order to do so, Socrates talks to\nvarious groups of experts in Athens: politicians, poets, and\ncraftsmen. As it turns out, all of them think that they know something\nabout great and important things, but in fact, it seems clear to\nSocrates, they do not. When asked they cannot provide reasons for\nbelieving the things they claim to know that are rationally\nsatisfactory. Socrates knows that he does not know about these most\nimportant matters (megista; 22d); his interlocutors, it\nappears, do not know that they lack this knowledge. In this respect,\nSocrates is wiser than everyone else who has any general reputation\nfor wisdom. In the course of recounting his conversations with others,\nSocrates says something enigmatic: “About myself I knew that I\nknow nothing” (22d; cf. Fine 2008). Some readers (ancient and\nmodern) take Socrates to profess that he knows nothing. But the\ncontext of the dialogue allows us to read his pronouncement as\nunproblematical. Socrates knows that he does not know about important\nthings. He advocates the importance of critically examining\none’s own and others’ views on important matters,\nprecisely because one does not know about them (Vogt 2012a, ch. 1).\nSuch examination is the only way to find out.", "\nSocrates’ commitment to reason—examination as the way to\nfind out—inspires the skepticism of the Hellenistic Academy\n(Cooper 2004b, Vogt 2013). One is bound to lead one’s life based\non one’s beliefs, he assumes. Therefore, one ought to examine\none’s beliefs, and abandon those that one finds to be false. One\nought to do so because otherwise one might lead a bad life.\nSocrates’ questioning is rooted in a concern with the good life.\nInsofar as it is, one might think that the Socratic roots of ancient\nskepticism lead one toward a kind of limited, wholly moral skepticism.\nHowever, Socrates’ examinations are not confined to value\nquestions. While ethical questions may be the starting-point, they\nimmediately lead to questions about the soul, the gods, knowledge, and\nso on. For Socrates and his Hellenistic followers, value questions\ncannot be insulated from questions of psychology, physics, and\nepistemology.", "\nAnother strand of skeptical thought begins with questions about the\nnature of philosophical investigation. In the Meno, Plato\nformulates a famous puzzle. How is investigation possible? We cannot\ninvestigate either what we know or what we do not know. In the former\ncase, there is no need to investigate, and besides, if we really do\nknow we already have in mind everything that investigation could\nreveal to us about the matter. In the latter case, we would not know\nwhat to look for, and we would not recognize it if we found it\n(80d-86c). So there is no room for investigating anything. Socrates\ncalls this an eristic argument, thus drawing attention to the fact\nthat this is a puzzle that sophists have put forward (cf.\nPlato’s Euthydemus).", "\nPlato’s solutions to this puzzle are difficult to assess (Fine\n2014). Learning is recollection, says one proposal (this is the one\nthat Socrates himself immediately offers). We already know, but only\nin some implicit way, what it takes investigation to come to know\nexplicitly. This is the famous Anamnesis theory (81a-d). If we give up\non investigation, we shall be lazy people, says another argument\n(81d-e). A third solution of the puzzle arguably says that one of its\npremises is false. It is not the case that, for everything, we either\nknow it or are entirely ignorant of it. Rather, there is a third\nstate, namely belief (83a-86a). Investigation can begin from\nbeliefs.", "\nThe Meno explores a mix of these solutions. Plato develops\nwhat he calls a hypothetical method (86c-100b). That is, the\ninterlocutors in some sense begin from their beliefs (for example,\n“virtue is good”). But they do not endorse them. They set\nthem up as hypotheses, and employ these hypotheses in investigation\n(on the relationship between Pyrrhonian skepticism and Plato’s\nand Aristotle’s notions of hypothesis, cf. Corti 2011). A\nspurious dialogue, the Sisyphus, discusses a similar puzzle,\nthough with respect to deliberation. Deliberation either involves\nknowledge or is mere guesswork; either way, deliberation is\nimpossible. Here, too, we may ask whether the distinction between\nknowing and not knowing is exhaustive, or whether attention to belief\nchanges the picture (Fine 2021, ch. 8).", "\nPlato discusses and re-formulates several of the metaphysical\nconsiderations that back up proto-skeptical and early skeptical\nintuitions. The relevant passages are spread out over a number of\ndialogues, among which passages in the Phaedo,\nRepublic, Theaetetus and Timaeus are\nperhaps most important. In these dialogues, Plato develops some of his\nown metaphysical ideas. He also engages critically with metaphysical\ntheories that he does not ultimately adopt. However, in order to\nexplore these theories he formulates them in detail, often invoking a\nPre-Socratic ancestor as a proponent of a given idea. These\ndiscussions are a great source of inspiration for Pyrrhonian skeptics,\nwho are interested in what may be called a metaphysics of\nindeterminacy (Bett 2000, Vogt 2021).", "\nIn contrasting the Forms with the perceptible realm, Plato discusses\nproperties. For example, for all sensible items, A is tall\nrelative to some B and short relative to some C.\nThere is no such thing as anything’s being tall\nsimpliciter. When we call something tall, we measure it\nagainst something else, look at it from a particular perspective, and\nso on. As we might say, “tall” and “short”\nare relative predicates. But perhaps many more, or indeed all,\npredicates work that way, even where this is less obvious.\nPlato’s arguments lead to the question of whether it is\nconceivable that all our predications are, in this particular sense,\nrelative. If this were the case, it might quite fundamentally upset\nour conception of the world as furnished with objects that have\nproperties. Such considerations lead to another idea about properties\nin the perceptual realm. If a fence is low and high, a cloud is bright\nand dark, a vase beautiful and ugly, and so on, then it seems that,\nperhaps quite generally, perceptual things are F and\nnot-F. Only the Form of F is F (for\nexample, only the Beautiful is beautiful). While the relevant passages\nare difficult to interpret, it is clear enough which line of thought\ncomes to influence later skeptics. The skeptics engage with the idea\nthat, if something appears to be F and not-F, it is\nnot really (or: by nature) either F or not-F.", "\nIn the Timaeus, Plato argues that an account of the natural\nworld can only be ‘likely’: it is an eikôs\nlogos. Most generally speaking, the idea here is that certain\nexplananda are such that theorizing about them can do no more than\nmirror their, comparatively speaking deficient, nature. This idea has\nancestors in Xenophanes and Parmenides, and it plays a crucial role in\nthe Timaeus (Bryan 2012). Academic skeptics employ various\nnotions of the plausible and the convincing, thus developing further\nthis tradition, albeit no longer with the assumption that different\ndomains require different kinds of theorizing.", "\nIn the Theaetetus, Plato explores the kind of cultural\nrelativism that is associated with some sophists. In his examination\nrelativism is extended to a general theory, not restricted to the\ndomain of values. Socrates (as main speaker of the dialogue) ascribes\nrelativism to Protagoras, who is famous for saying that “man is\nthe measure.” Socrates reformulates this claim as follows: what\nappears to A is true for A, and what appears to\nB is true for B. On this premise, Socrates argues,\nthere is no rational way to prefer our perceptions while awake to our\nperceptions while asleep, or similarly, to prefer sober to intoxicated\nor deranged perceptions. In each state, our perceptions are true for\nus. Socrates analyzes relativism in several steps, pointing to ever\nmore radical implications. Along the way, he envisages a moderate\nmetaphysics of flux, where objects do not have stable properties. But\neventually he points out that relativism is committed to an even\nstarker revisionist metaphysics, radical flux. For it to be possible\nthat what seems to A is true for A, and what seems\nto B is true for B, there cannot be a stable world\nthat A and B both refer to. Rather,\n“everything is motion” (Tht. 179c-184b). The\nskeptics employ versions of some of the arguments in the\nTheaetetus, without, however, arriving at relativist\nconclusions. Schematically speaking, the relativist says that,\nif X is F for A and F\nfor B, then X is F-for-A and\nF-for-B. Pyrrhonian skepticism of the variant found\nin Sextus reacts by continued investigation into whether X is\nF or F* (or both or neither)." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Plato" }, { "content": [ "\nAristotle engages, at several points in his works, with the\nMeno Problem. For example, Aristotle points out that, for\nsuccessful investigation to proceed, one first needs a well-formulated\nquestion. One needs to know the knot in order to untie it. In order to\nknow what to look for and recognize it when one finds it, one needs to\nfirst think one’s way through the difficulties involved, and\nthereby formulate a question. If one does, then one shall be able to\nrecognize the solution once one hits upon it (Met. 3.1,\n995a24–b4). These ideas are highly relevant to Hellenistic\ndiscussions. The skeptic is an investigator, and one anti-skeptical\ncharge says that, if indeed a skeptic knew nothing, they could not\neven formulate the questions they investigate. Interpreters have\nemphasized a contrast between Aristotle and the skeptics. For\nAristotle, formulating puzzles and thinking one’s way through\nthem puts one in a better position, such that one gets clear about how\nmatters are. This may be different for the skeptics: engagement with\ndifferent angles of philosophical problems leads them to suspension of\njudgment (Long 2006, Code 2010). Other scholars argue that the\nskeptics’ way of thinking through puzzles improves their\ncognitive condition even though they do not settle for an answer to a\ngiven question (Vogt 2012a, ch. 5). Also, scholars point to modes of\nthinking in Plato and Aristotle that are not primarily concerned with\nresults. In contemplation, a cognizer may think again and again\nthrough the same kinds of matters, and yet doing so presumably\nimproves their cognitive condition (Olfert 2014).", "\nIn Posterior Analytics I.1, Aristotle says that all teaching\nand learning comes about through things we already know. When we\nphrase questions, we already have ‘That-Knowledge’ and\n‘What-Knowledge.’ For example, when we ask questions about\ntriangles, we need to know that there are triangles (otherwise we\nwould not have questions about their properties). We also need to have\na notion of what triangles are (we draw a triangle, not a square, when\nwe phrase a question about its properties). Another way in which\nAristotle addresses the Meno Problem conceives of particular\nperceptions as the starting-points of investigation. Complex cognitive\nactivities arise from simpler ones. Many particular perceptions lead\nto memory, to experience, and eventually to expert understanding\n(Met. 1.1, An. Post. II.19). With the\ngeneralizations of memory, experience, and expertise comes the ability\nto investigate. With respect to skepticism, the important point here\nis that the starting-points of investigation are not themselves in\nneed of justification.", "\nLike Plato, Aristotle engages with the Protagorean claim that, as\nAristotle puts it, all seemings (dokounta) and appearances\n(phainomena) are true (Met 4.5). If this were so,\nAristotle says, everything would have to be true and false at the same\ntime. Aristotle argues that earlier thinkers arrived at such views\nbecause they identified being solely with the perceptual (4.5,\n1010a1–3). Caught up in this assumption, they did not see who or\nwhat was going to judge between conflicting sense perceptions. For\nexample, it seemed unsatisfactory to dismiss the views of sick and mad\npeople simply on the grounds that they are in the minority, thereby\nconsidering as true what appears to the greater number of people.\nSimilarly, Aristotle reports that these earlier thinkers looked at the\nways in which things appear differently to different kinds of living\nbeings, and to one person at different times (4.5,\n1099b1–11).", "\nIn Metaphysics 4.4, Aristotle notes that some people consider\nit possible for the same thing to be and not to be, and for someone to\nbelieve so (he refers to a range of positions, all of which in some\nway are related to denial of the Principle of Non-Contradiction; see\nCastagnoli 2010, I.5.4). Against this, Aristotle says it is the\nfirmest of principles that things cannot be and not be at the same\ntime. To deny this shows a lack of training. With adequate training,\none recognizes for which things proof should be sought, and for which\nit ought not to be sought (see also An. Post. I.3). It is\nimpossible that there be demonstration for everything. Otherwise\ndemonstration would go on ad infinitum. Scholars often refer\nto this point when discussing the skeptical modes of argument. The\nskeptics might be guilty of what, from Aristotle’s perspective,\nwould be a mistake of exactly this kind (on this theme in later\nAristotelian logic, cf. Malink 2020).", "\nAristotle continues in a way that is highly relevant to discussions of\nskeptical language and action. A person who wishes to deny that things\ncannot be and not be at the same time has two options. Either they say\nnothing, or they talk to us. In the first case, there is no need for\nus to refute them. This person is like a plant—they do not talk.\nIn the second case, either their utterance signifies something, or it\nsignifies nothing. If it signifies something, then they say that\nsomething is so-and-so (which Aristotle takes to be self-defeating for\nthem). If it signifies nothing, then it does not qualify as speech.\nEven though they make an utterance, the person is in effect not\nspeaking with us (or to themselves). Aristotle also explains the\nplant-metaphor in terms of action (1008b10-30). A person who believes\nnothing is like a plant because they cannot act. Pursuit and avoidance\ntestify to the fact that people have beliefs. (On Aristotle and\nskepticism, see the papers collected in Irwin 1995.)" ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Aristotle" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Academic Skepticism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nWith Arcesilaus (316/5–241/0 BCE) and his role as leader of the\nAcademy (266/268 BCE), Plato’s Academy turns skeptical.\nArcesilaus does not refer to himself as a skeptic—this\nnomenclature is a later designation. However, Arcesilaus stands at the\nbeginning of a re-orientation in the history of Platonically inspired\nphilosophy. He rediscovers Socrates the examiner, arguably based on\nhis reading of Plato’s dialogues (Thorsrud 2018).\nSocrates’ commitment to investigation, to the testing and\nexploring of one’s own and others’ beliefs, and his\npassion for weeding out falsehoods, are the starting-points of his\nAcademic skepticism (Cicero, Acad. 2.74, 1.46). Throughout\nthe history of this skeptical school, these traits, and the\ncorresponding commitment to a life guided by reason, remain alive\n(Cooper 2004b, Vogt 2013). When, as we shall see below, Arcesilaus\ndefends a skeptical life without belief, this is because, as he\nthinks, reason itself, if properly and faithfully followed, leads us\nto live that way. To Arcesilaus, the skeptical life is a life lived\nfollowing reason, a life based on reason—just as the\ncompeting Stoic and Epicurean lives are alleged by their proponents to\nbe. Arcesilaus engages with the epistemologies of these contemporaries\nof his. In particular, the Academics call into question that there is\na criterion of truth, as both Epicureans and Stoics, beginning in the\ngeneration before Arcesilaus, claim there is. One interpretive\nquestion that concerns Arcesilaus, but also later Academic skeptics,\nis especially vexed. According to Seneca (Letter 88,\n44), the Academics paradoxically claim to know that nothing can be\nknown. Scholars disagree on how this and similar reports fit together\nwith the picture of Academic skeptics as open-minded inquirers (Allen\n2017). According to Sextus Empiricus, the Academics skeptics say that\neverything is inapprehensible (PH 1.226, cf. PH 1.3). Is\n“everything is inapprehensible” the single thing that can\nbe apprehended? Does so-called “non-apprehension”\n(akatalêpsia) amount to the general claim that there is\nno knowledge? Alternatively, the Academics may dialectically\nappeal to the Stoic notion of katalêpsis, and argue\nmerely that the Stoic notion of apprehension is not compelling (Allen\n2022).", "\nLike Socrates, Arcesilaus did not write anything. His views must be\nunearthed from Sextus’ comparisons between Pyrrhonian and\nAcademic skepticism, from Cicero’s discussions in the\nAcademica, and from a range of shorter (and sometimes\nhostile) reports. Major themes in Arcesilaus’ philosophy are (i)\nhis dialectical method, (ii) discussion of whether there is a\ncriterion of truth, and (iii) his defense of the skeptic’s\nability to act.", "\n(i) Method. Arcesilaus embraces what scholars call a dialectical\nmethod (Couissin 1929 [1983], Perin 2013, Thorsrud 2018). This method\nis inspired by Socrates. It proceeds by asking one’s real or\nimaginary interlocutor what they think about a given question, then\nplunging into an examination of their views, employing their premises.\nCan they explain their position without running into inconsistencies,\nand without having to accept implications that they want to resist? As\na consequence of this method, it sometimes appears as if a skeptic,\nwhile examining someone’s view and its consequences, makes a\npositive claim: “so, such-and-such is not so-and-so.”\nHowever, within a dialectical exchange, this should be read as\n“according to your premises, such-and-such\nfollows.” This method remains a key ingredient of Greek\nskepticism. While the different skeptical schools develop variants of\nthe dialectical method, skeptical argument is often characterized by\nthe fact that skeptics think of themselves as engaging with\n“dogmatic” interlocutors. In the skeptical tradition, as\narticulated for example by Sextus Empiricus (see section 4.4.),\n“dogmatists” are philosophers who put forward, and defend,\npositive answers to philosophical questions about reality, knowledge,\nethical values, etc. They need not do so dogmatically or rigidly or\nwithout consideration of alternatives in order to count, in skeptical\nterms, as “dogmatists.”", "\n(ii) The Criterion of Truth. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, and\nroughly 20–30 years Arcesilaus’ senior, was for a time a\nstudent at the Academy. He was still in the Academy when he formulated\nkey Stoic doctrines. Like Arcesilaus, he claims Socratic ancestry.\nZeno is inspired by some of the same ideas that inspire the skeptics.\nIn particular, he engages with the Socratic idea that knowledge is\nintegral to virtue. Contrary to Arcesilaus, Zeno aims to give accounts\nof knowledge and virtue, and holds them up as ideals that human nature\npermits us to achieve. For him, knowledge is very difficult to attain,\nbut ultimately within the reach of human beings. From the point of\nview of Arcesilaus, Zeno’s claim to Socratic heritage is almost\noffensive: Zeno seems to be too optimistic about our cognitive powers\nto be following Socrates (Frede 1983). Scholars have traditionally\nenvisaged an exchange of arguments between Zeno and Arcesilaus, where\neach modified his views in the light of the other’s criticism.\nHowever, Zeno most likely formulated his views between 300–275,\nand Arcesilaus argued against him c. 275 to 240, when Zeno (who died\nc. 263) was probably already retired (Brittain 2006, xiii; Alesse\n2000, 115 f.; Long 2006, ch. 5).", "\nThe core of the dispute between Arcesilaus and the early Stoics\nconcerns the question of whether there is a criterion of truth. The\nnotion of a criterion is introduced into Hellenistic discussions by\nEpicurus, who speaks about the kanôn (literally\nmeasuring stick) and kritêrion. For Epicurus, a\ncriterion is that evident thing, viz., the content of a\nsense-perception, against which claims about the non-evident are\ntested. For example, physics advances claims about non-evident things,\nsuch as atoms and void. These are not accessible to the senses, and\naccordingly, do not count as evident. Perception rules out various\nphysical theories. For example, a physical or metaphysical theory\naccording to which there is no movement can be dismissed because it is\nin disagreement with the evident.", "\nZeno argues that a certain kind of impression—namely a cognitive\nimpression (phantasia\nkatalêptikê)—is the criterion of truth (cf.\nShogry 2018). Zeno’s conception of cognition\n(katalêpsis, literally grasping, apprehension), and the\nrelated notion of a cognitive impression, aim to solve an\nepistemological problem. Belief-formation aims at the truth; there is\na norm inherent in the practice of believing that one should only\nbelieve truths. It is not transparent to us, however, which of our\nbeliefs, or claims to the effect that such-and-such is true, are\nsuccessful in their aim and hit the truth. Zeno argues that some\nimpressions are cognitive. A number of Stoic definitions of the\ncognitive impression, formulated by Zeno and his successors, are\ntransmitted. Scholars approach them in at least three ways. First,\nsome scholars consider one of the Stoic definitions (SE M 7.247–52) as\ncanonical (Nawar 2014, Shogry 2018). Two, scholars at times examine\nspecific exchanges between Stoics and skeptics in the assumption that\nsome clauses in Stoic definitions respond to skeptic objections (for\nexample, Nawar 2017). Three, scholars have also pointed out that, here\nas elsewhere, the Stoics offer a multitude of definitions, without\nprivileging one of them as “the” definition; different\ndefinitions may speak to different dialectical contexts or theoretical\nfoci (Vogt 2022).", "\nWith some simplification, a cognitive impression reveals its content\nand that it is kataleptic (cf. Cicero, Academica\n2.77–8). For example, when I look at my computer screen\nwhile typing this, I may very well have a cognitive impression that\nthis is my computer screen. When I look up and out of the window, I\nhave an impression of a friend walking across campus that is probably\nnon-cognitive. This impression might be true. But since I see her from\nsuch a distance, it is pretty surely not cognitive. That is, not all\ntrue impressions are cognitive, but all cognitive impressions are\ntrue. We should only assent to cognitive impressions, and so in\nforming our beliefs, hold only those certified beliefs (cf. Brittain\n2014 on the Stoic view that assent to cognitive impressions is not\ncompelled).", "\nArcesilaus calls into question whether there are impressions of this\nkind. His main point seems to be that there could be an impression\nthat is phenomenologically indistinguishable from cognitive\nimpressions, but nevertheless misrepresents the matters it gives an\nimpression about. To use an example that may derive from Carneades\n(see section 3.2), there is no impression of a given egg such that no\nimpression of any other egg could be phenomenologically\nindistinguishable from it (Shogry 2018 and 2021, Machek and Veres\nforthcoming). Assuming that some clauses in Stoic definitions respond\nto specific skeptic challenges, the following clause, added to a\nshorter definition, appears to speak to these cases: “and\nof such a kind as could not arise from what is not”\n(Long and Sedley (1987) [= LS] 40; DL 7.46, 54; Cicero Acad.\n1.40–1, 2.77–8; SE M 7.247–52). Absent a\ncriterion of truth, Arcesilaus’ skeptic suspends judgment about\neverything (PH 1.232). Reason itself, Arcesilaus thinks,\ndemands such suspension.", "\n(iii) Action. If skeptics suspend judgment, argues their dogmatic\nopponent, they are not able to act. Stoic philosophy conceives of\nthree movements of the mind: impression, assent, and impulse\n(Plutarch, Col. 1122a-d). All three figure in action. The\nagent assents to the impression that A is to be done; their\nassent is an impulse for the action A; if there is no\nexternal impediment, the impulse sets off the action (Inwood 1985). It\nis a cornerstone of Stoic philosophy that there can be no action\nwithout assent, and so without the belief that the action done is\nto be done. The Stoics aim to avoid the kind of determinism\naccording to which actions are not ‘up to’ the agent\n(Bobzien 1998); for them, assent, but not impression, is up to the\nagent. In response to the Apraxia Charge, Arcesilaus seems to have\nargued that the skeptic can act without having assented (Plutarch,\nCol. 1122A-d), and so without believing that the action done\nis to be done. However, this is not his complete response.\nFrom the point of view of the Stoics, skeptical action, if performed\nwithout the relevant kind of assent (that is, assent that it is up to\nthe agent to give, and that is a rational acceptance of the\nimpression), is like the action of a non-rational animal, or like the\nautomatic movement of plants when they grow and flourish. Arcesilaus\nis robbing people of their minds (Cicero Acad. 2.37–9;\nObdrzalek 2013). But Arcesilaus need not and does not go so far as to\ncompare human agents with non-rational agents. As human beings,\nskeptics have rational impressions. They perceive the world\nconceptually, and think about it. Arcesilaus does not suggest that\nskeptical action is causally set off by impressions, or in the way,\nwhatever that is, that animal actions are set off. This would be a\nproblematic proposal, for it would disregard that the skeptic has a\nhuman mind. Given the complexity of human thought, the skeptic is\nlikely to have several, and often competing impressions. If all\nimpressions triggered impulses, the skeptic would be inactive due to a\nkind of paralysis. The second component of Arcesilaus’ reply,\nthus, is that the skeptic, in acting without assenting, adheres to the\nreasonable (eulogon) (SE M 7.158; 7.150; Striker\n2010). That is, Arcesilaus aims to explain skeptic action as rational\nagency (Cooper 2004b). Arcesilaus disputes the dogmatic claim that\nsome impressions can be identified as true, and the related claim that\none can only act on the belief that some impression is true.\nBut he does not argue that there are no differences between\nimpressions which agents could take into account. His agents are\nrational: they think about their options, and go with what looks, in\none way or another, more plausible.", "\nArcesilaus defends skeptical action also against Epicurean critics\n(Plutarch, Col. 1122A-d), again by showing on the basis of\nthe Epicureans’ own premises that skeptical action is possible.\nCan the sceptic explain why, when leaving a room, they go through the\ndoor rather than running into the wall? Arcesilaus seems to have\nexploited the Epicurean view that, while all sense-perception is true,\nbelief can introduce falsehood. Like the Epicurean, the skeptic can\nkeep apart the perception and a view formed on its basis. By not\nassenting to the perception, thus adding belief (“here is the\ndoor”), the skeptic guards against the source of falsehood,\nnamely belief. But a skeptic has perception of the door available to\nthem, which is enough for not running into walls." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Arcesilaus" }, { "content": [ "\nLike Arcesilaus, Carneades (214–129/8 BCE) refrains from writing\nand philosophizes in a Socratic spirit. Carneades led an embassy of\nthree philosophers from Athens to Rome in 156/5 BCE. Aside from his\nofficial role, he is said to have given two speeches, arguing for\njustice one day and against justice the next. Whether or not this is\nhistorically correct (Powell 2013), the traditional take on\nCarneades’ speeches is not that he aims to overthrow justice.\nInstead, the upshot is taken to be that he wants to show that the\nsupporters of justice—including Plato and Aristotle—do not\nhave the successful arguments they think they have to show what\njustice is and what it requires (Lactantius, Epitome 55.8, LS\n68M). Like Arcesilaus, Carneades (i) engages with Stoic epistemology.\nHis account of skeptical action includes (ii) a detailed proposal\nregarding the criterion. As part of his less radical skepticism,\nCarneades seems (iii) to allow for a certain kind of assent, and\nperhaps for belief.", "\n(i) The Stoic-Academic Debate. Chrysippus, the third major Stoic\n(after Zeno and Cleanthes), and his student Diogenes of Babylon,\nrevise Zeno’s epistemology, defending it against\nArcesilaus’ arguments (Brittain 2006, xiii). In response to\ntheir arguments, Carneades continues the exchange with the Stoics that\nArcesilaus began (SE M 7.402–10). His first move\naddresses the link between mental states and action. People in states\nof madness, he argues, act just as easily and naturally on their\nimpressions as other people, even those who act on cognitive\nimpressions (if there are any). From the point of view of exhibited\nbehavior, there does not seem to be a difference: any and all\nimpressions, even those the Stoics think clearly arise from something\nthat is not, are in all respects relevant to action completely on a\npar. Cognitive impressions, if there are any, have no superiority.", "\nIn a second argument, Carneades points to objects that are similar to\none another: can the wise person discern any two eggs, two grains of\nsand, and so on? The Stoics have multiple replies. It is conceivable\nthat, in some contexts of action, the wise person assents to what is\nreasonable (eulogon) (DL 1.177), without having a cognitive\nimpression of how things are. Or, if faced with the task to identify\ngrains of sand while lacking a cognitive impression, the wise person\ncan suspend judgment. However, the wise will train themselves so as to\nbe able to perceive minute differences (Cicero, Acad. 2.57),\nwhere it might be important to do so. This point is backed up by Stoic\nphysics: no two items in the universe are identical, and their\ndifferences are in principle perceptible (Sedley 1982, 2002).\nCarneades replies that even if no two things were exactly alike\n(consistent with his general line of argument, he does not take a\nstance on such questions), a very close similarity could appear to\nexist for all perceivers (Cicero, Acad. 2.83–5); that\nis, the impressions of two items, though in fact these items might\ndiffer from each other, could be indistinguishable (Nawar 2017, Shogry\n2018 and 2021). Discussion continues with a move on the part of the\nStoics: they add to their definition of the cognitive impression\n“one that has no impediment.” Sometimes an impression\nis—as it were, by itself—cognitive, but is unconvincing\ndue to external circumstances (SE M 7.253). It is a difficult\nquestion whether this addition harms the Stoics more than it helps\nthem. If the initial conception of a cognitive impression hangs on the\nidea that something about its phenomenological nature, or something\ninternal to the impression, marks it as cognitive, the Stoics give up\non a crucial assumption if they grant that sometimes there are\n“impediments.” If, however, cognitive impressions are\ndifferentiated by a causal feature (the way they are caused by the\n‘imprinter’ which causes the ‘imprint’), the\nfurther addition might help (Frede 1983, Nawar 2014), since the\nimpediment might need to be removed before the causal connection could\nbe confirmed (Hankinson 2003).", "\n(ii) Carneades’ Criterion. Even though Carneades further pursues\na discussion begun by Arcesilaus, he does not simply continue within\nthe framework of Arcesilaus’ skepticism. The distinctiveness of\nhis position is best seen in the context of his criterion: the\npersuasive (pithanon). The notion of the persuasive can be\nunderstood in two distinctively different ways. Persuasiveness might\nbe a causal feature, so that a persuasive impression sets off a\nphysiological process of being moved in a certain way. But there may\nalso be a rational kind of persuasiveness. Carneades construes\npersuasiveness in rational terms. For him, the persuasive is the\nconvincing, or perhaps even the plausible.", "\nCarneades develops a three-stage criterion: (1) In matters of\nimportance, skeptics adhere to the persuasive. (2) In matters of\ngreater importance, they adhere to the persuasive and undiverted. A\npersuasive impression is undiverted if there is no tension between it\nand its surrounding impressions. (3) In matters that contribute to\nhappiness, skeptics adhere to persuasive, undiverted, and thoroughly\nexplored impressions. A persuasive impression is undiverted and\nthoroughly explored when it and the surrounding impressions are\nclosely examined without its persuasiveness being diminished (SE\nM 7.166–84). Consider an example. A skeptic looks in a\ndark room for a rope. Before they pick up what appears to them to be a\nrope, they look closely and poke it with a stick. Coiled objects can\nbe ropes, but they can also be snakes. The persuasive impression that\nthis is a rope must be examined before the skeptic adheres to it\n(M 7.187).", "\nThe three-stage criterion is put forward in the context of action.\nHowever, Sextus describes Carneades’ criterion as a criterion of\ntruth, not a criterion of action (M 7.173). Carneades might\ntake himself to offer more than a practical criterion. His discussions\nof the persuasive come close to a general epistemological theory\n(Couissin 1929 [1983], Striker 1980, Bett 1989 and 1990, Allen 1994\nand 2004 [2006], Brittain 2001). Cicero renders the Greek\npithanon as probabile (and sometimes as veri\nsimile), which modern editors sometimes translate in terms of\nwhat is probable or likely to be true. Some scholars think that\nCarneades is an early thinker about likelihoods, and argue that he\ndevelops a fallibilist epistemology (Obdrzalek 2004).", "\n(iii) Assent and Belief. Does adherence to persuasive impressions\ninvolve belief? Carneades coins a term for the kind of adherence he\nhas been describing: approval (Cicero, Acad. 2.99). He\ndistinguishes it from assent in the sense of Stoic and other dogmatic\ntheories, which establishes a belief that something is in actual fact\ntrue; but he nevertheless describes it as a kind of assent (Cicero,\nAcad. 2.104). Carneades’ disciples disagree on whether\napproval is any kind of genuine assent. That is, they disagree on\nwhether, in approval, one forms a belief. Philo and Metrodorus think\nthat Carneades allows for some kind of belief, close to or identical\nwith belief as the Stoics understand it. Clitomachus disagrees, and\nCicero follows Clitomachus (Acad. 2.78, see also 2.59, 2.67).\nScholars continue to debate these issues (Allen 2022), and the basic\nproblem remains unchanged. It is not clear whether there is a\nplausible notion of belief according to which belief falls short of\n‘holding to be true’ (or according to which, though some\nkind of ‘holding true’ is involved, the relevant\naffirmation-as-true is weaker than in beliefs as Stoics and other\ndogmatist epistemologists conceive of them). In any event,\naffirmations as true, at least of the full and flat-out (“in\nactual fact”) sort the Stoics think of, are precisely what the\nskeptic does not make.", "\nAnother approach to Carneades’ stance toward belief is to ask\nwhether he might invoke Platonic considerations. Consider that\nSocrates, when asked in the Republic what he thinks the good\nis, refuses to reply because he thinks beliefs without knowledge are\nshameful (Rp. 506c). In response to this, his interlocutors\npoint out that there is a difference between putting forward\none’s beliefs as if one knew them to be true, and putting them\nforward with the proviso that they are merely beliefs (Vogt 2012a, ch.\n2). The shamefulness of mere belief might disappear through this\nproviso. A passage in Cicero’s Academica suggests that\nCarneades invokes this thought. According to Carneades, the wise\nperson can hold beliefs if they fully understand them to be beliefs\n(2.148). Along similar lines, it has been suggested that Carneades\nmight conceive of a hypothetical mode of believing (Striker 1980\n[1996, 112]), perhaps engaging with a move in Plato’s\nMeno. Investigation cannot get off the ground if we do not,\nin some sense, begin with our beliefs about the matter under\ninvestigation. But how can we do so without endorsing our beliefs, not\nknowing whether our views are true? Plato’s answer at this point\nis: by hypothesizing our beliefs. Today we would insist that\nhypotheses are not beliefs. However, it is conceivable that Carneades\nargued along these lines, and that the details of his vocabulary got\nlost or confused in doxography." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Carneades" }, { "content": [ "\nCarneades was an enigma to his students and immediate successors.\nClitomachus (head of the Academy from 127 to 110 BCE) seems to have\nattempted the impossible: to adhere closely to Carneades’\nphilosophy, even though he never understood what Carneades truly meant\n(Levy 2010). The cornerstone of his adherence lies in the view that\nCarneades argues for suspension of judgment and against beliefs\nunderstood as Stoics understand them. Philo of Larissa, another\nstudent of Carneades, interprets his teacher as allowing for tentative\nbeliefs in the skeptic’s life. With Philo, the skeptical era of\nPlato’s Academy comes to an end. Philo’s philosophy seems\nto divide into two phases. In Athens, and as head of the Academy, he\nstays relatively close to Carneades. Moving to Rome later in his\ncareer, he develops a markedly different position. He argues only\nnarrowly against the Stoic criterion and their conception of\ncognition. One can apprehend things and so come to know\nthem—one just cannot apprehend them in the way in which the\nStoics construe cognition (PH 1.235). The fact that there is\nno apprehension in the sense of the Stoics does not mean that there is\nno knowledge (Acad. 2.14). This move shifts the discussion in\nseveral important ways. First, Philo can be interpreted as a kind of\nexternalist: one can know something without knowing that one knows it.\nAbsent Stoic cognitive impressions, we are not able to identify which\ninstances of ‘holding-true’ qualify as knowledge; but we\nnevertheless have some knowledge (Hankinson 2010). Second, this\nproposal is a step toward modern skepticism, which is not concerned\nwith criteria of truth, but with knowledge.", "\nCicero’s skeptical philosophy in his own philosophical writings\nis again distinctively different. In line with his notions of what is\nprobable (probabile) or likely to be true (veri\nsimile), Cicero often examines a range of philosophical\npositions, aiming to find out which of them is most rationally\ndefensible. He thinks it is better for us to adopt a view that is\nlikely to be true, rather than remain unconvinced by either side\n(Thorsrud 2009, 84–101). Cicero is of the greatest importance\nfor the transition between ancient and early modern skepticism. As in\nother fields of philosophy, Cicero’s influence is partly the\ninfluence of the translator. In transposing philosophical ideas into\nthe language of a different culture, the ideas change. Cicero\nsometimes speaks of doubting, dubitari (e.g., Acad.\n2.27, 106; however, he often sticks with the earlier language of\nassent and suspension). But doubt has no place in Greek skepticism\n(see section 1)." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Later Academic Skepticism" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Pyrrhonian Skepticism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nWhen comparing Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism, two topics stand\nout: Pyrrhonism aims at tranquility; and it assigns pride of place to\nappearances. Anecdotes about Pyrrho’s life (365/60–275/70\nBC) convey how unaffected he was (DL 9.61–69). This kind of\nideal—a tranquil state of mind—is not part of Academic\nskepticism, and scholars disagree on its role in Pyrrhonism\n(Machuca 2006; Striker 2010; Perin 2020; on Democritean\ninfluences on tranquility in Pyrrho and Timon, cf. Svavarsson 2013).\nInsofar as the point of the anecdotes about Pyrrho’s life is\nthat Pyrrho did not avoid or pursue anything with fervor, or that he\ndid not despair about things that other people find terrible, they\ncapture ideas that remain central to Pyrrhonism (for a general account\nof early Pyrrhonism, cf. Castagnoli 2013; on Sextus’ take\non Pyrrhonian tranquility, cf. Svavarsson 2015).", "\nThe biographical anecdotes portray Pyrrho as a strikingly\nunconventional figure, unaffected not just by emotion and belief, but\nalso by perception—to the extent that friends had to pull him\noff the street when a wagon approached (DL 9.62). At the same time,\nPyrrho seems to have said that the skeptic adheres to appearances\n(phainomena) (DL 9.106; Bett 2000, 84–93; on earlier\nnotions of appearances relevant to skepticism, cf. Barney 1992). This\nmight suggest that he would not cross the street when a wagon is\napproaching, and so appears to him. One story makes Pyrrho appear\nnot only unusual, but arguably a not so sympathetic character. Passing\nby a drowning man, he was so unmoved that he simply walked on (DL\n9.63). This is in rather stark contrast with Stoic notions of\nunaffectedness, where the idea would be that, not being disturbed by\nemotions like fear and panic, the passerby is ideally equipped to help\neffectively. Some biographical details can seem to mold\nPyrrho’s life to fit the schema of the sage: a traveler to the\nEast (Flintoff 1980), whose insights are conveyed in brief sayings; an\nenigmatic figure, exemplary and shocking at the same time. Though it\nis difficult to assess the testimony on Pyrrho’s travels,\nscholars increasingly explore resonances between Pyrrho’s\npronouncements, later Pyrrhonian skepticism, and dimensions of\nBuddhist philosophy (Hanner 2020). For example, Mill (2018) argues\nthat a tradition in classical Indian philosophy develops a\n“skepticism about philosophy” that resembles dimensions of\nPyrrhonian thought.", "\nEven though he discussed tranquility and adherence to appearances,\nPyrrho was arguably no Pyrrhonian skeptic (Bett 2000, 14–62).\nThat is, it is likely that he put forward a dogmatic position, in the\nsense that he had positive philosophical views about the character of\nreality. Pyrrho wrote nothing. Much of what we know about him is\npreserved through the writings of Timon, his adherent\n(325/20–235/30 BCE) (Burnyeat 1980b; Clayman 2009). The\nmost important piece of testimony is a passage reporting an account by\nTimon:", "\nIt is necessary above all to consider our own knowledge; for if it is\nin our nature to know nothing, there is no need to inquire any further\ninto other things. […] Pyrrho of Elis was also a powerful\nadvocate of such a position. He himself has left nothing in writing;\nhis pupil Timon, however, says that the person who is to be happy must\nlook to these three points: first, what are things like by nature?\nsecond, in what way ought we to be disposed towards them? and finally,\nwhat will be the result for those who are so disposed? He [Timon] says\nthat he [Pyrrho] reveals that things are equally indifferent and\nunstable and indeterminate (adiaphora kai astathmêta kai\nanepikrita); for this reason, neither our perceptions nor our\nbeliefs tell the truth or lie (adoxastous kai aklineis kai\nakradantous). For this reason, then, we should not trust them,\nbut should be without opinions and without inclinations and without\nwavering, saying about each single thing that it no more is than is\nnot, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not (ou mallon\nestin ê ouk estin ê kai esti kai ouk estin\nê oute estin oute ouk estin). Timon says that the result\nfor those who are so disposed will be first speechlessness\n(aphasia), but then freedom from worry (ataraxia);\nand Aenesidemus says pleasure. These, then, are the main points of\nwhat they say (Aristocles in Eusebius PE 14.18.1–5 =\nDC53; tr. Bett 2000 with changes)\n", "\nIn response to the first question, how things are in their nature,\nPyrrho makes a metaphysical claim: they are indeterminate (Bett 2000,\n14–29). There are no stable items, or no items with stable\nproperties. Scholars sometimes hesitate to ascribe such a position to\nPyrrho, because it is undoubtedly dogmatic. Perhaps the text can be\ngiven an epistemological reading: things are indifferentiable and\nunmeasurable and undecidable, because we fail in differentiating,\nmeasuring, and determining how they are (Svavarsson 2010; Thorsrud\n2010). But Pyrrho’s response to the second question may only\nfollow if we adopt the metaphysical reading (Bett 2000, 29–37).\nPyrrho infers that our perceptions and beliefs are neither true nor\nfalse. They are not truth-evaluable, presumably because there are no\nfacts which could be correctly captured. Third, if we understand these\nthings, speechlessness (aphasia) follows, and then\ntranquility (ataraxia). Pyrrho does not say that we should\ncease to speak. He suggests that we adopt a complicated mode of\nspeech, constructed around the expression ou mallon\n(“no more”), which aims to capture the indeterminate\nnatures of things, when we attempt to say anything about anything\n(Bett 2000, 37–39; Vogt 2021)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Early Figures: Pyrrho and Timon" }, { "content": [ "\nAenesidemus (first century BCE) was discontented with the views\ndiscussed in the Academy at his time, of which he began as an\nadherent. Philo’s proto-externalism as well as a counterposition\nformulated by Antiochus both appeared to him dogmatic. Aenesidemus\naimed to revive a more radical skepticism, and left the Academy for\nthis purpose. Arguably, he is the first Pyrrhonian skeptic.\nAenesidemus wrote a treatise, the Pyrrhonian Discourses,\nprobably similar in structure to Sextus’ Outlines of\nPyrrhonism and partially preserved in a summary by Photius:\na general account of skepticism, followed by books on particular\nphilosophical questions (Hankinson 2010). The basic elements of\nAenesidemus’ skepticism are: the skeptic puts appearances and\nthoughts into opposition; this generates equipollence\n(isostheneia, lit. “of equal weight”) between\nseveral appearances and/or thoughts; suspension of judgment follows;\nwith it comes tranquility; and the skeptic leads a life according to\nappearances (DL 9.62, 78, 106–7). However, we do not know much\ndetail of his views on these matters. Instead, Aenesidemus is famous\nfor having developed Ten Modes or Tropes—forms of argument by\nwhich the sceptic puts appearances and thoughts into opposition. Key\nquestions about Aenesidemus’ skepticism concern (i) the\ninterpretation of his Modes, (ii) the relationship of his philosophy\nto competing theories, (iii) the scope of the Ten Modes, and (iv) the\nskeptic’s mode of speech.", "\n(i) Conflicting Appearances or Causal Invariance. The Ten Modes are\npreserved in Diogenes Laertius (9.78–88), Philo of Alexandria\n(On Drunkenness 169–202), and Sextus. Diogenes’\naccount of the Ten Modes may postdate Sextus’ (Sedley\n2015). Sextus gives extensive illustrations, and integrates the Ten\nModes into his general account of Pyrrhonism (PH\n1.36–163; cf. M 7.345 for ascription of the Ten Modes\nto Aenesidemus; cf. Annas-Barnes 1985 and Hankinson 1995, 268; the\nsequence below follows Sextus). Here is the first of the Ten Modes,\ninterpreted in two ways.", "\n\n\n10–1:\n\nArguments concerning oppositions based on the differences between\nkinds of animals.\n\n\nConflicting Appearances Interpretation:\n\nX appears F to animal of kind A (e.g.,\nhumans) and F* to animal of kind B [where F\nand F* are opposite or otherwise incompatible properties]. We\ncannot judge how X really is, because we are a party to the\ndispute.\n\n\nCausal Invariance Interpretation:\n\nFor something to be ‘really’ F, it would have to\nconsistently affect different perceivers as F. But different\nconstitutions of different animals cause different impressions of the\nsame thing. For different animals, something is F and\nF* (where F and F* are opposite or\notherwise incompatible properties). Therefore, things do not seem to\nreally be F or F.\n", "\nThe Conflicting Appearances Interpretation is based on Sextus’\naccount (Annas-Barnes 1985). The focus here is on the idea that every\nkind of animal, perceiver, sensory faculty, thinker, or judger\n(depending on which mode we consider) is only one of several animals,\nperceivers, sensory faculties, thinkers, or judgers. The object is\nperceived or considered from a particular point of view. Everyone is a\nparty to the dispute, and there is no ‘view from nowhere.’\nAccordingly, the dispute cannot be decided. The Causal Invariance\nInterpretation, on the other hand, suggests that the focus on\ndecidability is introduced by Sextus. Aenesidemus may (implicitly or\nexplicitly) have endorsed the following idea: if X were\nF by nature, X would affect everyone as F.\nIf X affects different people (living beings, sensory\nfaculties, etc.) as F and F, X is by\nnature neither F nor F. For example, if X\nis harmful to A and beneficial to B, it is neither\nharmful nor beneficial in its nature (Woodruff 2010, Bett 2000). The\nTen Modes can generally be construed as engaging either with conflicts\nbetween appearances or with causal invariance:", "\n\n\n10–2:\n\nArguments based on the differences among human beings (differences in\nbody and in soul).\n\n\n10–3:\n\nArguments based on the differences between the senses and on the\ncomplexity of perceived objects.\n\n\n10–4:\n\nArguments based on states (dispositions and conditions of a human\nbeing, such as age, motion versus rest, emotions, etc.).\n\n\n10–5:\n\nArguments based on positions, distances, and places.\n\n\n10–6:\n\nArguments based on mixtures (objects in conjunction with external\nthings like air and humidity; physical constituents of sense organs;\nphysiology of thought).\n\n\n10–7:\n\nArguments based on the composition of the perceived object.\n\n\n10–8:\n\nArguments based on relativity (to the judging subject, to\ncircumstances, etc.). 10–8 comprises at least 10–1 to 10–7, or all Ten\nModes.\n\n\n10–9:\n\nArguments based on constancy or rarity of occurrence.\n\n\n10–10:\n\nArguments concerned with ways of life, customs, laws, mythical\nbeliefs, and dogmatic assumptions, all of which can be put into\nopposition to each other.\n", "\n(ii) Skepticism, Relativism, Epicureanism. Consider first the\nrelationship between skepticism and relativism (cf. Bett 2000; Vogt\n2012a, ch. 4). Relativism, as envisaged in Plato’s\nTheaetetus, looks at a similar range of phenomena. Things\nappear different to different kinds of animals; to different people;\nand so on. Relativism embraces the intuition that there is (as we\nwould say today) faultless disagreement. That is, you and I disagree,\nbut neither of us is wrong. Accordingly, metaphysical relativism\nclaims we must give up the intuition that we both refer to the same\nthing. In the Theaetetus, the world dissolves into radical\nflux: there are no stable items with stable properties that we both\nrefer to.", "\nThe Ten Modes, according to Conflicting Appearances, differ from\nrelativism by turning precisely the other way (Annas-Barnes 1985,\n97–8; Pellegrin 1997, 552–3). They implicitly rely on the\nintuition that there are stable items with stable properties. Of\ncourse, the skeptic is not committed to the thesis that opposites\ncannot hold of the same thing, and that therefore no two conflicting\nappearances can be true. However, the modes presuppose a common sense\nmetaphysics that does not accommodate faultless disagreement. In all\ncases of disagreement, at best one of us can be right. If we cannot\nfigure out which view is right, we should suspend. This does not mean\nthat Pyrrhonians are committed to a common-sense metaphysics. The Ten\nModes are only one of several tools that skeptics have at their\ndisposal. They may thus imply a metaphysics that, at other points,\nskeptics would call into question (cf. Fine 2003b, 352).", "\nCausal Invariance differs from Conflicting Appearances precisely with\nrespect to the metaphysics that is, even if only dialectically,\ninvoked. Aenesidemus seems to have explored the relationship between\nskepticism and flux. He remarks that skepticism leads to Heraclitean\nphilosophy. The idea that one thing appears to have contrary\nproperties (the ones it appears to different animals/persons/senses to\nhave) leads to the idea that one thing actually has contrary\nproperties (PH 1.210; cf. Schofield 2007 on the role of\nHeraclitus and causal invariance). This remark can be taken as an\nexpression both of moderate flux and of relativism (Aenesidemus does\nnot seem to think of radical flux, where it is no longer even possible\nto refer to anything). There is no stable reality of how things are\n(moderate flux); X is F and F insofar as,\nif X seems F to A, this is true for\nA, and F* to B, this is true for B\n(relativism). This proposal differs from the Causal Invariance\ninterpretation of the Modes presented above. There, Aenesidemus seems\nto argue that things do not really have stable properties (they are\nneither F nor F* by nature); he does not say that\nthey are F and F* (as relativism says).", "\nA third approach, competing with skepticism and relativism, is\nEpicurean epistemology. Again, the set of phenomena to be accounted\nfor is the same. But it is described differently. Epicurus insists\nthat we should not even speak of conflicting appearances. Rather, we\nshould speak of different perceptions. Perceptions cannot refute each\nother, because they are of the same weight. Epicurus here uses the\nterm that is central to Pyrrhonism: equal weight,\nisostheneia (DL 10.31–2). The fact that\nperceptions differ has perfectly reasonable explanations: I look from\na distance, you look from nearby; I have a cold, you are healthy; I am\na human being, another cognizer is a dog; and so on. These facts\nfigure in the explanations of how our perceptions are constituted.\nAccordingly, Epicurus argues, all perceptions, even though they\ndiffer, are true. They all have a causal history that physics can\nexplain. The precise interpretation of this proposal is controversial.\nOne might object that the notion of truth employed here is deeply\npuzzling. It is not clear what it means to describe all perceptions as\ntrue if they cannot be true or false.", "\n(iii) Scope. For the greatest part, the Ten Modes seem to be concerned\nwith perception in a broad sense, so that it includes pleasure and\npain, harm and benefit, as well as pursuit and avoidance. To perceive\nsomething as pleasant or beneficial is to pursue it. Perception and\nevaluation are also mixed in another way: depending on the frequency\nwith which we perceive something, it seems more or less amazing and\nprecious to us. 10–10 envisages oppositions that can\nbe construed with the help of dogmatic theses. The Ten Modes thus fit\nSextus’ description of what skepticism is: the ability to put\nappearances and thoughts (phainomena and nooumena)\ninto opposition (PH 1.8, 1.31–33; cf. DL 9.78).", "\nAnother issue concerning the scope of the Ten Modes is whether they\naddress general or particular matters. Compare the example of whether\nthe tower is round or square (T) to the example of whether honey is\nsweet or bitter (H). (T) is a particular; the question is whether this\ntower is round or square. (H) can be construed as a particular\n(“is this bit of honey sweet?”), or as a general issue\n(“is honey sweet?”). The Ten Modes offer strategies for\nsuspension of judgment on both kinds of questions.", "\nScholars have asked whether it is a problem for skepticism if the Ten\nModes appear ‘systematic’ (Sedley 2015). A set of\narguments that aims to be complete, covering domains according to a\nstandardized pattern, may appear to be out of tune with the\nskeptic’s presumed mode of investigation. Purportedly, skeptics\nthink through given questions as they arise, arriving at suspension of\njudgment in a piecemeal fashion. If this self-description is to be\ntaken at face value, then modes of generating suspension of judgment\nacross the board may appear problematic. In this respect, Diogenes\nLaertius’ report of the Ten Modes may be superior to\nSextus’ account. Diogenes begins with a remark that suggests\nthat skeptics pick up where other philosophers have already begun to\nmake an argument (9.78–9). Other philosophers have collected,\npresumably, ways in which ‘we are persuaded’, say, because\nthings regularly appear the same way. Now the skeptics, as it were in\nresponse to this, add a collection of further cases, where things do\nnot appear the same way to different cognizers. If this is the\ndialectical set-up, the Ten Modes may not be ‘systematic’\nin ways that harm skepticism. They may co-opt the patterns of dogmatic\nreports about cases where appearances are stable (Sedley 2015).", "\n(iv) Language. Aenesidemus contributes an interesting move to the\nquestion of how the skeptic can speak. Consider the relationship\nbetween a skeptic’s state of mind and their utterances. One way\nto construe this relationship is that an utterance reflects a state of\nmind. This is a background assumption to the idea that, if skeptics\nuse assertoric language, they hold beliefs. Another option is to\nassume that language does not have the means to capture the\nskeptic’s state of mind. On this premise, a skeptic might flag\ntheir utterances as falling short of doing so. This is\nAenesidemus’ strategy. He says that the Pyrrhonian determines\nnothing, and not even this fact that he determines nothing. The\nPyrrhonian puts matters in such terms, he says, because he has no way\nto express the actual thought of the sceptic in determining nothing\n(Photius, Bibl. 169b40–170a14, = 71C(6)-(8) LS)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Aenesidemus, the Ten Modes, and Appearances" }, { "content": [ "\nAlmost nothing is known about Agrippa (1st to\n2nd century CE; SE PH 1.164–177; DL\n9.88–89). However, the modes of argument that Sextus calls the\nFive Modes are attributed to him. These modes are among the most\nfamous arguments of ancient skepticism (Barnes 1990, Hankinson\n2010).", "\n\n\n5–1 Diaphônia:\n\nThe mode that argues from disagreement. With respect to some matter\nthat presents itself, there is undecided (anepikriton)\nconflict, both among the views of ordinary life and the views held by\nphilosophers. Due to this, we are unable to choose or reject one\nthing, and must fall back on suspension.\n\n\n5–2 Eis apeiron ekballonta:\n\nArguments that throw one into an infinite regress. That which\nis brought forward to make a given matter credible needs yet something\nelse to make it credible, and so on ad infinitum.\nSince we thus have no starting point for our argument, suspension of\njudgment follows.\n\n\n5–3 Pros ti:\n\nArguments from relativity. X only ever appears\nsuch-and-such in relation to the subject judging and to the things\nobserved together with it. Suspension on how X really is\nfollows.\n\n\n5–4 Hypothesis:\n\nSomeone makes an assumption without providing argument. A dogmatist,\nif thrown back into an infinite regress of arguments, just assumes\nsomething as a starting-point, without providing an argument\n(anapodeiktôs). We suspend over mere\nhypotheses—they could be false, opposite hypotheses could be\nformulated, and so on.\n\n\n5–5 Ton diallêlon:\n\nArguments that disclose a circularity. This mode is used when\nthat which ought to confirm a given investigated matter requires\nconfirmation (pistis—credibility) from that matter. We\nare unable to assume either in order to establish the other. We\nsuspend judgment on both.\n", "\nIt is a commonplace to say that, while the Ten Modes, as presented in\nSextus, are concerned with conflicting appearances, the Five Modes are\nabout argument or proof. In these modes, the skeptics develop\nstrategies by which to attack theories that the dogmatists defend. If\nthis is how we characterize the Modes, Aristotle’s objection\n(section 2.3) immediately comes to mind. Do the Five Modes reveal the\nskeptic’s lack of understanding because they presuppose that\neverything is subject to proof? (Barnes 1990; Hankinson 1995,\n182–92; Long 2006, ch.3) The three so-called formal\nmodes—Regress, Hypothesis, and Circularity—can be\nconstrued in this fashion: when employing them, the skeptic can argue\nthat every premise must be supported by argument; if it is not so\nsupported, the theory begins from a mere hypothesis (on earlier uses\nof the term hupothesis in Plato and in medicine, cf. Cooper\n2002 [2004a]); or it is ultimately circular.", "\nHowever, the skeptic might not be vulnerable to this objection. First,\nthe Five Modes can be construed as dialectical, invoking dogmatic\ntheories of justification (Striker 2004). Second, they might be\nbroader in scope. 5–1 and 5–3\nexplore disagreement and relativity. Skeptical examination often\nbegins with the Mode of Disagreement: different answers to a given\nquestion are surveyed, and the conflict between them is observed. The\ninterpretation of 5–1 hangs, for the most part, on\nthe question of whether anepikriton should be translated as\n‘undecided’ or ‘undecidable’ (Barnes 1990). It\nwould be dogmatic to claim that matters are undecidable. The\nPyrrhonist must prefer the idea that, up to now, matters have not been\ndecided. In applying the Mode of Disagreement, skeptics can\neither record a conflicting argument that others have formulated or\ncome up with an argument that disagrees with a view formulated by a\ndogmatist (cf. Sienkiewicz 2019, 47–51). This leads to the question of\nwhether something can be found that would decide matters, and thus to\nthe application of further modes. Scholars have observed that\n5–3, the Mode of Relativity, does not really fit into\nthe Five Modes. However, the Five Modes could be designed to supersede\nand include the Ten Modes, and 5–3 might be viewed as\ncapturing the common thread of the Ten Modes. With the help of\n5–3, the skeptic can argue that the premises that\ntheorists employ are formulated from particular points of view, in\nparticular contexts, and so on (for a reading that emphasizes the role\nof the first mode at the expense of the role of the third, cf.\nSienkiewicz 2019).", "\nThird, even the so-called formal modes (5-2,\n5–4, 5–5) might not be narrowly\nconcerned with proof, but rather with everything that can lend\ncredibility to something else. Consider Regress\n(5–2), the first of the formal modes. The text does\nnot actually speak of proof (apodeixis) (this is obscured by\nBury’s Loeb translation; 5–4 is the only place\nin Sextus’ report of the Five Modes that uses a cognate of\napodeixis). Sextus’ language is wider: the mode deals\nwith everything that can make something else credible. We might read\nthis in the context of the Hellenistic view that proof is a species of\nsign (PH 2.122). A sign reveals something non-evident. Smoke\nthat reveals fire has, from this point of view, a function and\nstructure that is similar to a proof. The target of the Five Modes\nmight be sign-inferences in general. If this is so, then their target\nmight include what we would call inductive reasoning and causal\nexplanations (when Sextus introduces a further set of modes, the\nCausal Modes, he says that they are not really needed, because the\nrelevant work can be done by the Five Modes; PH\n1.180–86). Taken together, the Five Modes deny all “proof,\ncriterion, sign, cause, movement, learning, coming into being, and\nthat there is anything by nature good or bad.” (DL 9.90). This\nis notably more than just proof. Indeed, it is an excellent summary of\nthe key topics in Sextus’ discussions of logic, physics, and\nethics." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Agrippa, and the Five Modes" }, { "content": [ "\nSextus’ (ca. 160–210 CE) epithet, Empiricus, indicates\nthat he belonged to the empiricists, a medical school (cf.\nSvavarson 2014 for a brief conspectus of Sextus’ philosophy).\nThe empiricist medical school argued against rationalistic tendencies\nin medicine (Frede 1990; Allen 2010). Rationalism in medicine aims to\ngive causal explanations as a basis for therapies. Empiricism, on the\ncontrary, confines itself to observation and memory. Somewhat\nconfusingly (considering his name), Sextus discusses differences\nbetween Pyrrhonism and empiricism, and says that skepticism is closer\nto medical methodism than to empiricism (Allen 2010). On the whole, it\nmay be safest to think of Sextus as rejecting medical rationalism as\nwell as other trends within medicine that by Sextus’ lights are\ndogmatic. Methodism follows appearances, and derives from them what\nseems beneficial. No explanations are attempted, no underlying\nsubstances postulated, and no regularities assumed—these are\nsome of the rationalistic methods that both methodism and empiricism\nargue against. Methodism also makes no statements to the effect that\nsuch explanations cannot be given, or that underlying substances and\nregularities do not exist, as Sextus says empiricism does (SE\nPH 1.236–241). Beyond the fact that Sextus was a\ndoctor and wrote on medicine (M 7.202, M 1.61), his philosophical\nthinking seems shaped by engagement with medical writers. Scholars\nhave long been interested in the relationship between medicine and\nskeptical arguments that pertain to be therapeutic (Voelke 1990). More\nrecently, scholars explore ways in which medical writings, in\nparticular by Galen, inform Sextus’ thinking, even on specific\nissues such as how to conceive of and solve sophisms (Schmitt,\nforthcoming). It has also been argued that the skeptics’\napplication of the modes should be interpreted in light of the\nmethodological commitments of non-rationalist medicine (Sienkiewicz\n2019, 2021).", "\nSextus’ philosophical writings are traditionally divided into\ntwo groups. The Outlines of Pyrrhonism [PH] consists\nof three books. PH 1 is the only general account of\nPyrrhonism that survives. PH 2 and 3 discuss questions of\nlogic, physics, and ethics. The other writings are summarily referred\nto, traditionally, as Against the Mathematicians\n[M]. In fact, they oppose not just mathematical, but also\nother theorists: the title really means Against the\nTheoreticians, or Against the Learned (Bett 2012). In a\nsense, only M 1–6 should go by that title. It is a\ncomplete work, and M 7 does not seem to be its continuation\n(Bett 2012, “Introduction”). M 1–6 discuss\ngrammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology, and music theory.\nThey argue against theoretical ‘learning’ in these fields.\nM 7–11 discuss core questions of the three\nphilosophical disciplines, logic, physics, and ethics, and could\nplausibly be referred to as Against the Logicians (M\n7–8), Against the Physicists (M 9–10),\nand Against the Ethicists (M 11). Scholars disagree\non whether M is earlier (Bett 1997) or later than PH\n(Janacek 1948 and 1972). Scholars also disagree on whether we can\nevaluate different strands of skepticism within Sextus as more or less\nsophisticated. Those who consider PH as later often do so\nbecause they think it shows greater philosophical sophistication,\neither by avoiding claims that a certain matter cannot be known\n(sometimes described as negative dogmatism), as found in M\n1–6 and M 11, or by streamlining discussions from\nM 7–10 (Bett 1997; Brunschwig 1980).", "\nThese questions are complicated further by Sextus’ attempt to\nincorporate diverse material, such as different sets of Modes, into\nhis skepticism. According to recent interpretations, the\ndifferent sets of modes are part of an integrated philosophical\napproach (Powers 2010). Morison (2018) argues that the Ten Modes and\nFive Modes both serve the same purpose: to produce equal and opposing\narguments to arguments in support of philosophical or scientific\nviews. Arguably, two kinds of consistency are at work in Sextus’\nwritings. On the one hand, Sextus aims at the consistency of one\nphilosophical outlook. On the other hand, he aims at the consistency\nof having a response to every objection. These two aims overlap\ngreatly, but they can also come apart. A given argument might refute a\nparticular critic. This argument may go back to various earlier\nversions of Pyrrhonism. Similarly, the critical objection that is\nrefuted may be traced to dogmatic theories formulated over the course\nof several centuries. As a result, a given argument in Sextus may be\neffective against a given objection he has in mind. It may thus\npreserve consistency in the sense of leaving the skeptic unharmed by\ndogmatic criticism. But at the same time, this argument may have\nimplications that are in tension with the way in which Sextus explains\nskepticism in other passages. Such tensions are particularly important\nwith respect to the way in which Sextus uses core concepts. For\nexample, it is not clear that Sextus uses the notion of appearances\n(phainomena) in a consistent fashion (PH\n1.8–9; 1.15; 1.22; for the view that Sextus employs the notion\nconsistently throughout, see Barney 1992). At times, he draws on the\ncontrast between appearances and thoughts (noumena). But for\nthe most part, the term refers to all cases where something seems\nso-and-so to the skeptic, either perceptually or in thought. In some\ncontexts, Sextus draws on the idea that appearances are impressions,\ninvoking the dogmatic assumption that impressions are passive. In\nother contexts, he does not envisage appearances as entirely passively\nexperienced (Vogt 2012b).", "\nIt is thus no surprise that the interpretation of Sextus’\nPyrrhonism is quite controversial. This applies in particular to the\nquestion of whether the skeptic has any beliefs, or beliefs of any\nkind. In the past 40 years, scholars have paid attention to this\nquestion more than to any other interpretive issue. Insofar as the\ntexts may contain different strands of Pyrrhonian argument, exegesis\nis to some extent shaped by the philosophical interests we bring to\nthe texts. Two ideas are particularly prominent here. First, some\nscholars find in Sextus an account of action that challenges standard\nancient and modern theories of agency. These theories might portray\nordinary agents as all-too-rational, as if every action involved an\nactively formed belief that such-and-such is good. Scholars explore\nhow far we can draw on Sextus, asking whether a life guided by\nappearances (as Sextus says the skeptic’s life is) might after\nall be rather ordinary (Frede 1979 [1997]). Second, one might on the\nother hand embrace those aspects of Sextus’ texts that make\nPyrrhonism look radically different from ordinary life. From this\nperspective, Sextus’ writings invite reflection on the question\nof whether it would be possible to live without belief (Burnyeat 1980\n[1997]; Barnes 1982 [1997]; Burnyeat 1984 [1997]).", "\nPH 1, which figures most prominently in scholarly\ndiscussions, is a tour de force. Sextus gives a general\naccount of what skepticism is, including skeptical investigation,\nsuspension of judgment, the skeptic’s end, action, and language;\nhe gives lists and illustrations of various sets of Modes; he explains\nthe so-called skeptical formulae (phônai), such as\n“I determine nothing,” “non-assertion,”\n“maybe,” and so on; and he compares skepticism to\nrelevantly similar philosophies.", "\nSextus emphasizes that the skeptic is an investigator. Others either\narrive at theories (dogmatism) or at claims about inapprehensibility\n(negative dogmatism—that the matter investigated is beyond\none’s capacity to decide, and so is unknowable). But the skeptic\ncontinues to investigate (PH 1.1–4). Investigation is\ndescribed as setting appearances and thoughts into opposition\n(PH 1.8) (Morison 2011 offers a reconstruction of skepticism\nthat takes its starting–point from this description), and as the\napplication of the various sets of Modes (PH 1.36–186).\nSkepticism does not have teachings, but it is an approach in\nphilosophy (Smith 2022). Many of the thoughts the skeptics arrive at\nare expressed in the skeptical formulae (PH 1.13–15;\n187–209). The starting–point (archê) of\nskepticism is divergency—anômalia. The\nproto-skeptics are disturbed by the discrepancies they encounter, and\nbegin to investigate (PH 1.12). They hope to gain quietude by settling\nwhat is true and what is false. But then they have a surprising\nexperience. Encountering disagreement where several views appear to be\nof equal weight (isostheneia), they find themselves unable to\ndecide things, give up, and experience tranquility (ataraxia)\n(Striker 1990 [1996]; Nussbaum 1994). The skeptic’s end\n(telos) is tranquility in matters of belief (kata\ndoxan) and moderate affection (metriopatheia) in matters\nthat are forced upon us (PH 1.25–29). That is, skeptics\ncan free themselves from those kinds of turmoil that come with holding\nbeliefs. They cannot free themselves from freezing, thirst, or pain.\nBut they suffer less than others, for they do not add the belief\n(prosdoxazein) that, for example, pain is bad. The skeptic\nmust explain how, without belief (adoxastôs), they can\nbe active. Sextus says that skeptics follow appearances, and that is,\nthat they adhere to the fourfold ways of life (PH\n1.21–24). Nature supplies them with perception and thought;\nnecessary affections compel them (for example, thirst guides them to\ndrink); they go along with traditions and customs; and they can do\ntechnical things by having been instructed in skills. The notion of\nappearances is also central to Sextus’ account of how the\nskeptic can speak. Without making assertions, a skeptic reports\n(apangellein) like a chronicler (historikôs)\nwhat appears to them now (PH 1.4).", "\nI shall discuss the following aspects of Sextus’ skepticism: (i)\ninvestigation and tranquility, (ii) concepts and inference rules,\n(iii) belief, (iv) the formulae, (v) appearances, (vi) language, (vii)\naction, and (viii) the so-called special arguments (that is, arguments\nthat do not explain the nature of Pyrrhonism, but engage with specific\ndogmatic theories in logic, physics, and ethics).", "\n(i) Investigation and tranquility. Investigation must aim at discovery\nof the truth, otherwise it is not genuine investigation. However, a\nskeptic seems to mechanically apply the skeptical Modes, in order to\ngenerate suspension of judgment and tranquility. Scholars disagree on\nwhether the skeptics genuinely aim at the truth (Palmer 2000;\nStriker 2001; Perin 2006; Veres 2020b), while they (also) aim at\ntranquility. Note that this objection, unlike the other problems\ncentral to contemporary engagement with ancient skepticism, was not\nraised in antiquity. If ancient skepticism is approached in the\ncontext of the larger study of ancient philosophy, we might first of\nall note that the skeptics in a sense agree with Socrates, Plato,\nAristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics. All these philosophers defend, in\nso many formulations, a life of reason, of contemplation, of wisdom,\nor of inquiry as the best or at least a very good human life (on\naffinities between the skeptics’ commitment to inquiry and\nAristotle, cf. Olfert 2015). The objection that skeptical inquiry\nseems insincere, then, may not have come up in antiquity in quite the\nway in which it is discussed today because a commitment to inquiry\nwould be common ground among most philosophers. Further, we might\nobserve that aiming at the truth includes two aims: to accept truths,\nand to avoid falsehoods. The Modes are tailored to keep us from\nassenting to something that could be false. Insofar as the\nskeptic’s effort to avoid falsehoods expresses a valuation for\nthe truth, the skeptic might be a genuine investigator (Vogt 2012a,\nch. 5; Olfert 2014).", "\nA related objection calls into question the actual practice of\nskeptical inquiry. Does Sextus rely on the assumption that, in any\ngiven case of putting several arguments into opposition, these\narguments are equally persuasive for the skeptic? This seems\nunrealistic: at least in some cases, skeptical inquirers are bound to\nbe more strongly attracted to one view than to another. How then do\nthey arrive at suspension of judgment? One skeptical strategy is to\nremind oneself that additional arguments will be formulated in the\nfuture (PH 1.33–34, 89, 96–97; 2.38–41;\n3.233–34). Another strategy is to consider that different\narguments are persuasive to different people (Svararsson 2014).\nRelatedly, skeptics may find themselves in a position comparable to a\nstudent who takes a seminar on freedom and determinism: it is possible\nto be more attracted to one view rather than another, and at the same\ntime be aware that as far as the arguments are concerned, there is\nunresolved disagreement among several views, to the effect that\nneither of the views seems compelling in ways that warrant assent (cf.\nVogt 2012a, ch. 5, on how the skeptical expression “as far as\nthe argument is concerned” bears on this question; for general\ndiscussion of this expression, cf. Brunschwig 1990).", "\n(ii) Concepts and rules of inference. If skeptics do not assent, then\nhow can they understand the terms philosophers use (M\n8.337–332a)? Even more radically, how can they even think\n(PH 2.1–12)? This objection, which Sextus says is\ncontinually raised against the skeptics, proceeds on the assumption\nthat possession of concepts involves the acceptance of assumptions.\nFor example, in order to examine a given theory of proof, the skeptic\nmust have a notion of what proofs are. This involves assumptions: for\nexample, the assumption that a proof contains premises and a\nconclusion. Sextus’ response to this objection invokes the\nEpicurean and Stoic theories of preconceptions. Human beings are not\nborn with reason (Frede 1994, 1996). The acquisition of reason is a\nnature-guided process of concept acquisition. At a given age, children\nhave completed this process. They have become rational, which means\nthat they can perceive and think in a conceptual way. Only now, they\nhave rational impressions to which they can assent. The acquisition of\npreconceptions did not involve assent, simply because the child was\nnot yet rational (Brittain 2005).", "\nSextus invokes dogmatic ideas about the acquisition of reason (or: the\nabilities of conceptual thought) in his response to the Apraxia Charge\n(PH 1.23–4). Skeptics are, first of all, active because\nnature has equipped them with perception and thought (Vogt 1998,\n2010). More generally, the skeptics’ ability to think and\ninvestigate depends on the fact that they have acquired concepts as\npart of growing up. This process did not involve assent, and\naccordingly, Sextus argues that the skeptic’s ability to think\ndoes not violate suspension of judgment (cf. Brunschwig 1988; Vogt\n2012a ch. 6; Grgic 2008; Fine 2011). It is conceivable, though, that\nthe skeptic’s ability to understand involves some knowledge,\nnamely a kind of knowledge that does not entail any belief (Corti\n2009, part III; Corti 2015). This option appears counterintuitive\ngiven today’s premises in epistemology, according to which\nsomeone who knows that p also believes that p. The relevant notion of\nbelief in skeptical discussions, doxa, as well as the\nrelevant ancient notions of knowledge, however, may behave quite\ndifferently (cf. Vogt 2012a and Moss and Schwab 2019 on belief;\nBurnyeat 1980c, Frede 2008 and Schwab 2016 on knowledge). Insofar as\ndoxa is an inherently deficient activity and attitude, and\ninsofar as knowledge is conceived in elevated ways, knowledge without\nbelief is a rather intuitive option within ancient epistemology. If\nunderstanding concepts and arguments involves knowledge that does not\nentail beliefs, the skeptics may be taken to have such knowledge.\nModern critics raise the further question of whether the skeptic must\nendorse logical laws (such as the Principle of Non-Contradiction) and\nrules of inference. In particular, they ask whether a skeptic is\ncommitted to the logical validity of the conditionals they formulate\nwhen arguing against the dogmatists (Sorensen 2004). Sextus records no\nancient version of this complaint, and accordingly no direct\nresponse. Relatedly, one may ask whether Sextus’ method, in\nparticular regarding the Five Modes, is systematic in a way that is in\ntension with suspension of judgment (cf. Sienkiewicz 2021, who defends\nSextus against this charge).", "\n(iii) Belief. Bury, in his Loeb translation, translates\nadoxastôs as “undogmatically,” for example,\nwhen Sextus speaks (PH 1.15) of skeptics as saying that\n“nothing is true.” This translation suggests that Sextus\nbans dogmatism from the skeptic’s life, where this still leaves\nroom for other, non-dogmatic beliefs. But adoxastôs\nmeans non-doxastically or ‘without belief’ (cf. Burnyeat\n1980 [1997]). As noted above, the skeptic’s end is tranquility\nin matters relating to belief—kata doxan. A skeptic\nlives adoxastôs. And even more confusingly, the\nskeptics assent adoxastôs, when they act.", "\nContemporary interest in Pyrrhonian skepticism was much spurred by\nMichael Frede’s paper “The Sceptic’s Beliefs”\n(1979 [1997]). Frede argues that ancient skepticism was traditionally\ndismissed too easily as vulnerable to the Apraxia Charge, the charge\nthat, without belief, the skeptic cannot act. The skeptics seem to be\nconfident that they have replies to this objection. Thus, it seems\nuncharitable not to look closely at these replies. Further, insofar as\nthese replies respond to the charge that without belief one cannot\nact, we should focus on what the skeptics say about the role of belief\nin their lives. Frede cites PH 1.13, and claims that in this\npassage we find a distinction between two kinds of belief:", "\nWhen we say that the skeptic does not dogmatize, we are not using\n‘dogma’ in the more general sense in which some say it is\ndogma to accept anything (for the skeptic does assent to the\nexperiences forced upon him in virtue of this-or-that impression: for\nexample, he would not say, when warmed or cooled, ‘I seem not to\nbe warmed or cooled’). Rather, when we say he does not\ndogmatize, we mean ‘dogma’ in the sense in which some say\nthat dogma is assent to any of the non-evident matters investigated by\nthe sciences. For the Pyrrhonist assents to nothing that is\nnon-evident. (PH 1.13; trans. Burnyeat (1984) [1997] with\nchanges)\n", "\nFollowing Frede, several scholars focus on PH 1.13 when\ndiscussing skeptical belief (with the notable exceptions of Barnes\n1980 [1997] and Barney 1992). They take it to be obvious that, in this\nparagraph, Sextus distinguishes between two kinds of belief, one which\nhe bans from the skeptic’s life, and one which he allows into\nthe skeptic’s life. Barnes (1982 [1997]) employs a distinction\nbetween rustic and urbane skepticism. The rustic skeptic suspends on\nall matters. The urbane skeptic suspends on scientific matters, but\nholds ordinary beliefs. The clause “non-evident matters\ninvestigated in the sciences” in PH 1.13 might be taken\nas a point of reference for the urbane interpretation. However, Barnes\npoints out that this cannot be right. Everything can be considered as\na non-evident matter, even such things as whether honey is sweet.", "\nAgainst Barnes, Frede argues that the relevant distinction must be\ndrawn between two kinds of assent, such that “having a view\ninvolves one kind of assent, whereas taking a position, or making a\nclaim, involves another kind of assent, namely the kind of assent the\nsceptic will withhold” (1984 [1997], 128). Sextus characterizes\nskeptical assent in three ways. He speaks of forced assent (PH\n1.23–24), involuntary assent (PH 1.19), and\nadoxastôs assent (PH 2.102). Frede does not explore the\ndetails of how Sextus uses these notions. The core of his proposal is\nthat Sextus allows for a kind of assent that does not involve a claim\nas to how things are in actual fact.", "\nIn (1979 [1997]), Frede is predominantly concerned with the\nskeptic’s reply to the Apraxia Charge. In (1984 [1997]) his\nfocus is on skeptical pronouncements such as “nothing can be\nknown.” His distinction between two kinds of assent, and\naccordingly two kinds of belief, is explored with respect to such\nsentences. Frede writes that “[t]o be left with the impression\nor thought that p […] does not involve the further thought that\nit is true that p” (133). This is the sense in which, on his\ninterpretation, the skeptic might think “nothing is\nknown.” The thought counts as a belief, but not as a claim that,\nin actual fact, nothing is known by anybody. Contrary to Frede’s\ninterpretation, one might argue that to believe simply is to hold\ntrue, at least according to the notions of belief that the skeptics\ninvoke in discussions with their contemporary critics (Vogt 2012b). It\nis thus not clear that Frede’s distinction is genuinely one\nbetween two kinds of beliefs (Burnyeat 1980 [1997]). Perhaps it is a\ndistinction between two different propositional attitudes, only one of\nwhich is belief. As Striker (2001) points out, there is a danger that\ndebates over this issue become merely terminological. We might thus\ndraw a distinction between two issues. It is one thing to disagree\nwith Frede on what should or should not be called belief, and another\nto dispute whether he identifies and characterizes a phenomenon in the\nskeptic’s mental life. As Frede argues, skeptics find themselves\nwith a rather persistent thought, without having accepted it as true\nin actual fact. This appears to capture a core element of skepticism:\nthe way in which the skeptic thinks such thoughts as “everything\nis inapprehensible.”", "\n(iv) The Skeptical Formulae. PH 1.13, the passage in which\nscholars find a distinction between two kinds of belief, occurs in a\nchapter entitled “Does the Skeptic dogmatize?” One angle\nfrom which we might disagree with Frede is to insist that PH\n1.13 addresses the status of the core thoughts of skeptical\nphilosophy, rather than the question of skeptical belief. Consider the\nrest of the chapter:", "\nNot even in uttering the skeptical formulae about unclear\nmatters—for example, “In no way more,” or “I\ndetermine nothing,” or one of the other formulae which we shall\nlater discuss—do they dogmatize (dogmatizein). For if\nyou dogmatize, then you posit as real the things that you are said to\ndogmatize about; but skeptics posit these formulae not as necessarily\nbeing real. For they suppose that, just as the formula\n“Everything is false” says that it too, along with\neverything else, is false (and similarly for “Nothing is\ntrue”), so also “In no way more” says that it too,\nalong with everything else, is no more so than not so, and hence\ncancels itself along with everything else. And we say the same of the\nother skeptical formulae. Thus, if people who dogmatize posit as real\nthe things they dogmatize about, while skeptics utter their own\nphrases in such a way that they are implicitly cancelled by\nthemselves, then they cannot be said to dogmatize in uttering them.\nBut the main point is this: in uttering these formulae they say what\nappears to themselves and report their own feelings without any belief\n(adoxastôs), affirming nothing about external objects.\n(PH 1.14–15; trans. Annas-Barnes with changes)\n", "\nWhen explaining in PH 1.13 how the skeptic does not\ndogmatize, Sextus may have a particular issue in mind: that some\nskeptical formulae look like doctrines, and have traditionally been\nturned against themselves due to their dogmatic surface-structure. For\nexample, “all things are indeterminate” looks like a\nstraightforward dogmatic statement. There is a long history of\nskeptical attempts to explain the nature of such pronouncements so\nthat they no longer undermine themselves. Sextus arguably mentions\nseveral solutions to this problem (PH 1.13–15 and\n1.187–209; cf. Pellegrin 2010). In PH 1.15, Sextus\nidentifies the following as his main point: the skeptic merely reports\nwhat appears to them. Along these lines, Sextus calls indeterminacy an\naffection of thought (pathos dianoias; PH 1.198), a\nstate that the utterance “all things are indeterminate”\naims to capture. The other solution mentioned in PH\n1.14–15 is somewhat more problematic: the skeptical formulae\ncancel themselves out. That is, one can say them and convey something\nthrough them. But then, once one has made a point, they as it were\nturn back upon themselves and eat themselves up—as fire first\nburns combustible materials and then destroys itself. This idea became\nfamous through another comparison Sextus uses (invoked by Wittgenstein\n1922, 6.54): the skeptical pronouncements are like a ladder that\none climbs up; once one is on top, one can throw the ladder away\n(M 8.481). Scholars disagree on whether Sextus in some sense\nadmits that these statements are self-refuting (McPherran 1987), or\nwhether he defuses their self-refutational structure (Castagnoli 2010,\nIII.14).", "\n(v) Appearances (phainomena). While it is difficult to\nestablish a clear distinction between two kinds of belief in Sextus,\nthere is a comparatively more explicit distinction between two ways of\nengaging with appearances. Sextus says that, while things\nappear X to the skeptic, the skeptic does not affirm that\nthey are X. Questions that are traditionally discussed in\nterms of whether the skeptic has beliefs thus might be addressed in\nterms of whether the way things appear to the skeptic has a\njudgment-component. Arguably, “A appears X to\nme now” can be construed in different ways. Certain examples\n(say, the way in which it makes sense to say both that the moon\nappears small and that it appears large) may suggest that appearance\ncan but need not involve something like a judgment (Barney 1992). Some\nformulations in Sextus seem to insist on a significant difference\nbetween the mental activity of something appearing to a cognizer on\nthe one hand, and on the other hand the mental activity that, on the\nlevel of language, is represented by assertion. This suggests that,\nfor Sextus, A appearing F to me now does not entail\nthat I hold it to be true that A is F (Vogt\n2012b).", "\n(vi) Language. Another approach to the question of whether the skeptic\nhas beliefs looks at skeptical language. Sextus insists that the\nskeptic does not accept or reject any impression, and associates the\nabsence of these mental acts with the fact that the skeptic does not\naffirm or deny anything (e.g., PH 1.4, 7, 10). Arguably, we\ncan infer from Sextus’ account of the skeptic’s utterances\nwhat Sextus wants to say about the skeptic’s mental states and\nacts. That is, the question of language immediately bears on the\nquestion of belief. The report on Pyrrhonian skepticism in Diogenes\nLaertius is particularly instructive in this respect. Contrary to\nscholarly focus on belief in reconstructing skepticism, it barely\nmentions belief. Discussion of the skeptics’ attitudes is almost\nentirely conducted in terms of skeptical language and the skeptical\nformulae (for detailed discussion of the relevant paragraphs, DL\n9.74–7, cf. Corti 2015). If Sextus is read in light of the\nreport in DL IX, PH 1.13 may appear to be more of an isolated\npassage than scholarly debates imply. Sextus too devotes much space to\naccounts of skeptical expressions and language. It may thus be asked\nwhether scholars should reframe discussions, and pay more attention to\nskeptical language then they previously have. As of now, there is one\nmonograph on skeptical language, Corti (2009), and one approach to\nbelief that focuses on language, Vogt (1998). Both scholars pursue\nfurther ideas put forward by Barnes (1982 [1997]), who compares the\nskeptic’s utterances to avowals. The skeptic lays open their\nstate of mind, they announce or record (apangellein) it (Fine\n2003a). In order to do this, the skeptic must misuse language\n(Burnyeat 1984 [1997]). Some strategies to avoid assertion are given\nin the context of the skeptical formulae (“non-assertion,”\n“I determine nothing,” and so on). (i) Skeptical\nexpressions can be used as signs, which reveal a state of mind\n(PH 1.187). (ii) Expressions like “ou\nmallon” (no more) and “ouden mallon”\n(nowise more) can be used indifferently (in the sense of\ninterchangeably) (PH 1.188). (iii) As is the practice in\nordinary language, the skeptic can use expressions elliptically; for\nexample “no more” for “no more this-than-that”\n(PH 1.188). (iv) People often use questions instead of\nassertions and the other way around. Similarly, “no more”\ncan be construed as a question: “Why more this-than-that?”\n(v) The skeptic misuses language and uses it in a loose way\n(PH 1.191).", "\nIn M 1 and M 2, Sextus says that the skeptic goes\nalong with ordinary ways of using language (M 1.172, 193, 206, 218,\n229, 233; M 2.52–3, 58–9). This seems to be a key resource\nin construing skeptical ways of speaking: the skeptic exploits the\nways in which ordinary speakers can diverge from grammatically correct\nspeech, and still be understood. Apart from using their skeptical\nformulae, and apart from conducting philosophical investigations,\nwhich they can do in a dialectical mode, referring to theses,\narguments, and inferences, the skeptic also has to talk in everyday\ncontexts. It is here where we see best how skeptical utterances are\ntailored to reveal a state of mind in which nothing is accepted or\nrejected. Sextus takes great pains to construe his examples of\nskeptical utterances according to the following schema:\n“X appears F to me now.” This will\ngenerally be understood as an elliptical version of “X\nappears to be F to me now.” However, Sextus\nconsistently avoids “to be” (Vogt 1998; for the view that\n“X appears F” avoids reference to external\nobjects, see Everson 1991). The peculiar form of skeptical utterances\nsuggests that Sextus sees a relevant difference between\n“X appears to be F to me now” and\n“X appears F to me now.” The former\nmight imply reference to a state of affairs, and an epistemic usage of\n“to appear” that could be rendered as “It appears to\nme, that p,” or, “I take it that p.” This, however,\nwould be assertoric: the skeptic would state that it appears to them\nthat such-and-such is the case. But the skeptic’s elliptical\nutterances about what appears to them aim to be purely\nphenomenological. They aim to report a condition of the\nskeptic’s mind, without expressing a judgment of any kind\n(Burnyeat 1984 [1997]; Annas-Barnes 1985, 23–4; for an\nassessment of these strategies in terms of modern philosophy of\nlanguage, cf. Pagin 2020). As part of the skeptics’ way of life,\nlanguage can also be seen as an activity. That is, how the skeptics\ncan speak can be considered a sub–question of how the skeptics\ncan act. Skeptical utterances have been compared to Wittgensteinian\nconfessions, arguably a kind of speech act that is consistent with the\nskeptics’ avoidance of belief (Corti 2009, Parts I and II).\nMoreover, the skeptics not only speak. They presumably also understand\nwhat others say. A persuasive account of skeptical language must\nexplain both speaking and understanding (Corti 2009, Part III).", "\n(vii) Action. Sextus says that appearances (phainomena) are\nthe practical criterion of the skeptic (PH 1.23–24). By\nadhering to appearances, the skeptic is prevented from inactivity\n(anenergêsia). Note that Sextus does not describe the\nskeptic as performing actions in the sense of dogmatic theory of\naction, which involves belief and choice (cf. M\n11.162–166). Contrary to the Academic skeptic, a Sextan skeptic\ndoes not view themselves as a rational agent, who chooses one course\nof action over another. Sextus claims an active life for the skeptic,\nbut not the life of a rational agent, as conceived by dogmatic\nphilosophers (Vogt 2010; Schwab 2020). This attitude has been\ncritically discussed for a long time, for example, with respect to its\nethical (Bett 2019) and political upshots (Marchand 2015) and with\nrespect to the skeptics’ relation to the law (Marchand\n2021).", "\nThe skeptic’s forced assent is situated in the domain of action\n(PH 1.13, 19, 29–30, 193, 237–8). Thirst, for\nexample, necessitates assent, and that means, it moves the skeptic to\ndrink. This kind of assent may be genuinely unrelated to\nbelief-formation of any kind. Rather, forced assent generates the\nmovement of action. But what about more complex kinds of activities,\nsuch as applying a medication, or attending a festival? Sextus argues\nthat the skeptic adheres to custom, convention, and tradition, and to\nwhat they have been trained to do. In explaining how adherence to\nappearances in these domains generates activity, Sextus does not\nmention assent. However, he might have to concede that, like drinking\nwhen thirsty, more complex actions also involve some kind of assent.\nIn PH 2.102, Sextus says that the sceptic assents\nnon-doxastically (adoxastôs) to the things relied on in\nordinary life. In PH 1.19, he mentions involuntary assent.\nAccordingly, non-doxastic and involuntary assent may figure in those\ndomains of skeptical action that do not involve necessitation by\nbodily affections. Non-doxastic assent is, from the point of view of\nthe Stoics, a contradiction in terms, just like forced and involuntary\nassent. Assent is defined as in our power, and as that by which\nbeliefs are formed. If Sextus intends skeptical assent to be genuinely\nnon-doxastic and involuntary, then it does not have the core features\nof assent as defined by the dogmatists.", "\n(viii) Logic, Physics, Ethics, and the “disciplines.” The\nspecial arguments of the skeptic are directed against particular\ntheories in the three disciplines of Hellenistic philosophy: logic,\nphysics, and ethics. In addition, they address the so-called\ndisciplines, namely grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic,\nastrology, and music-theory. Sextus’ treatments of logic divide\nup into two main topics: sign and criterion (cf. Bett 2005 on signs).\nThis structure reflects central concerns of Hellenistic epistemology\nas well as of ancient skepticism. Skepticism looks for a\n‘decider’ between conflicting appearances and thoughts. A\ndecider could be something evident. Dogmatic philosophers associate\nthe evident with the criterion of truth. For something to serve the\nrole of criterion, it cannot be equally disputed as the matters it\nhelps to decide. Or something non-evident could take on the role of\ndecider. For that to be the case, the skeptics argue, it would have to\nbe conclusively revealed by a sign or proof. If there is no compelling\ntheory of the criterion and no compelling account of sign and proof,\nthen there is nothing that can decide between several conflicting\nviews. Sextus’ treatises on logic thus are not simply a\ncollection of individual arguments against various dogmatic theories.\nTheir main line of thought sketches a route into\nskepticism. Along these lines, Vlasits (2020b) argues that\nSextus’ treatment of logic in PH 2 is unified. Sextus’\nargument is structured such as to lead to suspension of judgment on\nthe methodologies of the dogmatists. The final section of M 8 (463–81)\nformulates a challenge for the skeptic that scholars interested in\nself-refutational arguments have examined (Castagnoli 2010): does the\nskeptic aim to prove that proof does not exist (Sienkiewicz\n2022)?", "\nSextus’ discussions of ethics also focus on issues that\nplausibly lead into skepticism. Again, there are two central\nquestions: whether there is anything good and bad by nature; and\nwhether there is an art of life (Bett 2010, 2011 and 2019),\nas the Epicureans and Stoics claim there is. If we could settle what\nis good and what is bad, some of the most disturbing anomalies would\nbe resolved. If there were an art of life, there would be a teachable\nbody of knowledge about the good and the bad. In both cases, questions\nthat can cause a great deal of puzzlement would be resolved.\nSextus’ discussions of ethics are in part famous because Sextus\nascribes outlandish and shocking views to the Stoics. As Sextus\nconstrues his arguments, the contrast between ‘ordinary\nlife’ and philosophical views leads to suspension of judgment\n(Vogt 2008a, ch. 1). In the modern tradition, a number of philosophers\nincluding Hegel and Nietzsche have engaged with aspects of\nSextus’ outlook and in particular with the skeptical adherence\nto ordinary life (Berry 2010 and 2020; Bett 2020a). Recently,\nscholars have asked how ethical a skeptic can be, to use a phrased\nemployed by Bett (2019), given that it may seem that suspension of\njudgment on grave ethical challenges can seem facile. At the same\ntime, scholars point out that some dimensions of ethical frameworks\nwent unquestioned a long time, for example, with respect to gender;\nhere suspension of judgment may appear innovative (Olfert\nforthcoming).", "\nThe books on physics discuss god, cause, matter, bodies, mixture,\nmotion, increase and decrease, subtraction and addition, whole and\npart, change, becoming and perishing, rest, place, time, and number.\nNotably, god is one of the topics explored in physics. This stands in\nstark contrast to medieval and early modern discussions, where the\nquest for knowledge of God often frames and motivates engagement with\nskepticism. In PH 3, Sextus prefaces his discussion of arguments\nfor and against the existence of gods by saying that the\nskeptics’ ordinary life without opinions\n(adoxastôs) includes the following: the skeptics say\nthat there are gods, are pious toward the gods, and say that the gods\nare provident. Scholars discuss how this relates to Sextus’\ndiscussions of theology qua topic in physics on the one hand (PH\n3.2–12, M 9.11–194), and to his portrayal of the skeptics’\nordinary life in PH 1 on the other hand (Annas 2011, Veres 2020a). The\nskeptics come to suspend judgment on all central questions in ancient\nphysics (Bett 2012). This means, they come to suspend judgment on\nwhether, for example, there are causes, time, place, and bodies (cf.\nBobzien 2015 and Warren 2015). Their suspension does not merely mean\nthat they have not yet found a satisfying theory of, say, body. It\nmeans that they find themselves unable to say whether there is body\n(Burnyeat 1997). (On the cumulative force of these arguments, see\nsection 5.4.)", "\nThe six books entitled Against those in the Disciplines\n(M 1–6) have traditionally received less attention.\nOnly in the last few years have scholars begun to explore them with\nthe kind of philosophical subtlety that has been brought to bear in\nthe study of ancient skepticism in recent decades. M\n1–6 skeptically examine six fields of study, namely grammar,\nrhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music-theory. Sextus\nbegins with an astonishing move. Contrary to his usual strategy of\nemphasizing the distance between skeptics and dogmatists, he admits\nthat Pyrrhonians and Epicureans share much in viewing standard\ndisciplines as useless (M 1.1–7; cf. Thorsrud 2019).\nGenerally speaking, increased attention to M 1–6 may\nprovide additional occasion to modify the long-standing assumption\nthat the Stoics are Sextus’ most important dogmatic\ninterlocutors. Throughout M 1–6, resonances between\nEpicurean and Pyrrhonian philosophy are remarkably visible (Bett 2018,\n“Introduction”). Engagement with Epicurean philosophy\nshapes Sextus’ approach deeply, to the extent that both schools,\nStoics and Epicureans, should be considered fundamental points of\nreference.", "\nAfter his remarks on how Pyrrhonians and Epicureans take issue with\nthe presumed usefulness of the disciplines, Sextus lays out general\narguments, suitable for skeptical examination of any field. He argues\nthat, for there to be a discipline, there must be the matter being\ntaught, the teacher, the learner, and the means of learning. If,\nhowever, neither of these things exists, then the discipline\ndoesn’t exist. This is how Sextus proceeds. He argues, or seems\nto argue, for the non-existence of the disciplines (M 1.9).\nAlready in the very first sentence of M 1, Sextus describes\nhis own approach as one of putting forward counterarguments, a\nstrategy that he mentions repeatedly throughout M\n1–6.", "\nThese moves give rise to the most contentious question regarding\nM 1–6. Are these books negatively dogmatic? Or do they\nfit in with Sextus’s outlook in PH 1–3, where\nskeptical arguments are described as leading up to suspension of\njudgment? Bett (2018, “Introduction”) argues that, with\nsome qualifications, Sextus’ approach is to be explained as\nfollows. Sextus lays out counterarguments based on the assumption that\nthe arguments of the dogmatists have already been formulated. For\nthere to be arguments of equal weight on both sides, only the\nanti-dogmatic arguments need to be adduced. The intended effect is\nthat jointly, these opposing sets of arguments lead us to suspend\njudgment. In addition, Bett notes that the remarkable emphasis on\ncounterarguments, non-existence, and uselessness suggests that some of\nthe material in M 1–6 goes back to an earlier phase of\nPyrrhonism.", "\nIn four of the six fields, namely grammar, rhetoric, music, and\nastrology, Sextus admits non-technical versions into the\nskeptic’s life, while subjecting all theoretical claims to\nskeptical examination. For example, he distinguishes between the\nordinary ability to read and write on the one hand and grammar as a\ntechnical discipline on the other, or the ability to play a musical\ninstrument on the one hand and music theory on the other (cf. Corti\n2015b on why this kind of contrast does not come up in the books on\narithmetic and geometry, Corti 2015c on Sextus’ attack on\nthe Platonic-Pythagorean notion of the Two, and Corti\nforthcoming).", "\nIt is remarkable that, qua theoretical field, Sextus examines\nastrology rather than astronomy. The latter would make for a more\ntypical sequence: apart from the fact that in Sextus, logic is\nconsidered part of philosophy rather than a “discipline,”\nthe six fields otherwise correspond to the so-called trivium of\ngrammar, logic, and rhetoric and quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry,\nastronomy, and music theory. Sextus’ attention to astrology\nrather than astronomy highlights a deep feature of his philosophy\n(Corti 2015, Bett 2018). Astronomy, from Sextus’ point of view,\nis concerned with appearances; and hence there is a sense in which the\nskeptic does not object to it. Astronomy, then, is the\n“version” of astrology that skeptics can admit into their\nadherence to ordinary life (M 5.1–3). Presumably,\nastronomy is concerned with predicting things like droughts, floods,\nearthquakes, and plagues based on appearances. Astrology, on the other\nhand, is concerned with matters of great obscurity." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Sextus Empiricus" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "5. Ancient and Modern Skepticism: Transitions", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nHistorians of philosophy sometimes argue that Henri Etienne’s\nrediscovery of Sextus in 1562 initiated an era of epistemology. Early\nmodern engagement with skepticism is here seen as a turn to arguments\nfound in Sextus (Annas-Barnes 1985, 5–7; Bailey 2002,\n1–20). Via Cicero, early modern and modern philosophers seem to\nhave engaged also with Academic arguments (for a recent analysis of\nAcademic skepticism in Hume and Kant, cf. González Quintero\n2022). In particular the beginning of Descartes’\nMeditations may display a kind of Socratic spirit: a\ncommitment to calling into question all one’s beliefs. However,\nearly modern philosophers work within a theologically framed tradition\nthat importantly begins with St. Augustine (354–430) (cf. Menn\n1998 and Lagerlund 2009; on the history of medieval skepticism cf.\nLagerlund ed. 2009; cf. Carriero 2009 on Descartes’ engagement\nwith Aquinas; for an analysis of the transformation of skepticism that\nturns immediately to Descartes, cf. Williams 2010).", "\nA major part of Augustine’s early education consisted in the\nstudy of Cicero’s writings. He was thus closely acquainted with\nAcademic skepticism (Cicero was one kind of Academic skeptic).\nAugustine sees the force of ancient skeptical strategies. Even though\nhe does not become a skeptic, he integrates distinctively skeptical\nmoves into his thought. This has a long-standing effect on the history\nof theology and science. For example, Galileo Galilei is able to cite\nAugustine when he defends himself against the charge that his physics\nis in opposition to the Bible (Letter to the Grand Duchess,\nin Drake 1957). Augustine supplies arguments to the effect that we\nshould keep an open mind. Both our physical theories and our\ninterpretations of the Bible are likely to evolve. This idea figures\nimportantly in Pyrrhonism. Past experience tells us that, on every\ngiven issue, someone eventually came up with a new argument.\nAccordingly, even if the skeptics cannot find an objection to a given\nclaim right now, they expect that in the future, a conflicting view\nwill be formulated.", "\nHowever, such traces of skepticism are integrated into an ultimately\nnon-skeptical philosophy. In Contra Academicos, Augustine\nrecognizes a core feature of ancient skepticism, namely that it is a\ncommitment to ongoing inquiry (cf. Nawar 2019 on Augustine’s\ndefense of knowledge against the skeptics in Contra\nAcademicos 3). The question that Augustine considers vital, then,\nis whether a life devoted to inquiry can be compelling, if seemingly\nthere is no prospect for ever attaining truth (cf. Lagerlund 2009). It\nis as a philosophy of inquiry that skepticism makes a lasting\ncontribution to ethics, continuing, as it were, a Socratic legacy\n(Vogt 2017).", "\nAugustine creates the framework that will become characteristic of\nearly modern discussions. First, in his work skeptical arguments are\nexplored in order to be refuted. Second, the key issue is whether we\nhave knowledge, not whether we should hold anything to be true. In\nAugustine, the background for caring so much about knowledge is the\npressing question of whether we can know God: whether we can know that\nhe exists and what his properties are. This might also be the reason\nwhy knowledge of testimony gains importance (De Trinitate,\n15.12; in Schoedinger 1996). The Bible, or parts of it, might be\nconsidered testimony about God, and accordingly as one possible way of\nattaining knowledge of God.", "\nThird, in the process of asking whether we can have knowledge of God\nit makes sense to distinguish between kinds of knowledge (sensory,\nrational, by testimony, etc.). If we know God, then we do so via one\nof the kinds of knowledge. This becomes a standard feature of\ndiscussions of skepticism. Philosophers go through the different kinds\nof knowledge that are conceivable, and examine them in turn. In\nAugustine as well as later authors, this includes mathematical\nknowledge (Nawar 2022). Though Sextus wrote on geometry and\narithmetic, questions about knowledge in mathematics do not shape\nHellenistic debates between skeptics on the one hand and Epicureans\nand Stoics on the other hand. Fourth, Augustine conceives of what he\ncalls ‘inner knowledge.’ He envisages a skeptical\nscenario. Suppose we have no sensory knowledge, no rational knowledge,\nand no knowledge of testimony. We still know that we think, love,\njudge, live, and are (De Trinitate 15.12). In the City of\nGod 11.26, Augustine uses his well-known phrase “si\nenim fallor, sum” (even if I err, I am). That is, Augustine\nsuggests that we have knowledge of our mental acts (cf. Nawar 2022 on\nAugustine’s concern with self-knowledge). However, Augustine\ndoes not consider these pieces of knowledge foundational. While he\npoints to them when he discusses the challenges of Academic\nskepticism, he does not systematically build upon them in refuting\nskepticism about sense perception, rational knowledge, and knowledge\nof testimony. Rather, he refutes skepticism by stating that God\ncreated us and the things that are known to us; God wanted these\nthings to be known to us (De Trinitate 15.12). In later\nepistemology, the idea of the turn into one’s mind and an\nintrospective access to one’s mental acts becomes a secular\nidea. Augustine is a transitional figure in the philosophy of mind,\nand thereby re-conceives skepticism. By focussing on a gap between\n‘what is in the mind’ and the world outside, he as it were\ninvites external world skepticism (Vogt 2014a). But Augustine is\nconcerned with the path to God: the mind turns into itself and\nfrom there it moves further, toward God (e.g., Confessions 7.\n17,23).", "\nNext to Augustine, Al-Ghazali (1085-1111) plays a major role in\nre-conceiving the questions relevant to skepticism (Menn 2003,\nKukkonen 2009). In The Rescuer From Error, Al-Ghazali\nliterally describes God as the rescuer from error (in Khalidi 2005).\nLike Augustine before and Descartes after him, Al-Ghazali moves\nthrough different cognitive faculties. Do the senses or reason allow\nus to gain knowledge? These questions are framed by the quest for\nknowledge of God. While Augustine thinks that knowledge of God comes\nthrough a combination of seeking God on the one hand and God’s\ngrace on the other, Al-Ghazali thinks it comes through spiritual\nexercises. However, once confidence in God is secured, trust in the\nmore familiar ways of gaining knowledge—sense perception,\nrational reasoning, and so on—is restored (for a detailed\ntreatment of skepticism in Classical Islam, cf. Heck 2014).", "\nOne key difference between ancient skepticism on the one hand, and\nmedieval as well as Cartesian skepticism on the other, is that ancient\nskepticism is not framed by theological concerns. Note that in\nCartesian skepticism, God is not only invoked when it comes to\nrefuting skepticism. More importantly, the skeptical problems arise in\na way that depends on God as creator. Our cognitive faculties are seen\nas created faculties, and the world as a created world. A kind of\n‘faculty-skepticism’ that asks whether our cognitive\nfaculties are built so as to be erroneous is formulated, and a\npotential gap between our minds and the world opens up. Perhaps God\nmade us in such a way that we are fundamentally wrong about everything\n(or, as later secular versions have it, a mad scientist experiments on\na “brain in a vat”).", "\nThese are important steps away from the non-theological ancient\nconstrual of skepticism. The theological premises of early modern\nskepticism are not only foreign to ancient debates; they would be seen\nas misguided. From the Hellenistic point of view, theology is part of\nphysics. An account of god is part of an account of the natural world\n(as such, it is unrecognizable as ‘theology’ from the\npoint of view of later theologies). Human beings and their cognitive\nfaculties are natural parts of a natural world. They are organic and\nfunctional parts, interconnected with the other parts of the large\nwhole which the universe is. A mind-world-gap (of the kind envisaged\nin the Cartesian tradition) is inconceivable. Each ‘mind,’\nand that is, rational soul, is an integrated physical part of the\nphysical world. Like a part of a complex organism, it would not exist\nwere it not for the interrelations it has with the other parts. A\nphysiological account of the mind makes the stark divide between mind\nand world that figures in early modern skepticism unimaginable." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Augustine: Re-Conceiving Skepticism in a Theological Framework" }, { "content": [ "\nContemporary discussions inherit long-standing problems from early\nmodern philosophy. Among them, external world skepticism, skepticism\nabout other minds, and skepticism about induction are particularly\nprominent. In assessing ancient skepticism, we might ask whether the\nancients saw these problems.", "\nAmong the skeptical problems of modern philosophy, skepticism about\ninduction stands out. Its early formulation in Hume does not depend on\nthe idea that our faculties are created by God, who also created the\nworld. Hume takes himself to engage with Pyrrhonian skepticism\n(Ainslie 2003). Induction proceeds from particular observations to a\ngeneral conclusion. Skepticism about induction points out that, no\nmatter how many particulars were observed, the general claim\npronounces also on what has not been observed. In this respect, the\ninference seems unwarranted and so we should suspend judgement on its\neffectiveness. Induction can concern the ascription of properties to\nsome kind of entity as well as causal claims. In the latter, the\nskeptic observes that what regularly precedes a type of event may not\nbe its cause. Perhaps we cannot infer anything from the fact that\ncertain properties or events regularly occur together (Vlasits 2020a;\nfor a related argument in Al-Ghazali, cf. Kukkonen 2009).", "\nRelevant ideas can be traced in various aspects of Sextus’\nphilosophy. First, Sextus sides with anti-rationalist tendencies in\nmedicine. According to these schools, a doctor remembers that, in\nearlier cases, symptom A was alleviated by medication\nB. They do not infer that medication B makes symptom\nA disappear, or that the illness C is the cause of\nsymptom A. Second, the Five Modes do not exclusively target\nproof. They address everything that lends credibility to something\nelse. They may thus also call into question signs that are taken as\nindicative of their causes. Sextus’ skeptic does not accept such\nindicative signs. Third, Sextus discusses the role of so-called\ncommemorative signs in the skeptic’s life (PH\n2.100–102; Allen 2001). For example, a scar is a commemorative\nsign of a wound. Both were co-observed in the past. A skeptic will\nthink of a wound when seeing a scar. But they do not commit to causal\nor explanatory claims. Fourth, Sextus records a set of Causal Modes\n(PH 1.180–86), which are specifically targeted toward\ncausal explanations (Corti 2014; on the relation between the Causal\nModes and Hume cf. Garrett 2020). He does not ascribe the kind of\nrelevance to them that the Ten Modes and the Five Modes have. Indeed,\nhe thinks the Five Modes can do the work of Causal Modes (that is,\ncall into question causal and explanatory theses and theories).\nHowever, the Causal Modes go into great detail on how the skeptic\ninvestigates any kind of causal thesis or theory." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Skepticism About Induction" }, { "content": [ "\nThe distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is central to\nmodern discussions of skepticism. It is not envisaged in ancient\nthought. However, this does not mean that ancient philosophers do not\nreflect on questions relevant to this distinction. Arguably,\nPyrrhonism conceives of the affections of the mind in ways that\nanticipate later thought about subjectivity (Fine 2003a and 2003b).\nSextus describes the skeptic’s states of\n‘being-appeared-to’ as affections of the mind. A skeptic\ncan report these states in their utterances. Illustrating this point,\nSextus uses expressions associated with the Cyrenaics, a Socratic\nschool of thought. These expressions literally mean something like\n‘I am being heated’ or ‘I am being whitened.’\nThey aim to record affections without claiming anything about the\nworld. Fine argues that the skeptic’s beliefs are beliefs about\nthese affections (2000). With this proposal, Fine turns against two\nprominent positions in scholarly debate about skeptical belief (see\nsection 4.4), that skeptics have no beliefs whatsoever, and that they\nhave beliefs that fall short of holding true. Fine envisages\nreflective beliefs: beliefs about one’s states of mind (on\nrelated issues in contemporary epistemology, cf. Feeney and\nSchellenberg 2020 and Glüer 2020).", "\nWhether or not Sextus’ account of the skeptic’s mental\nlife includes reflective beliefs about one’s mental states, we\nshould note an important difference to later proposals of that kind.\nLater philosophers focus on the particular kind of certainty attached\nto reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge is sometimes seen as a\nstepping-stone towards greater confidence in our cognitive powers, and\nour ability to also attain other kinds of knowledge. But it may not be\nobvious that reflective knowledge can take on this important role. In\nthis respect, Augustine is still closer to ancient than to modern\nintuitions. He says that such pieces of knowledge as “I know\nthat I think” are not what we are looking for. Augustine\nenvisages that reflective knowledge-claims can be iterated, so that we\nwould have infinitely many pieces of knowledge (“I know that I\nknow that I think…”). But from his point of view, this\nkind of knowledge leads nowhere. When we ask whether we can have\nknowledge, we are interested in knowledge of the world and of God\n(De Trinitate 15.12).", "\nModern philosophers also pay great attention to the privileged access\ncognizers have to their own cognitive activities. Augustine introduces\na distinction that paves the way for this idea. He argues that the\nmind cannot know what kind of stuff it is (De Trinitate 10.10\nand 15.12). The mind does not know its substance, but it knows its\nactivities. For Augustine, this means that the mind knows itself. The\nmind is precisely what it knows itself to be: in knowing that one\nthinks, judges, lives, and so on, one knows the mind (Vogt 2014a).\nNote that this argument indicates that knowing that one lives and is\nare not pieces of knowledge about one’s bodily existence, but\nabout the activities of the mind.", "\nFinally, modern philosophers conceive of the special kind of access to\none’s own mind not only in contrast with our access to the\nworld. They also compare it to our access to what goes on in other\nminds. One of their core problems is skepticism about other minds. If\nour own minds are accessible to us in the way nothing else is, then we\nmight not be able to ascribe mental states to others. For example, we\nmight not know that someone who looks as if she is in pain really is\nin pain. The ancient skeptics envisage nothing of this kind (Warren\n2011). This suggests that, insofar as they draw a distinction between\naffections of the mind and the world, this distinction is construed\ndifferently than in modern skepticism." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Subjectivity and Other Minds" } ] } ]	[ "Annas, J. and J. Barnes (ed. and trans.), 2000, Sextus\nEmpiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, 2nd edition.", "Bett, R. (ed. and trans. with commentary), 1997, Sextus\nEmpiricus: Against the Ethicists (Adversus Mathematicos XI),\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Bett, R. (ed. and trans. with commentary), 2005, Sextus\nEmpiricus: Against the Logicians, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Bett, R. (ed. and trans. with commentary), 2012, Sextus\nEmpiricus: Against the Physicists, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Bett, R. (trans. with an introduction and notes), 2018, Sextus\nEmpiricus: Against Those in the Disciplines, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Bettenson, H. 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Vogt (ed.) 2015, pp. 105–121.", "Williams, M., 1988, “Skepticism without Theory,”\nThe Review of Metaphysics, 41 (3): 547–588.", "–––, 2010, “Descartes’\nTransformation of the Sceptical Tradition,” in Bett (ed.) 2010,\npp. 288–313.", "Woodruff, P., 1986, “The sceptical side of Plato’s\nmethod,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 40:\n22–37.", "–––, 1988, “Aporetic Pyrrhonism”,\nOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 6: 139–68.", "–––, 2010, “The Pyrrhonian Modes,”\nin Bett (ed.) 2010, pp. 208–231." ]	[ { "href": "../arcesilaus/", "text": "Arcesilaus" }, { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../carneades/", "text": "Carneades" }, { "href": "../skepticism-moral/", "text": "moral skepticism" }, { "href": "../perception-episprob/", "text": "perception: epistemological problems of" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../pyrrho/", "text": "Pyrrho" }, { "href": "../skepticism/", "text": "skepticism" }, { "href": "../skepticism-medieval/", "text": "skepticism: medieval" }, { "href": "../stoicism/", "text": "Stoicism" }, { "href": "../timon-phlius/", "text": "Timon of Phlius" } ]
aesthetic-concept	The Concept of the Aesthetic	First published Fri Sep 11, 2009; substantive revision Mon Feb 28, 2022	[ "\nIntroduced into the philosophical lexicon during the Eighteenth\nCentury, the term ‘aesthetic’ has come to designate, among\nother things, a kind of object, a kind of judgment, a kind of\nattitude, a kind of experience, and a kind of value. For the most\npart, aesthetic theories have divided over questions\nparticular to one or another of these designations: whether\nartworks are necessarily aesthetic objects; how to square the\nallegedly perceptual basis of aesthetic judgments with the fact that\nwe give reasons in support of them; how best to capture the elusive\ncontrast between an aesthetic attitude and a practical one; whether to\ndefine aesthetic experience according to its phenomenological or\nrepresentational content; how best to understand the relation between\naesthetic value and aesthetic experience. But questions of more\ngeneral nature have lately arisen, and these have tended to\nhave a skeptical cast: whether any use of ‘aesthetic’ may\nbe explicated without appeal to some other; whether agreement\nrespecting any use is sufficient to ground meaningful theoretical\nagreement or disagreement; whether the term ultimately answers to any\nlegitimate philosophical purpose that justifies its inclusion in the\nlexicon. The skepticism expressed by such general questions did not\nbegin to take hold until the later part of the 20th century, and this\nfact prompts the question whether (a) the concept of the aesthetic is\ninherently problematic and it is only recently that we have managed to\nsee that it is, or (b) the concept is fine and it is only recently\nthat we have become muddled enough to imagine otherwise. Adjudicating\nbetween these possibilities requires a vantage from which to take in\nboth early and late theorizing on aesthetic matters." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Concept of Taste", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Immediacy", "1.2 Disinterest" ] }, { "content_title": "2. The Concept of the Aesthetic", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Aesthetic Objects", "2.2 Aesthetic Judgment", "2.3 The Aesthetic Attitude", "2.4 Aesthetic Experience", "2.5 Aesthetic Value" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe concept of the aesthetic descends from the concept of taste. Why\nthe concept of taste commanded so much philosophical attention during\nthe 18th century is a complicated matter, but this much is clear: the\neighteenth-century theory of taste emerged, in part, as a corrective\nto the rise of rationalism, particularly as applied to beauty, and to\nthe rise of egoism, particularly as applied to virtue. Against\nrationalism about beauty, the eighteenth-century theory of taste held\nthe judgment of beauty to be immediate; against egoism about virtue,\nit held the pleasure of beauty to be disinterested." ], "section_title": "1. The Concept of Taste", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nRationalism about beauty is the view that judgments of beauty are\njudgments of reason, i.e., that we judge things to be beautiful by\nreasoning it out, where reasoning it out typically involves inferring\nfrom principles or applying concepts. At the beginning of the 18th\ncentury, rationalism about beauty had achieved dominance on the\ncontinent, and was being pushed to new extremes by “les\ngéomètres,” a group of literary theorists who\naimed to bring to literary criticism the mathematical rigor that\nDescartes had brought to physics. As one such theorist put it:", "\nThe way to think about a literary problem is that pointed out by\nDescartes for problems of physical science. A critic who tries any\nother way is not worthy to be living in the present century. There is\nnothing better than mathematics as propaedeutic for literary\ncriticism. (Terrasson 1715, Preface, 65; quoted in Wimsatt and Brooks\n1957, 258)\n", "\nIt was against this, and against more moderate forms of rationalism\nabout beauty, that mainly British philosophers working mainly within\nan empiricist framework began to develop theories of taste. The\nfundamental idea behind any such theory—which we may call\nthe immediacy thesis—is that judgments of beauty are\nnot (or at least not canonically) mediated by inferences from\nprinciples or applications of concepts, but rather have all the\nimmediacy of straightforwardly sensory judgments. It is the idea, in\nother words, that we do not reason to the conclusion that things are\nbeautiful, but rather “sense” that they are. Here is an\nearly expression of the thesis, from Jean-Baptiste Dubos’s\nCritical Reflections on Poetry, Painting, and Music, which\nfirst appeared in 1719:", "\nDo we ever reason, in order to know whether a ragoo be good or bad;\nand has it ever entered into any body’s head, after having\nsettled the geometrical principles of taste, and defined the qualities\nof each ingredient that enters into the composition of those messes,\nto examine into the proportion observed in their mixture, in order to\ndecide whether it be good or bad? No, this is never practiced. We have\na sense given us by nature to distinguish whether the cook acted\naccording to the rules of his art. People taste the ragoo, and\ntho’ unacquainted with those rules, they are able to tell\nwhether it be good or no. The same may be said in some respect of the\nproductions of the mind, and of pictures made to please and move us.\n(Dubos 1748, vol. II, 238–239)\n", "\nAnd here is a late expression, from Kant’s 1790 Critique of\nthe Power of Judgment:", "\nIf someone reads me his poem or takes me to a play that in the end\nfails to please my taste, then he can adduce Batteux or Lessing, or\neven older and more famous critics of taste, and adduce all the rules\nthey established as proofs that his poem is beautiful… . I will\nstop my ears, listen to no reasons and arguments, and would rather\nbelieve that those rules of the critics are false … than allow\nthat my judgment should be determined by means of a priori\ngrounds of proof, since it is supposed to be a judgment of taste and\nnot of the understanding of reason. (Kant 1790, 165)\n", "\nBut the theory of taste would not have enjoyed its eighteenth-century\nrun, nor would it continue now to exert its influence, had it been\nwithout resources to counter an obvious rationalist objection. There\nis a wide difference—so goes the objection—between judging\nthe excellence of a ragout and judging the excellence of a poem or a\nplay. More often than not, poems and plays are objects of great\ncomplication. But taking in all that complication requires a lot of\ncognitive work, including the application of concepts and the drawing\nof inferences. Judging the beauty of poems and plays, then, is\nevidently not immediate and so evidently not a matter of taste.", "\nThe chief way of meeting this objection was first to distinguish\nbetween the act of grasping the object preparatory to judging it and\nthe act of judging the object once grasped, and then to allow the\nformer, but not the latter, to be as concept- and inference-mediated\nas any rationalist might wish. Here is Hume, with characteristic\nclarity:", "\n[I]n order to pave the way for [a judgment of taste], and give a\nproper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that\nmuch reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just\nconclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations\nexamined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. Some species of\nbeauty, especially the natural kinds, on their first appearance\ncommand our affection and approbation; and where they fail of this\neffect, it is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence,\nor adapt them better to our taste and sentiment. But in many orders of\nbeauty, particularly those of the fine arts, it is requisite to employ\nmuch reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment. (Hume, 1751,\nSection I)\n", "\nHume—like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson before him, and Reid after\nhim (Cooper 1711, 17, 231; Hutcheson 1725, 16–24; Reid 1785,\n760–761)—regarded the faculty of taste as a kind of\n“internal sense.” Unlike the five “external”\nor “direct” senses, an “internal” (or\n“reflex” or “secondary”) sense is one that\ndepends for its objects on the antecedent operation of some other\nmental faculty or faculties. Reid characterizes internal sense as\nfollows:", "\nBeauty or deformity in an object, results from its nature or\nstructure. To perceive the beauty therefore, we must perceive the\nnature or structure from which it results. In this the internal sense\ndiffers from the external. Our external senses may discover qualities\nwhich do not depend upon any antecedent perception… . But it is\nimpossible to perceive the beauty of an object, without perceiving the\nobject, or at least conceiving it. (Reid 1785, 760–761)\n", "\nBecause of the highly complex natures or structures of many beautiful\nobjects, there will have to be a role for reason in their perception.\nBut perceiving the nature or structure of an object is one thing.\nPerceiving its beauty is another." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Immediacy" }, { "content": [ "\nEgoism about virtue is the view that to judge an action or trait\nvirtuous is to take pleasure in it because you believe it to serve\nsome interest of yours. Its central instance is the Hobbesian\nview—still very much on early eighteenth-century\nminds—that to judge an action or trait virtuous is to take\npleasure in it because you believe it to promote your safety. Against\nHobbesian egoism a number of British moralists—preeminently\nShaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume—argued that, while a judgment\nof virtue is a matter of taking pleasure in response to an action or\ntrait, the pleasure is disinterested, by which they meant that it is\nnot self-interested (Cooper 1711, 220–223; Hutcheson 1725, 9,\n25–26; Hume 1751, 218–232, 295–302). One argument\nwent roughly as follows. That we judge virtue by means of an immediate\nsensation of pleasure means that judgments of virtue are judgments of\ntaste, no less than judgments of beauty. But pleasure in the beautiful\nis not self-interested: we judge objects to be beautiful whether or\nnot we believe them to serve our interests. But if pleasure in the\nbeautiful is disinterested, there is no reason to think that pleasure\nin the virtuous cannot also be (Hutcheson 1725, 9–10).", "\nThe eighteenth-century view that judgments of virtue are judgments of\ntaste highlights a difference between the eighteenth-century concept\nof taste and our concept of the aesthetic, since for us the concepts\naesthetic and moral tend oppose one another such\nthat a judgment’s falling under one typically precludes its\nfalling under the other. Kant is chiefly responsible for introducing\nthis difference. He brought the moral and the aesthetic into\nopposition by re-interpreting what we might call the disinterest\nthesis—the thesis that pleasure in the beautiful is\ndisinterested (though see Cooper 1711, 222 and Home 2005, 36–38\nfor anticipations of Kant’s re-interpretation).", "\nAccording to Kant, to say that a pleasure is interested is not to say\nthat it is self-interested in the Hobbesian sense, but rather that it\nstands in a certain relation to the faculty of desire. The pleasure\ninvolved in judging an action to be morally good is interested because\nsuch a judgment issues in a desire to bring the action into existence,\ni.e., to perform it. To judge an action to be morally good is to\nbecome aware that one has a duty to perform the action, and to become\nso aware is to gain a desire to perform it. By contrast, the pleasure\ninvolved in judging an object to be beautiful is disinterested because\nsuch a judgment issues in no desire to do anything in particular. If\nwe can be said to have a duty with regard to beautiful things, it\nappears to be exhausted in our judging them aesthetically to be\nbeautiful. That is what Kant means when he says that the judgment of\ntaste is not practical but rather “merely contemplative”\n(Kant 1790, 95).", "\nBy thus re-orienting the notion of disinterest, Kant brought the\nconcept of taste into opposition with the concept of morality, and so\ninto line, more or less, with the present concept of the aesthetic.\nBut if the Kantian concept of taste is continuous, more or less, with\nthe present-day concept of the aesthetic, why the terminological\ndiscontinuity? Why have we come to prefer the term\n‘aesthetic’ to the term ‘taste’? The not very\ninteresting answer appears to be that we have preferred an adjective\nto a noun. The term ‘aesthetic’ derives from the Greek\nterm for sensory perception, and so preserves the implication of\nimmediacy carried by the term ‘taste.’ Kant employed both\nterms, though not equivalently: according to his usage,\n‘aesthetic’ is broader, picking out a class of judgments\nthat includes both the normative judgment of taste and the\nnon-normative, though equally immediate, judgment of the agreeable.\nThough Kant was not the first modern to use ‘aesthetic’\n(Baumgarten had used it as early as 1735), the term became widespread\nonly, though quickly, after his employment of it in the third\nCritique. Yet the employment that became widespread was not exactly\nKant’s, but a narrower one according to which\n‘aesthetic’ simply functions as an adjective corresponding\nto the noun “taste.” So for example we find Coleridge, in\n1821, expressing the wish that he “could find a more familiar\nword than aesthetic for works of taste and criticism,” before\ngoing on to argue:", "\nAs our language … contains no other useable adjective,\nto express coincidence of form, feeling, and intellect, that\nsomething, which, confirming the inner and the outward senses, becomes\na new sense in itself … there is reason to hope, that the term\naesthetic, will be brought into common use. (Coleridge 1821,\n254)\n", "\nThe availability of an adjective corresponding to “taste”\nhas allowed for the retiring of a series of awkward expressions: the\nexpressions “judgment of taste,” “emotion of\ntaste” and “quality of taste” have given way to the\narguably less offensive ‘aesthetic judgment,’\n‘aesthetic emotion,’ and ‘aesthetic quality.’\nHowever, as the noun ‘taste’ phased out, we became saddled\nwith other perhaps equally awkward expressions, including the one that\nnames this entry." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Disinterest" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nMuch of the history of more recent thinking about the concept of the\naesthetic can be seen as the history of the development of the\nimmediacy and disinterest theses." ], "section_title": "2. The Concept of the Aesthetic", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nArtistic formalism is the view that the artistically relevant\nproperties of an artwork—the properties in virtue of which it is\nan artwork and in virtue of which it is a good or bad one—are\nformal merely, where formal properties are typically regarded as\nproperties graspable by sight or by hearing merely. Artistic formalism\nhas been taken to follow from both the immediacy and the disinterest\ntheses (Binkley 1970, 266–267; Carroll 2001, 20–40). If\nyou take the immediacy thesis to imply the artistic irrelevance of all\nproperties whose grasping requires the use of reason, and you include\nrepresentational properties in that class, then you are apt to think\nthat the immediacy thesis implies artistic formalism. If you take the\ndisinterest thesis to imply the artistic irrelevance of all properties\ncapable of practical import, and you include representational\nproperties in that class, then you are apt to think that the\ndisinterest thesis implies artistic formalism.", "\nThis is not to suggest that the popularity enjoyed by artistic\nformalism during the late 19th and early 20th centuries owed mainly to\nits inference from the immediacy or disinterest theses. The most\ninfluential advocates of formalism during this period were\nprofessional critics, and their formalism derived, at least in part,\nfrom the artistic developments with which they were concerned. As a\ncritic Eduard Hanslick advocated for the pure music of Mozart,\nBeethoven, Schumann, and later Brahms, and against the dramatically\nimpure music of Wagner; as a theorist he urged that music has no\ncontent but “tonally moving forms” (Hanslick 1986, 29). As\na critic Clive Bell was an early champion of the post-Impressionists,\nespecially Cezanne; as a theorist he maintained that the formal\nproperties of painting—“relations and combinations of\nlines and colours”—alone have artistic relevance (Bell\n1958, 17–18). As a critic Clement Greenberg was abstract\nexpressionism’s ablest defender; as a theorist he held\npainting’s “proper area of competence” to be\nexhausted by flatness, pigment, and shape (Greenberg 1986,\n86–87).", "\nNot every influential defender of formalism has also been a\nprofessional critic. Monroe Beardsley, who arguably gave formalism its\nmost sophisticated articulation, was not (Beardsley 1958). Nor is Nick\nZangwill, who recently has mounted a spirited and resourceful defense\nof a moderate version of formalism (Zangwill 2001). But formalism has\nalways been sufficiently motivated by art-critical data that once\nArthur Danto made the case that the data no longer supported it, and\nperhaps never really had, formalism’s heyday came to an end.\nInspired in particular by Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, which\nare (more or less) perceptually indistinguishable from the\nbrand-printed cartons in which boxes of Brillo were delivered to\nsupermarkets, Danto observed that for most any artwork it is possible\nto imagine both (a) another object that is perceptually indiscernible\nfrom it but which is not an artwork, and (b) another artwork that is\nperceptually indiscernible from it but which differs in artistic\nvalue. From these observations he concluded that form alone neither\nmakes an artwork nor gives it whatever value it has (Danto 1981,\n94–95; Danto 1986, 30–31; Danto 1997, 91).", "\nBut Danto has taken the possibility of such perceptual indiscernibles\nto show the limitations not merely of form but also of aesthetics, and\nhe has done so on the grounds, apparently, that the formal and the\naesthetic are co-extensive. Regarding a urinal Duchamp once exhibited\nand a perceptual indiscernible ordinary urinal, Danto maintains\nthat", "\naesthetics could not explain why one was a work of fine art and the\nother not, since for all practical purposes they were aesthetically\nindiscernible: if one was beautiful, the other one had to be\nbeautiful, since they looked just alike. (Danto 2003, 7)\n", "\nBut the inference from the limits of the artistically formal to the\nlimits of the artistically aesthetic is presumably only as strong as\nthe inferences from the immediacy and disinterest theses to artistic\nformalism, and these are not beyond question. The inference from the\ndisinterest thesis appears to go through only if you employ a stronger\nnotion of disinterest than the one Kant understands himself to be\nemploying: Kant, it is worth recalling, regards poetry as the highest\nof the fine arts precisely because of its capacity to employ\nrepresentational content in the expression of what he calls\n‘aesthetic ideas’ (Kant 1790, 191–194; see Costello\n2008 and 2013 for extended treatment of the capacity of Kantian\naesthetics to accommodate conceptual art). The inference from the\nimmediacy thesis appears to go through only if you employ a notion of\nimmediacy stronger than the one Hume, for example, takes himself to be\ndefending when he claims (in a passage quoted in section1.1) that\n“in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the fine arts,\nit is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper\nsentiment” (Hume 1751, 173). It may be that artistic formalism\nresults if you push either of the tendencies embodied in the immediacy\nand disinterest theses to extremes. It may be that the history of\naesthetics from the 18th century to the mid-Twentieth is largely the\nhistory of pushing those two tendencies to extremes. It does not\nfollow that those tendencies must be so pushed.", "\nConsider Warhol’s Brillo Boxes. Danto is right to\nmaintain that the eighteenth-century theorist of taste would not know\nhow to regard it as an artwork. But this is because the\neighteenth-century theorist of taste lives in the 18th century, and so\nwould be unable to situate that work in its twentieth-century\nart-historical context, and not because the kind of theory she holds\nforbids her from situating a work in its art-historical context. When\nHume, for instance, observes that artists address their works to\nparticular, historically-situated audiences, and that a critic\ntherefore “must place herself in the same situation as the\naudience” to whom a work is addressed (Hume 1757, 239), he is\nallowing that artworks are cultural products, and that the properties\nthat works have as the cultural products they are are among the\n“ingredients of the composition” that a critic must grasp\nif she is to feel the proper sentiment. Nor does there seem to be\nanything in the celebrated conceptuality of Brillo Boxes, nor\nof any other conceptual work, that ought to give the\neighteenth-century theorist pause. Francis Hutcheson asserts that\nmathematical and scientific theorems are objects of taste (Hutcheson\n1725, 36–41). Alexander Gerard asserts that scientific\ndiscoveries and philosophical theories are objects of taste (Gerard\n1757, 6). Neither argues for his assertion. Both regard it as\ncommonplace that objects of intellect may be objects of taste as\nreadily as objects of sight and hearing may be. Why should the\npresent-day aesthetic theorist think otherwise? If an object is\nconceptual in nature, grasping its nature will require intellectual\nwork. If grasping an object’s conceptual nature requires\nsituating it art-historically, then the intellectual work required to\ngrasp its nature will include situating it art-historically.\nBut—as Hume and Reid held (see section 1.1)—grasping the\nnature of an object preparatory to aesthetically judging it is one\nthing; aesthetically judging the object once grasped is another.", "\nThough Danto has been the most influential and persistent critic of\nformalism, his criticisms are no more decisive than those advanced by\nKendall Walton in his essay “Categories of Art.”\nWalton’s anti-formalist argument hinges on two main theses, one\npsychological and one philosophical. According to the psychological\nthesis, which aesthetic properties we perceive a work as having\ndepends on which category we perceive the work as belonging to.\nPerceived as belonging to the category of painting, Picasso’s\nGuernica will be perceived as “violent, dynamic, vital,\ndisturbing” (Walton 1970, 347). But perceived as belonging to\nthe category of “guernicas”—where guernicas are\nworks with “surfaces with the colors and shapes of\nPicasso’s Guernica, but the surfaces are molded to\nprotrude from the wall like relief maps of different kinds of\nterrain”—Picasso’s Guernica will be\nperceived not as violent and dynamic, but as “cold, stark,\nlifeless, or serene and restful, or perhaps bland, dull, boring”\n(Walton 1970, 347). That Picasso’s Guernica can be\nperceived both as violent and dynamic and as not violent and not\ndynamic might be thought to imply that there is no fact of the matter\nwhether it is violent and dynamic. But this implication holds only on\nthe assumption that there is no fact of the matter which category\nPicasso’s Guernica actually belongs to, and this\nassumption appears to be false given that Picasso intended that\nGuernica be a painting and did not intend that it be a\nguernica, and that the category of paintings was well-established in\nthe society in which Picasso painted it while the category of\nguernicas was not. Hence the philosophical thesis, according to which\nthe aesthetic properties a work actually has are those it is perceived\nas having when perceived as belonging to the category (or categories)\nit actually belongs to. Since the properties of having been intended\nto be a painting and having been created in a society in which\npainting is well-established category are artistically relevant though\nnot graspable merely by seeing (or hearing) the work, it seems that\nartistic formalism cannot be true. “I do not deny,” Walton\nconcludes, “that paintings and sonatas are to be judged solely\non what can be seen or heard in them—when they are perceived\ncorrectly. But examining a work with the senses can by itself reveal\nneither how it is correct to perceive it, nor how to perceive it that\nway” (Walton 1970, 367).", "\nBut if we cannot judge which aesthetic properties paintings and\nsonatas have without consulting the intentions and the societies of\nthe artists who created them, what of the aesthetic properties of\nnatural items? With respect to them it may appear as if there is\nnothing to consult except the way they look and sound, so that an\naesthetic formalism about nature must be true. Allen Carlson, a\ncentral figure in the burgeoning field of the aesthetics of nature,\nargues against this appearance. Carlson observes that Walton’s\npsychological thesis readily transfers from works of art to natural\nitems: that we perceive Shetland ponies as cute and charming and\nClydesdales as lumbering surely owes to our perceiving them as\nbelonging to the category of horses (Carlson 1981, 19). He also\nmaintains that the philosophical thesis transfers: whales actually\nhave the aesthetic properties we perceive them as having when we\nperceive them as mammals, and do not actually have any contrasting\naesthetic properties we might perceive them to have when we perceive\nthem as fish. If we ask what determines which category or categories\nnatural items actually belong to, the answer, according to Carlson, is\ntheir natural histories as discovered by natural science (Carlson\n1981, 21–22). Inasmuch as a natural item’s natural history\nwill tend not to be graspable by merely seeing or hearing it,\nformalism is no truer of natural items than it is of works of art.", "\nThe claim that Walton’s psychological thesis transfers to\nnatural items has been widely accepted (and was in fact anticipated,\nas Carlson acknowledges, by Ronald Hepburn (Hepburn 1966 and 1968)).\nThe claim that Walton’s philosophical thesis transfers to\nnatural items has proven more controversial. Carlson is surely right\nthat aesthetic judgments about natural items are prone to be mistaken\ninsofar as they result from perceptions of those items as belonging to\ncategories to which they do not belong, and, insofar as determining\nwhich categories natural items actually belong to requires scientific\ninvestigation, this point seems sufficient to undercut the\nplausibility of any very strong formalism about nature (see Carlson\n1979 for independent objections against such formalism). Carlson,\nhowever, also wishes to establish that aesthetic judgments about\nnatural items have whatever objectivity aesthetic judgments about\nworks of art do, and it is controversial whether Walton’s\nphilosophical claim transfers sufficiently to support such a claim.\nOne difficulty, raised by Malcolm Budd (Budd 2002 and 2003) and Robert\nStecker (Stecker1997c), is that since there are many categories in\nwhich a given natural item may correctly be perceived, it is unclear\nwhich correct category is the one in which the item is perceived as\nhaving the aesthetic properties it actually has. Perceived as\nbelonging to the category of Shetland ponies, a large Shetland pony\nmay be perceived as lumbering; perceived as belonging to the category\nof horses, the same pony may be perceived as cute and charming but\ncertainly not lumbering. If the Shetland pony were a work of art, we\nmight appeal to the intentions (or society) of its creator to\ndetermine which correct category is the one that fixes its aesthetic\ncharacter. But as natural items are not human creations they can give\nus no basis for deciding between equally correct but aesthetically\ncontrasting categorizations. It follows, according to Budd, “the\naesthetic appreciation of nature is endowed with a freedom denied to\nthe appreciation of art” (Budd 2003, 34), though this is perhaps\nmerely another way of saying that the aesthetic appreciation of art is\nendowed with an objectivity denied to the appreciation of nature." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Aesthetic Objects" }, { "content": [ "\nThe eighteenth-century debate between rationalists and theorists of\ntaste (or sentimentalists) was primarily a debate over the immediacy\nthesis, i.e., over whether we judge objects to be beautiful by\napplying principles of beauty to them. It was not primarily a debate\nover the existence of principles of beauty, a matter over which\ntheorists of taste might disagree. Kant denied that there are any such\nprinciples (Kant 1790, 101), but both Hutcheson and Hume affirmed\ntheir existence: they maintained that although judgments of beauty are\njudgments of taste and not of reason, taste nevertheless operates\naccording to general principles, which might be discovered through\nempirical investigation (Hutcheson 1725, 28–35; Hume 1757,\n231–233).", "\nIt is tempting to think of recent debate in aesthetics between\nparticularists and generalists as a revival of the eighteenth-century\ndebate between rationalists and theorists of taste. But the accuracy\nof this thought is difficult to gauge. One reason is that it is often\nunclear whether particularists and generalists take themselves merely\nto be debating the existence of aesthetic principles or to be debating\ntheir employment in aesthetic judgment. Another is that, to the degree\nparticularists and generalists take themselves to be debating the\nemployment of aesthetic principles in aesthetic judgment, it is hard\nto know what they can be meaning by ‘aesthetic judgment.’\nIf ‘aesthetic’ still carries its eighteenth-century\nimplication of immediacy, then the question under debate is whether\njudgment that is immediate is immediate. If ‘aesthetic’ no\nlonger carries that implication, then it is hard to know what question\nis under debate because it is hard to know what aesthetic judgment\ncould be. It may be tempting to think that we can simply re-define\n‘aesthetic judgment’ such that it refers to any judgment\nin which an aesthetic property is predicated of an object. But this\nrequires being able to say what an aesthetic property is without\nreference to its being immediately graspable, something no one seems\nto have done. It may seem that we can simply re-define\n‘aesthetic judgment’ such that it refers to any judgment\nin which any property of the class exemplified by beauty is predicated\nof an object. But which class is this? The classes exemplified by\nbeauty are presumably endless, and the difficulty is to specify the\nrelevant class without reference to the immediate graspability of its\nmembers, and that is what no one seems to have done.", "\nHowever we are to sort out the particularist/generalist debate,\nimportant contributions to it include, on the side of particularism,\nArnold Isenberg’s “Critical Communication” (1949)\nFrank Sibley’s “Aesthetic Concepts” (in Sibley 2001)\nand Mary Mothersill’s Beauty Restored (1984) and, on\nthe side of generalism, Monroe Beardsley’s Aesthetics\n(1958) and “On the Generality of Critical Reasons” (1962),\nSibley’s “General Reasons and Criteria in\nAesthetics” (in Sibley 2001), George Dickie’s\nEvaluating Art (1987), Stephen Davies’s “Replies\nto Arguments Suggesting that Critics’ Strong Evaluations Could\nnot be Soundly Deduced” (1995), and John Bender’s\n“General but Defeasible Reasons in Aesthetic Evaluation: The\nGeneralist/Particularist Dispute” (1995). Of these, the papers\nby Isenberg and Sibley have arguably enjoyed the greatest\ninfluence.", "\nIsenberg concedes that we often appeal to descriptive features of\nworks in support of our judgments of their value, and he allows that\nthis may make it seem as if we must be appealing to principles in\nmaking those judgments. If in support of a favorable judgment of some\npainting a critic appeals to the wavelike contour formed by the\nfigures clustered in its foreground, it may seem as if his judgment\nmust involve tacit appeal to the principle that any painting having\nsuch a contour is so much the better. But Isenberg argues that this\ncannot be, since no one agrees to any such principle:", "\nThere is not in all the world’s criticism a single purely\ndescriptive statement concerning which one is prepared to say\nbeforehand, ‘If it is true, I shall like that work so much the\nbetter’ (Isenberg 1949, 338).\n", "\nBut if in appealing to the descriptive features of a work we are not\nacknowledging tacit appeals to principles linking those features to\naesthetic value, what are we doing? Isenberg believes we are offering\n“directions for perceiving” the work, i.e., by singling\nout certain its features, we are “narrow[ing] down the field of\npossible visual orientations” and thereby guiding others in\n“the discrimination of details, the organization of parts, the\ngrouping of discrete objects into patterns” (Isenberg 1949,\n336). In this way we get others to see what we have seen, rather than\ngetting them to infer what we have inferred.", "\nThat Sibley advances a variety of particularism in one paper and a\nvariety of generalism in another will give the appearance of\ninconsistency where there is none: Sibley is a particularist of one\nsort, and with respect to one distinction, and a generalist of another\nsort with respect to another distinction. Isenberg, as noted, is a\nparticularist with respect to the distinction between descriptions and\nverdicts, i.e., he maintains that there are no principles by which we\nmay infer from value-neutral descriptions of works to judgments of\ntheir overall value. Sibley’s particularism and generalism, by\ncontrast, both have to do with judgments falling in between\ndescriptions and verdicts. With respect to a distinction between\ndescriptions and a set of judgments intermediate between descriptions\nand verdicts, Sibley is straightforwardly particularist. With respect\nto a distinction between a set of judgments intermediate between\ndescriptions and verdicts and verdicts, Sibley is a kind of generalist\nand describes himself as such.", "\nSibley’s generalism, as set forth in “General Reasons and\nCriteria in Aesthetics,” begins with the observation that the\nproperties to which we appeal in justification of favorable verdicts\nare not all descriptive or value-neutral. We also appeal to properties\nthat are inherently positive, such as grace, balance, dramatic\nintensity, or comicality. To say that a property is inherently\npositive is not to say that any work having it is so much the better,\nbut rather that its tout court attribution implies value. So\nalthough a work may be made worse on account of its comical elements,\nthe simple claim that a work is good because comical is intelligible\nin a way that the simple claims that a work is good because yellow, or\nbecause it lasts twelve minutes, or because it contains many puns, are\nnot. But if the simple claim that a work is good because comical is\nthus intelligible, comicality is a general criterion for aesthetic\nvalue, and the principle that articulates that generality is true. But\nnone of this casts any doubt on the immediacy thesis, as Sibley\nhimself observes:", "\nI have argued elsewhere that there are no sure-fire rules by which,\nreferring to the neutral and non-aesthetic qualities of things, one\ncan infer that something is balanced, tragic, comic, joyous, and so\non. One has to look and see. Here, equally, at a different level, I am\nsaying that there are no sure-fire mechanical rules or procedures for\ndeciding which qualities are actual defects in the work; one has to\njudge for oneself. (Sibley 2001, 107–108)\n", "\nThe “elsewhere” referred to in the first sentence is\nSibley’s earlier paper, “Aesthetic Concepts,” which\nargues that the application of concepts such as\n‘balanced,’ ‘tragic,’ ‘comic,’ or\n‘joyous’ is not a matter of determining whether the\ndescriptive (i.e., non-aesthetic) conditions for their application are\nmet, but is rather a matter of taste. Hence aesthetic judgments are\nimmediate in something like the way that judgments of color, or of\nflavor, are:", "\nWe see that a book is red by looking, just as we tell that the tea is\nsweet by tasting it. So too, it might be said, we just see (or fail to\nsee) that things are delicate, balanced, and the like. This kind of\ncomparison between the exercise of taste and the use of the five\nsenses is indeed familiar; our use of the word ‘taste’\nitself shows that the comparison is age-old and very natural (Sibley\n2001, 13–14).\n", "\nBut Sibley recognizes—as his eighteenth-century forebears did\nand his formalist contemporaries did not—that important\ndifferences remain between the exercise of taste and the use of the\nfive senses. Central among these is that we offer reasons, or\nsomething like them, in support of our aesthetic judgments: by\ntalking—in particular, by appealing to the descriptive\nproperties on which the aesthetic properties depend—we justify\naesthetic judgments by bringing others to see what we have seen\n(Sibley 2001, 14–19).", "\nIt is unclear to what degree Sibley, beyond seeking to establish that\nthe application of aesthetic concepts is not condition-governed, seeks\nalso to define the term ‘aesthetic’ in terms of their not\nbeing so. It is clearer, perhaps, that he does not succeed in defining\nthe term this way, whatever his intentions. Aesthetic concepts are not\nalone in being non-condition-governed, as Sibley himself recognizes in\ncomparing them with color concepts. But there is also no reason to\nthink them alone in being non-condition-governed while also being\nreason-supportable, since moral concepts, to give one example, at\nleast arguably also have both these features. Isolating the aesthetic\nrequires something more than immediacy, as Kant saw. It requires\nsomething like the Kantian notion of disinterest, or at least\nsomething to play the role played by that notion in Kant’s\ntheory.", "\nGiven the degree to which Kant and Hume continue to influence thinking\nabout aesthetic judgment (or critical judgment, more broadly), given\nthe degree to which Sibley and Isenberg continue to abet that\ninfluence, it is not surprising that the immediacy thesis is now very\nwidely received. The thesis, however, has come under attack, notably\nby Davies (1990) and Bender (1995). (See also Carroll (2009), who\nfollows closely after Davies (1990), and Dorsch (2013) for further\ndiscussion.)", "\nIsenberg, it will be recalled, maintains that if the critic is arguing\nfor her verdict, her argumentation must go something as follows:", "\nSince the critical principle expressed in premise 1 is open to\ncounter-example, no matter what property we substitute for p, Isenberg\nconcludes that we cannot plausibly interpret the critic as arguing for\nher verdict. Rather than defend the principle expressed in premise 1,\nDavies and Bender both posit alternative principles, consistent with\nthe fact that no property is good-making in all artworks, which they\nascribe to the critic. Davies proposes that we interpret the critic as\narguing deductively from principles relativized to artistic type, that\nis, from principles holding that artworks of a specific types or\ncategories—Italian Renaissance paintings, romantic symphonies,\nHollywood Westerns, etc.—having p are better for having it\n(Davies 1990, 174). Bender proposes that we interpret the critic as\narguing inductively from principles expressing mere tendencies that\nhold between certain properties and artworks—principles, in\nother words, holding that artworks having p tend to be better for\nhaving it (Bender 1995, 386).", "\nEach proposal has its own weaknesses and strengths. A problem with\nBender’s approach is that critics do not seem to couch their\nverdicts in probabilistic terms. Were a critic to say that a work is\nlikely to be good, or almost certainly good, or even that she has the\nhighest confidence that it must be good, her language would suggest\nthat she had not herself experienced the work, perhaps that she had\njudged the work on the basis of someone else’s testimony, hence\nthat she is no critic at all. We would therefore have good reason to\nprefer Davies’s deductive approach if only we had good reason\nfor thinking that relativizing critical principles to artistic type\nremoved the original threat of counterexample. Though it is clear that\nsuch relativizing reduces the relative number of counterexamples, we\nneed good reason for thinking that it reduces that number to zero, and\nDavies provides no such reason. Bender’s inductive approach, by\ncontrast, cannot be refuted by counterexample, but only by\ncounter-tendency.", "\nIf the critic argues from the truth of a principle to the truth of a\nverdict—as Davies and Bender both contend—it must be\npossible for her to establish the truth of the principle before\nestablishing the truth of the verdict. How might she do this? It seems\nunlikely that mere reflection on the nature of art, or on the natures\nof types of art, could yield up the relevant lists of good- and\nbad-making properties. At least the literature has yet to produce a\npromising account as to how this might be done. Observation therefore\nseems the most promising answer. To say that the critic establishes\nthe truth of critical principles on the basis of observation, however,\nis to say that she establishes a correlation between certain artworks\nshe has already established to be good and certain properties she has\nalready established those works to have. But then any capacity to\nestablish that works are good by inference from principles evidently\ndepends on some capacity to establish that works are good without any\nsuch inference, and the question arises why the critic should prefer\nto do by inference what she can do perfectly well without. The answer\ncannot be that judging by inference from principle yields\nepistemically better results, since a principle based on observations\ncan be no more epistemically sound than the observations on which it\nis based.", "\nNone of this shows that aesthetic or critical judgment could never be\ninferred from principles. It does however suggest that such judgment\nis first and foremost non-inferential, which is what the immediacy\nthesis holds." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Aesthetic Judgment" }, { "content": [ "\nThe Kantian notion of disinterest has its most direct recent\ndescendents in the aesthetic-attitude theories that flourished from\nthe early to mid 20th century. Though Kant followed the British in\napplying the term ‘disinterested’ strictly to pleasures,\nits migration to attitudes is not difficult to explain. For Kant the\npleasure involved in a judgment of taste is disinterested because such\na judgment does not issue in a motive to do anything in particular.\nFor this reason Kant refers to the judgment of taste as contemplative\nrather than practical (Kant 1790, 95). But if the judgment of taste is\nnot practical, then the attitude we bear toward its object is\npresumably also not practical: when we judge an object aesthetically\nwe are unconcerned with whether and how it may further our practical\naims. Hence it is natural to speak of our attitude toward the object\nas disinterested.", "\nTo say, however, that the migration of disinterest from pleasures to\nattitudes is natural is not to say that it is inconsequential.\nConsider the difference between Kant’s aesthetic theory, the\nlast great theory of taste, and Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory,\nthe first great aesthetic-attitude theory. Whereas for Kant\ndisinterested pleasure is the means by which we discover things to\nbear aesthetic value, for Schopenhauer disinterested attention (or\n“will-less contemplation”) is itself the locus of\naesthetic value. According to Schopenhauer, we lead our ordinary,\npractical lives in a kind of bondage to our own desires (Schopenhauer\n1819, 196). This bondage is a source not merely of pain but also of\ncognitive distortion in that it restricts our attention to those\naspects of things relevant to the fulfilling or thwarting of our\ndesires. Aesthetic contemplation, being will-less, is therefore both\nepistemically and hedonically valuable, allowing us a desire-free\nglimpse into the essences of things as well as a respite from\ndesire-induced pain:", "\nWhen, however, an external cause or inward disposition suddenly raises\nus out of the endless stream of willing, and snatches knowledge from\nthe thralldom of the will, the attention is now no longer directed to\nthe motives of willing, but comprehends things free from their\nrelation to the will … Then all at once the peace, always\nsought but always escaping us … comes to us of its own accord,\nand all is well with us. (Schopenhauer 1819, 196)\n", "\nThe two most influential aesthetic-attitude theories of the 20th\ncentury are those of Edward Bullough and Jerome Stolnitz. According to\nStolnitz’s theory, which is the more straightforward of the two,\nbearing an aesthetic attitude toward an object is a matter of\nattending to it disinterestedly and sympathetically, where to attend\nto it disinterestedly is to attend to it with no purpose beyond that\nof attending to it, and to attend to it sympathetically is to\n“accept it on its own terms,” allowing it, and not\none’s own preconceptions, to guide one’s attention of it\n(Stolnitz 1960, 32–36). The result of such attention is a\ncomparatively richer experience of the object, i.e., an experience\ntaking in comparatively many of the object’s features. Whereas a\npractical attitude limits and fragments the object of our experience,\nallowing us to “see only those of its features which are\nrelevant to our purposes,…. By contrast, the aesthetic attitude\n‘isolates’ the object and focuses upon it—the\n‘look’ of the rocks, the sound of the ocean, the colors in\nthe painting.” (Stolnitz 1960, 33, 35).", "\nBullough, who prefers to speak of “psychical distance”\nrather than disinterest, characterizes aesthetic appreciation as\nsomething achieved", "\nby putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear with our actual\npractical self; by allowing it to stand outside the context of our\npersonal needs and ends—in short, by looking at it\n‘objectively’ … by permitting only such reactions\non our part as emphasise the ‘objective features of the\nexperience, and by interpreting even our ‘subjective’\naffections not as modes of our being but rather as\ncharacteristics of the phenomenon. (Bullough 1995, 298–299;\nemphasis in original).\n", "\nBullough has been criticized for claiming that aesthetic appreciation\nrequires dispassionate detachment:", "\nBullough’s characterization of the aesthetic attitude is the\neasiest to attack. When we cry at a tragedy, jump in fear at a horror\nmovie, or lose ourselves in the plot of a complex novel, we cannot be\nsaid to be detached, although we may be appreciating the aesthetic\nqualities of these works to the fullest… . And we can\nappreciate the aesthetic properties of the fog or storm while fearing\nthe dangers they present. (Goldman 2005, 264)\n", "\nBut such a criticism seems to overlook a subtlety of Bullough’s\nview. While Bullough does hold that aesthetic appreciation requires\ndistance “between our own self and its affections”\n(Bullough 1995, 298), he does not take this to require that we not\nundergo affections but quite the opposite: only if we undergo\naffections have we affections from which to be distanced. So, for\nexample, the properly distanced spectator of a well-constructed\ntragedy is not the “over-distanced” spectator who feels no\npity or fear, nor the “under-distanced” spectator who\nfeels pity and fear as she would to an actual, present catastrophe,\nbut the spectator who interprets the pity and fear she feels\n“not as modes of [her] being but rather as characteristics of\nthe phenomenon” (Bullough 1995, 299). The properly distanced\nspectator of a tragedy, we might say, understands her fear and pity to\nbe part of what tragedy is about.", "\nThe notion of the aesthetic attitude has been attacked from all\ncorners and has very few remaining sympathizers. George Dickie is\nwidely regarded as having delivered the decisive blow in his essay\n“The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude” (Dickie 1964) by\narguing that all purported examples of interested attention are really\njust examples of inattention. So consider the case of the spectator at\na performance of Othello who becomes increasingly suspicious\nof his own wife as the action proceeds, or the case of the impresario\nwho sits gauging the size of the audience, or the case of the father\nwho sits taking pride in his daughter’s performance, or the case\nof the moralist who sits gauging the moral effects the play is apt to\nproduce in its audience. These and all such cases will be regarded by\nthe attitude theorist as cases of interested attention to the\nperformance, when they are actually nothing but cases of inattention\nto the performance: the jealous husband is attending to his wife, the\nimpresario to the till, the father to his daughter, the moralist to\nthe effects of the play. But if none of them is attending to the\nperformance, then none of them is attending to it interestedly (Dickie\n1964, 57–59).", "\nThe attitude theorist, however, can plausibly resist Dickie’s\ninterpretation of such examples. Clearly the impresario is not\nattending to the performance, but there is no reason to regard the\nattitude theorist as committed to thinking otherwise. As for the\nothers, it might be argued that they are all attending. The jealous\nhusband must be attending to the performance, since it is the action\nof the play, as presented by the performance, that is making him\nsuspicious. The proud father must be attending to the performance,\nsince he is attending to his daughter’s performance, which is an\nelement of it. The moralist must be attending to the performance,\nsince he otherwise would have no basis by which to gauge its moral\neffects on the audience. It may be that none of these spectators is\ngiving the performance the attention it demands, but that is precisely\nthe attitude theorist’s point.", "\nBut perhaps another of Dickie’s criticisms, one lesser known,\nultimately poses a greater threat to the ambitions of the attitude\ntheorist. Stolnitz, it will be recalled, distinguishes between\ndisinterested and interested attention according to the purpose\ngoverning the attention: to attend disinterestedly is to attend with\nno purpose beyond that of attending; to attend interestedly is to\nattend with some purpose beyond that of attending. But Dickie objects\nthat a difference in purpose does not imply a difference in\nattention:", "\nSuppose Jones listens to a piece of music for the purpose of being\nable to analyze and describe it on an examination the next day and\nSmith listens to the same music with no such ulterior purpose. There\nis certainly a difference in the motives and intentions of the two\nmen: Jones has an ulterior purpose and Smith does not, but this does\nnot mean Jones’s listening differs from Smith’s\n… . There is only one way to listen to (to attend to)\nmusic, although there may be a variety of motives, intentions, and\nreasons for doing so and a variety of ways of being distracted from\nthe music. (Dickie 1964, 58).\n", "\nThere is again much here that the attitude theorist can resist. The\nidea that listening is a species of attending can be resisted: the\nquestion at hand, strictly speaking, is not whether Jones and Smith\nlisten to the music in the same way, but whether they\nattend in the same way to the music they are listening to.\nThe contention that Jones and Smith are attending in the same way\nappears to be question-begging, as it evidently depends on a principle\nof individuation that the attitude theorist rejects: if Jones’s\nattention is governed by some ulterior purpose and Smith’s is\nnot, and we individuate attention according to the purpose that\ngoverns it, their attention is not the same. Finally, even if we\nreject the attitude theorist’s principle of individuation, the\nclaim that there is but one way to attend to music is doubtful: one\ncan seemingly attend to music in myriad ways—as historical\ndocument, as cultural artifact, as aural wallpaper, as sonic\ndisturbance—depending on which of the music’s features one\nattends to in listening to it. But Dickie is nevertheless onto\nsomething crucial to the degree he urges that a difference in purpose\nneed not imply a relevant difference in attention.\nDisinterest plausibly figures in the definition of the aesthetic\nattitude only to the degree that it, and it alone, focuses attention\non the features of the object that matter aesthetically. The\npossibility that there are interests that focus attention on just\nthose same features implies that disinterest has no place in such a\ndefinition, which in turn implies that neither it nor the notion of\nthe aesthetic attitude is likely to be of any use in fixing the\nmeaning of the term ‘aesthetic.’ If to take the aesthetic\nattitude toward an object simply is to attend to its aesthetically\nrelevant properties, whether the attention is interested or\ndisinterested, then determining whether an attitude is aesthetic\napparently requires first determining which properties are the\naesthetically relevant ones. And this task seems always to result\neither in claims about the immediate graspability of aesthetic\nproperties, which are arguably insufficient to the task, or in claims\nabout the essentially formal nature of aesthetic properties, which are\narguably groundless.", "\nBut that the notions of disinterest and psychical distance prove\nunhelpful in fixing the meaning of the term ‘aesthetic’\ndoes not imply that they are mythic. At times we seem unable to get by\nwithout them. Consider the case of The Fall of\nMiletus—a tragedy written by the Greek dramatist Phrynicus\nand staged in Athens barely two years after the violent Persian\ncapture of the Greek city of Miletus in 494 BC. Herodotus records\nthat", "\n[the Athenians] found many ways to express their sorrow at the fall of\nMiletus, and in particular, when Phrynicus composed and produced a\nplay called The Fall of Miletus, the audience burst into\ntears and fined him a thousand drachmas for reminding them of a\ndisaster that was so close to home; future productions of the play\nwere also banned. (Herodotus, The Histories, 359)\n", "\nHow are we to explain the Athenian reaction to this play without\nrecourse to something like interest or lack of distance? How, in\nparticular, are we to explain the difference between the sorrow\nelicited by a successful tragedy and the sorrow elicited in this case?\nThe distinction between attention and inattention is of no use here.\nThe difference is not that the Athenians could not attend to The\nFall whereas they could attend to other plays. The difference is\nthat they could not attend to The Fall as they could attend\nto other plays, and this because of their too intimate connection to\nwhat attending to The Fall required their attending to." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 The Aesthetic Attitude" }, { "content": [ "\nTheories of aesthetic experience may be divided into two kinds\naccording to the kind of feature appealed to in explanation of what\nmakes experience aesthetic: internalist theories appeal to\nfeatures internal to experience, typically to phenomenological\nfeatures, whereas externalist theories appeal to features\nexternal to the experience, typically to features of the object\nexperienced. (The distinction between internalist and externalist\ntheories of aesthetic experience is similar, though not identical, to\nthe distinction between phenomenal and epistemic conceptions of\naesthetic experience drawn by Gary Iseminger (Iseminger 2003, 100, and\nIseminger 2004, 27, 36)). Though internalist\ntheories—particularly John Dewey’s (1934) and Monroe\nBeardsley’s (1958)—predominated during the early and\nmiddle parts of the 20th century, externalist theories—including\nBeardsley’s (1982) and George Dickie’s (1988)—have\nbeen in the ascendance since. Beardsley’s views on aesthetic\nexperience make a strong claim on our attention, given that Beardsley\nmight be said to have authored the culminating internalist theory as\nwell as the founding externalist one. Dickie’s criticisms of\nBeardsley’s internalism make an equally strong claim, since they\nmoved Beardsley—and with him most everyone else—from\ninternalism toward externalism.", "\nAccording to the version of internalism Beardsley advances in\nhis Aesthetics (1958), all aesthetic experiences\nhave in common three or four (depending on how you count) features,\nwhich “some writers have [discovered] through acute\nintrospection, and which each of us can test in his own\nexperience” (Beardsley 1958, 527). These are focus (“an\naesthetic experience is one in which attention is firmly fixed upon\n[its object]”), intensity, and unity, where unity is a matter of\ncoherence and of completeness (Beardsley 1958, 527). Coherence, in\nturn, is a matter of having elements that are properly connected one\nto another such that", "\n[o]ne thing leads to another; continuity of development, without gaps\nor dead spaces, a sense of overall providential pattern of guidance,\nan orderly cumulation of energy toward a climax, are present to an\nunusual degree. (Beardsley 1958, 528)\n", "\nCompleteness, by contrast, is a matter having elements that\n“counterbalance” or “resolve” one another such\nthat the whole stands apart from elements without it:", "\nThe impulses and expectations aroused by elements within the\nexperience are felt to be counterbalanced or resolved by other\nelements within the experience, so that some degree of equilibrium or\nfinality is achieved and enjoyed. The experience detaches itself, and\neven insulates itself, from the intrusion of alien elements.\n(Beardsley 1958, 528)\n", "\nDickie’s most consequential criticism of Beardsley’s\ntheory is that Beardsley, in describing the phenomenology of aesthetic\nexperience, has failed to distinguish between the features we\nexperience aesthetic objects as having and the features aesthetic\nexperiences themselves have. So while every feature mentioned in\nBeardsley’s description of the coherence of aesthetic\nexperience—continuity of development, the absence of gaps, the\nmounting of energy toward a climax—surely is a feature we\nexperience aesthetic objects as having, there is no reason to think of\naesthetic experience itself as having any such features:", "\nNote that everything referred to [in Beardsley’s description of\ncoherence] is a perceptual characteristic … and not an effect\nof perceptual characteristics. Thus, no ground is furnished for\nconcluding that experience can be unified in the sense of being\ncoherent. What is actually argued for is that aesthetic objects are\ncoherent, a conclusion which must be granted, but not the one which is\nrelevant. (Dickie 1965, 131)\n", "\nDickie raises a similar worry about Beardsley’s description of\nthe completeness of aesthetic experience:", "\nOne can speak of elements being counterbalanced in the\npainting and say that the painting is stable, balanced and\nso on, but what does it mean to say\nthe experience of the spectator of the painting\nis stable or balanced? … Looking at a painting in some cases\nmight aid some persons in coming to feel stable because it might\ndistract them from whatever is unsettling them, but such cases are\natypical of aesthetic appreciation and not relevant to aesthetic\ntheory. Aren’t characteristics attributable to the painting\nsimply being mistakenly shifted to the spectator? (Dickie 1965, 132)\n", "\nThough these objections turned out to be only the beginning of the\ndebate between Dickie and Beardsley on the nature of aesthetic\nexperience (See Beardsley 1969, Dickie 1974, Beardsley 1970, and\nDickie 1987; see also Iseminger 2003 for a helpful overview of the\nBeardsley-Dickie debate), they nevertheless went a long way toward\nshaping that debate, which taken as whole might be seen as the working\nout of an answer to the question “What can a theory of aesthetic\nexperience be that takes seriously the distinction between the\nexperience of features and the features of experience?” The\nanswer turned out to be an externalist theory of the sort that\nBeardsley advances in the 1970 essay “The Aesthetic Point of\nView” and that many others have advanced since: a theory\naccording to which an aesthetic experience just is an experience\nhaving aesthetic content, i.e., an experience of an object as having\nthe aesthetic features that it has.", "\nThe shift from internalism to externalism has meant that one central\nambition of internalism—that of tying the meaning of\n‘aesthetic’ to features internal to aesthetic\nexperience—has had to be given up. But a second, equally\ncentral, ambition—that of accounting for aesthetic value by\ngrounding it in the value of aesthetic experience—has been\nretained. The following section takes up the development and prospects\nof such accounts." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Aesthetic Experience" } ] } ]	[ "Augustine, 389–390/2005 De vera religione in\nWorks of Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st Century,\nBook 1, Volume 8, John E. Rotelle et al. 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O., 1957, “What Makes a Situation\nAesthetic?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society\n(Supplementary Volumes), 31: 75–106.", "Van der Berg, S., 2020, “Aesthetic Hedonism and Its\nCritics,” Philosophy Compass, 15: 1–15.", "Walton, K.L., 1970, “Categories of Art,” The\nPhilosophical Review, 79 (3): 334–367.", "–––, 1993, “How Marvelous!: Towards a\nTheory of Aesthetic Value,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art\nCriticism, 51: 499–510.", "Watkins, G.M., and Shelley, J., 2012, “Response-Dependence\nabout Aesthetic Value,” Pacific Philosophical\nQuarterly, 93: 338–352.", "Wimsatt, W. and Brooks, C., 1957, Literary Criticism: A Short\nHistory, New York: Knopf.", "Wolf, S., 2011, “Good-for-Nothings,” Proceedings\nand Addresses of the American Philosphical Association, 85:\n47–64.", "Zangwill, N., 1998, “Aesthetic/Sensory Dependence,”\nBritish Journal of Aesthetics, 38: 66–81.", "–––, 1999, “Art and Audience,”\nThe Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 57:\n315–332.", "–––, 2001, The Metaphysics of Beauty,\nIthaca, NY: Cornell University Press.", "–––, 2007, Aesthetic Creation, Oxford:\nOxford University Press." ]	[ { "href": "../aesthetics-19th-romantic/", "text": "aesthetics: 19th Century Romantic" }, { "href": "../aesthetic-judgment/", "text": "aesthetics: aesthetic judgment" }, { "href": "../aesthetics-18th-british/", "text": "aesthetics: British, in the 18th century" }, { "href": "../environmental-aesthetics/", "text": "aesthetics: environmental" }, { "href": "../aesthetics-18th-french/", "text": "aesthetics: French, in the 18th century" }, { "href": "../aesthetics-18th-german/", "text": "aesthetics: German, in the 18th century" }, { "href": "../aesthetics-of-everyday/", "text": "aesthetics of the everyday" }, { "href": "../beardsley-aesthetics/", "text": "Beardsley, Monroe C.: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../collingwood-aesthetics/", "text": "Collingwood, Robin George: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../croce-aesthetics/", "text": "Croce, Benedetto: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../dewey-aesthetics/", "text": "Dewey, John: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../feminism-aesthetics/", "text": "feminist philosophy, interventions: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../gadamer-aesthetics/", "text": "Gadamer, Hans-Georg: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../goodman-aesthetics/", "text": "Goodman, Nelson: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../hegel-aesthetics/", "text": "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../heidegger-aesthetics/", "text": "Heidegger, Martin: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../hume-aesthetics/", "text": "Hume, David: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../japanese-aesthetics/", "text": "Japanese Philosophy: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../kant-aesthetics/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel: aesthetics and teleology" }, { "href": "../plato-aesthetics/", "text": "Plato: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../schopenhauer-aesthetics/", "text": "Schopenhauer, Arthur: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../wittgenstein-aesthetics/", "text": "Wittgenstein, Ludwig: aesthetics" } ]
aesthetic-experience	Aesthetic Experience	First published Fri Jan 20, 2023	[ "\nA paradigmatic aesthetic experience is a perceptual experience focused\non the beauty of an object like a work of art or an aspect of nature.\nSome philosophers take it that this is the only kind of aesthetic\nexperience, though many more take it that there are other varieties as\nwell. You might, for instance, have an aesthetic experience by\nwitnessing not a beautiful but a sublime storm. You might\nhave an aesthetic experience not by having a perceptual but rather by\nhaving an (imagined) emotional experience of the deep suffering of\nSethe expressed in Toni Morrison’s great novel Beloved.\nPerhaps you might even have an aesthetic experience by appreciating\nthe way in which an elegant theorem reorganizes your thought about a\nmathematical structure.", "\nPhilosophical work on art and beauty in the Western tradition extends\nback at least as far as the ancient Greeks, but the concept of\naesthetic experience as such emerged in this tradition only in the\n18th century. Not all who work in this area take any form\nof experience to be the most fundamental concept for aesthetic theory;\nothers take evaluative aesthetic judgments, or the aesthetic value of\nobjects themselves, to be more basic in explaining the relevant\nphenomena. This entry discusses all those views in the Western\ntradition with any theory of aesthetic experience at all—not\nonly those views that take aesthetic experience to be fundamental.", "\nPhilosophers use the idea of a distinctively aesthetic\nexperience for several different purposes. Some use it to defend deep,\neffortful engagement with the arts or art criticism (Shelley 1832\n[2003]). Some use it to give a substantive definition of art (Tolstoy\n1897 [2007]), or to elevate ‘real’ art over other cultural\nmedia (Collingwood 1938 [1958]). Some use it to argue for the personal\nor social importance of an education in sensibility (Schiller 1795\n[1989]). Others describe aesthetic experience as a special form of\ncognitive contact with the world, perhaps even with its fundamental\nmetaphysics (Schopenhauer 1818 [1958]). Only a few now question the\nutility of the concept of aesthetic experience (Shusterman 1997, 2008,\nNehamas 1998).", "\nGiven this diversity of purposes, it is difficult to say much about\naesthetic experience that is not controversial. But a few questions\ncan be posed for all theories of aesthetic experience. What is\ndistinctive about aesthetic experience? What is valuable about having\nan experience of this kind? How if at all, does it involve evaluating\nits own object? Who can have these experiences, and under what\nconditions? Does it make sense to say that we should have\nsuch experiences?", "\nThese questions will be answered on behalf of various different\napproaches to aesthetic experience in the course of this overview. The\noverview organizes such approaches along two dimensions: in terms of\nthe properties of an object on which such experience focuses; and in\nterms of various internal aspects of the experience itself." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Focus of aesthetic experience", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Form and Function", "1.2 Power to Please", "1.3 Merit", "1.4 (Emotional) expression", "1.5 Fundamental Nature" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Mental aspects of aesthetic experience", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Pleasure", "2.2 Conceptualization", "2.3 Imagination", "2.4 Emotion", "2.5 Disinterest", "2.6 Normativity" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAny aesthetic experience has intentionality: it is an experience (as)\nof some object. Typically, that object will be a work of\nart—such as a sculpture, a symphony, a painting, a performance,\nor a movie—or some aspect of nature, such as a bird’s\nplumage, a cliff, or a bright winter morning. An aesthetic experience\nof an object with sensible features is commonly thought to be a\nperceptual experience of those sensible features. In the case of\npoems, novels, and certain pieces of conceptual art, the experience\nmight be understood as an imagined sensory experience; in the case of\nabstract or intelligible objects like theorems, it might be neither\nsensory nor imaginative in nature.", "\nIt is common to individuate aesthetic experience\npartly—but typically not only—in terms of the types of\nproperties on which this experience focuses. In perceiving a\nsculpture, for instance, you might experience its shape, its color,\nits resemblance to a real person, its placement in a gallery, its\nauthorship, or its representational style. Most think that aesthetic\nexperience as such focuses on only some of these properties, and\nperhaps even excludes focus on others.", "\nThis section analyzes the broad categories of properties of objects on\nwhich aesthetic experience has been said to focus: formal properties\nlike shape or composition; the powers things have to give us pleasure;\nproperties of meriting or deserving certain subjective responses;\nexpressive properties, especially those that express emotions; and\nfundamental metaphysical properties like essences or the nature of\nhumanity. It is consistent to individuate aesthetic experience by its\nfocus on more than one of these types of properties. The views\npresented under each subsection below are not mutually exclusive,\nexcept where explicitly stated.", "\nThis discussion largely treats these types of properties without\ndiscriminating between their presence in manufactured artworks vs.\naspects of nature. It will leave aside discussion of the comparative\nfundamentality of art and nature (cf. Hegel 1820–29 [1920];\nCroce 1938 [2007] p. 277; Adorno 1970 [1997] pp. 61–2; Wollheim\n1990 §42–3; Savile 1982 Ch.8). It will also leave aside\ndiscussions of aesthetic experience that are solely focused on\naesthetic experience of nature (cf. Bullough 1912, Hepburn 1966,\nCarlson 1979, 2005, Budd 1996, Rolston 1998) or solely focused on\naesthetic experience of abstracta like theorems or proofs (cf.\nBaumgarten 1735 [1954], Hutcheson 1726 [2004], Schellekens 2022)." ], "section_title": "1. Focus of aesthetic experience", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nLong before the 18th-century development of special theories of\naesthetic experience, neo-Platonic medieval philosophers developed a\nconcept of beauty as rationally intelligible formal structure as it\ncould be appreciated in experience. In his fourth-century work De\nMusica, Augustine took beauty in music to be partly a matter of\nproportionality of parts, and later argued that visual beauty is\nformal harmony combined in the right way with color (Haldane 2013).\nNine centuries later, Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica)\nechoed this hylomorphic conception: the beautiful is material\nstructured in proper form, the kind “of which apprehension in\nitself pleases” (“Pulchrum dicatur id cujus apprehensio\nipsa placet,” § Ia, IIae, q.27, a.1 ad 3; as\ntranslated by Mothersill 1988, p. 323). In the Italian Renaissance,\nLeon Battista Alberti (1443–1452 [1988]) called beauty\n“reasoned harmony of all the parts within a body” (Book 6,\n§2 at p.156).", "\nIn the eighteenth century, attention to aesthetic experience per se,\nrather than beauty, grew out of a more general inquiry into\nperception. Alexander Baumgarten (1735 [1954]) first defined\n“aesthetics” much more broadly as we do now—as the\nscience of cognizing objects by sensory perception (from the Greek\n“aisthêsis” for sensory perception).\nBaumgarten’s work on the topic was heavily influenced by that of\nLeibniz (1684 [1969]) and Wolff (1719 [2003]). All three took pleasure\nmore generally to be sensory perception of an object’s\nperfection; Wolff treated this as the coherence of the aspects of an\nobject either in themselves or as they work together to accomplish a\npurpose.", "\nThese early claims that experience of beauty is experience of form\nwere thoroughly integrated into the general theistic metaphysics and\nepistemology of these thinkers. Baumgarten, for instance, claimed that\nwe take pleasure not only in the perfection of an object, he wrote,\nbut also in being conscious of our own “perfection of sensible\ncognition as such,” in how we are suited to sense the world\n(1750 [2007] §14; cf. Meier 1999 and Mendelssohn 1785 [1979]).\nThe contemporary English philosopher Anthony Ashbury Cooper, the Third\nEarl of Shaftesbury (1711 [2007]), took pleasurable admiration of\nwell-formed objects really to be admiration of the form-imposing\nminds, including those of the artist but ultimately that of the\ndivine. “The beautifying, not the beautified, is the really\nbeautiful,” he wrote (Cahn and Meskin 2007, p. 80).", "\nImmanuel Kant’s immensely influential Critique of\nJudgment (1789 [1987]) peeled aesthetic experience away from\napprehension of the divine, and cleaved the apprehension of form away\nfrom function. He claimed you make a pure judgment of\n(“free”) beauty when you take pleasure just in perceiving\nthe form of an object without even conceptualizing its function.", "\nKant clearly contradicts his German predecessors in his claim that\n“neither does perfection gain by beauty, nor beauty by\nperfection” (§16 at p. 78). Nonetheless, Kant does make two\nkinds of theoretical concessions to this tradition. First, he allows\nthat his German predecessors like Baumgarten may have confused\nperfection for a purpose with a subjective kind of purposiveness\nwithout reference to any specific purpose. This latter\n“purposiveness” is difficult to understand, but Kant\nsuggests that it consists in the harmony of an object’s parts,\nas presented in experience, that allows you to unite them in your\nimagination into a structured unity (§15, p. 74; see Section\n2.3). Secondly, Kant concedes that we sometimes speak of\n“beauty,” e.g. the beauty of a building, when we highlight\nhow something is perfect for its function. Kant calls this\n“accessory beauty” (or “adherent beauty,”\nanother translation of “pulchritude adhaerens”)\n(§16 at p. 76).", "\nKant is often cited as a “formalist”—someone who\nclaims that aesthetic experience focuses exclusively on formal\nproperties of objects—but this is a matter of interpretive\ndispute. What is clear is that Kant offered a way into understanding\naesthetic experience’s focus on form independently from its\nassociation with the divine or with any function that form might\nfulfill.", "\nMost German work on aesthetics in the nineteenth century moved away\nfrom focus on mere form to discuss the special knowledge that\naesthetic experience might afford (see Section 1.5). Interest in form\nwithout function saw resurgence in the final decades of the nineteenth\ncentury.", "\nIn The Birth of Tragedy (1872 [1992]), Friedrich Nietzsche\nargued that the artistic form of a tragedy—its rhythm, its\nmusical shapes, its overarching structure—could transfigure the\nfundamental facts of human suffering that would otherwise overwhelm\nand paralyze us. In such transfiguration by form, we come to take\n“aesthetic pleasure” (§24 at pp. 140–1,) in\nwhat would otherwise be horrible (cf. Bullough 1912 [2007]). Formal\nstructure produces a necessary, salutary illusion in our perception of\nterrible and otherwise unmanageable truths.", "\nThe influential Austrian music critic Eduard Hanslick argued in 1891\n[2007] that only pure form in music could be beautiful, and its lack\nof any “subject” was no discredit to it. In a partial\nreturn to Kant, George Santayana (1896) gave form a particularly\nimportant role to play in grounding beauty in all art forms. He said\nthat you can take self-conscious pleasure in synthesizing various\ndistinct perceptions of elements of an object to come to perceive it\nas a structured whole.", "\nIn response to the late 19th- and early\n20th-century development of abstract and\nnon-representational styles in the visual arts, a greater resurgence\nin formalism took place (Stolnitz 1960; Carroll 2013). The visual art\ncritic Clive Bell (1914 [2007]) took aesthetic experience to be a\nresponse to what he called “Significant Form” in a piece\nof visual art, i.e. “arrangements and combinations that move us\nin a particular way” to “austere and thrilling\nraptures” distinct from those feelings we encounter otherwise\n(p.264, 268). In contrast, the “representative element” is\nalways “irrelevant” to such aesthetic experience\n(p.27).", "\nA significant twist in the history of formalism came with John\nDewey’s landmark 1934 [1980] book Art as Experience. In\nit, Dewey emphasized primarily that aesthetic experience was an\nexperience which itself had a unified, consummatory form with\nmeaningful development. Understood in this way, an aesthetic\nexperience can be an experience of any event or object which offers\nsuch a “single quality that pervades the entire experience in\nspite of the variation of its constituent parts” (pp.\n305–6 as reprinted in Cahn and Meskin 2007). What it is for some\nexperience to be “esthetic” is not for it to be an\nexperience of some form, but rather for it to be an\nexperience that has an internal phenomenological structure that\nconstitutes its own form. You might have this kind of\nexperience at an exciting baseball game, watching a sunset, or writing\na paper.", "\nDewey’s methodology had an outsized impact on aesthetics in\nanalytic philosophy. This impact even survived the influence of\nWittgenstein’s later work (see 1953 [2009]), which many took to\nthreaten the possibility of phenomenological inquiry in general.\nDewey’s turn towards the primacy of the form of\naesthetic experience—rather than the form of an object\nof aesthetic experience—can be found most notably in the work of\nMonroe Beardsley (1958 [1981], 1970 [1982]). Beardsley is known partly\nas a hedonist, because he thought that aesthetic experiences were\nnecessarily pleasurable or “gratifying.” But it is not\njust any gratification that counts towards an experience’s being\naesthetic. Aesthetic experiences tend to gratifying because\nthey are intense, unified, complete experiences focused on single\nobjects whose features reward curiosity and active attention. It is\ntrue that only a certain kind of object of attention could offer such\na perceptual encounter—but it is the form of the experience so\noffered that is explanatorily prior, rather than the form of the\nobject.", "\nFormalism has now fallen out of favor, and is generally regarded as an\nextreme view about aesthetic experience. There are a few common\nobjections to formalism as the view that aesthetic experience focuses\nexclusively on the formal properties of objects.", "\nSome try to undercut a central motivation for formalism: the\nmotivation to find a “common denominator” in all types of\naesthetic objects, both artefactual and natural (Carroll 2012).\nEspecially after Wittgenstein (1953 [2009]) challenged the possibility\nof providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the application\nof certain concepts, many philosophers of aesthetics thought that\ntrying to define “art” was a lost cause—perhaps a\ncause antithetical to the radical “openness” (Weitz 1956)\nor “essentially contested” (Gallie 1956) nature of the\nconcept of art.", "\nFormalism crucially relies on the distinction between form and other\nfeatures of artworks, notably the content of artworks. But\nit’s not clear how to draw a clean line between form and\ncontent, especially when it comes to art forms like instrumental music\n(Isenberg 1973). According to prolific Victorian critic Walter Pater\n(1873 [1986]), in music “the end is not distinct from the means,\nthe form from the matter, the subject from the expression; they inhere\nin and completely saturate each other,” and it is the\n“constant effort of art to obliterate” this distinction\n(p.86).", "\nA more specific version of this objection targets Bell’s (1914\n[2007]) version of formalism. His theory relied not only on a\ndistinction between form and content, but also on an obscure\ndistinction between significant and insignificant form (Stolnitz 1960,\np.144).", "\nA third powerful line of criticism originated in work on the social\nstructures of aesthetic appreciation. Arthur Danto (1964) famously\nargued, with special reference to Andy Warhol’s Brillo\nBoxes installation, that art can be formally indistinguishable\nfrom things that aren’t art, and so whether something\ncounts as art cannot be a matter of its form, but must partly\nbe a matter of a certain kind of theory we apply. George Dickie (1974,\n1984) extended this idea to cover the claim that aesthetic\nappreciation per se is only available in the context of certain social\ninstitutions with their own patterns of value (see Guyer 2014c, p.\n479, for further criticism). Kendall Walton (1970) likewise argued\nthat the pleasure we take in an artwork’s formal features\ndepends crucially on the category in which we perceive it.", "\nWhile a purely formalist approach to aesthetic experience might\neffectively mark what is distinctive about aesthetic experience, it\ndoes not readily explain what is valuable about aesthetic experience.\nEspecially when form is taken independently of function or\napprehension of the divine, it’s not clear why it would even be\npleasant, let alone important, to have experiences that focus only on\nform. Dewey’s (1934 [1980]) turn doesn’t help here: is it\nall that valuable to have experiences with internal growth and a\nfeeling of consummation? Is this value great enough to justify all the\ntime and money we spend pursuing aesthetic experience?", "\nAlthough formalism has fallen from grace, even its critics accept the\nimportance of appreciating form among other features in aesthetic\nexperience (Carroll 2006, p. 78)." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Form and Function" }, { "content": [ "\nInfluential medieval philosophers like Augustine (De Musica)\nand Aquinas (Summa Theologica) conceived of beauty as a real\nand objective property inhering in objects themselves—the kind\nof property whose nature does not depend on our capacity to experience\nit. In the eighteenth century, philosophers started to challenge this\nconception of beauty. Many posited a deeper metaphysical dependence\nbetween our capacity to have certain feelings and the properties on\nwhich those very experiences are focused: they took these properties\njust to be powers to produce certain pleasurable responses in us (cf.\nShelley 2010 on “empiricism” and de Clercq 2013 on\n“experiential accounts”).", "\nAs James Shelley (“18th Century British\nAesthetics”) has pointed out, these views treat beauty as a\nLockean (1689) secondary quality (“nothing in the objects\nthemselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their\nprimary qualities,” Book I, Ch.VIII, §10). Accordingly, the\nBritish empiricists tended to endorse such views of beauty and\nsublimity. Addison (1712 [1879]) drew the connection with “Mr.\nLock” directly (letter no.413). Hutcheson (1726 [2004]) said\nbeauty was a capacity to “excite” a certain type of\npleasure. Edmund Burke (1756 [2007]) called beauty “some quality\nin bodies, acting mechanically upon the human mind by the intervention\nof the senses” (in Cahn and Meskin 2007, p. 119). In his\nTreatise (1739–40 [1987]), David Hume called beauty as\n“nothing but a form, which produces pleasure”\n(II.1.8.2).", "\nThe empiricists and those they influenced gave similar treatments of\nthe sublime, another kind of feature typically introduced as a focus\nof aesthetic experience (contrast Kant 1789 [1987]; see following\nsection). Here the emphasis is less on a power to produce a certain\nfrisson of feeling, and more on the power to inspire a certain kind of\nmental activity, especially of the imagination. Joseph Addison (1712\n[1879]) treated “Greatness” as a “rude kind of\nMagnificence” that offers our faculty of imagination the\npleasure of grasping at something it cannot capture in full (letter\nno.412). Burke (1756 [2007]), often cited as the originator of the\nidea of the sublime in Anglophone philosophy, considered the sublime\nto be that which would otherwise be painful and terrifying to behold,\nbut which is so distanced as to modify these feelings “as not to\nbe actually noxious … [but] capable of producing delight”\n(§VII). Influenced by reading Burke, Mendelssohn (1758 [1997])\ndefined the sublime as something that “captures our attention\n… [and] arouses a sweet shudder that rushes through every fiber\nof our being… giving wings to the imagination to press further\nand further without stopping” (pp. 196–7).", "\nSince these philosophers took aesthetic experience to focus on beauty\nand sublimity, and took these features to be powers to produce certain\nkinds of pleasurable mental responses, they thereby took aesthetic\nexperience to be experience of such powers to please. There need be\nnothing particularly troubling about the idea that you can experience\nan object’s power to please in perception; this power can be\nexperienced precisely by being so pleased in such perception.", "\nThe view of beauty or sublimity as powers sometimes led the\nempiricists to deny that beauty or sublimity was really a feature of\nobjects themselves (Hutcheson 1726 [2004], Hume 1739–40 [1987]).\nThis was a substantive confusion, and was effectively called out as\nsuch by Thomas Reid. Reid (1785 [1969]) charged Hutcheson with\n“an abuse of words” (p.782): it cannot be right to say\nthat beauty “property denotes the Perception of some\nMind,” since we talk of objects as having the property\nof beauty (Hutcheson 1726 [2004], p. 27). Contemporary commentators\nagree that there isn’t anything suspect about an object’s\ngenuinely having a property that is a power to produce certain mental\nresponses (Moran 2012; Sibley 1968). This worry has fallen away from\ncontemporary views that take beauty, sublimity, or aesthetic value to\nbe a matter of having a power to please—and aesthetic experience\nto be experience of that power (e.g. Matthen 2017a, 2017b, 2018).", "\nThere are two serious issues for those views which take aesthetic\nexperience to be solely focused in on its object’s powers to\nproduce certain responses in us.", "\nHere’s the first issue. If the beauty, sublimity, or other\naesthetic value of an object O is just a power to produce\ncertain responses in us, and aesthetic experience is just a certain\nappreciation of such a power—even one that involves actually\nhaving such a response—then anything that has the power to\nproduce such a response in us should have the same beauty, sublimity,\nor other aesthetic value as O. But we do not typically take\nbeauty, sublimity, or aesthetic value to be so cleanly separable from\nits bearer. Many think that an aesthetic experience of\nO’s properties is one that captures something utterly\nindividual in O, undetachable from the object it is (cf.\nSections 1.4.4 and 2.6). But any characterization of the kind of\nmental response which O has a power to produce, and which\nconstitutes O’s beauty, sublimity, or aesthetic value,\nwill simply offer an (in principle) way to get the same aesthetic\nexperience elsewhere—e.g. by appreciating a perfect forgery, or\na hallucinated object. This might seem unacceptable.", "\nThere are a couple of possible responses to this issue. Some (Budd\n1985; Davies 1994; Levinson 1996) simply deny that you really could\nhave the relevant type of experience in the absence of the relevant\nspecial object (cf. Shelley 2010). Another response is simply to\naccept that the relevant aesthetic experience and aesthetic value can\nbe had elsewhere, and to explain away intuitions that this should not\nbe possible (Peacocke 2021).", "\nThe second problem is harder to dismiss, and it calls for a more\nfundamental reorientation towards the focus of aesthetic experience.\nIt takes very little for an object to have a mere power to\nplease, even a power to please via perception of its features. If all\nit took for an object to be beautiful or sublime was for it to have\nsome such power, we should take individual experiences of such\npowers—individual instances of being so pleased—to be\ndemonstrative of such aesthetic value in objects. But we typically do\nnot take reports of such experience to be so demonstrative. Instead,\nthe pleasure an individual takes in an object is usually taken to be\ncontestably relevant to its aesthetic value. Whether that pleasure\nattests to an object’s power to please is beyond dispute, but\nwhether it attests to an object’s beauty, sublimity, or\naesthetic value is often disputed.", "\nThis fact troubled Hume in his later writing on aesthetics. In his\nseminal essay “Of the standard of taste,” Hume (1757\n[1987a]) subtly amended his Treatise’s (1739–40\n[1987]) view of beauty (cf. Nehamas 1981, Cavell 1965 [2007]). What is\n“fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings” of\npleasurable liking, and thus is in a sense genuinely beautiful, is\nthat which draws univocal and lasting approval from “true\njudges”—ideally sensitive, practiced, and unprejudiced\ncritics of the arts. This view of beauty still entangles it\nconstitutively with experience, but with a crucially idealized\nrestriction (cf. De Clercq 2013 on “response dependent\nproperties” at p. 305). This restriction anticipates, but does\nnot itself yet reach, a more fundamental shift in approach to the\nfocus of aesthetic value brought about by Kant: an approach that takes\naesthetic experience to involve an attribution of a merited\nresponse." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Power to Please" }, { "content": [ "\nAt the end of the eighteenth century, philosophers turned away from\nviews that took aesthetic experience to focus only on objects’\npowers to produce pleasure. This seems to have taken place largely due\nto the influence of Kant’s 1789 [1987] Critique of\nJudgment. There he distinguished the merely\nagreeable—things which we simply like, e.g. because they satisfy\nour appetites—from the beautiful. In doing so, he took it that\nan aesthetic experience of an object’s free or pure beauty\ninvolves pleasure felt to be merited by the object so\nperceived (§9). To have that response is to feel as though the\nobject deserves that very response you give it.", "\nThis is meant to make better sense of the way we discuss aesthetic\nexperiences and what we take to be authoritative on the matter of\nbeauty. To take pleasure in an aesthetic way in an object,\nKant thought, is just to engage your mental faculties of imagination\nand understanding in a pleasant free play with the form of the object\nyou perceive, unconstrained by thought of any real purpose that the\nobject might serve or any appetite it might satisfy (see Sections 2.3\nand 2.5). But any perceiver has these mental faculties, and must see\nthe same form in the object, and so (claimed Kant) aesthetic\nexperience involves a further thought that everyone ought to\ntake such pleasure in this object.", "\nOn this view of aesthetic experience, what you take to be merited is\nnot (just) a judgment about the aesthetic quality of an\nobject presented in perception. Kant is emphatic that what seems\nmerited to you, in having an aesthetic experience, is a\nfeeling, a form of pleasure. This is so in the case of beauty\nbut also in the case of the sublime (contrast the empiricists from the\nprevious section). The “mathematically sublime” is that\nwhich cannot be captured in full in our imagination, but about which\nwe can nonetheless reason, like infinitude itself. The\n“dynamically sublime” is that which looks to have total\npower over us—like a massive storm or other monstrous aspects of\nnature—but which we can nonetheless resist with the power of our\nown practical reason. In each, we feel pleased that our minds can\novercome limitations.", "\nThis is not a return to those thinkers (Augustine De Musica,\nAquinas Summa Theologica) who thought that aesthetic\nexperience was a direct apprehension of some inherent property of an\nobject, like its being well-formed for its function, or symmetrical in\na way that reflects the divine. According to Kant, beauty isn’t\nstrictly speaking a property of objects (even though we speak as\nthough it is), and we aren’t even tempted to attribute sublimity\nitself to objects. The focus here is pleasure in the powers of\nuniversal mental capacities themselves. Part of Kant’s\ninnovation in aesthetics consists in the suggestion that objects might\ndeserve certain subjective responses.", "\nThis idea is not easy to understand, and many have done significant\ninterpretive and substantive philosophical work attempting to explain\nhow an object could deserve a subjective feeling (see e.g. Mothersill\n1988; Eaton 2001; Hamawaki 2006; Moran 2012; Cavell 1965 [2007];\nGinsborg 2015; Gorodeisky 2019, 2021). One approach here is to\ninterpret the pleasure in question as not just a phenomenal tone (see\nLabukt 2012, Bramble 2013) but rather as a kind of liking or\npro-attitude which, like other attitudes, could be suited or\n‘fitted’ to its intentional object (Gorodeisky 2019, 2021;\nKriegel forthcoming; compare Hume 1757 [1987a]).", "\nDespite this difficulty, the idea that aesthetic experience involves a\nfocus on how an object merits a certain response has pervaded recent\ndiscussion. There’s an important distinction to be made here\nbetween what it is to take aesthetic experience to involve (what feels\nlike) merited pleasure or admiration per se (Scruton 1974, Sibley\n1974, Walton 1993), and what it is to feel pleasure in or simply to\nlike some object when you have an otherwise merited kind of\nexperience of it (Beardsley 1970; Matthen 2017a, 2017b,\n2018). The challenge of making sense of what it is to merit a certain\nsubjective feeling of pleasure does not face this latter claim in the\nsame way, as we can make sense of how an artwork merits a general\nexperience in terms of that experience’s accuracy, its\ncontextualization, or even how it matches the intentions of the artist\nwho created an object (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949; Wollheim 1990).", "\nOne line of research pulls the idea of a merited response apart from\nKant’s claim that the beautiful and the sublime universally\nmerit the same feelings across people. In his magnum opus In\nSearch of Lost Time (originally published 1913–1927),\nMarcel Proust (1913–1927 [2003]) suggested that an individual\nlike his narrator Marcel might feel an individualized, personal demand\nfor a feeling or an emotion from a certain scene or piece of artwork.\nPartly in response to Proust, and in resistance to Kant, Richard Moran\n(2012) and Nick Riggle (2016) have given substantive characterizations\nof the personal demands that artworks and natural scenes can make upon\nus (cf. Nussbaum 1990, Ch.13; Landy 2004, Chs. 1 and 3; Nehamas\n2007).", "\nThere is a challenge facing any theory that takes aesthetic experience\nto focus exclusively on objects’ meriting certain pleasurable\nsubjective responses. It is possible to see that Michelangelo’s\nstatue of David merits admiration, or that the view over Waimea Canyon\nmerits awe, without yourself feeling admiration or wonder in that\nmoment (cf. Moran 2012 on Proust 1913–1927 [2003]). Assuming\nthat other substantive restrictions can be met here (e.g. the demand\nfor disinterested attention; see Section 2.5), would this count as an\naesthetic experience? If so, it’s not clear entirely what would\nbe valuable about it, even if it does involve a positive evaluation of\nits object. Some might say that you have gotten something right: you\nare correct in thinking that the statue merits admiration and the view\nmerits awe. It’s not clear that this correctness would be enough\nto make sense of the great value of aesthetic experience.", "\nIt seems best to say here that this would not count as an aesthetic\nexperience because it does not bear the value of actually\ninvolving a subjective response that is itself of value. But this\ncould lead to trouble with dissociation in the other direction, which\nis also clearly possible: you could have a pleasurable experience\nas of some object’s meriting that very kind of\npleasurable experience, while also being incorrect that it merits\nthat. If the value of aesthetic experience rests exclusively or\nprimarily on the value of the pleasure itself, then it seems that this\ninappropriate experience should share almost all the value that a\nmerited aesthetic experience would have. That, to some, is\ninconceivable (Budd 1985; see Shelley 2010, Peacocke 2021 for further\ndiscussion).", "\nThe view that aesthetic experience focuses primarily on object’s\nmeriting certain positive responses can also clash with other\nintuitions about the nature of aesthetic experience. Some think that\nan experience should be counted as aesthetic even if it involves a\nnegative evaluation of its object: “an abominable performance of\nthe London Symphony is as aesthetic as a superb one …\nThe symptoms of the aesthetic are not marks of merit,” wrote\nNelson Goodman (1968 [1976], p. 255)." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Merit" }, { "content": [ "\nA third view takes aesthetic experience to be focused on expressive\nproperties of objects. An expressive property of an object is a\nproperty by which it expresses something—usually an emotion or\nother affect, but more rarely an attitude, a movement, a personality,\nor a way of experiencing the world as a whole.", "\nConsider how this kind of view differs from those discussed in the\nlast three subsections. Although certain forms can be expressive,\nexpressive properties in general are not just the same as formal\nproperties: something might have a deeply expressive coloration with\nvery simple, unexpressive form, like Rothko’s famous color field\npaintings. It is a matter of substantive dispute (to be described\nbelow) whether expressive properties are the same as powers\nto make perceivers feel certain ways, or properties that\nmerit certain mental responses in perceivers.", "\nRegardless of the answers to these questions, two positions need to be\ndistinguished. One is the position that having an aesthetic experience\nessentially or necessarily involves some emotion. The other is the\nposition that aesthetic experience is essentially, primarily, or\nparadigmatically experience of expressive properties of its\nobject. These claims do not necessarily come together. This section\ndiscusses the latter claim (see Section 2.4 for discussion of the\nformer).", "\nThere are roughly four kinds of views of expression endorsed by those\nwho take the primary focus of aesthetic experience to be expressive\nproperties of an artwork (or, more rarely, of nature; see Croce 1902\n[1992], 1938 [2007]; Wollheim 1968 [1980]). These differ according to\ntheir conceptions of how expression takes place, and what it means for\nthe experience both of the creator and of the appreciator of an\nartwork. These are transfer views, projection views, correspondence\nviews, and transformation views (for alternative taxonomies, see\nMatravers 2013 and Levinson 2006).", "\nDebates about the nature of expression and its importance to aesthetic\nexperience are still lively (Matravers 1998, Robinson 2005, 2011, Gaut\n2007, Kivy 1989, 2002, Boghossian 2002, 2010, 2020, Nussbaum 2007,\nMontero 2006a-b, Cochrane 2010, Wiltsher 2016; for overviews see Kania\n2013 and Matravers 2007, 2013).", "\nThe first kind of view is the simplest, but it offers the least\nexplanation of expression. A simple transfer view of expression takes\nit that some inner state or event of the creator is simply shared via\nexperience of the artwork to the observer—i.e. the spectator,\npercipient, or reader. What is expressed on this kind of view is\nusually an emotion or feeling, but it is sometimes a whole perceptual\nexperience or an entire way of seeing the world.", "\nIn the 1802 [1984] preface to his Lyrical Ballads, the poet\nWilliam Wordsworth identified poetry (which, on his view, could\ninclude prose) as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings\n… emotions recollected in tranquillity” after having been\nfelt in all their heat previously by the poet (p.611; cf. Dewey 1934\n[2007], p. 312). The reader of a poem shares this feeling, learns\nabout this feeling, and thereby feels a pleasant communal feeling with\nthe author. Perhaps the greatest champion of this view was the Russian\nnovelist Leo Tolstoy, who in 1897 [2007] defined art as that\n“human activity” by which “one man consciously, by\nmeans of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has\nlived through, and that other people are infected by these feelings\nand also experience them” (in Cahn and Meskin 2007 at p. 237).\nSomeone who undergoes an aesthetic experience of art, then, will feel\na “joy and spiritual union” not only with its creator, but\nalso with those others who experience it (p.239).", "\nThe transfer theory of emotional expression often associates this\ntransfer with an intermediate clarificatory step, and offers as part\nof a theory of the value of aesthetic experience that it offers not\njust emotional experience but a certain organized knowledge of what\nemotions feel like from the inside. In his lectures on aesthetics in\n1819–33 [1984], Friedrich Schleiermacher argued that artists\nconceive of works that both communicate their own emotions to the\naudience and clarify them in so doing (p.11). The painter and curator\nRoger Fry moved away from his friend Clive Bell’s formalism as\nhe endorsed it in his early work (“Art and Life,” 1917\n[1981]) to claim that art rouses emotion in us in a specifically clear\nway, cut off as they are from motivating us to specific action in our\nown lives (“Essay in Aesthetics” 1909 [1981],\n“Retrospect” 1920 [1981]).", "\nThe transfer theory of expression of emotions is not particularly\npopular, largely because it seems that an artist need not feel those\nemotions she expresses in a work, and that the audience need not\nthemselves feel those emotions expressed in a work (cf. Langer 1953;\nStolnitz 1960; Matravers 2013). Moreover, different spectators tend to\nfeel quite different emotions in response to an artwork, so it’s\nnot clear that art should be understood fundamentally in terms of\ntransferring just those emotions the creator had (Stolnitz 1960 p.\n186; Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949). Others take the focus on the emotion\nthat an artist felt to distract from the artwork itself (Stolnitz\n1960, p. 164).", "\nAnother kind of transfer theory focuses on transfer not of emotion but\nof sensory experience from creator to consumer. The critic John Ruskin\n(1843–60 [2004]) claimed that the true artist (e.g. the painter\nJ.M.W. Turner) could communicate precisely what it is like to have a\ncertain perceptual experience the artist had, by “producing on\nthe far-away beholder’s mind precisely the impression which the\nreality would have produced” (pp. 86–8). The French\nnovelist Marcel Proust—who was a deep admirer of\nRuskin—added that not only could aesthetic experience involve\nthe appreciation of one episode of subjective experience, but it could\nalso involve the appreciation of the artist’s total and unique\nway of experiencing the world, as a kind of subjective personality\n(for discussion, see Landy 2004; compare Véron 1879, Stolnitz\n1960 p.161ff.). One’s act of writing, then, can be understood as\na “secretion of one’s innermost life … that one\ngives to the world” (1895–1900 [1984], p. 79). The\ndenouement of his great novel In Search of Lost Time involves\nthe recognition on the narrator’s part that", "\nart, if it means awareness of our own life, means also awareness of\nthe lives of other people … it is the revelation, which by\ndirect and conscious methods would be impossible, of the qualitative\ndifference, the uniqueness of the fashion in which the world appears\nto each one of us, a difference which, if there were no art, would\nremain for ever the secret of every individual (Time Regained\nin 1913–1927 [2003], p. 299).\n", "\nArthur Danto (1981) echoes this idea in his claim that\n“externalization of the artist’s consciousness, as if we\ncould see his way of seeing and not merely what he saw,” is an\nessential part of expressiveness in art (p.164). This, too, is a way\nof making available to an appreciator a subjective state—but a\nmore general subjective stance on the world, a way of experiencing it\nas a whole, rather than just an individual emotion.", "\nProjection views derive largely from mid-19th century to\nearly 20th century psychological thought about\n“empathy,” which was originally called\n“Einfühlung” in the German (Lipps 1903–6,\ntranslated to “empathy” by Titchener 1909 [1926]). Empathy\ntheorists took it that aesthetic experience involves mentally (or\nperhaps even mystically; Vischer 1873 [1994], p. 104) projecting\nourselves into the physical shape of an item to have an emotional or\ndynamic experience of the kind that a human subject would have if she\ntook on that physical shape. In the 1850s, Hermann Lotze (1885\n[1899]) claimed that a shape can “transport” us\ninside of it “and make us share its life” (quoted by Lee\n& Anstruther-Thomson 1912, pp. 17-18). As Robert Vischer (1873\n[1994]) wrote, “I can think my way into [an object], mediate its\nsize with my own, stretch and expand, bend and confine myself to\nit” (pp. 104–5). The Swiss art historian Heinrich\nWölfflin (1886) agreed that “we submit all objects to\nsoulification” in this projective way, and suggested that such\nprojection involved actual workings of the “motor nerve\nsystem.”", "\nThis view takes it that aesthetic perceivers attribute feeling to\nobjects, but partly by relating them closely to oneself. The\nphilosopher Theodor Lipps (1935) insisted that the “inner\nimitation” involved in empathy involved feeling that the emotion\nin question is felt as belonging to the object perceived—but\nsince you feel “entirely and wholly identical” with the\nobject in this context, you feel that emotion as belonging to yourself\ntoo. The English novelist Vernon Lee (real name Violet Paget) co-wrote\na work with her lover and fellow author Clementina Anstruther-Thomson\n(1912) in which they claimed that we attribute “to lines and\nsurfaces, to the spatial forms, those dynamic experiences which we\nshould have were we to put our bodies into similar conditions”\n(pp. 20–1).", "\nLater on, the psychologist Herbert Sidney Langfeld offered an analysis\nof The Aesthetic Attitude (1920) in terms of empathy, and\nmade several innovations to the theory as it stood: he noted that the\ncapacity for empathy varies across people (p.133), and that sometimes\nwe project motion onto a shape not by feeling as a human in that shape\nwould feel, but rather by feeling how one who produced that gestural\ntrace would feel (p.122).", "\nThese theorists disagreed on some points, for example: whether such\nprojection was voluntary (Vischer, Langfeld) or involuntary\n(Wölfflin, Lipps 1935); whether the emphasis of one’s\nexperience is on feeling oneself as identical to the object\n(Lipps 1935 p. 298, Puffer 1905 pp. 12–13) or on the\nobject as it might feel were it human (Vischer p. 92,\nWölfflin p. 4, Lee & Anstruther-Thomson p. 17); whether the\nemotions in question literally involved any physical bodily activation\nof the perceiver’s nervous system (Wölfflin, Puffer 1905,\nLangfeld) or not (Lipps 1935); and whether such projection needed to\nbe based on actual remembered emotion or motion of the body (Lee &\nAnstruther-Thomson, Langfeld) or not (Vischer, Wölfflin, Lipps\n1935, Puffer 1905). But these disagreements pale in the face of the\nbroad consistency of these theories.", "\nFirst: none placed any particular emphasis on the mental, bodily, or\nemotional states of the creator of an object—just on the\nfeatures of an object that made it amenable to the projective\nidentification involved in empathy. Beautiful things, they tended to\nagree, were those things most amenable to this identification that\nwould then offer pleasure (in this way, some of these theories also\nhave ancestors in those who took beauty to be a power to please; see\nSection 1.2). The pleasure to be had in these contexts is thought by\nthese theorists to be universally accessible (Vischer), as a joy taken\nin the “liveliness” (Lipps 1903–6 p. 102) of\nobjects, the lessening of loneliness (Vischer), or in particular in\nthe naturally harmonious (Puffer 1905) or intrinsically salutary (Lee\n& Anstruther-Thomson) condition into which such empathic\nidentification puts an observer’s body. In the psychological\ncontext in which they wrote, they were not all exclusively concerned\nwith aesthetic experience per se, although they applied it to\narchitecture and the visual arts (Lipps 1903–6, 1935, Puffer\n1905, Lee & Anstruther-Thomson, Langfeld).", "\nRemarkably, these theorists are generally content to make claims about\nidentification and attribution of emotion that sound paradoxical to\nthe 21st-century ear (Goodman 1968 [1976], p. 243; Wollheim\n1968 [1980]). Partly due to the oddity in literally attributing\nemotions to objects or identifying with them, newer descendants of\nthis view focus instead on engagement from the imagination. Levinson\n(2006b) has claimed that you imagine a fictional “persona”\nin music who is expressing the emotions she really has, and Walton\n(1988, 1994) says you imagine of your own actual experience\nof a work of art that it’s an experiencing of real emotions (see\nMatravers 2013, p. 410, for objections).", "\nThere is a difference between (i) experiencing certain feelings\nsuggested by a shape’s affinity with a bodily position and (ii)\nexperiencing that very affinity itself. The former simply exploits a\nresemblance in eliciting a feeling experienced as being\n‘in’ the object, whereas the latter kind of experience\ntakes as its focus that very resemblance relation. Those who endorse\ncorrespondence theories of expression, and take expressive properties\nto be the focus of aesthetic experience, understand aesthetic\nexperience as belonging to the latter kind. These correspondence\ntheories tend to treat aesthetic experience as fundamentally a matter\nof understanding a meaning that certain artworks already have in\nvirtue of their manifest correspondence with certain aspects of human\nsubjective experience—which correspondence is experienced as\nsuch.", "\nAfter the resurgence of formalism in the early twentieth century,\nseveral philosophers started to think about form as having\nsignificance not just in itself but in the way it manifestly resembled\nor corresponded to emotion (e.g. Fry 1981). The philosopher to develop\nthis view most significantly was Susanne Langer, whose two influential\nbooks Philosophy in a New Key (1942) and Feeling and\nForm (1953) focused on music, poetry, and dance (for commentary\nsee Danto 1984). Music itself, she claimed, bears a “close\nlogical similarity to the forms of human feeling – forms of\ngrowth and attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution,\nspeed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and\ndreamy lapses” (1953, p. 27). This is a “pattern of\nsentience,” the form which lived phenomenal subjectivity of\nfeeling shares with music. Since music itself has this form, it has\n“import” or significance as well: it “expresses life\n– feeling, growth, movement, emotion and everything that\ncharacterizes vital existence” (1953, p. 82).", "\nAccording to Langer, this is not just a matter of conventional\nsymbolization, nor a matter of transmission of the life or feelings of\na creator. What the artist felt in making something, and indeed what\nyou yourself feel when you see it, is mostly beside the point. To the\nextent that there is a phenomenological feeling that pervades\naesthetic experience generally, it should be understood as a\n“pervasive feeling of exhilaration” (p.395). In\naesthetic experience a feeling is “not\n‘communicated,’ but revealed; the created form\n‘has’ it, so that perception of the virtual\nobject—say, the famous frieze from the Parthenon—is at\nonce the perception of its amazingly integrated and intense\nfeeling” (1953, p. 394). Far from erasing the comparison,\naesthetic experience (or ‘intuition’) makes plain to us,\nin an intellectually satisfying way, how space can mirror sentiment:\n“What it does to us is to formulate our conceptions of feeling\nand our conceptions of visual, factual, and audible reality together.\nIt gives us forms of imagination and forms of\nfeeling, inseparably” (p.397).", "\nRichard Wollheim is well known for formulating this subtle aspect of\n‘expressive perception’ in several books and essays\n(notably 1968 [1980], 1990, 1994). He treated art objects as\nmeaningful pieces of the physical world to be understood by spectators\nas physical objects which artists themselves intended to be perceived\nin a certain way. These are, and indeed are intended to be, expressive\nof the actual internal life of the artist. But an internal mental\ncondition can only be expressed by an art object via that\nobject’s correspondence to the relevant condition, i.e. that\nproperty of “seem[ing] to us to match, or correspond with, what\nwe experience inwardly” (p.21) in that condition. In an\naesthetic experience of such an art object, the object is seen (or\nheard, or felt) as corresponding in this way to a certain\nfeeling, in a way that involves a spectator’s feeling the\nrelevant feeling herself (cf. Wollheim 1994; see Budd 2008, Noordhof\n2008, Galgut 2010). This is not a matter of “reading off”\nthe feeling from the artwork as you might decode an unfamiliar diagram\n(1980 §29, p. 39ff), but rather participating in a certain\npractice of meaning-making and meaning-interpretation which he labels\na “form of life” (after Wittgenstein 1953 [2009]), and\nwhich allows us to literally experience emotion and inner life\nin artworks.", "\nOther views exploit correspondence, and our experience of\ncorrespondence as such, in different ways. Roger Scruton (1974)\nnotably analyzed aesthetic experience in terms of seeing as\n(cf. Wittgenstein 1953 [2009], 1958 [1965]), and stressed in a way\nsimilar to Wollheim that both a perceptual aspect and an aspect of\n‘thought’ that can attribute emotion to what is seen are\ninseparable aspects of one and the same experience (p.117ff.). At\nbase, such ‘seeing as’ is only available when we notice a\ncertain resemblance which we exploit via an act of the imagination to\nhear something like a falling melody as sad (Chs.8–9).\nIn contrast with Wollheim, though, Scruton claimed the relevant\nresemblance was between the experience of an artwork and the\nexperience of the emotion, not the artwork itself and the experience\nof the emotion (p.127; for amendments to his view, see his 1999, pp.\n140–170).", "\nBy definition, all correspondence views of expression will claim that\nan experience of an expressive property (aesthetic or not) involves\nexperiencing the correspondence relation itself. In this\nregard correspondence views are distinct from nearby theories.\nChristopher Peacocke’s (2009) view of expression, for instance,\nis a view on which you can hear music metaphorically as sad\nby exploiting, but not by consciously representing or experiencing, an\nisomorphism between music and sadness. This isomorphism might make a\ndifference to subpersonal representational processes, and thereby come\nto causally affect the phenomenology of the experience of sadness in\nthe music, but the relation itself is not experienced, on this\nview.", "\nDespite their differences, the correspondence views of Langer,\nWollheim, and Scruton all agree on one crucial point: the relevant\nexperience of correspondence is not one that can be decomposed into\nstrictly separable aspects, one of what is ‘strictly’\nperceived and another added element of what is expressed via what is\nseen. According to all, an experience can be one of correspondence,\nbut in a particularly integrated and indecomposable way.", "\nCorrespondence views of expression—which, by definition, take it\nthat you understand an expression partly by experiencing or noticing\nthe correspondence relation itself—are still popular\n(Budd 1995, Kivy 1989, Davies 1994), and still vigorously debated\n(Peacocke 2009, Matravers 2013, Davies 2006, Levinson 2006b).", "\nTransfer, projection, and correspondence views of expression all share\n(at least) one key commitment—the commitment to the idea that\nthe kinds of emotions or mental states expressed in art are one and\nthe same as the kinds of emotions or mental states experienced in\nordinary life. But those philosophers most closely associated with the\nview that aesthetic experience is focused on expressive properties did\nnot make this commitment. Instead, they took expression to transform\nthe nature of a feeling, and took the art-making process to be\ninextricably bound up with the nature of this transformation\n(Bosanquet 1892 [1904]; Ducasse 1929, p. 111; Dewey 1934 [1980];\nCassirer 1944, pp. 142–5).", "\nThe British philosopher Bernard Bosanquet propounded an early version\nof this view in his 1892 [1904] History of Aesthetic. He\nclaimed that expression of content through form—and especially\nof emotion—is the ultimate aim of any artwork. That content or\nemotion is fundamentally bound up with its “embodiment” in\nthe artwork, “attached, annexed, to the quality of some object\n– to all its detail” (p.4). The process of expression\n“creates the feeling in creating its embodiment, and the feeling\nso created not merely cannot be otherwise expressed, but cannot\notherwise exist, than in and through the embodiment which imagination\nhas found for it” (p.34). While John Dewey (1934 [1980]) thought\nthat aesthetic experience could be enjoyed in various ordinary life\ncircumstances, he considered art intrinsically expressive as the\n“very operation of creating, by means of new objects, new modes\nof experience … It enables us to share vividly and deeply in\nmeanings to which we had been dumb” (p.248).", "\nThe philosopher who most systematically developed the view of\nexpression as transformation was R.G. Collingwood, whose\nPrinciples of Art (1938 [1958]) drew deeply from Benedetto\nCroce’s work (1902 [1992], 1938 [2007]). Croce considered\nexpression fundamental to aesthetic experience, and considered\naesthetic experience to be one of the most fundamental modes of\ncognitive interaction with the world (compare Baumgarten 1735 [1954]).\nExpression, for Croce, was not a matter of communication; it was a\nmatter of organizing fleeting impressions into a clarified, meaningful\nwhole, and as such it can happen purely in the mind of an individual\n(e.g. a single artist). A work of art, then, is not to be considered\nany public manifestation, but rather a mental item, a\n“theoretical form” to be “convert[ed] into words,\nsong, and outward shape” (1938, in Cahn and Meskin 2007,\np.272).", "\nCollingwood (1938 [1958]) left aside Croce’s unusual metaphysics\nand philosophy of mind, but retained and elaborated much of what he\nsaid about the nature of expression. Real art just is a matter of\nexpression, and expression is an internal process directed at your own\nfeelings. It involves clarifying those feelings in a way that releases\nyou from their dominating influence on your thought and action (pp.\n109–10). To express a feeling is to attend wholly to a\nparticular affect-laden fleeting impression, to “stabilize and\nperpetuate it as an idea” in a Humean sense (p.218). In\nattending in this way, you come to consciousness of your feeling, but\nyou thereby also transform it: though “There is emotion there\nbefore we express it … as we express it, we confer upon it a\ndifferent kind of emotional colouring; in one way, therefore,\nexpression creates what it expresses” (p.152). Collingwood gives\nthe somewhat unusual label “Imagination” to “the new\nform which feeling takes when transformed by the activity of\nconsciousness” (p.218). Insofar as art simply is expression, it\nis the production not of some object in the physical world, nor even\n“a ‘form’, understood as a pattern or a system of\nrelations between the various noises we hear or the various colours we\nsee,” but an episode of “total imaginative\nactivity,” which asserts the mastery of the self over feeling\n(p.142).", "\nImportantly for Collingwood, a consumer-side experience of an\nartist’s expression is not to be understood as the reception of\na transferred feeling, or as the interpretation of a meaningful symbol\nor sign. Instead, it is a repetition of what the artist herself has\nalready done:", "\nIf a poet expresses, for example, a certain kind of fear, the only\nhearers who can understand him are those who are capable of\nexperiencing that kind of fear themselves. Hence, when some one reads\nand understands a poem, he is not merely understanding the\npoet’s expression of his, the poet’s, emotions, he is\nexpressing emotions of his own in the poet’s words, which have\nthus become his own words. As Coleridge puts it, we know a man for a\npoet by the fact that he makes us poets. We know that he is expressing\nhis emotions by the fact that he is enabling us to express ours.\n(p.118)\n", "\nThis conception puts certain limitations on what aesthetic production\nand spectator-side aesthetic experience can do. Expression cannot be\nintended at the level of the individual feeling, as it isn’t\nclear before expression what feeling is affecting you\n(p.111). What’s more, a feeling when expressed is not purged\nfrom the mind, only recognized for what it is, and controlled\n(p.110).", "\nCollingwood’s view is complicated and often obscure, but\nsecondary literature has elucidated it somewhat. Hopkins (2017) claims\nthat the clarification and freedom that expression offers comes from\nplacing a raw feeling imaginatively into a modal profile, thereby\nprojecting how it would shift with changes in objective circumstances.\nThis can affect the feeling itself in the moment, just as\nunderstanding the square projective shape in front of you as the face\nof a cube can affect the phenomenology of your visual experience of\nthat shape.", "\nThere is an elusive quality to the expression views of Croce,\nCollingwood, and their contemporaries: it is not easy to understand\nthe kinds of transformation, embodiments, or objectifications of\nfeelings that they take expression to involve. But the basic idea that\na feeling expressed in an artwork is thereby transformed in a way\ninextricable from the work itself has proven enduringly popular\n(Stolnitz 1960, p. 169; Sircello 1972, 1975; compare Budd 1985, Davies\n1994, Levinson 1996c, and Shelley 2010; see Wollheim 1980, p. 76ff.,\nMatravers 2013, and Tormey 1971 [1987] for criticism)." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 (Emotional) expression" }, { "content": [ "\nThe idea that aesthetic experience offers acquaintance with aspects of\nnature has a deep history. Medieval philosophers treated it as a means\nof knowing the divine. Several of those eighteenth-century\nphilosophers who focused on appreciation of form (see Section 1.1)\nthought form was itself a reflection of God’s creative\npower.", "\nThe association between the arts and truth has an even longer history,\ntracing at least back to Aristotle’s claim in the\nPoetics that (good) drama represents possibilities for human\nlife. Many philosophers have argued that the arts offer acquaintance\nwith emotions by expressing emotions (Section 1.4.), and many have\nargued that they offer acquaintance with moral truths (Ruskin\n1843–60 [2004]; Cousin 1854 [1873]; Nussbaum 1990; McMahon 2018;\nsee Landy 2012 for criticism). A significant new trend in\nphilosophical aesthetics also incorporates more cognitive content\ngenerally into the focus of aesthetic experience (see Carroll 2002,\n2006, 2015, Goldman 2013, Peacocke 2021). This section will not cover\nall such views, but only those that treat aesthetic experience as a\nmeans to acquaintance with or knowledge of fundamental facts about the\nstructure of the world and our place in it.", "\nThis claim is systematically defended in three historical contexts:\nRomanticism, post-Kantian German Idealism, and the\n20th-century intersection of existentialism and\nphenomenology.", "\nThe English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in his critical and\nphilosophical essays published together as Biographia\nLiteraria (1817 [1907]), treated imagination as essential to\nartistic creation and aesthetic experience—but fundamentally as\na source of knowledge rather than an empiricist faculty of association\nor a way of entertaining fantasies. In a proto-Idealist vein, he\nclaimed that such knowledge was knowledge of the spirit that grounds\nreality itself, and to which we ourselves belong as individual loci of\nspirit (cf. Guyer 2014b, p. 65). In Germany, the poet-philosopher\nJohann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1795 [1963]) wrote that\naesthetic experience could lead the mind to construct a unity out of a\nmessy space of intuition, which unity mirrored the unity of spirit\ninherent in the metaphysical fabric of the world itself.", "\nA retrospective reverence for the ancient Greek arts was a touchstone\nof the Romantics, who thought its pursuit of beauty precisely allowed\nit to attain “objectivity.” The English poet John Keats\nconcluded his famous Ode on a Grecian Urn (1820) with these\nlines (46–50):", "\nWhen old age shall this generation waste,\n\n Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe\n\nThan ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say’st,\n\n “Beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all\n\n Ye know on earth, and all ye need to\nknow.”\n", "\n(For criticism of Keats on this point, see Ruskin 1843–60\n[2004]). The German philosopher Friedrich Schlegel made this claim\nexplicitly in his essay “On the Study of Greek Poetry”\n(1795). He thought Sophocles composed terrific tragedy effortlessly,\njust by letting the harmonious structure of nature flow through him\ninto his drama.", "\nThe Romantics thought that aesthetic experience offered acquaintance\nwith a concrete individual sometimes called “the\nAbsolute”—either the infinite itself, or some particular\nconcrete individual within nature that somehow reflected the whole\nunified spirit of the universe. As Schlegel (1798–1800 [1991])\nput it, “one might believe [Romantic poetry] exists only to\ncharacterize poetical individuals of all sorts; and yet there is still\nno form so fit for expressing the entire spirit of an author …\nIt alone can become, like the epic, a mirror of the whole\ncircumambient world, an image of the age” (§116, pp.\n31–2). This acquaintance with a concrete individual was\ncontrasted with conceptualized or descriptive understanding.", "\nAlthough these various Romantic poets and philosophers thought\naesthetic experience was the best way to achieve acquaintance with the\ntrue fundamental nature of the universe, they also took on a certain\npessimism or “irony” about the extent to which this could\nreally be achieved. The thematization of limitations on our knowledge\nin the context of aesthetic attempts to know the harmonious unity of\nthe world is a common feature of Romantic writing.", "\nThe systematic theories of German Idealism and the proposals of\nRomanticism permeated one another, especially in the work of Friedrich\nSchelling. His System of Transcendental Idealism (1800\n[1978]) claimed that both the beautiful and the sublime gave us\nawareness of a fundamental conflict between unconscious (but\nnonetheless mental or spiritual) nature and the conscious\n“infinity” of human freedom. The sublime makes us aware of\nthis terrible conflict directly, and the beautiful offers the\ntemporary apparent reprieve from or resolution of this conflict. In\nhis later Philosophy of Fine Art (1802–3 [1989]), he\ndenied that art offered “sensual stimulation, as recreation, as\nrelaxation for a spirit fatigued by more serious matters” (in\nCahn and Meskin 2007, p. 170). Instead, “truth and beauty are\nmerely two different ways of viewing the one absolute,” where\nthe beautiful offers acquaintance with “the essential forms of\nthings” via concrete particulars, and philosophical theorization\noffers knowledge of the same via general principles (pp. 178,\n173).", "\nArthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics in The World as Will and\nRepresentation (1818 [1958]) picks up a significant piece of\nSchelling’s system. He expanded on Schelling’s claim that\n“Will is primal being” by claiming that all of fundamental\nreality is a matter of will. What aesthetic experience offers us is\ndirect, intimate acquaintance with essences: “what is thus known\nis no longer the individual thing as such, but the Idea, the\neternal form, the immediate objectivity of the will at this\ngrade” (§34 at p. 195).", "\nSchopenhauer sometimes speaks as though we can choose to have an\naesthetic experience by a “conscious and violent tearing away\nfrom the relations of the same object to the will” (§39,\np.202); the ‘genius’ artist in particular is good at doing\nthis. When we “devote the whole power of our mind to\nperception” of an object, we can come to forget our own\nwill—which is itself a pleasant thing, for our will is\nconstantly either bored with its own satisfaction or pained by its\nfrustration (§34, pp. 178–9).", "\nAt other points, Schopenhauer presented aesthetic experience as a\npassive result of experiencing great art, especially the art of tragic\ndrama. In tragedy, he wrote,", "\nthe terrible side of life is presented to us… and so that\naspect of the world is brought before our eyes which directly opposes\nour will … we become aware that there is still left in us\nsomething different that we cannot possibly know positively, but only\nnegatively, as that which does not will life … it\nraises us above the will and its interest, and puts us in such a mood\nthat we find pleasure in the sight of what directly opposes the will.\n(p.433)\n", "\nOutside of aesthetic experience, we can only know the nature of the\nuniverse by a kind of extrapolation. Schopenhauer thus puts aesthetic\nexperience in a place of priority with respect to philosophy\nitself.", "\nOn this last point he was directly opposed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich\nHegel, whose system of historical development developed in\nThe Phenomenology of Spirit (1807 [1979]) and his\nlectures on aesthetics and fine art (1820–29 [1920]) published\nposthumously. According to him, the point of art is to come to\nunderstand the fundamental, minded nature of the world—the\n“spirit” to which we all belong as self-conscious,\nrational, self-determining beings. Hegel considered a mode of\nunderstanding fundamental nature to be more advanced the more that it\nabstracts from concrete sensuous presentation and the more that it can\nturn contemplation back onto itself. There is a scale within types of\nart in this respect; visual art is less advanced than music, which is\nitself less advanced than poetry (1807 [1979]). While self-conscious\nRomantic poetry allows us to see our rational self-determining nature\nas minded beings, it nonetheless remains imperfect as a mode of\nknowledge of spirit. Philosophy, in its endless capacity for\nself-conscious reflection, “is a higher mode of\npresentment” (in Cahn and Meskin 2007, p. 181) and can\nultimately supplant art as a mode of knowing the world’s\nessential structure.", "\nThis Hegelian consequence is not a happy one, and it is a serious\ndrawback of treating art as revelatory of the structure of the\nuniverse: its pits aesthetic endeavors in competition with scientific\nand philosophical ones themselves (Poe 1850 [1984], Gotshalk 1947\np.8).", "\nSchelling’s (1800 [1978]) account of the inherent conflict\nbetween “unconscious” nature and the\n“conscious” free human subject had a great influence on\nphenomenologists and existentialists who wrote about aesthetic\nexperience in the early to mid-20th century.", "\nIn his influential essay “On the Origin of the Work of\nArt” (1935 [1971]), the phenomenologist Martin Heidegger\ninitially objected to the centrality of the “much-vaunted\naesthetic experience” to point out that the “thingly\naspect” of an artwork is essential to what it does for us (in\nCahn and Meskin 2007, p. 345). But it turns out that he is really only\nobjecting to a certain abstracted, perhaps Hegelian or neo-Hegelian\nconception of aesthetic experience, rather than all experience of art\nconsidered as special. He gives his own account of our experience of\nart, one on which art offers acquaintance with the basic, essential\nnature of our own human subjectivity. Our primary experience of the\nphysical objects around us foregrounds their utility to us—what\nHeidegger had previously called their “readiness-to-hand”\n(Being and Time, 1927)—rather than their physicality;\nthings only stand out as the clumps of matter they are when they fail\nin serving us in the way we expect them to, as when a tool breaks. It\nis art that allows us to step back from this mode of experiencing\nobjects to contemplate that very phenomenological mode of\nreadiness-to-hand itself, and how it struggles against blunt physical\nconstraints. A work of art, then, sets up a\n“world”—roughly, a way of experiencing\nthings—as it emerges from its physical basis (the\n“earth”). Through experiences of art, we come to see this\nstruggle itself. Heidegger uses the example of a Van Gogh painting of\nworn, dirty peasant shoes and a Greek temple to exemplify how these\nways of “being” emerge from physical things in their\n“thingliness.” Heidegger defines art as “the\nbecoming and happening of truth” as a form of\n“unconcealedness:” it brings to the foreground our ways of\nexperiencing the world and how they clash with physicality.", "\nThe French atheist existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre studied with\nHeidegger and with the founding phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. The\nview of aesthetic experience that emerges from his novel\nNausea (1938 [1965]) is one that draws from both of their\nconceptions of the physical world as fundamentally devoid of meaning.\nThe world and all of “existence” as it is in itself\nindependently of human agency is absurd enough to inspire a form of\nnausea in the narrator, Antoine Roquentin. This absurdity consists in\nthe facts that: things happen contingently and for no particular\nreason; no life has any narrative unity; and there is no patterned\nstructure to the unfolding of events one after another.", "\nWhat the experience of art is needed to do is to bring any order,\nstructure, and meaning to human life. In a series of scenes in which\nRoquentin hears the music of a particular jazz vocalist, he comes to\nfind in music the necessity, purpose, and internal structure the world\nhad lacked:", "\nIt seems inevitable, the necessity of this music is so strong …\nIf I love that beautiful voice, it is above all because of that: it is\nneither for its fullness nor its sadness, but because it is the event\nwhich so many notes have prepared so far in advance, dying so that it\nmight be born. … something has happened. (38)\n", "\nFrom Roquentin’s ecstatic listening we can extrapolate a theory\nof an experience of art and why it is so essential to us. Art\nexercises human freedom to structure the world and give it meaning and\na sense of purpose or necessity; it offers to those who appreciate it\na form of aesthetic experience that makes the world feel whole and\nnecessary. By extrapolating from Sartre’s writing of\nNausea itself, we can also see that art can give us\nacquaintance with the very absurdity of existence itself, and\nchallenge us to make something meaningful of ourselves. In What is\nLiterature? (1948 [1967]) Sartre called writing a way of\n“imposing the unity of mind on the diversity of things”\nthat serves our “need of feeling that we are essential in\nrelationship to the world” (p.27). The creation and appreciation\nof art, then, not only offers knowledge of the nauseating fundamental\nabsurdity in existence, but also offers at least a phenomenological\ncure for it.", "\nNot all in Sartre’s group were so optimistic (nor all so\npessimistic about the meaning in the world; consider Sartre’s\nChristian contemporary Marcel 1951 [1960]). Albert Camus (1942), for\ninstance, thought that absurdity was inescapable, and all you could do\nwas defy it and go on living anyway (cf. Nagel 1971). Later critical\ntheorists who were deeply influenced by the existentialists took a\nmore complicated stance. In Aesthetic Theory (1970 [1997]),\nTheodor Adorno claimed that artworks offer fantasies of escape from\nthe material world by imposing a new form upon its matter, but only in\na way that involves rejecting their material origin. “Aesthetic\nexperience,” then, “is that of something that spirit may\nfind neither in the world nor in itself; it is possibility promised by\nits impossibility” (pp. 135–6).", "\nThis concludes the survey of the various different types of properties\non which philosophers have variously claimed aesthetic experience\nfocuses. Note that it is consistent to claim that aesthetic experience\nis focused on more than one of these types of properties. In an\nimportant turn in mid-20th-century aesthetics, Frank Sibley\n(1959) argued that there was a heterogeneous class of aesthetic\nproperties—including beauty, sublimity, elegance, charm, and\nvarious expressive properties—on which aesthetic experience\nfocused (for discussion see Matravers 1996, Brady and Levinson 2001).\nSome contemporary philosophers draw from multiple traditions to\ncharacterize aesthetic experience (Carroll 2002, 2006, 2015, Levinson\n1996a-d, 2016b, Stecker 2005, Goldman 2013, Peacocke 2021). Views of\naesthetic experience that diffuse focus onto several different types\nof properties of objects are under correspondingly more pressure to\nclarify what is special about aesthetic experience in other terms." ], "subsection_title": "1.5 Fundamental Nature" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Mental aspects of aesthetic experience", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAlmost all agree that pleasure is a typical aspect of aesthetic\nexperience (for exceptions see Carroll 2006, Adorno 1970 [1997]). But\nnot all agree that it is an essential or even necessary aspect of\naesthetic experience (those who do not include Levinson 1996c, Stecker\n2005, and Peacocke 2021).", "\nIs it possible to explain the source of such pleasure in aesthetic\nexperience? It’s not obvious that it should be possible,\nespecially on the view that art has no function and aesthetic\nexperience no further purpose (see Section 2.5). One option is simply\nto delineate the particular type of pleasure that makes aesthetic\nexperience what it is—and thereby count on an\ninterlocutor’s recognition of that type of\npleasure—without explaining its source. In the\n“aestheticist” or “art for art’s sake”\nmovement amongst Romantic poets and essayists (Gautier 1835–6\n[2005], Poe 1850 [1984], Baudelaire 1857 [1965], Pater 1873 [1986];\nfor overview see Guyer 2014b, Ch.6), many took this particular stance,\nespecially to rebel against those (like Ruskin 1843–60 [2004])\nwho took the point of art to be moral in nature.", "\nIt is more common, however, to claim that aesthetic experience\ninvolves pleasure taken in some further aspect of aesthetic\nexperience. There are a few distinct proposed sources of pleasure in\naesthetic experience. First, we might take pleasure in positive\nevaluation of an object or its creator. Second, we might enjoy the\nactivity of our own minds, including the free play of our faculties.\nThird, we might feel joyful relief in being liberated, at least\ntemporarily, from certain practical pressures or domination. Fourth,\nwe might take pleasure in coming to know or understand something in\naesthetic experience. Fifth, and finally, we might take pleasure in a\nspecial connection to others made available in aesthetic experience in\nparticular.", "\nVarious theories of aesthetic experience combine these claims in\nconsistent ways; it is possible to think that there are several\ngrounds for the total pleasure involved here. Note also that\nit’s consistent to take pleasure to be a necessary aspect of\naesthetic experience without claiming (i) that pleasure makes\naesthetic experience what it is, (ii) that pleasure is the\npoint or aim of aesthetic experience, or (iii) that\nan object’s power to produce pleasure in us is the focus of\naesthetic experience. (For discussion of this last claim, see Section\n1.2 above).", "\nPerhaps most popular is the claim that aesthetic experience involves\npleasure because (and insofar as) it involves a positive evaluation of\nan object in some respect (see also Sections 1.1 and 1.3). The idea\nhere is that we take pleasure in an object’s intrinsic value,\nits suitedness to function, its power to produce a certain kind of\nexperience, or even in the goodness and skill of its creator\n(including, perhaps, the divine).", "\nTo compliate matters, pleasure can be understood in at least two ways:\nas a phenomenological feeling with a certain positive “hedonic\ntone,” or as a kind of pro-attitude with positive content (see\nLabukt 2012, Bramble 2013). On the former definition, it’s not\nclear that any positive evaluation of an object should\ninvolve a positive frisson of feeling (Peacocke 2021, pp.\n173–4). Given that we can begrudgingly, enviously, or otherwise\ngrumpily attribute genuine value to things in other contexts, why\nshould positive evaluation in aesthetics necessarily involve a\npositive hedonic tone? On the latter definition, it might trivially\nfollow that aesthetic experience involves pleasure (as a pro-attitude)\nif it involves positive evaluation, but this claim has limited\ninterest. Recent work in aesthetic normativity has done significant\nwork to make sense of a combination of the two (Gorodeisky 2019, 2021;\nKriegel forthcoming).", "\nA second common claim is that pleasure in aesthetic experience derives\nfrom a biologically natural joy we take in the activity of our own\nmental faculties. This position was especially popular in the\neighteenth century among those philosophers who thought of the mind\nfundamentally in terms of a limited number of faculties like\nsensation, imagination, understanding, and reason (Baumgarten 1735\n[1954], Meier 1999, Schlegel 1795 [2001], 1798–1800 [1991]).\nThis view also has its own contemporary proponents (Levinson 1996b, p.\n13).", "\nThe claim that we take pleasure in mental activity can be readily\ncombined with the thought that aesthetic experience involves an\nevaluation, especially as it involves a (positive) evaluation of our\nown minds (Baumgarten 1735 [1954], Mendelssohn 1758 [1997], Feagin\n1983). But this can seem too much focused on the perceiver or\nappreciator rather than the object of aesthetic experience itself.", "\nA famous version of this second claim derives largely from Kant (1789\n[1987]), who argued that we take pleasure in the free play of\nour mental faculties. This pleasure has a substantive aspect, but it\nalso has a privative aspect. In the absence of a concept we apply to\nsome object of perceptual representation, our imagination and\nunderstanding are liberated from the strictures of rational,\ndiscursive thought about the things we encounter in experience. This\nliberation is itself joyful. Some philosophers, notably Friedrich\nSchiller (1795 [1989]), thought this mental liberation was the single\nfundamental source of pleasure in aesthetic experience (cf. Matherne\nand Riggle 2020).", "\nThis relates closely to a third proposed source of pleasure in\naesthetic experience: liberation from certain practical thought and\nemotion in aesthetic experience. Schopenhauer (1818 [1958]) took it\nthat the basic condition of human practical life was a painful one: as\nwilling creatures, we are constantly vacillating between frustration\nof our desires and boredom in the satisfaction of them. What aesthetic\nexperience offers us is a reprieve from such suffering, a way to\nbecome a “pure will-less, painless, timeless\nsubject of knowledge” (§34, p. 179; cf. Schelling\n1800 [1978]).", "\nInfluential modern theories focused on liberation from the influence\nof unexpressed emotions. R.G.C. Collingwood (1938 [1958]) in\nparticular thought that all experience of “art proper,”\nwhether as creator or appreciator involves expression of an emotion,\nand that all such expression involves clarification and transformation\nof a feeling into something whose murky domination you can now resist\nin a way you couldn’t before (see Section 1.4.4 above).", "\nCollingwood explicitly distinguishes his view from another kind of\nview that takes pleasure in aesthetic experience to be a matter of\nrelease. This other view makes a process of “catharsis”\ncentral to some or all aesthetic experience. Catharsis is an\nAristotelian concept; Aristotle himself used it to explain the\npleasurable release from tension we feel after a tragic drama raises\nemotions of pity and fear in us (Poetics). But it is not\nentirely clear what catharsis is.", "\nA fourth proposed source of pleasure in aesthetic experience is the\npleasure of gaining knowledge or understanding. Those who take\naesthetic experience to involve, essentially, a form of acquaintance\nwith fundamental aspects of nature tend to attribute pleasure in this\nway. But any broadly epistemic approach to aesthetic experience can\nattribute pleasure to this source, even if the knowledge or\nunderstanding gained by aesthetic experience is not necessarily of\nfundamental metaphysics. Nelson Goodman (1968 [1976]), for instance,\ntook aesthetic experience to be an encounter with a meaningful\nsymbolic object. He rejects all attempts “to distinguish the\naesthetic in terms of immediate pleasure … The claim that\naesthetic pleasure is of a different and superior quality is\nnow too transparent a dodge to be taken seriously”\n(p.242–3). But he nonetheless notes that “what delights is\ndiscovery,” so there’s pleasure involved here (p.258).", "\nFinally, some trace pleasure in aesthetic experience to connection\nwith other people. This claim is particularly associated with those\nwho treat aesthetic experience as focused on expressive properties\n(see Section 1.4. above). The pleasure we take in communing with\nothers can be a matter of connecting with an artist and her own inner\nlife (Wordsworth 1802 [1984], Vischer 1873 [1994], Proust\n1913–1927 [2003]), or a matter of connecting with others who\nwould react to an object in the same distinctively aesthetic ways we\ndo, or both (Tolstoy 1897 [2007])." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Pleasure" }, { "content": [ "\nOne traditional line of thought in aesthetic theory takes it that\naesthetic experience of an object excludes conceptual thought about\nwhat kind of thing that object is. This was central to Kant’s\n(1789 [1987]) view; he thought that the imagination and the\nunderstanding could engage in a “free play” in aesthetic\nexperience precisely because no conceptual binding restricted the way\nan object presented itself to us in this context.", "\nThe same idea has been central to vastly different theories of\naesthetic experience too. After Croce (1902, 1938), Collingwood (1938\n[1958]) denied that an emotion could be conceptualized in the\nexpression essential to aesthetic experience because conceptual\n“description generalizes … Expression, on the contrary,\nindividualizes” (112). The idea that conceptualization is\ngeneralization, and so incompatible with the focus on the\nparticular demanded by aesthetic experience, is an enduring\none (see e.g. Sibley 1974, 1983). Theodor Adorno (1970 [1997]) claimed\nthat artworks offer the promise of escape from worldly\nconceptualization, although he also argued that this promise is\ninevitably broken, given that artworks are themselves aspects of the\nreal world.", "\nEven those who take aesthetic experience to be a mode of cognitive\ncontact with the world often distinguish it from other cognitive modes\nin terms of its incompatibility with conceptualization. The Romantics\n(see Section 1.5.1. above) thought that the “absolute,” or\nthe total infinite substratum of reality, could be experienced in a\nconcrete individual, but not by conceptualization. Nelson Goodman\n(1968 [1976]) treated aesthetic experience as a matter of\nunderstanding objects that present their subjects in an analog way\n(with what he calls “syntactic density, semantic density, and\nsyntactic repleteness,” p. 252), where this contrasts sharply\nwith the conceptual mode of representation offered by natural\nlanguages.", "\nOn the other hand, various philosophers have argued that\nconceptualization is positively necessary to aesthetic\nexperience.", "\nScruton (1974) took a form of “unasserted” conceptual\nimagination to be central to the “seeing-as” and\n“hearing-as” (etc.) of aesthetic experience. In this\nScruton was influenced by Wollheim, but Wollheim’s (1968 [1980],\n1990, 1994) reliance on conceptualization in aesthetic experience\nplausibly runs deeper than Scruton’s. To have an aesthetic\nexperience of an artwork in particular is, in part, to\ninterpret it, and to interpret an artwork is in part to\nattribute certain intentions concerning that very experience to the\nartist who made it (1987, p. 8; for a famous criticism of this claim,\nsee Wimsatt and Beardsley, 1946). This attribution of intentions\nsurely involves conceptualization, insofar as intention itself\ndoes.", "\nA similar interpenetration of thought and experience undergirds\nWalton’s (1970) famous argument that an aesthetic experience of\nan artwork necessarily involves assigning that work to a category. The\nexpressive chaos of Picasso’s Guernica would not seem\nchaotic at all if it belonged to a genre of “Guernicas”\nwhich tended to be much more brashly colored and three-dimensional; in\nthat context, it would seem flat, muted, even gentle. In a rare entry\ninto aesthetics, p. F. Strawson (1966) once argued that aesthetic\nappraisal—itself plausibly a part of aesthetic\nexperience—must involve conceptualization of a work of art\nas such, in order to focus attention on just those features\nrelevant to such appraisal (for critical discussion, see Sibley 1974\nand Wollheim 1980)." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Conceptualization" }, { "content": [ "\nIt’s an old idea (Addison 1712 [1879], Burke 1756 [2007]) that\nimagination is essentially involved in aesthetic experience. But\ndifferent philosophers mean vastly different things by\n“imagination” here.", "\nIn the eighteenth century, the imagination was conceived by both\nempiricists and rationalists as one of the few fundamental mental\nfaculties (alongside others like sensation and reason). As such, it\nplayed various different roles in the mental system. One of those\nroles was to take up and combine the raw material offered by sensation\ninto more sophisticated representations available in the absence of\nindividual objects there to be sensed.", "\nAs Kant put it, the imagination “synthesiz[es] the manifold of\nintuition.” In ordinary (non-aesthetic) experience, it does so\naccording to rules or schema provided by the understanding, which\ncorrespond roughly to what we consider concepts today. In an\nexperience of a beautiful object or scene, however, the imagination is\ngiven no such rules, and engages in a “harmonious” form of\n“free play” with the faculty of understanding without\nbringing the object presented in experience under any particular\nconcept whatsoever (see also Section 2.2. above).", "\nAlthough it is hard to say exactly what such “free play”\nis (cf. Ginsborg 1997, Matherne 2016, Küplen 2015, Savile 2020),\nthe idea that aesthetic experience crucially involves such free play\nof the imagination has been a vastly influential one (see Guyer 2014\nfor a comprehensive approach to the history of this thought). It is\nclosely allied with the idea of beauty as a form of unity in variety\n(Hutcheson 1726 [2004]), and the idea that we enjoy the activity of\nour own mental faculties in aesthetic experience (see Section 2.1.\nabove). As Benedetto Croce summarized it, it is the idea that\n“aesthetic activity fuses impressions into an organic\nwhole… the synthesis of variety, or multiplicity, into\nunity” (1902 [1992], p. 21). Such play is meant to involve the\nsubject as an agent, and it is meant to be pleasurable in part due to\nthe freedom it gives to the imagination. This is disputable: as the\nnovelist-philosophers Vernon Lee and Clementina Anstruther-Thomson\n(1912) put it, “we do not take pleasure in playing because\nplaying makes us feel free; but, on the contrary, we get greater and\nmore unmixed pleasure while playing, because we are free to …\naccommodate our activity to our pleasure” (pp. 6–7).", "\nThis kind of mental play should be carefully distinguished from other\nforms of play associated with aesthetic experience that also\nconstitutively involve imagination (e.g. Spencer 1855 [1895], Groos\n1896–9 [1901]). For example, Walton (1990) has influentially\ntreated our aesthetic engagement with various fictions as a form of\nmake-believe game involving imagination as constrained by certain\nkinds of prescriptions given by the structure of a story or a picture\n(cf. Groos 1898 on a “self-conscious illusion,” pp.\n302–3). This is structured, game-like play; Walton intends us to\nunderstand what we do with such aesthetic objects on the model of what\nkids do with toys. It is also often a purely ‘internal’\nplay, one that doesn’t manifest in further bodily action. But it\nis a form of play undergirded by the imagination not as a synthetic\ncapacity to structure a mess of impressions, but rather undergirded by\nthe imagination as a more general creative capacity, one that allows\nus to entertain vividly things which are not currently present to our\nsenses.", "\nThis now more common conception of the imagination also informs those\notherwise various and disparate views which take aesthetic experience\nto extend beyond what is immediately given in perception. The English\nRomantic poet Percy Bysshe Shelley (1832 [2003]) defined poetry as the\nexpression of imagination, where the imagination is just “mind\nacting upon … thoughts so as to color them with its own light,\nand composing from them as from elements, other thoughts, each\ncontaining within itself the principle of its own integrity”\n(p.674). Arthur Schopenhauer (1818 [1958]) thought that the\nimagination of the artist was required to go beyond what is literally\nperceived to divine the essences of things:", "\nactual objects are almost always only very imperfect copies of the\nIdea that manifests itself in them. Therefore the man of genius\nrequires imagination, in order to see in things not what nature has\nactually formed, but what she endeavoured to form, yet did not bring\nabout … (§36 p. 198).\n", "\nDilman Walter Gotshalk wrote in Art and the Social Order\n(1947) that aesthetic experience involves the amplification of what is\ncurrently presented in experience by “suggestions of the\nobject” brought to mind by the imagination (p.19).", "\nRoger Scruton built a theory of aesthetic experience on this creative,\nexpansive power of the imagination in his book Art and\nImagination (1974). A proper experience of art is an imaginative\none, one which “goes beyond what is strictly given”\n(p.98). The relevant role of imagination here is to make it possible\nfor you to engage in a voluntary, willed form of aspectual seeing, or\n“seeing as,” which makes it possible for you to see a\ncertain shade of blue as sad, for instance, even though it\ncannot literally be sad. Scruton is quick to emphasize that\nthis kind of imagination is not perfectly free, but rather\nconstrained; it “involves thinking of these descriptions [e.g.\nof blue as sad] as appropriate in some way to the primary\nobject,” and is subject to certain constraints of rationality\nand objectivity (pp. 98, 55, 112).", "\nA final role key role for the imagination in aesthetic experience of\nart involves recreating something that was originally in the mind of\nthe artist. This is, quite often, a matter of an emotion that is\nexpressed in the artwork (Tolstoy 1897 [2007]; Croce 1912, 1938;\nCollingwood 1938 [1958]; see Section 1.4 above). But it can also be\nmore than that. In The Imaginary (1940 [2004]) and his later\nessay “What is Literature?” (1948 [1967]) the French\nexistentialist Jean-Paul Sartre spoke of the imagination as needed to\nconstitute an object for conscious aesthetic contemplation (cf.\nDufrenne 1953). In the case of literature, “the imagination of\nthe spectator has not only a regulative function but a constitutive\none. It does not play: it is called upon to recompose the beautiful\nobject beyond the traces left by the artist” (1948, p. 33). John\nDewey (1934 [1980]) also claimed, in his theory of\n‘esthetic’ and thus particularly unified experience, that\na spectator of art “must create his own experience. And\nhis creation must include relations comparable to those which the\noriginal producer underwent. … there must be an ordering of the\nelements of the whole that is in form, although not in details, the\nsame as the process of organization the creator of the work\nconsciously experienced” (p.314)." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Imagination" }, { "content": [ "\nEmotion has been taken to be central to aesthetic experience since\nearly work on aesthetics as such in the eighteenth century. In France,\nthe influential Abbé Jean-Baptiste Du Bos (1719 [1748])\nemphasized the importance of occurrent, bodily emotion in our\nappreciation of drama. This emotion is pleasant in comparison to the\nlanguor of everyday life (cf. discussion in Hume, “Of\ntragedy,” 1757 [1987b]). In Germany, Georg Friedrich Meier\n(1999) treated the passions as essential to the pleasure we take in\naesthetic experience, and Mendelssohn (1785 [1979])—after\nDubos—added that part of why this is pleasurable is that we feel\na certain salutary effect on the body in having emotion in aesthetic\nexperience. Although Baumgarten (1735 [1954]) wrote more generally\nabout aesthetics as the science of cognition of objects by sensation,\nhe also specified in the case of poetry in particular that one central\ngoal is “to arouse affects” (§XXV, p. 24).", "\nWith the rise of Romanticism and then of empathy theory, artists and\nphilosophers were particularly concerned to clarify the ways in which\naesthetic experience involved feeling an emotion alongside that\nexpressed in an artwork (see Section 1.4 above). It is possible to\ntake aesthetic experience to be singularly focused on emotional\nexpression without claiming that the appreciator of an aesthetic\nobject actually needs to feel the emotion that object expresses\n(Langer 1953). Nonetheless, many views of expression did indeed think\nthat an appropriate aesthetic experience involved feeling that\nexpressed emotion (Bosanquet 1915, Collingwood 1938 [1958], Wollheim\n1990). On a view that takes aesthetic experience essentially to\ninvolve appreciating expression of emotion, and which also takes such\nappreciation essentially to involve feeling that emotion,\nfeeling some emotion or other is essential to aesthetic experience.\nBut the emotion in question varies from case to case, depending on\nwhat the aesthetic object expresses.", "\nA distinct influential view has it that there is one consistent\ndistinctive “aesthetic emotion” felt in all aesthetic\nexperience of any object whatsoever. A version of this thought G.E.\nMoore’s brief remarks on aesthetic experience in Principia\nEthica (1903 [1993]; cf. Guyer 2014c pp. 112–3): “It\nis not sufficient that a man should merely see the beautiful qualities\nin a picture and know that they are beautiful, in order that we may\ngive his state of mind the highest praise. We require that he should\nalso appreciate the beauty of that which he sees … he\nshould have an appropriate emotion towards the beautiful qualities\nwhich he cognizes” (§113). But the idea of a distinctive\naesthetic emotion is perhaps most closely associated with\nMoore’s friend Clive Bell (1914 [2007]), who took the goodness\nof art to be a matter of its ability to rouse us to a “state of\necstasy” by its “significant form” (cf. Dean 1996).\nBell explicitly called this “peculiar emotion provoked by works\nof art” an “aesthetic emotion.”", "\nBell presumed so much agreement on this point that he said little\nabout what this emotion is, leading to much criticism (e.g.\nStolnitz 1960, p. 144). Nelson Goodman (1968 [1976]) claimed that this\noversight meant that Bell had little or no available distinction\nbetween non-aesthetic and aesthetic experience: “The theory of\naesthetic phlogiston explains everything and nothing” (p.247).\nMore recently, Jesse Prinz (2014) has suggested that we understand the\naesthetic emotion in question as a form of wonder (see Carroll 2019\nfor objections).", "\nAfter Bell, Dewey (1934 [1980]) and Collingwood (1938 [1958]) took\nmore moderate positions on the nature of a specific aesthetic emotion.\nBoth thought that aesthetic experiences were colored distinctively by\ntheir own variable emotions, but also that there is a distinctive\naffect in common across all aesthetic experiences. Dewey claimed that\nthis affect was a matter of “qualitative unity” of an\nexperience (1938 [1980], pp. 84–5), and Collingwood that it was\n“the specific feeling of having successfully expressed\nourselves” (1938 [1958], p. 117).", "\nAll the views discussed in this section thus far share the claim that\nsome emotion or other is essential to aesthetic experience. There are\nother views on which emotion is a common concomitant of aesthetic\nexperience, but that it does not make aesthetic experience what it is\n(e.g. Vivas 1937). Goodman (1968 [1976]) insisted that “in\naesthetic experience the emotions function cognitively\n… Cognitive use involves discriminating and relating them in\norder to gauge and grasp the work and integrate it with the rest of\nour experience and the world” (p.248). According to Goodman,\nsuch cognitively purposed emotions need not be present in aesthetic\nexperience, and they are sometimes present in non-aesthetic experience\ntoo (p.251).", "\nIt is somewhat surprising that two of the most important historical\ntheories of aesthetic experience make the now rare claim that emotion\nis positively incompatible with aesthetic experience. Kant (1789), for\ninstance, claimed that “a pure judgment of\ntaste”—that which you would make in an aesthetic\nexperience of pure beauty—“is independent of charm and\nemotion” (p.68). Schopenhauer (1818 [1958]) thought of emotion\nas wrapped up in motive and will, in its striving or frustration, but\nalso claimed that aesthetic experience offered complete release from\nsuch striving and frustration. As such, aesthetic experience does not\ninvolve emotion as we ordinarily understand it. Nonetheless,\nSchopenhauer did indeed notice the importance of emotional expression\nto certain arts, and he conceded that some of those general\n“Ideas” we can come to understand in the course of\naesthetic experience are ideas of emotions and “their essential\nnature, without any accessories, and so also without the motives for\nthem” (§52, p. 260)." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Emotion" }, { "content": [ "\nThe idea that aesthetic experience must be in some way\n“disinterested”—roughly speaking, unconcerned with\nthe way its object could serve further practical purposes—is\ncentral in discussion of aesthetic experience. It is used to\ndistinguish aesthetic experience from close counterpart experiences of\nthe same object, and is thought to capture something essential about\nthe nature of the aesthetic. But philosophers can mean quite different\nthings by “disinterested” (for a brief history, see\nStolnitz 1961).", "\nAnthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, is often cited\n(e.g. by Guyer 2004) as the originator of the modern idea of\ndisinterest. However, John Haldane (2013) persuasively traces the idea\nright back to Johannes Scotus Erigena, who wrote in his De\ndivisione naturae that “The sense of sight is abused by\nthose who approach the beauty of visible forms with appetite or\ndesire” (Haldane 2013, p. 30; Erigena, De divisione\nnaturae, IV–V). Some find an ancient ancestor of the idea\nin Aristotle’s ethical writings (see entry on\n“Aristotle’s Aesthetics”).", "\nNonetheless, Shaftesbury (1711) did write of disinterest, and\nillustrated the idea by considering two approaches to a coin: one\naesthetic, which delights just in mere contemplation of its form, and\nthe other practical, which considers what it might purchase. Hutcheson\n(1726 [2004]) followed Shaftesbury in claiming that the pleasure we\ntake in the beautiful is “distinct from that joy which arises\nfrom self-love upon prospect of advantage,” and from any\nprospect of gaining knowledge (in Cahn and Meskin 2007). Hume\n(1739–40 [1987]) is a rare exception amongst eighteenth century\nBritish philosophers in allowing “that a great part of …\nbeauty … is deriv’d from the idea of convenience and\nutility” (2.1.8.2; cf. Santayana 1896, Zemach 1997).", "\nEarly eighteenth century German philosophy of pleasure in perception\nexplicitly classified it as pleasure taken in the perfection of\nsomething perfectly suited to its function (Wolff 1719 [2003]; see\nSection 1.1. above). Moses Mendelssohn (1785 [1979]) retained the\ncentrality of perfection to aesthetic experience, but he also claimed\nthat", "\nWe contemplate the beauty of nature and of art, without the least\narousal of desire, with gratification and satisfaction. It seems to be\na particular mark of beauty that … it pleases, even if we do\nnot possess it, and that is remote from the urge to possess it.\n(Lesson VII, p. 70, translated in Guyer 2020, section on Mendelssohn)\n", "\nIn an essay dedicated to Mendelssohn (“Attempt at a Unification\nof all the Fine Arts and Sciences under the Concept of that which\nis complete in itself” 1785 [1993]), the later aesthetician\nKarl Moritz extended this idea of disinterest to argue that experience\nof the beautiful offers you a way of pleasantly forgetting yourself in\n“unselfish gratification” by thinking of the beautiful\nobject “as something that has been brought forth entirely for\nits own sake, so that it could be something complete in itself”\n(trans. Guyer, p. 545).", "\nIt was Kant’s conception in the Critique of Judgment\n(1789) that cemented the place of disinterestedness in aesthetics, and\nshaped the discourse for the centuries to come. When Kant claimed that\npleasure taken in a representation of a beautiful object (as such) is\n“disinterested,” he meant that this pleasure is\n“indifferent … to the real existence of the object of\nthis representation” (§1–5). In his system, this is\ntantamount to saying that this pleasure is unmediated by any desire\nfor the object (cf. Zangwill 1992). This disinterest\ndistinguishes the pleasure that grounds a judgment of the beautiful\nfrom the pleasure that grounds a judgment of something as merely\n“agreeable.” Under a separate heading (not that of\n“disinterest” per se), Kant added that pleasure in a\nbeautiful object is not based in any attribution of a specific purpose\nto it. He thus distanced himself from predecessors like Wolff.", "\nOne way of interpreting a lack of concern with the “real\nexistence” of the object of an aesthetic experience is to\nunderstand that experience as focused on appearances instead. Edward\nBullough (1957) espoused a version of this view in 1907 lectures at\nCambridge. The idea had a wave of popularity in the\nmid-20th century (Gotshalk 1947, Urmson 1957, Tomas 1959).\nThe view survives in the influential contemporary work of Martin Seel\n(2005, p. 24): “to perceive something in the process of its\nappearing for the sake of its appearing is the focal point of\naesthetic perception, the point at which every exercise of this\nperception is directed.”", "\nA variation of this approach casts aesthetic experience as that which\nis valued or enjoyed “for its own sake,” as opposed to\nvaluing or enjoying it as a means to some further end (cf. Gorodeisky\nand Marcus 2018 on “self-containment,” p. 118). Gary\nIseminger (2006) denies that any aesthetic experience can be\nindividuated purely in terms of how it feels, since what really makes\na state of valued experience aesthetic is a matter of its being valued\njust for its own sake, and valuing is not just a matter of having a\ncertain feeling. In revision of his earlier (1996a, 1996b) account of\naesthetic experience, Jerrold Levinson (2016b) agrees with\nIseminger’s view, except he claims that the evaluative component\nof such appreciation must itself be phenomenological (p.39; cf.\nStecker 2005). Both Iseminger and Levinson treat disinterest in this\nsense as part of what makes aesthetic experience (or appreciation)\naesthetic at all (for objections, see Goodman 1968 [1976] p. 242,\nMeskin 2001, and Carroll 2006).", "\nSome of these views that take aesthetic experience to be valued\n“for its own sake” depart significantly from the Kantian\nconception of disinterest. For instance, Roger Scruton’s (1974)\nconception of the imaginatively inflected perception (e.g.\n“seeing-as”) essential to aesthetic experience can be\nbased on a desire for an object “for no other reason,\nwhere one’s desire is, nonetheless, based on a conception of the\nthing one wants” (p.147).", "\nAnother dominant conception of disinterest in the 20th\ncentury was a conception of a certain “aesthetic attitude”\none can take voluntary with respect to a natural scene or an\nartwork—an attitude which consists in detaching one’s\npractical self from what is perceived in that object. As Zangwill\n(1992) notes, this notion of disinterest is “unKantian” in\nits modification of a stance, attitude, or type of attention,\nrather than pleasure, as disinterested.", "\nIn discussion of sublime natural phenomena, Edward Bullough (1912)\nseems to have been the first to suggest that we can voluntarily put\nour experience “out of gear with our practical, actual\nself” as long as we have a certain amount of\n“distance” from the threatening aspects of these natural\nphenomena (in Cahn and Meskin, 2007, pp. 244). What is important in\nthe form of an object of such aesthetic attention is that it supports\na “marked degree of artificiality” that allows us to take\nthis stance on the object (p.249). This artificiality keeps us engaged\nin a “personal” but “filtered” way with the\nemotions of the object of our experience (p.245).", "\nThe idea that a certain “distance” can make it possible to\nforget the particularities of one’s own practical situation and\nthereby allow fuller “participation” in an object of\naesthetic experience has been attractive to theorists in various\ndistinct research paradigms. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960 [2005])\nemphasized how “aesthetic distance in a true sense …\nmakes possible a genuine and comprehensive participation in what is\npresented before us” via “self-forgetfulness” (pp.\n124–5). John Dewey (1934 [2007]) wrote that in\n‘esthetic’ experience", "\nThere is no severance of self, no holding of it aloof, but fulness of\nparticipation … so thoroughgoing … that the work of art\nis detached or cut off from the kind of specialized desire that\noperates when we are moved to consume or appropriate a thing\nphysically. (p.262; cf. Beardsley 1958 [1981], pp. 288–291)\n", "\nThis conception of disinterest takes it to be not just compatible with\nbut also supportive of a specialized activity\n(“participation”), and even sometimes takes it to be a\nproduct of a personal decision to engage in a certain kind of way with\nan object of experience.", "\nIn the middle of the 20th century, George Dickie levied a\nfamous objection to this interpretation of disinterest in his paper\n“The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude” (1964). He wrote:", "\n“disinterestedness” cannot properly be used to refer to a\nspecial kind of attention … [it] is a term which is used to\nmake clear that an action has certain kinds of motives …\nAttending to an object, of course, has its motives but the attending\nitself is not interested or disinterested … although the\nattending may be more or less close. (p.60)\n", "\nProposed cases of wrongly motivated attention, he suggests, are really\njust cases of (degrees of) inattention. Levinson (2016b) disagrees,\narguing that attending is indeed something that you can do with a\nmotive, and that the motive you have in attending affects your\nphenomenology. Nanay (2015) picks up this general point and proposes\nthat specifically aesthetic attention is distributed among\nall the properties of an object (though see Nanay 2016 for\ncomplexities).", "\nLanger’s (1953/2007) distinct objection is that the\n“aesthetic attitude” is too demanding to be an essential\npart of any aesthetic experience whatsoever: “If the groundwork\nof all genuine art experience is really such a sophisticated, rare,\nand artificial attitude, it is something of a miracle that the world\nrecognizes works of art as public treasures at all” (p.324).", "\nThese are objections to the interpretation of disinterest in terms of\na special attitude or attentive stance one can take on an object. They\nare not, as such, objections more generally to the claim that\ndisinterest is an essential or even just a necessary aspect of\naesthetic experience. That latter claim is still widely popular. But\nthere are a few reasonable ways to resist it.", "\nOne concerns the deep personal importance of aesthetic experience.\nNick Riggle (2016) argues that our phenomenal appreciation of beauty\nmust be interested in at least a certain sense in order for it to be\nable to effect the types of personal transformation that it does (cf.\nProust 1913–1927 [2003], Nehamas 2007). Another way to resist\nthe emphasis on disinterest is to note the great variety of aesthetic\nexperiences available to us, especially with the staggering diversity\nof contemporary arts (Adorno 1970 [1997], pp. 10–11)." ], "subsection_title": "2.5 Disinterest" } ] } ]	[ "Adorno, Theodor, 1970 [1997], Aesthetic Theory, Gretel\nAdorno and Rolf Tiedemann (eds.), Robert Hullot-Kentor (trans.),\nMinneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.", "Addison, J. and R. Steele, 1712 [1879], The Spectator, A.\nChalmers (ed.), New York: D. Appleton.", "Alberti, Leon Battista, 1443–1452 [1988], On the Art of\nBuilding in Ten Books, J. Rykwert, N. Leach, and R. 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aesthetics-of-everyday	Aesthetics of the Everyday	First published Wed Sep 30, 2015; substantive revision Mon Nov 18, 2019	[ "\nIn the history of Western aesthetics, the subject matters that\nreceived attention ranged from natural objects and phenomena, built\nstructures, utilitarian objects, and human actions, to what is today\nregarded as the fine arts. However, beginning with the nineteenth\ncentury, the discourse has become increasingly focused on the fine\narts. This narrowing attention occurred despite the prominence of the\naesthetic attitude theory in modern aesthetics, according to which\nthere is virtually no limit to what can become a source of aesthetic\nexperience. The tendency to equate aesthetics with the philosophy of\nart became widespread in twentieth century aesthetics, particularly\nwithin the Anglo-American tradition.", "\nChallenges to this rather limited scope of aesthetics began during the\nlatter half of the twentieth century with a renewed interest in nature\nand environment, followed by the exploration of popular arts. Everyday\naesthetics continues this trajectory of widening scope by including\nobjects, events, and activities that constitute people’s daily\nlife. However, it is more accurate to characterize this recent\ndevelopment as restoring the scope of aesthetics rather than\nopening a new arena.", "\nIn addition, many cultural traditions outside the Western sphere have\nlong been concerned with the aesthetics of daily life. In some\ncultural traditions, such as Inuit and Navajo, aesthetic\nconsiderations are thoroughly integrated in daily activities,\nincluding making things such as tools (Papanek 1995; Witherspoon\n1996). Even in other traditions, such as Japanese and Chinese, with\ndistinctive art-making practices of paintings, literature, theater,\nand the like, aesthetic practices permeate people’s daily life.\nOne of the findings of comparative aesthetics is that a greater\nemphasis is placed on the aesthetics of everyday life in many\nnon-Western cultures than in the West (Higgins 2005).", "\nThus, the perception that everyday aesthetics is a new frontier of\naesthetics discourse needs to be situated in the context of late\ntwentieth-century Anglo-American aesthetics. That is, it was\nestablished as a reaction against what was considered to be an undue\nrestriction on the scope of aesthetics. It aims to give due regard to\nthe entirety of people’s multi-faceted aesthetic life, including\nvarious ingredients of everyday life: artifacts of daily use, chores\naround the house, interactions with other people, and quotidian\nactivities such as eating, walking, and bathing. Everyday aesthetics\nalso seeks to liberate aesthetic inquiry from an almost exclusive\nfocus on beauty (and to a certain extent sublimity) characteristic of\nmodern Western aesthetics. It includes within its purview those\nqualities that pervade everyday experience, such as pretty, cute,\nmessy, gaudy, tasteful, dirty, lively, monotonous, to name only a few.\nThese items and qualities are characterized by their ubiquitous\npresence in the daily life of people, regardless of their identity,\noccupation, lifestyle, economic status, social class, cultural\nbackground, and familiarity with art.", "\nBeyond attending to more items and qualities for its inquiry, everyday\naesthetics also raises theoretical issues that have not received\nadequate attention from the prevailing mainstream Western aesthetics.\nThese include: indeterminate identity of the object of aesthetic\nexperience due to a lack of an institutionally agreed-upon framing;\nchanges and modifications everyday objects go through; general\nanonymity of the designer and creator, as well as absence of any clear\nauthorship behind everyday objects; bodily engagements with objects\nand activities and their pragmatic outcome; perceived lack of criteria\nfor aesthetic judgments. By raising these issues, everyday aesthetics\nchallenges long-held assumptions underlying art-centered aesthetics\ndiscourse. However, everyday aesthetics advocates pose these\nchallenges not as a way of invalidating the established aesthetics\ndiscourse. Rather, they are meant to shed new light on the prevailing\ndiscourse. Just as new forms of art often introduce qualities and\nvalues that were not considered before and enrich the artworld, as\nsuggested by Arthur Danto, everyday aesthetics proposes to help\ndevelop the overall aesthetics discourse by adding new avenues of\ninquiry. Accordingly, the account of everyday aesthetics that follows\nwill focus on these issues that have been raised to illuminate and\nchallenge the prevailing aesthetics discourse in contemporary Western\nphilosophy." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Recent History", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. ‘Everyday’ and ‘Aesthetics’ in Everyday Aesthetics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Defamiliarization of the Familiar", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Negative Aesthetics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Everyday Aesthetic Qualities", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Ambient Aesthetics and Social Aesthetics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Action-Oriented Aesthetics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Blurring the Line between Art and Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "9. Significance of Everyday Aesthetics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "10. New and Future Developments", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nWith the establishment of environmental aesthetics, efforts to open\nthe field of aesthetics beyond the fine arts started during the latter\nhalf of twentieth century. Almost all writers on everyday aesthetics\nderive inspiration from John Dewey’s Art as Experience,\nfirst published in 1934. In particular, his discussion of\n“having an experience” demonstrates that\naesthetic experience is possible in every aspect of people’s\ndaily life, ranging from eating a meal or solving a math problem to\nhaving a job interview. By locating ‘the aesthetic’ in the\ncharacter of an experience rather than in a specific kind of object or\nsituation, Dewey paves the way for everyday aesthetics advocates to\nexplore diverse aspects of people’s aesthetic lives without a\npre-configured boundary.", "\nIf Dewey’s aesthetics can be considered as the classic for\neveryday aesthetics discourse, Arnold Berleant’s early works on\naesthetic field and engagement continue the trajectory. Despite\nfocusing on the experience of art and without specifically referring\nto the term ‘everyday aesthetics,’ Berleant’s early\nworks provide a phenomenological account of aesthetic experience by\nemphasizing the interactive process between the experiencing agent and\nthe object of experience. This notion of ‘engagement’ as a\nmodel for aesthetics is applicable to one’s experience beyond\nart. Indeed, his subsequent works on environmental aesthetics, both\nnatural and built, and more recently on social aesthetics and negative\naesthetics, have been consistently opening the scope of aesthetic\ninquiry.", "\nBesides works on environmental aesthetics that addresses built\nenvironments (see the entry on \n environmental aesthetics), \n other notable\nearly works specifically addressing issues of everyday aesthetics\ninclude Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup’s Art and Human\nValues (1976), Joseph Kupfer’s Experience as Art:\nAesthetics in Everyday Life (1983), David Novitz’s The\nBoundaries of Art: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Place of Art in\nEveryday Life (1992), Thomas Leddy’s “Everyday\nSurface Aesthetic Qualities: ‘Neat,’ ‘Messy,’\n‘Clean,’ ‘Dirty’” (1995) and\n“Sparkle and Shine” (1997), Wolfgang Welsch’s\nUndoing Aesthetics (1997), Ossi Naukkarinen’s\nAesthetics of the Unavoidable: Aesthetic Variations in Human\nAppearance (1999), and Marcia Eaton’s Aesthetics and\nthe Good Life (1989) and Merit, Aesthetic and Ethical\n(2001).", "\nThe first anthology on this topic, The Aesthetics of Everyday\nLife, edited by Andrew Light and Jonathan M. Smith, published in\n2005, includes many articles that together lay the groundwork for more\nrecent literature on everyday aesthetics. Often cited among them are\nArto Haapala’s “On the Aesthetics of the Everyday:\nFamiliarity, Strangeness, and the Meaning of Place” and Tom\nLeddy’s “The Nature of Everyday Aesthetics.” ", "\nThe first monograph with the specific title Everyday\nAesthetics, accompanied by the subtitle Prosaics, the Play of\nCulture and Social Identities, was written by Katya Mandoki and\npublished in 2007. She offers an extensive critique of the prevailing\nWestern aesthetics discourse burdened by what she characterizes as\n“fetishes” regarding art and beauty, as well as a detailed\nsemiotic analysis of aesthetics involved in areas ranging from\nreligion and education to family and medicine. Almost immediately\nafter the publication of Mandoki’s book, Yuriko Saito’s\nEveryday Aesthetics was published. These works were followed\nby Thomas Leddy’s The Extraordinary in the Ordinary: The\nAesthetics of Everyday Life (2012). They together secured the\ninitial foothold for the subsequent development of everyday\naesthetics.", "\nParalleling these early works are monographs and anthologies dedicated\nto specific aspects of daily life, such as gustatory aesthetics\n(Korsmeyer 1999, 2005; Perullo 2016; van der Meulen and Wiese 2017),\ndomestic aesthetics (McCracken 2001), body aesthetics (Shusterman\n1999, 2013; Bhatt 2013; Irvin 2016), functional beauty (Parsons and\nCarlson 2008), the aesthetics of design (Forsey 2013), and olfactory\naesthetics (Drobnick 2005; Shiner forthcoming), as well as a\ncollection of essays dealing with the notion of\n“artification” in practices ranging from business and\neducation to science and sports (Naukkarinen and Saito, 2012).", "\nAll of these works together have given rise to an increasingly lively\ndebate on the subject in journals such as Aisthesis, The\nBritish Journal of Aesthetics , Contemporary Aesthetics,\nEspes, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,\nThe Nordic Journal of Aesthetics, Proceedings of the\nEuropean Society for Aesthetics, and Studi di Estetica\n(Italian Journal of Aethetics), to name only a few that feature\nor include articles in English. In addition, more anthologies on\neveryday aesthetics have been published recently, namely the \nAisthesis volume dedicated to the subject of Everyday Objects\n(2014), Experiencing the Everyday (Friberg and Vasquez 2017),\nand Paths from the Philosophy of Art to Everyday Aesthetics\n(Kuisma, et al. 2019). These anthologies and journals are particularly\nhelpful to those Anglophone readers who lack the language facility to\naccess many European aestheticians’ works, some monographs, that\nare written in their own languages. Among them are Gioia Iannilli,\nGiovanni Matteucci, Dan Eugen Ratiu, and Elisabetta di Stefano. Their\nEnglish language articles included in these anthologies and journals\nare valuable in making their important works available to Anglophone\nreaders.", "\nAs was the case with her Everyday Aesthetics, Saito’s\nrecent monograph, Aesthetics of the Familiar: Everyday Life and\nWorld-Making (2017a) includes extensive discussion of Japanese\naesthetics. However, the first explicitly and specifically\nmulti-cultural exploration of everyday aesthetics appeared in the form\nof an anthology, Aesthetics of Everyday Life: East and West\n(2014), edited by Liu Yuedi and Curtis Carter, with a number of pieces\non Chinese aesthetics. Similar to the case of European languages, most\nAnglophone readers lack the language ability to access many works on\nChinese aesthetics written in Chinese. English language papers\nincluded in this anthology and other journal articles by scholars\nprovide a good entry into a rich legacy of living aesthetics in the\nChinese tradition that is garnering a renewed attention today.\nFinally, although not specifically dedicated to everyday aesthetics,\nmany essays collected in the Special Volume 3 of Contemporary\nAesthetics (2011) on Aesthetics and the Arts of Southeast Asia,\nthe same journal’s Special Volume 6 (2018) on Aesthetic\nConsciousness in East Asia, and Artistic Visions and the Promise\nof Beauty: Cross Cultural Perspectives (Higgins, et al 2017)\nprovide valuable resources for non-Western aesthetics." ], "section_title": "1. Recent History", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nBecause everyday aesthetics was initially proposed as a way of\novercoming modern Western aesthetics’ limitation on what\ncomprises people’s aesthetic life as its subject matter, its\nscope has not been clearly defined except as including what has not\nbeen covered by art-centered aesthetics. With the development of this\ndiscourse, however, questions emerged as to what constitutes\n‘everyday’ and ‘aesthetics’ in everyday\naesthetics. Inclusion of not only daily activities like eating,\ngrooming, dressing, and cleaning but also occasional and even rare\nevents such as parties, sporting events, holidays, weddings, and\ntravelling calls into question whether ‘everyday’ should\nbe understood literally. ", "\nFurthermore, what may count as an everyday activity for one person may\nbe a special occasion for other people. Working on a farm constitutes\na farmer’s everyday life, while it is a rare experience sought\nby a city dweller who participates in a tour that incorporates work\nexperience, such as a day working in a vineyard. Besides\npeople’s occupation and lifestyle, diverse living environments\ndetermine what is included in their everyday life. For those residents\nin a densely populated urban area with a developed network of public\ntransportation, as well as for those living in different parts of the\nworld, riding in a car may be a rare occasion, while it is a daily\nroutine for many living in typical American suburbs. Finally, some\npeople’s daily lives consist of constant travels, as in the case\nof a famed conductor, Valery Gergiev (Puolakka 2019).", "\nThe notion of ‘everyday’ thus becomes hopelessly unwieldy,\nand it is impossible to come up with a list of objects and activities\nthat belong to it. However, one could point to some core activities\nand objects that transcend individual and cultural differences, such\nas eating, dressing, grooming, shelter, and basic utilitarian objects,\nsuch as clothing, furniture, and eating implements (Melchionne 2013).\nThe most important factor for the purpose of everyday aesthetics,\nhowever, is not so much an inventory of objects and activities but\nrather the typical attitude we take toward them. We tend to experience\nthese objects and activities mostly with practical considerations that\neclipse their aesthetic potentials (Bullough 1912–13; Stolnitz\n1969; Ziff 1997). These experiences are generally regarded as\nordinary, commonplace, and routine. Such characterization may be the\nbest way to capture ‘everyday,’ allowing diverse\noccupations, lifestyles, and living environments that give rise to\ndifferent ingredients of everyday life. ", "\nMany advocates of everyday aesthetics, however, also include rare,\nstandout, and more artistically-charged occasions in its scope. For\nexample, a holiday celebration is laden with all kinds of aesthetic\nconsiderations, ranging from interior and exterior decorations to\nspecial dishes, a carefully-arranged table setting and festive music.\nMany of us specifically attend to these aesthetic aspects both as\nproviders and as receivers, giving aesthetics a predominant role in\nthese experiences. In light of these different kinds of experiences,\nsome suggest allowing gradation among various objects and activities,\nwith one end designating the most quotidian objects and activities\nthat are experienced primarily with a practical mindset, and the other\nend those occasions standing out from daily life and marked by much\nmore conscious attention to the aesthetic dimension, rendering the\nexperience more like art appreciation (Naukkarinen 2013; Leddy\n2015).", "\nThus, recent discussion of the notion of everyday emphasizes\nrelationality and lability, a temporary framework that responds to\nspecific time and place, whether it regards the course of an\nindividual’s life (such as a painting becoming a part of\none’s everyday life after being purchased and hung on the living\nroom wall), or a general societal change, such as the increasing\npresence of the digital world today. Accordingly, the distinction\nbetween ordinary/extraordinary, familiar/unfamiliar, and\nevent-like/routine-like that dominate the discussion of everyday\nshould not be understood as something stationary, static, and fixed\n(Haapala 2017; Potgieter 2017).", "\nDebates surrounding what constitutes ‘aesthetics’ in\neveryday aesthetics are not unique to this discourse. The nature of\naesthetics has been a perennial point of contention in aesthetics at\nlarge, whether regarding fine arts, nature, popular culture or\neveryday objects and activities (see in particular the entries on the\nConcept of the Aesthetic and Dewey’s Aesthetics). However, there\nare at least two points of particular interest and significance\nregarding the notion of ‘aesthetics’ in everyday\naesthetics. First is the status of bodily sensations. They can be felt\nby us as we receive sensory stimulation such as the wafting smell of\nbaked goods, the sensation of silk against our skin, the taste of\nsushi, or the feeling of massage. They can also result from bodily\nactivities, such as running, chopping vegetables, using tools, or\nmowing the lawn. The debate regarding whether or not these bodily\nsensations belong to the realm of aesthetics proper is not new. The\nbest-known classical treatment of this issue is Immanuel Kant’s\ndistinction between the beautiful and the agreeable or the pleasant.\nMany contemporary art projects also give rise to this discussion\nthrough the creation of olfactory art, art happenings that include\ncooking and eating, and participatory art that requires the\naudience’s bodily engagement. However, the issue becomes more\nacute with everyday aesthetics because our daily experience is\npermeated by sensory experiences and bodily activities (see Sections 7\nand 8 for further discussion).", "\nAnother important issue regarding the term ‘aesthetics’ in\neveryday aesthetics is the distinction between its honorific and\nclassificatory use. In both aesthetics discourse and common\nvernacular, the term ‘aesthetic’ is generally used in the\nhonorific sense. Hence, something having an aesthetic property is\ngenerally regarded positively and gaining an aesthetic experience is\nunderstood to mean that it is a meaningful and satisfying experience.\nHowever, increasing number of everyday aestheticians return to the\nroot meaning of ‘aesthetic’ as sensory perception gained\nwith sensibility and imagination, whatever its evaluative valence may\nbe. Some things strike us with powerful positive aesthetic values, as\nin a great work of art or a spectacular landscape, while other things\ndo not affect us much because they are boring, non-descript, or plain.\nThen there are those objects and phenomena that offend or disturb us\nprofoundly because their sensuous appearance is hideous, monstrous, or\nappalling, without any overall redeeming value such as an artistic\nmessage. Everyday aesthetics casts a wide net for capturing these\ndiverse dimensions of our aesthetic life. It is noteworthy that in\nacademic discourses outside of philosophical aesthetics,\n‘aesthetics’ is often regarded in the classificatory\nsense, such as the aesthetics of manners, which includes both polite\nand rude behaviors, and the aesthetics of politics which, among other\nthings, refers to the social and political construction of what counts\nas the sensible (Mandoki 2007; Rancière 2009; Vihalem\n2018).", "\nSome recent writers propose that everyday aesthetics will be better\nserved by characterizing the aesthetic as a specific mode of\nperception. Everyday aestheticians who emphasize the difference of\neveryday aesthetic experience from a typical experience of art tend to\ncharacterize the former’s passivity and minimize the mediation\nof various conceptual considerations, emotional involvement, and\nimaginative engagement typically required in experiencing art. While\nit is agreed that the aesthetic is based upon our sensory perception,\nwithout a more active, creative, and imaginative involvement, those\ncritics point out, there is nothing distinctly aesthetic about mere\nsensations. One suggested solution is to characterize an aesthetic\nexperience as a dynamic and dialectic process of sensory perception\nand reflectivity that form aisthesis which leads to a\ndialogical relationship with the object we are perceiving (Matteucci\n2017). This more general theory of aesthetic perception will help\novercome the aforementioned two issues everyday aestheticians were\ngrappling with, namely inclusion of all sensory modes and rendering\nthe term valence-neutral. As will be discussed later in Section 8, one\nof the issues everyday aesthetics needs to determine is whether it\ncarves out an independent arena of aesthetics or it is rather a\ncontinuation of aesthetics that had been established with art as the\nprimary model. Those who advocate the continuity model argue that the\ndialogical mode of perception that integrates reflectivity provides\nthe specifically aesthetic character to everyday experience (Nielsen\n2005; Mateucci 2017; Potgieter 2017)." ], "section_title": "2. ‘Everyday’ and ‘Aesthetics’ in Everyday Aesthetics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIf ‘everyday’ is characterized as the familiar, ordinary,\ncommonplace, and routine, regardless of the specific content that\nvaries from people to people depending upon their lifestyle,\noccupation, living environment, and other factors, what makes its\naesthetic appreciation possible? The following response dominates\neveryday aesthetics discourse: the aesthetic appreciation of everyday\nlife requires defamiliarization, making strange, or casting an aura.\nBecause we are most of the time preoccupied by the task at hand in our\ndaily life, practical considerations mask the aesthetic potential of\ncommonplace objects and ordinary activities. Furthermore, such\nexperiences lack any coherent structure consisting of unity, pervasive\ncharacter, and a clear beginning and an end. In short, according to\nDewey, our everyday humdrum proceeds mechanically without any internal\norganic evolution, hence “anesthetic.” Only when we have\nan experience with all the structural requirements fulfilled\ndoes our everyday life gain aesthetic merit. Once we have an\nexperience with a different attitude and perceptual gear and/or a\ncohesive internal structure, we can unearth latent aesthetic values in\nthe most ordinary and routine. This view can be interpreted as a\nfaithful application of the claim made by the aesthetic attitude\ntheory that theoretically anything can be an object of aesthetic\nexperience. Mundane objects can acquire a kind of ‘aura’\nthat heightens their aesthetic value (Leonhardt 1985; Tuan 1993;\nVisser 1997; Gumbrecht 2006; Leddy 2008, 2012a; Al Qudowa 2017).\nAccording to this interpretation, what is new about everyday\naesthetics is its illumination of those aspects of our lives that are\nnormally neglected or ignored because they are eclipsed by standout\naesthetic experiences we often have with works of art and nature. More\ncareful attention and a different mindset can reveal a surprisingly\nrich aesthetic dimension of the otherwise mundane, non-memorable,\nordinary parts of our daily life. Many works of art are helpful in\nguiding us through the morasses of everyday life toward a rewarding\naesthetic experience (Dillard 1974; Prose 1999; Stabb 2002; Martin\n2004, Leddy 2012a; Nanay 2016, 2018). This trajectory of everyday\naesthetics is welcomed by a number of thinkers for its contribution to\nenriching life experiences, encouraging mindful living, and\nfacilitating happiness without problematic consequences that often\naccompany a hedonistic lifestyle (Irvin 2008b; Shusterman 2013;\nMelchionne 2014; Leddy 2014b).", "\nAt the same time, some point out the danger of over-emphasizing\ndefamiliarization as a precondition for everyday aesthetics. That is,\nthis way of accounting for everyday aesthetics risks losing the very\neveryday-ness of everyday experience, thereby becoming unable to\ncapture the aesthetic texture of everyday life characterized by its\nfamiliar, ordinary, and mundane quality (Felski 2002, 2009; Highmore\n2004, 2011a; Haapala 2005; Saito 2017a). The challenge then becomes\nhow to capture the very ordinary everyday-ness of everyday life while\nengaging aesthetically. That is, experiencing and appreciating the\nordinary as extraordinary follows a rather well-trodden path in\naesthetics discourse, while experiencing and appreciating the ordinary\nas ordinary poses a specific challenge to everyday aesthetics\ndiscourse.", "\nSeveral responses have been given to account for the aesthetics of the\nordinary as ordinary. One proposed response is to regard qualities\nsuch as the familiar and the ordinary as positively appreciable as a\ncounterpart to those qualities that make some experiences stand out\nfor being intense and extraordinary. Though not stunning or intense,\nthose qualities characterizing ordinary life provide a quiet calm,\ncomfort, stability, and security to our life experience (Haapala\n2005). It is difficult to imagine how we can handle, let alone enjoy,\na constant series of extraordinary, intense experiences with no\nrestful period. Many aspects of domestic life instead offer comfort,\nstability, and respite, in short hominess, because of the very\nordinary and repetitive nature, and such qualities are indispensable\nfor good life and appreciable in their own right (Highmore 2004,\n2011a; Irvin 2008b; Melchionne 2014).", "\nHowever, this response is challenged for failing to explain what is\ndistinctly aesthetic about the sense of comfort and stability. The\nvalue of these feelings, according to the critics, is rather\nexistentially-oriented and possibly relies on the instrumental role\nthey play in assuring a secure foundation for life. An alternative\nsolution to the dilemma proposed is to focus on the functional use of\nobjects of daily life that is not separate from our management and\nflow of daily life or the cultural context and knowledge required for\nits use. When an object functions particularly well, the pleasure we\ngain is still embedded in our daily life and does not render the\nexperience out of gear from the flow of everyday (Forsey 2014).", "\nThis move can also be characterized as a variation of\ncognitively-oriented aesthetics widely discussed in environmental\naesthetics regarding nature. Instead of natural sciences that inform\nthe aesthetic appreciation of nature, the suggestion is that everyday\naesthetic experience be informed by common sense knowledge about the\nobject’s function, significance, and place in our lives that\nprovides the familiarity sought for in aesthetically experiencing the\nfamiliar as familiar (Carlson 2014).", "\nThese solutions address familiarity experienced as familiar as a\npositive value whether regarding hominess or excellent functionality.\nHowever, those who are concerned with developing the classificatory\nsense of aesthetics point out that the the lack of coherent structure,\nslackness, monotony, and humdrum that, according to Dewey, generate\nexperiences that are “anesthetic” actually also\ncharacterize the aesthetic texture of everyday life (Highmore 2011a;\nMollar 2014; Saito 2017a). Deficiency in positive aesthetic qualities,\nsuch as exciting intensity, coherent narrative structure, or pervasive\nunifying theme, does not necessarily mean lack of aesthetic qualities.\nThose aspects of our lives can still be regarded as permeated by\naesthetic qualities, though negative, such as dreariness and painful\nmonotony. Such negative characterization of everyday life has often\nbeen the subject of Marxist interpretations of workers’ daily\nlives, whether at work or at home, providing a platform for rebellious\nmovements, such as the Situationist International (Highmore 2010)." ], "section_title": "3. Defamiliarization of the Familiar", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThis account of everyday life as pervaded by negative aesthetic\nqualities rather than lacking any aesthetic qualities gives rise to\n‘negative aesthetics.’ This notion may at first appear to\nbe an oxymoron, if ‘aesthetics’ is understood in the usual\nhonorific sense. Katya Mandoki and Arnold Berleant stress the\nimportance of attending to this aesthetically negative aspect of\npeople’s lives that is unfortunately all too common (Mandoki\n2007; Berleant 2010, 2012). Negative aesthetic qualities such as\nugliness, grotesqueness, repulsiveness, and disgust have not been\nabsent in the prevailing aesthetics discourse, but they don’t\noccupy a prominent place (notable exceptions being Korsmeyer 2011,\nForsey 2016). Furthermore, more often than not, these negative\nqualities become justified as a necessary means to facilitating an\nultimately positive aesthetic experience. For example, a disgusting\ncontent of art may be necessary for conveying an overall message, such\nas an exposé and critique of social ills, or a repulsive sight\nin nature, such as a predator devouring its prey, can be appreciated\nas an integral part of nature’s process.", "\nNegative aesthetic qualities experienced as negative, in comparison,\nare unfortunately quite pervasive in everyday life and they directly\naffect the quality of life. They range from less noteworthy qualities\nsuch as the boring, the monotonous, the uninspiring, the banal, and\nthe dull to “aesthetic violence,” “aesthetic\npain,” “aesthetic poisoning,” or “aesthetic\nassault,” such as the hideous, the offensive, the repulsive, and\nthe vulgar (Mandoki 2007). These more dramatically negative qualities\ncan be experienced in a squalid urban space, deafening noise,\ncluttered billboard with gaudy signage and sordid visual images,\nstench from a nearby factory, and the like. In light of the fact that\naesthetics has tended to confine its scope to positive qualities and\nexperiences, everyday aesthetics challenges us to pay serious\nattention to the aesthetically negative aspects of our lives because\nof their immediate impact on the quality of life.", "\nThe focus on negative aesthetics is particularly important in everyday\naesthetics discourse because it leads to what may be regarded as its\nactivist dimension. When confronted with negative aesthetic qualities,\nwe generally don’t remain a mere spectator but rather spring\ninto action to eliminate, reduce, or transform them. Even if we\ndon’t or can’t act, we wish we could do so and we think we\nshould. According to the prevailing mode of aesthetic analysis\nregarding art, and to a certain extent nature, our aesthetic life is\nprimarily characterized from a spectator’s point of view. We are\nnot literally engaged in an activity with the object other than\naesthetic engagement. Even if we are inspired to act by art or nature,\nthe resultant action is generally indirect, such as joining a\npolitical movement or making a contribution to an organization.", "\nIn comparison, the action we undertake motivated by negative\naesthetics in daily life has a direct impact on life. On a personal\nlevel, we launder a stained shirt and iron it, clean the carpet soiled\nby spilled wine, repaint the living room wall, open a window to get\nfresh air after cooking fish indoors, tidy up the guest room, reformat\na document for a clearer look, and the list goes on (Forsey 2016;\nSaito 2017a). These actions are taken primarily in response to our\nnegative aesthetic reaction against stain, wrinkle, unpleasant color\nof the wall, fishy smell, mess and clutter, and disorganized look. On\na community level, eyesore-like abandoned structures get torn down or\ngiven a make-over, a squalid neighborhood gets cleaned up, and\nordinances are created to eliminate factory stench and cluttered\nbillboards. At least we often work, or believe we should work, toward\nimproving the aesthetics of everyday environment and life. Negative\naesthetic experiences are thus useful and necessary in detecting what\nis harmful to the quality of life and environment and provide an\nimpetus for improvement (Berleant 2012)." ], "section_title": "4. Negative Aesthetics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nHowever, questions can be raised as to whether qualities such as\nmessiness and clutter belong to aesthetics discourse. Appreciation of\nmore typical aesthetic qualities, such as beauty, sublimity, elegance,\ngrace, artistic excellence, powerful expression, and the like, is\nthought to require a certain degree of aesthetic sensibility or\n‘taste’ that needs to be cultivated. Moreover, their\nappreciation often demands a certain conceptual understanding of\nthings, such as the object’s historical and cultural context,\nthe artist’s oeuvre, and some basic information regarding\nnature, among others. Aesthetic experience, after all, is expected to\npromote a dialogical process between the experiencing agent and the\nobject, thereby widening and deepening one’s sensuous,\nemotional, imaginative, and intellectual capacity. Sometimes\ncharacterized as Bildung, it should be an educational and\nempowering experience.", "\nIn comparison, the detection of the everyday aesthetic qualities in\nquestion, such as messiness, shabbiness, cuteness, and prettiness,\nseems to result from an almost knee-jerk reaction without any\nbackground knowledge, aesthetic sophistication or reflective process,\nand, as such, does not make a worthy subject matter for\naesthetics.", "\nTwo responses have been given to this challenge. First, even if some\nqualities can be experienced without the same kind and degree of\naesthetic sensibility or sophistication required for art appreciation,\nthis alone does not render them outside the realm of aesthetics. Even\na seemingly unreflective response to qualities – such as dirty,\nmessy, and disorganized – is not free of a cultural and\ncontextual framework (Douglas 2002; Saito 2007). Second, it is\npossible to provide a kind of sliding scale with one end requiring\nutmost sensibility often obtained after extensive education and\npractice, such as the ability to appreciate twelve-tone music,\nJoyce’s novels, Japanese Noh theater, and bogs, and the other\nend requiring very little education and practice, such as Norman\nRockwell paintings, a military march, a sparkling jewelry piece, and a\ncolorful flower garden. Some aesthetic qualities can be considered\n‘major league’ or heavy-weight while other aesthetic\nqualities are ‘minor league’ or light-weight, without\ndisqualifying the latter from the realm of the aesthetic altogether.\nAfter all, they refer to our qualitative response to the sensory\nexperience of the objects and phenomena and some experiences are more\nintense and profound than others without thereby denying the aesthetic\ndimension of more simple and easy experiences (Leddy 1995, 1997,\n2012a, 2012b; Harris 2000; Ngai 2012; Postrel 2013; Mollar 2014).", "\nIf minor league aesthetic qualities lack sophistication and profundity\ncompared to major league aesthetic qualities, a case can be made that\nthey make up for this lack by their pervasiveness in daily life with\nserious consequences. While we do experience beauty and sublimity in\nour daily life, such occasions are rather rare. More often than not,\nin our everyday life, we judge things for being pretty, nice,\ninteresting, cute, sweet, adorable, boring, plain, drab, dowdy,\nshabby, gaudy, ostentatious, and the like. It is particularly\nimportant to attend to these qualities because, due to their\nprevalence and relatively easy recognition, they exert a powerful\ninfluence on our decisions and actions regarding mundane matters.\nIndeed, strategies in advertising, political campaigning, and\npropaganda often make use of these qualities to direct people’s\nbehavior (Postrel 2003; Mandoki 2007; Saito 2007, 2017a, 2018b;\nSartwell 2010). Those who are concerned with both the prevalence and\nuncritical acceptance of aestheticization of life argue for a more\nactive, engaged, reflective mode of perception instead of passively\nexperiencing and being affected by aestheticization ploys, thereby\ncultivating aesthetic literacy and vigilance (Vihalem 2016; Matteucci\n2017; Potgieter 2017).", "\nAnother worry has been raised about the aesthetic worthiness, or\n“aesthetic credentials,” of some experiences (Dowling\n2010). It concerns the purely bodily-oriented responses such as the\nsensation of scratching an itch, receiving a massage, drinking tea, or\nsmelling fishy odor (Irvin 2008a,b). There is a concern that they are\ntoo private and subjective to allow any inter-subjective discussion\nand critical discourse, resulting in subjective relativism and\ncompromising the possibility of sensus communis.\nKant’s distinction between the beautiful and the merely\nagreeable is often invoked to support this criticism (Parsons and\nCarlson 2008; Soucek 2009; Dowling 2010).", "\nIn response, some thinkers point out that it is a mistake to treat\nthese bodily sensations as an isolated, singular sensory experience.\nAccording to them, in ordinary life, we almost never have an\nexperience of smell, taste, or touch by itself. Instead, our\nexperiences are usually multi-sensory or synaesthetic and take place\nin a specific context (Howes 2005; Howes and Classen 2014). Scratching\nan itch can be a part of experiencing a mosquito-infested bog, or\nexperienced as an annoyance caused by the stiff fabric label sewn on\nthe inside of a new shirt collar. The taste of tea cannot be separated\nfrom its aroma, visual appearance, and the tactile sensations of\ntexture and warmth as one holds the mug and presses the lip against\nits rim. All of these sensory experiences take place in a certain\nsurrounding and situation with its own ambiance, as well as within the\nspecific flow of one’s daily life. One may grab a cup of tea on\nthe run and gulp it down to get the caffeine kick as one rushes to a\nmeeting, or savor each sip as one sits in front of a fireplace\nrelaxing, or participate in the Japanese tea ceremony. Even if the tea\nitself were to remain the same, the experience surrounding its\ningestion changes, sometimes even affecting our experience of the\ntaste of tea itself (Irvin 2009a; Melchionne 2011, 2014; Perullo 2016;\nSaito 2017a). Thus, purely bodily sensation can be folded into the\natmosphere or ambiance constituted by many ingredients. Then what we\nappreciate is not merely a singular bodily sensation in isolation such\nas the tactile sensation or smell but the fittingness or, one may even\nsay, Kantian ‘purposiveness,’ or lack thereof, created by\nthe relationship between and among factors making up the\natmosphere.", "\nPresumed subjective relativism regarding a purely bodily sensation,\ntherefore, can be mitigated at least to a certain extent if it is\nregarded as one of the many ingredients that make up a larger whole\npermeated by a unified atmosphere, such as a sense of well-being,\ncontentment, comfort, or negatively, a sense of isolation, discomfort,\nuneasiness, or anxiety. Such an appreciation (or depreciation) allows\nsome degree of inter-subjective communication and sharing; indeed many\nliterary narratives provide a rich reservoir of such experiences." ], "section_title": "5. Everyday Aesthetic Qualities", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThis attention to atmosphere or ambiance of a certain situation\nconstituted by various ingredients has a long tradition in Japanese\naesthetics (Saito 2005). It was also the main point of the\nassociationist aesthetics advocated by Archibald Alison\n(1757–1839). Today ambient aesthetics is garnering a renewed\nattention primarily due to works by Gernot Böhme who suggests\nthat atmosphere should be the central focus of new aesthetics. In our\ndaily life, we often experience the atmospheric character of a\nsituation: tense or relaxed, cheerful or melancholic, exuberant or\nsubdued, inviting or alienating, electrifying or dull. Sometimes a\ndistinct character of a situation is intentionally orchestrated,\noftentimes in a special occasion like a wedding or a funeral, with\nspecifically selected music, decorations, attire, and choreographed\nmovements, to name a few. Some other times, a unified atmosphere\narises spontaneously when various elements making up the physical\nenvironment and human interactions and movements within it happen to\ncongeal (Böhme 1993, 1998; Miyahara 2014; di Stefano 2017).", "\nAlthough in our daily life we experience and appreciate (or\ndepreciate) a certain atmosphere or ambiance quite frequently, it has\nnot received adequate attention in the aesthetics discourse primarily\nbecause of the lack of clearly defined and delineated\n‘object’ of the experience. Without a clear\n‘frame’ around the object of experience, critics suggest,\ninter-subjective discussion of its aesthetics is not possible. Nor are\nthere clear criteria, such as art historical conventions, that are\nhelpful in determining what is and is not a part of the aesthetic\nexperience (Parsons and Carlson 2008). Ambiance, air, or atmosphere is\nindeed subjectively-oriented in the sense that one’s experience\nbecomes colored accordingly. However, it should also be noted that it\nis not purely subjective or private, as claimed by critics, insofar as\nit refers to objectively identifiable features of the environment and\nsituation. Furthermore, some contemporary works of art specifically\naim at creating a certain atmosphere that envelops the audience (Z.\nWang 2018).", "\nAmbient aesthetics also highlights the important role played by\nnon-visual sensory experiences that permeate our lived life. The\nrelevance of the so-called lower senses in everyday aesthetics has\nalready been mentioned (Section 5). However, possibly with an\nexception of the gustatory, non-visual sensory experiences, namely the\nauditory, the olfactory, and the haptic, tend to be eclipsed by the\nvisual, although their contribution to our everyday aesthetic\nexperience is undeniable (Ackerman 1991; Tuan 1993; Brady 2005; Howes\n2014; Korsmeyer 2017; Interference Journal (Issue 7, 2019); Shiner\nforthcoming). Sometimes they enrich an overall ambiance, such as a\ncalming ambient sound and a weather-beaten smooth surface of a\nbuilding, while other times they constitute negative aesthetics, such\nas a blaring car stereo sound and a stench from a nearby factory.\nFurthermore, the lack of sounds and smell may be a welcome relief\nwhile at other times it may render the experience deficient (Drobnick\n2005; Anderson forthcoming). Everyday aesthetics encourages attention\nto these non-visual experiences, which helps sharpen our sensibility.\nAttention to these sensory experiences is also critical in\narchitectural practice and urban planning which tend to be dominated\nby the visual orientation (Pearson 1991; Pallasmaa 1999).", "\nPart of what determines the ambiance or atmosphere is human\ninteractions. The character of such interactions is constituted by the\nparticipants’ personality and relationships with others that are\nsubject to aesthetic considerations. In addition to what one does and\nsays, one can be considered warm, cold, formal, aloof, friendly,\nintimidating, gentle, and so forth, largely due to aesthetic factors\nsuch as tone of voice, way of speaking, facial expression, bodily\ngesture and posture, and outward presentation such as clothing, hair\nstyle, ornamentation, and the like. Sometimes the moral character of\none’s action is assessed by aesthetic dimensions over and beyond\nwhat the action accomplishes. For example, one may gobble up a\nlovingly prepared and meticulously arranged meal carelessly and\nindifferently, or one may take time and savor every bite respectfully\nand mindfully to show one’s appreciation for the cook. One can\nclose a door roughly, making a loud noise and startling others, or one\ncan close it gently and carefully so as not to disturb others.\nFinally, one can help a person in need grudgingly and spitefully or do\nso with care and good cheer (Buss 1999; Sherman 2005; Naukkarinen\n2014; Shusterman 2016; Saito 2016, 2017a).", "\nIn these examples, important desiderata in aesthetic experiences can\nalso be regarded as desirable in human relationships: open-mindedness\nto accept and appreciate diversity, respect and reciprocity, full and\nsincere engagement, among others. Established as a sub-category of\neveryday aesthetics by Arnold Berleant, social aesthetics calls\nattention to the fact that the aesthetics plays a surprisingly and\noften unrecognized role in determining the moral character of actions,\npersons, and human interactions (Berleant 2005b, 2010, 2012,\n2017).", "\nFurthermore, social aesthetics promotes cultivating virtues through\neveryday practice. One’s kindness, compassion, thoughtfulness,\nand respect require appropriate expressions guided by aesthetic\nsensibility and skills, in addition to accomplishing a certain deed.\nHarmonious and cooperative interaction with others also requires not\nonly appropriate cultural knowledge but also aesthetic sensibility to\ndecipher group dynamics and determine how best to help create a\ncertain atmosphere (Naukkarinen 2014). A mere conceptual understanding\nof the importance of aesthetics in these interactions is not\nsufficient. Embodied practice is required to contribute to\naesthetically-minded social interactions." ], "section_title": "6. Ambient Aesthetics and Social Aesthetics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSocial aesthetics also sheds light on another new avenue of inquiry\nushered in by everyday aesthetics: the aesthetic dimension of\ndoing things instead of, or in addition to, the experience\ngained as a spectator or beholder. The traditional mode of aesthetic\ninquiry is primarily concerned with analyzing the aesthetic experience\nof a spectator who derives aesthetic pleasure from contemplating an\nobject (or a phenomenon or an event). Even in such an experience, as\nDewey’s characterization of ‘undergoing’ and\n‘doing’ and Berleant’s engagement model indicate,\nthe person is never passive; she is actively engaged with the object\nthrough exercising imagination and interacts with it perceptually,\nintellectually, and emotionally. However, in the most literal sense,\nshe is still an onlooker of the object: a painting, a symphony, a tea\nbowl, a figure skating performance, a flower garden, a piece of\nfurniture, an automobile, a house, and a freshly laundered shirt.", "\nWhile everyday aesthetics includes such spectator-oriented aesthetics,\na major part constituting the flow of everyday life is our active\nengagement with doing things by handling an object, executing an act,\nand producing certain results, all motivated by aesthetic\nconsiderations. Until recently, very little had been explored of the\naesthetic dimensions of active involvement in painting a canvas,\nplaying a violin, skating, gardening, repairing a garment, hanging\nlaundry outdoors, and giving birth (Rautio 2009; Brook 2012; Lintott\n2012). Perhaps food aesthetics illustrates this contrast most clearly.\nFood aesthetics generally focuses on the taste of the food rather than\nthe experience of eating itself or the activity of cooking (except for\nCurtin and Heldke 1992; Visser 1997; Giard 1998; Korsmeyer 1999;\nShusterman 2013; Perullo 2016).", "\nThe difficulty of accounting for the aesthetics involved in these\nactivities from the participants’ perspective is the same\ndifficulty facing ambient aesthetics: the lack of clear delineation of\nobject-hood of aesthetic experience. The constituents of an aesthetic\nobject are more or less clear in the case of a painting or a flower\ngarden appreciated from the spectator’s point of view.\nFurthermore, there is an object one can point to for\nintersubjectivity. However, there is no equivalent\n‘object’ of aesthetic experience when it comes to an\nactivity one undertakes. This lack, according to some thinkers,\nsignals the demise of any reasonable discussion as the subject matter\nbecomes hopelessly private with little possibility of intersubjective\ndiscourse. While we can meaningfully debate the aesthetic merit of a\npainting or a flower garden by giving reasons to justify our judgment,\nit is difficult to imagine an equivalent discussion of my experience\nof bodily engagement when executing brush ink painting or digging the\nground and planting flowers for the flower garden.", "\nIf one accepts John Dewey’s notion of having “an\nexperience” which gives an aesthetic character to whatever\nexperience one is undergoing, it becomes a challenge to facilitate a\ncritical discourse to determine whether or not one is truly having\n“an experience.” The act of planting flowers involves a\nmulti-sensory experience and bodily engagement, as well as designing\nthe garden’s layout. These ingredients may come together in a\nunified manner to give rise to a sense of joy felt by the gardener at\nthe arrival of spring and the anticipation of fully-blossomed flowers.\nIt is difficult to imagine how this gardener’s experience can be\nsubjected to a critical discourse in the same way the flower bed gets\nevaluated aesthetically for its design. Can we have a debate about\nwhether the gardener’s experience was truly aesthetic or whether\nit provided a rich or only mediocre aesthetic experience? If not, is\nthis aspect of our life forever closed to any mode of aesthetic\ninquiry?", "\nThe difficulty felt here regarding the aesthetics of ambiance and\nactions could be attributed to the mode of contemporary Western\naesthetic inquiry which is predominantly judgment-oriented (Böhme\n1993). Much of mainstream aesthetic debate surrounds the objectivity\nand justifiability of aesthetic judgment. A judgment presupposes the\ndeterminability of an object and its intersubjectively sharable\nexperience. Anything falling outside of it is considered hopelessly\nsubjective and relativistic. However, phenomenological accounts of\nbodily engagement in cooking, sports, and other mundane activities are\nplentiful not only in some aestheticians’ writings but also,\nperhaps more commonly, in writings by practitioners and literary\nauthors (Curtin and Heldke 1992; Giard 1998; Rautio 2009; Tainio\n2015). Body aesthetics is also garnering more attention in recent\nphilosophy and a large part of its concern is the bodily engagement in\naesthetic experience (Bhatt 2013; Irvin 2016).", "\nFurthermore, some agree that the practice of mundane activities,\ndomestic chores in particular, provides an opportunity for one to\nexercise imagination and creativity to inspire an aesthetic experience\n(McCracken 2001; Lee 2010; Highmore 2011a). For example, the activity\nof outdoor laundry hanging can be a chance for the person to arrange\nand hang the items in an aesthetically pleasing way to express her\nrespect and thoughtfulness toward her neighbors and passersby who are\ninevitably exposed to the visual parade of laundered items. At the\nsame time, this activity will occasion her appreciation of the arrival\nof spring after a long winter, as well as anticipation of the sweet\nsmell and crisp texture of dried items thanks to the sunshine and\nfresh air carried by the breeze (Rautio 2009; Saito 2017a). Dismissing\nthese experiences from aesthetic discourse because they do not fit the\nexpected format of analysis and cannot be subjected to a\nverdict-oriented discourse unduly impoverishes the rich content of our\naesthetic life. In addition, these experiences are not hopelessly\nprivate and it is possible that they are generated and shared\ncommunally. Gardening, cooking, and participation in sporting\nactivities can be a group activity and the participants can share and\nhelp with each other to mutually enrich and enhance aesthetic\nexperiences by pointing out the aesthetic contribution of some aspects\nthat others may have missed.", "\nIndeed, it is crucial for everyday aesthetics that these private\nexperiences to be intersubjectively communicable. If the aesthetic\ndimensions of our everyday life are important (and this conviction is\nwhat gave rise to everyday aesthetics in the fist place), then one of\nits tasks is to justify the value of seemingly monadistic experiences\nby facilitating what aesthetic experience in general does best:\nencouraging openness by sharing others’ experiences, viewing the\nworld from perspectives different from one’s own, and enlarging\none’s horizon and vision (Ratiu 2017a). Aesthetic experience\nunderstood in this way supports its educability, educational value,\nand contribution to enhancing life (Potgieter 2017)." ], "section_title": "7. Action-Oriented Aesthetics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe emergence of everyday aesthetics discourse parallels the\nincreasing attempt at blurring the distinction between art and life in\ntoday’s artworld. Although there have been many examples\nthroughout art history of depicting slices of everyday life,\nsuch as Dutch still life paintings, twentieth-century art introduced\nand experimented with different modes of appropriating everyday life,\nmost famously with the use of ready-mades. Since then, artists have\nbeen trying to overcome the presumed separation between art and real\nlife in a number of ways: rejecting the art institutional setting as a\nlocation for their art; denying the necessity of authorial authority;\nembracing various changes made to their works both by nature and human\nagency; blurring the creator/spectator dichotomy by collaborating with\nthe general public to create art as a joint venture; changing the role\nof the artist from the creator/choreographer to a facilitator who\nprovides an occasion or an event for things to happen; literally\nimproving the environment and society by planting trees, cleaning a\nriver, and playing the role of a social worker to promote a dialogue\namong people in conflict; and engaging in mundane activities like\ncooking and farming with tangible products for consumption. These\nattempts have given rise to a number of genres, including situationist\nart, conceptual art, environmental art, happening, performance,\nactivist art, socially engaged art, and art projects characterized as\nembodying “relational aesthetics” or “dialogical\naesthetics” (Kaprow 1993; Spaid 2002, 2012; Bourriaud 2002;\nKester 2004, 2011; Dezeuze 2006; Johnstone 2008; Bishop 2012).", "\nParalleling the movement of art to embrace everyday life, there is a\nmovement in the opposite direction: for everyday life to embrace art.\nWhile aestheticization of life is not a new phenomenon, what is\nnoteworthy in the so-called organizational aesthetics and artification\nstrategy is that they deploy art and art-like ways of thinking and\nacting in those areas of life which have not been traditionally\nassociated with art or aesthetics: medicine, business, education,\nsports, and science, among others, as well as organizational life in\ngeneral (Darsø 2004; Naukkarinen and Saito 2012; Ratiu 2017b).\nThese professional practices typically privilege rational discourse\ncomprised of logic and rules, but they cannot ignore their aesthetic\ndimensions. Art and aesthetics in this context are not regarded as\ndecorative amenities or prettifying touches. Rather, organizational\naesthetics and artification strategy are based upon the premise that\nhumans negotiate life, whatever the context may be, through sensory\nknowledge and affective experiences by interacting with others and the\nenvironment. As such, working with the aesthetic dimensions of these\nprofessional activities and environments cannot but help achieve the\nrespective goals and, perhaps more importantly, contribute to the\nwellbeing of the members and participants. Art and aesthetics can be a\npowerful ally in directing human endeavors and actions and determining\nthe quality of activities and environments. Such effects range from\nfacilitating creativity and imagination in educational and business\nventures and providing humane and healing environments for vulnerable\npopulations, such as hospital patients and nursing home residents, to\nrendering scientific data easily graspable (Pine and Gilmore 1998;\nLinstead 2000; Postrel 2003; Howes 2005, 2013; Duncum 2007; Tavin\n2007; Dee 2010, 2012; Schulze 2013; Moss and O’Neill 2013, 2014;\nRatiu 2017b; Krawczyk forthcoming).", "\nAs stated at the beginning of this entry, everyday aesthetics was\nfirst proposed as a way of accounting for those aesthetically charged\ndimensions of our lives that had not been adequately addressed by\nart-centered aesthetics. However, early works of everyday aesthetics,\nsuch as given by Saito (2007), are criticized for a rather outdated\nand overly restrictive characterization of so-called art-centered\naesthetics. The presumed distinguishing conditions of art-aesthetics,\nsuch as a relatively clear frame, privileging higher sense, authorial\nidentity, stable identity of the object, and the spectator mode of\nexperience, are no longer applicable to many examples of art today.\nConsequently, the critics urge everyday aesthetics to go beyond simply\nproviding a venue to enumerate those aesthetic dimensions of everyday\nlife that had previously been overlooked and to provide a conceptual\nfoundation. In particular, they advocate conceiving everyday\naesthetics as a continuation of aesthetics discourse that had\npreviously been focused on art (the view variously characterized as a\nweak formulation, continuistic pole, extraordinarist stance, or\nmonolithist model), rather than as something distinct and separate\nfrom art aesthetics (a strong formulation, discontinuistic pole,\nfamiliarity stance, or pluralist model) (see Dowling 2010; Ratiu 2013;\nIannilli 2016; Matteucci 2016 for a clear and helpful\n“mapping” and “nomenclature” of these strands\nof everyday aesthetics).", "\nThose who support the continuity model are specifically concerned to\nprovide a basis for intersubjectivity and normativity for everyday\naesthetics by referencing these features that support aesthetics\ndiscourse in general. Without such a framework, the worry is that\neveryday aesthetics may degenerate into a totally subjective, laissez\nfaire affair which would render the entire project trivial. Unless we\npresuppose the possibility of a sensus communis, that is,\ncommunicability though not necessarily commonality, which makes\nsharing and understanding the other’s experience possible, we\nare locked into a subjective, solipsistic silo. Furthermore, they\npoint out that the monadic characterization of everyday aesthetics\nwithin the general aesthetics discourse is not conducive to fruitfully\naccounting for the ways in which everyday life and art interact and\nform a continuous, ongoing flux of a person’s embodied\nexperience of the lived world. Popular and socially engaged forms of\nart permeate people’s everyday life more than ever and there is\nno reason not to consider experiencing them as a pervasive dimension\nof their lived world. Ultimately, the nature of art is open and\ndynamic and is very much an integral part of people’s life, and\neveryday aesthetics is better served by considering the continuity\nbetween art and everyday. In other words, the initial reactionary mode\nof everyday aesthetics needs to be recast as a proactive mode that\naddresses the totality of our aesthetic engagement with the world,\nwhich includes art, nature, and everyday (Ratiu 2013; Potgieter 2017).\nAlthough approaching the issue from a different angle, another\npossibility is to develop Rancière’s distribution of the\nsensible and explore what is deemed aesthetically relevant within a\nspecific cultural/historical/social context. For the consideration of\nthe regime of the sensible, the presumed distinction between art and\nlife becomes irrelevant (Vihalem 2018)." ], "section_title": "8. Blurring the Line between Art and Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAs the increasingly prevalent phenomenon of aestheticization of life\nindicates, the aesthetic has a significant power to influence,\nsometimes determine, the quality of life and society. While the power\nof everyday aesthetics can be harnessed to improve the quality of\nlife, it can also be used to serve a political agenda or a business\ngoal. As stated in the sections on the Everyday Aesthetic Qualities\nand Action-Oriented Aesthetics above, everyday aesthetic responses\noften guide people’s actions in the most direct way. If\nsomething attracts us with its aesthetic appeal, we tend to protect\nit, purchase it, or try to maintain its aesthetic value; on the other\nhand, if we don’t find an object or an environment aesthetically\nappealing, we tend to be indifferent to its fate, discard it, or try\nto make it more attractive (Nassauer 1995; Orr 2002). In particular,\ntoday’s global capitalist economy is fueled by ‘perceived\nobsolescence’ regarding products’ fashionableness and\nstylishness with little to no improvement in their functional values.\nAdditional aesthetic ‘hidden persuaders’ include branding,\nadvertising campaigns, and environments aesthetically orchestrated for\nstores (Pine and Gilmore 1998, 2013; Postrel 2003; Schulze 2013;\nBöhme 2017). These positive aesthetic values of and surrounding a\nproduct often hide various instances of ‘ugliness’\ninvolved in its manufacturing process and afterlife. The negative\naesthetics associated with manufacturing includes environmental\ndevastation caused by resource extraction and pollution, and dismal\nworking conditions of the factory workers, often in developing\nnations, who are forced to endure aesthetic deprivation, not to\nmention health and safety hazards. The negative aesthetics of the\nproduct’s afterlife can be seen in the ever-increasing volume of\ndiscarded items, no longer considered trendy and fashionable, not only\nin municipal landfills but in the ocean. Such ‘trash’ is\nalso shipped to developing nations where re-usable, and often toxic,\nparts are harvested by local people with no protective gear (Saito\n2018b).", "\nNegative consequences of people’s aesthetic preference can also\nbe found in the uniformly perfect appearance of fruits and vegetables\non the store shelf. The deformed and misshapen items are sometimes\ndiscarded, causing not only literal waste but also creation of methane\ngas from rotting produce. Some other times, a niche market emerges to\ndivert such imperfect items earmarked for free giveaway to the needy\nand to commodify them for cheap sale to the general public, thereby\nexacerbating the food insecurity of the vulnerable population. The\nAmerican attraction to the weed-free, velvety-smooth, uniformly green\nlawn has serious environmental ramifications, such as excessive water\nuse and chemical fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide. When outdoor\nlaundry hanging and wind turbines are judged to be an eyesore,\ncommunities create an ordinance to prohibit them, preventing the\nopportunity to create a more sustainable way of living (Duerksen and\nGoebel 1999; Gipe 2002; Saito 2004, 2017a; Gray 2012). ", "\nContrariwise, the success of sustainable design and goods produced\nunder humane conditions often depends upon the acceptance of new\naesthetic paradigms, such as gardens consisting of wildflowers or\nedible plants, garments and furniture made with recycled or reused\nmaterials, and green buildings that reduce literal footprints on the\nland as well as carbon footprints (Walker 2006, 2017; Salwa 2019).\nSome work has also been done to explore the ways in which moral\nvirtues such as respect, thoughtfulness, and humility can be expressed\nnot only by persons but also by the aesthetic features of objects and\nbuilt structures and environments (Norman 1990; Whiteley 1993, 1999;\nSepänmaa 1995a, 1995b; Pallasmaa 1999; Taylor 2000; Orr 2002;\nBerleant 2005, 2010, 2012; Berleant and Carlson 2007; Saito 2007,\n2017a). In addition, as indicated by social aesthetics, cultivation of\naesthetic sensibility and practice of aesthetic skills can contribute\nto facilitating respectful, thoughtful, and humane social\ninteractions", "\nThe relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical has been one of\nthe contested issues in the aesthetics discourse regarding art.\nDebates ensue regarding the aesthetic relevance of the moral content\nof art, the artist’s or performer’s character, and the\nprocess involved in creating a work of art. The positions range from\ntheir complete separation supported by aestheticism to their\nintegration advocated by moralists. However, the ethical implications\nof art (at least in its more conventional form) do not have a\ndirect bearing on changing the world. They may affect the\naudience’s perception, attitude, and worldview, which may lead\nthem toward a certain action, but the impact is indirect. In\ncomparison, the aesthetic impact of everyday affairs often leads to\ndirect consequences that change the state of the world. Just as in\nart-centered aesthetics, however, there are differing views on whether\nor not and to what degree the ethical implications should affect the\naesthetic value of the object. Some prefer to separate them and\nprotect the autonomous realm of the aesthetic (Forsey 2013). Others\nadvocate integration by calling for an aesthetic paradigm shift (Orr\n2002; Saito 2007, 2017a, 2018b; Maskit 2011) not only by explicitly\nincluding the moral dimensions of objects and environments in their\naesthetics but also by rethinking the fundamental ways in which we\nhumans interact with the material world. At least according to the\nWestern tradition, the material world lacks any agency in a morally\nrelevant sense and its value is exhausted by its instrumental utility\nto humans. However, just as the long-held Western anthropocentric\nattitude toward nature has come under scrutiny, some thinkers propose\na more respectful attitude toward and interaction with the material\nworld (Ingold 2000; Nielsen 2005; Brook 2012; Perullo 2016; Saito\n2018b).", "\nThe moral, social, and political significance of everyday aesthetics\nis perhaps most acute in body aesthetics. Culturally- and\nsocially-constructed, and often impossible to achieve, aesthetic\nstandards of the human body lead people to engage in various beauty\npractices, ranging from cosmetic surgery and extreme dieting to\ningestion of dangerous substances and bleaching of the skins, which\noften compromise health (Brand 2000, 2012; Lintott 2003; Rhode 2010;\nArcher and Ware 2018; Widdows 2018). Aesthetics is also implicated as\na primary instrument of justifying the societal oppression of\ndisabled, sexed, gendered, or racialized bodies. Those individuals\nwhose bodies do not meet the aesthetic standard suffer from an\nunfounded perception that their physical appearance correlates with\ntheir competence, intelligence, and moral character, and are subjected\nto many forms of injustice and discrimination in employment, social\nstanding, personal relationships, and economic status. Aesthetic\nqualifications for an ideal body can be explicitly institutionalized\nas in Nazism or policies requiring a certain appearance of employees,\nor implicitly referenced to reinforce the existing stereotype of the\noppressed groups (Garland-Thomson 2009; Siebers 2010; Irvin 2016; P.\nTaylor 2016; also see the entries on\n feminist perspectives on the body,\n feminist perspectives on disability, and\n feminist perspectives on objectification).\n ", "\nThe utilization of aesthetics as a strategy for consumerism and\npolitical agenda has thus been a concern for everyday aesthetics.\nAesthetic appeal can entice people to embrace, support, and promote\nproblematic causes that may be ultimately contrary to their wellbeing\nand quality of life, as well as to the ideal of justice and democracy.\nInstead of nurturing citizens and civil society engaged in a\nthoughtful and informed exchange, discussion, and critical reflections\nof ideas, aestheticization of everyday life is often used to cultivate\nconsumers for the market, audience for political spectacles, and\naccomplices in perpetuating oppression and injustice. However, this\ndanger of aestheticization of everyday life is not necessarily\ninevitable. Some argue that it is possible and indeed critical that we\nencourage an aestheticization strategy in the service of promoting\njustice, democracy, citizenry, and civil discourse (Nielsen 2005;\nMatteucci 2017; Saito 2017a, 2018b)." ], "section_title": "9. Significance of Everyday Aesthetics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWhile everyday aesthetics has matured significantly since its\nrelatively recent emergence in the Western aesthetics discourse, there\nstill remain many tasks to be tackled. In light of the new\ndevelopments described below, possibilities and opportunities abound\nto guide the future of everyday aesthetics.", "\nFirst, many critics, as well as supporters, of everyday aesthetics\npoint out that it needs to be anchored in a firm theoretical\nfoundation (Forsey 2013a; Ratiu 2013; Iannilli 2016). Among the\npossibilities suggested are finding roots in phenomenology,\nstructuralism and poststructuralism, in addition to pragmatism that is\noften cited as the primary root (Potgieter 2017). Also suggested is to\nframe everyday aesthetics as a practical philosophy with its emphasis\non practical knowledge that is contingent and relational as well as\nproviding agency for acting for common good (Vihalem 2016; Ratiu\n2017a). Another suggestion is to provide a theory of aesthetic\nperception based upon a specific mode of attention (Nanay 2016, 2018).\nThese suggestions are made specifically to address and possibly\nresolve the perceived conflicts and tensions debated by everyday\naestheticians between everyday and non-everyday, life and art, theory\nand practice, ordinary and extraordinary, routine and non-routine,\nfamiliar and unfamiliar, and bodily-oriented (lower) senses and\ncognitively-oriented (higher) senses. A firm theoretical footing\nshould also support intersubjectivity of aesthetic experience so as\nnot to render everyday aesthetics hopelessly subjective and trivial,\none of the common criticisms lodged against it. In addition, a\ntheoretical foundation is thought to help illuminate the political\ndimensions of everyday aesthetics, specifically the politically\ncharged regime of the sensible and the increasing aestheticization of\ncommerce and politics that treats people more as consumers than as\ncitizens.", "\nSecond, as was discussed in Section 2, what counts as everyday is a\ncomplicated matter, and one of the complications is the fact that our\nlived world is changing rapidly due to technology as well as climate\nchange. We cannot imagine our everyday life today without the use of\ninternet, social media, Googling, big data, virtual reality, and the\nlike. The future with self-driving vehicles, wearable technology, and\nAI is already here. Although it is safe to assume that in the\nforeseeable future we humans will still negotiate our lives surrounded\nby and interacting with various objects in the way that has always\nbeen familiar to us, our everyday life will increasingly include and\nbe affected by technological advancements. Furthermore, many\npeople’s physical environments consisting of nature and built\nstructures are bound to be transformed by climate change, drastically\nchanging their everyday affairs and cultural practices (Nomikos\n2018).", "\nIf everyday aesthetics has been focused on what has been characterized\nas a relatively stable environment consisting of familiar surroundings\nand material objects, the challenge is to explore whether and how\nrapid changes to the familiar everyday affects the nature of everyday\naesthetics as a discourse. Some works have already begun, indicated by\nthe research on the effects of self-driving vehicles (Mladenović,\net al 2019), cartographical tools (Iannilli 2014; Lehtinen 2019), and\nthe prevalence of all kinds of machine in general (Naukkarinen 2019).\nThese researches explore whether and how these machines facilitate an\nengaged experience of the users, how they move aesthetics discourse\nfrom the emphasis on contemplative experiences to immediate,\nbodily-engaged experiences guided by the functionality of the object,\nand how they impact privacy as well as the nature of aesthetics as an\nacademic discipline. It may be the case that the new normal for our\neveryday world becomes a rapid and constant change rather than\nstability and familiarity that have been considered a hallmark of\neveryday life to date. This future projection may require everyday\naestheticians to review some of the presuppositions that have\nsupported their discussion.", "\nThird, everyday aesthetics has become influential in various\ndisciplines and practices outside of philosophical discourse. As\nindicated by many works included in the bibliography, everyday\naesthetics has been embraced as providing both principles and\nstrategies by fields ranging from business, consumerism, healthcare,\nsports, law, science, and education to urban studies, sustainability,\nfashion, and design. This wide acceptance and utilization of everyday\naesthetics is due to its insight regarding the prevalence of\naesthetics in everyone’s lived world, as well as its aspiration\nthat cultivation of aesthetic literacy and sensibility will contribute\nto improving one’s wellbeing, social interactions, and the state\nof the society and the world. But the challenge, as well as\nopportunity, posed by these heterogeneous discipline-specific\npractices is to inquire whether there is an overarching unifying\nnotion of aesthetic experience and aesthetic practice. Even if there\nis a unifying notion, a further question is whether we should arrive\nat such a notion by building on case studies from these various\ndisciplines (Vihalem 2016).", "\nFinally, in light of an increasing attention to the culture-specific\nnature of various discourses, everyday aesthetics faces both the\nopportunity and challenge for situating its place in a global context.\nGlobalization of aesthetics is actively sought particularly regarding\nart, as indicated by decolonizing the discourses of art, art history,\nand museum practice. It was explained at the beginning of this entry\nthat everyday aesthetics’ emergence was historically and\nculturally situated to challenge what was considered to be\nart-centered aesthetics that dominated the Western aesthetics of the\nlast century. In many cultural traditions, including those that do not\nhave a concept equivalent to the Western notion of art, there is a\nlong legacy of aesthetic interests and concerns permeating, informing,\nand guiding people’s lives, whether regarding the management of\ndaily life, social relationships, spiritual rites, cultural\nactivities, or creation of objects (see Higgins 1996 and Higgins, et\nal. 2017 for a collection of essays representing diverse non-Western\naesthetic traditions). For example, the long-held Chinese tradition of\n“aesthetics of living” that has been practiced as a way of\nenhancing the quality of lived experience and contributing to\npeople’s happiness and wellbeing, rather than conceived as an\nabstract theory, is receiving a renewed attention by Chinese scholars\nwho are working on a cross-cultural dialogue (Liu 2014, 2017, 2018;\nPan 2014; Q. Wang 2014). Similarly, Japanese cultural tradition is\ngarnering an increasing interest by those who are exploring how its\naesthetics goes beyond the established arts to inform people’s\neveryday lives (Ikegami 2005; Sasaki 2013; Otabe 2018). Researching\nhow different cultural traditions promote their respective everyday\naesthetic practices helps to highlight the cultural situatedness of\nsome of the assumptions of Western philosophy and aesthetics, such as\nthe relationships between art and life, the theoretical and the\npractical, the subject and the object, as well as between and among\nthe aesthetic, the moral, the social, the practical, the existential,\nand the spiritual.", "\nEveryday aesthetics began its task in the spirit of inclusivity by\nexpanding the materials for deliberation. The discourse continues its\ntask with the same spirit of inclusivity by encouraging\nculture-specific, discipline-specific, and future-speculative\nexplorations, while at the same time searching for a theoretical\nfoundation that allows for intersubjective, intercultural, and\ninterdisciplinary exchanges." ], "section_title": "10. 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Cooper (eds), 2009, A Companion to\nAesthetics, second edition, Malden: Blackwell Publishing.", "De Certeau, Michel, 1988, The Practice of Everyday Life,\nSteven Rendall (tr.), Berkeley: University of California Press.", "Dee, Catherine, 2010, “Form, Utility, and the Aesthetics of\nThrift in Design Education”, Landscape Journal,\n29(1–10): 21–35.", "Dewey, John, 1958, Art as Experience, New York: Capricorn\nPress.", "Dezeuze, Anna, 2006, “Everyday Life, ‘Relational\nAesthetics’ and the ‘Transfiguration of the\nCommonplace’”, Journal of Visual Art Practice,\n5(3): 143–152.", "Dhillon, Pradeep, 2009, “Aesthetic Education”, in\nDavies et al. 2009: 114–117.", "di Stefano, Elisabetta, 2017, “Designing Atmospheres. The\nRole of Aesthetics in the Requalification of Space”,\nProceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Environmental\nDesign, Milan: De Lettera Publishers (Mediterranean Design\nAssociation), 15–21.", "–––, 2018, “Cosmetic Practices: The\nIntersection with Aesthetics and Medicine”, Studies in\nSomaesthetics, 1: 162–179.", "Diaconu, Madalina, 2013, “What is ‘Longing for Clouds:\nDoes Beautiful Weather Have To Be Fine?”, Contemporary\nAesthetics, 15.\n [Diaconu 2013 available online]", "Dickie, George, 1969, “The Myth of the Aesthetic\nAttitude”, in John Hospers (ed.), Introductory Readings in\nAesthetics, New York: The Free Press, pp. 28–44.", "Dillard, Annie, 1974, “Seeing”, in Pilgrim at\nTinker Creek, New York: Harper’s Magazine Press.", "Douglas, Mary, 2002, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept\nof Pollution and Taboo, London: Routledge.", "Dowling, Christopher, 2010, “The Aesthetics of Daily\nLife”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 50(3):\n225–242.", "Drobnick, Jim, 2005, “Volatile Effects: Olfactory Dimensions\nof Art and Architecture”, in David Howes (ed.), Empire of\nthe Senses: The Sensual Culture Reader, Oxford: Berg, pp.\n265–280.", "Duerksen, Christopher J. and R. Matthew Goebel, 1999,\nAesthetics, Community Character, and the Law, Chicago:\nAmerican Planning Association.", "Duncum, Paul, 1999, “A Case for an Art Education of Everyday\nAesthetic Experiences”, Studies in Art Education,\n40(4): 295–311.", "–––, 2007a, “Aesthetics, Popular Visual\nCulture, and Designer Capitalism”, Journal of Art and Design\nEducation, 26: 3–285–295.", "–––, 2007b, “Reasons for the Continuing\nUse of an Aesthetics Discourse in Art Education”, Art\nEducation, 60(2): 46–51.", "Eaton, Marcia Muelder, 1989, Aesthetics and the Good\nLife, Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson University Press.", "–––, 2001, Merit, Aesthetic and\nEthical, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Elkington, Sam, 2015, “Disturbance and Complexity in Urban\nPlaces: The Everyday Aesthetics of Leisure”, in Landscapes\nof Leisure, Sean Gammon and Sam Elkington (eds.), Basingstoke:\nPalgrave, pp. 24–49.", "Farías, Gabriela, 2011, “Everyday Aesthetics in\nContemporary Art”, Rupkatha Journal on Interdisciplinary\nStudies in Humanities, 3(3): 440–447.\n [Farías 2011 available online]", "Featherstone, Mike, 1991, Consumer Culture and\nPostmodernism, London: SAGE Publications.", "Felski, Rita, 2002, “Introduction”, New Literary\nHistory, 33(4): 607–622.", "–––, 2009, “Everyday Aesthetics”,\nThe Minnesota Review, 71–72: 171–179.", "Forsey, Jane, 2013a, The Aesthetics of Design, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "–––, 2013b, “Appraising the\nOrdinary–Tensions in Everyday Aesthetics”, Proceedings\nof the European Society for Aesthetics, 5: 237–245.\n [Forsey 2013b available online]", "–––, 2014, “The Promise, the Challenge, of\nEveryday Aesthetics”, Aisthesis, 7(1): 5–21.\n [Forsey 2014 available online]", "–––, 2016, “The Aesthetic Force of the\nUnpleasant”, Evental Aesthetics, 5(1): 15–24.\n [Forsey 2016 available online]", "Friberg, Carsten and Raine Vasquez (eds.), 2017, Experiencing\nthe Everyday, København, Denmark: NSU Press.\n [Friberg and Vasquez 2017 table of contents available online]", "Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie, 2009, Staring: How We Look,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Giard, Luce, 1998, “Doing Cooking”, in The\nPractice of Everyday Life, Volume 2: Living & Cooking, Luce\nGiard (ed.), Timothy J. Tomasik (tr.), Minneapolis: University of\nMinnesota Press, pp. 149–247.", "Gier, Nicholas F., 2001, “The Dancing Ru: A\nConfucian Aesthetics of Virtue”, Philosophy East &\nWest, 51(2): 280–305.", "Gipe, Paul, 2002, “Design As If People Matter: Aesthetic\nGuidelines for a Wind Power Future”, in Martin J. Pasqualetti,\nPaul Gipe, and Robert W. Righter (eds.), Wind Power in View:\nEnergy Landscape in a Crowded World, San Diego: Academic Press,\npp. 173–212.", "Graves, Jane, 1998, “Clutter”, Issues in\nArchitecture Art and Design, 5(2): 63–69.", "Gray, Tyson-Lord J., 2012, “Beauty or Bane: Advancing an\nAesthetic Appreciation of Wind Turbine Farms”, Contemporary\nAesthetics, 10.\n [Gray 2012 available online]", "Gronow, Jukka, 1987, The Sociology of Taste, London:\nRoutledge.", "Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich, 2006, “Aesthetic Experience in\nEveryday Worlds: Reclaiming an Unredeemed Utopian Motif”,\nNew Literary History, 37: 299–318.", "Haapala, Arto, 2005, “On the Aesthetics of the Everyday:\nFamiliarity, Strangeness, and the Meaning of Place”, in Andrew\nLight and Jonathan M. Smith (eds.), The Aesthetics of Everyday\nLife, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 39–55.", "–––, 2017, “The Everyday, Building, and\nArchitecture: Reflections on the Ethos and Beauty of our Built\nSurroundings”, Cloud-Cuckoo-Land: International Journal of\nArchitectural Theory, 22(36): 171–182.", "Haapala, Arto and Christopher Stevens (eds.), 2011, Aesthetic\nPathways, 1(2).", "Hainic, Cristian, 2016, “Early Theoretical Models for the\nAesthetic Analysis of Non-Art Objects”, Rivista di\nEstetica, 63: 188–202. doi:10.4000/estetica.1334\n [Hainic 2016 available online]", "Harris, Daniel, 2000, Cute, Quaint, Hungry and Romantic: The\nAesthetics of Consumerism, Cambridge: Da Capo Press.", "Higgins, Kathleen M. 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Artistic Visions\nand the Promise of Beauty: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, New York:\nSpringer.", "Highmore, Ben (ed.), 2002, The Everyday Life Reader,\nOxon: Routledge.", "–––, 2004, “Homework: Routine, Social\nAesthetics and the Ambiguity of Everyday Life”, Cultural\nStudies, 18(2/3): 306–327.", "–––, 2010, Everyday Life and Cultural\nTheory: An Introduction, Oxon: Routledge.", "–––, 2011a, Ordinary Lives: Studies in the\nEveryday, Oxon: Routledge.", "––– (ed.), 2011b, Everyday Life,\nAbingdon, Oxon.", "Howes, David, 2005, “HYPERESTHESIA, or, the Sensual Logic of\nLate Capitalism”, in Empire of the Senses: The Sensual\nCulture Reader, David Howes (ed.). Oxford: Berg, pp.\n281–303.", "–––, 2013, “Selling Sensation”,\nNew Scientist, 219(2934): 28–29.", "Howes, David and Constance Classen, 2014, Ways of Sensing:\nUnderstanding the Senses in Society, London: Routledge.", "Iannilli, Gioia Laura, 2014, “Inter-facing Everydayness from\nDistance to Use, through the Cartographic Paradigm”,\nAithesis, 7(1): 63–72.\n [Iannilli 2014 available online]", "–––, 2016, “Everyday Aesthetics:\nInstitutionalization and ‘Normative Turn’”,\nProceedings on the European Society for Aesthetics, 8:\n269–287.\n [Iannilli 2016 available online]", "–––, 2017, “How Can Everyday Aesthetics\nMeet Fashion?”, Studi di estetica, serie 7:\n229–246.\n [Iannilli 2017 available online]", "Ikegami, Eiko, 2005, Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and\nthe Political Origins of Japanese Culture, New York: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Ingold, Tim, 2000, The Perception of the Environment: Essays\non Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill, London: Routledge.", "Interference Journal, 2019, Issue 7, Editorial Intro by Rob\nMackay,\n available online.", "Irvin, Sherri, 2008a, “Scratching an Itch”, The\nJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 66(1): 25–35.", "–––, 2008b, “The Pervasiveness of the\nAesthetic in Ordinary Experience”, British Journal of\nAesthetics, 48(1): 29–44.", "–––, 2009a, “Aesthetics and the Private\nRealm”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,\n67(2): 226–230.", "–––, 2009b, “Aesthetics of the\nEveryday”, in Davies et al. 2009: 136–139.", "––– (ed.), 2016, Body Aesthetics,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Johnstone, Stephen (ed.), 2008, The Everyday, Cambridge:\nMIT Press.", "Kaprow, Allan, 1993, Essays on the Blurring of Art and\nLife, Jeff Kelley (ed.), Berkeley: University of California\nPress.", "Kester, Grant H., 2004, Conversation Pieces: Community and\nCommunication in Modern Art, Berkeley: University of California\nPress.", "–––, 2011, The One and the Many:\nContemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context, Durham: Duke\nUniversity Press.", "Kim, Kwang Myung, 2013, “The Aesthetic Turn in Everyday Life\nin Korea”, Open Journal of Philosophy, 3(3):\n359–365.\n [Kim 2013 available online]", "Korsmeyer, Carolyn, 1999, Making Sense of Taste: Food and\nPhilosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.", "–––, 2005, The Taste Culture Reader:\nExperiencing Food and Drink, Oxford: Berg.", "–––, 2011, Savoring Disgust: The Foul &\nthe Fair in Aesthetics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2017, “Taste and Other Senses:\nReconsidering the Foundations of Aesthetics”, The Nordic\nJournal of Aesthetics, 26(54): 20–34.\n [Korsmeyer 2017 available online]", "Krawczyk, Marcin M., forthcoming“The Aesthetics and\nFinancial Market: Beyond Mere Representing and\nSupporting”,Contemporary Aesthetics ", "Kuisma, Oiva, Sanna Lehtinen and Harri Mäcklin (eds.), 2019,\nPaths from the Philosophy of Art to Everyday Aesthetics,\nHelsinki: The Finnish Society for Aesthetics.\n [Kuisma et al. 2019 available online]", "Kupfer, Joseph, 1983, Experience as Art: Aesthetics in\nEveryday Life, Albany: SUNY Press, 1983.", "Lafebvre, Henri, 1991, Critique of Everyday Life, John\nMoore (tr.), London: Verso.", "Lehtinen, Sanna, and Vesa Vihanninjoki, 2019, “Seeing new in\nthe familiar: intensifying aesthetic engagement with the city through\nnew location-based technologies”, Behaviour and Information\nTechnology, 38: 1–8.", "Leddy, Thomas, 1995, “Everyday Surface Aesthetic Qualities:\n‘Neat,’ ‘Messy,’ ‘Clean,’\n‘Dirty’”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art\nCriticism, 53(3): 259–268.", "–––, 1997, “Sparkle and Shine”,\nBritish Journal of Aesthetics, 37(3): 259–273.", "–––, 2005, “The Nature of Everyday\nAesthetics”, in Andrew Light and Jonathan M. Smith (eds.),\nThe Aesthetics of Everyday Life, New York: Columbia\nUniversity Press, pp. 3–22.", "–––, 2008, “The Aesthetics of Junkyards\nand Roadside Clutter”, Contemporary Aesthetics, 6.\n [Leddy 2008 available online]", "–––, 2012a, The Extraordinary in the\nOrdinary: The Aesthetics of Everyday Life, Peterborough:\nBroadview Press.", "–––, 2012b, “Defending Everyday Aesthetics\nand the Concept of ‘Pretty’”, Contemporary\nAesthetics, 10.\n [Leddy 2012b available online]", "–––, 2012c, “Aestheticization,\nArtification, and Aquariums”, Contemporary Aesthetics,\nSpecial Volume 4.\n [Leddy 2012c available online]", "–––, 2014a, “Everyday Aesthetics and\nPhotography”, Aithesis, 7(1).\n [Leddy 2014a available online]", "–––, 2014b, “Everyday Aesthetics and\nHappiness”, in Aesthetics of Everyday Life: East and\nWest, Liu Yuedi and Curtis L. 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Smith, (eds.), 2005, The\nAesthetics of Everyday Life, New York: Columbia University\nPress.", "Linstead, Stephen and Heather Höpfl (eds.), 2000, The\nAesthetics of Organization, London: SAGE Publications.", "Lintott, Sheila, 2003, “Sublime Hunger: A Consideration of\nEating Disorders beyond Beauty”, Hypatia, 18(4):\n65–86.", "–––, 2012, “The Sublimity of Gestating and\nGiving Birth: Toward a Feminist Conception of the Sublime”, in\nSheila Lintott and Maureen Sander-Staudt (eds.), Philosophical\nInquiries Into Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Mothering: Maternal\nSubjects, New York: Routledge, pp. 237–250.", "Liu, Yuedi, 2014, “ ‘Living Aesthetics’\nfrom the Perspective of the Intercultural Turn”, in\nAesthetics of Everyday Life: East and West, Liu Yuedi and\nCurtis L. 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Carter (eds.), 2014, Aesthetics of\nEveryday Life: East and West, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge\nScholars Publishing.", "Livingston, Paisley, 2015, “New Directions in\nAesthetics”, in Anna Christina Ribeiro (ed.), The Bloomsbury\nCompanion to Aesthetics, London: Bloomsbury Academic, pp.\n255–263.", "Lopes, Dominic McIver, 2014, Beyond Art, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Lynes, Russell, 1985, “Kudos for Clutter”,\nArchitectural Digest, 41(3): 34–38.", "Mandoki, Katya, 2007, Everyday Aesthetics: Prosaics, the Play\nof Culture and Social Identities, Aldershot, Hampshire:\nAshgate.", "–––, 2010, “The Third Tear in Everyday\nAesthetics”, Contemporary Aesthetics, 8.\n [Mandoki 2010 available online]", "–––, 2012, “The Sense of Earthiness:\nEveryday Aesthetics”, Diogenes, 59(1–2):\n138–147.", "Martin, Lois, 2004, “Patina of Cloth”,\nSurface Design Journal, 28(4): 16–21.", "Maskit, Jonathan, 2011, “The Aesthetics of Elsewhere: An\nEnvironmentalist Everyday Aesthetics”, Aesthetic\nPathways, 1(2): 92–107.", "Matteucci, Giovanni, 2016, “The Aesthetic as a Matter of\nPractices: Form of Life in Everydayness and Art”,\nComprendre, 18(2): 9–28.", "–––, 2017, “Everyday Aesthetics and\nAestheticization: Reflectivity in Perception”, Studi di\nestetica, IV serie, 7: 207–227.\n [Matteucci 2017 available online]", "Maxwell, Robert, 1993, Sweet Disorder and the Carefully\nCareless: Theory and Criticism in Architecture, New York:\nPrinceton Architectural Press.", "May, Harvey, 2011, “Aestheticization of Everyday\nLife”, Encyclopedia of Consumer Culture, Dale\nSoutherton (ed.), pp. 15–19.", "McCracken, Janet, 2001, Taste and the Household: The Domestic\nAesthetic and Moral Reasoning, Albany: SUNY Press.", "Melchionne, Kevin, 1998, “Living in Glass Houses:\nDomesticity, Interior Decoration, and Environmental Aesthetics”,\nThe Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56(2):\n191–200.", "–––, 2011, “Aesthetic Experience in\nEveryday Life: A Reply to Dowling”, British Journal of\nAesthetics, 51(4): 437–442.", "–––, 2013, “The Definition of Everyday\nAesthetics”, Contemporary Aesthetics, 11.\n [Melchionne 2013 available online]", "–––, 2014, “The Point of Everyday\nAesthetics”, Contemporary Aesthetics, 12.\n [Melchionne 2014 available online]", "–––, 2017, “Aesthetic Choice”,\nBritish Journal of Aesthetics, 57(3): 283–298.", "Miyahara, Kojiro, 2014, “Exploring Social Aesthetics:\nAesthetic Appreciation as a Method for Qualitative Sociology and\nSocial Research”, International Journal of Japanese\nSociology, 23(1): 63–79.", "Mladenović, Miloš N., Lehtinen, Sanna, Emily Sof, and\nKarel Martens, 2019, “Emerging Urban Mobility Technologies\nthrough the Lens of Everyday Urban Aesthetics: Case of Self-Driving\nVehicle”, Essays in Philosophy, 20(2): Article 3,\n1–25.\n [Mladenović et al. 2019 available online]", "Mollar, Dan, 2014, “The Boring”, The Journal of\nAesthetics and Art Criticism, 72(2): 181–191.", "Moss, Hilary and Desmond O’Neill, 2013, “The Aesthetic\nand Cultural Interests of Patients Attending an Acute Hospital: A\nPhenomenological Study”, Journal of Advanced Nursing,\n70(1): 121–9. doi:10.1111/jan.12175", "–––, 2014, “Aesthetic Deprivation in\nClinical Settings”, The Lancet, 383(9922):\n1032–1033. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60507-9", "Mullis, Eric, 2007, “The Ethics of Confucian\nArtistry”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,\n65(1): 99–107.", "Nanay, Bence, 2016, Aesthetics as Philosophy of\nPerception, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2018, “The Aesthetic Experience of\nArtworks and Everyday Scenes”, The Monist, 101:\n71–82.", "Nassauer, Joan Iverson, 1995, “Messy Ecosystems, Orderly\nFrames”, Landscape Journal, 14(2): 161–170.", "Naukkarinen, Ossi, 1999, Aesthetics of the Unavoidable:\nAesthetic Variations in Human Appearance, Saarijärvi:\nGummerus Kirjapaino Oy.", "–––, 2013, “What is ‘Everyday’\nin Everyday Aesthetics?” Contemporary Aesthetics, 11.\n [Naukkarinen 2013 available online]", "–––, 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New Essays on Wine,\nTaste, Philosophy and Aesthetics, issue of Rivista di\nestetica, 51.\n [Perullo 2012 available online]", "–––, 2016, Taste as Experience: The\nPhilosophy and Aesthetics of Food, New York: Columbia University\nPress.", "Pine, B. Joseph II and James H. 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", "Prose, Francine, 1999, “A Dirty Tablecloth,\nDeconstructed”, ARTnews, 98(9): 126–127.", "Puolakka, Kalle, 2011, “Getting Rid of Bad Habits: The\nProper Role of Imagination in Everyday Aesthetics”,\nAesthetic Pathways, 1(2): 47–64.", "–––, 2014, “Dewey and Everyday Aesthetics:\nA New Look”, Contemporary Aesthetics, 12.\n [Puolakka 2014 available online]", "–––, 2015, “The Aesthetic Pulse of the\nEveryday: Defending Dewey”, Contemporary Aesthetics,\n13.\n [Puolakka 2015 available online]", "–––, 2017, “The Aesthetics of\nConversation: Dewey and Davidson”, Contemporary\nAesthetics, 15.\n [Puolakka 2017 available online]", "–––, 2018, “On Habits and Functions in\nEveryday Aesthetics”, Contemporary Aesthetics, 16.\n [Puolakka 2018 available online]", "–––, 2019, “Does Valery Gergiev Have An\nEveryday?”, Paths from the Philosophy of Art to Everyday\nAesthetics, , Oiva Kuisma, Sanna Lehtinen and Harri Mäcklin\n(eds.), Helsinki: The Finnish Society for Aesthetics, pp.\n132–147.\n [Puolakka 2019 available online]", "Quacchia, Russell, 2016, “The Aesthetic Experience of Aura,\nAwe, and Wonder: Reflections on Thier Nature and Relationships”,\nContemporary Aesthetics, 14.\n [Quacchia 2016 available online]", "–––, 2017, “A Conceptual Framework for the\nAesthetics of Everyday Object Appreciation”, Contemporary\nAesthetics, 15.\n [Quacchia 2017 available online]", "Rader, Melvin and Bertram Jessup, 1976, Art and Human\nValues, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.", "Rancière, Jacques, 2009, Aesthetics and Its\nDiscontents, Steven Corcoran (tr.), Cambridge: Polity Press.", "Ratiu, Dan Eugen, 2013, “Remapping the Realm of Aesthetics:\nOn Recent Controversies about the Aesthetic and the Aesthetic\nExperience in Everyday Life”, Estetika: The Central European\nJournal of Aesthetics, 50(6): 3–26.\n [Ratiu 2013 available online]", "–––, 2017a, “Everyday Aesthetic\nExperience: Explorations by a Practical Aesthetics”,\nExperiencing the Everyday, Carsten Friberg and Raine Vasquez\n(eds.), København, Denmark: NSU Press, pp. 22–52.", "–––, 2017b, “The Aesthetic Account of\nEveryday Life in Organizations: A Report on Recent Developments in\nOrganizational Research”, The Journal of Arts Management,\nLaw, and Society, 47(3): 178–191.", "Rautio, Pauliina, 2009, “On Hanging Laundry: The Place of\nBeauty in Managing Everyday Life”, Contemporary\nAesthetics, 7.\n [Rautio 2009 available online]", "Rhode, Deborah L., 2010, Beauty Bias: The Injustice of\nAppearance in Life and Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Roberdeau, Wood, 2011, “Affirming Difference: Everyday\nAesthetic Experience after Phenomenology”, Contemporary\nAesthetics, 9.\n [Roberdeau 2011 available online]", "Rothenberg, Julia, 2011, “Aestheticization of Everyday\nLife”, Encyclopedia of Consumer Culture, ed. 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Looking for a New Perspective on Aesthetic\nExperience”, Kunstiteaduslikke Uurimusi, 25(3/4):\n38–61.", "–––, 2018, “Everyday Aesthetics and\nJacques Rancière: Reconfiguring the Common Field of Aesthetics\nand Politics”, Journal of Aesthetics & Culture,\n10(1): 1–11.\n [Vihalem 2016 available online]", "Vihma, Susann, 2012, “Artification for Well-Being:\nInstitutional Living as a Special Case”, in Ossi Naukkarinen and\nYuriko Saito (eds.), Artification, Special Volume 4 of\nContemporary Aesthetics.\n [Vihma 2012 available online]", "Visser, Margaret, 1997, The Way We Are: Astonishing\nAnthropology of Everyday Life, New York: Kodansha\nInternational.", "Walker, Stuart, 1995, “The Environment, Product Aesthetics\nand Surfaces”, Design Issues, 11(3): 15–27.", "–––, 2006, Sustainable by Design:\nExplorations in Theory and Practice, London: Earthscan. ", "–––, 2017, Design for Life: Creating Meaning\nin a Distracted World, London: Routledge. 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Carter (eds.), Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars\nPublishing, pp. 134–144.", "Witherspoon, Gary, 1996, “Navajo Aesthetics: Beautifying the\nWorld through Art”, in Aesthetics in Perspective,\nKathleen M. Higgins (ed.), Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College\nPublishers, pp. 736–742.", "Zande, Robin, 2007, “Chairs, Cars, and Bridges: Teaching\nAesthetics from the Everyday”, Art Education, 60(1):\n39–42.", "Ziff, Paul, 1997, “Anything Viewed”, in Susan L.\nFeagin and Patrick Maynard (eds.), Oxford Readers:\nAesthetics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.\n23–30." ]	[ { "href": "../adorno/", "text": "Adorno, Theodor W." }, { "href": "../aesthetic-judgment/", "text": "aesthetics: aesthetic judgment" }, { "href": "../environmental-aesthetics/", "text": "aesthetics: environmental" }, { "href": "../aesthetics-existentialist/", "text": "aesthetics: existentialist" }, { "href": "../art-definition/", "text": "art, definition of" }, { "href": "../baudrillard/", "text": "Baudrillard, Jean" }, { "href": "../beauty/", "text": "beauty" }, { "href": "../benjamin/", "text": "Benjamin, Walter" }, { "href": "../buddhism-chan/", "text": "Chinese Philosophy: Chan Buddhism" }, { "href": "../dewey-aesthetics/", "text": "Dewey, John: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../feminism-aesthetics/", "text": "feminist philosophy, interventions: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../foucault/", "text": "Foucault, Michel" }, { "href": "../heidegger-aesthetics/", "text": "Heidegger, Martin: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../japanese-aesthetics/", "text": "Japanese Philosophy: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../kant-aesthetics/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel: aesthetics and teleology" }, { "href": "../merleau-ponty/", "text": "Merleau-Ponty, Maurice" }, { "href": "../schiller/", "text": "Schiller, Friedrich" } ]
affirmative-action	Affirmative Action	First published Fri Dec 28, 2001; substantive revision Mon Apr 9, 2018	[ "\n\n“Affirmative action” means positive steps taken to\nincrease the representation of women and minorities in areas of\nemployment, education, and culture from which they have been\nhistorically excluded. When those steps involve preferential\nselection—selection on the basis of race, gender, or\nethnicity—affirmative action generates intense controversy.", "\n\nThe development, defense, and contestation of preferential affirmative\naction has proceeded along two paths. One has been legal and\nadministrative as courts, legislatures, and executive departments of\ngovernment have made and applied rules requiring affirmative action.\nThe other has been the path of public debate, where the practice of\npreferential treatment has spawned a vast literature, pro and con.\nOften enough, the two paths have failed to make adequate contact, with\nthe public quarrels not always very securely anchored in any existing\nlegal basis or practice.", "\n\nThe ebb and flow of public controversy over affirmative action can\nbe pictured as two spikes on a line, the first spike representing a\nperiod of passionate debate that began around 1972 and tapered off\nafter 1980, and the second indicating a resurgence of debate in the\n1990s leading up to Supreme Court’s decisions in 2003 and 2016\nupholding certain kinds of affirmative action. The first spike\nencompassed controversy about gender and racial preferences alike. This\nis because in the beginning affirmative action was as much about the\nfactory, the firehouse, and the corporate suite as about the college\ncampus. The second spike represents a quarrel about race and ethnicity.\nThis is because the burning issue at the turn of the twentieth-first\ncentury is about college\n admissions. At selective colleges, women\nneed no boost; African-Americans and Hispanics\n do.[1]" ]	[ { "content_title": "1. In the Beginning", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Controversy Engaged", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Rights and Consistency", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Real-World Affirmative Action: The Workplace", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Real-World Affirmative Action: The University", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Equality’s Rule", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Diversity’s Dominion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. The Integration Argument", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "9. Desert Confounded, Desert Misapplied", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn 1972, affirmative action became an inflammatory public issue.\nTrue enough, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 already had made something\ncalled “affirmative action” a remedy federal courts could\nimpose on violators of the Act. Likewise, after 1965 federal\ncontractors had been subject to President Lyndon Johnson’s Executive\nOrder 11246, requiring them to take “affirmative action” to\nmake sure they were not discriminating. But what did this 1965 mandate\namount to? The Executive Order assigned to the Secretary of Labor the\njob of specifying rules of implementation. In the meantime, as the\nfederal courts were enforcing the Civil Rights Act against\ndiscriminating companies, unions, and other institutions, the\nDepartment of Labor mounted an ad hoc attack on the construction\nindustry by cajoling, threatening, negotiating, and generally\nstrong-arming reluctant construction firms into a series of region-wide\n“plans” in which they committed themselves to numerical\nhiring goals. Through these contractor commitments, the Department\ncould indirectly pressure recalcitrant labor unions, who supplied the\nemployees at job sites.", "\n\nWhile the occasional court case and government initiative made the\nnews and stirred some controversy, affirmative action was pretty far\ndown the list of public excitements until the autumn of 1972, when the\nSecretary of Labor’s Revised Order No. 4, fully implementing the\nExecutive Order, landed on campus by way of directives from the\nDepartment of Health, Education, and Welfare. Its predecessor, Order\nNo. 4, first promulgated in 1970, cast a wide net over American\ninstitutions, both public and private. By extending to all contractors\nthe basic apparatus of the construction industry “plans,”\nthe Order imposed a one-size-fits-all system of \n“underutilization analyses,” “goals,” and\n“timetables” on hospitals, banks, trucking companies,\nsteel mills, printers, airlines—indeed, on all the scores of\nthousands of institutions, large and small, that did business with the\ngovernment, including a special set of institutions with a\nparticularly voluble and articulate constituency, namely, American\nuniversities.", "\n\nAt first, university administrators and faculty found the rules of\nOrder No. 4 murky but hardly a threat to the established order. The\nnumber of racial and ethnic minorities receiving PhDs each year and\nthus eligible for faculty jobs was tiny. Any mandate to increase their\nrepresentation on campus would require more diligent searches by\nuniversities, to be sure, but searches fated nevertheless largely to\nmirror past results. The 1972 Revised Order, on the other hand, effected a\nchange that punctured any campus complacency: it included women among\nthe “protected classes” whose\n“underutilization” demanded the setting of\n“goals” and “timetables” for “full\nutilization” (Graham 1990, 413). Unlike African-Americans and\nHispanics, women were getting PhDs in substantial and growing\nnumbers. If the affirmative action required of federal contractors was\na recipe for “proportional representation,” then Revised\nOrder No. 4 was bound to leave a large footprint on campus. Some among\nthe professoriate exploded in a fury of opposition to the new rules,\nwhile others responded with an equally vehement defense of\nthem.[2]", "\n\nAs it happened, these events coincided with another development,\nnamely the “public turn” in philosophy. For several\ndecades Anglo-American philosophy had treated moral and political\nquestions obliquely. On the prevailing view, philosophers were suited\nonly to do “conceptual analysis”—they could lay\nbare, for example, the conceptual architecture of the idea of justice,\nbut they were not competent to suggest political principles,\nconstitutional arrangements, or social policies that actually did\njustice. Philosophers might do “meta-ethics” but not\n“normative ethics.” This viewed collapsed in the 1970s\nunder the weight of two counter-blows. First, John Rawls published in\n1971 A Theory of Justice, an elaborate, elegant, and inspiring\ndefense of a normative theory of justice (Rawls 1971).\nSecond, in the same year Philosophy & Public Affairs,\nwith Princeton University’s impeccable pedigree, began life, a few\nmonths after Florida State’s Social Theory and\nPractice. These journals, along with a re-tooled older\nperiodical, Ethics, became self-conscious platforms for\nsocially and politically engaged philosophical writing, born out of\nthe feeling that in time of war (the Vietnam War) and social tumult\n(the Civil Rights Movement, Women’s Liberation), philosophers ought to\ndo, not simply talk about, ethics. In 1973, Philosophy &\nPublic Affairs published Thomas Nagel’s “Equal Treatment\nand Compensatory Justice” (Nagel 1973) and Judith Jarvis\nThomson’s “Preferential Hiring” (Thomson 1973), and the\nphilosophical literature on affirmative action burgeoned\n forth.[3]", "\n\nIn contention was the nature of those “goals” and\n“timetables” imposed on every contractor by Revised Order\nNo. 4. Weren’t the “goals” tantamount to\n“quotas,” requiring institutions to use racial or gender\npreferences in their selection processes? Some answered\n“no” (Ezorsky 1977, 86). Properly understood, affirmative\naction did not require (or even permit) the use of gender or racial\npreferences. Others said “yes” (Goldman 1976, 182–3).\nAffirmative action, if it did not impose preferences outright, at\nleast countenanced them. Among the yea-sayers, opinion divided\nbetween those who said preferences were morally permissible and those\nwho said they were not. Within the “morally permissible”\nset, different writers put forward different justifications." ], "section_title": "1. In the Beginning", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe essays by Thomson and Nagel defended the use of preferences but on\ndifferent grounds. Thomson endorsed job preferences for women and\nAfrican-Americans as a form of redress for their past exclusion\nfrom the academy and the workplace. Preferential policies, in her\nview, worked a kind of justice. Nagel, by contrast, argued that\npreferences might work a kind of social good, and without doing\nviolence to justice. Institutions could for one or another good\nreason properly depart from standard meritocratic selection criteria\nbecause the whole system of tying economic reward to earned\ncredentials was itself indefensible.", "\n\nJustice and desert lay at the heart of subsequent arguments. Several\nwriters took to task Thomson’s argument that preferential hiring\njustifiably makes up for past wrongs. Preferential hiring seen as\nredress looks perverse, they contended, since it benefits\nindividuals (African-Americans and women possessing good educational\ncredentials) least likely harmed by past wrongs while it burdens\nindividuals (younger white male applicants) least likely to be\nresponsible for past wrongs (Simon 1974, 315–19; Sher 1975, 162;\nSher 1979, 81–82; and Goldman 1976, \n190–1).[4]\n Instead of doing justice, contended the critics, preferential\ntreatment violated rights. What rights were at issue? The right of an\napplicant “to equal consideration” (Thomson 1973, 377;\nSimon 1974, 312), the right of the maximally competent to an open\nposition (Goldman 1976, 191; Goldman 1979, 24–8), or the right\nof everyone to equal opportunity (Gross 1977a, 382; Gross 1978,\n97). Moreover, according to the critics, preferential treatment\nconfounded desert by severing reward from a “person’s character,\ntalents, choices and abilities” (Simon 1979, 96), by\n“subordinating merit, conduct, and character to race”\n(Eastland and Bennett 1979, 144), and by disconnecting outcomes from\nactual liability and damage (Gross 1978, 125–42).", "\n\nDefenders of preferences were no less quick to enlist justice and\ndesert in their cause. Mary Anne Warren, for example, argued that in a\ncontext of entrenched gender discrimination, gender preferences might\nimprove the “overall fairness” of job selections. Justice\nand individual desert need not be violated.", "\n\nIf individual men’s careers are temporarily set back because\nof…[job preferences given to women], the odds are good that\nthese same men will have benefited in the past and/or will benefit in\nthe future—not necessarily in the job competition, but in some\nways—from sexist discrimination against women. Conversely, if\nindividual women receive apparently unearned bonuses [through\npreferential selection], it is highly likely that these same women will\nhave suffered in the past and/or will suffer in the future\nfrom…sexist attitudes. (Warren 1977, 256)\n\n", "\n\nLikewise, James Rachels defended racial preferences as devices to\nneutralize unearned advantages by whites. Given the pervasiveness of\nracial discrimination, it is likely, he argued, that the superior\ncredentials offered by white applicants do not reflect their greater\neffort, desert, or even ability. Rather, the credentials reflect their\nmere luck at being born white. “Some white…[applicants]\nhave better qualifications…only because they have not had to\ncontend with the obstacles faced by their African-American\ncompetitors” (Rachels 1978, 162). Rachels was less confident\nthan Warren that preferences worked uniformly accurate\noffsets. Reverse discrimination might do injustice to some whites; yet\nits absence would result in injustices to African-Americans who have\nbeen unfairly handicapped by their lesser advantages.", "\n\nRachels’ diffidence was warranted in light of the counter-responses.\nIf racial and gender preferences for jobs (or college admissions) were\nsupposed to neutralize unfair competitive advantages, they needed to\nbe calibrated to fit the variety of backgrounds aspirants brought to\nany competition for these goods. Simply giving blanket preferences to\nAfrican-Americans or women seemed much too ham-handed an approach if\nthe point was to micro-distribute opportunities fairly (Sher 1975,\n165ff)." ], "section_title": "2. The Controversy Engaged", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nTo many of its critics, reverse discrimination was simply\nincoherent. When “the employers and the schools favor\nwomen and blacks,” objected Lisa Newton, they commit the same\ninjustice perpetrated by Jim Crow discrimination. “Just as the\nprevious discrimination did, this reverse discrimination violates the\npublic equality which defines citizenship” (Newton 1973,\n 310).[5]", "\n\nWilliam Bennett and Terry Eastland likewise saw racial preferences\nas in some sense illogical:", "\n\nTo count by race, to use the means of numerical equality to achieve\nthe end of moral equality, is counterproductive, for to count by race\nis to deny the end by virtue of the means. The means of race counting\nwill not, cannot, issue in an end where race does not \n matter (Eastland and Bennett 1979,\n 149).[6]\n\n", "\n\nWhen Eastland and Bennett alluded to those who favored using race to\nget to a point where race doesn’t count, they had in mind specifically\nthe Supreme Court’s Justice Blackmun who, in the famous 1978\nBakke case (discussed below), put his own view in just those\nsimple terms. For Blackmun, the legitimacy of racial preferences was\nto be measured by how fast using them moves us toward a society where\nrace doesn’t matter (a view developed in subtle detail by the\nphilosopher Richard Wasserstrom in Wasserstrom 1976). While the\ncritics of preferences claimed to find the very idea of using race to\nend racism illogical and incoherent, they also fell back on principle\nto block Blackmun’s instrumental defense should it actually prove both\nreasonable and plausible. “The moral issue comes in classic\nform,” wrote Carl Cohen. “Terribly important\nobjectives…appear to require impermissible means.” Cohen asked,\n“might we not wink at the Constitution this once” and allow\npreferences to do their good work (Cohen 1995, 20)? Neither he nor\nother critics thought so. Principle must hold firm. “[I]n the\ndistribution of benefits under the laws all racial\nclassifications are invidious” (Cohen 1995, 52).", "\n\nBut what, exactly, is the principle—constitutional or\nmoral—that always bars the use of race as a means to\n“terribly important objectives”? Alan Goldman did more\nthan anyone in the early debate to formulate and ground a relevant\nprinciple. Using a contractualist framework, he surmised that rational\ncontractors would choose a rule of justice requiring positions to be\nawarded by competence. On its face, this rule would seem to preclude\nfilling positions by reference to factors like race and gender that\nare unrelated to competence. However, Goldman’s\n“rule” blocked preferences only under certain empirical\nconditions. Goldman explained the derivation of the rule and its\nconsequent limit this way:", "\n\nThe rule for hiring the most competent was justified as part of a\nright to equal opportunity to succeed through socially productive\neffort, and on grounds of increased welfare for all members of society.\nSince it is justified in relation to a right to equal opportunity, and\nsince the application of the rule may simply compound injustices when\nopportunities are unequal elsewhere in the system, the creation of more\nequal opportunities takes precedence when in conflict with the rule for\nawarding positions. Thus short-run violations of the rule are justified\nto create a more just distribution of benefits by applying the rule\nitself in future years. (Goldman 1979, 164–165).\n\n", "\n\nIn other words, if “terribly important\nobjectives” having to do with\nequalizing opportunities in a system rife with unjust inequalities could in\nfact be furthered by measured and targeted reverse\ndiscrimination, justice wouldn’t stand in the way. Goldman’s principle\ndid not have the adamantine character Cohen and other critics sought\nin a bar to preferences. Where can such an unyielding principle be\nfound? I postpone further examination of this question until I discuss\nthe Bakke case, below, whose split opinions constitute an\nextended debate on the meaning of constitutional equality." ], "section_title": "3. Rights and Consistency", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe terms of the popular debate over racial and gender preferences\noften mirrored the arguments philosophers and other academics were\nmaking to each other. Preference’s defenders offered many reasons to\njustify them, reasons having to do with compensatory or distributive\njustice, as well as reasons having to do with social utility (more\nAfrican-Americans in the police department would enable it better to\nserve the community, more female professors in the classroom would\ninspire young women to greater achievements). Critics of preferences\nretorted by pointing to the law. And well they should, since the text\nof the Civil Rights Act of 1964 seemed a solid anchor even if general\nprinciple proved elusive. Title VI of the Act promised that\n“[n]o person…shall, on the ground of race, color, or\nnational origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the\nbenefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or\nactivity receiving Federal financial\n assistance.”[7]\n Title VII similarly prohibited\nall employment practices that discriminated on the basis of race,\ngender, religion, or national\n origin.[8]\n ", "\n\nIn face of the plain language of Titles VI and VII, how did\npreferential hiring and promotion ever arise in the first place? How\ncould they be justified legally? Part of the answer lies in the meaning\nof “discrimination.” The Civil Rights Act did not define\nthe term. The federal courts had to do that job themselves, and the\ncases before them drove the definition in a particular direction. Many\nfactories and businesses prior to 1964, especially in the South, had\nin place overtly discriminatory policies and rules. For example, a\ncompany’s policy might have openly relegated African-Americans to the\nmaintenance department and channeled whites into operations, sales,\nand management departments, where the pay and opportunities for\nadvancement were far better. If, after passage of the Civil Rights\nAct, the company willingly abandoned its openly segregative policy,\nit could still carry forward the effects of its past segregation\nthrough other already-existing facially neutral rules. For example, a\ncompany policy that required workers to give up their seniority\nin one department if they transferred to another would have locked in\nplace older African-American maintenance workers as effectively as the\ncompany’s own prior segregative rule that made them ineligible to transfer\nat all. Consequently, courts began striking down facially neutral\nrules that carried through the effects of an employer’s past\ndiscrimination, regardless of the original intent or provenance of the\nrules. “Intent” was effectively decoupled from\n“discrimination.” In 1971, the Supreme Court ratified this\nprocess, giving the following\nconstruction of Title VII:", "\n\nThe objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII…was\nto achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers\nthat have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white\nemployees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures,\nor tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,\ncannot be maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status\nquo of prior discriminatory employment practices.\n\n\n\nWhat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial,\narbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers\noperate invidiously to exclude on the basis of racial or other\nimpermissible\n classification.[9]\n\n\n", "\n\nIn a few short paragraphs the Court advanced from proscribing\npractices that froze in place the effects of a firm’s own past\ndiscrimination to proscribing practices that carried through the\neffects of past discrimination generally. The Court characterized\nstatutory discrimination as any exclusionary practice not necessary\nto an institution’s activities. Since many practices in most\ninstitutions were likely to be exclusionary, rejecting minorities and\nwomen in greater proportion than white men, all institutions needed to\nreassess the full range of their practices to look for, and correct,\ndiscriminatory effect. Against this backdrop, the generic idea of\naffirmative action took form:", "\n\nEach institution should effectively monitor its practices for\nexclusionary effect and revise those that cannot be defended as\n“necessary” to doing business. In order to make its\nmonitoring and revising effective, an institution ought to predict, as\nbest it can, how many minorities and women it would select over time,\nwere it successfully nondiscriminating. These predictions constitute\nthe institution’s affirmative action “goals,” and failure\nto meet the goals signals to the institution (and to the government)\nthat it needs to revisit its efforts at eliminating exclusionary \npractices. There may still remain practices that ought to be modified or\n eliminated.[10]\n\n", "\n\nThe point of such affirmative action: to induce change in institutions\nso that they could comply with the nondiscrimination mandate of the\nCivil Rights Act.", "\n\nHowever, suppose this self-monitoring and revising fell short? In\nearly litigation under the Civil Rights Act, courts concluded that some\ninstitutions, because of their histories of exclusion and\ntheir continuing failure to find qualified women or minorities, needed\nstronger medicine. Courts ordered these institutions to adopt\n“quotas,” to take in specific numbers of formerly excluded\ngroups on the assumption that once these new workers were securely\nlodged in place, the institutions would adapt to this new\n reality.[11]", "\n\nThroughout the 1970s, courts and government enforcement agencies\nextended this idea across the board, requiring a wide range of firms\nand organizations—from AT&T to the Alabama Highway\nPatrol—temporarily to select by the numbers. In all these cases,\nthe use of preferences was tied to a single purpose: to prevent\nongoing and future discrimination. Courts carved out this\njustification for preferences not through caprice but through\nnecessity. They found themselves confronted with a practical dilemma\nthat Congress had never envisaged and thus never addressed when it\nwrote the Civil Rights Act. The dilemma was this: courts could impose\nracial preferences to change foot-dragging or inept defendants (and by\ndoing so apparently transgress the plain prohibition in Title VII) or\nthey could order less onerous steps they knew would be ineffective,\nthus letting discrimination continue (and by doing so violate their\nduty under Title VII). Reasonably enough, the federal courts resolved\nthis dilemma by appeal to the broad purposes of the Civil Rights Act\nand justified racial preferences where needed to prevent ongoing and\nfuture\n discrimination.[12]", "\n\nThus, preferential affirmative action in the workplace served the\nsame rationale as the non-preferential sort. Its purpose was\nnot to compensate for past wrongs, offset unfair advantage,\nappropriately reward the deserving, or yield a variety\nof social goods; its purpose was to change institutions so they could\ncomply with the nondiscrimination mandate of the Civil Rights Act." ], "section_title": "4. Real-World Affirmative Action: The Workplace", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn the 1970s, while campuses were embroiled in debate about how to\nincrease African-Americans and women on the faculty, universities were\nalso putting into effect schemes to increase minority presence within\nthe student body. Very selective universities, in particular, needed\nnew initiatives because only a handful of African-American and\nHispanic high school students possessed test scores and grades good\nenough to make them eligible for admission. These institutions faced a\nchoice: retain their admissions criteria unchanged and live with the\nupshot—hardly any African-Americans and Hispanics on\ncampus—or fiddle with their criteria to get a more substantial\nrepresentation. Most elected the second path.", "\n\nThe Medical School of the University of California at Davis\nexemplified a particularly aggressive approach. It reserved sixteen of\nthe one hundred slots in its entering classes for minorities. In 1973\nand again in 1974, Allan Bakke, a white applicant, was denied\nadmission although his test scores and grades were better than most or\nall of those admitted through the special program. He sued. In 1977,\nhis case, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,\nreached the Supreme Court. The Court rendered its decision a year\n later (438 U.S. 265 [1978]).[13]", "\n\nAn attentive reader of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act might have\nthought this case was an easy call. So, too, thought four justices on\nthe Supreme Court, who voted to order Bakke admitted to the Medical\nSchool. Led by Justice Stevens, they saw the racially segregated,\ntwo-track scheme at the Medical School (a recipient of federal funds)\nas a clear violation of the plain language of the Title.", "\n\nFour other members of the Court, led by Justice Brennan, wanted very\nkeenly to save the Medical School program. To find a more attractive\nterrain for doing battle, they made an end-run around Title VI, arguing\nthat, whatever its language, it had no independent meaning itself. It\nmeant in regard to race only what the Constitution\n meant.[14]\n Thus,\ninstead of having to parse the stingy and unyielding language of Title\nVI (“no person shall be subjected to…on the ground of\nrace”), the Brennan group could turn their creative energies to\ninterpreting the broad and vague language of the Fourteenth Amendment\n(“no person shall be denied the equal protection of the\nlaws”), which provided much more wiggle-room for justifying\nracial preferences. The Brennan justices persuaded one other member,\nJustice Powell, to join them in their view of Title VI. But Powell\ndidn’t agree with their view of the Constitution. He argued that the\nMedical School’s policy was unconstitutional and voted that Bakke must\nbe admitted. His vote, added to the four votes of the Stevens group,\nmeant that Allan Bakke won his case and that Powell got to write the\nopinion of the Court. The Brennan strategy didn’t reap the fruit it\nintended.", "\n\nAgainst the leanings of the Brennan group, who would distinguish\nbetween “benign” and “malign” uses of race and\ndeal more leniently with the former, Powell insisted that the\nFourteenth Amendment’s promise of “equal protection of the\nlaw” must mean the same thing for all, black and white alike. To\nparaphrase Powell:", "\n\nThe Constitution can tolerate no “two-class” theory of\nequal protection. There is no principled basis for deciding between\nclasses that deserve special judicial attention and those that don’t.\nTo think otherwise would involve the Court in making all kinds of\n“political” decisions it is not competent to make. In\nexpounding the Constitution, the Court’s role is to discern\n“principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout\nthe community and continuity over significant periods of time, and to\nlift them above the pragmatic political judgments of a particular time\nand place” (Bakke, at 295–300 [Powell quoting Cox 1976,\n114]).\n\n", "\n\nWhat, then, was the practical meaning of a “sufficiently\nabsolute” rendering of the principle of equal protection? It was\nthis: when the decisions of state agents ‘touch upon an\nindividual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial\ndetermination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is\nprecisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental\n interest (Bakke, at 300).\n\n", "\n\nPowell, with this standard in hand, then turned to look at the four\nreasons the Medical School offered for its special program: (i) to\nreduce “the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored\nminorities in medical schools and the medical profession;” (ii)\nto counter “the effects of societal discrimination;” (iii)\nto increase “the number of physicians who will practice in\ncommunities currently underserved;” and (iv) to obtain “the\neducational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student\n body” (Bakke, at 307). Did any or all of them specify a\ncompelling governmental interest? Did they necessitate use of racial\npreferences?", "\n\nAs to the first reason, Powell dismissed it out of hand.", "\n\nIf [the School’s] purpose is to assure within its student body some\nspecified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race\nor ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as\ninsubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one\ngroup for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination\nfor its own sake.", "\n\nAs to the second reason, Powell allowed it more force. A state has a\nlegitimate interest in ameliorating the effects of past discrimination.\nEven so, contended Powell, the Court,", "\n\nhas never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as\nmembers of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other\ninnocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or\nadministrative findings of constitutional or statutory\n violations (Bakke, at 308).\n\n\n\nAnd the Medical School does not purport to have made, and is in no\nposition to make, such findings. Its broad mission is education, not\nthe formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of\nparticular claims of illegality.…[I]solated segments of our vast\ngovernmental structures are not competent to make those decisions, at\nleast in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively\ndetermined criteria (Bakke, at 309).\n\n", "\n\nAs to the third reason, Powell found it, too, insufficient. The\nMedical School provided no evidence that the best way it could\ncontribute to increased medical services to underserved communities was\nto employ a racially preferential admissions scheme. Indeed, the\nMedical School provided no evidence that its scheme would result in any\nbenefits at all to such\n communities (Bakke, at 311).", "\n\nThis left the fourth reason. Here Powell found merit. A university’s\ninterest in a diverse student body is legitimated by the First\nAmendment’s implied protection of academic freedom. This constitutional\nhalo makes the interest “compelling.” However, the Medical\nSchool’s use of a racial and ethnic classification scheme was not\n“precisely tailored” to effect the School’s interest in\ndiversity, argued Powell.", "\n\nThe diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses\na far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which\nracial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. [The\nMedical School’s] special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic\ndiversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine\n diversity (Bakke, at 316).\n\n", "\n\nThe diversity which provides an educational atmosphere\n“conducive to speculation, experiment and creation”\nincludes a nearly endless range of experiences, talents, and attributes\nthat students might bring to campus. In reducing diversity to racial\nand ethnic quotas, the Medical School wholly misconceived this\nimportant educational interest.", "\n\nIn sum, although the last of the Medical School’s four reasons\nencompassed a “compelling governmental interest,” the\nSchool’s special admissions program was not necessary to effect the\ninterest. The special admissions program was unconstitutional. So\nconcluded Justice Powell." ], "section_title": "5. Real-World Affirmative Action: The University", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThis was a conclusion Justice Brennan tried vigorously to forestall.\nBrennan agreed with Powell that “equal protection” must\nmean the same thing—that is, remain one rule—whether\napplied to blacks or whites. But the same rule applied to different\ncircumstances need not yield the same results. Racial preferences\ncreated for different reasons and producing different outcomes need not\nall be judged in the same harsh, virtually fatal, manner. This point\nwas the crux of Brennan’s defense of the Medical School’s policy.", "\n\nPowell thought there was no principled way to distinguish\n“benign” from “malign” discrimination, but\nBrennan insisted there was. He argued that if the Court looked\ncarefully at its past cases striking down Jim Crow laws, it would see\nthe principle at work. What the Court found wrong in Jim Crow was that\nit served no purpose except to mark out and stigmatize one group of\npeople as inferior. The “cardinal principle” operating in\nthe Court’s decisions condemned racial classifications “drawn on\nthe presumption that one race is inferior to another” or that\n“put the weight of government behind racial hatred and\n separation” (Bakke, at 358 [Brennan, dissenting]).\n Brennan agreed with Powell that no public\nracial classification motivated by racial animus, no classification\nwhose purpose is to stigmatize people with the “badge of\ninferiority,” could withstand judicial scrutiny. However, the\nMedical School’s policy, even if ill-advised or mistaken, reflected a\npublic purpose far different from that found in Jim Crow. The policy\nought not be treated as though it were cut from the same cloth.", "\n\nBrennan granted that if a state adopted a racial classification for\nthe purpose of humiliating whites, or stigmatizing Allan Bakke as\ninferior and confining him to second-class citizenship, that\nclassification would be as odious as Jim Crow. But the Medical School’s\npolicy had neither this purpose nor this effect. Allan Bakke may have\nbeen upset and resentful at losing out under the special plan, but he\nwasn’t “in any sense stamped as an inferior by the Medical\nSchool’s rejection of him.” Nor did his loss constitute a\n“pervasive injury,” in the sense that wherever he went he\nwould be treated as a “second-class citizen” because of his\n color (Bakke, at 376 [Brennan, dissenting]).", "\n\nIn short, argued Brennan, the principle expressed in the Equal\nProtection Clause should be viewed as an anti-caste principle,\na principle that uniformly and consistently rejects all public\nlaw whose purpose is to subject people to an inferior and degraded\nstation in life, whether they are black or \n white.[15]\n Of course, given\nthe asymmetrical position of whites and blacks in our country, we are\nnot likely to encounter laws that try to stigmatize whites as an\ninferior caste (much less succeed at it). But this merely shows that a\nprinciple applied to different circumstances produces different\nresults. Because the Medical School’s program sought to undo the\neffects of a racial caste system long-enduring in America, it\nrepresented a purpose of great social importance and should not be\nfound Constitutionally infirm: so maintained\n Brennan (Bakke, at 363 [Brennan, dissenting]).", "\n\nJustice Powell never successfully engaged this way of reading\n“constitutional equality.” His insistence on clear, plain,\nunitary, absolute principle did not cut against the Brennan view. The\nissue between Powell and Brennan was not the consistency and stringency\nof the principle but its content. If the Constitution says, “The\nstate cannot deliberately burden someone by race if its purpose is\nto create or maintain caste,” then constitutional law\ndoesn’t block any of the Medical School’s\n justifications.[16]", "\n\nIf we turn away from exegesis of the Constitution, are we likely to\nfind in political theory itself any principle of equality implying that\nevery use of racial preferences in every circumstance\nworks an intolerable injustice? ", "\nThe prospects seem dim. Won’t very general notions of equality\nlend themselves to defending affirmative action (and the social\ninclusion it effects) as well as condemning it (and the racial\nnon–neutrality it\n involves)?[17] \nThe challenge here is well-illustrated by\nCarl Cohen’s most recent effort, in a debate with James Sterba,\nto extract a strict prohibition on racial preferences from the\nAristotelian principle that “equals should be treated\nequally” (Cohen and Sterba 2003, 23). This principle, urges\nCohen, “certainly entails at least this: It is wrong, always and\neverywhere, to give special advantage to any group simply on the basis\nof physical characteristics that have no relevance to the award given\nor the burden imposed” (Cohen and Sterba 2003, 25). Whether\nanything interesting follows from this proposition depends on how we\nconstrue “relevance.” Cohen admits that public policy may\nrightly treat some people differently because of their physical\ncharacteristics. For example, the state might offer special assistance\nto the old or disabled. Now, this example suggests that the relevance\nof physical differences is something independent of social policy. Age\nand disability, it seems, are real features of persons and public\npolicy simply tracks them. However, the difference that differences\nmake is not something itself given by nature; it is determined by\npublic purposes. Age and disability are made relevant in this\nmanner—in the one case, by the social purpose of assuring that\npeople do not have to live in poverty when they can no longer work; in\nthe other case, by the social purpose of assuring that people are not\nforeclosed from developing and marketing their talents by impediments\nin the (largely constructed) physical environment. ", "\n\nPurpose determines relevancy, and this is true whether or not the\nrelevant differences are physical. If the nation thinks it desirable to change white\ninstitutions so that they are less uniformly white, that purpose links\nskin color to recruitment.", "\n\nBecause the Aristotelian principle by itself doesn’t rule out\nracial preferences (since blacks and whites may be relevantly\ndifferent with respect to certain legitimate public purposes), it is\nnot surprising that Cohen also invokes a substantive conception of\nequality: “All members of humankind are equally ends in themselves,\nall have equal dignity—and therefore all are entitled to equal\nrespect from the community and its laws” (Cohen and Sterba 2003,\n24). This principle, however, brings us back to the interpretive\nquestions about “equal protection of the laws” played out in the\nPowell-Brennan exchange in Bakke. By Justice Brennan’s lights,\nAllen Bakke’s basic dignity was not violated. The Medical\nSchool’s two-track policy that resulted in Bakke’s\nrejection did not, by intent or effect, stigmatize him as inferior, or\nmark him off as a member of a despised caste, or turn him into a\nsecond-class citizen. Bakke arguably had to bear a particular burden\nbecause of his race but the burden was not significantly different\nobjectively from others that public policy might have thrown his\nway. If the Medical School had reserved sixteen of its seats for\napplicants from economically deprived backgrounds, no one would have\nsuggested that it had violated the equal protection clause of the\nFourteenth Amendment. Yet under this hypothetical policy Allan Bakke\ncould have lost out as well—lost out to low-income applicants\nwhose college grades and MCAT scores were inferior to his own. Allen\nBakke may have felt aggrieved at losing out under the Medical\nSchool’s policy of racial preferences, but it is not enough to\nshow that those who lose out under some public scheme feel offended or\ndisgruntled. Cohen needs to specify a conception of dignity in which\nbearing unequal burdens on behalf of urgent social ends invariably\namounts to an assault on dignity if the burdens happen to be assigned\nby race. This specification remains unfinished in his work so far.\n" ], "section_title": "6. Equality’s Rule", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nHow, if it held the Medical School’s policy unconstitutional, did\nJustice Powell’s Bakke opinion become the basis upon which\nuniversities across the land enacted—or\nmaintained—racially preferential admissions policies?", "\n\nIf Powell had concluded with his assessment of the Medical School’s\nfour justifications, Bakke would have left university\naffirmative action in a precarious situation. However, he didn’t stop\nthere. In an earlier ruling on Bakke’s lawsuit, the California Supreme\nCourt had forbidden the Medical School to make any use of race or\nethnicity in its admissions decisions. Powell thought this went too\nfar. Given higher education’s protected interest in\n“diversity,” and given that a student’s race or ethnicity\nmight add to diversity just in the same way that her age, work\nexperience, family background, special talents, foreign language\nfluency, athletic prowess, military service, and unusual\naccomplishments might, Powell vacated that portion of the California\nSupreme Court’s order.", "\n\nThen he added some dicta for guidance. If universities want to\nunderstand diversity and the role that race and ethnicity might play in\nachieving it, they should look to Harvard, proposed Powell, and he\nappended to his opinion a long statement of Harvard’s affirmative action program.\nIn such a program, Powell contended, racial or ethnic background\nmight", "\n\nbe deemed a “plus” in a particular applicant’s file, yet\nit does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other\ncandidates for the available seats.…This kind of program treats\neach applicant as an individual in the admissions process. The\napplicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate\nreceiving a “plus” on the basis of ethnic background will\nnot have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply\nbecause he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would\nmean only that his combined qualifications…did not outweigh\nthose of the other applicant. His qualifications would have been\nweighed fairly and competitively, and he would have had no basis to\ncomplain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth\n Amendment (Bakke, at 318, 319).\n", "\n\nIn these off-hand comments, universities saw a green light for pushing\nahead aggressively with their affirmative action programs. Justice\nPowell’s basic holding could not have been plainer: any system like\nthe Medical School’s that assessed applications along two different\ntracks defined by race or that used numerical racial quotas must fail\nconstitutional muster. Yet by the mid-1980s universities across the\nland had in place systems of admissions and scholarships that\nexhibited one or both of these features. When the University of\nMaryland’s Banneker scholarships—awarded only to\nAfrican-American students—were held in violation of the\nConstitution in 1994, the house of cards forming university\naffirmative action began to\n fall.[18]\n In 1996, the Court of Appeals for\nthe Fifth Circuit struck down the University of Texas Law School’s two-track\nadmissions program.\n In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit struck down a Boston plan\nassigning students to selective high schools by\n race.[19]\n In 2001, two more schools saw their admissions programs invalidated\nby federal courts: the University of\n Georgia[20]\n and the University of Michigan Law\n School.[21]\n In many of these cases, educational\ninstitutions were using schemes that made race something very much more than\nJustice Powell’s “plus”\n factor.[22]\n The Fifth Circuit Court’s ruling in the University of Texas case (Hopwood\nv. Texas, 78 F 3d 932 [Fifth Circuit, 1996]) threw a cloud\neven over this small window for affirmative action, boldly asserting\nthat the Bakke holding was now dead as law and that race\ncould not be used at all in admissions.", "\n\nGiven Justice Powell’s singular opinion, supported by no one else on\nthe Court, and given the drift of Supreme Court decisions on racial\npreferences since\n 1978,[23]\n the Hopwood court was not\noutlandish, if a bit presumptuous, in declaring Powell’s holding in\nBakke dead. As it happened, Powell’s opinion was far from dead.\nIn the University of Michigan Law School case, Grutter v.\nBollinger, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in June 2003,\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor’s lead opinion declared: “today we\nendorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a\ncompelling state interest that can justify the use of race in\nuniversity admissions” (Grutter v. Bollinger, 539\nU.S. 306 [2003], at 330). Diversity was alive after all. But how it\nworked its affirmative action elixir remained as unclear in 2003 as it\nhad been in 1978.", "\n\nTo see why, consider how in Grutter Justice\nO’Connor posed the issue:", "\n\nThe [Law School’s] policy aspires to “achieve that\ndiversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education\nand thus make a law class stronger than the sum of its\nparts.”…The policy does not restrict the types of\ndiversity contributions eligible for substantial weight in the\nadmissions process, but instead recognizes “many possible bases\nfor diversity admissions.”…The policy does, however,\nreaffirm the Law School’s longstanding commitment to “one\nparticular type of diversity,” that is, “racial and ethnic\ndiversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from\ngroups which have been historically discriminated against”\n(Grutter, at 325).\n\n", "\n\nNow, posing the issue this way and allowing the Law School to assert a\nspecial interest in “one particular type of diversity”\ninvites the conflation of general diversity—a diversity\nof opinions, experiences, backgrounds, talents, aspirations, and\nperspectives—with ethnic and racial diversity\nthat Justice Powell appeared strongly to resist. After all, the\nMedical School too had asserted in its defense a similar special\ninterest.", "\n\nRecall Justice Powell’s principal objection to the Medical School’s\nset-asides. In making the race or ethnicity of an applicant a\n“plus,” a scheme like Harvard’s does", "\n\nnot insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates\nfor the available seats. The file of a particular African-American\napplicant may be examined for his potential contribution to diversity\nwithout the factor of race being decisive when compared, for example,\nwith that of an applicant identified as an Italian-American if the\nlatter is thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote\nbeneficial educational pluralism.…In short, an admissions\nprogram operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all\npertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular\nqualifications of each applicant…. This kind of program treats\neach applicant as an individual in the admissions\n process (Bakke, at 318–19).\n\n", "\n\nBy contrast, Allan Bakke was not able to compete for all one hundred\nseats at the Medical School; sixteen were reserved for candidates not\nlike him.", "\n\nIt is Powell’s resistance to this reservation that underpins Justice\nO’Connor’s opinion in Grutter, where she observed:", "\n\nWe find that the Law School’s admissions program bears the hallmark\nof a narrowly tailored plan. As Justice Powell made clear in\nBakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be\nused in a flexible, non-mechanical way. It follows from this mandate\nthat universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial\n groups (Grutter, at 337).\n\n", "\n\nWhat vindicated the Law School in O’Connor’s eyes was its\n“highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file,\ngiving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might\ncontribute to a diverse educational\nenvironment” (Grutter, at\n 339).[24]\n This “individualized consideration” is crucial; in\nGratz v. Bollinger, decided the same day as\nGrutter, Justice O’Connor switched sides to hold\nunconstitutional the undergraduate admissions process at the\nUniversity of Michigan. The undergraduate admissions office operated\ndifferently than the Law School. It computed an index score for each\napplicant by assigning numerical points for academic factors such as\nhigh school grades, admissions test scores, quality of high school,\nstrength of curriculum; and for nonacademic factors such as being a\nresident of Michigan, a child of an alumnus, a recruited athlete, or a\nmember of “an underrepresented minority group.” An\napplicant falling in this last category automatically received 20\n points (Gratz v. Bollinger,\n539 U. S. 244 [2003], at 287).\n In O’Connor’s view, this “mechanical” procedure meant\nthat the undergraduate admissions office did not fully take account in\neach application “of all factors that may contribute to student\nbody\n diversity” (Gratz, at 288).\n ", "\n\nBut O’Connor’s conclusion here simply draws us back to the lacuna in\nJustice Powell’s Bakke opinion. Why should the undergraduate\nadmissions office take account of all the factors that may\ncontribute to student body diversity if it especially wants to select\nfrom certain parts of the diversity spectrum? Why can’t it, like the\nLaw School, claim a special interest in “one particular type of\ndiversity”? Why bar the undergraduate admissions office from\nusing an effective tool to promote its interest even if the tool is\n“mechanical”? In fact, the Law School’s\n“non-mechanical” procedure differed from the undergraduate\nadmissions policy only on its face, not in its results. During\nadmissions season, the Law School’s director of admissions frequently\nconsulted the “daily reports” that “kept track of\nthe racial and ethnic composition” of the incoming class. He did\nso to make sure a “critical mass” of minority students was\n included (Grutter, at 326).\n In short, the Law School\n“managed” its admissions process so that roughly 6 to 7\npercent of each entering class was African-American. The undergraduate\nadmissions procedure, with its index scores, yielded a similar\n outcome (Grutter, at 367–69 [Rehnquist, dissenting] and 374 [Kennedy,\ndissenting]).\n Only surface appearance distinguished the\ntwo procedures. Justice Scalia called\nthe Law School’s “holistic” admissions process “a\nsham,” and not without\n reason (Grutter, at 375 [Scalia, dissenting]).", "\n\nAs it turned out, Grutter failed to close the book on\nuniversity affirmative action. A new legal challenge soon arose, this\ntime against the University of Texas, which had revised its own\nadmission program in 2004 to emulate the scheme validated\nin Grutter. The case, Fisher v. Texas, wound its way\nthrough the courts for a decade, twice landing on the steps of the\nSupreme Court before final disposition in 2016.", "\nJustice Kennedy, writing for the Court, left the Grutter\ndefense of racial preferences intact, essentially retracing Justice\nO’Connor’s opinion. Universities bent upon pursuing the\n“educational benefits that flow from student body\ndiversity,” he wrote, are due a degree of judicial deference\n(Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419\n[2013]).", "\n\nThe University explains that it strives to provide an ‘academic\nenvironment’ that offers a ‘robust exchange of ideas,\nexposure to differing cultures, preparation for the challenges of an\nincreasingly diverse workforce, and acquisition of competencies\nrequired of future leaders.’ … All of these\nobjectives … mirror the ‘compelling interest’ this\nCourt has approved in its prior cases (Fisher v. University of\nTexas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2211 [2016]).\n\n", "\nPersuaded that race–neutral policies didn’t allow the\nUniversity fully to succeed in deriving the “educational\nbenefits” of diversity, the Court majority found the\nUniversity’s modest use of race permissible. ", "\n\nBut despite these legal victories, have universities actually made a\ncase for diversity as the justifying basis for race–conscious\nadmissions? Caught napping in the mid–1990s when the legal\nchallenges began, higher education rushed to put meat on\nthe Bakke bones and turn Justice Powell’s\noff–hand remarks into a full–fledged defense. As the\nUniversity of Michigan cases approached a final test in 2003, the\nSupreme Court was bombarded with scores of\nfriend–of–the–court briefs from business groups,\nmilitary officers, higher education associations, coteries of\nscholars, and other interested parties lauding the benefits of\ndiversity. A similar outpouring preceded the two decisions\nin Fisher v. University of\nTexas.[25]", "\nConsider some of the claims in these briefs. “[S]tudent body\ndiversity is essential” if universities are to provide\nstudents with “skills necessary for…success in an\nincreasingly globalized world” (Leading Public Research\nUniversities 2015, 11–12; emphasis added). Racial and ethnic\ndiversity on campus are vital to securing a capable\nworkforce; it is essential that [students] be educated in an\nenvironment where they are exposed to diverse people, ideas,\nperspectives, and interactions (65 Leading American Businesses 2003,\n1, 2; emphasis added). Otherwise, the education of students is\n“degraded” (823 Social Scientists 2015, 5;\nemphasis added). “[S]tudents today must receive direct\nexperience with people of different backgrounds” (American\nCouncil on Education 2015, 6; emphasis added). The\n“only means of obtaining properly qualified employees\nis through diversity at institutions of higher\neducation…[Appropriate] skills can only be developed\nthrough exposure to widely diverse people, culture, ideas, and\nviewpoints” (Fortune 100 and Other Leading Businesses 2013, 3,\n5; emphasis added). “Diversity is an indispensable\nprerequisite to establishing the most productive problem–solving\ngroups” (Social and Organizational Psychologists 2015, 47;\nemphasis added).", "\n\nAccording to the briefs the positive effects of diversity are\nbountiful. They include “improvements in cognitive abilities,\nanalytical problem solving skills and complex thinking\nskills…[C]ross racial interactions are more strongly linked\nwith cognitive growth than are interactions with non–racial\ndiversity” (American Educational Research Association 2012,\n12). “[R]esearch shows that by increasing diversity, universities can\nhelp their graduates enter society with better problem–solving\ncapabilities than students who are not exposed to diversity” (Social\nand Organizational Psychologists 2015, 37). ", "\nNow consider four points. First, the promiscuous use of “diversity” in\nthe argument for affirmative action opens the door to waffling and\nequivocation. Students learn through “exposure to widely diverse\npeople, culture, ideas, and viewpoints” announces the Fortune 100\nbrief. Of course. But the issue at hand is racial\ndiversity. Wrapping the latter into the former is not an aid to\nprecision.[26]\nSecond, can we imagine that the University of Michigan or the\nUniversity of Texas would abandon its affirmative action program if\nstudies showed no particular educational benefit to diversity? Suppose\nit turns out that students in general don’t show additional “cognitive\ngrowth” from increased racial diversity. Suppose it turns out students\nwould best prepare for our “increasingly globalized world” by learning\nMandarin Chinese or Spanish.", "\nThird, the straining by academics to show that cross-racial\ninteraction\nis essential, indispensable, vital, necessary,\nor imperative to a good education, if taken at face value,\nleads to an unpleasant conclusion, namely that a lot of black college\nstudents suffer a deficient education. The young woman who excels at\nDunbar High School in Washington, DC (enrollment 95 % black, 1 %\nwhite) and then gets her Bachelor of Science degree in\nstatistics magna cum laude at Spelman College (enrolling, in\n2017, one white among its 2097 students) is, according to Fortune 100\ncompanies, not the sort of employee they want. Graduates of Fisk\nUniversity (0.7% white) or Tougaloo (0.6% white) or Florida A & M\n(3.5% white) haven’t achieved enough cognitive growth,\nhaven’t sufficiently honed their problem–solving\nskills—is that what we are supposed to conclude? The University\nof Texas (enrolling 25% Hispanics and 5% blacks) contends that without\na “critical mass” of minority students it can’t reap\n“the educational benefits of diversity.” Does this mean\nthat Prairie View University, two hours down the road from Austin and\nenrolling 7% Hispanics and 1.8% whites, has to do without those\nbenefits? Are its students poorly prepared for “our increasingly\ndiverse workforce and society” (Fisher 2016, at 2210,\n2211)? Defenders of affirmative action should think twice about\nclaiming an education in a “non–diverse” setting\nmust be degraded. ", "\nFourth, there is a noticeable lack of “fit” between university\naffirmative action practices and the diversity rationale (see, for\nexample, Anderson 2002, 27; Anderson 2004, 1217, 1221; Anderson 2010,\n142–143). Race is not treated just like any other special factor\nthat might warrant an admission “plus.” Universities work diligently\nto maintain a relatively constant percentage of black and Hispanic\nenrollees but give variable attention to other of the myriad qualities\nstudents can bring to campus. As one proponent of affirmative action\nnotes, “affirmative action programs…do not look or operate as\nif they were testing for ‘diversity’.” He suggests that many\nsupporters of affirmative action nevertheless disregard this fact,\nbelieving “that there is no harm in [a] miscast reliance on diversity\nbecause, with a wink and a nod, everyone understands that diversity is\nreally a proxy for integration” (Issacharoff 2002, 30, 34;\nemphasis added). " ], "section_title": "7. Diversity’s Dominion", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAlthough the University couched its legal defense in terms of the\n“educational benefits of diversity,” another rationale lay ready at\nhand. The main reason the University of Michigan strives for a\nreasonable representation of minorities on campus is because of the\nway it conceives of its mission: to prepare Michigan’s future\nleaders.", "\n\nThe argument is straightforward:", "\n\nThis is the “Michigan Mandate” (Gratz\nv. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 [2001], at 796–797).\nRacial and ethnic diversity aren’t incidental contributors to a\ndistinct academic mission; they are part of the mission of\nthe University, just as educating young people from Michigan is part\nof it (see Fullinwider and Lichtenberg 2004, 165–188). And\nsomething like a national version of the mandate underlies the\nMichigan Law School’s affirmative action policy, since its\ngraduates move into elite law firms or government service outside\nMichigan (see Lempert et al. 2000, 399; Wilkins 2000,\n530–534).", "\n\nThis “integration” rationale seems better aligned with the\nactual practice of university affirmative action than the diversity\nrationale. Indeed, in the midst of her nominally Powell-like defense\nof the Law School, Justice O’Connor in Grutter for a\nmoment veered away from the “educational benefits of\ndiversity” to go down a quite different path. Institutions like\nthe University of Michigan and its Law School, she noted,\n“represent the training ground for…our Nation’s\nleaders.” She went on:", "\n\nIn order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes\nof the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be\nvisibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and\nethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have\nconfidence in the openness and integrity of the educational\ninstitutions that provide this training.…Access…must be\ninclusive…of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of\nour heterogeneous society may participate in the educational\ninstitutions that provide the training and education necessary to\nsucceed in\n America (Grutter, at 336).\n\n", "\n\nThis “legitimacy” argument—not in any way about\nenriching the climate of opinion on campus or improving\nstudents’ complex thinking skills—parallels the simple\nsyllogism set out just above. Justice O’Connor inserted this new\nrationale into the middle of her Grutter\nopinion—inserted it unexpectedly and then abandoned it just as\nquickly to resume tracing the byways of diversity. Justice Kennedy did\nthe same in Fisher (2016, 2211). ", "\n\nCertainly, something in the spirit of the “Michigan\nMandate” has animated elite universities, including those\nstudied by William Bowen and Derek Bok in The Shape of the River:\nLong-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University\nAdmissions. The primary aim of these institutions is not through\nvigorous affirmative action to enhance the liberal learning of their\nstudents (although they welcome this gain for all students). Their\nmain motive for assuring that the percentage of African-Americans and\nHispanics on their campuses is more than token derives from their\nself-conceptions as institutions training individuals who will some\nday take up national and international leadership roles in the\nprofessions, arts, sciences, education, politics, and government\n(Bowen and Bok 1998, 7). Society, they believe, will be stronger and\nmore just if the ranks of its leading citizens include a racially and\nethnically broader range of people than it does now. Nor are they\nwrong in thinking that the pipeline to local and national elites runs\nthrough top-notch universities.", "\n\nElizabeth Anderson, in two long essays (2002, 2004), bookending\nthe Grutter decision, makes a thorough and cogent case for\nputting racial integration at the center of conceptions of affirmative\naction. The diversity argument is insufficient, she\nwrites. “Considered as a purely cognitive end, divorced from the\nvalues of democracy and social justice, the ‘robust exchange of\nideas’ cannot support the scope of racial preferences in college\nadmissions” (Anderson 2002, 1221). She goes on:", "\n\n\nThe integrative model of affirmative action offers an alternative\nrationale for race–sensitive admissions that unites educational\nwith democratic and social justice concerns. It begins with a\nrecognition that Americans live in a profoundly segregated society, a\ncondition inconsistent with a fully democratic society and with equal\nopportunity. To achieve the latter goals, we need to\ndesegregate—to integrate, that is—to live together as one\nbody of equal citizens (Anderson 2002, 1222).\n\n\n\n\nThe integrative model has several legal advantages over the diversity\nand compensation models of affirmative action. It makes sense of the\nscope and weight that educational institutions actually give to race\nin the admissions process. It thus closes the gap between theory and\npractice that makes affirmative action programs so vulnerable under\nstrict scrutiny. It also shows how race can be directly relevant to a\ncompelling state interest, rather than merely a proxy for something\nelse, such as diversity of opinions (Anderson 2002, 1226).\n\n\n\n\nGiven the realities of race in the U.S., people of different races\noccupy different walks of life. So in the U.S., democracy requires\nracial integration of the main institutions of civil society, the\nplaces where discussion of public import among citizens take place:\npublic accommodations, workplaces, schools, and neighborhoods. The\nsame point applies to society’s elites, those who play a pivotal\nrole in formulating and adopting policies of public import. Elites, to\nbe legitimate, must serve a representative function: they must be\ncapable of and dedicated to representing the concerns of people from\nall walks of life, so that the policies they forge are responsive to\nthese concerns. An elite drawn only from segments of society that live\nin isolation from other segments will be ignorant of the circumstances\nand concerns of those who occupy other walks of life (Anderson 2004,\n22).\n\n\n", "\nAnderson sees integration as an end courts can accept, one that\ninforms many past judicial opinions and acts of legislation, and one\ngiven endorsement in Grutter:", "\nThe “diversity” defense of affirmative action, articulated\nin Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion, limits integration\nto those cases in which it can be shown to yield educational\nbenefits. Grutter advances a more robust integrationist\nperspective, which affirms racial integration as a compelling interest\napart rom its educational benefits (Anderson 2004, 23).\n", "\n(It is hard to see how Grutter represents a\n“robust” defense of integrative affirmative\naction. Justice O’Connor introduced the “legitimacy”\nargument without prior preparation and left it hanging without further\ndevelopment. Justice Kennedy in Fisher likewise seemed not to\nnotice that the “legitimacy” argument departs considerably\nfrom the diversity rationale he was rehearsing. Nevertheless, there it\nis in the majority opinions, to be seized on and developed by a future\ncourt if it is so disposed.)[27] ", " \nOther writers, too, have talked about affirmative action in terms\nof integration (Warnke 1998; Estlund 2002; Jacobs 2004; Boddie\n2016). ", "\n\nThe integration argument, like the diversity argument, is\nstraightforwardly instrumental. It points to hoped-for outcomes of\naffirmative action. If those outcomes don’t materialize, then\naffirmative action’s cause is weakened. Moreover, the little\nintegration syllogism isn’t complete as it stands. It needs to include\nanother premise: that the gains from achieving racially and ethnically\nintegrated classes don’t come at a disproportionate cost.", "\n\nPerhaps the cost is high, or even too high. Stephan and Abigail\nThernstrom certainly think so. They contend that most of the cost\nfalls on the very persons affirmative action is supposed to benefit.\nUnder-prepared African-Americans are thrown into academic environments\nwhere they cannot succeed (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997, 395–411).\nIn the Thernstroms’ view, race-blind admissions policies will result\nin a desirable “cascading,” with African-American and\nHispanic students ending up at colleges and universities where the\nacademic credentials of their fellow students match their\nown. However, the Bowen and Bok study provides some evidence that\ncascading isn’t necessarily a valuable phenomenon. In fact, at the\nschools they studied, the better the institution a student entered,\nwhatever his academic credentials, the more likely he was to graduate,\ngo on to further education, and earn a good\nincome (Bowen and Bok 1998, 63, 114,\n 144).", "\n\nEven so, the select schools Bowen and Bok studied may be quite\nunrepresentative of the full range of schools that\nresort to racial preferences and the cost-benefit picture that holds\nfor these schools may not hold for the rest. Indeed, the picture drawn\nby Richard Sander in a lengthy review of affirmative action in law\nschools, published in the November 2004 Stanford Law Review,\nlends credence to the Thernstrom’s academic mismatch thesis. Ranking\nlaw schools from best to worst, Sander found that affirmative action\nboosts African-American students 20 or more steps up the ladder,\nputting them in schools with white classmates who possess considerably\nbetter LSAT scores and undergraduate college grades. The upshot:\n“close to half of black students end up in the bottom tenth of\ntheir classes.” This bad performance yields three bad\nconsequences. First, African-American students suffer high attrition\nrates. Second, they fail the bar exam at a high rate (the principal\npredictor of a student’s passing or failing is her grades, not the\nquality of her school). Third, they suffer a significant employment\npenalty for low grades “in all schools outside the top\nten.” Sander estimates that under a race-blind admissions\nsystem, American law schools would actually create more\nAfrican-American lawyers than they do under affirmative action (Sander\n2004, 449, 460, 478, 479).", "\n\nSander’s article inspired a flurry of responses disputing his\nmethodology and conclusions (e.g., Ayers and Brooks 2005, Chambers,\net al. 2005, Wilkins 2005, Ho 2005, Barnes 2007, and\nRothstein and Yoon 2008). Sander replied to his critics (Sander\n2005); other writers found evidence of mismatch effects in educational\ndomains outside law schools (Elliott et al. 1996, Smith and\nMcArdle, 2004, Arcidiacono et al. 2012); yet other scholars\npresented independent confirmation of Sander’s hypothesis\n(Arcidiacono et al. 2011b, Williams 2013), One critic, upon\nre-analysis, had to withdraw her refutation of Sander (Barnes 2007,\nBarnes 2011); and in 2012 Sander joined with co-author Stuart Taylor\nto publish Mismatch, a book-length treatment setting out old\nand new research supporting Sander’s hypothesis. Others continue\nto find the law school mismatch hypothesis dubious and unsupported\n(Camilli and Welner 2011; Camilli and Jackson 2011; Kidder and Lempert\n2015) ", "\nOther researchers, following the lead of Bowen and Bok, have focused\non undergraduate performance. Fischer and Massey, for example,\nconcluded that though affirmative action has “both positive and\nnegative implications for minority students, [such policies] operate,\non balance, to enhance the academic achievement of minority\nstudents” (Fischer and Massey 2007, 546). In another study,\nMassey and Mooney found “little support for the mismatch\nhypothesis” (Massey and Mooney 2007, 114). Dale and Krueger\ndetermined that “the effect of attending a school with a higher\naverage SAT score is positive for black and Hispanic students”\n(Dale and Krueger 2014, 350). Similarly, Melguizo held: ", "\nthat for minority students who were admitted to…selective\ninstitutions under affirmative action (i.e., with slightly\nbelow–average SAT scores but with other personal characteristics\nand experiences correlated with persistence), their probability of\ngraduation was not lower as was predicted by critics of affirmative\naction. On the contrary, their probability of graduation was higher at\nthe most and very selective institutions compared to the\nnon–selective ones (Melguizo 2008, 233).\n\n", "\n\nOne reason disputes persist about cause and effect is imperfect\ndata. Although often operating with large sets of information,\nresearchers must decide which statistical models most appropriately\ntease out significance, decisions that involve debatable assumptions\nabout filling in missing pieces. Two researchers note that\n“[b]etter data would undoubtedly permit more relevant and\nconvincing analyses of the effects of mismatch and and would\nespecially help to identify any threshold below which potential\nmismatch effects become more probable” (Camilli and Welner 2011,\n500). Much of the back–and–forth about the effects of\naffirmative action could be resolved if educational institutions\ndisclosed information about their admissions processes, student\ngrades, graduation rates, and the like. But institutional resistance\nmakes this unlikely.[28] " ], "section_title": "8. The Integration Argument", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe affirmative action debate throws up many ironies but one in\nparticular should be noted. From the time in 1973 when Judith Jarvis\nThomson conjectured that it was “not entirely\ninappropriate” that white males bear the costs of the\ncommunity’s “making amends” to African-Americans and women\nthrough preferential affirmative action, the affirmative action debate\nhas been distracted by intense quarrels over who deserves\nwhat. Do the beneficiaries of affirmative action deserve\ntheir benefits (Allen 2011)? Do the losers deserve their loss?", "\n\nChristopher Edley, the White House assistant put in charge of\nPresident Clinton’s review of affirmative action policy in 1994–95,\nspeaks of how, during the long sessions he and his co-workers put in\naround the conference table, the discussion of affirmative action kept\ncircling back to the “coal miner’s son” \n question (I’ve changed the gender for expository purposes).", "\n\nImagine a college admissions committee trying to decide between the\nwhite [son] of an Appalachian coal miner’s family and the African\nAmerican son of a successful Pittsburgh neurosurgeon. Why should the\nblack applicant get preference over the white\napplicant? (Edley 1996, 132ff)\n\n", "\n\nWhy, indeed? This is a hard question if one defends affirmative action\nin terms of compensatory or distributive justice. If directly doing\njustice is what affirmative action is about, then its mechanisms must\nbe adjusted as best they can to reward individual desert and true\nmerit. The “coal miner’s son” example is meant to throw\ndesert in the defender’s face: here is affirmative action at\nwork thwarting desert, for surely the coal miner’s son—from the\nhard scrabble of Harlan County, say—has lived with far less\nadvantage than the neurosurgeon’s son who, we may suppose, has reaped\nall the advantages of his father’s (or mother’s) standing. Why should\nthe latter get a preference?", "\n\nA defender might answer in the way that Charles Lawrence and Mari\nMatsuda do in their 1997 book, We Won’t Go Back:\n“All the talk about class, the endless citings of the\n‘poor white male from Appalachia,’ cannot avoid the\nreality of race and gender privilege” (Lawrence and Matsuda\n1997, 190–191). As they see it, because white privilege persists\nracial preferences really do balance the scales. Because male\nprivilege persists, gender preferences really do make selections\nfairer. Lawrence and Matsuda brook no concession: in every case the\nloser in affirmative action is not the more deserving.", "\n\nEven Justice Brennan tried his hand at this argument, writing in\nBakke:", "\n\nIf it was reasonable to conclude—as we hold that it\nwas—that the failure of minorities to qualify for admission at\n[the University of California at] Davis [Medical School] under regular\nprocedures was due principally to the effects of past discrimination,\nthen there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for pervasive racial\ndiscrimination…[Bakke] would have failed to qualify for\nadmission even in the absence of Davis’ special admissions\n program (Bakke, at 365–6 [Brennen, dissenting]).\n\n", "\n\nBakke was not denied anything to which he had moral claim in the\nfirst place.\n", "\n\nJust as Mary Anne Warren and James Rachels in the 1970s thought that\nthe losers under affirmative action were losing only illicit\nprivileges, and the gainers merely gaining what should have been theirs\nto start with, so Michel Rosenfeld in the 1990s, in his extended\n“dialogic” defense of affirmative action, echoes the same\nthought:", "\n\nAlthough affirmative action treats innocent white males unequally, it\nneed not deprive them of any genuine equal opportunity rights.\nProvided an affirmative action plan is precisely tailored to\nredress the losses in prospects of success [by African-Americans and\nwomen] attributable to racism and sexism, it only deprives innocent\nwhite males of the corresponding undeserved increases in their\nprospects of success…. [R]emedial affirmative action does\nnot take away from innocent white males anything that they have\nrightfully earned or that they should be entitled to\n keep (Rosenfeld 1991, 307–8, emphasis added).\n\n", "\n\nHowever, programs that give blanket preferences by race or gender are\nhardly “precisely tailored” to match desert and reward\nsince, as Lawrence and Matsuda themselves acknowledge at one place,\nthe white male “privilege” is “statistical”\n(Lawrence and Matsuda 1997, 252). Yet it is individuals, not\nstatistical averages, who gain or lose in admissions determinations\nand employment selections.[29] ", "\n\nThe persistence of this strategy of defense reflects a residual\nfeeling that the fruits of affirmative action are somehow spoiled if they are\nnot deserved (Harris 2003). Nevertheless, it is the wrong strategy for defending\nreal world affirmative action. The programs legitimated under the\nCivil Rights Act, in both their nonpreferential and preferential\nforms, had—and have—a clear aim: to change institutions so\nthat they can meet the nondiscrimination mandate of the Act. Selection\nby race or gender was—and is—a means to such change. To\nthe extent that such selection also compensates individuals for past\nwrongs or puts people in places they really deserve, these are\nincidental by-products of a process aimed at something else.", "\n\nThe same is true with university admissions policy. When the Medical\nSchool of the University of California at Davis offered four reasons\nin defense of the special admissions program that left Bakke on the\noutside, none of these reasons said anything about matching admissions\nand desert. The criteria of the special admissions program—race\nand ethnicity—were instruments to further ends: integrating the\nclassroom, the profession, and the delivery of medical services, and\nbreaking the chain of self-reproducing societal discrimination.\nLikewise, when the University of Michigan and the University of Texas\ndefended their programs they pointed not to desert rewarded but\neducational value generated.", "\n\nNow, if the neurosurgeon’s son because of his race can\nadvance each of these goals and the coal miner’s son, because of\nhis race, cannot, then isn’t the selection decision easy? Pick\nthe African-American neurosurgeon’s son (however advantaged\nhe may be) over the\nwhite coal miner’s son (even if he is the\nmost deserving creature imaginable). The aims of real world\naffirmative action make race and ethnicity (and sometimes gender)\nsalient, not personal desert or merit. The test of real world\naffirmative action lies in the urgency of its ends (preventing\ndiscrimination, promoting diversity or integration) and the aptness\n(moral and causal) of its means (racial, ethnic, and gender\npreferences). Both remain much in dispute.\n" ], "section_title": "9. Desert Confounded, Desert Misapplied", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "65 Leading American Businesses, 2003: Brief Supporting Respondents\nin Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244: 1–11.", "823 Social Scientists, 2015: Brief Supporting Respondents in\nFisher v. University of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016):\n1–42.", "Allen, Anita L., 1990–1991, “On Being a Role\nModel,” Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law and Justice\n(formerly Berkeley Women’s Law Journal), 6: 22–42.", "–––, 2011, “Was I Entitled or Should I\nApologize? 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africana	Africana Philosophy	First published Mon Oct 11, 2010; substantive revision Tue May 23, 2017	[ "\n\n“Africana philosophy” is the name for an emergent and\nstill developing field of ideas and idea-spaces, intellectual\nendeavors, discourses, and discursive networks within and beyond\nacademic philosophy that was recognized as such by national and\ninternational organizations of professional philosophers, including the\nAmerican Philosophical Association, starting in the 1980s. Thus, the\nname does not refer to a particular philosophy, philosophical system,\nmethod, or tradition. Rather, Africana philosophy is a\nthird-order, metaphilosophical, umbrella-concept used to bring\norganizing oversight to various efforts of\nphilosophizing—that is, activities of reflective,\ncritical thinking and articulation and aesthetic\nexpression—engaged in by persons and peoples African and of\nAfrican descent who were and are indigenous residents of continental\nAfrica and residents of the many African Diasporas worldwide. In all\ncases the point of much of the philosophizings has been to confer\nmeaningful orderings on individual and shared living and on natural and\nsocial worlds while resolving recurrent, emergent, and\nradically disruptive challenges to existence so as to survive,\nendure, and flourish across successive generations.", "\n\nThe emergent third-order work defining the field has been focused on\nidentifying for research and teaching, and for further refinements and\nnew developments of, instances of philosophical articulations and\nexpressions regarding what has been, and is, of thoughtful, aesthetic\nsignificance to persons African and of African descent. This work has\nproduced educative catalogings and critical surveys of particular ideas\nand idea-spaces; intellectual and aesthetic expressive agendas,\npractices, and traditions; and networks of individuals, organizations,\nand institutions serving philosophizing in African and\nAfrican-descended life-worlds." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Concept of Africana Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Philosophizings Born of Struggles: Conditions of Emergence of Africana Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Africana Philosophy: Continental Africa", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. African Philosophy: Contributions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Africana Philosophy: The African Diaspora", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. African American Philosophizings Born of Struggles", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. 1600–1860", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. 1860–1915", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "9. 1915–2000", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "10. 1950–Present: Professional Philosophers of African Descent", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "11. Publishing and Professional Africana Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "12. Africana Philosophy: Contributions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "13. Future Developments", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Africana Philosophy", "African Philosophy", "African American Philosophy", "Afro-Caribbean Philosophy" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nThere are significant challenges to the viability of the concept\nAfricana philosophy as well as to an effort to map out an\nencyclopedic overview of the extended and still expanding range of\nendeavors covered by the term. Foremost are the challenges to ordering\nthrough a single concept the geographical, historical, socio-political,\nand cultural differences and complexities that have defined and\ncontinue to define the realities of life of the many persons and\npeoples identified as “African” and “of African\ndescent” in many locales throughout the world. Yet, the viability\nof the concept is grounded on several centuries of continuous, linked,\ncomplicated histories during which Black peoples of Africa, and their\ndescendants, have been regarded as and engaged with, and more or less\nhave come to regard themselves, as “African” peoples, as\npersons and peoples “of African descent.” The long\nhistories of this regarding, by others and by themselves, have thus\nconditioned substantively the history-makings, the socio-political\nlives, the culture-makings and culture-mediations, intellectual\nproductions and philosophizings included, of persons and peoples\nAfrican and of African descent.", "\n\nOn these socially constructive historical groundings rest several key\nheuristic presumptions that are central to Africana\nphilosophy as a metaphilosophical concept for organizing\nintellectual praxes. First, the presumption that there are sufficient\ndistinguishing anthropological, historical, and other commonalities\nand similarities that are shared, more or less, by the many\nbio-cultural groupings of human beings who have been identified, and\nwho subsequently generally have come to identify themselves, as, in\npart, “African” or “of African descent” to\nwarrant ordering under a general heading particular instances of\nphilosophically articulate thought expressed by persons in these\ngroupings and shared with and debated by others within and beyond the\ngroupings. These identifications are consequences of the imposition on\nthe peoples of the continent named “Africa” of an\nattempted homogenizing racializing ontology by peoples of\nnation-states on another continent that was named “Europe”\nin an aspiration for geo-political and anthropological\nunification. Many “Europeans” came to believe that beneath\ntheir many formidable differences there was a foundational commonality\nthrough shared raciality and other constitutive virtues that was\ndefinitive of their anthropological and historical superiority as\nharbingers of a theologically and philosophically sanctioned destiny\nto achieve global predominance. It was out of this toxic mix of\nconvictions and aspirations that particular Europeans set about\nconstructing racialized, rank-ordered philosophical anthropologies\nthrough which they construed a continent of diverse peoples as a\nsingle “race” of “Africans” or\n“Negroes.” The outcomes of the histories of these\ninventive forgings through complex, centuries-long struggles against\nEuropean imperialist impositions and the adaptive endurances of\ncolonization and dispersing enslavements by persons and peoples\nAfrican and African-descendant provide the warrant for the presumption\nof commonalities embraced by the concept Africana philosophy\nwhen considering the philosophizings of people African and\nAfrican-descended subsequent to their encounters with impositions of\nimperialism by people(s) of Europe and European Diasporas.", "\n\nThis first presumption is tempered by a second: namely, that the\nbio-cultural groupings of peoples African and of African descent are\nnot homogeneous, racially or otherwise, neither individually nor\ncollectively, but are constituted by differences and dissimilarities\nas well as by similarities and commonalities. All the more so as\nconsequences of the various groups having created differing\nlife-worlds in differing geographical, political, and historical\nlocations prior to and as a consequence of impositions and disruptions\nof their lives fostered by Europeans and others on one hand; and, on\nthe other, while living interactions and cultural exchanges with other\npeoples, European and European-descended peoples included, which have\ngiven rise to differences in individual and group genomes, histories,\ncultures, interests, and aspirations. Furthermore, identified shared\nsimilarities and commonalities are understood to be\ncontingent, thus neither necessary nor inherent and fixed and\nthus the same for all persons African or of African descent. This\npresumption rules out any ahistorical, a priori claims regarding\nsupposedly definitive “natural” characteristics of\n“the” thought of African and African-descended\npeoples assumed as non-contingently widely and generally shared across\nextended historical times and geo-cultural spaces. Africana\nphilosophy as an ordering concept, then, is neither the promise\nof, nor an aspiration for, a unifying philosophy already shared, or to\nbe shared, by all properly thoughtful persons African and/or of African\ndescent. Judgments regarding the always-contingent distinguishing\nfeatures of philosophizing thought and expression by persons African\nand of African descent, and of the extent to which such features are\nshared—to what degree, under what circumstances, to what\nends—are to be achieved by way of combined efforts of\nphilosophical anthropology, sociology of knowledge, and intellectual\nhistories: that is, by way of historically and socio-culturally\nsituated comparative studies of instances of philosophizing.", "\n\nA third presumption: Africana philosophy should not be\nregarded as normatively prescriptive for philosophers identified as\nAfrican or of African descent, as setting requirements for what their\nphilosophizing must have been, or must be, about and to what ends\nbecause of their racial/ethnic identities. Such identities neither\nconfer nor require particular philosophical commitments or obligations.\nSubstantive differences among African and African-descended thinkers\nhave been, and must continue to be, acknowledged and taken into account\nin the ordering of the field and setting agendas for Africana\nphilosophy. There have been, are, and will likely continue to be\npersons African and of African descent for whom their identities as\nsuch are of no import for their philosophizing.", "\n\nOf particular importance, work in Africana philosophy is also\nconditioned by the presumption that contributors need not be persons\nAfrican or of African descent. This presumption rests on the\nunderstanding that the conditioning circumstances, motivations, modes,\nagendas, and importance of the philosophically articulate thought and\naesthetic expressions of persons African and of African descent can be\nidentified, understood, researched, taught, commented on, and taken up\nwith respectful competence by persons neither African nor of African\ndescent. By virtue of their competencies such persons may be identified\nappropriately as, for example, “Africanists” or\n“Afro-Caribbeanists” or “African\nAmericanists.”", "\n\nFinally, the extent to which these heuristic presumptions are cogent\nand effective in guiding work in Africana philosophy is a matter that\nis to be continuously explored and tested in the agora of disciplined,\nethical scholarship and thus confirmed or disconfirmed, to whatever\nextent appropriate, in accord with proper methods of critical review\nproperly deployed." ], "section_title": "1. The Concept of Africana Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe metaphilosophical efforts to map out and order a complex\ndiscursive field of articulations and practices as Africana\nphilosophy are, indeed, emergent disciplinary ventures of\nthe late twentieth century. However, many of the instances of\nthoughtful articulation and aesthetic expressiveness that are being\nidentified and explored as instances of philosophizing were neither\nproduced nor guided by norms and agendas of the discipline of academic\nphilosophy as institutionalized for centuries in various countries of\nWestern European and North America. The same is true for the needs,\nmotivations, objectives, and many of the principal intellectual\nresources that motivated and oriented those instances of articulation\nand creative expression and the formation of the networks of\nidea-spaces and discursive communities that nurtured them. For African\nand African-descended peoples were of little or no philosophical or\nanthropological significance to those who have been the designators,\nhistorians, practitioners, and mediators of the discipline’s\ninstitutionalized canons of issues, figures, agendas, conceptual and\nmethodological traditions, problem-sets, texts or text-analogs,\norganizations, and institutions. The pre-Modern histories of African\nand African-descended peoples; the centuries-long colonized, enslaved,\nand otherwise utterly dehumanizing unfreedom of Black peoples\nthroughout the continents of Africa, Europe, the Americas, and the\nCaribbean; the rapacious unjust exploitation of their bodies, lands,\nresources, and life-opportunities—all of these went mostly\nwithout explicit comment in the discipline of Philosophy, not even as a\nfocus of protest, notwithstanding all of the vaunted concern within the\ndiscipline for conceptions of freedom, justice,\nequality, human nature, and human well-being\ngenerally. Even as European and European-descended philosophes\nof the eighteen, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries fashion decidedly\nnew philosophical anthropologies, socio-political philosophies, and\nphilosophies of histories into complex Enlightenments to ground and\nguide quests to realize the global instantiations of Modernities in\nwhich reason-guided freedom and justice would be foundational to the\nspread of the racialized, capitalist civilizational projects of\nEurocentrism (Amin 1989), there was almost total silence about the intended and\nunintended consequences for peoples African and of African\ndescent—except for claims that colonization and enslavement would\nbring them much needed “civilizing.”", "\n\nEvolving academic, and subsequently professionalized, Philosophy\nthus aided and abetted, and was a substantial institutionalized\nbeneficiary of, these projects well into the twentieth century when the\nvarious forms and movements of resistance of African and\nAfrican-descended peoples to dehumanization were made more challenging\nwhile animated by motivating declarations of their claims to their\nhumanity and their rights to freedom, justice, and full citizenship. By\nthe middle of the twentieth century, throughout Africa, the Caribbean,\nand the Americas these movements had won major victories of liberation\nfrom the oppressive regimes of Eurocentric racial apartheid and\nexploitation. The movements were also contributing to progressive\ntransformations of these regimes that helped to open them to\nsubstantive measures of real freedom and justice not only for persons\nand peoples African and of African descent, but for other persons and\npeoples of color and, even, for women of European descent.", "\n\nThese historic movements and developments provided contemporary\npioneers of Africana philosophy rich, exemplary ideas, idea-spaces,\nagendas, and social networks on which to draw for motivations,\nmissions, and other resources to forge intellectual agendas and\nstrategies and social networks needed for philosophizing in the\ninterests of people African and of African descent. Hence, the\ntwentieth-century emergence of Africana philosophy as an international\nfield of and for discursive intellectual and expressive aesthetic work\nwith a distinctive mission: to gather up and explore critically\nthoughtful articulations and aesthetic expressions by and about persons\nand peoples African and of African descent as instances of\nphilosophizing; and to fashion revised or new articulations and artful\nexpressions in keeping with, and as aids to, quests for freedom,\njustice, and human dignity by and for these persons and peoples.", "\n\nExamples of such mission-driven creative intellectual and expressive\nwork in service to the liberation and redemption of Black peoples were\nalready at hand in several other disciplines: in history and sociology,\nmusic and literature, art and dance, religion and theology. Moreover,\noutside of academic disciplines, many among several generations of\nfiercely independent, extraordinarily formally and informally educated\n(and in some instances self-taught) socially, politically, and\naesthetically engaged female and male black intellectuals and artists,\nwho devoted much of their lives to service as uplifters of Black\npeoples, had pursued their often very highly productive, and certainly\nvery influential, intellectual and expressive work without ongoing\naffiliations with institutions of higher education, and without the\nassistance of sources of support for articulation and expression, that\nwere dominated and controlled by Europeans and people of European\ndescent. This independence was crucial to the production of their\nseminal reflections, articulations, and artistic creations and\nexpressions. Many of them helped to found and were affiliated with and\nsupported by religious and educational institutions, character-building\nwomen’s and men’s clubs and literary societies;\ninternational missionary ventures; benevolent and political\norganizations; publishing and commercial enterprises; and with local,\nregional, and international anti-colonial and liberatory organizations\nfounded and operated by and devoted to the uplift, freedom, and\nwell-being of African and African-descended peoples. As inspiring role\nmodels, much of their work became resource-reservoirs for new\ngenerations of women and men determined to continue the quests for\nliberation and justice for Black peoples. A matter of significant\ninfluence was that many of these important figures had become\ninternationalists in understanding the similarities and commonalities of\nthe plights suffered by African and African-descended peoples due to\nthe shared agendas for racialized oppression and exploitation forged\nand fostered by White peoples of various nation-states. Consequently,\nmore than a few of the new generations of twentieth-century African and\nAfrican-descended fighters for freedom and justice cultivated\ninternationalist, “Pan African” (Geiss 1974) understandings of and\naspirations for what would be needed in the way of intellectual\nresources and strategies to assist with claiming and realizing the full\nhumanity of and just freedom for African and African-descended\npeoples.", "\n\nMany of the contemporary disciplinary pioneers of the\nphilosophizings that are now being gathered under the umbrella of\nAfricana philosophy, though participants in institutionalized,\nprofessional philosophy, have also been intellectual and spiritual\nmembers of the new generations of freedom fighters or otherwise\nsubstantially influenced by them. Thus, many have drawn their\nmotivations, aspirations, and resources for philosophical work from\nbeyond the canonized motivations and traditions of thought\ninstitutionalized in the discipline. Energized and emboldened by the\nlegacies of the role models and liberatory movements, they have taken\non the work of challenging the discipline in order to create room\nwithin its intellectual and organizational structures and processes\nwherein they could pursue agendas of giving consideration to matters of\nphilosophical import to persons and peoples African and of African\ndescent, and of particular import to themselves as persons African and\nof African descent engaged in philosophizing formally and\nprofessionally.", "\n\nAmong the challenges was the need, first, to reconsider\nlong-prevailing defining assumptions regarding the nature of properly\n“philosophical” thought: namely, that such thought is\ncharacterized by a loving quest for wisdom pursued by persons who have\nthe most highly cultivated forms of disciplined thought, and whose\nlives are materially conditioned such that they have the leisure to\ndevote substantial amounts of their time and energy to reflective\nthought and to working out their thinking for articulate,\nsystematic expression in writing.", "\n\nIt became apparent to many—though by no means to all—of\nthe contemporary pioneers of Africana philosophy within academic\nphilosophy that this image of the ideal philosopher was not appropriate\nfor respectfully identifying or characterizing many of the\nphilosophically thoughtful and expressive persons African and of\nAfrican descent, those, especially, who lived several centuries ago.\nCertainly, throughout the centuries of radically disruptive and\ndehumanizing encounters between peoples African and of African descent\nand peoples of Europe and of the Euro-Americas, and others, the\nphilosophizing efforts of Black people have, indeed, been “born\nof struggle,” as the philosopher Leonard Harris has so aptly\nnoted. The experiences, thus the philosophizing, of many of these\npersons—and of generations of millions who were their\ncontemporaries, millions more who came before them, and millions more\nwho came after them—were conditioned profoundly by racialized and\ngendered exploitative settler-colonialism in their homelands; for\nothers by racialized and gendered capture, relocation, enslavement, and\noppression in The New World thousands of miles from their or\ntheir ancestors’ homelands; and in all such cases by racialized\nand gendered imperialist encroachments on the very core of their\nbeing by which they were forced to become and to be colonized\n“natives” and slaves, ontologically as well as\nsocio-economically. Survival and endurance of such conditions by those\nwho managed to do so required coordinated efforts of recovery and\nretention, or the recreation, of the integrity of personhood and\npeoplehood, even of basic humaneness, thus required thoughtful\nontological and political work of the most fundamental significance.\nSo, too, crucial intellectual efforts of the kinds designated moral,\nethical, epistemological, social, religious, theological, and\naesthetic.", "\n\nThus, survival and endurance of conditions of racialized and\ngendered colonization, enslavement, and oppression—not conditions\nof leisured freedom—compelled more than a few African\nand African-descended persons to philosophize. Almost daily, even on\nwhat seemed the most mundane of occasions, oppressed Black people were\ncompelled to consider the most fundamental existential\nquestions: Continue life during what would turn out to be\ncenturies-long colonization and enslavement, of brutal, brutalizing and\nhumiliating gendered and racialized oppression? Or, seek\n“freedom” in death? Suffer despair until mad? Or, find\nresources for continued living through surreptitiously nurtured\nappreciations of the sacred and beautiful, of irony and tragic comedy,\nwhile cultivating hope and patience aided by discoveries and creations\nof beauty and humaneness in the midst of the physical and\nsoul-distorting psychological brutalities of enforced impoverishments\nof conditions that were not in any way “mundane” living?\nDie at one’s own initiation? Or, capitulate to dehumanization?\nOr, struggle to find and sustain faith and hope for a better life, on\nearth as well as in the afterlife, through creativity and beauty in\nspeech, dance, and song while at work and rest; in thought and\nartistry; in finding and making truth and right; in seeking and doing\njustice; in forging and sustaining relations of family and community\nwhen such relations were largely prohibited; in rendering life\nsacred?", "\n\nFor centuries, persons African and of African descent, for\nthemselves as well as for their associates and successors, have\nhad to ponder the most fundamental questions of existence as a\ndirect consequence of their life-constraining, life-distorting\nencounters with various self-racializing and other-racializing peoples\nof Europe, the Euro-Americas, and elsewhere. And in choosing to live\nand endure, peoples African and of African descent have had to\nforge, test out with their lives, and then refine and further live out\nexplicit strategies by which to avoid being broken by brutality and\nhumiliation and succumbing to fear, despair, or the soul-devouring\nobsession with vengeance. They have had to share with their\nassociates, and those succeeding them, their creative and sustaining\nlegacies for infusing life with spirit-lifting artfulness and their\narticulated ponderings and strategies for surviving, living, and\nenduring with hope despite the circumstances. They have\nhad to philosophize, and to share their philosophizings, in\norder to forge the cross-generational bonds of respectful,\nextended-family, community-sustaining love and mutuality without which\nneither survival nor endurance would have been possible.", "\n\nIndeed, endurance of gendered and racialized colonization,\nenslavement, and oppression that would be continued for centuries\nrequired very compelling, sustaining, persuasive beliefs and nurtured\ninvestments in finding and creating soul-nurturing art and\nexperience-verified praxis-guiding thoughtfulness. These beliefs and\naesthetic considerations had to be articulated and communicated for\nsharing, sometimes surreptitiously, in order that persons and peoples\nendure. And enduring required that the brutalities and humiliations had\nto be countered that were directed, first and foremost, at the defining\ncore of their very being—that is, at their foundational\nnotions of themselves as persons and as distinctive, racialized\npeoples—so as to bring about their cross-generational living of\nsocial death (Patterson 1982). This particular persons did, throughout Africa\nand African Diasporas, and without either the guidance or sanction of\nacademic Philosophy and the discipline’s most canonical\npractitioners even as some among the latter subjected African and\nAfrican-descended peoples to their ontological racism.", "\n\nIt has been instances of such compelled, articulated thoughtfulness\nthat contemporary proponents of Africana philosophy have brought into\nthe discipline of academic Philosophy as the initial historic instances\nof philosophizing constituting the new field. The identification and\ncareful exploration of and commentary on the forms and efficacies of\nthis growing collection of works of thoughtful articulation and\naesthetic expression are now principal forms of endeavor in Africana\nphilosophy. The creation and expression of new articulations and\nexpressions of thoughtfulness by persons African and of African\ndescent, and by other philosophers not African or of African descent,\non these works as well as on old, continuing, or emergent issues\npertinent to Africans and people of African descent make for other\nforms of endeavor in Africana philosophy.", "\n\nThese efforts of recovery, exploration, commentary, and critique\nconstitute an ongoing project-of-projects with several agendas. A first\nagenda involves, as just noted, the identification and recovery of\ninstances and legacies of the ‘philosophizings born of\nstruggles’. Another very important agenda is the identification\nand recovery of philosophizings that were engaged in long before the\ncenturies-long struggles with peoples of Europe began. A third agenda\nis to learn from the philosophizings the lessons of the considerations\nthat governed or substantially conditioned the organization and living\nof life in the various circumstances in which peoples of Africa forged\ntheir evolutionary adaptations. Another agenda: to understand and\nappreciate fully those philosophizings that nurtured endurance in the\nface of brutalizing assaults on peoples’ being in order\nto learn from the life-affirming, very passionate intellectual and\nemotional endeavors of those among severely abused peoples who have\nbeen, and continue to be, those who work at gathering themselves, their\npeoples, and even those who have abused them into humane integrity,\nindividually and collectively. It is to learn how and why it was and is\nthat from among peoples abused and degraded for centuries in conditions\nof continuous terrorism there have been steady successions of persons\nwho have spared substantial portions of the emotional and intellectual\nenergies they managed to preserve and cultivate, along with nurtured\nsenses of their sacred humanity, to devote to quests for freedom and\njustice, hardly ever to quests for vengeance.", "\n\nYet another agenda is to compare the philosophizings of persons\nAfrican and of African descent intra-racially and inter-racially, as it\nwere—that is, to seek out the similarities and differences in the\nvarious instances and modes of thought and expression of persons\nsituated in similar and different times and places in order to learn\nmore about the forms and agendas of human species-being as manifested\nin philosophizing. An important consequence of pursuing this agenda\nshould be significant contributions to inventories of thoughtfulness\nand aesthetic expression in the storehouses of human civilizations,\ncontributions to the enlargement and enrichment of canons of Philosophy,\nand contributions to revisions of histories and of historiography in the\ndiscipline.", "\n\nStill another agenda is to make of Africana philosophy a collection\nof resources that inspire philosophizing, now and in the future, and\nthat guide such philosophizings by the best lessons found in the\ncollection, among them lessons in how to gain and sustain integrity of\nbody and soul, of person, of womanhood and manhood, of childhood and\nyoung-adulthood, of family and community, of “racial” and\ncultural being, of belief in the sacred sanctity of truth, of justice,\nand of freedom through the exercise of faith and\nhope-sustaining, pragmatically focused reasoning and creative\naesthetic expression in cross-generational conditions of\ndehumanizing brutality. Among the lessons to be relearned: how\nnot to abuse persons and peoples; how not to\nrationalize abuse; how not to live massive lies and\ncontradictions and lives of hypocrisy.", "\n\nWhat follows are brief surveys of several historically contextualized\ndevelopments of philosophizing now being explored as instances of the\nphilosophizing constitutive of the field of “Africana\nphilosophy.” The survey is not meant to be exhaustive, but one\nthat provides examples and solicits additional contributions in order\nto make the account more comprehensive and accurate." ], "section_title": "2. Philosophizings Born of Struggles: Conditions of Emergence of Africana Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe various peoples on the continent that came to be called\n“Africa” had constructed a variety of more or less complex\nsocieties of varying scale and scope many generations before fifteenth\ncentury encounters with acquisitive explorers and adventurers from the\nvarying configurations of polities, regions, cities, and states that\nhave been identified as Europe and from elsewhere. Several of these\nancient societies—the kingdoms of Mali and Ghana and the royal\ndynasties of Kemet (Ancient Egypt), for example—had evolved\ncomplex social strata that included persons of accomplished learning.\nSome of these persons were stationed in institutions devoted to the\nproduction and distribution of knowledge and creative expression and to\nthe preservation of that knowledge and expression in written and\nartistic works stored in libraries and other repositories and, in the\ncase of works of art, incorporated into the ontologically-structured\nroutines of daily life. Others, in social orders in which advanced\nknowledge was produced and mediated via oral literatures and\ntraditions, were selected and trained to be griots: that is,\npersons with rigorously structured memories who thus became the living\nrepositories, guardians, and mediators of a people’s and/or a\npolitical community’s genealogies and intellectual legacies,\ntheir keepers of wisdom. And in order to preserve shared, adaptive life\nacross generations in all of the various social orders, it was socially\nnecessary to construct and maintain interpretive orderings of natural\nand social realities, as well of creatively imagined origins and\ngenealogies and constructed histories, by which to meaningfully order\nindividual and shared life.", "\n\nThe production of these interpretive and expressive orderings, the\nworking out of the norms by which to structure, justify, and legitimate\nthe interpretations so as to order personal and social life, were,\nindeed, “philosophical” endeavors: labors devoted\nto the production of successful, time-tested, enduring thought-praxis\nand aesthetic strategies by which to resolve emergent and recurrent\nchallenges to transgenerational survival and flourishing. These were\nexperience-conditioned thoughtful means by which to provide knowledge\nto guide the ordering of meaningful individual and shared life\ntransmitted across generations past, present, and future. Such efforts\nare as old as the peoples now routinely referred to as\n“Africans.” And the efforts were not destroyed by the\nholocausts of imperialist colonization and domination, nor by\nracialized enslavement and apartheid-oppression, fostered by Europeans\nand others. Still, the philosophizing efforts were disrupted and\ndistorted to various degrees in many instances, were creatively\nadaptive in many others.", "\n\nFor example, during twentieth century anti-colonial and decolonizing\nstruggles to regain freedom from the domination and authoritative\njurisdiction of white racial supremacy over the lives, lands, and\nresources of African peoples, the disruptions and distortions would\ncompel reinvigorated and determined adaptive creativity on the part of\nAfrican peoples who endeavored to recover and repair old, and/or to\ninvent new, agendas and strategies for living in keeping with their will\nto endure. There is a long history of efforts by scholars African and\nof African descent to reclaim Egypt from the intellectual annexation to\nEurope that was urged by Hegel in his The Philosophy of\nHistory. It is still the case that many people throughout Europe\nand the United States regard Egypt as being in “the Middle\nEast” rather than as constituting the northern portion of the\nAfrican continent. This costly mis-education of popular imaginations\npersists, as well, in historical accounts of various areas of thought\n(though increasingly less so in historiography related to Africa). The\nsystematic production of ignorance and distorted, unethical\n“knowledge” about the peoples of Continental Africa persists\nin academic Philosophy, especially in the training of new\nprofessionals; in the writing of canonical histories of the discipline;\nand in the construction of disciplinary curricula though progressive\nchange has begun. Few in academic Philosophy not engaged in the work of\nAfricana philosophy are likely to know of a long tradition of\nscholarship contesting the claims of the Greco-Roman\n“origins” of Philosophy, an example of which is the\ncontroversial work by George G.M. James, Stolen Legacy (James 1954), in\nwhich he argues, as the title declares, that Greek thinkers\n“stole” Egyptian intellectual legacies that have since been\nattributed erroneously to Greek thinkers as their creations.", "\n\nA provocative and controversial argument, indeed. Still, widespread\ndisciplinary ignorance regarding the histories of ancient peoples and\ncivilizations other than those stipulated as being ancestors of\nEuropean White peoples is a direct and continuing consequence of racism\nin the formation, organization, and practices of communities of\ndiscourse and scholarship and the development of racially segregated\nidea-spaces, intellectual traditions and networks, and scholarly\norganizations throughout Europe and North America. For example, few\nacademic philosophers and workers in other disciplines who are neither\nAfrican nor of African descent are likely to know of the Association\nfor the Study of Classical African Civilizations, an international\norganization of scholars and intellectuals African and of African\ndescent who are determined to “rescue and rehabilitate” the\nhistories, intellectual traditions, and wisdom philosophies of Ancient\nAfrica. Thus, few academic philosophers are likely to know of the\nscholarship of various persons in the Association such as Maulana\nKarenga (1986) and Jacob H. Carruthers (1984). Both scholars have contributed\nadditional research and scholarship to studies devoted to reclaiming\nEgyptian thought-traditions as African traditions of thought.\nThese scholars’ efforts and works are paradigmatic examples of\nthe determined production and mediation of new knowledge of African and\nAfrican-descended peoples by African and African-descended, and other,\nscholars who have deliberately worked independently of the mainstream\norganizations of academic professionals in Philosophy and other\ndisciplines.", "\n\nWith little to no evidence in much of the canonical literature and\ncurricula of academic Philosophy that Western philosophers have focused\nattention on questions of historical relations between Egyptian and\nGreco-Roman thinkers, or on African thinkers and traditions of thought,\na number of the pioneers of Africana philosophy have turned to\nindependent, often controversial figures and scholarly projects outside\nof academic, professional Philosophy for their inspiration and for\nintellectual resources and strategies in taking on the challenges of\ncreating intellectual spaces in academic Philosophy for “matters\nAfrican.” A major resource and intellectual mentor continue to be\nworks by and the person of Cheikh Anta Diop, the intellectually daring\nand pioneering Senegalese scholar who, in The African Origin of\nCivilization: Myth or Reality, published in the early 1970s,\nargued for the reality of the African origin of human civilization. Diop had begun the\nchallenging work of reclaiming African heritages decades earlier by\narguing in a dissertation submitted for the Ph.D. at the University of\nParis that ancient Egyptian civilization was a black African\ncivilization. His explorations in support of his claims have enormous\nimplications for revisions to histories of the origins of Western\nPhilosophy. Similarly, Martin Bernal’s loudly and heatedly\ncontested multi-volume Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of\nClassical Civilization is by far the most widely read, and\nintensely debated, work in this vein to which many have turned.\nHowever, Bernal’s work, which acknowledges a long line of African\nand African-descended scholars who are his precursors, Diop included,\nhas raised hardly a ripple in academic Philosophy. The discipline has\nthus long been overdue for a spirited and disciplined critical\nreconsideration of the possibilities and realities of informing\nGreco-Roman and African Egyptian contributions to the\nhistories of emergence and development of philosophical thought that\nhas been canonized as foundational to the genealogy of Western\nPhilosophy. Africana philosophy has been forged as a novel context of\nprovocations for such critical reconsiderations.", "\n\nMeanwhile, for several decades academic philosophers in Africa, and\nelsewhere, have been involved in intense debates and discussions that\nhave prompted reconstructions of disciplinary enterprises of Philosophy\n(departments in educational institutions as well as national and\ninternational organizations of professional philosophers). The initial\nfocal question at the center of the debates and discussions was whether\nor not there were proper instances of Philosophy in traditional (i.e.,\npre-Modern) Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular. The publication in 1945\nof Placide Tempels’ La Philosophie Bantoue triggered\nmuch of the debate.", "\n\nThe historical context in which the debates and discussions emerged\nand in which they were waged was conditioned thoroughly by European\ncolonial domination and exploitation of African peoples rationalized\nthrough rank-ordering racial characterizations. This rationalizing work\nwas aided significantly by the intellectual efforts of canonical\nEuropean philosophers. David Hume, in a footnote in his “Of\nNational Characters,” philosophized about the “natural\ninferiority” of Negroes to White people (Hume 1742) and was supported by\nImmanuel Kant (1764), who elaborated his own theory of inferior and superior\nracial types in his writings on anthropology (Kant 1798). Since successive\ngenerations of European and Euro-American White people had been\neducated into widely-shared common senses of their racial superiority\nto inferior Africans by such supposedly philosophically well-reasoned,\nscience-verified, and theologically sanctioned teachings, the claim\nthat there were Africans capable of producing thought of the caliber of\nPhilosophy was regarded by most of them as utterly preposterous.", "\n\nAt the core of the controversy was the pressing question\nwhether African persons were fully and sufficiently human and capable\nintellectually in comparison to the model human par excellence: the\nman of Europe, the White Man, the avatar for all White people\nand for humanity proper, whose defining characteristics were capacities\nfor reasoning and articulate speech (logos). Consequently, the\nclaim of Bantu Philosophy made by Placide Tempels, a Belgium\npriest engaged in missionary work in the then-called Belgian Congo,\nthat Bantu Africans (related ethnic groups identified by the dominant\nlanguage group, Bantu, spoken by the related groups) had an indigenous\nphilosophy was a serious challenge to the racialized philosophical\nontology-cum-anthropology that undergirded colonial domination and\nexploitation. However, Tempels tempered the unsettling implications of\nhis claim by also claiming that Bantu Africans did not have conscious\nknowledge of their philosophy. Rather, he claimed, it was he who was\nable, using the tools at his disposal by virtue of his training in\nPhilosophy, to engage in a hermeneutic of the practices and language of\nthe Bantu and extract the constitutive epistemology and axiology\nstructuring the operative, behavior-guiding philosophy at work in their\nlinguistic practices and normative actions.", "\n\nNonetheless, the impact of Bantu Philosophy was\nsubstantial. Of particular consequence, the debates it prompted helped\nto direct the attention of researchers and scholars in several\ndisciplines (anthropology, ethnology, history, religion, philosophy) to\nthe identification and exploration of the articulate systems of thought\nof various groups of “traditional” Africans. A number of\nEuropean scholars and researchers who had spent years studying and\nliving among various African peoples were pleased to find confirmed in\nTempels’ book their own positive assessments of Africans’\nthought-systems, social organization, and artistic creativity. Others,\nhowever, disagreed and challenged Tempels’ claims, in a\nparticular case criticizing him for mistaking an “impetus\nfor” philosophy in the language and behavior of Bantu-speaking\nAfricans as evidence of a developed capacity for articulating a proper\nPhilosophy. This critic concluded that Bantu-Africans had not yet\nfulfilled the conceptual conditions for “taking off” into\nphilosophizing properly (Crahay 1965). Other scholars engaged in comparative\nexplorations of thought-systems of various African peoples countered\nthe criticism by providing accounts of a number of such systems that\ngave clear evidence of their very capable and developed\nrationality (Forde 1954; Fortes 1965).", "\n\nThe subsequent decades of debates (mid 1940 through the 1980s)\nregarding the possibility of African philosophy and disclosures of the\nlong-developed rationality and humanity of African peoples were\nsignificant consequences for intellectual agendas and practices of\nrevolutionary developments in political arenas manifested in\nanti-colonial struggles throughout the African continent, and in\nefforts to construct new political, economic, social, and cultural\norders after the successes of those struggles. A significant number\namong new generations of African intellectuals—many of them\neducated in institutions in Africa, many of which were administered by\npersons of European descent; and more than a few of them educated\nfurther in the most elite institutions of the colonizing “Mother\nCountry”—became radicalized in their opposition to\nracialized colonial domination and exploitation of African peoples and\nresources. A number of these engaged intellectuals regarded Tempels and\nsimilarly oriented European and Euro-American thinkers as allies in\ntheir struggles against the dehumanizing rationalizations that\nsupported European colonialism. Some regarded Bantu Philosophy\nas a defense, even a vindication, of Africans as rational human beings\nquite capable of managing their own lives and therefore capable of\nindependence from colonial rule. Others, however, thought\nTempels’ claims, and similar offerings by others, were misguided\nand misleading candidates for proper instances of philosophical thought\nby Africans. For these dissenters such candidates were really more\nethnological studies of African peoples than philosophical\narticulations by them, and that their proponents were more\nmisguided in seeming to attribute unconscious, unwritten, and widely\nshared putative philosophical systems to all of the persons in the\nparticular groups under discussion. These dissenters disparaged such\naccounts as “ethno-philosophy.”", "\n\nAfrican and African-descended intellectuals involved in and\notherwise supporting anti-colonial liberation struggles and\npost-colonial efforts to rehabilitate and further development new\nAfrican nation-states found in these raging debates intellectual\nweapons with which to reclaim, reconstruct, and redefine the histories,\npersonhood, peoplehood, needs, and future possibilities of African\npeoples. Life under exploitative, dehumanizing colonialism compelled\nintellectual and artistic engagements with prevailing conditions and\nspurred the nurturing of imaginative visions of possibilities of\nliberation and of how liberation might be achieved; whether and how\nmodes and agendas of life before the holocausts might be recovered,\nrestored, or adapted to new circumstances as thinkers and practitioners\nof the religious and theological, creative and expressive artists of\nliterature, music, sculpture, dance, and painting all grappled with the\nprofound existential challenges of the loss of personal and communal\nintegrity through the violent imposition of the conflicts of Tradition\nand Modernity and the need for liberation and freedom.\nTwentieth-century struggles on the African continent have thus had\nsignificant consequences for, and impacts on, creative intellectual and\nexpressive work in and with regard to continental Africa, and the\nAfrican Diaspora generally, in giving rise to widespread, prolific, and\nin many cases especially important articulations of social, political,\nethical, and expressive aesthetic thought and feeling. These\narticulations and expressions have become important object-lessons as\nwell as inspiring resources of agendas and critiques drawn on to forge\ndistinctive disciplinary enterprises of academic Philosophy. They have\nbecome, as well, the focus of informative critical thought for a number\nof philosophers focusing on “matters African.”", "\n\nFor example, the Tempels-inspired debates over the possibilities for\nand nature of philosophizing by persons African became focused, for a\ntime, on discussions of the nature and anthropological distributions of\nmodes of rationality unique to philosophizing, discussions that quickly\nprompted intense debates about the universality or relativity of\n“reason,” whether there were cultural (or racial or ethnic)\ndifferences in the nature or the exercise of reasoning, by persons\nAfrican in particular historical and cultural contexts in particular.\nPositions taken in these and other focal debates were developed from\nthe resources of a variety of traditions and schools of academic\nPhilosophy and other disciplines, including analytic philosophy,\nphenomenology, hermeneutical, and existential philosophizings, various\nmodes of social and political philosophy, and Afrocentrism.", "\n\nToday there are a significant and still growing number of formally\ntrained African philosophers throughout the world who draw on and\ncontribute to the discipline and profession of Philosophy. Explicit\ndevelopments of discursive formations, within and beyond the\ndiscipline, that are distinguished as being “African” have\nbeen unfolding through efforts by persons African, African-descended,\nand not of African descent to identify, reconstruct, and create\ntraditions and repositories of literate African thought and artistic\nexpression—oral, written, and in iconic forms of art—as\nforms of philosophizing. An important development has been the taking\non for serious consideration the expressed articulate thought of\nparticular persons past and present who were and are without formal\ntraining or degrees, in academic Philosophy especially, but who have\nengaged in and articulated more or less systematic reflections on\nvarious aspects of life, and the inclusion of instances and traditions\nof such expressed articulate thought in revised and new canons of\nAfrican philosophical thought. An important leading example of efforts\nalong these lines has been the groundbreaking work of deceased Kenyan\nphilosopher H. Odera Oruka on the philosophical thought of traditional\nAfrican sages. Engaging in actual field work in Kenya, Oruka\ninterviewed and conversed with several locally recognized and respected\nsages and amassed a substantial body of transcribed, critically edited,\nand now published texts that are the focus of critical studies as well\nas motivations for more refined work of the same kind in numerous\nplaces on the African continent. Other philosophers, a number of them\nfrom other countries and not of African descent, have taken up\nOruka’s lead and continue to explore the articulate thought of\nindigenous sages while incorporating the sages’ articulations\ninto their research, scholarship, and course-offerings. “Sage\nphilosophy” has thus become a subfield of energetic work in\nAfricana philosophy in continental Africa (Oruka 1990b).", "\n\nThe Tempels-inspired debates over whether African or\nAfrican-descended peoples have philosophies or can philosophize have\nbeen resolved—or are no longer taken seriously—and given\nway to explorations of other concerns. Both the anti-colonial struggles\nand the challenges of sustaining post-colonial successes and resolving\nsetbacks and failures have prompted much academic philosophizing. The\nevidence is the development of programs of study leading to advanced\nand terminal degrees in Philosophy with strong emphasis, in a number of\ninstances, on African philosophy in a significant number of\ninstitutions of higher education in several countries (Kenya, Nigeria,\nPeoples Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Republic of Benin, Senegal,\nSouth Africa); the appearance of a variety of journals and other\npublished (and unpublished) philosophical writings and other modes of\narticulate expression (literary works, especially); the development of\nnational organizations (in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, and elsewhere)\nand international organizations (the Inter-African Council of\nPhilosophy and the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association, the latter with\nheadquarters in Cairo, Egypt, with members from throughout North\nAfrica, Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, Europe, and elsewhere) of\nprofessional philosophers and other knowledge-workers; and the\norganization of national, regional, and international conferences\ndevoted to explorations of topics and issues explicitly characterized\nas philosophical.", "\n\nThe continuing maturation of these developments is evident in the\nemergence of different philosophical orientations, agendas, and foci\nthat have, in turn, prompted several thinkers to endeavor to develop\ncritical, metaphilosophical overviews of developing schools or trends\nthat account for their emergence and implications, their similarities\nand differences. H. Odera Oruka (1990a) provided one such overview and\ndistinguished what he termed four “currents” in African\nphilosophy. One of these, already mentioned, he joined others in\nlabeling and characterizing as ethno-philosophy: that is,\nsecond-order works that purport to identify and engage in an exegesis\nof the philosophical schemes and significances of articulated thoughts\nand expressions, acts, and modes of behavior shared by and thus\ncharacteristic of particular African ethnic groups. Another current,\npreviously mentioned as having been initiated by Oruka, he termed\nphilosophic sagacity to distinguish what he regarded as the\nrigorous and critically reflective thought of independent-minded\nindigenous thinkers who were not formally educated in modern schools.\nNationalist-ideological philosophy for Oruka was constituted\nby the articulations of persons actively engaged in political life,\nespecially those who led or otherwise contributed substantially to\nstruggles for African independence and sought to articulate conceptions\nby which to create new, liberatory social and political orders. His\ndesignation for a fourth current, professional\nphilosophy, was reserved for work by academically trained\nprofessional teachers and scholars of academic Philosophy and their\nstudents.", "\n\nOther nuanced characterizations and examinations of trends in\nphilosophizing on the African continent have been developed. O. Nkombe\nand Alphonse J. Smet (1978) identified an ideological trend, quite\nsimilar in characterization to Oruka’s\n“nationalist-ideological current,” that includes several\nvery rich lines of articulate socio-political thought devoted to\nreconstructing the political and cultural situations of African peoples\nthat were consequences of European imperialism, enslavement, and\ncolonization: African personality; Pan-Africanism; Négritude;\nAfrican humanism; African socialism; scientific socialism;\nConsciencism; and African “authenticity.” A second trend,\nthe traditionalist, includes efforts that are quite similar to\nOruka’s sage philosophy in that the efforts are focused on\nidentifying philosophizing practices by traditional Africa thinkers,\nexploring the philosophical aspects of manifestations of these\npractices, and examining just how these practices resulted in the\ndevelopment of repositories of wisdom and esoteric knowledge. Nkombe\nand Smet identified a third trend: the intellectual orientations and\npractices of critical thinkers characterized by these\nthinkers’ critiques of the projects of persons grouped in the\nideological and traditionalist trends structuring\ntheir critiques by norms and strategies drawn from familiar\nLeft-critical (Marxist), Liberal Democratic, and creative\nappropriations of other traditions of European thought. Thinkers in the\ncritical group applied the label\n“ethno-philosophy” to a number of the instances of thought\nin the traditionalist trend to set apart the latter modes of\nthought, as previously noted, as more akin to ethnology than proper\nphilosophizing. Finally, Nkombe and Smet labeled a fourth grouping the\nsynthetic trend, one characterized by the use of philosophical\nhermeneutics to explore issues and to examine new problems emerging in\nAfrican contexts.", "\n\nStill other scholars have attributed somewhat different\ncharacterizations to these and other traditions or modes of\nphilosophizing in Africa and, importantly, identified newer\ndevelopments. An example of the latter is the pathsetting\nmetaphilosophical and anthologizing work of Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, the\ndeceased philosopher from Nigeria who pioneered bringing into several\nidea-spaces and discursive communities of academic Philosophy in the\nUnited States and Africa the interdisciplinary writings of contemporary\nscholars and artists from across Africa, African Diasporas, and other\ncountries all of whom are significant contributors to\npostcolonial philosophizings. These are critical explorations\nof the challenges and opportunities facing Africans and people of\nAfrican descent in various national and transnational situations\ndefined by configurations of conditions after colonialism in\nwhich political liberation has not ended the suffering of African\npeoples, resolved long-running problems of individual and social\nidentity, or settled questions regarding the most appropriate relations\nof individuals to communities; of appropriate roles and\nresponsibilities of women and men and their relations to one another;\nof justice and equity after centuries of injustice and dehumanization;\nor of the most appropriate terms on which to order social and political\nlife (Eze 1997).", "\n\nThe heuristic value of the concept of postcolonial is not to\nbe underappreciated, for the various instances in which the successes\nof defeating the classical, directly administered colonial ventures in\nAfrica of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been compromised\nby situations of indirect rule, or neocolonialism, effected through\neconomic control of the new African nation-states by Western European\nand U.S. American transnational capitalist enterprises and\nmultinational organizations and agencies supposedly providing advice\nand aid. These compromises must be fully appreciated in order to\nunderstand the prospects for full national independence and\nself-determination in the areas of economic, political, social, and\ncultural life generally. Of decisive issue is on what terms, via which\nstrategies, African countries will contend with emergent challenges,\nsome of which are of magnitudes and character neither encountered nor\nimaginable by “traditional” African thinkers, or, even, by\ncontemporary thinkers. Foremost are the challenges from the scourge of\nHIV AIDS, which is proving to have as much impact demographically,\nthus in other areas of life, as were depletions of populations during\nthe centuries of export enslavement though with consequential\ndifferential impacts on age groups. Likewise challenging are questions\nof the priority and efficacy of armed struggle and the terms of\nengagement in light of recent and ongoing histories of such ventures\non the African continent, too many of which involve conscripting\nchildren into armies as armed warriors. Still other challenges: the\nterms and practices of political governance, at the level of the state\nespecially, as many African nations struggle against collapse or\ndebilitating dysfunction due to corruption, crippling economic\nexploitation, massive underdevelopment of human capital—of\nfemales especially—scarcities of food and other vital resources,\nand due to campaigns of genocide as ethnic affirmations coupled with\nethnic denunciations ‘go imperial’.", "\n\nScholarly efforts to develop informative and critical\nmetaphilosophical overviews of African philosophical trends, currents,\nand schools of thought, in part to forge new conceptions through which\nto take up these and other pressing challenges, are confirmation of\nthe rich diversity of formal philosophizing by academic philosophers\nand other intellectuals and artists that emerged on the African\ncontinent during recent decades, and of the continuing maturation of\ntheir efforts. A significant number of these intellectual workers,\nphilosophers among them, have cultivated international relationships\nwith other scholars and artists and their organizations; and some of\nthem have spent several years in, or even relocated to, the United\nStates, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, and other countries\nfor both formal education and to work in institutions of higher\neducation. In the process of doing so many have also developed the\nprofessional relations, practices, and levels of accomplishment and\nrecognition that have led to the publication of works that are\ncontinuing to attract wider critical attention in various discursive\ncommunities and are being added to course and seminar readings. These\nmovements, relocations, cultivations of transnational relationships,\nand expansion of the literature of published works have enriched the\ndevelopment of new idea-spaces, the circulation of ideas, the\nformation of new discursive communities, and thereby contributed\nsubstantially to the development of Africana philosophy. There are now\nhistories of African philosophy and major collections of writings in\nthe subfield by professional African, African-descended, and other\nphilosophers published by major, transnational publishing firms\ncovering a still-expanding list of subject-matters organized, in many\ninstances, by themes long established in academic Philosophy:\nhistorical studies; issues of methodology, logic, epistemology,\nmetaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics; philosophy of religion; political\nand social philosophy (Hallen 2009; Kwame 1995; Mosley 1995; Wiredu\n2004). In several noteworthy instances, these philosophizings are\nconducted by way of deliberate explorations of articulations of the\nsettled thought structuring the life-worlds of particular ethnic\ngroups. Such explorations are being conducted in increasing numbers\nand, in the process, are rehabilitating and giving new meaning and\nheuristic direction to the once disparaged notion of\n“ethno-philosophy” by establishing the legitimacy and\nresourcefulness of culturally and ethnologically contextualized\nstudies of articulated thought. As well, such studies will prove\nimportant for comparative studies of philosophizing (Bell\n2002). Hopefully, these efforts will motivate similar studies in other\nparts of the world, contribute to comparative studies that will\nenhance our understandings of philosophizing globally, and curtail\npractices of making false generalizations in some modes of\nphilosophical discourse, as, for example, characterizing the\nthought-endeavors of canonical Greek and European thinkers as being\n“universal” in their defining features or salience while\nbeing silent about the racial/ethnic, cultural, and gendered\ncharacteristics of the endeavors on the pretext that such matters are\nof no consequence for the thinkers’\n“philosophy.”" ], "section_title": "3. Africana Philosophy: Continental Africa", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAs an ongoing project-of-projects, it would be unwise to attempt a\ncomprehensive and definitive catalog and assessment of the thematic\nfoci across the full range of articulations and discussions still being\ngathered and explored under the heading of “African\nphilosophy” even as new discussions are emerging. Still, a number\nof developments are worth noting.", "\n\nSeveral canonical subfields of academic philosophical discourses\nstand to be enriched by the inclusion of explorations of\nsubject-matters within African contexts. As already noted, historical\naccounts of “Philosophy,” in the so-called\n“West” especially, are being reconsidered in light of\ncritical explorations of more recently disclosed relations between and\namong peoples and places in Africa and “the West” or\nEurope—among Greece, Rome, and Egypt definitely—and in light of\nfurther explorations of the impact of such relations on even canonical\nthinkers in Europe. In general, the discussion of “the\norigin of philosophy” in Ancient Greece must be replaced by\ncomparative explorations of the emergence of philosophizing in various\nsettings around planet earth, including pre-colonial North Africa,\nEthiopia (home of Zera Yacob and Walda Heyat, two seventeenth century\nphilosophers (Sumner 1976–78)), and places on the continent in which Arabic was a\nprincipal language.", "\n\nAs well, new questions should be posed and explored, among these the\nfollowing: How are canonical figures and subject-matters of the\nEuropean Enlightenments to be understood in light of the extensive\ninvolvements of European nation-states—and of canonical\nfigures—in colonial imperialism and the enslavement of African\npeoples? How did the centuries-long institutionalization of enslavement\naffect the philosophizing of various European thinkers with regard to\nnotions of freedom, the person, the citizen,\njustice, of manhood and womanhood? What was the impact on\ncanonical European thinkers of the presence among them of the\narticulated thought and the persons of such figures as Anton Wilhelm\nAmo (c. 1703–1758), a native of Ghana who, at age three, was\ntransported to the Netherlands to be educated and baptized in keeping\nwith colonial Dutch efforts to Christianize Africans? Amo settled in\nGermany and became a highly educated and influential\nteacher-philosopher. As more research and scholarship on such figures\nare completed, understandings of eighteenth century intellectual\ncommunities in Germany and elsewhere in Europe will have to be revised;\nso, too, notions of the meanings and influences of notions of\nrace and their impacts on intellectual productions as well as\non social life.", "\n\nWork in Africana philosophy in general, and African philosophy in\nparticular, compels comparative studies. No longer can it be presumed,\ncertainly not taken for granted, that many canonical notions, even\nso-called “perennial” or “universal” issues,\nhave the salience or global significance these issues have long been\nassumed to have. Conceptions of personhood in several indigenous\nAfrican schemes of thought (of Akan and Yoruba peoples, for example)\ninvite comparisons and rethinking of notions of personhood long\nsanctioned in some legacies of Western European and North American\nphilosophizing. For example, Kwasi Wiredu (1987) of Ghana has argued\npersuasively that in the indigenous conceptual-ontological schemes of\nthe Akan it would not be possible, in the normal course of matters, to\ngenerate the “mind-body problem” so central to the\nphilosophizing of René Descartes. Explorations of matters of\nlogic, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics in Akan and\nother schemes of thought will illuminate the extent to which Western\nEuropean and North American inventories of philosophical\n“problems” will have to be revised. Likewise for\nexplorations in the areas of religion, aesthetics, politics, and the\nmeaning of social life.", "\n\nWhile there are near daunting challenges being faced by African\npeoples and other citizens of the continent’s nation-states that\ncompel problem-solving philosophizing for enhanced living, there are,\ntoo, example-lessons of such engaged philosophizing that warrant close\nand appreciative study. One such example is the transformation under\nway in South Africa from the White Racial Supremacy of racial\napartheid to a multiracial, multiethnic democracy. A crucial factor\nconditioning the transformation has been the soul-wrenching work of\nthe Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which sponsored public\nhearings during which victims of the evils of apartheid, and\nperpetrators of the evils, disclosed the truths of their suffering and\nof their dehumanizing aggression, respectively. Grounding premises of\nthe TRC project were that disclosures of the truths of\nsuffering and of abuse were necessary in order to\nachieve restorative justice, not just compensatory or\nretributive justice; and that restorative justice is in keeping with\nphilosophical notions such as ubuntu—love, generosity,\nforgiveness—that are foundational to communal life at its best,\nthus are essential to the rehabilitative healing that must be lived\nthrough in forging new persons for a new and democratic South Africa\n(Bell 2002, Chapter 5, “African Moral Philosophy II: Truth and\nReconciliation,” pp. 85–107). Here, then, a case-study in\nthe articulation and testing out of a new conception of justice, of\nethics more generally, in an African context, a case-study that should\nalready be substantively instructive. Such comparative work in\nacademic Philosophy that engages seriously and respectfully\nphilosophical articulations of African and African-descendant thinking\nhas only just begun…" ], "section_title": "4. African Philosophy: Contributions", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe centuries of enslaving-relocations of millions of African\npeoples to the New Worlds of colonies-cum-nation-states\ncreated by European and Euro-American settler-colonists beginning in\nthe sixteenth century, and the subsequent centuries-long continuations\nof descendants of these African peoples in, and migrations of others\nto, these locales, occasioned the formation of new peoples of\nAfrican descent in the Americas, the Caribbean, Europe, and elsewhere.\nIndividuals and groupings of these peoples developed and perpetuated\nshared creative responses to the impositions of various forms of\nsystematized racialized oppression and class exploitation motivated and\nrationalized by notions of White Racial Supremacy, and further complicated by\nconsiderations of sexuality and gender. In the New Worlds, as had\nbecome the case in Africa after the colonizing and enslaving incursions\nof acquisitive peoples from Europe and the Arabian peninsula, the\nrecurrent and decisive foci of life in the racialized crucibles were\nthe struggles to endure while resolving mind- and soul-rending tensions\nthat threatened and otherwise conditioned self- and community-formation\nand living.", "\n\nThere were several major sources of these tensions. One, the traumas\nof the radical dislocations experienced by the\nmillions of persons kidnapped and purchased into relocation to\nenslavement through terrifying transport across thousands of miles of\nocean during which many thousands died. Another, the soul and\npsyche-taxing ambiguities and ambivalences of being compelled to become\nand be, in important senses, both New World “African”\nand “American,” “Canadian,”\n“Brazilian,” “Puerto Rican,”\n“Trinidadian,” “Haitian,”\n“Jamaican,” “French,” “British,”\netc., while, as slaves, being denied full access to the resources of\nthe prevailing meanings and practical realizations of the defining\nidentities of the most highly valued anthropological categorizations\nand social positions in the socio-political orders of the new states\nand locales as well as to the material resources crucial for realizing\nlives of well-being and denied full retention of and access to\nthe self-and community-defining resources of their natal cultures.", "\n\nHow the various African-descendant persons and communities resolved\nthese tensions conditioned the formation of new identities,\nlife-agendas, and praxes for living. Fundamental were the recurrent and\nvaried quests to survive and endure. With whatever\nsuccess there followed other fundamental recurrent and varied\nendeavors. Among the most compelling were quests to define and\nsecure freedom, quests that were profoundly affected by the\nabsence of any recourse to protections of law and by severe limitations\nimposed on Black peoples’ participation in what has come to be\ncalled “the public sphere.” Participation in this sphere\nwith protection of laws—for example, to articulate one’s\ncase for impartial and fair recognition and respect as a human being,\nparticularly as a woman or man of a despised race—was hardly ever\nallowed in slave-holding polities, and very infrequently even in\nlocales where slavery had been abolished as invidious discrimination\nagainst persons of African descent continued. When speaking out or\notherwise expressing oneself on one’s or one’s\npeople’s behalf was prohibited or strenuously circumscribed and\ncould be punished by beatings, imprisonment, or death with no legal\nprotection, the tensions were indeed wretched.", "\n\nThe variety of reasons for and means of coping in such\ncircumstances, and the variety of conceptions of life to be lived and\nof freedom to be achieved in the various New World locales, were\napproached differently by activist thinkers of African descent,\nconditioned by adaptive continuations—more or less—of some\nOld World African cultural agendas and practices. The efforts gave rise to\ndevelopments of different traditions of thought guiding the formation\nand pursuit of what would become, over time, a variety of agendas,\nfoci, objectives, and strategies of intellectual and practical\nengagement. It is these variegated, historically conditioned, socially\ngrounded, imperatives-driven thought and praxis complexes, immersed in\nand growing out of concerns and struggles for survival, endurance, and\nhuman dignity in freedom, that are being recovered and studied as the\nearliest instances of philosophizing by diasporic persons of African\ndescent and form the bases of the unfolding of several subfields of\nAfricana philosophy." ], "section_title": "5. Africana Philosophy: The African Diaspora", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe United States of America is one of several New World diasporic\ncontexts of focus for these recovery and study efforts that are being\nconducted under the heading of “African American\nphilosophy.” What follows is a historically contextualized\ndiscussion of several instances of the emergence of philosophizings\nborn of struggles. However, it would be an ethical travesty and a\ncase of epistemological presentist imperialism to require that\nthoughtful, critically reflective articulations by African Americans\nconsidered as instances of philosophizing worthy of the critical\nattention of professional philosophers first meet rigorous, formal\nstandards for “right reasoning” settled on by professionals\nin the discipline during the late twentieth and early twenty-first\ncenturies. For the contexts in which folks of African descent were\ncompelled to reflect on and reason about their first-order lived\nexperiences were substantially conditioned by the agendas and social\nlogics of projects of White Racial Supremacy and constitutive invidious\nanthropologies of raciality, ethnicity, and gender, not agendas\ngoverned by the academic logics of abstract formal reasoning. The\npressing exigencies of daily, cross-generation life under racialized\nenslavement and oppression were what compelled reflective\nthoughtfulness, not leisured, abstractive speculation. Again, what has\nto be witnessed and appreciated across the historical and hermeneutical\ndistances of centuries of history and life-world experiences structured\nby contemporary personal and social freedoms are the natures of the\nlived experiences and situations of those whose articulations, whose\nphilosophizings, are considered as having been born of\nstruggles.", "\n\nMuch psychic energy had to be expended by New World African and\nAfrican-descended peoples contending with the institutionalization of\ntheir enslavement and oppression otherwise that was racialized,\nthereby naturalized, and thoroughly sanctioned and justified by every\nenterprise of deliberate, normative thought and aesthetic\nexpression—law, science, theology, religion, philosophy,\naesthetics, and secular “common sense.” (For a historical\naccount of African-American life in the United States see Franklin and\nMoss, Jr. 2000.) In each case a primary resource was the foundational\nmetaphysical and ontological “unit idea” of a hierarchical\nGreat Chain of Being (Lovejoy 1964) on which each race was believed to\nhave a fixed and determining place. Accordingly, as\nliving property it was encumbered on enslaved Africans and\ntheir descendants to live so as to make good on the investments in\ntheir purchase and maintenance by engaging in productive labor,\nwithout compensation, and to endure and reproduce\nas ontological slaves in order to sustain and justify the\ninstitution of their imprisonment. According to this supposedly\ndivinely sanctioned philosophical anthropology, African and\nAfrican-descended children, women, and men were defined as\nconstituting a category of being to which none of the normative moral\nand ethical notions and principles governing civilized life\napplied. Pressed into an ethically null category, they were compelled\nto live lives of\nsocial death stripped of defining webs of ennobling meaning\nconstituted by narratives of previous histories, renewing presents, and\nimagined and anticipated futures of flourishing, cross-generational\ncontinuation.", "\n\nOn the whole, they did not succumb to the requirement to become\nsocially dead, certainly not completely, though many thousands did.\nAlways there were those who cultivated strengths of body,\nmind, soul, and spirit and exerted these in defense of the preservation\nof senses of themselves and of their peoples, of their\n“race,” as having worth beyond the definitions and\nvaluations set on them by rationalizations of institutionalized\nenslavement and oppression. Always there were those who, in\nthe cracks, crevices, and severely limited spaces of slave life and\nconstricted freedom, preserved and shared fading memories of lives of\nbeauty and integrity before the holocaust; who found, created, and\nrenewed nurturings of imaginings of better life to come through\nmusic-making, dancing, and creative expression in the artful fashioning\nand use of items of material culture, and in the communal and personal\nrelations, secular and spiritual, that the slaves formed, sustained,\nand passed on.", "\n\nNurtured by these efforts, they resisted the imposition of\nontological death and nurtured others in resisting. They reflected on\ntheir existence and the conditions thereof; conceived of and put into\npractice ways to endure without succumbing, ways to struggle against\nenslavement and the curtailment otherwise of their lives and\naspirations; and conceived and acted on ways to escape. They studied\ncarefully their enslavers and oppressors and assessed the moral\nsignificance of all aspects of the lives enslavers and oppressors led\nand determined how they, though enslaved and despised, must live\ndifferently so as not to follow their oppressors and enslavers on paths\nto moral depravity. They conceived of other matters, including the\nterms and conditions of freedom and justice; of better terms and\nconditions of existence and of personal and social identities; of how\nto resist and endure while creating things of beauty; how to love in\nspite of their situations; conceived of their very nature as living\nbeings …" ], "section_title": "6. African American Philosophizings Born of Struggles", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThese considerations took various forms within and across the\ncenturies. More than a few African and African-descendant persons\nwould engage in concerted intellectual and practical actions directed against\nthe enterprise of enslavement in all of its forms. Their considerations\nand articulations can be found in various repositories of\nphilosophizings: in the lyrics and rhythmic structures and timings of\nvarious genres of music-making; in newspaper writings and pamphlets;\nin poetry and other modes of creative writing; in letters; in slave\nnarratives and autobiographies; in the legacies and documentary\nhistories of institutions, those of Black churches and church\ndenominations especially; in those of women’s and men’s\nservice organizations; in the documentary histories of conventions and\nconvention movements; etc. For from the earliest instances of the\nenslavement of Africans in the colonies in the 1600s and continuing\nthrough the 1800–1865 Civil War between forces of the Union of\nNorth and East and forces of the Confederacy of the South, militant\nagitation for the abolition of slavery was a prominent endeavor among\npersons of color both “free” and enslaved, as were efforts\nto achieve greater respect and freedom for Black women from male\ndomination and oppression and from sexual exploitation as well as from\nracism. Phillis Wheatley (1753?-1784), a young, lettered house-slave\nin Boston, Massachusetts, wrote poems “on various subjects,\nreligious and moral,” in one of which she expounded on the\nsignificance of “Being Brought from Africa to America” and\nextolled Christians to remember that though Negroes be “black as\nCain,” they, too, can be “refin’d and join th’\nangelic train” (Wheatley [1773] 1997). Aside from\nWheatley’s highly polished and thoughtfully probing poetry,\nthe fact that she had penned the verses prompted such\ndisbelief that her master, and a prominent group of White men of the\ncity, including the governor and lieutenant governor of the state,\nfelt compelled to write letters to the publisher and the reading\npublic to attest that Wheatley had mastered the English language and\nwas, indeed, the author of the verses. Lettered articulation, in high\nverse no less, was a significant counter to claims of Negro\ninferiority, hence the need for legitimation of Wheatley’s\nwritings by White persons of significant standing in order for those\nwritings to enter a race- and gender-constricted literary public\nsphere.", "\n\nWheatley was the first in what would become a long and continuing\nline of enslaved persons of African descent in the United States who\ntook up creative and other genres of writing as a means for engaging in\nresisting oppression and for reclaiming and exercising their humanity\nthrough thoughtful articulation. Slaves’ narrations of the\nstories of their lives and of the conditions of enslavement and of their\naspirations and quests for freedom, constitute an extraordinarily rich\nbody of literature to be studied for philosophizings born of\nstruggles. Olaudah Equiano’s The Interesting Narrative\nof the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African. Written\nby Himself (1789) is but one example of such narratives. Consider\ncarefully Equiano’s recounting having to wrestle with and reclaim\nhis sense of self, even his name, after having been stolen into slavery\nas a child, transported to the New World, and being renamed\n“Gustavus Vassa.” A profound and consequential instance of\nexistential philosophizing, Equiano’s Narrative, one that discloses the significance of a\ncompelled struggle to reclaim and exercise a person’s right, and\npower, of identification of self and social being…", "\n\nFor a Negro, slave or free, to indulge in the articulation of\ncritical reflections on the nature of their being and the conditions of\ntheir life was a bold contradiction of prevailing characterizations of\nAfrican peoples and their descendants in the racialized ontologies of\nWhite Racial Supremacy, and a dangerous threat to the enterprise. David\nWalker (1785–1830) exemplified the threat. He sent shockwaves of fear\nacross the slaveholding South, especially, with the publication and\nwide distribution of his Appeal in Four Articles; Together with a\nPreamble, to the Coloured Citizens of the World, but in Particular and\nVery Expressly, to Those of the United States of America (1829) in\nwhich he advocated forcefully that Coloured people rise up in armed\nstruggle against their oppressors. Moreover, in articulating his\nprovocative appeal in a written document, Walker employed with great\nskill and impact a strategic use of rhetoric to gain leverage in the\npublic sphere: while ostensibly directing the Appeal to an\naudience of “Coloured Citizens” almost none of whom were\nregarded as citizens and very few of whom, among those enslaved\ncertainly, could read and, if they could, would have been prohibited\nfrom getting their hands and minds on such an appeal, in truth was also\ndirected at White slaveowners and oppressors. This strategy would\nbecome a staple in the arsenal of discursive strategies Black folks would\nuse to engage in the work of articulating their considerations and\nadvocating for life-enhancing changes.", "\n\nFrederick Douglass (1817–1895), a passionate and indefatigable\nopponent of enslavement, the institution of slavery, and of the\nsubordination of women (“What Are the Colored People Doing for\nThemselves?” 1848; “Prejudice Not Natural,” 1849;\n“The Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered,”\n1854), would use the strategy with superbly nuanced skill. An\nespecially brilliant thinker and prolific writer, he was also\nbrilliant in his oppositional eristic engagements over the\nconstitutional, biblical, and ethnological justifications of Negro\ninferiority and enslavement and over a wide range of other subjects,\nincluding the compelling need for appropriate education (directed at\npreparing the formerly enslaved for productive, economically\nself-sustaining labor), good character, and political equality.\nDouglass was an astute critical thinker and speech-maker, and was a\nforemost thinker with regard to such matters as the constitutionality\nof slavery, of the meanings of freedom and justice,\nand of the implications of both for enslaved, free, and freed Negroes\n(Douglass 1845). Maria Stewart (1803–1879), likewise committed\nto freedom and justice for Black people, was a pioneering feminist in\nspeaking out publicly (“Religion and the Pure Principles of\nMorality, the Sure Foundation on Which We Must Build,” 1831) and\nthus took advantage of cracks in the public sphere to advance the\ncause for abolition and the liberation of women (Stewart\n1831). Sojourner Truth (Isabella Baumfree, 1797–1883) was a\nlegendary unlettered but unnervingly bodacious itinerant intellectual\nprovocateur who agitated for ending enslavement and the subordination\nof women (“Woman’s Rights,” 1851). On one celebrated\noccasion, Truth walked uninvited into a Women’s Rights\nConvention of assembled White people, sat down on the edge of the\nspeakers’ stage until she simply had to be recognized, and then\ndelivered her now famous “Ar’n’t I a Woman?”\nspeech (Truth 1851).", "\n\nIf slavery were abolished, what did the vocal Negro advocates think\nwould be the most appropriate modes and ends of life for Negro men and\nwomen?", "\n\nFor some it would or should involve assimilation, that is,\nprocesses by which one racial and/or ethnic group is absorbed by\nanother, for some physically as well as socio-culturally, with one\ngroup relinquishing its own racial and/or ethnic cultural\ndistinctiveness to take on the defining life-world character and\npractices of another. For early African American assimilationists this\nwould have meant accepting as appropriate and sufficient goals for\nAfrican American life the country’s pronounced cultural, social,\npolitical, and economic ideals—though generally without\nendorsements of the superiority of the White race—as proof of\ntheir humaneness and of their having “risen” from a\ncondition of “savagery” to having become\n“civilized,” particularly by having become\nChristianized.", "\n\nHowever, particular care must be taken in characterizing an engaged\nthinker’s commitments and aspirations as\n“assimilationist.” While appropriate and useful in some\ninstances, in others the label is often misused or misplaced, for\nvarious thinkers were quite nuanced in articulating their positions on\nvarious matters: for example, in advocating assimilation of prevailing\neconomic ideas, principles, and practices while advocating social,\ncultural, and political independence for Black people. Douglass, one\nof the most well-known of African American cultural and political\nassimilationists, is an instructive example. He was not an advocate of\nthe assimilation of the Negro race into the White race; rather, he\npreferred, at the extreme, the assimilation of all distinct races into\na single, blended race, so to speak, so that there would no longer be\ndistinct races in which aspirations for super-ordination and\nsubordination could be invested. Similar views on cultural and\neconomic assimilation were articulated by T. Thomas Fortune\n(1856–1928), the journalist and advocate of Black unionizing and\npolitical independence (“Political Independence of the\nNegro,” 1884), and by the radical abolitionist Henry Highland\nGarnet (1815–1881), who at one point was convinced that\n“This western world is destined to be filled with a mixed\nrace” (“The Past and the Present Condition and the\nDestiny of the Colored Race,” (1848; 1996, p. 200), emphasis in\nthe original).", "\n\nOn the other hand, there were Negro women and men of the\nseventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries of enslavement for\nwhom the prospect of assimilating with White people in any fashion or\non any terms was to be firmly rejected. Such sentiments were especially\nprominent during the decades leading up to the Civil War as conditions\nbecame even more constraining for supposedly free-born and freedpersons\nwith the passage in 1850 of the Fugitive Slave Law that stripped away\nany legal protection for escaped and former slaves who made it to free\nstates by declaring it legal for any White person to apprehend any\nNegro who could not document their free status and return the person to\nenslavement. Garnet, responding to the circumstances the law created,\nis representative of those Black folks who became advocates of the\nemigration of Negro people to Africa. He was the founder of the African\nCivilization Society, an organization that promoted emigration of\nAmerican Negroes to Africa in keeping with a more positive agenda than\nwas the case with the American Colonization Society, which was\norganized by White people to foster the relocation of troublesome\nabolitionist free Negro people to Liberia, the colony founded with\nfederal support by White Americans intent on preserving the institution\nof slavery and White Racial Supremacy.", "\n\nEmigrationist considerations and projects thus became\nprominent ventures during this period, advocated with persuasive force\nby other very able activist thinkers, among them Edward Blyden\n(1832–1912), James T. Holly (1829–1911), and Martin Delany\n(1812–1883). Delany’s The Condition, Elevation,\nEmigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United\nStates (1852) was an especially well-reasoned critique of notions\nof citizen prevailing in the United States and a detailing of\nconditions affecting Colored people, including, in his estimation,\ntheir overreliance on “moral theorizing” and not enough on\npragmatic political reasoning informed by comparative studies of the\nhistories of oppression of other “nations” within\nnation-states dominated by an antagonistic national (i.e., racial)\ngroup (Delany 1852; 2004). Based on his analysis, Delany was convinced\nthat people of color could not enjoy lives as full citizens with full\nrespect and rights in the United States. Hence, he reasoned, people of\ncolor should leave the country for South America—though later he\nwould advocate emigrating to Africa—to establish their own\nindependent nation-state. (However, when the Civil War erupted, Delany\nwas persuaded by Frederick Douglass, his former colleague in\npublishing The North Star newspaper, to join other Black men\nin forming a regiment to aid the Union forces in defeating the\nConfederate Army and the South’s agenda for the continuation of\nthe enslavement and oppression of Black people.)", "\n\nIt is important to note, however, that emigrationists were often\nmotivated not only by desires to escape the various modes and\nintensities of disrespect for their racial being and humanity by\nrelocating to Africa, in particular, but also in order to fulfill\naspirations to engage in missionary work among native peoples on that\ncontinent in order to “raise” them from\n“savagery” to “civilization” through education\nand Christianization. Edward Blyden, for example, spent a large portion\nof his life engaged in educational and missionary work in Liberia.\nJames T. Holly, who advocated emigration to, and himself subsequently\nsettled in, Haiti and authored a lengthy work devoted to\n“defending the inherent capabilities of the Negro race, for\nself-government and civilized progress” (A Vindication of the\nCapacity of the Negro Race for Self-Government and Civilized\nProgress, 1857), was a clergyman. So, too, was the indomitable\nQueen’s College of Cambridge University-educated Alexander\nCrummell (1819–1898), who devoted twenty years of his life to\neducational and missionary work in Liberia and Sierra Leone followed by\nyears of pastoral work in the United States. Crummell (“The\nRelations and Duties of Free Colored Men in America to Africa,”\n1860; “The Race Problem in America,” 1888) was a formidable\nand very articulate thinker, author, speechmaker, and organizer with\ncommanding presence. He was a principal founder of the American Negro\nAcademy (1897–1924), a gathering of astute minds and engaged Negro men\ndevoted to analyzing the conditions of life of Negroes in the United\nStates, to determining how best to protect them from the continuing\nravages of centuries of enslavement, and to determining how best to\ndevelop the race to achieve political and social equality and economic\njustice.", "\n\nWorthy of critical exploration in the case of these figures: the\nextent to which, and on what terms, each of them embraced (assimilated)\nprevailing European and Euro-American conceptions of\ncivilization and the processes and conditions, states of\ncharacter in particular, by which a person or people could be said to\nbe “civilized.” It is apparent in their writings and the\nlogic of their missionary work, in other lands as well as within the\nUnited States, that neither figure accepted the long-prevailing\narguments that the Negro race was inherently and ineradicably\ninferior. To the contrary, close scrutiny of their articulations will\nreveal that each was convinced that the civilizational inferiority of\ncontinental Africans, and of the ignorant, brutally constrained Negroes\nof deficient character in the United States, was due to conditions of\ndeprivation fostered by the enslavement and racism perpetrated by White\npeople. At the core of the missionary work of these men, and of many of\ntheir female and male contemporaries and successors, including persons\nwho worked at “uplifting” enslaved and freedpersons in the\nUnited States, was a principled and dedicated commitment to\nwell-reasoned and forcefully articulated belief in the God-given\nhumanity and inherent worth of persons of the Negro race, and fervent\nand equally dedicated belief in the ameliorative and progressive\nbenefits of education and racial independence. And each of these\nseminal figures took himself or herself as a living example of the\nactualization of the potentiality for substantial, qualitative\ndevelopment and advancement by Negroes, contrary to the\ncharacterizations of the race by those who rationalized and otherwise\nsought to justify enslavement and constrictions of the range of\npossibilities for Negro development. The articulations of a significant\nnumber of such persons have been preserved in the vast body of writings\ncontending with enslavement, with aspirations and quests for freedom\nand justice, with what a constitutionally democratic and multiracial\nUnited States of America ought to be in order to include\nColoured people as full citizens and fully respected human beings.\nTheirs are, indeed, philosophizings born of struggles." ], "section_title": "7. 1600–1860", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nBeyond question, one of the particularly acute axial periods of\nhistory for people of African descent in the United States of America\nwas that of the half-decade of civil war (1860–1865) continued through\nensuing years of Reconstruction-struggles between White proponents of a\nculture of aspiring aristocratic genteel racial supremacy and a\npolitical economy devoted to developing industrial and finance\ncapitalism in the North and East of the country who also wanted to preserve\nthe federated union of states, and White proponents of a regional\ncivilization devoted to a decidedly pronounced and violently\naristocratic Southern hegemonic White Racial Supremacy based on a\npolitical economy of agrarian capitalism supported by enslaved Negro\nlabor, proponents who forged a Confederacy out of states that seceded\nfrom the Union in order to preserve their distinctive civilizational\nproject. For a great many Black people, the hope was that the Union\nforces would prevail in the war, the institution of slavery would be\nabolished, and they would be freed and free to enjoy lives of full\ncitizenship. More than a few devoted themselves, in various ways, to\naiding the Union efforts, some even as fighting soldiers. Frederick\nDouglass played a major role in persuading President Abraham Lincoln to\nallow Negro men to join the Union army as fighting soldiers and in\npersuading many men to join. With President Lincoln’s\nissuance of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 freeing the slaves in\nthe Confederate states and Union victory in the Civil War two years\nlater, the day of Jubilation! for Black people and other\nopponents of the institution of slavery appeared to be at hand.", "\n\nAnd so it seemed. There followed a brief, euphoric period of statutory\nfreedom during which Black people held elective and appointive offices\nin many states that had been part of the Confederacy and otherwise\nmade initial significant gains in other areas of life. However, a\npost-war (1877) so-called compromise between Republican economic and\npolitical forces in the North and East and those of Democrats in the\nSouth settled a disputed presidential election (a contest Republican\nRutherford B. Hayes and Democrat Samuel J. Tilden) and allowed a South\nnot completely vanquished by the lost war to regain power in its\nregion in exchange for Republican hegemony in the federal\ngovernment.", "\n\nViolent terrorism and brutal repression of Negroes followed\nimmediately, in the South especially, which spawned two decades (mid\n1860s-1880s) of post-Reconstruction struggles by newly-emancipated\nBlack people to survive conditions in which they had been set adrift by\nmany former allies in the North and East and were being pressed back\ninto near-slavery by forces in the South. A Great Migration ensued as\nhundreds of thousands of Negroes left the South for hoped-for better\nopportunities without racial violence in the East, North, Southwest,\nand West of the United States, in some cases in response to persuasive\narticulations by various spokespersons (Edward W. Blyden, James T.\nHolly, and Alexander Crummell, among others) who renewed calls for\nvarious programs of emigration or what some scholars have termed\nseparatist Black Nationalism: migrations within and out of the\ncountry to sites on which all-Black communities and towns would be\nformed (away from the United States in Africa; within the country in\nKansas and Oklahoma, for example).", "\n\nMigrations within the United States were by far the most significant\nof the relocations. And the movements greatly accelerated over the\ndecades as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth and the\nU.S. American economy was undergoing transformation into an industrial\ngiant and international power as a consequence of meeting the needs of\nproduction to support the country’s participation in the First\nWorld War and other developments. In the North, Northeast, and West of\nthe country this industrialization created historic demands for workers\nand, subsequently, historic opportunities for work. Meanwhile, in the\nSouth rapidly increasing mechanization in agriculture and subsequent\ndecreasing reliance on the labor of nearly-enslaved, hyper-exploited\nNegro tenant farmers and workers, and increasing industrialization in\nthe region, left the greater majority of Black people in dire straits.\nThese developments, combined with hopes for life unrestricted by racial\nsegregation enforced by brutal violence, by lynchings especially,\nexerted additional pull-and-push forces that prompted hundreds of\nthousands to join in the migrations to the country’s industrial\ncenters.", "\n\nIn settling in the new locales, the migrants and their subsequent\ngenerations began to undergo what, with hindsight, became a historic\nand wrenching transformation of what had been, for the most part, a\nbrutally oppressed, illiterate, yet resolute agrarian peasantry into an\nethno-racial urban working class, and the transformation of a\nsignificant few of them into a modern middle class. With the\ntransformations came vexing challenges and opportunities. Among the\nmost compelling needs were for forms of life appropriate to the new\nurban circumstances—as well as for those who remained in the\nrebuilding South—that would sustain the person and a people and\npromote flourishing life in conditions of intense competition with\nother ethno-racial class groups, and high risks of social\ndisintegration and failure as invidious racism, unchecked by federal\nrestraints, became ever more intense and widespread. There were, then,\ncompelling needs for social and cultural as well as economic support as\nnuclear and extended family units were disrupted in being stretched\nacross long miles of migration and crucial forms of communal and\norganizational support that helped to sustain life in the South were in\nvery short supply in the new urban centers. Once again, in the context\nof demanding needs to be met in the struggle to survive and endure,\nparticularly thoughtful and articulate Black persons took up the\nchallenges of conceiving what was best to be done for the well-being of\nthe race, and how best to achieve well-being.", "\n\nAfrican American women were especially prominent in endeavoring to\nattend thoughtfully and pragmatically to the well-being of the race,\nbut also in endeavoring to make good for Black women on the promises\nof Emancipation for social, political, and economic freedom. An\nexemplary figure in this regard is Anna Julia Cooper (1859?-1964), who\ngraduated from Oberlin College in 1884 and, at age sixty-five,\ncompleted a doctoral dissertation at the Sorbonne on Slavery and\nthe French Revolutionists, 1788–1805 (Cooper 1925). A\ncareer educator before earning her doctorate, Cooper was a pioneering\nfeminist who set out a provocative view of what she regarded as the\nsuperior capacity of women to lead the reformation of the human race\nin her book A Voice from South (1892). Poet, journalist,\nnovelist, and essayist Frances Ellen Watkins Harper (1825–1911)\nweighed in with a forceful argument that the “spiritual\naid” that women can provide is crucial for moral development and\nthe social advancement of the human race (“Woman’s\nPolitical Future,” 1893). Memphis, Tennessee-born and Oberlin\nCollege-educated Mary Church Terrell (1863–1954) lived a stellar\nlife of articulate leadership in uplift and advocacy organizations\ndevoted to the development and well-being of Colored women (Colored\nWomen’s League, the National Association of Colored Women),\ncommitments articulated in “The Progress of Colored Women”\n(1898, published 1904) and other writings. Fluent in several\nlanguages, Terrell forged relations with Negro and other women in\nseveral countries who worked for reforms on behalf of women. And\nparticular note must be taken of the audacious, pistol-totting Ida\nB. Wells-Barnett (1862–1931), an investigative journalist and\nnewspaperwoman who took it upon herself, as an anti-lynching crusader,\nto investigate cases of lynching across the country to document the\nfacts of each case, which she published in 1895 as The Red Record:\nTabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynching in the United\nStates with an introductory letter from Frederick Douglass, with\nwhom she collaborated in many endeavors. During an especially violent\nand trying period, courageous, thoughtful, and articulate activist\nBlack women such as Wells-Barnett, Cooper, Terrell, and others\ninitiated what would become a long and varied tradition of feminist\nphilosophizing and work by women of African descent devoted to the\nenhancing development of Negro persons, families, organizations, and\ncommunities.", "\n\nFew of these thoughtful feminists, it should be noted, were energetic\nadvocates of Nationalist emigration during this turbulent\nperiod. Perhaps because many Nationalist agendas and articulations\nwere soon eclipsed (though by no means completely silenced) during the\nyears of 1880–1915 that came to be largely dominated by the\npersuasive ameliorative leadership of Booker T. Washington\n(1856–1915), an educator and strategic power-broker who focused\nhis considerable efforts on uplifting a Black southern peasantry into\neducated literacy for economic self-reliance and on the nation-wide\norganization of Negro businesses for the pursuit of predominance in\ncertain sectors of the economy. After delivering a poignant and crafty\ninvited “Atlanta Exposition Address” to resounding praise\nduring an 1895 international industrial exposition, Washington,\nalready well on his way as a leader recognized as such by Negro\npeople, was elevated by certain powerful and influential White people\nto the vaunted position as their leader and spokesman for\n“the Negro” to whom they would turn to broker matters in\nrace relations. The key to this positioning was the reaction of many\nWhite people, concerned about post-war transformations under way in\nrace relations, to the following declaration in Washington’s\nExposition address: “In all things that are purely social we can\nbe as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things\nessential to mutual progress” (Washington 1895; 1992, p. 358).\nConcentrating on the first part of his statement, anxious White people\ninterpreted his public endorsement of the “purely social”\nseparation of the races as an endorsement by Washington of the\nhegemony of White people in all areas.", "\n\nIt was not. In fact, Washington was explicit in the address in\ndeclaring that it was “important and right that all privileges\nof the law be ours…” He went further in articulating a\nvision of “that higher good, that, let us pray God, will come in\na blotting out of sectional differences and racial animosities and\nsuspicions, in a determination to administer absolute justice, in a\nwilling obedience among all classes to the mandates of law”\n(Washington 1895; 1992, p. 359). Hearing, apparently,\nwhat they wanted to hear, not the fullness of\nwhat Washington wanted them to hear, anxious White people of\npower and influence certified him a ‘good and safe’ Negro\nand promptly made him their go-to Negro designated by them as\n“the Leader of the Negro people.” Washington\naccommodated them, in service to his own ego as well as in service to\nthe benefit of the Negro race (by his own reasoning, of course). He\nwas brilliantly skillful in executing a nuanced, pragmatic strategy of\nwearing a mask of seeming accommodation to White hegemony as\nhe promoted Negro empowerment and self-sufficiency through education\nthat stressed disciplined comportment, thrift, industrial and\nagricultural work, and ownership of property (and while clandestinely\nsupporting securing political equality for Negroes). As an enlarged\nfigure who brokered the largesse and influence of White people flowing\nto Negroes throughout the nation, and as the founding administrative\nand educational leader of Tuskegee Institute in Alabama that continues\nto provide education to persons of African descent, Booker T.\nWashington’s philosophizings, political engagements, and\npractical endeavors would have widespread, profound, and lasting\nimpact.", "\n\nWashington was challenged, publicly and on several fronts, by, among\nother thinker-activist Black persons, the astute and irrepressible\nthinker-scholar (and more) William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1868–1963)\nwhose philosophical stances and strategies for transforming the\nconditions of existence for Black people were substantially\ndifferent from Washington’s seeming public accommodation\nto White social hegemony. In the view of some, Washington might be\nbetter described as a social separatist and economic and political\nconservative committed to Black economic independence made even\nstronger by the predominance of Negroes in some sectors of the national\neconomy resulting in the dependence of White folks on the productivity\nof Black folks. To this end, for Washington and similar conservative\naccommodationists, the economic and political hegemony of White people\nwas to be finessed by strategies of seeming acceptance by\nBlack people that masked surreptitious opposition as Colored people\npursued economic self-reliance, full political citizenship, and\neventual social acceptance that was to be “earned” by\nforming and exercising good character and responsibility through\neducation for, and the practice of, honest, socially productive, and\neconomically rewarding work.", "\n\nDu Bois, however, argued for immediate recognition of and\nrespect for Negro people with full civil and political rights (though\nhe supported qualifications for exercising the franchise for\nall voters), social equality, and economic justice. He became\nan outspoken critic of Washington’s leadership (“Of Mr.\nBooker T. Washington and Others,” 1903) having become impatient\nwith the latter’s accommodating gradualism and the\nspirit-sapping impact he (Du Bois) thought this was having on those\nBlack folks who were ready, even overdue, for full equality and\nrespect (Du Bois 1903; 1992). In contrast to Washington, Du Bois might\nbest be described as a cultural nationalist\nadvocating pluralist integration: pursuit of a racially\nintegrated socially and politically democratic socio-political\norder—and, later in his long life, a democratic socialist\neconomic order—in which diverse racial and ethnic groups\ncultivate and share, and benefit mutually from sharing, the products\nof their cultural distinctiveness to the extent that doing so does not\nthreaten the integration and justness of the social whole.", "\n\nThe two men were from profoundly different backgrounds. Washington had\nbeen born into slavery, but with the aid of education and character\ndevelopment at Hampton Institute he was able to advance to national\nand international prominence as an educator and figure of\nunprecedented influence, which he recounted in his widely read and\ninspiring autobiography Up From Slavery (Washington 1901;\n1963). Du Bois, on the other hand, never had living experience with\nslavery, nor, even, with much in the way of invidious racial\ndiscrimination before entering college in the South. With\nundergraduate degrees from Fisk University and Harvard University,\nstudies at the University of Berlin, and a Ph.D. in History from\nHarvard, Du Bois was one of a very few exceptionally highly educated\npersons in the United States. Drawing on his learning and with\narrogant confidence in his education-enhanced, penetrating, creative,\nand critical intellect, varied, frequent, and penetrating scholarly\nand creative explorations of the history, conditions, and future\nprospects of the Negro and other oppressed races, as well as of\nWestern Civilization, became his passionate and committed life’s\nwork.", "\n\nDu Bois far outstripped Washington in the range of his (Du Bois’s) concerns, the\ndepths of his explorations, and the extent of his seminal involvements\nin and contributions to international organizations and movements\npressing for independence for colonized African and other peoples, his\ncontributions to a number of the international Pan-African Conferences\n(1919, 1921, 1923, 1927, and 1945) and Movement being but one example.\nAnd of particular note, Du Bois studied philosophy with William James\nand others while a student at Harvard, and, for a moment, considered\npursuing a career in the discipline. Though he chose otherwise, his\nvast and rich articulations are frequently philosophically novel and\nastute and thus all the more engaging for researchers, scholars,\nteachers, artists, and millions of readers in various educated publics.\nHis The Souls of Black Folk (1903), for example, has been a\nseminal text for generations of African Americans, and others, who were\ncoming of age intellectually. Many were aided, especially, by his\npoignant characterization and exploration of the vexing tensions of the\nexperience of “double consciousness”—of the\n“twoness” of being both Negro and American—and by his\npromising exploration of how best to work at resolving the tension by\n‘merging’ the two selves into one ‘truer’\nself.", "\n\nFrom Du Bois, then, a philosophy of the soul, if you will, motivated\nby the compelling needs of a racialized people subjected to\nontological as well as social, political, economic, and cultural\ndegradation. In particular, during the turbulent decades of the\norchestrated failure of post-Civil War Reconstruction, when real\npossibilities for racial and economic democracy were being killed at\nbirth by the proponents and guardians of capitalism and White Racial\nSupremacy, Du Bois initially worked out his affirmative cultural\nnationalist position on the raciality of the Negro, and of other\nraces, in “The Conservation of Races” (1897; 1992). This\nwas an effort at conceptionalization to which Du Bois would return and\nrework several times, even near the end of his extraordinarily long\nand productive life, as in “Whither Now and Why” (1960;\n1973). Throughout his life Du Bois remained convinced that people of\nAfrican descent should articulate and appropriate a racial identity\nbased on shared history and culture and continue to invest in their\nhistorical legacies and cultural creativity while holding open to all,\n“on the principle of universal brotherhood,” the\norganizations, institutions, and cultural riches in and through which\nthe life-worlds of Negro peoples are forged, sustained, and\nshared.", "\n\nBooker T. Washington died in 1915, W.E.B. Du Bois nearly half a\ncentury later (…on the evening before the historic 1963 March on\nWashington for Jobs and Freedom as hundred of thousands of Negroes and\nother supporters converged on the nation’s capital to press for\nfull civil and economic rights). The deaths of both brought to a close\ntheir long reigns of Black male leadership prominence, and\npredominance, in various arenas. Still, they were far from being the\nonly leaders of their people. For as the nineteenth century gave way to\nthe twentieth, Black women were again substantial contributors to the\nintellectual explorations, organizational work, and local, national,\nand international movements seeking freedom and enhanced existence for\nAfrican and African-descendant peoples. They were, as well, influential\non Black male leadership. In 1897, for example, Du Bois accepted an\ninvitation from Alexander Crummell to become a member of the American\nNegro Academy to share in the critical work of developing\nunderstandings of the deteriorating situation of Black people in the\nnation, made worse by widespread racially-motivated violence, in order\nto develop and implement strategies to protect and advance the race.\n(Du Bois offered his proposal in “The Conservation of\nRaces,” the second Occasional Paper delivered to the group.) Due\nlargely to Crummell’s objections, Black women were not initially\nallowed to become members of the Academy. However, while Crummell was a\nsubstantial influence on Du Bois, he (Du Bois) was also influenced by\nAna Julia Cooper who advised his thinking on a number of matters\nregarding which he conversed with his male colleagues in the Academy.\nOther women—Ida B. Wells, Mary Church Terrell, Jane\nAdams—also exerted critical influence on Du Bois through their\nideas, their organizational work, and their personal relations with\nhim.", "\n\nThese and other thoughtful, articulate, and engaged Black women did\nnot allow themselves to be limited to subordinate roles of influence on\nmale leaders. Rather, as was true for many of their foresisters, they\nhad important matters of concern about which they thought seriously,\ndiscussed in their women’s clubs and other organizations, wrote\nand spoke, and worked with determination to effect progressive\ntransformations in the lives of women and their families as well as for\nthe racial group and the society as a whole. From the especially\nviolent and trying decades of Reconstruction on into the early decades\nof the twentieth century, women such as Wells-Barnett, Cooper, Terrell,\nand others contributed substantially to what has become a long and\nvaried tradition of woman-focused philosophizing and artistic\nexpression by women of African descent in the United States.", "\n\nContinuing the tradition, Elise Johnson McDougald, for example, wrote\nof “The Struggle of Negro Women for Sex and Race\nEmancipation” (1924–25; 1995); Alice Dunbar-Nelson\n(1875–1935) of “The Negro Woman and the Ballot”\n(1927; 1995); Sadie Tanner Mosell Alexander of “Negro Women in\nOur Economic Life” (1930; 1995); and Florence “Flo”\nKennedy produced “A Comparative Study: Accentuating the\nSimilarities of the Societal Position of Women and Negroes”\n(1946; 1995). Working through, and often leading, local, regional,\nnational, and international secular and church-related women’s\nclubs and organizations, these and other Negro women gave defining\nshape to legacies of feminist and womanist engagement and leadership\nthat are now being reclaimed and studied for inspiration and\nguidance. And the efforts and contributions of several of these women\nwould be joined to those of later generations who would become major\ncontributors, in thought and in other ways, to developments that would\nunfold as history-making movements devoted to cultural expressiveness,\ngaining more in the way of civil and economic rights, to gaining\npower, Black Power!, and to gaining more freedom, rights, and\nrespect for women of all ethno-racial groups and socio-economic\nclasses." ], "section_title": "8. 1860–1915", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe historical context for the subsequent and more recent\ndevelopments and movements was set by transformative dislocations and\nreconfigurations that intensified competitions within and among\nethno-racial groups and socio-economic classes that affected\nsignificantly relations between White and Black races, in particular,\nas the country went through unprecedented industrial and economic\ngrowth and increasing predominance in the Western hemisphere as a\nconsequence of the Great Depression (1929 through the late 1930s and\ninto the early 1940s) and attendant disruptions, recovery from which\nwas spurred significantly by involvements in the Second World War\n(1939–1945) and the Korean War (1950–1953). There followed several\ndecades of economic expansion and rising prosperity for urban,\nindustrial workers among whom were large numbers of Black workers,\ndescendants of earlier migrants to the urban centers, who benefitted\nfrom the industrial intensifications and thus expanded significantly\nthe growing modern, educated, increasingly economically viable,\nchurch-going, community-sustaining, psychologically secure and\nincreasingly self-confident aspiring Black working and middle classes\nthat were determined to provide successive generations with greater\nfreedom, respect, and economic security bolstered by high expectations\nfor even greater successes and achievements. Spread across both classes\nwere the tens of thousands of Black men who returned to civilian life\nfrom the country’s recently racially integrated Armed Forces\nafter serving at home and overseas to help “make the world save\nfor democracy.” A great many of these veterans, supported by\nNegro women and men who kept the home-front while enduring the\ndifficulties of wartime sacrifices as they worked the nation’s\nfields and factories though still denied the fullness of citizenship,\nwere unwilling to acquiesce to the subordination to racial apartheid\nand invidious racial discrimination required by the doctrines and\nprograms of White Racial Supremacy that still held sway.", "\n\nThis context became the nurturing soil in which various forms of Black\nNationalism flowered once again as the influence of Washington’s\nphilosophy and strategies declined. Caribbean-born immigrant Marcus\nGarvey (“Race Assimilation,” 1922; 1992; “The True\nSolution of the Negro Problem,” 1922; 1992; “An Appeal to the\nConscience of the Black Race to See Itself,” 1923; 1992), proponent of\na militant Black Nationalist philosophy of independence and\nself-reliance for Black peoples world-wide, and of the emigration of\npeople of African descent from the U.S. and elsewhere “back to\nAfrica,” rose to prominence from his base in New York City as\nthe most successful mass organizer of Black people in the history of\nthe U.S. with the founding and internationalization of his United\nNegro Improvement Association (UNIA) (Garvey 1925; 1986; Martin\n1986). Garvey’s organizational and socio-political movement,\nfueled by his “Philosophy and Opinions” carried by his\norganization’s newspapers and other publications with\ninternational reach, along with the eruption of the Harlem\nRenaissance, likewise in New York, an eruption of literary and\nartistic productions motivated by very thoughtful and passionate\naffirmations of African ancestry and of the positive, creative\nimportance of the cultural and aesthetic significance of African\nAmerican life, were two of the most significant emigrationist and\ncultural nationalist developments of the period. Both were articulated\nthrough and otherwise spawned new, profoundly influential modes of\ncreative, reflective thought and expression.", "\n\nThe Harlem Renaissance was an extraordinary eruption of heightened,\ncritical, and creative self-conscious affirmative racial identification\nby thoughtful Negroes bent on expressing their affirmations of their\nraciality through all of the creative arts and modalities of\narticulation, a development unprecedented in the history of the\npresence of peoples of African descent in the United States (Huggins 2007). The\ncultural significance of the productions and articulations; of the\nengagements, practices, and creations of the bold and talented\nparticipant-contributors; of the organizations, institutions, and\npublications they created and endeavored to sustain (some successfully,\nmany others not) devoted to culture creation, refinement, preservation,\nand mediation— all continue to have substantial influences even\ntoday, most especially in terms of the novel ideas and idea-spaces and\ndiscursive communities that were created and articulated through the\nbodies of literature and works of art, music, and dance that are still\nbeing mined productively by contemporary artists and scholars. The\nproducers and carriers of the Renaissance were natives of the whole of\nthe African Diaspora, across the Atlantic World especially, as well as\nfrom across the African continent, and they drew on the cultural and\nhistorical legacies of both (and on those from other parts of the world)\nfor inspiration and content for their philosophizing artistic\ncreativity in defining and giving expression to The New\nNegro.", "\n\nAlain Leroy Locke (1886–1954), the first African American to\nearn a Ph.D. in Philosophy, from Harvard (having already earned a\ndegree from Oxford and having studied philosophy at the University of\nBerlin), and the first to be named a Rhodes Scholar, was one of the\nsignificant intellectual and facilitating midwives to the production\nand publication of much creative work during the Renaissance (as was\nDu Bois). As the guest editor for a special March 1925 issue\nof Survey Graphic devoted to explorations of race\nand the New York of people of African descent, Locke, titling the\nissue Harlem: Mecca of the New Negro, brought together for\nthe issue writings of fiction and poetry; articles on music, drama,\nthe Negro’s past, “Negro Pioneers,” “The New\nScene,” “The Negro and the American Tradition”; and\nmuch else by a racially mixed large group of authors with expertise in\na wide variety of fields. Among these: Du Bois (“The Negro Mind\nReaches Out”); Elise Johnson McDougald (“The Task of Negro\nWomanhood”); pioneering Africanist anthropologist Melville J.\nHerskovits (“The Negro’s Americanism”); sociologist\nE. Franklin Frazier (“Durham: Capital of the Black Middle\nClass”); the young poet and creative writer Countée\nCullen (“Heritage”); Howard University-based educator and\nscholar Kelly Miller (“Howard: The National Negro\nUniversity”); poetess Gwendolyn B. Bennett and creative writer\nLangston Hughes writing on music; poems by Angelina Grimke; and a\nlarge number of others. After the great success of the special issue,\nLocke edited and published an anthology, The New Negro, that\nincluded revised versions of most of the material from the Survey\nGraphic special issue, but with much new material and artwork by\nWinold Reiss, a very accomplished artist from Bavaria (Locke\n1925).", "\n\nIn the judgment of many scholars of the Renaissance, The New\nNegro became, in the words of one, “virtually the central\ntext of the Harlem Renaissance.” The title was taken from the\ncollection’s lead essay, “The New Negro,” which was\nwritten by Locke. In the essay Locke endeavored to characterize the\n“New” Negro, the circumstances of the emergence of this\ncharacter-type, the nature of its shared pride-of-race character, its\npsychology and mission and relation to the Negro masses, and the\nconsequences of the emergence of the New Negro for race relations in\nthe United States and for developments in Africa and the African\nDiaspora for which this new group-figure would serve as the avant\ngarde. The anthology, then, is a gateway to an important\nselection of articulations by figures who were seminal contributors to,\nas well as beneficiaries of, the Harlem Renaissance, and to the vast\nand still growing multidisciplinary body of works that explore various\naspects, figures, contributions, and consequences of the\nRenaissance. And Locke’s lead essay is a poignant gateway into\nhis career of philosophizing as well as an adept example of an attempt\nto simultaneously characterize and give agenda-setting character and\nguidance to an extraordinary praxis-guiding artistic and intellectual\nrevolution the focal points of which were determined efforts of\nracial-group self-affirmation and self-determination, beginning with\nthe radical ontological work of redefining and revaluing on\nprogressive terms the meaning of the Negro, then setting the\ntasks by which the New Negro—the “thinking\nNegro,” as Locke characterized the group in his\nessay—would lead through decidedly Negro Africanist-inspired,\nphilosophically-minded cultural creativity and articulate expressions\nof philosophizings born of struggles…", "\n\nAnd lead they did, as a number of the persons, organizations, and\ninstitutions participating in and contributing to the Renaissance, the\nGarvey and other movements, and others in the social classes that were\ninspired by and fed them all became prominent figures in the Civil\nRights/Freedom Movement of the 1950s-mid 1960s during which\n“civil rights” and “integration” were major\nobjectives of struggle. The National Association for the Advancement\nof Colored People (NAACP), the NAACP Legal and Educational Defense\nFund (which became formally independent from the NAACP in 1957), and\nthe National Urban League were but three of several organizations that\nwould lead the continuing, but substantially reenergized,\norganizationally strengthened, and philosophically prepared and focused\nstruggles to secure legally sanctioned and guaranteed democratic\nfreedom, social and political equality, economic justice, and human\ndignity for Negroes in the United States of America. Publications and\nstatements from these and other organizations; member correspondences;\nlegal briefs and papers from court cases; the creative and scholarly\nworks from members and descendants of the Renaissance, Garvey, and\nother movements; Black newspapers of the period—all are rich\nrepositories of the philosophizings fueling and guiding the new phase\nof struggle.", "\n\nStudies of these philosophizings are likely to reveal that while\nthere definitely were persons and organizations advocating radical,\neven revolutionary, transformations of the political economy and social\norders of the United States, overwhelmingly the pursuit of\ndesegregation and racial integration as important manifestations of the\nachievement of democratic freedom, social and political equality,\neconomic justice, and human dignity for Negroes using moderate but\nprogressive strategies of legal and civil-disobedience struggles were\ndominant means and agendas of social and political effort exerted by\npeople of African descent in the United States over the last\nhalf-century and more. These commitments were manifested most\nprofoundly in the Civil Rights/Freedom Movement.", "\n“The Movement,” as it was experienced and known by many\nof those intimately involved, proved to be a phenomenally\nhistoric, personally and socially transformative, national movement with\nprofound international ramifications in Africa—South Africa\nespecially—and other countries. Initially, the attack on racial\napartheid in the quest for racial integration was pursued through legal\nchallenges to de jure racial segregation. A major victory was\nachieved with the unanimous 1954 rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in\nBrown v. Board of Education I and II that declared\nracial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, thereby\noverturning the Court’s 1896 Plessey v. Ferguson\ndecision that declared that government-sanctioned racial segregation\nwas constitutional as long as “separate but equal”\nresources and facilities were provided. The team of engaged and\ncreative Black (and White) legal warriors from the NAACP Legal Defense\nand Education Fund and other thinker-scholars (historians,\nsociologists, social psychologists) were successful in persuading the\nJustices on the Court that the invidious discrimination suffered by\nBlack folks within the schemes of White-dominated racial segregation\nwas manifested not only in decidedly unequal resources and facilities,\nbut, through “inferior” education in Negro schools, in\ndebilitating damage to the psychic souls and self-concepts of Negroes,\nthe children especially, which severely impaired their capacity to\ndevelop into and be the kind of persons who could meet the full\nresponsibilities and enjoy the full benefits of citizenship. In short,\nthe legal team forged a legal strategy that rested on the construction\nand successful articulation of a sophisticated philosophical\nanthropology, aided by empirical psychological, sociological, and\nhistorical studies, in support of an argument regarding the vital\nlinkage between the integrity of personhood and democratic citizenship,\nthus between the enabling of democratic citizenry and the education of\nthe person free of resource-impoverishment and the distortions of the\nsoul that were consequences of hierarchic, invidious racial\ndiscrimination that was being imposed on Negro children in racially\nsegregated schools. The Court was persuaded...", "\n\nHowever, this historic victory through persuasive philosophizing was\ninitially stymied by recalcitrant, segregationist local governments and\nan overwhelming majority of White citizens in the Confederate South and\nby much foot-dragging by local governments and White citizens in other\nregions of the country. White opponents of racial integration who were\ndetermined to preserve segregation and White Supremacy unleashed yet\nanother wave of violent terrorism. Nonetheless, the advocates of\ndesegregation and integration were determined to secure full rights and\nhuman dignity for Negro Americans. A new philosophy and strategy of\nstruggle was adopted that, through the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi,\nhad proven successful in defeating Great Britain as the colonial power\ndominating India: non-violent direct action in the pursuit of justice\ngrounded in an explicit philosophical commitment to the\nsanctity of human life, including love for opponents, and to\nthe redeeming and restorative powers, personally and socially, of\nprincipled commitment to engagement in nonviolent struggle.", "\n\nGandhi’s philosophy, the history and intricacies of the\nmovement he led in India, and his leadership were studied closely by a\nyoung Negro missionary to India from the United States, James Morris\nLawson, Jr., who, due to his commitments to nonviolence, had already\nbeen imprisoned for refusing induction into the military during the\nKorean War. Noting from news accounts that reached him in India that\nthe Civil Rights/Freedom Movement in the United States was gathering force,\nLawson returned to the country determined to find ways to become\ninvolved and contribute. While studying theology at Oberlin College in\npreparation for a career as a minister in service to the Movement for\nsocial justice, he was introduced to Martin Luther King, Jr., who came\nto Oberlin to deliver a speech. Lawson was persuaded by King that he (Lawson)\nshould “not wait, come now” to the South to aid the\nMovement by, among other things, providing instruction in the\nphilosophy of nonviolence. Lawson transferred to the Divinity School of\nVanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, and was soon deeply\nengaged in providing intellectual and spiritual guidance and inspiration\nto the educational, psychological, philosophical, and practical\npreparation of legions of mostly young college students in the city who\nwere committed to engaging in nonviolent struggle to end the\nindignities suffered by Black people as a consequence of de\njure White Supremacy and racial segregation. The campaign they\nwaged, led by Fisk University co-ed Diane Nash and with the support of\nincreasing numbers of Nashville’s Black citizens, White college\nstudents, and that of more than a few very principled and dedicated\nanti-segregation White citizens, was eventually successful in bringing\nabout the formal desegregation of the city’s public facilities\nand commercial establishments. Many of the Nashville Movement’s\nleaders and stalwart participants, Lawson included, would become major\ncontributors to the national Movement while other student-participants\nhelped to bring about further historic transformations in the city and\nelsewhere in the South, through their courageous participation in the\nFreedom Rides, especially. (A critical, full-length biography and\nphilosophical study of James M. Lawson, Jr. and his philosophical\ncommitments and engagements have yet to be undertaken and completed…)", "\n\nA philosophy of nonviolence grounded in Christian love motivated and\nguided determined Black people, and allied White and other people, in\nachieving unprecedented progressive transformations of\ncenturies-hardened, intellectually well-supported social, political,\nand, to notable extents, economic life in a United States of America\nordered since its founding by philosophies of White Racial Supremacy\nand Black racial inferiority and subordination. Martin Luther King,\nJr. (“Love, Law, and Civil Disobedience,” 1961;\n“The Ethical Demands for Integration,” 1963) has become\nthe signature figure among several of the leaders of this Movement,\nmarked distinctively by his profoundly thoughtful Christian\ntheological and philosophical commitments to nonviolence as the\ngrounding for personal and shared social life as well as for engaging\nin struggles for freedom and justice (Washington, J.M. 1986). However,\nthe groundwork for the Movement he would be called to lead had been\nlaid and further developed by many other organizationally-supported\nNegro women and men of articulate thought and disciplined action from\nlabor and other constituencies: among these A. Philip Randolph (who\nserved as a founding organizer and president of the Brotherhood of\nSleeping Car Porters, president of the Negro American Labor Council,\nand vice president of the AFL-CIO) and Bayard Rustin (a veteran of\nstruggles for civil and other rights for Negroes and workers of all\ncolors), who were the organizers of the 1963 March on Washington for\nJobs and Freedom during which King delivered the speech (“I Have\na Dream...”) in which he invoked a vision for America that became\nhis hallmark and a guiding theme of the Movement.", "\n\nCertainly, Martin Luther King, Jr. is one of the most prolific and\nprofoundly influential, even historic, figures of African descent whose\narticulations continue to compel widespread, intensive study as\nespecially rich instances of religious, moral, theological, and\nsocio-political philosophizing. Still, King’s articulations, as\nwell as the sacrificial life he lived and gave in leadership service,\nfirmly and uncompromisingly grounded in especially thoughtful\ncommitments to Gandhi-inspired nonviolence (“Nonviolence and\nRacial Justice,” 1957; “The Power of Nonviolence,”\n1958) and Jesus-inspired agape love (“Love, Law, and\nCivil Disobediance,” 1961; “A Gift of Love,” 1966)\nawait full and widespread appreciation as the truly phenomenal gifts of\ninspiration, commitment, and guidance to a social movement that they\nwere. They were gifts that, infused in and channeled by the Movement,\nchanged the legal and social structures, the culture of race relations,\nand thereby the history of the United States. These gifts also inspired\nothers in their struggles for similar changes elsewhere in the world.\nThe consequences of the Movement that embodied these gifts confirmed,\nonce again, that the combination of love and nonviolent struggle could,\nindeed, succeed. And, as has been the case throughout the history of\nthe presence of persons of African descent in this country, these\nparticular philosophical gifts were neither forged and developed in,\nnor mediated to others from, the contexts of academic Philosophy, but\nwere, indeed, philosophizings born of struggles, gifts that\nchanged a country for the better that, it is feared, has yet to\nrecognize and embrace fully the confirmed lessons the gifts\nembody…", "\n\nOverwhelmingly, the pursuit of desegregation and racial integration\nas goals of movements for democratic freedom, social and political\nequality, economic justice, and human dignity for Negroes has been\na dominant item on the agendas of social and political philosophies\nmotivating and guiding struggles exerted by people of African descent\nin the United States over the last half-century and more, manifested\nmost profoundly in the Civil Rights/Freedom Movement. However, the\nMovement’s integrationist agenda, moral-persuasionist strategies,\ncommitment to nonviolence, and explicit commitment to a theologically and\nreligiously grounded notion of love for the Movement’s opponents\nwas strongly challenged by other organizational forces (mid-1960s to\nthe early 1970s), especially by “Young Turks” in the\nMovement’s Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), an\ninfluential number of whom were inspired by the revolutionary\nphilosophies conveyed in the speeches, writings, and organizational\nactivities of Malcolm X and the anti-colonial engagements and writings\nof Frantz Fanon as well as by major figures in decolonizing liberation\nmovements in Africa and elsewhere that were being waged through armed\nstruggle. These Young Turks, and others in a variety of decidedly\nLeft-Nationalist organizations and proto-movements who were inspired by\nvarious notions of revolutionary transformation, initiated yet another\nresurgence of Black Nationalist aspirations and movements that came to\nbe referred to collectively as the Black Power Movement. The period was\nalso complicated by competitive conflicts with a cacophony of persons\nand organizations espousing commitments to anti-Nationalist\nmulti-racial, multi-ethnic socialist and communist agendas.", "\n\nThis was a period of unprecedented tumult, complicated by violent\nrebellions by Black people in urban centers across the country, and by the\nnation’s involvement in a gone-badly-wrong and increasingly\nunpopular war in Vietnam that was highlighted all the more by national and\ninternational movements against the War led principally by young,\ncollege-age people, many of whom had come of age politically through\ntheir involvements in or educative witnessing of the Civil Rights and\nBlack Power Movements. Of particular note, a significant number of\nyoung White women who had been intimately involved in the Civil Rights,\nBlack Power, and Anti-War Movements had become increasingly poignantly\naware of the disrespect for, misuse, and underutilization of women by\nmany men in the Movements and became radicalized into forging a\nmovement to address their concerns, which was subsequently\ncharacterized as the Second Wave Feminist Movement.", "\n\nAll of these developments were fueled by and fostered intense\nintellectual adventures, some of which were also fertilized by\npractical engagements of various kinds. The Black Power Movement, in\nparticular, overlapped with and both fueled and was fueled by\nphilosophizings and engagements that were definitive of more expansive\nand consequential Black Consciousness and Black Arts Movements that, as\nhad the Harlem Renaissance of several decades earlier, spurred an\nintensive and extensive renaissance of aggressively radical and\nexpressive creativity in the arts that was centered, once again, on\nreclaiming for self-definition and self-determination the ontological\nbeing of persons and peoples of African descent, with influences, in\nmany instances, from various Leftist ventures, nationalist and\ninternationalist as well as socialist and communist. This was an\nunstable and volatile mixture that cried out for a clarifying\nphilosophy to provide guidance through the thicket of ideological\npossibilities and the agendas for personal and communal\nidentity-formation and life-praxes that each proffered with greater or\nless coherence and veracity.", "\n\nMore than a few spokesmen and spokeswomen came forward to\nphilosophize on behalf of their group’s or organization’s\n(or their own) vision for ‘what was to be done’ to insure\nliberation for Black people, people of\nAfrican descent. (“Liberation” was the watchword\nfor the new agenda; “Negro” and “Colored” were\ndenigrated and cast aside, no longer acceptable as terms of racial\nidentification). Politics—and all aspects and dimensions of\nindividual and social life were explicitly politicized—became\ndefined by and focused through the lenses of the substantive symbolics\nof racialized and enculturated Blackness, even as the\nintellectual warriors waging the conceptual and other battles on behalf\nof Blackness struggled to find adequate terms and strategies\nwith which to forge satisfactory and effective articulations of the\npassionately sought and urgently needed new identities as articulations\nof long standing identities and life-agendas were discredited and thus\nrendered inadequate for a significant and influential few. For still a\ngreat many other “Negro?”, “Black?”,\n“Colored?”, “African- American?”,\n“African-descended?”, and “American?” persons there\nwas more than a bit of psychic turmoil and tension, no less of\nconsternation and confusion. And hardly any of these persons, nor even\nmany of the most ardent warriors calling for and/or purveying new\nnotions and definitions of “Black consciousness” and\n“Black” agendas for individual and shared lives, knew of\nand had recourse to Alain Locke’s sober and sobering\nwell-reasoned “The New Negro,” nor the rich resources that\nhad been created by the producers and carriers of the Harlem\nRenaissance. And so the intensified ontologizing philosophizing\nproceeded at near breakneck speed driven largely by a generation of\nyoung adults few of whom had, nor would accept, much in the way of\nintellectual or practical guidance from the experienced and wise of\nprevious generations for whom many of the young and arrogant had too little\nrespect…", "\n\nThe reason, Harold Cruse, a wise and very experienced elder of Left\nand Nationalist organizations and struggles and a formidable thinker in\nhis own right, was careful to point out, was due to a severe and\nconsequential disruption of the passing-on of experience-tested and\nverified knowledge from one generation to another by the ravages of the\nwitch-hunting and persecuting of any and all accused of being a\nCommunist or Communist sympathizer during the crusading campaign led by\nSenator Joseph McCarthy during the 1950s. Many lives and careers were\ndestroyed as a result of McCarthy’s campaign, and many persons\nand organizations with Leftist commitments were either destroyed or\ndriven underground, or otherwise left severely tainted and thus made an\n“untouchable” bereft of employment, even for one-time\nfriends and close associates. (W.E.B. Du Bois was one who suffered this\nfate, which is largely why he made the momentous decision to renounce\nhis citizenship and leave the United States for residence in Ghana, where\nhe died…) The radical Young Turks, then, not short of courage or\npassion, set out on a mission all but impoverished, in many cases, of\nmuch needed historical and intellectual capital, thus were sometimes poorly\narmed for the battles they sought to wage. Still, the\ntrans-generational disruption that Cruse pointed out was not complete.\nThere were those who filled the gap between the Harlem Renaissance and\nthe rise of the new Black renaissance who would be of\nsignificant influence and guidance, and would serve some in the new movements as personal as well as\nintellectual mentors and role models: Richard Wright, Robert Hayden, Ralph Ellison,\nMargaret Walker, Gwendolyn Brooks, Lorraine Hansberry, and James\nBaldwin, among several others.", "\n\nThere would be much philosophizing born of struggles by the\nnew generation. Much credit has to be given to those who had the\nwherewithal of discipline and fortitude, and good fortune, to survive\nand leave legacies of accomplishment that continue to enrich Black\nfolks, and others. The Black Arts Movement, for example, had profound\nimpacts through the productions and articulations that gave new\ndirections and meanings to artistic creativity, to the agendas guiding\ncreativity and expression and the mission of service to various\naudiences. A manifesto, “Towards a Black Aesthetic,” by\nHoyt Fuller (1923–1981; Fuller 1994) and his work as editor of\nthe journal Negro Digest, which later was renamed Black\nWorld and was followed by First World when the publisher\nof the latter was pressured to discontinue publication of a journal\nserving Black radicals, were path-setting ventures during a period\nmuch in need of clear paths. Likewise “The Black\nAesthetic” by the essayist and theorist Addison Gayle,\nJr. (1932–1991), his introduction to an anthology that he edited\nand published bearing the same title (Gayle, Jr. 1972). A collection\nof writings on theory, drama, music, and fiction by many of the\nleading artistic minds in the new Black generation, The Black\nAesthetic has come to be regarded by scholars as “the\ntheoretical bible of the Black Arts Movement” and thus did for\nthe makers of this Movement what Locke’s The New Negro\nhad done for the makers of the Harlem Renaissance. Both Fuller and\nGayle would play roles similar to Locke’s in serving as midwives\nto the creative and critically-minded development of a sizable portion\nof a generation of seriously radicalized Black\nthinkers-artists.", "\n\nThe new activist thinkers-artists of the 1960s—Nikki Giovanni,\nSonia Sanchez, Amiri Baraka, A.B. Spellman, Larry Neal, Mari Evans,\nHaki R. Madhubuti, and Maulana Karenga, for example—were as\nproductive, formidable, and widely influential as were the New\nNegroes of the 1920s and 1930s, even more so as they exploited the\nadvantages of access to the enabling resources of the media of radio,\ntelevision, and recordings in addition to print media, and to the human\nresources that became available through lecture-circuits on college and\nuniversity campuses. Many of these Black warriors of the intellect and\narts took up positions, some settling into them for the long term, on\nthe faculties of colleges and universities and helped to development\nthe guiding philosophies and wage the political battles that ushered in\nnew programs in Black and African Studies. In so doing they magnified\nthe forcefulness and range of their intellectual and artistic powers\nand contributions, and helped to alter cultural and intellectual scenes\nin the United States and the African Disapora…" ], "section_title": "9. 1915–2000", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nUntil quite recently, there were very few person of African descent\nwho were professionals in the discipline of Philosophy. As already noted, W.E.B. Du\nBois was one of a very few to study Philosophy formally while a student\nat Harvard but decided against pursuing it professionally. Alain Leroy\nLocke was one of the first persons of African descent in America to\nearn a doctoral degree in Philosophy (Harvard University, 1918). A few\nmore followed decades later (1950s), among them Broadus N. Butler, Max\nWilson, Berkeley Eddins, and, still later, Joyce Mitchell Cook, the\nfirst African American female to earn a Ph. D. in Philosophy. These\nwere some of the pioneering persons of African descent in the United\nStates who entered the profession of academic Philosophy with the\ncertification of a terminal degree in the discipline.", "\n\nMore recently (late 1960s through the 1970s) successive generations of\npersons of African descent have entered the profession as cohorts of\nnew generations of young Black women and men entered the academy with\nthe expansion of opportunities for higher education that came as a\nresult of the successes of the desegregation-integration and Civil\nRights Movements. More than a few of these persons were influenced by\nthe Black Power, Black Consciousness, and Black Arts Movements, as\nwell, and in some cases by independence and decolonization movements\non the African continent and in the African Diaspora in the\nCaribbean. The emergence of and pursuit of distinctive agendas within\nacademic Philosophy to articulate and study philosophizings by persons\nAfrican and of African descent were initiated by several of the new\nentrants, agendas that grew out of and were motivated by these\nmovements. Thus, the new entrants were determined to contribute as\neducators, sometimes as engaged intellectuals involved in movement\norganizations, by identifying and contributing to, or by helping to\nforge anew, philosophical traditions, literatures, and practices\nintended, in many instances, to be distinctive of the thought- and\nlife-agendas of Black peoples. Here, then, the wellspring of concerns\nand aspirations that gave rise to calls for, and efforts to set out,\n“Black” philosophy, then “Afro-American,” and\nlater “African American” philosophy, precursive efforts\nleading to what is now the more or less settled name, but\nstill developing concept, of\nAfricana philosophy.", "\n\nFormal, professional recognition and sanctioning of these efforts,\nwhich had been pursued, with significant impact, through presentations\nof papers on and discussions of various topics in sessions during\nannual meetings of divisions of the American Philosophical Association\n(APA) and other organizations of professional philosophers and other organizations of\nteacher-scholars such as the Radical Philosophers Association (RPA) and\nthe Society for Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy (SPEP),\nwere achieved when, in 1987, the APA recognized the efforts as\nhaving established a legitimate sub-field of Philosophy and made\n“Africana philosophy” an officially listed specialty in the\ndiscipline. Across the years, the APA’s Committee on\nBlacks in Philosophy has been instrumental in organizing a number of\nthese important sessions, though, of no less importance, many such\nsessions were hosted by other sympathetic and supportive committees of\nthe APA as well as by other organizations of professional\nphilosophers that held meetings concurrent with those of divisions of\nthe Association. Thus, the recognition and sanction have come, to\nsignificant degrees, as results of long efforts led by philosophers\nRobert C. Williams (deceased), William Jones, Howard McGary, Jr., and\nLa Verne Shelton, among others, each of whom gave years of service as\nchairpersons of the APA’s Committee on Blacks in\nPhilosophy. Each also contributed early articulations that initiated\nthe work of forging the sub-field.", "\n\nAlso of special importance to this long development towards\nrecognition and legitimation, and to the production of much of the\nearly writings, presentations, and critical networking collegiality\nthat have been foundational to the development of Africana philosophy,\nwere a series of conferences devoted to explorations of “Black\nPhilosophy” or of “Philosophy and the Black\nExperience” that were held during the 1970s, most of them\norganized and hosted at Historically Black Colleges and Universities\n(HCBUs: notably, Tuskegee University, Morgan State University, and\nHoward University) though important gatherings were also held at the\nUniversity of Illinois-Chicago Circle (ca 1970, another thirty\nyears later), Haverford College (an international gathering in the\nsummer of 1982 of African and African American philosophers and\nteacher-scholars from other disciplines), and, more recently, at the\nUniversity of Memphis. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the\nPhilosophy Born of Struggle Conference, which has been hosted annually\nfor fifteen years primarily through the indefatigable efforts of J.\nEveret Green and Leonard Harris, and the Alain Locke Conference\norganized and hosted biannually by the Department of Philosophy of\nHoward University (Washington, DC).", "\n\nThe development and institutionalization of African American\nphilosophy, of Africana philosophy more generally, with recognition by\nthe American Philosophical Association—though not by all, or\neven most, departments of Philosophy in academic\ninstitutions—have also been facilitated by the noteworthy\nsuccess of many of the pioneers in securing and retaining positions in\nacademic departments (of Philosophy, of Philosophy and Religion, of\nPhilosophy and other disciplines) in various institutions of higher\neducation across the country. A substantial few of these persons have\nearned tenure and promotions, several to the rank of Professor, while\nseveral have even been appointed to endowed\nprofessorships. Consequently, a slowly increasing number of\nphilosophers who are African or of African descent now hold positions\nin departments and programs that serve graduate and professional\nstudents. Of importance, then, have been the growing number of\nlectures and seminars in colleges and universities across the country\ngiven and directed by philosophers of African descent in response to\ninvitations, and as part of regular curricular offerings,\nrespectively, of departments of Philosophy, often with the cooperation\nand co-sponsorship of other departments and programs. These invited\npresentations and regularized curricular offerings reconfirm and\nstrengthen the intellectual legitimacy of much work in Africana\nphilosophy while doing much the same for the invited and teaching\nphilosophers.", "\n\nOne especially significant consequence of these important developments\nis that several of these persons now have built legacies of teaching\nand scholarship that span decades with significant influences on\ngenerations of students. Practitioners of Africana philosophy are even\nproducing new generations of practitioners. And practitioners of all\ngenerations are contributing to the literature of articulate\nexpression of what is now a substantial and growing body of works\nsupporting teaching, research, and scholarship in Africana philosophy\nwhile, in the process of doing so, also initiating, and otherwise\ncontributing to, substantial changes to discursive agendas. Certainly,\nthe example beyond debate continues to be critical explorations\nof race and of “racism,” matters that have\ndistorted the basic institutions, virtually all considerations and\npractices, and all lives across the entirety of the history of the\nUnited States of America, and that of much of the world. However, it\nwas not until philosophers of African descent focused their\nphilosophizing on critical engagements with the racial conditionings\nof the profession and of life generally that discussions, teaching,\nand scholarship within professional Philosophy were opened to and\nconditioned by new critical discursive agendas affecting numerous\nsubfields within the discipline and the organization of the\nprofession, evident in the surge of writings by philosophers African\nand of African descent published in mainstream journals and by\nmainstream publishers.", "\n\nRace Matters by Cornel West (1994) became the national and\ninternational best-seller that propelled West into prominence as an\nacademic philosopher and preacher-become-public intellectual who\ncontributed to reinvigorated public critiques of racism with\nprofessionally attuned philosophical acumen. Yet, his earlier\npublication Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary\nChristianity (1982) had even greater impacts on discourses within\nthe academic disciplines of Philosophy, Theology, and\nReligion/Religious Studies, in particular. Of especially notable\ninfluence were his genealogy of racism and his sketching out of four\ndistinctive traditions of responsive thought generated by Black\nthinkers. West’s genealogical critique drew on several canonical\nfigures (Nietzsche, Michel Foucault) and was thus emblematic of his\nexpansive learnedness and creative ingenuity in drawing on canonical\nfigures to redirect critical thought back upon the social orders and\nhistory-making practices of those subjecting folks of African descent,\nand others, to dehumanization.", "\n\nOthers contributing to and shaping such critiques include Howard\nMcGary, whose Race and Social Justice (1999) brought together\na number of seminal essays in which he explored moral and political\nquestions regarding race and racism in a new and distinctive (and\ndistinctively embodied) voice among practitioners of Analytic\nPhilosophy, a voice concerned with social justice, with issues of\nequity and inclusion especially, while drawing on and highlighting\nlived experiences of African Americans conditioned unjustly and\nimmorally. For McGary, philosophical work was no longer to be confined\nto analysis restricted to ‘getting the terms\nright’. Rather, having lived experiences of invidious racial\ndiscrimination and impediments to accessing and exploiting conditions\nof possibility by which Black persons might forge individual and\ngroup-shared flourishing lives, across generations, McGary has\nremained committed to disciplined, well-argued clarifications and\nrevisions of key notions by which to pursue and secure social justice,\nmost especially for those “least well off”: the\nBlack underclass.", "\n\nContinuing such efforts, in a different register, with substantial and\ninnovative contributions is Paul Taylor (who studied with McGary at\nRutgers University). His Race: A Philosophical Introduction\nstands out as an especially clearly-articulated, nuanced, clarifying\nnavigation of many of the complexities of conceptualizations\nof race firmly situated in reconstructions of historical\npractices guided by political and other agendas. Yet, it is\nTaylor’s Black is Beautiful: A Philosophy of Black\nAesthetics that is especially noteworthy. It is, perhaps, the\nfirst-in-decades book-length “assembling” (Taylor’s\nown characterization of his effort) of a\ndeliberately philosophical theory of Black aesthetics: that\nis, a critical theoretical exploration of the roles expressive\npractices and objects play when taken up by Black folks in the\ncreation and maintenance of their lifeworlds. (The philosopher Alain\nLeroy Locke, midwife to the New Negroes of the Harlem Renaissance,\npreceded Taylor by half-a-century in taking seriously Black expressive\nlife, as did W.E.B. Du Bois, Zora Neale Hurston, Ralph Ellison, James\nBaldwin, Toni Morrison, and numerous others.) Taylor’s efforts\nare doubly innovative in his endeavor to bridge two discursive\ncommunities heretofore not in communication: professional\nphilosophers, and others, concerned with aesthetics who have had\nlittle to no concern with aesthetics in Black life; Black artists and\ncritics fully immersed in the productions of and engagements with\nexpressive practices and objects in Black life with little to no\nengagements with resources drawn from academic, professional\nPhilosophy. As did Alain Locke, Taylor aims to contribute to a new\ngeneration of articulate thinkers who are focusing their critical\nacumen on the expressivity and performativity in productions of self,\nand of self in relations with others, of those who have been\nracialized as Black.", "\n\nBut, how have folks African and of African descent been figured in the\nexpressive practices and products, and in the theorizings of such\naesthetic ventures, produced, in both cases, by folks not Black?\nRobert Gooding-Williams is but one of several philosophers of African\ndescent who probes these questions in his Look, A Negro!\nPhilosophical Essays on Race, Culture and Politics (2006), a\ncollection of essays connected, he notes, by his persistent effort to\nexplore whether it is possible to interpret race in ways that\nwould be in keeping with what is required in political and cultural\nlife if the United States as a polity were to become actually\nstructured by democratic principles and practices while adult citizens\nfully acknowledge the history and continuing legacies of White racial\nsupremacy that have structured the polity from its inception. In the\nchapter on “Aesthetics and Receptivity: Kant, Nietzsche, Cavell,\nand Astaire,” for example, Gooding-Williams rehearses accounts\nof aesthetic experiences by the canonic figures Kant (re:\n“aesthetic judgment”) and Nietzsche (re: embodied\nsensibilities) in preparation for a critical reading and assessment of\nthe philosopher Stanley Cavell’s aesthetic reading of how the\ndancer Fred Astaire is rendered in a particular movie in which he\nstars (The Band Wagon) as the focal character who is\nable/enabled to reclaim himself (i.e., make a “comeback”)\nas a star dancer. What Gooding-Williams lifts up is Cavell’s\nfailure to see that the Astaire-character is enabled by a\nBlack male character who, in shining Astaire’s shoes, transfers\nto Astaire and his feet a restoration of rhythmic capabilities by way\nof the rhythms the Black shoeshine-man articulates while brushing the\nAstaire-character’s shoes and polishing them with his\nshine-rag. All of which presumes something (on the part of the\nfilm-maker; so, too, Cavell, though differently...) about the\nembodiment of enabling aesthetic capabilities of particular kinds in\nthe being of the Black character representative of the\nculturally-inflected raciality of Black people.", "\n\nThere are centuries-long, quite rich traditions of thought\narticulated, and political praxis engaged in, by Black folks for whom\nit is the case that the constitutive racially of Black folks is such\nthat it sets the terms not only of identity, but, as well, of the\nethical imperatives of intra- and interracial mutualities, that is, of\nvarious modes and instances of solidarity. And, as well, for\ncompelling pragmatic reasons: to contend with, ultimately to overcome,\ninvidious racial discrimination and oppression. No small matters for\npersons and peoples suffering racialized dehumanization and\nexploitation thus in need of shared motivating and guiding notions of\nhow to gain and sustain freedom and justice. Many concerned to forge\nfreedom in just conditions have sought morally compelling guiding\nunderstandings in shared raciality, in being, by particular\nunderstandings of raciality, a distinctive people, a\ndistinctive nation of Black people. Hence, traditions of\n“Black Nationalism,” waxing and waning across the\ncenturies, resurgent more recently in various forms (music and art;\n“Afrocentric” thought) and locales in the United States,\nin particular. Tommie Shelby, who became a certified professional\nphilosopher after the resurgent Black nationalisms of the Black Power\nand Black Arts movements, while deeply committed to philosophical\nengagements with and out of contexts of lived experiences of Black\nfolks in which much of his life has been conditioned, has, in\nhis We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black\nSolidarity, endeavored to work out a philosophically clarified\nand justified account of the terms and agenda of solidarity as a basis\nfor organized and coordinated struggles for justice. The account is\nintended to be both motivating and welcoming of the solidaristic\ncooperation of persons Black and non-Black without needing to resort\nto what he reasons to be the philosophically indefensible racial\nessentialism of various construals of Black nationalism. Yet, the\naccount is intended to be in keeping with important conceptual and\nnormative groundings of Black political cultural life that are, as\nwell, compatible with a notion of political liberalism worked out by\nJohn Rawls. With Shelby’s efforts, too, there is the hard work\nof extending decidedly prominent mainstream philosophical thought\n(that of of Rawls in this particular case) to a creatively critical\nengagement with unjust limiting conditions on the lives of Black folks\nin conjunction with efforts of philosophical reconstruction and\ndefense of principles of Black solidarity that embrace a notion\nof Blackness suitable for emancipatory work." ], "section_title": "10. 1950–Present: Professional Philosophers of African Descent", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nLeonard Harris has been a pioneer of published works on African\nAmerican philosophy and continues to be a major contributor in many\nways, not least as an editor of collections that have made widely\navailable important texts that otherwise would not have gotten the\nattention of researchers and scholars concerned with the\nphilosophizings of Black folks. Of particular note, his edited\ncollection The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and\nBeyond (Harris 1989) provides ready access to philosophical\nessays from among Locke’s more than three hundred published and\nunpublished essays and book reviews. And his\nPhilosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy\nfrom 1917 (Harris 1983) was for many years the only widely\navailable, somewhat historically organized collection of writings by\nAfrican American professional philosophers and other philosophizing\nBlack scholars. (An important earlier collection is Percy\nE. Johnston’s Afro-American Philosophers. (Johnston\n1970)) More recently new collections devoted to African American\nPhilosophy have been organized and published by Tommy L. Lott (Lott\n2002); by Lott and John P. Pittman (Lott and Pittman 2003); and by\nJames A. Montmarquet and William H. Hardy (Montmarquet and Hardy\n2000).", "\n\nThis publishing is an important part of the story of Africana\nphilosophy, and helps to make and legitimate the case that persons\nAfrican and of African-descent, on the African continent and in the\nAfrican Diaspora in the Americas and elsewhere, are creators and\ncustodians of Africana philosophy. A number of publishers have\nrecognized and accepted these developments and, after substantial,\nlong-standing resistance and outright refusal by many to recognize\nhistoric writings by persons of African descent and contemporary\nscholarship by philosophers African and of African descent as proper\ninstances of philosophical work, have made a priority of adding works\nof Africana philosophy to their lists of published works.", "\n\nOf particular publishing significance is the continuing, regular\nappearance of issues of Philosophia Africana: Analysis of\nPhilosophy and Issues in Africa and the Black Diaspora, a journal\nfor which Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze of DePaul University was founding\neditor until his unexpected death in 2007. Philosophia\nAfricana remains the only scholarly journal in the United States\nthat is devoted to Africana philosophy, though increasingly other\nphilosophy journals are accepting and publishing writings that fall\nwithin the subfield. None, however, have been as generous as\nPhilosophical Forum, which, under the editorial directorship\nof Max Wartofsky (deceased), devoted two entire special issues to\nexplorations of philosophical matters of particular concern to Black\nphilosophers. Noteworthy, too, has been the continuing midwifing of New\nYork-based publisher and scholar Alfred Prettyman, who has devoted\ntime, energy, and other resources to nurturing The Society for the\nStudy of Africana philosophy (originally the New York Society for the\nStudy of Black Philosophy), an organization of philosophers and other\nengaged thinkers of African descent, and persons not of African\ndescent, who come together in his home to present and discuss ideas and\nworks on the way to publication or recently published. For a brief\nperiod Prettyman was editor and publisher of the now dormant The\nJournal of the New York Society for the Study of Black\nPhilosophy.", "\n\nThe professional recognition and legitimation of Africana philosophy\ngenerally, of African, African American, and Afro-Caribbean philosophy\nas sub-foci of the field; the notable success enjoyed by a slowly\nincreasing number of persons African and of African descent in being\nhired, retained, and promoted by departments and programs in\ninstitutions of higher education; more publishing opportunities; a\ncontinuing vigorous schedule of regular conferences and conference\nsessions devoted to explorations of matters pertinent to the\nfield—all of these continue to be crucial to building and\nenhancing the literature-base of the field and to facilitating\nteaching, research, scholarship, and other collegial engagements and\npractices that are essential to forming and sustaining nurturing\ndiscursive communities devoted to engaging philosophizing productive of\nAfricana philosophy. And the enterprise is being enriched by the\nparticipation and contributions of an increasing number of persons,\nstudents and professionals, who are neither African nor of African\ndescent." ], "section_title": "11. Publishing and Professional Africana Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nSubstantial progress has thus been made in mitigating some of the\nimpediments that had long hampered recognition of and attending to the\nphilosophizing efforts of persons African and of African descent.\nNonetheless, still more mitigating work remains. There is the need, for\nexample, to bring to consideration for better appreciation the writings\nof several generations of especially thoughtful and insightful Black\nessayists and novelists, poets and musicians, artists and dancers,\npreachers and theologians, and other public-speaking Black\nintellectuals who, through their means of expression, have\nphilosophized about the conditions and prospects of Black folks and, in\nmany cases, have helped to sustain the will and determination to\nendure the assaults on the humanity, on the being, of\npersons and peoples African and of African descent. In this regard, too\nlittle attention has been given, for example, to the philosophical\nwriter-novelist Charles Johnson who, before he became a distinguished\nnovelist, was a graduate student in Philosophy. The articulated thought\nof many other Black writers, some of them novelists, also compel close,\nappreciative readings by philosophers for what these articulations\ndisclose of the writers coming to terms thoughtfully and creatively\nwith the exigencies of existence for Black folks as the writers\nimagined or re-imagined them in the locales and historical moments of\ntheir writerly creations. Likewise in many sermons, speeches, letters,\nsongs, and dances created and expressed, creatively very often, by\nthoughtful Black persons. Of necessity, then, Africana\nphilosophy must be an even more intensive and extensive\ninterdisciplinary enterprise.", "\n\nA principal impediment to the recognition and appreciation of the\nphilosophizings of Black folks have been the thorough investments in\nEurocentrism and White Racial Supremacy that have grounded and\nstructured so much of the historiography within the discipline of\nPhilosophy for so very many decades. Resolving these misconstruals of\nthe discipline’s history will require substantial revisions,\nones inclusive of the philosophizings of persons of many excluded\ngroupings. In so doing, careful work must be done to reclaim for\nwider distribution and careful study as many as possible of the\nearliest articulations—many of which were never\npublished—that helped pave the way to the development of African\nAmerican philosophy, of Africana philosophy more generally, as fields\nof discourse (Kuklick 2001; Kuklick 2008).", "\n\nWith hindsight, an especially crippling factor in the development of\nAfricana philosophy within academic Philosophy in the United States\n(throughout the African continent and the African Diaspora, in fact)\nhas been that far too little of the attention of the pioneers, and of\npresent practitioners, has been devoted to issues that are of\nsignificance to women African and of African descent even though, as\nhas been indicated through the narration of the history of\nphilosophizing born of struggles, the contributions of Black\nwomen have been significant though seldom with the prominence of\nattention they should have had outside of women’s circles. As\nwas shown, in the New Worlds in which African peoples were being\nre-made/were remaking themselves into new persons and peoples of\nAfrican descent, numerous Black women across the generations were\nchallenged to think hard and long about the assaults on their\ncommunities, their families, their very bodies and souls. Here, then,\na compelling need to foster and support the philosophizing\nefforts of Black women who direct our attention to the lives and\nphilosophizing of Black women, historically and\ncontemporarily. Noteworthy in this regard are the groundbreaking,\ninspiring efforts of philosopher Kathryn Gines in founding the\nCollegium of Black Women Philosophers. The Collegium is bringing\ntogether women from across the country in conferences devoted to\nrecovering and recognizing the contributions of pioneering women\nphilosophers of African descent while exploring present issues and\nforging agendas of further work to be done." ], "section_title": "12. Africana Philosophy: Contributions", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe possible futures of developments in Africana philosophy in\nAfrican and the African Diaspora are open. The initial work of making\nthe case for and legitimacy of African American, African, and Africana\nphilosophy and its subfields has been accomplished with significant\nsuccess even without universal acceptance and respect. That is to be\nexpected, for no intellectual movement or disciplinary sub-field ever\nwins acceptance by all. Still, there is more to be done by way of\nconsolidating the gains while forging new developments as minds are\nturned to challenging issues, many of them novel. To note, for two\ndecades much of the effort of practitioners of Africana philosophy has\nbeen devoted to explorations of race, a foundational and\npervasive complex of forceful factors shaping virtually all aspects and\ndimensions of life in the formation of Modernity in Europe and the\nAmericas, and in every instance in which Europeans encroached on the\nlands and lives of peoples around the globe. Achieving justice without\nracism in polities bequeathed by Modernity is hardly finished business.\nSo, the need to rethink race will be with us for a while\nyet.", "\n\nHowever, the need will be generated by resolutions of old\ndifficulties and challenges. Success will bring new challenges. Among\nthese, settling such questions as whether there can and should be\nnorms, practices, and agendas that are definitive of philosophizing\nidentified as instances of “Africana” philosophy. If so,\nthen on what terms, and to what ends, are the requisite agendas, norms,\nand practices to be set to serve the best interests of African and\nAfrican-descended peoples, without injustice to non-Black peoples, and\nthereby provide those philosophizing with normative guidance while\nconforming to norms that ensure propriety and truthfulness in\ndiscursive practices on conditions of warrant that are open to and can\nbe confirmed by persons who are neither African nor African-descended?\nShould such concerns continue to be appropriate conditioners of\nphilosophical effort? The praxes and supportive discursive communities\nconstitutive of Africana philosophy will have to meet certain\ninstitutionalized rules governing scholarly practices even as those of\nus committed to the development of the enterprise contribute to\ncritiques and refinements of these institutionalized rules while\ndevising and proposing others.", "\n\nThe work constituting Africana philosophy, on the African continent\nand throughout the African Diaspora, has helped to change the agendas\nand rules of discourse and praxis in Philosophy and other disciplines\nand discursive communities in contemporary academic institutions and\norganizations. The enterprise has been a significant contributor to the\nemergent recognition of the need to give greater respectful attention\nto raciality and ethnicity (as well as to gender, sexual orientation,\nand other constitutive aspects of our personal and social identities)\nas conditioners of philosophical praxis without thereby invalidating\nreconstructed notions of proper reasoning. As well, practitioners of\nAfricana philosophy have aided the development of much wider and deeper\nrecognition and acknowledgment of inadequacies in basic notions and\nagendas in the legacies of Western Philosophy thereby helping to open\nus all to challenging new needs and possibilities for further revising\nphilosophical traditions and practices. The expansion of academic\nPhilosophy to include Africana philosophy is indicative of efforts to\nachieve greater intellectual democracy in multi-ethnic, multi-racial\nsocieties. These developments should be continued, aided by\nphilosophizing persons who are neither African nor of African descent,\nnor, even, professional academic philosophers, and continued as part of\na larger, ongoing effort to appreciate and learn from the many\nlife-enriching creations of all peoples as contributions to\nthe treasure-houses of human civilization." ], "section_title": "13. Future Developments", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Gordon, L, 2008, An Introduction to Africana Philosophy,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Monahan, M. J., 2007, “Africana Philosophy: Globalizing the\nDiversity Curriculum,” in Diversity & Democracy, 10\n(3): 12–13.", "Outlaw, Jr., L., 1996, “Africana Philosophy,” in L. T.\nOutlaw (Jr.), On Race and Philosophy, New York: Routledge, pp.\n75–95.", "Outlaw, Jr., L., 1997, “African, African American, Africana\nPhilosophy,” in J. P. 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afterlife	Afterlife	First published Mon Dec 26, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jan 23, 2019	[ "\nOne of the points where there is a significant, long-lasting\nintersection of the interests of many philosophers with the interests\nof many people of all kinds and conditions concerns the nature and\nsignificance of death. How should we understand the mortality of all\nliving things and, closer to home, how should we understand our own\nmortality? Is it possible for persons to survive biological death?\nThis is a topic that has occupied both analytic and continental\nphilosophy in the twentieth century (e.g., Fred Feldman, Martin\nHeidegger). When the topic of death is ignored or denied in popular\nculture, some philosophers, theologians, social and political critics\nrail against the inauthentic complacency of ignoring one of the most\nimportant facts about our lives (see, for example, Søren\nKierkegaard’s essay “At a Graveside” or Ernest\nBecker’s famous 1974 book, The Denial of Death). But\nwhat precisely are the facts of death? Is it true that a person is\nannihilated when she dies, or is there a possibility or even a\nlikelihood that she may survive death? Are any of the religious\nconceptions of an afterlife promising from a philosophical point of\nview?", "\nThere are five sections in this entry. In the first, we propose that\nbeliefs about death and the possibility of an afterlife are of\nenduring significance because of our care for persons here and now,\nand thus our concern for their future and our own. Just as it is\nreasonable to hope that those we love have a fulfilling future in this\nlife, it is natural to consider whether this life is the only life\nthere is and, if there is reason to believe that there is an afterlife\n(or a life beyond this life), it would be reasonable to hope that this\nmight involve a new, valuable environment or at least one that is not\nHellish in nature. We bring to the fore other reasons why the topic of\nan afterlife is philosophically interesting. In sections two and three\nwe consider the concept and possibility that persons survive death in\nlight of two substantial philosophies of mind: dualism (section two)\nand materialism (section three). Section four addresses the afterlife\nin terms of empirical evidence. In section five, reasons are advanced\nfor thinking that the reasonability of beliefs about an afterlife\ndepends on the reasonability of metaphysical convictions." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Survival and its Alternatives", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Possibility of Survival—Dualism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Objections to the Possibility of Survival—Materialism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Parapsychology and Near-Death Experiences", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Metaphysical Considerations Concerning Survival", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nIn ancient Western philosophy, Plato affirmed both a pre-natal life of\nthe soul and the soul’s continued life after the death of the\nbody. In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates presents reasons why\na philosopher should even welcome death (albeit not permitting or\nencouraging suicide), because of its emancipation of the souls of\nthose who are good in this life to a great afterlife. In the work of\nEpictetus, on the other hand, death is conceived of as a\nperson’s ceasing to be. Epictetus does not argue that we should\nwelcome death but he holds that we should not fear death because we\nwill not exist after death. The philosophical assessment of the truth\nof such matters continues on to the present, as does debate on the\nimplications of whether we may survive death. Why?", "\nThere are many reasons why there should be ongoing attention as to\nwhether Plato or Epictetus—or any other philosopher who offers a\ndifferent account about the reality or illusion of an\nafterlife—is right. One reason is that the values we have in the\nhere and now have a bearing on what we may or should hope for in terms\nof the future. While some philosophers believe that what happens in\nthe future has enormous consequences for life’s meaning now,\nother philosophers have so focused on the importance of the present\nthat questions about the future of humanity in this life, and the\npossible good or ill of an afterlife for individuals, is of little\nimportance. Consider two philosophers who take the latter position,\nPeter Singer and Erik Wielenberg.", "\nSinger asks us to consider a case when some good act is done and its\ngoodness does not depend upon the future. Imagine a village where\nthere is great need and that need is met with aid. Singer claims that\nthe goodness of such an act should not depend on the long term; one\ncan place to one side speculation about what might happen a thousand\nyears later.", "\n\n\nSuppose that we become involved in a project to help a small community\nin a developing country to become free of debt and self-sufficient in\nfood. The project is an outstanding success, and the villagers are\nhealthier, happier, better educated, and economically secure and have\nfewer children. Now someone might say “what good have you done?\nIn a thousand years people will all be dead, and their children and\ngrandchildren as well, and nothing that you have done will make any\ndifference”. (Singer 1993: 274) \n", "\nSinger responds: ", "\n\n\nWe should not, however, think of our efforts as wasted unless they\nendure forever, or even for a very long time. (1993: 274) \n", "\nHis solution is to think of the universe in four-dimensional terms;\naccording to this philosophy of time, all times are equally real. On\nthis view, it is always the case that in the year 2020, the lives of\nthe villagers are made better; they are happy, healthy, and well\neducated in 2020. ", "\nErik Wielenberg does not adopt Singer’s recourse to the\nphilosophy of time but, like Singer, his counsel is that we should not\nthink (or need not think) in terms of the big picture or the future in\nassessing the meaning and urgency of our current projects", "\n\n\nIsn’t it better that the Nazi Holocaust ended when it did rather\nthan in, say, 1970—regardless of what the world will be like a\nmillion years from now? I can remember occasions in junior high gym\nclass when a basketball or volleyball game became particularly heated\nand adolescent tempers flared. Our gym teacher sometimes attempted to\ncalm us down with such rhetorical questions as, “Ten years from\nnow, will any of you care who won this game?” It always struck\nme that a reasonable response to such a query would be, “Does it\nreally matter now whether any of us will care in ten years?” In\nmuch the same vein, Thomas Nagel suggests, “it does not matter\nnow that in a million years nothing we do now will matter”.\n(2013: 345)\n", "\nA possible response is that while there is some wisdom in\nSinger’s and Wielenberg’s positions, they should not\ndissuade us from appreciating that the natural trajectory of the love\nof people and wisdom (or philosophy) includes concern for “the\nbig picture”. If Singer truly cares about the villagers,\nshouldn’t he hope that they survive to enjoy the fruits of the\ninvestments that have been made? Or, putting this in four-dimensional\ntime terms; shouldn’t he wish that they are happy in 2030 and\n2040…? Surely those providing aid are not (and should not be)\nindifferent about the future. Granted, if the investment was made and\nthen a meteor struck the village, destroying all life (or if in 2030\nthe meteor is destroying the village), we might well think the\ninvestment was still wise, good and noble (especially if there were no\npredictions of a meteor strike). However, there would be something\ndeeply disturbing if one of the aid-givers announced upon leaving the\nvillage: ", "\n\n\nNo matter what happens, no matter whether you all are struck by a\nmassive plague in an hour and all die a horrible death or whether a\nthousand years from now your society will be condemned as deserving of\nnothing but contempt, what we have done today is our only concern and\nthe value of our act is not diminished regardless of what awaits you!\n\n", "\nWe suggest that this attitude would be bizarre. Returning to the\nquestion of the afterlife, if you think that some good afterlife is\npossible, one should hope for the long-term flourishing of the\nvillagers in both this life and the next rather than focusing only on\nthe value of their present position. And if you do have such a hope,\nwhy hope that the lives of everyone will come to an end at a specific\ntime, say in a thousand years? Similarly, if you believe that it is\nlikely or even possible that there is an afterlife where there is\ngreat ongoing harm, should we not hope that this not be the case for\nthe villagers?", "\nWielenberg’s comments on the Holocaust are puzzling. Of course,\nno one except a murderous, psychopathic Nazi would hope the Holocaust\nlasted longer or that it involved the death of even one more\nindividual. But what one hopes will take place a million years from\nnow is not irrelevant ethically or in terms of values. Consider two\nfutures: in one, the Jews survive a million years from now and are\nthriving. In another, imagine that a million years from now there is a\nrevival of the Nazi party. The Jews have colonized Mars and Nazi\ngenocidal units are dispatched to treat Jewish settlements the way the\nNazis treated the Warsaw Ghetto in 1940. This time, the Nazis succeed\nin annihilating every last Jew. Surely, it would be deeply perverse to\nhope for the second future. It would also be perverse to be\nindifferent now about whether the second will occur. We cannot imagine\nthat a person of integrity would say they are utterly indifferent\nabout whether all Jews will be annihilated by Nazis in the future, be\nit a million years, ten million, twenty, or….", "\nNagel’s comment (cited by Wielenberg) is worthy of note. His\ncomment suggests that what we do now will (or may) not matter a\nmillion years from now, but there is an important distinction between\nwhether some event matters (in the sense that it is valuable; it is\ngood that the event occurred) and whether persons who live in the\nfuture are aware of the event and care about it. Arguably, it will\nalways be the case that the Holocaust should not have happened,\nregardless of whether any human being remembers it a hundred (or a\nthousand or a million) years from now. Moreover, those of us who are\nhorrified about this genocide should hope that remembering it and\npassing on a record of it has no statute of limitation. In keeping\nwith our earlier thought experiment, imagine two futures: a million\nyears from now, persons recall the Holocaust and continue to lament\nthis mass genocide; in a different future imagine persons are all\nNazis and they only recall the Holocaust as a failure to succeed in\nkilling all Jews, something they were only able to achieve in the year\n1,002,014.", "\nSo, one reason why the topic of an afterlife is of historical and\ncontemporary interest is because our values about present persons,\nthings, and events have a bearing on the future, including the\npossibility of a future for individuals after their death. If we know\nthat it is impossible for individual persons to survive biological\ndeath, speculation on an afterlife we might expect or hope for would\nbe pointless (unless it serves some purpose in terms of fiction), but\nit would not be pointless to reflect on whether the impossibility of\nan afterlife should dominate our values in this life. What are the\nimplications for our lives now if we take seriously the idea that at\ndeath we will pass into oblivion? Some philosophers adopt a strategy\nlike Singer’s and Wielenberg’s about our individual lives.\nIn Religion Without God Ronald Dworkin is candid about\n“what we desperately dread”, namely “the total,\nobliterating, itself unimaginable, snuffing out of everything”\n(2013: 150). While he thinks some kind of individual afterlife may be\npossible (even given atheistic naturalism) he does propose a\n“kind of immortality” which is “the only kind we\nhave any business wanting” (Dworkin 2013: 159).", "\n\n\nWhen you do something smaller well—play a tune or a part or a\nhand, throw a curve or a compliment, make a chair or a sonnet or\nlove—your satisfaction is complete in itself. Those are\nachievements within life. Why can’t a life also be an\nachievement complete in itself, with its own value in the art in\nliving it displays? (Dworkin 2013: 158)\n", "\nWho would deny that such acts can be great achievements? If individual\nsurvival of death is impossible, then Dworkin is right to cast aside\n(as he does) the comedian Woody Allen’s aspiration to live on\nforever, not in his work, but in his apartment. But do we know that an\nindividual afterlife is impossible? Later in this entry, we suggest\nthat ruling out an afterlife as impossible is philosophically tenuous.\nMoreover, we suggest that the goods within the life that Dworkin\ndescribes invite us to consider whether human lives may be richer\nstill if they do not end in oblivion and instead death marks a\ntransition to a form of afterlife that some of the world religions\nenvision. For an interesting secular case that many of our values in\nthe present moment are tied to expectations of the future, see\nScheffler 2016 (NB: Scheffler is concerned with future evens in this\nlife rather than an individual’s life after their death.) ", "\nSo, we suggest that the topic of an afterlife is warranted for at\nleast three reasons: it is important if you love persons in this life\nand hope for their enduring flourishing (or hope they are not\nannihilated or meet a worse fate); it is important to think about the\nimplications of there not being an afterlife (or there being one) in\nterms of how to understand what is important to you now; and it is\nimportant to consider for historical reasons: speculation and beliefs\nabout life after death have existed through much of human history.", "\nIn most cultures, there is evidence of a belief in some sort of\npersonal afterlife, in which the same individual that lived and died\nnevertheless persists and continues to have new experiences. There are\nalternatives, however. The ancient Greeks are noted for having placed\na high premium on “survival” in the memory and honor of\nthe community—a practice reflected in our reference to deceased\ncelebrities as (for example) “the immortal Babe Ruth”.\n(Strictly speaking, this for the Greeks was not a replacement for a\npersonal afterlife, but rather a supplement to what was conceived as a\nrather colorless and unrewarding existence in Hades.) Such a hope, it\nwould seem, provides a major consolation only if one is optimistic\nconcerning the persistence and continued memory of the community, as\nwell as the accuracy and justice of their judgments. An interesting\nvariant of this form of immorality is found in process theology, with\nits promise of “objective immortality” in the mind of God,\nwho neither forgets nor misjudges the lives he remembers (Hartshorne\n1962: 262). Hindu and Buddhist traditions include a belief in\nreincarnation. Hindu philosophical tradition gives more credence to\nthe enduring of individuals through successive rebirths and deaths\nthan does Buddhist philosophical tradition see Knine 2010). In\nBuddhist philosophy, the ongoing task is to produce a sufficient\nconsciousness of the self for there to be reincarnation, while\nsimultaneously securing the understanding that the individual self is\nnot (in the end) a substantial, concrete thing, but a delusion that\nwill dissolve or become liberated into Nirvana (see Nattier 2010).", "\nOther entries in this encyclopedia address themes in Hindu and Buddhist\nphilosophy (see, e.g., the entry on\n mind in Indian Buddhist philosophy),\n so we will forego a comparative study here of competing religious\nportraits of an afterlife. Our focus for much of the rest of this\nentry is on the possibility and the reasonability of believing there\nis an afterlife for individual persons, though we will offer some\nobservations along the way about the kinds of afterlife that are\npossible, given different metaphysical assumptions. As for the\nphilosophers like Kierkegaard and Becker, cited earlier, who castigate\nthose of us who ignore our mortality, we suggest that sometimes the\ncontemplation of mortality can be disabling and distract us from\nseeking immediate goods (such as those Dworkin highlights) or\nrelieving suffering. It would not be admirable for the aid workers in\nSinger’s example to pause in their work in order to hold\ndeath-and-dying seminars. However, while there might be nothing wrong\nin living without wrestling with mortality, there are sufficient good\nreasons why the topics of the nature of death and the existence (or\nnon-existence) of an afterlife are philosophically interesting and\ndeserving of attention.", "\nAs we turn to the question of whether it is possible for persons to\nsurvive death, it is natural to pursue an answer in light of the\nphilosophy of human persons. The next section considers survival from\nthe standpoint of mind-body dualism." ], "section_title": "1. Survival and its Alternatives", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAt first, it seems obvious that dualism is a\n“survival-friendly” perspective. If we are nothing more\nthan our bodies, it seems that if death destroys our bodies, we are\ndestroyed and there is nothing left of us as persons—though\nparts of our bodies and the particles that make it up will be\nscattered and perhaps (temporarily) come to be part of the bodies of\nother living organisms. If, however, we are nonphysical (or\nimmaterial) minds or souls or persons who are embodied, then even the\ncomplete annihilation of our physical bodies does not entail our\nannihilation as persons. In fact, one of several arguments for dualism\nis based on the conceivability of our existing without our bodies. If\ndualism is true, however, it does not necessarily follow that persons\nwill survive the death of their bodies. It may be that the functional\ndependence of ourselves on our bodies is so essential that we only\ncome into existence as embodied persons when our bodies reach a\ncertain formation and constitution and then we cease to be when that\nformation and constitution is destroyed. But dualism at least opens\nthe door for claiming that our dependence on our bodies is contingent\n(not necessary) or is essential only given the present laws of nature\n(laws that may be violated by God). Dualist accounts of survival have\nbeen seriously questioned, however. ", "\nSome philosophers argue that dualist accounts of survival fail because\nwe have no “criteria of identity” for disembodied persons.\nWhen we make judgments about the identity of persons we are not making\njudgments about the identity of souls. It has been argued that we\ncannot make judgments about the identity of souls, because souls are\nsaid to be imperceptible and non-spatial. And because of this, the\nidentity of a person over time cannot consist of the identity of the\nperson’s soul over time. What we are able to identify—and\nre-identify—is a person’s body. But once the person has\ndied that body decomposes in a grave, and can’t be the basis for\nour identification of the person who is supposed to have survived\ndisembodied (Perry 1978: 6–18).", "\nHasker claims that this objection is confused, conflating two quite\ndistinct questions (Hasker 1989:208–09). One is a metaphysical\nquestion: What does it mean to say of a person at one time\nthat she is numerically the same person at a later time? (Or, if you\nlike, it is a metaphysical question to ask: Is x at\nt1 the same φ as y at\nt2?) The second is an epistemological question:\nHow can we tell that a person at one time is numerically the\nsame person at a later time? (Or how can we tell that x at\nt1 is the same φ as y at\nt2?) The failure to distinguish these questions (a\nfailure which may be due in part to Wittgenstein) is the source of\nserious philosophical confusions. The short answer to the first\nquestion is that normally, when we know what a φ is, we know also\nwhat it is for a φ at t1 to be the same\nindividual φ as a φ at t2. The abnormal\ncases are those in which the φ at t1 has\nundergone changes, and we are unsure whether those changes amount to\nthe destruction of the φ, or its replacement by another object, so\nthat the very same φ cannot possibly have persisted until\nt2. The classic example is the ship of\n Theseus,[1]\n but there are many others. In such cases, our first recourse is to\nseek to understand more accurately the concept of a φ—does\nour concept of a ship, for example, allow for the progressive\nreplacement of all of the ship’s parts, or not? But\nsometimes there may be no determinate answer to this question. Our\nconcepts, after all, have been developed to deal with the sorts of\ncontingencies that normally arise, and it may sometimes be possible to\ninvent scenarios (or even to discover them empirically) that are not\nprovided for in our ordinary usage of a concept. In that case, we must\neither provide for ourselves criteria to cover the novel situation\n(thus modifying our previous concept of a φ), or else admit that\nthe question we were asking has no answer.", "\nWhen we pose this question with regard to the persistence of\nimmaterial souls, what we find is that there is no problem that needs\na solution. We know what it is to be a subject of experience—to\nbe a being that thinks, and believes, and desires various things, for\nexample—and prima facie at least this does not entail\nbeing embodied, let alone being embodied in the very same body over\ntime. If we think of the immaterial soul in Cartesian terms, there\nsimply isn’t anything that can happen to such a soul (barring\nits being no longer sustained in existence by God) that could bring it\nabout that the soul ceases to be; Cartesian souls are “naturally\nimmortal”. Some other dualist views may not opt for natural\nimmortality of the soul, and if so they will need to say something\nabout the sorts of changes that a soul can and cannot sustain if it is\nto remain in existence as the individual it was. But there is no\nproblem here for the general hypothesis of survival as an immaterial\nsoul (Hasker 1999: 206–11).", "\nThe metaphysical question having been disposed of, it becomes apparent\nthat the epistemological question is less significant than it may\nappear to be at first. How do we re-identify immaterial souls over\ntime? Under normal circumstances, we do this by re-identifying the\nembodiment of the soul, but this is not always possible: prior at\nleast to the advent of DNA testing, cases of disputed identity could\nnot always be settled by re-identifying bodies. Sometimes the\nsubject’s memory of events is an important clue, though not of\ncourse an infallible one. But can any tests establish the identity of\na completely non-embodied subject? Evidently, the question of the\nidentity of a non-embodied subject makes sense to some: those who\nconsult spiritualist mediums certainly understand the question,\nwhether they’re conversing with dear departed Aunt Susie, or\nmerely with a manipulative practitioner. But again, once it is seen\nthat there is no metaphysical problem here, the epistemological\nquestion becomes purely a practical one, requiring to be answered if\nand when we have the need in practice to make such\nidentifications.", "\nIt is also worth noting that an objection against individual\ncontinuity in dualism can be deployed against individual continuity in\nmaterialism. One objection (that can be traced back to Kant) against\ndualism is that the dualist is unable to account for the possibility\nthat the soul or immaterial self is constantly being replaced by\ndifferent individual selves, (with complete updated\n“memories” and psychological qualities) thus creating the\nillusion of personal continuity of the self-same subject. If\nthe self is immaterial, how would we notice the successive changes?\nThis may be called the problem of undetected (and perhaps\nundetectable) soul-switching. This objection faces many obstacles, one\nbeing that we would be unable to properly account for our experience\nof successive states (we hear Big Ben ring three times by first\nhearing it ring twice) if we are not the self-same individuals over\ntime. But more to the point, in terms of continuity, it is logically\npossible that material bodies are switched every nanosecond. If the\nswitch (or annihilation and creation) were done in an instant (as\nopposed to an interval) there would be no duration, no event that\ncould be measured by us that would reveal the switch. If undetectable\nmaterial object-switching is not a problem, then undetectable\nsoul-switching should not be a problem.", "\nThere may still be an objection to a dualist account of an afterlife\nwhich holds that the idea of disembodied survival, even if not\nlogically incoherent, is one we don’t have a sufficient grasp of\nto allow it to count as a real possibility. What would such survival\namount to, anyway? Of course, if the souls of the departed are assumed\nto be fitted out immediately with resurrection bodies, this difficulty\nis greatly alleviated. But if the notion of an immaterial soul is to\ndo any philosophical work, we need to be able to think what it might\nbe like for such a soul to exist on its own, disembodied.", "\nThis challenge has been met in an interesting article by H.H. Price\n(1953). Price spells out, in considerable detail, a notion of\ndisembodied souls existing in a “world” of something like\ndream-images—images, however, that would be shared between a\nnumber of more or less like-minded, and telepathically interacting,\nsouls. Included among these images would be images of one’s own\nbody and of other people’s bodies, so that one might, at first,\nfind it difficult to distinguish the image-world from the ordinary\nphysical world we presently inhabit. The conception is similar to\nBerkeley’s, except that Price does not invoke God directly as\nthe sustainer of regularities in the image-world. He does say,\nhowever, that ", "\n\n\nif we are theists, we shall hold that the laws of nature, in other\nworlds as in this one, are in the end dependent on the will of a\nDivine Creator. (1953: 390) \n", "\nSomeone who seriously considers Price’s development of this idea\nwill be forced to admit that a sufficiently clear account of what\ndisembodied existence might be like has been proposed. (And for a more\nrecent work that argues that our actual world is idealist in the\ntradition of Berkeley, see Foster 2007.) We need not follow Price (or\nFoster) in (what appears to be) his supposition that this is a\nplausible account of the actual state of persons who have died. It is\nenough if he has provided an account that makes plain the\nintelligibility of the notion of disembodied survival; the believer in\nan afterlife can then say, “If not in just this way, then in\nsome other”.", "\nIf there is reason to think that mind-body dualism is true, then there\nis reason to think that a person’s survival of death is\nlogically possible. But dualism has come upon hard times lately, and\nis widely regarded as being discredited. Whether or not this is\nwarranted, dualism is undoubtedly subject to a number of objections,\nthough these are not necessarily more severe than the difficulties\nthat attend materialism (see the entry on\n dualism,\n also Koons and Bealer (eds.) 2010). For a positive case for dualism,\nsee Loose, Menuge, & Moreland 2018 (The Blackwell Companion to\nSubstance Dualism). In view of this let us consider also the\npossibility of survival given some form of\n materialism.[2]" ], "section_title": "2. The Possibility of Survival—Dualism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWhat are the prospects for survival on a materialistic view of\npersons? One possible reason for thinking that materialism is not\nhostile to the prospects of an afterlife is that, historically, the\nstandard view of the afterlife in the major theistic traditions is\nthat it involves the resurrection of bodies. While there is a\nlongstanding theological tradition that links belief in bodily\nresurrection with dualism, many theologians and some philosophers\nargue that dualism is a Platonic import into theistic traditions\n(Cullman 1955), and that it is more in keeping with the Hebrew,\nChristian, and Islamic stress on bodily life to understand the\nafterlife in materialist rather than dualist terms.", "\nThe central logical problem for materialist versions of the\nresurrection is personal identity. On dualist assumptions, personal\nidentity is preserved by the persistence of the soul between death and\nresurrection. But for materialism, nothing bridges the\nspatio-temporal gap between the body that perishes and that body\nresurrected. Without such a bridge, how can the\n“resurrected” person be identical with the person who\ndied? Considerable ingenuity has been expended in the search for an\nanswer to this question.", "\nWithout doubt, the most popular materialist option here is the\n“re-creation” theory, according to which, at some time\nafter a person’s death, God re-creates the person by creating a\nbody with the identical characteristics of the body that perished\n(Hick 1983: 125–26). While this may seem rather ghastly in cases\nof violent death, there is no reason why God could not correct any\ninjury and renew the body’s youthfulness, and so on. But can\nthis re-creation preserve the necessity of the identity relation (the\nfact that your persistence over time as you is strict and not\ncontingent)? If you are re-created, the “you” that comes\ninto existence in the re-creation cannot just contingently happen to\nbe you (as if someone else could do the job of being you). One reason\nto suspect that the identity relationship is not preserved (and this\nis not merely an epistemological matter) is that if God could create\none body that is exactly similar to the body that died, why not two or\nmore? It is not a satisfactory answer to this to say that God, being\ngood, would not (and perhaps could not) do such a thing. On the view\nin question, what is necessary for resurrection is merely that\nmaterial particles be arranged in the correct fashion, and it is\nhardly a necessary truth that only God could do this. (Perhaps a\nreally smart rogue angel could pull it off!) Nor is it feasible to\nguarantee uniqueness by requiring that the identical particles present\nin the dead body make up the resurrected body. On the one hand, the\nbody has no doubt shed, during its life, enough particles to make\nseveral bodies, and it is hardly credible that the replacement of one\nof the atoms present at the time of death with an atom shed by the\nbody a few seconds before death would mean we have a different body\n(assuming other requirements to be satisfied). If, on the other hand,\nonly particles from the body at the time of death may be used, there\nare the long-recognized problems about the availability of some of\nthese particles, which within a few years may have made their ways\ninto a large number of other human bodies. In any case there is a\nhard-to-quell intuition that reassembly, no matter how expertly\ncompleted, would at best produce a replica rather than the identical\nbody that perished. Peter van Inwagen offers a compelling example:", "\n\n\nSuppose a certain monastery claims to have in its possession a\nmanuscript written in St. Augustine’s own hand. And suppose the\nmonks of this monastery further claim that this manuscript was burned\nby Arians in the year 457. It would immediately occur to us to ask how\nthis manuscript, the one we can touch, could be the very\nmanuscript that was burned in 457. Suppose their answer to this\nquestion is that God miraculously recreated Augustine’s\nmanuscript in 458. We should respond to this answer as follows: the\ndeed it describes seems quite impossible, even as an accomplishment of\nomnipotence. God certainly might have created a perfect duplicate of\nthe original manuscript, but it would not be that one; its\nearliest moment of existence would have been after Augustine’s\ndeath; it would never have known the impress of his hand; it would not\nhave been a part of the furniture of the world when he was alive; and\nso on. Now suppose our monks were to reply by simply asserting that\nthe manuscript now in their possession did know the impress\nof Augustine’s hand; that it was a part of the\nfurniture of the world when the Saint was alive; that when God\nrecreated or restored it, God (as an indispensable component of\naccomplishing this task) saw to it that the object God produced had\nall these properties. [para. break in 1978] \n\n\nWe confess we should not know what to make of this. We should have to\ntell the monks that we did not see how what they believed could\npossibly be true. (van Inwagen 1992: 242–43) \n", "\nGiven these difficulties with the re-creation view, attempts have been\nmade to find other ways of accounting for resurrection in materialist\nterms. One of the more interesting of these is Lynne Rudder\nBaker’s invocation of a constitution view of persons (Baker\n2000, 2001, 2005). On this view persons are not identical with, but\nare constituted by, their bodies. (She discusses the constitution\nrelation at considerable length; the details of this are not relevant\nhere.) What is distinctive of persons is a “first-person\nperspective”, roughly, the capacity to think of oneself as\noneself. This ability, which humans possess but other animals\nseem to lack, is an essential component of moral responsibility as\nwell as of our ability to plan for the future and to perform many\nother distinctively personal activities and functions. According to\nBaker, the constitution view opens the way for a doctrine of\nresurrection that avoids the difficulties of the re-creation theory.\nSince persons are not identical with their bodies, it need not be\nmaintained that the resurrected body is the same identical body as the\nbody that died. What is required, however, is that the first-person\nperspective of the resurrected body be the same: “if a\nperson’s first-person perspective were extinguished, the person\nwould go out of existence” (2005: 385). So the first-person\nperspective must somehow be transferred from the original body to the\nresurrection body: ", "\n\n\nperson P1 at t1 is the same person as person P2\nat t2 if and only if P1 and P2 have the same\nfirst-person perspective. (2000: 132) \n", "\nBaker holds that there is indeed a fact of the matter as to whether a\ngiven future person has the same first-person perspective as I now\nhave, though there is no “informative” way of specifying\ncriteria of identity between the two.", "\nAlthough Baker’s account is intriguing, it seems problematic\nwhen one takes a closer look at the idea of a first-person\nperspective. Arguably, to have a first-person perspective, one has to\nbe a person. To have a first-person perspective is to have the\ncapacity to experience things; to act, think, speak, and so on with\nintention. Such acts can in principle be qualitatively identical in\ndifferent thinkers and speakers; what individuates them is the\nperson who’s doing the thinking or speaking. In other\nwords, intentional acts derive their identity from the person\nperforming them. But if this is true of the acts themselves it is also\ntrue of the first-person perspectives, which are nothing but the\ncapacities of various persons to perform such acts. So to say that\nP1 and P2 have the same first-person perspective is just\nto say that P1 and P2 are the same person, and the\ncriterion reduces to a tautology. Regrettably, we have not yet been\ngiven any help in understanding how a person, with her\nfirst-person perspective, can occupy first one body and then\nanother.", "\nAnother proposal is offered by Kevin Corcoran (2005). Corcoran, like\nBaker, is a constitution theorist, but, unlike Baker, he does not\nbelieve persons can be transferred from one body to another. Corcoran\nproposes that the body of a resurrected person does need to be\nidentical with the body of the person when he died. Corcoran advances\nseveral proposals about how this might be possible. The one to be\nnoted here is what might be termed a “brute force”\nsolution: ", "\n\n\nIf God causes that body to exist once, why could God not cause it to\nexist a second time? … But what makes the first stage of the\npost-gap body a different stage of the same body that perished is just\nthat God makes it so. (2005: 172) \n", "\nThis comes extremely close to making identity over time a matter of\nconvention—divine convention, to be sure, but convention all the\nsame. (It is reminiscent of Jonathan Edwards’ view that we are\njustly punished for Adam’s sin in the Garden of Eden because God\nhas decreed that the segment of Adam’s life including the sin is\na segment of our own lives also.) It is difficult to measure when an\nappeal to divine fiat is philosophically licit or illicit. The\nchallenge facing Corcoran’s position may be similar to the one\nHick faces: how would God distinguish between re-creating the same\nbody that was destroyed earlier and creating an exact duplicate? ", "\nWe have left until last van Inwagen’s own proposal for a\nmaterialist resurrection. For in spite of his criticisms of the common\nview, van Inwagen is himself a Christian and a believer in the\nresurrection. Here is his proposal:", "\n\n\nPerhaps at the moment of each man’s death, God removes his\ncorpse and replaces it with a simulacrum which is what is burned or\nrots. Or perhaps God is not quite so wholesale as this: perhaps He\nremoves for “safekeeping” only the “core\nperson”—the brain and central nervous system—or even\nsome special part of it. These are details. (van Inwagen 1992:\n245–46)\n", "\nContinuity is maintained, then, through the preservation of the body\n(or crucial body-part, such as the brain), and when the time comes for\nresurrection to occur, God restores life to the body in question and\none’s resurrected life can begin. In fairness, it should be\npointed out that van Inwagen originally advanced this proposal only in\norder to demonstrate the logical possibility of a materialist\nresurrection. In this he may well have succeeded. But as a proposal\nthat is supposed to represent the actual way in which God enables\nhumans to live again, the account has very little to recommend it. In\nthis view, God assumes the role of contemporary practitioners of\ncryonics, preserving the dead body until such time as it is revived\nand restored to health. But this is bad news for the actual\npractitioners, since the “bodies” they are preserving are\nmere simulacra and presumably incapable of being revived, even if all\nthe technology functions flawlessly. Furthermore, the feature of the\naccount that makes it unacceptable—that God “spirits\naway” the crucial part of the person’s body, leaving\nbehind a simulacrum—is essential to the view’s success in\ndepicting a possible way of resurrection. In the Author’s Note\nappended in 1992, van Inwagen writes:", "\n\n\nIf I were writing a paper on this topic today, I should not make the\ndefinite statement “I think this is the only way such a\nbeing could accomplish it”. I am now inclined to think that\nthere may well be other ways, ways that I am unable even to form an\nidea of because I lack the conceptual resources to do so. (1992:\n246)\n", "\nA more recent, and extremely ingenious, account of an afterlife from a\nmaterialist point of view has been proposed by Dean Zimmerman. The\nproposal goes roughly like this: at the instant of death, each\nelementary particle in a person’s body undergoes\n“budding” in which it produces another particle of the\nsame kind. The newly produced particle takes its place in a\nresurrection body, existing in a resurrection “space”; at\nthe same time the original particle remains in place as part of the\ncorpse. Since it is the resurrection body, and not the corpse, which\ncontinues the life of the subject, the resurrection body rather than\nthe corpse is the “closest continuer” of the pre-death\nbody. It is, then, the resurrection body and not the corpse that is\nthe same body as the one that previously lived, and personal identity\nis preserved. This proposal abandons strict (Leibnizian) identity in\nfavor of a “closest continuer” theory. It also shares an\ninteresting feature with van Inwagen’s account: the remaining\ncorpse is not the same body as the one that previously lived.\n(Zimmerman 1999 and 2010; Hasker 2011). For a critical analysis of\nZimmerman and van Inwagen thought experiments, see Taliaferro &\nKnuths 2017 and Knuths 2018.", "\nIt has not been shown conclusively that an identity-preserving\nmaterialist resurrection is impossible, but the difficulties, as\noutlined above, are formidable (Hasker 1999: 211–31). Proponents\nof an afterlife, it seems, would be better served if they were able to\nespouse some variety of mind-body dualism. This entry cannot undertake\nan assessment of the comparative merits of dualism and materialism. It\nis worth noting, however, that recent philosophy has seen an increased\nrecognition in some quarters of the difficulties resulting from\nmaterialist views, and a corresponding interest in different (not\nnecessarily Cartesian) varieties of dualism. (See Koons & Bealer\n(eds.) 2010; Batthyany & Elitzur (eds.) 2009; Loose, Menuge, &\nMoreland 2018; and Lofton 2017.) Given even the apparent coherence of\ndualism in which the person and her body are contingently related\n(metaphysically, it becomes more difficult to argue that it is known\nthat the annihilation of the body entails the annihilation of the\nperson)." ], "section_title": "3. Objections to the Possibility of Survival—Materialism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDuring the heyday of logical positivism in the twentieth century, it\nis interesting that while Moritz Schlick proposed that its demands for\nempirical verification would render propositions about God as\nmeaningless, it would not rule out as meaningless propositions about\nlife after death so long as they involved subjects having experiences.\nInterestingly, some of the most rigid materialists in the last\ncentury, such as Willard Van Orman Quine and Paul Churchland, allowed\nfor the possibility of there being compelling empirical evidence of\nparapsychological powers and even ghosts. In this section, let us\nconsider whether there is empirical support for belief in an\nafterlife.", "\nParapsychology investigates phenomena that are alleged to lie outside\nthe boundaries of ordinary naturalistic explanation. These phenomena\ninclude telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, mediumistic messages,\npossession-type cases, reincarnation-type cases, apparitions, and\nothers. Not all of these phenomena are directly relevant to survival\nand the afterlife, but some of them, if accepted as veridical, do\nprovide such evidence: for instance, messages received through a\nmedium, allegedly from a deceased person, that contain information to\nwhich the medium has no other access.", "\nThe evaluation of this body of evidence is highly contentious. Clearly\nthere exists both motive and opportunity for fraud and fabrication in\nmany cases. It is questionable, though, whether a responsible inquirer\ncan afford to dismiss out of hand all cases that seem to defy ordinary\nnaturalistic explanation. It counts against a sweeping dismissive\napproach that the phenomena have been attested as probably veridical\nby some highly reputable investigators, including such philosophers as\nWilliam James, Henry Sidgwick, C.D. Broad, H.H. Price and John Beloff.\nThese men had little to gain personally by their investigations;\nindeed in undertaking them they endangered already well-established\nreputations. Investigating the subject with finely-honed critical\ninstincts, they have applied stringent tests in selecting instances\nthey consider to be credible, and have rejected many cases they held\nto be fraudulent or inadequately attested.", "\nIf we are willing to give an initial hearing to this evidence, what\nconclusions can reasonably be reached? A conclusion that many (but not\nall) of these investigators would accept is that the evidence provides\nsome, but not conclusive, evidence for personal survival after death\n(Steinkamp 2002). However, the reason why the evidence is deemed\ninconclusive will give little comfort to many afterlife skeptics. The\nreason it is not conclusive is that the experiences are susceptible of\na different explanation if we accept the existence of some rather\nspectacular forms of extra-sensory perception, also known as\n“super psi” (see Braude 2002). An example is a case in\nwhich a medium received information that apparently was known in its\nentirety to no living person. In order to avoid the conclusion that\nthe information was communicated from the deceased person, the medium\nmust be credited with clairvoyance as well as the ability to integrate\ninformation received telepathically from several different persons.\nC.D. Broad (1953: 114) summarized the situation well: the possibility\nof extra-sensory perception weakens the direct force of the evidence\nfor survival by making possible alternative explanations of that\nevidence. But ESP strengthens the overall case by raising the\nantecedent probability of survival, insofar as it renders problematic\nthe naturalistic view of the human person, which for most\ncontemporaries constitutes the greatest obstacle to belief in\nsurvival.", "\nMore recently, it has been claimed that a superior source of evidence\nlies in so-called “near-death experiences” (Bailey and\nYates (eds.) 1996). These are experiences of persons who were, or\nperceived themselves to be, close to death; indeed many such persons\nmet the criteria for clinical death. While in this state, they undergo\nremarkable experiences, often taken to be experiences of the world\nthat awaits them after death. Returning to life, they testify to their\nexperiences, claiming in many cases to have had their subsequent lives\ntransformed as a result of the near-death experience. This testimony\nmay seem especially compelling in that (a) large numbers of persons\nreport having had such experiences; (b) the experiences come\nspontaneously to those near death, they are not sought out or\ndeliberately induced; and (c) normally no one stands to benefit\nfinancially from either the experiences or the reports.", "\nThese experiences, furthermore, are not random in their contents.\nThere are recurring elements that show up in many of these accounts,\nforming a general (but far from invariable) pattern. Typical elements\ninclude a sense of being dead, peacefulness and absence of pain;\n“out-of-body experiences” in which the subject views his\nor her own body “from outside” and witnesses various\nevents, sometimes at a considerable distance from the location of the\nperson’s body; passing through a dark tunnel towards intense\nlight; meeting “beings of light” (sometimes including\nfriends and relatives who have died previously); and a “life\nreview” in which the events of one’s life pass before one\nand are subjected to evaluation. The subject may be initially\ndisappointed or reluctant to return to the body, and (as already\nnoted) many testify that the experience has been life-changing,\nleading to a lessened—or even a complete absence of—fear\nof death and other beneficial results.", "\nThese experiences are surprisingly common. A Gallup poll taken in 1982\nfound that eight million Americans (about five percent of the adult\npopulation at that time) had survived a near-death experience (NDE).\nThe experiences occur regardless of age, social class, race, or\nmarital status. Probably the improvements in medical technology, which\nenable many to return from a state of “clinical death”,\nhave increased the numbers in recent times. But NDEs have been\nreported throughout recorded history and from all corners of the\nearth. Since the publication in 1975 of Raymond Moody’s book,\nLife After Life (1975), there have been numerous studies of\nthe phenomenon, some of them carried out with careful attention to\nscientific objectivity (e.g., Ring 1980; Sabom 1982; van Lommel et\nal. 2001).", "\nAs one might expect, there is a wide variety of interpretations of\nNDEs, from those that interpret the experiences as literally revealing\na state that lies beyond death to interpretations that attempt to\ndebunk the experiences by classifying them as mere reflections of\nabnormal brain states. Clearly, there is no one medical or\nphysiological cause; the experiences occur for persons in a great\nvariety of medical conditions. An interesting counterexample to\nexplanations in terms of the “dying brain” is found in the\nNDEs experienced by mountain climbers in the midst of what they\nexpected to be fatal falls (Heim 1892); it is hardly credible that\nthese experiences can be reduced to either drugs or oxygen\ndeprivation.", "\nOn the other hand, interpretations of NDEs as literally revelatory of\nthe life to come, though common in the popular literature, are\nextremely questionable. Carol Zaleski has shown, through her\ncomparative studies of medieval and modern NDEs, that many features of\nthese experiences vary in ways that correspond to cultural\nexpectations (Zaleski 1987). A striking instance of this is the\nminimal role played by judgment and damnation in modern NDEs; unlike\nthe medieval cases, the modern life-review tends to be therapeutic\nrather than judgmental in emphasis. In view of this, Zaleski ascribes\nthe experiences to the religious imagination, insisting that to do so\nenhances rather than diminishes their significance. Claims of\ncross-cultural invariance in modern NDEs are also questionable. The\nmajority of the research has been done in cultures where Christianity\nis the predominant religious influence, but research done in other\ncultures reveals significantly different patterns. One amusing\ndifference occurs in the episodes in which it is decided that the\nexperiencer will return to embodied life rather than remaining in the\nafterworld. In Western NDEs there is often a “spirit\nguide” who counsels the experiencer that it is better that he or\nshe should return to life. In India, on the other hand, the person is\noften turned back with the information that there has been a clerical\nerror in the paperwork, so that it was by mistake that he or she came\nto this point! (K. Augustine 2008,\n Other Internet Resources,\n see the section on “Cultural Differences”).", "\nThe causation of these experiences is problematic. Some aspects of the\nexperience have been deliberately induced by the administration of\ndrugs (see Jansen 1997); this demonstrates that such phenomena can be\nproduced by chemical alterations to the brain, but in most NDE cases\nno such chemical causes can be identified. Several researchers have\nconcluded that the triggering cause of the NDE is simply the perceived\nnearness of death. (NDEs have also been experienced by persons who\nbelieved they were close to death but were not in fact in any\nlife-threatening situation (K. Augustine 2008,\n Other Internet Resources,\n see the section on Pam Reynolds).) The specific content of NDEs can\nbe divided into mundane content, in which what is experienced\nis or resembles typical features of the ordinary world, and\ntranscendental content, portraying “another\nrealm” quite unlike the world of ordinary experience. The source\nof the transcendental content is problematic, though the cultural\nvariations suggest that a significant role must be assigned to\ncultural expectations concerning the afterlife.", "\nFinally, there is what Gary Habermas has termed the\nevidential aspect of NDEs. These are phenomena that, provided\nthey can be verified, would indicate strongly that something is\noccurring that is not susceptible of an ordinary naturalistic\nexplanation. This might seem to be the most helpful direction to look\nif the aim is to arrive at an objectively compelling assessment of\nNDEs. If it should turn out to be possible to verify objectively\ncertain paranormal aspects of NDEs, fully naturalistic explanations\ncould be ruled out and the way would be open for further exploration\nconcerning the meaning of the experiences. On the other hand, if all\nsuch evidential aspects could be fully explained in terms of ordinary\nnatural processes, the claim of NDEs to be revelatory of anything\nmetaphysically significant would be greatly weakened.", "\nEvidential aspects of NDEs fall into several categories. First, there\nare out-of-body sensory experiences, in which patients, often while\ncomatose, observe accurately features to which they have no access\nthrough normal sensory channels. In one case, an eight-year-old girl\nwho nearly drowned required 45 minutes of CPR to restore her\nheartbeat:", "\n\n\nIn the meantime, she said that she floated out of her body and visited\nheaven. Additionally … she was able to totally and correctly\nrecount the details from the time the paramedics arrived in her yard\nthrough the work performed later in the hospital emergency room.\n(Moreland and Habermas 1998: 159)\n", "\nSecond, there are accounts of sensory experiences which accurately\nreport events that occurred during periods in which the\nsubject’s heart had stopped, and even during “flat\nEEG” periods in which there was no detectable brain activity.\nFinally, there are “surprise encounters” during the NDE\nwith friends and relatives who had in fact recently died, but where\nthe subject had no knowledge of this prior to the time of the\nexperience. Here the crucial question would be, Where did the subject\nobtain knowledge of the other person’s death? If ordinary\nchannels of communication can be ruled out, the most natural\nconclusion would seem to be that this knowledge was obtained from the\ndeceased person, who is somehow still alive.", "\nAll of these claims concerning the evidential value of NDEs have been\ncalled into question. One of the most thorough discussions is by Keith\nAugustine\n (Other Internet Resources,\n 2008), who draws on work by a large number of other researchers. As\nnoted already, there is overwhelming evidence that NDEs do not provide\na literal experience of conditions in the afterlife; this is attested,\namong other things, by the considerable variations in these\nexperiences in different times and different cultures. Also relevant\nhere is the fact that similar experiences sometimes happen to persons\nwho mistakenly believe themselves to be in life-threatening\ncircumstances. Apparently it is the perceived nearness to\ndeath, rather than the actual proximity of the afterworld, that\ntriggers the experiences. The encounters with persons recently\ndeceased, but whose deaths were previously unknown to the experiencer,\nbecome somewhat less impressive once it is recognized that\nstill-living persons may also be encountered in NDEs (“Living\nPersons”). These still-living persons were otherwise occupied at\nthe time of the NDEs; they cannot have been literally present in the\nother-worldly realm in which they were encountered. And given that\nstill-living persons can appear in NDEs, it becomes statistically\nprobable that on occasion there will also be encounters with persons\nwho have recently died but whose death was unknown to the\nexperiencer.", "\nClaims that NDEs occurred during periods with no brain activity are\ncountered by the rejoinder that an EEG may not reveal all activity\nwithin the brain. Functional magnetic resonance imaging, for example,\ncan reveal activity that is missed by an EEG. In cases where brain\nactivity has indeed ceased for a given patient, the NDE may have\noccurred either before the cessation or after normal brain activity\nhas resumed; it is not necessary to assume that the NDE and the\nbrain’s non-activity were simultaneous (“Living\nPersons”). With respect to the claim of information that was\nlearned during the NDE that was not otherwise available, various\nanswers are possible. It is noted, first of all, that\ninaccurate “information” is often reported\n(“Out-of-Body Discrepancies”). In some cases where the\ninformation is confirmed, we may be dealing with subsequent\nenhancement as a result of the repeated recital of the story. (This\nneed not involve deliberate deception; it is a common experience that\nstories often repeated tend to gain new features of interest in the\ntelling.) In other cases, it is argued that the information was in\nfact available through ordinary sensory channels, often through the\nexperiencer’s hearing of things said during a medical procedure\nwhen they were apparently unconscious and unresponsive. (There is\nconsiderable evidence that “unconscious” persons do hear\nand register things said when they are apparently oblivious to their\nsurroundings.) (“Veridical Paranormal Perception During\nOBEs?”) However, it is worth noting that Augustine makes little\neffort to establish that the factors cited in his naturalistic\nexplanations were actually operative in the various NDE cases. It\nwould appear to be his view that the burden of proof lies almost\nentirely on the shoulders of those who make claims on behalf of the\nevidential value of NDEs.", "\nWith regard to this entire body of evidence, both from parapsychology\nand from NDEs, we may be close to an impasse. Those who support the\nevidential value of the experiences will argue that the naturalistic\nexplanations that have been offered are not adequate, that they\ndisplay excessive skepticism towards well-confirmed accounts, and are\nin many instances highly speculative. Those who reject the evidential\nvalue of these phenomena (including some believers in the afterlife)\nwill argue that the evidence is insufficient to warrant the\nextraordinary claims that are made, that the naturalistic explanations\nwork well overall, and that a full explanation of the most puzzling\ncases would require a detailed knowledge of the events and surrounding\ncircumstances that in many cases is not available to us. Further\ncareful research on individual cases may offer some hope of progress,\nbut it seems unlikely that the fundamental disagreements can be\nresolved, especially when the different viewpoints are supported by\ndiverse worldviews." ], "section_title": "4. Parapsychology and Near-Death Experiences", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nLeaving aside such empirical evidence, what general metaphysical\nconsiderations are relevant to belief in survival? We have already\nseen that a materialist account of persons creates some serious\nobstacles. As van Inwagen and others have argued, God could bring\nabout an afterlife for persons in a way consistent with a materialist\nphilosophy of mind. But in the absence of God, a materialist,\nnaturalist worldview seems not at all promising for survival. As noted\nearlier, mind-body dualism would offer some support for the\npossibility of survival but dualism by no means guarantees survival;\nthe old arguments from the simplicity and alleged indestructibility of\nsouls are out of favor. As Kant observed, a “simple” soul,\nwhich cannot be dissolved into its constituent parts, might still fade\naway gradually until it has completely disappeared. What often is not\nsufficiently appreciated, however, is the close tie between theism and\nbelief in an afterlife. The point is not merely that theistic\nreligions incorporate belief in an afterlife which many persons accept\nbecause of this religious context. The tie is closer than that, and it\nhas considerable force in both directions.", "\nSuppose, on the one hand, that the God of theism does in fact exist.\nAccording to theism, God is both all-powerful and perfectly good, and\nthis goodness is supposed to be of a sort that is relevant to the\nwelfare of human beings (and other rational creatures, if there are\nany). Indeed, this is not merely a speculative assumption; there are\nBiblical texts proclaiming that God is a God of love. If there is\nreason to believe that God loves created persons, then it is highly\nplausible to believe that God desires to provide creatures with the\nopportunity for a greater, and longer-lasting, fulfillment than is\npossible within the brief scope of earthly existence. This is\nespecially true, one would think, for those who, through no fault of\ntheir own, find their lives blighted by disease, or accident, or war,\nor any of the other natural or anthropogenic disasters to which we are\nvulnerable. And yet even those of us who enjoy relatively good and\nsatisfying lives are conscious of far, far more that could be\naccomplished and enjoyed, given more time and the vigor and energy to\nuse it well.", "\nThis argument can also be reversed to telling effect. If there is no\nafterlife, no realm in which the sorrows of this life can be assuaged\nand its injustices remedied, then it may be argued that the problem of\nevil becomes impossible to solve in any rationally intelligible way.\nArguably, a perfectly good and all-powerful God would not make a\ncosmos in which all or most created persons have lives that are full\nof misery and then are annihilated; nor would an all-loving good God\ncreate a cosmos in which there is no opportunity for transformation\nbeyond this life. That is not to say, of course, that allowing for an\nafterlife makes the problem of evil easy for theists—that is far\nfrom being the case. But it does provide a way in which this\nlife’s injustices can be seen as not having had the last\nword—victims in this life do not have to be eternally victims\nand those who’ve done evil won’t get away with it. For\nthese reasons, one would be hard pressed to find very many theists (as\nopposed to deists) who do not also affirm belief in an afterlife.", "\nThe close connection between theism and an afterlife is affirmed in\nKant’s arguments for the “postulates of practical\nreason”. To be sure, Kant gives different reasons for\npostulating God and for postulating an afterlife, and the ends to be\nserved by these postulations are ostensibly different. In actuality,\nhowever, it is highly plausible that the two postulates are\ninseparable. We ought to postulate God, because only in this way is it\npossible that in the end happiness should be enjoyed by persons in\nproportion to their moral worthiness. Given the actual conditions of\nthe present life, it is evident that this end can be secured, if at\nall, only in a future existence. We are told to postulate immortality,\nbecause only an endless life makes possible continued progress towards\nthe goal of a coincidence of one’s will with the requirements of\nthe moral law. But for such continued progress to be at all likely to\noccur would seem to require some kind of morally benign conditions in\nthe afterlife, and Kant implicitly assumes that such conditions will\nobtain.", "\nWhat about an argument in the opposite direction: if it is reasonable\nto believe in an afterlife, is it more reasonable to believe in\ntheism? Given the reasonability of believing in an afterlife, it would\nbe more reasonable to believe that theism is true rather than\nmaterialistic naturalism, but the reasonability of theism would have\nto be weighed in the context of non-theistic philosophies and\nreligions that include belief in an afterlife. Nontheistic Hinduism\nand Buddhism include beliefs about an afterlife; in these religious\ntraditions, belief in an afterlife is part of their understanding of\ncosmic justice, a system in which one’s reincarnation (and,\nultimately, one’s enlightenment and liberation) depends on\none’s Karma. These, and other traditions such as Jainism,\ninvolve matters that are addressed in other entries in the SEP, but we\noffer here a modest observation on how the evidence for a good\nafterlife (an afterlife that is in accord with some morally sound\norder) might lend more support for one religion or philosophy than\nanother.", "\nImagine that we have good reason to believe (or we possess Kantian\njustification for faith) that the cosmos is ultimately ordered in a\njust and moral manner (felicity and virtue will be in concord, and the\nwicked will not flourish indefinitely and so on). Imagine further that\nwe can limit the most plausible accounts of such a moral order on the\nbasis of either traditional theistic accounts of the afterlife or a\nsystem of reincarnation in which Karma is at work determining\nsuccessive re-births until enlightenment—liberation. Robin\nCollins has argued that the second alternative faces what he calls the\n“karma management problem”. He writes,", "\n\n\nTraditionally Buddhists have believed that by and large the\ncircumstances of one’s rebirth are determined by one’s\nkarma—that is, one’s deeds, whether good or bad in this\nand previous lives. This, however, seems to require that there exist\nsomething like a “program” that arranges your genes, the\nfamily conditions you are born into, and the like to correspond to the\nmoral worth of your past deeds (Collins 1999: 206).\n", "\nFor theists, such as many (but not all) Hindus, this minute\narrangement of one’s life circumstances to match one’s\nkarma can be viewed as the work of God. So long as we recognize the\nintelligibility of divine agency, the “management” of\nreincarnation should in principle be no more difficult to accept than\nany other theistic explanations. But in the absence of theistic,\nintentional explanations, how would a “karma program”\nwork, and how was it initiated? We know today, by means that were not\navailable to the ancient Hindus and Buddhists, that\n“nature”—the nature that is known and studied in the\nnatural sciences—simply doesn’t work this way. The laws of\nnature are subtle and marvelously complex (though also, in their own\nway, “simple”), but it is abundantly clear that they do\nnot work in such a way as to determine physical situations in\naccordance with the moral worth of persons, or in accordance with any\nmoral considerations whatsoever. The laws of nature, we might say, are\nno respecters of persons—or of morality. Rather, they are\nimpersonal in character, and in many cases are expressible in\nmathematical formulae that are far removed from the teleology that\npermeates human existence. So if there is a “karmic moral\norder” of the sort postulated by the Indian traditions, it must\nbe something radically different from the order of nature that (so far\nas science can discern) governs the physical processes of the world.\nAnd yet the two orders must be intimately related, for it is precisely\nthese physical processes which, in the end, are said to be disposed in\naccordance with one’s karma. It is wholly implausible that two\ndiverse systems of cosmic order such as this should arise from\nunrelated sources and come together accidentally; they must, then,\nhave a common source. If the common source of the natural order and\nthe karmic order is impersonal, we are still in need of some account\nof how and why it would be such as to produce these two quite\ndifferent sorts of order in the cosmos. These questions, it would\nseem, are much more readily answered if we postulate a\npersonal source of both the natural and the moral\norder—that is to say, a God who desired that there be created\npersons, and who wished to provide a stable natural order within which\nthey could live and exercise their varied powers.", "\nThis is of course a mere sketch of an argument that would require much\nmore space for its full development. We offer the above line of\nreasoning as an example of how one might compare the merits of\nalternative accounts of an afterlife. It is also offered to make the\npoint that the case for or against an afterlife is best understood in\nlight of one’s overall metaphysics. To see further how\nphilosophical reflection on an afterlife might be guided by\nmetaphysical considerations, consider briefly what has been called the\nargument from desire. Without question, many persons strongly desire\nthat there should be an afterlife and believe in one largely if not\nentirely for that reason. It is also beyond question that most\nphilosophers would regard this as a classic case of wishful thinking.\nBut this conclusion is too hasty; indeed, it commits the fallacy of\nbegging the question. To be sure, if the universe is naturalistic,\nthen the desire that many persons have for an afterlife does not\nconstitute any kind of evidence that an afterlife exists. One might\ninquire about the causes of such a desire and, given its widespread\noccurrence, might wonder about its possible Darwinian survival value.\nBut no evidential weight would attach to the desire on the assumption\nof naturalism.", "\nSuppose, on the other hand, that theism (or some view close to theism)\nis true. On this supposition, human life is not the accidental product\nof mindless forces that have operated with no thought to it or to\nanything else. On the contrary, human life (and the life of other\nrational creatures, if there are any) is the product of an\nevolutionary process, which was itself designed to produce such\nbeings, by a God who loves them and cares for them. If this is so,\nthen there is a strong case to be made that desires which are\nuniversal, or near-universal, among human beings are desires for which\nsatisfaction is possible. The inference does not amount to a\ncertainty; it is possible that humans have distorted God’s\npurpose for them, and certainly human conceptions of the way in which\ncertain desires could be satisfied may be wide of the mark. But the\npresumption must be that desires that are widespread or universal are\naimed at some genuine and attainable good, however inadequate the\nconceptions of that good held by many individuals may be. And if this\nis so, persons who take the desire for an afterlife as a reason to\nbelieve in one are on the side of right reason in doing so. Only if\none assumes from the outset that the universe is not human-friendly\ncan the charge of wishful thinking be sustained. In a recent\ncontribution, Johan Eddebo (2017) argues that because we do not know\nthat we are not in a human-friendly universe we cannot rationally rule\nout the possibility of an afterlife for human persons. ", "\nA great many persons who believe in life after death do so because of\nreasons that are internal to their own religious traditions. Hindus\nand Buddhists have their accounts of persons who remember in detail\nevents of their previous lives. Jews will rely on the visions of\nEzekiel and the traditions of the rabbis; Muslims on the prophecies of\nthe Koran. Christians will think of the resurrection of Jesus. Whether\nany of these appeals has serious evidentiary force is a question that\ncannot be pursued within the scope of this article; they must all the\nsame be included in any overall assessment of the rationality of\nbelief in an afterlife." ], "section_title": "5. Metaphysical Considerations Concerning Survival", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Bailey, Lee W. and Jenny Yates (eds.), 1996, The Near Death\nExperience: A Reader, New York: Routledge.", "Baker, Lynne Rudder, 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution\nView, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2001, “Material Persons and the\nDoctrine of Resurrection”, Faith and Philosophy, 18\n(2): 151–67.", "–––, 2005, “Death and the\nAfterlife”, in William Wainwright (ed.), 2001, The Oxford\nHandbook of Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress, pp. 366–91.", "Batthyany, Alexander and Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), 2009,\nIrreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness,\nHeidelberg: Universitaetsverlag Winter.", "Becker, Ernest, 1973, The Denial of Death, New York: The\nFree Press.", "Blackmore, Susan, 1993, Dying to Live, Buffalo:\nPrometheus Books.", "Blum, Deborah, 2006, Ghost Hunters: William James and the\nSearch for Scientific Proof of Life After Death, New York:\nPenguin Press.", "Braude, Stephen A., 2002, “The Problem of Super Psi”,\nin F. Steinkamp (ed.), 2002, Parapsychology, Philosophy, and the\nMind: Essays Honoring John Beloff, London: McFarland and\nCompany.", "Broad, C.D., 1953, Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical\nResearch, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company.", "Byerly, T. Ryan and Eric J. Silverman (eds.), 2017, Paradise\nUnderstood; New Philosophical Essays about Heaven, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Corcoran, Kevin, 2005, “The Constitution View of\nPersons”, in Joel B. Green and Stuart Palmer, eds., 2005, In\nSearch of the Soul: Four Views of the Mind-Body Problem, Downers\nGrove: InterVarsity Press, pp. 153–76.", "Collins, Robin, 1999, “Eastern Religions”, in Michael\nMurray (ed.), 1999, Reason for the Hope Within, Grand Rapids:\nEerdmans, pp. 182–216.", "Cullman, Oscar, 1955, “Immortality of the Soul or\nResurrection of the Dead: The Witness of the New Testament”, in\nKrister Stendahl (ed.), 1965, Immortality and Resurrection: Death\nin the Western World: Two Conflicting Currents of Thought, New\nYork: Macmillan, pp. 9–53.", "Dworkin, Ronald, 2013, Religion without God, Cambridge:\nHarvard University Press. ", "Eddebo, Johan, 2017, Death and the Self: A metaphysical\ninvestigation of the rationality of Afterlife Belief in the current\nIntellectual Climate, Uppsala: University of Uppsala Press.", "Foster, John, 2007, A World For Us: The case for\nPhenomenalistic Idealism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Gallup, G. and W. Proctor, 1982, Adventures in immortality: a\nlook beyond the threshold of death. New York, McGraw Hill, pp.\n198–200. “Have you, yourself, ever been on the verge of\ndeath or had a ‘close call’ which involved any unusual\nexperience at that time?”. Nationally 15% responded\n“yes”. ", "Griffin, David Ray, 1997, Parapsychology, Philosophy, and\nSpirituality: A Postmodern Exploration. Albany, NY: SUNY\nPress.", "Habermas, Gary R., 1996, “Near Death Experiences and the\nEvidence—A Review Essay”, Christian Scholar’s\nReview, 26(1): 78–85.", "Hartshorne, Charles, 1962, The Logic of Perfection and Other\nEssays in Neoclassical Metaphysics, La Salle, Ill.: Open\nCourt.", "Hasker, William, 1989, God, Time and Knowledge, Ithaca:\nCornell University Press.", "–––, 1999, The Emergent Self, Ithaca:\nCornell University Press", "–––, 2011, “Materialism and the\nResurrection: Are the Prospects Improving?”, European\nJournal for the Philosophy of Religion, 3(1): 83–103.", "Heim, Albert von st. Gallen, 1892, “Notizen über den\nTod durch absturz”, Jahrbuch des Schweizer Alpenclub,\n27: 327–37; translated, with an introduction, by Roy Kletti and\nRussell Noyes, Jr., “The Experiences of Dying from Falls”,\nOmega, 3 (1972): 45–52.", "Hick, John, 1983, Philosophy of Religion, 3rd Edition.\nEnglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.", "Jansen, K.L.R., 1997, “The ketamine model of the near-death\nexperience: A central role for the N-methyl-D-aspartate\nreceptor”, Journal of Near-Death Studies, 16:\n5–26.", "Kierkegaard, Søren, 1845, “At a Graveside”,\nHoward Hong and Edna Hong (trans.), Three Discourses on Imagined\nOccasions, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp.\n69–102.", "Knine, David M., 2010, “Hindu Eschatology”, in The\nOxford Handbook of Eschatoloy, Jerry Walls (ed.), Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, pp. 170–190.", "Knuths, Elliot, 2018, “A Problem for Christian\nMaterialism”, The European Journal for Philosophy of\nReligion, 10(3): 205–213. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v10i3.2631", "Koons, Robert C. and George Bealer (eds.), 2010, The Waning of\nMaterialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Lofton, Keith, 2017, Christian Physicalism? Philosophical\ntheological criticism, Anham, MD: Lexington Books.", "Loose, Jonathan, Angus J.L. Menuge, and J.P. Moreland (eds.),\n2018, The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, Oxford:\nWiley-Blackwell Publishers.", "Martin, Michael and Keith Augustine (eds.), 2015, The Myth of\nan Afterlife: The Case against Life after Death, Anham, MD: Roman\nand Littlefield.", "Moody, Raymond, 1975, Life After Life, New York:\nBantam/Mockingbird.", "Moreland, J. P. and Gary Habermas, 1998, Beyond Death:\nExploring the Evidence for Immortality, Wheaton, IL: Crossway\nBooks.", "Nattier, Jan, 2010, “Buddhist Eschatology”, in The\nOxford Companion to Eschatology, Jerry Walls (ed.), Oxford:\nOxford University Press, pp. 151–169.", "Noyes, R., 1972, “The experience of dying”,\nPsychiatry, 35: 174–184.", "Perry, John, 1978, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and\nImmortality, Indianapolis: Hackett.", "Potts, Michael, 2002, “The Evidential Value of Near-Death\nExperiences for Belief in Life after Death”, Journal of\nNear-Death Studies, 20(4): 233–258.", "Price, H.H., 1953, “Survival and the Idea of ‘Another\nWorld’”, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical\nResearch, 50 (182): 1–25; reprinted in John Hick (ed.),\nClassical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of\nReligion, second edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970,\npp. 370–93 (page references to Hick 1970).", "Ring, Kenneth, 1980, Life at Death: A Scientific Investigation\nof the Near-Death Experience, New York: Coward, McCann, and\nGeoghegan.", "Sabom, Michael, 1982, Recollections of Death: A Medical\nInvestigation, New York: Harper and Row.", "–––, 1998, Light and Death: One\nDoctor’s Fascinating Account of Near-Death Experiences,\nGrand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.", "Scheffler, Samuel, 2016, Death and the Afterlife, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Schlick, Moritz, 1936, “Meaning and Verification”,\nThe Philosophical Review, 45: 339–369.", "Singer, Peter, 1993, How are we to live? New South Wales:\nRandom House Australia.", "Steinkamp, Fiona (ed.), 2002, Parapsychology, Philosophy, and\nthe Mind: Essays Honoring John Beloff, London: McFarland and\nCompany.", "Taliaferro, Charles and Elliot Knuths, 2017, “Thought\nExperiments in Philosophy of Religion: The Virtues of phenomenological\nrealism and values”, Open Theology, 3(1):\n167–173.", "van Inwagen, Peter, 1992 [1978], “The Possibility of\nResurrection”, International Journal for the Philosophy of\nReligion, 9 (1978): 114–21; reprinted in Paul Edwards\n(ed.), Immortality, New York: Macmillan, 1992, pp.\n242–46 (page references are to Edwards (ed.) 1992).", "van Lommel, Pim, Ruud van Wees, Vincent Meyers, and Ingrid\nElfferich, 2001, “Near-Death Experiences in Survivors of Cardiac\nArrest: A Prospective Study in the Netherlands”.\nLancet, 358 (9298): 2039–2045.", "Wielenberg, Erik J., 2013, “God and the Meaning of\nLife”, in Joshua W. Seachris (ed.), Exploring the Meaning of\nLife: An Anthology and Guide, Madden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp.\n335–352.", "Zaleski, Carol, 1987, Otherworld Journeys: Accounts of\nNear-Death Experiences in Medieval and Modern Times, New York:\nOxford University Press.", "Zimmerman, Dean A., 1999, “The Compatibility of Materialism\nand Survival: The ‘Falling Elevator’ Model”,\nFaith and Philosophy, 16(2): 194–212.", "–––, 2010, “Bodily Resurrection: The\nFalling Elevator Model Revisited”, in George Gasser (ed.),\nPersonal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our\nDeath? Farnham, England: Ashgate Publishing, pp.\n51–66." ]	[ { "href": "../death/", "text": "death" }, { "href": "../dualism/", "text": "dualism" }, { "href": "../heaven-hell/", "text": "heaven and hell in Christian thought" }, { "href": "../mind-indian-buddhism/", "text": "mind: in Indian Buddhist Philosophy" }, { "href": "../physicalism/", "text": "physicalism" }, { "href": "../philosophy-religion/", "text": "religion: philosophy of" }, { "href": "../ancient-soul/", "text": "soul, ancient theories of" } ]
agency	Agency	First published Mon Aug 10, 2015; substantive revision Mon Oct 28, 2019	[ "In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to\nact, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of\nthis capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard\nconception and a standard theory of action. The former construes\naction in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the\nintentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s\nmental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception\nand a standard theory of agency. There are alternative conceptions of\nagency, and it has been argued that the standard theory fails to\ncapture agency (or distinctively human agency). Further, it seems that\ngenuine agency can be exhibited by beings that are not capable of\nintentional action, and it has been argued that agency can and should\nbe explained without reference to causally efficacious mental states\nand events.", "Debates about the nature of agency have flourished over the past\nfew decades in philosophy and in other areas of research (including\npsychology, cognitive neuroscience, social science, and\nanthropology). In philosophy, the nature of agency is an important\nissue in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, the\ndebates on free will and moral responsibility, in ethics, meta-ethics,\nand in the debates on the nature of reasons and practical\nrationality. For the most part, this entry focuses on conceptual and\nmetaphysical questions concerning the nature of agency. In the final\nsections, it provides an overview of empirically informed accounts of\nthe sense of agency and of various empirical challenges to the\ncommonsense assumption that our reasons and our conscious intentions\nmake a real difference to how we act." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Conceptions, theories, and kinds of agency", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Agency as intentional action", "2.2 Agency as initiation by the agent", "2.3 Agency and distinctively human action", "2.4 Agency without mental representations", "2.5 Other kinds of agency: mental, epistemic, shared, collective, relational, artificial" ] }, { "content_title": "3. The metaphysics of agency", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Three metaphysical frameworks", "3.2 Deviant causal chains", "3.3 Disappearing agents, naturalism, and dual standpoint theory", "3.4 Actions, events, processes, and omissions" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Empirical challenges and the role of consciousness", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Reasons and causes", "4.2 Situationism", "4.3 The Libet experiment and Wegner’s challenge", "4.4 Automaticity and dual-system theory", "4.5 The sense of agency", "4.6 Perception and attention" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "In a very broad sense, agency is virtually everywhere. Whenever\nentities enter into causal relationships, they can be said to act on\neach other and interact with each other, bringing about changes in\neach other. In this very broad sense, it is possible to identify\nagents and agency, and patients and patiency, virtually \neverywhere.[1]\nUsually, though, the term ‘agency’ is used in a much narrower sense to denote the performance of intentional actions. This\nway of thinking about agency has a long history in philosophy and it\ncan be traced back to Hume and Aristotle, among other historical\nfigures. In contemporary analytic philosophy, it is most commonly\nassociated with the influential work of Anscombe (1957) and Davidson\n(1963). Anscombe’s and Davidson’s views differ\nsignificantly in many respects, but they share the central doctrine\nthat action is to be explained in terms of the intentionality of intentional action. In the debates that followed, the philosophy of\naction revolved largely around the notion of intentional action. For\nsome time, the term ‘agency’ was rarely used, and if it was, it was usually taken to refer to the exercise of the capacity to perform intentional actions.[2] This has changed in the more recent\ndebate, where talk about agency has become more and more common in\nmany areas of philosophy (and in other areas of\nresearch).[3] To\nsome extent, this focus on the notion of agency has been fuelled by a\nresistance to the assimilation of agency to intentional action. As we\nwill see in the following section, this resistance amounts in some\ncases to the rejection of the standard conception of action,\nin some cases it amounts to the rejection of the\nstandard theory of action, and in some it amounts to the\nmore modest claim that there are different kinds of\nagency." ], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "The contributions of Anscombe and Davidson have established a\nstandard conception of action, and Davidson’s work has provided\nthe groundwork for a standard theory of action. At the core of the\nstandard conception are the following two claims. First, the notion of\nintentional action is more fundamental than the notion of action. In\nparticular, action is to be explained in terms of the intentionality\nof intentional action. Second, there is a close connection between\nintentional action and acting for a reason.", "There are two ways of spelling out the first claim (which\ncorrespond to two different views on the individuation of actions; see\nsection 3.4). According to the first, one\nand the same event can be more than one action under different\ndescriptions, and an event is an action just in case it is an\nintentional action under some description. An action, that\nis, may be intentional under some description and unintentional under\nothers (Anscombe 1957; Davidson 1963). Suppose that you alert the\nburglar by turning on the light, and suppose that this is one event\nthat is intentional under the description ‘turning on the\nlight’, but not under ‘alerting the burglar’. On this view, alerting the burglar is nevertheless something that you do,\ngiven that the event is an intentional action under some description.\nAccording to a second way of spelling out the first claim, something\nis an action either if it is identical with or “generated\nby” an intentional action (Goldman 1970; see also Ginet\n1990).[4] On this view, alerting the burglar is an action of yours either if it\nis an intentional action or if it is generated by an intentional\naction (your turning on the light, in this case). If it is merely\ngenerated by an intentional action, it is an unintentional action of\nyours. On both views, intentional action is more fundamental than\naction itself: action derives from and is dependent on intentional\naction.[5]", "According to the second claim of the standard conception, there is\na close connection between acting intentionally and acting for a\nreason. According to Anscombe and Davidson’s early view, this\nclose connection is identity. Following Aristotle, they both held the\nview that to act intentionally is to act for a reason, and that to\nact for a reason is to act in a way that can be rationalized by the\npremises of a sound practical syllogism, which consists, typically,\nof a major premise that corresponds to the agent’s goal and a\nminor premise that corresponds to the agent’s take on how to\nattain the goal. Furthermore, Davidson held the view that having an\nintention consists in having a desire and a belief that correspond to\nthe major and the minor premise of the relevant syllogism (Davidson\n1963, 1970; see also Goldman 1970; Audi\n1986).[6]", "One can still find a fairly widespread commitment to this\ndesire-belief version of the standard conception (in the philosophy of\nmind, the philosophy of psychology, ethics, meta-ethics, and in other\nareas of research). In the philosophy of action, however, it is now\nwidely thought that intentions cannot be reduced to desires and\nbeliefs (and combinations thereof). On this view, intentions play a\ncrucial and irreducible role in practical reasoning, long-term\nplanning, and in the initiation and guidance of action (see,\nespecially, Bratman 1987; see also Harman 1976; Brand 1984; Bishop\n1989; Mele 1992, 2003; Enç 2003). It is nevertheless still\nwidely accepted that there is a close connection between intentional\naction and acting for reasons and that intentional actions are\ntypically performed for reasons (Mele and Moser 1994; Mele 2003;\nEnç 2003; Clarke 2010b, for instance).", "The standard conception is not committed to a particular\naccount of what it is to act intentionally and for reasons, and it is\nnot committed to a particular account of the nature of reason\nexplanations. It is important to distinguish the standard conception\nfrom the standard theory, which provides a causal account of\nintentional action and reason explanation. This theory says, very\nroughly, that something is an intentional action and done for reasons\njust in case it is caused by the right mental states and events in the\nright way. The right mental states and events are states and events\nthat rationalize the action from the agent’s point of view (such\nas desires, beliefs, and intentions). The right way of causation is\nnon-deviant causation (see\nsection 3.2). On this view, a reason explanation is an explanation in terms of\nmental states and events that cause the action and that rationalize it\nfrom the agent’s point of view (typically by providing a\nmeans-end rationale). This theory is often called “the causal\ntheory of action”. Strictly speaking, it is an event-causal\ntheory and it consists of an event-causal theory of reason explanation\nand an event-causal theory of intentional action. In conjunction with\nthe standard conception, this causal theory provides us with a theory\nof action, which has been the standard theory in the contemporary\nphilosophy of mind and action (see also the entry on\naction).", "As indicated, the standard conception is compatible with non-causal\ntheories of intentional action and reason explanation. It is generally\nagreed that a reason explanation of an action usually renders the\naction intelligible by revealing the agent’s goal or intention.\nAccording to non-causal theories, having the relevant goals or\nintentions does not consist in the possession of causally\nefficacious mental states or events (Melden 1961; Ginet 1990;\nO’Connor 2000; Sehon 2005). Non-causal theories are, however,\nwidely rejected (the most influential critique is due to Davidson\n1963; see also Goldman 1970: 76–85; Mele 2003: 38–51;\nClarke 2003: 21–24). The standard conception is compatible,\nfurthermore, with dual standpoint theories. We will turn to this view\nin\nsection 3.3." ], "section_title": "2. Conceptions, theories, and kinds of agency", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "The standard conception of action provides us with a conception of\nagency. According to this view, a being has the capacity to exercise agency just\nin case it has the capacity to act intentionally, and the exercise of\nagency consists in the performance of intentional actions and, in many\ncases, in the performance of unintentional actions (that derive from\nthe performance of intentional actions; see\nsection 2). Call this the standard conception of agency. The standard theory of action provides us with a theory of agency, according to which a being\nhas the capacity to act intentionally just in case it has the right\nfunctional organization: just in case the instantiation of certain\nmental states and events (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions)\nwould cause the right events (such as certain movements) in the right\nway. According to this standard theory of agency, the exercise of\nagency consists in the instantiation of the right causal relations\nbetween agent-involving states and events. (Proponents include\nDavidson 1963, 1971; Goldman 1970; Brand 1984; Bratman 1987; Dretske\n1988; Bishop 1989; Mele 1992, 2003; Enç 2003.)", "The most serious problem for this standard theory has been the\nproblem of deviant causal chains. Further, some have argued that this\nview altogether fails to capture agency, because it reduces actions to\nmere happenings. We will turn to those issues in\nsection 3. Recently, it has been argued that reasons for actions cannot be the\ncauses of actions, because reasons are facts or states of affairs, not\nmental states or events (Dancy 2000; Alvarez 2010). But the standard\ntheory is not committed to the claim that reasons are identical with\nmental entities. It is, in particular, compatible with the view that\nreasons are the things that are represented by the contents of the\nrelevant mental states and events (see Scanlon 1998: 56–64; Mele\n2003: 82–84; Setiya 2007: 28–31)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Agency as intentional action" }, { "content": [ "It has often been claimed, and it is widely agreed, that agency\ninvolves the initiation of action by the\nagent.[7] But it\nhas been controversial what this consists in. The standard conception\nis compatible with the claim that intentional actions are initiated\nby the agent, and proponents of the standard theory have argued that\ninitiation can be explained in terms of causation by the\nagent’s mental states and events. According to desire-belief\nversions of the view, initiation by the agent consists in causation\nby the relevant desire-belief pairs (Goldman 1970; Davidson 1971;\nDretske 1988). According to more recent versions, initiation consists\nin causation by the relevant intentions (Brand 1984; Bratman 1987;\nBishop 1989; Mele 1992, 2003; Enç 2003). Opponents of the\nstandard conception argue, however, that an agent’s power to\ninitiate action cannot be reduced to the capacity to act\nintentionally and for reasons. They argue that the exercise of agency\nmay be entirely spontaneous, in the sense that an agent may initiate\nan action for no reason and without prior intent. On this view,\nreasons and intentions may have a strong and even a decisive\ninfluence on how an agent acts. But agency has its source in the\npower to initiate, and the exercise of this power cannot be reduced\nto the agent’s being moved by reasons or intentions. This is an\nalternative conception of agency (Ginet 1990; O’Connor\n2000; Lowe 2008; see also McCann 1998; for critical discussion see\nMele 2003: 38–51, 71–76; Clarke 2003:\n17–24). Proponents of this alternative conception reject the\nstandard theory and they reject, more generally, any account of\nagency in terms of causal relations between agent-involving states\nand events. According to some, the initiation of action consists in\nirreducible agent-causation, others appeal to uncaused mental acts of\nthe will. The main positions on this issue correspond to the main\npositions in the metaphysics of agency, to which we turn in\nsection 3.1." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Agency as initiation by the agent" }, { "content": [ "In an influential article, Frankfurt (1971) argued that the\ndifference between persons and other agents consists in the structure\nof their will. Only persons reflect on and care about their\nmotivations. According to Frankfurt, this reflective evaluation of our\nmotives usually results in the formation of second-order desires:\ndesires that are directed at first-order desires (which are directed\nat goals and actions). When a person wants to have a certain desire\nand wants to be moved by it, then he or she is said to\n“identify” with the desire and its motivational efficacy.\nOn this hierarchical account of agency, the role of higher-order\nattitudes is essential to the kind of agency that distinguishes\npersons from other agents. Taylor (1977) took this as a starting point\nfor an account of distinctively human agency, under the\nassumption that the distinction between persons and non-persons is,\nessentially, the distinction between human and non-human agents. It is\nnot entirely clear whether Frankfurt and Taylor meant to provide an\nalternative to the standard theory of agency or an extension\nof it.[8] On one\nreading, they accepted the account of intentional agency provided by\nthe standard theory, and they proposed a hierarchical extension of the\nstandard theory that captures the kind of agency that is distinctive\nof persons or human agents. (For an influential critique of such\nhierarchical accounts see Watson 1975.)", "According to Velleman (1992), Frankfurt’s observation that an\nagent may fail to identify with a particular motive points to a\nfundamental flaw in the standard theory. As it seems always possible\nthat an agent “disowns” the mental attitudes that cause an\naction, those attitudes do not “add up to the agent’s\nbeing involved” (1992: 463). This shows, according to Velleman,\nthat the standard theory captures, at best, actions that are\ndefective. It fails, in particular, to capture “human\naction par excellence”, because it fails to account for\nthe agent’s participation. Velleman rejects the appeal to\nirreducible agent-causation (see\nsection 3.1), and he argues that this leaves only one strategy for solving the\nproblem: we must find a mental attitude that the agent cannot disown\nand that is, therefore, fit to play the role of the agent. We must,\nthat is, find a mental attitude that is the agent,\nfunctionally speaking. According to Velleman, the desire to act in\naccordance with reasons is fit to play this role.", "Bratman (2000, 2001) agrees with Velleman that the standard theory\ndoes not explain genuine self-governance. On his view, though, an\naccount of “full-blown agency”, as he calls it, does not\nrequire reference to a mental attitude that the agent cannot disown.\nBuilding on his work on temporally extended planning agency (Bratman\n1987), he argues that an agent’s “self-governing\npolicies” have the “authority to speak for the\nagent”, because they help to establish and support the\nagent’s identity across time, and because they specify which\ndesires are to be treated as providing justifying reasons in practical\ndeliberation. According to Bratman, these self-governing policies\nexplain what it is for an agent “to take a stand in favor of or\nagainst certain motivations, a stand that can itself be subject to\nreexamination and revision” (2000: 50–51). (For a critical\ndiscussion of Bratman’s account see Hornsby 2004 and Franklin 2017.)", "In defense of the standard theory, Mele (2003: Ch. 10) has argued\nthat the search for a mental attitude that plays the role of the agent\nis misguided and that Velleman’s critique of the view is off\ntarget. As Mele points out, it seems clear that a desire cannot\npossibly be the agent, because agents deliberate, decide, and act.\nDesires do none of these things. He suggests that any talk of a mental\nattitude as playing the role of the agent can at best be metaphorical.\nFurther, there is no obvious reason why an agent’s failure to\nidentify with a motive should be diagnosed in terms of the\nagent’s failure to participate. It seems more plausible to\nsuggest that the agent does participate in such cases, but in a\ndefective manner. Once defective participation is distinguished from a\nfailure to participate, it is easy to avoid Velleman’s\nconclusion that the standard theory “leaves out the\nagent”. Moreover, one can then separate the question of whether\nthe standard theory accounts for the agent’s participation from\nthe question of whether it captures human action par\nexcellence. According to Mele, the human agent is simply a human\nbeing who acts. On this view, the agent does play some role in all\ninstances of agency, no matter how deficient. The standard theory\nprovides, first and foremost, an account of what it is for an agent to\nperform intentional actions. It does not claim that the capacity to\nperform intentional actions is the capacity that separates human from\nnon-human agency, and it does not claim to give an account of more\nrefined or excellent kinds of human agency, such as self-controlled,\nautonomous, wholehearted, or free agency. It is an interesting and\nimportant task to investigate whether or not the standard theory can\nbe extended so as to account for the more refined or excellent kinds\nof human agency (Mele 1995; Bratman 2007, for instance). But to reject\nthe view because it fails to do so is to misconstrue its aim and scope\n(see also\nsection 3.3)." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Agency and distinctively human action" }, { "content": [ "Arguments for the claim that the standard theory does not account\nfor important aspects of agency are usually driven by a focus on\ndistinctively human agency. Once we shift our focus to non-human\nagents, and simpler organisms, a very different challenge\nemerges. When we turn to such agents, it seems that the standard\ntheory is clearly too demanding. The view explains agency in terms of\nthe agent’s desires, beliefs, and intentions. Usually, it is\nassumed that this is an explanation in terms of mental\nrepresentations: in terms of intentional mental states and events that\nhave representational contents (typically, propositional contents). It\nseems, however, that there are beings that are capable of genuine\nagency and that do not possess representational mental states. We can\ndistinguish here between three claims (and three\nchallenges). According to the first, there are non-human beings that\nare capable of agency and that do not possess representational mental\nstates. Second, there are many instances of human agency that can and\nshould be explained without the ascription of representational mental\nstates. Third, all instances of agency can and should be explained\nwithout the ascription of representational mental states. We turn to\neach claim in turn.", "We have a pervasive tendency to interpret and explain behavior in\nterms of intentional mental states. We tend, even, to interpret the\ninteraction between animated objects in terms of desires, beliefs, and\nintentions (Heider and Simmel 1944). This raises the question of when\nit is appropriate to attribute mental states in the explanation of\nbehavior. According to an instrumentalist stance (Dennett 1987:\nCh. 2), the question of when it is appropriate to ascribe mental\nstates cannot be separated from the question of when it is appropriate\nto ascribe agency, and both questions are to be answered in terms of\npredictive success: it is appropriate to attribute mental states in\nthe explanation of agency when doing so supports successful\npredictions of behavior. However, most proponents of the standard\ntheory presume some form of realism, according to which the ascription\nof mental states is appropriate only if the agent in question\npossesses the right internal states with the right representational\ncontents. The question of what the possession of representational\nmental states consists in is one of the most controversial questions\nin the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and it is clearly\nbeyond the scope of this entry (see the entries on\nmental representation\nand\ncognitive science). Consider, though, the following remarks. Davidson (1982) held the view\nthat only human agents have the relevant mental attitudes, because he\nthought that having such attitudes requires linguistic\ncompetence. Others have argued that we are justified in ascribing\nrepresentational mental states to non-human agents if doing so\nprovides the best explanation of their behavior (Allen and Bekoff\n1997, for instance). Sometimes it is rather difficult to decide\nwhether or not the best explanation of an agent’s behavior\nrequires the ascription of representational mental states. Sterelny\n(2001: Ch. 11, 12), for instance, has argued that plausible\nexplanations in terms of desires can sometimes be replaced by equally\ngood explanations in terms of drives. The ascription of a desire is\nusually construed as the ascription of a representational mental\nstate, whereas a drive can be construed in terms of more basic\nmechanisms (and without the ascription of representational\ncontent). What is important to bear in mind, here, is that the issue\nconcerns not only the possession of the relevant mental states and\nevents. It concerns, moreover, the capacity to combine or process the\ncontents of such attitudes in rational inferences: the capacity to\ntreat the relevant contents as premises in practical reasoning (as\nemphasized by Anscombe 1957 and Davidson 1970).", "Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is appropriate to\nascribe representational mental states to non-human beings of various\nkinds. It may still be the case that there are other kinds of\nnon-human beings that are capable of agency and that do not possess\nrepresentational mental states. Would this show that the standard\ntheory is too demanding? Only if the standard theory is construed as\nproviding an account of agency as such. According to a less\ndemanding view, the standard theory provides an account of one\nparticularly interesting and central kind of agency:\nintentional agency (and the kind of unintentional agency that derives\nfrom it; see\nsection 2).[9] On this construal, the standard theory is perfectly compatible with\nthe claim that there are more basic kinds of agency, including kinds\nof agency that do not require the possession of representational\nmental states. It is, for instance, compatible with what Barandiaran\net al. (2009) call “minimal agency”. On their view, an\nagent is a unified entity that is distinguishable from its environment\nand that is doing something by itself in accord with a certain goal\n(or norm). This view departs from the standard conception and theory\nin its characterization of action (“doing something”) in\nterms of the “adaptive regulation” of the agent’s\n“coupling with the environment” and in terms of metabolic\nself-maintenance (inspired by Varela et al. 1974). They suggest that\norganisms as simple as bacteria exhibit this minimal kind of\nagency. The crucial point is that this provides an account of\ngoal-directed behavior that does not appeal to the mental\nrepresentation of goals. Barandiaran et al. suggest, rather, that\neven very simple organisms can be said to have the intrinsic\ngoal to be: to bring about the continuation of their\nexistence.", "We turn now to the second claim, which says that many instances of\nhuman agency can and should be explained without the ascription of\nrepresentational mental states. This view is usually based on and\nmotivated by embodied and enactive approaches in the philosophy of\nmind and cognitive science. Some versions of this approach are\ninspired by the works Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (Dreyfus\n1991, 2002), others are based on more recent developments in robotics\nand dynamical systems theory (Brooks 1991; Beer 1995). Common to such\nviews is the focus on skillful and “online” engagement with the world:\nthe ability to engage with others and with one’s circumstances\nby responding to the demands of the situation in a skillful and often\neffortless manner, without conscious deliberation, reasoning, or\nplanning (often called “skilled coping”). Examples of\nhuman agency include instances of habitual action, such as the actions\nthat one performs while driving a car, and cases where the agent is\nengaged in a responsive flow of interaction, such as in jazz\nimprovisation or in verbal exchanges. Examples from robotics include\nskills like the coordination of limb movements and the ability to\nnavigate through novel environments. The challenge to the standard\ntheory often involves the following three points. First, it is argued\nthat the explanation of such skills and abilities in terms of mental\nrepresentations is both costly and clumsy: it imposes very high\ndemands on the agent’s information-processing resources and it\nleads to an inelegant and implausible overpopulation of highly\nspecific mental representations. Second, it is pointed out that\ncurrent accounts of mental representation are untenable or, at least,\ncontroversial and that there is no obvious reason to think that there\nwill ever be a generally accepted account of mental\nrepresentation. Third, it is argued that the explanation of skilled\ncoping does not require the ascription of representational mental\nstates, because it can be explained in terms of behavioral\ndispositions and direct guidance by the relevant features of the\nsituation. The proposed conclusion is that we should, therefore,\nexplain instances of skilled coping without reference to\nrepresentational mental states and events.", "In response, proponents of the standard theory (and of\nrepresentational theories of mind) usually argue as follows. First, it\nis pointed out that the standard theory does not require that the\nagent considers the relevant mental contents in conscious deliberation\nor reasoning. This reduces the information-processing demands to a\nsignificant degree. Second, it is argued that the standard theory is\ncompatible with explanations of habitual actions in terms of motor\nschemata (or motor intentions). Motor schemata are not represented in\nthe contents of personal-level mental states, and they are usually\nrecruited automatically in the service of personal-level goals and\nintentions. The utilization of motor schemata further reduces the\nrequired processing load. Third, it is pointed out that most instances\nof skilled coping do not occur in an intentional vacuum, as it were.\nThey are, rather, usually constrained by and often integrated with the\nagent’s long-term goals and intentions. Given this, it seems\nthat a full explanation of skilled coping must, at some point or\nlevel, make reference to representational mental states after\nall. (For more on this see Clark and Toribio 1994; Antony 2002; Rey\n2002; Adams 2010; Clarke 2010b; Schlosser 2018.)", "According to the third claim, all instances of agency, including\nall instances of human agency, can and should be explained without the\nascription of representational mental states. This position is usually\nmotivated by radical versions of the embodied and enactive approach to\nthe mind (Chemero 2009; Silberstein and Chemero 2011; Hutto and Myin\n2014). The main strategy here is usually to generalize the argument\noutlined above: explanations in terms of representational mental\nstates are costly and clumsy; there is no generally accepted account\nof mental representation; and there is reason to think that we will,\neventually, be able to explain all kinds of agency without the\nascription of representational mental states. This radical view raises\nsome obvious and difficult questions. How can one explain our ability\nto deliberate about the future without assuming mental\nrepresentations? How can one explain reasoning about abstract\nconcepts, counterfactuals, and theoretical generalizations? And how\ncan one explain that our agency is to a significant extent motivated,\nguided, and constrained by our long-terms plans and commitments?\nTemporally extended planning agency (Bratman 1987, 2000) is clearly a\n“representation-hungry” phenomenon: it is difficult to see\nhow it can be explained without the ascription of representational\nmental states (Clark and Toribio 1994; Schlosser 2018; see also the entry on\nembodied cognition)." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Agency without mental representations" }, { "content": [ "There is, as we have seen, good reason to distinguish between\ndifferent kinds of agency. The standard theory offers an account of\nwhat is, arguably, the most central kind of agency: intentional agency\n(and the kind of unintentional agency that derives from it; see\nsection 2). This can be distinguished from higher or more refined kinds of agency,\nsuch as self-controlled, autonomous, and free agency, and it can be\ndistinguished from more basic kinds of agency that do not require the\nascription of representational mental states. Apart from that, there are\nseveral candidates for further kinds of agency. They include mental\nagency, shared agency, collective agency, relational agency, and\nartificial agency. In each case, we can ask whether the agency in\nquestion can be explained in terms of the standard conception and\ntheory, or whether it is indeed a different kind of agency. The main\nfocus in this section will be on mental agency, and we will address the\nother candidates only very briefly.", "It may seem obvious that our mental lives are filled with mental\naction. We attend, consider, judge, reason, deliberate, accept,\nendorse, decide, try, and so on. It may seem that these are all things\nthat we do. If we consider such cases through the standard theory of\nagency, we encounter immediately two difficulties. First, it seems\nthat such mental occurrences are hardly ever, if ever, intentional\nactions. According to the standard theory, an event is an intentional\naction of the type A only if the agent has an intention that\nincludes A in its content. In the basic case, this would be\nan intention to A. In an instrumental case, this would be an\nintention to perform some other action B in order\nto A. Now, thoughts are individuated in part by their\ncontents. Take the thought that p. According to the standard\ntheory, thinking that p is an intentional action only if the\nagent has an intention that includes “think\nthat p” in its content. This is rather odd and\nproblematic, because we would have to have the intention to think a\ncertain thought before we think it. Second, there are problems with\nthe central case of decision-making. According to the standard\ntheory, deciding to A would be an intentional action only if\none already had the intention to make a decision that includes\n“deciding to A” in its content. This seems,\nagain, rather odd and problematic. Further, our reasons for making a\ndecision to A are usually our reasons\nto A—they are reasons for performing\nthe action. According to the standard theory, something is\nan action only if it has a reason explanation (in terms of the\nagent’s desires, beliefs, and intentions). As reasons are\nusually reasons for action, it is again difficult to see how making a\ndecision can ever be an action. Considerations of this kind may lead\none to conclude that thoughts are hardly ever, if ever, mental actions\n(see Strawson 2003).", "It is not difficult to avoid this conclusion, as Mele\n(1997, 2003: Ch. 9, 2009b) has shown. Consider again the central case\nof decision-making, and assume that making a decision consists in the\nformation of an intention. According to the standard theory, the\nformation of an intention is an action if it is an intentional action\nunder some description (or if it is either identical with or generated\nby an intentional action; see\nsection 2). What could plausibly be the\nagent’s intention in making a decision? Mele suggests that\nprocesses of decision-making are usually motivated by the intention to\nsettle the practical question at hand. This proposal avoids the\nproblem outlined above. Suppose the agent decides to A. For\nthis to be an action, it is not required that the agent has the\nintention to decide to A. For if the agent has the intention\nto settle the question by making a decision, making the decision is\nintentional under a description. In particular, making a\ndecision is then an intentional action and making the\ndecision to A is then an unintentional action (that is either\nidentical with or generated by the intentional action of\nmaking a\ndecision).[10]\nSimilar considerations apply to the mentioned issue concerning reason\nexplanation and to other cases, such as remembering. Mele (2009b)\nargues that remembering something is never an intentional action,\nbecause no one has ever the intention to remember the particular\ncontent in question. But there is nevertheless a closely associated\nintentional mental action that one might perform: intentionally trying\nto bring it about that one remembers the particular content in\nquestion. See Shepherd (2015) for a defense of the view that decisions are intentional actions by construing them as extensions and conclusions of deliberative activity.", "Hieronymi (2009) takes a very different line. She thinks that we\nengage in mental agency whenever we settle the question of whether to\ndo or whether to believe something, and she argues that this kind of\nmental agency differs from ordinary intentional agency, primarily due\nto a difference in control. According to Hieronymi, we have\n“evaluative control” over our mental attitudes. This\nconsists in the ability to form and revise “our take on\nthings”, and it is to be distinguished from the kind of\nvoluntary control that we have over our overt bodily\nactions. According to volitionist theories of agency, mental acts of\nwilling (choosing or trying) are also different in kind from overt\nbodily actions. On such views, mental acts of willing are furthermore\nfundamental, in the sense that they are the source of overt\nagency (Ginet 1990; McCann 1998; Lowe 2008; more on this in\nsection 3.1).", "\nEpistemic agency concerns the control that agents may\nexercise over their beliefs (and other doxastic states). It is common\nto distinguish between two main positions: indirect doxastic\nvoluntarism and direct doxastic voluntarism. The former concerns the\nways in which we may acquire or revise beliefs by doing research,\nevaluating the evidence, considering opposing opinions, and so on. It\nis fairly uncontroversial that we can exercise control over our\nbeliefs in such indirect ways. In contrast, direct doxastic\nvoluntarism is very controversial. It says that we have direct\nvoluntary control over some of our beliefs, where voluntary control is\nusually understood as the kind of control that agents exercise in the\nperformance of intentional actions. A main issue here is that direct\ndoxastic voluntarism appears to be incompatible with the nature of\nbeliefs. Beliefs are supposed to represent the world (or “aim at\ntruth”). One may argue that there is no fundamental difference in the\ncontrol over action and belief-formation, because in both cases the\ncontrol consists basically in reason-responsiveness. But this proposal\noverlooks the central role of intentions. According to the standard\ntheory, actions must be initiated and guided by intentions, in\naddition to being responsive to reasons. The challenge is to find\nbeliefs-formations that are initiated and guided by intentions in the\nsame or similar way as intentional actions. (For a more extensive\noverview and references see Vitz 2019.)", "Shared agency occurs when two or more individuals do\nsomething together (such as carry a piece of furniture or sing a\nsong). Collective agency occurs when two or more individuals\nact as a group (in accordance with certain principles or procedures\nthat constitute and organize the group). Research on shared and\ncollective agency has flourished over the past two decades or so. One\ncentral question has been whether shared and collective agency can be\nreduced to the agency of the individuals involved, or whether they are\nconstitutive of different kinds of agency—whether they are, in\nsome sense, something over and above individual agency. An account of\ncollective agency in terms of the standard theory raises the question\nof whether it makes sense to attribute mental states and events (such\nas desires, beliefs, and intentions) to groups of individuals. (For\nreferences and discussion see the entries on\nshared agency\nand\ncollective intentionality.)", "The notion of relational agency derives from relational\naccounts of autonomy. According to feminist critiques, traditional\naccounts of autonomy are overly individualistic, insofar as they\noverlook or neglect the importance of interpersonal relationships in\nthe development and sustenance of an autonomous individual. As\nWestlund (2009) points out, however, most traditional accounts are\ncompatible with the feminist emphasis on interpersonal relationships\nas long as relationships and dependence on others are construed as\nbeing causally necessary for the development and sustenance\nof an individual agent. Autonomy is genuinely relational only if\ninterpersonal relationships and dependence are constitutive\nof autonomy. On Westlund’s own view, autonomous agency requires\nan “irreducibly dialogical form of reflectiveness and\nresponsiveness to others” (2009: 28). On this account, autonomy\nis an irreducibly relational kind of agency. (For more on this see the\nentry on\nfeminist perspectives on autonomy.)", "Finally, we turn briefly to the question of whether robots and\nother systems of artificial intelligence are capable of agency. If one\npresumes the standard theory, one faces the question of whether it is\nappropriate to attribute mental states to artificial\nsystems (see\nsection 2.4). If one takes an instrumentalist stance (Dennett 1987: Ch. 2), there is\nno obvious obstacle to the attribution of mental states\nand intentional agency to artificial systems. According to realist\npositions, however, it is far from obvious whether or not this is\njustified, because it is far from obvious whether or not artificial\nsystems have internal states that ground the ascription of\nrepresentational mental states. If artificial systems are not capable\nof intentional agency, as construed by the standard theory, they may\nstill be capable of some more basic kind of agency. According to\nBarandiaran et al. (2009), minimal agency does not require the\npossession of mental states. It requires, rather, the adaptive\nregulation of the agent’s coupling with the environment and\nmetabolic self-maintenance. This means, though, that on this view\nartificial systems are not even capable of minimal agency: “being specific about the requirements for agency\nhas told us a lot about how much is still needed for the development\nof artificial forms of agency” (Barandiaran et al. 2009:\n382). " ], "subsection_title": "2.5 Other kinds of agency: mental, epistemic, shared, collective, relational, artificial" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "What is the nature of agency? How should we construe the relation\nbetween agents and actions? How can agency be part of the event-causal\norder? In this section, we will first turn to the three main\napproaches in the metaphysics of agency that provide three different\nframeworks for how to think about such metaphysical questions (the\nevent-causal, the agent-causal, and the volitionist framework). After\nconsidering some problems and objections, we turn to an alternative\napproach that rejects the project of providing a metaphysics of agency\n(dual standpoint theory). Finally, we briefly consider the\nindividuation of actions and some further issues in the metaphysics of\nagency." ], "section_title": "3. The metaphysics of agency", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "According to an event-causal approach, agency is to be\nexplained in terms of event-causal relations between agent-involving\nstates and events.[11]\nOn this view, actions are events, and an\nevent is an action just in case it has the right event-causal\nhistory.[12] We\nmay call this a reductive approach to agency, as it reduces\nthe agent’s role in the exercise of agency to the causal roles\nof agent-involving states and events. Obviously, the standard theory\nbelongs to this reductive event-causal framework, because it explains\nagency in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and\nevents.[13]\n(Proponents include Davidson 1963, 1971; Goldman 1970; Brand 1984;\nBratman 1987; Dretske 1988; Bishop 1989; Mele 1992, 2003; Enç\n2003.)", "According to an agent-causal approach, agency is to be\nexplained in terms of a kind of substance-causation: causation by the\nagent, construed as a persisting substance. On this view, actions are\nevents, and an event is an action just in case it has the right\nagent-causal history.[14]\nThis framework provides\na non-reductive account of agency insofar as it holds that an\nagent’s role in the exercise of agency is to be construed in\nterms of the exercise of an irreducible agent-causal power (Chisholm\n1964; Taylor 1966; O’Connor 2000; see also Clarke 2003; Lowe\n2008).", "According to a volitionist approach, agency is to be\nexplained in terms of acts of the will, usually called\n“volitions”. On this view, volitions are the source of\nagency: an overt movement is an action just in case it is caused, in\nthe right way, by a volition. Volitions themselves are entirely\nuncaused and they are sui generis acts: they are acts in\nvirtue of their intrinsic properties, not in virtue of some extrinsic\nor relational property (such as having the right causal\nhistory). This is also a non-reductive approach to agency, but it\ndiffers sharply from both the event-causal and the agent-causal\nframework in the important respect that it rejects the suggestion\nthat all actions are events with a certain causal history (Ginet\n1990; McCann 1998; see also Lowe 2008).[15]", "The event-causal framework is by far the most widely accepted view\nin the contemporary philosophy of mind and action. One reason for this\nis that the commitment to the event-causal framework is tantamount to\na commitment to a very minimal and widely endorsed kind of naturalism,\naccording to which any appeal to irreducible substance-causation or\nteleology is to be avoided. Further, this commitment to the\nevent-causal framework is sustained by a widespread dissatisfaction\nwith alternative agent-causal and volitionist theories of agency. Some\nobjections to agent-causal theories derive from more general\nobjections to the notion of substance-causation, others address more\ndirectly the agent-causal account of agency. It has been argued, for\ninstance, that appeal to substances leaves both the timing and the\nmanner of causation mysterious (Broad 1952). Further, it has been\nargued that substance-causation collapses into event-causation, once\nit is acknowledged that a substance has its causal powers in virtue of\nits properties (Clarke 2003: Ch. 10). Others have argued that an\nappeal to the agent as a cause is vacuous, because it has no\nexplanatory import (Davidson 1971), and because it cannot explain what\nan agent’s exercise of control consists in (Schlosser 2010). A\ncommon objection to volitionist accounts is that they generate a\nregress of mental acts (Ryle 1949). Arguably, though, this objection\nbegs the question. The view holds that overt actions are to be\nexplained in terms of volitions. There is no need to appeal to further\nmental acts of the will in order to explain why volitions are actions,\nbecause volitions are actions sui generis (see Enç\n2003 for discussion). This, however, points also to the reason why\nthe view is widely rejected. Volitionist theories stipulate as\nprimitive what appears to be in need of explanation. In particular,\nthey do not explain what an agent’s exercise of control consists\nin, as the agent is merely the subject or the bearer of volitions\n(O’Connor 2000: 25–26; Clarke 2003:\n17–24). Moreover, if, as most contemporary philosophers would\nassume, volitions are realized by events in the brain, the view\nappears to be in tension with the fact that there are no events in the\nbrain that are entirely uncaused." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Three metaphysical frameworks" }, { "content": [ "In the 1950s and 60s, several philosophers argued that the\nevent-causal framework is incoherent. Their main argument was the so\ncalled “logical connection argument”, which says, very\nroughly, that the relation between mental attitudes and actions\ncannot be causal, because the connection between them is logical,\nconceptual, or in some sense non-contingent (Hampshire 1959; Melden\n1961; Kenny 1963, for instance). It is widely agreed now that this\nattack was unsuccessful (the most influential reply is due to\nDavidson 1963; see also Goldman 1970:\n109–116).[16]\nShortly after that another challenge\nemerged, which turned out to be the most serious and most persistent\nproblem for the standard theory and the event-causal framework: the\nproblem of deviant causal chains.", "In general, the problem is that it seems always possible that the\nrelevant mental states and events cause the relevant event (a certain\nmovement, for instance) in a deviant way: so that this event is\nclearly not an intentional action or not an action at all. It is\ncommon to distinguish between cases of basic deviance\nand consequential deviance (also called primary and\nsecondary deviance). A murderous nephew intends to kill his uncle in\norder to inherit his fortune. He drives to his uncle’s house\nand on the way he kills a pedestrian by accident. As it turns out,\nthis pedestrian is his uncle. This is a case of consequential\ndeviance (Chisholm 1966). In a standard case of basic deviance\n(Davidson 1973), a climber intends to rid himself of the weight and\ndanger of holding another man on a rope by loosening his grip. This\nintention unnerves him so that it causes him to loosen his hold on\nthe rope. The difference between the cases is best explained in terms\nof the distinction between basic and non-basic\nactions. Very roughly, basic actions are the things that one can do\nwithout doing something else (such as raising one’s hand),\nwhereas the performance of non-basic actions requires that one does\nsomething else (such as giving someone a signal by raising\none’s hand).[17] In the consequential case, the nephew\nhas an intention to perform a non-basic action (to kill his\nuncle). He successfully performs several basic actions, but it is a\nsheer coincidence that he brings about the intended end. The climber,\nin contrast, does not perform any action at all. The mental\nantecedent causes a movement that would have been a basic\naction, had the causal chain not been deviant.", "Any event-causal theory of agency must require that the relevant\nmental attitudes cause the action in the right way. The right way of\ncausation is non-deviant causation. The challenge is to spell out\nwhat non-deviant causation consists in within the event-causal\nframework; without, in particular, any appeal to some unanalyzed\nnotion of agent-causation or control. Davidson (1974) was pessimistic\nabout the prospects for finding an event-causal account of\nnon-deviant causation, and he suggested that the standard theory is\nbest understood as providing only necessary conditions for\nagency. Goldman (1970) suggested that giving an account of\nnon-deviant causation is an empirical rather than a philosophical\ntask. Since then, however, most proponents of the event-causal\napproach have acknowledged that the problem of deviant causal chains\nis a serious philosophical problem, and various solutions have been\nproposed (see Peacocke 1979; Brand 1984; Bishop 1989; Mele 2003;\nSchlosser 2007, 2011; Wu 2016).[18]" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Deviant causal chains" }, { "content": [ "Sometimes it is suggested that the problem of deviant causal chains\nis merely a symptom of the deeper problem that event-causal theories\naltogether fail to capture agency, because they reduce actions to\nthings that merely happen to us (Lowe 2008: 9, for instance). Put\ndifferently, this challenge says that the event-causal framework is\ndeficient because it leaves out agents: all there is, on this view, is\na nexus of causal pushes and pulls in which no one does\nanything (Melden 1961; Nagel 1986; see also Velleman 1992). This\nhas been called the problem of the “disappearing agent”\n(Mele 2003: Ch. 10; Lowe 2008: 159–161; Steward 2013).", "According to Mele (2003: Ch. 10), some formulations of this\ndisappearing agent objection are easily dismissed. Some proponents of\nthis challenge use the terms ‘event-causal order’ and\n‘natural order’ interchangeably. This would seem to\nsuggest that, on their view, agency is a supernatural\nphenomenon—a view that most contemporary philosophers find\nhard to take seriously. However, sometimes the challenge is raised in\norder to motivate alternative agent-causal or volitionist theories of\nagency, and the main proponents of agent-causal and volitionist\ntheories maintain that their views are compatible with\nnaturalism. They would argue that it is a mistake to presume that the\nevent-causal order exhausts the natural order of things.", "Further, the disappearing agent objection is not always put forward\nas a general objection to the event-causal framework. As we have seen\n(section 2.3), Velleman (1992) argued\nthat the standard theory leaves out the agent, or the agent’s\nparticipation, and he proposed a solution to this\nproblem within the event-causal framework. In his reply,\nMele (2003: Ch. 10) suggested that it would be more appropriate to\ncall this the problem of the “shrinking agent”. According to\nVelleman, the standard theory captures only deficient instances of\nagency, in which the agent’s participation is\n“unwitting” or “halfhearted”. Instances of\ndeficient agency can be explained in terms of various capacities or\nproperties that the agent does not possess, exercise, or instantiate;\ncapacities and properties such as conscious awareness, reflective\nawareness, reason-responsiveness, self-control, self-governance, and\nso on. Given this, there is no need to conceptualize instances of\ndeficient agency in terms of the agent’s absence. Further,\ndoing so creates a rather implausible dichotomy between a kind of\nagency in which the agent does participate and a kind of agency in\nwhich the agent does not participate (Schlosser 2010).", "Others, yet, press the disappearing agent objection in order to\nmotivate a dual standpoint theory. According to dual standpoint\ntheories, agency cannot be explained from any theoretical standpoint\nor metaphysical framework. Agency can only be understood from a\npractical and normative standpoint (Nagel 1986; Korsgaard 1996;\nBilgrami 2006, for instance). Arguably, this view has its roots in\nKant’s account of practical reason (see the entry on\nKant and Hume on morality). Usually, dual standpoint theories do not reject metaphysics as such,\nand they often provide a metaphysical framework of their own. But they\nreject both reductive and non-reductive theories of agency, and they\nreject, in general, the notion that we can have a metaphysical account\nof what the exercise of agency consists in. They align themselves\nnaturally with non-causal theories of reason explanation (see\nsection 2).\nBoth views tend to emphasize the normative and irreducibly\nteleological nature of reason explanation and, hence, agency. Dual\nstandpoint theories have received relatively little attention in the\nphilosophy of action. To many, it seems that such views are deeply\nunsatisfactory precisely because they refuse to face a central\nquestion in the metaphysics of agency: how can agents exercise control\nover their actions in a world in which all movements can be explained\nin terms of event-causation? It seems that this is in need of\nexplanation, and it seems that this requires a metaphysics of agency\n(see Bishop 1989; Schlosser 2010). Nelkin (2000) has questioned the\ncoherence of dual standpoint theories on the basis of an argument for\nthe claim that they entail commitments to contradictory beliefs about\nfree will." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Disappearing agents, naturalism, and dual standpoint theory" }, { "content": [ "We now turn, in brief, to some further issues in the metaphysics of\nagency. The first concerns the individuation of actions. You flick the\nswitch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and you thereby also\nalert the burglar. How many actions do you perform? According\nto coarse-grained (or minimizing) views on the individuation\nof actions, you perform one action under different descriptions\n(Anscombe 1957; Davidson 1963). According to fine-grained (or\nmaximizing) views, how many actions you perform depends on how many\nact-properties are instantiated. If you instantiate four\nact-properties, then you perform four distinct actions (Goldman 1970;\nsee also Ginet 1990). According to a third alternative, actions can\nhave other actions as their components or parts (Thalberg 1977; Ginet\n1990). According to all three views, actions are events, and the\nindividuation of actions derives from different views on the\nindividuation of events (see the entry on\nevents). Not much work has been done on this recently (see, however, Enç\n2003: Ch. 3). This is partly because it is now widely agreed that the\nindividuation of actions has little or no bearing on other issues. To\nillustrate, the question of whether agency is to be explained within\nan event-causal or an agent-causal framework bears directly on various\nissues in the debate on free will and moral responsibility (see the\nentry on\nfree will). But event-causal and agent-causal theories are both compatible with\ncoarse-grained and fine-grained views on the individuation of actions.\nSimilarly, it seems that the views on the individuation of actions\nhave no substantial bearing on the question of whether or not reason\nexplanations are causal explanations.", "A related issue is whether actions are to be identified with\nthe outcomes of causal processes or with\nthe processes themselves. According to most versions of\nevent-causal and agent-causal theories, an action is an event that is\ncaused in the right way: the action is identical with or constituted\nby the outcome of that process.[19] According to process views, the action\nis either identical with or constituted by that process (Searle 1983;\nDretske 1988; Wu 2011; see also Thompson 2008). This issue has also not\nreceived much attention. Again, this is mainly because it is widely\nassumed that this issue has little or no substantial bearing on more\nfundamental issues in the metaphysics of agency and on debates\noutside the philosophy of\naction.[20]", "Another issue in the metaphysics of agency that has received more\nattention in the recent debate is the nature of omissions (in\nparticular, intentional omissions). According to Sartorio (2009), an\nintentional omission is the absence of an action that is caused by the\nabsence of an intention. She argues, on the basis of this account,\nthat intentional omissions cannot be accommodated easily by the\nstandard theory. In reply, Clarke (2010a) has argued that in cases of\nintentional omission the agent usually does have an intention not to\nact that plays an important causal role, and he has identified various\nparallels between intentional actions and intentional omissions. On\nhis view, there are no major obstacles to an account of intentional\nomissions that is compatible and continuous with the standard theory\nof intentional action. Further, he argues that a failure to account\nfor intentional omissions would not obviously be a shortcoming of a\ntheory of intentional action. There are, after all, significant\ndifferences between actions and omissions, and so we should not expect\nthat a theory of action provides all the resources that are required\nfor an account of omissions. (For more on this see Clarke 2014.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.4 Actions, events, processes, and omissions" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Empirical challenges and the role of consciousness", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "According to our commonsense conception of agency, our reasons and\nconscious intentions tend to make a real difference to how we act\n(D’Andrade 1987; Malle 2004, for instance). This assumption is\npart and parcel of the standard theory and of numerous psychological\ntheories of intentional action and motivation (Fishbein and Ajzen\n1975; Locke and Latham 1990; Heckhausen 1991; Gollwitzer 1993; Austin\nand Vancouver 1996, for instance). There are, however, various\nempirical findings from psychology and cognitive neuroscience that\nhave been taken to show that this commonsense assumption is\nunwarranted, and that have raised interesting and challenging\nquestions concerning the role of consciousness in the initiation and\nguidance of agency. This section provides an overview of the most\nrelevant research.", "An early and highly influential source of the skepticism concerning\nthe causal relevance of our reasons is a theoretical review by Nisbett\nand Wilson (1977). This article reports numerous experiments and\nstudies in which participants appear to construct or confabulate\nrationalizing explanations by giving reasons that could not possibly\nhave been the reasons they acted for. Despite some rather serious\nmethodological problems (White 1988), this research has achieved and\nretained the status of textbook knowledge within psychology and\ncognitive science. Moreover, it has been taken to show that ordinary\nreason explanations are not causal explanations, even though the\nauthors themselves rejected this conclusion. On their view, the\nevidence shows, first and foremost, that verbal reports of mental\nstates are based on self-interpretation (theorizing or\nrationalization), rather than on direct or introspective access. They\nnoted that this epistemic view is perfectly compatible with the\nassumption that we can and often do give the actual causes of our\nactions when we give an ordinary reason explanation. The upshot is\nthat, even if the proposed epistemic view is correct, there is nothing\nin the evidence which shows that reason explanations cannot be causal\nexplanations, and there is nothing in the evidence which shows that\nreason explanations are usually not causal explanations." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Reasons and causes" }, { "content": [ "It seems that the empirical evidence in support of\nsituationism raises a challenge for our commonsense conception of\nagency. According to situationism, empirical research shows that\ncommonsense explanations of actions in terms of character traits (such\nas honesty, kindness, or courage) are systematically mistaken or\ninaccurate, because this research shows that the actions in question\nare better explained in terms of situational features (Ross and\nNisbett 1991; Harman 1999; Doris 2002). But none of the common\nphilosophical theories of agency say that actions are to be explained\nin terms of the agent’s character traits, and so it seems that\nsituationism does not raise a problem for the standard theory and\nother philosophical accounts of agency. Moreover, the interpretation\nof the empirical evidence in question and the argument for\nsituationism have been controversial (Sreenivasan 2002, for\ninstance). It has been argued, however, that this evidence raises the\nfurther question of whether we are genuinely reason-responsive. The\nevidence suggests that our actions are, under certain conditions,\ndriven by situational and morally irrelevant factors even when there\nare salient moral reasons to act otherwise. This suggests that we (or\nmost of us) are not as reason-responsive as we would like to\nthink. But it is controversial whether or not the evidence supports\nany stronger claims than that (for more on this see Nelkin 2005;\nSchlosser 2013; Vargas 2013)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Situationism" }, { "content": [ "The most influential empirical challenge concerning the role of\nconscious intentions stems from Libet’s seminal neuroscientific\nwork on the initiation of movements. In the Libet experiment (Libet\n1985), participants were instructed to initiate a simple and\npredefined movement when the wish or urge to do so arises. During\nthis, EEG measurements were taken to record the readiness potential, a\nbrain potential that was known to precede intentional movements. The\nmain finding was that the readiness potential precedes the occurrence\nof the conscious wish or urge to move by about 350ms. According to\nLibet, this shows that movements are not consciously initiated and\nthat we do not have free will in the sense we commonly think we do\n(Libet 1999). The methodology of this experiment has been scrutinized\nextensively and criticized on a number of points. Some of those\nmethodological issues have been addressed in follow-up experiments\n(Soon et al. 2008; Fried et al. 2011).", "Most philosophers who have addressed Libet’s work have argued\nthat the conclusions about the role of conscious intentions and about\nfree will do not follow, even if it is granted that the experimental\nmethods and results are sound. They have argued that there are\nalternative interpretations of the evidence that preserve a causal\nrole for conscious intentions and that are as plausible and probable\nas Libet’s own interpretation of the evidence (Flanagan 1992:\n136–138; Zhu 2003; Mele 2009a; Schlosser 2012b). Further, it has\nbeen argued that the experiment creates a very unusual and artificial\ncontext in which participants are instructed to\ndecide spontaneously. Due to this, it is questionable that\nthe results of the experiment can be generalized (Keller and\nHeckhausen 1990; Roskies 2011; Waller 2012; Schlosser 2014). Schurger\net al. (2012) have proposed and tested a model that addresses this\nissue. According to this model, the timing of the movement in the\nLibet experiment is determined by random threshold crossings in\nspontaneous fluctuations in neural activity. In particular, the model\nsays that a decision when to move is determined by random threshold\ncrossings only when it is not constrained by any evidence or\nreasons for action. The fact that this model has been tested\nsuccessfully supports the claim that the results from the Libet\nexperiment and from similar follow-up studies do not generalize,\nbecause most of our everyday decisions clearly are constrained by\nevidence and by reasons for action.", "A related challenge concerning the role of conscious intentions\nstems from Wegner’s model of apparent mental\ncausation. According to this view, conscious intentions provide mere\n“previews” of our actions: they precede our actions, but\nthey do not cause them (Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Wegner\n2002). Wegner provided evidence of dissociations between the sense of\nagency and the actual exercise of agency, and he argued that the\nmodel of apparent mental causation provides the best explanation of\nthe data. This view has been strongly criticized for conceptual ambiguities and\nargumentative flaws (see also section 4.5). One common objection is that the fact that the sense of agency can come apart from the exercise of agency is\nperfectly compatible with the assumption that conscious intentions\ntend to cause the intended actions. (See Bayne 2006; Mele 2009a; for\na reply to Wegner’s inference to the best explanation see\nSchlosser 2012a.)", "The work of Libet and Wegner has nevertheless raised interesting\nand challenging questions concerning the role of consciousness in\nagency. Proponents of the standard theory often qualify the view\nwith the claim that the relevant mental attitudes need not be\nconsciously accessed in order to play the right role in the exercise\nof agency. When, for instance, Davidson (1978: 85–86)\nconsidered the example of an agent who adds some spice to a stew with\nthe intention of improving the taste, he claimed that intentional\nagency requires only that the agent would have reasoned on\nthe basis of the relevant attitudes that the action is to be\nperformed, had he been aware of those attitudes at the\ntime. Few, though, would be prepared to accept the view that all of\nour actions might be like this: initiated and guided by attitudes\nthat are not consciously accessed at the time. This raises various\nquestions that are rarely addressed. How often, or in what kinds of\ncases, should actions be preceded by conscious intentions or\nconscious reasoning? What kind of consciousness is required? In cases\nwhere the relevant attitudes are not consciously accessed, must they\nbe accessible? And so forth.[21]" ], "subsection_title": "4.3 The Libet experiment and Wegner’s challenge" }, { "content": [ "One strand of empirical research that is relevant to questions\nconcerning the role of consciousness in agency is the work on\nautomaticity; in particular, the research on automatic goal\npursuit. It has been shown, for instance, that the goal to perform a\ncertain task accurately can be primed, so that the agent pursues the\ngoal without any awareness of doing so (Bargh et al. 2001). There is\na large body of research on this, and it has been suggested that this\nresearch shows that most of our actions are executed\nautomatically and without conscious control (Bargh and Chartrand\n1999, Custers and Aarts 2010).[22] This claim is less radical than the\nclaims put forward by Libet (1999) and Wegner (2002), as it concerns\nonly the extent or scope of conscious control. Further, this appears\nto be much less challenging once it is noted that the great majority\nof automatic actions are sub-routines that are in the service of\nhigher goals and long-term intentions. Consider, for instance, all\nthe sub-routines that one performs while driving a car. The claim\nthat such actions are performed automatically and without conscious\ncontrol can be reconciled with our commonsense conception of agency\nand it can be accommodated by the standard theory, provided that\nconscious intentions and plans can recruit the relevant routines\nautomatically, either by generating the relevant motor intentions, or\nby activating the relevant motor schemata. (For more on this see\nPacherie 2008; Adams 2010; Clarke 2010b.)", "Another relevant strand of research is the work on dual-process (or\ndual-system) theories of decision-making. According to such models,\nthere are two distinct types of mental processes (or systems) that\nunderlie decision-making and agency: one is typically characterized as\nautomatic, effortless, and heuristics-based, and the other as\nconscious, deliberate, and rule-based. Dual-process models have been\ndeployed widely and successfully in many areas of research (for\noverviews see Sloman 1996; Evans 2008; for critical reviews see Osman\n2004; Keren and Schul 2009). In philosophy, it is commonly assumed,\nexplicitly or implicitly, that there is one mechanism (or\nfaculty) of practical reason that underlies practical reasoning and\nreason-based agency. This appears to be incompatible with the\ndual-process framework. What complicates this issue, though, is that\nthere is no consensus on the details of the dual-process model. There\nis, for instance, no commonly accepted view on how the two processes\n(or systems) interact. Conscious and deliberate processes may have a\ntop-down influence on automatic processes; the two processes may\ninteract with each other; they may interfere with each other in some\ncases; there may be cases in which processing switches from one to the\nother; and so on. Not all of those possibilities are obviously\nincompatible with the assumption that there is one mechanism (or\nfaculty) of practical reason. Further research is needed in order to\ninvestigate whether the two types of processes are in the relevant\nrespects independent or whether they can be construed as interacting\nparts of one mechanism of decision-making. For a discussion of whether\nthe dual-system framework is compatible with the philosophical\nstandard theory of action see Schlosser\n2019.[23]" ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Automaticity and dual-system theory" }, { "content": [ "There has been some debate concerning the kind of knowledge we have\nof our own actions. Most prominently, Anscombe (1957) argued that the\nknowledge of our actions is direct, in the sense that it is not based\non observation or inference (see the entry on\naction). \nThis section provides an overview of the closely related debate on the\nso called “sense of agency”. It seems that when we act, we\nhave a sense of doing something: a sense of control and of being the\nagent or owner of the action. The debate about this has been driven\nlargely by empirical findings from psychology and cognitive science,\nand it has become common to distinguish between the following three\nmain positions.", "\nThe first is largely due to Wegner’s work on the “model of\napparent mental causation” (Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Wegner\n2002). According to this view, the sense of agency (or the\n“experience of conscious will”, as Wegner called it)\narises when we interpret a conscious intention to perform a\ncertain action as its cause. It says, in particular, that an agent\ninterprets an intention as the cause of an action when the following\nconditions obtain: the intention proximately precedes the action, the\naction is consistent with the intention, and the agent is not aware of\nany factors that could provide an alternative\nexplanation. Wegner’s argument for the model of apparent mental\ncausation is based on various experiments, studies, and observations\nconcerning illusions of control and failures in the ascription of\nagency. This work initiated the empirical study of the sense of\nagency, but Wegner’s model is now widely rejected. Philosophers\nhave criticized the view for various conceptual ambiguities and flaws\nin the interpretation and use of the evidence (Nahmias 2002; Bayne\n2006; Dennett 2008; and Mele 2009a, for instance). Moreover, there is\nnow plenty of empirical evidence to suggest that the sense of agency\nis not merely a matter of self-interpretation (Haggard 2005; Bayne and\nPacherie 2007; Gallagher 2007; and Synofzik et al. 2008).", "\nThe second account of the sense of agency is based on a\nfeedback-comparator model of motor control. According to this model,\nthe motor control system uses copies of motor commands in order to\ngenerate predictions of the ensuing bodily movements. Those\npredictions (so called “forward models”) are then used for\ncomparisons between the predicted and the intended trajectories of\nmovements, and for comparisons between the predicted and actual\ntrajectories (based on information from sensory feedback). The model\nholds that a sub-personal system of motor control uses those\npredictions and comparisons in order to adjust and fine-tune the\nexecution of bodily movements (Wolpert and Kawato 1998; Frith et\nal. 2000; Haggard 2005). It has been suggested that this system may\nalso play a crucial role in the generation of the sense of agency. On\nthis view, positive matches in the comparator system generate a sense\nof agency, whereas mismatches generate error signals that disrupt the\nsense of agency. This model can explain a wide range of phenomena\nconcerning the sense and control of agency (Frith et al. 2000;\nBlakemore et al. 2002). More recently it has been argued, however,\nthat this comparator model provides at best a partial explanation of\nthe sense of agency (Haggard 2005; Bayne and Pacherie 2007; Gallagher\n2007; Synofzik et al. 2008).", "\nThe third account of the sense of agency is a hybrid of the first\ntwo. Proponents of this approach usually distinguish between a basic\nsense of agency and post-act judgments concerning one’s agency.\nThe basic sense of agency is construed as an online and\nphenomenologically rather thin experience that accompanies the\nperformance of actions, and that does not necessarily require the\npresence of a conscious intention. Judgments about one’s agency,\nin contrast, are offline and usually post-act, and they are, thereby,\nsubject to various biases that may distort the interpretation of\none’s own agency. The feedback-comparator model is well suited\nto explain the basic sense of agency, whereas a self-interpretation\ntheory, akin to Wegner’s, can explain why judgments about\none’s own agency tend to be distorted or illusory under certain\nconditions (Bayne and Pacherie 2007; Gallagher 2007; Synofzik et\nal. 2008).", "\nPacherie (2008) develops the feedback-comparator model into an account\nof the phenomenology of agency that postulates three integrated\nfeedback loops at three different levels of intention: the level of\ndistal (or future-directed) intention, proximal (or present-directed)\nintention, and motor intention. These are levels of action\nspecification in which progressively more detailed representations of\nthe action are generated, at the later stages in response to\nperceptual and proprioceptive feedback. Pacherie’s main thesis\nis that the component representations of the stages in the process of\naction specification are strongly interconnected with the components\nand contents of the phenomenology of agency. At the level of proximal\nintentions, for instance, the model explains how the conceptual\ninformation that is inherited from the distal intention is integrated\nwith perceptual input and situational constraints. Concerning the\nsense of agency, the model distinguishes between the awareness of what\n(the goal), awareness of how (the means), the sense of intentionality,\nthe sense of initiation, the sense of situational control, and the\nsense of motor control. Shepherd (2017) argues that the components in\nthe phenomenology of agency are so richly integrated that they can be\nregarded as fused in the total experience." ], "subsection_title": "4.5 The sense of agency" } ] } ]	[ "Adams, F., 2010, “Action Theory Meets Embodied\nCognition”, in Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the\nCausal Theory of Action, A. Buckareff and J. Aguilar (eds.),\nCambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 229–252.", "Ahearn, L., 2001, “Language and Agency”, Annual\nReview of Anthropology, 30: 109–37.", "Allen, C. and M. 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reasons-agent	Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative	First published Thu Aug 11, 2005; substantive revision Fri Dec 23, 2022	[ "\nThe agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is widely and rightly\nregarded as a philosophically important one. Unfortunately, the\ndistinction is often drawn in different and mutually incompatible\nways. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction has historically\nbeen drawn three main ways: the ‘principle-based\ndistinction’, the ‘reason-statement-based\ndistinction’ and the ‘perspective-based\ndistinction’. Each of these approaches has its own distinctive\nvices (Sections 1–3). However, a slightly modified version of\nthe historically influential principle-based approach seems to avoid\nmost if not all of these vices (Section 4). The distinction so\nunderstood differs from numerous other distinctions with which it\nmight easily be confused (Section 5). Finally, the distinction so\ndrawn is important to normative theorizing for a variety of reasons\n(Section 6)." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Principle-Based Conception", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Reason-Statement-Based Conception", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. The Perspective-Based Conception", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. The Principle-Based Conception Revisited", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Related Distinctions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Why the Distinction Matters", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Conclusion.", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe principle-based version of the agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction actually predates the terminology\n‘agent-relative’ and ‘agent-neutral’. Thomas\nNagel instead uses the terms ‘subjective’ and\n‘objective’ to mark a version of the principle-based\ndistinction in his classic The Possibility of Altruism (Nagel\n1970). The terms ‘agent-relative’ and\n‘agent-neutral’ were later introduced by Derek Parfit\n(Parfit 1984) and Nagel himself then adopted Parfit’s\nterminology (Nagel 1986). As background to Nagel’s version of\nthe distinction, we must first note that for Nagel, reasons are\nuniversal, in the sense that for every token reason there corresponds\na predicate R which figures in a universally quantified\nproposition of the following form:", "\nEvery reason is a predicate R such that for all persons\np and events A, if R is true of A,\nthen p has prima facie reason to promote A. (Nagel\n1970: 47)\n", "\nWith this conception of the universality of reasons in hand, Nagel\narticulates the distinction as follows:", "\nFormally, a subjective reason is one whose defining predicate\nR contains a free occurrence of the variable p. (The\nfree-agent variable will, of course, be free only within\nR; it will be bound by the universal quantification over\npersons which governs the entire formula.) All universal reasons and\nprinciples expressible in terms of the basic formula either contain a\nfree-agent variable or they do not. The former are subjective; the\nlater will be called objective. (Nagel 1970: 91)\n", "\nDrawn in such formal terms, the distinction can seem alien and\ndifficult to grasp but the basic idea is actually not that complex. A\nfew examples should help illustrate Nagel’s idea. Suppose that\nthere is reason for me to phone a friend because doing so would make\nthe friend happy. Now suppose that my reason is best expressed as\nfollows—that phoning her would make someone happy. In that case,\nthe fact that the person who is made happy is my friend is\nincidental. If phoning a stranger would have generated just as much\nhappiness then I would have had just as much reason to call the\nstranger. This in turn suggests that the principle corresponding to\nthis reason is of the form,", "\n(p, A) (If A will make someone happy then\np has reason to promote A)\n", "\nThe use of ‘promote’ in Nagel’s canonical\nformulation raises some interesting issues. Nagel holds that\nperforming an action A is a trivial way of promoting\nA, so I can promote the calling of my friend by calling her.\nIn one sense, Nagel builds teleology into his conception of a reason\nfor action. For Nagel glosses ‘promotion’ in such a way\nthat the fact that an action will produce the relevant sort of outcome\nis sufficient for there being a reason to perform that action (see\nNagel 1970: 52). So every reason entails that if someone can promote\nthe relevant outcome (which outcomes are relevant may depend on the\nagents involved if the reason is agent-relative) then it logically\nfollows from Nagel’s gloss of reasons in terms of promotion (in\nhis sense) that there is reason to perform that action. In another\nsense, though, Nagel does not build teleology into his conception of a\nreason for action. For Nagel does not hold that causally producing (or\neven instantiating) are necessary for there to be a reason\nfor the action. In his somewhat capacious sense of\n‘promote’, it is sufficient for an action to count as\npromoting an outcome if the action is such that not performing it\nwould bring about the non-occurrence of the relevant state of affairs\n(again, see Nagel 1970: 52). So actions which are necessary but not\nsufficient for a given outcome thereby count as promoting that\noutcome. So all reasons are not teleological in the sense of being\nreasons in virtue of their causally bringing about the relevant sort\nof outcome; simply preserving the possibility of that outcome is\nenough. However, all reasons are teleological in the sense that any\nreason for an agent A to X does entail that if a\nsuitable agent (who counts as suitable depends on whether the reason\nis agent-relative; if it is agent-neutral then any agent will do) can\npromote A’s X-ing then there is reason for\nthem to do so. Reasons are for Nagel teleological in the sense that\nthey all entail reasons for people to perform actions in the right\ncircumstances in virtue of what states of affairs they would causally\nbring about. This is not trivial. Some conceptions of reasons do not\nhave this consequence, as in the case of those conceptions which gloss\nreasons for action in a way that does not advert to promotion at\n all.[1]\n ", "\nIn any event, for Nagel, the preceding principle (and hence the\ncorresponding reason) is agent-neutral because the antecedent contains\nno use of the free-agent variable ‘p’. The reason\nis in this sense not relativized to the agent for whom it is a reason.\nHowever, we could instead hold that the fact that it is my friend who\nwould be made happy is relevant to whether I have reason to call. In\nthat case, the principle corresponding to the reason would be of the\nform,", "\n(p, A) (If A will make p’s\nfriend happy then p has reason to promote A)\n", "\nThis principle is agent-relative because the free-agent variable\n‘p’ does appear in its antecedent. Basically, if\nthe sufficient condition for the application of the reason predicate\n(the condition given by the antecedent of the principle corresponding\nto the reason) includes such a free-agent variable then the reason is\nagent-relative; otherwise it is agent-neutral. It is easy enough to\nsee that on this conception, ethical egoism is an\nagent-relative theory (and hence concerns agent-relative reasons)\nwhile objective utilitarianism is an agent-neutral theory (and hence\nconcerns agent-neutral reasons). For egoism holds that there is reason\nfor a given agent to do something just in case his doing it would\npromote his welfare. Whereas objective\nutilitarianism, see the entry on\n consequentialism,\n (on at least one version) holds that someone ought to do something\njust insofar as it promotes welfare, period (no matter whose it is).\nIt is also important to be clear that the principles Nagel has in mind\nmust be understood as the basic normative principles of a theory\nrather than the theory’s account of what gives those principles\ntheir status as basic normative\n principles.[2]\n Otherwise various meta-ethical (see entry on\n metaethics)\n theories of what it is to be a reason (e.g., informed desire\naccounts) might be taken to imply agent-relativity when in fact they\nshould be understood as neutral on this issue.", "\nNagel’s version of the distinction is\n‘principle-based’ in the fairly straightforward sense that\none must first look to the principle corresponding to a given reason\nto determine whether it is agent-relative or agent-neutral. Nagel also\nmakes this clear in his later work. In The View From Nowhere\nhe holds that,", "\nIf a reason can be given a general form which does not include an\nessential reference to the person who has it, it is an\nagent-neutral reason…If on the other hand, the general\nform of a reason does include an essential reference to the person who\nhas it then it is an agent-relative reason. (Nagel 1986:\n152–153)\n", "\nThe context makes it relatively clear Nagel’s reference to the\n‘general form’ of a reason is a universally quantified\nprinciple corresponding to the reason of the sort he discussed in\nThe Possibility of Altruism. Derek Parfit, who is the first\none to introduce the terminology ‘agent-relative’ and\n‘agent-neutral’ makes it even more clear that the\ndistinction is in the first instance applied to normative theories.\nHaving described a moral theory he calls C, he remarks\nthat,", "\nSince C gives to all agents common moral aims, I shall call\nC agent-neutral. Many moral theories do not take\nthis form. These theories are agent-relative, giving to\ndifferent agents, different aims (Parfit 1984: 27).\n", "\nParfit’s conception of moral principles as giving agents (common\nor separate) moral aims is itself controversial. Some moral theories\ninstead understand moral principles as (at least in some cases)\nproviding constraints on how to pursue one’s ends. Parfit later\nexplains how his terminology, when applied to reasons, maps onto\nNagel’s:", "\nNagel’s subjective reasons are reasons only for the\nagent. I call these agent-relative…When I call some reason\nagent-relative, I am not claiming that this reason cannot be\na reason for other agents. All that I am claiming is that it may not\nbe. (Parfit 1984: 143)\n", "\nThis is slightly confusing. First, how does Parfit’s distinction\nbetween agent-relative and agent-neutral theories map onto his\ndistinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons? The\nformer is cast in terms of common aims while the second is cast in\nterms of whether a reason for one agent must also be a reason for\nanyone else. Second, how exactly does Parfit’s distinction\nbetween agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons correspond to\nNagel’s version of the distinction? The former is cast in terms\nof whether a reason for one agent must also be a reason for anyone\nelse while the latter is cast in terms of the occurrence of free agent\nvariables in the sufficient condition for the application of the\nreason predicate corresponding to the reason. These are not obviously\nequivalent, yet Parfit takes his distinction to be the same as\nNagel’s.", "\nThe first of these two questions is slightly easier to answer than the\nsecond. A moral theory is agent-neutral if it gives us common aims,\nbut if we have common aims then whenever there is a reason for you to\npromote an aim there will also be reason for me to promote that aim\n(if I can). So Parfit’s agent-neutral moral theories provide\nagent-neutral reasons in his sense—in the sense of being such\nthat a reason for one agent is guaranteed to be a reason for any agent\nsituated to promote the end which figures in that reason. By contrast,\na moral theory is agent-relative if it does not give every agent a\ncommon aim. However, if we do not have common aims then what is a\nreason for you may be no reason whatsoever for me even if I\nam in a position to promote the end which figures in that reason. So\nParfit’s agent-relative moral theories provide agent-relative\nreasons in his sense—reasons which are not such that a reason\nfor one agent entails a reason for any agent in a position to promote\nthe end which figures in that reason. So Parfit’s agent-relative\nmoral theories concern agent-relative reasons in his sense and his\nagent-neutral moral theories concern agent-neutral reasons in his\nsense. So the use of the same terminology is no coincidence, and\npresumably Parfit would agree that the agent-relativity of a reason is\nwell understood in terms of the agent-relativity of the principle\nassociated with that reason. Indeed, the primary reason we have\nincluded Parfit’s version of the distinction in this discussion\nof the principle-based version of the distinction is the suspicion\nthat his distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons\nis really just a corollary of his distinction between agent-relative\nand agent-neutral theories. The fact that Parfit clearly thinks that\nhis distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons is\njust the same as Nagel’s distinction also suggests that\nParfit’s distinction is well understood as principle-based,\nsince Nagel’s version of the distinction is a paradigmatic\ninstance of a principle-based version of the distinction. The other\n(closely related) reason for including Parfit’s version of the\ndistinction here is that it also shares the chief vice of\nNagel’s version. As explained below, neither Nagel’s nor\nParfit’s version of the distinction sits well with radical forms\nof moral particularism.", "\nWhat about our second question about Parfit’s distinctions,\nthough? Why should Parfit assume his version of the distinction\nbetween agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons is the same as\nNagel’s even though they are not drawn in the same way? Here it\nis relevant that (in at least one sense; see above) Nagel builds\nteleology into the logical form of the reason predicate, so that a\nreason is always understood as a reason to promote something.\nGiven this conception of reasons, it does seem that Parfit’s\nconception maps fairly neatly onto Nagel’s. For if a reason is\nagent-relative in Nagel’s sense, then whether there is a reason\nfor me to promote the state of affairs for which it is a reason will\ndepend on whether I am the agent who figures in the token reason under\nconsideration. An agent-relative reason to promote A’s\nhappiness will give me a reason only if I am A or suitably\nrelated to A (e.g., there can be agent-relative reasons to\npromote the welfare of my nearest and dearest). So reasons\nwhich are agent-relative in Nagel’s sense are agent-relative in\nParfit’s sense. By contrast, if a reason is agent-neutral in\nNagel’s sense then it gives any agent who can promote the state\nof affairs it favors a reason to promote that state of affairs. In\nNagel’s colorful phrase, agent-neutral reasons in his sense\ntransfer “across the gap between persons” (Nagel 1970:\n79). So reasons that are agent-neutral in Nagel’s sense are\nagent-neutral in Parfit’s sense as well. Moreover, so long as we\nassume that all reasons are teleological, any reason which is\nagent-relative in Parfit’s sense is agent-relative in\nNagel’s sense and any reason that is agent-neutral in\nParfit’s sense is agent-neutral in Nagel’s sense. For\nplausibly the only way a reason for one person to promote X\ncould fail to also provide someone else who could promote X a\nreason to do so would be if the reason was indexed to me in the way\nNagel’s agent-relative reasons are. So long as we hold onto the\nassumption that all reasons for action are teleological,\nParfit’s version of the distinction and Nagel’s version of\nthe distinction are at least extensionally equivalent in all possible\nworlds in spite of their rather different formulations of the\ndistinction.", "\nIn different ways, both Nagel and Parfit formulate the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in terms of general\nprinciples and the distinctions they draw do indeed seem useful and\nimportant (more on why they are useful and important below). For a\nmore explicit defense of drawing the distinction in terms of general\nprinciples (or ‘rules’ in their terminology), see also\nMcNaughton and Rawling\n 1991.[3]\n However, one unfortunate consequence of these classical\nprinciple-based ways of drawing the distinction is that they are\nincompatible with radical forms of particularism of the sort\nrecently defended by Jonathan Dancy and others. There are actually\nmany forms of moral particularism (see Jonathan Dancy’s entry on\nparticularism in this Encyclopedia; see also McKeever and Ridge 2005a,\n2016), but particularists are united in their embrace of holism in the\ntheory of reasons. On a holistic conception of reasons, a\nconsideration which functions as a reason in one context need not\nfunction as a reason at all in another context. For example, that my\ncalling my friend would give him pleasure may be a reason here, but\nnot a reason in another context (perhaps his pleasure would be purely\nsadistic in the second case, taking pleasure in some misfortune of\nmine). The atomist impulse is to build whatever is necessary for the\nconsideration’s status as a reason into the reason itself, so\nthat whatever is a reason in one context is thereby guaranteed to be a\nreason in any other context as well. So in the preceding example, the\natomist would insist that the second example just shows that we\nmischaracterized the reason in the first case. The real reason to call\nmy friend in the first case is not merely that it will give him\npleasure but rather that it will give him innocent pleasure, and that\nconsideration is not present in the second case. Particularists argue\nat some length that we should resist this atomistic impulse and stick\nwith the more natural characterization of the reason in the first case\nand accept a holistic conception of reasons. Particularists then argue\nthat holism in the theory of reasons in turn supports the conclusion\nthat morality is not well understood in terms of principles (for\ncritical discussion of this move, see McKeever and Ridge 2005b).", "\nParticularism is an interesting position and it would be a shame if\nsome plausible version of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction\nwere not compatible with the leading ideas behind particularism.\nHowever, it seems that both Nagel’s and Parfit’s versions\nof the distinction do not sit well with particularism. This is most\nclear in the case of Nagel. His doctrine of the universality of\nreasons directly contradicts holism about reasons yet plays an\nessential role in his account of what he calls the ‘general\nform’ of a reason which in turn plays an essential role in his\nversion of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction.\nParfit’s distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral\ntheories of course presupposes that we should think about morality in\nterms of normative theories, which also contradicts many forms of\nparticularism. Finally, Parfit’s distinction between\nagent-relative and agent-neutral reasons holds that a reason is\nagent-neutral only if it is guaranteed to provide a reason for any\nagent who can promote the end which figures in the reason (again, we\nare assuming all reasons are teleological and hence always involve an\nend). Particularists will reject the idea that just because something\nis a reason for one agent it thereby must be a reason for any other\nagent who can promote the end which figures in the reason. For on a\nholistic conception of how reasons function, there may be some further\naspect of another agent’s situation which cancels the force of\nthis consideration as a reason even though he could promote the\nrelevant end. If this is right then for this sort of particularism it\nwill follow trivially that all reasons are agent-relative and this\nmakes the distinction useless for their purposes. So perhaps\nunsurprisingly, the principle-based version of the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction does not seem like a\npromising one if we want to make sure that the distinction is useful\nto particularists as well as their generalist opponents. We should\ntherefore consider whether either the reason-statement-based version\nof the distinction or the perspective-based version of the distinction\nare more likely to be available to particularists as well while still\ndoing roughly the same sort of important philosophical work that Nagel\nand Parfit had in mind." ], "section_title": "1. The Principle-Based Conception", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe second version of the distinction foregoes Nagel’s appeal to\nthe ‘general form’ of the reason, but instead is\nformulated in terms of the reason itself. We call this the\n‘reason-statement-based version’ of the distinction\nbecause it holds that whether a reason is agent-relative depends on\nwhether a full statement of the reason itself (forget about its\n“general form”) involves pronominal back-reference to the\nagent for whom it is a reason. Philip Pettit puts forward a\nreason-statement-based version of the distinction:", "\nAn agent-relative reason is one that cannot be fully specified without\npronominal back-reference to the person for whom it is a reason. It is\nthe sort of reason provided for an agent by the observation that\nhe promised to perform the action in prospect, or that the\naction is in his interest, or that it is to the advantage of\nhis children. In each case, the motivating consideration\ninvolves essential reference to him or his.…An agent-neutral\nreason is one that can be fully specified without such an indexical\ndevice. (Pettit 1987: 75)\n", "\nOn Pettit’s account, whether a reason is agent-relative depends\non whether it (the reason) can be fully stated without pronominal\nback-reference to the agent for whom it is a reason. The use of\nanaphoric pronouns in Pettit’s version of the distinction does\nnot really mark much of a departure from Nagel’s formulation.\nFor Nagel’s ‘free agent variables’ are really\ntechnical devices which function just like anaphoric pronouns by\nreferring back to the agent for whom the consideration is a reason.\nThe real difference between Nagel’s formulation and\nPettit’s is that Nagel’s formulation is cast in terms of\nthe general form of a reason whereas Pettit’s formulation is\ncast in terms of a full statement of the reason itself, which need not\ninvolve any mention of the general form of the reason. For Pettit, the\nfull statement of a reason need not involve a universal quantifier at\nall. One of Pettit’s illustrative examples of a full statement\nof a reason is “that the action is in his\ninterest” and this statement involves no universal\nquantification whatsoever. So Pettit’s version of the\ndistinction, and more generally the reason-statement-based version of\nthe distinction, seems unlikely to offend against particularist\nsensibilities.", "\nMoreover, Pettit’s distinction seems to do much the same\nphilosophical work as Nagel’s version of the distinction. For in\nboth cases agent-relativity is characterized in terms of a certain\nsort of back-reference to the person for whom the consideration is a\nreason while agent-neutrality is in both cases characterized in terms\nof the absence of such back-reference. The only difference is that for\nNagel the relevant back-reference is to be found in the general form\nof the reason (which turns out to be a universally quantified\nprinciple giving a sufficient condition for the application of the\nreason predicate) whereas for Pettit the relevant back-reference is to\nbe found in a full statement of the reason itself. So far, it looks\nlike we have a kind of dominance argument for the\nreason-statement-based version of the distinction. It seems likely to\ndo much the same work as Nagel’s distinction and mirrors the\nlogical form of Nagel’s distinction, but does so without making\nthe distinction unavailable to particularists.", "\nHowever, the reason-statement-based version of the distinction has\nproblems of its own. Most significantly, this version of the\ndistinction seems to presuppose a particular ontology of reasons, in\nwhich case we end up inviting particularists to the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral party only by rescinding the invitations\nof those who hold opposing ontological views about reasons. For\nsuppose I think that reasons just are facts and also hold that there\nare no distinctively indexical facts. Rather, there are ordinary facts\nwhich can be characterized in indexical terms or characterized in\nnon-indexical terms. So the fact that having a beer at 6:13 p.m. on\nJanuary 17, 2005 would make MR happy is identical to the fact that\nhaving a beer now would make me happy. Here we have one fact which can\nbe expressed in two different ways. Given this package of ontological\nviews, the reason-statement-based version of the distinction looks\nunhelpful. For let us suppose that the fact that having a beer now\nwould give me pleasure provides an agent-relative reason for me to\nhave the beer—a sort of egoistic reason. On the\nreason-statement-based version of the distinction, the reason is\nagent-relative only if a full statement of the reason must\ninvolve pronominal reference to the agent for whom it is a reason.\nHowever, if reasons just are facts (this is my ontology of reasons)\nthen it is simply not true that a full statement of this reason (read:\nthis fact) must involve pronominal back-reference to me. For\ninstead of saying that having a beer would make him happy, you could\nsay that my reason is that having a beer would make MR happy. On the\nontology under consideration, this seems like a full statement (what\nis left out?) of the fact which is my reason to have the beer just as\nmuch as the anaphoric pronominal statement of my reason. Indeed, given\nthese ontological views it is hard to see how any reason could be\nagent-relative since any fact can be given a full statement without\nthe use of indexicals of any kind. Moreover, the problem here is not\nlimited to this particular ontology. Someone who holds that reasons\nare true propositions or states of affairs and who also holds that\nthere are no irreducibly indexical propositions or states of affairs\n(only indexical ‘modes of presentation’ of such\npropositions or states of affairs) will have trouble making use of the\nreason-statement version of the distinction for just this reason.", "\nThis is not to say that there are not ontologies which would provide a\nframework in which the reason-statement version of the distinction\ncould be useful. Two ontologies spring to mind. First, those who hold\nthat a reason is not just a fact but a fact plus a particular mode of\npresentation (a particular way of grasping the fact, as it were) might\nwell be able to make good use of the reason-statement-based version of\nthe distinction. Second, those who hold that reasons are just facts\nbut also hold that there really are irreducibly indexical facts can\nalso make sense of the reason-statement-based version of the\ndistinction. Still, it seems like a considerable cost that this\nversion of the distinction seems to exclude so many reasonable\nontological views. So whereas Nagel’s principle-based version of\nthe distinction excludes particularists, Pettit’s\nreason-statement-based version of the distinction excludes those who\nhold any of a wide range of ontological views about reasons. We should\nsee if we can do better." ], "section_title": "2. The Reason-Statement-Based Conception", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe third way in which the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction\nhas historically been drawn is in terms of the perspectives from which\nthe reasons in question can be recognized as reasons. The basic idea\nis to specify a suitably objective perspective and hold that\nagent-neutral reasons can be appreciated as such from that perspective\nwhile agent-relative reasons cannot. Jonathan Dancy seems to read\nNagel in this way:", "\nNagel holds that there are three kinds of reason. The first are\nstubbornly subjective reasons, such as those which are in play when we\nare choosing from a menu in a restaurant…But there are two\nclasses of objective reasons. The first are agent-relative\nreasons…the second are agent-neutral reasons. Both are\nrecognizable at some distance from here, as we shave peculiarities\nfrom our perspective in the move towards objectivity. The\nagent-relative ones are less objective, of course, though they can be\nrecognized, and in some sense endorsed, from more objective points of\nview. However, what is recognized and endorsed is not the importance\nwhich the agent finds in (e.g.) his own life-time projects; this\nitself cannot be recognized from much further out. As we move away\nfrom the agent’s own perspective, all that can be recognized is\nthat he finds importance in them, which is quite a different matter.\n(Dancy 1993: 146)\n", "\nThis reading of Nagel is to some extent invited by Nagel’s use\nof the metaphor of a ‘view from nowhere’. Moreover, it is\ntrue that in The Possibility of Altruism Nagel does argue\nthat agent-relative reasons (which he then called\n‘subjective’) cannot be recognized from a certain sort of\nimpersonal perspective. However, this was precisely supposed to be the\nconclusion of a substantive and highly controversial argument which\nNagel has since rejected (on the strength of an argument from Nicholas\nSturgeon; see Sturgeon 1974). If agent-relative reasons cannot be\nappreciated from a suitably objective perspective then Nagel quite\nclearly thinks that this will need to be established by argument. It\nis not part of his definition of agent-relativity; otherwise\nhe could have skipped most of the argument of The Possibility of\nAltruism as his main conclusion would have been established by\nlinguistic fiat. As we have seen, he instead defines agent-relativity\nin terms of the general form of the reason.", "\nStill, even if this is not what Nagel had in mind might this approach\nnot be philosophically useful and important? It would, after all, have\nthe virtue of being a distinction which is available to\nparticularists. For the idea of more and less objective perspectives\nis not obviously incompatible with even very radical forms of\nparticularism. Nor does it seem to exclude a variety of ontological\nviews about reasons as the reason-statement-based version of the\ndistinction did.", " On an interesting novel version of the perspective-based approach\ndefended by Löschke, it can enable us to understand\nagent-relative reasons as valid even if all value is agent-neutral.\nThis is because the perspective of the agent on the relevant\nagent-neutral value matters to their reasons in a way that makes the\nreason count as indexed to that agent in an important sense\n(Löschke 2020). The core idea is that the strength of a reason\ncan be relative to an agent in virtue of that agent’s\nperspective, even if its status as a reason (with whatever strength it\nmay have) is not. Löschke calls his approach the “normative\nforce interpretation,” it is relatively clear that it is a\nversion of the perspective-based approach in my sense. Löschke\nputs his view in terms of the agent’s perspective here, for\nexample: “NFI is in line with the idea that agent-relative\nreasons stem from the first-person perspective of agents and that\nmoral theory must make room for the importance of what an agent\nconsiders to be important and valuable in life” (Löschke\n2021: 369).", "\nHowever useful the distinction is, though, it is not\none which is well-suited to doing the work traditionally associated\nwith the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. For a start, a\nplausible litmus test for any proposed version of the distinction is\nthat it uncontroversially classifies egoistic reasons as\nagent-relative and utilitarian reasons (to maximize happiness,\nsimpliciter) as agent-neutral. These are perhaps the most commonly\ncited paradigms of each sort of reason, after all. Also, the\ndistinction is often thought to capture in a more abstract sense what\nHenry Sidgwick was discussing when he spoke of a ‘dualism of\npractical reason’ between reasons of self-interest and reasons\nof general benevolence (see Sidgwick 1907).", "\nThe crucial point is that it is far from obvious that the\nperspective-based distinction satisfies this litmus test.\nNagel’s attempt to prove that agent-relative reasons in his\nsense (including egoistic reasons) cannot be appreciated from a\nsuitably objective perspective is widely regarded as a failure, as are\nmany other attempts to refute egoism (and agent-relativism more\ngenerally) by showing it is incompatible with some suitable objective\nperspective. So perhaps egoistic reasons can, after all, be\nappreciated even from an ideally objective perspective on any of a\nwide range of conceptions of objectivity. Perhaps not, though; perhaps\nsome clever argument will still show that agent-relativity is\nincompatible with some important and independent notion of\nobjectivity. In any event, this remains at best a very controversial\nhunch rather than something which has been uncontroversially\ndemonstrated. This alone should give us great pause about adopting the\nperspective-based approach to the agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction. Egoistic reasons are paradigmatic agent-relative reasons,\nand it should be trivial that they come out as such rather than a\nmatter of great controversy. Moreover, the same point applies not only\nto egoistic reasons but to all of the typically invoked paradigms of\nagent-relativity. Reasons arising out of special relations to\none’s nearest and dearest are also paradigmatically\nagent-relative, but it is also far from clear that they will come out\nas such on the perspective-based approach. So even if we keep a single\nconception of objectivity as fixed there will be great controversy\nover whether seemingly paradigmatic instances of agent-relativity\nreally are such. This is unfortunate. The agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction should be one which is useful for framing these\ndebates at the outset (for more on this, see Dreier 1993) and not one\nwhich we can deploy with confidence only after the debates have been\nsettled. However, there will also be great controversy over just what\nthe right conception of objectivity is as well as controversy over the\nimplications of any given conception thereof. This threatens to mire\nthe agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in such controversy from\nthe outset as to make it virtually useless. Much better instead to\ndefine agent-relativity and agent-neutrality in terms of the logical\nform of the principle corresponding to the reason and then let it be a\nmatter of substantive debate whether agent-relative reasons so\nunderstood can be appreciated from various objective perspectives." ], "section_title": "3. The Perspective-Based Conception", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWe seemed to have reached a dialectical cul de sac. The\nprinciple-based approach draws the distinction nicely but is\ninaccessible to particularists. The reason-statement-based approach to\nthe distinction is tenable on certain ontological views about reasons\nbut seems useless on a wide variety of other plausible ontological\nviews about reasons. Finally, the perspective-based approach threatens\nto just change the subject or at least to mire the application of the\ndistinction down in so much controversy as to make it useless as a\ntool for framing the debates which it seems so naturally suited to\nframe.", "\nFortunately, though, the principle-based approach can actually be\nunderstood in a way that is compatible with particularism after all,\nand this is how we propose to understand the distinction (this goes\nbeyond the existing literature, but does so in the spirit of a\n‘friendly amendment’ to Nagel’s account). The key\nmove is to not build Nagel’s conception of universality into the\narticulation of the distinction. So one might allow that a given\nconsideration (or state of affairs, or feature of a situation; insert\nyour favored ontology of reasons here) is a reason in one case but\nthat very same consideration might be no reason at all (or even a\nreason with the opposite valence) in another situation due to some\ndifference between the two situations. At least, drawing of the\ndistinction should not rule this out. In this way, the distinction is\ncompatible with the particularist’s favored holistic conception\nof reasons.", "\nThis very quickly leads to an awkward question, though. Nagel drew his\ndistinction in terms of principles which incorporated his conception\nof universality. For Nagel’s principles were universally\nquantified generalizations which held that whenever an agent\ncan promote a certain sort of state of affairs there is reason to do\nso. So a different way of understanding ‘the general form of a\nreason’ or as one might prefer to put it, the principle\ncorresponding to the reason, is needed. Fortunately, there is an\nalternative conception ready to hand. As Sean McKeever and Ridge argue\nelsewhere (see McKeever and Ridge 2006) there is a species of hedged\nmoral principle which is compatible with the particularist’s\nholistic conception of reasons. McKeever and Ridge call these\n‘default principles’, and they are well situated to make\nNagel’s principle-based distinction available even to as hardy a\nparticularist as Jonathan Dancy. As background, recall that on the\nholistic conception of how reasons work, what is a reason here may be\nno reason at all or even a reason with the opposite valence elsewhere.\nSo for example, the fact that it would give a father pleasure is a\nreason for his son to give him a kiss on the cheek but that very same\nconsideration (that it would give him pleasure) may be no reason at\nall for him to watch a snuff film. Intuitively, the status of the fact\nthat it would give him pleasure as a reason is ‘defeated’\nin the latter case by the fact that the pleasure would be sadistic (or\nan expression of depravity, or whatever). Holists therefore call such\nfacts ‘defeaters’. This is also compatible with what\nholists call ‘enablers’—facts which are necessary\nfor some other fact to function as a reason. In fact, distinguishing\nenablers from reasons also arguably helps block another challenge to\nthe distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral\nreasons, namely that all reasons must make some reference to the agent\nbecause there being a reason implies that the agent is able to perform\nthe action. This objection could be blocked by characterizing this\nback-reference as trivial, but one might instead insist that the\nagent’s ability to perform the action is an enabling condition\nrather than part of the reason itself; see Ronnow-Rasmussen 2009 for\nan argument along these lines. In any event, with this machinery in\nhand, default principles can help craft a version of the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction that everyone (or just about\neveryone) can live with.", "\nGiven holism, a true and non-trivial principle about reasons must\naccommodate the possibility of defeaters. This can be done in one of\ntwo ways. First, one could try to list all of the different possible\ndefeaters in the antecedent and claim that none is present. However, a\nhardy particularist may insist that this is a fool’s game, on\nthe grounds that there is no saying in advance of considering all of\nthe indefinitely many possible contexts in which the putative reason\noccurs whether we have a complete list of all possible defeaters.\nAfter all, part of the particularist idea is that morality is far too\ncomplex for any such principles ever to be within our ken.\nParticularists allow that there may in principle be some infinitely\nlong generalization which lists all the defeaters, but deny that this\ncounts as a principle because it is not explanatory. However, there is\na second approach, and this is the approach which inspires the\nproposed conception of default principles. Instead of trying to list\nall of the possible defeaters and countervailing reasons one could\ninstead quantify over them. The proposal is most easily understood\nthrough illustrative examples. Returning to our example of pleasure\nand sadism, consider the following default principle:", "\n(P) is compatible with the particularist’s holistic conception\nof reasons. For in those cases in which the status of a fact about\npleasure as a reason is defeated by sadism (e.g.) the ‘no other\nfeature of the situation explains why F is not a\nreason…’ clause is not satisfied. Moreover, it is hard to\nsee how particularists could really object to principles as modest as\n(P). After all, (P) is compatible with the thesis that there are\nindefinitely many possible types of reasons and indefinitely many\npossible defeaters corresponding to each of those reasons. So the mere\navailability of default principles does not entail that the normative\nlandscape could be finitely (much less manageably) codified in some\nshort set of axioms like Ross’s list of prima facie\nduties, for instance. Furthermore, the availability of such principles\nin logical space does not in itself entail that they are presupposed\nby the very possibility of moral thought and judgment. So the\navailability of such principles is compatible with Dancy’s\ncanonical formulation of particularism, according to which, “the\npossibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the\nprovision of a suitable supply of moral principles” (Dancy 2004:\n7).", "\nWhat is the payoff of such principles in terms of the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction? Default principles allow one\nto draw the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in much the same\nway that Nagel drew it but without thereby excluding\nparticularists. An initial gloss of the distinction might go as\nfollows. A given default principle will either include a free-agent\nvariable in the statement of the consideration which is the reason or\nnot. If it does then the reason is agent-relative; if not then the\nreason is agent-neutral. However, this is not quite right. For every\nstatement of a reason will be a statement about an action which is a\npossible action for the agent for whom it is a reason. I cannot have\nreason to perform an action that only someone else could perform,\nafter all. Since this sort of back-reference to the agent is entirely\ntrivial, we must explicitly add to our definition that it is not\nsufficient to make a reason agent-relative. Otherwise, all reasons\nwill implausibly come out as agent-relative for this trivial reason.\nIndeed, Derek Parfit already noticed this in his discussion,\nexplaining that,", "\nEven if you and I are trying to achieve some common aim, we may be in\ndifferent causal situations. I may have reason to act in a way that\npromotes our common aim, but you may have no such reason since you may\nbe unable to act in this way. Since even agent-neutral reasons are, in\nthis sense, agent-relative, this sense is irrelevant to our\ndiscussion. (Parfit 1984: 143)\n", "\nThis suggests that the statement of the agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction should be slightly revised. The default principle\ncorresponding to a given reason will either include a\nnon-trivial free-agent-variable in the statement of the\nreason or not. If it does then the reason is agent-relative; otherwise\nit is agent-neutral. The idea is that the use of a free-agent variable\nto indicate that the action is one available to the agent for whom the\nfact is a reason is trivial in the sense that it must be included in\nthe statement of any reason whatsoever. So the reasons associated with\nthe default principle (P) [see above] are agent-neutral, as the only\nuse of the free-agent variable ‘p’ is the trivial one that\nindicates that x is a possible action of p’s.\nBy contrast, the reasons associated with the following principle would\nbe agent-relative:", "\nUnlike (P), the statement of the reason given in (P) includes a\nnon-trivial use of a free-agent variable in its insistence that the\npleasure promoted must be p’s. So the reasons\nassociated with (P) come out as agent-relative. It is not hard to see\nthat the proposed reading of the distinction should easily pass the\nlitmus test given above, classifying objective utilitarian reasons as\nagent-neutral (as with (P)) and egoistic reasons as agent-relative.\nMoreover, it is easy to see that the proposed reading of the\ndistinction would sort other paradigmatic instances of\nagent-relativity and agent-neutrality in an intuitively satisfying\nway. Abandoning Nagel’s assumption of universality in favor of\nour more modest default principles seems to allow us to make good\nsense of his distinction without excluding even fairly radical forms\nof particularism.", "\nHowever, before we rest too easily with this conclusion, we must first\naddress an important objection to default\n principles.[4]\n The challenge insists that they are all vacuously true simply in\nvirtue of their logical form. Since default principles are universally\nquantified conditionals, they can be false only if they have an\ninstantiation in which the antecedent is true and the consequent is\nfalse. The worry behind the vacuity objection is that the logical form\nof a default principle in conjunction with some very plausible\nassumptions about moral explanation entails that whenever the\nconsequent of a default principle is false, its antecedent will be\nfalse as well, in which case the principle itself is vacuously true.\nConsider the following inane default principle:", "\nLY is clearly absurd. For an action is wrong in virtue of a given fact\nor set of facts in the intended sense of ‘in virtue of’\nonly if the fact(s) in question is (or are) moral reason(s) not to\nperform the action which carry the day. Plausibly, that the fact that\nan action would be done in a leap year could never itself be a moral\nreason to perform the\n action.[5]\n So LY had better come out as false. The vacuity objection, however,\ninsists that LY turns out to be trivially true. Moreover, the\nobjection continues, the reason LY is true carries over to any default\nprinciple.", "\nLY is a universally quantified conditional ranging over possible\nactions and hence is false only if it has a possible instantiation in\nwhich its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. Presumably\nits consequent is necessarily always false—no action could be\nmade wrong in the relevant sense by being done in a leap\nyear—the fact that an action is done in a leap year could never\nin itself be a moral reason not to perform an action. So the crucial\nissue is whether any of its instantiations also has a true antecedent.\nThe antecedent is itself a conjunction and hence will be true only if\nboth conjuncts are true. However, the objection runs, the second of\nthe three conjuncts [(b) above] is necessarily false or is false for\nall possible actions. I am taking it as given that the leap year fact\nis not a moral reason, but the objection insists on general grounds\nthat it is implausible to suppose that there is no explanation of its\nfailure to be a moral reason. Moral facts are not arbitrary, at least\nin the extremely minimal sense that whenever something is or is not a\nmoral reason there will be some explanation of why this is\nso. Even someone who thought that morality was a direct function of\nthe arbitrary will of God should admit this much, since we will on\nsuch an account always be able to explain moral differences in terms\nof differences in God’s will even if we cannot go on to explain\nwhy God willed one way rather than another. So moral differences can\nalways be explained. Hence clause (b) in any default principle will\nalways be false, which is enough to make the antecedent false and so\nenough to make the conditional trivially true.", "\nAn adequate understanding of why the vacuity objection is unsound\nrequires careful attention to a further detail. The vacuity objection\ngoes from the premise that every time a fact is not a moral reason\nthere is some explanation for its failure to be a moral reason to the\nconclusion that the ‘no further feature of the situation\nexplains…’ clause of the corresponding default principle\nwill always be false whenever the fact in question is not a reason.\nHowever, this inference is valid only if it is valid to go from\n‘there is some explanation of p’ to ‘some\nfeature of the situation explains p’ and this inference\nis invalid. The inference would be valid only if we were to interpret\n‘feature of the situation’ so broadly that any possible\nexplanatory fact can count as a feature of the situation. This is not\nat all an intuitive reading of ‘feature of the situation’,\nnor is it the intended reading. Hence the vacuity objection is\nunsound.", "\nFor present purposes, the main point is just that a feature of a\nsituation must be a contingent fact. Necessary facts apply equally to\nall possible situations and hence are never features of any particular\nsituation in our sense. This is already enough to accommodate the\nplausible idea that every moral fact has an explanation of some kind\nwhile blocking the vacuity objection. For quite plausibly, the moral\nfacts in question will be explained by some necessary fact. For\nexample, the explanation of why the fact that a given action would be\ndone in a leap year is not a moral reason not to perform that action\nmight simply be that the fact that an action would be done in a leap\nyear could never be any kind of reason for action. That explanation is\nperhaps not the most illuminating one, but it is a kind of explanation\nand it is an explanation given in terms of a necessary fact. An\nalternative (and more controversial) explanation might appeal to the\nputative fact that a given fact is a moral reason only if it is a fact\nabout how the action bears in some way on welfare or treating people\nwith respect. This is a very controversial explanation, but the point\nis simply that if the main premise of this explanation (a kind of\npluralism involving utilitarian reasons and deontological reasons) is\ntrue then it very plausibly is a necessary truth. Once again, the fact\nin question does indeed have an explanation but it is not explained by\na feature of the situation. So there is no need to reject the\nplausible suggestion that every moral fact has some explanation to\nrefute the vacuity objection.", "\nMore importantly, no contingent feature of the situation could\nplausibly figure in an explanation of why the leap year fact is not a\nmoral reason in a given case. Indeed, because the leap year fact could\nnever be a reason its failure to be a reason here will in no\nway depend on any of the contingent features of this case. So none of\nthose contingent features of the case at hand will figure in an\nexplanation of why that fact is not a moral reason here. If the leap\nyear fact were sometimes a reason then things would be very different.\nFor in that case the contingent features that distinguish the\nsituation in which it is a reason from those in which it is not a\nmoral reason could intelligibly figure in an explanation of why the\nfact is not a moral reason here. Moreover, if asked to cite some\nparticular contingent feature of the situation that explains why that\nfact is not a moral reason here any sane moral agent would simply be\nperplexed. Hence for any default principle citing a patently absurd\ncandidate reason (and whose consequent is not necessarily true) there\nwill be possible instantiations of that principle in which the\nantecedent is true and the consequent is false. This line of argument\nis perfectly general, so any principle citing a putative reason in its\nantecedent which could never actually be a moral reason (and whose\nconsequent can be false; principles with tautologous consequents will\nof course be trivially true on anybody’s account) will turn out\nto be false. The only reason to doubt that the antecedent would\nsometimes be true was the thought that the ‘no feature of the\nsituation explains…’ clause is always trivially false.\nSince this rests on a failure to distinguish explanations in general\nfrom explanations cast in terms of contingent features, it is\nreasonable to conclude that default principles are not all vacuously\ntrue simply in virtue of their logical form. So default principles can\nsafely be invoked to articulate the agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction and thereby capture Nagel’s basic idea without\nmaking the distinction useless to radical moral particularists like\nDancy." ], "section_title": "4. The Principle-Based Conception Revisited", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAs will be explained in section 6, the agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction is a very useful and philosophically important one.\nHowever, as with all distinctions, its usefulness evaporates when it\nis confused with other related but different distinctions. This sort\nof confusion is depressingly commonplace, perhaps in virtue of an\nunfortunate tendency for philosophers to use terms like\n‘neutral’, ‘objective’, and\n‘relative’ without always being completely explicit about\nwhat those terms are supposed to mean. To guard against such\nconflations, this section canvasses a number of distinctions with\nwhich one might easily confuse the agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction and explains how each differs from it. These distinctions\nare divided into six groups, where the distinctions are put into the\nsame group insofar as they all have the same feature(s) in common with\nthe agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction.", "\nThe first of these families of distinctions consists of those that are\nlike the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in that they are\ndrawn in terms of a relativization of the reason to the agent who has\nthe reason, but in a different way from the way in which the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is. Only one widely employed\ndistinction clearly falls into this family: Bernard Williams’\ndistinction between internal and external reasons. On Williams’\naccount, a reason for acting is internal just in case it counts as a\nreason in virtue of its connection to the agent’s\n“motivational set” (desires, intentions, pro-attitudes,\netc.); otherwise it is external (see Williams 1981b). It is not hard\nto see how this distinction might easily be confused with the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction, for one might easily suppose\nthat internal reasons just are agent-relative ones, while external\nreasons just are agent-neutral ones. However, the distinctions are not\nthe same, for a reason may be external and still be agent-relative.\nSuppose, for example, that we accept a default principle according to\nwhich the fact that an agent’s culture demands something is\nsometimes a reason to do it. Such a reason will be agent-relative in\nvirtue of the use of a free-agent variable to indicate that it is the\nagent’s own culture which determines what reasons she has. Or\nconsider a default principle according to which the fact that an\naction would satisfy the agent’s biological needs is sometimes a\nreason. Again, the relativization to the agent (here to the\nagent’s needs) entails that such a reason is agent-relative.\nEach of the reasons grounded by either of these latter two principles\nwill be both agent-relative and external, for an agent simply\nmay not care about her culture’s standards or her biological\nneeds. Hence, reasons for acting also can be both external and\nagent-relative.", "\nIn a second family of distinctions, we find distinctions that are like\nthe agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in that they are also\ndrawn in terms of the principles underwriting an agent’s reasons\nfor acting, but are unlike it in that they are not drawn in terms of\ntheir relativity to the agent who has the reasons. Two main\ndistinctions fall into this family: universality/non-universality and\ngenerality/non-generality. Agent-neutrality is often confused with\nuniversality. A reason is universal insofar as any person, A,\nwho judges that one agent, B, has a reason is thereby\ncommitted to making the same judgment of anyone else, C, whom\nthey take to be in relevantly similar circumstances. So long as we\nassume reasons are associated with principles, this will mean that the\nprinciple associated with the reason will be universal in scope; that\nis to say, it will be of the form, “For all x, if\nx is an agent, then…” Note that this is much\nweaker than Nagel’s conception of universality; even default\nprinciples employ universal quantifiers and are universal in this\nsense. Universality in this thin sense is rightly taken to be a highly\nuncontroversial, perhaps even trivial, feature of reasons. However, it\nwould of course be a mistake to infer from this that agent-neutrality\nshould be uncontroversial, for the concepts are quite different.\nAgent-relative reasons, as well as agent-neutral reasons, can satisfy\nuniversality in this sense. An egoist principle, for example, would\ntypically be understood as a universally quantified thesis according\nto which for all agents A, if a given action maximizes\nA’s welfare then A ought to perform that action.\nNor, of course, is agent-neutrality the same as universality in\nNagel’s somewhat stronger sense according to which whatever is a\nreason in one case must be a reason anywhere. This is obvious once it\nis made explicit, but historical attempts to derive agent-neutrality\nfrom such forms of universality encourage the conflation (see, e.g.,\nHare 1963: 112–136).", "\nAgent-neutrality is also easily confused with generality, where a\nreason is general just in case the principle that underwrites it\ncontains no proper nouns or “rigidly designating”\ndescriptions (see Kripke 1972). Like universality, generality is a\nfunction of the principles underwriting the agent’s reasons.\nUpon reflection, though, it should be clear that the\ngeneral/non-general distinction simply cuts across the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction; agent-relative reasons could\nbe either general or non-general, as could agent-neutral ones. For\nexample, “The fact that God commands X-ing is a reason\nto X unless some other feature of the situation explains why\nit is not,” would be non-general (assuming that\n‘God’ is a rigid designator) yet agent-neutral, whereas,\n“The fact that God commands each person to do as her conscience\ndictates is a reason for each person to do as her conscience dictates\nunless some other feature of the situation explains why it is not a\nreason” would be both non-general and agent-relative.", "\nA third family of distinctions is like the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral one in that it is drawn in terms of a\nrelativization to the agent for whom the consideration is a reason,\nbut is not drawn in terms of the principle underwriting the\nreason. Here there are two very similar distinctions that merit\ndiscussion. In fact these two distinctions are so similar that they\nmight easily be confused with one another as well as with the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral one. The first of these two distinctions\nis the distinction between “deliberator relative” (DR)\nprinciples and “deliberator neutral” (DN) principles (see\nPostema 1998). Unlike the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction,\nthe DR/DN distinction is not one that is drawn in terms of the form of\nthose principles themselves. Unlike agent-relativity or\nagent-neutrality, deliberator relativity and deliberator neutrality\ncannot simply be “read off” from an accurate statement of\nthe principles themselves. For the DR/DN distinction concerns not the\nquestion of the form of the principles, but the question of the source\nof their authority, or if one prefers, their “force.” A\nprinciple’s having force for a given agent is then glossed as\nbeing such that the agent must recognize the principle’s\nvalidity to avoid counting as irrational. With this\nconception of force in play, the distinction is usefully characterized\nin the following way:", "\nA principle is DN iff it has force for every possible agent, which is\nto say all rational agents must recognize the principle’s\nvalidity to avoid counting as irrational.\n\n\nA principle is DR iff (a) its force varies from one possible agent to\nthe next, which is to say at least some possible rational agents might\nreject the principle’s validity without thereby being\nirrational, or (b) it has force for no possible agents. This is just\nthe denial of DN.\n", "\nOnce the DR/DN distinction is explicitly articulated and compared with\nthe AR/AN distinction, it is clear that they are different\ndistinctions, doing different theoretical work. The distinctions\nsimply cut across one another. A principle might have an\nagent-relative logical form, and so be agent-relative, yet have be\ndeliberator neutral given the source of its authority. Egoism, for\nexample, is an agent-relative principle, but a defender of egoism\nmight argue that a failure to recognize egoism’s validity is\nsufficient for someone to count as irrational, in which case egoism is\nalso deliberator neutral. ", "\nThe other distinction falling into this third family is very similar\nto the DR/DN distinction. It also concerns the force, rather than the\nform, of a practical principle. The DR/DN distinction is in terms of\nwhich principles an agent must recognize as binding on her to\navoid counting as irrational. A slightly different distinction is\nthe between principles that really are binding on everyone\n(BN–“binding neutral”), even if one might not\naccept their authority without thereby counting as irrational,\nand those that are not (BR–“binding relative”).\nDrawing the distinction may commit us to the thesis that there is a\nfairly fundamental appearance/reality distinction to be drawn even\nwith respect to principles of practical reason, so that even an\nideally rational agent could, in principle, be mistaken at a given\npoint in time about which principle(s) bind her without thereby\ncounting as irrational. At any rate, it should be clear that this\ndistinction, like the closely aligned DR/DN distinction is quite\ndifferent from the AR/AN distinction.", "\nA fourth family of distinctions with which the AR/AN distinction might\neasily be confused is of those distinctions that are like the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in that it is drawn in terms\nof relativization, but unlike it in that it is not in terms\nof a relativization to the agent who has the reason. There is perhaps\nonly one important distinction that clearly falls into this category:\nwhat Nicholas Sturgeon has helpfully referred to as\n“appraiser-relativism” (Sturgeon 1994). Though this may\nnot be essential to appraiser-relativism, it is worth noting that,\nunlike agent-relativism, appraiser-relativism is typically presented\nas a semantic thesis about terms of ordinary language (as opposed to\ntechnical terms like ‘agent-neutral’), to the effect that\nthe truth value of one and the same ethical or practical judgment can\nvary from one appraiser to the next. On such views, my judgment that\nwhat Hitler did was wrong could in principle be true while another\nperson making the very same judgment in a rather different context\n(but one in which Hitler’s actions, their context and\nconsequences are kept constant) could be false. By contrast, the\njudgment that there was agent-relative reason for Hitler to perform a\ngiven action will have a truth-value that is invariant across\ndifferent appraisers. Agent-relativism is a substantive view about\nwhat kinds of reasons people have, and is distinct from the semantic\nthesis of appraiser-relativism. Appraiser-relativism involves a\nrelativization to the person appraising an action, rather than a\nrelativization to the agent who might perform the action.", "\nA fifth family is of distinctions that in some sense divide reasons\ninto categories that might usefully be thought of as the\n“private” and the “non-private.” In this\nrespect, they are intuitively similar to the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction, in that there is a\nrecognizable sense in which agent-relative reasons are\nprivate—their status as reasons for an agent is irreducibly a\nfunction of the features of that agent as such.\nCorrespondingly, agent-neutral reasons are public in the sense that\nthis is, by definition, not true of them. At least two other\ndistinctions are usefully thought of as dividing reasons into the\ncategories of private and non-private. However, each of these two\ndistinctions mark the private/non-private division in an importantly\ndifferent sense from the one in which the agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction does.", "\nThe first of these two distinctions is one between reasons that are\n“essentially shared,” in a somewhat technical sense, and\nthose that are not. This distinction is perhaps the one that is most\nfrequently confused with the agent-relative/agent-neutral one, and the\nphilosophical consequences are significant. As the distinction is\ntypically drawn, a reason is supposed to be “essentially\nshared” just in case whenever the reason is a reason for one\nagent to perform an action it is equally a reason for anyone\nto promote his performance of that action; otherwise it is not. So,\nfor example, if my reason to take a walk is essentially shared, it\nfollows that it is equally a reason for anyone to promote my taking a\nwalk. Put more quaintly, the question of whether reasons for acting\nare essentially shared is the question of whether a reason for me must\nprovide everyone else with a corresponding reason to help me do as\nthat reason recommends, insofar as they can. It is not hard to see how\nthere is a sense in which this distinction divides reasons into the\npublic and the non-public, as essentially shared reasons, unlike those\nthat are not essentially shared, provide reasons for everyone who can\npromote the state of affairs in which people act in accordance with\nthose reasons. That being “shared” has become a rather\ntechnical notion should be apparent, since in more ordinary terms you\nand I may both share a reason, that doing X would be pleasant\nsay, where each of our reasons provides no corresponding reasons for\nthe other.", "\nIt is also quite easy to see how this distinction might be confused\nwith the agent-relative/agent-neutral one. Suppose one embraces the\ntempting view that all reasons for acting must be\nteleological in form, which is to say that any principle\nunderwriting a reason for acting must individuate actions in terms of\nthe states of affairs that they promote. However, the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction itself should not be\nunderstood as incorporating such a highly controversial assumption,\nand the version of the distinction proposed in section IV as an\nimprovement on Nagel and Parfit therefore does not incorporate it.\nGiven the assumption of teleology, though, and given the rejection of\nholism in the theory of reasons (which Nagel’s universality\nimplicitly does reject) it would indeed follow that agent-neutrality\nand being essentially shared are necessarily co-extensive, since any\nuniversal (in Nagel’s sense) agent-neutral principle will then\nhave the following form:", "\nIt follows trivially from the supposition that all practical\nprinciples have this form that whenever one agent has reason to\npromote a state of affairs that any agent who can promote\nN will have reason to do so.", "\nHowever, the view that all reasons for acting are teleological, while\ntempting, is a substantive doctrine that one might reasonably reject.\nTeleology is certainly not a trivial feature of our understanding of\npractical reasons. To take just one example, T.M. Scanlon has recently\nargued at some length that not all reasons are teleological and that\nthe assumption that they are badly distorts our conception of\npractical reason (Scanlon 1998: 79–107). So it would be a\nmistake to allow one’s attraction to that substantive view to\nlead one to conflate the distinction between the\nagent-neutral/agent-relative distinction and the essentially\nshared/not essentially shared distinction. For insofar as one rejects\nthat assumption, one can very well allow that there are reasons which\nare both agent-neutral and not essentially shared. Consider,\nfor example, the following principle:", "\nThe reasons generated by this principle are clearly agent-neutral, but\nthey are not essentially shared, for it simply does not\nfollow from this principle that I have any reason to perform actions\nthat would reduce the total number of violent incidents (either by\nothers or myself in the future). I may very well have such further\nreasons, but they would be associated with a different principle, and\ntherefore might not be as weighty as the reasons associated\nwith the above agent-neutral principle.", "\nOn a historical note, it is perhaps no surprise that these two\ndistinctions are so often conflated. For we have seen that Nagel, the\noriginal and most influential proponent of the\nagent-neutral/agent-relative distinction, explicitly commits himself\nto the view that all reasons are teleological in form, and is driven\nby this view to conflate the two distinctions. Recall that Nagel\nembraces the following teleological conception of practical\nprinciples:", "\n[E]very reason is a predicate R such that for all persons and\nevents A, if R is true of A, then\np has prima facie reason to promote A.\n(Nagel 1970: 47)\n", "\nNagel thinks this position is just an unproblematic simplification on\nthe grounds that he treats the performance “of act B as\na degenerate case of promoting the occurrence of act B”\n(Nagel 1970: 47). The reason it is not merely an\nunproblematic simplification is that putting all practical principles\ninto this form robs us of the ability to say that there is\nagent-neutral reason for an agent to but no reason for her to promote\nBing, except in the admittedly degenerate sense in which\nBing is a way of promoting Bing.", "\nOf Nagel’s critics, Christine Korsgaard has been most sensitive\nto the way in which he builds teleology into his view without argument\nfrom the very beginning. She notes, for example, that, “Nagel\ntreats all reasons as reasons to promote\nsomething…Nagel is in danger of ending up with consequentialism\nbecause that is where he started” (Korsgaard 1996a: 300). In\nspite of this perceptive diagnosis of Nagel’s error on this\nfront, though, Korsgaard occasionally blurs the two distinctions,\nclaiming that the criterion that the reason predicate not contain a\n“free agent variable” is simply a more formal way of\nsaying that these reasons are “common property” and not\n“personal property,” which on her view amounts to the\nthesis that they are essentially shared, as we have explicated that\nthesis (see Korsgaard 1996b: 276). That a philosopher perceptive\nenough to note and so accurately diagnose Nagel’s mistake could\nstill blur the two distinctions is a testament to the depth of the\nconfusion about these distinctions embedded throughout the current\nphilosophical literature. For another instance of this mistake, see\nMcNaughton and Rawling 1995a as well as Dreier 1993.", "\nA second distinction falling into this larger family of distinctions\nis the distinction between reasons that are intersubjective, and those\nthat are not, where intersubjectivity is cashed out in terms of the\npossibility of an agent’s successfully communicating the force\nof the reason to other agents. Korsgaard has emphasized this\ndistinction in a number of places and argued that all reasons for\nacting must be intersubjective (e.g., Korsgaard 1996b: 131–166).\nIt is not hard to see how non-intersubjective reasons might plausibly\nbe thought of as private and intersubjective reasons might be thought\nof as public; hence it is not too hard to see how that distinction\nmight be confused with the agent-relative/agent-neutral one given the\ntendency to confuse that distinction with the private/public\ndistinction. Still, once intersubjectivity/non-intersubjectivity is\nexplicitly defined, it is relatively clear that it is different from\nthe agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. For the former\ndistinction is drawn in terms of communicability and the latter\ndistinction makes no reference whatsoever to communicability. Indeed,\nfor all that has been said so far, a reason might be intersubjective\nand be either agent-relative or agent-neutral. Still, it is\nsurprisingly easy to run together these two distinctions. One way this\nconfusion might arise would happen in two stages. First, one might\nconfuse the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction with the\ndistinction between reasons that are essentially shared and\nthose that are not. Since intersubjective reasons are often\ncharacterized as reasons “we can share,” the\nstage is set for confusing both of those two distinctions with the\nfurther distinction between intersubjective and non-intersubjective\nreasons. For it would not be that difficult to confuse shareability\nwith being essentially shared.", "\nFinally, in the sixth family of distinctions, we find a distinction\nthat might easily be confused with the agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction as a kind of historical artifact. Here we have in mind the\ndistinction between “reasons for an agent to do something”\nand “reasons for something to happen.” Without actually\nconfusing them himself, Nagel may have unintentionally encouraged this\nconflation in remarking, for example, that, “Ethics is concerned\nnot only with what should happen, but also independently with what\npeople should or may do. Neutral reasons underlie the former;\nbut relative reasons can affect the latter” (Nagel 1986: 165).\nIn fact, however, it should be clear that these two distinctions are\ndifferent. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction concerns the\nform of a practical principle, whereas the other distinction concerns\nwhether a reason is a reason for an agent to do something or a reason\nfor something to happen. One way of making the separateness of these\ntwo distinctions especially vivid is to note that someone might\nembrace the former distinction and admit that there are both kinds of\nreasons, but reject the very notion of a “reason for something\nto happen” as resting on an obscure, confused notion of a reason\nthat can float free of all possible agents. This is not to say that we\nshould in fact reject that notion; Wilfrid Sellars argues that a\ndistinction of this sort is an important one (see Sellars 1968:\n175–229. See also Castaneda 1975, with a discussion of\nSellars’s distinction). Rather, it is simply to note that it is\nnot obviously misguided to reject the very concept of a reason for\nsomething to happen, and we should leave room for someone to do this\nwithout supposing all reasons for acting are agent-relative, for that\nis simply another question. Even if I grant that all reasons must be\nreasons for someone, in that a reason presupposes a possible agent, I\ncan still hold that the principle underlying those reasons need not\nmake any non-trivial, ineliminable pronominal back-reference to that\nagent. Hence the two distinctions are different.", "\nIn sum, then, the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction shares a\nnumber of features with several other distinctions, and therefore is\neasily confused with those other distinctions. These other\ndistinctions have been broken down into six families, where those\nfamilies are divided in terms of what the distinctions in question\nhave in common with the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction.\nHaving discussed all six of these families at some length, it may be\nuseful to provide a concise review of the defining features of each\nfamily:" ], "section_title": "5. Related Distinctions", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nHaving formulated the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction and\nseen how it differs from other important distinctions, we are now in a\nposition to consider why the distinction is an important one. The\ndistinction has played a very useful role in framing certain\ninteresting and important debates in normative philosophy.", "\nFor a start, the distinction helps frame a challenge to the\ntraditional assumption that what separates so-called consequentialists\nand deontologists is that the former but not the latter are committed\nto the idea that all reasons for action are teleological. A\ndeontological restriction forbids a certain sort of action (e.g.,\nstealing) even when stealing here is the only way to prevent even more\nstealing in the long run. Consequentialists charge that such a\nrestriction must be irrational, on the grounds that if stealing is\nforbidden then it must be bad but if it is bad then surely less\nstealing is better than more. The deontologist can respond in one of\ntwo ways. First, they could hold that deontological restrictions\ncorrespond to non-teleological reasons. The reason not to steal, on\nthis account, is not that stealing is bad in the sense that it should\nbe minimized but rather simply that stealing is forbidden no matter\nwhat the consequences (this is admittedly a stark form of deontology,\nbut there are less stern versions as well). This is indeed one way of\nunderstanding the divide between consequentialists and deontologists,\nbut the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction, and in particular\nthe idea of agent-relative reasons, brings to the fore an alternative\nconception. For arguably, we could instead understand deontological\nrestrictions as corresponding to a species of reasons which are\nteleological after all so long as those reasons are agent-relative. If\nmy reason not to steal is that I should minimize my stealing then the\nfact that my stealing here would prevent five other people from\ncommitting similar acts of theft does nothing to suggest that I ought\nto steal. To really have any chance of working, the reasons will\nprobably need to be temporally relative as well as agent-relative. For\notherwise the reason corresponding to a deontological restriction will\ngive me reason to steal now if this is the only way to prevent me from\nstealing even more\n later.[6]\n If the reasons in play are agent-relative then perhaps the\ndeontologist can do more to defuse the consequentialist’s charge\nof paradox, though other problems now arise. The deontologist now can\nlook overly self-indulgent, so obsessed with the purity of her own\nsoul that she will not sacrifice her integrity for the greater good\n(see Ridge 2001a). Another worry is that reasons which are both\nagent-relative and temporally relative are not really teleological\nafter all in any interesting sense. For the only way to promote an\naction right now is simply by performing it. The broader and\nmore standard conception of promoting an action by causing it simply\nhas no foothold here, and if it did then the proposal would not\ncorrespond exactly with deontological intuitions. In spite of these\nworries, many philosophers have characterized the reasons\ncorresponding to deontological restrictions as agent-relative. Indeed,\nthe characterization of deontological restrictions as agent-relative\n(or agent-centered) is close to being an\n orthodoxy.[7]\n ", "\nIf we can properly understand the reasons corresponding to\ndeontological restrictions as agent-relative (and temporally relative)\nteleological reasons but teleological reasons all the same then in\neffect we can, as James Dreier puts it, ‘consequentialize’\ndeontology, surprisingly enough. The apparent success of deploying\nagent-relativity to ‘consequentialize’ deontology leads\nDreier to defend the more bold hypothesis that any moral\ntheory can be represented as a form of consequentialism so long as we\nare willing to allow that consequentialism comes in agent-relative as\nwell as agent-neutral versions. The central idea behind\nconsequentialism, on this way of thinking, is its teleology and\ncommitment to maximizing, both of which seem compatible with\nagent-relativity about that which is\n maximized.[8]\n If Dreier is right about this then the agent-relative/agent-neutral\ndistinction may be more important than the distinction between\nconsequentialist theories and non-consequentialist theories.", "\nAnother advantage of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is\nthat it can bring to our attention important structural differences\nbetween what might otherwise seem like very similar normative\ntheories. For example, a theory which holds that our overriding reason\nis always to maximize actual utility seems very similar in spirit to a\ntheory which instead holds that our overriding reason is always to\nmaximize expected utility. One would naturally have thought\nthat both of these theories are agent-neutral so long as we assume\nthat utility is understood in agent-neutrally (in terms of general\nhappiness, e.g.). However, the reference to ‘expected’\nutility in the second theory actually seems to entail that the reasons\ncorresponding to that theory are agent-relative. For presumably the\nrelevant expectations are the agent’s, in which case we will\nneed to mark this with a free agent variable and that free agent\nvariable hardly seems\n trivial.[9]\n This is a surprising result, but there is no obvious way to block it\non the conception of agent-relativity proposed here (or on the\nclassical principle-based conceptions defended by Nagel, Parfit or\neven on the reason-statement-based version of the distinction defended\nby Pettit). This could itself be illuminating. Perhaps it suggests\nthat we need to draw a fundamental distinction between value and\nreasons, contra T.M. Scanlon and others who see value claims as really\njust indicating the presence of reasons; see Scanlon’s\ndiscussion of the ‘buck-passing account in Scanlon (1998). For\nsuch a distinction would allow us to say that while happiness is an\nagent-neutral good (thereby accommodating the intuition that there is\nsomething agent-neutral about the second theory) our reasons to\npromote that good are best understood in terms of the agent’s\nexpectations and hence agent-relative.", "\nNor should we forget that the first real use of the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction was Nagel’s in The\nPossibility of Altruism. There Nagel tried to prove that all\nreasons must be agent-neutral on pain of a kind of practical\nsolipsism. Nagel eventually abandoned this argument in light of\nobjections from Nicholas Sturgeon (see Sturgeon 1974), but the\nargument is ingenious and Nagel may have abandoned it prematurely. If\nany such argument could ever be made to work then we might be able to\nsettle a wide range of difficult issues in normative philosophy\nwithout simply appealing to first-order intuitions about cases which\nso often seems to lead to philosophical stalemate. Moreover, if an\nargument like Nagel’s could be made to work then its\nimplications would be dramatic. Not only egoistic reasons but arguably\ndeontological reasons and reasons arising out of special relations to\none’s nearest and dearest would stand refuted, as would what\nNagel later referred to as ‘reasons of autonomy’ (see\nNagel 1986: 165). Furthermore, Nagel is not the only one to have\noffered abstract considerations in favor of the thesis that all\nreasons are agent-neutral. For example, some of Derek Parfit’s\nwork on personal identity is supposed to undermine the importance of\npersonal identity as such, and that in turn might undermine the\ntenability of agent-relativity (see Parfit 1984).", "\nThe agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction was also invaluable in\nJames Dreier’s exploration of the often neglected issue of how\nan expressivist might make sense of agent-relative norms (see Dreier\n1996). Dreier’s argument is subtle and complex, and we shall not\ntry to reproduce it here. The point for present purposes is that his\ndiscussion highlights an important challenge for expressivists.\nAdmittedly, a more narrow version of this challenge was previously\nseen by Brian Medlin (see Medlin 1957), whose work heavily influenced\nDreier. However, Medlin cast the challenge specifically in terms of\negoistic reasons and that has important dialectical implications. As\nDreier points out, Medlin’s challenge applies to agent-centered\nnorms more generally and this wider scope matters. For we might well\nbe willing to abandon egoistic reasons, but if we also had to give up\non the intelligibility of deontology then the costs of expressivism\nmight well begin to seem too steep. Until Nagel and others drew the\nagent-relative/agent-neutral distinction, it was easy enough for\nphilosophers like Medlin to not fully appreciate the scope and power\nof their own arguments.", "\nFinally, the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction can also provide\na useful lens through which to examine some of the arguments of\nhistorical figures. Sidgwick’s famous discussion of the\n‘dualism of practical reason’ can now be seen as an\ninstance of the more general tension between agent-relative and\nagent-neutral reasons. G.E. Moore’s argument against ethical\negoism would, if sound, refute agent-relative conceptions more\ngenerally (see Moore 1903: 96–105), since Moore’s main\nobjection is not to egoism in particular but (in effect) to\nagent-relative conceptions of the good more generally.", "\nAlso, there is an interesting debate about whether Kantian moral\nprohibitions must be understood as agent-relative even if we allow\nthat all reasons are teleological (see Ridge 2009; compare Huckfeldt\n2007 and Dougherty 2013). The strategy is to understand the end to be\npromoted in agent-neutral terms, but also in such a way that the agent\nat any given point in time can best promote that agent-neutral aim\nonly by acting in accord with suitable deontological rules. One key\nidea behind this strategy is that the relevant end is “good\nwilling” understood in a broadly Kantian way, combined with a\nrobust theory of free will according to which one agent cannot ever\nfully control the will of another. The other key idea is that the\nagent-neutral teleological reasons in play are compatible with a\nnon-maximizing theory of right action. In particular, the idea will be\nthat the agent must always minimize the risk of the very worst of the\navailable outcomes. If the very worst of the available outcomes is\nthat everyone has a bad will, then one can ensure that the risk of\nthat outcome is zero by preserving one’s own good will. Given\nthat one cannot in this way fully control the will of another, the\nneeded self/other asymmetry is preserved without agent-relativity in\nthe theory of reasons or value. A suitable theory of right action and\nfree will can do the work that would otherwise require an\nagent-relative theory of reasons or value. " ], "section_title": "6. Why the Distinction Matters", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is extremely important to\na wide range of debates in normative philosophy. Yet the distinction\nis often drawn in very different ways, with the risk that philosophers\nare simply talking past one another. In this entry, different ways of\ndrawing the distinction have been distinguished, and the virtues of a\nmodified version of the principle-based approach has been defended.\nThe distinction so drawn is different from a wide range of other\ndistinctions with which it might easily be confused; these\ndistinctions are laid out here to help guard against such confusions.\nFinally, the distinction so drawn is an important one in structuring\ncentral debates in normative theory, such as how to understand the\ndivide between consequentialists and deontologists." ], "section_title": "7. Conclusion.", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Broome, John, 1995. “Skorupski on agent-neutrality”,\nUtilitas, 7: 315–17.\n [Preprint available online]\n ", "Buckland, J., 2019. “Skorupski and Broome on the\nAgent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction”,\nUtilitas, 31(1): 59–82.", "Castaneda, H.-N., 1975. Thinking and Doing, Dordrecht: D.\nReidel Publishing Company.", "Cummiskey, D, 1996. Kantian Consequentialism, New York:\nOxford University Press.", "D’Agostino, F. and Guas, G., 1998. Public Reason,\nAldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company.", "Dancy, J., 1993. Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell\nPress.", "–––, 2004. Ethics Without Principles,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Dougherty, Tom. 2013. “Agent-Neutral Deontology”,\nPhilosophical Studies, 163: 527–537.", "Dreier, James, 1993. “Structures of Normative\nTheories”, The Monist, 76: 22–40.\n [Preprint available online\n (in PDF)]", "–––, 1996. “Accepting Agent Centred\nNorms”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74:\n409–422.\n [Preprint available online\n (in PDF)]", "Hammerton, M., 2018. “Distinguishing Agent-Relativity From\nAgent-Neutrality”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,\n97(2): 239–250.", "Hare, R.M., 1963. Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Herman, B., 1993a. The Practice of Moral Judgment,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "–––, 1993b. “Leaving Deontology\nBehind”, in Herman 1993a: 208–240.", "Huckfeldt, V., 2007. “Categorical and Agent-Neutral Reasons\nin Kantian Justifications of Morality,” Philosophia, 35\n(1): 23–41.", "Hurley, P., 1997. “Agent-Centered Restrictions: Clearing the\nAir of Paradox”, Ethics, 108(1): 120–146.", "Kagan, S., 1989. The Limits of Morality, Clarendon Press:\nOxford.", "Korsgaard, C., 1996a. Creating the Kingdom of Ends,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 1996b. The Sources of Normativity,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Kripke, S., 1972. Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press.", "Löschke, J., 2020. “Agent-Relative Reasons as\nSecond-Order Value Responses.” Canadian Journal of\nPhilosophy, 50(4): 477–491.", "–––, 2021. “Agent-Relative Reasons and\nNormative Force”, Philosophia, 49: 359–372.", "Mack, Eric, 1989. “Against Agent-Neutral Value”\nReason Papers, 14: 76–85.\n [Preprint available online\n (in PDF)]", "–––, 1998. “Deontic Restrictions are Not\nAgent-Relative Restrictions”, Social Philosophy and\nPolicy, 15: 61–83.", "McKeever, S. and Ridge, M., 2005a. “The Many Moral\nParticularisms”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35(1):\n83–106.", "–––, 2005b. “What Does Holism Have to Do\nWith Particularism?” Ratio, 18(1): 93–103.", "–––, 2006. Principled Ethics: Generalism as\na Regulative Ideal, New York: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2016. “Moral Particularism and Moral\nGeneralism”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy\n(Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-particularism-generalism/>", "McNaughton, D., 1988. Moral Vision, Oxford:\nBlackwell.", "McNaughton, D. and Rawling, P., 1991. “Agent-Relativity and\nthe Doing-Happening Distinction”, Philosophical\nStudies, 63: 167–185.", "–––, 1995a. “Value and Agent-Relative\nReasons”, Utilitas, 7(1): 31–47.", "–––, 1995b. “Agent-Relativity and\nTerminological Inexactitudes”, Utilitas, 7(2):\n319–325.", "Medlin, B., 1957. “Ultimate Principles and Ethical\nEgoism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 35:\n111–118.", "Moore, G.E., 1903. Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Nagel, T., 1970. The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press.", "–––, 1986. The View From Nowhere, New\nYork: Oxford University Press.", "Parfit, D., 1984. Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon\nPress.", "Pettit, P., 1987. “Universality Without\nUtilitarianism”, Mind, 72: 74–82.", "Portmore, Douglas, 2001. “McNaughton and Rawling on the\nAgent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction”, Utilitas,\n13(3): 350–356.", "Postema, G., 1998. “Public Practical Reason: An\nArcheology”, in D’Agostino and Gaus 1998, pp.\n425–468.", "Ridge, M., 2001a. “Agent-Neutral Consequentialism From the\nInside-Out: Concern For Integrity Without Self indulgence,”\nUtilitas 13: 236–254.\n [Preprint available online\n (in PDF)]", "–––, 2001b. “Saving Scanlon:\nContractualism and Agent-Relativity”, Journal of Political\nPhilosophy, 9: 472–481.\n [Preprint available online\n (in PDF)] ", "–––, 2009. “Consequentialist\nKantianism,” Philosophical Perspectives, 23:\n421–438.", "Ronnow-Rasmussen, Toni, 2009. “Normative Reasons and the\nAgent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy”, Philosophia, 37:\n227–243.", "Scanlon, T.M., 1998. What We Owe to Each Other,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Scheffler, S., 1994. The Rejection of Consequentialism,\nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "Sellars, W.F., 1968. Science and Metaphysics, London:\nRoutledge & Kegan Paul.", "Sidgwick, H., 1907. The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition.\nChicago: University of Chicago.", "Smith, Michael. 2009. Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest\nObjection, in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the\nPhilosophy of Frank Jackson, Ian Ravenscroft (ed.). Oxford:\nBlackwell. ", "Sturgeon, N., 1974. “Altruism, Solipsism, and the\nObjectivity of Reasons”,Philosophical Review, 83:\n374–402.", "–––, 1994. “Moral Disagreement and Moral\nRelativism”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 11(1):\n80–115.", "Williams, B., 1981a. Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 1981b. “Internal and External\nReasons”, reprinted in Williams 1981a, 101–13." ]	[ { "href": "../consequentialism/", "text": "consequentialism" }, { "href": "../metaethics/", "text": "metaethics" }, { "href": "../moral-particularism/", "text": "moral particularism" }, { "href": "../special-obligations/", "text": "obligations: special" } ]
atheism-agnosticism	Atheism and Agnosticism	First published Wed Aug 2, 2017; substantive revision Tue Mar 22, 2022	[ "\nThe purpose of this entry is to explore how atheism and agnosticism\nare related to theism and, more importantly, to each other. This\nrequires examining the surprisingly contentious issue of how best to\ndefine the terms “atheism” and “agnosticism”.\nSettling this issue, at least for the purposes of this entry, will set\nthe stage for discussing an important distinction between global\natheism and local atheism, which in turn will be helpful for\ndistinguishing different forms of agnosticism. Examination of an\nargument in support of a modest form of agnosticism will ensue,\nfollowed by discussion of three arguments for atheism and one argument\nagainst a more ambitious form of agnosticism." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Definitions of “Atheism”", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Definitions of “Agnosticism”", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Global Atheism Versus Local Atheisms", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. An Argument for Agnosticism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. An Argument for Global Atheism?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Two Arguments for Local Atheism", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 How to Argue for Local Atheism", "6.2 The Low Priors Argument", "6.3 The Decisive Evidence Argument" ] }, { "content_title": "7. An Argument against Agnosticism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe word “atheism” is polysemous—it has multiple related\nmeanings. In the psychological sense of the word, atheism is a\npsychological state, specifically the state of being an atheist, where\nan atheist is defined as someone who is not a theist and a theist is\ndefined as someone who believes that God exists (or that there are\ngods). This generates the following definition: atheism is the\npsychological state of lacking the belief that God exists. In\nphilosophy, however, and more specifically in the philosophy of\nreligion, the term “atheism” is standardly used to refer to\nthe proposition that God does not exist (or, more broadly, to the\nproposition that there are no gods). Thus, to be an atheist on\nthis definition, it does not suffice to suspend judgment on whether\nthere is a God, even though that implies a lack of theistic belief.\nInstead, one must deny that God exists. This metaphysical sense of the\nword is preferred over other senses, including the psychological\nsense, not just by theistic philosophers, but by many (though not all)\natheists in philosophy as well. For example, Robin Le Poidevin writes,\n“An atheist is one who denies the existence of a\npersonal, transcendent creator of the universe, rather than one who\nsimply lives his life without reference to such a being” (1996:\nxvii). J. L. Schellenberg says that “in philosophy, the atheist\nis not just someone who doesn’t accept theism, but more strongly\nsomeone who opposes it.” In other words, it is “the denial\nof theism, the claim that there is no God” (2019: 5).", "\nThis definition is also found in multiple encyclopedias and\ndictionaries of philosophy. For example, in the Concise Routledge\nEncyclopedia of Philosophy, William L. Rowe (also an atheist)\nwrites, “Atheism is the position that affirms the nonexistence of\nGod. It proposes positive disbelief rather than mere suspension of\nbelief” (2000: 62). The Cambridge Dictionary of\nPhilosophy recognizes multiple senses of the word\n“atheism”, but is clear about which is standard in\nphilosophy:", "\n\n\n[Atheism is] the view that there are no gods. A widely used sense\ndenotes merely not believing in god and is consistent with agnosticism\n[in the psychological sense]. A stricter sense denotes a belief that\nthere is no god; this use has become standard. (Pojman 2015,\nemphasis added)\n", "\nInterestingly, the Encyclopedia of Philosophy recommends a\nslight broadening of the standard definition of “atheist”.\nIt still requires rejection of belief in God as opposed to merely\nlacking that belief, but the basis for the rejection need not be that\ntheism is false. For example, it might instead be that it is\nmeaningless.", "\n\n\nAccording to the most usual definition, an atheist is a\nperson who maintains that there is no God, that is, that the sentence\n“God exists” expresses a false proposition. In contrast, an\nagnostic [in the epistemological sense] maintains that it is not known\nor cannot be known whether there is a God, that is, whether the\nsentence “God exists” expresses a true proposition. On our\ndefinition, an atheist is a person who rejects belief in God,\nregardless of whether or not the reason for the rejection is the claim\nthat “God exists” expresses a false proposition. People\nfrequently adopt an attitude of rejection toward a position for\nreasons other than that it is a false proposition. It is common among\ncontemporary philosophers, and indeed it was not uncommon in earlier\ncenturies, to reject positions on the ground that they are\nmeaningless. (Edwards 2006: 358)\n", "\nAt least until recently, the standard metaphysical understanding of\nthe meaning of “atheism” was so ingrained in philosophy that\nphilosophers could safely use the word “atheism” in that\nsense without worrying that they might be misunderstood and without\nfeeling any need to defend it. For example, in his book, Arguing\nAbout Gods, Graham Oppy (another atheist) repeatedly treats\n“agnostic” (in the psychological sense of someone who\nsuspends judgment about God’s existence) and “atheist”\nas mutually exclusive categories (2006, 1, 15, and 34) without\noffering any justification for doing so. The only plausible\nexplanation for his failure to provide justification is that he\nexpects his readers to construe the term “atheism” in its\nmetaphysical sense and thus to exclude from the class of atheists\nanyone who suspends judgment about whether gods exist. Another\nsign of how dominant the standard definition is within the field of\nphilosophy is the frequent use of the term “non-theist” to\nrefer to the broader class of people who lack the belief that God\nexists.", "\nOf course, from the fact that “atheism” is standardly\ndefined in philosophy as the proposition that God does not exist, it\ndoes not follow that it ought to be defined that way. And the\nstandard definition is not without its philosophical opponents. For\nexample, some writers at least implicitly identify atheism with a\npositive metaphysical theory like naturalism or even materialism.\nGiven this sense of the word, the meaning of “atheism” is\nnot straightforwardly derived from the meaning of\n“theism”. While this might seem etymologically bizarre,\nperhaps a case can be made for the claim that something like\n(metaphysical) naturalism was originally labeled “atheism”\nonly because of the cultural dominance of non-naturalist forms of\ntheism, not because the view being labeled was nothing more than the\ndenial of theism. On this view, there would have been atheists even if\nno theists ever existed—they just wouldn’t have been\ncalled “atheists”. Baggini [2003, 3–10] suggests this line\nof thought, although his “official” definition is the\nstandard metaphysical one. While this definition of\n“atheism” is a legitimate one, it is often accompanied by\nfallacious inferences from the (alleged) falsity or probable falsity\nof atheism (= naturalism) to the truth or probable truth of\ntheism.", "\nDeparting even more radically from the norm in philosophy, a few\nphilosophers (e.g., Michael Martin 1990: 463–464) join many\nnon-philosophers in defining “atheist” as someone who\nlacks the belief that God exists. This commits them to adopting the\npsychological sense of “atheism” discussed above,\naccording to which “atheism” should not be defined as a\nproposition at all, even if theism is a proposition. Instead,\n“atheism”, according to these philosophers, should be\ndefined as a psychological state: the state of not believing in the\nexistence of God (or gods). This view was famously proposed by the\nphilosopher Antony Flew and arguably played a role in his (1972)\ndefense of an alleged presumption of “atheism”. The\neditors of the Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Bullivant &\nRuse 2013) also favor this definition and one of them, Stephen\nBullivant (2013), defends it on grounds of scholarly utility. His\nargument is that this definition can best serve as an umbrella term\nfor a wide variety of positions that have been identified with\natheism. Scholars can then use adjectives like “strong”\nand “weak” (or “positive” and\n“negative”) to develop a taxonomy that differentiates\nvarious specific atheisms. Unfortunately, this argument overlooks the\nfact that, if atheism is defined as a psychological state, then no\nproposition can count as a form of atheism because a proposition is\nnot a psychological state. This undermines Bullivant’s argument\nin defense of Flew’s definition; for it implies that what he\ncalls “strong atheism”—the proposition (or belief in\nthe sense of “something believed”) that there is no\nGod—is not really a variety of atheism at all. In short, his\nproposed “umbrella” term leaves so-called strong atheism\n(or what some call positive atheism) out in the rain.", "\nAlthough Flew’s definition of “atheism” fails as an\numbrella term, it is certainly a legitimate definition in the sense\nthat it reports how a significant number of people use the term.\nAgain, the term “atheism” has more than one legitimate\nmeaning, and nothing said in this entry should be interpreted as an\nattempt to proscribe how people label themselves or what meanings they\nattach to those labels. The issue for philosophy and thus for this\nentry is which definition is the most useful for scholarly or, more\nnarrowly, philosophical purposes. In other contexts, of course, the\nissue of how best to define “atheism” or\n“atheist” may look very different. For example, in some\ncontexts the crucial question may be which definition of\n“atheist” (as opposed to “atheism”) is the\nmost useful politically, especially in light of the bigotry that those\nwho identify as atheists face. The fact that there is strength in\nnumbers may recommend a very inclusive definition of\n“atheist” that brings anyone who is not a theist into the\nfold. Having said that, one would think that it would further no good\ncause, political or otherwise, to attack fellow non-theists who do not\nidentify as atheists simply because they choose to use the term\n“atheist” in some other, equally legitimate sense.", "\nThe next question, then, is why the standard metaphysical definition\nof “atheism” is especially useful for doing philosophy. One\nobvious reason is that it has the virtue of making atheism a direct\nanswer to one of the most important metaphysical questions in\nphilosophy of religion, namely, “Does God exist?” There are\nonly two possible direct answers to this question: “yes”,\nwhich is theism, and “no”, which is atheism in the\nmetaphysical sense. Answers like “I don’t know”,\n“no one knows”, “I don’t care”, “an\naffirmative answer has never been established”, and “the\nquestion is meaningless” are not direct answers to this question\n(cf. Le Poidevin 2010: 8). It is useful for philosophers to have a\ngood name for this important metaphysical position, and\n“atheism” works beautifully for that purpose. Of course, it\nmay also be useful on occasion to have a term to refer to all people\nwho lack theistic belief, but as noted above philosophers already have\nsuch a term, namely, “nontheist”, so the term\n“atheist” is not needed for that purpose.", "\nA second reason for preferring the metaphysical definition is that the\ntwo main alternatives to it have undesirable implications. Defining\n“atheism” as naturalism has the awkward implication that\nsome philosophers are both theists and atheists. This is because some\nphilosophers (e.g., Ellis 2014) deny that God is supernatural and\naffirm both naturalism and theism. Defining “atheism” as the\nstate of lacking belief in God faces similar problems. First,\nwhile this definition seems short and simple, which is virtuous, it\nneeds to be expanded to avoid the issue of babies, cats, and rocks\ncounting as atheists by virtue of lacking belief in God. While\nthis problem is relatively easy to solve, another is more challenging.\nThis additional problem arises because one can lack belief in God\nwhile at the same time having other pro-attitudes towards theism. For\nexample, some people who lack the belief that God exists may\nnevertheless feel some inclination to believe that God exists. They\nmay even believe that the truth of theism is more probable than its\nfalsity. While such people should not be labeled theists, it is\ncounterintuitive in the extreme to call them atheists. The\npsychological definition also makes atheists out of some people who\nare devoted members (at least in terms of practice) of theistic\nreligious communities. This is because, as is well-known, some\ndevoted members of such communities have only a vague middling level\nof confidence that God exists and no belief that God exists or even\nthat God probably exists. It would seem misguided for\nphilosophers to classify such people as atheists.", "\nA third reason to prefer the standard definition in philosophy is that\nit makes the definitions of “atheism” and “theism”\nsymmetrical. One problem with defining “atheism” as a\npsychological state is that philosophers do not define\n“theism” as a psychological state, nor should they.\n“Theism,” like most other philosophical “-isms”,\nis understood in philosophy to be a proposition. This is crucial\nbecause philosophers want to say that theism is true or false and,\nmost importantly, to construct or evaluate arguments for theism.\nPsychological states cannot be true or false, nor can they be the\nconclusions of arguments. Granted, philosophers sometimes define\n“theism” as “the belief that God exists”\nand it makes sense to argue for a belief and to say that a belief is\ntrue or false, but here “belief” means “something\nbelieved”. It refers to the propositional content of belief, not\nto the attitude or psychological state of believing. If, however,\n“theism” is defined as the proposition that God exists and\n“theist” as someone who believes that proposition, then it\nmakes sense to define “atheism” and “atheist” in\nan analogous way. This means, first, defining “atheism” as a\nproposition or position so that it can be true or false and can be the\nconclusion of an argument and, second, defining “atheist” as\nsomeone who believes that proposition. Since it is also natural to\ndefine “atheism” in terms of theism, it follows that, in the\nabsence of good reasons to do otherwise, it is best for philosophers\nto understand the “a-” in “atheism” as negation\ninstead of absence, as “not” instead of\n“without”—in other words, to take atheism to be the\ncontradictory of theism.", "\nTherefore, for all three of these reasons, philosophers ought to\nconstrue atheism as the proposition that God does not exist (or, more\nbroadly, as the proposition that there are no divine realities of any\nsort).", "\nIf, as has been argued here, atheism is both usually and\nbest understood in philosophy as the metaphysical claim that\nGod does not exist, then what, one might wonder, should philosophers\ndo with the popular term, “New Atheism”? Philosophers\nwrite articles on and have devoted journal issues (French &\nWettstein 2013) to the New Atheism, but there is nothing close to a\nconsensus on how that term should be defined. Fortunately, there is no\nreal need for one, because the term “New Atheism” does not\npick out some distinctive philosophical position or phenomenon.\nInstead, it is a popular label for a movement prominently represented\nby four authors—Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and\nChristopher Hitchens—whose work is uniformly critical of\nreligion, but beyond that appears to be unified only by timing and\npopularity. Further, one might question what is new about the New\nAtheism. The specific criticisms of religion and of arguments used to\ndefend religion are not new. For example, an arguably more\nsophisticated and convincing version of Dawkins’ central\natheistic argument can be found in Hume’s Dialogues\n(Wielenberg 2009). Also, while Dennett (2006) makes a passionate call\nfor the scientific study of religion as a natural phenomenon, such\nstudy existed long before this call. Indeed, even the cognitive\nscience of religion was well established by the 1990s, and the\nanthropology of religion can be traced back at least to the nineteenth\ncentury. Shifting from content to style, many are surprised by the\nmilitancy of some New Atheists, but there were plenty of aggressive\natheists who were quite disrespectful to religion long before Harris,\nDawkins, and Hitchens. (Dennett is not especially militant.) Finally,\nthe stereotype that New Atheism is religious or quasi-religious or\nideological in some unprecedented way is clearly a false one and one\nthat New Atheists reject. (For elaboration of these points, see Zenk\n2013.)", "\nAnother subcategory of atheism is “friendly atheism”,\nwhich William Rowe (1979) defines as the position that, although God\ndoes not exist, some (intellectually sophisticated) people are\njustified in believing that God exists. Rowe, a friendly atheist\nhimself, contrasts friendly atheism with unfriendly atheism and\nindifferent atheism. Unfriendly atheism is the view that atheism is\ntrue and that no (sophisticated) theistic belief is justified. Despite\nits highly misleading name, this view might be held by the\nfriendliest, most open-minded and religiously tolerant person\nimaginable. Finally, although Rowe refers to “indifferent\natheism” as a “position”, it is not a proposition\nbut instead a psychological state, specifically, the state of being an\natheist who is neither friendly nor unfriendly—that is, who\nneither believes that friendly atheism is true nor believes that\nunfriendly atheism is true.", "\nPerhaps an even more interesting distinction is between pro-God\natheism and anti-God atheism. A pro-God atheist like John Schellenberg\n(who coined the term in unpublished work) is someone who in some real\nsense loves God or at least the idea of God, who tries very hard to\nimagine what sorts of wonderful worlds such a being might create\n(instead of just assuming that such a being would create a world\nsomething like the world we observe), and who (at least\npartly) for that very reason believes that God does not exist. Such an\natheist might be sympathetic to the following sentiments:", "\n\n\nIt is an insult to God to believe in God. For on the one hand it is to\nsuppose that he has perpetrated acts of incalculable cruelty. On the\nother hand, it is to suppose that he has perversely given his human\ncreatures an instrument—their intellect—which must\ninevitably lead them, if they are dispassionate and honest, to deny\nhis existence. It is tempting to conclude that if he exists, it is the\natheists and agnostics that he loves best, among those with any\npretensions to education. For they are the ones who have taken him\nmost seriously. (Strawson 1990)\n", "\nBy contrast, anti-God atheists like Thomas Nagel (1997: 130–131)\nfind the whole idea of a God offensive and hence not only believe but\nalso hope very much that no such being exists. Nagel is often\ncalled an “antitheist” (e.g., Kahane 2011), but that term\nis purposely avoided here, as it has many different senses (Kahane\n2011: note 9). Also, in none of those senses is one required to be an\natheist in order to be an antitheist, so antitheism is not a variety\nof atheism." ], "section_title": "1. Definitions of “Atheism”", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe terms “agnostic” and “agnosticism” were\nfamously coined in the late nineteenth century by the English\nbiologist, T.H. Huxley. He said that he originally", "\n\n\ninvented the word “Agnostic” to denote people who, like\n[himself], confess themselves to be hopelessly ignorant concerning a\nvariety of matters [including of course the matter of God’s\nexistence], about which metaphysicians and theologians, both orthodox\nand heterodox, dogmatise with the utmost confidence. (1884)\n", "\nHe did not, however, define “agnosticism” simply as the\nstate of being an agnostic. Instead, he often used that term to refer\nto a normative epistemological principle, something similar to (though\nweaker than) what we now call “evidentialism”. Roughly,\nHuxley’s principle says that it is wrong to say that one knows\nor believes that a proposition is true without logically satisfactory\nevidence (Huxley 1884 and 1889). But it was Huxley’s application\nof this principle to theistic and atheistic belief that ultimately had\nthe greatest influence on the meaning of the term. He argued that,\nsince neither of those beliefs is adequately supported by evidence, we\nought to suspend judgment on the issue of whether or not there is a\nGod.", "\nNowadays, the term “agnostic” is often used (when the\nissue is God’s existence) to refer to those who follow the\nrecommendation expressed in the conclusion of Huxley’s argument:\nan agnostic is a person who has entertained the proposition that there\nis a God but believes neither that it is true nor that it is false.\nNot surprisingly, then, the term “agnosticism” is\noften defined, both in and outside of philosophy, not as a principle\nor any other sort of proposition but instead as the psychological\nstate of being an agnostic. Call this the “psychological”\nsense of the term. It is certainly useful to have a term to refer to\npeople who are neither theists nor atheists, but philosophers might\nwish that some other term besides “agnostic”\n(“theological skeptic”, perhaps?) were used. The problem\nis that it is also very useful for philosophical purposes to have a\nname for the epistemological position that follows from the premise of\nHuxley’s argument, the position that neither theism nor atheism\nis known, or most ambitiously, that neither the belief that God exists\nnor the belief that God does not exist has positive epistemic status\nof any sort. Just as the metaphysical question of God’s\nexistence is central to philosophy of religion, so too is the\nepistemological question of whether or not theism or atheism is known\nor has some other sort of positive epistemic status like being\njustified, rational, reasonable, or probable. And given the etymology\nof “agnostic”, what better term could there be for a\nnegative answer to that epistemological question than\n“agnosticism”? Further, as suggested earlier, it is, for\nvery good reason, typical in philosophy to use the suffix\n“-ism” to refer to a proposition instead of to a state or\ncondition, since only the former can sensibly be tested by\nargument.", "\nIf, however, “agnosticism” is defined as a proposition,\nthen “agnostic” must be defined in terms of\n“agnosticism” instead of the other way around.\nSpecifically, “agnostic” must be defined as a person who\nbelieves that the proposition “agnosticism” is true\ninstead of “agnosticism” being defined as the state of\nbeing an agnostic. And if the proposition in question is that neither\ntheism nor atheism is known to be true, then the term\n“agnostic” can no longer serve as a label for those who\nare neither theists nor atheists since one can consistently believe\nthat atheism (or theism) is true while denying that atheism (or\ntheism) is known to be true.", "\nWhen used in this epistemological sense, the term\n“agnosticism” can very naturally be extended beyond the\nissue of what is or can be known to cover a large family of positions,\ndepending on what sort of “positive epistemic status” is\nat issue. For example, it might be identified with any of the\nfollowing positions: that neither theistic belief nor atheistic belief\nis justified, that neither theistic belief nor atheistic belief is\nrationally required, that neither belief is rationally permissible,\nthat neither has warrant, that neither is reasonable, or that neither\nis probable. Also, in order to avoid the vexed issue of the nature of\nknowledge, one can simply distinguish as distinct members of the\n“agnosticism family” each of the following claims about\nintellectually sophisticated people: (i) neither theism nor atheism is\nadequately supported by the internal states of such people, (ii)\nneither theistic belief nor atheistic belief coheres with the rest of\ntheir beliefs, (iii) neither theistic nor atheistic belief results\nfrom reliable belief-producing processes, (iv) neither theistic belief\nnor atheistic belief results from faculties aimed at truth that are\nfunctioning properly in an appropriate environment, and so on.", "\nNotice too that, even if agnosticism were defined as the rather\nextreme position that neither theistic belief nor atheistic belief\never has positive epistemic status of any sort, it\nwouldn’t follow by definition that no agnostic is\neither a theist or an atheist. Some fideists, for example, believe\nthat neither atheistic belief nor theistic belief is supported or\nsanctioned in any way at all by reason because reason leaves the\nmatter of God’s existence completely unresolved. Yet they have\nfaith that God exists and such faith (at least in some cases) involves\nbelief. Thus, some fideists are extreme agnostics in the\nepistemological sense even though they are not agnostics in the\npsychological sense.", "\nIt is also worth mentioning that, even in Huxley’s time, some\napophatic theists embraced the term “agnostic”, claiming\nthat all good Christians worshipped an “unknown God”. More\nrecently, some atheists proudly call themselves “agnostic\natheists”, although with further reflection the symmetry between\nthis position and fideism might give them pause. More likely, though,\nwhat is being claimed by these self-identified agnostic atheists is\nthat, while their belief that God does not exist has positive\nepistemic status of some sort (minimally, it is not irrational), it\ndoes not have the sort of positive epistemic status that can turn true\nbelief into knowledge.", "\nNo doubt both senses of “agnosticism”, the psychological\nand the epistemological, will continue to be used both inside and\noutside of philosophy. Hopefully, context will help to disambiguate.\nIn the remainder of this entry, however, the term\n“agnosticism” will be used in its epistemological sense.\nThis makes a huge difference to the issue of justification. Consider,\nfor example, this passage written by the agnostic, Anthony Kenny\n(1983: 84–85):", "\n\n\nI do not myself know of any argument for the existence of God which I\nfind convincing; in all of them I think I can find flaws. Equally, I\ndo not know of any argument against the existence of God which is\ntotally convincing; in the arguments I know against the existence of\nGod I can equally find flaws. So that my own position on the existence\nof God is agnostic.\n", "\nIt is one thing to ask whether Kenny’s inability to find\narguments that convince him of God’s existence or non-existence\njustifies him personally in suspending judgment about the existence of\nGod. It is quite another to ask whether this inability (or anything\nelse) would justify his believing that no one (or at least no one who\nis sufficiently intelligent and well-informed) has a justified belief\nabout God’s existence.", "\nIf agnosticism (in one sense of the word) is the position that neither\ntheism nor atheism is known, then it might be useful to use the term\n“gnosticism” to refer to the contradictory of that\nposition, that is, to the position that either theism or atheism is\nknown. That view would, of course, come in two flavors: theistic\ngnosticism—the view that theism is known (and hence atheism is\nnot)—and atheistic gnosticism—the view that atheism is\nknown (and hence theism is not)." ], "section_title": "2. Definitions of “Agnosticism”", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nJeanine Diller (2016) points out that, just as most theists have a\nparticular concept of God in mind when they assert that God exists,\nmost atheists have a particular concept of God in mind when they\nassert that God does not exist. Indeed, many atheists are only vaguely\naware of the variety of concepts of God that there are. For example,\nthere are the Gods of classical and neo-classical theism: the\nAnselmian God, for instance, or, more modestly, the all-powerful,\nall-knowing, and perfectly good creator-God that receives so much\nattention in contemporary philosophy of religion. There are also the\nGods of specific Western theistic religions like Christianity, Islam,\nJudaism, and Sikhism, which may or may not be best understood as\nclassical or neo-classical Gods. There are also panentheistic and\nprocess theistic Gods, as well as a variety of other God-concepts,\nboth of Western and non-Western origin, that are largely ignored by\neven the most well-informed atheists. (Philosophically sophisticated\ntheists, for their part, often act as if refuting naturalism\nestablishes the existence of the particular sort of God in which they\nbelieve.) Diller distinguishes local atheism, which denies the\nexistence of one sort of God, from global atheism, which is the\nproposition that there are no Gods of any sort—that all\nlegitimate concepts of God lack instances.", "\nGlobal atheism is a very difficult position to justify (Diller 2016:\n11–16). Indeed, very few atheists have any good reason to\nbelieve that it is true since the vast majority of atheists have made\nno attempt to reflect on more than one or two of the many legitimate\nconcepts of God that exist both inside and outside of various\nreligious communities. Nor have they reflected on what criteria must\nbe satisfied in order for a concept of God to count as\n“legitimate”, let alone on the possibility of legitimate\nGod concepts that have not yet been conceived and on the implications\nof that possibility for the issue of whether or not global atheism is\njustified. Furthermore, the most ambitious atheistic arguments popular\nwith philosophers, which attempt to show that the concept of God is\nincoherent or that God’s existence is logically incompatible\neither with the existence of certain sorts of evil or with the\nexistence of certain sorts of non-belief [Schellenberg 2007]),\ncertainly won’t suffice to justify global atheism; for even if\nthey are sound, they assume that to be God a being must be omnipotent,\nomniscient, and perfectly good, and as the character Cleanthes points\nout at the beginning of Part XI of Hume’s Dialogues\n(see also Nagasawa 2008), there are religiously adequate God-concepts\nthat don’t require God to have those attributes.", "\nGlobal atheists might object that, even if atheism and (metaphysical)\nnaturalism are not identical, a belief in the former can be based on a\nbelief in the latter; in other words, if one has good arguments for\nthe view that nature is a closed system, then that removes any burden\nto consider each God-concept separately, so long as all legitimate\nconcepts of God imply that God is a supernatural entity—that is,\nan entity that is not natural, yet affects nature. Whether or not this\nstrategy for justifying global atheism works depends on whether it is\npossible to define “naturalism” narrowly enough to imply\nthe non-existence of all Gods but not so narrowly that no convincing\narguments can be given for its truth. This is no easy task, especially\ngiven recent work on naturalist forms of theism (e.g., Bishop 2008;\nBuckareff & Nagasawa 2016: Part V; Diller & Kasher 2013: Part\nX; and Ellis 2014). Nor is it obvious that evidential arguments from\nevil can be extended to cover all legitimate God concepts, though if\nall genuine theisms entail that ultimate reality is both aligned with\nthe good and salvific (in some religiously adequate sense of\n“ultimate” and “salvific”), then perhaps they\ncan. The crucial point, however, is that no one has yet made that\ncase.", "\nConcerning the issue of what exactly counts as a legitimate or\nreligiously adequate concept of God, various approaches might be\ntaken. One general strategy is to identify the religious role or roles\nthat anything deserving of the name or title “God” must\nplay and then distinguish legitimate or illegitimate concepts of God\ndepending on whether anything falling under the concept in question\ncould or would successfully play that role. (See, for example, Le\nPoidevin 2010: 52; and Leftow 2016: 66–71.)", "\nA second approach (compatible with the first) assumes plausibly that\nthe word “God” is a title instead of a proper name and\nthen asks what qualifications are required to bear that title (Pike\n1970). The fact that most titles indicate either rank or function\nsuggests that the meaning of “God” has something to do\neither with occupying a position in a hierarchy or performing some\nfunction. For example, the common dictionary definition of\n“God” as the Supreme Being and the Anselmian idea of God\nas the greatest possible being suggest that the title\n“God” is rank-indicating, while the definition of\n“God” as “ruler of the universe” fits well\nwith the view that “God” is function-indicating and\nexplains why the ordinary class noun, “god”, might be\ndefined as “ruler of some part of the universe or of some sphere\nof human activity” (e.g., Neptune, god of the sea, and Mars, god\nof war).", "\nA third approach (compatible with the first two) is to start from the\nclose connection in meaning between “God” and\n“worship”. Worship appears to be essential to theistic\nreligions and thus an essential role that any being must play to\nqualify for the title “God” is to be an appropriate object\nof worship. Indeed, although there is risk of circularity here if\n“worship” is defined in terms of the actions or attitudes\nappropriately directed towards “God”, it would not be\nobviously mistaken to claim that being worthy of some form of\nreligious worship is not just necessary for divinity but sufficient as\nwell, especially if worthiness of worship entails worthiness of\nallegiance. Of course, forms of worship vary widely from one religion\nto another, so even if worthiness of worship is the sole defining\nfeature of a God, that doesn’t mean that beliefs about what\nthese Gods are like won’t vary widely from one religion to\nanother. In some religions, especially (but not only) certain Western\nmonotheistic ones, worship involves total devotion and unconditional\ncommitment. To be worthy of that sort of worship (if that is even\npossible when the pool of potential worshipers are autonomous\nagents like most adult humans) requires an especially impressive God,\nthough it is controversial whether or not it requires a perfect\none.", "\nIf the ambiguity that results from defining “God” in terms\nof worthiness of worship is virtuous, then one might be tempted to\nadopt the following account of global atheism and its opposite,\n“versatile theism”:", "\nNotice that on this account of “global atheism”, the\natheist only denies the existence of beings that are worthy\nof worship. Thus, not even a global atheist is committed to denying\nthe existence of everything that someone has called a god or\n“God”. For example, even if the ancient Egyptians\nworshipped the Sun and regarded it as worthy of such worship, the\nglobal atheist need not deny the existence of the Sun. Instead, the\nglobal atheist can claim that the ancient Egyptians were mistaken in\nthinking that the Sun is worthy of religious worship.", "\nSimilarly, consider this passage at the beginning of Section XI of\nDavid Hume’s Natural History of Religion:", "\n\n\nIf we examine, without prejudice, the ancient heathen mythology, as\ncontained in the poets, we shall not discover in it any such monstrous\nabsurdity, as we may at first be apt to apprehend. Where is the\ndifficulty in conceiving, that the same powers or principles, whatever\nthey were, which formed this visible world, men and animals, produced\nalso a species of intelligent creatures, of more refined substance and\ngreater authority than the rest? That these creatures may be\ncapricious, revengeful, passionate, voluptuous, is easily conceived;\nnor is any circumstance more apt, among ourselves, to engender such\nvices, than the license of absolute authority. And in short, the whole\nmythological system is so natural, that, in the vast variety of\nplanets and world[s], contained in this universe, it seems more\nthan probable, that, somewhere or other, it is really carried into\nexecution. (Hume [1757] 1956: 53, emphasis added)\n", "\nThere is much debate about whether Hume was an atheist or a deist or\nneither, but no one uses this passage to support the view that he was\nactually a polytheist. Perhaps this is because, even if there are\nnatural alien beings that, much like the ancient Greek and Roman gods,\nare far superior in power to humans but quite similar in their moral\nand other psychological qualities, presumably no one, at least\nnowadays, would be tempted to regard them as worthy of religious\nworship.", "\nOne possible flaw in the proposed account of global atheism is that it\nseems to imply overlap between deism and atheism. Of course, it\nwasn’t that long ago when all deists were widely regarded as\natheists. These days, however, the term “deistic atheist”\nor “atheistic deist” has an oxymoronic ring to it. Of\ncourse, not all deists would count as atheists on the proposed\naccount, but some would. For example, consider a deist who believes\nthat, while a supernatural person intentionally designed the universe,\nthat deity did not specifically intend for intelligent life to evolve\nand has no interest whatsoever in the condition or fate of such life.\nSuch a deity would not be worthy of anyone’s worship, especially\nif worthiness of worship entails worthiness of allegiance, and so\nwould arguably not be a (theistic) god, which implies that an atheist\ncould on the proposed definition consistently believe in the existence\nof such a deity. Perhaps, then, “global atheism” should be\ndefined as the position that both versatile theism and (versatile)\ndeism are false—that there are no beings worthy of religious\nworship and also no cosmic creators or intelligent designers whether\nworthy of worship (and allegiance) or not. Even this account of\n“global atheism”, however, may not be sufficiently\ninclusive since there are religious roles closely associated with the\ntitle “God” (and thus arguably legitimate notions of God)\nthat could be played by something that is neither an appropriate\nobject of worship nor a cosmic designer or creator." ], "section_title": "3. Global Atheism Versus Local Atheisms", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAccording to one relatively modest form of agnosticism, neither\nversatile theism nor its denial, global atheism, is known to be true.\nRobin Le Poidevin (2010: 76) argues for this position as follows:", "\nLe Poidevin takes “theism” in its broadest sense to refer\nto the proposition that there exists a being that is the ultimate and\nintentional cause of the universe’s existence and the ultimate\nsource of love and moral knowledge (2010: 52). (He doesn’t use\nthe term “versatile theism”, but this would be his account\nof its meaning.) By the “intrinsic probability” of a\nproposition, he means, roughly, the probability that a proposition has\n“before the evidence starts to come in” (2010: 49). This\nprobability depends solely on a priori considerations like\nthe intrinsic features of the content of the proposition in question\n(e.g., the size of that content).", "\nLe Poidevin defends the first premise of this argument by stating\nthat, while intrinsic probability plausibly depends inversely on the\nspecificity of a claim (the less specific the claim, the more ways\nthere are for it to be true and so the more probable it is that it is\ntrue), it is impossible to show that versatile theism is more specific\nor less specific than its denial. This defense appears to be\nincomplete, for Le Poidevin never shows that the intrinsic probability\nof a proposition depends only on its specificity, and there\nare good reasons to believe that this is not the case (see, for\nexample, Swinburne 2001: 80–102). Le Poidevin could respond,\nhowever, that specificity is the only uncontroversial criterion of\nintrinsic probability, and this lack of consensus on other criteria is\nall that is needed to adequately defend premise\n (1).", "\nOne way to defend the second premise is to review the relevant\nevidence and argue that it is ambiguous (Le Poidevin 2010: chapter 4;\nand Draper 2002). Another way is to point out that atheism, which is\njust the proposition that theism is false, is compatible with a\nvariety of very different hypotheses, and these hypotheses vary widely\nin how well they account for the total evidence. Thus, to assess how\nwell atheism accounts for the total evidence, one would have to\ncalculate a weighted average of how well these different atheistic\nhypotheses account for the total evidence, where the weights would be\nthe different intrinsic probabilities of each of these atheistic\nhypotheses. This task seems prohibitively difficult (Draper 2016) and\nin any case has not been attempted, which supports the claim that\nthere is no firm basis upon which to judge whether the total evidence\nsupports theism or atheism.", "\nSo-called “Reformed epistemologists” (e.g., Plantinga\n2000) might challenge the second premise of the argument on the\ngrounds that many beliefs about God, like many beliefs about the past,\nare “properly basic”—a result of the functioning of\na basic cognitive faculty called the “sensus\ndivinitatis”—and so are, in effect, a part of the\ntotal evidence with respect to which the probability of any statement\ndepends. The agnostic, however, might reply that this sense of the\ndivine, unlike memory, operates at most sporadically and far from\nuniversally. Also, unlike other basic cognitive faculties, it can\neasily be resisted, and the existence of the beliefs it is supposed to\nproduce can easily be explained without supposing that the faculty\nexists at all. Thus, the analogy to memory is weak. Therefore, in the\nabsence of some firmer basis upon which to judge that beliefs about\nGod are properly a part of the foundation of some theists’\nbelief systems, premise\n (2)\n stands.", "\nOf course, even if the two premises of Le Poidevin’s argument\nare true, it doesn’t follow that the argument is a good one. For\nthe argument also contains two inferences (from steps\n 1\n and\n 2\n to\n step 3\n and from step 3 to\n step 4),\n neither of which is obviously correct. Concerning the first\ninference, suppose, for example, that even though there is no firm\nbasis upon which to judge which of theism and atheism is intrinsically\nmore probable (that is, Le Poidevin’s first premise is true),\nthere is firm basis upon which to judge that theism is not many times\nmore probable intrinsically than some specific version of atheism,\nsay, reductive physicalism. And suppose that, even though there is no\nfirm basis upon which to judge which of theism and atheism is favored\nby the total evidence (that is, Le Poidevin’s second premise is\ntrue), there is firm basis upon which to judge that the total evidence\nvery strongly favors reductive physicalism over theism (in the sense\nthat it is antecedently very many times more probable given reductive\nphysicalism than it is given theism). Then it follows that both of Le\nPoidevin’s premises are true and yet (3) is false: there is a\nfirm basis (that includes the odds version of Bayes’ theorem\napplied to theism and reductive physicalism instead of to theism and\natheism) to judge that reductive physicalism is more probable or even\nmany times more probable than theism and hence that theism is probably\nor even very probably false. Arguably, no similar strategy could be\nused to show that theism is probably true in spite of Le\nPoidevin’s premises both being true. So it may be that Le\nPoidevin’s premises, if adequately supported, establish that\ntheistic gnosticism is false (that is, that either agnosticism or\natheistic gnosticism is true) even if they don’t establish that\nagnosticism is true." ], "section_title": "4. An Argument for Agnosticism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAlmost all well-known arguments for atheism are arguments for a\nparticular version of local atheism. One possible exception to this\nrule is an argument recently made popular by some New Atheists,\nalthough it was not invented by them. Gary Gutting (2013) calls this\nargument the “no arguments argument” for atheism:", "\nNotice the obvious relevance of this argument to agnosticism.\nAccording to one prominent member of the agnosticism family, we have\nno good reason to believe that God exists and no good reason to\nbelieve that God does not exist. Clearly, if the first premise of this\nargument is true, then this version of agnosticism must be false.", "\nCan the no arguments argument be construed as an argument for global\natheism? One might object that it is not, strictly speaking, an\nargument for any sort of atheism since its conclusion is not that\natheism is true but instead that there is good reason to believe that\natheism is true. But that is just a quibble. Ultimately, whether this\nargument can be used to defend global atheism depends on how its first\npremise is defended.", "\nThe usual way of defending it is to derive it from some general\nprinciple according to which lacking grounds for claims of a certain\nsort is good reason to reject those claims. The restriction of this\nprinciple to claims “of a certain sort” is crucial, since\nthe principle that the absence of grounds for a claim is in all cases\na good reason to believe that the claim is false is rather obviously\nfalse. One might, for example, lack grounds for believing that the\nnext time one flips a coin it will come up heads, but that is not a\ngood reason to believe that it won’t come up heads.", "\nA more promising approach restricts the principle to existence claims,\nthereby turning it into a version of Ockham’s razor. According\nto this version of the principle, the absence of grounds supporting a\npositive existential statement (like “God\nexists”—however “God” is understood) is a good\nreason to believe that the statement is false (McLaughlin 1984). One\nobjection to this principle is that not every sort of thing is such\nthat, if it existed, then we would likely have good reason to believe\nthat it exists. Consider, for example, intelligent life in distant\ngalaxies (cf. Morris 1985).", "\nPerhaps, however, an even more narrowly restricted principle would do\nthe trick: whenever the assumption that a positive existential claim\nis true would lead one to expect to have grounds for its truth, the\nabsence of such grounds is a good reason to believe that the claim is\nfalse. It might then be argued that (i) a God would be likely to\nprovide us with convincing evidence of Her existence and so (ii) the\nabsence of such evidence is a good reason to believe that God does not\nexist. This transforms the no arguments argument into an argument from\ndivine hiddenness. It also transforms it into at best an argument for\nlocal atheism, since even if the God of, say, classical theism would\nnot hide, not all legitimate God-concepts are such that a being\ninstantiating that concept would be likely to provide us with\nconvincing evidence of its existence." ], "section_title": "5. An Argument for Global Atheism?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "6. Two Arguments for Local Atheism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe sort of God in whose non-existence philosophers seem most\ninterested is the eternal, non-physical, omnipotent, omniscient, and\nomnibenevolent (i.e., morally perfect) creator-God worshipped by many\ntheologically orthodox Muslims, Jews, and Christians. Let’s call\nthe proposition that a God of this sort exists\n“omni-theism”. One interesting question, then, is how best\nto argue for atheism understood locally as the proposition that\nomni-theism is false.", "\nIt is often claimed that a good argument for atheism is impossible\nbecause, while it is at least possible to prove that something of a\ncertain sort exists, it is impossible to prove that nothing of that\nsort exists. One reason to reject this claim is that the descriptions\nof some kinds of objects are self-contradictory. For example, we can\nprove that no circular square exists because such an object would have\nto be both circular and non-circular, which is impossible. Thus, one\nway to argue for the nonexistence of the God of omni-theism (or\n“omni-God” for short) is to argue that such a God is an\nimpossible object like a circular square.", "\nMany attempts have been made to construct such arguments. For example,\nit has been claimed that an omnibenevolent being would be impeccable\nand so incapable of wrongdoing, while an omnipotent being would be\nquite capable of doing things that would be wrong to do. There are,\nhowever, sophisticated and plausible replies to arguments like these.\nMore importantly, even if such an argument succeeded, omni-theists\ncould plausibly claim that, by “omnipotent”, they mean,\nnot maximally powerful, but optimally powerful, where the optimal\ndegree of power may not be maximal if maximal power rules out\npossessing the optimal degree of some other perfection like moral\ngoodness.", "\nSimilar problems face attempts to show that omni-theism must be false\nbecause it is incompatible with certain known facts about the world.\nSuch arguments typically depend on detailed and contested\ninterpretations of divine attributes like omnibenevolence.", "\nA very different approach is based on the idea that disproof need not\nbe demonstrative. The goal of this approach is to show that the\nexistence of an omni-God is so improbable that confident belief in the\nnon-existence of such a God is justified. Two such arguments are\ndiscussed in detail below: the “low priors argument” and\nthe “decisive evidence argument”. Each of these arguments\nemploys the same specific strategy, which is to argue that some\nalternative hypothesis to omni-theism is many times more probable than\nomni-theism. This doesn’t imply that the alternative hypothesis\nis probably true, but it does imply that omni-theism is very probably\nfalse. In the case of the second argument, the alternative hypothesis\n(aesthetic deism) is arguably a form of theism, and even in the case\nof the first argument it is arguable that the alternative hypothesis\n(source physicalism) is compatible with some forms of theism (in\nparticular ones in which God is an emergent entity). This is not a\nproblem for either argument, however, precisely because both are\narguments for local atheism instead of global atheism." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 How to Argue for Local Atheism" }, { "content": [ "\nThe basic idea behind the low priors argument is that, even if the\nagnostic is right that, when it comes to God’s existence, the\nevidence is ambiguous or absent altogether, what follows is not that\ntheism has a middling probability all things considered, but instead\nthat theism is very probably false. This is said to follow because\ntheism starts out with a very low probability before taking into\naccount any evidence. (“Evidence” in this context refers\nto factors extrinsic to a hypothesis that raise or lower its\nprobability.) Since ambiguous or absent evidence has no effect on that\nprior or intrinsic probability, the posterior or all-things-considered\nprobability of theism is also very low. If, however, theism is very\nprobably false, then atheism must be very probably true and this\nimplies (according to the defender of the argument) that atheistic\nbelief is justified. (This last alleged implication is examined in\nsection 7.)", "\nThis sort of argument is very relevant to the issue of which of\natheism and theism is the appropriate “default” position.\nIf theism has a sufficiently low intrinsic probability, then atheism\nis arguably the correct default position in the sense that ambiguous\nor absent evidence will justify, not suspending judgment on the issue\nof God’s existence, but instead believing that God does not\nexist. This is why Le Poidevin’s argument for agnosticism\nincludes, not just a premise asserting that the relevant evidence is\nambiguous, but also one asserting that, at least in the case of\nversatile theism, we are in the dark when it comes to the issue of\nwhich of theism and atheism has a higher intrinsic probability.\nUnfortunately, much discussion of the issue of which position is the\ncorrect “default position” or of who has the “burden\nof proof” gets sidetracked by bad analogies to Santa Claus,\nflying spaghetti monsters, and Bertrand Russell’s ([1952] 1997)\nfamous china teapot in elliptical orbit around the sun (see Garvey\n2010 and van Inwagen 2012 for criticism of some of these analogies).\nThe low priors argument implicitly addresses this important issue in a\nmuch more sophisticated and promising way.", "\nIn the version of the low priors argument formulated below, the basic\napproach described above is improved by comparing omni-theism, not\nsimply to its denial, but instead to a more specific atheistic\nhypothesis called “source physicalism”. Unlike ontological\nphysicalism, source physicalism is a claim about the source of mental\nentities, not about their nature. Source physicalists, whether they\nare ontological physicalists or ontological dualists, believe that the\nphysical world existed before the mental world and caused the mental\nworld to come into existence, which implies that all mental entities\nare causally dependent on physical entities. Further, even if they are\nontological dualists, source physicalists need not claim that mental\nentities never cause physical entities or other mental entities, but\nthey must claim that there would be no mental entities were it not for\nthe prior existence (and causal powers) of one or more physical\nentities. The argument proceeds as follows:", "\nOnly the argument’s two premises—steps (1) and\n(2)—are controversial. The other steps in the argument all\nclearly follow from previous steps.", "\nA thorough examination of the arguments for and against premise (1) is\nobviously impossible here, but it is worth mentioning that a defense\nof this premise need not claim that the known facts typically thought\nby natural theologians to favor omni-theism over competing hypotheses\nlike source physicalism have no force. Instead, it could be claimed\nthat whatever force they have is offset at least to some significant\ndegree by more specific facts favoring source physicalism over\nomni-theism. Natural theologians routinely ignore these more specific\nfacts and thus appear to commit what might be called “the\nfallacy of understated evidence”. More precisely, the point is\nthis. Even when natural theologians successfully identify some general\nfact about a topic that is more probable given omni-theism than given\nsource physicalism, they ignore other more specific facts about that\nsame topic, facts that, given the general fact, appear to be\nsignificantly more probable given source physicalism than given\nomni-theism.", "\nFor example, even if omni-theism is supported by the general fact that\nthe universe is complex, one should not ignore the more specific fact,\ndiscovered by scientists, that underlying this complexity at the level\nat which we experience the universe, is a much simpler early universe\nfrom which this complexity arose, and also a much simpler contemporary\nuniverse at the micro-level, one consisting of a relatively small\nnumber of different kinds of particles all of which exist in one of a\nrelatively small number of different states. In short, it is important\nto take into account, not just the general fact that the universe that\nwe directly experience with our senses is extremely complex, but also\nthe more specific fact that two sorts of hidden simplicity within the\nuniverse can explain that complexity. Given that a complex universe\nexists, this more specific fact is exactly what one would expect on\nsource physicalism, because, as the best natural theologians (e.g.,\nSwinburne 2004) say, the complexity of the universe cries out for\nexplanation in terms of something simpler. There is, however, no\nreason at all to expect this more specific fact on omni-theism since,\nif those same natural theologians are correct, then a simple God\nprovides a simple explanation for the observed complexity of the\nuniverse whether or not that complexity is also explained by any\nsimpler mediate physical causes.", "\nAnother example concerns consciousness. Its existence really does seem\nto be more likely given omni-theism than given source physicalism (and\nthus to raise the ratio of the probability of omni-theism to the\nprobability of source physicalism). But we know a lot more about\nconsciousness than just that it exists. We also know, thanks in part\nto the relatively new discipline of neuroscience, that conscious\nstates in general and even the very integrity of our personalities,\nnot to mention the apparent unity of the self, are dependent to a very\nhigh degree on physical events occurring in the brain. Given the\ngeneral fact that consciousness exists, we have reason on source\nphysicalism that we do not have on theism to expect these more\nspecific facts. Given theism, it would not be surprising at all if our\nminds were more independent of the brain than they in fact are. After\nall, if omni-theism is true, then at least one mind, God’s, does\nnot depend at all on anything physical. Thus, when the available\nevidence about consciousness is fully stated, it is far from clear\nthat it significantly favors omni-theism.", "\nSimilar problems threaten to undermine appeals to\nfine-tuning—that is, appeals to the fact that a number of\napparently independent physical parameters have values that, while not\nfixed by current physical theory, nevertheless happen to fall within a\nrelatively narrow “life-permitting” range assuming no\nchanges to other parameters. Arguably, given that fine-tuning is\nrequired for intelligent life and that an omni-God has reason to\ncreate intelligent life, we have more reason to expect fine-tuning on\nomni-theism than on source physicalism. Given such fine-tuning,\nhowever, it is far more surprising on omni-theism than on source\nphysicalism that our universe is not teeming with intelligent life and\nthat the most impressive intelligent organisms we know to exist are\nmerely human: self-centered and aggressive primates who far too often\nkill, rape, and torture each other.", "\nIn fairness to omni-theism, however, most of those humans are moral\nagents and many have religious experiences apparently of God. The\nproblem is that, while the existence of moral agents is\n“predicted” by omni-theism better than by source\nphysicalism, it is also true that, given their existence, the variety\nand frequency of easily avoidable conditions that promote morally bad\nbehavior and that severely limit the freedom, agency, and autonomy of\ncountless human beings are much more likely on source physicalism. And\nwhile religious experiences apparently of God are no doubt more to be\nexpected if an omni-God exists than if human beings are the product of\nblind physical forces, it is also true that, given that such\nexperiences do occur, various facts about their distribution that\nshould be surprising to theists are exactly what one would expect on\nsource physicalism, such as the fact that many people never have them\nand the fact that those who do have them almost always have either a\nprior belief in God or extensive exposure to a theistic religion.", "\nIt seems, then, that when it comes to evidence favoring omni-theism\nover source physicalism, the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away.\nFurther, when combined with the fact that what we know about the level\nof well-being of sentient beings and the extent of their suffering is\narguably vastly more probable on source physicalism than on theism, a\nvery strong though admittedly controversial case for premise\n (1)\n can be made.", "\nWhat about premise\n (2)?\n Again, a serious case can be made for its truth. Such a case first\ncompares source physicalism, not to omni-theism, but to its opposite,\nsource idealism. Source idealists believe that the mental world\nexisted before the physical world and caused the physical world to\ncome into existence. This view is consistent with both ontological\nidealism and ontological dualism, and also with physical entities\nhaving both physical and mental effects. It entails, however, that all\nphysical entities are, ultimately, causally dependent on one or more\nmental entities, and so is not consistent with ontological\nphysicalism. The symmetry of source physicalism and source idealism is\na good pro tanto reason to believe they are equally probable\nintrinsically. They are equally specific, they have the same\nontological commitments, neither can be formulated more elegantly than\nthe other, and each appears to be equally coherent and equally\nintelligible. They differ on the issue of what is causally dependent\non what, but if Hume is right and causal dependence relations can only\nbe discovered by observation and not a priori, then that\nwon’t affect the intrinsic probabilities of the two\nhypotheses.", "\nOmni-theism, however, is a very specific version of source idealism;\nit entails that source idealism is true but goes far beyond source\nidealism by making a number of very specific claims about the sort of\n“mental world” that produced the physical world. For\nexample, it adds the claim that a single mind created the physical\nuniverse and that this mind is not just powerful but specifically\nomnipotent and not just knowledgeable but specifically omniscient. In\naddition, it presupposes a number of controversial metaphysical and\nmeta-ethical claims by asserting in addition that this being is both\neternal and objectively morally perfect. If any of these specific\nclaims and presuppositions is false, then omni-theism is false. Thus,\nomni-theism is a very specific and thus intrinsically very risky form\nof source idealism, and thus is many times less probable intrinsically\nthan source idealism. Therefore, if, as argued above, source\nphysicalism and source idealism are equally probable intrinsically,\nthen it follows that premise\n (2)\n is true: source physicalism is many times more probable intrinsically\nthan omni-theism." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 The Low Priors Argument" }, { "content": [ "\nNotice that the general strategy of the particular version of the low\npriors argument discussed above is to find an alternative to\nomni-theism that is much less specific than omni-theism (and\npartly for that reason much more probable intrinsically),\nwhile at the same time having enough content of the right sort to fit\nthe totality of the relevant data at least as well as theism does. In\nother words, the goal is to find a runner like source physicalism that\nbegins the race with a large head start and thus wins by a large\nmargin because it runs the race for supporting evidence and thus for\nprobability at roughly the same speed as omni-theism does. This\ndoesn’t show that source physicalism is probable (a “large\nmargin” in this context means a large ratio of one probability\nto another, not a large difference between the probabilities), because\nthere may be even better runners in the race; it does, however, show\nthat omni-theism loses the race by a large margin and thus is very\nprobably false.", "\nAn alternative strategy is to find a runner that begins the race tied\nwith omni-theism, but runs the race for evidential support much faster\nthan omni-theism does, thus once again winning the race by a margin\nthat is sufficiently large for the rest of the argument to go through.\nA good name for an argument pursuing this second strategy is the\n“decisive evidence argument”. The choice of alternative\nhypothesis is crucial here just as it was in the low priors argument.\nOne promising choice is “aesthetic deism”. (Another would\nbe a more detailed version of source physicalism that, unlike source\nphysicalism in general, makes the relevant data antecedently much more\nprobable than theism does.) In order to help ensure that omni-theism\nand aesthetic deism begin the race at the same starting\nline—that is, have the same intrinsic\nprobability—“aesthetic deism” is best defined in\nsuch a way that it is almost identical to omni-theism. Thus, it may be\nstipulated that, like omni-theism, aesthetic deism implies that an\neternal, non-physical, omnipotent, and omniscient being created the\nphysical world. The only difference, then, between the God of\nomni-theism and the deity of aesthetic deism is what motivates them.\nAn omni-theistic God would be morally perfect and so strongly\nmotivated by considerations of the well-being of sentient creatures.\nAn aesthetic deistic God, on the other hand, would prioritize\naesthetic goods over moral ones. While such a being would want a\nbeautiful universe, perhaps the best metaphor here is not that of a\ncosmic artist, but instead that of a cosmic playwright: an\nauthor of nature who wants above all to write an interesting\nstory.", "\nAs everyone knows, good stories never begin with the line “and\nthey lived happily ever after”, and that line is the last line\nof any story that contains it. Further, containing such a line is\nhardly necessary for a story to be good. If aesthetic deism is true,\nthen it may very well be true that, “all the world’s a\nstage, and all the men and women merely players”\n(emphasis added). In any case, the hypothesis of aesthetic deism makes\n“predictions” about the condition of sentient beings in\nthe world that are very different from the ones that the hypothesis of\nomni-theism makes. After all, what makes a good story good is often\nsome intense struggle between good and evil, and all good stories\ncontain some mixture of benefit and harm. This suggests that the\nobserved mixture of good and evil in our world decisively favors\naesthetic deism over omni-theism. And if that’s right, then\naesthetic deism pulls far ahead of omni-theism in the race for\nprobability, thereby proving that omni-theism is very improbable.", "\nHere is one possible formulation of this argument:", "\nSteps (4)–(6) of this argument are the same as steps\n(3)–(5) of the low priors argument except that “source\nphysicalism” in step (3) of the low priors argument is replaced\nby “aesthetic deism” in step (4) of the decisive evidence\nargument. This makes no difference as far as the inference from step\n(4) to step (5) is concerned. That inference, like the inferences from\nsteps (1)–(3) to step (4) and from step (5) to step (6), is\nclearly correct. The key question, then, is whether premises (1), (2),\nand (3) are all true.", "\nIn spite of the nearly complete overlap between omni-theism and\naesthetic deism, Richard Swinburne (2004: 96–109) would\nchallenge premise\n (1)\n on the grounds that aesthetic deism, unlike omni-theism, must posit a\nbad desire to account for why the deity does not do what is morally\nbest. Omni-theism need not do this, according to Swinburne, because\nwhat is morally best just is what is overall best, and thus an\nomniscient being will of necessity do what is morally best so long as\nit has no desires other than the desires it has simply by virtue of\nknowing what the best thing to do is in any given situation. This\nchallenge depends, however, on a highly questionable motivational\nintellectualism: it succeeds only if merely believing that an action\nis good entails a desire to do it. On most theories of motivation,\nthere is a logical gap between the intellect and desire. If such a gap\nexists, then it would seem that omni-theism is no more probable\nintrinsically than aesthetic deism.", "\nIt’s hard to think of a plausible challenge to premise\n (2)\n because, at least when it comes to the usual evidence taken to favor\ntheism over competing hypotheses like naturalism, aesthetic deism\naccounts for that evidence at least as well as omni-theism does. For\nexample, a deity interested in good narrative would want a world that\nis complex and yet ordered, that contains beauty, consciousness,\nintelligence, and moral agency. Perhaps there is more reason to expect\nthe existence of libertarian free will on omni-theism than on\naesthetic deism; but unless one starts from the truth of omni-theism,\nthere seems to be little reason to believe that we have such freedom.\nAnd even if one takes seriously introspective or other non-theological\nevidence for libertarian free will, it is not difficult to construct a\n“de-odicy” here: a good explanation in terms of aesthetic\ndeism either of the existence of libertarian free will or of why there\nis apparently strong but ultimately misleading evidence for its\nexistence. For example, if open theists are right that not even an\nomniscient being can know with certainty what (libertarian) free\nchoices will be made in the future, then aesthetic deism could account\nfor libertarian free will and other sorts of indeterminacy by claiming\nthat a story with genuine surprises is better than one that is\ncompletely predictable. Alternatively, what might be important for the\nstory is only that the characters think they have free will, not that\nthey really have it.", "\nFinally, there is premise\n (3),\n which asserts that the data of good and evil decisively favors\naesthetic deism over theism. In this context, the “data of good\nand evil” include everything we know about how sentient beings,\nincluding humans, are benefitted or harmed. A full discussion of this\npremise is not possible here, but recognition of its plausibility\nappears to be as old as the problem of evil itself. Consider, for\nexample, the Book of Job, whose protagonist, a righteous man who\nsuffers horrifically, accuses God of lacking sufficient commitment to\nthe moral value of justice. The vast majority of commentators agree\nthat God does not directly respond to Job’s charge. Instead,\nspeaking out of the whirlwind, He describes His design of the cosmos\nand of the animal kingdom in a way clearly intended to emphasize His\npower and the grandeur of His creation. Were it not for theological\nworries about God’s moral perfection, the most natural\ninterpretation of this part of the story would be either that God\nagrees with Job’s charge that He is unjust or that God denies\nthat Job can sensibly apply terms like “just” and\n“unjust” to Him because He and Job are not members of any\nshared moral community (Morriston forthcoming; for an opposing view,\nsee Stump 2010: chapter 9). This is why Job’s first response to\nGod’s speech (before capitulating in his second response) is\njust to refuse to repeat his (unanswered) accusation. On this\ninterpretation, the creator that confronts Job is not the God he\nexpected and definitely not the God of omni-theism, but rather a being\nmuch more like the deity of aesthetic deism.", "\nThose who claim that a God might allow evil because it is the\ninevitable result of the universe being governed by laws of nature\nalso lend support, though unintentionally, to the idea that, if there\nis an author of nature, then that being is more likely motivated by\naesthetic concerns than moral ones. For example, it may be that\nproducing a universe governed by a few laws expressible as elegant\nmathematical equations is an impressive accomplishment, not just\nbecause of the wisdom and power required for such a task, but also\nbecause of the aesthetic value of such a universe. That value may very\nwell depend, however, on the creator’s choosing not to intervene\nregularly in nature to protect His creatures from harm.", "\nMuch of the aesthetic value of the animal kingdom may also depend on\nits being the result of a long evolutionary process driven by\nmechanisms like natural selection. As Darwin (1859) famously said in\nthe last lines of On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural\nSelection,", "\n\n\nThere is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers,\nhaving been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and\nthat, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed\nlaw of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most\nbeautiful and wonderful have been, and are being evolved.\n", "\nUnfortunately, such a process, if it is to produce sentient life, may\nalso entail much suffering and countless early deaths. One\nquestionable assumption of some natural order theodicists is to think\nthat such connections between aesthetic goods and suffering provide a\nmoral justification for God’s allowing horrific\nsuffering. It is arguably far more plausible that in such a scenario\nthe value of preventing horrendous suffering would, from a moral point\nof view, far outweigh the value of regularity, sublimity, and\nnarrative. If so, then a morally perfect God would not trade\nthe former for the latter though a deity motivated primarily by\naesthetic reasons no doubt would.", "\nTo summarize, nearly everyone agrees that the world contains both\ngoods and evils. Pleasure and pain, love and hate, achievement and\nfailure, flourishing and languishing, and virtue and vice all exist in\ngreat abundance. In spite of that, some see signs of cosmic teleology.\nThose who defend the version of the decisive evidence argument stated\nabove need not deny the teleology. They do need to show that it is far\neasier to make sense of the “strange mixture of good and ill,\nwhich appears in life” (Hume Dialogues, XI, 14) when\nthat teleology is interpreted as amoral instead of as moral (cf.\nMulgan 2015 and Murphy 2017) and in particular when it is interpreted\nas directed towards aesthetic ends instead of towards moral ends." ], "subsection_title": "6.3 The Decisive Evidence Argument" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe topic in\n section 4\n was Le Poidevin’s argument for the truth of a modest form of\nagnosticism. In this section, an argument for the falsity of a more\nambitious form of agnosticism will be examined. Because the sort of\nagnosticism addressed in this section is more ambitious than the sort\ndefended by Le Poidevin, it is conceivable that both arguments succeed\nin establishing their conclusions.", "\nIn Le Poidevin’s argument, the term “agnosticism”\nrefers to the position that neither versatile theism nor global\natheism is known to be true. In this section,\n“agnosticism” refers to the position that neither the\nbelief that omni-theism is true nor the belief that it is false is\nrationally permissible. This form of agnosticism is more ambitious\nbecause knowledge is stronger (in the logical sense) than rational\npermissibility: it can be rationally permissible to believe\npropositions that are not known to be true, but a proposition cannot\nbe known to be true by someone who is not rationally permitted to\nbelieve it. Thus, an appropriate name for this form of agnosticism is\n“strong agnosticism”.", "\nAnother difference concerns the object of the two forms of\nagnosticism. The agnosticism in Le Poidevin’s argument concerned\nversatile theism versus global atheism. In this section, the target is\nomni-theism versus the local atheistic position that omni-theism is\nfalse. The previous section focused on two arguments for the\nconclusion that this form of local atheism is very probably true. In\nthis section, the question is whether or not that conclusion, if\nestablished, could ground a successful argument against strong\nagnosticism.", "\nSuch an argument can be formulated as follows:", "\n\n Premise (1)\n was defended in\n section 6,\n premise (4) is true by the definition of “strong\nagnosticism”, and steps\n (3)\n and\n (5)\n follow from earlier steps by modus ponens and modus\ntollens, respectively. This leaves premise\n (2),\n the premise that, if atheism is very probably true, then atheistic\nbelief is rationally permissible.", "\nOne might attempt to defend this premise by claiming that the\nprobabilities in\n premise (2)\n are rational credences and hence the truth of the so-called Lockean\nthesis (Foley 1992) justifies (2):", "\n\n\nIt is rational for a person S to believe a proposition\nP if and only if it is rational for S’s\ncredence in P to be sufficiently high to make\nS’s attitude towards P one of belief.\n", "\nThe Lockean thesis, however, is itself in need of justification.\nFortunately, though, nothing so strong as the Lockean thesis is needed\nto defend\n premise (2).\n For one thing, all the defender of (2) needs is an “if”,\nnot an “if and only if”. Also, the defender of (2) need\nnot equate, as the Lockean thesis does, the attitude of belief with\nhaving a high credence. Thus, all that is required is the following\nmore modest thesis (call it “T”):", "\nEven this more modest thesis, however, is controversial, because\nadopting it commits one to the position that rational (i.e.,\nrationally permissible) belief is not closed under conjunction. In\nother words, it commits one to the position that it is possible for\neach of a number of beliefs to be rational even though the additional\nbelief that those beliefs are all true is not rational.", "\nTo see why this is so, imagine that a million lottery tickets have\nbeen sold. Each player purchased only a single ticket, and exactly one\nof the players is certain to win. Now imagine further that an informed\nobserver has a distinct belief about each of the million individual\nplayers that that particular player will lose. According to thesis\nT, each of those million beliefs is rational. For example, if\nSue is one of the players, then according to T the\nobserver’s belief that Sue will lose is rational because it is\nrational for the observer to have a (very) high credence in the\nproposition that Sue will lose. Since, however, it is certain that\nsomeone will win, it is also rational for the observer to believe that\nsome player will win. It is not rational, however, to have\ncontradictory beliefs, so it is not rational for the observer to\nbelieve that no player will win. This implies, however, that rational\nbelief is not closed under conjunction, for the proposition that no\nplayer will win just is the conjunction of all of the propositions\nthat say of some individual player that they will lose.", "\nDefenders of\n premise (2)\n will claim, very plausibly, that the implication of T that\nrational belief is not closed under conjunction is completely\ninnocuous. Isn’t it obvious, for example, that it would not be\nrational for a fallible human being to believe that all of their many\nbeliefs are true, even if each of those beliefs were rational? Others\n(e.g., Oppy 1994: 151), however, regard the conclusion that rational\nbelief is not closed under conjunction as unacceptable and will for\nthat reason reject premise (2). So even if it can be shown that\nomni-theism is very probably false, it still won’t be obvious to\neveryone that it is rationally permissible to be a local atheist about\nomni-theism and thus it still won’t be obvious to everyone that\nstrong agnosticism about omni-theism is false." ], "section_title": "7. An Argument against Agnosticism", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Baggini, Julian, 2003, Atheism: A Very Short\nIntroduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Bishop, John C., 2008, “How a Modest Fideism May Constrain\nTheistic Commitments: Exploring an Alternative to Classical\nTheism”, Philosophia, 35(3–4): 387–402.\ndoi:10.1007/s11406-007-9071-y", "Buckareff, Andrei A. and Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), 2016,\nAlternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the\nDivine, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722250.001.0001", "Bullivant, Stephen, 2013, “Defining\n‘Atheism’”, in Bullivant and Ruse 2013:\n11–21.", "Bullivant, Stephen and Michael Ruse (eds.), 2013, The Oxford\nHandbook of Atheism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199644650.001.0001", "Darwin, Charles, 1859, On the Origin of Species by Means of\nNatural Selection, London: John Murray.\n [Darwin 1859 available online]", "Dennett, Daniel C., 2006, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a\nNatural Phenomenon, New York: Viking Penguin.", "Diller, Jeanine, 2016, “Global and Local Atheisms”,\nInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 79(1):\n7–18. doi:10.1007/s11153-015-9550-1", "Diller, Jeanine and Asa Kasher, 2013, Models of God and\nAlternative Ultimate Realities, Dordrecht: Springer.", "Draper, Paul, 2002, “Seeking but Not Believing: Confessions\nof a Practicing Agnostic”, in Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul\nMoser (eds.), Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, pp. 197–214.", "–––, 2016, “Where Skeptical Theism Fails,\nSkeptical Atheism Prevails”, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy\nof Religion, volume 7, Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, pp. 63–80.", "Edwards, Paul, 2006, “Atheism”, in Donald M. Borchert\n(ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd edition, Volume 1),\nDetroit, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, pp. 356–377.", "Ellis, Fiona, 2014, God, Value, and Nature, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714125.001.0001", "Flew, Antony, 1972, “The Presumption of Atheism”,\nCanadian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1): 29–46.\ndoi:10.1080/00455091.1972.10716861", "Foley, Richard, 1992, “The Epistemology of Belief and the\nEpistemology of Degrees of Belief”, American Philosophical\nQuarterly, 29(2): 111–121.", "French, Peter A. and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), 2013,\n“Special Issue: The New Atheism and Its Critics”,\nMidwest Studies in Philosophy, 37(1).", "Garvey, Brian, 2010, “Absence of Evidence, Evidence of\nAbsence, and the Atheist’s Teapot”, Ars\nDisputandi, 10: 9–22.", "Gutting, Gary, 2013, “Religious Agnosticism”,\nMidwest Studies in Philosophy, 37(1): 51–67.\ndoi:10.1111/misp.12002", "Hume, David, [1757] 1956, The Natural History of\nReligion, H.E. Root (ed.), Stanford, CA: Stanford University\nPress, originally published in 1757.\n [Hume 1757 available online (1889 edition)]", "–––, [1779] 2007, Dialogues Concerning\nNatural Religion, Dorothy Coleman (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press. [References are to the part and paragraph\nnumber.]", "Huxley, Thomas Henry, 1884, “Agnosticism: A\nSymposium”, The Agnostic Annual, Charles Watts (ed.),\npp. 5–6.\n [Huxley 1884 available online]", "–––, 1889, “Agnosticism and\nChristianity”, reprinted in his Collected Essays, Volume 5:\nScience and the Christian Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, 1894, pp. 309–365.\n [Huxley [1889] 1894 available online]", "Kahane, Guy, 2011, “Should We Want God to Exist?”\nPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(3):\n674–696. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00426.x", "Kenny, Anthony, 1983, Faith and Reason, (Bampton lectures\nin America, no. 22), New York: Columbia University Press.", "Le Poidevin, Robin, 1996, Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction\nto the Philosophy of Religion, London and New York:\nRoutledge.", "–––, 2010, Agnosticism: A Very Short\nIntroduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/actrade/9780199575268.001.0001", "Leftow, Brian, 2016, “Naturalistic Pantheism”, in\nBuckareff and Nagasawa 2016: 64–87.", "Martin, Michael, 1990, Atheism: A Philosophical\nJustification, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.", "McLaughlin, Robert, 1984, “Necessary agnosticism?”\nAnalysis 44(4): 198–202.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/44.4.198", "Morris, Thomas V., 1985, “Agnosticism”,\nAnalysis 45(4): 219–224.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/45.4.219", "Morriston, Wes, 2017, “Protest and Enlightenment in\nthe Book of Job”, in Paul Draper and J.L. Schellenberg (eds.),\nRenewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays, Oxford:\nOxford University Press, pp. 223–242.", "Mulgan, Tim, 2015, Purpose in the Universe: The Moral and\nMetaphysical Case for Ananthropocentric Purposivism, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646142.001.0001", "Murphy, Mark C., 2017, God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine\nAgency and the Argument from Evil, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Nagasawa, Yujin, 2008, “A New Defence of Anselmian\nTheism”, Philosophical Quarterly, 58(233):\n577–596. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.578.x", "Nagel, Thomas, 1997, The Last Word, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press. doi:10.1093/0195149831.001.0001", "Oppy, Graham, 1994, “Weak Agnosticism Defended”,\nInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 36(3):\n147–67. doi:10.1007/BF01316921", "–––, 2006, Arguing About Gods,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Pike, Nelson, 1970, God and Timelessness, New York:\nSchocken Books.", "Plantinga, Alvin, 2000, Warranted Christian Belief,\nOxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195131932.001.0001", "Pojman, Louis P., 2015, “Atheism”, in Robert Audi (ed.),\nThe Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Rowe, William L., 1979, “The Problem of Evil and Some\nVarieties of Atheism”, American Philosophical\nQuarterly, 16(4): 335–341.", "–––, 2000, “Atheism”, in Edward\nCraig (ed.), Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,\nLondon and New York: Routledge, pp. 62–63.", "Russell, Bertrand, 1997, “Is There a God? [1952]”, in\nJohn G. Slater and Peter Köllner (eds.), The Collected Papers\nof Bertrand Russell, Vol. 11: Last Philosophical Testament,\n1943–68, London and New York: Routledge, pp.\n542–548.", "Schellenberg, J.L., 2007, The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification\nof Religious Skepticism, Ithaca and London: Cornell University\nPress.", "–––, 2019, Progressive Atheism: How Moral\nEvolution Changes the God Debate, London: Bloomsbury.", "Strawson, Galen, 1990, “Review of Created from\nAnimals, by James Rachels”, The Independent,\nLondon, June 24.", "Stump, Eleonore, 2010, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and\nthe Problem of Suffering, Oxford: Clarendon Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277421.001.0001", "Swinburne, Richard, 2001, Epistemic Justification,\nOxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199243794.001.0001", "–––, 2004, The Existence of God, second\nedition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.001.0001", "van Inwagen, Peter, 2012, “Russell’s China\nTeapot”, in Dariusz Lukasiewicz and Roger Pouivet (eds.),\nThe Right to Believe: Perspectives in Religious Epistemology,\nHeusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, pp. 11–26.", "Wielenberg, Erik J., 2009, “Dawkins’ Gambit,\nHume’s Aroma, and God’s Simplicity”, Philosophia\nChristi, 11(1): 111–125.", "Zenk, Thomas, 2013, “New Atheism”, in Bullivant and\nRuse 2013: 245–260." ]	[ { "href": "../ethics-belief/", "text": "belief, ethics of" }, { "href": "../formal-belief/", "text": "belief, formal representations of" }, { "href": "../evil/", "text": "evil: problem of" }, { "href": "../fideism/", "text": "fideism" }, { "href": "../moral-arguments-god/", "text": "God, arguments for the existence of: moral arguments" }, { "href": "../god-ultimates/", "text": "God: and other ultimates" }, { "href": "../divine-hiddenness/", "text": "hiddenness of God" }, { "href": "../monotheism/", "text": "monotheism" }, { "href": "../omnipotence/", "text": "omnipotence" }, { "href": "../panentheism/", "text": "panentheism" }, { "href": "../pantheism/", "text": "pantheism" }, { "href": "../physicalism/", "text": "physicalism" }, { "href": "../pragmatic-belief-god/", "text": "pragmatic arguments and belief in God" }, { "href": "../process-theism/", "text": "process theism" }, { "href": "../religion-science/", "text": "religion: and science" }, { "href": "../religion-epistemology/", "text": "religion: epistemology of" } ]
agrippa-nettesheim	Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim	First published Wed Feb 15, 2017; substantive revision Thu Mar 18, 2021	[ "\nThe intellectual biography of Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von\nNettesheim (1486–1535) provides us with significant proof of a\ncultural crisis in the Renaissance. The most striking aspect of his\nheritage is the seemingly paradoxical coexistence of a comprehensive\ntreatise on magic and occult arts, De occulta philosophia libri\ntres (Three Books on Occult Philosophy), written in\n1510, but then reworked, substantially enlarged, and finally published\nin 1533, and a rigorous refutation of all products of human reason,\nDe incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium atque\nexcellentia verbi Dei declamatio invectiva (On the\nUncertainty and Vanity of the Arts and Sciences: An Invective\nDeclamation), printed in 1530. Esoteric literature and\ninquisitorial handbooks invariably quoted Agrippa, the celebrated (or\nexecrated) Archimagus; bibliographies on skepticism granted\nhim a long lasting, but not entirely deserved, reputation as one\n“who professed to overturn all the science” (Naudé\n1644: 44–45). Actually, both works, as well as all of\nAgrippa’s other writings, are clearly defined moments in a\nbroader philosophical, religious, and moral meditation on the social\nsignificance of learning in his own time. The “paradox”\nwith which Agrippa challenges his readers lies precisely in the\nsimultaneous presence of two speculative concerns, which are scattered\nin different texts, but which express, in spite of their apparent\ninconsistency, a complex cultural and religious project. De\nvanitate performs the epistemological function of the pars\ndestruens, identifying the causes and the historical\nresponsibilities for the general spiritual wreckage of Christian\nsociety, and introducing the proposal contained in the pars\nconstruens. De occulta philosophia, recovering\n“true magic” in the framework of Neoplatonic metaphysics\nand Hermetic theology, offers humankind a wonder-working knowledge,\none which is able to restore human cognitive and practical\ncapacities.", "\nIn order to understand the internal coherence of Agrippa’s\nintellectual journey, his entire oeuvre has to be taken into\naccount. The task is made more difficult because of his specific\nwriting strategy, which entailed hiding his true purposes beneath a\nmound of borrowed material and erratic juxtapositions. This style of\nthought and exposition requires Agrippa’s readers to piece\ntogether his “scattered meaning” (dispersa\nintentio) and to search for the theoretical message which is\nknowingly concealed within an unsystematic exposition. The literary\ntechnique of spreading knowledge in disguise, typical of the\nsapiential tradition, turned out to be increasingly important for most\nRenaissance intellectuals, who were “forced to create spaces for\nthemselves by merging learning with prophecy” (Celenza 2001:\n128). In addition, Agrippa composed his texts by gathering a wide\nrange of concepts and quotations from ancient and contemporary\nsources, which were removed from their original context and\nre-composed in a new explanatory structure. Such a way of\nde-constructing and re-constructing his cultural models should be\nconsidered in the light of Agrippa’s ideological program. By\n“re-writing” his sources, he uncovered presuppositions and\nimplications, which the sources themselves often left unsaid, and he\nconnected together, in a single coherent design, arguments and points\nof view which remained separate in contemporary discussions. In this\nway, he added a “political” meaning to the new text which\nwas not present in the purely cultural or religious critique put\nforward by his sources. This emphasis on the civic function of\nphilosophy can be regarded as the most characteristic and\n“original” element in Agrippa’s works." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Biography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Sources", "Selected Studies" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nHeinrich Cornelius Agrippa was born on 14 September 1486 in Cologne.\nHe matriculated at the University of Cologne in 1499 and graduated in\n1502. The degree in medicine which he claimed to have earned was ruled\nout by Prost (1882: 67–74), who also raised serious doubts about\nhis doctorates in Canon and Civil Law (in utroque iure).\nNauert (1965: 10–11), however, suggested that they might have\nbeen obtained during the two periods of his life about which we have\nvery little information: 1502–1507 and 1511–1518. Agrippa\ncame into contact with the school of Albertus Magnus at Cologne, where\nit was still a living tradition and where he pursed his interest in\nnatural philosophy, encountering the Historia naturalis\n(Natural History) of Pliny the Elder for the first time.\nAndreas Canter, the city poet of Cologne, probably introduced him to\nLullism—later, Agrippa wrote a long commentary, printed at\nCologne in 1531, on Lull’s Ars magna (Great\nArt). During his youthful studies, Agrippa also established\npersonal relationships with those German humanists who shared his\ninterest in ancient wisdom. He spent a short period in Paris, where he\nmight have been a student. With some French friends, he formed a\nsodalitium, a sort of secret circle or initiatory\nbrotherhood, which, according the collection of letters from and to\nAgrippa, included Charles de Bovelles (c. 1479–1533), Symphorien\nChampier (c. 1471–1539), Germain de Brie (c. 1489–1538),\nGermain de Ganay (d. 1520), the portraitist at the French court Jean\nPerréal (c. 1455–1530), and an unknown Italian friend,\nLandulfus. Between 1508 and 1509, Agrippa undertook a mysterious\njourney to Spain, seemingly engaged in a military mission. In 1509 he\nwas charged with a course of lectures on Johannes Reuchlin’s\nDe verbo mirifico (On the Wonder-Working Word) at\nthe University of Dôle in Burgundy. This academic appointment\nhad been supported by the chancellor of the university, Archbishop\nAntoine de Vergy. In the inaugural lecture, Agrippa pronounced a\nprolusion in honor of the daughter of Emperor Maximilian, Margaret of\nAustria, Princess of Austria and Burgundy. He planned to develop the\nspeech into a more comprehensive treatise in praise of womankind,\ndedicating it to Margaret. Therefore, he began to draft, but perhaps\ndid not finish, his celebrated De nobilitate et praecellentia\nfoeminei sexus declamatio (Declamation on the Nobility and\nPre-Eminence of the Female Sex), which was published only in\n1529. Agrippa’s teaching on Christian kabbalah attracted\nconsiderable interest among the members of the university and of the\nlocal Parlement, and he joined the collegium of\ntheologians. Unfortunately, not everyone had a benevolent attitude to\nwhat sounded like an attempt to spread the “most criminal,\ncondemned and prohibited art of kabbalah”\n(Expostulatio, p. 494) in Christian schools. The Franciscan\nJean Catilinet, the provincial superior for Burgundy, preaching in the\npresence of Margaret at the court of Low Countries in Ghent, denounced\nAgrippa as a “judaizing heretic” (ibidem). This\ncharge put an end to Agrippa’s teaching career in Dôle and\ndashed his hopes of obtaining Margaret’s favor. Returning to\nGermany, in the winter of 1509–1510 Agrippa went to the\nmonastery of St. Jacob at Würzburg to meet Johannes Trithemius,\nAbbot of Sponheim. Over the course of a few intense days, the famous\nabbot and his young visitor discussed a topic of mutual interest:\nnatural magic and its role in contemporary culture. The meeting had a\ncrucial impact on Agrippa. He quickly finished a compendium\non magic, which he had been working on for some time. The first draft\nof De occulta philosophia was dedicated to Trithemius, who\nreceived the manuscript shortly before 8 April 1510 and generously\npraised Agrippa’s commitment. The book circulated in manuscript,\nas evidence from Agrippa’s correspondence shows; but he\ncontinued to assemble materials in order to revise this first draft.\nThis aim was achieved only twenty years later.", "\nIn London, where he had gone in 1510 to carry out a political and\n“very secret assignment” (occultissimum negotium,\nDefensio, F. B6), probably on the orders of Emperor\nMaximilian, he became familiar with John Colet, who introduced him to\nthe study of St. Paul’s epistles. Agrippa wrote\nCommentariola (Little Commentaries) on the Epistle\nto the Romans, which he then lost in Italy and recovered only in 1523,\nbut which remain totally unknown to us. During his stay in London,\nAgrippa replied to Catilinet’s accusations with a polemical\nExpostulatio super Expositione sua in librum De verbo mirifico cum\nJoanne Catilineti (Expostulation with Jean Catilinet over His\nExposition of the Book On the Wonder-Working Word)—just the\nfirst in a series of countless epic battles between him and\ncontemporary scholastic theologians. From 1511 to 1518, Agrippa was in\nItaly, serving Maximilian, but his military duties did not prevent him\nfrom pursuing his philosophical interests. He lectured on\nPlato’s Symposium (Convivium) and on the\nHermetic Pimander (that is, the Corpus Hermeticum)\nat the University of Pavia, in 1512 and 1515 respectively. He probably\nbelieved that he might be able to achieve his academic ambitions\nthere, but his fervent expectations were soon disappointed. After the\ndefeat of the Swiss and Imperial troops at Marignano (13–14\nSeptember 1515), he was forced to quit teaching and to abandon Pavia.\nHe then sought patronage at the court of William IX Paleologus,\nMarquis of Monferrato, to whom he promptly dedicated two little works,\nDe homine (On Humankind) and De triplici ratione\ncognoscendi Deum (On the Threefold Way of Knowing God),\ngathering together some notes and materials he had already organized\nor perhaps even prepared for press, in Pavia. Both works attest to the\nimportance of Agrippa’s contact with early sixteenth-century\nItalian culture. During his stay in Italy, he joined a network of\nfriends and correspondents, who allowed him to deepen his knowledge of\nNeoplatonic and Hermetic literature, to sharpen his acquaintance with\nkabbalistic texts, and to broaden and update his bibliographical\ninformation. For a time he was in Turin, where he lectured on\ntheological topics.", "\nIn the following years, Agrippa was in Metz (1518–1520), as the\ncity orator and advocate (advocatus), in Geneva\n(1521–1523), where he practiced medicine, and, finally in\nFreiburg (until 1524), as the city physician. Throughout this period,\nhe came into contact with a number of humanists who were engaging with\nthe new religious ideas circulating at the time. Therefore, his\nreputation as an “occult philosopher” assumed more complex\naspects. His De originali peccato declamatio (Declamation\non Original Sin), written in 1518 but not printed until 1529,\npuzzled the dedicatee, Dietrich Wichwael, Bishop of Cyrene, and\nAgrippa’s friend Claude Dieudonné with regard to his\ninterpretation of Adam’s sin as consisting in the sexual act. In\nMetz, he was involved in the debate on St. Anne’s triple\nmarriage, expressing his passionate support for Jacques Lefèvre\nd’Étaples’ criticism of the popular legend that\nattributed three husbands and three daughters to her. In De\nBeatissimae Annae monogamia ac unico puerperio (On St.\nAnne’s Monogamy and Sole Childbirth, printed in Cologne,\n1534), he gave a fierce reply to the accusations of heresy leveled at\nLefèvre (and at himself) by three conservative monks. The\ndefense was vehement and strongly sarcastic: no wonder Lefèvre\nd’Étaples reacted anxiously to Agrippa’s promise to\nbecome his ally. Meanwhile, Agrippa had successfully defended a woman\nof Woippy who was accused of being a witch, saving her from the stake.\nThanks to these courageous positions and his intense relationships\nwith pre-Reform circles, Agrippa was gradually assuming a by no means\nsecondary role in the general movement against the scholastic\ntradition. He won the esteem of many scholars (some of them would\nlater on join the Reformation), but, at the same time, attracted the\nparticular attention of the religious authorities.", "\nIn spring of 1524 Agrippa moved to Lyon to take up the office of\nphysician to the French king’s mother, Louise of Savoy. He tried\nto win the favor of the king’s sister, Marguerite\nd’Alençon, by dedicating to her his declamation De\nsacramento matrimonii (On the Sacrament of Marriage,\n1526) in parallel Latin and French versions. Unfortunately, it was a\nblunder and a terrible failure. The princess (who had recently been\nwidowed) was already hostile to the Erasmian ‘spirit’,\nwhich Agrippa referred to in order to claim the lawfulness and benefit\nof second marriages. Furthermore, ecclesiastical authorities were able\nto recognize the influence of some Erasmus’ condemned works on\nAgrippa’s positive attitude towards marriage, as well as the\nlink which connected it to the treatise De sacro coniugio\n(On Holy Wedlock) of the Franciscan François Lambert,\nwho had fled to Strasbourg after joining the Reformation.\nAgrippa’s position at court was becoming worse. His friendships,\nhis sympathies for the work of humanist Reformers, his more and more\naggressive theses—in 1526 he reworked an earlier oration or\nletter, Dehortatio gentilis theologiae (Dissuasion from\nPagan Theology), in which he criticized contemporaries for their\nexcessive curiosity about Hermetic theology and their disregard for\nChristian education—were raising doubts his religious orthodoxy.\nHis correspondence with the Duke of Bourbon, who had betrayed the\nFrench Crown in order to side with the Emperor, called into question\nhis political loyalties, and he was suspected of involvement in a\nplot. His refusal to furnish an astrological prognostication for\nFrançois I and his incautious remarks about Louise’s\nsuperstition, which a friend passed on to her, sparked off her open\nhostility. Agrippa was stripped of his pension and forbidden to leave\nFrance. In the midst of such dramatic misadventures, he wrote his\nDe incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum. It was a biting\ncommentary on all human sciences and arts and a fierce attack on the\nmoral and social assumptions of his day. Agrippa subjected the work to\nlater revisions and enlargements, right up to the moment of\npublication, in 1530.", "\nWhen, at last, he was allowed to leave France, Agrippa accepted the\noffice of archivist and imperial historiographer at the court of\nMargaret of Austria, governor of the Low Countries, in Antwerp. He\nfinally dedicated himself to publishing his writings. In 1529 a\ncollection of his short treatises was printed in Antwerp by Michael\nHillenius, and in 1530 another Antwerp printer, Johannes Graphaeus,\nbrought out De vanitate. In 1531, Graphaeus also printed the\nenlarged version of Book I of De occulta philosophia,\ndedicated to Hermann von Wied, Archbishop Elector of Cologne\n(1477–1552), and the table of contents for Book II and III. Both\nDe vanitate and De occulta philosophia circulated\nwidely, thanks to further editions (in Antwerp, Cologne, and Paris),\nand once more Agrippa found himself in trouble with the religious\nauthorities. The Louvain theologians, questioned by Margaret of\nAustria herself, condemned De vanitate as scandalous, impious\nand heretical, and so did the Sorbonne with respect to the Paris\nedition. The Parlement at Mechelin was informed of the\nLouvain professors’ judgment, and required Agrippa to answer\ntheir accusations. He replied with two fearless writings, refuting,\npoint by point, the criticisms in his Apologia\n(Defense) and accusing, in turn, his opponents of ignorance\nand bad faith in his Querela (Complaint). These\nevents obviously put an end to Agrippa’s career at\nMargaret’s court, and he was once again seeking a new protector.\nHermann von Wied, who was both interested in occult sciences and\nsympathized with moderate religious reform, offered him protection\nand, in June 1532, brought him into his own household. Eventually,\nAgrippa was able to deliver the complete, final version of De\nocculta philosophia to the Cologne printer Johannes Soter, who in\nNovember was already typesetting it. Shortly before Christmas,\nhowever, the Dominican inquisitor Conrad Köllin denounced the\nbook as heretical and blasphemous, getting the city’s Senate to\nsuspend the printing. Agrippa’s impassioned and controversial\nappeal to the Cologne Senate (Zika 2003: 99–124) did not succeed\nin resolving the impasse. It was, instead, the forceful intervention\nof Hermann which enabled De occulta philosophia to appear,\neven though accompanied by an appendix including the chapters of\nDe vanitate which criticized magic.", "\nWe are not informed about the last years of Agrippa’s life,\nbecause his correspondence stops in July 1533. He was perhaps the\nauthor of a self-defense, Dialogus de vanitate scientiarum et\nruina Christianae religionis (Dialogue on the Vanity of the\nSciences and the Ruin of Christian Religion), fictitiously\nattributed to Godoschalcus Moncordius, an otherwise unknown Cistercian\nmonk, and printed, in all probability, by Johannes Soter in 1534\n(Zambelli 1965: 220–23). On 22 February 1534, from Bonn, Agrippa\naddressed a legal memorandum to the Parliament of the Low Countries\n(Zambelli 1965: 305–12). According to his pupil Johannes Wier\n(1515–1565), Agrippa was in Bonn until 1535. He then returned to\nFrance, where he was arrested on the order of François I.\nShortly after his release, he died in Grenoble in 1535 or, at the\nlatest, in 1536." ], "section_title": "1. Biography", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDedicating to Trithemius his first attempt as a reformer of magic,\nAgrippa claimed to share the common desire for the renewal of a\n“sublime and sacred science”, perverted by having been\ndetached from its theoretical context and by being practiced with\nanti-natural means and intentions. Corrupted texts and inadequate\ncritical and philosophical awareness had made magic a convoluted\njumble of errors and obscurities, despised by the learned, mistrusted\nby the Church, and used with feckless irresponsibility by\nsuperstitious old witches. Instead, in its original and pure form,\nmagic was a sacred body of knowledge, providing the possibility of\nhuman dominion over all of created nature (elemental, celestial, and\nintellectual).", "\nBasically, the first draft of De occulta philosophia was\nstructured as a survey, which owed much to Marsilio Ficino’s\nDe vita (On Life), Giovanni Pico della\nMirandola’s Oratio (de dignitate hominis,\nOration [on the Dignity of Humankind]), and Johannes\nReuchlin’s De verbo mirifico. These authors had already\nendeavored to restore magic, distinguishing (from different\nperspectives and with different aims) between true and false magic,\nbetween philosophy and pseudo-philosophy, between the sacred and the\nsacrilegious. Agrippa’s program followed a slightly different\npath. For Giovanni Pico, magic was “the most perfect\naccomplishment of natural philosophy” (Oration, p.\n226). Instead, for Agrippa, it was “the most perfect\naccomplishment of the noblest philosophy” (totius\nnobilissimae philosophiae absoluta consummatio, I, 2, p. 86).\nThis definition had significant implications. Unlike his predecessors,\nAgrippa conceived of magic as a comprehensive knowledge, gathering\ntogether all the cognitive data collected in the various fields of\nhuman learning, and making explicit their potentials for acting on\nreality. Therefore, according to the three different levels of being,\nthere were three different operative areas to which magic applied,\nmaking it possible to distinguish three ‘forms’ of magic:\nnatural magic, astrological (and numerological) magic, and\n‘religious’ or ‘ceremonial’ magic, that is,\nthe kabbalistic and theurgic magic. All three forms are true and good,\nif properly practiced in the context of the reformed magic. This\nassessment highlighted that Agrippa had moved away from another of his\nsources. In De verbo mirifico, Johannes Reuchlin had proposed\na similar tripartite division in the “wonder-working art”\n(ars miraculorum), but he had also recognized the intrinsic\nrisks of each “form”. Magic based on physics (natural\nmagic) cannot be checked and is therefore limited in its powers. Magic\nbased on astrology is often false and confused. As far as ceremonial\nmagic is concerned, goetia, which relies on malign demons, is\nclearly superstitious; theurgy, which attempts to establish contact\nwith benign demons, is practicable in theory, but complicated and\ndangerous in practice. Therefore, Reuchlin favored a more reliable and\nefficacious alternative, a fourth way, called the “art of\nsoliloquy” (ars soliloquia), based on the use of the\nholy name of Christ. While sharing Reuchlin’s enthusiasm for\nthis thaumaturgic philosophy, Agrippa’s view was broader, also\nembracing Ficino’s astrological magic, Pico’s natural\nmagic, and Neoplatonic and Hermetic theurgic magic. The\nall-inclusiveness of his “restored” magic also allowed him\nto recover the legacy of the medieval tradition (of Albertus Magnus,\nabove all) and even to pay some attention to popular\nbeliefs—justifying them within a Neoplatonic conceptual\nframework.", "\nIn Book I Agrippa explores the elemental world, reviewing the manifest\nand occult virtues of stones, plants, animals, and human individuals.\nOccult virtues, on which natural magic mainly focuses, are explained\nby the relationship of causal correspondence, connecting the eternal\nexemplars, the ideas, to the sublunary forms through the stars. In his\nNeoplatonic animated cosmos, all things are harmoniously related to\neach other. Magical activity consists chiefly in attracting the\n“spirit of the world” (spiritus mundi). It is\ndiffused everywhere and distributes life to everything, acting as the\nmediator between heavenly souls and earthly bodies, and allowing a\nsympathetic exchange between the different levels of the ontological\nhierarchy.", "\nBook II, dedicated to astrology, opens with the celebrated image of\nthe magus as the go-between who subjects sublunary world to the stars.\nThe knowledge of the laws, governing how the celestial influences flow\ndown to the earth, enables the magus to collaborate actively with\nnature, modifying the phenomenal processes. To describe astrological\nimages, attracting astral virtues, Agrippa pillaged the technical\ndetails described by Ficino in De vita coelitus comparanda\n(On Obtaining Life from the Heavens), but he also went back\nto the medieval tradition.", "\nIn Book III, Agrippa commits the physical and celestial worlds to the\nprotection of religion, which has the task of guaranteeing a\nrigorously non-superstitious magic, immune to demonic deceptions.\nReligion provides the magus with a model of moral improvement,\nallowing him to realize the Hermetic ideal of the perfect philosopher,\nperfect magus, and perfect “priest” (sacerdos).\nIn describing the human path to Hermetic deification, the first draft\nof Book III makes a clear distinction between faith and science.\nAgrippa draws on Reuchlin to define the link between illumination,\noffered by God to the human mind through faith, and reason, which can\ngain true knowledge only by receiving it from the mind. Reason, after\nattaining the innate contents of the mind, produces a science which is\nlegitimized by its divine origins and is therefore not susceptible to\nthe assault of doubts and errors. This was only an initial (and\nsomewhat vague) approach to a topic which would play an increasingly\ncrucial role in Agrippa’s thought. At this time, the primacy of\nfaith, as expressed by Reuchlin, functioned chiefly as the basis for a\npowerful and reliable operative practice. As far as kabbalistic magic\nwas concerned, Agrippa seemingly played down Reuchlin’s raptures\nabout the Hebrew language, assimilating the sacred Hebrew names,\ninstituted by God as the vehicles of his power, to the so-called\n“strange” or “foreign words” (barbara\nverba) of ancient theology and Neoplatonic theurgy.", "\nThe early version of De occulta philosophia was, in many\nrespects, an original attempt. Nevertheless, it did not perfectly\nsucceed in organizing Agrippa’s different and varying sources\ninto a coherent structure—especially as regards Book III, which\nplayed a pivotal role in connecting magic to the religious foundation\nof learning. Not without reason, the dedicatee Trithemius noticed\nthese limitations, urging his pupil “not to imitate bullocks,\nbut to emulate birds” (Epistolae, pp.\n503–04)—that is, to turn his mind to the metaphysical\nUnity as a prior requirement for all magic activity." ], "section_title": "2. De occulta philosophia (early draft)", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe key to understanding the internal coherence of Agrippa’s\nthought is to be found in his deepening interest in Neoplatonic and\nHermetic writings, which allowed him to define the relationship\nbetween faith and reason in a more comprehensive perspective. In the\nPlotinian (and Ficinian) theory of the tripartite division of\npsychological faculties (mens, ratio,\nidolum), mind (mens) represents the highest\nfunction, the head (caput) of the soul, the divine spark\npresent in every human being; when God creates each soul, it is into\nthis supreme portion that he infuses the innate ideas, which mind\ndirectly intuits in God. Reason (ratio) is an intermediate\nfunction between the mind, which continually communicates with God,\nand the lower powers (idolum, that is, the sensory\nfaculties), which are connected to the material world. Reason, the\nseat of the will, is free to conform to either of the contrasting\ndirections indicated to it by the other parts of the soul.", "\nThis more structured view was already capitalized in the short\ntreatise De triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum (On the\nThreefold Way of Knowing God), dedicated to William Paleologus in\n1516, but published only in 1529, in a version somewhat expanded by\nAgrippa before printing. The term ratio had many meanings for\nAgrippa. Firstly, it recounted the ‘way’ of divine\nrevelation. To manifest himself to mankind, God wrote three books, by\nwhich the three different religious cultures were able to know him.\nAncient philosophers, reading the book of nature, knew God through the\ncreated world; Hebrew theologians, reading the book of the law, knew\nGod through the angels and the prophets; Christians, reading the book\nof the Gospel, gained perfect knowledge of God through his son, made\nman. Secondly, ratio referred to the three\n“steps” (gradus) in the spiritual ascent of every\nhuman soul to God: sense perception, rational knowledge, and spiritual\nknowledge. Finally, like the scholastics, Agrippa intended\nratio as the epistemological criterion by which philosophical\nschools performed their theological investigations and reached their\nunderstanding of God’s essence.", "\nAgrippa projected the history of the individual soul and of philosophy\nback into the time preceding human history: Adam’s sin is the\narchetypal figure of the moral choices and intellectual options of his\ndescendants. Adam willingly renounced true knowledge when he, trusting\nmore in Eve than in God, presumed that he could achieve a knowledge\ncapable of making him equal to God. Similarly, each of us renews the\noriginal sin committed by Adam when our reason denies that it is\ncreated and proudly proclaims an autonomy of its own, shattering its\nharmonious relationship with God. Once the hierarchy of cognition has\nbeen destabilized, reason strives to find its contents in the senses,\nwhich are fallacious and deceptive, and builds up a science which is\nboth dubious and vain: devoid of foundation, inert, and morally\npernicious. Original sin is also repeated in the schools of\ncontemporary theologians, who try to know God by the wretched means of\ntheir rebellious reason. This is the science of those, who live\n“in the realm of the flesh” (Romans 8:9)—the science\nof the “sophists of God” (theosophistae):\nfatuous, arrogant, quarrelsome and immoral, unable of transforming\ntheir notions into actions, that is, of solving the crisis of which\nthey are both authors and victims. Contemporary culture, as the fruit\nof this rebellious reason (which is, after all, Aristotelian and\nscholastic reason), is fated only to describe, to lightly touch on the\nstructure of reality, without being able to penetrate it.", "\nAgrippa was not professing any form of anti-intellectualism, but he\nwas applying the Platonic (broadly speaking) model of the tripartite\nsoul to the Christian way of knowledge. In accordance with this\npattern, if reason respects its subordination to the mind, that is, to\nthe message, which God has implanted directly in the soul, it fulfils\nthe role which has been assigned to it in the project of creation,\nwhich is to know God by means of the book of nature. On the other\nhand, since the book of nature is written by the hand of God, the\nfundamental goodness of the world is implied; and it is also implied\nthat human beings have the ability to read these pages and are,\nindeed, obliged to do so. Reason is therefore perfectly literate and\nlegitimate when it comes to deciphering this bundle of communicative\nsigns. Nonetheless, the book of nature is a means through which God\nhelps us to return to our origin. Therefore, the reading should be\ndone with our eyes fixed more on the author of the book than on its\ncontents: the knowledge of physical reality is merely a way of\nretracing through sensible objects the cosmic process of love, which\nis centered on the eternal Good, “beginning, middle and\nend” of everything which exists. Humanity’s greatness\nresides purely and simply in its capacity to grasp God by\ncontemplating his works, the created symbols which bear witness to\ntheir creator. Moreover, when reason “silences” the\nsensory part of the soul and turns itself inwards to its highest\nfunction, it becomes conscious of the constant illumination of the\nmind by God. At that moment, reason grasps essences by an intuitive\nact which is superior to the purely rational one, insofar as it is a\n“contact of the essence with God”. This is not a mystical\nexperience. It is an intellectual experience, founded on some\nintuitive philosophical certainties, which revelation proves true.\nFaith (fides) does not provide new contents, but unveils the\ndeep sense of the existing contents of the reason, which is operating\nin harmony with the mind. A truly Christian philosopher, however,\ncannot be satisfied with having achieved individual knowledge. The\ncommandment to love our neighbor requires us to become “leaders\nof the blind” (Matthew 15:14), “a corrector of the\nfoolish” and “a teacher of the immature” (Romans\n2:20). Contemporary “bad shepherds” (pupils of “the\nschool of Satan”, as the only preserved manuscript of De\ntriplici ratione called them) neglect their spiritual\nresponsibilities. Therefore, the “new” Christian\nphilosopher has to turn into theologian, teaching the path to general\nredemption to his brothers in Christ. In addition, he has to take care\nof the social benefits deriving from his knowledge. Agrippa slightly,\nbut significantly, modified the most celebrated sentence of the\nHermetic Asclepius: “A human, Asclepius, is a great\nmiracle!”) by stating: “A Christian human is a great\nmiracle!” (Magnum miraculum est homo Christianus!, p.\n146).", "\nThe allegorical interpretation of the original sin which Agrippa\nborrowed from Paulus Ricius’ Isagoge\n(Introduction) was repeated two years later in his De\noriginali peccato (On Original Sin), written in 1518,\nbut published in 1529. Adam is faith, the foundation of reason. The\nTree of Life, that is, the privilege of knowing and contemplating God,\nwas reserved to him. Eve is reason, which was allowed to have a\nrelationship with the snake, that is, with material things and the\nsenses. Unlike Adam, she was not forbidden to eat from the Tree of\nKnowledge, that is, to know the physical world. Our ancestors were\nequally responsible for original sin, but in different ways:\nEve/reason, because she placed trust and hope in the senses and\nweakened faith’s firmness with her arguments; Adam/faith,\nbecause he, wishing to indulge his woman, turned away from God to the\nsensory world, relying entirely on the conclusions which reason drew\nfrom senses. Agrippa did not generally censure the potential of\nreason, but emphasized the hierarchical link between faith and reason.\nWe are not allowed to debate de divinis (“about divine\nmatters”), in which we must only have faith and hope. Instead,\nwe can speculate about created beings, but not have faith and hope in\nthem.", "\nThe allegory was also invoked in his famous eulogy of women, De\nnobilitate et praecellentia foeminei sexus (On the Nobility\nand Superiority of the Feminine Sex), by which Agrippa hoped to\ningratiate himself with Margaret of Austria. Among all the topics\nwhich he meticulously collected from the rich repository of this\nliterary genre, he also proposed a more philosophical argument in\nfavor of women, analyzing Eve’s role in original sin. It was\nAdam, who introduced spiritual death into the world, since Eve was not\nprohibited from eating the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge: thus, she\nwas not guilty of disobeying God. Agrippa did not claim that Eve was\ncompletely without sin. More modestly, he maintained that her sin did\nnot entail transgressing God’s commandment; she sinned\nnevertheless because she allowed the snake to tempt her and became the\noccasion of Adam’s sin. She was deceived and went\nastray—not “involuntarily” (Van der Poel 1997: 210),\nbut “ignorantly”. What should we understand by\n“ignorantly”? Agrippa could not seriously regard\nEve’s ignorance as a defect in her spiritual progress (as\nAugustine did in his The Literal Meaning of Genesis) or as a\nweakness of her spiritual faculties (as Isotta Nogarola did in her\nDialogue on Adam and Eve). In the opening of the treatise,\nAgrippa, recalling humankind’s creation (Genesis 1:26–7),\nunderlined that both Adam and Eve had been created in God’s\nimage and likeness: as rational souls, both shared the same\npsychological faculties, the same teleology, and the same moral\nfreedom. The seeming inconsistency can be resolved by interpreting the\nbiblical progenitors as “figures” of Neoplatonic\npsychology. Reason’s ignorantia Dei (“ignorance\nof God”) is not a passive “not-knowing” (which is,\nin any case, unthinkable, because God is not concealed in unfathomable\ntranscendence, but “shines everywhere” in nature, and,\nabove all, inside humans). On the contrary, reason’s\nignorantia Dei is an active “neglecting”, a will\nto turn away from God and a pride in being an end in itself." ], "section_title": "3. De triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIt is not possible to establish the extent to which the declamatio\ninvectiva which Agrippa announced to his friend Jean Chapelain in\nSeptember 1526 was really finished at that time. We do know, however,\nthat when Johannes Grapheus published it in 1530, some parts at least\nhad been expanded and reworked, according to Agrippa’s custom\n(Nauert 1965: 108, n. 11; Zambelli 1992: 81, n. 40). The work was\nreprinted many times and was also translated into German (1534),\nItalian (1543), English (1569), French (1582), and Dutch (1651).", "\nRichard Popkin underlined that Agrippa’s declamation does not\ncontain the “serious epistemological analysis” one would\nexpect from a skeptical debate and suggested that it should be\nconsidered as an expression of anti-intellectualism and biblical\nfundamentalism (Popkin 2003: 29). This reading, however, leaves the\nkey question unresolved: such an anti-intellectualism or biblical\nfundamentalism is difficult to reconcile with Agrippa’s\nlong-standing interest in precisely those sciences which by then\nshould have been swept away by the appeal to verbum Dei\n(“word of God”). It is undeniably true that in De\nvanitate the moral angle prevails over the epistemological\ncritique. This is because Agrippa also looked at trades, professions,\npastimes, and social types, none of which were susceptible to\nepistemological analysis. Moreover, when discussing a science, he was\nprimarily interested in focusing on how it was used and on its\nconcrete effects on society, rather than in investigating its methods\nand subjects. Some scholars have identified De vanitate as\nthe result of a profound personal crisis (psychological, religious, or\ncultural), which led Agrippa to a radical criticism of the system of\noccult doctrines and of his own intellectual choices. No doubt, the\ncircumstances of his life between 1526 and 1530 influenced the tone of\nthe work which he was preparing, accentuating its harshness and\ninspiring some of its more polemical and audacious pages. Nonetheless,\nit is unlikely that, all of the sudden, Agrippa abandoned his\nphilosophical convictions, solely because of indignation at the\ntreatment he suffered at the court of Louise of Savoy (Weeks 1993:\n120–24). Likewise, the hypothesis of an intellectual upheaval\n(Keefer 1988: 614–53; Zambelli 2000: 41) remains merely\nconjectural. Agrippa’s supposed disbelief in science (and, above\nall, in astrology and magic) contrasts with his continuing work on\nDe occulta philosophia and with his project for a reform of\nthe magical tradition, based on a new vision of science. It is\nimportant to recognize that there were serious motivations behind his\nfierce attack on the foundations of knowledge. Bowen (1972:\n249–56) and Korkowski (1976: 594–607), reducing De\nvanitate to a simple exercise of rhetoric in the fashionable\nliterary genre of the paradox, correctly outlined the work’s\nformal characteristics; however, they did not sufficiently take into\naccount its philosophical intentions and turned its subversive\nimplications into something quite inoffensive. De vanitate\nproposed a reform project, one which was broader, more complex, and\nmore radical than that of its model, Erasmus’ Praise of\nFolly (Laus stultitiae).", "\nAgrippa’s aim was to pass judgment on the condition, methods,\nand practitioners of the philosophical and theological schools which\ndominated his time. His verdict is undoubtedly very severe. He\nbelieved that contemporary culture, lost in useless sophisms, was no\nlonger able to fulfill its task of educating Christian people and\npromoting their spiritual well-being. The social fabric had become\ntorn by corruption, by political and religious struggles, and by\nheresies and superstitions. He did not, however, intend De\nvanitate to be merely destructive. His aim was also to propose a\ncultural alternative, delineating a different philosophical approach,\ncapable of forming a new intellectual élite, who would be\nseriously interested in the moral and religious progress of human\ncommunity.", "\nCertainly, the most striking aspect of the declamatio is its\ncritical stance. The all-encompassing polemical parade emphasizes that\nhuman “inventions” (inventiones)—grammar as\nwell as dance, theology as well as hunting, ethics as well as dice\ngames—are nothing more than opinions, devoid of coherence and\nstability, and irreparably harmful to support the spiritual health of\nbelievers. The discord which divides practitioners of each branch of\nscience attests to the intrinsic weakness of the findings of natural\nreason, which proceeds by conjectures, subject to refutation.\nEverything reason devises and carries out, relying on its own strength\nalone, is fallacious, useless, and damaging: “the structure of\nthe sciences is so risky and unstable that it is much safer not to\nknow anything than to have knowledge” (1, p. 5). The happiest\nlife is the life of the ignorant.", "\nThe usual compilation of discordant opinions of philosophers was\npartly shaped by texts of the ancient skeptics; but for the most part\nAgrippa made use of more recent sources: Ficino, Reuchlin, and\nFrancesco Giorgio Veneto. There are no quotations from Gianfrancesco\nPico’s Examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium, the first\ndetailed reading of the work of Sextus Empiricus (Schmitt 1967:\n237–42). This significant omission suggests that Agrippa did not\nagree with the skeptical fideism expressed by Gianfrancesco. De\nvanitate did not, in fact, question the human ability to know\ncauses. Rather, it questioned the capacity of Aristotelian\nepistemology to account for the nature of things. In chapter 7,\nAgrippa states that knowledge based on sense perception is not able to\nguarantee a sure and truthful experience, since the senses are\nfallible; nor does it succeed in revealing the causes and properties\nof phenomena or in knowing what is only intelligible, since this\nescapes the grasp of the senses. Not all human knowledge was open to\nquestion, however. Instead, Agrippa, by proving that a sense-based\ntheory of knowledge cannot produce science, intended to introduce\nanother epistemology, one which he regarded as the foundation for true\nknowledge. So, in chapter 52, “On the Soul”, he did not\nuphold even the façade of skepticism. “Demonic\nAristotle” (daemoniacus Aristoteles) made the soul\ndependent on the nature of the body, defining it as “the first\nperfection of a natural body possessing organs, which potentially has\nlife” (Aristotle, De anima II.1). “Divine\nPlato” (divinus ille Plato) aligned himself with those\nphilosophers (Zoroaster, Hermes, and Orpheus) who had defined the soul\nas a divine substance: the “product of an incorporeal\nmaker” and dependent “solely on the power of its efficient\ncause, not on the bowels of matter” (52, pp. 109–10). Agrippa\nnoted the disagreement between Aristotle and Plato on this subject,\nnot in order to lead his readers to a skeptical “suspension of\njudgment” (epoché). Rather, he intentionally\ncontrasted two different models of rationality, explicitly weighing up\ntheir value. At least on this matter, the “ancient\ntheology” (prisca theologia) and the Platonic school\nwere found to be consistent with the criterion of truth, the Holy\nScriptures.", "\nThe real intentions of De vanitate have to be extracted from\ndeep inside the text, hidden beneath more polemical and provocative\nstatements. The sciences of their own accord “do not procure for\nus any divine felicity which transcends the capacity of man, except\nperhaps that felicity which the serpent promised to our\nancestors”; but in itself “every science is both bad and\ngood” and deserves whatever praise “it can derive from the\nprobity of its possessor” (1, p. 21). Agrippa appropriated here\nthe Aristotelian principle of the ethical neutrality of science: it is\nthe spiritual attitude of the knower, his “integrity”\n(probitas), which constitutes the moral criterion of the\ndiscipline and ensures good or bad usage. From the cultural point of\nview, the destructive action of skepticism puts an end to the\ndiscussion between the schools by eliminating one of the two\ncontenders, that is, all philosophers whose doctrines are built on the\nfoundation of sensory experience. From the pedagogical point of view,\nhowever, skepticism is no more than a preliminary training. Systematic\ndebate about sensory representations and the suspension of judgment\nconcerning the appearances of the material world free the soul from\nfalse opinions, demonstrating the inadequacy of empiricism and\ndirecting the search for truth towards the intelligible.", "\nPurification leads to a new spiritual attitude, which makes the\nphilosopher capable of undertaking the route to true knowledge. Truth,\nin fact, is grasped only by turning inwards, to the mind, where God\nimplanted the innate ideas when he created the soul. Agrippa’s\nacceptance of the Neoplatonic theory of knowledge is positively\nexpressed in the final peroration of De vanitate, when he\ninvites his readers to abandon the schools of the sophists in order to\nregain awareness of the cognitive inheritance to which every soul has\nan original entitlement. Agrippa refers to the Academics alongside\nHoly Scripture to support the idea that human beings have an innate\nrealm of knowledge, which needs to be recovered by means of a suitable\npaideia, or program of education. The return to original\nperfection is an ‘illumination’—not a mystical\nillumination, but an intellectual one: the reminiscence and\nre-appropriation of self-knowledge. Ultimately, illumination is the\nknowledge of the self as “mind” (mens) or\n“intellect” (intellectus).", "\nIn this sense, Agrippa defines faith as the “foundation of\nreason” (fundamentum rationis), that is, the criterion,\nguarantee, and firm basis of human knowledge. Revelation is without\ndoubt the absolute and complete expression of truth; but it originates\nfrom the same source as the contents of the mind, on which the\nactivity of reason is dependent. Since God is the sole source of\ntruth, the tradition of faith is homogeneous with philosophical\ncontemplation, which finds its justification in revelation. Through\ndivine will, rationality and its higher level of “spiritual\nintelligence” are able to establish a relationship of\ncontinuity. For this reason, rational science and all its practical\napplications gain authenticity and legitimacy if they develop within a\ntheological framework. This does not mean that reason has to draw its\ncontents directly from Scripture. Rather, it means that the contents\nof science, procured by the exercise of reason, are “true”\nwhen they do not contradict divine design, do not hinder the spiritual\nprogress of the Christian, and contribute to the good of humanity and\nthe world. Certainly, the architect will not seek technical\ninstructions for how to put up his building in the Bible. Instead, he\nand those who commission him need to seek in it an indication of the\n“manner” (modus) and “end”\n(finis) of this discipline. Architecture would be an art and\nscience “extraordinarily necessary and beautiful” in\nitself and capable of making a large contribution to the well-being of\nthe civil community, if humankind had not rendered it vain and noxious\nby their excessive use of it “for the simple exhibition of the\nriches” and by heedlessly destroying the natural\nsurroundings.", "\nIn De vanitate, Agrippa does not put faith in opposition to\nscience or the Holy Scriptures in opposition to human books. He\ninstead puts Aristotelian philosophy, worldly science and the source\nof unbelief in opposition to “Platonic” philosophy, the\nmodel of a Christian “science in the word of God”\n(scientia in verbo Dei). With this expression, Agrippa refers\nto a religiously orientated science: a science which can move freely\nin the sphere of the “visible manifestations of God”\n(visibilia Dei) in order to know his “invisible\nessentials” (invisibilia) and to trace the beginning\nand origin of everything. He does this in the awareness of the harmony\nbetween faith and reason, which scholastic Aristotelian philosophy had\ndisowned, infecting the world with a plague of “petty\nsyllogisms” (ratiunculae), sophisms, and impertinent\nquestions about God. There is, in sum, a ‘divine’ path to\nknowledge, which Plato and the ancient theologians founded on God and\nwhich deals with God. And there is a “demonic” path, which\nAristotle constituted merely on human abilities and which deals with\nlower things: it is demonic, because it renews and perpetuates the sin\nof Adam, inspired by Satan and his proud ambition to make himself\nequal to the creator in the knowledge of good and evil.", "\nAgrippa’s distinction between different forms of\nrationality—valued differently according to their basis and\ntheir final point of view—allows us to regard his declamatio\ninvectiva as not belonging to a true and proper profession of\nskepticism, of general anti-intellectualism, or of rigorous fideism.\nInstead, it can be realigned with the anti-Aristotelian and\nanti-scholastic critiques of Ficino, Reuchlin, and Giorgio. Agrippa\ndid not propose abandonment in God in the undifferentiated\nindifference of “neither this one nor that one” advocated\nby Sextus Empiricus. In his view, skepticism constituted an exercise\nin education, necessary for pointing the way towards the apprehension\nof truth. In the final digression, “In Praise of the Ass”,\nAgrippa seemingly invites his readers to put down the baggage of the\nhuman sciences and return to being “naked and simple\nasses”, and thus newly capable of carrying on their own backs\nthe mysteries of divine wisdom, like the ass which carried Jesus into\nJerusalem. This ironic exhortation is polemical: those who must be\nsubjected to metamorphosis into an ass are the “noble doctors in\nsciences”, professing a purely human (or rather, demonic)\nscience. For scholastic theologians, the motto “To know nothing\nis the happiest life” (nihil scire foelicissima vita)\nis valid, since “there is nothing more fatal than a science\nstuffed with impiety” (1, p. 4). Philosophy should be a\nreligious progress—or, rather, a regressus, a return to\nthe source of being." ], "section_title": "4. De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn De vanitate, Agrippa did not make any explicit recantation\nof his passion for occult sciences (Keefer 1988: 618); he simply\nadmitted that there might have been something wrong in his juvenile\nwork on magic, because of his adolescent curiosity. In fact, the\nrenewal of magic continued to be a central feature of his intellectual\njourney. Between 1530 and 1533, right in the middle of his violent\nbattle against theologians and conservatives, he was preparing De\nocculta philosophia for publication, entrusting his last hope of\na secure financial support to the same work to which he had committed\nhis desire for fame and fortune twenty years earlier. Although in the\nmeantime his religious concerns had deepened, he did not perceive any\nconflict between his involvement in theological debates and his\npersistent interest in the task of rebuilding magic. In his mind, they\nwere two coherent aspects of a single project, as he had already\npointed out in De triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum. There\nAgrippa had made clear that reforming culture on the basis of the\nsolid certainty of God’s illumination also implied regaining\nhumankind’s original perfection and thaumaturgic ability, which\nAdam owned by right before he sinned.", "\nComparison of the 1510 dedication copy, sent by Agrippa to Trithemius\n(MS Würzburg, M.ch.q.50), with the printed final edition (Cologne\n1533), reveals the careful and thorough revision and enlargement to\nwhich the first draft was subjected. The book doubled in length, and\nfresh ideas and references were included. In updating the text,\nAgrippa mostly drew on works consistent with the sources he had\nalready used in drafting the initial version. Between 1510 and 1533,\nhe had studied a number of texts which he had previously been unaware\nof or neglected (Ficino’s commentaries on Plato and on Plotinus;\nGiovanni Pico’s Conclusiones, Heptaplus, and\nDisputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem; Lodovico\nLazzarelli’s Crater Hermetis; and Gianfrancesco\nPico’s De rerum praenotione) or which had been\npublished in the meantime (some of Erasmus’ writings; Paulus\nRicius’ commentaries on Hebrew writings; Reuchlin’s De\narte cabalistica; and Francesco Giorgio’s De harmonia\nmundi). Agrippa’s vast exploration of books allowed him to\nre-orient his youthful project, providing a definitive justification\nof his aim to restore in full the religious, cognitive, and practical\nscope of ancient magic. This “reformed magic” (magia\nreformata) would not only guarantee to the magus mastery over\nnature and the ability to attract astral and angelic virtues, but\nwould also assure his ascent to the First Principle.", "\nThe revised version of De occulta philosophia offers\nextensive proof of this significant qualitative shift. The original\ntripartite structure was given a new metaphysical structure, which\npowerfully underlined the idea of the cosmos as an epiphany of the\ndivine. Thanks to the influence of Giorgio’s De harmonia\nmundi, Agrippa was able to adopt a radically new approach to\nnatural magic. Now, Book I explicitly contemplates the material world\nas the receptacle of divine and presents the occult virtues as an\nexample of the living links connecting the terrestrial forms to the\nFirst Cause through the chain of the higher intermediaries (stars and\nspiritual essences). The “perfection of both science and\npractice” is guaranteed by the ability to change the impure back\nto the pure, and plurality back to simplicity. In significant\nadditions “on the properties of elements” (chapters\n3–6), William Newman (1982) recognized the description of the\nalchemical reduction of elemental earth to the purity of first matter.\nThere are three orders of elements, corresponding to the three levels\nof being: pure elements, unmixed and incorruptible; compound elements,\nmultiplex, varied and impure, but which can be reduced to “pure\nsimplicity” (pura simplicitas); lastly, decomposed\nelements, convertible into one another. Earth, which confers solidity\non other elements, mixing with them but without changing into them, is\nthe receptacle of every celestial influence, because it is\ncontinuously animated by the virtues conveyed by the\nspiritus: so, earth is “the foundation and mother of\neverything”, because it encloses the seminal virtues of all\ncreation. Therefore, having undergone the process of purification and\nsimplification, it becomes “the purest remedy for restoring and\npreserving us”. The process of universal simplification of the\nelements can be carried out by reducing earth to the original purity\nof the first matter. Newman explained the nature of this process,\nreferring to chapter 4 of Book II, on the power of the number one.\nHere, Agrippa traces the presence of unity in all levels of existence:\nGod in the archetypal world, the anima mundi in the\nintellectual one, the Sun in the heavenly world, the heart in man, and\nLucifer in hell. In the elemental world, the one is the\nphilosopher’s stone, “embodying all wonders”,\nwithout which “neither alchemy, nor natural magic may attain\ntheir perfect end”. Agrippa’s source, as Newman has\npointed out, was a letter in which Trithemius gave a cosmological\ninterpretation of the Hermetic text “Emerald Tablet”\n(Tabula Smaragdina), identifying the alchemical opus\nas the universal “path to the highest unity”\n(Epistolae, pp. 471–73).", "\nBook II introduces a massive quantity of “technical”\nreferences, in some part influenced by the corpus of magical\nmanuscripts which had belonged to Trithemius and which came into\nAgrippa’s possession in 1520. This updating, however, depended\nfor the most part on epistolary exchanges of texts and ideas with his\ncorrespondents. Despite his violent attack on the divinatory arts in\nDe vanitate, he presented here a more comprehensive treatment\nof astrology. After all, magic (although “reformed”) could\nnot dispense with astrology. Occult virtues can be explained only in\nterms of the heavenly qualities conveyed by the rays which emanate\nfrom stars. It is each individual’s horoscope which determines\nhis or her specific powers. Even the relationships of\n“attraction or repulsion” (amicitia vel lis)\nbetween sublunary bodies correspond to the relationships between\ncelestial bodies. Agrippa insistently emphasizes the link connecting\nmagic to astrology, defining the latter as “the much-needed key\nfor all secrets”. In recognizing the pivotal role played by\nastrology, Agrippa seems to contradict his harsh judgment of this\nscience in De vanitate: fallacious conjecture, practiced by\nsuperstitious, ignorant, and mendacious followers. The contradiction\nis only apparent, however. Like any other human science, astrology is\nboth bad and good. It is bad in the hands of those who pass off a\nconjecture as an infallible fact, thus denying man’s freedom and\nthe divine providential design. It is good in the hands of the\nChristian magus, who uses it to reveal that God shines everywhere and\nto benefit his own kind. In the context of Agrippa’s purpose in\nDe occulta philosophia, good (that is, non-deterministic)\nastrology remains the key to rebuilding true Christian magic.", "\nBook III was most affected by Agrippa’s meticulous recasting of\nthe treatise. Through his contact with Latin kabbalistic texts (both,\ntranslations from Hebrew literature as well as works by Christian\nfollowers), Agrippa was able to insert many new chapters: on the\nSephiroth, that is, the ten attributes or emanations\nsurrounding the infinite; on the ten names of God; and on angels and\ndemons. His (second-hand) openness to the Hebrew tradition inspired a\nmore mature approach to a number of essential issues. In particular,\nthe topic that humanity is created “in the image of God”\nbecame a more developed account of the human being as a “small\nworld” (microcosmus). Juxtaposing the original nucleus,\ndrawn from his own unfinished Dialogus de homine\n(Dialogue on Humankind), with selected passages from the\ndoctrine of the Zohar, the most important kabbalistic work\n(via Giorgio’s De harmonia mundi), Agrippa was able to\nelaborate further his cherished doctrine of three parts of human soul.\nSince soul’s three parts (neshama, ruah, and\nnephesch in Hebrew) have different origins and natures, they\nalso have different destinies. After the body’s death, the\nsensitive soul (nephesch, idolum) immediately\ndissolves. Mind (neshama), as the breath of God, is immune\nfrom sin and returns immediately to its abode, reuniting with its\norigin. Reason (ruah), by contrast, must undergo judgment\nwith regard to the choices it has made in life: it will participate in\nthe beatific vision if it has followed the way of the mind; it will be\ndamned and reduced to the status of an evil demon if it has made\nitself a slave of the sensitive soul. In this way, the topic of\nhumankind as created in the image of God assumed a more defined\neschatological meaning. In Agrippa’s view, the Pauline\n“You are the temple of God” (I Corinthians 3:16) meant\nrecognizing the presence of God in each human being—the mind,\nwhich characterizes the peculiar dignity of the microcosmus\nin conformity with humankind’s privilege of being made in the\nimage of God. Interiority became the foundation of the intellectual\nand religious life. The cultural background of the magus must be\nwide-ranging, but his claim to perfection is to be founded on his\nself-consciousness.", "\nThe path to attaining wisdom requires moral and intellectual training\n(dignificatio). Firstly, “natural” perfection\n(dignitas) is needed, that is, the perfect physical and\nmental disposition granted by a favorable horoscope (the same which\nJesus Christ had). Avicenna’s doctrine of the “perfect\nhuman being” (homo perfectus), the prophet, is\nrecognizable here. According to Agrippa, however, those who were not\nborn under this favorable constellation can replace the natural\ndignitas which they lack with an “artificial”\none, using selected foodstuffs, natural remedies, and a proper\nlifestyle. The second requirement is the “merit”\n(dignitas meritoria), that is, the overcoming of corporeal\npassions and sensitive impressions, the recovery of knowledge, and the\nmastery of everything: when reason subjects itself to mind,\nman’s soul becomes a “soul standing and not falling”\n(anima stans et non cadens) and is able to perform miracles\n“by God’s virtue” (in virtute Dei). The\nthird requirement is “godliness” (ars religiosa),\nthat is, the constant and pious practicing of sacred ceremonies, which\nare metaphors and perceptible signs of the transformation worked by\nGod in us. This does not mean the requirement to carry out initiatory\nrituals in order to gain access to esoteric and supra-rational\nmysteries. Agrippa’s appeal to spiritual purification was\nessential precisely because his book made known to everyone the\n‘secrets’ of magic. Only a person who is “perfectly\npious and truly religious”, however, can legitimately perform\n‘true’ and ‘pure’ magic. This is why spiritual\nrebirth (and, hence, magic) is not available to everyone: the divine\nspark which is naturally present in each individual is completely\ninactive in the majority of humankind, whose reason is overwhelmed by\nthe impulses of their senses.", "\nAgrippa’s overall oeuvre may be regarded as an\nuninterrupted meditation on humanity: the meaning of its existence,\nits possibility of gaining not only eternal bliss, but also happiness\non earth. From this point of view, Agrippa may be considered as a\n“humanist theologian” (Van der Poel 1997). Nonetheless, he\nproposed a radical revision of the very idea of theology. It should\nnot be a “subalternating” or higher “science”,\nplaced at the end of a long and complex training, as medieval\nscholastics had done. Instead, theology must be an isagogic, or\nintroductory, knowledge, since its task was to guide Christian people\nin their moral improvement, as well as in their earthly well-being.\nAgrippa’s theology, more than a philosophical treatment of God,\nwas, above all, a serious reflection on humankind, with the goal of\nleading it to self-consciousness and, then, making it fully aware of\nits origin and its final end. Ultimately, Agrippa may be better\ndefined as a “civic theologian”. The specific intentions\nof his works, their literary genres, and the personal background to\ntheir composition are all very different, which to some extent may\nexplain certain inconsistencies between them. Nevertheless, despite\nevery apparent contradiction and ambiguity presented by an impetuous,\npolemical, and very often foolhardy personality such as Agrippa, he\nalways assessed human knowledge (including magic) with respect to its\nawareness of the relationship which binds man to God. The way to truth\nlies not in the rifts between different schools of thought or in\nphilosophical distinctions, but in self-knowledge and\nself-awareness." ], "section_title": "5. De occulta philosophia (final draft)", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Opera, 2 volumes, Lyon, per Beringos fratres, [n.d.].\n[The imprint of this edition is false, since the Bering firm had\nceased publishing several decades before. Zambelli (1972:\n149–50) suggested attributing it to the publisher Tommaso\nGuarino of Basel in 1580]. Repr. Hildesheim-New York: Olms, 1970.", "Apologia adversus calumnias propter declamationem De vanitate\nscientiarum et excellentia verbi Dei, sibi per aliquos Lovanienses\ntheologos intentatas. Querela super calunnia ob eandem Declamationem\nper aliquos sceleratissimos sycophantas apud Caesaream maiestatem\nnefarie ac proditorie illata, [n.p.], 1533.", "De arte chemica (On Alchemy), edited by Sylvain Matton,\nwith an Seventeenth-Century English Translation, Paris and Milan:\nS.É.H.A and Arché, 2014.", "De beatissimae Annae monogamia, ac unico puerperio\npropositiones abbreviatae et articulatae iuxta disceptationem Iacobi\nFabri Stapulensis in libro De tribus et una … Defensio\npropositionum praenarratarum contra quendam Dominicastrum earundem\nimpugnatorem … Quaedam epistolae super eadem materia atque\nsuper lite contra eiusdem ordinis haereticorum magistro habita,\n[n.p.], 1534.", "De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium atque de\nexcellentia verbi Dei declamatio invectiva, [Antwerp, 1530], in\nOpera, II, pp. 1–314.", "De nobilitate et praecellentia foeminei sexus, edited by\nRoland Antonioli and Charles Béné, translated by Odette\nSauvage, Geneva: Droz, 1990.", "De occulta philosophia libri tres, [n.p. (Cologne)],\n1533. Photomechanic reprint, edited by Karl Anton Nowotny, Graz:\nAkademish Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1967.", "De occulta philosophia libri tres, edited by Vittoria\nPerrone Compagni, Leiden and Cologne: Brill, 1992.", "De originali peccato declamatio, in Opera, II, pp.\n550–65.", "De sacramento matrimonii, in Opera, II, pp.\n536–49.", "De triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum, edited and\ntranslated by Vittoria Perrone Compagni, Ermetismo e cristianesimo\nin Agrippa. Il “De triplici ratione cognoscendi\nDeum”, Florence: Polistampa, 2005.", "Dehortatio gentilis theologiae, in Opera, II, pp.\n482–91.", "Dialogus de homine, edited by Paola Zambelli,\nRinascimento, II s., 5 (1965), App. I, pp.\n295–304.", "Dialogus de vanitate scientiarum et ruina christianae\nrelligionis, edited by Paola Zambelli, Rinascimento, II s., 5\n(1965), pp. 249–94.", "Expostulatio super Expositione sua in librum De verbo mirifico\ncum Ioanne Catilineti, in Opera, II, pp. 492–98.", "In artem brevem Raymundi Lullii commentaria, in Opera,\nII, pp. 315–451.", "Aristotle, De anima, in Barnes, Jonathan (ed.), The\nComplete Works of Aristotle, I, Princeton: Princenton University\nPress, 1984.", "Augustine, Aurelius, The Literal Meaning of Genesis,\ntranslated by John H. Taylor, New York: Newman, 1982.", "Erasmus, Praise of Folly, in Grant, John N (ed.),\nCollected Works, 27, Toronto: University of Toronto Press,\n1986.", "Tabula smaragdina, edited in Julius Ruska, Tabula\nsmaragdina. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Hermetischen\nLiteratur, Heidelberg: Winter, 1926.", "Ficino, Marsilio, Three Books of Life, edited and and\ntranslated by Carol V. Kaske and John R. Clark, Binghamton: Medieval\nand Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1989.", "Hermes Trismegistus, Hermetica. The Greek Corpus Hermeticum\nand the Latin Asclepius, translated by Brian P. 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Farmer, Syncretism in the West:\nPico’s 900 Theses (1486), Tempe: Medieval and Renaissance\nTexts and Studies, 1998.", "–––, Disputationes adversus astrologiam\ndivinatricem, edited and translated by Eugenio Garin, Torino:\nAragno, 2004.", "–––, Heptaplus, edited and translated\nby Eugenio Garin, Firenze: Vallecchi: 1942, pp. 167–383.", "–––, Oration on the Dignity of Man,\ntranslated by Francesco Borghesi, Michael Papio and Massimo Riva,\nCambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012.", "Plato, Symposium, in John M. 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Schmitt et al. (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, 264–300.", "Dagron, Tristan, 2005, “Secrets de la nature et\nmystères divins: Corneille Agrippa lecteur de Pic”, in\nD’un principe philosophique à un genre\nlittéraire: les “Secrets”, Dominique de\nCourcelles (ed.), Paris: Champion, 105–32.", "Geri, Lorenzo, 2020, “La lezione di Luciano contro gli\nScolastici. Serio ludere e polemica religiosa negli umanisti\ngermanici (1511–1520)”, in Serio ludere. Sagesse et\ndérision à l’âge de l’Humanisme,\nHélène Casanova-Robin et al. (eds.), Paris: Garnier,\n299–320.", "Gurashi, Dario, 2020, “Religione e ideologia nel\ngiovane Agrippa: appunti sulla vocazione intellettuale”,\nMediterranea: International Journal on the Transfer of\nKnowledge, 5: 153–192.", "Hanegraaff, Wouter J., 2009, “Better than Magic. Cornelius\nAgrippa and Lazzarellian Hermetism”, Magic, Ritual, and\nWitchcraft, 4: 1–25.", "–––, 2015, “Heinrich Cornelius\nAgrippa”, in The Occult World, Christopher Partridge\n(ed.), London, New York: Routledge, 92–99.", "Hieatt, A. Kent, 1980, “Eve as Reason in a Tradition of\nAllegorical Interpretation of the Fall”, Journal of the\nWarburg and Courtauld Institutes, 43: 21–26.\ndoi:10.2307/751197", "Hutton, Sarah, 2003, “Platonism, Stoicism, Scepticism and\nClassical Imitation”, A Companion to English Renaissance\nLiterature and Culture, Michael Hattaway (ed.), Oxford:\nBlackwell, 44–57.", "Jordan, Constance, 1990, Renaissance Feminism. Literary Text\nand Political Models, Ithaca and London: Cornell University\nPress.", "Keefer, Michael H., 1988, “Agrippa’s Dilemma: Hermetic\nRebirth and the Ambivalences of De Vanitate and De\nOcculta Philosophia”, Renaissance Quarterly,\n41(4): 614–53. doi:10.2307/2861884", "Korkowski, Eugene N., 1976, “Agrippa as Ironist”,\nNeophilologus, 60(4): 594–607.\ndoi:10.1007/BF01512650", "Lechner, Gerhard, 2020, “Die Transmigration bei Agrippa von\nNettesheim”, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und\nTheologie, 67: 88–112.", "Lehrich, Christopher I., 2003, The Language of Demons and\nAngels. Cornelius Agrippa’s Occult Philosophy, Leiden and\nBoston: Brill.", "Mañas Núñez, Manuel, 2003, “El\nDe vanitate scientiarum de Cornelio Agrippa: Vituperio de las\nciencias y Elogio del asno”, Revista de Estudios\nLatinos, 3: 183–203.", "Mantovani, Dario (ed.), 2013, Almum Studium Papiense, Storia\ndell’Università di Pavia, 2 vols, Milan: Cisalpino\nMonduzzo.", "Müller-Jahncke, Wolf-Dieter, 1975, “The Attitude of\nAgrippe von Nettesheim (1486–1535) towards Alchemy”,\nAmbix, 22: 134–50. doi:10.1179/amb.1975.22.2.134", "Naudé, Gabriel, 1644, Advis pour dresser une\nbiliothèque, Paris: Rolet le duc.", "Nauert, Charles G., Jr, 1965, Agrippa and the Crisis of\nRenaissance Thought, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois\nPress.", "–––, 2006, Humanism and Culture of\nRenaissance Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Newman, Barbara, 1993, “Renaissance Feminism and Esoteric\nTheology: The Case of Cornelius Agrippa”, Viator, 24:\n337–56. doi:10.1484/J.VIATOR.2.301253", "Newman, William, 1982, “Thomas Vaughan as an Interpreter of\nAgrippa von Nettesheim”, Ambix, 29(3): 125–40.\ndoi:10.1179/amb.1982.29.3.125", "Perrone Compagni, Vittoria, 1992, “Introduction”.\n(translated by Angus Clark), in Cornelius Agrippa ab Nettesheim,\nDe occulta philosophia libri tres, Leiden, New\nYork and Cologne: Brill, 1–50.", "–––, 2000, “Dispersa intentio:\nAlchemy, Magic and Scepticism in Agrippa”, Early Science and\nMedicine, 5(2): 160–77. doi:10.1163/157338200X00164", "–––, 2001, “Astrologia e filosofia occulta\nin Agrippa”, Rinascimento, II s., 41:\n93–111.", "–––, 2005, Ermetismo e Cristianesimo in\nAgrippa. Il “De triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum”,\nFlorence: Polistampa.", "–––, 2006, “L’innocenza di Eva.\nRetorica e teologia nel De nobilitate foeminei sexus di\nAgrippa”, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 12:\n59–80.", "–––, 2007, “Il De occulta\nphilosophia di Cornelio Agrippa. Parole chiave: uomo-microcosmo,\nprisca theologia, cabala, magia”, Bruniana &\nCampanelliana, 13(2): 429–48.", "–––, 2009, “Tutius ignorare quam\nscire: Agrippa and Scepticism”. (translated by Crofton\nBlack), in Renaissance Scepticisms, Gianni Paganini and\nJosé R. Maia Neto (eds), Dordrecht: Springer,\n91–110.", "Popkin, Richard H., 2003, The History of Scepticism from\nSavonarola to Bayle, Oxford and New York: Oxford University\nPress.", "Prost, August, 1882, Les sciences et les arts occultes au xvi\ne siècle: Corneille Agrippa. Sa vie et ses œuvres, 2\nvols, Paris: Champion.", "Putnik, Noel, 2013, “To Be Born (Again) from God: Scriptural\nObscurity as a Theological Way Out for Cornelius Agrippa”, in\n“Obscurity in Medieval Texts”, Lucie Dolezalová et\nal. (eds.), Medium Aevum quotidianum, 30: 145–156.", "–––, 2016, “Agrippa's Cosmic Ladder:\nBuilding a World with Words in the De occulta\nPhilosophia”, in Lux in Tenebris. The Visual and the\nSymbolic in the Western Esotericism, Peter J. Forshaw (ed.),\nLeiden: Brill, 81–102.", "–––, 2017, Obtinere Mentem Divinam: The\nSpiritual Anthropology of Cornelius Agrippa, Ph.D. Dissertation,\nMedieval Studies Department, Central European University,\nBudapest.", "Secret, François, 1990, “L’originalité\ndu De Occulta Philosophia”, Charis. Archives de\nl’Unicorne, 2: 57–87.", "–––, 1992, Hermétisme et\nKabbale, Naples: Bibliopolis.", "Schmidt-Biggerman, Wilhelm, 2012, Geschchte der Kristlicher\nKabbala: 15. und 16. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:\nFromman-Holzoobog.", "Schmitt, Charles B., 1967, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola\n(1469–1533) and His Critique of Aristotle, The Hague:\nNijhoff.", "Van der Poel, Marc, 1997, Cornelius Agrippa, the Humanist\nTheologian and His Declamations, Leiden, New York and Cologne:\nBrill.", "Weeks, Andrew, 1993, German Mysticism from Hildegard of Bingen\nto Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Literary and Intellectual History,\nAlbany, NY: SUNY Press.", "Zambelli, Paola, 1965, “Cornelio Agrippa. Scritti inediti e\ndispersi”, Rinascimento, II s., 5: 195–323.", "–––, 1972, “Cornelio Agrippa, Sisto da\nSiena e gli inquisitori”, Memorie Doemicane, n.s., 3:\n147–64.", "–––, 1976, “Magic and Radical Reformation\nin Agrippa of Nettesheim”, Journal of the Warburg and\nCourtauld Institutes, 39: 69–103. doi:10.2307/751133", "–––, 1992, “Cornelius Agrippa, ein\nkritischer Magus”, in August Buck (ed.), Die Okkulten\nWissenschaften in der Renaissance (Wolfenbütteler\nAbhandlungen zur Renaissanceforschung, Bd 12), Wiesbaden: Otto\nHarrassowitz, 65–89.", "–––, 1997, “Mariage et lutheranisme\nd’après Henri Corneille Agrippa”, Nouvelles de\nla République des Lettres, 1: 79–102.", "–––, 2000, “Continuità nella\ndefinizione della magia naturale da Ficino a Della Porta”, in\nLa geografia dei saperi. Studi in memoria di Dino Pastine,\nDomenico Ferraro and Gianna Gigliotti (eds.), Florence: Le Lettere,\n23–41.", "–––, 2007, White Magic, Black Magic, in the\nEuropean Renaissance, Leiden and Boston: Brill.", "Zika, Charles, 2003, Exorcising Our Demons: Magic, Witchcraft,\nand Visual Culture in Early Modern Europe, Leiden and Boston:\nBrill." ]	[ { "href": "../ficino/", "text": "Ficino, Marsilio" }, { "href": "../pico-della-mirandola/", "text": "Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni" }, { "href": "../plotinus/", "text": "Plotinus" }, { "href": "../skepticism/", "text": "skepticism" } ]
weakness-will	Weakness of Will	First published Wed May 14, 2008; substantive revision Wed Sep 4, 2019	[ "\n\nThere is nothing puzzling about Julie’s choice. Perhaps Julie was \nchoosing among vacation options, and b was a week’s vacation\nin Paris, while a was a week’s vacation in Peoria. In any \nevent, Julie evidently took the overall merits of b to \noutweigh those of a, even if b was inferior from a \nfinancial standpoint.", "\n\nAgain, we find Jimmy’s decision unremarkable. Perhaps c and \nd were competing dessert options: c, let us \nsuppose, was a dish of dry Wheaties, rich in fiber and whole grain, \nwhereas d was a gossamer-light yet oh-so-rich Valrhona \nchocolate mousse. Jimmy obviously (and reasonably!) assessed \nd as the better dessert option all things considered, even \nthough he knew d was less good for his health than \nc would be. Nothing puzzling about that.", "\n\nHere, by contrast, we have a genuinely puzzling case, one we cannot \nmake sense of in the same way. Why would Joseph do f when he\nassessed e as the superior course of action all things \nconsidered? Joseph’s choice sounds so inexplicable that we might\neven query whether the case has been accurately described. If Joseph \nis really freely choosing f over e, we might think \nit questionable that he does genuinely assess e as better \nall things considered. Perhaps he actually takes f to be \nsuperior (for him, under the circumstances), although he thinks most \npeople would opt for e or would say e was a better \nchoice.", "\n\nOur divergent reactions to these three examples point to something \ndistinctive about the judgment that one course of action is better \nthan another. (Better overall, or better all things \nconsidered, that is—not simply better in some respect.) Such \njudgments appear to enjoy a special connection to the agent’s actions\nwhich other judgments do not possess. We are puzzled by Joseph’s \nchoice precisely because we expect people’s actions—at least \nwhen freely undertaken—to reflect their overall assessment of \nthe merits of the alternative courses of action before them. We \nexpect their actions, in other words, to reflect that special \njudgment. And Joseph’s—at least as reported \nabove—doesn’t. When judgment and action are said to have \ndiverged in this way, we are often sceptical: we question whether the\nagent really held the course of action not taken to be better. And \neven when we accept the description of the case, we find such action \nsomehow puzzling, defective, or dubiously intelligible, in a way that\naction contrary to one’s judgments of financial wisdom (for example) \nis not. We can conclude that the particular judgment contrary to \nwhich Joseph acts—the judgment that one course of action is \nbetter than another—has what we can vaguely term a special \ncharacter, in comparison with other judgments such as that one course\nof action is healthier than another.", "\n\nLet us give a name to the assessment of his options contrary to which\nJoseph acts. Let us call his judgment that e is a better \nthing to do all things considered Joseph’s better judgment. \n(“Better judgment” does not mean “superior \njudgment”; it simply means a judgment as to which option is \noverall better.) Joseph, then, appears to have acted, freely and \nintentionally, contrary to his better judgment. And this is precisely\nthe phenomenon the philosophical tradition calls “weakness of \n will.”[1]\n Philosophers have been perplexed by or dubious about such action for \na very long \n time.[2]\n Indeed, Plato’s Socrates famously denied its possibility in the \nProtagoras. “No one,” he declared, “who \neither knows or believes that there is another possible course of \naction, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on \nhis present course” (Protagoras 358b–c). And \nphilosophers have been wrestling with the issue ever since. It is not\nsurprising that weakness of will has such a long and distinguished \npedigree as a topic of philosophical discussion: it is both an \nintrinsically interesting phenomenon and a topic rich in implications\nfor our broader theories of action, practical reasoning, rationality,\nevaluative judgment, and the interrelations among these." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Hare on the Impossibility of Weakness of Will", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Davidson on the Possibility of Weakness of Will", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. The Debate After Davidson", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Internalist and Externalist Strands", "3.2 Weakness of Will as Potentially Rational", "3.3 Changing the Subject", "3.4 Recent Developments" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nLet us commence our examination of contemporary discussions of this \nissue in appropriately Socratic vein, with an account that gives \nexpression to and builds on many of the intuitions that lead us to be\nsceptical about reports like (3) above. For the moral philosopher \nR. M. Hare—as for Socrates—it is impossible for\na person to do one thing if he genuinely and in the fullest sense \nholds that he ought instead to do something else. (If, that \nis—to echo the earlier quote from Socrates—he \n“believes that there is another possible course of action, \nbetter than the one he is following.”) This certainly seems to \nconstitute a denial of the possibility of akratic or weak-willed \naction. In Hare’s case it is a consequence of the general account of \nthe nature of evaluative judgments which he defends (Hare 1952; \nsee also Hare 1963).", "\n\nHare is much impressed by what we vaguely referred to above as the \n“special character” of evaluative judgments: judgments, \nthat is, such as that one course of action is better than \nanother, or that one ought to do a certain thing. Such \nevaluative judgments seem to have properties that differentiate them \nfrom merely “descriptive” judgments such as that one \nthing is more expensive than another, or rounder than another \n(Hare 1952, p. 111). Evaluative judgments seem, in \nparticular, to bear a special connection to action which no \npurely descriptive judgment possesses. Hare’s analysis, then, takes \noff from something like the data we rehearsed earlier. Hare goes on \nto develop these data in the following way. He begins by identifying,\nas the fundamental distinctive feature of evaluative \njudgments—that which lends them a special character—that \nevaluative judgments are intended to guide conduct. (See, \ne.g., Hare 1952, p. 1; p. 29; p. 46; p. 125;\np. 127; p. 142, pp. 171–2; Hare 1963, \np. 67; p. 70.) The special function of evaluative judgments\nis to be action-guiding: that is, if you will, what evaluative \njudgments are for. Hare then puts a more precise gloss on \nwhat it is for a judgment to “guide conduct”: an \naction-guiding judgment is one which entails an answer to the \npractical question “What shall I do?” (Hare 1952, \np. 29; see Hare 1963, p. 54 for the terminology “practical \n question”).[3]\n What is it that an action-guiding judgment must entail? That is, what\nconstitutes an answer to the question “What shall I do?” \nHare holds that no (descriptive) statement can constitute an answer \nto such a question (Hare 1952, p. 46). Rather, such a \nquestion is answered by a first-person command or \nimperative (Hare 1952, p. 79), which could be \nverbally expressed as “Let me do a” \n(Hare 1963, p. 55).", "\n\nTo recap the argument thus far: it is the function of evaluative \njudgments like “I ought to do a” to guide \nconduct. Guiding conduct means entailing an answer to the question \n“What shall I do?” An answer to that question will take \nthe form “Let me do a,” where this is a \nfirst-person command or imperative. Therefore evaluative judgments \nentail such first-person imperatives (Hare 1952, p. 192). \nNow in general, if judgment J1 entails judgment \nJ2, then assenting to J1 must\ninvolve assenting to J2: someone who professed to\nassent to J1 but who disclaimed \nJ2 would be held not to have spoken correctly \nwhen he claimed to assent to J1 (Hare 1952, \np. 172). So assenting to an evaluative judgment like “I \nought to do a” involves assenting to the first-person \ncommand “Let me do a” (Hare 1952, \npp. 168–9). We should inquire, then, what exactly is \ninvolved in sincerely assenting to a first-person command or \nimperative of this type. Just as sincere assent to a statement \ninvolves believing that statement, sincere assent to an \nimperative addressed to ourselves involves doing the thing \nin question:", "\n It is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a\n … command addressed to ourselves, and at the same\n time not perform it, if now is the occasion for performing it\n and it is in our (physical and psychological) power to do so.\n (Hare 1952, p. 20)\n", "\n\nSo: provided it is within my power to do a now, if I do not \ndo a now it follows that I do not genuinely judge that I \nought to do a now. Thus, as Hare states at the very opening \nof his book, a person’s evaluative judgments are infallibly revealed \nby his actions and choices:", "\n If we were to ask of a person ‘What are his moral\n principles?’ the way in which we could be most sure of a true\n answer would be by studying what he did…. It would\n be when … he was faced with choices or decisions between\n alternative courses of action, between alternative answers to the\n question ‘What shall I do?’, that he would reveal in\n what principles of conduct he really believed. (Hare 1952,\n p. 1)\n", "\n\nNote that Hare is not simply saying that a person’s actions are the \nmost reliable source of evidence as to his evaluative judgments, or \nthat if a person did b the most likely hypothesis is that he\njudged b to be the best thing to do. Hare is saying, rather,\nthat it follows from a person’s having done b that \nhe judged b best from among the options open to him at the \ntime. On this view, then, akratic or weak-willed actions as we have \nunderstood them are impossible. There could not be a case in which \nsomeone genuinely and in the fullest sense held that he ought to do \na now (where a was within his power) and yet did \nb. On Hare’s view, “it becomes analytic to say that \neveryone always does what he thinks he ought to [if physically and \npsychologically able]” (Hare 1952, p. 169).", "\n\nBut does everyone always do what he thinks he ought to, when\nhe is physically and psychologically able? It may seem that this is \nsimply not always the case (even if it is usually the case).\nHave you, dear reader, never failed to get up off the couch \nand turn off the TV when you judged it was really time to start \ngrading those papers? Have you never had one or two more \ndrinks than you thought best on balance? Have you never \ndeliberately pursued a sexual liaison which you viewed as an overall \nbad idea? In short, have you never acted in a way which \ndeparted from your overall evaluation of your options? If so, let me \nbe the first to congratulate you on your fortitude. While weak-willed\naction does seem somehow puzzling, or defective in some important \nway, it does nonetheless seem to happen.", "\n\nFor Hare, however, any apparent case of akrasia must in fact\nbe one in which the agent is actually unable to do \na, or one in which the agent does not genuinely evaluate \na as better—even if he says he \n does.[4]\n As an example of the first kind of case Hare cites Medea \n(Hare 1963, pp. 78–9), who (he contends) is powerless,\nliterally helpless, in the face of the strong emotions and desires \nroiling her: she is truly unable (psychologically) to resist\nthe temptations besieging her. A typical example of the second kind \nof case, on the other hand, would be one in which the agent is \nactually using the evaluative term “good” or \n“ought” only in what Hare calls an \n“inverted-commas” sense (Hare 1952, p. 120; \npp. 124–6; pp. 164–5; pp. 167–171). \nIn such cases, when the agent says (while doing b) “I \nknow I really ought to do a,” he means only that most \npeople—or, at any rate, the people whose opinions on such \nmatters are generally regarded as authoritative—would say he \nought to do a. As Hare notes (Hare 1952, p. 124), \nto believe this is not to make an evaluative judgment oneself; \nrather, it is to allude to the value-judgments of other people. Such \nan agent does not himself assess the course of action he fails to \nfollow as better than the one he selects, even if other people \nwould.", "\n\nNo doubt there are cases of the two types Hare describes; but they do\nnot seem to exhaust the field. We can grant that there is the odd \nmurderer, overcome by irresistible homicidal urges but horrified at \nwhat she is doing. But surely not every case that we might be tempted\nto describe as one of acting contrary to one’s better judgment \ninvolves irresistible psychic forces. Consider, for example, the \nfollowing case memorably put by J. L. Austin:", "\n I am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is served divided into\n segments corresponding one to one with the persons at High Table: I\n am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing\n to temptation and even conceivably (but why necessarily?) going\n against my principles. But do I lose control of myself? Do I raven,\n do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious\n to the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often\n succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse.\n (Austin 1956/7, p. 198)\n", "\n\n(I might add that it also seems doubtful that irresistible psychic \nforces kept you on the couch watching TV while those papers were \nwaiting.) As for the “inverted-commas” case, this too \nsurely happens: people do sometimes pay lip service to conventional \nstandards which they themselves do not really accept. But again, it \nseems highly doubtful that this is true of all seeming cases of \nweak-willed action. It seems depressingly possible to select and \nimplement one course of action while genuinely believing \nthat it is an overall worse choice than some other option open to \nyou.", "\n\nHas something gone wrong? We started with the \nunexceptionable-sounding thought that moral and evaluative judgments \nare intended to guide conduct; we arrived at a blanket denial of the \npossibility of akratic action which fits ill with observed facts. But\nif we are disinclined to follow Hare this far we should ask what the \nalternative is, for it may be even worse. For Hare, the answer is \nclear: our only other option is to repudiate the idea that moral and \nother evaluative judgments have a special character or nature, namely\nthat of being action-guiding. For we should recall that Hare presents\nall his subsequent conclusions as simply following, through a series \nof steps, from that initial thought. “The reason why actions \nare in a peculiar way revelatory of moral principles is that the \nfunction of moral principles is to guide conduct,” Hare \ncontinues in the passage quoted earlier (Hare 1952, p. 1). For \nHare, then, the only way to escape his “Socratic” \nconclusion about weakness of will would be to give up the idea that \nevaluative judgments are intended to guide conduct, or to “have\n[a] bearing upon our actions” (Hare 1963, p. 169; see\nalso Hare 1952, p. 46; p. 143; p. 163; \npp. 171–2; and Hare 1963, p. 70; p. 99).", "\n\nThe choices before us, then, as presented by Hare, are Hare’s own \nview, or one which assigns no distinctive role in action or practical\nthought to evaluative judgments, treating them as just like any other\njudgment. We might call the first of these an extreme version of \n(judgment) internalism. (I use this polysemous label to \nrefer, here, to the idea that certain judgments have an internal or \nnecessary connection to motivation and to action.) By extension, we \nmight usefully follow Michael Bratman in calling the second type of \nview “extreme externalism” (Bratman 1979, \npp. 158–9).", "\n\nExtreme externalism also seems unsatisfactory, however. First, it \nseems unable to explain why there should be anything perplexing or \nproblematical about action contrary to one’s better judgment, why \nthere should be any philosophical problem about its possibility or \nits analysis. On this kind of view, it seems, Joseph’s choice ((3) \nabove) should strike us as no more puzzling than Julie’s or Jimmy’s \n((1) or (2)). As Hare puts it:", "\n On the view that we are considering, there is nothing odder about\n thinking something the best thing to do in the circumstances, but\n not doing it, than there is about thinking a stone the roundest\n stone in the vicinity and not picking it up, but picking up some\n other stone instead…. There will be nothing that requires\n explanation if I choose to do what I think to be, say, the worst\n possible thing to do and leave undone what I think the best thing to\n do. (Hare 1963, pp. 68–9)\n", "\n\nBut our reactions to (1), (2), and (3) show that we do think\nthere is something peculiar about action contrary to one’s better \njudgment which renders such action hard to understand, or perhaps \neven impossible. An extreme externalist view thus seems to \nmischaracterize the status of akratic actions.", "\n\nPerhaps even more importantly, however, extreme externalism has \ndramatic implications for our understanding of intentional action in \ngeneral—not just weak-willed action. For such a view implies \nthat", "\n deliberation about what it would be best to do has no closer\n relation to practical reasoning than, say, deliberation about what\n it would be chic to do. If one happens to care about what it would\n be chic to do, then a consideration of this matter may play an\n important role in one’s practical reasoning. If one does not care,\n it will be irrelevant. The case is the same with reasoning about\n what it would be best to do. (Bratman 1979, p. 158)\n", "\n\nTo adopt a general doctrine of this sort seems an awfully precipitous\nresponse to the possibility of akrasia. For it seems \nextremely plausible to assign to our overall evaluations of our \noptions an important role in our choices. Man is a rational animal, \nthe saying goes; that is—to offer one gloss on this \nidea—we act on reasons, and in the light of our assessments of \nthe overall balance of reasons. When we engage in deliberation or \nreasoning about what to do, we often proceed by thinking about the \nreasons which favor our various options, and then bringing these \ntogether into an overall assessment which is, precisely, intended to \nguide our choice.", "\n\nOr, as Bratman puts it, we very often reason about what it is \nbest to do as a way of settling the question of what \nto do. (He calls this “evaluative practical \nreasoning”: Bratman 1979, p. 156.) “One’s \nevaluations [thus] play a crucial role in the reasoning underlying \nfull-blown action,” Bratman holds (p. 170), and to be \nforced to deny this would be in his view “too high a price to \npay” (p. 159). As Alfred Mele similarly puts it, \n“there is a real danger that in attempting to make causal and \nconceptual space for full-fledged akratic action one might commit \noneself to the rejection of genuine ties between evaluative judgment \nand action” (1991, p. 34). But that would be to throw the \nbaby out with the bathwater. If we want to resist Hare’s conclusions,\nwe must do so in a way which steers clear of the danger to which Mele\nalerts us. We must navigate between the Scylla of extreme internalism\nand the Charybdis of extreme externalism." ], "section_title": "1. Hare on the Impossibility of Weakness of Will", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThis is just what Donald Davidson set out to do in a rich, elegant, \nand incisive paper published in 1970 which has had a towering \ninfluence on the subsequent literature. Davidson’s treatment aims to \nvindicate the possibility of weakness of will; to offer a novel \nanalysis of its nature; to clarify its status as a marginal, somehow \ndefective instance of agency which we rightly find dubiously \nintelligible; and to do all this within the contours of a general \nview of practical reasoning and intentional action which assigns a \ncentral and special role to our evaluative judgments. Let us see how \nhe proposes to do these things.", "\n\nFirst, Davidson offers the following general characterization of \nweak-willed or incontinent \n action:[5]\n ", "\n In doing b an agent acts incontinently if and only\n if: (a) the agent does b intentionally;\n (b) the agent believes there is an alternative action\n a open to him; and (c) the agent judges that, all things\n considered, it would be better to do a than to do\n b.\n", "\n\nWe initially described weak-willed action as free, intentional action\ncontrary to the agent’s better judgment; it may be useful to see how\nDavidson’s more precise definition matches up with that initial\ncharacterization. Davidson’s condition (a) requires that the action in\nquestion be intentional.[6] Condition (b) seems intended to ensure that\nthe action in question is\n\n free.[7]\n Part (c) of Davidson’s definition represents what we have called the \nagent’s “better judgment,” that is, the overall \nevaluation of his options contrary to which the incontinent agent \nacts.", "\n\nDavidson notes that “there is no proving such actions exist; \nbut it seems to me absolutely certain that they do” \n(p. 29). Why, then, is there a persistent tendency, both in \nphilosophy and in ordinary thought, to deny that such actions are \npossible? Davidson’s diagnosis is that two plausible principles which\n“derive their force from a very persuasive view of the nature \nof intentional action and practical reasoning” (p. 31) \nappear to entail that incontinence is impossible. He articulates \nthose two principles as follows (p. 23):", "\n P1. If an agent wants to do a more than he wants to\n do b and he believes himself free to do either a\n or b, then he will intentionally do a if he does\n either a or b intentionally.\n \n \n P2. If an agent judges that it would be better to do\n a than to do b, then he wants to do a\n more than he wants to do b.\n", "\n\nP2, Davidson observes, “connects judgements of what it is \nbetter to do with motivation or wanting” (p. 23); he adds \nlater that it “states a mild form of internalism” \n(p. 26). Davidson is proposing, contra the extreme \nexternalist position, that our evaluative judgments about the merits \nof the options we deem open to us are not motivationally inert. While\nhe admits that one could quibble or tinker with the formulation of P1\nand P2 (pp. 23–4; p. 27; p. 31), he is confident\nthat they or something like them give expression to a powerfully \nattractive picture of practical reasoning and intentional action, one\nwhich assigns an important motivational role to the agent’s \nevaluative \n judgments.[8]\n ", "\n\nThe difficulty is, though, that P1 and P2—however \nattractive—together imply that an agent never intentionally \ndoes b when he judges that it would be better to do \na (if he takes himself to be free to do either). And this \ncertainly looks like a denial of the possibility of incontinent \naction. No wonder, then, that so many have been tempted to say that \nakratic action is impossible! Looking carefully, however, we can see \nthat P1 and P2 do not imply the impossibility of incontinent\nactions as Davidson has defined them. For Davidson \ncharacterizes the agent who incontinently does b as holding,\nnot that it would be better to do a than to do b, \nbut that it would be better, all things considered, to do \na than to do b. Is the “all things \nconsidered” just a rhetorical flourish? Or does it mark a \ngenuine difference between these two judgments? If these are two \ndifferent judgments, and one can hold the latter without holding the \nformer, then incontinent action is possible even if P1 and P2 are\ntrue.", "\n\nIn the rest of his paper Davidson sets out to vindicate that very \npossibility. The phrase “all things considered” is not, \nas it might seem, merely a minor difference in wording that allows \nweakness of will to get off on a technicality. Rather, that phrase \nmarks an important contrast in logical form to which we would need to\nattend in any case in order properly to understand the structure of \npractical reasoning. For that phrase indicates a judgment that is \nconditional or relational rather than \nall-out or unconditional in form; and that \ndifference is \n crucial.[9]\n We can better see the relational character of an \nall-things-considered judgment if we first look at evaluative \njudgments that play an important role in an earlier phase of \npractical reasoning, the phase where we consider what reasons or \nconsiderations favor doing a and what reasons or \nconsiderations favor doing b. (For simplicity, imagine a \ncase in which an agent is choosing between only two mutually \nincompatible options, a and b.) These prima\nfacie judgments, as Davidson terms them, take the form:", "\n PF: In light of r, a is prima\n facie better than b.\n", "\n\nIn this schema r refers to a consideration, say that \na would be relaxing, while b would be stressful. A \nPF judgment of this kind thus identifies one respect in which \na is deemed superior to b, one perspective from \nwhich a comes out on top.", "\n\nWe should pause to note three things about PF judgments. (a) A PF \njudgment is not itself a conclusion in favor of the overall \nsuperiority of a. Such “all-out” evaluative \njudgments have a simpler logical form, namely:", "\n AO: a is better than b.\n", "\n\n(b) Indeed, no conclusion of the form AO follows logically from any \nPF judgment. (c) More strongly: the fact, taken by itself, that \nsomeone has made a certain PF judgment does not even supply her with \nsufficient grounds to draw the corresponding AO conclusion. For even \nif she makes one PF judgment which favors a over b,\nas in the case we imagined, she may also make other\nPF judgments which favor b over a (say, when \nr is the consideration that b would be lucrative, \nwhile a would be expensive). We do not want to say in that \ncase that she has sufficient grounds to draw each of two incompatible\nconclusions (that a is better than b, and that \nb is better than a; these are incompatible provided\nthe better-than relation is asymmetric, assumed here).", "\n\nWe have contrasted PF judgments with AO or “all-out” \nevaluative judgments. PF judgments are relational in character: they \npoint out a relation which holds between the consideration \nr and doing a. (We could call that relation the \n“favoring” relation.) That relation is not such as to \npermit us to “detach” (as Davidson puts it, p. 37) \nan unconditional evaluative conclusion in favor of doing a \nfrom PF and the supposition that r obtains. That is, we are \nnot to understand PF judgments as having the form of a material \nconditional.", "\n\nDavidson’s innovative suggestion is that judgments with this PF \nlogical form are an appropriate way to model what happens in the \nearly stages of practical reasoning, where we rehearse reasons for \nand against the options we are considering. And his stressing that no\nsuch PF judgment commits the agent to an overall evaluative \nconclusion in favor of a or b is useful in thinking\nabout a case like Julie’s ((1) above). We described Julie as knowing \n(and therefore believing) that b was more expensive than \na, but opting for b nonetheless. We can imagine, \nthen, that among the ingredients of Julie’s practical reasoning was a\nPF judgment like this:", "\n In light of the fact that b is more expensive than a,\n a is prima facie better than b.\n", "\n\nBut this PF judgment alone, as we have seen, does not commit her to \nthe overall judgment that a is better than b. For \nshe may also have made other PF judgments, such as", "\n In light of the fact that b would be much more\n gastronomically exciting than a, b is prima\n facie better than a.\n", "\n\nBut we would not then want to say Julie has sufficient grounds to \nconclude that a is better than b and to conclude \nthat b is better than a. She does not have \nsufficient grounds to embrace a contradiction; her premises all seem \nconsistent. So her various PF judgments, when considered separately, \nmust not each commit her to a corresponding overall \nconclusion in favor of a or b.", "\n\nPractical reasoning, Davidson suggests, starts from judgments like \nthese, each identifying one respect in which one of the options is \nsuperior. But in order to make progress in our practical reasoning we\nshall eventually need to consider how a compares to \nb not just with respect to one consideration, but \nin the light of several considerations taken together. That is, Julie\nwill eventually need to consider how to fill in the blanks in a PF \njudgment like this:", "\n In light of the fact that b is more expensive\n than a and the fact that b would be much\n more gastronomically exciting than a, … is prima\n facie better than ….\n", "\n\nThis PF judgment is more comprehensive than the ones we \nattributed to Julie a moment ago, as it takes into account a broader \nrange of considerations. (I take the label \n“comprehensive” from Lazar 1999.) Now in Julie’s case we \ncan surmise how she filled in those blanks: with “b is\nprima facie better than a.” Julie’s filling \nin the blanks in that way can naturally be taken as expressing the \nview that the much greater gastronomic excitement promised by \nb outweighs or overrides b’s \ninferiority to a from a strictly financial standpoint.", "\n\nWe can generalize our schema for PF judgments to account for the \npossibility of relativizing our comparative assessment of a \nand b not just to a single consideration, but to multiple \nconsiderations taken together or as a body:", "\n PFN: In light of 〈r1, …,\n rn〉, a is prima facie\n better than b.\n", "\n\nNotice that PFN judgments are still relational in form: they assert \nthat a relation (the “favoring” relation) holds between \nthe set of considerations 〈r1, \n…, rn〉 and doing a. Indeed, \nthe relational character of a PFN judgment remains even if we make it\nas comprehensive as we can: if we expand the set \n〈r1, …, rn〉\nto incorporate all the considerations the agent deems \nrelevant to her decision. Following Davidson (p. 38), let us \ngive the label e to that set. So even the following \njudgment:", "\n ATC: In light of e, a is prima\n facie better than b.\n", "\n\nis a relational or conditional judgment and not an all-out conclusion\nin favor of doing a. To make a judgment of the form ATC is \nnot to draw an overall conclusion in favor of doing \na.", "\n\nWe may be better able to see this by considering an analogy from \ntheoretical reason. Suppose Hercule Poirot has been called in to \ninvestigate a murder. We can imagine him assessing bits of evidence \nas he encounters them:", "\n In light of the fact that the murder weapon belongs to Colonel\n Mustard, Mustard looks guilty;\n In light of his having an alibi for the time of the murder, Mustard\n looks not guilty;\n", "\n\nand so on. These are theoretical analogues of the PF judgments \nrelativized to single considerations which we looked at earlier. \nHowever, Poirot will eventually need to consider how these various \nbits of evidence add up; that is, he will eventually need to fill in \nthe blanks in a more comprehensive PFN judgment like this:", "\n In light of\n 〈e1, …, en〉,\n … looks to be the guilty party,\n", "\n\nwhere \n〈e1, …, en〉\nis a set of bits of pertinent evidence. Notice, though, that no such \nPFN judgment actually constitutes settling on a particular person as \nthe culprit. For even if we put in a maximally large \n〈e1, …, en〉\nconsisting of all the evidence Poirot has seen, and imagine \nhim thinking", "\n All the evidence I have seen points toward Colonel Mustard as the\n guilty party,\n", "\n\nto make this observation is manifestly not to conclude that \nMustard is guilty.", "\n\nIn the same way, an ATC or all-things-considered judgment, although\ncomprehensive, is still relational in nature, and therefore distinct\nfrom an AO judgment in favor of a. That is, it is possible to\nmake an ATC judgment in favor of a without making the\ncorresponding AO judgment in favor of a. (This is the\nanalogue of Poirot’s position.) And this is the key to Davidson’s\nsolution to the problem of how weakness of will is possible. For ATC\nis, precisely, the agent’s better judgment as Davidson\nconstrues it in his definition of incontinent action. P1 and P2\ntogether imply that an agent who reaches an AO conclusion in favor\nof a will not intentionally do b. But the\nincontinent agent never reaches such an AO conclusion. With respect\nto a, he remains stuck at the Hercule Poirot stage: he sees\nthat the considerations he has rehearsed, taken as a body,\nfavor a, but he is unwilling or unable to make a commitment\nto a as the thing to do.[10] He makes only a relational ATC judgment\nin favor of a, contrary to which he then acts.", "\n\nWhat should we say about an agent who does this? Returning to the \nthree features of prima facie or PF judgments which we noted\nearlier, features (a) and (b) hold even of the special \nsubclass of PF judgments which are ATC judgments. Such judgments \nneither are equivalent to, nor logically imply, any AO judgment. So \nthe incontinent agent who fails to draw the AO conclusion which \ncorresponds to his ATC conclusion, and to perform the corresponding \naction, is not committing “a simple logical blunder” \n(p. 40). Notably, he does not contradict himself. He does, \nhowever, exhibit a defect in rationality, on Davidson’s account. For \nfeature (c) of PF judgments in general does not hold of the \nspecial subclass of such judgments which are ATC judgments. Drawing \nan ATC conclusion in favor of a does give \none sufficient grounds to conclude that a is better sans\nphrase and, indeed, to do \na. For Davidson proposes that the transition from an ATC \njudgment in favor of a to the corresponding AO judgment, and\nto doing a, is enjoined by a substantive principle of \nrationality which he dubs “the principle of continence.” \nThat principle tells us to “perform the action judged best on \nthe basis of all available relevant reasons” (p. 41); and \nthe incontinent agent violates this injunction. The principle of \ncontinence thus substantiates the idea that “what is wrong is \nthat the incontinent man acts, and judges, irrationally, for this is \nsurely what we must say of a man who goes against his own best \njudgement” (p. 41). He acts irrationally in virtue of \nviolating this substantive principle, obedience to which is a \nnecessary condition for rationality.", "\n\nWe must put this point about the irrationality of incontinence with \nsome care, however. For recall that an incontinent action must itself\nbe intentional, that is, done for a reason. The weak-willed agent, \nthen, has a reason for doing b, and does b for that\nreason. What he lacks—and lacks by his own lights—is a \nsufficient reason to do b, given all the \nconsiderations that he takes to favor a. As Davidson puts \nit, if we ask “what is the agent’s reason for doing \n[b] when he believes it would be better, all things \nconsidered, to do another thing, then the answer must be: for this, \nthe agent has no reason” (p. 42). And this is so even \nthough he does have a reason for doing b (p. 42, \nn. 25). Because the agent has, by his own lights, no adequate \nreason for doing b, he cannot make sense of his own action: \n“he recognizes, in his own intentional behaviour, something \nessentially surd” (p. 42). So akratic action, while \npossible on Davidson’s account, is nonetheless necessarily \nirrational; this is the sense in which it is a defective and\nnot fully intelligible instance of agency, despite being a very real \nphenomenon." ], "section_title": "2. Davidson on the Possibility of Weakness of Will", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. The Debate After Davidson", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nDavidson has certainly presented an arresting theory of practical \nreasoning. But has he shown how weakness of the will is possible? \nMost philosophers writing after him, while acknowledging his \npathbreaking work on the issue, think he has not. One principal \ndifficulty which subsequent theorists have seized on is that \nDavidson’s view can account for the possibility of action contrary to\none’s better judgment only if one’s better judgment is \nconstrued merely as a conditional or prima facie judgment. \nDavidson’s P1 and P2 in fact rule out the possibility of free \nintentional action contrary to an all-out or unconditional evaluative\n judgment.[11]\n But it seems that such cases exist. Michael Bratman, for instance, \nintroduces us to Sam, who, in a depressed state, is deep into a \nbottle of wine, despite his acknowledged need for an early wake-up \nand a clear head tomorrow (1979, p. 156). Sam’s friend, stopping \nby, says:", "\n Look here. Your reasons for abstaining seem clearly stronger than\n your reasons for drinking. So how can you have thought that it would\n be best to drink?\n", "To which Sam replies:", "\n I don’t think it would be best to drink. Do you think\n I’m stupid enough to think that, given how strong my reasons\n for abstaining are? I think it would be best to abstain. Still,\n I’m drinking. \n", "\n\nSam’s case certainly seems possible as described. Davidson’s view, \nthough, must reject it as impossible. Given his conduct, Sam can’t \nthink it best to abstain; at most, he thinks it all-things-considered\nbest to abstain, a very different kettle of fish. But this seems \nfalse of Sam: there is no evidence that he has remained stuck at the \nHercule Poirot stage with respect to the superiority of abstaining. \nHe seems to have gone all the way to a judgment sans phrase \nthat abstaining would be better; and yet he drinks.", "\n\nIronically, this complaint makes Davidson out to be a bit like Hare. \nLike Hare, Davidson subscribes to an internalist principle (P2) which\nconnects evaluative judgments with motivation and hence with action. \n(Indeed, in light of the difficulty raised here, one might wonder if \nDavidson is entitled to consider P2 a “mild” form of \ninternalism (p. 26).) As with Hare, this internalist commitment \nrules out as impossible certain kinds of action contrary to one’s \nevaluative judgment. Now Davidson, like Hare, does accept the \npossibility of certain phenomena in this neighborhood; but—as \nwith Hare—critics think the cases permitted by his analysis \nsimply do not exhaust the range of actual cases of weakness of will. \nThe phenomenon seems to run one step ahead of our attempts to make \nroom for it.", "\n\nThose writing after Davidson have tended to focus, then, on the \nquestion of the possibility and rational status of action contrary to\none’s unconditional better \n judgment.[12]\nNaturally, different theorists have plotted different courses through\nthese shoals. Some tack more to the internalist side, wishing to\npreserve a strong internal connection between evaluation and action\neven at the risk of denying or seeming to deny the possibility of\nakratic action (or at least some understandings of it). Examples of\nsome post-Davidson treatments which share a broadly internalist\nemphasis, even if they feature different flavors of internalism, are\nthose of Bratman (1979), Buss (1997), Tenenbaum (1999; see also 2007,\nch. 7), and Stroud (2003). The main danger for such approaches is that\nin seeking to preserve and defend a certain picture of the primordial\nrole of evaluative thought in rational action—a picture critics\nare likely to dismiss as too rationalistic—such theorists may be\nled to reject common phenomena which ought properly to have\nconstrained their more abstract theories. (See the opening of Wiggins\n1979 for a forceful articulation of this criticism.)", "\n\nOther theorists, by contrast, are more drawn toward the externalist \nshoreline. They emphasize the motivational importance of factors \nother than the agent’s evaluative judgment and the divergences that \ncan result between an agent’s evaluation of her options and her \nmotivation to act. They are thus disinclined to posit any strong, \nnecessary link between evaluative judgment and action. Michael \nStocker, for instance, argues that the philosophical tradition has \nbeen led astray in assuming that evaluation dictates motivation. \n“Motivation and evaluation do not stand in a simple and direct \nrelation to each other, as so often supposed,” he writes. \nRather, “their interrelations are mediated by large arrays of \ncomplex psychic structures, such as mood, energy, and interest”\n(1979, pp. 738–9). Similarly, Alfred Mele proposes as a \nfundamental and general truth—and one that underlies the \npossibility of akrasia—that “the motivational \nforce of a want may be out of line with the agent’s evaluation of the\nobject of that want” (1987, p. 37). Mele goes on to offer \nseveral different reasons why the two can come apart: for example, \nrewards perceived as proximate can exert a motivational \ninfluence disproportionate to the value the agent reflectively \nattaches to them (1987, ch. 6). Such wants may function as \nstrong causes even if the agent takes them to constitute \nweak reasons.", "\n With respect to these questions, the challenge sketched at the end of\nSection 1 above remains in full force. What is required is a view\nwhich successfully navigates between the Scylla of an extreme\ninternalism about evaluative judgment which would preclude the\npossibility of weakness of will, and the Charybdis of an extreme\nexternalism which would deny any privileged role to evaluative\njudgment in practical reasoning or rational action. For one’s\nverdict about akrasia will in general be closely connected to\none’s more general views of action, practical reasoning,\nrationality, and evaluative judgment—as was certainly true of\nDavidson.", "\n\nViews that downplay the role of evaluative judgment in action and \nhence tack more toward the externalist side of the channel may more \neasily be able to accept the possibility and indeed the actuality of \nweakness of will. But they are subject to their own challenges. For \nexample, suppose we follow Mele’s image of akrasia and posit\nthat a certain agent is caused to do x by motivation to do \nx which is dramatically out of kilter with her assessment of\nthe merits of doing x. In what sense, then, is her doing \nx free, intentional, and uncompelled? Such an agent might \nseem rather to be at the mercy of a motivational force which is, from\nher point of view, utterly alien. Thus, worries about distinguishing \nakrasia from compulsion come back in full force in \nconnection with proposals like these. (See \n fn. 7\n above for relevant references; Buss and Tenenbaum press these worries\nagainst accounts like Mele’s in particular.) Moreover, there is the \ndanger, for accounts of this more externalist stripe, of taking too \nmuch of the mystery out of weakness of will. Even if akratic action \nis possible and indeed actual, it remains a puzzling, marginal, \nsomehow defective instance of agency, one that we rightly find not \nfully intelligible. Views that do not assign a privileged place in \nrational deliberation and action to the agent’s overall assessment of\nher options risk making akratic action seem no more problematic than \nJulie’s or Jimmy’s decisions, or Hare’s agent who fails to pick up \nthe roundest stone in the vicinity." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Internalist and Externalist Strands" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe “externalist turn” toward downplaying the role of an \nagent’s better judgment and emphasizing other psychic factors instead\nis connected to a second way in which some theorists writing after \nDavidson have dissented from his analysis. Davidson, as we saw, \nviewed akratic action as possible, but irrational. The weak-willed \nagent acts contrary to what she herself takes to be the balance of \nreasons; her choice is thus unreasonable by her own lights. On this \npicture, incontinent action is a paradigm case of practical \nirrationality. Many other theorists have agreed with Davidson on this\nscore and have taken akrasia to be perhaps the clearest \nexample of practical irrationality. But some writers (notably Audi \n1990, McIntyre 1990, and Arpaly 2000) have questioned whether akratic\naction is necessarily irrational. Perhaps we ought to leave \nroom, not just for the possibility of akratic action, but \nfor the potential rationality of akratic action.", "\n\nThe irrationality which is held necessarily to attach to akratic \naction derives from the discrepancy between what the agent judges to \nbe the best (or better) thing to do, and what she does. That is, her \naction is faulted as irrational in virtue of not conforming to her \nbetter judgment. But—ask these critics—what if her better\njudgment is itself faulty? There is nothing magical about an agent’s \nbetter judgment that ensures that it is correct, or even warranted; \nlike any other judgment, it can be in error, or even unjustified. \n(Recall that by “better judgment” we meant, all along, \nonly “a judgment as to which course of action is better,”\nnot “a superior judgment.”) Where the agent’s \nbetter judgment is itself defective, in doing what she deems herself \nto have insufficient reason to do, the agent may actually be doing \nwhat she has most reason to do. “Even though the akratic agent \ndoes not believe that she is doing what she has most reason to do, it\nmay nevertheless be the case that the course of action that she is \npursuing is the one that she has … most reason to \npursue” (McIntyre 1990, p. 385). In that sense the \nakratic agent may be wiser than her own better judgment.", "\n\nHow, concretely, could an agent’s better judgment go astray in \nthis way? Perhaps her survey of what she took to be the relevant \nconsiderations did not include, or did not attach sufficient weight \nto, what were in fact significant reasons in favor of one of the \npossible courses of action. She may have overlooked these, or \n(wrongly) deemed them not to be reasons, or failed to appreciate \ntheir full force; and in that case her judgment of what it is best to\ndo will be incorrect. Consider, for example, Jonathan Bennett’s \nHuckleberry Finn (Bennett 1974, discussed in \nMcIntyre 1990), who akratically fails to turn in his slave \nfriend Jim to the authorities. Huck’s judgment that he ought to do \nso, however, was based primarily on what he took to be the force of \nMiss Watson’s property rights; it ignored his powerful feelings of \nfriendship and affection for Jim, as well as other highly relevant \nfactors. His “better judgment” was thus not in fact a \nvery comprehensive judgment; it did not take into account the full \nrange of relevant considerations.", "\n\nOr consider Emily, who has always thought it best that she pursue a \nPh.D. in chemistry (Arpaly 2000, p. 504). When she revisits\nthe issue, as she does periodically, she discounts her increasing \nfeelings of restlessness, sadness, and lack of motivation as she \nproceeds in the program, and concludes that she ought to persevere. \nBut in fact she has very good reasons to quit the program—her \ntalents are not well suited to a career in chemistry, and the people \nwho are thriving in the program are very different from her. If she \nimpulsively, akratically quits the program, purely on the basis of \nher feelings, Emily is in fact doing just what she ought to \n do.[13]\n That her action conflicts with her better judgment does not \nsignificantly impugn its rationality, given all the considerations \nthat do support her quitting the program. “A theory of\nrationality should not assume that there is something special about \nan agent’s best judgment. An agent’s best judgment is just another \nbelief” (Arpaly 2000, p. 512). Emily’s action \nconflicts, then, with one belief she has; but it coheres with many \nmore of her beliefs and desires overall. So even though she may find \nher own action inexplicable or “surd,” she is in fact \nacting rationally, although she does not know it. Contra \nDavidson, “we can … act rationally just when we cannot \nmake any sense of our actions” (Arpaly 2000, p. 513).", "\n\nIt is unclear, however, whether these arguments and examples are \nlikely to sway those who take akrasia to be a paradigm of \npractical irrationality. These dissenters stress the substantive \nmerits of the course of action the akratic agent follows. But \ntraditionalists may say that is beside the point: however well things\nturn out, the practical thinking of the akratic agent still exhibits \na procedural defect. Someone who flouts her own conclusion \nabout where the balance of reasons lies is ipso facto not \nreasoning well. Even if the action she performs is in fact supported \nby the balance of reasons, she does not think it is, and that is \nenough to show her practical reasoning to be faulty. The defenders of\nthe traditional conception of akrasia as irrational thus \nwish to grant special rational authority (in this procedural sense) \nto the agent’s better judgment, even if they admit that such a \njudgment can be substantively incorrect. By contrast, the dissenters \n“[do] not believe best judgments have any privileged \nrole” (Arpaly 2000, p. 513). We see again the \ncontrast between “internalist” and \n“externalist” tendencies in the debates over weakness of \nwill." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Weakness of Will as Potentially Rational" }, { "content": [ "\n\nA final revisionist strand now emerging in the literature takes the\nagent’s better judgment even farther out of the picture. In an\noutstandingly lucid and stimulating essay published in 1999 (see also\nhis 2009, ch. 4), Richard Holton argued that weakness of will is not\naction contrary to one’s better judgment at all. The literature has\ngone astray in understanding weakness of will in this way; weakness of\nwill is actually quite a different phenomenon, in which the agent’s\nbetter judgment plays no\n role.[14]\n For Holton, when ordinary people speak of weakness of will they have \nin mind a certain kind of failure to act on one’s \nintentions. What matters for weakness of will, then, is not whether\nyou deem another course of action superior at the time of action. It \nis whether you are abandoning an intention you previously formed. \nWeakness of will as the untutored understand it is not \nakrasia (if we reserve that term for action contrary to \none’s better judgment), but rather a certain kind of failure to stick to \none’s plans.[15] \nThis understanding of weakness of will changes the \nsubject in two ways. First, the state of the agent with which the \nweak-willed action is in conflict is not an evaluative judgment (as \nin akrasia) but a different kind of state, namely an \nintention. Second, it is not essential that there be \nsynchronic conflict, as akrasia demands. You must \nact contrary to your present better judgment in order to \nexhibit akrasia; conflict with a previous better \njudgment does not indicate akrasia, but merely a change of \nmind. However, you can exhibit weakness of will as Holton understands\nit simply by abandoning a previously formed intention.", "\n\nOf course not all cases of abandoning or failing to act on a \npreviously formed intention count as weakness of will. I intend \nto run five miles tomorrow evening. If I break my leg tomorrow \nmorning and fail to run five miles tomorrow evening, I will not have \nexhibited weakness of will. How can we characterize \nwhich failures to act on a previously formed intention count\nas weakness of will? Holton’s answer has two parts. First, he says, \nthere is an irreducible normative dimension to the question whether \nsomeone’s abandoning of an intention constituted weakness of will \n(Holton 1999, \n p. 259).[16] \nThat is, there is no purely \ndescriptive criterion (such as whether her action conflicted with her\nbetter judgment) which is sufficient for weakness of will; in order \nto decide whether a given case was an instance of weakness of will we\nmust consider normative questions, such as whether it was \nreasonable for the agent to have abandoned or revised that \nintention, or whether she should have done so. In the case \nof my broken leg, for instance, it was clearly reasonable for me to \nabandon my intention; that is why I could not be charged with \nweakness of will in that case.", "\n\nSecond, says Holton, we need to attend to an important subclass of \nour intentions to do something at a future time, namely \ncontrary-inclination-defeating intentions, or, as he\nlater terms them (Holton 2003), resolutions. \nResolutions are intentions that are formed precisely in order to \ninsulate one against contrary inclinations one expects to feel when \nthe time comes. Thus one reason I might form an intention on Monday \nto run five miles on Tuesday—as opposed to leaving the issue \nopen until Tuesday, for decision then—is to reduce the effect \nof feelings of lassitude to which I fear I may be subject when \nTuesday rolls around. Then suppose Tuesday rolls around; I am indeed \nprey to feelings of lassitude; and I decide as a result not to run. \nNow I can be charged with weakness of will. Weakness of will\ninvolves, specifically, a failure to act on a resolution; \nthis is sufficient to differentiate weakness of will from mere change\nof mind and even from caprice (which is a different species \nof unreasonable intention revision, according to Holton).", "\n\nAs a later paper by Alison McIntyre shows (McIntyre 2006), \nunderstanding weakness of will in this way casts a fresh light on the\nissue of its rational status. The weak-willed agent abandons a \nresolution because of a contrary inclination of exactly the type \nwhich the resolution was expressly designed to defeat. Therefore, as \nMcIntyre underlines, weak-willed action always involves a procedural \nrational \n defect:[17]\n a technique of self-management has been deployed but has failed \n(McIntyre 2006, p. 296). To that extent we have grounds to \ncriticize weak-willed action simply in virtue of the second of the \nways in which Holton wishes to distinguish weakness of will from a \nmere change of mind, without even resolving the potentially murky \nissue of whether the agent was reasonable in abandoning her \nintention.", "\n\nMcIntyre holds, however, that it would be overstating the case to say\nthat because weakness of will involves this procedural defect, it is \nalways irrational (McIntyre 2006, p. 290; \npp. 298–9; p. 302). She proposes rather that \npractical rationality has multiple facets and aims, and that failure \nin one respect or along one dimension does not automatically justify \nthe especially severe form of rational criticism which we intend by \nthe term “irrational.” For example, consider an agent who\nsuccumbs to contrary inclination of exactly the type expected when \nthe time comes to act on a truly stupid resolution. (Holton \ngives the example of resolving to go without water for two days just \nto see what it feels like: Holton 2003, p. 42.) There will \nindeed be a blemish on this agent’s rational scorecard if he \neventually gives in and drinks: he will have failed in his attempt at\nself-management. But wouldn’t it be rationally far worse for\nhim to stick to his silly resolution no matter what the cost?", "\n\nWe can also re-examine the issue of the rationality of \nakrasia in light of this analysis of weakness of will; for \nwe can distinguish between akratic and non-akratic cases of the \nlatter. As McIntyre points out, resolutions typically rest on \njudgments about what it is best that one do at a (future) time \nt. If an agent fails to act on a previously formed \nresolution to do a at t, thus exhibiting weakness \nof will, we can distinguish the case in which he still endorses at \nt the judgment that it is best that he do a at \nt (even though he does not do it) from the case in which he \nabandons that judgment as well as his resolution. In the latter, \nnon-akratic type of case, the agent in effect rationalizes his \nfailure to live up to his resolution by deciding that it is not after\nall best that he do a at t. McIntyre points out \nthat the traditional view that akrasia is always irrational \nseems to give us a perverse incentive to rationalize, since in that \ncase we escape the grave charge of practical irrationality, being \nleft only with the procedural practical defect present in all cases \nof weakness of will (McIntyre 2006, p. 291). But this seems\nimplausible: are the two sub-cases so radically different in their \nrational status? Indeed, she argues, if anything, akratic weakness of\nwill is typically rationally preferable to rationalizing \nweakness of will (McIntyre 2006, p. 287; pp. 309ff.). \n“In the presence of powerful contrary inclinations that bring \nabout a failure to be resolute,” she writes, “resisting \nrationalization and remaining clearheaded about one’s reasons to act \ncan constitute a modest accomplishment” (McIntyre 2006, \np. 311). Have we witnessed the transformation of \nakrasia from impossible, to irrational, to downright \nadmirable?" ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Changing the Subject" } ] } ]	[ "Adler, J. 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(ed.), 2008, Weakness of Will from Plato to the\n Present, Washington: Catholic University of America Press.", "Holton, R., 1999, “Intention and Weakness of Will,”\nJournal of Philosophy, 96: 241–262.", "–––, 2003, “How is Strength of Will\nPossible?,” in Stroud and Tappolet 2003, pp. 39–67.", "–––, 2009, Willing, Wanting, Waiting,\nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "Holton, R., and May, J., 2012, “What in the World is\nWeakness of Will?,” Philosophical Studies, 157:\n341–360.", "Horowitz, S., 2014, “Epistemic Akrasia,” Noûs,\n48(4): 718–744.", "Hurley, S., 1989, Natural Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Jackson, F., 1984, “Weakness of Will,” Mind,\n93: 1–18.", "Jones, K., 2003, “Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the\nNormative Conception of Agency,” in A. 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(eds.), 2003,\nWeakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford:\nClarendon Press.", "Tappolet, C., 2003, “Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic\nAction,” in Stroud and Tappolet 2003, pp. 97–120.", "Tenenbaum, S., 1999, “The Judgment of a Weak\nWill,” Philosophy and Phenomenological\nResearch, 59: 875–911.", "–––, 2007, Appearances of the Good: An Essay\non the Nature of Practical Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Thero, D., 2006, Understanding Moral Weakness,\n Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi.", "Walker, A., 1989, “The Problem of Weakness of\nWill,” Noûs, 23: 653–676.", "Wallace, R. J., 1999, “Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some\nPhilosophical Reflections,” Law and\nPhilosophy, 18: 621–654.", "Watson, G., 1977, “Skepticism About Weakness of\nWill,” Philosophical Review, 86: 316–339.", "Weatherson, B., 2019, Normative Externalism, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Wedgwood, R., 2011, “Justified\nInference,” Synthese, 189(2): 1–23.", "Wiggins, D., 1979, “Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and\nthe Objects of Deliberation and Desire,”\nProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 79:\n251–277.", "Wilkerson, T. E., 1997, Irrational Action: A Philosophical\nAnalysis, Aldershot: Ashgate." ]	[ { "href": "../action/", "text": "action" }, { "href": "../aristotle-ethics/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: ethics" }, { "href": "../davidson/", "text": "Davidson, Donald" }, { "href": "../practical-reason/", "text": "practical reason" }, { "href": "../practical-reason-action/", "text": "practical reason: and the structure of actions" }, { "href": "../practical-reason-med/", "text": "practical reason: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../epistemic-self-doubt/", "text": "self-doubt, epistemic" } ]
al-baghdadi	‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi	First published Wed Sep 9, 2015; substantive revision Wed Sep 18, 2019	[ "The Greek-Arabic sciences penetrated in the Islamic world during\nthe 8th and 9th centuries AD due to the massive\nactivity of the translators and al-Kindi’s vision of knowledge\nand also through the exegetical activity of the Aristotelian circle of\nBaghdad. From the end of the 10th, throughout the\n11th, and up to the beginning of the 12th\ncenturies, the production of original philosophical literature into\nArabic and Persian became the main stream of the Arabic-Islamic\nphilosophy, which was by then increasingly distant from the Greek\nsources in Arabic translation. Avicenna’s works fully attest\nthis phenomenon, which prompted a 12th century purist trend\nwell exemplified in the Muslim West by Averroes’ program of\ngoing back to Aristotle: a similar phenomenon occurred also in the\nMuslim East, with Muwaffaq al-Din Muhammad ‘Abd al-Latif ibn\nYusuf al-Baghdadi .", "‘Abd al-Latif was a philosopher and polymath who lived\nbetween the Second Crusade (1147–1149 AD) and the end of the\nFifth Crusade (1217–1231 AD). He was born in Baghdad in 1162 and\ndied there on 9 November 1231 after a pilgrimage of more than forty\nyears during which he travelled throughout Iraq, Syria and Egypt\nlooking for a good teacher in philosophy. He grew up in a\nShafi‘i family with excellent links with the Nizamiyya madrasa\nand he received a solid education in Islamic sciences. Then he turned\nto natural sciences, medicine, philosophy and, critically, to\nalchemy. His spasmodic search for knowledge brought him to meet\nthrough their writings Avicenna, al-Ghazali and\nal-Suhrawardi. ‘Abd al-Latif had many generous patrons and was\nin touch with the most important men of his era including the Saladin\nand, in Cairo, Maimonides. Cairo represented for ‘Abd al-Latif\nthe much-desired goal of his pilgrimage, the place where he finally\nmet Aristotle and his philosophy as well as that of his commentators\nThemistius and Alexander, and where he finally encountered the work of\nthe greatest Arabic Aristotelian commentator of the East,\nal-Farabi. For ‘Abd al-Latif, Cairo also meant the progressive\nabandonment of Avicenna’s philosophy, which he had held to be\nthe only one possible during the earlier years of his\neducation. ‘Abd al-Latif was a sharp critic, an independent\nthinker, and a prodigious writer on philosophy and medicine. His\nstated intellectual program was that to go back to the original Greek\nworks in Arabic translation, and in particular to return to Aristotle\nin philosophy and to Hippocrates, via Galen, in medicine, but he was\nable to go back to these sources only through the lens of their\nreworkings by the philosophers before Avicenna, al-Kindi and\nal-Farabi." ]	[ { "content_title": " Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Life", "1.2 Works" ] }, { "content_title": "2. What Philosophical Research is", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Criticisms against the “Moderns”", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Against Avicenna", "3.2 Against Fakhr al-Din al-Razi" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Metaphysics as Research into the Causes and First Philosophy", "4.2 Providence", "4.3 Intellect and First Cause", "4.4 Metaphysical Science as of Science of Sovereignty" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Good and bad Epistemologies and Practices", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Medical Epistemology", "5.2 Against Alchemy" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": " Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "‘Abd al-Latif’s intellectual position comes across in\nhis autobiography (sira). It seems to have formed part of a\nlarger work no longer extant which he wrote for his son Sharaf al-Din\nYusuf. The sira is contained in the Sources of\nInformation on the Classes of Physicians by Ibn Abi\nUsaybi‘a (Ibn Abi Usaybi‘a, c. 1242 [1882–84], Kitab\n‘Uyun al-anba’ fi tabaqat al-atibba’,\nA. Müller (ed.), al-Qahira: al-Matba‘at al-wahbiyya,\n1882–1884: II. 201–213; Martini Bonadeo 2013), and even\nmore in the Book of the Two Pieces of Advice (see Gutas 2011;\nMartini Bonadeo 2013; Joosse 2014; Fedouache - Ajoun - Ben Ahmed 2018). Other passages from ‘Abd\nal-Latif’s autobiography have been preserved by\nal-Dhahabi’s History of Islam (Von Somogyi 1937;\nCahen 1970). Finally, further information on ‘Abd al-Latif can\nbe found in the report of his journey in Egypt entitled Book of\nthe Report and Account of the Things which I Witnessed and the Events\nSeen in the Land of Egypt, a compendium extracted from his own\nhistory of Egypt, lost to us (Zand, Videan, & Videan 1965; Martini Bonadeo 2017).", "He was born in Baghdad in 1162 from an upper class family\noriginating from Mosul and spent his formative years in Baghdad until\n1189. In the years of his youth in Baghdad he studied Islamic sciences\nand medicine with many renowned scholars of his time, including Kamal\nad-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Anbari (d.1181), a professor\nof fiqh (law), adab-literature, hadith\n(traditions) and Arabic grammar at the Nizamiyya madrasa, Wagih\nal-Wasiti (d.1215), a professor at the Zafariyya Mosque, Ibn Fadlan\n(d.1199), an outstanding legal scholar versed in the khilaf\n(divergence of the law) and dialectic, and leader of the\nShafi‘is in Iraq, ‘Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn al-Khashshab\n(d.1171), master of hadith, grammarian, mathematician, expert\nin fara’id (hereditary law) and nasab\n(genealogy), Radi al-Dawla Abu Nasr (d.ca.1182), son of the well-known\nphysician Amin al-Dawla Ibn al-Tilmidh, professor of medical\nsubjects.", "In his hometown ‘Abd al-Latif made his first steps in\nphilosophy studying al-Ghazali’s Intentions of the\nPhilosophers, the Measure of Science in the Art of\nLogic, the Criterion of Action on Ethics and the Touchstone\nof Reasoning in Logic. Then he turned to Avicenna’s books\nincluding the Salvation, the Cure,\nthe Canon, and the Validation by Bahmanyar, a pupil\nof Avicenna. Finally still in Baghdad he studied Indian mathematics,\nEuclid’s geometry, and many books on alchemy by Jabir ibn\nHayyan, but then he abandoned this discipline which he considered an\nirrational practice.", "At the age of twenty-eight, in 1189, he left Baghdad and began a\nlong period of travel in search for knowledge. First he was in Mosul\nfor a year. There he heard people saying great things about\nal-Suhrawardi. He came across al-Suhrawardi’s treatises\nthe Intimations, the Glimmer, and the Ascending\nSteps; but he did not find in them the knowledge that he was\nlooking for. He left Mosul for Damascus where he joined the grammarian\nal-Kindi al-Baghdadi (d.1216) and he worked on a certain number of\ngrammatical treatises. In Damascus he took more and more distance from\nthe study and practice of alchemy. Then ‘Abd al-Latif went to\nJerusalem and then to the Saladin near Acre. Here he came into contact\nwith Saladin’s entourage: Baha’ al-Din ibn Shaddad\n(1145–1234), his biographer and the chief of the army and the\ncity of Jerusalem, and ‘Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani\n(d.1201), the chronicler of Saladin’s deeds. With a safe-conduct\ndocument written by this latter ‘Abd al-Latif arrived in\nCairo.", "His aim in Egypt was to meet Yasin al-Simiya’i, a not well\nknown alchemist, and Moses Maimonides, the famous Jewish philosopher,\ntheologian, and doctor, born in Cordoba in 1135. ‘Abd al-Latif\nrefused to work with the first for the senselessness of his teaching\nand found the latter excellent, but dominated by the desire to excel\nand to lend his services to men in command and of\nprominence. ‘Abd al-Latif’s encounter with the Peripatetic\ntradition took place in the vibrant cultural environment of Cairo\nwhere he met Abu al-Qasim al-Shari‘i, probably the renowned and\nfamous master in the science of hadith Abu al-Qasim\nal-Busayri (d.1202), who had expert knowledge of the works of the\n“Ancients” and of those of Abu Nasr al-Farabi. In Cairo,\nfor the first time ‘Abd al-Latif studied the books of the\n“Ancients”, namely Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias,\nand Themistius, and on the basis of these he began to test the cogency\nof Avicenna’s doctrines. From this he came to hold the\ninferiority of the work of Avicenna. Nevertheless, ‘Abd al-Latif\nwas intimately loath to renounce he who had been his master and the\ninspiration behind his research from his youth.", "After 13 September 1192, the date of the armistice with the Franks,\n‘Abd al-Latif moved to Jerusalem with the Saladin who appointed\nhim as the administrator of the Umayyad mosque in Damascus. After the\ndeath of the Saladin (d.1193), the last years of ‘Abd\nal-Latif’s life took the form of a long series of journeys, no\nlonger in search of knowledge, instruction, teachers and books, but\nall motivated by, or at the behest of, patrons: in Damascus al-Malik\nal-Afdal, Saladin’s eldest son; in Cairo al-Malik al-Aziz, in\nJerusalem al-Malik al-Adil Sayf al-Din Abu Bakr ibn Ayyub, in Erzinjan\nal-Malik ‘Ala’ al-Din Da’ud ibn Bahram, in Aleppo\nShihab al-Din Tughril. While he was in Aleppo he wanted to go on\npilgrimage to Mecca, and he started his journey towards Baghdad to\nleave some of his works to the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Mustansir ibn\nal-Zahir (r. 1226–1242). Once he arrived in Baghdad ‘Abd\nal-Latif fell ill and died on 9 November, 1231. He was buried next to\nhis father in the Wardiyya cemetery.", "‘Abd al-Latif’s more famous students were:\nthe hadith scholar al-Birzali (d.1239), the botanist Ibn\nal-Suri (d.1242), the judge al-Tifashi (d.1253), and the biographer\nIbn Khallikan (d.1282)." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Life" }, { "content": [ "The oldest list of ‘Abd al-Latif’s works is that given\nby Ibn Abi Usaybi‘a at the end of the entry devoted to him in\nthe Sources of Information on the Classes of Physicians (Ibn\nAbi Usaybi‘a, c. 1242 [1882–84]: II. 211.1–213.16). A\nsecond, later, list is found in Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi’s What\nwas omitted in the Obituaries (Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi, before 1363\n[1974], Fawat al-wafayat, I. ‘Abbas (ed.), Bayrut: Dar\nal-Sadir, 1974: II. 385.1–388.2).", "The list presented by Ibn Abi Usaybi‘a numbers one hundred\nand seventy-three works, including brief essays and treatises. The\nsubjects reflect the variety of ‘Abd al-Latif’s\ninterests. Thirteen writings are listed which deal with the Arabic\nlanguage, lexicography, and grammar, two with fiqh, nine with\nliterary criticism, fifty-three with medicine, ten with zoology, three\non the science of tawhid (unity of God), three on history,\nthree on mathematics and related disciplines, two on magic and\nmineralogy, and twenty-seven on other themes. There are forty-eight\nworks concerning philosophy: nineteen on logic—two of which are\nagainst Avicenna and the theory of conditional syllogisms—ten on\nphysics, eight on metaphysics, and nine on politics. Two general works\nare also mentioned, divided into three sections: logic, physics, and\nmetaphysics; one of these was in ten volumes and was completed by the\nauthor over a span of twenty years. ", "Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi’s list is shorter. It numbers fifteen\ndiscourses by ‘Abd al-Latif which are not mentioned by Ibn Abi\nUsaybi‘a and eighty-one works, all mentioned in the previous\nlist, with the exception of one about antidotes.", "The works which have come down to us, or at least those\ncontained in manuscripts so far\nidentified (Martini Bonadeo 2013, Fedouache - Ajoun - Ben Ahmed 2018), concerning hadith, lexicography, and grammar\nare ", "About fiqh (law) there are", "About mathematics there is ", "On medicine some works survived: ", "Concerning philosophy, there are: ", "Besides these works further eleven treatises have been\npreserved—among which is the already mentioned Book of the\nTwo Pieces of Advice—in the miscellaneous manuscript Bursa,\nHüseyin Çelebi 823 (Stern 1962; Fedouache - Ajoun - Ben Ahmed 2018, 3–236): " ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Works" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "In the Book of the Two Pieces of Advice, a diatribe\nagainst false knowledge, ‘Abd al-Latif presents “two\npieces of advice” for would-be physicians and would-be\nphilosophers, an impassioned polemic against false physicians, and an\nequally harsh invective against false philosophers (see Gutas 2011;\nMartini Bonadeo 2013; Joosse 2014; Fedouache - Ajoun - Ben Ahmed 2018).", "Those who, in his age, devote themselves to philosophy are bad\nphilosophers for many different reasons: their lack of interest, the\nobscurity of philosophy and their lack of training and good\nteachers. But the main reason for the decline of the philosophical\nproduction of his age lies in the neglect into which the works of the\nAncients have fallen. The pages of these works are by now being used\nby bookbinders and pharmacists as paper for packaging. No\none—says ‘Abd al-Latif—wants to deny the\ncontributions made by Avicenna to philosophical research. He has, in\nfact, provided new energy to philosophy, and he has been able in part\nto understand the books of the Ancients and to offer an introduction\nto them. Nevertheless, if one examines his works in more detail and\ncompares them with those on similar themes by ancient authors and, in\nparticular, with Aristotle or al-Farabi, their inferiority\nemerges. For this reason ‘Abd al-Latif proposes presenting the\nmethod followed by Plato and Aristotle in their respective\nphilosophies. In doing that, he follows al-Farabi, summarizes and\nliterally quotes al-Farabi’s Philosophy of Plato and\nAristotle (Rosenthal & Walzer 1943; Mahdi 1961, 2001), where\nboth Platonic dialogues and Aristotelian treatises are set out in such\nan order as to constitute a systematic and progressive investigation\nof all the areas of philosophical research.", "For ‘Abd al-Latif, as for al-Farabi’s Plato,\nphilosophical research begins with an investigation of what\nconstitutes the perfection of man as man, which does not consist of a\nhealthy physique, a pleasant face, noble descent, a large group of\nfriends and lovers; nor does it consist in riches, glory, or power,\nsince none of these is able to make man fully and truly happy. For man\nthe attainment of happiness consists in a particular type of\nknowledge, the knowledge of the substances of all the beings and a\ncertain lifestyle, the virtuous life. Knowledge of things according to\ntheir essence is not an end in itself, but is that which must\ncharacterize the virtuous lifestyle of the philosopher: in him, in\nfact, theoretical knowledge is the prolegomenon to action, ethics, and\npolitics. For this reason ‘Abd al-Latif stresses that there is\nno difference between a man who lives in ignorance and the life of\nbeasts because in ignorance man acts like a beast. A life in ignorance\nis a life without the search for truth and, hence, inhuman in\nitself.", "In this perspective ‘Abd al-Latif introduces Plato’s\npolitical philosophy. Since the perfection of the soul is possible\nonly in a city where justice reigns, Plato starts from analysis of\nwhat justice is and how it ought to be. Then Plato examines the cities\nwhich deviate from the good ways of life and from the philosophical\nvirtues. In the virtuous city, man must be educated in the knowledge\nof the divine and natural beings and in following a virtuous way of\nlife. Human perfection is achieved by the man who combines the\ntheoretical, the political and the practical sciences. He will rule\nand will possess the ability to conduct a scientific investigation of\njustice and the other virtues and to form the character of the youth\nand the multitude. He will be able to correct wrong opinions and to\ncure every rank of his society with knowledge. The ruler will be the\none who has achieved human perfection at its utmost.", "Then ‘Abd al-Latif passes to present al-Farabi’s\nAristotle who holds that the perfection of man sought by Plato is not\nself-evident or easy to explain by way of a demonstration which leads\nto certainty. He believes, therefore, that it is necessary to start\nwith a prior consideration. There are four things which by nature are\ndesired by man in so far as they are good: the soundness of the body,\nof the senses, of the ability to discern that which leads to the\nhealth of the body and the senses, and of the ability to obtain that\nwhich leads to their soundness. In the second place man desires to\nknow the causes of the sensible things and also the causes of what he\nsees in his soul, and he discovers that the more he knows the more he\nfeels pleasure. Thus according to Aristotle, the knowledge sought by\nman can be said to be of two types: the first is a useful knowledge\nsought for the soundness of the body, of the senses, and of the other\ntwo abilities, the second is desired and desirable in itself for the\npleasure that a man experiences in apprehending it: for instance,\nthe myths or the stories of nations.", "‘Abd al-Latif goes on by explaining that in human knowledge\nthere are three sorts of cognitions: those acquired by senses,\nfrequently insufficient, those first necessary cognitions that\noriginate with man, and those acquired by investigation and\nconsideration. ‘Abd al-Latif asks himself what type of knowledge\nis most appropriate for man. Animals, too, in fact, have a body,\nsenses, and the ability to discern how and with what to safeguard\ntheir health. They do not, however, possess the desire, provoked by\nwonder, to know the causes of what can be seen in the heavens and on\nearth.", "This problem involves the following question: why should man ever\ndesire to know the causes if the type of knowledge that they involve\nis not made for him? It is because man can grow in perfection by\nknowing the causes; indeed, knowing the causes is an act of the\nessence of man. Yet this statement opens up a series of problems. What\nis the essence of man, what is his ultimate perfection, what is the\nact whose realization leads to the final perfection of his essence?\nNevertheless, given that man is part of the world, if one wishes to\nknow the end of man and his activity he must first know the world in\nits totality. The four causes of the world in its totality and in each\nof its individual parts which must be sought are the what it is, the\nhow it is, the what it is from, and the what is it for.", "The investigation which deals with the world, in its totality and\nin each of its individual parts, is called natural investigation,\nwhile that which regards what man possesses by virtue and will is\ncalled the science of the things that depend on the will. Since that\nwhich is natural and innate in man precedes in time that which is in\nman by will and choice, the first type of investigation will precede\nthe second even if both must arrive at a certain science. Besides\nthese two types of research is the art of logic which forms the\nrational part of the soul, leads it to certainty, to study and to\nresearch; logic, moreover, guides and tests the validity of the other\ntwo fields of research.", "‘Abd al-Latif reminds that in Aristotle’s science of\nnature the fundamental epistemological criterion holds that man must\nstart from what is attested to by the senses, to then proceed to what\nis hidden, until he knows everything which he desires to know. For\nthis reason, he goes on in the study of plants and then of animals. He\ncatalogues their species, and explains the apparatus of organs which\neach animal species is provided with. Since organs alone are not\nsufficient to explain animal life, man feels the need to introduce a\nfurther principle, which is the soul. Nevertheless, the soul is not a\nprinciple sufficient to explain man, since the actions of man reveal\nthemselves to be more powerful than the acts of the soul. The soul is\nnot enough to explain the highest degree of substantiality reached by\nman: Aristotle found man with speech and speech proceeds from\nintellect or the intellectual principles and powers.", "The human intellect is in potency and moves to act. All that which\npasses from potency to act necessitates an agent of the same species\nas the thing that must pass on to the act. The intellect as well,\ntherefore, in order to pass from potency to act, needs an active\nintellect which is always in act and never in potency. When\nman’s intellect reaches its extreme perfection, it comes close\nin its substance to the substance of this active intellect. In its\nsearch for perfection, man’s intellect tends to imitate the\nmodel of this intellect, since it is that which makes man substantial\nin so far as he is man. This intellect is also man’s end because\nit is that which provides him with a principle and an example to\nfollow in tending to perfection, which consists in approximating\nhimself as far as it is possible to it. It is therefore his agent, his\nend, and his perfection. It is a principle in three different ways: as\nan agent, as an end, and as the perfection to which man tends. It is,\nhowever, a separate form with respect to man, a separate agent, and a\nseparate end.", "The result of the enquiry undertaken leads to the conclusion that\nhuman nature, the human soul, and the capabilities and the acts of\nthese two, just like the capabilities of the practical intellect, are\nall finalized with respect to the perfection of the human\nintellect. Nature, the soul, and the human intellect are, however,\ninsufficient to attain perfection and it is not possible to leave out\nof consideration the acts generated by volition and choice which\ndepend on the practical intellect. For this reason, therefore, these\nacts must also become the object of investigation like all that which\nconstitutes human will. Desire and the things, which depend on sense\nand discernment—which the other animals also possess—on\nthe other hand, are neither human, nor useful for attaining\ntheoretical perfection. According to this criterion it is necessary to\nre-examine completely all the scientific fields already established in\nthe search for that which contributes to the attainment of perfection\nby man and that which, on the other hand, impedes this search. ", "Finally ‘Abd al-Latif mentions the Metaphysics\nsaying that in Aristotle’s Metaphysics beings are\ninvestigated according to a different method from that used in the\nscience of nature. Unlike his Farabian source,\nal-Farabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle,\n‘ as we know it, Abd al-Latif begins to analyze the metaphysical science which\nhas as its objects of inquiry the divine and noble things. He seems to\nmention the pseudo-Theology of Aristotle, the paraphrastic\nselection from Plotinus’ Enneads (IV to VI) translated\nby ‘Abd al-Masih ibn Nai‘ma al-Himsi and corrected by\nal-Kindi. He states that Aristotle in the Theology (Kitab\nbi-utulugiyya) said that God created the terrestrial world for\nman and also created in man the intellect and dispersed it in his soul\nso that it might be a weapon which strengthens man to make him able to\nlive in the earth (i.e., practical intellect) and to investigate the\ncreation of the heavens and the earth and the wonders which are found\nin the heavens and on the earth (i.e., theoretical intellect). And he\nsays that God is provident and takes care of qualitatively better men\nand inspires them as a result of the mediation of the active intellect\neither through the way of meditation, or through the way of the\neffulgence of soul or through the way of revelation.", "Of course since men are different there are different forms of\nassent to the truth: the absolute certainty of the man who follows the\ndemonstrative way as indicated by Aristotle in the Posterior\nAnalytics and the persuasion produced by examples and images as\nindicated by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and\nthe Poetics. Hence, philosophy comes into being in every man\nin the way that is possible for him. ", "For ‘Abd al-Latif, Plato and his disciple Aristotle pursue\nthe same purpose and the same end in their philosophical speculation,\nthat is to say, the perfection of man as man, which both identify in\nknowledge of the truth of things. Moreover, they describe a system so\nperfect in its organic constitution and completeness that the\ngenerations following them are left with nothing but the task of\nstudying it in an attempt to understand their thought correctly. The\nexceptional nature of Plato and Aristotle’s philosophy, says\n‘Abd al-Latif, has three causes: first, their philosophy is\nuseful in motivating one to study, second, for a long time they had\ninfluence in this field, and third, the absolute primacy of their\nphilosophy lies in their research into the causes from the more\ndistant to the closest to the object. This method of inquiry does not\nneed anything else and it is impossible to confute. It is therefore a\ngreat mistake to believe that the works of the Moderns are clearer,\nmore useful, or qualitatively superior with respect to those of the\nAncients." ], "section_title": "2. What Philosophical Research is", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "Abd al-Latif constantly held authors defined by him as\nModerns distinct from the Ancients and he unleashed a\nharsh polemic attack against the works of the former. His privileged\ntargets were Avicenna and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi whom he considered, as\nfar as it was possible, even worse than Avicenna. The writings of\nthese authors in fact, if compared with those of the Ancients, reveal\ntheir low scientific level, are confused, and lack detailed\nanalysis." ], "section_title": "3. Criticisms against the Moderns ", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "‘Abd al-Latif makes a series of criticisms on\nAvicenna’s philosophy (Martini Bonadeo 2013; Ben Ahmed 2019). In the first\nplace, he explains that Avicenna did not manage to present an\nexhaustive philosophical system in which every field of philosophical\nresearch could receive adequate treatment. ‘Abd al-Latif\ncriticizes Avicenna’s lack of reflection on the practical\nfield. Even in his most famous summa, the Kitab\nal-Shifa’, Avicenna neglected the contents of\nPlato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Ethics,\nand his Politics. ‘Abd al-Latif explains this omission\nas a total lack of familiarity by Avicenna not only of practical\nphilosophy, but also of philosophy in general.", "In the second place, according to ‘Abd al-Latif, Avicenna\nseems to have distorted or not to have had any knowledge of the\nfundamental Aristotelian epistemological criterion according to which\nresearch must begin with that which is more easily knowable to us\n(cf. Aristotle, Physics I.1, 184a16–21; Nicomachean\nEthics I.4, 1095b3–4). This is why, for example Avicenna\nmistakenly placed zoology after his treatment of the soul.", "Next, ‘Abd al-Latif points out that Avicenna has produced\nnumerous works, which have been copied from one another, as in the\ncase of the Kitab al-Shifa’ and the Kitab\nal-Najat. He observes that Avicenna decided to introduce all his\ntreatises with the discourse presented by Aristotle at the beginning\nof the Posterior Analytics (ll, 71a1–3) on every form\nof knowledge. But this is all that Avicenna knows of the Posterior\nAnalytics. In fact, he has not dealt with what constitutes the\nend of logic, that is to say, the five logical arts which are the\nobject of the Posterior Analytics, the Topics,\nthe Sophistical Refutations, the Rhetoric, and\nthe Poetics, and he has dwelt on an analysis of the contents of\nthe Isagoge, Categories, De Interpretatione\nand Prior Analytics which, according to ‘Abd al-Latif,\nconstitute a preparatory introduction to true logic. Even\nthe Kitab al-Shifa’, which deals with logic at greater\nlength, presents a confused discourse. ‘Abd al-Latif provides\nexamples which strengthen his strong criticism. In the first place it\nis surprising to him that Avicenna has not clarified the category of\n“having” (ἔχειν; for\nits Arabic translations see Afnan 1964: 89–90). But, in fact, in\nthe section on the categories (al-Maqulat) of the Kitab\nal-Shifa’, Avicenna devotes few words to his explanation of\nthe meaning and the value of this category. He maintains that it is\nnot a clear category and recognizes that he has not managed to\nunderstand it because he does not see how it can contain\nspecies. Moreover, ‘Abd al-Latif is amazed by the fact that\nAvicenna places the movement of the sky in the category of\n“Being-in-a-position”\n(κεῖσθαι), even\nthough he himself has written a book on the De Caelo et mundo\nand on the Physics. The category\nof κεῖσθαι is\nexplained by Avicenna both in the Kitab al-Shifa’ and\nthe Kitab al-Najat as the manner of being of the body in as\nfar as the fact that its parts constitute, one with another, a\nrelation of inclination and parallelism in relation to the directions\nand the parts of the place, if the body is in a place, such as, for\nexample standing up and sitting down. ‘Abd al-Latif’s\nthird criticism is of Avicenna’s claim that he can define one of\ntwo relative terms without having recourse to the other. ‘Abd\nal-Latif stresses that in the Isagoge Avicenna defines genus\nseparately and species separately and father separately and son\nseparately. Then in his definition of father as a “living thing\nwhich creates from his sperm another living thing similar to\nhim” Avicenna finds himself obliged to seek recourse to four\ndistinct relations.", "‘Abd al-Latif proceeds to criticize Avicenna’s theory\nof the syllogism and in particular his admission of the hypothetical\nsyllogisms. Finally, ‘Abd al-Latif makes a series of further\ncriticisms of Avicenna without, however, going into each of them in\ndetail. Avicenna has enlarged the book of the Poetics with an\namount of material which actually derives from\nthe Rhetoric. Since Avicenna’s Kitab\nal-Shifa’, despite its numerous errors, has become the\nphilosophical encyclopedia of reference among ‘Abd\nal-Latif’s contemporaries, he believes that Avicenna is the\nindirect cause of the vast spread of philosophical errors, such as the\nconfusing, for example, the object proper to the Physics,\nthat is, nature, with that of the Metaphysics." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Against Avicenna" }, { "content": [ "‘Abd al-Latif presents two sets of reasons why\nal-Razi‘s works, full of errors, should not be the object of\npeople’s admiration. In the first place this writer does not\npossess a specific technical knowledge of the various sciences which\nhe has decided to consider: his use of the medical terminology is\ninaccurate, for example, in his notes on\nAvicenna’s Canon. In the second place, since he lacks\nany didactic method, he simply raises continual sophisms. For these\nreasons, ‘Abd al-Latif maintains that he should not even try to\ntake on the holy text of the Koran as he did in his\ncommentary on sura 112 or on sura 95 and sura 87 (Gannagé 2011:\n227–256; Stern 1962: 57–59). " ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Against Fakhr al-Din al-Razi" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Metaphysics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "In the twenty-four chapters of his Book on the Science of\nMetaphysics ‘Abd al-Latif paraphrases and summarizes a sort\nof “library” of treatises on metaphysics (Zimmermann 1986)\nwhich were assimilated in the formative period of falsafa and\nimposed themselves to the point of becoming canonical. The editorial\nplan of the Book on the Science of Metaphysics follows the\nordering of the metaphysical and divine science according to\nal-Farabi’s Enumeration of the Sciences. It consists in\nfact of three distinct parts which reflect al-Farabi’s\ntripartite division: in the first part, which includes the first four\nchapters, there is the study of beings and their accidents; the second\npart, which goes from chapter five to chapter twelve, deals with the\nprinciples of definition and demonstration; the third and last part,\ncomprising chapters thirteen to twenty-four, is devoted to a\ndescription of the hierarchy of the immaterial and intelligible\nrealities until it reaches the First Mover, the First Principle, the\nFirst Cause, the One, which is nothing but the one God of\nthe Koran, the provident Creator, in a synthesis of\nAristotelian metaphysics, Neoplatonic metaphysics, and Islamic\nmonotheism (Neuwirth 1976).", "‘Abd al-Latif devotes a full sixteen out of twenty-four\nchapters to a discussion of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,\nwhich he probably knew in more than one translation. The books\nof the Metaphysics he freely paraphrases are, in\norder, Alpha Elatton/Alpha\nMeizon, Beta, Delta, Gamma, \nEpsilon, Zeta, Eta, Theta, Iota,\nand Lambda (Neuwirth 1976, 1977–78; Martini Bonadeo\n2001, 2010, 2013, 2018; Ajoun 2017). Three whole chapters (13–15) are devoted to the\nlatter one. ‘Abd al-Latif is strongly influenced by\nThemistius’ paraphrase (Brague 1999) in his reading\nof Lambda. The presentation of Lambda ends with an\nentire chapter (16) containing an epitome of Alexander Arabus’s\ntreatise On the principles of the Universe (Badawi 1947;\nGenequand 2001; Endress 2002; Ajoun 2017). ‘Abd al-Latif’s use of\nthe Metaphysics reflects that of its first Arabic\ninterpreters, in particular al-Kindi, who centered on the contents of\nbooks Alpha Elatton, Epsilon, and Lambda\nand was tied to the criterion of the doctrinal unity of Greek\nmetaphysics: the natural theology of Lambda is only a premise\nfor a characterization of the First Principle, which is of clear\nNeoplatonic origin (D’Ancona 1996).", "This is particularly clear from the very beginning of the Book\non the Science of Metaphysics. For ‘Abd al-Latif, in fact,\nthere are different causes for different kinds of being and different\nsciences for different causes, but there is one first science leading\nall the others, for two different reasons. First, as al-Farabi taught,\nit is able to demonstrate the principles of the other sciences,\nbecause it is only this science, which investigates absolute beings\nand from them it provides an explanation of the principles of the\nparticular sciences, comprised in it and below it. Second, this\nscience includes speculation about the First Principle, which every\nother thing needs in its own existence. ‘Abd al-Latif claims\nthat this First Principle is the absolute final cause and that the\nscience of this cause is the wisdom (hikma) which precedes\nall other knowledge (Martini Bonadeo 2010; 2017a).", "The First Principle is described by ‘Abd al-Latif in a\ntypical Avicennian phrase as the Pure Being (al-wujud\nal-mujarrad), the aim of everything, and the First mover\nimmobile, pure act, eternal and everlasting, i.e., the First Principle whose\nknowledge is the end of our inquiry. The First mover not only produces the movement of the things, but it is their perfection, namely the paradigmatic cause, and their final cause. Abd al-Latif introduces the example of the law, which he derives from Themistius' paraphrase. The law moves politics in so far as it is chosen for itself. The First Principle, as God, is the cause for being of the worlds and their ordering according to their beauty and their duration and it is a substance which equals his science. The First Principle is also\ndescribed as the True One (al-wahid al-haqq), one by\nessence, without any kind of multiplicity. The way to know this True\nOne is to ascend from the things which have some degree of unity. So\nwe say one army, one city, that Zayd is one, that the\ncelestial sphere is one, and that the world is one. Then we proceed\nthrough souls and intellects, and through the things which in this\nascent loose multiplicity and acquire unity until we reach the\nAbsolute One (al-wahid al-mutlaq), the architectural\nprinciple of everything and the supreme intelligible which makes the\nworld be, preserves its existence, and orders it. The First Cause is\nfor ‘Abd al-Latif that cause which has within it all things in\npurely Neoplatonic vein. It is not surprising therefore that in\nparaphrasing chapter 10 of Lambda he speaks of emanation from\nthe First Principle.", "The characteristics of the Neoplatonic One are thus grafted onto\nthe Aristotelian characterization of the First Principle. The point of\nfusion lies in the doctrine of the self-reflection of divine thought,\nwhich for ‘Abd al-Latif, who is influenced by the exegesis of\nThemistius, is not a reason for composition and multiplicity within\nthe First Principle, as it was for Plotinus. If the thinking\nprinciple, the act of thinking and the object of thought coincide in\nthe First Principle, which by now is called God, there is in It no\nmultiplicity." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Metaphysics as Research into the Causes and First Philosophy" }, { "content": [ "The exposition of Lambda is followed by three chapters\nwhich discuss the theme of Providence\n(πρόνοια) of the First\nPrinciple. ‘Abd al-Latif’s main source is Alexander of\nAphrodisias’ De Providentia (Ruland 1976, 1979;\nZimmermann 1986; Thillet 2003; Martini Bonadeo 2017a). ‘Abd al-Latif therefore mutually\nharmonizes two solutions which are in reality quite different from one\nanother, not to say alternative: that put forward by Alexander\nregarding the problem of divine providence—the First Principle\nthinks and knows primarily only itself, but it eternally knows the\nevents of the world too, subject to becoming, in so far as it\nexercises its own direction over them through the celestial\norder—and that of Themistius, which ‘Abd al-Latif had\nalready made his own in the course of his paraphrase\nof Lambda, whereby God knows that which is different from him\nwithout for this reason coming out of himself, since he contains in\nhim all the ideas of all things, and is the norm and the condition of\nthe intelligibility of the world.", "‘Abd al-Latif maintains that the action of God’s\nprovidence expresses itself both in the superior and in the inferior\nworld; but if in the first case the relationship between divine\nprovidence and the superior world is immediate, in the second case it\nis mediated by the superior world. The relationship between divine\nprovidence and those who receive it, however, cannot be thought of as\na causal relationship, since in this case “the noble would come\ninto being because of the ignoble and the earlier because of the\nlater” (Rosenthal 1975: 156), which is shameful, nor can this\nrelationship be thought as purely accidental. Both situations are\nunsuitable for the First Principle, which cannot therefore exercise\nprovidence as its primary action, but cannot either be considered as\nthat from which providence derives accidentally. ‘Abd al-Latif\nthen affirms that the existence and the order of things derive from\nthe existence of God, who is absolute good and returns to the image of\nfire which warms everything: God concedes to all existing things as\nmuch good as they, for their proximity to him, are able to\nreceive. The bodies of the sublunary world are able to enjoy the\npotency which emanates from God and so they tend to move towards\nhim. Among the existing things of the sublunary world, man has been\ngiven the capacity for reason, due to which he can carry out those\nactions that lead him to acquire the happiness appropriate to him. The\nsame rational capacity allows him to know divine things and, in virtue\nof this knowledge, man is superior to all other things that come to\nbeing and pass away. At times, however, he uses this rational capacity\nto obtain, not the good and virtues, but vices. This can happen\nbecause providence allows man the capacity to be able to acquire\nvirtues, but the success of this enterprise lies in the will and in\nthe choice made by man himself.", "Following the lead of Alexander’s treatise On\nProvidence, ‘Abd al-Latif introduces the problem of evil\nand places his examination of those aspects of the doctrine of\nprovidence that regard man and his actions within the framework of a\ndiscussion more of a cosmological nature. For this reason, though he\nfavours Themistius’ solution whereby God knows all things in\nthat he contains within him the ideas of all things, which he holds to\nbe closest to the dogma of the Koran, ‘Abd al-Latif has recourse\nto Alexander concerning the problems of evil, man’s free will,\nand divine justice." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Providence" }, { "content": [ " ‘Abd al-Latif then proceeds in his treatise by epitomizing\nthe Book of the Exposition of the Pure Good, that is to say,\nthe Liber de causis of the Latin Middle Ages, proposition\n54, on the difference between eternity and time (Endress 1973; Jolivet\n1979: 55–75; Zimmermann 1994: 9–51) from\nProclus’ Elements of Theology, Metaphysics Lambda, and the pseudo-Theology (Martini Bonadeo 2017b, Ajoun 2017). ‘Abd al-Latif\nreproduces all the propositions of the Liber de causis,\nexcept numbers 4, 10, 18, and 20, and follows the same order in which\nthey are set out (Badawi 1955b; Anawati 1956: 73–110; Taylor\n1984: 236–248). Abd al-Latif's aim is to establish, on a Farabian model, an identification between the First Cause, One and Pure Good, as presented in the Liber de causis and the Aristotelian First Principle, Unmoved Mover and Intellect in actuality, described in his paraphrase of Metaphysics Lambda. \n", " Abd al-Latif stresses the primacy of the most universal\ncause, which is, therefore, further from its effect with respect to\nthe causes nearer to the effect and hence apparently more\nimportant. The First Cause transcends any possibility of our knowledge. If\nknowing the true nature of things in fact means knowing their causes,\nsince by definition the First Cause has no causes that precede it, it\nis unknowable in its true nature. It can only be known by\napproximation, through a description of the secondary causes. A long\nsection, which describes intellect, follows this theory of the\ntranscendent ineffability of the First Cause which precludes any\nproper predication. The intellect is with eternity, above time, and is\nnot subject to division, because everything which is divisible is\ndivisible in magnitude, in number, or in motion, but all these kinds\nof division are under time. It is one, in so far as it is the first\nthing which originated from the First Cause, but it is multiple with\nrespect to the multiplicity of the gifts that come to it from the\nFirst Cause. The intellect knows what is above it—the gifts that\ncome to it from the First Cause—and what is below it—the\nthings of which it is the cause. But intellect knows its cause and its\neffect through its substance, that is to say that it perceives things\nintellectually. It grasps intellectually either the intellectual\nthings or the sensible ones. The First Cause, which is the Pure Good,\npours all that is good into the intellect and into all that which\nexists through the mediation of the intellect. There is, however, a\ncertain fluctuation in ‘Abd al-Latif’s attempt to\nestablish a perfect conformity between the First Cause as presented in\nthe Liber de causis and the First Principle presented in his\nchapters devoted to the paraphrase of Metaphysics\nLambda. According to ‘Abd al-Latif God precedes the\nintellect in ruling things: he orders the intellect to govern. But,\nhaving stated that the self-subsistent substance is not generated from\nsomething else, ‘Abd al-Latif maintains that intellect does not\nneed anything other than itself in its conceptualizing and formation\n(tasawwuri-hi wa taswiri-hi), that it is perfect and complete\neternally, and that it is the cause of itself." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Intellect and First Cause" }, { "content": [ "At this point ‘Abd al-Latif introduces the description of the\nScience of Sovereignty (‘ilm al-rububiyya) which echoes\nthat of the first chapter in the Theology of Aristotle: it is\nnot a physical science that limits itself to ascend from effects to\ncauses, but a science which, when it comes close to causes, is able to\ngo back to consider the effects in greater depth approaching the\ndivine knowledge of things.", "Moreover, ‘Abd al-Latif summarizes in the contents, but not\nin the order, a selection of twenty propositions of Proclus\n(1–3, 5, 62, 86, 15–17, 21, 54, 76, 78, 91, 79, 80, 167,\nand 72–74: see Zimmermann 1986), four quaestiones of Alexander\nof Aphrodisias (Van Ess 1966; Fazzo & Wiesner 1993) and the\nadaptation of John Philoponus’ De aeternitate mundi contra\nProclum IX,8 and IX,11 (Hasnawi 1994), entitled What\nAlexander of Aphrodisias Extracted from the Book of Aristotle Called\nTheology, Namely the Doctrine of Divine Sovereignty (Endress\n1973). In doing that ‘Abd al-Latif sets for himself three\nobjectives. In the first place, he wants to stress the crucial aspects\nof the doctrine of the First Cause understood as One, presented in the\nprevious chapters. In the second place, he discusses the relationship\nbetween the One and the many, and, not by chance, he does so after a\nseries of chapters (16–20) devoted to the relationship between\nthe First Cause and the world. As for these two objectives, he\nstresses the basic features of the First Cause: it is One and it gives\nunity to that which is multiple; it is One in itself and the True One\nwithout composition; it is the cause of all that which is multiple in\nthat, although it is by essence One, its causal action propagates in a\nmultiplicity of effects; it is above eternity and time; it is life\nthat does not end, light that does not extinguish, it is Pure Being,\nit is the first agent, it is ineffable and nothing can be properly\npredicated of it, it is unknowable, the apex of the hierarchy of being\nwhich is composed of the intellect, intelligible realities, the Soul,\nthe souls, and, finally, the corporeal realities of nature. Then he\nturns to the providence of the First Cause with regard to its effects:\nthis providence exists, is mediated by the spheres and preserves the\nspecies on earth. The divine power acts upon the sublunary world by\ncontact, and, starting from the first sphere of fire, the divine power\nis in matter according to the receptivity of the various matters.", "‘Abd al-Latif ends his presentation of the metaphysical\nscience by summarizing the text of the pseudo-Theology from\nchapter 2 to chapter 10 (chapter nine is not included), more or less\nliterally (Badawi 1955a, Ajoun 2017). Through the\npseudo-Theology—as we have seen before, an item of the\nArabic Plotinus—‘Abd al-Latif was exposed to a Neoplatonic\ndoctrine on the causality of the Platonic ideas which took into\naccount the Aristotelian themes of the immobile causality of the First\nMover and the coincidence of the nature of what is the supreme\nintelligent and what is the supreme intelligible. ‘Abd al-Latif\nwrites about the First Principle, True One, and Creator, which is\nknown only through imperfect images and which is infinite in its\nessence, the process of emanation and the hierarchy from the First\nPrinciple to the word of coming to be, the nature and movement of the\ncelestial bodies which move out of the desire to imitate the\nperfection of the First Unmoved Mover and to assimilate themselves to\nthe Pure Good to the extent to which they are capable; the movement of\nthe first sphere and the life in the world of coming to be; the\nontological anteriority of the First Cause with respect to the\nproximate causes, the ascent of human soul from sensible to\nintellectual knowledge up to the First Principle, which is true\nintellect, true being, true perfection, true science and true\nsubstance. At the end he deals with the limits of our senses and of\nthe human intellect in understanding the First Cause and the others\nseparate beings: our intellect is weak in understanding concepts such\nas movement, time, matter, privation, and possibility, and it can\nattain them only through analogies and long meditation. Moreover, for\nour intellect the First Principle is the condition of knowing without\nbeing known by us, as the sun is the condition of our vision even\nthough we cannot bear the direct sight of it. The Book on the\nScience of Metaphysics ends with the announcement of a treatise\non political philosophy to follow, entitled The Conditions of the\nPerfect State and its Consequences: if people are educated to\ngrew up in virtues, it will be possible to realize al-madina\nal-fadila, the Farabian perfect state.", "This overview of the reception and use of the Greek and Arabic\nsources by ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi in his Book on the\nScience of Metaphysics proves that, in the framework of\nal-Farabi’s awareness of the manifold nature of\nmetaphysics—ontology, knowledge of causes, universal science,\nand divine science or theology—the return to the Ancients, and\nto Aristotle, declared by ‘Abd al-Latif to be necessary in his\nbiography, was certainly not a return to the Aristotle of the Greek\nsources, linguistic access to which had by that time been lost for a\ncouple of centuries. Rather it was a return to the Aristotle of his\nown tradition: that strongly Neoplatonized Aristotle of the origins of\nthe Kindian falsafa. ‘Abd al-Latif’s treatise on\nmetaphysics is in fact deeply rooted in the whole set of Greek works\non first philosophy that had been translated or paraphrased into\nArabic under the impulse and direction of al-Kindi: in al-Kindi as in\n‘Abd al-Latif’s project where the knowledge of the causes\ncomes to coincide with a natural theology that investigates the First\nPrinciple, the De Providentia of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Proclus’ Elements of\nTheology, and the last three of Plotinus’ Enneads\nconstitute a natural development of book Lambda of\nthe Metaphysics." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Metaphysical Science as of Science of Sovereignty" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "‘Abd al-Latif’s attitude towards contemporary medicine\nand the practice of alchemy helps us understand his consideration for\nthe epistemology of the sciences, which must be based on universal\ngrounds as that of the Ancients, and it explains once more the primacy\n‘Abd al-Latif assigns to the philosophy of the Greeks which he\nconsidered the right way of thinking and therefore of acting." ], "section_title": "5. Good and bad Epistemologies and Practices", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "‘Abd al-Latif in the first part of his above mentioned\nautobiographical work (Joosse 2011, 2014) focuses on the\nepistemological status of the art of medicine using different\ncomparisons which seem to be in contradiction: medicine is like both\nmathematics and the art of archery (Joosse & Pormann\n2008). Medicine is an art concerned with universals. For this reason\nit does not make errors. Mathematics is also a science which considers\nabstract concepts, but even in this theoretical science approximation\noccurs (the examples are that of the impossibility of squaring a\ncircle and the approximation in writing an irrational\nnumber). Concerning the physicians, they are like the expert in the\nart of archery “who hits the mark in most cases” (Joosse\n2014: 66), but they can make mistakes because they are concerned with\nparticulars. Good physicians, even if they do not hit the target, do\nnot miss it entirely. For ‘Abd al-Latif his contemporaries are\nlike those whose arrows which do not hit the targets, but on the\ncontrary, fall in the opposite direction (Joosse & Pormann\n2010).", "The pitiful state of contemporary medicine, in contrast to the\nmedicine of the Ancients Hippocrates, Dioscorides and Galen, is caused\nfirst of all because the contemporaries do not follow a medical\nepistemology. ‘Abd al-Latif observes that, even in antiquity,\nmedical sects had existed which taught false medicine. ‘Abd\nal-Latif recalls, in particular, the Empirical and Methodist sects\nwhich were in opposition to the Dogmatic or Rationalist one, according\nto the classic tripartite division of medical schools which were known\nto Arabic authors due precisely to the Arabic translation of many\nintroductory works by Galen and pseudo-Galen. The Empirical sect of\nSceptical inspiration, in fact, was neither concerned to study the\nanatomical structure of the human body nor the internal secrets of\nillnesses. It rejected any possible analogy between the dead body and\nthe living body. It denied any general theory. The medicine which it\ntaught, therefore, translated itself into a medical practice totally\nalien to the anatomic-physiological basis of symptoms and was wholly\nlinked to clinical phenomena and the classification of symptoms and\nmedicines. The Methodist sect of Stoic and Epicurean inspiration, for\nwhich human life was the natural place for moral and physical\nsuffering, held that the human body was formed of atoms which could\nnot be perceived by the senses and which were in continual movement\nthrough pores and channels. According to this sect, illness came about\nin the case of an alteration in the quality and the movement of the\ncorpuscles or in the case of an excessive tightening or relaxing of\nthe pores through which the atoms moved. Therapy, therefore, was\nreduced to baths designed to provoke sweat in cases of the tightening\nof the pores and astringents and tonics in the case of dilation, in\norder to return to an intermediate perviousness. ‘Abd al-Latif\nholds that the above sects are far removed from the medicine practiced\nby the Dogmatic doctors of Platonic and Aristotelian inspiration who\nconsidered anatomy and physiology to be the basic sciences and for\nwhom the detailed study of the internal causes of an illness was\nprimary and necessary. Nevertheless, the criteria followed by the\nEmpirical and the Methodist sects were thus far scientific: the\nphysicians followed a theory and did not proceed by pure and simple\nsupposition, as most contemporary physicians did (Joosse & Pormann\n2010).", "In ‘Abd al-Latif’s opinion, the medicine of his age\nmust rediscover and apply Greek medicine with its principles,\ndescriptions of diseases, and therapies. Greek theoretical medicine is\nconcerned with universals and is founded on the ground of universal\nprinciples which are valid everywhere. In this respect, according to\nhim, Greek medicine is far superior to his contemporaries’\npractice and must be learned by the physicians of his age according to\nthe principle of accumulation of knowledge which also guides\n‘Abd al-Latif’s philosophical project. 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Paraphrase de la\nMétaphysique d’Aristote (Livre Lambda), traduit de\nl’hébreu et de l’arabe, Vrin: Paris.", "Cahen, C., 1970, “‘Abdallatif al-Baghdadi,\nportratiste et historien de son temps, Extraits inédits de\nses Mémoires”, Bulletin\nd’Études orientales, 23: 101–128.", "De Sacy, S., 1810, Relation de l’Égypte par\nAbd-Allatif, médecin arabe de Bagdad [1162–1231 AD],\nParis: Imprimerie Impériale (Reprint Frankfurt am Main:\nPublications of the Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic\nScience at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, 1992).", "Fedouache, N., Y. Ajoun and F. Ben Ahmed, 2018, Muwaffaq al-Din ‘Abd al-Latif ibn Yunus al-Bagdadi.Al-A‘mal al-falsafiyya al-kamila, al-juz’ al-awwal, Beirut Borj El Kiffan: Edition Difaf & Edition El-ikhtilef.", "Genequand, C., 2001, Alexander of Aphrodisias on the\nCosmos, Arabic Text with English Translation, Introduction and\nCommentary, Leiden: Brill.", "Ghalioungui, P. and S. Abdou, 1972,‘Abd al-Latif\nal-Baghdadi, Maqala fi-l-Hawass wa-masa’il tabi‘iyya,\nRisala li-l-Iskandar, Risala fi l-marad al-musamma diyabita\n(Essay on the Senses and Two Questions on their Function, Questions on\nNatural History, On Specific Difference, On Diabetes), Kuwait:\nGovernment Press.", "Gibb, H.A.R., 1927, “Life of Muwaffiq ad-Din Abd al-Latif of\nBaghdad by Ibn Abi Usaybiya”, in Healing through Spirit\nAgency by the Great Persian Physician Abduhl Latif (‘The Man of\nBaghdad’) and Information concerning the Life Hereafter of the\ndeepest Interest to all Enquirers and Students of Psychic\nPhenomena, R.H. Saunders (ed.), London: Hutchinson & Co.", "Ibn Abi Usaybi‘a, Kitab ‘Uyun al-anba’ fi\ntabaqat al-atibba’ (Sources of Information on the Classes\nof Physicians), A. Müller (ed.), al-Qahira: al-Matba‘at\nal-wahbiyya, 1882–1884.", "–––, ‘Uyun al-anba’ fi tabaqat\nal-atibba’ (Sources of Information on the Classes of\nPhysicians), A.R. Nizar Rida (ed.), Bayrut: Dar al-Maktabat al-Hayat,\n1965.", "Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi, Fawat al-wafayat (What was omitted\nin the Obituaries), I. ‘Abbas (ed.), Bayrut: Dar al-Sadir,\n1974.", "Ibn al-Nadim, Kitab al-fihrist (Catalogue), in G. Flügel,\nJ. Rödiger, and A. Müller (eds), Leipzig: Vogel,\n1871–72.", "–––, Kitab al-fihrist (Catalogue), R. Tagaddud\n(ed.), Tihran: Marvi Offset Printing, 1973.", "Ibn al-Qifti, Inbah al-ruwat ‘ala anbah al-nuhat\n(Information of the Narrators on Renowned Grammarians), M. Abu l-Fadl\nIbrahim (ed.), al-Qahira: Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya,\n1950–55.", "–––, Ta’rikh al-hukama’\n(History of Learned Men), J. Lippert (ed.), Leipzig:\nDieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903.", " Joosse, N.P., 2014, The Physician as a Rebellious\nIntellectual. The Book of the two Pieces of Advice or Kitab\nal-Nasihatayn by ‘Abd al-Latif ibn Ibn Yusuf al-Baghdadi\n(1162–1231). Introduction, Edition and Translation of the\nMedical Section, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.", "Mahdi, M., 1961, al-Farabi, Philosophy of Aristotle,\nBeirut: Dar majallat Shi‘r.", "–––, 2001, Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and\nAristotle, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.", "Martini Bonadeo, 2017b, “The First ‘Proclean’ Section (Chapter 20) of ‘Abd al Latif al-Baghdadi’s Book on the Science of Metaphysics. It the Pure Good of the Mahd al-khayr Aristotle's First Principle, Intellect in Actuality?”, Oriens, 45 (3-4), 259–305.", "–––, 2018, “Una parafrasi araba di Metafisica Iota. Il capitolo undicesimo dal Libro sulla scienza della Metafisica di ‘Abd al Latif al-Baghdadi”, Studia graeco-arabica, 8, 269–286.", "Neuwirth, A., 1976, ‘Abd al Latif al-Baghdadi’s\nBearbeitung von Buch Lambda der aristotelischen Metaphysik,\nWiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH.", "–––, 1977–78, “Neue Materialen zur\nArabischen Tradition der beiden\nersten Metaphysik-Bücher”, Die Welt des\nIslams, 18 (1–2): 84–100.", "al-Radi, F.H., 1977,‘Abd al-Latif ibn Yusuf\nal-Baghdadi, Al-mujarrad li-lughat al-hadith (Compendium for\nthe Language of Hadith), Baghdad: Matba‘a al-Sa‘b.", "–––, 1979, “‘Abd al-Latif ibn Yusuf\nal-Baghdadi, Min kitab al-mujarrad li-lughat\nal-hadith”, al-Maurid, 8 (2): 121–136.", "Rashed, R., 2002, “‘Abd al-Latif ibn Yusuf\nal-Baghdadi, Fi l-Radd ‘ala Ibn Haytham\nfi l-makan; La réfutation du lieu d’Ibn\nHaytham”, in Les mathématiques\ninfinitésimales du IXe au XIe siècle, R. Rashed\n(ed.), London: Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, IV,\npp. 908–53.", "Rosenthal, F., 1975, The Classical Heritge in Islam, New\nYork London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.", "Rosenthal, F. and R. Walzer, 1943, Alfarabius De Platonis\nphilosophia, London: The Warburg Institute.", "Ruland, H.J., 1976, Die arabischen Fassungen von zwei\nSchriften des Alexanders von Aphrodisias. Über die Vorsehung und\nÜber das liberum Arbitrium, diss., Saarbrucken.", "–––, 1979, Zwei arabische Fassungen der\nAbhandlung des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die universalia\n(Quaestio I 11a), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &\nRuprecht.", " Taylor, R.C., 1984, “‘Abd al Latif\nal-Baghdadi’s Epitome of the Kalam fi Mahd al-Khayr\n(Liber de Causis)”, in Islamic Theology and\nPhilosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, M.E. Marmura\n(ed.), Albany NY: State of New York Press, pp. 286–323.", "Thies, H.J., 1971, Der Diabetestraktat ‘Abd al-Latif\nal-Baghdadi’s Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Krankheitsbildes\nin der arabischen Medizin, Bonn: Sebstverlag des Orientalischen\nSeminars der Universität.", "Thillet, P., 2003, Alexandre d’Aphrodise. Traité\nde la Providence. Περὶ\nΠρονοίας. Version arabe\nd’Abu Bishr Matta Ibn Yunus: édition et traduction,\nParis: Verdier.", "Wahl, S.F.G., 1790, ‘Abd al-Latif’s eines\narabischen Arztes Denkwürdigkeiten Ëgyptens,\nHalle.", "White, J., 1800, Abdollatiphi historiae Aegypti compendium,\nar. et lat. partim ipse vertit, partim a Pocockes versum edendum\ncuravit notisque illustravit, Oxford.", "Zand, K.H., J.A. Videan, and I.E. Videan, 1965, The Eastern\nkey: Kitab al-Ifadah wa-l-i‘tibar of ‘Abd al-Latif\nal-Baghdadi (‘Abd al-Latif Ibn-Yusuf Ibn-Muhammad\nal-Baghdadi), London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.", "Afnan, S.M., 1964, Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and\nPersian, Leiden: Brill.", "Anawati, G., 1956,“Prolégomènes à une\nnouvelle édition du De causis arabe (Kitab\nal-khayr al-mahd), in Mélanges Louis\nMassignon, Damas: Institut Français,\npp. 73–110.", "Ben Ahmed, F., 2019, “Fi munahadat Ibn Sina wa as-sinawiyya: ‘Abd-Allatif al-Baghdadi wa islah al-falsafa fi al-qarn at-thalith ‘ashar al-miladi” (Challenging Ibn Sina and the Avicennism. ‘Abd al\nLaṭif al-Baghdadi and the Reform of Philosophy in the 13th Century), Hespéris-Tamuda, 54: 129–164.", "Butterworth, C., 1980, “Review to A. Neuwirth, ‘Abd al\nLaṭif al-Baġdadi’s Bearbeitung von Buch Lambda der\naristotelischen Metaphysik, Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, Wiesbaden\n1976”, Journal Asiatique, 268: 198–199.", "D’Ancona, C., 1995, Recherches sur le Liber de\nCausis, Paris: Vrin.", "–––, 1996, La casa della sapienza. La\ntrasmissione della metafisica greca e la formazione della filosofia\naraba, Milano: Guerini e Associati (Revised Arabic Translation by\nI. Marjani, Casablanca: Éditions Toubkal, 2014).", "Degen, R., 1977, “Zum Diabetestraktat des ‘Abd\nal-Latif al-Baghdadi”, Annali dell’Istituto Orientale\ndi Napoli, 37: 455–462.", "Dietrich, A., 1967, “Ein Arzneimittelverzeichnis des\n‘Abdallatif ibn Yusuf al-Baghdadi”, in Der Orient in\nder Forscung. Festschrift für Otto Spies zum 5. April 1966,\nW. Hoenerbach (ed.), Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, pp. 42–60.", "El-Bizri, N., 2007, “In Defence of the Sovereignty of\nPhilosophy: al-Baghdadi’s Critique of Ibn Haytham’s\nGeometrisation of Place”, Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 17: 57–80.", "Endress, G., 1973, Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der\nInstitutio Theologica in Arabischer Übersetzung, Wiesbaden:\nFranz Steiner Verlag.", "–––, 2002, “Alexander Arabus on the First\nCause, Aristotle’s First Mover in an Arabic treatise attributed\nto Alexander of Aphrodisias”, in Aristotele e Alessandro di\nAfrodisia nella tradizione araba. Atti del colloquio La ricezione\naraba ed ebraica della filosofia e della scienza greche, Padova,\n14–15 maggio 1999, C. D’Ancona and G. Serra (eds),\nPadova: Il Poligrafo, pp. 19–74.", "Ephrat, D., 2000, A Learned Society in a Period of\nTransition. The Sunni ‘Ulama’ of Eleventh-Century\nBaghdad, Albany NY: State University of New York Press.", "Fazzo, S. and H. Wiesner, 1993, “Alexander of Aphrodisias in\nthe Kindi-Circle and in al-Kindi’s Cosmology”, Arabic\nSciences and Philosophy, 3: 119–153.", "Fenton, P., 1986, “The Arabic and Hebrew Version\nof Theology of Aristotle”, in Pseudo-Aristotle in\nthe Middle Ages. The Theology and other texts, J. Kraye,\nW.F. Ryan, and C.B. Schmitt (eds), London: The Warburg Institute,\npp. 241–264.", "Gannagé, E., 2011, “Médecine et philosophie\nà Damas à l’aube du XIIIème siècle:\nun tournant post-avicennien?”, Oriens, 39:\n227–256.", "Genequand, C., 1978, “Review to A. Neuwirth, ‘Abd al\nLatif al-Baghdadi’s Bearbeitung von Buch Lambda der\naristotelischen Metaphysik, Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH,\nWiesbaden 1976”, Der Islam, 55: 362–364.", "Gutas, D., 1980, “Editing Arabic Philosophical\nTexts”, Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, 75:\n214–222.", "–––, 1998, Greek Thought, Arabic\nCulture. The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early\n‘Abbasid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries),\nLondon New York: Routledge.", "–––, 2002, “The Heritage of Avicenna: the\nGolden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000–ca.1350”, in Avicenna\nand his Heritage. Acts of the International Colloquium,\nLeuven—Louvain-La-Neuve September 8–September 11, 1999,\nJ. Janssens and D. De Smet (eds), Leuven: University Press,\npp. 81–97.", "–––, 2011, “Philosophy in the Twelfth\nCentury: one View from Baghdad, or the Repudiation of\nal-Ghazali”, in In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in\nthe Sixth/Twelfth Century, P. Adamson (ed.), London Turin: The\nWarburg Institute - Nino Aragno Editore, pp. 9–26.", "Hasnawi, A., 1994, “Alexandre d’Aphrodise vs Jean\nPhilopon: Notes sur quelques traités d’Alexandre\n“perdus” en Grec, conservés en\nArabe”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 4,\n53–109.", "Jolivet, J., 1979, “Pour le dossier du Proclus Arabe:\nal-Kindi et la Théologie\nplatonicienne”, Studia Islamica, 49: 55–75.", "Joosse, N.P., 2007, “‘Pride and Prejudice, Praise and\nBlame’ ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi’s View on Bad and\nGood Medical Practioners”, in O ye Gentlemen: Arabic Studies\non Science and Literary Culture in Honour of Remke Kruk,\nA. Vrolijk and J.P. Hogendijk (eds), Leiden Boston: Brill,\npp. 129–141.", "–––, 2008, “Unmasking the Craft:\n‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi’s views on Alchemy and\nAlchemists”, in Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages. Studies\nin Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber,\nA. Akasoy and W. Raven (eds), Leiden Boston: Brill,\npp. 301–317.", "–––, 2011, “‘Abd al-Latif\nal-Baghdadi as a Philosopher and a Physician: Myth or Reality, Topos\nor Truth?”, in In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in\nthe Sixth/Twelfth Century, P. Adamson (ed.), London Turin: The\nWarburg Institute—Nino Aragno Editore, pp. 27–43.", "Joosse, N.P. and P.E. Pormann, 2008, “Archery, Mathematics,\nand Conceptualizing Inaccuracies in Medicine in 13th Century Iraq and\nSyria”, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 101:\n425–427.", "–––, 2010, “Decline and Decadence in Iraq\nand Syria after the Age of Avicenna? ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi\n(1162–1231) between Myth and History”, Bulletin of the\nHistory of Medicine, 84 (1): 1–29.", "–––, 2012, “‘Abd al-Latif\nal-Baghdadi’s Commentary on Hippocrates’\nPrognostic: A Preliminary Exploration”,\nin >Epidemics< in Context. Greek Commentaries on Hippocrates\nin the Arabic Tradition, P.E. Pormann (ed.), Berlin Boston: de\nGruyter, pp. 251–283.", "Kruk, R., 2008, “‘Abd al-Latif\nal-Baghdadi’s Kitab al-Ḥayawan: a\nChimaera?”, in Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages. Studies\nin Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber,\nA. Akasoy and W. Raven (eds), Leiden Boston: Brill,\npp. 345–362.", "Makdisi, G., 1981, The Rise of Colleges, Istitutions of\nLearning in Islam and the West, Edinburgh: University Press.", "Martini Bonadeo, C., 2001, “The Arabic version of book Alpha Meizon of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the testimony of. MS: Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, Ott. Lat. 2048”, in Les traducters au travail. leur manuscripts et leur méthodes. Actes du Colloque international organisé par le “Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture” (Erice 30 septembre - 6 octobre 1999), J. Hamesse (ed.), Turnout: Brepols, 2001, pp. 173–206.", "–––, 2002, “La tradizione araba\ndella Metafisica di Aristotele. Libri a–A”,\nin Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione\naraba. Atti del colloquio La ricezione araba ed ebraica della\nfilosofia e della scienza greche, Padova, 14–15 maggio\n1999, C. D’Ancona and G. Serra (eds), Padova: Il Poligrafo,\npp. 75–112.", "–––, 2005, “Avicenna: seguaci e\ncritici”, in Storia della filosofia nell’Islam\nmedievale, C. D’Ancona (ed.), Torino: Einaudi, II,\npp. 627–668.", "–––, 2010, “‘Abd al-Latif\nal-Baghdadi’s Reception of Book Beta of\nAristotle’s Metaphysics against the Background of the\nCompeting Readings by Avicenna and Averroes”, Documenti e\nstudi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 21:\n411–431.", "–––, 2013, ‘Abd al-Latif\nal-Baghdadi’s Philosophical Journey. From Aristotle’s\nMetaphysics to the ‘Metaphysical Science’, Leiden\nBoston: Brill.", "–––, 2017, “ “Vi racconterò delle meraviglie che ho veduto con i miei occhi”. 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Gibb Memorial Trust Series,\npp. 91–109.", "–––, 2004, “Travel in medieval Islamic\nWorld: the Importance of Patronage as illustrated by ‘Abd\nal-Latif al-Baghdadi (d. 629/1231) (and others\nlittérateurs)”, in Eastward Bound. Travel and\ntravellers 1050–1550, R. Allen (ed.), Manchester New York:\nManchester University Press, pp. 53–70.", "Van Ess, J., 1966, “Über einige neue Fragmente des\nAlexander von Aphrodisias und des Proklos in arabischer\nÜbersetzung”, Der Islam, 42: 148–68.", "Von Somogyi, J., 1937, “Ein arabischer Bericht über die\nTataren im Ta’rikh al-Islam von\nal-Dhahabi”, Der Islam, 24(2):\n105–130.", "Wiedeman, E., 1907, “Zur Alchemie bei den\nArabern”, Separatabdruck aus dem Journal für praktische\nChemie, 76: 65–123.", "Zimmermann, F.W., 1986, “The Origins of the So-called\nTheology of Aristotle”, in Pseudo- Aristotle in the Middle\nAges. The Theology and other texts, J. Kraye, W.F. Ryan, and\nC.B. Schmitt (eds), London: The Warburg Institute,\npp. 110–240.", "–––, 1994, “Proclus Arabus Rides\nAgain”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 4:\n9–51." ]	[ { "href": "../al-farabi/", "text": "al-Farabi" }, { "href": "../al-kindi/", "text": "al-Kindi" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-greek/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: Greek sources" }, { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../ibn-rushd/", "text": "Ibn Rushd [Averroes]" }, { "href": "../ibn-sina/", "text": "Ibn Sina [Avicenna]" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../plotinus/", "text": "Plotinus" }, { "href": "../proclus/", "text": "Proclus" }, { "href": "../theology-aristotle/", "text": "Theology of Aristotle" } ]
al-farabi	al-Farabi	First published Fri Jul 15, 2016; substantive revision Fri Jul 24, 2020	[ "\nWe know little that is really reliable about\nal-Fârâbî’s life. Abû Nasr\nal-Fârâbî was probably born in 870 CE (AH 257) in a\nplace called Farab or Farayb. In his youth he moved to Iraq and\nBaghdad. In 943 CE (AH 331) he went to Syria and Damascus. He may have\ngone to Egypt but died in Damascus in December 950 CE or January 951\nCE (AH 339). Scholars have disputed his ethnic origin. Some claimed he\nwas Turkish but more recent research points to him being a\nPersian (Rudolph 2017: 536–45). ", "\nAl-Fârâbî had two main interests:", "\nBeginning in the 1980s, much has happened in Farabian scholarship. New\nand better editions of his works as well as new and better\ntranslations have led to deeper studies of his thought and to some\ninteresting and lively controversies. More current bibliographies\nallow for more detailed research. We still lack critical editions,\nfull English translations—and even, at times, translation in any\nlanguage of several texts—as well as a solid introduction to\nal-Fârâbî’s philosophy. More research is also\nneeded to better understand the relation between his philosophical and\nmusical interests.", "\nOne can find the most recent and detailed listings of\nal-Fârâbî’s works and their translations in\nUlrich Rudolph, “Abû Nasr\nal-Fârâbî” (2017: 526–594), and Philippe\nVallat (2004: 379–87). Also, Jon McGinnis & David. C. Reisman\ntranslated a series of Farabian texts in their Classical Arabic\nPhilosophy: An Anthology of Sources (2007: 54–120)." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Language", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Mathematics and Music", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Physics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Ethics and Politics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Research Tools", "Primary Literature", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nIn what follows we will underline important scholarly developments of\nthe last thirty years and add useful complements to these listings. In\norder to highlight these scholarly developments we will follow the\ntraditional order of the Aristotelian sciences that\nal-Fârâbî himself offers in his Enumeration of\nthe sciences, ‘Ihsâ’\nal-‘ulûm, one of his most famous texts, as its\nMedieval Latin versions had much influence in the West. There is no\nfull English translation of this text, but Amor Cherni (2015)\npublished an edition with French translation and commentaries.\nRecently, a new critical edition with German translation of one of the two\nMedieval Latin versions have come out: Über die\nWissenschaften (de scientiis) Dominicus Gundissalinus’\nversion (2006). Alain Galonnier published a critical edition, French translation and study of the other Medieval latin version: Le De scientiis Alfarabii de Gerard de Cremone (2016). Following this\ntraditional theoretical order makes much sense since we know very\nlittle about the chronological order of\nal-Fârâbî’s works, even if there is some\nindication that The Opinions of the People of the Virtuous\nCity, also known as The Perfect State, and The\nPolitical Regime, also known as The Principles of the\nBeings, may be among his latest works. The paucity of serious\ninformation about the chronological order of\nal-Fârâbî’s works makes it difficult to\ndetermine whether some inconsistencies and tensions between different\nworks result from an evolution in his thought, as Damien Janos claims (2019, pp. 166–70), or hint at a distinction\nbetween exoteric and esoteric treatises or simply arise from\nlimitations inherent to human nature that affect even the greatest\nphilosophers. As al-Fârâbî understood philosophy as\nall-encompassing and attempted to present coherent views, some works\nstraddle several philosophical disciplines and so we will indicate\nwhen such is the case. Al-Fârâbî’s knowledge\nof Aristotle’s works is extensive, and even includes some of his\nzoological treatises." ], "section_title": "1. Enumeration of the Sciences", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn the Enumeration of the Sciences\nal-Fârâbî first focuses on language, grammar,\nmetrics, etc. His Kitâb al-Hurûf (Book of Letters)\nor Particles, gives us much information on his views on\nlanguage. Muhsin Mahdi, who published the first edition of this text\nin 1969a based on a single manuscript, later on found two other manuscripts but could not complete a new edition. Making\nuse of the new material already gathered by Mahdi, Charles Butterworth\nhas prepared a second edition with facing full English\ntranslation to be published by Cornell University Press. Muhammad Ali Khalidi gave a partial English translation\ncovering the middle section (2005). Thérèse-Anne Druart\n(2010) began studying al-Fârâbî’s innovative\nviews of language. In Freiburg-im-Brisgau Nadja Germann (2015-16) and her team\nhave been working on language and logic in classical Arabic and are more and\nmore impressed by the sophistication of\nal-Fârâbî’s positions. As for\nal-Fârâbî, music is at the service of speech, the\nlast section of the Great Book of Music explains how\ntechnically to fit music to speech, i.e., poetry, in order to enhance\nthe meaning of a text. Azza Abd al-Hamid Madian’s 1992 Ph. D.\ndissertation for Cornell University, Language-music relationships\nin al-Fârâbî’s “Grand Book of\nMusic”, includes an English translation of this section." ], "section_title": "2. Language", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nNext to the study of language, al-Fârâbî considers\nlogic. For a long time the possibility of a serious study of\nal-Fârâbî’s logic remained somewhat elusive.\nEditions and translations of his logical works, except for his\n[‘Long’] Commentary on Aristotle’s De\nInterpretatione (Zimmerman 1981), were scattered in\nvarious journals and collective works often difficult to access. Many\nof these texts were more critically edited and gathered\nin al-mantiq ‘inda al-Fârâbî, ed. by\nRafîq al-‘Ajam and Majid Fakhry in 4\nvol. (1985–87). In 1987–89 Muhammad Taqî\nDânishpazuh published in Qumm a more complete collection of\nlogical texts, including a newly discovered part of a long commentary\non the Prior Analytics. Soon afterwards, two books on Farabian logic followed: Shukri\nB. Abed, Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in\nAlfârâbî (1991) and Joep\nLameer, Al-Fârâbî & Aristotelian\nSyllogistics: Greek Theory & Islamic Practice (1994). In 2006 Mauro Zonta published fragments of a long commentary\non the Categories in Hebrew, Arabic, and English translation. John\nWatt (2008) assessed the influence of the Syriac organon on\nal-Fârâbî and Kamran Karimullah (2014) dedicated a\nlengthy article to al-Fârâbî’s views on\nconditionals. Translations now are coming out: Alfarabi’s Book of Dialectic (Kitab al-Jadal) (David M. Di Pasquale, 2019), and Al-Farabi, Syllogism (Wilfird Hodges & Saloua Chatti, forthcoming), as well as further studies of al-Farabi’s logic by Saloua Chatti (2019) and papers by Terrence J. Kleven (2013) and Riccardo Strobino (2019).", "\nSome issues dealt with in logic are also relevant to ethics and\nmetaphysics. Al-Farabi sees logic as the path to happiness (Germann, 2015). He also discusses the issue of future contingents. If the truth\nvalue of statements on future contingents is immediately determined,\ni.e., before the event happens, then everything is predetermined and\nfreewill is an illusion. Aristotle treats of this issue in On\nInterpretation, 9. Al-Fârâbî discusses more\ncomplex aspects of this issue as he adds a consideration of\nGod’s foreknowledge and defends human freewill against some\ntheologians (see Peter Adamson (2006), “The Arabic Sea Battle:\nal-Fârâbî on the Problem of future\nContingents”).", "\nAs Deborah L. Black (1990) showed, following the Alexandrian\ntradition, philosophers in Islamic lands consider Rhetoric\nand Poetics as integral to logic proper and so parts of\nAristotle’s Organon. Lahcen E. Ezzaher (2008:\n347–91) translated the short commentary on the Rhetoric.\nFrédérique Woerther (2018) & Maroun Aouad are preparing a\nnew edition of some of al-Fârâbî’s texts on\nrhetoric. Stéphane Diebler in Philosopher à Bagdad\nau Xe siècle (2007) [in fact a very useful collection of\ntranslations of short Farabian works] gave a French translation of the\nthree very brief treatises al-Fârâbî dedicated to\nPoetics. Geert Jan van Gelder & Marlé Hammond (2008:\n15–23) translated one of these treatises, The Book of\nPoetics, into English, as well as a brief relevant passage in the\nfirst part of The Great Book of Music. Terrence J. Kleven (2019) studies The Canons of Poetry. Scholars interested in\npolitical philosophy have highlighted the distinctions\nal-Fârâbî makes between (1) demonstrative discourse,\nreflecting Aristotle’s positions in the Posterior\nAnalytics (in Arabic this text is known as The Book of\nDemonstration), and which alone is philosophical stricto\nsensu, (2) dialectical discourse, typical of the\n“mutakallimûn” or theologians and linked to\nAristotle’s Topics, and (3) rhetorical and poetical\ndiscourse, used in the Qur’ân or Jewish and Christian\nScriptures in order to address ordinary people. ", "\nGreat respect for Aristotle’s theory of demonstration led\nal-Fârâbî to attempt to fit any theoretical\ndiscipline in its framework, though some of them, such as music, do\nnot exclusively rest on necessary and universal primary principles, as\nthey also include principles derived from empirical observations\n(Miriam Galston, 2019). As music is dear to\nal-Fârâbî, it is in the first part of his Great\nBook on Music that we find the most extensive consideration of\nprimary empirical principles and their derivation from careful\nexamination of practice, i.e., in this case of musical\nperformances." ], "section_title": "3. Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAfter logic comes mathematics. For al-Fârâbî\nmathematical sciences include arithmetic, geometry, optics, astronomy,\nmusic, the science of weights and mechanics. Only recently has more\nattention be paid to this aspect of Farabian thought. Gad Freudenthal\n(1988) focused on al-Fârâbî’s views on\ngeometry. Except for pointing to al-Fârâbî’s\nrejection, in contradistinction to al-Kindî, of the validity of\nwhat we now call astrology, scholars had neglected his views on\nastronomy and cosmology. Damien Janos’s Method, Structure,\nand Development in al-Fârâbî’s Cosmology\n(2012) has filled this gap. His book throws new light on various\naspects of al-Fârâbî’s astronomy, cosmology,\nand philosophy of nature. It also highlights the link between\ncosmology and metaphysics. Johannes Thomann (2010–11) pointed to\na newly discovered commentary on the Almagest attributed to\nal-Fârâbî (Ms. Tehran Maglis 6531).", "\nIn the Enumeration al-Fârâbî follows the\ntraditional classification of music under mathematics. In The\nGreat Book of Music he certainly indicates that music derives\nsome of its principles from mathematics but he also insists, as we\nsaid above, on the importance of performance for determining its\nempirical principles. On some points the ear, rather than theoretical\nreflections, is the ultimate judge, even if at times the ear\ncontradicts some mathematical principle. For instance, he is well\naware that a semitone is not exactly the half of a tone. Of The\nGreat book of Music there exists only one full translation, that\nof Rodolphe d’Erlanger into French (originally published in\n1930–35 before the Arabic text was edited; reprint 2001). Only\npartial English translations exist. I referred to two of them: one in\nthe section on language and one in the logic section under poetics.\nGeorge Dimitri Sawa (2009) translated the two chapters on rhythm.\nAlison Laywine (McGill University), both a philosopher with excellent\nknowledge of Greek musical theories and a ‘Oud player, is\npreparing a full English translation of this complex and lengthy text.\nYet, The Great Book is not the only text\nal-Fârâbî dedicated to music. After having written\nit, dissatisfied with his explanation of rhythms, he subsequently\nwrote two shorter texts on rhythms (English translation of both by Sawa\n2009). Apparently al-Fârâbî invented a system of\nnotation for rhythms. In his Philosophies of Music in Medieval\nIslam Fadlou Shehadi (1995) dedicates his third chapter to\nal-Fârâbî. Thérèse-Anne Druart (2020) shows how al-Farabi links music to language, logic and even politics." ], "section_title": "4. Mathematics and Music", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAfter mathematics comes physics. We have only a few Farabian texts\ndealing with physics taken in the broadest sense and covering the\nwhole of natural philosophy. Paul Lettinck addresses some of\nal-Fârâbî’s views on physics in his\nAristotle’s Physics and its Reception in the Arabic\nWorld (1994) and Janos (2012) also does so. Marwan Rashed (2008)\nattempted a reconstruction of a lost treatise on changing beings.", "\nAl-Fârâbî wrote a little treatise rejecting the\nexistence of the vacuum by means of an experiment. Necati Lugal & Aydin Sayili (1951)\npublished the Arabic with an English translation.", "\nThe substantive Refutation of Galen’s Critique of\nAristotle’s Views on Human Organs merits serious studies.\n‘Abdurrahman Badawi edited it in his Traités\nphilosophiques (1983: 38–107). It shows\nal-Fârâbî’s interest in Aristotle’s\nzoological works and develops interesting parallels between the\nhierarchical structure of the organs of the human body, that of\ncosmology, that of emanation, and that of the ideal state. Badr El-Fakkak (2017) explains these parallels and Jawdath Jadour (2018) studies the structure of this text, which remains untranslated, and presents a new edition of al-Farabi’s Epistle on medicine. ", "\nPhysics includes Aristotle’s On the soul and scholars\nhave paid much attention to al-Fârâbî’s little\ntreatise On intellect (ed. by M. Bouyges, 1983). A full\nEnglish translation of this important treatise, of which there exist\ntwo Medieval Latin versions, was finally given by McGinnis &\nReisman in their Classical Arabic Philosophy (2007:\n68–78). Philippe Vallat published an extensive study of al-Farabi’s views on the intellect (2019a). The issue of the soul and the intellect is linked to logic, ethics, cosmology, and metaphysics. It also gives rise to a\ndebate. Earlier scholars considered that for\nal-Fârâbî universals are acquired by emanation from\nthe Agent Intellect, which for him is the tenth and last Intelligence,\neven if in many passages the second master uses the language of\nabstraction. Recently, Richard Taylor (2006 & 2010) argued that,\non the contrary, there is genuine abstraction in\nal-Fârâbî, even if in some ways it involves the\nemanative power of the Agent Intellect." ], "section_title": "5. Physics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nMetaphysics follows physics. It is not easy to assess\nal-Fârâbî’s understanding of metaphysics. The\nvery brief treatise, The Aims of Aristotle’s\nMetaphysics, insists that, contrary to what most people assume,\nmetaphysics is not a theological science but rather investigates\nwhatever is common to all existing beings, such as being and unity.\nMcGinnis and Reisman provide a full English translation in their\nClassical Arabic Philosophy (2007: 78–81). In 1989\nMuhsin Mahdi published the Arabic text of a short treatise On One\nand Unity. It is still untranslated but Damien Janos (2017) explained its structure and contents and Philippe Vallat (2019b) studied it. Many passages of The Book of Letters are of\ngreat metaphysical import as Stephen Menn (2008) showed. These texts\nraise the question of the exact relation between logic and\nmetaphysics, as, for instance, both disciplines treat of the\ncategories (see Thérèse-Anne Druart (2007) & Kristell Trego (2018)). Such texts\npresent an Aristotelian outlook focusing on ontology that sharply\ndistinguishes metaphysics from Kalâm and seem to leave limited\nspace for philosophical theology and Neo-Platonic descent in\nparticular.", "\nOn the other hand, both The Opinions of the People of the Perfect\nCity and The Political Regime or The Principles of\nBeings begin with a metaphysical part presented as a Neo-Platonic\ndescent followed by a second part dealing with the organization of the\ncity or state and do not treat of being and unity as the most\nuniversal notions. The hierarchical structure of the ideal state\nmirrors the hierarchical emanationist structure presented in the first\npart. Walzer edited the former with an English translation under the\ntitle The Perfect State (1985) and Fauzi M. Najjar edited the\nlatter (1964). Charles Butterworth (2015) provided the first full\nEnglish translation of The Political Regime in The\nPolitical Writings, vol. II, pp. 27–94. The question of how\nexactly the ontology relates to the Neo-Platonic descent or emanation\nhas not yet been fully clarified, though The Enumeration of the\nSciences addresses both aspects. Furthermore, whether the\nNeo-Platonic descent grounds the political philosophy or metaphysics\nis simply a rhetorical appeal to make\nal-Fârâbî’s controversial political and\nphilosophical views palatable to religious authorities and ordinary\npeople is a hotly debated issue. Disciples of Leo Strauss and of\nMuhsin Mahdi divide al-Fârâbî’s views into\nexoteric ones for a broad audience and esoteric ones written for an\nintellectual elite. The exoteric are more compatible with the\nreligious views and speak, for instance, of an immortality of the\nhuman soul, whereas such views are deliberately muted in esoteric\nwritings (below we will see that a lost treatise of\nal-Fârâbî may have denied the immortality of the\nsoul). Among the most recent “Straussian” positions on\nthis debate one can find two papers by Charles E. Butterworth: (1)\n“How to Read Alafarabi” (2013), and (2)\n“Alfarabi’s Goal: Political Philosophy, Not Political\nTheology” (2011). Recently, Philippe Vallat (2019c) attempted to clarify what al-Farabi means by “esoterism,” Some other scholars such as Dimitri Gutas, S. Menn\nand Th.-A. Druart take Farabian metaphysics, including the\nNeo-Platonic descent as at the core of\nal-Fârâbî’s works, even if in his\nPhilosophy of Aristotle, al-Fârâbî treats\nlittle of metaphysics. We will say more on this controversy in\npresenting ethics and politics, which in the Farabian classification\nof sciences, follow metaphysics." ], "section_title": "6. Metaphysics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAl-Fârâbî dealt little with ethics, but part of the\ncontroversy stems from what we may know of his lost Commentary on\nthe Nicomachean Ethics, his main foray in Ethics. Despite the\nexistence of an Arabic translation of Aristotle’s\nNicomachean Ethics (ed. by A. A. Akasoy & A. Fidora with\nan English translation by D.M. Dunlop, 2005), we see few signs of its\ninfluence in al-Fârâbî’s extant writings. Yet,\nal-Fârâbî wrote on it a lost commentary, to which\nthree Andalusian philosophers, Ibn Bâjja, Ibn Tufayl and\nAverroes, refer. According to them, therein\nal-Fârâbî denied the immortality of the human soul\nas well as the possibility of any conjunction with the active or Agent\nIntellect, considering them tall tales. Yet, in many other works, such\nas the Treatise on the Intellect, the Opinions, and\nthe Political Regime, he claims that this conjunction is\npossible and constitutes ultimate happiness. If what the Andalusian\nphilosophers report, presents an accurate reading of this lost text,\nthen the disciples of Leo Strauss may have some justification in reading\nal-Fârâbî’s works as divided between exoteric\nand esoteric ones since the content of this work would contradict\nviews in more popular texts, such as the Opinions in which\nthe Neo-Platonic influence is the strongest. Neo-Platonic metaphysics,\nconstrued mainly as the descent and emanation, would provide an\nexoteric view good for a more general public, but denied in the\nesoteric works reserved for an intellectual elite. Chaim\nMeir Neria (2013) published two quotations from this commentary (in\nHebrew translation and with English translation) that have been newly\ndiscovered and gave a summary of the issue. ", "\nThough we do not have any ethical text from\nal-Fârâbî relying mainly on the Nicomachean\nEthics, Marwan Rashed (2019) discussed his ethical outlook in relying on the Attainment of Happiness. We do have a brief ethical treatise in the tradition of\nHellenistic ethics, Directing Attention to the Way of\nHappiness or Tanbîh (not to be confused with the\nAttainment of Happiness or Tahsîl), which is\npropaedeutic to the study of philosophy proper and of logic in\nparticular (English translation in McGinnis & Reisman’s\nClassical Arabic Philosophy (2007: 104–20)). This\ntreatise (1) incites the student to curb his passions in order to be\nable to focus on his studies and (2) encourages him to begin the study\nof philosophy and of logic in particular. It is obviously\npre-philosophical and serves as introduction to a Farabian elementary\nintroduction to logic The Utterances Employed in Logic\n(Mahdi’s edition, 1968;\nno English translation). Al-Fârâbî’s\nconception of truly philosophical ethics remains unclear as we have so\nlittle extended textual basis to establish it. Janne Mattila (2017) compared the philosopher’s ethical progression in al-Farabi and in al-Razi. Ethics, when treating of our relations with other people, implies intersubjectivity, but al-Farabi, though not treating it much in what concerns this life, offers an interesting picture of it in the afterlife (Druart, 2017).", "\nAl-Fârâbi’s political philosophy fared much better\nand has attracted much attention from many scholars. According to\nThe Enumeration, it also includes kalâm, i.e.,\nnon-philosophical theology, and fiqh or Islamic law. Many\nFarabian political works have been translated into English. Muhsin\nMahdi translated three of them in Philosophy of Plato and\nAristotle (1969b; reprint 2001), which contains The Attainment\nof Happiness, The Philosophy of Plato, and The\nPhilosophy of Aristotle. These three texts form a trilogy.\nCharles E. Butterworth in, The Political Writings, vol. I\n(2001), translated Selected Aphorisms, part V of The\nEnumeration of the Sciences, Book of Religion, and\nThe Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the\nDivine and Aristotle and in vol. II (2015), Political\nRegime and Summary of Plato’s Laws. ", "\nAl-Fârâbî does not take inspiration from\nAristotle’s Politics (a text which does not seem to\nhave been translated or summarized into Arabic) but rather takes some\ninspiration from Plato’s Republic and Laws,\neven if his access to these two texts may have been rather limited, as\nthere is some doubt that a full Arabic translation of them ever\nexisted. Though Averroes wrote a commentary of sort on the\nRepublic, its brevity and content do not testify to an\nin-depth knowledge of the whole text. Yet, David C. Reisman (2004)\ndiscovered an Arabic translation of a single passage from the\nRepublic (VI, 506d3–509b10). As for the Laws,\nwe certainly have al-Fârâbî’s Summary of\nPlato’s Laws, but this text (Arabic ed. by Th.-A. Druart\n(1998) and English translation by Butterworth, in The Political\nWritings, II, (2015: 129–73)) is very brief and covers only\nthe first eight books. Whether this summary relies on a full or\npartial Arabic translation of the Laws or on a translation of\na Greek summary, possibly that of Galen (lost in Greek), at this stage\ncannot be determined. For the latest status quaestionis about\nArabic translations of Plato’s works and their paucity, see\nDimitri Gutas (2012). Al-Fârâbî’s own brief\nPhilosophy of Plato does not exhibit detailed knowledge of\nPlato’s works.", "\nThough al-Fârâbî’s political philosophy takes\nsome inspiration from Plato, it much transforms it in important and\ninteresting ways to reflect a very different world and adapt it to it.\nInstead of a monolingual and monoethnic city state,\nal-Fârâbî envisions a vast multicultural,\nmultilingual, and multireligious empire (Alexander Orwin, 2017). He also sees the necessity to\nmake of the philosopher king a philosopher prophet ruler. ", "\nAl-Fârâbî’s Summary of Plato’s\nLaws caused much controversy, which Butterworth narrates in the\nintroduction to his translation (2015: 97–127). In 1995 Joshua\nParens, making use of a draft of Druart’s edition, published\nMetaphysics as Rhetoric: Alfarabi’s Summary of\nPlato’s “Laws”. He argued that\nal-Fârâbî takes metaphysics, or maybe more exactly\nspecial metaphysics or the Neo-Platonic descent, i.e., what treats of\nimmaterial beings rather than ontology, as a form of rhetoric, and\nthat such was already the case for Plato. Whether or not we should\nread Plato as Parens and other Straussians claim\nal-Fârâbî understood him is a hotly debated\nquestion. ", "\nMarwan Rashed (2009) introduced a new element in the controversy by\nputting into serious doubt the authenticity of\nal-Fârâbî’s Harmonization of the Opinions\nof the Two Sages. Following an Alexandrian tradition, this\ntreatise (for Butterworth’s 2001 English translation, see above)\nargues that, despite a series of issues on which Aristotle and Plato\nseem to contradict each other, there is remarkable harmony between\nthese two sages, as one can easily resolve such contradictions. This\ntext also refers 1. to the so-called Aristotle’s Theology,\nwhich in fact Aristotle never wrote, as it derives from Plotinus, and 2. to Proclus Arabus, as Peter Adamson (forthcoming) shows. On\nthe other hand, Cecilia Martini Bonadeo, in her 2008 critical edition\nand Italian translation of this text (al-Fârâbî,\nL’armonia delle opinioni dei due sapienti, il divino Platone\ne Aristotele), argued for the Farabian authenticity of this text.\nWhether one accepts the Farabian authorship of this text affects\none’s understanding of the whole controversy of how to read\nal-Fârâbî, as well as one’s understanding of\nthe relationship between his Aristotelianism and his Neo-Platonism. It\nalso makes the whole issue of the relationship between his metaphysics\nand his political philosophy still more complex and convoluted.", "\nAmong the most recent developments, expressed in various articles, on\nthe Straussian side, let us point to Butterworth’s “How to\nRead Alfarabi” (2013) and “Alfarabi’s Goal:\nPolitical Philosophy, Not Political Theology” (2011) to which I\nreferred earlier. On the other side, we can point to Charles\nGenequand’s “Théologie et philosophie. La\nprovidence chez al-Fârâbî et\nl’authenticité de l’Harmonie des opinions des\ndeux sages” (2012), which objects to M. Rashed’s\ndeclaring the Harmonization inauthentic, and his (2013)\n“Le Platon d’al-Fârâbî”. Amor\nCherni (2015), on the other hand, published a book on the\nrelation between politics and metaphysics in\nal-Fârâbî (La cité et ses opinions:\nPolitique et métaphysique ches Abû Nasr\nal-Fârâbî), which includes an appendix\nrejecting the authenticity of The Harmonization. " ], "section_title": " 7. Ethics and Politics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThough we now have more decent editions of\nal-Fârâbî’s texts and more complete\ntranslations, in English and in French in particular, many such\neditions and translations are scattered in various books and journals.\nGathering all of al-Fârâbî’s available texts\nis no mean accomplishment. If Oxford University Press would publish\nThe Philosophical Works of al-Fârâbî, as it\ndid for al-Kindî in 2012 (one volume, ed. by P. Adamson &\nP.E. Pormann), beginning with those still untranslated or not fully\ntranslated into English, as well as those whose English translation is\nhidden in rare books or unusual journals, we would be eternally\ngrateful, but we are well aware that it would require several volumes\nand much time. ", "\nSome texts still need to be better edited. Some texts are not\ntranslated at all into any European language or not yet into English.\nScholars do not always seem fully aware of what is available and what\nother scholars have said. Much more work still needs to be done, but a\nclearer and more complex picture of\nal-Fârâbî’s works is emerging. It highlights\ntheir breadth and sophistication, even if we still have trouble\npiecing together all the parts. " ], "section_title": "8. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Al-Mawrid (Special Issue on Al-Farabi), 4(3), 1975.", "Chavooshi, Jafar Aghayani, Al-Fârâbî: An\nAnnotated Bibliography, Tehran, 1976. ", "Cunbur, Müjgan, Ismet Ninark & Nejat Sefercioglu,\nFârâbî Bibliyografyasi, Ankara: Bashakanhk\nBasimevi, 1973. ", "Daiber, Hans, Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy (from\nthe 15th Century to 1999) 2 vol., Leiden: Brill, 1999 and\nits\nSupplement, Leiden: Brill, 2007, much complete and update\nthese pioneers works. ", "Druart, Thérèse-Anne, \nBrief Bibliographical Guide in Medieval and Post-Classical Islamic Philosophy and Theology, \n available online in yearly installments and includes a section on\n al-Fârâbî. ", "Rescher, Nicholas, Al-Fârâbî: An Annotated\nBibliography, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962.", "Alon, Ilai and Shukri B. Abed, \nAl-Fârâbî’s Philosophical Lexicon, 2\nvolumes (volume I: Arabic Text; volume II: English translation).\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 (provides\nal-Fârâbî’s own definitions of technical\nphilosophical terms).", "al-‘Ajam, Rafîq & Majid Fakhry (eds.),\n1985–87, al-Fârâbî, al-mantiq ‘inda\nal-Fârâbî, in 4 volumes, Beirut: Dar\nal-Mashriq.", "Badawi, ‘Abdurrahman, 1983, Traites philosophiques par\nal-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Bajjah & Ibn ‘Adyy, 3rd\nedition, Beirut: Dar Al-Andaloss.", "Bonadeo, Cecilia Martini (ed.), 2008,\nal-Fârâbî, L’armonia delle opinioni dei\ndue sapienti, il divino Platone e Aristotele, Pisa: Plus.", "Bouyges, Maurice (trans. and ed.), 1983, Alfarabi, Risalat\nfi’l-‘Aql, 2nd edition, Beirut: Imprimerie\nCatholique.", "Butterworth, Charles E. (ed. and trans.), 2001, Alfarabi, The\nPolitical Writings: “Selected Aphorisms” and Other\nTexts (Volume I), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.", "––– (ed. and trans.), 2015, Alfarabi, The\nPolitical Writings: “Political Regime” and “Summary\nof Plato’s Laws” (Volume II), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University\nPress. ", "––– (ed. and trans.), forthcoming, Alfarabi,\nBook of Letters, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.", "Chatti, Saloua & Hodges, Wilfrid (trans.), forthcoming,\nAl-Farabi, Syllogism: An Abdrigement of Aristotle’s Prior\nAnalytics, London: Bloomsbury.", "Cherni, Amor (trans. and ed.), 2015, al-Fârâbî,\nLe recensement des sciences, Paris: Al Bouraq. ", "Dânishpazuh, Muhammad Taqî (ed.), 1987–89,\nal-Fârâbî, al-mantiqiyyât\nlilfârâbî, 3 volumes, Qumm: Matba‘at\nBahman.", "Diebler, Stéphane (trans), 2007,\nal-Fârâbî, Philosopher à Bagdad au Xe\nsiècle, introduction by Ali Benmakhlouf, glossary by\nPauline Koetschet, Paris: Seuil.", "DiPasquale, David M. (trans.), 2019, Alfarabi’s Book of\nDialectic (Kitab al-Jadal): On the Starting Point of Islamic\nPhilosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Druart, Thérèse-Anne (ed.), 1998, “Le\nSommaire du livre des ‘Lois’ de Platon”,\nBulletin d’Études Orientales, 50:\n109–55;", "d’Erlanger, Rodolphe (trans.), 1930–35, La\nmusique arabe: Al-Fârâbî, Grand Traité de la\nMusique, vol. I–II, Paris: Geuthner,\nreprint (Paris: 2001).", "Ezzaher, Lahcen E. (ed.), 2008, “Alfarabi’s Book\nof Rhetoric: An Arabic-English translation of Alfarabi’s\nCommentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric”,\nRhetorica, 26(4): 347–91. ", "––– (transl.), 2015, Three Arabic Treatises\non Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” (translation,\nintroduction, & notes), Carbondale: Southern Illinois University\nPress , pp. 12–49.", "Galonnier, A. (ed. and trans.), 2016, Le ‘De\nscientiis Alfarabii’ de Gérarde de Crémone:\nContributions aux problèmes de l’acculturation au XIIe\nsiècle. Étude introductive et édition critique,\ntraduite et annotée, Turnhout: Brepols.", "van Gelder, Geert Jan & Marlé Hammond (trans. and\neds), 2008, Takhyîl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic\nPoetics, Exeter: Gibb Memorial Trust, pp. 15–23.", "Gundissalinus, Dominicus [ca. 1150] (transl.), 2006,\nal-Fârâbî, Über die Wissenschaften (de\nscientiis), Jakob Hans Josef Schneider (ed.), Freiburg: Herder .", "Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (ed. and trans.), 2005,\nal-Fârâbî, “The Book of Letters”, in his\nMedieval Islamic Philosophical Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, pp. 1–26.", "Lugal, Necati & Aydin Sayili, 1951, “Maqâla\nfî l-Khalâ”, Belleten (Türk Tarih\nKurumu), 15: 1–16 & 21–36. ", "Mahdi, Muhsin (ed.), 1968, al-Fârâbi, Utterances\nEmployed in Logic, introduction and notes, Beirut: Dar\nel-Mashreq.", "––– (ed.), 1969a, Alfarabi’s Book of\nLetters (Kitab al-Huruf), Arabic text, introduction and notes,\nBeirut: Dar el-Mashreq.", "––– (ed.), 1969b, Alfarabi’s Philosophy of\nPlato and Aristotle, translated with an introduction,\n2nd edition, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press;\nreprinted 2002.", "––– (ed.), 1989, Alfarabi’s On One and\nUnity, Casablanca: Toubkal .", "McGinnis, Jon & David C. Reisman (eds.), 2007, Classical\nArabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources, Indianapolis: Hackett\nPublishing, pp. 54–120.", "Najjar, Fauzi M. (ed.), 1964,\nAl-Fârâbî’s The Political Regime,\nwith introduction & notes, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique .", "Neria, Cahim Meir, 2013,\n“Al-Fârâbî’s Lost Commentary on the\nEthics: New Textual Evidence”, Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 23(1): 69–99. ", "Rashed, Marwan, 2008, “Al-Fârâbî’s\nlost treatise On changing beings and the possibility of a\ndemonstration of the eternity of the world”, Arabic Sciences\nand Philosophy, 18(1): 19–58.", "Sawa, George Dimitri, 2009, Rhythmic Theories and Practices\nin Arabic Writings to 339 AH/950 CE : Annotated translations and\ncommentaries, Ottawa: The Institute of Mediaeval Music. ", "Sayili, Aydin, 1951, “Al-Farabi’s Article on Vacuum”,\nBelleten (Turk Tarih Kurumu), 15: 151–74.", "Walzer, Richard (ed. and trans.), 1985, Al-Faradi on the\nPerfect State, with introduction and commentary, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Zimmerman, F.W., 1981, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short\nTreatise on Aristotle’s “De interpretatione”\n(translation, introduction & notes), London: British\nAcademy. ", "[Aristotle] Akasoy, A.A. & A. Fidora (eds.), 2005, The\nArabic Version of the “Nicomachean Ethics”, with an\nEnglish translation by D.M. Dunlop, Leiden: Brill.", "[al-Kindî] Adamson, Peter and Peter E. Pormann (ed.), 2012,\nThe Philosophical Works of al-Kindi (Studies in Islamic\nPhilosophy), Karachi: Oxford University Press.", "Abed, Shukri B., 1991, Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic\nLanguage in Alfârâbî, Albany, NY: SUNY\nPress.", "Adamson, Peter, 2006, “The Arabic Sea Battle:\nal-Fârâbî on the Problem of future\nContingents”, Archiv für Geschichte der\nPhilosophie, 88: 163–88.", "–––, forthcoming, “Plotinus Arabus and\nProclus Arabus in the Harmony of the Two Philosophers Attributed to\nal-Farabi,” in Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes\n(Volume II: Translations and Acculturations), Dragos Calma (ed.),\nLeiden: Brill.", "Black, Deborah L., 1990, Logic and Aristotle’s\n“Rhetoric” and “Poetics” in Medieval Arabic\nPhilosophy, Leiden: Brill.", "Butterworth, Charles E., 2011, “Alfarabi’s Goal:\nPolitical Philosophy, Not Political Theology”, in Islam, the\nState, and Political Authority: Medieval Issues and Modern\nConcerns, Asma Afsaruddin (ed.), New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan\nUS, pp. 53–74.", "–––, 2013, “How to Read Alafarabi”,\nin More Modoque: Festschrift for Miklós Maróth,\nedited by P. Fodor et alii, Budapest: Research Centre for the\nHumanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, pp. 33–41.", "Chatti, Saloua, 2019, Arabic Logic from al-Farabi to Averroes: A\nStudy of the Early Arabic Categorical, Modal and Hypothetical\nSyllogistics, Basel: Birkhhauser.", "Cherni, Amor, 2015, La cité et ses opinions: Politique\net métaphysique chez Abû Nasr\nal-Fârâbî, Paris: Albouraq. ", "Daiber, Hans, 1983, “Fârâbîs Abhandlung\nüber das Vakuum: Quellen und Stellung in der islamischen\nWissenschaftsgeschichte”, Der Islam, 60(1):\n37–47.", "Druart, Thérèse-Anne, 2007,\n“Al-Fârâbî, the categories, metaphysics, and\nThe Book of Letters”, Medioevo, 32:\n15–37.", "–––, 2010, “Al-Fârâbî:\nAn Arabic Account of the Origin of Language and of Philosophical\nVocabulary”, Proceedings of the American Catholic\nPhilosophical Association, 84: 1–17. ", "–––, 2017, “Al-Farabi on Intersubjectivity\nin This Life and Thereafter,” in Promisa nec aspera\ncurrans, Georgio Rahal & Heinz-Otto Luthe (eds.), Toulouse:\nLes Presses Universitaires, pp. 341–54.", "–––, 2020, “What Does Music Have to Do\nwith Language, Logic, and Rulership? Al-Farabi’s Answer,”\nin The Origin and Nature of Language and Logic: Perspectives in\nMedieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought, Nadja Germann\n& Steven Harvey (eds.), Turnhout: Brepols, pp. 193–210.", "El-Fekkak, Badr, 2017, “Cosmic, Corporeal and Civil\nRegencies: al-Farabi’s anti-Galenic Defence of Hierarchical\nCardiocentrism,” in Philosophy and Medicine in the Formative\nPeriod of Islam, Peter Adamson & Peter E. Pormann (eds.), London:\nThe Warburg Institute, pp. 255–68. ", "Freudenthal, Gad, 1988, “La philosophie de la\ngéométrie d’al-Fârâbî. Son\ncommentaire sur le début du Ier et le début du Ve livre\ndes Éléments d’Euclide”,\nJerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 11:\n104–219.", "Galston, Miriam, 2019, “The Origin of the Primary\nPrinciples: The Role of Nature and Experience,” in The\nPilgrimage of Philosophy, Rene M. Paddags, Waseem El-Rayes &\nGregory A. McGrayer (eds.), South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press,\npp. 114–35.", "Genequand, Charles, 2012, “Théologie et philosophie.\nLa providence chez al-Fârâbî et\nl’authenticité de l’Harmonie des opinions des\ndeux sages”, Mélanges de\nl’Université Saint-Joseph, 64: 195–211. ", "–––, 2013, “Le Platon\nd’al-Fârâbî”, in Lire les dialogues,\nmais lesquels et dans quel ordre? Définitions du corpus et\ninterprétations de Platon, A. Balansard & I. Koch\n(eds.), Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, pp. 105–15. ", "Germann, Nadja, 2015–16,\n“Imitation–Ambiguity–Discourse: Some Remarks on\nal–Farabi’s Philosophy of Language,” Melanges de\nl’Universite Saint–Joseph, 66: 135–66.", "–––, 2015, “Logic as the Path to\nHappiness: Al-Farabi and the Divisions of the Sciences,”\nQuaestio, 15: 15–30.", "Gutas, Dimitri, 2012 “Platon: Tradition arabe”, in\nDictionnaire des philosophes antiques, vol. V-b, Richard\nGoulet (ed.), Paris: CNRS, pp. 854–63. ", "Jabbour, Jawdath, 2018, “La structure du Contre Galien de\nFarabi et son epitre sur la medicine,” Documenti e\nStudi, 29: 89–123.", "Janos, Damien, 2012, Method, Structure, and Development in\nal-Fârâbî’s Cosmology, Leiden: Brill.\n", "–––, 2017, “Al-Farabi’s (d. 950) On the\nOne and Oneness: Some Preliminary Remarks on Its Structure, Contents,\nand Theological Implications,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic\nPhilosophy, Khaled El-Rouayheb & Sabine Schmidtke (eds.), Oxford:\nOxford University Press, pp. 101–28.", "–––, 2019, “The Role of Developmentalism\nin the Study of Arabic Philosophy: Overview and Some Methodological\nInsights,” in La Philosophie arabe a l’etude. Sens, limites\net defis d’une discipline modern (Studying Arabic Philosophy:\nMeaning, Limits, and Challenges of a Modern Discipline),\nJean-Baptiste Brenet & Olga Lizzini (eds.), Paris: Vrin,\npp. 113–78.", "Karimullah, Kamran, 2014, “Alfarabi on Conditionals”,\nArabic Sciences and Philosophy, 24(2): 211–67.", "Kleven, Terrence F., 2013, “Alfarabi’s Commentary on\nPorphyry’s Isagoge (Kitab Isaguji),” Schede Medievali,\n51: 41–52.", "–––, 2019, “Alfarabi’s Account of\nPoetry as a Logical Art in A Treatise on the Cannons of the Art of\nPoetry,” in The Pilgrimage of Philosophy, Rene M. Paddags,\nWaseem El-Rayes & Gregory A. McGrayer (eds.), South Bend, IN:\nSt. Augustine’s Press, pp. 136–52.", "Lameer, Joep, 1994, Al-Fârâbî &\nAristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory & Islamic Practice,\nLeiden: Brill. ", "Lettinck, Paul, 1994, Aristotle’s Physics and its\nReception in the Arabic World, Leiden: Brill.", "Madian, Azza Abd al-Hamid, 1992, Language-music relationships\nin al-Fârâbî’s “Grand Book of\nMusic”, Ph.D. dissertation for Cornell University.", "Mattila, Janne, 2017, “The Ethical Progression of the\nPhilosopher in al-Razi and al-Farabi,” Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 27(1): 115–37.", "Menn, Stephen, 2008, “Al-Fârâbî’s\nKitâb al-Hurûf and his analysis of the Senses of\nBeing”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 18(1):\n59–97. ", "Orwin, Alexander, 2017, Redifining the Muslim Community:\nEthnicoity, Religion, and Politics in the Thought of Alfarabi,\nPhiladelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.", "Parens, Joshua, 1995, Metaphysics as Rhetoric:\nAlfarabi’s “Summary of Plato’s\n‘Laws’”, Albany, NY: SUNY Press. ", "Rashed, Marwan, 2009, “On the Authorship of the Treatise\nOn the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages\nAttributed to al-Fârâbî”, Arabic Sciences\n& Philosophy, 19(1): 43–82. ", "–––, 2019, “Al-Farabi et le parachevement\nde l’Ethique a Nicomaque,” in Ethike Theoria, F. Masi,\nSt. Maso & C. Viano (eds.), Rome: Edizioni di storia e\nletteratura, pp. 301–38.", "Reisman, David C., 2004, “Plato’s Republic\nin Arabic: A Newly Discovered Passage”, Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 14(2): 263–300. ", "Rudolph, Ulrich, 2017, “Abû Nasr\nal-Fârâbî”, in Philosophy in the Islamic\nWorld, (Volume 1: 8th-–10th Centuries), Ulrich\nRudolph, Rotraud Hansberger & Peter Adamson (eds.), Leiden: Brill,\npp. 526–654.", "Shehadi, Fadlou, 1995, Philosophies of Music in Medieval\nIslam, Leiden: Brill.", "Taylor, Richard C., 2006, “Abstraction in\nal-Fârâbî”, Proceedings of the American\nCatholic Association, 80: 151–68", "–––, 2010, “The Agent Intellect as\n”Form for Us“ and Averroes’s Critique of\nal-Fârâbî”, in Universal Representation\nand the Ontology of Individuation, Gyula Klima & Alexander W.\nHall (eds.), Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing ,\npp. 25–44.", "Strobino, Riccardo, 2019, “Varieties of Demonstration in\nAlfarabi,” History & Philosophy of Logic, 40(1):\n22–41.", "Thomann, Johannes, 2010–11, “Ein\nal-Fârâbî zugeschriebener Kommentar zum Almagest\n(Ms. Tehran Maglis 6531)”, Zeitschrift für Geschichte\nder arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften, 19: 35–76.", "Vallat, Philippe, 2004: Farabi et l’École\nd’Alexandrie. Des prémisses de la connaissance à\nla philosophie politique, Paris: Vrin. ", "–––, 2019a, “L’intellect selon\nFarabi. La transformation du connaitre en etre,” in Noetique et\ntheorie de la connaissance dans la philosophie arabe du IXe au XIIe\nsiècle, Meryem Sebti & Daniel De Smet (eds.), Paris: Vrin,\npp. 211–41.", "–––, 2019b, “Le Livre del’Un et de\nl’Unite de Farabi: l’invention persane de la doctrine des\ntranscendantaux,” in Commenter au Moyen Age, Pascale\nBermon & Isabelle Moulin, Paris: Vrin, pp. 211–41.", "–––, 2019c, “L’esoterisme de Farabi\nexplique par lui-meme: nature et fonctions,” in La philosophie\narabe a l’etude, J.-B. Brent & O. Lizzini (eds.), Paris:\nVrin, pp. 545–611.", "Watt, John, 2008, “Al-Farabi and the History of the Syriac\nOrganon”, in Malphono w-Rabo d-Malphone (Gorgias\nEastern Christian Studies), George Anton Kiraz (ed.), Piscataway, NJ:\nGorgias Press, pp. 751–78. Reprinted separately in 2009,\n(Analecta Gorgiana 129), Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press.", "Woerther, Frederique, 2018, “Al-Farabi commentateur\nd’Aristote dans les Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotelis ex\nglosa Alpharabii,” in Commenting on Aristotle’s Rhetoric\nfrom Antiquity to the Present, F. Woerther (ed.), Leiden: Brill,\npp. 41–63.", "Zonta, Mauro, 2006, “Al-Fârâbî’s\nLong Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories in\nHebrew and Arabic. A Critical Edition and English Translation of the\nNewly-found Fragments”, in Studies in Arabic and Islamic\nCulture, II, B. Abrahamov (ed.), Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University\nPress , pp. 185–254." ]	[ { "href": "../al-farabi-soc-rel/", "text": "al-Farabi: philosophy of society and religion" }, { "href": "../al-farabi-psych/", "text": "al-Farabi: psychology and epistemology" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-metaphysics/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in: metaphysics" }, { "href": "../music/", "text": "music, philosophy of" } ]
al-ghazali	al-Ghazali	First published Tue Aug 14, 2007; substantive revision Fri May 8, 2020	[ "\nAl-Ghazâlî (c.1056–1111) was one of the\nmost prominent and influential philosophers, theologians, jurists, and\nmystics of Sunni Islam. He was active at a time when Sunni theology\nhad just passed through its consolidation and entered a period of\nintense challenges from Shiite Ismâ’îlite theology\nand the Arabic tradition of Aristotelian philosophy\n(falsafa). Al-Ghazâlî understood the importance\nof falsafa and developed a complex response that rejected and\ncondemned some of its teachings, while it also allowed him to accept\nand apply others. Al-Ghazâlî’s critique of twenty\npositions of falsafa in his Incoherence of the\nPhilosophers (Tahâfut al-falâsifa) is a\nsignificant landmark in the history of philosophy as it advances the\nnominalist critique of Aristotelian science developed later in 14th\ncentury Europe. On the Arabic and Muslim side\nal-Ghazâlî’s acceptance of demonstration\n(apodeixis) led to a much more refined and precise discourse\non epistemology and a flowering of Aristotelian logics and\nmetaphysics. With al-Ghazâlî begins the successful\nintroduction of Aristotelianism or rather Avicennism into Muslim\ntheology. After a period of appropriation of the Greek sciences in the\ntranslation movement from Greek into Arabic and the writings of the\nfalâsifa up to Avicenna (Ibn Sînâ,\nc.980–1037), philosophy and the Greek sciences were\n“naturalized” into the discourse of kalâm\nand Muslim theology (Sabra 1987). Al-Ghazâlî’s\napproach to resolving apparent contradictions between reason and\nrevelation was accepted by almost all later Muslim theologians and\nhad, via the works of Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126–98) and Jewish\nauthors, a significant influence on Latin medieval thinking." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Al-Ghazâlî’s Reports of the ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Al-Ghazâlî’s “Refutations” of ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. The Place of ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. The Ethics of the ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Cosmology in the ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Causality in al-Ghazâlî", "sub_toc": [ "7.1 Occasionalism versus Secondary Causality", "7.2 The 17th Discussion of the Incoherence", "7.3 Two Different Concepts of the Modalities", "7.4 The Cum-Possibility of Occasionalism and Secondary Causality" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Texts", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nLater Muslim medieval historians say that Abû Hâmid\nMuhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazâlî was born in 1058 or 1059\nin Tabarân-Tûs (15 miles north of modern Meshed, NE Iran),\nyet notes about his age in his letters and his autobiography indicate\nthat he was born in 1055 or 1056 (Griffel 2009, 23–25).\nAl-Ghazâlî received his early education in his hometown of\nTus together with his brother Ahmad (c.1060–1123 or\n1126) who became a famous preacher and Sufi scholar. Muhammad went on\nto study with the influential Ash’arite theologian\nal-Juwaynî (1028–85) at the Nizâmiyya Madrasa in\nnearby Nishapur. This brought him in close contact with the court of\nthe Grand-Seljuq Sultan Malikshâh (reg. 1071–92) and his\ngrand-vizier Nizâm al-Mulk (1018–92). In 1091 Nizâm\nal-Mulk appointed al-Ghazâlî to the prestigious\nNizâmiyya Madrasa in Baghdad. In addition to being a confidante\nof the Seljuq Sultan and his court in Isfahan, he now became closely\nconnected to the caliphal court in Baghdad. He was undoubtedly the\nmost influential intellectual of his time, when in 1095 he suddenly\ngave up his posts in Baghdad and left the city. Under the influence of\nSufi literature al-Ghazâlî had begun to change his\nlifestyle two years before his departure (Griffel 2009, 67). He\nrealized that the high ethical standards of a virtuous religious life\nare not compatible with being in the service of sultans, viziers, and\ncaliphs. Benefiting from the riches of the military and political\nelite implies complicity in their corrupt and oppressive rule and will\njeopardize one’s prospect of redemption in the afterlife. When\nal-Ghazâlî left Baghdad in 1095 he went to Damascus and\nJerusalem and vowed at the tomb of Abraham in Hebron never again to\nserve the political authorities or teach at state-sponsored schools.\nHe continued to teach, however, at small schools (singl.\nzâwiya) that were financed by private donations. After\nperforming the pilgrimage in 1096, al-Ghazâlî returned via\nDamascus and Baghdad to his hometown Tûs, where he founded a\nsmall private school and a Sufi convent\n(khânqâh). In 1106, at the beginning of the 6th\ncentury in the Muslim calendar, al-Ghazâlî broke his vow\nand returned to teaching at the state-sponsored Nizâmiyya\nMadrasa in Nishapur, where he himself had been a student. To his\nfollowers he justified this step with the great amount of theological\nconfusion among the general public and pressure from authorities at\nthe Seljuq court (al-Ghazâlî 1959a, 45–50 = 2000b,\n87–93). Al-Ghazâlî regarded himself as one of the\nrenewers (singl. muhyî) of religion, who, according to\na hadîth, will come every new century. In Nishapur,\nal-Ghazâlî’s teaching activity at the\nNizâmiyya madrasa led to a controversy that was triggered by\nopposition to his teachings, particularly those in his most widely\nread work, The Revival of the Religious Sciences, and by\naccusations that these show a distinct influence from\nfalsafa. Al-Ghazâlî was summoned to defend\nhimself in front of the Seljuq governor Sanjar (d. 1157). The latter,\nhowever, acquitted him from all charges and supported his teaching\nactivity in Nishapur (Garden 2014: 143–168). On this occasion,\nal-Ghazâlî again asked to be released from his obligations\nat the Nizâmiyya madrasa, a request that was denied. All this\ntime, he continued to teach at his zâwiya in Tûs\nwhere he died in December 1111 (Griffel 2009, 20–59)." ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAfter having already made a name for himself as a competent author of\nlegal works, al-Ghazâlî published around 1095 a number of\nbooks where he addresses the challenges posed by falsafa and\nby the theology of the Ismâ’îlite Shiites. The\nmovement of falsafa (from Greek: philosophía)\nresulted from the translation of Greek philosophical and scientific\nliterature into Arabic from the 8th to the early 10th centuries. The\nArabic philosophers (falâsifa) were heirs to the\nlate-antique tradition of understanding the works of Aristotle in\nNeoplatonic terms. In philosophy the translators from Greek into\nArabic focused on the works of Aristotle and although some distinctly\nNeoplatonic texts were translated into Arabic—most notably the\npseudo-Aristotelian Theology, a compilation from\nPlotinus’ Enneads—the most significant\nNeoplatonic contributions reached the Arabs by way of commentaries on\nthe works of the Stagirite (Wisnovsky 2003, 15). Falsafa was\na movement where Christians, Muslims, and even pagan authors\nparticipated. After the 12th century it would also include Jewish\nauthors. For reasons that will become apparent, al-Ghazâlî\nfocused his comments on the Muslim falâsifa. In the\nearly 10th century al-Fârâbî (d. 950) had developed\na systemic philosophy that challenged key convictions held by Muslim\ntheologians, most notably the creation of the world in time and the\noriginal character of the information God reveals to prophets.\nFollowing Aristotle, al-Fârâbî taught that the world\nhas no beginning in the past and that the celestial spheres, for\ninstance, move from pre-eternity. Prophets and the revealed religions\nthey bring articulate the same insights that philosophers express in\ntheir teachings, yet the prophets use the method of symbolization to\nmake this wisdom more approachable for the ordinary people. Avicenna\ncontinued al-Fârâbî’s approach and developed\nhis metaphysics and his prophetology to a point where it offers\ncomprehensive explanations of God’s essence and His actions as\nwell as a psychology that gives a detailed account of how prophets\nreceive their knowledge and how they, for instance, perform miracles\nthat confirm their missions. Avicenna’s philosophy offers\nphilosophical explanations of key Muslim tenets like God’s unity\n(tawhîd) and the central position of prophets among\nhumans.", "\nIn his autobiography al-Ghazâlî writes that during his\ntime at the Baghdad Nizâmiyya he studied the works of the\nfalâsifa for two years before he wrote his\nIncoherence of the Philosophers in a third year\n(Ghazâlî 1959a, 18 = 2000b, 61). It is hardly credible,\nhowever, that al-Ghazâlî began to occupy himself with\nfalsafa only after he became professor at the Nizâmiyya\nin Baghdad. This account is apologetic and aims to reject the claim of\nsome of his critics that he had learned falsafa before his\nown religious education was complete. Most probably he had become\nacquainted with falsafa while studying with al-Juwaynî,\nwhose works already show an influence from Avicenna.\nAl-Ghazâlî’s response to Aristotelianism, the\nIncoherence of the Philosophers, is a masterwork of\nphilosophical literature and may have been decades in the making. It\nis accompanied by works where al-Ghazâlî provides faithful\nreports of the philosophers’ teachings. Two of those works have\ncome down to us. The first is an almost complete fragment of a long\nbook where al-Ghazâlî copies or paraphrases passages from\nthe works of philosophers and combines them to a comprehensive report\nabout their teachings in metaphysics (Griffel 2006, al-Akiti 2009).\nThe fragment unfortunately bears no title. The second work, the\nDoctrines of the Philosophers (Maqâsid\nal-falâsifa, on the translation of the title see Shihadeh\n2011, 90–92), is a loosely adapted Arabic translation of the\nparts on logics, metaphysics, and the natural sciences in\nAvicenna’s Persian work Philosophy for\n‘Alâ’ al-Dawla (Dânishnamah-yi\nAlâ’î) (Janssens 1986). Previously it has been\nassumed that the Doctrines of the Philosophers was written as\na preparatory study to his major work, the Incoherence. This\ncan no longer be upheld. Both reports of al-Ghazâlî stand\nonly in a very loose connection to the text of the Incoherence of\nthe Philosophers. The Incoherence and the\nDoctrines use different terminologies and the latter presents\nits material in ways that does not support the criticism in the\nIncoherence (Janssens 2003, 43–45). The Doctrines\nof the Philosophers may have been a text that was initially\nunconnected to the Incoherence or that was generated after\nthe composition of the latter. Only its introduction and its brief\nexplicit create a connection to the refutation in the\nIncoherence. These parts were almost certainly written (or\nadded) after the publication of the Incoherence (Janssens\n2003, 45; Griffel 2006, 9–10).", "\nThe Doctrines of the Philosophers was translated into Latin\nin the third quarter of the 12th century and into Hebrew first in 1292\nand at least another two times within the next fifty years. These\ntranslations enjoyed much more success than the Arabic original.\nWhereas in Arabic, numerous books that follow a similar goal of\npresenting (and soon also improving) Avicenna’s philosophical\nsystem were composed during the 12th and 13th centuries, none of them\nwere translated into Latin and very few became available in Hebrew. In\nthe Latin as well as in the Hebrew traditions, translations of The\nDoctrines of the Philosophers overshadowed all of\nal-Ghazâlî’s other writings. The Latin translation,\nsometimes referred to as Summa theoricae philosophiae or as\nLogica et philosophia Algazelis, was the only book by\nal-Ghazâlî translated during the period of the\ntransmission of Arabic philosophy to Christian Europe (the part on\nlogic is edited in Lohr 1965, the two remaining parts on metaphysics\nand the natural sciences in al-Ghazâlî 1933). It was\ntranslated by Dominicus Gundisalivi (Gundissalinus, d. c.\n1190) of Toledo in collaboration with someone referred to as\n“Magister Iohannes” (d. 1215), also known as Iohannes\nHispanus (or Hispalensis), probably an Arabized Christian (a Mozarab),\nwho was dean at the cathedral of Toledo in the 1180s and 1190s\n(Burnett 1994). The two translators seem to have omitted the short\nintroduction and the explicit where the work is described as\nan uncommitted report of the falâsifa’s\nteachings. A small number of Latin manuscripts show signs that this\ntranslation was revised during the 13th century (Lohr 1965, 229) and\nin one case they preserve a Latin rendition of\nal-Ghazâlî’s original introduction (edited in Salman\n1935, 125–27). That, however, had next to no influence on the\ntext’s reception (Salman 1935), and the version that circulated\namong readers of Latin does not include al-Ghazâlî’s\ndistancing statements (al-Ghazâlî 1506). The book thus\nconcealed its character as a report of Avicenna’s teachings and\nits author “Algazel” was considered a faithful follower of\nAvicenna who had produced a masterful compendium of the latter’s\nphilosophy. During the late 12th, the 13th, and the 14th centuries the\nSumma theoricae philosophiae was a principal source on the\nteachings of the Arabic philosophers in books by authors like Albert\nthe Great (d. 1280) and Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) that were essential\nto the development of the Latin philosophical tradition. The work was\nstill used sporadically in the 15h century and even more often in the\n16th century (Minnema 2014; Alonso 1958; d’Alverny 1986).\nAl-Ghazâlî’s identification as one of them is\nusually attributed to the limited knowledge of Latin scholars about\nmatters relating to the authors of the texts they read. The\nassumption, however, that the Doctrines of the Philosophers\nis not merely a report of the teachings of the falâsifa\nbut rather represents al-Ghazâlî’s genuine positions\nin philosophy is not limited to the Latin tradition. There are Arabic\nmanuscripts that attribute a text that is quite similar to the\nDoctrines of the Philosophers to al-Ghazâlî\nwithout mentioning that the teachings therein are an uncommitted\nreport. The oldest of these manuscripts was produced at the beginning\nof the 13th century at Maraghah, an important center of scholarship in\nNW Iran and is available in facsimile (Pourjavady 2002, 2–62).\nIt shows that also in the Arabic tradition, the positions reported in\nthe Doctrines of the Philosophy were closely associated with\nal-Ghazâlî. The “mis-identification” of\nal-Ghazâlî as a follower of Avicenna may have its roots in\nan attitude among some Arabic readers of al-Ghazâlî who\nsaw in him a closer follower of the falâsifa than the\nmainstream Arabic tradition wished to acknowledge.", "\nIn its several Hebrew versions, al-Ghazâlî’s\nDoctrines of the Philosophers (known as De’ôt\nha-fîlôsôfîm and Kavvanôt\nha-fîlôsôfîm) was one of the most\nwidespread philosophical texts studied among Jews in Europe\n(Steinschneider 1893, 1:296–326; Harvey 2001). The translator of\nthe first Hebrew version of 1292, the Jewish Averroist Isaac Albalag,\nattached his own introduction and extensive notes to the text (Vajda\n1960). This and the other two Hebrew translations attracted a great\nnumber of commentators, including Moses Narboni (d. 1362), who was\nactive in southern France and Spain, and Moses Almosnino (d.\nc.1580) of Thessalonica (Steinschneider 1893,\n1:311–25). Al-Ghazâlî’s Doctrines of the\nPhilosophers was a very popular text up to the 16th century and\nover 75 manuscripts of the Hebrew translations are extant (Eran 2007,\nHarvey 2015: 289). Some Jewish scholars, like the 14th century Katalan\nHasdai Crescas, saw in this Avicennan text a welcome alternative to\nthe equally widespread teachings of Averroes (Harvey and Harvey 2002;\nHarvey 2015: 300–302). In fact, by the 15th century the Hebrew\nversion of al-Ghazâlî’s Doctrines of the\nPhilosophers may have replaced Averroes as the most popular\nsource among Jews for the study of the Aristotelian natural sciences\n(Harvey 2015: 289). Although the Hebrew translations make the\ncharacter of the work as a report clear, al-Ghazâlî\nwas—as in the Latin tradition—regarded as a much closer\nfollower of falsafa than in the mainstream Arabic tradition.\nThe Hebrew tradition, for instance, makes widely available the\ntranslation of a text ascribed to al-Ghazâlî where the\nauthor responds to questions about astronomy and cosmology that are\nquite far from Ash’arism and much closer to Aristotelianism\n(Langermann 2011). This relatively widespread Hebrew text (edited and\ntranslated in al-Ghazâlî 1896), referred to as\nTeshuvôt she’alôt, “Answers to\nQuestions,” or more recently as the “Hebrew\nAjwiba,” exists in eleven Hebrew manuscripts (Harvey\n2015: 298). Its Arabic original is known only from a very small number\nof manuscripts, among them the one from Maraghah (Pourjavady 2002,\n63–99). Accounts saying that al-Ghazâlî taught\nphilosophical positions he had openly condemned in his\nIncoherence were relatively widespread in Hebrew literature\n(Marx 1935, 410, 422–24). Moses Narboni, for instance, believed\nthat al-Ghazâlî used a stratagem to teach philosophy at a\ntime when it was, according to Narboni, officially prohibited. By\npretending to refute philosophy in his Incoherence he could\njustify the writing of the Doctrines. The Doctrines\nis therefore the main work on philosophy by al-Ghazâlî,\nNarboni suspected, while the Incoherence serves only the\nfunction of legitimizing the former’s publication by saying that\na refutation must rely on a thorough knowledge of what is to be\nrefuted (Chertoff 1952, part 2, 6–7). This tendency among Hebrew\nauthors to disentangle al-Ghazâlî from the criticism of\nphilosophy expressed in his Incoherence led the Algerian\nJewish scholar Abraham Gavison (fl. 16th cent.) to report erroneously\nthat al-Ghazâlî was the author of both The\nIncoherence of the Philosophers as well as its repudiation\nThe Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahâfut\nal-tahâfut), a work in reality written by Averroes (Gavison\n1748, fol. 135a). In addition to his Doctrines, his\nIncoherence, which was translated in 1411, and the text known\nas Teshuvôt she’alôt (whose ascription to\nal-Ghazâlî is doubtful), at least two other works by\nal-Ghazâlî were translated into Hebrew: Mishkât\nal-anwâr and Mîzân al-’amal\n(Steinschneider 1893, 1:326–48, the text Moznei\nha-’iyyunîm mentioned there is not by\nal-Ghazâlî). " ], "section_title": "2. Al-Ghazâlî’s Reports of the falâsifa’s Teachings", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAl-Ghazâlî describes the Incoherence of the\nPhilosophers as a “refutation” (radd) of the\nphilosophical movement (Ghazâlî 1959a, 18 = 2000b, 61),\nand this has contributed to the erroneous assumption that he opposed\nAristotelianism and rejected its teachings. His response to\nfalsafa was far more complex and allowed him to adopt many of\nits teachings. The falâsifa are convinced,\nal-Ghazâlî complains at the beginning of the\nIncoherence, that their way of knowing by\n“demonstrative proof” (burhân) is superior\nto theological knowledge drawn from revelation and its rational\ninterpretation. This conviction led “a group” among the\nMuslim falâsifa who disregard Islam and who neglect its\nritual duties and its religious law (sharî’a). In\nhis Incoherence al-Ghazâlî discusses twenty key\nteachings of the falâsifa and rejects the claim that\nthese teachings are demonstratively proven. In a detailed and\nintricate philosophical discussion al-Ghazâlî aims to show\nthat none of the arguments in favor of these twenty teachings fulfills\nthe high epistemological standard of demonstration\n(burhân) that the falâsifa have set for\nthemselves. Rather, the arguments supporting these twenty convictions\nrely upon unproven premises that are accepted only among the\nfalâsifa, but are not established by reason. By showing\nthat these positions are supported by mere dialectical arguments\nal-Ghazâlî aims to demolish what he regarded was an\nepistemological hubris on the side of the falâsifa. In\nthe Incoherence he wishes to show that the\nfalâsifa practice taqlîd, meaning they\nmerely repeat these teachings from the founders of their movement\nwithout critically examining them (Griffel 2005).", "\nThe initial argument of the Incoherence focuses on\napodeixis and the demonstrative character of the arguments\nrefuted therein. While the book also touches on the truth of these\nteachings, it “refutes” numerous positions whose truths\nal-Ghazâlî acknowledges or which he subscribed to in his\nlater works. In these cases al-Ghazâlî wishes to show that\nwhile these particular philosophical teachings are sound and true,\nthey are not demonstrated. The ultimate source of the\nfalâsifa’s knowledge about God’s nature,\nthe human soul, or about the heavenly spheres, for instance, are the\nrevelations given to early prophets such as Abraham and Moses. Their\ninformation made it into the books of the ancient philosophers who\nfalsely claimed that they gained these insights by reason alone.", "\nAmong the twenty discussions of the Incoherence, sixteen are\nconcerned with positions held in the falâsifa’s\nmetaphysics (ilâhiyyât) and four with positions\nthat appear in their natural sciences\n(tabî’iyyât). The 17th discussion on\ncausality will be analyzed below. The longest and most substantial\ndiscussion is the first, which deals with Avicenna’s and\nal-Fârâbî’s arguments in favor of the\nworld’s pre-eternity (Hourani 1958, Marmura 1959).\nAl-Ghazâlî denies that this position can be\ndemonstratively proven and draws from arguments that were earlier\ndeveloped by anti-Aristotelian critics such as the Christian John\nPhiloponus (Yahyâ l-Nahwî,\nc.490–c.570) of Alexandria. Philoponus’\narguments, most importantly those that deny the possibility of an\ninfinite number of events in the past, had entered the Arabic\ndiscourse on the world’s creation earlier during the 9th century\n(Davidson 1987, 55–56, 86–116, 366–75).", "\nAt the end of the Incoherence al-Ghazâlî asks\nwhether the twenty positions discussed in the book are in conflict\nwith the religious law (sharî’a). Most of them\nare wrong, he says, yet pose no serious problems in terms of religion,\nwhere they should be considered “innovations” (singl.\nbid’a). A small group of positions is considered wrong\nas well as religiously problematic. These are three teachings from\nAvicenna’s philosophy, namely (1) that the world has no\nbeginning in the past and is not created in time, (2) that God’s\nknowledge includes only classes of beings (universals) and does not\nextend to individual beings and their circumstances (particulars), and\n(3) that after death the souls of humans will never again return into\nbodies. In these three cases the teachings of Islam, which are based\non revelation, suggest the opposite, al-Ghazâlî says, and\nthus overrule the unfounded claims of the falâsifa.\nWhat’s more, these three teachings may mislead the public to\ndisregarding the religious law (sharî’a) and are,\ntherefore, dangerous for society (Griffel 2000, 301–3). In his\nfunction as a Muslim jurisprudent al-Ghazâlî adds a brief\nfatwâ at the end of his Incoherence and\ndeclares that everybody who teaches these three positions publicly is\nan unbeliever (kâfir) and an apostate from Islam, who\ncan be killed (al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 226).", "\nAl-Ghazâlî’s efforts in dealing with the\nphilosophical movement amount to defining the boundaries of religious\ntolerance in Islam. Soon after the Incoherence, he wrote a\nsimilar book about the movement of the Ismâ’îlite\nShiites, known as the “Bâtinites” (“those who\narbitrarily follow an inner meaning in the Qur’an”).\nInitially the Ismâ’îlite Shiites were supporters of\nthe Fâtimid counter-caliphate in Cairo and opposed the political\nand religious authority of the Sunni caliph in Baghdad and the Seljuq\nSultans that he installed. During al-Ghazâlî’s\nlifetime, however, there occurred a schism within the clandestine\nIsmâ’îlite movement. The “new\npropaganda” of the Ismâ’îlites in Iraq and\nIran was now independent from the center in Cairo and developed its\nown strategies. A key element of their—not entirely\nunsuccessful—efforts to persuade people to their camp was their\ncriticism of sense perception and of rational arguments\n(al-Ghazâlî 1954, 34; 1964b, 76, 80).\nAl-Ghazâlî was closely familiar with the\nIsmâ’îlites’ propaganda efforts but did not\nalways have reliable information on their teachings on cosmology and\nmetaphysics. These were deeply influenced by cosmological notions in\nlate antique Gnostic and Neoplatonic literature (Walker 1993, de Smet\n1995). What information he got, al-Ghzâlî seems to have\nreceived from the Persian writings of the Ismâ’îlite\npropagandist and philosopher Nâsir-i Khosrow (d. c.\n1075), who lived a generation earlier in Balkh in Khorasan and in the\nremote region of the Pamir Mountains (Andani 2017).\nAl-Ghazâlî, however, did not know about the schism within\nthe movement. In his book on the Scandals of the Esoterics\n(Fadâ’ih al-Bâtiniyya) he looks closely at\nthose teachings that he knew and discusses which of them are merely\nerroneous and which are unbelief. He assumes—wrongly—that\nthe Ismâ’îlite propagandists teach the existence of\ntwo gods. Yet this presentation is not so much a misunderstanding on\nthe side of al-Ghazâlî but rather a deliberate\nmisrepresentation, based on a long discourse of\nanti-Ismâ’îlite polemics (Andani 2017: 193). This\nassumed dualism and the Ismâ’îlites’ denial of\nbodily resurrection in the afterlife leads to their condemnation by\nal-Ghazâlî as unbelievers and apostates from Islam\n(al-Ghazâlî 1964b, 151–55 = 2000b,\n228–29)." ], "section_title": "3. Al-Ghazâlî’s “Refutations” of falsafa and Ismâ’îlism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn his attempt to define the boundaries of Islam\nal-Ghazâlî singles out a limited number of teachings that\nin his opinion overstep the borders. In a separate book, The\nDecisive Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Clandestine\nUnbelief (Faysal al-tafriqa bayna l-Islâm\nwa-l-zandaqa) he clarifies that only teachings that violate\ncertain “fundamental doctrines” (usûl\nal-‘aqâ’id) should be deemed unbelief and\napostasy. These doctrines are limited to three: monotheism,\nMuhammad’s prophecy, and the Qur’anic descriptions of life\nafter death (al-Ghazâlî 1961, 195 = 2002, 112). He\nstresses that all other teachings, including those that are erroneous\nor even regarded as “religious innovations” (singl.\nbid’a), should be tolerated. Again other teachings may\nbe correct, al-Ghazâlî adds, and despite their\nphilosophical background, for instance, should be accepted by the\nMuslim community. Each teaching must be judged by itself, and if found\nsound and in accordance with revelation, should be adopted\n(al-Ghazâlî 1959a, 25–27 = 2000b, 67–70). This\nattitude leads to a widespread application of Aristotelian teachings\nin al-Ghazâlî’s works on Muslim theology and\nethics.", "\nAl-Ghazâlî’s refutations of the\nfalâsifa and the Ismâ’îlites have a\ndistinctly political component. In both cases he fears that the\nfollowers of these movements as well as people with only a cursory\nunderstanding of them might believe that they can disregard the\nreligious law (sharî’a). In the case of the\nIsmâ’îlites there was an additional theological\nmotive. In their religious propaganda the\nIsmâ’îlites openly challenged the authority of Sunni\ntheology, claiming its religious speculation and its interpretation of\nscripture is arbitrary. The Sunni theologians submit God’s word\nto judgments that appear to be reasonable, the\nIsmâ’îlites said, yet they are purely capricious, a\nfact evident from the many disputes among Sunni theologians. No\nrational argument is more convincing than any of its opposing rational\narguments, the Ismâ’îlites claimed, since all\nrational proofs are mutually equivalent (takâfu’\nal-adilla). Only the divinely guided word of the Shiite Imam\nconveys certainty (al-Ghazâlî 1964b, 76, 80 = 2000b, 189,\n191). In response to this criticism al-Ghazâlî introduces\nthe Aristotelian notion of demonstration (burhân).\nSunni theologians argue among each other, he says, because they are\nlargely unfamiliar with the technique of demonstration. For\nal-Ghazâlî, reason (‘aql) is executed most\npurely and precisely by formulating arguments that are demonstrative\nand reach a level where their conclusions are beyond doubt.\nAl-Ghazâlî wrote in one of his letters to a student that\nlater circulated as an independent epistle: “A [valid] rational\ndemonstration is never wrong” (Griffel 2015: 110–112).\nThis also implies that the results of true demonstrations cannot\nconflict with revelation since neither reason nor revelation can be\nconsidered false. If demonstration proves something that violates the\nliteral meaning of revelation, the scholar must apply interpretation\n(ta’wîl) to the outward text and read it as a\nsymbol of a deeper truth. There are, for instance, valid demonstrative\narguments proving that God cannot have a “hand” or sit on\na “throne.” These prompt the Muslim scholar to interpret\nthe Qur’anic passages where these words appear as symbols\n(al-Ghazâlî 1961, 175–89 = 2002, 96–103). The\ninterpretation of passages in revelation, however, whose outward\nmeaning is not disproved by a valid demonstration, is not allowed\n(Griffel 2000, 332–35; 2009, 111–16).", "\nAl-Ghazâlî’s rule for reconciling apparent conflicts\nbetween reason and the literal meaning of revelation was widely\naccepted by almost all later Muslim theologians, particularly those\nwith rationalist tendencies. Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), however,\ncriticized al-Ghazâlî’s rule from an scriptualist\nangle. Ibn Taymiyya (1980, 1:86–87) rejected\nal-Ghazâlî’s implication that in cases of conflict\nbetween reason and the revealed text, priority should be given to the\nformer over the latter. He also remarked that\nal-Ghazâlî’s own arguments denying the possibility\nthat God sits on a “throne” (Qur’an 2.255), for\ninstance, fail to be demonstrative. Ibn Taymiyya flatly denied the\npossibility of a conflict between reason and revelation and maintained\nthat the perception of such a disagreement results from subjecting\nrevelation to premises that revelation itself does not accept (Heer\n1993, 188–92).", "\nOn the falâsifa’s side Averroes accepted\nal-Ghazâlî’s rule for reconciling conflicts between\nreason and the outward meaning of revelation but he did not agree with\nhis findings on what can and cannot be demonstrated (Griffel 2000,\n437–61). Averroes composed a refutation of\nal-Ghazâlî’s Incoherence, which he called\nThe Incoherence of the [Book of the] Incoherence\n(Tahâfut al-tahâfut). This work was translated\ntwice into Latin in 1328 and 1526, the later one on the basis of an\nearlier Hebrew translation of the text (Steinschneider 1893,\n1:330–38). The two Latin translations both have the title\nDestructio destructionum (the later one is edited in Averroes\n1961). They were printed numerous times during the 16th century and\nmade al-Ghazâlî’s criticism of Aristotelianism known\namong the Averroists of the Renaissance. The Italian Agostino Nifo\n(c.1473– after 1538), for instance, wrote a Latin\ncommentary to Averroes’ book. While accepting the principle that\nonly a valid demonstration allows interpreting the Qur’an\nsymbolically, Averroes maintained that Aristotle had already\ndemonstrated the pre-eternity of the world, which would elevate it,\naccording to al-Ghazâlî’s rules, to a philosophical\nas well as religious doctrine. Averroes also remarked that there is no\npassage in the Qur’an that unambiguously states the creation of\nthe world in time (Averroes 2001, 16). Al-Ghazâlî was\nclearly aware of this but assumed that this tenet is established\nthrough the consensus (ijmâ’) of Muslim\ntheologians (Griffel 2000, 278, 429–30; 2002, 58). While\nal-Ghazâlî condemns the pre-eternity of the world at the\nend of his Incoherence of the Philosophers, the subject of\nthe world’s pre-eternity is no longer raised in his later more\nsystematic work on the boundaries of Islam, The Decisive\nCriterion for Distinguishing Islam from Clandestine Unbelief." ], "section_title": "4. The Place of falsafa in Islam", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSoon after al-Ghazâlî had published his two refutations of\nfalsafa and Ismâ’îlism he left his position\nat the Nizâmiyya madrasa in Baghdad. During this period he began\nwriting what most Muslim scholars regard as his major work, The\nRevival of the Religious Sciences (Ihyâ’\n‘ulûm al-dîn). The voluminous Revival\nis a comprehensive guide to ethical behavior in the everyday life of\nMuslims (Garden 2014: 63–122). It is divided into four sections, each\ncontaining ten books. The first section deals with ritual practices\n(‘ibâdât), the second with social customs\n(‘âdât), the third with those things that\nlead to perdition (muhlikât) and hence should be\navoided, and the fourth with those that lead to salvation\n(munjiyât) and should be sought. In the forty books of\nthe Revival al-Ghazâlî severely criticizes the\ncoveting of worldly matters and reminds his readers that human life is\na path towards Judgment Day and the reward or punishment gained\nthrough it. Compared with the eternity of the next life, this life is\nalmost insignificant, yet it seals our fate in the world to come. In\nhis autobiography al-Ghazâlî writes that reading Sufi\nliterature made him realize that our theological convictions are by\nthemselves irrelevant for gaining redemption in the afterlife. Not our\ngood beliefs or intentions count; only our good and virtuous actions\nwill determine our life in the world to come. This insight prompted\nal-Ghazâlî to change his lifestyle and adopt the Sufi path\n(al-Ghazâlî 1959a, 35–38 = 2000b, 77–80). In\nthe Revival he composed a book about human actions\n(mu’âmalât) that wishes to steer clear of\nany deeper discussion of theological insights\n(mukâshafât). Rather, it aims at guiding people\ntowards ethical behavior that God will reward in this world and the\nnext (al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 1:4–5).", "\nIn the Revival al-Ghazâlî attacks his colleagues\nin Muslim scholarship, questioning their intellectual capacities and\nindependence as well as their commitment to gaining reward in the\nworld to come. This increased moral consciousness brings\nal-Ghazâlî close to Sufi attitudes, which have a profound\ninfluence on his subsequent works such as The Niche of Lights\n(Mishkât al-anwâr). These later works also reveal\na significant philosophical influence on al-Ghazâlî. In\nthe Revival he teaches ethics that are based on the\ndevelopment of character traits (singl., khulq, pl.\nakhlâq). Performing praiseworthy deeds is an effect of\npraiseworthy character traits that warrant salvation in the next life\n(al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 1:34.4–5). He criticizes\nthe more traditional concept of Sunni ethics that is limited to\ncompliance with the ordinances of the religious law\n(sharî’a) and following the example of the\nProphet Muhammad. Traditional Sunni ethics are closely linked to\njurisprudence (fiqh) and limit itself, according to\nal-Ghazâlî, to determining and teaching the rules of\nsharî’a. Traditional Sunni jurisprudents are mere\n“scholars of this world” (‘ulamâ’\nal-dunyâ) who cannot guide Muslims on the best way to gain\nthe afterlife (al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 1:30–38,\n98–140).", "\nIn his own ethics al-Ghazâlî stresses that the\nProphet—and no other teacher—should be the one person a\nMuslim emulates. He supplements this key Sunni notion with the concept\nof “disciplining the soul” (riyâdat\nal-nafs). At birth the essence of the human is deficient and\nignoble and only strict efforts and patient treatment can lead it\ntowards developing virtuous character traits (al-Ghazâlî\n1937–38, book 23). The human soul’s temperament, for\ninstance, becomes imbalanced through the influence of other people and\nneeds to undergo constant disciplining (riyâda) and\ntraining (tarbiya) in order to keep these character traits at\nequilibrium. Behind this kind of ethics stands the Aristotelian notion\nof entelechy: humans have a natural potential to develop\nrationality and through it acquire virtuous character. Education,\nliterature, religion, and politics should help realizing this\npotential. Al-Ghazâlî became acquainted with an ethic that\nfocuses on the development of virtuous character traits through the\nworks of Muslim falâsifa like Miskawayh (d. 1030) and\nMuslim scholars like al-Râghib al-Isfahânî (d.\nc.1025), who strove to make philosophical notions compatible\nwith Muslim religious scholarship (Madelung 1974). As a result\nal-Ghazâlî rejected the notion, for instance, that one\nshould try to give up potentially harmful affections like anger or\nsexual desire. These character traits are part of human nature,\nal-Ghazâlî teaches, and cannot be given up. Rather,\ndisciplining the soul means controlling these potentially harmful\ntraits through one’s rationality (‘aql). The\nhuman soul has to undergo constant training and needs to be\ndisciplined similar to a young horse that needs to be broken in,\nschooled, and treated well.", "\nAt no point does al-Ghazâlî reveal the philosophical\norigins of his ethics. He himself saw a close connection between the\nethics of the falâsifa and Sufi notions of an ascetic\nand virtuous lifestyle. In his Revival he merges these two\nethical traditions to a successful and influential fusion. In his\nautobiography al-Ghazâlî says that the ethics of the\nfalâsifa and that of the Sufis are one and the same.\nCongruent with his position that many teachings and arguments of the\nfalâsifa are taken from earlier revelations and from\nthe divinely inspired insights of mystics, who existed already in\npre-Islamic religions (Treiger 2012, 99–101) he adds that the\nfalâsifa have taken their ethics from the Sufis,\nmeaning here mystics among the earlier religions\n(al-Ghazâlî 1959a, 24 = 2000b, 67).", "\nAnother important field where al-Ghazâlî introduced\nAvicennan ideas into Ash’arite kalâm in a way\nthat this tradition eventually adopted them is human psychology and\nthe rational explanation of prophecy (Griffel 2004, al-Akiti 2004).\nBased on partly mis-translated texts by Aristotle (Hansberger 2011),\nAvicenna developed a psychology that assumes the existence of several\ndistinct faculties of the soul. These faculties are stronger or weaker\nin individual humans. Prophecy is the combination of three faculties\nwhich the prophet has in an extraordinarily strong measure. These\nfaculties firstly allow the prophet to acquire theoretical knowledge\ninstantly without learning, secondly represent this knowledge through\nsymbols and parables as well as divine future events, and thirdly to\nbring about effects outside of his body such as rain or earthquakes.\nThese three faculties exist in every human in a small measure, a fact\nproven by the experience of déjà vu, for\ninstance, a phenomenon referred to in the Arabic philosophic tradition\nas “the veridical dream” (al-manâm\nal-sâdiq). Al-Ghazâlî adopted these teachings\nand appropriated them for his own purposes (Treiger 2012). The\nexistence of the three faculties in human souls that make up prophecy\nserves for him as an explanation of the higher insights that mystics\nsuch as Sufi masters have in comparison to other people. While\nprophets have strong prophetic faculties and ordinary humans very weak\nones, the “friends of God” (awliyâ’,\ni.e. Sufi masters) stand in between these two. They are endowed with\n“inspiration” (ilhâm), which is similar to\nprophecy and which serves in al-Ghazâlî as one of the most\nimportant sources of human knoweldge. Unlike Avicenna, for whom\nprophets and maybe also some particularly talented humans\n(’ârifûn in his language) acquire the same\nknowledge that philosophers reach through apodictic reasoning, in\nal-Ghazâlî the prophets and awliyâ’\nhave access to knowledge that is superior to that available solely\nthrough reason. ", "\nDespite the significant philosophical influence on\nal-Ghazâlî’s ethics, he maintained in Islamic law\n(fiqh) the anti-rationalist Ash’arite position that\nhuman rationality is mute with regard to normative judgments about\nhuman actions and cannot decide whether an action is\n“good” or “bad.” When humans think they know,\nfor instance, that lying is bad, their judgment is determined by a\nconsideration of their benefits. With regard to the ethical value of\nour actions we have a tendency to confuse moral value with benefit. We\ngenerally tend to assume that whatever benefits our collective\ninterest is morally good, while whatever harms us collectively is bad.\nThese judgments, however, are ultimately fallacious and cannot be the\nbasis of jurisprudence (fiqh). “Good” actions are\nthose that are rewarded in the afterlife and “bad” actions\nare those that are punished (al-Ghazâlî 1904–07,\n1:61). The kind of connection between human actions and reward or\npunishment in the afterlife can only be learned from revelation\n(Hourani 1976, Marmura 1968–69). Muslim jurisprudence is the\nscience that extracts general rules from revelation. Like most\nreligious sciences it aims at advancing humans’ prospect of\nredemption in the world to come. Therefore it must be based on the\nQur’an and the sunna of the Prophet while it uses logic\nand other rational means to extract general rules.", "\nAl-Ghazâlî was one of the first Muslim jurists who\nintroduced the consideration of a “public benefit”\n(maslaha) into Muslim jurisprudence. In addition to\ndeveloping clear guidance of how to gain redemption in the afterlife,\nreligious law (sharî’a) also aims at creating an\nenvironment that allows each individual wellbeing and the pursuit of a\nvirtuous and pious lifestyle. Al-Ghazâlî argues that when\nGod revealed divine law (sharî’a) He did so with\nthe purpose (maqsad) of advancing human benefits in this\nworld and the next. Al-Ghazâlî identifies five\nessential components for wellbeing in this world: religion, life,\nintellect, offspring, and property. Whatever protects these\n“five necessities” (al-darûriyyât\nal-khamsa) is considered public benefit (maslaha) and\nshould be advanced, while whatever harms them should be avoided. The\njurisprudent (faqîh) should aim at safeguarding these\nfive necessities in his legal judgments. In recommending this,\nal-Ghazâlî practically implies that a “maslaha\nmursala,” a public benefit that is not mentioned in the\nrevealed text, is considered a valid source of legislation (Opwis 2007\nand 2010, 65–88)." ], "section_title": "5. The Ethics of the Revival of the Religious Sciences", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDespite his declared reluctance to enter into theological discussions,\nal-Ghazâlî addresses in his Revival important\nphilosophical problems related to human actions. In the 35th book on\n“Belief in Divine Unity and Trust in God” (Kitâb\nal-Tawhîd wa-l-tawakkul) he discusses the relationship\nbetween human actions and God’s omnipotence as creator of the\nworld. In this and other books of the Revival\nal-Ghazâlî teaches a strictly determinist position with\nregard to events in the universe. God creates and determines\neverything, including the actions of humans. God is the only\n“agent” or the only “efficient cause”\n(fâ’il, the Arabic term means both) in the world.\nEvery event in creation follows a pre-determined plan that is\neternally present in God’s knowledge. God’s knowledge\nexists in a timeless realm and does not contain individual\n“cognitions” (‘ulûm) like human\nknowledge does. God’s knowledge does not change, for instance,\nwhen its object, the world, changes. While the events that are\ncontained in God’s knowledge are ordered in “before”\nand “after”, there is no past, present, and future.\nGod’s knowledge contains the first moment of creation just as\nthe last, and He knows “in His eternity,” for instance,\nwhether a certain individual will end up in paradise or hell (Griffel\n2009, 175–213).", "\nFor all practical purposes it befits humans to assume that God\ncontrols everything through chains of causes (Marmura 1965,\n193–96). We witness in nature causal processes that add up to\nlonger causal chains. Would we be able to follow a causal chain like\nan “inquiring wayfarer” (sâlik\nsâ’il), who follows a chain of events to its origin,\nwe would be led through causal processes in the sub-lunar sphere, the\n“world of dominion” (‘âlam al-mulk),\nfurther to causes that exist in the celestial spheres, the\n“world of sovereignty” (‘âlam\nal-malakût), until we would finally reach the highest\ncelestial intellect, which is caused by the being beyond it, God\n(al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 13:2497–509 = 2001,\n15–33; see also idem 1964a, 220–21). God is the starting\npoint of all causal chains and He creates and controls all elements\ntherein. God is “the one who makes the causes function as\ncauses” (musabbib al-asbâb) (Frank 1992, 18).", "\nGod’s “causal” determination of all events also\nextends to human actions. Every human action is caused by the\nperson’s volition, which is caused by a certain motive\n(dâ’iya). The person’s volition and motive\nare, in turn, caused by the person’s convictions and his or her\nknowledge (‘ilm). Human knowledge is caused by various\nfactors, like one’s experience of the world, one’s\nknowledge of revelation, or the books one has read\n(al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 13:2509–11 = 2001,\n34–37). There is no single event in this world that is not\ndetermined by God’s will. While humans are under the impression\nthat they have a free will, their actions are in reality compelled by\ncauses that exist within them as well as outside (Griffel 2009,\n213–34).", "\nAl-Ghazâlî viewed the world as a conglomerate of\nconnections that are all pre-determined and meticulously planned in\nGod’s timeless knowledge. God creates the universe as a huge\napparatus and employs it in order to pursue a certain goal\n(qasd). In two of his later works al-Ghazâlî\ncompares the universe with a water-clock. Here he describes three\nstages of its creation. The builder of the water-clock first has to\nmake a plan of it, secondly execute this plan and build the clock, and\nthirdly he has to make the clock going by supplying it with a constant\nsource of energy, namely the flow of water. That energy needs to be\ncarefully measured, because only the right amount of energy will\nproduce the desired result. In God’s creation of the universe\nthese three stages are called judgment (hukm), decree\n(qadâ’), and pre-destination (qadar)\n(al-Ghazâlî 1971, 98–102; 1964a, 12–14). God\ndesigns the universe in His timeless knowledge, puts it into being at\none point in time, and provides it with a constant and well-measured\nsupply of “being” (wujûd). According to\nAvicenna’s explanation of creation—which\nal-Ghazâlî was not opposed to—“being” is\npassed down from God to the first and ontologically highest creation\nand from there in a chain of secondary efficient causes to all other\nexistents. It is important to acknowledge, however, that God is the\nonly true efficient cause (fâ’il) in this chain.\nHe is the only “agent,” all other beings are merely\nemployed in His service (Griffel 2009, 236–53).", "\nNature is a process in which all elements harmoniously dovetail with\none another. Celestial movements, natural processes, human actions,\neven redemption in the afterlife are all “causally”\ndetermined. Whether we will be rewarded or punished in the afterlife\ncan be understood, according to al-Ghazâlî, as the mere\ncausal effect of our actions in this world. In the 32nd book of his\nRevival al-Ghazâlî explains how knowing the\nQur’an causes the conviction (i’tiqâd) that\none is punished for bad deeds, and how that conviction may cause\nsalvation in the afterlife:", "\n…and the conviction [that some humans will be punished] is a\ncause (sabab) for the setting in of fear, and the setting in\nof fear is a cause for abandoning the passions and retreating from the\nabode of delusions. This is a cause for arriving at the vicinity of\nGod, and God is the one who makes the causes function as causes\n(musabbib al-asbâb) and who arranges them\n(murattibuhâ). These causes have been made easy for\nhim, who has been predestined in eternity to earn redemption, so that\nthrough their chaining-together the causes will lead him to paradise.\n(al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 11:2225.)\n", "\nAll these are teachings that are very close to those of Avicenna\n(Frank 1992, 24–25). Al-Ghazâlî also followed\nAvicenna in his conviction that this universe is the best of all\npossible worlds and that “there is in possibility nothing more\nwondrous than what is” (laysa fî-l-imkân\nabda’ mimmâ kân) (al-Ghazâlî\n1937–38, 13:2515–18 = 2001, 47–50). This led to a\nlong-lasting debate among later Muslim theologians about what is meant\nby this sentence and whether al-Ghazâlî is, in fact, right\n(Ormsby 1984). It must be stressed, however, that contrary to\nAvicenna—and contrary to Frank’s (1992, 55–63)\nunderstanding of him—al-Ghazâlî firmly held that God\nexercises a genuine free will and that when He creates, He chooses\nbetween alternatives. God’s will is not in any way determined by\nGod’s nature or essence. God’s will is the undetermined\ndeterminator of everything in this world." ], "section_title": "6. Cosmology in the Revival of the Religious Sciences", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAl-Ghazâlî’s cosmology of God’s determination\nand His control over events in His creation through chains of causes\n(singl. sabab) aimed at safeguarding the Sunni doctrine of\nomnipotence and divine pre-determination against the criticism of\nMu’tazilites and Shiites. Humans have only the impression of a\nfree will (ikhtiyâr). In reality they are compelled to\nchoose what they deem is the best action (khayr) among the\npresent alternatives. Avicenna’s determinist ontology, where\nevery event in the created world is by itself contingent (mumkim\nal-wujûd bi-dhâtihi) yet also necessitated by\nsomething else (wâjib al-wujûd bi-ghayrihi),\nprovided a suitable interpretation of God’s pre-determination\nand is readily adopted by al-Ghazâlî although he never\nadmits that or uses Avicenna’s language. In Avicenna the First\nBeing, which is God, makes all other beings and events necessary. In\nal-Ghazâlî God’s will, which is distinct from His\nessence, necessitates all beings and events in creation. The\nadaptation of fundamental assumptions in Avicenna’s cosmology\ntogether with an almost wholesale acceptance of Avicenna’s\npsychology and his prophetology led Frank (1992, 86) to conclude\n“that from a theological standpoint most of [Avicenna’s]\ntheses which he rejected are relatively tame and inconsequential\ncompared to those in which he follows the philosopher.”", "\nWhile al-Ghazâlî’s determinist cosmology is a\nradical but faithful interpretation of the Ash’arite tenet of\ndivine pre-determination, the way al-Ghazâlî writes about\nit in his Revival and later works violates other principles\nof Ash’arism and has led to much confusion among modern\ninterpreters. The remainder of this article will make an attempt to\nresolve current interpretative problems and explain\nal-Ghazâlî’s innovative approach towards\ncausality." ], "section_title": "7. Causality in al-Ghazâlî", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAl-Ash’ari (873–935), the founder of the theological\nschool that al-Ghazâlî belonged to, had rejected the\nexistence of “natures” (tabâ’i’\n) and of causal connections among created beings. In a radical attempt\nto explain God’s omnipotence, he combined several ideas that\nwere developed earlier in Muslim kalâm to what became\nknown as occasionalism. All material things are composed of atoms that\nhave no qualities or attributes but simply make up the shape of the\nbody. The atoms of the bodies are the carrier of\n“accidents” (singl. ‘arad), which are\nattributes like weight, density, color, smell, etc. In the cosmology\nof al-Ash’arî all immaterial things are considered\n“accidents” that inhere in a “substance”\n(jawhar). Only the atoms of spatially extended bodies can be\nsubstances. A person’s thoughts, for instance, are considered\naccidents that inhere in the atoms of the person’s brain, while\nhis or her faith is an accident inhering in the atoms of the heart.\nNone of the accidents, however, can subsist from one moment\n(waqt) to the next. This leads to a cosmology where in each\nmoment God assigns the accidents to bodies in which they inhere. When\none moment ends, God creates new accidents. None of the created\naccidents in the second moment has any causal relation to the ones in\nthe earlier moment. If a body continues to have a certain attribute\nfrom one moment to the next, then God creates two identical accidents\ninhering in that body in each of the two subsequent moments. Movement\nand development generate when God decides to change the arrangement of\nthe moment before. A ball is moved, for instance, when in the second\nmoment of two the atoms of the ball happen to be created in a certain\ndistance from the first. The distance determines the speed of the\nmovement. The ball thus jumps in leaps over the playing field and the\nsame is true for the players’ limbs and their bodies. This also\napplies to the atoms of the air if there happen to be some wind. In\nevery moment, God re-arranges all the atoms of this world anew and He\ncreates new accidents—thus creating a new world every moment\n(Perler/Rudolph 2000, 28–62).", "\nAll Ash’arite theologians up to the generation of\nal-Ghazâlî—including his teacher\nal-Juwaynî—subscribed to the occasionalist ontology\ndeveloped by al-Ash’arî. One of al-Juwaynî’s\nlate works, the Creed for Nizâm al-Mulk\n(al-‘Aqîda al-Nizâmiyya), shows, however,\nthat he already explored different ontological models, particularly\nwith regard to the effects of human actions (al-Juwaynî 1948,\n30–36; Gimaret 1980, 122–28). A purely occasionalist model\nfinds it difficult to explain how God can make humans responsible for\ntheir own actions if they do not cause them. As a viable alternative\nto the occasionalist ontology, al-Ghazâlî considered the\nAvicennan model of secondary causes. When God wishes to create a\ncertain event He employs some of His own creations as mediators or\n“secondary causes.” God creates series of efficient causes\nwhere any superior element causes the existence of the inferior ones.\nAvicenna stresses that no causal series, in any of the four types of\ncauses, can regress indefinitely. Every series of causes and effects\nmust have at least three components: a first element, a middle\nelement, and a last element. In such a chain only the first element is\nthe cause in the real sense of the word (‘illa mutlaqa)\nof all subsequent elements. It causes the last element of that\nchain—the ultimate effect—through one or many\nintermediaries (singl. mutawassat), which are the middle\nelements of the chain. Looking at a chain of efficient causes, the\n“finiteness of the causes” (tanâhî\nl-’ilal) serves for Avicenna as the basis of a proof of\nGod’s existence. Tracing back all efficient causes in the\nuniverse will lead to a first efficient cause, which is itself\nuncaused. When the First Cause is also shown to be incorporeal and\nnumerically one, one has achieved a proof of God’s existence\n(Avicenna 2005, 257–9, 270–3; Davidson 1987,\n339–40)." ], "subsection_title": "7.1 Occasionalism versus Secondary Causality" }, { "content": [ "\nAl-Ghazâlî offers a brief yet very comprehensive\nexamination of causality within the 17th discussion of his\nIncoherence of the Philosophers. The 17th discussion is not\ntriggered by any opposition to causality. Rather it aims at forcing\nal-Ghazâlî’s adversaries, the\nfalâsifa, to acknowledge that all prophetical miracles\nthat are reported in the Qur’an are possible. If their\npossibility is acknowledged, a Muslim philosopher who accepts the\nauthority of revelation must also admit that the prophets performed\nthese miracles and that the narrative in revelation is truthful.\nAl-Ghazâlî divides the 17th discussion into four different\nsections. He presents three different “positions” (singl.\nmaqâm) of his (various) opponents and addresses them\none by one. His response to the “second position”, which\nis that of Avicenna, is further divided into two different\n“approaches” (singl. maslak). This four-fold\ndivision of the 17th discussion is crucial for its understanding.\nAl-Ghazâlî addresses different concepts about causality\nwithin the different discussions and develops not one, but at least\ntwo coherent responses.", "\nFor a detailed discussion of the four parts in the 17th discussion the\nreader must be referred to chapter 6 in Griffel 2009 (147–73).\nThe following pages give only an outline of\nal-Ghazâlî’s overall argument. In the opening\nsentence of the 17th discussion al-Ghazâlî introduces the\nposition he wishes to refute and he lines out elements that\nalternative explanations of causality must include in order to be\nacceptable for al-Ghazâlî. This opening statement is a\nmasterwork of philosophical literature:", "\nThe connection (iqtirân) between what is habitually\nbelieved to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect\nis not necessary (darûrî), according to us. But\n[with] any two things [that are not identical and that do not imply\none another] (…) it is not necessary that the existence or the\nnonexistence of one follows necessarily (min darûra)\nfrom the existence or the nonexistence of the other (…). Their\nconnection is due to the prior decision (taqdîr) of\nGod, who creates them side by side (‘alâ\nal-tasâwuq), not to its being necessary by itself,\nincapable of separation. (al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 166)\n", "\nAl-Ghazâlî lays out four conditions that any explanation\nof physical processes that is acceptable to him must fulfill: (1) the\nconnection between a cause and its effect is not necessary, (2) the\neffect can come to exist without this particular cause (“they\nare not incapable of separation”), (3) God creates two events\nconcomitant, side by side, and (4) God’s creation follows a\nprior decision (taqdîr). On first sight, it seems that\nonly an occasionalist explanation of physical processes would fulfill\nthese four conditions, and this is how this statement has mostly been\nunderstood. Rudolph (in Perler/Rudolph 2000, 75–77), however,\npointed out that not only occasionalism but other types of\nexplanations also fulfill these four criteria. Most misleading is the\nthird requirement that God would need to create events “side by\nside.” These words seem to point exclusively to an occasionalist\nunderstanding of creation. One should keep in mind, however, that this\nformula leaves open, how God creates events. Even an\nAvicennan philosopher holds that God creates the cause concomitant to\nits effect, and does so by means of secondary causality. While the\n17th discussion of al-Ghazâlî’s Incoherence\npoints towards occasionalism as a possible solution, it also points to\nothers. Al-Ghazâlî chooses a certain linguistic\nassociation to occasionalism, which has led many interpreters of this\ndiscussion to believe that here, he argues exclusively in favor of\nit.", "\nIt is important to understand that al-Ghazâlî does not\ndeny the existence of a connection between a cause and its effect;\nrather he denies the necessary character of this connection. In the\nFirst Position of the 17th discussion al-Ghazâlî brings\nthe argument that observation cannot prove causal connections.\nObservation can only conclude that the cause and its effect occur\nconcomitantly:", "\nObservation (mushâhada) points towards a concomitant\noccurrence (al-husûl ‘indahu) but not to a\ncombined occurrence (al-husûl bihi) and that there is\nno other cause (‘illa) for it. (al-Ghazâlî\n2000a, 167.)\n", "\nIt would be wrong, however, to conclude from this argument that\nal-Ghazâlî denied the existence of causal connections.\nWhile such connections cannot be proven through observation (or\nthrough any other means), they may or may not exist. In the First\nPosition al-Ghazâlî rejects the view that the connection\nbetween an efficient cause and its effect is simply necessary per\nse, meaning that the proximate cause alone is fully responsible\nfor the effect and that nothing else is also necessary for the effect\nto occur. In another work this position is described as one held by\n“materialists” (dahriyyûn) who deny that\nthe world has a cause or a maker (al-Ghazâlî 1959a, 19 =\n2000b, 61). The Mu’tazilite view of tawallud, meaning\nthat humans are the sole creators of their own actions and their\nimmediate effects, also falls under this position\n(al-Ghazâlî 2000, 226.13–14). Like in the connection\nbetween a father and his son, where the father is not the\nonly efficient cause for the son’s existence, so there\nmay be in every causal connection efficient causes involved other than\nthe most obvious or the most proximate one. The proximate efficient\ncause may be just the last element in a long chain of efficient causes\nthat extends via the heavenly realm. The intellects of the celestial\nspheres, which were thought to be referred to in revelation as\n“angels,” may be middle elements or intermediaries in\ncausal chains that all have its beginning in God.\nAl-Ghazâlî rejects the position of the materialists and\nthe Mu’tazilites because it does not take account of the fact\nthat God is the ultimate efficient cause of the observed effect. God\nmay create this effect directly or by way of secondary causality.\nDiscussing the example that when fire touches a ball of cotton it\ncauses it to combust, al-Ghazâlî writes about the First\nPosition that the fire alone causes combustion:", "\nThis [position] is one of those that we deny. Rather we say that the\nefficient cause (fâ’il) of the combustion through\nthe creation of blackness in the cotton and through causing the\nseparation of its parts and turning it into coal or ashes is\nGod—either through the mediation of the angels or without\nmediation. (al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 167.)\n", "\nSecondary causality is a viable option for al-Ghazâlî that\nhe is willing to accept. Still he does not accept the teachings of\nAvicenna, which are discussed in the Second Position. Avicenna\ncombines secondary causality with the view that causal processes\nproceed with necessity and in accord with the natures of things, and\nnot by way of deliberation and choice on the side of the efficient\ncause. The ultimate efficient cause in a cosmology of secondary\ncausality is, of course, God. The Avicennan opponent of the Second\nPosition teaches secondary causality plus he holds that the\ncausal connections follow with necessity from the nature of the First\nBeing. They are not created through God’s deliberation and\nchoice but are a necessary effect of God’s essence." ], "subsection_title": "7.2 The 17th Discussion of the Incoherence" }, { "content": [ "\nWhen al-Ghazâlî writes that the connection between a cause\nand its effect is not necessary he attacks Avicenna’s\nnecessitarian ontology not his secondary causality. The dispute\nbetween al-Ghazâlî and Avicenna is not about causality as\nsuch, rather about the necessary nature of God’s creation.\nKukkonen (2000) and Dutton (2001) have shown that the two start with\nquite different assumptions about necessity. Avicenna’s view of\nthe modalities follows the statistical model of Aristotle and connects\nthe possibility of a thing to its temporal actuality (Bäck 1992).\nA temporally unqualified sentence like, “Fire causes cotton to\ncombust,” contains implicitly or explicitly a reference to the\ntime of utterance as part of its meaning. If this sentence is true\nwhenever uttered, it is necessarily true. If its truth-value can\nchange in the course of time, it is possible. If such a sentence is\nfalse whenever uttered, it is impossible (Hintikka 1973, 63–72,\n84–6, 103–5, 149–53). In Aristotelian modal\ntheories, modal terms were taken to refer to the one and only\nhistorical world of ours. For Avicenna, fire necessarily causes cotton\nto combust because the sentence “Fire causes cotton to\ncombust,” was, is, and will always be true.", "\nAl-Ghazâlî’s understanding of the modalities\ndeveloped in the context of Ash’arite kalâm and\ndoes not share the statistical model of Aristotle and Avicenna.\nAsh’arite kalâm developed an understanding that\nis closer to our modern view of the modalities as referring to\nsynchronic alternative states of affairs. In the modern model, the\nnotion of necessity refers to what obtains in all alternatives, the\nnotion of possibility refers to what obtains in at least in one\nalternative, and that which is impossible does not obtain in any\nconceivable state of affairs (Knuuttila 1998, 145). Ash’arite\nkalâm pursued the notion that God is the\nparticularizing agent (mukhassis) of all events in the world,\nwho determines, for instance, when things come into existence and when\nthey fall out of existence (Davidson 1987, 159–61,\n176–80). The idea of particularization (takhsîs)\nincludes implicitly an understanding of possible worlds that are\ndifferent from this. The process of particularization makes one of\nseveral alternatives actual. In his Creed for Nizâm\nal-Mulk, al-Juwaynî explains the Ash’arite\nunderstanding of the modalities. Every sound thinking person finds\nwithin herself, “the knowledge about the possibility of what is\npossible, the necessity of what is necessary, and the impossibility of\nwhat is impossible” (al-Juwaynî 1948, 8–9). We know\nthis distinction instinctively without learning it from others and\nwithout further inquiry into the world. It is an impulse\n(badîha) in our rational judgment\n(‘aql). Al-Juwaynî explains this impulse:", "\nThe impulsive possibility that the intellect rushes to apprehend\nwithout [any] consideration, thinking, or inquiry is what becomes\nevident to the intelligent person when he sees a building. [The\nbuilding] is a possibility that comes into being (min jawâz\nhudûthihi). The person knows decisively and offhand that\nthe actual state (hudûth) of that building is from\namong its possible states (ja’izât) and that it\nis not impossible in the intellect had it not been built.\n(al-Juwaynî 1948, 9)\n", "\nThe intelligent person (al-‘âqil)—here\nsimply meaning a person with full rational capacity—realizes\nthat all the features of the building, its height, its length, its\nform, etc., are actualized possibilities and could be different. The\nsame applies to the time when the building is built. We immediately\nrealize, al-Juwaynî says, that there is a synchronic alternative\nstate to the actual building. This is what we call possibility or more\nprecisely contingency (imkân). Realizing that there is\nsuch an alternative is an important part of our understanding:\n“The intelligent person cannot realize in his mind anything\nabout the states of the building without comparing it with what is\ncontingent like it (imkân mithlihi) or what is\ndifferent from it (khilâfihi).” (al-Juwaynî\n1948,9.)", "\nIn at least three passages of the Incoherence\nal-Ghazâlî criticizes Avicenna’s understanding of\nthe modalities. Here he refers to another, closely related dispute,\nnamely that for Avicenna the modalities exist in reality while for\nal-Ghazâlî they exist only as judgments in the minds of\nhumans (al-Ghazâlî 2000, 42.2–5, 124.10–11,\n207.4–14). He denies Avicenna’s premise that possibility\nneeds a substrate. This premise is Aristotelian—it is the basis\nto the principle of entelechy, namely that all things have\npotentialities and are driven to actualize them (Dutton 2001,\n26–7) Al-Ghazâlî shifts, as Kukkonen (2000,\n488–9) puts it, the locus of the presumption of a thing’s\nactual existence from the plane of the actualized reality to the plane\nof mental conceivability.", "\nWhen al-Ghazâlî says that “according to us”\nthe connection between the efficient cause and its effect is not\nnecessary, he aims to point out that the connection could be\ndifferent even if it never will be different. For Avicenna, the fact\nthat the connection never was different and never will be different\nimplies that it is necessary. Nowhere in his works requires\nal-Ghazâlî that any given causal connection was different\nor will be different in order to be considered not necessary. We will\nsee that he, like Avicenna, assumes causal connections never were and\nnever will be different from what they are now. Still they are not\nnecessary, he maintains. The connection between a cause and its effect\nis contingent (mumkin) because an alternative to it is\nconceivable in our minds. We can imagine a world where fire does not\ncause cotton to combust. Or, to continue reading the initial statement\nof the 17th discussion:", "\n(…) it is within divine power to create satiety without eating,\nto create death without a deep cut (hazz) in the neck, to\ncontinue life after having received a deep cut in the neck, and so on\nto all connected things. The falâsifa deny the\npossibility of [this] and claim it to be impossible.\n(al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 166.)\n", "\nOf course, a world where fire doesn’t cause combustion in cotton\nwould be radically different from the one we live in. A change in a\nsingle causal connection would probably imply that many others would\nbe different as well. Still, such a world can be conceived in our\nminds, which means it is a possible world. God, however, did not\nchoose to create such an alternative possible world (Griffel 2009,\n172–3).", "\nIn the initial statement of the 17th discussion al-Ghazâlî\nclaims that “the connection [between cause and effect] is due to\nthe prior decision (taqdîr) of God.” When he\nobjects to Avicenna that these connections are not necessary,\nal-Ghazâlî wishes to point out that God could have chosen\nto create an alternative world where the causal connections are\ndifferent from what they are. Avicenna denied this. This world is the\nnecessary effect of God’s nature and a world different from this\none is unconceivable. Al-Ghazâlî objects and says this\nworld is the contingent effect of God’s free will and His\ndeliberate choice between alternative worlds." ], "subsection_title": "7.3 Two Different Concepts of the Modalities" } ] } ]	[ "Avicenna, 2005, The Metaphysics of The Healing: A Parallel\nEnglish-Arabic Text, M.E. Marmura (ed. and trans.). Provo (Utah):\nBrigham Young University Press.", "Averroes, 1930, Averroès Tahafot at-Tahafot, M.\nBouyges (ed.), Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique.", "––– 1954, Averroes’ Tahafut al-tahafut\n(The Incoherence of the Incoherence), S. van den Bergh (trans.),\n2 vols., London: Luzac.", "––– 1961, Destructio destructionum\nphilosophiae Algazelis in the Latin Version of Calo Calonymos,\nB.H. Zedler (ed.), Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.", "––– 2001, The Book of the Decisive Treatise\nDetermining the Connection Between Law and Wisdom (Arabic and\nEnglish Text), C. Butterworth (ed. and trans.), Provo (Utah): Brigham\nYoung University Press.", "al-Juwaynî, 1948, al-’Aqîda\nal-Nizâmiyya, M.Z. al-Kawtharî (ed.), Cairo: Maktabat\nal-Khânjî.", "al-Ghazâlî, 1506, Logica et philosophia Algazelis\nArabis, Venice: P. Liechtenstein. Reprint Frankfurt (Germany):\nMinerva, 1969.", "––– 1896, Die Abhandlung des Abû\nHâmid al-Gazzâlî. Antworten auf Fragen, die an ihn\ngerichtet wurden, H. Malter (ed.) Frankfurt: J. Kauffmann.", "––– 1904–07, al-Mustasfâ min\n‘ilm al-usûl, 2 vols. Bûlâq:\nal-Matba’a al-Amîriyya. Reprint Beirut: Dâr al-Fikr,\nn.d.", "––– 1923, Mîzân\nal-’amal, M.S. al-Kurdî (ed.), Cairo:\nal-Matba’a al-’Arabiyya.", "––– 1933, Algazels’s Metaphysics: A\nMedieval Translation, J.T. Muckle (ed.), Toronto: St.\nMichael’s College.", "––– 1936, Maqâsid\nal-falâsifa, M.S. al-Kurdî (ed.), Cairo:\nal-Matba’a al-Mahmûdiyya al-Tijâriyya.", "––– 1937–38, Ihyâ’\n‘ulûm al-dîn, 16 parts, Cairo: Lajnat Nashr\nal-Thaqâfa al-Islâmiyya. Reprint Beirut: Dâr\nal-Kitâb al-’Arabî, n. d. [c.1990].", "––– 1954, Qawâsim\nal-Bâtiniyya, in Ahmed Ates,\n“Gazâlî’in Batinîlerin Belini\nDelliler’i Kitâb Kavâsim\nal-Bâtînîya.” Ilâhiyât\nFakültesi Dergisi Ankara Üniversitesi 3:\n23–54.", "––– 1959a, al-Munqidh min\nal-dalâl / Erreur et délivrance, F. Jabre\n(ed. and trans.), Beirut: Commission libanaise pour la traduction des\nchefs-d’oeuvre.", "––– 1959b, al-Qistâs\nal-mustaqîm, V. 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Rashâd Sâlim (ed.), 11\nvols., Beirut: Dâr al-Kunûz al-Adabiyya.", "Andani, Khalil, 2017, “The Merits of the\nBâtiniyya: Al-Ghazâlî’s Appropriation\nof Isma’ili Cosmology,” Journal of Islamic\nStudies 29: 181–229.", "al-Akiti, M.A., 2004, “The Three Properties of Prophethood\nin Certain Works of Avicenna and al-Gazâlî,” in\nInterpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval\nIslam, J. McGinnis (ed.), Leiden: Brill, pp. 189–212.", "––– 2009, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly\nof Falsafa: Al-Ghazâlî’s Madnûn,\nTahâfut, and Maqâsid, with Particular Attention to Their\nFalsafî Treatment of God’s Knoweldge of Temporal\nEvents,” in Avicenna and His Legacy: A Golden Age of Science\nand Philosophy, Y.T. Langermann (ed.), Turnhout (Bel.): Brepols,\npp. 51–100.", "Alonso, M., 1958, “Influencia de Algazel en el mundo\nlatino,” Al-Andalus 23: 371–80.", "Bäck, A., 1992, “Avicenna’s Conception of\nModalities,” Vivarium 30: 217–55.", "Burnett, C., 1994, “Magister Iohannes Hispanus: Towards the\nIdentity of a Toledan Translator,” in Comprendre et\nmaîtriser la nature au Moyen Age. Mélanges\nd’histoire des sciences offerts à Guy Beaujouan,\nGeneva/Paris: Librairie Droz/Librairie Champion, pp.\n425–36.", "Chertoff, G.B., 1952, The Logical Part of\nal-Ghazâlî’s Maqâsid al-Falâsifa. In an\nAnonymous Hebrew Translation with the Hebrew Commentary of Moses of\nNarbonne, PhD Diss. Columbia University, New York.", "d’Alverny, M.T., 1986, “Algazel dans l’occident\nlatin,” in Un trait d’union entre l’orient et\nl’occident: al-Ghazzali et Ibn Maimoun. Agadir 27–29 Nov.\n1985, Agadir: Academie Royale du Maroc, pp. 125–46. Reprint\nin d’Alverny 1994, 3–24.", "–––– 1994, La transmission des textes\nphilosophiques et scientifique au moyen âge, C. Burnett\n(ed.), Aldershot: Variorum.", "Davidson, H.A., 1987, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the\nExistence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, New\nYork: Oxford University Press.", "Dutton, B.D., 2001, “Al-Ghazâlî on Possibility\nand the Critique of Causality,” Medieval Philosophy and\nTheology 10: 23–46.", "de Smet, D., 1995, La quietude de l’intellect.\nNéoplatonisme et gnose ismaélienne dans l’oeuvre\nde Hamîd ad-Dîn al-Kirmânî (Xe/XIe s.),\nLeuven: Peeters.", "Eran, A., 2007, “Ghazâlî, Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn\nMuhammad al-Tûsî, al-” in Encyclopaedia\nJudaica, 2nd ed., F. Skolnik (ed.), 22 vols., Detroit: Macmillan\nReference, vol. 7, pp. 571–73.", "Frank, R.M., 1992, Creation and the Cosmic System:\nAl-Ghazâlî & Avicenna, Heidelberg: C.\nWinter.", "––– 1994, Al-Ghazali and the Ash’arite\nSchool, Durham: Duke University Press.", "Garden, K., 2014, The First Islamic Reviver. Abû\nHâmid al-Ghazâlî and His Revival of the Religious\nSciences, New York: Oxford University Press.", "Gavison, A., 1748, Sefer ‘Omer ha-Shikhhah.\nLivorno: A. Meldola. Reprint Brooklyn (N.Y.): Ch. Reich, 1993.", "Gimaret, D., 1980, Théories de l’acte humain en\nthéologie musulmane, Paris: Vrin.", "Griffel, F., 2000, Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam. Die\nEntwicklung zu al-Gazâlîs Urteil gegen die Philosophen und\ndie Reaktionen der Philosophen, Leiden: Brill.", "––– 2002, “The Relationship Between\nAverroes and al-Ghazâlî as it Presents Itself in\nAverroes’ Early writings, Especially in his Commentary on\nal-Ghazâlî’s al-Mustasfâ,” in\nMedieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism,\nand Christianity, J. Inglis (ed.), Richmond: Curzon Press, pp.\n51–63.", "––– 2004, “Al-Gazâlî’s\nConcept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into\nAs’arite Theology,” Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy 14: 101–44.", "––– 2005, “Taqlîd of the\nPhilosophers. Al-Ghazâlî’s Initial Accusation In the\nTahâfut”, in Ideas, Images, and Methods of\nPortrayal. Insights into Arabic Literature and Islam, S.\nGünther (ed.), Leiden: Brill, pp. 253–273.", "––– 2006, “MS London, British Library Or.\n3126: An Unknown Work by al-Ghazâlî on Metaphysics and\nPhilosophical Theology,” Journal of Islamic Studies 17:\n1–42.", "––– 2009, Al-Ghazâlî’s\nPhilosophical Theology, New York: Oxford University Press.", "––– 2015, “Al-Ghazâlî at His\nMost Rationalist: The Universal Rule for Allegorically\nInterpreting Revelation (al-Qânûn al-Kullî fî\nt-Ta’wîl)”, in Islam and Rationality: The\nImpact of al-Ghazâlî. Papers Collected on His 900th\nAnniversarym (Volume 1), G. Tamer (ed.), Leiden: Brill, pp.\n89–120.", "Hansberger, R., 2011, “Plotinus Arabus Rides Again,”\nArabic Sciences and Philosophy 21: 57–84.", "Harvey, S., 2001, “Why Did Fourtheenth Century Jews Turn to\nAlghazali’s Account of Natural Science?” Jewish\nQuarterly Review 91: 359–76.", "––– 2015, “The Changing Image of\nal-Ghazâlî in Medieval Jewish Thought,” in Islam\nand Rationality. 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J., 1973, Time & Necessity: Studies in\nAristotle’s Theory of Modalities, Oxford: Clarendon.", "Hourani, G.F., 1958, “The Dialogue Between al\nGhazâlî and the Philosophers on the Origin of the\nWorld,” Muslim World 48: 183–191,\n308–14.", "––– 1976, “Ghazâlî on the\nEthics of Action,” Journal of the American Oriental\nSociety, 96: 69–88. Reprinted in Hourani 1985, pp.\n135–66.", "––– 1985, Reason and Tradition in Islamic\nEthics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Janssens, J., 1986, “Le Dânesh-Nâmeh\nd’Ibn Sînâ: Un text à revoir?”\nBulletin de philosophie médiévale 28:\n163–77.", "––– 2003, “Al-Ghazzâlî and his\nUse of Avicennian Texts,” in Problems in Arabic\nPhilosophy, M. Maróth (ed.), Piliscaba (Hungary): Avicenna\nInstitute of Middle East Studies, pp. 37–49.", "Knuuttila, S., 1998, “Plentitude, Reason and Value: Old and\nNew in the Metaphyscis of Nature,” in Nature and Lifeworld:\nTheoretical and Practical Metaphysics, C. 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Reprinted in Marmura 2005, pp.\n231–60.", "––– 1968–69, “Ghazâlî on\nEthical Premises,” The Philosophical Forum 4:\n393–403. Reprinted in Marmura 2005, pp. 261–65.", "––– 1981, “Al-Ghazâlî’s\nSecond Causal Theory in the 17th Discussion of His\nTahâfut,” in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, P.\nMorewedge (ed.), Delmar (N.Y.): Caravan Books, pp. 85–112.", "––– 1995, “Ghazâlian Causes and\nIntermediaries,” Journal of the American Oriental\nSociety 115: 89–100.", "––– 2005, Probing in Islamic\nPhilosophy, Binghampton (N.Y.): Global Academic Publishing.", "Marx, A., 1935, “Texts by and About Maimonides,”\nJewish Quarterly Review 25: 371–428.", "Minnema, A.H. 2014, “Algazel Latinus: The Audience of the\nSumma Theoricae Philosophiae, 1150–1600,”\nTraditio, 69: 153–213.", "Opwis, F., 2007, “Islamic Law and Legal Change: The Concept\nof Maslaha in Classical and Contemporary Legal Theory”,\nin Shari’a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context, A.\nAmanat and F. Griffel (eds.), Stanford (Calif.): Stanford University\nPress, pp. 62–82, 203–07.", "––– 2010, Maslaha and the Purpose of the\nLaw: Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from the 4th/10th to 8th/14th\ncentury, Leiden: Brill.", "Ormsby, E.L., 1984, Theodicy in Islamic Thought. The Dispute\nover al-Ghazâlî’s ‘Best of All Possible\nWorlds’, Princeton: Princeton University Press.", "Pourjavady, N. (ed.), 2002, Majmû’ah-ye\nfalsafî-e Marâghah: A Philosophical Anthology from\nMaraghah. Containing Works by Abû Hâmid\nGhazzâlî, ‘Ayn al-Qudât\nal-Hamadânî, Ibn Sînâ, ‘Umar ibn\nSahlân Sâvi, Majduddîn Jîlî and\nothers, Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Dânishgâh.", "Perler, D. and U. 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The Ismaili\nNeoplatonism of Abû Ya’qûb\nal-Sijistânî, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Wisnovsky, R., 2003, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in\nContext, London: Duckworth." ]	[ { "href": "../al-farabi/", "text": "al-Farabi" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-natural/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in: natural philosophy and natural science" }, { "href": "../causation-medieval/", "text": "causation: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../duns-scotus/", "text": "Duns Scotus, John" }, { "href": "../medieval-futcont/", "text": "future contingents: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../ibn-rushd/", "text": "Ibn Rushd [Averroes]" }, { "href": "../ibn-sina/", "text": "Ibn Sina [Avicenna]" }, { "href": "../maimonides-islamic/", "text": "Maimonides: the influence of Islamic thought on" }, { "href": "../modality-medieval/", "text": "modality: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../philoponus/", "text": "Philoponus" } ]
al-kindi	al-Kindi	First published Fri Dec 1, 2006; substantive revision Fri Feb 21, 2020	[ "\n\nAbu Yusuf Ya‘qub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi (ca. 800–870 CE) was\nthe first self-identified philosopher in the Arabic tradition. He\nworked with a group of translators who rendered works of Aristotle,\nthe Neoplatonists, and Greek mathematicians and scientists into\nArabic. Al-Kindi’s own treatises, many of them epistles\naddressed to members of the caliphal family, depended heavily on these\ntranslations, which included the famous Theology of Aristotle\nand Book of Causes, Arabic versions of works by Plotinus and\nProclus. Al-Kindi’s own thought was suffused with Neoplatonism,\nthough his main authority in philosophical matters was\nAristotle. Al-Kindi’s philosophical treatises include On\nFirst Philosophy, in which he argues that the world is not\neternal and that God is a simple One. He also wrote numerous works on\nother philosophical topics, especially psychology (including the\nwell-known On the Intellect) and cosmology. Al-Kindi’s\nwork in mathematics and the sciences was also extensive, and he was\nknown in both the later Arabic and the Latin traditions for his\nwritings on astrology." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Life", "1.2 Works" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Influences on al-Kindi", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Greek influences", "2.2 Contemporary influences" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Divine simplicity", "3.2 Creation", "3.3 Eternity of the world" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Psychology", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 The human soul", "4.2 Epistemology", "4.3 Application to ethics" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Science", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 The use of mathematics", "5.2 Cosmology" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Legacy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nAl-Kindi was a member of the Arab tribe of Kinda, which had played an\nimportant role in the early history of Islam. His lineage earned him\nthe title “philosopher of the Arabs” among later writers.\nWe know that al-Kindi died after 866 CE, and his death date is usually\nput in the early 870s. His birth date is harder to pin down, but he\nis said to have served as a scholar under the caliph al-Ma’mun,\nwhose reign ended in 833, and he was certainly associated with the\ncourt of the next caliph, al-Mu‘tasim (reigned\n833–842). He is thus usually reckoned to have been born around\n800 CE. He was born in Basra and educated in Baghdad. His\nphilosophical career peaked under al-Mu‘tasim, to whom al-Kindi\ndedicated his most famous work, On First Philosophy, and\nwhose son Ahmad was tutored by al-Kindi.", "\n\nAl-Kindi’s philosophical activities centered around the\ntranslation movement that had been initiated and supported by the\n‘Abbasid caliphs since prior to al-Kindi’s birth (on this\nsee Endress 1987/1992, Gutas 1998). Al-Kindi oversaw one of the two\nmain groups of translators in the ninth century (the other group was\nled by Hunayn ibn Ishaq). The “Kindi circle” (see Endress\n1997) translated numerous works of philosophy and science from Greek\ninto Arabic. (On the output of the circle see below, 2.1.) Al-Kindi\nseems to have been a mediator between the patrons of these translators\nand the scholars who actually did the translating, many of whom were\nSyrian Christians or of Syrian extraction. His own writings might be\nthought of as a sustained public relations campaign intended to display\nand advertise the value of Greek thought for a contemporary ninth\ncentury Muslim audience." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Life" }, { "content": [ "\n\nWe are fortunate in having a list of titles of works ascribed to\nal-Kindi, which is found in the Fihrist of the tenth century\nbookseller Ibn al-Nadim. Thanks to Ibn al-Nadim we know that al-Kindi\nwrote hundreds of treatises on a very wide variety of scientific and\nphilosophical disciplines. Indeed the scientific and mathematical\ntitles far outnumber the philosophical titles. Many of the latter would\nnow be lost if not for a single manuscript, held in Istanbul, which\ncontains most of al-Kindi’s extant philosophical writings (edited\nin Abu Rida 1950 and 1953; several important texts are edited and\ntranslated in Rashed and Jolivet 1998). This includes the work for\nwhich he is best known, On First Philosophy. Our version of\nthis treatise is incomplete, comprising only the first part, which is\ndivided into four sections. The first section is essentially an\nexhortation to the reader to honor Greek philosophical wisdom. The\nsecond contains al-Kindi’s celebrated discussion of the eternity\nof the world. The third and fourth establish the existence of a\n“true One,” i.e. God, which is the source of unity in all\nother things, and consider the inapplicability of language to this true\nOne.", "\n\nThe Istanbul manuscript also includes one of the few copies of\nal-Kindi’s On the Intellect to survive in Arabic (it is\nalso preserved in Latin translation). This is the first treatise in the\nArabic tradition to give a taxonomy of the types of intellect, such as\nwill become familiar in al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes. Other works\nshed further light on al-Kindi’s psychology (i.e. theory of\nsoul): the Discourse on the Soul consists of supposed\nquotations from Greek philosophers, That There are Separate\nSubstances uses Aristotle’s Categories to prove\nthat the soul is immaterial, and On Sleep and Dream gives an\naccount of prophetic dreams in terms of Aristotle’s theory of the\nimagination. Related to al-Kindi’s psychological theories is his\nonly significant surviving work on ethics, On Dispelling\nSorrows. (He also composed a collection of ethical anecdotes and\nsayings ascribed to Socrates, for which see Fakhry 1963.)", "\n\nAl-Kindi sets out his cosmological theories in two further texts\nfound in the same manuscript, On the Proximate Agent Cause of\nGeneration and Corruption and On the Prostration of the\nOutermost Sphere. Also relevant here are numerous works on\nmeteorology and weather forecasting. These apply the same cosmological\nideas to show how heavenly motion produces rain and other\nmeteorological phenomena in the lower world where we live. While these\nworks are influenced by Aristotle, al-Kindi also draws on other Greek\nsources, such as Ptolemy. His knowledge of the Greek scientific\ntradition was in fact extensive. For instance, he uses Euclid and ideas\nthat can be traced to Ptolemy in a well-known work on optics, On\nPerspectives, which is preserved only in Latin. Al-Kindi’s\nextant scientific corpus is sizable and includes treatises on the\nmanufacture of drugs, music, astrology, and mathematics (see further\nRosenthal 1942). But the focus here will be on al-Kindi’s\nphilosophical views." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Works" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Influences on al-Kindi", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nAs one would expect given his prominent role in the translation\nmovement, al-Kindi’s works are suffused with ideas from Greek\nthought. His philosophical works are indebted in part to the\nmathematical and scientific authors translated by his day, for\ninstance Nicomachus of Gerasa; Euclid influenced his methodology as\nwell as his mathematics (cf. Gutas 2004). But the most important\ninfluence on his philosophy was from Aristotle, whose corpus al-Kindi\nsurveys in a treatise called On the Quantity of Aristotle’s\nBooks (Abu Rida 1950, 363–84; also Guidi and Walzer 1940,\nCortabarria Beitia 1972, Jolivet 2004, Ighbariah 2012). This work provides a fairly\nthorough overview of Aristotle’s corpus, though al-Kindi clearly has\nnot read some of the treatises he discusses. When al-Kindi comes to\nmention the contents of the Metaphysics he gives the\nfollowing, rather surprising, summary:", "\n\nHis purpose in his book called Metaphysics is to explain\nthings that subsist without matter and, though they may exist together\nwith what does have matter, are neither connected nor united to matter;\nto affirm the oneness of God, the great and exalted, to explain His\nbeautiful names, and that He is the agent cause of the universe, which\nperfects [all things], the God of the universe who governs through His\nperfect providence and complete wisdom.", "\n\nWhile this may not look like an accurate description of Aristotle’s\nMetaphysics, it is a wholly accurate description of\nal-Kindi’s own conception of the science of metaphysics. That he\nconflates metaphysics with theology is clear from the opening of\nOn First Philosophy, which says that since philosophy in\ngeneral is the study of truth, “first philosophy” is\n“the knowledge of the first truth who is the cause of all\ntruth.” And indeed Aristotle’s Metaphysics is a major\ninfluence on this work. However, as is typical of al-Kindi’s\nphilosophical writings, On First Philosophy also makes\nextensive use of ideas from translations of Neoplatonic writings. The\nproof for the existence of a “true One” is based in part\non Proclus (as shown in Jolivet 1979), and one can detect influences\nfrom the Arabic version of Plotinus produced in al-Kindi’s circle, the\nso-called Theology of Aristotle. Perhaps the most important\nsingle influence, however, is an attack on Aristotle by the\nNeoplatonist Christian thinker John Philoponus, over the issue of the\nworld’s eternity.", "\n\nOn First Philosophy, then, is a particularly good example of\nhow al-Kindi combines Neoplatonic and Aristotelian ideas in his vision\nof a coherent philosophy derived from the Greeks. The way for this\nsynoptic conception of the Greek inheritance had actually been prepared\nby the Neoplatonists themselves, whose commentaries on Aristotle\npresage the harmonizing tendencies obvious in al-Kindi. But as a\npromoter of Greek wisdom, al-Kindi would in any case have been eager to\ndeemphasize any tensions between Greek philosophers, or any failings on\nthe part of Greek thinkers. For example he gives no sign that his\nposition on the eternity of the world departs from that of Aristotle.\n(Interestingly he is more willing to recognize shortcomings on the part\nof Greek scientific thinkers, for instance in Euclid’s optics,\nthough even here he emphasizes the need for a charitable approach.)\nLater in the first section of On First Philosophy, al-Kindi\nunleashes a torrent of abuse against unnamed contemporaries who\ncriticize the use of Greek ideas:", "\n\nWe must not be ashamed to admire the truth or to acquire it, from\nwherever it comes. Even if it should come from far-flung nations and\nforeign peoples, there is for the student of truth nothing more\nimportant than the truth, nor is the truth demeaned or diminished by\nthe one who states or conveys it; no one is demeaned by the truth,\nrather all are ennobled by it.", "\n\nAlthough al-Kindi was unyielding in his support for the ideas\ndisseminated in the translation project, he was inevitably influenced\nby the intellectual currents of his day. This comes out most clearly\nwhen al-Kindi uses Greek ideas to engage with the problems of his time,\nespecially in the arena of theology." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Greek influences" }, { "content": [ "\n\nTwo examples of this engagement, to be discussed in more detail in\nthe next section, are al-Kindi’s treatment of divine attributes,\nand his views on creation. As we will see al-Kindi held an austere view\non the question of attributes, on the basis that predication invariably\nimplies multiplicity, whereas God is unrestrictedly one. This has been\ncompared (Ivry 1974, Adamson 2003) to the position of the\nMu‘tazilites, who were the main contemporary theologians of the\nninth century. Mu‘tazilite influence may also be present in\nal-Kindi’s theory that creation is a “bringing to be of\nbeing from non-being,” and especially in his denial that creation\ncan be eternal. (This may be related to the Mu‘tazilite claim\nthat the Koran is created and not eternal; see Adamson 2007, ch.4.)", "\n\nAl-Kindi uses philosophy to defend and explicate Islam in several\nworks. He wrote a short treatise attacking the Christian doctrine of\nthe Trinity, using concepts drawn from the Isagoge of Porphyry\n(al-Kindi’s refutation was the subject of a counter-refutation by\nthe tenth century Christian philosopher, Yahya ibn ‘Adi; see\nPérier 1920). While this is the only extant work that engages in\ntheological controversy, we know from the Fihrist that he\nwrote other treatises on similar themes. The extant corpus also\ncontains passages in which al-Kindi expounds the meaning of passages\nfrom the Koran. Most striking, perhaps, is his discussion of creation\nex nihilo in the midst of On the Quantity of\nAristotle’s Books. This passage is a commentary on Koran\n36: 79–82. Al-Kindi mentions the same Koranic passage, and discusses the\nspecial nature of prophetic knowledge, in a meteorological work\nentitled On Why the Higher Atmosphere is Cold (see Abu Rida\n1953, 92–93). The cosmological work On the Prostration of the\nOutermost Sphere, meanwhile, is entirely devoted to explaining the\nKoranic verse “the stars and the trees prostrate\nthemselves” (55: 6) in terms of al-Kindi’s account of\nheavenly influence on the sublunary world. Al-Kindi’s remarks\nhere show his interest in the contemporary disciplines of grammar and\nKoranic exegesis.", "\n\nA desire to integrate Greek ideas into his own culture is shown in a\ndifferent way by On Definitions, a list of technical\nphilosophical terms with definitions (see Abu Rida 1950, 165–79;\nalso Allard 1972, Klein-Franke 1982). This work is ascribed to\nal-Kindi, and though its authenticity has been doubted it is almost\ncertainly at least a production of al-Kindi’s circle. Most of the\ndefined terms correspond to Greek technical terms, and thus build up\nan Arabic philosophical terminology which is intended to be equivalent\nto that of the Greeks. It is striking that, so early in the Arabic\nphilosophical tradition, there was already a perceived need for a\nnovel technical language for communicating philosophical ideas in a\ndifferent setting (and of course for translating Greek into\nArabic). Some, though certainly not all, of the terms listed in On\nDefinitions will indeed become standard in the later\nphilosophical tradition." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Contemporary influences" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Metaphysics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nAl-Kindi’s most significant work, On First Philosophy\n(for which see Abu Rida 1950, 97–162, Ivry 1974, Rashed and Jolivet\n1998, 9–99), is devoted to “first philosophy” or\nmetaphysics, a science al-Kindi immediately identifies with the study\nof God. Since all philosophy is an inquiry into truth, first philosophy\nis the knowledge of God, who is “the first truth and the cause of\nall truth.” While this may not sound like it has much to do with\nAristotle’s understanding of first philosophy as the science of\nbeing, al-Kindi closely associates being with truth (“everything\nthat has being has truth”). For him, to say that God is the cause\nof all truth is tantamount to saying that God is the cause of all\nbeing, a point made more explicit at the end of what remains to us of\nOn First Philosophy (see further below, 3.2).", "\n\nThe central concept in the theology of On First Philosophy,\nhowever, is neither truth nor being, but oneness. Indeed al-Kindi\nargues for a first cause of being precisely by arguing for a first\ncause of oneness, and asserting that “bringing something to\nbe” means imposing unity of a certain kind. Al-Kindi’s\nphilosophical theology thus has two main aspects: a proof that there\nmust be some “true One” that is the cause of the unity in\nall things, and a discussion of the nature of this true One. These\naspects are treated, respectively, in the third and fourth sections\nof On First Philosophy.", "\n\nIn the third section, al-Kindi first proves that nothing can be its\nown cause, a point that is not used explicitly in what follows, but\nmay be intended to show that nothing can be the cause of its own\nunity. He then undertakes an exhaustive survey of the various types of\n“utterance (lafz).” Following Porphyry’s\nIsagoge, he classifies all predicates or terms\n(maqulat) into genus, species, difference, individual, proper\naccident, and common accident. Taking them in turn, al-Kindi argues\nthat each type of predicate implies both unity and multiplicity. For\nexample, animal is one genus, but it is made up of a\nmultiplicity of species; human is one species but is made up\nof many individuals; and a single human is one individual but made up\nof many bodily parts. Finally, al-Kindi seeks an explanation for the\nassociation of unity and multiplicity in all these things. He argues\nthat the association cannot be merely the product of chance; nor can\nit be caused by any part of the set of things that are both one and\nmany. So there must be some external cause for the association of\nunity and multiplicity. This cause will be exclusively one, entirely\nfree of multiplicity: al-Kindi expresses this by saying that it is\n“essentially” one, whereas the other things are\n“accidentally” one. He also speaks of it as “one in\ntruth,” whereas other things are one\n“metaphorically.” In short, the cause in question is the\n“true One,” or God.", "\n\nNow, since we have already seen that every sort of term or\nexpression implies multiplicity as well as unity, it is no surprise\nthat in section four of One First Philosophy al-Kindi goes on\nto argue that the various sorts of predicate are inapplicable to the\ntrue One. He sums up his conclusion as follows (Rashed and Jolivet\n1998, 95):", "\n\nThus the true One possesses no matter, form, quantity, quality, or\nrelation. And is not described by any of the other terms: it has no\ngenus, no specific difference, no individual, no proper accident, and\nno common accident. It does not move, and is not described through\nanything that is denied to be one in truth. It is therefore only pure\nunity, I mean nothing other than unity. And every unity other than it\nis multiple.", "\n\nAs mentioned above, this conclusion has been compared to the view of\nthose contemporary theologians referred to as Mu‘tazilites. They\nsimilarly took a strict view on the question of divine attributes,\narguing that God’s simplicity ruled out the acceptance of any\nattributes distinct from God’s essence. However it is Greek\nantecedents that are clearly the main influence on al-Kindi here. His\n“true One” bears a strong resemblance to the first\nprinciple of the Neoplatonists. Indeed we might be reminded of Plato\nhimself, insofar as al-Kindi’s God seems to function like a\nPlatonic Form. Just as the Form of Equal is entirely equal and not at\nall unequal, and serves to explain equality in other things, so God is\nentirely one, not at all multiple, and explains the unity in other\nthings." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Divine simplicity" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThis is, however, only a part of al-Kindi’s view on divine\ncausation. Because, as we have seen, al-Kindi thinks that to be a thing\nof a certain kind is to be one in a certain way, he infers that the\ntrue One is the cause of being as well as unity (see further Adamson\n2002b). In particular, he believes that God is an “agent”\nor efficient cause. This view is expressed in a succinct text (possibly\na fragment from a longer, lost work) headed with the title On the\nTrue, First, Complete Agent and the Deficient Agent that is\nMetaphorically [an Agent] (Abu Rida 1950, 182–4). The\ntext begins as follows:", "\n\nWe say that the true, first act is the bringing-to-be of beings from\nnon-being. It is clear that this act is proper to God, the exalted, who\nis the end of every cause. For the bringing-to-be of beings from\nnon-being belongs to no other. And this act is a proper characteristic\n[called] by the name “origination.”", "\n\nAl-Kindi goes on to explain that whereas God is a “true”\nagent, since He is a cause of being and acts without being acted upon,\nall other agents are only “metaphorically” agents, because\nthey both act and are acted upon. The force of the term\n“metaphorical” here is the same as it was in On First\nPhilosophy: just as created things are both many and one, and thus\nnot “truly” one, so they are both passive and active, and\nthus not “truly” agents.", "\n\nThis short text raises two interesting questions about how al-Kindi\nconceived of divine action. First, what does he have in mind when he\ndescribes God’s agency as being mediated by the action of\n“metaphorical agents” (God “is the proximate cause\nfor the first effect, and a cause through an intermediary for His\neffects that are after the first effect”)? Second, what is\ninvolved in “bringing being to be from non-being”?", "\n\nRegarding the first question, one might suppose that al-Kindi is\nfollowing Neoplatonic texts, and that he has in mind a mediated\nemanation of effects from the first principle. If this is right, then\nthe “first effect” will be the “world of the\nintellect” mentioned in other Kindian texts (e.g. the\nDiscourse on the Soul, repeating this phrase from the\nTheology of Aristotle). This is supported by a non-committal\nremark in On First Philosophy that “one might think the\nintellect is the first multiple” (Rashed and Jolivet 1998, 87).\nBut it seems at least as likely that the “first effect”\nmentioned here is the world of the heavens: by creating the heavens and\nsetting them in motion, God indirectly brings about things in the\nsublunary world (see further below, 5.2). This would be a more\nAristotelian version of the idea that divine causation is mediated.", "\n\nRegarding the second question, the idea that God is an agent\ncause of being may likewise seem at first to be a departure\nfrom Aristotle. But in fact Neoplatonist authors like Ammonius had\nexplicitly argued that Aristotle’s God was an efficient cause of\nbeing, not just a final cause of motion. And a passage in On the\nQuantity of Aristotle’s Books — the aforementioned\ndiscussion of Koran 36: 79–82 — understands creation on the\nmodel of Aristotelian change, in which something passes from one\ncontrary to another. In the case of creation, one contrary is\n“non-being” and the other “being.” Al-Kindi’s\ndiscussion of this has parallels in ninth century theological\ndiscussions of creation (see Adamson 2003). But his main source,\nsurprisingly, is Ammonius’ student John Philoponus, a Christian\nNeoplatonist who had also spoken of creation as bringing something to\nbe “from non-being.” What separates al-Kindi and\nPhiloponus from Aristotle is their idea that this kind of\n“change” from non-being to being requires no subject. For\nexample, for there to be a change from non-white to white, there must\nbe some subject or substrate for both the privation of the whiteness\nand the whiteness itself (for instance the fence that goes from being\nnon-white to being white when it is painted). God, by contrast, can\nbring about being ex nihilo, with no subject for the change.\nAl-Kindi emphasizes also that God’s creative act requires no time to\nbe realized." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Creation" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThese two points bring us to a more extensive use of Philoponus by\nal-Kindi, in the latter’s well-known argument that the world is\nnot eternal (for which see Davidson 1969 and 1987, and Staley 1987).\nMost Greek philosophers followed Aristotle in holding that the world is\neternal, meaning not only that it will never cease to exist, but that\nit has always existed. This was the doctrine of Aristotle and the\nStoics, and also of orthodox Neoplatonists, who interpreted\nPlato’s Timaeus as likewise committed to the past\neternity of the world. Philoponus was an exception to this rule. In a\nwork rebutting the Neoplatonist Proclus’ arguments in favor of\nthe world’s eternity, he argued at great length that\nPlato’s Timaeus rightly envisions a world with a\nbeginning in time. And in another work directed against Aristotle,\nPhiloponus tried to undermine the arguments of the De Caelo\nand Physics by which Aristotle had shown that the world is\neternal.", "\n\nIn section two of On First Philosophy, and several other\nshort works that repeat the same arguments found in this section,\nal-Kindi follows arguments that derive from Philoponus. (Exactly which\ntext or texts by Philoponus he used is unclear, but it would seem that\nhe at least knew parts of Against Aristotle.) Interestingly,\nal-Kindi completely ignores a major aspect of Philoponus’\npolemic: in the De Caelo, Aristotle had argued that the\nheavens must be eternal, because they have perfect, circular motion and\nare therefore not made out of any of the corruptible four elements of\nour lower world. Whereas Philoponus attacks this cosmology with a\nlengthy and detailed refutation, al-Kindi simply accepts that the\nheavens are made out of an ungenerable and indestructible fifth element\n– but blithely adds that they are nonetheless originally brought\ninto being by God with a beginning in time. (For this see the treatise\nThat the Nature of the Celestial Sphere is Different from the\nNatures of the Four Elements, edited at Abu Rida 1953, 40–6.)", "\n\nWhen al-Kindi comes to argue explicitly against the eternity of the\nworld, he uses Philoponus’ strategy of using Aristotle against\nhimself. Aristotle famously held that there can be no such thing as an\nactual infinite. Thus, for instance, the body of the world cannot be\ninfinitely large. Because the cosmos is finite in spatial magnitude,\nargues al-Kindi, nothing predicated of the body of the cosmos can be\ninfinite. Since time is one of the things predicated of this body, time\nmust be finite; therefore the world is not eternal.", "\n\nThis argument seems to be a poor one. Even if Aristotle admits that\nnothing infinite can be predicated of a finite body, he will want to\nsay that al-Kindi’s argument fails to take full account of the\ndistinction between actual and merely potential\ninfinities. An actual infinity is an infinity which is simultaneously\npresent in its entirety – for example, an infinitely large body,\nor in general any set with an infinite number of members existing at\nthe same time. A potential infinity is when a finite magnitude can be\nextended or multiplied indefinitely. For example, Aristotle thinks\nthat any finite magnitude of space or time is potentially infinite, in\nthat it can in principle be divided into as many parts as one wishes,\nwith smaller divisions still possible. The body of the cosmos, as\nal-Kindi admits himself, is also potentially infinite, in the sense\nthat there is nothing conceptually impossible about increasing its\nsize indefinitely. Notice, though, that in either case the actual\nresult of such a process will be finite: any determinate addition to\nthe size of a body will still yield a body of finite size. Likewise,\nno matter how finely I divide a body, any particular act of division\nwill yield a finite number of parts.", "\n\nNow, Aristotle believes that the eternity of the world commits him\nonly to a potential infinity. This is because saying that the\nworld has always existed does not imply that any infinity is\npresently actual. Rather, it implies only that “the\nworld has already existed for N years” will be true for\nany value of N. One can, so to speak, go as far as one wishes into the\npast, positing increasingly large (but still finite) periods of past\ntime, just as one can divide a body as finely as one wishes. And it is\nfar from clear that this sort of potential infinity is\ninapplicable to a finite magnitude. Does al-Kindi have any response to\nthis?", "\n\nHe does, though his response comes only at the end of his treatment\nof the world’s eternity. The response, found also in Philoponus,\nis that even to reach the present moment, an actually infinite number\nof moments must already have elapsed. In other words, there is\ncurrently an actually infinite number of moments (or years, or\nwhatever) that have elapsed “since the world began.” And,\nas Aristotle himself says, the infinite cannot be traversed. Whether\nthis argument is successful is unclear. It seems to presuppose that we\nselect an infinitely distant point in past time, and then reckon the\nnumber of years that have elapsed since then. But Aristotle will\npresumably want to block the initial move of selecting an infinitely\ndistant point in past time, insisting that any particular\npoint we choose in the past will be removed from the present by a\nmerely finite number of years." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Eternity of the world" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Psychology", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nWe have two works by al-Kindi devoted to the ontology of the human\nsoul: That There are Incorporeal Substances and Discourse\non the Soul. The two depend on very different Greek sources, and\nare very different in rhetorical presentation. But the doctrine that\nemerges from them is not necessarily inconsistent.", "\n\nThat There are Incorporeal Substances (Abu Rida 1950,\n265–69, Adamson and Pormann 2009) is a creative application of\nideas from Aristotle’s\nCategories to the problem of showing that the human soul is\nan immaterial substance. Al-Kindi takes up this task in stages, first\nproving that the soul is a substance, then showing that it is\nimmaterial. He argues that the soul is a substance by drawing on the\nopening chapters of the Categories to claim that the essence\nof something shares a name and definition with that thing. Since the\nsoul is the essence of the living being, and the living being is a\nsubstance, the soul is also a substance. Furthermore, it is an\nimmaterial substance: for the soul is “the intellectual form of\nthe living thing,” and an intellectual form is a species. But\nspecies, al-Kindi argues, are immaterial; therefore the soul is\nimmaterial. Among the problematic moves in this train of argument is\nthe identification of the human soul with the species of human. This\nwould seem to be al-Kindi’s attempt to bring together the idea of\nspecies, which is a “secondary substance” in the\nCategories, with the doctrine of form found in such works as\nthe De Anima and Metaphysics. Al-Kindi simply\nconflates the two, without argument – he does not address the\nobvious question of how there can be many human souls, all of which\nare identical with the single species human.", "\n\nApart from brief opening and closing remarks, Discourse on the\nSoul (Abu Rida 1950, 272–80; also D’Ancona 1996,\nGenequand 1987, Jolivet 1996) consists entirely of supposed quotes\nfrom Greek authorities – Plato, Pythagoras, and Aristotle\n– about the nature of the soul. The actual sources used are\nunclear, though the Republic is the ultimate source for a\nsection describing Plato’s tripartite soul. The section on Aristotle\nis a fable about a Greek king, and has nothing to do with any extant\nAristotelian work. The tenor of these remarks is hortatory, ascetic\nand even visionary: our task is to cleanse our souls from the\n“stains” that adhere to it from the body, and to ascend\nthrough the heavenly spheres, ultimately to the “world of the\nintellect” where it will reside in “the light of the\nCreator.” The soul in question here would seem to be the\nrational soul: the lower parts of Plato’s tripartite soul (the\nirascible and concupiscent parts) are described as faculties seated in\nthe body. The point of this psychological doxography is not unlike\nthat of Incorporeal Substances: the soul is a “simple\nsubstance,” separate from body. Indeed this is presented as the\noverall message of the treatise in al-Kindi’s closing remarks." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 The human soul" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThis rigorously dualist psychology has far-reaching effects in\nal-Kindi’s epistemology and ethics. It is clear from the\nDiscourse that when al-Kindi speaks of the soul as separate\nfrom body, even during our worldly life, he is referring only to the\nintellective or rational soul. While this does not by itself rule out\nthat intellection and reason are somehow grounded in bodily experience,\nal-Kindi does not pursue an empiricist program in contexts where he\naddresses epistemological issues.", "\n\nThe most important text on epistemology is al-Kindi’s\nbest-known work apart from On First Philosophy, namely On\nthe Intellect (Abu Rida 1950, 353–8; also McCarthy 1964,\nRuffinengo 1997). This treatise has received an unusual amount of\nattention, despite its brevity and compressed argument, because it is\nthe first Arabic work to show the influence of Greek taxonomies of the\nintellect into levels or types. (See especially Jolivet 1971, with\nEndress 1980.) These taxonomies, with various versions put forward by\nAlexander, Themistius, Philoponus and other commentators, were in turn\nattempts to systematize Aristotle’s remarks on intellect in\nDe Anima book 3 and elsewhere.", "\n\nFar from grounding intellect in sensation, al-Kindi argues in On\nthe Intellect that the human intellect has a parallel, but\nseparate, function to human sense-perception. (For a similar contrast\nsee also On First Philosophy, section 2.) Just like sensation,\nthe human intellect in itself begins in a state of potentiality. This\nis the first type of intellect, the potential intellect, which is\nmerely an ability to grasp intellectual forms. Once it grasps a form\nand is actually thinking, it becomes “actual intellect.” We\nare then able to think about these forms at will. Our ability to do so\nis what al-Kindi calls the “acquired intellect” (not to be\nconfused with “acquired intellect” in al-Farabi, who means\nby this a comprehensive attainment of the many intellectual forms).\nNotice that these types of intellect are really only the same, human\nintellect in three different states: wholly potential, wholly actual,\nand temporarily potential but able to actualize at will.", "\n\nBut how in the first place do we get from potential intellect to\nactual intellection? It is here that al-Kindi might have told some sort\nof empiricist story, perhaps involving abstraction; such a story plays\nat least some role in al-Kindi’s successors al-Farabi and\nAvicenna. But instead al-Kindi gives a thoroughly intellectualist\naccount of how we come to think, one which is parallel to, but distinct\nfrom, his account of sensation. Just as sensation is actualized by an\nexternal sensible form, so intellect is actualized by an external\nintelligible form. This form will reside in the final type of\nintellect, the “first intellect,” which is al-Kindi’s\nversion of the infamous “maker intellect” in\nAristotle’s De Anima 3.5. While it is unclear what\nposition this first intellect is meant to have in al-Kindi’s\nontology, it is clear that it is distinct from human intellect. The\nfirst intellect is “always in act,” which means that it can\nserve as an external source for intelligible forms, just as sensible\nobject serves as an external source for a sensible form.", "\n\nWe get some sense of how al-Kindi might have applied this highly\nintellectualist epistemology in specific contexts from works on\nrecollection and on dreams. His On Recollection (for which see\nEndress 1986 and 1994) argues explicitly that we cannot derive\nintelligible forms from sense-perception. Thus we do not\n“learn” these forms, but simply “remember” them\nfrom before the soul entered into the body. Here al-Kindi is of course\nbroadly following the account of recollection given by Plato in the\nMeno or Phaedo, though how he might have known of\nthis account remains obscure. (Most likely it is from an Arabic\nversion, perhaps in summary, of the Phaedo.)", "\n\nA longer and more detailed text is On Sleep and Dream (Abu\nRida 1950, 293–311; also Ruffinengo 1997), which gives a naturalistic\naccount of why prophetic dreams occur, and how they may be interpreted.\nHere al-Kindi’s chief source was Aristotle’s Parva\nNaturalia, which include the works On Sleep, On\nDreams, and On Prophecy in Sleep. The extant Arabic\nversion of these texts, which may well be related to the version used\nby al-Kindi, is importantly different from the Greek version, in that\nit admits that genuinely prophetic dreams can be sent from God (cf.\nPines 1974). If al-Kindi knew this version then he follows it only in\npart: he embraces the idea of prophetic dreams, but does not claim that\nthey come to us from God. To explain dreams al-Kindi invokes a faculty\nwe have not yet discussed, namely imagination or phantasia.\nFollowing Aristotle, al-Kindi says that dreams occur when we are\nsleeping because the senses are no longer active, and the imagination\nhas free rein to conjure up forms on its own. We are also given a\nphysiological account of sleep, which departs from Aristotle by placing\nthe imaginative faculty in the brain. Whereas Aristotle has some\ndifficulty explaining, and is in fact rather skeptical about, the\nphenomenon of prophetic dreams, al-Kindi is enthusiastic about them. He\neven explains the various types of dream, with their accuracy\ndetermined by the physical state of the brain. But despite the\nphysiological aspects of al-Kindi’s account, the fundamental\nexplanatory work is done by the incorporeal soul, which\n“announces” its visions of the future to the imagination.\nAgain, the rational soul grasps its objects by itself. Tellingly,\nal-Kindi thinks that sensation hinders this power of the soul, rather\nthan contributing anything to it." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Epistemology" }, { "content": [ "\n\nGiven that al-Kindi sharply divides the rational soul from the body\nand the lower psychological faculties, and that he sees the rational\nsoul as our true “self” or “essence” and as the\nonly part of us that survives the death of the body, it is no surprise\nthat his ethical thought is likewise highly intellectualist.\nUnfortunately, the numerous works on ethical and political topics\nascribed to him in the Fihrist are almost all lost. The most\nsignificant remaining text is On Dispelling Sadness (Ritter\nand Walzer 1938, also Butterworth 1992, Druart 1993, Jayyusi-Lehn 2002,\nMestiri and Dye 2004). This is also the work of al-Kindi that will be\nmost often cited by subsequent thinkers, for example by Miskawayh in\nhis Tahdhib al-Akhlaq (The Refinement of\nCharacter).", "\n\nOn Dispelling Sadness, as its title indicates, is a work in\nthe genre of philosophical consolation. Much of the text consists in\npractical advice, maxims and anecdotes that one may bear in mind when\none finds oneself affected by sorrow. One particularly striking passage\nallegorizes our earthly life as a temporary landfall during a sea\nvoyage; this image derives ultimately from Epictetus. The philosophical\nfoundations of the treatise, though, are laid in the early sections,\nwhere al-Kindi gives a principled argument against placing value on\nphysical objects. By their very nature, he says, wealth and other\nphysical goods are vulnerable and transitory. No one can be sure that\ntheir possessions will not be taken from them – they may\n“be seized by any power.” And more crucially, the very fact\nthat they are physical means that they are subject to generation and\ncorruption, and are therefore fleeting. Instead, we should value and\npursue things that are stable and enduring, and that cannot be taken\nfrom us: these will be the things in the now familiar “world of\nthe intellect.” To the extent that one’s desires are\ndirected solely towards intelligible things, one will be invulnerable\nto sadness. This argument, then, shows that sadness is always needless.\nThe anecdotes and more practical “remedies” offered in the\nrest of the treatise are intended to make it easier for us to accept\nand live in accordance with this conclusion." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Application to ethics" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "5. Science", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nDespite the anti-empiricist character of al-Kindi’s epistemology noted\nabove, he devoted enormous energy to various branches of the physical\nsciences. Particularly well represented in the extant corpus are his\nwork on optics and medicine, especially the compounding of drugs (for\noptics see Rashed 1997; for medicine see Gauthier 1939, Klein-Franke\n1975, Celentano 1979; for these aspects of al-Kindi’s thought\ngenerally see Adamson 2007, ch.7). What is characteristic about\nal-Kindi’s approach to such topics is the use of mathematics. It has\nbeen persuasively argued that mathematics was fundamental to\nal-Kindi’s own philosophical method (Gutas 2004, cf. Endress 2003); a\ngood example is his mathematical approach to Aristotle’s categories,\nwhich makes quantity and quality fundamental for Aristotelian logic\n(Ighbariah 2012). Certainly he missed no opportunity to apply\nmathematical techniques to what we would now think of as\n“scientific” topics. In addition, he wrote numerous works\non music (edited in Zakariyya’ 1962), which for the ancients and\nal-Kindi himself was a branch of the mathematical sciences. He also\nwrote extensively on more recognizably mathematical topics, as is\nattested by the Fihrist, though again much of this material\nis lost.", "\n\nA good example of how al-Kindi applied mathematics to other fields\nis his use of geometry in optics (see further Lindberg 1971, Rashed\n1997, Adamson 2006). On this subject al-Kindi followed the tradition\ninaugurated by Euclid, and carried on by Ptolemy and others, in which\ngeometrical constructions were used to explain phenomena such as visual\nperspective, shadows, refraction, reflection, and burning mirrors. This\nprocedure implies that light and vision can be formalized as\ngeometrical lines, an implication that al-Kindi and his sources embrace\nby claiming that vision occurs when “rays” emitted from the\neyes along straight lines strike a visual object. Likewise, objects are\nilluminated when a light source emits light rays that strike the\nobjects’ surfaces. Aspects of al-Kindi’s account anticipate\nthat of Ibn al-Haytham, who some decades later would be the first to\nexplain vision accurately.", "\n\nNow, this account based on “rays” also seems to underlie\nal-Kindi’s most ambitious work on the physical sciences: a\nlengthy treatise entitled On Rays (de Radiis, for\nwhich see D’Alverny and Hudry 1974) and preserved only in Latin.\nThere is some question as to its authenticity, but it seems plausible\nthat On Rays represents al-Kindi’s attempt to explain\nall physical interaction – from heating and cooling, to vision,\nto astral influence, to magical incantations – in terms of a\nfundamentally geometrical mechanism. (For connections to the optical\nworks, see Travaglia 1999.)" ], "subsection_title": "5.1 The use of mathematics" }, { "content": [ "\n\nA central part of On Rays explains that the stars and\nplanets bring about events in the sublunary world by means of rays\nemitted from the heavenly bodies to points on the earth’s\nsurface. This differs from an account found in several other\ncosmological treatises by al-Kindi, where he follows Alexander of\nAphrodisias in holding that the heavenly bodies literally heat up the\nlower world by means of friction as they pass over it. In either case,\nhowever, the account given is intended to explain the efficacy of the\nscience of astrology. Al-Kindi wrote numerous works on this subject,\nand his associate Abu Ma‘shar was the greatest figure in Arabic\nastrology. Both of them saw astrology as a rational science,\nundergirded by a well-worked out theory of physical causes (see further\nBurnett 1993, Adamson 2002a).", "\n\nAl-Kindi’s corpus includes several treatises on cosmology,\nexplaining and defending a picture of the cosmos as four concentric\ncircles of elements, which are mixed together by the outer, heavenly\nspheres to yield complex compound substances like minerals, plants, and\nanimals. Though al-Kindi’s main influences are works of Aristotle\nand his commentators, especially Alexander, he also knows something of\nthe Timaeus, as is shown by a treatise explaining why Plato\nassociated the elements and heavens with the Platonic solids (Abu Rida\n1953, 54–63; also Rescher 1968).", "\n\nOne respect in which al-Kindi follows Alexander is his conviction that\nthe heavenly spheres are the means by which God exercises providence\nover the sublunary world (see Fazzo and Wiesner 1993). Al-Kindi’s\nbold claims for astrology already commit him to the idea that a wide\nrange of specific events can be predicted on the basis of astral\ncausation. His doctrine of providence goes further by implying that\nall events in the lower world are caused by the stars,\nwhich are carrying out the benign “command” of God. This\ndoctrine is set out in On the Prostration of the Outermost\nSphere (Abu Rida 1950, 244–261, Rashed and Jolivet 1998, 177–99)\nand On the Proximate Agent Cause of Generation and Corruption\n(Abu Rida 1950, 214–237). The former explains that the heavens are\npossessed of souls, and freely follow God’s command so as to move in\nsuch a way that the providentially intended sublunary things and\nevents will come about. This, according to al-Kindi, is what the Koran\nrefers to when it says that the stars “prostrate”\nthemselves before God. In Proximate Agent Cause, meanwhile,\nal-Kindi gives a more detailed account of the means by which the\nheavens cause things in the lower world (here he invokes friction, not\nrays). The most obvious effect of the stars on our world is of course\nthe seasons, because the sun (due to its size and proximity) is the\nheavenly body with the most powerful effect. If there were no such\nheavenly causation, according to al-Kindi, the elements would never\nhave combined at all, and the lower realm would consist of four\nspheres of unmixed earth, water, air and fire.", "\n\nAl-Kindi’s account of astral causation and providence is a very good\nexample of his philosophical method: combining and building on ideas\ntaken from Aristotle, later Greek philosophers, and\n“scientific” authors like Ptolemy, he gives a rational\naccount of a central concept in Islam. Prostration shows that\nhe is even willing to use such an account to expound the Koran itself.\nAl-Kindi is confident that, once exposed to judicious presentations of\nGreek wisdom, his more enlightened contemporaries and sponsors will\nagree that these foreign texts can be used — jointly with\nautochthonous “Arabic” disciplines like grammar — in\nthe service of a deeper understanding of Islam itself." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Cosmology" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAl-Kindi’s optimism on this score was not necessarily borne\nout in subsequent generations. But among thinkers influenced by\nal-Kindi, one can discern a continuing tendency to harmonize\n“foreign” philosophy with the “indigenous”\ndevelopments of Muslim culture. This is one feature of what might be\ncalled the “Kindian tradition,” an intellectual current\nthat runs up through the tenth century, which is most obviously\nrepresented by first and second generation students of\nal-Kindi’s. Particularly prominent among these figures is\nal-‘Amiri, a well-known Neoplatonist thinker who was a second\ngeneration student of al-Kindi’s (the link was al-Kindi’s\nstudent Abu Zayd al-Balkhi). Also influenced by al-Kindi were the\nJewish thinker Isaac Israeli (on whom see Altmann and Stern 1958) and\nthe aforementioned tenth century polymath Miskawayh.", "\n\nWhile al-Kindi is only rarely cited by authors writing in Arabic\nlater than the tenth century, he was a significant figure for Latin\nmedieval authors. Most influential were his works on astrology (see\nBurnett 1999); but works like On the Intellect were also\ntranslated, and as noted above there are works in the Kindian corpus\nthat are extant only in Latin. One of these, On Rays, was the\ntarget of a polemic composed by Giles of Rome.", "\n\nTo this we might add that philosophy in the Islamic world was itself\na broader legacy of al-Kindi’s, and this in two respects.\nFirstly, the translations produced in the Kindi circle would become\nstandard philosophical texts for centuries to come – particularly\ninfluential would be their translations of certain Aristotelian works\n(such as the Metaphysics) and of Plotinus, in the Theology\nof Aristotle. Secondly, though authors like al-Farabi and Averroes\nhardly mention al-Kindi by name (al-Farabi never does so, and Averroes\ndoes so only to criticize his pharmacological theory), they are\ncarrying on his philhellenic project, in which the practice of\nphilosophy is defined by an engagement with Greek philosophical\nworks." ], "section_title": "6. Legacy", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Abu Rida, M.‘A.H. (ed.), 1950/1953, Al-Kindi,\nRasa’il al-Kindi al-Falsafiyya, 2 volumes, Cairo: Dar\nal-Fikr al-‘Arabi.", "Adamson, P., 2002a, “Abu Ma‘shar, al-Kindi and the\nPhilosophical Defense of Astrology,” Recherches de\nphilosophie et théologie médiévales, 69:\n245–270.", "–––, 2002b, “Before Essence and Existence:\nAl-Kindi’s Conception of Being,” The Journal of the\nHistory of Philosophy, 40: 297–312.", "–––, 2003, “Al-Kindi and the Mu‘tazila: Divine\nAttributes, Creation and Freedom,” Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 13: 45–77.", "–––, 2005, “Al-Kindi and the Reception of Greek\nPhilosophy,”in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic\nPhilosophy, ed. P. Adamson and R.C. Taylor, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, 32–51.", "–––, 2006, “Vision, Light and Color in al-Kindi,\nPtolemy and the Ancient Commentators,” Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 16: 207–236.", "–––, 2007, Al-Kindi, New York: Oxford University\nPress.", "–––, 2015, Studies on Plotinus and al-Kindi,\nFarnham: Ashgate Variorum.", "Adamson, P. and Pormann, P.E. (trans.), 2012, The\nPhilosophical Works of al-Kindi, Karachi: Oxford University\nPress.", "Adamson, P. and Pormann, P.E., 2009, “Aristotle’s\nCategories and the Soul: an Annotated Translation of\nal-Kindi’s That There Are Separate Substances,” in\nJ.M. Dillon and M. Elkaisy-Friemuth (eds), The Afterlife of the\nPlatonic Soul. Reflections of Platonic Psychology in the Monotheistic\nReligions, Leiden: Brill, 95–106.", "Akasoy, A. (trans.), 2011, Al-Kindi: Die erste Philosophie,\nFreiburg: Harder.", "Allard, M., 1972, “L’épître de Kindi sur\nles definitions,” Bulletin d’études orientales\nde l’Institut français de Damas, 25: 47–83.", "Altmann, A., and Stern, S.M., 1958, Isaac Israeli: a Neoplatonic\nPhilosopher of the Early Tenth Century, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Atiyeh, G.N., 1966, Al-Kindi: the Philosopher of the Arabs,\nRawalpindi: Islamic Research Institute.", "Burnett, C., 1993, “Al-Kindi on Judicial Astrology: ‘The\nForty Chapters,’” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy,\n3: 77–117.", "–––, 1999, “Al-Kindi in the Renaissance,” in\nP.R. Blum (ed.), Sapientiam amemus: Humanismus und Aristotelismus\nin der Renaissance, München: Wilhelm Fink, 13–30.", "Butterworth, C., 1992, “Al-Kindi and the Beginnings of\nIslamic Political Philosophy,” in C. Butterworth (ed.), The\nPolitical Aspects of Islamic Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard\nUniversity Press, 14–32.", "Celentano, G., 1979, Due scritti medici di al-Kindi,\nNaples: I.U.O.", "Cortabarria Beitia, A., 1972, “La classification des sciences\nchez al-Kindi,” MIDEO, 11: 49–76.", "D’Alverny, M.-T. and Hudry, F., 1974, “Al-Kindi. De\nRadiis,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et\nlittéraire du moyen âge, 61: 139–260.", "D’Ancona, C., 1996, “La dottrina Neoplatonica\ndell’anima nella filosofia Islamica: un esempio in\nal-Kindi,” in Actes del Simposi Internacional de Filosofia de\nl’Edat Mitjana, Vic: Patronat d’Estudis Osonencs,\n91–6.", "–––, 1998, “Al-Kindi on the Subject Matter of\nthe First Philosophy. Direct and Indirect Sources of\n‘Falsafa-l-ula,’ Chapter One,” in J.A. Aertsen and A.\nSpeer (eds), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter,\nBerlin: Walter de Gruyter, 841–55.", "Davidson, H.A., 1969, “John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval\nIslamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation,” Journal of the\nAmerican Oriental Society, 89: 357–91.", "–––, 1987, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the\nExistence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, New\nYork: Oxford University Press.", "Druart, T.-A., 1993, “Al-Kindi’s Ethics,”\nReview of Metaphysics, 47: 329–57.", "Endress, G., 1980, Review of Jolivet (1971), Zeitschrift der\ndeutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 130: 422–35.", "–––, 1986, “Al-Kindi’s Theory of Anamnesis. A\nNew Text and its Implications,” in Islão e arabismo na\nPenínsula Ibérica: Actas do XI Congreso da União\nEuropaeia de Arabistas e Islamólogos, Évora:\nUniversidade de Évora, 393–402.", "–––, 1987/1992, “Die wissenschaftliche\nLiteratur,” in H. Gätje (ed.), Grundriss der arabischen\nPhilologie (Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert), Volume 2, 400–506,\nVolume 3 (Supplement), 3–152.", "–––, 1994, “Al-Kindi über die Wiedererinnerung\nder Seele,” Oriens, 34: 174–221.", "–––, 1997, “The Circle of al-Kindi,” in G.\nEndress and R. Kruk (eds), The Ancient Tradition in Christian and\nIslamic Hellenism, Leiden: Research School CNWS, 43–76.", "–––, 2003, “Mathematics and Philosophy in Medieval\nIslam,” in J.P. Hogendijk and A.I. Sabra (eds), The\nEnterprise of Science in Islam, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,\n121–76.", "Endress, G. and Adamson, P., 2017, “Abu Yusuf\nal-Kindi,” in U. Rudolph, R. Hansberger, and P. Adamson\n(eds.), Philsophy in the Islamic World (Volume 1: 8th to 10th\nCenturies), Leiden: Brill, 143–220.", "Fakhry, M., 1963, “Al-Kindi wa ’l-Suqrat,”\nal-Abhath, 16: 23–34.", "Fazzo, S. and Wiesner, H., 1993, “Alexander of Aphrodisias in\nthe Kindi Circle and in al- Kindi’s Cosmology,” Arabic\nSciences and Philosophy, 3: 119–53.", "Gannagé, E., 2016, Al-Kindī, “Ptolemy (and\nNicomachus of Gerasa) Revisited,” Studia\nGraeco-Arabica, 6: 83–112.", "Gauthier, L., 1939, Antécédents\ngréco-arabes de la psycho-physique, Beirut: Imprimerie\nCatholique.", "Genequand, C., 1987, “Platonism and Hermetism in\nal-Kindi’s Fi al-Nafs,” Zeitschrift für\nGeschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften, 4: 1–18.", "Guidi, M. and Walzer, R., 1940, Uno Scritto Introduttivo allo\nStudio di Aristotele, Rome: Reale Accademia Nazionale dei\nLincei.", "Gutas, D., 1998, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: the\nGraeco-Arabic Translation movement in Baghdad and early society\n(2nd-4th / 8th-10th centuries), London: Routledge.", "Gutas, D., 2004, “Geometry and the Rebirth of Philosophy in\nArabic with al-Kindi,” in R. Arnzen and J. Thielmann (eds),\nWords, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea: Studies\non the Sources, Contents and Influences of Islamic Civilization and\nArabic Philosophy and Science, Leuven: Peeters, 195–209.", "Ighbariah, A., 2012, “Between Logic and Mathematics:\nal-Kindi’s Approach to the Aristotelian Categories,” Arabic\nSciences and Philosophy, 22: 51–68.", "Ivry, A., 1974, Al-Kindi’s Metaphysics, Albany: SUNY\nPress.", "Janssens, J., 1994, “Al-Kindi’s Concept of God,”\nUltimate Reality and Meaning, 17: 4–16.", "Jayyusi-Lehn, G., 2002, “The Epistle of Ya‘qub ibn Ishaq\nal-Kindi on the Device for Dispelling Sorrows,” British\nJournal of Middle Eastern Studies, 29: 121–135.", "Jolivet, J., 1971, L’Intellect selon Kindi, Leiden:\nBrill.", "–––, 1979, “Pour le dossier du Proclus arabe: al-Kindi\net la Théologie Platonicienne,” Studia\nIslamica, 49: 55–75.", "–––, 1996, “La topographie du salut\nd’après le Discours sur l’Âme\nd’al-Kindi,” in M.A. Amir-Moezzi (ed.), La voyage\ninitiatique en terre d’Islam, Louvain: Peeters.", "–––, 2004, “L’Épître sur la\nquantité des livres d’Aristote par al-Kindi (une\nlecture),” in R. Morelon and A. Hasnawi (eds), De\nZénon d’Élée à Poincaré:\nRecueil d’études en hommage à Roshdi Rashed,\nLouvain: Peeters, 665–83.", "Klein-Franke, F., 1975, “Die Ursachen der Krisen bei akuten\nKrankheiten: eine wiederentdeckte Schrift al-Kindi’s,”\nIsrael Oriental Studies, 5: 161–88.", "–––, 1982, “Al-Kindi’s ‘On\nDefinitions and Descriptions of Things,’” Le\nMuséon: Revue des Études Orientales, 95: 191–216.", "Lindberg, D.C., 1971, “Alkindi’s Critique of\nEuclid’s Theory of Vision,” Isis, 62: 469–89.", "McCarthy, R., 1964, “Al-Kindi’s Treatise on the\nIntellect,” Islamic Studies, 3: 119–49.", "Mestiri, S. and Dye, G., 2004, Al-Kindi: Le moyen de chasser les\ntristesses et autres textes éthiques, Paris: Fayard.", "Pines, S., 1974, “The Arabic Recension of Parva\nNaturalia and the Philosophical Doctrine Concerning Veridical\nDreams According to al-Risala al-Manamiyya and Other\nSources,” Israel Oriental Studies, 4: 104–53.", "Périer, A., 1920, “Un traité de Yahya ben\n‘Adi. Défense du dogme de la Trinité contre les\nobjections d’al-Kindi,” Revue de l’orient\nchristian (3rd series), 22: 3–21.", "Rashed, R., 1997, Oeuvres Philosophiques & Scientifiques\nd’al-Kindi: Volume 1, L’Optique et la\nCatoptrique, Leiden: Brill.", "Rashed, R. and Jolivet, J., 1998, Oeuvres Philosophiques &\nScientifiques d’al-Kindi: Volume 2, Métaphysique\net cosmologie, Leiden: Brill.", "Rescher, N., 1968, “Al-Kindi’s Treatise on the Platonic\nSolids,” in N. Rescher, Studies in Arabic Philosophy,\nPittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 15–37.", "Ritter, H., and Walzer, R., 1938, Uno Scritto Morale Inedito di\nal-Kindi, Rome: Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei.", "Rosenthal, F., 1942, “Al-Kindi als Literat,”\nOrientalia, 11: 262–88.", "Ruffinengo, P.P., 1997, “Al-Kindi, Trattato\nsull’intelletto. Trattato sul sogno e la visione,”\nMedioevo, 23: 337–94.", "Schöck, C., 2012, “The Controversy between al-Kindi and\nYahya b. ʿAdi on the Trinity: a revival of the Controversy\nBetween Eunomius and the Cappadocian Fathers,”\nOrientalia, 40: 1–50.", "Staley, K., 1989, “Al-Kindi on Creation: Aristotle’s\nChallenge to Islam,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 50:\n355–70.", "Tornero Poveda, E., 1992, Al-Kindi: la transformacion de un\npensamiento religioso en un pensamiento racional, Madrid: Consejo\nSuperior de Investigaciones Científicas.", "Travaglia, P., 1999, Magic, Causality, and Intentionality. The\nDoctrine of Rays in al-Kindi, Turnhout: Micrologus.", "Zakariyya’, Y., 1962, Mu’allafat al-Kindi\nal-musiqiyya, Baghdad: Matba‘a Shafiq." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../eternity/", "text": "eternity, in Christian thought" }, { "href": "../philoponus/", "text": "Philoponus" }, { "href": "../plotinus/", "text": "Plotinus" }, { "href": "../proclus/", "text": "Proclus" } ]
abu-bakr-al-razi	Abu Bakr al-Razi	First published Wed May 19, 2021	[ "\nAbū Bakr al-Rāzī (865–925 CE, 251–313 AH)\nwas one of the greatest figures in the history of medicine in the\nIslamic tradition, and one of its most controversial philosophers.\nWhile we have ample surviving evidence for his medical thought, his\nphilosophical ideas mostly have to be pieced together on the basis of\nreports found in other authors, who are often hostile to him. This\nconcerns especially his notorious critique of religion, and his\nteaching that the cosmos is produced through the interaction of five\n“eternal principles”, namely God, Soul, matter, time, and\nplace. We do however have direct access to one branch of his\nphilosophy, namely ethics, represented by a work of advice called\nThe Spiritual Medicine and a briefer rejoinder to his\ncritics, The Philosophical Way of Life. (Note that Abū\nBakr is not to be confused with other philosophers from the same city\nof Rayy, who are also called al-Rāzī: the most famous of\nthese is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who wrote several\ncenturies later.)" ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Five Eternal Principles", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Ethics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Medicine and the ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Religion and Prophecy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Legacy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary sources and translations", "Secondary Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAbū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyāʾ\nal-Rāzī made his fame mostly as a doctor. As his name\n“al-Rāzī” indicates, he hailed from the Persian\ncity of Rayy, near modern-day Tehran. His biographers report that he\nran a hospital there, and another in Baghdad. He received patronage\nfrom Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Manṣūr (d. 914),\nthe governor of Rayy, to whom al-Rāzī dedicated a\nsubstantial medical treatise, The Book for\nal-Manṣūr. We have a variety of anecdotes about\nal-Rāzī’s medical practice, some found in his own\nworks and some in his medieval biographers, for instance that\nal-Rāzī would deal only with patients whose condition\nstumped his students. We also know, because he tells us himself, that\nhe suffered from eye problems and a hand injury from copious reading,\ncopying, and writing.", "\nThis latter piece of information is found in The Philosophical Way\nof Life, which is a good first text to read by al-Rāzī\n(Arabic edition in al-Rāzī\n RF;\n English translation in al-Rāzī\n PWL).\n In it he rebuts accusations that he is a hypocrite for claiming to\nmodel his lifestyle on that of Socrates, when in fact Socrates was\nrigorously ascetic and al-Rāzī is not (see Strohmaier 1974).\nAl-Rāzī responds by saying that reports of Socrates’\nasceticism, which unbeknownst to him go back to a confusion in the\nsources between Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic, do not tell the whole\nstory. In fact Socrates adopted a lifestyle of moderation as he\nmatured, and it is this model that al-Rāzī imitates.", "\nThis is one of only two complete surviving works by al-Rāzī\ndevoted solely to a philosophical topic; the other one also deals with\nethics. This is The Spiritual Medicine (Arabic edition in\nal-Rāzī RF; English translation in al-Rāzī\n SPR\n and for discussion Adamson 2016), a longer book of ethical advice\npresented to his patron al-Manṣūr as a complement to the\naforementioned medical treatise. Here al-Rāzī offers\ntreatment for the soul, following on his overview of treatments for\nthe body (Adamson 2019). Apart from this, the most significant\nsurviving work for his philosophy is his Doubts about Galen\n(Arabic critical edition and translation by Koetschet in\nal-Rāzī\n DG).\n Al-Rāzī considered Galen the greatest of medical\nauthorities, but on the basis of Galen’s own critical attitude\ntowards esteemed predecessors, felt free to critique weak points in\nthe extensive corpus of Galenic works that had been translated into\nArabic. While a number of these points naturally concern medicine, the\nDoubts also touches on a wide range of philosophical issues,\nas discussed below.", "\nBeyond this, the extant writings have to do mostly with medicine,\nincluding a number of smaller treatises, like a celebrated text on the\ndifference between smallpox and measles (English translation in\nal-Rāzī\n SM), and the by no means small Comprehensive Book, a\nstaggeringly huge collection of notes on medicine that was compiled by\nal-Rāzī’s students after his death. The\nComprehensive Book is sometimes said to present\nal-Rāzī’s “case notes”. But, while it is\ntrue that he reports on his own medical experiences, the work is more\naccurately described as a collection of excerpts from Greek and Arabic\nmedical sources. When he does introduce “case notes” this\nis to provide counterexamples and amplifications for the textual\nevidence (Savage-Smith 2012). Broadly speaking, despite his often\nharsh diatribe against Galen’s failures in the Doubts,\nal-Rāzī’s own medical theories fall broadly within the\nGalenic framework, and thus deploy such standard concepts as the four\nhumors, the natural powers of the body, and the role of\npneuma in explaining animal sensation and motion.", "\nA final group of works that come down to us from al-Rāzī\ndiscuss alchemy (Ruska 1935). He was evidently a practicing alchemist\nand describes in detail a wide variety of chemical procedures, all\naimed towards the goal of manufacturing valuable minerals and stones,\nor likenesses thereof. It may be that al-Rāzī’s\natomist theory of matter provided him with a basis for understanding\nthese processes. Chemical transformation would involve breaking down\ncomplex substances to more primitive particles and then recombining\nthem in other proportions to produce the desired result (Kraus\n1942–3: vol. 2, 10–11; Adamson 2021: 96–98).", "\nBeyond these extant works we have reports on the full range of\nal-Rāzī’s writings by later authors who recorded lists\nof their titles. These confirm that he wrote much on medicine,\nphilosophy, and alchemy, as well as mathematics, logic, and poetry.\nMost eye-catching here, though, are works in which he discussed\nreligion and, especially, prophecy. The latter bear titles like On\nthe Tricks of Supposed Prophets and On the Necessity of the\nProphetic Mission. That could just show that he was concerned to\nrefute the claims of spurious prophets, while accepting the legitimacy\nof true prophets. But in reports by still other authors, we are given\na picture of al-Rāzī as a fundamentally anti-religious\nauthor who rejected all revelation and prophecy. This is especially\nthe case with al-Rāzī’s contemporary, also from Rayy,\nAbū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 934). In a treatise\ncalled The Proofs of Prophecy, Abū Ḥātim\nrecounts face-to-face debates he had with al-Rāzī and then\nsummarizes, and elaborately refutes, a treatise by al-Rāzī\nthat supposedly sought to unmask the falsehoods of all revelatory\nreligious traditions (see\n AHR\n in the bibliography).", "\nAlong with Abū Ḥātim, two other sources are crucial\nfor reconstructing al-Rāzī’s cosmology. These are\nNaṣīr-e Khosraw (d. 1088), who explained this cosmology in\norder to refute it in his Persian work Provision for the\nTraveler (hereafter\n NK,\n selective trans. into Arabic in al-Rāzī RF), and yet\nanother al-Rāzī, this time the famous theologian-philosopher\nFakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), in his Exalted\nTopics (hereafter\n FDR).\n From these and a few other sources, we can piece together the details\nof a remarkable account of the creation of the world, which invokes\nfive factors that have always existed and come together to produce the\ncosmos: God, Soul, matter, time, and place. Abū Ḥātim\nand Naṣīr-e Khosraw both present this as an appalling\ndeparture from Islam, since it involves postulating four eternal\nprinciples alongside God." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSome reports suggest that al-Rāzī saw his five principles as\nhaving a systematic structure: God and Soul are active and alive,\nmatter passive and non-living, and time and place neither active, nor\npassive, nor alive. But the scheme does not seem to be motivated by\nits ability to satisfy all logical possibilities. Rather,\nal-Rāzī argues specifically for each of the five principles.\nGod’s existence is demonstrated on the basis of the good design\nof the universe; more contentious are the other four.", "\nWhile the Soul is invoked as the source of life in bodies, its primary\nfunction in al-Rāzī’s philosophy is to facilitate a\ndistinctive theodicy. The presence of great suffering in the world,\nalongside the aforementioned good design of that world, shows that it\ncannot have been created directly by God. Furthermore,\nal-Rāzī is concerned with a traditional argument against the\neternity of the universe, namely that a perfectly wise and rational\nGod could not arbitrarily choose a moment for the universe to begin\nexisting. Both problems are solved by postulating a Soul which is\n“foolish” where God is wise. The Soul conceives of a\ndesire or even passion (ʿishq) to be “mixed”\nwith matter, which initiates the process of the world’s\ncreation. God intervenes to make the world as good as it can be, but\nour bodily life is still inevitably full of pain.", "\nOne question that arises here is why God would not prevent the Soul\nfrom mixing with matter, if this is such a bad idea.\nAl-Rāzī’s explanation is that God allows it to happen\nas a learning experience for the Soul (Goodman 1975). God bestows upon\nthe Soul the gift of reason or intellect (ʿaql), and\nSoul can use this to realize that it should be working to free itself\nfrom its unwise bond with matter (Druart 1996). We have reports of\nparables used by al-Rāzī to explain this. A wise father\nmight allow his inexperienced child to venture to a dangerous country,\nbut send with him a good advisor (namely the intellect; Fakhr\nal-Dīn al-Rāzī, FDR: vol. 4, 416). Similarly, a wise\nfather might allow his foolish child to go into an alluring garden\nfull of thorns and stinging insects, so as to teach the child a lesson\n(Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī, AHR: 18–19). This\ntheodicy points the way towards a conception of our ultimate end,\nnamely to escape from the material world, achieving\n“liberation” through moderate lifestyle and the practice\nof philosophy.", "\nAs for matter, time, and place, these principles are required in order\nthat the universe may be created at all (for an overview see Fakhry\n1968). First, al-Rāzī thinks that there must already be some\nmaterial before the cosmos exists, out of which it is constructed. As\nNāṣir-e Khosraw (NK: 75) complains, al-Rāzī\nbelieved that creation ex nihilo was impossible. He argued\nfor this on the grounds that we constantly see things being produced\nthrough lengthy processes of development, even though instantaneous\nmanifestation would be far easier and involve less suffering: he gives\nthe example of the need for childbirth and growth to maturity. His\npoint is that God would not cause this to happen, if He could just\nmake humans exist from nothing. Time and place are needed for an\nanalogous reason. Time cannot be created, since creation must occur\nat a time, and place cannot be created, because there would\nalready need to be somewhere to put it.", "\nAl-Rāzī’s conception of matter is unusual among\nfalāsifa, that is, thinkers of the Islamic world who\nrespond primarily to the Greek philosophical tradition. More or less\nall of them, from al-Kindī (d. after 870) to\nal-Fārābī (d. 950), Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d.\n1037), and Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198), endorse a broadly\nAristotelian understanding of bodies as potentially subject to\nindefinite division. By contrast, al-Rāzī is an atomist\n(Pines 1936 [1997], Baffioni 1982, Langermann 2009). He believes that\nthe four elements (or possibly five: our sources are not clear as to\nwhether he thinks the heavens are constituted from a distinct fifth\nelement) differ in their properties because of variations in the ratio\nof atoms to void. Thus earth, which has little or no void in it, is\ndark, cold, dense, and moves downward; fire is luminous, hot, subtle,\nand moves upward. Actually these are not strictly\n“elements” but only the most basic compounds of atoms,\nwhich are truly fundamental. Though contemporary Islamic theologians\nwere also atomists (Dhanani 1994), al-Rāzī’s theory\ndiffers from theirs in some respects, and we know that he debated the\ntopic of matter with a theologian named\nal-Miṣmaʿī.", "\nAl-Rāzī referred to atoms as “absolute\n(muṭlaq) matter”, a locution echoed in his\ncharacterizations of the last two principles, namely “absolute\ntime” and “absolute place”. These are also known,\nrespectively, as “eternity (dahr)” or\n“duration (mudda)” and “void\n(khalāʾ)”. As we learn from the report of the\ndebate with Abū Ḥātim, al-Rāzī was concerned\nto stress the independence of time and place from bodies, that is,\nfrom composites of atoms (Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī,\nAHR: 12). Time in itself is simply eternal duration, with events\n(including the creation of the world) and motions happening within\nthat duration. Similarly, place in itself is an infinite void, into\nwhich the bounded physical cosmos is placed. As already explained,\nvoid also exists (at least at the microscopic level) within the\ncosmos, since its admixture into bodies explains the variation between\nthe elements.", "\nAl-Rāzī’s theories may be usefully contrasted to those\nof Aristotle; we know he was familiar with Aristotle’s\nPhysics because he tells us as much in his Philosophical\nWay of Life. For Aristotle, time and place are dependent or\nsupervenient phenomena: place is the inner boundary of the body that\ncontains the body that is in place, while time is the number of\nmotion. Al-Rāzī by contrast makes space-time independent.\nFor instance he proposed a thought experiment that, if the universe\nwere taken away, its place would remain (a similar idea is proposed by\nPhiloponus in Phys. 574, translated in Philoponus\n CPV:\n 36). However his attitude towards Aristotelian physics is more\nnuanced than straightforward rejection (Adamson 2021: ch.5). For he\naccepts that one may speak of “relative” time and place,\nwhich would be the time and place of a particular motion and\nparticular body, respectively. For example a year would be a\ndemarcated segment of eternal duration that measures the sun’s\nmotion along the ecliptic, while the place of a ball would be the\nlimit of the region of void occupied by the ball. Likewise,\nal-Rāzī includes the Aristotelian elements, earth, water,\nair, fire, and perhaps ether, in his cosmology but does not accept\nthat these are fundamental. As just seen, the real\n“element” that underlies them is atomic.", "\nThus Aristotle managed to articulate genuine principles of physics,\nbut only “relative” ones that need to be understood within\na more basic framework. It was Plato who, in al-Rāzī’s\nopinion, had gotten closest to putting forward that framework.\nAbū Ḥātim says that al-Rāzī told him as\nmuch: “what Plato says is hardly different from what I believe\nconcerning time, and this, according to me, is the best thing that has\nbeen said about it” (Abū Ḥātim\nal-Rāzī, AHR: 13). The text he must have in mind is\nPlato’s Timaeus, which he would have known through the\nintermediary of Galen (see Galen,\n CTP\n for the Arabic translation of his paraphrase of the dialogue). The\nTimaeus likewise postulates a pre-existing matter that is\nformed into the cosmos; it can also be read as suggesting that time\nand place in some sense pre-exist the cosmos. Furthermore, Plato puts\nforward an atomic theory in the Timaeus. In fact,\nal-Rāzī rises to the defense of that theory in Doubts\nabout Galen (al-Rāzī, DG: §15.1-6). So there is\ngood reason to believe that al-Rāzī was modeling his\ncosmology primarily on Plato’s, as he understood it, albeit with\nadjustments.", "\nOn the other hand, Naṣīr-e Khosraw tells us that\nal-Rāzī plagiarized this whole theory from his teacher,\nĪrānshahrī. He is an obscure figure whose works are\nlost, though al-Bīrūnī (d. ca. 1050) does speak of him\nas an expert in astronomy and the diversity of religions. Another\nwitness, Abū l-Maʿālī (fl. 1092), has\nĪrānshahrī claiming to have been a prophet who had\nreceived revelation from an angel, like the Prophet Muhammad did. He\nreports that for Īrānshahrī, all religions put forth a\nsingle teaching, an idea which might be thought to resonate with\nal-Rāzī’s own irenic, rationalist approach to\nrevelation. If Naṣīr-e Khosraw is right to trace the Razian\ncosmology to this shadowy teacher, then perhaps we should think of\nal-Rāzī’s project as a creative fusion of\nĪrānshahri’s ideas and Plato’s." ], "section_title": "2. The Five Eternal Principles", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nFrom the foregoing discussion of al-Rāzī’s theodicy it\nmay seem obvious that his ethical teaching would focus on the goal of\nliberation from the body and its concerns. But as mentioned already,\nhis Philosophical Way of Life defends a lifestyle of\nmoderation, and distances itself from outright asceticism.\nFurthermore, in this text he says that bodily pleasure may licitly be\nsought so long as one does not transgress what he calls a “limit\npast which one may not go”. This limit dictates that we should\npartake of no pleasures", "\n\n\nthat can be attained only by engaging in evildoing, murder, and in\ngeneral anything that displeases God, when the judgment of intellect\nand justice is that it is unnecessary. All else is permitted.\n(al-Rāzī, RF: 106–7)\n", "\nOn the other hand, in the Spiritual Medicine he seems to take\na dim view of pleasures, and offers advice for resisting the allure of\nfood, drink, sex, and luxury. One point made in both works is that it\nis a violation of reason to enjoy things that entail more pain than\npleasure in the long run, like overeating. In the Spiritual\nMedicine al-Rāzī tells the story of how he chastized a\nman who gobbled down a plate of dates, warning him that it would lead\nto illnesses, and thus “many times more pain than the pleasure\nyou have had” (al-Rāzī, RF: 71).", "\nTwo interpretations have been offered to explain\nal-Rāzī’s position on pleasure. According to Lenn E.\nGoodman (1971, 1999, followed by Groff 2014), al-Rāzī was\ndefending an Epicurean ethic in which pleasure should be maximized. On\nthis account, his rationale for moderation is that it is the way to\nhave the most pleasure: going too far with pleasures turns out to be\nmore painful in the long run. This interpretation has been criticized\nby Adamson (2008a, 2021), on the grounds that it ignores\nal-Rāzī’s own theory of pleasure. According to this\ntheory, which is clearly based on the Timaeus, pleasure can\nbe had only as the result of a process of removing a harmful state.\nFor example, drinking is pleasant because it eliminates thirst. On\nthis account of pleasure, as Plato himself pointed out, hedonism is an\nattempt to win at a zero-sum game: you can only have pleasure to the\nextent that you have suffered pain, or at least harm. (Not all harm is\nfelt as pain, just as not all restoration is felt as pleasure, because\nonly fast changes are noticeable.) Furthermore, al-Rāzī says\nhimself in the Doubts about Galen (DG: §7.7) that\npleasure is not the good to be sought in itself, which is a\ndirect rejection of the sort of hedonism adopted in Epicureanism.", "\nOn this latter reading, much of al-Rāzī’s advice for\nreaders focuses on helping non-philosophers work towards a moderate\nlifestyle, which will prepare them for the more serious and important\nundertaking of adopting a “philosophical way of life” that\nwill ultimately lead to liberation from the body. Al-Rāzī\nhimself seems to accept this distinction between\n“pre-philosophical” and “philosophical” ethics\n(Druart 1997, Adamson 2016), for example in the aforementioned passage\nabout the glutton who loves dates. Al-Rāzī says he\nthreatened the man with stomach aches and illness because", "\n\n\nthis and other such remarks are of more benefit to someone who has not\nengaged in philosophical training than proofs built on philosophical\nprinciples.\n", "\nAs for the truly philosophical life, it resides in the Platonic ideal\nof imitating God (Theaetetus 176b), realized through the\npursuit of wisdom and justice towards all living things. In a\nremarkable passage of the Philosophical Way of Life,\nal-Rāzī stresses the importance of not mistreating beasts of\nburden and other non-rational animals (Adamson 2012). This would\nexplain the “upper limit” placed on the pursuit of\njustice: that limit does not derive from the need to maximize pleasure\nand minimize pain, but from the injunction to avoid “displeasing\nGod” by engaging in injustice.", "\nIn more recent publications this interpretive dispute seems to be\nmoving towards agreement. Goodman (2015) now concedes that\nal-Rāzī, unlike Epicurus, does not make pleasure the highest\ngood and sole criterion in ethics. He does however adopt a therapeutic\napproach to ethics, which is characteristic of Epicureanism, as of\ncourse is the advice to avoid things that bring pain than pleasure all\nthings considered. Adamson accepts this (2021: 6), but suggests that\nthe resonances with Epicureanism may rather reflect a more general\nreception of Hellenistic ethics by al-Rāzī, again through\nthe intermediary of Galen (see also Bar-Asher 1989)." ], "section_title": "3. Ethics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAs yet, al-Rāzī’s extensive medical corpus has barely\nbeen explored with a view to its philosophical significance. An\naccount of the human body and its primary organs in the Spiritual\nLife—here ascribed to Plato—echoes what he says on\nthis topic in medical works (Adamson 2021: 57–58). His view,\nfollowing both Galen and the Timaeus, is that humans have\nthree general powers or faculties (quwan), the rational,\nanimal or irascible, and vegetative or desiderative, associated\nrespectively with the brain, heart, and liver. The rational soul is\nnot really seated in the brain, as the other two faculties are seated\nin their organs; it uses the brain only as an instrument. In medical\ncontexts al-Rāzī makes the same three organs to be the seats\nof these powers, albeit that the power in the brain is instead called\n“psychic (nafsānī)”, perhaps to\nacknowledge the fact that its powers of voluntary self-motion and\nsensation also belong to irrational animals.", "\nAl-Rāzī’s views on medical epistemology are also\nGalenic, and presuppose that the best doctor should understand the\nhuman body at a theoretical level while also drawing on a wealth of\nexperience (Pormann 2008). This provides a methodological context for\nunderstanding the aforementioned Comprehensive Book, which as\nmentioned collects book-learning on medical theory, but uses\nal-Rāzī’s own empirical observations to confirm or\ndisconfirm those theories.", "\nBut the most rewarding medical text for philosophical readers is\nDoubts about Galen. Or rather, it should be said that this\nwork deals with a range of philosophical, as well as medical, issues,\nincluding the relation between soul and body, vision, atomism, and\npleasure (see the ample introduction by Koetschet in\nal-Rāzī, DG). Regarding the first of these issues,\nal-Rāzī criticizes Galen for suggesting that the soul is\nentirely dependent on bodily states or “temperament”, that\nis, the mixture of the body’s constituents. As in the\nSpiritual Medicine, he defends Plato’s idea that the\nrational part of the soul only uses the brain as an “instrument\n(āla)”, and that injury to the brain impedes\nrational function only in the way that damage to a flute would make it\nharder for the flute player to perform (al-Rāzī, DG:\n§21.4). When it comes to vision, al-Rāzī strikes a less\nPlatonist note, since he rejects Galen’s\n“extramissionist” theory, which is in part inspired by\nPlato’s Timaeus. According to Galen, spirit\n(pneuma) is sent forth from the eyes and transforms air,\nmaking it into an instrument for contacting the visual object\n(Ierodiakonou 2014). Instead, al-Rāzī defends the view that\nincorporeal images are sent from the seen object and arrive at the eye\n(Koetschet 2017a).", "\nOne of the more elaborate philosophical discussions in the Doubts\nabout Galen comes early in the work, and is devoted to the\neternity of the world (this section is translated in PWL).\nAl-Rāzī here takes issue with Galen’s suggestion that\nempirical observation shows that the world was not created after not\nexisting. Galen’s idea, based on a passage in Aristotle (On\nthe Heavens 1.3, 270b11–16), is that the universe seems to\nbe unchanging in its general features. If it is unchanging then it is\nnot liable to corruption, and what is incorruptible is also\nungenerable. Thus the universe has always existed, and always will.\nAl-Rāzī has little difficulty poking holes in this argument:\nhe points out that the universe could be unchanging for a long time,\nand then be destroyed all at once, like a glass being smashed or a\nbuilding collapsing when previously solid ground under it gives way\n(al-Rāzī, DG: §2.3). Furthermore, the incorruptibility\nof the universe would not be guaranteed by its lacking a natural\ntendency to decay. One also needs to rule out that there is some\nexternal cause that could destroy it (al-Rāzī, DG:\n§2.5). As often in the Doubts, al-Rāzī is here\nnot trying to show that Galen’s conclusion is wrong—though\nin this case, we know that he thinks it is wrong—but that the\nargument offered for the conclusion is not sufficient. Ironically,\nthis seems to be in accord with Galen’s own original intention.\nGalen’s argument is taken from his On Demonstration and\nwas actually offered as an example of a proof that is not\ndemonstrative (Koetschet 2015). Al-Rāzī is either being\nremarkably contentious, or has lost sight of the context of the\nargument: he even accuses Galen of being inconsistent, as he elsewhere\nstates that it cannot be proven whether or not the universe is\neternal." ], "section_title": "4. Medicine and the Doubts", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIf the five eternal theory was considered problematic by\ncontemporaries and later authors, al-Rāzī’s views on\nreligion were considered utterly outrageous and heretical. In his\nProofs of Prophecy, Abū Ḥātim selectively\nquotes and paraphrases from a work by al-Rāzī on this topic,\nand presents him as having flatly denied the validity of prophetic\nrevelation. Accepting this evidence as more or less reliable, some\nmodern-day scholars have celebrated al-Rāzī as a\n“freethinker” comparable with such daringly unorthodox\nthinkers as Ibn al-Rāwandī (Urvoy 1996, Stroumsa 1999), or\neven as having had pagan sympathies (Vallat 2015a, 2015b, 2016).\nAgainst this, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī quotes our\nal-Rāzī as having offered interpretations of the\nQurʾān, which were designed to show that this revelatory\ntext and indeed the whole history of prophecy was in agreement with\nhis own philosophy (this evidence is presented and discussed in Rashed\n2000, 2008). The bio-bibliographical tradition is also ambiguous in\nits evidence. For instance al-Bīrūnī, who clearly\nadmired al-Rāzī, admits that he made foolish and obstinate\nremarks about religion and prophecy. But another broadly favorable\nwitness, Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, says that a supposed work\nattacking religion was perhaps written by “malicious enemies of\nal-Rāzī and ascribed to him” (for references, see\nAdamson 2021: 11).", "\nThe most ample, if not necessarily trustworthy, evidence is found in\nAbū Ḥātim. He says that in face-to-face debate,\nal-Rāzī argued against prophecy on the grounds that it would\nbe unjust to single out only some people for knowledge that is useful\nby everyone. Furthermore, appointing only a certain few as religious\nleaders (imāms) would lead to dissension between their\nfollowers (Abū Ḥātim, AHR: 1). Followers of religious\nlaw are guilty of the cardinal intellectual sin of the Islamic world,\ntaqlīd, which means uncritically adopting beliefs on the\nbasis of authority (AHR: 24). Instead, al-Rāzī argues, God\ngives reason (ʿaql) to everyone, and in this respect\neveryone is created equal, able to determine for themselves what goals\nthey should be pursuing. Furthermore, Abū Ḥātim tells\nus about a range of more specific religious teachings rejected by\nal-Rāzī in his book against prophecy, such as\nanthropomorphic descriptions of God and the possibility of miracles,\nincluding the inimitability of the Qurʾān\n(iʿjāz).", "\nIn several respects this teaching on prophecy fits well with what we\nknow of al-Rāzī’s philosophy more generally. It\ninvokes the idea that reason is given to the soul as a gift from God,\nsomething confirmed in other sources and suggested at the beginning of\nal-Rāzī’s Spiritual Medicine. Furthermore,\nAbū Ḥātim has al-Rāzī arguing that God would\nnot send prophets because this is an unreasonable and overly difficult\nway to achieve His goals (Abū Ḥātim, AHR: 1;\n131–2). Why not just give everyone the ability to figure things\nout for themselves? This same premise that God only proceeds in the\nmost rational way is also important in his theodicy as we know it from\nother sources, as seen above. Furthermore the critique of\ntaqlīd, while admittedly commonplace, does sound like it\ncould come from al-Rāzī: his irreverent approach to Galen\nbears witness to a similar independence of mind, albeit in a very\ndifferent context.", "\nOn the other hand, the evidence presented by Fakhr al-Dīn casts\nserious doubt on the notion that al-Rāzī was openly hostile\nto the Islamic revelation. And this is backed up by evidence internal\nto al-Rāzī’s own surviving works, for instance\nacknowledgment of the preeminent value of “books sent by\nGod” in Doubts about Galen (al-Rāzī, DG:\n§2.1). At a minimum it seems clear that al-Rāzī was a\nforthright rationalist, who believed that the truth of a revelatory\ntext would necessarily accord with the truth discoverable by human\nreason. But that position would not be so remarkable: it is shared\nfrom other philosophers of the Islamic world, from al-Kindī to\nal-Fārābī to Ibn Rushd. The question is whether\nal-Rāzī went further and insisted that revelation is\nuseless, or even counterproductive, as claimed by Abū\nḤātim.", "\nRecent material brought to light by Philippe Vallat (2015a, 2015b,\n2016) could confirm this interpretation. It would show that\nal-Rāzī said in debate with a theologian named Abū\nQāsim al-Balkhī, also called al-Kaʿbī, that\n“prophets are unnecessary, because we have reason which\nsuffices, assuming that prophecy is in accordance with reason”\n(on al-Kaʿbī in general see El Omari 2016; and on their\ndebate Rashed 2000, Shihadeh 2006: 103). It has however been argued\nthat Vallat’s new evidence cannot convincingly be linked to the\ndebate between al-Kaʿbī and al-Rāzī, who is never\nnamed in these texts (Adamson 2021: 148–151). A different\napproach would be to read Abū Ḥātim as having\ndistorted al-Rāzī’s position, which may have been a\nmore targeted attack on schismatic and controversialist groups\nincluding the Ismāʿīlī branch of Islam to which\nAbū Ḥātim belonged. Ismāʿīlism is\ncharacterized by its insistence on the need for a religious leader or\nimām to guide the faithful to a true understanding of\nIslam. It may have been this doctrine, and not prophecy more\ngenerally, that al-Rāzī attacked, as a signal example of the\ndangers of taqlīd (Mohaghegh 1970: 160–1; Adamson\n2021: 147)." ], "section_title": "5. Religion and Prophecy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWhatever the case, there is no doubt that the\nIsmāʿīlīs were especially hostile to\nal-Rāzī. Alongside Abū Ḥātim\nal-Rāzī and the aforementioned Naṣīr-e Khosraw,\nwho was also an Ismāʿīlī, one may mention another\nrepresentative of this group named Ḥamīd al-Dīn\nal-Kirmānī (d. after 1020), who attacked\nal-Rāzī’s ethical teachings (Ḥamīd\nal-Dīn al-Kirmānī, see\n HDK\n in bibliography). This is not to say that only\nIsmāʿīlī authors are critical of\nal-Rāzī, though. Another opponent, who polemicizes against\nal-Rāzī’s cosmology and apparent belief in the\npossibility of transmigration (al-Rāzī, RF: 174), is the\nAndalusian jurist and philosopher Ibn Ḥazm. Also in the Western\nIslamic world, Maimonides includes a diatribe against the Razian\ntheodicy in his Guide for the Perplexed (GP: §3.12).\nThough Ibn Ḥazm associates other thinkers with\nal-Rāzī’s teachings (al-Rāzī, RF: 170 and\n174) it does not seem that his daring ideas gained much traction among\nlater philosophers. Perhaps the most productive engagement with the\nfive eternal theory is found in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.\nHe gives a fair hearing to al-Rāzī’s account of place\nand time, and adopts a similar view on the question of time in\nparticular (Adamson and Lammer 2020).", "\nIn his primary vocation of medicine, too, al-Rāzī had his\ncritics, including Ibn Sīnā, his only rival for the title of\nmost influential figure in the Islamic medical tradition. In an\nepistolary exchange with al-Bīrūnī, Ibn Sīnā\nsays that al-Rāzī overreached his competence in both\nphilosophy and medicine (“he exceeded his abilities when lancing\nabscesses and examining urine and feces”, quoted at\nal-Rāzī, RF: 290). Al-Rāzī’s project in\nDoubts was also deemed presumptuous by later medical writers,\nwho composed refutations of the work. Nonetheless,\nal-Rāzī’s works were widely consulted by doctors in\nthe Islamic world, and he had a wide diffusion in the Latin speaking\nworld under the name “Rhazes”. This began in the medieval\nperiod and persisted through the Renaissance, with sixty-seven printed\neditions of his works before 1700 (Hasse 2016: 8). No less an\nauthority than Vesalius edited an older translation of\nal-Rāzī’s Book for al-Manṣūr, and\nal-Rāzī’s medical writings were on the teaching\nsyllabus at Bologna, the most important university in Europe for\nmedical training (Siriasi 1990: 131 and 178). The independent-minded\nGirolamo Cardano, who in personality and diversity of interests was in\nsome ways the heir of Galen and al-Rāzī, praised the latter\nas one of several doctors from the Islamic world who had improved upon\nGalenic medicine through empirical observation (experimentum)\n(Siriasi 1997: 60). More recently, al-Rāzī has been praised\nfor his innovative approach and for breakthroughs in the history of\nmedicine, for example by investigating differential diagnosis\n(Iskandar 1962) and using a control group to test the efficacy of a\ndrug (Pormann 2008). Thus al-Rāzī the doctor has had a more\nillustrious posthumous career than al-Rāzī the\nphilosopher." ], "section_title": "6. Legacy", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Adamson, Peter, 2008a, “Platonic Pleasures in Epicurus and\nal-Rāzī”, in Adamson 2008b: 71–94.", "––– (ed.), 2008b In the Age of\nal-Fārābī: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth\nCentury, London: Warburg Institute.", "–––, 2012, “Abū Bakr\nal-Rāzī on Animals”, Archiv für Geschichte\nder Philosophie, 94(3): 249–273.\ndoi:10.1515/agph-2012-0011", "–––, 2016, “Abū Bakr\nal-Rāzī (d. 925), The Spiritual Medicine”, in\nThe Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, Khaled El-Rouayheb\nand Sabine Schmitdke (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press,\n63–82.", "–––, 2019, “Health in Arabic Ethical\nWorks”, in Health: a History, Peter Adamson (ed.), New\nYork: Oxford University Press, 103–135.\ndoi:10.1093/oso/9780199916429.003.0006", "–––, 2021, Great Medieval Thinkers:\nal-Rāzī, New York: Oxford University Press.", "Adamson, Peter and Andreas Lammer, 2020, “Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī’s Platonist Account of the Essence of\nTime”, in Philosophical Theology in Islam: The Later\nAshʿarī Tradition, Ayman Shihadeh and Jan Thiele\n(eds.), Leiden: Brill, 95–122.", "Baffioni, Carmela, 1982, Atomismo e antiatomismo nel pensiero\nislamico, Naples: Istituto universitario orientale.", "Bar-Asher, Meir M., 1989, “Quelques aspects de\nl’éthique d’Abū Bakr al-Rāzī et ses\norigines dans l’oeuvre de Galien”, 2 parts, Studia\nIslamica, 69: 5–38; 70: 119–147.", "Daiber, Hans, 2016, “Abū Bakr al-Rāzī”,\nin Philosophy in the Islamic World:\n8th–10th Centuries, Ulrich Rudolph,\nRotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson (eds.), Leiden: Brill,\n381–420.", "Dhanani, Alnoor, 1994, The Physical Theory of Kalām:\nAtoms, Space and Void in Basrian Muʿtazilī Cosmology,\nLeiden: Brill.", "Druart, Thérèse-Anne, 1996, “Al-Razi’s\nConception of the Soul: Psychological Background to his Ethics”,\nMedieval Philosophy and Theology, 5(2): 245–263.\n [Druart 1996 available online]", "–––, 1997, “The Ethics of al-Razi\n(865–925?)”, Medieval Philosophy and Theology,\n6(1): 47–71.\n [Druart 1997 available online]", "–––, 2003, “Alrazi”, in A\nCompanion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Jorge J. E. Gracia\nand Timothy B. Noone (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 136–37.\ndoi:10.1002/9780470996669.ch20", "El Omari, Racha, 2016, The Theology of Abū l-Qāsim\nal-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d.319/931), Leiden:\nBrill.", "Fakhry, Majid, 1968, “A Tenth-Century Arabic Interpretation\nof Plato’s Cosmology”, Journal of the History of\nPhilosophy, 6(1): 15–22.", "Goodman, Lenn Evan, 1971, “The Epicurean Ethic of Muhammad\nIbn Zakariya’ Ar-Razi”, Studia Islamica, 34:\n5–26. doi:10.2307/1595324", "–––, 1975, “Rāzī’s Myth of\nthe Fall of Soul: its Function in his Philosophy”, in Essays\non Islamic Philosophy and Science, George Fadlo Hourani (ed.),\nAlbany, NY: SUNY Press, 25–40.", "–––, 1999, “Rāzī and\nEpicurus”, in Jewish and Islamic Philosophy:\nCrosspollinations in the Classical Age, Lenn E. Goodman (ed.),\nEdinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 35–67.", "–––, 2015, “How Epicurean was\nRāzī?”, Studia graeco-arabica, 5:\n247–280.\n [Goodman 2015 available online]", "Groff, Peter S., 2014, “Leaving the Garden:\nAl-Rāzī and Nietzsche as Wayward Epicureans”,\nPhilosophy East and West, 64(4): 983–1017.\ndoi:10.1353/pew.2014.0084", "Hasse, Dag Nikolaus, 2016, Success and Suppression: Arabic\nSciences and Philosophy in the Renaissance, Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press.", "Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 2014, “On Galen’s Theory of\nVision”, in Philosophical Themes in Galen (Bulletin of\nthe Institute of Classical Studies Supplements), Peter Adamson,\nRotraud Hansberger, and James Wilberding (eds.), London: Institute of\nClassical Studies, 235–247.", "Iskandar, Albert Zaki, 1962, “Al-Rāzī,\nal-Ṭabīb al-Iklīnīkī”,\nAl-Mashreq 56: 217–82; English translation by Zakia and\nPeter E. Pormann in Islamic Medical and Scientific Tradition,\nCritical Concepts in Islamic Studies, 4 vols, Peter E. Pormann\n(ed.), London: 2011, vol. 1, 207–253.", "Koetschet, Pauline, 2015, “Galien, al-Rāzī, et\nl’éternité du monde. Les fragment du traité\nSur la Démonstration IV, dans les Doutes sur\nGalien”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 25(2):\n167–198. doi:10.1017/S0957423915000016", "–––, 2017a, “Abū Bakr\nal-Rāzī on Vision”, in Philosophy and Medicine in\nthe Formative Period of Islam, Peter Adamson and Peter E. Pormann\n(eds.), London: Warburg Institute, 170–189.", "–––, 2017b, “Abū Bakr\nal-Rāzī et le signe: fragment retrouvé d’un\ntraité logique perdu”, Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 27(1): 75–114.\ndoi:10.1017/S0957423916000102", "Kraus, Paul, 1942–3, Jābir Ibn\nḤayyān, 2 vols, Cairo: Institut d'archéologie\norientale.", "Langermann, Y. Tzvi, 2009, “Islamic Atomism and the Galenic\nTradition”, History of Science, 47(3): 277–295.\ndoi:10.1177/007327530904700302", "Lucchetta, Giulio A., 1987, La natura e la sfera: la scienza\nantica e le sue metafore nella critica di Rāzī, Lecce:\nMilella.", "Mohaghegh, Mahdī, 1970, Filsūf-i-Rayy,\nTehran: Intishārāt-e Anjuman-e Āṯār-e\nMillī.", "–––, 1973, “Al-Rāzī fī\nal-Ṭibb al-Rūhānī”, Maʿārif\nIslāmī, 14: 30–63.", "Pines, Shlomo, 1936 [1997], Beiträge zur islamischen\nAtomenlehre, Berlin: Heine. Translated as Studies in Islamic\nAtomism, Michael Schwarz (ed.), Jerusalem: Magnes.", "Pormann, Peter E., 2008, “Medical Methodology and Hospital\nPractice: the Case of Fourth-/Tenth-Century Baghdad”, in Adamson\n2008b: 95–118.", "Rashed, Marwan, 2000, “Abū Bakr al-Rāzī et le\nkalām”, MIDEO, 24: 39–54.\n [Rashed 2000 available online]", "–––, 2008, “Abū Bakr\nal-Rāzī et la prophétie”, MIDEO, 27:\n169–182.\n [Rashed 2008 available online]", "Ruska, Julius, 1935, “Die Alchemie\nAr-Rāzī’s.”, Der Islam, 22(4):\n281–319. doi:10.1515/islm.1935.22.4.281", "Savage-Smith, Emilie, 2012, “The Working Files of Rhazes:\nAre the Jāmiʾ and the Ḥāwī\nIdentical?” in Medieval Arabic Thought: Essays in Honour of\nFritz Zimmermann, Rotraud Hansberger, M. Afifi al-Akiti and\nCharles Burnett (eds.), London: Warburg Institute, 163–180.", "Shihadeh, Ayman, 2006, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr\nal-Dīn al-Rāzī, Leiden: Brill.", "Siriasi, Nancy G., 1990, Medieval and Early Renaissance\nMedicine: an Introduction to Knowledge and Practice, Chicago:\nChicago University Press.", "–––, 1997 The Clock and the Mirror: Girolamo\nCardano and Renaissance Medicine, Princeton, NJ: Princeton\nUniversity Press.", "Strohmaier, Gotthard, 1974, “Die arabische Sokrateslegende\nund ihre Ursprünge”, in Studia Coptica, Peter\nNagel (ed.), Berlin: Akademie, 121–136.", "Stroumsa, Sarah, 1999, Freethinkers of Medieval Islam: Ibn\nal-Rāwandī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and their\nImpact on Islamic Thought, Leiden: Brill.", "Urvoy, Dominique, 1996, Les penseurs libres dans l’Islam\nclassique, Paris: Michel.", "Vallat, Philippe, 2015a, “La chute de l’homme,\nfondement de l’anthropologique, du religieux et du politique.\nLes enseignement ‘rhaziens’ d’une comparaison entre\nthéologies islamique (sunnite) et chretienne (arabe et\nlatine)”, in L’ordre social et les religions\n(Studia Arabica 25), Versailles: Éditions de Paris,\n197–273.", "–––, 2015b, “Between Hellenism, Islam, and\nChristianity: Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and His Controversies\nwith Contemporary Muʿtazilite Theologians as Reported by the\nAshʿarite Theologian and Philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī”, in Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and\nBeyond: Philosophical and Theological Exchanges between Christians and\nMuslims in the Third/Ninth and Fourth/Tenth Centuries, Damien\nJanos (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 178–220.", "–––, 2016, “Can Man Assess God’s\nGoodness? A Controversy Between Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d.\n925) and Muʿtazilī Theologians”, MIDEO, 31:\n213–251.\n [Vallat 2016 available online]" ]	[ { "href": "../arabic-islamic-natural/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in: natural philosophy and natural science" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-greek/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: Greek sources" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-influence/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West" }, { "href": "../galen/", "text": "Galen" }, { "href": "../ibn-sina/", "text": "Ibn Sina [Avicenna]" }, { "href": "../philoponus/", "text": "Philoponus" } ]
al-din-al-razi	Fakhr al-Din al-Razi	First published Sun Feb 5, 2023	[ "\nFakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1149–1210) was one of the\nmost innovative and influential thinkers in the first stage of what is\nsometimes called “post-classical” Islamic thought. Along\nwith other major thinkers of the Islamic East in the twelfth century,\nnotably Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī and\nal-Suhrawardī, Fakhr al-Dīn reacted critically to the\nphilosophy of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). He produced a voluminous\ncorpus that is often elusive in terms of conveying Fakhr\nal-Dīn’s own considered opinions, but is packed with subtle\nphilosophical argumentation on pretty well every aspect of Ibn\nSīnā’s thought. Fakhr al-Dīn did also stake out\ndistinctive positions of his own, for example with respect to the\nproblem of providing real definitions, the distinction between essence\nand existence, the principles of physics, the unity of the human soul,\nand the source of ethical norms. This abundant output in philosophy\nwas only one part of his life’s work, which includes texts on\nIslamic law, theology, astrology, and one of history’s most\nimportant commentaries on the Quran." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Logic and Epistemology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Physics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Psychology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Ethics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary literature", "Secondary literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nFakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s life was shaped by the\npolitical situation in central Asia in the generations just before the\nMongol conquest of that region. He was born in the Persian city of\nRayy, near modern-day Tehran, in 1149 CE (544 of the Muslim calendar).\nThe name “Rāzī” refers to this birthplace,\nleading to potential confusion with other philosophers from Rayy,\nincluding the earlier Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 920) and the\nlater Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.1364). Fakhr\nal-Dīn did not stay in Rayy, but traveled widely throughout\nPersia and central Asia for the rest of his life in search of\neducation, patronage, and worthy intellectual opponents. In fact, he\ndid not need to venture far for his initial education. His father was\nan expert in Islamic theology and law, a second-generation student of\nthe major Ashʿarite thinker al-Juwaynī (d.1085). Thus the\nyoung Fakhr al-Dīn was from early on trained in the rational\ntheology (kalām) of the Ashʿarite school and the\nlegal system of his father’s Shāfiʿī school. He\nwent on to study in Nishapur, where he first encountered the works of\nal-Fārābī (d.950–51) and Ibn Sīnā\n(Avicenna, d.1037). Responding to the latter would become the central\nproject of his own philosophical career. At Marāgha, he studied\nwith the teacher Majd al-Dīn al-Jīlī (d. after 1175).\nAl-Suhrawardī (d. 1191), the famous founder of the\n“Illuminationist” philosophical tradition, was also a\nstudent of al-Jīlī’s.", "\nThe mature career of Fakhr al-Dīn has been divided into three\nphases in a recent detailed overview of his life (Griffel 2021:\n264–303; see also Street 1997, Griffel 2007, Altaş 2013a\nand 2013b, Shihadeh 2022). These phases were marked by patronage\nrelationships with two political powers who were vying for dominance\nin central Asia, the Khwārazm-Shāhs and the Ghūrids.\nFakhr al-Dīn first enjoyed the support of the\nKhwārazm-Shāhs for about two decades, before joining the\nGhūrids in 1197 after a military defeat of the\nKhwārazm-Shāhs at the hands of the Ghūrids. By all\naccounts this led to great wealth and standing, as Fakhr al-Dīn\nbecame an ornament to the Ghūrid court and a close companion and\nteacher of the sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn (d.1203). This did not\nmean he could stay above the political fray, though. He was accused of\nlingering loyalty to the enemies of the court and was also involved in\na religious rivalry between Ashʿarism and the more literalist,\nless rationalist Karrāmite theological movement. His travels in\nTransoxania seeking out debates with other jurists and theologians\nhave similarly been explained as an attempt to promote Ashʿarite\nkalām against Maturīdī opponents, and\nShāfiʿī legal thought against Hanbalī opponents\n(for his legal thought see, e.g., Opwis 2012, Başoğlu 2014).\nIn a record of these encounters around the year 1186, called\nDebates (Munāẓarāṭ), Fakhr\nal-Dīn presents himself as “the only respectable scholar\namong a swarm of dimwits” (Griffel 2021: 296; for this work see\nKholeif 1966). At the end of his life, we see a third phase of\npatronage as he rejoins the Khwārazm-Shāhs after they take\nthe city of Herat from the Ghūrids. Fakhr al-Dīn died two\nyears later in that city, in 1210 CE (606 of the Muslim calendar).", "\nDespite his extensive travels and political maneuvering, Fakhr\nal-Dīn found time to compose a startlingly large body of work.\nMany will associate his name most immediately with his titanic\nGreat Commentary on the Quran (also called Keys to the\nHidden: Mafāṭih al-ghayb). The modern\nprinting runs to no fewer than 32 volumes (here it is almost\nobligatory to cite Ibn Taymiyya’s barb that the work\n“contains everything apart from exegesis of the Quran”).\nFakhr al-Dīn wrote extensively on law, theology, and\n“occult sciences” like magic and astrology. As can be\nlearned from studies of his Quranic commentary (Jaffer 2015) and a\ntreatise of his on the occult disciplines (Noble 2021), every work of\nFakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī can be profitably read with his\nphilosophical interests in mind. But in this overview we will largely\nrestrict our focus to the theological-philosophical treatises that are\nof most evident importance for the historian of philosophy. Scholars\nsometimes refer to these as summae, which suggests a parallel\nwith Latin scholastic works like those by Thomas Aquinas. The\ncomparison is not misleading, insofar as Fakhr al-Dīn was\navowedly a theologian, but one who pursued philosophical problems at\nlength and with great sophistication.", "\nA couple of problems confront anyone who is trying to come to grips\nwith his writings in this area. First, the sheer quantity of material.\nHis first summa, entitled Eastern Points of Investigation\non Metaphysics and Physics (al-Mabāḥith\nal-mashriqiyya fī ʿilm al-ilāhiyyāt\nwa-l-ṭabīʿiyyāt) is more than 1200 pages\nlong in the modern printing. His final summa, written in his\nfinal years and arguably best representing his own views on a wide\nrange of topics, is the similarly titled Exalted Topics of Inquiry\nwithin Divine Science (al-Maṭālib\nal-ʿāliya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī) and is\nprinted in nine books bound in five volumes. In between these two\nworks we have, among other texts, the shorter but highly innovative\nand influential Mulakhkhaṣ al-ḥikma (Epitome\nof Philosophy) and not one but two exegetical works devoted to\nIbn Sīnā’s Pointers and Reminders\n(al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt), a critical\nabridgment from 1201 (Lubab al-Ishārāt) and an\nearlier, and very extensive, line-by-line critical commentary\n(Sharḥ al-Ishārāt).", "\nFakhr al-Dīn’s decision to devote such a detailed\ncommentary to a work by Ibn Sīnā is historically revealing.\nWhile his contemporary Sharaf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī\n(d. before 1204) did compose a set of Doubts\n(Shukūk) on the same text, the commentary of\nal-Rāzī on al-Ishārāt seems to be the\nfirst lemmatized exegesis of an Arabic philosophical work (see also\nWisnovsky 2013, Shihadeh 2014 and 2017), as had been devoted to\nAristotle in late antiquity and earlier Arabic philosophy. Even a\ncasual perusal of Fakhr al-Dīn’s corpus makes clear that he\nhas identified Ibn Sīnā as the chief representative of\nfalsafa, a word which is most naturally translated\n“philosophy” (since it is likewise derived from the Greek\nphilosophia) but which really has a narrower meaning in this\nperiod, since it is so closely tied to Ibn Sīnā’s\ndistinctive teachings. To be a faylasūf is to uphold\nsuch doctrines as the necessary and eternal emanation of the universe\nfrom God. (A more generic word for the discussion of such issues,\nwithout any particular doctrinal commitment, would be\nḥikma, literally meaning “wisdom”; see\nGriffel 2021.) While Fakhr al-Dīn follows his famous predecessor\nand fellow Ashʿarite al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) in targeting\nIbn Sīnā as the outstanding exponent of falsafa, he\ndoes not go along with al-Ghazālī’s idea that the\nfalāsifa were heretics and apostates from Islam.", "\nInstead, he seems to welcome the powerful challenge posed by Ibn\nSīnā’s thought, since it gives him something worthy of\nhis own considerable critical acumen and helps him to map out the wide\nrange of issues tackled in his summae. These fall into the\ndomains of logic, physics, psychology, ethics, and above all,\nmetaphysics (general survey in Zarkān 1963). Indeed Fakhr\nal-Dīn used metaphysics to restructure the curriculum of the\nsciences, something we especially see in his Mulakhkhaṣ\n(Eichner 2007, 2009). This work adopts a new arrangement, which would\nbe influential on later thinkers. Fakhr al-Dīn first tackles\nlogic, then “generalities (al-umūr\nal-ʿāmma)”, then natural philosophy, and finally\nphilosophical theology. The second and fourth parts of the project\ncorrespond to what is called general and special metaphysics in the\nLatin scholastic tradition, and the parallel does not end there. Like\nDuns Scotus, Fakhr al-Dīn offers an analysis of existence (the\ncentral case of a metaphysical “generality”) by way of\ndisjunction, e.g., existence may be one or many, necessary or\ncontingent, infinite or finite, self-sufficient or dependent, etc.\nWhile these contrasts are largely drawn from Ibn Sīnā, Fakhr\nal-Dīn innovates with his systematic use of the disjunctions to\nstructure general metaphysics. This also means, as we will see below,\nthat his discussions of metaphysics are by no means restricted to\nraising and answering questions about God, as we might expect from a\n“theologian”.", "\nIn fact, while Fakhr al-Dīn’s Ashʿarite sympathies are\noften evident, and he does also write works that summarize\nkalām teachings, he is not consistent in taking a clear\nstance in favor of Ashʿarite kalām and against\nAvicennan falsafa. Instead, the really stable feature of his\nwork is a method that is, again, reminiscent of Latin scholasticism\nand its genre of disputed questions. His various summae are\norganized into topics for inquiry (hence the use of words like\nmabāḥith and maṭālib in the\ntitles of the works), with arguments considered for and against every\nconceivable stance that could be adopted on each topic. (The famous\nSufi poet al-Rūmī compared this approach to “tearing\nscience apart like bread and feeding it to the birds”.) The fact\nthat no actual historical figure or school has adopted a possible\nposition will not prevent Fakhr al-Dīn from considering it.", "\nBy using this “dialectical” procedure (Wisnovsky 2004,\nShihadeh 2005, Griffel 2011) Fakhr al-Dīn is able to stand in\njudgment over the whole historical tradition leading up to him.\nAlongside Ibn Sīnā and other philosophers, notably the\nslightly earlier Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d.\n1160s), the kalām tradition supplies him with a stock of\npositions and arguments to rehearse and critique. He will thus\nfrequently refer in the third person to “theologians\n(mutakallimūn)”, as if this were a group that does\nnot include him. The upshot is that Fakhr al-Dīn puts himself\nforward as the arbiter in debates that span the\nfalsafa-kalām divide. If he is not consistent in\nadopting one or another teaching himself (many times, a lengthy\ninvestigation in his works ends with only a brief statement of the\nlikeliest answer, or none at all, followed with a pious “but God\nknows best”), this is perhaps because the exhaustive method of\ntesting arguments and doctrines is more important to him than the\nassertion of any one doctrine." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn the Islamic world, representatives of falsafa largely\naccept the traditional Aristotelian presentation of the manner of the\nacquisition of knowledge. This is the Peripatetic Organon,\nwhich starts from the predicables and moves through syllogistic to\ndemonstrative science and essential definitions. Fakhr al-Dīn,\nhowever, presents a different structure for logic and epistemology,\nwhich leaves the traditional organization of the Organon\nbehind. The new structure revolves around two ways of acquiring\nknowledge, conceptualization (taṣawwur) and assent\n(taṣdīq) (El-Rouayheb 2019: 29).\n“Conceptualization” stands for mentally entertaining a\nconcept, such as “human” or “rational animal”,\nwithout ascribing any truth-value to it, while “assent”\nstands for claiming that the human is rational animal in the real\nworld (Lameer 2006). Fakhr al-Dīn’s reorganization of logic\nand epistemology may have been one inspiration for later authors who\nre-define the subject matter of logic as “the objects of\nconception and assent” (El-Rouayheb 2012).", "\nFakhr al-Dīn complements this picture with his critique of\ndefinitions, a rejection of the intentional acquisition of knowledge\nthrough conceptualization (Falaturi 1969, Ibrahim 2013, Özturan\n2018, Jacobsen Ben Hammed 2020, Benevich 2022a). According to the\ntraditional Aristotelian epistemology, wholly embraced by Ibn\nSīnā, we know what a human is by acquiring a complete\ndefinition of the essence of what it means to be a human, through a\ncombination of all inherent generic and specific aspects, for instance\n“being an animal” and “being rational”. Fakhr\nal-Dīn denies that this is how we learn what things are. For him,\nas for his contemporaries Abū l-Barakāt and\nal-Suhrawardī, the best that we can hope to achieve with the\ntraditional Aristotelian-Avicennan approach is a nominal definition,\nthe explication of a meaning we have in our minds\n(Muḥaṣṣal, 84; Mulakhkhaṣ:\nManṭiq, 106). By defining humans as “rational\nanimals”, we do not learn anything new about real humans.\nRather, we just explain what we meant by “humans” in the\nfirst place.", "\nFakhr al-Dīn’s main argument against real definitions is a\nreapplication of an old epistemological problem that goes back to\nMeno’s paradox in Plato (Meno, 80d6–10).\nAl-Rāzī formulates it as follows:", "\n\n\nIf one is not aware of the object of inquiry, inquiry is impossible.\nFor, if one is entirely unaware of something, the soul undertakes no\ninquiry into it. If on the other hand one is aware of it,\ninquiry is again impossible, since it is absurd to make something\navailable when it is already available (taḥṣīl\nal-ḥāṣil).\n", "\nIf someone says: [the inquirer] is aware of [the object of\ninquiry] in some respect or other, I respond: the respect in\nwhich he is aware of it is distinct from the respect in which he is\nnot aware of it. [82] He cannot inquire into the first [respect],\nsince it is [already] available. Nor can he inquire into the second\n[respect], since he is absolutely unaware of it\n(Muḥaṣṣal, 81–82)", "\nHow can we learn something new if we do not even know what to look\nfor; and if we already know what we are looking for, what sense does\nit make to learn something new about it? Al-Fārābī and\nIbn Sīnā mostly accepted the Aristotelian solution to the\nparadox, namely that we can know something in one respect, and inquire\ninto it and learn something new about it in another respect (Black\n2008, Marmura 2009). Fakhr al-Dīn rejects this solution, on the\ngrounds that the problem may be applied to each aspect individually.\nIf we do not know one aspect but already know another aspect, new\ninquiry is impossible for both, with the two aspects falling prey to\nthe two different horns of the paradox.", "\nIn his analysis of the acquisition of knowledge, Fakhr al-Dīn\naddresses the traditional epistemological distinction inherited from\nkalām between “necessary”\n(ḍarūrī) and “acquired”\n(iktisābī) knowledge. We receive\n“necessary” items of knowledge as a given, whether or not\nwe want to do so. For instance, when I look at a red apple, I have no\npower over seeing that the apple is red. I cannot just decide to see\nit as blue. By contrast, acquired knowledge means that we are\nintentionally involved in the acquisition of knowledge. I might for\ninstance try to learn why humans have certain features that belong to\nthem, though I need not do so (see further Abrahamov 1993, Radhi\nIbrahim 2013, Benevich 2022b). Fakhr al-Dīn goes against this\nstandard kalām account by denying the second type of\nknowledge. According to him, we do not have any power over our\nconceptualization of things, nor over any beliefs that derive from\nconceptualization (Arbaʿīn, vol.1, 330–332).\nRather, all items of conceptualization and assent are given to us,\nwhich in the occasionalist Ashʿarite framework means given\ndirectly by God (Jacobsen Ben Hammed 2020, Benevich 2022a). We are\nthus “forced” to have whatever knowledge we wind up\nhaving. The nature of the objects known is not so clear: it has been\nargued that for Fakhr al-Dīn we can only get to objects of\nphenomenal experience (Ibrahim 2013), and also that for him we can get\nat the things in themselves (Benevich 2022a). Either way, the\nnecessary items of knowledge are the primary data for epistemic\nagents. We do not learn what humans are through an inquiry and by\nproducing essential definitions. We know what humans are through\ndirect experience, which is not up to us.", "\nFor someone who denies that we can voluntarily acquire knowledge\nthrough either conceptualization or assent, Fakhr al-Dīn devotes\nsurprising effort to discussing the ways of acquiring assents. He\nintroduces a few substantial innovations in the Avicennan theories of\nthe types of propositions and syllogistics. In fact, Fakhr al-Dīn\nintroduces several notions and distinctions that become standard in\nthe subsequent history of Arabic logic. Most of them are rooted in Ibn\nSīnā’s logical apparatus, but Fakhr al-Dīn makes\ngreat effort to critically revise and re-organize them, creating the\nfoundations of what has been called “revisionist Avicennan\nlogic” (El-Rouayheb 2019: 68–69). One of the most\nimportant innovations is Fakhr al-Dīn’s suggestion that Ibn\nSīnā failed to distinguish between the alethic and temporal\nunderstanding of necessity. “Every A is necessarily\nB” does not need to mean the same as “Every\nA is always B”. With this distinction, Fakhr\nal-Dīn creates what Street has called “profusion of\npropositional types”, which would be extensively discussed in\nthe later period of Arabic logic (Street 2014, 2016; see further\nStrobino & Thom 2016).", "\nAnother important contribution in logic is Fakhr al-Dīn’s\ndistinction between two readings of the subject term of a proposition:\nexternalist (khārijī) and essentialist\n(ḥaqīqī). When we say “Every A\nis B” on the externalist reading, we mean that every\nsingle thing which actually happens to be A in the real world\nis B. On the essentialist reading, “Every A is\nB” means “everything, were it to be described as\nA, would be B” (Mulakhkhaṣ:\nManṭiq, 141–42). The distinction between the\nexternalist and the essentialist reading is Fakhr al-Dīn’s\nresponse to the earlier Arabic discussions of the subject term by\nal-Farābī and Ibn Sīnā. Al-Farābī was\ncredited with the ampliation of the subject term to the possible. In\nother words, for him, “Every A is B”\nmeans “everything that is possibly A, is\nB”. Ibn Sīnā was more restrictive:\n“Every A is B” means “everything\nthat is actually A, is B”. This need not mean\n“everything that actually is A in the real\nworld” but can also refer to whatever is actually described\nas A in the mind (Street 2005, 2010, 2014, and 2016, cf.\nChatti 2016). Fakhr al-Dīn’s distinction between the\nessentialist and the externalist readings of the subject term may be a\nreaction to Ibn Sīnā’s ampliation of the subject term\nto include the mental realm. As we will see in\n Section 4,\n Fakhr al-Dīn denies mental existence, and hence requires\ndifferent formulation for the readings of the subject term that do not\nrefer to real-world actuality." ], "section_title": "2. Logic and Epistemology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nFakhr al-Dīn’s treatment of the principles of physics\nprovides an illuminating example of his philosophical method. In his\nvarious summae he addresses the same set of issues treated in\nIbn Sīnā’s physics, which are ultimately those already\naddressed by Aristotle’s Physics. Thus we get\nconsiderations of body, motion, time, place, and void. Yet ideas from\nthe kalām tradition are brought into the mix too, and\nsometimes allowed to prevail. Thus he usually upholds the atomism\nshared by both the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite schools of\nkalām against the continuism of Ibn Sīnā. In\nother cases, Fakhr al-Dīn seems to be following the lead of\nAbū Bakr al-Rāzī (who was himself an atomist), as he\nembraces a “Platonic” understanding of time and place,\naccording to which these are independent principles rather than\nmeasurements and limits of bodies and their motions.", "\nThe fundamental distinction in kalām physics is that\nbetween the atomic substance (jawhar) or “indivisible\npart”, on the one hand, and the accidental properties\n(aʿrāḍ) that belong to these atoms, on the\nother hand (Dhanani 1994, Sabra 2006). As far back as the initial\nreception of Greek philosophy into Arabic, falāsifa like\nal-Kindī (in a lost work) had rejected atomism in favor of\nAristotelian continuism. This is the view that every part of every\nbody, no matter how small, can in principle be divided into yet\nsmaller sub-parts. Ibn Sīnā was also a strong opponent of\natomism (Lettinck 1988, McGinnis 2013, Dhanani 2015), and his\narguments provoked discussion in a number of twelfth century authors\n(see, e.g., McGinnis 2019). Fakhr al-Dīn is thus joining a\nlong-running debate when he addresses the cogency of atomism. His\nstatements on the question present a typically confusing picture. He\nseems to reject atomism in his “philosophical”\n(falsafī, ḥikmī) works, only to\naccept it in his kalām works (Zarkān 1963:\n67–98). However his late summa, the\nMaṭālib, may show that he came to embrace\nkalām atomism as his own considered view (Dhanani 2015;\nsee also Setia 2004 and 2006, and Baffioni 1982: 211–75; for his\nopposition to hylomorphism see Ibrahim 2020).", "\nAs a decisive consideration in favor of atomism he here states that,\nif continuism were true, each body would have an infinity of parts, so\nthat a mustard seed could be “stretched” to coincide with\nthe whole universe (Maṭālib vol.6, 71; see Dhanani\n2015: 102 for the passage). Another atomist argument is that if a true\nsphere were to meet a true surface, it would make contact at an\nindivisible point. We can further argue as follows:", "\n\n\nOnce it is established that the locus of contact is something\nindivisible, the existence of the individual atom must be\nacknowledged. For if we roll a sphere in a full circle on a plane\nsurface, there can be no doubt that as soon as one point of contact\nceases, contact is established with another\n(Maṭālib vol.6, 48–9).\n", "\nAs this argument shows, the atoms under consideration here are akin to\ngeometrical points, rather than the very small, extended but\nindivisible bodies proposed in ancient Greek atomism and by the\nearlier Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. This itself an inheritance\nfrom the kalām tradition. Geometry was also used by some\nto rebut atomism, so in both the Maṭālib and a\nseparate treatise dedicated to this issue (Altaş 2015), Fakhr\nal-Dīn sets out geometrical arguments against atomism and offers\ncounter-refutations.", "\nIf he is indeed an atomist, it would make sense that he should believe\nin the possibility of void, since in both classical and\nkalām atomism these two doctrines are usually found\ntogether. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and Abū l-Barakāt\nal-Baghdādī were also proponents of the void, and both were\ninfluential figures for Fakhr al-Dīn. On this topic, he seems to\nbe fairly consistent in upholding the possibility of void against\nAristotelian and Avicennan arguments for its impossibility (Adamson\n2018a). For example, he rejects the Aristotelian argument that, if the\nspeed of motion is inversely proportional to the density of the\nmedium, then motion in a void would be infinitely fast:", "\n\n\nIf we assume that part of the [required] time is to accommodate the\nmotion in itself, and part of it to accommodate the hindrance, then\nthe motion in pure void will take place in that amount of time that is\nappropriate to the motion as it is in itself. Motion occurring in a\nplenum, meanwhile, will occur in that amount of time plus a further\namount of time, as rendered appropriate by whatever is in the interval\nthat offers [175] hindrance. So it is established that the conclusion\nthey sought to force [on the proponent of void, sc. that motion in a\nvoid would be infinitely fast given the total lack of resistance] does\nnot follow (Maṭālib, vol.5,\n174.19–175.1).\n", "\nIn other words, the density of the medium only slows the intrinsic\nspeed of the motion that it would have in a vaccuum, which is\nfinite.", "\nVoid is defined either as a case in which two bodies fail to be in\ncontact, with no body between them (Arbaʿīn vol.2,\n32) or as a space that has nothing placed within it\n(Maṭālib vol.5, 155). Physical arguments provide\nevidence that void is in fact not just possible but actually occurs,\nas when two flat surfaces are pulled apart: it will take some time,\nhowever minimal, until air rushes in to fill the empty space\n(Arbaʿīn vol.2, 35). The second definition of void\njust mentioned brings us to Fakhr al-Dīn’s notion of space\nor place, and already suggests his view that place is not dependent on\nbodies, as Ibn Sīnā had claimed (Adamson 2017). For Ibn\nSīnā, following Aristotle, place is the inner boundary of a\ncontaining body, for example the interior surface of a jug that\nsurrounds the water placed in the jug (Lammer 2018: §5.3). Fakhr\nal-Dīn subjects this conception to a barrage of criticisms, for\nexample that a jewel inside a bag would remain in the same\n“place” even as it is being transported between cities\n(Maṭālib vol.5, 147). Instead, place is for him\nindeed “space” (faḍāʾ,\nḥayyiz), which is independent of bodies and may be\neither occupied by a body or not.", "\nWe find a parallel between this idea about space and his account of\ntime (Setia 2008, Adamson 2018b, Adamson & Lammer 2020). For Ibn\nSīnā time is a measure of motion (ʿAbd\nal-Mutaʿāl 2003, McGinnis 2003 and 2008). In the first\ninstance it is the measure of the motion of the outermost heaven,\nsince this is the fastest motion in the cosmos, which accounts for the\napparent diurnal rotation of the fixed stars around the Earth. This,\nfor Fakhr al-Dīn, is the “peripatetic” account of\ntime. In his Maṭālib he refutes it and also a\nvariant of the view found in Abū l-Barakāt, according to\nwhich time is the measure of existence rather than motion.\nFakhr al-Dīn does at least agree that time is real. To establish\nthis he cites an old kalām idea that time offers a\ncoordination between independent events (Mabāḥith\nvol.1, 761; Maṭālib vol.5, 47), which is why it is\npossible for me to arrange to meet with you tomorrow (one event) when\nthe sun rises (another event). But time’s existence is not\nsupervenient on motions or cases of existence. Were that the case,\nthen we would have multiple, simultaneous times for the various\nmotions, which would need a superordinate time to coordinate them.", "\nFakhr al-Dīn’s discussions of time give us a nice example\nof how his views developed, even while circling around the same set of\narguments (Adamson & Lammer 2020). In the\nMabāḥith he expresses an an agnostic point of\nview:", "\n\n\nI have not yet arrived at the realization of the truth about time, so\nlet your expectation from this book be a thorough examination and\nreport of whatever can possibly be said [about time] from all points\nof view (Mabāḥith vol.1, 761).\n", "\nWhen he writes the Mulakhkhaṣ, by contrast, he is\ncoming around to the view that beforeness and afterness are\n“items of consideration” (umūr\niʿtibāriyya). Yet at the end of his career, he has\nadopted the contrary view. Now he endorses what he says is\nPlato’s view of time: it is “a substance subsisting in\nitself and independent in itself” (Maṭālib\nvol.6, 76). The allusion to Plato presumably refers to the\nTimaeus. He is apparently following his fellow philosopher of\nRayy, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, both in accepting the\nindependence of time and place and in seeing Plato as an authority for\nthat physical theory (Adamson 2021a: ch.5). One difference between the\ntwo Rāzīs, however, is that Fakhr al-Dīn makes it clear\nthat time and place are both created by God, and not\n“eternal” principles. Thus his overall account of physics\nenvisions a created spatio-temporal framework within which bodies may,\nbut need not, exist." ], "section_title": "3. Physics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nJust as “substance” (ousia) may rightfully be\ncalled the central notion of Aristotelian metaphysics, so is\n“existence” (wujūd) the core notion of\nAvicennan metaphysics. Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics is a\nstudy of the relationship between different kinds of things and the\nmode of their existence, which ultimately results in identifying a\nspecial, necessary mode of existence, which belongs to one being\nalone, namely God (see, e.g., Bertolacci 2016). There are two core\ndoctrines of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics, both widely\ndiscussed after him in the Islamic world, and both addressed by Fakhr\nal-Dīn in detail: the distinction between essence and existence,\nand the idea that God is sheer existence, necessary in all\nrespects.", "\n“Existence” refers for Ibn Sīnā to the very fact\nthat things are, irrespective of what they are. For instance, it is\none thing for a red apple to be a red apple, and it is a completely\ndifferent thing for the red apple to be. To establish the\ndistinction between what things are (that is, their essence), and\nwhether they are (that is, their existence), Ibn Sīnā uses\nan argument from conceivability. We can conceive of a red apple\nwithout knowing whether it exists, hence its existence must be\ndifferent from its essence (Išārāt,\nnamaṭ 4, 266). But how should we understand this\ndistinction between essence and existence? In the post-Avicennan\ntradition, there are two main answers to this question: the\ndistinction between essence and existence is real\n(ḥaqīqī) or it is merely conceptual\n(iʿtibārī). The first answer requires that\nthere are two different items outside the mind, which together make up\nthe existent red apple. The second response means that there is just\none item in the extramental world, the existent red apple; but we can\nanalyse it conceptually into “existence” and “red\napple” (Wisnovsky 2012, Eichner 2011b).", "\nWithin this debate, Fakhr al-Dīn seems to take the realist stance\nthat essence and existence are distinct outside the mind (Benevich\n2017). For instance, he feels compelled to address one of the most\npressing issues for the realists. If essence and existence are\ndistinct in reality, does this mean that all essences are already\nsomehow out there before existence attaches to them? Fakhr al-Dīn\nis not puzzled by that difficulty:", "\n\n\nThe essence as such (min ḫayṯu hiya hiya) is an\nessence distinct from existence and non-existence. This does not imply\nthe subsistence of something existent in something non-existent\n(Arbaʿīn, vol.1, 88).\n", "\nThe essence of the red apple as such (min ḥaythu hiya\nhiya) is indeed prior to its existence. The essences of things,\nconsidered as such, are in a different, third state of being, neither\nexistent nor non-existent (Mabāḥith, vol.1, 129).\nOf course, this does not mean that there are essences of red apples\nhanging around before they even become existent. Just like Ibn\nSīnā, Fakhr al-Dīn accepts that essence and existence\nare extensionally identical: all instances of essence are also\ninstances of existence (Wisnovsky 2012). But Fakhr al-Dīn offers\na realist take on the Avicennan distinction by introducing a clear\npriority of essence over existence; more recent interpreters disagree\nas to whether this is faithful to Ibn Sīnā’s own\nmetaphysics (Bertolacci 2012, Benevich 2019b, Janos 2020).", "\nFakhr al-Dīn consistently uses his theory of the priority of\nessence over existence to discuss what Ibn Sīnā considered a\nspecial case, God. In Fakhr al-Dīn’s understanding, for Ibn\nSīnā, God’s essence is just identical to His\nexistence. For Ibn Sīnā, this would be the only way to\nguarantee that God exists necessarily. For, if there were any\ncomposition at all of A and B, A could fail\nto be B, and B could fail to attach to A;\nsome further cause would be needed to guarantee the connection between\nthe two. Thus, the only way to secure that A is necessarily\nB is just to say that A is B. That would\nmean that God’s essence is not even conceptually distinct from\nGod’s existence. There is an obvious problem with this doctrine,\nhowever. If God’s essence is sheer existence, but existence also\nbelongs to, for example, a red apple, how is the existence of the red\napple different from the divine essence? Ibn Sīnā’s\nreply depends on the notion of the analogy or modulation\n(taskīk) of existence, whereby one kind of existence\nbelongs to the red apple and another kind belongs to—or rather,\njust is—God (Treiger 2012, De Haan 2015, Druart 2014,\nZamboni 2020, Janos 2021). But Fakhr al-Dīn, again much like Duns\nScotus almost a century later, refuses to take this route. Instead, he\ninsists on the univocity of existence. Everything that exists, does so\nin the same manner of existence. Thus Fakhr al-Dīn is also\ncompelled to deny the identity of essence and existence in God’s\ncase. God’s existence will still be necessary, because His\nessence is such that it implies its own existence. So in God essence\nis prior to existence. This priority should not bother or indeed\nsurprise us, since we just have learned that all essences are\nprior to their existence. The upshot is that what is special about God\nis His essence, not a unique kind of existence\n(Muḥaṣṣal, 67; see further Mayer 2003,\nBenevich 2020a).", "\nFakhr al-Dīn’s contribution to history of metaphysics\nrecalls not only Duns Scotus but also Thomas Aquinas. Like Aquinas, he\noffers a taxonomy of proofs for God’s existence, which becomes\nstandard in philosophy of the Islamic world after him. Fakhr\nal-Dīn distinguishes between four mains proofs for God’s\nexistence available to him at his time: from the contingency of\nessences; from the temporal origination (ḥudūth)\nof essences; from the contingency of attributes; and from the temporal\norigination of attributes. The first argument may be easily identified\nwith Ibn Sīnā’s proof for God’s existence, which\nestablishes the existence of the Necessary Being by reasoning from the\ncontingency of all beings in the world (Marmura 1980; Mayer 2001;\nZarepour 2022). The second argument is the kalām\ncosmological argument. It argues for the existence of a Creator based\non the fact that the world came to be at some point. The third\nargument, from the contingency of attributes, alludes to the fact that\neverything in the world exists in a certain way, while it could have\neasily been some other way. Therefore, there needs to be some agent\nthat determined how things would exist. Finally, the fourth argument\ncomes closest to what we would designate as a design argument. The\nattributes of things in the world are not just one way when they could\nhave been different, but are in the best way possible. Hence, there\nmust be a wise agent who chose these marvelous features for the world.\nFakhr al-Dīn contends that the first argument, that is, Ibn\nSīnā’s argument for the existence of a Necessary Being\nis more fundamental than all other arguments\n(Maʿālim, 42).", "\nSo, while disagreeing with Ibn Sīnā whether God’s\nessence and existence are identical, Fakhr al-Dīn does accept\nthat God is a Necessary Being. Still, probably due to his\nkalām allegiances, he is not ready to accept that God is\na necessary being in all respects. For instance, Ibn\nSīnā’s God cannot know particular individuals.\nKnowledge of what is happening right now while you are reading this\narticle would involve a change in God, since He would need to stop\nknowing that you are reading this sentence as soon as you move on to\nthe next one. But if God changes, then He is not necessary in all\nrespects, since necessity implies immutability. So the only way for\nGod to know what happens in the world is to conceive of universal\nrules, laws of nature, and causation, without knowing which of those\nrules are being at work right now (Marmura 2005, Adamson 2005; cf.\nAcar 2004 and Nusseibeh 2009). Following Abū l-Barakāt and\nal-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn rejects this line of\nreasoning, on the grounds that change in God’s knowledge is\nmerely relational (Arbaʿīn, vol.1, 198). Imagine\nthat you are standing still and something passes by you from right to\nleft; in such a case you do not change, but your relation to that\nmoving thing does change. Now, we need to imagine the same with\nrespect to God’s knowledge the chain of events: it passes by God\nand God observes it, without God essentially changing.", "\nThis account of divine knowledge requires a very specific\nunderstanding of knowledge and cognition. Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī, again following Abū l-Barakāt and\nal-Ghazālī, defines cognition as a relational state\n(ḥāla iḍāfiyya). Fahr al-Dīn\nopposes this theory to the representationalist theory of cognition,\ncommonly ascribed to Ibn Sīnā at this time:", "\n\n\nPerception does not just come down to the making of an impression. The\ntruth is rather that it is a relational connective state. For we know\nself-evidently that we have seen Zayd, given that our visual capacity\nfaculty has a certain relation to him. Anyone who claims that the\nobject seen is not Zayd, who exists extramentally and is not seen at\nall, and that the object seen is rather his representation\n(miṯāl) and likeness\n(šabaḥ), has put into doubt the most important\nand powerful items of necessary knowledge (Šarḥ\nal-Išārāt vol.2, 233).\n", "\nAccording to representationalism, cognition involves the inherence of\nthe cognized object in the object of cognition. For instance, when I\nthink of a red apple, the idea of a red apple must be\n“imprinted” in my mind. For Fakhr al-Dīn, cognition\nis a direct relation between the agent of cognition and the object of\ncognition itself, that is, the red apple in itself.\nRepresentations—if there are any—are not the objects of\ncognition (Benevich 2019a, 2020b; Griffel 2021: 341–84).", "\nOne may wonder how this theory could explain the cognition of\nnon-existent objects. To what does my mind relate when I think of a\nphoenix, or of a square circle? Ibn Sīnā introduced the\nnotion of mental existence in response to this kind of question. The\nphoenix may fail to be existent outside the mind, but it\nexists in my mind while I am thinking about it, again being imprinted\nin my mind (Black 1997). Just as Fakhr al-Dīn rejects the\nrepresentationalist theory of cognition, he consistently rejects the\nAvicennan notion of mental existence (wujūd\ndhihnī). For him, when I think of non-existent beings, I\njust think of elements that constitute those beings and are observable\nin the world. For instance, thinking of a square circle means thinking\nof a square and a circle as if they were combined (Benevich 2018; on\nthe related issue of the “paradox of the unknown” see\nLameer 2014).", "\nWith this relational theory of cognition in hand, Fakhr al-Dīn is\nable to resolve the puzzle of how God knows about changing things.\nObjects of cognition are external to the agent of cognition, so that\nchange in those objects and the subsequent change in the process of\ncognition does not involve any change in the agent. Thus we can say\nthat God is a necessary being, but not necessary in all respects,\nsince His relational cognition of current events is constantly in the\nprocess of change. Yet this implies no change in God’s essence.\nMoreover, we have seen above that Ibn Sīnā suggests that God\nhas knowledge of universal rules of causation and natural laws. Fakhr\nal-Dīn argues that precisely this kind of knowledge that Ibn\nSīnā ascribes to God, that is, the knowledge of universal\nrules and causation, results in knowing every single event in the\nworld at the time when it happens (Maṭālib, vol.3,\n163–64).", "\nFakhr al-Dīn’s reasoning here presupposes a strictly\ndeterminist account of the world. There is a causal explanation for\neach event, and God knows it. And indeed, Fakhr al-Dīn is willing\nto embrace determinism fully. For instance, with respect to human\nactions, he argues that they are determined by the combination of our\nmotivations, beliefs, and capacities. We do not have control over any\nof these (as we saw in Section 1, Fakhr al-Dīn insists that our\nbeliefs are not up to us); so we do not have any control over our\nactions either (Maṭālib, vol.9, 35–43).\nThere are two important premises underlying Fakhr al-Dīn’s\ndeterminism, both borrowed from Ibn Sīnā. One is that there\nmust be, for everything that exists but could have failed to exist,\nsome reason why it exists; this is said to “preponderate”\nthe thing to exist rather than not existing. Second, when that reason\nis present, the phenomenon must inevitably happen. Therefore, in the\npresence of our capacities and motivations, we have no choice but to\nact, and do so necessarily (Maṭālib, vol.9,\n21–23; Mabāḥith, vol.2, 517; on\nal-Rāzī’s theory of action see further Shihadeh\n2006)." ], "section_title": "4. Metaphysics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nA fundamental assumption of Aristotelian psychology is that the souls\nof all living things are characterized by a range of\n“powers” or “faculties” (Greek\ndunameis, Arabic quwan). These powers account for\nthe distinction between plants, animals, and humans: plants have the\n“vegetative” powers of nutrition, growth, and\nreproduction; animals the powers of sensation, locomotion, and\nimagination; humans alone (among embodied beings) have the power of\nreason or intellect. Ibn Sīnā made significant alterations\nto this scheme, not least by introducing a theory of “internal\nsenses” to account for cognitive capacities lying between\nsensation and full-blown intellection. But broadly speaking, he\nadhered to the tradition of faculty psychology. Fakhr\nal-Dīn’s earlier contemporary Abū l-Barakāt\nal-Baghdādī rejected this whole approach. For him the soul\nis a unity and is the single subject of all cognition (Kaukua\n2016).", "\nFakhr al-Dīn agrees, and in several of his works offers arguments\nintended to confirm Abū l-Barakāt’s thesis. The most\npowerful of these is that the soul is capable of what we might call\n“hybrid judgments”. These are modeled on the sort of case\nconsidered already by Aristotle, that honey is both white and sweet:\nhere vision and taste might seem to be making a judgment about the\nsame object, suggesting that they belong to a single subject, which\ncould be the entire soul. Such is Aristotle’s commitment to\nfaculty psychology, though, that he instead introduces a new power\nwithin the soul (the “common sense”) to take\nresponsibility for judgments that involve more than one sense\nmodality. Or at least, this is how he was understood in the later\ntradition.", "\nFakhr al-Dīn argues, however, that the same pattern repeats\nacross all the faculties. For example, Ibn Sīnā had drawn a\nstrict contrast between the human intellect and the lower cognitive\nfaculties, on the grounds that the former grasps universals while the\nlatter powers—from sensation to imagination and\nmemory—deal only with particulars. But, says Fakhr al-Dīn,\nwe are able to apply a universal to a particular (“Zayd is\nhuman”). It must be the unified soul that is responsible for\nsuch judgments:", "\n\n\nWhen we perceive a particular individual human, we know that he is a\nparticular belonging to the universal “human” and not a\nparticular belonging to the universal “horse”. That which\njudges a particular man to be a particular belonging to the universal\n“human” and not a particular belonging to the universal\n“horse”, must inevitably be perceptive of the particular\nman, the universal “human”, and the universal\n“horse”. And so that which perceives particulars is also\nthat which perceives universals (Mabāḥith vol.2,\n255; 345–6; Sharḥ al-Ishārāt vol.2,\n265–7; the unity of the soul is discussed in depth at\nMaṭālib vol.7, 159ff).\n", "\nAnother point, which again is taken over from Abū\nl-Baghdādī, is that the human soul at least has a kind of\n“first person perspective” on its cognitive actions. It is\ncapable of grasping itself directly—as argued by Ibn\nSīnā himself in his famous “flying man”\nargument—and of grasping itself as the subject of all its\ncognitions. Note that, since these arguments all turn on active\ncognition, Fakhr al-Dīn is willing to exempt the non-cognitive\nvegetative powers from this unified soul (Mabāḥith\nvol.2, 256–7). But there is no division of powers distinguishing\nthe “animal soul” from the rational soul that is\ndistinctive of humans.", "\nThis does not stop Fakhr al-Dīn from using Ibn\nSīnā’s method for proving that the human soul is an\nimmaterial substance (Adamson 2021b, Alpina 2021). Ibn\nSīnā’s proof inferred the rational soul’s nature\nfrom the nature of its objects: since it grasps indivisible\nintelligible forms, it must itself be indivisible, and therefore not a\nbody. In this case Fakhr al-Dīn chooses not to refute the\nAvicennan line of argument but to improve upon it, by adding further\narguments to show that intelligibles are indeed indivisible\n(Mabāḥith vol.2, 362–5, also\nSharḥ vol.2, 285–8). He does still worry that the\nargument is incomplete: the rational soul could be indivisible but not\nimmaterial if it were an atom (Maṭālib vol.7, 62),\nso the cogency of the argument will depend on showing that atomism is\nincoherent (see above, Section 3). And even if we reject atomism,\nAvicennan prime matter is arguably also indivisible\n(Sharḥ vol.2, 295). Still Fakhr al-Dīn seems to be\nat least well-disposed towards the idea that the soul’s ability\nto grasp intelligibles establishes its immateriality.", "\nSince this ability belongs to the entire, unified soul and not is just\none “faculty” that could exist on its own as a disembodied\nmind, this should secure immateriality, and hence the prospect of\nimmortality, for the human soul. When he speaks about the nature of\nthe human soul, he sometimes says that it is a luminous substance that\nfuses with the body like rosewater in rose petals or oil in sesame,\nwhich seems to make it a kind of very subtle body but not, he says,\nlike those perceptible to the senses (for passages see Jaffer 2015:\n192). But it other contexts, Fakhr al-Dīn seems to be ready to\nembrace full-fledged substance dualism. For this conclusion he\ntypically uses argumentation based on introspection, such as his\nversion of Ibn Sīnā’s Flying Man argument, or the\nimmediate awareness of personal identity over time (see, e.g.,\nMaṭālib, vol.7, 101; 105).", "\nWhat about animal souls? The arguments presented so far clearly blur\nthe sharp distinction that Ibn Sīnā and other\nfalāsifa drew between human and animal souls. But Fakhr\nal-Dīn goes further. In both his Mulakhkhaṣ and\nhis Maṭālib he suggests that non-human animals\nhave intelligence that is not different in kind from human rationality\n(Adamson & Somma forthcoming, Virgi 2022). Animals are self-aware,\nknow that they persist through time, grasp universals, and can make\nplans and solve problems. This does not necessarily mean that animals\nare equal to humans in their intelligence. Rather there may be a\ncontinuum of cognitive capacities, with some animals ranged further\naway from humans, others closer to them. But", "\n\n\nif what is meant by “reason” is any of the types of\nintelligence, then this intelligence should be attributed to\n[non-human] animals. (Maṭālib vol.7, 311)\n", "\nHe may have found this view plausible in part because, again following\nAbū l-Barakāt, he is open to the idea that even just within\nthe human “species” we have differences that amount to\ndistinctions in quiddity (Maṭālib vol.7, 141). So\nfrom this point of view too, there is little reason to embrace a stark\nopposition between human and non-human animal nature." ], "section_title": "5. Psychology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nOne passage which makes that point is found in his Book on the\nSoul and Spirit (Kitāb al-Nafs wa-l-rūḥ\n86–7): humans differ so much in their character traits that one\nmay suspect they do not all share the same essence. That exemplifies\nthe approach of this separate treatise, which is to stage a joint\ninquiry into ethics and the soul. One theme addressed here is the\nimprovement of our “character traits\n(akhlāq)”. This is hardly surprising: the\ncentrality of this concept in Arabic moral thinking was such that\nethics itself was referred to as ʿilm al-akhlāq\n(literally, “the science of character traits”). And\nphilosophers both before Fakhr al-Dīn, like Miskawayh (d.1040)\nand Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī (d.974), and after him, like\nNaṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d.1274), put\ncharacter traits in both the thematic focus of their writings on\nethics and the titles of those writings. These works are part of a\nbroadly Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, which encourages\nreaders to pursue excellent rather than base character. Ibn\nSīnā also contributed to this tradition, as in two short\nworks called On Ethics (again, Fī l-ʿilm\nal-akhāq) and On Governance (Fī\nl-Siyāsa; for Ibn Sīnā’S influence on later\npractical philosophy see Kaya 2014).", "\nFakhr al-Dīn was of course aware of this approach to ethics, and\ntook an interest in the topic of virtue (al-Shaar 2012). But he was no\nAristotelian. Historically, we can say that he responds more to\nkalām ethics; philosophically, we can say that he was a\nconsequentialist rather than a virtue theorist (for this the essential\nreading is Shihadeh 2006; see also his 2016). Taking the historical\npoint first, as an Ashʿarite he is committed to what would now be\ncalled a “divine command theory”. That is, the right\naction is whatever is commanded by God, the wrong action is whatever\nis forbidden. The Ashʿarite stance emerged as a critique of the\nMuʿtazilite position, which holds that certain types of action\nare known to be wrong without recourse to revelation, for example\nlying. We can always imagine circumstances in which\n“intrinsically wrong” action types turn out to be right\nafter all, like lying to a tyrant to avoid betraying a prophet\n(Arbaʿīn vol.1, 348). Therefore this\nMuʿtazilite theory is untenable.", "\nFakhr al-Dīn’s early works uphold a straightforward divine\ncommand theory. But he comes to pair this with a hedonist and\nconsequentialist ethics, which assumes that pleasure is good for\nhumans and pain bad. To avoid a regress of normative explanation,\nthere must be some fundamental norm, and in Fakhr al-Dīn’s\nview hedonism provides that norm. The connection between hedonism and\nAshʿarite ethics is that God has promised us pleasure if we\nfollow His commands, and pain if we do not. Thus, the divine command\ntheory turns out to be justified on egoistic, consequentialist grounds\n(Shihadeh 2016: 66). This also opens the prospect for determining what\nwe should do in the absence of a divine command: whatever is\n“beneficial”, in other words pleasure-maximizing for the\nagent. Because pleasure is now so central to his ethical theory, he\ndevotes significant attention to its nature, refuting the originally\nPlatonic “restoration theory” according to which all\npleasure is a return to a natural state from a harmful or painful\nstate (Sharḥ vol.2, 552–4). This analysis might\napply to the base pleasures of food or sex, but would not hold for\nhigher pleasures like the grasping of knowledge (see his Epistle\nCensuring the Pleasures of this World, in Shihadeh 2016).", "\nIf we again take his late work, the Maṭālib, as\nour best evidence for Fakhr al-Dīn’s final philosophical\nviews, then we can infer that he retained his commitment to\nconsequentialism. Characteristically, he itemizes arguments against\nhis own position and refutes them one by one\n(Maṭālib vol.3, 66–9). For example, you\nmight encounter an ill person in a wasteland where no one else is\naround to see, and help them. What pleasure are you getting out of\nthis? None, it would seem, yet you would and should do it nonetheless.\nFakhr al-Dīn explains that you would be acting on the principle\nthat, if you were in the same position as the unfortunate person, you\nwould want to be treated in the same way. This is not an appeal to\nsome kind of Kantian categorical imperative, but more like what we now\ncall “rule utilitarianism”. That is, we should act in such\na way that if people in general acted like this, pleasure would be\nmaximized and pain minimized (for a similar interpretation see\nShihadeh 2016: 80, who emphasizes that the motivation is\n“neither altruistic nor based on a sense of duty… but is\na self-centred, prudential motivation”).", "\nThis example shows that Fakhr al-Dīn was not simply reacting to\nAvicennan falsafa by rehearsing an Ashʿarite\nkalām view (though he does also refute Ibn\nSīnā’s proposal, inspired by Neoplatonism, that evils\nare cases of non-being). He also applied his philosophical acuity to\nreflect on, and modify, the Ashʿarite position. In the later\ntradition he was sometimes accused of adopting skepticism. A\nrepresentative anecdote has him weeping after being disabused of\nsomething he had formerly taken as certain truth and lamenting,\n“what is there to prove that all my beliefs are not of this\nnature?” (quoted at Kholeif 1966: 18). The impression of\nskepticism could also be encouraged by his tendency to provide only a\nminimal verdict, or no verdict at all, at the end of a lengthy\ndialectical investigation of some issue. This is something else that\nannoyed later readers: the sheer accumulation of arguments he offered\nfor unacceptable views was dangerous, even if refutations of these\narguments were given thereafter. And it does seem that he saw certain\ndemonstration as being impossible on many theological and\nphilosophical issues. But he was not a global skeptic. As discussed\nabove, he had views about what it would mean to have knowledge, and\nassumed that knowledge is indeed attainable. His massive and still\ninadequately explored corpus testifies to his determination to attain\nthat knowledge like no one else in his time, and thus to supplant Ibn\nSīnā as the indispensable thinker of the Islamic world." ], "section_title": "6. Ethics", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Janos, Damien and Muhammad Fariduddin Attar, 2023, A\nComprehensive, Annotated, and Indexed Bibliography of the Modern\nScholarship on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, (Handbook of\nOriental Studies. Section 1 the Near and Middle East, 171),\nLeiden/Boston: Brill.", "Ibn Sīnā [Avicenna], al-Ishārāt\nwa-l-tanbīhāt, Mujtabā l-Zārʿī\n(ed.), Qom: Bustān-i Kitāb, 2008.", "Plato, Meno, in John Burnet (ed.) Platonis\nopera, vol. 3, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.", "al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, al-Arbaʿīn\nfī uṣūl al-dīn, Aḥmad\nḤigjāzī al-Saqqā (ed.), 2 volumes, Cairo:\nMaktabat al-kullīyāt al-azharīya, 1986.", "–––, al-Maʿālim, in\nAsʾila Naǧm al-Dīn al-Kātibī ʿan\nal-Maʿālim li-Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī maʿa\ntaʿālīq ʿIzz al-Dawla b. Kammūna, Sabine\nSchmidtke and Reza Pourjavadi (eds.), Tehran: Iranian Institute of\nPhilosophy & Institute of Islamic Studies, Free University of\nBerlin, 2007.", "–––, al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya\nfī ʿilm al-ilāhiyyāt\nwa-l-ṭabīʿiyyāt, Muḥammad\nal-Muʿtaṣim bi-llāh al-Baghdādī (ed.), 2\nvols, Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī, 1990.", "–––, al-Maṭālib\nal-ʿāliya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī, ed.\nAḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā (ed.), 9 vols,\nBeirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī, 1987.", "–––, Muḥaṣṣal afkār\nal-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾakhkhirīn min\nal-ʿulamāʾ wa-l-ḥukamāʾ\nwa-l-mutakallimīn, Ḥusayn Atay (ed.), Cairo:\nal-Maktaba al-azhariyya li-l-turāth, 1991.", "–––, al-Mulakhkhaṣ:\nal-Manṭiq, A. Qarāmalkī and A.\nAshgarīnizhād (eds.), Tehran: Dānišgāh-i\nImām Ṣādiq, 2003.", "–––, Al-nafs wa-l-rūḥ,\nMuhammad Ṣaghīr Ḥasan al-Maʿṣūmī\n(ed.), Tehran, 1970.", "–––, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt\nwa-l-tanbīhāt, ʿAlī Reża Najafzādah\n(ed.), 2 vols, Tehran: Anjuman-i sār va-Mafākhir-i\nFarhangī, 2004-6.", "ʿAbd al-Mutaʿāl, ʿA.D.M., 2003,\nTaṣawwur Ibn Sīnā li-l-zamān\nwa-uṣūluhū al-yūnānīya,\nAlexandria: Dār al-wafāʾ li-dunyā\nl-ṭibāʿa wa-l-našr.", "Abrahamov, Binyamin, 1992, “Fakhr Al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī on God’s Knowledge of the Particulars”,\nOriens, 33: 133–155. doi:10.1163/1877837292X00051", "–––, 1993, “Necessary Knowledge in Islamic\nTheology”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,\n20(1): 20–32.", "Acar, Rahim, 2004, “Reconsidering Avicenna’s Position\non God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, in Interpreting\nAvicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam, Jon McGinnis\nand David C. Reisman (eds), Leiden: Brill, 142–156.\ndoi:10.1163/9789047405818_011", "Adamson, Peter, 2005, “On Knowledge of Particulars”,\nProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105(1):\n257–278. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00114.x", "–––, 2011a, “Avicenna and his Commentators\non Self-Intellective Substances”, in Hasse and Bertolacci 2011:\n97–122.", "––– (ed.), 2011b, In the Age of Averroes:\nArabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century, (Warburg\nInstitute Colloquia 16), London: Warburg Institute, School of Advanced\nStudy, University of London.", "–––, 2017, “Fakhr Al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī on Place”, Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 27(2): 205–236.\ndoi:10.1017/S0957423917000029", "–––, 2018a, “Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī on Void”, in Islamic Philosophy from the\n12th to the 14th Century, Abdelkader Al\nGhouz (ed.), Bonn: Bonn University Press, 307–324.", "–––, 2018b, “The Existence of Time in\nFakhr Al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Maṭālib\nal-ʿāliya”, in The Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin\nReception of Avicenna’s Physics and Cosmology, Dag Nikolaus\nHasse and Amos Bertolacci (eds.), (Scientia Graeco-Arabica 23),\nBoston: De Gruyter, 65–99. doi:10.1515/9781614516972", "–––, 2018c, “The Simplicity of\nSelf-Knowledge after Avicenna”, Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 28(2): 257–277.\ndoi:10.1017/S0957423918000048", "–––, 2021a, Al-Rāzī, (Great\nMedieval Thinkers), New York: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/oso/9780197555033.001.0001 [Note: this book concerns\nAbū Bakr al-Rāzī, not Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī, but the latter is often mentioned as a source for\nthe former.]", "–––, 2021b, “From Known to Knower:\nAffinity Arguments for the Mind’s Incorporeality in the Islamic\nWorld”, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Volume\n1, Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,\n373–396. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0013", "Adamson, Peter and Andreas Lammer, 2020, “Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī’s Platonist Account of the Essence of\nTime”, in Shihadeh and Thiele 2020: 95–122.", "Adamson, Peter and Bethany Somma, forthcoming, “Faḫr\nAl-Dīn al-Rāzī on Animal Cognition and\nImmortality”, Archiv Für Geschichte Der\nPhilosophie, first online: 14 July 2022.\ndoi:10.1515/agph-2021-0171", "Ahmed, Asad Q., 2016, “The Reception of Avicenna’s\nTheory of Motion in the Twelfth Century”, Arabic Sciences\nand Philosophy, 26(2): 215–243.\ndoi:10.1017/S0957423916000023", "Alpina, Tommaso, 2021, Subject, Definition, Activity: Framing\nAvicenna’s Science of the Soul, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.\ndoi:10.1515/9783110706840", "Altaş, Eşref, 2009, Fahreddin\ner-Râzî’nin İbn Sînâ yorumu ve\neleştirisi, İstanbul: İz\nYayıncılık.", "–––, 2013a, “Fahreddin\ner-Râzî’nin Hayati, Hāmileri İilmī ve\nSiyasī İlişkileri”, in Ö. Türker and O.\nDemir (eds.), İslam düşüncesinin\ndönüşüm çağında Fahreddin\ner-Râzî, Istanbul, İsam Yayınları,\n41–90.", "–––, 2013b, “Fahreddin\ner-Râzî’nin eserlerinin kronolojisi”, in\nÖ. Türker and O. Demir (eds.), İslam\ndüşüncesinin dönüşüm\nçağında Fahreddin er-Râzî, Istanbul:\nİsam Yayınları, 91–164.", "–––, 2015, “An Analysis and Editio\nPrinceps of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s\nRisālah: Al-Jawhar al-Fard”, Nazariyat,\n1(3): 77–178. doi:10.15808/Nazariyat.2.3.M0018", "Arnaldez, Roger, 2002, Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî:\ncommentateur du Coran et philosophe, Paris: J. 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Montgomery\n(ed.), (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 152), Leuven/Dudley, MA:\nUitgeverij Peeters en Department Ossterse Studies, 199–272.", "Setia, Adi, 2004, “Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on\nPhysics and the Nature of the Physical World: A Preliminary\nSurvey”, Islam & Science (now Islamic\nSciences), 2(2): 161–180.", "–––, 2006, “Atomism Versus Hylomorphism in\nthe Kalām of al-Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī: A\nPreliminary Survey of the Maṭālib\nal-ʿāliyyah”, Islam & Science, 4(2):\n113–140.", "–––, 2008, “Time, Motion, Distance, and\nChange in the Kalām of Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī: A Preliminary Survey with Special Reference to the\nMaṭālib ʿāliyyah”, Islam &\nScience, 6(1): 13–29.", "Al-Shaar, Nuha, 2012, “An Islamic Approach to Moral Virtue:\nFakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Treatment of Birr\n(Virtue) in his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr”,\nMélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph,\n64: 87–100.", "Shihadeh, Ayman, 2005, “From Al-Ghazālī to\nal-Rāzī: 6th/12th Century Developments in Muslim\nPhilosophical Theology”, Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy, 15(1): 141–179.\ndoi:10.1017/S0957423905000159", "–––, 2006, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr\nal-Dīn al-Rāzī, Leiden: Brill.\ndoi:10.1163/9789047409007", "–––, 2014, “Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī’s response to Sharaf al-Dīn\nal-Masʿūdī’s critical commentary on\nAvicenna’s Ishārāt”, The Muslim\nWorld, 104(1–2): 1–61. doi:10.1111/muwo.12037", "–––, 2016, “Theories of Ethical Value in\nKalām: A New Interpretation”, in The Oxford Handbook of\nIslamic Theology, Sabine Schmidtke (ed.), Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, 384–407.", "–––, 2017, “Al-Rāzī’s (d.\n1210) commentary on Avicenna’s Pointers: The confluence\nof exegesis and aporetics”, in The Oxford Handbook of\nIslamic Philosophy, Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke\n(eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 286–325.", "–––, 2019, “Avicenna’s Theodicy and\nal-Rāzī’s Anti-Theodicy”, Intellectual\nHistory of the Islamicate World, 7: 61–84.\ndoi:10.1163/2212943X-00701004", "–––, 2022, “Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī and Ghūrid Self-Fashioning”,\nAfghanistan, 5(2): 253–292.\ndoi:10.3366/afg.2022.0095", "Shihadeh, Ayman and Jan Thiele (eds), 2020, Philosophical\nTheology in Islam: Later Ashʻarism East and West,\n(Islamicate Intellectual History 5), Leiden/Boston: Brill.", "Street, Tony, 1997, “Concerning the Life and Works of Fakhr\nal-Dīn al-Rāzī”, in Islam: Essays on\nScripture, Thought and Society: A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H.\nJohns, Peter Riddell and Tony Street (eds), Leiden: Brill,\n135–146. doi:10.1163/9789004452091_013", "–––, 2005, “Faḫraddin\nar-Rāzī’s Critique of Avicennan Logic”, in\nLogik und Theologie: Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen\nMittelalter, Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph (eds), Leiden:\nBrill, 99–116. doi:10.1163/9789047403982_007", "–––, 2010, “Appendix: Readings of the\nSubject Term”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 20(1):\n119–124. doi:10.1017/S0957423909990117", "–––, 2014, “Afḍal Al-Dīn\nal-Khūnajī (d. 1248) on the Conversion of Modal\nPropositions”, Oriens, 42(3–4): 454–513.\ndoi:10.1163/18778372-04203006", "–––, 2016, “Al-ʿAllāma\nal-Ḥillī (d. 1325) and the Early Reception of\nKātibī’s Shamsīya: Notes towards a Study\nof the Dynamics of Post-Avicennan Logical Commentary”,\nOriens, 44(3–4): 267–300.\ndoi:10.1163/18778372-04403004", "Strobino, Riccardo and Paul Thom, 2016, “The Logic of\nModality”, in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval\nLogic, Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Stephen Read (eds), Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, 342–369.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9781107449862.015", "Treiger, Alexander, 2012, “Avicenna’s Notion of\nTranscendental Modulation of Existence (taškīk\nal-wujūd, analogia entis) and its Greek and Arabic\nSources,” in Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and\nReligion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, Felicitas Opwis and\nDavid C. Reisman (eds), Leiden: Brill, 327–63.", "Türker, Ömer and Osman Demir, 2011, İslâm\nDüşüncesinin Dönüşüm\nÇağında Fahreddin er-Râzî,\nİstanbul: İsam Yayınları. [Collection of articles\non Fakhr al-Dīn.]", "Virgi, Sarah, 2022, “The Mouse’s Tale:\nAl-Jāḥiẓ, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and Fakhr\nal-Dīn al-Rāzī on Animal Thinking”, British\nJournal for the History of Philosophy, 30(5): 751–772.\ndoi:10.1080/09608788.2022.2049203", "Wisnovsky, Robert, 2004, “One Aspect of the Avicennian\nTurn in Sunnī Theology”, Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy 14: 65–100.", "–––, 2012, “Essence and Existence in the\nEleventh- and Twelfth-Century Islamic East (Mašriq): A\nSketch”, in Hasse and Bertolacci 2011: 27–50.", "–––, 2013, “Avicennism and Exegetical\nPractice in the Early Commentaries on the\nIshārāt”, Oriens, 41(3–4):\n349–378. doi:10.1163/18778372-13413406", "Zamboni, Francesco, 2020, “Is Existence One or Manifold?\nAvicenna and His Early Interpreters on the Modulation of Existence\n(taškīk al-wuǧūd)”, Documenti\ne studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 31:\n121–149.", "Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh, 2022, Necessary Existence and\nMonotheism: An Avicennian Account of the Islamic Conception of Divine\nUnity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/9781108938112", "al-Zarkān, Muḥammad Ṣ., 1963, Fakhr\nal-Dīn al-Rāzī wa-ārāʾuhū\nal-kalāmiyya wa-l-falsafiyya, Cairo: Dār al-Fikr\nli-l-Ṭabāʿa wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle-logic/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: logic" }, { "href": "../ibn-sina/", "text": "Ibn Sina [Avicenna]" }, { "href": "../ibn-sina-metaphysics/", "text": "Ibn Sina [Avicenna]: metaphysics" }, { "href": "../suhrawardi/", "text": "Suhrawardi" } ]
albalag	Isaac Albalag	First published Thu Aug 20, 2020	[ "\nIsaac Albalag stands out as one of the most rigorous representatives\nof the school of Jewish Averroism which flourished in Western Europe\nin the thirteenth century and lasted until the Renaissance. The\nmembers of this school, such as Ibn Kaspi, Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera,\nMoses Narboni, Isaac Polqar, Gersonides, and Elijah Delmedigo,\nregarded Averroes’ philosophical writings, particularly his\ncommentaries on Aristotle, as the main source for the study of\nscience and philosophy. The impact of Averroes on these philosophers,\nvaried as it was, extended to the question of the relationship between\nreligion and philosophy. Many Jewish philosophers, drawing upon\nAverroes’ religious epistemology, which established a\ntheoretical basis for reading Scripture and demonstrative sciences as\ndifferent representations of the truth rather than conflicting truths,\nundertook to interpret Judaism as a philosophical religion, a\nphilosophical-religious approach that was arguably championed by the\nprominent Jewish philosopher Maimonides (d.1204). Like most Jewish\nAverroists, Albalag occupied himself with purely philosophical\nquestions of physics, metaphysics, and epistemology, addressing them\nthrough the lens of Averroes. Characteristically, Albalag holds\nunreserved admiration for and faithfulness to Aristotle whose\nteachings he deems synonymous with the truth and which he\ndiscovers in the writings of Averroes. Restoring Aristotelianism and\nestablishing it among Jewish students of philosophy emerge as key\ngoals of Albalag’s philosophical enterprise. Within the\nframework of that enterprise, Albalag also engages with the crucial\nquestion of the relationship between Judaism and philosophy, uniquely\nanswering it by advocating the double truth doctrine." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Epistemology", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Knowledge, Belief and Intellectual Perfection", "3.2 Human Knowledge: Means and Limits" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Conception of Being and God’s Existence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. God-world Relationship", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 The Origin of the World", "5.2 Divine Will", "5.3 Divine Knowledge", "5.4 The Problem of Determinism" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Cosmology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Celestial Motion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. The Relationship Between Religion and Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "9. Theory of Prophecy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "10. Political Thought", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "11. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Sources", "Secondary Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nLittle is known about Isaac Albalag. All that we know about him is\nthat he lived in the second half of the thirteenth century either in\nCatalonia or Provence (Sirat 1985: 238). References to Albalag in the\nmedieval Jewish literature indicate that he was not a figure of\nfavorable reputation. His name appears in a number of Jewish writings\nusually in association with humiliating accusations of heresy. The\nKabbalist Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov (d.1440), for instance,\naccuses Albalag of heresy for advocating a heretical view regarding\nthe fate of the human soul (Sefer ha ʾemunot [the Book\nof Beliefs], I:1). In Sefer Neveh Shalom (Indwelling of\nPeace), the fifteenth-century Spanish thinker Abraham Shalom\nattacks Albalag for eliminating the doctrine of creation by radically\nnaturalizing the account for celestial motion (Vajda 1960: 271).\nAlbalag’s worth as a philosopher did not go unnoticed,\nnotwithstanding. Isaac Polqar (14th century), the author of\nʿEzer ha-dat (The Support of Faith) holds Albalag in\ngreat esteem and cites him approvingly in dealing with the\ncontroversial issue of the origin of the world (ʿEzer\nha-dat: part II: p.46).", "\nAlbalag wrote only one treatise, Sefer Tiqqun ha deʿot\n(The Emendation of the Opinions)—I here employ Manekin’s\ntranslation of the title (Manekin 2007: 140)—which is a\ntranslation with commentarial notes on the first two sections of Abu\nHamid al-Ghazali’s encyclopedic treatise kitāb\nMaqāṣid al-Falāsifah (The Opinions of the\nPhilosophers), Logic and Metaphysics. The third section, Natural\nPhilosophy, was completed by Isaac Polqar (Vajda 1960: 268).", "\nTwo goals stand behind the composition of the Tiqqun. The\nprimary one, as the title reveals (Emendation of the Opinions), is\ncorrective. Motivated by confidence in Aristotelianism, Albalag adopts\na critical stance towards any doctrine that deviates from Aristotelian\nteachings and rules. For him, most errors in the philosophical\ndiscourse are instances of deviation from Aristotle or\nmisunderstandings of his teachings. The cumulative literature of\ncommentaries on Aristotle, excluding Averroes’ commentaries, is\nreplete with such instances. Avicenna is particularly regarded by\nAlbalag as a major source of error and thus the process of\n“emendation” (Tiqqun) largely consists in\nsystematic critiques of Avicennian philosophy. But Avicenna is not the\nsole target of criticism, though he is the central one. Albalag also\ncriticizes other philosophers such as al-Farabi, Maimonides, and\nal-Ghazali—it is not unlikely that Albalag thought, like\nMedieval Latin philosophers, that Maqāṣid\nal-Falāsifah was a genuine representation of\nal-Ghazali’s philosophical view (for al-Ghazali’s\nphilosophical image in Latin literature see Salman 1999; Shihadeh\n2011).[1]\nMaqāṣid al-Falāsifah encompasses a concise\npresentation of the opinions of the philosophers, and as a result it\nfurnishes Albalag with an ideal framework for pursuing the announced\nprocess of “emendation” (Tiqqun). In most of his\ndiscussions, critiques, and corrections Albalag derives what he\nregards as the correct understanding of Aristotle from Averroes’\nwritings. ", "\nThe second goal of the Tiqqun is pedagogical. Here, again,\nal-Ghazali’s Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah\nserves as an adequate vehicle. Thanks to al-Ghazali’s style\nwhich is free of complexities and accords with “popular\nbeliefs”, the Maqāṣid provides a suitable\nmedium for instructing students who have little training in philosophy\n(Tiqqun preface: 4). By translating and commenting on\nal-Ghazali’s Maqāṣid, Albalag hopes to offer\na piecemeal instruction in philosophy, starting with a presentation of\nGhazali’s summary of the doctrines of the philosophers and\nculminating in the establishment of Aristotelian demonstrative\ndoctrines. Overall, the Tiqqun follows the structure of the\nMaqāṣid except on some occasions where Albalag\nengages in large digressions." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe first part of the Tiqqun (Logic) is, more or less, a\nfaithful translation of the Maqāṣid. Although this\npart is generally unoriginal, it may still be credited with a specific\ncontribution. Manuscripts of the Tiqqun include a sympathetic\ndiscussion of the fourth figure of syllogism. This figure was\nattributed by most Medieval logicians to Galen, though this\nattribution remains disputed in modern scholarship (Rescher 1965;\nSabra 1965), and was dismissed as lacking utility and\n“naturalness” (see Gersonides Sefer ha-heqqesh\nha-Yashar [The Book of the Correct Syllogism]: 147). It is not\nclear, however, whether Albalag himself wrote this discussion or\nwhether it was written by Abner of Burgos, a thirteenth-century\nJewish-convert-to-Christianity philosopher, as suggested by some\ntextual evidence (Vajda 1960: 275–276). In any case, the\ninclusion of this discussion in the Tiqqun independently of\nany explicit criticism indicates that Albalag agrees with its positive\nattitude towards the fourth figure of syllogism.", "\nThe Aristotelian syllogism does not determine a specific order for the\nmajor and minor premises. Hence, the terms comprising the premises,\nthe “unique major” and “minor” terms and the\nshared middle term, may be arranged in three possible figures as\nfollows: ", "\nSome later logicians distinguished the order of the major and minor\npremises with the result that the first figure was divided into two\nfigures: ", "\nThe additional fourth figure “is sometimes placed after the\nfirst figure, rather than the third” (ibid, 1996: 50).", "\nThe Tiqqun provides a quasi-defense of the fourth figure as a\n“valuable” form of reasoning (Tiqqun n.5:12).\nThis interrupts Albalag’s overall adherence to Averroes who,\nlike the majority of Medieval logicians, rejects the fourth figure due\nto considerations that have to do with “naturalness.”\nAccording to Averroes, “the form of reasoning embodied in the\nfourth figure of syllogism does not exist in us by nature” and\ninvolves “absurd self-predication” (Manekin 1996: 56). In\nHebrew logical writings, limited attempts were advanced to establish\nthe validity of that figure, most famously by Gersonides. The\ndiscussion in the Tiqqun is another attempt to this effect\nwhere the author, interestingly, subjects even Aristotle to criticism\nfor omitting this form of reasoning (Tiqqun n.5: 12)." ], "section_title": "2. Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Epistemology", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nLike most Medieval Aristotelians, Albalag understands the ultimate\ngoal of man in terms of intellectual perfection (Tiqqun\npreface: 2–3, n.30: 42; cf. Maimonides,\nGuide III:54; Farabi, Selected Aphorisms: 61;\nAverroes, Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction: 103). To\nfulfill this goal one has to attain knowledge of existents in a manner\n“that dispels doubt” (Tiqqun preface: 3). The\nformula of “dispelling doubt” points to the conception\nof certainty (yaqīn), which is defined in the Arab\nAristotelian tradition as a cognitive state in which the cognizer\nacquiesces that what she perceived is necessarily true and cannot be\notherwise (see Black 2006: 15–25). In line with this tradition,\nAlbalag specifies the logical tool of demonstration as the\nmeans for fulfilling the criterion of dispelling doubt (i.e.,\nattaining certainty).", "\nThis, however, raises a difficulty, for the ultimate goal of man would\nseem to be exclusively tied to philosophy, while the role of religion\nwould be meager. Although this difficulty is not peculiar to Albalag,\nit is particularly strong in the Tiqqun where a notable\ndichotomy between ʾemunah (belief) and\nyediʿah (scientific knowledge) serves to confine\nreligion/Scripture to a domain of knowledge that is quantitatively and\nqualitatively different from demonstrative knowledge (i.e., prophetic\nknowledge). Whether this knowledge qualifies as an alternative or a\nparallel means to philosophy in fulfilling the epistemic requirement\nof intellectual perfection is a complex question. Insofar as the\nTiqqun is concerned, ʾemunah can rightly be\nequated with fideism (see Tiqqun n.30: 38, 51), unlike the\nphilosophical conception of belief (for which\nʾiʿtiqād and taṣdīq were\nthe basic technical terms in Arabic) advocated by many Jewish and\nMuslim philosophers and theologians (see, for instance, al-Farabi \nBook of Demonstration: 63–4; Saʿadia Gaʾon \nBook of Beliefs: 14; Maimonides Guide\nI:50). In view of the latter, belief consists in judgment or\naffirmation, following from cognitive processes and syllogistic\nreasoning, that a given perceived object is true. In this way, belief\nis said to be associated with certainty or approximation of certainty\ndepending on the form of reasoning.", "\nThe Tiqqun, by contrast, points to a traditional conception\nof belief; one that amounts to simple acceptance of a given Scriptural\ndoctrine or a set of doctrines as true without prior rational\njustification (Tiqqun n.30: 51). Simple belief can always be\nregarded as a source of certainty on account of prophetic authority\nand this appears to be the basic standpoint of the Tiqqun\n(for background on the conception of belief in Jewish thought see\nWolfson 1942: 213–261; Kellner 1986; Rosenberg 1984:\n273–307). Yet it is important to consider the implications that\nthe Tiqqun’s extreme skeptical stance in regard to\nprophetic knowledge raises for this standpoint. The Tiqqun\nencompasses a number of significant remarks stressing the\ninaccessibility of the Torah's prophetic secrets to non-prophets\n—we will see below that the Torah has two layers of esoteric\nknowledge, prophetic and philosophical. What remains is the layer of\nphilosophical knowledge to which philosophers, as Albalag points out,\ncould have access. Accessing this layer of knowledge essentially\ndepends on allegorical interpretation of Scripture in terms of what\nwas learned from demonstrative sciences (see below). This means that\nwhatever assent Scripture evokes in a person who is well-trained in\ndemonstrative sciences (i.e., a philosopher) will be of the type of\nreason-based, namely demonstrative, assent (cf. Averroes Decisive\nTreatise: 17–18). It would, thus, be beside the point to\nspeak of “simple belief” (ʾemunah pashoṭah),\nunless we grant that simple faith attaches to the surface layer of\nScripture. But this, again, would be implausible, since Albalag admits\nthat this layer is addressed to the multitude of people who,\n“like animals”, lack rationality, rather than philosophers\n(Tiqqun n.30: 45; for further discussion see Guttmann\n1945)." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Knowledge, Belief and Intellectual Perfection" }, { "content": [ "\n\nAlthough Albalag does not devote a specific discussion to the theory\nof knowledge, many questions pertaining to the limit, means, and\nfeatures of human knowledge recur throughout the Tiqqun. His\ntreatment of these questions show indebtedness to Aristotelian\nepistemological theories as expounded by Arab Aristotelians, in\nparticular Averroes. Following the framework of the theory of\nrepresentational knowledge, standard among Arab Aristotelians, Albalag\ndivides knowledge into representation and assent. The former, which is\na prerequisite for the latter, is acquired by definition, while assent\nis acquired by a proof (Tiqqun [Logic]: 98; cf.\nMaqāṣid: 12). As noted previously, Albalag adopts\nthe Aristotelian theory of syllogism, assigning a primary significance\nto demonstrative syllogisms in evoking certain assent. Moreover,\nlike Averroes, Albalag places conspicuous emphasis on the empirical\nfoundation of human knowledge (for Averroes’ epistemology see\nBlack 2019). Intelligible thoughts arise in the soul through the\ncognitive process of abstraction and syllogistic reasoning. Without\nexternal images, Albalag affirms, it would be impossible for the soul\nto apprehend the intelligible forms, just as it is impossible for a\nperson who is deprived of visual data to apprehend the quiddity of\ncolors (Tiqqun, n.11: 16, n.44: 71; cf. Aristotle \nDe Anima III, 7, 431a, 14–17).", "\nAlthough the Tiqqun is generally characterized by confident\nrationalism, it involves skeptical elements that echo\nMaimonides’ critiques of the limitation of the human intellect\nin regard to metaphysical knowledge (for these critiques in Maimonides\nsee Pines 1979; Stern 2013). Albalag admits, like Maimonides,\nthat attaining complete knowledge of immaterial beings lies\nbeyond the capacity of the human intellect. The reason for this\nlimitation is, first and foremost, the material component of human\nbeings (ḥomer) which acts as both a constant impediment\nto the pursuit of knowledge and a cause of intellectual deficiency\n(Tiqqun n.11: 16, n.38: 58; cf. Guide\nIII:9)." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Human Knowledge: Means and Limits" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAvicenna’s proof of God’s existence, famously known as\n“Burhān al-ṣidiqin”, Demonstration of\nthe Truthful (Mayer 2001), occupies a good deal of Albalag’s critical\ndiscussion. The proof is meant to be a metaphysical proof, one that\ntakes place in the science of Metaphysics and proceeds from analyses\nof the conception of existence qua existence.", "\nAvicenna divides “actual” beings, as opposed to impossible\nthings, into necessary in itself and possible in itself but necessary\nthrough another (Davidson 1987: 292–3; McGinnis 2010:\n159–164). The necessary in itself is that which has existence in\nits essence and an impossibility arises whenever it is assumed not to\nexist. By contrast, the possible in itself but necessary through\nanother is that which “has no existence in essence” and\n“no impossibility” arises whether it is assumed to exist\nor not (Avicenna al-Najāt: 546; cf.\nal-ʾisharāt: 122; cf. al-Ghazali\nMaqāṣid: 100–101). In other words, both\nexistence and non-existence are equal states with respect to it. This\nlatter point is crucial to Avicenna’s proof, for it stipulates\nthat there must be an external cause that ultimately preponderates\nexistence over non-existence in things that are possible. This cause\nmust be necessary in itself. Considering all possible things as an\n“aggregate” (jumlah), two alternatives arise in\nregard to the cause of that aggregate (Avicenna,\nal-Najāt: 567–8): either the aggregate of possible\nthings is self-caused or caused by something external. Avicenna\ndismisses the former alternative as impossible because the nature of\nwhat is possible in itself does not change independently of a cause;\npossible things become necessary only through other causes. Hence, an\naggregate of possible things is also possible in itself and cannot be\nself-caused. Furthermore, “a chain” (silsilah) of\npossible things cannot continue ad infinitum and it must end\nto a being that is necessary in itself. The trait of “necessary\nexistence” further entails a number of divine attributes such as\noneness, simplicity and goodness, which permits identifying the\nNecessary Existent with the deity (Adamson 2013: 172).", "\nTo Albalag, Avicenna’s proof of God as Necessary Existent\nappeared to involve flagrant deviations from Aristotle. Firstly,\nAvicenna’s procedure for establishing the existence of the First\nPrinciple in the science of metaphysics is methodologically incorrect.\n(Tiqqun n.8: 13–14). Appealing to Averroes, Albalag\nargues that the existence of the prime mover must be accepted from\nnatural philosophy—not insofar as it is the deity—while\nmetaphysicians proceed therefrom in examining its states and\nattributes. Obviously, the theoretical basis for this argument is\nAristotle’s rule that “no master of any art can\ndemonstrate the proper principles of his art”\n(Metaphysics IV 1003a21–22), which, according to\nAverroes, means that a given science does not demonstrate the\nexistence of its subject, but must concede to their existence either\nas something which is “self-evident” or as\n“something that has been demonstrated in another science”\n(Wolfson 1950–1 : 691). Since the First\nPrinciple is the subject matter of metaphysics, its existence cannot\nbe established in that specific science.", "\nSecondly, Avicenna breaks away from Aristotle in that he proceeds in\nestablishing the existence of the First Principle from analyses of the\nconception of being rather than motion and moved objects (for\nAristotle’s argument see Physics 7 & 8). In order\nto establish the Necessary Existent, Avicenna proceeds from a\nconception of being that Albalag, following Averroes, dismisses as\nspurious (for Averroes see al-kashf: 14). His discomfort with\nthis conception has to do primarily with the fact that it is alien to\nAristotle. But Albalag additionally speaks of errors and absurd implications,\nespecially in the science of metaphysics, that follow from\nAvicenna’s method of distinguishing two types of necessary\nexistents, i.e., that which is necessary in itself and that which is\nnecessary by another. One implication pertains to the nature of\nseparate intellects. Assuming that anything which is not\nnecessary in itself involves two modes, necessity and possibility, as\nAvicenna holds, then separate intellects would also involve both\nnecessity and possibility. This, however, absurdly clashes with the\nessential nature of separate intellects as immaterial beings, since\npossibility must reside in a substratum (Tiqqun n.8: 14, \nn.29: 27).", "\nThese deviations from Aristotle provided Albalag with sufficient\nreason to reject the metaphysical proof of God. Moreover,\nAvicenna’s supplementary arguments, as reproduced by al-Ghazali\nin the Maqāṣid, to the effect that the Necessary\nExistent is one, simple and incorporeal fall short of satisfying the\nepistemic criterion of dispelling doubt (i.e., certainty), unlike\nAristotle’s argument from motion which, as Albalag asserts,\n“dispels doubt” (Tiqqun n.33: 53). But although\nAlbalag only trusts Aristotle’s argument, he points to a subtle\nproblem whose origin goes back to ancient commentaries on Aristotle:\nthe problem of the relation of the Prime Mover to the deity (for this\nproblem see Avicenna Shifāʾ\n[Metaphysics]: 13). Aristotle’s argument from motion\narrives at the existence of a mover that is not a body or a force in a\nbody. But whether that mover is the First Principle/Cause, i.e., the\ndeity, or a first effect remains an open question (Tiqqun\nn.8: 14, n.38: 61). Philosophers hold no unanimous answer to this\nquestion. While Avicenna concludes that the deity is ontologically\nsuperior to the Prime Mover known from Aristotle’s analyses of\nmotion (Tiqqun n.38: 61), Averroes identifies the Prime Mover\nwith the deity in all his writings (see for instance the\nCommentary on Metaphysics: 172)—the exclusion being, as\nAlbalag correctly notes, the Epitome of Metaphysics (see\nTalẖīṣ mā baʿd\nal-ṭabiʿah: 149) where Averroes follows\nAvicenna’s standpoint (Tiqqun n.69: 96).", "\nCuriously, Albalag does not immediately side with either camp.\nHowever, his discussions of the relation of the Prime Mover to the\ncelestial and sublunary realms confirm Averroes’ standpoint by\nestablishing the primacy of the Prime Mover as a cause of all\nsublunary and celestial entities, and Its absolute unity and\nsimplicity, two essential specifications of the deity (see below)." ], "section_title": "4. Conception of Being and God’s Existence", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nTo reconstruct a rough picture of Albalag’s understanding of the\nGod-world relationship, we consider three interrelated themes: the\norigin of the world, divine will, and divine wisdom." ], "section_title": "5. God-world Relationship", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nOn scientific grounds, Albalag dismisses the doctrine of temporal\norigination as “defective” and accepts the eternal\nexistence of the universe as an indisputable truth (we will see below\nthat he accepts the former on the authority of Scripture). Albalag,\nhowever, attempts to present the Aristotelian theory of eternity and\nits fundamental premises in a theologically appealing fashion. Thus,\nhe introduces the theory of “eternal origination”\n(ḥidūsh neṣaḥi) which maintains that\n“there was no moment at which the universe was not\noriginated” (Tiqqun n.30: 30; cf. Tahāfut\nal-Tahāfut, Third Discussion). That the universe has no\ntemporal beginning is a premise that Albalag accepts based on\nAristotle’s demonstration of the eternal existence of spheres\nand celestial motion (see for instance Tiqqun, n.30: 30,\n60:84–97; cf. De Caelo I: 2–3). What remains is\nto show that the universe is not self-sufficient. This procedure is\nnecessary in order to avoid confusing the philosophical doctrine of\neternity with that of Epicurus which maintains that “the\nuniverse has no cause” (Tiqqun n.30: 45). More\nspecifically, it shows that the philosophical conception of eternal\ncausation is not heretical and does by no means eliminate the idea of\norigination.", "\nFor this purpose, Albalag engages in a philosophical discussion in\nwhich he sets out to demonstrate the consistency of the theory of\neternal origination—in addition, he offers interpretive notes to\nshow that the doctrine of eternal origination is not offensive to\nScripture (for the interpretive notes see Feldman 2000: 19–30).\nHis discussion indirectly links to some elements of al-Ghazali’s\nrefutation of philosophers in Tahāfut al-Falāsifah\nconcerning their conceptions of God and the universe.\nAl-Ghazali’s central point of contention is that the\nphilosophers’ exposition of the relation of God to the universe\ndwells on two premises that form an oxymoron, namely that the universe\nis eternal and that it has an Agent and Maker (see Tahāfut\nal-Falāsifah third and tenth discussions). Contrary to\nal-Ghazali, Albalag holds these premises to be absolutely consistent.\nWhat is more, he introduces the theory of eternal origination as a\nmore adequate way for articulating the universe and divine causation\nthan the doctrine of temporal origination, the “defective”\ndoctrine of the multitude which confines divine causation to\ntemporality. If perfection indicates absoluteness, then the term\n“perfect” (shalem) applies to both “the\nabsolute” (muḥlaṭ) universe, which\neternally and immutably exists, and “the absolute” Creator\nwhose act of creation is free from temporal or circumstantial\nlimitations.", "\nThe doctrine of eternal origination rests on a conception of the\nuniverse as a moving entity in which the cause-effect relationship is\na relation between a mover and a moved object (see Tiqqun\nn.30: 29; cf. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut: third discussion,\n101). In the natural realm, all processes of generation and corruption\nconsist in motion—for instance the movement from potential to\nactual existence—and occurs through motion. All natural changes\ndepend on the movements of the celestial spheres, which in turn depend\non the Mover of the outermost sphere, the Prime Mover (Tiqqun\nn.30: 29, n.39: 62).", "\nBeyond this well-known Aristotelian conception of the Prime Mover as\nthe ultimate cause of motion in the universe, Albalag seeks to prove\nthat the very act of producing motion is sufficient to make the Prime\nMover a cause/creator of the universe. To this end, he differentiates\nbetween two classes of existents in terms of their dependence on\nmotion: ", "\nThings belonging to the latter class continue to exist after their\ncauses perish—for instance, a house continues to exist after the\ndeath of its builder. By contrast, things belonging to the former\nclass perish as soon as motion ceases—for instance wind does not\ncontinue to exist as soon as the motion of air ceases (Tiqqun\n30: 30; cf. Averroes Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, fourth\ndiscussion: 156–8). These things are said to be more in need of\na cause than things belonging to the former class are, for should the\ncause disappear from existence “for a twinkling of an\neye”, they would necessarily perish (Tiqqun n.30: 30).\nThe universe as a whole belongs to this class. Both the natural and\ncelestial realms subsist because their constituent “parts are\neternally originated” through the motion produced by the Prime\nMover; the parts of the natural and celestial realms referring to\nsublunary existents and the “successive” stages of\ncelestial motion respectively (Tiqqun, n.30: 30). " ], "subsection_title": "5.1 The Origin of the World" }, { "content": [ "\nWithin the framework of the theory of eternal creation, Albalag deals\nwith another problematic issue, which also links to al-Ghazali’s\nrefutations of philosophers in Tahāfut\nal-Falāsifah: the nature of divine causation, whether it is\nvoluntary or involuntary. In this treatise, Al-Ghazali maintains that\nvolition is a fundamental characteristic of acting causes; “the\nagent must be willing, choosing and knowing what he wills ”\n(Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, third discussion:\n135). Causes that act by necessity, that is, without willing or\nchoosing, fall in the category of natural involuntary\ncauses. Proceeding from this conception of agency, Al-Ghazali asserts\nthat the conception of divine causation that philosophers espouse\ndeprives the deity of volition. Again, the theory of eternity is\nbrought into focus. Necessity is a key postulation of the scheme of\neternity. Philosophers, according to al-Ghazali, hold the perpetual\nprocession of the universe from God to be necessary in the same manner\nthat the connection between “the sun and light” is\nnecessary (Tahāfut, third discussion: 135;\ncf. Tiqqun n.23: 24). In opposition to al-Ghazali, Albalag\nbroadens the conception of agency to include both involuntary natural\nand voluntary causes. However, he emphasizes that a natural cause is\ninsufficient to produce an effect. It must primarily be moved by a\nvoluntary agent. In the empirical world, natural causes bring forth\neffects inasmuch as they are being moved by close or remote voluntary\nagents. In this connection, Albalag states that “in this way all\nmaterial effects are related to God and it is said of Him that He is\ntheir Maker”, vaguely indicating that God is the ultimate\nvoluntary cause in the universe. Other than articulating the God-world\ncausal relationship in terms of motion, Albalag barely explains the\nnature of divine will or the manner in which it causes the perpetual\nproduction of the universe.", "\nIn other contexts, Albalag argues, in opposition to al-Ghazali, that\ndivine agency is neither natural nor voluntary, but an intermediary\ntype that lies beyond human understanding. This, however, does not\nmean that God has no will. The truth is that God has a capacity that\nconstitutes for Him what will constitutes for human beings. The exact\nnature of this capacity, which human beings call will, is obscure,\neven though demonstration establishes that it exists. Nonetheless,\nconsidering the defining criteria of the conception of divine\nperfection, it is inferred that this capacity shares no features with\nempirical will. Unlike empirical will which follows from a stimulus\nand seeks to fulfill a desire, divine will is self-sufficient. While\nempirical will is temporal, originates with a stimulus and perishes as\nsoon as the desire is fulfilled, divine will, consistently with the\neternal and immutable nature of God, is eternal and immutable, being\ncharacterized as a benevolent and immutable capacity to eternally\n“choose” the best of two opposite things: ", "\n\n\nEven though He possesses power over everything, the manner of His will\nis such that it constantly attaches itself to a single object, the\nbest among two opposites. Certainly, if He willed evil He would be\ncapable of doing it, but His will desires nothing but what is good\nonly. (Tiqqun n.23: 24 [my translation]; cf. Guide\nIII:25 where Maimonides states that God acts in the best way) \n", "\nOn this basis, the universe maintains a fixed natural order such that\n“nothing can be added to or reduced from it”\n(Tiqqun n.30: 39), since God’s will continuously and\nimmutably chooses this order." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Divine Will" }, { "content": [ "\nIf God possesses will, then He must also possess wisdom, since\ndeliberation and choosing assume knowledge of the thing that is\nwilled. That is to say, the God-world relationship is based on will\nand wisdom. In discussing the nature of divine knowledge, Albalag\ndisplays an obsession with divine perfection. Thus, he differentiates\nbetween divine and human knowledge on the basis of type rather than\nrank, removing any ground for comparing them or inferring premises\nabout God’s mode of apprehension and knowledge from the\ncharacteristics of human knowledge and cognition. This idea of the\ndistinctiveness of divine knowledge, and, indeed all divine\nattributes, is best expressed in terms of Maimonides’ theory of\nequivocation. According to Maimonides, terms such as wisdom, power and\nwill are predicated of God and creatures only equivocally. When\npredicated of God and other creatures, these terms are semantically\ndissimilar, sharing only the names rather than meaning (Guide\nI:56; cf. Tiqqun n.23: 24). Epistemologically speaking,\nmoreover, they are not informative; constituting an artificial\nlanguage, which we predicate of God owing to our inability to fathom\nand signify the corresponding characteristics in Him (Benor 1995;\nStern 2013: 198–204).", "\nOn this conception of divine attributes, Albalag examines\nAvicenna’s theory of divine knowledge, as reproduced by\nal-Ghazali in the Maqāṣid, according to which\n“God knows particulars in a universal fashion”\n(Maqāṣid: 118). Avicenna’s theory of divine\nknowledge has been subject to different interpretations (Marmura 1962:\n299–312; Adamson 2005: 257–278; Belo 2006: 177–199).\nFor Albalag, it simply means that God’s knowledge is universal.\nSince this way of articulating divine knowledge implies a\ncorrespondence between divine and human knowledge, Albalag naturally\nrejects it and scolds al-Ghazali for diffusing improper doctrines\nabout God. In opposition, he insists that God’s knowledge is\nopposite in characteristics, not merely superior in rank, to human\nknowledge: it is neither particular nor universal, it is atemporal,\nindivisible, absolutely actual and self-sufficient, being exclusively\ndependent on the mode of self-intellection which is peculiar to God\nand separate intellects (Tiqqun n.42: 76).", "\nGiven this radical notion of transcendency, it would seem that the\ncelestial realm and sublunary species and individuals lie beyond the\ndomain of God’s knowledge. But Albalag insists that God’s\nknowledge is all-encompassing. To establish this, he appropriates\nAverroes’ conception of the divine essence as a unified Form of\nthe forms of all existents (Averroes Commentary on\nMetaphysics: 197). Through the very act of self-intellection,\nGod, as Albalag concludes, apprehends all existents, including\nsublunary existents (Tiqqun n.42: 66). This conclusion is\naccompanied by an important clarification for the sake of maintaining\ndivine perfection and transcendence unimpaired: forms contained in the\nessence of God do not exactly correspond to the forms of sublunary\nthings insofar as they are material objects, but exist in the divine\nessence in the noblest possible manner, being absolutely simple,\nindivisible and independent of accidents." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Divine Knowledge" }, { "content": [ "\nIn the Maqāṣid, al-Ghazali restates the basic\nelements of Avicenna’s deterministic metaphysics and its\nimplication for the nature and domain of divine knowledge. He\nexplains, in light of Avicenna’s conception of being, the manner\nin which God knows future events. Possible things are necessitated by\ntheir causes; when a cause exists, the effect must necessarily follow.\nAs such, knowledge of a cause allows one to predict, beyond doubt, the\noccurrence of the associated effect or event. Inasmuch as God has\ncomplete knowledge of the hierarchy of the causes, He has knowledge of\nall future events (Maqāṣid: 118; cf. Avicenna \nal-Najāt: 587–599)", "\nFor Albalag, this deterministic worldview on which al-Ghazali’s\naccount of God’s knowledge of future events dwells follows from\na narrow understanding of the cause-effect relationship. Possible\nthings, according to Albalag, are realized by either material or\nefficient causes, or both. Some of these causes are either volitional\nor natural. Volitional causes, “hinge solely on the power of the\nchooser”, which means that effects are not necessary and cannot\nbe predicted. Effects arising from natural causes are necessary, only\nwhen the natural causes are necessary, that is, when they maintain a\nfixed order and cannot be hindered by other accidental or voluntary\ncauses. An example of this is a solar eclipse. Foreknowledge of this\nevent and ones like it are correspondingly necessary with respect to\nthe knower. By contrast, some natural causes, despite having an\norder, can be impeded by voluntary or accidental causes. In such\ncases, the effects are not necessary, and hence it is not possible to\nmake certain predictions about their occurrence. ", "\n\n\nI maintain that for any possible thing, if all its proximate an remote\ncauses succeed each other essentially and maintain order in their\nactions, and no hindrance can prevent any of them, then it is to be\njudged the same as a necessary thing with respect to knower. However,\nregarding other possible things one cannot know with certain knowledge\nthe fact or the time of their occurrence before their occurrence.\n(quotation from Manekin 2007: 141)\n", "\nAlbalag is aware that this note entails a denial of God’s\nknowledge of every future event. For this reason, he clarifies that\nhis intention is not to propose that God is ignorant of future events,\nfor, indeed, he thinks that God knows them, but in a manner that is\ndifferent from human knowledge.", "\nAlthough Albalag is critical, overall, of al-Ghazali’s account\nof God’s foreknowledge, he recommends teaching it to the\nmultitude because it is easy for them to comprehend. Albalag still\npoints to the theological implication associated with it. ", "\n\n\nWhen you examine al-Ghazali’s statements carefully you will find\nthat they entail the annulment of man’s choice and the\nconclusion that his actions are compelled, as well as the annulment of\nthe nature of the possible altogether. These opinions not only\nconstitute repudiation of philosophy but also heresy with respect the\nTorah. (Quotation from Manekin 2007: 142)\n" ], "subsection_title": "5.4 The Problem of Determinism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn discussing the fundamental traits of the Necessary Existent,\nal-Ghazali considers the implications of the divine attribute of\nabsolute simplicity to the scope of divine causation and conception of\nthe universe. Al-Ghazali explains, following Avicenna, that from what\nis one and simple (i.e., the Necessary Existent) only one thing may\nproceed (Maqāṣid: 157;\ncf. al-Shifāʾ [Metaphysics]:\n326–334; al-Najāt: 649–657). Underlying this\nunderstanding of the scope of divine causation is a conception of the\nrelationship between cause and effect as one of correspondence;\n“the action must be consistent with the essential nature of its\ncause” (Kogan 1984: 249). Thus, a single cause has one act and\nproduces only a single effect. In keeping with this conception, and\nconsidering the absolute simplicity of the First Principle,\nal-Ghazali, describes an emanationist cosmology in which the First\nPrinciple causes multiplicity not directly, but through a\nchain of emanative intermediaries that successively proceed from one\nanother. The First Principle produces only one entity, the first\nintellect, by thinking Itself. In turn, the first intellect produces,\nby thinking its Cause and itself, the second intellect and the first\ncelestial sphere (Maqāṣid: 157). The reason for\nthis multiplicity is that the first intellect is not absolutely simple\nlike the First Principle, but complex: in addition to thinking its\nPrinciple, it thinks itself insofar as it is possible and insofar as\nit is necessary by virtue of the First Principle. The process of\nemanation continues in a descending manner, terminating with the\nActive Intellect, the intellect of the sphere of the moon which is the\nimmediate source of the forms of sublunary entities.", "\nConvinced that the scheme of emanation constitutes an unsatisfactory\ndeviation from Aristotle, Albalag devotes extensive discussions to\nelucidating its inconsistency and fallacies, and alternatively\nestablishing what he regards as the correct Aristotelian scheme.\nUnlike the scheme of emanation, this scheme ascribes the\nuniverse’s manifold existents to God’s direct causation:\n“from what is one and simple many things can come to be”\n(Tiqqun n.96:\n 69).[2]\n Albalag describes a hierarchical cosmological scheme of separate\nintellects and celestial spheres in which each separate intellect\nrelates to the corresponding sphere as a cause of motion while the\nFirst Principle/Intellect relates to all separate intellects as a\ndirect formal\n cause.[3]\n Two theories account for this cosmological scheme: ", "\nBy definition, separate intellects are intellects in actu\nwhose substantiation is the very act of thinking. Without\nknowledge, the essence of the separate intellect would be nullified.\nThus, separate intellects, just like the First Intellect, have actual\nknowledge of the forms of all existents. In actual thinking, the\nknower, the known object, and the act of thinking are identical\n(Tiqqun n.42: 65), the relationship of identity being\nparticularly formal as Aristotle’s dictum of cognitive\nidentification establishes (De Anima 3.8 431b21). This means\nthat in separate intellects “essence/form”, the known\nobject and the act of thinking are the same. In this way, the First\nIntellect is said to be “the formal cause” of the separate\nintellects on the grounds that It provides them with “their\nforms”, i.e., the intelligible forms which they apprehend and by\nmeans of which they are what they are, intellects in actu\n(Tiqqun n.69:\n 98).[4]", "\nThis cosmological account, however, calls for explaining how separate\nintellects are differentiated. After all, separate intellects share\nthe feature of immateriality, hence they cannot be numbered.\nFurthermore, considering the fact that separate intellects share the\nsame epistemological content (i.e., the forms of all existents derived\nfrom the First Intellect) and that the knower is identical with the\nobject known, according to the Aristotelian dictum of “cognitive\nidentity”, separate intellects should all be identical. In the\nAvicennian-emanative scheme, intellects are numbered on account of the\ncausal relation between them, each intellect being the cause of an\nintellect emanating from it and “only God, who is at the top of\nthe series is an uncaused caused” (Wolfson 1958 : 244). By\nrejecting the conception of an emanative causal relationship between\nintellects, Albalag, however, could not speak of a distinction in\nterms of causal relation. Alternatively, he follows Averroes in\npositing ontological hierarchy as the differentiating factor between\nintellects (Tahāfut al-Tahāfut: fifth discussion:\n173). While each separate intellect derives its knowledge directly\nfrom the First Intellect, each stands in a specific hierarchical\nrelation to the First Intellect, the ranking of each intellect being\nin accordance with the extent of purity of its mode of apprehension;\nthe purer and simpler the mode of apprehension the closer the\nintellect in rank to the First Intellect. Overlap between these modes\nis not possible, which ensures that separate intellects remain\ndifferentiated.", "\nBeyond this cosmological account, Albalag indicates that multiplicity\nin the sublunary realm also comes forth from the deity; the First is\nsaid to be the cause of multiplicity inasmuch as It is the ultimate\ncause of the cosmic unity. Were it not for the unifying force that\nholds the parts together, the universe as a totality and its\nparts—each of which comes to be by virtue of a unifying force\nthat conjoins its constituent parts like matter and form and the\nelements—would not exist (Tiqqun n.69: 97; cf.\nAverroes Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, third discussion:\n108)." ], "section_title": "6. Cosmology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn the Avicennian-emanative scheme celestial motion is ascribed to two\nprinciples: ", "\nWhereas the soul functions as the efficient cause of motion, the\nseparate unmoved movers function as the final cause of motion insofar\nas they represent an object of love and desire. The point is that\nsince celestial souls are corporeal and finite, they are insufficient\nto account for the spheres’ perpetual activities. The\nperpetuation of motion, accordingly, must be the function of\nimmaterial and incorruptible principles. These are the unmoved\nseparate intellects of which the mover of the outermost spheres is the\nhighest in rank (Avicenna Shifāʾ\n[Metaphysics]: 308; cf. Maqāṣid:\n149).", "\nAs with many of Avicenna’s theories, Albalag raises a number of\nobjections to this account of celestial motion. Firstly, Albalag\ndismisses the conception of complementary efficient-final causation as\nunwarranted, since, in his understanding, a final cause could hardly\ncontinue the activity of a terminated efficient cause. Secondly,\nAlbalag rejects the theory of the spheres’ animation by souls\n(For background on this theory see Wolfson 1962: 65– 93;\nFreudenthal 2002: 111–137). His argument against that theory\nproceeds from the eternity premise as follows. Forces inhering in\nbodies (including celestial bodies) are finite. As such, they could\nhardly move the body in which they inhere infinitely. But we know that\nthe nature of spheres is such that they move eternally and this means\nthat celestial souls are superfluous in this regard. That Nature\n(ha tevaʿ) “does nothing in vain”\n(cf. Aristotle Politics 1252b30–1253a1;\nAverroes Commentary on Metaphysics: 178) prompts the\nconclusion that spheres do not have souls (Tiqqun n.61: 87).\nAlthough the basic lines of this argument are derived from Averroes,\nAlbalag seems to adopt a firmer position than Averroes in denying the\nanimation of spheres by souls. While Averroes rejects Avicenna’s\ntwofold account of celestial motion and argues in some of his works\n(especially De Substantia Orbis: 71; cf. Commentary on\nMetaphysics: 164) that celestial motion could hardly be dependent\non a finite force inhering in the celestial body, he uses the term\nsoul interchangeably with form in reference to the principles of\nmotion in celestial spheres: the immaterial separate intellects. In\nother works, we still find indications that spheres are ensouled\n(e.g., Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, fourth discussion).\nThese variations in Averroes’ standpoint in regard to the theory\nof the spheres’ animation by souls have invited different\ninterpretations (see Donati 2015; Kogan 1984: 190–201).", "\nAs for Albalag, his account of celestial motion consistently\nattributes celestial motion to the efficient, formal and final\ncausation of separate intellects. Relaying on Averroes, while giving\nthe credit to Aristotle, Albalag argues that the three modes of\ncausation are one in the divine realm (cf. Averroes Commentary on\nMetaphysics: 149). While separate intellects are themselves\ninvariable, they produce motion in the spheres in three different\nmanners (Tiqqun n.64: 92)." ], "section_title": "7. Celestial Motion", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAlbalag is most famous in modern scholarship for his view of the\nrelationship between religion and philosophy. In the context of\nmedieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy, he stands out as perhaps the only\nphilosopher to straightforwardly stress, accept and account for the\ntension between philosophy and prophetic knowledge. His name is\nusually connected with the doctrine of the “double truth”,\nwhich maintains that the truth of prophecy and the truth of philosophy\nmay contradict each other while at the same time remaining\nsimultaneously true (Sirat 1985: 238; Zinberg 1973:\n107]; Vajda 1960: 264–265). The origin of this doctrine had long\nbeen attributed to Averroes and Latin Averroists until recent studies\nchallenged this attribution. Some scholars have argued that the double\ntruth doctrine never existed as an actual dogma (Dales 1984).\nSimilarly, some scholars question the attribution of the double truth\ndoctrine to Albalag (Guttmann 1966: 227–229) and Elijah\nDelmedigo, another Jewish Averroist whose treatment of the question in\ndiscussion involves some elements alluding to the double truth\ndoctrine (for Delmedigo, see Fraenkel 2013).", "\nThe discussion of the question of the relationship between religion\nand philosophy in the Tiqqun is complex and spans a number of\ncontexts. On the one hand, Albalag states in the preface to the\nTiqqun that there is no essential distinction between\nphilosophy and the Torah except that the former, addressing the select\nfew, conveys the truth in a demonstrative manner, while the latter,\naddressing the multitude, conveys the truth in a figurative language\nin accordance with their limited comprehension. By this means, Albalag\nseems to align with the understanding of religion as an imitation of\nphilosophy which was founded by al-Farabi and adopted by many Muslim\nand Jewish philosophers, most significantly Averroes and arguably\nMaimonides (see al-Farabi The Book of Letters: 19–26;\nMaimonides Guide: preface; Averroes Decisive\nTreatise: 1–3, 7–10). Both philosophers not only\nmaintain that religion and philosophy are compatible, but also accord\nphilosophy a crucial role in arriving at the true meaning of Scripture\n(Maimonides Guide: preface; Averroes Decisive\nTreatise: 1–3, 7–10). Furthermore, Averroes sets\nforth a religious epistemology based on the principle that\n“truth does not oppose truth; rather, it agrees with and bears\nwitness to it” (Decisive: 9). On this principle,\ncontradictions between al-Shariʿah (Religious Law) and\nphilosophy are viewed as mere apparent, rather than essential,\ncontradictions that result from the literary form of\nScripture—consisting in similes, metaphors and\nstories—which is directed to the multitude. Since\nal-Shariʿah cares for all people, “the red and\nblack”, it conveys the truth in different methods in accordance\nwith the diverse intellectual capacities of people and types of assent\nthey are fit for (ibid, 8). Only those who are adept in science\n(al-rasiẖuna fi-lʿilm) can have access to the\ninternal meaning of Scripture, which is designed according to the\ntruth as it is, thereby attaining certain, demonstrative, assent to\nScripture. Drawing on Averroes’ religious epistemology,\npost-Maimonidean philosophers, continuing Maimonides’\nphilosophical-religious \nenterprise,[5] \nundertook to interpret Judaism as “a philosophical\nreligion” by giving principles of Judaism that appeared to be in\nconflict with philosophy naturalistic interpretations (for the concept\nof philosophical religion see Fraenkel 2012: 5). In a similar vein,\nAlbalag engages in allegorical interpretations of some elements of the\nAccount of the Beginning, stating, in an obviously apologetic tone,\nthat “it is possible to extract the philosophical doctrine of\neternal creation from the Torah” (Tiqqun n.30,\n33). ", "\nOn the other hand, Albalag reveals ambivalence about the feasibility\nof the philosophical approach to religion. His main stated concern is\nthat the true meaning of Scripture is not readily accessible. The\nreason is that prophetic knowledge, as Albalag repeatedly affirms, is\nexclusive to prophets and even the ablest philosopher has no access to\nthe “intention” of the prophet. Thus, when philosophers\nassign philosophical meanings to verses of the Torah they may just be\nswerving away from their actual tenor. Albalag finds Maimonides to be\nparticularly at fault in this regard and therefore he labels him as\none of the “hasty” people (nemharim) of our time\nwho did harm not only to “faith”, but also to\n“wisdom” (Tiqqun n.1: 5; Tiqqun n.30:\n44). In their attempts to rationally support religious doctrines they\nacted “with ignorance” as they ", "\nTwo points of contention seem to underlie this critique. The first is\nthat those “hasty” people tend to compromise philosophy in\norder to satisfy theological considerations. The second is sceptical.\nWhile many philosophers confidently interpret Scripture allegorically\non the assumption that the internal meaning of Scripture accords with\nphilosophy, Albalag merges his interpretive notes on the Account of\nthe Beginning—the sole context where he offers interpretations\nof that sort—with remarks emphasizing the inaccessibility of\nprophetic knowledge to non-prophets.", "\nIn response, Albalag offers what may be characterized as a restrictive\nscheme for interpreting the Jewish Scripture in terms of philosophy.\nThis scheme regards demonstration as the means for attaining\nthe truth and Scripture as a divine source for the truth. Scripture\ncontains two layers of secrets: philosophical and prophetic. A\nphilosopher arrives at the former layer by engaging in allegorical\ninterpretation after he has obtained knowledge through demonstrative\nreasoning: ", "\n\n\nfor one who seeks the truth, it is not proper [for him] to seek its\npremises from what he apprehends from Scripture by his own effort\nwithout primarily [engaging in] demonstrative reasoning. Rather, he\nhas to learn the truth first through demonstration and thereafter seek\nsupport from Scripture. (Tiqqun n.30: 37; cf. Averroes \nDecisive Treatise: 7) \n", "\nWhen Scripture does not agree with demonstrative knowledge, this\npoints to the presence of a deeper layer of secrets, prophetic secrets\nto which only a prophet has access. On this occasion, the disharmony\nbetween demonstrative and prophetic knowledge is treated with fideism,\nby accepting the Scriptural doctrine on the basis of simple faith. One\nshould not, however, abandon the demonstrative doctrine. Both\ndoctrines remain “true” (ʾemet) to the\nphilosopher-believer.", "\nThese claims lie behind the attribution of the double truth doctrine\nto Albalag in modern scholarship. It should be noted, however, that\nthe scope of application of the double truth doctrine in the\nTiqqun is meagre, being limited to the tension between\nreligion and philosophy in regard to the issue of the origin of the\nworld. Towards the end of his discussion of this issue Albalag\ndeclares that he accepts as “true” both the philosophical\ndoctrine of eternal creation and the biblical doctrine of temporal\ncreation, the former based on analysis of “nature” and by\nmeans of “demonstration” and the latter based on\n“the authority of the prophet by way of miracle”\n(Tiqqun n.30: 52). This peculiar way of treating the question\nof the relationship between religion and philosophy draws a parting\nline between Albalag and the tradition of Arab Aristotelians and\nJewish Averroists in which religion and philosophy are held to be\nseemingly different representations of the same truth. " ], "section_title": "8. The Relationship Between Religion and Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nUnderlying the double truth doctrine is a unique theory of prophecy\nthat credits Albalag with novelty. Deviating from the widely accepted\nconception of prophecy in medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy,\nwhich views prophets as accomplished philosophers and qualitatively\nequates prophetic knowledge with philosophy, this theory links\nprophets and prophetic knowledge to the divine realm (i.e., the realm\nof separate intellects) while at the same time stressing the absolute\ntranscendence and unknowability of that realm. It correspondingly\nstresses essential distinctions between philosophical reasoning and\nknowledge, on the one hand, and prophecy and prophetic knowledge, on\nthe other. Prophets, according to Albalag, are extraordinary human\nbeings endowed with a special mode of apprehension. Thanks to this\nmode of apprehension prophets have access to knowledge that differs\nfrom philosophical knowledge in both content and type. Not only do\nprophets arrive at answers to questions that lie beyond the capacity\nof human reason, but they also grasp the truth in a transcendent\nmanner, independently of physical tools and the cognitive processes\nnecessary for rational knowledge (Guttmann 1945: 86).", "\n\n\nTheir [the philosopher’s and prophet’s] modes of\napprehension are distinct. Not only that, but they are [like two]\nopposites, since this [the philosopher] perceives intelligible [forms]\nthrough sensory objects, whereas the latter [the prophet] perceives\nsensory objects through intelligible [forms]. (Tiqqun n.30:\n44 [my translation])\n", "\nThis note suggests that the prophetic mode of apprehension is similar\nto that of separate intellects which is described in the\nTiqqun in similar terms: “if there exists a separate\nintellect in the universe whose knowledge is not obtained through\nphysical tools”, its “grasp of things would be completely\nopposite to that of the human [intellect]”\n(Tiqqun n.11: 16; cf. n.42: 67). The distinction in the mode\nof apprehension entails fundamental distinctions in the\ncharacteristics of the perceived knowledge. Human knowledge passes\nfrom potentiality to actuality. It is either universal or particular.\nIt is temporal and involves features of multiplicity, compositeness\nand materiality. By contrast, divine knowledge is transcendent; it is\n“neither particular nor universal.” It is constantly\nactual and absolutely indivisible, simple and atemporal\n(Tiqqun n.42: 67). In this way, prophetic knowledge, like\nknowledge of the separate intellects, is said to be qualitatively\ndistinct from philosophical knowledge. Radically maximizing the\ndistinction between prophecy and philosophy, Albalag emphasizes the\npossibility of contradiction. ", "\n\n\nJust as the ways through which they [the philosopher and the prophet]\napprehend things are so distinct, their respective grasps of things\nare so distinct that it is possible for the former [the philosopher]\nto perceive from below [based on nature and reasoning] the opposite\n(hefekh) of what the latter [the prophet] perceives from\nabove. (Tiqqun n.30: 45 [my translation])\n", "\nThis theory of prophecy parts ways with the standard contemporary\ntheory of prophecy according to which prophets are accomplished\nphilosophers endowed with a strong imaginative faculty. By virtue of\nthis faculty, prophets, unlike philosophers, are able to carry out the\nnecessary political role of establishing laws conducive to the welfare\nof society, and reformulate theoretical knowledge in a language easy\nfor the multitude to understand. Whatever theoretical knowledge a\nprophet attains through emanation from the Active Intellect—the\nintellect of the sphere of the moon to which philosophers variably\nascribed epistemological and ontological roles in the sublunary\nrealm—accords with philosophical knowledge; the difference being\nparticularly quantitative (Macy 1986; Rahman 1958). Even the\nAvicennian theory of prophecy, which links the prophetic mind to the\ndivine realm, does not ascribe to prophetic knowledge a specific\nqualitative merit above philosophical knowledge; prophets apprehend\nthe principles of all existents, the middle term of every syllogism\nand intelligible forms instantaneously and effortlessly through divine\nintuition (ḥads). (Rahman, 1958: 32; Marmura 1963:\n49–51; Morris 1992: 84). That is, there are no grounds for\ncontradiction, as Albalag’s theory of prophecy suggests." ], "section_title": "9. Theory of Prophecy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn the context of medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy, political\nthought was largely concerned with investigating the connection\nbetween social good and human happiness, on the one hand, and\nphilosophy and religion on the other. In the last section of the\nMetaphysics of the Maqāṣid, al-Ghazali\nrecapitulates Avicenna’s view of the relationship between social\nwelfare and religion. Proceeding from the Aristotelian dictum that\n“man is political by nature” (Aristotle Politics\n1252b30–1253a1), al-Ghazali stresses that human beings cannot\ndispense with social interaction and cooperation for fulfilling their\nbasic needs and for the sake of attaining the highest good of man.\nThis, however, is not possible unless society is stable and justly\ngoverned. The realization of these conditions is tied to the existence\nof a lawgiver that enacts laws and promotes doctrines that are\nconducive to the social and spiritual well-being.", "\nRemarkably, Albalag starts the Tiqqun with the political\ntheme with which al-Ghazali concludes the Maqāṣid.\nThe preface to the Tiqqun offers a gloss on the political\nnature of human beings, emphasizing the essentiality of society to the\nindividual’s well-being and human survival in general. But,\nagain, society can be conducive to well-being only under specific\ncircumstances. From the point of view of a Medievalist like Albalag,\npluralism stands as a major enemy to social stability. The more\ndiversified the society the less stable and more conflict-fraught it\nis. Pluralism may result in constant warring among people to such an\nextent as to threaten human existence. Thus comes the need for a\nlawgiver who promotes social harmony by unifying people in creed and\npraxis.", "\nAlbalag accommodates the Torah into this political theme, assigning it\na crucial role in establishing social and political order and\nmaintaining the divinely ordained perpetual existence of the human\nspecies. Nothing in this outlook deviates from the view of Medieval\nAristotelians regarding the socio-political benefit of Divine Law.\nMaimonides, for instances, deems the Torah a key factor in the\nestablishment and preservation of social well-being. Still Albalag\ndeparts from Maimonides, as well as prominent Muslim philosophers such\nas al-Farabi and Averroes, in that he confines the Torah to this\nspecific socio-political purpose. These philosophers define divine Law\nin terms of its goal: unlike man-made laws which care only for the\nwelfare of society, divine Law cares for both the welfare of society\nand welfare of the soul (Fraenkel 2012: 175; Z. Harvey 1980:\n199–200). Maimonides particularly emphasizes that the\nTorah’s goal does not exclusively focus on the practical domain\nand that it concerns itself with theoretical virtues. Even practical\nactions prescribed in the Torah are conducive to the fulfillment of\nthe commandment to “love the Lord” (Deuteronomy\n6:4–5), which in Maimonides’ interpretation is an\ninjunction for the true worship of God: intellectual worship. The\nTorah, accordingly, calls upon people to seek knowledge of all\nexistents by virtue of which man attains intellectual perfection,\ntruly worshiping God (Eight Chapters: 78; cf. Guide\nIII:53).", "\nUnlike Maimonides, Albalag scarcely associates the Torah with any\nexplicit role in promoting theoretical virtues. Indeed, he\ndifferentiates between philosophy and the Torah in terms of their\nrespective final goals. While philosophy aims for the happiness of the\nselect few, the Torah aims for the happiness of the multitude, the\nformer type of happiness is intellectual whereas the latter is\nexclusively civic. In this connection, Albalag defines four basic\nprinciples of the Torah, which, as he states, are also foundational to\nphilosophy and religious systems. These principles are: ", "\nAs many scholars noted, these four principles belong to the category\nof principles that are necessary for social well-being (Touati 1962:\n44–47; Schweid 2008: 320–321; Guttmann 1945:\n90–91). Furthermore, Albalag explains that the Torah adopts a\nstrategy of concealment. Revealing or concealing doctrines is\ndetermined on the basis of their respective benefits to society and\nsocial well-being. All in all, the preface to the Tiqqun\nstresses the value of the Torah as a political treatise that is\nnecessary for the establishment of justice and social well-being." ], "section_title": "10. Political Thought", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSefer Tiqqun ha deʿot represents a significant\ndevelopment in the domain of Jewish thought in particular and\nphilosophy in general. In a time when post-Maimonidean philosophers\nexerted efforts to enhance the philosophical-religious\nenterprise of Maimonides (as they understood Maimonides’\nenterprise to be), Albalag highlights the shortcomings of that\nenterprise, advocating as an alternative the double truth doctrine. In\napplication, however, this doctrine is strikingly restricted to a very\nnarrow scope, while the superiority of philosophy as a source of true\nknowledge and certainty is made noticeable throughout the\nTiqqun. Unlike the religious domain in which truth is\nqualified by degrees, the ultimate of which being exclusively\naccessible to prophets, and subject to human interpretations, truth in\nthe philosophical domain is absolute. It can be obtained through\ndemonstrative reasoning and learned from Aristotelian sciences. It is\nthis understanding of philosophical truth that motivated Albalag to\nundertake scrutiny of the philosophical discourse in order to purge it\nfrom errors and reinstate correct Aristotelianism, as he understands\nit through the writings of Averroes, the Commentator. On the whole,\nAlbalag’s enterprise marks an attempt to break away from\nsome of the major Neo-Platonic trends that had characterized the\nAvicennian-Farabian interpretation of Aristotle." ], "section_title": "11. 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Based on\nLa philosophie juive au Moyen Age, Paris: Editions du Centre\nnational de la recherche scientifique, 1983.", "Stern, Joseph, 2013, The Matter and Form of Maimonides\nGuide, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Strauss, Leo, 1983, “Jerusalem and Athens: Some Introductory\nReflections”, in Studies on Platonic Political\nPhilosophy, with an introduction by Thomas Pangle (Chicago:\nChicago University Press, 147–173.", "Touati, Charles, 1962, “Vérité prophétique et vérité\nphilosophique Chez Isaac Albalag”, Des études juives,\n35–47.", "Vajda, George, 1960, Averroïste juif, traducteur et\nannotateur da̕̕-Ghazâlî, Paris : J. Vrin.", "Wolfson, Harry A., 1942, “The Double Faith Theory in\nClement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas, and its Origin in Aristotle\nand the Stoics”, Jewish Quarterly Review, 33:\n213–261; reprinted in H. Wolfson, Studies in The History of\nPhilosophy and Religion (Volume 1), Isadore Twersky and George\nH. Williams (eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973,\n538–619. ", "–––, 1950–51,“Averroes’ Lost\nTreatise on The Prime Mover”,\nHebrew Union College Annual, 23(1): 683–710; reprinted\nin H. Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and\nReligion (Volume 1), Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams\n(eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973,\n402–429.", "–––, 1958, “The Plurality of Immovable\nMovers in Aristotle, Averroes, And St. Thomas”,\nHarvard Studies in Classical Philology, 63: 233–253;\nreprinted in H. Wolfson, Studies in The History of Philosophy and\nReligion (Volume 1), Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams\n(eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973, 1–22.", "–––, 1962 “The Problem of the Souls of the\nSpheres from Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle Through the Arabs And\nSt. Thomas to Kepler”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 16:\n65–93; reprinted in H. Wolfson, Studies in The History of\nPhilosophy and Religion, Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams\n(eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973, 22–60.", "Zinberg, Israel, [1972–1978] 1973, “Isaac Albalag and the\nDoctrine of the ‘Double Truth’”, in A History of\nJewish Literature (Die Geshichte fun der Literatur bei\nYidn), Volume 3, Bernard Martin (trans.), Cleveland, OH: Press of\nCase Western Reserve University, 99–108." ]	[ { "href": "../al-ghazali/", "text": "al-Ghazali" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-judaic/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on Judaic thought" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-causation/", "text": "causation: in Arabic and Islamic thought" }, { "href": "../delmedigo/", "text": "Delmedigo, Elijah" }, { "href": "../ibn-sina/", "text": "Ibn Sina [Avicenna]" }, { "href": "../maimonides/", "text": "Maimonides" }, { "href": "../polqar/", "text": "Polqar, Isaac" } ]
albert-saxony	Albert of Saxony	First published Mon Jan 29, 2001; substantive revision Tue Mar 12, 2019	[ "\n\nAlbert of Saxony (ca. 1320–1390), Master of Arts at Paris, then\nRector of the University of Vienna, and finally Bishop of Halberstadt\n(Germany). As a logician, he was at the forefront of the movement that\nexpanded the analysis of language based on the properties of terms,\nespecially their reference (in Latin: suppositio), but also\nin the exploration of new fields of logic, especially the theory of\nconsequences. As a natural philosopher, he worked, along with Buridan, in the context of the new Parisian physics, contributing to its spread throughout Italy and central Europe.\n" ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Natural Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Impact and Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Texts", "Selected Studies and Critical Discussions", "Bibliographical studies" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn the later Middle Ages Albert of Saxony (Albertus de\nSaxonia) was sometimes called Albertucius (Little\nAlbert), to distinguish him from the thirteenth-century theologian\nAlbert the Great. He is however a master of great importance in his own right. He was born at Rickensdorf, in the region of\nHelmstedt (Lower Saxony) in present-day Germany, around 1316. After\ninitial schooling in his native area, and possibly a sojourn at Erfurt,\nhe made his way to Prague and then on to Paris. He was member of the\nEnglish-German Nation and became a master of arts in 1351. He was\nRector of the University of Paris in 1353. He remained in Paris until\n1362, during which time he taught arts and studied theology at the\nSorbonne, apparently without obtaining a degree in the latter\ndiscipline. His logical and philosophical works were composed during\nthis period. After two years of carrying out diplomatic missions\nbetween the Pope and the Duke of Austria, he was charged with founding\nthe University of Vienna, of which he became the first Rector in 1365.\nAppointed canon of Hildesheim in 1366, he was also named Bishop of\nHalberstadt the same year, serving in that office until his death on\nJuly 8, 1390. ", "\n\nNot having left any theological writings or a commentary on\nAristotle’s Metaphysics (at least none that we know of),\nAlbert is primarily known for his works on logic and natural\nphilosophy, though he also wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s\nNicomachean Ethics and Economics, as well as several\nshort mathematical texts (the Treatise on Proportions,\nQuestion on the Squaring of the Circle, Question on the\nminimum and maximum).", "\n\nAlbert’s masterwork in logic is a summa entitled the\nPerutilis logica (Very Useful Logic). He also composed a\nvoluminous collection of Sophismata, which examines numerous\nsentences that raise difficulties of interpretation due to the presence\nof syncategorematic words — i.e., terms such as quantifiers and\ncertain prepositions, which, according to medieval logicians, do not\nhave a proper and determinate signification but rather modify the\nsignification of the other terms in the propositions in which they\noccur. He also wrote several question commentaries:\nQuaestiones on the Ars Vetus or Old Logic (i.e., the\nIsagoge of Porphyry and Aristotle’s Categories and\nDe Interpretatione), Quaestiones on the Posterior\nAnalytics, and a series of 25 Quaestiones logicales\n(Logical Questions), addressed to semantic problems and the status of\nlogic. Of dubious authenticity are the treatises De\nconsequentiis (On Consequences) and De locis dialecticis\n(On Dialectical Topics), which have been attributed to him in a\nParisian manuscript.", "\n\nThe most renowned philosopher when Albert studied and taught in the\nFaculty of Arts at Paris was John Buridan. Albert was one of several masters contemporary with or immediately following Buridan whose work transformed logic and natural\nphilosophy in the later Middle Ages. For a long time he was thought to\nhave been a pupil or follower of Buridan, but this idea is now widely questioned. Some of his works on logic and physics were composed before Buridan had lectured on these subjects for the last time, and Buridan clearly takes notice of them, whether for criticizing or for adopting Albert’s views. In logic, he seems to have been influenced by certain ideas\nand methods imported from England. His logic depends very much on\nOckham’s, but the influence of William Heytesbury is also evident in\nhis\nSophismata.\nWalter Burley was another important influence on Albert, though this is\nsomewhat puzzling in view of the fact that they had opposing views on\nthe nature of universals. In any case, Burley seems to have been on\nAlbert’s mind when he wrote his commentary on the Nicomachean\nEthics as well as when he was developing his theory of\nconsequences.", "\n\nThese different influences have sometimes made Albert seem no more\nthan an eclectic compiler of the views of others. But, in addition to\nproviding the context for some of his own contributions, Albert’s\nfluency with the views of his contemporaries gives him a unique place\nin the development of logic and philosophy at the University of Paris\nin the fourteenth century." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nOn most topics the Perutilis logica (a text based on lectures first given before 1356 and finally revised for publication before 1360) is influenced by Ockham’s\nSumma logicae, though it offers an independent approach in the\ntreatises on obligations, insolubles, and consequences, which had\nassumed greater importance during this period. As has been known for\nsome time, this work is a remarkable handbook organized into six\ntreatises: the first defines the elements of propositions; the second\ntreats of the properties of terms; the third of the truth conditions of\ndifferent types of proposition; the fourth of consequences (including\nsyllogisms, and in fact adding to it the theory of topics); the fifth\nof fallacies; and the sixth of insolubles and obligations. ", "\n\nIn the first part of the Perutilis logica, which sets out the\nterminology of the entire text, Albert returns to the Ockhamist\nconception of the sign and in so doing distances himself from the\nposition defended by Buridan. After clearly including the term (an\nelement of the proposition) in the genus of signs — by which he\nprovides, in the tradition of Ockham, a semiotic approach to\nlogico-linguistic analysis — he establishes signification\nthrough a referential relation to a singular thing, defining the\nrelation of spoken to conceptual signs as a relation of\nsubordination. He is also an Ockhamist in his conception of universals,\nwhich he regards as spoken or conceptual signs, and in his theory of\nsupposition, which essentially restates the Ockhamist divisions of\nsupposition, despite of some refinements as descensus\ncopulatim, perhaps influenced by Heytesbury. In particular, he\nrestores the notion of simple supposition — i.e., the reference\nof a term to the concept to which it is subordinated, when it\nsignifies an extra-mental thing — which had been criticized and\nrejected by Buridan. Finally, Albert is close to the Venerabilis\nInceptor in his theory of the categories, where he refuses to consider quantity as something absolutely real,\nreducing it instead to a disposition of substance and quality. Albert\nin fact contributed as much as Ockham to the spread of this conception\nof the relation between substance and quantity in natural philosophy\nin Paris and Italy.", "\n\nAlbert’s treatment of relations is, on the other hand, highly\noriginal. Although (like Ockham) he refuses to make relations into\nthings distinct from absolute entities, he clearly ascribes them to an\nact of the soul by which absolute entities are compared and placed in\nrelation to each other, an “act of the referring soul [actus animae\nreferentis]”. This leads him to reject completely certain\npropositions Ockham had admitted as reasonable, even if he did not\nconstrue them in quite the same way, e.g., ‘Socrates is a\nrelation’. Both Ockham and Buridan had allowed that the term\n‘relation’ could refer to the things signified or connoted\nby concrete relative terms (whether collectively or not).", "\n\nSo Albert was not content with merely repeating Ockhamist arguments.\nMore often than not, he developed and deepened them, e.g., in\nconnection with the notion of the appellation of form. This property of\npredicates, which had previously been used by the Venerabilis\nInceptor, was employed by Albert in an original manner when he\nadopted it instead of Buridan’s appellation of reason (appellatio\nrationis) to analyze verbs expressing propositional attitudes.\nEvery proposition following a verb such as ‘believe’ or\n‘know’ appellates its form. In other words, it must be\npossible to designate the object of the belief via the expression\nunderstood as identical to itself in its material signification and\nwithout reformulation. Another area in which Albert deviates from\nOckham is his rejection of the idea that any distinction with multiple\nsenses must have an equivocal proposition as its object. According to\nAlbert, equivocal propositions can only be conceded, rejected, or left\nin doubt.", "\n\nHe adopts the same position as Burley about the issue of the complex subject-term (including an oblique case) in a categorical proposition, as in ‘Any man’s donkey is running [Cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit]’. He supports a logico-semantical model in which ‘man [homo]’ is the logical subject while ‘a man’s donkey [hominis asinus]’ is the grammatical one. He will be criticized on that point by Buridan, for whom the logical subject is always the grammatical subject.", "\n\nAlbert’s semantics becomes innovative when he admits that\npropositions have their own proper significate, which is not identical\nto that of their terms (see especially his Questions on the\nPosterior Analytics I, qq. 2, 7, 33). Like syncategorematic terms\n(see his Questions on the Categories, qu. 1 ‘On\nNames’), propositions signify the “mode of a thing\n[modus rei]”. This position is not repeated in the\nLogical Questions. In any case, Albert avoids hypostatizing\nthese modes by explaining them as relations between the things to which\nthe terms refer. It cannot be said here that Albert is moving towards\nthe “complexly signifiable [complexe\nsignificabile]” of Gregory of Rimini, although his remarks\nare reminiscent of the latter theory. Still, he uses the idea of the\nsignification of a proposition to define truth and to explain\n‘insolubles’, i.e., propositions expressing paradoxes of\nself-reference. On Albert’s view, every proposition signifies that it\nis true by virtue of its form. Thus, an insoluble proposition is always\nfalse because it signifies at the same time that it is true and that it\nis false.", "\n\nThe Questiones circa logicam (Questions on Logic)\nwere written at roughly the same time as the Perutilis logica\nand the Questiones circa artem veterem, that is to say about\n1356. They explore in a series of disputed questions the status of\nlogic and semantics on topics such as the relation of words to\nconcepts, the difference between natural and conventional\nsignification, etc., as well as the theory of reference and truth.\nAlbert defines signification by representation. He\ndistinguishes two ways of understanding suppositio, the first\nas the act of the mind itself; the second as an operation constituting one\nof the properties of terms.", "\n\nIn his Sophismata, Albert usually follows Heytesbury. The\ndistinction between compounded and divided senses, which is presented\nin a highly systematic way in Heytesbury’s Tractatus de sensu\ncomposito et diviso, is the primary instrument (besides the\nappellation of form) for resolving difficulties connected with\nepistemic verbs and with propositional attitudes more generally. This\nis abundantly clear in his discussion of infinity. Rather than\nappealing to the increasingly common distinction between the\ncategorematic and syncategorematic uses of the term\n‘infinite’ and then indicating the different senses it can\nhave depending on where it occurs in a proposition, he treats the\ninfinite itself as a term. Albert’s approach involves analyzing the\nlogical and linguistic conditions of every proposition involving the\nterm ‘infinite’ that is significant and capable of being\ntrue. This leads him to sketch a certain number of possible\ndefinitions (where he appears to take into account the teachings of\nGregory of Rimini), as well as to raise other questions, e.g., on the\nrelation between finite and infinite beings (in propositions such as\n‘Infinite things are finite [infinita sunt\nfinita]’), on the divisibility of the continuum, and on\nqualitative infinity. There are echoes in Albert not only of the\napproach Buridan had systematically implemented in his\nPhysics, but also of the analyses of English authors —\nagain, especially Heytesbury. As is often the case, the treatment\nproposed by Albert in the Sophismata provides good evidence\nof the extent to which philosophers were gripped by questions about\ninfinity at that time.", "\n\nFinally, one of the fields in which Albert is considered a major\ncontributor is the theory of consequences. In the treatise of the\nPerutilis Logica devoted to consequences, Albert often seems\nto follow Buridan. But whereas Buridan maintained the central role of\nAristotelian syllogistic, Albert, like Burley, integrated syllogistic\nand the study of conversions into the theory of consequences.\nConsequence is defined as the impossibility of the antecedent’s being\ntrue without the consequent’s also being true — truth itself being\nsuch that howsoever the proposition signifies things to be, so they\nare. The primary division is between formal and material consequences,\nthe latter being subdivided into consequences simpliciter and\nut nunc. A syllogistic consequence is a formal consequence\nwhose antecedent is a conjunction of two quantified propositions and\nwhose consequent is a third quantified proposition. Albert is thus led\nto present a highly systematic theory of the forms of inference,\nwhich represents a major step forward in the medieval theory of logical\ndeduction." ], "section_title": "2. Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIt is this analysis of language together with a particularist ontology\nthat places Albert in the tradition of nominalism. This is combined\nwith an epistemological realism that emerges, e.g., in his analysis of\nthe vacuum. In certain respects, Albert’s work is an extension of\nphysical analysis to imaginary cases. Distinguishing, as Buridan did,\nbetween what is absolutely impossible or contradictory and what is\nimpossible “in the common course of nature” (Questions\non De Caelo I, qu. 15), he considers hypotheses under\ncircumstances that are not naturally possible but imaginable given\nGod’s absolute power (e.g., the existence of a vacuum and the plurality\nof worlds). However, even if we can imagine a vacuum existing by divine\nomnipotence, no vacuum can occur naturally (Questions on the\nPhysics IV, qu. 8). Albert refuses to extend the reference of\nphysical terms to supernatural, purely imaginary possibilities. In the\nsame way, one can certainly use the concept of a point, although this\nwould only be an abbreviation of a connotative and negative expression.\nThere is no simple concept of a point, a vacuum, or the infinite, and\nalthough imaginary hypotheses provide an interesting detour, physics\nmust in the end provide an account of the natural order of things. ", "\n\nHistorically, Albert’s reputation in natural philosophy is at least as\nhigh as the one he had in logic. His commentaries on the\nPhysics and De caelo are close to Buridan’s, but in some questions on De generatione et corruptione he rather follows Oresme. He\nappeals to the authority of his “revered masters from the\nFaculty of Arts at Paris” at the beginning of his questions\non De caelo. Even so, it should be noted that\nhis Physics was composed soon after 1351, before the final\nversion of Buridan’s Questions on the Physics (between 1355\nand 1358). On some points we see that Buridan modifies his positions\nbetween the third and the final versions of his commentary,\nand we can presume that this is in response to Albert’s ideas.", "\n\nOn some other issues, the oppositions remain strong between the two\nmasters. We have already seen that on the question of the status of\nthe category of quantity, then at the border of logic and physics,\nAlbert followed Ockham and distanced himself from Buridan by reducing\nquantity to a disposition of substance or quality. This move becomes\nevident in certain physical questions, e.g., in the study of\ncondensation and rarefaction, where Albert openly disagrees with\nBuridan by arguing that condensation and rarefaction are possible only\nthrough the local motion of the parts of a body, and without needing\nto assume some quantity that would have a distinct reality on its\nown. Nevertheless, he defines the concept of a “lump of matter\n[materie massa]” without giving it any autonomous\nreality, although it does help fill out the idea of a ‘quantity\nof matter’, which Giles of Rome had already distinguished from\nsimple extension.", "\n\nSimilarly, Albert is sometimes seen as standing alongside Ockham on\nthe nature of motion, rejecting the idea of motion as a flux\n(fluxus), which is the position Buridan had adopted. In\ncontrast to Buridan, Albert treats locomotion in the same way as\nalteration (movement according to quality): in neither case is it\nnecessary to imagine local motion as a res successiva distinct\nfrom permanent things, at least if the common course of nature holds\nand one does not take into account the possibility of divine\nintervention.", "\n\nConcerning the motion of projectiles, gravitational acceleration,\nand the motion of celestial bodies, Albert adopts Buridan’s major\ninnovation, i.e., the theory of impetus, a quality acquired by\na moving body (see Buridan’s Questions on the Physics VIII,\nqu. 13, on projectile motion). Like Buridan, he extends this approach\nto celestial bodies in his commentary on De caelo, clearly\nfollowing its consequences in rejecting intelligences as agents of\nmotion and in treating celestial and terrestrial bodies using the same\nprinciples. Nevertheless, he formulates the idea of impetus in\nmore classical terms as a virtus impressa (impressed force)\nand virtus motiva (motive force). Albert makes no\npronouncements about the nature of this force, claiming that this is a\nquestion for the metaphysician. His work also mentions the mean speed\ntheorem, a method of finding the total velocity of a uniformly\naccelerated (or decelerated) body, which had been stated (though\nwithout being demonstrated) in Heytesbury’s Tractatus de motu,\nand also adopted by Nicole Oresme. Albert was part of a general\nscientific trend which sought the first formulations of the principles\nof dynamics. He explained a number of curious natural phenomena, taking\nparticular interest in earthquakes, tidal phenomena, and geology.", "\n\nAlbert wrote a treatise on proportions dedicated to the analysis of\nmotion, highly influenced by the treatise De proportionibus\nvelocitatum in motibus of Thomas Bradwardine. He explains in a\nsynthetic way the elements of the theory of proportions, applying this\ntheory to different motions (local motion, alteration, augmentation,\nand diminution). Motion is to be studied “from the point of view\nof the cause” and “from the point of view of the\neffect”. Like Oresme, Albert adopts the idea that motion varies\naccording to a geometrical progression when the relation of motive\nforce to resistance varies arithmetically. His treatise is less\ninnovative than Oresme’s, but it is a clear exposition that was very\nwidely read.", "\n\nAlbert was interested in certain\nmathematical problems. To this end, he wrote a question on the squaring\nof the circle as well as questions on John of Sacrobosco’s Treatise\non the Sphere. In addition to authoritative arguments and purely\nempirical justifications, his question on the squaring of the circle\nuses properly mathematical arguments appealing to both Euclid (in the\nversion of Campanus of Novarra) and Archimedes (translated by Gerard of\nCremona). His most original contribution is a proposal to dispense with\nEuclid’s proposition X.1, replacing it with a postulate stating that if\nA is less than B, then there exists a quantity C such that\nA<C<B.", "\n\nFinally, a treatise De maximo et minimo, considering the\nlimits of active and passive potencies, written in the tradition\nof the Oxford Calculators, at the frontiers of logic and natural\nphilosophy." ], "section_title": "3. Natural Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAlbert of Saxony’s teachings on logic and metaphysics were extremely\ninfluential. Although Buridan remained the predominant figure in\nlogic, Albert’s Perutilis logica was destined to serve as a\npopular text because of its systematic nature and also because it\ntakes up and develops essential aspects of the Ockhamist position. But\nit was his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics that was\nespecially widely read. Many manuscripts of it can be found in France\nand Italy, in Erfurt and Prague. Thanks to Albert of Saxony, many new\nideas raised in Parisian physics and cosmology in the later Middle\nAges became widespread in Central Europe. Albert’s Physics,\nmuch more than Oresme’s and even Buridan’s, basically guaranteed the\ntransmission of the Parisian tradition also in Italy, where it was\nauthoritative along with the works of Heytesbury and John\nDumbleton. His commentary on Aristotle’s\nDe caelo was also influential, eclipsing Buridan’s commentary\non this text. Blasius of Parma read it in Bologna between 1379 and\n1382. A little later, it enjoyed a wide audience at Vienna.\nHis Treatise on Proportions was often quoted in Italy where,\nin addition to the texts of Bradwardine and Oresme, it influenced the\napplication of the theory of proportions to motion. ", "\n\nAlbert played an essential role in the diffusion throughout Italy\nand central Europe of Parisian ideas which bore the mark of Buridan’s\nteachings, but which were also clearly shaped by Albert’s own grasp of\nEnglish innovations. At the same time, Albert was not merely a compiler\nof the work of others. He manifests an undeniable\noriginality on many topics in logic and physics." ], "section_title": "4. Impact and Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Tractatus de quadratura circuli, ed. H. Sutor,\n“Der Tractatus de quadratura circuli des Albertus de\nSaxonia,” Zeitschrift für Mathematik und\nPhilosophie, XXXII (1887): 41–56.", "Tractatus proportionum, ed. H.L.L.Busard,\n“Der Tractatus proportionum von Albert von\nSachsen”, Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,\nDenkschriften, math.-naturwiss., 116/2 (1971): 43–72.", "Questiones de anima [doubtful authenticity], partial\nedition in Peter Marshall, “Parisian Psychologie in the\nMid-Fourteenth Century,” Archives d’histoire\ndoctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, L (1983):\n185–193.", "Questiones de sensu et sensato (doubtful authenticity),\ned. Jole Agrimi, Le “Quaestiones de sensu” attribuite\na Oresme e Alberto di Sassonia, Firenze: La Nuova Italia,\n1983.", "Quaestiones in artem veterem, ed. A. Muñoz\nGarcía, Maracaibo: Univ. del Zulia, 1988.", "Perutilis logica, in the incunabula edition of Venice\n1522, with a Spanish translation by A. Muñoz García,\nMaracaibo: Univ. del Zulia, 1988.", "Perutilis logica, Tractatus Secundus (De proprietatibus\nterminorum): cf. infra, Kann, 1993.", "Expositio et Questiones in Aristotelis libros Physicorum ad\nAlbertus de Saxonia attributae, 3 vols., ed. B. Patar\n(Philosophes médiévaux XXXIX–XLI), \nLouvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 1999.", "Questiones circa logicam, in Albert of Saxony’s\nTwenty-Five Disputed Questions on Logic. A critical edition of his\nQuestiones circa logicam by Michael J. Fitzgerald, \nLeiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2002.", "Expositio super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis:\ncf. infra Hanser, Alois F., 2003.", "Alberti de Saxonia Quaestiones in Aristotelis De caelo,\ned. Benoit Patar (Philosophes médiévaux\nLI), Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 2008.", "Logik, Lateinisch-deutsch, übersetzt mit einer\nEinleitung und Anmerkungen hrsg. von Harald Berger, Hamburg: Felix\nMeiner, 2010.", "Tractatus de maximo et minimo: cf. infra Di\nLiscia, Daniel A., 2014.", "Ashworth, E. Jennifer, 1991, “Nulla propositio est\ndistinguenda: la notion d’equivocatio chez Albert de\nSaxe,” in Biard, 1991, 149–160.", "Berger, Harald, 1991, “Simple Supposition in William of\nOckham, John Buridan and Albert of Saxony,” in Biard, 1991,\n31–43.", "–––, 2000, “Albert von Sachsen,” in\nB. Wachinger et al. (eds.), Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters.\nVerfasserlexikon, 2. Aufl., Bd. 11, Lfg. 1, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004,\n39–56.", "–––, 2016, “Neues Licht auf die Wiener\nZeit Alberts von Sachsen (1363/1364–1366). Eine kleine Gabe zum\n650-Jahr-Jubiläum der Universität Wien\n2015,” Codices. Manuscripti & impressi, 103/104:\n1–12.", "Biard, Joël, 1989, “Les sophismes du savoir: Albert de\nSaxe entre Jean Buridan et Guillaume Heytesbury,”\nVivarium, XXVII: 36–50.", "–––, 1990, “Verbes cognitifs et\nappellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe,” in Knowledge\nand the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy, Proceedings of the\nEighth International Congress for the Study of Medieval Philosophy,\nHelsinki, 427–435.", "––– (ed.), 1991, Paris-Vienne au XIVe\nsiècle. Itinéraires d’Albert de Saxe (Actes de la\ntable ronde internationale, Paris, 19–22 juin 1990), Paris: Vrin. ", "–––, 1993, “Albert de Saxe et les sophismes de\nl’infini,” in Stephen Read (ed.), Sophisms in Medieval Logic\nand Grammar, Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer, \n 288–303.", "–––, 1996, “De la logique à la\nphysique: quantité et mouvement selon Albert de Saxe,\n” Les Études philosophiques, juillet-septembre:\n361–374. ", "–––, 2011, “Albert de Saxe et\nl’idée d’infini,” in Tiziana Suarez-Nani et Martin Rhode\n(eds), Représentations et conceptions de l’espace dans la\nculture médiévale / Repräsentationen und\nKonzeptionen des Raums in der Kultur des Mittelalters, Berlin: De\nGruyter, 215–236.", "–––, 2012, “Signification et statut du\nconcept de vide selon Albert de Saxe et Jean Buridan,” in\nJoël Biard et Sabine Rommevaux (eds), La Nature et le Vide\ndans la physique médiévale, Brepols: Turnhout,\n269–292.", "–––, 2017, “L’objectivité des\ndirections spatiales: quelques éléments de\nréflexion sur la philosophie naturelle au XIVe\nsiècle,” in T. Suarez-Nani, O. Ribordy et A. Petagine\n(eds.), Lieu, espace, mouvement: Physique, métaphysique et\ncosmologie (XIIe-XIVe siècle,\nBarcelona–Roma, 125–144. ", "Braakhuis, H.A.G., 1993, “Albert of Saxony’s De\nobligationibus. Its Place in the Development of Fourteenth\nCentury Obligational Theory, ” in Klaus Jacobi\n(ed.), Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den\nlogischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, Leiden-New\nYork-Köln: Brill, 323–341.", "Celeyrette, Jean, et Mazet, Edmond, 2003, “Le mouvement du\npoint de vue de la cause et le mouvement du point de vue de l’effet\ndans le Traité des rapports d’Albert de Saxe,”\nin Revue d’Histoire des Sciences, 56 (2):\n402–419. ", "Dewender, Thomas, 2013, “John Buridan, Albert of Saxony,\nMarsilius of Inghen on Chimerae and Impossible Objects,” in\nVictor M. Salas (ed.) Hicocervi and Other Metaphysical\nWonders, Milwaukee, 95–119.", "Di Liscia, Daniel, 2014, “A Tract De maximo et\nminimo According to Albert of Saxony,” Sciamus, 15:\n57–104. ", "Drake, Stillman, 1975, “Free Fall from Albert of Saxony to\nHonoré Fabri,” Studies in History and Philosophy of\nScience, 5 (4): 347–366.", "Ely, Pamela, 1981, The Modal Logic of Albert of Saxony,\nPh.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto,\n available online.", "Fitzgerald, Michael, 2003, “The Medieval Roots of Reliabilist\nEpistemology: Albert of Saxony’s View of Immediate\nApprehension”, Synthese, 136 (3): 409–434.", "–––, 2006, “Problems with Temporality and\nScientific Propositions in John Buridan and Albert of\nSaxony,” Vivarium, 44: 305–337.", "–––, 2009, “Time as a Part of Physical\nObjects: The Modern ‘Descartes-minus’ Argument and an Analogous\nArgument from Fourteenth-Century Logic (William Heytesbury and Albert\nof Saxony),” Vivarium, 47: 54–73.", "–––, 2012, “Unconfusing Merely Confused\nSupposition in Albert of Saxony,” Vivarium, 50:\n161–189.", "–––, 2014, “The ‘Mysterious’\nThomas Manlevelt and Albert of Saxony” History and\nPhilosophy of Logic: 1–18.", "–––, 2016, “Albert of Saxony’s View\nof Complex Terms in Categorical Propositions and the ‘English\nRule’,” History and Philosophy of Logic, 37:\n347–374.", "Gonzales, A., 1958, “The Theory of Assertoric Consequences in\nAlbert of Saxony,” Franciscan Studies, XVIII:\n290–354; XIX: 13–114.", "Heidingsfelder, G., 1927, Albert von Sachsen. Sein Lebensgang\nund sein Kommentar zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles, in\nBeiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters\nXXII (3–4): Münster.", "Kann, Christoph, 1993a, “Zur Behandlung der dialektischen\nÖrter bei Albert von Sachsen,” in Klaus Jakobi (ed.),\nArgumentationsheorie. Schoslastischen Forschungen zu den logischen\nund semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, Leiden-New\nYork-Köln: Brill, 59–80.", "–––, 1993b, Die Eigenschaften der\nTermini. Eine Untersuchung zur ‘Perutilis Logica’\ndes Alberts von Sachsen, Amsterdam: Brill. [Study of the theory\nof the property of terms, including the theory of supposition, with an\nedition of the second treatise of the Perutilis logica.]", "Lagerlund, Henrik, 2010, “Skeptical Issues in Commentaries\non Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics: John Buridan and Albert of\nSaxony,” in Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), Rethinking the History\nof Skepticism. The Missing Medieval Background, Leiden-Boston:\nBrill, 193–213. ", "Muñoz Delgado, Angel, 2002, “Alberto de Sajonia y la\nlógica medieval: Reinvindicación de dos\nmarginados” in Fr. Bertelloni y G. Burlando (eds), La\nfilosofía medieval (Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de\nFilosofía, 24), Madrid: 285–304. ", "Patar, Benoit, 2001, La Physique de Bruges et le Traité\ndu ciel d’Albert de Saxe, 2 volumes, Longueuil: Les Presses\nphilosophiques.", "Panzica, Aurora, 2018 “L’hypothèse de la\ncessation des mouvements célestes au XIVe\nsiècle: Nicole Oresme, Jean Buridan, Albert de Saxe,”\nVivarium, 56: 83–125. ", "Sarnowsky, Jürgen, 1989, Die aristotelisch-scholastische\nTheorie der Bewegung. Studien zum Kommentar Alberts von Sachsen zur\nPhysik des Aristoteles (Beiträge zur Geschichte der\nPhilosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, N. F. XXXII),\nMünster: Aschendorff.", "–––, 1999, “Place and Space in Albert of\nSaxony’s Commentary on the Physics,” Arabic\nSciences and Philosophy, 9: 25–45.", "–––, 1999, “Albert von Sachsen und die\nPhysik des ens mobile ad formam,” in J.M.M.H. Thijssen\nand H.A.G. Braakhuis (eds.), The Commentary Tradition on\nAristotle’s De generatione et corruptione. Ancient, Medieval and Early\nModern (Studia Artistarum, 7), Turnhout: Brepols,\n163–181.", "–––, 2002, “Ein Albert von Sachsen\nzugeschribener Physikkomentar aus der Mitte des\n14. Jahrhunderts,” Medioevo, 27: 449–474.", "–––, 2004, “Nicole Oresme and Albert of\nSaxony’s Commentary on he Physics: the Problems of Vacuum and Motion\nin a Void,” in Stefano Caroti and Jean Celeyrette\n(eds), Quia inter doctores est magna dissensio. Les débats\nde philosopie naturelle à Paris au XIVe\nsiècle, Firenze, Olschki, 161–174.", "Thijssen, J.H.M.M., 2004, “The Buridan School\nReassessed. John Buridan and Albert of\nSaxony,” Vivarium, 42: 18–42.", "–––, 2009, “The Debate over the Nature of\nMotion: John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony. With an\nEdition of John Buridan’s Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum\nsecundum ultimam lecturam,” Early Science and\nMedicine, 14: 186–210.", "Berger, Harald, 2017–2018, \n ‘Albert von Sachsen († 1390), Fortsetzung und Ergänzungen zur Bibliographie der Sekundäre literatur, Internet Ausgabe 8–9,’\n this online bibliography is the continuation and complement of\nbibliographies previously published in the Bulletin de philosophie\nmédiévale de la SIEPM, 36 (1994), 37 (1995), 38\n(1996), 40 (1998), then in Acta medievalia, 17 (2004). It\nmakes an inventory of publications dedicated to Albert of Saxony but\nalso of publications which only mention him." ]	[ { "href": "../buridan/", "text": "Buridan, John [Jean]" }, { "href": "../burley/", "text": "Burley [Burleigh], Walter" }, { "href": "../heytesbury/", "text": "Heytesbury, William" }, { "href": "../ockham/", "text": "Ockham [Occam], William" } ]
albert-great	Albert the Great	First published Mon Mar 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 19, 2020	[ "\n\nAlbertus Magnus, also known as Albert the Great, was one of the most\nuniversal thinkers to appear during the Middle Ages. Even more so than\nhis most famous student, St. Thomas of Aquinas, Albert’s\ninterests ranged from natural science all the way to theology. He made\ncontributions to logic, psychology, metaphysics, meteorology,\nmineralogy, and zoology. He was an avid commentator on nearly all the\ngreat authorities read during the 13th Century. He was\ndeeply involved in an attempt to understand the import of the thought\nof Aristotle in some orderly fashion that was distinct from the Arab\ncommentators who had incorporated their own ideas into the study of\nAristotle. Yet he was not averse to using some of the outstanding Arab\nphilosophers in developing his own ideas in philosophy. His superior\nunderstanding of a diversity of philosophical texts allowed him to\nconstruct one of the most remarkable syntheses in medieval\nculture." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life of Albert the Great", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Philosophical Enterprise", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Psychology and Anthropology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Albertus Magnus and the Sciences", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Ethics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. The Influence of Albert the Great", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Literature: Works by Albert the Great", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe precise date of Albert’s birth is not known. It is generally\nconceded that he was born into a knightly family sometime around the\nyear 1200 in Lauingen an der Donau in Germany. He was apparently in\nItaly in the year 1222 where he was present when a rather terrible\nearthquake struck in Lombardy. A year later he was still in Italy and\nstudying at the University of Padua. The same year Jordan of Saxony\nreceived him into the Dominican order. He was sent to Cologne in order\nto complete his training for the order. He finished this training as\nwell as a course of studies in theology by 1228. He then began\nteaching as a lector at Cologne, Hildesheim, Freiburg im Breisgau,\nRegensburg, and Strassburg. During this period he published his first\nmajor work, De natura boni.", "\n\nTen years later he is recorded as having been present at the general\nchapter of the Dominican Order held in Bologna. Two years later he\nvisited Saxony where he observed the appearance of a comet. Some time\nbetween 1241 and 1242 he was sent to the University of Paris to\ncomplete his theological education. He followed the usual prescription\nof lecturing on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. In addition\nhe began writing his six part Summa parisiensis dealing with\nthe sacraments of the Church, the incarnation and resurrection of\nChrist, the four coevals, human nature, and the nature of the good. He\ntook his degree as master of theology in 1245 and began to teach\ntheology at the university under Gueric de Saint-Quentin. St. Thomas\nAquinas became his student at this time and remained under\nAlbert’s direction for the next three years. In 1248 Albert was\nappointed regent of studies at the studium generale that was\nnewly created by the Dominican order in Cologne. So Albert, along with\nThomas Aquinas, left Paris and went to Cologne. Thomas continued his\nstudies under Albert in Cologne and served as magister\nstudium in the school as well until 1252. Then Thomas returned to\nParis to take up his teaching duties while Albert remained in Cologne,\nwhere he began to work on the vast project he set himself of preparing\na paraphrase of each of the known works of Aristotle.", "\n\nIn 1254 the Dominican order again assigned Albert a difficult task.\nHe was elected the prior provincial for the German-speaking province\nof the order. This position mandated that Albert spend a great deal of\nhis time traveling throughout the province visiting Dominican\nconvents, priories, and even a Dominican mission in Riga. This task\noccupied Albert until 1256. That year he returned to Cologne, but left\nthe same year for Paris in order to attend a General Chapter of his\norder in which the allegations of William of St. Amour’s De\npericulis novissimorum temporum against mendicant orders were\nconsidered. A little later Pope Alexander IV asked Albert to go to\nAnagni in order to speak to a commission of Cardinals who were looking\ninto the claims of William. While engaged in this charge Albert\ncompleted his refutation of Averroistic psychology with his De\nunitate intellectus contra Averroistas. Afterwards Albert\ndeparted for another tour of the province of Germany. In 1257 he\nreturned to the papal court, which was now located in Viterbo. He was\nrelieved of his duties as prior provincial and returned again to\nCologne as regent of studies. He continued to teach until 1259 when he\ntraveled to Valenciennes in order to attend a General Chapter of his\norder. At that time, along with Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarentasia,\nBonhomme Brito, and Florent de Hesdin, he undertook on behalf of his\norder an extensive discussion of the curriculum of the scholastic\nprogram used by the order.", "\n\nThe next year of his life found Albert once again appointed to an\nonerous duty. In obedience to the wishes of the pope Albert was\nconsecrated a bishop of the Church and sent to Ratisbon (modern\nRegensburg) in order to undertake a reform of abuses in that diocese.\nAlbert worked at this task until 1263 when Pope Urban IV relieved him\nof his duties and asked Albert to preach the Crusade in the German\nspeaking countries. This duty occupied Albert until the year 1264. He\nthen went to the city of Würzburg where he stayed until 1267.", "\n\nAlbert spent the next eight years traveling around Germany conducting\nvarious ecclesiastical tasks. Then in 1274 while he was traveling to\nthe Council of Lyons Albert received the sad news of the untimely\ndeath of Thomas Aquinas, his friend and former student of many\nyears. After the close of the Council Albert returned to\nGermany. There is evidence that he traveled to Paris in the year 1277\nin order to defend Aquinas’ teaching, which was under attack at\nthe university. In 1279, anticipating his death he drew up his own\nlast will and testament. On November 15, 1280 he died and was buried\nin Cologne. On December 15, 1931 Pope Pius XI declared Albert both a\nsaint and a doctor of the Church. On the 16th of December\n1941 Pope Pius XII declared Albert the patron saint of the natural\nsciences." ], "section_title": "1. Life of Albert the Great", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAn examination of Albert’s published writings reveals something\nof his understanding of philosophy in human culture. In effect he\nprepared a kind of philosophical encyclopedia that occupied him up to\nthe last ten years of his life. He produced paraphrases of most of the\nworks of Aristotle available to him. In some cases where he felt that\nAristotle should have produced a work, but it was missing, Albert\nproduced the work himself. If he had produced nothing else it would be\nnecessary to say that he adopted the Aristotelian\nphilosophical-scientific program and subordinated it to the Neoplatonic tradition. Albert’s\nintellectual vision, however, was very great. Not only did he\nparaphrase “The Philosopher” (as the medievals called\nAristotle) but Porphyry, Boethius, Peter Lombard, Gilbert de la\nPorrée, the Liber de causis, and Ps.-Dionysius. He\nalso wrote a number of commentaries on the Bible. In addition to all\nof this work of paraphrasing and commenting, in which Albert labored\nto prepare a kind of unified field theory of medieval Christian\nintellectual culture, he also wrote a number of works in which he\ndeveloped his own philosophical-scientific-theological vision. Here\none finds titles such as De unitate intellectus, \nProblemata determinate, De fato, \nDe XV problematibus, De natura boni, \nDe sacramentis, De incarnatione, \nDe bono, De quattuor coaequaevis, \nDe homine, and his unfinished \nSumma theologiae de mirabilis scientia Dei.", "\n\nAlbert’s labors resulted in the formation of what might be\ncalled a Christian reception of Aristotle in the Western Europe.\nAlbert himself had a strong bias in favor of Neo-Platonism,and his\nwork on Aristotle shows him to have had a deep understanding of the\nAristotelian program. Along with his student Thomas Aquinas he was of\nthe opinion that Aristotle and the kind of natural philosophy that he\nrepresented was no obstacle to the development of a Christian\nphilosophical vision of the natural order. In order to establish this\npoint Albert carefully dissected the method that Aristotle employed in\nundertaking the task of expounding natural philosophy. This method,\nAlbert decided, is experientially based and proceeds to draw\nconclusions by the use of both inductive and deductive\nlogic. Christian theology, as Albert found it taught in Europe rested\nfirmly upon the revelation of Sacred Scripture and the Church\nFathers. Therefore, he reasoned, the two domains of human culture are\ndistinct in their methodology and pose no threat to each other. Both\ncan be pursued for their own sake. Philosophy was not to be valued\nonly in terms of its ancillary relation to theology. As recent\nresearch has shown, Albert subordinated his use of Aristotle to his\nunderstanding of the Neoplatonic view of reality that he found in the\nwritings of Pseudo Dionysius and the Liber de causis. He saw\nall of reality in terms of the Neoplatonic categories of exit and\nreturn, which he referred to in his writings with the terms\nexitus, perfectio, and reductio. This\nschema gave him a framework into which he could develop the scientific\ninsights of Aristotle. But within this framework he insisted that natural science must investigate the causes that are operating in nature as based on empirical evidence." ], "section_title": "2. Philosophical Enterprise", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAlbert carefully prepared a paraphrase of Aristotle’s\nOrganon (the logical treatises in the Aristotelian corpus). He\nthen used the results of this paraphrase to address the problem of\nuniversals as he found it discussed in the philosophical literature and\ndebates of the medieval philosophical culture. He defined the term\nuniversal as referring to “ … that which, although it\n exists in one, is apt by nature to exist in\n many.”[1]\n Because it is apt\nto be in many, it is predicable of them. (De praed., tract II,\nc. 1) He then distinguished three kinds of universals, those that\npre-exist the things that exemplify them \n(universale ante rem), \nthose that exist in individual things (universale in re), \nand those that exist in the mind when abstracted from individual things \n(universale post rem).", "\n\nAlbert attempted to formulate an answer to Porphyry’s famous problem\nof universals—namely, do the species according to which we\nclassify beings exist in themselves or are they merely constructions\nof the mind? Albert appealed to his three-fold distinction, noting\nthat a universal’s mode of being is differentiated according to which\nfunction is being considered. It may be considered in itself, or in\n respect to understanding, or as existing in one particular or\n another.[2]\n Both the nominalist and realist solutions to Porphyry’s problem are\nthus too simplistic and lack proper distinction. Albert’s distinction\nthus allowed him to harmonize Plato’s realism in which universals\nexisted as separate forms with Aristotle’s more nominalistic theory of\nimmanent forms. For universals when considered in themselves\n(secudum quod in seipso) truly exist and are free from\n generation, corruption, and\n change.[3]\n If, however, they are taken in reference to the mind (refertur ad\nintelligentiam) they exist in two modes, depending on whether\nthey are considered with respect to the intellect that is their cause\n or the intellect that knows them by\n abstraction.[4]\n But when they are considered in particulars (secundum quod est in\nisto vel in illo) their existence is exterior to as well as\n beyond the mind, yet existing in things as\n individuated.[5]" ], "section_title": "3. Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAlbert’s metaphysics is an adaptation of Aristotelian\nmetaphysics as conditioned by a form of Neo-Platonism. His reading the\nLiber de causis as an authentic Aristotelian text influenced\nhis understanding of Aristotle. It seems that Albert never realized the\nNeo-Platonic origin of the work. As with the other works of Aristotle\nhe prepared a paraphrase of the work entitled De causis et processu\nuniversitatis, and used it as a guide to interpreting other works\nby Aristotle. However, he also used the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius to\ncorrect some of the doctrine found in the Liber de causis.", "\n\nAlbert blends these three main sources of his metaphysics into a\nhierarchical structure of reality in which there is an emanation of\nforms directed by what Albert calls “a summoning of the\ngood” (advocatio boni). The good operates metaphysically\nas the final cause of the order of forms in the universe of beings. But\nit is also the First Cause. And its operation in the created order of\nbeing is discovered as an attraction of all being back to itself.\n“We exist because God is good,” Albert explains, “and\n we are good insofar as we\n exist.”[6]\n Thus the balanced relations of the exit and return of all things\naccording to classical Neo-Platonism is skewed in favor of the\nrelationship of return. This is because Albert, as a Christian\nphilosopher, favors a creationist view of being over the doctrine of\npure emanation. Rejecting also the doctrine of universal hylomorphism\nAlbert argues that material beings are always composite in which the\nforms are inchoate until they are called forth by the ultimate\ngood. Spiritual creatures (excluding man) have no material\nelement. Their being summoned to the good is immediate and final. The\nsummoning of the inchoate forms of material beings, however, is not\ndirect. It depends upon the intervention of the celestial spheres.", "\n\nThe First Cause, which Albert understands as God, is an absolutely\ntranscendent reality. His uncreated light calls forth a hierarchically\nordered universe in which each order of being reflects this light.\nGod’s giving existence to creatures is understood by Albert as\n their procession from him as from a first\n cause.[7]\n At the top of this hierarchy of light are found the purely spiritual\nbeings, the angelic orders and the intelligences. Albert carefully\ndistinguishes these two kinds of beings. He basically accepts the\nanalysis of the angelic orders as found in Pseudo-Dionysius’ treatise\nof the celestial hierarchy. The intelligences move the cosmic spheres\nand illuminate the human soul. The intelligences, just as the order of\nangels, form a special hierarchy. The First Intelligence, as Albert\ncalls it, contemplates the entire universe and uses the human soul, as\nilluminated by the lower intelligences, to draw all creatures into a\nunity.", "\n\nBeneath the angels and intelligences are the souls that possess\nintellects. They are joined to bodies but do not depend on bodies for\ntheir existence. Although they are ordered to the First Intelligence\nso as to enjoin contemplative unity on the entire cosmos, Albert\nrejects the Averroistic theory of the unity of the intellect. Each\nhuman soul has its own intellect. But because the human soul uniquely\nstands on the horizon of both material and spiritual being it can\noperate as a microcosm and thus can serve the purpose of the First\nIntelligence, which is to bind all creatures into a universe.", "\n\nFinally there are the immersed forms. Under this heading Albert\nestablishes another hierarchy with the animal kingdom at the top,\nfollowed by the plant kingdom, then the world of minerals (in which\nAlbert had a deep interest), and finally the elements of material\ncreation.", "\n\nOne important aspect of Albert’s metaphysics appears in his\ncommentary on Aristotle’ Metaphysics. In this work\nAlbert relies heavily on both Averroes in his Long Commentary on\nthe Metaphysics and Avicenna’s Philosophia\nprima. While the commentary of Averroes is an almost literal\nanalysis of the text of Aristotle, Avicenna’s analysis often\ndeparts from this literal approach and incorporates ideas that\nAvicenna found in Aristotle’s Posterior\nAnalytics. Albert seems to be using Averroes when he is\nparaphrasing Aristotle’s text, but relies on Avicenna when he\ndeparts from the paraphrasing. As a result of this usage Albert\nproceeds to develop his own ideas of first philosophy as outlined\nabove. This can be seen for example in his analysis of the fifth book\nof the Metaphysics in his digression on unity found in\ntractate 1, chapter 8. Following Avicenna he argues that unity cannot\nbe an essential feature of any substance." ], "section_title": "4. Metaphysics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAlbert’s interest in the human condition is dominated by his\nconcern with the relationship of the soul to the body on the one hand\nand the important role that the intellect plays in human psychology.\n According to Albert, man is identified with his\n intellect.[8]\n With regard to the relationship between the soul and the body Albert\nappears to be torn between the Platonic theory which sees the soul as\na form capable of existing independently of the body and the\nAristotelian hylomorphic theory which reduces the soul to a functional\nrelationship of the body. With respect to human knowing, for example,\nhe maintains the position that the human intellect is dependent upon\n the\n senses.[9]\n In order to resolve the conflict between the two views Albert availed\nhimself of Avicenna’s position that Aristotle’s analysis\nwas focused on the function and not the essence of the\nsoul. Functionally, Albert argues, the soul is the agent cause of the\nbody. “Just as we maintain that the soul is the cause of the\nanimated body and of its motions and passions insofar as it is\nanimated,” he reasons, “likewise we must maintain that the\nlowest intelligence is the cause of the cognitive soul insofar as it\nis cognitive because the cognition of the soul is a particular result\n of the light of the\n intelligence.”[10]\n Having been created in the image and likeness of God it not only\ngoverns the body, as God governs the universe, but it is responsible\nfor the very existence of the body, as God is the creator of the\nworld. And just as God transcends his creation, so does the human soul\ntranscend the body in its interests. It is capable of operating in\ncomplete independence of corporeal functions. This transcendental\nfunction of the soul allows Albert to focus on what he believes is the\nessence of the soul—the human intellect.", "\n\nViewed as essentially an intellect, the human soul is an incorporeal\nsubstance. Albert divides this spiritual substance into two\n powers—the agent intellect and the possible\n intellect.[11]\n Neither of these powers needs the body in order to function. Under\ncertain conditions concerning its powers the human intellect is\ncapable of transformation. While it is true that under the stimulus or\nillumination of the agent intellect the possible intellect can\nconsider the intelligible form of the phantasms of the mind which are\nderived from the senses, it can also operate under the sole influence\nof the agent intellect. Here, Albert argues, the possible intellect\nundergoes a complete transformation and becomes totally actualized, as\nthe agent intellect becomes its form. It emerges as what he calls the\n“adept intellect” (intellectus\n adeptus).[12]\n At this stage the human intellect is susceptible to illumination by\nhigher cosmic intellects called the “intelligences”. Such\nillumination brings the soul of man into complete harmony with the\nentire order of creation and constitutes man’s natural\nhappiness. Since the intellect is now totally assimilated to the order\nof things Albert calls the intellect in its final stage of development\nthe “assimilated intellect” (intellectus\nassimilativus). The condition of having attained an assimilated\nintellect constitutes natural human happiness, realizing all the\naspirations of the human condition and human culture. But Albert makes\nit clear that the human mind cannot attain this state of assimilation\non its own. Following the Augustinian tradition as set forth in the\nDe magistro Albert states that “because the divine\ntruth lies beyond our reason we are not able by ourselves to discover\nit, unless it condescends to infuse itself; for as Augustine says, it\nis an inner teacher, without whom an external teacher labors\n aimlessly.”[13]\n There is thus an infusion involved with divine illumination, but it\nis not a pouring forth of forms. Rather, it is an infusion of an inner\nteacher, who is identified with divine truth itself. In his commentary\non the Sentences Albert augments this doctrine when he argues\nthat this inner teacher strengthens the weakness of the human\nintellect, which by itself could not profit by external\nstimulation. He distinguishes the illumination of this interior\nteacher from the true and final object of the\n intellect.[14]\n Divine light is only a means by which the intellect can attain its\n object.[15]\n This is consistent with his emphasis upon the analogy of divine light\nand physical light, which pervades so much of his thinking. It\nfollows, then, that in the order of human knowing there are first of\nall the forms that are derived from external things. They cannot teach\nus anything in any useful way until the light of an inner teacher\nilluminates them. So light is the medium of this vision. But the inner\nteacher himself is identified with the divine truth, which is the\nfinal object and perfection of the human intellect. In his\nSumma, however, Albert makes further distinctions concerning\nthe object of human knowing. Natural things, he tells us, are received\nin a natural light, while the things that the intellect contemplates\nin the order of belief (ad credenda vero) are received in a\nlight that is gratuitous (gratuitum est), and the beatifying\nrealities are received in the light of\n glory.[16]\n It seems that Albert has abandoned the position that even\nnaturalia require divine illumination. Strictly speaking, he\nhas not abnegated his earlier position. Naturalia may very\nwell still require the work of a restorative inner teacher. In the\nSumma, however, Albert is anxious to stress the radical\ndifference natural knowing has from supernatural knowing. He has\nalready established this difference in his study of the human\nintellect (De intellectu) where he tells us, “Some\n[intelligibles] with their light overpower our intellect which is\ntemporal and has continuity. These are like the things that are most\nmanifest in nature which are related to our intellect as the light of\nthe sun or a strong scintillating color is to the eyes of the bat or\nthe owl. Other [intelligibles] are manifest only through the light of\nanother. These would be like the things which are received in faith\nfrom what is primary and\n true.”[17]\n But in both natural and supernatural knowing Albert is careful to\nstress the final object and perfection of the human intellect. This\nleads naturally to a consideration of Albert’s understanding of\nethics." ], "section_title": "5. Psychology and Anthropology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn the first section of his Commentary on Aristotle’s\nPhysics Albertus Magnus discusses the possibility of the study of\nnatural science. If science could only study particulars, Albert\nargues, then there would be no science in the sense of the\ndemonstration of necessary causes because there would be as many\nsciences as there are particulars. But particulars, Albert goes on to\npoint out, belong to definite kinds (species) and these can be studied\nbecause their causes can be demonstrated. Species have common\nattributes and a determined subject of which the attributes can be\ndetermined with necessity. Thus science is possible.", "\n\nAnd this conviction about science being possible, as opposed to the\nPlatonic and Neoplatonic tendency to discount the world of particular\nreality, and its presumed unaccountable changeableness, was not just a\ntheoretical position on Albert’s part. He devotes a great deal of\nhis time and attention to the actual empirical study of the\nrelationships between attributes and natural subjects. Furthermore, he\norders such study into what today would be called the “natural\nsciences”. Besides the study of the heavens and the earth and\ngeneration and corruption that he found in Aristotle, he adds the study\nof meteors, the mineral, animal, and vegetable kingdoms.", "\n\nAlbert inherited astronomy as part of the scholastic curriculum known\nas the quadrivium. But his interest in this science\nwas not merely conceptual; he was also interested in using mathematical\ncalculations and conferring with astronomical tables to study the\nnature of celestial bodies. He was concerned with the constellations,\nthe sizes of planets and stars and their positions and movements in the\nheavens. He seems to have known about astronomical instruments,\nparticularly the astrolabe, but gives no clue as to what method of\ninvestigation he used to carry out his studies. He did make it clear,\nhowever, that the principles of physics had to be applied to celestial\nbodies, which he regarded as natural physical bodies moving in real\nspace.", "\n\nBesides studying the properties of the celestial bodies themselves, he\nalso was concerned with their effects on terrestrial objects. For\nexample, he seems to have understood that the tides on earth were\nrelated to celestial bodies.", "\n\nAfter astronomy, Albert develops a particular order in which he\nproposes to study the other sciences. In his Meteora, he\nexplains that sublunary moveable bodies can be studied in three ways.\nFirst, in so far as they come into and pass out of being (generation\nand corruption). Then they must be investigated with respect to their\nmixture with other moveable bodies. And lastly, they need to be studied\nwith respect to their contraction to the mineral, vegetable, and animal\nspecies. This last phase of his plan, however, is where Albert made his\nown contribution to the development of modern science as it is known\ntoday. That is, he undertook his own empirical investigations into the\nmineral, plant, and animal kingdoms.", "\n\nAlbert’s Treatise on Minerals (De mineralibus)\nshows that he undertakes his own observations and did not merely\ncollate authorities on the topic. He studies different kinds of\nminerals and metals as well as rare stones. Beginning with the mineral\nkingdom, he notes the properties of each mineral specimen, including\nwhere it was found along with its cause or causes. Next, he deals with\nrare stones, investigating the powers of these specimens along with\ntheir causes. He then produces an alphabetical list of a large number\nof these more precious stones. Throughout the treatise, Albert is\ncareful always to proceed from the effects or properties of the mineral\nworld to hypotheses concerning their causes. It is clear from his text\nthat he himself made a number of studies (experiments) with different\nminerals.", "\n\nNext, Albert studies the plant kingdom. In his Treatise on\nPlants (De vegetabilibus), as in his Treatise on\nMinerals, he combines his own observations with those of other\nauthorities, providing an alphabetical list of plants as he did for\nstones in his Treatise on Minerals. But he adds a long section\non the cultivation of plants. He makes the interesting observation that\nthe properties of certain plants are caused by celestial bodies. He\nalso indicates the medicinal properties of certain plants, although he\nis careful to point out that his principal concern is in understanding\nthe nature of plants based on a study of their properties and\nvirtues.", "\n\nAlbert’s interest in the natural order concludes with his\ninvestigations of the final level of natural beings, the animal\nkingdom. His Treatise on Animals (De animalibus)\ninvolves Aristotle’s studies of animals as well as material taken\nfrom Thomas of Cantimpré’s encyclopedic On the Nature\nof Things (De natura rerum). But Albert inserts his own\nstudies of animals into the treatise. He investigates the causes of the\nproperties of different kinds of animals based on their operations and\npowers. Again, Albert organizes a kind of dictionary of animals based\non their various species, listed in alphabetical order as he had done\nin the other special sciences.", "\n\nIt seems to have been of considerable importance to Albert to do two\nthings in developing his scientific investigations. First, to review\nand organize the authorities in each of the branches of science and\nsecond to test by his own experience the claims made by these\nauthorities. In this way, he was careful to accommodate readers who\nwere used to consulting authorities instead of experience by providing\na context in which he could introduce his new findings." ], "section_title": "6. Albertus Magnus and the Sciences", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAlbert’s ethics rests on his understanding of human freedom. This\nfreedom is expressed through the human power to make unrestricted\ndecisions about their own actions. This power, the liberum\narbitrium, Albert believes is identified neither with the\nintellect nor the will. He holds this extraordinary position because\nof his analysis of the genesis of human action. In his treatise on man\n(Liber de homine) he accounts for human action as beginning\nwith the intellect considering the various options for action open to\na person at a given moment in time. This is coupled by the will\ndesiring the beneficial outcome of the proposed event. Then the\nliberum arbitrium chooses one of the options proposed by the\nintellect or the object of the will’s desire. The will then moves the\nperson to act on the basis of the choice of the liberum\narbitrium. Brutes do not have this ability, he argues, and must\nact solely on their initial desire. Hence they have no power of free\nchoice. In his later writings, however, Albert eliminates the first\nact of the will. But even so he distinguishes the liberum\narbitrium from both the will and the intellect, presumably so\nthat it can respond to the influences of both these faculties\nequally. Thus the way to ethics is open.", "\n\nAlbert’s concern with ethics as such is found in his two\ncommentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The\nprologues to both these works reveal Albert’s original thoughts\non some problems about the discipline of ethics. He wonders if ethics\ncan be considered as a theoretical deductive science. He concludes that\nit can be so considered because the underlying causes of moral action\n(rationes morum) involve both necessary and universal\nprinciples, the conditions needed for a science according to the\nanalysis of Aristotle that Albert\n accepted.[18]\n The rationes morum are contrasted by him to the mere\nappearance of moral\n behaviour.[19]\n Thus virtue can be discussed in abstraction from particular actions\nof individual human agents. The same is true of other ethical\nprinciples. However, Albert maintains that it is possible to refer to\nparticular human acts as exemplifying relevant virtues and as such to\ninclude them in a scientific discussion of\n ethics.[20]\n Therefore, ethics is theoretical, even though the object of its\ntheory is the practical.", "\n\nAnother concern that Albert expresses is how ethics as a theoretical\ndeductive science can be relevant to the practice of the\nvirtuous life. He addresses this problem by distinguishing ethics as a\ndoctrine (ethica docens) from ethics as a practical activity\nof individual human beings (ethica\n utens).[21]\n The outcomes of these two aspects of ethics are different he\nargues. Ethics as a doctrine is concerned with teaching. It proceeds\nby logical analysis concentrating on the goals of human action in\ngeneral. As such its proper end is knowledge. But as a practical and\nuseful art ethics is concerned with action as a means to a desired\n end.[22]\n Its mode of discourse is rhetorical—the persuasion of the\nhuman being to engage in the right actions that will lead to the\ndesired\n end.[23]\n Albert sees these two aspects of ethics as linked together by the\nvirtue of prudence. It is prudence that applies the results of the\ndoctrine of ethics to its\n practice.[24]\n Ethics considered as a doctrine operates through prudence as a remote\ncause of ethical action. Thus the two functions of ethics are related\nand ethics is considered by Albert as both a theoretical deductive\nscience and a practical applied science.", "\n\nAlbert goes beyond these methodological considerations. He addresses\nthe end of ethics, as he understands it. And here his psychology bears\nfruit. For he embraces the idea that the highest form of human\nhappiness is the contemplative life. This is the true and proper end\nof man, he claims. For the adept intellect, as noted above, is the\nhighest achievement to which the human condition can aspire. It\nrepresents the conjunction of the apex of the human mind to the\nseparated agent intellect. In this conjunction the separated agent\nintellect becomes the form of the soul. The soul experiences\nself-sufficiency and is capable of contemplative wisdom. This is as\nclose to beatitude as man can get in this life. Man is now capable of\ncontemplating separated beings as such and can live his life in almost\nstoical detachment from the concerns of sublunar existence." ], "section_title": "7. Ethics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAlbert’s influence on the development of scholastic philosophy in the\nthirteenth century was enormous. He, along with his most famous\nstudent Thomas of Aquinas, succeeded in incorporating the philosophy\nof Aristotle into the Christian West. Besides Thomas, Albert was also\nthe teacher of Ulrich of Straßburg (1225 – 1277), who\ncarried forward Albert’s interest in natural science by writing a\ncommentary on Aristotle’s Meteors along with his metaphysical\nwork, the De summo bono; Hugh Ripelin of Straßburg\n(c.1200 – 1268) who wrote the famous Compendium theologicae\nveritatis; John of Freiburg (c.1250 – 1314) who wrote the\nLibellus de quaestionibus casualibus; and Giles of Lessines\n(c. 1230 – c. 1304) who wrote a treatise on the unity of\nsubstantial form, the De unitate formae. The influence of\nAlbert and his students was very pronounced in the generation of\nGerman scholars who came after these men. Dietrich of Freiberg, who\nmay have actually met Albert, is probably the best example of the\ninfluence of the spirit of Albert the Great. Dietrich (c. 1250 –\nc. 1310) wrote treatises on natural science, which give evidence of\nhis having carried out actual scientific investigation. His treatise\non the rainbow would be a good example. But he also wrote treatises on\nmetaphysical and theological topics in which the echoes of Albert can\nbe distinctly heard. Unlike Albert he did not write commentaries on\nAristotle, but preferred to apply Albertist principles to topics\naccording to his own understanding. On the other hand Berthold of\nMoosburg (+ c. 1361) wrote a very important commentary on Proclus’\nElements of Theology, introducing the major work of the great\nNeo-Platonist into German metaphysics. Berthold’s debt to Albert is\nfound throughout his commentary, especially with regard to\nmetaphysical topics. Many of these Albertist ideas and principles\npassed down to thinkers such as Meister Eckhart, John Tauler, and\nHeinrich Suso where they took on a unique mystical flavor. The\nAlbertist tradition continued down to Heymeric de Campo (1395 –\n1460) who passed it on to Nicholas of Cusa. From Nicholas the ideas\npass down to the Renaissance. The philosophers of the Renaissance seem\nto have been attracted to the Albert’s understanding of Neo-Platonism\nand his interest in natural science." ], "section_title": "8. The Influence of Albert the Great", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Opera Omnia, P. Jammy (ed.), 21 volumes, Lyon, 1651.", "Opera Omnia, E. Borgnet (ed.), 38 volumes, Paris: Vives,\n1890–9.", "Alberti Magni Opera Omnia edenda curavit Institutum Alberti\nMagni Coloniense Bernhardo Geyer praeside, Münster:\nAschendorff, 1951–.", "Book of Minerals, Dorothy Wyckoff (trans.), Oxford:\nOxford University Press, 1967.", "Commentary on Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, Simon\nTugwell, O.P. (trans.), in S. Tugwell, Albert and Thomas:\nSelected Writings, New York: Paulist Press, 1988.", "On the Causes of the Properties of the Elements, Irven\nM. Resnick (trans.), Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2010.", "Über den Menschen (De homine), Henryk Anzulewicz and\nJoachim R. Söder (trans.), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,\n2004.", "Métaphysique, Livre XI, Traités II et\nIII. Texte latin en vis-à-vis Traduction, introduction et\nnotes, par Isabelle Moulin. Sic et Non. Paris: Vrin, 2009.", "Questions concerning Aristotle’s On\nAnimals. Tr. Irven M. Resnick and Kenneth F. Kitchell, Jr. The\nFathers of the Church: Medieval Continuation, 9. Washington, D.C.: CUA\nPress, 2008.", "Aertsen, J., 1996, “Albertus Magnus und die mittelalterliche\nPhilosophie,” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für\nPhilosophie, 21: 111–128.", "–––, 2001, “Die Frage nach dem Ersten und Grundlegenden.\nAlbert der Große und die Lehre von den Transzendentalien,”\nin Senner et al. 2001, pp. 91 – 112.", "Anzulewicz, H., 2001, “‘Bonum’ als\nSchlüsselbegriff bei Albertus Magnus,” in Senner et\nal. 2001, pp. 113–140.", "–––, 1999, De Forma Resultante in\nSpeculo: die Theologische Relevanz des Bildbegriffs und des\nSpiegelbildmodells in den Frühwerken des Albertus Magnus\nin Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des\nMittelalters, 53: 1–2 (Münster: Aschendorff).", "–––, 2000, Die Denkstruktur des Albertus\nMagnus. Ihre Dekodierung und ihre Relevanz für die\nBegrifflichkiet und Terminologie in L’élaboration du\nvocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge, Turnhout: Brepols\n2000, 269-396.", "–––, 2015, “Scientia Mystica sive Theologia\n– Alberts des Grossen Begriff der Mystik,” Roczniki\nFilozoficne, 63: 37–58.", "Arendt, W., 1929, Die Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre Alberts des\nGrossen, Jena: Fischer.", "Asúa, M. de, 2001, “Minerals, Plants and Animals from\nA to Z. The Inventory of the Natural World in Albert the\nGreat’s philosophia naturalis,” in Senner et al.\n2001, pp. 389–400.", "Bach, J., 1881, Des Albertus Magnus Verhältniss zu der\nErkenntnisslehre der Griechen, Lateiner, Araber und Juden, Wien;\nreprint Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966.", "Baldner, S., 1993, “Is St. Albert the Great a Dualist on Human\nNature?” Proceedings of the Catholic Philosophical\nAssociation, 67: 219–229.", "Bertolacci, A., 2001, “The Reception of Avicenna’s\nPhilosophia Prima in Albert the Great’s Commentary on\nthe Metaphysics: the Case of the Doctrine of Unity,” in\nSenner et al. 2001, pp. 67–78.", "Blankenhorn, B., 2011, “How the Early Albertus Magnus\nTransformed Augustinian Interiority,” Freiburger\nZeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 58:\n351–386.", "–––, 2015, The Mystery of Union with\nGod. Dionysian Mysticism in Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas,\nWashington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.", "Bonné, J., 1935, Die Erkenntnislehre Alberts des\nGroßen, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des arabischen\nNeuplatonismus, Bonn: Stodieck.", "Catania, F., 1960, “Divine Infinity in Albert the Great’s\nCommentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,”\nMediaeval Studies, 22: 27–42.", "–––, 1980, “‘Knowable’ and\n‘Namable’ in Albert the Great’s Commentary on the\nDivine Names,” in Kovach and Shahan 1980,\npp. 97–128.", "Craemer-Ruegenberg, I., 2005, Albert the Great, Leipzig:\nBenno.", "–––, 1980, “The Priority of Soul as Form and\nIts Proximity to the First Mover: Some Aspects of Albert’s Psychology\nin the First Two Books of His Commentary on Aristotle,” in\nKovach and Shahan 1980, pp. 49–62.", "Cunningham, S. B., 1969, “Albertus Magnus and the Problem of Moral\nVirtue,” Vivarium, 7: 81–119.", "–––, 2008, Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral\nPhilosophy of Albert the Great, Washington D.C.: Catholic\nUniversity of America Press.", "Da Silva, M.A.O., 2017, “Albert the Great on Mathematical\nQuantities,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia,\n73(3–4): 1191–1201.", "Ducharme, L., 1979, “The Individual Human Being in Saint\nAlbert’s Earlier Writings,” Southwestern Journal of\nPhilosophy, 10(3): 131–160; reprinted in Kovach and Shahan\n1980, pp. 131–160.", "Ferro, C., 1953, “Metafisica ed etica nel De bono\ndi S. Alberto Magno,” Rivista di Filosofia\nNeo-Scolastica, 45: 434–464.", "Führer, M., 1991, “The Contemplative Function of the\nAgent Intellect in the Psychology of Albert the Great,” in\nB. Mojsisch and O. Pluta (eds.), Historia Philosophiae Medii\nAevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters,\nAmsterdam/Philadelphia: B.R. Grüner, pp. 305–319.", "–––, 2001, “Albertus Magnus’ Theory\nof Divine Illumination,” in Senner et al. 2001,\npp. 141–155.", "Gaul, L., 1913, Alberts des Grossen Verhältnis zu Plato,\nMünster i. W.: Aschendorff.", "Guldentops, G., 2001, “Albert’s Influence on\nBate’s Metaphysics and Noetics,” in Senner et\nal. 2001, pp. 195–206.", "Hergan, J., 2002, St. Albert the Great’s Theory of the\nBeatific Vision, New York: Peter Lang.", "Hödl, L., 1974, ldquo;Albert der Große und die Wende in der\nlateinischen Philosophie im 13. Jahrhundert,” in Virtus\npolitica, J. Möller and H. Kohlenberger (eds.), Stuttgart –\nBad Cannstatt, pp. 251–275. ", "Hoenen, M. and Libera, A. de, 1995, Albertus Magnus und der\nAlbertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters,\nLeiden: Brill.", "Honnefelder, Ludger (ed.), 2005. Albertus Magnus and the\nBeginnings of the Medieval Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West.\nFrom Richardus Rufus to Franciscus de Mayronis, Münster:\nAschendorff.", "Hünemörder, C., 1980, “Die Zoologie des Albertus\nMagnus,” in G. Meyer and A. Zimmerman (eds.), \nAlbertus Magnus – Doctor Universalis, Mainz:\nMatthias-Grüewald, pp. 235-48.", "Imbach, R. and Flüeler, C. (eds.), 1985, Albert der\nGrosse und die deutsche Dominikanerschule. Philosophische\nPerspektiven, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und\nTheologie (Special Issue), Band 32, Heft 1/2.", "Johnston, H., 1960, “Intellectual Abstraction in\nSt. Albert,” Philosophical Studies, 10:\n204–212.", "Kennedy, L., 1960, “The Nature of the Human Intellect\nAccording to St. Albert the Great,” Modern Schoolman,\n37: 121–137.", "–––, 1962, “The Nature of the Human Intellect\nAccording to St. Albert the Great,” The Modern\nSchoolman, 40: 23–38.", "Killermann, S., 1944, “Die somatische Anthropologie bei\nAlbertus Magnus,” Angelicum, 21: 224–269.", "Kovach, F., 1980, “The Enduring Question of Action at a\nDistance in Saint Albert the Great,” in Kovach and Shahan 1980,\npp. 161–235.", "Kovach, F. and Shahan, R. (eds.), 1980, Albert the Great:\nCommemorative Essays, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.", "Krause, K., 2015, “Albert the Great on Animal and Human\nOrigin in his Early Works,” Lo Sguardo di Filosofia,\n18: 205–232.", "Lauer, R., 1951, “St. Albert and the Theory of Abstraction,”\nThomist, 14: 69–83.", "Libera, A. de, 1990, Albert le Grand et la Philosophie,\nParis: J. Vrin.", "–––, 1994, La Mystique Rhenane. D’\nAlbert le Grand à Maître Eckhart, Paris:\nJ. Vrin.", "–––, 2005, Métaphysique et\nnoétique. Albert le Grand, Paris: J. Vrin.", "Liertz, R., 1948, Albert der Grosse: Gedanken\nüber sein Leben und aus seinen Werken, Münster i. W.:\nBroschur.", "Lottin, O., 1928, “La syndérèse chez Albert le\nGrand et S. Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue\nNéo-Scolastique de philosophie, 30: 18–44.", "McInerny, R., 1980, “Albert on Universals,” in Kovach\nand Shahan 1980, pp. 3–18.", "Meersseman, O. P., G., 1931, Introductio in Opera Omnia\nB. Alberti Magni, Bruges: Beyaert.", "Meyer, G. and Zimmerman, A. (eds.), 1980, Albertus Magnus\n– Doctor Universalis, Mainz: Matthias-Grüewald.", "Müller, J., 2001, “Ethics as a Practical Science in Albert\nthe Great’s Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics,” in\nSenner et al. 2001, pp. 275–285.", "–––, 2001, Natürliche Moral und philosophische\nEthik bei Albertus Magnus, Münster: Aschendorff.", "Mulligan, R., 1956, “Ratio Inferior and Ratio\nSuperior in St. Albert and St. Thomas,”\nThomist, 19: 339–367.", "Resnick, I., 2013, A Companion to Albert the Great,\nLeiden/Boston: Brill.", "Resnick, I. and K. Kitchell (eds.), 2004, Albert the Great: a\nSelectively Annotated Bibliography (1900-2000), Tempe:\nArizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies.", "Schmieder, K., 1932, Alberts des Großen Lehre vom\nnatürlichen Gotteswissen, Freiburg im Br.: Herder.", "Schneider, A., 1903/1906, Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen\nnach den Quellen dargestellt, 2 volumes, Münster i. W.:\nAschendorff.", "Schönberger, R., 2001, “Rationale Spontaneität. Zur\nTheorie des Willens bei Albertus Magnus,” in Senner et\nal. 2001, pp. 221–234.", "Senner, O.P., W., H. Anzulewicz, M. Burger, R. Meyer, M. Nauert,\nP. Sicouly, O.P., J. Söder, K.-B. Springer (eds.), 2001,\nAlbertus Magnus. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren:\nNeue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven, Berlin: Akademie\nVerlag.", "Söder, J., 2002, Albert der Große über Sinne und\nTräume. Beobachtungen am Traumtraktat von “De Homine”,\nMicrologus, 10: 239-250.", "Stammkötter, F.-B., 2001, “Die Entwicklung der\nBestimmung der Prudentia in der Ethik des Albertus Magnus,” in\nSenner et al. 2001, pp. 303–310.", "Stannard, J., 1980, “The Botany of St. Albert the\nGreat,” in G. Meyer and A. Zimmerman (eds.), Albertus Magnus\n– Doctor Universalis, Mainz: Matthias-Grüewald, pp.\n345-72.", "Sweeney, S.J., L., 1980, “The Meaning of Esse in Albert\nthe Great’s Texts on Creation in Summa de Creaturis and\nScripta Super Sententias”, in Kovach and Shahan 1980,\npp. 65–95. ", "Takahashi, A., 2008, “Nature, Formative Power and Intellect\nin the Natural Philosophy of Albert the Great”,\nEarly Science and Medicine, 13: 451–481.", "Tarabochia Canavero, A., 1984, “A proposito del trattato De\nbono naturae nel Tractatus de natura boni di Alberto\nMagno,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, 76:\n353–373.", "Tellkamp, Jörg Alejandro, 2012,“Albert the Great on\nStructure & Function of the Inner Senses,” in R.C. Taylor,\nI. A. Omar (eds.)The Judeo-Christian-Islamic Heritage,\nMarquette, pp. 305–324.", "Tremblay, Bruno, 2014. “La logique comme science du langage chez\nAlbert le Grand,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et\nthéologiques, 98(2): 193–239.", "Trottmann, C., 2001, “La syndérèse selon Albert le\nGrand,” in Senner et al. 2001, pp. 255–273.", "Vost, K., 2011, St. Albert the Great: Champion of Faith and\nReason, Charlotte, NC: TAN Books.", "Wéber, O.P., E.-H., 2001, “Un thème de la\nphilosophie arabe interpreté par Albert le Grand,” in\nSenner et al. 2001, pp. 79–90.", "Wieland, G., 1972, Untersuchungen zum Seinsbegriff im\nMetaphysikkommentar Alberts des Grossen, Münster:\nAschendorff.", "Weisheipl, J., 1980a, Albertus Magnus and the Sciences:\nCommemorative Essays 1980, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of\nMedieval Studies.", "–––, 1980b, “Albertus Magnus and Universal\nHylomorphism: Avicebron,” in Kovach and Shahan 1980,\npp. 239–260.", "–––, 1958, “Albertus Magnus and the Oxford\nPlatonists,” Proceedings of the American Catholic\nPhilosophical Association, 32: 124–139." ]	[ { "href": "../aquinas/", "text": "Aquinas, Thomas" }, { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../aristotle-metaphysics/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: metaphysics" }, { "href": "../augustine/", "text": "Augustine, Saint" }, { "href": "../binarium/", "text": "binarium famosissimum [= most famous pair]" }, { "href": "../cusanus/", "text": "Cusanus, Nicolaus [Nicolas of Cusa]" }, { "href": "../dietrich-freiberg/", "text": "Dietrich of Freiberg" }, { "href": "../freewill/", "text": "free will" }, { "href": "../ibn-sina/", "text": "Ibn Sina [Avicenna]" }, { "href": "../meister-eckhart/", "text": "Meister Eckhart" }, { "href": "../properties/", "text": "properties" }, { "href": "../pseudo-dionysius-areopagite/", "text": "Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite" }, { "href": "../ancient-soul/", "text": "soul, ancient theories of" }, { "href": "../substance/", "text": "substance" } ]
albo-joseph	Joseph Albo	First published Thu Jul 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Jan 8, 2020	[ "\n\nJoseph Albo (c. 1380–1444) was a Jewish philosopher active in\nChristian Spain in the first half of the fifteenth century. His\ntheoretical work found expression in his well-known opus Sefer\nha-‘Ikkarim [Book of Principles], completed in 1425 in\nthe town of Soria in the crown of Castile. In this work, Albo\naddresses a wide variety of interpretive, theological and\nphilosophical issues, in a style integrating logical, methodical\nanalyses with exegetical discussions. Albo’s composition reveals his\nexposure to the works of many Jewish philosophers that preceded him,\nparticularly Maimonides, Hasdai Crescas (Albo’s teacher in his\nformative years), and his contemporary, Simeon ben Zemah Duran. The\nhistorical circumstances in which he functioned, especially the\nCatholic Church’s persecution of the Jews in Christian Spain, led him\nto contribute to the anti-Christian polemic, and apparently also\npermitted his exposure to the writings of such Christian philosophers\nas Thomas Aquinas.", "\n\nAlbo’s central contribution to the history of Jewish philosophy is his\ntheory of principles. In his theory, he determines the fundamental,\nnecessary beliefs that a person must uphold in order to belong to the\nsystem called “divine law.” This theory serves as an\nalternative to previous lists of principles, especially the thirteen\nprinciples of faith formulated by Maimonides. Albo’s list includes\nonly three fundamental beliefs: the existence of God, the divine\norigin of the Torah, and reward and punishment. The following\nparagraphs will outline Albo’s theory and several of the prominent\nissues in his thought, such as the theory of law, the theory of divine\nattributes, the theory of human perfection and the theory of\nprovidence and reward." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Biographical Sketch", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Historical Background", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Introduction to ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. The Theory of Law", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. The Theory of Principles", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. The Theory of Divinity", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. The Theory of Humanity", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. The Theory of Providence and Recompense", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Literature", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe known details of Albo’s life are sparse. As far as we know,\nhe was born in Christian Spain in the crown of Aragon around 1380, and\ndied in the crown of Castile around 1444. In documenting the\nhighlights of his career, we should first mention his period of study\nin the school of Hasdai Crescas in Saragossa. Further, in\n1413–1414 he played a dominant role in the Disputation at\nTortosa, a major public polemic between the Jewish convert to\nChristianity Geronimo de Santa Fe (formerly Joshua Lorki), who\nrepresented the pope, and delegates from many Jewish communities in\nChristian Spain. In this debate, Albo represented the Jewish community\nof Daroca in Aragon (Graetz 1894, 179–220; Baer 1961,\n170–232; Rauschenbach 2002, 11–47). After this community\nwas decimated in 1415, he moved to the town of Soria in Castile\n(Gonzalo Maeso 1971, 131; Motis Dolader 1990, 148). But Albo is mainly\nknown for his philosophical treatise,\nSefer ha-‘Ikkarim, which he finished around 1425. Aside from\nacting as a philosopher and spiritual leader, Albo served as a\npreacher and possibly also as a physician. Apparently, Albo had a\ncommand of Spanish and Latin in addition to Hebrew, the language of\nSefer ha-‘Ikkarim (Husik 1928–30, 67), but we cannot\ndetermine his level of fluency in Arabic." ], "section_title": "1. Biographical Sketch", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe roots of Albo’s philosophical theory are located deep within the\nground of the historical reality in which he lived and worked. The\ncentral circumstance that directly shaped his thought was the\ndistressed state of Jewish society in Christian Spain. Beginning in the\nfourteenth century, the Jews in Spain were subject to religious\npersecution on the part of the Catholic Church and Christian society in\ngeneral. Jewish thought also suffered from sharp ideological conflict\nbetween conservative thinkers and rationalists over both theological\nand social issues.", "\n\nFirst of all, in pressuring the Jews to convert, the Christian\nauthorities instituted extreme economic measures and passed\ndiscriminatory social legislation. They used coercive tactics in their\nexhortations. They also organized harsh pogroms, such as those of\n1391. These repressive measures forced many Jews to die a martyr’s\ndeath. They also led to mass conversion of Jews to Christianity and to\ndeterioration on the social, economic, and spiritual planes (Baer\n1961, 95–243; Netanyahu 1966, cf. index\n[“Conversions”]; Ben-Sasson 1984, 208–220,\n232–238; Gutwirth 1993).", "\n\nIn addition, this period witnessed the revival of the dispute between\nfollowers of Maimonides and his opponents. On one side of this\nconflict stood the rationalists. They espoused the study of philosophy\nand attempted to integrate it into their religious-spiritual world\nwhile resolving the contradictions that emerged between philosophy and\nthe sources of revelation. On the other side stood the conservatives,\nwho rejected the study of philosophy. They adhered to the classic\nreligious sources, the Bible and the Talmud, and viewed kabbalistic\nliterature as a continuation of the chain of revelation. One of the\nfocal points of the conflict between these two theological schools\nwas the exchange of mutual accusations on the issue of responsibility\nfor the dire situation of Jewish society under Christian persecution\n(Schwartz 1991).", "\n\nModern scholars have conducted comprehensive studies of the\nrelationship between the characteristics of Jewish philosophy in Spain\nduring the fifteenth century, including Albo’s thought, and the\nhistorical reality of that period (Baer 1961, 232–243; Davidson\n1983, 112–113; Cohen 1993; Manekin 1997)." ], "section_title": "2. Historical Background", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nSefer ha-‘Ikkarim is Albo’s monumental philosophical\ntreatise. This book offers an extensive description of the author’s\ntheoretical doctrine. Forming the basis of this doctrine and the\nframework for the rest of his formulations are his principles of\nfaith, which attempt to define the beliefs that are the necessary\nfundamentals of a system of laws whose source is the divine. Before we\nexamine the various philosophical views incorporated within this book,\nwe will offer a concise description of its structure, stylistic\ncharacteristics, and goals.", "\n\nSefer ha-‘Ikkarim is composed of a preface, which\nincludes a highly detailed table of contents; an introduction; and\nfour treatises divided into chapters. Although Albo completed writing\nthe book around 1425, scholars have long agreed that before the book\nwas published in its entirety, a preliminary version appeared,\ncomprising the first of the four treatises (Back 1869, 8–10;\nTänzer 1896, 19–22, 27; Schweid 1967, 25).", "\n\nIn the first treatise of Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim, Albo\npresents in detail his theory of principles and the various issues it\nincludes. Albo points out several problems with the lists of\nprinciples of faith proposed by his predecessors. In particular, he\nchallenges Maimonides’ list of thirteen principles of faith,\nproposing in their place a concise list numbering only three basic\nbeliefs. Absent these beliefs, Albo believes that divine law has no\nexistence or significance: 1) the existence of God, 2) the divine\norigin of the Torah, and 3) reward and punishment. This list\ndetermines the structure of the entire book, since the following three\ntreatises address each one of the three principles in turn. The main\ntopic of the second treatise is the existence of God, and it discusses\nthe theory of divinity, especially the theory of divine\nattributes. The third treatise, whose main topic is the divine origin\nof the Torah, covers the issues of human perfection, general prophecy,\nand Mosaic prophecy and law. It concludes with a thorough discussion\nof the religious emotions of fear and love of God. The fourth and last\ntreatise, whose main subject is reward and punishment, divides into\ntwo sections. The first section describes the theory of divine\nprovidence, the problem of evil and the significance of the precepts\nof prayer and repentance. The second section in the fourth treatise\nspeaks of the theory of recompense, emphasizing that of the world to\ncome. We should note here that Albo’s theory of principles also\nincludes additional components. Each one of the principles\nnecessarily leads to further beliefs, which he calls\n“roots,” and these in turn lead to a third level of less\nimportant beliefs, which he calls “branches.”", "\n\nThe language of Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim is straightforward, and its\nphilosophical arguments are formulated in a relatively simple and\nclear manner. These characteristics mean that a broad audience of\nreaders can approach this philosophical work on their\nown. Furthermore, the modern reader can rely on Albo’s clear\nformulations to gain a preliminary acquaintance with many of the\nphilosophical viewpoints offered in the general framework of medieval\nJewish philosophy.", "\n\nAn additional stylistic aspect of Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim touches\ndirectly on the body of his theory. The book includes a number of\ninternal contradictions on a wide variety of philosophical issues.\nThis fact has led most scholars to the conclusion that this is an\neclectic work, lacking originality and vision, at a low philosophical\nlevel (Guttmann 1955; Guttmann 1964, 247–251; Ravitzky 1988,\n104–105). Yet recent scholars have proposed a new angle of\nperception on the significance of these internal contradictions,\nidentifying in Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim an esoteric writing style\nsimilar to that of Maimonides’ Guide of the\nPerplexed. According to this viewpoint, the internal\ncontradictions are not the result of lack of attention on the part of\nan eclectic and average philosopher who combined various sources\nwithout regard to the differences between them. On the contrary, they\nbelieve these contradictions demonstrate meticulous attention on the\npart of the philosopher. The maverick position claims that Albo\nintentionally embedded in his book conflicting opinions in order to\nhide his true viewpoint on various theological issues from certain\ngroups of readers. Among other evidence, this research position relies\non Albo’s explicit statement in the introductory comment to the second\ntreatise (Schwartz 2002, 183–196; Ehrlich 2009a).", "\n\nMost scholars assume that we should understand Albo’s goal in\nwriting Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim against the\nbackground of the historical reality in which he lived. As indicated,\nthe book was written as an attempt to address the severe social and\nreligious distress of the Jews of Christian Spain in the late\nfourteenth – early fifteenth centuries. In the framework of this\napproach, we may discern two different goals that the book intends to\nserve.", "\n\nSocial goal –to offer a rationalist\napologetic for Judaism alongside a refutation of the doctrines of\nChristianity, with the aim of limiting the phenomenon of conversion and\nthe spiritual decline of the Jews of Christian Spain at that time\n(Husik 1928–30, 62–65).\n\n\n\nTheoretical goal – to redefine the\nprinciples of Judaism and discuss its theoretical relation to\nphilosophy, in light of the intensification of internal arguments on\nthese issues within Jewish thought during the period discussed (Back\n1869, 5–6; Lerner 2000, 90–95).\n\n", "\n\nSefer ha-‘Ikkarim was first published in 1485 as one of the\nfirst works of Jewish philosophy to reach the printing press. The book\nmade a considerable impact throughout the fifteenth century, with\nrenowned Jewish philosophers citing it and contending with its\nideas. Among them we may name such personalities as Isaac Arama,\nAbraham Bibago and Isaac Abravanel. From the sixteenth to the\neighteenth centuries, his thought continued to engage Jewish and\nnon-Jewish philosophers, including Baruch Spinoza, Moses Mendelssohn,\nand several Christian theologians. During this period, two authors\nwrote commentaries on Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim: Jacob Koppelman\n(Ohel Ya‘akov, Freiburg 1584) and Gedaliah Lipschitz (Etz\nShatul, Venice 1618). In addition, the book was translated into\nLatin, German, English and Russian, and its first treatise was\ntranslated into Italian. In 1929, Isaac Husik published a critical\nedition of Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim, including his translation of\nthe book into English, an introduction, and detailed notes and indices\n(Albo 1929).", "\n\nBefore taking up our discussion of Albo’s thought, we must point out a\nsignificant methodological problem that this discussion entails. On\nthe one hand, the common opinion in the literature on Albo estimates\nthat he was not an original philosopher at all, and that the body of\nhis book merely summarizes the various approaches he knew from the\nworks of the Jewish philosophers that preceded him. This theory, in\nits extreme version, argues that even the theory of principles, the\nmain reason for his book’s renown, is not Albo’s unique creation. In\ncontrast, a more recent trend in research on Albo’s work identifies\nclear characteristics of esoteric writing in his book. This theory\ninterprets the conflicting opinions on the issues in the book as\nbelonging to two separate layers of writing – the external,\nexoteric layer, and the inner, esoteric layer. In many cases, these\ntwo research approaches lead to differing opinions regarding the\nquestion of Albo’s independent philosophical positions.", "\n\nBecause of this, the overview below will present the central issues\naddressed in Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim with a faithful reflection of\nthe state of present research on Albo’s philosophy. At the same time,\nwe will refrain from categorizing his various philosophical\nviews. This essay will discuss Albo’s theories of: (1) law, (2)\nprinciples, (3) divinity, (4) humanity, and (5) providence and\nrecompense." ], "section_title": "3. Introduction to Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn striving to formulate a list of the fundamental beliefs of religion\nfrom within his theory of principles (which we will explain in the\nnext section), Albo abandons the status quo of similar lists composed\nby his predecessors. Instead of naming the principles of Mosaic law\n(“the Torah of Moses”) as, for example, Maimonides did in\nhis well-known list of thirteen principles, Albo widens his target and\nlists the principles of “divine law.” By this term he\nrefers to the entire system of laws whose source is in the revelation\nof God to humanity. This change leads Albo to dedicate a particularly\nlong discussion (treatise 1, chapters 5–8) to the topic of the\nvarious types of law. Albo distinguishes three such types. The first\nof these is divine law, meaning a law whose origin is in divine\nrevelation, such as Judaism. The second type is conventional law, a\nsystem of laws that human beings establish by mutual agreement in\nnumerous political and social frameworks. Its purpose is to maintain\nthe moral order of society and ensure the ongoing function of its\nsystems. The third form of law according to Albo is natural law, or\nthe basic laws of morality that aim to prevent injustice and promote\nhonest behavior. Following is a short explanation of two main aspects\nof Albo’s theory of law that the academic literature covers: the\nconcept of natural law, its origins, meaning and influence; and the\nmethod of verification of divine law.", "\n\nNatural law. Albo was one of the first Jewish\nphilosophers to specifically address the concept of natural law along\nwith his contemporary Zerahia Halevi Saladin. Apparently, this was due\nto the influence of the Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas, who\nclassified laws in his book Summa Theologica. Albo’s\nview of natural law has attracted the attention of many scholars, in\ncomparison to other topics in his philosophy, but the popular view\namong these scholars is that Albo did not attach great importance to\nthis concept (Guttmann 1955, 176–184; Lerner 1964; Novak 1983,\n319–350; Melamed 1989; Ehrlich 2006; Ackerman 2013).", "\n\nVerification of divine law. One of the formative\nfactors in Albo’s philosophy was the anti-Christian polemic. For this\nreason, one of the questions that engages him is the method of\ndistinguishing between the true divine law, meaning the Torah of Moses,\nand a false religion that also claims to be of divine origin, meaning\nChristianity. Albo proposes two criteria for distinguishing between the\ntwo. Firstly, the true divine law is the one whose beliefs do not\ncontradict any one of the necessary principles of divine law. Secondly,\nthe true divine law provides incontrovertible proof of the credibility\nof its messenger, who informs the world of the law’s existence and\ndivine origin (treatise 1, chapter 18). An important study on this\nissue argued that the first point is problematic, because it assumes\nthat philosophy defines the basic beliefs of divine law and thus\ndetermines which law is truly divine. This is in opposition to the\nAverroistic approach, which disallows the use of philosophy for\nverifying religious matters. The solution for this problem lies in an\nalternate understanding of the role of philosophy in inter-religious\ndebate. Philosophy does not serve as an affirming mechanism to validate\ncertain beliefs, but only as a negating tool for identifying beliefs\nthat stand in direct conflict with the basic rules of logic. In other\nwords, Albo does not use philosophy to prove the validity of the\nbeliefs of Judaism, but rather to reject Christianity as a false\nreligion in light of its beliefs that stand in contradiction to\nphilosophy (Lasker 1980)." ], "section_title": "4. The Theory of Law", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAlbo’s theory of principles is the focal point of his book, the\nframework upon which its sections are built, and the element that\ngrants the book its name. Naturally, the academic debate on the theory\nof principles is also quite extensive. Below we will relate to two\naspects of the theory. First we will present the conceptual structure\nof the theory of principles as detailed in the first treatise of\nSefer ha-‘Ikkarim, and then we will survey the various\napproaches of the scholarship on this theory.", "\n\nAlbo presents his theory of principles as an alternative to previous\ntheories of principles, especially that of Maimonides. Additionally,\nAlbo openly criticizes his predecessors’ lists of principles. In their\nstead, he proposes a system of fundamental beliefs divided into three\nlevels, which he calls “principles,” “roots,”\nand “branches.” The principles are those beliefs that are\nderived necessarily from the term “divine law.” They are:\n(1) the existence of the divine entity (“existence of\nGod”); (2) the divine origin of the system of laws (“Torah\nfrom heaven”); and (3) the existence of divine providence,\nexpressed in compensatory reward and punishment for humanity\n(“reward and punishment”). From these principles stem\neight “roots,” which are beliefs that instill clear and\ndetailed content into the general concept of the principle. The first\nprinciple, the existence of God, develops into four roots: (1) the\nunity of God, (2) the incorporeality of God, (3) God’s independence of\ntime, (4) God’s lack of deficiencies. The second principle, Torah from\nheaven, leads to three roots: (5) God’s knowledge, (6) prophecy, and\n(7) the genuineness of the divine messenger. The third principle,\nreward and punishment, branches into a single root: (8)\nprovidence. Denial of any of the principles or roots represents a\nheresy of the divine law.", "\n\nThe third category, “branches,” comprises beliefs that\nAlbo argues are true and that every follower of divine law must\naccept. But in contrast to the first two categories, Albo does not\ndefine refusal to accept the branches as heresy of the divine law, but\nrather only as a sin requiring atonement. Albo lists six beliefs in\nthis category: (1) creation ex nihilo; (2) the supremacy of\nMoses’ prophecy; (3) the eternal nature of the Torah; (4) the\npossibility of obtaining human perfection through the performance of a\nsingle commandment; (5) the resurrection of the dead; (6) the coming\nof the Messiah.", "\n\nEarly scholars of Albo’s work in the late nineteenth and early\ntwentieth centuries argued that Albo’s contribution to the history of\nJewish thought was limited to his theory of principles and the first\ntreatise of his book (Schlesinger 1844, xi–xiv; Back 1869,\n3–5, 8–9; Tänzer 1896, 23–30). Later scholars\ncalled his theory unoriginal, and identified the philosophical sources\nthat influenced it, especially Maimonides, Ibn Rushd, Nissim of Gerona,\nHasdai Crescas and Simeon ben Zemah Duran (Guttmann 1955,\n170–176; Waxman 1956, 158–161; Schweid 1963; Klein-Braslavi\n1980, 194–197). A subsequent, third scholarly trend attempted to\nclarify the nature of the internal relationship between the categories\nof Albo’s theory of principles (principles, roots, and branches), and\nexamined Albo’s position regarding the concept of heresy (Kellner 1986,\n140–156)." ], "section_title": "5. The Theory of Principles", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe central discussion in the theory of divinity in Sefer\nha-‘Ikkarim is located in the second treatise, which is dedicated\nto the principle of the existence of God and its derivative roots. The\nphilosophical issue at the focal point of this discussion is the\ntheory of divine attributes. Scholars of Albo’s theory of attributes\nhave discerned an internal contradiction between rationalist and\nconservative positions in his discussion of this topic. On the one\nhand, in a number of locations he purports to support Maimonides’\nnegative theology, and interprets the various attributes of God as\nnegative attributes. On the other hand, elsewhere he relates positive\nattributes to God, in accordance with the method of his teacher,\nCrescas. Some scholars have ascribed this contradiction to the\neclectic character of Albo’s work (Wolfson 1916–17,\n213–216; Guttmann 1955, 184–191), while others have\nrelated it to the esoteric style of writing of Sefer\nha-‘Ikkarim. Possibly, they suggest, his goal here was to\nconceal his conservative position on this issue from the circles of\nrationalist thinkers he frequented (Schwartz 2002, 187–196;\nEhrlich 2009a, 88–93).", "\n\nThe second treatise of the book raises another important philosophical\nproblem, the significance of the concept of time. One of the roots of\nthe principle of the existence of God is God’s independence of\ntime. In Albo’s discussion of this root, he discriminates between two\ndifferent concepts of time, Aristotelian-physical and\nNeoplatonic-ontological. Two central trends appear in the academic\nliterature on this topic. The first places the concept of time at the\nfocus of the discussion, attempting to clarify the relationship\nbetween the two different concepts of time that appear in Albo’s\ndiscussion (Harvey 1979–80). Those scholars who take the second\nposition discuss Albo’s concept of time as part of their attempt to\nidentify his cosmogonic view, in other words, which theory of the\norigin of the world he upholds (Klein-Braslavi 1976, 118–120,\n126; Rudavsky 1997, 470–473). In this context, we should point\nout that comprehensive study of Albo’s writing on this issue reveals a\ncertain difficulty in categorizing his exact position. Together with\nexplicit dogmatic statements supporting the theory of creation ex\nnihilo appearing in the first treatise, we find other statements,\nalthough less overt, some of which argue for the eternal existence of\nmatter, and some of which even support the eternal existence of the\nworld (Ehrlich 2009a, 94–112)." ], "section_title": "6. The Theory of Divinity", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe central discussion on the theory of humanity in Sefer\nha-‘Ikkarim is located in the third treatise, which covers\nthe principle of Torah from heaven and its roots. The philosophical\nissue present throughout the sections of this treatise is that of the\nnature of human perfection. To put it mildly, Albo’s discussion on this\ntopic has not merited intensive treatment in the academic literature.\nAside from this concept, the treatise addresses in depth the idea of\nprophecy and several aspects of the Torah of Moses and its\ncommandments. In one section of his discussion on the last topic, Albo\nresponds to the attacks of a Christian scholar on the Torah of Moses,\nincluding both apologetic and polemic elements in his rejoinders.", "\n\nIn the introductory chapters of the third treatise, Albo criticizes\nthe position of the rationalist Jewish philosophers, who associated\nhuman perfection with the level of individual intellectual\nachievement. In contrast to this approach, Albo proposes a\nconservative theory, arguing that human perfection depends on the\nfulfillment of the Torah’s commandments, in other words, the practical\nworship of God (treatise 3, chapters 1–7). Yet on this subject\nas well, we note considerable internal contradictions, which we will\nillustrate with several examples. Firstly, in the first treatise of\nhis book, Albo clearly determines that human perfection depends on\nfaith in God and in the principles of divine law (treatise 1, chapters\n21–22). Secondly, in several places in the book he diminishes\nthe value of the practical element of fulfilling the commandments of\nthe Torah, and emphasizes in its stead the element of awareness, or\nintent (treatise 3, chapters 28–29). A third contradiction is\nfound in the final chapters of the third treatise, which analyze the\nconcepts of reverence and love for God. Albo considers these to be\nthe highest levels of divine worship. He defines love of God as an\nintellectual phenomenon whose level depends on the intellectual status\nof the person (treatise 3, chapters 35–36; Ehrlich\n2004a). According to the two main theories found in the academic\nliterature, these contradictions may characterize either eclectic or\nesoteric writing.", "\n\nTo Albo, prophecy is not a natural characteristic of the human soul,\nbut rather depends on divine will. God, should He so will, grants\ndivine inspiration to the prophet. His primary purpose in so doing is\nto inform humanity of the commandments so that through them they may\nachieve human perfection (treatise 3, chapter 8). Scholars who have\nstudied Albo’s theory of prophecy have pointed out that it integrates\nboth rationalist elements from Maimonides’ parallel discussion and\nspiritual, supra-intellectual elements from the writings of Rabbi\nJudah Halevi and Crescas on this subject. Some have seen in this\nintegration a demonstration of Albo’s purpose in remaining faithful to\nthe Aristotelian tradition of Maimonides, while attempting (not always\nsuccessfully) to bend it as far as possible in the conservative\ndirection (Schweid 1965). Others have considered this integration an\nexpression of the general problematic character of Albo’s thought that\ndoes not contend with the problems it produces. These scholars also\nargue that Albo’s basic approach is that prophecy transcends the\nnatural, and that this concept is grounded in the deep-seated\ntradition of Jewish thought (Kreisel 2001, 540–543). Here as\nwell, we should not ignore the possibility that the internal\ncontradictions in Albo’s discussion reflect an esoteric writing\nstyle.", "\n\nAlbo distinguishes between various levels of prophecy, with the\ncentral goal of establishing the supremacy of Mosaic prophecy as the\nstarting point for validating Mosaic law as the divine law. According\nto Albo, Moses is the most exalted prophet, for only in his case did\ndivine inspiration directly reach the intellectual power of his soul,\nwithout the mediation of the imagination. The significance of this\nproclamation is that only for Moses’ prophecy is there no doubt\nregarding the validity of its content (treatise 3, chapters\n8–10). Albo also claims that at the giving of the Torah on Mt.\nSinai, the Israelites all received prophetic inspiration; however, they\nwere not on the prophetic level, and this is in support of Moses’\nadvanced status (treatise 3, chapter 11).", "\n\nAfter discussing the prophecy of Moses, Albo takes up the topic of the\ndivine Torah that Moses gave to the people of Israel. He treats a\nnumber of aspects of this issue, such as the classification of the\nmitzvot (commandments), the status of the Ten Commandments,\nand the importance of the Oral Law. Yet apparently, the thrust of his\nefforts is directed toward establishing the idea of the eternity of\nthe Torah, apparently in response to the Jewish-Christian polemic on\nthis topic. Remaining faithful to his dogmatic method, Albo argues\nthat in Mosaic law, and in divine law in general, changes in the\ndetails of the commandments may take place, but their fundamental\nprinciples cannot change (treatise 3, chapters 13–22).", "\n\nWithin his discussion on Mosaic law, Albo includes a chapter\ndescribing its condemnation by an anonymous Christian scholar\n(treatise 3, chapter 25). The Christian contends that in every\npossible parameter, the religion of Jesus supersedes Mosaic law, and\nAlbo replies to this assault in detail. The present forum is too\nlimited to specify the content of this polemic, but suffice it to say\nthat this chapter in particular reflects Albo’s quite extensive\nknowledge of the Christian religion. He demonstrates proficiency in\nChristian writings, and in addition, he recognizes the internal\ntension within Christianity between the papacy and the Roman\nEmpire. He reveals knowledge of Church history, and finally, he\nchallenges the central Christian doctrines (the Trinity,\ntransubstantiation, and the virgin birth) while describing them in\ndetail. It should be noted that Albo’s polemic against Christianity is\nnot limited to this chapter, but runs throughout the book, both\nexplicitly and implicitly (Schweid 1968; Lasker 1977, cf. index\n[“Albo, Joseph”]; Rauschenbach 2002, 142–156)." ], "section_title": "7. The Theory of Humanity", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe fourth and last treatise of Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim is\nprimarily concerned with the principle of reward and punishment and\nits roots. The first part of this treatise (chapters 1–28)\ncontains Albo’s central discussion on the theory of providence, while\nthe second part (chapters 29–51) incorporates his main\ndiscussion on the theory of recompense. Below we will discuss these\ntwo theories in their order of appearance in the book.", "\n\nAlbo begins this treatise with the statement that humanity has basic\nfree will, for this is the necessary condition of the concept of\nrecompense. Additionally, he argues that this human freedom does not\nconflict with God’s omniscience, nor with the existence of an\nastrological-deterministic system in the universe (treatise 4,\nchapters 1–6; Sadik 2012; Weiss 2017). His direct discussion of\nthe concept of divine providence divides into three main parts. First,\nhe discusses the proofs of the veracity of providence from natural and\nhuman reality, and from intellectual investigation (treatise 4,\nchapters 8–10). Then he treats the principal theological\nchallenge to the concept of providence, namely, the problem of evil,\nor the suffering of the righteous and success of the wicked (treatise\n4, chapters 12–15). Finally, he examines the specific religious\nconsequences of providence, paying special attention to the\ntheoretical infrastructure of the precepts of prayer (treatise 4,\nchapters 16–24) and repentance (treatise 4, chapters\n25–28; Ehrlich 2008; Harvey 2015). These last two discussions\nare of exceptional scope within medieval Jewish philosophy.", "\n\nAlbo’s discussions of free will, of proofs for divine providence, and\nof the problem of evil do not include almost any original ideas, and he\nmostly relies on the writings of the Jewish philosophers who preceded\nhim. In contrast, his treatment of prayer and repentance seem to\nreveal a certain level of innovation. Regarding free will, Albo\napparently adopts Maimonides’ opinion that divine knowledge differs\nsignificantly from human knowledge, and that God’s absolute knowledge\ndoes not necessarily abrogate free will for human beings. The academic\nliterature considers several of Albo’s discussions on providence to be\nnothing more than comprehensive summaries of the work of his\nprecursors. This category includes his methods of proving the\nexistence of divine providence over humanity, as well as his attempts\nto defend the concept of God’s absolute good, despite what seems to be\ninjustice in the world (Bleich 1997, 340–358). Still, in the\nrest of the treatise Albo presents broad, methodical discussions on\nthe various philosophical aspects of the issues of prayer and\nrepentance, for which his predecessors addressed mainly the halakhic\nfeatures.", "\n\nAlbo’s central argument on the topic of prayer is that it\ninfluences a person’s status by causing an internal change\nwithin that person. This change raises the person to a level where he\nreceives constant divine inspiration through God’s\nbenevolence. The basic assumption of this concept is that prayer\ncannot cause any change in God, since such an assumption would detract\nfrom divine perfection. Thus we should conceive of prayer as the\ninternal act of a person upon the self, raising the self to a higher\nspiritual level (treatise 4, chapters 16–18). This model stands\nin opposition to the traditional conception of prayer as a channel of\ncommunication between the praying person and the listening God.", "\n\nAlbo understands the significance of repentance in two directions.\nThe first is based on his concept of prayer, and defines repentance as\nan act in which a person uplifts himself to a higher level than at the\ntime of the sin. In this way, he changes his identity, and is no\nlonger deserving of punishment for the act he performed in his\nprevious identity (treatise 4, chapter 18). The second conception of\nrepentance focuses not on the person but on the sinful act he has\ncommitted. Under this rubric, repentance retroactively expropriates\nthe conscious foundations of this act. In other words, repentance\nredefines the sinful act as unintentional, and thus undeserving of\npunishment (treatise 4, chapter 27).", "\n\nThe second half of the fourth treatise of Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim\npresents Albo’s theory of recompense. The main issue Albo raises here\nis the character of the reward and punishment destined for a person in\nthe world to come. Throughout his wide-ranging discussion on the\nquestion of recompense in the next world, Albo confronts two\nconflicting points of view. Maimonides views recompense as applying to\nthe soul alone, while Nahmanides opines that it affects the body as\nwell (treatise 4, chapters 29–41). Albo’s own opinion on this\nsubject is unclear. At the beginning of the discussion, he seems to\nsupport Maimonides’ viewpoint, but he continues the discussion with\nthe assumption that he cannot definitely rule out Nahmanides’\napproach, which is supported by sources from kabbalistic literature.\nScholars who have discerned the unique character of this section have\ndescribed Albo’s position in almost every possible way. Some say he\navoids commitment (Sarachek 1932, 224), while others think he adopts a\nsynthetic middle position (Schwartz 1997, 202–208); still others\nbelieve he accepts Maimonides’ approach (Husik 1966, 426), and their\nopponents argue that he accepts Nahmanides’ view (Agus 1959,\n238–239). Apparently, therefore, this issue in Albo’s\nphilosophical-religious theory is especially obscure (Ehrlich 2009b)." ], "section_title": "8. The Theory of Providence and Recompense", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Albo, Joseph, 1929, Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim [Book of\nPrinciples], I. Husik (trans. and ed.), Philadelphia: The Jewish\nPublication Society of America.", "Ackerman, A., 2013, “Zerahia Halevi Saladin and Joseph Albo\non Natural, Conventional and Divine Law”, Jewish Studies\nQuarterly, 20: 315–339.", "Agus, J. B., 1959, The Evolution of Jewish Thought\nfrom Biblical Times to the Opening of the Modern Era, London:\nAbelard-Schuman.", "Back, S., 1869, Joseph Albo’s Bedeutung in der Geschichte der\njüdischen Religionsphilosophie: Ein Beitrag zur genauern\nKenntniss der Tendenz des Buches “IKKARIM”,\nBreslau: B. Heidenfeld.", "Baer, Y., 1961, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain\n(Volume 2), Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America.", "Ben-Sasson, H. H., 1984, Retzef u-tmurah\n[Continuity and Variety], J. R. Hacker (ed.), Tel Aviv: Am Oved\nPublishers.", "Bleich, J. D., 1997, “Providence in the Philosophy of Hasdai\nCrescas and Joseph Albo”, in Hazon Nahum: Studies in Jewish Law,\nThought, and History Presented to Dr. Norman Lamm, Y. Elman &\nJ. S. Gurock (eds.), New York: Yeshiva University Press,\npp. 311–358.", "Cohen, J., 1993, “Profiat Duran’s The Reproach of the\nGentiles and the Development of Jewish Anti-Christian Polemic”,\nin Shlomo Simonsohn Jubilee Volume: Studies on the\nHistory of the Jews in the Middle Ages and Renaissance Period,\nD. Carpi et al. (eds.), Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, pp. 71–84\n(English section).", "Davidson, H. A., 1983, “Medieval Jewish Philosophy in the\nSixteenth Century”, in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth\nCentury, B. D. Cooperman (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University\nPress, pp. 106–145.", "Ehrlich, D., 2004a, “Ahavat ha-el u-ktivah\nezoterit be-Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim le-R. Yosef Albo” [Love of\nGod and esoteric writing in Albo’s Book of Roots],\nDa‘at, 53: 63–82.", "–––, 2004b, Filosofia ve-omanut\nha-ktivah be-Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim le-R. Yosef Albo [Philosophy\nand the art of writing in R. Joseph Albo’s Book of Roots],\nPh.D. diss., Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan.", "–––, 2006, “A Reassessment of Natural Law\nin Rabbi Joseph Albo’s Book of Principles”, Hebraic\nPolitical Studies, 1: 413–439.", "–––, 2008, “Het, tshuvah u-kfirah be-Sefer\nha-‘Ikkarim le-R. Yosef Albo” [Sin, repentance and heresy in\nR. Josepf Albo’s Book of Principles], in Al ha-tshuvah\nve-al ha-geulah: minhat shay le-Binyamin Gross [On repentance and\nredemption: presented to Binyamin Gross], D. Schwartz & A. Gross\n(eds.), Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, pp. 55–80.", "–––, 2009a, Haguto shel R. Yosef Albo:\nktivah ezoterit be-shilhey yemey he-beinayim [The thought of\nR. Joseph Albo: esoteric writing in the late middle ages], Ramat-Gan:\nBar-Ilan University Press.", "–––, 2009b, “Hidden Apocalyptic Messianism\nin Late Medieval Jewish Thought”, Review of Rabbinic\nJudaism, 12: 75–88.", "–––, 2013, “Ha-dimuy ha-aristoteli\nshel einey ha-atalef ke-hipertext etsel Rihal, Ibn Daud, Hillel\nmi-Verona and Albo”, Daat, 74–75:\n357–374.", "–––, 2017, “Ekron ha-maamad ba-diyunim\nal nitshiyut onesh ha-gehenom etsel ha-Ran, Rahak ve-Albo”,\nDaat, 83: 69–84.", "Gonzalo Maeso, D., 1971, “La Judería de Soria y el\nRabino José Albo”, Misceláneade Estudios Arabes y\nHebraicos, 20 (2): 119–141.", "Graetz, H., 1894, History of the Jews (Volume IV),\nPhiladelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America.", "Guttmann, J., 1955, “Le-heker ha-mekorot shel sefer\nha-‘ikkarim” [An inquiry concerning the sources of\nthe Sefer ha-Ikkarim], in Dat u-mada: kovetz\nma’amarim ve-harza’ot [Religion and Knowledge: Essays\nand Lectures], S. H. Bergman & N. Rotenstreich (eds.), Jerusalem:\nMagnes Press, The Hebrew University, pp. 169–191.", "–––, 1964, Philosophies of Judaism: The\nHistory of Jewish philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz\nRosenzweig, New York: Doubleday.", "Gutwirth, E., 1993, “Conversions to Christianity Amongst\nFifteenth-Century Spanish Jews: An Alternative Explanation”, in\nShlomo Simonsohn Jubilee Volume: Studies on the History\nof the Jews in the Middle Ages and Renaissance Period, D. Carpi\net al. (eds.), Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, pp. 97–121\n(English section).", "Harvey, W. Z., 1979–80, “Albo’s Discussion of\nTime”, Jewish Quarterly Review, 70: 210–238.", "–––, 2015, “Albo on Repentance and\nCoersion”, Jewish Law Annual, 21: 47–57.", "Husik, I., 1928–30, “Joseph Albo The Last of the\nMediaeval Jewish Philosophers”, Proceedings of the American\nAcademy for Jewish Research, 1: 61–72.", "–––, 1966, A History of Mediaeval Jewish\nPhilosophy, New York: Harper Torchbook.", "Kellner, M., 1986, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought From\nMaimonides to Abravanel, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Klein-Braslavi, S., 1976, “Meziut ha-zman ve-ha-yamim\nha-rishonim la-briah ba-filosofia ha-yehudit shel yemei\nha-beinayim” [The reality of time and the primordial period\nin mediaeval Jewish philosophy], Tarbiz, 45:\n106–127.", "–––, 1980, “Terumato shel R. Nissim\nGirondi le-’itzuvan shel torot ha-‘ikkarim shel Hasdai Crescas\nve-shel Yosef Albo” [The influence of R. Nissim Girondi on\nCrescas’ and Albo’s “principles”], Eshel\nBeer-Sheva, 2: 177–197.", "Kreisel, H., 2001, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in\nMedieval Jewish Philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic\nPublishers.", "Lasker, D. J., 1977, Jewish Philosophical Polemics Against\nChristianity in the Middle Ages, New York: Ktav Publication\nHouse.", "–––, 1980, “Torat ha-‘immut\nbe-mishnato ha-filosofit shel Yosef Albo” [Joseph\nAlbo’s theory of verification], Da‘at, 5:\n5–12.", "–––, 1998, “The Impact of Christianity on\nLate Iberian Jewish Philosophy”, in In Iberia and Beyond: Hispanic\nJews between Cultures, B. D. Cooperman (ed.), Newark: University\nof Delaware Press, pp. 175–190.", "Lerner, R., 1964, “Natural Law in Albo’s Book of\nRoots”, in Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of\nPolitical Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss, J. Cropsey (ed.),\nNew York: Basic Books, pp. 132–147.", "–––, 2000, Maimonides’ Empire of\nLight: Popular Enlightenment in an Age of Belief, Chicago:\nUniversity of Chicago Press.", "Manekin, Charles H., 1997, “Hebrew philosophy in the\nfourteenth and fifteenth centuries: an overview”, in History\nof Jewish Philosophy (Routledge History of World Philosophies:\nVolume 2), D. H. Frank & O. Leaman (eds.), London: Routledge,\npp. 350–378.", "Melamed, A., 1989, “Ha-‘Im hikdim ibn Wakar et Albo\nbe-sivug ha-hukim?” [Did ibn Wakar precede Albo in the\nclassification of the law?], Tura, 1: 270–284.", "Motis Dolader, M. A., 1990, “The Disappearance of the Jewish\nCommunity of Daroca in the Beginning of the 15th Century”,\nProceedings of the Tenth World Congress for Jewish Studies,\n2: 143–150.", "Netanyahu, B., 1966, The Marranos of Spain from the Late\n14th Century to the Early 16th Century According\nto Contemporary Hebrew Sources, New York: American Academy for\nJewish Research.", "Novak, D., 1983, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: A\nHistorical and Constructive Study of the Noahides laws, New York:\nMellen.", "Rauschenbach, S., 2002, Josef Albo: Jüdische Philosophie\nund christliche Kontroverstheologie in der Frühen Neuzeit\n[Studies in European Judaism, vol. 3], Leiden: Brill.", "Ravitzky, A., 1988, Derashat ha-Pesah le-R. Hasdai Crescas\nu-mehkarim be-mishnato ha-filosofit [Crescas’ sermon on the\nPassover and studies in his philosophy], Jerusalem: The Israel Academy\nof Sciences and Humanities.", "Rudavsky, T. M., 1997, “Creation and Temporality in Medieval\nJewish Philosophy”, Faith and Philosophy, 14:\n458–477.", "Sadik, S., 2012, “Ha-behira be-haguto shel Rabbi Yosef\nAlbo” [Freedom of Choice in the Thought of Rabbi Josef\nAlbo], Jewish Studies, an Internet Journal, 11:\n139–151.", "Sarachek, J., 1932, The Doctrine of the Messiah in Medieval\nJewish Literature, New York: Hermon Press.", "Schlesinger, L., 1844, Introduction to Joseph Albo, Buch\nIkkarim: Grund- und Glaubenslehren der Mosaischen Religion,\ntrans. W. Schlessinger & L. Schlesinger, Frankfurt a.M..", "Schwartz, D., 1991, “Ha-Yeridah ha-ruhanit datit shel\nha-kehilah ha-yehudit bi-sfarad be-sof ha-meah ha-arba‘\n‘esre” [The spiritual-intellectual decline of the Jewish\ncommunity in Spain at the end of the fourteenth century],\nPe‘amim, 46–47: 92–114.", "–––, 1997, Ha-Ra’ayon ha-meshihi be-hagut\nha-yehudit bi-ymei ha-beinayim [Messianism in medieval Jewish\nthought], Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press.", "–––, 2002, Setirah ve-hastarah\nbe-hagut ha-yehudit bi-ymei ha-beinayim [Contradiction and\nconcealment in medieval Jewish thought], Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan\nUniversity Press.", "Schweid, E., 1963, “Bein mishnat ha-‘ikkarim\nshel R. Yosef Albo le-mishnat ha-‘ikkarim shel ha-Rambam” [Joseph\nAlbo’s system of dogmas as distinct from that of Maimonides],\nTarbiz, 33: 74–84.", "–––, 1965, “Ha-nevuah be-mishnato shel\nR. Yosef Albo” [The doctrine of prophecy in the\nphilosophic system of R. Joseph Albo], Tarbiz, 35:\n48–60.", "–––, 1967, Introduction to Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim\nle-R. Yosef Albo: perakim [R. Joseph Albo’s Book of\nPrinciples: chapters], Jerusalem: Bialik Institute.", "–––, 1968, “Ha-pulmus neged ha-Nazrut\nke-gorem me’azzev be-mishnat ha-R. Y. Albo” [The polemic\nagainst Christianity as a factor in shaping Joseph Albo’s doctrines],\nProceedings of the Forth World Congress for Jewish Studies,\n2: 309–312.", "Shemesh, A. O., 2019, “Two Medieval Necromantic Practices:\nMaimonides Versus Nahmanides and R. Joseph Albo Concerning\n‘Ob’ and ‘Yidoni’”, Review of\nRabbinic Judaism, 22: 93–119.", "Tänzer, A., 1896, Die Religionsphilosophie Josef Albo’s\nnach seinem werke ‘Ikkarim’: Systematisch\nDragestellt und Erläutert, Frankfurt a.M.: Kauffmann.", "Waxman, M., 1956, “Shitato shel R. Yosef Albo\nbe-‘ikkarei ha-dat ve-yahasah le-torat bnei-doro R. Hasdai\nCrescas ve-R. Shimon ben-Zemah Duran” [The method of R. Joseph\nAlbo in the principles of religion and its relation to the theory of\nhis contemporaries, R. Hasdai Crescas and R. Shimon ben Zemah Duran],\nBi-shvilei ha-sifrut ve-ha-mahshavah ha-‘ivrit [Paths in\nJewish literature and philosophy], Tel Aviv: Yavne,\npp. 135–165.", "Weiss, S., 2017, Joseph Albo on Free Choice: Exegetical\nInnovation in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Wolfson, H. A., 1916–17, “Crescas on the Problem of\nDivine Attributes”, Jewish Quarterly Review, 7: 1–44,\n175–221." ]	[ { "href": "../aquinas/", "text": "Aquinas, Thomas" }, { "href": "../crescas/", "text": "Crescas, Hasdai" }, { "href": "../evil/", "text": "evil: problem of" }, { "href": "../halevi/", "text": "Halevi, Judah" }, { "href": "../ibn-rushd/", "text": "Ibn Rushd [Averroes]" }, { "href": "../maimonides/", "text": "Maimonides" }, { "href": "../mendelssohn/", "text": "Mendelssohn, Moses" }, { "href": "../natural-law-theories/", "text": "nature of law: natural law theories" }, { "href": "../prophecy/", "text": "prophecy" }, { "href": "../providence-divine/", "text": "providence, divine" }, { "href": "../spinoza/", "text": "Spinoza, Baruch" }, { "href": "../time/", "text": "time" } ]
alcmaeon	Alcmaeon	First published Thu Apr 10, 2003; substantive revision Sun Apr 4, 2021	[ "\nAlcmaeon of Croton was an early Greek medical writer and\nphilosopher-scientist. His exact date, his relationship to other early\nGreek philosopher-scientists, and whether he was primarily a medical\nwriter/physician or a typical Presocratic cosmologist, are all matters\nof controversy. He is likely to have written his book sometime between\n500 and 450 BCE. The surviving fragments and testimonia focus\nprimarily on issues of physiology, psychology, and epistemology and\nreveal Alcmaeon to be a thinker of considerable originality. He was\nthe first to identify the brain as the seat of understanding and to\ndistinguish understanding from perception. Alcmaeon thought that the\nsensory organs were connected to the brain by channels\n(poroi) and may have discovered the poroi connecting\nthe eyes to the brain (i.e. the optic nerve) by excising the eyeball\nof an animal, although it is doubtful that he used dissection as a\nstandard method. He was the first to develop an argument for the\nimmortality of the soul. He used a political metaphor to define health\nand disease: The equality (isonomia) of the opposing powers\nwhich make up the body (e.g., the wet, the dry, the hot, the cold, the\nsweet, the bitter etc.) preserves health, whereas the monarchy of any\none of them produces disease. Alcmaeon discussed a wide range of\ntopics in physiology including sleep, death, and the development of\nthe embryo. It is unclear whether he also presented a cosmology in\nterms of opposing powers, but we do have some testimonia concerning\nhis views on astronomy. Alcmaeon had considerable impact on his\nsuccessors in the Greek philosophical tradition. Aristotle wrote a\ntreatise responding to him, Plato may have been influenced by his\nargument for the immortality of the soul, and both Plato and Philolaus\naccepted his view that the brain is the seat of intelligence." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Medical Writer or Philosopher?", "1.2 Was Alcmaeon a Pythagorean?", "1.3 Date", "1.4 Alcmaeon’s Book and the Evidence for Its Contents" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Epistemology and Psychology", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 The Limits of Knowledge", "2.2 Understanding and Empiricism", "2.3 Did Alcmaeon Practice Dissection?", "2.4 Sense Perception", "2.5 The Immortality of the Soul" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Medical Doctrines", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Health and Disease", "3.2 Sleep, Embryology and the Use of Analogy" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Cosmology", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Astronomy", "4.2 Opposites" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Importance and Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAlcmaeon, son of Peirithous (otherwise unknown), lived in the Greek\ncity of Croton on the instep of the boot of Italy. Diogenes Laertius,\nin his brief life of Alcmaeon (VIII. 83), asserts that he wrote mostly\non medical matters. There is, however, little direct evidence for his\nwork as a practicing physician. Later writers in the medical\ntradition, such as Galen (DK A2), treat him as a philosopher-scientist\nrather than as a physician, so that some scholars (Mansfeld 1975; cf.\nPerilli 2001 for a critique) have concluded that he was not a doctor\nat all but rather a typical Presocratic physiologos (writer\non nature). The majority of scholars, however, because of\nDiogenes’ remark and because of the focus on the functioning of\nthe human body in the testimonia and fragments, refer to Alcmaeon as a\nphysician-philosopher. The historian Herodotus tells us that, in the\nsecond half of the sixth century, the physicians of Croton were the\nbest in the Greek world (III. 131) and recounts in some detail the\nactivities of the most prominent Crotoniate physician of the time,\nDemocedes (III. 125–138). Thus, whether a practicing physician\nor not, Alcmaeon undoubtedly owes some of his interest in human\nphysiology and psychology to the medical tradition in Croton. In the\nfifth century, it is difficult to draw clear lines between the work of\na medical writer/physician and a philosopher/scientist. Presocratic\ncosmologies of this period devoted some attention to questions of\nhuman physiology and medicine, and conversely the early treatises in\nthe Hippocratic corpus often paid some attention to cosmology (see\nAristotle, Resp. 480b23 ff.). The earliest Presocratic\ncosmologies in Ionia (e.g., those of Anaximander and Anaximenes) did\nnot deal with physiology, and it is possible that the new interest in\nphysiology in cosmologies of the fifth century (e.g., those of\nEmpedocles and Anaxagoras) was due to the influence of Alcmaeon (Zhmud\n2012a, 366; 2014, 100)." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Medical Writer or Philosopher?" }, { "content": [ "\nCroton is also famous as the center of Pythagoras’ activity from\nca. 530, when he left Samos. Alcmaeon addressed his book to three men\nwho may have been Pythagoreans:", "\nAlcmaeon of Croton, son of Peirithous, said the following to Brotinus,\nLeon, and Bathyllus… (DK, B1)\n", "\nWe know nothing of Leon and Bathyllus, except that Iamblichus, in\nOn the Pythagorean Way of Life (=VP), lists a\nPythagorean named Leon from Metapontum and a Pythagorean Bathylaus\nfrom Poseidonia (Paestum), both Greek cities of southern Italy\n(VP 267). Bro(n)tinus is identified as a Pythagorean from\nCroton in some places (D.L. VIII. 42; Iamb. VP 132) and from\nMetapontum in others (VP 194, 267). He is either the father\nor the husband of Theano, who is in turn either the wife or student of\nPythagoras. Does this “dedication” of his book to\nPythagoreans indicate that Alcmaeon himself was a Pythagorean? Even if\nthis is a dedication, it does not follow that Alcmaeon agreed with the\nviews of his addressees. Comparison with Empedocles’ address to\nPausanias suggests, moreover, that what we have is not a dedication\nbut an exhortation or an attempt to instruct (Vlastos 1953, 344, n.\n25). Comparison with other early Greek prose writers such as Hecataeus\nand Heraclitus shows that books could begin with criticism of the\nviews of others so that Alcmaeon’s address to these Pythagoreans\nmay be polemical (Kouloumentas 2018).", "\nDiogenes Laertius, in his Lives of the Philosophers\n(3rd century AD), includes Alcmaeon among the Pythagoreans\nand says that he studied with Pythagoras (VIII. 83). Later authors\nsuch as Iamblichus (VP 104, 267), Philoponus (De An.\np. 88), and the scholiast on Plato (Alc. 121e) also call\nAlcmaeon a Pythagorean. A majority of scholars up to the middle of the\ntwentieth century followed this tradition. However, it is not true\nthat the ancient “tradition is unanimous in presenting him as a\nPythagorean” (Zhmud 2012a, 123). In fact, the majority of\nancient sources do not describe him as a Pythagorean (e.g., Clement\n[DK 24A2], Galen [DK24A2], Aetius [DK 24A4, 6, 8–10, 13,\n17–18], Censorinus [DK 24A13–14], and Chalcidius [DK\nA10]). The best argument for regarding him as Pythagorean would be his\ninclusion in Iamblichus’ catalogue of Pythagoreans at the end of\nhis On the Pythagorean Life, if we could be sure that all\nparts of that catalogue go back to Aristoxenus in the fourth century,\nsince Aristoxenus is a very knowledgeable source on Pythagoreanism\n(Zhmud 2012a, 122; 2012b, 241–43). However, certain parts of the\ncatalogue are very unlikely go back to Aristoxenus and we cannot be\ncertain that the inclusion of Alcmaeon was due to him (Huffman 2005,\n297–99). Apart from this possibility regarding Aristoxenus, no\none earlier than Diogenes Laertius (ca. 200 AD) calls Alcmaeon a\nPythagorean. Aristotle wrote two books on the Pythagoreans but wrote a\nseparate book on Alcmaeon. Aristotle and Theophrastus refer to him a\nnumber of times but never identify him as a Pythagorean, and this is\nthe practice of the doxographical tradition (see A4, 6, 8–10,\n13–14, 17–18, in DK 24). Simplicius\n(6th AD) reports that some have handed down the view that\nAlcmaeon is a Pythagorean but notes that Aristotle denies it (De\nAn. 32.3). Most telling is Aristotle’s discussion of\nAlcmaeon in Metaphysics book I (986a22 ff.). He notes a\nsimilarity between Alcmaeon and a group of Pythagoreans in positing\nopposites as the principles of things but expresses uncertainty as to\nwho influenced whom. Earlier scholars took this comparison of Alcmaeon\nto the Pythagoreans as confirmation that he was a Pythagorean. Most\nscholars of the last fifty years, however, have come to recognize that\nAristotle’s treatment of Alcmaeon here suggests the exact\nopposite; it only makes sense to compare him with the Pythagoreans and\nwonder who influenced whom, if he is not a Pythagorean (e.g., Guthrie\n1962, 341: “Aristotle … expressly distinguishes him from\nthe Pythagoreans”). Certainly most of the opposites which are\nmentioned as crucial to Alcmaeon do not appear in the Pythagorean\ntable of opposites, and there is no trace of the crucial Pythagorean\nopposition between limit and unlimited in Alcmaeon. The overwhelming\nmajority of scholars since 1950 have accordingly regarded Alcmaeon as\na figure independent of the Pythagoreans (e.g., Guthrie 1962, 341;\nBurkert 1972, 289; KRS 1983, 339; Lloyd 1991, 167; Kahn 2001; Riedweg\n2005, 115; Primavesi 2012, 447. Zhmud [2012a, 121–124; 2014,\n97–102] is the notable exception), although, as a fellow citizen\nof Croton, he will have been familiar with their thought." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Was Alcmaeon a Pythagorean?" }, { "content": [ "\nNo issue concerning Alcmaeon has been more controversial than his\ndate. Some have sought to date him on the basis of his address to\nBrotinus (e.g., Zhmud 2012a, 122). Brotinus’ dates are too\nuncertain to be of much help, however. If he is Theano’s father\nand Theano was Pythagoras’ wife, he could be a contemporary of\nPythagoras (570–490) or even older. If he is Theano’s\nhusband and she was a student of Pythagoras in his old age and thus\ntwenty in 490, Brotinus could have been born as late as 520. This\nsuggests that Brotinus could have been the addressee of the book any\ntime between 550 and 450 BCE. The center of controversy, however, has\nbeen a sentence in the passage of Aristotle’s\nMetaphysics discussed above:", "\nAlcmaeon of Croton also seems to have thought along similar lines, and\neither he took this theory over from them [i.e. the Pythagoreans] or\nthey from him. For in age Alcmaeon was in the old age of\nPythagoras, and his views were similar to theirs\n(986a27–31).\n", "\nThe sentence in bold above is missing in one of the major manuscripts\nand Alexander makes no mention of it in his commentary on the\nMetaphysics. It does appear in the other two major\nmanuscripts and in Asclepius’ commentary. A number of scholars\nhave regarded it as a remark by a later commentator, which has crept\ninto the text (e.g., Ross 1924, 152; Burkert 1972, 29, n.60) and this\nis the view of the most recent editor (Primavesi 2012, 447–8).\nIt is a surprising remark for Aristotle to make, since he only refers\nto Pythagoras once elsewhere in all his extant writings and throughout\nthis passage of the Metaphysics refers to the Pythagoreans or\nItalians in the plural. Other scholars regard the remark as genuine\n(e.g., Wachtler 1896; Guthrie 1962, 341–3; Zhmud 2012a, 122).\nEven if we accept the remark as genuine, the assertion that Alcmaeon\n“was” (egeneto) in the old age of Pythagoras is\nambiguous. Does it mean that Alcmaeon was born in the old age of\nPythagoras, or that he lived (flourished?) in the old age of\nPythagoras? Diels emended the sentence to say that Alcmaeon was\n“young” in the old age of Pythagoras and this emendation\nis supported by a similar remark found in Iamblichus (VP\n104). Although Diels accepted the text as Aristotelian, others have\nseen the parallel with Iamblichus as evidence that it is a remark by a\nlater commentator and have pointed out that the report in Iamblichus\ninvolves several chronological impossibilities (e.g., that Philolaus\nwas young in the old age of Pythagoras). Moreover, Diels’ text\nsuggests that the purpose of the remark was to show Alcmaeon’s\ndependence on Pythagoras, which would show that the remark cannot be\ndue to Aristotle, who has just distinguished Alcmaeon from the\nPythagoreans and expressed doubts as to who influenced whom (Primavesi\n2012, 447–8). Even if the remark is unlikely to go back to\nAristotle, his doubts about who influenced whom suggest that Alcmaeon\nbelonged to the late sixth or early fifth century (Schofield 2012,\n156), which would argue against the late date of 440 adopted by\nMansfeld (2013, 78, n. 1). One group of scholars thus dates the\npublication of Alcmaeon’s book to around 500 (Burkert 1972, 292;\nKirk, Raven, Schofield 1983, 339 [early 5th]; Zhmud 2012a,\n122 [not later than 490]) so that he would have been born around 540.\nAnother group has him born around 510 so that his book would have been\npublished in 470 or later (Guthrie 1962, 358 [480–440 BCE];\nLloyd 1991, 168 [490–430 BCE]). In either case Alcmaeon probably\nwrote before Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Philolaus. He is either the\ncontemporary or the predecessor of Parmenides. Attempts to date him on\nthe basis of internal evidence alone, i.e. comparison of his doctrines\nwith those of other thinkers, have led to the widest divergence of\ndates. Edelstein says that he may have lived in the late fifth century\n(1942, 372), while Lebedev makes him active in the late 6th\n(1993)." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Date" }, { "content": [ "\nThe ancient tradition assigns one book to Alcmaeon, which came to bear\nthe traditional title of Presocratic treatises, On Nature\n(DK, A2), although this title probably does not go back to Alcmaeon\nhimself. Favorinus’ report that Alcmaeon was the first to write\nsuch a treatise (DK, A1) is almost certainly wrong, since Anaximander\nwrote before Alcmaeon. Theophrastus’ detailed report of\nAlcmaeon’s account of the senses (DK, A5) and the fact that\nAristotle wrote a treatise in response to Alcmaeon (D.L. V. 25)\nsuggest that the book was available in the fourth century BCE. It is\nunclear whether Alcmaeon wrote in the Doric dialect of Croton or in\nthe Ionic Greek of the first Presocratics (Burkert, 1972, 222, n. 21).\nThe report that an Alcimon of Croton was the first to write animal\nfables might be a reference to a poet of a similar name. Fragment 5 in\nDK (“It is easier to be on one’s guard against an enemy\nthan a friend.”) sounds very much like the moral of such a fable\n(Gomperz 1953, 64–5). Diels and Kranz (=DK) identify five other\nfragments of Alcmaeon (Frs. 1, 1a, 2, 3, 4) and arrange the testimonia\nunder 18 headings. Fragments 1a, 3 and 4, however, are really\ntestimonia which use language of a later date, although some of\nAlcmaeon’s terminology is embedded in them. The three lines of\nFragment 1, which probably began the book, and the half line in\nFragment 2 are the only continuous texts of Alcmaeon. Another brief\nfragment/testimonium should be added to the material in DK: “the\nearth is the mother of plants and the sun their father”\n(Nicolaus Damascenus, De plantis I 2.44; see Kirk 1956 and\nLebedev 1993). There is also the possibility that Fr. 125 of the\nSpartan poet Alcman (“Experience is the beginning of\nlearning.”) should, in fact, be assigned to Alcmaeon (Lanza\n1965; Barnes 1982, 610)." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 Alcmaeon’s Book and the Evidence for Its Contents" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Epistemology and Psychology", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAlcmaeon began his book by defining the limits of human knowledge:", "\nConcerning things that are not perceptible [concerning mortal things]\nthe gods have clarity, but insofar as it is possible for human beings\nto judge (tekmairesthai) … (DK, B1)\n", "\nSuch skepticism about human knowledge is characteristic of one strand\nof early Greek thought. Both Alcmaeon’s predecessors (e.g.,\nXenophanes B34) and his successors (e.g., Philolaus B6) made similar\ncontrasts between divine and human knowledge, but in Alcmaeon’s\ncase, as in these other cases, we do not have enough evidence to be\nsure what he intended. Most of the subjects that Alcmaeon went on to\ndiscuss in his book could not be settled by a direct appeal to sense\nperception (e.g., the functioning of the senses, the balance of\nopposites in the healthy body, the immortality of the soul). In this\nsense he was dealing largely with what is “not\nperceptible” (aphanes). Alcmaeon is decidedly not an\nextreme skeptic, however, in that he is willing to assign clear\nunderstanding about such things to the gods and by implication admits\nthat even humans have clear understanding of what is directly\nperceptible. Moreover, while humans cannot attain clarity about what\ncannot be perceived, Alcmaeon thinks that they can make reasonable\njudgments from the signs that are presented to them by sensation\n(tekmairesthai). He thus takes the stance of the scientist\nwho draws inferences from what can be perceived, and he implicitly\nrejects the claims of those who base their account of the world on the\ncertainty of a divine revelation (e.g., Pythagoras, Parmenides\nB1).", "\nThere are difficulties with the text of Fr. 1, which make its\ninterpretation problematic. Some scholars exclude the material in\nbrackets above because it is hard to see how to connect it to what\nprecedes (e.g., Wachtler 1896), while others keep the material and\nsuppose that we are to understand an “and” coordinating\nthe phrase in brackets with what precedes it (e.g., DK 1952). Other\nscholars would place a semicolon or colon after “things that are\nnot perceptible” so that up to the colon Alcmaeon is identifying\nhis topic or the area of disagreement with this addressees, while\nafter the colon he begins his own account (Kouloumentas 2018 following\nGomperz). Gemelli Marciano (2007, 18–22), on the other hand, has\nsuggested that the material in brackets above should be kept but made\ndependent on the immediately preceding phrase rather than coordinated\nwith it, so that the fragment would read:", "\nConcerning things that are not perceptible concerning mortals the gods\nhave clarity, but insofar as it is possible for human beings to judge\n… (DK, B1)\n", "\nIf we regard Alcmaeon as primarily a doctor or medical thinker, rather\nthan as a cosmologist, “things that are not perceptible\nconcerning mortals” is likely to refer to the interior of the\nbody and hidden diseases. Passages in the Greek medical writings of\nthe fifth century provide clear parallels for the difficulty of\nknowing about the interior of the body and invisible maladies (Gemelli\nMarciano 2007, 20–21). On this reading Fr.1 is addressed to\nmedical students. Parallels with medical treatises suggest that, after\nfirst raising difficulties about medical knowledge in these matters,\nAlcmaeon may have gone on to assert that these difficulties can be\novercome with the proper teaching, the teaching that followed in his\nbook. If this is the correct context in which to read the fragment, it\nis not so much about the limits of understanding as the success of\nmedical teaching in overcoming apparent limits." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 The Limits of Knowledge" }, { "content": [ "\nAccording to Theophrastus, Alcmaeon was the first Greek thinker to\ndistinguish between sense perception and understanding and to use this\ndistinction to separate animals, which only have sense perception,\nfrom humans, who have both sense perception and understanding (DK,\nB1a, A5). Alcmaeon is also the first to argue that the brain is the\ncentral organ of sensation and thought (DK, A5, A8, A10). There is no\nexplicit evidence, however, as to what Alcmaeon meant by\nunderstanding. The word translated as understanding here is\nsuniêmi, which in its earliest uses means “to\nbring together,” so that it is possible that Alcmaeon simply\nmeant that humans are able to bring the information provided by the\nsenses together in a way that animals cannot (Solmsen 1961, 151).\nAnimals have brains too, however, and thus might appear to be able to\ncarry out the simple correlation of the evidence from the various\nsenses, whereas the human ability to make inferences and judgments\n(DK, B1) appears to be a more plausible candidate for the distinctive\nactivity of human intelligence. It is possible that we should use a\npassage in Plato’s Phaedo (96a-b = A11) to explicate\nfurther Alcmaeon’s epistemology. The passage is part of\nSocrates’ report of his early infatuation with natural science\nand with questions such as whether it is the blood, or air, or fire\nwith which we think. He also reports the view that it is the brain\nthat furnishes the sensations of hearing, sight, and smell. This\ncorresponds very well with Alcmaeon’s view of the brain as the\ncentral sensory organ and, although Alcmaeon is not mentioned by name,\nmany scholars think that Plato must be referring to him here. Socrates\nconnects this view of the brain with an empiricist epistemology, which\nAristotle will later adopt (Posterior Analytics 100a3 ff.).\nThis epistemology involves three steps: first, the brain provides the\nsensations of hearing, sight and smell, then, memory and opinion arise\nfrom these, and finally, when memory and opinion achieve fixity,\nknowledge arises. Some scholars suppose that this entire epistemology\nis Alcmaeon’s (e.g., Barnes 1982, 149 ff.), while others more\ncautiously note that we only have explicit evidence that Alcmaeon took\nthe first step (e.g., Vlastos 1970, 47, n.8)." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Understanding and Empiricism" }, { "content": [ "\nAlcmaeon’s empiricism has sometimes been thought to have arisen\nfrom his experience as a practicing physician (Guthrie 1962). He has\nalso been hailed as the first to use dissection, but this is based on\na hasty reading of the evidence. Calcidius, in his Latin commentary on\nPlato’s Timaeus, praises Alcmaeon, along with\nCallisthenes and Herophilus, for having brought many things to light\nabout the nature of the eye (DK, A10). Most of what Calcidius goes on\nto describe, however, are the discoveries of Herophilus some two\ncenturies after Alcmaeon (Lloyd 1975, Mansfeld 1975, Solmsen 1961).\nThe only conclusions we can reasonably draw about Alcmaeon from the\npassage are that he excised the eyeball of an animal and observed\nporoi (channels, i.e. the optic nerve) leading from the eye\nin the direction of the brain (Lloyd 1975). Theophrastus’\naccount of Alcmaeon’s theory of sensation implies that he\nthought that there were such channels leading from each of the senses\nto the brain:", "\nAll the senses are connected in some way with the brain. As a result,\nthey are incapacitated when it is disturbed or changes its place, for\nit then stops the channels, through which the senses operate. (DK, A5)\n", "\nThere is no evidence, however, that Alcmaeon dissected the eye itself\nor that he dissected the skull in order to trace the optic nerve all\nthe way to the brain. Alcmaeon’s account of the other senses,\nfar from suggesting that he carried out dissections in order to\nexplain their function, implies that he did not (Lloyd 1975; for a\npartial critique of Lloyd see Perilli 2001). Alcmaeon’s\nconclusion that all of the senses are connected to the brain may have\nbeen drawn from nothing more than the excision of the eye and the\ngeneral observation that the sense organs for sight, hearing, smell,\nand taste are located on the head and appear connected to passages\nwhich lead inward towards the brain (Gomperz 1953, 69). It is striking\nin this regard that Alcmaeon gave no account of touch (DK, A5), which\nis the only sense not specifically tied to the head. It would be a\nserious mistake then to say that Alcmaeon discovered dissection or\nthat he was the father of anatomy, since there is no evidence that he\nused dissection systematically or even that he did more than excise a\nsingle eyeball." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Did Alcmaeon Practice Dissection?" }, { "content": [ "\nTheophrastus says that Alcmaeon did not explain sensation by the\nprinciple of like to like (i.e. by the likeness between the sense\norgan and what is perceived), a principle which was used by many early\nGreek thinkers (e.g., Empedocles). Unfortunately he gives no general\naccount of how Alcmaeon did think sensation worked (DK, A5). Alcmaeon\nexplained each of the individual senses with the exception of touch,\nbut these accounts are fairly rudimentary. He regarded the eye as\ncomposed of water and fire and vision as taking place when what is\nseen is reflected in the gleaming and translucent part of the eye.\nHearing arises when an external sound is first transmitted to the\nouter ear and then picked up by the empty space (kenon) in\nthe inner ear, which transmits it to the brain. Taste occurs through\nthe tongue, which being warm and soft dissolves things with its heat\nand, because of its loose texture, receives and transmits the\nsensation. Smell is the simplest of all. It occurs “at the same\ntime as we breathe in, thus bringing the breath to the brain”\n(DK, A5)." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Sense Perception" }, { "content": [ "\nAlcmaeon developed the first argument for the immortality of the soul,\nbut the testimonia concerning it differ slightly from one another, and\nit appears to have been taken over and developed by Plato, so that it\nis very hard to determine exactly how to reconstruct Alcmaeon’s\nown argument. Barnes (1982, 116–120) and Hankinson (1998,\n30–3) provide the most insightful analysis. Alcmaeon appears to\nhave started from the assumption that the soul is always in motion. At\none extreme we might suppose that Alcmaeon only developed the simple\nargument from analogy, which Aristotle assigns to him (De An.\n405a29). The soul is like the heavenly bodies, which Alcmaeon regarded\nas divine and immortal (DK, A1, A12), in being always in motion, so it\nis also like them in being immortal. This is clearly fallacious, since\nit assumes that things that are alike in one respect will be alike in\nall others. The version in the doxographical tradition is more\nsophisticated (DK, A12). Alcmaeon thought that the soul moved itself\nin continual motion and was therefore immortal and like to the divine.\nThe similarity to the divine is not part of the inference here but\nsimply an illustrative comparison. However, Mansfeld has recently\npointed out that the doxographical report in Aetius is just a\nparaphrase of Aristotle’s earlier report with the significant\naddition that the soul is self-moving. Examination of the context in\nAetius shows that the self-motion of the soul, which is attested\nindependently for Plato and Xenocrates, was projected back on\nPythagoras and Thales, who are very unlikely to have held such a view.\nThis context and Aristotle’s failure to assign self-motion to\nAlcmaeon makes it likely that the same projection occurred in the case\nof Alcmaeon, who thus is likely to have assigned continual motion but\nnot self motion to the soul (Mansfeld 2014b, see also Laks 2018). The\ncore of the simpler argument is the necessary truth that what is\nalways in motion must be immortal. This is the assumption from which\nPlato starts his argument for the immortality of the soul\nat Phaedrus 245c, but how much of Plato’s analysis of\nwhat is always in motion can be assigned to Alcmaeon? Plato makes no\nmention of Alcmaeon in the passage. There are still serious questions\nfor Alcmaeon, even on the more sophisticated version of the\nargument. We might well recognize that things with souls, i.e. things\nthat are alive, are able to move themselves, and conclude that it is\nsouls that bring this motion about. We might also conclude that the\nsoul, as what moves something else, must be in motion itself (the\nsynonymy principle of causation). But why did Alcmaeon suppose that\nthe soul must be always in motion? (Hankinson [1998, 32] provides two\npossible answers and discusses the difficulties with them.) Horn\nargues that there is no obvious meaning to the idea that the human\nsoul is in continual motion so that Alcmaeon must be talking about a\nworld soul, which has the continual motion of the heavens (2005,\n157–8). However, Mansfeld rightly argues that Aristotle’s\nreport on Alcmaeon’s view of the soul is clearly about the human\nsoul; since the soul being discussed is said to be similar to the\nheavenly motions it has to be distinct from them (2014a). Finally,\nwhat sort of motion is being ascribed to souls? The natural assumption\nmight be that the soul’s motion is thinking, but, at this early\npoint in Greek thought, Alcmaeon was more likely to have thought that,\nif the soul is going to cause motion in space, it too must be in\nlocomotion. Plato describes the soul as composed of two circles with\ncontrary motions, which imitate the contrary motions of the fixed\nstars and the planets, so that the soul becomes a sort of orrery in\nthe head (Timaeus 44d). It has been suggested that this image\nis borrowed from Alcmaeon (Barnes 1982, 118; Skemp 1942, 36 ff.).", "\nIn Fragment 2, Alcmaeon is reported to have said that:", "\nHuman beings perish because they are not able to join their beginning\nto their end.\n", "\nAt first sight, this assertion might appear to conflict with\nAlcmaeon’s belief that the soul is immortal. It seems likely,\nhowever, that Alcmaeon distinguished between human beings as\nindividual bodies, which do perish, and as souls, which do not (Barnes\n1982, 115). There is no evidence about what Alcmaeon thought happened\nto the soul, when the body perished, however. Did he believe in\nreincarnation as the Pythagoreans did? No ancient source associates\nAlcmaeon with reincarnation and his sharp distinction between animals\nand human beings may suggest that he did not believe in it (Guthrie\n1962: 354). He might have thought that the soul joined other divine\nbeings in the heavens. The point of Fragment 2 may be that, whereas\nthe heavenly bodies do join their beginnings to their ends in circular\nmotion, humans are not able to join their end in old age to their\nbeginning in childhood, i.e. human life does not have a cyclical\nstructure. We might even suppose that the soul tries to impose such a\nstructure on the body from its own circular motion but ultimately\nfails (Guthrie 1962, 353). It has been rather speculatively suggested\nthat, since Alcmaeon explains sleep and waking by the blood retreating\ninto the inner vessels and then expanding again into the outer vessels\n(see 3.2 below), it may be that this “circular motion” of\nthe blood that fails in death (Kouloumentas 2018b)." ], "subsection_title": "2.5 The Immortality of the Soul" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Medical Doctrines", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nFragment 4 presents Alcmaeon’s account of health and\ndisease:", "\nAlcmaeon said that the equality (isonomia) of the powers\n(wet, dry, cold, hot, bitter, sweet, etc.) maintains health but that\nmonarchy among them produces disease.\n", "\nThis is, in fact, not a fragment but a testimonium and much of the\nlanguage comes from the doxographical tradition rather than Alcmaeon.\nThe report goes on to say that Alcmaeon thought that disease arose\nbecause of an excess of heat or cold, which in turn arose because of\nan excess or deficiency in nutrition. Disease is said to arise in the\nblood, the marrow, or the brain. It can also be caused by external\nfactors such as the water, the locality, toil, or violence. The idea\nthat health depends on a balance of opposed factors in the body is a\ncommonplace in Greek medical writers. Although Alcmaeon is the\nearliest figure to whom such a conception of health is attributed, it\nmay well be that he is not presenting an original thesis but rather\ndrawing on the earlier medical tradition in Croton. Perhaps what is\ndistinctive to Alcmaeon is the use of the specific political metaphor\nand most scholars (e.g., Sassi 2007, 198; Jouanna 1999, 327;\nKouloumentas 2014, 871) agree that the political terminology\n(isonomia, monarchia) goes back to him. Indeed,\nthese terms are not found elsewhere in the Greek medical\ntradition. Just as Anaximander explained the order of the cosmos in\nterms of justice in the city-state, so Alcmaeon used a political\nmetaphor to explain the order of the human body. It is commonly\nrecognized that isonomia (equality) is not a specific form of\ngovernment but rather a concept of political equality in terms of\nwhich forms of government are evaluated (Ostwald 1969, 108; Meier\n1990, 162 calls it a “yardstick”, Vlastos 1981,\n173–74 a “banner”). Its primary application is to\ndemocracies (Herodotus III.80) but it is also applied to moderate\noligarchies that have democratic features (Thucydides III.\n62.3–4). Although a significant number of scholars argue that\nthere is a purely aristocratic application for isonomia as\nthe equality of aristocratic peers in opposition to a tyrant (e.g.,\nRaaflaub 2004: 95; Zhmud 2012a: 358), one of the most noted early\nadherents of this view later abandoned it (Ehrenberg 1956: 67) and it\nappears more likely that the term isonomia originated with\nthe radical democracy which emerged in Athens in the late sixth\ncentury and was only applied in a secondary sense to moderate\noligarchies (Vlastos 1973, 175–7; Ostwald 1969, 99–106).\nIs Alcmaeon’s use of the term simply descriptive of the equality\nof powers that is necessary for the healthy body, or does his use of\nthe term to describe health suggest that he was in sympathy with\nradical democracy (Vlastos 1953, 363)? We simply have no direct\nevidence for Alcmaeon’s political views. However, Aristotle\nemphasizes that Alcmaeon posited an indefinite number of opposites as\nactive in the human body in contrast to the Pythagoreans who specified\nten pairs (see 4.2 below), which suggests that Alcmaeon’s\n“body” politic was not an oligarchy with a numerically\ndefined group of peers but rather a democracy which gave equality to\nthe full range of opposites. Mansfeld has recently argued that\nscholars are wrong to ascribe the key terms isonomia and\nmonarchia to Alcmaeon (Mansfeld 2014a). Such a metaphorical\nuse of isonomia is unparalleled at this early date and is\nmuch more likely to have been introduced later in the doxographical\ntradition. Moreover, monarchia may have been introduced by a\ndoxographer familiar with its use in the famous debate on\nconstitutions in Herodotus (III 80–3), where isonomia\nalso appears (III 80). Mansfeld concludes that this origin of the\nterms from the doxography is more likely than assuming influence on\nAlcmaeon from the reforms of Cleisthenes. The difficulty with\nMansfeld’s approach is that the striking thing about the report\non Alcmaeon is precisely the political metaphor and it seems more\nplausible that his views were introduced into the doxography because\nof that metaphor than that his views were typical Greek views on\ndisease and the metaphor only arose as an artefact of the\ndoxographical tradition. If he did introduce the political metaphor\nthen it is as probable as not that he used the terms ascribed to him,\nespecially since both appear only a little later in Herodotus,\nalthough not with a metaphorical sense. " ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Health and Disease" }, { "content": [ "\nAlcmaeon is the first to raise a series of questions in human and\nanimal physiology that later become stock problems, which every\nthinker tries to address. He thus sets the initial agenda for Greek\nphysiology (Longrigg 1993, 54–7; Lloyd 1966, 322 ff.). He said\nthat sleep is produced by the withdrawal of the blood away from the\nsurface of the body to the larger (“blood-flowing”)\nvessels and that we awake when the blood diffuses throughout the body\nagain (DK, A18). Death occurs when the blood withdraws entirely.\nHippocratic writers (Epid. VI 5.15) and Aristotle\n(H.A. 521a15) both seem to have adopted Alcmaeon’s\naccount of sleep. It is very unlikely, however, that Alcmaeon\ndistinguished between veins (the “blood-flowing vessels”)\nand arteries, as some have claimed. It is more likely that he simply\ndistinguished between larger more interior blood vessels as opposed to\nsmaller ones close to the surface (Lloyd 1991, 177). He probably\nargued that human seed was drawn from the brain (DK, A13). It has\nrecently been suggested (König 2019), however, that he instead\nthought 1) that sperm came from the whole body, 2) that the brain was\nits transit port and 3) that it was ultimately a product of\ndigestion. But no ancient source directly assigns any of these\ndoctrines to Alcmaeon and the arguments in favor of them are very\nindirect. Contrary to a popular Greek view, which regarded the father\nalone as providing seed, a view that would be followed by Aristotle\n(Lloyd 1983, 86 ff.), Alcmaeon may have argued that both parents\ncontribute seed (DK, A13) and that the child takes the sex of the\nparent who contributes the most seed (DK, A14). It has recently been\nsuggested, however, that our sole source for these views (Censorinus)\nis mistaken and that, while Alcmaeon thought that both the male and\nfemale contributed to the child, only the male contributed seed\n(Leitao 2012: 278–79), the female contributing menses. According\nto one report, Alcmaeon thought that the head was the first part of\nthe embryo to develop, although another report has him confessing that\nhe did not have definite knowledge in this area, because no one is\nable to perceive what is formed first in the infant (DK, A13). These\nreports are not inconsistent and conform to the epistemology with\nwhich Alcmaeon began his book. It is plausible to suppose that he\nregarded the development of the embryo as one of the imperceptibles\nabout which we can have no certain knowledge. On the other hand, he\nmay have regarded it as a reasonable inference that the part of the\nbody which controls it in life, i.e., the brain, developed first in\nthe womb. Dissection is of obvious relevance to the debate about the\ndevelopment of the embryo, and Alcmaeon’s failure to appeal to\ndissection of animals in this case is further evidence that he did not\nemploy it as a regular method (Lloyd 1979, 163). Alcmaeon studied not\njust humans but also animals and plants. He gave an explanation of the\nsterility of mules (DK, B3) and, if we can believe Aristotle, thought\nthat goats breathed through their ears (DK, A7). More significantly,\nhe used analogies with animals and plants in developing his accounts\nof human physiology. Thus, the pubic hair that develops when human\nmales are about to produce seed for the first time at age fourteen is\nanalogous to the flowering of plants before they produce seed (DK,\nA15); milk in mammals is analogous to egg white in birds (DK,\nA16). The infant in the womb absorbs nutrients through its entire\nbody, like a sponge, although another report suggests that the embryo\nalready feeds through its mouth (DK, A17). However, the text of the\nlatter report should perhaps be amended from stomati [mouth]\nto\nsômati [body], thus removing the contradiction\n(Olivieri 1919, 34). Analogies such as these will become a staple item\nin later Greek biological treatises, but Alcmaeon is one of the\nearliest figures in this tradition." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Sleep, Embryology, and the Use of Analogy" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Cosmology", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAs indicated in section 1 above, there is considerable controversy as\nto whether and to what extent Alcmaeon was a typical Presocratic\ncosmologist. Certainly the evidence for his cosmology is meager. There\nare three references to his astronomical theory (DK, A4). He is\nreported to have recognized that the planets have a motion from west\nto east opposite to the motion of the fixed stars. Some doubt that\nsuch knowledge was available at the beginning of the fifth century\n(Dicks 1970, 75). Others suggest that Anaximenes, in the second half\nof the sixth century, had already distinguished between the fixed\nstars, which are nailed to the ice-like vault of the sky, and planets\nwhich float on the air like leaves (DK13A7; Burkert 1972, 311).\nAlcmaeon’s belief that the sun is flat is another possible\nconnection to Anaximenes, who said that the sun was flat like a leaf\n(DK13A15). Finally, another similarity to Ionian astronomy is found in\nAlcmaeon’s agreement with Heraclitus that lunar eclipses were to\nbe explained by the turning of a bowl-shaped moon. One might have\nexpected, however, that the moon would be flat like the sun (West\n1971, 175)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Astronomy" }, { "content": [ "\nDid Alcmaeon present a cosmogony or cosmology in terms of the\ninteraction of pairs of opposites? Such a cosmology could be seen as\nyet another connection to earlier speculation in Ionia, since\nAnaximander’s cosmos is based on the “justice”\nestablished between conflicting opposites (DK12B1). Heraclitus is also\na possible influence on Alcmaeon, since he seems to envisage an\nendless process of opposites turning into one another such as is\nproposed for Alcmaeon (Mansfeld 2014a, 91–2). Aristotle provides\nthe primary evidence for such a cosmology in Alcmaeon\n(Metaph. 986a22 ff. = A3), but he compares Alcmaeon not to\nthe Ionians but to a group of Pythagoreans who proposed a table of ten\npairs of opposites. Alcmaeon agrees with these Pythagoreans in\nregarding the opposites as principles of things. Aristotle complains,\nhowever, that Alcmaeon did not arrive at a definite set of opposites\nbut spoke haphazardly of white, black, sweet, bitter, good, bad,\nlarge, and small, and only threw in vague comments about the remaining\nopposites. It may well be that Alcmaeon’s primary discussion of\nopposites was in relation to his account of the human body (DK, B4;\nsee the discussion of his medical theories above). Aristotle’s\nlanguage supports this suggestion to some extent, when he summarizes\nAlcmaeon’s view as that “the majority of human\nthings (tôn anthrôpinôn) are in\npairs” (Metaph. 986a31). Isocrates (DK, A3) says that\nAlcmaeon, in contrast to Empedocles, who postulated four elements,\nsaid that there were only two, and, according to a heterodox view,\nAlcmaeon posited fire and earth as basic elements (Lebedev 1993). Most\nscholars follow Aristotle, however, in supposing that Alcmaeon thought\nthat the human body and perhaps the cosmos is constituted from the\nbalance of an indefinite number of opposites. Some have seen\nAlcmaeon’s unwillingness to adopt a fixed set of opposites as a\nvirtue and a further sign of his empiricism, which is willing to\naccept that the world is less tidy than theoretical constructs, such\nas the Pythagorean table of opposites, would suggest (Guthrie 1962,\n346)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Opposites" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAlcmaeon has been somewhat neglected in recent scholarship on early\nGreek philosophy (e.g., he hardly appears in Curd and Graham 2008,\nLong 1999 and Taylor 1997, the most recent surveys of the subject, but\nboth Guthrie 1962 and now Zhmud 2012a and 2014 stress his importance).\nThere would appear to be several reasons for this neglect. First, what\nremains of Alcmaeon’s book has little to say on the metaphysical\nquestions about the first principles of the cosmos and about being,\nwhich have dominated recent scholarship on the Presocratics. Second,\ndoubts about his date and about the focus of his investigations have\nmade it difficult to place him in the development of early Greek\nthought. Finally, a more accurate appreciation of his use of\ndissection has deflated some of the hyperbolic claims in earlier\nscholarship about his originality. The extent of his originality and\nthe importance of his influence depend to a degree on his dating. An\nextremely late dating for his activity (after 450 BCE) makes him\nappear to espouse the typical views of the age rather than to break\nnew ground. If he was active in the early fifth century, his views are\nmuch more original. That Aristotle wrote a separate treatise in\nresponse to Alcmaeon argues in favor of his originality. He should\nprobably be regarded as a pioneer in applying a political metaphor to\nthe balance of opposites that constitute the healthy human body. The\nrange of his work in biology is remarkable for the early fifth century\nand he may have initiated a physiological emphasis in Greek philosophy\nwhich was not present in Ionian philosophers, such as Anaximander and\nAnaximenes, and set the agenda in this area for later Presocratics\n(Zhmud 2012a, 366). It is sometimes said that his conception of\nporoi (channels), which connect the sense organs to the\nbrain, influenced Empedocles’ theory of poroi, but the\ntheories may share no more than the name. In Empedocles, all materials\nhave pores in them, which determine whether they mix well with other\nobjects. Sense organs also have pores, but these function not to\nconnect the sense organ to the seat of intelligence (which for\nEmpedocles is the heart) but to determine whether the sense organ can\nreceive the effluences that are poured forth by external objects\n(Solmsen 1961, 157; Wright 1981, 230). Alcmaeon’s influence was\nsignificant in three final ways: 1) His identification of the brain as\nthe seat of human intelligence influenced Philolaus (DK, B13), the\nHippocratic Treatise, On the Sacred Disease, and Plato\n(Timaeus 44d), although a number of thinkers including\nEmpedocles and Aristotle continued to regard the heart as the seat of\nperception and intelligence. 2) His empiricist epistemology may lie\nbehind important passages in Plato (Phaedo 96b) and Aristotle\n(Posterior Analytics 100a). 3) He developed the first\nargument for the immortality of the soul, which may have influenced\nPlato’s argument in the Phaedrus (245c ff.)." ], "section_title": "5. Importance and Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Diels, H. and W. Kranz, 1952, Die Fragmente der\nVorsokratiker (in three volumes), 6th edition, Dublin\nand Zürich: Weidmann, Volume 1, Chapter 24, pp. 210–216. Greek\ntexts of the fragments and testimonia with translations in German.\nReferred to as [DK]. The testimonia for each author are indicated by\nan A and a number. So A5 is the fifth testimonia about Alcmaeon listed\nin DK. The B annotations refer to actual fragments of Alcmaeon in DK\nas opposed to the testimonia, second hand reports, etc., constituting\nthe A annotations.", "Laks, A. and Most, G., 2016, ‘Alcmaeon’, in Early\nGreek Philosophy: Western Greek Thinkers (Part 2), A. Laks and\nG. Most (eds.), Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press (Loeb\nClassical Library: Volume 5), pp. 737–771.", "Timpanaro Cardini, M., 1958–64, Pitagorici,\nTestimonianze e frammenti, 3 vols., Firenze: La Nuova Italia,\nVol. 1, pp. 124–153 (Greek texts of the fragments and testimonia\nwith translations and commentary in Italian).", "Wachtler, J., 1896, De Alcmaeone Crotoniata, Leipzig:\nTeubner (The only full-scale commentary devoted to Alcmaeon. Greek\ntexts of the fragments and testimonia with commentary in Latin).", "Barnes, Jonathan, 1982, The Presocratic Philosophers,\nLondon: Routledge.", "Beare, J. I., 1906, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition\nfrom Alcmaeon to Aristotle, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Curd, P. and Graham, D. W., 2008, The Oxford Handbook of\nPresocratic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Dicks, D. R., 1970, Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle,\nIthaca, NY: Cornell University Press.", "Dörrie, H., 1970, ‘Alkmaion’, in A. Pauly, G.\nWissowa, and W. Kroll, Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen\nAltertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, Supp.-Bd. 12, pp.\n22–6.", "Ebner, P., 1969, ‘Alcmeone Crotoniate’,\nKlearchos, 11: 25–77.", "Edelstein, L., 1942, ‘Review of Stella 1939’, American Journal\nof Philology, 63: 371–2.", "Ehrenberg, V., 1956, ‘Das Harmodioslied’, Wiener\nStudien, 69: 57–69.", "Gemelli Marciano, L., 2007, ‘Lire du début’,\nPhilosophie antique, 17: 7–37.", "Gomperz, H., 1928, ‘Zu Alkmaion Frag. I Diels’,\nPhilologische Wochenschrift, 48: 1597–1598.", "–––, 1953, Philosophical Studies,\nBoston: Christopher Publishing House.", "Gomperz, T., 1901, Greek Thinkers, Vol. I, London: John\nMurray.", "Guthrie, W. K. C., 1962, A History of Greek Philosophy,\nVol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 341–359 (The\nbest overview in English).", "Hankinson, R. J., 1998, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek\nThought, Oxford: Clarendon Press .", "Harris, C. R. S., 1973, The Heart and the Vascular System in\nAncient Greek Medicine from Alcmeon to Galen, Oxford: Clarendon\nPress.", "Heidel, W. A., 1940, ‘The Pythagoreans and Greek\nMathematics’, American Journal of Philology, 61(1):\n1–33.", "–––, 1941, Hippocratic Medicine: Its Spirit\nand Method, New York: Columbia University Press.", "Hirzel, R., 1876, ‘Zur Philosophie des Alkmäion’,\nHermes, 11: 240–6.", "Horn, C., 2005, ‘Der Begriff der Selbstbewegung bei Alkmaion\nund Platon’, in G. Rechenauer, (ed.), Frühgriechisches\nDenken, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,\npp. 152–73.", "Huffman, C. A., 2008, ‘Two Problems in\nPythagoreanism’, in P. Curd and D. W. Graham, (eds.), The\nOxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, pp. 284–304.", "Jouanna, J., 1999, Hippocrates, Baltimore and London: The\nJohns Hopkins University Press.", "Kahn, C., 2001, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans,\nIndianapolis: Hackett.", "Kirk, G. S., 1956, ‘A Passage in De Plantis’\n, Classical Review, n.s., 6(1): 5–6.", "Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E. and Schofield, M., (eds.), 1983, The\nPresocratic Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press =\nKRS.", "König, J., 2019, ‘Ancient Greek Spermatology: The\nTheory of Alcmaeon of Croton’, Mnemosyne, 73(4):\n529–552.", "Kouloumentas, S., 2014, ‘The Body and the Polis: Alcmaeon on\nHealth and Disease’, British Journal for the History of\nPhilosophy, 22(5): 867–887.", "–––, 2018a, ‘Alcmaeon and his\naddressees’, in P. Bouras-Vallianatos and S. Xenophontos\n(eds.), Greek Medical Literature and its Readers, London and\nNew York: Routledge, pp. 7–29.", "–––, 2018b, ‘Heraclitus and the Medical\nTheorists on the Circle’, Dialogues d’histoire\nancienne, 44(2): 43–63. doi:10.3917/dha.442.0043", "Laks, A., 2018, ‘How Preplatonic Worlds Became\nEnsouled’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 55:\n1–34.", "Lanza, D., 1965, ‘Un nuovo frammento die Alcmeone’,\nMaia, 17: 278–80.", "Lebedev, Andrei, 1993, ‘Alcmaeon on plants: a new fragment\nin Nicolaus Damascenus’, La parola del passato, 48:\n456–60.", "Leitao, D. D., 2012, The Pregnant Male as Myth and Metaphor in\nClassical Greek Literature, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Lesky, E., 1952, ‘Alkmaion bei Aetios und Censorin’,\nHermes, 80: 249–55.", "Lloyd, G. E. R., 1966, Polarity and Analogy, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press.", "–––, 1975, ‘Alcmeon and the early history\nof dissection’, Sudhoffs Archiv, 59: 113–47 =\nLloyd, 1991: 164–193.", "–––, 1979, Magic, Reason and\nExperience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 1983, Science, Folklore and\nIdeology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 1991, Methods and Problems in Greek\nScience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Long, A. A., (ed.), 1999, The Cambridge Companion to Early\nGreek Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Longrigg, James, 1993, Greek Rational Medicine: Philosophy and\nMedicine from Alcmaeon to the Alexandrians, London:\nRoutledge.", "Mansfeld, J., 1975, ‘Alcmaeon: “Physikos” or\nPhysician? With some remarks on Calcidius’ “On\nVision” compared to Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat. VII’, in J.\nMansfeld and L. M. de Rijk, (eds.), Kephalaion: Studies in Greek\nPhilosophy and its continuation offered to Professor C. J. de\nVogel, Assen: Van Gorcum, pp. 26–38.", "–––, 2014a,‘The body politic: Aëtius\non Alcmaeon on isonomia and monarchia’, in V.\nHarte and M. Lane, (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman\nPhilosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:\npp. 78–95.", "–––, 2014b, ‘Alcmaeon and Plato on\nSoul’, Études platoniciennes, 11\n available online.\n doi:10.4000/etudesplatoniciennes.508.", "Meier, C., 1990, The Greek Discovery of Politics,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Olivieri, A., 1919, ‘Alcmeone di Crotone’ ,\nMemorie della reale Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere e Belle\nArti (Società Reale di Napoli), 4: 15–41.", "Ostwald, M., 1969, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian\nDemocracy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Perilli, L., 2001, ‘Alcmeone di Crotone tra filosofia e\nscienza’, Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica, 69:\n55–79.", "Primavesi, O., 2012, ‘Aristotle, Metaphysics A: A\nNew Critical Edition with Introduction’, in Carlos Steel (ed.),\nAristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, pp. 385–516.", "Raaflaub, K., 2004, The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient\nGreece, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.", "Riedweg, C., 2005, Pythagoras: His Life, Teaching, and\nInfluence, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.", "Sassi, M. M., 2007, ‘Ordre cosmique et\nisonomia’, Philosophie antique, 7:\n189–218.", "Schofield, M., 2012, ‘Pythagoreanism: Emerging from the\nPresocratic Fog’, in Carlos Steel (ed.), Aristotle’s\n Metaphysics Alpha, Oxford: Oxford University Press,\npp. 141–166.", "Schubert, C., 1996, ‘Menschenbild und Normwandel in der\nklassischen Zeit’, in Médicine et Morale dans\nl’Antiquité, Vandoeuvres-Genève: Fondation\nHardt, Entretiens 93: 121–155.", "Skemp, J. B., 1942, The Theory of Motion in Plato’s\nLater Dialogues, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Solmsen, F., 1961, ‘Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of\nNerves’, Museum Helveticum, 18: 150–97.", "Stella, L. A., 1939, ‘Importanza di Alcmeone nella storia\ndel pensiero greco’, Memorie della Reale Accademia\nNazionnale dei Lincei, s. 6, 8(4): 233–87.", "Stratton, G. M., 1917, Theophrastus and the Greek\nPhysiological Psychology before Aristotle, London: George Allen\n& Unwin.", "Taylor, C. C. W., (ed.), 1997, Routledge History of\nPhilosophy, Volume 1: From the Beginning to Plato, London:\nRoutledge.", "Thivel, A., 1979, ‘L’astronomie d’\nAlcméon’, in L’ astronomie dans l’\nAntiquité classique, Paris: Les Belles Lettres,\npp. 57–72.", "Timpanaro Cardini, M., 1938, ‘Originalità di\nAlcmeone’, Atene e Roma, 3(6): 233–44.", "–––, 1940 ‘Anima, vita e morte in\nAlcmeone’, Atene e Roma, 3(8): 213–24.", "Triebel-Schubert, C., 1984, ‘Der Begriff der Isonomie bei\nAlkmaion’, Klio, 66: 40–50.", "–––, 1987, ‘Medizin und Symmetrie’,\nSudhoffs Archiv, 73: 190–199.", "Vlastos, Gregory, 1953, ‘Isonomia’, American\nJournal of Philology, 74(4): 337–366.", "–––, 1955, review of Cornford, F. M.,\nPrincipium Sapientiae, Gnomon, 27: 65–76 = D.\nJ. Furley and R. A. Allen, (eds.) 1970, Studies in Presocratic\nPhilosophy, London: Routledge, pp. 42–55.", "–––, 1964, ‘Isonomia Politike’, in\nJürgen Mau and E. G. Schmidt, (eds.), Isonomia, Berlin:\n1–35 = Gregory Vlastos, 1973, Platonic Studies,\nPrinceton: Princeton University Press, pp. 164–203.", "Wellmann, M., 1929, ‘Alkmaion von Kroton’,\nArcheion, 11: 156–69.", "West, M. L., 1971, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient,\nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "Wright, M. R., 1981, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments,\nNew Haven: Yale University Press.", "Zhmud, L., 1997, Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion im\nfrühen Pythagoreismus, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.", "–––, 2012a, Pythagoras and the Early\nPythagoreans, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2012b, ‘Aristoxenus and the\nPythagoreans’, in C. A. Huffman, (ed.), Aristoxenus of\nTarentum: Discussion, New Brunswick and London: Transaction\nPublishers, pp. 223–49.", "–––, 2014, ‘Sixth-, fifth-, and\nfourth-century Pythagoreans’, in C. A. Huffman, (ed.), A\nHistory of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,\npp. 97–102." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../empedocles/", "text": "Empedocles" }, { "href": "../philolaus/", "text": "Philolaus" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../pythagoras/", "text": "Pythagoras" }, { "href": "../pythagoreanism/", "text": "Pythagoreanism" } ]
alexander	Samuel Alexander	First published Mon Jun 2, 2014; substantive revision Wed Jul 13, 2022	[ "\nAustralian-born philosopher Samuel Alexander (1859–1938) was a\nprominent figure in early twentieth-century British philosophy. He is\nbest known for advancing “British Emergentism”, a movement\nthat held mind “emerges” from matter. Alexander rejected\nidealism, and accordingly can be labelled a “new\nrealist” alongside the likes of Bertrand Russell; however,\nunlike other new realists, Alexander maintained close ties with\nBritish idealism throughout his career, and his ontology arguably\nbears similarities to the Absolute Idealism of F. H.\nBradley. Alexander’s mature metaphysical system is set out in\nhis greatest work Space, Time, and Deity (1920). Alexander\nconceives the world as a hierarchy of levels: space and time sit at\nthe lowest level, and through a process of emergence give rise to the\nlevels of matter, life, mind, and deity. These levels are pervaded by\n“categorial” features of reality, such as substance,\nuniversals, and causality. Although Alexander is primarily known as a\nmetaphysician, he wrote extensively on many other philosophical\ntopics, including the history of philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, and\nthe philosophy of religion. Alexander spent most of his professional\ncareer at the University of Manchester, where he supported various\nmoves in education and feminism. On his death, Alexander left his\nphilosophical papers and correspondence to the John Rylands Library at\nManchester, and this collection constitutes an important philosophic\narchive of the period.", "\nAlexander’s work was widely celebrated during his lifetime. J. H.\nMuirhead (1939: 3) wrote that, after Bradley’s death in 1924,\nAlexander was “the leading figure in British philosophy, and whom\nall schools, whatever their differences, were delighted to\nhonour as their chief”. John Laird (1939: 61–5)\ndescribed Space, Time, and Deity as “the boldest\nadventure in detailed speculative metaphysics” since\nHobbes. Although he never founded a school of philosophy,\nAlexander is credited with having an influence on figures as diverse\nas new realists Laird, C. D. Broad, and Edwin B. Holt; the\nprocess philosopher A. N. Whitehead; John Anderson, “father\nof Australian philosophy”, and his school at Sydney; British\nidealists May Sinclair and Hilda Oakeley; and philosopher of\nhistory R. G. Collingwood. A number of studies were produced on\nAlexander’s work in the mid-twentieth century, but it then saw a\nperiod of neglect. Over the last decade or so, interest has increased,\nas indicated by Fisher’s (2021) collection Marking the\nCentenary of Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Early Writings", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 History of Philosophy: Hegel and Locke", "2.2 Evolutionary Ethics" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Metaphysics and Related Views", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Realism and Compresence", "3.2 Space, Time, and Deity", "3.3 Philosophy of Religion" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Late Writings", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 History of Philosophy: Spinoza", "4.2 Art and Other Forms of Value", "4.3 The Historicity of Things" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Alexander’s Legacy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Works by Alexander", "Other Primary Literature", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAlexander was born in Sydney on 6 January 1859, to a Jewish family. He\nwas the third son of Samuel Alexander, a British emigrant and saddler.\nAlexander’s father died a few weeks after his birth, and five\nyears later the remaining family moved to Melbourne. Alexander was\nhome-educated by tutors before entering Wesley College in 1871.\nAlexander entered the University of Melbourne in 1875, and\nsubsequently won awards in arts, sciences, languages and natural\nphilosophy. In 1877, Alexander sailed for England, in an attempt to\nwin a scholarship at Oxbridge. He successfully obtained a scholarship\nat Balliol College, Oxford, and went on to win a First in 1881. The\nfollowing year, Alexander was awarded a Fellowship at Lincoln College,\nOxford.", "\nAt this time, the Oxford philosophical scene was dominated by British\nidealism, and Alexander formed lifelong ties with the Absolute\nidealists F. H. Bradley, A. C. Bradley, and Bernard Bosanquet. This\nidealist influence is evident in Alexander’s earliest works, on\nHegel and moral progress. Arguably, it is also evident in his later\nworks on metaphysics too. As a student, Alexander also read\nPlato—under the tutelage of the idealist Benjamin\nJowett—and Hegel.", "\nAlthough Alexander remained largely UK-based, in 1882\nhe travelled to Germany for a year, spending at least some of\nthis time at the University of Berlin, where he became familiar with\nthe physiological psychology of Hermann von Helmholtz. In 1890 he\ntravelled to Freiburg, Germany, to spend roughly another year working\nin Hugo Münsterberg’s new psychological laboratory.", "\nIn 1893, Alexander accepted a Professorship at the University of\nManchester. He took an active part in the university life there, and\nstrongly supported feminism. Alexander remained at Manchester for the\nrest of his life, and in 1902 he brought various family members\nover—including his mother and three of his siblings—from\nAustralia to Manchester. He did not marry. Although Alexander never\nreturned to Australia he maintained a correspondence with several\nAustralian philosophers, including the Scottish-born John\nAnderson.", "\nAs Alexander developed his anti-idealist views, he published on\nnaturalism and realism. He corresponded at length with fellow British\nemergentists C. Lloyd Morgan and C. D. Broad on psychology and\nmetaphysics. Whilst he rejected idealism, he also continued to\ncorrespond with F. H. Bradley and Bosanquet. During the War, Alexander\ncanvassed for recruits, and assisted Belgian refugees.", "\nInterest in Alexander’s work grew as he became President of\nthe Aristotelian Society from 1908–1911 (he\nbecame President again, from 1936–1937). He was invited to\ndeliver the Gifford lectures during the war years 1917 and 1918.\nThese were called ‘Space, time, and deity’ and would form the basis of\nhis (1920) Space, Time, and Deity. Laird reports\nthat, after the war, Alexander struggled with writing its two volumes:\n“He was overwhelmed by a sense of his littleness in comparison\nwith the task to which he was tied” (Laird 1939: 61).\nNonetheless, Space, Time, and Deity was finally\nfinished, assuring Alexander’s place within the British philosophical\nlandscape. It was praised by new realists and idealists alike. As\nJohn Passmore puts it:", "\n\n\n…even when he [Alexander] broke with the Idealists, they\ncontinued to speak of him with a respect they rarely showed to the New\nRealists—although this charity did not survive the bleakness of\nCambridge, where McTaggart, forgetting his own blackened pots,\ncomplained of Space, Time, and Deity that “in every\nchapter we come across some view which no philosopher, except\nProfessor Alexander, has ever maintained”. It would be inhuman\nto expect the arch-enemy of Time to praise its arch-prophet. (Passmore\n1957: 268)\n", "\nBleakness of Cambridge aside, Alexander received many honours during\nhis lifetime. These include his election as a Fellow of the British\nAcademy in 1913, an honorary D.Litt from Oxford in 1924, an honorary\nLitt.D from the University of Liverpool in 1925, and another from the\nUniversity of Cambridge in 1934. In 1923, Alexander retired from\nManchester. In a speech, he described how proud and happy he was\nduring his time as a professor there, “during which I tried to\ndo my part” (Alexander, cited in Laird 1939: 71).", "\nAlexander’s retirement did not stem the tide of his output.\nHaving completed Space, Time, and Deity, Alexander continued\nto produce a stream of articles as prolific as it was diverse. He\nwrote several pieces comparing his metaphysics to that of Spinoza, and\nAlexander took pride—rooted partly in their shared Jewish\nheritage—in the deep similarity he perceived there. Alexander\nalso wrote on the nature of art, history, Moliere, Pascal, theology,\nand Jane Austen. Alexander was a lifelong fan of Austen, and\nparticularly loved Persuasion. His friend and colleague, J.\nH. Muirhead, suggested that Alexander’s love of literature may\nhave resulted from partial deafness, which made it difficult for\nhim to appreciate music.", "\nUltimately, Alexander turned his philosophic attention away from\nmetaphysics to art and value. Lord Listowel describes\nAlexander’s move towards aesthetics:", "\n\n\nBut why, of the many unsailed seas he must have been tempted to chart,\ndid his insatiable curiosity launch him on a last voyage into the\nrough waters of aesthetic theory? There is no certain answer to this\nquestion. What we do know is that the third person of the hallowed\ntrinity whose members are Truth, Goodness, and Beauty had hitherto\nbeen sadly neglected as compared with the first two, and that a\ntreatise on aesthetics was urgently required as the coping stone of a\nneatly finished philosophical system. Yet it would be a grievous error\nto suppose that his fondness for the subject was due solely or even\nmainly to systematic grounds. Art, in its manifold shapes, attracted\nhim irresistibly… [he] wrote and talked about Art because he\nreally loved the pictures, statues, mansions, poems, novels, and plays\nthat are its concrete manifestations. (Listowel 1939: 181)\n", "\nAlexander’s full system of aesthetics can be found in his final\nmonograph, Beauty and Other Forms of Value (1933).", "\nIn his late years, Alexander continued to publish, but Laird reports\nthat Alexander was greatly troubled from the 1930s by the suffering of\nJewish refugees; Alexander did all he could to help with pen and purse\n(Laird 1939: 94). Alexander died on 13 September 1938, and his ashes\nlie in the Manchester Southern Cemetery. He bequeathed the majority of\nhis estate, and his philosophical papers, to the University of\nManchester. A bust of Alexander, by the artist Epstein, stands in the\nUniversity of Manchester’s Samuel Alexander Building (formerly\nknown as the Hall of the Arts Building). Alexander reportedly said\nthat he would be happy to have Erravit cum Spinoza engraved\non his funeral urn; Muirhead suggested that instead he should have\nUt alter Spinoza\n philosophatus[1]\n (Muirhead 1939: 14).", "\nA biography of Alexander can be found in Laird’s (1939) memoir;\nsee also Muirhead (1939) and G. F. Stout (1940). " ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Early Writings", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAlexander’s first publication, “Hegel’s Conception\nof Nature” (1886), reveals Alexander’s philosophic\nupbringing in Oxford’s British Hegelian enclave. Alexander aims to set\nout Hegel’s conception of nature, “so fantastic and\nso poetical that it may often be thought not to be\nserious”, as clearly as possible. He also aims to show\nwhere it agrees with, and diverges from, contemporary science. The\narticle explains that science leads to a philosophy of nature\nthrough observation—for example, transforming seemingly isolated\nindividuals into universals by discovering their general\ncharacter—and the discovery of laws. Alexander also compares\nHegel’s account to contemporary theories of evolution, and\nargues there is a “great likeness” (Alexander 1886: 518).\nArguably, some of the positions that Alexander attributes to Hegel are\nsimilar to his own mature views; for example, Alexander reads Hegel as\nholding that space and time are “in the world” as much as\nmatter (Alexander 1886: 506).", "\nAlexander’s early monograph Locke (1908) discusses\nJohn Locke’s Essay on ethics, politics, and\nreligion. This short book reveals Alexander’s admiration\nfor Locke, and Lockean empiricism. Whilst this work is mainly of\nscholarly interest, Alexander spends one chapter “Observations\non the Essay” critiquing Locke, and here Alexander\nreveals the bent of his own early views. For example, Alexander\ncomplains that Locke might have gone further had he applied his\nobservations regarding the continuity of mental experience to\nsubstance (Alexander 1908: 52). This is suggestive, given that one of\nAlexander’s later key claims concerning spacetime—the\nstuff of substances—is that it is continuous." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 History of Philosophy: Hegel and Locke" }, { "content": [ "\nAlexander’s first monograph, Moral Order and\nProgress (1889), defends evolutionary ethics, the\nnaturalist thesis that human morality is a product of biological\nevolution. The monograph is based on a dissertation written by\nAlexander at Oxford, for which he won the 1887 T. H. Green Moral\nPhilosophy Prize. In the preface, Alexander writes,", "\n\n\nI am proud to have my work connected, however indirectly, with the\nname of T. H. Green; and I feel this all the more because, though, as\nwill be obvious, my obligations to him are very great, I have not\nscrupled to express my present dissent from his fundamental\nprinciples. (vii)\n", "\nThe preface also reveals the strong idealist backdrop against which\nAlexander’s work is set: the monograph is dedicated to A. C.\nBradley, and in the preface Alexander personally thanks D. G. Ritchie,\nWilliam Wallace, R. L. Nettleship, and J. S. Haldane. Alexander adds\nthat he owes a special debt of gratitude to F. H. Bradley, who went\nthrough the essay with him (Alexander 1889: ix). Alexander continued\nto exchange philosophic ideas with many of these idealists throughout\ntheir lives.", "\nAlexander opens the monograph by stating that the proper business of\nethics is the study of moral judgements, such as “It is wrong to\nlie”. Alexander sets out to discover the nature of morality,\nasking what these judgements actually express (Alexander 1889:\n1–3). He does so by examining a selection of “working\nconceptions” in ethics—including right, wrong, and\nduty—and asking what they correspond to. In the same way that\nthe working conceptions of physics—including energy, matter and\nmotion—are ordered according to a “natural\ncoherence”, Alexander aims to order ethical conceptions.\nAlexander concludes that these working conceptions correspond to ways\nof maintaining equilibrium in society. For example, ideas of good or\nright imply nothing more than “an adjustment of parts in an\norderly whole”: the equilibrium of different persons in\nsociety.", "\n\n\n[T]he predicate ‘good’ applied to an action… means\nthat the act is one by which the agent seeks to perform the function\nrequired of him by his position in society. (Alexander 1889: 113)\n", "\nAlexander takes this thesis to be the common ground of at least two\ncurrent rival ethical theories:", "\n\n\nNow nothing is more striking at the present time than the convergence\nof the main opposing ethical theories, at any rate, in our own\ncountry—on the one hand, the traditional English mode of\nthought, which advancing through utilitarianism has ended in the\nso-called evolutionary ethics; and on the other, the idealistic\nmovement which is associated with the German philosophy derived from\nKant… Both these views recognise that kind of proportion\nbetween the individual and his society, or between him and the law,\nwhich is expressed under the phrase, organic connection. (Alexander\n1889: 5–6)\n", "\nAlexander’s perception of progress in ethical theory, towards\nthis correct end point, is Hegelian in style.", "\nAlexander’s ethical system is a kind of evolutionary ethics,\nakin to that of Leslie Stephen. By applying evolution to\nethics, Alexander explains that one can mean either the mere\nintegration of the biological into the ethical sphere, or treating\nmorals as one part of a comprehensive view of the universe, in which a\nsteady development from the lower to the higher can be observed, a\ndevelopment which follows the law of the survival of the fittest\n(Alexander 1889: 14). Alexander, of course, means both. He emphasises\nthat while his ethical system, based on the organic nature of society,\nis due in part to the influence of the biological sciences, it would\nbe an “entire misapprehension” to think that it were\nentirely due to this influence; his views are also the result of\nprogress in ethics and politics (Alexander 1889: 7–8).", "\nIt is worth noting that, despite the spectre of Hegelian idealism\nhovering in the background of this work, Alexander firmly resists\nidealism’s tendency towards monism, the view that the universe is\nin some sense One:", "\n\n\n[T]he conception of a common good is apt to suggest an absolute\nidentity of good… in greater or less degree all forms of\nso-called Monism, which hold that in the good act the individual is at\none with others, and with the Universal Being, are victims of the\nmisconception. (Alexander 1889: 174)\n", "\nIn other words, Alexander is arguing that just because he is putting\nforward one conception of goodness—organic connection within\nsociety—we should not accept that individuals within society are\nnot individuals." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Evolutionary Ethics" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Metaphysics and Related Views", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAlthough Alexander may have defended realism from his\nearliest works, his mature realism can be found in a battery of later\npapers, published in quick succession: including his\n1909–10, 1912a, 1912b and 1914. These papers advance theses\nthat Alexander would expand on in Space, Time, and Deity\n(1920).", "\nIn “The Basis of Realism” (1914), Alexander rejects\nidealism in favour of realism. He writes that the “temper”\nof realism is to de-anthropomorphise: to put man and mind in their\nproper places in the world of things. Whilst mind is properly\nunderstood as part of nature, this does not diminish its value\n(Alexander 1914: 279–80). For Alexander, realism is thus\nnaturalistic. This paper is an expansion of Alexander’s less\nrigorous (1909–10), where he compares the new conception of mind\nas a mere part of the universe—as opposed to being at the centre\nof the universe—to the move from geocentrism to\nheliocentrism.", "\nA key part of Alexander’s view is that minds exist in the world\nalongside other things. Minds are “compresent” with other\nobjects in the world, such as tables and mountains. In fact, all\nexistents are compresent with each other:", "\n\n\nThere is nothing peculiar in the relation itself between mind and its\nobjects; what is peculiar in the situation is the character of one of\nthe terms, its being mind or consciousness. The relation is one of\ncompresence. But there is compresence between two physical things. The\nrelation of mind and object is comparable to that between table and\nfloor. (Alexander 1914: 288)\n", "\nAccording to Alexander, we perceive the world directly: we do not\nperceive representations or ideas of tables, but the tables themselves\n(or aspects of the tables). We are conscious of our\nperceptual process, a consciousness he labels\n“enjoyment”. Any direct theory of perception must account\nfor error. If we perceive the world directly, how do we make\nmistakes about it? Alexander’s answer is that we do not perceive\nthe world incorrectly, but we can incorrectly apply partial\nperceptions to wholes. For example, we may correctly perceive a table\nas having a flat edge, but incorrectly apply that perception to\nthe table as a whole.", "\nAlexander also argues here that minds emerge from lower-level living\norganisms, and are no less real for it:", "\n\n\n[M]ind, though descended on its physical side from lower forms of\nexistence, is, when it comes, a new quality in the world, and no more\nceases to be original because in certain respects it is resoluble into\nphysical motions, than colour disappears because it is resoluble into\nvibrations. (Alexander 1914: 304)\n", "\nThe biology that informed Alexander’s early (1889) work on\nethics survives in his account of mind: mind emerges in the world\nthrough evolution. This theory of “emergent evolution” is\nakin to that advanced by C. Lloyd Morgan; Alexander later references\nMorgan’s Instinct and Experience (1912). Alexander\nadds here that the lowest level of existence is space and\ntime—that they are “the foundation of all\nreality”—and he greatly expands on this view in his book\n(1920).", "\nOn Alexander’s realism, including the motivations underlying\nit and the question of whether realism can be found in his\nearliest work, see Weinstein (1984), Fisher (2017; 2021b),\nand Thomas (2021). " ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Realism and Compresence" }, { "content": [ "\nThis difficult two-volume work sets out Alexander’s grand\nmetaphysical picture, a sweeping system that offers a\ncosmogony, an explanation of how the world came to be in its\ncurrent state; and a hierarchical ontology based on emergence\nthat attempts to account for matter, life, mind, value, and deity.\nAlexander does not argue for this picture. Rather, he intends that his\npicture should provide a description of the world. This is in line\nwith his general methodology.", "\n\n\nPhilosophy proceeds by description; it only uses argument in order to\nhelp you to see the facts, just as a botanist uses a microscope.\n(Alexander 1921b: 423)\n", "\nThe idea is that Space, Time, and Deity offers a description\nof the world that best fits the facts.", "\nThe first chapter of Space, Time, and Deity opens with\nAlexander’s proclamation that all the vital problems of\nphilosophy depend on space and time (Alexander 1920i: 35). Alexander\nconceives space and time as the stuff out of which all things are\nmade: space and time are real and concrete, and out of them emerge\nmatter, life, and so on. Space and time are unified in a\nfour-dimensional manifold, spacetime. This single vast entity does not\nmove but contains all motions within itself, and so Alexander labels\nit “Motion”. In this respect, Alexander’s spacetime\nbears some resemblance to F. H. Bradley’s (1893) Absolute:\nneither Motion nor the Absolute move or exist in time, but they both\ncontain motion and time within themselves.", "\nAlexander presents a metaphysical argument for the unity of space and\ntime, arguing they are merely distinguishable aspects of Motion. He\nargues that space and time must be unified because, when abstracted\naway from each other, it becomes clear that they could not exist\nindependently. Time would become a mere “now”, incapable\nof succession; and space would become a mere “blank”,\nwithout distinguishable elements (Alexander 1920i: 47). Motion is both\nsuccessive and boasts distinguishable elements - this is\nbecause it is the union of space and time. Alexander’s\nmetaphysical argument for this union was severely criticised by\n Broad (1921a,b).[2]\n Alexander considered his account of spacetime to be in line with the\nphysics of his day. The following might be understood as an\nargument from physics for his position:", "\n\n\nOur purely metaphysical analysis of Space-Time on the basis of\nordinary experience is in essence and spirit identical with\nMinkowski’s conception of an absolute world of four dimensions,\nof which the three-dimensional world of geometry omits the element of\ntime. (Alexander 1920i: 87)\n", "\nAlexander goes on to distinguish between the characters of empirical\nexistents that are variable—such as life, redness or\nsweetness—and those that are pervasive.", "\n\n\n[These pervasive qualities] belong in some form to all existents\nwhatever. Such are identity (numerical identity for example),\nsubstance, diversity, magnitude, even number… The pervasive\ncategories of existence are what are known from Kant’s usage as\nthe categories of experience, and I shall call them, in distinction\nfrom the empirical ones or qualities, categorial characters.\n(Alexander 1920i: 184–5)\n", "\nCategorial qualities are the properties of spacetime, and this is why\nthe categories apply to all things within spacetime. This discussion\nbuilds on Alexander’s “The Method of Metaphysics; and the\nCategories” (1912). In a later paper, “Some\nExplanations” (1921b), which aims to answer critics’\nworries, Alexander explains that the existence of the categories\nimplies the existence of something that contains them: spacetime.", "\n\n\n[F]or me the doctrine of the categories, taken along with the notion\nof S-T [spacetime], is central… What is “relation”\nin virtue of which duration is a whole of related successive moments?\nWhat does relation stand for in our experience? I answer that it\nalready implies S-T, and that until it receives its concrete\ninterpretation it is in metaphysics a word. (Alexander 1921b:\n411–2)\n", "\nThe idea is that, by supposing the existence of spacetime, we explain\nthe existence of relations (characteristics of reality that hold\nbetween all things). Similarly, the existence of spacetime explains\nthe existence of all other categories. For more on relations, see\nAlexander’s (1921b).", "\nThe second volume of Space, Time, and Deity asks how\nspacetime is related to the various levels of existence within it:\nmatter, life, mind and deity. Alexander argues we should model the\nemergence of levels within spacetime on the emergence of mind from\nbody:", "\n\n\nEmpirical things are complexes of space-time with their qualities, and\nit is now my duty to attempt to show how the different orders of\nempirical existence are related to each other… [T]he nature of\nmind and its relation to body is a simpler problem in itself than the\nrelation of lower qualities of existence to their inferior basis; and\nfor myself it has afforded the clue to the interpretation of the lower\nlevels of existence. (Alexander 1920ii: 3)\n", "\nAnalogous to the way that Alexander takes mind to emerge from body,\nnew levels of being emerge from spacetime when the motions within\nspacetime become complex enough:", "\n\n\nEmpirical things or existents are… groupings within Space-Time,\nthat is, they are complexes of pure events or motions in various\ndegrees of complexity. Such finites have all the categorial\ncharacters, that is, all the fundamental features which flow from the\nnature of any space-time… [A]s in the course of Time new\ncomplexity of motions comes into existence, a new quality\nemerges… The case which we are using as a clue is the emergence\nof the quality of consciousness from a lower level of complexity which\nis vital [i.e., life]. (Alexander 1920ii: 45)\n", "\nAlexander has been criticised for explaining the emergence of\nqualities within spacetime by analogy with mind-body emergence, as the\nlatter kind of emergence is rarely taken to be as unproblematic as\nAlexander appears to conceive it. For more on this, see for example\nEmmet (1950).", "\nAccording to Alexander, the emergence of new levels of being within\nspacetime is driven by a “nisus”, a striving or felt push\ntowards some end:", "\n\n\nThere is a nisus in Space-Time which, as it has borne its creatures\nforward through matter and life to mind, will bear them forward to\nsome higher level of existence. (Alexander 1920ii: 346)\n", "\nThis means that the emergence of qualities in spacetime is not merely\na process, it is a progress. Exactly what the nisus is has\ndivided\n commentators.[3]\n but however it is best understood, it pushes the emergence of new\nqualities within spacetime, and this includes the push towards\ndeity.", "\nThe second volume of Space, Time, and Deity also contains a\nrelatively brief discussion of beauty, and other forms of value.\nAlexander hugely expands on this account in his 1933 monograph;\n see Section 4.2 below.", "\nAlexander engaged in extended correspondence on Space, Time, and\nDeity: his letters with F. H. Bradley, C. D. Broad, and C.\nLloyd Morgan are particularly important. Some of the Bradley\ncorrespondence can be found in Bradley’s (1999) Collected\nWorks. Other letters can be found in Samuel Alexander\nPapers, John Rylands Library, Manchester.", "\nSecondary literature on Alexander’s spacetime metaphysics\nincludes Brettschneider (1964), Broad (1921a,b), Murphy’s\n(1927–1928) series, Emmet (1950), Thomas (2013), Fisher (2015),\nand Rush (2021). Schaffer’s (2009) argues for the identification\nof spacetime with matter, and traces this line of thought to\nAlexander. Secondary literature on Alexander’s account of\nmind-body emergence include classic critiques from Broad (1921a,b),\nCalkins (1923) and Emmet (1950). Stout (1922) discusses and rejects\nAlexander’s theory of perception. There has been more recent\nwork on Alexander’s account of emergence in general; see\nMcLaughlin (1992), Gillet (2006), and O’Connor and Wong\n(2012)." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Space, Time, and Deity" }, { "content": [ "\nOne of the optimistic conclusions of Space, Time, and Deity\nis that, in the future, deity will emerge as a quality of the universe\nas a whole. This deity-world emergence is akin to mind-body emergence.\nIn the following passage, Alexander explains that we should not\nidentity God with spacetime. Instead, the spacetime system is in the\nprocess of “engendering” God:", "\n\n\nThe universe, though it can be expressed without remainder in terms of\nSpace and Time, is not merely spatio-temporal. It exhibits materiality\nand life and mind. It compels us to forecast the next empirical\nquality of deity. On the one hand, we have the totality of the world,\nwhich in the end is spatio-temporal; on the other the quality of deity\nengendered or rather being engendered, within that whole. These two\nfeatures are united in the conception of the whole world as expressing\nitself in the character of deity, and it is this and not bare\nSpace-Time which for speculation is the ideal conception of God.\n(Alexander 1920ii: 353–4)\n", "\nFor Alexander, God is the whole world possessing the quality of deity\n(Alexander 1920ii: 353). However, the “whole world” does\nnot yet exist because Alexander’s universe is one of process;\nthe universe is in progress towards becoming complete, and this is why\nAlexander claims the universe is in process towards deity. The whole\nworld, which will possess the quality of deity, does not yet exist,\nbut part of it does: “As an actual existent, God is the infinite\nworld with its nisus towards deity” (Alexander 1920ii: 353). The\nquality of deity has not yet arrived—and indeed, may never\narrive—but God exists in the sense that part of his body, the\ngrowing world, does.", "\nA potential problem for Alexander is that God is frequently perceived\nas being atemporal. In contrast, on Alexander’s system, God is\nboth spatial and temporal. Alexander recognises that this could be\nconsidered a problem, but argues that in fact it is an advantage. If\nGod does not “precede” the world, but rather is the\nproduct of it, you can avoid one formulation of the problem of\nevil, on which God creates the world and allows suffering within it\n(Alexander 1920ii: 399).", "\n\n\nGod is then not responsible for the miseries endured in working out\nhis providence, but rather we are responsible for our acts. (Alexander\n1920ii: 400)\n", "\nA created deity makes our positions as free agents more important.", "\nAlexander’s account of deity is explored further in his 1927\n“Theism and Pantheism”, reprinted in his\nPhilosophical and Literary Pieces (1939). This paper argues\nthat theology is a kind of science aiming to account for a\ncertain kind of experience: one’s sense of the divine in the\nworld (Alexander 1939: 316). Alexander discusses a particular\nphilosophical problem facing theism, the question of whether\ntranscendence (i.e., being beyond the material world) and immanence\n(i.e., living within the world) can be combined in one being, as is\noften claimed of God. Alexander argues he can offer a solution: God\ncan be understood as being transcendent and immanent if he will emerge\nfrom the world:", "\n\n\nGod… is himself in the making, and his divine quality or deity\na stage in time beyond the human quality. And as the root and leaves\nand sap of the plant feed its flower, so the whole world, as so far\nunrolled in the process of time, flowers into deity…\nGod’s deity is thus the new quality of the universe which\nemerges in its forward movement in time. (Alexander 1939: 330)\n", "\nGod is transcendent in the sense that he is still in the making, and\nimmanent in the sense that he will bloom from the whole world.", "\nExtended discussions of Alexander’s theism can be found in Titus\n(1933) and Thomas (2016). Brief discussions can be found in\nMcCarthy (1948) and Stiernotte (1954). Emergentist\ntheologies, holding that in some sense God will emerge\nfrom the universe, are currently enjoying a revival, and in this\ncontext Clayton (2004) discusses Alexander’s system as a rival\nto his own." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Philosophy of Religion" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Late Writings", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAfter the publication of Space, Time, and Deity, Alexander\nreportedly came across the system of Spinoza for the first time. In a\nlate series of papers, including Spinoza and Time\n(1921a) and “Lessons from Spinoza” (1927), Alexander\nreconstructs his system as a “gloss” of Spinoza.", "\nAlexander argues that philosophy and physics has only just begun to\n“Take time seriously” and, had Spinoza been aware of\nthese developments, his ontology would ultimately have resembled\nAlexander’s. Alexander particularly refers to the thesis that\nspace and time should be combined into the four dimensional manifold\nspacetime.", "\nSpinoza’s Ethics argues there is only one substance, and\nthis substance is identical with God and nature. The substance has an\ninfinite number of attributes, including spatial extension, and it\nsupports an infinity of dependent modes. Alexander argues that his\nsystem is similar to Spinoza’s except that he understands the\nsingle substance—Motion—to have only two attributes, space\nand time.", "\n\n\nIn our gloss upon Spinoza the ultimate reality is full of Time, not\ntimeless but essentially alive with Time, and the theatre of incessant\nchange. It is only timeless in the sense that taken as a whole it is\nnot particularised to any one moment of duration, but comprehends them\nall… Reality is Space-Time or motion itself, infinite or\nself-contained and having nothing outside itself. (Alexander 1921a:\n39)\n", "\nAlexander argues his gloss solves problems\nin Spinoza’s original system. He also praises Spinoza for\nsuccessfully combining religious values and naturalism (Alexander\n1927: 14). Alexander concludes one of his pieces on this topic by\nsaying that he takes pride in the similarity between his system and\nSpinoza’s (Alexander 1921a: 79). Alexander was corresponding at\nthis time with the Spinoza scholar Harold Joachim.", "\nThere is very little secondary literature on this aspect of\nAlexander’s thought, although Thomas (2013) has argued Alexander\nis best understood through Spinoza." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 History of Philosophy: Spinoza" }, { "content": [ "\nAlexander’s writing on art falls into two kinds. First, there\nare essays on literature and art. These are all reprinted in\nAlexander’s (1939), and cover a wide range of\ntopics: from the art of Jane Austen, to the writings of Pascal,\nto the origin of the creative impulse. Second, there are the pieces\ncomprising Alexander’s account of value. Alexander’s early\ninterest in ethics—exemplified in his first monograph\n(1889)—survived in his later work as a preoccupation with the\nnature of value, albeit with a focus on the aesthetic value of beauty.\nAlexander’s (1920) contained several chapters on the nature of\nvalue, and he goes on to supplement these with further papers on the\nsame theme. These include “Naturalism and Value”, and\n“Value”, both reprinted in Alexander’s\nPhilosophical and Literary Pieces (1939); and “Morality\nas An Art” (1928). These papers culminate in another monograph,\nBeauty and Other Forms of Value\n(1933), Alexander’s most important work on the topic. His\nwritings on value are of greater philosophic interest than those on\nliterature and art.", "\nThe views that Alexander expresses in “Morality as An Art”\nprovide a useful introduction to his full account. In this paper,\nAlexander argues we can fruitfully understand morality by comparing it\nwith fine art. He argues that, just as the value of beauty found in\nart is a human construction, so are moral values:", "\n\n\nFor it is the most obvious feature of fine art that it is a human\nconstruction. But it is not so evident that truth and morality are as\nmuch constructions of ours as beauty is… I am here to plead the\nopposite doctrine. The highest so-called values, truth, beauty, and\ngoodness, are all of them human inventions, and the valuable is what\nsatisfies certain human instincts or impulses. (Alexander 1928:\n143)\n", "\nAn objection to this view is that beauty is not constructed; we might\nfind it in a natural landscape, for example. Alexander replies to this\nthat landscapes and other natural phenomena are rendered beautiful by\nthe parts that we pick out, akin to a photographer composing a\npicture. As such, the beauty of nature is composed by us (Alexander\n1928:149). This entails that there is no difference in kind between\nnatural beauty and art; for more on this, see Alexander’s\n“Art and the Material” (reprinted in Alexander 1939).", "\nAlexander argues we construct values in response to certain needs. For\nexample, beauty satisfies the impulse of constructiveness in humans.\nIn “Value”, Alexander connects human art to the dam\nbuilding of beavers (Alexander 1939: 296). Analogously, morality\nsatisfies the impulse of gregariousness or sociality in humans.", "\n\n\n[I]t is humanized out of the purely animal sociality… which we\nfind in animals that live in herds like wild dogs, or form societies\nlike bees. (Alexander 1928: 150)\n", "\nBeauty and other forms of Value (1933) expands on this\naccount. Alexander perceives his naturalistic account of value to be\nsimilar to that offered by Spinoza. In “Naturalism and\nValue”, Alexander tells us that Spinoza’s is the\n“true” naturalism: everything is extension, including\nvalue, and yet everything is still divine (Alexander 1939: 279).", "\nBuilding on the many smaller pieces that preceded it, Beauty and\nOther Forms of Value provides a full naturalist account of value.\nAlexander’s approach is to discuss the supreme values in\nturn, beginning with beauty, and moving on to truth and goodnes.\nHe continues down to lesser values. He aims to explain not just\nwhat values are, but also how they came to be.", "\nAlexander argues that anything can have value if it matters to a\nthing. In this sense, food is valuable to an animal, and moisture is\nvaluable to a plant. However, the “supreme”\nvalues—beauty, goodness and truth—can be distinguished\nfrom others because they are the only values that are valuable in\nthemselves, for their own sake:", "\n\n\nWhen we come to the highest values, the beautiful, the true and the\ngood, these in one respect are like wheat and apples: they are objects\nof a certain constitution—statues and sonatas, landscapes,\ngenerous deeds, chemistry. Their pre-eminence as values is that they\nhave no being apart from their value. That is because they are not\nmerely found, like apples, and their value, like the value of apples\nfor food, then discovered, but are made to have value, come into\nexistence along with their value. (Alexander 1933: 293)\n", "\nThe claim that these values come into existence along with their value\nis of course referring to Alexander’s thesis, also given in\nhis Beauty and other forms of Value (1933), that the\nsupreme values are human inventions.", "\nAs we saw above, Alexander argues that humans construct values in\nresponse to certain needs or instincts. The final part of Beauty\nand Other Forms of Value identifies the animal origin of our\nsupreme values. For example, there is an analogy to be drawn between\nthe social impulse in humans and in bees. “Naturalism and\nValue” explains that in the same way that bees’\ninstinct for finding honey once seemed to be\n“magical” and yet has been explained by biology in\nnaturalistic terms, similarly values appear to be magical and yet can\nbe explained naturally (Alexander 1939: 282). He goes on to argue that\nDarwin’s theory of evolution plays an important role in the\ndevelopment of value:", "\n\n\n[T]he doctrine of natural selection may be described as the history of\nhow value makes its entry into the organic world. So far as it is a\nnecessary part of the process by which species are established, it is\nthe principle which constitutes the history of value, for it shows how\nthe mere interests of individual organisms come to be well-founded and\nto be values. (Alexander 1933: 287)\n", "\nThe idea is that, for animals, things that have value are usually\nthose that will further the survival of the species, such as food.\nAnimals whose interests do not help to maintain their existence\nsuccumb under the conditions of their existence, and “leave the\nfield” for others. In this way, natural selection provides a\nhistory of value. More on this can be found in Alexander’s\n“Naturalism and Value” (reprinted in Alexander 1939). This\nintegration of the theory of evolution into Alexander’s\naesthetics should come as no surprise to us, being as it is a theme in\nAlexander’s larger work.", "\nAlexander’s writings on art and value were well received in\ntheir day:", "\n\n\n[Alexander’s] happy blending of Herbert Spencer’s patient\nempiricism with the bolder systematic sweep of Bradley and the giant\nfigures of German idealism was nowhere more fruitful than in his\ntreatment of aesthetics. (Listowel 1939: 183)\n", "\nThe secondary literature includes Listowel (1939), Fox (1934),\nHooper (1950), and Innis (2017)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Art and Other Forms of Value" }, { "content": [ "\n“The Historicity of Things” (1936) is one of\nAlexander’s last papers. One reason it is valuable is\nthat it gives a concise overview of Alexander’s spacetime\nmetaphysics in his own words. Another reason it is valuable is\nthat it tackles an unusual theme: the relationship between history and\nnature. Alexander argues that while some of the contributions to\nphilosophy from science are clear, it is less clear what philosophy\ncan learn from history (Alexander 1936: 12). Alexander argues that, as\ntime and motion belong to the most fundamental level of reality, all\nthat exists is “historical”. As such, science begins with\nhistory:", "\n\n\nHistory can claim to be mistress of science, as much as mathematics,\nthough in a different sense. They stand for the two vital elements in\nevery science which cannot be separated, if they can be considered\nseparately, the constructive process by which we discover by our\nthought the order inherent in things, and the raw material\nitself… It must be remembered, however, of course, that\nhistorical science is but one of the sciences which arise\nfrom the facts and happenings of the world. (Alexander 1936: 24)\n", "\nAlexander’s characterisation of history as having the whole\nworld as its subject matter is interesting not least because it proved\nso controversial. Both R. G. Collingwood and Hilda Oakeley, two\nphilosophers of history associated with British idealism, took strong\nissue with Alexander’s description; see Collingwood’s\nreprinted Principles of History (1938 [1999: 56]) and\nOakeley’s “The World as Memory and as History”\n(1925–6).", "\nBoth Oakeley and Collingwood corresponded with Alexander, and what has\nsurvived of their correspondence can be found in the Samuel Alexander\nPapers at the John Rylands Library. The Alexander-Collingwood\ncorrespondence has been published in Kobayashi (2021), who also\nprovides discussion. " ], "subsection_title": "4.3 The Historicity of Things" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAlexander’s work impacted a wide variety of thinkers, and he was\nespecially widely read from the 1910s to the 1930s. His work was\nused and referenced by the likes of British new realists Bertrand\nRussell, G. E. Moore, and G. F. Stout, John Laird, C. D. Broad;\nand by American realists Edwin B. Holt, and George P. Adams;\nfor a longer list, see Fisher (2021a). ", "\nThe last decade has seen increasing scholarly interest in tracing\nAlexander’s influence on other philosophers. For example, his work was\nalso picked up by John Anderson, who attended Alexander’s\n1917–1918 Gifford lectures. Lines of thought stemming from\nAlexander can be found in Anderson’s Australian student, D.M.\nArmstrong; and in American philosopher Donald C. Williams. On\nAlexander’s influence on Anderson and Armstrong, see Gillett\n(2006), Fisher (2015), Cole (2018, §1; §5.2); and Weblin\n(2021). On Williams, see Fisher (2015) and Williams (2021).\nMetaphysician Dorothy Emmet’s (2021) piece shows her work also\nowed a lot to Alexander.", "\nThe extent of Alexander’s intellectual relationship with\nphilosopher of history R. G. Collingwood is only recently coming to be\nappreciated; see O’Neill (2006), Connelly (2021), and Kobayashi\n(2021). Unusually for a realist, Alexander’s work was also\npicked up by at least two British idealists, May Sinclair and Hilda\nOakeley; see Thomas (2015; 2019)." ], "section_title": "5. Alexander’s Legacy", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "1886, “Hegel’s Conception of Nature”,\nMind, 11: 495–523.", "1889, Moral Order and Progress: An Analysis of Ethical\nConceptions, London: Trubner & Co.", "1908, Locke, London: Archibald Constable & Co.", "1909–10, “Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of the Place\nof Mind in The Universe”, The Hibbert Journal, 8:\n47–66.", "1912a, “The Method of Metaphysics; and the\nCategories”, Mind, 21: 1–20.", "1912b, “On Relations; and in Particular the Cognitive\nRelation”, Mind, 21: 305–28.", "1914, “The Basis of Realism”, Proceedings of the\nBritish Academy, 5: 279–314.", "1920, Space, Time, and Deity (2 volumes), London:\nMacmillan & Co Ltd.", "1921a, Spinoza and Time, London: Unwin Brothers.", "1921b, “Some Explanations”, Mind, 30:\n409–428.", "1928, “Morality as An Art”, Journal of\nPhilosophical Studies, 3: 143–57.", "1927, “Lessons from Spinoza”, Chronicon\nSpinozanum, 5: 14–29.", "1933, Beauty and other forms of Value, London: Macmillan\n& Co.", "1939, Philosophical and Literary Pieces, edited by John\nLaird. London, Macmillan & Co.", "2021, Marking the Centenary of Samuel Alexander’s Space,\nTime and Deity, in Fisher, A. R. J. (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan:\nCham, Switzerland.", "Bradley, F. H., 1893, Appearance and Reality, London:\nSwan Sonnenschein.", "Collingwood, R. G., 1938 [1999], The Principles of\nHistory, W. H. Dray & W. J. Van der Dussen (eds.), Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Morgan, C. Lloyd., 1912, Instinct and Experience, London:\nMethuen.", "Oakeley, H. D., 1926–7, “The World as Memory and as\nHistory”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 27:\n291–316.", "Spinoza, Ethics, in Edwin Curley, translator, The\nCollected Writings of Spinoza (Volume I), Princeton: Princeton\nUniversity Press, 1985.", "Bateman, J. V., 1940, “Professor Alexander’s Proofs of\nthe Spatio-Temporal Nature of Mind”, The Philosophical\nReview, 49: 309–324.", "Bradley, F. H., 1999, Collected Works of FH Bradley, Volumes 4\n&5, Selected Correspondence, edited by Carol A. Keene,\nChippenham: Theommes Press.", "Brettschneider, Betram, 1964, The Philosophy of Samuel\nAlexander, New York: Humanities Press.", "Broad, C. D., 1921a, “Professor Alexander’s Gifford\nLectures I”, Mind, 30: 25–39.", "–––, 1921b, “Professor Alexander’s\nGifford Lectures II”, Mind, 30: 129–150.", "Calkins, Mary Whiton, 1923, “The Dual Role of the Mind in\nthe Philosophy of S. Alexander”, Mind, 32:\n197–210.", "Clayton, Philip, 2004, Mind and Emergence, New York:\nOxford University Press.", "Cole, Creagh McLean. 2018. John Anderson. In Stanford\nEncyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta.\nhttps://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/anderson-john/.", "Connelly, James M. (2021). “Becoming Real: The Metaphysics\nof Samuel Alexander and R.G. Collingwood”, in Fisher,\nA. R. J. (ed.), Marking the Centenary of Samuel Alexander’s\nSpace, Time and Deity, pp. 193–210, Palgrave Macmillan: Cham,\nSwitzerland.", "Emmet, Dorothy, 1950, “Time is the mind of space”,\nPhilosophy, 25: 225–234.", "–––, 2021. “Samuel\nAlexander in Manchester”, in Fisher, A. R. J. (ed.),\nMarking the Centenary of Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and\nDeity, pp. 77–88, Palgrave Macmillan: Cham, Switzerland.", "Gillet, Carl, 2006, “Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism:\nOr, higher causation for physicalists”, Synthese, 153:\n261–296.", "Fisher, A. R. J., 2015, “Samuel Alexander’s Theory of\nCategories”, The Monist, 98: 246–267.", "–––, 2017, “Samuel Alexander’s Early\nReactions to British Idealism”, Collingwood and British\nIdealism Studies 23: 169–96.", "–––, 2021a, “Introduction”, in\nFisher, A. R. J. (ed.), Marking the Centenary of Samuel\nAlexander’s Space, Time and Deity, pp. 1–20, Palgrave\nMacmillan: Cham, Switzerland", "–––, 2021b, “Samuel Alexander and the\nPsychological Origins of Realism”, in Fisher,\nA. R. J. (ed.), Marking the Centenary of Samuel Alexander’s\nSpace, Time and Deity, pp.165–192, Palgrave Macmillan:\nCham, Switzerland.", "Fox, A. C., 1934, “Professor Alexander’s Ethical\nViews”, International Journal of Ethics, 44:\n405–417", "Hooper, Sydney E., 1950, “A Reasonable Theory of Morality\n(Alexander and Whitehead)”, Philosophy, 25:\n54–67.", "Innis, Robert. E, 2017, “Aesthetic Naturalism and the\n«Ways of Art»: linking John Dewey and Samuel\nAlexander”, Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia, 3:\n513–532.", "\nKobayashi, Chinatsu, 2021, “Collingwood’s\nLetters to Alexander”, Collingwood and British Idealism\nStudies 27: 145–196.", "Laird, John, 1939, “Memoir” in Alexander’s\nPhilosophical and Literary Pieces, J. Laird (ed.), London:\nMacmillan & Co.", "Listowel, Lord, 1939, “The Aesthetic Doctrines of Samuel\nAlexander”, Philosophy, 14: 180–191.", "McCarthy, John, 1948, The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander,\nNew York: Macmillan.", "McLaughlin, B., 1992, “The rise and fall of British\nEmergentism”, in Emergence or Reduction?, A. Beckerman,\nH. Flohr and J. Kim (eds.), pp. 49–39, Berlin: Walter de\nGruyer.", "Muirhead, J. H., 1939, “Samuel Alexander”,\nPhilosophy, 14: 3–14.", "Murphy, Arthur E., 1927a, “Alexander’s Metaphysic of\nSpace-Time I”, The Monist, 37: 357–383.", "–––, 1927b, “Alexander’s Metaphysic\nof Space-Time II. Space-Time and the Categories”, The\nMonist, 37: 624–644.", "–––, 1928, “Alexander’s Metaphysic\nof Space-Time III: Space-Time and Knowledge”, The\nMonist, 38: 18–37.", "O’Connor, Timothy and Hong Yu Wong, 2012, “Emergent\nProperties”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy\n(Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/properties-emergent/>.", "O’Neill, Michael, 2006, “On the Role of Time in\nCollingwood’s Thought”, in Alexander Lyon Macfie (ed.)\nThe Philosophy of History, Basingstoke: Palgrave\nMacmillan.", "Passmore, John, 1957, A Hundred Years of Philosophy.\nLondon: Duckwork.", "Rush, Michael, 2021, “Samuel Alexander on Motion”, in\nFisher, A. R. J. (ed.), Marking the Centenary of Samuel\nAlexander’s Space, Time and Deity, pp. 129–148,\nPalgrave Macmillan: Cham, Switzerland.", "Schaffer, Jonathan, 2009, “Spacetime as the One\nSubstance”, Philosophical Studies, 145:\n131–148.", "Simons, Peter, 2021, “Samuel Alexander’s\nCategories”, in Fisher, A. R. J. (ed.), Marking the\nCentenary of Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity,\npp. 149–164, Palgrave Macmillan: Cham, Switzerland.", "Stiernotte, Alfred, 1954, God and Space-Time, New York:\nPhilosophy Library.", "Stout, G. F., 1922, “Prof. Alexander’s Theory of Sense\nPerception”, Mind, 31: 385–412.", "–––, 1940, “S. Alexander\n(1859–1938): Personal Reminiscences”, Mind, 49:\n126–129.", "Thomas, Emily, 2013, “Space, Time, and Samuel\nAlexander”, British Journal for the History of\nPhilosophy, 21: 549–569.", "–––, 2015, Hilda Oakeley on Idealism, History\nand the Real Past. British Journal for the History of Philosophy\n23 (5): 933–953.", "–––, 2016, “Samuel Alexander’s\nSpacetime God: A Naturalist Rival to Current Emergentist\nTheologies”, in Alternative Concepts of God, Y.\nNagasawa and A. Buckareff (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press,\npp. 225– 273. ", "–––, 2019. The Idealism and Pantheism of May\nSinclair. Journal of the American Philosophical Association\n5(2): 137–157.", "–––, 2021, “Samuel Alexander’s Place\nin British Philosophy: Realism and Naturalism from the 1880s\nOnwards”, in Fisher, A. R. J. (ed.), Marking the\nCentenary of Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity,\npp. 113–128, Palgrave Macmillan: Cham, Switzerland.", "Titus, Harold, 1933, “A Neo-realist’s Idea of\nGod”, Journal of Religion, 13: 127–38.", "Weblin, Mark, 2021, “The Rise and Fall of Australian\nEmpiricism”, in Fisher, A. R. J. (ed.), Marking\nthe Centenary of Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity,\npp. 211–236, Palgrave Macmillan: Cham, Switzerland.", "Weinstein, Michael, 1984, Unity and Variety in the Philosophy\nof Samuel Alexander, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University\nPress.", "Williams, Donald C., 2021, “Samuel Alexander and the\nAnalytical Introverts”, in Fisher, A. R. J. (ed.),\nMarking the Centenary of Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and\nDeity, pp. 89–110, Palgrave Macmillan: Cham, Switzerland." ]	[ { "href": "../anderson-john/", "text": "Anderson, John" }, { "href": "../bradley/", "text": "Bradley, Francis Herbert" }, { "href": "../collingwood/", "text": "Collingwood, Robin George" }, { "href": "../properties-emergent/", "text": "emergent properties" }, { "href": "../art-ontology-history/", "text": "ontology of art, history of" }, { "href": "../pantheism/", "text": "pantheism" }, { "href": "../spinoza/", "text": "Spinoza, Baruch" } ]
alexander-aphrodisias	Alexander of Aphrodisias	First published Mon Oct 13, 2003; substantive revision Thu Jan 19, 2017	[ "\nAlexander was a Peripatetic philosopher and commentator, active in the\nlate second and early third century CE. He continued the tradition of\nwriting close commentaries on Aristotle’s work established in the\nfirst century BCE by Andronicus of Rhodes, the editor of Aristotle’s\n‘esoteric’ writings, which were designed for use in his\nschool only. This tradition reflected a gradual revival of interest in\nAristotle’s philosophy, beginning in the late second century BCE, and\nhelped to reestablish Aristotle as an active presence in philosophical\ndebates in later antiquity. Aristotle’s philosophy had fallen into\nneglect and disarray in the second generation after his death and\nremained in the shadow of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Academic\nskeptics throughout the Hellenistic age. Andronicus’ edition of\nwhat was to become the Corpus Aristotelicum consolidated a\nrenewed interest in Aristotle’s philosophy, albeit in a different\nform: active research was replaced by learned elucidations of The\nPhilosopher’s difficult texts. The commentaries themselves served as\nmaterial for the exposition of Aristotle’s work to a restricted circle\nof advanced students. Hence each generation of teachers produced their\nown commentaries, often relying heavily on their predecessors’\nwork. Thus, the ‘scholastic’ treatment of authoritative\ntexts that was to become characteristic of the Middle Ages had already\nstarted in the first century BCE. Alexander, due to his meticulous and\nphilosophically astute exegesis of a wide range of Aristotle’s texts,\nin logic, physics, psychology, metaphysics and ethical topics, became\nknown as the exemplary commentator throughout later antiquity\nand the Arabic tradition. He is often referred to simply as ‘The\nCommentator’ (ho exêgetês), later sharing\nthis title with Avicenna or Averroes. Because there is little evidence\non Alexander’s life and activities, his commentaries and his short\ntreatises on topics related more or less closely to Aristotelian\ndoctrine provide all the information we have about him as a\nphilosopher and a man. As these writings show, his main contemporary\nopponents were the Stoics, but there is also some evidence of a\ncontroversy with Galen. Alexander is not only regarded as the best of\nthe ancient commentators but also as the last strictly Aristotelian\none, whose aim was to present and defend Aristotle’s philosophy as a\ncoherent whole, well suited to engage contemporary philosophical\ndiscussions. The later commentators were members of the Neoplatonist\nschools and were concerned to document the substantial agreement of\nPlatonic and Aristotelian thought, and to integrate Aristotle’s work\ninto their Neoplatonist philosophical system. But they continued not\nonly to consult, discuss, but also to criticize, Alexander’s work, a\nfact that probably accounts for its survival." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Date, Family, Teachers, and Influence", "1.2 Works and their history" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Alexander as commentator", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Alexander as philosopher", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Importance and Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "A. Primary Sources", "B. Translations", "C. Secondary Literature: Overviews", "D. Secondary Literature: Studies on Particular Topics" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nNext to nothing is known about Alexander’s origin, life circumstances,\nand career. His native city was (probably) the Aphrodisias in Caria,\nan inland city of southwestern Asia Minor. His father’s name was\nHermias. The only direct information about his date and activities is\nthe dedication of his On Fate to the emperors Septimius\nSeverus and Caracalla in gratitude for his appointment to an endowed\nchair. Their co-reign lasted from 198 to 209 CE; this gives us a rough\ndate for at least one of Alexander’s works. Nothing is known about his\nbackground or his education, except that his teacher was Aristoteles\nof Mytilene, rather than the more famous Aristocles of Messene, as had\nbeen conjectured by certain scholars since the 16th. century. He is\nalso said to have been a student of Sosigenes and of Herminus, the\npupil of the commentator Aspasius, the earliest commentator on\nAristotle whose work has in part survived (for information concerning\nAlexander’s teachers and their philosophy, see Moraux 1984, 335–425).\nHow much Alexander owed to his teachers is hard to guess, for he\nsometimes criticizes Sosigenes and Herminus extensively. But it is\nclear from the scope and depth of his work that he was a well-trained\nphilosopher with a broad range of knowledge and interests.", "\nThough the dedication to the emperors tells us that Alexander was\nappointed to a chair in philosophy, there is not sufficient evidence\nas to whether, as is often asserted, he obtained one of the four\nchairs, representing the four traditional schools, established in\nAthens by Marcus Aurelius in 176 CE. There were similar established\nchairs in several cities (on Athens see Lynch 1972, 192–207;\n213–216). Given the amount and scope of his writing he must have\nbeen an active teacher with a flourishing school. It is therefore\npossible that some of the short essays attributed to Alexander are\nactually the production of one of his collaborators or disciples. But\nnothing is known about any of his associates and students (cf.\nSharples 1990a). To us his work therefore represents both the heyday\nand the end of the series of commentators who explained Aristotle\nexclusively on the basis of Aristotelian texts, without commitment to\nsome other doctrine. Alexander concludes the series of these purely\n‘Peripatetic’ commentators (beginning with Andronicus of\nRhodes in the first century BCE), who try to explain “Aristotle\nby Aristotle” (Moraux 1942, xvi). Though later commentators,\nstarting with Porphyry, the disciple and editor of Plotinus, relied\nheavily on his works, they had a Neo-Platonist approach. Since\nPorphyry lived considerably later than Alexander (ca. 234–305/10\nCE), Alexander’s school may have continued to exist until it became\noutmoded by the ‘Neo-Platonist turn’. Porphyry’s report\nthat Plotinus included texts by Alexander ‘and related authors\nin his discussions’ (The Life of Plotinus, 14.13) makes\nthis quite likely. Alexander’s commentaries formed a central part of\nthe Arabic tradition and was heavily used by Maimonides. It thereby\ninfluenced the Latin West after the revival of Aristotelianism in the\nMiddle Ages. The scarcity of Latin translations of Alexander’s\ncommentaries suggests a certain preference for the interpretation of\nthe later, Neoplatonist, commentators. If William of Moerbeke confined\nhis translations of Alexander’s commentaries to those on the\nMeteorologica and the De sensu that may in part be\ndue to the availability of Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle’s\nPrior Analytics and the Topics, but it leaves\nunexplained why he did not translate the commentary on the\nMetaphysics. " ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Date, Family, Teachers, and Influence" }, { "content": [ "\nAs the list of his work shows, Alexander was a prolific writer. His\nwritings comprise both commentaries (hupomnêmata) on\nthe works of Aristotle and several systematic treatises of his own\n(including works on ‘problems’, consisting of series of\nessays on different Aristotelian texts and topics). Of the\ncommentaries, the following are extant: On Prior Analytics\nI, Topics, Metaphysics, Meteorologica, and On\nSense Perception. Of the commentary on the Metaphysics\nonly the first five books are by general consent accepted as genuine;\nthe remaining nine books are attributed to the late commentator\nMichael of Ephesus (11th-12th century CE.). The commentary on the\nSophistical Refutations, ascribed to Alexander in some\nmanuscripts, is considered spurious. References by later commentators\nshow that Alexander’s commentaries covered all of Aristotle’s\ntheoretical philosophy, including his physical writings (with the\nexception of the biological works). The list of his lost work is long:\nthere are references to commentaries on the Categories,\nDe interpretatione, Posterior Analytics,\nPhysics, and On the Heavens, as well as On the\nSoul and On Memory. Alexander did not write commentaries\non Aristotle’s Ethics or Politics, nor on the\nPoetics or the Rhetoric. That he had quite some\ninterest in ethical problems, however, is witnessed by the discussions\nin his own treatises. Among the extant short systematic writings the\nfollowing are regarded as genuine: Problems and Solutions, Ethical\nProblems, On Fate, On Mixture and Increase, On the\nSoul and a Supplement to On the Soul\n(‘Mantissa’ lit. ‘make-weight’) that not only\ncontain discussions of questions concerning psychology but also\nproblems in physics, ethics, vision and light, as well as fate and\nprovidence. The ‘Mantissa’ may not be by Alexander but a\ncompilation of notes by his students. The rest, Medical Questions,\nPhysical Problems, and On Fevers are considered\nspurious. Of his lost works some have been preserved in Arabic because\nthey were highly influential (see D’Ancona & Serra 2002): On\nthe Principles of the Universe, On Providence,\nAgainst Galen on Motion, and On Specific\nDifferences. Because of Alexander’s prestige and authority as an\ninterpreter of Aristotle, many of his works now lost were incorporated\nin the commentaries of his successors, whether they name him or not.\nNothing certain is known about the relative chronology of his\nwritings, but this is not an issue of much importance, since his\ncommentaries may well represent the results of many years of teaching,\nwith later insertions and additions, in a way quite similar to\nAristotle’s own texts. This would explain the lack of any attempt at\nelegance and the occurrence of inconsistencies or unclear transitions\nin Alexander." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Works and their history" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn general, Alexander goes on the assumption that Aristotelian\nphilosophy is a unified whole, providing systematically connected\nanswers to virtually all the questions of philosophy recognized in his\nown time. Where there is no single, clearly recognizable Aristotelian\npoint of view on some question, he leaves the matter undecided, citing\nseveral possibilities consistent with what Aristotle says. Sometimes\nAlexander tries to force an interpretation that does not obviously\nagree with the text, but he avoids stating that Aristotle contradicts\nhimself and, with rare exceptions, that he disagrees with him. Readers\nwill not always be convinced by his suggestions but they will often\nfind them helpful and informative where Aristotle is overly compressed\nand obscure. As a remark in his commentary on the Topics\nshows, Alexander was quite aware that his style of philosophic\ndiscussion was very different from that of the time of Aristotle\n(In top. 27,13): “This kind of speech [dialectic\nrefutation] was customary among the older philosophers, who set up\nmost of their classes in this way — not on the basis of books as\nis now done, since at the time there were not yet any books of this\nkind.” As this explanation indicates, however, he seems to have\nregarded the bookishness of his own time as an advantage over the\ndialectic style rather than a disadvantage.", "\nLike the other commentaries in the ancient tradition, Alexander’s\nderive from his courses of lectures (‘readings’) on\nAristotle’s works. In commenting, Alexander usually refrains from\ngiving comprehensive surveys. He generally starts with a preface on\nthe work’s title, its scope and the nature of the subject matter. He\nthen takes up individual passages in rough succession by citing a line\nor two (this provides the ‘lemma’ for the ensuing\ndiscussion) and explaining what he considers as problematic (in\nexplanatory paraphrases, clarifications of expressions, or refutations\nof the views of others), often in view of what Aristotle says about\nthe issue elsewhere. This procedure clearly presupposes that the\nstudents had their own texts at hand and were sufficiently familiar\nwith Aristotle’s philosophy as a whole. Alexander does not generally\ngo through the text line by line, but chooses to discuss certain\nissues while omitting others. Paraphrases are interrupted by\nclarifications of terminology, and sometimes, at crucial points, by\nnotes on divergent readings in different manuscripts and a\njustification of his own preference concerning Aristotle’s original\nwords. Decisions on such philological problems are based on what makes\nbetter sense in conforming with Aristotle’s intentions here or\nelsewhere. As Alexander indicates, such philological explorations were\nconsidered as part of the commentator’s work (cf. On Aristotle\nMetaphysics A, 59, 1–9): “The first reading,\nhowever, is better; this makes it clear that the Forms are causes of\nthe essence for the other things, and the One for the Forms. Aspasius\nrelates that the former is the more ancient reading, but that it was\nlater changed by Eudorus and Euharmostus.” Alexander’s concern\nwith textual problems makes him a valuable source for textual\ncriticism, as can be seen from Kotwick’s (2016) monograph on the text\nof Aristotle’s Metaphysics.", "\nThough Alexander follows the Aristotelian texts quite conscientiously,\nhe often concentrates on special points and the respective passages\nwhile passing over others with brief remarks. Thus in his comments on\nthe first book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics he devotes more\nthan half of his exegesis to the two chapters in which Aristotle\nattacks Plato’s theory of Forms (Metaph. A, 6 & 9). Since\nAristotle there focuses on Plato’s attempt to connect the Forms with\nnumbers, a theory that is not elaborated in the dialogues, Alexander’s\ndisquisition turns out to be our most valuable source on the vexed\nquestion of Plato’s Unwritten Doctrine and also on the impact of this\ndoctrine on the members of the Early Academy (see Harlfinger &\nLeszl, 1975; Fine 1993). Though on the whole Alexander adopts\nAristotle’s critical stance towards Plato’s separate Forms, he\nsometimes at least indicates the possibility of dissent. When, for\ninstance, Aristotle claims that Plato recognizes only two of his own\nfour causes, the formal and the material cause, Alexander refers to\nthe demiurge’s activities in the Timaeus as an example for an\nefficient cause acting for the sake of a final cause. But then he adds\na justification to explain why Aristotle acknowledges neither of the\ntwo causes in his report on Plato (59,28–60,2): “The\nreason is either because Plato did not mention either of these in what\nhe said about the causes, as Aristotle has shown in his treatise\nOn the Good; or because he did not make them causes of the\nthings involved in generation and destruction, and did not even\nformulate any complete theory about them.”", "\nThere is not room here to discuss each of Alexander’s commentaries\nindividually. Some remarks on his treatment of Aristotle’s logic in\nhis commentary on Prior Analytics I can serve the purpose of\na general survey (cf. the Introduction in trsl. Barnes et al. 1991).\nAs his explanations show, Alexander was fully familiar with the\ndevelopment of logic after Aristotle, under Theophrastus and the\nStoics. On the whole, he presents the Aristotelian kind of logic as\nthe obviously right one, treating the Stoic approach as wrong-headed.\nWhen he confronts problems in Aristotle’s syllogistic he sometimes\nexpresses bafflement, and indicates the difficulties or even\ninconsistencies he sees in the text. But he usually tries to smooth\nthem over or offers an alleged Aristotelian solution. In any case he\navoids, if at all possible, openly criticizing Aristotle or\ncontradicting him. As his analyses show, Alexander was not an original\nlogician with innovative ideas of his own, as was his contemporary,\nGalen. He does not always get Aristotle right and sometimes blunders\nin his exegesis. In addition, his style is uninviting. If Aristotle is\nhard to comprehend on account of his clipped and elliptic style,\nAlexander is often hard to follow because of his long and tortuous\nperiods. In the past this has made his commentary on the Prior\nAnalytics inaccessible to all but experts. The English\ntranslations try to make up for these deficiencies by cutting up long\nperiods into shorter sentences. This will greatly enhance the\nusefulness of Alexander’s reconstruction and assessment of those\naspects of Aristotle’s logic that are still a matter of controversy\nnowadays.", "\nThe idea that discrepancies in Aristotle’s texts are due to the\ndevelopment of his philosophy was as alien to Alexander as it was to\nall other thinkers in antiquity. Instead, he treats Aristotle’s\nphilosophy as a unitary whole and tries to systematize it by forging\ntogether different trains of thought, and smoothing over\ninconsistencies. Thereby he contributed to the emergence of what was\nto become the canonical ‘Aristotelianism’ that was\nattacked in early modern times as a severe obstacle to new ideas and\nscientific development. Though Alexander indicates that he was aware\nof changes at particular points (he regarded the Categories\nas Aristotle’s earliest work and notes that it does not yet observe\nthe systematic distinction between genus and species), he does not\nconsider the possibility that there were different phases with\nsubstantial changes in the Master’s work. If such conservatism\nsurprises us in view of the fact that Alexander’s own work shows\ntraces of revisions and improvement, we must keep in mind that in the\neyes of ‘The Commentator’ Aristotle was an authority quite\noutside the common order. The doctrine of the Master was not the\nproduct of an ordinary human mind, subject to trial and error, but a\nmagisterial achievement in a class of its own." ], "section_title": "2. Alexander as commentator", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAs a philosopher, Alexander presents in his writings an Aristotelian\npoint of view that reflects in many ways the conditions of his own\ntime, on questions that were not or not extensively discussed by\nAristotle himself. His Problems and Solutions\n(Quaestiones), in three books, are collections of short\nessays, which were apparently grouped together in different books\nalready in antiquity. As their Greek title (phusikai scholikai\naporiai kai luseis. lit. ‘School-discussion of problems and\nsolutions on nature’, cf. Sharples 1992, 3) indicates, these\nthree books address problems in natural philosophy in the broadest\nsense. The fourth collection, Problems of Ethics\n(êthika problêmata) proceeds in a similar way. As\nthe lists of the essays’ titles at the beginning of each book\nshow, the collections contain a hodgepodge of topics, arranged in a\nquite loose order. The intellectual level of these discussions is\nuneven and the titles of the treatises are sometimes misleading. Some\nof essays do present problems and solutions, but others contain\nexegeses of problematic passages in Aristotle’s texts. There are also\nmere paraphrases or summaries of certain texts, collections of\narguments for a certain position, and sketches of larger projects that\nwere never worked out. It is unclear when and by whom these\ncollections were put together. As mentioned above, some of the essays\nmay be the work of Alexander’s associates, or lecture-notes taken by\nhis students. Most interesting from our point of view are those\nquestions that deal with metaphysical issues, like the relation of\nform and matter, and with the status of universals in general (see\nTweedale 1984, Sharples 2005, and Sirkel 2011). Of particular interest\nare also those discussions in book II that are concerned with certain\naspects of Aristotle’s psychology, because Alexander’s commentary on\nthe De anima is lost; they supplement his treatise On the\nSoul. Of special interest here is his work that has been dubbed\n‘De anima libri Mantissa’ (=\n‘makeweight’ for his book On the Soul) by its\nfirst modern editor, I. Bruns. Of interest are also the essays on the\nnotion of providence (an important topic at Alexander’s time, in part\ndue to the influence of the Stoics’ focus on divine providence).\nThese essays defend the view that while there is no special care for\nindividuals, providence over the objects in the sublunary sphere is\nexercised by the movement of the heavenly bodies in the sense that\nthey preserve the continuity of the species on earth.", "\nSince Alexander did not write a commentary on Aristotle’s ethics, his\nEthical Problems, despite their somewhat disorganized state,\nare of considerable interest (cf. Madigan 1987; Sharples 1990; 2001,\n2). For, apart from Aspasius’ early commentary on parts of the\nNicomachean Ethics there are no extant commentaries on\nAristotle’s ethics before the composite commentary by various hands of\nthe Byzantine age (Michael of Ephesus in the 11th/12th c. and his\ncontemporary Eustratius, together with some material extracted from\nearlier authors, cf. Sharples 1990, 6–7, 95). This gap may\nsuggest that ethics had become a marginal subject in later antiquity.\nAlexander’s Ethical Problems are therefore the only link\nbetween Aspasius and the medieval commentaries. Though Alexander’s\ncollection of essays displays no recognizable order, it is worth\nstudying because many of the ‘questions’ address central\nissues in Aristotle’s ethics. Some, for instance, are concerned with\nthe notion of pleasure as a good and pain as an evil; with pleasure as\na supplement of activity supporting its connection with happiness;\nwith the relation between virtues and vices; with virtue as a mean;\nand with the concept of the involuntary and the conditions of\nresponsibility. Alexander’s discussions confirm not only his thorough\nfamiliarity with Aristotle’s ethics, but also reflect the debates of\nthe Peripatetics with the Epicureans and Stoics in Hellenistic times,\nas shown especially by the terminology he uses. The Hellenistic\nbackground also explains the fact that Alexander pays special\nattention to logical and physical distinctions in connection with\nethical problems.", "\nThe best example of his procedure is Alexander’s construal of an\nAristotelian conception of fate in the treatise On Fate.\nThough its long, and at times inelegant, passages do not make for easy\nreading, this is no doubt the essay that is most interesting for a\ngeneral public (cf. Sharples 1983 and 2001, 1). Not only is it the\nmost comprehensive surviving document in the centuries-long debate on\nfate, determinism, and free will that was carried on between the\nStoics, the Epicureans and the Academic Skeptics, it also contains\nsome original suggestions and points of criticism, as a comparison\nwith Cicero’s On Fate would show. It is unclear whether there\nhad been a genuinely Peripatetic contribution to this debate before\nAlexander. If there was not, Alexander clearly filled a significant\ngap. Though Aristotle himself in a way touches on all important\naspects of the problem of determinism — logical, physical, and\nethical — in different works, he was not greatly concerned with\nthis issue, nor does he entertain the notion of fate\n(heimarmenê) as a rational cosmic ordering-force, as\nthe Stoics were going to introduce. In De interpretatione 9,\nhe famously proposed to solve the problem of ‘future\ntruth’ by suspending truth-values for statements in the future\ntense concerning individual contingent events. In his ethics he deals\nwith the question of whether individuals have free choice, once their\ncharacter is settled. As Aristotle sees it, there is little or no\nleeway, but he holds individuals responsible for their actions because\nthey collaborated in the acquisition of their character (EN\nIII, 1–5). In his physical works Aristotle limits strict\nnecessity to the motions of the stars, while allowing for a wide range\nof events in the sublunary realm that do not happen of necessity but\nonly for the most part or by chance (Phys. II, 4–6).\nThough he subscribes to the principle that the same causal\nconstellations have the same effects, he also allows for ‘fresh\nstarts’ in a causal series (Metaph. E 3). Given these\nvarious limitations, Aristotle had no reason to treat determinism as a\ncentral philosophical problem either in his ethics or in his physics.\nThe situation changed, however, once the Stoics had established a\nrigorously physicalist system ruled by an all-pervasive divine mind.\nIt is this radicalization of the determinist position that sharpened\nthe general consciousness of the problematic, as witnessed by the\nrelentless attacks on the Stoics by their opponents, most of all by\nthe Academic skeptics and the Epicureans, which lasted for\ncenturies.", "\nThis long-standing debate prompted Alexander to develop an\nAristotelian concept of fate by identifying it with the natural\nconstitution of things, including human nature (On Fate, ch.\n2–6). Since there is always the possibility that something\nhappens against the natural and normal order of things, there are\nexceptions to what is ‘fated’ and there is room for chance\nand the fortuitous. Most of the treatise is occupied not with the\ndefense of this Peripatetic position, but rather with attacks on the\nvarious aspects of the determinist position. Alexander claims to show\nwhy the Stoics’ attempt (though he nowhere names them) to defend\na compabilitist position must fail. The determinists, he says, are\nneither entitled to maintain a coherent concept of luck and the\nfortuitous, nor of contingency and possibility, nor of deliberation\nand potency. The bulk of this polemical discussion concentrates on the\ndifficulties for the Stoic position by claiming that their concept of\nfate makes human deliberation superfluous and therefore imports\ndisastrous consequences for human morality and life in general (chs.\n7–21). Alexander also presents, albeit in a dialectical fashion\nintended to lead to the defeat of the Stoic tenets, the arguments used\nby the Stoics in their defense of contingency, chance, and human\nresponsibility. As he claims time and again, the Stoics can defend the\nuse of these terms at best in a verbal sense. In addition, their\nnotion of divine foreknowledge and prophecy turns out to be incoherent\n(chs. 22–35). The stringency and originality of Alexander’s\ncritique cannot be discussed here (cf. Sharples 1983; Bobzien 1998).\nWhile his presentation is not free from repetition and while the order\nof the arguments leaves something to be desired, it is an interesting\ntext that displays a lively engagement with the issues and quite some\nphilosophical sophistication. He argues that truly free action\nrequires that at the time one acts, it is open to one both to do and\nnot to do what one does in fact then do. Thus Alexander originates the\nposition later known as ‘libertarianism’ in the theory of\nfree action. Alexander’s construction of an Aristotelian account of\nfate and divine providence that limits them to nature and its overall\nbenign order clearly argues for a weak conception of fate; but it is\nthe only one that Alexander regards as compatible with the principles\nof Aristotelian philosophy of nature and ethics. That the concept of\nfate greatly intrigued him is confirmed by the fact that he returns to\nthe issue in his addendum (‘Mantissa’) to the treatise\nOn the Soul and in some of his Problems (2.4.5, cf.\nSharples 1983, esp. the Introduction).", "\nThe attempt to ‘naturalize’ crucial concepts in\nAristotle’s philosophy is typical of Alexander’s philosophical stance\nin general. He regards universals as inseparable from particulars and\nas secondary to them, and stresses the unity of matter and form.\nSimilarly, he treats the human soul as the perishable form imposed\nupon the bodily elements to constitute a living human being. He argues\nthat the intellect develops from an embodied intellect (that is\nfocused upon the material world) to a state that eventually contains\nforms that are not embodied. He rules out personal immortality by\nidentifying the active intellect with pure form and with God, the\nUnmoved Mover (see On the Soul and Caston 2012). In his\nemphasis on a naturalist point of view he appears remarkably free from\nthe increasingly spiritualistic and mystical tendencies of his own\ntime. In the treatise On Mixture and Increase Alexander\nexpands on problems that Aristotle touched upon only briefly in On\nGeneration and Corruption I 10, but his main concern is —\nas it is in his On Fate — to prove that the Stoic\nposition of a ‘thorough’ mixture of two substances cannot\nbe maintained. These treatises suggest that at the beginning of the\nthird century philosophical discussions between the traditional\nschools were still lively. We have, of course, no other evidence on\nthat issue. But there would be little point in proving the superiority\nof the Peripatetic doctrine, as he does in On Fate, to the\nemperors if the issue was by general consent regarded as obsolescent.\nIt is unlikely, therefore, that Alexander’s polemics are only a kind\nof shadow-boxing against long-gone adversaries." ], "section_title": "3. Alexander as philosopher", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere is no information concerning the impact of Alexander’s teaching\nin his lifetime. But certain indications of critical attacks on his\ncontemporary Galen (129–216 CE) suggest that he was engaged in\ncontroversy with other contemporaries as well. Whether his polemics\nagainst contemporary versions of Stoic doctrine were part of a\npersonal exchange or rather a bookish exercise is unclear. If\nAlexander held the chair of Peripatetic philosophy at Athens it is\nquite possible that he was in direct contact with the incumbents of\nthe other philosophical chairs there. He was, of course, not the first\ncommentator on Aristotle. But posterior exegetes certainly treated as\nexemplary his method and his standards for explaining problems and\nobscurities in Aristotle’s texts. This is indicated both by explicit\nreferences in later commentators and by the unacknowledged\nexploitation of his work in some extant later commentaries on the same\ntexts. As the translations of his work into Arabic and, to a lesser\ndegree, into Latin show, he continued to be treated as a leading\nauthority and his work influenced the Aristotelian tradition\nthroughout late antiquity, the Middle Ages, and in the Renaissance.\nScholars nowadays continue to make use of his commentaries, not only\nfor historical reasons but also because his suggestions are often\nworth considering in their own right. Because in recent years much\nmore attention has been paid to the philosophers in late antiquity,\nnot only to the Neo-Platonists, Alexander’s work has come under\ndetailed scrutiny in various respects by specialists, as witnessed by\nan increase in publications both on general and on special aspects of\nhis exegetical and philosophical work. The accessibility of most of\nhis writings in English translations will make apparent to a more\ngeneral readership that Alexander’s work is not only relevant for\nspecialists in the history of philosophy, but opens up an interesting\nage of transition in the history of philosophical and scientific\nideas." ], "section_title": "4. Importance and Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Diels, H. (ed.), 1882–1909, Commentaria in Aristotelem\nGraeca, Berlin: Reimer.\n\n\n\nHayduck, M. (ed.), 1891, Vol. 1 On the Metaphysics.\n\nWallies, M. (ed.), 1883, Vol. 2.1 On Prior Analytics\n1.\n\nWallies, M. (ed.), 1891, Vol. 2.2. On the Topics.\n\nWallies, M. (ed.), 1898, Vol. 2.3. On Sophistical\nRefutations.\n\nWendland, P. (ed.), 1901, Vol. 3.1. On De sensu.\n\nHayduck, M. (ed.), 1899, Vol. 3.2. On Meteorology.\n ", "Hayduck, M. (ed.), 1891, Vol. 1 On the Metaphysics.", "Wallies, M. (ed.), 1883, Vol. 2.1 On Prior Analytics\n1.", "Wallies, M. (ed.), 1891, Vol. 2.2. On the Topics.", "Wallies, M. (ed.), 1898, Vol. 2.3. On Sophistical\nRefutations.", "Wendland, P. (ed.), 1901, Vol. 3.1. On De sensu.", "Hayduck, M. (ed.), 1899, Vol. 3.2. On Meteorology.", "Bruns, Ivo (ed.), 1887, 1892, Scripta Minora, vols. 1 and\n2, Berlin: Reimer", "Rescigno, A. (ed), 2004, Alessandro di Afrodisia: Commentario\nal (De caelo di Aristotele, Frammenti del primo libro),\nAmsterdam: Hakkert", "Rashed, M. (ed.), 2011, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Commentaire\nperdue à la Physique d’Aristote (livres IV-VIII). Les scholies\nbyzantines, Berlin: De Gruyter.", "Groisard, J. (ed.), 2013, Sur la mixtion et la croissance d’\nAlexandre d’Aphrodise, Texte établi, trad. et\ncommenté, Paris: Belles Lettres", "Kapetanaki, S. & R. W.Sharples, 2006, Pseudo Aristoteles\n(Pseudo Alexander), Supplementa Problematorum (edited with\nintroduction and annotated translation), Berlin: De Gruyter.", "Alexandre d’Aphrodiasias. Commentaire sur les\nmétéores d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de\nMoerbeke, A.J. Smet (ed.), Paris: Nauwelaerts, 1968.", "Alexandre d’Aphrodisias. De fato ad imperatores: Version\nlatine de Guillaume de Moerbeke, P. Thillet (ed.), Paris: Vrin,\n1963.", "Alexander Aphrodisias: Enarratio de anima ex Aristotelis\ninstitutione, Hieronymus Donatus (trans.), reprint of first\nedition Brescia 1495 (with intr. by Eckard Kessler). Commentaria\nin Aristotelem Graeca: Versiones latinae temporis resuctitatarum\nlitterarum, (CAGL.) 13, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2008.", "Alexander von Aphrodisias: In libros meteorologicorum,\nAlexander Piccolomineus (trans.), reprint of first edition Venice\n1561, with introduction by Cristina Viano, Stuttgart:\nFrommann-Holzboog, 2010.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1,\nW.E. Dooley, 1989.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 2 &\n3, W.E. Dooley & A. Madigan, 1992.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics\n4, A. Madigan, 1993.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics\n5, W. E. Dooley, 1993.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Meteorology 4, E.\nLewis, 1996.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics\n1.1–7, J. Barnes et al., 1991.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics\nI.8–13, I. Mueller with J. Gould, 1999.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics\nI,14–22. I. Mueller with J. Gould, 1999", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s On Sense\nPerception, A. Towey, 2000.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Topics 1, J. M.\nvan Ophuisen, 2001.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Coming-to-Be and\nPerishing 2.2–5, E. Gannagé, 2005.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics\n1.23–31, I. Mueller, 2006.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics\n1.32–46, I. Mueller, 2006.", "Todd, R. B., 1976, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics:\na study of the De mixtione with preliminary essay (text,\ntranslation and commentary), Leiden: Brill.", "Fotinis, A. P., 1980, The De anima of Alexander of\nAphrodisias (translation and commentary), Washington, D.C.:\nUniversity Press of America.", "Sharples, R.W., 1983, Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate\n(text, translation and commentary), London: Duckworth.", "Sharples, R.W, 2004, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Supplement to\nOn the Soul, London: Duckworth", "Sharples, R.W., 2008, Alexander Aphrodisiensis De anima libri\nmantissa (a new edition of the Greek text with introduction and\ncommentary), Berlin: De Gruyter.", "Caston, V., 2012, Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Soul: Part\nI (translation with introduction and commentary), London: Bristol\nClassical Press.", "Sharples, R.W., 1990, Ethical Problems (translation with\nnotes), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University Press.", "Sharples, R.W., 1992, Quaestiones 1.2–2.15\n(translation with notes), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell\nUniversity Press.", "Sharples, R.W., 1994, Quaestiones 2.16–3.15\n(translation with notes), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell\nUniversity Press.", "D’Ancona C. & G. Serra, 2002 (eds.), ‘ Alexander On\nthe Principles of the Universe, On Providence,\nAgainst Galen on Motion, and On Specific\nDifferences’, in Aristotele et Alessandro di Afrodisia\nnella tradizione araba, Padova: Il Poligrafo.", "Genequand, C., 2001, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On the\nCosmos, Leiden: Brill.", "Rescher, N. & M. Marmura, 1969, The Refutation by\nAlexander of Aphrodisias of Galen’s Treatise on the Theory of\nMotion (translation with introduction and notes), Islamabad:\nIslamic Research Institute.", "Thillet, P., 2003, Alexandre d’Aphrodise: Traité de la\nprovidence (Peri pronoias, version Arabe de Abu Bissar Matthae ibn\nYunus. Intr. ed. et trad.), Lagrasse: Verdier.", " D’Ancona C. & Serra, G. 2002, Aristotele et Alessandro di\nAfrodisia nella tradizione araba, Padova: Il Poligrafo.", "Blumenthal, H. & H. Robinson (eds.), 1991, Aristotle and\nthe Later Traditions, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Blumenthal, H., 1996, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late\nAntiquity, London: Duckworth.", "Gottschalk, H.B., 1987, ‘Aristotelian philosophy in the\nRoman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century\nA.D.,’ in W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der\nRömischen Welt, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987, II.36.2,\n1079–1174.", "Lynch, J. P., 1972, Aristotle’s School. A Study of a Greek\nEducational Institution, Berkeley: University of California\nPress.", "Mercken, P., 1973, The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean\nEthics of Aristotle, Leiden: Brill.", "Moraux, P., 1942, Alexandre d’Aphrodise: exégète\nde la noétique d’ Aristote, Liège: Faculté\nde Philosophie et Lettres de l’Université de Liège.", "Moraux, P., 1973, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen,\nVolume 1 (Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im 1. Jh. v.\nChr.), Berlin: De Gruyter.", "Moraux, P., 1984, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen,\nVolume 2 (Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jahrhundert n.\nChr.), Berlin: De Gruyter.", "Moraux, P., 2001, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen,\nVolume 3 (Alexander von Aphrodisias), J. Wiesner (ed.),\nBerlin: De Gruyter.", "Pfeiffer, R., 1968, A History of Classical Scholarship,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Rashed, M., 2007, Essentialisme. Alexandre d’Aphrodise entre\nlogique, physique et comologie, Berlin: De Gruyter.", "Rashed, M. (ed.), 2008, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Paris: Les\nEtudes Philologiques.", "Schroeder, F. M.,2014,‘From Alexander to Plotinus‘,\nThe Routledge Handbook in Philosophy, London: Routledge,\n293–309", "Sharples, R. W., 1987, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias:\nScholasticism and Innovation,’ in W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg\nund Niedergang der Römischen Welt, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987,\npp. 1176–1243.", "Sorabji, R. (ed.), 1990, Aristotle Transformed: the ancient\ncommentators and their influence, London: Duckworth.", "Sorabji, R., 2004, The Philosophy of the Commentators. A\nSource-Book, 4 volumes, London: Duckworth", "Sojabji, R. (ed.), 2016, Aristotle re-interpreted: New\nfindings on seven hundred years of the ancient commentators,\nLondon: Bloomsbury Publishers", "Trego, K., 2015, La liberte en actes: ethique et metaphysique\nd’Alexandre d’Aphrodise a Jeans Duns Scotus, Paris: Vrin", "Tuominen, M., 2009, The ancient commentators on Platon and\nAristotle, Berkeley: University of California Press", "Accattino, P., 2005, Alessandro di Afrodisia: De anima II\n(Mantissa), Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso.", "Adler, J., 2014, ‘Mortality of the soul from Alexander of\nAphrodisias to Spinoza,’ Spinoza and medieval Jewish\nphilosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 13–35.", "Angelelli, I. & Cerezo, M. (eds.), 1996, Studies on the\nHistory of Logic, Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 107–127.", "Bobzien, S., 1998, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic\nPhilosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "–––, 2014, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on\nAristotle’s Theory of the Stoic Indemonstrables’, in M. Lee\n(ed.), Strategies of Argument. Essays in Ancient Ethics,\nEpistemology, and Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press,\n199–227.", "Bodnar, I., 1997, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on Celestial\nMotions,’ Phronesis, 42: 190–205.", "Bonelli, M., 2001, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica\ncome scienza dimostrativa, Naples: Bibliopolis.", "Chaniotis, A., 2004, ‘Epigraphic evidence for the\nphilosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias,’ Bulletin of the\nInstitute of Classical Studies, 47: 79–81.", "Coroleu, A., 1996, ‘The Fortuna of Juan Ginés de\nSepúlveda’s Translations of Aristotle and of Alexander of\nAphrodisias,’ Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld\nInstitutes, 59: 325–332.", "Ellis, J., 1994, ‘Alexander’s Defense of Aristotle’s\nCategories,’ Phronesis, 39: 69–89.", "Ebbesen, S., 1981, Commentators and Commentaries on\nAristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, Leiden: Brill.", "Fine, G., 1993, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s\nTheory of Forms, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Flannery, K., 1995, Ways into the Logic of Alexander of\nAphrodisias, Leiden: Brill.", "Gaskin, R., 1993, ‘Alexander’s Sea Battle: a discussion of\nAlexander of Aphrodisias De fato 10,’\nPhronesis, 38: 75–94.", "Gili, L., 2011, La sillogistica di Alessandro di\nAfrodisia (with preface by Paul Thom), Hildesheim: Olms.", "–––, 2011, ‘Boeto di Sidone e Alessandro\ndi Afrodisia intorno alla sillogistica,’ Rheinisches\nMuseum, 154: 375–397.", "–––, 2015, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias and\nthe Heterodox dictum de omni et nullo,’ History and\nPhilosophy of Logic, 36: 114–128", "–––, 2015, ‘Categorical me kata\nchronon-propositions in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Modal\nSyllogistic,’ Apeiron, 48: 466–482.", "Gutas, D., 1988, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition,\nLeiden: Brill.", "Hahmann, A., 2005, Was ist Willensfreiheit?: Alexander von\nAphrodisias Über das Schicksal, Marburg: Tectum.", "Harlfinger, D. & W. Leszl (eds.), 1975, Il “De\nideis”di Aristotele e la teoria Platonica delle idee,\nFlorence: Olschki.", "Kessler, E., 2011, Alexander of Aphrodisias and his doctrine\nof the soul: 1400 years of lasting significance, Leiden:\nBrill.", "Kotwick, M., 2016, Alexander of Aphrodisias and the text of\nAristotle’s Metaphysics, Berkeley: University of California\nPress.", "Kupreeva, I., 2004, ‘Qualities and Bodies: Alexander against\nthe Stoics.’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 25:\n297–334.", "–––, 2004, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on\nMixture and Growth,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient\nPhilosophy, 27: 297–334.", "–––, 2010, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on\nForm. A discussion of Marwan Rashed, Essentialisme,’\nOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 38: 211–249.", "–––, 2012, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias and\nAristotle’s De anima: What is in a commentary?’, Bulletin of\nthe Institute of Classical Studies, 55: 109–129.", "Lee, T. S., 1984, Die griechische Tradition der\naristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike,\nHypomnemata 79, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &\nRuprecht.", "Madigan, A., 1987, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: The Book of\nEthical Problems,’ in W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg und\nNiedergang der Römischen Welt, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987, pp.\n1260–1279.", "–––, 1994, ‘Alexander on Species and\nGenera,’ in L. Schrenk (ed.), Aristotle in Late\nAntiquity. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America\nPress, pp. 74–91.", "Mansfeld, J., 1988, ‘Diaphonia: the argument of\nAlexander, de fato chs. 1–2,‘ Phronesis, 33:\n181–207.", "Mignucci, M., 1985,‘Logic and omniscience: Alexander of\nAphrodisias and Proclus,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient\nPhilosophy, 3: 219–246.", "Mittelmann, J., 2013, ‘Neoplatonic sailors and Peripatetic\nShips: Aristotle, Alexander, and Philoponus‘, Journal of the\nHistory of Philosophy, 51: 545–566.", "Movia, G. (ed.), 2003, Alessandro di Afrodisia et la\nMetafisica di Aristotele, Milan: Vita e pensiero\nuniversita.", "Opsomer, J. & R. W. Sharples, 2000, ‘Alexander of\nAphrodisias, De intellectu 110.4: “I heard this from\nAristotle”. A modest proposal,’ Classical\nQuarterly, 50: 252–256.", "Rashed, M., 2010, ‘Alexander of Aphrosisias on Particulars\nand the Stoic Criterion of Identity,’ in R. Sharples (ed.),\nParticulars in Greek Philosophy, Leiden: Brill,\n157–179.", "Rashed, M., 2011, ‘Un corpus de logique anti-platonicienne\nd’Alexandre d’Aphrodise,’ in T. Benatouil et al. (eds.),\nPlato, Aristotle, or Both? Dialogues between Platonism and\nAristotelianism in Antiquity, Hildesheim: Olms.", "Rist, J. M., 1966, ‘On tracking Alexander of\nAphrodisias,’ Archiv für Geschichte der\nPhilosophie, 48: 82–90.", "Salis, R., 2005, Il commento di pseudo-Alessandro al libro\nΛ della Metafisica di Aristotele, Padua:\nRubbettino.", "Salles, R., 1998, ‘Categorical Possiblity and\nIncompatibilism in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Theory of\nResponsibility,’ Methexis, 11: 65–83.", "Schroeder, F. M. & R. B. Todd, 1990, Two Aristotelian\nCommentators on the Intellect: The De intellectu attributed\nto Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s\nDe anima 3.4–8, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval\nStudies.", "Sharples, R. W., 1990, ‘The School of Alexander?’ in\nSorabji (ed.) 1990, 83–111.", "–––, 1994, ‘On Body, Soul and Generation\nin Alexander of Aphrodisias,’ Apeiron, 27:\n163–170.", "–––, 1999, ‘On being a tode ti in\nAristotle and Alexander,’ Methexis, 12:\n77–87.", "–––, 2001a, ‘Determinism, Responsibility\nand Chance,’ in Moraux 2001, 513–592.", "–––, 2001b, ‘Other Ethical\nProblems,’ in Moraux 2001, 593–616.", "–––, 2004, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: what\nis a mantissa?’ in P. Adamson et al. (eds.), Philosophy,\nScience and Exegesis in Greek, Latin and Arabic Commentaries,\nLondon: Institute of Classical Studies Bulletin, Suppl. 83.1, pp.\n51–69.", "–––, 2004,‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on the\nnature and location of vision,’ in R. Salles (ed.)\nMetaphysics, Soul, and Ethics: Themes frorm the Work of Richard\nSorabji, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 345–362.", "–––, 2005,‘ Alexander of Aphrodisias on\nUniversals: Two Problematic Texts,’ Phronesis, 50:\n43–55.", "Sirkel, R., 2011, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Account of\nUniversals and its Problems,’ Journal of the History of\nPhilosophy, 49: 297–314.", "Smith, Robin, 1998, ‘Ways into the Logic of Alexander of\nAphrodisias,’ Ancient Philosophy, 18:\n206–210.", "Tweedale, M.M., 1984, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias’ views on\nuniversals,’ Phronesis, 29: 279–303.", "Weidemann, H., 1996 ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, Cicero, and\nAristotle’s Definition of Possibility,’ in I. Angelelli & M.\nCerezo (eds.), Studies in the History of Logic, Berlin: De\nGruyter, pp. 33–41." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotelianism-renaissance/", "text": "Aristotelianism: in the Renaissance" }, { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../aristotle-commentators/", "text": "Aristotle, commentators on" }, { "href": "../elias/", "text": "Elias" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../platonism/", "text": "Platonism: in metaphysics" }, { "href": "../plotinus/", "text": "Plotinus" }, { "href": "../porphyry/", "text": "Porphyry" }, { "href": "../stoicism/", "text": "Stoicism" } ]
algebra	Algebra	First published Tue May 29, 2007; substantive revision Thu Nov 3, 2022	[ "\nAlgebra is a branch of mathematics sibling to geometry, analysis\n(calculus), number theory, combinatorics, etc. Although algebra has\nits roots in numerical domains such as the reals and the complex\nnumbers, in its full generality it differs from its siblings in\nserving no specific mathematical domain. Whereas geometry treats\nspatial entities, analysis continuous variation, number theory integer\narithmetic, and combinatorics discrete structures, algebra is equally\napplicable to all these and other mathematical domains.", "\nElementary algebra, in use for centuries and taught in\nsecondary school, is the arithmetic of indefinite quantities or\nvariables \$x, y,\\ldots\$. Whereas the definite sum \$3+4\$ evaluates\nto the definite quantity 7, the indefinite sum \$x+y\$ has no definite\nvalue, yet we can still say that it is always equal to \$y+x\$, or to\n\$x^2 -y^2\$ if and only if \$x\$ is either \$-y\$ or \$y+1\$.", "\nElementary algebra provides finite ways of managing the infinite. A\nformula such as \$\\pi r^2\$ for the area of a circle of radius \$r\$\ndescribes infinitely many possible computations, one for each possible\nvaluation of its variables. A universally true law expresses\ninfinitely many cases, for example the single equation \$x+y = y+x\$\nsummarizes the infinitely many facts \$1+2 = 2+1, 3+7 = 7+3\$, etc.\nThe equation \$2x = 4\$ selects one number from an infinite set of\npossibilities. And \$y = 2x+3\$ expresses the infinitely many points\nof the line with slope 2 passing through \$(0, 3)\$ with a finite\nequation whose solutions are exactly those points.", "\nElementary algebra ordinarily works with real or complex values.\nHowever its general methods, if not always its specific operations and\nlaws, are equally applicable to other numeric domains such as the\nnatural numbers, the integers, the integers modulo some integer \$n\$,\nthe rationals, the quaternions, the Gaussian integers, the \$p\$-adic\nnumbers, and so on. They are also applicable to many nonnumeric\ndomains such as the subsets of a given set under the operations of\nunion and intersection, the words over a given alphabet under the\noperations of concatenation and reversal, the permutations of a given\nset under the operations of composition and inverse, etc. Each such\nalgebraic structure, or simply algebra, consists of\nthe set of its elements and operations on those elements obeying the\nlaws holding in that domain, such as the set \$Z = \\{0, \\pm 1, \\pm 2,\n\\ldots \\}\$ of integers under the integer operations \$x+y\$ of\naddition, \$xy\$ of multiplication, and \$-x\$, negation, or the set\n\$2^X\$ of subsets of a set \$X\$ under the set operations \$X\\cup Y\$\nof union, \$X\\cap Y\$ of intersection, and \$X'\$, complement relative\nto \$X\$.", "\nThe laws are often similar but not identical. For example integer\nmultiplication distributes over addition, \$x(y+z) = xy+xz\$, but not\nconversely, for example \$2+(3\\times 5) = 17\$ but \$(2+3)\\times(2+5)\n= 35\$. In the analogy that makes intersection the set theoretic\ncounterpart of multiplication and union that of addition, intersection\ndistributes over union,", "\nas for the integers, but unlike the integers union also distributes\nover intersection:", "\nWhereas elementary algebra is conducted in a fixed algebra,\nabstract or modern algebra treats classes of\nalgebras having certain properties in common, typically those\nexpressible as equations. The subject, which emerged during the 19th\ncentury, is traditionally introduced via the classes of groups, rings,\nand fields. For example any number system under the operations of\naddition and subtraction forms an abelian (commutative) group; one\nthen passes to rings by bringing in multiplication, and further to\nfields with division. The common four-function calculator provides the\nfour functions of the field of reals.", "\nThe abstract concept of group in full generality is defined not in\nterms of a set of numbers but rather as an arbitrary set equipped with\na binary operation \$xy\$, a unary inverse \$x^{-1}\$ of that\noperation, and a unit \$e\$ satisfying certain equations\ncharacteristic of groups. One striking novelty with groups not\nencountered in everyday elementary algebra is that their\nmultiplication need not be abelian: \$xy\$ and \$yx\$ can be\ndifferent! For example the group \$S_3\$ of the six possible\npermutations of three things is not abelian, as can be seen by\nexchanging adjacent pairs of letters in the word dan. If you\nexchange the two letters on the left before the two on the right you\nget adn and then and, but if you perform these\nexchanges in the other order you get dna and then\nnda instead of and. Likewise the group of\n43,252,003,274,489,856,000 operations on Rubik’s cube and the\ninfinite group \$SO(3)\$ of rotations of the sphere are not abelian,\nthough the infinite group \$SO(2)\$ of rotations of the circle is\nabelian. Quaternion multiplication and matrix multiplication is also\nnoncommutative. Abelian groups are often called additive groups and\ntheir group operation is referred to as addition \$x+y\$ rather than\nmultiplication \$xy\$.", "\nGroups, rings and fields only scratch the surface of abstract algebra.\nVector spaces and more generally modules are restricted forms of rings\nin which the operands of multiplication are required to be a scalar\nand a vector. Monoids generalize groups by dropping inverse; for\nexample the natural numbers form a monoid but not a group for want of\nnegation. Boolean algebras abstract the algebra of sets. Lattices\ngeneralize Boolean algebras by dropping complement and the\ndistributivity laws.", "\nA number of branches of mathematics have found algebra such an\neffective tool that they have spawned algebraic subbranches. Algebraic\nlogic, algebraic number theory, and algebraic topology are all heavily\nstudied, while algebraic geometry and algebraic combinatorics have\nentire journals devoted to them.", "\nAlgebra is of philosophical interest for at least two reasons. From\nthe perspective of foundations of mathematics, algebra is strikingly\ndifferent from other branches of mathematics in both its domain\nindependence and its close affinity to formal logic. Furthermore the\ndichotomy between elementary and abstract algebra reflects a certain\nduality in reasoning that Descartes, the inventor of Cartesian\nDualism, would have appreciated, wherein the former deals with the\nreasoning process and the latter that which is reasoned about, as\nrespectively the mind and body of mathematics.", "\nAlgebra has also played a significant role in clarifying and\nhighlighting notions of logic, at the core of exact philosophy for\nmillennia. The first step away from the Aristotelian logic of\nsyllogisms towards a more algebraic form of logic was taken by Boole\nin an 1847 pamphlet and subsequently in a more detailed treatise,\nThe Laws of Thought, in 1854. The dichotomy between\nelementary algebra and modern algebra then started to appear in the\nsubsequent development of logic, with logicians strongly divided\nbetween the formalistic approach as espoused by Frege, Peano, and\nRussell, and the algebraic approach followed by C. S. Peirce,\nSchroeder, and Tarski." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Elementary Algebra", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Formulas", "1.2 Laws", "1.3 Word problems", "1.4 Cartesian geometry" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Abstract Algebra", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Semigroups", "2.2 Groups", "2.3 Rings", "2.4 Fields", "2.5 Applications" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Universal Algebra", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Concepts", "3.2 Equational Logic", "3.3 Birkhoff’s Theorem" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Linear Algebra", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Vector Spaces", "4.2 Associative Algebras" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Algebraization of mathematics", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Algebraic geometry", "5.2 Algebraic number theory", "5.3 Algebraic topology", "5.4 Algebraic logic" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Free algebras", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Free monoids and groups", "6.2 Free rings", "6.3 Free combinatorial structures", "6.4 Free logical structures", "6.5 Free algebras categorially" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nElementary algebra deals with numerical terms, namely\nconstants 0, 1, 1.5, \$\\pi\$, variables \$x,\ny,\\ldots\$, and combinations thereof built with operations\nsuch as \$+\$, \$-\$, \$\\times\$ , \$\\div\$ , \$\\sqrt{\\phantom{x}}\$,\netc. to form such terms as \$x+1, x\\times y\$ (standardly abbreviated\n\$xy\$), \$x + 3y\$, and \$\\sqrt{x}\$.", "\nTerms may be used on their own in formulas such as \$\\pi\nr^2\$, or in equations serving as laws such as \$x+y = y+x\$,\nor as constraints such as \$2x^2 -x+3 = 5x+1\$ or \$x^2 + y^2\n= 1\$.", "\nLaws are always true; while they have the same form as constraints\nthey constrain only vacuously in that every valuation of their\nvariables is a solution. The constraint \$x^2 +y^2 = 1\$ has a\ncontinuum of solutions forming a shape, in this case a circle\nof radius 1. The constraint \$2x^2 -x+3 = 5x-1\$ has two solutions,\n\$x = 1\$ or 2, and may be encountered in the solution of word\nproblems, or in the determination of the points of intersection\nof two curves such as the parabola \$y = 2x^2 -x+3\$ and the line \$y\n= 5x-1\$." ], "section_title": "1. Elementary algebra", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nA formula is a term used in the computation of values by hand or\nmachine. Although some attributes of physical objects lend themselves\nto direct measurement such as length and mass, others such as area,\nvolume, and density do not and must be computed from more readily\nobserved values with the help of the appropriate formula. For example\nthe area of a rectangle \$L\$ inches long by \$W\$ inches wide is\ngiven by the formula \$LW\$ in units of square inches, the volume of a\nball of radius \$r\$ is \$4\\pi r^3 /3\$, and the density of a solid of\nmass \$M\$ and volume \$V\$ is given by \$M/V\$.", "\nFormulas may be combined to give yet more formulas. For example the\ndensity of a ball of mass \$M\$ and radius \$r\$ can be obtained by\nsubstituting the above formula for the volume of a ball for \$V\$ in\nthe above formula for the density of a solid. The resulting formula\n\$M/(4\\pi r^3 /3)\$ is then the desired density formula." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Formulas" }, { "content": [ "\nLaws or identities are equations that hold for all applicable values\nof their variables. For example the commutativity law", "\nholds for all real values of \$x\$ and \$y\$. Likewise the\nassociativity law", "\nholds for all real values of \$x, y\$ and \$z\$. On the other hand,\nwhile the law \$x/(y/z) = zx/y\$ holds for all numerical values of\n\$x\$, it holds only for nonzero values of \$y\$ and \$z\$ in order to\navoid the illegal operation of division by zero.", "\nWhen a law holds for all numerical values of its variables, it also\nholds for all expression values of those variables. Setting \$x = M, y\n= 4\\pi r^3\$, and \$z = 3\$ in the last law of the preceding paragraph\nyields \$M/(4\\pi r^3 /3) = 3M/(4\\pi r^3)\$. The left hand side being\nour density formula from the preceding section, it follows from this\ninstance of the above law that its right hand side is an equivalent\nformula for density in the sense that it gives the same answers as the\nleft hand side. This new density formula replaces one of the two\ndivisions by a multiplication." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Laws" }, { "content": [ "\nIf Xavier will be three times his present age in four years time, how\nold is he? We can solve this word problem using algebra by\nformalizing it as the equation \$3x = x + 4\$ where \$x\$ is\nXavier’s present age. The left hand side expresses three times\nXavier’s present age, while the right hand side expresses his\nage in four years’ time.", "\nA general rule for solving such equations is that any solution to it\nis also a solution to the equation obtained by applying some operation\nto both sides. In this case we can simplify the equation by\nsubtracting \$x\$ from both sides to give \$2x = 4\$, and then\ndividing both sides by 2 to give \$x = 2\$. So Xavier is now two years\nold.", "\nIf Xavier is twice as old as Yvonne and half the square of her age,\nhow old is each? This is more complicated than the previous example in\nthree respects: it has more unknowns, more equations, and terms of\nhigher degree. We may take \$x\$ for Xavier’s age and \$y\$ for\nYvonne’s age. The two constraints may be formalized as the\nequations \$x = 2y\$ and \$x = y^2 /2\$, the latter being of degree 2\nor quadratic.", "\nSince both right hand sides are equal to \$x\$ we can infer \$2y = y^2\n/2\$. It is tempting to divide both sides by \$y\$, but what if \$y =\n0\$? In fact \$y = 0\$ is one solution, for which \$x = 2y = 0\$ as\nwell, corresponding to Xavier and Yvonne both being newborns. Setting\nthat solution to one side we can now look for solutions in which \$y\$\nis not zero by dividing both sides by \$y\$. This yields \$y = 4\$, in\nwhich case \$x = 2y = 8\$. So now we have a second solution in which\nXavier is eight years old and Yvonne four.", "\nIn the absence of any other information, both solutions are\nlegitimate. Had the problem further specified that Yvonne was a\ntoddler, or that Xavier was older than Yvonne, we could have ruled out\nthe first solution." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Word problems" }, { "content": [ "\nLines, circles, and other curves in the plane can be expressed\nalgebraically using Cartesian coordinates, named for its\ninventor Rene Descartes. These are defined with respect to a\ndistinguished point in the plane called the origin, denoted\n\$O\$. Each point is specified by how far it is to the right of and\nabove \$O\$, written as a pair of numbers. For example the pair (2.1,\n3.56) specifies the point 2.1 units to the right of \$O\$, measured\nhorizontally, and 3.56 units above it, measured vertically; we call\n2.1 the \$x\$ coordinate and 3.56 the \$y\$ coordinate of that point.\nEither coordinate can be negative: the pair \$(-5, -1)\$ corresponds\nto the point 5 units to the left of \$O\$ and 1 unit below it. The\npoint \$O\$ itself is coordinatized as (0, 0).", "\nLines. Given an equation in variables \$x\$ and \$y\$, a\npoint such as (2, 7) is said to be a solution to that\nequation when setting \$x\$ to 2 and \$y\$ to 7 makes the equation\ntrue. For example the equation \$y = 3x+5\$ has as solutions the\npoints (0, 5), (1, 8), (2, 11), and so on. Other solutions include\n(.5, 6.5), (1.5, 9.5), and so on. The set of all solutions constitutes\nthe unique straight line passing through (0, 5) and (1, 8). We then\ncall \$y = 3x+5\$ the equation of that line.", "\nCircles. By Pythagoras’s Theorem the square of the\ndistance between two points \$(x, y)\$ and \$(x', y')\$ is given by\n\$(x'-x)^2 +(y'-y)^2\$. As a special case of this, the square of the\ndistance of the point \$(x, y)\$ to the origin is \$x^2 +y^2\$. It\nfollows that those point at distance \$r\$ from the origin are the\nsolutions in \$x\$ and \$y\$ to the equation \$x^2 +y^2 = r^2\$. But\nthese points are exactly those forming the circle of radius \$r\$\ncentered on \$O\$. We identify this equation with this circle.", "\nVarieties The roots of any polynomial in \$x\$ and \$y\$ form\na curve in the plane called a one-dimensional variety of\ndegree that of the polynomial. Thus lines are of degree 1,\nbeing expressed as polynomials \$ax+by+c\$, while circles centered on\n\$(x', y')\$ are of degree 2, being expressed as polynomials\n\$(x-x')^2 +(y-y')^2 -r^2\$. Some varieties may contain no points, for\nexample \$x^2 +y^2 +1\$, while others may contain one point, for\nexample \$x^2 +y^2\$ having the origin as its one root. In general\nhowever a two-dimensional variety will be a curve. Such a curve may\ncross itself, or have a cusp, or even separate into two or more\ncomponents not connected to each other.", "\nSpace The two-dimensional plane is generalized to\nthree-dimensional space by adding to the variables \$x\$ and \$y\$ a\nthird variable \$z\$ corresponding to the third dimension. The\nconventional orientation takes the first dimension to run from west to\neast, the second from south to north, and the third from below to\nabove. Points are then triples, for example the point \$(2, 5, -3)\$\nis 2 units to the east of the origin, 5 units to the north of it, and\n3 units below it.", "\nPlanes and spheres. These are the counterparts in space of\nlines and circles in the plane. An equation such as \$z = 3x + 2y\$\ndefines not a straight line but rather a flat plane, in this case the\nunique plane passing through the points (0, 1, 2), (1, 0, 3), and (1,\n1, 5). And the sphere of radius \$r\$ centered on the origin is given\nby \$x^2 +y^2 +z^2 = r^2\$. The roots of a polynomial in \$x, y\$ and\n\$z\$ form a surface in space called a two-dimensional variety, of\ndegree that of the polynomial, just as for one-dimensional varieties.\nThus planes are of degree 1 and spheres of degree 2.", "\nThese methods generalize to yet higher dimensions by adding yet more\nvariables. Although the geometric space we experience physically is\nlimited to three dimensions, conceptually there is no limit to the\nnumber of dimensions of abstract mathematical space. Just as a line is\na one-dimensional subspace of the two-dimensional plane, and a plane\nis a two-dimensional subspace of three-dimensional space, each\nspecifiable with an equation, so is a hyperplane a\nthree-dimensional subspace of four-dimensional space, also specifiable\nwith an equation such as \$w = 2x - 7y + z\$." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 Cartesian geometry" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nElementary algebra fixes some domain, typically the reals or complex\nnumbers, and works with the equations holding within that domain.\nAbstract or modern algebra reverses this picture by\nfixing some set \$A\$ of equations and studying those domains for\nwhich those equations are identities. For example if we take the set\nof all identities expressible with the operations of addition,\nsubtraction, and multiplication and constants 0 and 1 that hold for\nthe integers, then the algebras in which those equations hold\nidentically are exactly the commutative rings with identity.", "\nHistorically the term modern algebra came from the title of the first\nthree editions of van der Waerden’s classic text of that name,\nrenamed simply “Algebra” for its fourth edition in 1955.\nVolume 1 treated groups, rings, general fields, vector spaces, well\norderings, and real fields, while Volume 2 considered mainly linear\nalgebra, algebras (as vector spaces with a compatible multiplication),\nrepresentation theory, ideal theory, integral algebraic elements,\nalgebraic functions, and topological algebra. On the one hand modern\nalgebra has since gone far beyond this curriculum, on the other this\nconsiderable body of material is already more than what can be assumed\nas common knowledge among graduating Ph.D. students in mathematics,\nfor whom the typical program is too short to permit mastering all this\nmaterial in parallel with focusing on their area of\nspecialization.", "\nA core feature of abstract algebra is the existence of domains where\nfamiliar laws fail to hold. A striking example is commutativity of\nmultiplication, which as we noted in the introduction need not hold\nfor the multiplication of an arbitrary group, even so simple a group\nas the six permutations of three letters." ], "section_title": "2. Abstract Algebra", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nWe begin with the concept of a binary operation on a set \$X\$, namely\na function \$f: X^2 \\rightarrow X\$ such that \$f(x, y)\$ is an\nelement of \$X\$ for all elements \$x, y\$ of \$X\$. Such an operation\nis said to be associative when it satisfies \$f(f(x, y), z) =\nf(x, f(y, z))\$ for all \$x, y, z\$ in \$X\$.", "\nA semigroup is a set together with an associative operation,\ncalled the multiplication of the semigroup and notated \$xy\$\nrather than \$f(x, y)\$.", "\nThe product \$xx\$ of an element with itself is denoted \$x^2\$.\nLikewise \$xxx\$ is denoted \$x^3\$ and so on.", "\nConcatenation \$uv\$ of words \$u, v\$ is associative because when a\nword is cut into two, the concatenation of the two parts is the\noriginal word regardless of where the cut is made. The concatenation\nof al and gebra is the same as that\nof algeb and ra, illustrating\nassociativity of concatenation for the case \$x = \$\nal, \$y =\$ geb, \$z =\$\nra.", "\nComposition \$f\\cdot g\$ of two functions \$f\$ and \$g\$ is\nassociative via the reasoning", "\nfor all \$x\$ in \$X\$, whence \$f\\cdot(g\\cdot h) = (f\\cdot g)\\cdot\nh\$.", "\nA semigroup \$H\$ is a subsemigroup of a semigroup \$G\$ when\n\$H\$ is a subset of \$G\$ and the multiplication of \$G\$ restricted\nto \$H\$ coincides with that of \$H\$. Equivalently a subsemigroup of\n\$G\$ is a subset \$H\$ of \$G\$ such that for all \$x, y\$ in \$H,\nxy\$ is in \$H\$.", "\nA binary operation is called commutative when it satisfies\n\$f(x, y) = f(y, x)\$ for all \$x, y\$ in \$X\$. A commutative\nsemigroup is a semigroup whose operation is commutative. All the\nexamples so far have been of noncommutative semigroups. The following\nillustrate the commutative case.", "\nAn element \$x\$ of \$X\$ is a left identity for \$f\$ when\n\$f(x, y) = y\$ for all \$y\$ in \$X\$, and a right identity\nwhen \$f(y, x) = y\$ for all \$y\$ in \$X\$. An identity for\n\$f\$ is an element that is both a left identity and a right identity\nfor \$f\$. An operation \$f\$ can have only one identity, because when\n\$x\$ and \$y\$ are identities they are both equal to \$f(x,y)\$.", "\nA monoid is a semigroup containing an identity for the\nmultiplication of the semigroup, notated 1.", "\nA monoid \$H\$ is a submonoid of a monoid \$G\$ when it is a\nsubsemigroup of \$G\$ that includes the identity of \$G\$." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Semigroups" }, { "content": [ "\nWhen two elements \$x, y\$ of a monoid satisfy \$xy = 1\$ we say that\n\$x\$ is the left inverse of \$y\$ and \$y\$ is the right inverse of\n\$x\$. An element \$y\$ that is both a left and right inverse of \$x\$\nis called simply an inverse of \$x\$.", "\nA group is a monoid every element of which has an\ninverse.", "\nA subgroup of a group \$G\$ is a submonoid of \$G\$ closed\nunder inverses. The monoids of natural numbers and of even integers\nare both submonoids of the monoid of integers under addition, but only\nthe latter submonoid is a subgroup, being closed under negation,\nunlike the natural numbers.", "\nAn abelian group is a group whose operation is commutative.\nThe group operation of an abelian group is conventionally referred to\nas addition rather than multiplication, and abelian groups are\nsometimes called additive groups.", "\nA cyclic group is a group \$G\$ with an element \$g\$ such\nthat every element of \$G\$ is of the form \$g^i\$ for some positive\ninteger \$i\$. Cyclic groups are abelian because \$g^{i}g^j = g^{i +\nj} = g^j g^{i}\$. The group of integers under addition, and the groups\nof integers mod \$n\$ for any positive integer \$n\$, all form cyclic\ngroups, with 1 as a generator in every case. All cyclic groups are\nisomorphic to one of these. There are always other generators when the\ngroup is of order 3 or more, for example \$-1\$, and for groups of\nprime order every nonzero element is a generator." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Groups" }, { "content": [ "\nA ring is an abelian group that is also a monoid by virtue of\nhaving a second operation, called the multiplication of the\nring. Zero annihilates, meaning that \$0x = x0 = 0\$.\nFurthermore multiplication distributes over addition (the group\noperation) in both arguments. That is, \$x(y+z) = xy + xz\$ and\n\$(x+y)z = xz + yz\$.", "\nIn all but the last example, the integers (other than the integer\n\$n\$ giving the size of the matrices) may be replaced by any of the\nrationals, the reals, or the complex numbers. When replacing the\nintegers with the reals the fourth example becomes simply the ring of\nreals because even if \$b\$ is zero \$a\$ can be any real. However\nwhen replacing with the rational numbers the ring includes the\nrationals, but is more than that because \$\\sqrt{2}\$ is irrational,\nyet it does not contain for example \$\\sqrt{3}\$." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Rings" }, { "content": [ "\nA field is a ring for which the multiplicative monoid of\nnonzero ring elements is an abelian group. That is, multiplication\nmust be commutative, and every nonzero element \$x\$ must have a\nreciprocal \$1/x\$.", "\nThe last example does not generalize directly to other moduli. However\nfor any modulus that is a power \$p^n\$ of a prime, it can be shown\nthat there exists a unique multiplication making the group \$Z_{p^n}\$\na ring in a way that makes the nonzero elements of the ring a cyclic\n(and therefore abelian) group under the multiplication, and hence\nmaking the ring a field. The fields constructed in this way are the\nonly finite fields." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Fields" }, { "content": [ "\nWhy study entire classes? Well, consider for example the set \$Z\$ of\nintegers along with the binary operation of addition \$x+y\$, the\nunary operation of negation \$-x\$, and the constant 0. These\noperations and the constant satisfy various laws such as \$x+(y+z) =\n(x+y)+z, x+y = y+x, x+0 = x\$, and \$x+(-x) = 0\$. Now consider any\nother algebra with operations that not only have the same names but\nalso satisfy the same laws (and possibly more), called a\nmodel of those laws. Such an algebra could serve any of the\nfollowing purposes.", "\n(i) It could tell us to what extent the equational laws holding of the\nintegers characterize the integers. Since the set \$\\{0, 1\\}\$ of\nintegers mod 2 under addition and negation satisfies all the laws that\nthe integers do, we immediately see that no single equational property\nof the integers tells us that there are infinitely many integers. On\nthe other hand any finite model of the equational theory of the\nintegers necessarily satisfies some law that the integers don’t\nsatisfy, in particular the law \$x+x+\\ldots +x = 0\$ where the number\nof \$x\$\$s\$ on the left hand side is the size of the\nmodel. Since the equational theory of the integers contains no such\nlaw we can tell from its theory as a whole that the integers must be\nan infinite set. On the other hand the rational numbers under addition\nand negation satisfy exactly the same equational properties as the\nintegers, so this theory does not characterize the algebra of integers\nunder addition and subtraction with sufficient precision to\ndistinguish it from the rationals.", "\n(ii) It could provide us with a useful new domain that can be\nsubstituted for the integers in any application depending only on\nequational properties of the integers, but which differs from the\nintegers in other (necessarily nonequational) useful respects. For\nexample the rationals, which satisfy the same laws as we just noted,\ndiffer in having the density property, that between any two\nrationals there lies another rational. Another difference is that it\nsupports division: whereas the ratio of two integers is usually not an\ninteger, the ratio of two rationals is always a rational. The reals\nalso satisfy the same equations, and like the rationals are dense and\nsupport division. Unlike the rationals however the reals have the\ncompleteness property, that the set of all upper bounds of\nany nonempty set of reals is either empty or has a least member,\nneeded for convergent sequences to have a limit to converge to.", "\nThis idea extends to other operations such as multiplication and\ndivision, as with fields. A particularly useful case of such a\ngeneralization is given by the use of complex numbers in Cartesian\ngeometry. When \$x\$ and \$y\$ range over the field of reals, \$x^2\n+y^2 =1\$ describes the ordinary Euclidean circle in two dimensions,\nbut when the variables range over the complex numbers this equation\ndescribes the complex counterpart of the circle, visualizable as a\ntwo-dimensional surface embedded in four real dimensions (regarding\nthe complex plane as having two real dimensions). Or if the variables\nrange over the integers mod 7, which form a field under the usual\narithmetic operations mod 7, the circle consists of eight points,\nnamely \$(\\pm 1, 0), (0, \\pm 1)\$, and \$(\\pm 2, \\pm 2)\$. Certain\ntheorems about the Euclidean circle provable purely algebraically\nremain provable about these other kinds of circles because all the\nequations on which the proof depends continue to hold in these other\nfields, for example the theorem that a line intersects a circle in at\nmost two points.", "\n(iii) It could help us decide whether some list of equational laws\nintended to axiomatize the integers is complete in the sense\nthat any equation holding of the integers follows from the laws in\nthat list. If some structure satisfies all the axioms in the list, but\nnot some other equation that holds of the integers, then we have a\nwitness to the incompleteness of the axiomatization. If on the other\nhand we can show how to construct any algebra satisfying the axioms\nfrom the algebra of integers, limiting ourselves only to certain\nalgebraic constructions, then by a theorem of Birkhoff applicable to\nthose constructions we can infer that the axiomatization is\ncomplete.", "\n(iv) It could give another of way of defining a class, besides the\nstandard way of listing axioms. In the case at hand, the class of all\nalgebras with a constant, a unary operation, and a binary operation,\nsatisfying all the laws satisfied by the integers, is exactly the\nclass of abelian groups." ], "subsection_title": "2.5 Applications" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nUniversal algebra is the next level of abstraction after abstract\nalgebra. Whereas elementary algebra treats equational reasoning in a\nparticular algebra such as the field of reals or the field of complex\nnumbers, and abstract algebra studies particular classes of algebras\nsuch as groups, rings, or fields, universal algebra studies classes of\nclasses of algebras. Much as abstract algebra numbers groups, rings,\nand fields among its basic classes, so does universal algebra count\nvarieties, quasivarieties, and elementary classes among its basic\nclasses of classes.", "\nA model of a theory is a structure for which all the\nequations of that theory are identities. Terms are built up from\nvariables and constants using the operations of the theory. An\nequation is a pair of terms; it is satisfied by an algebra when the\ntwo terms are equal under all valuations of (assignments of values to)\nthe \$n\$ variables appearing in the terms, equivalently when they\ndenote the same \$n\$-ary operation. A quasiequation is a pair\nconsisting of a finite set of equations, called the premises or\nantecedents, and another equation, the conclusion; it is satisfied by\nan algebra when the two terms of the conclusion are equal under all\nvaluations of the \$n\$ variables appearing in the terms satisfying\nthe premises. A first order formula is a quantified Boolean\ncombination of relational terms.", "\nA variety is the class of all models of a set of equations. A\nquasivariety is the class of all models of a set of\nquasiequations. An elementary class is the class of all\nmodels of a set of first-order formulas.", "\nQuasivarieties have received much less attention than either varieties\nor elementary classes, and we accordingly say little about them here.\nElementary classes are treated in sufficient depth elsewhere in this\nencyclopedia that we need not consider them here. We therefore focus\nin this section on varieties.", "\nAbelian groups, groups, rings, and vector spaces over a given field\nall form varieties.", "\nA central result in this area is the theorem that a lattice arises as\nthe lattice of subalgebras of some algebra if and only if it arises as\nthe lattice of congruences on some algebra. Lattices of this sort are\ncalled algebraic lattices. When the congruences of an algebra\npermute, its congruence lattice is modular, a strong condition\nfacilitating the analysis of finite algebras in particular." ], "section_title": "3. Universal Algebra", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nFamiliar theorems of number theory emerge in algebraic form for\nalgebras. An algebra \$A\$ is called directly irreducible or\nsimple when its lattice of congruences is the two-element\nlattice consisting of \$A\$ and the one-element algebra, paralleling\nthe notion of prime number \$p\$ as a number whose lattice of divisors\nhas two elements \$p\$ and 1. However the counterpart of the\nfundamental theorem of arithmetic, that every positive integer factors\nuniquely as a product of primes, requires a more delicate kind of\nproduct than direct product. Birkhoff’s notion of subdirect\nproduct enabled him to prove the Subdirect Representation Theorem,\nthat every algebra arises as the subdirect product of its subdirectly\nirreducible quotients. Whereas there are many subdirectly irreducible\ngroups, the only subdirectly irreducible Boolean algebra is the\ninitial or two-element one, while the subdirectly irreducible rings\nsatisfying \$x^n = x\$ for some \$n \\gt 1\$ are exactly the finite\nfields.", "\nAnother central topic is duality: Boolean algebras are dual to Stone\nspaces, complete atomic Boolean algebras are dual to sets,\ndistributive lattices with top and bottom are dual to partially\nordered sets, algebraic lattices are dual to semilattices, and so on.\nDuality provides two ways of looking at an algebra, one of which may\nturn out to be more insightful or easier to work with than the other\ndepending on the application.", "\nThe structure of varieties as classes of all models of some equational\ntheory is also of great interest. The earliest result in this area is\nBirkhoff’s theorem that a class of algebras is a variety if and\nonly if it is closed under formation of quotients (homomorphic\nimages), subalgebras, and arbitrary (including empty and infinite)\ndirect products. This “modern algebra” result constitutes\na completeness theorem for equational logic in terms of its models.\nIts elementary counterpart is the theorem that the equational theories\non a free algebra \$F(V)\$, defined as the deductively closed sets of\nequations that use variables from \$V\$, are exactly its substitutive\ncongruences.", "\nA locally finite variety is one whose finitely generated free algebras\nare finite, such as pointed sets, graphs (whether of the directed or\nundirected variety), and distributive lattices. A congruence\npermutable variety is a variety all of whose algebras are congruence\npermutable. Maltsev characterized these in terms of a necessary and\nsufficient condition on their theories, namely that \$F\$(3) contain\nan operation \$t(x, y, z)\$ for which \$t(x, x, y) = t(y, x, x) = y\$\nare in the theory. Analogous notions are congruence distributivity and\ncongruence modularity, for which there exist analogous syntactic\ncharacterizations of varieties of algebras with these properties. A\nmore recently developed power tool for this area is McKenzie’s\nnotion of tame congruences, facilitating the study of the structure of\nfinite algebras.", "\nWithin the algebraic school, varieties have been defined with the\nunderstanding that the operations of a signature form a set. Insights\nfrom category theory, in particular the expression of a variety as a\nmonad, defined as a monoid object in the category \$C^C\$ of\nendofunctors of a category \$C\$ (Set in the case of ordinary\nuniversal algebra) indicate that a cleaner and more general notion of\nvariety is obtained when the operations can form a proper class. For\nexample the important classes of complete semilattices, CSLat, and\ncomplete atomic\n Boolean algebras,\n CABA, form varieties only with this broader notion of signature. In\nthe narrow algebraic sense of variety, the dual of a variety can never\nbe a variety, whereas in the broader monadic notion of variety, the\nvariety Set of sets is dual to CABA while CSLat is self-dual." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Concepts" }, { "content": [ "\nAxiom systems. Identities can also be used to transform\nequations to equivalent equations. When those equations are themselves\nidentities for some domain, the equations they are transformed into\nremain identities for that domain. One can therefore start from some\nfinite set of identities and manufacture an unlimited number of new\nidentities from them.", "\nFor example if we start from just the two identities \$(x+y)+z =\nx+(y+z)\$ and \$x+y = y+x\$, we can obtain the identity \$(w+x)+(y+z)\n= (w+y)+(x+z)\$ via the following series of transformations.", "\nThis process of manufacturing new identities from old is called\ndeduction. Any identity that can be generated by deduction\nstarting from a given set \$A\$ of identities is called a\nconsequence of \$A\$. The set of all consequences of \$A\$ is\ncalled the deductive closure of \$A\$. We refer to \$A\$ as\nan axiomatization of its deductive closure. A set that is its\nown deductive closure is said to be deductively closed. It is\nstraightforward to show that a set is deductively closed if and\nonly if it is the deductive closure of some set.", "\nAn equational theory is a deductively closed set of\nequations, equivalently the set of all consequences of some set \$A\$\nof equations. Every theory always has itself as its own\naxiomatization, but it will usually also have smaller axiomatizations.\nA theory that has a finite axiomatization is said to be finitely\nbased or finitely axiomatizable.", "\nEffectiveness. Finitely based theories can\nbe effectively enumerated. That is, given a finite set \$A\$ of\nequations, one can write a computer program that prints consequences\nof \$A\$ for ever in such a way that every consequence of \$A\$ will\nappear at some finite position in the infinite list of all\nconsequences. The same conclusion obtains when we weaken the\nrequirement that \$A\$ be finite to merely that it can be effectively\nenumerated. That is, if the axiomatization is effectively enumerable\nso is its deductive closure.", "\n(In reconciling the finite with the infinite, bear in mind that if we\nlist all the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, … in order, we obtain an\ninfinite list every member of which is only finitely far from the\nbeginning, and also has a well-defined predecessor (except for 0) and\nsuccessor. Only if we attempt to pad this list out at the\n“end” with infinite numbers does this principle break\ndown.", "\nOne way to visualize there being an “end” that could have\nmore elements beyond it is to consider the rationals of the form\n\$1/n\$ for all nonzero integers \$n\$, in increasing order. This list\nstarts out \$-1/1, -1/2, -1/3,\\ldots\$ and after listing infinitely\nmany negative rationals of that form, with no greatest such, switches\nover to positive rationals, with no first such, finally ending with\n1/3, 1/2, 1/1. The entire list is discrete in the sense that every\nrational except the endpoints \$-1/1\$ and 1/1 has a well-defined\npredecessor and successor in this subset of the rationals, unlike the\nsituation for the set of all rationals between \$-1/1\$ and \$1/1\$.\nThis would no longer be the case were we to introduce the rational 0\n“in the middle”, which would have neither a predecessor\nnor a successor.)", "\nEquational Logic. Our informal account of\ndeduction can be formalized in terms of five rules for producing new\nidentities from old. In the following, \$s\$ and \$t\$ denote\narbitrary terms.", "\n“Consistently” in this context means that if a term is\nsubstituted for one occurrence of a given variable, the same term must\nbe substituted for all occurrences of that variable in both \$s\$ and\n\$t\$. We could not for example appeal solely to R5 to\njustify substituting \$u+v\$ for \$x\$ in the left hand side of \$x+y\n= y+x\$ and \$v+u\$ for \$x\$ in the right hand side, though some\nother rule might permit it.", "\nAn equational theory as a set of pairs of terms amounts to a binary\nrelation on the set of all terms. Rules R1–R3\ncorrespond to respectively reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity of\nthis binary relation, \$i.e\$. these three rules assert that an\nequational theory is an equivalence relation. Rule\nR4 expresses the further property that this binary relation\nis a congruence. Rule R5 further asserts that the\nrelation is a substitutive congruence. It can be shown that a binary\nrelation on the set of terms is an equational theory if and only if it\nis a substitutive congruence. These five rules therefore completely\naxiomatize equational logic in the sense that every consequence of a\nset \$A\$ of equations can be produced from \$A\$ via finitely many\napplications of these five rules." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Equational Logic" }, { "content": [ "\nA variety is by definition the class of models of some equational\ntheory. In 1935 Birkhoff provided an equivalent characterization of\nvarieties as any class closed under quotients (homomorphic images),\ndirect products, and subalgebras. These notions are defined as\nfollows.", "\nGiven two algebras \$(X, f_1 , \\ldots f_k)\$ and \$(Y, g_1 , \\ldots\ng_k)\$, a homomorphism \$h: (X, f_1 , \\ldots f_k) \\rightarrow\n(Y, g_1 , \\ldots g_k)\$ is a function \$h: X \\rightarrow Y\$\nsatisfying \$h(f_i (x_0 , \\ldots ,x_{n_{ i}-1 })) = g_i (h(x_0),\n\\ldots ,h(x_{n_{ i}-1 })))\$ for each \$i\$ from 1 to \$k\$ where\n\$n_i\$ is the arity of both \$f_i\$ and \$g_i\$.", "\nA subalgebra of an algebra is a set of elements of the\nalgebra closed under the operations of the algebra.", "\nLet \$I\$ be an arbitrary set, which may be empty, finite, or\ninfinite. A family \$\\langle A_{i}\\rangle_{i\\in I}\$ of\nalgebras \$(X_i, f_{1}^i,\\ldots, f_k^i)\$ indexed by \$I\$ consists of\none algebra \$A_i\$ for each element \$i\$ of \$I\$. We define the\ndirect product \$\\Pi A_i\$ (or \$\\Pi_{i\\in I} A_i\$ in full)\nof such a family as follows.", "\nThe underlying set of \$\\Pi A_i\$ is the cartesian product \$\\Pi X_i\$\nof the underlying sets \$X_i\$, and consists of those \$I\$-tuples\nwhose \$i\$-th element is some element of \$X_i\$. (\$I\$ may even be\nuncountable, but in this case the nonemptiness of \$\\Pi X_i\$ as a\nconsequence of the nonemptiness of the individual \$X_i\$’s is\nequivalent to the axiom of choice. This should be kept in mind for any\nconstructive applications of Birkhoff’s theorem.)", "\nThe \$j\$-th operation of \$\\Pi A_i\$, of arity \$n_j\$, takes an\n\$n_j\$-tuple \$t\$ of elements of \$\\Pi X_i\$ and produces the\n\$I\$-tuple \$\\langle f_{j}^i(t_{1}^i , \\ldots t_{n_{ j}\n}^i)\\rangle_{i\\in I}\$ where \$t_k^i\$ is the \$i\$-th component of\nthe \$k\$-th component of \$t\$ for \$k\$ from 1 to \$n_j\$.", "\nGiven two algebras \$A\$, \$B\$ and a homomorphism \$h: A \\rightarrow\nB\$, the homomorphic image \$h(A)\$ is the subalgebra of\n\$B\$ consisting of elements of the form \$h(a)\$ for \$a\$ in\n\$A\$.", "\nGiven a class \$C\$ of algebras, we write \$P(C)\$ for the class of\nall algebras formed as direct products of families of algebras of \$C,\nS(C)\$ for the class of all subalgebras of algebras of \$C\$, and\n\$H(C)\$ for the class of all homomorphic images of algebras of\n\$C\$.", "\nIt is relatively straightforward to show that any equation satisfied\nby all the members of \$C\$ is also satisfied by all the members of\n\$P(C), S(C)\$, and \$H(C)\$. Hence for a variety \$V, P(V) = S(V) =\nH(V)\$.", "\nBirkhoff’s theorem is the converse: for any class \$C\$ such\nthat \$P(C) = S(C) = H(C), C\$ is a variety. In fact the theorem is\nslightly stronger: for any class \$C\$, HSP\$(C)\$ is a\nvariety. That is, to construct all the models of the theory of \$C\$\nit suffices to close \$C\$ first under direct products, then under\nsubalgebras, and finally under homomorphic images; that is, later\nclosures do not compromise earlier ones provided \$P, S\$, and \$H\$\nare performed in that order.", "\nA basic application of Birkhoff’s theorem is in proving the\ncompleteness of a proposed axiomatization of a class \$C\$. Given an\narbitrary model of the axioms, it suffices to show that the model can\nbe constructed as the homomorphic image of a subalgebra of a direct\nproduct of algebras of \$C\$.", "\nThis completeness technique complements the completeness observed in\nthe previous section for the rules of equational logic." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Birkhoff’s Theorem" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Linear Algebra", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nSibling to groups, rings, and fields is the class of vector\nspaces over any given field, constituting the universes of linear\nalgebra. Vector spaces lend themselves to two opposite approaches:\naxiomatic or abstract, and synthetic or concrete. The axiomatic\napproach takes fields (whence rings, whence groups) as a prerequisite;\nit first defines a notion of \$R\$-module as an abelian group with a\nscalar multiplication over a given ring \$R\$, and then defines a\nvector space to be an \$R\$-module for which \$R\$ is a field. The\nsynthetic approach proceeds via the familiar representation of vector\nspaces over the reals as \$n\$-tuples of reals, and of linear\ntransformations from \$m\$-dimensional to \$n\$-dimensional vector\nspaces as \$m\\times n\$ matrices of reals. For the full generality of\nvector spaces including those of infinite dimension, \$n\$ need not be\nlimited to finite numbers but can be any cardinal.", "\nThe abstract approach, as adopted by such classical texts as Mac Lane\nand Birkhoff, has a certain purist appeal and is ideally suited to\nmathematics majors. The concrete approach has the benefit of being\nable to substitute calculus or less for groups-rings-fields as a\nprerequisite, suiting it to service courses for scientists and\nengineers needing only finite-dimensional matrix algebra, which enjoys\nenormous practical applicability. Linear algebra over other fields, in\nparticular finite fields, is used in coding theory, quantum computing,\netc., for which the abstract approach tends to be better suited.", "\nFor any field \$F\$, up to isomorphism there is exactly one vector\nspace over \$F\$ of any given finite dimension. This is a theorem in\nthe abstract approach, but is an immediate consequence of the\nrepresentation in the concrete approach (the theorem is used in\nrelating the two approaches).", "\nAnother immediate consequence of the concrete approach is duality for\nfinite-dimensional vector spaces over \$F\$. To every vector space\n\$V\$, of any dimension, corresponds its dual space \$V^\$ comprised\nof the functionals on \$V\$, defined as the linear\ntransformations \$f: V\\rightarrow F\$, viewing the field \$F\$ as the\none-dimensional vector space. The functionals form a vector space\nunder coordinatewise addition \$(f+g)(u) = f(u)+g(u)\$ and\nmultiplication \$(xf)(u) = x(f(u))\$ by any scalar \$x\$ in \$F\$, and\nwe take \$V^\$ to be that space. This operation on vector spaces\nextends to the linear transformations \$f: U\\rightarrow V\$ as \$f^* :\nV^\\rightarrow U^\$ defined such that \$f\$ maps each functional \$g:\nV\\rightarrow F\$ to \$g\\cdot f: U\\rightarrow F\$. Repeating this\noperation produces a vector space that, in the finite-dimensional\ncase, is isomorphic to \$V\$, that is, \$V \\cong V^{*}\$, making the\noperation an involution. The essence of duality for finite-dimensional\nvector spaces resides in its involutary nature along with the reversal\nof the linear transformations.", "\nThis duality is easily visualized in the concrete approach by viewing\nlinear transformations from \$U\$ to \$V\$ as \$m\\times n\$ matrices.\nThe duality simply transposes the matrices while leaving the machinery\nof matrix multiplication itself unchanged. It is then immediate that\nthis operation is an involution that reverses maps—the \$m\\times\nn\$ matrix linearly transforming an \$n\$-dimensional space \$U\$ to\nan \$m\$-dimensional one \$V\$ transposes to an \$n\\times m\$ matrix\nlinearly transforming the \$m\$-dimensional space \$V^\$ to the\n\$n\$-dimensional space \$U^*\$." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Vector Spaces" }, { "content": [ "\nThe linear transformations \$f: V\\rightarrow V\$ on a vector space\n\$V\$ can be added, subtracted, and multiplied by scalars, pointwise\nin each case, and hence form a vector space. When the space has finite\ndimension \$n\$, the linear transformations are representable as\n\$n\\times n\$ matrices.", "\nIn addition they can be composed, whence they form a vector space\nequipped with a bilinear associative operation, namely composition. In\nthe finite-dimensional case, composition is just the usual matrix\nproduct. Vector spaces furnished with such a product constitute\nassociative algebras. Up to isomorphism, all associative\nalgebras arise in this way whether of finite or infinite dimension,\nproviding a satisfactory and insightful characterization of the notion\nin lieu of an axiomatic characterization, not given here.", "\nWell-known examples of associative algebras are the reals, the complex\nnumbers, and the quaternions. Unlike vector spaces, many nonisomorphic\nassociative algebras of any given dimension greater than one are\npossible.", "\nA class of associative algebras of interest to physicists is that of\nthe Clifford algebras. Clifford algebras over the reals (which as\nvector spaces are Euclidean spaces) generalize complex numbers and\nquaternions by permitting any number of formal quantities \$e\$\nanalogous to \$i = \\sqrt{-1}\$ to be adjoined to the field of reals.\nThe common feature of these quantities is that each satisfies either\n\$e^2 = -1\$ or \$e^2 = 1\$. Whereas there are a great many\nassociative algebras of low dimension, only a few of them arise as\nClifford algebras. The reals form the only one-dimensional Clifford\nalgebra, while the hyperbolic plane, defined by \$e^2 = 1\$, and the\ncomplex plane, defined by \$e^2 = -1\$, are the two two-dimensional\nClifford algebras. The hyperbolic plane is just the direct square of\nthe real field, meaning that its product is coordinatewise, \$(a,\nb)(c, d) = (ac, bd)\$, unlike that of the complex plane where it\ndefined by \$(a, b)(c, d) = (ac - bd, ad+bc)\$. The two\nfour-dimensional Clifford algebras are the \$2\\times 2\$ matrices and\nthe quaternions. Whereas the \$2\\times 2\$ matrices contain zero\ndivisors (nonzero matrices whose product is zero), and so form only a\nring, the quaternions contain no zero divisors and so form a division\nring. Unlike the complex numbers however, the quaternions do not form\na field because their multiplication is not commutative. Complex\nmultiplication however makes the complex plane a commutative division\nring, that is, a field." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Associative Algebras" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nA number of branches of mathematics have benefited from the\nperspective of algebra. Each of algebraic geometry and algebraic\ncombinatorics has an entire journal devoted to it, while algebraic\ntopology, algebraic logic, and algebraic number theory all have strong\nfollowings. Many other more specialized areas of mathematics have\nsimilarly benefited." ], "section_title": "5. Algebraization of mathematics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAlgebraic geometry begins with what we referred to in the introduction\nas shapes, for example lines \$y = ax +b\$, circles \$x^2 +y^2 =\nr^2\$, spheres \$x^2 +y^2 +z^2 = r^2\$, conic sections \$f(x, y) = 0\$\nwhere \$f\$ is a quadratic polynomial in \$x\$ and \$y\$, quadric\nsurfaces \$f(x, y, z) = 0\$ with \$f\$ again quadratic, and so on.", "\nIt is convenient to collect the two sides of these equations on the\nleft so that the right side is always zero. We may then define a shape\nor variety to consist of the roots or zeros of a\npolynomial, or more generally the common zeros of a set of\npolynomials.", "\nOrdinary analytical or Cartesian geometry is conducted over the reals.\nAlgebraic geometry is more commonly conducted over the complex\nnumbers, or more generally over any algebraically closed field. The\nvarieties definable in this way are called affine\nvarieties.", "\nSometimes however algebraic closure is not desirable, for example when\nworking at the boundary of algebraic geometry and number theory where\nthe field may be finite, or the rationals.", "\nMany kinds of objects are characterized by what structure their maps\nhold invariant. Posets transform via monotone functions, leaving order\ninvariant. Algebras transform via homomorphisms, leaving the algebraic\nstructure invariant. In algebraic geometry varieties transform via\nregular \$n\$-ary functions \$f: A^n \\rightarrow\nA\$, defined as functions that are locally rational polynomials in\n\$n\$ variables. Locally rational means that at each point of the\ndomain of \$f\$ there exists a neighborhood on which \$f\$ is the\nratio of two polynomials, the denominator of which is nonzero in that\nneighborhood.", "\nThis notion generalizes to regular functions \$f: A^n \\rightarrow\nA^m\$ defined as \$m\$-tuples of regular \$n\$-ary functions.", "\nGiven two varieties \$V, V'\$ in \$A^n\$ and \$A^m\$ respectively, a\nregular function from \$A^n\$ to \$A^m\$ whose restriction to \$V\$ is\na function from \$V\$ to \$V'\$ is called a regular function of\nvarieties. The category of affine varieties is then defined to\nhave as its objects all affine varieties and as its morphisms all\nregular functions thereof.", "\nPolynomials being continuous, one would expect regular functions\nbetween varieties to be continuous also. A difficulty arises with the\nshapes of varieties, where there can be cusps, crossings, and other\nsymptoms of singularity. What is needed here is a suitable topology by\nwhich to judge continuity.", "\nThe trick is to work not in affine space but its projective\nspace. To illustrate with Euclidean three-space, its associated\nprojective space is the unit sphere with antipodal points identified,\nforming a two-dimensional manifold. Equivalently this is the space of\nall (unoriented) lines through the origin. Given an arbitrary affine\nspace, its associated projective space is the space of all such lines,\nunderstood as a manifold.", "\nThe topology on projective space appropriate for algebraic geometry is\nthe Zariski topology, defined not by its open sets but rather\nby its closed sets, which are taken to be the algebraic sets, namely\nthose sets constituting the common zeros of a set of homogeneous\npolynomials. The crucial theorem is then that regular maps between\naffine varieties are continuous with respect to the Zariski\ntopology." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Algebraic geometry" }, { "content": [ "\nAlgebraic number theory has adopted these generalizations of algebraic\ngeometry. One class of varieties in particular that has been of great\nimportance to number theory is that of elliptical curves.", "\nA celebrated success of algebraic number theory has been Andrew\nWiles’ proof of Fermat’s so-called “last\ntheorem.” This had remained an open problem for over three and a\nhalf centuries." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Algebraic number theory" }, { "content": [ "\nAlgebraic topology analyzes the holes and obstructions in connected\ntopological spaces. A topologist is someone who imagines all objects\nto be made of unbreakable but very pliable playdough, and therefore\ndoes not see the need to distinguish between a coffee cup and doughnut\nbecause either can be turned into the other. Topology is concerned\nwith the similarities and differences between coffee cups with \$n\$\nhandles, surfaces with \$n\$ holes, and more complicated shapes.\nAlgebraic topology expresses the invariants of such shapes in terms of\ntheir homotopy groups and homology groups." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Algebraic topology" }, { "content": [ "\nAlgebraic logic got off to an early start with Boole’s\nintroduction of Boolean algebra in an 1847 pamphlet. The methods of\nmodern algebra began to be applied to Boolean algebra in the 20th\ncentury. Algebraic logic then broadened its interests to first order\nlogic and modal logic. Central algebraic notions in first order logic\nare ultraproducts, elementary equivalence, and elementary and\npseudoelementary varieties. Tarski’s cylindric algebras\nconstitute a particular abstract formulation of first order logic in\nterms of diagonal relations coding equality and substitution relations\nencoding variables. Modal logic as a fragment of first order logic is\nmade algebraic via Boolean modules." ], "subsection_title": "5.4 Algebraic logic" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nGiven any system such as integer arithmetic or real arithmetic, we can\nwrite \$T\$ for the set of all definite terms such as \$1 + (2/3)\$\nbuilt from constants and constituting the definite language, and\n\$T[V]\$ for the larger indefinite language permitting variables drawn\nfrom a set \$V\$ in place of some of the constant symbols, with terms\nsuch as \$x + (2/y)\$. When \$V\$ contains only a single variable\n\$“x”\$, \$T[\\{“x”\\}]\$ is usually abbreviated\nto \$T[“x”]\$ or just \$T[x\$] which is usually\nunambiguous. This convention extends to the algebra \$\\Phi\$ of terms\nof \$T\$ together with its list of operation symbols viewed as\noperations for combining terms; we write \$\\Phi[V\$] and call it the\nterm algebra on \$V\$. ", "\nThis notion of term algebra is a purely syntactic one involving only\nthe operation symbols, constants, and variables of some language. The\nterms \$2 + 3\$ and \$3 + 2\$ are distinct; likewise \$x + y\$ and \$y\n+ x\$ are distinct terms. As such they can be considered concrete\nterms.", "\nNow in a universe such as the integers certain concrete terms are\nequivalent in the sense that they always evaluate to the same element\nof the universe regardless of the values of their variable, for\nexample \$x + y\$ and \$y + x\$. It is convenient to collect\nequivalent concrete terms into equivalence classes each of which is to\nbe thought of as an abstract term.", "\nAs a simple example of abstract terms consider linear polynomials of\nthe form \$ax + by\$ where \$a\$ and \$b\$ are nonnegative integers,\nfor example \$7x + 3y\$. The set of all such polynomials includes 0\nand is closed under polynomial addition, an associative and\ncommutative operation. This set together with the operation of\naddition and the zero polynomial therefore constitutes a commutative\nmonoid.", "\nThis monoid is an example of a free algebra, namely the free\ncommutative monoid on two generators \$x\$ and \$y\$. What makes it\nfree is that it satisfies no laws other than those of a commutative\nmonoid. It is not however a free monoid because it satisfies the\ncommutative law. The free monoid on two generators \$x\$ and \$y\$ is\ninstead the set of all finite strings over the two-letter alphabet\n\$\\{x,y\\}\$.", "\nWhen commutativity is introduced as a law, it identifies the\npreviously distinct strings \$xy\$ and \$yx\$ as a single polynomial;\nmore generally any two strings with the same number of \$x\$s and\n\$y\$s are identified.", "\nFree monoids and free commutative monoids are examples of free\n\$C\$-algebras where \$C\$ is a class of algebras. In these two\nexamples the class \$C\$ is respectively that of monoids and\ncommutative monoids.", "\nA free \$C\$-algebra is an algebra that lives at the frontier of\nsyntax and semantics. On the semantic side it is a member of \$C\$. On\nthe syntactic side its elements behave like terms subject to the laws\nof \$C\$, but no other laws expressible with its generators.\nCommutativity \$xy = yx\$ is expressible with two generators and so a\nfree monoid on two or more generators cannot be commutative, though\nthe free monoid on one generator, namely the set of all finite strings\nover a one-letter alphabet does form a commutative monoid on one\ngenerator.", "\nOn the syntactic side, the free \$C\$-algebra \$B\$ on a set \$X\$\narises as a quotient of the term algebra formed from \$X\$ (viewed as\na set of variables) using the operation symbols and constants common\nto the algebras of \$C\$. The quotient identifies those terms that\nhave the same value for all algebras \$A\$ of \$C\$ and all valuations\nassigning values in \$A\$ to the variables of \$X\$. This performs\njust enough identifications to satisfy every law of \$C\$ (thereby\nmaking this quotient a \$C\$-algebra) while still retaining the\nsyntactic essence of the original term algebra in a sense made more\nprecise by the following paragraph.", "\n(Since the concept of a term algebra can seem a little circular in\nplaces, a more detailed account may clarify the concept. Given the\nlanguage of \$C\$, meaning the operation symbols and constant symbols\ncommon to the algebras of \$C\$, along with a set \$X\$ of variables,\nwe first form the underlying set of the algebra, and then interpret\nthe symbols of the language as operations on and values in that set.\nThe set itself consists of the terms built in the usual way from those\nvariables and constant symbols using the operation symbols; in that\nsense these elements are syntactic. But now we change our point of\nview by treating those elements as semantic, and we look to the\nconstant symbols and operation symbols of the language as syntactic\nentities needing to be interpreted in this semantic domain (albeit of\nterms) in order to turn this set of terms into an algebra of terms. We\ninterpret each constant symbol as itself. And we interpret each\n\$n\$-ary operation symbol \$f\$ as the \$n\$-ary operation that takes\nany \$n\$ terms \$t_1 , \\ldots ,t_n\$ as its \$n\$ arguments and\nreturns the single term \$f(t_1 , \\ldots ,t_n)\$. Note that this\ninterpretation of \$f\$ only returns a term, it does not\nactually build it. All term building was completed when we\nproduced the underlying set of the algebra.)", "\nFrom the semantic side, a \$C\$-algebra \$B\$ together with a subset\n\$X\$ of \$B\$ thought of as variables is said to be a free\n\$C\$-algebra on \$X\$, or is freely generated by \$X\$, when, given\nany \$C\$-algebra \$A\$, any valuation in \$A\$ of the variables in\n\$X\$ (that is, any function \$f: X\\rightarrow A\$) uniquely extends\nto a homomorphism \$h: B\\rightarrow A\$. (We say that \$h:\nB\\rightarrow A\$ extends \$f: X\\rightarrow A\$ when the restriction of\n\$h\$ to \$X\$ is \$f\$.)", "\nAs a convenient shorthand a free \$C\$-algebra on no generators can\nalso be called an initial \$C\$-algebra. An initial \$C\$-algebra has\nexactly one homomorphism to every \$C\$-algebra.", "\nBefore proceeding to the examples it is worthwhile pointing out an\nimportant basic property of free algebras as defined from the semantic\nside.", "\nTwo free algebras \$B, B'\$ on respective generator sets \$X, Y\$\nhaving the same cardinality are isomorphic.", "\nBy way of proof, pick any bijection \$f: X\\rightarrow Y\$. This, its\ninverse \$f': Y\\rightarrow X\$, and the two identity functions on\nrespectively \$X\$ and \$Y\$, form a system of four functions closed\nunder composition. Each of these functions is from a generator set to\nan algebra and therefore has a unique extension to a homomorphism.\nThese four homomorphisms are also closed under composition. The one\nfrom \$B\$ to itself extends the identity function on \$X\$ and\ntherefore must be the identity homomorphism on \$B\$ (since the latter\nexists and its restriction to \$X\$ is the identity function on\n\$X)\$. Likewise the homomorphism from \$G\$ to \$G\$ is an identity\nfunction. Hence the homomorphisms between \$B\$ and \$G\$ compose in\neither order to identities, which makes them isomorphisms. But this is\nwhat it means for \$B\$ and \$B'\$ to be isomorphic.", "\nThis fact allows us to say the free algebra on a given set,\nthinking of isomorphic algebras as being “morally” the\nsame. Were this not the case, our quotient construction would be\nincomplete as it produces a unique free algebra, whereas the above\ndefinition of free algebra allows any algebra isomorphic to that\nproduced by the quotient construction to be considered free. Since all\nfree algebras on \$X\$ are isomorphic, the quotient construction is as\ngood as any, and is furthermore one way of proving that they exist. It\nalso establishes that the choice of set of variables is irrelevant\nexcept for its cardinality, as intuition would suggest." ], "section_title": "6. Free Algebras", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nTake \$C\$ to be the class of monoids. The term algebra determined by\nthe binary operation symbol and the constant symbol for identity can\nbe viewed as binary trees with variables and copies of the constant\nsymbol at the leaves. Identifying trees according to associativity has\nthe effect of flattening the trees into words that ignore the order in\nwhich the operation was applied (without however reversing the order\nof any arguments). This produces words over the alphabet \$X\$\ntogether with the identity. The identity laws then erase the\nidentities, except in the case of a word consisting only of the\nidentity symbol, which we take to be the empty word.", "\nThus the monoid of finite words over an alphabet \$X\$ is the free\nmonoid on \$X\$.", "\nAnother representation of the free monoid on \$n\$ generators is as an\ninfinite tree, every vertex of which has \$n\$ descendants, one for\neach letter of the alphabet, with each edge labeled by the\ncorresponding letter. Each vertex \$v\$ represents the word consisting\nof the letters encountered along the path from the root to \$v\$. The\nconcatenation of \$u\$ and \$v\$ is the vertex arrived at by taking\nthe subtree whose root is the vertex \$u\$, noticing that this tree is\nisomorphic to the full tree, and locating \$v\$ in this subtree as\nthough it were the full tree.", "\nIf we ignore the direction and labels of the edges in this tree we can\nstill identify the root: it is the only vertex with \$n\$ edges\nincident on it, all other vertices have \$n+1\$, namely the one\nincoming edge and the \$n\$ outgoing ones.", "\nThe free commutative monoid on a set is that monoid whose\ngenerators behave like letters just as for free monoids (in particular\nthey are still atoms), but which satisfy the additional law \$uv =\nvu\$. We make further identifications, e.g. of\n“dog” and “dgo”. Order of letters in a word is\nnow immaterial, all that matters is how many copies there are of each\nletter. This information can be represented as an \$n\$-tuple of\nnatural numbers where \$n\$ is the size of the alphabet. Thus the free\ncommutative monoid on \$n\$ generators is \$N^n\$, the algebra of\n\$n\$-tuples of natural numbers under addition.", "\nIt can also be obtained from the tree representation of the free\nmonoid by identifying vertices. Consider the case \$n = 2\$ of two\nletters. Since the identifications do not change word length, all\nidentifications are of vertices at the same depth from the root. We\nperform all identifications simultaneously as follows. At every vertex\n\$v\$, identify \$v_{01}\$ and \$v_{10}\$ and their subtrees. Whereas\nbefore there were \$2^n\$ vertices at depth \$n\$, now there are\n\$n+1\$. Furthermore instead of a tree we have the upper right\nquadrant of the plane, that is, \$N^2\$, rotated 135 degrees\nclockwise, with every vertex \$v\$ at the top of a diamond whose other\nvertices are \$v_0\$ and \$v_1\$ at the next level down, and the\nidentified pair \$v_{01} = v_{10}\$ below both.", "\nTo form the free group on \$n\$ generators, first form the free monoid\non \$2n\$ generators, with generators organized into complementary\npairs each the inverse of the other, and then delete all adjacent\ncomplementary pairs from all words.", "\nThis view is not particularly insightful. The group counterpart of the\ntree representation does a better job of presenting a free group.\nConsider the free group on \$n = 2\$ generators \$A\$ and \$B\$. We\nstart with the free monoid on 4 generators \$A, B, a, b\$ where \$a\$\nis the inverse of \$A\$ and \$b\$ that of \$B\$. Every vertex of this\ntree has 4 descendants. So the root has degree 4 and the remaining\nvertices have degree 5: every vertex except the root has one edge\ngoing in, say the generator \$a\$, and four out. Consider any nonroot\nvertex \$v\$. The effect of deleting adjacent complementary pairs is\nto identify the immediate ancestor of \$v\$ with one of the four\ndescendants of \$v\$, namely the one that makes the path from the\nancestor to the descendant a complementary pair. For every nonroot\nvertex \$v\$ these identifications reduce the degree of \$v\$ from 5\nto 4. The root remains at degree 4.", "\nSo now we have an infinite graph every vertex of which has degree 4.\nUnlike the tree for the free monoid on 2 generators, where the root is\ntopologically different from the other vertices, the tree for the free\ngroup on 2 generators is entirely homogeneous. Thus if we throw away\nthe vertex labels and rely only on the edge labels to navigate, any\nvertex can be taken as the identity of the group.", "\nThis homogeneity remains the case for the free abelian group on 2\ngenerators, whose vertices are still of degree 4. However the\nadditional identifications turns it from a tree (a graph with no\ncycles) to a grid whose vertices are the lattice points of the plane.\nThat is, the free abelian group on 2 generators is \$Z^2\$, and on\n\$n\$ generators \$Z^n\$. The edges are the line segments joining\nadjacent lattice points." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Free monoids and groups" }, { "content": [ "\nWith no generators the free monoid, free group, and free ring are all\nthe one-element algebra consisting of just the additive identity 0. A\nring with identity means having a multiplicative identity, that is, a\nword \$\\varepsilon\$. But this makes \$\\varepsilon\$ a generator for\nthe additive group of the ring, and the free abelian group on one\ngenerator is the integers. So the free ring with identity on no\ngenerators is the integers under addition and now multiplication.", "\nThe free ring on one generator \$x\$ must include \$x^2 , x^3\$, etc.\nby multiplication, but these can be added and subtracted resulting in\npolynomials such as \$7x^3 -3x^2 +2x\$ but without a constant term,\nwith the exception of 0 itself. The distributivity law for rings means\nthat a term such as \$(7x+x^2 )(2x^3 +x)\$ can be expanded as \$7x^2\n+x^3 +14x^4 +2x^5\$. It should now be clear that these are just\nordinary polynomials with no constant term; in particular we are\nmissing the zero-degree polynomial 1 and so this ring has no\nmultiplicative identity. However it is a commutative ring even though\nwe did not specify this. The free ring with identity on one generator\nintroduces 1 as the multiplicative identity and becomes the ordinary\none-variable polynomials since now we can form all the integers. Just\nas with monoids, the free ring with identity on two generators is not\ncommutative, the polynomials \$xy\$ and \$yx\$ being distinct. The\nfree commutative ring with identity on two generators however\nconsists of the ordinary two-variable polynomials over the\nintegers." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Free rings" }, { "content": [ "\nFrom the examples so far one might conclude that all free algebras on\none or more generators are infinite. This is by no means always the\ncase; as counterexamples we may point to a number of classes: sets,\npointed sets, bipointed sets, graphs, undirected graphs, Boolean\nalgebras, distributive lattices, etc. Each of these forms a locally\nfinite variety as defined earlier.", "\nA pointed set is an algebra with one constant, say \$c\$. The free\npointed set on \$x\$ and \$y\$ has three elements, \$x, y\$, and\n\$c\$. A bipointed set is an algebra with two constants \$c\$ and\n\$d\$, and the free bipointed set on \$x\$ and \$y\$ then has four\nelements, \$x, y, c\$, and \$d\$.", "\nGraphs, of the oriented kind arising in say automata theory where\nmultiple edges may connect the same two vertices, can be organized as\nalgebras having two unary operations \$s\$ and \$t\$ satisfying\n\$s(s(x)) = t(s(x)) = s(x)\$ and \$t(t(x)) = s(t(x)) = t(x)\$. The\nfree graph on one generator \$x\$ has three elements, \$x, s(x)\$, and\n\$t(x)\$, constituting respectively an edge and its two endpoints or\nvertices. In this framework the vertices are the elements\nsatisfying \$s(x) = x\$ (and hence \$t(x) = x\$ since \$x = s(x) =\nt(s(x)) = t(x)\$); all other elements constitute edges. The free graph\non \$n\$ generators consists of \$n\$ such edges, all independent.\nOther graphs arise by identifying elements. There is no point\nidentifying an edge with either another edge or a vertex since that\nsimply absorbs the first edge into the second entity. This leaves only\nvertices; identifying two vertices yields a single vertex common to\ntwo edges, or to the same edge in the identification \$s(x) = t(x)\$\ncreating a self-loop.", "\nThe term “oriented” is to be preferred to\n“directed” because a directed graph as understood in\ncombinatorics is an oriented graph with the additional property that\nif \$s(x) = s(y)\$ and \$t(x) = t(y)\$ then \$x = y\$; that is, only\none edge is permitted between two vertices in a given direction.", "\nUnoriented graphs are defined as for graphs with an additional unary\noperation \$g\$ satisfying \$g(g(x)) = x\$ and \$s(g(x)) = t(x)\$\n(whence \$s(x) = s(g(g(x))) = t(g(x)))\$. The free undirected graph on\n\$x\$ consists of \$x, s(x), t(x)\$, and \$g(x)\$, with the pair \$x,\ng(x)\$ constituting the two one-way lanes of a two-lane highway\nbetween \$s(x) = t(g(x))\$ and \$t(x) = s(g(x)\$). Identification of\nelements of undirected graphs works as for their oriented\ncounterparts: it is only worth identifying vertices. However there is\none interesting twist here: vertices can be of two kinds, those\nsatisfying \$x = g(x)\$ and those not. The latter kind of vertex is\nnow asymmetric: one direction of the bidirectional edge is identified\nwith its vertices while the other one forms an oriented loop in the\nsense that its other direction is a vertex. This phenomenon does not\narise for undirected graphs defined as those satisfying “if\n\$s(x) = s(y)\$ and \$t(x) = t(y)\$ then \$x = y\$.”" ], "subsection_title": "6.3 Free combinatorial structures" }, { "content": [ "\nBoolean algebras are traditionally defined axiomatically as\ncomplemented distributive lattices, which has the benefit of showing\nthat they form a variety, and furthermore a finitely axiomatizable\none. However Boolean algebras are so fundamental in their own right\nthat, rather than go to the trouble of defining lattice, distributive,\nand complemented just for this purpose, it is easier as well as more\ninsightful to obtain them from the initial Boolean algebra. It\nsuffices to define this as the two-element set \$\\{0, 1\\}\$, the\nconstants (zeroary operations) 0 and 1, and the \$2^{2^2} = 16\$\nbinary operations. A Boolean algebra is then any algebra with those 16\noperations and two constants satisfying the equations satisfied by the\ninitial Boolean algebra.", "\nAn almost-definitive property of the class of Boolean algebras is that\ntheir polynomials in the initial Boolean algebra are all the\noperations on that algebra. The catch is that the inconsistent class\nconsisting of only the one-element or inconsistent algebra also has\nthis property. This class is easily ruled out however by adding that\nBoolean algebra is consistent. But just barely—adding any new\nequation to Boolean algebra (without introducing new operations)\naxiomatizes the inconsistent algebra.", "\nSheffer has shown that the constants and the 16 operations can be\ngenerated as polynomials in just one constant, which can be 0 or 1,\nand one binary operation, which can be NAND, \$\\neg(x\\wedge y)\$, or\nNOR, \$\\neg(x\\vee y)\$. Any such sufficient set is called a\nbasis. Along the same lines Stone has shown that conjunction,\nexclusive-or, and the constant 1 form a basis. The significance of\nStone’s basis over Sheffer’s is that Boolean algebras\norganized with those operations satisfy all the axioms for a\ncommutative ring with identity with conjunction as multiplication and\nexclusive-or as addition, as well as the law \$x^2 = 1\$. Any ring\nsatisfying this last condition is called a Boolean ring.\nBoolean rings are equivalent to Boolean algebras in the sense that\nthey have the same polynomials.", "\nAn atom of a Boolean algebra is an element \$x\$ such that for all\n\$y, x\\wedge y\$ is either \$x\$ or 0. An atomless Boolean algebra is\none with no atoms.", "\nThere is exactly one Boolean algebra of cardinality every finite power\nof 2, and it is isomorphic to the Boolean algebra of a power set\n\$2^X\$ of that cardinality under the set operations of union,\nintersection, and complement relative to \$X\$. Hence all finite\nBoolean algebras have cardinality a power of 2. This situation changes\nwith infinite Boolean algebras; in particular countable Boolean\nalgebras exist. One such is the free Boolean algebra on countably many\ngenerators, which is the only countable atomless Boolean algebra. The\nfinite and cofinite (complement of a finite set) subsets of the set\n\$N\$ of natural numbers form a subalgebra of the powerset Boolean\nalgebra \$2^N\$ not isomorphic to the free Boolean algebra, but it has\natoms, namely the singleton sets.", "\nThe free Boolean algebra \$F(n)\$ on \$n\$ generators consists of all\n\$2^2 n\$ \$n\$-ary operations on the two-element Boolean algebra.\nBoolean algebras therefore form a locally finite variety.", "\nThe equational theory of distributive lattices is obtained from that\nof Boolean algebras by selecting as its operations just the monotone\nbinary operations on the two-element algebra, omitting the constants.\nThese are the operations with the property that if either argument is\nchanged from 0 to 1, the result does not change from 1 to 0. A\ndistributive lattice is any model of those Boolean equations between\nterms built solely with monotone binary operations. Hence every\nBoolean algebra is a distributive lattice.", "\nDistributive lattices can be arbitrarily “thin.” At the\nextreme, any chain (linear or total order, \$e.g\$. the reals\nstandardly ordered) under the usual operations of max and min forms a\ndistributive lattice. Since we have omitted the constants this\nincludes the empty lattice, which we have not excluded here as an\nalgebra. (Some authors disallow the empty set as an algebra but this\nproscription spoils many good theorems without gaining any useful\nones.) Hence there exist distributive lattices of every possible\ncardinality.", "\nEvery finite-dimensional vector space is free, being generated by any\nchoice of basis. This extends to infinite-dimensional vector spaces\nprovided we accept the Axiom of Choice. Vector spaces over a finite\nfield therefore form a locally finite variety when scalar\nmultiplication is organized as one unary operation for each field\nelement." ], "subsection_title": "6.4 Free logical structures" } ] } ]	[ "Harold R. Jacobs, Elementary Algebra, 876pp, W.H.\nFreeman, 1979.", "Bartel Leendert van der Waerden, Moderne Algebra (2\nvolumes), Springer, Vol. 1 1930, Vol. 2 1931.", "I.N. Herstein, Topics in Algebra, 2nd ed, 400pp, Wiley,\n1975.", "Saunders Mac Lane, Categories for the Working\nMathematician, Springer-Verlag, 1978." ]	[ { "href": "../boolalg-math/", "text": "Boolean algebra: the mathematics of" }, { "href": "../category-theory/", "text": "category theory" } ]
algebra-logic-tradition	The Algebra of Logic Tradition	First published Mon Mar 2, 2009; substantive revision Fri Feb 12, 2021	[ "\nThe algebra of logic, as an explicit algebraic\nsystem showing the underlying mathematical structure of logic, was\nintroduced by George Boole (1815–1864) in his book The\nMathematical Analysis of Logic (1847). It is therefore to be\ndistinguished from the more general approach of algebraic\nlogic. The methodology initiated by Boole was successfully\ncontinued in the 19th century in the work of William\nStanley Jevons (1835–1882), Charles Sanders Peirce\n(1839–1914), Ernst Schröder (1841–1902), among many\nothers, thereby establishing a tradition in (mathematical) logic. From\nBoole’s first book until the influence after WWI of the monumental\nwork Principia Mathematica (1910–1913) by Alfred North\nWhitehead (1861–1947) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970),\nversions of the algebra of logic were the most developed form of\nmathematical logic above all as presented in Schröder’s three\nvolumes Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik\n(1890–1905). Furthermore, this tradition motivated the\ninvestigations of Leopold Löwenheim (1878–1957) that\neventually gave rise to model theory. In addition, in 1941, Alfred\nTarski (1901–1983) in his paper “On the calculus of\nrelations” returned to Peirce’s relation algebra as presented in\nSchröder’s Algebra der Logik. The tradition of the\nalgebra of logic played a key role in the notion of Logic as\nCalculus as opposed to the notion of Logic as Universal\nLanguage. Beyond Tarski’s algebra of relations, the influence of\nthe algebraic tradition in logic can be found in other mathematical\ntheories, such as category theory. However this influence lies outside\nthe scope of this entry, which is divided into 10 sections." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. 1847—The Beginnings of the Modern Versions of the Algebra of Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. 1854—Boole’s Final Presentation of his Algebra of Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Jevons: An Algebra of Logic Based on Total Operations", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Peirce: Basing the Algebra of Logic on Subsumption", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. De Morgan and Peirce: Relations and Quantifiers in the Algebra of Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Schröder’s systematization of the algebra of logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Huntington: Axiomatic Investigations of the Algebra of Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "9. Stone: Models for the Algebra of Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "10. Skolem: Quantifier Elimination and Decidability", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "11. Tarski and the Revival of Algebraic Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Sources", "Secondary Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nBoole’s The Mathematical Analysis of Logic presents many\ninteresting logic novelties: It was the beginning of\nnineteenth-century mathematization of logic and provided an\nalgorithmic alternative (via a slight modification of\nordinary algebra) to the catalog approach used in traditional\nlogic (even if reduction procedures were developed in the latter).\nInstead of a list of valid forms of argument, the validity of\narguments were determined on the basis of general principles and\nrules. Furthermore, it provided an effective method for proving\nlogical laws on the basis of a system of postulates. As Boole wrote\nlater, it was a proper “science of reasoning”, and not a\n“mnemonic art” like traditional Syllogistics (Boole 1997:\n136). Three-quarters of the way through this book, after finishing\nhis discussion of syllogistic logic, Boole started to develop the\ngeneral tools that would be used in his Laws of Thought\n(1854) to greatly extend traditional logic by permitting an argument\nto have many premises and to involve many classes. To handle the\ninfinitely many possible logical arguments of this expanded logic, he\npresented theorems that provided key tools for an algorithmic analysis\n(a catalog was no longer feasible).", "\nBoole’s ideas were conceived independently of earlier anticipations,\nlike those developed by G.W. Leibniz. They emerged from the particular\ncontexts of English mathematics (see Peckhaus 2009). According to\nVíctor Sánchez Valencia, the tradition that originated\nwith Boole came to be known as the algebra of logic since the\npublication in 1879 of Principles of the Algebra of Logic by\nAlexander MacFarlane (see Sánchez Valencia 2004: 389).\nMacFarlane considered “the analytical method of reasoning about\nQuality proposed by Boole” as an algebra (see MacFarlane 1879:\n3).", "\nThis approach differs from what is usually called algebraic\nlogic; though there is some overlap, the historical development\nof the two areas are different. Algebraic logic is understood as:", "\n\n\na style [of logic] in which concepts and relations\nare expressed by mathematical symbols [\$\\ldots\$] so that\nmathematical techniques can be applied. Here mathematics shall mean\nmostly algebra, i.e., the part of mathematics concerned with finitary\noperations on some set. (Hailperin 2004: 323)\n", "\nAlgebraic logic can be already found in the work of Leibniz, Jacob\nBernoulli and other modern thinkers, and it undoubtedly constitutes an\nimportant antecedent of Boole’s approach. In a broader perspective,\nboth are part of the tradition of symbolic knowledge in the\nformal sciences, as first conceived by Leibniz (see Esquisabel 2012).\nThis idea of algebraic logic was continued to some extent in the\nFrench Enlightenment in the work of Condillac and Condorcet (see\nGrattan-Guinness 2000: 14 ff.)", "\nBoole’s methodology for dealing with logical problems can be described\nas follows:", "\nIn other words, symbolic formulation of logical problems and solution\nof logical equations constitutes Boole’s method (see Sánchez\nValencia 2004: 389).", "\nLater, in his Pure Logic from 1864, Jevons changed Boole’s\npartial operation of union of disjoint sets to the modern unrestricted\nunion and eliminated Boole’s questionable use of uninterpretable terms\n(see Jevons 1890). Peirce (1880) eliminated explicitly the\nAristotelian derivation of particular statements from universal\nstatements by giving the modern meaning for “All \$A\$ is\n\$B\$”. In addition, he extended the algebra of logic for\nclasses to the algebra of logic for binary relations and introduced\ngeneral sums and products to handle quantification. Ernst\nSchröder, taking inspiration from previous work by Hermann\n(1809–1877) and Robert Grassmann (1815–1901) and using the\nframework developed by Peirce, developed and systematized the\n19th Century achievements in the algebra of logic in his\nthree-volume work Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik\n(1890–1910).", "\nThe contributions of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) to logic from the\nperiod 1879–1903, based on an axiomatic approach to\nlogic, had very little influence at the time (and the same can be said\nof the diagrammatic systems of C.S. Peirce developed at the\nturn of the century). Whitehead and Russell rejected the algebra of\nlogic approach, with its predominantly equational formulations and\nalgebraic symbolism, in favor of an approach strongly inspired by the\naxiomatic system of Frege, and using the notation developed by\nGiuseppe Peano, namely to use logical connectives, relation symbols\nand quantifiers.", "\nDuring the first two decades of the twentieth century, the algebra of\nlogic was further developed in the works of Platon Sergeevich\nPoretzsky (1846–1907), Louis Couturat (1868–1914), Leopold\nLöwenheim (1878–1957), and Heinrich Behmann\n(1891–1970) (see Styazhkin 1969). In particular, elimination\ntheorems in the algebra of logic influenced decision procedures for\nfragments of first-order and second-order logic (see Mancosu, Zach,\nBadesa 2009).", "\nAfter WWI David Hilbert (1862–1943), who had at first adopted\nthe algebraic approach, picked up on the approach of\nPrincipia, and the algebra of logic fell out of favor.\nHowever, in 1941, Tarski treated relation algebras as an equationally\ndefined class. Such a class has many models besides the collection\nof all binary relations on a given universe that was considered\nin the 1800s, just as there are many Boolean algebras besides the\npower set Boolean algebras studied in the 1800s. In the years\n1948–1952 Tarski, along with his students Chin and Thompson,\ncreated cylindric algebras as an algebraic logic companion to\nfirst-order logic, and in 1956 Paul Halmos (1916–2006)\nintroduced polyadic algebras for the same purpose. As Halmos (1956 b,\nc and d) noted, these new algebraic logics tended to focus on studying\nthe extent to which they captured first-order logic and on their\nuniversal algebraic aspects such as axiomatizations and structure\ntheorems, but offered little insight into the nature of the\nfirst-order logic which inspired their creation." ], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn late 1847, Boole and Augustus De Morgan (1806–1871) each\npublished a book on logic—Boole’s Mathematical Analysis of\nLogic (1847) and De Morgan’s Formal Logic (1847). De\nMorgan’s approach was to dissect every aspect of traditional deductive\nlogic (usually called ‘Aristotelian logic’) into its\nminutest components, to consider ways to generalize these components,\nand then, in some cases, undertake to build a logical system using\nthese components. Unfortunately, he was never able to incorporate his\nbest ideas into a significant system. His omission of a symbol for\nequality made it impossible to develop an equational algebra of logic.\nIt seems that synthesis was not De Morgan’s strong suit.", "\nDe Morgan’s book of 1847 was part of a revival in logic studies that\noriginated at the beginning of 19th Century with Joseph Diez Gergonne\n(1771–1859) in France, and Bernhard Bolzano (1781–1848) in\nBohemia, among others. George Bentham and William Hamilton in the\nUnited Kingdom were also part of this revival and their studies\nfocused on the nature of variations of the categorical sentences in\ntraditional syllogistic, including what was called\n“quantification of the predicate”; for example, “All\n\$A\$ are some \$B\$” or “Some \$A\$ are all\n\$B\$”. It was thought that this problem required an extension\nof the syllogistic logic of Aristotle and that some form of symbolic\nmethod was needed both to handle such statements and provide a\nclassification of their different types (see Heinemann 2015 chapters 2\nand 3). ", "\nBoole approached logic from a completely different perspective, namely\nhow to cast Aristotelian logic in the garb of symbolical algebra.\nUsing symbolical algebra was a theme with which he was well-acquainted\nfrom his work in differential equations, and from the various papers\nof his young friend and mentor Duncan Farquharson Gregory\n(1813–1844), who made attempts to cast other subjects such as\ngeometry into the language of symbolical algebra. Since the\napplication of symbolical algebra to differential equations had\nproceeded through the introduction of differential operators, it must\nhave been natural for Boole to look for operators that applied in the\narea of Aristotelian logic. He readily came up with the idea of using\n“selection” operators, for example, a selection operator\nfor the color red would select the red members from a class. In his\n1854 book, Boole realized that it was simpler to omit selection\noperators and work directly with classes. (However he kept the\nselection operators to justify his claim that his laws of logic were\nnot ultimately based on observations concerning the use of language,\nbut were actually deeply rooted in the processes of the human mind.)\nFrom now on in this article, when discussing Boole’s 1847 book, the\nselection operators have been replaced with the simpler direct\nformulation using classes.", "\nSince symbolical algebra was just the syntactic side of ordinary\nalgebra, Boole needed ways to interpret the usual operations and\nconstants of algebra to create his algebra of logic for classes.\nMultiplication was interpreted as intersection, leading to his one new\nlaw, the idempotent law \$XX = X\$ for multiplication, rediscovering a\nlogical law already formulated by Leibniz. Addition was defined as\nunion, provided one was dealing with disjoint classes; and\nsubtraction as class difference, provided one was subtracting a\nsubclass from a class. In other cases, the addition and subtraction\noperations were simply undefined, or as Boole wrote,\nuninterpretable. The usual laws of arithmetic told Boole that\n1 must be the universe and \$1 - X\$ must be the complement of\n\$X\$.", "\nThe next step in Boole’s system was to translate the four kinds of\ncategorical propositions into equations, for example “All \$X\$\nis \$Y\$” becomes \$X = XY\$, and “Some \$X\$ is\n\$Y\$” becomes \$V = XY\$, where \$V\$ is a new symbol. To\neliminate the middle term in a syllogism Boole borrowed an elimination\ntheorem from ordinary algebra, but it was too weak for his algebra of\nlogic. This would be remedied in his 1854 book. Boole found that he\ncould not always derive the desired conclusions with the above\ntranslation of particular propositions (i.e., those with existential\nimport), so he added the variants \$X = VY\$, \$Y = VX\$, and \$VX =\nVY\$ (see the entry on\n Boole).", "\nThe symbolic algebra of the 1800s included much more than just the\nalgebra of polynomials, and Boole experimented to see which results\nand tools might apply to the algebra of logic. For example, he proved\none of his results by using an infinite series expansion. His\nfascination with the possibilities of ordinary algebra led him to\nconsider questions such as: What would logic be like if the idempotent\nlaw were replaced by the law \$X^3 = X\$? His successors, especially\nJevons, would soon narrow the operations on classes to the ones that\nwe use today, namely union, intersection and complement.", "\nAs mentioned earlier, three-quarters of the way through his brief book\nof 1847, after finishing derivations of the traditional Aristotelian\nsyllogisms in his system, Boole announced that his algebra of logic\nwas capable of far more general applications. Then he proceeded to add\ngeneral theorems on developing (expanding) terms, providing\ninterpretations of equations, and using long division to express one\nclass in an equation in terms of the other classes (with side\nconditions added).", "\nBoole’s theorems, completed and perfected in 1854, gave algorithms for\nanalyzing infinitely many argument forms. This opened a new and\nfruitful perspective, deviating from the traditional approach to\nlogic, where for centuries scholars had struggled to come up with\nclever mnemonics to memorize a very small catalog of valid conversions\nand syllogisms and their various interrelations.", "\nDe Morgan’s Formal Logic did not gain significant\nrecognition, primarily because it was a large collection of small\nfacts without a significant synthesis. Boole’s The Mathematical\nAnalysis of Logic had powerful methods that caught the attention\nof a few scholars such as De Morgan and Arthur Cayley\n(1821–1895); but immediately there were serious questions about\nthe workings of Boole’s algebra of logic: Just how closely was it tied\nto ordinary algebra? How could Boole justify the procedures of his\nalgebra of logic? In retrospect it seems quite certain that Boole did\nnot know why his system worked. His claim, following Gregory, that in\norder to justify using ordinary algebra it was enough to check the\ncommutative law \$XY = YX\$ for multiplication and the distributive\nlaw \$X(Y + Z) = XY + XZ\$, is clearly false. Nonetheless it is also\nlikely that he had checked his results in a sufficient number of cases\nto give substance to his belief that his system was correct." ], "section_title": "2. 1847—The Beginnings of the Modern Versions of the Algebra of Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn his second book, The Laws of Thought, Boole not only\napplied algebraic methods to traditional logic but also attempted some\nreforms to logic. He started by augmenting the laws of his 1847\nalgebra of logic (without explicitly saying that his previous list of\nthree axioms was inadequate), and made some comments on the rule of\ninference (performing the same operation on both sides of an\nequation). But then he casually stated that the foundation of his\nsystem actually rested on a single (new) principle, namely it sufficed\nto check an argument by seeing if it was correct when the class\nsymbols took on only the values 0 and 1, and the operations were the\nusual arithmetical operations. Let us call this Boole’s Rule of 0\nand 1. No meaningful justification was given for Boole’s adoption\nof this new foundation, it was not given a special name, and the scant\nreferences to it in the rest of the book were usually rather clumsily\nstated. For a modern analysis of this Rule of 0 and 1 see Burris &\nSankappanavar 2013.", "\nThe development of the algebra of logic in the Laws of\nThought proceeded much as in his 1847 book, with minor changes to\nhis translation scheme, and with the selection operators replaced by\nclasses. There is a new and very important theorem (correcting the one\nhe had used in 1847), the Elimination Theorem, which says the\nfollowing: given an equation \$F(x,y, z, \\ldots) = 0\$ in the class\nsymbols \$x, y, z\$, etc., the most general conclusion that follows\nfrom eliminating certain of the class symbols is obtained by (1)\nsubstituting 0s and 1s into \$F(x, y, z, \\ldots)\$ for the symbols to\nbe eliminated, in all possible ways, then (2) multiplying these\nvarious substitution instances together and setting the product equal\nto 0. Thus eliminating \$y\$ and \$z\$ from \$F(x, y, z) = 0\$ gives\n\$F(x, 0, 0)F(x, 0, 1)F(x, 1, 0)F(x, 1, 1) = 0\$. This theorem also\nplayed an important role in Boole’s interpretation of Aristotle’s\nsyllogistic.", "\nFrom an algebra of logic point of view, the 1854 treatment at times\nseems less elegant than that in the 1847 book, but it gives a much\nricher insight into how Boole thinks about the foundations for his\nalgebra of logic. The final chapter on logic, Chapter XV, was an\nattempt to give a uniform proof of the Aristotelian conversions and\nsyllogisms. (It is curious that prior to Chapter XV Boole did not\npresent any examples of arguments involving particular propositions.)\nThe details of Chapter XV are quite involved, mainly because of the\nincrease in size of expressions when the Elimination and Development\nTheorems are applied. Boole simply left most of the work to the\nreader. Later commentators would gloss over this chapter, and no one\nseems to have worked through its details.", "\nAside from the Rule of 0 and 1 and the Elimination Theorem, the 1854\npresentation is mainly interesting for Boole’s attempts to justify his\nalgebra of logic. He argued that in symbolical algebra it was quite\nacceptable to carry out equational deductions with partial operations,\njust as one would when the operations were total, as long as the terms\nin the premises and the conclusion were interpretable. He said this\nwas the way ordinary algebra worked with the uninterpretable\n\$\\sqrt{-1}\$, the square root of −1. (The geometric\ninterpretation of complex numbers was recognized early on by Wessel,\nArgand, and Gauss, but it was only with the publications of Gauss and\nHamilton in the 1830s that doubts about the acceptability of complex\nnumbers in the larger mathematical community were overcome. It is\ncurious that in 1854 Boole regarded \$\\sqrt{-1}\$ as\nuninterpretable.)", "\nThere were a number of concerns regarding Boole’s approach to the\nalgebra of logic:" ], "section_title": "3. 1854—Boole’s Final Presentation of his Algebra of Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nJevons, who had studied with De Morgan, was the first to offer an\nalternative to Boole’s system. In 1863 he wrote to Boole that surely\nBoole’s operation of addition should be replaced by the more natural\n‘inclusive or’ (or ‘union’), leading to the\nlaw \$X + X = X\$. Boole completely rejected this suggestion (it would\nhave destroyed his system based on ordinary algebra) and broke off the\ncorrespondence. Jevons published his system in his 1864 book, Pure\nLogic (reprinted in Jevons 1890). By ‘pure’ he meant\nthat he was casting off any dependence on the algebra of\nnumbers—instead of classes, which are associated with quantity,\nhe would use predicates, which are associated with quality, and his\nlaws would be derived directly from the (total) fundamental operations\nof inclusive disjunction and conjunction. But he kept Boole’s use of\nequations as the fundamental form of statements in his algebra of\nlogic.", "\nBy adopting De Morgan’s convention of using upper-case/lower-case\nletters for complements, Jevons’ system was not suited to provide\nequational axioms for modern Boolean algebra. However, he refined his\nsystem of axioms and rules of inference until the result was\nessentially the modern system of Boolean algebra for ground\nterms, that is, terms where the class symbols are to be thought\nof as constants, not as variables.", "\nIt must be noticed that modern equational logic deals with\nuniversally quantified equations (which would have been\ncalled laws in the 1800s). In the 19th century\nalgebra of logic one could translate “All \$X\$ is \$Y\$”\nas the equation \$X = XY\$. This is not to be viewed as the\nuniversally quantified expression \$(\\forall X)(\\forall Y)(X = XY)\$.\n\$X\$ and \$Y\$ are to be treated as constants (or schematic letters).\nTerms that only have constants (no variables) are called\nground terms.", "\nBy carrying out this analysis in the special setting of an algebra of\npredicates (or equivalently, in an algebra of classes) Jevons played\nan important role in the development of modern equational logic. As\nmentioned earlier, Boole gave inadequate sets of equational axioms for\nhis system, originally starting with the two laws due to Gregory plus\nhis idempotent law; these were accompanied by De Morgan’s inference\nrule that one could carry out the same operation (Boole’s fundamental\noperations in his algebra of logic were addition, subtraction and\nmultiplication) on equals and obtain equals. Boole then switched to\nthe simple and powerful (but unexplained) Rule of 0 and 1.", "\nHaving replaced Boole’s fundamental operations with total operations,\nJevons proceeded, over a period of many years, to work on the axioms\nand rules for his system. Some elements of equational logic that we\nnow take for granted required a considerable number of years for\nJevons to resolve:", "\nThe Reflexive Law (\$A=A\$). In 1864 Jevons listed this as a\npostulate (1890, p. 11) and then in §24 he referred to \$A = A\$\nas a “useless Identical proposition”. In his 1869 paper on\nsubstitution it became the “Law of Identity”. In the\nPrinciples of Science (1874) it was one of the three\n“Fundamental Laws of Thought”.", "\nThe Symmetric Law (\$B = A\$ follows from \$A = B\$). In 1864\nJevons wrote “\$A = B\$ and \$B = A\$ are the same\nstatement”. This is a position he would maintain. In 1874 he\nwrote", "\n\n\nI shall consider the two forms \$A = B\$ and \$B = A\$ to express\nexactly the same identity written differently.\n", "\nFor a final form of his algebra of logic we turn to the laws which he\nhad scattered over 40 pages in Principles of Science (1874),\nhaving replaced his earlier use of + by \$\\ORjev\$, evidently to move\nfurther away from any appearance of a connection with the algebra of\nnumbers:", "\nLaws of Combination", "\nLaws of Thought", "\nFor his single rule of inference Jevons chose his principle of\nsubstitution—in modern terms this was essentially a combination\nof ground replacement and transitivity. He showed how to derive\ntransitivity of equality from this; he could have derived symmetry as\nwell but did not. The associative law was missing—it was\nimplicit in the lack of parentheses in his expressions.", "\nIt was only in his Studies in Deductive Logic (1880) that\nJevons mentioned McColl’s use of an accent to indicate negation. After\nnoting that McColl’s accent allowed one to take the negation of\ncomplex bracketed terms he went on to say that, for the most part, he\nfound the notation of De Morgan, the notation that he had always used,\nto be the more elegant." ], "section_title": "4. Jevons: An Algebra of Logic Based on Total Operations", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nPeirce started his research into the algebra of logic in the late\n1860s. In his paper “On an Improvement in Boole’s calculus of\nLogic” (Peirce 1867), he arrived independently at the same\nconclusion that Jevons had reached earlier, that one needed to replace\nBoole’s partial operation of addition with the total operation of\nunion (see CP 3.3.6). In his important 1880 paper, “On the\nAlgebra of Logic”, Peirce quietly broke with the traditional\nextensional semantics and introduced a usual assumption of modern\nsemantics: the extension of a concept, understood as a class, could be\nempty (as well as the universe), and stated the truth values of the\ncategorical propositions that we use today. For example, he said the\nproposition “All \$A\$ is \$B\$” is true if \$A\$ and\n\$B\$ are both the empty class. Conversion by Limitation, that is, the\nargument “All \$A\$ is \$B\$” therefore “Some \$B\$\nis \$A\$”, was no longer a valid inference. Peirce said nothing\nabout the reasons for and merits of his departure from the traditional\nsemantic assumption of existence.", "\nPeirce also broke with Boole’s and Jevons’ use of equality as the\nfundamental primitive, using instead the relation of\n“subsumption” interpretable in different ways (subclass\nrelation, implication, etc.). He stated the partial order properties\nof subsumption and then proceeded to define the operations of + and\n× as least upper bounds and greatest lower bounds—he\nimplicitly assumed such bounds existed—and listed the key\nequational properties of the algebras with two binary operations that\nwe now call lattices. Then he claimed that the distributive law\nfollowed, but said the proof was too tedious to include. The\nfruitfulness of this perspective is evident in his seminal paper from\n1885. There Peirce introduced a system for propositional logic based\non five axioms for implication (represented by the sign\n‘\$-\\kern-.4em<\$’), including what is now called\nPeirce’s law. It certainly made the algebra of logic more elegant." ], "section_title": "5. Peirce: Basing the Algebra of Logic on Subsumption", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDe Morgan wrote a series of six papers called “On the\nSyllogism” in the years 1846 to 1863 (reprinted in De Morgan\n1966). In his efforts to generalize the syllogism, De Morgan replaced\nthe copula “is” with a general binary relation in the\nsecond paper of the series dating from 1850. By allowing different\nbinary relations in the two premises of a syllogism, he was led to\nintroduce the composition of the two binary relations to express the\nconclusion of the syllogism. In this pursuit of generalized syllogisms\nhe introduced various other operations on binary relations, including\nthe converse operation, and he developed a fragment of a calculus for\nthese operations. His main paper on this subject was the fourth in the\nseries, called “On the syllogism, No. IV, and on the logic of\nrelations” published in 1859 (see De Morgan 1966).", "\nFollowing De Morgan’s paper, Peirce, in his paper “Description\nof a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, resulting from an\nAmplification of the Conceptions of Boole’s Calculus of Logic”\nfrom 1870, lifted Boole’s work to the setting of binary\nrelations—with binary relations one had, in addition to union,\nintersection and complement, the natural operations of composition and\nconverse. A binary relation was characterized as a set of ordered\npairs (see 3.328). He worked on this new calculus between 1870 and\n1883. Like De Morgan, Peirce also considered a number of other natural\noperations on relations. Peirce’s main paper on the subject was\n“On the Algebra of Logic” (1880). By employing\nunrestricted unions, denoted by Σ, and unrestricted\nintersections, denoted by Π, Peirce thus introduced quantifiers\ninto his algebra of logic.", "\nIn a paper from 1882, “Brief Description of the Algebra of\nRelatives”, reprinted in De Morgan 1966, he used these\nquantifiers to define operations on relations by means of operations\non certain kind of coefficients. De Morgan gets credit for introducing\nthe concept of relation, but Peirce is considered the true creator of\nthe theory of relations (see, e.g., Tarski 1941: 73). However, Peirce\ndid not develop this theory. As Calixto Badesa wrote, “the\ncalculus of relatives was never to Peirce’s liking” (Badesa\n2004: 32). He considered it too complicated because of the combination\nof class operations with relational ones. Instead, he preferred from\n1885 onwards to develop a “general algebra” including\nquantifiers but no operation on relations. In this way, he arrived at\nan elementary and informal presentation of what is now called\nfirst-order logic (see Badesa 2004, loc. cit.)." ], "section_title": "6. De Morgan and Peirce: Relations and Quantifiers in the Algebra of Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe German mathematician Ernst Schröder played a key role in the\ntradition of the algebra of logic. A good example was his challenge to\nPeirce to provide a proof of the distributive law, as one of the key\nequational properties of the algebras with two binary operations.\nPeirce (1885) admitted that he could not provide a proof. Years later\nHuntington (1904: 300–301) described part of the content of a\nletter he had received from Peirce in December 1903 that claimed to\nprovide the missing proof—evidently Peirce had stumbled across\nthe long lost pages after the death of Schröder in 1902. Peirce\nexplained to Huntington that he had originally assumed Schröder’s\nchallenge was well-founded and that this apparent shortcoming of his\npaper “was to be added to the list of blunders, due to the\ngrippe, with which that paper abounds, …”. Actually\nPeirce’s proof did not correct the error since the distributive law\ndoes not hold in lattices in general; instead his proof brought in the\noperation of complementation—he used the axiom", "\n\n\nif \$a\$ is not contained in the complement of \$b\$ then \$a\$ and\n\$b\$ have a common lower bound.\n", "\nOn the basis of his previous algebraic work, Schröder wrote an\nencyclopedic three volume work at the end of the 19th\ncentury called Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik\n(1890–1905), built on the subsumption framework with the modern\nsemantics of classes as presented by Peirce. This work was the result\nof his research in algebra and revealed different influences.\nSchröder aimed at a general algebraic theory with applications in\nmany mathematical fields, where the algebra of logic was at the core.\nAs Geraldine Brady pointed out, it offers the first exposition of\nabstract lattice theory, the first exposition of Dedekind’s theory of\nchains after Dedekind, the most comprehensive development of the\ncalculus of relations, and a treatment of the foundations of\nmathematics on the basis of the relation calculus (see Brady 2000: 143\nf.)", "\nThe first volume concerned the equational logic of classes, the main\nresult being Boole’s Elimination Theorem of 1854. Three rather\ncomplicated counter-examples to Peirce’s claim of distributivity\nappeared in an appendix to Vol. I, one of which involved nine-hundred\nand ninety identities for quasigroups. On the basis of this volume,\nDedekind (1897) composed an elegant modern abstract presentation of\nlattices (which he called Dualgruppen); in this paper he\npresented a five-element counter-example to Peirce’s claim of the\ndistributive law.", "\nVolume II augments the algebra of logic for classes developed in\nVolume I so that it can handle existential statements. First, using\nmodern semantics, Schröder proved that one cannot use equations\nto express “Some \$X\$ is \$Y\$”. However, he noted that\none can easily express it with a negated equation, namely \$XY \\ne\n0\$. Volume II, a study of the calculus of classes using both\nequations and negated equations, attempted to cover the same topics\ncovered in Vol. I, in particular there was considerable effort devoted\nto finding an Elimination Theorem. After dealing with several special\ncases, Schröder recommended this topic as an important research\narea—the quest for an Elimination Theorem would be known as the\nElimination Problem.", "\nInspired mainly by Peirce’s work, Schröder examined the algebra\nof logic for binary relations in Vol. III of his Vorlesungen\nüber die Algebra der Logik. As Tarski once noted, Peirce’s\nwork was continued and extended in a very thorough and systematic way\nby Schröder. One item of particular fascination for him was this:\ngiven an equation \$E(x, y, z, \\ldots) = 0\$ in this algebra, find the\ngeneral solution for one of the relation symbols, say for \$x\$, in\nterms of the other relation symbols. He managed, given a particular\nsolution \$x = x0\$, to find a remarkable term \$S(t, y, z, \\ldots)\$\nwith the following properties: (1) \$x = S(t, y, z, \\ldots)\$ yields a\nsolution to \$E = 0\$ for any choice of relation \$t\$, and (2) every\nsolution \$x\$ of \$E = 0\$ can be obtained in this manner by choosing\na suitable \$t\$. Peirce was not impressed by Schröder’s\npreoccupation with the problem of solving equations, and pointed out\nthat Schröder’s parametric solution was a bit of a hoax—the\nexpressive power of the algebra of logic for relations was so strong\nthat by evaluating the term \$S(t, y, z, \\ldots)\$ one essentially\ncarried out the steps to check if \$E(t, y, z, \\ldots) = 0\$; if the\nanswer was yes then \$S(t, y, z, \\ldots)\$ returned the value \$t\$,\notherwise it would return the value \$x0\$.", "\nSumming up, Schröder constructed an algebraic version of modern\npredicate logic and also a theory of relations. He applied it to\ndifferent fields (e.g., Cantor’s set theory), and he considered his\nalgebraic notation as a general or universal language\n(pasigraphy, see Peckhaus 2004 and Legris 2012). It is to be\nnoted that Löwenheim in 1940 still thought it was as reasonable\nas set theory. According to him, Schröder’s idea of solving a\nrelational equation was a precursor of Skolem functions, and\nSchröder inspired Löwenheim’s formulation and proof of the\nfamous theorem that every “arithmetical” sentence with an\ninfinite model has a countable model. Schröder’s calculus of\nrelations was the basis for the doctoral dissertation of Norbert\nWiener (1894–1964) in Harvard (Wiener 1913). According to Brady,\nWiener gave the first axiomatic treatment of the calculus of\nrelations, preceding Tarski’s axiomatization by more than twenty years\n(see Brady 2000: 165)." ], "section_title": "7. Schröder’s systematization of the algebra of logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAt the turn of the 19th Century, David Hilbert\n(1862–1943) presented, in his Grundlagen der Geometrie,\nEuclidean geometry as an axiomatic subject that did not depend on\ndiagrams for its proofs (Hilbert 1899). This led to a wave of interest\nin studying axiom systems in mathematics; in particular one wanted to\nknow if the axioms were independent, and which primitives led to the\nmost elegant systems. Edward Vermilye Huntington (1874–1952) was\none of the first to examine this issue for the algebra of logic. He\ngave three axiomatizations of the algebra of logic, showed each set of\naxioms was independent, and that they were equivalent (see Huntington\n1904). In 1933 he returned to this topic with three new sets of\naxioms, one of which contained the following three equations (1933:\n280):", "\nShortly after this, Herbert Robbins (1915–2001) conjectured that\nthe third equation could be replaced by the slightly simpler", "\nNeither Huntington nor Robbins could prove this, and later it\nwithstood the efforts of many others, including even Tarski and his\ntalented school at Berkeley. Building on partial results of Winker,\nthe automated theorem prover EQP, designed by William McCune of the\nArgonne National Laboratory, found a proof of the Robbins Conjecture\nin 1996. This accomplishment was popularized in Kolata 2010.", "\nAccording to Huntington (1933: 278), the term “Boolean\nalgebra” was introduced by Henry M. Sheffer (1882–1964) in\nthe paper where he showed that one could give a five-equation\naxiomatization of Boolean algebra using the single fundamental\noperation of joint exclusion, now known as the Sheffer stroke (see\nSheffer 1913). Whitehead and Russell claimed in the preface to the\nsecond edition of Principia that the Sheffer stroke was the\ngreatest advance in logic since the publication of Principia.\n(Hilbert and Ackermann (1928), by contrast, stated that the Sheffer\nstroke was just a curiosity.) Neither realized that decades earlier\nSchröder had discovered that the dual of the Sheffer stroke was\nalso such an operation—Schröder’s symbol for his operation\nwas that of a double-edged sword.", "\nIn the 1930s Garrett Birkhoff (1911–1996) established the\nfundamental results of equational logic, namely (1) equational classes\nof algebras are precisely the classes closed under homomorphisms,\nsubalgebras and direct products, and (2) equational logic is based on\nfive rules: reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, replacement, and\nsubstitution. In the 1940s, Tarski joined in this development of\nequational logic; the subject progressed rapidly from the 1950s till\nthe present time." ], "section_title": "8. Huntington: Axiomatic Investigations of the Algebra of Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nTraditional logic studied certain simple relationships between\nclasses, namely being a subclass of and having a nonempty\nintersection with. However, once one adopted an axiomatic\napproach, the topic of possible models besides the obvious ones\nsurfaced. Beltrami introduced models of non-Euclidean geometry in the\nlate 1860s. In the 1890s Schröder and Dedekind constructed models\nof the axioms of lattice theory to show that the distributive law did\nnot follow. But when it came to the algebra of classes, Schröder\nconsidered only the standard models, namely each was the collection of\nall subclasses of a given class.", "\nThe study of general models of the axioms of Boolean algebra did not\nget underway until the late 1920s; it was soon brought to a very high\nlevel in the work of Marshall Harvey Stone (1903–1989) (see his\npapers 1936, 1937). He was interested in the structure of rings of\nlinear operators and realized that the central idempotents, that is,\nthe operators \$E\$ that commuted with all other operators in the ring\nunder multiplication (that is, \$EL = LE\$ for all \$L\$ in the ring)\nand which were idempotent under multiplication (\$EE = E\$) played an\nimportant role. In a natural way, the central idempotents formed a\nBoolean algebra.", "\nPursuing this direction of research led Stone to ask about the\nstructure of an arbitrary Boolean algebra, a question that he answered\nby proving that every Boolean algebra is isomorphic to a Boolean\nalgebra of sets. In his work on Boolean algebras he noticed a\ncertain analogy between kernels of homomorphisms and the ideals\nstudied in ring theory—this led him to give the name\n“ideal” to such kernels. Not long after this he discovered\na translation between Boolean algebras and Boolean rings; under this\ntranslation the ideals of a Boolean algebra corresponded precisely to\nthe ideals of the associated Boolean ring. His next major contribution\nwas to establish a correspondence between Boolean algebras and certain\ntopological spaces now called Boolean spaces (or Stone spaces). This\ncorrespondence would later prove to be a valuable tool in the\nconstruction of exotic Boolean algebras. These results of Stone are\nstill a paradigm for developments in the algebra of logic.", "\nInspired by the rather brief treatment of first-order statements about\nrelations in Vol. III of the Algebra der Logik,\nLöwenheim (1915) showed that if such a statement could be\nsatisfied in an infinite domain then it could be satisfied in a\ndenumerable domain. In 1920 Thoralf Skolem (1887–1963)\nsimplified Löwenheim’s proof by introducing Skolem normal forms,\nand in 1928 Skolem replaced his use of normal forms with a simpler\nidea, namely to use what are now called Skolem functions. He used\nthese functions to convert first-order sentences into universal\nsentences, that is to say, into sentences in prenex form with all\nquantifiers being universal (\$\\forall\$)." ], "section_title": "9. Stone: Models for the Algebra of Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSkolem was strongly influenced by Schröder’s Algebra der\nLogik, starting with his PhD Thesis. Later he took a particular\ninterest in the quest for an Elimination Theorem in the calculus of\nclasses. In his 1919 paper he established some results for lattices,\nin particular, he showed that one could decide the validity of\nuniversal Horn sentences (i.e., universal sentences with a matrix that\nis a disjunction of negated and unnegated atoms, with at most one\npositive atom) by a procedure that we now recognize to be a polynomial\ntime algorithm. This algorithm was based on finding a least fixed\npoint of a finite partial lattice under production rules derived from\nuniversal Horn sentences. Although this result, which is equivalent to\nthe uniform word problem for lattices, was in the same paper as\nSkolem’s famous contribution to Löwenheim’s Theorem, it was\nforgotten until a chance rediscovery in the early 1990s. (Whitman\n(1941) gave a different solution to the more limited equational\ndecision problem for lattices; it became widely known as the solution\nto the word problem in lattices.)", "\nSkolem (1920) gave an elegant solution to the Elimination Problem\nposed by Schröder for the calculus of classes by showing that if\none added predicates to express “has at least \$n\$\nelements”, for each \$n = 1, 2, \\ldots\$, then there was a\nsimple (but often lengthy) procedure to convert a first-order formula\nabout classes into a quantifier-free formula. In particular this\nshowed that the first-order theory of the calculus of classes was\ndecidable. This quantifier-elimination result was used by Mostowski\n(1952) to analyze first-order properties of direct powers and direct\nsums of single structures, and then by Feferman and Vaught (1959) to\ndo the same for general direct sums and direct products of\nstructures.", "\nThe elimination of quantifiers became a main method in mathematical\nlogic to prove decidability, and proving decidability was stated as\nthe main problem of mathematical logic in Hilbert and Ackermann\n(1928)—this goal was dropped in subsequent editions because of\nthe famous undecidability result of Church and Turing." ], "section_title": "10. Skolem: Quantifier Elimination and Decidability", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nModel theory can be regarded as the product of Hilbert’s methodology\nof metamathematics and the algebra of logic tradition, represented\nspecifically by the results due to Löwenheim and Skolem. But it\nwas Tarski who gave the discipline its classical foundation. Model\ntheory is the study of the relations between a formal language and its\ninterpretation in “realizations” (that is, a domain for\nthe variables of the language together with an interpretation for its\nprimitive signs). If the interpretation happens to make a sentence of\nthe language state something true, then the interpretation is a\nmodel of the sentence (see the entry on\n model theory).\n Models consist basically of algebraic structures, and model theory\nbecame an autonomous mathematical discipline with its roots not only\nin the algebra of logic but in abstract algebra (see Sinaceur\n1999).", "\nApart from model theory, Tarski revived the algebra of relations in\nhis 1941 paper “On the Calculus of Relations”. First he\noutlined a formal logic based on allowing quantification over both\nelements and relations, and then he turned to a more detailed study of\nthe quantifier-free formulas of this system that involved only\nrelation variables. After presenting a list of axioms that obviously\nheld in the algebra of relations as presented in Schröder’s third\nvolume he proved that these axioms allowed one to reduce\nquantifier-free relation formulas to equations. Thus his calculus of\nrelations became the study of a certain equational theory which he\nnoted had the same relation to the study of all binary relations on\nsets as the equational theory of Boolean algebra had to the study of\nall subsets of sets. This led to questions paralleling those already\nposed and resolved for Boolean algebras, for example, was every model\nof his axioms for relation algebras isomorphic to an algebra of\nrelations on a set? One question had been answered by Arwin Korselt\n(1864–1947), namely there were first-order sentences in the\ntheory of binary relations that were not equivalent to an equation in\nthe calculus of relations—thus the calculus of relations\ndefinitely had a weaker expressive power than the first-order theory\nof relations. Actually the expressive power of relation algebra is\nexactly equivalent to first-order logic with just three variables.\nHowever, if in relation algebras (the calculus of relations) one wants\nto formalize a set theory which has something such as the pair axiom,\nthen one can reduce many variables to three variables, and so it is\npossible to express any first-order statement of such a theory by an\nequation. Monk proved that, unlike the calculus of classes, there is\nno finite equational basis for the calculus of binary relations (see\nMonk 1964). Tarski and Givant (1987) showed that the equational logic\nof relation algebras is so expressive that one can carry out\nfirst-order set theory in it.", "\nFurthermore, cylindric algebras, essentially Boolean algebras equipped\nwith unary cylindric operations \$C_x\$ which are intended to capture\nthe existential quantifiers (\$\\exists x\$), were introduced in the\nyears 1948–1952 by Tarski, working with his students Louise Chin\nand Frederick Thompson (see Henkin & Tarski 1961), to create an\nalgebra of logic that captured the expressive power of the first-order\ntheory of binary relations. Polyadic algebra is another approach to an\nalgebra of logic for first-order logic—it was created by Halmos\n(1956c). The focus of work in these systems was again to see to what\nextent one could parallel the famous results of Stone for Boolean\nalgebra from the 1930s." ], "section_title": "11. Tarski and the Revival of Algebraic Logic", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Boole, G., 1847, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, Being an\nEssay Towards a Calculus of Deductive Reasoning, Cambridge:\nMacmillan, Barclay, & Macmillan; reprinted Oxford: Basil\nBlackwell, 1951.", "–––, 1854, An Investigation of The Laws of\nThought on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and\nProbabilities, London: Macmillan; reprint by Dover 1958.", "–––, 1997. Selected Manuscripts on Logic and\nits Philosophy, Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Gérard Bornet\n(eds.), Basel, Boston, Berlin, Birkhäuser: Springer.", "Couturat, Louis, 1905, L’Algèbre de la Logique,\nParis: Gauthier-Villars; 2nd edition, Paris: Blanchard\n1980.", "Dedekind, R., 1897, “Über Zerlegungen von Zahlen durch\nihre grössten gemeinsamen Teiler”, reprinted in\nGesammelte mathematische Werke (1930–1932), 2:\n103–147.", "–––, 1930–1932, Gesammelte\nmathematische Werke, Robert Fricke, Emmy Noether, Öystein\nOre (eds.), Braunschweig: Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn.", "De Morgan, A., 1847, Formal Logic: or, the Calculus of\nInference, Necessary and Probable, London: Taylor and Walton;\nreprinted London: The Open Court Company 1926.", "–––, 1966, On the Syllogism and Other\nLogical Writings, a posthumous collection of De Morgan’s papers\non logic, edited by Peter Heath, New Haven: Yale University\nPress.", "Feferman, S. and R.L. Vaught, 1959, “The first order\nproperties of products of algebraic systems”, Fundamenta\nMathematica, 47: 57–103.", "Frege, F., 1879, Begriffsschrift: eine der arithmetischen\nnachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle a. S.:\nLouis Nebert.", "–––, 1884, Die Grundlagen der\nArithmetik:eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über den\nBegriff der Zahl, Breslau: W. Koebner.", "–––, 1893/1903, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik,\nbegriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, 2 vols, Jena: Verlag Hermann\nPohle.", "Halmos, P.R., 1956a, “Algebraic logic. I. Monadic Boolean\nalgebras”, Compositio Mathematica, 12:\n217–249.", "–––, 1956b, “The basic concepts of\nalgebraic logic”, American Mathematical Monthly, 63:\n363–387.", "–––, 1956c, “Algebraic logic. II.\nHomogeneous locally finite polyadic Boolean algebras of infinite\ndegree”, Fundamenta Mathematica, 43:\n255–325.", "–––, 1956d, “Algebraic logic. 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M.: Harri\nDeutsch, pp. 255–269.", "Mancosu, Paolo, Richard Zach, and Calixto Badesa, 2009, “The\nDevelopment of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski:\n1900–1935”, in Haaparanta 2009: 318–471", "Peckhaus, Volker, 1997, Logik, Mathesis universalis und\nallgemeine Wissenschaft, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.", "–––, 2004, “Schröder’s Logic”,\nin Gabbay & Woods 2004: pp. 557–609.", "–––, 2009, “The Mathematical Origins of\nNineteenth-Century Algebra of Logic”, in Haaparanta 2009:\n159–195.", "Sánchez Valencia, Victor, 2004, “The Algebra of\nLogic”, in Gabbay & Woods 2004: pp. 389–544.", "Sinaceur, Hourya, 1999, Corps et Modèles. Essai sur\nl’histoire de l’algèbre réelle, 2nd ed.,\nParis: Vrin.", "Styazhkin, N. I., 1969, History of Mathematical Logic from\nLeibniz to Peano, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.", "Van Heijenoort, Jean, 1967, “Logic as Calculus and Logic as\nLanguage”, Synthese, 17: 324–330" ]	[ { "href": "../algebra/", "text": "algebra" }, { "href": "../boole/", "text": "Boole, George" }, { "href": "../leibniz-logic-influence/", "text": "Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: influence on 19th century logic" }, { "href": "../model-theory/", "text": "model theory" }, { "href": "../modeltheory-fo/", "text": "model theory: first-order" } ]
alienation	Alienation	First published Thu Aug 30, 2018; substantive revision Thu Oct 6, 2022	[ "\nThe concept of alienation identifies a distinct kind of psychological\nor social ill; namely, one involving a problematic separation between\na self and other that belong together. So understood,\nalienation appears to play a largely diagnostic or critical role,\nsometimes said to suggest that something is awry with both\nliberal societies and liberal political philosophy. Theories of\nalienation typically pick out a subset of these problematic\nseparations as being of particular importance, and then offer\nexplanatory accounts of the extent of, and prognosis for, alienation,\nso understood. Discussions of alienation are especially, but not\nuniquely, associated with Hegelian and Marxist intellectual\ntraditions.", "\nThe present entry clarifies the basic idea of alienation. It\ndistinguishes alienation from some adjacent concepts; in particular,\nfrom ‘fetishism’ and ‘objectification’. And it\nelucidates some conceptual and normative complexities, including: the\ndistinction between subjective and objective alienation; the need for\na criterion by which candidate separations can be identified as\nproblematic; and (some aspects of) the relation between alienation and\nethical value. The empirical difficulties often generated by\nostensibly philosophical accounts of alienation are acknowledged, but\nnot resolved." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Basic Idea", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Introduced", "1.2 Elaborated", "1.3 Modesty Of" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Adjacent Concepts", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Introduced", "2.2 Fetishism", "2.3 Objectification" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Subjective and Objective Alienation", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 The Distinction Between Subjective and Objective Alienation", "3.2 Diagnostic Schema", "3.3 Applications" ] }, { "content_title": "4. What Makes a Separation Problematic?", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Criteria of ‘Impropriety’", "4.2 Essential Human Nature", "4.3 An Alternative Criterion" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Alienation and Value", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Negative Element", "5.2 Positive Element", "5.3 Morality as Alienating" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Some (Unresolved) Empirical Issues", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Content", "6.2 Extent", "6.3 Prognosis" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. The Basic Idea", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe term ‘alienation’ is usually thought to have comparatively modern\nEuropean origins. In English, the term had emerged by the early\nfifteenth century, already possessing an interesting cluster of\nassociations. ‘Alienation’, and its cognates, could\nvariously refer: to an individual’s estrangement from God (it\nappears thus in the Wycliffe Bible); to legal transfers of ownership\nrights (initially, especially in land); and to mental derangement (a\nhistorical connection that survived into the nineteenth-century usage\nof the term ‘alienist’ for a psychiatric doctor). It is\nsometimes said that ‘alienation’ entered the German\nlanguage via English legal usage, although G.W.F. Hegel\n(1770–1831), for one, typically uses\n‘Entäusserung’, and not\n‘Entfremdung’ to refer to property transfer\n(Hegel 1991a: §65). (It is only the latter term which has an\netymological link to ‘fremd’ or\n‘alien’.) Moreover, perhaps the first philosophical\ndiscussion of alienation, at least of any sophistication, was in\nFrench. In the Second Discourse, Jean-Jacques Rousseau\n(1712–1778) diagnoses ‘inflamed’ forms of amour\npropre—a love of self (which is sometimes rendered as\n‘pride’ or ‘vanity’ in older English\ntranslations)—whose toxicity is amplified by certain social and\nhistorical developments, as manifesting themselves in alienated forms\nof self; that is, in the actions and lives of individuals who have\nsomehow become divided from their own nature (see Rousseau 1997, and\nForst 2017, 526–30).", "\nThere are limits to what can usefully be said about the concept of\nalienation in general; that is, what can usefully be said without\ngetting involved in the complexities of particular accounts, advanced\nby particular authors, or associated with particular intellectual\ntraditions. However, there is a basic idea here which seems to capture\nmany of those authors and traditions, and which is not unduly\nelusive or difficult to understand.", "\nThis basic idea of alienation picks out a range of social and\npsychological ills involving a self and other. More precisely, it\nunderstands alienation as consisting in the problematic separation of\na subject and object that belong together." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Introduced" }, { "content": [ "\nThat formulation of the basic idea is perhaps too abbreviated to be\neasily intelligible, and certainly benefits from a little elaboration.\nThe characterisation of alienation offered here—as a social or\npsychological ill involving the problematic separation of a subject\nand object that belong together—involves three constituent\nelements: a subject, an object, and the relation between them. It will\nbe helpful to say a little more about each of these in turn.", "\nFirst, the subject here is a self; typically, but not\nnecessarily, a person, an individual agent. ‘Not\nnecessarily’ because the subject could also be, for instance, a\ngroup of some kind. There seems to be no good reason to deny that a\ncollective as well as an individual agent might be alienated from some\nobject. For instance, as well as Anna being alienated from her\ngovernment, it might be that women or citizens find themselves\nalienated from their government.", "\nSecond, the relevant object can take a variety of forms.\nThese include: entities which are not a subject; another subject or\nsubjects; and oneself. The object here might be an entity which is not\na subject; for example, Beatrice might be alienated from the natural\nworld, from a social practice, from an institution, or from a social\nnorm, where none of those entities are understood as agents of any\nkind. In addition, the object might be an entity which is another\nsubject, another person or group; for example, Beatrice might be\nalienated from her childhood friend Cecile, and Beatrice might also be\nalienated from her own family. Lastly, the object here might be the\noriginal subject; that is, there might be reflexive variants of the\nrelation, for example, in which Beatrice is alienated from\nherself.", "\nThird, the relation is one of problematic separation between\na subject and object that belong together. All of these elements are required: there has to be a separation; the separation has to be problematic; and it has to obtain\nbetween a subject and object that properly belong together.", "\nThe idea of separation is important. Not all problematic\nrelations between relevant entities involve alienation. For instance,\nbeing overly integrated into some other object might also be a\nproblematic or dysfunctional relation but it is not what is typically\nthought of as alienation. Imagine, for instance, that Cecile has no\nlife, no identity, finds no meaning, outside of her family membership.\nIt is tempting, at least for modern individuals, to say that she has\nan ‘unhealthy’ relationship with her family, but it would\nseem odd to say that she was alienated from it. Alienation typically\ninvolves a separation from something.", "\nThese problematic separations can be indicated by a wide\nvariety of words and phrases. No particular vocabulary seems to be\nrequired by the basic idea. The linguistic variety here might include\nwords suggesting: breaks (‘splits’,\n‘ruptures’, ‘bifurcations’,\n‘divisions’, and so on); isolation\n(‘indifference’, ‘meaninglessness’,\n‘powerlessness’, ‘disconnection’, and so on);\nand hostility (‘conflicts’, ‘antagonism’,\n‘domination’, and so on). All these, and more, might be\nways of indicating problematic separations of the relevant kind. Of\ncourse, particular authors may use language more systematically, but\nthere seems little reason to insist that a specific vocabulary is\nrequired by the basic idea.", "\nThe idea of the relevant separation having to be, in some way,\nproblematic, is also important. Separations between a subject\nand object do not necessarily appear problematic. Relations of\nindifference, for example, might or might not be problematic. For an\nunproblematic instance, consider Daniela, a distinguished Spanish\narchitect, who—when it is brought to her\nattention—discovers that she is unconcerned with, and apathetic\ntowards, the complex constitutional relationship between the Pacific\nislands of Niue and New Zealand. Her indifference in this case looks\nunproblematic. Less obviously perhaps, the same might be true of\nrelations of hostility; that is, that hostility also might or might\nnot be problematic. For an unproblematic instance, consider Enid and\nFrancesca, two highly competitive middleweight boxers competing in the\nOlympics for the first time. It may well be that a certain amount of\nantagonism and rancour between these two individual sportswomen is\nentirely appropriate; after all, if Enid identifies too closely with\nFrancesca—imagine her experiencing every blow to\nFrancesca’s desires and interests as a defeat for her\nown—she is not only unlikely to make it to the podium, but is\nalso, in some way, failing qua boxer.", "\nThe suggestion here is that to be appropriately\nproblematic—appropriate, that is, to constitute examples of\nalienation—the separations have to obtain between a subject and\nobject that properly belong together (Wood 2004: 3). More\nprecisely, that the candidate separations have to frustrate or\nconflict with the proper harmony or connectedness between that subject\nand object. Imagine, for instance, that both the indifference of\nDaniela, and the hostility of Enid, now also take appropriately\nproblematic forms. Perhaps we discover that Daniela has become\nincreasingly indifferent to her lifelong vocation, that she no longer\ncares about the design and construction issues over which she had\npreviously always enthused and obsessed; whilst Enid has started to develop feelings of loathing and suspicion for her domestic partner who she had previously trusted and loved. What makes these examples of separation (indifference and hostility) appear appropriately problematic is that they violate some\nbaseline condition of harmony or connectedness between the relevant\nentities. (A baseline condition that does not seem to obtain in the\nearlier examples of unproblematic separation.) Alienation\nobtains when a separation between a subject and object that properly\nbelong together, frustrates or conflicts with that baseline\nconnectedness or harmony. To say that they properly belong together is\nto suggest that the harmonious or connected relation between the\nsubject and object is rational, natural, or good. And, in turn, that\nthe separations frustrating or conflicting with that baseline\ncondition, are correspondingly irrational, unnatural, or bad. (For\nsome resistance to this characterisation, see Gilabert 2020,\n55–56.) Of course, that is not yet to identify what might establish\nthis baseline harmony as, say, rational, natural, or good. Nor is it\nto claim that the disruption of the baseline harmony is\nall-things-considered bad, that alienation could never be a justified\nor positive step. (These issues are discussed further in sections 4.1\nand 5.2, respectively.)" ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Elaborated" }, { "content": [ "\nThis basic idea of alienation appears to give us a diverse but\ndistinct set of social and psychological phenomena; picking out a\nclass of entities which might have little in common other than this\nproblematic separation of subject and object. The problematic\nseparations here are between the self (including individual and\ncollective agents) and other (including other selves, one’s own\nself, and entities which are not subjects). So understood, the basic\nidea of alienation seems to play largely a diagnostic or critical\nrole; that is, the problematic separations might indicate that\nsomething is awry with the self or social world, but do not, in\nthemselves, offer an explanation of, or suggest a solution to, those\nills. ", "\nOn this account, the basic idea of alienation looks conceptually\nrather modest. In particular, this idea is not necessarily committed\nto certain stronger claims that might sometimes be found in the\nliterature. That all these social and psychological ills are\ncharacterised by a problematic separation, for example, does not make\nalienation a natural kind, anymore than—to borrow an example\nassociated with John Stuart Mill—the class of white objects is a\nnatural kind (Wood 2004: 4). Nor, for instance, need there be any\nsuggestion that the various forms of alienation identified by this\naccount are necessarily related to each other; that, for example, they\nare all explained by the same underlying factor. Of course, particular\ntheorists may have constructed—more or less\nplausible—accounts of alienation that do advance those, or\nsimilar, stronger claims. For instance, the young Karl Marx\n(1818–1883) is often understood to have suggested that one of\nthe systematic forms of alienation somehow explains all the other ones\n(Wood 2004: 4). The claim here is simply that these, and other,\nstronger claims are not required by the basic idea.", "\nThat said, the basic idea of alienation appears to require only a few\nadditions in order to extend its critical reach significantly.\nConsider two further suggestions often made in this context: that\nalienation picks out an array of non-trivial social and psychological\nills that are prevalent in modern liberal societies; and that the idea\nof ‘alienation’ is distinct from that of\n‘injustice’ on which much modern liberal political\nphilosophy is focused. These familiar claims are not extravagant, but,\nso understood, the concept of alienation would appear to have some\ncritical purchase on both contemporary liberal societies (for\ncontaining alienation) and contemporary liberal political philosophy\n(for neglecting alienation). The implied critical\nsuggestion—that the concept of alienation reveals that something\nsignificant is awry with both liberal society and liberal\nunderstandings—looks far from trivial. (Of course, establishing\nthat those purported failings reveal fundamental flaws in either\nliberal society, or liberal political philosophy, is rather harder to\naccomplish.)", "\nParticular theories of alienation typically restrict the range of\nproblematic separations that they are interested in, and introduce\nmore explanatory accounts of the extent and prognosis of alienation so\ncharacterised. They might, for instance, focus on social rather than\npsychological ills, and maintain that these are caused by certain\nstructural features—particular aspects of its economic\narrangements, for instance—of the relevant society. Such\nexplanatory claims are of considerable interest. After all,\nunderstanding the cause of a problem looks like a helpful step towards\nworking out whether, and how, it might be alleviated or overcome.\nHowever, these explanatory claims are not readily open to general\ndiscussion, given the significant disagreements between particular\nthinkers and traditions that exist in this context. Note also that\nintroducing these various restrictions of scope, and various competing\nexplanatory claims, increases the complexity of the relevant account.\nHowever, these complexities alone scarcely explain the—somewhat\nundeserved—reputation that the concept of alienation has for\nbeing unduly difficult or elusive. It might be that their impact is\ncompounded—at least in the intellectual traditions with which\nthe concept of alienation is most often associated (Hegelianism and\nMarxism)—by language and argumentative structures that are\nunfamiliar to some modern readers." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Modesty Of" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Adjacent Concepts", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIt may be helpful to say something about the relation of alienation to\nwhat can be called ‘adjacent’ concepts. The two examples\ndiscussed here are both drawn from Hegelian and Marxist traditions;\nnamely, the concepts of fetishism and objectification. Disambiguating\nthe relationship between these various concepts can help clarify the\ngeneral shape of alienation. However, they are also discussed because\nparticular accounts of alienation, both within and beyond those two\ntraditions, are sometimes said—more or less plausibly—to\nconflate alienation either with fetishism, or with objectification. Even if some particular treatments of alienation\ndo equate the relevant concepts with each other, alienation is better\nunderstood as synonymous with neither fetishism nor\nobjectification. Rather, fetishism is only one form that alienation can take, and not all objectification involves alienation." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Introduced" }, { "content": [ "\nThe first of these adjacent ideas is fetishism.\n‘Fetishism’ refers here to the idea of human creations\nwhich have somehow escaped (we might say that they have\ninappropriately separated out from) human control, achieved the\nappearance of independence, and come to enslave or dominate their\ncreators.", "\nWithin Hegelian and Marxist traditions, a surprisingly wide range of\nsocial phenomena—including religion, the state, and private\nproperty—have been characterised as having the character of a\nfetish. Indeed, Marx sometimes treats the phenomenon of fetishism as a\ndistinguishing feature of modernity; where previous historical epochs\nwere characterised by the rule of persons over persons, capitalist\nsociety is characterised by the rule of things over persons.\n‘Capital’, we might say, has come to replace the feudal\nlord. Consider, for instance, the frequency with which ‘market\nforces’ are understood and represented within modern culture as\nsomething outside of human control, as akin to natural forces which\ndecide our fate. In a famous image—from the Communist\nManifesto—Marx portrays modern bourgeois society as\n‘like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers\nof the nether world whom he has called up by his spells’ (Marx\nand Engels 1976: 489).", "\nIn order to elaborate this idea of fetishism, consider the example of\nChristian religious consciousness, as broadly understood in the\nwritings of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872). (Feuerbach was a\ncontemporary of, and important influence on, the young Marx, amongst\nothers.) The famous, and disarmingly simple, conclusion of\nFeuerbach’s philosophical analysis of religious consciousness is\nthat, in Christianity, individuals are worshipping the predicates of\nhuman nature, freed of their individual limitations and projected onto\nan ideal entity. For Feuerbach, however, this is no purely\nintellectual error, but is rather ripe with social, political, and\npsychological consequences, as this ‘deity’ now comes to\nenslave and dominate us. Not least, the Christian God demands real\nworld sacrifices from individuals, typically in the form of a denial\nor repression of their essential human needs. For instance, the\nChristian idea of marriage is portrayed as operating in a way that\nrepresses and punishes, rather than hallows and satisfies, the flesh\nof humankind (Leopold 2007: 207–210).", "\nReligious consciousness, on this Feuerbachian account, looks to be a\ncase where alienation takes the form of fetishism. That is, there is\nboth a problematic separation here between subject and object\n(individuals and their own human nature), and it takes the form of a\nhuman creation (the idea of the species embodied in God) escaping our\ncontrol, achieving the appearance of independence, and coming to\nenslave and dominate us. The same looks to be true, on\nMarx’s account, of production in contemporary capitalist\nsocieties. Capital takes on the appearance of an independent social\npower which determines what is produced, how it is produced, and the\neconomic (and other) relations between producers. Marx himself was\nstruck by the parallel, and in the first volume of Capital,\noffers the following analogy: ‘As, in religion, man is governed\nby the products of his own brain, so in capitalistic production, he is\ngoverned by the products of his own hand’ (Marx 1996: 616).\nHowever, rather than equating alienation and fetishism, fetishism is\nbetter thought of as a particular form that alienation might take. (To\nbe clear, there looks to be no reason to think that Marx would, or\nshould, disagree with this claim.)", "\nNote, in particular, that although Marx’s discussions of\nalienation often utilise the language of fetishism, not all of them\ntake that form. Consider, for instance, the problematic separation\nsometimes said to exist between modern individuals and the natural\nworld, as the former think of themselves and behave as if they were\nisolated, or cut off, or estranged, from the latter. The idea here is\nreflected in the less ‘Promethean’ moments of Marx’s\nwork, for example, in the suggestion that the appropriate relation\nbetween humankind and nature would involve not our instrumental\ndomination of ‘the other’, but rather a sympathetic\nappreciation of our complex interdependence with the natural world of\nwhich we are, in reality, a part. Those moments are perhaps most\nevident in Marx’s discussion of contemporary\n‘ecological’ threats—including deforestation,\npollution, and population growth—and typically involve his\n‘metabolic’ account of the appropriate relation between\nhumankind and nature (Foster 1999). The inappropriate modern relation\nbetween humankind and nature here looks like an example of\nalienation—there is a problematic separation of self and\nother—but certain central characteristics of fetishism would\nappear to be absent. Most obviously, the natural world is not a human\ncreation which has escaped our control; not least, because\nnature is not a human creation. Moreover, the impact on humankind\nof this particular separation does not comfortably suit the language\nof enslavement and domination. Indeed, if anything, our inappropriate\nseparation from the natural world seems to find expression in our own\nruthlessly instrumental treatment of nature, rather than in\nnature’s tyranny over us." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Fetishism" }, { "content": [ "\nThe second of these adjacent ideas is objectification. The\nconcept in question is not the idea of objectification—familiar\nfrom certain feminist and Kantian traditions—which concerns the\nmoral impropriety of systematically treating a human being as if she\nwere an object, thing, or commodity (Nussbaum 1995). That is a\ndistinct and important phenomenon, but it is not the one that is\nrelevant here. In the present context, objectification refers rather\nto the role of productive activity in mediating the evolving\nrelationship between humankind and the natural world. This association\nis most familiar from certain Hegelian and Marxist traditions, with\nMarx often using the German term\n‘Vergegenständlichung’ to capture what is\nhere called ‘objectification’ (e.g., 1975: 272).", "\nHumankind is seen as being part of, and dependent upon, the natural\nworld. However, nature is initially somewhat stingy with its\nblessings; as a result, human beings confront the natural world from\nan original position of scarcity, struggling through productive\nactivity of various kinds to change the material form of\nnature—typically through making things—in ways that make\nit better reflect and satisfy their own needs and interests. In that\nevolving process, both the natural world and humankind come to be\ntransformed. Through this collective shaping of their material\nsurroundings, and their increasing productivity, the natural world is\nmade to be, and seem, less ‘other’, and human beings\nthereby come to objectify themselves, to express their essential\npowers in concrete form. These world transforming productive\nactivities, we might say, embody the progressive self-realisation of\nhumankind.", "\nOn this account, all productive activity would seem to involve\nobjectification. However, Marx insists that not all productive\nactivity involves alienation. Moreover, some other forms of\nalienation—unrelated to productive activity—have no\nobvious connection with objectification.", "\nMarx maintains that productive activity might or might not take an\nalienated form. For instance, productive activity in capitalist\nsocieties is typically said to take an alienated form; whereas\nproductive activity in communist societies is typically predicted to\ntake an unalienated or meaningful form. Schematically, we might\nportray alienated labour (characteristic of capitalist\nsociety) as: being forced; not involving self-realisation (not\ndeveloping and deploying essential human powers); not intended to\nsatisfy the needs of others; and not appropriately appreciated by\nthose others. And, schematically, we might portray unalienated or\nmeaningful work (characteristic of communist society) as:\nbeing freely chosen; involving self-realisation (the development and\ndeployment of essential human powers); being intended to satisfy the\nneeds of others; and being appropriately appreciated by those\nothers (Kandiyali 2020). Productive activity mediates the\nrelationship between humankind and the natural world in both of these\nsocieties, but alienation is found only in the former (capitalist)\ncase.", "\nFor an example of a view which might be said to equate objectification\nwith alienation, consider what is sometimes called the\n‘Christian’ view of work. On this account, work is seen as\na necessary evil, an unpleasant activity unfortunately required for\nour survival. It owes its name to Christianity’s embrace of the\nclaim that alienated work is part of the human condition: at least\nsince the Fall, human beings are required to work by the sweat of\ntheir brows (see Genesis 31:9). On Marx’s account, or something\nlike it, one might characterise this Christian view as mistakenly\nequating objectification and alienation, confusing productive activity\nas such with its stunted and inhuman forms. Indeed, one might go\nfurther and suggest that this kind of confusion reflects the alienated\nsocial condition of humankind, embodying an emblematic failure to\nunderstand that material production is a central realm in which human\nbeings can express, in free and creative ways, the kind of creatures\nthat they are.", "\nIn addition, according to the basic idea defended here, equating\nalienation and objectification fails to appreciate that certain forms\nof alienation might have nothing at all to do with productive\nactivity. Their mutual hostility and undisguised contempt confirm that\nGillian and her sister Hanna are alienated from each other, but there\nseems little reason to assume that their estrangement is necessarily\nrelated to the world of work or their respective place in it. The\nsisters’ engagement in productive activity and the forms that it\ntakes, might well have nothing to do with the problematic separation\nhere. Imagine that the latter arose from a combination of sibling\nrivalry, stubbornness, and a chance misunderstanding at a time of\nfamily crisis involving the death of a parent. This possibility gives\nus another reason not to equate alienation and objectification.", "\nIn short, neither fetishism, nor objectification, are best construed as identical with alienation. Rather than being synonymous, these concepts only partially overlap. Fetishism can be understood as picking out only a subset—on some accounts perhaps\na large subset—of cases of alienation. And there are forms of\nobjectification which do not involve alienation (the meaningful work\nin communist societies, for instance), as well as forms of\nalienation—outside of productive activity—with no obvious\nconnection to objectification." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Objectification" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Subjective and Objective Alienation", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe basic idea of alienation may not be unduly elusive or\ndifficult to understand. However, it obviously does not follow\nthat there are no complexities or slippery issues here, perhaps\nespecially once we venture further into the relevant literature.", "\nThree interesting complexities are introduced here. They concern,\nrespectively: the distinction between subjective and objective\nalienation; the need for a criterion identifying candidate separations\nas problematic; and the relation between alienation and\nvalue.", "\nThis section provides an introduction to, and some initial reflections\non, the first of these interesting complexities; namely, the division\nof alienation into subjective and objective varieties (Hardimon 1994:\n119–122). Not all theorists or traditions operate (either,\nexplicitly or implicitly) with this distinction, but it can be a\nconsiderable help in understanding the diagnosis offered by particular\nauthors and in handling particular cases.", "\nFirst, alienation is sometimes characterised in terms of how subjects\nfeel, or think about, or otherwise experience, the problematic\nseparation here. This can be called subjective alienation.\nFor instance, Ingrid might be said to be alienated because she feels\nestranged from the world, because she experiences her life as lacking\nmeaning, because she does not feel ‘at home [zu\nHause]’ in the world—to adopt the evocative shorthand\nsometimes used by Hegel—and so on (e.g. 1991a: §4A,\n§187A, and §258A).", "\nSecond, alienation is sometimes characterised in terms which make no\nreference to the feelings, thoughts, or experience of subjects. This\ncan be called objective alienation. For instance, Julieta\nmight be said to be alienated because some separation prevents her\nfrom developing and deploying her essential human characteristics,\nprevents her from engaging in self-realising activities, and so on.\nSuch claims are controversial in a variety of ways, but they assume\nalienation is about the frustration of that potential, and they make\nno reference to whether Julieta herself experiences that lack as a\nloss. Maybe Julieta genuinely enjoys her self-realisation-lacking\nlife, and even consciously rejects the goal of self-realisation as\ninvolving an overly demanding and unattractive ideal.", "\nSubjective alienation is sometimes disparaged – treated, for example,\nas concerning ‘merely’ how an individual\n‘feels’ about ‘real’ alienation. However, subjective alienation is better understood as a full-blown, meaningful, variety of alienation, albeit\nnot the only one. If you genuinely feel alienated, then you really are\n(subjectively) alienated." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 The Distinction Between Subject and Objective Alienation" }, { "content": [ "\nThis distinction between subjective and objective alienation can give\nus a useful diagnostic schema. Let us assume—no doubt\ncontroversially—that all combinations of these two forms of\nalienation are possible. That gives us four social outcomes to\ndiscuss:", "\n\n\n\n\n Social\n\nSituation:\n Subjective\n\nAlienation:\n Objective\n\nAlienation: \n\n (i)\n ◼\n ◼ \n\n (ii)\n ◻\n ◼ \n\n (iii)\n ◼\n ◻ \n\n (iv)\n ◻\n ◻ \n\n\n\nWhere: ◻ = Absent and ◼ = Present\n" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Diagnostic Schema" }, { "content": [ "\nThese various alternative combinations—numbered (i) to (iv)\nabove—correspond, very roughly, to the ways in which particular\nauthors have characterised particular kinds of social arrangement or\ntypes of society. Consider, for example, the different views of modern\nclass-divided society taken by Hegel and Marx.", "\nMarx can be characterised as diagnosing contemporary capitalist\nsociety as corresponding to situation (i); that is, as being a social\nworld which contains both objective and subjective alienation. On what\nwe might call his standard view, Marx allows that objective and\nsubjective alienation are conceptually distinct, but assumes that in\ncapitalist societies they are typically found together sociologically\n(perhaps with the subjective forms tending to track the objective\nones). However, there are passages where he deviates from that\nstandard view, and—without abandoning the thought that objective\nalienation is, in some sense, more fundamental—appears to allow\nthat, on occasion, subjective and objective alienation can also come\napart sociologically. At least, that is one way of reading a\nwell-known passage in The Holy Family which suggests that\ncapitalists might be objectively but not subjectively alienated. In\nthese remarks, Marx recognises that capitalists do not get to engage\nin self-realising activities of the right kind (hence their objective\nalienation), but observes that—unlike the proletariat—the\ncapitalists are content in their estrangement; not least,\nthey feel ‘at ease’ in it, and they feel\n‘strengthened’ by it (Marx and Engels 1975: 36).", "\nIn contrast, Hegel maintains that the modern social world approximates\nto something more like situation (iii); that is, as being a social\nworld not containing objective alienation, but still containing\nsubjective alienation. That is, for Hegel, the social and political\nstructures of the modern social world do constitute a home, because\nthey enable individuals to realise themselves, variously as family\nmembers, economic agents, and citizens. However, those same\nindividuals fail to understand or appreciate that this is the case,\nand rather feel estranged from, and perhaps even consciously reject,\nthe institutions of the modern social world. The resulting situation\nhas been characterised as one of ‘pure subjective\nalienation’ (Hardimon 1994: 121).", "\nThat Hegel and Marx diagnose modern society in these different ways\nhelps to explain their differing strategic political commitments. They\nboth aim to bring society closer to situation (iv)—that is, a\nsocial world lacking systematic forms of both objective and subjective\nalienation—but, since they disagree about where we are starting\nfrom, they propose different routes to that shared goal. For Marx,\nsince we start from situation (i), this requires that the existing\nworld be overturned; that is, that both institutions and attitudes\nneed to be revolutionised (overcoming objective and subjective\nalienation). For Hegel, since we start from situation (iii), this\nrequires only attitudinal change: we come to recognise that the\nexisting world is already objectively ‘a home’, and in\nthis way ‘reconcile’ ourselves to that world, overcoming\npure subjective alienation in the process.", "\nSituation (ii) consists of a social world containing objective, but\nnot subjective, alienation – a situation that can be characterised as\none of ‘pure objective alienation’ (Hardimon\n1994: 120). It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to think of\nthis situation as corresponding, very roughly, to one of the Frankfurt\nSchool’s more nightmarish visions of contemporary capitalist\nsociety. (The Frankfurt School is the colloquial label given to\nseveral generations of philosophers and social theorists, in the\nWestern Marxist tradition, associated—more or less\nclosely—with the Institute for Social Research founded in\n1929–1930.) For example, in the pessimistic diagnosis of Herbert\nMarcuse (1898–1979), articulated in One-Dimensional Man\n(1964), individuals in advanced capitalist societies appear happy in\ntheir dysfunctional relationships—they ‘identify\nthemselves’ with their estranged circumstances and gain\n‘satisfaction’ from them (2002: 13). Objective alienation\nstill obtains, but no longer generates social conflict, since the\nlatter is assumed—not implausibly—to require agents who\nfeel, or experience, some form of hostility or rebelliousness towards\nexisting social arrangements.", "\nThat latter assumption raises the wider issue of the relation between\nalienation and, what might be called ‘revolutionary\nmotivation’. Let us assume that radical social change requires,\namongst other conditions, an agent—typically a collective\nagent—with both the strength and the desire to bring that change\nabout. The role of alienation in helping to form that latter\npsychological prerequisite—the desire to bring about change on\nthe part of the putative revolutionary agent—looks complicated.\nFirst, it would seem that the mere fact of objective alienation cannot play\nthe motivating role, since it does not involve or require any feeling,\nor thinking about, or otherwise experiencing, the problematic\nseparation here. It remains possible, of course, that a subject’s knowledge of that alienation\nmight—depending, not least, on one’s views on the\nconnections between reasons and motivations—provide an\nappropriately psychological incentive to revolt. Second, the relation\nbetween subjective alienation and motivation looks more complex than\nit might initially seem. Note, in particular, that some of the\nexperiential dimensions of subjective alienation look less likely than\nothers to generate the psychological prerequisites of action here.\nFeelings of powerlessness and isolation, for instance, might well\ngenerate social withdrawal and individual atomism, rather than radical\nsocial engagement and cooperative endeavour, on the part of the\nrelevant agents. In short, whether subjective alienation is a friend\nor an enemy of revolutionary motivation would seem to depend on the\nprecise form that it takes.", "\nInterestingly, situation (ii)—that is, the case of ‘pure\nobjective alienation’—might also be thought to approximate\nto the social goal of certain thinkers in the tradition of\nexistentialism (the tradition of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980),\nAlbert Camus (1913–1960), and others). Some interpretative\ngenerosity may be needed here, but existentialists appear to think of (something like) objective alienation as a permanent feature of all human societies. Rejecting both substantive accounts of essential human nature, and the ethical embrace of social relations\nthat facilitate the development and deployment of those human\ncharacteristics, they rather maintain that the social world will\nalways remain ‘other’, can never be a ‘home’.\nHowever, although this ‘otherness’ can never be overcome,\nthere do look to be better and worse ways of dealing with it. What is\nessential to each individual is what they make of themselves, the ways\nin which they choose to engage with that other. The preferred outcome\nhere seems to involve individuals embodying a norm of\n‘authenticity’, which amongst other conditions—such\nas choosing, or committing, to their own projects—may require\nthat they have the ‘courage’ to ‘grasp, accept, and,\nperhaps even affirm’ the fact that the social world is not a\nhome for them (Hardimon 1994: 121).", "\nThis also clarifies that situation (iv)—which contains\nsystematic forms of neither objective or subjective\nalienation—is the social goal of some but not all of these\nauthors (of Hegel and Marx, for instance, but not the\nexistentialists). Of course, (iv) might also be a characterisation of\nthe extant social world according to a hypothetical, and\nover-optimistic, apologist for the present." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Applications" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. What Makes a Separation Problematic?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe second of the interesting complexities broached here concerns what\nwe can call the need for a criterion of\n‘impropriety’ – that is, a criterion by which candidate\nseparations might be identified as problematic or not. Recall the\nearlier suggestion that accounts of alienation require some benchmark\ncondition of harmony or connectedness against which separations might\nbe assessed as problematic or not.", "\nHistorically, this role—identifying whether candidate\nseparations are problematic—has often been played by accounts of\nour essential human nature. However, motivated by suspicion of that\nlatter idea, theorists of alienation have sometimes sought\nalternatives to fulfil that role." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Criteria of ‘Impropriety’" }, { "content": [ "\nTo see how the appeal to human nature works, imagine two hypothetical\ntheorists—Katerina and Laura—seeking to assess whether\nalienation exists in a particular society. We can stipulate that the\ninstitutions and culture of this particular society are\nindividualistic—in the sense that they systematically frustrate\ncooperation and sociability—and that the two theorists share\nmany, but not all, of the same views. In particular, assume that our\ntwo theorists agree that: alienation is a coherent and useful\nconcept; the account of alienation given here is, broadly\nspeaking, plausible; the only serious candidate for a problematic\nseparation in this particular society are those arising from its\nindividualism; and our essential human nature provides the\nbenchmark of ‘propriety’ for assessing separations. Simply\nput, separations are problematic if they frustrate, and unproblematic\nif they facilitate, ‘self-realisation’. Self-realisation\nis understood here as a central part of the good life and as\nconsisting in the development and deployment of an individual’s\nessential human characteristics. However, assume also that Katerina\nand Laura disagree about what comprises human nature. In\nparticular, they disagree about whether cooperation and sociability\nare essential human characteristics, with Katerina insisting that they\nare and Laura insisting that they are not. It seems to follow that\nKaterina will conclude, and Laura will deny, that this society is one\ncontaining alienation. For Katerina, the widespread lack of\ncooperation and sociability confirm that the basic social institutions\nhere frustrate our self-realisation. For Laura, the very same\nwidespread lack of cooperation and sociability confirm that the basic\nsocial institutions facilitate, or at least do not\nfrustrate, our self-realisation.", "\nNote that in sub-section 1.2, where the basic idea of alienation was\nelaborated, various relations between subject and object were\ndistinguished, only one of which was characterised as reflexive.\nHowever, in the light of the present discussion, we might now think it\nmore accurate to say that—on this kind of account, which\nuses our essential human nature to identify alienation—only\none of them was directly reflexive, because there is some\nsense in which all of those dimensions of alienation involve a\nseparation from some aspect of our own human nature. After all, this\nis precisely what picks out the relevant separation as problematic.\nFor example, the separation of individuals from each other is, for\nKaterina, indirectly also a separation from human nature, from the\ncooperation and sociability that characterises our essential\nhumanity." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Essential Human Nature" }, { "content": [ "\nAs already noted, this benchmark—by which candidate separations\nare assessed as problematic or not—is often, but not always,\nplayed by accounts of our essential human nature. Given the widespread\ncontemporary suspicion of such accounts—not least, by those\nopposed to what is sometimes called ‘essentialism’ about\nhuman nature—it might be helpful to sketch a recent account\nof alienation which is not dependent on such assumptions (or, at\nleast, consciously strives to avoid them). There is also a potential\nbenefit here for those of us who do not fully share that suspicion,\nnamely, that such an example might provide some sense of the\ndiversity of available theories of alienation.", "\nRahel Jaeggi offers an account of alienation of this kind, and\nsituates it explicitly in the tradition of Critical Theory – the kind\nof emancipatory theory associated with the Frankfurt School. On this\naccount, the idea of alienation has the potential to help us\nunderstand and change the world, but only if it receives some\nsignificant conceptual reconstruction. Alienation is still associated\nwith the frustration of freedom, with disruptions to something like\n‘self-realisation’. However, this account—unlike its\nforerunners and associates—is said not to be fatally compromised\nby a commitment to either ‘strongly objectivistic’\ntheories of the good life or ‘essentialist’ conceptions of\nthe self (Jaeggi 2014: 40).", "\nThe crucial term of art here is ‘appropriation’, which\nJaeggi uses to refer to the capacity for, and process of, relating to\nour own actions and projects in ways which engage ‘something\nlike self-determination and being the author of one’s own\nlife’ (2014: 39). Appropriation is successful—and\nalienation is absent—when ‘one is present in one’s\nactions, steers one’s life instead of being driven by it,\nindependently appropriates social roles and is able to identify with\none’s desires, and is involved in the world’ (Jaeggi 2014:\n155). In contrast, appropriation is unsuccessful—and alienation\nis present—when there is ‘an inadequate power and a lack\nof presence in what one does, a failure to identify with one’s\nown actions and desires and to take part in one’s own\nlife’ (Jaeggi 2014: 155). Alienation is thus identified with\nsystematic disruptions of the process of appropriation – in particular,\nin those systematic disruptions which lead us to fail to experience\nour actions and projects as our own. These disruptions are said\ntypically to take one of four forms: first,\n‘powerlessness’ or the experience of losing control over\none’s own life; second, ‘loss of authenticity’\nespecially when one is unable to identify with one’s own social\nroles; third, ‘internal division’ where one experiences\nsome of one’s own desires and impulses as alien; and fourth,\n‘indifference’ or a detachment from one’s own\nprevious projects and self-understandings.", "\nThis model fits happily enough with our basic idea of alienation as\nconsisting in a problematic separation between self and other\nthat belong together. However, the conditions for identifying\nthe relevant dysfunctional relation here are intended to be less\ndemanding and controversial than those involving claims about our\nessential human nature. There is a kindred notion of freedom as\nself-realisation, but it is said to be the realisation of a thin kind\nof self-determining agency and not the actualisation of some thick\n‘pre-given’ identity of an essentialist sort. A normative\ndimension remains, but it is presented as expansive and broadly\nprocedural. It is expansive in that a wide range of actions and\nprojects might be included within its remit. And it is procedural in\nthat the benchmark for judging the success of these various actions\nand projects is that they were brought about in the right kind of\nself-determination delivering way, and not that their content reflects\na narrow and controversial account of what human beings are ‘in\nessence’.", "\nModern culture is said to recognise and value the kind of freedom at\nthe heart of this picture of appropriation. As a result, this account\nof alienation can be presented as a form of immanent\ncritique – that is, as utilising a standpoint which judges\nindividuals and forms of life according to standards that those\nindividuals have themselves propounded or which those forms of life\npresuppose. At the individual level, this critique might involve\nidentifying potential tensions between the conditions for treating\npeople as responsible agents, and the obstructions to such agency that\ncharacterise alienated selves – for instance, the feelings of\npowerlessness that prevent individuals from directing and embracing\ntheir own lives. And at the social level, this critique might involve\nidentifying potential discrepancies between modern ideals of freedom\nand their actual realisation in the contemporary world – for instance,\nthe existence of social or political roles that an individual can\nnever make their own (Jaeggi 2014: 41–42).", "\nOf course, there remain questions about this account, and three are\nbroached here. First, one might doubt whether the contrast between\nessentialist accounts of human nature, on the one hand, and a thinner\nkind of self-governing agency, on the other, can either be sustained\nor play the role intended. Second, one might wonder about the\nground(s) of normativity; after all, that the kind of subjectivity or\nself-determination which appropriation embodies is recognised and\nvalued in modern culture does not in itself establish its ethical\nworth. (More generally, it can seem easier to dismiss Hegelian\nteleology, or Marxist perfectionism, than it is to find wholly\nsatisfactory replacements for them.) Third, one might be sceptical\nabout the degree of social criticism here, since both the sources of,\nand solutions to, Jaeggi’s paradigmatic examples of\nunsuccessful appropriation (‘powerless’, ‘loss\nof authenticity’, ‘internal division’,\nand ‘indifference’) seem to focus on the\n‘thoughts and dispositions’ of individuals rather than the\nstructures of particular societies (Haverkamp 2016, 69). Of course,\nthere might be plausible responses to these critical worries, some\nof which could draw on Jaeggi’s own subsequent work\n(see espcially 2018). " ], "subsection_title": "4.3 An Alternative Criterion" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "5. Alienation and Value", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe third of these interesting complexities concerns the ethical\ndimension of alienation. The connections between alienation and ethics\nare many and diverse, and there is no attempt here to sketch that\nwider landscape in its entirety. Instead, attention is drawn to two\ntopographical features: the claim that alienation is necessarily a\nnegative, but not a wholly negative, phenomenon, is elaborated and\ndefended; and the suggestion that some forms of moral theory or even\nmorality itself might encourage or embody alienation is briefly\noutlined.", "\nThe claim that alienation is necessarily a negative, but not a wholly\nnegative, phenomenon can be addressed in two parts. Defending the\nfirst part of that claim looks straightforward enough. Alienation, on\nthe present account, consists in the separation of certain entities\n– a subject and some object—that properly belong together.\nAs a result, alienation always involves a loss or lack of something of\nvalue, namely, the ‘proper’—rational, natural, or\ngood—harmony or connectedness between the relevant subject and\nobject. " ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Negative Element" }, { "content": [ "\nIt is the second part of the claim which looks less obvious: that\nalienation is not a wholly negative phenomena, that is, that the loss\nor lack here may not always be the whole story, ethically speaking.\nNote, in particular, that some well-known accounts also locate an\nachievement of something of value in the moment of alienation. The resulting ethical\n‘gains’ and ‘losses’ would then need to be weighed and\njudged overall.", "\nIn order to illustrate this possibility—that alienation can\ninvolve the achievement of something of value—consider the\nnuanced and critical celebration of capitalism found, but not always\nrecognised, in Marx’s writings. One pertinent way of introducing\nthis account involves locating the moment of alienation within a\npattern of development that we might call ‘dialectical’ in\none sense of that slippery term.", "\nThe dialectical pattern here concerns the developing relationship\nbetween a particular subject and object: the individual, on the one\nhand, and their social role and community, on the other. By a\ndialectical progression is meant only a movement from a stage\ncharacterised by a relationship of ‘undifferentiated\nunity’, through a stage characterised by a relationship of\n‘differentiated disunity’, to a stage characterised by a\nrelationship of ‘differentiated unity’.\nThere are no further claims made here about the necessity, the naturalness, or the\nprevalence, of such progressions (Cohen 1974: 237).", "\nThe dialectical progression here involves three historical\nstages:", "\nFirst, past (pre-capitalist) societies are said to\nembody undifferentiated unity. In this stage, individuals\nare buried in their social role and community, scarcely\nconceptualising, still less promoting, their own identity and\ninterests as distinguishable from those of the wider community.", "\nSecond, present (capitalist) societies are said to\nembody differentiated disunity. In this stage, independence\nand separation predominate, and individuals care only for themselves,\nscarcely thinking of the identity and interests of the wider\ncommunity. Indeed, they are typically isolated from, and indifferent\nor even hostile towards, the latter.", "\nThird, future (communist) societies are said to\nembody differentiated unity. In this stage, desirable\nversions of community and individuality flourish together. Indeed, in\ntheir new forms, communal and individual identities and communal and\nindividual interests presuppose and reinforce each other. It is\nsometimes said that the contents of the first two stages (community\nand individuality, respectively) have thereby been\n‘sublated’—that is, elevated, cancelled, and\npreserved—in this third stage. ‘Sublated’ is an\nattempted English translation of the German verb\n‘aufheben’and its cognates, which Hegel\noccasionally uses to suggest this elusive combination of ideas (e.g.\nHegel 1991b: §24A3, §81A1).", "\nIn the present context, the crucial historical stage is the second\none. This is the stage of alienation, the stage of disunity which\nemerges from a simple unity before reconciliation in a higher\n(differentiated) unity (Inwood 1992: 36). This is the stage associated\nwith present (capitalist) societies involving the problematic\nseparation of individuals from their social role and community. In the\nfirst historical stage (of past pre-capitalist societies) there is a\nproblematic relation, but no separation. And in the third historical\nstage (of future communist societies) there is a separation but it is\na healthy rather than problematic one. In this second historical stage\nof alienation, there is a loss, or lack, of something of value;\nroughly speaking, it is the loss or lack of the individuals’\nattachment to their social role and community. (More precisely, we\nmight say that they have lost a sense of, and connection to, the\ncommunity, and that they lack a healthy sense of, and connection to,\nthe community.)", "\nHowever, this disvalue is not the whole of the historical story,\nethically speaking. In comparison with the first stage, the second\nstage also involves a liberation of sorts from the object in which\nsubjects were previously ‘engulfed’ (Cohen 1974: 239). The\n‘of sorts’ is a way of acknowledging that this is a rather\ndistinctive kind of liberation. The individual here is not necessarily\nrid of the constraints of the other (of their social position and\ncommunity), but they do now at least identify and experience them as\nsuch—that is, as constraints on the individual—whereas\npreviously the individual was engulfed by that other and failed to\nthink of themselves as having any identity and interests outside of\ntheir social position. In short, the loss or lack of something of\nvalue is not the only feature of the second stage of alienation. There\nis also an important gain here, namely, the achievement of what we can\ncall ‘individuality’. This significant good was missing in\nthe first pre-capitalist stage, and—freed from its present\ndistorting capitalist form—it will be preserved and developed in\nthe communist future of the third historical stage.", "\nThis claim goes beyond the familiar suggestion that alienation forms a\nnecessary step in certain Hegelian and Marxist developmental\nnarratives. The suggestion here is that internal to the second stage,\nthe stage of alienation, there is both a problematic separation from\ncommunity and a positive liberation from engulfment. Those who see\nonly the negative thread in alienation, and fail to see ‘what is\nbeing achieved within in and distorted by it’, will miss an\nimportant, albeit subtle, thread in Marx’s account of the\nprogressive character of capitalism (Cohen 1974: 253).", "\nThere is a lot going on in this schematic discussion of historical\nstages. The point emphasised here is that theorists—even\ncritics—of alienation need not assume that it is a wholly\nnegative phenomena, ethically speaking. Marx, for example, recognises\nthat the moment of alienation, for all its negative features, also\ninvolves the emergence of a good (individuality), which, in due course\n(and freed from the limitations of its historical origins), will be\ncentral to the human flourishing achieved in communist\nsociety." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Positive Element" }, { "content": [ "\nThis claim—that alienation might not be a wholly negative\nphenomenon—concerns the normative dimensions of alienation.\nHowever, it is sometimes suggested that the concept of alienation\nmight provide a standpoint from which morality itself, or at least\nsome forms of it, can be criticised. This looks to be a very\ndifferent kind of thought.", "\nThe broad suggestion is that morality, or certain conceptions of\nmorality, might embody, or encourage, alienation. More precisely,\nmorality, or certain conceptions of morality, might embody or\nencourage a problematic division of self and a problematic separation\nfrom much that is valuable in our lives. Consider, for example,\naccounts of the moral standpoint as requiring universalisation and\nequal consideration of all persons (Railton 1984: 138). It could seem\nthat adopting such a standpoint requires individuals to disown or\ndownplay the relevance of their more personal or partial (as opposed to impartial) beliefs and\nfeelings. The picture of persons divided into cognitive and affective\nparts, with the partial and personal relegated to the downgraded\nsphere of the latter (perhaps conceptualised as something closer to\nmere sentiment than reason) is a familiar one. In addition to that\nproblematic bifurcation of the self, such accounts might seem to cut\nus off from much that is valuable in our lives. If these impersonal\nkinds of moral consideration are to dominate our practical reasoning,\nthen it seems likely that an individual’s particular\nattachments, loyalties, and commitments will have, at best, a marginal\nplace (Railton 1984: 139). In aspiring to adopt ‘the point of\nview of the universe’—to use the well-known phrase of\nHenry Sidgwick (1838–1900) – there can sometimes seem to\nbe precious little security or space remaining for, say, friendship,\nlove, and family (Sidgwick 1907: 382). So understood, morality, or\ncertain conceptions of morality, are charged with embodying and\nencouraging alienation in the form of both a divided self, and a\nseparation of self and world.", "\nThe weight and scope of these kinds of concerns about alienation\ncan obviously vary; that is, they might be thought to have more or\nless critical purchase on a wider or narrower range of targets. There\nare various possibilities here. These concerns might, for\nexample, be said to apply: first, only to certain kinds of personality\ntypes inclined to adopt particular moral theories, and not to the\ntheories themselves (Piper 1987); second, only to certain ways of\nformulating particular moral theories (the objections here being\novercome by a more adequate formulation of\nthe particular theories in question); third, only to particular\nmoral theories (such as act utilitarianism, certain forms of\nconsequentialism, or all impartial moral theories) to which they\nconstitute foundational objections (but not to morality as such);\nand, fourth, as a foundational objection that counts\nagainst ‘the peculiar institution’ of morality itself\n(Williams 1985: 174). Given both that variety and the subject matter\nof this entry, it may not be helpful to generalise much more here.\nHowever, the point is hopefully made that the ethical dimensions of\nthe present topic extend beyond the normative assessment of the\nrelevant separations. Indeed, taking alienation seriously might lead\nus to think more critically about some familiar moral standpoints and\ntheories." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Morality as Alienating" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "6. Some (Unresolved) Empirical Issues", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe above discussion of the concept of alienation—clarifying its\nbasic shape, sketching some of its theoretical forms, and introducing\na few complexities—still leaves many issues unresolved.\nThese include many empirical and quasi-empirical issues. The\npresent section is concerned with some of the\nempirical assumptions and claims that appear in what might be\ncalled broadly philosophical accounts of alienation of the kind\ndiscussed above. It is not directly concerned with the extensive\nsocial scientific literature on alienation. That latter\nliterature is often preoccupied\nwith ‘operationalising’ the concept—for\ninstance, treating job satisfaction or absenteeism as proxies of\nalienated work—in order to engineer predictive models in\ndisciplines (including education, psychology, sociology, and\nmanagement studies) dealing with a variety of real world contexts\n(see e.g. Chiaburu et al 2014).", "\nAs an example of some of the empirical dimensions of broadly\nphilosophical accounts of alienation, consider Marx’s\ncharacterisation of capitalist society as characterised by\nseparations which frustrate self-realisation, especially\nself-realisation in work. To come to a considered judgement about the\nplausibility of his views on this topic, one would have to be in a\nposition to assess, amongst other issues, whether work in capitalist\nsocieties is necessarily alienated. One would need to judge not only\nwhether existing work is rightly characterised as alienated (as\nforced, frustrating self-realisation, not intended to satisfy the\nneeds of others, and not appropriately appreciated by those others),\nbut also, if so, whether it could be made meaningful and unalienated\nwithout undermining the very features which made the relevant society\na capitalist one. (There are, of course, also many more\nnormative-looking issues here regarding that account of human\nflourishing: whether, for example, Marx overestimates the value of\ncreative and fulfilling work, and underestimates the value of,\nsay, leisure and intellectual excellence.) Reaching anything like a\nconsidered judgment on these empirical and quasi-empirical issues\nwould clearly require some complicated factual assessments of, amongst\nother issues, the composition and functioning of human nature and the\nextant social world." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Content" }, { "content": [ "\nA range of complex empirical and quasi-empirical issues also look to\nbe woven into Marx’s views about the historical extent of\nalienation. Consider the various claims about the\nhistorical location and comparative intensity of alienation that can\nbe found in his writings (and in certain secondary\ninterpretations of those writings). These include: first, that\ncertain systematic forms of alienation—including alienation in\nwork—are not a universal feature of human society (not least,\nthey will not be a feature of a future communist order); second, that\nat least some systematic forms of alienation—presumably\nincluding the alienation that Marx identifies as embodied in religious belief —are widespread in pre-capitalist\nsocieties; and third, that systematic forms of alienation are greater\nin contemporary capitalist societies than in pre-capitalist\nsocieties. There seems no good textual or theoretical reason to\nlumber Marx with the view that less systematic forms of alienation—such as the hypothetical estrangement of Gillian from her sister Hanna (which arose from sibling rivalry, stubbornness, and a chance misunderstanding at a time of family crisis)—could never exist under communism.", "\nTake the last of these assorted empirical claims attributed to Marx – the comparative\nverdict about the extent or intensity of systematic forms of alienation in capitalist\nsocieties. Its plausibility is scarcely incontrovertible given the\namount of sheer productive drudgery, and worse, in pre-capitalist\nsocieties. Nor is it obvious how one might attempt to substantiate the\nempirical dimensions of the claim. The empirical difficulties of\nmeasuring subjective alienation look considerable enough (especially\ngiven the limitations of historical data), but alienation for Marx is\nfundamentally about the frustration of objective human potentials,\nthose separations that prevent self-realisation, perhaps especially\nself-realisation in work. One suggestion, made in this context, is\nthat the scale of alienation in a particular society might be\nindicated by the gap between the liberating potential of human\nproductive powers, on the one hand, and the extent to which that\npotential is reflected in the lives actually lived by producers, on\nthe other (Wood 2004: 44–48). Whatever the appeal of that\nsuggestion, the social scientific details of how one might actually\napply that kind of measure in particular historical cases remain\nunclear." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Extent" } ] } ]	[ "Chiaburu, Dan S., Tomas Thundiyil, and Jiexin Wang, 2014,\n“Alienation and its Correlates: A Meta-Analysis,”\nEuropean Management Journal, 32 (1): 24–36.", "Cohen, G.A., 1974, “Marx’s Dialectic of\nLabour,”Philosophy & Public Affairs, 3 (3):\n235–261.", "Forst, Rainer, 2017, “Noumenal Alienation: Rousseau,\nKant and Marx on the Dialectics of Self-Determination,”\nKantian Review, 22 (4): 523–551.", "Foster, John Bellamy, 1999, “Marx’s Theory of\nMetabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental\nSociology,”American Journal of Sociology, 105 (2):\n366–405.", "Gilabert, Pablo, 2020, “Alienation, Freedom, and\nDignity,” Philosophical Topics, 48\n(2): 51–79.", "Hardimon, Michael O., 1994, Hegel’s Social Philosophy.\nThe Project of Reconciliation, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Haverkamp, Beatrijs, 2016, “Reconstructing Alienation: A\nChallenge to Social Critique?” Krisis, 1: 66–71.", "Hegel, G.W.F., 1991a [1820], Elements of the Philosophy of\nRight, Allen W. Wood (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "–––, 1991b [1830], The Encyclopedia Logic:\nPart 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, (with the\nZusätze), T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris\n(trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett.", "Inwood, Michael, 1992, A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford:\nBlackwell.", "Jaeggi, Rahel, 2014, Alienation, Frederick Neuhouser\n(ed.), with a Foreword by Axel Honneth, New York: Columbia University\nPress.", "–––, 2018, Critique of Forms of\nLife, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.", "Kandiyali, Jan, 2020, “The Importance of Others: Marx,\nUnalienated Production and Meaningful Work,” Ethics, 130\n(4): 555–587.", "Leopold, David, 2007, The Young Karl Marx. German Philosophy,\nModern Politics, and Human Flourishing, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 2016, “On Marxian\nUtopophobia,”Journal of the History of Philosophy, 54\n(1): 111–134.", "Marcuse, Herbert, 2002 [1964], One-Dimensional Man. Studies in\nthe Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, New York:\nRoutledge.", "Marx, Karl, 1975 [1844], “Economic and Philosophical\nManuscripts of 1844,”,in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels:\nCollected Works (Volume 3), London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp.\n229–347.", "–––, 1996 [1867], Capital (Volume One),\nin Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works (Volume 35),\nLondon: Lawrence & Wishart.", "Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich, 1975 [1845], The Holy\nFamily, in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works\n(Volume 4), London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 3–211.", "–––, 1975 [1848], “The Manifesto of the\nCommunist Party,” in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected\nWorks (Volume 6), London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp.\n477–519.", "Nussbaum, Martha C., 1995, “Objectification,”\nPhilosophy & Public Affairs, 24 (2): 249–291.", "Piper, Adrian M.S., 1987, “Moral Theory and Moral\nAlienation,” The Journal of Philosophy, 84\n(2): 102–118.", "Railton, Peter, 1984, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the\nDemands of Morality,”Philosophy & Public Affairs,\n13 (2): 134–171.", "Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1997 [1754–1755], “Discourse\non the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men or\nSecond Discourse”, in The Discourses and Other Early\nPolitical Writings, Victor Gourevitch (ed. and tr.), Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, pp. 111–232.", "Sayers, Sean, 2011, Marx and Alienation. Essays on Hegelian\nThemes, London: Palgrave Macmillan.", "Schacht, Richard, 1971, Alienation, (with an introductory\nessay by Walter Kaufmann), London: Allen & Unwin.", "–––, 1994, The Future of Alienation,\nUrbana: University of Illinois Press.", "Sidgwick, Henry, 1907, The Methods of Ethics, 7th\nedition, London: Macmillan.", "Wendling, Amy E., 2009, Karl Marx on Technology and\nAlienation, London: Palgrave Macmillan.", "Williams, Bernard, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of\nPhilosophy, London: Fontana.", "Wood, Allen W., 2004, Karl Marx, second edition, London:\nRoutledge." ]	[ { "href": "../existentialism/", "text": "existentialism" }, { "href": "../feminism-class/", "text": "feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on class and work" }, { "href": "../hegel/", "text": "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich" }, { "href": "../marx/", "text": "Marx, Karl" }, { "href": "../rousseau/", "text": "Rousseau, Jean Jacques" }, { "href": "../socialism/", "text": "socialism" } ]
althusser	Louis Althusser	First published Fri Oct 16, 2009; substantive revision Mon Aug 22, 2022	[ "\nLouis Pierre Althusser (1918–1990) was one of the most\ninfluential Marxist philosophers of the 20th Century. As\nthey seemed to offer a renewal of Marxist thought as well as to render\nMarxism philosophically respectable, the claims he advanced in the\n1960s about Marxist philosophy were discussed and debated worldwide.\nDue to apparent reversals in his theoretical positions, to the\nill-fated facts of his life, and to the historical fortunes of Marxism\nin the late twentieth century, this intense interest in\nAlthusser’s reading of Marx did not survive the 1970s. Despite\nthe comparative indifference shown to his work as a whole after these\nevents, the theory of ideology Althusser developed within it has been\nbroadly deployed in the social sciences and humanities and has\nprovided a foundation for much “post-Marxist” philosophy.\nIn addition, aspects of Althusser’s project have served as\ninspiration for Analytic Marxism as well as for Critical\nRealism and Discourse Analysis. Though this influence is not\nalways explicit, Althusser’s work and that of his students\ncontinues to inform the research programs of literary studies,\npolitical philosophy, history, economics, and sociology. At present,\nAlthusser’s philosophy as a whole is undergoing a critical\nreevaluation by scholars who have benefited from the anthologization\nof previously unpublished texts. His concepts are also being\nincreasingly employed by philosophers, political theorists, and\nactivists who have returned to Marx and to Marxian analyses in order\nto explain and to envision alternatives to our present socio-economic\nconjuncture." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Early Work (1946–60)", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Christianity and Marxism", "2.2 Hegelian Marxism", "2.3 Marx not Hegel", "2.4 Historical Work: Montesquieu and Feuerbach" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Classic Work (1961–1966)", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Hermeneutic Theory", "3.2 Epistemology and Philosophy of Science", "3.3 The Role of Philosophy", "3.4 Marxist Philosophy", "3.5 Social and Political Philosophy, Historiography" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Revisions (1966–78)", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 The Relationship between Theory and Practice", "4.2 Theory of Ideology", " 4.3 Aesthetic Theory", "4.4 Marx’s Philosophy Redux" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Late work (1980–1986): Aleatory Materialism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Literature", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nLouis Althusser was born on October 16th, 1918 in Bir\nMourad Raïs (formerly Birmandreis), a suburb of Algiers.\nHailing from Alsace on his father’s side of the family, his\ngrandparents were French citizens who had chosen to settle in\nAlgeria. At the time of his birth, Althusser’s father was a\nlieutenant in the French Military. After this service was up, his\nfather returned to Algiers and to his work as a banker. By all\naccounts save for the retrospective ones contained in his\nautobiographies, Althusser’s early childhood in North Africa was\na contented one. There he enjoyed the comforts of the Mediterranean\nenvironment as well as those provided by an extended and stable\npetit-bourgeois family.", "\nIn 1930, his father’s work moved the family to Marseille. Always\na good pupil, Althusser excelled in his studies and became active in\nthe Scouts. In 1936, the family moved again, this time to Lyon. There,\nAlthusser was enrolled in the prestigious Lycée du Parc. At the\nLycée, he began taking classes in order to prepare for the\ncompetitive entrance exams to France’s grandes\nécoles. Raised in an observant family, Althusser was\nparticularly influenced by professors of a distinctly Catholic\ntendency. These included the philosophers Jean Guitton and Jean\nLacroix as well as the historian Joseph Hours. In 1937, while still at\nthe Lycée, Althusser joined the Catholic youth group\nJeunesse étudiantes chrétiennes. This interest\nin Catholicism and his participation in Catholic organizations would\ncontinue even after Althusser joined the Communist Party in 1948. The\nsimultaneous enthusiasm that Althusser showed in Lyon for Royalist\npolitics did not last the war.", "\nIn 1939, Althusser performed well enough on the national entrance\nexaminations to be admitted to the École Normale\nSupérieure (ENS) in Paris. However, before the school year\nbegan, he was mobilized into the army. Soon thereafter, he was\ncaptured in Vannes along with the rest of his artillery regiment. He\nspent the remainder of the war as a prisoner of war at a camp in\nNorthern Germany. In his autobiographical writings, Althusser credits\nthe experiences of solidarity, political action, and community that he\nfound in the camp as opening him up to the idea of communism. Indeed,\nhis prison writings collected as Journal de captivité,\nStalag XA 1940–1945 evidence these experiences. They also\nprovide evidence of the cycles of deep depression that began for\nAlthusser in 1938 and that would mark him for the rest of his\nlife.", "\nAt the end of the war and following his release from the P.O.W. camp\nin 1945, Althusser took his place at the ENS. Now 27 years old, he\nbegan the program of study that was to prepare him for the\nagrégation, the competitive examination which\nqualifies one to teach philosophy in French secondary schools and that\nis often the gateway to doctoral study and university employment.\nPerhaps not surprisingly for a young man who had just spent half a\ndecade in a prison camp, much happened during the three years he spent\npreparing for the exam and working on his Master’s thesis.\nThough still involved in Catholic groups and still seeing himself as a\nChristian, the movements that Althusser associated with after the war\nwere leftist in their politics and, intellectually, he made a move to\nembrace and synthesize Christian and Marxist thought. This synthesis\nand his first published works were informed by a reading of\n19th Century German idealist philosophy, especially Hegel\nand Marx, as well as by progressive Christian thinkers associated with\nthe group Jeunesse de l’Église. Indeed, it was\n19th Century German Idealism with which he was most engaged\nduring his period of study at the ENS. In line with this interest (one\nshared with many other French intellectuals at the time), Althusser\nobtained his diplôme d’études\nsupérieures in 1947 for a work directed by Gaston\nBachelard and titled “On Content in the Thought of G.W.F.\nHegel.” In 1948, he passed his agrégation,\ncoming in first on the written portion of the exam and second on the\noral. After this showing, Althusser was offered and accepted the post\nof agrégé répétiteur (director of\nstudies) at the ENS whose responsibility it was to help students\nprepare for their own agrégations. In this capacity,\nhe began offering courses and tutorials on particular topics in\nphilosophy and on particular figures from the history of philosophy.\nAs he retained this responsibility for more than thirty years and\nworked with some of the brightest thinkers that France produced during\nthis time (including Alain Badiou, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel\nFoucault), through his teaching Althusser left a deep and lasting\nimpression on a generation of French philosophers and on French\nphilosophy.", "\nIn addition to inaugurating his extended association with the ENS, the\nfirst few years spent in Paris after the war saw Althusser begin three\nother long-lasting relationships. The first of these was with the\nFrench Communist Party, the second with his companion and eventual\nwife, Hélène Rytmann-Légotien, and the third with\nFrench psychiatry. Begun to treat recurrent bouts of depression, this\nlast affiliation continued for the rest of his life and included\nfrequent hospitalization as well as the most aggressive treatments\npost-war French psychiatry had to offer such as electroconvulsive\ntherapy, narco-analysis, and psychoanalysis.", "\nThe second relationship begun by Althusser was little happier and no\nless dependent than the first. At its outset, Althusser’s bond\nwith Rytmann-Légotien was complicated by his almost\ntotal inexperience with women and by her being eight years older than\nhim. It was also made difficult by the vast differences in their\nexperience of the world and by her relationship with the Communist\nParty. Whereas Althusser had known only home, school, and P.O.W.\ncamp, Rytmann-Légotien had traveled widely and had long\nbeen active in literary and radical circles. At the time the two met,\nshe was also embroiled in a dispute with the Party over her role in\nthe resistance during World War II.", "\nThough Althusser was not yet a Party member, like many of his\ngeneration, he emerged from the War deeply sympathetic to its moral\naims. His interest in Party politics and involvement with Party\nmembers grew during his time as a student at the ENS. However, the\nENS’ suspicion of communists as well\nas Rytmann-Légotien’s troubles with the Party\ncomplicated Althusser’s relationship with each of these\ninstitutions. Nonetheless, shortly after being offered the post of\nagrégé répétiteur (and thus safe\nfrom being bypassed for the position due to his membership), Althusser\njoined the Communist Party. For the next few years, Althusser tried to\nadvance the aims of the Communist Party as well as the goal of getting\nHélène Rytmann-Légotien accepted back into it. He\ndid so by being a good militant (going to cell meetings, distributing\ntracts, etc), by re-starting a Marxist study group at the ENS (the\nCercle Politzer), and by making inquiries into\nHélène Rytmann-Légotien’s wartime\nactivities in the hopes of clearing her name. By his own account, he\nmade a terrible activist and he also failed to rehabilitate\nher reputation. Nonetheless, his relationship with the Party and\nwith his future wife deepened during this period.", "\nDuring the 1950s, Althusser lived two lives that were only somewhat\ninter-related: one was that of a successful, if somewhat obscure\nacademic philosopher and pedagogue and the other that of a loyal\nCommunist Party Member. This is not to say that Althusser was\npolitically inactive at the school or that his communism did not\ninfluence his philosophical work. On the contrary, Althusser recruited\ncolleagues and students to the Party and worked closely with the\ncommunist cell based at the ENS. In addition, at mid-decade, he\npublished a few introductions to Marxist philosophy. However, in his\nteaching and advising, he mostly avoided bringing in Marxist\nphilosophy and Communist politics. Instead, he catered to student\ninterest and to the demands of each new agrégation by\nengaging closely with classic philosophical texts and with\ncontemporary philosophy and social science. Further, the bulk of his\nscholarship was on 18th Century political philosophy.\nIndeed, the only book-length study Althusser published during his\nlifetime was a work on Montesquieu, which appeared at the end of the\ndecade. At the ENS, Althusser’s professionalism as well as his\nability to think institutionally was rewarded in 1954 with a promotion\nto secrétaire de l’école\nlittéraire, a post where he had some responsibility for\nthe management and direction of the school.", "\nIt would have surprised no one if Althusser had continued to influence\nFrench political and philosophical life subtly, through the students\nthat he mentored, through his scholarship on the history of political\nphilosophy, through the colloquia among philosophers, scientists, and\nhistorians that he organized, and through his routine work as a Party\nmember. However, in 1961, with an essay titled “On the Young\nMarx,” Althusser aggressively entered into a heated debate about\nthe continuity of Marx’s oeuvre and about what constitutes the\ncore of Marxist philosophy. Appearing at a time of crisis in the\nFrench Communist Party’s direction and seeming to offer a\n“scientific” alternative to Stalinism and to the humanist\nrevisions of Marxism then being proffered, the theoretical viewpoint\noffered by Althusser gained adherents. Invigorated by this recognition\nand by the possibility that theoretical work might actually change\nCommunist Party practice, Althusser began to publish regularly on\nMarxist philosophy. These essays occasioned much public discussion and\nphilosophical activity both in France and abroad. At the same time as\nthese essays began creating a stir, Althusser changed his teaching\nstyle at the ENS and began to offer collaborative seminars where he\nand his students attempted a “return to Marx” and to\nMarx’s original texts. In 1965, the fruit of one of these\nseminars was published as Reading Capital. That same year,\nthe essays on Marxist theory that had made such a sensation were\ncollected and published in the volume For Marx. Amplifying\nthese books’ collective impact well beyond the realm of\nintra-party discussion was the general trend in literary and social\nscientific theory labeled “structuralism” and with which\nAlthusser’s re-reading of Marx was identified.", "\nAt mid-decade, Althusser seized on these works’ popularity and\nthe fact that his arguments had created a faction within the French\nCommunist Party composed mostly of young intelligentsia to try and\nforce change. This gambit to have the Party directed by theorists\nrather than by a Central Committee, whose Stalinism remained\nentrenched and who believed in the organic wisdom of the worker, met\nwith little success. At the most, he succeeded in carving out some\nautonomy for theoretical reflection within the Party. Even though it\nis his most well-known intervention, this was not the first attempt by\nAlthusser to try and influence the Party (he had tried once before\nduring the mid 1950s from his position as cell leader at the ENS) and\nit would not be his last. While he lost much of the student support\nthat his work had created when he remained silent during the\n“revolutionary” events of May 1968 (he was in a\npsychiatric hospital at the time), he campaigned once more to\ninfluence the Party during the mid 1970s. This intervention occurred\nin response to the French Communist Party’s decision to abandon\ntraditional Marxist-Leninist aspects of its platform so as to better\nally itself with the Socialist Party. Though Althusser’s\nposition was well publicized and found its supporters, in the end, his\narguments were unable to motivate the Party’s rank-and-file such\nthat its leadership would reconsider its decision.", "\nDuring the decades in which he became internationally known for his\nre-thinking of Marxist philosophy, Althusser continued in his post at\nthe ENS. There he took on increasing institutional responsibility\nwhile continuing to edit and, with François Maspero, to publish\nhis own work and that of others in the series Théorie.\nIn 1975, Althusser acquired the right to direct research on the basis\nof his previously published work. Shortly after this recognition, he\nmarried his longtime companion, Hélène\nRytmann-Légotien.", "\nFollowing the French Left’s and the Communist Party’s\nelectoral defeats in the 1978 elections, Althusser’s bouts of\ndepression became more severe and more frequent. In November 1980,\nafter a painful surgery and another bout of mental illness, which saw\nhim hospitalized for most of the summer and whose symptoms continued\nafter his return to the ENS in the fall, Althusser strangled his wife.\nBefore he could be arrested for the murder, he was sent to a mental\nhospital. Later, when an examining magistrate came to inform him of\nthe crime of which he was accused, Althusser was in so fragile a\nmental state that he could not understand the charges or the process\nto which he was to be submitted and he was left at the hospital. After\nan examination, a panel of psychiatrists concluded that Althusser was\nsuffering at the time of the murder from severe depression and\niatrogenic hallucinations. Citing a French law (since changed), which\nstates that “there is neither crime nor delict where the suspect\nwas in a state of dementia at the time of the action,” the\nmagistrate in charge of Althusser’s case decided that there were\nno grounds on which to pursue prosecution.", "\nThe last ten years of Althusser’s life were spent in and out of\nmental hospitals and at the apartment in Paris’ 20th\narrondissement where he had planned to retire. During this period, he\nwas visited by a few loyal friends and kept up some correspondences.\nGiven his mental state, his frequent institutionalizations, his\nanomie, and the drugs he was prescribed, these were not very\nproductive years. However, at mid-decade, he did find the energy to\nre-visit some of his old work and to attempt to construct from it an\nexplicit metaphysics. He also managed to write an autobiography, a\ntext he averred was intended to provide the explanation for the murder\nof his wife that he was never able to provide in court. Both texts\nonly appeared posthumously. When his mental and physical health\ndeteriorated again in 1987, Althusser went to live at a psychiatric\nhospital in La Verrière, a village to the west of Paris. There,\non the 22nd of October, 1990, he died of a heart attack" ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDespite its being anthologized and translated during the mid 1990s,\nthere has until recently been relatively little critical attention\npaid to Althusser’s writings prior to 1961. Certainly, in terms\nof method, style, and inspiration, the Althusser found in these works\ndiffers significantly from the Althusser of For Marx and\nReading Capital. In his writings from the 1940s, for\ninstance, his method and conclusions resemble those of the Marxist\nHumanists of whom he would later be so critical, while texts from the\n1950s deploy without irony the Stalinist shibboleths he would later\nsubject to such castigation. Nonetheless, as these texts announce many\nof Althusser’s perennial themes and because some of the\ncontradictions these works possess are shared with his classic texts\nand are repeated again in his late work, these early essays, books,\nand translations are worthy of examination" ], "section_title": "2. Early Work (1946–60)", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAlthusser’s philosophical output between 1946 and 1961 can\nroughly be divided into four categories. The first category includes\nthose essays, mostly written between 1946 and 1951, where Althusser\nexplores possible rapports between Christianity and Marxism. In the\nfirst of these essays “The International of Decent\nFeelings,” Althusser argues from what he takes to be “the\ntruth of Christianity” against the popular post-war view that\nthe misery, guilt, and alienation of the human condition in the atomic\nage is equally experienced by all subjects. For him, this\nexistentialist diagnosis is a type of idolatry: it replaces\nrecognition of our equality before God with our equality before the\nfear of death. In that it does so, it is twice anti-Christian. For, in\naddition to the sin of idolatry (death equals God), it fails to\nacknowledge the existence of a particular class, the proletariat, for\nwhom anguish is not its lot and who is actually capable of delivering\nthe emancipation from fear by re-appropriating the products of human\nproduction, including the atomic bomb. A subsequent essay from 1947,\n“A Matter of Fact,” continues in this vein, suggesting the\nnecessity of socialist means for realizing Christian ends. It also\nincludes a Hegelian critique of the existing Catholic Church which\nsuggests that the church is incapable of such an alliance without a\ntheological revolution. Each of these essays includes the suggestion\nthat critique and reform will occasion a better church and a truer\nChristianity. By 1949, however, Althusser was totally pessimistic\nabout this possibility and, in a letter to his mentor Jean Lacroix, he\nargued that the sole possibility for realizing Christian values is\nthrough communist action. Though some critics have argued that\nChristian and Catholic values and modes of reasoning inform all of\nAlthusser’s philosophy, any explicit consideration of a\npractical and theoretical reconciliation between the two was abandoned\nat this point in Althusser’s development." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Christianity and Marxism" }, { "content": [ "\nThe second category of Althusser’s early work, one closely\nrelated to the first, are those texts that deal with Hegel. Written\nprimarily for an academic audience, they approach Hegel’s\nphilosophy either critically, in terms of the history of its reception\nand use, or exegetically, in terms of examining what possibility\nHegel’s metaphysics, logic, politics, epistemology, and\nunderstanding of subjectivity offer to those interested in\nunderstanding and encouraging societal transformation. Between 1946\nand 1950, the results of Althusser’s exegeses were positive:\nHegel indeed had something to offer. This judgment finds its most\ndetailed explanation in Althusser’s 1947 thesis “On\nContent in the thought of G.W.F. Hegel.” In addition to\ndetailing Hegel’s relation to Kant and criticizing the\nsimplification of the dialectic by Hegel’s commentators,\nAlthusser argues in this work that the dialectic “cannot be\nattacked for its form” (1947, 116). Instead, Hegel can only be\ncritiqued for a failure of the contents of the form (as these contents\nare specified in Hegel’s historical and political works) to have\nactually fulfilled the absolute idea. Following the Young Hegelians,\nthen, Althusser uses Hegel’s dialectic against itself to\ncriticize claims like the one made in The Philosophy of Right\nthat the Prussian state is the fulfillment of the dialectic. Though he\nuses Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of\nRight to make his points and though he is in agreement with Marx\nthat the Hegelian concept, realized in thought, must now be realized\nin the world, Althusser does not suggest in his thesis that\nMarx’s philosophy leaves Hegel’s insights about, history,\nlogic, and the subject behind. Instead, he contends that Marx is\nguilty of committing the same error as Hegel in mistaking historical\ncontent for the fulfillment of the dialectic. Because all knowledge is\nhistorical, Althusser argues, Marxists can only correct for this error\nby appeal to the idea of the dialectic and to its end in the absolute\nand the eternal, to a time “when the human totality will be\nreconciled with its own structure” (1947, 156). Something like\nthis argument will appear again in his classical work as a critique of\nthe empiricist tendency in Marxist philosophy." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Hegelian Marxism" }, { "content": [ "\nBy the early 1950s, Althusser’s judgments that Marxism was, of\nnecessity, Hegelian and that it aimed at human fulfillment had\nundergone revision. This transition to thinking about Marx as the\noriginator of a philosophy totally distinct from Hegel’s was\nsignaled in a review essay from 1950 which argued that the post-war\nmania for Hegel in France was only a bourgeois attempt to combat Marx.\nIn two short essays from 1953 on Marxist philosophy, this switch is\nfully apparent. In these texts, Althusser aligns himself with the\nposition advanced by Mehring and Lenin that, at a certain point in\nMarx’s development, Hegel is left behind and that, afterwards,\nMarx forged his own original concepts and methodology. In his\ndescription of what these concepts and methodology are, Althusser\npretty much follows the Party line, insisting that Marx reversed the\nHegelian dialectic, that historical materialism is a science, that the\nsciences verify dialectical materialism, and that the proletariat\nneeds to be taught Marxist science from above. Though these essays\nrepeat the Party philosophy as formulated by Lenin, Stalin, and\nZhdanov, they also include recognizable Althusserian themes and show\nhis thinking about these themes to be in transition. For instance,\nboth essays retain the idea from Althusser’s 1947 thesis about\nthe quasi-transcendental status of present scientific knowledge. Both\nalso anticipate future concerns in their speculations about the\nideological character of current scientific knowledge and in their\nincorporation of ideas from Mao about the relationship between theory\nand practice. Written as a response to Paul Ricoeur and representing\nthe last example of this third category of Althusser’s early\nwork, a text from 1955 argues for the objectivity of historical\nscience. This is a theme to which he would return. Noticeably absent\nfrom this body of work, however, are the detailed and original claims\nAlthusser would make in the early 1960s about Marx’s\nphilosophy." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Marx not Hegel" }, { "content": [ "\nTwo essays that Althusser wrote in the mid 1950s were the first to\nfocus exclusively on Marxist philosophy and are interesting inasmuch\nas they evidence his rejection of Hegel and his embrace of the\nParty’s Marxism-Leninism. In addition, these texts suggest the\nneed for a thorough study of Marx. This study, however, would wait\nuntil the beginning of the next decade. For the rest of the 1950s,\nmost of Althusser’s published work involved the study of\nphilosophical figures who preceded Marx. These figures included\nMontesquieu, on whose political philosophy and theory of history he\nwrote a book-length study, and Feuerbach, whose writings he translated\nand commented upon. The dual thesis of Althusser’s Montesquieu\nbook: that, insofar as Montesquieu studies the “concrete\nbehavior of men” he resists idealism and inaugurates the study\nof history as a science and that, insofar as Montesquieu accepts past\nand present political formations as delimiting the possibilities for\npolitical life, he remains an idealist, is one that will find echoes\nin Althusser’s study of Marx during the next decade. Similarly,\ninasmuch as he makes the argument in a commentary (1960) that part of\nhis intention in translating Feuerbach is to show just what Marx owes\nin his early writings to the author of The Essence of\nChristianity so that these may be better seen as absent from\nMarx’s mature work, these studies of Feuerbach can also be seen\nas propaedeutic to the study of Marx which Althusser inaugurated in\n1961 with his article “On the Young Marx”." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Historical Work: Montesquieu and Feuerbach" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWith the perspective afforded by the mass of posthumous writings\npublished since the 1990s, it has become clear that Althusser was\nperennially concerned with important issues in metaphysics,\nepistemology, philosophy of science, historiography, hermeneutics, and\npolitical philosophy. However, it is also true that the primary medium\nAlthusser employed for thinking through problems in these areas was\nMarxist philosophy. This is especially true of the period between 1961\nand 1966 when the majority of his published and unpublished work\nconcerned itself with how to read Marx, the definition of Marxist\nphilosophy, and how to understand and apply Marxian concepts. In\naddition, if we are to take Althusser’s retrospective word for\nit, the pieces he published during this period were intended as\npolitical-theoretical acts, polemics meant to respond to contemporary\nopinions and policies and to shift the terms of these arguments as\nwell as the actions which were their results. For these reasons, it is\nnatural when discussing these texts to focus upon the contexts that\nengendered them and upon the positions within Marxist philosophy that\nAlthusser stakes out by their means. Alternatively, as Althusser\nindicates in many of these pieces his debts to contemporaneous\ntheorists and to philosophical predecessors such as Spinoza, there is\nthe temptation to understand his thought as a combination of the\ninsights contributed by these thinkers with Marxist philosophy. While\neach is a useful approach to understanding and explaining\nAlthusser’s philosophy, when excessive attention is paid to one\nor another of them, one risks historicizing his contributions or\nsuggesting that they are merely derivative. Seeking to avoid either\nresult, even though the following discussion will note the context for\nAlthusser’s work, its relation to Marxist philosophy, and the\nnon-Marxist philosophical insights that contribute to its method and\nconclusions, this account will also suggest the uniqueness of his\ncontributions to hermeneutics, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy\nof science, historiography, and political philosophy.", "\nFor multiple, overlapping, and complicated reasons of which the most\nrelevant may be the discrediting of Stalin’s personage,\npolicies, and version of Marxist philosophy that followed\nKhrushchev’s “Secret Speech,” Europe in the late\n1950s saw a blossoming of political and philosophical alternatives to\nthe version of Marxism-Leninism promulgated by the Soviet Union. This\nversion of Marxist philosophy had dominated European leftist thought\nand action since the dawn of the Cold War in 1947 and, in France, was\nwidely disseminated via Communist Party schools and literature. While\npolitical and philosophical change were slow to occur in the French\nCommunist Party, by the late 1950s, many intellectuals associated with\nthe Party began to ask questions about what constitutes the core of\nMarx’s philosophy and about how this philosophy guides, relates\nto, or allows for political action.", "\nFor many of these intellectuals, answering this question meant a\nreturn to Marx’s early work (those texts written before 1845) in\nthe hopes of finding the “key” to his philosophy. In\npieces like “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s\nPhilosophy of Right” (1844), and the Economic and\nPhilosophic Manuscripts (1844), these thinkers found and\nchampioned a Marx obviously indebted to a Hegelian dialectical\nunderstanding of subjectivity and historical development and deeply\nconcerned about ending human alienation. It is to this\nproject—that of finding the true method, aim, and intent of\nMarx’s philosophy in his early work’s emphasis on the\nrealization of full human freedom and potentials through dialectical\nhistorical change—that Althusser made the first of his public\n“interventions” into Marxist philosophy. He inaugurated\nthis effort with the essay “On the Young Marx” (1961),\nwhich sought to demonstrate that this method of looking to\nMarx’s early work for the key to his philosophy was\nmethodologically suspect and ideologically driven. Further, in this\nessay and in subsequent work, he developed an alternate method of\ninvestigation or “reading” that would allow Marx’s\ntrue philosophy to be revealed in its purity.", "\nFrom the fruits of this new method of reading, Althusser argued that\nnot only was Marx the originator of a new philosophy, Dialectical\nMaterialism, that had nothing to do with its Hegelian and Feuerbachian\npredecessors, but that he also founded a new science, Historical\nMaterialism, which broke with and superseded such ideological and\npre-scientific precursors as the political economics of Smith and\nRicardo. For the most part, the essays collected in For Marx\n(1965) and the seminar papers issued as Reading Capital\n(1965) develop and utilize this method of reading in order to justify\nand describe Marxist philosophy and Marxist science as well as to\ndistinguish between these two theoretical activities. In so doing,\nAlthusser says quite a bit about the nature of knowledge and the\ngeneral relations between philosophy, science, politics, and ideology.\nFurther, Althusser applies this hermeneutic method to argue against\nwhat he labeled “empiricist” understandings of Marx. These\nincluded the Humanist interpretations of Marx described above as well\nas variations on the orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory, which specified\nthe strict determination of culture and history by the existing modes\nof economic exchange and resulting class struggles. The following\nparagraphs discuss this theory of reading, how it produces a different\nunderstanding of Marx’s philosophy than that which is derived\nfrom Humanist and Economist readings, and how it informs his\nepistemology, philosophy of science, historiography, and political\nphilosophy." ], "section_title": "3. Classic Work (1961–1966)", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe label that Althusser gave to the method by which he approached\nMarx’s texts was that of a “symptomatic reading.”\nInstead of looking back at Marx’s early work in order to find\nthe “essence” of his philosophy, one of whose expressions\nwas Capital, and also instead of trying to build a true or\nconsistent theory out of Marx’s oeuvre by explaining away\ncontradictions within it and noting certain passages as key, Althusser\nargued that Marx’s true philosophy was largely absent from his\nwork prior to 1845. Even in mature texts such as Capital,\nAlthusser maintained that Marx’s philosophy remained largely\nimplicit, as the background system of concepts which allowed the\nscientific work Marx was involved in generating to take place. The\nsymptomatic method of reading was designed to make these concepts\nexplicit and “to establish the indispensable minimum for the\nconsistent existence of Marxist philosophy”\n(1965a [2005], 35).", "\nThe three inspirations Althusser gave for this interpretive method\nwere those provided by Spinoza, Freud by way of Lacan, and that\nprovided by Marx himself. In addition, he added to these examples\ninsights from the French tradition of historical epistemology about\nthe way in which sciences come to be constituted. One of the ideas\nborrowed from Spinoza was the contention that texts and authors are\nthe products of their times and that the thoughts authors set down on\nthe page cannot help but be a part of, and be affected by, the\nideological currents that accompany and allow for the satisfaction of\nneeds in a specific era. So then, similar to the way in which Spinoza\nargued in the Theological Political-Treatise that by engaging\nin a materialist historical study of the Bible one could disentangle\nthose prophetic laws and commands which were merely the result of\ntemporal exigencies and the prophet’s imagination from those\nwhich represented the true word of God, so Althusser argued that one\ncould disentangle those concepts which were merely ideological in\nMarx’s texts from those which comprised his true philosophy.", "\nThough this theory was later to be complicated and revised, during\nthis period, Althusser consistently argued that Marx’s work\nprior to 1845 was ideological and that it was saturated with\nnon-Marxian concepts borrowed from Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s\nphilosophical anthropologies. Althusser did recognize that some of\nMarx’s early work is marked by its rejection of idealist\npremises and concepts. However, inasmuch as this early work was seen\nto espouse a telic view of humanity in which the individual and\nsociety was said to undergo a necessary historico-dialectical\ndevelopment, Althusser identified it as fundamentally Hegelian. That\nthere was a materialist correction to this basic narrative with\nMarx’s embrace of Feuerbach, Althusser also granted. However,\nthe replacement by Marx of a speculative anthropology which saw the\nhistorical development of society as the self-fulfillment of human\nfreedom with a materialist anthropology that cited the same logic of\ndevelopment but which specified that the motor of this development was\nhuman beings in their “sensuous life activity,” was seen\nby Althusser to represent little conceptual and no logical advance\nfrom Hegel.", "\nThis “theory of the break,” which held that Marx’s\nearly work was Hegelian and ideological and that, after a decisive\nrupture in 1845 and then a long period of transition between\n1845–1857, his work became recognizably Marxist and scientific,\nwould seem to indicate that all one has to do to understand\nMarx’s philosophy is to read this mature work. However, the\nactual case is not so simple. While reading Capital and other\nlate works is necessary for understanding Marx’s philosophy, it\nis not sufficient. It is not sufficient, Althusser argued, because,\neven in his post-1857 writings, Marx provides no systematic exposition\nof his epistemology or his ideas about social structure, history, and\nhuman nature, all of which were necessary for Marxist\nphilosophy’s consistent and continuing existence.", "\nMany interpreters of Marx, and not just those Althusser directly\nengaged with during the early 1960s, have maintained that such texts\nas the 1859 Preface and the 1844 Manuscripts provide\nkeys to understanding Marx’s philosophy. However, Althusser made\nthe case that these texts were contradictory and insufficient for this\npurpose. It is with this contention that the models provided by\npsychoanalysis and by Marx’s own critique of classical political\neconomy come to inform Althusser’s overall hermeneutic strategy.\nPart of this strategy, Althusser maintains, is directly taken from\nMarx’s own method. Thus, in a way parallel to Marx pointing out\nin Capital V.II (1885) that Adam Smith needed the concept of\nthe “value of labor” for his explanations of capitalist\neconomic activity but could not fully generate it out of the systems\nof ideas available to him, Althusser argued that, though Marx was\nrecognizably engaged in the work of Historical Materialism in\nCapital, the philosophical theory or background conceptual\nframework that allowed this investigation to proceed was not fully\narticulated.", "\nThe explicit project of Reading Capital and of many of the\nessays included in For Marx was to make these fundamental\nconcepts explicit. It was to do so by paying attention to the\ntheoretical “problematic,” or background ideological\nframework in which the work was generated, by analyzing those passages\nwhere a philosophical concept had to have been in use but was not made\nexplicit, and by noting and explaining where and why one theoretical\npronouncement is in contradiction with itself or with another passage.\nFor Althusser, such areas of Marx’s text are\n“symptoms,” in the psychoanalytic sense of the word, of\nthe necessary but unarticulated philosophical framework that\nunderwrites and allows his scientific investigations. Of these\nframeworks, Marx was not fully conscious. However, they were what\nallowed him to investigate and describe such socio-economic events as\nthe transformation of money into capital without recourse to Hegelian\nlogic and concepts. Althusser argues that by paying attention to these\npassages in Marx’s text as well as by seeking out Marxist\nconcepts as these were developed during the course of practical\nMarxist activity by theorists such as Lenin and Mao, an attentive\nreader can render explicit Marx’s philosophy.", "\nThat the concepts Althusser derived from his symptomatic reading of\nMarx, Lenin, and Mao were Marxist concepts was avowed. Nevertheless,\nAlthusser also acknowledged that some of the concepts found latent in\nthese texts were derived from and consistent with his philosophical\nand social scientific contemporaries as well as with those of Spinoza.\nOf course, this is not inconsistent with the theory of reading and\nauthorship that underwrites a symptomatic reading of a text. Inasmuch\nas authors and readers are always said to think with concepts borrowed\nfrom or supplied by the problematic that they inhabit, there is no\nsuch thing as an innocent or objective reading: we understand things\nwith and through the concepts available to us. Perhaps nowhere is this\nborrowing more evident than in Althusser’s ideas about how\nscientific and philosophic knowledge is generated. Though Althusser is\nvery careful to back up his arguments about Marx’s epistemology\nwith close analyses of Marx’s work, it is apparent that the\nmodel for knowledge acquisition that is developed in Reading\nCapital owes much to Spinoza and to the French tradition of\nhistorical epistemology." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Hermeneutic Theory" }, { "content": [ "\nWith his re-reading of Marx, Althusser wished to offer an alternative\nto the two then dominant understandings of Marx’s philosophy.\nBoth understandings were charged with the same mistake. This mistake\nwas, fundamentally, an epistemological one: each cast Marx as an\nempiricist. At first glance, this charge might seem ridiculous. This\nis especially the case as, according to Althusser’s own\ncritique, both understandings of Marx offered variants of the Hegelian\nclaim that there is a reason to history. For Althusser, however, both\nreadings were “empiricist” inasmuch as each ascribed to\nMarx a theory of knowledge in which the subject, by means of a process\nof observation and abstraction, comes to know what an object really\nand truly is, according to its essence. This is a definition of\nempiricism meant to include philosophers as diverse as Locke, Kant,\nand Hegel and traditions as varied as British Empiricism, German\nIdealism, Positivism, and Pragmatism. In the case of Humanist Marxism,\nthe object that comes to be known by its essence is the human subject\nin its full freedom. It does so by means of critique and by creatively\novercoming that which is alien to it or “merely\nhistorical.” In the case of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, this\nobject is the economy, the reality that underlies, causes, and can\nexplain all historical structures and transformations. The economy\ncomes to be known as it truly is only by the proletariat, by those\nwhom the historical process has endowed with an objective gaze and who\npossess the ability to make this truth objective.", "\nIn opposition to the empiricist model of knowledge production,\nAlthusser proposes that true or scientific knowledge is distinguished\nfrom ideology or opinion not by dint of an historical subject having\nabstracted the essence of an object from its appearances. Instead,\nthis knowledge is understood to be produced by a process internal to\nscientific knowledge itself. Though this transformation takes place\nentirely in thought, Althusser does not maintain that scientific\nknowledge makes no use of facts. However, these facts or materials are\nnever brute. Rather, specific sciences start with pre-existing\nconcepts or genera such as “humors,”\n“unemployment,” “quasars,” or\n“irrational numbers.” These genera may be ideological in\npart or in whole. Science’s job is to render these concepts\nscientific. This labor is what Althusser terms “theoretical\npractice.” The result of this practice is scientific knowledge.\nScientific knowledge is produced by means of applying to these genera\nthe body of concepts or “theory” that the science\npossesses for understanding them. This body of concepts may be more or\nless unified and consistent and it may be more or less consciously\narticulated. Further, the sum of the individual concepts that this\ntheory consists of delimits the possible ways in which the genera that\na science begins with can be understood.", "\nWhen applied, a science’s theory weeds out ideological notions\nassociated with the original concept or genera. The result of this\napplication of theory to genera is the transformation of the\n“ideological generality into a scientific generality”\n(1963b [2005], 185). An example of such a process is the\ntransformation in medical science of a concept like “phlegmatic\nhumors” into the idea of blood-borne pathogens by dint of the\ntheory of circulation and infectious disease. Once generated, such\nscientific concepts inform regular scientific practice, allowing\nspecific research programs within an individual science to progress.\nAlthusser himself gives examples of three such major transformations.\nThe first is the founding of modern physics by Galileo, the other that\nof Greek mathematics, and the third, that of Marx’s founding of\nthe science of Historical Materialism out of Classical Political\nEconomy. Each of these foundings is marked by what Althusser terms an\n“epistemological break,” or a period when ideological\nconcepts are replaced by scientific ones. Any similarity here to\nKuhnian ideas about revolutionary and normal science is not\nsurprising. Both Canguilhem and Bachelard, from whom Althusser drew\ninspiration for his theory, were part of a dialogue that took in the\nwork of Alexander Koyré on scientific revolutions, a thinker\nfrom whom Kuhn, in turn, drew his inspiration.", "\nAlthusser’s debt to the tradition of French historical\nepistemology in this account of knowledge production and philosophy of\nscience should now be evident. However, this epistemology’s\nMarxian and Spinozistic elements may be less pronounced. The\nvocabulary adopted above to express this theory, however, gestures to\nboth influences. For Althusser, Marx’s founding of the science\nof history is crucial not only to politics (as will be addressed\nbelow) but also to understanding all of human activity, including\nscientific activity. That there is a circular logic to this\nepistemological theory, Althusser readily admits, for it is only the\nscience of Historical Materialism that allows us to understand\nscientific practice in general. Althusser, though, is comfortable with\nthis circularity. This is because, insofar as this understanding of\nscientific practice in general allows us to understand how individual\nsciences produce their knowledge, Historical Materialism is a science\nthat functions like any other.", "\nFor Althusser, the concept that helps to produce this understanding of\nscientific practices is that of the “mode of production.”\nWith it, he argues, Marx supplied theorists with an idea sufficient to\ncomprehend the way in which we materially produce our selves, our\nenvironments, our knowledges, and our histories. Indeed, this concept\nmakes it possible to analyze all of our activities in their\nspecificity and to understand them in their relation to the totality\nof which they are a part. As it must be if we are to make sense of\nscientific practice as one aspect of the total mode of production,\nmuch more than the activity of economic production must be included in\nthis totality of productive practices. Added by Althusser to these two\naspects of the mode of production are those of ideological, political,\nand philosophical production, among others.", "\nIn each of the practices that together comprise, at any given time, a\nspecific mode of production, some form or forms of labor uses the\nexisting means of production to transform existing materials into new\nproducts. According to Althusser, this realization is Marx’s\nbasic insight. In scientific production, for example, thinkers use\nexisting theories to transform existing concepts into new, scientific\nconcepts. However, and this is where Althusser’s Spinozism\nbecomes apparent and also where he breaks with economistic\nunderstandings of Marx, it is not the case that the analysis of any\none mode of production within the totality of productive practices is\ncapable of generating an understanding of the way in which all rest of\nthe productive processes are causally determined. Rather, and in line\nwith the parallelism attributed by Leibniz to Spinoza, as each\nproductive process transforms a unique material (concepts in science,\ngoods in economics, social relations in politics), each process can\nonly be understood in terms of its unique causal structure. In\naddition, and again also in a way similar to Spinoza’s account\nof substance as seen from different aspects, each productive process\nis understood to stand in relation to and play a part of a complexly\nstructured whole, none of which is reducible to being the simple or\nessential cause of the others.", "\nThat Althusser regards most, if not all, human activity as consisting\nof material processes of production and reproduction can be used as a\nkey to understanding other parts of his philosophy. These include his\nthoughts on the structure of the social and political world, the\nhistorical process, and philosophy. As philosophy is closely related\nto science and because it is charged with a task that allows the\nproduction of knowledge about the other socio-economic practices to be\ngenerated, it is probably best to start with Althusser’s\nunderstanding of philosophy as a material practice of production\nbefore proceeding to a discussion of how Althusser understands the\nother practices listed above." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Epistemology and Philosophy of Science" }, { "content": [ "\nAccording to Althusser, most activity labeled “philosophy”\nis really a type of ideological production. By this, he means to say\nthat most philosophy reproduces, in highly abstract form, notions\nabout the world whose effect is to sustain existing socio-economic\nrelations. As such, philosophy merely reflects the background values,\nattitudes, and ideas that allow the socio-economic world to function.\nHowever, for Althusser, genuine philosophy functions as a\n“Theory of theoretical practice” (1965b). In this mode, it\nworks to provide an aid to scientific practice by distinguishing\nbetween ideological concepts and scientific ones as well as by\nclarifying and rendering consistent the scientific concepts that\nenable a science to transforms existing ideas into scientific\nknowledge.", "\nFor Althusser, it is not necessary that this process of distinction\nand clarification be accomplished before a specific theoretical\npractice can generate scientific knowledge. In fact, scientific\nactivity often proceeds without a clear understanding of the concepts\nthat allow it to produce its knowledge. Indeed, Althusser maintained\nthat this was Marx’s lot when he was writing Capital:\nscientific knowledge of the capitalist economic system was being\nproduced, but Marx did not possess a full awareness of the concepts\nallowing this production. According to this definition of philosophy\nas the Theory of theoretical practice, Althusser’s re-reading of\nCapital and other texts was philosophical insofar as it was\nable to name and distinguish the concepts that allowed Marx’s\nscientific analysis of history to proceed." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 The Role of Philosophy" }, { "content": [ "\nThe latent concepts rendered explicit by the practice of symptomatic\nreading were said by Althusser to constitute the theory of Dialectical\nMaterialism, or what is the same thing, Marx’s philosophy. With\nthese concepts made explicit, Althusser believed that Marxist science,\nor Historical Materialism, could employ them in order to achieve\nbetter analyses of specific modes of production and better\nunderstandings of the opportunities that specific modes of production\npresented for political change. Some of these concepts have already\nbeen articulated in the discussion of the mode of production above,\nbut without being named. To label these concepts and then to add some\nmore, the idea that each individual productive process or element\nstands in relation to and plays a part of a complexly structured\nwhole, none of which is reducible to being the simple or essential\ncause of the others, is what Althusser terms the idea of\n“structural causality.” This concept, in turn, is closely\nrelated to the idea of “overdetermination” or the theory\nthat every element in the total productive process constituting a\nhistorical moment is determined by all the others.", "\nAnother Marxist philosophical concept that allows the historical\nmaterialist scientist to understand the logic of a specific mode of\nproduction is that of “contradiction.” This is the idea\nthat, at any given period, multiple, concrete and definite practices\ntake place within a mode of production. Among and within these\nspecific practices, there may or may not be tensions. To take an\nexample from Marx’s chapter on “Primitive\nAccumulation” in Capital V.I, at the same time as\npeasants holdings were being expropriated in the late 15th\nand early 16th centuries by a nascent bourgeoisie, the\nchurch and the aristocracy were passing laws against this\nappropriation. Any isolable element of the total structure, be it a\nperson, a social class, an institution, or the state, in some way\nreflects and embodies these practices and these antagonisms and as\nsuch each is said to be “overdetermined.” Further,\nAlthusser specifies that the development of productive practices\nwithin a specific mode of production is often “uneven” in\naddition to possibly being antagonistic. This means, for instance,\nthat some economic elements within a whole may be more or less\ncapitalistic while others simultaneously operate according to\nsocialist norms. Thus, the development within a mode of production of\nthe practices specific to it is not necessarily homogenous or\nlinear.", "\nAdded to the Marxian concepts of structural causality, contradiction,\nuneven development, and overdetermination is that of the\n“structure in dominance.” This concept designates that\nmajor element in a structural whole that tends to organize all of the\nother practices. In much of the contemporary world and inasmuch as it\ntends to organize the production of moral values, scientific\nknowledge, the family, art, etc. this structure is the economic\npractice of commodity production and consumption. However, in another\nera and in other places, it may be the production and dissemination of\nreligious beliefs and practices that dominates and organizes the\nsocio-economic structure." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 Marxist Philosophy" }, { "content": [ "\nWith this understanding of the elements that compose any\nsocio-economic structure and their relations made explicit, something\ncan now be said about the social and political philosophies that\nfollow from it. First, with the idea that human individuals are merely\none of the sites at which the contradictory productive forces that\ncharacterize an era are enacted, Althusser signals that the primary\nobject of social philosophy is not the human individual. Second, with\nthe idea that the state produced by political activity is merely one\nproductive process among others, Althusser signals that the primary\nelement in political philosophy is not the state. Though both states\nand individuals are important elements of the socio-economic whole,\nnothing philosophical is learned by examining the essence of the\nindividual or the way in which justice is embodied by the state.", "\nAs Althusser understands them, whatever conceptions we have of the\nnature of human beings or about the proper function of the state are\nhistorically generated and serve to reproduce existing social\nrelations. In other words, they are ideological. Apart from the\nnecessity of human beings to engage in productive relations with other\nhuman beings and with their environment in order to produce their\nmeans of subsistence, there is no human nature or essence. This is the\ncore of Althusser’s “anti-humanist” position.\nFurther, though some order must exist in order to allow for the\nproduction and reproduction of social life, there is no essential or\nbest form that this order must take. This is not to say that human\nbeings do not conceive of or strive for the best order for social life\nor that they do not believe that they are essentially free or equal\nand deserving of rights. It also does not mean that all of our ideas\nare homogenous and that heterogeneous ideas about what is best cannot\nexist side by side in the same system without leading to conflict\n(though they sometimes do). However, the science of Historical\nMaterialism has revealed the desire for such orders to be historically\ngenerated along with the ideas about human nature that justify\nthem.", "\nThis account of the ideological role of our conceptions of human\nnature and of the best political arrangement shows Althusser to differ\nlittle from interpretations of Marx which hold that political\nideologies are the product of and serve existing economic relations.\nHowever, and as was detailed above, Althusser rejects the simple\nunderstanding of causality offered by this model in which economic\npractices order consciousness and our cultural practices. He also\nrejects the philosophy of history that often accompanies this model.\nThis philosophy has it that certain economic practices not only\ngenerate corresponding cultural practices, but that there is a pattern\nto economic development in which each economic order inexorably leads\nto its own demise and replacement by a different economic system. In\nthis understanding of history, feudalism must lead to capitalism and\ncapitalism to socialism. Althusser, however, argues against the idea\nthat history has a subject (such as the economy or human agency) and\nthat history has a goal (such as communism or human freedom). History,\nfor Althusser, is a process without a subject. There are patterns and\norders to historical life and there is historical change. However,\nthere is no necessity to any of these transformations and history does\nnot necessarily progress. Transformations do occur. However, they do\nso only when the contradictions and levels of development inherent in\na mode of production allow for such change." ], "subsection_title": "3.5 Social and Political Philosophy, Historiography" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nFrom the time of its initial dissemination, Althusser’s\nre-reading of Marx was met by almost equal amounts of enthusiasm and\ncastigation. For every reader who found in his prose an explanation of\nMarx’s philosophy and science that rendered Marx philosophically\nrespectable and offered renewed hope for Marxist theory, there were\ncritics who judged his work to be idealist, Stalinist, dogmatist, or\nexcessively structuralist, among myriad other charges. Though many of\nthe initial reactions were contradictory and evidenced\nmisunderstandings of what Althusser was up to, compelling criticisms\nwere also offered. One was that Althusser was only able to offer his\nreading by ignoring much of what Marx actually wrote about his logic\nand about the concepts important to his analysis. Another criticism,\nand one voiced to Althusser by leaders of the French Communist Party,\nwas that Althusser’s reading of Marx offered little on the\nrelationship between Marxist theory and Marxist political\npractice.", "\nIt took a long time before Althusser explicitly addressed the charge\nthat he had ignored much of what Marx had to say about his own logic\nand concepts. However, buffeted by these criticisms and with a sense\nthat there were idealist or “theoreticist” tendencies in\nhis reading of Marx and that the relationship between theory and\npractice was indeed under-developed, Althusser set out during the late\n1960s and 1970s to correct and revise his take on the relationships\namong philosophy, science, ideology, and politics. To some readers,\nthese revisions represented a politically motivated betrayal of his\ntheoretical accomplishments. For others, they simply revealed his\nproject as a whole to be untenable and self-contradictory. Some recent\ncritics, however, have argued that these revisions are consistent with\nand necessary to the development of what they view to be the overall\ngoal of Althusser’s work: the development of a materialist\npolitical philosophy adequate for political practice." ], "section_title": "4. Revisions (1966–78)", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAlthusser’s initial revisions to his understanding of the social\nstructure and knowledge production were informed by a renewed\nattention to the works of Lenin and by a seminar he convened at the\nENS in 1967 for leading scientists and interested students. This\ncourse resulted in a series of papers, gathered together as\nPhilosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists\n(1967a), in which Althusser began rethinking the relations among\nphilosophy, science, ideology, and politics. Though this revision was\nlater to be made more explicit, one of the most striking aspects of\nthese papers was Althusser’s abandonment of the Spinozistic\nclaim that the different levels of theoretical practice were\nautonomous. He now maintained that there was no criterion sufficient\nto demarcate scientific from ideological concepts and that all\ntheoretical concepts are marked by ideology. This did not mean,\nhowever, that any concept was as good as any other. Scientists,\nthrough their work on the material real, tended to generate better\nunderstandings of things than were available intuitively. Further, he\nargued that philosophy still had a role to play in the clarification\nof scientific concepts. This is the case because, no matter how much\nwork scientists do to understand the material real and to generate\nbetter concepts, they must always employ ideological concepts to frame\ntheir investigations and its results. Marxist philosophers, he\nmaintained, could be useful to scientists by pointing out, from the\nstandpoint of politics and by the method of historical critique, where\nand how some of the concepts scientists employed were ideological. The\nresult of this intervention of philosophy into politics would not be\n“truer” concepts, but ideas that were more\n“correct” or “right” in both the normative and\npositive senses of these words.", "\nParallel to this move, and motivated by the need to provide the link\nbetween philosophical theory and political practice that was largely\nmissing from his classic work, Althusser now argued that philosophy\nhad a useful role to play between politics and science. Political\npractice, Althusser maintained, was mostly motivated by ideological\nunderstandings of what the good is and how to accomplish it. Though he\ndid not argue that there was a way to leave ideology behind and to\nreveal the good in itself, he did maintain that science could help to\ncorrect ideological thinking about political means and ends. Social\nscience in particular could do so by showing how certain goals were\nimpossible or misguided given present socio-economic relations and by\nsuggesting that, at a certain time and in a certain place, other means\nand other ends might be more fruitfully adopted and pursued. As\nscientific knowledge does not speak directly to the public or to\npoliticians, Althusser assigned materialist philosophers the job of\ncommunicating scientific knowledge of the material real, its\nconditions, and its possibilities to politicians and the public. If\nthis communication is successful, Althusser maintained, one should not\nexpect all political activity to be successful. Instead, one should\nexpect a modest shift from an idealist ideology to one that is\nmaterialist and more scientific and which has a better chance of\nrealizing its goals." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 The Relationship between Theory and Practice" }, { "content": [ "\nDuring the 1970s, Althusser continued the revisions begun in 1967 and\nelaborated other Marxian ideas he believed to be underdeveloped.\nPerhaps the best known of the new conceptual formulations resulting\nfrom these efforts is that of “ideological\ninterpellation.” This account of how a human being becomes a\nself-conscious subject was published in an essay titled\n“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970). It\nwas excerpted from a larger essay titled “On the Reproduction of\nCapitalism.” This work analyzed the necessary relationship\nbetween state and subject such that a given economic mode of\nproduction might subsist. It includes not only an analysis of the\nstate and its legal and educational systems but also of the\npsychological relationship which exists between subject and state as\nideology. This narrative of subjectification was intended to help\nadvance Althusser’s argument that regimes or states are able to\nmaintain control by reproducing subjects who believe that their\nposition within the social structure is a natural one. Ideology, or\nthe background ideas that we possess about the way in which the world\nmust function and of how we function within it is, in this account,\nunderstood to be always present. Specific socio-economic structures,\nhowever, require particular ideologies. These ideologies are\ninstantiated by institutions or “Ideological State\nApparatuses” like family, schools, church, etc., which provide\nthe developing subject with categories in which she can recognize\nherself. Inasmuch as a person does so and embraces the practices\nassociated with those institutions, she has been successfully\n“hailed” or “interpellated” and recognized\nherself as that subject who does those kinds of things. As the effect\nof these recognitions is to continue existing social relations,\nAlthusser argued that a Dictatorship of the Proletariat is necessary\nso that Ideological State Apparatuses productive of the bourgeois\nsubject can be replaced with those productive of proletarian or\ncommunist subjects." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Theory of Ideology" }, { "content": [ "\nAlthusser’s engagement with aesthetic theory was not nearly\nso consistent as those with philosophy of science and social\nphilosophy. However, dramaturgical speculations from the\nearly 1960s were crucial to the development of his method of\nsymptomatic reading and forays into the criticism of\nvisual art beginning in the mid-1960s likewise proved of decisive\nimportance for the development of his theory of ideology. In\nparticular, Althusser’s Brechtian musings on aesthetics\nprovide partial answers to the question of how criticism\nof ideological notions of the real as well as the\ndevelopment of revolutionary strategy is possible. Althusser does\nnot argue that art provides a glimpse of actual social conditions\nunfiltered by ideology. Indeed, he argues that art mostly\nreproduces ideology. Further, there is no formal way\nto distinguish between a work of art and other cultural\nproductions like advertising. A person can “sees\nherself” in a pick-up truck advertisement as easily as a\nsubject can mis-recognize herself as the subject of a drama.\nHowever, some art, that which Althusser\ndeems “authentic” (1996a), troubles a subject’s\nusual relationship between herself and the world. This habitual\nrelation is one where the world is always seen to conform to and\nto confirm the subject’s view of “the way\nthings are”. Authentic art though makes felt or known the\ndistance between the real world and a subject’s\nhabitual ideological view of it. In this moment, the space for\ncriticism, investigation, and, perhaps, the possibility for\nacting to change the world is inaugurated.\n\n " ], "subsection_title": " 4.3 Aesthetic Theory" }, { "content": [ "\nIn 1978 and as a response to what he saw, yet again, as the\ntheoretical and political misdirection of the Communist movement,\nAlthusser authored a piece, “Marx in his Limits,” which\nwas intended to separate the good from the bad in Marx’s\nphilosophy. In his classic work (1960–65), Althusser had tried to\naccomplish this goal by separating out ideological concepts and by\nbringing forth the scientific ones. However, in “Marx in his\nLimits,” he now argued that such a method of separation cannot\nwork because—within Marx’s writings and throughout his\noeuvre—both good and bad, materialist and idealist concepts, are\nhopelessly intermixed and many are underdeveloped.", "\nInasmuch as Althusser admits in this piece that Marx never fully\nabandoned Hegel’s logic, the concept of human alienation, or the\nidea that history has a goal, the inventory Althusser offers can be\nseen as an assenting response to the charge that he had ignored\nMarx’s explicit statements in order to imagine for Marx a\nconsistent and “true” philosophy. Althusser does not give\nup on the task of articulating a better Marxist philosophy, however.\nInstead, he argues that there is another, “materialist”\ncriterion that allows us to see the limits of Marx’s thinking\nand to recognize those points in his work where Marx was unable to\ntranscend his bourgeois background and his education in German\nIdealism. This criterion is that of the practical success or failure\nof Marx’s concepts as each has been employed in the history of\nMarxist movements. When we have made this inventory and grouped\ntogether the successful concepts, what we are left with is a\nmaterialist Marxism, a Marxism which endorses the scientific method as\nthe best way for understanding ourselves and our potential but that\nalso understands that this method is fallible. Remaining also is a\nMarxism which does not subscribe to any philosophy of history and\nwhich certainly does not maintain that capitalism will inevitably lead\nto communism. This Marxism has no system of interrelated concepts that\nguarantee a scientific analysis. Further, it possesses no worked-out\ntheory of the relations between economic structures and cultural\nstructures but for that limited knowledge which scientific practice\nprovides. Finally, this Marxism has given up the dream of analyzing\nthe whole of culture and its movement from the outside; it realizes\nthat one thinks inside and about the culture one inhabits in order to\npossibly effect and change that culture." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Marx’s Philosophy Redux" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAfter being interrupted by ill health and by the events following from\nthe murder of his wife, in 1982 Althusser returned to the question of\nwhat was essential to Marx’s philosophy and expanded the scope\nof this inquiry to include speculation about the metaphysics that must\nunderlie it. Freed by his ignoble status from the task of influencing\nthe direction of the Communist movement, the texts associated with\nthis project and gathered together in the book Philosophy of the\nEncounter differ tremendously in subject matter, style, and\nmethod from his other writings. Whether these texts represent a\ncontinuation of, or even the key to his philosophy or whether they are\nan aberration is presently being debated in the secondary literature.\nHowever, as there is strong textural and archival evidence that many\nof the ideas explicitly expressed in these works had been gestating\nfor a long time, the contention that these writings are of a piece\nwith his earlier work seems to be gaining ground.", "\nThe principal thesis of Althusser’s last philosophical writings\nis that there exists an “underground” or little recognized\ntradition in the history of philosophy. Variously labeled a\n“materialism of the encounter” or “aleatory\nmaterialism,” the method which he uses to articulate this\nphilosophy is to simply comment upon works by philosophers who\nexemplify this current and to point out where, how, and to what extent\nthey do so. In addition to Marx, the philosophers that he cites as\nbeing part of this underground tradition include Democritus, Epicurus,\nLucretius, Machiavelli, Spinoza, Hobbes, Rousseau, Montesquieu,\nHeidegger, Wittgenstein, and Derrida. From these readings in the\nhistory of philosophy, Althusser aims to suggest that this tradition\nexists and that it is both philosophically fecund and viable. He also\nwishes to return to and bolster the thesis he first ventured in the\nlate 1960s that there are really only two positions in philosophy:\nmaterialism and idealism. As he understood it, the two tendencies are\nalways in a war of opposition with the one functioning to reinforce\nthe status quo and the other to possibly overcome it.", "\nPerhaps because it functions in opposition to the idealist tendency in\nphilosophy, aleatory materialism is marked almost as much by its\nrejections as it is by the positive claims it contains about the world\nand about history. As Marx is included within this tradition, it is\nnot surprising that many of these rejections are also attributed to\nhim during the course of Althusser’s earlier work. These include\na dismissal of what Althusser calls “the principle of\nReason,” or the idea that the universe or history has an origin\nor an end. With this prohibition, Althusser means to exclude from this\ntradition not only the usual suspects in the rationalist tradition,\nbut also mechanical and dialectical materialisms with their logics of\ndetermination. Also dismissed, he maintains, is the myth that somehow\nphilosophy and philosophers are autonomous, that they see the world\nfrom outside and objectively. Though there is an objective world,\nphilosophy does not have knowledge of this world as its object for\nthere is no way for it to ground itself and the material it thinks\nwith and through arises historically. Philosophy is therefore not a\nscience or the Science of sciences and it produces no universal Truth.\nRather, the truths it produces are contingent and are offered in\nopposition to other competing truths. If philosophy does have an\nobject, it is the void, or that which is not yet but which could\nbe.", "\nThat the philosophy of the encounter lacks an object does not mean\nthat it lacks positive propositions. However, given the\nepistemological status attributed to philosophy by Althusser, these\nmetaphysical propositions or “theses” are true only\ninsofar as they have explanatory or practical value. First among them,\nfollowing Democritus, is the thesis that matter is all that exists.\nSecond is the thesis that chance or the aleatory is at the origin of\nall worlds. That the patterns which constitute and define these worlds\ncan be known, described, and predicted according to certain laws or\nreasons is also true. However, the fact that these worlds ever came to\nbe organized in these patterns is aleatory and the patterns themselves\ncan only ever be known immanently. Third, new worlds and new orders\nthemselves arise out of chance encounters between pre-existing\nmaterial elements. Whether or not such orders emerge is contingent:\nthey do not have to occur. When material elements collide, they either\n“take” and a new order is founded, or they do not and the\nold world continues.", "\nTo Althusser, the propositions which have explanatory value at the\nlevel of ontology and cosmology also have value at the level of\npolitical philosophy. After first citing Rousseau and Hobbes as\nexample of philosophers who recognized that the origin and continued\nexistence of political orders is contingent, Althusser turns to\nMachiavelli and Marx for his principal examples of how aleatory\nmaterialism functions in the political realm. The anti-teleological,\nscientistic, and anti-humanist, Marxist philosophy developed by\nAlthusser over the course of his career works well with the\nmaterialist metaphysics recounted above. In this understanding of\nMarxist philosophy, societies and subjects are seen as patterns of\nactivity that behave in predictable ways. Though scientists may study\nand describe these orders in their specificity, it does not at first\nappear that philosophy can do much except to categorize these\ninteractions at the most general level. However, citing Marx’s\nwork again and taking inspiration from Machiavelli’s project of\ninstalling “a new prince in a new principality,” Althusser\nargues that the materialist philosopher may accomplish somewhat more\nthan this with her descriptions, critiques, and predictions. This is\nbecause, by examining a political order not from the perspective of\nits necessity but with an awareness of its contingency, this\nphilosopher may be able think the possibility of its transformation.\nIf chance smiles on her, if someone listens and if effects occur, then\nelements might recombine and a new political might take hold. This is,\nto be sure, a very limited and unpredictable power attributed to the\nphilosopher. However, it is also the only one that Althusser in his\nlate works argues is adequate for political practice and that does\nnot, like idealism, merely serve to reproduce existing relations." ], "section_title": "5. Late work (1980–1986): Aleatory Materialism", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "(1940–45) Journal de captivité (Stalag XA\n1940–45), (Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1992)", "(1946) “L’internationale des bons sentiments”,\nin Ecrits Philosophiques et Politiques I (Paris: Stock/IMEC\n1994), 35–57; tr. as “The International of Decent\nFeelings,” by G.M. Goshgarian in The Spectre of Hegel: Early\nWritings (London, NY: Verso, 1997).", "(1947) “Du contenu dans la pensée de G.W.F.\nHegel” in Ecrits Philosophiques et Politiques I (Paris:\nStock/IMEC 1994), 59–238; tr. as “On Content in the\nThought of G.W.F. Hegel,” by G.M. Goshgarian in The Spectre\nof Hegel: Early Writings (London, NY: Verso, 1997).", "(1950) “Le retour à Hegel. Dernier mot du\nrévisionisme universitaire,” La Nouvelle\nCritique 20 (1950); tr. as “The Return of Hegel: The Latest\nWord in Academic Revisionism,” by G.M. Goshgarian in The\nSpectre of Hegel: Early Writings (London, NY: Verso, 1997).", "(1953a) “À propos du marxisme,” Revue de\nl’enseignement philosophique, 3:4 (1953): 15–19; tr.\nas “On Marxism,” by G.M. Goshgarian in The Spectre of\nHegel: Early Writings (London, NY: Verso, 1997).", "(1953b) “Note sur le matérialisme dialectique,”\nRevue de l’enseignement philosophique, 3:5 (1953):\n11–17; tr. as “On Marxism,” by G.M. Goshgarian in\nThe Spectre of Hegel: Early Writings (London, NY: Verso,\n1997).", "(1958) Montesquieu, la politique et l’histoire\n(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959); tr. as\n“Montesquieu: Politics and History” by Ben Brewster, in\nPolitics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx, (London:\nVerso, 2007).", "(1960) “Les ‘Manifestes philosophiqes’ de\nFeuerbach,” La Nouvelle Critique 121 (1960):\n32–38; tr. as “Feuerbach’s Philosophical\nManifestoes” by Ben Brewster in Louis Althusser, For\nMarx (London: Verso, 2005).", "(1961) “Sur le jeune Marx (Questions de\nthéorie),” La Pensée 96\n(1961):3–26; tr. as “On the Young Marx: Theoretical\nQuestions,” by Ben Brewster in For Marx (London: Verso\n2005).", "(1962) “Contradiction et surdetermination (Notes pour un\nrecherche),” La Pensée 106 (1962): 3–22;\ntr. as “Contradiction and Overdetermination: Notes for an\nInvestigation” by Ben Brewster in For Marx (London:\nVerso 2005).", "(1963a) “Marxisme et humanisme” Cahiers de\nl’Institut des Sciences Économique Appliquées\n20 (1964): 109–133; tr. as “Marxism and Humanism” by\nBen Brewster in For Marx (London: Verso 2005).", "(1963b) “Sur la dialectique matérialiste (De\nl’inégalité des origines),” La\nPensée 110 (1963): 5–46; tr. as “On the\nMaterialist Dialectic: On the Unevenness of Origins,” by Ben\nBrewster in For Marx (London: Verso 2005).", "(1964) “Freud et Lacan,” La Nouvelle Critique\n161–162 (1964–1965): 88–108; tr. as “Freud and\nLacan” by Ben Brewster in Lenin and Philosophy and Other\nEssays (New York: Monthly Review, 2002.", "(1965a) Lire le Capital, Tome 1 & 2, with\nÉtienne Balibar, Roger Establet, Pierre Macherey, and Jacques\nRancière (Paris: Maspero, coll. “Théorie”);\ntr. by Ben Brewster as Reading Capital with the contributions\nof Establet, Macherey, and Rancière omitted (London: Verso\n2016)", "(1965b) “Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical\nFormation” tr. by James Kavanaugh, in Gregory Elliott ed.\nPhilosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists\n(London: Verso, 1990).", "(1966a) “Lettre sur la connaissance de l’art\n(réponse à André Daspre) (In Ecrits\nphilosophiques et politiques, Tome II, edited by François\nMatheron, 559–68. Ecrits philosophiques et politiques. Paris:\nStock IMEC, 1995.", "(1966b) “Sur la genèse,”\nDécalages 1(2) (2013). J. Smith (trans.), 2012,\n“On Genesis”, Décalages 1 (2).", "(1966c) “Sur Lévi-Strauss,” in\nÉcrits philosophiques et politiques, Tome 2 (Paris:\nStock/IMEC, 1997), 417–432; tr. by G.M. Goshgarian in The\nHumanist Controversy and Other Writings (London: Verso\n2003).", "(1967a) Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des\nsavants (1967), (Maspero, coll. “Théorie”,\n1974); tr. Warren Montag as “Philosophy and the Spontaneous\nPhilosophy of the Scientists,” in Gregory Elliott ed.\nPhilosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists\n(London: Verso, 1990).", "(1967b) “La tâche historique de la philosophie\nmarxiste” tr. by G.M. Goshgarian as “The Historical Task\nof Marxist Philosophy” in in The Humanist Controversy and\nOther Writings (London: Verso 2003).", "(1968a) “Lenine et la Philosophie,” Bulleting de\nla Société de Philosophie 4 (1968): 127–181;\ntr. as “Lenin and Philosophy” by Ben Brewster in Lenin\nand Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review\n2002).", "(1968c) “Sur le rapport de Marx à Hegel,” in\nJacques l’Hondt ed. Hegel et la pensée moderne\n(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), 85–111; tr. as\n“Marx’s Relation to Hegel” by Ben Brewster in\nLenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly\nReview 2002).", "(1969b) Ideologie et appareils idéologiques\nd’État (notes pour une recherche) La\nPensée 151 (1970): 3–38; tr. as “Ideology and\nIdeology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an\nInvestigation” by Ben Brewster in Lenin and Philosophy and\nOther Essays (New York: Monthly Review 2002).", "(1969c) On The Reproduction Of Capitalism: Ideology And\nIdeological State Apparatuses, tr. G. M. Goshgarian (London &\nNew York: Verso 2013).", "(1972a) Élements d’autocritique (Paris:\nHachette coll. “Analyse”, 1974); tr. as “Elements of\nSelf-Criticism” by Grahame Lock in Essays in\nSelf-Criticism (New Left Books, London, 1976).", "(1973) “Livre sur l’imperialisme” tr. As\n“Book on Imperialism” by G.M. Goshgarian in History and\nImperialism (Cambridge, UK and Medford, MA: Polity Press, 202", "(1975) “Est-il simple d’être marxiste en\nphilosophie? (Soutenance d’Amiens)” La\nPensée 183 (1975): 3–31; tr. as “Is it Simple\nto be a Marxist in Philosophy?” by Grahame Locke in Essays\nin Self-Criticism (New Left Books, London, 1976).", "(1976a) 22éme Congrés (Paris: Maspero,\n1977); tr. as “On the Twenty-Second Congress of the French\nCommunist Party” by Ben Brewster in New Left Review 104\n(1977): 3–22.", "(1976b) Etre marxiste en philsophie (Paris: Presses universitaires\nde France 2016) tr. as How to Be a Marxist in Philosophy, by G.M.\nGoshgarian (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).", "(1976c) “La transformation de la philosophie,” Sur\nla philosophie (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 139–178; tr. as\n“The Transformation of Philosophy” by Thomas E. Lewis in\nGregory Elliott ed. Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of\nthe Scientists (London: Verso, 1990).", "(1977a) “Avant-propos du livre de G. Duménil,\n‘Le concept de loi économique dans ‘Le\nCapital’”, in Solitude de Machiavel et autres\ntextes, ed. Yves Sintomer (Paris: Presses Universitaires de\nFrance, 1998), 245–266.", "(1977b) “Enfin la crise du marxisme!” in Pouvoir\net opposition dans les sociétés\npost-révolutionnaires (Le Seuil, coll.\n“Combats”, 1978), 242–253.", "(1977c) “Solitude de Machiavel” in Solitude de\nMachiavel et autres texts (Paris: Presses Universitaires de\nFrance, 1998), 311–324; tr. as “Machiavell’s\nSolitude” by Ben Brewster in Machiavelli and Us\n(London: Verso, 1999).", "(1977d) Les vâches noires: interview imaginaire (le\nmalaise du XXIIe congrès) ce qui ne va pas camarades!, ed.\nby G. M. Goshgarian (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,\n2016).", "(1978a) “Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans le Parti\nCommuniste,”(Paris: François Maspero 1978).", "(1978b) “Marx dans ses limites,” in Écrits\nphilosophiques et politiques, Tome 1 (Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1994),\n357–524.", "(1978c) “Le marxisme aujourd’hui,” in\nSolitude de Machiavel et autres texts (Paris: Presses\nUniversitaires de France, 1998), 292–310; tr. as “Marxism\nToday” by James H. Kavanaugh in Gregory Elliott ed.\nPhilosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists\n(London: Verso, 1990).", "(1978d) Que Faire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de\nFrance, 2018) tr. as What Is to Be Done?, by G. M. Goshgarian\n(Cambridge [U.K.]: Polity, 2020).", "(1980) Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes\n(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013) tr. as Philosophy\nfor Non-Philosophers, by G.M. Goshgarian (New York: Bloomsbury,\n2017).", "(1982) “Sur la pensée Marxiste,” in Future\nanterieur, Sur Althusser. Passages (Paris: L’Harmattan,\n1993), 11–29; and “Le courant souterrain du\nmatérialisme de la rencontre,”in Écrits\nphilosophiques et politiques, Tome 1 (Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1994),\n583–594; and ‘Notes sur les Thèses sur\nFeuerbach,’ Magazine Littéraire, 324 (1994):\n38–42; extracts translated as “The Underground Current of\nthe Materialism of the Encounter” by G.M. Goshgarian in\nPhilosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978–1987\n(London: Verso, 2006).", "(1984–1987a) “Lettres de Louis Althusser à\nFernanda Navarro,” (1984), Sur la philosophie (Paris:\nGallimard, 1994), 89–138; tr. as “Letters from Louis\nAlthusser to Fernanda Navarro” by G.M. Goshgarian in\nPhilosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978–1987\n(London: Verso, 2006).", "(1984–1987a) “Philosophie et marxisme: entretiens avec\nFernanda Navarra (1984–1987)” in Sur la\nphilosophie (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 13–79.", "(1985) “L’avenir dure longtemps,” in\nL’avenir dure longtemps, suivi de Les Faits (Paris:\nStock/IMEC, 1992), 7–279; tr. as “The Future Lasts\nForever” by Richard Veasey in The Future Lasts Forever: A\nMemoir (New York: New Press, 1993).", "Althusser, Louis, et al., 1993. Sur Althusser:\nPassages, Paris: Éditions l’Harmattan.", "Atkinson, D., 1984. “The Anatomy of Knowledge:\nAlthusser’s Epistemology and its Consequences,”\nPhilosophical Papers, 13: 1–19.", "Balibar, Étienne, 1974. “Sur la dialectique\nhistorique. Quelques remarques critiques à propos de Lire le\nCapital,” in: Cinq études du matérialisme\nhistorique, Paris: François Maspero: 203–245.", "Badiou, Alain, 2009. “Louis Althusser,” in Pocket\nPantheon: figures of postwar philosophy (David Macey trans.),\nLondon: Verso: 54–90.", "–––, 2012. “The Recommencement of\nDialectical Materialism”, in The Adventures of French\nPhilosophy, Bruno Bosteels (trans.), London: Verso:", "Balibar, Étienne, 1991. Écrits pour\nAlthusser, Paris: Éditions la Découverte.", "–––, 1994. “Althusser’s\nobject,” Social Text, 39: 157–188.", "Baltas, Aristide, 1993. “Philosophy and the Spontaneous\nPhilosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays, by Louis\nAlthusser,” Philosophy of Science, 60(4):\n647–658.", "Bargu, Banu, 2015. “Althusser’s Materialist Theater:\nIdeology and Its Aporias,” Differences, 26(3):\n81–106.", "Bargu, Banu, and William S Lewis, 2020. “Disjecta\nMembra: Althusser’s Aestethics\nReconsidered.” Filozofski Vestnik, 41(1):\n7–59. ", "Benton, Ted, 1984. The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism:\nAlthusser and his Influence, London: McMillan.", "Bidet, Jacques, 1997. “La Lecture du Capital par\nLouis Althusser,” in P. Raymond (ed.), Althusser\nPhilosophe, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.", "Boer, Roland, 2007. Criticism of Heaven: On Marxism and\nTheology (Historical Materialism Book Series), New York: Brill\nAcademic.", "Bourdin, Jean-Claude, 2000. “The Uncertain Materialism of\nLouis Althusser,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal,\n22(1): 271–287.", "Bourgeois, Bernard, 1997. “Althusser et Hegel” in P.\nRaymond (ed.), Althusser Philosophe, Paris: Presses\nUniversitaires de France, 87–104.", "Breton, Stanislas, 1997. “Althusser et la religion,”\nin P. Raymond (ed.), Althusser Philosophe, Paris: Presses\nUniversitaires de France, 155–166.", "Bruschi, Fabio, 2020. Le matérialisme politique de Louis\nAlthusser, Paris: Mimesis.", "Callinicos, Alex, 1976. Althusser’s Marxism (London: Pluto\nPress).", "Carmichael, Thomas, 2022. “‘[A]Nother Kind of\nRain’: Aesthetic Ontology and Contagious Imaginations in\nAlthusser’s Aleatory Materialism.” Historical Materialism\n1: 1–28.", "Cavazzini, André, 2015. “Althusser/Bachelard: Une\nCoupure et Ses Enjeux,” Revue Synthèse (Philosophie et\nmathématique), 136(1-2): 117–33.", "Crézégut, Anthony, 2016. “Althusser,\nÉtrange Lecteur de Gramsci. Lire «Le Marxisme N’est\nPas Un Historicisme»: 1965–2015,” Décalages,\n2(1).\n[Crézégut 2016 available online]\n", "Dupuis-Déri, F., 2015. “La banalité du\nmâle. Louis Althusser a tué sa conjointe,\nHélène Rytmann-Legotien, qui voulait le quitter,”\nNouvelles Questions Féministes, 34(1): 84–101.", "Erdem, Erdinç, 2019. “Althusser’s Relation to\nHegel: French Hegelianism, Marxism, and Aleatory Materialism.”\nRethinking Marxism 31(3): 380–401. ", "Ekici, Ekrim, Jörk Nowak, and Freider Otto Wolf (eds.), 2015.\nAlthusser – Die Reproduktion des Marxismus,\nMünster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. ", "Elliot, Gregory, 2006 [1987]. Althusser: The Detour of\nTheory, New York: Verso.", "––– (ed.), 1994. Althusser: A critical\nReader, Oxford: Blackwell.", "Geerlandt, Robert, 1978. Garaudy et Althusser: le\ndébate sur l’humanisme dans le Parti Communiste\nFrançais et son Enjeu, Paris: Presses Universitaires de\nFrance.", "Gillot, Pascale, 2009. Althusser et la psychanalyse,\nParis: Presses universitaires de France.", "Goshgarian, G.M., 2003. “Introduction,” In The\nHumanist Controversy and Other Writings, London: Verso,\nxi–lxii.", "–––, 2006. “Translator’s\nIntroduction,” in Louis Althusser: Philosophy of the\nEncounter (Later Writings 1978–1987), London: Verso,\nxiii–l", "–––, 2015a. “A Marxist in\nPhilosophy,” Diacritics, 43(2): 24–46.", "–––, 2015b. “Philosophie et\nrévolution. Althusser sans le théoricisme ,”\nPériode, February 19, 2015.", "Hardy, N., 2014. “Wolff, Althusser, and Hegel: Outlining an\nAleatory Materialist Epistemology,” Rethinking Marxism,\n26(4): 454–71.", "Hamza, Agon, 2011. Louis Althusser, Kosovo: Kolektivi\nMaterializmi Dialektik.", "Harnecker, Marta, 1994. “Althusser and the Theoretical\nAnti-Humanism of Marx,” Nature, Society, and Thought, 7\n(3): 325–329.", "Lazarus, Sylvain (ed.), 1993. Politique et Philosophie dans\nl’oeuvre de Louis Althusser, Paris: Presses Universitaires\nde France.", "Lewis, William S., 2005. Louis Althusser and the Traditions of\nFrench Marxism, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.", "Lewis, William S., 2022. Concrete Critical Theory:\nAlthusser’s Marxism, Leiden: Brill.", "Lindner, Kolja, 2007. “Lire le Capital: Althusser et\nl’impasse du tournant politiciste,” Contretemps,\n20: 71–81.", "Lindner, Urs, 2011. “Repenser la «coupure\népistémologigue» lire Marx avec et Contre\nAlthusser,” Actuel Marx, 1 (49): 121–139", "Macey, David, 1994. “Thinking With Borrowed Concepts:\nAlthusser and Lacan,” in Gregory Elliott (ed.), Althusser: a\nCritical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 142–158.", "Macherey, Pierre, 2002. “Althusser et le jeune Marx,”\nActuel-Marx, 31: 159–175.", "Malabou, Catherine, 2016. “Où va le\nmatérialisme ? Althusser/Darwin,” Lignes,\n51: 3–51.", "Matheron, François, 1998. “The Recurrence of the Void\nin Louis Althusser,” Rethinking Marxism, 10(3):\n22–27.", "Matheron, François, 2004. “Louis Althusser, or, the\nImpure Purity of the Concept,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy\nJournal, 25(1): 137–159.", "–––, 2005. “‘des problèmes\nqu’il faudra bien appeler d’un autre nom et\npeut-être politique’: Althusser et\nl’instabilité de la politique,”\nMultitudes, 22: 21–35.", "Montag, Warren, 1998. “Althusser’s Nominalism:\nStructure and Singularity (1962–66),” Rethinking\nMarxism, 10(3): 64–73.", "–––, 2002. Louis Althusser, New York:\nPalgrave.", "–––, 2005a. “Politics: Transcendent or\nImmanent?: A response to Miguel Vatter’s ‘Machiavelli\nafter Marx’,” Theory and Event, 7(4); doi:\n10.1353/tae.2005.0052", "–––, 2009. Althusser and His Contemporaries:\nPhilosophy’s Perpetual War, Durham, NC: Duke University\nPress.", "Moreau, Pierre-François, 1997. “Althusser et\nSpinoza,” in P. Raymond (ed.), Althusser Philosophe,\nParis: Presses Universitaires de France, 75–86.", "Morfino, Vitorrio, 2005. “An Althusserian Lexicon,”\ntranslated by Jason Smith, Borderlands e-journal, 4(2).", "Morfino, Vittorio, 2022. “The Prince between Gramsci and\nAlthusser” in Machiavelli Then and Now: History, Politics,\nLiterature, ed. by Prasanta Chakravarty and Sukanta Chaudhuri,\n296–315. Cambridge [UK]: Cambridge University Press.", "Moulier-Boutang, Yann, 1992. Louis Althusser: Une\nBiographie (Tome I: La Formation du mythe,\n1918–1956), Paris: Bernard Grasset.", "Negri, Antonio, 2000. The Savage Anomaly: The Power of\nSpinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, New York: University of\nMinnesota Press.", "O’Boyle, B., and T. McDonough, 2016. “Critical\nRealism and the Althusserian Legacy,” Journal for the Theory\nof Social Behaviour, 46(2): 143–164.", "Patton, Paul, 1978. “Althusser’s Epistemology: The\nLimits of the Theory of Theoretical Practice,” Radical\nPhilosophy, 19: 8–18.", "Pfeifer, Geoff., 2015. The New Materialism: Althusser, Badiou,\nZizek, London: Routledge.", "Pippa, Stefano., 2020. “A Heap of Splinters On the\nFloor.” SoftPower 7(1):125–44.", "Pippa, Stefano., 2019. Althusser and Contingency, Milan:\nMimesis.", "O’Hagan, Timothy, 1982. “Althusser: How to be a\nMarxist in Philosophy,” in G. H. R. Parkinson (ed.), Marx\nand Marxisms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,\n243–264.", "Rancière, Jacques, 2011. Althusser’s Lesson,\nEmiliano Battista (trans.), Continuum, 2011", "Raymond, Pierre, 1997. “Le matérialisme\nd’Althusser,” in P. Raymond (ed.), Althusser\nPhilosophe, Paris: Presses Universitaire de France,\n167–179; trans. by Ted Stolze, 2015, “Althusser’s\nMaterialism,” Historical Materialism, 23(2):\n176–88.", "Resch, Robert Paul, 1992. Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist\nSocial Theory, Berkeley: University of California Press.", "Rodríguez Arriagada, Marcelo, and Starcenbaum, Marcelo,\n2017. Lecturas de Althusser En América Santiago de Chile :\nDoble Ciencia.", "Romé, Natalia, 2021. For Theory: Althusser and\nthe Politics of Time. Lanham (Md.): Rowman &\nLittlefield.", "Roudinesco, Elisabeth, 2008. Philosophy in Turbulent Times:\nCanguilhem, Sartre, Foucault, Althusser, Deleuze, Derrida, New\nYork: Columbia University Press.", "Sanchez Estop, Juan Domingo, and Louis Althusser, 2022.\nAlthusser et Spinoza, détours et retours: avec trois textes\ninédits de Louis Althusser sur Spinoza. Brussels: Editions\nde l’Université de Bruxelles", "Sève, Lucien, 1997. “Althusser et la\ndialectique,” in P. Raymond (ed.), Althusser Philosophe, Paris:\nPresses Universitaire de France, 105–136.", "–––, 2004. Penser avec Marx\naujourd’hui, Paris: La Dispute.", "Sotiris, Panagiotis, 2020. A Philosophy for Communism:\nRethinking Althusser. A Philosophy for Communism. Leiden:\nBrill.", "Sprinker, Michael, 1995. “The Legacies of Althusser,”\nYale French Studies, 88: 201–225.", "Suchtig, Wal, 2004. “Althusser’s Late Thinking About\nMaterialism,” Historical Materialism, 12(1):\n3–70.", "Thomas, Peter, 2002. “Philosophical Strategies: Althusser\nand Spinoza,” Historical Materialism, 10(3):\n71–113.", "Thomas, Peter, Gal Kirn, Sara Farris, and Katja Diefenbach (eds.),\n2012. Encountering Althusser: politics and materialism in\ncontemporary radical thought, London: Continuum.", "Thomas, Paul, 2008. Marxism and scientific socialism: from\nEngels to Althusser, London: Routledge.", "Thompson, E. P., 1978. “The Poverty of Theory, or an Orrery\nof Errors,” The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays,\nLondon: Merlin.", "Tosel, André, 2005. “Les aléas du\nmatérialisme aléatoire dans la dernière philo de\nLouis Althusser,” in E. Kouvelakis, et al. (eds.),\nSartre, Lukács, Althusser: des Marxistes en\nphilosophie, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,\n169–196", "Vatter, Miguel, 2004. “Machiavelli After Marx: the\nSelf-Overcoming of Marxism in the Late Althusser,” Theory\nand Event 7(4).", "Viparelli, I., 2015, “Althusser. La nécessité\ndu « tournant » ontologique,” I. Pinto\n(trans.), Cahiers du GRM, 8 (December).", "Williams, Caroline, 2001. Contemporary French Philosophy:\nModernity and the Persistence of the Subject, London,\nAthlone.", "Wolf, Frieder Otto, 2008. “Reproduktion und Ideologie bei\nLouis Althusser. Eine aktualisierende Annäherung”, in\nFrieder O. Wolf and Gerd Peter (eds.), Welt ist Arbeit. Im Kampf\num die neue Ordnung, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot,\n41–54." ]	[ { "href": "../epistemology-social/", "text": "epistemology: social" }, { "href": "../foucault/", "text": "Foucault, Michel" }, { "href": "../hegel-dialectics/", "text": "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: dialectics" }, { "href": "../hermeneutics/", "text": "hermeneutics" }, { "href": "../lacan/", "text": "Lacan, Jacques" }, { "href": "../law-ideology/", "text": "law: and ideology" }, { "href": "../marx/", "text": "Marx, Karl" }, { "href": "../postmodernism/", "text": "postmodernism" }, { "href": "../scientific-revolutions/", "text": "scientific revolutions" }, { "href": "../social-institutions/", "text": "social institutions" }, { "href": "../spinoza-political/", "text": "Spinoza, Baruch: political philosophy" } ]
altruism	Altruism	First published Thu Aug 25, 2016; substantive revision Mon Aug 31, 2020	[ "\nBehavior is normally described as altruistic when it is motivated by a\ndesire to benefit someone other than oneself for that person’s\nsake. The term is used as the contrary of\n“self-interested” or “selfish” or\n“egoistic”—words applied to behavior that is\nmotivated solely by the desire to benefit oneself.\n“Malicious” designates an even greater contrast: it\napplies to behavior that expresses a desire to harm others simply for\nthe sake of harming them.", "\nSometimes, however, the word is used more broadly to refer to behavior\nthat benefits others, regardless of its motive. Altruism in this broad\nsense might be attributed to certain kinds of non-human\nanimals—mother bears, for example, who protect their cubs from\nattack, and in doing so put their own lives in danger. So used, there\nis no implication that such adult bears act “for the sake”\nof their young (Sober and Wilson 1998: 6). ", "\nThis essay will discuss altruism in the former sense, as behavior\nundertaken deliberately to help someone other than the agent for that\nother individual’s sake. There is a large and growing empirical\nliterature on altruism, which asks whether there is an evolutionary or\nbiological basis for human altruism, and whether\nnon-human species exhibit it or something similar to it.\nThese issues are addressed by the entries on\n empirical approaches to altruism and\n biological altruism.\n", "\nIt is commonly assumed that we ought to be altruistic at least to some\nextent. But to what extent? And is altruism necessarily admirable? Why\nshould one act for the sake of others and not only for\none’s own sake? For that matter, do people in fact act out\nof altruism, or is all behavior ultimately self-interested?" ]	[ { "content_title": "1. What is altruism?", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Mixed motives and pure altruism", "1.2 Self-sacrifice, strong and weak altruism", "1.3 Moral motives and altruistic motives", "1.4 Well-Being and perfection" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Does altruism exist?", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Psychological egoism: strong and weak versions", "2.2 An empirical argument for psychological egoism", "2.3 An a priori argument for psychological egoism", "2.4 Hunger and desire", "2.5 Desire and motivation", "2.6 Pure altruism and self-sacrifice", "2.7 Does egoism exist?" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Self and others: some radical metaphysical alternatives", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Why care about others?", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Eudaimonism", "4.2 Impartial Reason", "4.3 Nagel and the impersonal standpoint", "4.4 Sentimentalism and fellow feeling" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Kant on sympathy and duty", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Sentimentalism revisited", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nBefore proceeding, further clarification of the term\n“altruism” is called for." ], "section_title": "1. What is altruism?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAltruistic acts include not only those undertaken in order to do good\nto others, but also those undertaken in order to avoid or prevent harm\nto them. Suppose, for example, someone drives her car extra cautiously\nbecause she sees that she is in an area where children are playing, and\nshe wants to insure that she injures no one. It would be appropriate to\nsay that her caution is altruistically motivated. She is not trying to\nmake those children better off, but she is being careful not to make\nthem worse off. She does this because she genuinely cares about them for\ntheir sake.", "\nFurthermore, altruistic acts need not involve self-sacrifice, and they\nremain altruistic even when they are performed from a mixture of\nmotives, some of which are self-interested. The driver in the\npreceding example may have plenty of time to get where she is going;\nslowing down and paying extra attention may not be contrary to her own\ngood. Even so, her act counts as altruistic if one of her\nmotives for being cautious is her concern for the children for their\nsake. She may also be aware that if she injures a child, she could be\npunished for reckless driving, which she of course wants to avoid for\nself-interested reasons. So, her caution is both altruistic and\nself-interested; it is not motivated by only one kind of reason. We\nshould not be confused by the fact that “self-interested”\nand “altruistic” are opposites. A single motive\ncannot be characterized in both ways; but a single act can be\nundertaken from both motives.", "\nIf someone performs an act entirely from altruistic motives—if,\nthat is, self-interested motives are entirely absent—we can\ndescribe her act as a case of “pure” altruism. We should\nbe careful to distinguish purely altruistic behavior from\nself-sacrificing behavior: the former involves no gain for oneself,\nwhereas the latter involves some loss. If someone has a theater ticket\nthat he cannot use because he is ill, and he calls the box office so\nthat the ticket can be used by someone else, that is a case of pure\naltruism, but it involves no sacrifice." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Mixed motives and pure altruism" }, { "content": [ "\nConsider someone whose deliberations are always guided by this\nprinciple: “I shall never do anything unless doing so is best\nfor me”. Such an individual is refusing ever to sacrifice his\nwell-being even to the slightest degree. But in view of the\nterminological points just made, he could have altruistic motives for\nsome of what he does—or even for much or all that he does! On\nany given occasion, he could have mixed motives: he is careful always\nto do what is best for himself, but that allows him also to be\nmotivated by the perception that what he does is also good for others.\n", "\nIt would be odd or misleading to say that such an individual is an\naltruistic person. Many people would criticize him for being\ninsufficiently altruistic. It is part of common sense morality that\none should be willing to compromise with other people—to\ncooperate with others in ways that require one to accept what is less\ngood for oneself than some other alternative, so that others can have\ntheir fair share.", "\nThese reflections lead to a peculiar result: each act undertaken by\nsuch an individual could be altruistically motivated, and yet we are\nreluctant, and reasonably so, to say that he is an altruistic person.\nThe best way to accommodate both ideas, which seem to be in tension,\nwould be to make a distinction between two uses of the word\n“altruism”. An act is altruistic in the strong sense if is\nundertaken in spite of the perception that it involves some loss of\none’s well-being. An act is altruistic in the weak sense if it\nis motivated, at least in part, by the fact that it benefits someone\nelse or the fact that it will not injure anyone else. The individual\ndescribed two paragraphs above is someone who never acts\naltruistically in the strong sense. That policy seems objectionable to\nmany people—even though he may act altruistically in the weak\nsense on many occasions." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Self-sacrifice, strong and weak altruism" }, { "content": [ "\nSome of what we do in our interactions with other people is morally\nmotivated but not altruistic. Suppose A has borrowed a book\nfrom B and has promised to return it within a week. When\nA returns the book by the deadline, his motive might be\ndescribed as moral: he has freely made a promise, and he takes himself\nto have an obligation to keep such promises. His motive is simply to\nkeep his word; this is not an example of altruism. But if A\ngives B a book as a gift, thinking that B will enjoy it\nand find it useful, he is acting simply out of a desire to benefit\nB. His motive in this case is altruistic. ", "\nSimilarly, suppose a mother refrains from giving her adult son advice\nabout a certain matter because she thinks that it is not her place to\ndo so—it would be interfering too much in his private affairs.\nEven so, she might also think that he would benefit from receiving her\nadvice; she respects his autonomy but fears that as a result he will\ndecide badly. Her restraint is morally motivated, but it would not\nnormally be described as an act of altruism.", "\nAs these examples indicate, the notion of altruism is applicable not\nto every morally motivated treatment of others, but more narrowly to\nwhat is done out of a concern for the good of others—in other\nwords, for their well-being. Altruistic acts might be described as\ncharitable or benevolent or kind, for these words also convey the idea\nof acting for the good of others, and not merely rightly towards\nothers.", "\nOften the individuals who are the “targets” of altruistic\nbehavior are selected for such treatment because of a personal tie\nbetween the benefactor and the beneficiary. If A was\nextraordinarily kind to B when B was a child, and at a\nlater time B is in a position to help A out of a\ndifficult situation, the help B gives to A is\naltruistically motivated, even though their common past explains why\nit is A that B has chosen to help (rather than a\nstranger in need). Here it is assumed that B is not promoting\nA’s well-being as a mere means to his own\n(B’s) own well-being. If that were so, B would not\nbe benefiting A for A’s sake, but only for\nB’s sake. (A further assumption is that B is not\nmotivated simply by a sense that he owes repayment to A;\nrather, he not only feels indebted to A but also genuinely\ncares about him.) The people whom we treat altruistically are often\nthose to whom we have a sentimental attachment, or towards whom we\nfeel grateful. But that is not the only possibility. Some altruistic\nacts are motivated simply by a recognition of the great need of those\nwho benefit from them, and the benefactor and beneficiary may be\nstrangers to each other. ", "\nThat an act is altruistically motivated does not entail that it is\njustified or praiseworthy. A may mistakenly think that\nshe is enhancing the well-being of B; B might also\nmistakenly think that she is benefiting from A’s\nefforts. We could say that in such cases there is something admirable\nabout A’s motive, but nonetheless judge that she ought not\nto have acted as she did." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Moral motives and altruistic motives" }, { "content": [ "\nAs noted above, altruistic acts are guided by assumptions made by the\nagent about the well-being of some other individual or group. What\nwell-being consists in is a disputed matter, but it is uncontroversial\nthat a distinction must be drawn between (i) what constitutes\nwell-being and (ii) what is a necessary means towards or a\npre-condition of well-being. This kind of distinction is familiar, and\nis applicable in all sorts of cases. For example, we distinguish\nbetween what a breakfast consists in (cereal, juice, coffee) and the\nthings one needs in order to eat breakfast (spoons, glasses, mugs).\nThere is no such thing as eating breakfast but not eating anything\nthat breakfast consists in. In the same way, well-being must be sought\nand fostered by seeking and fostering the good or goods in which\nwell-being consists. Rival theories of well-being are competing ways\nof answering the question: what are its constituents? After we have\nanswered that question, we need to address the further question of how\nbest to obtain those constituents. (Contemporary discussions of\nwell-being can be found in Badhwar 2014; Feldman 1994, 2010; Fletcher\n2016; Griffin 1986; Kraut 2007; Sumner 1996 Tiberius 2018.)", "\nWell-being admits of degrees: the more one has of the good or goods in\nwhich it consists, the better off one is. It would be an awkward\nmanner of speaking to say of someone: “she has well-being”.\nA more natural way to express that idea would be to use such terms as\nthese: “she is faring well”, “she is well off”,\n“she is flourishing”, “her life is going well for\nher”. The constituents of well-being can also be spoken of as\nbenefits or advantages—but when one uses these terms to refer to\nwell-being, one must recognize that these benefits or advantages are\nconstituents of well-being, and not merely of instrumental value.\nBenefits and advantages, in other words, fall into two categories:\nthose that are good for someone merely because they foster other\ngoods, and those that are good for someone in that they are\nconstituents of that individual’s well-being.", "\nA distinction must be drawn between being good at something\nand having what is good for oneself. It is one thing to say,\n“he is good at acting” and another to say “acting is\ngood for him”. Philosophers speak of the former as\n“perfectionist value” and the latter as “prudential\nvalue”. That is because when one tries to be good at something,\none hopes to move closer to the ideal of perfection. Prudential value\nis the kind of good that it would be in someone’s interest to\nobtain—it is another term that belongs to the group we have been\ndiscussing: “well-being”, “welfare”,\n“benefit”, and so on.", "\nEven though perfectionist and prudential value must be distinguished,\nit should not be inferred that that being good at something is not a\nconstituent of well-being. To return to the example used in the\npreceding paragraph: if someone has great talent as an actor and\nenjoys acting and every aspect of theatrical life, it is plausible to\nsay that his well-being consists, at least to some extent, in his\nenjoyment of these activities. There are two different facts in play\nhere: (i) he is an excellent actor, and (ii) being an excellent actor\nis good for him (not as a mere means, but as a component of his\nwell-being). The value referred to in (i) is perfectionist value, and\nin (ii) prudential value. It would be prudent of him, in other words,\nto continue to excel as an actor.", "\nThese points about well-being and excellence are pertinent to a study\nof altruism because they help guard against a too narrow conception of\nthe sorts of goods that an altruist might promote in others. Altruists\ndo not aim only at the relief of suffering or the avoidance of\nharm—they also try to provide positive benefits to others for\ntheir sake. What counts as a benefit depends on what the correct\ntheory of well-being is, but it is widely and plausibly assumed that\ncertain kinds of excellence are components of a good life. For\nexample, someone who founds a school that trains children to excel in\nthe arts and sciences, or in sports, simply so that they will enjoy\nexercising such skills, would be regarded as a great public benefactor\nand philanthropist. Similarly, teachers and parents who foster in\ntheir students and children a love of literature and the skills needed\nto appreciate it would be viewed as altruists, if they are motivated\nby the thought that by themselves these activities are benefits to\nthose students and children.", "\nHowever, it is possible for someone to be dedicated to excellence and\nat the same time to be utterly indifferent to human\nwell-being—and when this happens, we have no inclination to say\nthat such a person is motivated by altruism. Someone might be devoted\nto a subject—mathematics, or philosophy, or\nliterature—rather than to the well-being of those who study and\nmaster that subject. For example, imagine a student of literature who\ncares deeply about James Joyce’s Ulysses, because he\ntakes it to be one of the supreme achievements of the human mind. He\ndoes not want that novel merely to gather dust on library\nshelves—it deserves readers who love and understand it, and so\nthe skills needed to appreciate it must be kept alive from one\ngeneration to another. This kind of devotion to perfectionist value is\nnot a form of altruism.", "\nFor an act to be altruistically motivated is for the\nbenefactor—not the beneficiary—to have a certain\nattitude towards it. A child who acquires from a tennis instructor the\nskills of a good athlete and a love of the game may simply think of\ntennis as great fun—not as something that benefits him or as a\nconstituent of his life going well. The child does not need to\npractice his skills because he believes that doing so is good for him:\nthat is not a necessary condition of his being the beneficiary of an\naltruistic act. Similarly, someone might deny that physical suffering\ncounts as something that is bad for him. (He should deny this,\naccording to the Stoics.) But on any plausible theory of well-being,\nhe is wrong about that; someone who aims to diminish the pain of\nanother individual, out of a concern for that individual’s\nwell-being, is acting altruistically. ", "\nTo take another example, consider someone who develops a love of\nphilosophy and immerses herself in the subject. When she asks herself\nwhether she is doing this for her own good, she may reply that her\nreasons are quite different. She may say, “philosophy is\nworthwhile in itself”. Or: “I want to solve the mind-body\nproblem and the free will problem because these are deep and important\nissues”. If we suggested to her that her philosophical struggles\nare a component of her well-being, she might regard that as a strange\nway of looking at things. But her view is not\nauthoritative—whether she is right depends on what the best\ntheory of well-being is. Others who care about her could plausibly\nbelieve that her love of philosophy is a component of her well-being,\nbecause it constitutes an enrichment and deepening of her mind, which is of value to her in itself, whether or not it leads to some further result. If they help her pursue her\nphilosophical interests simply for her sake, their motives would be\naltruistic, even if she herself does not care about philosophy because\nshe thinks it is good for her." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 Well-Being and perfection" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Does altruism exist?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAccording to a doctrine called “psychological egoism”, all\nhuman action is ultimately motivated by self-interest. The\npsychological egoist can agree with the idea, endorsed by common\nsense, that we often seek to benefit others besides ourselves; but he\nsays that when we do so, that is because we regard helping others as a\nmere means to our own good. According to the psychological egoist, we\ndo not care about others for their sake. Altruism, in other words,\ndoes not exist.", "\nSince we have distinguished several different ways of using the term\n“altruism”, it will be helpful to make similar\ndistinctions between different varieties of psychological egoism.\nRecall that an act is altruistic in the weak sense if it is motivated,\nat least in part, by the fact that it benefits someone else (or the\nfact that it will not injure anyone else). Psychological egoism, as\ndefined in the preceding paragraph, denies that altruism in this sense\nexists. That is the strongest form of this doctrine; it is usually\nwhat philosophers have in mind when they discuss psychological egoism.\nBut we can imagine weaker versions. One of them would deny that\naltruism is ever pure; it would say, in other words, that whenever we\nact, one of our motives is a desire for our own good. Another\nweaker form of psychological egoism would hold that we never\nvoluntarily do what we foresee will sacrifice our well-being to some\nextent. This third form of psychological egoism would admit that\nsometimes one of our reasons for acting is the good we do for others\nfor their sake; but it claims that we never act for the good of others\nwhen we think that doing so would make us worse off." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Psychological egoism: strong and weak versions" }, { "content": [ "\nSomeone might arrive at one or another of these forms of psychological\negoism because she takes herself to be a keen observer of the human\nscene, and her acquaintance with other people has convinced her that\nthis is how they are motivated. But that way of justifying\npsychological egoism has a serious weakness. Others can say to this\npsychological egoist: ", "\n\n\nPerhaps the people you know are like this. But my experience\nof the world is rather different from yours. I know many people who\ntry to benefit others for their sake. I myself act altruistically. So,\nat most, your theory applies only to the people in your social\nworld.\n", "\nThe psychological egoist can respond to this criticism in either of\ntwo ways. First, she might claim that his doctrine is supported by\nexperimental evidence. That is, she might believe that (i) the subjects\nstudied by psychologists in carefully conducted experiments have been\nshown to be not purely altruistic, or (more strongly) that these\nsubjects ultimately care only about their own good; and (ii) that we\ncan infer from these experiments that all human beings are\nmotivated in the same way.", "\nThis is a disputed matter. There is experimental evidence that casts\ndoubt on psychological egoism in its strong and in weaker forms, but\nthe controversy continues (see Batson 2011; Stich et al. 2010)." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 An empirical argument for psychological egoism" }, { "content": [ "\nA second response on the part of the psychological egoist would\nconsist in an a priori philosophical argument for one or\nanother version of that doctrine. According to this line of thinking,\nwe can see “from the armchair”—that is, without\nseeking empirical confirmation of any sort—that psychological\negoism (in one of its forms) must be true.", "\nHow might such an argument go? Drawing upon some ideas that can be\nfound in Plato’s dialogues, we might affirm two premises: (i)\nWhat motivates us to act is always a desire; (ii) all desires are to\nbe understood on the model of hunger (see Meno 77c;\nSymposium 199e–200a, 204e).", "\nTo elaborate on the idea behind (ii): When we are hungry, our hunger\nhas an object: food (or perhaps some particular kind of food). But we\ndo not want to ingest the food for its own sake; what we are really\nafter is the feeling of satisfaction that we expect to get as a result\nof eating. Ingesting this or that piece of food is something we want,\nbut only as a means of achieving a sense of satisfaction or\nsatiation.", "\nIf all desire is understood in the same way, and all motivation takes\nthe form of desire, then we can infer that psychological egoism in its\nstrong form is true (and therefore its weaker versions are also true).\nConsider an action that seems, on the surface, to be altruistically\nmotivated: I give you a gift simply because I think you will like it.\nNow, since I want to give you this gift, and all desire should be\nunderstood as a kind of hunger, I am hungering after your feeling\npleased, as I hunger after a piece of food. But just as no one wants\nto ingest a piece of food for its own sake, I do not want you to feel\npleased for your sake; rather, what I am seeking is the feeling of\nsatisfaction I will get when you are pleased, and your being pleased\nis simply the means by which I achieve satisfaction. Accordingly, we\ndon’t have to be keen observers of other people or look within\nourselves to arrive at psychological egoism. We can recognize that\nthis doctrine is correct simply by thinking about the nature of\nmotivation and desire." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 An a priori argument for psychological egoism" }, { "content": [ "\nBut the assumption that all desires are like hunger in the relevant\nrespect is open to question. Hunger is not satisfied if one still\nfeels hungry after one has eaten. It seeks a certain kind of\nconsciousness in oneself. But many kinds of desires are not like that.\nSuppose, for example, that I want my young children to be prosperous\nas adults long after I have died, and I take steps that increase to\nsome small degree their chances of achieving that distant goal. What\nmy desire is for is their prosperity far into the future, not my\ncurrent or future feeling of satisfaction. I don’t know and\ncannot know whether the steps that I take will actually bring about\nthe goal I seek; what I do know is that I will not be alive when they\nare adults, and so even if they are prosperous, that will give me no\npleasure. (Since, by hypothesis I can only hope, and do not feel\nconfident, that the provisions I make for them will actually produce\nthe good results I seek for them, I get little current satisfaction\nfrom my act.) It would make no sense, therefore, to suggest that I do\nnot want them to be prosperous for their sake, but only as a means to\nthe achievement of some goal of my own. My goal is their well-being,\nnot my own. In fact, if I allocate to them resources that I myself\nneed, in the hope that doing so will make their lives better, I am\ndoing something that one form of psychological egoism says is\nimpossible: sacrificing my own good, to some degree, for the sake of\nothers. If the psychological egoist claims that such self-sacrifice is\nimpossible because all desire is like hunger, the reply should be that\nthis model does not fit all cases of desire.", "\nRecall the two premises used by the armchair psychological egoist: (i)\nWhat motivates us to act is always a desire; (ii) all desires are to\nbe understood on the model of hunger. The second premise is\nimplausible, as we have just seen; and, since both premises must be\ntrue for the argument to reach its conclusion, the argument can be\nrejected. " ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Hunger and desire" }, { "content": [ "\nIt is worth observing, however, that first premise of this argument is\nalso open to question.", "\nThis thesis that what motivates us to act is always a desire should be\naccepted only if we have a good understanding of what a desire is. If\na desire is simply identified with whatever internal state moves\nsomeone to act, then the claim, “what motivates us to act is\nalways a desire”, when spelled out more fully, is a tautology.\nIt says: “the internal state that moves us to act is always the\ninternal state that moves us to act”. That is not a substantive\ninsight into human psychology, but a statement of identity, of the\nform “A = A”. We might have thought we were\nlearning something about what causes action by being told, “what\nmotivates people is always a desire”, but if\n“desire” is just a term for whatever it is that motivates\nus, we are learning nothing (see Nagel 1970: 27–32).", "\nHere is a different way of making the same point: As the words\n“desire” and “want” are often used, it makes\ngood sense to say: “I don’t want to do this, but I think I\nought to”. That is the sort of remark we often make when we take\nourselves to have an unpleasant duty or obligation, or when we face a\nchallenge that we expect to be difficult and stressful. In these sorts\nof situation, we do not hunger after the goal we move towards. So, as\nthe word “desire” is often used, it is simply false that\nwhat motivates us to act is always a desire. Now, the psychological\negoist who seeks an a priori defense of this doctrine might\nsay: ", "\n\n\nwhen I claim that what motivates us to act is always a desire, I am\nnot using the word “desire” as it is sometimes used. My\nusage is much broader. Among desires, in this broad sense, I include\nthe belief that one ought to do something. In fact, it includes any\ninternal state that causes someone to act. \n", "\nClearly, the thesis that what moves us is always a desire, when so\nunderstood, is empty. ", "\nThe common sense terms we often use to explain why we help others do\nnot need to refer to our own desires. You are in a public space and\ncome across someone off-putting in appearance but who seems to need\nyour help. He appears to be in pain, or confused, or needy in some\nway. Recognizing this, you take yourself to have a good reason to\noffer him your assistance. You think that you ought to ask him whether\nyou can help—even though that will delay you and may cause you\nsome trouble and discomfort. These ways of describing your motivation\nare all that is needed to explain why you offered him your help, and\nit is not necessary to add, “I wanted to help him”.\nAdmittedly, when “desire” is used to designate whatever it\nis that motivates someone, it is true that you wanted to help him. But\nwhat does the explanatory work, in these cases, is your recognition of\nhis need and your judgment that therefore you ought to offer your\nhelp. Saying, “I wanted to help him” would be misleading,\nsince it would suggest that there was something pleasant that you\nexpected to get by offering your assistance. After you have given him\nyour help, it is true, you might think back on this encounter, and be\npleased that you had done the right thing. But you might not—you\nmight be worried that what you did actually made him worse off,\ndespite your good intentions. And in any case, if you do look back\nwith pleasure at your good deed, it does not follow that feeling good\nwas your goal all along, and that you merely used him as a means to\nthat end. That would follow only if desire by its very nature is a\nform of hunger." ], "subsection_title": "2.5 Desire and motivation" }, { "content": [ "\nOf the three forms of psychological egoism distinguished above, the\none that is least open to objection is the weak form that holds that\naltruism is never pure. It claims that whenever we act, one\nof our motives is a desire for our own good. There is no good a\npriori argument for this thesis—or, at any rate, the a\npriori argument we have been considering for the strongest form\nof psychological egoism does not support it, because the two premises\nused in that argument are so implausible. But it might nonetheless be\nsuggested that as a matter of fact we always do find some\nself-interested motivation that accompanies altruistically motivated\nbehavior. It is difficult to refute that proposal. We should not\npretend that we know all of the considerations and causes that\nunderlie our behavior. Some of our motives are hidden, and there is\ntoo much going on in our minds for us to be aware of the whole of our\npsychology. So, for all we know, we might never be pure altruists.", "\nBut what of the other weak form of psychological egoism?—the one\nthat admits that sometimes one of our reasons for acting is the good\nwe do for others for their sake, but claims that we never act for the\ngood of others when we think that doing so would make us worse off. It\nsays, in other words, that we never voluntarily do what we foresee\nwill sacrifice our well-being to some extent. ", "\nThe first point to be made about this form of psychological egoism is\nthat, once again, there is no a priori argument to support\nit. The two premises we have been examining—that all action is\nmotivated by desire and all desire is like hunger—are\nimplausible, and so they do not support the thesis that we never\nsacrifice our well-being to any degree. If this form of psychological\negoism is to be sustained, its evidence would have to be drawn from\nthe observation of each human being’s reasons for acting. It\nwould have to say: when our motives are carefully scrutinized, it may\nindeed be found that although we do good to others for the sake of\nthose others, we never do so when we think it would detract even\nslightly from our own well-being. In other words, we count the good of\nothers as something that by itself gives us a reason, but it is always\na weak reason, in that it is never as strong as reasons that derive\nfrom our self-interest.", "\nWe have no reason to suppose that human behavior is so uniform in its\nmotivation. A far more plausible hypothesis about human motives is\nthat they vary a great deal from one person to another. Some people\nare never altruistic; others are just as this weak form of\npsychological egoism says: they are altruistic, but only when they\nthink this will not detract from their own well-being; and then there\nis a third and large category filled with people who, to some degree\nor other, are willing to sacrifice their well-being for others. Within\nthis category there is wide range—some are willing to make only\nsmall sacrifices, others larger sacrifices, and some extraordinarily\nlarge sacrifices. This way of thinking has the great advantage of\nallowing our experience of each individual to provide us with the\nevidence by means of which we characterize him. We should not label\neveryone as an egoist on the basis of some a priori theory;\nrather, we should assess each person’s degree of egoism and\naltruism on the basis of what we can discern of their motives." ], "subsection_title": "2.6 Pure altruism and self-sacrifice" }, { "content": [ "\nOne further point should be made about our reasons for supposing that\nthere is such a thing as altruism. Just as we can ask, “what\nentitles us to believe that altruism exists?” so we can ask:\n“what entitles us to believe that egoism exists?” Consider\nthe possibility that whenever we act for our own good, we are not\ndoing so only for our own sake, but also for the sake of someone else.\nOn what grounds are we entitled to reject that possibility?", "\nOnce again, the egoist might reply that it is an a priori\ntruth that all of our actions are ultimately motivated only by\nself-interest, but we have seen the weakness of the premises that\nsupport that argument. So, if the hypothesis that sometimes one acts\nonly for one’s own sake is true, it must recommend itself to us\nbecause close observation of human behavior supports it. We must find\nactual cases of someone promoting his own good only for his\nown sake. It is no easier to be confident about such matters than it\nis easy to be confident that someone has acted out of purely\naltruistic motives. We realize that much of what we do for ourselves\nhas consequences for other people as well, and we care to some degree\nabout those other people. Perhaps our ultimate motivation always\nincludes an other-regarding component. It is more difficult to find\nevidence against that suggestion than one might have thought.", "\nTo take matters to an extreme, it might be suggested that our ultimate\nmotivation is always entirely other-regarding. According to this\nfar-fetched hypothesis, whenever we act for our own good, we do so not\nat all for our own sake, but always entirely for the sake of someone\nelse. The important point here is that the denial that altruism exists\nshould be regarded with as much suspicion as this contrary denial,\naccording to which people never act ultimately for their own good.\nBoth are dubious universal generalizations. Both have far\nless plausibility than the common sense assumption that people\nsometimes act in purely egoistic ways, sometimes in purely altruistic\nways, and often in ways that mix, in varying degrees, the good of\noneself and the good of others." ], "subsection_title": "2.7 Does egoism exist?" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAn assumption that many people make about egoistic and altruistic\nmotives is that it is more difficult to justify the latter than the\nformer, or that the former do not require justification whereas the\nlatter do. If someone asks himself, “Why should I take my own\ngood to be a reason to do anything?” it is tempting to respond\nthat something is amiss in the very asking of this\nquestion—perhaps because there can be no answer to it.\nSelf-interest, it might be said, can be given no justification and\nneeds none. By contrast, since other people are other, it\nseems as though some reason needs to be given for building a bridge\nfrom oneself to those others. In other words, we apparently have to\nfind something in others that justifies our taking an interest in\ntheir well-being, whereas one need not seek something in oneself that\nwould justify self-regard. (Perhaps what we find in others that\njustifies altruism is that they are just like oneself in important\nrespects.) It is worth asking whether this apparent asymmetry between\njustifying self-interest and justifying altruism is real or only\napparent.", "\nOne response to this question is that the asymmetry is illusory\nbecause the very distinction between oneself and others is artificial\nand an obstacle to clear thinking. One can begin to challenge the\nvalidity or importance of the distinction between self and others by\nnoticing how many changes occur in the inner life of what is,\nconventionally speaking, a single “person”. The mind of a\nnewborn, a child, an adolescent, a young adult, a middle aged person,\nand an old person approaching death—these can have at least as\nmany differences as do those who are conventionally counted as two\ndistinct individuals. If a young man of twenty years sets aside money\nto provide for his retirement in old age, he is saving for someone who\nwill be quite different from himself. Why should that not be called\naltruism rather than self-interest? Why does it matter whether it is\ncalled acting for his own good or for the good of another? (See Parfit\n1984.)", "\nAnother kind of challenge to the validity of the distinction between\nself and others derives from the observation made by David Hume that\nwhen we look within and make an inventory of the contents of our\nmental life, we have no acquaintance with any entity that would\nprovide a reference for the word “self”. Introspection can\ntell us something about sensations, feelings, and thoughts—but\nwe do not have any experience of some entity that is the one who has\nthese sensations, feelings, and thoughts. That point might be regarded\nas a reason to reject the common sense view that when you refer to\nyourself, and distinguish yourself from someone else, there is\nsomething real that you are talking about, or some valid distinction\nbetween yourself and others. It might be thought, in other words, that\nthe ordinary distinction between altruistic and egoistic motives is\nmisguided because there are no such things as selves.", "\nA third metaphysical possibility is this: human beings cannot be\nunderstood one by one, as though each were a self-sufficient and fully\nreal individual. That way of thinking about ourselves fails to\nrecognize the profound way in which we are by our nature social\nbeings. You and I and others are by our nature mere parts of some\nlarger social unit. As an analogy, one might think of the human body\nand such parts of the body as fingers, hands, arms, legs, toes, torso,\nand so on. They cannot exist, much less function properly, in\nisolation. Similarly, it might be said that individual human beings\nare mere fragments of a larger social whole. Accordingly, instead of\nusing the concepts expressed by the terms\n“self-interested” and “altruistic”, we should\nsee ourselves as contributors to the success and well-functioning of\nthe larger community to which we belong (see Brink 2003; Green\n1883).", "\nThe remainder of this essay will set aside these unorthodox\nalternatives to the common sense metaphysical framework that we\nnormally presuppose when we think about self-interested and altruistic\nmotives. It would take us too far afield to examine them. We will\ncontinue to make these assumptions: First, a single individual human\nbeing persists over time from birth to death, even when the mental\nlife of that individual undergoes many changes. Second, there is\nsomeone one is referring to when one talks about oneself, even though\nthere is no object called the “self” that we detect\nintrospectively. And the fact that we do not encounter such an object\nby introspection is no reason to doubt the validity of the distinction\nmade between oneself and others. Third, although certain things (arms,\nlegs, noses, etc.) are by their very nature parts of a whole, no human\nbeing is by nature a part in that same way. Rejecting these ideas, we\nwill continue to assume, with common sense, that for each human being\nthere is such a thing as what is good for that human being; and that\nthe questions, “what is good for me?”, “what is good\nfor that other individual, who is not me?” are different\nquestions. Accordingly, it is one thing for a reason to be\nself-interested, and another for it to be altruistic (although of\ncourse one and the same act can be supported by both kinds of\nreasons).", "\nAssuming, then, that the distinction between these motives is real,\nthe questions we asked at the beginning of this section remain: Why\nought one to be altruistic? Does one need a justification for being\nmotivated in this way? Is egoistic motivation on a sounder footing\nthan altruistic motivation, in that it stands in no need of\njustification?" ], "section_title": "3. Self and others: some radical metaphysical alternatives", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nRadically different ways of answering these questions can be found in\nmoral philosophy. The first makes self-interested motivation\nfundamental; it holds that we should be altruistic because it is in\nour interest to be so moved. That strategy is often attributed to the\nGreek and Roman philosophers of antiquity—Plato, Aristotle, the\nStoics, and the Epicureans (see Annas 1993).", "\nIn the modern era, a second approach has come to the fore, built on\nthe notion that moral thinking is not self-centered but impartial and\nimpersonal. Its basic idea is that when we think morally\nabout what to do, reason takes a god’s-eye perspective and sets\naside the emotional bias we normally have in our own favor, or in\nfavor of our circle of friends or our community. Here Kant 1785 is a\nrepresentative figure, but so too are the utilitarians—Jeremy\nBentham 1789, John Stuart Mill 1864, and Henry Sidgwick 1907. ", "\nA third approach, championed by David Hume (1739), Adam Smith (1759),\nand Arthur Schopenhauer (1840), gives sympathy, compassion, and\npersonal affection—rather than impartial reason—a central\nrole to play in the moral life. It holds that there is something\nextraordinarily valuable in the sentimental bonds that take hold among\nhuman beings—a feature of human life that is overlooked or\ndistorted when morality is understood solely or primarily in\nimpersonal terms and from a god’s-eye point of view. In\nfavorable conditions, we naturally and emotionally respond to the weal\nand woe of others; we do not and should not look for reasons to do so.\n(The assorted ideas labeled “sentimentalism” in this entry\nare an amalgam of ideas derived loosely from the writings of Blum\n1980; Noddings 1986; Slote 1992, 2001 2010, 2013; and others. The term\nis sometimes applied to a family of meta-ethical views that ground the\nmeaning or justification of moral propositions in attitudes rather\nthan response-independent facts (Blackburn 2001). Here, by contrast,\nsentimentalism is a ground-level thesis about what is most valuable in\nhuman relationships. It could be combined with meta-ethical\nsentimentalism, but need not be.)", "\nThese three approaches are hardly an exhaustive survey of all that has\nbeen said in the Western philosophical tradition about altruism. A\nfuller treatment would examine the Christian conception of love, as\ndeveloped by thinkers of the medieval period. To a large extent, such\nfigures as Augustine and Aquinas work within a eudaimonistic\nframework, although they are also influenced by the Neoplatonic\npicture of the visible world as an outpouring of the bountifulness of\ndivine goodness. To the extent that rewards of heaven and the\nsufferings of hell play a role in a theocentric framework, there are\ninstrumental reasons, for those who need them, to care for others. But\nthere are other reasons as well. Other-regarding virtues like charity\nand justice are perfections of the human soul and are therefore\ncomponents of our earthly well-being. Christian philosophy rejects\nAristotle’s doctrine that divine being has no ethical qualities\nand makes no interventions in human life. God is a person who loves\nhis creation, human beings above all. When we love others for\nthemselves, we imitate God and express our love for him (Lewis\n1960)." ], "section_title": "4. Why care about others?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe term “eudaimonism” is often used by philosophers to\nrefer to the ethical orientation of all or the major philosophers of\nGreek and Roman antiquity. “Eudaimonia” is the\nordinary Greek word they apply to the highest good. As Aristotle\nobserves at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, whenever\nwe act, we aim at some good—but goods are not all at the same\nlevel. Lower goods are undertaken for the sake of more valuable goals,\nwhich are in turn pursued in order to achieve still better goods. This\nhierarchy of value cannot continue endlessly—a life must have\nsome ultimate goal, something that is valuable in itself and not for\nthe sake of anything still better. What that goal should be, Aristotle\nacknowledges, is a much disputed matter; but at any rate, everyone\nuses the word “eudaimonia” to designate that\nhighest good. (“Happiness” is the standard translation,\nbut “well-being” and “flourishing” may be\ncloser to the Greek word’s meaning.)", "\nAristotle does not say that one’s ultimate goal should be\none’s own well-being (eudaimonia) and no one\nelse’s. On the contrary, he holds that the common\ngood (the good of the whole political community) is superior to the\ngood of a single individual. Nonetheless, it has become common among\nscholars of ancient ethics to attribute to Aristotle and the other\nmajor moral philosophers of antiquity the assumption that one’s\nultimate goal should just be one’s own well-being.", "\nIs this an implausible assumption? That is the accusation of many\nsystems of modern moral philosophy, but one must be careful not to\nattribute to Greek and Roman ethics an extreme endorsement of\nselfishness. One way to see that this would be unfair is to recognize\nhow important it is to Aristotle that we love others for their\nsake. That is a key ingredient of his lengthy discussion of\nfriendship and love in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean\nEthics. There he argues that (i) friendship is an ingredient of a\ngood life, and (ii) to be a friend to someone (or at any rate a friend\nof the best sort) one must not treat him as a mere means to\none’s own advantage or one’s own pleasure. He elaborates\non (ii) by adding that in friendships of the best sort, each\nindividual admires the other for the excellence of that other\nperson’s character, and benefits him for that reason. It is\nclear, then, that he explicitly condemns those who treat others as\nmere means to their own ends. So, even if it is true that, according\nto Aristotle, one’s ultimate goal should be one’s own\nwell-being (and no one else’s), he combines this with the denial\nthat the good of others should be valued solely as a means to\none’s own.", "\nIt is crucial, at this point, that we keep in mind the distinction,\ndrawn above in\n section 1.4,\n between (i) what constitutes well-being and (ii) what is a necessary\nmeans towards or a pre-condition of well-being. Aristotle argues that\none’s well-being is constituted by the excellent use of\none’s reason, and that such virtues as justice, courage, and\ngenerosity are among the qualities in which one’s good consists.\nWhen one acts with justice and generosity towards one’s family,\nor friends, or the larger community, that is good for oneself (one is\nachieving one’s ultimate goal) and it is also good for\nothers—in fact, one’s action is motivated in part by the\ndesire to benefit those others for their sake. If treating\nothers justly and in accordance with the other ethical virtues were\nmerely a means towards one’s own well-being, Aristotle’s\nframework for ethics would be objectionably self-regarding—and\nit would be difficult for it to endorse, without inconsistency, the\nthesis that we ought to benefit others for their sake.", "\nWe should recall a point made in\n section 1.1:\n altruistic acts need not involve self-sacrifice, and they remain\naltruistic even when they are performed from a mixture of motives,\nsome of which are self-interested. For Aristotle, altruism should\nalways be accompanied by self-interested motives. His system\nof practical thought could be dismissed out of hand if one begins with\nthe assumption that moral motivation must be purely altruistic, free\nfrom all taint of self-regard. Otherwise, it would not count as\nmoral. That idea has some currency, and it is often\nattributed (rightly or wrongly) to Kant. But on reflection, it is open\nto question. If it is the case that whenever one has a good reason to\nbenefit someone else for that person’s sake, there is also a\nsecond good reason as well—namely, that in doing so one will\nalso benefit oneself—it would be implausible to suppose that one\nshould not let that second reason have any influence on one’s\nmotivation.", "\nNonetheless, if another point made earlier is correct, there\nis a serious problem for Aristotle’s eudaimonism. In\n section 1.2,\n we noted that someone is open to criticism if he is always guided by\nthe principle, “I shall never do anything unless doing so is\nbest for me”. Such a person seems insufficiently altruistic,\ninsufficiently willing to make compromises for the good of others. He\nis (to use the term introduced earlier) never altruistic in the strong\nsense. Aristotle, it might be said, would have been on firmer ground\nif he had said that ultimately one should act for one’s own good\nand that of others. (To be fair to him, he does not deny\nthis; on the other hand, he does say that treating others well never\nmakes one worse off.)", "\nIf the project undertaken by Greek and Roman moral philosophy is to\nbegin with the unquestioned assumption that one should never act\ncontrary to one’s own good, and that one’s ultimate end\nshould be only one’s own eudaimonia, it faces the serious\nobjection that it will never be able, on this basis, to give proper\nrecognition to the interests of others. The idea underlying this\nobjection is that we should be directly concerned with\nothers: the fact that an act one performs benefits someone\nelse can already provide a reason for undertaking it, without\nhaving to be accompanied by a self-interested reason. There\nis no argument to be found in ancient ethics –none is\noffered—that purports to show that the only way to justify\nhaving other-regarding motives is by appealing to the good it does\noneself to have them.", "\nAt the same time, that gives us no reason to dismiss out of hand the\nefforts made by these authors to show that in fact one does benefit by\nhaving altruistic motives. There is nothing morally offensive about\nasking the question: “is it good for someone to be a good\nperson?” once it is understood that being a good person might be\na component of well-being, not a means to further private\nends. As noted earlier\n (section 1.4),\n certain kinds of excellence are widely assumed to be components of a\ngood life. The examples used there were excellence in the arts, the\nsciences, and sport. But excelling at ethical life is also a plausible\nexample, since it consists in developing and exercising cognitive,\nemotional, and social skills that we are pleased and proud to have. In\nany case, it would be sheer dogmatism to close our minds and refuse to\nlisten to the arguments found in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics that\nethical virtue is of great value because it is a component (and for\nthe Stoics the sole component) of one’s well-being." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Eudaimonism" }, { "content": [ "\nWe turn now to the idea, central to one modern approach to ethics,\nthat when we think morally, we reason from an impartial or impersonal\nperspective. Moral thinking is not self-centered. Of course we all\nhave an emotional bias that attaches special weight to self-interest,\nand we are often partial to our particular circle of friends or our\ncommunity. But when we look at the world from a moral point of view,\nwe try to set aside this self-centered framework. Taking a god’s\neye perspective on things, we ask ourselves what one ought to\ndo in this or that situation—not what would be good for me or my\nfriends. It is as though we forget about locating ourselves as this\nparticular person; we abstract away from our normal self-centered\nperspective and seek the solution to a practical problem that anyone\nsimilarly impartial would also arrive at.", "\nWe can find anticipations or analogues of this idea in ancient\nethics—for example, in Plato’s and Aristotle’s\nrecognition that the political community serves the common\ngood rather the interest of some one class or faction; and in the\nStoic belief that the cosmos is governed by a providential force that\nassigns to each of us a distinctive role by which we serve not just\nourselves but also the whole. In the ideal city of Plato’s\nRepublic, the family and private property are abolished\nwithin the elite classes, because these institutions interfere with\nthe development of a common concern for all individuals. It is not\nclear how these ideas can be made to fit within a eudaimonistic\nframework. How can the good of the community serve as the highest\nstandard of evaluation if one’s own good alone is one’s\nhighest end? One way of looking at the history of ethics would be to\nsay that modern ethics salvages the impartialism that occasionally\nappears in ancient ethics, and rightly abandons its attempt to derive\na justification of altruism from a prior commitment to self-interest.\nContemporary eudaimonists, of course, would tell a different story\n(see, for example Annas 1993; LeBar 2013; Russell 2012).", "\nThe notion of impartiality has thus far been described in highly\ngeneral terms, and it is important to see that there are different\nways of making it more concrete. One way of doing so is adopted by\nutilitarians, and more generally, by consequentialists. (The\nutilitarianism of Bentham 1789, Mill 1864, and Sidgwick 1907 holds\nthat one is to maximize the greatest balance of pleasure over\npain—treating pleasure and the absence of pain as the sole\nconstituents of well-being. Consequentialism abstracts away from this\nhedonistic component of utilitarianism; it requires one to maximize\nthe greatest balance of good over bad. See Driver 2012.) In their\ncalculus, no individual’s good is given greater weight or\nimportance than any other’s. Your own good, therefore, is not to\nbe treated by you as having greater weight as a reason than anyone\nelse’s, simply because it is your own good. The well-being of a\nhuman being (or of a sentient creature) is what provides one with a\nreason to act: that is why one has a reason to take one’s own\ngood into consideration in practical thinking. But the same point\napplies equally and with equal force to the well-being of anyone\nelse.", "\nBut that is not the only way of taking the general notion of\nimpartiality and making it more specific. The general idea, as stated\nearlier, is that moral thinking, unlike prudential thinking, is not\nself-centered. One can make this idea more concrete by taking it to\nmean that there is a single set of rules or norms that apply equally\nto all human beings, and so the standard by which one answers the\nquestion, “what should I do in this situation?” is the\nstandard by which one answers the question, “what should anyone\ndo in this situation?” Someone whose practical reasoning is\nguided by this condition is abiding by an ideal of impartiality. He\nmakes no special exceptions for himself or his friends.", "\nSuppose, for example, that you are a lifeguard and one afternoon you\nmust choose between swimming north to rescue one group and swimming\nsouth to rescue another. The northern group includes your friend, but\nthe southern group, full of strangers, is much larger. The ideal of\nimpartiality described in the previous paragraph does not by itself\ndetermine what one should do in this situation; what it requires is\nsimply that it should make no difference that the lifeguard faced with\nthis dilemma is you (and the northern group includes\nyour friend). What you should do, if you are the\nlifeguard, is what any lifeguard ought to do in that\nsituation. If it is right to take friendship into consideration, when\nmaking this decision, then it would be right for anyone to do so.\n(What would be right, in that case, would be for each individual to\nchoose the good of his or her friend over the good of\nstrangers.)", "\nThe consequentialist has a more radical interpretation of what\nimpartiality means and requires. His ideal of impartiality does not\nallow the lifeguard to take into consideration the fact that by\nswimming north he will be able to save his friend. After all,\nthe well-being of his friend is not made more valuable simply\nbecause that person is his friend. Just as my good is not\nmade more valuable than the good of others simply because it is\nmy good, so too the well-being of my friend deserves no extra\nweight because he is a friend of mine. So, the lifeguard,\naccording to the consequentialist, must choose to save one group\nrather than the other solely on the basis of the greater balance of\ngood over bad. ", "\nThe consequentialist will correctly point out that quite often one is\nin a better position to promote one’s own good than that of\nothers. As a rule, I have more knowledge about what is good for me\nthan I have about what is good for strangers. It often requires fewer\nresources for me to benefit myself than to benefit others. I know\nimmediately when I am hungry without having to ask, and I know what\nkind of food I like. But additional steps are needed to find out when\nothers are hungry and which food they like. These sorts of facts about\none’s special relationship to oneself might allow the\nconsequentialist to justify giving somewhat more attention to\none’s own well-being than that of anyone else. Even so, there is\nonly one individual who is me; and the number of other individuals\nwhom I can benefit, if I make the effort, is very large. When all of\nthese factors are taken into consideration, it will often be the case\nthat self-interested reasons ought to give way to altruistic\nmotives.", "\nConsequentialism evidently does not recognize certain ways in which\neach human being has a special relation to her own well-being—a\nrelation different from the one she has to the well-being of others.\nWhen each of us becomes an adult, we are normally charged with the\nspecial responsibility of having to look after our own welfare. Young\nchildren are not expected to be in command of their own lives; they\nare not yet competent to occupy this role. But the point of their\neducation is to train them so that as adults they can be responsible\nfor themselves. A fully mature person is rightly expected by others to\ncare for someone in particular—namely herself. She is given room\nto make decisions about her own life but is not given the same kind\nand degree of authority over the lives of others. If she would like to\ndevote herself to others, she cannot simply do so without receiving\ntheir permission, or without taking other steps that make her entry\ninto their lives permissible. Consequentialism, by contrast, regards\nall adult human beings as equally responsible for the well-being of\nall. It does not take seriously the idea that our social relations are\ngoverned by a division of labor that charges each with a special\nresponsibility for herself—and certain others as well\n(one’s children, one’s friends, and so on.)", "\nAccording to the weaker interpretation of impartiality described\nabove, moral rules reflect this division of labor. (By the\n“weaker interpretation” is meant the thesis that moral\nthinking avoids being self-centered because it upholds a single set of\nrules or norms that apply equally to all human beings.) Consider, for\nexample, the duty we normally have to help others, even when they are\nstrangers. If someone is in need, and asks for your assistance, that\ngives you a reason to help him, and you should do so, provided\nthat compliance with such appeals is not overly burdensome.\nNotice the escape clause: it builds into the duty to aid others a\nrecognition of the importance of each person having a significant\ndegree of control over his own life. Common sense morality assumes\nthat what we owe to others might call for some sacrifice of our own\ngood, but also that in the ordinary business of life the degree of\nsacrifice should fall within certain limits, so that we can make good\nuse of the responsibility we have been given as adults to seek our own\ngood. The balance struck by moral rules between the claims of\nself-interest and the claims of others is what makes it possible for\nthose rules to be recognized and accepted as appropriate. These rules\nleave us free to volunteer to make greater sacrifices; but such\ngreater sacrifices are not required of us except in extraordinary\ncircumstances (wars, disasters, emergencies).", "\nThe three approaches to altruism that we have examined thus far give\nthree rather different answers to the question: “why should one\nact for the sake of others and not only for one’s own\nsake?” ", "\nEudaimonism replies that those who act for the sake of others are\nbenefited by having an altruistic disposition.", "\nThe consequentialist’s answer begins with the claim that\none’s own well-being ought to be of concern to oneself simply\nbecause it is someone’s well-being; it should not be of\nimportance to oneself simply because it is one’s own well-being.\nThere is, in other words, no reason why a benefit should go to you\nrather than someone else just because you are the one who would be\nreceiving it. Accordingly, if one assumes, as one should, that one\nshould act for one’s own sake, then one has no less a reason to\nact for the good of anyone and everyone else.", "\nIf we adopt a weaker interpretation of impartiality, we see the\njustification of altruism simply by seeing that we have a duty to aid\nother people in certain circumstances. The moral rule that requires us\nto help others is a rule that calls upon us to help them not as a\nmeans to our own good, but simply in virtue of their need. And we see\nthe rule as justified by recognizing that it strikes a proper balance\nbetween our self-concern and the appropriate claims of others.", "\nNotice that both consequentialism and the weaker impartialist position\nare compatible with the eudaimonist’s thesis that having\naltruistic motives is a component of one’s own well-being. What\nthese two forms of impartialism reject is the stronger eudaimonistic\nthesis that one’s ultimate goal should be one’s own\nwell-being and that alone.", "\nThat stronger eudaimonistic thesis and consequentialism stand at\nopposite poles from each other, in the following respect: The first of\nthese poles elevates the self to a position of primacy, since it is\nonly one’s own well-being that constitutes one’s ultimate\ngoal; by contrast, consequentialism, at the opposite extreme, deflates\nthe self to the point where it has no more claim to one’s\nattention than does any other individual. The weak impartialist\nattempts to occupy a middle ground." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Impartial Reason" }, { "content": [ "\nYet another conception of impartiality—and a novel argument for\nthe rationality of altruism—can be found in the work of Thomas\nNagel. In The Possibility of Altruism (1970), he seeks to\nundermine both psychological egoism, in its strong form, as defined in\n section 2.1\n above, and its normative counterpart (sometimes called\n“rational egoism or “ethical egoism”), which holds\nthat one ought to have no direct concern with the good of\nothers. Indirect concern, the ethical egoist grants, can be\njustified: the good of others may be instrumental to one’s own\ngood, or one might happen to have a sentimental attachment to others.\nBut absent these contingent relations to others, one has, according to\nthe ethical egoist, no reason to care about their well-being.", "\nNagel doubts that anyone actually is a psychological egoist (1970:\n84–85), but his major concern is to refute ethical egoism, by\nshowing that altruism is a rational requirement on action. His\nidea is not simply that we ought in certain circumstances to help\nothers for their sake; it is also that we are acting irrationally if\nwe do not. That is because it is required of us as rational beings to\nview ourselves and others from what Nagel calls “the impersonal\nstandpoint”. As he puts it, ", "\n\n\nto recognize others fully as persons requires a conception of oneself\nas identical with a particular, impersonally specifiable inhabitant of\nthe world, among others of a similar nature. (1970: 100)\n", "\nNagel likens the impersonal standpoint to the prudential policy of\nregarding all times in one’s life as equal in importance. One\nhas reason not to be indifferent to one’s future because the\npresent moment is not more reason-giving simply by virtue of being\npresent. Similarly, he holds, one has reason not to be indifferent to\nother people, because the fact that some individual is me is not more\nreason-giving simply because he is me. Terms like “now”\nand “later, ” “me and not me” point to no\ndifferences that make a rational difference. A time that is later\neventually becomes a time that is now; that is why it is arbitrary and\nirrational to discount the future simply because it is future. Giving\ngreater weight to someone’s good because that person is me is no\nless irrational.", "\nThe “impersonal standpoint”, as Nagel conceives it, is a\nview of the world from outside it, one that deprives one of\ninformation about which individual in that world one is. (It is, in\nthe phrase Nagel chose as the title of his 1986 book, The View\nFrom Nowhere.) From this perspective, one need not be a\nutilitarian or consequentialist—one need not maximize the good,\nbut can abide by the constraints of principles of the right. But\ncertain principles are ruled out from the impersonal\nstandpoint: egoism is, as well as any other principle that gives one\nindividual or group a reason not shared by all others. For example, if\nsomeone has reason to avoid pain, that must be because\npain—anyone’s pain—is to be avoided. So, it cannot\nbe the case that although I have a reason to avoid pain, others are\npermitted to be indifferent to my plight, as if that pain were not an\nobjectively bad thing, something that gives only the person who feels\nit a reason to oppose it. Nagel called such reasons\n“objective”, as contrasted with “subjective”.\nParfit, in Reasons and Persons (1984), speaks instead of\n“agent-relative” and “agent neutral” reasons,\nand subsequently Nagel himself adopted these terms. The critique of\negoism in The Possibility of Altruism rests on the thesis\nthat all genuine reasons are agent neutral.", "\nWhat Nagel’s position and utilitarianism have in common is a\nperspective that is the opposite of the self-centered world of\nrational egoism: from the point of view of this self-less perspective,\neach individual is just a tiny part of a vast universe of moral\nsubjects, each of no more importance or value than any other. Our\ncommon sense point of view, moving from our inner life looking\noutward, lulls us into a massive kind of insularity—a tendency\nto downplay or ignore the fact that we are just one individual of no\ngreater importance than any other. We put ourselves at the center of\nour world, and this can only be corrected by stepping back, leaving\nout of our picture the particular individual one is, and making\ngeneral judgments about how human beings should behave towards each\nother. From this perspective, when one person ought to do something,\nsome related requirement is imposed on all others as well –some\n“ought” statement applies to each. ", "\nNagel is faced with the problem of how to explain why self-interest is\nnot regularly swamped by agent-neutral reasons. If anyone’s pain\nimposes on all other moral agents a requirement of some sort,\nthen one person’s pain is everyone’s problem. As Nagel\nsays in The View From Nowhere, (using the term\n“objective standpoint” for the impersonal standpoint),\n", "\n\n\nwhen we take up the objective standpoint, the problem is not that\nvalues seem to disappear but that there are too many of them, coming\nfrom every life and drowning out those that arise from our own. (1986:\n147)\n", "\nIt would be consistent with this picture to add that the weight of\nreasons that derive from the situation of other people is extremely\nsmall and becomes increasingly so, as they are added together.\nTherefore, it might be said, they do not often outweigh reasons of\nself-interest. But that would be an ad hoc stipulation, and\nwould differ only slightly from the egoist’s thesis that the\ngood of others has no independent weight. It is hard to\nbelieve that we are forced to choose between ethical egoism (which\nsays that only one’s own pain ought to be one’s direct\nconcern) and Nagel’s conception of impartiality (according to\nwhich everyone’s pain ought to weigh on me, because that of\nothers is as bad as my own). The first demands no altruism of us, the\nsecond too much." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Nagel and the impersonal standpoint" }, { "content": [ "\nSome philosophers would say that the approaches to altruism discussed\nthus far are missing an important—perhaps the most\nimportant—ingredient in moral motivation. These approaches, one\nmight say, make altruism a matter of the head, but it is much more a\nmatter of the heart. The eudaimonist can say that we should have a\ncertain amount of fellow feeling, but justifies that emotional\nresponse by giving a self-interested reason for being so motivated.\nThe consequentialist seems to leave no legitimate room in our moral\nthinking for the friendly feelings and love we have for particular\nindividuals, for these sentiments are often at odds with the project\nof increasing the total amount of good in the world. The weak\nimpartialist says that in certain situations we are to be moved by the\ngood of others, but that is only because there is a moral rule,\nstriking a reasonable balance between oneself and others, that\nrequires one to do so. All three approaches—so the objection\ngoes—are too cold and calculating. They call upon us to treat\nothers in accordance with a formula or rule or general policy. What is\nmost important in human relationships cannot be captured by an\napproach that begins with a general rule about how to treat others,\nand justifies a certain way of treating each particular individual\nsimply by applying that general rule. ", "\nIt would miss the point of this critique if one said, in response,\nthat having an emotional response to the good of others is an\neffective means of getting oneself to give them the aid they need.\n(For example, the consequentialist can say that this doctrine does\ncall upon us to act on the basis of friendly feelings and love towards\nparticular individuals, because over the long run relationships\nsolidified by such sentiments are likely to result in a greater\nbalance of good over bad than would colder relationships.) But a\ndefender of the critique put forward in the preceding paragraph would\nreply that one’s emotional response to the good or ill of others\ncan be assessed as appropriate independently of the effectiveness of\none’s emotions as motivators of action. When we feel compassion\nfor the suffering of a particular individual, that reaction is already\njustified; the suffering of another ought to elicit such a response\nsimply because that is the appropriate reaction. Consider, as an\nanalogy, the proper reaction to the death of a loved one; this calls\nforth grief and ought to do so, even though grief cannot undo\none’s loss. In the same way, it could be said that altruistic\nfeelings are the appropriate response to the good and ill of others,\nquite apart from whether those feelings lead to results. That does not\nimply that it does not matter whether one does anything for\nthe good of others. One ought to alleviate their suffering and seek\ntheir well-being; that is because this is the proper behavioral\nexpression of one’s feeling for them. If, in the face of the\nsuffering of others, one feels nothing and offers no help, the\nfundamental flaw in one’s response is one’s emotional\nindifference, and a secondary flaw is the failure to act that flows\nfrom that emotional defect.", "\nAccording to this “sentimentalist” approach to altruism,\nthe question, “why should one act for the sake of others and not\nonly for one’s own sake?” should not be answered by\nappealing to some notion of impartiality or some conception of\nwell-being. That would be no better than trying to justify grief by\nway of impartiality or well-being. The sentimentalist simply asks us\nto recognize that the situation of this or that human being (or\nanimal) rightly calls forth a certain emotional response, and the help\nwe give is the proper expression of that sentiment." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Sentimentalism and fellow feeling" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nTo assess the role that sympathy should play in our relations with\nother human beings, it will be helpful to consider Kant’s\ndiscussion of this question in the Groundwork of the \nMetaphysics of Morals (1785). He notes that ", "\n\nmany souls are so compassionately disposed that, without any further\nmotive of vanity or self-interest, they find an inner pleasure in\nspreading joy around them. (4:398) \n", "\nHe is by no means contemptuous of them—on the contrary, he says\nthat they “deserve praise and encouragement” (4:398). But\nnot the highest praise or the strongest encouragement. ", "\nWhat they do not deserve, he says, is our “esteem”,\nbecause their motivation “has no genuinely moral worth”.\nThat is because the “maxim” of what they do “lacks\nthe moral merit of such actions done not out of inclination but out of\nduty” (4:398). Kant means that these people are not following a\nrule when they help others—a rule, rationally acceptable to all,\naccording to which all those who are in such and such circumstances\nought to be helped because it is morally right to do so. (The term\n“such and such circumstances” is a place-holder for a\nphrase stating in general terms what those circumstances are.) These\ncompassionate people act instead on an emotional basis: they are\npained by the misfortunes of others, and they know that if they offer\ntheir help, they will give themselves pleasure. That is a good motive,\nKant thinks, but it ought not to be one’s sole or primary reason\nfor helping others.", "\nKant elaborates on his claim by imagining a transformation in one of\nthese sympathetic and compassionate people: suppose someone’s\nmisfortunes have brought him sorrows that extinguish his feeling for\nothers. He retains his power to “assist others in\ndistress” but now “their adversity no longer stir[s]\nhim”. He feels no “inclination” to help them, but\ndoes so nonetheless, simply because he believes he has a moral duty to\ndo so. Kant says that when this happens, this man’s character\nand his action have “moral worth”—whereas\nthey had none before. His motive is now “incomparably the\nhighest”—not only is it better than before, but, because\nit is now a moral motive, it has a kind of value that takes priority\nover every other kind (4:398).", "\nWhat should we make of this? To begin with, we should acknowledge that\nif someone assists another person because he is aware of that\nperson’s suffering and is distressed by it, he may not be acting\nfor the most admirable of motives. For example, if you hear someone\ncrying, and this leads you to help him, you may be motivated solely by\nyour desire for a good night’s sleep, which you could not have\nhad, had he continued to cry. Alleviating his pain was not your\nultimate end –it was just a way to quiet him down, so that you\ncould enjoy some peace. We might say that you “did a good\nthing”, but you don’t deserve any praise or admiration for\ndoing so. But this falls far short of vindicating Kant’s claim.\nThis is not really a case of acting compassionately, because it was\nnot that other person’s suffering you cared about—only his\ncrying, and only because this distressed you.", "\nBefore we move closer to the sort of case that Kant is discussing, it\nwill be helpful to engage in a thought experiment due to Robert Nozick\n(1974: 42–5). He imagines an “experience machine” in\nwhich a neuroscientist manipulates your brain so that you can have any\nexperiences of your choosing. Those experiences would be illusory, but\nthey could be as lifelike, rich, and complex as you choose. You might,\nfor example, enter the machine in order to have an experience exactly\nlike that of climbing Mt. Everest; you would be lying on a table with\nyour brain attached to the machine, but it would be exactly as though\nyou were facing great danger, wind, cold, snow, and so on. Nozick\nclaimed that we would not choose to plug into the machine, and rightly\nso, because there is much of value beyond the experiential component\nof our lives.", "\nWith this device in mind, let’s return to Kant’s\ncompassionate souls who “without any further motive of vanity or\nself-interest, … find an inner pleasure in spreading joy around\nthem”. We can offer them the opportunity to plug into the\nexperience machine, and it would then seem to them as if they were\n“spreading joy around them”. They would not in fact be\nhelping anyone, but it would seem to them as though they were, and\nthat would fill them with joy. Clearly, there would be little or\nnothing to admire in those who would enter the machine on these terms.\nBut what about a compassionate person who refuses this offer, and\nprefers to find joy in actually helping people—not merely in\nseeming to help them? To be more precise, we might offer someone the\nfollowing choice: (a) You will experience great joy in the machine,\nimagining yourself to be helping others; (b) you will experience less\njoy outside the machine, but it will be joy taken in actually helping\nothers. A genuinely compassionate person would choose (b). He would be\ngiving up a certain amount of pleasure in order to be of use to\nothers. And there is certainly something admirable about that.", "\nAccording to Kant, however, there is still something of great worth\nthat is missing in the motivation of this genuinely compassionate\nperson, willing though he is to make some sacrifice in his own\nwell-being for the sake of others. His reason for helping is not that\nit would be morally wrong to fail to do so—wrong because he\nwould be violating a moral rule that makes it a duty for him to help\nthem. What motivates him to aid others is simply that he is inclined\nto do so. If he did not take any pleasure in being of assistance, he\nwould not do so.", "\nWe should agree with Kant that there are situations in which it would\nbe morally wrong for one person to refuse to help another, whether\nthat person has fellow feeling for others or not. For example, suppose\na child needs to be taken to the hospital, and it so happens that you\ncan do so at some small cost or inconvenience to yourself. Although\nthis child is a stranger to you, you are someone who finds children\nadorable and likes to be with them. And so you willingly accompany the\nchild to the hospital. Your love of children is admirable, but you\nwould still be subject to criticism, if that were your sole motivation\nfor assisting this child. By hypothesis, in the situation we are\nimagining, it would be wrong to refuse—and yet the wrongness of\nrefusing, by hypothesis, is not one of your motives.", "\nBut Kant’s point is of limited application, for there are many\nother kinds of situation in which assisting others for their sake is\nadmirable but not a moral duty. Suppose, for example, a novelist takes\ntime away from her work each day in order to read to blind people in\nher community. She does not have a moral obligation to assist those\npeople; she helps them because she loves books and she wants to spread\nthe joy she takes in literature to others. Perhaps at some point in the\nfuture, her interests will change—she might no longer write\nnovels, and she might get no pleasure from reading to others. She might\nthen no longer volunteer to read to the blind. Kant must say that the\nhelp given by this writer does not deserve our “esteem”\nand “has no genuinely moral worth”, because she acts from\ninclination rather than duty. But it is implausible to withhold these\nwords of praise. The author does not read to others merely as a means\nto advance her career or her own well-being. Although she enjoys\nreading to others, she may believe that it would be better for her to\nspend more of her time working on her own writing projects. She makes\nsome sacrifices because she believes that other people’s lives\nwill improve if she can instill in them the joy she takes in these\nbooks. Surely her motives have “moral worth” in the normal\nsense of that term: her reason for acting is to help others.", "\nRecall Kant’s thought experiment in which a person full of\nsympathy and compassion suffers severe misfortunes that extinguish all\nof his feeling for others. He is still able to benefit others, and he\nstill has a strong sense of duty. Kant seems to be implying that if\nsuch an individual continues to “assist others in\ndistress” because he sees that he has a duty to do so, then\nthere is no moral defect in him at all. His motivation, on the\ncontrary, is exemplary, because it has “moral worth”\n(unlike the motivation of the individual who is moved by inclination\nand fellow feeling). Surely Kant is right that we ought not to lower\nour opinion of him merely because he has experienced severe\nmisfortunes—assuming that he did not bring them on himself. He\nsays that the adversity of others “no longer stir[s]” this\npoor soul, and presumably he would add that this emotional condition\nis not this unfortunate man’s fault either. But even if there is\nnothing blameworthy in this man’s emotional\nindifference to the good of others, it is also true that his\nrelationship with others has been damaged. He cannot respond\nto others as he should. Lacking any inclination to spread joy to\nothers, when he undertakes projects that fulfill his duty to promote\ntheir happiness or diminish their unhappiness, he will do so in a\njoyless, dutiful manner, thereby tarnishing the relationship he ought\nto have with them. If, for example, he volunteers to read to the\nblind, he will be unable to communicate to them a love of\nliterature—for he himself feels no “inner pleasure”\nwhen he reads, and has no inclination to help others, due to his own\nsuffering. When he receives news of his adult children’s\nmisfortunes, he will not respond with sympathy or\ncompassion—such news will simply leave him cold (although he\nwill fulfill his parental duties, if his assistance is morally\nrequired). It would be appropriate, then, to say that this man\nexhibits significant moral defects. He lacks the motivation\nto act towards others as he should, and to feel for others as he\nshould. " ], "section_title": "5. Kant on sympathy and duty", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWe are now in a better position to sort through the package of ideas\nlabeled “sentimentalism” in preceding sections, and to\nrecognize that some are far more plausible than others.", "\nFirst, we should accept the sentimentalist thesis that one’s\nfeelings can be assessed as fitting or unfitting on grounds other than\ntheir causal effect on one’s actions. We should, for example,\ncare about what happens to our children even when we can do nothing to\nhelp them; that emotional response is appropriate because it is part\nof what it is to be a good parent. This point allows us to concede\nthat in certain situations one ought to try to suppress an emotional\nresponse that would normally be appropriate. If one has a duty to\nminister to many people who are suffering, one may be more effective\nin aiding them if one keeps oneself from feeling the emotions that are\nfitting. A nurse working in a war zone, for example, might save more\nlives if she trains herself, for now, to feel little emotion when she\nhears the moans and cries of the wounded. She has reason to feel\ncompassion, but that is overridden by stronger reasons to act\neffectively to relieve their burden.", "\nA closely related sentimentalist point that should be accepted is that\naiding someone in need, but doing so in a manifestly cold, affectless,\nor hostile manner is, in many situations, a defective response.", "\nA second idea associated with sentimentalism in\n section 4.4\n was this: ", "\n\n\nwhat is most important in human relationships cannot be captured by an\napproach that begins with a general rule about how to treat others,\nand justifies a certain way of treating each particular individual\nsimply by applying that general rule.\n", "\nThe kernel of truth in this statement is that some of the most\nvaluable components of our lives are not available by following a\nrule. We do not fall in love with people by applying a general\nprinciple, standard, or criterion about whom we ought to fall in love\nwith. We do not develop a passion for mathematics, or history, or\ntennis, by seeing these pursuits as specific instances of something\nmore general that we care about. Some of the most valuable components\nof our lives are available to us only if they arise spontaneously from\nfeelings that respond to the lovable features of the world or the\npeople in it.", "\nBut that leaves a great deal of room for the project of treating\npeople in accordance with rules that we accept because they survive\nour rational scrutiny. For example, it would be absurd to suggest that\nwe should abstain from torturing someone if (but only if) we have an\nuntutored and negative emotional reaction to torturing him. With\nrespect to torture, we need to respond to a general question: are\nthere circumstances in which it would be justified? (And to answer\nthat question, we must first ask: what is torture?) The only way to\naddress these questions is one in which we reason our way towards a\ngeneral policy—a rule, however simple or complex, that governs\nthe use of torture. And surely such a rule should be\nimpartial—it should be a single rule that applies to all, not\ntailored to serve the interests of some nations or factions to which\nwe belong.", "\nThe same point applies to questions about everyday rules that govern\nsuch acts as promise-keeping, lying, theft, and other kinds of suspect\nbehavior. Here too we rightly expect each other to have a general\npolicy, one that takes these sorts of actions to be wrong in normal\ncircumstances. That a promise has been freely made is normally a\ndecisive reason for keeping it; someone who keeps a promise only if he\nhas a positive feeling about doing so would not be treating others as\nthey rightly expect to be treated. (For opposing views, see Dancy\n2004; Ridge and McKeever 2006.)", "\nA third question about the relation between our sentiments and\naltruism arises when we ask about the proper basis for charitable\ngiving. Consider, for example, someone who donates money to an\norganization devoted to fighting cancer, and chooses to do so because\nhis mother has died of cancer. His gift is an expression of his love\nfor her; it is meant, of course, to do good to others, but those\nothers are chosen as beneficiaries because he takes the reduction of\nthis disease to be an appropriate expression of his feelings for her.\nUtilitarianism cannot easily accept this form of altruism, since it\nbegins with the premise that charitable acts, like everything else,\nare right only if they do the most good—and it could easily be\nthe case that money allocated to cancer research would do more good if\ndonated to some other humanitarian cause. But if one does not\npresuppose the truth of utilitarianism, it is not difficult to defend\nthe practice of choosing one charity over another on the basis of\none’s sentimental attachments. If friendships and other loving\nrelationships have a proper place in our lives even if they do not\nmaximize the good, then sentiment is an appropriate basis for\naltruism. (For an opposing view, see Singer 2015.)", "\nThat does not entail that it is always right to follow our feelings\nwhen we decide whether to help this person or organization rather than\nthat. Suppose you belong to a group dedicated to reducing the number\nof people who die in drowning accidents, and you are on your way to an\nessential meeting of this organization. If you miss the meeting, let\nus suppose, the group will have to suspend its operations for many\nmonths—with the result that the number of drownings will remain\nhigh. On your way, you pass a child who is in danger of drowning, and\ncries for your help. You must choose: either you can save this one\nchild, or you can attend the meeting and thereby save many more from\ndrowning. When you hear the child’s cries for help, you cannot\nhelp responding emotionally; it would be cold and calculating to pass him\nby, even if in doing so you will be saving many more. What ought you\nto do?", "\nThe fact that your emotions are fully aroused by the child’s\ncries does not have the same bearing on this issue as does the love\nfelt by a son for his departed mother in the previous example. The\ndrowning child whose cries fill you with compassionate feeling is a\nstranger to you. So your alternatives in this case are whether to help\none stranger (the one who is tugging at your heartstrings) or many\n(whom you do not see or hear at the moment). It would not be\nimplausible to hold that sentiment plays an appropriate role in\naltruism when it is the expression of a long-term and meaningful bond,\nbut not when it is a short-lived reaction to the cries of a\nstranger." ], "section_title": "6. Sentimentalism revisited", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWe have found no reason to doubt that we both can and should be\naltruistic to some extent. To what extent? Utilitarians and\nconsequentialists have an exact answer to that question: one is to\ngive equal weight to the good of every human being (or every sentient\ncreature), counting oneself as just one small part of that universal\ngood. If that is more altruism than can be required of us, the better\nalternative is not to retreat to the other extreme (egoism). Rather,\nhow much altruism is appropriate for an individual varies according to\nthat individual’s situation in life.", "\nAltruism is not necessarily admirable. It is to be admired only in\ncircumstances in which it is appropriate to act for another’s\nsake—and only when what one aims to do for another really does\nbenefit that individual. If one seeks what one takes to be the good of\nothers for their sake, but is mistaken about what is really good for\nthem, one’s action is defective. Altruism is fully admirable\nonly when combined with a correct understanding of well-being.", "\nWhat is wrong with those who do not care about others for their sake?\nIt could be the case that such individuals are themselves worse off\nfor their lack of altruistic motivation. That is what a eudaimonist\nmust say, and we have not objected to that aspect of eudaimonism. It\ncould also be the case that there is a failure of rationality among\nthose who are never altruistic or insufficiently altruistic. But it\nshould not be assumed that there must be something else that goes awry\nin those who are not altruistic or not altruistic enough, beyond the\nfact that when they ought to have cared about some individual other\nthan themselves, they failed to do so." ], "section_title": "7. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Annas, J., 1993, The Morality of Happiness, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated with\nintroduction and notes by C.D.C. Reeve, Indianapolis: Hackett,\n2014.", "Arpaly, N. and T. Schroeder, 2014, In Praise of Desire,\nNew York: Oxford University Press.", "Badhwar, Neera K., 2014, Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile\nLife, New York: Oxford University Press.", "Batson, C. 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[Cited by volume and page number of the Academy Edition\n(Gesammelte Schriften), which appear as marginalia in most\ntranslations of Kant.] ", "Keller, Simon, 2013, Partiality, Princeton: Princeton\nUniversity Press.", "Kraut, Richard, 2007, What is Good and Why: The Ethics of\nWell-Being, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.", "LeBar, Mark, 2013, The Value of Living Well, Oxford:\nOxford University Press", "Lewis, C.S., 1960, The Four Loves, New York: Harcourt,\nBrace.", "Maestripieri, Dario (ed.), 2003, Primate Psychology,\nCambridge: Harvard University Press.", "Maibom, Heidi L. (ed.), 2014, Empathy and Morality,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Mendus, Susan, 2002, Impartiality in Moral and Political\nPhilosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Mill, John Stuart, 1864, Utilitarianism, second edition,\nIndianapolis: Hackett, 2002.", "Nagel, Thomas, 1970, The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "–––, 1986, The View From Nowhere, New\nYork: Oxford University Press.", "Nichols, Shaun, 2004, Sentimental Rules: on the Natural\nFoundations of Moral Judgment, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Noddings, Nel, 1986, Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics and\nMoral Education, Berkeley: University of California Press.", "Nozick, Robert, 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New\nYork: Basic Books, pp. 42–45.", "Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford:\nClarendon Press.", "Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul (eds.),\n1993, Altruism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Plato, Meno, Symposium, in Complete\nWorks, J. Cooper and D. Hutchinson (eds)., Indianapolis: Hackett,\n1997.", "Ricard, Matthieu, Altruism: The Power of Compassion to Change\nYourself and the World, New York: Little, Brown & Co.,\n2015.", "Ridge, Michael and Sean McKeever, 2006, Principled Ethics:\nGeneralism as a Regulative Ideal, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Roberts, Robert C., 2013, Emotions in the Moral Life,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Russell, Daniel C., 2012, Happiness for Humans, Oxford:\nOxford University Press", "Scanlon, Thomas, 1998, What We Owe to Each Other,\nCambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, pp. 17–77.", "Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1840, On the Basis of Morality,\nIndianapolis: Hackett, 1999.", "Schroeder, Timothy, 2004, Three Faces of Desire, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Schueler, G.F., 1995, Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and\nthe Explanation of Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.", "Shaver, R., 1999, Rational Egoism, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Sidgwick, Henry, 1907, The Methods of Ethics,\n7th edition, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981.", "Singer, Peter, 2015, The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective\nAltruism is Changing Ideas About Living Effectively, New Haven:\nYale University Press.", "Skorupski, John, 2010, The Domain of Reasons, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Slote, Michael, 1992, From Morality to Virtue, New York:\nOxford University Press.", "–––, 2001, Morals From Motives, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "–––, 2010, Moral Sentimentalism,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2013 From Enlightenment to Receptivity:\nRethinking Our Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press", "Smith, Adam, 1759, The Theory of Moral Sentiments,\nIndianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2009.", "Sober, Elliott and David Wilson, 1998, Unto Others: The\nEvolution and Psychology on Unselfish Behavior, Cambridge:\nHarvard University Press.", "Stich, Stephen, John M. Doris, and Erica Roedder, 2010 [2012],\n“Altruism”, in The Moral Psychology Handbook,\nJohn M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, pp. 147–205; reprinted in Stephen Stich, 2012,\nCollected Papers (Volume 2: Knowledge, Rationality, and\nMorality, 1978–2010), Oxford: Oxford University Press,\npp. 348–400.", "Sumner, L. Wayne, 1996, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics,\nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "Tiberius, Valerie, 2018, Well-Being As Value-Fulfillment: How We Can Help Each Other to Live Well, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Trivers, Robert L., 1971, “The Evolution of Reciprocal\nAltruism”, Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1):\n35–57.", "Wolf, Susan, 1992, “Morality and Partiality”,\nPhilosophical Perspectives, 6: 243–259; reprinted in\nWolf 2015b: 31–46. doi:10.2307/2214247", "–––, 2015a, “The Importance of\nLove”, in Wolf 2015b: 181–195.", "–––, 2015b, The Variety of Values: Essays on\nMorality, Meaning, and Love, New York: Oxford University Press." ]	[ { "href": "../altruism-biological/", "text": "altruism: biological" }, { "href": "../altruism-empirical/", "text": "altruism: empirical approaches" }, { "href": "../egoism/", "text": "egoism" }, { "href": "../empathy/", "text": "empathy" }, { "href": "../impartiality/", "text": "impartiality" }, { "href": "../morality-biology/", "text": "morality: and evolutionary biology" }, { "href": "../moral-particularism/", "text": "moral particularism" }, { "href": "../reasons-agent/", "text": "reasons for action: agent-neutral vs. agent-relative" }, { "href": "../well-being/", "text": "well-being" } ]
alyngton	Robert Alyngton	First published Wed Jul 25, 2001; substantive revision Mon Jan 17, 2022	[ "\nRobert Alyngton was one of the most important authors of the\ngeneration after John Wyclif. He was deeply influenced by Walter\nBurley’s logico-ontological system and Wyclif’s\nmetaphysics. His major extant work, a commentary on the\nCategories, heavily depends on Burley’s last commentary\non the Categories and Wyclif’s De ente\npraedicamentali. Yet he was able to develop new logical and\nsemantic theories as well as the general strategy adopted by the\nOxford Realists, as he methodically substituted reference to external\nobjective realities for reference to linguistic and/or mental\nactivities." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Being and Categories", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Universals and Predication", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. The Theory of Substance", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. The Absolute Accidents", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Relations and Relatives", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. The Semantics of Second Intentions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Alyngton in the History of Medieval Thought", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Literature", "Secondary literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nNot a great deal is known of Robert Alyngton’s life. Most of the\ninformation about him comes from Emden 1957–59. From 1379 until\n1386, he was fellow of Queens College (the same Oxonian college where\nWyclif started his theological studies in 1363 and Johannes Sharpe\ntaught in the 1390s); he became Magister Artium and, by 1393,\ndoctor of theology. He was chancellor of the University in 1393 and\n1395. In 1382 he preached Wyclif’s religious and political ideas\nin Hampshire (McHardy 1987). He was rector of Long Whatton,\nLeicestershire, where he died by September 1398. ", "\nAccording to Emden 1957–59 and Ashworth & Spade 1992,\nAlyngton was of considerable repute as a logician. Among his extant\nworks, the following can be mentioned (the most complete list of his\nwritings is found in Bale 1557–59 [pp. 519–20]):" ], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe point of departure of every realist interpretation of the\nCategories is the notion of being (ens) in its\nrelationship to the ten categories, as Realists considered the\ncategorial table to be a division of beings. Like Burley, Alyngton\naffirms that (i) the division into categories is first of all a\ndivision of things existing outside the mind, and only secondarily of\nthe mental concepts and spoken or written terms which signify them,\nand (ii) things belonging to one categorial field are really distinct\nfrom those belonging to another—for instance, substances are\nreally distinct from quantities, qualities, and relations, quantities\nare really distinct from substances, qualities, and relations, and so\non (In Cat., cap. de numero et sufficientia\npraedicamentorum, Conti pp. 251, 252–53).", "\nUnfortunately Alyngton does not define being; yet, what he says about\n(1) the subject of the Categories (the real categorial being\nwhich can be signified by simple expressions, namely terms (In\nCat., cap. de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum ,\np. 252), and (2) analogy (In Cat., cap. de\naequivocis, ms. London, Lambeth Palace 393, fol. 70r–v)\nseems to entail that, like Wyclif, he also thinks of being as a sort\nof an extramental reality proper to everything (God and creatures;\nsubstances and accidents; universal and individual items; things,\ncollections of things, and states of affairs) according to different\nmodes and degrees.", "\nIn the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, all the realist authors,\nwith the only notable exception of Duns Scotus, regarded categorial\nitems as composed of two main aspects: the inner nature or essence,\nand their peculiar mode of being or of being predicated (modi\nessendi vel praedicandi). They maintained that the categorial\ntable divides categorial items according to their modes of being (or\nof being predicated) and not according to their inner natures (or\nessences). In particular, Thomas Aquinas (Sententia super\nMetaphysicam, liber V, lectio 9) based his method of finding the\nten Aristotelian categories on the differences of modes of being\npredicated, and recognized three fundamental modes of being\npredicated: essentially, proper to substances, when the predication\nindicates what a given thing is; accidentally, proper to quantities,\nqualities, and relatives, when the predication indicates that\nsomething inheres in a subject; and externally, proper to the\nremaining six categories, when the predication indicates that\nsomething which does not inhere in the subject nevertheless affects\nit. On the contrary Albert the Great (Liber de\npraedicamentis, tr. I, cap. 7) and Simon of Faversham\n(Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum, q. 12) based\ntheir method of finding the categories on the differences of modes of\nbeing. They admitted two fundamental modes of being: being by itself,\nproper to substance; and being in something else, proper to the nine\ngenera of accidents. The latter was subdivided into being in something\nelse absolutely, proper to quantities and qualities, and being in\nsomething else in virtue of a relation to a third thing (esse ad\naliud), proper to the remaining seven categories. Walter Burley,\nwhose last commentary on the Categories is, along with\nWyclif’s De ente praedicamentali, the main source of\nAlyngton’s commentary on the Categories, recalled two\nways of deducing the ten Aristotelian categories, both based on the\nvarious levels of similarity among their own modes of being. Alyngton\nfollows very closely Burley’s first way of deriving the ten\ncategories. In his opinion, there are two fundamental modes of being\nproper to things: being by itself, which characterizes substances, and\nbeing or inhering in something else, which characterizes accidents.\nThe latter is subdivided into three less general modes: being in\nsomething else in virtue of its matter; being in something else in\nvirtue of its form; and being in something else in virtue of the whole\ncomposite. Something can inhere in something else in virtue of its\nmatter, form, and composite according to three different ways: from\ninside (ab intrinseco), from outside (ab\nextrinseco), and partially from inside and partially from outside\n(partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco). If something\nis in something else in virtue of its matter and from inside, then it\nis a quantity; if from outside, it is a where; if partially from\ninside and partially from outside, it is an affection. If something is\nin something else in virtue of its form and from inside, then it is a\nquality; if from outside, it is when (quando vel\nquandalitas); if partially from inside and partially from\noutside, it is an action. If something is in something else in virtue\nof the whole composite and from inside, then it is a relation; if from\noutside, it is a possession (habitus); if partially from\ninside and partially from outside, it is a position (In Cat.,\ncap. de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum, pp.\n252–53).", "\nAlyngton’s choice implies an anti-reductionist approach to the\nmatter, which is confirmed by the solution of the problem of what\nproperly falls into the categorial fields. According to the standard\nrealist conception, not only the accidental forms, such as whiteness,\nbut also the compounds they cause when inhering in substances, such as\na white-thing (album), fall into the categories. Burley\nthought that whilst the accidental forms properly fall into the\ncategories, the aggregates made up from a substance and an accidental\nform do not, since they are beings per accidens, wanting in\nreal unity. In his opinion, such an aggregate may be said to fall into\na certain category, the category into which its accidental form falls,\nonly by reduction, in virtue of the accidental form itself. On the\ncontrary, Wyclif maintained that the aggregates built up by a\nsubstance and an accidental form fall per accidens into both\nthe category of substance and the category which the accidental form\nat issue belongs to (cf. Wyclif, De ente praedicamentali,\ncap. 1, pp. 3–4). Alyngton combines in an original way the two\nslightly different opinions of Burley and Wyclif. He affirms that a\nthing can be said to belong to a category in a threefold way: by\nitself, by accident (per accidens), and by reduction (per\nreductionem). Something is in a category by itself if and only if\nthe highest genus of that category is predicated by itself and and\ndirectly (in recto) of it (In Cat., cap. de\nnumero et sufficientia praedicamentorum, p. 259). In other words,\nif and only if the highest genus of that category is one of the\nconstitutive elements of the essence of the thing at issue. Accidental\nforms belong per se to the nine categories of accidents\n(In Cat., cap. de relativis, p. 300). Something is\nin a category by accident if and only if it is an aggregate from a\nsubstance and an accidental form. Such aggregates belong per accidens\nboth to the category of substance and to the category in which its\naccidental form is by itself (In Cat., cap. de numero et\nsufficientia praedicamentorum, p. 259; and cap. de\nrelativis, p. 300). Something can be in a category by reduction\nin two different ways: in a broad sense (large) and in a\nstrict sense (stricte). Something is in a category by\nreduction large if and only if it is an aggregate, and the\nhighest genus of a certain category is predicated only indirectly of\nit. Something is in a category by reduction stricte if and\nonly if it is not an aggregate, and, (a) like differences, it is a\ncomponent of the reality of a thing which is in a category by itself,\nbut the highest genus of that category is not predicated of it; or (b)\nit is the privation correlated to a certain property which, in turn,\nis in a category by itself; or (c), like extra-categorial principle\nsuch as God, the unity, and the point, it somehow instantiates the\nmode of being proper to a certain categorial field, but the highest\ngenus of that category is not one of the constitutive elements of the\nessence of that thing (In Cat., cap. de numero et\nsufficientia praedicamentorum, pp. 259–60).", "\nFundamental to Alyngton’s deduction of the categories and\nsolution of the problem of what falls into the categorial fields (and\nhow) is a close isomorphism between language (mental, written, and\nspoken) and the world. Like Burley and Wyclif, he was firmly convinced\nthat our thought is modelled on reality itself, so that it reproduces\nreality in all its elements, levels, and inner relations. Therefore,\none of the best ways of understanding the world lay for him in an\naccurate investigation of our notions and conceptual schemes, as they\nshow the structure of the world. A logical consequence of this\nconviction was his strong propensity towards reification: he\nhypostatises the notion of being and considers equivocity, analogy,\nand univocity not only as semantic relations between terms and things,\nbut also as real relations between extra-mental items (In\nCat., cap. de aequivocis, ms. London, Lambeth Palace\n393, fols. 69v–70r).", "\nAccording to the common interpretation of the opening passage of the\nCategories, equivocal terms are correlated with more than one\nconcept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing different\nnatures, whereas univocal terms are correlated with only one concept\nand refer to a multiplicity of things sharing one and the same nature.\nIn his last commentary on the Physics (after 1324), Burley\nhad maintained that the term ‘being’ is at the same time\nunivocal and equivocal with respect to the categories, as a single\nconcept corresponds to it (broadly speaking univocity), but the\ncategorial items share it in different ways, according to a hierarchy\nof value (broadly speaking equivocity)—see his Expositio in\nlibros octo Physicorum, lib. I, tr. 2, cap. 1, ed. Venice 1501,\nfols. 12vb-13ra. In turn, Wyclif had admitted three main types of\nequivocity: by chance (a casu), analogical, and generic, the\nsecond of which applies to the relationship between being and\ncategories (De ente praedicamentali, cap. 2). Alyngton\nrecognises four main kinds of equivocity: by chance; deliberate (a\nconsilio); analogical; and generic. Equivocals by chance are\nthose things that just happen to have the same name, but with\ndifferent meanings and/or reasons for imposing the name. Those things\nare deliberate equivocals which have distinct natures but the same\nname, and are subordinated to different but correlated concepts. Those\nthings are analogical which share the nature signified by their common\nname in various degrees and/or ways. Generic equivocals are those\nthings which share the same generic nature in the same way, but have\ndistinct specific natures of different absolute value (In\nCat., cap. de aequivocis, fol. 70r-v). So, within\nAlyngton’s system, what differentiates analogy from univocity is\nthe way in which a certain nature (or property) is shared by a set of\nthings: analogous things share it according to different degrees\n(secundum magis et minus, or secundum prius et\nposterius), univocal things share it all in the same manner and\nto the same degree (In Cat., cap. de univocis, fol.\n71v). Alyngton argues that being is not a sort of genus in relation to\nthe ten categories, since it does not manifest their essence, nor is\nit predicated univocally of them; being is analogous in relation to\nthe ten categories. It is the basic stuff of the metaphysical\nstructure of each reality, which possesses it in accordance with its\nown nature and level in the hierarchy of essences (In Cat.,\ncap. de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum, pp.\n255–56)." ], "section_title": "2. Being and Categories", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAmong the many kinds of beings (entia) that Alyngton admits,\nthe most important set is that consisting of universal items.\nUniversals are among the most disputed topics in Medieval\nphilosophical literature. Like Wyclif and the other Oxford Realists,\nAlyngton claims that universals fully exist outside the mind and are\nreally identical-to and formally distinct-from the individuals which\ninstantiate them. Like Albert the Great whom he quotes by name,\nAlyngton recognizes three main kinds of universals:", "\nThe ideas in God are the causes of formal universals, and formal\nuniversals are the causes of intentional universals. Furthermore, like\nBurley and Wyclif, Alyngton holds that formal universals actually\nexist (in actu) outside our minds, and not potentially only\n(in potentia) as moderate realists thought (In Cat.,\ncap. de substantia, p. 279)—even if, unlike Burley, he\nmaintains they are really identical with their individuals, for\notherwise it would be impossible to explain, against the Nominalists,\nwhy and how individual substances show different and more or less\nclose kinds of similarity among themselves (In Cat., cap.\nde substantia, pp. 267–68).", "\nAccording to Alyngton, who depends here on Avicenna and Wyclif, formal\nuniversals are common natures in virtue of which the individuals that\nshare them are exactly what they are—as the human species is the\nform by which every man formally is a man. Qua natures, they\nare prior, and so indifferent, to any division into universals and\nindividuals. Universality (universalitas or\ncommunicabilitas) is as it were their inseparable property,\nbut not a constitutive mark of the nature itself (In\nCat., cap. de substantia, fol. 101v). As a consequence,\nformal universals can be conceived of in two different manners: as\nfirst intentions or as second intentions. In the former case, they are\nnatures of a certain kind and are identical with their individuals\n(for example, man is the same thing as Socrates). In the latter case,\nthey are properly universals (that is, something that can exist in\nmany things and can be shared by them), and are distinct from their\nindividuals considered qua individuals, because of opposite\nconstitutive principles (In Cat., cap. de\nsubstantia, p. 268). Therefore, universals are really\n(realiter) identical to, but formally (formaliter)\ndistinct from their individuals. In fact, universals are formal causes\nin relation to their individuals, and individuals are material causes\nin relation to their universals. Thus three different kinds of\nentities can be qualified as formal universals:", "\nAlyngton accepts the traditional realistic account of the relationship\nbetween formal universals and individuals, and, like Wyclif, improves\nit by defining its logical structure more accurately, in order to\navoid the inconsistencies stressed by Ockham and his followers.\nAlyngton thought that a universal of the category of substance could\ndirectly receive only the predications of substantial forms more\ncommon than itself. On the other hand, accidental forms inhering in\nsubstantial individuals could be predicated only indirectly\n(essentialiter) of the substantial form itself that those\nindividuals instantiate, predicated indirectly through and in virtue\nof the individuals of that substantial form. So his description of the\nlogical structure of the relationship between universals and\nindividuals demanded a redefinition of predication. Alyngton was\nprobably the first to ameliorate Wyclif’s theory of predication\nby dividing predication into formal predication (praedicatio\nformalis) and remote inherence (inhaerentia remota) or\npredication by essence (praedicatio secundum essentiam).\nRemote inherence is grounded in a partial identity between subject and\npredicate, which share some but not all metaphysical constituents, and\ndoes not demand that the form signified by the predicate term be\ndirectly present in the entity signified by the subject term. On the\nother hand, such a direct presence is needed by formal predication.\n“Man is an animal” and “Socrates is white” are\ninstances of formal predication; “(What is) singular is (what\nis) common” (singulare est commune) and “Humanity\nis running” (humanitas est currens) are instances of\nremote inherence, as according to Alyngton it is possible to attribute\nthe property of being running to the form of humanity if at least one\nman is running. However, he makes sure to use as a predicate term a\nsubstantival adjective in its neuter form, because only in this way\ncan it be made apparent that the form signified by the predicate term\nis not directly present in the subject, but is indirectly attributed\nto it, through its individuals (In Cat., cap. de\nsubstantia, pp. 288–90)." ], "section_title": "3. Universals and Predication", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThese remarks on the relations between forms and substances bring us\nto the core of Alyngton’s ontology: the doctrine of substance,\ndeveloped in the fifth chapter of his commentary on the\nCategories. Alyngton’s treatment can be divided into\ntwo main parts. (i) The first attempts to clarify what characterizes\nsubstance, and therefore what falls by itself into that category; (ii)\nthe second is concerned with the distinction between primary (or\nindividual) and secondary (or universal) substances.", "\nAlyngton lists seven opinions about the nature and mode of being of\nsubstance, the last of which he supports.", "\nWyclif’s position about the nature of substance implies that the\ndistinction between potency and act is, from the point of view of\nmetaphysics, the most fundamental distinction, of which that between\nform and matter is but one example. As (i) prime matter is pure\npotentiality, while form is act, and (ii) the distinction between\npotency and act is wider than that between matter and form, the latter\nis a particular case of the former. In fact, according to Wyclif, the\ndistinction between potency and act runs though the whole of creation,\nsince it applies also to any kinds of spiritual creatures, whereas the\ndistinction between matter and form is found only in the corporeal\ncreatures. On the contrary, Alyngton seems to interpret the\ndistinction between potency and act as a particular case of the\ndistinction between matter and form, since he constantly explains the\nmeaning of the opposition potency-act in terms of the opposition\nbetween matter and form in a crucial passage that he quotes from\nWyclif’s De ente praedicamentali (In Cat.,\ncap. de substantia, p. 267 [= Wyclif, De ente\npraedicamentali, cap. 5, pp. 38–39]). The result is a sort\nof universal hylemorphism, since in this way matter and form serve as\nprinciples in the order of being as well as in the order of becoming.\nAll the more so because Alyngton seems to accept the thesis that\n(angelic) intelligences are not pure forms existing by themselves, but\nformal principles necessarily joined to the matter of the heavens in\nsuch a way as to make up living beings (In Cat., cap. de\nsubstantia, p. 264).", "\nA second consequence of this approach to the problem of the nature of\nsubstance is that, within his system, primary substances alone are\nsubstances properly speaking. This conclusion is confirmed by his\nanalysis of the distinctive mark (proprium) of substance:\nwhile remaining numerically one and the same, being capable of\nadmitting contrary properties, the modification taking place through a\nchange in the subject itself of the motion at issue. Alyngton appears\nto think that this description is satisfied only by primary (that is,\nindividual) substances (In Cat., cap. de substantia,\nfol. 104v). Secondary substances therefore are per se in the\ncategory of substance only insofar as they are constitutive parts of\nprimary substances. Thus, secondary substances belong to the category\nof substance by virtue of the individual substances that instantiate\nthem, since they are not formally substances. In fact, unlike primary\nsubstances, secondary substances are forms, and consequently\nincomplete entities with an imperfect and dependent mode of existence.\nThey require composite substances in order to properly exist. No form\nas such, not even the substantial ones, is formally a substance, since\nno form as such has (i) the capacity of underlying potency and act,\nand (ii) matter and form as its inner constituent. Secondary\nsubstances are related to primary substances as formal principles of\nthe latter. It is in this way that humanity and (say) Socrates are\nlinked together. For this reason no secondary substances as such are\ntotally identical with primary substances (In Cat., cap.\nde substantia, p. 280; see also pp. 281 and 282–283).\nAs a consequence, while ‘man is animal’ (‘homo\nest animal’) is a sentence to which a formal predication\ncorresponds in the world, a predication by essence matches\n‘humanity is animality’ (‘humanitas est\nanimalitas’). Any (individual) man is an animal because of\nthe form of humanity present in him qua its essential\nconstituent, albeit the form of humanity as such is not the principle\nof animality. Therefore, humanity is not formally animality nor\nrationality, even though it is animality plus rationality (In\nCat., cap. de substantia, pp. 283–284; see also\ncap. de quantitate, fols. 106v–107r).", "\nPrimary substances are the substrate of existence of any other kinds\nof categorial being, as nothing exists in addition to primary\nsubstances but secondary substances and accidents, which both are\nforms present in individual substances. Like Aristotle\n(Categories 5, 2b5–6), Alyngton can therefore affirm\nthat primary substances are the necessary condition of existence for\nany other items of the world: nothing could exist, if primary\nsubstances stopped existing (In Cat., cap. de\nsubstantia, p. 286). This does not mean, however, that it would\nbe possible to find in the world a primary substance (i) that would\nnot belong to a certain species, and (ii) without any accident\ninhering in it. It means that, from the point of view of full\nexistence, accidents and secondary substances always presuppose\nprimary substances, as to be a primary substance is to be an\nautonomous singular existing item (hoc aliquid), whilst (i)\nto be a secondary substance is to be a quale quid, that is,\nan inner and essential determination (or form) of a primary substance,\nand (ii) to be an accident is to be an outer determination or aspect\nof a primary substance (In Cat., cap. de substantia,\nfol. 101v)." ], "section_title": "4. The Theory of Substance", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSince Alyngton thinks of primary substances as the ultimate substrates\nof existence in relation to anything else, the only way to safeguard\nthe reality of accidents as well as their distinction from substance\nand from each other, while at the same time, to affirm their\ndependence on substance in existence, was to conceive of them as forms\nof the substance itself, and therefore as something existentially\nincomplete. Accordingly, like Wyclif, he insists that quantity,\nquality, and relations, considered as abstract accidents, are forms\ninherent in primary substances, whereas, if considered from the point\nof view of their actual existence as concrete items, they are not\nreally distinct from the substance in which they are present, but only\nformally, as they are modes of substances. So, the chief features of\nAlyngton’s treatment of accidents are his twofold consideration\nof them as abstract forms and as concrete properties as well as his\ncommitment to their objective reality, since, in his opinion, they are\nmind-independent items of the world in both cases. Hence, the main\ngoals of his reading of the chapters 6–8 of the Aristotelian\ntreatise are showing the ordered internal structure of the chief\ncategories of accidents, and reasserting their reality and real\ndistinction from the category of substance, against those thinkers,\nlike Ockham and his followers, who had attempted to reduce quantity\nand relations to mere aspects of material substances.", "\n1. (Quantity) According to the standard realist\ninterpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories,\nfollowed also by Alyngton among the nine genera of accidents, quantity\nis the most important one, as it is the basis of all further\naccidents, since quantity orders material substances for receiving\nquality and the other accidental forms (In Cat., cap. de\nquantitate, fol. 106r). On the contrary, Ockham had claimed that\nit was superfluous to posit quantitative forms really distinct from\nsubstance and quality, since quantity presupposes what it is intended\nto explain, that is, the extension of material substances and their\nhaving parts outside parts. As an accident, quantity needs substance\nas its substrate of inherence (cf. Ockham, Expositio in librum\nPraedicamentorum Aristotelis, cap. 10.4, in Opera\nphilosophica, vol. 2, pp. 205–24). Like Burley and Wyclif,\nAlyngton denies that material substance can be actually extended\nwithout the presence of the general form of quantity in it, thereby\naffirming its necessity. Hence, he tries to confute Ockham’s\nargumentation. He thinks that the existence of quantity always implies\nthat of substance, but he also believes that the actual existence of\nparts in a substance necessarily implies the presence of a general\nform of quantity in it, really distinct from the substance (say\nSocrates) in which it inheres, and formally distinct from the fact,\ngrounded on the substance at issue, that this same substance is a\nquantified thing. For Alyngton, what characterizes quantity and\ndifferentiates it from the other accidental forms, and in particular\nfrom quality, are the following features: (1) being the appropriate\nmeasure of anything, and (2) being an absolute entity which makes it\npossible that material substances actually have parts outside parts\n(In Cat., cap. de quantitate, fols. 106v, 107r,\n114v).", "\nIf the highest genus of the category of quantity is a form, the seven\nspecies Aristotle enumerates (line, surface, solid, time, place,\nnumber, and speech) clearly are not. Alyngton tries to meet this\ndifficulty by reformulating the notion of quantified-thing\n(quantum), and by proposing a method for deducing the seven\nspecies of quantity from the highest genus (a sort of sufficientia\nquantitatum). He considers the seven species Aristotle lists not\nas quantitative forms, but as the most proper and primary bearers of\nthe quantitative nature, revealed by the highest genus of the\ncategory. In fact, encouraged by the Aristotelian distinction between\nstrict and derivative quantities (Categories 6,\n5a38–b10), like Burley, he distinguishes two different ways of\nbeing quantified: by itself and accidentally (per accidens).\nOnly the seven species of quantity would be quanta by\nthemselves, while any other quantum would be such per\naccidens, and so indirectly, because of its connection to one (or\nmore) of the seven quanta per se (In Cat., cap.\nde quantitate, fol. 116r).", "\nIn Alyngton’s view, the seven species of quantity correspond to\nthe seven possible ways of measuring the being (esse) of the\nmaterial substance. In fact, substance has two main kinds of being:\npermanent and in succession. And both of them can be either discrete\nor continuous. In turn, the being permanent and continuous of material\nsubstance can be measured either from inside or from outside. If from\ninside, then in three different modes: according to one, two or all\nthe three dimensions proper to material substances. In the first case,\nthe measure is line, in the second surface, and in the third solid. If\nit is measured from outside, then it is place. The being of material\nsubstance which is permanent and discrete is measured by numbers. The\nbeing which is in succession and continuous is measured by time. And\nfinally, the being of substance which is in succession and discrete is\nmeasured by the quantity called ‘speech’ (oratio)\n(In Cat., cap. de quantitate, fol.\n107r–v).", "\nAlyngton’s derivation of the seven species of quantity from a\nunique principle common to them is unconvincing, but extremely\ninteresting, nonetheless, as it clearly shows that he wants to stress\nthe unity of the category of quantity, which at first appears\nheterogeneous, and to trace the problem of reality and real\ndistinction of quantities back to that of the nature and status of its\ndistinctive mark.", "\n2. (Quality) The chapter on quality is the least complex and\ninteresting part of the whole commentary, since Alyngton is faithful\nto Aristotle’s text and doctrine, and sometimes even offers\nrather unproblematic analyses and elucidations. The main general topic\nhe deals with is the internal structure of the category.", "\nIn the first lines of the eighth chapter of the Categories\n(8a25–26) Aristotle observes that quality is among those things\nthat are spoken of in a number of ways—an affirmation which\nseems to imply that quality is not a highest genus, as, according to\nAristotle himself, what is spoken of in a number of ways always\ngathers in several different natures. Furthermore, the Stagirite\nspeaks of four species of quality (habits and dispositions, natural\ncapacities and incapacities, affective qualities and affections,\nfigures and shapes), without explaining how they are related to one\nanother and to the highest genus of the category. No Aristotelian\ncommentator had ever thought that quality was spoken of in many ways\npurely equivocally. Therefore no Aristotelian commentator had ever\npresumed that the term ‘quality’ could have several\ndifferent (but connected) meanings. On the contrary, they unanimously\ntook for granted that it had a unique ratio, common to all\nthe items belonging to the category. They disagreed, however, about\nthe status and hierarchical order of the four species mentioned by\nAristotle. For example, Albert the Great held that quality at once and\ndirectly splits up into the four species, which would all be equally\nfar from the highest genus. Duns Scotus, Ockham, and Walter Burley\nmaintained that the so called ‘species’ of the quality\nwere not properly species (or intermediate genera), but modes of\nquality, since many singular qualities would belong to the first three\nspecies at the same time, as, unlike species, modes are not\nconstituted by opposite properties. Alyngton rejected both opinions.\nThe latter because it compromises the actual goal of a correct\ncategorial theory, and the former because it does not fit in with the\nstandard infracatagorial structure described by Porphyry in his\nIsagoge. Consequently, he inserts an intermediate level between the\nhighest genus of the category and the four species by claiming that\nquality is first of all divided into perceptible (sensibilis)\nand non-perceptible (insensibilis) qualities. Affective\nqualities and affections, figures and shapes stem from the former kind\nof quality, while habits and dispositions, natural capacities and\nincapacities derive from the latter. In fact, (1) figures and shapes\nare those perceptible qualities which inhere in substances because of\nthe mutual position of its quantitative parts, while affective\nqualities and affections inhere in substances because of the form\nitself of the substantial composite. (2) Natural capacities and\nincapacities are inborn non-perceptible qualities, while habits and\ndispositions are due to the activity, both physical and, if it is the\ncase, intellectual, of the substance in which they inhere (In\nCat., cap. de qualitate, fol. 130r)." ], "section_title": "5. The Absolute Accidents", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAristotle’s treatment of relations and relatives in the\nCategories is opaque and incomplete, since (1) he does not\nhave any notion of relation, as he speaks of relatives and conceives\nof them as those entities to which non-absolute terms of our language\nrefer; (2) he does not discuss the question of the reality of\nrelatives; (3) he does not clarify the connection between the two defi\nnitions of relatives he proposes in the seventh chapters of the\nCategories; (4) he does not give any effective criterion for\ndistinguishing relatives from some items belonging to other categories\n(cf. Ackrill 1963, pp. 98–103). Because of these\nfacts, in the Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages many authors tried\nto reformulate the doctrine of relatives. The most successful and\ninteresting attempt was that of the Neoplatonic commentators of the\nsixth century, such as Olympiodorus, Philoponus, and Simplicius.\nUnlike Aristotle, they were able to elaborate a notion of relation\n(schesis) almost equivalent to our modern notion of two-place\npredicates, as they conceived of relations as abstract forms whose\ndistinctive feature was the property of being present-in and joining\ntwo different substances at once. This view was rejected by Latin\nmedieval authors. According to Boethius relation (respectus or\nhabitudo) is an accidental form which is in a substance (its substrate\nof inherence) and simply entails a reference to another, without\ninhering in that other. Shortly after the middle of the13th century,\nAlbert the Great explicitly denied that a relation could inhere (in\nthe technical sense of the word) in two substances at once (Liber\nde praedicamentis, tr. 4, cap. 10). Some years later, the same\nthesis was held by Simon of Faversham (Quaestiones in librum\nPraedicamentorum, q. 43). In the 14th century, also Walter Burley\nshared this approach, since it appeared to him to be the only thing\nconsistent with one of the basic principle of medieval metaphysics:\nthe equivalence and correspondence between accidental forms and their\nsubstrates of inherence, so that no accidental form could inhere at\nthe same time and in full in two (or more) substances (cf. Burley,\nExpositio super librum Sex principiorum, cap. de\nhabitu). On the contrary, Wyclif seems to support a different\nopinion, similar to that of the Neoplatonists , as he maintained that\nrelation (1) is different from quality and quantity, since it\npresupposes them, and (2) qua such is a sort of link between two\nthings (cf. Wyclif, De ente praedicamentali,\nch. 7. p. 61).", "Alyngton’s theory of ad aliquid is worthy of note,\nas he possibly was the only late medieval author who followed and\ndeveloped Wyclif ’s ideas on that topic. He conceived of\nrelation (relatio) as an accidental form which is present in\nboth the relatives at once – even though in different ways,\nsince it names only one of them. Consequently his relation can be\nconsidered as a sort of ontological counterpart of our modern\nfunctions with two variables, or two-place predicates (In\nCat., cap. de relativis, pp. 295–96). According\nto Alyngton, whose account partially differs from that of Wyclif, in\nthe act of relating one substance to another four distinct\nconstitutive elements can be singled out: (1) the relation itself\n– for instance, the form of paternity; (2) the subject of the\nrelation, that is, the substance that denominatively receives the name\nof the relation – for instance, the (substance that is the)\nfather; (3) the object of the relation, that is, the substance which\nthe subject of the relation is connected with – for instance,\nthe (substance that is the) son; and (4) the foundation\n(fundamentum) of the relation, that is, the absolute entity\nin virtue of which the relation inheres in the subject and in the\nobject (ibidem, p. 299). The foundation is the main\ncomponent, since it joins the relation to the underlying substances,\nlets the relation link the substrate to the object, and transmits some\nof its properties to the relation (ibidem, p. 291). Like\nWyclif, Alyngton affirms that only qualities and quantities can be the\nfoundation of a relation (ibidem). Some consequences about\nthe nature and status of relations and relatives derive from these\npremises: (1) relation is a categorial item whose reality is feebler\nthan that of any other accidental form, as it depends upon the\nsimultaneous existence of three different items: the subject, the\nobject, and the foundation (ibidem, p. 295). (2) A relation\ncan start inhering in a substance without any change in the latter,\nbut simply because of a change in another substance. For example:\ngiven two things, one white and the other black, if the black thing\nbecomes white, then, because of this change, a new accident, that is,\na relation of similarity, will inhere also in the fi rst thing, apart\nfrom any other change in it. (3) All the real relatives (relativa\nsecundum esse) are simultaneous by nature, since the real cause of\nbeing a relative is relation, which at the same time inheres in two\nsubstances, thereby making both ones relatives (ibidem,\np. 301). On this basis Alyngton can divide relations into\ntranscendental and categorial relations (ibidem, pp.\n290–91), and, what is more, among the latter he can contrast\nreal relatives (relativa secundum esse) with relatives of\nreason (relativa rationis) without utilizing references to\nour mental activities nor to semantic principles. In fact, on the one\nhand, Alyngton describes real relatives as those aggregates (1) made\nup of a primary substance, (2) an absolute accidental form (quantity\nor quality), and (3) a relation which correlates the substance at\nissue to another substance existing in actu. On the other hand, he\ndefi ne relatives of reason as those aggregates characterized by the\noccurrence of at least one of these negative conditions: (1) either\nthe relation’s subject of inherence or its object is not a\nsubstance; (2) the object is not an actual entity; (3) the foundation\nof the relation is not an absolute accident (ibidem, p. 293).\nThe strategy which supports this choice is evident: Alyngton wanted to\nsubstitute references to mental activity with references to the\nexternal world, thus using only objective criteria, based on the\nframework of reality itself in order to classifying things." ], "section_title": "6. Relations and Relatives", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nNot until the end of the fourteenth century did anyone claim\nextramental reality for second intentions, not even Walter Burley.\nAccording to him, second intentions are concepts that have a\nfoundation in the extramental world, but are not “things”\nin the proper sense of the term. This account implied that the\nkeystone of medieval realism, the principle of one-to-one\ncorrespondence between language and the world, has to suffer an\nexception, since no common nature matches second intention terms. It\nwas just in order to do away with this exception that Alyngton (then\nfollowed by William Penbygull, Roger Whelpdale, and John Tarteys)\nhypostatized second intentions, heavily modifying the standard theory\nof the status of second intentions. In fact, Alyngton not only\nconsiders second intentions as objective, but clearly hypostatizes\nthem, speaking of them in terms of real determinations joined to the\nmodes of being of extramental things and directly inhering in them\n(In Cat., cap. de substantia, pp. 268–69). As\na consequence, he conceives of logic as an analysis of the general\nframework of reality, since according to him logic turns on structural\nforms (aimed at building up semantic contents), which are, as forms,\nindependent of both such contents and of the mental acts by which they\nare learned. It is through these forms that the network connecting the\nbasic constituents of the world (individuals and universals,\nsubstances and accidents) is disclosed to us (In Cat., cap.\nde substantia, pp. 278–79). The strategy that supports\nthis choice is evident: as in the case of relations of reason,\nAlyngton is trying to substitute references to external reality for\nreferences to mental activity. In other words, he seeks to reduce\nepistemology to ontology. From a logical point of view, this means\nthat the same interpretative pattern is employed in order to account\nfor both the semantic power of proper names and common terms (that is,\nthose expressions that refer to a class of individuals), and first and\nsecond intentions. Like proper names, common terms also primarily\nsignify and label a unique object—that is, a common nature. But\nunlike the object signified by a proper name, the reality of the\ncommon nature is distributed among many individuals as their main\nmetaphysical constituent, since it determines the typical features of\nthe individuals themselves. By associating common terms with such\nobjects as their main referent, Alyngton thinks he can explain the\nfact that a common term can stand for and label many individuals at\nonce. Only in this way does he believe we can grant the value of our\nknowledge, which otherwise lacks an adequate foundation (In\nCat., cap. de substantia, fols. 101v–102v).", "\nStill, this procedure, so strong and powerful, leads to a paradox when\napplied to terms of second intention by which we speak of singular\nobjects considered as such—that is, terms (or expressions) like\n‘first substance’ (substantia prima),\n‘individual’ (individuum), and so on. In fact,\naccording to Alyngton (and many other Realists of that period), a\ncommon term is always matched by a common nature really existing in\nthe world. Therefore, as the term ‘individual’ appears to\nbe common, since it can stand for a multiplicity of things, it should\nsignify an extramental common nature shared by them. As a consequence,\nwe would have to admit the existence of an individual common\nnature, that is a (self-contradictory) entity present in all the\nindividuals as the cause of their being individuals. Alyngton, who\nwould not give up the principle of the one-to-one relation between\nphilosophical language and the world, could remove this paradox only\nby classifying this kind of term among atomic (discreti)\nterms—that is, terms or nominal syntagms, like\n‘Socrates’ or ‘this man’ (hic homo),\nthat refer to individuals and not to sets of individuals. According to\nAlyngton, there are three main kinds of atomic terms:", "\nThe rule that terms can be listed as common ones if and only if they\nsignify a common nature is safe, but at the cost of a counterintuitive\ncategorization of their semantic power. In fact, according to\nAlyngton’s account, saying that Socrates and Plato are first\nsubstances simply means that (i) each one is what he is, and that (ii)\nwhat each one is is a non-universal substance. This is a solution that\nentails that to be an individual is not a positive state of affairs,\nbut a negative one, and therefore connects Alyngton’s ontology\nwith Henry of Ghent’s theory of individuation." ], "section_title": "7. The Semantics of Second Intentions", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAlyngton’s theory of categories is an interesting example of\nthat partial dissolution of the traditional doctrine which took place\nin between the end of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th\ncenturies. Within Alyngton’s metaphysics, (1) the relationships\nbetween primary (or individual) substances and secondary (or\nuniversal) substances, and (2) between substances and accidents (both\nabstract and concrete) as well as (3) the inner natures of essential\nand accidental predications are so different from their Aristotelian\noriginals that the general meaning of the categorial doctrine is\ndeeply modified. According to Alyngton, the formal-and-essential\npredication and the formal-and-accidental predication would correspond\nto Aristotle’s essential and accidental predications\nrespectively. But he regards remote inherence as more general than\nformal predication. Therefore, in his system formal predication is a\nsort of sub-type of the remote inherence. This means that he\nrecognises a single ontological pattern, founded on a partial\nidentity, as the basis of every kind of predicative relation. Thus,\nthe praedicatio formalis essentialis and the praedicatio\nformalis accidentalis are very different from their Aristotelian\nmodels, as they express degrees in identity as well as the remote\ninherence. As a consequence, the relationships between substance and\naccidents and between individuals and universals (and hence the\nontological status of universal substances and that of accidents) are\ncompletely changed. In Alyngton’s view, both concrete accidents,\nqua modes of individual substances, and universal substances, qua the\nmain components of the natures of individual substances, are really\nidentical-to and formally distinct-from primary substances. Moreover,\nin the Categories Aristotle (1) characterizes primary\nsubstances as those beings which are neither present in a subject nor\npredicable of a subject, and (2) considers the capacity of underlying\naccidents as the constitutive principle of substance, while Alyngton\n(1) defi nes primary substance as what (i) is apt to underlie potency\nand act, and (ii) has matter and form as its inner foundations, and\n(2) explicitly affi rms that underlying accidents is only a derivative\nproperty of substance. Finally, because of his strong propensity\ntowards hypostatization (as we have seen, Alyngton methodically\nreplaces logical and epistemological rules with ontological criteria\nand references), he interprets Aristotle’s theory of homonymy,\nsynonymy, and paronymy as an ontological theory about real items and\nnot as a semantic one about the relations between terms and things. In\nconclusion, Alyngton conflates the real and logical (so to say) levels\ninto one: just like Burley and Wyclif , he considers logic as the\ntheory of the discourse on being, turning on structural forms and\nrelations, which exist in the world and are totally independent of the\nmental acts by which they are grasped. It is through these structural\nforms and relations that the network connecting the basic items of\nreality (individuals and universals, substances and accidents) is\nclearly disclosed. Yet, because of his peculiar ideas on substance and\npredication, his world is different from those of Burley and of\nWyclif. On Burley ’s view, macro-objects (i.e., what is\nsignified by a proper name or by an individual expression, such as\n‘Socrates ’ or ‘this particular horse’) are\nthe basic components of the world. They are aggregates made up of\nreally different items: primary substances and substantial and\naccidental forms existing in them. Primary substances and substantial\nand accidental forms are like simple (or atomic) objects, each\npossessing a unique, well-defi ned nature. Although they are simple,\nsome of these components are in a sense composite because they are\nreducible to something else – for example, primary substance is\ncomposed of a particular form and matter. Primary substance differs\nfrom the other components of a macro-object because of its peculiar\nmode of being as an autonomous and independently existing object, in\ncontrast with the other categorial items, which necessarily presuppose\nit for their existence. Primary substances are therefore substrates of\nexistence in relation to everything else. The distinction between\nsubstantial and accidental forms derives from their different\nrelations to primary substances: substantial, universal forms disclose\nthe natures of primary substances; by contrast, those forms that\nsimply affect primary substances without being actually joined to\ntheir natures are accidental forms. As a result, the macro-object is\nnot simply a primary substance but an orderly collection of categorial\nitems, so that primary substance, even though it is the most important\nelement, does not contain the whole being of the macro-object. On\nWyclif ’s view, whatever is is a proposition\n(pan-propositionalism). The constitutive property of any kind of being\nis the capacity of being the object of a complex act of signifying.\nThis choice implies a revolution in the standard medieval theory of\ntranscendentals, since Wyclif actually replaces being with true.\nAccording to the common belief, verum was nothing but being\nitself considered in relation to an intellect, no matter whether\ndivine or human. According to Wyclif, being is no more the main\ntranscendental and its notion is not the first and simplest, but there\nis something more basic to which being can be brought back: the truth\n(veritas) (or true, verum). Only what can be signifi\ned by a complex expression is a being, and whatever is the proper\nobject of an act of signifying is a truth. ‘Truth’ is\ntherefore the true name of being itself. From the ontological point of\nview this entails the uniqueness in type of the significata\nof every class of categorematic expressions. Within Wyclif ’s\nworld it is the same (kind of ) object which both concrete terms and\npropositions refer to, as primary substances have to be regarded as\n(atomic) states of affairs. According to him, from the metaphysical\npoint of view a singular man, for instance, is nothing but a real\nproposition, with its real suject (the concrete existence in time of\nthat singular thing, say Socrates), its real predicate (the common\nnature, i.e., the human nature viewed qua universal), and its copula\n(the singular essence, i. e., the individual essence of Socrates). The\nresult is that Wyclif ’s world consists of molecular objects,\nwhich are not simple, but composite, because they are reducible to\nsomething else, belonging to a different rank of reality, and unable\nto exist by itself: being and essence, potency and act, matter and\nform, abstract genera, species and differences. For that reason,\neverything one can speak about or think of is both a thing (or\nmolecular object) and a sort of atomic state of affairs, while every\ntrue proposition expresses either an atomic or a molecular state of\naffairs, that is the union (if the proposition is affirmative) or the\nseparation (if the proposition is negative) of two (or more) molecular\nobjects. On the contrary, Alyngton’s world consists of atomic\nobjects whose constitutive elements are abstract forms (or essences),\nboth substantial and accidental, potency and act, and matter. In fact,\naccording to him, unlike Burley, what is signified by a proper name or\nby an individual expression is a primary substance, and, unlike\nWyclif, simple and complex expressions have different\nsignificata. Moreover, in his view, Socrates cannot be\nregarded as an aggregate, since the beings of the substantial\nuniversal forms predicated of him and those of the concrete accidental\nforms inhering in him coincide with the being of that primary\nsubstance Socrates himself is. Thus, if we consider Socrates from the\npoint of view of his being, Socrates is simply an atomic object, a\nprimary substance. If we consider him from the point of view of the\nessences that he contains in himself, then he is a compound of really\ndifferent forms, which can exist only in it, as its components, and\nthrough its being. This is the inner sense (1) of the formula\n‘really identical and formally distinct’ that Alyngton\nemploys for explaining the relation between universals and individuals\nas well as the relation between substance and concrete accidents; and\n(2) of his description of the nature and peculiar mode of being of the\nprimary substance: to be a primary substance is to be the\nbeing of whatever can be." ], "section_title": "8. Alyngton in the History of Medieval Thought", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, in\nA.D. Conti, “Linguaggio e realtà nel commento alle\nCategorie di Robert Alyngton,” Documenti e studi\nsulla tradizione filosofica medievale 4 (1993), pp.\n179–306, at pp. 242–306. Partial edition: only chaps. 2,\n3, 4, and 7, and the first section of chap. 5.", "Albert the Great, Liber de praedicamentis, in\nOpera Omnia, E. Borgnet (ed.), 38 volumes, Paris: Vives,\n1890–9.", "Burley, Walter, Expositio super librum Sex principiorum,\ncap. de habitu, in Expositio super Artem Veterem\nPorphyrii et Aristotelis, ed. Venetiis 1509, fol. 63ra.", "Wyclif, De ente praedicamentali, R. Beer (ed.), London:\nTrübner for the Wyclif Society, 1891.", "Ackrill, J.L., 1963, Aristotle’s Categories and De\ninterpretatione, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Ashworth, E.J & P.V. Spade, 1992, “Logic in Late\nMedieval Oxford,” in The History of the University of\nOxford, J.I. Catto & R. Evans eds., vol. 2, Oxford: Clarendon\nPress, pp. 50–62.", "Bale, J., 1557–59, Scriptorum illustrium Maioris\nBritanniae …, 2 vols. in 1, Basel: Joannes Oporinus.", "Conti, A.D., 1993, “Linguaggio e realtà nel commento\nalle Categorie di Robert Alyngton,” Documenti e\nstudi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 4:\n179–306.", "–––, 2006, “Wyclif’s Logic and\nMetaphysics,” in I.C. Levy (ed.), A Companion to John\nWyclif, Leiden: Brill, 2006, pp. 67–125, at pp.\n118–124.", "–––, 2008, “A Realist Interpretation of\nthe Categories in the Fourteenth Century: the Litteralis\nSententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis of Robert\nAlyngton,” in L. Newton (ed.), Medieval Commentaries on\nAristotle’s Categories, Leiden: Brill, pp.\n317–46.", "–––, 2010, “Realism,” in R. Pasnau\n(ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, 2 vols.,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 647–60.", "Conti, A.D. (ed.), 1990, Johannes Sharpe, Quaestio super\nuniversalia, Firenze: Olschki. See the “Studio\nstorico-critico,” pp. 309–15.", "de Libera, A., 1996, La querelle des universaux. De Platon\nà la fin du Moyen Age, Paris: Éditions du Seuil.\nSee pp. 403–28.", "de Rijk, L.M., 1977, “Logica oxoniensis: an Attempt\nto Reconstruct a 15th Century Manual of Logic,”\nMedioevo, 3: 125–55.", "Emden, A.B., 1957–59, A Biographical Register of the\nUniversity of Oxford to AD 1500, 3 vols., Oxford: Clarendon\nPress. (See vol. 1, pp. 30–31.)", "Lohr, Ch.H., 1973, “Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries.\nAuthors: Robertus-Wilgelmus,” Traditio, 29:\n96–97.", "McHardy, A.K., 1987, “The Dissemination of Wyclif’s\nIdeas,” in A. Hudson & M. Wilks (eds.), From Ockham to\nWyclif, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 361–62.", "Spade, P.V. & G.A. Wilson (eds.), 1986, Johannis Wyclif\nSumma insolubilium, Binghamton, N.Y.: Medieval & Renaissance\nTexts & Studies. See the “Introduction,” especially\npp. xxii–xlvii." ]	[ { "href": "../burley/", "text": "Burley [Burleigh], Walter" }, { "href": "../penbygull/", "text": "Penbygull, William" }, { "href": "../sharpe/", "text": "Sharpe, Johannes" }, { "href": "../wyclif/", "text": "Wyclif, John" } ]
ambiguity	Ambiguity	First published Mon May 16, 2011; substantive revision Sat May 22, 2021	[ "\nFun fact: the word ‘ambiguous’, at least according to the\nOxford English Dictionary, is ambiguous: it can mean uncertainty or\ndubiousness on the one hand and a sign bearing multiple meanings on\nthe other. I mention this merely to disambiguate what this entry is\nabout, which concerns a word or phrase enjoying multiple meanings. In\nthis sense, ambiguity has been the source of much frustration,\nbemusement, and amusement for philosophers, lexicographers, linguists,\ncognitive scientists, literary theorists and critics, authors, poets,\norators and pretty much every other being who uses language regularly\nto communicate.", "\nPhilosophers’ interest in ambiguity stems from several sources,\nranging from an intense interest in logical representation to\npragmatic, political and ethical concerns about how we use language to\ncommunicate. An example of the first concerns regarding the\nregimentation of natural language in formal logic: arguments that may\nlook good in virtue of their linguistic form in fact can go very wrong\nif the words or phrases involved are equivocal. It would be logical\nfolly, for example, to conclude from the true (on one reading)\nsentences ‘All bachelors are necessarily unmarried’ and\n‘Adam was a bachelor’ that Adam was necessarily unmarried.\nIn other words, philosophers have often found ambiguity the sort of\nthing one needs to avoid and eradicate when they do their serious\nphilosophical business. Frege worried about the phenomenon enough to\ncounsel against allowing any multiplicities of sense in a perfect\nlanguage. An example of the second may be found in the infamous case\nof Smith vs. United States in which the law stipulated that a\nweapon used in the main question was whether the law proscribing\npenalties for using a firearm in committing a crime applied\nto weapons used as items of exchange for drugs.", "\nAuthors, poets, lyricists and the like, on the other hand, have often\nfound ambiguity to be an extremely powerful tool. Thomas\nPynchon’s sentence “we have forests full of game and\nhundreds of beaters who drive the animals toward the hunters such as\nmyself who are waiting to shoot them,” (Against the Day, p. 46)\nutilizes the referential ambiguity of ‘them’ to great\neffect when said by his fictionalized Archduke Ferdinand.\nShakespeare’s “Ask for me tomorrow and you shall find me a\ngrave man” (Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Scene 1 line 97–98)\nplays cleverly on the double meaning of ‘grave’. Comedians\nhave often found ambiguity useful in the misdirection essential to\nsome forms of comedy. Groucho Marx’s “I shot an elephant\nin my pajamas” is a classic example.", "\nAmbiguity is important and it is worth examining what the phenomenon\nis and how it differs and relates to similar phenomena such as\nindexicality, polysemy, vagueness, and especially sense generality.\nWhile ‘is an uncle’ can be satisfied by both brothers of\nmothers and brothers of fathers, the phrase is not ambiguous but\nunspecified with respect to parent. The boundaries of the predicate\n‘is a heap’ is famously difficult to detect but the\nproblem doesn’t seem to be that ‘heap’ enjoys too\nmany meanings. The article will focus on what the phenomenon is and\nisn’t and discuss some of the interesting factors that\nconfound the easy detection and categorization of apparent\nambiguities." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. What (Linguistic) Ambiguity Isn’t", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Vagueness", "2.2 Context Sensitivity", "2.3 Under-specification and Generality", "2.4 Sense and Reference Transfer" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Types of Ambiguity", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Lexical Ambiguity", "3.2 Syntactic Ambiguity", "3.3 Pragmatic Ambiguity", "3.4 Other Interesting Cases" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Detecting Ambiguity", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Conjunction Reduction", "4.2 Ellipsis", "4.3 Contradiction Tests", "4.4 Definitional Tests", "4.5 Checking the Lexicon of Other Languages", "4.6 Problems for the Tests", "4.7 Contextual Resolution and Degree of Zeugma", "4.8 Metaphor and Non-Literal Usage" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Philosophical Issues", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Validity", "5.2 Basic Semantic Methodology", "5.3 The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction", "5.4 The Flexibility of the Lexicon", "5.5 Legal Interpretations" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Ambiguity and Indexicality: Are They Easily Told Apart?", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Deictic vs. Bound Anaphora", "6.2 The Scope of Indefinites", "6.3 Modals" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAmbiguity is generally taken to be a property enjoyed by signs that\nbear multiple (legitimate) interpretations in a language or, more\ngenerally, some system of signs. ’legitimate’ is a cover\nterm I’m using to nod to the fact that many signs can, in principle,\nbear just about any interpretation. The relativization is to\nprevent ambiguity in terms like like ‘leaped’\nwhich means leaped in English but loved in German. In\ncommon parlance, the word ‘ambiguity’ is used loosely:\noften simple underspecificity will suffice for a charge of ambiguity.\nThe U.S.’s policy towards the unification of China and Taiwan\nhas been described as a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’,\none that allows the U.S. to be non-specific with respect to the status\nof Taiwan. ‘Jane’s sister will come to visit’ is\nsometimes thought to be ambiguous when Jane has multiple sisters. A\nmovie with a character that heads to surgery at the end, leaving it\nopen whether he lives or dies, is said to have an ambiguous ending.\nThere is a medical condition known as ‘ambiguous\ngenitalia’ in which the genitals don’t categorize clearly, or\nexclusively, into male or female genitalia.", "\nIn many domains, however, theorists have found it useful to divide the\nphenomenon of ambiguity from other phenomena (e.g.,\nunderspecification, vagueness, context sensitivity). Ambiguity is of\ninterest to philosophers for a variety of reasons, some of which we\nwill look at below. First, ambiguity makes vivid some of the\ndifferences between formal languages and natural languages and\npresents demands on the usage of the former to provide\nrepresentations of the latter. Second, ambiguity can have a\ndeleterious effect on our ability to determine the validity of\narguments in natural language on account of possible equivocation.\nThird, ambiguity in art can intentionally (or unintentionally)\nincrease the interest in a work of art by refusing to allow easy\ncategorization and interpretation. Fourth, ambiguity in the statement\nof the law can undermine their applicability and our ability to\nobey them. Finally, ambiguity resolution is an important feature of our\ncognitive understanding and interpretative abilities. Studying\nambiguity and how we resolve it in practice can give us insight into both thought\nand interpretation.", "\nAmbiguity has excited philosophers for a very, very long time. It was\nstudied in the context of the study of fallacies in Aristotle’s\nSophistical Refutations. Aristotle identifies various\nfallacies associated with ambiguity and\n amphiboly[1]\n writing:", "\n\n\nThere are three varieties of these ambiguities and amphibolies: (1)\nWhen either the expression or the name has strictly more than one\nmeaning… (2) when by custom we use them so; (3) when words that\nhave a simple sense taken alone have more than one meaning in\ncombination; e.g. ‘knowing letters’. For each word, both\n‘knowing’ and ‘letters’, possibly has a single\nmeaning: but both together have more than one-either that the letters\nthemselves have knowledge or that someone else has it of them.\n(Sophistical Refutations bk. 4)\n", "\nThe stoics were also intrigued by ambiguity (see Atherton 1993).\nChrysippus claimed at one point that every word is\nambiguous – though by this he meant that the same person may\nunderstand a word spoken to him in many distinct ways. Philosophers\nconcerned with the relation between language and thought, particularly\nthose who argue for a language of thought, concerned\nthemselves with whether the language in which we think could contain\nambiguous phrases. Ockham, for example, was willing to countenance\nambiguities in mental sentences of a language of thought but not\nmental terms in that language (see Spade p. 101). Frege contemplated\nnon-overlap of sense in natural language in a famous footnote,\nwriting:", "\n\n\n…So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of\nsense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the\ntheoretical structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to\noccur in a perfect language. (Frege 1948 [1892], p. 210 fn. 2)\n", "\nFrege’s hostility to ambiguity remains with\nus today. Frequently we use formal languages precisely so that we can\ndisambiguate otherwise ambiguous sentences (brackets being a paradigm\nexample of a disambiguating device).", "\nGiving an account of ambiguity (and disambiguation) requires one to\ndiscern the bearer(s) of ambiguity. Propositions, for example, are\npresumably unambiguous (since they are meanings they can’t be\nsubject to further considerations of meaning). This leaves a range of\npotential objects: utterances, utterances relative to a context,\nsentences, sentences relative to a context, discourses,\ninscriptions…. The differences aren’t trivial: a written\ndown sentence corresponds to many possible ways of being uttered in\nwhich features such as prosody can prevent certain meanings that the\nwritten down sentence seems capable of enjoying. Two written\nutterances may sound the same (if they contain words that sound alike)\nwithout being spelt alike (if the words aren’t co-spelled) thus\nresulting in phonological ambiguity without corresponding orthographic\nambiguity. I’m going to (somewhat perversely) simply use\n‘sentence’ and ‘phrase’ ambiguously, and I\nwill attempt to disambiguate when necessary. We will also look briefly\nat the application of ambiguity to discourse transitions. ", "\nOne important question regarding ambiguity is how we ought to\nrepresent ambiguities. With structural ambiguities there is no\nindependent issue but with lexical ambiguities there is a real issue.\nIt’s tempting to see this as a question we could answer in any\nnumber of equally good ways. For example, we may choose to represent\nthe meaning of ‘bank’ disjunctively or we may choose to\nindividuate ‘bank’ as multiple lexical items that simply\nsound and look alike, perhaps using subscripts. Both are potentially\nproblematic if taken as analyses: disjunctive meanings are not unique\nto ambiguity (I can introduce any term I like with a single\ndisjunctive meaning), and representation using subscripts simply masks\nthe question of what the subscripts represent. This suggests that the\nissue is more like a problem than a nuisance or a trivial choice and\nactually has serious ramifications for how to pursue truth conditional\nsemantics. (See Davidson 1967, Gillon 1990, and Saka 2007 (Ch. 6) for\nan interesting account of the problem regarding representing\nambiguity.) I’ll proceed as though lexical ambiguities are properly\nrepresented as two separate words/lexical items that overlap with\nrespect to some significant feature (phonologically, graphemically,\npictorially…).", "\nA brief terminological point: ‘polysemy’ refers to a\nphenomenon that is closely related to ambiguity, but often is\ncharacterized as a term with multiple meanings that are, in some hard\nto specify sense, interestingly related. For example, ‘in’\nis often thought to be a paradigm of polysemy: to be in a car, in my\nthoughts and in trouble seem to play on notions of containment but\nthere is clearly a difference in how we interpret ‘in’ in\neach case. It is sometimes characterized as a phenomenon subsumable\nunder ambiguity (basically, an ambiguity with the meanings that are\ntightly related meanings) but sometimes it is taken to be a different\nphenomenon altogether. One traditional carving is that ambiguity in\nwords is a matter of two or more lexical entries that correspond to\nthe same word and polysemy a single lexeme that has multiple\nmeanings.[2] For\nthe rest of this article, I will assume that polysemy is simply\nambiguity with tightly corresponding meanings and I will not try to\ndistinguish polysemy from ambiguity very carefully. Many cognitive\nlinguists contend that there there is no principled way to divide\nthese in any case. It’s worth noticing that terms could be both\nambiguous and polysemous if it had three meanings, two of which were\nsuitably related and one which was quite far apart from the other\ntwo. See Vicente and Falkum (2017) for a detailed look at\npolysemy. " ], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n‘Ambiguity’, as used by philosophers of language and\nlinguists, refers to a more specific phenomenon than that of multiple permissible interpretations. Distinguishing\nambiguity from these related phenomenon can be a difficult and\ntendentious (and sometimes tedious!) affair. We will discuss testing for ambiguity below: for\nnow, we will try to isolate ambiguity by separating it from other\ntypical cases with which ambiguity is easily conflated." ], "section_title": "2. What (Linguistic) Ambiguity Isn’t", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nCharacterizing vagueness is notoriously (and ironically) difficult,\nbut it seems to stem from lack of precision in the meaning or\nreference of a term or phrase. There are clearly words that are\nambiguous but not (obviously) vague: ‘bat’ is not vague\nbut it is ambiguous. ‘Is bald’ looks to be vague but not\nambiguous. ", "\nA general hallmark of vagueness is that it involves borderline cases:\npossible cases that are neither clearly in the extension of the vague\nterm nor clearly not in its extension. An alternative characterization\ninvolves fuzzy boundaries rather than borderline cases (see Fara 2000,\n47–48). Cases of ambiguity can be like this: one can imagine a sorites\nseries involving something that is clearly a baseball bat at\nt1 that is changed particle by particle into a\nchiropteran with borderline cases of each mid-series, thus being a\nvague case of ‘bat’ in both senses. However, ambiguity\nneed not be characterized by borderline cases nor by sorites-series\nsusceptibility.", "\nInterestingly, there are views regarding vague language that treat\nvagueness as at least akin to ambiguity. Braun and Sider (2007) treat\nsentences with vague terms as expressing multiple distinct\npropositions and supervaluationism treats vague terms as expressing\nmultiple distinct semantic values. But the relevant notion of multiple\nexpression seem different from paradigmatic ambiguity, where two\nmeanings are definitely meanings of a term or phrase, not where a\nbunch of meanings are acceptable ways of making a term more\nprecise. If anything, one might think that these views treat vagueness\nas a sort of polysemy." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Vagueness" }, { "content": [ "\nContext sensitivity is (potential) variability in content due purely\nto changes in the context of utterance without a change in the\nconvention of word usage. Thus, ‘I am hungry’ varies in\ncontent speaker to speaker because ‘I’ is context\nsensitive and shifts reference depending on who utters it.\n‘I’, however, is not massively ambiguous – if\nanything, the mystery of context sensitive terms has been how they\ncould have a single meaning with multiple reference.\n‘Bank’ is ambiguous, not (at least, not obviously) context\nsensitive. Of course, knowledge of context may well help disambiguate\nan ambiguous utterance. Nonetheless, ambiguity is not characterized by\ninteraction with (extra- linguistic) context but is a property of the\nmeanings of the terms." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Context Sensitivity" }, { "content": [ "\nI have a sister in New York, a sister in Kingston and one in Toronto.\nIf I tell you that I am going to visit one of my sisters, what I say\nunderspecifies which sister I am going to see. This can be frustrating\nif you are trying to figure out where I am going. But this\nisn’t due to ‘one of my sisters’ being ambiguous\nambiguous. Its meaning is clear. The sentence is\n‘sense-general’; it doesn’t specify some detail without\nthereby being ambiguous with respect to that detail. In general,\nunder- determination and generality may leave open many possibilities\nwithout being ambiguous between those possibilities. One more\nterminological note: in the cognitive linguistics literature (e.g.\nDunbar 2001) it is common to treat what we call ‘sense\ngenerality’ as vagueness: a single lexeme with a unified meaning\nthat is unspecified with respect to certain features.", "\nSimilarly, if I tell you that I am going to visit my aunt, I\nunderspecify whether it is my mother’s sister or my\nfather’s sister whom I am going to go visit. Nothing follows\nabout the univocality or ambiguity of ‘aunt’. It simply\nmeans ‘aunt’ is true of things that are female siblings of\nyour parent. By the same token, ‘human’ doesn’t make\nany demand on an person’s mass in order to be part of its\nextension.", "\nIt is easy to mistake sense generality for ambiguity, as often the\nextension of a univocal term can break up into two or more distinct\nsalient categories. The sentence ‘I ordered filet mignon’\ndoesn’t specify whether or not the filet was to be given to me\ncooked or raw.\nYou will surely be annoyed and say ‘that’s not what I\nmeant’ at a restaurant if the waiter brings the filet raw, but\nnot so at the butcher shop. Often it is difficult to tell when the\ndistinction in extension corresponds to an ambiguity in the meaning of\nthe term. But difficulty in telling these apart in some cases should\nnot lead us to abjure the distinction." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Under-specification and Generality" }, { "content": [ "\nOne difficult phenomenon to classify is transference of sense or\nreference (see Nunberg, Ward). When you say ‘I am parked on G\nSt.’, you presumably manage to refer to the car rather than\nyourself. Similarly, ‘I am traditionally allowed a final\nsupper’ said by a prisoner is not about himself (there are no\ntraditions regarding him). The mechanics of reference transfer are\nmysterious, and the interaction of transferred terms with the syntax\nis a matter of some dispute.", "\nOf course, sentences can have many of these properties at once.\n‘My uncle wonders if I am parked where the bank begins’ is\nsense-general, ambiguous, context-sensitive, vague and it involves\nreference-transfer. Nonetheless, it is important to keep these\nproperties apart as the semantic treatment we give each may vary\nwildly, the ways of testing for them may require highly specialized\nconsiderations and their source may well differ radically from\nphenomenon to phenomenon." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Sense and Reference Transfer" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere are different sources and types of ambiguities. To explore\nthese, however, we will need to adopt some terminology to make clear\nwhat sorts of phenomena we are looking at. Those familiar with some of\nthe issues in current syntactic theory can skip until the next\nsection.", "\nModern linguistic theory involves, in part, the study of syntax. The\ndominant strain of current syntactic theory takes the lexicon as\nprimitive and studies the rule-governed derivation of syntactic forms,\nwhich are structures known as LFs (or, more misleadingly, Logical\nForms). The relationship of sentences in natural language to LFs can\nbe one to many: the phonological/orthographic forms of a sentence can\nbe associated with more than one LF. Thus, ‘every man loves a\nwoman’ has been argued (e.g., May 1977) to involve two distinct\nlogical forms. It has also been argued (see May 1985) to involve one\nthat is multiply interpretable with constrained but not determined\nquantifier scopes. ", "\nA standard, but controversial, assumption is that LFs are the input to\nsemantic theory, not the phonological/orthographic objects we hear and\nsee. (see May 1985). Thus, while LFs may not be ambiguous, the\nsentences we actually use and assert often are. If this assumption\nturns out to be false, then it will be a great deal more difficult to\nlocate the source of some ambiguities.", "\nLFs can be represented as trees, and the terminal nodes of the\nbranches are taken from the lexicon. A lexicon is a repository of\nlexical items, which need not look like words and they certainly need\nnot correspond to our intuitions about words. Thus, intuitions about a\nword’s modal profile suggest that it can undergo massive shifts\nin its orthographic and phonetic properties. It is far less clear that\nthe lexemes retain their identity over shifts of phonological\nproperties. We should be a bit careful, then, about the relationship\nbetween words and lexemes: a word may retain its identity while the\nlexeme it is derived from may not constitute it over time.\nFortunately, issues of concerning the diachronic identity of words\nwon’t concern us much here.", "\nThe LF driven picture of semantic interpretation is controversial for\nmany reasons: some people don’t think that LFs are properly\nthought of as inputs to anything, never mind semantic interpretation.\nCulicover and Jackendoff (2005) argue for much less extensive\nsyntactic structures coupled with very messy mappings to semantic (or\n‘conceptual’) structures. Others think that most of the\nwork done by LFs could be done by taking a notion of surface syntax\nseriously, trading in syntactic structure for very complicated\nsemantic theories to account for the data. (Bittner 2007, Jacobson\n1999). Thus, the description of some of the ambiguities as syntactic\nor structural rather than semantic can be somewhat controversial.\nHowever, everyone in the game needs something to serve as the input to\nsemantic interpretation and everyone needs some way to describe those\nstructures (if you don’t, call me and let’s talk about it…) so\nhopefully similar points will hold in your preferred syntactic\nframework. We will highlight some of these controversies where\nnecessary.", "\nOne more clarification: ambiguity is a property of either sentences or\nperhaps the speech acts in which the sentences are used. But ambiguity\nof a sentence or sentences uttered does not necessarily result in\nany unclarity regarding what was expressed or meant by the speaker.\nThere is no guarantee that unambiguous utterances will result in full\nunivocal clear understanding either. In some syntactic contexts, the\nambiguity won’t show up at all: ‘I want to see you\nduck’ is a case in which the NP interpretation of\n‘duck’ is simply unavailable (especially with no comma\nafter ‘you’). In many cases our best theory predicts\nan ambiguity in the sentence used, without predicting confusion over\nhow the utterance ought to be interpreted. " ], "section_title": "3. Types of Ambiguity", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe lexicon contains entries that are homophonous, or even co-spelled,\nbut differ in meanings and even syntactic categories.\n‘Duck’ is both a verb and a noun as is\n‘cover’. ‘Bat’ is a noun with two different\nmeanings and a verb with at least one meaning. ‘Kick the\nbucket’ is arguably ambiguous between one meaning involving\ndying and one meaning involving application of foot to bucket.", "\nThis sort of ambiguity is often very easy to detect by simple\nlinguistic reflection, especially when the meanings are wildly\ndistinct such as in the case of ‘bat’. It can be more\ndifficult, however, when the meanings are closely related. A classic\ncase is the short word ‘in’. The meaning(s) of\n‘in’, if it is ambiguous, seem to crucially involve a\ngeneral notion of containment, but at a more fine-grained level, the\ntypes of containment can seem wildly distinct. One can be in therapy,\nin Florida, in the Mafia, in the yearbook…but it seems like a\njoke to say that one is in therapy and the Mafia. ", "\nThe considerations suggest that ‘in’ is ambiguous, but\nperhaps it is univocal with a very sense general meaning that involves\ncontainment of an appropriate sort and different objects require\ndifferent sorts of appropriate containment. Telling between these two\npossibilities is difficult. An even harder case of lexical ambiguity\ninvolves the putative ambiguity in ‘any’ between the\nreading as a universal quantifier and a ‘free choice’\nitem. (see Dayal 2004)", "\nA few points about lexical ambiguity should be kept in mind, so\nI’ll repeat them. First, a bookkeeping issue: should we relegate\nlexical ambiguity to the lexicon (two non-identical entries for\nambiguous terms) or to semantic interpretation (one lexical entry, two\nor more meanings)? We’ll go with the first option (so the two meanings\nof ‘bank’ correspond to two separate lexical items) but\nnothing I know of forces this choice. Second, the word/lexical item\ndistinction may cause us some trouble. While ‘holey’ and\n‘holy’ are homophonous, they are not co-spelled. Thus an\nutterance of ‘the temple is holey’ is ambiguous between\ntwo sentences, while an inscription in English is not. Sometimes\nco-spelled words are distinct sounding, such as ‘refuse’\nwhich is distinct sounding (in my dialect at least) between\n‘ree-fuze’ and ‘reh-fuse’. Fortunately, we\nhave the relevant categories to describe these differences and we can\ntalk about ambiguity in sound or in notation (or in sign)." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Lexical Ambiguity" }, { "content": [ "\nSyntactic ambiguity occurs when there are many LFs that correspond to\nthe same sentence – assuming we don’t think of sentences as\ndistinct if their LFs are distinct. This may be the result of scope,\nmovement or binding, and the level at which the ambiguity is localized\ncan involve full sentences or phrases. Here are some examples of\npurportedly syntactic ambiguities.", "\nA phrase can be ambiguous by corresponding to distinct syntactic\nstructures. The classic example:", "\nsuperfluous hair remover\n", "\ncan mean the same as ‘hair remover that is superfluous’ or\n‘remover of hair that is superfluous’. The ambiguity\nresults from the lack of representation of constituent structure in the English\nsentence, since it is unclear if the noun ‘hair remover’\nis modified by ‘superfluous’ in its specifier or if the\n ‘superfluous hair’ is the specifier of the noun\n‘remover’. In current syntax, the phrase would be\nassociated with two different NPs.", "\nSimilarly, a phrase can be ambiguous between an adjunct and an\nargument:", "\n‘between the rocks’ can modify the event of floating,\nsaying where it happened and thus acts as an adjunct. It can also act\nas an argument of ‘float’, specifying where the resulting\nlocation of the boat on account of the floating. It can also act as an\nadjunct modifying ‘the boat’, helping to specify which\nboat it is. All of these are readings of (1) and in each case we find\n‘between the rocks’ playing very different roles. Assuming\nthese roles are dictated by their relations in the relevant LF, we get three very\ndifferent LFs that correspond to (1).", "\nThematic assignments can be similarly ambiguous at the level of LF\nwith deleted phrases:", "\n(2) can mean that the chicken is ready to be fed or to be fed to\nsomeone depending on the thematic assignment. In a popular semantic\nframework, this is because ‘the chicken’ is assigned agent\non one reading and patient on another. Arguably, these assignments is\ncorresponds syntactic phenomenon assuming principles that align\nthematic role and syntactic position (see Baker 1988, 1997; Williams\n1994; and Grimshaw 1990) but the semantic point stands either way.\nThey result in a clear ambiguity that we may term ‘thematic\nambiguity’ for present purposes.", "\nMultiple connectives present similar ambiguities. The following\nambiguity, for example, is borne directly out of failure to tell which\nconnective has widest scope:", "\nWe teach our students in propositional logic to disambiguate these\nwith brackets but we are not so lucky when it comes to the\northographic and phonetic groupings in natural language.", "\nAn interesting case is the semantics of modals. At least some modal\nauxiliaries and adverbs seem to allow for distinct senses such as\nmetaphysical, deontic, doxastic and perhaps practical. Consider", "\n(4) can mean that John’s presence at home is, given everything\nwe know, guaranteed. It might mean that, though we have no idea where\nhe is, he is under the obligation to be at home. Similarly:", "\n(5) means that there is an open metaphysical possibility in which the\ncoin comes up heads. It also means that everything we know\ndoesn’t tell us that the coin won’t come up heads. On the\nlatter reading, for example, we can utter (5) truly even if we know\nthat the coin is weighted, but we aren’t sure in which way.", "\nSimilarly:", "\n(6) can express a moral imperative: you are obliged morally to eat a\npiece of cake. It can express a practical obligation: given your\ntastes you’d be remiss if you didn’t eat a piece. Though\nthis would rarely make sense, (6) can suggest a doxastic certainty:\neverything we know entails that you won’t fail to eat the\ncake.", "\nThe multiplicity of interpretation in these modals is pretty clear.\nOne particularly controversial case involves imperative vs epistemic\ninterpretations of ‘must’ as in ‘He must be\nhere’. However, whether or not it is a lexical or structural\nambiguity (or best treated as a case of univocality with indexicality)\nis a source of some controversy (see Drubig 2001). In the semantics\nliterature, views on which modalities are treated indexically rather\nthan as cases of ambiguity pretty much dominate all contemporary\nthinking, as we shall see in section 6.3.", "\nFinally, and of much interest to philosophers and logicians, there are\nscopal ambiguities involving operators and quantifiers. For example:", "\n(7) can express", "\n(In regimented English: For every womani there is at least\none man that shei squeezed.)", "\nOr", "\n(In regimented English: There is at least one mani who is\nsuch that every womanj squeezed himi.)", "\nThese ambiguities can be very difficult to hear in some cases. For\nexample:", "\nNo one is tempted to hear the reading of (10) that involves an unlucky\ndriver who is constantly in car accidents. Thus, our best theory may\ndetermine an ambiguity that is never the intended meaning of an \nutterance of the ambiguous sentence. If we were able to revive people\nfrequently and very quickly and immediately get them into cars , we would presumably start to consider the currently\npragmatically unavailable reading of (10) more seriously.", "\nOperators have scopal interactions with quantifiers as well. The\nsemantics of modal auxiliaries, adverbs, temporal modifiers and tense\nare the subject of much concern but one thing is clear: they have\ninteractive effects.", "\nModal and temporal fallacies abound if we aren’t careful about\nscope:", "\nIf we allow ‘necessarily’ to have ‘bachelors’\netc. within its scope, P2 is true but the conclusion is not entailed.\nIf the modal is interpreted narrowly, the conclusion follows but P2 is\nfalse and so is the conclusion.", "\nThere is a great deal of controversy over how scope is to be handled.\nOrthodoxy suggests movement of quantifiers at LF where quantifier\nscope is made explicit and unambiguous. May (1985) is often cited as\nthe canonical source for this – but it is worth nothing that in\nthat work May treats some LFs as underdetermining some semantic scopal\nrelations. The situation is less clear with temporal and modal (and\nother) operators: many semantic theories treat tense and temporal\nadverbs as quantifiers, while some treat modal expression in this\nmanner. Other treat them as the operators or adverbs they appear to\nbe. One respectable semantic tradition sees (P2) as ambiguous, for\nexample, between:", "\n(In regimented English: Every world is such that every bachelor at\nthat world is unmarried at that world.)", "\nAnd", "\n(In regimented English: Every bachelor at a world is such that at\nevery world he is a bachelor.)", "\nOn the first reading, the world-quantifier takes wide scope. On the\nsecond, the bachelor-quantifier takes wide scope and the world\nvariable is unbound. On the operator treatment, we dispose of\nquantification over worlds and let the predicates be interpreted\nrelative to the operators, perhaps as a matter of movement, perhaps by\nother semantic means.", "\nNegation has similarly been argued to present interesting scope\nambiguities (see Russell (1905) for an early example of a\nphilosophical use of this type of ambiguity). The following, according\nto Russell, is ambiguous:", "\nAs is:", "\nRussell claims that (13) and (14) are ambiguous between a reading on which negation that scopes over\nthe sentence as a whole and one reading on which it scopes under the determiner\nphrase and over the predicate (though see Strawson (1950) See also Neale (1990)).", "\nLong story short, of great interest to philosophers are these sorts of\nscope worries as many an argument has been accused of looking\nconvincing because of a scope ambiguity (the causal argument for\nGod’s existence, the ontological argument). The development of\nlogics capable of handling multiple quantification was an achievement\nin part because they could sort out just this sort of linguistic\nphenomenon.", "\nOne final note: even in the domain of scopal ambiguities, there are\ncontroversies about whether to treat (some of) these apparent ambiguities as\nambiguities. Pietroski and Hornstein (2002) argue that many of these\ncases aren’t ambiguities at all and prefer a pragmatic\nexplanation of the multiple readings. ", "\nBound and unbound readings of pronouns give rise to similar problems,\nthough whether this is a semantic, syntactic or pragmatic ambiguity\nhas been the source of heated debate. If I tell you ‘everyone\nloves his mother’, the sentence may be interpreted with\n‘his’ being co-indexed with ‘everyone’ and\nyielding different mothers (potentially) for different values of\n‘everyone’ or it could be interpreted deictically saying\nthat everyone loves that [appropriate demonstration] guy’s\nmother. Static semantics usually treats the distinction between bound\nand free pronouns as a fundamental ambiguity; dynamic semantics\nrelegates the distinction to an ambiguity in variable choice (see Heim\n1982, 1983, and Kamp 1981).", "\nThe phenomenon is subject to syntactic constraints. We have a good\nidea of the conditions under which we can fail to get bound readings,\nas characterized by binding theory. Thus, we know that binding is\nimpossible in cross-over cases and cases where pronouns are ‘too\nclose’ to their binder ((15) is a case of ‘weak\ncrossover’, (16) is a case of ‘strong crossover’ and\n(17) is a violation of principle B of binding theory):", "\nHowever, the impossibility of these readings demonstrates constraints\non interpretation. It doesn’t resolve the ambiguity in\nsentences where violations of binding theory do not occur. " ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Syntactic Ambiguity" }, { "content": [ "\nPragmatics has been claimed to be the study of many different things;\nbut for our purposes we can focus on two: speech acts and truth conditional pragmatics. ", "\nSpeech act theory is complicated and it is not easy to offer a neutral\naccount of the typology or interpretation of speech acts. But,\nintuitively, an utterance (locutionary act) of the sentence ‘The\ncops are coming’ can be an assertion, a warning, or an\nexpression of relief. ‘I’m sorry you were raised so\nbadly’ can be an assertion or an apology. ‘You want to\ncook dinner’ can function as a request or as an\nassertion. ‘Can you pick me up later?’ can function as a\nrequest or a question or both. And these are just examples of speech\nacts that are conventionally tied to these sentence forms. Many, if\nnot all, sentences can be used in multiple ways.", "\nInterestingly, these ambiguities are not always signaled by the\ncontent of the sentence. For example the following differ in their\npotential for use in speech acts though they seem to express similar\ncontent:", "\nSome creativity may allow (19) to function as a request but it is very\ndifficult compared to (18). As such, some theorists have been\ninterested in trying to determine whether sentence types constrain the\nspeech act potential of utterances of them (see Murray and Starr\n(2018) for an overview). ", "\nAn interesting case of ubiquitous potential ambiguity is the notion, suggested by Donnellan (1966), that\nthe apparent referential use of some sentences with definite\ndescriptions. Donnellan writes:", "\nIt does not seem possible to say categorically of a definite\ndescription in a particular sentence that it is a referring expression\n(of course, one could say this if he meant that it might be used to\nrefer). In general, whether or not a definite description is used\nreferentially or attributively is a function of the speaker’s\nintentions in a particular case. … Nor does it seem at all\nattractive to suppose an ambiguity in the meaning of the words; it\ndoes not appear to be semantically ambiguous. (Perhaps we could say\nthat the sentence is pragmatically ambiguous ….) (Donnellan, p.\n297)\n", "\nPhilosophers puzzled a great deal over the import of a\n‘pragmatic’ ambiguity that wasn’t a speech act\nambiguity or perhaps an ambiguity in what a speaker implies by\nuttering a sentence. Kripke (1977) and Searle (1979: p. 150 fn. 3)\nclaim that pragmatic ambiguity is conceptually confused – either\nthe sentence bears two interpretations and there is a vanilla\nambiguity or the sentence used in univocal but the speaker is using it\nto get across a different or additional piece of information. But the\nintuition that perhaps pragmatics has a great role to play in\ninterpretation than merely an account of inferences licensed by the\nneeds of conversational coherence has lead philosophers to consider\nwhat ambiguity that resides in the interface of semantics and\npragmatics might look like (see Recanati (2010).", "\nAmbiguity can be found at the level of presupposition, terms of\nidentifying the presupposition triggered by a sentence/utterance, as\nwell. The case of ‘too’ is instructive. It has long been\nobserved that the word ‘too’ triggers presuppositions, as\nin:", "\nIt’s natural on first read to think that (20) carries the\npresupposition that someone else solved the problem. But that need not\nbe the case: it may presuppose that Maria solved the problem as well\nas having done something else, as in:", "\nKent Bach (1982) explores the intriguing case of:", "\nThis can mean (at least) one of four distinct things:", "\nIf none of these are true, ‘I love you too’ is clearly\ninfelicitous." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Pragmatic Ambiguity" }, { "content": [ "\nAristotle noticed in Metaphysics Γ2 that some words are related\nin meaning but subtly distinct in what they imply. He thought that\n‘being’ was like this and he illustrates his point with\nexamples such as ‘health’:", "\n\n\nThere are many senses in which a thing may be said to\n‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related to one\ncentral point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to\n‘be’ by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is\nrelated to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health,\nanother in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it\nis a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it.\n(Metaphysics Γ2)\n", "\nThe idea here is that there are words like ‘health’ (and,\nif Aristotle is right, ‘being’) that are ambiguous between\na ‘primary’ sense of ‘healthy’ is that which\napplies to things that can enjoy health, such as people, dogs, plants,\nand perhaps corporations but also a ‘secondary’ sense that\ninvolves promoting or signaling the presence of health in the primary\nsense. For example, your diet may be healthy not because it is\nfailing to suffer from a disease but because it promotes your\nhealth. Your doctor may tell you that you have healthy urine on\naccount of it being a positive indication of your health. This\nambiguity is special in that the derivative senses of\n‘health’ are all defined in terms of the more primary\nsense of ‘health’. The linguistic context doesn’t always\nsettle which sense of is at play: ‘dogs are healthy pets’\ncan both mean that dogs tend to be themselves healthy and that dogs\ntend to promote health in their owners.", "\nAnother interesting ambiguity is the collective-distributive ambiguity that\noccurs in the case of some predicates with certain quantificational or\nconjunctive antecedents. Consider:", "\n(27) enjoys a collective reading on which the piano lifting is true of\nthe politicians collectively but not true of any particular politician\nand a similar ambiguity is present in (28). They also have\ndistributive readings involving as many liftings of the piano as there\nwere politicians and at least two different deal brokerings\nrespectively. See section (4.1) for relevant considerations.", "\nAn interesting case of ambiguity comes from ellipsis. The following is\nclearly ambiguous:", "\nWe’ve already discussed the bound/unbound ambiguity inherent in\n‘John loves his mother’. Consider the bound reading of the\nfirst sentence. Now, on that reading, there are still two\ninterpretations of the second sentence to deal with: one on which Bill\nloves John’s mother and one on which Bill loves his own. This\nambiguity has been given the regrettable name ‘strict-sloppy\nidentity’ and seems to be the result of what ‘does\ntoo’ is short form for. There is a long-standing debate over\nwhether the mechanism is primarily one of copying over at LF (Fiengo\nand May 1994), the result of expressing a lambda-abstracted predicate\n(Sag, 1976; Williams, 1977) or the result of centering on a discourse\nreferent (see Hardt and Stone 1997). Ambiguities can arise from words that\naren’t written or said as well as from ones that are.", "\nSimilar ambiguities come up in cases such as:", "\n(30) can mean either that Sam loves Jess more than he loves Jason or\nthat Sam loves Jess more than Jason loves Jess. This ambiguity arises\nfrom phrasal and clausal comparatives: the phrasal comparative of\n‘more than’ takes a noun phrase and relates Jess and Jason\n(effectively saying that the degree to which Sam loves Jess exceeds\nthe degree to which he loves Jason). On the other hand, one can read\n(30) as involving ellipsis in which ‘loves Jess’ is\nstripped from the complement of Jason and left sotto\nvoce.", "\nMontague (Montague 1973) held to a policy of holding fixed the\nsemantic type of lexical items by their category, so that names,\nfalling in the same category as quantifier phrases, were assigned the\nsame type as quantifier phrases. Otherwise, he reasoned, there would\nbe a type mismatch when we conjoined names and quantifier phrases.\nOthers, however, have been content to posit ambiguities in type for\none and the same expression. Thus, we may posit that\n‘John’, when the word occurs alone, is of type\n〈e〉 (entity referring) but when conjoined with\n‘every man’, it is of type\n〈〈e,t〉,t〉 (a function\nfrom functions to truth values) just like quantifier phrases. The\nsemantics is carefully rigged so as not to make a truth-conditional\ndifference; but there is ambiguity nonetheless in what names literally\nexpress.", "\nThere are alternatives. We could retain the univocality of names and\ntreat ‘and’ as flexible in type depending on its\narguments. We could also treat ‘and’ as a type-shifter.\nSimilar considerations hold for verb phrases. Whether or not there is\nan ambiguity present in such cases is likely to be determined by very\nhigh level considerations, not by competent speakers ability to detect\na difference in intuitive meaning.", "\nSome terms are ambiguous between a generic and non-generic reading,\nand the sentences they play into are similarly ambiguous between the\ntwo readings. For example:", "\n(31) is clearly ambiguous between a generic reading (equivalent\nroughly to ‘dinosaurs were kelp-eaters’) and a\nnon-generic, episodic reading (equivalent to ‘there were some\ndinosaurs that ate some kelp’). The ambiguity can be located\nwith certain predicates as well:", "\nThe habitual reading (describing how John favored utensil for eating\nbreakfast) vs. the episodic reading (describing a particular breakfast\nJohn ate) is evident in (32).", "\nThe following sentences are obviously related:", "\n‘Broke’ and other words like it (e.g.,\n‘boiled’) have double lives as transitive and intransitive\nverbs. This could encourage one to posit an ambiguity (or a polysemy)\nsince the putative lexical entries are closely related. However, that\nwould be awfully quick: another approach is to take words like\n‘broke’ as playing two distinct syntactic roles\nunivocally, where the root ‘broke’ is a monadic predicate\nof events. Another is to take ‘broke’ to be univocal and\nallow the object to move into subject position. Whether or not the\nterm is ambiguous lexically depends a great deal on which theory of\nthe inchoative turns out to be right.", "\nYet another systematic (seeming) ambiguity corresponds roughly\nto the type-token distinction that philosophers cherish, though it is\nmore general. Philosophers have noticed that (35) is ambiguous between\na type and a token reading:", "\n(35) can express a complaint that a car was paid for twice or the\nclaim that I now own a car that is like yours. How closely they have\nto correspond in similarity is an open question. But interestingly,\nthe two senses cannot always be accessed felicitously:", "\nOne cannot read (36) as saying, say, that my Honda hit another Honda.\nIt’s tempting to think that ‘same’ is the culprit,\nallowing for sameness across different levels of grain from the very\nfine to the very coarse. The phenomenon is quite wide-spread, however\n(See Hobbs 1985).", "\nAnother ambiguity, though perhaps best thought\nof as polysemy due to the similarity of the meanings, concerns count\nnouns like ‘(one) chicken’ and mass nouns like, say, ‘(a lot of)\nchicken’. David Lewis used the idea of a universal grinder (reported\nby Pelletier in his (1975)) to suggest that we can make sense of mass\nuses of substantive count nouns – apply the imaginary grinder to,\nsay, three guitars and you can then make sense of:", "\nThe possibility of grinding out mass nouns with the universal grinder\nis limited to predicates that refer to things we can imagine being\ngrindable in their extensions – it’s hard to see how one\ngets a mass interpretation of ‘melody’ by grinding. The\napplicability of the universal grinder, moreover, is not\nlinguistically universal in its ability to imbue one and the same noun\nwith a mass interpretation. The count/mass distinction concerns, in\npart, whether nouns supply a criterion for counting (explaining why\ncount nouns play well with numerical determiners). Thus, continuing\nour example of ground guitars, notice that (38) doesn’t entail\nand isn’t entailed by (39):", "\nThis doesn’t hold for, say ‘footwear’ and\n‘shoes’ where owing more shoes entails owning more\nfootwear and vice versa. See Doetjes (2011) for discussion.", "\nMuch recent work has gone into trying to give informative\nexplanations of the oddity of discourses such as:", "\nClearly, the ‘him’ in (43) can be interpreted as Phil\nor Stanley. But, crucially, how you interpret ‘him’ will\ndepend on how you connect the two sentences. On the one hand, the\ninterpretation of ‘him’ as referring to Phil goes hand in\nhand with a causal relation – its was the tickling that caused\nthe poking (known as a result relation. Interpreting\n‘him’ as referring to Stanley suggests goes hand in hand\nwith a parallel relation. Of course the inference is defeasible\n– one can always break the connection between discourse relation\nand pronoun resolution in a manner that looks much like cancellation\nfor Griceans (‘…Liz poked him, I mean, Phil, for\nunrelated reasons’). But the point is that the search for\ndiscourse relations that help settle pronominal reference is good\nevidence that the discourse relations are part of your linguistic\nknowledge, not just a reflect of cooperative conversation and maxim\nfollowing or flaunting. The study of discourse relations has\nflourished into a large literature in the last 20 years but the\nrelevant point for us is that it looks like (43) is ambiguous as a\ndiscourse. This type of ambiguity is fairly novel and much work is\nstill needed to get clear on the number and nature of possible\nrelations that provide the possible resolutions of ambiguities like\n(41).\n\n" ], "subsection_title": "3.4 Other Interesting Cases" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nNow that we have separated types of ambiguity, we may reasonably ask\nhow we tell when a term or phrase contains an ambiguity. The answer\nmay be disappointing – there are tests and considerations but no\nfirm answers and probably a lot depends on what the ‘best\ntheories’ in linguistics etc. end up looking like. Nevertheless,\nwe can make some progress. The canonical source for these tests is\nZwicky and Sadock’s ‘Ambiguity Tests and How to Fail\nThem’ (1975).", "\nThese tests generally depend on the presence or lack of\ninterpretations and on judgments regarding the ridiculousness of\ninterpretation (the absurdity of the meaning is known as\nzeugma – though it should probably be known as syllepsis). These\njudgments can be difficult to make, especially in tricky philosophical\ncases, so we must treat the results of the tests with care." ], "section_title": "4. Detecting Ambiguity", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nA standard test for ambiguity is to take two sentences that contain\nthe purportedly ambiguous term and conjoin them by using the term only\nonce in contexts where both meanings are encouraged. For example,\n‘light’ is a predicate that can enjoy the same meaning as\neither ‘not dark’ or ‘not heavy’.", "\nThe following, however, seems to be zeugmatic:", "\nThe reduced sentence is zeugmatic for obvious reasons. This is\nevidence for ambiguity (or polysemy) in ‘light’. On the\nother hand, ‘exist’, which has been claimed to be\nambiguous, seems not to display such zeugmatic effects:", "\nThe test is limited in one way. If a term can be ambiguous but in a\nway so subtle that competent speakers may miss it, then the zeugma might not be\nnoticeable. Given that these tests try to draw on linguistic judgments\nto detect ambiguity, it’s not clear how to proceed when there is\na case of disagreement over the presence of zeugma.", "\nWe can use the test in cases in which one wouldn’t necessarily\nexpect zeugma, but merely lack of multiple interpretations. For\nexample:", "\n(51) doesn’t allow a reading on which Han used a hair remover\nthat was superfluous and Chewbacca used a remover of superfluous hair.\nIf multiple interpretations are impossible, there is evidence of\nambiguity. This is to be expected since the point of conjunction\nreduction is to ‘freeze’ the syntactic structure and in\nambiguous cases, the effect is achieved.", "\nAs mentioned above, conjunction reduction has been used to argue that\ncollective-distributive ambiguities are due to an ambiguity in the\nsubject phrase. Consider:", "\nOne might think that the readings are generated by an ambiguity in\n‘and’: sometimes it acts as a sentential operator and\nsometimes as a term-forming operator that makes two names into a\nsingle term for predication. However, notice that there are some\npredicates that can only be (sensibly) interpreted collectively, such\nas ‘met’:", "\nIn this case, there is no sense to be made of ‘John met for\nlunch and Jane met for lunch’ and so the sentential conjunction\nreading is not available. Using conjunction reduction on (52) and (53)\nwe get:", "\n(54) has a reading on which ‘moved the piano’ is\ninterpreted distributively (two liftings) and ‘met’ is\nread collectively. The felicity of the conjunction reduced (54)\nsuggests that the ambiguity isn’t the result of an ambiguity in\nconjunction. (see Schein (2006), McKay (2006)). We can try to use\nthe test in an extended manner on full sentences if we embed them\nunder ‘says that’ or perhaps ‘believes that’:\n‘John and Adam believe that Sarah bought a superfluous hair\nremover’ is infelicitous if the unconjoined sentences involve\ndifferent interpretations of ‘superfluous hair\nremover’.", "\nThe test has certain weaknesses. In actual utterances, intonation can\nbe used to indicate an assertion or an each question (‘Ben\nwanted to eat that?) conjoined with ‘Ben wanted to eat\nthat’ yields an infelicity even if the demonstrative has the\nsame value on both occasions – though we may try to fix things up\nby demanding that the test be run using common intonation (at least in\nspoken uses of the test!). On that note, the test will judge\ndemonstrative and indexicals to be ambiguous since they are famously\nnot generally conjunction reducible. Similar worries concern polysemy and ambiguity, which conjunction reduction may be overly sensitive to (See Viebahn (2016) for relevant considerations)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Conjunction Reduction" }, { "content": [ "\nEllipsis tests work in a manner similar to conjunction reduction\ntests. For example:", "\n(55) can mean that I saw their birds under the table or that I saw\ntheir activities of ducking and swallowing but it can’t mean\nthat I saw one’s birds and the other’s activities. Similar\nfeatures hold for structural ambiguities:", "\nIt isn’t possible to interpret (56) as having ‘every\nman’ with wide scope in one but narrow in the other. This\nsuggests a real ambiguity in the scope of the two quantifiers. This\ntest has led people some philosophers to surprising results. For\nexample, Atlas (1989) argues that the acceptability of the following\nsuggest that negation does not interact scopally with descriptions in\nthe ways we have come to expect:", "\nThe purported availability of both readings suggests that sentences\nwith negation(s) and descriptions are sense-general rather than\nambiguous, contradicting many standard assumptions about the\navailable truth conditions these structures should make available. Alternatively, it may lead us to\nthink that there weren’t as many readings as we initially\nthought there were (or that we have the wrong theory of\ndescriptions)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Ellipsis" }, { "content": [ "\nAnother way to test for ambiguity is to test for lack of contradiction\nin sentences that look to be contradictory. For example, say someone\nargued that ‘aunt’ was ambiguous on account of not\nspecifying maternal from paternal aunt. If that was the case, we would\nexpect that we can access the two distinct senses of\n‘aunt’ just as we can for ‘bank’. However,\ncompare:", "\nBoth sentences are rather awkward but only one is doomed to\nlife as a contradiction. This is good evidence that ‘aunt’ is\nunspecified with respect to which side of the family she comes from,\nbut not ambiguous. The tests can be used for most of the other types\nof ambiguity:", "\n(It helps to provide a paraphrase afterwards to bring out the distinct\nsenses). The tests can be used to detect lexical, structural and\nthematic ambiguity." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Contradiction Tests" }, { "content": [ "\nAristotle offers a test for ambiguity: try to construct a definition\nthat encompasses both meanings and posit an ambiguity only if you\nfail. The notion of definition here has to be taken as a heavy-weight\nnotion: ‘bank’ is ambiguous even though you can\n‘define’ it as ‘financial institution or river\nside’. However, we can get a reasonable grip on what Aristotle\nhad in mind. ‘Uncle’ is not ambiguous because it has a\nsingle definition that covers both: x is an uncle iff\nx is the brother of y and y has a\nchild. ", "\nThe test depends partly on how strict we are about what counts as a\ndefinition. And on the assumption that there are interesting\ndefinitions to be had (see Fodor 1998)." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Definitional Tests" }, { "content": [ "\nKripke, in his famous attack on Donnellan, suggests a few tests for\nambiguity that are more conceptual in nature. In particular, he makes\nthe following intriguing suggestion:", "\n\n“Bank” is ambiguous; we would expect the ambiguity to be\ndisambiguated by separate and unrelated words in some other languages.\nWhy should the two separate senses be reproduced in languages\nunrelated to English? First, then, we can consult our linguistic\nintuitions, independently of any empirical investigation. Would we be\nsurprised to find languages that used two separate words for the two\nalleged senses of a given word? If so, then, to that extent our\nlinguistic intuitions are really intuitions of a unitary concept,\nrather than of a word that expresses two distinct and unrelated\nsenses. Second, we can ask empirically whether languages are in fact\nfound that contain distinct words expressing the allegedly distinct\nsenses. If no such language is found, once again this is evidence that\na unitary account of the word or phrase in question should be sought.\n(Kripke 1977: p. 268)\n", "\nIn other words, since lexical ambiguity should involve something like\naccidental homophony, one would expect that other languages would\nlexicalize these meanings differently. Thus, it would not surprise one\nto find out that the two meanings of ‘bat’ were expressed\nby two different words in other languages. It may well surprise one to\nfind out that every action verb was lexicalized as two different\nverbs, one for a reading on which the action was done intentionally,\none on which it wasn’t in some other language.", "\nOne may worry about this test, especially with respect to its ability to\ndifferentiating sense generality from ambiguity. It would not be\nsurprising to find out that other languages lexicalize\n‘uncle’ in two different words (in Croatian, there is no\none word translation of ‘uncle’: ‘stric’ means\nbrother of one’s father and ‘ujak’ means an uncle\nfrom the mother’s side). Nonetheless, there is no reason to\nthink that ‘uncle’ is ambiguous in English. Why\nwouldn’t language users create words to designate the specific\nmeanings that are left sense-general in a different language?" ], "subsection_title": "4.5 Checking the Lexicon of Other Languages" }, { "content": [ "\nZwicky and Sadock (1975) argue that sometimes the two (or more)\nputative meanings of a word are related by overlapping except with\nrespect to one or more features. The Random House Dictionary, for\nexample, gives (amongst many others) the following two definitions for\n‘dog’:", "\nIgnoring for now whether or not dictionaries manage to report\nanalyticities (is having a bushy tail really an analytic necessary\ncondition for being a dog?), it looks like sense (ii) and (iii) differ\nmerely by specification of gender, and so if this makes for ambiguity,\nit may well be hard to test for. Similarly for verbs that allow a\nfactive and non-factive reading such as ‘report’ where the\nfactive reading entails the non-factive. If I say ‘the police\nreported that the criminal was apprehended but the police didn’t\nreport that the criminal was apprehended’ there is at least one\nreading that is anomalous, but largely out of contradiction engendered\nby entailment rather than univocality: it takes subtle intuitions to\ntrain one’s ear to hear ambiguities when the meanings are\nlargely overlapping. As mentioned above, Pietroski and Hornstein\n(2002) make a similar point regarding syntactic ambiguities. Noting\nthat the two putative readings of ‘every man loves a\nwoman’ are such that the wide scope ‘a woman’\nreading entails the narrow, they ask whether or not we should be\ncountenancing a structural ambiguity or chalking up the two\n‘readings’ to confusion over the specific and general\ncase. If these sorts of factors can interfere, we will indeed have to\napply our tests gingerly.", "\nA problem for the conjunction reduction test involves the\ncontext-sensitivity of zeugma. As noted by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk\n(following Cruse 1986), the following two are different in terms of\nzeugma:", "\nSimilarly, from the literature on generics:", "\nThese cases looks like a problem for the conjunction reduction test,\ndepending on how one thinks we should treat the ambiguity in generics.\nOne might think that this provides evidence against ambiguity in bare\nplurals." ], "subsection_title": "4.6 Problems for the Tests" }, { "content": [ "\nAs we suggested above, context-sensitivity, vagueness and indexicality\nare frequently thought to be different phenomena than ambiguity,\nrequiring a different treatment than lexical proliferation or\ndifferences in structure. However, in context, it can be pretty easy\nto make them pass some of the tests for ambiguity. For example,\nconsider James, who wants to meet a man who is is tall for a\nphilosopher, and Jane who wants to meet a man who is tall for a\nhorse jockey (who tend to be a fair bit shorter on average). Let’s\nconjunction reduce and see what happens:", "\nAdmittedly, (65) strikes me as meriting a ‘?’ rather than\na ‘#’, but I am unwilling to let it escape\nunmarked. Let’s try another case. Consider, James speaking to\nJill and disagreeing over the relevant height required to be tall:", "\nIt’s possible, I think, to get a non-contradictory reading of\n(66). But it requires, to my ear, adding a good helping of\nfocal stress on the second ‘tall’. Of course, putting\nfocal stress on a word has semantic effects of its own. So we\ndon’t have clear counter-examples to the tests here. But we do have\nsome evidence that running the tests requires controlling for\nvariables.", "\nSimilarly, speaker’s reference and semantic reference\ndistinctions mentioned above can interfere with the proper operation\nof the tests. Let’s consider a variant on Kripke’s famous\ncase. We see someone who looks like Smith (but is Jones) raking the\nleaves and someone else sees Smith (the actual Smith) raking leaves.\nCan we hear the following as non-zeugmatic?", "\nIn context, this sounds awfully bad to me. It doesn’t seem,\nhowever, that the word ‘Smith’ is ambiguous in sometimes\nreferring to Jones, sometimes Smith. The utterance of the word ‘Smith’\nhowever, may well be used with referential intentions that lead to\nutterance ambiguity. ", "\nThe bottom line is that in clear cases, the tests work great. In\ncontroversial cases, one must be very careful and run many of them and\nhope for the best; it will sometimes involve sifting through degrees\nof zeugma rather than triumphantly producing an indisputable\nresult." ], "subsection_title": "4.7 Contextual Resolution and Degree of Zeugma" }, { "content": [ "\nMetaphor and non-literal usage can also confound the tests. For\nexample:", "\nThe metaphors aren’t very good and (68) and (69) are clearly\nzeugmatic. Given how many parts of speech can be used metaphorically,\nslavish obedience to the test would postulate massive and\nunconstrained ambiguity in natural language. (See Camp 2006) The\nnatural answer is to restrict the use of the test to cases in which\nthe words are used literally; but of course the tests are supposed to\nhelp us decide when we have literal, semantic difference and when we\ndon’t. To add to the complication, metaphors that are used in\nsimilar manners over time tend to become ‘dead’\nmetaphors – literally ambiguities that took a causal path through\nmetaphor. ‘Deadline’ is a pretty clear case of a metaphor\nthat has died. Since the passing of the non-literal into the\nstandardized literal is not exactly a transition whose time of\noccurrence is obvious, it will be difficult in some cases to tell what\nhas been lexicalized as a different meaning and what has not (think,\nagain, of ‘deadline’ as a case, which once meant a line\nthe crossing of which would result in your death. Think of that next\ntime you are late with a paper…) " ], "subsection_title": "4.8 Metaphor and Non-Literal Usage" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere are a few main philosophical issues involved in ambiguity." ], "section_title": "5. Philosophical Issues", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nMany arguments look persuasive but fail on closer inspection on\naccount of structural and/or lexical ambiguity. For example,\nconsider:", "\nThe argument looks valid and the premises seem true, on at\nleast one reading, but the conclusion doesn’t follow.", "\nIf logic is to be free of issues that would complicate telling valid\nfrom non-valid arguments by form, detecting ambiguity is essential to\nlogical representation of natural language arguments. Frege noted this\nto be the main defect of natural language and a real obstacle to\ntrying to formalize it (as opposed to just using the formal language\nwithout translation from natural language). We typically are more\noptimistic on this point than Frege; but the long history of dispute\nover such issues as the pragmatic-semantics distinction and skepticism\nover the viability of semantic theory in general stand as\nchallenges." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Validity" }, { "content": [ "\nAmbiguity has been used methodologically as a way to shield a theory\nfrom counter-example. Kripke laments this tendency explicitly:", "\n\n\nIt is very much the lazy man’s approach in philosophy to posit\nambiguities when in trouble. If we face a putative counterexample to\nour favorite philosophical thesis, it is always open to us to protest\nthat some key term is being used in a special sense, different from\nits use in the thesis. We may be right, but the ease of the move\nshould counsel a policy of caution: Do not posit an ambiguity unless\nyou are really forced to, unless there are really compelling\ntheoretical or intuitive grounds to suppose that an ambiguity really\nis present.(Kripke 1977, p.268)\n", "\nGrice (1975) counsels a methodological principle: ‘Senses are\nnot to be multiplied beyond necessity’.", "\nThis general moral seems right. It is worryingly easy to deflect a\ncounter-example or to explain an intuition by claiming differences in\nmeaning. On the other hand, in philosophical discourse, distinctions\nthat are quite fine can be made that may well be missed by normal\nusers of the language who are inclined to miss\ndifferences in meaning that are slight. One thus often will be tempted\nto posit ambiguity as a way to reconcile differences between two\nplausible hypotheses about the meanings of words and phrases\n(‘evidence’ has both an internal sense and an external\nsense, ‘right action’ has both a utilitarian sense and a\ndeontic sense…) A neat case of this is Gilbert Ryle’s\ncontention that ‘exists’ is ambiguous mentioned above:", "\n\n\n…two different senses of ‘exist’, somewhat as\n‘rising’ has different senses in ‘the tide is\nrising’, ‘hopes are rising’, and ‘the average\nage of death is rising’. A man would be thought to be making a\npoor joke who said that three things are now rising, namely the tide,\nhopes and the average age of death. It would be just as good or bad a\njoke to say that there exist prime numbers and Wednesdays and public\nopinions and navies; or that there exist both minds and bodies. (Ryle\n1949, p. 23)\n", "\nRyle here makes use of the conjunction reduction test mentioned above\nand has been the target of much scorn for his intuitions on this\nmatter. This may just go to show how hard it is to (dis)prove a claim\nto ambiguity using the tests." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Basic Semantic Methodology" }, { "content": [ "\nOne long-standing issue about ambiguity is that it assumes a\ndifference between something like sense and reference. While some\nwords can clearly be used to refer to things that are wildly different\nin ontic category, that has not been taken to be sufficient for a\nclaim to ambiguity. In theory, a phrase could be ambiguous and yet\ndiffer not at all in reference: imagine a term t that was\nambiguous between two meanings, but it turned out as highly surprising\nessential condition that things that were t in the first\nsense were also t in the second sense – while this seems\nunlikely to happen, it is by no means conceptually impossible.", "\nHowever, the 20th century saw a vicious and sometimes relentless\nattack on the distinction between facts about meaning and facts about\nreference (see the entry on the \n analytic/synthetic distinction). \n If the line between these two is blurry, there will very\nlikely be cases in which the line between ambiguity and\nsense-generality is blurry as well (and not just epistemologically).\nLet’s indulge in some possible-world anthropology on a group\nthat uses a term, ‘gavagai’ (Quine 1960). Furthermore, I\nstipulate (perhaps counter-possibly) that the world is a\nfour-dimensional world with respect to the referent of\n‘gavagai’ so if they refer at all with\n‘gavagai’, they refer to something made up of stages. Now\nwe sit down to write the lexicon of the world’s inhabitants and\nwe come to ‘gavagai’. We write:", "\n\n\n‘Gavagai’ (ga-vuh-guy): (N, sing.):\n", "\nIt’s not easy to know what to write down for this entry as\nit’s not obvious what counts as semantic content for the word\nand what counts as information about the referent of the word. For\nexample, say they clearly think that the referent of\n‘gavagai’ is something that does not have temporal parts.\nDoes this mean that they fail to refer to rabbits with\n‘gavagai’ or that they are mistaken about their nature? If\nthis question is hard to answer, we can generalize to harder cases:\nsay that some of the ‘rabbits’ in this world are\nthree-dimensional and some four- dimensional. Should we countenance an\nambiguity in ‘gavagai’ given that the people use it\nindiscriminately to refer to both? Should we posit a lexical ambiguity\nwith two different definitions for ‘gavagai’?", "\nThis case may be far-fetched; but we have a real live cases of it.\nField (1973) discusses the case of the term ‘mass’, which seems to have been\nthought to pick out one property of objects but in fact picks out two\nthat are really very different in character. Deciding whether this is\na surprising case of disjunctive reference, or an indeterminacy in\nreference is no easy task, but the decision has ramifications for\nwhether or not we categorize ‘mass’ as ambiguous or highly\nsense-general (and if sense-general, what is the general sense?)" ], "subsection_title": "5.3 The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction" }, { "content": [ "\nThe lexicon is highly productive and easily extended. Most people,\nincluding myself, upon hearing:", "\nwill think that it’s safe to infer that she bought a\nfuzzy little pet that hops around and likes carrots. However, upon\nlearning that there is a car by the same name made by Volkswagen, it\nwill be much less clear to me that I know what she bought.", "\nSimilar phenomena include dead metaphors and idioms. The former\ninclude such items as ‘branch’ which now applies to\ndistinct sections of the government, the latter to phrases ‘kick\nthe bucket.’ (As an aside, I puzzled over several candidates for\nboth and realized it was hard to tell in most cases which were which!)\nThese clearly pass the ambiguity tests above by exhibiting zeugma,\ni.e.,", "\nIt’s controversial whether metaphors ever actually die and\nwhether or not, assuming they do die, they are metaphors. So it is\ncontroversial whether or not ‘branch’ is lexically\nambiguous. It clearly has two readings but whether or not these are to\nbe reflected as lexical meanings is a difficult and vague\nmatter – not that it clearly matters all that much in most\ncases." ], "subsection_title": "5.4 The Flexibility of the Lexicon" }, { "content": [ "\nOn the other hand, the facts about ambiguity can matter a great deal\nwhen it comes to determining policy, extension of law etc. The law is\nsensitive to this and makes certain division between ambiguities. For\nexample, the law divides between patent and latent ambiguity, where\nthe former roughly corresponds to a case where the meaning of a law is\nunclear, the latter to cases where the meaning is clear but applies\nequally well to highly disparate things. In effect, this is the\ndifference between ambiguity in sense and ambiguity in reference.", "\nU.S. Constitution scholars sometimes claim that the Constitution is\n‘ambiguous’ at key points. A famous example of such an ambiguity is the\nsuccession of the vice president, where the framers stipulate\nthat:", "\n\n\nIn Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,\nResignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the\nsaid Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, (Article 2,\nsection 1)\n", "\nThe clause is not clear as to what ‘devolve’ means.", "\nOf course, given what has been discussed, this looks to be more like a\ncase of under-specificity, or simply ignorance of a word’s\nmeaning (in 1787), not ambiguity. As the distinction has no real legal\nrelevance in this case, it is ignored as it generally is in common\nparlance." ], "subsection_title": "5.5 Legal Interpretations" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn\n section 2\n we looked at phenomena that were not the same as ambiguity; in this\nsection, we look at a few cases in which we might have been wrong to\ntear them apart." ], "section_title": "6. Ambiguity and Indexicality: Are They Easily Told Apart?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIt is often claimed that:", "\nis ambiguous between a deictic reading and a bound reading. Syntactic\northodoxy holds that either ‘his’ is co-indexed with John\nor it bears a different referential index. Various theories of\nanaphora, however, have claimed that we can dispense with the\nfundamental ambiguity between free and bound anaphora and unify the\ntreatment of the two. Dynamic Semantics aspires to offer just such a\nunified account, taking all anaphora to always refer to discourse\nreferents, or functions from information states to information states.\nThis provides a unified treatment of the function of anaphora in\nnatural language and dispenses with the need to think of anaphoric\ninterpretation as ambiguous as opposed to merely context-sensitive.\n(See Heim 1982, 1983, and Kamp 1981)." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Deictic vs. Bound Anaphora" }, { "content": [ "\nConsider:", "\n(77) is ambiguous between one where ‘a book by Chomsky’\ntakes wide scope over ‘every man who reads’ and one where\nit takes narrow scope. Maybe so; but most quantifiers in fact cannot\nescape from relative clauses. Relative clauses are known as\n‘scope islands’, or contexts in which quantifiers\ncan’t be interpreted as raised. In fact, it has been noted that\nindefinites seem to escape from nearly any normal scope island\nwhatsoever. This suggests that treating the various readings as an\nambiguity akin to other scopal ambiguities is mistaken. Another\ntreatment of (77)’s multiplicity of readings involves domain\nrestriction: if we restrict the domain of ‘a book’ to only\none particular book, we can emulate the reading one would get from\ntreating ‘a book’ as having wide-scope. Domain restriction\ntraditionally is treated as a matter of context sensitivity rather\nthan ambiguity. We thus have some reason to doubt that the right\ntreatment of (77) has much to do with the phenomenon of scope. (see\nSchwarzchild (2002) for further discussion)." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 The Scope of Indefinites" }, { "content": [ "\nAs noted above, modals seem to come in various flavours (doxastic,\nmetaphysical, logical, deontic, practical…). It is tempting to\ntreat these as ambiguities involving the modal term. However, it is\nworth noting that other treatments abound. Kratzer (1983) treats\nmodals as univocal but indexical: they get their differing\ninterpretations by taking in different input sets of worlds and\norderings induced on the relevant sets. If this is right, it may well\nbe that what looks like an ambiguity should actually be treated as a\nmatter of straightforward indexicality (much like ‘I’ is\nnot ambiguous but indexical)." ], "subsection_title": "6.3 Modals" }, { "content": [ "A really interesting case that may be loosely described as\nambiguity at the level of a sentence concerns focal stress and its\nmyriad of interesting effects. Generally focal stress is well known to\nco-ordinate assertions with questions under discuss and to introduce\nsets of alternatives into a discourse. In particular, these\nalternative sets can have truth conditional effects, for example:" ], "subsection_title": "6.4 Focal Stress" } ] } ]	[ "Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, Pickard-Cambridge\n(trans.), in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford\nTranslation, J. Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton\nUniversity Press, 1984.", "Aristotle, Metaphysics, W.D. Ross (trans.), in The\nComplete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, J.\nBarnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.", "Atherton, Catherine, 1993. The Stoics on Ambiguity.\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Atlas, Jay, 1989. 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F., 1950. “On Referring,” Mind,\n59: 320–344.", "Tuggy, David, 1993. “Ambiguity, Polysemy and\nVagueness,” Cognitive Linguistics, 4:\n273–290.", "Vicente, A., & Falkum, I. 2017. ‘Polysemy,’\nin Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Linguistics, \nVicente & Falkum 2017 available online. \ndoi:10.1093/acrefore/9780199384655.013.325.", "Viebahn, E., 2018. “Ambiguity and Zeugma,” in \nPacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99(4): 749–762.", "Ward, Gregory, 2004. “Equatives and Deferred\nReference,” Language, 80: 262–289.", "Williams, Edwin, 1977. “Discourse and Logical Form,”\nLinguistic Inquiry, 8(1): 101–139.", "Williams, Edwin, 1994. Thematic Structure in Syntax.\nCambridge, MA: MIT Press.", "Zwicky, Arnold M. and Jerrold M. Sadock, 1975. “Ambiguity\nTests and How to Fail Them,” in Syntax and Semantics (Volume IV),\nJ. Kimball (ed.), New York: Academic Press, 1–36." ]	[ { "href": "../analytic-synthetic/", "text": "analytic/synthetic distinction" }, { "href": "../anaphora/", "text": "anaphora" }, { "href": "../pragmatics/", "text": "pragmatics" }, { "href": "../reference/", "text": "reference" }, { "href": "../sorites-paradox/", "text": "Sorites paradox" }, { "href": "../vagueness/", "text": "vagueness" } ]
ammonius	Ammonius	First published Wed Oct 19, 2005; substantive revision Fri Nov 10, 2017	[ "\nAmmonius (ca. 435/445–517/526) taught philosophy at Alexandria,\nwhere his father Hermeias had taught earlier. Known primarily for his\ncommentaries on Aristotle, which were said to be of greater benefit\nthan anyone else’s, he was also distinguished in geometry and\nastronomy. Himself a pupil of Proclus at Athens, at Alexandria\nAmmonius taught most of the important Platonists of the late\n5th and early 6th centuries: Asclepius,\nDamascius and Simplicius, Eutocius, and Olympiodorus; Elias and David\nare considered indirect pupils of his. Damascius, who went on to head\nthe school at Athens, heard Ammonius lecture, but attached himself\nrather to the mentorship of Isidore and followed him to Athens. While\nalmost all of Ammonius’ Aristotle commentaries were published by\nstudents from his lectures, the large commentary on De\nInterpretatione was written up by Ammonius himself for\npublication. These commentaries are largely dependent on the lectures\nof Proclus and, to a lesser extent, Syrianus and thus indebted to\ntheir style of Iamblichean Neoplatonism. Ammonius is known for several\ncontributions, especially for the introduction of an Alexandrian\ntradition of commentary on Aristotle, but also for the first preserved\nversion of the set of questions to be answered preliminary to the\nstudy of Aristotle, the thesis that for Aristotle God is the efficient\nas well as final cause of the world, and the treatment of the sea\nbattle of De Interpretatione 9 as one of three determinist\narguments, along with the ‘Reaper’ and the argument from\ndivine foreknowledge." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Life", "1.2 Works" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Ammonius as Aristotelian Commentator", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Philosophical Positions", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Ammonius’ Neoplatonism", "3.2 Aristotle’s God as Efficient Cause of the World", "3.3 Aristotle and Anti-determinism" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAmmonius’ father Hermeias, after studying in Athens under\nSyrianus (Head of School in Athens 431/2–437), returned to Alexandria,\nwhere he established the teaching of Platonism as an additional\nsubject in the school of Horapollo (see below), alongside the\nprincipal curriculum in rhetoric. Ammonius’ mother Aedesia had\nbeen chosen as a young girl by Syrianus, a relative of hers, to marry\nProclus, who would succeed their teacher Syrianus as head on the\nlatter’s death in 437. When Proclus was kept from marrying her\nby ‘some god’, Aedesia was then married to Proclus’\nfellow student Hermeias. From these details, it is clear that\nAmmonius, second of three sons of Hermeias and Aedesia (the eldest died in childhood), must have been born\nafter about 435, presumably not long before 445. He seems to have been\ndead when Damascius (ca. 460-after 532) was writing his Life of\nIsidore or Philosophical History in 526, but alive in\n517, when his course on Aristotle’s Physics was first\npublished by Philoponus.", "\nDamascius, whose Life of Isidore is the source of most\ndetails about Ammonius’ life, greatly admired Aedesia for her\npiety and charity, and while still a young student of rhetoric he gave\nher eulogy at Horapollo’s school. Although the municipal stipend\nwhich had been paid to Hermeias (presumably as a teacher) continued to\nbe given her after Hermeias’ death, from the time Ammonius and\nhis younger brother Heliodorus were small until their maturity,\nDamascius says that Aedesia’s charitable giving left her sons in\ndebt on her death in old age (ca. 475, since Damascius, still a boy\nand a student of rhetoric, was honored to give her eulogy, ornamented\nwith heroic hexameters). These financial straits may have something to\ndo with Damascius’ opinion that Ammonius was viciously greedy:\nwith this debt, he would certainly have striven to keep teaching and\ncollecting salary and fees; however, the preserved excerpts of\nDamascius do not make this connection, perhaps in order to portray\nAmmonius as simply greedy (see below, on Ammonius’ alleged\n‘deal’ with the Christian Bishop of Alexandria). For\nDamascius the true offspring of this union of this exceptionally moral\nand holy couple was Aedesia and Hermeias’ eldest child, blessed\nwith divine gifts, who died at age seven and receives a rather\nhagiographic description. Aedesia accompanied her two surviving sons\nto Athens, where, at her suggestion, both studied with Proclus.", "\nAedesia and her sons must have returned before 475 from their study in\nAthens under Proclus to Alexandria, where Ammonius began lecturing on\nphilosophy at the school of Horapollon. We have reports of lectures on\nPlato by Ammonius from the beginning and end of his career. Sometime\nbetween 475 and 485 Damascius, who studied under Ammonius and his\nbrother Heliodorus, heard Ammonius lecture on Platonic philosophy;\nabout 515 Olympiodorus heard him lecture on the Gorgias\n(Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 199,8–10). Asclepius mentions\nlectures (or seminars: sunousiai, in Met. 77,4) on\nPlato and refers to an ‘exegesis’ (in Met. 70,31)\nof the Theaetetus. Nonetheless, Damascius reports that\nAmmonius was better versed in Aristotle, and it is his lectures on\nAristotle which, for the most part, have been transmitted to us.", "\nIn Ammonius’ day, Alexandria, unlike Athens, was an important\ncenter of Christian cult and culture, the third See of Christendom.\nThe school founded by Horapollo, where after Hermeias joined it the\ntwo main courses of study were rhetoric and philosophy, was a hub of\nthe ‘Hellenic’ pagan learning, religion and culture.\nApparently, Christian professors taught there as well, however, though\nthe latter tended to lecture in their homes on Fridays, leaving the\nschool largely to the pagans on that day (Zacharias, Life of\nSeverus p. 23 Kugener); certainly, there were Christian students\nin the classes of both their co-religionists and the Hellenes. The\natmosphere in Ammonius’ classroom is (too?) vividly portrayed in\nAmmonius or On the Creation of the World, written by one such\nChristian student, Zacharias of Maiuma (Gaza’s port-city), the\nlater Bishop of Mytilene, who studied with Ammonius in Alexandria\nbetween 485 and 487. Zacharias’ book recounts discussions\nbetween ‘The Christian’, presumably Zacharias himself, and\n‘Ammonius’ in front of the classroom; there is also\n(perhaps added later, after Ammonius’ death: Watts 2005) a\ndiscussion with the medical philosopher (iatrosophistēs)\nGesius, said to have been Ammonius’ best student at the time.\nThis recounting of the ‘dialogues in the Platonic manner’\n(1. 7–8) should not be taken as historical: it is embellished by\nZacharias with various references to Platonic dialogues and their digs\nat sophists; the arguments themselves largely depend upon another\ncontemporary work, the Theophrastus by Aeneas of Gaza, which\nhas no express connection with Ammonius. But Zacharias portrays\nAmmonius’ classroom as a battle over the souls of a mixture of\ncommitted pagans and Christians, and some students leaning one way or\nthe other. Zacharias’ contempt for Ammonius and for Platonic\nphilosophy is evident, and their discussion ends with Ammonius’\nembarrassed silence. That the school could be a focus of hostile\nChristian attention had been made abundantly clear by the lynching of\nHypatia at the hands of an Alexandrian mob in 415. Questions thus\narise about the relation of the school to what Damascius in his\nLife of Isidore calls ‘the dominant doctrine’.\nHow did the school manage to keep going as a largely pagan institution\nin a strongly Christian city? Did the philosophers in the school make\nany concessions, doctrinal or otherwise, to the Christian authorities?\nWas the school enabled to continue teaching Platonic philosophy with\nsome pagan professors into the 530’s by a concession of\nAmmonius’ to the Christian authorities?", "\nIt has been speculated that Ammonius may actually have converted to\nChristianity. A remark in Philoponus’ edition of Ammonius’\nlectures on De Anima (104,21–23) to the effect that the\nsoul could be forced to profess tyrants’ impious dogma, but\ncould not be forced to assent to it and believe it, might perhaps go\nback to Ammonius and has been taken as possible evidence that he was\ncoerced to pay lip service to Christianity, as has the dialectically\ncoerced admission (2.1094–1121) of Zacharias’ character\n‘Ammonius’ that the Trinity really is\n“three in hypostasis and being, but one in number”\n(Westerink 1962, XI–XII and Cameron 1969,14–15). But there\nis no convincing evidence of a conversion (cf. Blumenthal 1986,\n322–323), nor of any change in the real Ammonius’\nteaching. ", "\nAmmonius’ tenure at the school saw a large-scale attack on the\npagan community of Alexandria in the wake of the revolt of Illus\n(484–488) against the Emperor Zeno, during which harsh measures\nwere taken against the pagans by the Patriarch Peter III Mongus\n(482–489), since Illus had allied himself with the corrupt pagan\nPamprepius and may have promised him that pagan practice would be\ntolerated. It was probably during this crisis that Ammonius is\nrepresented by Damascius as making an agreement or deal:\n“Ammonius, who was wickedly greedy and saw everything in terms\nof any profit he could make, concluded an agreement\n(sunthēkas) with the overseer (episkopounta,\ni.e., bishop) of the dominant doctrine” (Photius, Bibl.\ncod. 242.352a 11–14=Damascius 118B Athanassiadi; cf. her Intro.\n30–1 and n. 37). Scholarly attention has focused on the nature\nof Ammonius’ ‘deal’ with the Bishop (presumed, by\nconnecting this persecution with the end of Illus’ revolt, to\nhave been Peter Mongus; the appearance of the name of his successor,\nAthanasius II [490–497] in a doublet of the same passage from\nDamascius [Photius, Bibl. cod. 242.347a 20] is apparently an\nintrusive, mistaken gloss). The suggestions have been put forward that\nhe agreed to continue the alleged Alexandrian Neoplatonic practice of\nmaking the gods into one by collapsing the One into the Intellect (a\nview congenial to Christianity); or that he agreed to lecture only on\nAristotle, avoiding Plato, or not to mention in his teaching the\nAristotelian doctrine of the eternity and divinity of the world; or\nthat he betrayed the hiding places of colleagues and pupils. Scholars\nhave adduced counterevidence against the first three suggestions,\nconcerning the school’s doctrine. That Ammonius betrayed his\nfellow Hellenes is a speculation based on his ability—alone\namong the major figures of the school—to resume his teaching\nunscathed after the turmoil of 489, on Damascius’ association of\nAmmonius’ deal with a profit motive, and also on\nDamascius’ hints that Ammonius was unprincipled and given to\nintrigue, as evidenced by an earlier power-struggle against Erythrius\n(a three-time praetorian prefect) in Constantinople (Damascius 78E;\nAthanassiadi 1999, 30–2). Indeed, the excerpts from Damascius\nseem to indicate that Ammonius was a prime target of the investigation\nand persecution led by the imperial envoy Nicomedes, who in an attempt\nto get information on “the Ammonius affair” (Damascius\n117A) ordered the arrest of Ammonius’ friend Harpocras, a\nprofessor of literature; he fled, but the order led to the arrest and\ntorture of Horapollo and Heraïscus, whom they tried to make\ninform on Harpocras and Isidore (Damascius 117B). Thus, Damascius\nperhaps implies that Ammonius set the investigators on Harpocras to\ndraw them away from himself. ", "\nRichard Sorabji (1990b, 12; see also 2005; 2016b, xiii–xiv;\n2016c, 46–47) suggested that Ammonius might have agreed not to\nallow the school to be a center of pagan and theurgic ritual, which he\nwould also de-emphasize in his teaching, or simply not to make trouble\nwith Christians, as the practice of theurgy or any attempt to convert\nChristian students to it would do. On Sorabji’s thesis, instead\nof agreeing with Iamblichus’ insistence on theurgy as\nindispensable to reaching spiritual union with God, a doctrine largely\ntaken over by Proclus (on Proclus’ theurgy and its three types,\nsee Sheppard 1982), Ammonius sided\nwith Porphyry’s refusal to accept the efficacy of theurgy in\npurifying the intellect and hence leading us to God. This\ninterpretation puts Ammonius in an altogether better light than does\nDamascius’, which is approved by Athanassiadi. For Sorabji his\nfinancial gain was the continuation of his municipal salary, so that\nhe could keep his school open, rather than a craven payment for\nservices rendered to the Christian authorities; he did not betray his\nfriends; he did not betray philosophy, since he merely preferred the\nnoncommittal attitude of Porphyry in the matter of divine names and\ntheurgy to that of Iamblichus and Proclus; on the contrary, he saved\nphilosophy in Alexandria.", "\nSorabji’s conjecture has attained something like a consensus\namong scholars (e.g., Hadot 2015, 29) and is quite possibly correct.\nThere is still room for doubt, however. It is not clear that Ammonius\nand his school rejected or downplayed theurgy; Olympiodorus (in\nPhd., Lect. 8, sec. 2) puts theurgy on the highest level of\nvirtue: philosophy can make us Intellect, while theurgy can unite us\nwith the intelligibles, so that we act paradeigmatically (cf. Blank\n2010, 659–660). Still, as Sorabji says (2016c, 47), he\napparently addressed his students as if they were all Christians, and\nwithout the volatile mix of pagans, Christians, and those who were\nwavering, the danger of Ammonius’ day was absent; Ammonius would\nhave had much more reason to agree to keep theurgy out of his\nclassroom after the riots of 486 and persecution of 489. If on the\nbasis of its absence from his commentaries on Aristotle we say that\nAmmonius de-emphasized theurgy or kept it to himself, he appears to\nhave done so consistently throughout his career, so that this cannot\nbe used as evidence of any forced change in his teaching. Did he,\nthen, agree to continue doing what he had been doing all along?\nPerhaps the mere fact of Ammonius’ willingness to approach and\nmake an agreement with Peter was enough to justify the disdain of\nDamascius.", "\nCan we ascertain Ammonius’ attitude to theurgy and\n‘Egyptian’ or ‘Hellenic’ rites? Beyond the\ncommentaries we have three quasi-historical sources for Ammonius:\nDamascius’ Life of Isidore and Zacharias’\nLife of Severus and Ammonius. In narrating the early\nlife of Severus (Bishop of Antioch 512–518, though he was a\npagan during his student days at Alexandria in the 480’s),\nZacharias recounts the story of Paralius, a student in\nHorapollo’s school undecided between paganism and Christianity\n(see Watts 2005). In 486 after taunting the philosopher Asclepiodotus\nfor his claim to have got his hitherto infertile wife pregnant by\nEgyptian magic, Paralius was set upon and beaten by the Hellenic\nstudents of the school on a Friday, when the Christians were largely\nabsent. This incident resulted in complaints to Entrechius the Prefect\nand to the Bishop, Peter Mongus, leading to the ransacking of the\nsanctuary of Isis at Menouthis and the burning of many hieratic cult\nobjects. The professors of the school accused in this incident were\nHorapollon himself, along with the ‘philosophers’\nAsclepiodotus, Heraïscus, Ammonius, and Isidore. Nothing further\nis said about Heraïscus or Ammonius; Zacharias had already\nridiculed Asclepiodotus, who subsequently repaired to Aphrodisias, and\nhe remarks that Isidore was later revealed as a magician and\ntroublemaker. Thus, Zacharias associates Ammonius with colleagues whom\nhe generally labels philosophers and adherents of the Egyptian\nmysteries, but gives us no particulars about him. In his Life of\nSeverus, Zacharias focused on the conflicts between Alexandrian\npagans and Christians, showing the winning and salvific force of\nChristianity. In the Ammonius he portrayed the superiority of\nChristian doctrine, especially that the world was created, and the\ndialectical victories of a Christian student over the more\nphilosophically experienced pagans Ammonius and Gesios. Therefore,\nthat book avoids the cultic conflict altogether and tells us nothing\nabout Ammonius relating to theurgic belief or ritual. ", "\nDamascius and his hero Isidore, on the other hand, were fervent\nadherents of theurgy and practitioners of hieratic ritual, and\nDamascius’ cast of characters are divided into those who\npracticed such ritual (good), those who were especially divinely\ngifted (better), and those whose participation was nil or is passed\nover in silence (bad guys); Ammonius is among the latter. The same was\nnot true of his family, however, as Damascius saw them. Hadot (2015,\n1–14) argues for the importance of religiosity and theurgy in the\nAlexandrian, as well as in the Athenian, school. Plutarch, who\nintroduced Iamblichean Platonism into Athens, had three famous\nstudents: Hierocles, Syrianus, and Proclus. Of the first two,\nAlexandrians by birth, Hierocles, author of a book on the Pythagorean\nGolden Verses, returned to teach in his native city, while\nSyrianus was chosen by Plutarch to succeed him. Proclus was younger\nthan these. Born in Byzantium and raised in Lycian Xanthos, convinced\nthat his Alexandrian teachers did not read Plato in the true spirit of\nthe philosopher and mindful of the divine vision and calling he had\nreceived in Xanthos (Marinus, Life of Proclus 10)—not\nthe last gift he would receive from the gods—he left Alexandria\nfor Athens. Hermeias studied with Syrianus; his commentary on the\nPhaedrus cites the Chaldaean Oracles and Orphic\nHymns frequently. Hermeias’ wife Aedesia not only\nshared her husband’s virtuous character, she was “so pious\ntoward God and holy and, to tell the whole of it, beloved of the gods\nthat she was accorded many epiphanies” (Damascius, Life of\nIsidore 56). Indeed, the first child born to the couple was a boy\nof such wondrous qualities and virtue that he departed this life at\nage seven, “unable to bear his embodied existence”\n(Life of Isidore 57A). As for Ammonius himself, we have seen\nhim listed (Zacharias, Life of Severus 16 and 22) as one of\nthe four philosophy teachers associated with the philologist\n(grammatikos) Horapollon and mocked for their adherence to\nthe pagan gods. Of these, Asclepiodotus and Isidore were explicitly\nconnected by Zacharias with Egyptian religion and magic. Damascius\n(Life of Isidore 81) describes how Asclepiodotus was saved\nfrom drowning by divine intervention, “such was his divine\npower, even while he was still embodied”. Heraïscus he\ndescribes as having a divine nature and living in such a way that his\nsoul dwelt as much as possible among shrines and places of initiation\n(Life of Isidore 72A, B). Of the four, then, only about\nAmmonius does Damascius report nothing regarding theurgy, mysteries,\nor holiness. Is this an accurate picture, or is Damascius’\nsilence as malicious as his words? ", "\nAmmonius’ ‘deal’ with the Bishop is attested only by\nDamascius, who despises Ammonius. Although he could have connected\nAmmonius’ agreement with his debts, Damascius chose instead to\nemphasize his greed, blackening his character with a trait\n(aischrokerdēs) which Plato had said (Republic\n408c3–4) would be incompatible with the demigod Asclepius’\ndivinity, if shown in his medical practice; it must be equally bad for\nAmmonius in his profession. As Photius already reports, Damascius\nalways mixed praise for some traits with blame for others in each\nperson he reports on. He also plays characters one against the other\n(cf. O’Meara 2006). Damascius prepared his claim about\nAmmonius’ greed by his idealization of Hermeias, who even told\nmerchants that their wares were priced too low (Damascius 54), and of\nAedesia, whose continuation of her husband’s charitable giving\nput the family into debt, and of the couple’s saintly eldest son\n(Damascius 56). The respect and love which Ammonius’ parents\nearned from both philosophers and the masses form an implicit contrast\nto the conflict surrounding Ammonius and his greed. The rhetorical\nstructure of Damascius’ narrative thus casts doubt on any\n‘deal’ between Ammonius and the Bishop, which may have\nbeen the result of pure speculation on Damascius’ part, combined\nwith his animus toward Ammonius (see Blank 2010, 657–660).\nDamascius actually admits (120B) making such an inference in the case\nof Horapollon, who he says deserted to ‘the others’, a\nconversion that “he apparently chose on his own, not compelled\nby any misfortune, perhaps too from the demands of an insatiable\ngreed; for it is not easy to propose any other reason to excuse his\nconversion”. ", "\nIs a deal with the Bishop necessary to explain Ammonius’\ncontinued ability to teach in Alexandria? The other professors of\nphilosophy appear to have fled or died during Nicomedes’\ninvestigation in 489, while Ammonius, initially a focus of that\ninvestigation, remained in Alexandria. We are not told that it became\nimpossible for pagans other than Ammonius to teach after 489, and\nthere were evidently Christian students in Ammonius’ school\nafter that date, just as there were earlier. Since Damascius connects\nAmmonius’ deal with his avarice, we should like to know more\nabout his income. In major cities, the role of teacher was associated\nwith payment by the city, and in Constantinople there were chairs paid\nby the Emperor; a law of Justinian in 529, the extension of an order\nof his father (Justin I, 518–527), decrees (Codex Justinianus\n1.5.18.4) that only those of orthodox faith may teach and receive a\npublic stipend (sitēsis dēmosia). Damascius reports\nthat Hermeias had received a municipal stipend, presumably for\nteaching, which his widow managed to have continued until her sons\ncould do philosophy (h&omacr;s ephilosoph&emacr;san, where h&omacr;s is used in the sense of he&omacr;s).\nScholars mostly think this makes it likely that Ammonius took up his\nfather’s position on his return from Athens, or even that his\nfather’s position in the school was held vacant for him and was\npaid in the meanwhile. But there were at least four philosophers\nteaching together with Horapollon in the 480s, so it is difficult to\nassert that Ammonius held ‘the chair’ of philosophy;\nperhaps there were a number of ‘chairs’—difficult,\nbut not impossible, since Ammonius was undoubtedly the most important\nand influential of the four. How long did Aedesia continue to receive\nher dead husband’s salary for her sons, “until they began\nto do philosophy” (h&omacr;s ephilosoph&emacr;san): was\nit until they could receive it in their own right? Damascius uses the\naorist tense of philosophe&omacr; to mean ‘studied\nphilosophy’ (54 Hermeias studied philosophy under Syrianus; 57B\nAmmonius and Heliodorus studied philosophy under Proclus; 71B Isidore\nstudied philosophy under the brothers Heraïscus and Asclepiades;\ncf. 63B while Hierios was studying [philosophounta]\nphilosophy). On that likely reading, Aedesia will have arranged for\nher sons to be supported by the city until she could take them to\nAthens to study philosophy, where they would, as members of the\nAcademy community, have been supported. When they returned to\nAlexandria, they will have made their own way, with the support of\ntheir mother and of family friends; whether with financial support\nfrom students, from the city, or both, is unclear. ", "\nHadot (2015, 23–25) thinks that Zacharias’ account proves that\nHorapollon’s school was a private institution when Ammonius\ntaught there and that it is highly unlikely that a pagan philosopher\ncould have received a municipal salary in Alexandria in\nAmmonius’ day, due to Christian hostility. She argues Ammonius\nand his colleagues will have relied on students’ fees for their\nincome and therefore been more vulnerable than their Athenian\ncolleagues, who lived communally, supported by the wealth of the\nAcademy, which stemmed from bequests of the pious and learned\n(Life of Isidore 102). Support for this may come from\nOlympiodorus, who says (in Gorg. 43.2, 224.20–24; 43.4,\n225.19–21; 43.6, 226.24–26) that philosophers will receive the merited\nthanks of their students for their help and must therefore not ask\nthem for fees (misthous); but this is a hoary philosophical\ncliché (cf. Xenophon, Mem. 1.2.6–8). In his\narticle on the complex of lecture rooms excavated in Alexandria,\nSorabji (2014, 36–37) points to the size of the establishment and its\nrebuilding and expansion after the earthquake of 535 as indications of\ngenerous municipal support. It may well be that Christian Alexandria\ncontinued to support the teaching of pagan philosophers because they\nhad an audience of students. There were still pagan students and those\nleaning toward paganism in the city. But Christians too will have been\ndrawn to the high reputation of pagan Greek literature and philosophy.\nChristian students will also have sought the kind of dialectical\nskills taught by pagan philosophers and rhetoricians, along with their\nadvanced logical and metaphysical teachings, the better to argue\nagainst them and the better to understand the philosophical basis of\ntheir own Christian faith (cf. Wildberg 2005, 234–236). After all,\nZacharias stayed in Alexandria a year after Severus left to study law\nat Berytus because he needed further study of the rhetoricians and\nphilosophers, so as to fight the pagans, who were so proud of them,\nwith their own weapons (Life of Severus 46; cf. Champion\n2014, 31–32). " ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Life" }, { "content": [ "\nOne work of Ammonius clearly survives in the written form he gave it,\nhis ‘commentary’ (hupomn&emacr;ma) on\nAristotle’s De Interpretatione. His commentary on\nPorphyry’s Introduction (in Isag.), is\ndescribed in the manuscripts variously as ‘Ammonius the\nPhilosopher’s Exegesis (or Prolegomena or Commentary) of the\nFive Sayings’ and is perhaps another work given its final form\nby Ammonius; but its present Prooemium is, in any case, considered\ninauthentic, and other passages are also interpolations (Busse,\nCAG IV.3 p. vi).", "\nWe hear of other works published by Ammonius, but these are mostly\nsingle book-rolls, monographs on particular points:", "\nIn addition, the commentary by an Ammonius on Aristotle’s\nTopics mentioned in Syriac and Arabic authors was perhaps\nwritten by our Ammonius (cf. Stump 1978, 212 and Militello 2014, 92).\n", "\nThe other works of Ammonius which survive are all derived, directly or\nindirectly, from his lectures, taken down by his students and hence\nmostly described as being ‘from the voice (apo t&emacr;s\nphōnēs, or: the lectures [skholōn]) of\nAmmonius’. Two of these are transmitted under the name of\nAmmonius himself, but are thought to come from the notes of anonymous\nstudents from Ammonius’ lectures:", "\nTwo courses bear the name of Asclepius (ca. 465- ?):", "\nFour courses are transmitted under the name of John Philoponus (ca.\n490-ca. 570):", "\nThe titles of three of Philoponus’ Aristotle courses do not\nmention Ammonius, and these were probably perceived as representing\nrather the lectures of Philoponus than those of Ammonius. These are:\n", "\nHowever, On Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic\n(in Nicomachi Intro. Arith.) is thought to be lectures by\nPhiloponus based on Asclepius’ publication (see above) of his\nown notes on Ammonius’ lectures (cf. Tarán 1969,\n10–13)." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Works" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAmmonius established the tradition of Aristotelian commentary in\nAlexandria. He was followed in this by his students Asclepius,\nPhiloponus (ca. 490–570), Simplicius (writing after 529 after\nmoving to the Athenian school and moving with it from Athens to Persia\nafter the school’s closure under Justinian), and Olympiodorus\n(495/505-after 565). The tradition continues through the Christian\ncommentators Elias (probably a pupil of Olympiodorus), David,\nPs.-Elias and Stephanus (fl. ca. 610).", "\nDamascius commented that Ammonius, who explicated works of both Plato\nand Aristotle, was more practiced in the latter (Life of\nIsidore 57C). The Christian character in Zacharias’\ndialogue (562–565) accuses Ammonius’ star pupil Gesius and his\ncomrades, presumably including Ammonius, of being accustomed to refute\nPlato’s doctrines, while claiming to be his pupils and wanting\nto be called ‘Platonists’; he also uses a literal\ninterpretation of the cosmogony in Plato’s Timaeus to\ncounter the Aristotelian doctrine of the world’s co-eternity\nwith God espoused by the dialogue’s ‘Ammonius’\ncharacter. Still, Ammonius did lecture on Platonic texts. He is cited\nby name nine times in his student Olympiodorus’ commentary on\nthe Gorgias, three times on the Phaedo, and not at\nall on Alcibiades I; the differences probably reflect the\nfact that for the Gorgias Olympiodorus could rely less on a\nprevious tradition of Neoplatonic interpretation. In all cases, he is\ncited with the greatest respect. ", "\nThe most substantive comment cited by Olympiodorus from\nAmmonius’ lectures on the Gorgias (§32,2–3)\nis a defense of the four democratic politicians Socrates declines to\ncall statesmen (499b–503c); Ammonius says they are practitioners\nof the ‘intermediate’ rhetoric, rather than of the false\nkind. He draws his explanation from the Republic (425c-427a),\nwhere he distinguishes three kinds of physician: the false kind that\ngives prescriptions aimed at flattery and pleasing the patient, the\ntrue kind that insists the patient do what is best for him, and the\nintermediate kind that gives the patient a true prescription but does\nnot insist that he follow it. In this explanation, Ammonius follows\nthe lead of his father Hermeias, who cited (in Phdr. p.\n231,26–232,14 Lucarini-Moreschini) this passage of the\nGorgias in his explanation of Phaedrus 260d as\nreferring to true, popular, and intermediate rhetoric and the\ndifferent kinds of therapy of the masses they apply. Ammonius’\nlectures on Plato seem to have been enlivened by wit and personal\nremarks, some apparently cited as apophthegms from the great teacher.\nSocrates (Gorgias 513a) warns Callicles against assimilating\nhimself to the current Athenian d&emacr;mos, thereby\nattaining power but perhaps losing all he holds dear. Such\nassimilation, Olympiodorus says, destroys one’s soul utterly;\nthe proper object to which one should assimilate one’s soul is\nthe cosmos, that is, God. Like the Thessalian witches mentioned by\nSocrates, nowadays too the Egyptian magicians claim to have the power\nto ‘draw down the moon’ and run such risk of destruction,\nif they fail. Olympiodorus notes that we must not believe these\nmythical stories, though most people are deceived by them: this is\nsimply an eclipse; similarly, even now they say that there are\nmagicians in Egypt who can change men into crocodiles, asses, or any\nshape they like—but one must not believe it. Indeed, Ammonius\ntold them, in his exegesis, “this experience overpowered me too,\nand when I was a boy I used to believe these things were true”\n(in Gorg. §39,2). Known for astronomical expertise,\nAmmonius was chiding his credulous audience. Another remark of\nAmmonius’ is cited in Olympiodorus’ argument that the myth\nat the end of the Gorgias that emphasizes the judgement of\nour souls in the underworld over that of judges in our present life\nshows that our actions derive from our own souls’ autonomy.\nOlympiodorus notes (§48,5) that it is up to us to choose virtue\nor vice and that there is no place for astrology, which would nullify\nforesight, law, and justice: “Ammonius the philosopher says\n‘I know some men who have the astrological horoscope of\nadulterers, yet are temperate, since the self-moving nature of the\nsoul dominates’”. Again, Ammonius does not deny the\ninfluence of the stars in our lives, but insists that our individual\nchoice plays an overriding role. Explaining that aristocracy is the\nbest government, Olympiodorus (§42,1–2) likens the city to\nthe cosmos, ruled best by God, citing the Homeric line so favored by\nAristotle (Metaphysics 12.10, 1076a4) and his Neoplatonic\nexegetes: “Rule of many is not good: let there be one\nchief!”. If someone objects that this is rather monarchy than\naristocracy, respond with Ammonius: “Keep silent; let him have\nyour fist”! ", "\nIn his lectures on Aristotle, Ammonius was heavily indebted to his\nteacher Proclus, even if he disagreed with him on some important\npoints. The introduction to his in Int. makes Ammonius’\ngreat debt to Proclus clear: “Now, we have recorded the\ninterpretations of our divine teacher Proclus, successor to the chair\nof Plato and a man who attained the limits of human capacity both in\nthe ability to interpret the opinions of the ancients and in the\nscientific judgment of the nature of reality. If, having done that, we\ntoo are able to add anything to the clarification of the book, we owe\ngreat thanks to the god of eloquence” (1,6–11; cf. in\nAn. Pr. 43,30, with a citation of Proclus’ School\nCommentary [skholikon hupomn&emacr;ma]). Proclus, in\nturn, often used Iamblichus (see, e.g., in An. Pr. 40,16). In\naddition, Ammonius used other commentators. For example in his in\nInt., most of his material comes from Proclus’ lectures,\nbut Ammonius has polished up what he had in his notes of those\nlectures, then added material of his own or from other sources. In\nthis case, Ammonius’ main source for supplementing\nProclus’ lectures was apparently the now lost voluminous\ncommentary (see Stephanus in Int. 63,9) of Porphyry, which\nwas also the major source of Boethius’ commentary on De\nInt. and probably also of Ammonius’ citations of earlier\nauthors, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (active late 2nd\nto early 3rd century), Aspasius (first half of\n2nd century), Herminus’ (2nd C.), and the\nStoics. Both Porphyry and Proclus held Int. c. 14 to be\nspurious (252,10 ff.). Although Ammonius agreed, unlike them he\ndecided to include commentary on the chapter, which he repeats\n‘verbatim’ from Syrianus, having nothing of his own to add\n(254,22–31; cf. 253,12).", "\nThe sources on which Ammonius drew and his mode of using them will\nlikely have varied according to the nature of the previous\ncommentaries he could work with for each text. In Asclepius’\npublished version of Ammonius’ lectures, for example, we see a\nvery different procedure from the one Ammonius followed in writing out\nhis own commentary on De Interpretatione and basing it on\nProclus’ lectures. It is difficult to say to what extent\nAsclepius’ commentary on Metaphysics A–Z is\neither a reflection or a more thorough reworking of Ammonius’\nlectures. Still, this work is reasonably thought to give the best\nrepresentation we have of the lectures themselves, copied down by\nAmmonius’ student ‘from the voice’ of the master.\nIndications of the commentary’s origin in the lectures abound\n(cf. Luna 2001, 100–103): the explanation of a passage often\nbegins by referring to “what was said yesterday” (e.g.,\n3,13; 433,18–19); we are told that “the teacher of\nmedicine Asclepius, who studied with us at these lessons” raised\na question, and “our professor of philosophy” answered him\n(143,31 ff.). That faithful transcription of lectures was practiced\nand thus could have formed the basis of a later reworking for\npublication is implied by Damascius’ story (45A) about\nTheosebius, who compared his own transcripts of lectures on the\nGorgias given at two different times by his master Hierocles\nand found nothing repeated between the two versions, “each of\nwhich, however improbable it is to hear, hewed as much as possible to\nthe intention of Plato”. ", "\nIn Asclepius of Tralles’ commentary on Metaphysics A-Z\nthere are two voices: the Peripatetic voice of Aristotle and Alexander\nof Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonic voice of Syrianus and Ammonius.\nAsclepius begins with a lemma taken from Aristotle, sometimes\nparaphrases it, and explains its philosophical significance; then, if\nnecessary, he explains why Aristotle was wrong, saying that “we,\non the other hand, say” or “against this we say” or\n“our teacher of philosophy Ammonius says”, or else why\nAristotle appears wrong but really agrees with Plato. Next, he\nexplains the Aristotelian text itself, usually taking the explanation\nfrom Alexander, either word-for-word or in paraphrase; occasionally,\nhe appears to have drawn his paraphrase of Alexander from Syrianus.\nAsclepius’ commentary and, presumably, Ammonius’ lectures,\nthen, combine the inheritance of Alexander and of Syrianus, a move in\nkeeping with the opinion of Syrianus himself, who introduced his\ncommentary on Metaphysics Γ saying (54,11–15):\n“[Aristotle] will attempt to teach [these things] in this book,\nwhich, since it has been made sufficiently clear by the very\nhardworking Alexander, we will not interpret in its entirety. But if\nhe seems to us to say something that is troublesome [and requiring]\nscrutiny, that part we will try to examine, summarizing all the rest\nfor the sake of the treatise’s coherence.” The commentary\non Metaphysics A, closely studied by Cardullo (2012),\nprovides numerous clear examples of Asclepius’—i.e.,\nAmmonius’—procedures. Thus, in explaining the famous\ndeclaration of all men’s desire for knowledge in the opening\nsentence of the Metaphysics, Ammonius goes through a number\nof different types of knowledge, following Aristotle, ending with art,\nwhich is superior to experience, since it knows the\n‘why’ and not just the\n‘that’: “Hence Plato says of the divine\nmind ‘I do not call art that which is an irrational\nthing’”. With this reference to Gorgias 465a6,\nAsclepius-Ammonius cites (28,3–6 on Metaph. 984b1) a\nPlatonic argument in explanation of an Aristotelian one to show their\nclose relation. Later, Asclepius attributes Aristotle’s argument\nthat wisdom is chosen for itself, not for the sake of something else,\nto Plato (20,15–16; cf. Cardullo 2012, 266 n. 391). In another\ninstance of this kind of association, Asclepius comments that\n“it is good that sensible things exist: even pitch is necessary\nfor the perfection of the cosmos, and ‘it is unjust to leave\nsuch a great matter to chance or luck’, but only to God, who has\ncreated everything because of his own goodness”. That the\nreference is to the Demiurge of the Timaeus (29e) is evident\nfrom the emphasis on the creator’s goodness, and the producing\ncause is here connected with the Unmoved Mover, which is a final cause\ndue to its goodness (Cardullo 2012, 294 n. 488). ", "\nFrom Ammonius’ version of the list of ten preliminary topics\nrecommended by Proclus for those beginning to study Aristotle (cf.\nElias, in Cat. 107,24–27), we know that the study of\nAristotle in Ammonius’ school began with logic, then moved on to\nethics, physics, mathematics, and theology (Ammonius, in Cat.\n5,31–6,8). Ammonius also introduced as a new set a sequence of\nlessons introductory to the study of Aristotle consisting of: an\nintroduction to philosophy; an introduction to Porphyry’s\nEisag&omacr;g&emacr; or Introduction to Aristotle’s\nlogic; a commentary on Porphyry’s Introduction; the\nreading of Porphyry’s Introduction itself; an\nintroduction to the philosophy of Aristotle; an introduction to the\nCategories (cf. Sorabji 2016c, 48–50; Hadot, 1988,\n44–45). The introduction to philosophy was particularly\ncongenial and influential, giving a number of definitions of\nphilosophy and, particularly, two definitions ‘from the\ngoal’: Plato’s ‘assimilation to God as far as\npossible’ (Theaetetus 176b) and ‘practice of\ndeath’ (Phaedo 64a; Ammonius, in Isag. 3,7 ff.\nand 4,15 ff.). Lectures on the works of Plato and Aristotle presumably\nlasted about an hour. In Proclus we see signs of such hour-long\ndivisions, as well as a division of the lecture on an individual\npassage into discussion of its doctrine (the&omacr;ria),\nsometimes quite wide-ranging, followed by its wording\n(lexis); signs of this division are still present in\nAmmonius’ in Int. Students evidently took copious\nnotes, which they might then publish, under their own names or that of\nAmmonius himself.", "\nThe lectures of Ammonius and his students gave a very detailed\nexegesis of their text and an indication of its philosophical\nimportance, including how it related to other texts of Aristotle and\nPlato. These two philosophers were each taken to be substantially\nself-consistent and uniform in opinion throughout his own writings,\nand in agreement with one another and with the truth (see, e.g.,\nSimplicius, in DA 1,3–21). According to Elias (in\nCat. 107,24–7), Proclus put together a list of ten\nquestions to be answered preliminary to the study of Aristotle, and it\nis Ammonius who gives us the first preserved version of these. One of\nthe preliminary questions concerns the role of the interpreter. Elias\n(in Cat. 122,25–123,5) says that the exegete is also a\nknower, in the one capacity explaining what is unclear in his text and\nin the other judging its truth and falsity. He ought not to insist\nthat his author is always correct, but he ought rather to value the\ntruth more than the man; he ought not to become an exclusive partisan\nof his philosopher, as Iamblichus was for Plato. Further, he ought to\nknow all of Aristotle, so that he can show on the basis of\nAristotle’s works that he agrees with himself; he ought to know\nall of Plato, so that he can show that Plato agrees with himself,\nwhile making the works of Aristotle an introduction to those of Plato.\nThese requirements are associated with Ammonius by Olympiodorus in his\ncommentary on the Gorgias (cf. Tarrant in Jackson et al.\n1998, 11 and notes on 32.1 and 42.2), and one can see the insistence\non knowing and judging the truth over loyalty to Aristotle in\nAmmonius’ own introductory precepts (in Cat. 7,34\nff.).", "\nThe later Alexandrian commentators tend to emphasize that it is the\ncommentator’s duty not to interpret apparent disagreements of\nAristotle with Plato literally, but to look to the sense and discover\nthe fundamental agreement or ‘harmony’\n(sumph&omacr;nia) of the two philosophers (e.g., Simplicius,\nin Cat. 7,31). Ammonius’ own statement of the qualities\nof an exegete (in Cat. 7,34 ff.) does not say this, but in\npractice he does point out the agreement of Plato and Aristotle\n(in Int. 39,11). Syrianus and Proclus criticized, at times\nharshly, Aristotle’s disagreement with Plato’s views on,\ne.g., the existence of Forms and the demiurgic role of God as crafting\nand creating the physical world. In contrast, Ammonius points out\n(Asclepius, in Metaph. 69,17–27; cf. Sorabji 2005, vol.\n3 sect. 5(d), and Cardullo 2012, 78–81) that, while Aristotle\n‘seems’ to be attacking Plato on the Forms in\nMetaph. 990b3, he actually agrees with Plato, since he\npraises (De An. 429a28) those who say that the soul is the\nplace of Forms. Ammonius also makes God the efficient cause of all\nthings, in addition to being the final cause (see below, sect. 3.2).\nThis appears to be a characteristic difference of approach between\nSyrianus-Proclus and Ammonius and his pupils: the latter outdo the\nformer in their concern to ‘harmonize’ Aristotle’s\nand Plato’s views and their willingness to interpret Aristotle\nas not disagreeing with Plato in any fundamental way. " ], "section_title": "2. Ammonius as Aristotelian Commentator", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nFor four reasons it is difficult to pinpoint Ammonius’ own\nphilosophical positions and contributions to philosophy or to the\ninterpretation of Aristotle: (1) Our evidence is confined to\ncommentaries on Aristotle, whose interpretation did not leave as much\nscope for expounding Neoplatonic ideas as did that of Plato. (2) He\ndepends in these works on Proclus, whose Aristotle lectures or\ncommentaries do not survive, so that we cannot be sure what in them is\nreally his own. (3) Some of Ammonius’ works failed to reach us.\n(4) We have to depend to a significant degree on his pupils’\nwritings for our information about him and his contributions, and\ntheir own stance may be difficult to separate from that of Ammonius\nhimself. The best approach at present attempts to piece together\nAmmonius’ views from his commentary on De\nInterpretatione, from statements attributed to him by later\ncommentators, and from those lectures of Ammonius which were either\npublished by students under Ammonius’ name or which, while\npublished under students’ names, seem to show little sign of\nhaving altered his teachings—namely, Asclepius on the\nMetaphysics and the early commentaries of Philoponus (or\ntheir early versions, in the case of commentaries, such as that on the\nPhysics, which were revised). The use of Philoponus to\nrecover Ammonius’ positions was much advanced by Verrycken\n1990a; his chronology of the commentaries by Philoponus—and\nhence, the degree to which they may represent the thought of Ammonius,\nbefore Philoponus departed from it in important ways—has\nrecently been revisited by Golitsis 2008 and Sorabji 2016d. (see\nabove, sect. 1.2)." ], "section_title": "3. Philosophical Positions", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIt was claimed by K. Praechter (1910) that the Alexandrian Neoplatonic\nschool of Ammonius and his followers differed substantially from that\nof Athens both before and after Ammonius’ time, particularly by\ndownplaying the Iamblichean theurgic or magical and religious elements\nand the complex Iamblichean and Proclan hierarchies and triadic\ngroupings at the different levels of reality recognized in\nNeoplatonist metaphysics (on these, see, e.g., Wallis 1972,\n100–110, 123–34, 146–54). In contrast to these wild\nand woolly Athenian doctrines and practices, Praechter saw the\nAlexandrian school, in whose commentaries such doctrines do not figure\nprominently, as more restrained, rational, respectable; they were\nsober interpreters of Aristotle and had a doctrine much more easily\nreconcilable with the strong Christian cult of Alexandria. Scholars\nlike P. Merlan (1968) went further, making Ammonius the purveyor of a\nstrongly Christianized philosophy which featured a creative, personal\nGod.", "\nRecent studies of the Alexandrians (especially Hadot 1978 on Hierocles\nand Simplicius, Verrycken 1990a on Ammonius, Tempelis 1999, Luna 2001,\nCardullo 2009 and 2012, Hadot 2015, Sorabji 2016a and c) have largely\nresulted in the abandonment of Praechter’s claims. Overlapping\npersonal histories already cast doubt on the hypothesis of a gulf\nbetween the two schools. As noted above, Plutarch’s chosen\nsuccessor Syrianus came from Alexandria together with Hermeias, who\nbrought Plutarch’s and Syrianus’ teachings back from\nAthens to his native city Alexandria. Ammonius studied with and was\nevidently greatly influenced by Proclus in Athens. Furthermore,\nreferences and allusions to various important pieces of Proclan\ndoctrine can be adduced from various places in the commentaries of\nAmmonius and his students. The relative paucity, however, of such\nreferences and their lack of centrality to the works in which they are\nfound makes it difficult to assess their significance in this regard.\nThe interpretation of certain statements which might be interpreted as\ntelling against Ammonius’ espousal of, say, the transcendent\nOne, is also a complex matter. Ammonius’ interpreters now\nrightly rely to a great extent on context in understanding his works.\nThey ask, for example, whenever Ammonius does not mention a particular\nNeoplatonic doctrine or mentions it in a simplified form, whether the\ndoctrine was necessary to an understanding of the passage on which\nAmmonius was commenting. As noted above, Ammonius comments mostly on\nAristotle, especially his logical works. This was the first part of\nthe Neoplatonic curriculum: Marinus (Life of Proclus 13) says\nthat Syrianus taught Proclus all of Aristotle’s works in less\nthan two years and “having led him through these, as it were,\npreliminary initiatory rites and little mysteries, brought him to the\nmystagogy of Plato”. Ammonius apparently held a similar view of\nthe Aristotelian portion of the Neoplatonic curriculum, and in\ncommentary on such works may have felt no need to go into many of the\ndetails of a complex Neoplatonic theology and metaphysics;, even if he\nheld such views. Even the Metaphysics, which according to\nAmmonius dealt with things ‘entirely unmoved’, that is,\n‘theology’ (Asclepius, in Metaph. 1,3 and\n17–18) may not have been thought to require an explanation of\nthe highest levels of reality. In a second statement, explaining the\nfirst line of the book, Asclepius says Aristotle aimed to speak about\n“beings and how they are beings and, to reason about absolutely\nall beings, insofar as they are beings” (2,9–11), which\nHadot (2015, 27) takes to exclude “the entire divine hierarchy\nbeyond being”. The second statement, however, probably derives\nfrom Alexander, who thinks that the Metaphysics is\ntheological in the sense that God is one of the causes of reality and\nthus a subject of ‘first philosophy’ (cf. Cardullo 2012,\n225 n. 230). Ammonius here elides the reasoning needed to get from the\nstudy of being qua being to theology, and there is some\nambiguity as to the extent to which he thinks the role of theology in\nAristotle is the same as in Plato (Hadot 2015, 27 n. 83). In some\ncontexts a discussion of certain metaphysical doctrines might even\nhave been inappropriate, especially if the work under discussion was\nmeant to be studied by less advanced students. Thus, the fact that\nAmmonius does not avail himself of certain opportunities to discuss\ncertain tenets of Neoplatonic metaphysics does not mean that he would\nnot espouse such tenets in other circumstances. Still, the very fact\nthat Ammonius was, as emphasized above, especially known for his\ncommentaries on Aristotle, could reflect a tendency on his part not to\nhave taught a full-blown Neoplatonic metaphysical system. Hadot 2015\ngives a lengthy account of the similarities and differences in the\nways Aristotle and Plato were ‘harmonized’ by various\nPlatonists since Porphyry (cf. the account of various issues on which\nharmonization was needed, as seen in Themistius and then in Ammonius,\nin Sorabji 2016c, 18–20 and 53–55). In agreement with Cardullo\n(e.g., 2009, 245) that one finds in Ammonius an “absolute\nallegiance to Neoplatonism”, Hadot interprets differences\nbetween, say, Syrianus-Proclus and Ammonius as resulting from the\ngreater determination of the latter to minimize their possible\ndisagreements and Ammonius’ consequently greater willingness to\nbend Aristotle in Plato’s direction. There may be debate over\nwhether this involved more ‘Aristotelizing Plato’ or\n‘Platonizing Aristotle’ (cf. Sorabji 2016a,\nxxvii–xxxi for a discussion of Hadot’s objections to\nVerrycken’s [1990] view of Ammonius’ simplification of the\nmetaphysics of the Athenian Neoplatonists). One may also wonder\nwhether Ammonius would have thought that his philosophy differed in\nany important way from that of his Athenian teacher. ", "\nOn the most general level, Ammonius says that the purpose and utility\nof studying Aristotle’s philosophy is “to ascend to the\ncommon principle (arkh&emacr;) of all things and to be aware\nthat this is the one goodness itself, incorporeal, indivisible,\nuncircumscribed, unbounded and of infinite potentiality” (in\nCat. 6,9–12). Thus, his stance, in this early work, is that\nof a Neoplatonist, as has been clearly shown by Verrycken (1990a,\n212–15). Thus he says that Aristotle’s distinction of\nspoken sound, affection of the soul, and thing in the world (De\nInt. 16a3–8) corresponds to the Neoplatonic hypostases of\nSoul, Intellect and God (in Int. 24,24–9). He also\nplaces ‘not-being’ above the Intellect at the highest\nplane of reality and occasionally writes in a manner reminiscent of\nProclus’ divine henads. So there seems no doubt of his genuine\ncommitment to a Neoplatonic stance in metaphysics, even if, as\nVerrycken would hold, he may not have espoused a system as complex as\nthat of Proclus.", "\nPerhaps, though, Ammonius set different emphases and cited different\nultimate authorities than the Athenians. Following Iamblichus,\nSyrianus and Proclus held that Plato taught the true philosophy that\noriginated with Pythagoras and various of his followers, including\nParmenides. They also thought the highest expression of this ancient\nwisdom was found in the Orphic Hymns and in the Chaldaean Oracles, and\nthese two works were the final course Syrianus was willing to teach,\nbut only to Proclus and Domninus, though disagreement over which one\nto study caused the two students to be taught separately, and\nProclus’ study of the Oracles was interrupted by\nSyrianus’ death (Marinus, Life of Proclus 26). Proclus\nlater worked intensively on both texts, along with those of Porphyry\nand Iamblichus, and taught them. In fact, “he attained the\nhighest degree of theurgic virtue” (Life of Proclus\n27–28). Ammonius was certainly concerned, in Asclepius’\ncommentary on Metaphysics A, to point out on numerous\noccasions that Aristotle—who criticized the Pythagoreans and,\naccording to Ammonius, also the line of reasoning that led from them\nto Plato—had got them wrong, since he did not understand that\nthey expressed themselves ‘symbolically’ (cf. Cardullo\n2009, 258–259). Again, some argue that Ammonius and his students\ndid not see the importance of the ‘divine poetry’ of\nOrpheus and the Chaldaean Oracles. Hadot 2015, 13–14 counters\nthat citation of these poetic works is also infrequent in Aristotelian\ncommentaries of the Athenian school, while both Olympiodorus and\nDamascius cite the Oracles in their commentaries on Plato’s\nPhaedo. In any event, it is important to note that we have no\nrecord that Ammonius or his pupils lectured or commented on the four\ngreat ‘theological’ dialogues in the Neoplatonic\ncurriculum: Phaedrus, Symposium, Philebus, Parmenides (cf.\nTarrant, in Jackson, et al. 1998, 3). " ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Ammonius’ Neoplatonism" }, { "content": [ "\nAristotle’s intellectual God seems not to be a good fit for the\nrole of craftsman and creator which God plays in Plato’s\nTimaeus. Proclus (in Tim. 1.266.28–268.24)\nsays as much: while “the Peripatetics say there is something\nseparate [from the physical world], it is not creative\n(poi&emacr;tik&emacr;), but final (telikon); hence they\nboth removed the exemplars (paradeigmata) and set a\nnon-plural intelligence over all things.” Indeed, Proclus says,\nAristotle’s own principles ought to have made him admit that God\nwas a creator. According to Simplicius, Peripatetic interpreters,\nincluding Alexander of Aphrodisias, accepted that God was a final\ncause of the entire world, that God’s moving the heavens made\nhim indirectly the efficient cause of sublunar motion, and that he was\nalso the efficient cause of the heavens’ motion, but not of\ntheir existence as a substance (in Cael. 271,13–21;\nin Phys. 1360,24–1363,24). Simplicius goes on to say\nthat Ammonius devoted an entire book to arguing that, contrary to\nthese Peripatetics, God was both final and efficient cause of both the\nmovement and existence of the whole world, sublunar and supralunar.\nThis interpretation, according to Simplicius, allowed Ammonius to\nharmonize Aristotle with Plato; it should not, therefore, be taken as\na concession to Christian doctrine. Instead of criticizing Aristotle,\nas Proclus had done, Ammonius took five Aristotelian passages and\ninterpreted them as indicating that Aristotle did in fact reason along\nthe lines Proclus had indicated in his criticism. Thus, for example,\nAmmonius argued, according to Simplicius, that in Physics\n2.3, 194b29–32, that from which comes the origin of motion\n(i.e., God, the unmoved mover) is itself a productive cause.\nAmmonius also argued that “if, according to Aristotle, the power\nof any finite body is itself finite, clearly whether it be a power of\nmoving or a power that produces being, then, just as it gets its\neternal motion from the unmoved cause, so it must receive its\neternal being as a body from the non-bodily cause”\n(trs. of this and other relevant texts in Sorabji 2005, vol. 2, sect.\n8(c)1). Ammonius’ harmonization of Aristotle with Plato on this\npoint would prove essential to both Arabic Aristotelians and,\neventually, to Aquinas’ ability to enlist Aristotle’s God\nfor Christianity. Verrycken (1990, 218) interprets Ammonius’\nconception of the relation of God and the world as based on the\nNeoplatonic ‘procession’ (God’s production of the\nworld) and ‘reversion’ (its direction toward God as final\ncause), with God conceived as the divine Intellect. Verrycken (1990,\n222) argues further that Ammonius and his school also conceived of\nAristotle’s God as consisting of two Neoplatonic hypostases, the\nGood and the Intellect, and that he/it could be viewed as either one,\ndepending on one’s point of view: in metaphysics, as we see in\nAsclepius’ commentary, Aristotle’s God is mostly\nunderstood as the Good, “the first origin and final cause of all\nreality”; in natural philosophy, as we see in Simplicius, God is\nprimarily the demiurgic Intellect, which is itself the final cause of\nthe world’s movement." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Aristotle’s God as Efficient Cause of the World" }, { "content": [ "\nIn his commentary on On Interpretation chapter 9, Ammonius\nadded two other determinist arguments to the famous ‘there will\nbe a sea-battle tomorrow’ argument, making his commentary into a\nsmall treatise on determinism. The first of these was the\n‘Reaper’ (131,20 ff.), an argument which Ammonius\nconsidered more ‘verbal’, which perhaps goes back to\nDiodorus Cronus and which greatly interested Zeno the Stoic: “if\nyou will [that is, you are going to] reap, it is not the case that\nperhaps (takha) you will reap and perhaps you will not reap,\nbut you will reap, whatever happens (pant&omacr;s); and if\nyou will not reap, in the same way it is not that perhaps you will\nreap and perhaps you will not reap, but, whatever happens, you will\nnot reap. But in fact, of necessity, either you will reap or you will\nnot reap.” In consequence, Ammonius says, “the\n‘perhaps’ is destroyed,” and with it the contingent.\nAgainst this, Ammonius argues that if the determinist intends\n‘you will reap’ to be contingent, he has already lost his\npoint, but if he intends it as necessary, he is taking for granted\nwhat he intends to prove; further, in that case, ‘will reap,\nwhatever happens’ will be true, but the determinist cannot say\n‘but in fact either you will reap or you will not reap’,\nsince if one of these is necessary, the other is impossible. Sorabji\n(1998, 4–5) argues that ‘perhaps’ is ambiguous,\nmarking either a hesitant statement about the future or a statement\nabout present possibilities, and that the determinist argument plays\non this ambiguity, something which he thinks Ammonius did not see.", "\nThe second determinist argument, said by Ammonius to be ‘more\nrelated to the nature of things’, is from divine knowledge\n(132,8 ff.): “the gods either know in a definite manner the\noutcome of contingent things or they have absolutely no notion of them\nor they have an indefinite knowledge of them, just as we do.”\nAmmonius shows that the gods must have definite knowledge of their\ncreations. Is the future definite, then, and not contingent, since the\ngods know future facts in a definite manner? Ammonius’ reply to\nthis question is based on the idea (from Iamblichus, originally) that\nthe type of knowledge depends on the type of knower, not on the type\nof thing known. Therefore (136,1–17), due to their own nature,\nthe gods, and only they, can have definite\n(h&omacr;rismen&emacr;) knowledge of future contingent facts,\nthough those facts are indefinite, in themselves, and not determined.\nIndeed, with the gods nothing is past or future (133,20), for they are\noutside of time.", "\nOnly after discussing these two additional arguments for the abolition\nof contingency does Ammonius consider the sea-battle argument from\nAristotle’s discussion (De Int.18b17–25,\n19a30–32): if every affirmation must be true or false and if\nthere is a sea-battle today, it was always true to say that there\nwould be a sea-battle on this day and, hence, it was not possible for\nthis not to happen or not to be going to happen, so that it is\nnecessary for it to happen. Ultimately, all things which are going to\nhappen happen necessarily and none by chance. There has been, since\nthe Stoics, controversy over Aristotle’s answers to this\nargument. What has been called the ‘standard\ninterpretation’ holds that Aristotle thought that, unlike such\nsentences about the past or present, sentences asserting future\nsingular contingent facts are neither true nor false, exempting them\nfrom the principle of bivalence and avoiding the alleged deterministic\nconsequence that contingency and chance are destroyed. There has\nlikewise been a substantial debate over whether Ammonius was an\nadherent of the ‘standard interpretation’ of\nAristotle’s answer (cf. Sorabji 1998, Kretzmann 1998, Mignucci\n1998, Seel 2000ab).", "\nAmmonius, like Boethius, whose answer is somewhat more complicated,\nattacks the problem by means of his interpretation of\nAristotle’s opening remark in the chapter (18a28 ff.) that,\nwhile the rule that, of every contradictory pair of sentences, one is\ntrue and one false holds among sentences about what is or has\nhappened, as well as sentences about universals taken universally and\nfor singulars in the present or past tense, for universals not said\nuniversally it is not necessary, as he has explained in the preceding;\n“but in the case of future singulars it is not the same.”\nAmmonius interprets “it is not the same” as indicating a\ndoctrine that sentences about future singular contingent events\n‘divide the true and false’ (i.e., obey the principle of\nbivalence) but do so in an indefinite, ‘not in a definite\nmanner’ (ouk aph&omacr;rismen&omacr;s): either there\nwill be a sea-battle tomorrow or there will not be one, and certainly\nthere will not both be one and not, but whichever of these two will\nturn out to be the case, the sentence correctly predicting that\noutcome is true (and the other false) only in an indefinite, not a\ndefinite way. Thus it is not “possible in a definite manner to\nsay which of them will be true and which will be false, since the\nthing has not already occurred but can both occur and not occur”\n(130,23 ff.).", "\nThe idea of being true ‘in a definite’ or ‘in an\nindefinite manner’ does not occur in De Int. The\ninterpretation of Aristotle’s response to the sea-battle\nargument by this distinction probably goes back to Alexander of\nAphrodisias (cf. Alexander, Quaestiones 1.4 with Sharples\n1992, esp. 32–6). The distinction itself is probably taken over\nfrom the discussion of one of two contrary properties belonging to a\nsubject ‘in a definite manner’ in Cat. 10,\n12b38–40, which may have been suggested to the commentators by\nAristotle’s remark at De Int. 19a33 that\n“sentences are true in the way things are.” What precisely\nis meant by the distinction between being true in a definite or in an\nindefinite manner is obscure, controversial and much debated in the\nliterature: is it the distinction between necessary or causally\ndeterministic truth and mere truth, or that between being already true\nand going to be, while not yet being, true (cf. Nicostratus’\ncharacterization of ‘the Peripatetics’ in Simplicius,\nin Cat. 406,13–407,15)?", "\nAt the end of his discussion (154,3 ff., interpreting 19a23 ff.),\nAmmonius brings together necessary and definite truth, but not clearly\nenough to resolve all questions about the latter. He uses\nAristotle’s idea that sentences can be necessarily true in two\nways, either absolutely, no matter whether they are said of\nperishable, existing or non-existent things, or for as long as the\npredicate holds of the subject. The whole of a disjunction of\ncontradictory assertions, such as ‘either there will be a\nsea-battle tomorrow or there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow’\nor ‘either Socrates is walking or Socrates is not\nwalking’, is necessarily true in the absolute sense. Ammonius\nsays that this is still the case when, due to the nature of the thing\nin question, one of the disjuncts is true in a definite manner, as in\n‘either fire is hot or fire is not hot’ (154,11). It\nappears, then, that Ammonius treats only the contradictory\ndisjunctions as necessarily true in the absolute sense, while their\ndisjoined parts may be necessarily true in the other sense, that is,\nonly as long as the predicate holds of the subject. In the case of\ncertain facts, such as fire being hot, this is always the case, and of\ntwo contradictory disjuncts the one which asserts this fact is always\ntrue in a definite manner. In the case of contingent facts, then, one\ndisjunct will only be true in a definite manner when the subject\nexists and the predicate is true of it. For Ammonius, when Aristotle\nrestricts the discussion to future contingent facts, this\nmakes it necessary that neither member of a contradiction said about\nthem be true in a definite manner, ‘whatever happens’,\nsince each, being contingent, must be susceptible of both truth and\nfalsity ‘however it chances’ or ‘for the most\npart’ or ‘for the lesser part’. Thus,\nAmmonius’ explanation of Aristotle’s reply to the\ndeterminist has an affinity with his answers to the\ndeterminist’s claims about the ‘Reaper’ (there, the\ndeterminist is said to have illegitimately assumed that ‘you\nwill reap’ is necessary, not contingent; here, to have ignored\nAristotle’s assumption that the disjuncts are contingent) and\nabout divine foreknowledge (there, the gods are said to know things\ndefinitely, because these things are not future for the gods, although\nthey are both future and indefinite for us; here, the future disjuncts\nare each contingent and, thus, not definitely true, it being open for\neach to be true or false in the event). Ammonius’ approach may\nnot be very satisfying to us, in that it does not answer the question\nof what kind of truth-value Aristotle or Ammonius assigned to future\ncontingent propositions, but it keeps to the project of De\nInt., exploring the application of and the exceptions to the rule\nthat every contradictory pair of sentences has one member true and one\nmember false (cf. Whitaker 1996). Boethius (in De Int. II\n106,30–107,16, 208,1–18) also uses the distinction between\nbeing true in a definite and in an indefinite manner, but there is\ndebate among scholars as to whether he understands this distinction\nand its role in Aristotle’s argument in just the same way as\nAmmonius (cf. Sorabji 1998, Kretzmann 1998, Mignucci 1998). " ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Aristotle and anti-determinism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAmmonius was chiefly influential as the founder of the school of\nAristotle-interpretation in Alexandria. Nearly all the principal\ncommentators who came after him were his pupils or his pupils’\npupils. He gave a model for the method of exegesis of Aristotle and\nPlato and his lecturing style made an impression on students. His\ncommentary on De Interpretatione was particularly important\nand served as a source for Stephanus and other commentators. In its\ntranslation by William of Moerbeke, this work was influential on\nAquinas and thus on medieval and later Aristotelian philosopy and\nsemantics (cf., e.g., Fortier 2012). Ammonius’ new set of\nintroductions to philosophy and the study of Aristotle, once adopted\nand adapted by his Alexandrian students—Olympiodorus, Elias,\nDavid, Pseudo-Elias, and Philoponus, were also transferred to other\nlanguages and cultures. Importantly, a number of his and his\nstudents’ works were studied and translated into Persian, Arabic\nand Syriac, where Ammonius’ influence was carried forward (cf.\nthe brief overview of the diffusion of Ammonius’ new curriculum\nand its introductions in Sorabji 2016c, 49–53, also with further\nliterature on the translations of works from Ammonius’ school).\nAs an example of this diffusion, take the larger commentary on the\nCategories by Sergius of Reshaina (d. 536), who studied with\nAmmonius at Alexandria and later became a physician in his home city\n(see Hugonnard-Roche 2004 and Watt 2010, both with further\nliterature)." ], "section_title": "4. Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (= CAG), H.\nDiels (ed.), Berlin, 1882–1909.", "CAG IV 3, Ammonius in Porphyrii Isagogen sive V\nVoces, A. Busse (ed.), Berlin, 1891.", "CAG IV 4, Ammonius in Aristotelis Categorias, A.\nBusse (ed.), Berlin, 1895. On Aristotle Categories, S. M.\nCohen and G. B. Matthews (trans.), London and Ithaca, 1992.", "CAG IV 5, Ammonius in Aristotelis De Interpretatione\nCommentarius, A. Busse (ed.), Berlin, 1897. Latin translations:\nCommentaire sur le Peri Hermeneias d’Aristote, traduction de\nGuillaume de Moerbeke, G. Verbeke (ed.), Louvain and Paris, 1961.\nAmmonius Hermeae, Commentaria in Peri hermeneias Aristotelis\nÜbersetzt von Bartholomaeus Sylvanus, Neudruck der Ausgabe\nVenedig 1549, mit einer Einleitung von Rainer Thiel, Gyburg Radke und\nCharles Lohr (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: versiones\nLatinae temporis resuscitatarum litterarum), Stuttgart-Bad\nCannstatt, 2005. English translations: Aristotle’s Theory of\nLanguage and its Tradition: Texts from 500–1750. Selection,\nTranslation and Commentary, H. Arens (trans.), Amsterdam\n1984; On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1–8,\nD. Blank (trans.), London and Ithaca 1996;\nAmmonius. On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 9: with Boethius.\nOn Aristotle’s On Interpretation 9, D. Blank (trans.)\n(Ammonius) and N. Kretzmann (trans.) (Boethius). London and Ithaca,\n1998; Blank’s translation (slightly revised by G. Seel and J.-P.\nSchneider) is also found in Seel 2000. Ammonius and the Seabattle:\ntexts, commentary and essays (Peripatoi, Bd. 18), Berlin and New\nYork, 2000.", "CAG IV 6, Ammonii in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum\nLibrum I Commentarium, M. Wallies (ed.), Berlin, 1899.", "CAG VI 2, Asclepii in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum\nLibros A-Z Commentaria, M. Hayduck (ed.), Berlin, 1888.", "L. Tarán, 1969. Asclepius of Tralles, Commentary to\nNicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic, Transactions of\nthe American Philosophical Society (n.s.), 59: 4.\nPhiladelphia.", "CAG XIII 1, Philoponi (olim Ammonii) in Aristotelis\nCategorias Commentarium, A. Busse (ed.), Berlin, 1898. [For\nfurther details on the commentaries of Philoponus, see the entry on\n Philoponus.]", "CAG XIII 2, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis\nAnalytica Priora Commentaria, M. Wallies (ed.), Berlin,\n1905.", "CAG XIII 3, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis\nAnalytica Posteriora Commentaria cum Anonymo in Librum II, M.\nWallies (ed.), Berlin, 1909.", "CAG XIV 1, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis\nMeteorologicorum Librum Primum Commentaria, M. Hayduck (ed.),\nBerlin, 1901.", "CAG XIV 2, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Libros De\nGeneratione et Corruptione Commentaria, H. Vitelli (ed.), Berlin,\n1897. On Aristotle On Coming-to-be and Perishing 1.1-5, C. J.\nF. Williams (trans.), London and Ithaca, 1999; On Aristotle On\nComing-to-be and Perishing 1.6-2.4, C. J. F. Williams (trans.),\nLondon and Ithaca, 1999.", "CAG XV, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De Anima\nLibros Commentaria, M. Hayduck (ed.), Berlin, 1897. On\nAristotle On the Soul 2.1–6, W. Charlton (trans.), London\nand Ithaca, 2005; On Aristotle On the soul 2.7–12, W.\nCharlton (trans.), London and Ithaca, 2005; On Aristotle On the\nSoul 3.1–8, W. Charlton (trans.), London and Ithaca, 2000;\nOn Aristotle On the Intellect (de Anima 3.4–8), W.\nCharlton (trans.), London and Ithaca, 1991.", "CAG XVI-XVII, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis\nPhysicorum Libros I-III et V-VIII Commentaria, H. Vitelli (ed.),\nBerlin, 1887–8. On Aristotle Physics 2, A. R. Lacey\n(trans.), London and Ithaca, 1993; On Aristotle Physics 3, M.\nJ. Edwards (trans.), London and Ithaca, 1994; On Aristotle Physics\n5–8 with Simplicius, On Aristotle on the Void, P. Lettinck\nand J. O. Urmson (trans.), London and Ithaca, 1994.", "Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus, M.E. Colonna (ed.), Naples\n1958.", "Damascius, The Philosophical History, text with\ntranslation and notes by P. Athanassiadi, Athens, 1999.\n[Athanassiadi’s Introduction is the best place to start.]", "Zacharias of Mytilene (Scholasticus), Ammonius, M.\nMinniti Colonna (ed.), Naples, 1973.", "Zacharias of Mytilene, Life of Severus, M.A. Kugener (ed.\nand trans.), Patrologia Orientalis II, 1904.", "Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus, trs. J. Dillon and D.\nRussell. Zacharias of Mytilene, Ammonius, trs. S. Gertz\n(Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, London, 2012).", "Adamson, P., 2006. “The Arabic Sea Battle: al-Farabi on the\nProblem of Future Contingents” Archiv für Geschichte\nder Philosophie 88, 163–188.", "–––, 2015. “Neoplatonism: The Last Ten\nYears”, The International Journal of the Platonic\nTradition 9, 205–220.", "Barnes, J., 1991. “Ammonius and Adverbs,” Oxford\nStudies in Ancient Philosophy (Supplementary Volume),\n145–63.", "Bertolacci, A., 2005. “Ammonius and al-Farabi: the Sources\nof Avicenna’s Concept of Metaphysics” Quaestio 5,\n287–305.", "Blank, D. L., 2010. “Ammonius Hermeiou and his\nSchool,” in Gerson 2010, 654–666.", "Blumenthal, H. J., 1986. “John Philoponus: Alexandrian\nPlatonist?” Hermes 114, 314–335.", "Bobzien, S., 2002. “Some elements of propositional logic in\nAmmonius”, in Linneweber-Lammeskitten, H. and G. Mohr, eds.,\nInterpretation und Argument, Würzburg,\n103–119.", "Brunschwig, J., 2008. “Le chapitre 1 du De\nInterpretatione: Aristote, Ammonius et nous”, Laval\nthéologique et philosophique 64, 35–87.", "Cameron, Alan, 1969. “The Last Days of the Academy at\nAthens,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological\nSociety (n.s.), 15: 7–29.", "Cardullo, R. Loredana, 2002. “Asclepio di Tralle: Pensatore\noriginale o mero redattore ΑΠΟ ΦΩ\nΝΗΣ?”, in Barbanti, M., G. R. Giardina, and P.\nManganaro, eds., ΕΝΩ ΣΙΣ\nΚΑΙ ΦΙΛΙΑ Unione e\nAmicizia Omaggio a Francesco Romano, Catania, 495–514.", "–––, 2009. “Una lettura neoplatonica di\nMetaphysica Alpha: gli scolii di Asclepio di Tralle\ntrascritti «dalla voce» di Ammonio”, in Cardullo, R.\nL., ed., Il libro Alpha della Metafisica di\nAristotele tra storiografia e teoria (Symbolon 35),\nCatania, 239–270.", "–––, 2012. Asclepio di Tralle Commentario al\nlibro Alpha Meizon (A) della Metafisica di\nAristotele, Acireale.", "Champion, M., 2014. Explaining the Cosmos. Creation and\nCultural Interaction in Late-Antique Gaza, Oxford. [An\nexploration of Aeneas, Zacharias, and Procopius, their religious and\ncultural background and the philosophical content of their\nworks.]", "Cribiore, R., 2017. “The Conflict between Rhetoric and\nPhilosophy and Zacharias’ Ammonius”, in\nL’École de Gaza: espace littéraire et\nidentité culturelle dans l’Antiquité tardive,\nAmato, E., A. Corcella, D. Lauritzen, eds. (Orientalia Lovanensia\nAnalecta 249), Louvain, 73–84.", "De Rijk, L-M., 2003. “Boethius on De Interpretatione (Ch.\n3): Is he a reliable guide?”, in Galonnier 2003,\n207–227.", "Dillon, J., “Philosophy,” in Cambridge Ancient\nHistory, XI: 922–965.", "Fortier, S., 2012. “Ammonius on Universals and Abstraction:\nAn Interpretation and Translation of Ammonius’ In Porphyrii\nEisagogen 39, 8–42”, Laval Théologique et\nphilosophique 68, 21–33.", "Frede, D., 1985. “The Sea Battle reconsidered: A Defence of\nthe Traditional Interpretation,” Oxford Studies in Ancient\nPhilosophy, 3: 31–87.", "–––, 1998. “Logik, Sprache und die\nOffenheit der Zukunft in der Antike. Bemerkungen zu zwei neuen\nForschungsbeiträgen,” Zeitschrift für\nPhilosophische Forschung, 52: 84–104.", "Galonnier, A. (ed.), 2003. Boèce ou la chaîne des\nsavoirs, Actes du colloque international de la Fondation\nSinger-Polignac Paris, 8-12 juin 1999, Louvain and Paris.", "Gaskin, R., 1995. The Sea-Battle and the Master Argument:\nAristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future,\nBerlin.", "Gerson, L.P., 2010. The Cambridge History of Philosophy in\nLate Antiquity, Cambridge.", "Glucker, J., 1978. Antiochus and the Late Academy (\nHypomnemata 56), Göttingen.", "Golitsis, P., 2008. Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean\nPhilopon à la Physique d’Aristote. Tradition et\nInnovation, (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina.\nQuellen und Studien Band 3), Berlin.", "Griffin, M., 2016. “Ammonius and His School” in A.\nFalcon, ed., Brill’s Companion to the Reception of\nAristotle (Leiden), 394–414. [A good, summary discussion of\nAmmonius and his pupils.]", "Haas, C., 1996. Alexandria in Late Antiquity. Topography and\nSocial Conflict, Baltimore.", "Hadot, I., 1978. Le problème du néoplatonisme\nalexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris.", "–––, 1990a. “The Life and Work of\nSimplicius in Greek and Arabic Sources,” in Sorabji 1990a,\n275–304.", "–––, 1990b. “Commentaire” in\nHoffmann and Hadot, eds., 1990, 19–182.", "–––, 2015. Athenian and Alexandrian\nNeoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato, trs.\nM. Chase, Leiden.", "Hase, H., 1839. “Joannis Alexandrini, cognomine Philoponi,\nde vsu astrolabii ejusque constructione libellus”,\nRheinisches Museum 6, 127–171 bis.", "Heiberg, J. L., 1907. Claudii Ptolemaei Opera Quae Exstant\nOmnia, Vol. II Opera Astronomica Minora, Lipsiae.", "Hoffmann, P. and I. Hadot, eds., 1990. Simplicius. Commentaire\nsur les Catégories. I: Introduction, première partie (p.\n1–9,3 Kalbfleisch), Leiden.", "Hugonnard-Roche, H., 2004. La logique d’Aristote du grec\nau syriaque, Paris. [Collected articles 1987–2004.]", "Jackson, R., K. Lycos, H. Tarrant, trs. and eds., Olympiodorus\nCommentary on Plato’s Gorgias, Leiden.", "Karamanolis, G.E., 2006. Aristotle and Plato in Agreement?\nPlatonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford. [This\nbook does not treat Ammonius, ending as it does with Porphyry, but it\ndoes introduce the issues which arose concerning whether Aristotle and\nPlato were in accord, a fundamental principle of interpretation for\nAmmonius.]", "Kretzmann, N., 1998. “Boethius and the truth about\ntomorrow’s sea battle,” in Ammonius On Aristotle On\nInterpretation 9 with Boethius On Aristotle On Interpretation 9,\nD. Blank and N. Kretzmann (trans.), London and Ithaca,\n24–52.", "Lee, Tae-Soo, 1984. Die griechische Tradition der\naristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike: eine Untersuchung\nüber die Kommentare zu den analytica priora von Alexander von\nAphrodisias, Ammonius und Philoponus, Göttingen.", "Luna, C., 2001. Trois études sur la tradition des\ncommentaires anciens à la Métaphysique\nd’Aristote (Philosophia Antiqua LXXXVIII),\nLeiden.", "Merlan, P., 1968. “Ammonius Hermiae, Zacharias Scholasticus\nand Boethius,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 9:\n143–203.", "Mignucci, M., 1998. “Ammonius’ sea battle,” in\nAmmonius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 9 and Boethius:\nOn Aristotle On Interpretation 9, D. Blank and N. Kretzmann\n(trans.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 53–86; also found as\n“Ammonius and the Problem of Future Contingent Truth,” in\nSeel 2000a, 247–284.", "Militello, C., 2014. “Aristotle’s Topics in\nthe Greek Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories,”\nPeitho/Examina Antiqua 1(5), 91–117.", "Obortello, L., 2003. “Ammonius Son of Hermias, Zacharias\nScholasticus and Boethius: Eternity of God and/or Time?” in\nGalonnier 2003, 465–479.", "O’Meara, D., 2006. “Patterns of Perfection in\nDamascius’ ‘Life of Isidore’”,\nPhronesis 51, 74–90.", "Omelyantchik, V., 2003. “Boèce et Ammonius sur la\nquestion d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise (PERI HERMENEIAS, 16 A\n1–2),” in Galonnier 2003, 241–256.", "Pelletier, Y., 1983. Les Attributions (Catégories). Le\ntexte aristotélicien et les prolégomènes\nd’Ammonios d’Hermias, Montréal et Paris.", "Pingree, D., 1973. “The Greek Influence on Early Islamic\nMathematical Astronomy”, Journal of the American Oriental\nSociety 93, 32–43.", "Praechter, K., 1910. “Richtungen und Schulen im\nNeuplatonismus,” in Graeca Halensis, ed., Genethliakon C.\nRobert Zum 8. März 1910. Berlin, 103–156.", "–––, 1912. “Christlich- neuplatonische\nBeziehungen”, Byzantinische Zeitung 21, 1–27.", "Schemmel, F., 1909. “Die Hochschule von Alexandria im IV.\nund V. Jahrhundert P. Ch. N.”, Neue Jahrbücher für\nPädagogik 12, 439–457.", "Seel, G., 2000a. Ammonius and the Seabattle: texts, commentary\nand essays (Peripatoi, Bd. 18), Berlin and New\nYork.", "–––, 2000b. “‘In a Definite Way\nTrue’ Truth-Values and their Modalization in Ammonius”, in\nSeel 2000a, 234–246.", "Sharples, R., 1992. Alexander of Aphrodisias Quaestiones\n1.1–2.1, London and Ithaca, NY.", "Sheppard, A., 1982. “Proclus’ attitude to\ntheurgy”, Classical Quarterly 32, 232–224.", "–––, 1987. “Proclus’ philosophical\nmethod of exegesis, the use of Aristotle and the Stoics in the\nCommentary on the Cratylus,” in J. Pépin and P.\nSaffrey (eds.), Proclus. Lecteur et interprète des\nAnciens, Paris, 137–151.", "Sorabji, R., 1988. Matter, Space and Motion, London and\nIthaca, NY [See esp. Ch. 15].", "––– (ed.), 1990a. Aristotle Transformed. The\nAncient Commentators and their Influence. London and Ithaca.\nSecond Edition, London 2016.", "–––, 1990b. “THe Ancient Commentators on\nAristotle” in Sorabji 1990a, 1–30.", "–––, 1990c. “Infinite Power Impressed, the\ntransformation of Aristotle’s physics and theology,” in\nSorabji 1990a, 181–198; a longer version is in Sorabji’s\nMatter, Space and Motion, London and Ithaca 1988.", "–––, 1998. “The Three deterministic\narguments opposed by Ammonius,” in Ammonius On Aristotle On\nInterpretation 9 with Boethius On Aristotle On Interpretation 9,\ntrs. D. Blank and N. Kretzmann (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)\nLondon and Ithaca, 3–15.", "–––, 2003. “Sordid deals and divine names\nin Ammonius’ Alexandria,” in Andrew Smith, ed.,\nNeoplatonism and Society. Cardiff.", "–––, 2005. “Introduction,” to\nThe Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 A.D.: A\nSourcebook (Volume 1: Psychology (with Ethics and Religion),\nVolume 2: Physics, Volume 3: Logic and Metaphysics), Ithaca: Cornell\nUniversity Press, 5 ff. [These sourcebooks are now the best place to\nobtain an overview of the philosophy of the Aristotelian\ncommentators.]", "–––, 2012. “Waiting for Philoponus”,\nin Aeneas of Gaza, etc., vii–xxx.", "–––, 2014. “The Alexandrian classrooms\nexcavated and sixth-century philosophy teaching”, in Remes, P.\nand S. Slaveva-Griffin, eds., The Routledge Handbook of\nNeoplatonism, London, 30–39.", "–––, 2016a. “Introduction to the Second\nEdition” of Sorabji 1990a, xii–xlvii. [Sorabji’s\nuseful review of developments, including many of his own thoughts\nconcerning the articles published in the first edition.]", "–––, 2016b. Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New\nFindings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators,\nLondon.", "–––, 2016c. “Introduction: Seven Hundred\nYears of Commentary and the Sixth Century Diffusion to Other\nCultures”, in Sorabji 2016b, 1–80. [An illuminating review of\nrecent scholarly controversies and developments.]", "–––, 2016d. “Dating of Philoponus’\nCommentaries on Aristotle and of his Divergence from his Teacher\nAmmonius”, in Sorabji 2016b, 367–392.", "Tarán, L., 1978. Anonymous Commentary on\nAristotle’s De interpretatione. Meisenheim-am-Glan.", "Tempelis, E., 1997. “Iamblichus and Ammonius, Son of\nHermias, On Divine Omniscience”, Syllecta Classica 8,\n207–217.", "–––, 1998. The School of Ammonius, Son of\nHermias, On Knowledge of the Divine. Athens.", "Tuominen, M., 2009. The Ancient Commentators on Plato and\nAristotle, Berkeley. [A good introduction to the ancient\ncommentaries on Plato and Aristotle; focuses on Philoponus and\nSimplicius, rather than Ammonius, as representatives of the\ncommentators of Late Antiquity.]", "Van den Berg, R. M., 2009. Proclus’ Commentary on\nthe Cratylus in Context (Ancient Theories of\nLanguage and Naming), Philosophia Antiqua 112, Leiden.\n[Discusses on pages 201–206 Ammonius’ ideas about\nlanguage, particularly his stance compared to Proclus’\ninterpretation of Plato’s Cratylus.]", "Verrycken, K., 1990a. “The Metaphysics of Ammonius Son of\nHermeias,” in Sorabji 1990a, 199–231.", "–––, 1990b. “The Development of\nPhiloponus’ Thought and its chronology”, in Sorabji 1990a,\n232–274.", "–––, 1994. De vroegere Philoponus. Een\nstudie van het Alexandrinjnse Neoplatonisme (Verhandelingen\nvan de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone\nKunsten van België 56, Nr. 153).", "–––, 2001/2. “La métaphysique\nd’Ammonius chez Zacharie de Mytilène”, Revue\ndes Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 85,\n241–267.", "–––, 2010. “John Philoponus,” in\nGerson 2010, II 733–755.", "Wallis, R.T., 1972. Neoplatonism, London.", "Watt, J. W., 2010. “Commentary and Translation in Syriac\nAristotelian Scholarship: Sergius to Baghdad”, Journal for\nLate Antique Religion and Culture 4, 28–42.", "Watts, E. J., 2005. “Winning the Intracommunal Dialogues:\nZacharias Scholasticus’ Life of Severus”,\nJournal of Early Christian Studies 13, 437–464.", "–––, 2006. City and School in Late Antique\nAthens and Alexandria, Berkeley.", "Westerink, L.G., 1962. Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic\nPhilosophy, Amsterdam.", "–––, 1990. “The Alexandrian Commentators\nand the Introductions to their Commentaries,” in Sorabji 1990a,\n325–349.", "Whitaker, C. W. A., 1996. Aristotle’s De\nInterpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic, Oxford.", "Wildberg, C. 1990. “Three Neoplatonic Introductions to\nPhilosophy: Ammonius, David, Elias,” Hermathena, 149:\n33–51.", "–––, 2005. “Philosophy in the Age of\nJustinian”, in Maas, M., ed., The Cambridge Companion to the\nAge of Justinian, Cambridge, 316–340." ]	[ { "href": "../alexander-aphrodisias/", "text": "Alexander of Aphrodisias" }, { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../aristotle-commentators/", "text": "Aristotle, commentators on" }, { "href": "../boethius/", "text": "Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus" }, { "href": "../dialectical-school/", "text": "Dialectical School" }, { "href": "../diodorus-cronus/", "text": "Diodorus Cronus" }, { "href": "../freedom-ancient/", "text": "freedom: ancient theories of" }, { "href": "../iamblichus/", "text": "Iamblichus" }, { "href": "../neoplatonism/", "text": "Neoplatonism" }, { "href": "../olympiodorus/", "text": "Olympiodorus" }, { "href": "../philoponus/", "text": "Philoponus" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../porphyry/", "text": "Porphyry" }, { "href": "../proclus/", "text": "Proclus" }, { "href": "../simplicius/", "text": "Simplicius" }, { "href": "../syrianus/", "text": "Syrianus" } ]
plotinus	Plotinus	First published Mon Jun 30, 2003; substantive revision Thu Jun 28, 2018	[ "\n\nPlotinus (204/5 – 270 C.E.), is generally regarded as the\nfounder of Neoplatonism. He is one of the most influential\nphilosophers in antiquity after Plato and Aristotle. The term\n‘Neoplatonism’ is an invention of early 19th\ncentury European scholarship and indicates the penchant of historians\nfor dividing ‘periods’ in history. In this case, the term\nwas intended to indicate that Plotinus initiated a new phase in the\ndevelopment of the Platonic tradition. What this\n‘newness’ amounted to, if anything, is controversial,\nlargely because one’s assessment of it depends upon one’s\nassessment of what Platonism is. In fact, Plotinus (like all his\nsuccessors) regarded himself simply as a Platonist, that is, as an\nexpositor and defender of the philosophical position whose greatest\nexponent was Plato himself. Originality was thus not held as a\npremium by Plotinus. Nevertheless, Plotinus realized that Plato\nneeded to be interpreted. In addition, between Plato and himself,\nPlotinus found roughly 600 years of philosophical writing, much of it\nreflecting engagement with Plato and the tradition of philosophy he\ninitiated. Consequently, there were at least two avenues for\noriginality open to Plotinus, even if it was not his intention to say\nfundamentally new things. The first was in trying to say what Plato\nmeant on the basis of what he wrote or said or what others reported\nhim to have said. This was the task of exploring the philosophical\nposition that we happen to call ‘Platonism’. The second\nwas in defending Plato against those who, Plotinus thought, had\nmisunderstood him and therefore unfairly criticized him. Plotinus\nfound himself, especially as a teacher, taking up these two avenues.\nHis originality must be sought for by following his path." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Writings", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Three Fundamental Principles of Plotinus’ Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Human Psychology and Ethics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Beauty", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Principal Opponents", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "A. Primary Literature", "B. Secondary Literature", "C. Reference" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n Owing to the unusually fulsome biography by Plotinus’ disciple\nPorphyry, we know more about Plotinus’ life than we do about most\nancient philosophers’. The main facts are these.", "\n Plotinus was born in Lycopolis, Egypt in 204 or 205 C.E. When he was\n28, a growing interest in philosophy led him to the feet of one\nAmmonius Saccas in Alexandria. After ten or eleven years with this\nobscure though evidently dominating figure, Plotinus was moved to\nstudy Persian and Indian philosophy. In order to do so, he attached\nhimself to the military expedition of Emperor Gordian III to Persia in\n243. The expedition was aborted when Gordian was assassinated by his\ntroops. Plotinus thereupon seems to have abandoned his plans, making\nhis way to Rome in 245. There he remained until his death in 270 or\n271.", "\n Porphyry informs us that during the first ten years of his time in\nRome, Plotinus lectured exclusively on the philosophy of Ammonius.\nDuring this time he also wrote nothing. Porphyry tells us that when\nhe himself arrived in Rome in 263, the first 21 of Plotinus’ treatises\nhad already been written. The remainder of the 54 treatises\nconstituting his Enneads were written in the last seven or\neight years of his life.", "\n Porphyry’s biography reveals a man at once otherworldly and deeply\npractical. The former is hardly surprising in a philosopher but the\nlatter deserves to be noted and is impressively indicated by the fact\nthat a number of Plotinus’ acquaintances appointed him as guardian to\ntheir children when they died.", "\n Plotinus’ writings were edited by Porphyry (there was perhaps another\nedition by Plotinus’ physician, Eustochius, though all traces of it\nare lost). It is to Porphyry that we owe the somewhat artificial\ndivision of the writings into six groups of nine (hence the name\nEnneads from the Greek word for ‘nine’). In fact,\nthere are somewhat fewer than 54 (Porphyry artificially divided some\nof them into separately numbered ‘treatises’), and the\nactual number of these is of no significance. The arrangement of the\ntreatises is also owing to Porphyry and does evince an ordering\nprinciple. Ennead I contains, roughly, ethical discussions;\nEnneads II–III contain discussions of natural philosophy and\ncosmology (though III 4, 5, 7, 8 do not fit into this rubric so\neasily); Ennead IV is devoted to matters of psychology;\nEnnead V, to epistemological matters, especially the intellect;\nand Ennead VI, to numbers, being in general, and the One above\nintellect, the first principle of all. It is to be emphasized that\nthe ordering is Porphyry’s. The actual chronological ordering, which\nPorphyry also provides for us, does not correspond at all to the\nordering in the edition. For example, Ennead I 1 is the\n53rd treatise chronologically, one of the last things\nPlotinus wrote.", "\n These works vary in size from a couple of pages to over a hundred.\nThey seem to be occasional writings in the sense that they constitute\nwritten responses by Plotinus to questions and problems raised in his\nregular seminars. Sometimes these questions and problems guide the\nentire discussion, so that it is sometimes difficult to tell when\nPlotinus is writing in his own voice or expressing the views of\nsomeone else. Typically, Plotinus would at his seminars have read out\npassages from Platonic or Aristotelian commentators, it being assumed\nthat the members of the seminar were already familiar with the primary\ntexts. Then a discussion of the text along with the problems it\nraised occurred.", "\n One must not suppose that the study of Aristotle at these seminars\nbelonged to a separate ‘course’ on the great successor of\nPlato. After Plotinus, in fact Aristotle was studied on his own as\npreparation for studying Plato. But with Plotinus, Aristotle, it\nseems, was assumed to be himself one of the most effective expositors\nof Plato. Studying both Aristotle’s own philosophy as explained by\ncommentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd –\nearly 3rd c. C.E.) and his explicit objections to Plato was\na powerful aid in understanding the master’s philosophy. In part,\nthis was owing to the fact that Aristotle was assumed to know Plato’s\nphilosophy at first hand and to have recorded it, including Plato’s\n‘unwritten teachings’. In addition, later Greek\nhistorians of philosophy tell us that Plotinus’ teacher, Ammonius\nSaccas, was among those Platonists who assumed that in some sense\nAristotle’s philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. This harmony\ndid not preclude disagreements between Aristotle and Plato. Nor did\nit serve to prevent misunderstandings of Platonism on Aristotle’s\npart. Nevertheless, Plotinus’ wholesale adoption of many Aristotelian\narguments and distinctions will seem less puzzling when we realize\nthat he took these both as compatible with Platonism and as useful for\narticulating the Platonic position, especially in areas in which Plato\nwas himself not explicit." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Writings", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n The three basic principles of Plotinus’ metaphysics are called by him\n‘the One’ (or, equivalently, ‘the Good’),\nIntellect, and Soul (see V 1; V 9.). These principles are both\nultimate ontological realities and explanatory principles. Plotinus\nbelieved that they were recognized by Plato as such, as well as by the\nentire subsequent Platonic tradition.", "\n The One is the absolutely simple first principle of all. It is both\n‘self-caused’ and the cause of being for everything else\nin the universe. There are, according to Plotinus, various ways of\nshowing the necessity of positing such a principle. These are all\nrooted in the Pre-Socratic philosophical/scientific tradition. A\ncentral axiom of that tradition was the connecting of explanation with\nreductionism or the derivation of the complex from the simple. That\nis, ultimate explanations of phenomena and of contingent entities can\nonly rest in what itself requires no explanation. If what is actually\nsought is the explanation for something that is in one way or another\ncomplex, what grounds the explanation will be simple relative to the\nobserved complexity. Thus, what grounds an explanation must be\ndifferent from the sorts of things explained by it. According to this\nline of reasoning, explanantia that are themselves complex,\nperhaps in some way different from the sort of complexity of the\nexplananda, will be in need of other types of explanation. In\naddition, a plethora of explanatory principles will themselves be in\nneed of explanation. Taken to its logical conclusion, the explanatory\npath must finally lead to that which is unique and absolutely\nuncomplex.", "\n The One is such a principle. Plotinus found it in Plato’s\nRepublic where it is named ‘the Idea of the Good’\nand in his Parmenides where it is the subject of a series of\ndeductions (137c ff.). The One or the Good, owing to its simplicity,\nis indescribable directly. We can only grasp it indirectly by\ndeducing what it is not (see V 3. 14; VI 8; VI 9. 3). Even the names\n‘One’ and ‘Good’ are fautes de mieux.\nTherefore, it is wrong to see the One as a principle of oneness or\ngoodness, in the sense in which these are intelligible attributes.\nThe name ‘One’ is least inappropriate because it best\nsuggests absolute simplicity.", "\n If the One is absolutely simple, how can it be the cause of the being\nof anything much less the cause of everything? The One is such a\ncause in the sense that it is virtually everything else (see III 8. 1;\nV 1. 7, 9; V 3. 15, 33; VI 9. 5, 36). This means that it stands to\neverything else as, for example, white light stands to the colors of\nthe rainbow, or the way in which a properly functioning calculator may\nbe said to contain all the answers to the questions that can be\nlegitimately put to it. Similarly, an omniscient simple deity may be\nsaid to know virtually all that is knowable. In general, if A is\nvirtually B, then A is both simpler in its existence than B and able\nto produce B. ", "\n The causality of the One was frequently explained in antiquity as an\nanswer to the question, ‘How do we derive a many from the\nOne?’ Although the answer provided by Plotinus and by other\nNeoplatonists is sometimes expressed in the language of\n‘emanation’, it is very easy to mistake this for what it\nis not. It is not intended to indicate either a temporal process or\nthe unpacking or separating of a potentially complex unity. Rather,\nthe derivation was understood in terms of atemporal ontological\ndependence.", "\n The first derivation from the One is Intellect. Intellect is the\nlocus of the full array of Platonic Forms, those eternal and immutable\nentities that account for or explain the possibility of intelligible\npredication. Plotinus assumes that without such Forms, there would be\nno non-arbitrary justification for saying that anything had one\nproperty rather than another. Whatever properties things have, they\nhave owing to there being Forms whose instances these properties are.\nBut that still leaves us with the very good question of why an eternal\nand immutable Intellect is necessarily postulated along with these\nForms.", "\n The historical answer to this question is in part that Plotinus\nassumed that he was following Plato who, in Timaeus (30c;\ncf. Philebus 22c), claimed that the Form of Intelligible Animal\nwas eternally contemplated by an intellect called ‘the\nDemiurge’. This contemplation Plotinus interpreted as cognitive\nidentity, since if the Demiurge were contemplating something outside\nof itself, what would be inside of itself would be only an image or\nrepresentation of eternal reality (see V 5) – and so, it would not\nactually know what it contemplates, as that is in itself.\n‘Cognitive identity’ then means that when Intellect is\nthinking, it is thinking itself. Further, Plotinus believed that\nAristotle, in book 12 of his Metaphysics and in book 3 of his\nDe Anima supported both the eternality of Intellect (in\nAristotle represented as the Unmoved Mover) and the idea that\ncognitive identity characterized its operation.", "\n Philosophically, Plotinus argued that postulating Forms without a\nsuperordinate principle, the One, which is virtually what all the\nForms are, would leave the Forms in eternal disunity. If this were\nthe case, then there could be no necessary truth, for all necessary\ntruths, e.g., 3 + 5 = 8, express a virtual identity, as indicated here\nby the ‘=’ sign. Consider the analogy of\nthree-dimensionality and solidity. Why are these necessarily\nconnected in a body such that there could not be a body that had one\nwithout the other? The answer is that body is virtually\nthree-dimensionality and virtually solidity. Both\nthree-dimensionality and solidity express in different ways what a\nbody is.", "\n The role of Intellect is to account for the real distinctness of the\nplethora of Forms, virtually united in the One. Thus, in the above\nmathematical example, the fact that numbers are virtually united does\nnot gainsay the fact that each has an identity. The way that identity\nis maintained is by each and every Form being thought by an eternal\nIntellect. And in this thinking, Intellect ‘attains’ the\nOne in the only way it possibly can. It attains all that can be\nthought; hence, all that can be thought ‘about’ the\nOne.", "\n Intellect is the principle of essence or whatness or intelligibility\nas the One is the principle of being. Intellect is an eternal\ninstrument of the One’s causality (see V 4. 1, 1–4; VI 7. 42, 21–23).\nThe dependence of anything ‘below’ Intellect is owing to\nthe One’s ultimate causality along with Intellect, which explains, via\nthe Forms, why that being is the kind of thing it is. Intellect needs\nthe One as cause of its being in order for Intellect to be a\nparadigmatic cause and the One needs Intellect in order for there to\nbe anything with an intelligible structure. Intellect could not\nsuffice as a first principle of all because the complexity of thinking\n(thinker and object of thought and multiplicity of objects of thought)\nrequires as an explanation something that is absolutely simple. In\naddition, the One may even be said to need Intellect to produce\nIntellect. This is so because Plotinus distinguishes two logical\n‘phases’ of Intellect’s production from the One (see V\n1. 7). The first phase indicates the fundamental activity of\nintellection or thinking; the second, the actualization of thinking\nwhich constitutes the being of the Forms. This thinking is the way\nIntellect ‘returns’ to the One.", "\n The third fundamental principle is Soul. Soul is not the\nprinciple of life, for the activity of Intellect is the highest\nactivity of life. Plotinus associates life with desire. But in the\nhighest life, the life of Intellect, where we find the highest form of\ndesire, that desire is eternally satisfied by contemplation of the One\nthrough the entire array of Forms that are internal to it.\nSoul is the principle of desire for objects that are external\nto the agent of desire. Everything with a soul, from human beings to\nthe most insignificant plant, acts to satisfy desire. This desire\nrequires it to seek things that are external to it, such as food.\nEven a desire for sleep, for example, is a desire for a state other\nthan the state which the living thing currently is in. Cognitive\ndesires, for example, the desire to know, are desires for that which\nis currently not present to the agent. A desire to procreate is, as\nPlato pointed out, a desire for immortality. Soul explains, as\nunchangeable Intellect could not, the deficiency that is implicit in\nthe fact of desiring.", "\n Soul is related to Intellect analogously to the way Intellect is\nrelated to the One. As the One is virtually what Intellect is, so\nIntellect is paradigmatically what Soul is. The activity of\nIntellect, or its cognitive identity with all Forms, is the paradigm\nfor all embodied cognitive states of any soul as well as any of its\naffective states. In the first case, a mode of cognition, such as\nbelief, images Intellect’s eternal state by being a\nrepresentational state. It represents the cognitive identity of\nIntellect with Forms because the embodied believer is cognitively\nidentical with a concept which itself represents or images Forms. In\nthe second case, an affective state such as feeling tired represents\nor images Intellect (in a derived way) owing to the cognitive\ncomponent of that state which consists in the recognition of its own\npresence. Here, x’s being-in-the-state is the\nintentional object of x’s cognition. Where the affective\nstate is that of a non-cognitive agent, the imitation is even more\nremote, though present nevertheless. It is, says Plotinus, like the\nstate of being asleep in comparison with the state of being awake (see\nIII 8. 4). In other words, it is a state that produces desire that is\nin potency a state that recognizes the presence of the desire, a state\nwhich represents the state of Intellect. In reply to the possible\nobjection that a potency is not an image of actuality, Plotinus will\nwant to insist that potencies are functionally related to actualities,\nnot the other way around, and that therefore the affective states of\nnon-cognitive agents can only be understood as derived versions of the\naffective and cognitive states of souls closer to the ideal of both,\nnamely, the state of Intellect.", "\n There is another way in which Soul is related to Intellect as\nIntellect is related to the One. Plotinus distinguishes between\nsomething’s internal and external activity (see V 4. 2, 27–33). The\n(indescribable) internal activity of the One is its own\nhyper-intellectual existence. Its external activity is just\nIntellect. Similarly, Intellect’s internal activity is its\ncontemplation of the Forms, and its external activity is found in\nevery possible representation of the activity of being eternally\nidentical with all that is intelligible (i.e., the Forms). It is also\nfound in the activity of soul, which as a principle of\n‘external’ desire images the paradigmatic desire of\nIntellect. Anything that is understandable is an external activity of\nIntellect; and any form of cognition of that is also an external\nactivity of it. The internal activity of Soul includes the plethora\nof psychical activities of all embodied living things. The external\nactivity of Soul is nature, which is just the intelligible structure\nof all that is other than soul in the sensible world, including both\nthe bodies of things with soul and things without soul (see III 8. 2).\nThe end of this process of diminishing activities is matter which is\nentirely bereft of form and so of intelligibility, but whose existence\nis ultimately owing to the One, via the instrumentality of Intellect\nand Soul. ", "\n According to Plotinus, matter is to be identified with evil and\nprivation of all form or intelligibility (see II 4). Plotinus holds\nthis in conscious opposition to Aristotle, who distinguished matter\nfrom privation (see II 4. 16, 3–8). Matter is what accounts for the\ndiminished reality of the sensible world, for all natural things are\ncomposed of forms in matter. The fact that matter is in principle\ndeprived of all intelligibility and is still ultimately dependent on\nthe One is an important clue as to how the causality of the latter\noperates. ", "\n If matter or evil is ultimately caused by the One, then is not the\nOne, as the Good, the cause of evil? In one sense, the answer is\ndefinitely yes. As Plotinus reasons, if anything besides the One is\ngoing to exist, then there must be a conclusion of the process of\nproduction from the One. The beginning of evil is the act of\nseparation from the One by Intellect, an act which the One itself\nultimately causes. The end of the process of production from the One\ndefines a limit, like the end of a river going out from its sources.\nBeyond the limit is matter or evil.", "\n We may still ask why the limitless is held to be evil. According to\nPlotinus, matter is the condition for the possibility of there being\nimages of Forms in the sensible world. From this perspective, matter\nis identified with the receptacle or space in Plato’s Timaeus\nand the phenomenal properties in the receptacle prior to the\nimposition of order by the Demiurge. The very possibility of a\nsensible world, which is impressively confirmed by the fact that there\nis one, guarantees that the production from the One, which must\ninclude all that is possible (else the One would be self-limiting),\nalso include the sensible world (see I 8. 7). But the sensible world\nconsists of images of the intelligible world and these images could\nnot exist without matter.", "\n Matter is only evil in other than a purely metaphysical sense when it\nbecomes an impediment to return to the One. It is evil when\nconsidered as a goal or end that is a polar opposite to the Good. To\ndeny the necessity of evil is to deny the necessity of the Good (I 8.\n15). Matter is only evil for entities that can consider it as a goal\nof desire. These are, finally, only entities that can be\nself-conscious of their goals. Specifically, human beings, by opting\nfor attachments to the bodily, orient themselves in the direction of\nevil. This is not because body itself is evil. The evil in bodies is\nthe element in them that is not dominated by form. One may be\ndesirous of that form, but in that case what one truly desires is that\nform’s ultimate intelligible source in Intellect. More typically,\nattachment to the body represents a desire not for form but a corrupt\ndesire for the non-intelligible or limitless. " ], "section_title": "2. The Three Fundamental Principles of Plotinus’ Metaphysics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n The drama of human life is viewed by Plotinus against the axis of\nGood and evil outlined above. The human person is essentially a soul\nemploying a body as an instrument of its temporary embodied life (see\nI 1). Thus, Plotinus distinguishes between the person and the\ncomposite of soul and body. That person is identical with a cognitive\nagent or subject of cognitive states (see I 1. 7). An embodied person\nis, therefore, a conflicted entity, capable both of thought and of\nbeing the subject of the composite’s non-cognitive states, such as\nappetites and emotions.", "\n This conflicted state or duality of personhood is explained by the\nnature of cognition, including rational desire. Rational agents are\ncapable of being in embodied states, including states of desire, and\nof being cognitively aware that they are in these states. So, a\nperson can be hungry or tired and be cognitively aware that he is in\nthis state, where cognitive awareness includes being able to\nconceptualize that state. But Plotinus holds that the state of\ncognitive awareness more closely identifies the person than does the\nnon-cognitive state. He does so on the grounds that all embodied or\nenmattered intelligible reality is an image of its eternal paradigm in\nIntellect. In fact, the highest part of the person, one’s own\nintellect, the faculty in virtue of which persons can engage in\nnon-discursive thinking, is eternally ‘undescended’. It\nis eternally doing what Intellect is doing. And the reason for\nholding this is, based on Plotinus’ interpretation of Plato’s\nRecollection Argument in Phaedo (72e-78b), that our ability to\nengage successfully in embodied cognition depends on our having access\nto Forms. But the only access to Forms is eternal access by cognitive\nidentification with them. Otherwise, we would have only images or\nrepresentations of the Forms. So, we must now be cognitively\nidentical with them if we are going also to use these Forms as a way\nof classifying and judging things in the sensible world.", "\n A person in a body can choose to take on the role of a non-cognitive\nagent by acting solely on appetite or emotion. In doing so, that\nperson manifests a corrupted desire, a desire for what is evil, the\nmaterial aspect of the bodily. Alternatively, a person can distance\nhimself from these desires and identify himself with his rational\nself. The very fact that this is possible supplies Plotinus with\nanother argument for the supersensible identity of the person.", "\n Owing to the conflicted states of embodied persons, they are subject\nto self-contempt and yet, paradoxically, ‘want to belong to\nthemselves’. Persons have contempt for themselves because one\nhas contempt for what is inferior to oneself. Insofar as persons\ndesire things other than what Intellect desires, they desire things\nthat are external to themselves. But the subject of such desires is\ninferior to what is desired, even if this be a state of fulfilled\ndesire. In other words, if someone wants to be in state B when he is\nin state A, he must regard being in state A as worse than being in\nstate B. But all states of embodied desire are like this. Hence, the\nself-contempt.", "\n Persons want to belong to themselves insofar as they identify\nthemselves as subjects of their idiosyncratic desires. They do this\nbecause they have forgotten or are unaware of their true identity as\ndisembodied intellects. If persons recognize their true identity,\nthey would not be oriented to the objects of their embodied desire but\nto the objects of intellect. They would be able to look upon the\nsubject of those embodied desires as alien to their true selves.", "\n Plotinus views ethics according to the criterion of what\ncontributes to our identification with our higher selves and what\ncontributes to our separation from that identification. All virtuous\npractices make a positive contribution to this goal. But virtues can\nbe graded according to how they do this (see I 2). The lowest form of\nvirtues, what Plotinus, following Plato, calls ‘civic’ or\n‘popular’, are the practices that serve to control the\nappetites (see I 2. 2). By contrast, higher\n‘purificatory’ virtues are those that separate the person\nfrom the embodied human being (I 2. 3). One who practices\npurificatory virtue is no longer subject to the incontinent desires\nwhose restraint constitutes mere civic or popular virtue. Such a\nperson achieves a kind of ‘likeness to God’ recommended by\nPlato at Theaetetus 176a-b. Both of these types of virtue are\ninferior to intellectual virtue which consists in the activity of the\nphilosopher (see I 2. 6). One who is purified in embodied practices\ncan turn unimpeded to one’s true self-identity as a thinker.", "\n\nPlotinus, however, while acknowledging the necessity of virtuous\nliving for happiness, refuses to identify them. Like Aristotle,\nPlotinus maintains that a property of the happy life is its\nself-sufficiency (see I.1.4–5). But Plotinus does not agree that a\nlife focused on the practice of virtue is self-sufficient. Even\nAristotle concedes that such a life is not self-sufficient in the\nsense that it is immune to misfortune. Plotinus, insisting that the\nbest life is one that is in fact blessed owing precisely to its\nimmunity to misfortune, alters the meaning of\n‘self-sufficient’ in order to identify it with the\ninterior life of the excellent person. This interiority or\nself-sufficiency is the obverse of attachment to the objects of\nembodied desires. Interiority is happiness because the longing for\nthe Good, for one who is ideally an intellect, is satisfied by\ncognitive identification with all that is intelligible. If this is\nnot unqualifiedly possible for the embodied human being, it does at\nleast seem possible that one should have a second order desire,\nderiving from this longing for the Good, that amounts to a profound\nindifference to the satisfaction of first order desires.\nUnderstanding that the good for an intellect is contemplation of all\nthat the One is means that the will is oriented to one thing only,\nwhatever transient desires may turn up." ], "section_title": "3. Human Psychology and Ethics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nPlotinus’ chronologically first treatise, ‘On Beauty’ (I\n6), can be seen as parallel to his treatise on virtue (I 2). In it,\nhe tries to fit the experience of beauty into the drama of ascent to\nthe first principle of all. In this respect, Plotinus’ aesthetics is\ninseparable from his metaphysics, psychology, and ethics.", "\nAs in the case of virtue, Plotinus recognizes a hierarchy of beauty.\nBut what all types of beauty have in common is that they consist in\nform or images of the Forms eternally present in Intellect (I 6. 2).\nThe lowest type of beauty is physical beauty where the splendor of the\nparadigm is of necessity most occluded. If the beauty of a body is\ninseparable from that body, then it is only a remote image of the\nnon-bodily Forms. Still, our ability to experience such beauty serves\nas another indication of our own intellects’ undescended character. We\nrespond to physical beauty because we dimly recognize its paradigm.\nTo call this paradigm ‘the Form of Beauty’ would be\nsomewhat misleading unless it were understood to include all the Forms\ncognized by Intellect. Following Plato in Symposium, Plotinus\ntraces a hierarchy of beautiful objects above the physical,\nculminating in the Forms themselves. And their source, the Good, is\nalso the source of their beauty (I 6. 7). The beauty of the Good\nconsists in the virtual unity of all the Forms. As it is the ultimate\ncause of the complexity of intelligible reality, it is the cause of\nthe delight we experience in form (see V 5. 12)." ], "section_title": "4. Beauty", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nPlotinus regarded himself as a loyal Platonist, an accurate exegete of\nthe Platonic revelation. By the middle of the 3rd century CE, the\nphilosophical world was populated with a diverse array of\nanti-Platonists. In the Enneads, we find Plotinus engaged\nwith many of these opponents of Platonism. In his creative response to\nthese we find many of his original ideas.", "\nAlthough Plotinus was glad to mine Aristotle’s works for distinctions\nand arguments that he viewed as helpful for explicating the Platonic\nposition, there were a number of issues on which Plotinus thought that\nAristotle was simply and importantly mistaken. Perhaps the major issue\nconcerned the nature of a first principle of all. Plotinus recognized\nthat Aristotle agreed with Plato that (1) there must be a first\nprinciple of all; (2) that it must be unique; and (3) that it must be\nabsolutely simple. But Aristotle erred in identifying that first\nprinciple with the Unmoved Mover, fully actual self-reflexive\nintellection. Plotinus did not disagree that there must be an eternal\nprinciple like the Unmoved Mover; this is what the hypostasis\nIntellect is. But he denied that the first principle of all could be\nan intellect or intellection of any sort, since intellection requires\na real distinction between the thinking and the object of thinking,\neven if that object is the thinker itself. A real distinction indicates some sort of complexity or compositeness in the thing (a real minor distinction) or among things (a real major distinction); by contrast, in a conceptual distinction, one thing is considered from different perspectives or aspects. In the absolutely simple first principle of all, there can be no distinct elements or parts at all. In fact, the first\nprinciple of all, the Good or the One, must be beyond thinking if it\nis to be absolutely simple. The misguided consequence of holding this\nview, according to Plotinus, is that Aristotle then misconceives being\nsuch that he identifies it with substance or ousia. But for the first\nprinciple of all actually to be such a principle, it must be unlimited\nin the way that ousia is not. As a result, Aristotle makes many\nmistakes, especially in metaphysics or ontology.", "\nThe second group of major opponents of Platonism were the Stoics. The\nEnneads are filled with anti-Stoic polemics. These polemics\nfocus principally on Stoic materialism, which Plotinus finds to be\nincapable of articulating an ontology which includes everything in the\nuniverse. More important, Stoic materialism is unable to provide\nexplanatory adequacy even in the realm in which the Stoics felt most\nconfident, namely, the physical universe. For example, the Stoics,\nowing to their materialism, could not explain consciousness or\nintentionality, neither of which are plausibly accounted for in\nmaterialistic terms. According to Plotinus, the Stoics were also\nunable to give a justification for their ethical position – not\nin itself too far distant from Plato’s – since their\nexhortations to the rational life could not coherently explain how one\nbody (the empirical self) was supposed to identify with another body\n(the ideal rational agent).", " With regard to Plotinus’ contemporaries, he was sufficiently\nexercised by the self-proclaimed Gnostics to write a separate\ntreatise, II 9, attacking their views. These Gnostics, mostly heretic\nChristians, whose voluminous and obscure writings, were only partially\nunearthed at Nag Hammadi in 1945 and translated in the last two\ndecades, were sufficiently close to Platonism, but, in Plotinus’\nview, so profoundly perverse in their interpretation of it, that they\nmerited special attention. The central mistake of Gnosticism,\naccording to Plotinus, is in thinking that Soul is\n‘fallen’ and is the source of cosmic evil. As we have\nseen, Plotinus, although he believes that matter is evil, vociferously\ndenies that the physical world is evil. It is only the matter that\nunderlies the images of the eternal world that is isolated from all\nintelligible reality. The Gnostics ignore the structure of Platonic\nmetaphysics and, as a result, wrongly despise this world. For\nPlotinus, a hallmark of ignorance of metaphysics is arrogance, the\narrogance of believing that the elite or chosen possess special\nknowledge of the world and of human destiny. The idea of a secret\nelect, alone destined for salvation – which was what the\nGnostics declared themselves to be – was deeply at odds with\nPlotinus’ rational universalism." ], "section_title": "5. Principal Opponents", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n Porphyry’s edition of Plotinus’ Enneads preserved for\nposterity the works of the leading Platonic interpreter of antiquity.\nThrough these works as well as through the writings of Porphyry\nhimself (234 – c. 305 C.E.) and Iamblichus (c. 245–325\nC.E.), Plotinus shaped the entire subsequent history of philosophy.\nUntil well into the 19th century, Platonism was in large\npart understood, appropriated or rejected based on its Plotinian\nexpression and in adumbrations of this.", "\n The theological traditions of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism all,\nin their formative periods, looked to ancient Greek philosophy for the\nlanguage and arguments with which to articulate their religious\nvisions. For all of these, Platonism expressed the philosophy that\nseemed closest to their own theologies. Plotinus was the principal\nsource for their understanding of Platonism.", "\n Through the Latin translation of Plotinus by Marsilio Ficino\npublished in 1492, Plotinus became available to the West. The first\nEnglish translation, by Thomas Taylor, appeared in the late\n18th century. Plotinus was, once again, recognized as the\nmost authoritative interpreter of Platonism. In the writings of the\nItalian Renaissance philosophers, the 15th and\n16th century humanists John Colet, Erasmus of Rotterdam,\nand Thomas More, the 17th century Cambridge Platonists, and\nGerman idealists, especially Hegel, Plotinus’ thought was the\n(sometimes unacknowledged) basis for opposition to the competing and\nincreasingly influential tradition of scientific philosophy. This\ninfluence continued in the 20th century flowering of\nChristian imaginative literature in England, including the works of\nC.S. Lewis and Charles Williams. " ], "section_title": "6. Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Plotinus, 7 volumes, Greek text with English translation by\nA.H. Armstrong, Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1968–88.", "Plotinus. The Enneads, edited by Lloyd P. Gerson, and\ntranslated by George Boys-Stones, John M. Dillon, Lloyd P. Gerson,\nR.A. King, Andrew Smith and James Wilberding, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, 2018.", "Plotinus. The Enneads, translated by Stephen MacKenna,\nabridged and edited by John Dillon, London: Penguin Books, 1991.", "Neoplatonic Philosophy. Introductory Readings, translations\nof portions of the works of Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and\nProclus by John Dillon and Lloyd P. Gerson, Indianapolis: Hackett,\n2004.", "Plotin. Traites, 9 volumes, French translation with\ncommentaries by Luc Brisson and J.-F. Pradéau, et al., Paris:\nFlammarion, 2002–2010.", "Blumenthal, H.J., 1971, Plotinus’ Psychology, The Hague:\nMartinus Nijhoff.", "Bussanich, J., 1988, The One and its Relation to Intellect in\nPlotinus, Leiden: Brill.", "Caluori, D., 2015, Plotinus on the Soul, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press.", "Emilsson, E., 1988, Plotinus on Sense-Perception,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2007, Plotinus on Intellect, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "–––, 2017, Plotinus, London:\nRoutledge.", "Gerson, Lloyd P., 1994, Plotinus (Series: Arguments of the\nPhilosophers), London: Routledge.", "Gerson, Lloyd P. (ed.), 1996, The Cambridge Companion to\nPlotinus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "––– (ed.), 2010, The Cambridge History of\nPhilosophy in Late Antiquity, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Gurtler, G.M., 1988, Plotinus: The Experience of Unity, New\nYork: Peter Lang.", "Kalligas, P, 2014, The Enneads of Plotinus: A Commentary\n(Volume 1: Enneads I–III), Princeton: Princeton University Press.", "O’Brien, D., 1991, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter,\nNaples: Bibliopolis.", "O’Meara, Dominic, 1993, Plotinus: An Introduction to the\nEnneads, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Rappe, S., 2000, Reading Neoplatonism: Non-discursive Thinking\nin the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press.", "Remes, Pauliina, 2007, Plotinus on Self. The Philosophy of the\n‘We’, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Rist, J., 1967, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press.", "Dufour, Richard, 2002, Plotinus: A Bibliography\n1950–2000, Leiden: E.J. Brill. See in particular the\nreferences to the numerous commentaries on particular treatises in the\nEnneads, some of which are in English." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotelianism-renaissance/", "text": "Aristotelianism: in the Renaissance" }, { "href": "../beauty/", "text": "beauty" }, { "href": "../ficino/", "text": "Ficino, Marsilio" }, { "href": "../neoplatonism/", "text": "Neoplatonism" }, { "href": "../plato-timaeus/", "text": "Plato: Timaeus" }, { "href": "../platonism/", "text": "Platonism: in metaphysics" }, { "href": "../porphyry/", "text": "Porphyry" }, { "href": "../ancient-soul/", "text": "soul, ancient theories of" } ]
reasoning-analogy	Analogy and Analogical Reasoning	First published Tue Jun 25, 2013; substantive revision Fri Jan 25, 2019	[ "\nAn analogy is a comparison between two objects, or systems of\nobjects, that highlights respects in which they are thought to be\nsimilar. Analogical reasoning is any type of thinking that\nrelies upon an analogy. An analogical argument is an\nexplicit representation of a form of analogical reasoning that cites\naccepted similarities between two systems to support the conclusion\nthat some further similarity exists. In general (but not always), such\narguments belong in the category of ampliative reasoning, since their\nconclusions do not follow with certainty but are only supported with\nvarying degrees of strength. However, the proper characterization of\nanalogical arguments is subject to debate (see\n §2.2).", "\nAnalogical reasoning is fundamental to human thought and, arguably, to\nsome nonhuman animals as well. Historically, analogical reasoning has\nplayed an important, but sometimes mysterious, role in a wide range of\nproblem-solving contexts. The explicit use of analogical arguments,\nsince antiquity, has been a distinctive feature of scientific,\nphilosophical and legal reasoning. This article focuses primarily on\nthe nature, evaluation and justification of analogical arguments.\nRelated topics include\n metaphor,\n models in science, and\n precedent and analogy in legal reasoning." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction: the many roles of analogy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Analogical arguments ", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Examples", "2.2 Characterization", "2.3 Plausibility", "2.4 Analogical inference rules?" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Criteria for evaluating analogical arguments", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Commonsense guidelines", "3.2 Aristotle’s theory", "3.3 Material criteria: Hesse’s theory", "3.4 Formal criteria: the structure-mapping theory", "3.5 Other theories", "3.6 Practice-based approaches" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Philosophical foundations for analogical reasoning", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Deductive justification", "4.2 Inductive justification", "4.3 A priori justification", "4.4 Pragmatic justification" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Beyond analogical arguments", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Analogy and confirmation", "5.2 Conceptual change and theory development" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [ "Websites", "Online Manuscript" ] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAnalogies are widely recognized as playing an important\nheuristic role, as aids to discovery. They have been\nemployed, in a wide variety of settings and with considerable success,\nto generate insight and to formulate possible solutions to problems.\nAccording to Joseph Priestley, a pioneer in chemistry and\nelectricity,", "\n\n\nanalogy is our best guide in all philosophical investigations; and all\ndiscoveries, which were not made by mere accident, have been made by\nthe help of it. (1769/1966: 14)\n", "\nPriestley may be over-stating the case, but there is no doubt that\nanalogies have suggested fruitful lines of inquiry in many fields.\nBecause of their heuristic value, analogies and analogical reasoning\nhave been a particular focus of AI research. Hájek (2018)\nexamines analogy as a heuristic tool in philosophy.", "\nAnalogies have a related (and not entirely separable)\njustificatory role. This role is most obvious where an\nanalogical argument is explicitly offered in support of some\nconclusion. The intended degree of support for the conclusion can vary\nconsiderably. At one extreme, these arguments can be strongly\npredictive. For example:\n\n", "\n\n Example 1.\n Hydrodynamic analogies exploit mathematical similarities\nbetween the equations governing ideal fluid flow and torsional\nproblems. To predict stresses in a planned structure, one can\nconstruct a fluid model, i.e., a system of pipes through which water\npasses (Timoshenko and Goodier 1970). Within the limits of\nidealization, such analogies allow us to make demonstrative\ninferences, for example, from a measured quantity in the fluid model\nto the analogous value in the torsional problem. In practice, there\nare numerous complications (Sterrett 2006).", "\nAt the other extreme, an analogical argument may provide very weak\nsupport for its conclusion, establishing no more than minimal\nplausibility. Consider:", "\n\n Example 2.\n Thomas Reid’s (1785) argument for the existence of life on\nother planets (Stebbing 1933; Mill 1843/1930; Robinson 1930; Copi\n1961). Reid notes a number of similarities between Earth and the other\nplanets in our solar system: all orbit and are illuminated by the sun;\nseveral have moons; all revolve on an axis. In consequence, he\nconcludes, it is “not unreasonable to think, that those planets\nmay, like our earth, be the habitation of various orders of living\ncreatures” (1785: 24).", "\nSuch modesty is not uncommon. Often the point of an analogical\nargument is just to persuade people to take an idea seriously. For\ninstance:", "\nSometimes analogical reasoning is the only available form of\njustification for a hypothesis. The method of ethnographic\nanalogy is used to interpret", "\n\n\nthe nonobservable behaviour of the ancient inhabitants of an\narchaeological site (or ancient culture) based on the similarity of\ntheir artifacts to those used by living peoples. (Hunter and Whitten\n1976: 147)\n", "\nFor example:", "\n\n Example 4.\n Shelley (1999, 2003) describes how ethnographic analogy was used to\ndetermine the probable significance of odd markings on the necks of\nMoche clay pots found in the Peruvian Andes. Contemporary potters in\nPeru use these marks (called sígnales) to indicate\nownership; the marks enable them to reclaim their work when several\npotters share a kiln or storage facility. Analogical reasoning may be\nthe only avenue of inference to the past in such cases, though this\npoint is subject to dispute (Gould and Watson 1982; Wylie 1982, 1985).\nAnalogical reasoning may have similar significance for cosmological\nphenomena that are inaccessible due to limits on observation\n(Dardashti et al. 2017). See\n §5.1\n for further discussion.", "\nAs philosophers and historians such as Kuhn (1996) have repeatedly\npointed out, there is not always a clear separation between the two\nroles that we have identified, discovery and justification. Indeed,\nthe two functions are blended in what we might call the\nprogrammatic (or paradigmatic) role of analogy: over\na period of time, an analogy can shape the development of a program of\nresearch. For example:", "\nMore generally, analogies can play an important programmatic role by\nguiding conceptual development (see\n §5.2).\n In some cases, a programmatic analogy culminates in the theoretical\nunification of two different areas of inquiry.", "\n\n Example 6.\n Descartes’s (1637/1954) correlation between geometry and\nalgebra provided methods for systematically handling geometrical\nproblems that had long been recognized as analogous. A very different\nrelationship between analogy and discovery exists when a programmatic\nanalogy breaks down, as was the ultimate fate of the acoustical\nanalogy. That atomic spectra have an entirely different explanation\nbecame clear with the advent of quantum theory. In this case, novel\ndiscoveries emerged against background expectations shaped by\nthe guiding analogy. There is a third possibility: an unproductive or\nmisleading programmatic analogy may simply become entrenched and\nself-perpetuating as it leads us to “construct… data that\nconform to it” (Stepan 1996: 133). Arguably, the danger of this\nthird possibility provides strong motivation for developing a critical\naccount of analogical reasoning and analogical arguments.", "\nAnalogical cognition, which embraces all cognitive processes\ninvolved in discovering, constructing and using analogies, is broader\nthan analogical reasoning (Hofstadter 2001; Hofstadter and Sander\n2013). Understanding these processes is an important objective of\ncurrent cognitive science research, and an objective that generates\nmany questions. How do humans identify analogies? Do nonhuman animals\nuse analogies in ways similar to humans? How do analogies and\nmetaphors influence concept formation?", "\nThis entry, however, concentrates specifically on analogical\narguments. Specifically, it focuses on three central epistemological\nquestions:", "\nFollowing a preliminary discussion of the basic structure of\nanalogical arguments, the entry reviews selected attempts to provide\nanswers to these three questions. To find such answers would\nconstitute an important first step towards understanding the nature of\nanalogical reasoning. To isolate these questions, however, is to make\nthe non-trivial assumption that there can be a theory of\nanalogical arguments—an assumption which, as we shall\nsee, is attacked in different ways by both philosophers and cognitive\nscientists." ], "section_title": "1. Introduction: the many roles of analogy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Analogical arguments ", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAnalogical arguments vary greatly in subject matter, strength and\nlogical structure. In order to appreciate this variety, it is helpful\nto increase our stock of examples. First, a geometric example:", "\n\n Example 7\n (Rectangles and boxes). Suppose that you have established that of all\nrectangles with a fixed perimeter, the square has maximum area. By\nanalogy, you conjecture that of all boxes with a fixed surface area,\nthe cube has maximum volume.", "\nTwo examples from the history of science:", "\n\n Example 8\n (Morphine and meperidine). In 1934, the pharmacologist Schaumann was\ntesting synthetic compounds for their anti-spasmodic effect. These\ndrugs had a chemical structure similar to morphine. He observed that\none of the compounds—meperidine, also known as\nDemerol—had a physical effect on mice that was\npreviously observed only with morphine: it induced an S-shaped tail\ncurvature. By analogy, he conjectured that the drug might also share\nmorphine’s narcotic effects. Testing on rats, rabbits, dogs and\neventually humans showed that meperidine, like morphine, was an\neffective pain-killer (Lembeck 1989: 11; Reynolds and Randall 1975:\n273).", "\n\n Example 9\n (Priestley on electrostatic force). In 1769, Priestley suggested that\nthe absence of electrical influence inside a hollow charged spherical\nshell was evidence that charges attract and repel with an inverse\nsquare force. He supported his hypothesis by appealing to the\nanalogous situation of zero gravitational force inside a hollow shell\nof uniform density.", "\nFinally, an example from legal reasoning:", "\n\n Example 10\n (Duty of reasonable care). In a much-cited case (Donoghue v.\nStevenson 1932 AC 562), the United Kingdom House of Lords found\nthe manufacturer of a bottle of ginger beer liable for damages to a\nconsumer who became ill as a result of a dead snail in the bottle. The\ncourt argued that the manufacturer had a duty to take\n“reasonable care” in creating a product that could\nforeseeably result in harm to the consumer in the absence of such\ncare, and where the consumer had no possibility of intermediate\nexamination. The principle articulated in this famous case was\nextended, by analogy, to allow recovery for harm against an\nengineering firm whose negligent repair work caused the collapse of a\nlift (Haseldine v. CA Daw & Son Ltd. 1941 2 KB 343). By\ncontrast, the principle was not applicable to a case where a workman\nwas injured by a defective crane, since the workman had opportunity to\nexamine the crane and was even aware of the defects (Farr v.\nButters Brothers & Co. 1932 2 KB 606)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Examples" }, { "content": [ "\nWhat, if anything, do all of these examples have in common? We begin\nwith a simple, quasi-formal characterization. Similar formulations are\nfound in elementary critical thinking texts (e.g., Copi and Cohen\n2005) and in the literature on argumentation theory (e.g., Govier\n1999, Guarini 2004, Walton and Hyra 2018). An analogical argument has\nthe following form:", "\n(1) and (2) are premises. (3) is the conclusion of the argument. The\nargument form is ampliative; the conclusion is not guaranteed\nto follow from the premises.", "\n\$S\$ and \$T\$ are referred to as the source domain and\ntarget domain, respectively. A domain is a set of\nobjects, properties, relations and functions, together with a set of\naccepted statements about those objects, properties, relations and\nfunctions. More formally, a domain consists of a set of objects and an\ninterpreted set of statements about them. The statements need not\nbelong to a first-order language, but to keep things simple, any\nformalizations employed here will be first-order. We use unstarred\nsymbols \$(a, P, R, f)\$ to refer to items in the source domain and\nstarred symbols \$(a^, P^, R^, f^)\$ to refer to corresponding\nitems in the target domain. In\n Example 9,\n the source domain items pertain to gravitation; the target items\npertain to electrostatic attraction.", "\nFormally, an analogy between \$S\$ and \$T\$ is a one-to-one\nmapping between objects, properties, relations and functions in \$S\$\nand those in \$T\$. Not all of the items in \$S\$ and \$T\$ need to be\nplaced in correspondence. Commonly, the analogy only identifies\ncorrespondences between a select set of items. In practice, we specify\nan analogy simply by indicating the most significant similarities (and\nsometimes differences).", "\nWe can improve on this preliminary characterization of the argument\nfrom analogy by introducing the tabular representation found\nin Hesse (1966). We place corresponding objects, properties, relations\nand propositions side-by-side in a table of two columns, one for each\ndomain. For instance, Reid’s argument\n (Example 2)\n can be represented as follows (using \$\\Rightarrow\$ for the\nanalogical inference):", "\nHesse introduced useful terminology based on this tabular\nrepresentation. The horizontal relations in an analogy are\nthe relations of similarity (and difference) in the mapping between\ndomains, while the vertical relations are those between the\nobjects, relations and properties within each domain. The\ncorrespondence (similarity) between earth’s having a moon and\nMars’ having moons is a horizontal relation; the causal relation\nbetween having a moon and supporting life is a vertical relation\nwithin the source domain (with the possibility of a distinct such\nrelation existing in the target as well).", "\nIn an earlier discussion of analogy, Keynes (1921) introduced some\nterminology that is also helpful.", "\nFinally we have:", "\nThese concepts allow us to provide a characterization for an\nindividual analogical argument that is somewhat richer than the\noriginal one.", "\nAn analogical argument may thus be summarized:", "\nIt is plausible that \$Q^\$ holds in the target, because of\ncertain known (or accepted) similarities with the source domain,\ndespite certain known (or accepted) differences.", "\nIn order for this characterization to be meaningful, we need to say\nsomething about the meaning of ‘plausibly.’ To ensure\nbroad applicability over analogical arguments that vary greatly in\nstrength, we interpret plausibility rather liberally as meaning\n‘with some degree of support’. In general, judgments of\nplausibility are made after a claim has been formulated, but prior to\nrigorous testing or proof. The next sub-section provides further\ndiscussion.", "\nNote that this characterization is incomplete in a number of ways. The\nmanner in which we list similarities and differences, the nature of\nthe correspondences between domains: these things are left\nunspecified. Nor does this characterization accommodate reasoning with\nmultiple analogies (i.e., multiple source domains), which is\nubiquitous in legal reasoning and common elsewhere. To characterize\nthe argument form more fully, however, is not possible without either\ntaking a step towards a substantive theory of analogical reasoning or\nrestricting attention to certain classes of analogical arguments.", "\nArguments by analogy are extensively discussed within argumentation\ntheory. There is considerable debate about whether they constitute a\nspecies of deductive inference (Govier 1999; Waller 2001; Guarini\n2004; Kraus 2015). Argumentation theorists also make use of tools such\nas speech act theory (Bermejo-Luque 2012), argumentation schemes and\ndialogue types (Macagno et al. 2017; Walton and Hyra 2018) to\ndistinguish different types of analogical argument.", "\nArguments by analogy are also discussed in the vast literature on\nscientific models and model-based reasoning, following the lead of\nHesse (1966). Bailer-Jones (2002) draws a helpful distinction between\nanalogies and models. While “many models have their roots in an\nanalogy” (2002: 113) and analogy “can act as a catalyst to\naid modeling,” Bailer-Jones observes that “the aim of\nmodeling has nothing intrinsically to do with analogy.” In\nbrief, models are tools for prediction and explanation, whereas\nanalogical arguments aim at establishing plausibility. An analogy is\nevaluated in terms of source-target similarity, while a model is\nevaluated on how successfully it “provides access to a\nphenomenon in that it interprets the available empirical data about\nthe phenomenon.” If we broaden our perspective beyond analogical\narguments, however, the connection between models and\nanalogies is restored. Nersessian (2009), for instance, stresses the\nrole of analog models in concept-formation and other cognitive\nprocesses." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Characterization" }, { "content": [ "\nTo say that a hypothesis is plausible is to convey that it has\nepistemic support: we have some reason to believe it, even prior to\ntesting. An assertion of plausibility within the context of an inquiry\ntypically has pragmatic connotations as well: to say that a hypothesis\nis plausible suggests that we have some reason to investigate it\nfurther. For example, a mathematician working on a proof regards a\nconjecture as plausible if it “has some chances of\nsuccess” (Polya 1954 (v. 2): 148). On both points, there is\nambiguity as to whether an assertion of plausibility is categorical or\na matter of degree. These observations point to the existence of two\ndistinct conceptions of plausibility, probabilistic and\nmodal, either of which may reflect the intended conclusion of\nan analogical argument.", "\nOn the probabilistic conception, plausibility is naturally\nidentified with rational credence (rational subjective degree of\nbelief) and is typically represented as a probability. A classic\nexpression may be found in Mill’s analysis of the argument from\nanalogy in A System of Logic:", "\n\n\nThere can be no doubt that every resemblance [not known to be\nirrelevant] affords some degree of probability, beyond what would\notherwise exist, in favour of the conclusion. (Mill 1843/1930:\n333)\n", "\nIn the terminology introduced in\n §2.2,\n Mill’s idea is that each element of the positive analogy boosts\nthe probability of the conclusion. Contemporary\n‘structure-mapping’ theories\n (§3.4)\n employ a restricted version: each structural similarity\nbetween two domains contributes to the overall measure of similarity,\nand hence to the strength of the analogical argument.", "\nOn the alternative modal conception, ‘it is plausible\nthat \$p\$’ is not a matter of degree. The meaning, roughly\nspeaking, is that there are sufficient initial grounds for taking\n\$p\$ seriously, i.e., for further investigation (subject to\nfeasibility and interest). Informally: \$p\$ passes an initial\nscreening procedure. There is no assertion of degree. Instead,\n‘It is plausible that’ may be regarded as an epistemic\nmodal operator that aims to capture a notion, prima facie\nplausibility, that is somewhat stronger than ordinary epistemic\npossibility. The intent is to single out \$p\$ from an\nundifferentiated mass of ideas that remain bare epistemic\npossibilities. To illustrate: in 1769, Priestley’s argument\n (Example 9),\n if successful, would establish the prima facie plausibility\nof an inverse square law for electrostatic attraction. The set of\nepistemic possibilities—hypotheses about electrostatic\nattraction compatible with knowledge of the day—was much larger.\nIndividual analogical arguments in mathematics (such as\n Example 7)\n are almost invariably directed towards prima facie\nplausibility.", "\nThe modal conception figures importantly in some discussions of\nanalogical reasoning. The physicist N. R. Campbell (1957) writes:", "\n\n\nBut in order that a theory may be valuable it must … display an\nanalogy. The propositions of the hypothesis must be analogous to some\nknown laws…. (1957: 129)\n", "\nCommenting on the role of analogy in Fourier’s theory of heat\nconduction, Campbell writes:", "\n\n\nSome analogy is essential to it; for it is only this analogy\nwhich distinguishes the theory from the multitude of others…\nwhich might also be proposed to explain the same laws. (1957: 142)\n", "\nThe interesting notion here is that of a “valuable”\ntheory. We may not agree with Campbell that the existence of analogy\nis “essential” for a novel theory to be\n“valuable.” But consider the weaker thesis that an\nacceptable analogy is sufficient to establish that a theory\nis “valuable”, or (to qualify still further) that an\nacceptable analogy provides defeasible grounds for taking the theory\nseriously. (Possible defeaters might include internal inconsistency,\ninconsistency with accepted theory, or the existence of a (clearly\nsuperior) rival analogical argument.) The point is that Campbell,\nfollowing the lead of 19th century philosopher-scientists\nsuch as Herschel and Whewell, thinks that analogies can establish this\nsort of prima facie plausibility. Snyder (2006) provides a\ndetailed discussion of the latter two thinkers and their ideas about\nthe role of analogies in science.", "\nIn general, analogical arguments may be directed at establishing\neither sort of plausibility for their conclusions; they can have a\nprobabilistic use or a modal use.\n Examples 7\n through\n 9\n are best interpreted as supporting modal conclusions. In those\narguments, an analogy is used to show that a conjecture is worth\ntaking seriously. To insist on putting the conclusion in probabilistic\nterms distracts attention from the point of the argument. The\nconclusion might be modeled (by a Bayesian) as having a certain\nprobability value because it is deemed prima facie\nplausible, but not vice versa.\n Example 2,\n perhaps, might be regarded as directed primarily towards a\nprobabilistic conclusion.", "\nThere should be connections between the two conceptions. Indeed, we\nmight think that the same analogical argument can establish both\nprima facie plausibility and a degree of probability for a\nhypothesis. But it is difficult to translate between epistemic modal\nconcepts and probabilities (Cohen 1980; Douven and Williamson 2006;\nHuber 2009; Spohn 2009, 2012). We cannot simply take the probabilistic\nnotion as the primitive one. It seems wise to keep the two conceptions\nof plausibility separate." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Plausibility" }, { "content": [ "\n\n Schema (4)\n is a template that represents all analogical arguments, good\nand bad. It is not an inference rule. Despite the confidence with\nwhich particular analogical arguments are advanced, nobody has ever\nformulated an acceptable rule, or set of rules, for valid analogical\ninferences. There is not even a plausible candidate. This situation is\nin marked contrast not only with deductive reasoning, but also with\nelementary forms of inductive reasoning, such as induction by\nenumeration.", "\nOf course, it is difficult to show that no successful analogical\ninference rule will ever be proposed. But consider the following\ncandidate, formulated using the concepts of schema (4) and taking us\nonly a short step beyond that basic characterization.", "\nRule (5) is modeled on the\n straight rule for enumerative induction\n and inspired by Mill’s view of analogical inference, as\ndescribed in\n §2.3.\n We use the generic phrase ‘degree of support’ in place of\nprobability, since other factors besides the analogical argument may\ninfluence our probability assignment for \$Q^\$.", "\nIt is pretty clear that (5) is a non-starter. The main problem is that\nthe rule justifies too much. The only substantive requirement\nintroduced by (5) is that there be a nonempty positive analogy.\nPlainly, there are analogical arguments that satisfy this condition\nbut establish no prima facie plausibility and no measure of\nsupport for their conclusions.", "\nHere is a simple illustration. Achinstein (1964: 328) observes that\nthere is a formal analogy between swans and line segments if we take\nthe relation ‘has the same color as’ to correspond to\n‘is congruent with’. Both relations are reflexive,\nsymmetric, and transitive. Yet it would be absurd to find positive\nsupport from this analogy for the idea that we are likely to find\ncongruent lines clustered in groups of two or more, just because swans\nof the same color are commonly found in groups. The positive analogy\nis antecedently known to be irrelevant to the hypothetical analogy. In\nsuch a case, the analogical inference should be utterly rejected. Yet\nrule (5) would wrongly assign non-zero degree of support.", "\nTo generalize the difficulty: not every similarity increases the\nprobability of the conclusion and not every difference decreases it.\nSome similarities and differences are known to be (or accepted as\nbeing) utterly irrelevant and should have no influence whatsoever on\nour probability judgments. To be viable, rule (5) would need to be\nsupplemented with considerations of relevance, which depend\nupon the subject matter, historical context and logical details\nparticular to each analogical argument. To search for a simple rule of\nanalogical inference thus appears futile.", "\nCarnap and his followers (Carnap 1980; Kuipers 1988; Niiniluoto 1988;\nMaher 2000; Romeijn 2006) have formulated principles of analogy for\ninductive logic, using Carnapian \$\\lambda \\gamma\$ rules. Generally,\nthis body of work relates to “analogy by similarity”,\nrather than the type of analogical reasoning discussed here. Romeijn\n(2006) maintains that there is a relation between Carnap’s\nconcept of analogy and analogical prediction. His approach is a hybrid\nof Carnap-style inductive rules and a Bayesian model. Such an approach\nwould need to be generalized to handle the kinds of arguments\ndescribed in\n §2.1.\n It remains unclear that the Carnapian approach can provide a general\nrule for analogical inference.", "\nNorton (2010, and 2018—see Other Internet Resources) has argued\nthat the project of formalizing inductive reasoning in terms of one or\nmore simple formal schemata is doomed. His criticisms seem especially\napt when applied to analogical reasoning. He writes:", "\n\n\nIf analogical reasoning is required to conform only to a simple formal\nschema, the restriction is too permissive. Inferences are authorized\nthat clearly should not pass muster… The natural response has\nbeen to develop more elaborate formal templates… The familiar\ndifficulty is that these embellished schema never seem to be quite\nembellished enough; there always seems to be some part of the analysis\nthat must be handled intuitively without guidance from strict formal\nrules. (2018: 1)\n", "\nNorton takes the point one step further, in keeping with his\n“material theory” of inductive inference. He argues that\nthere is no universal logical principle that “powers”\nanalogical inference “by asserting that things that share some\nproperties must share others.” Rather, each analogical inference\nis warranted by some local constellation of facts about the target\nsystem that he terms “the fact of analogy”. These local\nfacts are to be determined and investigated on a case by case\nbasis.", "\nTo embrace a purely formal approach to analogy and to abjure\nformalization entirely are two extremes in a spectrum of strategies.\nThere are intermediate positions. Most recent analyses (both\nphilosophical and computational) have been directed towards\nelucidating criteria and procedures, rather than formal rules, for\nreasoning by analogy. So long as these are not intended to provide a\nuniversal ‘logic’ of analogy, there is room for such\ncriteria even if one accepts Norton’s basic point. The next\nsection discusses some of these criteria and procedures." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Analogical inference rules?" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Criteria for evaluating analogical arguments", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nLogicians and philosophers of science have identified\n‘textbook-style’ general guidelines for evaluating\nanalogical arguments (Mill 1843/1930; Keynes 1921; Robinson 1930;\nStebbing 1933; Copi and Cohen 2005; Moore and Parker 1998; Woods,\nIrvine, and Walton 2004). Here are some of the most important\nones:", "\nThese principles can be helpful, but are frequently too vague to\nprovide much insight. How do we count similarities and differences in\napplying (G1) and (G2)? Why are the structural and causal analogies\nmentioned in (G5) and (G6) especially important, and which structural\nand causal features merit attention? More generally, in connection\nwith the all-important (G7): how do we determine which similarities\nand differences are relevant to the conclusion? Furthermore, what are\nwe to say about similarities and differences that have been omitted\nfrom an analogical argument but might still be relevant?", "\nAn additional problem is that the criteria can pull in different\ndirections. To illustrate, consider Reid’s argument for life on\nother planets\n (Example 2).\n Stebbing (1933) finds Reid’s argument “suggestive”\nand “not unplausible” because the conclusion is weak (G4),\nwhile Mill (1843/1930) appears to reject the argument on account of\nour vast ignorance of properties that might be relevant (G3).", "\nThere is a further problem that relates to the distinction just made\n(in\n §2.3)\n between two kinds of plausibility. Each of the above criteria apart\nfrom (G7) is expressed in terms of the strength of the argument, i.e.,\nthe degree of support for the conclusion. The criteria thus appear to\npresuppose the probabilistic interpretation of plausibility.\nThe problem is that a great many analogical arguments aim to establish\nprima facie plausibility rather than any degree of\nprobability. Most of the guidelines are not directly applicable to\nsuch arguments." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Commonsense guidelines" }, { "content": [ "\nAristotle sets the stage for all later theories of analogical\nreasoning. In his theoretical reflections on analogy and in his most\njudicious examples, we find a sober account that lays the foundation\nboth for the commonsense guidelines noted above and for more\nsophisticated analyses.", "\nAlthough Aristotle employs the term analogy (analogia) and\ndiscusses\n analogical predication,\n he never talks about analogical reasoning or analogical arguments\nper se. He does, however, identify two argument forms, the\nargument from example (paradeigma) and the\nargument from likeness (homoiotes), both closely\nrelated to what would we now recognize as an analogical argument.", "\nThe argument from example (paradeigma) is described\nin the Rhetoric and the Prior Analytics:", "\n\n\nEnthymemes based upon example are those which proceed from one or more\nsimilar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue\ndeductively to a particular inference. (Rhetoric 1402b15)\n\n\nLet \$A\$ be evil, \$B\$ making war against neighbours, \$C\$\nAthenians against Thebans, \$D\$ Thebans against Phocians. If then we\nwish to prove that to fight with the Thebans is an evil, we must\nassume that to fight against neighbours is an evil. Conviction of this\nis obtained from similar cases, e.g., that the war against the\nPhocians was an evil to the Thebans. Since then to fight against\nneighbours is an evil, and to fight against the Thebans is to fight\nagainst neighbours, it is clear that to fight against the Thebans is\nan evil. (Pr. An. 69a1)\n", "\nAristotle notes two differences between this argument form and\ninduction (69a15ff.): it “does not draw its proof from all the\nparticular cases” (i.e., it is not a “complete”\ninduction), and it requires an additional (deductively valid)\nsyllogism as the final step. The argument from example thus amounts to\nsingle-case induction followed by deductive inference. It has the\nfollowing structure (using \$\\supset\$ for the conditional):", "\nIn the terminology of\n §2.2,\n \$P\$ is the positive analogy and \$Q\$ is the hypothetical analogy.\nIn Aristotle’s example, \$S\$ (the source) is war between\nPhocians and Thebans, \$T\$ (the target) is war between Athenians and\nThebans, \$P\$ is war between neighbours, and \$Q\$ is evil. The first\ninference (dashed arrow) is inductive; the second and third (solid\narrows) are deductively valid.", "\nThe paradeigma has an interesting feature: it is amenable to\nan alternative analysis as a purely deductive argument form.\nLet us concentrate on Aristotle’s assertion, “we must\nassume that to fight against neighbours is an evil,” represented\nas \$\\forall x(P(x) \\supset Q(x))\$. Instead of regarding this\nintermediate step as something reached by induction from a single\ncase, we might instead regard it as a hidden presupposition. This\ntransforms the paradeigma into a syllogistic argument with a\nmissing or enthymematic premise, and our attention shifts to\npossible means for establishing that premise (with single-case\ninduction as one such means). Construed in this way, Aristotle’s\nparadeigma argument foreshadows deductive analyses of\nanalogical reasoning (see\n §4.1).", "\nThe argument from likeness (homoiotes) seems to be\ncloser than the paradeigma to our contemporary understanding\nof analogical arguments. This argument form receives considerable\nattention in Topics I, 17 and 18 and again in VIII, 1. The\nmost important passage is the following.", "\n\n\nTry to secure admissions by means of likeness; for such admissions are\nplausible, and the universal involved is less patent; e.g. that as\nknowledge and ignorance of contraries is the same, so too perception\nof contraries is the same; or vice versa, that since the perception is\nthe same, so is the knowledge also. This argument resembles induction,\nbut is not the same thing; for in induction it is the universal whose\nadmission is secured from the particulars, whereas in arguments from\nlikeness, what is secured is not the universal under which all the\nlike cases fall. (Topics 156b10–17)\n", "\nThis passage occurs in a work that offers advice for framing\ndialectical arguments when confronting a somewhat skeptical\ninterlocutor. In such situations, it is best not to make one’s\nargument depend upon securing agreement about any universal\nproposition. The argument from likeness is thus clearly distinct from\nthe paradeigma, where the universal proposition plays an\nessential role as an intermediate step in the argument. The argument\nfrom likeness, though logically less straightforward than the\nparadeigma, is exactly the sort of analogical reasoning we\nwant when we are unsure about underlying generalizations.", "\nIn Topics I 17, Aristotle states that any shared attribute\ncontributes some degree of likeness. It is natural to ask when the\ndegree of likeness between two things is sufficiently great to warrant\ninferring a further likeness. In other words, when does the argument\nfrom likeness succeed? Aristotle does not answer explicitly, but a\nclue is provided by the way he justifies particular arguments from\nlikeness. As Lloyd (1966) has observed, Aristotle typically justifies\nsuch arguments by articulating a (sometimes vague) causal principle\nwhich governs the two phenomena being compared. For example, Aristotle\nexplains the saltiness of the sea, by analogy with the saltiness of\nsweat, as a kind of residual earthy stuff exuded in natural processes\nsuch as heating. The common principle is this:", "\n\n\nEverything that grows and is naturally generated always leaves a\nresidue, like that of things burnt, consisting in this sort of earth.\n(Mete 358a17)\n", "\nFrom this method of justification, we might conjecture that Aristotle\nbelieves that the important similarities are those that enter into\nsuch general causal principles.", "\nSummarizing, Aristotle’s theory provides us with four important\nand influential criteria for the evaluation of analogical\narguments:", "\nThese four principles form the core of a common-sense model\nfor evaluating analogical arguments (which is not to say that they are\ncorrect; indeed, the first three will shortly be called into\nquestion). The first, as we have seen, appears regularly in textbook\ndiscussions of analogy. The second is largely taken for granted, with\nimportant exceptions in computational models of analogy\n (§3.4).\n Versions of the third are found in most sophisticated theories. The\nfinal point, which distinguishes the argument from likeness and the\nargument from example, is endorsed in many discussions of analogy\n(e.g., Quine and Ullian 1970).", "\nA slight generalization of Aristotle’s first principle helps to\nprepare the way for discussion of later developments. As that\nprinciple suggests, Aristotle, in common with just about everyone else\nwho has written about analogical reasoning, organizes his analysis of\nthe argument form around overall similarity. In the terminology of\n section 2.2,\n horizontal relationships drive the reasoning: the\ngreater the overall similarity of the two domains, the stronger the\nanalogical argument. Hume makes the same point, though stated\nnegatively, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion:", "\n\n\nWherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases,\nyou diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to\na very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and\nuncertainty. (1779/1947: 144)\n", "\nMost theories of analogy agree with Aristotle and Hume on this general\npoint. Disagreement relates to the appropriate way of measuring\noverall similarity. Some theories assign greatest weight to\nmaterial analogy, which refers to shared, and typically\nobservable, features. Others give prominence to formal\nanalogy, emphasizing high-level structural correspondence. The\nnext two sub-sections discuss representative accounts that illustrate\nthese two approaches." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Aristotle’s theory" }, { "content": [ "\nHesse (1966) offers a sharpened version of Aristotle’s theory,\nspecifically focused on analogical arguments in the sciences. She\nformulates three requirements that an analogical argument must satisfy\nin order to be acceptable:", "\nFor Hesse, an acceptable analogical argument must include\n“observable similarities” between domains, which she\nrefers to as material analogy. Material analogy is contrasted\nwith formal analogy. Two domains are formally analogous if\nboth are “interpretations of the same formal theory”\n(1966: 68). Nomic isomorphism (Hempel 1965) is a special case\nin which the physical laws governing two systems have identical\nmathematical form. Heat and fluid flow exhibit nomic isomorphism. A\nsecond example is the analogy between the flow of electric current in\na wire and fluid in a pipe. Ohm’s law", "\nstates that voltage difference along a wire equals current times a\nconstant resistance. This has the same mathematical form as\nPoiseuille’s law (for ideal fluids):", "\nwhich states that the pressure difference along a pipe equals the\nvolumetric flow rate times a constant. Both of these systems can be\nrepresented by a common equation. While formal analogy is linked to\ncommon mathematical structure, it should not be limited to nomic\nisomorphism (Bartha 2010: 209). The idea of formal analogy generalizes\nto cases where there is a common mathematical structure between\nmodels for two systems. Bartha offers an even more liberal\ndefinition (2010: 195): “Two features are formally similar if\nthey occupy corresponding positions in formally analogous theories.\nFor example, pitch in the theory of sound corresponds to color in the\ntheory of light.”", "\nBy contrast, material analogy consists of what Hesse calls\n“observable” or “pre-theoretic” similarities.\nThese are horizontal relationships of similarity between properties of\nobjects in the source and the target. Similarities between echoes\n(sound) and reflection (light), for instance, were recognized long\nbefore we had any detailed theories about these phenomena. Hesse\n(1966, 1988) regards such similarities as metaphorical relationships\nbetween the two domains and labels them “pre-theoretic”\nbecause they draw on personal and cultural experience. We have both\nmaterial and formal analogies between sound and light, and it is\nsignificant for Hesse that the former are independent of the\nlatter.", "\nThere are good reasons not to accept Hesse’s requirement of\nmaterial analogy, construed in this narrow way. First, it is apparent\nthat formal analogies are the starting point in many\nimportant inferences. That is certainly the case in mathematics, a\nfield in which material analogy, in Hesse’s sense, plays no role\nat all. Analogical arguments based on formal analogy have also been\nextremely influential in physics (Steiner 1989, 1998).", "\nIn Norton’s broad sense, however, ‘material analogy’\nsimply refers to similarities rooted in factual knowledge of the\nsource and target domains. With reference to this broader meaning,\nHesse proposes two additional material criteria.", "\nHesse requires that the hypothetical analogy, the feature transferred\nto the target domain, be causally related to the positive\nanalogy. In her words, the essential requirement for a good argument\nfrom analogy is “a tendency to co-occurrence”, i.e., a\ncausal relationship. She states the requirement as follows:", "\n\n\nThe vertical relations in the model [source] are causal relations in\nsome acceptable scientific sense, where there are no compelling a\npriori reasons for denying that causal relations of the same kind may\nhold between terms of the explanandum [target]. (1966: 87)\n", "\nThe causal condition rules out analogical arguments where there is no\ncausal knowledge of the source domain. It derives support from the\nobservation that many analogies do appear to involve a transfer of\ncausal knowledge.", "\nThe causal condition is on the right track, but is arguably too\nrestrictive. For example, it rules out analogical arguments in\nmathematics. Even if we limit attention to the empirical sciences,\npersuasive analogical arguments may be founded upon strong statistical\ncorrelation in the absence of any known causal connection.\nConsider\n (Example 11)\n Benjamin Franklin’s prediction, in 1749, that pointed metal\nrods would attract lightning, by analogy with the way they attracted\nthe “electrical fluid” in the laboratory:", "\n\n\nElectrical fluid agrees with lightning in these particulars: 1. Giving\nlight. 2. Colour of the light. 3. Crooked direction. 4. Swift motion.\n5. Being conducted by metals. 6. Crack or noise in exploding. 7.\nSubsisting in water or ice. 8. Rending bodies it passes through. 9.\nDestroying animals. 10. Melting metals. 11. Firing inflammable\nsubstances. 12. Sulphureous smell.—The electrical fluid is\nattracted by points.—We do not know whether this property is in\nlightning.—But since they agree in all the particulars wherein\nwe can already compare them, is it not probable they agree likewise in\nthis? Let the experiment be made. (Benjamin Franklin’s\nExperiments, 334)\n", "\nFranklin’s hypothesis was based on a long list of properties\ncommon to the target (lightning) and source (electrical fluid in the\nlaboratory). There was no known causal connection between the twelve\n“particulars” and the thirteenth property, but there was a\nstrong correlation. Analogical arguments may be plausible even where\nthere are no known causal relations.", "\nHesse’s final requirement is that the “essential\nproperties and causal relations of the [source] have not been shown to\nbe part of the negative analogy” (1966: 91). Hesse does not\nprovide a definition of “essential,” but suggests that a\nproperty or relation is essential if it is “causally closely\nrelated to the known positive analogy.” For instance, an analogy\nwith fluid flow was extremely influential in developing the theory of\nheat conduction. Once it was discovered that heat was not conserved,\nhowever, the analogy became unacceptable (according to Hesse) because\nconservation was so central to the theory of fluid flow.", "\nThis requirement, though once again on the right track, seems too\nrestrictive. It can lead to the rejection of a good analogical\nargument. Consider the analogy between a two-dimensional rectangle and\na three-dimensional box\n (Example 7).\n Broadening Hesse’s notion, it seems that there are many\n‘essential’ differences between rectangles and boxes. This\ndoes not mean that we should reject every analogy between rectangles\nand boxes out of hand. The problem derives from the fact that\nHesse’s condition is applied to the analogy relation\nindependently of the use to which that relation is put. What counts as\nessential should vary with the analogical argument. Absent an\ninferential context, it is impossible to evaluate the importance or\n‘essentiality’ of similarities and differences.", "\nDespite these weaknesses, Hesse’s ‘material’\ncriteria constitute a significant advance in our understanding of\nanalogical reasoning. The causal condition and the\nno-essential-difference condition incorporate local factors, as urged\nby Norton, into the assessment of analogical arguments. These\nconditions, singly or taken together, imply that an analogical\nargument can fail to generate any support for its conclusion, even\nwhen there is a non-empty positive analogy. Hesse offers no theory\nabout the ‘degree’ of analogical support. That makes her\naccount one of the few that is oriented towards the modal, rather than\nprobabilistic, use of analogical arguments\n (§2.3)." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Material criteria: Hesse’s theory" }, { "content": [ "\nMany people take the concept of\n model-theoretic isomorphism\n to set the standard for thinking about similarity and its role in\nanalogical reasoning. They propose formal criteria for\nevaluating analogies, based on overall structural or syntactical\nsimilarity. Let us refer to theories oriented around such criteria as\nstructuralist.", "\nA number of leading computational models of analogy are structuralist.\nThey are implemented in computer programs that begin with (or\nsometimes build) representations of the source and target domains, and\nthen construct possible analogy mappings. Analogical inferences emerge\nas a consequence of identifying the ‘best mapping.’ In\nterms of criteria for analogical reasoning, there are two main ideas.\nFirst, the goodness of an analogical argument is based on the\ngoodness of the associated analogy mapping. Second, the\ngoodness of the analogy mapping is given by a metric that indicates\nhow closely it approximates isomorphism.", "\nThe most influential structuralist theory has been Gentner’s\nstructure-mapping theory, implemented in a program called the\nstructure-mapping engine (SME). In its original form (Gentner\n1983), the theory assesses analogies on purely structural grounds.\nGentner asserts:", "\n\n\nAnalogies are about relations, rather than simple features. No matter\nwhat kind of knowledge (causal models, plans, stories, etc.), it is\nthe structural properties (i.e., the interrelationships between the\nfacts) that determine the content of an analogy. (Falkenhainer,\nForbus, and Gentner 1989/90: 3)\n", "\nIn order to clarify this thesis, Gentner introduces a distinction\nbetween properties, or monadic predicates, and\nrelations, which have multiple arguments. She further\ndistinguishes among different orders of relations and\nfunctions, defined inductively (in terms of the order of the relata or\narguments). The best mapping is determined by systematicity:\nthe extent to which it places higher-order relations, and items that\nare nested in higher-order relations, in correspondence.\nGentner’s Systematicity Principle states:", "\n\n\nA predicate that belongs to a mappable system of mutually\ninterconnecting relationships is more likely to be imported into the\ntarget than is an isolated predicate. (1983: 163)\n", "\nA systematic analogy (one that places high-order relations and their\ncomponents in correspondence) is better than a less systematic\nanalogy. Hence, an analogical inference has a degree of plausibility\nthat increases monotonically with the degree of systematicity of the\nassociated analogy mapping. Gentner’s fundamental criterion for\nevaluating candidate analogies (and analogical inferences) thus\ndepends solely upon the syntax of the given representations and not at\nall upon their content.", "\nLater versions of the structure-mapping theory incorporate refinements\n(Forbus, Ferguson, and Gentner 1994; Forbus 2001; Forbus et al. 2007;\nForbus et al. 2008; Forbus et al 2017). For example, the earliest\nversion of the theory is vulnerable to worries about hand-coded\nrepresentations of source and target domains. Gentner and her\ncolleagues have attempted to solve this problem in later work that\ngenerates LISP representations from natural language text (see Turney\n2008 for a different approach).", "\nThe most important challenges for the structure-mapping approach\nrelate to the Systematicity Principle itself. Does the value\nof an analogy derive entirely, or even chiefly, from systematicity?\nThere appear to be two main difficulties with this view. First: it is\nnot always appropriate to give priority to systematic, high-level\nrelational matches. Material criteria, and notably what Gentner refers\nto as “superficial feature matches,” can be extremely\nimportant in some types of analogical reasoning, such as ethnographic\nanalogies which are based, to a considerable degree, on surface\nresemblances between artifacts. Second and more significantly:\nsystematicity seems to be at best a fallible marker for good\nanalogies rather than the essence of good analogical reasoning.", "\nGreater systematicity is neither necessary nor sufficient for a more\nplausible analogical inference. It is obvious that increased\nsystematicity is not sufficient for increased plausibility.\nAn implausible analogy can be represented in a form that exhibits a\nhigh degree of structural parallelism. High-order relations can come\ncheap, as we saw with Achinstein’s “swan” example\n (§2.4).", "\nMore pointedly, increased systematicity is not necessary for\ngreater plausibility. Indeed, in causal analogies, it may even weaken\nthe inference. That is because systematicity takes no account\nof the type of causal relevance, positive or negative. (McKay\n1993) notes that microbes have been found in frozen lakes in\nAntarctica; by analogy, simple life forms might exist on Mars.\nFreezing temperatures are preventive or counteracting causes;\nthey are negatively relevant to the existence of life. The\nclimate of Mars was probably more favorable to life 3.5\nbillion years ago than it is today, because temperatures were warmer.\nYet the analogy between Antarctica and present-day Mars is more\nsystematic than the analogy between Antarctica and ancient Mars.\nAccording to the Systematicity Principle, the analogy with\nAntarctica provides stronger support for life on Mars today than it\ndoes for life on ancient Mars.", "\nThe point of this example is that increased systematicity does not\nalways increase plausibility, and reduced systematicity does not\nalways decrease it (see Lee and Holyoak 2008). The more general point\nis that systematicity can be misleading, unless we take into account\nthe nature of the relationships between various factors and\nthe hypothetical analogy. Systematicity does not magically produce or\nexplain the plausibility of an analogical argument. When we reason by\nanalogy, we must determine which features of both domains are relevant\nand how they relate to the analogical conclusion. There is no\nshort-cut via syntax.", "\nSchlimm (2008) offers an entirely different critique of the\nstructure-mapping theory from the perspective of analogical reasoning\nin mathematics—a domain where one might expect a formal approach\nsuch as structure mapping to perform well. Schlimm introduces\na simple distinction: a domain is object-rich if the number\nof objects is greater than the number of relations (and properties),\nand relation-rich otherwise. Proponents of the\nstructure-mapping theory typically focus on relation-rich examples\n(such as the analogy between the solar system and the atom). By\ncontrast, analogies in mathematics typically involve domains with an\nenormous number of objects (like the real numbers), but relatively few\nrelations and functions (addition, multiplication, less-than).", "\nSchlimm provides an example of an analogical reasoning problem in\ngroup theory that involves a single relation in each domain. In this\ncase, attaining maximal systematicity is trivial. The difficulty is\nthat, compatible with maximal systematicity, there are different ways\nin which the objects might be placed in correspondence. The\nstructure-mapping theory appears to yield the wrong inference. We\nmight put the general point as follows: in object-rich domains,\nsystematicity ceases to be a reliable guide to plausible analogical\ninference." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 Formal criteria: the structure-mapping theory" }, { "content": [ "\nDuring the past thirty-five years, cognitive scientists have conducted\nextensive research on analogy. Gentner’s SME is just one of many\ncomputational theories, implemented in programs that construct and use\nanalogies. Three helpful anthologies that span this period are Helman\n1988; Gentner, Holyoak, and Kokinov 2001; and Kokinov, Holyoak, and\nGentner 2009.", "\nOne predominant objective of this research has been to model the\ncognitive processes involved in using analogies. Early models tended\nto be oriented towards “understanding the basic constraints that\ngovern human analogical thinking” (Hummel and Holyoak 1997:\n458). Recent connectionist models have been directed towards\nuncovering the psychological mechanisms that come into play when we\nuse analogies: retrieval of a relevant source domain,\nanalogical mapping across domains, and transfer of\ninformation and learning of new categories or schemas.", "\nIn some cases, such as the structure-mapping theory (§3.4), this\nresearch overlaps directly with the normative questions that are the\nfocus of this entry; indeed, Gentner’s Systematicity\nPrinciple may be interpreted normatively. In other cases, we\nmight view the projects as displacing those traditional\nnormative questions with up-to-date, computational forms of\n naturalized epistemology.\n Two approaches are singled out here because both raise important\nchallenges to the very idea of finding sharp answers to those\nquestions, and both suggest that connectionist models offer a more\nfruitful approach to understanding analogical reasoning.", "\nThe first is the constraint-satisfaction\nmodel (also known as the multiconstraint\ntheory), developed by Holyoak and Thagard (1989, 1995).\nLike Gentner, Holyoak and Thagard regard the heart of analogical\nreasoning as analogy mapping, and they stress the importance\nof systematicity, which they refer to as a structural\nconstraint. Unlike Gentner, they acknowledge two additional types of\nconstraints. Pragmatic constraints take into account the\ngoals and purposes of the agent, recognizing that “the purpose\nwill guide selection” of relevant similarities.\nSemantic constraints represent estimates of the degree to\nwhich people regard source and target items as being alike, rather\nlike Hesse’s “pre-theoretic” similarities.", "\nThe novelty of the multiconstraint theory is that these\nstructural, semantic and pragmatic\nconstraints are implemented not as rigid rules, but rather as\n‘pressures’ supporting or inhibiting potential pairwise\ncorrespondences. The theory is implemented in a connectionist program\ncalled ACME (Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine),\nwhich assigns an initial activation value to each possible pairing\nbetween elements in the source and target domains (based on semantic\nand pragmatic constraints), and then runs through cycles that update\nthe activation values based on overall coherence (structural\nconstraints). The best global analogy mapping emerges under the\npressure of these constraints. Subsequent connectionist models, such\nas Hummel and Holyoak’s LISA program (1997, 2003), have made\nsignificant advances and hold promise for offering a more complete\ntheory of analogical reasoning.", "\nThe second example is Hofstadter and Mitchell’s\nCopycat program (Hofstadter 1995; Mitchell\n1993). The program is “designed to discover insightful\nanalogies, and to do so in a psychologically realistic way”\n(Hofstadter 1995: 205). Copycat operates in the domain of\nletter-strings. The program handles the following type of problem:", "\nSuppose the letter-string abc were changed to abd;\nhow would you change the letter-string ijk in “the same\nway”?", "\nMost people would answer ijl, since it is natural to think\nthat abc was changed to abd by the\n“transformation rule”: replace the rightmost letter with\nits successor. Alternative answers are possible, but do not agree with\nmost people’s sense of what counts as the natural analogy.", "\nHofstadter and Mitchell believe that analogy-making is in large part\nabout the perception of novel patterns, and that such\nperception requires concepts with “fluid” boundaries.\nGenuine analogy-making involves “slippage” of concepts.\nThe Copycat program combines a set of core concepts pertaining to\nletter-sequences (successor, leftmost and so forth)\nwith probabilistic “halos” that link distinct concepts\ndynamically. Orderly structures emerge out of random low-level\nprocesses and the program produces plausible solutions. Copycat thus\nshows that analogy-making can be modeled as a process akin to\nperception, even if the program employs mechanisms distinct from those\nin human perception.", "\nThe multiconstraint theory and Copycat share the idea that analogical\ncognition involves cognitive processes that operate below the level of\nabstract reasoning. Both computational models—to the extent that\nthey are capable of performing successful analogical\nreasoning—challenge the idea that a successful model of\nanalogical reasoning must take the form of a set of quasi-logical\ncriteria. Efforts to develop a quasi-logical theory of\nanalogical reasoning, it might be argued, have failed. In place of\nfaulty inference schemes such as those described earlier\n (§2.2,\n §2.4), computational models substitute procedures\nthat can be judged on their performance rather than on traditional\nphilosophical standards.", "\nIn response to this argument, we should recognize the value of the\nconnectionist models while acknowledging that we still need a theory\nthat offers normative principles for evaluating analogical arguments.\nIn the first place, even if the construction and recognition of\nanalogies are largely a matter of perception, this does not eliminate\nthe need for subsequent critical evaluation of analogical inferences.\nSecond and more importantly, we need to look not just at the\nconstruction of analogy mappings but at the ways in which individual\nanalogical arguments are debated in fields such as mathematics,\nphysics, philosophy and the law. These high-level debates require\nreasoning that bears little resemblance to the computational processes\nof ACME or Copycat. (Ashley’s HYPO (Ashley 1990) is one example\nof a non-connectionist program that focuses on this aspect of\nanalogical reasoning.) There is, accordingly, room for both\ncomputational and traditional philosophical models of analogical\nreasoning.", "\nMost prominent theories of analogy, philosophical and computational,\nare based on overall similarity between source and target\ndomains—defined in terms of some favoured subset of\nHesse’s horizontal relations (see\n §2.2).\n Aristotle and Mill, whose approach is echoed in textbook discussions,\nsuggest counting similarities. Hesse’s theory\n (§3.3)\n favours “pre-theoretic” correspondences. The\nstructure-mapping theory and its successors\n (§3.4)\n look to systematicity, i.e., to correspondences involving complex,\nhigh-level networks of relations. In each of these approaches, the\nproblem is twofold: overall similarity is not a reliable guide to\nplausibility, and it fails to explain the plausibility of any\nanalogical argument.", "\nBartha’s articulation model (2010)\nproposes a different approach, beginning not with horizontal\nrelations, but rather with a classification of analogical arguments on\nthe basis of the vertical relations within each domain. The\nfundamental idea is that a good analogical argument must satisfy two\nconditions:", "\nPrior Association. There must be a clear connection, in the\nsource domain, between the known similarities (the positive analogy)\nand the further similarity that is projected to hold in the target\ndomain (the hypothetical analogy). This relationship determines which\nfeatures of the source are critical to the analogical\ninference.", "\nPotential for Generalization. There must be reason to think\nthat the same kind of connection could obtain in the target domain.\nMore pointedly: there must be no critical disanalogy between\nthe domains.", "\nThe first order of business is to make the prior association explicit.\nThe standards of explicitness vary depending on the nature of this\nassociation (causal relation, mathematical proof, functional\nrelationship, and so forth). The two general principles are fleshed\nout via a set of subordinate models that allow us to identify critical\nfeatures and hence critical disanalogies.", "\nTo see how this works, consider\n Example 7\n (Rectangles and boxes). In this analogical argument, the source\ndomain is two-dimensional geometry: we know that of all rectangles\nwith a fixed perimeter, the square has maximum area. The target domain\nis three-dimensional geometry: by analogy, we conjecture that of all\nboxes with a fixed surface area, the cube has maximum volume. This\nargument should be evaluated not by counting similarities,\nlooking to pre-theoretic resemblances between rectangles and boxes, or\nconstructing connectionist representations of the domains and\ncomputing a systematicity score for possible mappings. Instead, we\nshould begin with a precise articulation of the prior association in\nthe source domain, which amounts to a specific proof for the result\nabout rectangles. We should then identify, relative to that proof, the\ncritical features of the source domain: namely, the concepts and\nassumptions used in the proof. Finally, we should assess the potential\nfor generalization: whether, in the three-dimensional setting, those\ncritical features are known to lack analogues in the target domain.\nThe articulation model is meant to reflect the conversations that can\nand do take place between an advocate and a critic\nof an analogical argument." ], "subsection_title": "3.5 Other theories" }, { "content": [ "\nAs noted in\n §2.4,\n Norton rejects analogical inference rules. But even if we agree with\nNorton on this point, we might still be interested in having an\naccount that gives us guidelines for evaluating analogical arguments.\nHow does Norton’s approach fare on this score?", "\nAccording to Norton, each analogical argument is warranted by local\nfacts that must be investigated and justified empirically. First,\nthere is “the fact of the analogy”: in practice, a\nlow-level uniformity that embraces both the source and target systems.\nSecond, there are additional factual properties of the target system\nwhich, when taken together with the uniformity, warrant the analogical\ninference. Consider Galileo’s famous inference\n (Example 12)\n that there are mountains on the moon (Galileo 1610). Through his\nnewly invented telescope, Galileo observed points of light on the moon\nahead of the advancing edge of sunlight. Noting that the same thing\nhappens on earth when sunlight strikes the mountains, he concluded\nthat there must be mountains on the moon and even provided a\nreasonable estimate of their height. In this example, Norton tells us,\nthe the fact of the analogy is that shadows and other optical\nphenomena are generated in the same way on the earth and on the moon;\nthe additional fact about the target is the existence of points of\nlight ahead of the advancing edge of sunlight on the moon.", "\nWhat are the implications of Norton’s material theory when it\ncomes to evaluating analogical arguments? The fact of the\nanalogy is a local uniformity that powers the inference.\nNorton’s theory works well when such a uniformity is patent or\nnaturally inferred. It doesn’t work well when the uniformity is\nitself the target (rather than the driver) of the\ninference. That happens with explanatory analogies such as\n Example 5\n (the Acoustical Analogy), and mathematical analogies such as\n Example 7\n (Rectangles and Boxes). Similarly, the theory doesn’t\nwork well when the underlying uniformity is unclear, as in\n Example 2\n (Life on other Planets),\n Example 4\n (Clay Pots), and many other cases. In short, if\nNorton’s theory is accepted, then for most analogical arguments\nthere are no useful evaluation criteria.", "\nFor those who sympathize with Norton’s skepticism about\nuniversal inductive schemes and theories of analogical reasoning, yet\nrecognize that his approach may be too local, an appealing strategy is\nto move up one level. We can aim for field-specific “working\nlogics” (Toulmin 1958; Wylie and Chapman 2016; Reiss 2015). This\napproach has been adopted by philosophers of archaeology, evolutionary\nbiology and other historical sciences (Wylie and Chapman 2016; Currie\n2013; Currie 2016; Currie 2018). In place of schemas, we find\n‘toolkits’, i.e., lists of criteria for evaluating\nanalogical reasoning.", "\nFor example, Currie (2016) explores in detail the use of ethnographic\nanalogy\n (Example 13)\n between shamanistic motifs used by the contemporary San people and\nsimilar motifs in ancient rock art, found both among ancestors of the\nSan (direct historical analogy) and in European rock art (indirect\nhistorical analogy). Analogical arguments support the hypothesis that\nin each of these cultures, rock art symbolizes hallucinogenic\nexperiences. Currie examines criteria that focus on assumptions about\nstability of cultural traits and environment-culture relationships.\nCurrie (2016, 2018) and Wylie (Wylie and Chapman 2016) also stress the\nimportance of robustness reasoning that combines analogical arguments\nof moderate strength with other forms of evidence to yield strong\nconclusions.", "\nPractice-based approaches can thus yield specific guidelines unlikely\nto be matched by any general theory of analogical reasoning. One\ncaveat is worth mentioning. Field-specific criteria for ethnographic\nanalogy are elicited against a background of decades of methodological\ncontroversy (Wylie and Chapman 2016). Critics and defenders of\nethnographic analogy have appealed to general models of scientific\nmethod (e.g., hypothetico-deductive method or Bayesian confirmation).\nTo advance the methodological debate, practice-based approaches must\neither make connections to these general models or explain why the\nlack of any such connection is unproblematic.", "\nClose attention to analogical arguments in practice can also provide\nvaluable challenges to general ideas about analogical inference. In an\ninteresting discussion, Steiner (1989, 1998) suggests that many of the\nanalogies that played a major role in early twentieth-century physics\ncount as “Pythagorean.” The term is meant to connote\nmathematical mysticism: a “Pythagorean” analogy is a\npurely formal analogy, one founded on mathematical similarities that\nhave no known physical basis at the time it is proposed. One example\nis Schrödinger’s use of analogy\n (Example 14)\n to “guess” the form of the relativistic wave equation. In\nSteiner’s view, Schrödinger’s reasoning relies upon\nmanipulations and substitutions based on purely mathematical\nanalogies. Steiner argues that the success, and even the plausibility,\nof such analogies “evokes, or should evoke, puzzlement”\n(1989: 454). Both Hesse (1966) and Bartha (2010) reject the idea that\na purely formal analogy, with no physical significance, can support a\nplausible analogical inference in physics. Thus, Steiner’s\narguments provide a serious challenge.", "\nBartha (2010) suggests a response: we can decompose Steiner’s\nexamples into two or more steps, and then establish that at least one\nstep does, in fact, have a physical basis. Fraser (forthcoming),\nhowever, offers a counterexample that supports Steiner’s\nposition. Complex analogies between classical statistical mechanics\n(CSM) and quantum field theory (QFT) have played a crucial role in the\ndevelopment and application of renormalization group (RG) methods in\nboth theories\n (Example 15).\n Fraser notes substantial physical disanalogies between CSM and QFT,\nand concludes that the reasoning is based entirely on formal\nanalogies." ], "subsection_title": "3.6 Practice-based approaches" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWhat philosophical basis can be provided for reasoning by analogy?\nWhat justification can be given for the claim that analogical\narguments deliver plausible conclusions? There have been several ideas\nfor answering this question. One natural strategy assimilates\nanalogical reasoning to some other well-understood argument pattern, a\nform of deductive or inductive reasoning\n (§4.1,\n §4.2). A few philosophers have explored the possibility of\na priori justification\n (§4.3).\n A pragmatic justification may be available for practical applications\nof analogy, notably in legal reasoning\n (§4.4).", "\nAny attempt to provide a general justification for analogical\nreasoning faces a basic dilemma. The demands of generality require a\nhigh-level formulation of the problem and hence an abstract\ncharacterization of analogical arguments, such as schema (4). On the\nother hand, as noted previously, many analogical arguments that\nconform to schema (4) are bad arguments. So a general justification of\nanalogical reasoning cannot provide support for all arguments that\nconform to (4), on pain of proving too much. Instead, it must first\nspecify a subset of putatively ‘good’ analogical\narguments, and link the general justification to this specified\nsubset. The problem of justification is linked to the\nproblem of characterizing good analogical arguments. This\ndifficulty afflicts some of the strategies described in this\nsection." ], "section_title": "4. Philosophical foundations for analogical reasoning", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAnalogical reasoning may be cast in a deductive mold. If\nsuccessful, this strategy neatly solves the problem of justification.\nA valid deductive argument is as good as it gets.", "\nAn early version of the deductivist approach is exemplified by\nAristotle’s treatment of the argument from example\n (§3.2),\n the paradeigma. On this analysis, an analogical argument\nbetween source domain \$S\$ and target \$T\$ begins with the\nassumption of positive analogy \$P(S)\$ and \$P(T)\$, as well as the\nadditional information \$Q(S)\$. It proceeds via the generalization\n\$\\forall x(P(x) \\supset Q(x))\$ to the conclusion: \$Q(T)\$. Provided\nwe can treat that intermediate generalization as an independent\npremise, we have a deductively valid argument. Notice, though, that\nthe existence of the generalization renders the analogy irrelevant. We\ncan derive \$Q(T)\$ from the generalization and \$P(T)\$, without any\nknowledge of the source domain. The literature on analogy in\nargumentation theory\n (§2.2)\n offers further perspectives on this type of analysis, and on the\nquestion of whether analogical arguments are properly characterized as\ndeductive.", "\nSome recent analyses follow Aristotle in treating analogical arguments\nas reliant upon extra (sometimes tacit) premises, typically drawn from\nbackground knowledge, that convert the inference into a deductively\nvalid argument––but without making the source domain\nirrelevant. Davies and Russell introduce a version that relies upon\nwhat they call determination rules (Russell 1986; Davies and\nRussell 1987; Davies 1988). Suppose that \$Q\$ and \$P_1 , \\ldots\n,P_m\$ are variables, and we have background knowledge that the value\nof \$Q\$ is determined by the values of \$P_1 , \\ldots ,P_m\$. In the\nsimplest case, where \$m = 1\$ and both \$P\$ and \$Q\$ are binary\nBoolean variables, this reduces to", "\ni.e., whether or not \$P\$ holds determines whether or not \$Q\$\nholds. More generally, the form of a determination rule is", "\ni.e., \$Q\$ is a function of \$P_1,\\ldots\$, \$P_m\$. If we assume\nsuch a rule as part of our background knowledge, then an analogical\nargument with conclusion \$Q(T)\$ is deductively valid. More\nprecisely, and allowing for the case where \$Q\$ is not a binary\nvariable: if we have such a rule, and also premises stating that the\nsource \$S\$ agrees with the target \$T\$ on all of the values\n\$P_i\$, then we may validly infer that \$Q(T) = Q(S)\$.", "\nThe “determination rule” analysis provides a clear and\nsimple justification for analogical reasoning. Note that, in contrast\nto the Aristotelian analysis via the generalization \$\\forall x(P(x)\n\\supset Q(x))\$, a determination rule does not trivialize the\nanalogical argument. Only by combining the rule with information about\nthe source domain can we derive the value of \$Q(T)\$. To illustrate\nby adapting one of the examples given by Russell and Davies\n (Example 16),\n let’s suppose that the value \$(Q)\$ of a used car (relative to\na particular buyer) is determined by its year, make, mileage,\ncondition, color and accident history (the variables \$P_i)\$. It\ndoesn’t matter if one or more of these factors are redundant or\nirrelevant. Provided two cars are indistinguishable on each of these\npoints, they will have the same value. Knowledge of the source domain\nis necessary; we can’t derive the value of the second car from\nthe determination rule alone. Weitzenfeld (1984) proposes a variant of\nthis approach, advancing the slightly more general thesis that\nanalogical arguments are deductive arguments with a missing\n(enthymematic) premise that amounts to a determination rule.", "\nDo determination rules give us a solution to the problem of providing\na justification for analogical arguments? In general: no. Analogies\nare commonly applied to problems such as\n Example 8\n (morphine and meperidine), where we are not even aware of\nall relevant factors, let alone in possession of a determination rule.\nMedical researchers conduct drug tests on animals without knowing all\nattributes that might be relevant to the effects of the drug. Indeed,\none of the main objectives of such testing is to guard against\nreactions unanticipated by theory. On the “determination\nrule” analysis, we must either limit the scope of such arguments\nto cases where we have a well-supported determination rule, or focus\nattention on formulating and justifying an appropriate determination\nrule. For cases such as animal testing, neither option seems\nrealistic.", "\nRecasting analogy as a deductive argument may help to bring out\nbackground assumptions, but it makes little headway with the problem\nof justification. That problem re-appears as the need to state and\nestablish the plausibility of a determination rule, and that is at\nleast as difficult as justifying the original analogical argument." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Deductive justification" }, { "content": [ "\nSome philosophers have attempted to portray, and justify, analogical\nreasoning in terms of some well-understood inductive argument pattern.\nThere have been three moderately popular versions of this strategy.\nThe first treats analogical reasoning as generalization from a single\ncase. The second treats it as a kind of sampling argument. The third\nrecognizes the argument from analogy as a distinctive form, but treats\npast successes as evidence for future success.", "\nLet’s reconsider Aristotle’s argument from example or\nparadeigma\n (§3.2),\n but this time regard the generalization as justified via induction\nfrom a single case (the source domain). Can such a simple analysis of\nanalogical arguments succeed? In general: no.", "\nA single instance can sometimes lead to a justified generalization.\nCartwright (1992) argues that we can sometimes generalize from a\nsingle careful experiment, “where we have sufficient control of\nthe materials and our knowledge of the requisite background\nassumptions is secure” (51). Cartwright thinks that we can do\nthis, for example, in experiments with compounds that have stable\n“Aristotelian natures.” In a similar spirit, Quine (1969)\nmaintains that we can have instantial confirmation when dealing with\nnatural kinds.", "\nEven if we accept that there are such cases, the objection to\nunderstanding all analogical arguments as single-case induction is\nobvious: the view is simply too restrictive. Most analogical arguments\nwill not meet the requisite conditions. We may not know that we are\ndealing with a natural kind or Aristotelian nature when we make the\nanalogical argument. We may not know which properties are essential.\nAn insistence on the ‘single-case induction’ analysis of\nanalogical reasoning is likely to lead to skepticism (Agassi 1964,\n1988).", "\nInterpreting the argument from analogy as single-case induction is\nalso counter-productive in another way. The simplistic analysis does\nnothing to advance the search for criteria that help us to distinguish\nbetween relevant and irrelevant similarities, and hence between good\nand bad analogical arguments.", "\nOn the sampling conception of analogical arguments, acknowledged\nsimilarities between two domains are treated as statistically relevant\nevidence for further similarities. The simplest version of the\nsampling argument is due to Mill (1843/1930). An argument from\nanalogy, he writes, is “a competition between the known points\nof agreement and the known points of difference.” Agreement of\n\$A\$ and \$B\$ in 9 out of 10 properties implies a probability of 0.9\nthat \$B\$ will possess any other property of \$A\$: “we can\nreasonably expect resemblance in the same proportion” (367). His\nonly restriction has to do with sample size: we must be relatively\nknowledgeable about both \$A\$ and \$B\$. Mill saw no difficulty in\nusing analogical reasoning to infer characteristics of newly\ndiscovered species of plants or animals, given our extensive knowledge\nof botany and zoology. But if the extent of unascertained properties\nof \$A\$ and \$B\$ is large, similarity in a small sample would not be\na reliable guide; hence, Mill’s dismissal of Reid’s\nargument about life on other planets\n (Example 2).", "\nThe sampling argument is presented in more explicit mathematical form\nby Harrod (1956). The key idea is that the known properties of \$S\$\n(the source domain) may be considered a random sample of all\n\$S\$’s properties—random, that is, with respect to the\nattribute of also belonging to \$T\$ (the target domain). If the\nmajority of known properties that belong to \$S\$ also belong to\n\$T\$, then we should expect most other properties of \$S\$ to belong\nto \$T\$, for it is unlikely that we would have come to know just the\ncommon properties. In effect, Harrod proposes a binomial distribution,\nmodeling ‘random selection’ of properties on random\nselection of balls from an urn.", "\nThere are grave difficulties with Harrod’s and Mill’s\nanalyses. One obvious difficulty is the counting\nproblem: the ‘population’ of properties is poorly\ndefined. How are we to count similarities and differences? The ratio\nof shared to total known properties varies dramatically according to\nhow we do this. A second serious difficulty is the problem of\nbias: we cannot justify the assumption that the sample of known\nfeatures is random. In the case of the urn, the selection process is\narranged so that the result of each choice is not influenced by the\nagent’s intentions or purposes, or by prior choices. By\ncontrast, the presentation of an analogical argument is always\npartisan. Bias enters into the initial representation of similarities\nand differences: an advocate of the argument will highlight\nsimilarities, while a critic will play up differences. The paradigm of\nrepeated selection from an urn seems totally inappropriate. Additional\nvariations of the sampling approach have been developed (e.g., Russell\n1988), but ultimately these versions also fail to solve either the\ncounting problem or the problem of bias.", "\nSection\n 3.6\n discussed Steiner’s view that appeal to\n‘Pythagorean’ analogies in physics “evokes, or\nshould evoke, puzzlement” (1989: 454). Liston (2000) offers a\npossible response: physicists are entitled to use Pythagorean\nanalogies on the basis of induction from their past success:", "\n\n\n[The scientist] can admit that no one knows how [Pythagorean]\nreasoning works and argue that the very fact that similar strategies\nhave worked well in the past is already reason enough to continue\npursuing them hoping for success in the present instance. (200)\n", "\nSetting aside familiar worries about arguments from success, the real\nproblem here is to determine what counts as a similar strategy. In\nessence, that amounts to isolating the features of successful\nPythagorean analogies. As we have seen (§2.4), nobody has yet\nprovided a satisfactory scheme that characterizes successful\nanalogical arguments, let alone successful Pythagorean analogical\narguments." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Inductive justification" }, { "content": [ "\nAn a priori approach traces the validity of a pattern of\nanalogical reasoning, or of a particular analogical argument, to some\nbroad and fundamental principle. Three such approaches will be\noutlined here.", "\nThe first is due to Keynes (1921). Keynes appeals to his famous\nPrinciple of the Limitation of Independent Variety, which he\narticulates as follows:", "\nArmed with this Principle and some additional assumptions, Keynes is\nable to show that in cases where there is no negative\nanalogy, knowledge of the positive analogy increases the\n(logical) probability of the conclusion. If there is a non-trivial\nnegative analogy, however, then the probability of the conclusion\nremains unchanged, as was pointed out by Hesse (1966). Those familiar\nwith Carnap’s theory of logical probability will recognize that\nin setting up his framework, Keynes settled on a measure that permits\nno learning from experience.", "\nHesse offers a refinement of Keynes’s strategy, once again along\nCarnapian lines. In her (1974), she proposes what she calls the\nClustering Postulate: the assumption that our epistemic\nprobability function has a built-in bias towards generalization. The\nobjections to such postulates of uniformity are well-known (see Salmon\n1967), but even if we waive them, her argument fails. The main\nobjection here—which also applies to Keynes—is that a\npurely syntactic axiom such as the Clustering Postulate fails\nto discriminate between analogical arguments that are good and those\nthat are clearly without value (according to Hesse’s own\nmaterial criteria, for example).", "\nA different a priori strategy, proposed by Bartha (2010),\nlimits the scope of justification to analogical arguments that satisfy\ntentative criteria for ‘good’ analogical reasoning. The\ncriteria are those specified by the articulation model\n (§3.5).\n In simplified form, they require the existence of non-trivial\npositive analogy and no known critical disanalogy. The scope of\nBartha’s argument is also limited to analogical arguments\ndirected at establishing prima facie plausibility, rather\nthan degree of probability.", "\nBartha’s argument rests on a principle of symmetry reasoning\narticulated by van Fraassen (1989: 236): “problems which are\nessentially the same must receive essentially the same\nsolution.” A modal extension of this principle runs roughly as\nfollows: if problems might be essentially the same, then they\nmight have essentially the same solution. There are two\nmodalities here. Bartha argues that satisfaction of the criteria of\nthe articulation model is sufficient to establish the modality in the\nantecedent, i.e., that the source and target domains ‘might be\nessentially the same’ in relevant respects. He further suggests\nthat prima facie plausibility provides a reasonable reading\nof the modality in the consequent, i.e., that the problems in the two\ndomains ‘might have essentially the same solution.’ To\ncall a hypothesis prima facie plausible is to elevate it to\nthe point where it merits investigation, since it might be\ncorrect.", "\nThe argument is vulnerable to two sorts of concerns. First, there are\nquestions about the interpretation of the symmetry principle. Second,\nthere is a residual worry that this justification, like all the\nothers, proves too much. The articulation model may be too vague or\ntoo permissive." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 A priori justification" }, { "content": [ "\nArguably, the most promising available defense of analogical reasoning\nmay be found in its application to case law (see\n Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning).\n Judicial decisions are based on the verdicts and reasoning that have\ngoverned relevantly similar cases, according to the doctrine of\nstare decisis (Levi 1949; Llewellyn 1960; Cross and Harris\n1991; Sunstein 1993). Individual decisions by a court are\nbinding on that court and lower courts; judges are obligated\nto decide future cases ‘in the same way.’ That is, the\nreasoning applied in an individual decision, referred to as the\nratio decidendi, must be applied to similar future cases (see\n Example 10).\n In practice, of course, the situation is extremely complex. No two\ncases are identical. The ratio must be understood in the\ncontext of the facts of the original case, and there is considerable\nroom for debate about its generality and its applicability to future\ncases. If a consensus emerges that a past case was wrongly decided,\nlater judgments will distinguish it from new cases,\neffectively restricting the scope of the ratio to the\noriginal case.", "\nThe practice of following precedent can be justified by two main\npractical considerations. First, and above all, the practice is\nconservative: it provides a relatively stable basis for\nreplicable decisions. People need to be able to predict the actions of\nthe courts and formulate plans accordingly. Stare decisis\nserves as a check against arbitrary judicial decisions. Second, the\npractice is still reasonably progressive: it allows for the\ngradual evolution of the law. Careful judges distinguish bad\ndecisions; new values and a new consensus can emerge in a series of\ndecisions over time.", "\nIn theory, then, stare decisis strikes a healthy balance\nbetween conservative and progressive social values. This justification\nis pragmatic. It pre-supposes a common set of social values, and links\nthe use of analogical reasoning to optimal promotion of those values.\nNotice also that justification occurs at the level of the practice in\ngeneral; individual analogical arguments sometimes go astray. A full\nexamination of the nature and foundations for stare decisis\nis beyond the scope of this entry, but it is worth asking the\nquestion: might it be possible to generalize the justification for\nstare decisis? Is a parallel pragmatic justification\navailable for analogical arguments in general?", "\nBartha (2010) offers a preliminary attempt to provide such a\njustification by shifting from social values to epistemic values. The\ngeneral idea is that reasoning by analogy is especially well suited to\nthe attainment of a common set of epistemic goals or values. In simple\nterms, analogical reasoning—when it conforms to certain\ncriteria—achieves an excellent (perhaps optimal) balance between\nthe competing demands of stability and innovation. It supports both\nconservative epistemic values, such as simplicity and coherence with\nexisting belief, and progressive epistemic values, such as\nfruitfulness and theoretical unification (McMullin (1993) provides a\nclassic list)." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Pragmatic justification" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAs emphasized earlier, analogical reasoning takes in a great\ndeal more than analogical arguments. In this section, we examine two\nbroad contexts in which analogical reasoning is important.", "\nThe first, still closely linked to analogical arguments, is the\nconfirmation of scientific hypotheses. Confirmation is the process by\nwhich a scientific hypothesis receives inductive support on the basis\nof evidence (see\n evidence,\n confirmation, and\n Bayes’ Theorem).\n Confirmation may also signify the logical relationship of\ninductive support that obtains between a hypothesis \$H\$ and a\nproposition \$E\$ that expresses the relevant evidence. Can analogical\narguments play a role, either in the process or in the logical\nrelationship? Arguably yes (to both), but this role has to be\ndelineated carefully, and several obstacles remain in the way of a\nclear account.", "\nThe second context is conceptual and theoretical development\nin cutting-edge scientific research. Analogies are used to suggest\npossible extensions of theoretical concepts and ideas. The reasoning\nis linked to considerations of plausibility, but there is no\nstraightforward analysis in terms of analogical arguments." ], "section_title": "5. Beyond analogical arguments", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nHow is analogical reasoning related to the confirmation of scientific\nhypotheses? The examples and philosophical discussion from earlier\nsections suggest that a good analogical argument can indeed provide\nsupport for a hypothesis. But there are good reasons to doubt the\nclaim that analogies provide actual confirmation.", "\nIn the first place, there is a logical difficulty. To appreciate this,\nlet us concentrate on confirmation as a relationship between\npropositions. Christensen (1999: 441) offers a helpful general\ncharacterization:", "\nSome propositions seem to help make it rational to believe other\npropositions. When our current confidence in \$E\$ helps make rational\nour current confidence in \$H\$, we say that \$E\$ confirms \$H\$.", "\nIn the Bayesian model, ‘confidence’ is represented in\nterms of subjective probability. A Bayesian agent starts with an\nassignment of subjective probabilities to a class of propositions.\nConfirmation is understood as a three-place relation:", "\n\$E\$ represents a proposition about accepted evidence, \$H\$ stands\nfor a hypothesis, \$K\$ for background knowledge and \$Pr\$ for the\nagent’s subjective probability function. To confirm \$H\$ is to\nraise its conditional probability, relative to \$K\$. The shift from\nprior probability \$Pr(H \\mid K)\$ to posterior\nprobability \$Pr(H \\mid E \\cdot K)\$ is referred to as\nconditionalization on \$E\$. The relation between these two\nprobabilities is typically given by Bayes’ Theorem (setting\naside more complex forms of conditionalization):", "\nFor Bayesians, here is the logical difficulty: it seems that an\nanalogical argument cannot provide confirmation. In the first place,\nit is not clear that we can encapsulate the information contained in\nan analogical argument in a single proposition, \$E\$. Second, even if\nwe can formulate a proposition \$E\$ that expresses that information,\nit is typically not appropriate to treat it as evidence because the\ninformation contained in \$E\$ is already part of the\nbackground, \$K\$. This means that \$E \\cdot K\$ is equivalent to\n\$K\$, and hence \$Pr(H \\mid E \\cdot K) = Pr(H \\mid K)\$. According to\nthe Bayesian definition, we don’t have confirmation. (This is a\nversion of the problem of old evidence; see\n confirmation.)\n Third, and perhaps most important, analogical arguments are often\napplied to novel hypotheses \$H\$ for which the prior probability\n\$Pr(H \\mid K)\$ is not even defined. Again, the definition of\nconfirmation in terms of Bayesian conditionalization seems\ninapplicable.", "\nIf analogies don’t provide inductive support via ordinary\nconditionalization, is there an alternative? Here we face a second\ndifficulty, once again most easily stated within a Bayesian framework.\nVan Fraassen (1989) has a well-known objection to any belief-updating\nrule other than conditionalization. This objection applies to any rule\nthat allows us to boost credences when there is no new evidence. The\ncriticism, made vivid by the tale of Bayesian Peter, is that these\n‘ampliative’ rules are vulnerable to a\n Dutch Book.\n Adopting any such rule would lead us to acknowledge as fair a system\nof bets that foreseeably leads to certain loss. Any rule of this type\nfor analogical reasoning appears to be vulnerable to van\nFraassen’s objection.", "\nThere appear to be at least three routes to avoiding these\ndifficulties and finding a role for analogical arguments within\nBayesian epistemology. First, there is what we might call minimal\nBayesianism. Within the Bayesian framework, some writers\n(Jeffreys 1973; Salmon 1967, 1990; Shimony 1970) have argued that a\n‘seriously proposed’ hypothesis must have a sufficiently\nhigh prior probability to allow it to become preferred as the result\nof observation. Salmon has suggested that analogical reasoning is one\nof the most important means of showing that a hypothesis is\n‘serious’ in this sense. If analogical reasoning is\ndirected primarily towards prior probability assignments, it\ncan provide inductive support while remaining formally distinct from\nconfirmation, avoiding the logical difficulties noted above. This\napproach is minimally Bayesian because it provides nothing more than\nan entry point into the Bayesian apparatus, and it only applies to\nnovel hypotheses. An orthodox Bayesian, such as de Finetti (de Finetti\nand Savage 1972, de Finetti 1974), might have no problem in allowing\nthat analogies play this role.", "\nThe second approach is liberal Bayesianism: we can change our\nprior probabilities in a non-rule-based fashion. Something\nalong these lines is needed if analogical arguments are supposed to\nshift opinion about an already existing hypothesis without\nany new evidence. This is common in fields such as archaeology, as\npart of a strategy that Wylie refers to as “mobilizing old data\nas new evidence” (Wylie and Chapman 2016: 95). As Hawthorne\n(2012) notes, some Bayesians simply accept that both initial\nassignments and ongoing revision of prior probabilities\n(based on plausibility arguments) can be rational, but", "\nthe logic of Bayesian induction (as described here) has\nnothing to say about what values the prior plausibility assessments\nfor hypotheses should have; and it places no restrictions on how they\nmight change.", "\nIn other words, by not stating any rules for this type of probability\nrevision, we avoid the difficulties noted by van Fraassen. This\napproach admits analogical reasoning into the Bayesian tent, but\nacknowledges a dark corner of the tent in which rationality operates\nwithout any clear rules.", "\nRecently, a third approach has attracted interest: analogue\nconfirmation or confirmation via analogue simulation. As\ndescribed in (Dardashti et al. 2017), the idea is as follows:", "\n\n\nOur key idea is that, in certain circumstances, predictions concerning\ninaccessible phenomena can be confirmed via an analogue simulation in\na different system. (57)\n", "\nDardashti and his co-authors concentrate on a particular example\n (Example 17):\n ‘dumb holes’ and other analogues to gravitational black\nholes (Unruh 1981; Unruh 2008). Unlike real black holes, some of these\nanalogues can be (and indeed have been) implemented and studied in the\nlab. Given the exact formal analogy between our models for these\nsystems and our models of black holes, and certain important\nadditional assumptions, Dardashti et al. make the controversial claim\nthat observations made about the analogues provide evidence about\nactual black holes. For instance, the observation of phenomena\nanalogous to Hawking radiation in the analogue systems would provide\nconfirmation for the existence of Hawking radiation in black holes. In\na second paper (Dardashti et al. 2018, Other Internet Resources), the\ncase for confirmation is developed within a Bayesian framework.", "\nThe appeal of a clearly articulated mechanism for analogue\nconfirmation is obvious. It would provide a tool for exploring\nconfirmation of inaccessible phenomena not just in cosmology, but also\nin historical sciences such as archaeology and evolutionary biology,\nand in areas of medical science where ethical constraints rule out\nexperiments on human subjects. Furthermore, as noted by Dardashti et\nal., analogue confirmation relies on new evidence obtained\nfrom the analogue system, and is therefore not vulnerable to the\nlogical difficulties noted above.", "\nAlthough the concept of analogue confirmation is not entirely new\n(think of animal testing, as in\n Example 8),\n the claims of (Dardashti et al. 2017, 2018 [Other Internet\nResources]) require evaluation. One immediate difficulty for the black\nhole example: if we think in terms of ordinary analogical arguments,\nthere is no positive analogy because, to put it simply, we\nhave no basis of known similarities between a ‘dumb hole’\nand a black hole. As Crowther et al. (2018, Other Internet Resources)\nargue, “it is not known if the particular modelling framework\nused in the derivation of Hawking radiation actually describes\nblack holes in the first place.” This may not concern\nDardashti et al., since they claim that analogue confirmation is\ndistinct from ordinary analogical arguments. It may turn out that\nanalogue confirmation is different for cases such as animal testing,\nwhere we have a basis of known similarities, and for cases where our\nonly access to the target domain is via a theoretical model." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Analogy and confirmation" } ] } ]	[ "Achinstein, P., 1964, “Models, Analogies and\nTheories,” Philosophy of Science, 31:\n328–349.", "Agassi, J., 1964, “Discussion: Analogies as\nGeneralizations,” Philosophy of Science, 31:\n351–356.", "–––, 1988, “Analogies Hard and\nSoft,” in D.H. 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Chapman, 2016, Evidential Reasoning in\nArchaeology, Bloomsbury Academic." ]	[ { "href": "../abduction/", "text": "abduction" }, { "href": "../analogy-medieval/", "text": "analogy: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../argument/", "text": "argument and argumentation" }, { "href": "../bayes-theorem/", "text": "Bayes’ Theorem" }, { "href": "../confirmation/", "text": "confirmation" }, { "href": "../epistemology-bayesian/", "text": "epistemology: Bayesian" }, { "href": "../evidence/", "text": "evidence" }, { "href": "../legal-reas-prec/", "text": "legal reasoning: precedent and analogy in" }, { "href": "../logic-inductive/", "text": "logic: inductive" }, { "href": "../metaphor/", "text": "metaphor" }, { "href": "../models-science/", "text": "models in science" }, { "href": "../probability-interpret/", "text": "probability, interpretations of" }, { "href": "../scientific-discovery/", "text": "scientific discovery" } ]
analysis	Analysis	First published Mon Apr 7, 2003; substantive revision Wed Mar 19, 2014	[ "\n\nAnalysis has always been at the heart of philosophical method, but it\nhas been understood and practised in many different ways. Perhaps, in\nits broadest sense, it might be defined as a process of isolating or \nworking back to what is more fundamental by means of which something,\ninitially taken as given, can be explained or reconstructed. The \nexplanation or reconstruction is often then exhibited in a \ncorresponding process of synthesis. This allows great variation in \nspecific method, however. The aim may be to get back to basics, but \nthere may be all sorts of ways of doing this, each of which might be \ncalled ‘analysis’. The dominance of \n‘analytic’ philosophy in the English-speaking world, and \nincreasingly now in the rest of the world, might suggest that a \nconsensus has formed concerning the role and importance of analysis. \nThis assumes, though, that there is agreement on what \n‘analysis’ means, and this is far from clear. On the \nother hand, Wittgenstein's later critique of analysis in the \nearly (logical atomist) period of analytic philosophy, and \nQuine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction, for \nexample, have led some to claim that we are now in a \n‘post-analytic’ age. Such criticisms, however, are only \ndirected at particular conceptions of analysis. If we look at the \nhistory of philosophy, and even if we just look at the history of \nanalytic philosophy, we find a rich and extensive repertoire of \nconceptions of analysis which philosophers have continually drawn \nupon and reconfigured in different ways. Analytic philosophy is alive\nand well precisely because of the range of conceptions of analysis \nthat it involves. It may have fragmented into various interlocking \nsubtraditions, but those subtraditions are held together by both \ntheir shared history and their methodological interconnections. It is\nthe aim of this article to indicate something of the range of \nconceptions of analysis in the history of philosophy and their \ninterconnections, and to provide a bibliographical resource for those\nwishing to explore analytic methodologies and the philosophical \nissues that they raise." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. General Introduction", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Characterizations of Analysis", "1.2 Guide to this Entry", "Supplementary Document: Definitions and Descriptions of Analysis" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Ancient Conceptions of Analysis and the Emergence of the Regressive Conception", "sub_toc": [ "Supplementary Document: Ancient Conceptions of Analysis" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Medieval and Renaissance Conceptions of Analysis", "sub_toc": [ "Supplementary Document: Medieval and Renaissance Conceptions of Analysis" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Early Modern Conceptions of Analysis and the Development of the Decompositional Conception", "sub_toc": [ "Supplementary Document: Early Modern Conceptions of Analysis" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Modern Conceptions of Analysis, outside Analytic Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic Philosophy and the Introduction of the Logical (Transformative) Conception", "sub_toc": [ "Supplementary Document: Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic Philosophy" ] }, { "content_title": "7. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nThis section provides a preliminary description of analysis—or \nthe range of different conceptions of analysis—and a guide to \nthis article as a whole." ], "section_title": "1. General Introduction", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nIf asked what ‘analysis’ means, most people today \nimmediately think of breaking something down into its components; and\nthis is how analysis tends to be officially characterized. In the \nConcise Oxford Dictionary, for example, \n‘analysis’ is defined as the “resolution into \nsimpler elements by analysing (opp. synthesis)”, the \nonly other uses mentioned being the mathematical and the \npsychological \n [Quotation].\n And in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, \n‘analysis’ is defined as “the process of breaking a\nconcept down into more simple parts, so that its logical structure is\ndisplayed” \n [Quotation].\n The restriction to concepts and the reference to displaying \n‘logical structure’ are important qualifications, but the\ncore conception remains that of breaking something down.", "\n\nThis conception may be called the decompositional conception\nof analysis (see \n Section 4).\n But it is not the only conception, and indeed is arguably neither the\ndominant conception in the pre-modern period nor the conception that \nis characteristic of at least one major strand in \n‘analytic’ philosophy. In ancient Greek thought, \n‘analysis’ referred primarily to the process of working \nback to first principles by means of which something could then be \ndemonstrated. This conception may be called the regressive \nconception of analysis (see \n Section 2).\n In the work of Frege and Russell, on the other hand, before the \nprocess of decomposition could take place, the statements to be \nanalyzed had first to be translated into their ‘correct’ \nlogical form (see \n Section 6).\n This suggests that analysis also involves a transformative \nor interpretive dimension. This too, however, has its roots \nin earlier thought (see especially the supplementary sections on \n Ancient Greek Geometry\n and \n Medieval Philosophy).\n ", "\n\nThese three conceptions should not be seen as competing. In actual \npractices of analysis, which are invariably richer than the accounts \nthat are offered of them, all three conceptions are typically \nreflected, though to differing degrees and in differing forms. To \nanalyze something, we may first have to interpret it in some way, \ntranslating an initial statement, say, into the privileged language \nof logic, mathematics or science, before articulating the relevant \nelements and structures, and all in the service of identifying \nfundamental principles by means of which to explain it. The \ncomplexities that this schematic description suggests can only be \nappreciated by considering particular types of analysis.", "\n\nUnderstanding conceptions of analysis is not simply a matter of \nattending to the use of the word ‘analysis’ and its \ncognates—or obvious equivalents in languages other than \nEnglish, such as ‘analusis’ in Greek or \n‘Analyse’ in German. Socratic definition is \narguably a form of conceptual analysis, yet the term \n‘analusis’ does not occur anywhere in \nPlato's dialogues (see \n Section 2\n below). Nor, indeed, do we find it in Euclid's \nElements, which is the classic text for understanding \nancient Greek geometry: Euclid presupposed what came to be known as \nthe method of analysis in presenting his proofs \n‘synthetically’. In Latin, \n‘resolutio’ was used to render the Greek word \n‘analusis’, and although \n‘resolution’ has a different range of meanings, it is \noften used synonymously with ‘analysis’ (see the \nsupplementary section on \n Renaissance Philosophy).\n In Aristotelian syllogistic theory, and especially from the time of \nDescartes, forms of analysis have also involved \n‘reduction’; and in early analytic philosophy it was \n‘reduction’ that was seen as the goal of philosophical \nanalysis (see especially the supplementary section on \n The Cambridge School of Analysis).\n ", "\n\nFurther details of characterizations of analysis that have been \noffered in the history of philosophy, including all the classic \npassages and remarks (to which occurrences of \n ‘[Quotation]’\n throughout this entry refer), can be found in the supplementary \ndocument on", "Definitions and Descriptions of Analysis.", "\n\nA list of key reference works, monographs and collections can be \nfound in the", "Annotated Bibliography, §1." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Characterizations of Analysis" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThis entry comprises three sets of documents:", "\n\nThe present document provides an overview, with introductions to the \nvarious conceptions of analysis in the history of philosophy. It also\ncontains links to the supplementary documents, the documents in the \nbibliography, and other internet resources. The supplementary \ndocuments expand on certain topics under each of the six main \nsections. The annotated bibliography contains a list of key readings \non each topic, and is also divided according to the sections of this \nentry." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Guide to this Entry" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe word ‘analysis’ derives from the ancient Greek term \n‘analusis’. The prefix \n‘ana’ means ‘up’, and \n‘lusis’ means ‘loosing’, \n‘release’ or ‘separation’, so that \n‘analusis’ means ‘loosening up’ or \n‘dissolution’. The term was readily extended to the \nsolving or dissolving of a problem, and it was in this sense that it \nwas employed in ancient Greek geometry and philosophy. The method of \nanalysis that was developed in ancient Greek geometry had an \ninfluence on both Plato and Aristotle. Also important, however, was \nthe influence of Socrates's concern with definition, in which \nthe roots of modern conceptual analysis can be found. What we have in\nancient Greek thought, then, is a complex web of methodologies, of \nwhich the most important are Socratic definition, which Plato \nelaborated into his method of division, his related method of \nhypothesis, which drew on geometrical analysis, and the method(s) \nthat Aristotle developed in his Analytics. Far from a \nconsensus having established itself over the last two millennia, the \nrelationships between these methodologies are the subject of \nincreasing debate today. At the heart of all of them, too, lie the \nphilosophical problems raised by Meno's paradox, which \nanticipates what we now know as the paradox of analysis, concerning \nhow an analysis can be both correct and informative (see the \nsupplementary section on \n Moore),\n and Plato's attempt to solve it through the theory of \nrecollection, which has spawned a vast literature on its own.", "\n\n‘Analysis’ was first used in a methodological sense in \nancient Greek geometry, and the model that Euclidean geometry \nprovided has been an inspiration ever since. Although Euclid's \nElements dates from around 300 BC, and hence after both \nPlato and Aristotle, it is clear that it draws on the work of many \nprevious geometers, most notably, Theaetetus and Eudoxus, who worked \nclosely with Plato and Aristotle. Plato is even credited by Diogenes \nLaertius (LEP, I, 299) with inventing the method of \nanalysis, but whatever the truth of this may be, the influence of \ngeometry starts to show in his middle dialogues, and he certainly \nencouraged work on geometry in his Academy.", "\n\nThe classic source for our understanding of ancient Greek geometrical\nanalysis is a passage in Pappus's Mathematical \nCollection, which was composed around 300 AD, and hence drew on \na further six centuries of work in geometry from the time of \nEuclid's Elements:", "Now analysis is the way from what is sought—as if it\nwere admitted—through its concomitants (akolouthôn)\nin order[,] to something admitted in synthesis. For in analysis we suppose\nthat which is sought to be already done, and we inquire from what it\nresults, and again what is the antecedent of the latter, until we on\nour backward way light upon something already known and being first in\norder. And we call such a method analysis, as being a solution\nbackwards (anapalin lysin). \n\n\n\nIn synthesis, on the other hand, we suppose that which was reached \nlast in analysis to be already done, and arranging in their natural \norder as consequents (epomena) the former antecedents and \nlinking them one with another, we in the end arrive at the \nconstruction of the thing sought. And this we call synthesis. \n [Full Quotation]\n \n", "\n\nAnalysis is clearly being understood here in the regressive \nsense—as involving the working back from ‘what is \nsought’, taken as assumed, to something more fundamental by \nmeans of which it can then be established, through its converse, \nsynthesis. For example, to demonstrate Pythagoras's \ntheorem—that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled \ntriangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two \nsides—we may assume as ‘given’ a right-angled triangle with the\nthree squares drawn on its sides. In investigating the properties of \nthis complex figure we may draw further (auxiliary) lines between \nparticular points and find that there are a number of congruent \ntriangles, from which we can begin to work out the relationship \nbetween the relevant areas. Pythagoras's theorem thus depends \non theorems about congruent triangles, and once these—and \nother—theorems have been identified (and themselves proved), \nPythagoras's theorem can be proved. (The theorem is \ndemonstrated in Proposition 47 of Book I of Euclid's \nElements.)", "\n\nThe basic idea here provides the core of the conception of analysis \nthat one can find reflected, in its different ways, in the work of \nPlato and Aristotle (see the supplementary sections on \n Plato\n and \n Aristotle).\n Although detailed examination of actual practices of analysis reveals\nmore than just regression to first causes, principles or theorems, \nbut decomposition and transformation as well (see \nespecially the supplementary section on \n Ancient Greek Geometry),\n the regressive conception dominated views of analysis until well into\nthe early modern period.", "\n\nAncient Greek geometry was not the only source of later conceptions \nof analysis, however. Plato may not have used the term \n‘analysis’ himself, but concern with definition was \ncentral to his dialogues, and definitions have often been seen as \nwhat ‘conceptual analysis’ should yield. The definition \nof ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’ (or\n‘true belief with an account’, in more Platonic terms) is\nperhaps the classic example. Plato's concern may have been with\nreal rather than nominal definitions, with ‘essences’ \nrather than mental or linguistic contents (see the supplementary \nsection on \n Plato),\n but conceptual analysis, too, has frequently been given a \n‘realist’ construal. Certainly, the roots of conceptual \nanalysis can be traced back to Plato's search for definitions, \nas we shall see in \n Section 4\n below.", "\n\nFurther discussion can be found in the supplementary document on", "Ancient Conceptions of Analysis.", "\n\nFurther reading can be found in the", "Annotated Bibliography, §2." ], "section_title": "2. Ancient Conceptions of Analysis and the Emergence of the Regressive Conception", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nConceptions of analysis in the medieval and renaissance periods were \nlargely influenced by ancient Greek conceptions. But knowledge of \nthese conceptions was often second-hand, filtered through a variety \nof commentaries and texts that were not always reliable. Medieval and\nrenaissance methodologies tended to be uneasy mixtures of Platonic, \nAristotelian, Stoic, Galenic and neo-Platonic elements, many of them \nclaiming to have some root in the geometrical conception of analysis \nand synthesis. However, in the late medieval period, clearer and more\noriginal forms of analysis started to take shape. In the literature \non so-called ‘syncategoremata’ and \n‘exponibilia’, for example, we can trace the development \nof a conception of interpretive analysis. Sentences involving more \nthan one quantifier such as ‘Some donkey every man sees’,\nfor example, were recognized as ambiguous, requiring \n‘exposition’ to clarify.", "\n\nIn John Buridan's masterpiece of the mid-fourteenth century, \nthe Summulae de Dialectica, we can find all three of the \nconceptions outlined in \n Section 1.1\n above. He distinguishes explicitly between divisions, definitions and\ndemonstrations, corresponding to decompositional, interpretive and \nregressive analysis, respectively. Here, in particular, we have \nanticipations of modern analytic philosophy as much as reworkings of \nancient philosophy. Unfortunately, however, these clearer forms of \nanalysis became overshadowed during the Renaissance, despite—or\nperhaps because of—the growing interest in the original Greek \nsources. As far as understanding analytic methodologies was \nconcerned, the humanist repudiation of scholastic logic muddied the \nwaters.", "\n\nFurther discussion can be found in the supplementary document on", "Medieval and Renaissance Conceptions of Analysis.", "\n\nFurther reading can be found in the", "Annotated Bibliography, §3." ], "section_title": "3. Medieval and Renaissance Conceptions of Analysis", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe scientific revolution in the seventeenth century brought with it \nnew forms of analysis. The newest of these emerged through the \ndevelopment of more sophisticated mathematical techniques, but even \nthese still had their roots in earlier conceptions of analysis. By \nthe end of the early modern period, decompositional analysis had \nbecome dominant (as outlined in what follows), but this, too, took \ndifferent forms, and the relationships between the various \nconceptions of analysis were often far from clear.", "\n\nIn common with the Renaissance, the early modern period was marked by\na great concern with methodology. This might seem unsurprising in \nsuch a revolutionary period, when new techniques for understanding \nthe world were being developed and that understanding itself was \nbeing transformed. But what characterizes many of the treatises and \nremarks on methodology that appeared in the seventeenth century is \ntheir appeal, frequently self-conscious, to ancient methods (despite,\nor perhaps—for diplomatic reasons—because of, the \ncritique of the content of traditional thought), although \nnew wine was generally poured into the old bottles. The model of \ngeometrical analysis was a particular inspiration here, albeit \nfiltered through the Aristotelian tradition, which had assimilated \nthe regressive process of going from theorems to axioms with that of \nmoving from effects to causes (see the supplementary section on \n Aristotle).\n Analysis came to be seen as a method of discovery, working back from \nwhat is ordinarily known to the underlying reasons (demonstrating \n‘the fact’), and synthesis as a method of proof, working \nforwards again from what is discovered to what needed explanation \n(demonstrating ‘the reason why’). Analysis and synthesis \nwere thus taken as complementary, although there remained \ndisagreement over their respective merits.", "\n\nThere is a manuscript by Galileo, dating from around 1589, an \nappropriated commentary on Aristotle's Posterior \nAnalytics, which shows his concern with methodology, and \nregressive analysis, in particular (see Wallace 1992a and 1992b). \nHobbes wrote a chapter on method in the first part of De \nCorpore, published in 1655, which offers his own interpretation \nof the method of analysis and synthesis, where decompositional forms \nof analysis are articulated alongside regressive forms \n [Quotations].\n But perhaps the most influential account of methodology, from the \nmiddle of the seventeenth century until well into the nineteenth \ncentury, was the fourth part of the Port-Royal Logic, the \nfirst edition of which appeared in 1662 and the final revised edition\nin 1683. Chapter 2 (which was the first chapter in the first edition)\nopens as follows:", "The art of arranging a series of thoughts properly, either\nfor discovering the truth when we do not know it, or for proving to\nothers what we already know, can generally be called method. \n\n\n\nHence there are two kinds of method, one for discovering the truth, \nwhich is known as analysis, or the method of \nresolution, and which can also be called the method of \ndiscovery. The other is for making the truth understood by \nothers once it is found. This is known as synthesis, or the \nmethod of composition, and can also be called the method\nof instruction. \n [Fuller Quotations]\n \n", "\n\nThat a number of different methods might be assimilated here is not \nnoted, although the text does go on to distinguish four main types of\n‘issues concerning things’: seeking causes by their \neffects, seeking effects by their causes, finding the whole from the \nparts, and looking for another part from the whole and a given part \n(ibid., 234). While the first two involve regressive \nanalysis and synthesis, the third and fourth involve decompositional \nanalysis and synthesis.", "\n\nAs the authors of the Logic make clear, this particular part\nof their text derives from Descartes's Rules for the \nDirection of the Mind, written around 1627, but only published \nposthumously in 1684. The specification of the four types was most \nlikely offered in elaborating Descartes's Rule Thirteen, which \nstates: “If we perfectly understand a problem we must abstract \nit from every superfluous conception, reduce it to its simplest terms\nand, by means of an enumeration, divide it up into the smallest \npossible parts.” (PW, I, 51. Cf. the editorial \ncomments in PW, I, 54, 77.) The decompositional conception \nof analysis is explicit here, and if we follow this up into the later\nDiscourse on Method, published in 1637, the focus has \nclearly shifted from the regressive to the decompositional conception\nof analysis. All the rules offered in the earlier work have now been \nreduced to just four. This is how Descartes reports the rules he says\nhe adopted in his scientific and philosophical work:", "The first was never to accept anything as true if I did not\nhave evident knowledge of its truth: that is, carefully to avoid\nprecipitate conclusions and preconceptions, and to include nothing more\nin my judgements than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and\nso distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it. \n\n\n\nThe second, to divide each of the difficulties I examined into as \nmany parts as possible and as may be required in order to resolve \nthem better.\n\n\n\nThe third, to direct my thoughts in an orderly manner, by beginning \nwith the simplest and most easily known objects in the order to \nascend little by little, step by step, to knowledge of the most \ncomplex, and by supposing some order even among objects that have no \nnatural order of precedence.\n\n\n\nAnd the last, throughout to make enumerations so complete, and \nreviews so comprehensive, that I could be sure of leaving nothing \nout. (PW, I, 120.)\n", "\n\nThe first two are rules of analysis and the second two rules of \nsynthesis. But although the analysis/synthesis structure remains, \nwhat is involved here is decomposition/composition rather than \nregression/progression. Nevertheless, Descartes insisted that it was \ngeometry that influenced him here: “Those long chains composed \nof very simple and easy reasonings, which geometers customarily use \nto arrive at their most difficult demonstrations, had given me \noccasion to suppose that all the things which can fall under human \nknowledge are interconnected in the same way.” (Ibid. \n [Further Quotations])\n ", "\n\nDescartes's geometry did indeed involve the breaking down of \ncomplex problems into simpler ones. More significant, however, was \nhis use of algebra in developing ‘analytic’ geometry as \nit came to be called, which allowed geometrical problems to be \ntransformed into arithmetical ones and more easily solved. In \nrepresenting the ‘unknown’ to be found by \n‘x’, we can see the central role played in \nanalysis by the idea of taking something as ‘given’ and \nworking back from that, which made it seem appropriate to regard \nalgebra as an ‘art of analysis’, alluding to the \nregressive conception of the ancients. Illustrated in analytic \ngeometry in its developed form, then, we can see all three of the \nconceptions of analysis outlined in \n Section 1.1\n above, despite Descartes's own emphasis on the decompositional \nconception. For further discussion of this, see the supplementary \nsection on \n Descartes and Analytic Geometry.\n ", "\n\nDescartes's emphasis on decompositional analysis was not \nwithout precedents, however. Not only was it already involved in \nancient Greek geometry, but it was also implicit in Plato's \nmethod of collection and division. We might explain the shift from \nregressive to decompositional (conceptual) analysis, as well as the \nconnection between the two, in the following way. Consider a simple \nexample, as represented in the diagram below, \n‘collecting’ all animals and ‘dividing’ them \ninto rational and non-rational, in order to define \nhuman beings as rational animals.", "", "\n\nOn this model, in seeking to define anything, we work back up the \nappropriate classificatory hierarchy to find the higher (i.e., more \nbasic or more general) ‘Forms’, by means of which we can \nlay down the definition. Although Plato did not himself use the term \n‘analysis’—the word for ‘division’ was \n‘dihairesis’—the finding of the \nappropriate ‘Forms’ is essentially analysis. As an \nelaboration of the Socratic search for definitions, we clearly have \nin this the origins of conceptual analysis. There is little \ndisagreement that ‘Human beings are rational animals’ is \nthe kind of definition we are seeking, defining one concept, the \nconcept human being, in terms of other concepts, the \nconcepts rational and animal. But the construals \nthat have been offered of this have been more problematic. \nUnderstanding a classificatory hierarchy extensionally, that\nis, in terms of the classes of things denoted, the classes higher up \nare clearly the larger, ‘containing’ the classes lower \ndown as subclasses (e.g., the class of animals includes the class of \nhuman beings as one of its subclasses). Intensionally, \nhowever, the relationship of ‘containment’ has been seen \nas holding in the opposite direction. If someone understands the \nconcept human being, at least in the strong sense of knowing\nits definition, then they must understand the concepts \nanimal and rational; and it has often then seemed \nnatural to talk of the concept human being as \n‘containing’ the concepts rational and \nanimal. Working back up the hierarchy in \n‘analysis’ (in the regressive sense) could then come to \nbe identified with ‘unpacking’ or \n‘decomposing’ a concept into its \n‘constituent’ concepts (‘analysis’ in the \ndecompositional sense). Of course, talking of \n‘decomposing’ a concept into its \n‘constituents’ is, strictly speaking, only a metaphor (as\nQuine was famously to remark in §1 of ‘Two Dogmas of \nEmpiricism’), but in the early modern period, this began to be \ntaken more literally.", "\n\nFor further discussion, see the supplementary document on", "Early Modern Conceptions of Analysis,", "\n\nwhich contains sections on Descartes and Analytic Geometry, British \nEmpiricism, Leibniz, and Kant.", "\n\nFor further reading, see the", "Annotated Bibliography, §4." ], "section_title": "4. Early Modern Conceptions of Analysis and the Development of the Decompositional Conception", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAs suggested in the supplementary document on \n Kant,\n the decompositional conception of analysis found its classic \nstatement in the work of Kant at the end of the eighteenth century. \nBut Kant was only expressing a conception widespread at the time. The\nconception can be found in a very blatant form, for example, in the \nwritings of Moses Mendelssohn, for whom, unlike Kant, it was \napplicable even in the case of geometry \n [Quotation].\n Typified in Kant's and Mendelssohn's view of concepts, it\nwas also reflected in scientific practice. Indeed, its popularity was\nfostered by the chemical revolution inaugurated by Lavoisier in the \nlate eighteenth century, the comparison between philosophical \nanalysis and chemical analysis being frequently drawn. As Lichtenberg\nput it, “Whichever way you look at it, philosophy is always \nanalytical chemistry” \n [Quotation].\n ", "\n\nThis decompositional conception of analysis set the methodological \nagenda for philosophical approaches and debates in the (late) modern \nperiod (nineteenth and twentieth centuries). Responses and \ndevelopments, very broadly, can be divided into two. On the one hand,\nan essentially decompositional conception of analysis was accepted, \nbut a critical attitude was adopted towards it. If analysis simply \ninvolved breaking something down, then it appeared destructive and \nlife-diminishing, and the critique of analysis that this view \nengendered was a common theme in idealism and romanticism in all its \nmain varieties—from German, British and French to North \nAmerican. One finds it reflected, for example, in remarks about the \nnegating and soul-destroying power of analytical thinking by Schiller\n\n [Quotation],\n Hegel \n [Quotation]\n and de Chardin \n [Quotation],\n in Bradley's doctrine that analysis is falsification \n [Quotation],\n and in the emphasis placed by Bergson on ‘intuition’ \n [Quotation].\n ", "\n\nOn the other hand, analysis was seen more positively, but the Kantian\nconception underwent a certain degree of modification and \ndevelopment. In the nineteenth century, this was exemplified, in \nparticular, by Bolzano and the neo-Kantians. Bolzano's most \nimportant innovation was the method of variation, which involves \nconsidering what happens to the truth-value of a sentence when a \nconstituent term is substituted by another. This formed the basis for\nhis reconstruction of the analytic/synthetic distinction, \nKant's account of which he found defective. The neo-Kantians \nemphasized the role of structure in conceptualized experience and had\na greater appreciation of forms of analysis in mathematics and \nscience. In many ways, their work attempts to do justice to \nphilosophical and scientific practice while recognizing the central \nidealist claim that analysis is a kind of abstraction that inevitably\ninvolves falsification or distortion. On the neo-Kantian view, the \ncomplexity of experience is a complexity of form and content rather \nthan of separable constituents, requiring analysis into \n‘moments’ or ‘aspects’ rather than \n‘elements’ or ‘parts’. In the 1910s, the idea\nwas articulated with great subtlety by Ernst Cassirer \n [Quotation],\n and became familiar in Gestalt psychology.", "\n\nIn the twentieth century, both analytic philosophy and phenomenology \ncan be seen as developing far more sophisticated conceptions of \nanalysis, which draw on but go beyond mere decompositional analysis. \nThe following \n Section\n offers an account of analysis in analytic philosophy, illustrating \nthe range and richness of the conceptions and practices that arose. \nBut it is important to see these in the wider context of \ntwentieth-century methodological practices and debates, for it is not\njust in ‘analytic’ philosophy—despite its \nname—that analytic methods are accorded a central role. \nPhenomenology, in particular, contains its own distinctive set of \nanalytic methods, with similarities and differences to those of \nanalytic philosophy. Phenomenological analysis has frequently been \ncompared to conceptual clarification in the ordinary language \ntradition, for example, and the method of ‘phenomenological \nreduction’ that Husserl invented in 1905 offers a striking \nparallel to the reductive project opened up by Russell's theory\nof descriptions, which also made its appearance in 1905.", "\n\nJust like Frege and Russell, Husserl's initial concern was with\nthe foundations of mathematics, and in this shared concern we can see\nthe continued influence of the regressive conception of analysis. \nAccording to Husserl, the aim of ‘eidetic reduction’, as \nhe called it, was to isolate the ‘essences’ that underlie\nour various forms of thinking, and to apprehend them by \n‘essential intuition’ \n(‘Wesenserschauung’). The terminology may be \ndifferent, but this resembles Russell's early project to \nidentify the ‘indefinables’ of philosophical logic, as he\ndescribed it, and to apprehend them by ‘acquaintance’ \n(cf. POM, xx). Furthermore, in Husserl's later \ndiscussion of ‘explication’ (cf. EJ, \n§§ 22-4 \n [Quotations]),\n we find appreciation of the ‘transformative’ dimension of\nanalysis, which can be fruitfully compared with Carnap's \naccount of explication (see the supplementary section on \n Carnap and Logical Positivism).\n Carnap himself describes Husserl's idea here as one of \n“the synthesis of identification between a confused, \nnonarticulated sense and a subsequently intended distinct, \narticulated sense” (1950, 3 \n [Quotation]).\n ", "\n\nPhenomenology is not the only source of analytic methodologies \noutside those of the analytic tradition. Mention might be made here, \ntoo, of R. G. Collingwood, working within the tradition of British \nidealism, which was still a powerful force prior to the Second World \nWar. In his Essay on Philosophical Method (1933), for \nexample, he criticizes Moorean philosophy, and develops his own \nresponse to what is essentially the paradox of analysis (concerning \nhow an analysis can be both correct and informative), which he \nrecognizes as having its root in Meno's paradox. In his \nEssay on Metaphysics (1940), he puts forward his own \nconception of metaphysical analysis, in direct response to what he \nperceived as the mistaken repudiation of metaphysics by the logical \npositivists. Metaphysical analysis is characterized here as the \ndetection of ‘absolute presuppositions’, which are taken \nas underlying and shaping the various conceptual practices that can \nbe identified in the history of philosophy and science. Even among \nthose explicitly critical of central strands in analytic philosophy, \nthen, analysis in one form or another can still be seen as alive and \nwell.", "\nFor further reading, see the", "Annotated Bibliography, §5." ], "section_title": "5. Modern Conceptions of Analysis, outside Analytic Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIf anything characterizes ‘analytic’ philosophy, then it \nis presumably the emphasis placed on analysis. But as the foregoing \nsections have shown, there is a wide range of conceptions of \nanalysis, so such a characterization says nothing that would \ndistinguish analytic philosophy from much of what has either preceded\nor developed alongside it. Given that the decompositional conception \nis usually offered as the main conception today, it might be thought \nthat it is this that characterizes analytic philosophy. But this \nconception was prevalent in the early modern period, shared by both \nthe British Empiricists and Leibniz, for example. Given that Kant \ndenied the importance of decompositional analysis, however, it might \nbe suggested that what characterizes analytic philosophy is the \nvalue it places on such analysis. This might be true of \nMoore's early work, and of one strand within analytic \nphilosophy; but it is not generally true. What characterizes analytic\nphilosophy as it was founded by Frege and Russell is the role played \nby logical analysis, which depended on the development of \nmodern logic. Although other and subsequent forms of analysis, such \nas linguistic analysis, were less wedded to systems of formal logic, \nthe central insight motivating logical analysis remained.", "\n\nPappus's account of method in ancient Greek geometry suggests \nthat the regressive conception of analysis was dominant at the \ntime—however much other conceptions may also have been \nimplicitly involved (see the supplementary section on \n Ancient Greek Geometry).\n In the early modern period, the decompositional conception became \nwidespread (see \n Section 4).\n What characterizes analytic philosophy—or at least that central\nstrand that originates in the work of Frege and Russell—is the \nrecognition of what was called earlier the transformative or\ninterpretive dimension of analysis (see \n Section 1.1).\n Any analysis presupposes a particular framework of interpretation, \nand work is done in interpreting what we are seeking to \nanalyze as part of the process of regression and decomposition. This \nmay involve transforming it in some way, in order for the \nresources of a given theory or conceptual framework to be brought to \nbear. Euclidean geometry provides a good illustration of this. But it\nis even more obvious in the case of analytic geometry, where the \ngeometrical problem is first ‘translated’ into the \nlanguage of algebra and arithmetic in order to solve it more easily \n(see the supplementary section on \n Descartes and Analytic Geometry).\n What Descartes and Fermat did for analytic geometry, Frege and \nRussell did for analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy is \n‘analytic’ much more in the sense that analytic geometry \nis ‘analytic’ than in the crude decompositional sense \nthat Kant understood it.", "\n\nThe interpretive dimension of modern philosophical analysis can also \nbe seen as anticipated in medieval scholasticism (see the \nsupplementary section on \n Medieval Philosophy),\n and it is remarkable just how much of modern concerns with \npropositions, meaning, reference, and so on, can be found in the \nmedieval literature. Interpretive analysis is also illustrated in the\nnineteenth century by Bentham's conception of \nparaphrasis, which he characterized as “that sort of \nexposition which may be afforded by transmuting into a proposition, \nhaving for its subject some real entity, a proposition which has not \nfor its subject any other than a fictitious entity” \n [Full Quotation].\n He applied the idea in ‘analyzing away’ talk of \n‘obligations’, and the anticipation that we can see here \nof Russell's theory of descriptions has been noted by, among \nothers, Wisdom (1931) and Quine in ‘Five Milestones of \nEmpiricism’ \n [Quotation].\n ", "\n\nWhat was crucial in the emergence of twentieth-century analytic \nphilosophy, however, was the development of quantificational theory, \nwhich provided a far more powerful interpretive system than anything \nthat had hitherto been available. In the case of Frege and Russell, \nthe system into which statements were ‘translated’ was \npredicate logic, and the divergence that was thereby opened up \nbetween grammatical and logical form meant that the process of \ntranslation itself became an issue of philosophical concern. This \ninduced greater self-consciousness about our use of language and its \npotential to mislead us, and inevitably raised semantic, \nepistemological and metaphysical questions about the relationships \nbetween language, logic, thought and reality which have been at the \ncore of analytic philosophy ever since.", "\n\nBoth Frege and Russell (after the latter's initial flirtation \nwith idealism) were concerned to show, against Kant, that arithmetic \nis a system of analytic and not synthetic truths. In the \nGrundlagen, Frege had offered a revised conception of \nanalyticity, which arguably endorses and generalizes Kant's \nlogical as opposed to phenomenological criterion, i.e., (ANL) rather than (ANO) (see the\nsupplementary section on \n Kant):\n ", "(AN) A truth is analytic if its proof depends only\non general logical laws and definitions.", "\n\nThe question of whether arithmetical truths are analytic then comes \ndown to the question of whether they can be derived purely logically.\n(Here we already have ‘transformation’, at the \ntheoretical level—involving a reinterpretation of the concept \nof analyticity.) To demonstrate this, Frege realized that he needed \nto develop logical theory in order to formalize mathematical \nstatements, which typically involve multiple generality (e.g., \n‘Every natural number has a successor’, i.e. ‘For \nevery natural number x there is another natural number \ny that is the successor of x’). This \ndevelopment, by extending the use of function-argument analysis in \nmathematics to logic and providing a notation for quantification, was\nessentially the achievement of his first book, the \nBegriffsschrift (1879), where he not only created the first \nsystem of predicate logic but also, using it, succeeded in giving a \nlogical analysis of mathematical induction (see Frege FR, \n47-78).", "\n\nIn his second book, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), \nFrege went on to provide a logical analysis of number statements. His\ncentral idea was that a number statement contains an assertion about \na concept. A statement such as ‘Jupiter has four moons’ \nis to be understood not as predicating of Jupiter the property of \nhaving four moons, but as predicating of the concept moon of \nJupiter the second-level property has four instances, \nwhich can be logically defined. The significance of this construal \ncan be brought out by considering negative existential statements \n(which are equivalent to number statements involving the number 0). \nTake the following negative existential statement:", "(0a) Unicorns do not exist.", "\n\nIf we attempt to analyze this decompositionally, taking its \ngrammatical form to mirror its logical form, then we find ourselves \nasking what these unicorns are that have the property of \nnon-existence. We may then be forced to posit the \nsubsistence—as opposed to existence—of \nunicorns, just as Meinong and the early Russell did, in order for \nthere to be something that is the subject of our statement. On the \nFregean account, however, to deny that something exists is to say \nthat the relevant concept has no instances: there is no need\nto posit any mysterious object. The Fregean analysis of (0a)\nconsists in rephrasing it into (0b), which can then be \nreadily formalized in the new logic as (0c):", "(0b) The concept unicorn is not instantiated. \n\n\n\n(0c) ~(∃x) Fx.\n", "\n\nSimilarly, to say that God exists is to say that the concept \nGod is (uniquely) instantiated, i.e., to deny that the \nconcept has 0 instances (or 2 or more instances). On this view, \nexistence is no longer seen as a (first-level) predicate, but \ninstead, existential statements are analyzed in terms of the \n(second-level) predicate is instantiated, represented by \nmeans of the existential quantifier. As Frege notes, this offers a \nneat diagnosis of what is wrong with the ontological argument, at \nleast in its traditional form (GL, §53). All the \nproblems that arise if we try to apply decompositional analysis (at \nleast straight off) simply drop away, although an account is still \nneeded, of course, of concepts and quantifiers.", "\n\nThe possibilities that this strategy of ‘translating’ \ninto a logical language opens up are enormous: we are no longer \nforced to treat the surface grammatical form of a statement as a \nguide to its ‘real’ form, and are provided with a means \nof representing that form. This is the value of logical analysis: it \nallows us to ‘analyze away’ problematic linguistic \nexpressions and explain what it is ‘really’ going on. \nThis strategy was employed, most famously, in Russell's theory \nof descriptions, which was a major motivation behind the ideas of \nWittgenstein's Tractatus (see the supplementary \nsections on \n Russell\n and \n Wittgenstein).\n Although subsequent philosophers were to question the assumption that\nthere could ever be a definitive logical analysis of a given \nstatement, the idea that ordinary language may be systematically \nmisleading has remained.", "\n\nTo illustrate this, consider the following examples from Ryle's\nclassic 1932 paper, ‘Systematically Misleading \nExpressions’:", "(Ua) Unpunctuality is reprehensible. \n\n\n\n(Ta) Jones hates the thought of going to hospital.\n", "\n\nIn each case, we might be tempted to make unnecessary reifications, \ntaking ‘unpunctuality’ and ‘the thought of going to\nhospital’ as referring to objects. It is because of this that \nRyle describes such expressions as ‘systematically \nmisleading’. (Ua) and (Ta) must therefore be rephrased:", "(Ub) Whoever is unpunctual deserves that other people\nshould reprove him for being unpunctual. \n\n\n\n(Tb) Jones feels distressed when he thinks of what he will undergo if\nhe goes to hospital.\n", "\n\nIn these formulations, there is no overt talk at all of \n‘unpunctuality’ or ‘thoughts’, and hence \nnothing to tempt us to posit the existence of any corresponding \nentities. The problems that otherwise arise have thus been \n‘analyzed away’.", "\n\nAt the time that Ryle wrote ‘Systematically Misleading \nExpressions’, he, too, assumed that every statement had an \nunderlying logical form that was to be exhibited in its \n‘correct’ formulation \n [Quotations].\n But when he gave up this assumption (for reasons indicated in the \nsupplementary section on \n The Cambridge School of Analysis),\n he did not give up the motivating idea of logical analysis—to \nshow what is wrong with misleading expressions. In The Concept of\nMind (1949), for example, he sought to explain what he called \nthe ‘category-mistake’ involved in talk of the mind as a \nkind of ‘Ghost in the Machine’. His aim, he wrote, was to\n“rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we \nalready possess” (1949, 9), an idea that was to lead to the \narticulation of connective rather than reductive \nconceptions of analysis, the emphasis being placed on elucidating the\nrelationships between concepts without assuming that there is a \nprivileged set of intrinsically basic concepts (see the supplementary\nsection on \n Oxford Linguistic Philosophy).\n ", "\n\nWhat these various forms of logical analysis suggest, then, is that \nwhat characterizes analysis in analytic philosophy is something far \nricher than the mere ‘decomposition’ of a concept into \nits ‘constituents’. But this is not to say that the \ndecompositional conception of analysis plays no role at all. It can \nbe found in the early work of Moore, for example (see the \nsupplementary section on \n Moore).\n It might also be seen as reflected in the approach to the analysis of\nconcepts that seeks to specify the necessary and sufficient \nconditions for their correct employment. Conceptual analysis in this \nsense goes back to the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues (see\nthe supplementary section on \n Plato).\n But it arguably reached its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. As \nmentioned in \n Section 2\n above, the definition of ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified \ntrue belief’ is perhaps the most famous example; and this \ndefinition was criticised in Gettier's classic paper of 1963. \n(For details of this, see the entry in this Encyclopedia on \n The Analysis of Knowledge.)\n The specification of necessary and sufficient conditions may no \nlonger be seen as the primary aim of conceptual analysis, especially \nin the case of philosophical concepts such as \n‘knowledge’, which are fiercely contested; but \nconsideration of such conditions remains a useful tool in the \nanalytic philosopher's toolbag.", "\n\nFor a more detailed account of the these and related conceptions of \nanalysis, see the supplementary document on", "Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic Philosophy.", "\n\nFor further reading, see the", "Annotated Bibliography, §6." ], "section_title": "6. Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic Philosophy and the Introduction of the Logical (Transformative) Conception", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe history of philosophy reveals a rich source of conceptions of \nanalysis. Their origin may lie in ancient Greek geometry, and to this\nextent the history of analytic methodologies might be seen as a \nseries of footnotes to Euclid. But analysis developed in different \nthough related ways in the two traditions stemming from Plato and \nAristotle, the former based on the search for definitions and the \nlatter on the idea of regression to first causes. The two poles \nrepresented in these traditions defined methodological space until \nwell into the early modern period, and in some sense is still \nreflected today. The creation of analytic geometry in the seventeenth\ncentury introduced a more reductive form of analysis, and an \nanalogous and even more powerful form was introduced around the turn \nof the twentieth century in the logical work of Frege and Russell. \nAlthough conceptual analysis, construed decompositionally from the \ntime of Leibniz and Kant, and mediated by the work of Moore, is often\nviewed as characteristic of analytic philosophy, logical analysis, \ntaken as involving translation into a logical system, is what \ninaugurated the analytic tradition. Analysis has also frequently been\nseen as reductive, but connective forms of analysis are no less \nimportant. Connective analysis, historically inflected, would seem to\nbe particularly appropriate, for example, in understanding analysis \nitself." ], "section_title": "7. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Baker, Gordon, 2004, Wittgenstein's Method, Oxford:\nBlackwell, especially essays 1, 3, 4, 10, 12", "Baldwin, Thomas, 1990, G.E. Moore, London: Routledge, ch. 7", "Beaney, Michael, 2004, ‘Carnap's Conception of Explication:\nFrom Frege to Husserl?’, in S. Awodey and C. Klein,\n(eds.), Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena, Chicago:\nOpen Court, pp. 117-50", "–––, 2005, ‘Collingwood's Conception of\nPresuppositional Analysis’, Collingwood and British Idealism\nStudies 11, no. 2, 41-114", "–––, (ed.), 2007, The Analytic Turn: Analysis\nin Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, London: Routledge\n[includes papers on Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, C.I. Lewis, Bolzano,\nHusserl]", "Byrne, Patrick H., 1997, Analysis and Science in\nAristotle, Albany: State University of New York Press", "Cohen, L. Jonathan, 1986, The Dialogue of Reason: An Analysis\nof Analytical Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, chs.\n1-2", "Dummett, Michael, 1991, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics,\nLondon: Duckworth, chs. 3-4, 9-16", "Engfer, Hans-Jürgen, 1982, Philosophie als Analysis,\nStuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog [Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff,\nKant]", "Garrett, Aaron V., 2003, Meaning in Spinoza's\nMethod, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 4", "Gaukroger, Stephen, 1989, Cartesian Logic, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, ch. 3", "Gentzler, Jyl, (ed.), 1998, Method in Ancient Philosophy,\nOxford: Oxford University Press [includes papers on Socrates, Plato,\nAristotle, mathematics and medicine]", "Gilbert, Neal W., 1960, Renaissance Concepts of Method,\nNew York: Columbia University Press", "Hacker, P.M.S., 1996, Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century\nAnalytic Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell", "Hintikka, Jaakko and Remes, Unto, 1974, The Method of\nAnalysis, Dordrecht: D. Reidel [ancient Greek geometrical\nanalysis]", "Hylton, Peter, 2005, Propositions, Functions, Analysis:\nSelected Essays on Russell's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press", "–––, 2007, Quine, London: Routledge,\nch. 9", "Jackson, Frank, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of\nConceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, chs.\n2-3", "Kretzmann, Norman, 1982, ‘Syncategoremata, exponibilia,\nsophistimata’, in N. Kretzmann et al., (eds.),\nThe Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, 211-45", "Menn, Stephen, 2002, ‘Plato and the Method of\nAnalysis’, Phronesis 47, 193-223", "Otte, Michael and Panza, Marco, (eds.), 1997, Analysis and\nSynthesis in Mathematics, Dordrecht: Kluwer", "Rorty, Richard, (ed.), 1967, The Linguistic Turn, Chicago:\nUniversity of Chicago Press [includes papers on analytic\nmethodology]", "Rosen, Stanley, 1980, The Limits of Analysis, New York:\nBasic Books, repr. Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2000 [critique of\nanalytic philosophy from a ‘continental’ perspective]", "Sayre, Kenneth M., 1969, Plato's Analytic Method, Chicago:\nUniversity of Chicago Press", "–––, 2006, Metaphysics and Method in\nPlato's Statesman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,\nPart I", "Soames, Scott, 2003, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth\nCentury, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis, Volume 2:\nThe Age of Meaning, New Jersey: Princeton University Press\n[includes chapters on Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, logical\npositivism, Quine, ordinary language philosophy, Davidson,\nKripke]", "Strawson, P.F., 1992, Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction\nto Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, chs. 1-2", "Sweeney, Eileen C., 1994, ‘Three Notions of\nResolutio and the Structure of Reasoning in Aquinas’,\nThe Thomist 58, 197-243", "Timmermans, Benoît, 1995, La résolution des\nproblèmes de Descartes à Kant, Paris: Presses\nUniversitaires de France", "Urmson, J.O., 1956, Philosophical Analysis: Its Development\nbetween the Two World Wars, Oxford: Oxford University Press" ]	[ { "href": "../abstract-objects/", "text": "abstract objects" }, { "href": "../analytic-synthetic/", "text": "analytic/synthetic distinction" }, { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../bolzano/", "text": "Bolzano, Bernard" }, { "href": "../buridan/", "text": "Buridan, John [Jean]" }, { "href": "../descartes/", "text": "Descartes, René" }, { "href": "../descriptions/", "text": "descriptions" }, { "href": "../frege/", "text": "Frege, Gottlob" }, { "href": "../kant/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel" }, { "href": "../knowledge-analysis/", "text": "knowledge: analysis of" }, { "href": "../leibniz/", "text": "Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm" }, { "href": "../logical-construction/", "text": "logical constructions" }, { "href": "../logical-form/", "text": "logical form" }, { "href": "../moore/", "text": "Moore, George Edward" }, { "href": "../necessary-sufficient/", "text": "necessary and sufficient conditions" }, { "href": "../ockham/", "text": "Ockham [Occam], William" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../russell/", "text": "Russell, Bertrand" }, { "href": "../wittgenstein/", "text": "Wittgenstein, Ludwig" } ]
analytic-synthetic	The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction	First published Thu Aug 14, 2003; substantive revision Wed Mar 30, 2022	[ "\n“Analytic” sentences, such as “Pediatricians are\ndoctors,” have historically been characterized as ones that are\ntrue by virtue of the meanings of their words alone and/or can be\nknown to be so solely by knowing those meanings. They are contrasted\nwith more usual “synthetic” sentences, such as\n“Pediatricians are rich,” (knowledge of) whose truth\ndepends also upon (knowledge of) the worldly fortunes of\npediatricians. Beginning with Frege, many philosophers hoped to show\nthat the truths of logic and mathematics and other apparently a\npriori domains, such as much of philosophy and the foundations of\nscience, could be shown to be analytic by careful “conceptual\nanalysis” of the meanings of crucial words. Analyses of\nphilosophically important terms and concepts, such as “material\nobject,” “cause,” “freedom,” or\n“knowledge” turned out, however, to be far more\nproblematic than philosophers had anticipated, and some, particularly\nQuine and his followers, began to doubt the reality of the\ndistinction. This in turn led him and others to doubt the factual\ndeterminacy of claims of meaning and translation in general, as well\nas, ultimately, the reality and determinacy of mental states. There\nhave been a number of interesting reactions to this scepticism, in\nphilosophy and linguistics (this latter to be treated in the\nsupplement, Analyticity and Chomskyan Linguistics); but,\nwhile the reality of mental states might be saved, it has yet to be\nshown that appeals to the analytic will ever be able to ground\n“analysis” and the a priori in quite the way that\nphilosophers had hoped. (Note that all footnotes are substantive, but\ninessential to an initial reading, and are accessed in a separate file\nby clicking on the bracketed superscript. The mention vs. use of a\nterm will be indicated either by quotation marks or italics, depending\nupon which is most easily readable in the context.)" ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Intuitive Distinction", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Kant", "1.2 Frege" ] }, { "content_title": "2. High Hopes", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Mathematics", "2.2 Science and Beyond" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Problems with the Distinction", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 The Paradox of Analysis", "3.2 Problems with Logicism", "3.3 Convention?", "3.4 Verificationism and Confirmation Holism", "3.5 Quine on Meaning in Linguistics", "3.6 Explaining Away the Appearance of the Analytic" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Post-Quinean Strategies", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Neo-Cartesianism", "4.2 Externalist Theories of Meaning", "4.3 Internal Dependencies", "4.4 A Chomskyan Strategy" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Supplement: Analyticity and Chomskyan Linguistics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nCompare the following two sets of sentences:", "\nMost competent English speakers who know the meanings of all the\nconstituent words would find an obvious difference between the two\nsets: whereas they might wonder about the truth or falsity of those of\nset I, they would find themselves pretty quickly incapable of doubting\nthose of II. Unlike the former, these latter seem to be justifiable\nautomatically, “just by knowing what the words mean,” as\nmany might spontaneously put it. Indeed, denials of any of them,\ne.g.,", "\nwould seem to be in some important way unintelligible, very\nlike contradictions in terms (the “#” indicates semantic\nanomaly). Philosophers standardly refer to sentences of the first set\nas “synthetic,” those of the second as (at least\napparently) “analytic.” (Members of set III. are sometimes\nsaid to be “analytically false,” although this term is\nrarely used, and “analytic” is standardly confined to\nsentences that are regarded as true.) We might call sentences such as\n(5)-(10) part of the “analytic data” to which philosophers\nand linguists have often appealed in invoking the distinction (without\nprejudice, however, to whether such data might otherwise be\nexplained). Some philosophers might want to include in set III. what\nare called category mistakes (q.v.) such as #The number\nthree likes Tabasco sauce, or #Saturday is in bed (cf.,\nRyle, 1949 [2009]), but these have figured less prominently in recent\ndiscussions, being treated not as semantically anomalous, but as\nsimply false and silly (Quine 1960 [2013, p. 210]).", "\nMany philosophers have hoped that the apparent necessity and a\npriori status of the claims of logic, mathematics and much of\nphilosophy could be explained by their claims being analytic, our\nunderstanding of the meaning of the claims explaining why they seemed\nto be true “in all possible worlds,” and knowable to be\nso, “independently of experience.” This view led many of\nthem to regard philosophy as consisting in large part in the\n“analysis” of the meanings of the relevant claims, words\nand\n concepts;[1]\n i.e., a provision of conditions that were individually necessary and\njointly sufficient for the application of a word or concept, in the\nway that, for example, being a female and being a\nparent are each necessary and together sufficient for being a\nmother. Such a conception seemed to invite and support (although\nwe’ll see it doesn’t entail) the special methodology of\n“armchair reflection” on concepts in which many\nphilosophers traditionally engaged, independently of any empirical\nresearch." ], "section_title": "1. The Intuitive Distinction", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAlthough there are precursors of the contemporary notion of the\nanalytic in Leibniz, and in Locke and Hume in their talk of\n“relations of ideas,” the conception that currently\nconcerns many philosophers has its roots in the work of Kant (1787\n[1998]) who, at the beginning of his Critique of Pure Reason,\nwrote:", "\n\n\nIn all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate\nis thought (if I only consider affirmative judgments, since the\napplication to negative ones is easy) this relation is possible in two\ndifferent ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as\nsomething that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies\nentirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in\nconnection with it. In the first case, I call the judgment analytic,\nin the second synthetic. (1787 [1998], B10)\n", "\nHe provided as an example of an analytic judgment, “All bodies\nare extended”: in thinking of a body we can’t help but\nalso think of it being extended in space; that would seem to be just\npart of what is meant by “body.” He contrasted this with\n“All bodies are heavy,” where the predicate (“is\nheavy”) “is something entirely different from that which I\nthink in the mere concept of body in general” (B11), and we must\nput together, or “synthesize,” the different concepts,\nbody and heavy (sometimes such concepts are called\n“ampliative,” “amplifying” a concept beyond\nwhat is “contained” in it).", "\nKant tried to spell out his “containment” metaphor for the\nanalytic in two ways. To see that any of set II is true, he wrote,\n“I need only to analyze the concept, i.e., become conscious of\nthe manifold that I always think in it, in order to encounter this\npredicate therein” (B10). But then, picking up a suggestion of\nLeibniz, he went on to claim:", "\n\n\nI merely draw out the predicate in accordance with the principle of\ncontradiction, and can thereby at the same time become conscious of\nthe necessity of the judgment. (B11)\n", "\nAs Jerrold Katz (1988) emphasized, this second definition is\nsignificantly different from the “containment” idea, since\nnow, in its appeal to the powerful method of proof by contradiction,\nthe analytic would include all of the (potentially infinite) deductive\nconsequences of a particular claim, many of which could not be\nplausibly regarded as “contained” in the concept expressed\nin the claim. For starters, Bachelors are unmarried or the moon is\nblue is a logical consequence of Bachelors are\nunmarried—its denial contradicts the latter (a denial of a\ndisjunction is a denial of each disjunct)—but clearly nothing\nabout the color of the moon is remotely “contained in” the\nconcept bachelor. To avoid such consequences, Katz (e.g.,\n1972, 1988) went on to try to develop a serious theory based upon only\nthe initial containment idea, as, along different lines, does Paul\nPietroski (2005, 2018).", "\nOne reason Kant may not have noticed the differences between his\ndifferent characterizations of the analytic was that his conception of\n“logic” seems to have been confined to Aristotelian\nsyllogistic, and so didn’t include the full resources of modern\nlogic, where, as we’ll see, the differences between the two\ncharacterizations become more glaring (see MacFarlane 2002). Indeed,\nKant demarcates the category of the analytic chiefly in order to\ncontrast it with what he regards as the more important category of the\n“synthetic,” which he famously thinks is not confined, as\none might initially suppose, merely to the\n empirical.[2]\n He argues that even so elementary an example in arithmetic as\n7+5=12 is synthetic, since the concept of 12 is not\ncontained in the concepts of 7, 5, or +,:\nappreciating the truth of the proposition would seem to require some\nkind of active “synthesis” by the mind uniting the\ndifferent constituent thoughts (1787 [1998], B15). And so we arrive at\nthe category of the “synthetic a priori,” whose\nvery possibility became a major concern of his work. Kant tried to\nshow that the activity of synthesis was the source of the important\ncases of a priori knowledge, not only in arithmetic, but also\nin geometry, the foundations of physics, ethics, and philosophy\ngenerally, a controversial view that set the stage for much of the\nphilosophical discussions of the subsequent centuries (see Coffa 1991,\npt. I).", "\nApart from geometry, Kant, himself, actually didn’t focus much\non the case of mathematics. But, as mathematics in the 19th C. began\nreaching new heights of sophistication, worries were increasingly\nraised about its foundations. It was specifically in response to these\nlatter worries that Gottlob Frege (1884 [1980]) tried to improve upon\nKant’s formulations of the analytic, and presented what is\nwidely regarded as the next significant discussion of the\n topic.[3]" ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Kant" }, { "content": [ "\nFrege (1884 [1980], §§5,88) and others noted a number of\nproblems with Kant’s “containment” metaphor. In the\nfirst place, as Kant (1787 [1998], B756) himself would surely have\nagreed, the criterion would need to be freed of\n“psychologistic” suggestions, or claims about merely the\naccidental thought processes of thinkers, as opposed to claims about\ntruth and justification that are presumably at issue with the\nanalytic. In particular, mere associations are not always matters of\nmeaning: many people in thinking about Columbus may automatically\nthink “the discoverer of America,” or in thinking about\nthe number 7 they “can’t help but also think” about\nthe numeral that denotes it, but it’s certainly not analytic\nthat Columbus discovered America, or that a number is identical with a\nnumeral. Moreover, while it may be arguably analytic that a circle is\na closed figure of constant curvature (see Katz, 1972), someone could\nfail to notice this and so think the one without the other.", "\nEven were Kant to have solved this problem, it isn’t clear how\nhis notion of “containment” would cover cases that seem to\nbe as “analytic” as any of set II, such as:", "\nThe transitivity of ancestor or the symmetry of\nmarried are not obviously “contained in” the\ncorresponding thoughts in the way that the idea of extension\nis plausibly “contained in” the notion of body,\nor male in the notion of bachelor. (13) has seemed\nparticularly troublesome: what else besides colored could be\nincluded in the analysis? The concept red involves color\n– and what else? It is hard to see what else to\n“add” – except red itself!", "\nFrege attempted to remedy the situation by completely rethinking the\nfoundations of logic, developing what we now think of as modern\nsymbolic logic. He defined a perfectly precise “formal”\nlanguage, i.e., a language characterized by the “form”\n– standardly, the shape—of its expressions, and he\ncarefully set out an account of the syntax and semantics of what are\ncalled the “logical constants,” such as “and,”\n“or,” “not,” “all” and\n“some,” showing how to capture a very wide class of valid\ninferences containing them. Saying precisely how the constants are\ndetermined is a matter of controversy (see Logical\nConstants), but, at least roughly and intuitively, they can be\nthought of as those parts of language that don’t\n“point” or “function referentially,” aiming to\nrefer to something in the world, in the way that ordinary nouns,\nverbs, adjectives, adverbs and prepositions seem to do.\n“Socrates” refers to Socrates, “dogs” to dogs,\n“(is) clever” to cleverness and/or clever things, but\nwords like “or” and “all” don’t seem to\nfunction referentially at all. At any rate, it certainly isn’t\nclear that there are any ors and alls in the world,\nalong with Socrates, the dogs, and sets or properties of them.", "\nThis distinction between non-logical, “referring”\nexpressions and logical constants allows us to define a logical truth\nin a way that has become common (and will be particularly useful in\nthis entry) as a sentence that is true no matter what non-logical\nexpressions occur in it (cf. Tarski, 1936 [1983], Quine, 1956\n[1976], Davidson 1980). Consequently (placing non-logical expressions\nin bold, and re-numbering prior examples):", "\ncounts as a (strict) logical truth: no matter what grammatical\nexpressions we put in for the non-logical terms “doctor”,\n“specialize on” and “children” in (14), the\nsentence will remain true. For example, substituting\n“cats” for “doctors”, “chase” for\n“specialize on” and “mice” for\n“children,” we get:", "\n(Throughout this discussion, by “substitution” we shall\nmean uniform substitution of one presumably univocal expression for\nanother in all its occurrences in a sentence.) But what about the\nothers of set II? Substituting “cats” for\n“doctors” and “mice” for\n“pediatricians” in", "\nwe get:", "\nwhich is obviously false, as would many such substitutions render the\nrest of the examples of II. (14) and (15) are patent logical truths;\ntheir truth depends only upon the semantic values of their logical\nparticles. But All pediatricians are doctors and the other\nexamples, (6)–(8) and (11)–(13), are not formal\nlogical truths, specifiable by the logical form of the\nsentence (or its pattern of logical particles) alone; nor are their\ndenials, e.g., (9) and (10), formal contradictions (i.e., of\nthe form, where ‘p’ stands in for any\nsentence: “p and it is not the case that\np”). How are we to capture them?", "\nHere Frege appealed to the notion of “definition,” or\n—presuming that definitions preserve\n“meaning”— “synonymy”: the non-logical\nanalytic truths are those that can be converted to formal logical\ntruths by substitution of definitions for defined terms, or synonyms\nfor synonyms. Since “mice” is not synonymous with\n“pediatrician,” (17) is not a substitution into (16) of\nthe required sort. We need, instead, a substitution of the\ndefinition of “pediatrician,” i.e., “doctor\nthat specializes on children,” which would convert (16) into our\nearlier purely formal logical truth:", "\nOf course, these notions of definition, meaning and\nsynonymy would themselves need to be clarified, But they were\nthought at the time to be sufficiently obvious notions whose\nclarification didn’t seem particularly urgent until W.V.O. Quine\n(1953 [1980a]) raised serious questions about them much later (see\n§3.3ff below). Putting those questions to one side, Frege made\nspectacularly interesting suggestions, offering a famous definition,\nfor example, of the “ancestral” relation involved in (11)\nas a basis for his definition of number (see\nFrege’s Theorem and Foundations for Arithmetic), and\ninspiring the program of “logicism” (or the reduction of\narithmetic to logic) that was pursued in Whitehead and Russell’s\n(1910–13) monumental Principia Mathematica, and the\n(early) Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1922) Tractatus\nLogico-philosophicus.", "\nFrege was mostly interested in formalizing arithmetic, and so\nconsidered the logical forms of a relative minority of natural\nlanguage sentences in a deliberately spare notation – he\ndidn’t take on the likes of (12)-(13). But work on the logical\n(or syntactic) structure of the full range of sentences of natural\nlanguage has blossomed since then, initially in the work of Bertrand\nRussell (1905), in his famous theory of definite descriptions (see\nDescriptions), which he (1912) combined with his views about\nthe knowledge by “acquaintance” with sense-data and\nuniversals into a striking “fundamental principle in the\nanalysis of propositions containing descriptions”:", "\n\n\nEvery proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of\nconstituents with which we are acquainted (1912:58),\n", "\nan early version of a proposal pursued by Logical Positivists, to be\ndiscussed in the next sections below. Frege’s and\nRussell’s formalizations are also indirectly the inspiration for\nthe subsequent work of Noam Chomsky and other “generative”\nlinguists and logicians (see supplement). Whether\nFrege’s criterion of analyticity will work for the rest of II\nand other analyticities depends upon the details of these latter\nproposals, some of which are discussed in the supplement," ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Frege" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nInfluenced by these developments in logic, many philosophers in the\nfirst half of the Twentieth Century thought analyticity could perform\ncrucial epistemological work not only in accounting for our apparently\na priori knowledge of mathematics, but also —with a\nlittle help from British empiricism—of our understanding of\nclaims about the spatiotemporal world as well. Indeed,\n“analysis” and the “linguistic turn” (Rorty,\n1992) soon came to constitute the very way many Anglophone\nphilosophers characterized their work, particularly since such\nanalyses of what we mean by our words seemed to be the sort of\nenterprise available to “armchair reflection” that seemed\nto many a distinctive feature of that work (see Haug, 2014). Many\nthought this project would also perform the more metaphysical\nwork of explaining the truth and necessity of\nmathematics, showing not only how it is we could know about\nthese topics independently of experience, but how they could be\ntrue in this and in all possible worlds, usually, though,\nwithout distinguishing this project from the epistemic one. Thus,\nGilbert Harman (1967 [1999] begins his review of the topic combining\nthe two projects:", "\n\n\nWhat I shall call a ‘full-blooded theory of analytic\ntruth’ takes the analytic truths to be those that hold solely by\nvirtue of meaning or that are knowable solely by virtue of meaning.\n(p. 119, see also p. 127),\n", "\ntaking himself to be expressing the views of a number of other then\ncontemporary philosophers.", "\nThis seemed like a grand unified plan until Saul Kripke (1972) and\nHilary Putnam (1975) drew attention to fundamental differences between\nthe metaphysical and epistemic modalities that had tended to be run\ntogether throughout this period. They pointed out that, for example,\n“water is H2O” might well be necessarily true,\nbut not knowable a priori, and “The meter stick in\nParis is one meter long” might be knowable a priori but\nnot be necessarily true (that very stick might have been broken and\nnever used for measurements; see A Priori Justification and\nKnowledge).", "\nOnce the metaphysical and epistemic issues are separated, it becomes\nless obvious that mere matters of meaning could really explain all\nnecessities. Recall that Frege’s ambition had been to\nreduce mathematics to logic by showing how, substituting synonyms for\nsynonyms, every mathematical truth could be shown to be a logical one.\nHe hadn’t gone on to claim that the logical truths\nthemselves were true or necessary by virtue of meaning alone.\nThese were “Laws of Truth” (Frege, 1918/84:58), and it\nwasn’t clear what sort of explanation could be provided for\nthem. Obviously, appealing merely to further synonym substitutions\nwouldn’t suffice. As Michael Devitt (1993a) pointed out:", "\n\n\nthe sentence ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is not true\nsolely in virtue of meaning and so is not analytic in the…sense\n[of true in virtue of meaning alone]. The sentence is indeed true\npartly in virtue of the fact that ‘unmarried’ must refer\nto anything that ‘bachelor’ refers to but it is also true\npartly in virtue of the truth of ‘All unmarrieds are\nunmarried.’ (Devitt 1993a, p. 287; cf., Quine 1956 [1976], p.\n118)\n", "\nIt was certainly not clear that the truth of “All unmarrieds are\nunmarrieds” is based on the same sort of arbitrary synonymy\nfacts that underlie “All bachelors are unmarried.” In any\nevent, a different kind of account seemed to be needed (see\n footnotes 9 and 16).", "\nJerrold Katz and Paul Postal (1991, pp. 516–7) did claim that\nadequate linguistic theory should, inter alia, explain why,\nif John killed Bill is true, then so is Bill is\ndead. However, as David Israel (1991) pointed out in reply:\n“there are facts about English, about what propositions are\nexpressed by certain utterances, and then there is a non-linguistic\nfact: that one proposition entails another” (p. 571). Utterances\nof sentences are one thing; the propositions (or\nthoughts) many different sentences may express,\nquite another, and the two shouldn’t be confused:", "\n\n\nIt is just not true that if the proposition expressed by [an\nutterance of John killed Bill] is true that, then “in\nvirtue of [natural language] so, necessarily, is” the\nproposition expressed by [an utterance of Bill is\ndead]. Rather, if the proposition that, according to the grammar\nof English, is expressed by [an utterance of John killed\nBill] is true, then, in virtue of the structure of the\npropositions concerned, the proposition that,\naccording to the grammar of English, is expressed by [an utterance of\nBill is dead] must also be true.--(D. Israel, 1991, p. 71,\nemphasis added)\n", "\nProviding the metaphysical basis for logical truth is a fine issue\n(see Logical Truth), but as Devitt (1993a and b) and others\n(e.g., Paul Boghossian, 1996, Williamson, 2007) went on to stress, it\nhas been the epistemological issues about justifying our\nbeliefs in necessary truths that have dominated philosophical\ndiscussions of the analytic in the last seventy\n years.[4]\n Consequently, we will focus primarily on this more modest,\nepistemological project in the remainder of this entry." ], "section_title": "2. High Hopes", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAs we noted (§1.2), Frege had developed formal logic to account\nfor our apparently a priori knowledge of mathematics. It is\nworth dwelling on the interest of this problem. It is arguably one of\nthe oldest and hardest problems in Western philosophy, and is easy\nenough to understand: ordinarily we acquire knowledge about the world\nby using our senses. If we are interested, for example, in whether\nit’s raining outside, how many birds are on the beach, whether\nfish sleep or stars collapse, we look and see, or turn to others who\ndo. It is a widespread view that Western sciences owe their tremendous\nsuccesses precisely to relying on just such “empirical”\n(experiential, experimental) methods. However, it is also a patent\nfact about all these sciences, and even our ordinary ways of counting\nbirds, fish and stars, that they depend on often immensely\nsophisticated mathematics, and mathematics does not seem to be known\non the basis of experience. Mathematicians don’t do experiments\nin the way that chemists, biologists or other “natural\nscientists” do. They seem simply to think, seeming to\nrely precisely on the kind of “armchair reflection” to\nwhich many philosophers also aspire. In any case, they don’t try\nto justify their claims by reference to experiments, arguing that\ntwice two is four by noting that pairs of pairs tend in all cases\nobserved so far to be quadruples.", "\nBut how could mere processes of thought issue in any knowledge about\nthe independently existing external world? The belief that it could\nwould seem to involve some kind of mysticism; and, indeed, many\n“naturalistic” philosophers have felt that the appeals of\n“Rationalist” philosophers to some special faculty of\n“rational intuition,” such as one finds in philosophers\nlike Plato, Descartes and Leibniz and, more recently, Katz (1988,\n1990), George Bealer (1987) and Laurence Bonjour (1998), these all\nseem no better off than appeals to “revelation” to\nestablish theology. The program of logicism and “analysis”\nseemed to many to offer a more promising, “naturalistic”\nalternative." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Mathematics" }, { "content": [ "\nBut why stop at arithmetic? If logical analysis could illuminate the\nfoundations of mathematics by showing how the axioms of arithmetic\ncould all be derived from pure logic by substitution of synonyms,\nperhaps it could also illuminate the foundations of the rest of our\nknowledge by showing how its claims could similarly be derived from\nsome kind of combination of logic and experience. Such was the hope\nand program of Logical Positivism (see Logical Empiricism)\nchampioned by, e.g., Moritz Schlick, A.J. Ayer and, especially, Rudolf\nCarnap from about 1915 in Vienna and Berlin to well into the 1950s in\nEngland and America. Of course, such a proposal did presume that all\nof our concepts were somehow “derived” either from logic\nor experience, but this seemed in keeping with the then prevailing\npresumptions of empiricism, which, they assumed, had been vindicated\nby the immense success of the empirical sciences.", "\nFor the Positivists, earlier empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley and\nHume, had erred only in thinking that the mechanism of construction\nwas mere association. But association can’t account for the\nstructure of even a simple judgment, such as Caesar is bald.\nThis is not merely the excitation of its constituent ideas,\nCaesar, is, and bald, along the lines of\nthe idea of salt exciting the idea of pepper, but,\nas Frege had shown, involves combining the noun Caesar and\nthe predicate is bald in a very particular way, a fact that\nwas important in accounting for more complex judgments such as\nCaesar is bald or not bald, or Someone is bald. Our\nthoughts and claims about the world have some kind of logical\nstructure, of a sort that seems to begin to be revealed by\nFrege’s proposals. Equipped with his logic, it was possible to\nprovide a more plausible formulation of conceptual empiricism: our\nclaims about the empirical world were to be analyzed into the\n(dis)confirming experiences out of which they must somehow have been\nlogically constructed.", "\nBut constructed out of which experiences? For the\nPositivists, the answer seemed obvious: out of the experiential\ntests that would standardly justify, verify\nor confirm the claim. Indeed, as Ayer (1934, chap 1) made\nplain, a significant motivation for the Positivists was to save\nempirical knowledge from the predations of traditional sceptical\narguments about the possibility that all of life is a dream or the\ndeception of an evil demon: if meaning could be tied to verification,\nsuch possibilities could be rendered “meaningless” because\nunverifiable (see Jerry Fodor, 2001, pp. 3–5, for a penetrating\ndiscussion of this motivation). In any event, interpreting\nWittgenstein’s (1922) Tractatus claims about the nature\nof language epistemologically along the lines of the American\nphilosopher, C.S. Peirce, they proposed various versions of their\n“Verifiability Theory of Meaning,” according to which the\nmeaning (or what they called the “cognitive significance”)\nof any sentence was constituted by the conditions of its\nempirical\n (dis-)confirmation.[5]\n Thus, to say that the temperature of a liquid is of a certain\nmagnitude is to say, for example, that the mercury in a thermometer\nimmersed in the liquid would expand to a certain point marked by a\nnumeral representing that magnitude, a claim that would ordinarily be\ndisconfirmed if it didn’t. Closer to “experience”:\nto say that there is a cat on a mat is just to say that certain\npatterns of certain familiar visual, tactile and aural appearances are\nto be expected under certain circumstances.", "\nThe project of providing analyses in this way of especially\nproblematic concepts like those concerning, for example, material\nobjects, knowledge, perception, causation, expectation, freedom,\nand the self, was pursued by Positivists and other analytic\nphilosophers for a considerable period (see Carnap 1928 [1967] for\nsome rigorous examples, Ayer 1934 [1952] for more accessible ones).\nWith regard to material object claims, the program came to be known as\n“phenomenalism”; with regard to the theoretical claims of\nscience, as “operationalism” ; and with regard to the\nclaims about people’s mental lives, “analytical\nbehaviorism” (the relevant experiential basis of mental claims\nbeing taken to be observations of others’ behavior). Although\nthese programs became extremely influential, and some form of the\nverifiability criterion was often (and sometimes still is) invoked in\nphysics and psychology to constrain theoretical speculation, they\nseldom, if ever, met with any serious success. No sooner was an\nanalysis, say, of “material object” or\n“freedom” or “expectation,” proposed than\nserious counterexamples were raised and the analysis revised, only to\nbe faced with still further counterexamples (see Roderick Chisholm\n1957, and Fodor 1981, for discussion). Despite what seemed its initial\nplausibility, philosophers came to suspect that the criterion, and\nwith it the very notion of analyticity itself, rested on some\nfundamental mistakes." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Science and Beyond" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Problems with the Distinction", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nOne problem with the entire program was raised by C.H. Langford (1942)\nand discussed by G.E. Moore (1942 [1968], pp. 665–6): why should\nanalyses be of any conceivable interest? After all, if an analysis\nconsists in providing the definition of an expression, then it should\nbe providing a synonym for it, and this, then, should be wholly\nuninformative: if brother is analyzed as the presumably\nsynonymous male sibling, then the claim Brothers are male\nsiblings should be synonymous with Brothers are\nbrothers, and thinking the one should be no different from\nthinking the other. But, aside from such simple cases as\nbrother and bachelor, proposed analyses, if\nsuccessful, often seemed quite non-obvious and philosophically\ninformative. The proposed reductions of, say, material object\nstatements to sensory ones (even where successful) were often fairly\ncomplex, had to be studied and learned, and so could hardly be\nuninformative. So how could they count as seriously\n analytic?[6]", "\nThis is “the paradox of analysis,” which can be seen as\ndormant in Frege’s own move from his (1884) focus on definitions\nto his more controversial (1892a) doctrine of “sense,”\nwhere two senses are distinct if and only if someone can think a\nthought containing the one but not other, as in the case of the senses\nof “the morning star” and “the evening star.”\nIf analyses or definitions preserved sense, then, unlike the case of\n“morning star” and “evening star,” whenever\none thought the definiendum, one should thereby be thinking the\ndefiniens. And perhaps one can’t think Bill is Bob’s\nbrother without thinking Bill is Bob’s male sibling. But few of\nFrege’s definitions of arithmetic concepts are nearly so simple\n(see Gottlob Frege, §2.5). In their case, it seems\nperfectly possible to think the definiendum, say, number,\nwithout thinking the elaborate definiens Frege provided (cf. Bealer\n1982, Michael Dummett 1991, and John Horty 1993, 2007, for extensive\ndiscussions of this problem, as well as of further conditions, e.g.,\nfecundity, that Frege placed on serious definitions).", "\nThese problems, so far, can be regarded as relatively technical, for\nwhich further technical moves within the program might be made. For\nexample, one might make further distinctions within the theory of\nsense between an expression’s “content” and the\nspecific “linguistic vehicle” used for its expression, as\nin Fodor (1990a) and Horty (1993, 2007); and perhaps distinguish\nbetween the truth-conditional “content” of an expression\nand its idiosyncratic role, or “character,” in a language\nsystem, along the lines of the distinction David Kaplan (1989)\nintroduced to deal with indexical and demonstrative expressions (such\nas I, now, and that; see\nDemonstratives, and Narrow Mental Content, as well\nas Stephen White, 1982). Perhaps analyses could be regarded as\nproviding a particular “vehicle,” having a specific\n“character,” that could account for why one could\nentertain a certain concept without entertaining its analysis (cf.\nGillian Russell 2008, and Paul Pietroski 2002, 2005 and 2018 for\nrelated suggestions).", "\nHowever, the problems with the program seemed to many philosophers to\nbe deeper than merely technical. By far, the most telling and\ninfluential of the criticisms both of the program, and then of\nanalyticity in general, were those of Quine, who began as a great\nchampion of the program (see esp. his 1934), and whose subsequent\nobjections therefore carry special weight. The reader is well-advised\nto consult particularly his (1956 [1976], hereafter “CLT”)\nfor as rich and deep a discussion of the issues up to that time as one\nmight find. The next two sections abbreviate some of that\ndiscussion." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 The Paradox of Analysis" }, { "content": [ "\nAlthough pursuit of the logicist program produced a great many\ninsights into the nature of mathematics, there emerged a number of\nserious difficulties with it. Right from the start there was, of\ncourse, the problem of the logical truths themselves. Simply saying,\nas Frege had, that they are “Laws of Truth” doesn’t\nseem to explain how we could know them a priori. But perhaps\nthey, too, are “analytic” involving perhaps some sort of\n“implicit” acceptance of certain rules merely by virtue of\naccepting certain patterns of reasoning. But any such proposal has to\naccount for people’s frequent, often apparent violations of\nrules of logic in fallacious reasoning and in ordinary speech, as well\nas of disputes about the laws of logic of the sort that are raised,\nfor example, by mathematical intuitionists, who deny the Law of\nExcluded Middle (“p or not p”), or, more recently, by\n“para-consistent” logicians, who argue for the toleration\neven of contradictions to avoid certain\n paradoxes.[7]\n Moreover, given that the infinitude of logical truths needs to be\n“generated” by rules of inference, wouldn’t that be\na reason for regarding them as “synthetic” in Kant’s\nsense (see Frege 1884 [1980], §88, Katz 1988, pp. 58–9, and\nMacFarlane 2002)?", "\nMuch more worrisome is a challenge raised by Quine (CLT, §II):\neven if certain logical truths seemed undeniable, how does claiming\nthem to be analytic differ from claiming them to be simply\n “obvious”?[8]", "\n\n\nConsider…the logical truth “Everything is\nself-identical”, “(x)(x = x)”. We can say that it\ndepends for its truth on traits of the language (specifically on the\nusage of “=”), and not on traits of its subject matter;\nbut we can also say, alternatively, that it depends on an obvious\ntrait, viz., self-identity, of its subject matter, viz., everything.\nThe tendency of [my] present reflections is that there is no\ndifference. (CLT, p. 113)\n", "\nPressing the point more deeply:", "\n\n\nI have been using the vaguely psychological word “obvious”\nnon-technically, assigning it no explanatory value. My suggestion is\nmerely that the linguistic doctrine of elementary logical truth\nlikewise leaves explanation unbegun. I do not suggest that the\nlinguistic doctrine is false and some doctrine of ultimate and\ninexplicable insight into the obvious trait of reality is true, but\nonly that there is no real difference between these two\npseudo-doctrines. (CLT, p. 113)\n", "\nAs we’ll see, this is the seed for the challenge that continues\nto haunt proposals about the analytic to this day: what explanatory\ndifference is there between “analytic” claims and simply\nwidely and firmly held beliefs, such as that The earth has existed\nfor many years or There have been black dogs?\nWe’ll consider some proposals —and their problems—\nin due course, but it’s important to bear in mind that, if no\ndifference can be sustained, then it’s difficult to see the\nsignificance of the logicist program or of the claims of (strictly)\n“analytic” philosophy generally.", "\nThe most immediately calamitous challenge to Logicism was, however,\nthe famous paradox Russell raised for one of Frege’s crucial\naxioms, his prima facie plausible “Basic Law V”\n(sometimes called “the unrestricted Comprehension Axiom”),\nwhich had committed him to the existence of a set for every predicate.\nBut what, asked Russell, of the predicate x is not a member of\nitself? If there were a set for that predicate, that set itself\nwould be a member of itself if and only if it wasn’t;\nconsequently, there could be no such set. Therefore Frege’s\nBasic Law V couldn’t be true (but see Frege’s Theorem\nand Foundations for Arithmetic for ways to rescue something close\nto logicism, discussed in §5 below).", "\nWhat was especially upsetting about Russell’s paradox was that\nthere seemed to be no intuitively satisfactory way to repair set\ntheory in a way that could lay claim to being as obvious and/or merely\na matter of logic or meaning in the way that Frege and the Positivists\nhad hoped. Various proposals were made, but all of them seemed simply\ntailor-made to avoid the paradox, and seemed to have little\nindependent appeal (although see Boolos, 1971, for a defense of the\n“iterative” notion of set). Certainly none of them\nappeared to be analytic. Indeed, as Quine notes:", "\n\n\nWhat we do [in set theory] is develop one or another set theory by\nobvious reasoning, or elementary logic, from unobvious first\nprinciples which are set down, whether for good or for the time being,\nby something like convention. (CLT, p. 111)\n" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Problems with Logicism" }, { "content": [ "\nConvention, indeed, would seem to be at the very heart of the\nanalytic. After all, aren’t matters of meaning, unlike matters\nof fact, in the end really matters of arbitrary conventions about the\nuse of words? For example, someone could invest a particular word,\nsay, “schmuncle,” with a specific meaning merely by\nstipulating that it mean, say, unmarried uncle. Wouldn’t that\nafford a basis for claiming then that “A schmuncle is an\nuncle” is analytic, or knowable to be true by virtue of the\n(stipulated) meanings of the words alone?", "\nCarnap (1956a) proposed setting out the “meaning\npostulates” of a scientific language as just such conventional\nstipulations. This had the further advantage of allowing terms to be\n“implicitly defined” by their conventional roles in such\npostulates, which might then serve as part of a theory’s laws or\naxioms. The strategy seemed especially appropriate for defining\nlogical constants, as well as for dealing with cases like (11)-(13)\nabove, e.g. “Red is a color,” where mere substitution of\nsynonyms might not\n suffice.[9]\n So perhaps what philosophical analysis is doing is revealing the\ntacit conventions of ordinary language, an approach particularly\nfavored by Ayer (1934/52).", "\nQuine is sceptical such a strategy could work for the principles of\nlogic itself. Drawing on his earlier discussion (1936 [1976]) of the\nconventionality of logic, he argues that logic itself could not be\nentirely established by such conventions, since:", "\n\n\nthe logical truths, being infinite in number, must be given by general\nconventions rather than singly; and logic is needed then in the\nmeta-theory, in order to apply the general conventions to individual\ncases (CLT, p. 115)\n", "\nIf so, and if logic is established by convention, then one would need\na meta-meta-theory to establish the conventions for the use\nof the logical particles of the meta-theory, and so on for what seemed\nlike an infinite regress of meta-theories. This is certainly an\nargument that ought to give the proponents of the conventionality of\nlogic pause: for, indeed, how could one hope to set out the general\nconventions for “all” or\n“if…then…” without at some point using the\nnotions of “all” and “if…then…”\n(“ALL instances of a universal quantification are to be\ntrue”. “IF p is one premise, and if p then\nq another, THEN conclude q”)? (See Warren, 2017,\nhowever, for a reply, exploiting the resources of implicit definition;\ncf. fns 9 and 16.)", "\nAs we noted, Quine sees more room for convention in choosing between\ndifferent, incompatible versions of set theory needed for mathematics\nthat were developed in the wake of Russell’s paradox. Here:", "\n\n\nWe find ourselves making deliberate choices and setting them forth\nunaccompanied by any attempt at justification other than in terms of\nelegance and convenience. (CLT, p. 117).\n", "\nBut then it’s hard to see the difference between mathematics and\nthe conventional “meaning postulates” Carnap had proposed\nfor establishing the rest of science —and then the difference\nbetween them and any other claims of a theory. As Quine goes on to\nargue, although stipulative definitions (what he calls\n“legislative postulations”)", "\n\n\ncontribute truths which become integral to the corpus of truths, the\nartificiality of their origin does not linger as a localized quality,\nbut suffuses the corpus. If a subsequent expositor singles out those\nonce legislatively postulated truths again as postulates, this\nsignifies nothing… He could as well choose his postulates from\nelsewhere in the corpus, and will if he thinks it this serves his\nexpository ends. (CLT, pp. 119–20)\n", "\nCarnap’s legislated “meaning postulates” should\ntherefore be regarded as just an arbitrary selection of sentences a\ntheory presents as true, a selection perhaps useful for purposes of\nexposition, but no more significant than the selection of certain\ntowns in Ohio as “starting points” for a journey Quine\n(1953 [1980a], p. 35).", "\nQuine’s observation certainly seems to accord with scientific\npractice. Suppose, say, Newton, himself, had explicitly set out\n“F=ma” as a stipulated definition of “F”:\nwould “F=ma” be therefore justifiable by knowing the\nmeaning the words alone? Our taking such a stipulation seriously would\nseem to depend upon our view of the plausibility of the surrounding\ntheory as a whole. After all, as Quine continues:", "\n\n\n[S]urely the justification of any theoretical hypothesis can, at the\ntime of hypothesis, consist in no more than the elegance and\nconvenience which the hypothesis brings to the containing bodies of\nlaws and data. How then are we to delimit the category of legislative\npostulation, short of including under it every new act of scientific\nhypothesis? (CLT, p. 121)\n", "\nSo conventional legislation of claims, such as Carnap’s meaning\npostulates, affords the claims no special status. As vivid examples,\nPutnam (1965 [1975]) discusses in detail revisions of the definitions\nof “straight line” and “kinetic energy” in the\nlight of Einstein’s theories of\n relativity.[10]", "\nThis appeal to “the containing bodies of laws and data”\nessentially invokes Quine’s famous holistic metaphor of the\n“web of belief” with which CLT eloquently concludes:", "\n\n\nthe lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences [which] develops and\nchanges, through more or less arbitrary and deliberate revisions and\nadditions of our own, more or less directly occasioned by the\ncontinuing stimulation of our sense organs. It is a pale grey lore,\nblack with fact and white with convention. But I have found no\nsubstantial reasons for concluding that there are any quite black\nthreads in it, or any white ones (CLT, p.\n 132)[11]\n " ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Convention?" }, { "content": [ "\nThe picture presented in this last and many similar passages expresses\na tremendously influential view of Quine’s that led several\ngenerations of philosophers to despair not only of the\nanalytic-synthetic distinction, but of the category of a\npriori knowledge entirely. The view has come to be called\n“confirmation holism,” and Quine had expressed it more\nshortly a few years earlier, in his widely read article, “Two\nDogmas of Empiricism” (1953 [1980a]):", "\n\n\nOur statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense\nexperience not individually, but only as a corporate body. (1953\n[1980a], p. 41)\n", "\nIndeed, the “two dogmas” that the article discusses are\n(i) the belief in the intelligibility of the “analytic”\nitself, and (ii), what Quine regards as the flip side of the same\ncoin, the belief that “each statement, taken in isolation from\nits fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all”\n(p. 41), i.e., the very version of the Verifiability Theory of Meaning\nwe have seen the Positivists enlisted in their effort to\n“analyze” the claims of science and\n commonsense.[12]", "\nQuine bases his “confirmation holism” upon observations of\nPierre Duhem (1914 [1954]), who drew attention to the myriad ways in\nwhich theories are supported by evidence, and the fact that an\nhypothesis is not (dis)confirmed merely by some specific experiment\nconsidered in isolation from an immense amount of surrounding theory.\nThus, a thermometer will be a good indication of ambient temperature\nonly if it’s made of the right materials, calibrated\nappropriately, and there aren’t any other forces at work that\nmight disturb the measurement—and, of course, only if the\nbackground laws of physics and other beliefs that have informed the\ndesign of the measurement are sufficiently correct. A failure of the\nthermometer to measure the temperature could be due to a failure of\nany of these other conditions, which is, of course, why experimenters\nspend so much time and money constructing experiments to\n“control” for them. Moreover, with a small change in our\ntheories or background beliefs, or just in our understanding of the\nconditions for measurement, we might change the tests on which we\nrely, but often without changing the meaning of the sentences whose\ntruth we might be trying to establish (which, as Putnam 1965 [1975]\npointed out, is precisely what practicing scientists regularly\ndo).", "\nWhat is novel—and highly controversial—about Quine’s\nunderstanding of these commonplace observations is his extension of\nthem to claims presumed by most people (e.g., by Duhem himself) to lie\noutside their scope, viz., the whole of mathematics and even logic! It\nis this extension that seems to undermine the traditional a\npriori status of these latter domains, since it appears to open\nthe possibility of a revision of logic, mathematics and any supposed\nanalytic claims in the interest of the plausibility of the one,\noverall resulting empirical theory—containing the empirical\nclaims and those of logic, mathematics and the analytic!\nPerhaps this wouldn’t be so odd should the revisability of such\nclaims permit their ultimately admitting of a justification that\ndidn’t involve experience. But this is ruled out by\nQuine’s insistence that scientific theories, along with their\nlogic and mathematics, are confirmed “only” as\n“corporate\n bodies.”[13]", "\nOne might wonder why, though, there have historically been virtually\nno revisions of mathematics on empirical grounds. A common example\noffered is how Riemannian replaced Euclidean geometry in\nEinstein’s theory of General Relativity. But this mis-interprets\nthe history. Non-Euclidean geometries were purely conceptual\ndevelopments in the 19th C. by mathematicians such as Gauss, Riemann\nand Lobechevsky. Einstein simply argued in 1916 that one of these\nconceptual possibilities seemed to be better supported by physics than\nwas the traditional Euclidean one, and should therefore be taken to be\ntrue of actual space(-time). It is only this latter claim that is\nempirical.", "\nCertainly, though, Quine’s holism has been an epistemic\npossibility that many have taken seriously. For example, influenced by\nQuine’s claim, Putnam (1968 [1975]) argued that one ought to\nrevise even elementary logic in view of the surprising results of\nquantum mechanics (a proposal not without its critics, see Quantum\nLogic and Probability Theory). And in his (1962 [1975] he also\nargued that it isn’t hard to imagine discovering that a\npurported analytic truth, such as Cats are animals, could be\ngiven up in light of discovering that the little things are really\ncleverly disguised robots controlled from Mars (but see Katz, 1990,\npp. 216ff and G. Russell, 2008, for replies, and the\nsupplement §3 for further discussion)." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 Verification and Confirmation Holism" }, { "content": [ "\nQuine’s discussion of the role of convention in science seems\nright; but how about the role of meaning in ordinary natural language\n(cf. Chomsky’s 2000 cautions mentioned in\n footnote 10)?\n Is it really true that in the “pale grey lore” of all the\nsentences we accept, there aren’t some that are\n“white” somehow “by virtue of the very meanings of\ntheir words”? What about our examples in our earlier set II?\nWhat about sentences of the sort that interest Juhl and Loomis (2010)\nthat merely link patent synonyms, as in “Lawyers are\nattorneys,” or “A fortnight is a period of fourteen\ndays”? As Grice and Strawson (1956) and Putnam (1965 [1975])\npointed out, it is unlikely that so intuitively plausible a\ndistinction should turn out to have no basis at all in\nfact.", "\nQuine addressed this issue, first, in his (1953 [1980a], chapter 3),\nand then in a much larger way in his (1960, chapter 2, and 1974) and\nrelated articles. In his (1953 [1980a]) he pressed his objection to\nanalyticity further to the very ideas of synonymy and the linguistic\nmeaning of an expression, on which, we saw, Frege’s criterion of\nanalyticity crucially relied. His objection is that he sees no way to\nmake any serious explanatory sense of them. He explored plausible\nexplanations in terms of “definition,”\n“intension,” “possibility,” and\n“contradiction,”, pointing out that each of these notions\nseems to stand in precisely as much need of explanation as synonymy\nitself (recall our observation in §1.2 above regarding the lack\nof any formal contradiction in “Some pediatricans\naren’t doctors”). The terms seem to be mutually definable\nin what seems to be a—viciously?—small “closed curve\nin space” (Quine 1953 [1980a], p. 30). Though they might be\ninvoked to explain one another, they could not in the end answer the\nchallenge of how to distinguish an analytic claim from simply a\ntenaciously held belief.", "\nTo take a recent example, David Chalmers (2012) revisits\nCarnap’s (1956b) proposal for basing synonymy on\n“intension” by way of eliciting a person’s judgments\nabout the extension of a term/concept in all possible\n worlds:[14]", "\n\n\nCarnap’s key idea is that we can investigate the intension that\na subject associated with an expression by investigating the\nsubject’s judgments about possible cases. To determine the\nintension of an expression such as ‘Pferd’ for a subject,\nwe present the subject with descriptions of various logically possible\ncases, and we ask the subject whether he or she is willing to apply\nthe term ‘Pferd’ to objects specified in these cases. If\nwe do this for enough cases, then we can test all sorts of hypotheses\nabout the intension of the expression. (Chalmers 2012, p. 204)\n", "\nBut how are the informants to understand the questions they’re\nbeing asked? If they understand the term “possible” as\nlogicians do, as truth in a set-theoretically specified\nmodel, then it will be too weak: there are obviously models in\nwhich synonymous expressions e.g., “horse” and\n“Pferd,” or “bachelor” and “unmarried\nmale” are assigned non-overlapping sets (cf. Quine\n[1953 [1980a], pp. 22–3), so that it’s logically possible\nfor there be a horse that’s not a Pferd, or a bachelor\nthat’s married (again, “a married bachelor” is\nformally contradictory only if one substitutes synonyms for synonyms;\nbut we certainly can’t appeal to synonymy in trying to\ndefine synonymy). But if “possible” is understood\n(as it ordinarily would be) as merely imaginable, then it\nwill be far too strong, ruling out ideas that the scientifically\nunder-informed might find impossible, e.g., curved space-time,\nsomething having the properties of both waves and particles, or\ncompletely unconscious thoughts (which, at least, e.g., John Searle\n1992, pp. 155–6, and Galen Strawson 1994, pp. 166–7 report\nhaving trouble conceiving). As Quine (1953 [1980a]) famously argued,\nsuch appeals to informant verdicts will only work if the informants\nunderstand the questions as about the very terms the proposed test\nis supposed to define, viz., “possible” as\nconstrained by synonymy or preservation of meaning. Although, as many\nhave noted (e.g., Williamson 2007, p. 50), there may be explanatory\ncircularities in the best of theories, the circularity here seems\nparticularly vicious, with the relevant ideas appearing not to perform\nany explanatory work other than bringing in each other’s\nlaundry.", "\nWhy was Quine so convinced of this last claim? Because he thought it\nwas possible to provide a satisfactory explanation of human language\nwithout them, indeed, without any mentalistic notions at all. In his\n(1953 [1980b], 1960 [2013] and 1974) he sketched a behavioristic\ntheory of language that doesn’t rely on the postulation of\ndeterminate meaning or reference, and argued that, indeed, translation\nis “indeterminate”: there is “no fact of the\nmatter” about whether two expressions do or do not have the same\nmeaning (see Indeterminacy of Translation). This would appear\nto imply that there are pretty much no facts of the matter about\npeople’s mental lives at all! For, if there is no fact of the\nmatter about whether two people mean the same thing by their words,\nthen there is no fact of the matter about the content of\nanyone’s thoughts. Quine himself took this consequence in\nstride—he was, after all, a behaviorist– regarding it as\n“of a piece” with Franz Brentano’s (1874 [1995])\nfamous thesis of the “irreducibility of the intentional”;\nit’s just that for him, unlike for Brentano, it simply showed\nthe “baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a\nscience of intention” (1960 [2013], p. 202). Needless to say,\nmany subsequent philosophers have not been happy with this view, and\nhave wondered where Quine’s argument went wrong." ], "subsection_title": "3.5 Quine on Meaning in Linguistics " }, { "content": [ "\nOne problem many have had with Quine’s argument is about how to\nexplain the appearance of the analytic. It just seems an\nempirical fact that most people would spontaneously distinguish our\noriginal two sets of sentences (§1) by saying that sentences of\nthe second set, such as “All pediatricians are doctors for\nchildren” are “true by definition,” or could be\nknown to be true just by knowing the meanings of the constituent\nwords. Moreover, they might agree about an indefinite number of\nfurther examples, e.g., that ophthalmologists are eye doctors,\ngrandfathers are parents of parents, sauntering a kind of movement,\npain and beliefs mental states, and promising an intentional act.\nAgain, as Grice and Strawson (1956) and Putnam (1965 [1975]) stressed,\nit’s implausible to suppose that there’s nothing\npeople are getting at in these judgments.", "\nQuine’s (1953 [1980a]) initial explanation of the appearance of\nthe analytic invoked his metaphor of the web of belief, claiming that\nsentences are more or less revisable, depending upon how\n“peripheral” or “central” their position is in\nthe web, the more peripheral ones being closer to experience. The\nappearance of sentences being “analytic” is simply due to\ntheir being, like the laws of logic and mathematics, comparatively\ncentral, and so are given up, if ever, only under extreme pressure\nfrom the peripheral forces of experience. But no sentence is\nabsolutely immune from revision; all sentences are thereby empirical,\nand none is actually analytic.", "\nThere are a number of problems with this explanation. In the first\nplace, centrality and the appearance of analyticity don’t seem\nto be so closely related. As Quine (1960, p. 66) himself noted, there\nare are plenty of central, unrevisable beliefs that don’t seem\nremotely analytic, e.g., “There have been black dogs,”\n“The earth has existed for more than five minutes,”\n“Mass-energy is conserved”; and many standard examples of\nwhat seem analytic aren’t seriously central: “Bachelors\nare unmarried,” “A fortnight is two weeks” or\n“A beard is facial hair” are pretty trivial verbal issues,\nand could easily be revised if people really cared (cf., Juhl and\nLoomis, 2010, p. 118).", "\nSecondly, it’s not mere unrevisability that seems distinctive of\nthe analytic, but rather a certain sort of unintelligibility:\nfor all the unrevisability of “There have been black\ndogs,” it’s perfectly possible to imagine it to\nbe false. In contrast, what’s peculiar about analytic claims is\nthat their denials often seem peculiarly impossible to seriously\nthink: it seems distinctively impossible to imagine a married\nbachelor. Now, of course, as we noted, this could be due simply to a\nfailure of imagination. But what’s striking about about the\nunrevisability of many apparently analytic cases is that they\ndon’t appear to be like scientifically controversial cases such\nas curved space-time or completely unconscious thoughts. The standard\ncases about, e.g., bachelors or pediatricians seem entirely innocuous.\nFar from unrevisability explaining analyticity, it would seem to\nbe analyticity that explains this peculiar unrevisability: the\nonly reason someone might balk at denying bachelors are unmarried is\nthat, well, that’s just what the word “bachelor”\n means![15]\n The challenge, though, is to clarify the basis for this sort of\nexplanation.", "\nIt is important to note here a crucial change that Quine (and earlier\nPositivists) casually introduced into the characterization of the\na priori, and consequently into much of the now common\nunderstanding of the analytic. Where Kant and others had traditionally\nassumed that the a priori concerned beliefs\n“justifiable independently of experience,” Quine and many\nother philosophers of the time came to regard it as consisting of\nbeliefs “unrevisable in the light of experience.” And, as\nwe have seen, a similar status is accorded the at least apparently\nanalytic. However, this would imply that people taking something to be\nanalytic or a priori would have to regard themselves as being\ninfallible about it, forever unwilling to revise it in light\nof further evidence or argument. But this is a further claim that many\ndefenders of the traditional notions need not embrace (consider,\nagain, the disputes philosophers have about the proper analysis of\nterms such as “knowledge” or “freedom”).", "\nIndeed, a claim might be in fact analytic and justifiable\nindependently of experience, but nevertheless perfectly well revised\nin the light of it. Experience, after all, might mislead us, as it\n(perhaps) misled Putnam when he suggested revising logic in light of\ndifficulties in quantum mechanics, or suggested revising “cats\nare animals,” were we to discover the things were robots. Just\nwhich claims are genuinely analytic and a priori might not be\navailable in the “armchair” at the introspective or\nbehavioral surface of our lives in the way that Quine and much of the\nphilosophical tradition has assumed. Certainly the “dispositions\nto assent or dissent from sentences” on which Quine (1960\n[2013], chapter 2) standardly relied are likely very dubious guides\n(see the findings of “experimental philosophy” discussed\nin §4.1 below). Behavioral dispositions in general may have any\nof a variety of aetiologies that aren’t clearly distinguishable\nin actual behavior (one wonders how much of Quine’s seamless\nepistemology went hand in hand with his mentalistically seamless\nbehavioristic psychology). The relevant dispositions might be hidden\nmore deeply in our minds, and our access to them as fallible as our\naccess to any other such facts about ourselves. The genuinely analytic\nmay be a matter of difficult reflective analysis or deep linguistic\ntheory (see Bealer, 1987, Bonjour 1998, Rey, 1998, and\nsupplement), a possibility to which we will return\nshortly.", "\nIn his expansion of Quine’s point, Putnam (1962 [1975]) tried to\nrescue what he thought were theoretically innocuous examples of\nanalytic truths by appeal to what he called\n“one-criterion” concepts, or concepts like, e.g.,\npediatrician, bachelor, widow, where there seems to be only\none “way to tell” whether they apply. However, as Fodor\n(1998) pointed out, so stated, this latter account won’t suffice\neither, since the notion of “criterion” seems no better\noff than “meaning” or “analytic.” Moreover, if\nthere were one way to tell what’s what, there would seem,\ntrivially, to be indefinite numbers of other ways: look for some\nreliable correlate (living alone, frequenting singles bars for\n“bachelor”), or, just ask someone who knows the one way;\nor ask someone who knows someone who knows; or…, etc., and so\nnow we would be faced with saying which of these ways is genuinely\n“criterial,” which would seem to leave us with the same\nproblem we faced in saying which way appears to be\n“analytic.”", "\nFodor (1998) tried to improve on Putnam’s proposal by suggesting\nthat a criterion that appears to be analytic is the one on which all\nthe other criteria depend, but which does not depend upon them. Thus,\ntelling that someone is a bachelor by checking out his gender and\nmarriage status doesn’t depend upon telling by asking his\nfriends, but telling by asking his friends does depend upon telling by\nhis gender and marriage status; and so we have an explanation of why\n“bachelors are unmarried males” seems analytic, but, said\nFodor, without it’s actually being so (perhaps somewhat\nsurprisingly, given his general “asymmetric dependence”\ntheory of content, see his 1990b and Rey, 2009, to be discussed\nshortly, §§4.2–4.3).", "\nHowever, such asymmetric dependencies among criteria alone will not\n“explain (away)” either the reality or the appearance of\nthe analytic, since there would appear to be asymmetric dependencies\nof the proposed sort in non-analytic cases. Natural kinds are dramatic\ncases in point (see Putnam 1962 [1975], 1970 [1975], 1975). At some\nstage in history probably the only way anyone could tell whether\nsomething was a case of polio was to see whether there was a certain\nconstellation of standard symptoms, e.g. paralysis; other ways\n(including asking others) asymmetrically depended upon that way. But\nthis wouldn’t make “All polio cases exhibit\nparalysis” remotely analytic—after all, the standard\nsymptoms for many diseases can sometimes be quite misleading. It\nrequired serious empirical research to discover the proper definition\nof a natural kind term like “polio.” Precisely as Putnam\notherwise stressed, methods of testing are so variable it is doubtful\nthat even “single criterion” tests could provide a basis\nfor the identification of the stable meanings of words.", "\nIndeed, as many philosophers in the wake of Quine’s and\nPutnam’s work came to suspect, the recourse of philosophy in\ngeneral to epistemology to ground semantics may have been a\nfundamental mistake. It was an enticing recourse: it seemed to offer a\nway to dispatch philosophical disputes and secure empirical knowledge\nfrom sceptical challenges regarding demons and dreams. But the above\ndifficulties suggested that those disputes and challenges would need\nto be met in some other way, perhaps by looking not to words, but to\nthe world instead.", "\nIndeed, another strategy that a Quinean can deploy to explain the\nappearance of the analytic is to claim that analyses are really not of\nthe meanings of words, but of the actual phenomena in the\nworld to which they refer (see Fodor, 1990b, 1998). Thus, claims\nthat, e.g., cats are animals, triangles are three-sided, or that every\nnumber has a successor should not be construed as claims about the\nmeanings of the words “cat”, “triangle” or\n“number,” but about the nature of cats,\ntriangles and numbers themselves. Arguably, many such\nclaims, if they are true, are necessarily so (cf., Kripke,\n1972; Putnam, 1975), and may be commonly understood to be, and this\nmight make them seem analytic. But then we would be faced with\nprecisely the challenge that Quine raised: how to distinguish claims\nof analyticity from simply deeply held beliefs about “the\nnature” of things.", "\nThis recourse to the world may, however, be a little too swift. Cases\nof (arguably) deeply explanatory natural kinds such as polio\nor cats contrast dramatically with cases of more superficial\nkinds like bachelor or fortnight. whose natures are\nnot specified by any explanatory science, but are pretty much\nexhausted by what would seem to be the meanings of the words. Again,\nunlike the case of polio and its symptoms, the reason that gender and\nmarriage status are the best way to tell whether someone is a bachelor\nis, again, that that’s just what “bachelor” means.\nIndeed, should a doctor propose revising the test for polio in the\nlight of better theory—perhaps reversing the dependency of\ncertain tests—this would not even begin to appear to involve a\nchange in the meaning of the term. Should, however, a feminist\npropose, in the light of better politics, revising the use of\n“bachelor” to include women, this obviously would. If the\nappearance of the analytic is to be explained away, it needs to\naccount for such differences in our understanding of different sorts\nof revisions in our beliefs, which don’t appear to be\nissues regarding the external world." ], "subsection_title": "3.6 Explaining Away the Appearance of the Analytic" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere has been a wide variety of responses to Quine’s\nchallenges. Some, for example, Davidson (1980), Stich (1983) and\nDennett (1987), seem simply to accept it and try to account for our\npractice of meaning ascription within its “non-factual”\nbounds. Since they follow Quine in at least claiming to forswear the\nanalytic, we will not consider their views further here. Others, who\nmight be (loosely) called “neo-Cartesians,” reject\nQuine’s attack as simply so much prejudice of the empiricism and\nnaturalism that they take to be his own uncritical dogmas (§4.1\nin what follows). Still others hope simply to find a way to break out\nof the “intentional circle,” and provide an account of at\nleast what it means for one thing (a state of the brain, for example)\nto mean (or “carry the information about”) another\nexternal phenomenon in the world (§4.2). Perhaps the most\ntrenchant reaction has been that of empirically oriented linguists and\nphilosophers, who look to a specific explanatory role the analytic may\nplay in an account of thought and talk (§4.3). This role is\ncurrently being explored in considerable detail in the now various\nareas of research inspired by the important linguistic theories of\nNoam Chomsky (§4.4, and supplement, Analyticity and Chomskyan\nLinguistics)." ], "section_title": "4. Post-Quinean Strategies", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe most unsympathetic response to Quine’s challenges has been\nessentially to stare him down and insist upon an inner faculty of\n“intuition” whereby the truth of certain claims is simply\n“grasped” directly through, as Bonjour (1998) puts it:", "\n\n\nan act of rational insight or rational intuition … [that] is\nseemingly (a) direct or immediate, nondiscursive, and yet also (b)\nintellectual or reason-governed … [It] depends upon nothing\nbeyond an understanding of the propositional content itself….\n(p. 102)\n", "\nBealer (1987, 1999) defends similar proposals. Neither Bonjour nor\nBealer are in fact particularly concerned to defend the analytic by\nsuch claims, but their recourse to mere understanding of propositional\ncontent is certainly what many defenders of the analytic have had in\nmind. Katz (1998, pp. 44–5), for example, explicitly made the\nvery same appeal to intuitions on behalf of the analytic claims\nsupported by his semantic theory. Somewhat more modestly, Peacocke\n(1992, 2004) claims that possession of certain logical concepts\nrequires that a person find certain inferences “primitively\ncompelling,” or compelling not by reason of some inference that\ntakes “their correctness…as answerable to anything\nelse” (1992, p. 6; see also his 2004, p. 100 and the other\nreferences in fn 9 above for the strategy, and fn 7, as well as\nHarman, 1996 [1999], and Horwich, 2000, for qualms).", "\nPerhaps the simplest reply along these lines emerges from a suggestion\nof David Lewis (1972 [1980]), who proposes to implicitly define, e.g.,\npsychological terms by conjoining the “platitudes” in\nwhich they appear:", "\n\n\nInclude only platitudes that are common knowledge among us –\neveryone knows them, everyone knows that everyone else knows them, and\nso on. For the meanings of our words are common knowledge, and I am\ngoing to claim that names of mental states derive their meaning from\nthese platitudes. (1972 [1980], p. 212)\n", "\nEnlarging on this idea, Frank Jackson (1998) emphasizes the role of\nintuitions about possible cases, as well as the need sometimes to\nmassage such intuitions so as to arrive at “the hypothesis that\nbest makes sense of [folk] responses” (p. 36; see also pp.\n 34–5).[16]", "\nThe Quinean reply to all these approaches is, again, his main\nchallenge: how in the end are we to distinguish such claims of\n“rational insight,” “primitive compulsion,”\ninferential practices or folk beliefs, from merely some deeply\nentrenched empirical convictions, folk practices or, indeed, from mere\ndogmas? Isn’t the history of thought littered with what have\nturned out to be deeply mistaken claims, inferences and platitudes\nthat people at the time have found “rationally” and/or\n“primitively compelling,” say, with regard to God, sin,\ndisease, biology, sexuality, or even patterns of reasoning themselves?\nAgain, consider the resistance Kahneman (2011) reports people\ndisplaying to correction of the fallacies they commit in a surprising\nrange of ordinary thought (cf. fn 7 above); or in a more disturbing\nvein, how the gifted mathematician, John Nash, claimed that his\ndelusional ideas “about supernatural beings came to me the same\nway that my mathematical ideas did” (Nasar 1998, p. 11).\nIntrospected episodes, primitive compulsions, intuitions about\npossibilities, or even tacit folk theories alone are not going to\ndistinguish the analytic, since these all may be due as much to\npeople’s (possibly mad!) empirical theories as to any special\nknowledge of meaning.", "\nA particularly vivid way to feel the force of Quine’s challenge\nis afforded by a recent case that came before the Ontario Supreme\nCourt concerning whether laws that confined marriage to heterosexual\ncouples violated the equal protection clause of the constitution (see\nHalpern et al. 2001). The question was regarded as turning in\npart on the meaning of the word “marriage”, and each party\nto the dispute solicited affidavits from philosophers, one of whom\nclaimed that the meaning of the word was tied to\nheterosexuality, another that it wasn’t. Putting aside\nthe complex moral-political issues, Quine’s challenge can be\nregarded as a reasonably sceptical request to know how any serious\ntheory of the world might settle it. It certainly wouldn’t be\nsufficient merely to claim that marriage is/isn’t necessarily\nheterosexual on the basis of common “platitudes,” much\nless on “an act of rational insight [into] the propositional\ncontent itself”; or because speakers found the inference from\nmarriage to heterosexuality “primitively compelling” and\ncouldn’t imagine gay people getting\n married![17]", "\nIndeed, some philosophers have offered some empirical evidence that\ncasts doubt on just how robust the data for the analytic might be. The\nmovement of “experimental philosophy” has pointed to\nevidence of considerable malleability of subject’s\n“intuitions” with regard to the standard kinds of thought\nexperiments on which philosophical defenses of analytic claims\ntypically rely. Thus, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) found\nsignificant cultural differences between responses of Asian and\nWestern students regarding whether someone counted as having knowledge\nin a standard “Gettier” (1963) example of accidental\njustified true belief; and Knobe (2003) found that\nnon-philosophers’ judgments about whether an action is\nintentional depended on the (particularly negative) moral qualities of\nthe action, and not, as is presumed by most philosophers, on whether\nthe action was merely intended by the agent. Questions, of course,\ncould be raised about these experimental results (How well did the\nsubjects understand the project of assessing intuitions? Did the\nexperiments sufficiently control for the multitudinous\n“pragmatic” effects endemic to polling procedures? To what\nextent are the target terms merely polysemous – see\nsupplement, §3– allowing for different uses in\ndifferent contexts?) However, the results do serve to show how the\ndetermination of meaning and analytic truths can be regarded as a far\nmore difficult empirical question than philosophers have traditionally\nsupposed (see Bishop and Trout, 2005, and Alexander and Weinberg,\n2007, for further discussion)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Neo-Cartesianism" }, { "content": [ "\nDeveloping the strategy of §3.3C above, Externalist theories of\nmeaning (or “content”) try to meet at least part of\nQuine’s challenge by considering how matters of meaning need not\nrely on epistemic. or really any internal\nconnections among thoughts or beliefs, in the way that many\nphilosophers had traditionally supposed, but as involving largely\ncausal and social relations between uses of words and the phenomena in\nthe world that they pick out. This suggestion gradually emerged in the\nwork of Putnam (1962 [1975], 1965 [1975] and 1975), Kripke (1972\n[1980]) and Burge (1979, 1986), but it took the form of positive\ntheories in, e.g., the work of Devitt (1981, 2015), Dretske (1988) and\nFodor (1990b), who tried to base meaning in various actual or\nco-variational causal relations between states of the mind/brain and\nexternal phenomena (see Indicator Semantics; as well as the\nwork on “teleosemantics” of Millikan, 1984), Papineau,\n1987, and Neander, 1995, 2017, who look to mechanisms of natural\nselection; see Teleological Theories of Mental Content).", "\nConsider, for example, Fodor’s proposal. Simplifying it\nslightly, Fodor (1990b) claimed that", "\n\n\na symbol S means p if\n\n\n(i)\nunder some conditions, C, it’s a law that S\nis entokened iff p, and\n(ii)\nany other tokening of S synchronically depends upon (i),\nbut not vice versa.\n\n", "\nThus, tokenings of “horse” mean horse because\nthere are (say, optimal viewing) conditions under which tokenings of\n“horse” co-vary with horses, and tokenings of\n“horse” caused by cows asymmetrically depend upon that\nfact. The intuitive idea here is that what makes “horse”\nmean horse is that errors and other tokenings of\n“horse” in the absence of horses (e.g., dreaming of them)\ndepend upon being able to get things right, but not vice\nversa: getting things right doesn’t depend upon getting\nthem wrong. The law in (i), so to say, “governs” the\ntokenings of (ii). (Note that this condition is metaphysical,\nappealing to actual laws of entokenings, and not upon\nasymmetric dependencies between epistemic criteria suggested\nby Fodor in his defense of Putnam we discussed in §3.6.2.)", "\nFodor’s and related proposals are not without their problems\n(see Loewer, 1996, Rey, 2009 and Causal Theories of Mental\nContent). Nevertheless, it’s worth noting that,\nwere such theories to succeed in providing the kind of\nexplanatorily adequate, non-circular account of intentionality to\nwhich they aspire, they would go some way towards saving at least\nintentional psychology from Quine’s attack, and provide at least\none prima facie plausible, naturalistic strategy for\ndistinguishing facts about meaning from facts about mere belief. The\nproposals, unlike those in the traditions of Carnap or of\nneo-Cartesians, have at least the form of a serious\nreply.", "\nHowever, even if such externalist strategies, either Fodor’s or\nteleosemantic ones, were to save intentionality and meaning, they\nwould do so only by forsaking the high hopes we noted in §2\nphilosophers harbored for the analytic. For externalists are typically\ncommitted to counting expressions as “synonymous” if they\nhappen to be linked in the right way to the same external phenomena,\neven if a thinker couldn’t realize that they are by a\npriori (or, at any rate, “armchair”) reflection\nalone. By at least the Fregean substitution criterion (§1.2),\nthey would seem to be committed to counting as “analytic”\nmany patently empirical sentences as “Water is H2O,”\n“Salt is NaCl” or “Mark Twain is Samuel\nClemens,” since in each of these cases, something may co-vary in\nthe relevant way with tokenings of the expression on one side of the\nidentity if and only if it co-varies with tokenings of the one on the\nother (similar problems and others arise for teleosemantics; see Fodor\n1990b, pp. 72–73).", "\nOf course, along the lines of the worldly turn we noted in\n§3.6.3, an externalist might cheerfully just allow that some\nsentences, e.g., “water is H20,” are in fact analytic,\neven though they are “external” and subject to empirical\n(dis)confirmation. Such a view would actually comport well with an\nolder philosophical tradition less interested in the meanings of our\nwords and concepts, and more interested in the\n“essences” of the worldly phenomena they pick\nout. Locke (1690 [1975], II, 31, vi), for example, posited\n“real” essences of things rather along the lines\nresuscitated by Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1972 [1980]), the real\nessences being the conditions in the world independent of our thought\nthat make something the thing it is. Thus, being H2O may be\nwhat makes something water, and (to take the striking\nexamples of diseases noted by Putnam, 1962 [1975]) being the\nactivation of a certain virus is what makes something polio. But, of\ncourse, such an external view would still dash the hopes of\nphilosophers looking to the analytic to explain a priori\nknowledge (but see Bealer 1987 and Jackson 1998 for strategies to\nassimilate such empirical cases to nevertheless a priori,\narmchair analysis). Such a consequence, however, might not faze an\nexternalist like Fodor (1998), who is concerned only to save\nintentional psychology, and might otherwise share Quine’s\nscepticism about the analytic and the a priori.", "\nTwo final problems, however, loom over any such externalist\nstrategies. One is how to provide content to\n“response-dependent” terms, such as\n“interesting,” “amusing,” “sexy,”\n“worrisome,” whose extensions vary greatly with users and\noccasions. What seems crucial to the contents of such terms is not any\nexternalia that they might pick out, but simply some\ninternal reactions of thinkers that might vary among them\neven under all conditions, but without difference in meaning.\nAt any rate, there’s no reason to suppose there’s any sort\nof law that links the same phenomena to different people who find\ndifferent things “interesting,” “funny,” or\neven “green” (cf. Russell, 1912; Hardin, 2008). The other\nproblem is how to distinguish necessarily empty terms that\npurport to refer to (arguably) impossible phenomena such as perfectly\nflat surfaces, Euclidean figures, fictional characters or immortal\nsouls. An externalist would seem to be committed to treating all such\nterms as synonymous, despite, of course, the fact that thoughts about\nthem should obviously be distinguished (see Rey, 2009)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Externalist Theories of Meaning" }, { "content": [ "\nA promising strategy for replying to these latter problems, as well as\nto Quine’s challenge in a way that might even begin to provide\nwhat the neo-Cartesian wants, can be found in a proposal of Paul\nHorwich (1998, 2005). He emphasizes how the meaning properties of a\nterm are the ones that play a “basic explanatory role”\nwith regard to the use of a term generally, the ones ultimately in\nvirtue of which a term is used with that meaning. For example, the use\nof “red” to refer to the color of blood, roses, stop\nsigns, etc,. is arguably explained by its use to refer to certain\napparent colors in good light, but not vice versa: the latter\nuse is “basic” to all the other uses. Similarly, uses of\n“and” explanatorily depend upon its basic use in\ninferences to and from the sentences it conjoins, and number terms to\nitems in a sequence respecting Peano’s axioms (Horwich,\n1998:45,129; see also Devitt 1996, 2002 for a similar proposal).", "\nAlthough by allowing for purely internal explanatory conditions, this\nstrategy offers a way to deal with response-dependent and necessarily\nempty terms, and promises a way of distinguishing analyticities from\nmere beliefs, there are still several further potential problems it\nfaces. The first is that merely appealing to a “basic\nexplanatory” condition for the use of a word doesn’t\ndistinguish misuses and metaphors from etymologies, derived idioms and\n“dead metaphors”: saying “Juliet is the sun”\ncan be explained by the use of “sun” to refer to the sun,\nbut so can “lobbying” be explained by the use of\n“lobby” for lobbies of buildings (where politicians often\nmet), and “the eye of a needle” by the shape of an animal\neye. In these latter cases, the words seem to be “frozen”\nor “dead” metaphors, taking on meanings of their own.\nWhile they are explained by original “basic”\nuses, they are no longer “governed” by them.", "\nHere it may be worth combining something of the Horwich view with\nsomething of Fodor’s aforementioned cousin suggestion of the\nasymmetric counterfactual (§4.2), along lines suggested by Rey\n(2009; 2020a, §10.3): the new “dead” uses of an idiom\nor metaphor no longer asymmetrically depend upon the\nexplanatorily basic use. “Eye of a needle” would still\nmean the hole at the end of a needle, even if “eye” no\nlonger referred to animal eyes. But “eye” used to refer\nto, say, the drawing of an eye, would both asymmetrically and\nexplanatorily depend upon its being used to refer to actual eyes. And\ndescribing a three-way correspondence as “triangular” may\nasymmetrically and explanatorily depend upon thinking of certain\ngeometric figures as triangular, but not vice versa –\ndespite the impossibility of there ever being any actual triangles in\nthe external world (see Allott and Textor, 2022, for development of\nthis suggestion). Taking the asymmetric dependency to be\n“internally” explanatory relieves it of the excessive\nexternalism with which Fodor burdened it, while avoiding the\netymologies and dead metaphors facing Horwich’s view on its\nown.", "\nHowever, although such a proposal may offer a promising strategy for\nmeeting Quine’s challenge about many ordinary terms, it\nisn’t clear it would work for highly theoretic ones. For if\nQuine (1953 [1980a]) is right about even a limited holism involved in\nthe use of scientific terms, then there may be no sufficiently local\nbasic facts on which all other uses of a term asymmetrically and\nexplanatorily depend. To take the kind of case that most interested\nQuine, it certainly seems unlikely that there is some small set of\nuses of, say, “number,” “positron,”\n“space” or “biological species” that are\nexplanatorily basic, on which all other uses really depend. Such terms\noften come with a large cluster of terms appearing in claims that come\nas, so to say, a loose “package deal,” and revision over\ntime may touch any particular claim in the interests of overall\nexplanatory adequacy. Uses of a term involved in the expression of\nbelief, either in thought or talk, will likely be justified and\nexplained by the same processes of holistic confirmation that led\nQuine to his scepticism about the analytic in the first place (cf.\nGibbard, 2008). Of course, Quine might be wrong about taking the case\nof theoretic terms in science to be representative of terms in human\npsychology generally (cf. Chomsky, 2000,\n footnote 10\n above), and the above proposal might be confined to some restricted\nportions of a speaker’s psychology, e.g., to perception (as in\nFodor, 1983, 2000). But, to put it mildly, the verdict on these issues\nis not quite in (see supplement §§4–5).", "\nLastly, a third (and, for some, a serious) possible drawback of this\nstrategy is that it still risks rendering matters of meaning far less\n“transparent” and introspectively accessible than\nphilosophers have standardly supposed. There is little reason to\nsuppose that what is asymmetrically-explanatorily basic about\none’s use of a term in thought or talk is a matter that is\navailable to introspection or armchair reflection. As in the case of\n“marriage” mentioned earlier, but certainly with respect\nto other philosophically problematic notions, just which properties,\nif any, are explanatorily basic may not be an issue that is at all\neasy to determine. What are the asymmetric-explanatorily basic uses of\n“freedom” or “soul”? Do even people’s\nuses of animal terms really depend upon dubbings of species – or\nof individual exemplars – or do they depend more upon an innate\ndisposition to think in terms of underlying biological kinds (cf. Keil\n2014, pp. 327–333)? Do their uses of number words and concepts\nreally depend upon their grasp of Peano’s axioms? Perhaps the\nusage is grounded more in practices of (finite) counting, estimates\nand noticing merely finite one-to-one correspondences; or\nperhaps they lie in the general recursive character of\nlanguage (cf. Hauser et al 2002). Again, one may need the\nresources of a psychology that delves into far more deeply into the\ncomplex, internal causal relations in the mind than are available at\nits introspective or behavioral surface." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Internal Dependencies" }, { "content": [ "\nSuch an interest in a deeper and richer internal psychology\nemerged most dramatically in the 1950s in the work of Noam Chomsky. In\nhis (1957, 1965, 1968 [2006]) he began to revolutionize linguistics by\npresenting substantial evidence and arguments for the existence of an\ninnate “generative” grammar in a special language faculty\nin people’s brains that he argued was responsible for their\nunderlying competence to speak and understand natural languages. This\nopened up the possibility of a response to Quine’s (1960)\nscepticism about the analytic within his own naturalistic framework,\nsimply freed of its odd behaviorism, which Chomsky and others had\nindependently, empirically refuted (see Chomsky 1959, and Gleitman,\nGross and Reisberg 2011, chapter 7). Some of it also dovetails nicely\nwith ideas of Friedrich Waismann and the later Wittgenstein, as well\nas with important recent work on polysemy. But the program Chomsky\ninitiated is complex, and its relation to the analytic quite\ncontroversial, and so discussion of it is relegated to the following\nsupplement to this entry:", "\n Supplement: Analyticity and Chomskyan Linguistics.\n " ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Chomskyan Strategies" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSuppose, per the discussion of at least §3 of the\nsupplement, that linguistics were to succeed in\ndelineating a class of analytic sentences grounded in the constraints\nof a special language faculty in the way that some Chomskyans\nsometimes seem to suggest. Would such sentences serve the purposes for\nwhich we noted earlier (§2) philosophers had enlisted them?\nPerhaps some of them would. An empirical grounding of the analytic\nmight provide us with an understanding of what constitutes a\nperson’s competence with specific words and concepts,\nparticularly logical or mathematical ones. Given that Quinean\nscepticism about the analytic is a source of his scepticism about the\ndeterminacy of cognitive states (see §3.5 above), such a\ngrounding may be crucial for a realistic psychology, determining the\nconditions under which someone has a thought with a specific\ncontent.", "\nMoreover, setting out the constitutive conditions for possessing a\nconcept might be of some interest to philosophers generally, since\nmany of the crucial questions they ask concern the proper\nunderstanding of ordinary notions such as material object, person,\naction, freedom, god, the good, or the beautiful.\nSuppose, further, that a domain, such as perhaps ethics or aesthetics,\nis “response dependent,” constituted by the\nunderlying rules of our words and concepts; suppose, that is, that\nthese rules constitute the nature of, say, the good, the\nfunny, or the beautiful. If so, then it might not be\nimplausible to claim that successful conceptual analysis could provide\nus with some a priori knowledge of such domains (although,\nagain, sorting out the rules may require empirical linguistic and\npsychological theories not available to “armchair\nreflection”).", "\nBut, of course, many philosophers have wanted more than these\nessentially psychological gains. They have hoped that analytic claims\nmight provide a basis for a priori knowledge of domains that\nexist independently of us and are not exhausted by our concepts. An\nimportant case in point would seem to be the very case of arithmetic\nthat motivated much of the discussion of the analytic in the first\nplace. Recent work of Crispin Wright (1983) and others on the logicist\nprogram has shown how a version of Frege’s program might be\nrescued by appealing not to his problematic Basic Law V, but instead\nmerely to what is called “Hume’s Principle,” or the\nclaim that for the number of Fs to be equal to the number\nof Gs is for there to be a “one-to-one\ncorrespondence” between the Fs and the Gs (as in the case of the\nfingers of a normal right and left hand), even in infinite cases.\nAccording to what is now regarded as “Frege’s\nTheorem,” the Peano axioms for arithmetic can be derived from\nthis principle in standard second-order logic (see Frege’s\ntheorem and foundations for arithmetic).", "\nNow, Wright has urged that Hume’s Principle might be regarded as\nanalytic, and perhaps this claim could be sustained by an examination\nof the language faculty along the lines of a Chomskyan linguistics set\nout in the supplement. If so, then wouldn’t that\nvindicate the suggestion that arithmetic can be known a\npriori? Not obviously, since Hume’s Principle is a claim\nnot merely about the concepts F and G, but about the\npresumably concept-independent fact about the number of\nthings that are F and the number of things that are G, and, we can\nask, what justifies any claim about them? As George Boolos (1997)\nasked in response to Wright:", "\n\n\nIf numbers are supposed to be identical if and only if the concepts\nthey are numbers of are equinumerous, what guarantee do we have that\nevery concept has a number? (p. 253)\n", "\nIndeed, as Edward Zalta (2013) observes,", "\n\n\nThe basic problem for Frege’s strategy, however, is that for his\nlogicist project to succeed, his system must at some point include\n(either as an axiom or theorem) statements that explicitly assert the\nexistence of certain kinds of abstract entities and it is not obvious\nhow to justify the claim that we know such explicit existential\nstatements. (2013, Section 6.2)\n", "\nThe concept of a unique successor to every number might be a defining\nfeature of the lexical item, “number,” but that\ndoesn’t itself imply that an infinity of numbers actually\nexists. Meanings and concepts are one thing; reality quite\nanother. Justification of such existential statements and, with them,\nHume’s Principle would seem to have to involve something more\nthan appealing to merely the concept, but also —to recall\nQuine’s (CLT, p. 121, §3.3 above) claim— to\n“the elegance and convenience which the hypothesis brings to the\ncontaining bodies of laws and data,” i.e., to our best overall\nempirical theory of the world, irrespective of what constraints\nlanguage might impose (see Wright, 1999, and Horwich, 2000, for\nfurther discussion).", "\nThe problem here becomes even more obvious in non-mathematical cases.\nFor example, philosophers have wanted to claim not merely that our\nconcepts of red and green exclude the possibility of\nour thinking that something is both colors all over, but that this\npossibility is ruled out for the actual colors,\nred and green,\nthemselves (if such there be). It is therefore no accident that\nBonjour’s (1998, pp. 184–5) defense of a priori\nknowledge turns on resuscitating views of Aristotle and Aquinas,\naccording to which the very properties of red and\ngreen themselves are constituents of\nthe propositions we grasp. But it is just such a wonderful coincidence\nbetween merely our concepts and actual worldly\nproperties that a linguistic semantics alone obviously cannot\nensure.", "\nBut suppose, nevertheless, there did in fact exist a\ncorrespondence between our concepts and the world, indeed, a deeply\nreliable, counterfactual-supporting correspondence whereby it was in\nfact metaphysically impossible for certain claims\nconstitutive of those concepts not to be true. This is, of course, not\nimplausible in the case of logic and arithmetic, and is entirely\ncompatible with, e.g., Boolos’ reasonable doubts about them\n(after all, it’s always possible to doubt what is in fact a\nnecessary truth). Such necessary correspondences between thought and\nthe world might then serve as a basis for claims to a priori\nknowledge in at least a reliabilist epistemology, where what’s\nimportant is not believers’ abilities to justify their\nclaims, but merely the reliability of the processes by which\nthey arrive at them (see Reliabilist Epistemology). Indeed,\nin the case of logic and arithmetic, the beliefs might be arrived at\nby steps that were not only necessarily reliable, but might\nalso be taken to be so by believers, in ways that might in fact depend\nin no way upon experience, but only on their competence with the\nrelevant words and concepts (Kitcher 1980; Rey 1998; and Goldman 1999\nexplore this strategy).", "\nSuch a reliabilist approach, though, might be less than fully\nsatisfying to someone interested in the traditional analytic a\npriori. For, although someone might turn out in fact to have\nanalytic a priori knowledge of this sort, she might not\nknow that she does (reliabilist epistemologists standardly\nforgo the “KK Principle,” according to which if one knows\nthat p, one knows that one knows that p). Knowledge that the\nrelevant claims were knowable a priori might itself be only\npossible by an empirically informed understanding of one’s\nlanguage faculty and other cognitive capacities à la\nChomsky, and by its consonance with the rest of one’s theory of\nthe world, à la Quine. One would only know a\nposteriori that something was knowable a priori.", "\nThe trouble then is that claims that people do have a capacity for\na priori knowledge seem quite precarious. As we noted earlier\n (footnote 7),\n people are often unreliable at appreciating deductively valid\narguments; and appreciating the standard rules even of natural\ndeduction is for many people often a difficult intellectual\nachievement. Consequently, people’s general competence with\nlogical notions may not in fact consist in any grip on valid logical\nrules; and so whatever rules do underlie that competence may well turn\nout not to be the kind of absolutely reliable guide to the\nworld on which the above reliabilist defense of a priori\nanalytic knowledge seems to depend. In any case, in view merely of the\nserious possibility that these pessimistic conclusions are true,\nit’s hard to see how any appeal to the analytic to establish the\ntruth of any controversial claim in any mind-independent domain could\nhave any special justificatory force without a sufficiently detailed,\nempirical psychological theory to back it up.", "\nMoreover, even if we did have a true account of our minds and the\nsemantic rules afforded by our linguistic and conceptual competence,\nit’s not clear it would really serve the “armchair”\npurposes of traditional philosophy that we mentioned at the outset\n(§1). Consider, for example, the common puzzle about the\npossibility that computers might actually think and enjoy a mental\nlife. In response to this puzzle some philosophers, e.g, Wittgenstein\n(1953 [1967], §§111, 281), Ziff, 1959, and Hacker, 1990,\nhave suggested that it’s analytic that a thinking thing must be\nalive, a suggestion that certainly seems to accord with many\nfolk intuitions (many people who might cheerfully accept a\ncomputational explanation of a thought process often balk at the\nsuggestion that an inanimate machine engaging in that computation\nwould actually be thinking). Now, as we noted in the\nsupplement, §2, Chomsky (2000, p. 44) explicitly\nendorses this suggestion. So suppose then this claim were in fact\nsustained by linguistic theory, showing that the lexical item\n“think” is, indeed, constrained by the feature [+animate],\nand so is not felicitously applied to artifactual computers. Should\nthis really satisfy the person worried about the possibility of\nartificial thought?", "\nIt’s hard to see why. For the serious question that concerns\npeople worried about whether artifacts could think concerns whether\nthose artifacts could in fact share the genuine, theoretically\ninteresting, explanatory properties of a thinking thing (cf.\nJackson 1998, pp. 34–5). We might have no empirical, scientific\nreason to suppose that genuine, biological animacy (n.b., not\nmerely the perhaps purely syntactic, linguistic feature\n[+animate]!; see supplement §2) actually figures among\nthem. And so we might conclude that, despite these supposed\nconstraints of natural language, inanimate computers could come to\n“think” after all. Indeed, perhaps, the claim that\nthinking things must be alive is an example of a claim that is\nanalytic but false, rather as the belief that cats are\nanimals would be, should it turn that the things are actually robots\nfrom Mars; and so we should pursue the option of polysemy and\n“open texture” that Chomsky also endorses, and proceed to\nallow that artifacts could think.", "\nOf course, a speaker could choose not to go along with, so to say,\nopening the texture this far. But if the explanatory point were\nnevertheless correct, other speakers could of course simply proceed to\ndefine a new word “think” that lacks the animacy\nconstraint and applies to the explanatory kind that in fact turns out\nto include, equally, humans and appropriately programmed artifacts.\nThe issue would reduce to merely a verbal quibble: so computers\ndon’t “think”; they “think” instead.\nIndeed, it’s a peculiar feature of the entire discussion of the\nanalytic that it can seem to turn on what may in the end be mere\nverbal quibbles. Perhaps the “linguist turn” of philosophy\nthat we sketched in §§1.2–3.3 led into a blind alley,\nand it would be more fruitful to explore, so far as possible,\nconceptual and/or explanatory connections that may exist in our minds\nor or in the world to a large extent independently of language.", "\nIn any case, while the semantic conditions of a language might provide\na basis for securing a priori knowledge of claims about\nmind-dependent domains, such as those of perhaps ethics and\naesthetics, in the case of mind-independent domains, such as\nlogic and mathematics, or the nature of worldly phenomena such as life\nor thought, the prospects seem more problematic. There may be analytic\nclaims to be had here, but at least in these cases they would, in the\nimmortal words of Putnam (1965 [1975], p. 36), “cut no\nphilosophical ice…bake no philosophical bread and wash no\nphilosophical\n windows.”[18]\n We would just have to be satisfied with theorizing about the\nmind-independent domains themselves, without being able to justify our\nclaims about them by appeal to the meanings of our words alone.\nReflecting on the difficulties of the past century’s efforts on\nbehalf of the analytic, it’s not clear why anyone would really\nwant to insist otherwise." ], "section_title": "5. 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Zalta (ed.), URL =\n <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/frege-logic/>.", "Ziff, P., 1959, “The Feelings of Robots,”\nAnalysis, 19: 64–8." ]	[ { "href": "../analysis/", "text": "analysis" }, { "href": "../apriori/", "text": "a priori justification and knowledge" }, { "href": "../behaviorism/", "text": "behaviorism" }, { "href": "../carnap/", "text": "Carnap, Rudolf" }, { "href": "../definitions/", "text": "definitions" }, { "href": "../epistemology/", "text": "epistemology" }, { "href": "../frege/", "text": "Frege, Gottlob" }, { "href": "../frege-theorem/", "text": "Frege, Gottlob: theorem and foundations for arithmetic" }, { "href": "../kant/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel" }, { "href": "../logical-constants/", "text": "logical constants" }, { "href": "../logical-truth/", "text": "logical truth" }, { "href": "../logicism/", "text": "logicism and neologicism" }, { "href": "../meaning/", "text": "meaning, theories of" }, { "href": "../metaphysics/", "text": "metaphysics" }, { "href": "../naturalism/", "text": "naturalism" }, { "href": "../operationalism/", "text": "operationalism" }, { "href": "../phenomenology/", "text": "phenomenology" }, { "href": "../quine/", "text": "Quine, Willard Van Orman" }, { "href": "../rationalism-empiricism/", "text": "rationalism vs. empiricism" }, { "href": "../russell/", "text": "Russell, Bertrand" } ]
anaphora	Anaphora	First published Tue Feb 24, 2004; substantive revision Wed Oct 27, 2021	[ "\nAnaphora is sometimes characterized as the phenomenon whereby the\ninterpretation of an occurrence of one expression depends on the\ninterpretation of an occurrence of another or whereby an occurrence of\nan expression has its referent supplied by an occurrence of some other\nexpression in the same or another\n sentence.[1]\n However, these are at best very rough characterizations of the\nphenomena, since things other than anaphoric expressions satisfy the\nfirst characterization and many cases of anaphora fail to satisfy the\nsecond. For example, in some sense of “interpretation”,\nthe interpretation of the expression “bank” in the\nfollowing sentence depends on the interpretation of other expressions\n(in particular, “of the river”):", "\nBut no one would say this is an example of anaphora. And as to the\nsecond characterization, though all agree that the following is an\nexample of anaphora (and “he” is an anaphoric pronoun here\non one reading of the sentence), it is not a case of the\nreferent of one expression being supplied by another\nexpression, (since “he” is not a referring expression on\nthe reading in question):", "\nHence, rather than attempting to characterize anaphora generally and\nabstractly, we shall begin with some examples. There is generally\nthought to be many types of anaphora, though in some cases there is\ndisagreement as to whether to classify those cases as anaphora or\n not.[2]", "\nPronominal anaphora:", "\nVP anaphora (also called VP ellipsis):", "\nPropositional anaphora:", "\nAdjectival anaphora:", "\nModal anaphora:", "\nTemporal anaphora:", "\nKind-level anaphora:", "\nThe antecedent also does not always have to precede the anaphoric\nexpression; when it doesn’t, these are called cases of\ncataphora or backwards anaphora:", "\nDespite there being many kinds of anaphora, this article will focus on\npronominal anaphora, since this is the type of anaphora that has\nreceived the most attention in the linguistics and (especially)\nphilosophical literature. Some anaphoric pronouns are referring\nexpressions that inherit their referents from other referring\nexpressions. For example, on the anaphoric reading of\n (3),\n “He” inherits its referent from “John”, which\nis said to be the antecedent of the pronoun. Such anaphora is\nsimple and well understood. In cases such as\n (2)\n above, the anaphoric pronoun has as its antecedent a quantifier\n(“Every male lawyer” in (2)), and essentially functions as\na variable bound by the quantifier. Again, such cases are well\nunderstood. There are some anaphoric pronouns that cannot be\nunderstood as referring expressions that inherit their referents from\nother referring expressions, nor as variables bound by quantified\nantecedents. These cases of anaphora are of interest to philosophers\nand linguists because formulating proper semantic theories for them\nhas proved to be a difficult and interesting task. Many theories of\nthese cases are currently being advocated." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Unproblematic Anaphora", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Problematic Anaphora", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Recent Theories of Problematic Anaphora", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Discourse Representation Theory", "3.2 Dynamic Semantic Approaches", "3.3 Descriptive Approaches", "3.4 The Context Dependent Quantifier Approach" ] }, { "content_title": "4. How Many Readings Do Donkey Sentences Have?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Anaphora in Sign Language", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe simplest sorts of anaphoric pronouns are those that “pick\nup” a reference from a previous referring expression whether in\nthe same sentence or another. Consider for example:", "\non the readings of these sentences on which “he” and\n“his” co-refer with “John”. In such cases, the\npronouns are anaphoric, and the expression “John” is\ncalled the antecedent of the anaphoric expression. The\nsemantics of such anaphoric pronouns is very simple: the referent of\nthe anaphoric pronoun is the referent of its antecedent.", "\nAs indicated above, there are also anaphoric pronouns with quantifier\n(rather than referring expression) antecedents. Examples include\n (2)\n above and:", "\nAgain, on the readings of these sentences on which “he”\nand “his” “look back” to their antecedents for\ninterpretation rather than being assigned independent reference (e.g.,\nby pointing to Chris when uttering “his” in (12)). It is\nwidely held that in such cases, the pronouns function semantically as\nvariables bound by their quantifier antecedents. Thus, their semantic\nfunction is just like that of bound variables of first order logic.\n [3]\n The insight that some pronouns with quantifier antecedents function\nlike bound variables in first order logic goes back at least to Quine\n(1960, see chapter IV section 28). Historically, these cases have been\nof more interest to linguists than philosophers. For example, one\nthing that needs to be explained is that in a sentence like\n“Sarah likes her”, “Sarah” and\n“her” cannot co-refer (in order to get a co-reference\nreading, we must say “Sarah likes herself”), though we can\nget the co-reference reading (or not) in a sentence like “Sarah\nlikes her sister”. Accounting for these types of patterns of\nsentence-internal anaphora is the central concern of the area of\nlinguistics called binding theory (see May 1980; Higginbotham\nand May 1981; Chomsky 1981; Reinhardt 1983a,b; Büring 2005).\nThough these insights are all important, if examples like\n (3),\n (11), and\n (12)\n were the only kinds of pronominal anaphora, they currently would not\nbe of much interest to so many philosophers and linguists. " ], "section_title": "1. Unproblematic Anaphora", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSignificant interest in anaphoric pronouns grew out of the realization\nthat there are anaphoric pronouns that cannot be understood as having\ntheir references fixed by their antecedents (as in\n (3)\n and\n (11)\n above) nor as being variables bound by their quantifier antecedents\n(as in\n (2)\n and\n (12)\n above). The three sorts of examples of this discussed here have\nfigured prominently in the literature on anaphora.", "\nFirst, there is discourse anaphora: cases in which an\nanaphoric pronoun has an antecedent in another sentence, where that\nantecedent at least appears to be a\n quantifier.[4]\n Examples include:", "\nThere are at least two reasons for thinking that the pronouns in (13)\nand (14) are not variables bound by their quantifier antecedents. Both\nreasons are discussed by Evans (1977). The first is that such a\ntreatment clearly yields the wrong truth conditions for examples like\n(14). If “they” is a bound variable in (14), the two\nsentences should be equivalent to", "\n(Or, more colloquially, “Few professors are such that they both\ncame to the party and had a good time.”) This is clearly\nincorrect, since the sentences of (14) entail that few professors\nattended the party (i.e., the first sentence entails this), whereas\n(14a) could be true if many professors\n attended.[5]", "\nThe second reason for thinking pronouns in cases of discourse anaphora\naren’t bound variables is that it seems committed to the claim\nthat the following anomalous sentences aren’t anomalous:", "\nIf the (apparent) quantifiers in\n (13)\n and\n (14)\n can bind variables in sentences after those in which they occur, why\ncan’t the quantifiers in (15) and (16)? If this could happen,\n(15) and (16) should be fine and should together be equivalent to,\nrespectively:", "\nBut they are not. Thus, pronouns in discourse anaphora are not\nvariables (syntactically) bound by their quantifier\n antecedents.[6]", "\nFurthermore, there are cases of (plural) anaphora in which the\ndenotation of “they” is derived in a more indirect way\nfrom the antecedent, as in (17), an example of complement\nanaphora:", "\nUnlike in (14), where “they” picks out the professors who\ncame to the party, in (17), “they” picks out the students\nwho didn’t come to the party. (For more about\ncomplement anaphora, see Nouwen (2003a), for complement anaphora in the\npsycholinguistics literature, see Sanford & Moxey (1993).)", "\nNor are these like example\n (3),\n in which the pronoun simply refers to the same thing as the\nantecedent. Indefinite descriptions like “an\nanthropologist” are commonly thought to be quantifiers, and\nexpressions like “few professors” are certainly\nquantifiers, not referring expressions. On most theories of indefinite\ndescriptions, the first sentence of\n (13)\n is true just in case there is at least one anthropologist who\ndiscovered the skeleton called “Lucy”; its truth does not\ndepend on any particular anthropologist. Thus there is no referential\nantecedent in the first sentence for the pronoun in the second\nsentence to be co-referential with.", "\nA further problem with thinking of these pronouns as referential can\nbe seen by considering a slightly more complex example:", "\nThe crucial point is that the second sentence has a reading on which\nit attributes to Scott a general belief instead of a belief about a\nparticular person. This reading would be true, for example, if Scott\nbelieved that some man broke into Sarah’s apartment by coming in\nthe window, but had no idea about who might have broken in. This is\n(prima facie) evidence that the pronoun in the second\nsentence is not a referring expression, because if it were, the second\nsentence of (18) would only have a reading on which it attributes to\nScott a belief about the particular person the pronoun refers to. But\nthis is\n incorrect.[7]\n (On the other hand, for a treatment of such de dicto\nreadings while maintaining that the pronoun is a referring expression,\nsee Elbourne 2005: 99–106.)", "\nThus, with pronouns in discourse anaphora, we have examples of\npronouns that can neither be understood as picking up their referents\nfrom their antecedents nor as being variables bound by their\nantecedents. Discourse anaphora provides further interesting examples\nto philosophers and linguists when the antecedents are under the scope\nof quantifiers, modals, or negation. For example, the pronouns in\n(19), (20), and (22) are infelicitous, but those in (21) and (23) are\nfelicitous. This is something further that an account of discourse\nanaphora needs to\n explain.[8]", "\nA second sort of anaphoric pronoun that cannot be understood as a\nreferring expression or as a bound variable is in fact a special case\nof discourse anaphora. However, it deserves separate mention because\nit has generated so much interest. Consider the following discourse,\nwhich we shall call a Geach Discourse, adapted from the\nanalogous conjunction in Geach 1967:", "\nThere is a reading of this discourse on which both sentences in it are\ntrue even if there are no witches, so that “a witch” in\nthe first sentence must take narrow scope with respect to “Hob\nthinks”. But then the scope of “a witch” cannot\nextend to the second sentence to bind the pronoun “she”,\nsince the “scope” of “Hob thinks”\ndoesn’t extend to the second sentence. Hence on the reading in\nquestion, which we shall call the Geach Reading, the pronoun\n“she” is not a bound variable. Further, since there are no\nwitches, and “she” is anaphoric on “a witch”,\n“she” in the second sentence must in some sense being used\nto “talk about” a non-existent witch. Thus, it apparently\ncannot be a referring term either, since its alleged referent\ndoesn’t exist. So here again we have an anaphoric pronoun that\ncannot be understood as a referring expression nor as a bound\nvariable. Examples of this sort are sometimes referred to\n(misleadingly, in our view) as instances of intentional\nidentity.", "\nThe third sort of case in which an anaphoric pronoun cannot be\nunderstood as a referring expression nor as a bound variable is that\nof “donkey\n anaphora”.[9]\n Here there are two varieties, which are called conditional\nand relative clause donkey sentences, respectively:", "\nOn the readings we are concerned with, neither (25) nor (26) is\ntalking about any particular donkey, and so the pronoun\n“it” cannot be a term referring to a particular donkey.\nFurther, in the case of (25), all independent evidence available\nsuggests that a quantifier can’t take wide scope over a\nconditional and bind variables in its consequent (“If John owns\nevery donkeyi, he beats iti”). This\nsuggests that the (apparent) quantifier “a donkey” in (25)\ncannot bind the pronoun in the consequent. In addition, even if\n“a donkey” could magically do this in (25), assuming it is\nan existential quantifier, we still wouldn’t get the intuitive\ntruth conditions of (25), which require that Sarah beats\nevery donkey she owns. Similarly, the independent evidence\navailable suggests that quantifiers can’t scope out of relative\nclauses (“A man who owns every donkeyi beats\niti”), and so again the pronoun in (26) is not within\nthe scope of its quantifier antecedent and so is not bound by it.\nThus, the pronouns in both conditional and relative clause donkey\nsentences can be neither understood as referring expressions nor as\nbound variables.", "\nSo now we have three cases of anaphoric pronouns that cannot be\nunderstood as referring expressions nor as bound variables: 1)\npronouns in discourse anaphora; 2) pronouns in Geach discourses and 3)\npronouns in (conditional and relative clause) donkey sentences.\nLet’s call these cases of problematic anaphora. The\nrecent interest in anaphora is largely an interest in finding a\nsemantic theory for problematic anaphora. In the next section, we\noutline the main theories that have arisen to fill this void." ], "section_title": "2. Problematic Anaphora", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nBefore discussing recent theories of problematic anaphora, a few\ncaveats are in order. First, our discussion will not be exhaustive. We\ncover what we take to be the best known and most promising theories.\nSecond, because each theory is a formal, sophisticated semantic\ntheory, to describe a single theory in detail would itself be a paper\nlength project. Thus, we try instead to give a simple, informal sketch\nof the main features of each theory. The notes and references point\nthe interested reader to places where he/she can get more detail.\nThird, we shall confine ourselves to briefly describing how each\ntheory handles simple discourse anaphora of the sort exhibited by\n (13)\n above, in which a pronoun in one sentence is anaphoric on an\nindefinite noun phrase in a previous sentence, and donkey anaphora\nlike\n (25)\n and\n (26).\n Readers interested in more details on how these theories deal with\nembedding under quantifiers, negation, or modals should consult the\nreadings cited both in the previous section and in the sections below.\nReaders interested in Geach discourses or “intentional\nidentity” should begin by consulting Asher (1987), Edelberg\n(1986), Geach (1967), Kamp (1990), King (1994), Braun (2012), and the\nworks mentioned therein.", "\nThe first two of the theories discussed below, discourse\nrepresentation theory and dynamic semantics, represent departures from\ntraditional semantics, departures which were largely motivated at the\nbeginning by the problematic anaphora cases. The second two theories\ndiscussed below, d-type theories and the CDQ theory, represent ways in\nwhich the problematic anaphora data is dealt with within a traditional\nsemantic framework." ], "section_title": "3. Recent Theories of Problematic Anaphora", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIn the early 1980s, Irene Heim (1982) and Hans Kamp (1981)\nindependently formulated very similar semantic theories that were in\npart designed to handle problematic anaphora, particularly donkey and\ndiscourse anaphora. The theories developed by Heim and Kamp have come\nto be known as Discourse Representation Theory or DRT (see entry on\n Discourse Representation Theory).[10]\n We shall not attempt to describe differences between the formulations\nof Heim and Kamp. Indeed, in our exposition we shall combine elements\nof the two theories. Readers interested in the differences between the\ntwo accounts should consult Heim (1982) and Kamp (1981) directly.", "\nWe believe it is fair to say that it was the development of DRT that\nmade the semantics of anaphora a central issue in philosophy of\nlanguage. One reason for this was the following bold statement by Kamp\n(1981):", "\n\n\nA theory of this form differs fundamentally from those familiar from\nthe truth-theoretical and model-theoretical literature, and thus a\nsubstantial argument will be wanted that such a radical departure from\nexisting frameworks is really necessary. The particular analysis\ncarried out in the main part of this paper should be seen as a first\nattempt to provide such an argument. The analysis deals with only a\nsmall number of linguistic problems, but careful reflection upon just\nthose problems already reveals, I suggest, that a major revision of\nsemantic theory is called for. (Kamp 1981: 278) \n", "\nThe problems that Kamp goes on to address are the treatment of donkey\nanaphora and simple discourse anaphora. Hence Kamp appears to be\nsaying that these problems cannot be handled within more traditional\nframeworks and thus that a DRT approach is necessary. Obviously, the\nclaim that the semantics of anaphora requires a radical revision in\nsemantic theory got the attention of philosophers of language. Thus,\nthe study of problematic anaphora blossomed during the 1980s and\n1990s.", "\nThe first way in which DRT departs from more traditional approaches is\nthat it claims that indefinite noun phrases such as “an\nanthropologist” or “a donkey” are essentially\npredicates with free variables rather than existential quantifiers.\nThus, the above indefinites might as well look as follows at the level\nof “logical form”:", "\nIn effect, an indefinite introduces a “novel” variable,\n(i.e., in DRT’s terminology, establishes a discourse\nreferent) and a pronoun anaphoric on an indefinite is interpreted\nas the same variable as was introduced by its indefinite antecedent.\nHence a simple discourse such as:", "\nin effect can be represented\n as[11]", "\nIn addition to this, DRT builds in to the assignment of truth\nconditions default existential quantification over free variables.\nThus, (27a) is true iff there is some assignment to the variable\n“x” that is in the extension of “man”,\n“loves Annie” and “rich”, that is, iff\nsomething is a man who loves Annie and is rich. Thus, that indefinites\nappear to have the force of existential quantifiers in cases like (27)\nis not because they are existential quantifiers but because of the\ndefault existential quantification of free variables.", "\nLet us turn now to the DRT treatment of donkey anaphora. First, note\nthat both relative clause and conditional donkey anaphora appear to\nhave a sort of “universal force”: the truth of\n (25)\n and\n (26)\n above, repeated here, require that Sarah beats every donkey she owns\nand that every donkey owning woman beats every donkey she\n owns.[12]", "\nThus, the indefinite here mysteriously has universal force and\nexpresses something about every donkey owned by someone. Recall that\naccording to DRT, an indefinite is effectively a one-place predicate\nwith a free variable. The central idea of DRT in the case of both\nconditional and relative clause donkey sentences is that the universal\nforce of the indefinite results from the variable in it being bound by\nan operator with genuine universal force. In the case of (25), the\n“conditional operator” has universal force, since it in\neffect says that in every case (assignment to free variables) in which\nthe antecedent is true, the consequent is true. So (25) claims that\nevery assignment to “x” that makes “Sarah\nowns x” and “x is a donkey” true, also\nmakes “Sarah beats x” true. So (25) is true iff\nSarah beats every donkey she owns. In (26), by contrast, the universal\nquantifier (determiner) “every” not only binds the\nvariables associated with the predicative material “woman who\nowns a donkey” (for example, presumably there is such a variable\nin the subject argument place of “beats”), but it also\nbinds the variable introduced by the predicate-with-free-variable\n“a donkey”. So it is as though (26) has the “logical\n form”.[13]", "\nNote that this account requires allowing quantificational determiners\n(“every”) to bind multiple variables. This, again, is a\ndeparture from more classical\n approaches.[14]", "\nNow since the DRT approach claims that indefinites get their apparent\nquantificational force from other elements that bind the variables in\nthem, it predicts that when different determiners are involved in\nrelative clause donkey sentences, as in", "\nthe indefinite should appear to have the quantificational force of the\nnew determiner (“Most”). So (16) should be true if most\npairs of women and donkeys they own are such that the women beat the\ndonkeys. Similar remarks apply to conditionals containing\n“non-universal” quantifiers such as “usually”,\nas in", "\nThis should be true if most pairs of women and donkeys they own are\nsuch that the women beat the donkeys. But this prediction,\nparticularly in the case of (28), seems clearly false. If there are\nexactly ten donkey owning women and one woman owns ten donkeys and\nbeats them all, while the nine other women own a donkey each and\ndon’t beat them, (28) intuitively seems false: most donkey\nowning women fail to beat the donkeys they own. However, the DRT\naccount as formulated claims (28) is true in this situation. This\ndifficulty is one of the main criticisms of classical DRT in the\nliterature and is often called the proportion problem (Heim\n(1990) claims that Nirit Kadmon so dubbed it). The criticism is\ndamaging, because it appears to refute what was claimed to be a\ncentral insight of DRT: that the apparent quantificational force of\nindefinites comes from other elements that bind the variables in\nthem.", "\nA second difficulty with classical DRT as formulated here involves\ncases such as\n (18)\n above, repeated here:", "\nAs mentioned above, (18) has a reading on which the second sentence of\nthe discourse attributes a general belief to Scott (something like the\nbelief that a man who broke into Sarah’s apartment came in\nthrough the window). But as formulated, DRT doesn’t get this\nreading. For the default existential quantification of free variables\nacts in effect like a wide scope existential quantifier over the\nentire discourse. Thus, it is as if (18) were as follows:", "\nBut this attributes a belief about a specific person to Scott. Hence\nit can’t capture the reading mentioned. Similarly, consider the\nfollowing sentences:", "\nThese sentences also appear to have readings on which they attribute\ngeneral or de dicto beliefs to the women in question. That\nis, they have readings on which they attribute to the women in\nquestion general beliefs to the effect that they are being\nstalked by secret admirers. This is why these sentences can be true\neven though the women in question don’t know who their secret\nadmirers are, and so have no beliefs about particular persons\nstalking them. For reasons exactly similar to those given for the case\nof the analogous reading of the second sentence of\n (18),\n these readings can’t be captured by DRT as formulated here. We\nshall see below that dynamic approaches have exactly similar problems.\nAsher (1987) and Kamp (1990) attempt to remedy this problem (among\nothers). For further elaboration of the DRT framework, see also Kamp\nand Reyle (1993) and van Eijck and Kamp (1997). For expansions of the\nDRT framework, e.g., SDRT (segmented discourse representation theory),\nsee Asher and Lascarides (2003), for compositional versions of DRT,\nsee Muskens (1996) and Brasoveanu (2006, 2007, 2008)." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Discourse Representation Theory" }, { "content": [ "\nAs its name suggests, Discourse Representation Theory was designed to\ncapture the way in which certain features of a discourse, particularly\ninter-sentential relations such as inter-sentential anaphora, affect\nthe interpretation of sentences in the discourse. At the same time,\nDiscourse Representation Theory as originally formulated in Kamp\n(1981) failed to be compositional, at least in the sense of that term\nfamiliar from Montagovian\n approaches.[15]", "\nThe initial motivation for a dynamic semantic (see entry on\n dynamic semantics)\n approach to discourse and donkey anaphora was on the one hand to\npreserve the “dynamic” elements of DRT, that is the view\nthat what an expression means is given by the way in which the\naddition of the expression to a discourse changes the information\navailable to a hearer of the discourse, (“meaning as potential\nfor changing the state of information”). On the other hand,\ndynamic semantic approaches wanted to adhere to compositionality. This\nis made very clear in the introduction of the classic statement of the\ndynamic semantic approach to discourse and donkey anaphora, namely\nGroenendijk and Stokhof (1991). We shall here discuss their treatment\nof discourse and donkey anaphora, Dynamic Predicate Logic\n(henceforth DPL), and gesture at other treatments in the dynamic\nsemantic tradition. First generation dynamic semantic theories of anaphora like DPL give an account of singular cross-sentential anaphora as well as donkey sentences. Subsequent work in dynamic semantics has adapted and added to these tools to account for things like plural anaphora, quantificational subordination, and other issues. (See for example van den Berg (1996), Krifka (1996a), Nouwen (2003b), Brasoveanu (2007, 2010), and Keshet (2018).) Of the theories discussed in this entry, this is\nthe most difficult to explain informally. We shall keep the discussion\nas informal as possible, and urge interested readers to consult the\nworks cited directly for more detail.", "\nTo begin with, let’s look at how simple discourse anaphora is\nhandled on DPL. So consider again:", "\nNow in DPL, indefinites such as “a man” are treated as\nexistential quantifiers. Further, DPL treats consecutive sentences in\ndiscourses as being conjoined. So we can think of (27) as follows:", "\nHere we have rendered the anaphoric pronoun “He” as the\nvariable “x”, the same variable that is the\nvariable of its quantifier antecedent. This represents the anaphoric\nconnection. The important point to notice is that the anaphoric\npronoun/variable in (27b) is not within the syntactic scope of its\nquantifier antecedent. This corresponds to the fact that in DPL, the\nsyntactic scopes of quantifiers are confined to the sentences in which\nthey occur, as current syntactic theory tells us they should be.", "\nThe key to understanding the DPL account of discourse anaphora lies in\nunderstanding its semantics of the existential quantifier and\nconjunction. Let’s begin with existential quantification. The\nbasic idea here it that when we interpret an existential quantifier,\nthe output of that interpretation may affect the interpretation of\nsubsequent expressions. In standard predicate logic, the\ninterpretation of an existential quantifier is a set of assignment\nfunctions. In DPL, it is a set of ordered pairs of input and\noutput assignment functions. The output assignment functions act as\nthe input to subsequent formulas. Take for example the simple formula\n“\$(\\exists x)(\\mbox{man } x)\$”. In DPL, such a formula\ntakes all the input functions g, and for each one outputs all\nthe possible assignment functions h such that they differ from\ng at most in that they assign x to an object in the\ninterpretation of “man” (i.e., they assign x to a\nman). More generally, accounting for possibly more complex formulas in\nthe scope of the existential (including another quantifier), a pair of\nsequences \$\\langle g, h\\rangle\$ is in the interpretation of an\nexistential formula “\$(\\exists x)\\Phi\$” just in case\nthere is an assignment function k differing from g at\nmost on x such that \$\\langle k,h\\rangle\$; is in the\ninterpretation of “\$\\Phi\$”.[16]\n So note how interpreting the existential quantifier results in\nshifting from the input function g to k, where k\nis now the input to “\$\\Phi\$”. This makes the existential\nquantifier internally dynamic, capable of affecting the\ninterpretation of expressions within its syntactic scope. Further, the\nfact that the output assignment functions of interpreting the whole\nexistentially quantified sentence are allowed to be different from the\ninput to the interpretation means that the processing of the\nexistentially quantified formula may affect the interpretation of\nexpressions after the existentially quantified formula, and\nhence outside the scope of the existential quantifier. This\nis to say that the existential quantifier is externally\ndynamic, capable of affecting the interpretation of expressions\noutside its syntactic scope. As we will see, an expression\ncan be internally dynamic and externally static (as well as internally\nand externally static). At any rate, putting things very roughly, the\nidea here is that once the existential quantifier “resets”\nthe value of “x” so that it satisfies the formula\nthe quantifier embeds, that value stays reset (unless there is a\nsubsequent existential quantifier attached to the same variable) and\ncan affect the interpretation of subsequent formulas.", "\nTurning now to conjunction, the idea here is similar. Again, the\nfundamental idea is that the interpretation of the left conjunct can\naffect the interpretation of the right conjunct. A bit more formally,\na pair of assignment functions \$\\langle g,h\\rangle\$; is in the\ninterpretation of a conjunction just in case there is an assignment\nfunction k such that \$\\langle g,k\\rangle\$; is in the\ninterpretation of the left conjunct and \$\\langle k,h\\rangle\$; the\nright\n conjunct.[17]\n So note how interpreting the left conjunct changes the input sequence\nfor the interpretation of the right conjunct. Again, this means that\nconjunction is internally dynamic, possibly affecting the\ninterpretation of expressions in its scope. And again, that the output\nof interpreting a conjunction, here h, can differ from the\ninput, here g, means that a conjunction is capable of affecting\nthings outside of it and hence outside of the scope of that\nconjunction sign. Again, this is to say that conjunction is externally\ndynamic.", "\nTo go through an example, we also need to understand the semantics of\nan atomic formula like “man x”. Atomic formulas act\nlike a test on the input assignments, allowing those assignments that\nsatisfy the condition to pass through and act as input to subsequent\nassignments and rejecting the rest. However, atomic formulas do not\nchange assignment functions. More specifically, an input\noutput pair \$\\langle g,h\\rangle\$ is in the interpretation of an\natomic formula “\$Rt_1 \\ldots t_n\$” just in case \$h=g\$\nand h assigns “\$t_1\$”…\n“\$t_n\$” to something in the interpretation of\nR.", "\nPutting these elements all together, we are now in a position to see\nhow DPL accounts for (27b). Informally speaking, the first sentence of\n(27b) takes all the input assignment functions g and outputs\nall those assignments h in that they differ at most from\ng in assigning “x” to a man who loves Annie.\nThus the output of the first sentence is all (and only) the possible\nassignments of “x” (given the model) to men who\nlove Annie. The output of the first sentence is the input to the\nsecond. The second sentence tests these assignments, allowing only\nthose through which also assign “x” to something in\nthe interpretation of “rich”. The output of the second\nsentence includes all and only the assignments of\n“x” to rich men who love Annie. As long as the\nmodel includes at least one rich man who loves Annie, there will be at\nleast one such output assignment. Hence the discourse is true iff\nthere is at least one rich man who loves Annie. Since conjunction is\nexternally dynamic, we can keep adding sentences with anaphoric\npronouns to similar effect. Thus in a discourse such as", "\nthe discourse is all true iff some rich famous man loves Annie.", "\nThus the dynamic semantic treatment yields a truth conditional\nequivalence between \n\n\\[\n(\\exists x)(\\Phi) \\mathbin{\\&} \\Psi \n\\]\n\n and \n\n\\[\n(\\exists x)(\\Phi \\mathbin{\\&} \\Psi) \n\\]\n\n even when\n“\$\\Psi\$” contains free occurrences of\n“x”. Hence it is often said that in DPL quantifiers\nsemantically bind free variables outside their syntactic\nscope. This doesn’t encounter the same problems as the syntactic\nbinding treatment rejected in\n section 2,\n since it allows quantifiers to provide values for subsequent\nanaphoric pronouns without actually binding them in a way that falsely\npredicts, e.g., that “Exactly one man loves Annie. He is\nrich” is truth-conditionally equivalent to\n\$\\mbox{“}(\\exists !x)(\\mbox{man } x \\mathbin{\\&} x \\mbox{\nloves Annie} \\mathbin{\\&} x \\mbox{ is rich})\\mbox{”}\$.", "\nBecause the treatment of donkey anaphora is a bit more complicated\ntechnically, and because some of the main ideas of DPL are now on the\ntable, we will be more suggestive here. Again, we urge the interested\nreader to consult Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) directly.", "\nFirst, consider conditional donkey anaphora:", "\n(32) gets regimented in DPL as follows:", "\nThere are three crucial points to the DPL treatment here. (1) The\nexistential quantifier is externally dynamic and hence may affect the\ninterpretation of variables outside its scope, and in particular\n“x” in the consequent of (32a). (2)\n“\$\\rightarrow\$” is internally dynamic and allows the\ninterpretation of its antecedent to affect the interpretation of its\nconsequent (just as is conjunction). 1 and 2 together mean that the\nquantifier in the antecedent of (32)/(32a) can semantically bind the\nvariable in the consequent, even though it is not in the syntactic\nscope of the quantifier. But without doing anything further, we would\nbe left with (32a) having the truth conditions of", "\nwhere “\$\\rightarrow\$” is the standard material\nconditional. This doesn’t give the intuitive truth conditions of\n(32) on the reading that concerns us, i.e., that every donkey-owning\nfarmer beats every donkey he owns. The third and final element we need\nto get the truth conditions to come out right is to say that a pair of\nassignments \$\\langle h,h\\rangle\$ is in the interpretation of a\nconditional iff for all k such that \$\\langle h,k\\rangle\$\nsatisfies the antecedent, there is a j such that \$\\langle\nk,j\\rangle\$ satisfies the\n consequent.[18]\n This says, roughly, that for any output assignment k of a pair\nof assignments satisfying the antecedent of the conditional\n(assignment of a donkey-owning farmer to x and a donkey owned\nby x to y in the case of (32)/(32a)), k is the\ninput of a pair \$\\langle k,j\\rangle\$ that satisfies the consequent,\nfor some j. Since the consequent of the conditional in\n(32)/(32a) is an atomic formula, j=k. So the account\nclaims that any output of a pair of sequences that satisfies the\nexistentially quantified antecedent also satisfies “x\nbeats y”, and so also assigns to “x”\nand “y” to something that stands in the beating\nrelation. That is, the truth of (32)/(32a) requires every\ndonkey-owning farmer to beat every donkey he owns.", "\nTurning now to our relative clause donkey sentence, (repeated\nhere)", "\nwe shall be even more schematic. This gets regimented in DPL as\nfollows, (giving the predicate letters here the obvious meanings):", "\nNote in particular that the “y” in\n“Bxy” is not in the scope of the existential\nquantifier. Now given a quite straightforward treatment of the\nuniversal quantifier, on which it allows dynamic effects in its\n scope,[19]\n in all essentials, the example works like (32)/(32a). For stripping\nthe universal quantifier away, we have:", "\nAnd overlooking the free variables left by stripping away the\nuniversal quantifier (which anyway were in its scope and bound by it),\nwe simply have another conditional with an existential quantifier in\nits antecedent and a formula in the consequent containing an\noccurrence of the variable of that existential quantifier. So the\ntreatment goes essentially as it did for (32)/(32a) itself, with the\nexternally dynamic existential quantifier, internally dynamic\nconditional, and universal quantification over assignments in the\nsemantics of the conditional all working their magic so that\n(26)’s truth requires every donkey owning woman to beat every\ndonkey she owns.", "\nThough DPL cannot handle relative clause donkey sentences such as:", "\nsince it is working within the framework of a first order logic\nwithout generalized quantifiers, this is only a limitation of this\nparticular formulation and not of dynamic approaches generally. Others\nhave formulated systems of dynamic semantics with generalized\nquantifiers that are capable of dealing with examples like\n (33).[20]", "\nOn the other hand, DPL and dynamic approaches generally do face a\nproblem. Put crudely, DPL (and dynamic approaches generally) solve the\nproblems of discourse and donkey anaphora by formulating semantics for\nquantifiers that allows quantifiers to semantically bind variables\nthat aren’t in their syntactic scopes. In this they\n(self-consciously) resemble DRT. But then they face a problem similar\nto one faced by DRT and mentioned above. Consider again our discourse\n (18), repeated here", "\nAs mentioned above, (18) has a reading on which the second sentence of\nthe discourse attributes a general belief to Scott (something like the\nbelief that a man who broke into Sarah’s apartment came in\nthrough the window). On a dynamic approach to (18), the quantifier in\nthe first sentence semantically binds the variable in the second\nsentence. But then this semantically amounts to quantification into\nthe verb of attitude, and so will not result in a reading of the\nsecond sentence on which it attributes a general belief to Scott.\nHence, dynamic approaches need to invoke some other mechanism to get\nthe reading of the second sentence in\n question.[21]", "\nSimilarly, again consider the following sentences discussed in\nconnection with DRT above :", "\nAs mentioned there, these sentences also appear to have readings on\nwhich they attribute general or de dicto beliefs to the women\nin question. That is, they have readings on which they attribute to\nthe women in question general beliefs to the effect that they\nare being stalked by secret admirers. This is why these sentences can\nbe true even though the women in question don’t know who their\nsecret admirers are, and so have no beliefs about particular\npersons stalking them. For reasons exactly similar to those given for\nthe case of the analogous reading of the second sentence of (18),\nthese readings can’t be captured by DPL or dynamic approaches\ngenerally.", "\nPaul Elbourne (2005) reviews three other serious problems for dynamic\napproaches. The first is the problem of disjunctive antecedents\n(discussed in detail in Stone 1992). The problem is with sentences\nlike the following:", "\nThis is problematic because the pronouns cannot co-refer with the\nantecedent (since it is disjunctive), but the antecedent also does not\nintroduce any suitable variables or quantifiers to provide values for\nthe pronouns, since they are definites (names) and not indefinites or\nother quantificational expressions.", "\nThe other two problems involve anaphoric pronouns that don’t\nhave a proper linguistic antecedent. The following example, originally\nfrom Jacobson (2000), is one in which there is no linguistic\nantecedent for the pronoun “it”, though the pronoun has a\ncovarying interpretation with the quantifier “most faculty\nmembers”:", "\nThe second kind of example involves what is commonly called a\npaycheck pronoun:", "\nThe problematic (salient) reading is the one is which everybody else\nput their own paychecks in the bank. The first sentence only\nintroduces John’s paycheck, hence “it”\ndoesn’t have a proper antecedent. Standard dynamic accounts\ndon’t have the machinery for dealing with pronouns without the\nproper linguistic antecedent, since it is the antecedent’s\neffect on the context that accounts for the anaphoric pronoun’s\n interpretation (but see Keshet (2018) for a recent dynamic semantics of anaphora that includes an account of paycheck pronouns).[22]" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Dynamic Semantic Approaches" }, { "content": [ "\nThere have been many accounts of the semantics of anaphora according\nto which anaphoric pronouns in some sense function like definite\ndescriptions. Though there are important differences between such\ntheories, examples of theories of this sort include Evans (1977),\nParsons (1978, Other Internet Resources), Davies (1981), Neale (1990),\nHeim (1990) and Elbourne (2005). Theories of this sort are often\ncalled E-Type or\nD-type approaches. Though it is beyond the scope of this\narticle to compare all the different accounts, some of the main\ndifferences in types of accounts are as follows. E-type accounts are\nsometimes distinguished as ones in which a definite description fixes\nthe referent of an anaphoric pronoun, whereas D-type accounts are\nones in which the pronoun itself has the semantics of a definite\ndescription. However, it is common to describe the latter as 'E-type' as well. These are further sub-divided into those that treat\npronouns as definite descriptions merely at the level of semantics and\nthose that also treat them as descriptions at the level of syntax.\nFinally, accounts differ in how the descriptive material is recovered.\nSome accounts hold that the descriptive material has to be recovered\nlinguistically, from prior discourse. Others hold that it can be any\ncontextually salient description.", "\nWe will discuss two of the best known versions of the view, Neale\n(1990) and Elbourne (2005). We should add that though Neale developed\nthe view in question in greater detail, Davies (1981) had earlier\ndefended essentially the same view in all crucial\n respects.[23]\n Thus, the view we go on to describe should probably be called the\nDavies-Neale view. But since we shall focus on Neale’s\npresentation of the view, we shall talk of Neale’s view.", "\nOn Neale’s view, in all instances of problematic anaphora,\nanaphoric pronouns “go proxy for” definite descriptions\nunderstood as quantifiers along roughly Russellian lines. First,\nconsider discourse anaphora. Neale’s view is that in a discourse\nsuch as:", "\nthe pronoun “it” “goes proxy for” the definite\ndescription “the donkey John bought.” Hence the second\nsentence of such a discourse is equivalent to the sentence\n“Harry vaccinated the donkey John bought” with the\ndescription understood in the standard Russellian fashion. Within a\ngeneralized quantifier type framework, where “the” is\ntreated as a determiner that, like other determiners, combines with a\nset term to form a quantified NP, the evaluation clause for sentences\ncontaining a singular description (with wide scope) can be given as\nfollows", "\nSo the second sentence of (37) is true iff Harry vaccinated the unique\ndonkey John bought. Thus far, then, the view is that pronouns\nanaphoric on singular indefinites are interpreted as Russellian\ndefinite descriptions.", "\nThere is, however, a further complication in Neale’s theory that\nis invoked in the explanation of donkey anaphora. In particular, Neale\nintroduces what he calls a “numberless description”: a\ndescription that, unlike semantically singular descriptions, puts no\ncardinality constraint on the denotation of the set term that combines\nwith the determiner to form the quantified NP (other than that it must\nbe nonempty—note above how in the singular case \$\|\\mathbf{F}\|\$\nis constrained to equal one.) Following Neale, let “whe”\nbe the determiner (corresponding to “the”) used to form\n“numberless descriptions.” Then the evaluation clause for\nsentences containing numberless descriptions, analogous to (38) above,\nwould be", "\nThus numberless descriptions are in effect universal quantifiers.", "\nIn addition to going proxy for Russellian singular descriptions in the\nway we have seen, Neale claims that anaphoric pronouns sometimes go\nproxy for numberless descriptions. In particular, Neale holds that\npronouns anaphoric on singular existential quantifiers (but outside of\ntheir scope) can be interpreted either as standard Russellian\ndescriptions or as numberless descriptions. Now if the\npronouns in our conditional and relative clause donkey sentences\n(repeated here)", "\nare interpreted as a numberless description, (25) asserts that if\nSarah owns a donkey, she beats all the donkeys she owns and (26)\nasserts that every donkey owning woman beats every donkey she owns.\nThus, Neale’s account of donkey anaphora requires the pronouns\nhere to be interpreted as numberless descriptions.", "\nHaving seen how Neale’s theory handles discourse anaphora and\ndonkey anaphora, we turn to difficulties with the account. An obvious\nquestion concerning an account like this that allows pronouns\nanaphoric on singular existential quantifiers to go proxy for both\nRussellian and numberless descriptions is: what determines\nwhether such a pronoun is going proxy for a Russellian, as opposed to\na numberless, description? This question is pressing for Neale’s\naccount, since there will be a substantial difference in the truth\nconditions of a pronoun-containing sentence depending on whether the\npronoun receives a numberless or Russellian interpretation. In his\nmost explicit statement about the matter (1990: 237) Neale makes clear\nthat it is primarily whether the utterer had a particular individual\nin mind in uttering the indefinite description that determines whether\na pronoun anaphoric on it receives a Russellian or a numberless\n interpretation.[24]", "\nIf this is correct, then discourses of the form", "\ngenerally ought to display both readings (in the suitable contexts),\ndepending on whether the utterer of the discourse had a particular\nindividual in mind in uttering “A(n) F”. So the\nsecond sentences of discourses of the form of (40) ought to have\nreadings on which they mean the unique F that is G is\nH (Russellian) and on which they mean every F\nthat is G is H (numberless). But this does not seem to\nbe the case. In particular, such discourses do not have readings\ncorresponding to the numberless interpretation of the pronoun.\nConsider the discourse anaphora analogue of the donkey conditional\n(25):", "\nIt seems clear that this discourse has no reading on which the second\nsentence means that Sarah beats every donkey she owns, even if we\nimagine that the utterer of the discourse had no particular donkey in\nmind when she uttered the first sentence. Suppose, for example, that\nthe Homeland Security and Donkey Care Bureau comes to town and wants\ninformation about local donkey ownership and beating. The speaker\ntells them that she really don’t know how many donkeys anybody\nowns, and has never seen or had any other contact with particular\nlocal donkeys. But she tells them that she has received some\ninformation from reliable sources and it has been deemed\n“credible”. Asked what she has heard, she responds:\n“Sarah owns a donkey and she beats it”.", "\nEven though she has no particular donkey in mind in uttering these\nsentences, we simply don’t get a numberless reading here. If\nSarah beats some donkey she owns, the speaker has spoken truly even if\nshe owns others she fails to beat. Or again, suppose we are debating\nwhether anybody has an eight track tape player anymore, and one of us\nsays “I’ll bet the following is true: some guy with a\n‘68 Camaro owns an eight track player and he still uses\nit.” Again, there is no numberless reading for the pronoun in\nthe second sentence, even though the speaker clearly has no particular\neight-track player in mind. If some ‘68 Camaro driving guy owns\nand uses an eight-track player, the sentence is true even if he owns\nother eight track players that aren’t\n used.[25]", "\nSo it appears that Neale’s account has no explanation of why the\npronouns in discourses like (25a) never have numberless readings.\nNeale’s account has similar problems with sentences like:", "\nHere again, Neale’s theory predicts that this sentence has a\nreading on which its truth requires that some woman beats every donkey\nshe owns. And again, even if we imagine the sentence being uttered\nwithout any particular woman or donkey in mind, we don’t get\nthis reading of the sentence predicted by Neale’s theory, (say\nwe are discussing women’s tendencies towards animals they own,\nand one of us utters (41) simply thinking it is statistically likely\nto be true). So Neale’s account has no explanation as to why the\nsecond sentence of discourse (25a) and sentence (41) lack the relevant\nreadings assigned to those sentences by his theory.[26]", "\nElbourne (2005) proposes a different D-type theory. The main thesis of\nthe book is that pronouns of all types, proper names, and definite\ndescriptions have a unified syntax and semantics: they are all of type\n\$\\langle s, e\\rangle\$ (functions from situations to individuals) and\nare syntactically comprised of a definite determiner that takes two\narguments: an index and an NP (noun phrase). ", "\nHis theory of unbound pronouns is NP-deletion theory.\nNP-deletion is when an NP at the level of syntax is (felicitously)\nunpronounced at the surface level as in:", "\nOn Elbourne’s theory, pronouns undergo obligatory\nNP-deletion. That is, a sentence like\n (25),\n at the level of syntax is actually (25b):", "\nFollowing Elbourne, we’ll suppress mention of the index, since\nit doesn’t do any work here (anaphoric pronouns have a null\nindex on his view, though he does provide arguments for why this null\nindex is present—see Elbourne (2005: 118–126)). Pronouns\nhave the same semantics as the determiner “the”\n(abstracting away from the phi-features of pronouns) so that (25b) has\nthe same semantics as (25c):", "\nThis is motivated by the insight that pronouns pattern with\nminimal definite descriptions rather than long ones, as other\nD-type theories have it. For example, a theory like Neale’s\npredicts that (43a) has the semantics of (43b):", "\nBut this is problematic, because (43a) clearly has a salient, true\nreading, whereas (43b) does not. However, Elbourne observes that (43c)\nhas the same salient true reading as (43a):", "\nTreating pronouns as determiners is motivated more generally by Postal\n(1966)’s arguments\nthat they at least sometimes have the same semantics as determiners\nbased on examples such as:", "\nFinally, positing an NP-deletion theory provides an elegant solution\nto the problem of the formal link, which is that any good account of\nanaphora has to explain why (45a) is felicitous but (46b) is not:", "\nSince NP-deletion generally requires a linguistic antecedent, if\npronouns are determiners that have undergone NP-deletion, this\nexplains the contrast. ", "\nAs mentioned above, pronouns have the semantics of determiners.\nSpecifically, Elbourne proposes a situation semantics\n (situations in natural language semantics),\n where the semantics of pronouns (and determiners) are treated in a\nFregean way, as follows:", "\nThat is to say, pronouns come with presuppositions that there is a\nunique individual in each situation that satisfies the predicate, and\n(when that presupposition is satisfied), they refer to that individual\n(in that situation). Conditional donkey anaphora works as follows. A\nsentence like (47) has the structure at LF of (48):", "\nThe semantics of “always” is crucial to getting the truth\nconditions right:", "\nBasically, “always” takes two sentences, and returns true\niff every minimal situation that satisfies the first sentence has a\nminimal extension that satisfies the second sentence. A minimal\nsituation is one that contains one or more thin\nparticulars—an individual abstracted away from its\nproperties—and one or more properties or relations that the thin\nparticular(s) instantiate(s). An extension of a minimal situation\nincludes all those same particulars and properties and relations, with\n(possibly) some more particulars, properties, or relations in\naddition. On Elbourne’s account “if” doesn’t\nplay any role in contributing to the truth conditions of a donkey\nconditional; it is semantically vacuous. It is the (sometimes silent)\nadverb of quantification along with the semantics of the antecedent\nand consequent that do the work in yielding the truth conditions. The\nfollowing are the truth conditions for (47) on Elbourne’s\naccount. (We won’t go through the derivation for relative clause\ndonkey anaphora, but it works similarly. See Elbourne 2005: 53.)", "\n\n\$\\lambda s_1\$. For every minimal situation \$s_4\$ such that\n\n\$s_4 \\le s_1\$ and there is\nan individual y and a situation \$s_7\$ such that \$s_7\$ is a\nminimal situation such that \$s_7\\le s_4\$ and y is a man in\n\$s_7\$, such that there is a situation \$s_9\$ such that \$s_9\\le\ns_4\$ and \$s_9\$ is a minimal situation such that\n\n \$s_7\\le s_9\$ and\nthere is an individual x and a situation \$s_2\$ such that\n\$s_2\$ is a minimal situation such that \$s_2\\le s_9\$ and x\nis a donkey in \$s_2\$, such that there is a situation \$s_3\$ such\nthat \$s_3\\le s_9\$ and \$s_3\$ is a minimal situation such that \$s_2\n\\le s_3\$ and y owns x in \$s_3\$,\n\n there is a situation \$s_5\$ such that\n\n \$s_5\\le s_1\$ and \$s_5\$ is a minimal situation\nsuch that \$s_4\\le s_5\$ and \$\\iota x\\ x\$ is a man in \$s_5\$ beats\n in \$s_5\$ \$\\iota x\\ x\$ is a donkey in \$s_5\$. (2005: 52)\n \n\n", "\nThus on Elbourne’s account (47) is true iff each donkey-owning\nman beats every donkey he owns.", "\nElbourne surprisingly never goes through a derivation of a case of\ncross-sentential anaphora as in:", "\nHis view is that this has the same semantics as (49a):", "\nBut he doesn’t provide an account of how this works, neither in\ndescription nor detailed derivation. One worry about this is that in\nthe conditional and relative clause donkey sentences, the fact that\nthe pronoun(s) co-varies with its antecedent is accounted for by\n“always” and “every”. These expressions\nquantify over situations in a way that guarantees that the man who\nbeats the donkey is the same man who owns that same donkey,\neffectively acting as (semantic) binding. But there is no such\nmechanism in place to guarantee that “the woman” in (the\nsituation in) the second sentence of (49) in any sense co-varies with\nthe woman (in the situation) in the first. It is not clear how\nElbourne’s view can accomplish this without employing either a\ndynamic notion of binding or a more traditional d-type account with\ncomplete descriptions.", "\nHowever, Elbourne’s account doesn’t encounter the same\nproblem as Neale’s in predicting numberless readings where there\nare none, as he doesn’t posit a numberless interpretation of the\npronoun at all. This highlights a difference between the way that\nNeale’s theory approaches the truth conditions of conditional\ndonkey sentences and the way DRT, dynamic semantics, the CDQ theory\n(discussed in the next section) and other D-type theories like\nElbourne’s and Heim (1990)’s do (Heim 1990 also employs a\nsituation semantics to account for conditional donkey anaphora). In\nthese other theories, the requirement that all the donkey-owning men\nbeat all the donkeys they own for (47) to be true arises due to the\ninteraction of the semantic of indefinites, the semantics of anaphoric\npronouns and the semantics of\n conditionals.[28]\n Indeed, it is the latter that is primarily implicated in (47)’s\ntruth requiring that all donkeys owned by donkey-owning men\nbe beaten (since the theories posit some sort of universal\nquantification in the semantics of conditionals). By contrast, on\nNeale’s view, the requirement that the men beat all the donkeys\nthey own for (47) to be true (on one of its readings) essentially\nfalls out of the semantics of the anaphoric pronoun alone, since on\none of its readings, it expresses universal quantification over\ndonkeys Sarah owns (the numberless description reading).", "\nOne problem that D-type theories face is that pronouns come with a uniqueness requirement (either as a presupposition or part of the asserted content). But it has been observed that pronouns anaphoric on indefinites do not have a uniqueness requirement; it seems that the truth conditions for such sentences are existential. This observation is nicely captures by Discourse Representation Theory, File Change Semantics, dynamic semantics, and the Context Dependent Quantifier approach (discussed in the next section). For example, consider (49) again. This seems true even if many women walked into the contextually salient place at the contextually salient time, and regardless of whether they sat down or not, so long as at least one woman walked in and sat down. Mandelkern & Rothschild (2020) call this phenomenon \"definiteness filtering\" and Lewis (forthcoming) calls it \"the problem of non-uniqueness\". Both of the cited works argue that there is evidence of uniqueness requirements on definites more generally, and the non-uniqueness is specific to the kind of constructions in (49). Mandelkern & Rothschild tentatively propose a D-type theory that employs situation semantics, while Lewis (forthcoming) argues for a D-type theory that takes definite descriptions to be ambiguous between presupposing worldly uniqueness and discourse uniqueness.[29]\n\n", "\nAnother problem that all D-type theories must address is the problem of\nindistinguishable participants. Since on D-type theories,\npronouns in one way or another have the semantics of definite\ndescriptions, they come with uniqueness presuppositions. When it comes\nto conditional donkey anaphora, the way to meet these uniqueness\npresuppositions is by employing minimal situations—the definite\ndescription then picks out the unique object satisfying the\ndescription in the minimal situation. (With the exception of\nNeale’s theory: since he employs numberless pronouns, the\npronouns have no uniqueness presupposition.) Thus uniqueness is\nsatisfied within the situation, even if it can’t be satisfied in\nthe larger world. But in examples of indistinguishable participants,\nuniqueness cannot even be satisfied within a minimal situation.\nConsider the typical example, (50):", "\nIn the minimal situation that satisfies the antecedent, there are\ntwo bishops that have the same property (meeting another\nbishop). Thus descriptions like “the bishop” or\n“the bishop who meets a bishop” do not denote uniquely.\nDRT and dynamic theories don’t have any problem at all with\nthese examples because pronouns are treated as dynamically bound\nvariables, not definite descriptions, and each instance of “a\nbishop” in the antecedent of (50) is associated with a different\nvariable, which prescribe the anaphoric links to the two pronouns in\nthe consequent. For D-type solutions to this puzzle see Heim(1990),\nLudlow (1994), Elbourne (2005, 2016), Lewis (forthcoming).", "\nFinally, it should be mentioned that there are some who propose\nmixed approaches, wherein some pronouns are treated as\ndynamically bound variables whereas others are treated as D-type (see\nChierchia 1995; Kurafuji 1998, 1999). On these views, some pronouns\nare ambiguous between the two readings, while others have only the\ndynamically bound variable or D-type reading. This type of theory\navoids many of the problems raised for each type of account, since\nthey use dynamic semantics for the examples most amenable to a dynamic\nexplanation and d-type pronouns for example most amenable to that sort\nof explanation. However, the theory comes at a considerable\ntheoretical cost in that it predicts a systematic ambiguity in\npronouns that is (arguably) not explicitly marked in any language.\n(See Elbourne 2005 for further criticisms of these views.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Descriptive Approaches" }, { "content": [ "\nThe Context Dependent Quantifier, or CDQ, account of anaphora was\nsuggested in Wilson (1984) and subsequently developed in King (1987,\n1991,\n 1994).[30]\n The idea underlying the application of CDQ to discourse anaphora is\nthat these expressions look like quantifier-like expressions of\ngenerality, where the precise nature of the generality they express is\ndetermined by features of the linguistic context in which they occur.\nOn the CDQ account, anaphoric pronouns with quantifier antecedents in\ndiscourse anaphora are contextually sensitive devices of\nquantification. That is, these anaphoric pronouns express\nquantifications; and which quantifications they\nexpress is partly a function of the linguistic environments\nin which they are embedded. Consider the following discourses:", "\nLooking at (51), suppose that in fact at least one Swede has soloed\nMt. Everest without oxygen. Then it would seem that the sentences of\n(51) are true. If this is correct, then it appears that the second\nsentence of (51) expresses a (existentially) general claim.\nCDQ claims that the pronoun “He” in the second sentence is\nitself a (existential) quantifier, and this explains why the second\nsentence expresses a general claim: the generality is a result of the\npresence of this quantifier in the sentence. Similar remarks apply to\n(52), (except that “They” expresses a universal\nquantifier). Further, consider the following example, which is similar\nto our example (18) above:", "\nThe second sentence of this discourse appears to have two different\nreadings. On one reading, it asserts that concerning the man who\nkilled Alan last night, Michelle believes of that very man\nthat he used a knife. This would be the case if, for example, Michelle\nknew the man who killed Alan, believed that he killed Alan and based\non his well-known fondness of knives, believed he used this sort of\nweapon. But the second sentence has another reading on which it\nascribes to Michelle the general belief to the effect that a man\nkilled Alan with a knife last night. On this reading the sentence\nwould be true if e.g., on the basis of conversations with personnel at\nthe hospital and having no particular person in mind, Michelle\nbelieved that a man fatally stabbed Alan last night.", "\nAgain, CDQ claims these facts are to be explained by holding that the\npronoun in the second sentence is a quantifier. For then we should\nexpect that, like other quantifiers, it could take wide or narrow\nscope relative to “Michelle believes”. On the wide scope\nreading of the pronoun/quantifier, the second sentence attributes to\nMichelle a belief regarding a particular person. On the narrow scope\nreading, it attributes to Michelle a general belief.", "\nOccurrences of “ordinary quantifiers”, such as\n“every man” have what we might call a force, in\nthis case universal; what we might call a restriction, in\nthis case the set of men; and scope relative to other\noccurrences of quantifiers, verbs of propositional attitude, and so\non. CDQ claims that the anaphoric pronouns in question also have\nforces (universal, existential, etc.), restrictions\n(“domains over which they quantify”) and scopes\nrelative to each other, verbs of propositional attitude, etc. However,\nunlike “ordinary” quantifiers, these anaphoric pronouns\nqua quantifiers have their forces, restrictions and relative scopes\ndetermined by features of their linguistic environments. King (1994)\nlays out how the forces, restrictions and relative scopes of these\nanaphoric pronouns are determined, and we shall not describe those\ndetails here.", "\nAs to donkey anaphora, without going through the details, let me just\nsay that CDQ assigns to a relative clause donkey sentence such as\n (26)\n above (repeated here)", "\ntruth conditions according to which (26) is true iff every woman who\nowns a donkey beats some donkey she owns (see King 2004 for details\nand discussion). Some think that the truth of (26) requires every\nwoman who owns a donkey to beat every donkey she owns, and as\nwe saw, DRT, DPL, and the D-type theories discussed assign these truth\nconditions to (26) (though this is not an essential feature of DRT or\ndynamic semantic approaches more generally). The truth conditions CDQ\nassigns to (26) correspond to what is often called the weak\nreading of donkey sentences (Chierchia (1995) calls this the\n\$\\exists\$-reading) and the truth conditions the accounts discussed thus far\ncorrespond to the strong reading of donkey sentences\n(Chierchia calls this the \$\\forall\$-reading). There actually has been a debate\nin the literature as to which truth conditions sentences like (26)\nhave. There are sentences that are exactly like (26) except for the\ndescriptive material in them that clearly seem to have (only) the weak\nreading. An example is:", "\nIt seems clear that the truth of this sentence does not require every\nperson with a credit card to pay his bill with each credit card he\nhas. We will discuss these matters further in\n section 4,\n but for now let us simply note that CDQ differs from the other\naccounts discussed on what truth conditions should be assigned to\nsentences like (26) and (54) and that it is simply unclear which truth\nconditions are the correct ones.", "\nAs for conditional donkey anaphora, the CDQ account is rather\ncomplicated and we are only able to provide the briefest outline of\nthe account here (interested readers should consult King 2004). As we\nsaw above, a conditional donkey sentence such as\n (25)\n ", "\nis true iff Sarah beats every donkey she owns. Thus, “a\ndonkey” somehow seems to have ended up with universal force. The\nCDQ account holds that this illusion of universal force for the\nindefinite is really the result of the interaction of the semantics of\nthe conditional, the indefinite, understood as an existential\nquantifier, and the CDQ “she”, understood as a\ncontext dependent quantifier with existential force ranging over\ndonkeys Sarah owns. Roughly, the account goes as follows. The\nantecedent of (25) is equivalent to", "\nGiven the CDQ “it” and its context in (25), the consequent\nof (25) is equivalent to", "\nThe semantics of the conditional involves universal quantification\nover minimal situations. In particular, a conditional claims that for\nevery minimal situation \$s_1\$ in which its antecedent is true, there\nis a situation \$s_2\$ that \$s_1\$ is part of in which its consequent\nis true. In the case of (25), a minimal situation in which the\nantecedent is true consists of Sarah and a single donkey she owns. The\nfinal element here is that the definiteness and/or anaphoricness of\nthe CDQ “it” in the consequent of (25) makes a difference\nto its truth conditions. The definiteness and anaphoricness of\n“it” in (25) induces a sort of “familiarity\n effect”.[31]\n In particular, for any (minimal) \$s_1\$ in which the antecedent is\ntrue, there must be an \$s_2\$ that \$s_1\$ is part of in which the\nconsequent (understood as expressing the claim that Sarah beats a\ndonkey she owns) is true. But in addition, because of the\n“familiarity” condition induced by the anaphoric definite\n“it”, there must be a donkey in \$s_2\$ that is also in\n\$s_1\$ and that makes the consequent true. In other words,\nfamiliarity requires that a donkey that makes the CDQ-containing\nconsequent true in \$s_2\$ also be present in \$s_1\$. In this sense,\nthe donkey is “familiar”, having been introduced by the\nantecedent and the situation \$s_1\$ in which it is true. To see what\nthis means, consider a situation \$s_1\$ that is a minimal situation\nin which the antecedent is true. \$s_1\$ consists of Sarah owning a\nsingle donkey. If e.g., Sarah owns ten donkeys, there are ten such\nminimal situations. For (25) to be true, each such \$s_1\$ must be\npart of a situation \$s_2\$ such that \$s_2\$ is a situation in which\nSarah beats a donkey that she owns and that is in \$s_1\$. Now the\nonly way that every minimal \$s_1\$ in which Sarah owns a donkey can\nbe part of an \$s_2\$ in which Sarah beats a donkey she owns in\n\$s_1\$ is if Sarah beats every donkey she owns. Thus, the CDQ account\nclaims that (25) is true iff Sarah beats every donkey she owns.", "\nTurning now to difficulties with CDQ, a main difficulty is that it\nisn’t clear whether the use of the notion of\nfamiliarity in the account of conditional donkey sentences\ncan be ultimately upheld. Recall that the idea was that because\n“it” is a definite NP, and because definite NPs generally\nare thought to involve some sort of familiarity, the pronoun in the\ndonkey conditional induces a sort of familiarity effect. There are\nreally two distinct problems here. One is that though the pronoun\n“it” is “syntactically” definite in that the\npronoun “it” is thought to be a definite NP, according to\nCDQ it is “semantically” indefinite in (25), since it\nexpresses an existential quantification (over donkeys owned by Sarah).\nBut then if “it” really is semantically indefinite in\n(25), why should it induce familiarity effects at all? (Jason Stanley\n(p.c.) raised this difficulty). One might reply that it is the fact\nthat “it” is “syntactically” definite that\ntriggers the familiarity effects CDQ posits. But familiarity probably\nis not well enough understood to allow us to assess this response. A\nsecond, and perhaps more pressing, difficulty is this. Generally,\nfamiliarity has something to do with whether what an expression is\nbeing used to talk about is familiar or salient to the audience being\naddressed. This is vague, of course, but the idea is that if one says\n“The dog is hungry” to an audience who isn’t even\naware of any dog that is around or relevant to the conversation, the\nremark is somewhat infelicitous. That is because the definite NP\n“The dog” was used to talk about something not familiar to\nthe audience. Now the question is: is it plausible to claim that this\nand related phenomena are related to the rather complex effect CDQ\nclaims is induced by the anaphoricness/definiteness of\n“it” in donkey conditionals? In the latter case, CDQ\nclaims the effect of familiarity is to make the CDQ “it”\nin the consequent of donkey conditionals quantify over donkeys in the\nminimal situations introduced by the antecedents of the conditionals\n(in the case of (25), situations consisting of Sarah and a single\ndonkey she owns). The CDQ can only quantify over\n“familiar” donkeys—those introduced by the\nantecedent. One may well wonder whether the effect CDQ posits here can\nreally be seen to be a manifestation of phenomena that have\ntraditionally been explained in terms of familiarity." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 The Context Dependent Quantifier Approach" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWe have already mentioned that there is some disagreement regarding\nthe truth conditions of sentences like", "\nSome think that the truth of (26) requires every woman who owns a\ndonkey to beat every donkey she owns. As mentioned above,\nthis is called the strong reading of a donkey sentence.\nOthers think that the truth of (26) requires that every donkey owning\nwoman beats some donkey she owns. As above, this is the\nweak reading of (26). As we mentioned above, there are\nsentences that are exactly like (26) except for the descriptive\nmaterial in them that clearly seem to have (only) the weak reading.\nThe example we gave was:", "\nIt seems clear that the truth of this sentence does not require every\nperson with a credit card to pay his bill with each credit card he\nhas, but merely with some credit card he has. Our comments to this\npoint have suggested that the debate with respect to (26)/(54) and\nweak vs. strong readings is over which one of the two sets of truth\nconditions (26)/(54) have. Each of the theories discussed in this\nentry only assign one of the existential or universal truth\nconditions to relative clause donkey sentences (though this may be\nmore of an artifact of the specific implementations of the theories\nthan the theories themselves).", "\nBut some think that (at least some) donkey sentences have\nboth weak and strong readings. Chierchia (1994) and Kanazawa\n(1994b) are examples. In their favor, for a given determiner, one can\nfind pairs of relative clause donkey sentences fronted by that\ndeterminer such that one has the existential truth conditions (on its\nmost natural interpretation) and the other has the universal truth\nconditions (on its most natural reading). For example, consider the\nfollowing pairs:", "\nElbourne, for example, explicitly addresses this issue, since his\nsemantics captures only the strong reading. He claims that while this\nmay present a problem for his semantics, it is not a problem for\nNP-deletion theory more generally, since replacing the pronoun in a\ntypical weak reading example with a minimal definite description also\nyields a weak reading, e.g.:", "\nHowever, he doesn’t present an account of how this reading might\nbe captured.", "\nThese examples and others suggest that whether a given relative clause\ndonkey sentence appears to favor the strong reading or weak reading is\ninfluenced by a variety of factors, including the monotonicity\nproperties of the determiner on the wide scope quantifier, the lexical\nsemantics of the predicates occurring in the sentence, and general\nbackground assumptions concerning the situations in which we are to\nconsider the truth or falsity of the sentences. However, it is very\nhard to find significant generalizations regarding under what\nconditions a given reading is\n favored.[32]\n Further, it is very hard to find sentences that clearly allow both a\nstrong and a weak reading.[33] This makes the view that the sentences\nactually possess both readings as a matter of their semantics at least\nsomewhat suspect. If they really do possess both readings, why is it\nso hard to find sentences that clearly allow both readings? And\nfinally, relative clause donkey sentences fronted by the determiner\n“some” seem always to only have the existential truth\nconditions:", "\nObviously, the facts here are quite complicated.", "\nBrasoveanu (2006, 2007, 2008) points out that there are also\nmixed readings of donkey sentences, such as:", "\nSentence (59) intuitively is true iff for every book that a\ncredit-card owner buys on amazon.com, there is some credit\ncard or other that she uses to pay for the book. Hence the mixed\nstrong and weak reading. Brasoveanu accounts for these readings, along\nwith the weak/strong ambiguity in general, within his system of Plural\nCompositional Discourse Representation Theory (PCDRT) by positing an\nambiguity at the level of indefinites. In his account, indefinites are\nunderspecified as to the presence of a maximization operator (which is\npresent in the strong indefinite but not the weak); the decision of\nwhich indefinite to use in a specific case is a “context-driven\nonline process”.", "\nTheories that assign both sets of truth conditions to relative clause\ndonkey sentences generally do so by positing some sort of ambiguity,\neither in the quantifiers, the pronouns, or the\n indefinites.[34]\n Though the matter isn’t entirely clear, it seems plausible that\nthe theories discussed in this entry also may be able to assign both\nthe universal and the existential truth conditions to relative clause\ndonkey sentences by positing some sort of ambiguity. These matters\nrequire further\n investigation.[35]", " A recent theory that does not rely on any ambiguity is presented in Champollion, Bumford & Henderson (2019). Champollion et al. argue for a trivalent semantics that allows for truth-value gaps for donkey sentences, along with a pragmatic theory that both fills in the gaps and predicts when hearers get a strong or weak interpretation. This explains the different readings of donkey sentences in terms of underspecification rather than ambiguity. The (dynamic) semantics delivers that a sentence like (26) is true iff every female donkey-owner beats every donkey she owns, false if at least one female donkey-owner does not beat any donkey she owns, and otherwise neither true nor false. Relying on Križ (2016)'s framework for plural definites, speakers can use a sentence to address the question under discussion (QUD) that is true enough at a world w even if it lacks a truth value at w, so long as it is not false at any world equivalent to w. If the QUD is such that it requires that every female donkey-owner beat every donkey she owns, then worlds in which (say) some female donkey-owners who own multiple donkeys only beat one of their donkeys will be equivalent to worlds in which some female donkey owners do not beat any of their donkeys. However, if the QUD is such that it requires that every female donkey-owner beat some donkey she owns, such worlds will be equivalent for conversational purposes to worlds in which each female donkey-owner beats all the donkeys she owns, and thus speakers will judge the weak reading true in this scenario." ], "section_title": "4. How Many Readings Do Donkey Sentences Have?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAnother recent development in the study of anaphora comes from a\nseries of papers by Philippe Schlenker on anaphora in sign language,\nparticularly ASL (American Sign Language) and LSF (French Sign\nLanguage) (2010, 2011, 2012a,b, 2013a,b, 2014, 2015). In sign\nlanguage, an antecedent is associated with a particular position in\nsigning space called a locus, and an anaphoric link to the\nantecedent is obtained by pointing at that same locus. Unlike spoken\nlanguages, which have a limited number of lexically encoded pronouns,\nin sign language there seems to be no upper bound on how many loci can\nsimultaneously be used, aside from limitations of performance (since\nsigners have to remember what the loci are assigned to, and be able to\ndistinguish one from another). Schlenker (2015) gives an example of a\nshort discourse that involves 7 distinct loci. Given their unbounded\nnumber and their overt connection to antecedents, Schlenker (as well\nas others) posits that they are the overt realization of formal\nindices, i.e., the variables that mark anaphoric connections in\ntheories like DRT and dynamic semantics. Despite their differences,\nsign language and spoken language pronouns have enough in common that\na uniform theory is desirable, and Schlenker argues that sign language\nprovides evidence applicable to at least two debates in the anaphora\nliterature. First, there is good evidence that in sign language, there\nis a single system of anaphora using loci for denoting individuals,\ntimes, and worlds. This provides evidence in favor of those who think\nthat there are temporal and modal variables and pronouns in spoken\nlanguage. Second, Schlenker argues that the use of loci, which look\nlike an overt use of indices, very much resembles the dynamic semantic\naccount of pronominal anaphora since antecedents introduce variables\n(loci) and anaphoric connections are made by repeating the same\nvariables (loci). Just as in spoken language, this occurs even when\nthe anaphoric pronouns are outside the syntactic scope of their\nantecedents. Furthermore, according to Schlenker one of the most\ndecisive examples is the bishop example\n (50),\n repeated here:", "\nIn sign language, the only way to obtain the intended reading of the\nsentence is for the pronouns to index different antecedents. This\nshows that a theory need not only get the truth conditions right (as\nsome D-type theories can), but must account for the formal link\nbetween each antecedent and pronoun. For criticism of the thesis that\nloci are overt variables see Kuhn (2016). ", "\nThe second major conclusion from Schlenker’s research is that\nsign language pronouns have an iconic element. For example,\nthe verb “ask” is signed near the chin/neck area of a\nlocus. If the locus denotes a person standing on a branch,\n“ask” is signed at a fairly high spot in the locus. If the\nlocus denotes a person hanging upside-down from a branch,\n“ask” is signed lower in the locus. This and many other\nexamples of iconicity in pronouns provides evidence that there needs\nto be an account of iconicity integrated into the formal\nsemantics." ], "section_title": "5. 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anarchism	Anarchism	First published Tue Oct 3, 2017; substantive revision Tue Oct 26, 2021	[ "\nAnarchism is a political theory that is skeptical of the justification\nof authority and power. Anarchism is usually grounded in moral claims\nabout the importance of individual liberty, often conceived as freedom\nfrom domination. Anarchists also offer a positive theory of human\nflourishing, based upon an ideal of equality, community, and\nnon-coercive consensus building. Anarchism has inspired practical\nefforts at establishing utopian communities, radical and revolutionary\npolitical agendas, and various forms of direct action. This entry\nprimarily describes “philosophical anarchism”: it focuses\non anarchism as a theoretical idea and not as a form of political\nactivism. While philosophical anarchism describes a skeptical theory\nof political legitimation, anarchism is also a concept that has been\nemployed in philosophical and literary theory to describe a sort of\nanti-foundationalism. Philosophical anarchism can mean either a theory\nof political life that is skeptical of attempts to justify state\nauthority or a philosophical theory that is skeptical of the attempt\nto assert firm foundations for knowledge." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Varieties of Anarchism", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Political Anarchism", "1.2 Religious Anarchism", "1.3 Theoretical Anarchism", "1.4 Applied Anarchism", "1.5 Black, Indigenous, and Decolonizing Anarchism" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Anarchism in Political Philosophy", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Anarchism in the History of Political Philosophy", "2.2 Absolute, Deontological, and a priori Anarchism", "2.3 Contingent, Consequentialist, and a posteriori Anarchism", "2.4 Individualism, Libertarianism, and Socialist Anarchism" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Anarchism and Political Activity", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Nonviolence, Violence, and Criminality", "3.2 Disobedience, Revolution, and Reform", "3.3. Utopian Communities and Non-Revolutionary Anarchism" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Objections and Replies", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Anarchism is Nihilistic and Destructive", "4.2 Anarchy Will Always Evolve Back into the State", "4.3 Anarchism is Utopian", "4.4 Anarchism is Incoherent", "4.5 Philosophical Anarchism is “Toothless”" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThere are various forms of anarchism. Uniting this variety is the\ngeneral critique of centralized, hierarchical power and authority.\nGiven that authority, centralization, and hierarchy show up in various\nways and in different discourses, institutions, and practices, it is\nnot surprising that the anarchist critique has been applied in diverse\nways." ], "section_title": "1. Varieties of Anarchism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAnarchism is primarily understood as a skeptical theory of political\nlegitimation. The term anarchism is derived from the negation of the\nGreek term arché, which means first principle,\nfoundation, or ruling power. Anarchy is thus rule by no one or\nnon-rule. Some argue that non-ruling occurs when there is rule by\nall—with consensus or unanimity providing an optimistic goal\n(see Depuis-Déri 2010).", "\nPolitical anarchists focus their critique on state power, viewing\ncentralized, monopolistic coercive power as illegitimate. Anarchists\nthus criticize “the state”. Bakunin provides a paradigm\nhistorical example, saying:", "\n\n\nIf there is a State, there must be domination of one class by another\nand, as a result, slavery; the State without slavery is\nunthinkable—and this is why we are the enemies of the State.\n(Bakunin 1873 [1990: 178])\n", "\nA more recent example comes from Gerard Casey who writes,\n“states are criminal organizations. All states, not just the\nobviously totalitarian or repressive ones” (Casey 2012: 1).", "\nSuch sweeping generalizations are difficult to support. Thus anarchism\nas political philosophy faces the challenge of specificity. States\nhave been organized in various ways. Political power is not\nmonolithic. Sovereignty is a complicated matter that includes\ndivisions and distributions of power (see Fiala 2015). Moreover, the\nhistorical and ideological context of a given anarchist’s\ncritique makes a difference in the content of the political\nanarchist’s critique. Bakunin was responding primarily to a\nMarxist and Hegelian view of the state, offering his critique from\nwithin the global socialist movement; Casey is writing in the\nTwenty-First Century in the era of liberalism and globalization,\noffering his critique from within the movement of contemporary\nlibertarianism. Some anarchists engage in broad generalizations,\naiming for a total critique of political power. Others will present a\nlocalized critique of a given political entity. An ongoing challenge\nfor those who would seek to understand anarchism is to realize how\nhistorically and ideologically diverse approaches fit under the\ngeneral anarchist umbrella. We look at political anarchism in detail\nbelow." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Political Anarchism" }, { "content": [ "\nThe anarchist critique has been extended toward the rejection of\nnon-political centralization and authority. Bakunin extended his\ncritique to include religion, arguing against both God and the State.\nBakunin rejected God as the absolute master, saying famously,\n“if God really existed, it would be necessary to abolish\nhim” (Bakunin 1882 [1970: 28]).", "\nThere are, however, religious versions of anarchism, which critique\npolitical authority from a standpoint that takes religion seriously.\nRapp (2012) has shown how anarchism can be found in Taoism. And\nRamnath (2011) has identified anarchist threads in Islamic Sufism, in\nHindu bhakti movements, in Sikhism’s anti-caste\nefforts, and in Buddhism. We consider anarchism in connection with\nGandhi below. But we focus here on Christian anarchism.", "\nChristian anarchist theology views the kingdom of God as lying beyond\nany human principle of structure or order. Christian anarchists offer\nan anti-clerical critique of ecclesiastical and political power.\nTolstoy provides an influential example. Tolstoy claims that\nChristians have a duty not to obey political power and to refuse to\nswear allegiance to political authority (see Tolstoy 1894). Tolstoy\nwas also a pacifist. Christian anarcho-pacifism views the state as\nimmoral and unsupportable because of its connection with military\npower (see Christoyannopoulos 2011). But there are also non-pacifist\nChristian anarchists. Berdyaev, for example, builds upon Tolstoy and\nin his own interpretation of Christian theology. Berdyaev concludes:\n“The Kingdom of God is anarchy” (Berdyaev 1940 [1944:\n148]).", "\nChristian anarchists have gone so far as to found separatist\ncommunities where they live apart from the structures of the state.\nNotable examples include New England transcendentalists such as\nWilliam Garrison and Adin Ballou. These transcendentalists had an\ninfluence on Tolstoy (see Perry 1973 [1995]).", "\nOther notable Christians with anarchist sympathies include Peter\nMaurin and Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker movement. In more recent\nyears, Christian anarchism has been defended by Jacques Ellul who\nlinks Christian anarchism to a broad social critique. In addition to\nbeing pacifistic, Ellul says, Christian anarchism should also be\n“antinationalist, anticapitalist, moral, and\nantidemocratic” (Ellul 1988 [1991: 13]). The Christian anarchist\nought to be committed to “a true overturning of authorities of\nall kinds” (Ellul 1988 [1991: 14]). When asked whether a\nChristian anarchist should vote, Ellul says no. He states,\n“anarchy first implies conscientious objection” (Ellul\n1988 [1991: 15])." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Religious Anarchism" }, { "content": [ "\nAnarchist rejection of authority has application in epistemology and\nin philosophical and literary theory. One significant usage of the\nterm shows up in American pragmatism. William James described his\npragmatist philosophical theory as a kind of anarchism: “A\nradical pragmatist is a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of\ncreature” (James 1907 [1981: 116]). James had anarchist\nsympathies, connected to a general critique of systematic philosophy\n(see Fiala 2013b). Pragmatism, like other anti-systematic and\npost-Hegelian philosophies, gives up on the search for an\narché or foundation.", "\nAnarchism thus shows up as a general critique of prevailing methods.\nAn influential example is found in the work of Paul Feyerabend, whose\nAgainst Method provides an example of “theoretical\nanarchism” in epistemology and philosophy of science (Feyerabend\n1975 [1993]). Feyerabend explains:", "\n\n\nScience is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism\nis more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its\nlaw-and-order alternatives. (Feyerabend 1975 [1993: 9])\n", "\nHis point is that science ought not be constrained by hierarchically\nimposed principles and strict rule following.", "\nPost-structuralism and trends in post-modernism and Continental\nphilosophy can also be anarchistic (see May 1994). So-called\n“post-anarchism” is a decentered and free-flowing\ndiscourse that deconstructs power, questions essentialism, and\nundermines systems of authority. Following upon the deconstructive and\ncritical work of authors such as Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, and\nothers, this critique of the arché goes all the way\ndown. If there is no arché or foundation, then we are\nleft with a proliferation of possibilities. Emerging trends in\nglobalization, cyber-space, and post-humanism make the anarchist\ncritique of “the state” more complicated, since\nanarchism’s traditional celebration of liberty and autonomy can\nbe critically scrutinized and deconstructed (see Newman 2016).", "\nTraditional anarchists were primarily interested in sustained and\nfocused political activism that led toward the abolition of the state.\nThe difference between free-flowing post-anarchism and traditional\nanarchism can be seen in the realm of morality. Anarchism has\ntraditionally been critical of centralized moral authority—but\nthis critique was often based upon fundamental principles and\ntraditional values, such as autonomy or liberty. But\npost-structuralism—along with critiques articulated by some\nfeminists, critical race theorists, and critics of\nEurocentrism—calls these values and principles into\nquestion." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Theoretical Anarchism" }, { "content": [ "\nThe broad critical framework provided by the anarchist critique of\nauthority provides a useful theory or methodology for social critique.\nIn more recent iterations, anarchism has been used to critique gender\nhierarchies, racial hierarchies, and the like—also including a\ncritique of human domination over nature. Thus anarchism also\nincludes, to name a few varieties: anarcha-feminism or feminist\nanarchism (see Kornegger 1975), queer anarchism or anarchist queer\ntheory (see Daring et al. 2010), green anarchism or eco-anarchism also\nassociated with anarchist social ecology (see Bookchin 1971 [1986]),\nBlack and indigenous anarchisms and other anarchist critiques of white\nsupremacy and Eurocentrism (to be discussed below); and even\nanarcho-veganism or “veganarchism” (see Nocella, White,\n& Cudworth 2015). In the anarcho-vegan literature we find the\nfollowing description of a broad and inclusive anarchism:", "\n\n\nAnarchism is a socio-political theory which opposes all systems of\ndomination and oppression such as racism, ableism, sexism,\nanti-LGBTTQIA, ageism, sizeism, government, competition, capitalism,\ncolonialism, imperialism and punitive justice, and promotes direct\ndemocracy, collaboration, interdependence, mutual aid, diversity,\npeace, transformative justice and equity. (Nocella et al. 2015: 7)\n", "\nA thorough-going anarchism would thus offer a critique of anything and\neverything that smacks of hierarchy, domination, centralization, and\nunjustified authority.", "\nAnarchists who share these various commitments often act upon their\ncritique of authority by engaging in nonconformist practices (free\nlove, nudism, gender disruption, and so on) or by forming intentional\ncommunities that live “off the grid” and outside of the\nnorms of mainstream culture. In extreme forms this becomes\nanarcho-primitivism or anti-civilizational anarchism (see Zerzan 2008,\n2010; Jensen 2006). Alternative anarchist societies have existed in\nreligious communes in post-Reformation Europe and in the early United\nStates, in Nineteenth Century American utopian communities, the hippy\ncommunes of the Twentieth Century, anarchist squats, temporary\nautonomous zones (see Bey 1985), and occasional gatherings of\nlike-minded people.", "\nGiven this sort of antinomianism and non-conformism it is easy to see\nthat anarchism also often includes a radical critique of traditional\nethical norms and principles. Thus radical ethical anarchism can be\ncontrasted with what we might call bourgeois anarchism (with radical\nanarchism seeking to disrupt traditional social norms and bourgeois\nanarchism seeking freedom from the state that does not seek such\ndisruption). And although some argue that anarchists are deeply\nethical—committed to liberty and solidarity—others will\nargue that anarchists are moral nihilists who reject morality entirely\nor who at least reject the idea that there could be a single source of\nmoral authority (see essays in Franks & Wilson 2010).", "\nIn more recent explorations and applications of anarchist thought, the\nanarchist critique has been related and connected to a variety of\nemerging theoretical issues and applied concerns. Hilary Lazar (2018)\nfor example, explores how anarchism connects to intersectionality and\nissues related to multiculturalism. And Sky Croeser (2019) explores\nhow anarchism is connected to the emerging technologies including the\nInternet. And there are anarchist elements in the development of\nshared technological and information, as for example in the\ndevelopment of cryptocurrencies, which create economies that outside\nof traditional state-based economic systems." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 Applied Anarchism" }, { "content": [ "\nAs mentioned above, among the varieties of applied anarchism we find\nanarchism associated with various liberation movements and critiques\nof white supremacy, Eurocentrism, and colonialism. This could be\nconnected with feminist anarchism, women’s liberation movements,\nand an anarchist critique of patriarchy. We’ll focus here on the\nanarchist critique found in Black and indigenous liberation movements.\nGandhi’s movement in India could be included here (as discussed\nbelow). ", "\nOne focal point here is a claim about anarchist characteristics\nthought to be found in the social structures of indigenous peoples.\nSometimes this is a romantic projection of anti-civilizational\nanarchists such as John Zerzan, who echoes Rousseau’s naive and\nill-informed ideal of the “noble savage.” One must be careful to avoid\nessentializing claims made about indigenous cultures and political\nsocieties. The Inca and the Aztec empires were obviously not utopian\nanarchist collectives. Nonetheless, scholars of indigeneity affirm the\nanarchist critique of dominant hegemonies as part of the effort of\nliberation that would allow indigenous people a degree of\nself-determination (see Johnson and Ferguson 2019).", "\nBlack and indigenous anarchisms provide a radical critique, which\nholds that the global history of genocide, slavery, colonization, and\nexploitation rest upon the assumption of white supremacy. White\nsupremacy is thus understood, from this point of view, as a\npresupposition of statism, centralization, hierarchy, and authority.\nThe anarchist critique of white supremacy is thus linked to a critique\nof social and political systems that evolved out of the history of\nslavery and native genocide to include apartheid, inequality,\ncaste/racial hierarchies, and other forms of structural racism. Some\ndefenders of Black anarchism go so far as to suggest that when\n“Blackness” is defined in opposition to structures of white supremacy,\nthere is a kind of anarchism woven into the concept. Anderson and\nSamudzi write, ", "\n\n\nWhile bound to the laws of the land, Black America can be understood\nas an extra-state entity because of Black exclusion from the liberal\nsocial contract. Due to this extra-state location, Blackness is, in so\nmany ways, anarchistic. (Anderson and Samudzi 2017: no page\nnumbers)\n", "\nThis implies that the experience of Black people unfolds in a social\nand political world that its defined by its exclusion from power. A\nsimilar implication holds for indigenous people, who have been\nsubjugated and dominated by colonial power. Liberation movements thus\nspring from a social experience that is in a sense anarchic (i.e.,\ndeveloped in exclusion from and opposition to structures of power).\nIt is not surprising, then, that some liberatory activists espouse and\naffirm anarchism. The American activist Lorenzo Kom’boa Ervin,\nfor example, affirms anarchism in pursuit of Black liberation (Ervin\n1997 [2016]). He explains that Black anarchism is different from what\nhe describes as the more authoritarian hierarchy of the Black Panther\nparty. He also argues against the authoritarian structure of\nreligiously oriented Black liberation movements, such as that led by\nMartin Luther King, Jr. ", "\nA significant issue in Black and indigenous anarchisms is the effort\nto decolonize anarchism itself. Many of the key figures in the\nanarchist tradition are white, male, and European. The concerns of\nanarchists such as Kropotkin or Bakunin may be different from the\nconcerns of African Americans or from the concerns of indigenous\npeople in Latin America or elsewhere around the globe. One solution to\nthis problem is to retrieve forgotten voices from within the\ntradition. In this regard, we might consider Lucy Parsons (also known\nas Lucy Gonzalez), a former slave who espoused anarchism. Parsons\nexplained that she affirmed anarchism because the political status quo\nproduced nothing but misery and starvation for the masses of humanity.\nTo resolve this an anarchist revolution was needed. Parsons said,", "\n\n\nMost anarchists believe the coming change can only come through a\nrevolution, because the possessing class will not allow a peaceful\nchange to take place; still we are willing to work for peace at any\nprice, except at the price of liberty. (Parsons 1905 [2010])\n" ], "subsection_title": "1.5 Black, Indigenous, and Decolonizing Anarchism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAnarchism in political philosophy maintains that there is no\nlegitimate political or governmental authority. In political\nphilosophy anarchy is an important topic for consideration—even\nfor those who are not anarchists—as the a-political background\ncondition against which various forms of political organization are\narrayed, compared, and justified. Anarchy is often viewed by\nnon-anarchists as the unhappy or unstable condition in which there is\nno legitimate authority. Anarchism as a philosophical idea is not\nnecessarily connected to practical activism. There are political\nanarchists who take action in order to destroy what they see as\nillegitimate states. The popular imagination often views anarchists as\nbomb-throwing nihilists. But philosophical anarchism is a theoretical\nstandpoint. In order to decide who (and whether) one should act upon\nanarchist insight, we require a further theory of political action,\nobligation, and obedience grounded in further ethical reflection.\nSimmons explains that philosophical anarchists “do not take the\nillegitimacy of states to entail a strong moral imperative to oppose\nor eliminate states” (Simmons 2001: 104). Some anarchists remain\nobedient to ruling authorities; others revolt or resist in various\nways. The question of action depends upon a theory of what sort of\npolitical obligation follows from our philosophical, moral, political,\nreligious, and aesthetic commitments." ], "section_title": "2. Anarchism in Political Philosophy", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThere is a long history of political anarchism. In the ancient world,\nanarchism of a sort can be found in the ideas of the Epicureans and\nCynics. Kropotkin makes this point in his 1910 encyclopedia article.\nAlthough they did not employ the term anarchism, the Epicureans and\nCynics avoided political activity, advising retreat from political\nlife in pursuit of tranquility (ataraxia) and self-control\n(autarkeai). The Cynics are also known for advocating\ncosmopolitanism: living without allegiance to any particular state or\nlegal system, while associating with human beings based upon moral\nprinciple outside of traditional state structures. Diogenes the Cynic\nhad little respect for political or religious authority. One of his\nguiding ideas was to “deface the currency”. This meant not\nonly devaluing or destroying monetary currency but also a general\nrejection of the norms of civilized society (see Marshall 2010: 69).\nDiogenes often mocked political authorities and failed to offer signs\nof respect. While Diogenes actively disrespected established norms,\nEpicurus counseled retreat. He advised living unnoticed and avoiding\npolitical life (under the phrase me politeuesthai—which\ncan be understood as an anti-political admonition).", "\nThe assumption that anarchy would be unhappy or unstable leads to\njustifications of political power. In Hobbes’ famous phrase, in\nthe stateless—anarchic—condition of “the state\nnature” human life would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and\nshort. Hobbes’ social contract—as well as other versions\nof the social contract theory as found for example in Locke or\nRousseau—are attempts to explain how and why the political state\nemerges from out of the anarchic state of nature.", "\nAnarchists respond by claiming that the state tends to produce its own\nsort of unhappiness: as oppressive, violent, corrupt, and inimical to\nliberty. Discussions about the social contract thus revolve around the\nquestion of whether the state is better than anarchy—or whether\nstates and state-like entities naturally and inevitably emerge from\nout of the original condition of anarchy. One version of this argument\nabout the inevitable emergence of states (by way of something like an\n“invisible hand”) is found in Nozick’s influential\nAnarchy, State, Utopia (1974). While Nozick and other\npolitical philosophers take anarchy seriously as a starting point,\nanarchists will argue that invisible hand arguments of this sort\nignore the historical actuality of states, which develop out of a long\nhistory of domination, inequality, and oppression. Murray Rothbard has\nargued against Nozick and social contract theory, saying, “no\nexisting state has been immaculately conceived” (Rothbard 1977:\n46). Different versions of the social contract theory, such as we find\nin John Rawls’s work, view the contract situation as a heuristic\ndevice allowing us to consider justice from under “the veil of\nignorance”. But anarchists will argue that the idea of the\noriginal position does not necessarily lead to the justification of\nthe state—especially given background knowledge about the\ntendency of states to be oppressive. Crispin Sartwell concludes:", "\n\n\nEven accepting more or less all of the assumptions Rawls packs into\nthe original position, it is not clear that the contractors would not\nchoose anarchy. (Sartwell 2008: 83)\n", "\nThe author of the present essay has described anarchism that results\nfrom a critique of the social contract tradition as “liberal\nsocial contract anarchism” (Fiala 2013a).", "\nAn important historical touchstone is William Godwin. Unlike Locke and\nHobbes who turned to the social contract to lead us out of the\nanarchic state of nature, Godwin argued that the resulting\ngovernmental power was not necessarily better than anarchy. Locke, of\ncourse, allows for revolution when the state becomes despotic. Godwin\nbuilds upon that insight. He explained, “we must not hastily\nconclude that the mischiefs of anarchy are worse than those which\ngovernment is qualified to produce” (Godwin 1793: bk VII, chap.\nV, p. 736). He claimed,", "\n\n\nIt is earnestly to be desired that each man should be wise enough to\ngovern himself, without the intervention of any compulsory restraint;\nand, since government, even in its best state, is an evil, the object\nprincipally to be aimed at is that we should have as little of it as\nthe general peace of human society will permit. (Godwin 1793: bk III,\nchap. VII, p. 185–6)\n", "\nLike Rousseau, who praised the noble savage, who was free from social\nchains until forced into society, Godwin imagined original anarchy\ndeveloping into the political state, which tended on his view to\nbecome despotic. Once the state comes into being, Godwin suggests that\ndespotism is the primary problem since “despotism is as\nperennial as anarchy is transitory” (Godwin 1793: bk VII, chap.\nV, p. 736).", "\nAnarchism is often taken to mean that individuals ought to be left\nalone without any unifying principle or governing power. In some cases\nanarchism is related to libertarianism (or what is sometimes called\n“anarcho-capitalism”). But non-rule may also occur when\nthere is unanimity or consensus—and hence no need for external\nauthority or a governing structure of command and obedience. If there\nwere unanimity among individuals, there would be no need for\n“ruling”, authority, or government. The ideas of unanimity\nand consensus are associated with the positive conception of anarchism\nas a voluntary association of autonomous human beings, which promotes\ncommunal values. One version of the anarchist ideal imagines the\ndevolution of centralized political authority, leaving us with\ncommunes whose organizational structure is open-ended and\nconsensual.", "\nGiven this emphasis on communal organization it is not surprising that\npolitical anarchism has a close historical association with communism,\ndespite the connection mentioned above with free market capitalism.\nAuthors such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Goldman developed their\nanarchism as a response to Marx and Marxism. One of the first authors\nto explicitly affirm anarchism, Pierre Proudhon, defended a kind of\n“communism”, which he understood as being grounded in\ndecentralized associations, communes, and mutual-aid societies.\nProudhon thought that private property created despotism. He argued\nthat liberty required anarchy, concluding,", "\n\n\nThe government of man by man (under whatever name it be disguised) is\noppression. Society finds its highest perfection in the union of order\nwith anarchy. (Proudhon 1840 [1876: 286])\n", "\nFollowing Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and the other so-called\n“classical anarchists”, anarchism comes to be seen as a\nfocal point for political philosophy and activism.", "\nLet’s turn to a conceptual analysis of different arguments made\nin defense of anarchism." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Anarchism in the History of Political Philosophy" }, { "content": [ "\nAnarchists often make categorical claims to the effect that no state\nis legitimate or that there can no such thing as a justifiable\npolitical state. As an absolute or a priori claim, anarchism\nholds that all states always and everywhere are illegitimate and\nunjust. The term “a priori anarchism” is found in\nSimmons 2001; but it is employed already by Kropotkin in his\ninfluential 1910 article on anarchism, where he claims that anarchists\nare not utopians who argue against the state in a priori\nfashion (Kropotkin 1927 [2002: 285]). Despite Kropotkin’s claim,\nsome anarchists do offer a priori arguments against the\nstate. This sort of claim rests upon an account of the justification\nof authority that is usually grounded in some form of deontological\nmoral claim about the importance of individual liberty and a logical\nclaim about the nature of state authority.", "\nOne typical and well-known example of this argument is found in the\nwork of Robert Paul Wolff. Wolff indicates that legitimate authority\nrests upon a claim about the right to command obedience (Wolff 1970).\nCorrelative to this is a duty to obey: one has a duty to obey\nlegitimate authority. As Wolff explains, by appealing to ideas found\nin Kant and Rousseau, the duty to obey is linked to notions about\nautonomy, responsibility, and rationality. But for Wolff and other\nanarchists, the problem is that the state does not have legitimate\nauthority. As Wolff says of the anarchist, “he will never view\nthe commands of the state as legitimate, as having a binding moral\nforce” (Wolff 1970: 16). The categorical nature of this claim\nindicates a version of absolute anarchism. If the state’s\ncommands are never legitimate and create no moral duty of obedience,\nthen there can never be a legitimate state. Wolff imagines that there\ncould be a legitimate state grounded in “unanimous direct\ndemocracy”—but he indicates that unanimous direct\ndemocracy would be “so restricted in its application that it\noffers no serious hope of ever being embodied in an actual\nstate” (Wolff 1970: 55). Wolff concludes:", "\n\n\nIf all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree\nof autonomy possible, then there would appear to be no state whose\nsubjects have a moral obligation to obey its commands. Hence, the\nconcept of a de jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous, and\nphilosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political\nbelief for an enlightened man. (Wolff 1970: 17)\n", "\nAs Wolff puts it here, there appears to be “no state” that\nis legitimate. This claim is stated in absolute and a priori\nfashion, a point made by Reiman in his critique of Wolff (Reiman\n1972). Wolff does not deny, by the way, that there are de facto\nlegitimate states: governments often do have the approval and support\nof the people they govern. But this approval and support is merely\nconventional and not grounded in a moral duty; and approval and\nsupport are manufactured and manipulated by the coercive power and\npropaganda and ideology of the state.", "\nWe noted here that Wolff’s anarchism is connected to Kant. But\nKant is no anarchist: he defended the idea of enlightened republican\ngovernment in which autonomy would be preserved. Rousseau may be\ncloser to espousing anarchism in some of his remarks—although\nthese are far from systematic (see McLaughlin 2007). Some authors view\nRousseau as espousing something close to “a posteriori\nphilosophical anarchism” (see Bertram 2010 [2017])—which\nwe will define in the next section. Among classical political\nphilosophers, we might also consider Locke in connection with\n“libertarian anarchism” (see Varden 2015) or Locke as\noffering a theory “on the edge of anarchism”, as Simmons\nhas put it (Simmons 1993). But despite his strong defense of\nindividual rights, the stringent way he describes voluntary consent,\nand his advocacy of revolution, Locke believes that states can be\ndefended based upon the social contract theory.", "\nLeaving the canonical authors of Western political philosophy aside,\nthe most likely place to find deontological and a priori\nanarchism is among the Christian anarchists. Of course, most\nChristians are not anarchists. But those Christians who espouse\nanarchism usually do so with the absolute, deontological, and a\npriori claims of the sort made by Tolstoy, Berdyaev, and\nEllul—as noted above." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Absolute, Deontological, and a priori Anarchism" }, { "content": [ "\nA less stringent form of anarchism will argue that states could be\njustified in theory—even though, in practice, no state or very\nfew states are actually legitimate. Contingent anarchism will hold\nthat states in the present configuration of things fail to live up to\nthe standards of their own justification. This is an a\nposteriori argument (see Simmons 2001) based both in a\ntheoretical account of the justification of the state (for example,\nthe social contract theory of liberal-democratic theory) and in an\nempirical account of how and why concrete states fail to be justified\nbased upon this theory. The author of the present article has offered\na version of this argument based upon the social contract theory,\nholding that the liberal-democratic social contract theory provides\nthe best theory of the justification of the state, while arguing that\nvery few states actually live up to the promise of the social contract\ntheory (Fiala 2013a).", "\nOne version of the contingent anarchist argument focuses on the\nquestion of the burden of proof for accounts that would justify\npolitical authority. This approach has been articulated by Noam\nChomsky, who explains:", "\n\n\n[This] is what I have always understood to be the essence of\nanarchism: the conviction that the burden of proof has to be placed on\nauthority, and that it should be dismantled if that burden cannot be\nmet. Sometimes the burden can be met. (Chomsky 2005: 178)\n", "\nChomsky accepts legitimate authority based in ordinary experience: for\nexample, when a grandfather prevents a child from darting out into the\nstreet. But state authority is a much more complicated affair.\nPolitical relationships are attenuated; there is the likelihood of\ncorruption and self-interest infecting political reality; there are\nlevels and degrees of mediation, which alienate us from the source of\npolitical authority; and the rational autonomy of adults is important\nand fundamental. By focusing on the burden of proof, Chomsky\nacknowledges that there may be ways to meet the burden of proof for\nthe justification of the state. But he points out that there is a\nprima facie argument against the state—which is based in a\ncomplex historical and empirical account of the role of power,\neconomics, and historical inertia in creating political institutions.\nHe explains:", "\n\n\nSuch institutions face a heavy burden of proof: it must be shown that\nunder existing conditions, perhaps because of some overriding\nconsideration of deprivation or threat, some form of authority,\nhierarchy, and domination is justified, despite the prima facie case\nagainst it—a burden that can rarely be met. (Chomsky 2005:\n174)\n", "\nChomsky does not deny that the burden of proof could be met. Rather,\nhis point is that there is a prima facie case against the state, since\nthe burden of proof for the justification of the state is rarely\nmet.", "\nContingent anarchism is based in consequentialist reasoning, focused\non details of historical actuality. Consequentialist anarchism will\nappeal to utilitarian considerations, arguing that states generally\nfail to deliver in terms of promoting the happiness of the greater\nnumber of people—and more strongly that state power tends to\nproduce unhappiness. The actuality of inequality, classism, elitism,\nracism, sexism, and other forms of oppression can be used to support\nan anarchist argument, holding that even though a few people benefit\nfrom state power, a larger majority suffers under it.", "\nThere is a significant difference between anarchism that is offered in\npursuit of utilitarianism’s greater happiness ideal and\nanarchism that is offered in defense of the minority against the\ntyranny of the majority. As we shall see in the next section,\nindividualist anarchists are primarily concerned with the tendency of\nutilitarian politics to sacrifice the rights of individuals in the\nname of the greater good.", "\nBefore turning to that conception of anarchism, let’s note two\nclassical authors who offer insight into utilitarian anarchism. Godwin\narticulated a form of anarchism that is connected to a utilitarian\nconcern. Godwin’s general moral thought is utilitarian in basic\nconception, even though he also argues based upon fundamental\nprinciples such as the importance of liberty. But Godwin’s\narguments are a posteriori, based upon generalizations from\nhistory and with an eye toward the future development of happiness and\nliberty. He writes:", "\n\n\nAbove all we should not forget, that government is an evil, an\nusurpation upon the private judgment and individual conscience of\nmankind; and that, however we may be obliged to admit it as a\nnecessary evil for the present. (Godwin 1793: bk V, ch. I, p. 380)\n", "\nThis claim is similar to Chomsky’s insofar as it recognizes the\ncomplicated nature of the historical dialectic. The goal of political\ndevelopment should be in a direction that goes beyond the state (and\ntoward the development of individual reason and morality). But in our\npresent condition, some form of government may be “a necessary\nevil”, which we ought to strive to overcome. The point here is\nthat our judgments about the justification of the state are\ncontingent: they depend upon present circumstances and our current\nform of development. And while states may be necessary features of the\ncurrent human world, as human beings develop further, it is possible\nthat the state might outlive its usefulness.", "\nWe should note that utilitarian arguments are often used to support\nstate structures in the name of the greater good. Utilitarian\nanarchists will argue that states fail to do this. But utilitarian\nconclusions are not usually based upon a fundamental appeal to moral\nprinciples such as liberty or the rights of the individual. Thus\nBentham described claims about human rights as “anarchical\nfallacies” because they tended to lead toward anarchy, which he\nrejected. Bentham described the difference between a moderate\nutilitarian effort at reform and the anarchist’s revolutionary\ndoctrine of human rights, saying that", "\n\n\nthe anarchist setting up his will and fancy for a law before which all\nmankind are called upon to bow down at the first word—the\nanarchist, trampling on truth and decency, denies the validity of the\nlaw in question,—denies the existence of it in the character of\na law, and calls upon all mankind to rise up in a mass, and resist the\nexecution of it. (Bentham 1843: 498)\n", "\nMore principled deontological anarchism will maintain that states\nviolate fundamental rights and so are not justified. But utilitarian\nanarchism will not primarily be worried about the violation of a few\npeople’s rights (although that is obviously a relevant\nconsideration). Rather, the complaint for a utilitarian anarchist is\nthat state structures tend to produce disadvantages for the greater\nnumber of people. Furthermore what Oren Ben-Dor calls\n“utilitarian-based anarchism” is based upon the idea that\nthere is no a priori justification of the state (Ben-Dor\n2000: 101–2). For the utilitarian, this all depends upon the\ncircumstances and conditions. Ben-Dor calls this anarchism because it\nrejects any a priori notion of state justification. In other\nwords, the utilitarian anarchist does not presume that states are\njustifiable; rather a utilitarian anarchist will hold that the burden\nof proof rests upon the defender of states to show that state\nauthority is justifiable on utilitarian grounds, by bringing in\nhistorical and empirical data about human nature, human flourishing,\nand successful social organization." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Contingent, Consequentialist, and a posteriori Anarchism" }, { "content": [ "\nForms of anarchism also differ in terms of the content of the theory,\nthe focal point of the anarchist critique, and the imagined practical\nimpact of anarchism. Socialist forms of anarchism include communist\nanarchism associated with Kropotkin and communitarian anarchism (see\nClark 2013). The socialist approach focuses on the development of\nsocial and communal groups, which are supposed to thrive outside of\nhierarchical and centralized political structures. Individualist forms\nof anarchism include some forms of libertarianism or\nanarcho-capitalism as well as egoistically oriented antinomianism and\nnon-conformism. The individualistic focus rejects group identity and\nideas about social/communal good, while remaining firmly rooted in\nmoral claims about the autonomy of the individual (see Casey\n2012).", "\nIndividualistic anarchism is historically associated with ideas found\nin Stirner who said, “every state is a despotism” (Stirner\n1844 [1995: 175]). He argued that there was no duty to obey the state\nand the law because the law and the state impair self-development and\nself-will. The state seeks to tame our desires and along with the\nchurch it undermines self-enjoyment and the development of unique\nindividuality. Stirner is even critical of social organizations and\npolitical parties. While not denying that an individual could\naffiliate with such organizations, he maintains that the individual\nretains rights and identity against the party or social organization:\nhe embraces the party; but he ought not allow himself to be\n“embraced and taken up by the party” (Stirner 1844 [1995:\n211]). Individualist anarchism has often been attributed to a variety\nof thinkers including Josiah Warren, Benjamin Tucker, and Thoreau.", "\nIndividualist anarchism also seems to have something in common with\negoism of the sort associated with Ayn Rand. But Rand dismissed\nanarchism as “a naïve floating abstraction” that\ncould not exist in reality; and she argued that governments properly\nexisted to defend people’s rights (Rand 1964). A more robust\nsort of pro-capitalist anarchism has been defended by Murray Rothbard,\nwho rejects “left-wing anarchism” of the sort he\nassociates with communism, while applauding the individualist\nanarchism of Tucker (Rothbard 2008). Rothbard continues to explain\nthat since anarchism has usually been considered as being primarily a\nleft-wing communist phenomenon, libertarianism should be distinguished\nfrom anarchism by calling it “non-archism” (Rothbard\n2008). A related term has been employed in the literature,\n“min-archism”, which has been used to describe the minimal\nstate that libertarians allow (see Machan 2002). Libertarians are\nstill individualists, who emphasize the importance of individual\nliberty, even though they disagree with full-blown anarchists about\nthe degree to which state power can be justified.", "\nIt is worth considering here, the complexity of the notion of liberty\nunder consideration by appealing to Isaiah Berlin’s well-known\ndistinction between negative and positive liberty (Berlin 1969). Some\nindividualist anarchists appear to focus on negative liberty, i.e.,\nfreedom from constraint, authority, and domination. But anarchism has\nalso been concerned with community and the social good. In this sense,\nanarchists are focused on something like positive liberty and concerned\nwith creating and sustaining the social conditions necessary for\nactualizing human flourishing. In this regard, anarchists have also\noffered theories of institutional rules and social structures that are\nnon-authoritarian. This may sound paradoxical (i.e., that anarchists\nespouse rules and structures at all). But Prichard has argued that\nanarchists are also interested in “freedom within” institutions and\nsocial structures. According to Prichard rather than focusing on\nstate-authority, anarchist institutions will be be open-ended\nprocesses that are complex and non-linear (Prichard 2018).", "\nWe see then, that individualist anarchism that focuses only on\nnegative liberty is often rejected by anarchists who are interested in\nreconceiving community and restructuring society along more\negalitarian lines. Indeed, individualistic anarchism has been\ncriticized as merely a matter of “lifestyle” (criticized\nin Bookchin 1995), which focuses on dress, behavior, and other\nindividualistic choices and preferences. Bookchin and other critics of\nlifestyle individualism will argue that mere non-conformism does very\nlittle to change the status quo and overturn structures of domination\nand authority. Nor does non-conformism and lifestyle anarchism work to\ncreate and sustain systems that affirm liberty and equality. But\ndefenders of lifestyle non-conformism will argue that there is value\nin opting out of cultural norms and demonstrating contempt for\nconformity through individual lifestyle choices.", "\nA more robust form of individualist anarchism will focus on key values\nsuch as autonomy and self-determination, asserting the primacy of the\nindividual over and against social groups as a matter of rights.\nIndividualist anarchists can admit that collective action is important\nand that voluntary cooperation among individuals can result in\nbeneficial and autonomy preserving community. Remaining disputes will\nconsider whether what results from individual cooperation is a form of\ncapitalism or a form of social sharing or communism. Libertarian\nanarchists or anarcho-capitalists will defend free market ideas based\nupon individual choices in trading and producing goods for market.", "\nOn the other hand, socialist or communistically oriented anarchism\nwill focus more on a sharing economy. This could be a large form of\nmutualism or something local and concrete like the sharing of family\nlife or the traditional potlatch. But these ideas remain anarchist to\nthe extent that they want to avoid centralized control and the\ndevelopment of hierarchical structures of domination. Unlike\nstate-centered communism of the sort developed by Marxists, anarchist\ncommunism advocates decentralization. The motto of this approach comes\nfrom Kropotkin: “all for all”. In The Conquest of\nBread (1892) Kropotkin criticizes monopolistic centralization\nthat prevents people from gaining access to socially generated wealth.\nThe solution is “all for all”: “What we proclaim is\nthe Right to Well-Being: Well-Being for All!” (Kropotkin 1892\n[1995: 20]). The communist idea that all humans should enjoy the\nfruits of the collective human product shares something with the\nMarxist idea of “to each according to his need” (Marx\n1875). But Kropotkin argues for the need to evolve beyond centralized\ncommunist control—what he criticizes as mere\n“collectivism”—and toward anarchist communism:", "\n\n\nAnarchy leads to communism, and communism to anarchy, both alike being\nexpressions of the predominant tendency in modern societies, the\npursuit of equality. (Kropotkin 1892 [1995: 31])\n", "\nKropotkin argues that the communal impulse already exists and that the\nadvances in social wealth made possible by the development of\nindividualistic capitalism make it likely that we will develop in the\ndirection of communal sharing. He argues that the tendency of history\nis away from centralized power and toward equality and\nliberty—and toward the abolition of the state. Kropotkin’s\ncommunist anarchism is based upon some historical and empirical\nclaims: about whether things can actually be arranged more\nsatisfactorily without state intervention; and about whether states\nreally do personify injustice and oppression. Libertarianism and\nanarcho-capitalism also think that the free market will work to\nadequately maximize human well-being and help individuals to realize\ntheir own autonomy. But for the socialist and communist anarchists,\nthe question of individual self-realization is less important than the\nidea of social development. Kropotkin’s “all for\nall” indicates a moral and ontological focus that is different\nfrom what we find among the individualists.", "\nSocialist and communally focused forms of anarchism emphasize the\nimportance of social groups. For example, families can be viewed as\nanarchic structures of social cooperation and solidarity. A social\nanarchist would be critical of hierarchical and domineering forms of\nfamily organization (for example, patriarchal family structure). But\nsocial anarchists will emphasize the point that human identity and\nflourishing occur within extended social structures—so long as\nit remains a free and self-determining community.", "\nThe tension between individualist and socialist anarchism comes to a\nhead when considering the question of the degree to which an\nindividual ought to be subordinated to the community. One problem for\nso-called “communitarian” theories of social and political\nlife is that they can result in the submergence of individuals into\nthe communal identity. Individualists will want to struggle against\nthis assault upon autonomy and individual identity. Communalists may\nrespond, as Clark does, by claiming that the ideal of a genuine\ncommunity of autonomous individuals remains a hoped for dream of an\n“impossible community” (Clark 2013). On the other hand\ncommunally focused theorists will point out that individual human\nbeings cannot exist outside of communal structures: we are social\nanimals who flourish and survive in communities. Thus radical\nindividualism also remains a dream—and as more politically\noriented anarchists will point out, individualism undermines the\npossibility of organized political action, which implies that\nindividualist anarchists will be unable to successfully resist\npolitical structures of domination." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Individualism, Libertarianism, and Socialist Anarchism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAnarchism forces us to re-evaluate political activity. Ancient Greek\nphilosophers such as Aristotle and Plato held that human beings\nflourished within just political communities and that there was a\nvirtue in serving the polis. Modern political philosophy tended to\nhold, as well, that political action—including obedience to the\nlaw and the ideal of a rule of law—was noble and enlightened. In\nHegelian political philosophy, these ideas combine in a way that\ncelebrates citizenship and service to the state. And in contemporary\nliberal political philosophy, it is often presumed that obedience to\nthe law is required as a prima facie duty (see Reiman 1972;\nGans 1992). Anarchists, of course, call this all into question.", "\nThe crucial question for anarchists is thus whether one ought to\ndisengage from political life, whether one ought to submit to\npolitical authority and obey the law, or whether one ought to engage\nin active efforts to actively abolish the state. Those who opt to work\nactively for the abolition of the state often understand this as a\nform of “direct action” or “propaganda of the\ndeed”. The idea of direct action is often viewed as typical of\nanarchists, who believe that something ought to be done to actively\nabolish the state including: graffiti, street theater, organized\noccupations, boycotts, and even violence. There are disputes among\nanarchists about what ought to be done, with an important dividing\nline occurring with regard to the question of violence and criminal\nbehavior.", "\nBefore turning to that discussion, let’s note one further\nimportant theoretical distinction with regard to the question of\ntaking action, connected to the typology offered above: whether action\nshould be justified in consequentialist or non-consequentialist terms.\nFranks has argued that anarchist direct action ought to exemplify a\nunity of means and ends (Franks 2003). On this view, if liberation and\nautonomy are what anarchists are pursuing, then the methods used to\nobtain these goods must be liberationist and celebrate\nautonomy—and embody this within direct action. Franks argues\nthat the idea that “the end justifies the means” is more\ntypical of state-centered movements, such as Bolshevism—and of\nright-wing movements. While some may think that anarchists are willing\nto engage in action “by any means necessary”, that\nphraseology and the crass consequentialism underlying it is more\ntypical of radical movements which are not anarchist. Coercive\nimposition of the anarchist ideal re-inscribes the problem of\ndomination, hierarchy, centralization, and monopolistic power that the\nanarchist was originally opposed to." ], "section_title": "3. Anarchism and Political Activity", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nOne significant philosophical and ethical problem for politically\nengaged anarchists is the question of how to avoid ongoing cycles of\npower and violence that are likely to erupt in the absence of\ncentralized political power. One suggestion, mentioned above, is that\nanarchists will often want to emphasize the unity of means and ends.\nThis idea shows why there is some substantial overlap and conjunction\nbetween anarchism and pacifism. Pacifist typically emphasize the unity\nof means and ends. But not all pacifists are anarchists. However, we\nmentioned above that there is a connection between anarchism and\nChristian pacifism, as found in Tolstoy, for example. Gandhi was\ninfluenced by Tolstoy and the anarchists. Although Gandhi is better\nknown as an anti-colonial activist, Marshall includes Gandhi among the\nanarchists (Marshall 2010: chapter 26). It is possible to reconstruct\nanti-colonial movements and arguments about self-determination and\nhome rule as a kind of anarchism (aimed at destroying colonial power\nand imperial states). Gandhi noted that there were many anarchists\nworking in India in his time. In saying this, Gandhi uses the term\nanarchism to characterize bomb-throwing advocates of violence. He\nsays: “I myself am an anarchist, but of another type”\n(Gandhi 1916 [1956: 134]). Gandhian anarchism, if there is such a\nthing, embraces nonviolence. In general nonviolent resistance as\ndeveloped in the Tolstoy-Gandhi-King tradition fits with an approach\nthat turns away from political power and views the state as a purveyor\nof war and an impediment to equality and human development.", "\nObjecting to this anarcho-pacifist approach are more militant\nactivists who advocate direct action that can include sabotage and\nother forms of political violence including terrorism. Emma Goldman\nexplains, for example, that anti-capitalist sabotage undermines the\nidea of private possession. While the legal system considers this to\nbe criminal, Goldman contends it is not. She explains,", "\n\n\nit is ethical in the best sense, since it helps society to get rid of\nits worst foe, the most detrimental factor of social life. Sabotage is\nmainly concerned with obstructing, by every possible method, the\nregular process of production, thereby demonstrating the determination\nof the workers to give according to what they receive, and no more.\n(Goldman 1913 [1998: 94])\n", "\nGoldman struggled with the question of violence through the course of\nher career. Early on she was a more vocal proponent of revolutionary\nviolence. She began to rethink this later. Nonetheless, like other\nanarchists of her generation, she attributed violence to the state,\nwhich she opposed. She writes:", "\n\n\nI believe that Anarchism is the only philosophy of peace, the only\ntheory of the social relationship that values human life above\neverything else. I know that some Anarchists have committed acts of\nviolence, but it is the terrible economic inequality and great\npolitical injustice that prompt such acts, not Anarchism. Every\ninstitution today rests on violence; our very atmosphere is saturated\nwith it. (Goldman 1913 [1998: 59])\n", "\nGoldman views anarchist violence as merely reactive. In response to\nstate violence, the anarchists often argued that they were merely\nusing violence in self-defense. Another defender of violence is\nMalatesta who wrote that the revolution against the violence of the\nruling class must be violent. He explained:", "\n\n\nI think that a regime which is born of violence and which continues to\nexist by violence cannot be overthrown except by a corresponding and\nproportionate violence. (Malatesta 1925 [2015: 48])\n", "\nLike Goldman, Malatesta warned against violence becoming an end in\nitself and giving way to brutality and ferocity for its own sake. He\nalso described anarchists as preachers of love and advocates of peace.\nHe said,", "\n\n\nwhat distinguishes the anarchists from all others is in fact their\nhorror of violence, their desire and intention to eliminate physical\nviolence from human relations. (Malatesta 1924 [2015: 46])\n", "\nBut despite this rejection of violence, Malatesta advocates violence\nas a necessary evil.", "\nAnarchist violence appears as the violence of an individual against\nthe state. It is easy to see why such violence would be characterized\nas terroristic and criminal. For an individual to declare war against\nthe state and take action to disrupt the state is criminal. And thus\nanarchists have also been interested in a critique of crime and\ncriminality—arguing that it is the law and the legal system that\ncreates and produces crime and criminality. This critique was advanced\nby Kropotkin as early as the 1870s, when he called prisons\n“schools for crime”. Similar ideas are found in Foucault\nand in more recent criticisms of mass incarceration. Contemporary\nanarchists will argue that mass incarceration is an example of state\npower run amok." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Nonviolence, Violence, and Criminality" }, { "content": [ "\nThe question of violence leads us to a further issue: the question of\nobedience, disobedience, resistance, and political obligation. Much\ncould be said here about the nature of political obligation and\nobedience: including whether obedience is merely pragmatic and\nstrategic or based upon notions about loyalty and claims about\nidentification with the nation and its laws. But it is clear that\nanarchists have no principled reason for political obedience. If the\nanarchist views the state as illegitimate, then obedience and\nparticipation are merely a matter of choice, preference, and\npragmatism—and not a matter of loyalty or duty.", "\nChristian anarchists will look, for example, to the case of Jesus and\nhis idea of rendering unto Caesar what is due to Caesar (Matthew\n22:15–22). The anarchist interpretation of this passage claims\nthat this is an indication both of Jesus’s disaffection with the\nstate and with his grudging acquiescence to political authority.\nChristoyannopoulos argues, “Jesus’ political subversion is\ncarried out through submission rather than revolt”\n(Christoyannopoulos 2010: 156). The crucifixion, on this\ninterpretation, is a subversive event, which “unmasks”\npolitical power as “demonic” and illegitimate. Jesus does\nnot recognize the ultimate moral and religious authority of Caesar or\nPilate. But he goes along with the political regime. Thus some\nanarchists may simply be compliant and submissive.", "\nBut politically motivated anarchists encourage resistance to state\npower, including strategic and principled disobedience. Such\ndisobedience could involve symbolic actions—graffiti and the\nlike—or acts of civil resistance, protests, tax resistance and\nso on—up to, and possibly including, sabotage, property crime,\nand outright violence. Again, there is overlap with the discussion of\nviolence here, but let’s set that question aside and focus on\nthe notion of civil disobedience.", "\nOne important example is found in Thoreau, who famously explained his\nact of disobedience by tax resistance as follows:", "\n\n\nIn fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion,\nthough I will still make what use and get what advantage of her I can,\nas is usual in such cases. (Thoreau 1849 [1937: 687])\n", "\nThoreau’s disobedience is principled. He recognizes that a\ndeclaration of war against the state is a criminal act. He willingly\ngoes to jail. But he also admits that he will cooperate with the state\nin other cases—since there is something advantageous about\ncooperation. This indicates the complexity of the question of\ncooperation, protest, and disobedience. Thoreau’s essay,\n“Civil Disobedience” (1849), is often viewed as an\nanarchist manifesto. Kropotkin discussed him as an anarchist\n(Kropotkin 1927 [2002]). And Tolstoy admired his act of civil\ndisobedience—as did Gandhi.", "\nAnarchists continue to discuss strategies and tactics of disobedience.\nOne problem throughout this discussion is the degree to which\ndisobedience is effective. If there were to be successful anarchist\ncampaigns of disobedience they would have to be organized and\nwidespread. Whether such campaigns would actually work to disassemble\nthe state apparatus remains an open question.", "\nUntil their dreamed-of revolution comes, anarchist must consider the\ndegree to which cooperation with the state involves “selling\nout” to the political status quo. Perhaps there are reforms and\nshort-term gains that can be obtained through traditional political\nmeans: voting, lobbying legislators, etc. But anarchists have often\nheld to an all-or-nothing kind of approach to political participation.\nWe noted above that the Christian anarchist Jacques Ellul has said\nthat he does not vote because anarchy implies conscientious objection.\nBut herein lies a strategic conundrum. If progressively minded\nanarchists opt out of the political system, this means that less\nenlightened policies will prevail. By not voting or otherwise engaging\nin ordinary politics, the anarchist ends up with a system that he or\nshe will be even less happy with than if he or she had actively\nparticipated in the system.", "\nThis is, really, a problem of revolution versus reform. The\nrevolutionary wants revolution now, believing that it will occur by\nway of direct action of various sorts. Perhaps the revolutionary is\nalso thinking that the psychological, cultural, and spiritual\nevolution toward revolutionary consciousness can only occur when\ndirect action is taken: in order for anarchism to emerge, the\nanarchist may think, one ought to behave and think like an anarchist.\nBut without a concerted and nation-wide revolution, revolutionary\naction begins to look like mere selfishness, Epicurean opting out, or\nwhat Bookchin criticized as “lifestyle anarchism”.\nMeanwhile those reform-minded folks who work within the system of\npolitical power and legality can end up supporting a system that they\nhave doubts about. This philosophical problem of reform vs. revolution\nexists for all radical political agendas. But the problem is\nespecially acute for anarchists, since anarchism is often an\nall-or-none proposition: if the state is justified then gradualism and\nreformism make sense; but if no state can be justified, then what is\nsometimes called “reformist anarchism” is a non-starter\n(see L. Davis 2012)." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Disobedience, Revolution, and Reform" }, { "content": [ "\nMany anarchists are revolutionaries who want change to be created\nthrough direct action. But given our preceding discussion of violence,\ndisobedience, and the potential for success of revolutionary activity,\nthe question arises about opting-out of political life. The Epicureans\nand Cynics pointed in this direction. The history of anarchism is\nreplete with efforts to construct anarchist communes that are\nindependent and separated from the rest of state centered political\nlife.", "\nWe might pick up the history here with the Christian anarchists and\npacifists of the Reformation: the Mennonites, for example; or the\nQuakers who refused to doff their hats for political authorities and\nwho sought a refuge in Pennsylvania. Indeed, there is an anarchist\nthread to the colonization of North America, as those who were\ndisgruntled with European political and religious hierarchy left for\nthe “new world” or were forced out by the European\nauthorities. In the Seventeenth Century, Anne Hutchinson was cast out\nof the Massachusetts Bay Colony and forced to found a new community,\nwhen she concluded that the idea of government was flawed. Hutchinson\nis considered as one of the first anarchists of North America (see\nStringham 2007). Separatist communities were founded by the New\nEngland abolitionists and transcendentalists, by Josiah Warren, and by\nothers.", "\nAnarchist communes were formed in Europe during the Nineteenth Century\nand in Spain during the 1930s. There have been ongoing movements and\norganizations of indigenous peoples and others who inhabit the margins\nof mainstream political life. In the 1960s and 70s, anarchist\nseparatism was reiterated in the Hippy communes and attempts to live\noff the grid and get back to nature. Alternative communes, squats, and\nspontaneous gatherings continue to occur.", "\nSeparatist communities have to consider: the degree to which they give\nup on anarchist direct action against dominant political forces, the\nextent to which they have to accommodate themselves to political\nreality, and the risk that customary hierarchies will be reinstated\nwithin the commune. For the revolutionary anarchist, separatism is a\nstrategy of avoidance that impedes political action. Separatist\ncommunes must often obey the rules of the dominant political\norganization in order to trade and get connected to the rest of the\nworld. Finally, a complaint made about separatist communes is that\nthey can end up being structured by sexist, classist, and other\nhierarchical organizing principles. One might argue that until the\ndominant culture is revolutionized, separatism will only be a pale\nreflection of the anarchist ideal. And yet, on the other hand,\nadvocates of separatism will argue that the best way for anarchist\nideals to take hold is to demonstrate that they work and to provide an\ninspiration and experimental proving ground for anarchism.", "\nIf revolutionary activity is taken off the table, then anarchists are\nleft with various forms of gradualism and reformism. One way this\nmight occur is through the creation of “temporary autonomous\nzones” such as those described by Bey. Along these lines David\nGraeber provides a description of the cultural and spiritual work that\nwould be required in order to prepare the way for anarchist\nrevolution. Graeber says that this would require “liberation in\nthe imaginary”, by which he means that through activism, utopian\ncommunities, and the like there can be a gradual change in the way\npolitical power is imagined and understood (Graeber 2004).\nRevolutionary anarchists will respond to this by arguing that\nliberation in the imaginary is simply imaginary liberation: without\nactual change in the status quo, oppression and inequality continue to\nbe a problem." ], "subsection_title": "3.3. Utopian Communities and Non-Revolutionary Anarchism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nLet’s conclude by considering some standard objections to\nanarchism and typical replies." ], "section_title": "4. Objections and Replies", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nObjection: This objection holds that anarchism is\nmerely another name for chaos and for a rejection of order. This\nobjection holds that anarchists are violent and destructive and that\nthey are intent on destroying everything, including morality\nitself.", "\nReply: This objection does not seem to recognize that\nanarchists come in many varieties. Many anarchists are also\npacifists—and so do not advocate violent revolution. Many other\nanarchists are firmly committed to moral principles such as autonomy,\nliberty, solidarity, and equality. Some anarchists do take their\ncritique of arché in a nihilistic direction that\ndenies ethical principles. But one can be committed to anarchism,\nwhile advocating for caring communities. Indeed, many of the main\nauthors in the anarchist tradition believed that the state and the\nother hierarchical and authoritarian structures of contemporary\nsociety prevented human flourishing." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Anarchism is Nihilistic and Destructive" }, { "content": [ "\nObjection: This objection holds that anarchism is\ninherently unstable. Hobbes and other early modern social contract\ntheories maintain that the state emerges as a necessary response to\nnatural anarchy which keeps order and protects our interests. A\ndifferent theory comes from Nozick, who argues that the\n“night-watchman state” would emerge out of anarchy by an\ninvisible hand process: as people will exercise their liberty and\npurchase protection from a protection agency, which would eventually\nevolve into something like a minimal state.", "\nReply: Anarchists may argue that the state of nature\nis simply not a state of war and so that Hobbes’s description is\nfalse. Some anarcho-primitivists will argue that things were much\nbetter for human beings in the original state of nature in small\ncommunities living close to the land. Other anarchists might argue\nthat the disadvantages of state organizations—the creation of\nhierarchies, monopolies, inequalities, and the like—simply\noutweigh the benefits of state structures; and that rational agents\nwould choose to remain in anarchy rather than allow the state to\nevolve. Some anarchists may argue that each time a state emerges, it\nwould have to be destroyed. But others will argue that education and\nhuman development (including technological development) would prevent\nthe reemergence of the state." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Anarchy Will Always Evolve Back into the State" }, { "content": [ "\nObjection: This objection holds that there simply is\nno way to destroy or deconstruct the state. So exercises in anarchist\npolitical theory are fruitless. It would be better, from this point of\nview to focus on critiques of hierarchy, inequality, and threats to\nliberty from within liberal or libertarian political theory—and\nto engage in reforms that occur within the status quo and mainstream\npolitical organization.", "\nReply: Ideal theory is always in opposition to\nnon-ideal theory. But utopian speculation can be useful for clarifying\nvalues. Thus philosophical anarchism may be a useful exercise that\nhelps us understand our values and commitment, even though political\nanarchism has no hope of succeeding. Furthermore, there are examples\nof successful anarchist communities on a small local scale (for\nexample, in the separatist communities discussed above). These\nconcrete examples can be viewed as experiments in anarchist theory and\npractice." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Anarchism is Utopian" }, { "content": [ "\nObjection: This objection holds that a political\ntheory that abolishes political structures makes no sense. A related\nconcern arises when anarchism is taken to be a critique of authority\nin every case and in all senses. If anarchists deny then that there\ncan be any arché whatsoever, then the claim\ncontradicts itself: we would have a ruling theory that states that\nthere is no ruling theory. This sort of criticism is related to\nstandard criticisms of relativism and nihilism. Related to this is a\nmore concrete and mundane objection that holds that there can be no\nanarchist movement or collective action, since anarchism is\nconstitutionally opposed to the idea of a movement or collective\n(since under anarchism there can be no authoritative ruler or set of\nrules).", "\nReply: This objection only holds if anarchism is\ntaken to be an all-or-nothing theory of the absolutist variety.\nPolitical anarchists do not necessarily agree with the skeptical\npost-foundationalist critique which holds that there can be no ruling\nprinciple or authority whatsoever. Rather, political anarchists hold\nthat there are legitimate authorities but that political power quickly\nloses its authoritativeness and legitimacy. Furthermore, anarchists\ntend to advocate for a principle and procedure for organization based\nupon voluntarism and mutual aid, as well as unanimity and/or\nconsensus. From this point of view anarchist communities can work very\nwell, provided that they avoid coercive authority. To support this\npoint anarchists will point to historical examples of successful\nanarchist communes. They will also point to ordinary human\nrelations—in families and civil society relationship—which\noperate quite well apart form coercive and hierarchical political\nauthority" ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Anarchism is Incoherent" } ] } ]	[ "Anderson, William C. and Zoé Samudzi, 2017, “The Anarchism\nof Blackness” at The Anarchist Library\n [Anderson and Samudzi 2017 available online]", "Bakunin, Mikhail, 1873 [1990], Statism and Anarchy\n(Gosudarstvennost’ i anarkhii͡a), Marshall S.\nShatz (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 1882/1908 [1910/1970], God and the\nState (Dieu et l’État), New York: Dover\nPublishing.", "Ben-Dor, Oren, 2000, Constitutional Limits and the Public\nSphere: A Critical Study of Bentham’s Constitutionalism,\nOxford: Hart Publishing.", "Bentham, Jeremy, 1843, “Anarchical Fallacies”, in\nThe Works of Jeremy Bentham, Volume 2. 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John, 1980, Moral Principles and Political\nObligations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.", "–––, 1993, On The Edge of Anarchy: Locke,\nConsent, and the Limits of Society, Princeton, NJ: Princeton\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 2001, Justification and Legitimacy:\nEssays on Rights and Obligations, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Stirner, Max, 1844 [1995], The Ego and Its Own (Der\nEinzige und sein Eigentum), David Leopold (ed.), Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press. doi:9780511815959", "Stringham, Edward P., 2007, Anarchy and the Law: The Political\nEconomy of Choice, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.", "Thoreau, Henry David, 1849 [1937], “Civil\nDisobedience” in Walden and Other Writings, Brooks\nAtkinson (ed.), New York: Modern Library, pp. 667–693.", "Tolstoy, Leo, 1894, The Kingdom of God is Within You\n(T͡Sarstvo Bozhie vnutri vas), London: William\nHeinemann.", "Varden, Helga, 2015, “John Locke: Libertarian\nAnarchism”, in Philosophie de la justice/Philosophy of\nJustice, Guttorm Fløistad (ed.), Netherlands: Springer,\npp. 157–176.", "Wolff, Robert Paul, 1970, In Defense of Anarchism, New\nYork: Harper and Row.", "Zerzan, John, 2008, Running on Emptiness: The Pathology of\nCivilization, Port Townsend, WA: Feral House.", "–––, 2012, Future Primitive: Revisited,\nPort Townsend, WA: Feral House." ]	[ { "href": "../authority/", "text": "authority" }, { "href": "../autonomy-moral/", "text": "autonomy: in moral and political philosophy" }, { "href": "../feyerabend/", "text": "Feyerabend, Paul" }, { "href": "../godwin/", "text": "Godwin, William" }, { "href": "../libertarianism/", "text": "libertarianism" }, { "href": "../nozick-political/", "text": "Nozick, Robert: political philosophy" }, { "href": "../pacifism/", "text": "pacifism" }, { "href": "../political-obligation/", "text": "political obligation" }, { "href": "../sovereignty/", "text": "sovereignty" }, { "href": "../max-stirner/", "text": "Stirner, Max" } ]
anaxagoras	Anaxagoras	First published Wed Aug 22, 2007; substantive revision Mon Nov 11, 2019	[ "\n\nAnaxagoras of Clazomenae (a major Greek city of Ionian Asia Minor), a\nGreek philosopher of the 5th century B.C.E. (born ca.\n500–480), was the first of the Presocratic philosophers to live in\nAthens. He propounded a physical theory of\n“everything-in-everything,” and claimed that\nnous (intellect or mind) was the motive cause of the\ncosmos. He was the first to give a correct explanation of eclipses,\nand was both famous and notorious for his scientific theories,\nincluding the claims that the sun is a mass of red-hot metal, that the\nmoon is earthy, and that the stars are fiery stones. Anaxagoras\nmaintained that the original state of the cosmos was a mixture of all\nits ingredients (the basic realities of his system). The ingredients\nare thoroughly mixed, so that no individual ingredient as such is\nevident, but the mixture is not entirely uniform or\nhomogeneous. Although every ingredient is ubiquitous, some ingredients\nare present in higher concentrations than others, and these\nproportions may also vary from place to place (even if they do not do\nso in the original state of the cosmos). The mixture is unlimited in\nextent, and at some point in time it is set into motion by the action\nof nous (intellect). The mixture begins to rotate around some\nsmall point within it, and as the whirling motion proceeds and expands\nthrough the mass, the ingredients in the mixture are shifted and separated\nout (in terms of relative density) and remixed with each other,\nultimately producing the cosmos of apparently separate material masses and\nmaterial objects, with the different properties, that we perceive." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Work", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Metaphysical Principles", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 No Becoming or Passing-Away", "2.2 Everything-in-Everything", "2.3 No Smallest or Largest" ] }, { "content_title": "3. The Physical Principles", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Mixture and Rotation", "3.2 Ingredients and Seeds", "3.3 Mind/Intellect", "3.4 The Principle of Predominance" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Science: The Anaxagorean Cosmos", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Cosmology", "4.2 Meteorology and Geology", "4.3 Other Worlds?" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Knowledge", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Mind/Intellect in Us" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Anaxagoras’ Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Editions and Texts", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nAnaxagoras, son of Hegesibulus (or Eubulus), was a native of\nClazomenae, on the west coast of what is now Turkey. According to\nDiogenes Laertius (see the article on Doxography of Ancient\nPhilosophy) (Diels-Kranz [DK] 59 A1), Anaxagoras came from an\naristocratic and landed family, but abandoned his inheritance to study\nphilosophy. (We do not know how he acquired his philosophical\nlearning). He came to Athens (perhaps about the middle of the\n5th century, perhaps earlier), and was a friend and\nprotégé of Pericles, the Athenian general and political\nleader. There is controversy about his time in Athens; Diogenes\nLaertius says that he came to Athens to study philosophy as a young\nman. Some scholars claim that his arrival was as early as the Persian\ninvasion of 480 (O’Brien 1968, Woodbury 1981, Graham 2006), others\nargue for a later date of about 456 (Mansfeld 1979, see also Mansfeld\n2011 on Aristotle’s evidence; there is a good discussion of the\nproblems about dating Anaxagoras’ life in Sider 2005). It is clear\nfrom their dramas that his work was known to Sophocles, Euripides, and\nperhaps Aeschylus (Seneca suggests in his Natural Questions\n4a.2.17 that they shared Anaxagoras’ view about the source of the\nNile); it was certainly familiar to the comic playwright Aristophanes\n(Curd 2007, Sider 2005; see Mansfeld 1979). He was a resident in the\ncity for at least twenty years; he was said to have been charged with\nimpiety (and perhaps with Medism, political sympathy with the\nPersians), and banished from the city (437/6?). The charges against\nAnaxagoras may have been as much political as religious, because of\nhis close association with Pericles. He retreated to Lampsacus (in the\neastern Hellespont) where he died; ancient reports say that he was\nmuch honored there before and after his death. Democritus, a younger\ncontemporary, dated his own life in relation to Anaxagoras’, saying\nthat he was young in the old age of Anaxagoras (DK59A5); he reportedly\naccused Anaxagoras of plagiarism. Although Anaxagoras lived in Athens\nwhen Socrates was a youth and young adult, there are no reports that\nAnaxagoras and Socrates ever met. In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates\nsays that he heard someone reading from Anaxagoras’ book (probably\nArchelaus, who was, according to Diogenes Laertius, pupil of\nAnaxagoras and teacher of Socrates). Anaxagoras is included in the\nancient lists of those who wrote only one book: in\nthe Apology, Socrates reports that it could be bought for a\ndrachma.", "\n\nAs with all the Presocratics, Anaxagoras’ work survives only in\nfragments quoted by later philosophers and commentators; we also have\ntestimonia about his views in many ancient sources. The standard\ncollection of Presocratic texts (both fragments and testimonia) is\nH. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, in\nwhich Anaxagoras is given the identifying number 59. The Greek text\nand translations can also be found in Gemelli-Marciano, 2007–2010; Graham, 2010; and Laks and Most, 2016a and 2016b. (For discussion\nof the sources for the Presocratics, and problems associated with\nthem, see the article on Presocratic Philosophy.) Any\ndiscussion of Anaxagoras’ views must be a reconstruction that goes\nbeyond the few details that we have in the verbatim quotations, though\ninformed by the evidence of the fragments and testimonia. It should be\nkept in mind in reading the following account that scholars disagree and that other\ninterpretations are possible.", "\n\nAccording to Simplicius, a 6th century C.E. neo-Platonist\ncommentator on Aristotle, and our main source for the fragments,\nAnaxagoras began his book by describing an original state of complete\n(but not entirely uniform) mixture of all the ingredients of the\ncosmos; that mixture is then set in motion by the action of\nMind/Intellect (nous). The ingredients are eternal and always remain in a\nmixture of all with all, yet the rotary motion produces shifts in the\nproportions of the ingredients in a given region. The expanding\nrotation of the original mixture ultimately produces the continuing development\nof the world as we now perceive it. The foundations of his theory,\ndescriptions of this development, and a discussion of nous\nform the bulk of what remains to us of Anaxagoras’ book. The\ntestimonia suggest that the book also included detailed accounts of\nastronomical, meteorological, and geological phenomena as well as more\ndetailed discussions of perception and knowledge, now missing from our\ncollection of fragments, and known only by later reports and criticisms." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Work", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAnaxagoras was influenced by two strains in early Greek\nthought. First, there is the tradition of inquiry into nature founded\nby the Milesians, and carried on by Xenophanes (Mourelatos 2008b) and\nby Heraclitus (Graham 2008). The early Milesian\nscientist-philosophers (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes) sought to\nexplain the cosmos and all its phenomena, by appealing to regularities\nwithin the cosmic system itself, without reference to extra-natural\ncauses or to the personified gods associated with aspects of nature by\ntraditional Greek religion (Graham 2006, Gregory 2007 and 2013). They\nbased their explanations on the observed regular behavior of the\nmaterials that make up the cosmos (see White 2008 on the role of\nobservation and measurement in early Presocratic theories).", "\n\nSecond, there is the influence of Eleatic arguments, due to\nParmenides, concerning the metaphysical requirements for a basic\nexplanatory entity within this Milesian framework, and the\nmetaphysically proper way to go about inquiry (Curd, 2004, 2007; Sisko\n2003; for different views, see Palmer 2009, Sisko 2013). Parmenides\ncan be seen as arguing that any acceptable cosmological account must\nbe rational, i.e., in conformity with the canons for proper inquiry,\nand must begin with metaphysically acceptable entities that are wholly\nand completely what they are; are not subject to generation,\ndestruction, or alteration; and are wholly knowable i.e., graspable by\nthought and understanding (Parmenides B2, B3, B7, B8; see Mourelatos\n2008a). Anaxagoras bases his account of the natural world on three\nprinciples of metaphysics, all of which can be seen as grounded in\nthese Eleatic requirements: No Becoming or Passing-Away, Everything is\nin Everything, and No Smallest or Largest." ], "section_title": "2. Metaphysical Principles", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nA fundamental tenet of Eleatic theory is that what-is-not cannot be\n(Parmenides DK 28 B2). Parmenides, using this claim (see DK 28\nB8.15–16), argued that coming-to-be and passing-away are therefore\nruled out, because genuine coming-to-be is change from what-is-not to\nwhat-is, while destruction is change from what-is to what-is-not.\nThus, says Parmenides, what-is “is without start or stop, since\ncoming to be and passing away have wandered very far away, and true\ntrust drove them out”\n (DK 28 B8.27–28).[1] \n Anaxagoras accepts this principle, explaining apparent generation and\ndestruction by replacing them with mixture and separation (or\ndissociation) of ingredients:", "\n\nThe Greeks do not think correctly about coming-to-be and\npassing-away; for no thing comes to be or passes away, but is mixed\ntogether and dissociated from the things that are. And thus they\nwould be correct to call coming-to-be being mixed together and passing-away\nbeing dissociated. (DK 59 B17)", "\n\nWhat seems to us, through perception, to be generation of new entities or\ndestruction of old ones is not that at all. Rather, objects that\nappear to us to be born, to grow, and to die, are merely arrangements\nand re-arrangements of more metaphysically basic ingredients. The\nmechanism for the apparent coming-to-be is mixing and separating out\nfrom the mixture produced by the vortex motion of the ingredients. Through that mechanism, the real things, the ingredients,\ncan retain their character throughout. When an arrangement breaks\napart (or “passes away”) the ingredients are dissociated\nfrom one another (through separation) and can be re-mixed to form (or\n“become”) different arrangements, i.e., other perceptible\nobjects.", "\n\nOne way to think of Anaxagoras’ point in B17 is that animals,\nplants, human beings, the heavenly bodies, and so on, are natural\nconstructs. They are constructs because they depend\nfor their existence and character on the ingredients of which they are\nconstructed (and the pattern or structure that they acquire in the\nprocess). Yet they are natural because their\nconstruction occurs as one of the processes of nature. Unlike\nhuman-made artifacts (which are similarly constructs of\ningredients), they are not teleologically determined to fulfill some\npurpose. This gives Anaxagoras a two-level metaphysics. Things\nsuch as earth, water, fire, hot, bitter, dark, bone, flesh, stone, or\nwood are metaphysically basic and genuinely real (in the required\nEleatic sense): they are things-that-are. The objects constituted\nby these ingredients are not genuinely real, they are temporary\nmixtures with no autonomous metaphysical status: they are not\nthings-that-are. (The natures of the ingredients, and the\nquestion of what is included as an ingredient, are addressed below; see\n3.2 “Ingredients and Seeds”). This view, that the\ningredients are more real than the objects that they make up, is common\nin Presocratic philosophy, especially in the theories of those thinkers\nwho were influenced by Parmenides’ arguments against the\npossibility of what-is-not and so against genuine coming-to-be and\npassing-away. It can be found in Empedocles, and in the\npre-Platonic atomists, as well as, perhaps, in Plato’s middle\nperiod Theory of Forms (Denyer, 1983, Frede 1985, W.-R. Mann 2000, Silverman\n2002)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 No Becoming or Passing-Away" }, { "content": [ "\n\n\n\n“All things were together.” B1 (in part)\n\n\n\n“In everything there is a share of everything.” B11 (in\npart)\n\n", "\n\nAs we have seen, Anaxagoras’ commitment to Eleatic principles rules\nout the possibility of genuine coming-to-be or passing-away. It also\nrules out real qualitative changes and transformations. When a warm\nliquid cools (it seems) the hot liquid becomes cold; when a child\ningests food (milk and bread, for instance), the milk and bread are\n(it seems) transformed into flesh, blood, and bone. Yet Anaxagoras\nobjects to these claims because they entail that the hot ceases to be,\nand the cold comes to be, in the liquid, and that the bread and milk\nare destroyed while flesh, blood, and bone come to be. His solution is\nto claim not only that “all things were together” in the\noriginal mixture, but that everything is in everything at all\ntimes. If there is already blood and bone in the milk and bread, then\nthe growth of the child can be attributed to the accumulation of these\ningredients from the bread and milk, and their assimilation into the\nsubstance of the child’s body, rather than to the transformation of\nbread and milk into something else. Further, if there are both hot and\ncold in the liquid, there is no disappearance into nothing of the hot\nas the liquid cools, and no generation of the cold from what is not\n(or even from what is not cold). The clearest statement of this is in\nAnaxagoras B10, a quotation found in the following passage:", "\n\nWhen Anaxagoras discovered the old belief that nothing comes from\nthat which is not in any way whatsoever, he did away with coming-to-be,\nand introduced dissociation in place of coming-to-be. For he\nfoolishly said that all things are mixed with each other, but that as\nthey grow they are dissociated. For in the same seminal fluid\nthere are hair, nails, veins and arteries, sinew, and bone, and it\nhappens that they are imperceptible because of the smallness of the\nparts, but when they grow, they gradually are separated off.\n“For how,” he says, “can hair come from what is not\nhair, and flesh from what is not flesh?” He maintained\nthis, not only about bodies, but also about colors. For he said\nthat black is in white and white in black. And he laid down the\nsame thing with respect to weights, believing that light is mixed with\nheavy and vice versa. (DK 59 B10; the passage is from the\nanonymous scholiast on a 4th c. C.E. work of Gregory\nof\n Nazianzus.[2])", "\n\nAlthough interpreters both ancient (including this scholiast and\nSimplicius) and modern (Guthrie 1965 is a good example) have seen\nthe desire to explain nutrition and growth as the primary\nmotivation for adopting the Everything-in-Everything principle, it is more\nlikely that Anaxagoras’ adoption of the general metaphysical\nprinciple of No-Becoming leads him to claim that everything is in\neverything (Schofield 1981, Curd 2007). Nutrition and growth are simply particularly clear instances of the changes\nthat are ruled out as fundamentally real if there is no becoming.", "\n\nThe Everything-in-Everything principle asserts the omnipresence of\ningredients. In everything there is a mixture of all the ingredients\nthat there are: every ingredient is everywhere at all times. This\nprinciple is a fundamental tenet of Anaxagoras’ theory, and leads to\ndifficulties of interpretation (see, for instance, the debate between\nMathews 2002 and 2005 and Sisko 2005). If everything is in everything,\nthere must be interpenetration of ingredients, for it must be possible\nfor there to be many ingredients in the same space. Indeed, the\nprinciple requires that all ingredients be in every space at all times\n(the No Smallest or Largest principle also plays a role here: see\nsect. 2.3). This will allow any ingredient to emerge from a mixture\nthrough accumulation (or, having been unmixed, to become submerged in\none) at any point at any time, and thus allow for the appearance of\ncoming-to-be (or passing-away) of things or qualities.", "\n\nSome scholars have supposed that Anaxagoras thought of these\ningredients as very small particles (Vlastos 1950, Guthrie 1965, Sider\n2005, Lewis 2000). But a particle would have to be a smallest\namount of some type of ingredient, occupying some space all by\nitself—with no other type of ingredient in it. Not only\ndoes the No Smallest or Largest principle rule this out (see sect.\n2.3), but the particulate interpretation seems inconsistent with the\nEverything-in-Everything principle. It is crucial to\nAnaxagoras’ theory that there be (in actuality) no such pure bits\nor volumes of any type of ingredient.", "\n\nInstead one might conceive of the ingredients as fluid, like pastes or\nliquids which can be smeared together, with different areas of the\nmixture characterized by different relative densities of the\ningredients, all of which are nevertheless everywhere in it. Each\ngenuinely real ingredient could be mixed with every other, and so\nwould be contained in any area of the mixture, and in principle\nvisibly recoverable from it by accumulation or increased\nconcentration. The differing densities of the ingredients would allow\nfor differences in the phenomenal character of the mixture. To an\nobserver, different areas would appear hotter or colder, sweeter or\nmore bitter, more red than green, and so on, and rightly so. As the\nrelative concentration of ingredients in any area of the mixture\naltered (through the mixture and separation brought about by the\nrotation of the original blend of ingredients), the phenomenal\ncharacter of that region of the mixture would alter. An\nintriguing account (Marmodoro 2015, 2017) suggests that Anaxagorean\ningredients are not material; rather they are primitive physical\nqualitative powers or dispositions (in the parlance of contemporary\nmetaphysics, they are “gunky”). " ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Everything-in-Everything" }, { "content": [ "\n\nB1’s claim that “all things were together” before the\noriginal rotation occurred does not guarantee the truth of the\nEverything-in-Everything principle. If separation occurs within an\noriginal mixture of everything with everything, as a result of the\nmotion imparted by nous, then it could be that, given enough\ntime, ingredients would be segregated from one another (as they are in\nEmpedocles during the triumph of Strife, when the four roots are\ncompletely separated). Anaxagoras needs to block this, so that he can\nmaintain his commitment to the No Becoming principle. In some region\nthat came by separation to contain, say, nothing but bone, there would\ncome to be pure bone (as a new entity), in replacement for and\ndestruction of the mixture that was previously there. He blocks this\npossibility by claiming that there is no smallest (and no largest). If\nthere is no lower limit on the density of an ingredient, then no\ningredient will be completely removed from any region of the mixture\nthrough the force of the rotary motion caused by\nnous. Here are Anaxagoras’ claims:", "\n\n\n\nNor of the small is there a smallest, but always a smaller (for\nwhat-is cannot not be) — but also of the large there is always a\nlarger. And [the large] is equal to the small in extent\n(plêthos), but in relation to itself each thing is both\nlarge and small.\n (B3[3])\n\n\n\nSince the shares of the large and the small are equal in number, in\nthis way too, all things will be in everything; nor is it possible that\n[anything] be separate, but all things have a share of\neverything. Since it is not possible that there is a least, it\nwould not be possible that [anything] be separated, nor come to be by\nitself, but just as in the beginning, now too all things are together.\n(B6 [in part])\n\n", "\n\nThe passage from B6 makes clear that the “no smallest”\nprinciple is connected to the principle of Everything-in-Everything,\nand B3 asserts that the “no smallest” claim depends on the\nimpossibility of what-is-not. Here is one way to interpret what\nAnaxagoras is saying: if there were a smallest (particle, density,\namount) of any ingredient (call it S), we could in principle\nthrough separation reduce the amount of S in some area of the\nmixture to that smallest, and then induce further separation through\nrotation, which would remove that ingredient from a particular area of\nthe mixture. That would leave some area without “everything\nin everything.” The area would cease to be S to\nany degree and so would be not-S. In that area, the\nexplanation of coming-to-be in terms of emergence from a previous\nmixture would fail. Note that Anaxagoras — like other Greek\nthinkers, including Plato — assumes that anything that is\nmust be something or other and so slides easily between “what is\nnot f” and “what is not” (Furley\n2002).", "\n\nAnaxagoras’ solution is to deny that there is any lower limit\non smallness. Adopting the model of density described above, he\ncan say that there is no lowest degree of density in the mixture.\nThis emphasis on density makes it clear that Anaxagoras’\ntechnical sense of smallness is not one of particle size but of degree\nof submergence or emergence in the mixture. For an ingredient to\nbe small is for there to be a comparatively low density of that\ningredient in a particular area of the mixture in comparison with all\nthe other ingredients (everything else) in that area. The\ncorresponding assertion that there is no upper limit on largeness can\nthen be interpreted as the claim that no matter how emergent from the\nmixture (standing out from the background mixture) an ingredient is, it\ncan become still more emergent. So, no matter how sweet some water\ntastes, there is still some salt in it. The salt in the sample is\nsmall, i.e., submerged in the mixture of water and other ingredients,\nbut there will never cease to be salt in the sample.\nCorrespondingly, no matter how salty another sample is, it can always\nbecome more salty and even “turn to salt” because there is\nno upper limit to the degree of emergence from the background. As\nthe salt emerges, other ingredients will submerge, but will never\ndisappear, so that the wet itself is deeply submerged in the mix, and\nwe are left with an apparently solid block of salt (though that salt\nwill itself contain all other ingredients, with most of them in such\nsmall concentrations that they are completely submerged and not\napparent to an observer). This account of large and small is\nimplied in Schofield 1980, and worked out more fully in Inwood 1986 and\nFurth 1991; it is accepted in Curd 2007; see also Marmodoro 2017." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 No Smallest or Largest" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe Eleatic metaphysics that Anaxagoras accepts shapes the science\nthat he proposes. Anaxagoras offers an ambitious scientific theory that\nattempts to explain the workings of the cosmos, even while accepting\nthe Eleatic ban on coming-to-be and passing-away. His goal is\nscientific knowledge, i.e., understanding, as far as that is possible for human\nbeings." ], "section_title": "3. The Physical Principles", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nThe original state of the cosmos was an unlimited (apeiron)\nmixture of all the ingredients. The mixture of ingredients, all\nwith all, exists eternally. Up to some point in the past, it was\nmotionless (59 B1, A45), and it was everywhere undifferentiated, or\nalmost so. According to B1, which Simplicius, the source for the\nfragment, says was near the beginning of Anaxagoras’ book:", "\n\nAll things were together, unlimited both in amount and in\nsmallness, for the small, too, was unlimited. And because all\nthings were together, nothing was evident on account of smallness; for\nair and aether covered all things, both being unlimited, for these are\nthe greatest among all things both in amount and in largeness.", "\n\nThis undifferentiated mass includes all there is of all the natural\ningredients that there are, the ingredients that will eventually form\nthe natural constructs that constitute the cosmos as we know it.\nNothing is ever added to or subtracted from this storehouse of stuffs,\nalthough the mass of stuffs is not always homogeneous. In fact,\nthere are different densities of ingredients even at this earliest\n(pre-motion) stage. B1 makes clear that air (dark, moist stuff)\nand aether (bright fiery stuff) are the most emergent (largest)\ningredients, and their dominance means that the original mixture must\nhave been like a dense bright cloud: nothing else would be evident or\nmanifest, even had there been an observer. At some point\nnous (the time being right) set the mixture in motion and\ncaused it to begin to revolve (first in a small area, and then in an\never-widening area). The rotary motion causes the ingredients in\nthe mass to shift. This shifting produces what Anaxagoras calls\n“separating off.” Because the mass is a plenum, any\nseparation will be a rearrangement (thus a mixing) of\ningredients. The continouous ever-expanding rotation produces more and\nmore separation. The Everything-in-Everything principle continues\nto hold, so there are all ingredients at all places at all times, but\nthe different densities of ingredients allow for local variations, and\nso the rotating mass becomes qualitatively differentiated." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Mixture and Rotation" }, { "content": [ "\n\nNowhere in the extant fragments does Anaxagoras give a complete list\nof the ingredients in the mixture, or a clear indication of their\nscope, so it is up to commentators to figure out what he meant, given\nthe available evidence. There are three alternatives. First, some\nscholars have held that Anaxagoras limited the basic ingredients to\nthe opposites, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, sweet and bitter,\ndark and light, and so on. It is the opposites that have explanatory\nforce in the theory, and all other things and properties are reducible\nto the opposites. Supporters of this view include Tannery 1886, Burnet\n1930, Cornford 1930, Vlastos 1950, Schofield 1980 (with reservations),\nInwood 1986, Spanu 1987–88, Sedley 2007, and Marmodoro 2015, 2017. On\nthis view all the material stuffs and all the objects in the universe\nwould be natural constructs. At the opposite extreme, a second option\naccepts that literally everything in the natural world is in the\noriginal mixture — opposites, but also natural materials (fire,\nearth, copper, iron, and the like), animals and plants (and their\nparts such as flesh, blood, and bone), and so on. This view makes no\ndistinction between ingredients and what have been called natural\nconstructs above. It can be found in Strang 1963, Stokes 1965, Guthrie\n1965, Barnes 1982, Furth 1991, Graham 1994 and 2004, Lewis\n2000. Finally, there is a middle view, which rejects the\nopposites-only account, and accepts that some things (plants and\nanimals, heavenly bodies) are natural constructs. The original mix\nincludes opposites, but also natural substances like metals and earth,\nand the ingredients of animals, such as flesh, blood, and bone, but no\nwhole physical objects such as plants and animals themselves, or their\norganic parts such as legs and hearts (Curd 2007; this view is\nsuggested in Schofield 1980, 132 ff.).", "\n\nThe “opposites only” view cannot stand (arguments\nagainst it are given in Guthrie 1965 and Graham 2004). B15 may provide\nsome evidence for the view:", "\n\nThe dense and the wet and the cold and the dark came together\nhere, where <the> earth is now; but the rare and the hot and the\ndry <and the bright> moved out to\nthe far reaches of the aether.", "\n\nBut Anaxagoras’ own lists include more than the opposites (see B4a and\nB4b). Further, the Principle of Predominance (in B12, see sect. 3.4)\nwould seem to require more than opposites, since it does not seem to\nsay that each thing is reducible to opposite characteristics that\npredominate, but that each thing gets its character from the\nparticular material ingredients that predominate in it. Further\nevidence against the opposites-only view is found in Aristotle.\nAristotle claims that for Anaxagoras, the elements (the basic\nrealities) are what Aristotle calls the homoiomerous parts (On\nComing to Be and Passing Away I.1 314a18). These are (for\nAristotle) things that are literally “like-parted,” i.e.,\nthey are homogeneous all the way through, like a piece of pure gold,\nrather than being different in their different parts (like a hand),\nand Aristotle lists flesh, blood, bone, and adds “and the others\nof which the part is called by the same name [as the whole].”\nThe term homoiomeries is Aristotelian, and has no role to\nplay in Anaxagoras (Graham 1994, Curd 2007; contra: Sisko\n2009), but it is clear that for Aristotle, the ingredients in an\nAnaxagorean mixture are not just the opposites.", "\n\nIf the attempt to reduce the Anaxagorean ingredients to opposites is\nunsuccessful, so, too, is the interpretation that allows as an\ningredient every kind of thing in the phenomenal world. A minor\npoint is that Anaxagoras surely does not think that artifacts made by\nhuman beings are part of the mixture, and there are other semi-natural\nartifacts as well that would not seem to be present: cheese, bronze,\nwhiskey, for example. More importantly, the wide-scope view fails\nto take seriously B17’s replacement of coming-to-be and\npassing-away with mixture and dissolution. Further, it is unclear\nhow the view can discriminate between an individual and its parts or\ningredients. Are there homunculi of individuals in the original\nmix? (Lewis 2000 accepts this.) If so, how can the theory\nexplain that the growth of an organism is not simply its enlargement\n(by adding ingredients) but also its development? (A\nplant’s leaves may grow larger, but its seed pods develop, and\nare not just an enlargement of a structure that was already present in\nthe seedling plant.) In B4a Anaxagoras refers to the animals and\nhumans “that have been compounded, as many as have soul,”\nand this suggests that B17’s implicit model of living things as\nnatural constructs mixed together from the ingredients that are\ngenuinely real must be taken seriously.", "\n\nIt seems, then, best to interpret Anaxagoras as claiming that all\nthe material ingredients of natural living things and the heavenly\nbodies are present in the original mix, but that these objects\nthemselves are not among the ingredients but are natural constructions,\nproduced by the processes of mixture and separation that we call\nnutrition and growth, or by the rotations of the heavens and the\nattendant clumping together and breaking apart of the ingredients of\nthe stars, clouds, comets, planets, and so on.", "\n\nA problem for any account of the original mixture is Anaxagoras’\nmention of seeds. The word for seeds (spermata) occurs twice\nin the fragments, in lists of ingredients (in B4a and in B4b), but\nAnaxagoras nowhere explains or makes it clear what it means. There are\na number of options: seeds have been taken to be the smallest possible\nbits of ingredients (but, as argued above, there are no smallest bits\nin Anaxagoras’ system), or to be extremely small homunculi-like\ningredients that some interpretations take to be origins for\nAnaxagoras of living things which then expand by the addition of other\ningredients (Lewis 2000). Furley 1976 and 2002 advocates the simplest\ninterpretation, that Anaxagoras simply means biological seeds (but not\nhomunculi), and this seems the best proposal (see also Barnes 1982,\nCurd 2007, Sedley 2007, Marmodoro 2015, 2017, 147–153; Marmodoro also sees seeds as biological, containing pre-existing structures). A seed would then be a biological origin\npoint, and might perhaps be the route through which nous\n(which controls all things that have soul, i.e., anything alive)\nenters a living thing. If a seed is mixed with the right ingredients\nin the right circumstances, a living thing will grow." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Ingredients and Seeds" }, { "content": [ "\n\nAccording to Diogenes Laertius, Anaxagoras acquired the nickname Mr.\nMind (DK 59 A1); his view that the cosmos is controlled by\nnous, mind or intelligence, first attracted and then\ndisappointed Socrates (Plato, Phaedo 97b8ff.). Plato and\nAristotle applauded Anaxagoras for using nous as the\nfirst principle of motion, but both criticized him for failing to be\nconsistent in that use, arguing that once he invoked Mind to set the\noriginal mixture in motion, Anaxagoras reduced later causes to\nmindless mechanism.", "\n\nAnaxagoras is adamant that nous is completely different\nfrom the ingredients that constituted the original mixture. It is the\nonly thing to which the Everything-in-Everything principle does not\napply. Mind is present to some things, but it is not an ingredient or share as\nflesh and blood are ingredients in a dog (B11: “In everything\nthere is a share of everything except nous, but there\nare some things in which nous, too, is\npresent”). In B12 (the longest extant fragment), Anaxagoras\nclaims that if nous were just another ingredient it\ncould neither know nor rule in the way that it does.", "\n\nThe other things have a share of everything, but nous\nis unlimited and self-ruling and has been mixed with no thing, but is\nalone itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but had been\nmixed with anything else, then it would partake of all things, if it\nhad been mixed with anything (for there is a share of everything in\neverything just as I have said before); and the things mixed together\nwith it would thwart it, so that it would control none of the things\nin the way that it in fact does, being alone by itself. For it is the\nfinest of all things and the purest, and indeed it maintains all\ndiscernment about everything and has the greatest strength. (59 B12,\nin part)", "\n\nMind/Intellect plays a number of roles in Anaxagoras’ system. First, it\ninaugurates the rotation of the mass of ingredients; it then controls\nthat rotation, and the local rotations that take place within the\nlarge whirl that is the whole cosmos:", "\n\nNous controlled the whole revolution, so that it\nstarted to revolve in the beginning. First it began to revolve from a\nsmall region, but it is revolving yet more, and it will revolve still\nmore… And whatever sorts of things were going to be, and\nwhatever sorts were and now are not, and as many as are now and\nwhatever sorts will be, all these nous set in\norder. And nous also ordered this revolution, in which\nthe things being separated off now revolve, the stars and the sun and\nthe moon and the air and the aether. This revolution caused them to\nseparate off. (59 B12, in part)", "\n\nNous then is not only first cause, it also, one might\nsay, is the preserver of order in the cosmos, as it maintains the\nrotations that govern all the natural processes. Anaxagoras does not\nexplain how these processes work, or how nous can\naffect the ingredients. But there is a hint of his reasoning in a\ncomment in Aristotle (Metaphysics I.3.984b15):", "\n\nWhen someone said that nous is present — in\nnature just as it is in animals — as the cause of the cosmos and\nof all its order, he appeared as a sober man among the random\nchatterers who preceded him. (We know that Anaxagoras clearly held\nthese views, but Hermotimus of Clazomenae gets the credit for holding\nthem earlier.)", "\n\nJust as we control our bodies by our thoughts, so the cosmos is\ncontrolled by nous; we may be unclear about the\ndetails, but the results are obvious to us. One fundamental point\nabout Anaxagoras’ theory of mind is that he nowhere in the extant\nmaterial identifies mind with a divine principle or god. In fragment\n1018 and in Trojan Women (886), Euripides says that mind is\ngod in each of us, and connects the necessity of the universe with\nZeus and mind, and these claims are thought to have been influenced by\nAnaxagoras’ views. Although later testimonial reports in Aëtius\nand Iamblichus say that Anaxagoras connected nous and\ngod, there are many more reports of his denial of divinity to the\nheavenly bodies and his alleged atheism.", "\n\nNous is the most powerful thing in the cosmos,\ncontrolling the rotation and all ensouled things. Part of that power\nand control lies in its powers of knowledge. Anaxagoras asserts that\nnous has all judgment and discernment about all things;\nmoreover, this knowledge extends to everything that emerges from the\nmixtures and dissociations caused by the original rotation:", "\n\nAnd nous discerned them all: the things that are being mixed\ntogether, the things that are being separated off, and the things that\nare being dissociated. And whatever sorts of things were going to be,\nand whatever sorts were and now are not, and as many as are now and\nwhatever sorts will be, all these nous set in\norder. (B12, in part)", "\n\nThis suggests a beginning of an answer to the objections lodged\nagainst Anaxagoras’ use of nous as a cause. While\nnous is not the teleological and ethical cause for which Socrates was\nsearching in the Phaedo, nous could serve as an\nultimate explanation. Anaxagoras nowhere says that\nnous arranges things in a certain way because it is best for\nthem to be so, or even suggests something like an Aristotelian final\ncause, (although Sedley 2007 argues that exactly this view is implicit\nin the fragments, contra: Graham, 2009, Sisko 2010a). Things are the way\nthey are because that is the way things have unfolded\nsince nous first set everything in motion, and as it\ncontinued to move them. (One might compare this to the role of the\nunmoved mover as the ultimate cause in Aristotle’s universe; despite\nbeing the first cause the unmoved mover does not create.)", "\n\nAnaxagoras links mind and soul in B12: “nous has\ncontrol over all things that have soul, both the larger and the\nsmaller.” This suggests not only that Anaxagoras took the\nactions of humans and animals as the model for how nous\ncontrols the cosmos, but also suggests how nous differs from\nthe other ingredients. He claims that it is the purest and finest of\nall things. Some scholars argue that it is only in Plato that we meet\na genuine notion of the immaterial (Renehan 1980, Sedley 2007), but\nAnaxagoras’ denial that nous is mixed with or partakes of\nother ingredients (while still being in some of them) and his\ninsistence on its fineness and purity may suggest that he is thinking\nof mind as a non-corporeal entity that can pervade and control a body\nor even the whole cosmos without being a material part of it (Curd\n2009). On either interpretation, if\nnous were simply an ordinary ingredient on a par with the\nother basic ingredients, then, as Anaxagoras notes in B12, its relative\nsmallness would allow it to be swamped and overcome\n(“thwarted”) by the other ingredients." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Mind/Intellect" }, { "content": [ "\n\nFragment B12 ends with a further discussion of mixture and separation,\nand Anaxagoras’ enunciation of what has come to be called the\n“Principle of Predominance.” After reasserting that no\ningredient is ever fully dissociated or separated from any other\n(except for nous, which is not an ingredient),\nAnaxagoras adds that all nous is alike (that is, cosmic\nnous and mind in us share the same nature), but\n“Nothing else is like anything else, but each one is and was\nmost manifestly those things of which there are the most in it.”\nThus, something is hot, if hot predominates over the cold in it, flesh\nif flesh predominates over other ingredients, and so on. The principle\ndoes not claim that there is any single predominating ingredient at\neach place in the mixture. Rather, the predominance seems to be along\nnumerous lines of possibility: more flesh than blood, more hot than\ncold, more red than green, and so on (Furley 2002). This need not\nmean that there is more humanity than doghood in a human being (indeed\nit could not mean this, on the account advanced in this article, which\nrules out dogs and humans as Anaxagorean ingredients). Rather, to be a\nhuman being is to have a certain set of predominant characteristics\narranged in a certain way (that arrangement may be the work of soul\n— perhaps nous — in a living thing).", "\n\nA problem for the Principle of Predominance is to determine what it is\nto be a predominant ingredient, especially given the\nEverything-in-Everything and No Smallest principles. A classic example\nis the following: the gold in this gold ring is that discontinuous\npart of the total mixture in which gold predominates. But now, as\nStrang says, “Consider the gold which predominates as an\ningredient: does it also, like the original piece of gold, contain\nwithin it an admixture of all other substances? If so, it is gold\nbecause gold predominates in it as an ingredient; and we can ask the\nsame question about the ingredient of the ingredient, and so on ad\ninfinitum” (Strang 1963, 101; see also Cornford\n1930). Because there can be no pure gold (there is no pure anything),\nit becomes difficult to see what the gold could be that predominates\nin anything. But if I cannot determine what predominates in it, I\ncannot determine what anything is.", "\n\nStrang 1963 proposes a solution to the problem. While acknowledging\nthat there can never be pure instances of any ingredient in actuality,\nthere could be such instances in analysis. I can analyze mixtures and\ndetermine predominant ingredients, but I will never be able to produce\na pure instance of such an ingredient. The problem here is how this\nwould be worked out, and why I can be certain that there are such\nnatures (as we might call them). Anaxagoras suggests two\nthings. First, in B12 he stresses that nous has the\npower to know and understand all the ingredients (indeed cosmic\nnous apparently knew all this before the rotation began; see\nquotation above). Second, in B21 and B21a he suggests how\nhuman nous (nous in us) can come to such an\nunderstanding by relying on sense perception but moving beyond it in\nthought (see sect. 5. Knowledge). Finally, because the ingredients are\ngenuinely basic entities in the sense required to ground a rational\ncosmology in the Eleatic sense, they must be stable natures in the\nParmenidean sense (for a related account, see Marmodoro\n2015). Anaxagoras is committed to the arguments that ground Eleatic\nmetaphysics; thus he can claim an a priori reason to think\nthat the ingredients can be knowable in the sense required by the\nPrinciple of Predominance. His epistemological view that humans can\nreach understanding through beginning with sense experience then fits\nwith these metaphysical commitments." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 The Principle of Predominance" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAnaxagoras gave a complete account of the universe: of the heavens,\nthe earth, and geological and meteorological phenomena. The accounts\nof the action of nous and the original rotation and its\nconsequences appear in the fragments: B9 describes the force and\nvelocity of the rotation, B12 and 13 explain the beginning of the\nrotation and the subsequent breaking up and remixing of the mass of\ningredients, while B15 and 16 specify the cosmological consequences of\nthe continued rotation (Curd 2007 and 2008, Graham 2006, Gregory\n2007). Most of the other information comes from the testimonia, but\nthere is enough in the remaining fragments to make it clear that\neverything is ultimately explained by the great rotation set in motion\nby nous. Further, and intriguingly, Anaxagoras claims that\nthe cosmic rotary motion could produce other worlds like our own." ], "section_title": "4. Science: The Anaxagorean Cosmos", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nThe rotation of the mixture begins in a small area, and then spreads\nout through the mass (B12). As the extent of the mixture is unlimited\n(or infinite, apeiron), the rotation and expansion will\ncontinue forever, bringing more and more ingredients into the whirl (a\nsummary of the process is in Gregory 2007). The force and speed of the\nrotation is (according to B9) much faster at the edges, where the\nexpanding rotation meets the as-yet-unmoved mass of ingredients: what\nwe perceive of the rotation (probably the motions of the heavens) is\nmuch slower than the unobserved rotation. The force is enough to pull\napart and rearrange the ingredients:", "\n\nWhen nous began to move [things], there was separation\noff from the multitude that was being moved, and whatever\nnous moved, all this was dissociated; and as things\nwere being moved and dissociated, the revolution made them dissociate\nmuch more. (B13)", "\n\nThere are two sorts of dissociation. First, as the rotation enters the\nas-yet-unmoved mass of ingredients, that mass begins to break up and\nthe ingredients start to shift in their concentrations. This causes\nthe original arrangement of ingredients to break up and begin to be\nrearranged. Because the mixture is a plenum, any separation is at the\nsame time a rearrangement of ingredients. Then, those new\nrearrangements are themselves subject to further break-up and further\nrearrangement. Anaxagoras indicates this in the fragments by using\ndifferent terms for different stages in the process (although he is\nnot completely consistent in these uses). Normally, he uses the notion\nof being separated off (forms of the verb apokrinesthai) for the\ninitial breaking apart of the mass. Re-arrangements are referred to as\nmixing (summisgesthai) or compacting\n(sumpêgnusthai). He also uses “joining\ntogether” (proskrinesthai) as a contrast to the\nseparating off process (apokrinesthai) in B4a and B4b. When,\nin B17, he claims that passing-away is really dissociation, he uses\nthe word diakrinesthai. This is a later stage than the\nearliest separations off of B1. The primary terms are compound forms\nof the verb krinein, to distinguish. The word can also mean\n“to judge” or “to determine,” and through the\nuse of these compound terms, Anaxagoras reminds his readers that all\nof the changes are ultimately traceable to the action of\nnous, or Mind, that sets the mass moving in the first\ninstance.", "\n\nOver time, the rotation throws lighter ingredients towards the edges\nof the whirl and pushes the heavier ones to the center (B15), thus\nputting more dark and heavy ingredients like earth in the center and\nthrowing air and aether (fire) away from the center. This gives the\ntraditional Greek picture of our Earth (itself a mixture of all\ningredients, with earth and heavy ores and minerals predominating)\ncovered (in many places) by water, with air and the fiery reaches of\nthe heavens.", "\n\nThe sun is a mass of fiery metal, and the moon is an earthy lump\n(with no light of its own). The same rotation ultimately produces\nthe stars and planets as well. Sometimes the force of the\nrotation snatches up stones from the surface of the Earth and spins\nthem around the Earth as they gradually rise higher through the force\nof the rotation. Until these bodies are high enough, they remain\nunseen between the Earth and the moon and so sometimes intervene to\nprevent heavenly bodies from being seen by terrestrial observers.\nThe force and shaking of the rotation can cause slippage, and so\nsometimes a star (a flaming mass of rock and iron) is thrown downwards\ntoward the earth as a meteor (such as the one Anaxagoras is supposed to\nhave predicted at Aegospotami; see Galzerano 2019). The fullest account of\nAnaxagoras’ view on meteors can be found in Plutarch’s\nLife of Lysander 12 (59 A12). Anaxagoras is also credited\nwith discovering the causes of eclipses — the interposition of\nanother body between earth and the sun or the moon: sometimes he\ncredits this to the “unseen bodies” mentioned above (see\nGraham and Hintz, 2007, Graham 2013a and 2013b, Taub 2003). According\nto the ancient sources (see esp. A1 and A42), Anaxagoras also gave\nexplanations for the light of the Milky Way, the formation of comets,\nthe inclination of the heavens, the solstices, and the composition of\nthe moon and stars." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Cosmology" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe rotation begun by nous ultimately affects phenomena\non the earth and above the surface of the earth. Anaxagoras claims\nthat the earth is flat, rests on air, and remains where it is because\nof its size (A42; a number of geological and meteorological views\nattributed to Anaxagoras were also apparently held by Anaximenes;\nwhether this is because Anaxagoras was following Anaximenes or because\nthe commentators conflate the two is unclear). Despite the manner of\nits formation, the earth is stationary, not spinning. The (relative)\nflatness of the earth allows water to spread over the earth, with\nmountains and plains rising above the level of the water. The levels\nchange as water is evaporated or added by rain, and as water that has\nbeen trapped in the earth by the rotation makes its way out through\nrivers to the sea. Because the air under the earth is also moving\n(pushed along by the cosmic rotation), it sometimes gets caught up in\nthe crevices of the earthy stuff. When this air cannot make its way\nout, the force of the moving air causes earthquakes. Anaxagoras seems\ndetermined to explain everything. The extant sources report views on\nthunder and lightning, the source of the Nile, the first correct\naccount of the nature of hail, and inquiry into why the sea is\nsalty. He also offered accounts of sense perception and made\ninquiries into embryology." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Meteorology and Geology" }, { "content": [ "\n\nOne of the more curious aspects of Anaxagoras’ theory is hinted\nat in B4a:", "\n\nSince these things are so, it is right to think that there are many\ndifferent things present in everything that is being combined, and\nseeds of all things, having all sorts of forms, colors, and flavors,\nand that humans and also the other animals were compounded, as many as\nhave soul. Also that there are cities that have been constructed\nby humans and works made, just as with us, and that there are a sun and\na moon and other heavenly bodies for them, just as with us, and the\nearth grows many different things for them, the most valuable of which\nthey gather together into their household and use. I have said\nthis about the separation off, because there would be separation off\nnot only for us but also elsewhere.", "\n\nWhere is the “elsewhere” where there would also be\nseparation off, and where there are sun and moon “for them, just\nas with us”? Surprisingly, no ancient sources discuss this\n(although Simplicius, who quotes the fragment, is clearly puzzled by\nit, and argues for a neo-Platonic metaphysical interpretation). Modern\ncommentators have suggested that the other worlds are on the moon\nand/or other planets (Jöhrens 1939, Zeller 1923), elsewhere on\nthe face of our Earth (Cornford, 1934), or even contained within\nourselves (and all other things) so that there are infinite worlds\nwithin worlds (Mansfeld 1980, Schofield 1996, Sisko 2003). There is\nalso the possibility that Anaxagoras has no commitment to the reality\nof these other worlds, but is simply engaging in a thought experiment\nto show how the rotation would work (Fränkel 1969, Vlastos 1975,\nSchofield 1996). There may be another possibility (Curd 2007). The\nunlimited rotation begins in a small area and expands indefinitely,\npulling more and more of the unlimited mass of as-yet-unmixed\ningredients into the whirl. Such an action could produce smaller local\nrotations within the larger whirl (especially at the expanding edges,\nas in the rotations of hurricane winds) and there, too, separation,\nmixture, and dissociation would occur. Such processes would result in\nthe formation of systems like our own. This is not a\nthought-experiment on Anaxagoras’ part, but a commitment to the\nlaw-likeness of the rotations controlled by\nnous, and an awareness that similar processes will\nproduce similar phenomena. Our world-system is not unique in the\nuniverse, although there is but one universe (constituted by the\nentire limitless mass of ingredients)." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Other Worlds?" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nBoth ancient and modern critics have complained that Anaxagoras is\nunclear about the nature of nous (Mind/Intelligence) and its\nrole in his theory (Laks 1993, 2002; Lesher 1995). In B12 Anaxagoras\nclaims that\nnous has all discernment, and that nous “knew\nthem all: the things that are being mixed together, the things that\nare being separated off, and the things that are being\ndissociated.” Further, Anaxagoras remarks that there is\nnous in many things, and that it is alike in all the\nthings that it is in, both large and small (presumably those with\nsoul, i.e., living things). Aristotle says that Anaxagoras conflates\nsoul and mind, and B12 seems to confirm this, insofar as Anaxagoras\nthere treats nous primarily as a mover, yet also says\nthat it controls all things that have soul. It seems likely that in\nthings other than cosmic nous, those compacted or\nmixed-together natural constructs that have soul, the powers of\nnous include both knowing and perceiving. Nowhere do we have\nan analysis of the process of thinking for Anaxagoras, and although\nAristotle and Theophrastus say that earlier thinkers identified\nthinking and sense perception, there is little evidence for this view\nin Anaxagoras (Laks 1999, Warren 2007).", "\n\nIt seems clear that if nous is to have all discernment and\nto order the cosmos, it must have some knowledge of the contents of the\noriginal mixture (Lesher 1995, Curd 2004). Further, if the\ningredients are fundamentally real things they must have stable and\nknowable natures. (This follows from Parmenides’ arguments\nabout the connection between what-is and what is knowable.) Thus,\nthere is a match between the natures of the ingredients and the\ncognitive power of cosmic nous, but Anaxagoras leaves the\nmechanism unexplained. It seems likely that cosmic nous\njust has a direct intellectual grasp of these nature and acts in\naccordance with that knowledge." ], "section_title": "5. Knowledge", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nOnly a few fragments and testimonia discuss Anaxagoras’\nviews on perception and knowledge in living things. Aristotle and\nTheophrastus give us some account of his theory of perception, saying,\nmost surprisingly, that for Anaxagoras all sensation is accompanied by\ndiscomfort or pain (A92). Theophrastus links this to\nAnaxagoras’ belief that like is perceived by unlike; on\nTheophrastus’ view, perception is via touch, and unlike things\nproduce some irritation when touched. Theophrastus adduces loud noises\nand very bright light as producers of pain in perceivers, and suggests\nthat the mechanism is the same in all cases of sensation. Some\nirritation will be below the level of awareness for most perceivers,\nwhich is why humans do not normally feel pain when\nperceiving (see Warren 2007 for a good discussion of Anaxagoras on perception).", "\n\nWhat is the relation between perception and knowledge?\nAnaxagoras does not claim that perception alone is sufficient for\nknowing; nor does he seem to embrace skepticism. Sextus\nEmpiricus, always on the lookout for arguments for and against any\ndogmatic position, gives us most of the evidence for Anaxagoras’\nviews. Says Sextus, of the skeptic’s methodology, “We\nset what is thought in opposition to what appears, as Anaxagoras set\nthe appearance that snow is white in opposition to the claim that snow\nis frozen water, water is black, and therefore snow is black”\n(A97; but see the passage from Cicero in the same testimonium).\nHere Anaxagoras accepts that snow seems to us to be white, but claims\nthat the reality must be that snow is black. The evidence of the\nsenses must be corrected by what we know through thought. In B21,\nAnaxagoras recognizes the weakness of the senses (“Owing to\nfeebleness [of the senses], we are not able to determine the\ntruth”), but in B21a he accepts that sense perception can be a\nstep towards understanding: “appearances are a sight of the\nunseen.” This follows from his own theory, for the evidence\nof our own control of our bodies by our minds, the facts of nutrition\nand growth, and the local revolutions of the heavens are evidence for\nthe workings of cosmic nous, the No-Becoming principle, and\nthe great cosmic revolution. Like other Presocratics, Anaxagoras\nleaves us with no detailed account of how knowledge derives from\nperception through the refinements of thought: Anaxagoras’\naccount can be compared with that of Democritus, where the relation of\nsense-perception and thought is similar and similarly unexplained." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Mind in Us" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nReportedly the first of the Presocratic philosophers to settle\nin Athens, Anaxagoras was a significant figure, not only for later\nphilosophical thinkers, but also for the wider civic culture of his\ntime. He was clearly an important influence on Pericles.\nPlutarch reports:", "\n\nBut Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was the one who most associated with\nPericles and who most bestowed on him that dignity and wisdom more\nweighty than demagoguery, and on the whole raised up and exalted the\nworthiness of his character …These are not the only advantages\nthat Pericles enjoyed because of his connection with Anaxagoras. It\nseems that Pericles rose above superstition, that attitude of\nastonishment about celestial occurrences which is produced in those\nwho are ignorant about the causes of things and who are crazed by\ndivinity and divine interventions because of their inexperience in\nthese areas. Natural philosophy substitutes for festering superstition\nthat unshaken piety that is attended by good hopes. (A15,\nA16)", "\n\nThat naturalism appears in the dramas of Euripides, who is often\ndescribed as a pupil of Anaxagoras, and in the comedies of\nAristophanes, who satirizes the views of Anaxagoras as well as the\nfigure of Socrates in Clouds. Anaxagoras’ theory\nof the floods of the Nile was known to Herodotus (and may be referred\nto in Aeschylus). Despite stories that they did not get along,\nthere are signs of influence of Anaxagoras on Democritus (in his\naccounts of perception and knowledge) and Anaxagoras’ scientific\nclaims and discoveries affected all the thinkers of his time.\nOnce his views about meteors, hail, and eclipses became known, such\ntopics were always included in scientific accounts of astronomical and\nmeteorological phenomena. In the testimonia, Anaxagoras’\neven temperament was taken as a model of good behavior, and he was\nfamous as a prognosticator of everything from meteor falls to rain\nshowers. ", "\n\nAnaxagoras’ views appear among Socrates’ survey of\nprevious naturalistic theories of explanation (Phaedo 96a6\nff.). More ominously, Meletus seems to have attributed Anaxagoras’\nclaims about the earthy nature of the moon and stars to Socrates at his\ntrial (see Plato’s Apology 26e7ff., 59 A35). Although\nAnaxagoras’ alleged indictment for impiety was probably as much political\nas a sign of his danger to public religion (attacking Anaxagoras was an\nindirect attack on Pericles), he was seen as important and influential\nenough to qualify to some as an enemy of the polis.", "\n\nPhilosophically, Anaxagoras’ theories were also widely known and\ninfluential. Some scholars have thought that the author of the Derveni\nPapyrus (found in Northern Greece) was familiar with Anaxagoras’\ntheories (Betegh 2004; Kouremenos et al. 2006), and once he introduced\nMind as a cause, other thinkers followed him. Diogenes of Apollonia\nclaimed that air (as mind and god) directs all things. Zeno of Elea\n(perhaps) and Melissus (certainly) criticize his theory. Anaxagoras’\nview that “each one is and was most manifestly those things of\nwhich there are the most in it” (the principle of Predominance)\nis echoed in Plato’s claims that sensible things acquire their\ncharacters and names from the Forms in which they participate\n(Phaedo 102a10 ff.). Plato even adopts Anaxagoras’ language\nof sharing or participating in (see Furley 2002), and like Anaxagoras’ nous,\nPlatonic forms are “themselves by themselves” in being\nself-explanatory (see Herrmann, 2007). Aristotle, although impatient\nwith the gaps in Anaxagoras’ account of nous, expresses\nadmiration for his recognition that mind has a role to play in guiding\nthe cosmos, and he treats Anaxagoras’ explanation of eclipses as a\nmodel of scientific explanation." ], "section_title": "6. Anaxagoras’ Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Diels, H. and W. Kranz, eds., 1974, Die Fragmente der\nVorsokratiker. Three Vols. Reprint of Sixth Edition, Berlin:\nWeidmann.", "Curd, P., 2007, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments. Text and\nTranslation with Notes and Essays, Toronto: University of Toronto\nPress.", "Gemelli Marciano, L.M., 2007–2010, Die Vorsokratiker 3 volumes. Düsseldorf and Mannheim: Artemis and Winkler.", "Graham, D. W., 2010, The Texts of the Early Greek\nPhilosophers: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the\nMajor Presocratics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Jöhrens, O., 1939, Die Fragmente des Anaxagoras,\nBochum-Langendreer: Heinrich Pöppinghaus.", "Laks, A. and Most, G. 2016a, Les débuts de la philosophie. Des premiers penseurs Grecs à Socrate, Paris: Fayard.", "–––, 2016b, Early Greek Philosophy 9 volumes. Cambridge MA, London: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press.", "Lanza, D., 1966, Anassagora: Testimonianze e Frammenti,\nFlorence: La Nuova Italia.", "Schaubach, E., 1827, Anaxagorae Clazomenii Fragmenta quae\nsupersunt omnia, Leipzig, 1827.", "Sider, D., 2005, The Fragments of Anaxagoras: Edited with an\nIntroduction and Commentary. Second Edition, Sankt Augustin:\nAcademia Verlag.", "Althoff, J., 2012, “Presocratic Discourse in Poetry and Prose: The case of Empedocles and Anaxagoras,“ Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 43: 293–299.", "Barnes, J., 1982, The Presocratic Philosophers, London:\nRoutledge.", "Betegh, G., 2004, The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology,\nand Interpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Burnet, J., 1930, Early Greek Philosophy (4th ed.),\nLondon: Adam and Charles Black.", "Cornford, F. M., 1930, “Anaxagoras’ Theory of\nMatter,” Classical Quarterly, 24: 14–30; 83–95.", "–––, 1934, “Innumerable Worlds in\nPresocratic Philosophy,” Classical Quarterly, 28:\n1–16.", "Curd, P., 2004, The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and\nLater Presocratic Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press,\n1998; rev. edn. Las Vegas: Parmenides Press.", "–––, 2008, “Anaxagoras and the Theory of\nEverything,” in Curd and Graham, 2008, 230–249.", "–––, 2009, “Thought and Body in Heraclitus\nand Anaxagoras,” in G. Guertler and W. Wians, Proceedings of\nthe Boston Area Collquium in Ancient Philosophy, Leiden: Brill:\n1–20; 39–41.", "Curd, P. and D. H. Graham (eds.), 2008, The Oxford\nHandbook of Presocratic Philosophy, New York: Oxford University\nPress.", "Denyer, N.C., 1983, “Plato’s Theory of Stuffs,”\nPhilosophy, 58: 315–27.", "Fränkel, H., 1969, Wege und Formen\nfrühgriechischen Denkens, Munich: C. H. Beck,\n3rd Edition.", "Frede, M., 1985, “Substance in Aristotle’s\nMetaphysics,” in A. Gotthelf, ed. Aristotle on Nature and\nLiving Things, Pittsburgh, PA: Mathesis: 17–26.", "Furley, D. J., 1976, “Anaxagoras in Response to\nParmenides,” in New Essays in Plato and the\nPre-Socratics, R. A. Shiner, J. King-Farlow, eds., Canadian\nJournal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 2: 61–85.", "–––, 2002, “Anaxagoras, Plato, and the\nNaming of Parts,” in Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in\nHonour of A. P. D. Mourelatos, ed. V. Caston and D. Graham,\nAldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.: 119–126.", "Furth, M., 1991, “A ‘Philosophical Hero?’\nAnaxagoras and the Eleatics,” Oxford Studies in Ancient\nPhilosophy, 9: 95–129.", "Galzerano, M., 2019, “Aristotle against Anaxagoras?” Philologus, 163(1): 150–155.", "Graham, D. W., 1994, “The Postulates of Anaxagoras,”\nApeiron, 27: 77–121.", "–––, 1999, “Empedocles and Anaxagoras:\nResponses to Parmenides,” in Long, 1999: 159–180.", "–––, 2002, “La lumière de la lune\ndans la pensée grecque archaïque,” in Laks and\nLouget (eds.): 351–380.", "–––, 2004, “Was Anaxagoras a\nReductionist?” Ancient Philosophy, 24: 1–18.", "–––, 2006, Explaining the Cosmos: The Ionian\nTradition of Scientific Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 2009, Review of Sedley 2007, Ancient\nPhilosophy, 29: 423–27.", "–––, 2013a, “Anaxagoras and the Comet,” Ancient Philosophy 33 (1): 1–18.", "–––, 2013b, “Anaxagoras: Science and\nSpeculation in the Golden Age,” in Early Greek Philosophy:\nThe Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason, ed. J. McCoy,\nWashington DC: The Catholic University Press of America:\n139–156.", "–––, 2013c, Science Before Socrates:\nParmenides, Anaxagoras, and the New Astronomy, Oxford and New\nYork: Oxford University Press.", "Graham, D. W. and E. Hintz, 2007, “Anaxagoras and the Solar\nEclipse of 478 BC,” Apeiron, 40: 319–44.", "Gregory, A., 2007, Ancient Greek Cosmogony, London: Duckworth.", "–––, 2013, The Presocratics and the\nSupernatural: Magic, Science, and Philosophy in Early Greece,\nLondon: Bloomsbury.", "Guthrie, W.K.C., 1965, A History of Greek Philosophy,\nVol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Herrmann, H.-G., 2007, Words and Ideas, Swansea: The\nClassical Press of Wales.", "Inwood, B., 1986, “Anaxagoras and Infinite Divisibility,”\nIllinois Classical Studies, 11: 17–33.", "Kouremenos, Theokritos, George M. Parássoglou, Kyriakos\nTsantsanoglou, 2006, The Derveni Papyrus. Edited with Introduction\nand Commentary. Studi e testi per il “Corpus dei papiri\nfilosofici greci e latini”, vol. 13, Florence: Casa Editrice Leo\nS. 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(ed.), 1999, The Cambridge Companion to Early\nGreek Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Louguet, C. 2002, “Note sur le fragment B4a d’Anaxagore:\nPourquoi les autres mondes doivent-ils être semblables au\nnotre?” in Laks and Louguet (eds.), 2002: 497–530", "–––, 2013a, “Anaxagore: Analogie, Proportion, Identité,”, Philosophie Antique 13: 117–145.", "–––, 2013b, “L’Anaxagore de Diego Lanza: Quelques Réflexions,”, in P. Rousseau and S. Cottone (eds.), Diego Lanza, Lecteur des ouvres de l’Antiquité: Poésie, Philosophie, Histoire de Philologie, Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion: 51–84.", "Macé, A., 2011, “Une Science Athénienne de la Nature. La Promesse et les Testament d’Anaxagore”, Méthexis, 24: 21–43.", "Mann, W.-R., 2000, The Discovery of Things: Aristotle’s\nCategories and their Context, Princeton: Princeton University\nPress.", "Mansfeld, J., 1979, “The Chronology of Anaxagoras’ Athenian\nPeriod and the Date of his Trial” Part I: “The Length and\nDating of the Athenian Period,” Mnemosyne, 32:\n39–69.", "–––, 1980, “Anaxagoras’ Other\nWorld,” Phronesis, 25: 1–4.", "–––, 2011, “Aristotle on Anaxagoras in\nRelation to Empedocles,” Philologus, 155: 361–66.", "Marmodoro, A., 2015, “Anaxagoras’s Qualitative\nGunk,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy,\n23: 402–422.", "–––, 2017, Everything in Everything: Anaxagoras’s Metaphysics, New York: Oxford University Press.", "Matthews, G., 2002, “On the Idea of There Being Something of\nEverything in Everything,” Analysis, 62: 1–4.", "–––, 2005, “Anaxagoras\nRe-Defended,“ Ancient Philosophy, 25: 245–46.", "Mourelatos, A. P. D., 2008a, The Route of Parmenides, New\nHaven: Yale, 1970; revised and expanded edition, Las Vegas: Parmenides\nPublishing.", "–––, 2008b, “The Cloud-Astrophysics\nof Xenophanes and Ionian Material Monism,” in Curd and Graham,\n2008: 134–168.", "O’Brien, D., 1968, “The Relation of Anaxagoras and\nEmpedocles,” Journal of Hellenic Studies, 88:\n93–113.", "Palmer, J. A., 2009, Parmenides and Presocratic\nPhilosophy, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.", "Renehan, R., 1980, “On the Greek Origins of the Concepts of\nIncorporeality and Immateriality”, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine\nStudies, 21: 105–138.", "Schofield, M., 1975, “Doxographica Anaxagorea,”\nHermes, 103: 1–24.", "–––, 1980. An Essay on\nAnaxagoras, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 1996, “Anaxagoras’ Other World\nRevisited,” in K. Algra, P. Van der Horst, and D. T. Runia,\neds. Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of\nAncient Philosophy, Leiden: Brill: 3–20.", "Sedley, D., 2007, Creationism and its Critics, Berkeley:\nUniversity of California Press.", "Silverman, A., 2002, The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of\nPlato’s Metaphysics, Princeton: Princeton University\nPress.", "Sisko, J., 2003, “Anaxagoras’ Parmenidean Cosmology: Worlds\nwithin Worlds within the One,” Apeiron, 26:\n87–114.", "–––, 2005, “Anaxagoras and Recursive\nRefinement,” Ancient Philosophy, 25: 239–245.", "–––, 2009, “On the Question of\nHomoeomreity in Anaxagorean Physics,” Apeiron, 42:\n89–103.", "–––, 2010a, “Anaxagoras Betwixt Parmenides\nand Plato,” Philosophy Compass, 5/6: 432–442.", "–––, 2010b, “Anaxagoras on Matter, Motion,\nand Multiple Worlds,” Philosophy Compass, 5/6:\n443–454.", " –––, 2013, “Anaxagoras and Empedocles in\nthe Shadow of Elea,” The Routledge Companion to Ancient\nPhilosophy, eds. J. Warren and F. Sheffield, London:\nRoutledge: 49–64. ", "Spanu, H., 1987–88, “Inhalt und Form der Theorie von\nAnaxagoras,” Archaiognosia, 5: 11–19.", "Stokes, M. C., 1965, “On Anaxagoras,” Archiv\nfür Geschichte der Philosophie, 47: “Part I:\nAnaxagoras’ Theory of Matter,” 1–19; “Part II: The Order\nof Cosmogony,” 217–250.", "Strang, C., 1963, “The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras,”\nArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 45: 101–118.", "Taub, L., 2003, Ancient Meteorology, London and New York:\nRoutledge.", "Tannery, P., 1886, “La Théorie de la Matière\nd’Anaxagore,” Revue Philosophique, 22:\n255–274.", "Therme, A.-L. and Macé, A., 2013 “Anaxagore et Homère? Trier les Moutons, Trier les Hommes, Trier l’Univers,” in M.-L. Desclos and F. Fronterotta (eds.), La Sagesse Présocratique. 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Furley (eds.), London: Routledge and\nKegan Paul: 354–60.", "Warren, J., 2007, “Anaxagoras on Perception, Pleasure, and\nPain,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33:\n19–54.", "White, S., 2008, “Milesian Measures,” in Curd and\nGraham, 2008: 89–133.", "Woodbury, L, 1981, “Anaxagoras and Athens,”\nPhoenix, 35: 295–315.", "Zeller, E. 1923, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer\nGeschichtlichen Entwicklung, W. Nestle (ed.), Seventh Edition,\nLeipzig." ]	[ { "href": "../democritus/", "text": "Democritus" }, { "href": "../doxography-ancient/", "text": "doxography of ancient philosophy" }, { "href": "../empedocles/", "text": "Empedocles" }, { "href": "../parmenides/", "text": "Parmenides" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../presocratics/", "text": "Presocratic Philosophy" }, { "href": "../ancient-soul/", "text": "soul, ancient theories of" }, { "href": "../zeno-elea/", "text": "Zeno of Elea" } ]
pyrrho	Pyrrho	First published Mon Aug 5, 2002; substantive revision Thu Sep 15, 2022	[ "\nPyrrho was the starting-point for a philosophical movement known as\nPyrrhonism that flourished beginning several centuries after his own\ntime. This later Pyrrhonism was one of the two major traditions of\nsceptical thought in the Greco-Roman world (the other being located in\nPlato’s Academy during much of the Hellenistic period). Perhaps\nthe central question about Pyrrho is whether or to what extent he\nhimself was a sceptic in the later Pyrrhonist mold. The later\nPyrrhonists claimed inspiration from him; and, as we shall see, there\nis undeniably some basis for this. But it does not follow that\nPyrrho’s philosophy was identical to that of this later\nmovement, or even that the later Pyrrhonists thought that it was\nidentical; the claims of indebtedness that are expressed by or\nattributed to members of the later Pyrrhonist tradition are broad and\ngeneral in character (and in Sextus Empiricus’ case notably\ncautious—see Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.7), and do not in\nthemselves point to any particular reconstruction of Pyrrho’s\nthought. It is necessary, therefore, to focus on the meager evidence\nbearing explicitly upon Pyrrho’s own ideas and attitudes. How we\nread this evidence will also, of course, affect our conception of\nPyrrho’s relations with his own philosophical contemporaries and\npredecessors." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Ancient Sources and the Nature of the Evidence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. The Aristocles Passage", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Other Reports on Pyrrho’s General Approach", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Reports on Pyrrho’s Demeanor and Lifestyle", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. “The Nature of the Divine and the Good”", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Influences on Pyrrho", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Pyrrho’s Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Ancient Texts", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nPyrrho appears to have lived from around 365–360 BCE until\naround 275–270 BCE (for the evidence see von Fritz (1963), 90).\nWe have several reports of philosophers from whom he learned, the most\nsignificant (and the most reliable) of which concern his association\nwith Anaxarchus of Abdera. Alongside Anaxarchus (and several other\nphilosophers) he allegedly accompanied Alexander the Great on his\nexpedition to India. We are told that in the course of this expedition\nhe encountered some “naked wise men”\n(gumnosophistai); Diogenes Laertius (9.61) claims that his\nphilosophy developed as a result of this meeting, but it is not clear\nwhat basis, if any, he has for this assertion. In any case, after his\nreturn to Greece Pyrrho did espouse a philosophy that attracted\nnumerous followers, of whom the most important was Timon of Phlius.\nThe travel writer Pausanias reports (6.24.5) seeing a statue of him in\nthe marketplace in Pyrrho’s home town of Elis in the\nPeloponnese; Diogenes also reports (9.64) that he was made high\npriest, and that in his honor philosophers were made exempt from city\ntaxation. While Pausanias’ report is easier to accept at face\nvalue than Diogenes’, both suggest that (at least locally) he\nachieved considerable celebrity. However, there is no good reason to\nbelieve that a Pyrrhonist ‘movement’ continued beyond his\nown immediate followers; it was not until the first century BCE that\nPyrrhonism became the name of an ongoing philosophical tradition." ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWith the exception of poetry allegedly written while on\nAlexander’s expedition (which, as far as we can tell, did not\nsurvive that expedition), Pyrrho wrote nothing; we are therefore\nobliged to try to reconstruct his philosophy from reports by others.\nUnfortunately the reports that we have are fragmentary and, in many\ncases, of doubtful reliability. Pyrrho’s follower Timon wrote\nnumerous poems and prose works; but of these only fragments and in\nsome cases second-hand reports survive. It is likely that much of what\nwe hear about Pyrrho in later sources also derives indirectly from\nTimon, but it is frequently not possible to judge, in individual\ncases, whether or not this is so. Other difficulties concerning\nTimon’s evidence are, first, that he writes as a devotee rather\nthan as a neutral reporter, and second, that the great majority of\nTimon’s fragments derive from a poem called Silloi\n(Lampoons), and consist of satirical thumbnail sketches of\nother philosophers rather than any kind of direct exposition of\nPyrrho’s outlook. (See the entry on Timon, section 2, for\ndetails.) Nevertheless, Timon is clearly the most important and\nthe most trustworthy source of information about Pyrrho. Of the\nevidence from Timon, one piece looks to be especially important.\nThis is a summary, by the Peripatetic Aristocles of Messene (late 1st\nc. BCE), of an account by Timon of what appear to\nbe Pyrrho’s most general philosophical attitudes. It is\nwidely agreed that this passage must be the centerpiece of any\ninterpretation of Pyrrho’s philosophy. However, its usefulness\nfor this purpose depends in part on how much of it is actually talking\nabout Pyrrho’s attitudes, as opposed to Timon’s own\ndevelopments or expansions of them. As we shall see, this is one of\nmany difficulties in interpreting the passage.", "\nWith the exception of a very few snippets of information, the only\nother source of evidence on Pyrrho that is close to contemporary is\nAntigonus of Carystus, a biographer of the mid-third century BCE.\nDiogenes Laertius, whose life of Pyrrho is our major source of\nbiographical anecdotes, frequently cites Antigonus, and is probably\nindebted to him in many places even when he does not cite him;\nAntigonus is also mentioned by Aristocles, and is likely to be the\norigin of much or even most of the surviving biographical material on\nPyrrho. But Antigonus needs to be handled even more carefully than\nTimon. He was not a philosopher, and there is no reason to think that\nhe was capable of or particularly interested in comprehending\nphilosophical nuances. Nor is it clear that accuracy was high on his\nlist of priorities; on the contrary, what we know about him suggests\nthat he was a purveyor of sensationalist gossip rather than a reliable\nhistorian. His account probably did contain genuine information about\nPyrrho’s demeanor and activities; but it would certainly be\nunwise to take his anecdotes as a group on trust.", "\nCicero refers to Pyrrho about ten times, and Cicero is, in general, a\nresponsible reporter of other people’s views. Unfortunately his\ninformation about Pyrrho appears to be very incomplete, and, as we\nshall see, the impression he conveys of him may very well be\ninaccurate. With one exception, he never mentions him except in\nconjunction with the famously non-orthodox Stoics Aristo and\n(sometimes) Herillus, and the remarks in question always concern the\nsame one or two points in ethics; it looks as if his knowledge of\nPyrrho derives almost entirely from a single source that conveyed\nlittle or nothing about Pyrrho individually. In addition, a number of\nauthors in later antiquity make isolated comments about Pyrrho. But\nsince these comments postdate the rise of the later Pyrrhonist\nmovement, there is often room for suspicion as to whether they reflect\ngenuine information about Pyrrho himself, as opposed to the later\nphilosophy that took his name.", "\nEven given the difficulty referred to above, any attempt to interpret\nPyrrho’s philosophy must pay close attention to the summary of\nTimon in Aristocles. If the entire passage is summarizing the\nviews of Pyrrho (as Timon understood them), it clearly takes\nprecedence, in detail and trustworthiness, over the remaining\nevidence — pace Green (2017), who proposes a more holistic\napproach. If, on the other hand, much of the passage conveys the views\nof Timon, and only part of it the views of Pyrrho, the holistic\napproach has more to recommend it, despite the paucity of the\nremaining evidence. Even on this assumption, however, the Aristocles\npassage remains as important as anything else, and to this we now\nturn." ], "section_title": "2. Ancient Sources and the Nature of the Evidence", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nA word, first, about the provenance and evidential value of the\nAristocles passage. Several chapters from book 8 of Aristocles’\nPeri philosophias (On Philosophy) appear in\nquotation in the Praeparatio evangelica of Eusebius, the\nfourth-century bishop of Caesarea. These chapters expound, and then\nattack from an Aristotelian perspective, a number of philosophies that\nimpugn the reliability of one or other of our cognitive faculties.\nAmong these Aristocles counts Pyrrhonism, as represented by Pyrrho\nhimself and by the initiator of the later Pyrrhonist tradition,\nAenesidemus; Aristocles speaks of Aenesidemus (first century BCE,\nq.v.), as recent, and is apparently not aware of any subsequent\nmembers of the Pyrrhonist tradition. The chapter on Pyrrhonism opens\nwith a brief summary of the early Pyrrhonist outlook, as reported by\nTimon, who refers to Pyrrho (14.18.1–5).", "\nThis convoluted transmission might lead one to doubt how much\nauthentic information can be extracted from the passage. But there is\nno reason, first, to doubt Eusebius’ explicit claim to be\nquoting Aristocles verbatim. Aristocles is not quoting Timon verbatim;\nsome of the vocabulary in this passage is clearly reminiscent of\nAristocles’ own vocabulary in other chapters. However, other\nterms in the passage are quite distinct both from Aristocles’\nown normal usage and from any of the terminology familiar to us from\nlater Pyrrhonism, yet were in use prior to Timon’s day; it seems\neasiest to account for these as authentic reproductions of\nTimon’s own language. In addition, the frequent mention of Timon\neither by name or by the word phêsi, ‘he\nsays’, suggests that Aristocles is taking pains to reproduce the\nessentials of his account as faithfully as possible. And finally,\nAristocles’ other chapters, where we are in a position to check\nhis summaries against other evidence of the views being summarized,\nsuggest that he is in general a reliable reporter of other\npeople’s views, even views to which he himself is strongly\nopposed—or at least, that he is reliable when he has access to\nsystematic written expositions of those views, as seems to be the case\nhere. As for Timon’s reliability as a source for Pyrrho’s\nviews, we cannot be sure, but we cannot do better; he is clearly\ncloser to Pyrrho than any other source who discusses him.\nHowever, as already noted, there is a further question concerning how\nfar the passage is a report of Pyrrho’s ideas and how far it gives\nus Timon’s creative development of them.", "\nEven aside from that question, the interpretation of the\nAristocles passage is fraught with controversy. It follows that the\ncharacter of Pyrrho’s thinking is, at its very core, a matter\nfor sharp disagreement. The present survey will begin by assuming that\nthe passage is all about Pyrrho, laying out the two main\nalternatives (given this assumption) and exploring the\nconsequences of each. (Numerous other readings besides these two have\nbeen proposed; in particular, the interpretation of Svavarsson (2004)\nis an intriguing, though arguably unstable, hybrid of the two. But it\nis fair to say that these two are the ones that have commanded by far\nthe most scholarly attention.) It will then explain why some scholars\nhave questioned this assumption, and what difference this would\nmake to our understanding of Pyrrho and of Timon’s\nrelation to him. First, then, on the assumption that the whole\npassage is Timon’s summary of Pyrrho’s thought:", "\nTimon is reported as telling us that in order to be happy, one must\npay attention to three connected questions: first, what are things\nlike by nature? second, how should we be disposed towards things\n(given our answer to the first question)? and third, what will be the\noutcome for those who adopt the disposition recommended in the answer\nto the second question? And the passage then gives us answers to\neach of the three questions in order.", "\nThe answer to the question “what are things like by\nnature?” is given by a sequence of three epithets; things are\nsaid to be adiaphora and astathmêta and\nanepikrita. Taken by themselves, these epithets can be\nunderstood in two importantly different ways: they may be taken as\ncharacterizing how things are (by nature) in themselves, or they may\nbe taken as commenting on human beings’ lack (by our nature) of\ncognitive access to things. Adiaphora is normally translated\n‘indifferent’. But this might be taken as referring either\nto an intrinsic characteristic of things—namely that, in\nthemselves and by nature, they possess no differentiating features\n— or to our natural inability to discern any such features. In\nthe latter case ‘undifferentiable’ might be a more\nperspicuous translation. (Beckwith (2011) plausibly connects the focus\non differentiating features, or the lack of them, with the\nAristotelian notion of differentiae; on either of the readings to be\nexplored, Aristotle’s picture of the world and of our ability to\nunderstand it would indeed be a prime example of the kind of view from\nwhich Pyrrho is anxious to distance himself.) Similarly,\nastathmêta might mean ‘unstable’ or\n‘unbalanced’, describing an objective property of things;\nor it might mean ‘not subject to being placed on a\nbalance’, and hence ‘unmeasurable’, which would\nagain place the focus on our cognitive inabilities. And\nanepikrita might mean ‘indeterminate’, referring\nto an objective lack of any definite features, or\n‘indeterminable’, pointing to an inability on our part to\ndetermine the features of things. The statement as a whole, then, is\neither answering the question “what are things like by\nnature?” by stating that things are, in their very nature,\nindefinite or indeterminate in various ways — the precise nature\nof the thesis would be a matter for further speculation—or by\nstating that we human beings are not in a position to pin down or\ndetermine the nature of things. Let us call these the metaphysical and\nthe epistemological interpretations respectively.", "\nIt is clear that the metaphysical interpretation gives us a Pyrrho who\nis not in any recognizable sense a sceptic. Pyrrho, on this\ninterpretation, is issuing a declaration about the nature of things in\nthemselves—precisely what the later Pyrrhonists who called\nthemselves sceptics were careful to avoid. On the epistemological\ninterpretation, on the other hand, Pyrrho is very much closer to the\ntradition that took his name. There is still some distance between\nthem. To say that we cannot determine the nature of things\n— as opposed to saying that we have so far failed to determine\nthe natural features of things—is already a departure from the\nsceptical suspension of judgement promoted by Sextus Empiricus. And to\nput it, as on this reading Pyrrho does put it, by saying that\nthings are indeterminable, is a further departure, in that it\ndoes attribute at least one feature to things in themselves —\nnamely, being such that humans cannot determine them. Nevertheless,\nthe epistemological interpretation clearly portrays Pyrrho as a\nforerunner—a naive and unsophisticated forerunner, perhaps\n— of later Pyrrhonist scepticism, whereas the metaphysical\ninterpretation puts him in a substantially different light.", "\nThe natural way to try to choose between these two interpretations is\nto see which of them fits best with the logic of the passage as a\nwhole. Unfortunately, a neutral decision on this does not seem be\npossible. According to the manuscripts, the phrase that\nfollows the words we have been discussing reads “for\nthis reason (dia touto) neither our sensations nor our\nopinions tell the truth or lie”. On the metaphysical\ninterpretation, the idea would be that, since things are in\ntheir real nature indeterminate, our sensations and opinions, which\nrepresent things as having certain determinate features, are neither\ntrue nor false. They are not true, since reality is not the way they\npresent it as being. It might then seem that they are false. But\nif reality is indeterminate because it is constantly changing\n(as the sensible world is sometimes portrayed, for example, in Plato),\nthen one might say that our perceptions of the fleeting, temporary\nfeatures of things are not simply false. Because these\nfeatures are temporary and fleeting, they do not belong to the real\nnature of things, so the perceptions do not qualify as\ntrue; but (assuming our senses are functioning normally) they are\nfeatures the things do actually manifest on particular occasions.", "\nAs for the epistemological interpretation, some scholars have\nsuggested that the manuscripts are in error at this point, and that\nwhat the text should say is “on account of the fact\nthat (dia to) neither our sensations nor our opinions\ntell the truth or lie”. The change is justified on linguistic\ngrounds; it is alleged that the text in the manuscripts as they stand\nis not acceptable Greek. The considerations for and against this\nproposal are technical, and debate has yielded no consensus on this\nquestion. However, it is clear that if one does make this small\nalteration to the text, the direction of the inference is reversed;\nthe point about our sensations and opinions now becomes a reason for\nthe point about the nature of things, not an inference from it. And\nthis, it has been argued, points towards the epistemological\ninterpretation. The idea would then be that, since our sensations and\nopinions fail to be consistent deliverers of true reports (or, for\nthat matter, false reports) about the world around us, there is no\nprospect of our being able to determine the nature of things. However,\neven if we retain the manuscript text, the epistemological reading may\nstill be possible (so Green (2017)). The idea would be that, in order\nfor our sensations and opinions to tell the truth or lie, they would\nhave to do two things: 1) present an appearance of things and 2)\npresent this appearance as how things really are. But since\nwe are not able to determine the latter (as we were just told in the\nstatement about the nature of things), our sensations and opinions\ncannot do this; they can only register appearances, and that is not\nenough for them to tell either truths or falsehoods.", "\nThe immediate inference from the statement about the nature of things,\nthen, is not decisive. And the remainder of the Aristocles\npassage can be also read so as to fit with either the\nmetaphysical or the epistemological reading of his answer to the\nquestion about the nature of things. The Aristocles passage continues\nwith the answer to the second question, namely the question of the\nattitude we should adopt given the answer to the first question. We\nare told, first, that we should not trust our sensations and opinions,\nbut should adopt an unopinionated attitude. On the epistemological\nreading, the significance of this is obvious. But on the metaphysical\nreading, too, we have already been told that our sensations and\nopinions are not true, which is presumably reason enough for us not to\ntrust them; and the unopinionated attitude that is here recommended\nmay be understood as one in which one refrains from positing any\ndefinite characteristics as inherent in the nature of\nthings—given that their real nature is wholly indefinite. (To\nthe objection that this thesis of indefiniteness is itself an opinion,\nit may be replied that doxa, ‘opinion’, is\nregularly used in earlier Greek philosophy, especially in Parmenides\nand Plato, to refer to those opinions—misguided opinions, in the\nview of these authors—that take on trust a view of the world as\nconforming more or less to the way it appears in ordinary experience.\nIn this usage, the claim that reality is indefinite would not be a\n(mere) opinion, but would be a statement of the truth.)", "\nThe passage now introduces a certain form of speech that is supposed\nto reflect this unopinionated attitude. We are supposed to say\n“about each single thing that it no more is than is not or both\nis and is not or neither is nor is not”. There are a number of\nintricate questions about the exact relations between the various\nparts of this complicated utterance, and especially about the role and\nsignificance of the ‘both’ and ‘neither’\ncomponents. But it is clear that this too is susceptible of being read\nalong the lines of either of the two interpretations introduced above.\nOn the metaphysical interpretation, we are being asked to adopt a form\nof words that reflects the utter indefiniteness of the way things are;\nwe should not say of anything that it is any particular way\nany more than that it is not that way (with ‘is’\nbeing understood, as commonly in Greek philosophy, as shorthand for\n‘is F’, where F stands for any arbitrary\npredicate). On the epistemological interpretation, we are being asked\nto use a manner of speaking that expresses our suspension of judgement\nabout how things are. Sextus Empiricus specifically tells us that\n‘no more’ (ou mallon) is a term used by the\nsceptics to express suspension of judgement, and its occurrence in the\nAristocles passage can be taken as an early example of the same type\nof usage.", "\nFinally, in answer to the third question, we are told that the result\nfor those who adopt the unopinionated attitude just recommended is\nfirst aphasia and then ataraxia. Ataraxia,\n‘freedom from worry’, is familiar to us from later\nPyrrhonism; this is said by the later Pyrrhonists to be the result of\nthe suspension of judgement that they claimed to be able to induce.\nThe precise sense of aphasia is less clear. Beckwith (2011)\nactually argues that the transmitted text is erroneous, and that we\nshould instead read apatheia, “lack of passion”.\nThis is an attractive suggestion; apatheia is indeed a term\nused not infrequently of Pyrrho’s untroubled attitude (see\nsection 5), whereas a reference to aphasia would be\nunparalleled in the other evidence on Pyrrho. However, the proposal is\ninevitably speculative, and aphasia is a term in use in later\nPyrrhonism; it seems worth trying to elucidate it on the assumption\nthat the transmitted text is correct. It might mean\n‘non-assertion’, as in Sextus—that is, a refusal to\ncommit oneself to definite alternatives; or it might mean, more\nliterally, ‘speechlessness’, which could in turn be taken\nto be an initial reaction of stunned silence to the radical position\nwith which one has been presented (an uncomfortable reaction that is\nsubsequently replaced by ataraxia—the passage does say\nthat aphasia comes first and ataraxia comes later).\nBut the decision between these two ways of understanding the term is\nindependent of the broader interpretive issues bearing upon the\npassage as a whole. For some form of ‘non-assertion’ is\nclearly licensed by either the metaphysical or the epistemological\ninterpretation; and on either interpretation, the view proposed might\nindeed render someone (initially) uncomfortable to the point of\n‘speechlessness’. The important point, though, is that\nataraxia is the end result; and this links back to the\nintroductory remark to the effect that the train of thought to be\nsummarized has the effect of making one happy.", "\nWe have, then, two major possibilities. On the one hand, Pyrrho can be\nread as advancing a sweeping metaphysical thesis, that things are in\ntheir real nature indefinite or indeterminate, and encouraging us to\nembrace the consequences of that thesis by refusing to attribute any\ndefinite features to things (at least, as belonging to their real\nnature) and by refusing to accept at face value (again, as revelatory\nof the real nature of things) those myriad aspects of our ordinary\nexperience that represent things as having certain definite features.\nOr, on the other hand, Pyrrho can be read as declaring that the nature\nof things is inaccessible to us, and encouraging us to withdraw our\ntrust (and to speak in such a way as to express our withdrawal of\ntrust) in ordinary experience as a guide to the nature of things. As\nnoted earlier, the second, epistemological interpretation makes\nPyrrho’s outlook a great deal closer to that of the later\nPyrrhonists who took him as an inspiration. But that is not in itself\nany reason for favoring this interpretation over the other,\nmetaphysical one. For on either interpretation Pyrrho is said to\npromise ataraxia, the later Pyrrhonists’ goal, and to\npromise it as a result of a certain kind of withdrawal of\ntrust in the veracity of our everyday impressions of things; the\nconnection between these two points aligns Pyrrho with the later\nPyrrhonists, and sets him apart from every other Greek philosophical\nmovement that preceded later Pyrrhonism. The fact that this later\nsceptical tradition took Pyrrho as an inspiration is therefore readily\nunderstandable whichever of the two interpretations is correct (or\nwhichever they thought was correct). It is also true that, on the\nmetaphysical interpretation of the passage, the grounds on which\nPyrrho advanced his metaphysical thesis of indeterminacy are never\nspecified; this too, like the precise character of the thesis itself,\nmust be a matter for speculative reconstruction. But Aristocles only\npurports to be giving the key points of Timon’s summary; the\nlack of detail, though disappointing, would not be surprising.", "\nSo far we have assumed that the Aristocles passage is supposed to\nrepresent the thought of Pyrrho. But, as noted earlier, some scholars\nhave questioned that assumption (see especially Brunschwig\n(1994), Marchand (2018)). Their reason is that there is only one place\nin the Aristocles passage that reads “Timon says that Pyrrho says\n…”; this is the threefold statement about the nature of things.\nElsewhere Aristocles says “Timon says”, but nowhere else are we\nspecifically told that Timon is conveying the thought of Pyrrho.\nAdmittedly Aristocles introduces Pyrrho as one of those who question\nour ability to know things, but he may have thought that Timon’s own\n(written) ideas are the closest we can get to Pyrrho’s (unwritten)\nideas. Hence it is not obvious that anything beyond the threefold\nstatement about the nature of things should actually be attributed to\nPyrrho himself. Of course, when Aristocles says “Timon says”, he\nmay have meant this as short for “Timon says Pyrrho says”,\nbut he may also have intended to distinguish between the contributions\nof Pyrrho and of Timon.", "\nIf we limit Pyrrho’s contribution in this way, what difference does it\nmake? There is still the question whether the statement about the\nnature of things is about how things are in themselves or about\nour inability to grasp them. But in this case, all the mention of\nsensations and opinions, of their truth or falsehood, and of what we\nshould say belongs to Timon, not to Pyrrho. And this opens the\npossibility that the main philosophical outlook expressed in the\nAristocles passage, whether one reads it metaphysically or\nepistemologically, is Timon’s construction, building on a single idea\nof Pyrrho’s that may have been rather less broad in scope or ambitious\nin character. In particular, as we shall see, much of the other\nevidence on Pyrrho seems to depict him as focused on questions of\nvalue, questioning our characterizations of things as good or bad\nand doubting whether our views on such matters are stable or\nreliable. His statement of the “indifferent” nature of things, as\nreported in the Aristocles passage, may also have been of an\nevaluative kind: things do not really — or, we cannot tell\nwhether things really — have the positive or negative evaluative\nqualities we accord them." ], "section_title": "3. The Aristocles Passage", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe other evidence bearing upon Pyrrho’s central philosophical\nattitudes does nothing to settle the dispute between these various\npossible interpretations of the Aristocles passage. A number of texts\nexplicitly or implicitly represent Pyrrho’s outlook as\nessentially identical to the sceptical outlook of the later\nPyrrhonists. However, all of these texts postdate the rise of later\nPyrrhonism itself, and none of them contains anything like the level\nof detail of the Aristocles passage; there is no particular reason to\nsuppose that any of them represents a genuine understanding of Pyrrho\nas distinct from the later Pyrrhonists. There are also a few texts\nthat appear to offer a picture of Pyrrho’s thought that is\ncongenial to the metaphysical interpretation. The most significant of\nthese is a passage from near the beginning of Diogenes Laertius’\nlife of Pyrrho (9.61); Pyrrho, we are told, “said that nothing\nis either fine or ignoble or just or unjust; and similarly in all\ncases that nothing is the case in reality (mêden einai\ntêi alêtheiai), but that human beings do everything\nby convention and habit; for each thing is no more this than\nthat”. This looks as if it is attributing to Pyrrho a\nmetaphysical thesis, and a thesis according to which things have no\ndefinite features; it does not seem to be portraying Pyrrho as an\nadvocate of suspension of judgement. However, the passage is\nundoubtedly in some way confused. For immediately beforehand we are\ntold that Pyrrho was the one who initiated the type of philosophy\nconsisting of “inapprehensibility and suspension of\njudgement”, which sounds epistemic; and the previously quoted\npassage is then cited as confirmation of this. In addition, while\n“nothing is the case in reality” and “each thing is\nno more this than that” sound wholly general, Diogenes’\nexamples are all in the domain of values, which ties in with the\npossibility that Pyrrho’s statement about the nature of things,\nin the Aristocles passage, was only about values and that most of that\npassage represents Timon’s views rather than\nPyrrho’s. This passage of Diogenes, then, cannot be used as\nsupport for any particular understanding of Pyrrho." ], "section_title": "4. Other Reports on Pyrrho’s General Approach", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nMost of the remaining evidence about Pyrrho has to do with his\npractical attitudes and behavior. There are a number of biographical\nanecdotes, and there are a few fragments of Timon that purport to\ndepict Pyrrho’s state of mind. Some of the biographical\nanecdotes are clearly polemical inventions. For example, Diogenes\n(9.62) reports Antigonus as saying that Pyrrho’s lack of trust\nin his senses led him to ignore precipices, oncoming wagons and\ndangerous dogs, and that his friends had to follow him around to\nprotect him from these various everyday hazards. But he then reports\nthe dissenting verdict of Aenesidemus, according to which Pyrrho was\nperfectly capable of conducting himself in a sensible manner. This\nreflects a longstanding ancient dispute as to whether it is possible\nto live if one radically abandons common-sense attitudes to the world.\nAntigonus has transformed a hostile criticism of Pyrrho—that, if\none really were to adopt the attitudes he recommends, one\nwould be unable consistently to live as a sane human being\n— into an account of how Pyrrho actually did act; but there is\nno reason to take this seriously as biography. (It does, however,\nraise the question of what it means to mistrust the senses—as\nthe Aristocles passage tells us that either Timon or Pyrrho\ndid—if this is to be consistent with self-preservation in\none’s ordinary behavior; we shall return to this point at the\nend of this section.)", "\nBut there are many other anecdotes, preserved in Diogenes and\nelsewhere, that cannot be dismissed in this fashion. The dominant\nimpression they convey as a group is of an extraordinary impassivity\nor imperturbability; with rare exceptions (which he himself is\nportrayed as regretting), Pyrrho is depicted as maintaining his calm\nand untroubled attitude no matter what happens to him. (The exceptions\nhave led Pyrrho’s outlook to be labeled\n“aspirationalism”; see Ribeiro (2022). But while his\nattainment of tranquility was admittedly not perfect, the picture we\nget is of someone who was truly exceptional in this respect.) This\nextends even to extreme physical pain—he is reported not to have\nflinched when subjected to the horrific techniques of ancient\nsurgery—but it also encompasses dangers such as being on a ship\nin a storm. (This is not to say that he did not avoid such troubles if\nhe could, as suggested by the apocryphal stories mentioned in the\nprevious paragraph; it is just to say that he did not lose his\ncomposure in the face of life’s inevitable hardships.) There is\nanother aspect to this untroubled attitude as well. In numerous\nanecdotes Pyrrho is shown as unconcerned with adhering to the normal\nconventions of society; he wanders off for days on end by himself, and\nhe performs tasks that would normally be left to social inferiors,\nsuch as housework and even washing a pig. Here, too, the suggestion is\nthat he does not care about things that ordinary people do care about\n— in this case, the disapproval of others. (The passage from\nDiogenes quoted in the previous section, according to which Pyrrho\nheld “that human beings do everything by convention and\nhabit” is not necessarily in conflict with this; by ‘human\nbeings’ Pyrrho might have meant ordinary human beings,\namong whom he would not have included himself.)", "\nThe fragments of Timon also emphasize Pyrrho’s exceptional\ntranquility, and add a further, more philosophical dimension to it.\nSeveral fragments suggest that this tranquility results from his not\nengaging in theoretical inquiry like other philosophers, and with his\nnot engaging in debate with those philosophers. Other thinkers are\nperturbed by their need to discover how the universe works, and their\nneed to prevail in arguments with their rivals; Pyrrho is unconcerned\nabout any of this.", "\nClearly it would be foolish to accept every detail of this composite\naccount. Timon’s picture is no doubt idealized, and the\nbiographical material surely includes a measure of embellishment.\nCollectively, however, these fragments and anecdotes add up to a\nhighly consistent portrait; it does not seem overconfident to take\nthis at least as reflecting an ideal towards which Pyrrho strived, and\nwhich he achieved to a sufficient degree to have attracted notice.", "\nWhat connections can be drawn between this portrait of Pyrrho’s\ndemeanor and the philosophy expounded in the Aristocles passage? What\nwe have here, plainly, is a fuller specification of the\nataraxia that the Aristocles passage promised as the outcome\nof the process of responding in the recommended way to the three\nquestions. (And it confirms that, even if the process of reaching\nataraxia, as explained in the Aristocles passage, was largely\nTimon’s rather than Pyrrho’s, the ideal of\nataraxia itself was one to which Pyrrho adhered.) But\nwhy should thinking as Pyrrho did, according to that passage,\nyield ataraxia, and why should this outcome take the specific\nform suggested by the material discussed in this section? Now is a\nconvenient point to address these questions (as we did not do in\ninitially examining the Aristocles passage). We may distinguish the\noverall emotional tranquility depicted in the biographical material\nand the particular tranquility, derived from the avoidance of\ntheoretical inquiry, that is emphasized in the fragments of Timon.", "\nThe most obvious explanation for the overall emotional tranquility\nwould seem to be along the following lines. If one adopts the position\nrecommended in the Aristocles passage, one will not hold any\ndefinite beliefs, about any object or state of affairs, to the effect\nthat the object or state of affairs really is good, or valuable, or\nworth seeking—or, on the other hand, bad or to be avoided. (This\nwill be true on either the metaphysical or the epistemological\ninterpretations of the Aristocles passage, and it will be true of\nPyrrho, given his answer to the first question, even if the rest is\nTimon’s development.) Hence one will attach far less importance to the\nattainment or the avoidance of any particular objects, or the\noccurrence or non-occurrence of any particular state of affairs, than\none would if one thought that these things really did have some kind\nof positive or negative value; nothing will matter to one to anything\nlike the same extent as it matters to most people. If this is on the\nright lines, then Pyrrho’s route to ataraxia closely\nresembles the one described in several places by Sextus Empiricus\n(PH 1.25–30, 3.235–8, M\n11.110–67); the account I have given is in fact modeled after\nSextus’ explanation of how suspension of judgement produces\nataraxia. Indeed, it is difficult to see how else the process\nis to be reconstructed. One difference, however, between the practical\nattitudes of Pyrrho and Sextus is that Sextus attributes an important\nrole to convention in the shaping of one’s behavior; more on\nthis in a moment.", "\nAs for the avoidance of theoretical inquiry and debate, if Pyrrho was\nprimarily a moralist and the Aristocles passage mostly contains\nTimon’s ideas, such inquiry and debate would simply have been\noutside Pyrrho’s sphere of interest. But if the Aristocles\npassage as a whole represents Pyrrho’s own thought, it is fair\nto assume that he will have regarded such inquiry and debate as\ntroublesome because it is necessarily fruitless and interminable. If\nthe real nature of things is indeterminable by us, as the\nepistemological interpretation would have it, then to attempt to\ndetermine the nature of things, and to provide cogent grounds for the\nsuperiority of one’s own theories, is to attempt the impossible;\nsuch matters are simply beyond our grasp. But if, as the metaphysical\ninterpretation would have it, the world is in its real nature\nindefinite, then one is also attempting the impossible, though for a\ndifferent reason; one is attempting to determine a fixed character for\nthings that inherently lack any fixed character. Of course, the thesis\nthat reality is indefinite is itself a definite statement. But it\nfollows from this statement that any attempt to establish fixed and\ndefinite characteristics for specific items in the universe is doomed\nto failure. And it seems to be this kind of theoretical inquiry that\nTimon represents Pyrrho as eschewing; as one fragment puts it\n(addressing Pyrrho), “you were not concerned to inquire what\nwinds hold sway over Greece, from where everything comes and into what\nit passes” (Diogenes Laertius 9.65). On this reading, then,\nPyrrho’s avoidance of inquiry and debate resembles the disdain\nfor physical speculation that is apparent in some writings of Plato\n(Phaedo for example); physical speculation is fruitless\nbecause the physical world is not susceptible to rational inquiry.", "\nHere another difference may be discerned from the Pyrrhonism of Sextus\nEmpiricus. For although Sextus certainly does not claim to have\ndefinite answers of his own concerning the nature of things, he has no\nqualms about engaging with his opponents in debate, or about pitting\nthem against one another. Indeed, the Pyrrhonism of Sextus depends on\na constant interplay of competing arguments on as many topics as\npossible. One’s suspension of judgement results from one’s\nexperience of the ‘equal strength’ (isostheneia)\nof the competing considerations on all sides of a given issue; but\nthis requires that one be regularly exposed to such competing\nconsiderations, and the works of Sextus are themselves bountiful\nsources for this. Sextus may agree with Pyrrho that such debates are\ninterminable, but they have an important role in later Pyrrhonist\npractice nonetheless. Pyrrho’s own practice is quite different,\nbecause his ataraxia flows not from an ongoing practice of\nintellectual juggling, but from a conclusion about the nature\nof things, as reported in the Aristocles passage. As we have seen,\nthis conclusion may be interpreted in several different ways, but\nhowever we interpret it, it is a firm view of his.", "\nWe have seen that Pyrrho was unconcerned, or aspired to be\nunconcerned, about things that most of us care about very deeply. But\nhow does one make any decisions at all, if one adopts this kind of\nattitude? Unless we are to believe the stories of Pyrrho as a madman\ndepending on his friends to rescue him from precipices and dogs, we\nare entitled to expect an answer to this question. There is some\nevidence to suggest that the answer proposed—if not by Pyrrho\nhimself, then at least by Timon—was that one relies on the\nappearances. If this is correct, we have another link, at least at a\ngeneral level, with the Pyrrhonism of Sextus, for whom appearances are\nwhat he calls the “criterion of action”. One difference,\nas mentioned earlier, is that Sextus lists laws and customs as one of\nthe four main varieties of appearances that one may use to guide\none’s behavior; on Sextus’ account, then, certain courses\nof action will appear to one as desirable or undesirable given that\nthey are approved or disapproved of by the prevailing mores. But\nPyrrho seems to have been thoroughly unconventional in some aspects of\nhis behavior. It is impossible to say specifically what kinds of\nphenomena were included for him and Timon under the heading of\n‘the appearances’ — or whether they had anything\nvery precise in mind here. Nevertheless, it looks as if the early or\nproto-Pyrrhonist answer to the question of how one acts and makes\ndecisions is that one does so in light of the way things appear to\none. Depending on how we read the Aristocles passage, this might\namount to “in light of the characteristics that things seem to\nhave (but, for all we know, may not really have)”, or it\nmight amount to “in light of the temporary and contingent\ncharacteristics that things manifest on any given occasion (but that\nare no part of how they really are, since how they really are\nis indefinite)”. In either case, the way in which one mistrusts\nsensations and common-sense opinions, as the Aristocles passage\nrecommends, is not that one pays no attention to them in one’s\neveryday behavior; one mistrusts them simply in that one does not take\nthem as a guide to the underlying nature of things." ], "section_title": "5. Reports on Pyrrho’s Demeanor and Lifestyle", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere is one further, highly problematic fragment of Timon that seems\nto belong in the area of practical philosophy. This is a set of four\nlines of verse that make reference to “the nature of the divine\nand the good”. There is no consensus on how to translate these\nlines, and different translations yield very different consequences\nfor interpretation. The first two lines can be rendered either", "\nThe second two lines can be rendered either", "\nThere are numerous other disputes over the translation, but these\nalternatives put on display most of the central options for\ninterpretation.", "\nThe lines are quoted by Sextus Empiricus (M 11.20); there is\nno further trace of them in the surviving record. The context in which\nSextus introduces them shows that he is inclined to understand the\nfirst couplet according to reading (A) rather than reading( B); but he\nsuggests that he is not sure about this. The speaker into whose mouth\nTimon put these lines is never identified, but it has generally been\nassumed to be Pyrrho.", "\nIf one understands the second couplet according to reading (C), then\nthe speaker is apparently endorsing a position that attributes\ndefinite natures to things; and this appears flatly inconsistent with\nthe Pyrrho of the Aristocles passage, on any of the readings we\nhave considered. The tension is especially bad if one reads the first\ncouplet according to reading (B), in which case the speaker is\ninsisting that he is in possession of the truth. But even on reading\n(A), where the effect is to weaken the assertion to one about what\nappears to the speaker to be the case, the statement about “the\nnature of the divine and the good” seems strikingly out of\nkeeping with the rest of what we hear about Pyrrho’s philosophy.\nIt has been suggested that Pyrrho made an exception, in the case of\nthe divine and the good, to his general prohibition on attributing\ndefinite natures to things; but it is hard to see the motivation for\nsuch a move, and this interpretation has not been generally accepted.\nIt is true that Cicero speaks of Pyrrho as holding that virtue is the\nsole good, and that no distinctions of value are to be drawn among\nthings other than virtue and vice. However, as was mentioned earlier,\nCicero always attributes this view to Pyrrho alongside the unorthodox\nStoic Aristo of Chios; he never gives any details about Pyrrho’s\nthinking specifically. We know from other sources that Aristo did hold\nthis position; and, as we have seen, there is good reason to think\nthat Pyrrho did refrain quite generally from attributing positive or\nnegative value to ordinary objects of concern (things other than\nvirtue and vice), which is one part of the position Cicero attributes\nto him and Aristo. So it looks as if Cicero has been misled (probably\nby the sketchiness of the information in his source) into thinking\nthat Pyrrho agreed with Aristo in both parts of his position rather\nthan in just one part. At any rate, Cicero cannot be regarded as\noffering any credible support for an interpretation of Pyrrho that has\nhim believing in a natural good; again, this is just too discordant\nwith the remainder of the evidence.", "\nReading (D) of Timon’s second couplet (which is due, with minor\nmodifications, to Burnyeat (1980)) is intended to eliminate the\ntroublesome reference to an eternal real nature. According to this\ninterpretation, the phrase “the nature of the divine and the\ngood” refers simply to a characteristic that is attributed to\nPyrrho, and labeled by poetic hyperbole as ‘divine’, in\nanother fragment of Timon, namely his extraordinary tranquility; the\ncouplet as a whole, then, is saying that tranquility is the source of\nan even-tempered life. And if one combines this with the less dogmatic\nreading (A) of the first couplet, this yields a set of remarks that\nare not obviously in conflict with anything else in the record on\nPyrrho.", "\nThe acceptability of the translation in reading (D) is not beyond\nquestion. There is also some question whether the claim that\ntranquility is the source of an even-tempered life is anything more\nthan vacuous. However, if one assumes that Pyrrho is the speaker of\nthese lines, then this interpretation or something close to it seems\nto be the only way to rescue his thought (as reported by Timon) from\ninconsistency. Another possibility, an interpretatively less\nburdensome one, is to drop the assumption that Pyrrho is the speaker;\nin this case, there is no reason to assume that the thought expressed\nby the lines must be consistent with what we know of Pyrrho’s\nphilosophy. But if one takes this option, one must devise an\nalternative explanation for why Timon would have written these\nlines—including some account of who else the speaker might be.\nThis challenge has recently been taken up in Clayman (2009), chapter\n2. Clayman argues that the speaker is Timon himself, and that the\nlines serve a programmatic function at the opening of the poem; in\nlight of parallel passages in other early Hellenistic poetry, the\nreference to truth is understood as an allusion to poetic\nverisimilitude rather than to anything philosophically problematic.\nFinally, it has been suggested (in Svavarsson 2002) that\nmuthon, rendered in both readings (A) and (B) by\n“word”, should rather be understood as “myth”\nin the sense of “fiction” (and “of truth”\nlinked instead, as is linguistically quite possible, with\n“standard”). In this case, again, there is no difficulty\nin understanding the second couplet as expressing a dogmatic position;\nindeed, such a reading is only to be expected, since the position is\nbeing debunked, not advocated. Green (2017) has extended\nSvavarsson’s suggestion by proposing that “word of\ntruth” and “correct standard” are to be understood\nsarcastically rather than at face value, making fun of other\nthinkers’ belief in these things (which would also render the\nthought less dogmatic; it would not simply be a declaration of\nfalsehood). But whether the word muthos, all by itself, can\ncarry this weight of significance—or whether, if that is what\nTimon had intended, he would not have chosen some less ambiguous means\nof expressing it—is open to question. It is fair to say that no\nresolution of these matters is in sight." ], "section_title": "6. “The Nature of the Divine and the Good”", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nMany different philosophical antecedents have been claimed for Pyrrho.\nSince we know very little about which philosophical currents Pyrrho\nmay have been acquainted with, such claims are bound to be in large\nmeasure speculative. There are, however, a couple of exceptions to\nthis; as noted at the outset, Pyrrho was associated with Anaxarchus\nand was reported to have encountered some unnamed Indian thinkers. The\nlittle that we know of Anaxarchus seems to suggest that his philosophy\nhad a good deal in common with Pyrrho’s. Diogenes Laertius\n(9.60) ascribes to him an attitude of apatheia and\neukolia, ‘freedom from emotion’ and\n‘contentedness’; as noted earlier, apatheia is\nused in some sources to describe Pyrrho’s attitude as well, and\nthe combination of the two terms seems to describe something close to\nthe state cultivated by Pyrrho. We also hear from Sextus Empiricus\nthat Anaxarchus “likened existing things to stage-painting and\ntook them to be similar to the things which strike us while asleep or\ninsane” (M 7.88). This has often been taken as an early\nexpression of a form of epistemological scepticism. But it may also be\ntaken as an ontological comment on the insubstantiality of the world\naround us; it is things (as opposed to our impressions of\nthings) that are assimilated to stage-sets and the contents of dreams\nand fantasies. Either way, the remark looks like an anticipation of\nthe position expounded in the Aristocles passage; the first\nreading conforms to the epistemological interpretation of that\npassage, and the second to the metaphysical interpretation. It\nappears, then, that Pyrrho may have borrowed to a considerable extent\nfrom Anaxarchus, especially if the Aristocles passage as a whole\nrepresents Pyrrho’s thought.", "\nWe do not know the identity of the “naked wise men” whom\nPyrrho met in India, or what they thought. There are reports of other\nmeetings between Indian and Greek thinkers during Alexander’s\nexpedition, and these tend to emphasize the Indians’\nextraordinary impassivity and insensitivity to pain and hardship. It\nis not unlikely that Pyrrho, too, was impressed by traits of this\nkind. Though precedents for his ideal of ataraxia exist in\nearlier Greek philosophy as well, his reported ability to withstand\nsurgery without flinching is exceptional in the Greek context (and\nquite distinct from anything in later Pyrrhonism); if we believe this\nstory, it is tempting to explain it by way of some form of training\nfrom the Indians. Some scholars have sought to establish more detailed\nlinks between the thought of the Aristocles passage and various\ncurrents in ancient Indian philosophy; and Beckwith (2015) finds in\nPyrrho an authentic representative of early Buddhism. But there is at\nleast room for debate about how far these similarities really go. From\nan opposing perspective, some have suggested that the linguistic\nbarriers would have ruled out an interchange of any great\nphilosophical subtlety between the Indians and Pyrrho. But this may be\noverly pessimistic; the expedition lasted a number of years, and some\npeople manage to learn new languages remarkably quickly.", "\nBeyond these figures with attested connections to Pyrrho, it is\nplausible to suppose a certain influence on Pyrrho from Democritus.\nPyrrho is reported to have had a special admiration for Democritus\n(Diogenes Laertius 9.67, citing Pyrrho’s associate Philo);\nDemocritus is one of the few philosophers besides Pyrrho himself who\nseems to escape serious criticism in Timon’s Lampoons;\nand Anaxarchus belonged in the tradition of thinkers stemming from\nDemocritus. The influence may have been mainly in the ethical area;\nDemocritus, too, had an ethical ideal that is recognizably a\nforerunner to Pyrrho’s ataraxia. If one adopts the\nepistemological interpretation of Pyrrho’s philosophy, one may\nsee an additional area of influence in Democritus’ sceptical\npronouncements about the prospects for knowledge of the world around\nus.", "\nAlternatively, if one interprets Pyrrho along metaphysical lines, one\nmay be inclined to look to Plato and the Eleatics as possible\ninfluences. Timon’s verdicts on these figures in the\nLampoons are at least partially favorable; and, as was hinted\nat earlier on, the dim view of sensibles that is suggested by a number\nof Plato’s dialogues—but also anticipated by the\nEleatics—seems to have something in common with Pyrrho’s\nview of reality (on the metaphysical interpretation) as indeterminate.\nThe difference, of course, is that Pyrrho does not suggest any higher\nlevel of reality such as Plato’s Forms or the Eleatic Being." ], "section_title": "7. Influences on Pyrrho", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nPyrrho’s relation to the later Pyrrhonists has already been\ndiscussed. Given the importance of Pyrrhonism in earlier modern\nphilosophy, Pyrrho’s indirect influence may be thought of as\nvery considerable. But beyond his being adopted as a figurehead in\nlater Pyrrhonism—itself never a widespread philosophical\nmovement — Pyrrho seems to have had very little impact in the\nancient world after his own lifetime. Both Cicero and Seneca refer to\nPyrrho as a neglected figure without a following, and the surviving\ntestimonia do not contradict this impression. It is possible that he\nhad some influence on the form of scepticism adopted by Arcesilaus and\nother members of the Academy; the extent to which this is so is\ndisputed and difficult to assess. It is also possible that the\nEpicureans, whose aim was also ataraxia, learned something\nfrom Pyrrho; there are indications of an association between Pyrrho\nand Nausiphanes, the teacher of Epicurus. But if so, the extent of the\nEpicureans’ borrowing was strictly limited. For them,\nataraxia is to be attained by coming to understand that the\nuniverse consists of atoms and void; and the Epicureans’\nattitude towards the senses was anything but one of mistrust." ], "section_title": "8. Pyrrho’s Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Decleva Caizzi, F., 1981, Pirrone: Testimonianze, Naples:\nBibliopolis. Complete collection of texts referring to Pyrrho, with\nItalian translation and commentary.", "–––, 2020, Pirroniana, Milan: LED. A\nsecond edition of the previous item, with new material including\nan English translation of the texts by Mauro Bonazzi and David\nSedley.", "Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley, 1987, The Hellenistic\nPhilosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2 vols),\nsections 1–3. Vol. 1 contains texts in English translation with\nphilosophical commentary; vol. 2 contains original texts with\nphilological commentary.", "Beckwith, C., 2011, “Pyrrho’s Logic: A Re-examination\nof Aristocles’ Record of Timon’s Account”,\nElenchos, 32: 287–327.", "–––, 2015, Greek Buddha: Pyrrho’s\nEncounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia, Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press.", "Bett, R., 2000, Pyrrho, his Antecedents and his Legacy,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2012, Review of Clayman (2009),\nGnomon, 84: 107–12.", "Brennan, T., 1998, “Pyrrho on the Criterion”,\nAncient Philosophy, 18: 417–34.", "Brunschwig, J., 1994, “Once again on Eusebius on Aristocles\non Timon on Pyrrho”, in J. Brunschwig, Papers in Hellenistic\nPhilosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:\n190–211.", "Burnyeat, M., 1980, “Tranquility without a Stop: Timon,\nFrag. 68”, Classical Quarterly (New Series), 30:\n86–93.", "Castagnoli, L., 2002, Review of Bett (2000), Ancient\nPhilosophy, 22: 443–457.", "Clayman, D., 2009, Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonism into\nPoetry, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.", "Green, J., 2017, “Was Pyrrho a Pyrrhonian?”,\nApeiron, 50: 335–65.", "Hankinson, J., 1995, The Sceptics, London:\nRoutledge.", "Marchand, S., 2018. Le scepticisme: vivre sans opinions,\nParis: Vrin, chapter 1.", "Perin, C., 2018. “Pyrrho and Timon”, in D. Machuca and\nB. Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present,\nLondon/New York: Bloomsbury, 24–35.", "Ribeiro, B., 2022. “Aspirationalism in Pyrrho’s\nProject of Living Suspensively”, Sképsis: Revista de\nFilosofia, 24: 1–11.", "Stopper, M., 1983, “Schizzi Pirroniani”,\nPhronesis, 28: 265–97.", "Svavarsson, S., 2002, “Pyrrho’s Dogmatic\nNature”, Classical Quarterly, 52(1):\n248–256.", "–––, 2004, “Pyrrho’s Undecidable\nNature”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 27:\n249–295.", "–––, 2010, “Pyrrho and Early\nPyrrhonism”, in R. Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to\nAncient Scepticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,\n36–57.", "von Fritz, K., 1963, “Pyrrhon”, in Paulys\nRealencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft,\nxxiv: 89–106." ]	[ { "href": "../ethics-ancient/", "text": "ethics: ancient" }, { "href": "../sextus-empiricus/", "text": "Sextus Empiricus" }, { "href": "../skepticism-ancient/", "text": "skepticism: ancient" }, { "href": "../timon-phlius/", "text": "Timon of Phlius" } ]
anderson-john	John Anderson	First published Mon Oct 22, 2012; substantive revision Mon Nov 8, 2021	[ "\nJohn Anderson (1893–1962) was a Scottish philosopher who worked\nprimarily in Australia. In 1927 he was appointed to the Challis Chair\nof Philosophy at the University of Sydney and occupied this position\nuntil his retirement in 1958. In relative isolation he developed a\ndistinctive realist philosophy which was inspirational for generations\nof students at Sydney. While developing this position, he carried most\nof the teaching load in philosophy at the university, wrote the\narticles for which he is primarily known, and as contributor and\neditor kept the Australasian Journal of Psychology and\nPhilosophy going. Shortly after his arrival in Sydney he acted as\ntheoretical advisor to the Communist Party of Australia, but moved\naway from the party through the 1930s and finally adopted a strongly\nanti-communist stance. He remained active throughout his career,\nhowever, in a series of public controversies concerning censorship,\nuniversity reform, academic freedom and opposition to religious\ninstruction in education. Depending upon one’s perspective,\nthese activities diverted him from serious philosophical work or were\nthe natural expression of his philosophical outlook. On either view\nhis intellectual impact at Sydney was overwhelming. Philosophers such\nas David Malet Armstrong, John Passmore, John Leslie Mackie, Eugene\nKamenka, Jim Baker and David Stove all acknowledged Anderson’s\nformative influence. From his early teaching at Edinburgh, Anderson\ninfluenced the social and political thought of Rush Rhees, and so also\nindirectly that of Alasdair Macintyre who came to recognise and value\ncommon themes in his own sociological and historical view of ethics.\nOutside the academy, Anderson’s criticisms of conventional\nmorality and his account of positive ethical goods promoting a stance\nof commitment, endeavour, risk and critical opposition to merely\ncustomary expectations was a powerful tonic for a small but\ninfluential group of anti-careerist intellectuals, lawyers,\njournalists and artists collectively known as the “Sydney\nPush”. " ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Work", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Outline of Anderson’s Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Difficulties in Understanding Anderson’s Work", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. A Systematic Realism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Specific Fields", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Logic", "5.2 Metaphysics", "5.3 Epistemology", "5.4 Ethics", "5.5 Social and Political Thought", "5.6 Education" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Influence Beyond the University", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nJohn Anderson was born in 1893 in the weaving and coal-mining village\nof Stonehouse, Lanarkshire (about 20km from Glasgow). His father was\nschoolmaster in the village and politically active in the Independent\nLabour Party. In 1911 Anderson began his university studies at the\nUniversity of Glasgow, enrolling in two successive honours degrees:\nmathematics/natural philosophy (including laboratory training) and\nlogic/moral philosophy (including political economy). His\nundergraduate studies extended throughout the years of the World War,\nculminating in 1917 with his Masters thesis on the philosophy of\nWilliam James. Declared medically unfit for service, his experience of\nthe war was dominated by the Red Clydeside industrial and rental\ndisputes, characterised by workers’ resistance to state and\nindustry attempts to re-organise work practices and personnel in the\ninterests of a supposed common national interest. The disputes\nultimately led to state suppression at the conclusion of the war when\nBritish troops and artillery were deployed to Glasgow.", "\nAnderson’s philosophical direction was powerfully influenced by\nthe Australian-born philosopher, Samuel Alexander, who delivered the\nGifford Lectures at Glasgow in 1918. In the previous year Anderson had\nbeen awarded for an essay supporting Henry Jones’ practical\nidealist view of the state as a moral agent. Following\nAlexander’s lectures (later published as Space, Time and\nDeity) Anderson accepted the case for the complete rejection of\nthis form of idealism in favour of a new and systematic realist\nprogramme.", "\nIn 1919 Anderson married fellow philosophy student Jenny Baillie, was\nappointed assistant lecturer at University College of South Wales\n(where he also provided Workers’ Education Classes) and was\nsubsequently appointed assistant lecturer in logic at the University\nof Glasgow. In 1920 he was appointed lecturer at the University of\nEdinburgh and so became the main exponent of realism in Norman Kemp\nSmith’s Department of Logic and Metaphysics. In the same year,\nhis brother William accepted the Chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy\nat Auckland University College, New Zealand.", "\nBy 1926 Anderson had become dispirited by the rejection for\npublication of a textbook on logic that he had been working on since\n1922. He had also become politically isolated in the department\nbecause of his support for the General Strike in Britain. Such factors\nmay have moved him to accept the Challis Chair of Philosophy at the\nUniversity of Sydney, although as with his brother, the movement of\nScottish philosophers to Commonwealth universities was not unusual. In\n1927 he moved with Jennie and their young son Alexander\n(“Sandy”) to Sydney.", "\nAnderson’s first serious professional engagement was in a\ncritical discussion of F. C. S. Schiller’s logic,\n“Propositions and Judgments” and “The Truth of\nPropositions” (1926). The first outlines of a distinctive\nrealist position were made in “Empiricism” and “The\nKnower and the Known” (1927). After his arrival at Sydney,\nAnderson was intent upon developing this position and was dismissive\nof the fragmentary nature of most international philosophy in the wake\nof the “linguistic turn”. The important philosophical work\nin Anderson’s view was to establish and preserve a school of\nrealist philosophy as the repository of a tradition of critical\ninquiry that would remain alert to the dangers of corrupting external\nforces and expectations. ", "\nShortly after his arrival at Sydney, Anderson became a\n“theoretical advisor” to the Australian Communist Party\nand so began a long history of antagonising conservative political and\ncultural representatives in the city. He was repeatedly accused of\ndisloyalty and communist sympathies by returned servicemen\norganisations, the churches and the conservative political parties.\nThe University Senate ultimately debated censure although a motion to\ndeclare him unfit to occupy the Chair of Philosophy was defeated. ", "\nIn 1930 James Joyce’s Ulysses was banned in Australia\nand the Freethought Society was formed with Anderson as President.\nAnderson’s political influence at Sydney primarily took the form\nof a libertarian pluralism, particularly concerned with issues of\nstate and religious censorship and interference in education. By the\n1940s and 1950s his political position was strongly anti-communist.\nYet he remained unpopular with conservative politicians and clerics\nand was criticised for “corrupting the city’s youth”\nas late as 1961.", "\nIn 1935 Anderson became the editor of The Australasian Journal of\nPsychology and Philosophy. He had previously contributed\nsignificantly to the journal with his articles “Determinism and\nEthics” (1928), “The Non-Existence of\nConsciousness”, “‘Universals’ and\nOccurrences” (1929), “The Place of Hegel in the History of\nPhilosophy”, “Utilitarianism” (1932), “Realism\nand Some of its Critics” (1933), and “Mind as\nFeeling” (1934). He retained editorial responsibility for the\njournal until 1947 when it passed to John Passmore with the new name\nThe Australasian Journal of Philosophy.", "\nIn 1958 Anderson retired and in 1962 died at his home in\nSydney’s northern suburbs. The Challis Chair of Philosophy was\noccupied for the next 30 years by Anderson’s students, J. L.\nMackie (1959–1963) and D. M. Armstrong (1964–1991). Both\nphilosophers were critical of Anderson’s philosophy and were\nmore engaged with contemporary philosophical debates, but both also\nacknowledged Anderson’s formative influence on their work.", "\nIn 1972 members of the Department of Philosophy at the University of\nSydney were caught in a bitter dispute concerning subject matter,\neducational practices and the nature of philosophical study itself,\nand by the start of 1974 the department had split into two separate\nunits. D. M. Armstrong led the minority Department of Traditional and\nModern Philosophy away from what he perceived to be the politically\nradical but philosophically barren Department of General Philosophy.\nPolitical disruptions throughout the academic world in the early 1970s\nwere not uncommon, but the particular intransigence and secessionist\ntendencies which characterised both sides of the conflict at Sydney\nmay well have been at least in part a legacy of Anderson’s\nteaching and practice. The department eventually reunited some thirty\nyears later." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Work", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe emphasis of Anderson’s realism is upon\nindependence, directed particularly at the notion of\nconstitutive relations (which he takes to be the central error of\nidealism), but also employed in qualifying reductivist and\ninstrumentalist forms of scientific explanation. His position is that\nalthough whatever exists has relations and is conditioned, it is\nnonetheless a specific existing thing with qualities of its own. It is\nthe aim of critical inquiry in any given field to identify relevant\nqualities and characteristics and to state the issue in the form of\nobjective and communicable truth. Whatever our interests draw our\nattention to, the truth of the matter is independent of our\nconsideration. Whatever innovative and imaginative uses we make of\nparticular things, those uses are available to us because of existing\nproperties in the things themselves. For Anderson, two aspects of\nphilosophical speculation have been linked throughout the history of\nthe subject, and his own thought can be considered as a single system\nwith these complementary aspects: the logical and the ethical.", "\nFirst, there is a single way of being, that of ordinary things\nbehaving in ordinary ways in space and time. All theories of higher\nand lower realities can only be stated in terms of the common reality\nwe all know and share. Anderson applied this thesis across the board:\nthere are not different kinds or degrees of truth, only\nsomething’s being the case or not; universals and values do not\nexist above the world of space and time in a transcendent sphere of\noperation; powers are not entities distinct from the processes they\nexplain; the mental realm cannot be conceived as operating in a sphere\nseparate from or other than space and time. There is no absolute or\nlogical distinction between universals and particulars –\nuniversals exist within the ordinary world, but never apart from the\nparticulars they describe; that is, there is no ontological level\nabove or below that of the state of affairs or the fact of a\npredicated subject. As the study of the formal features of facts,\nlogic provides an account of what is objectively real: logic entails a\ngeneral ontology.", "\nSecond, Anderson emphasised both the objective and subjective\ndifficulties inherent in the endeavour to see things as they are, and\nthe necessary discipline acquired in ongoing traditions of critical\ninquiry. Confronting the reality of our existence entails recognising\nand not turning away from the ubiquity of conflict, tension and strife\nin all spheres. For Anderson ethical goods exist in the world in such\nactivities as intellectual inquiry, artistic production and scientific\ninvestigation. Ethical investigation is primarily concerned with\nidentifying those human activities which are driven by internal\nstandards of correctness and value and not by concern for external\nrewards or utilities. But these activities exist perilously in a world\nseriously inclined towards stasis and corruption. There is an almost\ntheological depth to Anderson’s pessimism in this regard. ", "\nAnderson’s views in normative philosophy are outlined in\nwritings in ethical inquiry, narrowly construed, aesthetics, political\nthought and educational philosophy. Ethics is the study of\nthe real qualities of human activities, not of what is right or\nobligatory, these latter questions being relegated to the study of\ncustomary norms and expectations arising from particular practices and\nways of life. Similarly, aesthetics is the study of the\nqualities of beautiful things, and is neither a study of feelings,\nexpressions or judgments, nor a source of directives for artists. A\nwork of art succeeds to the extent that it objectively portrays its\ntheme, accounts for what is the case (for example, anger\nconsidered as the “theme” of The Iliad). Literary\ncriticism consists in assessing whether the artist has succeeded,\nobjectively, in capturing or portraying the chosen theme. In his\nsocial and political thought, Anderson holds that society is\na complex of competing and cooperating movements neither united by\ninclusive social purpose, nor reducible to its individual members.", "\nUnderlying both logical and ethical aspects of Anderson’s\nthought is the identification of systematic confusions and errors in\nphilosophical thought. One persistent confusion is the\nmisidentification of relations as qualities. Most commonly, being in\nsome relation is thought to constitute the “nature” of\nsome special status entity. But whereas a term together with a quality\nis a complete unit just as it stands, a term and a relation is simply\nincomplete without a second term. Anderson applied this thesis widely:\nthere are no such things whose nature it is to be known or perceived\n(“ideas”); there is no such thing whose nature it is to\nknow (“consciousness”); there are no such things whose\nnature it is to be pursued or whose nature it is to direct action\n(“values” conceived as standing over and above the goods\nand values of this life). Relations are often more evident to us than\nthe underlying qualities of the things related and so relational\nexplanations suggest themselves to us quite naturally. On the other\nhand, significant intellectual effort is required in any given field\nto understand the illusory nature of such explanations and the manner\nin which they obstruct the identification and assertion of real\nissues.", "\nAccording to Anderson, one central confusion infecting modern\nphilosophy since Descartes has been its obsession with epistemological\nquestions, the attempt to provide unshakeable foundations for our\nknowledge of the external world. There is no gap between mind and\nworld that needs to be bridged because mentality belongs to the\nspatio-temporal world along with everything else. This is not to say\nthat misunderstanding is impossible, just that understanding is\npossible. It is possible to know various conditions and characters of\nthings in the first place only because things have these\ncharacters independently of our inquiries. And since as knowers we\noccupy the single world of space and time we come under the same\nconditions and so come into relations with those things that we are\ninvestigating. All knowledge depends upon empirical investigation and\nso is fallible: it is not built upon any more immediate or reliable\nentities such as sense data or self-evident ideas. Epistemological and\nontological bedrock is the complex situation of being there and\nso, a particular’s being of a certain kind. Knowing minds\nare themselves complex spatio-temporal things, societies of emotions\nand feelings without a unifying consciousness to which these might\nbelong nor some ultimate self which could conceivably take a stand\nsomehow outside and beyond the world of space and time. Modern\nphilosophy’s epistemological obsession can be regarded as an\nillogical attempt to look behind the proposition, to gain a sideways\nview of how our propositions hook up to the real world." ], "section_title": "2. Outline of Anderson’s Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nGilbert Ryle listed Anderson among the “seniors” who had\npreceded his own generation: philosophers such as Russell, Moore,\nWittgenstein, Bradley, Stout, McTaggart, Alexander, Laird, and Kemp\nSmith. For Ryle, Anderson’s generation represented “the\nold gang”, many the products of “those dominating Scots\nteachers” who had established philosophy as an academic\ndiscipline in English-speaking universities around the world. Anderson\nwas an exact contemporary of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, yet only\nseven years older than Ryle himself. But Ryle seems to have a point in\nsuggesting a generational gap that separated him from that earlier\ngeneration’s “pieties, lores, sagacities, equipments\n– yes, and fetishes too” (Ryle 1976: 383). Ryle was\ndescribing the generation of philosophers who were adult prior to or\nduring the Great War. He only became acquainted with Anderson in the\n1950s and was struck by the manner in which Anderson had continued a\nform of philosophy into modern times that had given way elsewhere to\nphilosophies more concerned with linguistic usage. Despite this\nrecognition of interpretive challenges, for many of Anderson’s\nfollowers Ryle at that time radically misunderstood Anderson’s\nwork (Ryle 1950), reading it from the perspective of the\n“linguistic turn”.", "\nFor current readers there are indeed several obstacles to approaching\nAnderson’s work. His published works, primarily articles for the\nAustralasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology and in\nlocal journals and newspapers, are difficult without the context of\nAnderson’s broader teaching. They are generally regarded as\nsubsidiary to the lectures and syllabus of an Andersonian\napprenticeship. It seems that they were written for the benefit of the\nstudents who already had the value of his personal contact. Without\nthis contact, we must rely on the publication of several series of\nlecture notes from Anderson’s papers by Sydney University Press\n(see Bibliography). Anderson’s isolation from his intellectual\npeers and his seeming reluctance to engage in international debate\nalso deprives contemporary students of the opportunity to locate his\nwork within more familiar territory.", "\nOne point of access to Anderson’s work for contemporary\nstudents, of course, lies in the work of his students such as D. M.\nArmstrong, John Passmore, and J. L. Mackie. But there is a danger even\nhere that their specialisations may distort our view of\nAnderson’s work as a whole. Anderson, as Passmore noted, was a\ngeneralist (Passmore, Introduction to Anderson’s posthumous\nwork, Studies in Empirical Philosophy, hereafter\nEMP). Unlike the next generation, he expected all\nspheres of philosophical inquiry to open up to his investigation and\nhis philosophy extended to all spheres: logic, metaphysics, ethics,\npolitical thought, aesthetics, education.", "\nAnderson describes his position variously as empiricist, realist,\nnaturalist, physicalist, positivist and pluralist, conceiving each of\nthese as different aspects of the one truly empirical philosophy. But\nhis use of these terms is problematic for the uninitiated.\nAnderson’s empiricism has no time for representational\nviews of truth, nor for the traditional empiricist entities of sense\ndata or ideas. Empiricism for Anderson is an ontological doctrine\nasserting a single way of being to which we as investigators belong.\nWhile undoubtedly committed to empirical investigation and the\nfallible nature of all propositional claims, Anderson’s\nempiricism is only secondarily an epistemological viewpoint relating\nto how we come to know things within this spatio-temporal world.\nAnderson’s realism rejects the traditional\nrealist-nominalist options concerning the existence of universals.\nUniversals are brought down to (spatio-temporal) earth, but there are\nno such things as pure universals nor pure particulars outside their\nroles within complex states of affairs. Mentality is a\nproduct of physico-chemical processes in the brain but this does not\npreclude our inquiry into the nature of mind as a field of conflicted\ntendencies, feelings and emotions. Whatever the special sciences tell\nus about their particular subject matters, philosophy retains its\nauthority in questions of logic, that is to say, concerning the\nconditions of possibility of discourse. Indeed, modern science is\nbadly infected by instrumentalist and technological views of its\ninvestigations and needs to become more truly philosophical and\ncritical, more concerned with establishing what is the case within\nspecific fields, and less with being practical and useful in relation\nto perceived societal needs (EMP, 290).\nPositivism then is for Anderson a commitment to what is\nobjectively and positively the case, and not a program of instrumental\nor operational truth, nor a means of distinguishing meaningful from\nmeaningless utterances. Anderson’s call for a “science of\nethics” is not an assimilation of ethical inquiry to the\nstandards of the special sciences. It is a plea for an objective\ninvestigation of the ethical, focussed on the existing ethical\nqualities of human activities, rather than on the pieties of\ntraditional moral philosophy: the questions of right, obligation, duty\nand so forth. ", "\nRyle was only the first of many to be accused of misreading Anderson.\nCriticisms of Anderson’s position from within mainstream\nEnglish-language philosophy have always seemed to his followers to\nmiss their mark. They have generally failed to recognise the\nontological, non-representational, non-semantic basis for his\nempiricism. Robert Brandom’s recent criticism and rejection of\nthe “theoretical, explanatory and strategic commitments”\nmotivating Anglo-American philosophy in the 20th century lists these\nas: empiricism, naturalism, representationalism, semantic atomism,\nformalism about logic, instrumentalism about practical norms (Brandom\n2000). Anderson would reject all of these criticisms of his own work\nas they stand. Brandom regards the notion of “facts” and\n“states of affairs” as emblematic of atomistic,\nrepresentationalist thought. Anderson would have replied imperiously\nas he did to Gilbert Ryle’s “representationist”\ncriticisms: “That is nothing to me”. ", "\nMany of the problems contemporary readers encounter in\nAnderson’s work result from his relative international\nisolation. But for many of his students it was precisely\nAnderson’s secessionist traditional stance that was the key to\nthe great value of an Andersonian education. He may have failed in his\nproject, but he kept alive at Sydney enduring values of traditional\nphilosophical inquiry at a time when mainstream philosophy was either\nobsessed with linguistic usage on the one hand or in deference to the\nnatural sciences on the other. Many of Anderson’s students\nexpected his philosophy to re-emerge stronger following the inevitable\ndecline of linguistic philosophy and the renewed interest in\nmetaphysical questions which followed this decline. But if his work\nplayed any role in this renewal it was only indirectly through the\nwork of his student D. M. Armstrong. Contemporary philosophers\ninterested in metaphysical questions do not refer to Anderson’s\nwork and are frankly baffled by Armstrong’s enthusiasm for his\nteacher’s work. Anderson exists today almost exclusively in the\nfootnotes of his more engaged and accomplished students." ], "section_title": "3. Difficulties in Understanding Anderson’s Work", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn Anderson’s view the realist movement initiated by Russell and\nMoore had ended in failure because it had attempted to overcome\nHegelian philosophy by a return to pre-idealist certainties\n(EMP, 89). As a result, realism had been left without\na school from which to challenge the newly emerging schools of\nidealism and pragmatism (STP, 161). Hegel’s\nall-encompassing system of thought was an example for a new and\nsystematic realism to emulate.", "\nIn brief, Hegel’s attempt to formulate his sequence of outlooks\nrelies upon a realist view of the proposition which is incompatible\nwith his whole theory of outlooks or categories and their varying\nadequacy to reality as a whole. Hegel “unwittingly is proceeding\nin terms of the proposition” but is caught up with the illusory\nattempt to establish an overarching truth (“that whereby a true\nproposition can be true”), instead of the task of establishing\ntrue propositions (JAA, Lectures on William\nJames, 1935). The same criticism of Hegel seems to be made by Brandom\nin the service of his very different expressionist project (Brandom\n2000). But for Anderson, Hegel’s doctrine of outlooks\n“rests on an inability to grasp the independence of\ntruths” (EMP, 81). On the other hand, we need\nonly reject Hegel’s doctrine of expressions to find that we are\nleft with actual states of affairs rather than abstract\nbeing.", "\nNeither Cartesian rationalism nor English empiricism could replace\nHegel’s philosophy with any philosophical position of comparable\nrange. Hegel was right to emphasise system, but not as totality (a\npretended solution to real problems), but in the form of a single\nlogic. He was also right to see this logic as historical, but wrong to\nattempt to replace a “logic of things developing” with the\nnotion of a “developing logic” (EMP, 80).\nAnderson summarises the position as follows. The only way to answer\nHegel would be to drop the modern fixation with epistemological\nquestions altogether and return to a Greek consideration of things. In\naddition to Greek directness, a true replacement for Hegelian idealism\nwould incorporate three major components: a positive theory of the\nmind as feeling and as non-unitary, as much a part of spatial and\ntemporal reality as any non-mental things and events; a true\nempiricism which recognised relations and generals as being as real\n(and as knowable) as the particulars related; and a conception of\nspace and time as conditions of existence rather than of human\nknowledge as in Kant’s transcendental idealism. Anderson\nproposed to replace Hegel’s totality by developing a systematic\nrealism which would incorporate the work of John Burnet on Greek\nphilosophy, of Sigmund Freud on mind, of William James’ radical\nempiricism and of Samuel Alexander’s reworking of Kant’s\ntranscendental aesthetic (EMP, 80). Anderson does not\nmention here another possible source for his direct realism, namely,\nScottish common sense philosophy, but he does consider this in his\nLectures on Thomas Reid of 1935 (LMP).", "\nRichard Rorty has suggested that English language philosophy in the\nearly 20th century emerged from the dominance of Hegelian idealism by\ndeferring to the natural sciences, partly because the alternative\nassociation with modernist literature seemed to threaten “a kind\nof privatised aestheticism which contained disturbing strains of\nirrationalism” (Rorty 1985, p. 748). Superficially,\nAnderson’s work suggests an attempt of some kind to assimilate\nphilosophy to the sciences. But he was a true modernist in relation to\nliterary culture: his articles and addresses include critical works on\nsuch figures as, in particular, James Joyce, but also Lawrence, Shaw,\nWells, Grahame, Belloc, Wilde, Hardy, Ibsen, Meredith, Dostoevsky and\nMelville, as well as on the genre of detective fiction. Literature for\nAnderson had a special character as the embodiment or repository of\nculture (JAA, Lectures on the Educational Theories of\nSpencer and Dewey, 1949). At Sydney in the 1930s he championed both\nthe works of James Joyce (recently banned) and the importance of\nFreudian psychoanalysis to our understanding of mentality as\nconflicted and passionate, and to cultural inquiry more generally\n(cf., Damousi 2005). He thought the pre-modernist “literary\nphilosophers” of romanticism and idealism had shown\n“greater tenacity” than those philosophers who professed\nscientific exactitude (EMP, 80). But they had also\ntended to promote forms of moralising and theologising which were\nopposed to precision and independence of thought and which were\n“detrimental to culture in general” (EMP,\n87). Anderson thought his interpretation of traditional Aristotelian\nlogic had an important role to play in the new world of literary\nculture as much as in the natural sciences.", "\nOne major achievement of Hegel for Anderson was the encouragement he\ngave to the study of Greek philosophers. Anderson’s lectures\nexplored the historical background to his propositional view of\nreality in the issues raised by the pre-Socratics and later in\nPlato’s Dialogues. Like other modernist philosophers and\nnovelists (and Hegel himself), Anderson found in Heraclitus an\ninspirational alternative to what he came to regard as the sentimental\nand intellectually stifling idealism of his teachers.", "\nThis world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or man has made;\nbut it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, with\nmeasures of it kindling and measures going out. (Heraclitus Fragment\n20. trans. John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 4th Ed., 1930,\np.134.)\n", "\nAnderson acknowledged that Heraclitus’ emphasis on the element\nFire might be read as a typically Ionian response to the question\n“what is the world made of”, but the more important theme\nis his treatment of fire purely as process, as transaction and\nexchange, as the paradigm element of strife and harmony. In embryo\nAnderson found in Heraclitus so many of his own principles: the close\nlink between logic and ethics (ethics as the field in which conflict\ncomes primarily to the fore); the single way of being, of “what\nis common” (the search for a general logic, a theory of the\ncommensurability of things in terms of a theory of process); the\nrecognition of complexity, conflict and strife underlying existing\nthings; the anti-sentimentality and pessimism which refuses to find\nsolace in unity; the hidden harmony of forces in balance preferable to\nthe open harmony of illusory unity; the unremitting attack on\nsubjectivist illusions of desiring or imagining things as we would\nlike them to be (unchanging and secure) rather than seeing them for\nwhat they are.", "\nFor Anderson’s Heraclitus, “seeing things as they\nare” is seeing them as complex, active and changing; a\nperspective opposed to the optimistic, rationalist illusion of the\nsimple, fixed and static. It is to see things as moving, historical,\nin process, and yet as in balance. Heraclitean “strife” is\nharmony: the things of everyday experience are positive and concrete\nbecause they are contingent and historical. Anderson described this\n“fundamental strain” in all fields of inquiry as that\n“between objectivism and subjectivism”, between\n“critical thinking” recognising complexity and tension\neverywhere, and “rationalist illusion” seeking the fixed\nand simple (JAA, Lectures on Criticism 1955, number 11.).\nRationalism here shared with more primitive mythological thinking the\nquest for stability, security and moral uplift. Both have looked for\nsolutions at a higher level than the problems being addressed.", "\nAnderson’s teaching and writings constantly refer to the history\nof philosophy, but Anderson was not a scholarly historian. He thought\nthat persistent philosophical issues and positions were evident\nthroughout history (eleaticism, for example, was a highly instructive\nand critical stage recurring throughout the history of the subject\n– for example in Green’s criticisms of Hume’s\nparticulars). The history of philosophy helped to emphasise the value\nof his own position. On the other hand, his lectures and writings are\nladen with references to philosophers, scientists, novelists,\npsychoanalysts and revolutionaries. Nothing seems alien to even the\nmost abstruse topic of discussion in his work. And his lectures were\n“great starters of hares” (Partridge’s reflections\non Anderson’s teaching, in EAI). John Passmore\nacknowledges the inspiration of Anderson’s lectures in his own\nworks on Hume, philosophical reasoning, Ralph Cudworth, perfectibility\nand his history of one hundred years of philosophy." ], "section_title": "4. A Systematic Realism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "5. Specific Fields", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAnderson wrote a Textbook on Logic in the early 1920s\n(JAA, Textbook on Logic, released 2010) and its fate\ntells us much about his philosophical ambitions. According to his\nbiographer, Anderson submitted the manuscript not to narrowly academic\npublishers but to A. R. Orage, the editor of The New Age\n(Kennedy 1995 p. 64), described by the historian of Scottish\nphilosophy, George Davie, as serving a readership “of\nlibertarian and often leftist autodidacts” (Davie 1977 p. 57).\nUnder Orage the journal was nonetheless a highly influential avant\ngarde modernist vehicle for literary and political criticism. Anderson\nconceived his logic to have wider cultural aims than merely codifying\nforms of reasoning and when Orage rejected the work due to its\nsupposed eccentricity Anderson was deeply disappointed.", "\nLogic for Anderson is concerned with statements, and not with\nquestions, commands, prescriptions, exhortations or other forms of\nexpression. Logic is concerned fundamentally with statements that\nraise an “objective issue” and these other forms of speech\ndo so only indirectly (JAA, Lectures on Scientific\nMethod, c.1950). Discourse implies a common logic of assertion,\nimplication and definition (EMP, 6). Apparent\ndifferences in logical form are due simply to different modes of\nexpression. Any statement, if it is saying anything at all, can be\nshown by transformation into logical form to be asserting some matter\nof fact: a description of a certain thing as being of a certain kind,\na claim that something is the case. Anderson’s students were set\na range of statements to be transformed into one of the four\nAristotelian propositional forms, traditionally designated as the A,\nE, I and O forms. In any field, until questions or issues are posed in\none of these four propositional forms they will inevitably be confused\nand potentially misleading bases for inquiry.", "\nSo, from typical examination papers in Andersonian logic:", "\nIn Anderson’s view of traditional logic, the universal\nproposition “All As are B” asserts the\nsimple fact that all As are B; a thing’s being of\na certain sort is the irreducible minimum of a fact or state of\naffairs; there is no assertion of some “general\nconnection” over and above that fact. Nor does the universal\nproposition assert that some class relation holds between A and\nB – the assertion of a class relation is just a way of\nsaying that certain propositions are true. Nor is it about some\ntotality A: it asserts simply of each and every A that\nit is B. And although it does not directly assert the existence\nof A, it certainly presupposes it. It is indeed the great\nvirtue for Anderson of his version of traditional logic that it fully\nbrings out the existential presuppositions of the proposition. In\naddition, Anderson thinks that what are often taken to be supreme\nlogical truths (for example, identity statements) are not truths at\nall, for they say nothing. There is no analytic truth: if a\nproposition says anything at all, it can be false. Anderson rejects\nthe view that mathematical truths are so only within a calculus, that\nis, derivable from a given set of chosen postulates.", "\nAnderson rejects Mill’s view that universal statements are\ngeneralisations from experience. Universal propositions cannot be\nderived by generalisation from particular experiences, because there\nsimply are no such immediate experiences. Such truths are derived from\nother universal propositions and tested in experience. In discussing\nthe functions of subjects, predicates and the copula in propositions\nand the logical relations between propositions, logic is already\ndiscussing universals, individuals, identity, space-time and\ncausality. And, contra Mill’s inductivism, because we have\ndirect experience of generality and of relations, a single instance is\nsufficient to establish the universal proposition (say, that all glass\nis brittle). Further investigation may challenge such assertions since\nall our beliefs are fallible but wholesale doubt is simply not an\noption. The logical gap between particulars and universals that\ninductive reasoning proposes is a gap that no amount of human\nreasoning could hope to span. Hume was right in this, but instead of\nembracing skepticism he should have concluded as did William James\nthat generality and relations are as much a part of our experience as\nare particulars.", "\nThe validity of the syllogism is fundamental and Anderson rejects the\nabsolute independence from syllogistic reasoning of other forms of\nreasoning such as the relational, hypothetical and disjunctive. The\nsyllogism demonstrates clearly that the subject in one proposition can\nfunction as the predicate in another. The difference between subject\nand predicate is purely one of function: the function of the subject\nterm is to locate, that of the predicate to describe. There are not\ntwo classes of entities involved here; that is, there are no pure\nlocations/particulars/substances, just as there are no pure\ndescriptions/universals. There is no logical gap that needs to be\nspanned between subject and predicate terms: any term can play the\nrole of particular or general, subject or predicate. ", "\nFor Anderson logic is the science of the most general features of\nreality. Logic is not simply a useful calculus following on from an\ninitial choice of primitives, and Anderson’s logic is not simply\none version of predicate calculus among others. His view is that logic\ndescribes the general structure of facts and the relations between\nthem. It provides the conditions of possibility for all discourse, but\nit is not about forms of language nor about special status entities\nsuch as universals. It is about the most general features of facts.\nUnderlying this propositional view of reality is the thesis that\nthings within space and time are irreducibly complex. Every situation\nhas both particular and general aspects represented by the subject and\npredicate functions within the proposition. Every predicate can be the\nsubject of a further proposition. The simplest unit is a being there\nand so, a state of affairs in which a particular is characterised in\nsome specific way, but neither the particular nor the universal could\nexist independently. We never arrive at absolutely simple elements in\nany field. The quest for such simples urged by Russell, Moore and the\nearly Wittgenstein indicated a residual rationalist element in their\nthinking. On the other hand, against the idealist opponents of these\nearly realists, Anderson of course insisted that no entities could be\nconstituted, wholly or in part, by their relations\n(EMP, 43). ", "\nMackie described Anderson as the last of the Aristotelian logicians\nand observed some awkward consequences for his conception of logic:\nthe problem of false propositions; the absence of a way of\ndealing with singular propositions; an inability to deal with multiple\nquantification; the difficulty in expressing relational propositions\nin subject-predicate and syllogistic form. For Mackie, any logic\ndealing with false propositions, relations of contradiction and\ncontrariety, entertained arguments, falsifications and reductions\nad absurdum must be something more than an account of\npropositions as what is there (Mackie 1985).", "\nAnderson distinguished idealism’s substance-attribute logic that\nhad been condemned by Russell from his own subject-predicate logic.\nNonetheless, his Aristotelian logic of everyday experience did seem to\nsit uneasily with the broader search for logics that could more\nadequately capture forms of reasoning across a wide variety of\ndomains. Ontological logics like Anderson’s came to seem\n“naively realistic and Aristotelian”, and “hard to\nhang on to” in the history of twentieth century philosophy\n(Rorty 1986). It is not just that 20th century philosophy’s\n“counter-intuitive redescription and relativisation to choice of\nprimitives” (Rorty 1986) ignored Anderson’s insistence\nthat logic is not a calculus. Technical developments in the logic of\nmodal, tense and relational terms proceeded without reference to\nAnderson’s form of onto-logic." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Logic" }, { "content": [ "\nNonetheless, a traditional form of metaphysics did make a resurgence\nin the last quarter of the century in the work of Anderson’s\nstudent, D. M. Armstrong. Armstrong accepts against Anderson that the\nnature of space and time is a matter for scientific investigation, as\nis the identification of real properties – Anderson’s view\nof three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time as\n“ontological bed-rock”, for example, simply cannot be\nsustained (Armstrong, introduction to STC). But he\nfinds real interest in Anderson’s conception of the categories,\nas elaborated in the lectures on Samuel Alexander, recently published\nas Space, Time and the Categories: Lectures on Metaphysics\n(STC – published from typescript lectures in\nArmstrong’s possession and originally presented in\n1949–50). In his introduction to these lectures, Armstrong\nwrites:", "\nThe categories of being dive so deep that though quantum physics and\nother physics may have interesting things to say to philosophy –\nin particular whether causation is in fact deterministic – the\nissues are not susceptible of being resolved at the level of\nexperimental science, yet seem to be real issues. Science may be able\nto cast light on whether causation is irreducibly statistical or not,\nbut how can it decide what causation is in itself? Is it just a\nuniversal or statistical regularity? Or is it something deeper in the\nnature of things? What of the properties and quantities in which\nscience inevitably traffics? Are they just concepts in our minds, or\nsomethings in the objects that our concepts merely reflect?\n(STC, x)\n", "\nIn these lectures Anderson systematically derived the number of\ncategories and their ordering from the nature of the proposition and\nits subject-predicate structure. The result was a scheme of 13\ncategories, laid out in Hegel-like “succession” organized\nin three groups with the categories of Universality and Quantity\nacting as “link categories” in the two transitions between\nthe groups.", "\nArmstrong concludes:", "\n[W]ith this scheme, John Anderson joins a very distinguished line of\nphilosophers who have presented us with a set of categories. We have\nfirst Plato (the doctrine of Highest Kinds in his dialogue The\nSophist), then Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Samuel Alexander.\n(STC, xiii)\n", "\nDespite his appreciation of Hegel, Anderson thought that Kant had laid\n“the foundations for a logic of things as historical” and\nhere “Hegel can be regarded only as reactionary”\n(EMP, 83). Kant had shown that the objects of science\nare just the objects of observation, that “matter” is\nsomething we perceive and not something lying behind our perceptions.\nKant’s answer to Hume was that things perceived are connected\nwith one another; they pass through and affect one another in various\nways because they are related in space and time. We are aware of such\nrelations in being aware of anything at all. But Anderson insists\nagainst Kant that relations are known on the same level as the\nrelated. Kant was still subject to the assumptions of\nrepresentationalism, and thought of the objects of science as mere\nphenomena. Kant viewed space and time as forms of intuition under\nwhich we must experience the world. He viewed the categories such as\ncausality and substance as forms of understanding under which we must\nunderstand the world. Things-in-themselves are not given to us in\nexperience, and so remain beyond our cognitive grasp. In this way Kant\nset up an untenable division in reality between phenomena and\nthings-in-themselves, and along with this division the idea that our\nthoughts, practices and forms of inquiry in some way create or\nconstitute the reality we inhabit, act upon and investigate. Anderson,\nfollowing Samuel Alexander, proposed a realist alternative such that\nspace and time would be considered not as forms of intuition, but as\nforms of being, the categories not as forms of understanding but as\ncategories of being, categories under which all being must fall. On\nsuch a proposal we can recognise the objects of science as\nthings-in-themselves.", "\nAnderson claimed to have avoided the pitfalls of traditional\nmetaphysical questions concerning the reality of universals through\nhis account of the proposition (cf., “‘Universals’\nand Occurrences”, EMP). H. O. Mounce has\nsuggested that Anderson’s realism may not be able to avoid the\nissue. In particular, his account of universals is in danger of\ncollapsing into nominalism on the question of whether the directly\nperceived relation (say, of causality) is on separate occasions\none and the same (for Mounce, anything less than complete\nidentity would be a retreat to nominalism – Mounce 1989). Mounce\nsuggests that Anderson may not be able to hold off a Humean challenge\nhere. He would be drawn back to a familiar realist-nominalist debate\non the nature of universals, which may explain why Armstrong’s\nphilosophy takes seriously Plato’s question of the one and the\nmany as the starting point for metaphysical reflection (Armstrong\n1997). From a Quinean perspective, however, Armstrong’s\nmetaphysics, despite its improved scientific credentials, remains\nattentive to old school pseudo-questions (Quine 1953). (Michael Devitt\nexplicitly associates Armstrong with Quine’s parody of the\ntraditional Scottish metaphysician “McX” in Devitt\n2010.)", "\nFor his more empirically-minded students, Anderson’s logic\nseemed to rely upon an unwelcome element of a priorism. Any\nweakening of our confidence in Anderson’s identification of\nlogic and ontology, for example, would critically undermine\nsignificant components of the position. First, it would no longer be\nclear that things spoken of together must exist in the same way\n– the notion of a single level of being would become a matter\nfor investigation (what kinds of differences exist) rather than\ndetermined by general principle (Mackie 1985). Regarding his social\nthought, the importance of individuals’ behaviour in explaining\nthe nature and operation of social movements and institutions would\nrequire investigation, rather than a pronouncement based purely on\ngeneral grounds. Again, Anderson’s rejection of the rationalist\nview that there must be simple or ultimate units upon which\ncomplex things can be built would not lead without further argument to\nthe view that there cannot be such simple parts or totalities\n(Mackie 1985).", "\nAccording to Anderson, David Hume’s skepticism was a direct\nresult of his inability to work out a logic, to create a coherent\naccount of existence. But his mentor at Edinburgh, Norman Kemp Smith,\nhad long argued that Hume’s importance was in demonstrating the\nfactual limits of all logic. If Hume had failed to work out a logic to\nAnderson’s satisfaction this was because in his view\nphilosophers should resist the temptation of this kind of\n“systematic working out” altogether (Davie 1977).\nHume’s reservations about a “systematic working out”\nhave emerged in another form with the “linguistic\nreturn” proposed by Huw Price, who became the first\nappointment to the Challis Chair of Philosophy within a united\ndepartment at Sydney since the split of 1974. Price describes the\nproject as a “linguistic retooling of metaphysics” (Price\n2011, p. 18) and the attempt specifically to avoid Mackie’s\n“placement” issue which arises from an obsession with the\nrepresentational aspect of language (although Mackie himself regarded\nthis with Anderson as an ontological issue – see section 5.4\nbelow). On Price’s view plurality exists in the world of an\nentirely familiar kind: a plurality of ways of talking and ways of\nbehaviour which don’t need to be mirrored in an ontology of any\nkind.", "\nIt has been observed that Anderson’s most prominent students\naccepted in fact very little of his system. It is still the case that\ntheir most fundamental philosophical commitments can be traced to the\nboldness of Anderson’s position. And Armstrong suggests that the\nphilosopher at some point can only outline his or her most basic\ncommitments. Stephen Mumford summarises Armstrong’s own position as\nfollows: no God, no non-spatial minds, no abstract\nentities beyond space-time, no Platonic forms or realm of universals;\nan austere ontology without transcendent universals, realm of numbers,\ntranscendent standards of value, timeless propositions, non-existent\nobjects, possibilia, possible worlds, abstract classes (Mumford 2007\np. 5). Armstrong diverges from Anderson in his emphasis upon\nscientific naturalism, in the position that the world is to be\ncompletely described in terms of a completed physics. What properties\nexist will ultimately be determined solely by science, and the results\nwill inevitably seem counter-intuitive within the perspective of\nAristotelian common sense. But for Armstrong this scientific view can\nbe reconciled with a form of metaphysical realism derived from\nAnderson’s teaching which takes universals to exist immanently\nrather than in a transcendent realm; which takes the world to contain\nnothing but particulars having properties and being related to each\nother; which takes the world to be nothing but a single\nspatio-temporal system; which regards reality as a world of states of\naffairs conceived as particulars bearing properties; which insists\nthat states of affairs are the smallest units of existence since\nneither particulars nor universals are capable of independent\nexistence. " ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Metaphysics" }, { "content": [ "\nThe Greeks, according to Anderson,", "\nare far clearer on many questions than modern philosophers …\nthey avoid many modern errors, and especially … they are not,\nlike the moderns, obsessed with ‘the problem of knowledge’\n– they do not set out to discover (i.e., to know!) how, or how\nmuch, we can know, before they are prepared to know anything. This\n‘criticism of the instrument’ amounts to scientific\ndefeatism, and the instrumental view of mind has both prevented a\nknowledge of minds themselves, and hampered the direct inquiry into\nlogical and other scientific problems. (EMP, 82)\n", "\nAnderson’s Hegelian diagnoses of the obsessions of modern\nphilosophy and Cartesianism with epistemology are likely to elicit\nrecognition and appreciation from many contemporary readers.\nCartesianism in modern philosophy represented for Anderson an\nanti-classicist movement: an antipathy towards history and tradition.\nModern philosophy searched within abstract rationality as the ground\nof human knowledge, rather than in concrete and many-sided culture.\nThe whole modern era was characterised by this lack of concreteness\n(EMP, 195). ", "\nHegel in this regard stands out as a lonely classical figure within\nthe history of modern philosophy (EMP, 201).\nPhilosophy since Descartes has become infected by practicalism and\nprogressivism and logic has been reduced to the status of an\ninstrument, a generalised method for acquiring new knowledge. Along\nwith this instrumental view of logic came contempt for the syllogism,\nreplaced by Bacon with “inductive reasoning” and by\nDescartes with rational intuition. ", "\nEmpiricism for Anderson is primarily the denial of any higher form of\nbeing, any other reality by which experienced reality can be found\nwanting, or dependent, or in a position of striving to emulate, and so\nforth. So also, the importance of modern realism lies not in its\naccount of knowledge, but its development of a theory of independence,\nthe rejection of any conception of relative existence and the\ndevelopment of a logic of situations (JAA, Philosophy\nII Distinction Lectures, 1937).", "\nThere is no criterion of “truth”, “nothing by\nbelieving which we believe something else”\n(EMP, 55). Truth is simply what is conveyed by the\ncopula, the “is” of the proposition. It cannot reside in\ncorrespondence between a believed proposition and something else we\ncall reality, nor in relations between propositions in terms of\ncoherence. Propositions are not forms of words: we convey our beliefs\nby words, but what we are putting forward for acceptance is not the\nform of words but the state of affairs itself. Representionalist and\ncorrespondence theories of truth are “attempts to get behind the\nproposition – to maintain (in words!) that we mean more than we\ncan say.” (EMP, 5). We must abandon the notion\nof “thought” as something contrasted with or identified\nwith things. Our thoughts are just our dealings with things –\nAnderson shared with Norman Kemp Smith a quasi-Calvinist conception of\nknowledge as a striving and grappling with problems rather than\nmirroring an external reality. Anderson dismisses most contemporary\nphilosophies as “varieties of representationalism”\n(EMP, 87). The proposition is not “about”\nanything in the sense of representing an external reality. ", "\nOne of Anderson’s most audacious articles was the 1934\n“Mind as Feeling” which attempts to work out exactly how\nmentality should be conceived as belonging to the spatio-temporal\nrealm. Anderson believed that once we admit the spatial nature of mind\nor of anything mental, “Cartesianism goes”\n(JAA, Lectures on Reid, 1935.) The mental realm\nconsists as much of situations as the natural and social world, so our\nknowledge of mind is on the same footing as the non-mental. He\nrepudiates the Cartesian subject-object model which sees\nphilosophy’s task as the study of the medium for knowledge\nunderstood as the relation whereby one entity reproduces within itself\nthe essence or intrinsic characteristics of some other entity. There\nis no such medium for there are not different entities within space\nand time requiring such mediation. There is no “knower”\nconceived as a point of consciousness that has stepped outside\nhistory, outside of space and time. In our striving and grappling with\nillusions so as to come to terms with ourselves and the things around\nus we never step outside the movement of things, nor see behind the\nproposition; never reach outside the realm of propositional claim and\ncounter-claim.", "\nWhat is this thing that strives? Anderson adopts a Nietzschean,\npre-Socratic view of mentality as a social structure of instincts and\npassions competing and cooperating. It is the emotions or feelings\nthemselves that strive. The passion of curiosity, for example, is the\nactual agent of inquiry. There is no entity of conscious willing that\ndirects our attention on the world. “Part of the deception, of\ncourse, part of the ‘analytic’ myth, is of an egoistic\ncharacter (‘what do I find when I set my analysis\nmachine rumbling?’), and this is opposed to the fact that\nlanguage and inquiry are inherent in social life, are at all stages\npart of communication.” (EMP, 181.)", "\nThat critical inquiry itself rests on the existence of specific ways\nof carrying on and proceeds from within some definite way of life,\nprovides one important link with the ethical aspect of\nAnderson’s thought. Such ways of life which lift individuals out\nof their humdrum existence and base material concerns are what\nAnderson regards as the embodiment of ethical goodness. For Anderson\nif the good exists we must find it as a natural quality in this world,\njust as we come to know and identify other natural qualities. However,\nthe good is not merely something we discover, but “that by which\nwe discover things” (EMP, 266). Anderson was\naware that his view of the good as a natural quality would not\nconvince everyone, and that he could do little to convert the\ndoubters. But he claimed that there will be those who recognise the\ntruth of his position, seeing this view of the good as\n“something with which they have long been in a certain way\nacquainted” (EMP, 267)." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Epistemology" }, { "content": [ "\n“We do not, in fact, step out of the movement of things, ask\n‘What am I to do?’ and, having obtained an answer, step in\nagain. All our actions, all our questionings and answerings, are part\nof the movement of things.” (EMP, 241). ", "\nPositive ethical inquiry for Anderson is concerned with the\nidentification of good as a natural quality and he finds that this\nmost naturally pertains to certain actually existing practices and\nways of living in the world of common experience. Traditionally the\ngood has been identified abstractly as an end to be achieved or aimed\nfor, either as a transcendent reality to which we can only aspire (but\nwhich in some unexplained way is supposed to guide our moral actions)\nor as an end external to our actions in the real world and by which\nthose actions may be evaluated; for example, some optimal quantum of\nhappiness or welfare for the greatest number of people involved. In\neither case, a relational explanation is mistakenly offered in place\nof identifying a real quality. This has been the problem with\nvirtually all moral thought since the Greeks, although Anderson\nthought that G. E. Moore had made important advances in our thinking\non these matters. Anderson proposes that the good exists in forms of\nenterprise, productive activities capable of developing in a special\nway by means of “communication” – individuals are\ncaught up in these goods and in the process transcend their more\nimmediate and mundane goals and demands. Any theory of social life\nmust take account of activities with no formulated end: customs,\nregular forms of behaviour, and practices which precede the\nformulation of ends (JAA, Philosophical Implications\nof Marxism, 1945).", "\nValues have objective reality, but not in a transcendent realm\ndivorced from this world of facts or states of affairs. Anderson\nagrees that “the way things are” includes moral facts:\n“it is impossible to discuss social processes except in terms of\nways of living or forms of enterprise, and that is moral\ncharacterisation” (EMP, 330). But he cannot\naccept that moral characterisation entails moral prescription because\nthis would commit us to a morality of commands, and to programmes for\naction and reform designed to achieve a merely external good. The\nimportance of ethical inquiry is in giving an account of\nproductive activities which entail the operation of a certain\nmentality or spirit. Within such activities there is no question of\nexternal ends or rewards to be achieved. Goodness exists in free,\nspontaneous participation in such movements and activities (although\nnot of course in the metaphysical sense of undetermined free will\n– such practices, social movements and ways of life are not\nthings we as individuals “opt into” at will; they in a\nsense adopt us). Acting because we feel obliged so\nto act is on this view an indication of the absence of\ngoodness. Although the notion of “virtue” does not much\nappeal to him, Anderson’s emphasis upon the transformative role\nof practices and ways of life upon the ethical outlook of the\nindividual does seem to accord with many of the major preoccupations\nof virtue ethicists. Alasdair Macintyre recognises the value to\ncontemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics of Anderson’s\nHeraclitean appreciation of conflict and the importance he attributes\nto critical traditions (Macintyre 1981).", "\nEthics is especially concerned to bring out the facts of conflict, the\nopposition of different strains in things in general, but in human and\nmental life most particularly. The category of causality is central to\nthe ethical sphere – false views of causality represent the\nattempt to escape conflict, to gain a standpoint above that of strife\nand interlocking tensions (JAA, Lectures on\nCriticism, 1954). Positive ethics exhibits the good life as constantly\nstruggling with difficulties and other types of life driven by\nexternal or instrumental considerations (JAA,\nLectures on Greek Theories of Education, 1954). The good exists in\nstruggle and so cannot be made secure (JAA,\nPhilosophy I Lectures, 1943). In all spheres of life the good can only\nmake its stand. Attempts at reconciliation and compromise often\nobscure the issues and may well prove detrimental to the good. The\nresulting Heraclitean harmony is best served by this stance of\nindependence and intransigence.", "\nSociological inquiry is appropriate for the bulk of traditional moral\nterms. Forms of social organisation develop regular habits of action\nwhich come to be seen as obligatory: rights, duties and so forth are\neasily understood by those involved in the same way of life. Bourgeois\nsociety is based on commodification and contractual relations. The\nmarket destroys folk life and with it one important source by which\nculture can be refreshed (JAA, Lectures on Marx,\n1950). Marxism has made important advances in this area but Anderson\nnotes the “simple-mindedness” of most Marxists on moral\nquestions – altruism seems to be the peak of their thinking\nabout morality (Cf., remarks on Kautsky, EMP, 321)\nand little consideration is given to the importance of a plurality of\nways of living.", "\nParticipation in disinterested activities represents the ethical value\nof “devotion to a cause”. Anderson even offers a\nsociological interpretation of sin as a person’s sense of\ninadequacy to social movements, one’s inability to keep the flag\nflying, to devote oneself thoroughly to these kinds of activity. Sin\nappears then as a kind of backsliding and subjectivism: the individual\nsetting him or herself up as the standard. Anderson was opposed to all\nforms of religious instruction and interference in educational\npractice, but he occasionally shocked his students with a\nquasi-theological appreciation of the existence of evil in the world.\nPassmore commented that forms of religion that emphasise that our life\nis not of our making and that it goes on independently of our plans,\nare far more preferable in Anderson’s view to any form of\nsecular sentimental humanism (Passmore, Introduction to\nEMP).", "\nJ. L. Mackie regarded Anderson’s positive conception of goods as\nbeing “hopeless as an account of moral talk and reasoning”\n(Mackie 1985). However, despite being one of the current standard\nbearers for anti-realism in ethics the manner in which Mackie posed\nthe question of the subjectivity of values owes much to\nAnderson’s ontological standpoint. Mackie seemed at pains to\nexplain that his subjectivist view of ethical terms complied with\nAnderson’s main concern. Subjectivism in ethics is for Mackie\nthe doctrine that objective facts in this field do not include any\ndescriptive assignment of goodness or rightness of actions. It is\n“precisely because we want to distinguish what is simply and\nabsolutely the case that we say values/obligations are\nrelative.” (Mackie 1985). Mackie suggested that linguistic\nphilosophy had made the realist-antirealist opposition a philosophical\npseudo-question, and that with renewed interest in ontological issues\nthis opposition returned in a pressing form in the\n“placement” issue regarding various “queer”\nentities in the world.", "\nRush Rhees was a student of Anderson’s at Edinburgh and, of\ncourse, later of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s. Like Mackie, he was\ncritical of Anderson’s ethical theory, but from the other pole\nin that he was more inclined towards Anderson’s positive view of\nethics. He regarded Anderson’s notion of a “way of\nlife” as at some level the same as Wittgenstein’s (Rhees\n1969). But he came to think that Anderson paid too little attention to\nthe ways in which moral questions are posed for individuals, that\nAnderson too readily portrayed individual concerns as base,\negocentric, low concerns in contrast with the uplifting concerns\nresulting from participation in social movements. Anderson, Rhees\nconcluded, had no appreciation for the urgency with which moral\nquestions presented themselves to individuals (Rhees 1999, p. xiii),\nnor their distinctive character compared to more practical questions\nof how to go on. However, Rhees always emphasised the Andersonian\nlesson that values are rooted in different traditions and movements.\nWe have to resist the temptation to locate values in a realm which\ntranscends these contexts. It is futile to argue that the moral\nindividual is located in a realm outside history, outside the\nparticularities of space and time. Only in these contexts do the\nindividual’s convictions, problems, struggles and difficulties\nhave their sense. Resources for criticism of moral codes exist within\nmovements, and criticism develops only within ways of living. Notions\nof the “common good” generally conceal special interests\n(Rhees 1989, p. 53)." ], "subsection_title": "5.4 Ethics" }, { "content": [ "\nAnderson’s moral and political thought was strongly influenced\nby the writings of the French socialist Georges Sorel (and before him\nthe libertarian socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon). Although Anderson\nabandoned communism and socialism as movements whose time had passed,\nthe influence of these thinkers for whom socialism was a moral\nmovement remained with him (Cole 2009). In all fields of human\nactivity, there is a conflict between what Sorel described as the\n“ethic of the producer”, characterised by spontaneous and\ncooperative endeavour, and the ethic of the consumer, characterised by\nan instrumental morality of reward and punishment, obligation and\nexpectation, an ethic most perfectly suited in sociological terms to\nthe marketplace (and in purely psychological terms to the compulsive\nobligations of the neurotic personality). More accurately, for\nAnderson, the ethic of the consumer is an ethic without a\ntheme. In history there are classical periods of cultural\nachievement in contrast with periods in which we struggle to find a\ntheme at all; that is, periods in which nothing really happens,\nnothing develops from within. Anderson also admired Vico’s\ncyclical view of history and by the 1940s had not only resigned\nhimself to the collapse of heroic 19th century socialism, but\ndiscerned in the era of post-war optimism and state planning the early\nstages of one of Vico’s periods of barbarism\n(EMP, 290). More positively, for Anderson the\nrejection of all totalising views, the thesis that “no formula\ncovers all things”, has the practical consequence of supporting\nand encouraging “a life of responsibility and adventure”\nfor those prepared to face the situation (EMP,\n86).", "\nAnderson intended to combat the influence of idealism in our thinking\non political issues evident since Plato’s Republic. The\nmodernist, realist project he meant to develop in opposition to the\npolitical outlook of British Idealism would draw upon the major\ntheorists of conflict, struggle and cyclic historical movement:\nHeraclitus, Vico and Sorel. In place of a simple contrast between\nindividual and state Anderson insisted upon the complex interplay of\nmovements, institutions and traditions. In place of an unargued\ntendency towards ever greater social harmony he insisted on the\ninevitability of conflict and constant adjustment, the persistent\ndanger of regress, and the consequent need for clear lines of critical\nengagement. Order is a Heraclitean state of balance between complex\ninteracting forces rather than a normative standard by which to\nmeasure existing social and political formations. Conflict is not an\nindication of social dysfunction which needs to be overcome or\nrationalised away, but a necessary feature of any social institution.\nAny notion of an ideal state without such features can have no bearing\non our present real life situation.", "\nAnderson’s political thought is distinctive for his rejection of\nthe state as the fundamental object of political investigation and\nreflection. This aspect of his thought aligns rather strongly with\nmodern Nietzschean and anti-humanist political thought. For Anderson\nthe social is not reducible to agreements among atomic individuals. In\nhis anti-individualist statements, however, he seems to echo an\nidealist view of social movements portrayed, for example, by Bernard\nBosanquet who similarly decried the “repellent isolation”\nof atomist individualism. Culture and human achievement depend upon\nthe capacity of human beings to engage in activities that take them\noutside themselves. Apart from these struggles with nature or within\nbroad social movements, a person collapses into non-entity (Bosanquet\n1899, pp. xxxiii ff.). ", "\nAnderson’s rejection of good as an end to be achieved applied to\nhis ultimate rejection of socialism as a progressive movement and of\nMarxism in particular. “The doctrine of history as struggle is\nat once the liberal and the scientific part of Marxism; the doctrine\nof socialism as something to be established (‘classless\nsociety’) is its servile part” (EMP,\n339). Socialism for Anderson was not a goal to be achieved but a\nmovement to be joined. The amelioration of social conditions of the\nworkers would be achieved by the workers themselves in the process of\nasserting the value and validity of their way of life within the wider\nsocio-political sphere. But once alleviation became the primary goal\nof the workers’ movement and representatives, that movement was\nfinished as a progressive and liberating force. It could be bought off\nby employers and the state. Socialism understood as a force lobbying\nfor state action and funding to redress market inequities had become\nmired in “servility” as a matter of historical fact." ], "subsection_title": "5.5 Social and Political Thought" }, { "content": [ "\nIn the 1950s, Anderson retreated from broad political theory which had\nbeen a feature of his lectures and writings of the 1940s, and attended\nmore to local and institutional questions. This new emphasis emerged\nin his lectures on education and on criticism. Central to\nAnderson’s view of education is the rejection of any utilitarian\nor instrumental view of education, the view of education as a means to\nsome other purpose. Education needs to be understood as an activity\nwith positive characteristics of its own. Education is critical,\ndevoted to developing and discarding hypotheses, to seeing through\npretensions of all kinds. It means for the individual “finding a\nway of life” and it affects the whole life of the educated\nindividual. Critical intellectual life survives as a social tradition,\na “movement” to which individuals are attracted and in\nwhich they are caught up.", "\nAnderson’s classicism promotes the history of European culture\nfrom the early Greeks as a tradition of critical thought that can\nrefresh and fortify contemporary education against the predations of\npracticalism and servility in the modern world. Education is concerned\nwith training in taste and judgement. The educated individual is not\nshackled by the assumptions of his society or group\n(JAA, Lectures on the Educational Theories of Spencer\nand Dewey, 1949). But to play its part, education must resist outside\nstandards (such as those set by the attitudes and capacities of\ncommercial society, or by the vocational needs of business) as to what\nis to be allowed and valued in institutions of education. Rhees\nsuggested that Anderson was primarily concerned with a “grammar\nschool education”, one not suited to the “masses”\n(Rhees 1969 p. 168). In particular, for Anderson, vocational and\nmoralistic standards have to be resisted. True learning is not easy\nand cannot be made easy – it advances only through overcoming\nresistances. The inquiring life has to stand up for itself. It is just\nas real, just as practical, just as positive a part of society as\nother activities (J. L. Mackie, in EAI).", "\nAny activity or institution of learning can proceed only along the\nlines of certain traditions with custodians and in terms of common\nactivities (JAA, Lectures on Greek Theories of\nEducation, 1954). For education is simply one struggling tendency in\nsociety itself among others – even within institutions\nsupposedly devoted to educational aims, true educational values have\nto be fought for. ", "\nAnderson’s lectures on education are of interest because they\ninclude the most extensive account of his appreciation for the\nclassicism of Matthew Arnold, but more particularly of his attitude\ntowards the philosophy of John Dewey. Besides his early\nacknowledgement of the importance of William James (at least the more\nmetaphysical writings on radical empiricism) and his critical articles\non F. C. S. Schiller, the consideration of Dewey’s educational\ntheory is the most important reflection on American pragmatism in\nAnderson’s work. The question of the relation of theory to\npractice was one that exercised Anderson repeatedly. His position was\nthat the connection was a close one, but not in the direction that he\nassumed pragmatism urged. Theory was not dependent upon practice for\nthe validity of its findings. Rather inquiry proceeded from particular\nkinds of practice. Certain forms of life made possible an objective\nview of things. Moreover, theory was not subsidiary to practice in an\ninstrumental sense because it was itself a distinct form of practice\nwith its own requirements and standards. Anderson reflected upon this\nquestion both in the lectures on education but also in his lectures on\nMarxism and most particularly on Marx’s Theses on\nFeuerbach where he was concerned to dispute Sidney Hook’s\npragmatist reading of the theses (JAA, Philosophical\nImplications of Marxism). Both the fact of his consideration of the\nenigmatic Theses and his substantial conclusions on the\nrelation of theory to practice would have resonated with the\nAlthusserian Marxists in the Department of General Philosophy in the\n1970s. " ], "subsection_title": "5.6 Education" }, { "content": [ "\nAnderson’s influence extended beyond the confines of the\nacademy. One of Anderson’s students, a young man from the\nPacific island of Tonga, Futa Helu, later claimed that John\nAnderson’s realism had revolutionised his thinking, particularly\nwith reference to the notion of “tapu” or the sacred, as\nthe cover-up for the special demands of the ruling class in Tonga.\nReturning to Tonga in the early 1960s, he founded the Atenisi (Athens)\nInstitute as an independent high school based on the ideals of Greek\nphilosophy. He added “Atenisi University” in 1975, where\nthe philosophical thought of Heraclitus as interpreted by Anderson\nbecame the backbone of philosophy courses. Following Anderson’s\nexample of public engagement, Helu is credited as one of the\nintellectual architects of the democracy movement in Tonga (Keith\nCampbell, personal communication).", "\nAnderson’s influence on the self-styled “Sydney\nPush” is more widely known. The latter was a diffuse sub-culture\nof anarchist libertarians who met around Sydney’s inner city in\nthe 1950s and 1960s. Members were imbued with a spirit of\nanti-careerism, and a major influence in their meetings, talks and\ndrinking sessions was the philosophy of John Anderson who had lectured\nmany of them on the value of risk, endeavour, withdrawal from\nconsumerist society and the overriding value of criticism to the\nhealth of a society. Through his influence on many of these figures,\nAnderson affected the tone of intellectual debate and discussion in\nSydney and beyond. If the key figures of the movement are relatively\nunknown, there were more famous figures who moved through this\nenvironment and were on their own accounts deeply affected by its\nintellectual stimulus: such figures as Germaine Greer, Robert Hughes\nand Clive James.", "\nMore centrally involved with the life of the Push over an extended\nperiod and more particularly with the direct teachings of John\nAnderson was the anarchist activist and philosopher George Molnar. He\nattended Anderson’s lectures in the 1950s and was active in\ndebates on metaphysical questions in the 1960s associated with\nArmstrong and C. B. Martin. Students recall Armstrong and Molnar in\nthe university quadrangle around 1970 arguing about dispositions and\npowers with an intensity no doubt propelled by their political\ndisagreements at the time. Molnar conducted courses on anarchism and\neducation theory in the early 1970s but in 1976 resigned his position\nat the university, a move consistent with the anti-careerist ethos of\nthe Push and of the radical politics of the time. Perhaps he also\nfound his philosophical interests on the wrong side of an\nirreconcilable split within the department. Some thirty years later,\nhe returned to academic life to take up a part-time position as John\nAnderson Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, but died\nunexpectedly in 2002. His book Powers: a study in metaphysics\nwas published posthumously in 2007 by Oxford University Press at the\nurging of his old adversary D. M. Armstrong." ], "subsection_title": "6. Influence Beyond the University: the Sydney Push" } ] } ]	[ "Armstrong, D. M., 1977, “On Metaphysics”,\nQuadrant, 21 (7): 64–69.", "–––, 1997, Universals and Scientific\nRealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2001, “Interview”, Matters\nof the Mind: Poems, Essays and Interviews in Honour of Leonie\nKramer, Lee Jobling and Catherine Runcie (eds.), Sydney:\nUniversity of Sydney Press, 322–32.", "Baker, A. J., 1979, The Social Thought and Political Life of\nProfessor John Anderson, Sydney: Angus and Robertson.", "–––, 1986, Australian Realism: the\nSystematic Philosophy of John Anderson, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Barcun, A., 2002, Radical Students: the Old left at Sydney\nUniversity, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.", "Birchall, B., 1983, “The Problem of Form”,\nInternational Studies in Philosophy, 15: 15–40.", "Bosanquet, Bernard, 1899, The Philosophical Theory of the\nState, London: Macmillan.", "Boucher, David, 1990, “Practical Hegelianism: Henry\nJones’s Lecture Tour of Australia”, Journal of the\nHistory of Ideas, 51(3): 423–52.", "Brandom, Robert, 2000, Articulating Reasons: an introduction\nto inferentialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Cole, Creagh McLean, 2009, “John Anderson’s Political\nThought Revisited”, Australian Journal of Political\nScience, 44(2): 229–44.", "–––, 2010, “The Ethic of the Producers:\nSorel, Anderson and Macintyre”, History of Political\nThought, 31(1): 155–76.", "Damousi, Joy, 2005, Freud in the Antipodes: A Cultural History\nof Psychoanalysis in Australia, Sydney: University of New South\nWales Press.", "Davie, George, 1961, The Democratic intellect: Scotland and\nHer Universities in the Nineteenth Century, Edinburgh: Edinburgh\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 1977, “John Anderson in\nScotland”, Quadrant, 21(7): 55–57.", "Devitt, Michael, 2010, “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or\n‘Mirage Realism’”, in Putting Metaphysics First:\nEssays on Metaphysics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Eddy, Harry, 1944, “Ethics and Politics”,\nAustralasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 22:\n70–92.", "Franklin, James, 2003, Corrupting the Youth: a History of\nPhilosophy in Australia, Sydney: Macleay Press.", "Gasking, D. A. T., 1949, “Anderson and the Tractatus\nLogico-Philosophicus”, Australasian Journal of\nPhilosophy, 27(1): 1–26.", "Hibberd, Fiona, 2009, “John Anderson’s Development of\n(Situational) Realism and its Bearing on Psychology Today”,\nHistory of the Human Sciences, 22(4): 63–92.", "Hylton, Peter, 1990, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of\nAnalytic Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Kennedy, Brian, 1995, A Passion to Oppose: John Anderson,\nPhilosopher, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.", "Macintyre, Alasdair, 1981, After Virtue: a Study in Moral\nTheory. London: Duckworth.", "–––, 1988, Whose Justice; Which\nRationality, London: Duckworth.", "Mackie, J. L., 1946, “A Refutation of Morals”,\nAustralasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy,\n24(1–2): 77–90.", "–––, 1951, “Logic and Professor\nAnderson”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 29(2):\n109–113.", "–––, 1985, “The Philosophy of John\nAnderson”, Logic and Knowledge: Selected Papers (Volume\nI), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 1–20.", "Mounce, H. O., 1989, “Anderson on Generality”,\nWittgenstein: Attention to Particulars. Essays in Honour of Rush\nRhees (1905–89), D. Z. Phillips and Peter Winch (eds.),\nLondon: Macmillan.", "Mumford, Stephen, 2007, David Armstrong, Durham:\nAcumen.", "Passmore, John, 1943, “Logical Positivism” (Parts I\nand II), Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy,\n21(2–3): 65–92; 22(3): 129–53.", "–––, 1948, “Logical Positivism”\n(Part III), Australasian Journal Philosophy, 26(1):\n1–19.", "–––, 1962, “John Anderson and Twentieth\nCentury Philosophy”, Introduction to John Anderson’s\nposthumous work, Studies in Empirical Philosophy, Sydney:\nAngus and Robertson, pp. ix-xxiv.", "–––, 1963, “Philosophy”, in The\nPattern of Australian Culture, A. L. McLeod (ed.), New York:\nCornell University Press.", "–––, 1997, Memoirs of a Semi-Detached\nAustralian, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.", "Price, Huw, 2011, Naturalism Without Mirrors, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Quine, W. V. O., 1953, From a Logical Point of View,\nCambridge MA: Harvard University Press.", "Redding, Paul, 2007, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of\nHegelian Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Reinhardt, Lloyd, 1980, “Olympian Pessimist”,\nQuadrant, 24(4): 48–52.", "Rhees, Rush, 1969, Without Answers, London: Routledge and\nKegan Paul.", "–––, 1999, Moral Questions, London:\nMacmillan.", "Rorty, Richard, 1986, “From Language to Play”,\nProceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 59(5):\n747–53.", "Ryle, Gilbert, 1950, “Logic and Professor Anderson”,\nAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, 28(3): 137–53.", "–––, 1976, “Fifty Years of Philosophy and\nPhilosophers”, Philosophy, 51(198): 381–89.", "Schiller, F. C. S., 1926, “Judgments and\nPropositions”, Mind (New Series), 35(139):\n337–43.", "–––, 1927, “The Two Logics”,\nMind (New Series), 36(141): 64–68.", "Stavropoulos, Pam, 1992, “Conservative Radical”,\nAustralian Journal of Anthropology, 3: 67–79.", "Stewart, A. W., 2009, “A Debate about Anderson’s\nLogic”, History and Philosophy of Logic, 30(2):\n157–69.", "Weblin, Mark, 2003, “Introduction”, in M. Weblin\n(ed.), A Perilous and Fighting Life: Political Writings of John\nAnderson, London: Pluto Press.", "–––, 2007, “John Anderson”,\nDictionary of Twentieth Century British Philosophers, London:\nBloomsbury Academic.", "–––, 2007, “John Anderson on Reid and\nScottish Philosophy”, Monist, 90: 310.", "–––, 2010, “John Anderson and\nIdealism”, Biographical Encyclopedia of British\nIdealism, London: Bloomsbury Academic.", "–––, 2014, “John Anderson Arrives:\n1930s”, History of Philosophy in Australia and New\nZealand, Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis (eds.), Dordrecht:\nSpringer, pp. 55–87." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle-logic/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: logic" }, { "href": "../bosanquet/", "text": "Bosanquet, Bernard" }, { "href": "../medieval-categories/", "text": "categories: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../causation-counterfactual/", "text": "causation: counterfactual theories of" }, { "href": "../ethics-virtue/", "text": "ethics: virtue" }, { "href": "../facts/", "text": "facts" }, { "href": "../green/", "text": "Green, Thomas Hill" }, { "href": "../heraclitus/", "text": "Heraclitus" }, { "href": "../logic-classical/", "text": "logic: classical" }, { "href": "../logic-informal/", "text": "logic: informal" }, { "href": "../logic-ontology/", "text": "logic and ontology" }, { "href": "../metaphysics/", "text": "metaphysics" }, { "href": "../parmenides/", "text": "Parmenides" }, { "href": "../realism-sem-challenge/", "text": "realism: challenges to metaphysical" }, { "href": "../reid/", "text": "Reid, Thomas" }, { "href": "../russell/", "text": "Russell, Bertrand" }, { "href": "../ryle/", "text": "Ryle, Gilbert" }, { "href": "../scottish-19th/", "text": "Scottish Philosophy: in the 19th century" }, { "href": "../square/", "text": "square of opposition" }, { "href": "../states-of-affairs/", "text": "states of affairs" } ]
aristotle-commentators	Commentators on Aristotle	First published Thu Aug 11, 2005; substantive revision Fri Sep 24, 2021	[ "\nOne important mode of philosophical expression from the end of the\nHellenistic period and into Late Antiquity was the philosophical\ncommentary. During this time Plato and Aristotle were regarded as\nphilosophical authorities and their works were subject to intense\nstudy. This entry offers a concise account of how the revival of\ninterest in the philosophy of Aristotle that took place toward the end\nof the Hellenistic period eventually developed into a new literary\nproduction: the philosophical commentary. It also follows the\ncommentary tradition into Late Antiquity in order to account for the\nvitality and richness of this tradition. Special emphasis is given to\nthe ancient study of the Categories because this short but\ndifficult treatise played a central role in the post-Hellenistic\nreturn to Aristotle. The reader should keep in mind that the study of\nAristotle in the form of the commentary did not mean the cessation of\ngenuine philosophical thought. Quite the contrary: philosophers\ncustomarily used the commentary format not only to expound the works\nof Aristotle, but also as a vehicle for original philosophical\ntheorizing. One consequence of this approach was that, at least at the\nbeginning, the return to Aristotle did not involve the acceptance of\nany definite set of doctrines. More directly (and more boldly): there\nwas no definite set of doctrines that a Peripatetic philosopher in the\n1st century BCE was expected to accept. At the time\nAristotle was considered an authority not because he was above\ncriticism, but because he deserved to be studied carefully." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Pre-History of the Commentary Tradition: The Fortune of the ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Aristotelian Tradition in the 1", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. The Commentary Tradition in Late Antiquity: The Place of the ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. The Exegetical Labor on the ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Boethius and the Latin Tradition", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "A. Primary Sources in Translation", "B. Secondary Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe primary purpose of a commentary is to explain a text. Typically,\nthe text is divided into lemmata (plural of lemma). A lemma is what is quoted from a\ntext in order to explain and interpret it. Some times the text is\nquoted in its entirety. Other times only its beginning is recalled.\nThe lemma is always followed by an analysis of the text. Commentaries\nwere not written exclusively on philosophical works. Any poetical or\nscientific work that came to be regarded as authoritative could become\nthe object of a commentary. For instance, the tradition of writing\ncommentaries on the Hippocratic corpus started very early. Although\nmost of this tradition is lost, the commentaries that Galen wrote on\nthe Hippocratic corpus have come down to us. Galen was a doctor who\nlived and wrote in the second half of the 2nd\ncentury CE. Interestingly enough, his exegetical activity was not\nconfined to Hippocrates. Galen wrote commentaries on several of\nAristotle’s works, specifically on the De\nInterpretatione, the Prior and Posterior\nAnalytics, and the Categories (Galen, On my Own\nBooks, XIX 47). In all probability, these commentaries were not\nintended for publication but only for the use of a small group of\nfriends and students. Here is what Galen says about his commentary on\nthe Categories:", "\nOn Aristotle’s work on The Ten Categories I had not\npreviously written any commentary, either for myself or for others;\nwhen subsequently somebody asked me for something on the solution\nposed on that work, <I wrote a commentary> with the firm\ninstruction that he should only show it to students who had already\nread the book with a teacher, or at least made a start with some other\ncommentaries, such as those of Adrastus and Aspasius (Galen, On My\nOwn Books, XIX 42, Kühn, trans. Singer).\n", "\nGalen makes clear that he regards the commentator as a teacher and as\nan expositor of a text with an audience of students in mind. Moreover,\nas Galen presents the matter, the commentary was a teaching tool\naddressed to students with specific levels of knowledge. The students\nwho were expected to read Galen on the Categories were not\nabsolute beginners. They were students who either had previously\nbenefited from the study of this treatise with a teacher or had become\nacquainted with the Categories through some more elementary\ncommentaries. Galen refers to the commentaries written by Adrastus and\nAspasius. By so doing, he gives us an idea of the profusion of\ncommentaries that were written on the Categories. These\ncommentaries were written one after the other as part of an already\nconsolidated exegetical practice. Most of these commentaries have not\nreached us. We no longer have the commentaries that Adrastus and\nAspasius wrote on the Categories, nor do we have the\ncommentary that Galen wrote on the same treatise. This frustrating (at\nleast for us) fact is ultimately due to the very nature of this\nliterary production. Each generation of commentators read and\ninterpreted Aristotle in the light of their own theoretical\npreoccupations and proclivities, only to be replaced by the next\ngeneration of commentators. One remarkable exception is Alexander of\nAphrodisias, a younger contemporary of Galen. His commentaries survive\nbecause they were adopted as exemplary models by later commentators.\nBut not all of them have come down to us. For example, Alexander wrote\na commentary on the Categories (Simplicius, In Cat.\n1.16). This commentary suffered the same fate as those written by\nAdrastus, Aspasius, Galen, and others. Today it survives only in\nfragmentary form, incorporated in the commentaries that a later\ngeneration of interpreters wrote on the Categories. " ], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe critical engagement with Aristotle that began toward the end of\nthe Hellenistic age and continued throughout the centuries that\nfollowed was directed to works such as the Categories, which\nhad been largely ignored in the preceding centuries. This engagement\npresupposes the availability of Aristotle’s writings in a form\nthat suited the interests and needs of the time. Although the\ninformation in our possession is slim, it strongly suggests that an\nintense editorial activity took place in the 1st century\nBCE. Apellicon of Teos, a bibliophile rather than a philosopher, seems\nto have produced copies of Aristotle’s works in the 90s (Strabo,\nGeo. XIII I 54); Tyrannion of Amisus, a grammarian and\nenthusiast of Aristotle (philaristotelês), who had\naccess to Apellicon’s books, may have done the same in the 60s\n(but our sources do not say that he edited the works of Aristotle;\nthey only say that he “put in order the books of\nAristotle”; Strabo, Geo. XIII I 54; Plutarch,\nSulla 26 468 B-C). According to the tradition, these\neditorial labors were surpassed by that of Andronicus of Rhodes, who\nis credited with the production of the first reliable edition of\nAristotle; an edition that exercised an enormous influence on the\nPost-Hellenistic return to Aristotle. More information on Andronicus\nand his putative edition of Aristotle is available in the", "\n Supplement on Andronicus of Rhodes.\n ", "\nIn reality, Andronicus could not be entirely responsible for the\nrevival of interest in the philosophy of Aristotle. This revival was,\nat least in part, independent of him. Moreover, a close study of the\nfortune that the Categories enjoyed in this context suggests\nthat the return to Aristotle took different forms and involved a great\nvariety of exegetical positions not necessarily related to one\nanother. Finally, the return to Aristotle did not necessarily involve\neither the acceptance of the views stated by Aristotle or their\ncodification in the form of a commentary. In short, there was no\northodoxy in the Aristotelian tradition at this early stage\n(pace Moraux 1973, pages xii–xx, especially\nxvi–xvii).", "\nWe have the names of five ancient interpreters (palaioi\nexêgêtai) of the Categories whose activity\nis placed in the 1st century BCE: Andronicus, Boethus,\nAthenodorus, Ariston, and Eudorus (Simplicius, In Cat.\n159.32–33). It is likely that, of these five philosophers, only\nBoethus of Sidon wrote a commentary on the Categories.\nBoethus’ activity can be dated to the second half of the\n1st century BCE. Simplicius contrasts his\n“word-by-word exegesis” to that of Andronicus, who is said\n“to have paraphrased the Categories” (Simplicius,\nIn Cat. 29.28–30.5). We cannot exclude that Simplicius\nprojected his own literary conventions onto Andronicus and Boethus,\nand that by his own standards Boethus and Andronicus were\nengaged in two different exegetical exercises. On the one hand, there\nis some clear evidence that Andronicus did rephrase and clarify\nAristotle’s text in order to extract Aristotle’s\nintentions. On the other hand, there is no reason to think that\nAndronicus wrote in the style that will later be codified as\nparaphrase. Themistius was the champion of this particular form of\nexegesis in antiquity. Themistius does not give\nus names of predecessors. His silence is open to different\ninterpretations: either Themistius did not know of Andronicus’\nwork on the Categories or this work was not written in the\nstyle of a paraphrase. Fortunately, it is not essential for us to\nestablish whether or not Andronicus was the first paraphraser of\nAristotle. What matters is that his style of exegesis was perceived as\ndifferent from that of Boethus. Unlike Andronicus, Boethus was engaged\nin an in-depth examination of whole book of the Categories in\nthe form of a word-by-word commentary. Boethus was highly regarded in\nantiquity. Simplicius refers to him as “the amazing\nBoethus” (In Cat. 1.18), “the noble\nBoethus” (In Cat. 379.32), and prizes “the\nsharpness of his mind” (In Cat. 1.23 and 434.18).\nExcept for a few testimonies, his commentary has not survived. From\nthese few testimonies, however, it is clear that Boethus concerned\nhimself with the difficulties that the Stoics raised against\nAristotle’s Categories. The Stoics attacked the\nCategories on the assumption that this treatise is on\nlanguage and about linguistic expressions. They argued that as a\ntreatise on language and about linguistic expressions the\nCategories was incomplete. Boethus resisted this reading of\nthe Categories and anticipated a line of interpretation that\nwas then followed, among others, by Porphyry. ", "\nBoethus’ defense of the Categories documents that this\ntreatise was intensely read and studied, and not only among\nphilosophers friendly to Aristotle. The Stoic philosopher Athenodorus\nis credited with a book (Simplicius, In Cat. 86.22) or books\n(Porphyry, In Cat. 62.25–26) significantly entitled\nAgainst Aristotle’s Categories. We know very little\nabout Athenodorus. If he is the same person as Athenodorus of\nTarsus, who was a friend and adviser of the Emperor Augustus and was\nappointed by him as governor of Taurus, then Athenodorus was active in\nthe second half of the 1st century BCE. There is no\ncompelling reason to think that his critique of the\nCategories was written in the form of a commentary.\nAthenodorus could have been content with offering a series of\nobjections and difficulties, just as the Platonist Lucius and\nNicostratus would do more than a hundred years later (Simplicius,\nIn Cat 1.18–20: “Others have chosen simply to\npresent a series of difficulties (aporiai) arising from the\ntext, which is what has been done by Lucius, and after him by\nNicostratus, who took over for himself the job of Lucius”).", "\nThe temptation to credit all ancient interpreters of the\nCategories with a commentary must be resisted also in the\ncase of Eudorus of Alexandria. It is generally assumed that Eudorus\nflourished in the middle of the first century BCE. Simplicius is not\ncontent to enumerate Eudorus among the ancient interpreters of the\nCategories. He preserves nine testimonies in which Eudorus\ntook issue with Aristotle. But no inference about the form of his\nliterary production is possible. The only safe inference is that the\nstudy of the Categories was not confined to the school of\nAristotle. In fact, Eudorus was not a Peripatetic philosopher.\nSimplicius refers to him as the “Academic Eudorus” (In\nCat. 187.10).", "\nThe last name on list of ancient interpreters of the\nCategories is that of Ariston of Alexandria. From Cicero\n(Lucullus §§ 11–12), we learn that Ariston\nwas among the learned men who attended the conversations that took\nplace in Alexandria in 87 BCE between Heraclitus of Tyrus, a former\nstudent of Clitomachus and Philo of Larissa, and Antiochus of Ascalon.\nCicero depicts Ariston as a pupil of Antiochus. That Ariston was a\npupil of Antiochus is confirmed by the Index Academicorum, a\nhistory of the Academy written by Philodemus in the 1st\ncentury BCE. There, we are told that Antiochus “took over\n<the Academy>” (XXXIV 34 Dorandi). A list of his students\nis also given. The list includes the names of Aristus,\nAntiochus’ brother; Ariston and Dio of Alexandria; and Cratippus\nof Pergamum (XXXV 1–6 Dorandi). What immediately follows is\nextremely interesting: “Ariston of Alexandria and Cratippus of\nPegamum deserted the Academy and turned Peripatetic” (XXXV\n10–16 Dorandi). We are not told the reasons for their defection\nto Peripatetic philosophy. In the case of Ariston it is also difficult\nto see what this defection really involved. From the information in\nour possession we can only say that he wrote about the\nCategories. But there is no evidence that Ariston wrote in\nthe form of a commentary. His case is significantly different from\nthat of Andronicus and Boethus. Andronicus and Boethus made an attempt\nto organise, clarify, and indeed defend, the philosophy of Aristotle.\nThis does not seem to apply to Ariston. His name is never related to\nthose of Andronicus and Boethus. In addition, there is no evidence\nthat Ariston was aware of the existence of Andronicus and Boethus, or\nthat he was influenced by their works or their activity as interpreters of\nAristotle. That the edition of Andronicus played a role in the\nconversion of Ariston to the philosophy of Aristotle is merely a\nconjecture.", "\nThere is a wealth of information in the subsequent commentary\ntradition about the early (that is, 1st century BCE)\nreception of the Categories. Even the expert reader is often\nleft wondering how best to organize it. The reader of this entry will\nfind a useful presentation of the extant evidence in a recent\nmonograph produced by Michael Griffin (Griffin 2015, to be read along\nwith the critical comments offered in Falcon 2018 and Menn 2018;\nwith a response by Griffin in Griffin 2020). According to Griffin,\nAndronicus of Rhodes played a key role in the Post-Hellenistic surge\nof interest in Aristotle’Categories. Andronicus placed\nthe Categories at the outset of his catalogue\n(pinakes) of Aristotle’s writings. He saw in this\ntreatise a useful introduction to Aristotle’s theory of\npredication, aimed at (absolute) beginners in Aristotelian logic. In\nthe end, what Andronicus thought of the Categories did not\nmatter; what mattered was the place that he assigned to this work in\nhis pinakes. The prominence assigned to the work in his\npinakes contributed to attract attention to an hitherto\nobscure work.", "\nWhat do we learn from the rich and complex story of the early\nreception of Aristotle’s Categories? We learn that the\nreturn to Aristotle attracted thinkers with a diverse philosophical\nbackground and a different philosophical agenda. We also learn that\ntheir critical engagement with Aristotle resulted in a few creative\nreadings of the Categories. To the extent that those readings\ncan be reconstructed, they do not take us any closer to\nAristotle’s original intentions. More directly, and more boldly:\nthere existed, and still exists, a gap between\nAristotle’Categories and all his interpreters. This gap\nopened up early on in the Hellenistic times. As a result, all his\nsubsequent (that is, Post-Hellenistic) interpreters struggled to close\nthis gap. Early interpreters of the Categories such as\nAndronicus of Rhodes and Boethus of Sidon are no exception to the rule.\nTheir efforts, just like ours, had a mixed success at best. In the\nend, Aristotle’Categories was then, and still remains\nnow, an elusive work." ], "section_title": "2. The Pre-History of the Commentary Tradition: The Fortune of the Categories in the 1st century BCE", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe revival of interest in the philosophy of Aristotle outlived the\n1st century BCE. The exegetical activity on\nAristotle’works continued to flourish in the 1st and\n2nd century CE. New layers of interpretation were added in\nthese two centuries. They greatly contributed to the formation of the\nexegetical tradition that found its culmination in the commentaries of\nAlexander of Aphrodisias.", "\nAlexander of Aegae wrote about the Categories (Simplicius,\nIn Cat. 10.20; 13.16) and the De caelo (Simplicius,\nIn DC 430.29–32). Since he is said to have been teacher\nof the Emperor Nero, his exegetical activity can be dated to the first\nhalf of the 1st century CE. Nothing can be said about the\nform of his literary production. This is also the case of two other\ninterpreters of the Categories: Sotion and Achaius\n(Simplicius, In Cat. 159.23). Although their exegetical\nactivity is much more difficult to date, there is one line of argument\nthat places it in the 1st century CE. The information at\nour disposal is frustratingly meagre, but it is hard to escape the\nconclusion that the Categories continued to be at the centre\nof the exegetical activity on the philosophy of Aristotle. The\nsituation did not change in the first half of the 2nd\ncentury CE. From Galen we learn that Adrastus of Aphrodisias and\nAspasius wrote elementary commentaries on the Categories.\nFrom the way Galen refers to these commentaries, they must have been\neasily available and routinely used to introduce students to the\nCategories. Adrastus and Aspasius established themselves as\nrespected interpreters of Aristotle. We know that their commentaries\nwere still used about one hundred years later by the great Plotinus\n(Porphyry, Life of Plotinus. 14.12–14). Aspasius did\nnot confine his exegetical activity to the Categories. He\nwrote commentaries on the De Interpretatione, the\nPhysics, and the Metaphysics. These commentaries\nwere used and quoted by later generations of commentators. The\nreputation that Aspasius enjoyed in antiquity explains why his\ncommentary on Aristotle’s Ethics has survived. This\ncommentary is the earliest surviving commentary on an Aristotelian\ntext.", "\nOne significant impact on the way the practice of philosophy developed\ntoward the end of the 2nd century CE was the intervention\nof the imperial power in matters of education. This intervention seems\nto go as far back as the Emperor Antoninus Pius, who is said to have\nestablished public chairs of rhetoric and philosophy in the provinces.\nBut it was Marcus Aurelius who first established Imperial chairs of\nphilosophy in Athens in 176 CE. From our ancient sources we are told\nthat those chairs were in Platonic, Stoic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean\nphilosophy. In all probability, the first holder of the chair in\nAristotelian philosophy was Alexander of Damascus, an older\ncontemporary of Galen described by him as “knowledgeable about\nthe doctrines of Plato but more inclined to those of Aristotle”\n(Galen, De praenotione XIV 627–628 Kühn). The\nholder of the Imperial chairs of philosophy was a public teacher and\nreceived an annual salary. His teaching consisted in lecturing on the\ntexts of the founder of the school. Alexander of Aphrodisias was one\nof these teachers publicly appointed to a chair of Aristotelian\nphilosophy. Alexander refers to himself as a teacher—namely, a\ndidaskalos (De fato 164.15). As a teacher of\nAristotelian philosophy, Alexander was concerned not only with\nexplicating this philosophy but also with defending it in the context\nof debates between philosophical schools. His attitude toward\nAristotle is best expressed at the very beginning of his De\nanima. This treatise is not a commentary on Aristotle’s\nDe anima but an investigation of the soul based on the\nprinciples established in Aristotle’s De anima. The\ntask that here Alexander sets for himself is that of clarifying and\npromoting the views of Aristotle:", "\nIn all philosophical questions, the present writer cherishes a special\nregard for the authority of Aristotle, in the conviction that his\nteaching on these matters has greater claim to truth than that of\nother philosophers. The purpose of this present treatise will\ntherefore be satisfactorily accomplished if the doctrine of the soul\nwhich I here set forth is as clear an exposition as possible of what\nAristotle has said on this subject; and I shall limit my own\ncontribution to explanations of the specific points that Aristotle\nhimself has so excellently stated. (Alexander, De anima 2.\n5–9, translation after Fotinis)\n", "\nAlexander wrote commentaries on most (but not all) of\nAristotle’s treatises. His commentaries on the Prior\nAnalytics (Book 1), Topics, Meteorology, and\nthe work On Sense and Sense Objects have survived. Fragments\nfrom his lost commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and\nPhysics have been collected and edited (in Moraux 1979 and\nRashed 2011, respectively). A long excerpt from his lost commentary on\nGeneration and Corruption, extant only in the Arabic\ntradition, is now available in English translation (Gannagé\n2005). Of the commentary on the Metaphysics that is\ntransmitted under his name, only the first five books (Alfa\nto Delta) are genuine. Since Praetcher (Praetcher 1906) the\ncommentary on the other books (Epsilon to Nu) is\ngenerally attributed to Michael of Ephesus. This attribution is now\nvindicated (in Luna 2001) except for book Epsilon, which\nshould be attributed to Stephanus of Alexandria (Golitsis 2016b). The\ncommentary on the Sophistical Refutations, traditionally\nattributed to Alexander, is spurious. It should be attributed to\nMichael of Ephesus (Ebbesen 1981, I: 268–285).", "Although Alexander is best known for his\ncommentaries on Aristotle, his exegetical activity extended to include\nshort discussions on specific points of interpretation within\nAristotelian philosophy. These discussions are collected in four books\nof Problems and Solutions and in a further book traditionally\nknown as Mantissa (literally, “Makeweight”). These\ncollections offer an eloquent illustration of the extraordinary\nvariety of exegetical methods deployed in the exposition of\nAristotle’s philosophy. Up to a point, the deployment of such a\nvariety of exegetical methods can be explained with reference to the\npedagogic function of these writings, which were used as teaching\ntools in the instruction of students with different levels of\nknowledge of Aristotle’s philosophy. ", "\nAlexander’s exegetical activity ultimately consisted in an\neffort of systematization combined with an attempt to extract what he\nregarded as the genuine thought of Aristotle. It was this loyalty to\nthe philosophy of the master coupled with the finesse of his\ninterpretation that gained Alexander the reputation of “the most\nauthentic interpreter of Aristotle” (Simplicius, In\nPhys. 80.16). His commentaries set standards of interpretations\nthat remained largely unsurpassed in antiquity and beyond. But it is\nimportant to realize that his extraordinary accomplishment was the\nculmination of the exegetical tradition that had started in the\n1st century BCE. More to the point: Alexander was not the\nfirst but rather the last authentic interpreter of Aristotle. Although\nsubsequent generations of commentators were profoundly influenced by\nAlexander, they were motivated by a very different exegetical\nideal. Their primary aim was no longer to recover and preserve\nAristotle’s thought for its own sake, but rather for the sake of\nfinding agreement between Aristotle and Plato and presenting the two\nphilosophers as part of one and the same philosophical outlook. (For\nfurther information on Alexander as a commentator and a philosopher, I\nrefer the reader to Sections 2 and 3 of the entry on Alexander of Aphrodisias.)\n " ], "section_title": "3. Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Aristotelian Tradition in the 1st and 2nd century CE", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe study of Aristotle through close textual reading of his works\ncontinued, if not increased, in Late Antiquity. So did the supply of\ncommentaries on all his major works. Unlike Alexander of Aphrodisias,\nmost of these commentators considered themselves followers of Plato\n(that is, Platonists.) By their lights, Plato’s philosophy was\nsuperior to all the systems of thought that came later. In addition,\nthey believed that all these later systems started out as more or less\nfaithful developments of Plato’s philosophy. Aristotle was no\nexception to the rule. On the contrary, these commentators viewed\nAristotle as a true descendant of Plato. This explains why, by\nreverting to Plato, they did not mean to reject Aristotle’s\nphilosophy. On the contrary, they were convinced that this philosophy\ncould be integrated into a Platonic framework. The Platonism of Late\nAntiquity was so comprehensive as a system of thought that it could\nharbor Aristotle’s philosophy as one of its elements. In this\nframe of mind, a major exegetical concern became that of finding\nsubstantial agreement between Plato and Aristotle. For most of these\ncommentators, the disagreement on specific issues between Aristotle\nand Plato did not preclude harmony between the two philosophers on a\ndeeper level.", "\nIn reality, the conciliation of Plato and Aristotle attempted by these\ncommentators consisted in an appropriation of Aristotle’s works\nas a pre-requisite for the study of Plato’s philosophy. Among\nthese works, the Categories continued to enjoy a special\nstatus. Following a tradition that may go all the way back to\nAndronicus of Rhodes (see the section on the early fortune of the\nCategories), this treatise was considered an elementary\nintroduction to the whole of philosophy and as such it was used to\nteach beginners with little or no knowledge of philosophy (Porphyry,\nIn Cat. 56. 28–29). For this reason the exegetical\nactivity on this short but difficult treatise never stopped but in\nfact increased in Late Antiquity. The key figure for the reception of\nthe Categories during this period was undoubtedly Porphyry\n(ca 234–305 CE). The latter wrote a commentary in seven\nbooks addressed to a student named Gedalius. In this commentary,\nPorphyry offered a complete interpretation of the Categories,\nincluding a resolution of all previous aporiai (Simplicius,\nIn Cat. 2. 6–9). He also dealt with the traditional\ncriticism of the Categories, including a comprehensive\ndiscussion of the objections leveled by the earlier interpreters of\nthe Categories (e.g., the Stoic Athenodorus and Cornutus, and\nthe Platonic Lucius and Nicostratus). His defense of the\nCategories relied, and indeed expanded, on the Peripatetic\ntradition (e.g., Boethus of Sidon, Alexander of Aphrodisias). An\nexcerpt from this commentary has been recently discovered in what is\nknown as the Archimedes Palimpsest (See R. Chiaradonna, M. Rashed, and\nD. Sedley 2013). Porphyry wrote another commentary on the\nCategories. This second commentary has reached us. The\nresults achieved in the more comprehensive commentary are here\nabbreviated, simplified, and made accessible in the form of a dialogue\nbetween a teacher and a pupil. The existence of two commentaries\nwritten in a different format on the very same treatise by the same\nauthor has to be understood in the light of the fact that these\ncommentaries were teaching tools and were used to teach students with\ndifferent skills and different levels of familiarity with the\nCategories. Finally, Porphyry is the author of the\nIsagoge (literally, “Introduction”).\nThis short book is an introduction to Aristotle’s theory of\npredication. It is addressed to absolute beginners in philosophy whose\nreading curriculum then continued with Aristotle’s logic,\nbeginning with the Categories.", "\nThe commentary addressed to Gedalius became an instant success and an\nexample to imitate. Iamblichus (ca 242–325 CE) is known\nto have written a commentary on the Categories that closely\nfollowed this commentary, abbreviating the argument and making the\noverall interpretation clearer. He is also known to have amplified the\nPorphyrian interpretation with the help of the book that the\nPythagorean Archytas wrote on the doctrine of the categories\n(Simplicius, In Cat. 2.9–14). The writing in question\nis a late forgery intended to claim Aristotle’s doctrine of the\nten categories for the Pythagorean school. Iamblichus considered this\nforgery an authentic anticipation of Aristotle’s\nCategories and a vindication of his vision of philosophy as a\nsingle tradition of wisdom, starting with Pythagoras and continuing\nwith Plato and Aristotle. Iamblichus is reported to have made use of\nthe considerations of Archytas in the attempt to demonstrate the\noverall agreement between Aristotle and the Pythagorean doctrine.", "\nIamblichus’ commentary is lost, but we can form an idea of the\ncontribution that this commentary made to the ancient debate on the\nCategories thanks to Dexippus. Nothing is known about\nDexippus besides the fact that he was a pupil of Iamblichus. His\nsurviving commentary provides a concise and clear presentation of the\nsolutions offered to the aporiai leveled against\nAristotle’s Categories. Dexippus opted for the\nquestion-and-answer format, which better suited his purpose to provide\na brief and relatively simple summary of the exegetical results\nachieved by his predecessors, especially Porphyry and Iamblichus.\nDexippus was not an original thinker. According to Simplicius, he\nadded virtually nothing to the considerations of Porphyry and\nIamblichus (Simplicius, In Cat. 2. 29–30).", "\nAfter having mastered the Categories, the student of\nphilosophy was expected to read the rest of the Aristotelian corpus\nbefore turning to Plato’s dialogues. Syrianus, the teacher of\nProclus (ca 410–485 CE), exposed his students to both\nPlato and Aristotle, starting with Aristotle. Proclus arrived in\nAthens around 430 CE, at a time when Plutarch, the previous head of\nthe school, was an old man and Syrianus had already taken over. As a\nyoung and gifted student, Proclus read Aristotle’s De\nanima and Plato’s Phaedo with Plutarch. But when\nPlutarch died, Syrianus became responsible for his philosophical\neducation. Under the direction of Syrianus, Proclus mastered in less\nthan two years the entire Aristotelian corpus. He studied the logical,\nethical, political, physical works and finished up with theology\n(Marinus, Life of Proclus, chapters 12 and 13). The sequence\nlogic-ethics-politics-physics-theology reflected not only a certain\norganization of the teaching but also a particular conception of\nphilosophy. To begin with, the first place assigned to\nAristotle’s logical writings was not neutral with respect to a\ncertain view of the nature of logic. By this time logic was regarded\nas a tool for philosophy. This conception of logic and its relation to\nthe rest of philosophy is reflected in the collective title\nOrganon that we still use to refer to Aristotle’s\nlogical writings. Moreover, the non-theological writings were\npreliminary to the study of theology as it is offered in the\nMetaphysics. This treatise was the last of Aristotle’s\nworks to be studied. The conception of God as an intellect and a\nliving being enjoying the state of perfect actuality was designed by\nSyrianus as the culmination of his course on Aristotle’s\nphilosophy. Once Proclus had mastered the Metaphysics and\nlearned about the Aristotelian conception of the divine, Syrianus\ndirected him to Plato, whose dialogues were also read in a definite\nsequence, culminating with the Timaeus and the\nParmenides.", "\nThis attitude toward the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato was passed\nfrom Syrianus to Proclus, and from Proclus to Ammonius (ca\n440–520 CE). The commentaries of Ammonius on the\nCategories, the De Interpretatione, the Prior\nAnalytics, and Porphyry’s Isagoge have come down\nto us. The last is the earliest extant commentary on the\nIsagoge. By this time the Isagoge had already\nestablished itself as part of the reading curriculum of philosophy,\nwhich continued with the Categories, the De\nInterpretatione and the Prior Analytics. Note, however,\nthat Ammonius did not write his commentaries on the\nCategories, the Prior Analytics, and perhaps the\nIsagoge. They were produced by pupils who attended his\nlectures on Aristotle. (For further information and discussion of his\ncommentaries, see Section 1.2 of the entry on\n Ammonius.)\n Other commentaries originated in the lecture room as a transcription\nof the oral exposition delivered by the teacher. The commentaries on\nthe Categories based on the lectures offered by Olympiodorus\n(ca 495–565 CE) and his pupil Elias (David) have\nreached us. Philoponus (ca 490–570 CE) edited his own\nlectures on the Categories. However, the most influential of\nthese later commentaries was the one that Simplicius wrote after 529\nCE. Simplicius was a man of vast learning and extraordinary synthetic\npowers. He was also acutely aware of writing at the end of a long and\nvenerable exegetical tradition. He consciously tried to assimilate and\nblend together the various strands of this tradition. By so doing he\nleft us the most comprehensive and informative survey of the reception\nof the Categories in antiquity. At first sight Simplicius may\nlook like a modern scholar. His commentary shows the great care and\nprecision of a thoughtful and dedicated interpreter who is explicating\nthe Categories through a close reading of the text. Yet there\nis one important difference that must not be overlooked. Simplicius\nwas a Platonist and his exegetical activity was intended to show that\nPlato and Aristotle were in substantial agreement. Simplicius is\nadamantly clear on his own exegetical ideal:", "\n<the worthy interpreter> must, I believe, not convict the\nphilosopher of discordance by looking only at the letter of what\n<Aristotle> says against Plato; but he must look towards the\nspirit, and track down the harmony which reigns between them on the\nmajority of points (Simplicius, In Cat. 7. 29–32,\ntrans. Michael Case)\n", "\nThe commentary tradition that found its culmination in Simplicius\nconsisted in a sincere attempt to arrive at a better understanding of\nthe Categories. By reading Simplicius’ commentary one\nstill gets a sense of the extraordinary ingenuity that this tradition\nemployed in explicating this short yet elusive treatise. But\none also gets the impression that this tradition had no privileged\naccess to this text. Quite the opposite: from the beginning of the\nrevival of interest in the philosophy of Aristotle and into Late\nAntiquity, the Categories remained a tantalizing puzzle. Not\nonly its title, but also its unity, structure, and place in the\nAristotelian corpus were intensely discussed. For instance, various\ntitles are attested in the commentary tradition: Introduction to\nthe Topics, On the Genera of Being, On the Ten\nGenera, The Ten Categories, Categories\n(Simplicius, In Cat. 15. 26–30). Each of these titles\nreflected a certain interpretation of what the treatise is\nabout. Andronicus is the first interpreter who is known to have\npreferred the title Categories. He rejected the title\nIntroduction to the Topics and considered the final chapters\nof the Categories—the so-called\nPostpraedicamenta—a later addition contrary to the\npurpose of the book. He held that the people who added those chapters\nalso inscribed the book with the title Introduction to the\nTopics (Simplicius, In Cat. 279. 8–10). By\ncontrast, Adrastus of Aphrodisias defended the relationship between\nthe Categories and the Topics in a work entitled\nConcerning the Order of Aristotle’s Treatises\n(Simplicius, In Cat. 16. 1–4). The dispute was not\nconfined to the organization Aristotle’s works, but it extended\nto the philosophical significance of the treatise. The title\nCategories eventually prevailed and, along with the title, a\ncertain interpretation of the treatise imposed itself." ], "section_title": "4. The Commentary Tradition in Late Antiquity: The Place of the Categories in the Reading Curriculum", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe impression that, from very early on, the interpreters were\nstruggling to understand Aristotle is confirmed by the commentary\ntradition on the De anima. Consider, for example, De\nanima 3.5. There, Aristotle famously argues for the existence of\nan intellect that is separate, unaffected, and unmixed (De\nanima 430 a 17–18). In antiquity commentators traditionally\nreferred to this intellect as the active (or productive) intellect,\nnous poiêtikos. Discussion on how exactly this\nintellect is to be understood started very early. There is evidence\nthat already Theophrastus puzzled over it (Themistius, In De\nanima 110.18–28). Among other things, it is not obvious\nwhat sort of thing the active intellect is supposed to be. More\ndirectly, it is not clear whether it is a human or a divine intellect.\nWhat Aristotle says outside of the De anima is equally\nperplexing. In his work On the Generation of Animals\nAristotle speaks of an intellect that enters “from\nwithout” (736 b 27). But it is not at all clear how the comment\nthat Aristotle makes in this context is to be understood. What exactly\nis the status of this enigmatic intellect? How does it fit with the\ndiscussion offered in the De anima?", "\nAlexander of Aphrodisias developed a line of interpretation that made\nthe active intellect a non-human intellect and identified it with God.\nHis commentary on the De anima is lost. Instead we have the\nDe anima that he wrote following the principles that\nAristotle had established in his own De anima. There,\nAlexander identifies the active intellect with “the first cause,\nwhich is the cause and principle of existence to all the other\nthings” (Alexander, De anima 89. 9–10). The\nintellect so understood is not only the cause of human thought; it is\nalso the cause of the existence of everything that there is in the\nuniverse. This intellect can also be an object of thought. When this\nhappens, this intellect enters in us from without: “this is the\nintellect from without which comes to be in us and is\nimperishable” (Alexander, De anima 90.19–20).\nAlexander makes it abundantly clear that this intellect alone is\nimperishable and as such it is also divine. A similar but not\nidentical attempt to expand on the elliptical remarks that Aristotle\nhas left on the active intellect can be found in the On\nIntellect, a short essay attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias\nand preserved in the collection of brief exegetical writings known to\nus as Mantissa.", "\nAnother text that has important implications for the reception of\nAristotle’s treatment of the intellect is the paraphrase of the\nDe anima that Themistius wrote around 350 CE. There,\nThemistius argues that the active intellect is the most accurate\nspecification of the human form (In De anima\n100.35–36). Put differently, our essence as human beings is the\nactive intellect (In De anima 100.36–101.1). Although\nThemistius does not name names, he is clearly reacting against the\nreading advanced by Alexander of Aphrodisias. For Themistius the\nactive intellect is not God or the supreme principle upon which\neverything depends for its existence. For him, the active intellect is\nan integral part of the human soul: “the active intellect is in\nthe soul and it is like the most honourable part of the human\nsoul” (In De anima 103.4–5). Although the active\nintellect so understood is a human intellect, it is emphatically not\nconceived of as a personal intellect. Themistius is adamantly clear\nthat there is only one separate, unmixed, and unaffected active\nintellect. Likewise, there is only one separate, unmixed, and\nunaffected potential intellect, nous dunamei. According to\nThemistius, both the active and the potential intellects are not\nsubject to generation and perishing. What is perishable is only the\ncommon or passive intellect, koinon or pathêtikos\nnous. This third intellect is mixed with the body and its fate is\nto perish along with the body (In De anima 105.28–29;\n106.14–15)." ], "section_title": "5. The Exegetical Labor on the De anima", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nBeginning some time in the fourth century CE, Aristotle’s\nOrganon established itself as part of the reading curriculum\nin the Latin tradition. Like the Greek tradition, the Latin tradition\nemployed a great variety of exegetical tools in the teaching of\nAristotle: paraphrases, elementary as well as more advanced\ncommentaries. In addition, the Latin tradition was confronted with the\nspecific problem of providing the students with adequate translations\nof the relevant texts.", "\nThe tradition credits Marius Victorinus (fourth century CE) with a\ntranslation of the Categories, the De\nInterpretatione, and Porphyry’s Isagoge\n(Cassiodorus, Instit. II, 3, 18). The same tradition credits\nhim with a commentary in eight books on the Categories. A few\nyears later Vettius Agorius Praetextatus is known to have translated\nthe Greek paraphrases of the Prior and Posterior\nAnalytics produced by Themistius (Boethius, De\nInt.2 3.6–4.3). None of these works have reached\nus, with the exception of excerpts from Victorinus’ translation\nof the Isagoge. An anonymous paraphrase of the\nCategories falsely attributed to Augustine and traditionally\nknown as Categoriae Decem has survived only because it was\nwidely read and used in the early Middle Ages. Finally, an incomplete\nparaphrase of the Categories is preserved in Martianus\nCapella’s On Dialectic (the forth book of his The\nMarriage of Philosophy and Mercury, an influential textbook on\nthe seven liberal arts dating from the fifth century CE). Even these\nfew remarks suffice to document a sustained effort to provide the\nstudents with a Latin Organon that reflected the teaching\nneeds of the time.", "\nThe key figure for the reception of Aristotle in the Latin world was\nBoethius. Best known for his Consolation of Philosophy,\nBoethius (ca 475–526) was the transmitter of the\nAristotelian logical tradition to the early Middle Ages. His attitude\nto the text of Aristotle and Plato was not different from that of the\nother commentators of Late Antiquity. He regarded Plato and Aristotle\nas philosophical authorities and was persuaded that the best way to do\nphilosophy was to read and comment on their works. Like the Platonists\nof Late Antiquity, he was convinced that Plato and Aristotle were in\nbasic agreement, and that Aristotle’s thought was to be\nunderstood as a genuine development of Plato’s. In this frame of\nmind, Boethius planned to translate all the works of Aristotle that he\ncould find along with all the dialogues of Plato, and to comment on\nall of them in order to show that Plato and Aristotle agreed on the\nmost significant philosophical points (Boethius De\nInt.2 79. 9–80.9).", "\nBoethius was able to execute this plan only in part. He managed to\ntranslate the Categories, the De Interpretatione,\nthe Prior Analytics, the Topics and the\nSophistical Refutations. In addition, he translated\nPorphyry’s Isagoge. Boethius produced two commentaries\non the Isagoge. Along with these commentaries, he\nwrote two commentaries on the De Interpretatione.", "\nThe practice of writing double commentaries is to be understood in the\nlight of the concern for pedagogy that motivates the entire commentary\ntradition. Here is how Boethius explains why he wrote two commentaries\n(or rather two versions of the same commentary) on the De\nInterpretatione:", "\nIt has been my plan to disclose Aristotle’s subtlest doctrines\nin a commentary organized in two versions; for what the first version\ncontains prepares, to some extent, an easier path for those who are\nentering into these more profound and subtle matters. But because the\nsecond version develops in connection with the expositor’s\nsubtler doctrines, it is presented to be read and studied by those who\nare advanced in this inquiry and study (Boethius, In De\nInt.2 186. 2–9 after Kretzmann).\n", "\nBoethius also wrote a commentary on the Categories. This\ncommentary was intended to be an elementary exposition of the\ntreatise. Boethius planned to write a second exposition, addressed to\nmore advanced students (Boethius In Cat. 160 A-B). It is just\nunclear whether he was able to produce this more advanced commentary.\n(For further information on Boethius as a commentator, see Section 2\nof the entry on\n Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius.)", "\nThe exegetical labor on the Isagoge, the Categories\nand the De Intepretatione continued after Boethius. This\nlabor took often the form of glosses, that is, annotations written in\nmargin of copies of the Isagoge, the Categories and\nthe De Interpretatione. A survey of the exegetical results\nreached in the early Latin Medieval tradition goes beyond the scope of\nthis entry. I refer the reader to the Bibliography for further reading\non the commentary tradition in the early Middle Ages." ], "section_title": "6. Boethius and the Latin Tradition", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere is no philosophy of the commentators in the sense of a definite\nset of doctrines that all the ancient commentators on Aristotle\nshared. What the ancient commentators shared was the practice of\nreading and commenting on the texts of Aristotle on the crucial\nassumption that Aristotle was a philosophical authority and his\nwritings deserved to be studied with great care.", "\nDue to the almost complete loss of the relevant literature, we know\nvery little about the first generation of interpreters of Aristotle.\nNo picture of unity emerges from the little that has reached us. The\nnotion that all these interpreters wrote commentaries is not supported\nby the information in our possession. The commentary eventually became\nthe standard form of exegesis. But even within the commentary\ntradition there was room for a plurality of exegetical positions.\nDifferent commentators developed different lines of interpretations in\nthe light of the different (often competing) concerns that motivated\ntheir exegesis. The exegetical tradition that finds its culmination in\nAlexander of Aphrodisias was primarily (but not exclusively) motivated\nby an attempt to defend the philosophy of Aristotle in the context of\nthe ancient debate between philosophical schools. Alexander of\nAphrodisias viewed Aristotle as his master and devoted his exegetical\nworks to explicate and extract Aristotle’s distinctive\nphilosophical position. While the Platonists of Late Antiquity put\nthemselves in continuity with this tradition, their exegesis was\nlargely an attempt to develop a philosophy that insisted on the\ncontinuity between Plato and Aristotle. They wrote their commentaries\non the assumption that Aristotle and Plato were in substantial\nagreement." ], "section_title": "7. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Sorabji, R., 2005, The Philosophy of the Commentators\n200–600 AD. A Sourcebook. (Volume 1:\nPsychology; Volume 2: Physics; Volume 3: Logic and Metaphysics),\nLondon, Ithaca, NY: Duckworth, Cornell University Press.", "Alessandro di Afrodisia. Commento al De caelo di Aristotele.\nFrammenti del primo libro, A. Rescigno (ed.), Amsterdam: Hakkert,\n2004.", "–––. Commento al De caelo di Aristotele.\nFrammenti del secondo, terzo, e quarto libro, A. Rescigno (ed.),\nAmsterdam: Hakkert, 2008.", "Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Prior Analytics\n1.1–7, J. Barnes, S. Bobzien, K. Flannery, K. Ierodiakonou\n(trans.), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University Press,\n1991.", "–––, On Aristotle Prior Analytics\n1.8–13, J. B. Gould, and I. Müller (trans.), London,\nDuckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.", "–––, On Aristotle Prior Analytics\n1.14–22, J. B. Gould, and I. Müller (trans.), Ithaca:\nCornell University Press, 1999.", "–––, On Aristotle Prior Analytics\n1.23–31, I. Müller (trans.), London: Duckworth and\nIthaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.", "–––, On Aristotle Prior Analytics\n1.32–46, I. Müller (trans.), London: Duckworth and\nIthaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.", "–––, On Aristotle Topics 1, J. van\nOphuijsen (trans.), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University\nPress, 2001.", "–––, On Aristotle Topics 2, L. Castelli\n(trans.), London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020.", "–––, On Aristotle On Coming-to-Be and\nPerishing 2.2–5, E. Gannagé (trans.), Ithaca:\nCornell University Press, 2005.", "–––, On Aristotle Meteorology 4, E.\nLewis (trans.), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University\nPress, 1996.", "–––, On Aristotle Metaphysics 1, W. E.\nDooley (trans.), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University\nPress, 1989.", "–––, On Aristotle Metaphysics 2 and 3,\nW. E. Dooley, and A. Madigan (trans.), Ithaca: Cornell University\nPress, 1992.", "–––, On Aristotle Metaphysics 4, A.\nMadigan (trans.), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University\nPress, 1993.", "–––, On Aristotle Metaphysics 5, W. E.\nDooley (trans.), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University\nPress, 1993.", "–––, On Aristotle On Sense Perception,\nJ. A. Towey (trans.), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University\nPress, 2000.", "–––, On Fate, R. W. Sharples (ed.),\nLondon: Duckworth, 1983.", "–––, On the Soul (Part 1), V. Caston\n(trans.), Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 2012.", "–––, The De anima of Alexander of\nAphrodisias, A. P. Fotinis (trans.), Washington, D.C.: University\nPress of America, 1979.", "–––, Quaestiones 1.1–2.15, R. W.\nSharples (trans.), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University\nPress, 1992.", "–––, Quaestiones 1.16–3.15, R. W.\nSharples (trans.), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University\nPress, 1994.", "–––, Ethical Problems, R. W. 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Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed:\nThe Ancient Commentators and their Influence, London: Duckworth\n1990, pp. 31–54.", "Primavesi, O., 2007, “Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis:\nvier Kapitel zur frühen Überlieferung der Corpus\nAristotelicum”, Philologus 151: 51–77.", "–––, 2021, “Werk und Überlieferung”,\nin Ch. Rapp and K. Corcilius (eds.), Aristoteles Handbuch,\nStuttgart: J. B. Metzler, second, augmented edition, pp.\n67–74.", "Rashed, M., 2007, Essentialisme: Alexandre d’Aphrodise\nentre logique, physique et cosmologie, Berlin and New York:\nWalter de Gruyter.", "–––, 2014, L’héritage\naristotélicien. Textes inédits de\nl’antiquité, Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Second,\naugmented, edition.", "Reinhardt, T., 2007, “Andronicus of Rhodes and Boethus of\nSidon on Aristotle’s Categories”, in R. Sorabji\nand R. W. Sharples (eds.), Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC-200\nAD, London: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies\n(Supplementary Volume 94), pp. 513–529.", "Richard, M., 1950, “Apo phonês”,\nByzantion, 20: 191–222.", "Schofield, M., 2012, Plato, Aristotle, and Pythagoras in the\nFirst Century B.C., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Sellars, J., 2004, “The Aristotelian Commentators: A\nBiographical Guide”, in P. Adamson, H. Baltussen, M. Stone\n(eds.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and\nLatin Commentaries, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical\nStudies (Supplementary Volume), 83(2): 239–268.", "Sharples, R.W., 1987, “Alexander of Aphrodisias:\nScholasticism and Innovation”, in H. Temporini and W. Haase\n(eds.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt\n(Volume 36, Number 2), Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp.\n1176–1243.", "–––, 1997, “The Peripatetic School”,\nin D. J. Furley (ed.), Routledge History of Philosophy,\nvolume 2: From Aristotle to Augustine, London: Routledge, pp.\n147–187.", "–––, 1998, “Alexander and pseudo-Alexander\nof Aphrodisias, scripta minima. Questions and\nproblems, makeweights and prospects”, in W.\nKullmann, J. Althoff, and M. Asper (eds.), Gattungen\nwissenschaftlicher Literatur in der Antike, Tübingen:\nGünter Narr Verla, pp. 383–403.", "–––, 2007, “Aristotle’s Exoteric and\nEsoteric Works: Summaries and Commentaries”, in R. Sorabji and\nR. W. Sharples (eds.), Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC-200\nAD, London: University of London, Institute of Classical Studies,\nsupplementary volume 94, pp. 505–512.", "–––, 2008, “Habent sua fata libelli:\nAristotle’s Categories in the 1st Century\nBC”, Acta antiqua Hungarica, 48: 273–287.", "–––, 2010, Peripatetic Philosophy, 200 B.C.\nto A.D. 200. An Introduction and Collection of Sources in\nTranslation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Shiel, J., 1990, “Boethius’ commentaries on\nAristotle” in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed,\nLondon: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp.\n349–372.", "Schroeder, F. M., Todd, R. B. (eds.), 1990, Two Greek\nAristotelian commentators on the Intellect, Toronto: Pontifical\nInstitute of Medieval Studies.", "Solmsen, F., 1944, “Boethius and the History of the\nOrganon”, in American Journal of Philology,\n65: 69–74.", "Sorabji, R. (ed.), 1990, Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient\nCommentators and their Influence, London: Duckworth.", "–––, 2016, Aristotle Re–interpreted:\nNew Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators,\nLondon: Bloomsbury Publishing.", "Tarán, L., 1981, “Aristotelianism in the\n1st century BC”, Gnomon 57:\n721–750; reprinted in L. Taràn, 2001, Collected\nPapers, Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, pp. 479–524.", "Tuominen, M., 2009, The Ancient Commentators on Plato and\nAristotle, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California\nPress.", "Watts, E., 2006, City and School in Late Antiquity: Athens and\nAlexandria, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California\nPress." ]	[ { "href": "../alexander-aphrodisias/", "text": "Alexander of Aphrodisias" }, { "href": "../ammonius/", "text": "Ammonius" }, { "href": "../aristotelianism-renaissance/", "text": "Aristotelianism: in the Renaissance" }, { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../aristotle-categories/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: categories" }, { "href": "../boethius/", "text": "Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus" }, { "href": "../david/", "text": "David" }, { "href": "../elias/", "text": "Elias" }, { "href": "../neoplatonism/", "text": "Neoplatonism" }, { "href": "../olympiodorus/", "text": "Olympiodorus" }, { "href": "../philoponus/", "text": "Philoponus" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../plotinus/", "text": "Plotinus" }, { "href": "../porphyry/", "text": "Porphyry" }, { "href": "../simplicius/", "text": "Simplicius" } ]
animalism	Animalism	First published Mon Apr 7, 2014; substantive revision Mon Jul 15, 2019	[ "\nAmong the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal\nidentity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental\nnature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist\nthrough time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant\nneo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism\nanswers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo\nsapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of\nanimals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of\nanimalism and its rivals, this entry explores some of the arguments\nfor and objections to this controversial account of our nature and\npersistence." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Formulating Animalism", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Our Fundamental Nature", "1.2 Our Persistence" ] }, { "content_title": "2. The Lockean Legacy", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Locke’s Human/Person Distinction", "2.2 Animalism and the Human/Person Distinction", "2.3 Animalism(s) vs. Neo-Lockeanism(s)" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Arguments for and Objections to Animalism", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Thinking Animal Argument", "3.2 Replies to the Thinking Animal Argument", "3.3 Animal Ancestors Argument", "3.4 Further Objections, Implications, and Questions" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nDespite its Aristotelian heritage, animalism is a relative newcomer to\nthe personal identity debate. While early intimations of the view can\nbe found in work by Wiggins (1980) and Wollheim (1984), those\nprimarily responsible for injecting the view into the contemporary\ndebate over personal identity include Ayers (1991), Carter (1989,\n1999), Olson (1997), Snowdon (1990, 1991, 1995), and van Inwagen\n(1990). Though its supporters appear to remain in the minority,\nanimalism has since attracted other advocates, including Bailey (2016,\n2017), Blatti (2012), DeGrazia (2005), Hacker (2007), Hershenov\n(2005a), D. Mackie (1999a,b), Merricks (2001), and Wiggins (2001).\nNotable critics include Baker (2000, 2016), Johnston (2007, 2016),\nMcMahan (2002), Noonan (1998, 1989 [2019]), Parfit (2012), and S.\nShoemaker (1999, 2011, 2016), among others.", "\nThe name ‘animalism’ was conferred by Snowdon (1991: 109)\nand has been widely adopted. The view is also sometimes referred to as\n“the organism view” (e.g., Liao 2006), the\n“biological criterion” (e.g., D. Shoemaker 2009), or\n“the biological approach” (e.g., Olson 1997)." ], "section_title": "1. Formulating Animalism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAnimalism’s hallmark claim concerns our basic metaphysical\nnature: whether we are material or immaterial; simple or composite;\nsubstance, property, process, or event; organic or inorganic; etc. In\nthis context, the animalist asserts simply:", "\nDespite its plainness, (1′) is easily misinterpreted (for\ndiscussion, see D. Mackie 1999b: 230–33; Olson 2003:\n318–21; and Snowdon 2014: ch. 1). According to the intended\nreading, the ‘we’ picks out human persons such as you and\nme. Nevertheless, (1′) should not be taken to assert that\nall persons are animals. It leaves open the possibilities of\nboth non-animal people (e.g., robots, angels, aliens, deities) and\nhuman animals that are not people (e.g., patients in persistent\nvegetative states, human fetuses). The ‘are’ reflects the\n‘is’ of numerical identity. Consequently, animalism is not\nthe view that each of us is “constituted by” a particular\norganism, in the way that a statue is sometimes said to be\nnon-identically constituted by the hunk of matter with which it\ncoincides (see\n section 2.3).\n Nor still should (1′) be understood to claim that each of us\nhas a body that is an animal—as if you were one thing\nand your animal body another. Finally, ‘animals’ refers to\nbiological organisms—members of the primate species Homo\nsapiens. While participants on both sides of the debate over\nanimalism tend to treat these terms interchangeably, some prominent\ncritics distinguish ‘animals’ from ‘organisms’\nand deny that these terms co-refer (e.g., Johnston 2007: 55–56,\nS. Shoemaker 2011: 353).", "\nExpressed in logical notation and individualized, (1′) is\nsometimes presented in the following form:", "\nThis says: necessarily, for any object x, if x is a\nhuman person, then x is an animal, i.e., necessarily, human\npersons are animals. While neither (1′) nor (1″) is\nunproblematic (see, e.g., Johansson 2007 and Toner 2011), it is clear\nenough what they do not suggest. According to the animalism\naccount of our most fundamental nature, we are not", "\nHaving said that, this entry will focus primarily on animalism’s\npositive assertions, rather than on animalist criticisms of each of\nits rival views. The interested reader is directed to Olson 2007 and\nSnowdon 2014, which not only include qualified defenses of (1), but\nalso raise a host of criticisms of the foregoing\nalternatives—criticisms that, if not motivated by an acceptance\nof (1), are at least consistent with its truth.", "\nIt bears mention that animalism is sometimes formulated slightly\ndifferently as:", "\nOn this construal, animalism is the view that we could not exist\nexcept as animals. Indeed, some have alleged that a commitment to\n(1′) is insufficient to qualify anyone as an animalist and that\nthis label should be reserved only for those committed to\nboth (1′) and (1‴) (Belshaw 2011: 401; cf. Olson\n2007: 26–27, Snowdon 1990). Insistence on this point is probably\ninnocuous, however, since most philosophers accept that all animals\n(human and otherwise) are essentially animals, in which case,\n(1‴) follows immediately from (1′)." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Our Fundamental Nature" }, { "content": [ "\nWhile it is a claim about our fundamental nature that is most readily\nassociated with the name, animalism also incorporates a view about our\npersistence. Stated in its most general form, this view asserts the\nfollowing:", "\nAll animalists subscribe to (2), so far as it goes. But it does not go\nvery far. What exactly are the conditions of (human) animal\ncontinuity? Although animalists are mostly in agreement, there is a\nsubtle and seldom acknowledged rift between two camps of animalist\nthinking about the answer to this question.", "\nAccording to the first camp, remaining alive is both a necessary and a\nsufficient condition for the persistence of human animals.\nHuman-animal persistence thus consists in the continuation of those\nprocesses constitutive of biological life. As Olson puts it,\n“one survives just in case one’s purely animal\nfunctions—metabolism, the capacity to breathe and circulate\none’s blood, and the like—continue” (1997: 16). On\nthis view, an animal’s life is understood as", "\n\n\na self-organizing biological event that maintains the organism’s\ncomplex internal structure. The materials that organisms are made up\nof are intrinsically unstable and must therefore be constantly\nrepaired and renewed, or else the organism dies and its remains decay.\nAn organism must constantly take in new particles, reconfigure and\nassimilate them into its living fabric, and expel those that are no\nlonger useful to it. An organism’s life enables it to persist\nand retain its characteristic structure despite constant material\nturnover. (Olson 2007: 28)\n", "\nThis first animalist answer to the persistence question, then, can be\nglossed as follows:", "\nOnce (2a) is conjoined with the animalist answer to the fundamental\nnature question, (1), we have a view that might be labeled\n“organic animalism”. Notable advocates of this view\ninclude Olson and van Inwagen (1990). Of course, it follows from the\norganicist view that death will constitute the end of our existence.\nWhatever else may remain following our deaths, each of us will cease\nto exist when we die. Indeed, strictly speaking on this view, there is\nno such thing as a dead animal (or perhaps—if ‘dead’\nis a non-attributive adjective like ‘fake’—that a\n“dead animal” is not an animal).", "\nThose in the second animalist camp deny that being alive is a\nnecessary condition for the persistence of human animals. On their\nview, a human animal (like all organisms) is a functionally organized\nphysical object whose membership in a particular species is attributed\nto its origin and structure. Only if it is so gruesome as to destroy\nthis structure will an organism’s death bring about its\nnonexistence. We persist, David Mackie puts it, “as long as this\norganisation of [our] constituent parts remains sufficiently nearly\nintact” (1999b: 237).", "\nBut this focus on the functional organization of animal bodies should\nbe taken neither as discounting altogether the significance of the\nlife processes emphasized by organicists nor as affirming a\ntraditional bodily criterion of persistence. On the contrary, on this\nview, a human animal’s ", "\n\n\nlife is both a consequence or inseparable function of its origin and\nthe continuing explanation of its structure and parts at any moment of\nits existence. Life is essential to the thing in so far as it is\ninconceivable that it (this thing) should have come into existence as\na non-living thing. (Ayers 1991: vol. 2: 224)\n", "\n“But”, Ayers continues, “that is not to say that\nwhen it dies the thing itself will cease to exist: merely that an\nexplanation of the existence and structure of the thing will then\nrefer to a life that is over” (ibid.).", "\nIn contrast with their organicist counterparts, these animalists\nanswer the persistence question along the following lines:", "\n\n\nthe persistence of biological organisms depends on their retaining\n(enough of) the organisation of parts that is the product of their\nnatural biological development, and that makes them apt for life,\nwhile stopping short of saying that life itself is necessary. (D.\nMackie 1999b: 236) \n", "\nIn short:", "\nHereafter, ‘somatic animalism’ will refer to the\nconjunction of (1) and (2b). In addition to Ayers and Mackie, notable\nsomaticists include Carter (1989, 1999) and Feldman (1992).", "\nIt is worth emphasizing that the debate between somatic and organic\nanimalists is not merely verbal and that the sort of linguistic\nevidence sometimes marshaled (e.g., by D. Mackie 1999b) is—while\ngermane—unlikely to settle the question at issue. The debate\nbetween somaticist and organicist conceptions of the conditions of\nanimal continuity reflects a substantive (if, as yet, inadequately\nexplored) disagreement about the nature of (human) animals. (Are they\nessentially living? How ought life itself be understood?) Moreover,\nwhile the issue of whether something can be both an animal and dead\nillustrates the somaticist-organicist debate, it is hardly\nthe only context in which that debate manifests itself. The same\ndebate could be illustrated when considering unborn human fetuses,\nhuman animals in suspended animation, etc." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Our Persistence" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nToward the end of his magisterial two-volume commentary on John Locke,\nAyers writes that ", "\n\n\nfor all the transformation of our motives, indeed, of our general\nphilosophical theory … the debate on personal identity has\nhardly moved on since the innovations of the seventeenth and\neighteenth centuries. (1991: vol. 2: 281)\n", "\nIn a similar spirit, S. Shoemaker recently adapted Whitehead’s\nfamous remark, observing that “the history of the topic of\npersonal identity has been a series of footnotes to Locke”\n(2008: 313). It is certainly undeniable that no single discussion of\npersonal identity has done more to shape the current debate than the\nchapter titled “Of Identity and Diversity” that Locke\nadded to the second edition of his Essay Concerning Human\nUnderstanding (II.xxvii). (Hereafter, all textual references to \nLocke are to this work, Locke 1689 [1975].) Also undeniable is the \neffect these\npages have had on the emergence of the animalist alternative to the\nLockean approach to personal identity. For whatever intuitive appeal\nanimalism may seem to have in our secular, post-Darwinian climate, in\nthe wake of Locke’s work, the falsity of animalism was long\ntaken for granted." ], "section_title": "2. The Lockean Legacy", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nFrom an animalist perspective, the most significant aspect of\nLocke’s famous discussion is the sharp distinction he draws\nbetween the human animal (“man”) and the person. Unlike a\nmass of matter—which consists merely in “the Cohesion of\nParticles … any how united” (II.xxvii.4)—a living\norganism (e.g., oak tree, horse, human animal) is a structurally\ncomplex material object whose functional organization is conducive to\ncontinued life. A person, by contrast, is a \n“thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and \ncan\nconsider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different\ntimes and places; which it does by that consciousness, which is\ninseparable from thinking” (II.xxvii.9).", "\nBy classifying “man” with other organisms and then drawing\na distinction between organisms and persons, Locke recognizes that he\nis prying apart the traditional notion of “man” as\nrational, on the one hand, and animal, on the other. Against this\ntraditional understanding, he introduces a thought experiment\ninvolving a rational parrot (II.xxvii.8). Our unwillingness to call\nthis parrot a “man” simply because it is an animal\npossessed of language and reason illustrates that not all rational\nanimals are men. Nor are all men rational animals: “whoever\nshould see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, though it had no more\nreason all its Life, than a Cat or a Parrot, would\ncall him still a Man” (ibid.). The human/person\ndistinction gains traction once it is coupled with one of\nthe Essay’s key insights, viz. that sortal concepts\n(e.g., human animal, person) are often (though not\nalways) associated with different identity criteria.\n“Identity”—as he puts it in the title of the section\nin which this insight is first registered—is “suited to\nthe Idea”: “such as is the Idea\nbelonging to [a] Name, such must be the Identity”\n(II.xxvii.7). Locke is keenly aware of the significance of this\nprinciple; “if it had been a little more carefully attended\nto”, he admonishes, it “would possibly have prevented a\ngreat deal of that Confusion, which often occurs about this Matter\n… especially concerning\nPersonal Identity” (ibid.). And indeed, it is this\ninsight about the association of sortal concepts and identity criteria\nthat encourages the thought in Locke that human animals and persons\nare governed by different criteria of identity. Whereas a human animal\npersists just in case “the same continued Life [is] communicated\nto different Particles of Matter, as they happen successively to be\nunited to that organiz’d living Body” (II.xxvii.8), when\none “consider[s] what Person stands for”, Locke\ncontends, one finds that its persistence consists in “the\nsameness of a rational Being”. He explains: “as far as\nthis consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or\nThought, so far reaches the Identity of that\nPerson” (II.xxvii.9).", "\nThe impetus behind Locke’s human/person distinction was the\nongoing debate amongst seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theologians\nand philosophers concerning the metaphysics of resurrection. Their\nchallenge was to account for the Biblical prediction that the dead\nwould be resurrected on judgment day. But what is it exactly that gets\nresurrected? The physical particles associated with a living organism\nare in a state of constant flux. The set of particles associated with\nan organism changes from one moment to the next and may turnover\ncompletely (perhaps several times) during the course of an\norganism’s life. Moreover, whether due to decomposition and/or\nbecause they are consumed by other organisms, the particles associated\nwith an organism at its death will be widely dispersed. These facts\nalone make it unlikely, if not impossible, that the resurrection of\neach individual will involve the reconstitution of that\nindividual’s former “body”. The human/person\ndistinction supplies Locke with the resources to resolve this problem\nbecause, on his view, something is a person not because of\nthe material or immaterial substance in which it is grounded—a\nquestion on which Locke remains steadfastly agnostic, though he is\ninclined to think the underlying substance is immaterial\n(II.xxvii.25)—but in virtue of the psychological capacities it\nexercises, viz. self-consciousness and rationality. And a person\npersists “as far as” the exercise of those capacities\n“reaches” (II.xxvii.9): “For the same consciousness\nbeing preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances,\nthe personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Thus\nthe way is clear for Locke to assert that one and the same person may\nbe resurrected even if that person comes to inhabit an altogether\ndifferent body than any with which she was previously associated\n(II.xxvii.15).", "\nIt is in the context of his solution to this problem that Locke\nintroduces the famous thought experiment involving the prince and the\ncobbler—not as a puzzle in need of explanation, but as a case\nwhose apparent plausibility vindicates the human/person distinction\n(and thereby, his solution to the problem of the resurrection). If\n\n“the soul of the prince, carrying with it the consciousness of\nthe Prince’s past Life, [were to] enter and inform the Body of a\nCobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul”, Locke enjoins his\nreader, “every one sees, he would be the same Person\nwith the Prince, accountable only for the Prince’s Actions: But\nwho would say it was the same Man?” (II.xxvii.15, emphasis\nadded). This thought experiment is often taken to support a\npsychological criterion of personal identity. The precise form of such\na criterion has been the subject of much dispute, both in\nLocke’s time and subsequently. Locke himself is sometimes said\n(probably incorrectly) to have advocated a memory criterion, according\nto which a person,\nx, existing at one time, \$t_1\$, and a person, y,\nexisting at a later time, \$t_2\$, y is identical with x\nif and only if y remembers experiences had by x. Whether\nor not this was Locke’s view, generally speaking, psychological\ncriteria of personal identity assert that a psychological relation of\nsome sort (i.e. a relation involving memory, characteristics and\ndispositions, beliefs, desires, rationality, etc.) is necessary and/or\nsufficient for each of us to persist through time.", "\nAnother important dimension of the human/person distinction is also\nsignaled in this example, viz. the person as locus of moral\naccountability. On Locke’s view, it is in virtue of their\ncapacities for self-consciousness and rationality that persons not\nonly persist through time, but also are prudentially concerned and\nmorally and legally responsible for actions committed at other times.\nAccording to Locke, a person should be punished only for those actions\nthat she can remember having committed (II.xxvii.20). This is true not\nonly in the case of divine law carried out on judgment day—when\n“the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open”\nand rewards and punishments meted out for the good and bad deeds\nundertaken throughout the course of our lives (II.xxvii.26)—but\nalso, more generally, in the course of everyday legal and moral\naffairs. So it is that ‘person’ functions as “a\nForensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit” (ibid.)\nand in “personal Identity is founded all the Right and\nJustice of Reward and Punishment” (II.xxvii.18).", "\nIn discussing these normative aspects of personhood, Locke raises and\nanswers an obvious objection in a way that anticipates some strains of\nthe contemporary debate. “Suppose”, he says,", "\n\n\nI wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a\npossibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be\nconscious of them again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those\nActions, had those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I\nhave now forgot them? (II.xxvii.20)\n", "\nLocke replies that, although they typically refer to both the same\nhuman animal and the same person, self-referring personal pronouns can\nbe equivocal. So the question “Did I do such and so?” can\nbe ambiguous as between “Did the person to which ‘I’\npresently refers do such and so?” and “Did the human\nanimal to which ‘I’ presently refers do such and\nso?” In Locke’s amnesiac case, the answer to the first\nquestion is no, while the answer to the second question is yes:\n“the Word I is applied to … the Man only”\n(ibid.).", "\nTwo aspects of Locke’s discussion of this case are salient to\nthe contemporary discussion. The first, of course, is the view that,\nif I am incapable of recalling having done this or that, then the\nperson responsible for the action in question is not the person I am,\neven if the person who is responsible for that action occupied the\nsame human animal presently occupied by the person I am (see Johansson\n2016, D. Shoemaker 2009, 2016, and Sauchelli 2017a). The second is the\nidea that the first-person pronoun can refer equivocally in a way that\n tracks the human/person distinction (see\n section 3.2).", "\nA host of interpretive questions can be raised concerning the\nhistorical distinction between human animals and persons, and some of\nthese may be of interest to participants in the contemporary debate\nbetween animalism and its rivals. For example, whether Locke’s\ndistinction reflects a conceptual or an ontological difference remains\na point of controversy amongst historians of the period (e.g., Bolton\n1994; Chappell 1989; Thiel 1997 and 1998). But setting aside these\nscholarly matters, the features of Locke’s distinction that are\nuncontroversially endorsed by Locke as well as especially relevant for\nthe current debate include the following:" ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Locke’s Human/Person Distinction" }, { "content": [ "\nIt should be emphasized at this point that animalists do not deny that\nthere is a distinction to be drawn between human animals and persons.\nThis, in part, is why the formulation of (1) that is sometimes\nascribed to animalists—“persons are human\nanimals”—is misleading. In fact, there are several aspects\nof Locke’s discussion that animalists uphold.", "\nFor example, animalists often ally their answer to the persistence\nquestion with Locke’s identity criteria for human animals (e.g.,\nOlson 2007: 28). Of course, since organic animalists affirm and\nsomatic animalists deny that being alive is a necessary condition of\nour persistence, Locke cannot be an ally to both camps. For his part,\nD. Mackie (1999b: 235–39) classifies Locke as an organicist.\nHowever, enough passages from the Essay suggest otherwise\n(some of which Mackie himself acknowledges—e.g., in\nII.xxvii.4–5) that the more circumspect conclusion may be that\nLocke was either inconsistent or just ambivalent on the matter.\nAnimalists are also sympathetic to Locke’s account of\npersonhood—albeit with a different understanding of the type of\nconcept person is—and this alternative understanding\nallows animalists to endorse element (d) above.", "\nWhat animalists reject is Locke’s claim that\n‘person’ names a sortal concept (e.g., Snowdon 2014: ch.\n3). Rather, following Olson (1997: ch. 2), most animalists insist that\n‘person’ names only a phase sortal concept (or\nstatus concept, see Hacker 2007). (The idea of a\n“phased sortal”, as he called them, is due to Wiggins\n[1967, 2001].) Unlike a sortal concept, which determines the\npersistence conditions of its instances, a phase sortal concept is a\nconcept to which its instances belong temporarily, for only a phase of\ntheir existence (e.g., teenager). Simply by reaching a\nparticular age, for example, something that was not a teenager can\nbecome a teenager without ceasing to exist. Likewise, something that\nwas a teenager can cease to be a teenager without ceasing to exist. So\ntoo, animalists say, with person. Personhood, they claim, is\na phase that something begins upon acquiring the psychological\ncapacities that Locke identifies (self-consciousness and rationality)\nand concludes upon losing those capacities. In this way, being a\nperson is a matter of what something can do, rather than what\nsomething is. In Olson terminology, person is a\n“functional kind”, akin to locomotor (1997:\n31–37). A locomotor is anything that is able to move about under\nits own power, be it a garden slug or a ballistic missile. Likewise,\nOlson argues (following Locke), a person is anything that is able to\nthink in certain ways—anything that “is rational, …\nordinarily conscious and aware of itself as tracing a path through\ntime and space, … [and] morally accountable for its\nactions” (1997: 32). Many things besides human animals can be\npersons on this view: an angel, a god, a machine, an animal, an\nimmaterial soul, an alien, etc.. In the case of human animals, we\nordinarily become persons not at conception or at birth, but around\nthe age of two. And while it is possible for a human animal to go out\nof existence at the same moment that she ceases to be a person (e.g.,\nif she steps on an active landmine), it is also possible for a human\nanimal to continue existing long after he has ceased to be a person\n(e.g., if he lapses into a persistent vegetative state)." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Animalism and the Human/Person Distinction" }, { "content": [ "\nAnimalism’s principal rival is not infrequently identified as\n“neo-Lockeanism”. This way of staging the debate dates\nback at least as far as a prominent exchange between Noonan (1998,\n2001) and D. Mackie (1999a). Also, the first monograph dedicated to\nanimalism mounts a sustained attack on the “psychological\napproach” to personal identity—an approach whose\n“best-known advocate … is, of course, Locke” (Olson\n1997: 20). And the “animalism vs. neo-Lockeanism”\nopposition remains common in contemporary discussions (e.g., S.\nCampbell 2001; Hershenov 2012; Johnston 2010; Robinson 2016; S.\nShoemaker 2008).", "\nIn one respect, setting things up in this way is fairly harmless.\nViews classified as “neo-Lockean” share a common\ncommitment to a psychological criterion of personal identity (whether\nthat criterion requires direct psychological connectedness or merely\noverlapping chains of psychological continuity) that animalists\nuniversally oppose. But ultimately, the simple “animalism vs.\nneo-Lockeanism” dichotomy is too coarse-grained and exclusionary\nto provide a particularly informative taxonomy of the contemporary\ndebate. For example, whilst all animalists resist a psychological\ncriterion of persistence, the distinction between organic and somatic\nanimalisms\n (section 1.2)\n shows us that the source of this resistance varies significantly.\nAnd, as the list given above indicates\n (section 1.1),\n animalism’s answer to the fundamental nature question is\nopposed by a wide range of views, not all of which are properly\nclassified as neo-Lockean. Moreover, as we shall see in what follows,\nthe “neo-Lockeanism” label both obscures importantly\ndifferent varieties of neo-Lockeanism and ignores different rationales\ngiven for those views.", "\nWhilst a comprehensive taxonomy of alternatives to animalism is\nneither feasible nor necessary in the present context, one step in the\nright direction would be to differentiate those neo-Lockean views that\nrely on the notion of material constitution from those that do not.\nThose that do—call this type of view “constitutionalist\nneo-Lockeanism”—are today regarded as the leading\nopposition to animalism. Advocates of this form of neo-Lockeanism\n(including Baker, Johnston, and S. Shoemaker) contend that each of us\n“is” an animal only in the sense that (according to some)\na statue “is” the piece of marble, viz. by being\nmaterially colocated and yet distinguished by one or more modal,\ntemporal, and/or relational properties. On this view, we are persons\nnon-identically constituted by human animals.", "\nDespite this common reliance on the notion of material constitution,\nthere are significant differences between the views advocated by\nanimalism’s constitutionalist neo-Lockean opponents. According\nto S. Shoemaker (1984), for instance, it is the capacity for thought\nthat distinguishes the mental subject you are from the human animal\nthat constitutes you. Partly because it is embedded within his\nbroader, functionalist response to the mind/body problem,\nShoemaker’s arguments against animalism and animal thought are\ncomplex (see\n section 3.2\n for further discussion). But roughly, on his view, animals are\nincapable of thinking because they do not persist under the\nappropriate conditions. Psychological continuity is sufficient for the\npersistence of any being endowed with the capacity to think, and since\npsychological continuity is not sufficient for a (human) animal to\npersist, animals are not thinking beings. And because each of us is a\nthinking being, we are not animals. (For a thorough presentation of\nShoemaker’s most recent thinking on this topic, see his 1999,\n2004, 2008, 2011, 2016.)", "\nPerhaps the most extensive elaboration of the constitutionalist\napproach has been given by Baker (2000, 2002, 2007). On her view, the\nproperty that distinguishes the persons we are from the human animals\nthat constitute us is a form of self-consciousness that she calls the\n“first-person perspective” (2000: ch. 3). It is from this\nperspective that “one thinks of oneself as an individual facing\na world, as a subject distinct from everything else”; it is what\nenables us “to conceive of one’s body and mental states as\none’s own” (2000: 60, 4). On her view, persons have their\nfirst-person perspectives essentially, and they “persist as long\nas [their] first-person perspectives are exemplified” (2016: 51;\nsee also 2000: 132–41).", "\nAt the heart of this view is what Baker has recently labeled her\n“Key Distinction” (2007: 43; 2016: 53). Constitutionalists\nmaintain that constituting objects (e.g., pieces of marble) and\nconstituted objects (e.g., statues) can share some of their\nproperties. For instance, a statue shares its physical and aesthetic\nproperties with the piece of marble that constitutes it; likewise,\nBaker will claim, a person shares its physical and psychological\nproperties with the human animal that constitutes it. But these\nobjects cannot share all of their properties in the same way, or else\nthere would be no difference between the constituting and the\nconstituted. So Baker draws an exhaustive and mutually exclusive\ndistinction between two ways that objects can instantiate properties:\nderivatively or nonderivatively. Roughly, an object has a property\nderivatively if it instantiates it only in virtue of being colocated\nwith another object, whereas an object instantiates a property\nnonderivatively if it instantiates that property independently of\nbeing colocated with another object. We might express this distinction\nmore perspicuously as follows. If one object (x) constitutes\nanother object (y) and both objects instantiate some property\n(F), then", "\nConsider, for example, a marble statue of a giant ogre. In this case,\n(i) the piece of marble instantiates the property of being three\nmeters tall nonderivatively (because it would be three meters tall\neven if it did not constitute the statue); (ii) the statue\ninstantiates the property of being ugly nonderivatively (because the\npiece of marble with which it is colocated would not be ugly if it did\nnot constitute a statue); and (iii) the statue instantiates the\nproperty of being three meters tall derivatively (because the piece of\nmarble would be three meters tall even if it did not constitute the\nstatue). (Still more precise elaborations of Baker’s Key\nDistinction are given in her 2000: 46–58 and 2007: 166–69.\nA number of critics have argued that the distinction generates more\nheat than light; see, e.g., Hershenov 2009; Olson 2007: ch. 3;\nZimmerman 2002; and contributions to the \nField Guide to the Philosophy of Mind \nonline symposium on Baker 2000.)", "\nBaker argues by analogy that, as it goes for marble statues, so it\ngoes for human persons. On her view, each of us is an animal, but\n(contra the animalist) only derivatively. Baker’s\nanswer to the fundamental nature question is that we are persons; each\nof us possesses the first-person perspective essentially and\nnonderivatively. In the course of ordinary development, a human animal\ndevelops increasingly sophisticated psychological capacities (just\nlike the piece of marble develops aesthetic characteristics as the\nsculptor chisels away at it). Once these capacities include a\nfirst-person perspective, a person comes into existence, and this\nperson is constituted by the human animal (2000: 115–16; cf.\n2007: 72–82). Since the animal would not have a first-person\nperspective if it did not come to constitute the person, it shares\nthis perspective with the person in the same way that the piece of\nmarble shares the property of being ugly with the statue of the ogre,\nviz. derivatively.", "\nOn Baker’s view, the first-person perspective is unique to\npersons. Without this perspective, she argues, a being cannot refer to\nitself using first-person pronouns, for this ability requires that one\nbe able to conceive of oneself both as the subject of mental events\nand as the object that embodies the subject of those events. Because\nthe human animal that constitutes you possesses a first-person\nperspective only derivatively, then, it is unable to self-refer. That\nsaid, Baker does not claim that person-constituting human animals lack\ncognitive and experiential capacities altogether. Nor does she claim\nthat they possess these capacities only derivatively. Like many of the\n“higher” nonhuman animals, human animals are subjects of\nan array of mental phenomena, including pains and pleasures, beliefs\nand desires. Such phenomena require not the “strong” or\n“robust” first-person perspective characteristic of\npersons, but only what Baker calls a “weak” or\n“rudimentary” first-person perspective—roughly, the\ncapacity to experience the world from an egocentric point of view\n(2000: 60–64). And just as the statue inherits the property of\nbeing three meters tall from the piece of marble, so too the person\npossesses these lesser psychological capacities only derivatively\nbecause the human animal would possess these capacities even if it did\nnot constitute the person.", "\nNeo-Lockean resistance to animalism that is not linked to\nconstitutionalism is an even more diverse lot. One of the prevailing\nviews in the non-constitutionalist neo-Lockeanism category rejects\nanimalism by identifying the person with a proper part of the human\nanimal—typically, the brain or one of its (spatial or temporal)\nparts. On this view, the human animal thinks only derivatively, in\nvirtue of having a thinking brain as a part. Among those who advocate\nviews along this line are Puccetti (1973), Persson (1999), McMahan\n(2002), Hudson (2001), and more recently Parfit (2012). Animalist\nresponses to these views are given by Hershenov (2005b, 2016) and\nOlson (2007: ch. 4). Also relevant are the various thought experiments\nraised by non-constitutionalist neo-Lockeans (e.g., Lewis 1976; Parfit\n1984) that seem to count against animalism; for instance, thought\nexperiments involving teletransportation and transplantation. See\n section 3.4\n for some discussion of these cases." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Animalism(s) vs. Neo-Lockeanism(s)" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nParticularly when introduced in isolation, animalism—especially\n(1)—might strike one as obviously true. In his book-length\ntreatment of the view, Snowdon demonstrates at length how animalism\n“represents the default conception of ourselves” (2014:\n106). And in an earlier article, he notes:", "\n\n\nThe central claim of animalism is in some ways a curious proposition\nto assert. It is natural to respond to its assertion in the words of\nWittgenstein: “Only whom are we informing of this? And on what\noccasion?”. (1995: 72; Wittgenstein 1953: 101e)\n", "\nOlson echoes this sentiment, writing that we certainly", "\n\n\nseem to be animals. When you eat or sleep or talk, a human\nanimal eats, sleeps, or talks. When you look in the mirror, and animal\nlooks back at you. Most ordinary people suppose that we are animals.\n… Compared with [competing] proposals, the idea that we are\nanimals looks like plain common sense. (2007: 23)\n", "\nBut common sense will not settle the issue because some of\nanimalism’s rivals are supported by other, equally intuitive\nconsiderations. In addition to common sense, then, what arguments can\nbe marshaled in support of animalism?" ], "section_title": "3. Arguments for and Objections to Animalism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe standard argument for (1) is variously referred to as the\n“thinking animal argument” (Olson 1997, 2003), the\n“too many minds objection” (S. Shoemaker 1999), the\n“two lives objection” (S. Campbell 2006), and the\n“too many thinkers problem” (Parfit 2012: 7). It was\ndeveloped by Snowdon (1990: 91), Carter (1988), McDowell (1997: 237),\nand Ayers (1991, vol. 2: 283). It has since been sharpened and\npopularized by Olson (1997: 106–09, 2003: 325–30, 2007:\n29–39). Here it is:", "\nWhilst none of (P1), (P2), and (P3) is incontestable, nor is any one\nof them easily contested. Save perhaps for far-reaching metaphysical\nreasons (e.g., an antecedent commitment to idealism), few would deny\nthe very existence of animals, nor the fact that a perfectly good\nspecimen of the species Homo sapiens is presently seated in\nyour chair. So (P1) is not easily rejected.", "\nMoreover, concerning (P2), since it would be odd (to say the least) to\ndeny that human animals think while accepting that porpoises and\nporcupines do, and since we can assume that the human animal in your\nchair is not atypical of its kind, whatever reasons one has for\naccepting that various nonhuman animals think apply equally to the\nhuman animal in your chair. While there are those who deny (in a\nsense) that any animal can think (e.g., Descartes, Johnston, S.\nShoemaker), their positions strain empirical credibility and/or depend\non fairly sophisticated metaphysical machinery. At first glance,\nanyway, (P2) is much easier to accept.", "\n(P3) is also difficult to resist, since its denial would seem to\nrequire positing the existence of a thinking being in your chair other\nthan yourself. For if (P1) and (P2) are true, and if it is true that\nyou exist and are thinking, then denying (P3) results in the\nimplication that you are but one of (at least) two thinkers seated in\nyour chair. Such a view faces a host of difficult questions: practical\nquestions (e.g., which of these beings owns the car parked out\nfront?), epistemic questions (how do you determine which of these\nbeings you are?), linguistic questions (to which of these beings do\ninstances of the first-person pronoun refer?), ontological questions\n(what is the relationship between you and the qualitatively identical\nbeing with which you are associated?), and so on. These challenges\nhave not passed unnoticed, and serious attempts have been made to\naddress them. But, the animalist says, the trouble can be avoided from\nthe start simply by conceding the truth of (P3).", "\nSo, while not necessarily unanswerable or insurmountable, the\nquestions and problems that await one who rejects any of (P1) through\n(P3) are not insignificant. Animalism, then, has at least this much\ngoing for it." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Thinking Animal Argument" }, { "content": [ "\nNot all replies to the thinking animal argument have focused\nexclusively on, or even addressed themselves directly, to one or the\nother of the three premises that make up that argument. Nevertheless,\nmany replies to animalism do concern questions raised by the thinking\nanimal argument and may fruitfully be seen as addressing one or\nanother of its premises.", "\nFor instance, according to Baker’s (2000, 2007) constitution\nview, (P3) should be rejected, since “thinking being sitting in\nyour chair” is ambiguous as between the constituted person who\nthinks nonderivatively and the constituting human animal who thinks\nderivatively\n (section 2.3).\n And Noonan (1998, 2001) also detects an ambiguity in (P2) and (P3).\nAccording to his revisionist view of personal pronoun use,\nfirst-person thoughts and utterances refer only to persons, not to\nanimals. On his view, we must distinguish between the referent of\nfirst-person thoughts and utterances, on the one hand, and the thinker\nof those thoughts and utterances, on the other hand. Noonan does not\ndeny that the human animal sitting in your chair is capable of\nfirst-personal thinking. Nor does he deny that such thoughts (and the\nutterances that express them) successfully refer. But he does insist\nthat, when the animal has a first-person thought or utters\n‘I’, that thought or utterance refers not to the animal\nwho thinks the thought but to the person with whom the animal shares\nits thoughts. (For further discussion, see Noonan 2012 and Olson\n2002a, 2007: 37–39.)", "\nAnd, although not initially developed as a response to the thinking\nanimal argument, S. Shoemaker’s (1984, 1999, 2004) view\nrepresents a direct and formidable challenge to (P2). On his account,\nthe human animal sitting in your chair is not thinking because no\nanimal is capable of thinking. This in turn is because the capacity\nfor thought requires persistence conditions that all animals, human or\notherwise, lack: “mental properties”, Shoemaker writes,\n“can belong only to things having psychological persistence\nconditions” (2004: 528). A thinker’s psychological states\nplay characteristic causal roles, and these states (in combination\nwith others) tend to cause the thinking being whose states they are to\nbehave in certain ways. Thus, for example, the state of being in pain\nmay be caused by bodily damage of some kind and may dispose the one\nwho is in pain to cry out or recoil.", "\nThe linchpin of Shoemaker’s view is his claim that the causal\nrole of any psychological state as well as any other states involved\nin that causal role must all be states of one and the same thinking\nbeing (1999: 300). In other words, the effects typically brought about\nby a being’s psychological states cannot fail to occur in that\nvery being. Olson summarizes the consequence of this commitment as\nfollows:", "\n\n\nif your cerebrum gets put into my head tomorrow, your current mental\nstates will have their characteristic effects in the being who ends up\nwith that organ, and not in the empty-headed thing left behind. By\nShoemaker’s reasoning, the subject of those\nstates—you—must therefore be the being who ends up with\nyour transplanted cerebrum. Any being whose later states or actions\nare caused in the appropriate way by your current mental states must\nbe you. In other words, psychological continuity of a sort must\nsuffice for you or any other mental being to persist through time.\nSince no sort of psychological continuity suffices for any organism to\npersist … it follows that no organism could have mental\nproperties. The nature of mental properties makes it metaphysically\nimpossible for animals to think. (Olson 2007: 33–34.)\n", "\nShoemaker’s functionalist theory of mind has received\nconsiderable attention in the philosophy of mind. His view that\nanimals cannot think and the implications of that claim for the\nthinking animal argument are discussed in Árnadóttir\n2010, Hershenov 2006, Olson 2002b, and S. Shoemaker 2004, 2008, 2011,\n2016.", "\nBeyond these discussions of (P2) and (P3), much of the recent\ndiscussion concerning animalism has focused on such questions as\nwhether one or more than one thinker is sitting in your chair; if more\nthan one, which one is doing the thinking; and in what sense.\nZimmerman (2008), for instance, objects to (P1) by noting that the\nrationale for the claim that a human animal is located where you\nare—in effect, that it is just obvious that there is an instance\nof the species Homo sapiens currently located where you\nare—extends equally to such things as “mere hunk of\nmatter”, “mere body”, “psychological\nperson”, and the like. Since the animalist does not accept that\nwe are identical to any of these non-animals, the evident truth of\n(P1) will not be sufficient to establish the thinking animal\nargument’s conclusion. What is required, in other words, is not\nsimply a reason for believing that (P1) is true—animalists, let\nus assume, are correct in insisting that few would deny it—but\nalso a reason for denying the presence of other things besides a human\nanimal. This is the “rival candidates problem”.", "\nClosely related to this problem is another. The “thinking parts\nproblem” charges that, even if you are a thinking being, no\nreason has been given to suppose that you are a thinking\nanimal rather than any of the other thinking beings currently\nlocated where you are. To begin, consider all the parts of a human\nanimal that are plausibly regarded as thinking: the head, the brain,\nthe right-leg complement (i.e., the entire animal body minus the right\nleg), the entire animal from the waist up (torso, neck, and head), the\nleft-arm complement minus a single electron in the animal’s\nliver, the left-arm complement minus a different electron in the\nanimal’s liver, etc. For each of these thinking parts, an\nargument structurally analogous to the thinking animal argument could\nbe constructed. For instance:", "\nLikewise:", "\nAnd so on. If the thinking animal argument were sound, then it would\nfollow (per impossibile) that you are identical with each of\nan infinite number of nonidentical thinking parts. Since you could be\nidentical with no more than one of those things, and since the\nanimalist has provided no principled explanation for why you are the\nwhole animal and not one or another of the animal’s thinking\nparts, the thinking animal argument should be rejected.", "\nMuch of the discussion about animalism has been concerned with the\nrival candidates and thinking parts problems. (See, for instance,\nBlatti 2016; Lowe 2001; Madden 2016a; Olson 2007: 215–19 and\n2015; Parfit 2012; Yang 2015.) One line of response draws on van\nInwagen’s (1990) view of composite material beings. According to\nvan Inwagen’s answer to what he calls the “special\ncomposition question”, the only composite objects that exist are\nliving organisms. Only a living organism unifies the particles that\ncompose it at any given moment, on this view. Such things as\n“mere hunk of matter” and “right-leg\ncomplement” are gerrymandered objects. And since they are not\ngenuine composite objects, they are neither genuine rivals nor genuine\nthinkers. Olson (2008: 38–42) is, however, quick to acknowledge\nthat this riposte will be welcomed only by those antecedently\npersuaded of van Inwagen’s view. And proponents of the rival\ncandidates and thinking parts problems are particularly unlikely to\ncount among van Inwagen’s supporters." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Replies to the Thinking Animal Argument" }, { "content": [ "\nEven if these objections to the thinking animal argument can be\nanswered, there is some irony in the fact that the fate of the\nhallmark argument for animalism should hang in the balance of disputes\nover the nature of mental properties and the individuation of\nthinkers. Thought is an essential ingredient not in animalism’s\ntheory of our fundamental nature, but in the theories advanced by\nanimalism’s neo-Lockean rivals. It is precisely our capacity for\nthought that animalists deny is essential to us; on the contrary,\nanimalists say, each of us was once a non-thinking fetus and each of\nus may yet become a non-thinking persistent-vegetative-state\npatient.", "\nThus, a second argument attempts to ground animalism’s defense\nin a broader naturalistic context. The “animal ancestors\nargument” takes the form of a reductio. If (1) is false and we\nare not animals, then nor are our parents animals, in which case nor\nare our parents’ parents, nor our parents’ grandparents,\nand so on, as far back as our ancestries extend. But in that case, the\nfalsity of animalism entails the rejection of evolutionary theory (or\nat least that theory’s applicability to us), since it denies\nthat our distant ancestries includes beings who were animals. But,\nsince the rejection of evolutionary theory is too high a price to pay,\nit is instead the assumption of animalism’s falsity that ought\nto be rejected. Whilst Blatti (2012) argues that this argument\nwithstands a number of extant objections, it also faces challenges\n(Daly and Liggins 2013, Gillett 2013)." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Animal Ancestors Argument" } ] } ]	[ "Árnadóttir, Steinvör Thöll, 2010,\n“Functionalism and Thinking Animals”, Philosophical\nStudies, 147(3): 347–354. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9287-0", "Atherton, Margaret, 1983, “Locke’s Theory of Personal\nIdentity”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 8: 273–293.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1983.tb00470.x", "Ayers, Michael, 1991, Locke, 2 vols., London:\nRoutledge.", "Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1997, “Why Constitution Is Not\nIdentity”, The Journal of Philosophy, 94(12): 599.\ndoi:10.2307/2564596", "–––, 1999, “What Am I?”,\nPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(1):\n151–159. doi:10.2307/2653462", "–––, 2000, Persons and Bodies: A\nConstitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9781139173124", "–––, 2002, “The Ontological Status of\nPersons”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,\n65(2): 370–388. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00207.x", "–––, 2007, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life:\nAn Essay in Practical Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511487545", "–––, 2016, “Animalism vs.\nConstitutionalism”, in Blatti and Snowdon (eds) 2016: 50–63.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0003", "Bailey, Andrew M., 2016, “You Are an Animal”, Res\nPhilosophica, 93(1): 205–218.\ndoi:10.11612/resphil.2016.93.1.9", "–––, 2017, “Our Animal Interests”,\nPhilosophical Studies, 174(9): 2315–2328.\ndoi:10.1007/s11098-016-0800-6", "Belshaw, Christopher, 2011, “Animals, Identity and\nPersistence”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,\n89(3): 401–419. doi:10.1080/00048402.2010.497190", "Blatti, Stephan, 2007, “Animalism, Dicephalus, and\nBorderline Cases”, Philosophical Psychology, 20(5):\n595–608. doi:10.1080/09515080701540867", "–––, 2012, “A New Argument for\nAnimalism”, Analysis, 72(4): 685–690.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/ans102", "–––, 2016, “Headhunters”, in Blatti\nand Snowdon (eds.) 2016: 162–179.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0008", "Blatti, Stephan and Paul F. 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S., 2007, Human Nature: The Categorial\nFramework, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.\ndoi:10.1002/9780470692165", "Hershenov, David B., 2005a, “Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem\nfor Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?”, Mind,\n114(453): 31–59. doi:10.1093/mind/fzi031", "–––, 2005b, “Persons as Proper Parts of\nOrganisms”, Theoria, 71(1): 29–37.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2005.tb01003.x", "–––, 2006, “Shoemaker’s Problem of Too\nMany Thinkers”, Proceedings of the American Catholic\nPhilosophical Association, 80: 225–236.\ndoi:10.5840/acpaproc20068017", "–––, 2008, “A Hylomorphic Account of\nThought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity”:, American\nCatholic Philosophical Quarterly, 82(3): 481–502.\ndoi:10.5840/acpq200882332", "–––, 2009, “Problems with a Constitution\nAccount of Persons”, Dialogue, 48(2): 291–312.\ndoi:10.1017/S001221730909026X", "–––, 2012, “Personal Identity”, in\nContinuum Companion to Metaphysics, Neil A. Manson and Robert\nW. 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(See\n Other Internet Resources.)" ]	[ { "href": "../cognition-animal/", "text": "animal: cognition" }, { "href": "../consciousness-animal/", "text": "animal: consciousness" }, { "href": "../moral-animal/", "text": "animals, moral status of" }, { "href": "../functionalism/", "text": "functionalism" }, { "href": "../identity/", "text": "identity" }, { "href": "../identity-time/", "text": "identity: over time" }, { "href": "../life/", "text": "life" }, { "href": "../locke/", "text": "Locke, John" }, { "href": "../identity-personal/", "text": "personal identity" }, { "href": "../identity-ethics/", "text": "personal identity: and ethics" } ]
moral-animal	The Moral Status of Animals	First published Tue Jul 1, 2003; substantive revision Wed Aug 23, 2017	[ "\nIs there something distinctive about humanity that justifies the idea\nthat humans have moral status while non-humans do not? Providing an\nanswer to this question has become increasingly important among\nphilosophers as well as those outside of philosophy who are interested\nin our treatment of non-human animals. For some, answering this\nquestion will enable us to better understand the nature of human\nbeings and the proper scope of our moral obligations. Some argue that\nthere is an answer that can distinguish humans from the rest of the\nnatural world. Many of those who accept this answer are interested in\njustifying certain human practices towards non-humans—practices\nthat cause pain, discomfort, suffering and death. This latter group\nexpects that in answering the question in a particular way, humans\nwill be justified in granting moral consideration to other humans that\nis neither required nor justified when considering non-human animals.\nIn contrast to this view, an increasing number of philosophers have\nargued that while humans are different in a variety of ways from each\nother and other animals, these differences do not provide a\nphilosophical defense for denying non-human animals moral\nconsideration. What the basis of moral consideration is and what it\namounts to has been the source of much disagreement." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Moral Considerability of Animals", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Speciesism", "1.2 Human Exceptionalism", "1.3 Personhood", "1.4 Sentience" ] }, { "content_title": "2. The Moral Significance of Animals’ Moral Claims", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Alternative Perspectives on Human Relations to Other Animals", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "References Cited", "Further Reading" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nTo say that a being deserves moral consideration is to say that there\nis a moral claim that this being can make on those who can recognize\nsuch claims. A morally considerable being is a being who can be\nwronged. It is often thought that because only humans can recognize\nmoral claims, it is only humans who are morally considerable. However,\nwhen we ask why we think humans are the only types of beings that can\nbe morally wronged, we begin to see that the class of beings able to\nrecognize moral claims and the class of beings who can suffer moral\nwrongs are not co-extensive." ], "section_title": "1. The Moral Considerability of Animals", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe view that only humans are morally considered is sometimes referred\nto as “speciesism”. In the 1970s, Richard Ryder coined\nthis term while campaigning in Oxford to denote a ubiquitous type of human centered prejudice, which he\nthought was similar to racism. He objected to favoring one’s own\nspecies, while exploiting or harming members of other species. Peter\nSinger popularized the term and focused on the way speciesism, without\nmoral justification, favors the interests of humans: ", "\n\n\nthe racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight\nto the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash\nbetween their interests and the interests of those of another race.\nSimilarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to\noverride the greater interests of members of other species. The\npattern is the same in each case. (Singer 1974: 108) \n", "\nDiscrimination based on race, like discrimination based on species is\nthought to be prejudicial, because these are not characteristics that\nmatter when it comes to making moral claims.", "\nSpeciesist actions and attitudes are prejudicial because there is no\nprima facie reason for preferring the interests of beings\nbelonging to the species group to which one also belongs over the\ninterests of those who don’t. That humans are members of the\nspecies Homo sapiens is certainly a distinguishing feature of\nhumans—humans share a genetic make-up and a distinctive\nphysiology, we all emerge from a human pregnancy, but this is\nunimportant from the moral point of view. Species membership is a\nmorally irrelevant characteristic, a bit of luck that is no more\nmorally interesting than being born in Malaysia or Canada. As a\nmorally irrelevant characteristic it cannot serve as the basis for a\nview that holds that our species deserves moral consideration that is\nnot owed to members of other species.", "\nOne might respond that it is not membership in a biological category\nthat matters morally, but rather the social meaning of those\ncategories, meanings that structure not only the institutions we\noperate within, but how we conceptualize ourselves and our world.\nHumans have developed moral systems as well as a wide range of other\nvaluable practices, and by creating these systems, we separate the\nhuman from the rest of the animal kingdom. But the category\n“human” itself is morally contested. Some argue, for\nexample, that racism is not simply, or even primarily about\ndiscrimination and prejudice, but rather a mechanism of dehumanizing\nblackness so as to provide the conditions that makes humans white (see\nFanon 1967; Kim 2015; Ko& Ko 2017). According\nto this line of thought, speciesism isn’t focused on\ndiscrimination or prejudice but is a central tool for creating human\n(and white) supremacy or exceptionalism." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Speciesism" }, { "content": [ "\nLike speciesism, human exceptionalism can be understood in different\nways. The most common way of understanding it is to suggest that there\nare distinctly human capacities and it is on the basis of these\ncapacities that humans have moral status and other animals do not. But\nwhich capacities mark out all and only humans as the kinds of beings\nthat can be wronged? A number of candidate capacities have been\nproposed—developing family ties, solving social problems,\nexpressing emotions, starting wars, having sex for pleasure, using\nlanguage, or thinking abstractly, are just a few. As it turns out,\nnone of these activities is uncontroversially unique to human. Both\nscholarly and popular work on animal behavior suggests that many of\nthe activities that are thought to be distinct to humans occurs in\nnon-humans. For example, many species of non-humans develop long\nlasting kinship ties—orangutan mothers stay with their young for\neight to ten years and while they eventually part company, they\ncontinue to maintain their relationships. Less solitary animals, such\nas chimpanzees, baboons, wolves, and elephants maintain extended\nfamily units built upon complex individual relationships, for long\nperiods of time. Meerkats in the Kalahari desert are known to\nsacrifice their own safety by staying with sick or injured family\nmembers so that the fatally ill will not die alone. All animals living\nin socially complex groups must solve various problems that inevitably\narise in such groups. Canids and primates are particularly adept at\nit, yet even chickens and horses are known to recognize large numbers\nof individuals in their social hierarchies and to maneuver within\nthem. One of the ways that non-human animals negotiate their social\nenvironments is by being particularly attentive to the emotional\nstates of others around them. When a conspecific is angry, it is a\ngood idea to get out of his way. Animals that develop life-long bonds\nare known to suffer from the death of their partners. Some are even\nsaid to die of sorrow. Darwin reported this in The Descent of\nMan: “So intense is the grief of female monkeys for the\nloss of their young, that it invariably caused the death of certain\nkinds” (1871: 40). Jane Goodall’s report of the death of\nthe healthy 8 year old chimpanzee Flint just three weeks after the\ndeath of his mother Flo also suggests that sorrow can have a\ndevastating effect on non-human animals (see Goodall 2000:\n140–141 in Bekoff 2000). Coyotes, elephants and killer whales\nare also among the species for which profound effects of grief have\nbeen reported (Bekoff 2000) and many dog owners can provide similar\naccounts. While the lives of many, perhaps most, non-humans in the\nwild are consumed with struggle for survival, aggression and battle,\nthere are some non-humans whose lives are characterized by expressions\nof joy, playfulness, and a great deal of sex (Woods 2010). Recent\nstudies in cognitive ethology have suggested that some non-humans\nengage in manipulative and deceptive activity, can construct\n“cognitive maps” for navigation, and some non-humans\nappear to understand symbolic representation and are able to use\n language.[1]", "\nIt appears that most of the capacities that are thought to distinguish\nhumans as morally considerable beings, have been observed, often in\nless elaborate form, in the non-human world. Because human behavior\nand cognition share deep roots with the behavior and cognition of\nother animals, approaches that try to find sharp behavioral or\ncognitive boundaries between humans and other animals remain\ncontroversial. For this reason, attempts to establish human uniqueness\nby identifying certain capacities, are not the most promising when it\ncomes to thinking hard about the moral status of animals." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Human Exceptionalism" }, { "content": [ "\nNonetheless, there is something important that is thought to\ndistinguish humans from non-humans that is not reducible to the\nobservation of behavior best explained by possessing a certain\ncapacity and that is our “personhood”. The notion of\npersonhood identifies a category of morally considerable beings that\nis thought to be coextensive with humanity. Historically, Kant is the\nmost noted defender of personhood as the quality that makes a being\nvaluable and thus morally considerable (for a contemporary utilitarian\ndiscussion of personhood, see Varner 2012). Kant writes:", "\n\n\n…every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not\nmerely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that\nwill…Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on\nnature have, nevertheless, if they are not rational beings, only a\nrelative value as means and are therefore called things. On the other\nhand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature\nalready marks them out as ends in themselves. (Kant [1785] 1998: [Ak\n4: 428])\n", "\nAnd:", "\n\nThe fact that the human being can have the representation\n“I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings on\nearth. By this he is a person….that is, a being altogether\ndifferent in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals,\nwith which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion. (Kant\n[1798] 2010: 239 [Ak 7: 127])\n", "\nMore recent work in a Kantian vein develops this idea. Christine\nKorsgaard, for example, argues that humans “uniquely” face\na problem, the problem of normativity. This problem emerges because of\nthe reflective structure of human consciousness. We can, and often do,\nthink about our desires and ask ourselves “Are these desires\nreasons for action? Do these impulses represent the kind of things I\nwant to act according to?” Our reflective capacities allow us\nand require us to step back from our mere impulses in order\nto determine when and whether to act on them. In stepping back we gain\na certain distance from which we can answer these questions and solve\nthe problem of normativity. We decide whether to treat our desires as\nreasons for action based on our conceptions of ourselves, on our\n“practical identities”. When we determine whether we\nshould take a particular desire as a reason to act we are engaging in\na further level of reflection, a level that requires an endorseable\ndescription of ourselves. This endorseable description of ourselves,\nthis practical identity, is a necessary moral identity because without\nit we cannot view our lives as worth living or our actions as worth\ndoing. Korsgaard suggests that humans face the problem of normativity\nin a way that non-humans apparently do not:", "\n\n\nA lower animal’s attention is fixed on the world. Its\nperceptions are its beliefs and its desires are its will. It is\nengaged in conscious activities, but it is not conscious of\nthem. That is, they are not the objects of its attention. But we human\nanimals turn our attention on to our perceptions and desires\nthemselves, on to our own mental activities, and we are conscious\nof them. That is why we can think about\nthem…And this sets us a problem that no other animal has. It is\nthe problem of the normative…. The reflective mind cannot\nsettle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason.\n(Korsgaard 1996: 93)\n", "\nHere, Korsgaard understands “reason” as “a kind of\nreflective success” and given that non-humans are thought to be\nunable to reflect in a way that would allow them this sort of success,\nit appears that they do not act on reasons, at least reasons of this\nkind. Since non-humans do not act on reasons they do not have a\npractical identity from which they reflect and for which they act. So\nhumans can be distinguished from non-humans because humans, we might\nsay, are sources of normativity and non-humans are not.", "\nBut arguably, Kant’s view of personhood does not distinguish all\nand only humans as morally considerable. Personhood is not, in fact,\ncoextensive with humanity when understood as a general description of\nthe group to which human beings belong. And the serious part of this\nproblem is not that there may be some extra-terrestrials or deities\nwho have rational capacities. The serious problem is that many humans\nare not persons. Some humans—i.e., infants, children, people in\ncomas—do not have the rational, self-reflective capacities\nassociated with personhood. This problem, unfortunately known in the\nliterature as the problem of “marginal cases”, poses\nserious difficulties for “personhood” as the criterion of\nmoral considerability. Many beings whose positive moral value we have\ndeeply held intuitions about, and who we treat as morally\nconsiderable, will be excluded from consideration by this account.", "\nThere are three ways to respond to this counter-intuitive conclusion.\nOne, which can be derived from one interpretation of Kant, is to\nsuggest that non-persons are morally considerable indirectly. Though\nKant believed that animals were mere things it appears he did not\ngenuinely believe we could dispose of them any way we wanted. In the\nLectures on Ethics he makes it clear that we have indirect\nduties to animals, duties that are not toward them, but in regard to\nthem insofar as our treatment of them can affect our duties to\npersons.", "\n\n\nIf a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of\nservice, he does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot\njudge, but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity\nwhich it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle\nhis human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he\nwho is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.\n([1784–5] 1997: 212 [Ak 27: 459])\n", "\nAnd one could argue the same would be true of those human beings who\nare not persons. We disrespect our humanity when we act in inhumane\nways towards non-persons, whatever their species.", "\nBut this indirect view is unsatisfying—it fails to capture the\nindependent wrong that is being done to the non-person. When someone\nrapes a woman in a coma, or whips a severely brain damaged child, or\nsets a cat on fire, they are not simply disrespecting humanity or\nthemselves as representatives of it, they are wronging these\nnon-persons. So, a second way to avoid the counter-intuitive\nconclusion is to argue that such non-persons stand in the proper\nrelations to “rational nature” such that they should be\nthought of as morally considerable. Allen Wood (1998) argues in this\nway and suggests that all beings that potentially have a rational\nnature, or who virtually have it, or who have had it, or who have part\nof it, or who have the necessary conditions of it, what he calls\n“the infrastructure of rational nature”, should be\ndirectly morally considerable. Insofar as a being stands in this\nrelation to rational nature, they are the kinds of beings that can be\nwronged.", "\nThis response is not unlike that of noted animal rights proponent, Tom\nRegan, who argues that what is important for moral consideration are\nnot the differences between humans and non-humans but the\nsimilarities. Regan argues that because persons share with certain\nnon-persons (which includes those humans and non-humans who have a\ncertain level of organized cognitive function) the ability to be\nexperiencing subject of a life and to have an individual welfare that\nmatters to them regardless of what others might think, both deserve\nmoral consideration. Regan argues that subjects of a life:", "\n\n\nwant and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect\nthings. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure\nand pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and\nfrustration, our continued existence or our untimely death—all\nmake a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced,\nby us as individuals. As the same is true of … animals …\nthey too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life, with\ninherent value of their own. (Regan 1985: 24) \n", "\nA third way of addressing this problem has been taken up by Korsgaard\nwho maintains that there is a big difference between those with\nnormative, rational capacities and those without, but unlike Kant,\nbelieves both humans and non-humans are the proper objects of our\nmoral concern. She argues that those without normative, rational\ncapacities share certain “natural” capacities with\npersons, and these natural capacities are often the content of the\nmoral demands that persons make on each other. She writes, ", "\n\n\nwhat we demand, when we demand … recognition, is that our\nnatural concerns—the objects of our natural desires and\ninterests and affections—be accorded the status of values,\nvalues that must be respected as far as possible by others. And many\nof those natural concerns—the desire to avoid pain is an obvious\nexample—spring from our animal nature, not from our rational\nnature. (Korsgaard 2007: 7) \n", "\nWhat moral agents construct as valuable and normatively binding is not\nonly our rational or autonomous capacities, but the needs and desires\nwe have as living, embodied beings. Insofar as these needs and desires\nare valuable for agents, the ability to experience similar needs and\ndesires in patients should also be valued.", "\nIn the courts, all humans and some corporations are considered persons\nin the legal sense. But all animals, infants and adults, are not legal\npersons, but rather, under the law they are considered property. There\nhave been a few attempts to change the legal status of some nonhuman\nanimals from property to persons. The Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP)\nfounded by Steven Wise, has filed a series of cases in the New York\ncourts seeking to establish legal personhood for particular\nchimpanzees being held in the state, with the goal of protecting their\nrights to bodily integrity and liberty, and allow them to seek remedy,\nthrough their proxies, when those rights are violated. Chimpanzees are\na good test case for establishing nonhuman legal personhood as they\nare, according to the documents filed by NhRP, autonomous beings with\nsophisticated cognitive abilities including ", "\n\n\nepisodic memory, self-consciousness, self-knowing, self agency,\nreferential and intentional communication, mental time-travel,\nnumerosity, sequential learning, meditational learning, mental state\nmodeling, visual perspective taking, understanding the experiences of\nothers, intentional action, planning, imagination, empathy,\nmetacognition, working memory, decision-making, imitation, deferred\nimitation, emulation, innovation, material, social, and symbolic\nculture, cross-modal perception, tool-use, tool-making,\ncause-and-effect. (petition of NhRP v. Samuel Stanley, p. 12, see Other Internet Resources)\n", "\nThe legal arguments to extend personhood beyond the human parallel\nmore general ethical arguments that extend ethical consideration\noutward from those who occupy the moral center. Turning to empirical\nwork designed to show that other animals are really similar to those\nconsidered legal persons, primatologists submitted affidavits\nattesting to what they have learned working with chimpanzees. Mary Lee\nJensvold suggests ", "\n\nthere are numerous parallels in the way chimpanzee and human\ncommunication skills develop over time, suggesting a similar unfolding\ncognitive process across the two species and an underlying\nneurobiological continuity. (Jensvold affidavit, p. 4, in Other Internet Resources)\n\n", "\nJames King notes ", "\n\n\nchimpanzees and humans resemble each other in terms of their ability\nto experience happiness and the way in which it relates to individual\npersonality. (King affidavit, p. 8, in Other Internet Resources) \n", "\nAnd Mathias Osvath makes remarkable claims about chimpanzee\npersonhood:", "\nAutonoetic consciousness gives an individual of any species an\nautobiographical sense of it self with a future and a past. Chimps and\nother great apes clearly possess an autobiographical self, as they are\nable to prepare themselves for future actions… they likely can,\njust as humans, be in pain over an anticipated future event that has\nyet to occur. For instance, confining someone in a prison or cage for\na set time, or for life, would lose much of its power as punishment if\nthat individual had no self-concept. Every moment would be a new\nmoment with no conscious relation to the next. But, chimpanzees. and\nother great apes have a concept of their personal past and future and\ntherefore suffer the pain of not being able to fulfill one’s\ngoals or move around as one wants; like humans they experience the\npain of anticipating a never-ending situation. (Osvath affidavit, pp. 4–7, in Other Internet Resources)\n", "\nThese claims, as well as those of others experts, identify the\nrelevantly similar capacities that chimpanzees and other great apes\nshare with humans and it is in virtue of these capacities that legal\npersonhood is sought." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Personhood" }, { "content": [ "\nUsing rational nature or cognitive capacities as the touchstone of\nmoral considerability misses an important fact about animals, human\nand nonhuman. Our lives can go better or worse for us. Utilitarians\nhave traditionally argued that the truly morally important feature of\nbeings is unappreciated when we focus on personhood or the rational,\nself-reflective nature of humans, or the relation a being stands in to\nsuch nature, or being the subject of a life, or being legal persons.\nWhat is really important, utilitarians maintain, is the promotion of\nhappiness, or pleasure, or the satisfaction of interests, and the\navoidance of pain, or suffering, or frustration of interests. Bentham,\none of the more forceful defenders of this sentientist view of moral\nconsiderability, famously wrote:", "\n\n\nOther animals, which, on account of their interests having been\nneglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded\ninto the class of things. [original emphasis] … The\nday has been, I grieve it to say in many places it is not yet past, in\nwhich the greater part of the species, under the denomination of\nslaves, have been treated … upon the same footing as …\nanimals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal\ncreation may acquire those rights which never could have been\nwithholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have\nalready discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human\nbeing should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a\ntormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of\nlegs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the\nossacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a\nsensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace\nthe insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the\nfaculty for discourse?…the question is not, Can they\nreason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they\nsuffer? (Bentham 1780/1789: chapter xvii, paragraph 6)\n", " Contemporary utilitarians, such as Peter Singer (1990, 1979\n[1993]), suggest that there is no morally justifiable way to exclude\nfrom moral consideration non-humans or non-persons who can clearly\nsuffer. Any being that has an interest in not suffering deserves to\nhave that interest taken into account. And a non-human who acts to\navoid pain can be thought to have just such an interest. Even\ncontemporary Kantians have acknowledged the moral force of the\nexperience of pain. Korsgaard, for example, writes “it is a\npain to be in pain. And that is not a trivial fact” (1996:\n154).", "\n\n\nWhen you pity a suffering animal, it is because you are perceiving a\nreason. An animal’s cries express pain, and they mean that there\nis a reason, a reason to change its conditions. And you can no more\nhear the cries of an animal as mere noise than you can the words of a\nperson. Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way\nanother person can. …So of course we have obligations to\nanimals. (Korsgaard 1996: 153)\n", "\nWhen we encounter an animal in pain we recognize their claim on us,\nand thus beings who can suffer are morally considerable." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 Sentience" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThat non-human animals can make moral claims on us does not in itself\nindicate how such claims are to be assessed and conflicting claims\nadjudicated. Being morally considerable is like showing up on a moral\nradar screen—how strong the signal is or where it is located on\nthe screen are separate questions. Of course, how one argues for the\nmoral considerability of non-human animals will inform how we are to\nunderstand the force of an animal’s claims.", "\nAccording to the view that an animal’s moral claim is equivalent\nto a moral right, any action that fails to treat the animal as a being\nwith inherent worth would violate that animal’s right and is\nthus morally objectionable. According to the animal rights position,\nto treat an animal as a means to some human end, as many humans do\nwhen they eat animals or experiment on them, is to violate that\nanimal’s right. As Tom Regan has written,", "\n\n\n…animals are treated routinely, systematically as if their\nvalue were reducible to their usefulness to others, they are\nroutinely, systematically treated with a lack of respect, and thus are\ntheir rights routinely, systematically violated. (Regan 1985: 24).\n", "\nThe animal rights position is an absolutist position. Any being that\nis a subject of a life has inherent worth and the rights that protect\nsuch worth, and all subjects of a life have these rights equally. Thus\nany practice that fails to respect the rights of those animals who\nhave them, e.g., eating animals, hunting animals, experimenting on\nanimals, using animals for entertainment, is wrong, irrespective of\nhuman need, context, or culture.", "\nThe utilitarian position on animals, most commonly associated with\nPeter Singer and popularly, though erroneously, referred to as an\nanimal rights position, is actually quite distinct. Here the moral\nsignificance of the claims of animals depends on what other morally\nsignificant competing claims might be in play in any given situation.\nWhile the equal interests of all morally considerable beings are\nconsidered equally, the practices in question may end up violating or\nfrustrating some interests but would not be considered morally wrong\nif, when all equal interests are considered, more of these interests\nare satisfied than frustrated. For utilitarians like Singer, what\nmatters are the strength and nature of interests, not whose interests\nthese are. So, if the only options available in order to save the life\nof one morally considerable being is to cause harm, but not death, to\nanother morally considerable being, then according to a utilitarian\nposition, causing this harm may be morally justifiable. Similarly, if\nthere are two courses of action, one which causes extreme amounts of\nsuffering and ultimate death, and one which causes much less suffering\nand painless death, then the latter would be morally preferable to the\nformer.", "\nConsider factory farming, the most common method used to convert\nanimal bodies into relatively inexpensive food in industrialized\nsocieties today. An estimated 8 billion animals in the United States\nare born, confined, biologically manipulated, transported and\nultimately slaughtered each year so that humans can consume them. The\nconditions in which these animals are raised and the method of\nslaughter causes vast amounts of suffering (see, for example, Mason\n& Singer 1980 [1990]). Given that animals suffer under such conditions\nand assuming that suffering is not in their interests, then the\npractice of factory farming would only be morally justifiable if its\nabolition were to cause greater suffering or a greater amount of\ninterest frustration. Certainly humans who take pleasure in eating\nanimals will find it harder to satisfy these interests in the absence\nof factory farms; it may cost more and require more effort to obtain\nanimal products. The factory farmers, and the industries that support\nfactory farming, will also have certain interests frustrated if\nfactory farming were to be abolished. How much interest frustration\nand interest satisfaction would be associated with the end to factory\nfarming is largely an empirical question. But utilitarians are not\nmaking unreasonable predictions when they argue that on balance the\nsuffering and interest frustration that animals experience in modern\nday meat production is greater than the suffering that humans would\nendure if they had to alter their current practices.", "\nImportantly, the utilitarian argument for the moral significance of\nanimal suffering in meat production is not an argument for\nvegetarianism. If an animal lived a happy life and was painlessly\nkilled and then eaten by people who would otherwise suffer hunger or\nmalnutrition by not eating the animal, then painlessly killing and\neating the animal would be the morally justified thing to do. In many\nparts of the world where economic, cultural, or climate conditions\nmake it virtually impossible for people to sustain themselves on plant\nbased diets, killing and eating animals that previously led relatively\nunconstrained lives and are painlessly killed, would not be morally\nobjectionable. The utilitarian position can thus avoid certain charges\nof cultural chauvinism and moralism, charges that the animal rights\nposition apparently cannot avoid.", "\nIt might be objected that to suggest that it is morally acceptable to\nhunt and eat animals for those people living in arctic regions, or for\nnomadic cultures, or for poor rural peoples, for example, is to\npotentially condone painlessly killing other morally considerable\nbeings, like humans, for food consumption in similar situations. If\nviolating the rights of an animal can be morally tolerated, especially\na right to life, then similar rights violations can be morally\ntolerated. In failing to recognize the inviolability of the moral\nclaims of all morally considerable beings, utilitarianism cannot\naccommodate one of our most basic prima facie principles, namely that\nkilling a morally considerable being is wrong.", "\nThere are at least two replies to this sort of objection. The first\nappeals to the negative side effects that killing may promote. If, to\ndraw on an overused and sadly sophomoric counter-example, one person\ncan be kidnapped and painlessly killed in order to provide body parts\nfor four individuals who will die without them, there will inevitably\nbe negative side-effects that all things considered would make the\nkidnapping wrong. Healthy people, knowing they could be used for spare\nparts, might make themselves unhealthy to avoid such a fate or they\nmay have so much stress and fear that the overall state of affairs\nwould be worse than that in which four people died. Appealing to\nside-effects when it comes to the wrong of killing is certainly\nplausible, but it fails to capture what is directly wrong with\nkilling.", "\nA more satisfying reply would have us adopt what might be called a\nmulti-factor perspective, one that takes into account the kinds of\ninterest that are possible for certain kinds of morally considerable\nbeings, the content of interests of the beings in question, their\nrelative weight, and the context of those who have them. Consider a\nseal who has spent his life freely roaming the oceans and ice flats\nand who is suddenly and painlessly killed to provide food for a human\nfamily struggling to survive a bitter winter in far northern climes.\nWhile it is probably true that the seal had an immediate interest in\navoiding suffering, it is less clear that the seal has a future\ndirected interest in continued existence. If the seal lacks this\nfuture directed interest, then painlessly killing him does not violate\nthis interest. The same cannot be said for the human explorer who\nfinds himself face to face with a hungry Inuit family. Persons\ngenerally have interests in continued existence, interests that,\narguably, non-persons do not have. So one factor that can be appealed\nto is that non-persons may not have the range of interests that\npersons do.", "\nAn additional factor is the type of interest in question. We can think\nof interests as scalar; crucial interests are weightier than important\ninterests, important interests are weightier than replaceable\ninterests, and all are weightier than trivial interests or mere whims.\nWhen there is a conflict of interests, crucial interests will always\noverride important interests, important interests will always override\nreplaceable interests, etc. So if an animal has an interest in not\nsuffering, which is arguably a crucial interest, or at least an\nimportant one, and a person has an interest in eating that animal when\nthere are other things to eat, meaning that interest is replaceable,\nthen the animal has the stronger interest and it would be wrong to\nviolate that interest by killing the animal for food if there is\nanother source of food available.", "\nOften, however, conflicts of interests are within the same category.\nThe Inuit’s interest in food is crucial and the explorer’s\ninterest in life is crucial. If we assume that the explorer cannot\notherwise provide food for the hunter, then it looks as if there is a\nconflict within the same category. If you take the interests of an\nindigenous hunter’s whole family into account, then their\ncombined interest in their own survival appears to outweigh the\nhapless explorer’s interest in continued existence. Indeed, if\npainlessly killing and eating the explorer were the only way for the\nfamily to survive, then perhaps this action would be morally condoned.\nBut this is a rather extreme sort of example, one in which even our\ndeepest held convictions are strained. So it is quite hard to know\nwhat to make of the clash between what a utilitarian would condone and\nwhat our intuitions tell us we should believe here. Our most basic\nprima facie principles arise and are accepted under ordinary\ncircumstances. Extraordinary circumstances are precisely those in\nwhich such principles or precepts give\n way.[2]", "\nThe multi-factor utilitarian perspective is particularly helpful when\nconsidering the use of animals in medical research. According to the\nanimal rights position, the use of animals in experimental procedures\nis a clear violation of their rights—they are being used as a\nmere means to some possible end—and thus animal rights\nproponents are in favor of the abolition of all laboratory research.\nThe utilitarian position, particularly one that incorporates some kind\nof multi-factor perspective, might allow some research on animals\nunder very specific conditions. Before exploring what a utilitarian\nmight condone in the way of animal experimentation, let us first\nquickly consider what would be morally prohibited. All research that\ninvolves invasive procedures, constant confinement, and ultimate death\ncan be said to violate the animal’s crucial interests. Thus any\nexperiments that are designed to enhance the important, replaceable,\nor trivial interests of humans or other animals would be prohibited.\nThat would mean that experiments for cosmetics or household products\nare prohibited, as there are non-animal tested alternatives and many\noptions already available for consumers. Certain psychological\nexperiments, such as those in which infant primates are separated from\ntheir mothers and exposed to frightening stimuli in an effort to\nunderstand problems teenagers have when they enter high school, would\nalso come into question. There are many examples of experiments that\nviolate an animal’s crucial interests in the hopes of satisfying\nthe lesser interests of some other morally considerable being, all of\nwhich would be objectionable from this perspective.", "\nThere are some laboratory experiments, however, that from a\nmulti-factor utilitarian perspective may be permitted. These are\nexperiments in which the probability of satisfying crucial or\nimportant interests for many who suffer from some debilitating or\nfatal disease is high, and the numbers of non-human animals whose\ncrucial interests are violated is low. The psychological complexity of\nthe non-humans may also be significant in determining whether the\nexperiment is morally justified. In the case of experimenting in these\nlimited number of cases, presumably a parallel argument could be made\nabout experimenting on humans. If the chances are very high that\nexperimenting on one human, who is a far superior experimental animal\nwhen it comes to human disease, can prevent great suffering or death\nin many humans, then the utilitarian may, if side effects are minimal,\ncondone such an experiment. Of course, it is easier to imagine this\nsort of extreme case in the abstract, what a utilitarian would think\nactually morally justified, again depends on the specific empirical\ndata.", "\nIn sum, the animal rights position takes the significance of morally\nconsiderable claims to be absolute. Thus, any use of animals that\ninvolves a disregard for their moral claims is problematic. The\nsignificance of an animal’s morally considerable interests\naccording to a utilitarian is variable. Whether an action is morally\njustified or permissible will depend on a number of factors. The\nutilitarian position on animals would condemn a large number of\npractices that involve the suffering and death of billions of animals,\nbut there are cases in which some use of non-human animals, and\nperhaps even human animals, may be morally justified (Gruen 2011: ch.\n4; Gilbert, Kaebnick, & Murray 2012)." ], "section_title": "2. The Moral Significance of Animals’ Moral Claims", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nGiven the long-standing view that non-humans are mere things, there\nare still many who reject the arguments presented here for the moral\nconsiderability of non-humans and the significance of their interests.\nNonetheless, most now realize that the task of arguing that humans\nhave a unique and exclusive moral status is rather difficult. Yet even\namongst those who do view animals as within the sphere of moral\nconcern, there is disagreement about the nature and usefulness of the\narguments presented on behalf of the moral status of animals.", "\nIncreasingly, philosophers are arguing that while our behavior towards\nanimals is indeed subject to moral scrutiny, the kinds of ethical\narguments that are usually presented frame the issues in the wrong\nway. Some philosophers suggest that rational argumentation fails to\ncapture those features of moral experience that allow us to really see\nwhy treating animals badly is wrong. The point, according to\ncommentators such as Stephen R.L. Clark and Cora Diamond, for example,\nis that members of our communities, however we conceive of them, pull\non us and it is in virtue of this pull that we recognize what is wrong\nwith cruelty. Animals are individuals with whom we share a common life\nand this recognition allows us to see them as they are. Eating animals\nis wrong not because it is a violation of the animal’s rights or\nbecause on balance such an act creates more suffering than other acts,\nbut rather because in eating animals or using them in other harmful,\nviolent ways, we do not display the traits of character that kind,\nsensitive, compassionate, mature, and thoughtful members of a moral\ncommunity should display.", "\nAccording to some in the virtue ethics tradition, carefully worked out\narguments in which the moral considerability and moral significance of\nanimals are laid out will have little if any grip on our thoughts and\nactions. Rather, by perceiving the attitudes that underlie the use and\nabuse of non-human animals as shallow or cruel, one interested in\nliving a virtuous life will change their attitudes and come to reject\ntreating animals as food or tools for research. As Rosalind Hursthouse\nrecognized after having been exposed to alternative ways of seeing\nanimals:", "\n\n\nI began to see [my attitudes] that related to my conception of\nflesh-foods as unnecessary, greedy, self-indulgent, childish, my\nattitude to shopping and cooking in order to produce lavish dinner\nparties as parochial, gross, even dissolute. I saw my interest and\ndelight in nature programmes about the lives of animals on television\nand my enjoyment of meat as side by side at odds with one\nanother…Without thinking animals had rights, I began to see\nboth the wild ones and the ones we usually eat as having lives of\ntheir own, which they should be left to enjoy. And so I changed. My\nperception of the moral landscape and where I and the other animals\nwere situated in it shifted. (Hursthouse 2000: 165–166; see also\nDiamond 2001 [especially chs. 11 and 13], and Clarke 1977)\n", "\nAlice Crary argues that shifting perceptions of our moral landscapes\noccur because these landscapes, and more precisely the rich worlds of\nthose who inhabit them, are not morally neutral. The characteristics\nthat philosophers tend to look for in other animals to determine\nwhether or not they are morally considerable, according to Crary, are\nalready infused with moral importance, “human beings and other\nanimals have empirically discoverable moral characteristics” (my\nemphasis, 2016: 85) that are, as she puts it “inside\nethics”. These values often sneak in under a supposedly neutral\ngloss. By explicitly locating these characteristics inside ethics, the\ntexture, quality, and purposes of our ethical reflection on moral\nconsiderability changes. Arriving at an adequate empirical\nunderstanding requires non-neutral methods, identifying historical and\ncultural perspectives as shaping how we consider other animals\nmorally. What ethical questions we think are important and how we\nframe and answer them, will be different if we see our lives and the\nlives of other animals as already imbued with moral values. ", "\nOther feminist philosophers have taken issue with the supposedly\nmorally neutral methods of argumentation used to establish the moral\nstatus of animals. For many feminists the traditional methods of\nrational argumentation fail to take into account the feelings of\nsympathy or empathy that humans have towards non-humans, feelings they\nbelieve are central to a full account of what we owe non-humans and\nwhy (see Adams & Donovan 1995; Donovan & Adams 2007; Adams\n& Gruen 2014).", "\nFeminist philosophers have also challenged the individualism that is\ncentral in the arguments for the moral status of animals. Rather than\nidentifying intrinsic or innate properties that non-humans share with\nhumans, some feminists have argued instead that we ought to understand\nmoral status in relational terms given that moral recognition is\ninvariably a social practice. As Elizabeth Anderson has written: ", "\n\n\nMoral considerability is not an intrinsic property of any creature,\nnor is it supervenient on only its intrinsic properties, such as its\ncapacities. It depends, deeply, on the kind of relations they can have\nwith us. (Anderson 2004: 289).\n", "\nAnd these relationships needn’t be direct. The reach of human\nactivity has expanded across the entire globe and humans are entangled\nwith each other and other animals in myriad ways. We participate in\nactivities and institutions that directly or indirectly harm others by\ncreating negative experiences, depriving them of their well-being, or\ndenying them opportunities to be who they are and pursue what they\ncare about. Philosophers Elisa Aaltola and Lori Gruen have argued for\nrefining our empathetic imagination in order to improve our\nrelationships with each other and other animals.", "\nEven though it is challenging to understand what it is like to be\nanother, and even though we are limited by our inevitable\nanthropocentric perspectives, being in respectful ethical relation\ninvolves attempting to understand and respond to another’s\nneeds, interests, desires, vulnerabilities, hopes, and perspectives.\nWhat Gruen calls, “entangled empathy” is a process that\ninvolves both affect and cognition (Gruen 2015). Individuals who are\nempathizing with others respond to the other’s condition and\nreflectively imagine themselves in the distinct position of the other\nwhile staying attentive to both similarities and differences between\nherself and her situation and that of the fellow creature with whom\nshe is empathizing. Entangled empathy involves paying critical\nattention to the broader conditions that may negatively affect the\nexperiences and flourishing of those with whom one is empathizing, and\nthis requires those of us empathizing to attend to things we might not\nhave otherwise. It therefore also enhances our own experiences,\ndevelops our moral imagination, and helps us to become more sensitive\nperceivers. " ], "section_title": "3. 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New York:\nOxford University Press.", "Ryder, Richard D., 1989, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes\nToward Speciesism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.", "Sapontzis, Steve F. (ed.), 2004, Food for Thought: The Debate\nOver Eating Meat, NY: Prometheus Press." ]	[ { "href": "../consciousness-animal/", "text": "animal: consciousness" }, { "href": "../bentham/", "text": "Bentham, Jeremy" }, { "href": "../consequentialism/", "text": "consequentialism" }, { "href": "../emotion/", "text": "emotion" }, { "href": "../feminism-ethics/", "text": "feminist philosophy, interventions: ethics" }, { "href": "../feminism-political/", "text": "feminist philosophy, interventions: political philosophy" }, { "href": "../kant/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel" }, { "href": "../rights/", "text": "rights" } ]
anomalous-monism	Anomalous Monism	First published Tue Nov 8, 2005; substantive revision Fri Sep 6, 2019	[ "\nAnomalous Monism is a theory about the scientific status of\npsychology, the physical status of mental events, and the relation\nbetween these issues developed by Donald Davidson. It claims that\npsychology cannot be a science like basic physics, in that it cannot\nin principle yield exceptionless laws for predicting or explaining\nhuman thoughts and actions (mental anomalism). It also holds that\nthoughts and actions must be physical (monism, or token-identity).\nThus, according to Anomalous Monism, psychology cannot be reduced to\nphysics, but must nonetheless share a physical ontology.", "\nWhile neither of these claims, on its own, is novel, their relation,\naccording to Anomalous Monism, is. It is precisely because\nthere can be no such strict laws governing mental events that those\nevents must be identical to physical events. Previous\nidentity theories of mind had held that claims concerning the identity\nof particular mental and physical events (tokens) depended upon the\ndiscovery of lawlike relations between mental and physical properties\n(types). Empirical evidence for psychophysical laws was thus held to\nbe required for particular token-identity claims. Token-identity\nclaims thus depended upon type-identity. Davidson’s position is\ndramatically different—it requires no empirical evidence and\ndepends on there being no lawlike relations between mental\nand physical properties. It in effect justifies the token-identity of\nmental and physical events through arguing for the impossibility of\ntype-identities between mental and physical properties. (For\ndiscussion of philosophical positions related to Anomalous Monism, see\nthe supplement on\n Related Views.)", "\nThe appeal of Anomalous Monism is due to these enigmatic features, a\nfairly straightforward argumentative structure, and its attempt to\nbring together an intuitively acceptable metaphysics (monism) with a\nsophisticated understanding of the relation between psychological and\nphysical explanatory schemes (anomalism). Its explicit assumptions are\neach intended, on their own, to be acceptable to positions opposing\nmonism, but, when taken together, to show that monism is in fact\nrequired." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Argument for Anomalous Monism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Premise I: The Interaction Principle", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Mental and Physical Events", "2.2 Mental Causation", "2.3 Psychological Anomalism" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Premise II: The Cause-Law Principle", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Strict Laws", "3.2 Justifying the Cause-Law Principle", "3.3 Objections to the Cause-Law Principle" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Premise III: The Anomalism Principle", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 The Holism/Indeterminacy Arguments", "4.2 The Rationality Arguments", "4.3 The Causal Definition Argument" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Monism", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Token Identity", "5.2 Objections to Token Identity", " 5.3 Is Supervenience Consistent with Mental Anomalism?" ] }, { "content_title": "6. The Epiphenomenalism Objections", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Mental Properties and Explanatory Relevance", "6.2 Interest-Relativity and the Dual Explananda Strategy", "6.3 The Causal Constitution of Reasons" ] }, { "content_title": "7. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Views", "sub_toc": [ "1. Spinoza’s Parallelism", "2. Functionalism", "3. Bare Materialism", "4. Other Positions" ] }, { "content_title": "Related Issues", "sub_toc": [ "1. Anomalous Monism and Scheme-Content Dualism", "2. Mental Anomalism and Semantic Externalism", "3. Anomalous Monism and Freedom" ] }, { "content_title": "Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Monism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Mental Properties and Causal Relevance", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Homonomic and Heteronomic Generalizations", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Explanatory Ephiphenomenalism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Kim’s ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Supervenience and the Explanatory Primacy of the Physical", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Token-Identity and Minimal Materialism", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe basic structure of the argument for Anomalous Monism is as\nfollows. We start with the plausible assumption that some mental\nevents, such as believing that it is raining, are caused by certain\nphysical events, in this case the rain. Similarly, it is assumed that\nsome physical events, such as one’s arm rising, are caused by\ncertain mental events, such as deciding to scratch one’s head.\nDavidson calls this the Principle of Causal Interaction; we shall call\nit the interaction principle:", "\n\n\nThe Interaction Principle: Some mental events causally\ninteract with some physical events\n", "\nDavidson presents this assumption as obvious and not in need of\njustification, but we shall see that motivations for it can be found\nin parts of his writings\n (2.2).\n To this interaction principle is added the requirement that all\nsingular causal interactions are covered by strict laws—laws\nwith fully articulated antecedents which guarantee some fully\narticulated consequence (for caveats and details,\n see 3.1).\n Davidson calls this the Principle of the Nomological Character of\nCausality; we shall call it the cause-law principle:", "\n\n\nThe Cause-Law Principle: Events related as cause and effect\nare covered by strict laws\n", "\nThis cause-law principle was also initially assumed without argument\nby Davidson, though we shall see below\n (3.2)\n how he later came to try to justify it. Now, the assumptions so far\nseem to point directly to the existence of strict psychophysical\nlaws—if some particular mental event m1 is\ncaused by some particular physical event p1, then,\ngiven the cause-law principle, it seems to follow that there must be a\nstrict law of the form\n‘P1 → M1’.\nThat is, whenever events of kind P1 occur, events\nof kind M1 must follow. However, Davidson then\nclaims that there can be no such laws. He calls this the Principle of\nthe Anomalism of the Mental, and it holds that mental properties are\nnot suitable for inclusion in strict laws of any kind; we shall call\nit the anomalism principle:", "\n\n\nThe Anomalism Principle: There are no strict laws on the\nbasis of which mental events can predict, explain, or be predicted or\nexplained by other events\n", "\nDavidson offered loose ruminations concerning rationality and\nrationalizing explanations, which purportedly constitute the very\nnature of mental properties, in support of the anomalism principle\n (4.2).\n All of this will be discussed in detail below.", "\nWith the interaction principle, the cause-law principle, and the\nanomalism principle now in place, we can see that there is a tension\nin need of resolution. From the interaction and cause-law principles\nit follows that there must be strict laws covering the interaction\nbetween mental and physical events. But the anomalism principle\nentails that there are no strict psychophysical laws. How can all\nthree principles be held simultaneously?", "\nTo resolve the tension, Davidson noted that while the cause-law\nprinciple requires that there be strict covering laws, it\ndoesn’t specify the vocabulary in which those laws must be\nformulated. If particular physical event p1 causes\nparticular mental event m1, and there must be some\nstrict law covering this interaction, but there is no strict law of\nthe form\n‘P1 → M1’,\nthen there must be some other law,\n‘?1 → ?2’, which\ncovers the causal relation between p1 and\nm1. That is, m1 and\np1 must instantiate properties suitable for\ninclusion in strict laws; but since we know that\nM1 is not a property of this kind,\nm1 must instantiate some other property.\nDavidson’s ingenious deduction at this point was that this\nproperty must be physical, since only the physical sciences hold out\nthe promise of a closed system of strict laws (Davidson 1970,\n223–24; on the notion of a closed system, see\n 5.1\n and the supplement on\n Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Monism).\n Therefore, every causally interacting mental event must be\ntoken-identical to some physical event—hence, monism\n (5.1):", "\n\n\nMonism: Every causally interacting mental event is\ntoken-identical to some physical event\n", "\nIn arguing in this way, Davidson relies upon a key distinction between\nexplanation and causation. While explanation is, intuitively, an\nintensional notion—one sensitive to how events are\ndescribed—causation is extensional, obtaining between pairs of\nevents independently of how they are described. For example, a\nbridge’s collapse is explained by the explosion of a bomb. That\nexplosion, let us suppose, was the most newsworthy event of the day.\nWhile the most newsworthy event of the day caused the\nbridge’s collapse, ‘the most newsworthy event of the\nday’ does not explain that collapse. Telling someone\nthat it was the most newsworthy event of the day that explained the\nbridge’s collapse wouldn’t provide an explanation—it\nwouldn’t make the bridge’s collapse intelligible to the\naudience—though it would pick out its actual cause. How the\ncause is described is relevant to whether an explanation occurs.\nCauses and effects can be accurately picked out using a variety of\nexpressions, many of which are not explanatory. As we shall see, the\ndistinction between causation and explanation is crucial to Anomalous\nMonism\n (6.1–6.3; \nsee also related discussion of the intensionality\nof deterministic relations in \n Related Issues: 3.1 Anomalous Monism and Kant’s Theory of Freedom).\n", "\nFinally, to alleviate certain concerns about the adequacy of the form\nof physicalism he was endorsing, Davidson endorsed a dependency\nrelation of supervenience of the mental on the physical, and claimed\nthat it was consistent with Anomalous Monism\n (5.1,\n 5.3) (Davidson 1970, 214; 1993; 1995a, 266):", "\n\n\nSupervenience of the Mental on the Physical: if two events\nshare all of their physical properties, they will share all of their\nmental properties\n", "\nIn what follows (2–5), each step of this argument will be\nanalyzed and discussed separately, but always with an eye to the\noverall argument. In 6, a central objection to Anomalous\nMonism—that it appears unable to account for the\ncausal/explanatory power of mental events and properties—will be\nexplained and discussed. (For discussion of the relationship between\nAnomalous Monism and two other pillars of Davidson’s\nphilosophy—his rejection of conceptual relativism and commitment\nto semantic externalism—see the supplement on\n Related Issues.)" ], "section_title": "1. The Argument for Anomalous Monism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe interaction principle states that some mental events causally\ninteract with some physical events. In this section we will look\nbriefly at a number of issues related to this principle: how mental\nand physical events are demarcated, the nature of events themselves,\nthe scope of the interaction principle, the relationship between\nmental events and causation, and the use of the interaction principle\nin establishing one component of mental\nanomalism—psychological anomalism, according to which\nthere can be no strict, purely psychological laws. Psychological\nanomalism is to be distinguished from psychophysical\nanomalism, which holds that there can be no strict psychophysical\nlaws. This latter thesis will be explored in detail in our discussion\nof the anomalism principle\n (4)." ], "section_title": "2. Premise I: The Interaction Principle", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nDavidson restricts the class of mental events with which Anomalous\nMonism is concerned to that of the propositional\nattitudes—states and events with psychological verbs such as\n‘believes’, ‘desires’, ‘intends’\nand others that subtend ‘that-’ clauses, which relate\nsubjects to propositional contents such as ‘it is raining\noutside’. Anomalous Monism thus does not address the status of\nmental events such as pains, tickles and the\nlike—‘conscious’ or sentient mental events. It is\nconcerned exclusively with sapient mental events—thoughts with\npropositional content that appear to lack any distinctive\n‘feel’.", "\nThough traditional and intuitive, this way of dividing up the domain\nof the mental isn’t without controversy. Generally, Davidson\nexpresses some skepticism about the possibility of formulating a clear\nand general definition of the class of mental phenomena (Davidson\n1970, 211). And he is suspicious about the idea of mental states given\nto, but uninterpreted by, concepts (Davidson 1974a), which is how\nphilosophers have often thought of conscious phenomena. But for\ncurrent purposes the class of propositional attitudes will suffice as\na criterion for the mental. One key reason for so limiting the reach\nof Anomalous Monism, as we shall see\n (4.2),\n is that it is the rational status of the relevant mental\nevents that Davidson usually cites as responsible for mental\nanomalism. Conscious events have traditionally been thought to occur\nin non-rational animals, a position with which Davidson shows some\nsympathy (Davidson 1985a). Such events thus appear to fall outside of\nthe domain of the rational, and thus outside of the purview of\nDavidson’s argument.", "\nDavidson is even less helpful about offering a criterion for the\n‘physical’ (Davidson 1970, 211). One half-hearted attempt\ncomes in the statement that", "\n\n\n[p]hysical theory promises to provide a comprehensive closed system\nguaranteed to yield a standardized, unique description of every\nphysical event couched in a vocabulary amenable to law. (Davidson\n1970, 224) \n", "\nThis is at best a promissory note about some future language of\n‘physics’—the ‘true’ physics—and\nit incorporates a requirement of the causal closure of the physical\ndomain that creates problems for certain aspects of Anomalous Monism\n(see the supplement on\n Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Anomalous Monism).\n It is probably best to take a ‘physical’ description\nsimply to be one that occurs in the language of a future science that\nis similar to what we call ‘physics’ today but with none\nof its inadequacies. One important component of such descriptions is\ntheir capacity to figure in strict laws of nature (see\n 3.1).\n While this is non-negotiable for physical terms, it is an open\nquestion for mental terms, and Davidson will be arguing\n (4)\n for a negative answer.", "\nWhen Davidson first argued for Anomalous Monism he subscribed to a\ncausal criterion of event-individuation, according to which two events\n(event-descriptions) are identical (co-refer) if they share all the\nsame causes and effects (Davidson 1969). He much later came to reject\nthat criterion in favor of one according to which events are identical\nif and only if they occupy the same spatiotemporal region (Davidson\n1985b). The difference between these views will not, however, be\nreflected in our discussion. It does not appear to affect either the\nderivation or the essential nature of Anomalous Monism. For our\npurposes, Davidson’s central claims are that what makes an event\nmental (or physical) is that it has a mental (or physical)\ndescription, and the extensionalist thesis that events are concrete\nentities that can be described in many different ways (‘the\nflipping of the light switch’, ‘the illuminating of the\nroom’ and ‘the alerting of the burglar that someone is\nhome’ can all pick out the same one event in different terms).\n(For controversies concerning extensionalism, see\n 5.2\n and the supplement on\n Related Issues\n (Anomalous Monism and Scheme-Content Dualism).)", "\nThe interaction principle states that at least some mental events\ncause and are caused by physical events (Davidson 1970, 208). This\nleaves open the possibility of mental events that do not causally\ninteract with physical events. However, given Davidson’s early\nviews about event-individuation (the causal criterion) it is unclear\nthat this possibility can be realized. His later views on\nevent-individuation appear to leave this possibility open, but his\ngeneral claims about the causal individuation of mental contents and\nattitudes (see\n 4.3\n and\n 6.3\n below) also stand in some tension with this possibility. In any case,\nDavidson goes on to say that he in fact believes that all mental\nevents causally interact with physical events (Davidson 1970, 208),\nbut he restricts his argument only to those that actually do. Given\nthe pressures just noted in favor of the inclusive reading of the\ninteraction principle, we shall assume it in what follows.", "\nThe interaction claim itself should be understood as follows: some\nevents that have a mental description or instantiate a mental property\ncause and are caused by events that have a physical description or\ninstantiate a physical property. Formulating the interaction principle\nin this way both clears the way for an extensional reading of the\ncausal relation (events are causally related no matter how they are\ndescribed), and also leaves open the possibility, which Davidson will\nsubsequently argue for, that mental events in particular must have\nsome non-mental description/instantiate some non-mental property. At\nthis stage that possibility is left as an open question, but it is\nimportant to notice that for it to be an open question we need to at\nleast allow for a distinction between events and the ways in which\nthey are picked out in language." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Mental and Physical Events" }, { "content": [ "\nThough this will be focused on separately below\n (6),\n it is also important to recognize that we are beginning with the\nassumption that mental events cause and are caused by physical events.\nMany critics of Anomalous Monism have claimed that it is difficult to\nsee how the position avoids epiphenomenalism—the view that\nmental events are causally/explanatorily impotent—and that\nAnomalous Monism is therefore unacceptable as an account of the place\nof the mental in the physical world. However, since Anomalous Monism\nis based upon the interaction principle, Davidson can claim\nin response that if Anomalous Monism is true, then mental events are\nalready known to have a kind of causal efficacy. As we shall see, this\npoint is not by itself sufficient to ward off all epiphenomenalist\nconcerns about Anomalous Monism. But it does serve to remind us of the\nfull framework within which challenges to Anomalous Monism must be\nassessed, and in particular brings out the reliance of that framework\non specific assumptions about causality (see Sections\n 4.3,\n 6, and Yalowitz 1998a).", "\nWhat needs to be noted at this point is that Davidson argued early on\nfor the claim that mental events have causal efficacy, through noting\na problem for non-causal accounts of action explanation (Davidson\n1963). Mental events and states explain action by making it\nintelligible—rational—in light of the agent’s\nbeliefs and purposes. The challenge that Davidson raised for\nnon-causal theories of action explanation was to account for the fact\nthat, for any action performed, there may well be a large number of\nmental events and states true of the agent, and capable of\nrationalizing the action, but that don’t thereby\nexplain that action. The agent acted because of some\nspecific beliefs and purposes, but other beliefs and purposes of his\ncould just as easily rationalize that action, and thus be cited in its\nexplanation. Was the agent moving his hand as he did because he wanted\nto swat the fly, relieve a cramp, or wave in greeting? He may well\nhave wanted to achieve all three of these aims, but still only in fact\nperformed the action because of one of these reasons. How do\nwe understand ‘because’ so as to rule out the pretenders?\nDavidson’s claim was that it is only if we understand\n‘because’ as ‘was caused by’ that we can\njustifiably pick out the genuine explanans—thereby\nimputing causal potency to mental events.", "\nWhat exactly does this argument show? It is intended to tell against\nnon-causal theories of action, which deny that reasons explain actions\nby causing them. There have been sophisticated attempts, on the behalf\nof non-causal theories of action explanation, to respond to this\nchallenge (von Wright 1971; Wilson 1985; Ginet 1995; for a good\noverview, see Stoutland 1976; and see related discussion in\n 6.3.)\n However, assuming the argument is successful, while it does establish\nmental efficacy of a kind, it does not by itself establish the\ninteraction principle. Establishing that reasons explain actions by\ncausing them, and that therefore reasons causally interact with\nactions, does not establish that reasons causally interact\nwith physical events. Dualists who reject the identity of\nmental and physical events will surely object.", "\nA key point to grasp in many of the issues raised by Anomalous Monism\nis that there is an important distinction between action and behavior.\nAccording to Davidson, action is intentionally described\nbehavior—the moving of a hand through space in a certain way\nmay, but need not, be an action of waving or swatting or any action at\nall. It may simply be mere bodily behavior—as happens as the\nresult of a muscle twitch or a strong gust of wind. The behavior must\nbe caused by an agent’s beliefs and desires in order to be\naction. However, while this is necessary for action, it is not,\naccording to Davidson, sufficient. The behavior must be caused in\nthe right way by the beliefs and desires. Davidson notes the\npossibility of cases where an agent’s beliefs and desires cause\nbehavior which is not rationalized by those states, and thus not\naction. A mountain climber might become so unnerved by his desire to\nrid himself of an annoying second climber sharing his rope and belief\nthat jiggling the rope is a means for doing so that he unintentionally\njiggles the rope, leading to the loss of the second climber. This is\nnot an action—it is mere behavior that happens to him, no\ndifferent than if caused by a muscle twitch or gust of wind. It is\ncaused in the wrong way—a “deviant causal\nchain”—by the belief and desire, and so is not an action.\nDavidson is skeptical about the possibility of cashing out what it\nmeans to be caused in the right way (Davidson 1973b,\n78–9), for reasons relating to mental anomalism (Davidson 1973b,\n80; see\n 4\n for explicit discussion). The key point for now is that because\nDavidson rejects the possibility of analyzing action in terms of\nbehavior caused in a particular way by reasons, the point made by the\n‘because’ argument cannot be used to establish that mental\nevents cause physical events. It does not follow from the fact that\nreasons must cause actions in order to explain them that\nreasons must cause behavior or (the interaction principle)\nthat reasons do cause behavior. It does not entail that\nactions are physical behavior.", "\nThis point is important when one considers the wider framework to\nwhich the interaction principle contributes. Since Davidson is\nattempting to derive monism from it and other principles that are\nthemselves neutral about the metaphysics of mind, he cannot assume\nthat action is (identical with) behavior on pain of circularity. Once\nmonism has been established, Davidson will be in a position to deploy\nthe ‘because’ point in order to argue for the claim that\nmental events are causally efficacious with respect to physical\nevents. How this relates to the wave of epiphenomenalist criticism\nabout Anomalous Monism will be explored in detail below\n (6,\n and see the supplement on\n Mental Properties and Causal Relevance).\n To summarize, the interaction principle is an unargued assumption in\nthe Davidsonian framework, one that does not assume monism, and the\n‘because’ argument, while important for ruling out\nnon-causal theories of action, does not itself establish the\ninteraction principle." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Mental Causation" }, { "content": [ "\nDavidson uses the interaction principle to establish directly one part\nof mental anomalism—psychological anomalism, which\ndenies the possibility of strict, purely psychological laws of the\nform\n‘M1 & M2 → M3’\n(Davidson 1970, 224; 1974b, 243). For if physical events causally\nimpact on mental events, then the mental domain is ‘open’,\nand any laws in which mental predicates figure will have to take this\ninto account (for related discussion, see the supplement on\n Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Anomalous Monism).\n More generally, physical conditions will always play some role in any\nplausible psychological generalizations, because physical intervention\n(e.g., injury) is always a possibility and can prevent the occurrence\nof the consequent ‘M3’. Thus, the only\npotentially true and strict laws in which psychological\npredicates can figure are variants of the psychophysical form\n‘P1 & M1 & M2 → M3’.\nPsychophysical anomalism, the other component of mental\nanomalism and the one that denies the possibility of such strict laws,\nis thus the view that Davidson focuses on establishing." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Psychological Anomalism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe cause-law principle states that events related as cause and effect\nare covered by strict laws. In the earliest formulations of Anomalous\nMonism, Davidson assumed but did not argue for this principle. His\nlater argument in support of it will be considered below\n (3.2),\n along with objections to the principle\n (3.3).\n But we need to consider the nature of the requirement contained in\nthis claim, and how it relates to the framework out of which Anomalous\nMonism is deduced." ], "section_title": "3. Premise II: The Cause-Law Principle", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe nature of the strict laws required by the cause-law principle is\nas follows. For any causal relationship between particular events\ne1 and e2, there must be a law\nof the form\n‘(C1 & D1) → D2’,\nwhere ‘C1’ states a set of standing\nconditions, and ‘D1’ is a description\nof e1 that is sufficient, given\nC1, for the occurrence of an event of the kind\n‘D2’, which is a description of\ne2. Traditionally, a strict law has been thought\nof as one where the condition and event-types specified in the\nantecedent are such as to guarantee that the condition or\nevent-types specified in the consequent occur—the latter\nmust occur if the former in fact obtain. But indeterministic\nor probabilistic versions of strict laws are possible as well\n(Davidson 1970, 219). The point that distinguishes strict laws is not\nso much the guaranteeing of the effect by satisfaction of the\nantecedent as the inclusion, in the antecedent, of all conditions and\nevents that can be stated that could possibly prevent the\noccurrence of the effect. A strict indeterministic law would\nbe one that specified everything required in order for some effect to\noccur. If the effect does not occur when those conditions obtain,\nthere is nothing else that could be cited in explanation of this\nfailure (other than the brute fact of an indeterministic universe).\nFor reasons of simplicity, we will assume determinism in this\ndiscussion, though what is said about strict laws could be carried\nover without remainder to strict indeterministic laws.", "\nThe cause-law principle is aimed, in the first instance, at laws of\nsuccession, which cover singular causal relationships between\nevents at distinct times. However, as will become clearer below,\nmental anomalism also takes in bridge laws that would\ncorrelate simultaneous instantiations of mental and physical\npredicates as well—such as\n‘P1 → M1’,\n‘M1 → P1’,\nor\n‘P1 ↔ M1’.\nIndeed, mental anomalism rejects the possibility of any\nstrict law in which mental predicates figure (where those predicates\nfigure essentially, and are not redundant)—including (as we have\nseen\n (2.3))\n laws formulated with purely mental predicates\n(‘(M1 & M2) → M3’),\nas well as laws with mental predicates in either the antecedent or\nconsequent, such as\n‘(M1 & M2) → P1’\nand\n‘(P1 & P2) → M1’\nand mixed variants of these (see\n 4).", "\nThe denial of strict laws of these forms is consistent with allowing\nhedged versions of them which are qualified by a ceteris\nparibus clause. ‘All things being equal’ or\n‘under normal conditions’, such psychological and\npsychophysical generalizations can, according to Davidson, be\njustifiably asserted (Davidson 1993, 9). As will be discussed below\n (4),\n denying the strict version of these generalizations amounts to\ndenying that the qualifying clause ‘ceteris\nparibus’ can be fully explicated. That is,\n‘ceteris paribus,\n((M1 & \nM2) → P1)’\ncannot be transformed into something like\n‘(P2 & P3 & \nM1 & M2 & M3) → \nP1’ (for a related discussion of this\nparticular issue, see the debate between Schiffer 1991 and Fodor\n1991).", "\n(Davidson organizes his discussion of this transformation process, and\nAnomalous Monism more generally, around a distinction between\n‘homonomic’ and ‘heteronomic’ generalizations\n(Davidson 1970, 219). That distinction is extremely problematic for\nthe purposes of establishing Anomalous Monism, and is set aside here\nin favor of the related (but by no means identical) distinction\nbetween strict and ceteris paribus generalizations. For\ndiscussion of the former distinction, see the supplement on\n Homonomic and Heteronomic Generalizations.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Strict Laws" }, { "content": [ "\nDavidson argues for the cause-law principle—that singular causal\nrelations require strict covering laws—on the basis of a\nconceptual interconnection between the concepts of physical\nobject, event and law. As he says, “our\nconcept of a physical object is the concept of an object whose changes\nare governed by laws” (Davidson 1995a, 274). The\ninterconnections are established partly in response to C.J.\nDucasse’s attempt, in reaction to Hume’s regularity theory\nof causation, to define singular causal relations without appeal to\ncovering laws (Ducasse 1926).", "\nSimply put, Ducasse defined some particular event c as the\ncause of some effect e if and only if c was the only\nchange occurring in the immediate environment of e just prior\nto e. The striking of the match is the cause of the flaming\nmatch just insofar as the striking is the only change occurring in the\nimmediate vicinity of the flaming match just prior to the flaming of\nthe match. Ducasse intended this definition to rebut Hume’s\nclaim that singular causal relations between particular events must be\nanalyzed in terms of regularities between types of events (and thus\nlaws). Indeed, Ducasse claimed that Hume was wrong to deny that we\nhave the ability to perceive singular causal relations—this\ndenial being the basis for Hume’s subsequent regularity account\n (see 3.3).\n For, according to Ducasse, we can perceive that some event is the\nonly change in the immediate environment of some subsequent event just\nprior to that event’s occurrence. (We can, of course, be wrong\nin thinking that this is what we have in fact perceived. But as\nDucasse points out, the same problem plagues Hume’s own\naccount—we can be wrong that what we have perceived are\ninstances of types which bear a regular relation to each other. But\nthis does not lead Hume to hold that since we can’t infallibly\nperceive that some succession is an instance of a regularity, we\ncannot form the concept of causality in terms of regularity. The same\nthus applies to Ducasse’s own account.)", "\nDavidson notes the heavy dependence, in Ducasse’s account, on\nthe notion of a ‘change’. And he asks whether we really\nhave a purchase on this concept absent appeal to laws. There are two\naspects of this concern. First, the notion of ‘change’ is\nshort for ‘change of predicate’—a change occurs when\na predicate true of some object (or not true of that object) ceases to\nbe true (or comes to be true) of that object. And this leads directly\nto questions about how predicates are individuated and their\nrelationship to laws (see below). Second, and at a more general level,\nthe notion of ‘change’ has itself changed over\ntime—for instance, Newtonian mechanics defines a change\ndifferently than Aristotelian physics, so that continuous motion\ncounts as a change, and thus requires an explanation, according to the\nlatter but not the former. Thus, the very notion of\n‘change’ is theory dependent, and therefore (Davidson\nholds) presupposes the notion of ‘law’, in the sense that\nsomething counts as a change, and thus as having a cause, only against\na background of theoretical principles.", "\nThis second point does not appear to deliver the result Davidson is\nafter—establishing that each causal interaction must be covered\nby a particular strict law. The claim that something is a change, and\nthus has a cause, only if certain theoretical assumptions are in place\nis consistent with the claim that those assumptions (for instance,\nthat uniform rectilinear motion does not count as a change) cannot\nplay the explanatory role for specific causal interactions that strict\nlaws are supposed to play. They are simply of too general a\nnature—they don’t enable predictions or explanations of\nany particular events. And in any case, there appears to be nothing in\nDavidson’s considerations here that forces the requirement that\nthe covering laws be strict as opposed to irreducibly ceteris\nparibus. (As we have already seen\n (3.1),\n Davidson himself has insisted upon the legitimacy and ubiquity of\nsuch laws in scientific explanation.)", "\nReturning to the first point about predicate-individuation, Davidson\nclaims that “it is just the predicates which are projectible,\nthe predicates that enter into valid inductions, that determine what\ncounts as a change” (Davidson 1995a, 272). We know from Nelson\nGoodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’ (Goodman 1983)\nthat we can invent predicates, such as ‘grue’ and\n‘bleen’ (where an object is grue if it is green and\nexamined before 2020 or otherwise blue, and an object is bleen if it\nis blue and examined before 2020 or otherwise green) so that a green\nobject goes from being grue to bleen over the course of time without\nhaving changed in any intuitive sense. It will continue to be green,\nthough it will also be true that it ceases to be grue and comes to be\nbleen. Contrary to much discussion of Goodman’s riddle, Davidson\nholds that such unusual predicates can be projectible, and figure in\nlaws, but only when appropriately paired with other such predicates (\n“All emeralds are grue” is not lawlike, but “All\nemerires are grue” is (where “emerire” is true of\nemeralds examined before 2020 or otherwise sapphires ). What is\ncrucial for Davidson is that to understand the notion of change, which\nis so closely tied to the notion of causation, one must understand the\nnotion of a projectible predicate—one appropriate for use in\nscience—and this notion inevitably brings in the notion of law.\nChanges are described by predicates suitable for inclusion within\nlaws. But how does this relate to the cause-law principle? Once again,\nit is unclear why Davidson would think that it is the notion of a\nstrict law in particular that this line of argument\nmotivates.", "\nA related line of argument that Davidson offers (see\n 4.3)\n appears to suggest that dispositional predicates—those defined\nin terms of the effects they tend to bring about—are not\nsuitable for inclusion in strict laws (generalizations in which they\nfigure are always qualified by a ceteris paribus clause), but\nthere must be strict laws at the bottom, so to speak, of the\ndispositional vocabulary. Davidson’s discussion of this issue\nrefers back to an older debate about the status of dispositional\nterms—specifically, whether they are ‘place-holders’\nfor predicates that are non-dispositional (‘intrinsic’ or\n‘manifest’) (see Goodman 1983, 41ff). Whatever one’s\nview about that issue, it again does not appear that Davidson has\nprovided adequate argument for establishing that strict laws\n(as opposed to ceteris paribus laws) are required for our\ndispositional vocabulary to operate as it does. So Davidson does not\nappear to have provided the cause-law principle with a plausible\nrationale (for skepticism about the principle, see Anscombe 1971,\nCartwright 1983, McDowell 1985, Hornsby 1985 and 1993, and\n 3.3 below).\n This is not to say that it is false, or even that it is implausible\nto assume it in his argument for Anomalous Monism. Many find the\nprinciple highly intuitive, and it is worthwhile to explore its\nrelation to the other central claims in Davidson’s\nframework." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Justifying the Cause-Law Principle" }, { "content": [ "\nThe cause-law principle has come in for a lot of criticism since it\nreceived its canonical formulation in Hume’s regularity theory\nof causation, and it is worth briefly reviewing some of the central\nobjections relevant to Davidson’s own discussions. This will\nmake clear how important it is, for an argument such as\nDavidson’s for Anomalous Monism, that some justification for the\nthesis ultimately be provided.", "\nAn initial objection is that Hume’s analysis of singular causal\nstatements (‘a caused b’ is true if and\nonly if ‘whenever an A occurs, it is followed by an\noccurrence of a B’), which articulates his own version\nof the cause-law principle, is not an accurate rendering of the way in\nwhich we typically use the term ‘cause’. We are confident\nin judgments such as ‘Harry’s smoking caused his lung\ncancer’ while knowing that in fact not all smokers are stricken\nby lung cancer. This point is entirely general—we make singular\ncausal judgments all the time without believing in (indeed, while\nknowing the falsity of) the associated universal generalization (see\nAnscombe 1971). However, Davidson’s extensionalism about\ncausality provides a straightforward response to this concern. His\nview is that while we may not believe in the associated universal\ngeneralization, that is consistent with there being some\nuniversal generalization, stated in a different vocabulary than the\nsingular causal statement, which ‘covers’ that statement.\n(It is worth noting that Davidson rejects Hume’s\nanalysis of singular causal statements in terms of universal\ngeneralizations—he holds that the requirement of such a covering\ngeneralization is necessary but not sufficient for the truth of such a\nstatement (Davidson 1967).)", "\nWhile this response does appear to meet the objection, it raises the\nfollowing concern, which is behind a related objection to the\ncause-law principle: no one in fact seems to know any true predictive\n‘strict’ laws (in the literal sense of that term). Now,\nwhile it is certainly consistent with this point that there are or\neven must be such laws, it becomes more pressing to know why we should\nthink this if we cannot even offer any examples. It is well and good\nfor Davidson to point to the possibility of strict covering laws that\ntranscend our current knowledge, but we need to know why we should\nbelieve in such things. Science seems to have done well for itself\nwithout any apparent use of them.", "\nAnother objection to the cause-law principle comes from the state of\ncontemporary physics. According to quantum mechanics, it is not simply\ndifficult or impossible for us to state such laws for quantum\nphenomena. Rather, quantum theory appears to entail that determinism\nfails to obtain at the level of microparticles. What the theory and\nthe behavior of such particles tells us is that causation, at least at\nthe level of micro phenomena, is indeterministic. And this\nindeterminism is claimed to be inconsistent with the requirement of\nstrict laws. This objection to the cause-law principle, then, is that\nphilosophy should never dictate to science on empirical matters.\nObservation of the world tells us that strict laws are impossible in\nthis domain even while causation is present, in direct contradiction\nof the cause-law principle.", "\nNow, we have already seen Davidson’s own response to this sort\nof objection\n (3.1).\n As traditionally construed, strict laws are supposed to guarantee the\nconsequent condition on the basis of the antecedent condition. But\nthey do not need to provide such a guarantee. What strict laws require\nis that the antecedent include all conditions and events that could\npossibly prevent the occurrence of the consequent. If the consequent\ndoes not occur when all these conditions have been accounted for,\nthere is nothing else to be cited in explanation of the non-occurrence\nother than the sheer brute fact of an indeterministic universe. So\nindeterministic causation is entirely consistent with the cause-law\nprinciple (Davidson 1970, 219). The determinist/indeterminist and\nstrict/nonstrict law distinctions do not map neatly onto each other.\nAn indeterministic law can be universal, exceptionless and true. This\npoint does not appear to be recognized by central proponents of the\nindeterministic objection to strict laws (see Cartwright 1983).", "\nA final objection to the cause-law principle which is more internal to\nthe wider framework of Anomalous Monism has been put forth in McDowell\n1985. McDowell sees a tension between Davidson’s allegiance to\nthe cause-law principle and his rejection of ‘the dualism of\nscheme and content’ (Davidson 1974a). Briefly, the dualism\nDavidson opposes is the idea that, for instance, a perceptual judgment\nis the rational upshot of an interaction between a concept and an\nnonconceptualized experiential element—the sensory input. Given\nDavidson’s systematic rejection of this idea, McDowell believes\nhe ought to disavow the cause-law principle. McDowell doesn’t\nthink the principle is required for a minimal version of materialism\n(see the supplement on\n Related Views\n (Bare Materialism), and without the need to justify materialism\nMcDowell sees the principle as lacking any motivation in\nDavidson’s framework. For discussion of this issue and others\nrelated to scheme-content dualism and Anomalous Monism, see the\nsupplement on\n Related Issues\n (Anomalous Monism and Scheme-Content Dualism)." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Objections to the Cause-Law Principle" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe anomalism principle states that there are no strict laws on the\nbasis of which mental events can predict, explain, or be predicted or\nexplained by other events. In this section we look at different\ninterpretations of the argument for this principle. Davidson’s\nown formulations, while suggestive, are notoriously vague and often\nappeal to very different sorts of considerations, including aspects of\nlanguage and interpretation, questions about psychological\nexplanation, and the nature of causality and dispositions. We shall be\nlooking at specific interpretations as well as the problems they face\nin providing a compelling rationale for both the anomalism principle\nand Anomalous Monism.", "\nWhile differing in important ways, the various formulations of the\nargument, as well as the objections to them, exhibit a discernible\npattern: proponents of mental anomalism highlight some feature of\nmental properties that is claimed to (1) sharply individuate them from\nphysical properties and (2) create a conceptual tension with physical\nproperties that precludes the possibility of strict lawful relations\nbetween these properties. According to the objections, however, the\nhighlighted feature of mental properties either does not serve to\ndistinguish it from physical properties or does not actually stand in\nany conceptual tension with physical properties that rules out lawlike\nrelations. We will consider each interpretation, and its problems, in\nturn. In a later section\n (5.3)\n we will look at another objection related to the anomalism\nprinciple—that it is inconsistent with Davidson’s\ninvocation of the doctrine that mental properties stand in a relation\nof supervenience to physical properties. For discussion of the\nrelation between the anomalism principle and Davidson’s views\nabout scheme-content dualism and semantic externalism, see the\nsupplement on\n Related Issues.", "\nMental anomalism, as initially formulated by Davidson, holds that\nthere can be no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be\npredicted and explained (Davidson 1970, 208). It is thus restricted to\nruling out strict laws of succession with mental predicates occurring\nin the consequent—laws such as\n‘P1 → M1’,\n‘(M1 & P1) → M2’,\nor\n‘M1 → M2’.\nIt thus denies that the occurrence of particular mental events such as\ncoming to believe or intend something, or intentionally acting in some\nway, can be explained by appeal to strict covering laws. But as\nbecomes clear, Davidson’s considered position rejects the\npossibility of any strict laws in which mental predicates\nfigure—and this includes, in particular, bridge laws of the form\n‘P1 ↔ M1’,\nwhich form the basis of type-identity theories of mind, as well as any\nstrict laws with mental antecedents. We have already seen how strict\npurely psychological laws are ruled out by the interaction principle\n (2.3).\n And, at a more general level, it rules out purported solutions to the\nproblem of deviant causal chains noted in\n 2.2,\n which would spell out, in terms of some required physical and also,\nperhaps, mental conditions, how behavior must be caused by reasons\n(“caused in the right way”) in order to be action. (That\nsome physical conditions are necessary in such an analysis is\nguaranteed, as we have seen\n (2.3),\n by the open nature of the mental and subsequent psychological\nanomalism.) Any such adequate analysis of action would entail\nparticular psychophysical laws of the form\n‘(M1 & M2 & M3 & P1) → P2’.\nFor such an analysis would state that whatever behavior\n(P2) which in fact is caused in the right way\n(M3 & P1) by\nreasons\n(M1 & M2) would\nbe the action that is rationalized by those reasons. This\nprovides a schema for generating strict psychophysical laws: by\nplugging in particular reasons and the causal conditions\nP1 and M3 proffered by the\nanalysis, we get a strict predictive psychophysical law simply by\nnoting what effect is produced by these causes. (In the course of an\nextended discussion of the problem of deviant causal chains, Bishop\n1989, 125–75, fails to see this connection between it and mental\nanomalism—see 164.) With strict purely psychological laws thus\nalready ruled out, the focus now is on strict psychophysical laws.", "\nIt is useful to view Davidson’s attack against psychophysical\nlaws in light of an argument, in vogue in the 1950s and 1960s, against\nthe claim that reasons are causes of the actions they explain. This\nargument was referred to as the “Logical Connection\nArgument” (see Stoutland 1970). According to this argument,\nreasons cannot be held to explain actions by causing them because (1)\ncauses and effects must be logically distinct from each other (one of\nHume’s requirements on causality) but (2) reasons and the\nactions they explain bear a quasi-logical connection to each other, by\nvirtue of the rationalizing relation between them. That relationship\nis quasi-logical because not just any reason can explain any\naction—only those reasons which actually rationalize (make\nintelligible) an action can explain it. Davidson’s own\ninfluential response to this argument was to distinguish between\ncausal relations, which obtain between events no matter how they are\ndescribed, and logical relations, which obtain between particular\ndescriptions of events. The Logical Connection Argument fails to\nrecognize this simple distinction. The distinction allowed Davidson to\nmerge two key ideas in his theory of action—that reasons explain\nby causing, and that they explain by rationalizing (Davidson 1963,\n13–17). As we shall see below, however, Davidson appears to\naccept a basic distinction at the heart of the Logical Connection\nArgument—that the rationalizing relationship bears a certain key\nproperty (quasi-logical status) that is at odds with the relationship\nbetween physically described, causally related events." ], "section_title": "4. Premise III: The Anomalism Principle", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nDavidson’s explicit considerations in favor of mental anomalism\nappeal to factors about the interpretation of action (linguistic as\nwell as non-linguistic) and the ascription of mental states and events\nto persons. Several distinguishable features are noted—holism\nwith respect to particular ascriptions, indeterminacy with respect to\nsystematic interpretative frameworks, and the responsiveness of mental\nascription to an ideal of rationality. According to holism, particular\nmental states can be cited in explanation of behavior only in the\ncontext of other mental states, which in turn depend upon others.\nDavidson claims that this dependency and holistic interrelatedness is\n“without limit” (Davidson 1970, 217). This echoes a\nrelated point he makes about the impossibility of definitional\nreduction of mental states in purely behavioristic terms, because of\nthe ineliminable need for mental caveats (e.g., that the person\nunderstands, or notices or cares….) qualifying any attempt to\nstate non-mental conditions for mental states.", "\nDavidson presents these claims about definitional reduction as facts\nwhich “provide at best hints of why we should not expect\nnomological connections between the mental the physical”\n(Davidson 1970, 217). If definitional reduction of this kind were in\nfact impossible, it would rule out the possibility of a subclass of\nstrict psychophysical laws—those relating mental states with\nnon-intentionally described behavior—but the basis for this\nimpossibility would not have been explained. In fact, however, without\nknowing what that basis is supposed to be, we have no reason to accept\nDavidson’s claim that definitional reduction is indeed\nimpossible. What prevents us from articulating all the required\ncaveats? Without a rationale in hand, nothing prevents a reductionist\nfrom simply offering us detailed definitions and challenging us to\ncome up with counterexamples. Something both principled and convincing\nis clearly needed. Davidson’s concerns about definitional\nreduction are ‘hints’ concerning nomological reduction\nonly in the sense that they draw out our intuitions about something\nstanding in the way of formulating such laws. What that obstacle is\nneeds clear formulation.", "\nAt times, Davidson appeared to flirt with the idea that the missing\nlink was provided by the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation,\ndeveloped by W.V Quine (1960) and endorsed by Davidson (1970, 222;\n1979). This thesis claims that there are empirically adequate but\nnon-equivalent complete frameworks for assigning linguistic meanings\nand mental states to a person on the basis of his behavior, and that\nthere is no fact of the matter that determines that one but not other\nsuch frameworks is correct. In particular, there are no physical\nfacts, inside a person’s body or head or outside in the external\nworld, that could settle whether a person’s words refer to some\ndeterminate range of objects rather than some other range, or whether\none rather than another systematically interdependent set of mental\nstates, with distinct distributions of truth values, is true of that\nperson (see Davidson 1979). If the indeterminacy thesis is true, then\non the face of it there would be some rationale for rejecting the\npossibility of psychophysical laws. For if all physical facts are\nconsistent with different psychological/semantic assignments, then it\nseems that knowing all the physical facts could not tell us whether\nsome mental states were true of some person, or some meaning true of\nher words—neither could be exceptionlessly predicted or\nexplained, just as mental anomalism maintains.", "\nThere are two problems with this, however. First, this would do\nnothing to rule out certain psychophysical laws, such as those of the\nform\n‘M1 → P1’.\nAnd so it couldn’t ground the completely general thesis\nof mental anomalism. But more importantly, Davidson himself holds that\nthe least controversial versions of indeterminacy, having to do with\ndiverging reference schemes, amount to mere notational\nvariance—as he puts it, meaning is what is invariant between\nempirically adequate translation schemes (Davidson 1977, 225; 1999a,\n81). And given that such schemes are generated through a purely\nmechanical permutation function (Davidson 1979, 229–30) it is a\nrelatively simple technical trick to take these different schemes into\naccount when formulating psychophysical laws. The laws, for instance,\ncould be formulated with disjunctive predicates\n(‘P1 → (M1 ∨ M2 ∨ M3’).\nOr, if such predicates are considered problematic, the laws could be\nof the form\n‘P1 → M’,\nwhere ‘M’ picks out the invariant element\nbetween the empirically equivalent theories. So it is not at all clear\nthat indeterminacy in and of itself is capable of supporting an\nacross-the-board rejection of strict psychological or psychophysical\nlaws. And Davidson ultimately acknowledges this, in stating that\nanomalism would hold even if indeterminacy didn’t (Davidson\n1970, 222)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 The Holism/Indeterminacy Arguments" }, { "content": [ "\nWhat is responsible for the possibility of indeterminacy, however, is\nthe role of the principle of charity in formulating a theory of\nanother person’s behavior (Davidson 1970, 222–23). And\nthis principle is closely aligned for Davidson with mental anomalism.\nAccording to this principle, we must “try for a theory that\nfinds him consistent, a believer of truths, and a lover of the good\n(all by our own lights, it goes without saying)” (Davidson 1970,\n222). In the process of coming to understand another, by ascribing\nmental states and events to him and meanings to his words, we must,\nDavidson claims, stand ready to adjust previous assignments of\nmeanings and mental states and events based upon new evidence about\nthe person and how it relates to the overall project of finding him\nand his behavior intelligible. There are two key points here that for\nDavidson suggest mental anomalism. First, we never have all possible\nevidence—we must maintain an openness to better interpretations\nof previous behavior as new evidence becomes available. Interpretation\nis always ongoing. And second, ‘better’ interpretations\nare those made in light of the constitutive ideal of rationality.\nConsequently, Davidson claims, ", "\n\n\nthere cannot be tight connections between the realms [of the mental\nand the physical] if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source\nof evidence. (Davidson 1970, 222)\n", "\nRationality is claimed by Davidson to be constitutive of the\nmental in the sense that something only counts as being a\nmind—and thus an appropriate object of psychological\nattributions—if it meets up to certain rational standards. This\nconstitutive idea is open to weaker and stronger interpretations. The\nweaker interpretation sees only very basic logical, semantic or\nconceptual constraints on understanding others—and thus what is\nconstitutive of minds—which allows for significant variation as\none moves further out from these to more substantive principles of\npractical reasoning and theoretical reasoning, and even more when\nextending out further to desires and values. The stronger\ninterpretation appears to be suggested in the quote from Davidson\nimmediately above. In requiring consistency, true beliefs and\nappropriate desires, it appears to require maximizing agreement\nbetween interpreter and interpreted, and thus a maximal conception of\nwhat is constitutive of minds. The weaker interpretation instead\nrequires merely minimizing inexplicable error on the part of the\ncreature being interpreted, thus allowing for significant deviations\nfrom psychological assignments that might be required by the stronger\ninterpretation. On this view, the interpreter puts himself into the\nshoes of the interpreted, acknowledging evidential and cognitive\nlimitations that might prevent her from achieving maximal rationality\n(Grandy 1973). As we will see in this section, how one interprets the\nnotion of rationality as constitutive directly affects how the\nargument for mental anomalism is interpreted to work.", "\nWhile Davidson never offers any substantive account of what the proper\nsource of evidence is for the physical, he often invokes the notion of\nrationality as constraining mental ascription, and it is clear that\nwhatever constrains physical ascription is supposed to pull in a\ndifferent and potentially conflicting direction. One suggestive way of\ngetting at Davidson’s idea here is through the traditional\ndistinction between ‘normative’ and\n‘descriptive’ concepts. When we look to uncover\ngeneralizations in the physically described world, what we find to\nfollow from a certain set of physical conditions is a brute\nfact; our world is constituted in certain ways (in its governing\nlaws) that we could imagine to be different. We may come to an\nempirical investigation with certain theoretical commitments that\ninevitably lead us to read the data in some ways rather than others;\nand there may indeed, as Davidson himself suggests, be constitutive\na priori principles that govern very basic physical concepts\nsuch as ‘object’ and ‘event’ (Davidson 1970,\n220; 1974b, 239; 1973a, 254; see\n 3.2\n above). However, the constraints are far looser and allow for a wide\nvariation in terms of empirical content—of what physical events\nand states can follow from others. This is contrasted with mental\nascription, where the normative notion of rationality rules out the\npossibility of certain mental states following from others. This line\nof thinking is suggestive, but it is in need of considerable\ntightening.", "\nJaegwon Kim’s account of Davidson’s position (Kim 1985)\nattempts to do just this. Kim argues that if there were strict lawlike\nrelations between mental and physical predicates, the ‘brute\nfactness’ and contingency of the physical would\n‘infect’ the mental. For instance, rationality\nconsiderations will typically lead us to attribute a belief that q to\na person if we attribute a belief that p and also attribute a\nbelief that p entails q. According to Kim’s account, beliefs\ninvolving very basic logical, semantic or conceptual relations like\nthis hold of necessity—we cannot make sense of possible worlds\nwhere beliefs of the first two kinds are attributed but not the\nthird.", "\nNow, this may appear to be too strong a claim, in light of\nDavidson’s rejection of strict, purely psychological\nlaws—mental anomalism rejects the possibility of any strict laws\nin which mental predicates figure, but Kim here appears to be\ndeploying laws of the form\n‘M1 & M2 → M3’.\nKim would reply that Davidson is only interested in rejecting strict\ndescriptive (i.e., explanatory, predictive) laws, not strict normative\nlaws (see below). ", "\nIf physical predicates stood in strict lawful relations to mental\npredicates, this contingency would ‘infect’ the mental in\nthe following sense. Suppose that there were strict bridge laws\ncorrelating the instantiation of mental and physical properties,\n‘P1 ↔ M1’\nand\n‘P2 ↔ M2’.\nThen, Kim argues, rational principles of the form\n‘M1 → \nM2’ would enable the logical derivation of\nphysical laws like\n‘P1 → P2’.\nIndeed, the reverse would be true as well; starting with the physical\nlaw\n‘P1 → P2’,\nand assuming the psychophysical bridge laws, one could derive the\nrational principle\n‘M1 → M2’.\nHowever, the metaphysical status of the rational principle and the\nphysical law are importantly different—rational principles are\nnecessary, true in all possible worlds, while physical laws, being\ncontingent, are not. In particular, with the bridge laws in place, a\ncontingent physical law could explain (through derivation) the\nrational principle, undermining its status as necessary. Since it is\nthe bridge laws that enable these troublemaking derivations,\nthey—and thus strict psychophysical laws—are to be\nrejected. This is how Kim makes sense of Davidson’s suggestive\nclaim that mental anomalism is grounded in the fact that mental and\nphysical explanation owe their allegiance to different sources of\nevidence. (For related discussion, see the supplement on\n Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.)", "\nKim’s argument rests upon two central assumptions. First, it\nassumes that no distinction between strict and ceteris\nparibus laws need play any role in reconstructions of\nDavidson’s argument. It is, purportedly, not the scope\nof a psychological law which accounts for an asymmetry with physical\nlaws, but rather the point of each type of law (Kim 1985,\n381). Second, it assumes that there is a firm distinction between\ndescriptive laws and relations, on the one hand, and normative laws\nand relations, on the other, that can bear the weight of mental\nanomalism (Kim 1985, 383) The first assumption is clearly mistaken; as\nalready noted, Davidson heavily emphasizes the focus on strict laws in\nhis own discussions of Anomalous Monism, and explicitly allows for the\npossibility of hedged laws incorporating mental predicates.\nKim’s reductio strategy, then, would fail to uniquely\nidentify the culprit responsible for producing the trouble as the\nbridge laws rather than the rational principle, all of which\nare strict. And while Davidson does emphasize the normative status of\nmental predicates, he also recognizes, as we have already noted\n (3.2\n and\n 4.2),\n a normative component to the physical realm, in constitutive a\npriori principles. There does not appear to be a significant\ndistinction between descriptive and normative principles in\nDavidson’s framework that can bear the burden of mental\nanomalism, as required on Kim’s interpretation. (For further\ndiscussion of Kim’s interpretative strategy, see the supplement\non\n Kim’s Reductio Strategy for Establishing Mental Anomalism.)", "\nJohn McDowell also focuses on the normative nature of rationality, but\nemphasizes a very strong conception of rationality as an ideal\nconstitutive of the mental, taking in more than merely the familiar\ndeductive relations—logical, semantic or\nconceptual—deployed in Kim’s reading (McDowell 1985,\n391–4). McDowell appears to be guided by some of\nDavidson’s broader formulations and discussions of the principle\nof charity\n (4.2),\n which extend to more general principles governing action and belief\nformation, highlighted in Davidson’s discussions of\nirrationality (see Davidson 1982). For example, the principle of\ncontinence requires one to act on the basis of all available\nconsiderations, and the principle of total evidence requires one to\nbelieve the hypothesis supported by all of one’s evidence. And\nthe broad formulations entail that our conception of rationality\nincludes conceptions of the Good, and so the formation of rationally\nappropriate desires, thus extending beyond constraints on belief and\naction. According to McDowell, those inclined to think that mere\ndeductive relations can be captured in physical terms (see Loar 1981)\nwill find mental anomalism much more difficult to deny when taking\ninto account this stronger conception of rationality. ", "\nThis stronger conception of rationality puts McDowell in a position to\nexploit a crucial gap between rational norms and actual explanations\nof behavior:", "\n\n\nFinding an action or propositional attitude intelligible, after\ninitial difficulty, may not only involve managing to articulate for\noneself some hitherto merely implicit aspect of one’s conception\nof rationality, but actually involve becoming convinced that\none’s conception of rationality needed correcting, so as to make\nroom for this novel way of being intelligible. (McDowell 1985,\n392)\n", "\nJust as our beliefs about empirical matters can be mistaken in any\ngiven case, and we can make genuine discoveries about empirical\nreality, just so with rationality. Clearly this claim is much more\nplausible with the stronger conception of rationality that McDowell is\nurging than the weaker conception limited to mere deductive relations.\nMcDowell goes on to argue that because of this feature, we must be\nopen to the possible reinterpretation of a person’s behavior and\npsychological states in light of our changing conception of\nrationality, and how it changes cannot be anticipated in advance so\nthat rationality could be captured in a permanent set of principles\nfrom which strict laws could be fashioned. For this reason,\nrationality is uncodifiable. According to McDowell, this is\nwhat underlies mental anomalism.", "\nOne might understand the reasoning here in the following way: because\nit is built into our conception of rationality that our own particular\ngrasp of rationality may be mistaken on any given occasion and is also\ninherently limited, no statement of psychological or psychophysical\ngeneralizations could exhaust, and therefore explain, our conception\nof rationality. If the concept of rationality does not simply\nconsist in one’s conception, at any given time, of\nrationality, then it cannot be captured in terms of the\nactual goings on in one’s brain (the same point applies\nif we substitute “everyone’s” for\n“one’s”). Therefore, strict lawlike relations\nbetween the mental and the physical are impossible. This contrasts\ninterestingly with Kim’s strategy: on McDowell’s reading,\nit is partly because no detailed statement of a rational principle\ncould be claimed to be necessarily true that there can be no\npsychophysical laws.", "\nA number of questions arise in considering McDowell’s argument.\nIt appears to be heavily influenced by Davidson’s remarks about\nthe ongoing nature of interpretation (Davidson 1970, 223;\n see 4.2).\n However, Davidson appeals to the fact that new\nevidence—in the form of behavior and environmental\ncontext—is always coming in that can force us to revise existing\ninterpretations of an agent. There is no mention of shifting\nstandards, or unarticulated or inarticulable conceptions of\nrationality. Indeed, the implication is that a stable\nstandard, when taking into account new evidence, can lead to revised\ninterpretations of prior behavior. So McDowell appears to be going\nbeyond Davidson’s own views about the concept of rationality.\nIndeed, the idea that one is not able to fully articulate a concept in\nthe way suggested by McDowell—that it is in effect\nineffable –does not clearly sit comfortably with\nDavidson’s views about conceptual relativism and rejection of\nthe idea of untranslatable languages (see further the supplement on\n Related Issues\n (Anomalous Monism and Scheme-Content Dualism).", "\nFurther, and more importantly, McDowell’s distinctive\nuncodifiability claim, which rests on this view of rationality, looks\nto be too general to underwrite a specific thesis like mental\nanomalism. This becomes apparent when one asks why the very same\nfeatures that he is insisting are true of our conception of\nrationality aren’t also true of the key concepts that figure in\nexplanations of the physical world. Surely our concepts of physical\nreality outstrip any particular conception we have at any given time,\nand the possibility of mistaken application is built into them. And\nscientists are in the same position as interpreters in terms of the\npossibility of new evidence and its bearing on how previous evidence\nwas understood. So far this looks to be nothing more than a\ncombination of a completely general point about concepts together with\nthe familiar problem of induction, which plagues all empirical\nenquiry. McDowell’s assertion that “someone who aims at\nexplanations of the ideal-involving kind must be alive to the thought\nthat there is sure to be a gap between actual current conception and\nideal structure in his own case as well as others” (McDowell\n1985, 392) doesn’t appear to uniquely pick out any particular\nexplanatory framework. It therefore cannot tell us anything\ndistinctive about the metaphysical status of psychology.", "\nIf, however, the emphasis here falls on constitutive\nprinciples in particular—as surely it must—then two other\nproblems arise. First, McDowell’s reasoning doesn’t tell\nus what exactly it is about such principles that makes them resistant\nto reduction, since, as we’ve just seen, that reasoning has\nfailed to distinguish them from empirical concepts in the physical\nsciences. And second, as noted in\n 4.2,\n Davidson holds that there are constitutive a priori\nprinciples underlying the physical sciences which play a similar role\nthere that rationality plays in psychological explanation. So we are\nstill in need of an explanation of why psychology and physics cannot\nstand in strict lawlike relations. Now, we did note there that such\nphysical constitutive principles are far more lenient than\nrationality, allowing for a greater variety of empirical\ncontent—of what can follow from what. This indeed accounts for\nan important asymmetry between mental and physical explanation. And\nMcDowell heavily emphasizes this point in his discussion: that it is\nnot merely a brute fact that rationality marks the limits of\nintelligibility, while physical explanations do bottom out in brute\nfacts (McDowell 1985, 394). However, this point appears to be entirely\nseparable from the distinctive feature of McDowell’s reading of\nthe argument for mental anomalism—it has nothing especially to\ndo with the idea of rationality as uncodifiable in\nMcDowell’s specific sense. In fact, it is the key point behind\nKim’s strategy, and it appears to have no essential connection\nto McDowell’s stronger views about rationality. One can think of\nrationality as constitutive, as normative and as asymmetrical to the\nphysical in the way just noted—as Kim does—without buying\ninto McDowell’s distinctive picture of it. So it looks like the\nsalvageable part of McDowell’s actual argument for mental\nanomalism ultimately reduces to Kim’s. Uncodifiability appears\nto be a red herring.", "\nTherefore, despite McDowell’s extremely subtle and interesting\nviews about the nature of the ideal of rationality, in the end those\nviews do not appear to provide a secure foundation for mental\nanomalism. It is only what is shared in common with Kim’s\nstrategy—the modal asymmetry between rational and physical\nexplanation—that bears directly on mental anomalism. And that\nleaves McDowell’s reading facing the sorts of concerns raised in\n 4.2.1.", "\nAs we have seen above, Kim thinks that mental anomalism is susceptible\nof a kind of proof. This seems to be something stronger than Davidson\nhimself claims (Davidson 1970, 215). In light of Davidson’s\nmodesty about provability, and lack of explicit argumentation, some\ncommentators (Child 1992; see also McDowell 1979) have suggested that\nmere reflection on the kinds of generalizations that we draw upon in\ncoming to understand each other supports (but cannot prove) mental\nanomalism. Such generalizations are rules of thumb that hold only for\nthe most part, and require, for their application to a given case,\ndetailed contextual supplementation that cannot, by its nature, be\nincluded in anything like a universal generalization. The suggestion\nis that the sheer amount of contextual detail that would need to be\naccounted for in any statement with even a hope of being true is\ninappropriate for inclusion in strict lawful statements. A related\nstrategy is to point to a lack of fixed, predetermined ends that all\nhumans (or even any particular human over the course of her life) aim\nfor in situations of choice, or values to maximize when deciding what\nto believe (such as simplicity, scope, and consistency in the case of\ntheory choice) (Child 1992). The thought here is that if there are no\nsuch fixed ends or values, then no psychological generalization could\nbe complete—since in particular contexts such ends or values\nplay a crucial explanatory role in determining what to do or\nbelieve.", "\nIt would seem, however, that reflection on the level of detail\nrequired for strict laws in the physical sciences fails to provide for\nan interesting asymmetry here. If one considers the number of factors\nthat would have to be taken in to account in order to state conditions\nthat guarantee that when a match is struck it will produce a flame,\nthe resulting strict law would be quite complex, and in a way not\nobviously different from any putative strict laws in which mental\npredicates figure, with contextual features included. And if there are\nindeed no fixed ends or values in the realm of choice and a decision,\nthis can be accommodated in the same way—the contextual ends or\nvalues could themselves be included in the putative strict laws. This\nwould complicate and expand the set of such laws, but as already noted\nthis is not something that would set mental generalizations apart from\nphysical ones. (For further discussion of rationality and the argument\nfor Anomalous Monism see Yalowitz 1997 and Latham 1999.)" ], "subsection_title": "4.2 The Rationality Arguments" }, { "content": [ "\nWe have been looking at different ways of making sense of and\njustifying Davidson’s claim that mental anomalism stems from the\nconstitutive role of rationality in mental ascription. In\nDavidson’s writings, however, another line of argument often\nsurfaces which focuses less on the rational nature of mental events\nand more on their causal nature. As we have already seen, in his\nearliest work on action Davidson argued that reasons explain actions\nby causing them, and he later came to emphasize that what makes mental\nstates and events what they are is determined in part by their causes\nand effects. Particular psychological explanations are causal (they\ninvoke causes—Davidson 1963), and are formulated in terms of\ncausally defined concepts (for propositional attitudes, see Davidson\n1987b, 41; for mental contents, see Davidson 1987a, 44). In later work\nhe frequently notes the anomic nature of causal concepts and causal\nexplanations, and how mental properties and reasons explanations are\nanomic because of this—“reason-explanations…are in\nsome sense low-grade; they explain less than the best explanations in\nthe hard sciences because of their heavy dependence on causal\npropensities” (Davidson 1987b, 42; see also Davidson 1991, 162).\nIf mental concepts are causally defined, and strict laws do not employ\ncausally defined concepts, then mental anomalism appears to follow\nstraight away, without need of any detour through issues concerning\nthe rationality of mental concepts.", "\nExtending this reasoning, Davidson writes that", "\n\n\n[m]ental concepts…appeal to causality because they are\ndesigned, like the concept of causality itself, to single out from the\ntotality of circumstances which conspire to cause a given event just\nthose factors that satisfy some particular explanatory interest.\n(Davidson 1991, 163)\n", "\nThis appears to ground the causal definition of anomic properties\n(whether mental or otherwise) in the fact that they answer to\nparticular explanatory interests. This is contrasted with the case of\n‘ultimate physical’ properties: “Explanation in\nterms of the ultimate physics, though it answers to various interests,\nis not interest relative” (Davidson 1987b, 45). This seems to\ncollapse the distinction between psychology and all the other special\nsciences with respect to the question of anomalism. All of the latter\nanswer to particular explanatory interests, and are thus\nselective with respect to the total sufficient condition for\nan effect-type (see Davidson 1987b, 45); the causal definition, and\nthus anomalism, of their vocabularies is owed to this\ninterest-relativity and selectivity. ‘Ultimate physics’,\non the other hand, “treats everything without exception as a\ncause of an event if it lies within physical reach (falls within the\nlight cone leading to the effect)” (Davidson 1987b, 45).", "\nDavidson repeats these sorts of claims about the anomic nature of\ncausally defined properties in a number of places in later writings,\nbut at no point does he clearly bring them into contact with his early\nremarks concerning the constitutive role of rationality in\npsychological ascription. And he never provides argument in support of\nthis general thesis concerning causality. It is natural to wonder why,\ngiven this general thesis about causally defined concepts, rationality\nshould be thought to underwrite mental anomalism. And it becomes\nimperative to know why that general thesis is plausible (for\ndiscussion, see Yalowitz 1998a).", "\nWith regard to the first issue, there is some evidence that Davidson\nis confusing two distinct questions: why mental concepts cannot stand\nin lawlike relation to physical concepts, and why mental concepts\ncannot be eliminated in favor of physical concepts in the explanation\nof human behavior. Given the general thesis about causally defined\nproperties, we have an understanding of why mental concepts are\nanomic. But this leaves open the question whether we ought to continue\nto traffic in anomic concepts generally, and mental concepts in\nparticular. Why not eliminate them in favor of the nomic physical\nconcepts? Here, the rationality of mental concepts may be thought to\nprovide an answer. If we wish to understand why an agent performed the\naction that she did, as opposed to having a full sufficient causal\nexplanation of why her body moved as it did, we are interested in a\nselective explanation—that part of the total sufficient\ncondition that satisfies the particular explanatory interests behind\nreasons-explanations (Davidson 1991, 163). Those interests highlight\nthe normative nature of reason and action—their responsiveness\nto the principle of charity and ideal of rationality. Rationality, on\nthis line of thinking, does not account for mental anomalism; but it\ndoes speak to the question of mental realism (see further\n 6.2).\n (For further discussion of the anomic nature of causally defined\nconcepts and its bearing on Anomalous Monism, see Yalowitz 1998a. For\nmore on the relation between rational explanation and mental realism,\nsee the supplement on\n Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.\n For discussion of issues closely related to the causal definition\nargument, see\n 6.3\n and the supplement on\n Related Issues\n (Mental Anomalism and Semantic Externalism)." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 The Causal Definition Argument" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSo far we have looked at Davidson’s three premises in support of\nAnomalous Monism—the interaction, cause-law and anomalism\nprinciples. In this section, we examine the conclusion that Davidson\ndraws on the basis of these principles—the token-identity theory\nof mental events, according to which every causally interacting mental\nevent is token-identical to some physical event. We will look at the\nderivation and nature of this theory, some questions about its\nadequacy, as well as the additional thesis that mental properties\nsupervene on physical properties. As we shall see, both the\ntoken-identity and supervenience claims turn out to be controversial,\nin their motivation as well as in their consistency with mental\nanomalism. One key point to keep in mind at this point is that monism\nis supposed to be derived from the principles and other assumptions\nthat, taken individually, could be acceptable to positions opposing\nmonism.", "\nTo begin with, it is worth pointing out that Davidson is concerned\nonly with the ontological status of events, and not substances.\nDescartes, for instance, argued for the claim that mind and body are\ndistinct entities. While Descartes’ position has implications\nfor accounts of mental events, the issues concerning event and\nsubstance identity are distinct (see Latham 2001). Davidson clearly\ntakes himself to be establishing something that is inconsistent with\nCartesian dualism, however, and it is useful briefly to look at how\nAnomalous Monism bears upon substance dualism.", "\nAccording to Descartes, mind and body are distinct substances in part\nbecause they do not share essential properties in common. In\nparticular, minds do not occupy a spatial location, while bodies\nnecessarily do. Since mental events thus constitute changes occurring\nin a nonspatially-located entity, they also do not occupy a spatial\nregion. Bodily events, on the other hand, do occupy spatial locations\nby virtue of being changes in material substances, which themselves\nare spatially located. On Descartes’ view, then, particular\nmental and physical events cannot be token-identical, since they fail\nto share a crucial property in common without which identity is\nunintelligible. While Anomalous Monism is not officially concerned\nwith the ontological status of substances, it thus appears to have\nconsequences that are inconsistent with Descartes’ substance\ndualism—though it doesn’t by itself establish substance\nmonism, it does rule out the Cartesian thought that mental and\nphysical events fail to be identical, and so conflicts with one of the\nbases for Cartesian substance dualism." ], "section_title": "5. Monism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe structure of Davidson’s derivation of the token-identity of\ncausally interacting mental events with physical events appears to be\nstraightforward: causally interacting mental events (the interaction\nprinciple) must instantiate some strict law property (the cause-law\nprinciple) but mental properties are not suitable for inclusion in\nstrict laws (the anomalism principle). So mental events must\ninstantiate some other property, which is suitable for such inclusion.\nGiven Davidson’s invocation of the causal closure of the\nphysical domain, according to which every physical event has a\nphysical explanation, he moves rather quickly to the conclusion that\nthis other property must be physical, since closure entails that\nphysical properties have a privileged status, which suggests that they\nhold out the promise of strict laws. (Davidson also has a tendency\nsimply to identify as ‘physical’ those properties that\nfigure in strict laws (Davidson 1970, 224; 1995a, 266), but this would\nof course beg the question of mental anomalism.) Consequently,\ncausally interacting mental events must be token-identical with\nphysical events, ruling out Cartesian as well as other forms of\ndualism.", "\nThere are serious problems with the assumption of causal closure of\nthe physical in Davidson’s framework (for discussion, see the\nsupplement on\n Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Anomalous Monism).\n It is difficult, however, to see how Davidson can move from the claim\nthat mental events must instantiate non-mental, strict law properties\nto the claim that these properties must be physical without assuming\nclosure. Why assume that only ‘physical’ properties are\nnomic? This raises interesting issues about the nomic status of other\nspecial sciences—the relevant ones here being biology and\nchemistry—but there do not appear to be explicit, conclusive\nresources in Davidson’s own thinking for addressing this.\nYalowitz 1998a has, however, provided an interpretation of Anomalous\nMonism stressing Davidson’s views on causality and the nomic\nstatus of dispositions (see\n 4.3)\n in which causal closure is derived from the\ncause-law principle, token-identity and the anomalism of causally\ndefined properties. On this interpretation, the strict law properties\nthat mental events must instantiate turn out to be physical because\nonly physical properties are non-causally individuated—all\nspecial science properties are causally individuated, and all such\nproperties are anomic.", "\nDavidson’s token-identity theory is dramatically different than\nprevious identity theories of mind, in both it’s a\npriori status as well as its stance towards the role of laws in\njustifying monism. Previous theories had argued that claims concerning\nthe identity of particular mental and physical events depended upon\nthe discovery of lawlike relations between mental and physical\nproperties. These theories thus held that empirical evidence\nsupporting such laws was required for particular identity claims.\nAccording to Anomalous Monism, however, it is precisely\nbecause there can be no such strict laws that causally\ninteracting mental events must be identical to some physical\nevent. The token-identity thesis thus requires no empirical evidence\nand depends on there being no lawlike relations. It in effect\njustifies the token-identity of mental and physical events through\narguing for the impossibility of type-identities between mental and\nphysical properties or kinds (Davidson 1970, 209, 212–13; see\nJohnston 1985).", "\nAn important point to recognize in Davidson’s version of\ntoken-identity is that he is not simply deriving the conclusion that\nmental events bear some property that we would intuitively acknowledge\nas ‘physical’ (such as spatial location). As pointed out\nin\n 2.1,\n the relevant ‘physical’ properties would more likely have\nto resemble the sorts of properties currently invoked in physics, our\nmost mature science and the one closest to issuing in strict laws.\nThis point has generated numerous objections to Davidson’s\ntoken-identity theory, but it also has been overlooked by some\nobjectors (see below). Davidson’s central claim is that what\nmakes a mental event identical to a physical event is that the mental\nevent has a physical description. In Davidson’s original\nformulation, monism entailed that every mental event can be\nuniquely singled out using only physical concepts (1970,\n215). It is this position that became the target of some\nDavidson’s critics\n (5.2).\n However, Davidson eventually came to explicitly deny that his monism\ncommits him to the possibility of providing descriptions of mental\nevents or actions in physical terms suitable for strict laws (Davidson\n1999d, 639; 1999b, 653–4). He noted that strict laws will say\nsomething to the effect that “whenever there is a certain\ndistribution of forces and matter in a field of a certain size at time\nt, it will be followed by a certain distribution of forces\nand matter in a field of a certain size at time\nt′” (Davidson 1999d, 639). And he claimed that\nboth the antecedents and consequents of such laws, when covering\nparticular mental events and actions, will cover much larger regions\nof space than merely the agent or her action. Why? Because while\nsingular causal statements are singular, and therefore select\nfrom a complete set of causal factors those that are salient or in\nline with our particular explanatory interests, strict laws\ndon’t themselves select—“that’s what makes\nthem strict” (Davidson 1999d, 640; see Yalowitz 1998a for an\nextended discussion of this issue and its bearing on the argument for\nboth mental anomalism as well as monism). Davidson soft-pedals how\nthis view bears on the uniqueness claim in the official statement of\nAnomalous Monism, parsing away that claim in favor of the blander idea\nthat “some physical description applies to each mental\nevent” (Davidson 1999b, 654). As subtle as it seems, this\nappears to be a fundamental shift in Davidson’s thinking about\nmonism, though it goes unexplored in his later work and has failed to\nattract the attention of his critics.", "\nIn any case, Anomalous Monism thus does not inherit the problem of how\nto justify specific identifications between mental and physical\nevents, because the claim that there is a physical description for\neach mental event is established purely a priori. And the\nphysical descriptions are not (indeed, cannot be) specifiable in\nprecise and uniquely identifying spatial and temporal terms. As we are\nabout to see\n (5.2),\n each of these points is overlooked by many of Davidson’s\ncritics. That the latter is overlooked is understandable, given its\nlate appearance. However, the former point has always been\nfundamental, and critics’ failure to appreciate it is\ncurious.", "\nDavidson additionally claims that the relation between the mental and\nphysical properties is not merely haphazard or coincidental. A\nrelationship of supervenience obtains between the two (Davidson 1970,\n214; 1973a, 253; 1993; 1995a, 266). (Davidson never argues for\nsupervenience. For discussion, see the supplement on\n Supervenience and the Explanatory Primacy of the Physical.)\n A working statement of this relationship is that if two events fail\nto share a mental property, they will fail to share at least one\nphysical property (Davidson 1995a, 266)—or, equivalently, if two\nevents share all of their physical properties, they will share all of\ntheir mental properties. It is meant to articulate a kind of\ndependency of the mental on the physical, and correlatively a kind of\nexplanatory primacy to the physical, but without claiming any kind of\nreductive relation between the mental and the physical. The working\nstatement’s truth depends, it seems, on the thought that the\ndistribution of physical properties somehow explains the\ndistribution of mental properties—failure to share a mental\nproperty depends upon/is explained by failure to share at\nleast one physical property. The supervenience relation is usually\nunderstood to issue in generalizations of the following kind:\n‘P1 → M1’,\n‘P2 → M1’,\netc. (where antecedent and consequent occur at the same time). This\nallows for the empirical possibility that a number of different\nphysical state kinds underlie the same mental state kind (for more on\nthis, see the supplement on\n Related Issues\n (Mental Anomalism and Semantic Externalism)). However, it also\nappears to suggest the existence of lawlike relations between physical\nand mental properties, and so to be in tension with mental anomalism.\nThis issue will be explored in\n 5.3." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Token Identity" }, { "content": [ "\nThe token-identity thesis has been the subject of a number of\ninteresting criticisms. Many of them, however, are difficult to bring\nfully into contact with Davidson’s own particular version of the\nthesis, primarily because Davidson’s version is derived a\npriori from the other premises in his framework. So, for\ninstance, it has been argued that mental events do not bear the burden\nof the spatiotemporal precision of physical events that they would\nneed to if the former were genuinely identical to the latter (Hornsby\n1981; Leder 1985). For example, it would seem arbitrary to identify\nthe deduction of some conclusion from a chain of reasoning with some\nparticular neural event or set of neural events occurring at a\nspecific time and place in the brain—especially given the\nmicro-precision of the neural framework. Compare attempting to provide\nphysical description for the action of paying back a debt—how\ndoes one determine the spatial and temporal parameters with the\nprecision demanded by the language of physics? Distinguishing between\n“the” physical event, as opposed to its causes and its\neffects, can seem daunting if not outright nonsensical (Leder 1985;\nsee also di Pinedo 2006). Further, it has been argued that the only\npossible empirical evidence for specific token-identity claims could\nbe type-identities between either those or other mental and physical\nproperties, because evidence needs to be drawn from variant cases in\norder to sort out merely coincident from identical events (Leder\n1985).", "\nSuch criticisms become difficult to evaluate given Davidson’s\na priori procedure for establishing the token-identity\nthesis. He can respond that we already know, a priori, that\nany particular mental event must instantiate some physical property if\nit causally interacts with any mental or physical event, given the\ncause-law and anomalism principles. Questions about how this physical\nproperty, whatever it is, relates to properties currently invoked in\nneuroscience come later and are necessarily secondary to this monistic\nconclusion. And there is no guarantee (indeed, it is quite unlikely)\nthat neuroscientific properties currently in vogue are candidates for\nstrict-law properties. As we have just seen\n (5.1),\n Davidson eventually came to explicitly associate the physical\nproperties that cover mental events with broad descriptions covering\nlarge space-time regions. Further, it would confuse epistemology with\nmetaphysics to insist that, because we can only establish which\nphysical property some mental token event instantiates by leaning on\nsome type-correlations between other mental and physical properties,\ntoken-identity claims presuppose type-identity. How we discover the\nparticular physical properties is one thing; whether there can be\npsychophysical laws is quite another, and not settled by the method of\ndiscovery.", "\nWe also need to keep in mind that Davidson embraces the possibility of\nsubstantive mental-physical correlations (ceteris paribus\npsychophysical laws), which directly address these epistemological\nissues. More generally, Davidson’s token-identity claim is that\nthe predicates that come to form the vocabulary of the as-yet unknown\nstrict-law science will be capable of being used to describe mental\nevents. While we cannot judge this claim by appealing to features of\ncurrent neuroscience, it also seems that it should be possible to\nadjudicate conceivability concerns. And, putting aside\nDavidson’s later views, while we are not currently in the\nbusiness of assigning fine-grained spatiotemporal parameters to mental\nevents, it does not seem obvious that we couldn’t come to accept\nsuch assignments on the basis of theoretical considerations without\nthereby committing ourselves to the existence of type-identities.\nHowever, Davidson’s official position, early and late, has\nalways been that we do not need to be capable of making such\nassignments in order to assert token-identity—there must simply\nbe such true assignments, and this is something we know on the basis\nof a purely a priori argument. (Davidson 1999b; for further\ndiscussion of this issue, see the supplement on\n Related Views\n (Bare Materialism); for a different criticism of token-identity, see\nthe supplement on\n Related Views\n (Other Positions). For a criticism based upon Davidson’s own\ntreatment of causal explanation, see Horgan and Tye 1985. For\ndiscussion of the criticism that Davidson’s monism is too weak\nto warrant the label ‘materialism’, see the supplement on\n Token-Identity and Minimal Materialism)." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Objections to Token Identity" }, { "content": [ "\nWe have seen that Davidson supplements his monism with a claim of\nsupervenience. There are many different conceptions of the\nsupervenience relation (see Kim 1993b), and Davidson ultimately came\nto identify his version with what is called “weak”\nsupervenience, in contrast to “strong” and\n“global” supervenience. Briefly, the basic differences\nbetween these positions are as follows. Weak supervenience links\nspecific mental and physical properties within but not across possible\nworlds, while strong supervenience links those properties across\nworlds. Global supervenience links the class of mental properties as a\nwhole with the class of physical properties as a whole within but not\nacross worlds, but does not constrain relations between specific pairs\nof mental and physical properties. Weak supervenience comes down to\nthe view that mental properties depend upon those physical properties\nthey are correlated with within a particular possible world, but those\nvery same physical properties may, in another possible world,\ncorrelate with very different (or even no) mental properties. Weak\nsupervenience is thus stronger than global supervenience, in that it\nposits correlations between particular pairs of mental and physical\nproperties, but weaker than strong supervenience in that it recognizes\nthe possibility that these correlations can fail to obtain in other\npossible worlds. (It should be noted that Davidson never brought his\nviews on supervenience into contact with his later views, noted above,\nabout the broad nature of the physical properties that mental events\nmust instantiate according to Anomalous Monism. It is not at all clear\nwhether or how these views can be combined. In the following\ndiscussion of supervenience, this complication will be ignored, and it\nwill be assumed that the physical properties in question are not of\nthis broad nature, since this is how Davidson’s own discussions\nof supervenience seem to proceed, and certainly what his critics\npresuppose.)", "\nThe puzzling aspect of Davidson’s doctrine of supervenience\narises independently of fine points of the disagreement between the\ncompeting conceptions of supervenience sketched above. Whether the\ndependency is between particular mental and physical properties, or\nsets of the two, and whether or not the dependency holds only within\nor also across possible worlds, it appears that it entails that there\nwill exist strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be\npredicted and explained that were supposed to be ruled out by the\nanomalism principle. Davidson sometimes claims (Davidson 1995a, 266)\nthat supervenience is actually entailed by Anomalous Monism,\nin which case it would appear to follow that Anomalous Monism itself\nis an inconsistent theory—entailing both that there cannot be\nany strict psychophysical laws (the anomalism principle) and that\nthere must be such laws (supervenience). But generally his position\nappears to be that Anomalous Monism is simply consistent with\nsupervenience (Davidson 1993, 7). If supervenience and Anomalous\nMonism are indeed inconsistent, and the former is rejected, the\nquestion of the plausibility of a materialist position with no\ndiscernible relation between mental and physical properties arises\n(see the supplement on\n Supervenience and the Explanatory Primacy of the Physical).\n (The caveat about the relation between Davidson’s later views\nabout physical descriptions and supervenience noted at the end of\n 5.1.\n should be kept in mind here.)", "\nWhy does supervenience appear to generate strict laws? When Davidson\nfirst stated the supervenience claim, he articulated it in the\nfollowing terms: “there cannot be two events alike in all\nphysical respects but differing in some mental respects”\n(Davidson 1970, 214)). This formulation appears to entail strict\npsychophysical laws of the form\n‘P1 → \nM1’. Davidson later came to focus on the\ninversion of this formulation: “if two events fail to share a\nmental property, they will fail to share at least one physical\nproperty” (Davidson 1995a, 266). The advantage of this\nreformulation is that it brings out the fact that the requisite\nphysical differences need not be the same in each case of\nmental difference (see Davidson 1973a, 253–4). As Davidson says,\n", "\n\n\nalthough supervenience entails that any change in a mental property\np of a particular event e will be accompanied by a\nchange in the physical properties of e, it does not entail\nthat a change in p in other events will be accompanied by an\nidentical change in the physical properties of those other events.\nOnly the latter entailment would conflict with [Anomalous Monism].\n(Davidson 1993, 7)\n", "\nThere seem to be two problems here, however. First, the inverted\nreformulation actually entails the original thesis—that if two\nevents share all physical properties they will share all mental\nproperties—and so once again generates strict psychophysical\nlaws. Second, even if the accompanied physical changes can be\ndifferent, that simply generates more strict psychophysical\nlaws—‘\nP1 → M1’,\n‘P2 → M1’,\nand so on. So it is hard to see why Davidson thinks that the second\nformulation is consistent with the anomalism principle.", "\nSome defenders of Davidson (Child 1992, 224; see also Davidson 1973,\n258) have responded to the apparent tension between supervenience and\nmental anomalism by emphasizing that the degree of detail that would\nhave to go into the formulation of such laws would make them useless\nfor prediction, since it is unlikely that the relevant initial\nconditions will repeat. But as we have seen\n (4.2.3),\n this seems to be true of any candidate for a strict law—it must\ntake into account all possible interfering conditions, and doing so\nbecomes quite unwieldy for generating predictions. And in any case,\nsuch laws would still provide strict explanations of mental\nevents, contrary to Davidson’s own formulation of mental\nanomalism. So the problem that supervenience ‘laws’ seem\nto pose for the anomalism principle remains.", "\nOther defenders of Davidson (see Macdonalds 1986) have responded to\nthis problem by arguing that the existence of strict supervenience\nlaws is compatible with mental anomalism so long as we are not\nactually able to state any such laws and thus be in a position to use\nthem to predict and explain actual mental events—which is\ncertainly the case currently and likely for the foreseeable future.\nThis suggestion exploits a literal reading of Davidson’s\nofficial statement of the anomalism principle, which denies the\npossibility of strict laws on the basis of which mental events can\nbe explained or predicted. But in doing so, it makes Anomalous\nMonism into a much weaker position, dependent on the cognitive\nlimitations of human beings. It in effect becomes a contingent\nepistemological position rather than the necessary metaphysical\ndoctrine it purports to be.", "\nDavidson in one place offers a very different suggestion in response\nto the problem. He claims that the supervenient relations between\nmental and physical predicates that he envisages are of a ceteris\nparibus nature. He accepts the requirement that any satisfactory\naccount of the relation between mental and physical properties must\npermit appeal to local correlations and dependencies between specific\nmental and physical properties (Davidson 1993, 9). But he blocks any\nentailment from this requirement to strict psychophysical laws,\nsuggesting that such ‘correlations’ and\n‘dependencies’ are of a ceteris paribus form.", "\nSuch a ceteris paribus conception of supervenience has not\nbeen discussed in the extensive literature on the topic (its\npossibility is recognized and endorsed by Kim 1995, 136; however, see\nKim 1993, 24–25) and it is unclear whether it can deliver a\nsuitably strong notion of dependency to satisfy materialist\nintuitions. But it does seem to be an attractive way of reconciling\nsupervenience with mental anomalism so that Anomalous Monism remains a\nconsistent theory." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Is Supervenience Consistent with Mental Anomalism?" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIt has been widely held that Anomalous Monism cannot avoid\nepiphenomenalism—the view that mental events lack\ncausal/explanatory powers. At a first approximation, the concern\nderives from a tension between mental anomalism and the apparently\nprivileged status assigned to physical properties in Davidson’s\nframework—in particular, that all events are physical, and all\nphysical events have a strict explanation in terms of other physical\nevents. It then becomes an important question what sort of\ncausal/explanatory role mental properties can play when all events\nalready have a physical explanation.", "\nSome welcome this result, holding that mental events explain actions\nin a sui generis way not accountable for in the terms of\ntypical scientific explanations (see von Wright 1971; Stoutland 1976;\nWilson 1985; Ginet 1995; Campbell 1998 and 2005 and related discussion\nin the supplement on\n Explanatory Epiphenomenalism).\n Many, however, see this charge as devastating to the prospects of\nAnomalous Monism’s attempt to occupy a position between\nreductionist materialism and dualism. Without a distinctive causal\nrole for mental events to play in the explanation of action, many\nthink that they would lack the sort of robust reality needed to\ncompete with reductionism and dualism. On this way of thinking, only\ncausal powers can justify mental realism. So if Anomalous Monism\ncannot avoid epiphenomenalism, it appears to open the door to\neliminativist materialism, which holds that mental vocabulary and\nexplanations are vacuous and ought to be thrown out and replaced by\nneuroscience (assuming, which seems extremely doubtful, that\nneuroscience can itself supply strict laws—if not, then this\nline of thought would lead to throwing out all but\n‘physical’ strict law properties and explanations).", "\nAs noted, the epiphenomenalist worry arises from two points that are\nabsolutely basic to Anomalous Monism—first, that mental events\nare at the same time physical events, and, second, that while mental\npredicates cannot figure into strict causal laws, physical predicates\nmust. Early critics moved quickly from these points to the\nepiphenomenalist conclusion that mental properties are causally\nirrelevant, because there are always strict law\nproperties—physical properties—to causally explain the\noccurrence of an event. (For detailed discussion of this line of\nargument, see the supplement on\n Mental Properties and Causal Relevance.)\n Among many other problems with this line of argument, however, there\nis the one immediately capitalized on by Davidson: that within the\nextensionalist metaphysical framework in which Anomalous Monism is\ndeveloped\n (2.1\n above), properties don’t cause anything, and so can be neither\ncausally relevant nor irrelevant. According the Davidson, only events\nare causal relata. He expresses general skepticism about\nepiphenomenalist objections to Anomalous Monism that depend on the\nidea that events cause ‘by virtue’ of the properties they\ninstantiate (Davidson 1993, 6, 13). This is closely connected to his\nsharp distinction between causation—a metaphysical relation\nbetween particular events independently of how they are\ndescribed—and explanation—which relates events only as\nthey are described in particular ways. But as we will now see, this\ndoesn’t end the concerns about epiphenomenalism. (For related\ndiscussion concerning epiphenomenalism and its bearing on the\nrelationship between Anomalous Monism and human freedom, see \n Related Issues: 3.2 Anomalous Monism and Contemporary Compatibilism.)" ], "section_title": "6. The Epiphenomenalism Objections", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nCritics of this extensionalist line of defense insisted that related\nquestions remained about Anomalous Monism even taking into account the\ndistinction between causation and explanation. In particular, they\nquestioned whether mental properties could play any genuine\nexplanatory role—whether they had explanatory\nrelevance—given the priority assigned to physical\nproperties in Davidson’s framework. Why think that mental\nproperties explain anything given that the events which instantiate\nthem always also instantiate physical properties that figure in causal\nlaws? One thought here is that genuine explanations require laws, and\nmental anomalism, in ruling out psychological and psychophysical laws,\ncannot account for any explanatory role for mental properties vis a\nvis physical or mental events.", "\nIn response, Davidson notes that while Anomalous Monism rejects the\npossibility of strict laws in which mental predicates can figure, it\nallows for ceteris paribus psychological and psychophysical\nlaws (Davidson 1993, 9–12). His point appears to be that if\nbacking by law is sufficient for explanatory relevance, then mental\nproperties are explanatorily relevant. (Davidson and his critics often\nslide between the issues of causal and explanatory relevance, but the\nlatter issue is clearly what is at stake given Davidson’s views\nabout causal efficacy and properties.) Second, Davidson appeals to the\nsupervenience of mental properties on physical properties in order to\nground the explanatory role of mental properties. Davidson says\nthat", "\n\n\nproperties are causally efficacious if they make a difference to what\nindividual events cause, and supervenience ensures that\nmental properties do make a difference to what mental events cause.\n(Davidson 1993, 15)\n", "\nThe first point does not get developed by Davidson in any systematic\nway, though it has been explored by others interested in defending\nnonreductive monism from epiphenomenalist concerns. Some have focused\non exploiting ceteris paribus covering laws for\npsychophysical causal relations, claiming that this allows mental\nproperties to be sufficient for their effects, thus providing the\nneeded type of explanatory role (McLaughlin 1989; Fodor 1989, 1991).\nOthers have attempted to sidestep the issue of covering laws entirely\nby appealing directly to the truth of psychological and psychophysical\ncounterfactuals in grounding the explanatory role of mental properties\n(LePore and Loewer 1987, 1989; Horgan 1989). Davidson himself instead\nfocused on supervenience (although as we are about to see, the\npossibility of ceteris paribus laws enters into his\naccount).", "\nSupervenience implies that", "\n\n\nif two events differ in their psychological properties, they differ in\ntheir physical properties (which we assume to be causally\nefficacious). If supervenience holds, psychological properties make a\ndifference to the causal relations of an event, for they matter to the\nphysical properties, and the physical properties matter to causal\nrelations. (Davidson 1993, 14) \n", "\nThe point here is not simply that mental properties inherit or\npiggyback on the causal powers of the physical properties on which\nthey supervene. Rather, Davidson appears to be claiming that mental\nproperties influence the causal powers of their subvenient\nphysical properties.", "\nOne problem with Davidson’s response here is its reversal of the\ndependency relationship between mental and physical properties\ntypically claimed in supervenience relationships. A central rationale\nfor positing supervenience is to mark a kind of explanatory primacy to\nthe subvenient properties (see the supplement on\n Supervenience and the Explanatory Primacy of the Physical).\n And this is reflected in the first part of Davidson’s\nformulation above—surely a difference in psychological\nproperties entails (requires) a difference in physical properties\nbecause the difference in physical properties is needed in\norder to explain the difference in psychological properties.\nSo the sense in which psychological properties ‘matter’ to\nphysical properties is that changing the former amounts to a change in\nthe latter because a change in the latter explains a change\nin the former. This does not appear to be helpful in establishing the\nexplanatory relevance of mental properties. Another problem, discussed\nabove\n (5.3),\n is that it is difficult to see how a supervenience relation of\nsufficient power to make mental properties explanatory of an\nevent’s physical properties in the way Davidson seems to suggest\ndoes not issue in strict laws. So it is unclear how supervenience is\nconsistent with the anomalism principle, and thus how it can help\nblock epiphenomenalist concerns, although we did previously note one\npotentially worthwhile but unexplored possibility—a ceteris\nparibus supervenience relation—which Davidson endorses." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Mental Properties and Explanatory Relevance" }, { "content": [ "\nKim has explored a related but different route from Anomalous Monism\nto mental epiphenomenalism—the problem of explanatory exclusion\n(Kim 1989, 44). A causal explanation of an event cites a sufficient\ncondition for that event’s occurrence. This seems to exclude the\npossibility of other independent causes or explanations of that event.\nSo if, as Anomalous Monism entails, physics can provide a sufficient\nexplanation of any particular event, there appears to be no room for\nan independent and irreducible mental explanation of an event\n(Davidson 1993, 15). It is because the cause instantiated some\nparticular physical property that the effect (which happens to\ninstantiate a mental property) came about. Any mental properties that\nthe cause instantiates seem superfluous in explaining why the effect\noccurred—unless those properties are identical or related in\nsome strict lawlike way to the physical properties, something ruled\nout by the anomalism principle.", "\nDavidson responds by arguing that citing only the physical properties\nof the cause to provide a sufficient explanation of an action does not\naddress the particular interests that psychological explanations of\nactions serve—providing the reasons of the agent in light of\nwhich she performed the action that she did. Serving these explanatory\ninterests compensates for the fact that such explanations cannot be\nsharpened into strict laws or folded neatly into physical laws\n(Davidson 1991, 163). We only understand why the agent waved her\nhand—why the effect is of the mental kind ‘waving\none’s hand’ (as opposed to merely ‘one’s hand\ngoing up and down’)—by citing mental properties\nof the causing event, such as her wanting to greet her friend. The\ncitation of physical properties of the causing event and the\nassociated mere bodily movement will not bring about such\nunderstanding, assuming mental anomalism, because of the lack of any\nreductive relationship between either the physical properties of the\ncause and the agent’s reasons or the physical properties of the\neffect and the agent’s action.", "\nHere we see the interest-relativity of explanation and its bearing on\nexplanatory relevance (see the supplement on\n Mental Properties and Causal Relevance)\n playing an important role for Davidson. Mental properties must be\ncited if we want a rational explanation of mental\neffects. Davidson’s response to epiphenomenalist concerns can\nthus be described as a kind of ‘dual explananda’\ntheory of the explanatory role of mental properties. According to this\ntheory, for every (causally interacting) mental event there are two\ndistinct explananda in need of explanation: an event of a\ncertain physical type and an event of a certain mental type. Mental\nproperties are accorded an ineliminable and (given Anomalous Monism)\nirreducible explanatory role by virtue of their singular capacity to\nmake intelligible the occurrence of other mental properties through\nthe sui generis relation of rationalization. This reflects\nthe point made at the end of\n 4.3\n by the causal definition interpretation of the argument for mental\nanomalism: that rationality underlies, not mental anomalism, but\nrather mental realism. (For related discussion of the dual\nexplananda approach, see Macdonalds 1995 and Gibbons\n2006.)", "\nIt should be noted, however, that it is not the case that\nonly mental properties can explain and be explained by the\noccurrence of mental properties. That would lead to an\n“outlet” problem, with mental properties being\nexplanatorily insulated from physical properties—something\ninconsistent with the way in which we ordinarily think of\nmental-physical interaction. A blow to the head can, for instance,\nexplain the occurrence of a thought. And a thought can explain the\nmovement of an object, as when my decision to quench my thirst leads\nto the movement of a glass of water to my lips. However, the blow\ncannot rationalize the thought, and the decision cannot rationalize\nthe movement of the glass (though it can rationalize the\naction of moving the glass). Davidson’s dual\nexplananda strategy provides no account of such phenomena\n(for discussion of the outlet problem, see Gibbons 2006). Nonetheless,\nso long as there are occurrences of mental properties in need of the\ndistinctive kind of explanation provided by rationalization, mental\nproperties occupy an ineliminable explanatory role. And given\nAnomalous Monism, that role is irreducible. It is worth noting that\nthis dual explananda strategy is consistent with\nDavidson’s commitment to the causal closure of the physical\ndomain (Crane 1995 seems to miss this point)—every physical\nevent can have a physical explanation, even if the mental component of\nsome physical events can be rationally explained only through appeal\nto mental components of the causing event. Therefore, however causal\nclosure ultimately enters into Anomalous Monism (see the supplement on\n Causal Closure of the Physical and Anomalous Monism),\n it does not appear to create any further problems for Anomalous\nMonism’s ability to account for the ineliminable, irreducible\nexplanatory role of mental properties.", "\nThe interest-relativity of causal explanation is thus crucial in\nDavidson’s grounding of the ineliminable explanatory role of\nmental properties within the framework of Anomalous Monism. If, as\nAnomalous Monism contends, mental event-types such as actions are not\nreducible to physical-event types, then the only way to explain\nactions (as opposed to mere bodily movements) so as to make them\nintelligible is by appeal to the mental properties of the\ncause—reasons. (For discussion of whether, in light of this,\nreason explanations can still be maintained to be causal\nexplanations within the framework of Anomalous Monism, see the\nsupplement on\n Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.)" ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Interest-Relativity and the Dual Explananda Strategy" }, { "content": [ "\nA final point to consider in evaluating the epiphenomenalist\nobjections to Anomalous Monism is the way in which causality enters\ninto the constitution of reasons and reasons-explanations according to\nDavidson. Before we have established the anomalism principle, or go on\nto derive monism, we already know that reasons explain actions by\ncausing them (the ‘because’ problem discussed in\n 2.2).\n And, as we have seen\n (4.3),\n we know that propositional attitudes and mental contents are\nindividuated, and thus defined, partially in terms of what they are\ncaused by and cause (for attitudes, see Davidson 1987b, 41; for\ncontents, see Davidson 1987a, 444, and extended discussion in the\nsupplement on\n Related Issues\n (Mental Anomalism and Semantic Externalism)). But if something cannot\neven be recognized as a reason unless it is a cause, then the charge\nthat mental properties are causally impotent appears to have\ndifficulty getting any traction. And since these claims are prior to\nthe argument for monism, they are neutral about whatever else reasons\nmust be in order to be causes. So reasons must be recognized as causes\nprior to any discovery that they are also physical events. This\nappears to secure the causal potency of reasons in a way entirely\nindependent of the claim of token-identity. Within Davidson’s\nframework, reasons can only play the rationalizing and explanatory\nrole that they do by virtue of their causal nature.", "\nMany of Anomalous Monism’s epiphenomenalist critics do not\naddress this rich causal background. As we have seen, the background\nis not sufficient by itself to silence all epiphenomenalist concerns.\nBut it does significantly affect how those concerns can be formulated\nand addressed. Anomalous Monism is clearly deeply committed, at a\nnumber of levels, to the causal explanatory relevance of the mental,\nand so charity suggests that we try to understood it in a way such\nthat these commitments are respected. The dual explananda\nstrategy discussed above\n (6.2)\n provides one promising framework for doing this, while at the same\ntime displaying sensitivity to the sorts of concerns driving the\nepiphenomenalist objections." ], "subsection_title": "6.3 The Causal Constitution of Reasons" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDespite the initial appearance of simplicity in its assumptions,\nstructure and argumentation, we have turned up several important\nproblems and lacunae that stand in the way of any overall final\nassessment of the plausibility of Anomalous Monism. While the central\nobjections it has faced have derived from epiphenomenalist concerns,\nthe force of these objections is not clear. Arguably, the most serious\ndifficulties for Anomalous Monism are not with its adequacy but with\nits justification. We still stand in need of a clear argument for how\nrationality leads to the anomalism principle; there are the\nsubstantial problems surrounding the status of the causal closure of\nthe physical and its bearing on monism; and the cause-law\nprinciple’s strictness requirement is still in need of a\ncompelling rationale. Even with these problems, Anomalous Monism\ncontinues to provide an extremely useful framework for exploring\nfundamental issues and problems in the philosophy of mind, and has\nearned a central place on the rather short list of important positions\non the relation between mental and physical events and properties." ], "section_title": "7. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Allison, H., 1983, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism,\nNew Haven: Yale University Press.", "–––, 1990, Kant’s Theory of\nFreedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Anscombe, G. E. 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Macdonald and G. Macdonald\n(eds.), Philosophy of Psychology, Oxford: Blackwell\nPress.", "Latham, N., 1999, “Kim and Davidson on Psychophysical\nLaws”, Synthese, 118: 121–143.", "–––, 2001, “Substance Physicalism”,\nin Loewer and Gillett (eds.), Physicalism and its\nDiscontents, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2003, “What is\nToken-Physicalism?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,\n84: 270–290.", "–––, 2011, “Are Fundamental Laws Necessary\nor Contingent?”, in Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural\nKinds in Metaphysics and Science, J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke\nand M. Slater (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT.", "Leder, D., 1985, “Troubles with Token Identity”,\nPhilosophical Studies, 47: 79–94.", "LePore, E., and Loewer, B., 1987, “Mind Matters”,\nJournal of Philosophy, 84: 630–642.", "–––, 1989, “More on Making Mind\nMatter”, Philosophical Topics, 17: 175–191.", "LePore, E. and McLaughlin, B, (eds.), 1985, Actions and\nEvents: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New\nYork: Blackwell.", "Lewis, D., 1966, “An Argument for the Identity\nTheory”, Journal of Philosophy, 63(2):\n17–25.", "–––, 1981, “Are We Free to Break the\nLaws?”, Theoria, 47: 113–121.", "Loar, B., 1981, Mind and Meaning, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Macdonald, C. and G., 1986, “Mental Causes and Explanation\nof Action”, Philosophical Quarterly, 36(143):\n145–158.", "–––, 1995, “How to be Psychologically\nRelevant”, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds.),\nPhilosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological\nExplanation (Vol. 1), Oxford: Blackwell: 60–77.", "McDowell, J., 1979, “Virtue and Reason”, The\nMonist 62: 331–350.", "–––, 1985, “Functionalism and Anomalous\nMonism”, in LePore and McLaughlin 1985.", "McLaughlin, B., 1985, “Anomalous Monism and the\nIrreducibility of the Mental”, in Lepore and McLaughlin:\n331–68.", "–––, 1989, “Type Epiphenomenalism, Type\nDualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical”,\nPhilosophical Perspectives, 3: 109–135.", "Meerbote, R., 1984, “Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of\nHuman Actions”, in W. Harper and R. Meerbote (eds.), Kant on\nCausality, Freedom, and Objectivity, Minneapolis: University of\nMinnesota Press.", "Mumford, S., 2009, “Laws and Dispositions”, in The\nRoutledge Companion to Metaphysics, R. le Poidevin, P. Simons,\nA. McGonigal and R. Cameron (eds.), London: Routledge,\n471–9.", "Nagel, T., 1974, “What is it like to be a bat?”,\nPhilosophical Review, 83: 435–456.", "Nelkin, D., 2000, “Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(10): 564–576.", "Pereboom, D., 1995, “Determinism al Dente”,\nNoûs, 29(1): 21–45.", "Quine, W.V., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT\nPress.", "Schiffer, S., 1991, “Ceteris Paribus Laws”,\nMind, 100: 1–17.", "Shea, N., 2003, “Does Externalism entail the Anomalism of\nthe Mental?”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211):\n201–213.", "Smith, M., 2003, “Rational Capacities or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion”, in Stroud, S. and Tappolet, C. (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Rationality, New York: Oxford", "Solomon, R., 1974, “Comment on Davidson” in Brown,\nStuart (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology, London:\nMacMillan.", "Spinoza, B., 1985 [1677], Ethics, in The Collected\nWritings of Spinoza (Vol. I), E. Curley (trans.), Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press.", "Stoutland, F., 1970, “The Logical Connection\nArgument”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph\nNo. 4, 117–29.", "–––, 1976, “The Causation of\nBehavior”, in Essays on Wittgenstein in Honor of G.H. von\nWright, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 28(1–3):\n286–325.", "van Inwagen, P., 1984, An Essay on Free Will, New York:\nOxford University Press.", "von Wright, G.H., 1971, Explanation and Understanding,\nCornell: Cornell University Press.", "Watson, G., 1975, “Free Action”, in Watson 2004.", "–––, 1999, “Soft Libertarianism and Hard\nCompatibilism”, in Watson 2004.", "–––, 2004, Agency and Answerability,\nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "Widerker, D., 1995, “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s\nAttack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities”,\nPhilosophical Review, 104(2): 247–261.", "Wilson, G., 1985, “Davidson on Intentional Action”, in\nLePore and McLaughlin 1985.", "Yalowitz, S., 1997, “Rationality and the Argument for\nAnomalous Monism”, Philosophical Studies, 87(3):\n235–58.", "–––, 1998a, “Causation in the Argument for\nAnomalous Monism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy,\n28(2): 183–226.", "–––, 1998b, “Semantic Determinants and\nPsychology as a Science”, Erkenntnis, 49:\n57–91." ]	[ { "href": "../action/", "text": "action" }, { "href": "../davidson/", "text": "Davidson, Donald" }, { "href": "../dualism/", "text": "dualism" }, { "href": "../epiphenomenalism/", "text": "epiphenomenalism" }, { "href": "../events/", "text": "events" }, { "href": "../content-externalism/", "text": "externalism about the mind" }, { "href": "../functionalism/", "text": "functionalism" }, { "href": "../laws-of-nature/", "text": "laws of nature" }, { "href": "../mental-causation/", "text": "mental causation" }, { "href": "../content-causal/", "text": "mental content: causal theories of" }, { "href": "../mind-identity/", "text": "mind/brain identity theory" }, { "href": "../monism/", "text": "monism" }, { "href": "../multiple-realizability/", "text": "multiple realizability" }, { "href": "../physicalism/", "text": "physicalism" }, { "href": "../psychologism/", "text": "psychologism" }, { "href": "../quine/", "text": "Quine, Willard Van Orman" }, { "href": "../relativism/", "text": "relativism" }, { "href": "../scientific-explanation/", "text": "scientific explanation" }, { "href": "../spinoza/", "text": "Spinoza, Baruch" }, { "href": "../supervenience/", "text": "supervenience" } ]
anscombe	Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe	First published Tue Jul 21, 2009; substantive revision Mon May 30, 2022	[ "\nGertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe was one of the most important\nphilosophers of the twentieth century. She worked on an unusually\nbroad array of topics: the entire range of the history of philosophy\n(ancient, medieval, modern, recent), metaphysics, epistemology,\nphilosophy of language, philosophy of mind/psychology, philosophy of\naction, moral philosophy, political philosophy, and the philosophy of\nreligion. As a result, this entry will have to be very selective.\nDespite the fact that her work is often cryptic and difficult, it\ngreatly influences philosophers working in action theory, moral\nphilosophy, and the philosophy of mind. Like the work of her mentor\nLudwig Wittgenstein, studying Anscombe’s work generates insight\nafter study and struggle." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Moral and Political Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Action Theory", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Philosophy of Perception", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Testimony", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Anscombe’s Writings", "Translations by Anscombe", "General Bibliography" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nShe was born in Limerick, Ireland 18 March 1919 to Allen Wells\nAnscombe and Gertrude Elizabeth Anscombe (née Thomas). At the\ntime of her birth her father was serving in the British Army. The\nfamily later returned to England where her father resumed his career\nas a schoolmaster, while her mother, a classical scholar, worked as a\nheadmistress.", "\nAn inquisitive child, Anscombe decided to convert to Roman Catholicism\nin her early teens. She attended the Sydenham School, graduating in\n1937, and went on to St. Hugh’s College, Oxford. During her\nearly years at Oxford she met three young women who also had\nremarkable careers in philosophy: Iris Murdoch, Mary Midgley, and,\nabove all, Philippa Foot, with whom she developed a deep friendship\nher entire life (Mac Cumhaill & Wiseman 2022). Anscombe received a\nFirst in Literae Humaniores (Classics and Philosophy) in 1941. After\nher graduation she remained at St. Hugh’s as a research student,\nand in 1942 moved to Newnham College, Cambridge, where she met Ludwig\nWittgenstein. She believed that attending Wittgenstein’s\nlectures freed her from the trap of phenomenalism that had so plagued\nher (MPM, ix). In 1946 she was offered a Research Fellowship at\nSomerville College, Oxford, and was appointed to a teaching Fellowship\nthere in 1964. She moved from Oxford to Cambridge in 1970 when she was\nawarded a Chair of Philosophy at Cambridge – the Chair formerly\noccupied by Wittgenstein. She remained at Cambridge until her\nretirement in 1986.", "\nIn 1938, at Oxford, she met the philosopher Peter Geach, who then was\nstudying at Balliol. They were both receiving instruction from the\nsame Dominican priest. They were married in 1941, and had three sons\nand four daughters.", "\nIn 1948, the young Anscombe read a paper [CSL] to the Socratic Club\nattacking an argument offered by C. S. Lewis in his book\nMiracles. In Chapter 3 of that book Lewis argued that\nnaturalism is self-refuting. Lewis attended her talk, and, although\naccounts vary, some acquaintances report that he was crushed by her\nwithering criticism. In any case, Lewis significantly rewrote the\nrelevant chapter in the subsequent edition of his book.", "\nAnscombe also became one of Wittgenstein’s good friends and\nthen, after his death in 1951, the chief translator of his work into\nEnglish. Ray Monk wrote that Anscombe was “…one of\nWittgenstein’s closest friends and one of his most trusted\nstudents, an exception to his general dislike of academic women and\nespecially of female philosophers.” (Monk 1991, 498).", "\nAnscombe did not avoid controversy. In 1956 she publicly opposed\nOxford University’s decision to award an honorary degree to\nHarry Truman, whom she considered a murderer for intentionally killing\nthe civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. She also courted\ncontroversy by coming out in print against contraception (see below),\nand engaging in civil disobedience at abortion clinics.", "\nAnscombe famously flouted gender conventions: she did not take her\nhusband’s name, she frequently wore men’s clothes, she\nsmoked cigars, and she was prone to cursing and vulgar speech.\nAlthough influenced by several men – Frege, Wittgenstein, Geach,\nvarious Catholic thinkers historical and contemporaneous –\nAnscombe was a fiercely independent and original philosopher. Those\nwho suspect she merely echoed or applied the views of another person\nare sorely mistaken.", "\nAnscombe continued to produce original work beyond her retirement.\nPeter Geach, for example, reported in Analysis that she had\nconstructed a novel paradox late in life (Geach 2006,\n266–7).", "\nAnscombe died in Cambridge on 5 January 2001." ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAnscombe’s philosophical work does not form a system. But\nunderstanding her thoughts in moral and political philosophy helps one\ngrasp some of her wider philosophical motivations, especially those on\nthe topics of action and intention. We will first discuss several of\nher most well-known papers in moral and political philosophy, for this\nwill shed light on her interest in these other areas.", "\nIn her infamous pamphlet “Mr. Truman’s Degree” (MTD)\n(1958), Anscombe protested Oxford’s decision to award Harry\nTruman an honorary doctorate. Some of the ideas in this pamphlet were\nlater developed in “War and Murder” (WAM) (1972), written\nfor a Christian venue.", "\nShe opposed Oxford’s decision to honor Truman on the grounds\nthat Truman was a murderer. He was a murderer, because “choosing\nto kill the innocent as a means to your ends is always murder”\n(MTD, 66). The people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were by and large\nnoncombatants, neither fighting the Allies nor supplying Japan with\nthe means of fighting them. She argued that killing these innocent\npeople seemed necessary only because the Allies stupidly insisted that\nJapan unconditionally surrender.", "\nOne defense of Truman that she mentions and briefly opposes goes like\nthis: Truman didn’t really kill anybody; he merely\nsigned a piece of paper. Another goes like this: if killing innocent\npeople were really murderous, then it would be murderous to kill enemy\nsoldiers while they are sleeping, for at that moment they aren’t\nharming anyone (MTD, 67). Both of these moves rest on an implicit view\nof what action (e.g. killing, harming) is. Opposing this view of\naction motivated Anscombe’s own later work on action and\nintention, discussed below in Section 4.", "\nIn WAM, Anscombe wrote at greater length about the difference between\nmurdering and other forms of killing. She distinguished choosing to\nkill the innocent as a means to your end, which is always murder, from\nchoosing to do something else which you know as a statistical\ncertainty will kill the innocent. Bombing civilian populations in\norder to provoke surrender is clearly a case of the former. The\nlatter might or might not also be murder – it depends upon some\ndetails. It’s possible to administer a drug to alleviate the\nhorrid pain of someone in mortal illness, knowing full well that,\nalas, the patient will thereby die sooner, but not thereby murder your\npatient. The patient’s death might not have been your end, nor a\nmeans to any such end. This difference in an action’s\nstructure bears upon whether it constitutes murder. That is,\nwhat makes some forms of killing murder is not our opposition to it,\nnor the fact that it is unjust or wrong. Rather, some forms of killing\nare aptly described as murder, which we then might condemn\nand oppose.", "\nIn WAM, Anscombe also argued that human society is essential to human\ngood, that the state is necessary for such society, and thus the state\nmust have some right to use even deadly violence against those who\nattack it. (She defends some of these claims in greater detail in\nSAS.) But while pacifism is misguided, so too is the view that the\nstate or its officers may do anything to defend itself. Killing is\nsometimes unjust, sometimes not. But warriors and police are often\ntempted to kill even those who are not unjustly attacking it, and, she\nholds, to kill the innocent deliberately is always murder, and,\nmoreover, murder is always unjust.", "\nTo kill someone deliberately, she notes, is to kill someone either for\nits own sake or as a means to some further end. Such killing is\nintentional. By contrast, Anscombe claims that the distinction between\nthe intended and the merely foreseen is “absolutely\nessential” to Christian ethics. Some actions (e.g. murder)\nChristian ethics always prohibits or forbids, and intentional killing\nof the innocent is on this list.", "\nSome people had instead held that one can direct one’s\nintentions a certain way to achieve the desired result with moral\nimpunity. If, for example, one tells oneself that by doing y\none is really only intending x, then one is off the hook,\neven if y is forbidden.", "\nThe devout Catholic bomber secures by a “direction of\nintention” that any shedding of innocent blood that occurs is\n“accidental.” I know a Catholic boy who was puzzled at\nbeing told by his schoolmaster that it was an accident that\nthe people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were there to be killed; in fact,\nhowever absurd it seems, such thoughts are common among priests who\nknow that they are forbidden by the divine law to justify the direct\nkilling of the innocent (WAM, 59).\n", "\nThis teaching strikes Anscombe as quite absurd. She chalks this\nmisunderstanding up to “Cartesian” psychology, a\nphilosophy of psychology she works to oppose elsewhere.", "\nA philosophical understanding of intention (and thus not just Catholic\ndoctrine) is needed to show that killing innocent people as a\nmeans to ending a war (or whatever) just is intentionally\nkilling the innocent, despite whatever thoughts are running through\nthe mind of the killer at the time. Thus she argues for a proper\nunderstanding of Aquinas’s idea that it matters whether some\naction’s effect is intended or merely foreseen, something we\nmust grasp if we are to see what motivates the Principle or Doctrine\nof Double Effect (See SEP entry for more about the pros and cons of\nthe Doctrine of Double Effect). Anscombe does not so much argue for\nthe principle, as insist that it has not been adequately understood.\nSo to defend the Principle of Double Effect, a principle of ethics, we\nfirst need a sound understanding of the concepts of action and of\nintention. More on this in Section 4.", "\nWe will see the same need to understand the concepts of action and\nintention by studying her most well-known paper, “Modern Moral\nPhilosophy” (MMP). There Anscombe presses three theses. First,\ndoing moral philosophy is useless, and will remain so until we have an\nadequate philosophy of psychology, which is a long way away. Second,\nmoral philosophers in any case should abandon the concepts of moral\nobligation, moral duty, and the moral “ought”, for these\nconcepts make sense only in several conceptions of ethics none of\nwhich generally survives. Third, there are no important differences\namong the well-known English moral philosophers from Sidgwick onwards.\nEach of Anscombe’s three theses is bold; taken together, they\nare shocking.", "\nWe will start with her last thesis. Anscombe notes that despite their\nmany differences, “every one of the best known English academic\nmoral philosophers” thinks that killing the innocent is\nsometimes right, such as when the foreseeable consequences of\nnot killing them would be catastrophic. She traces this to\nSidgwick’s definition of intention, according to which one\nintends any and every foreseen consequence of one’s\nvoluntary action. While the moral philosophers she criticizes\ndon’t necessarily accept Sidgwick’s definition of\nintention, they do accept an ethical thesis based upon it: a person is\nalways equally responsible for the intended and the merely\nforeseeable consequences of their voluntary actions. Anscombe\nidentifies this move as the difference between the\nUtilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, who rejected the thought that it\ncould ever be apt to calculate whether to kill an innocent person, and\nthe consequentialism (a term she invented) of later English\nphilosophers. Consequentialism, as she explains, is not directly a\ndoctrine about what makes an action right – this meaning came\nabout only later in the recent history of philosophy. Instead,\nconsequentialism is about what one is responsible for. But the two\ntopics are connected: if you are equally responsible for intentionally\nkilling innocent people and for merely foreseeably killing innocent\npeople, then why would it be wrong to kill one innocent person to save\nfive? For if you don’t, you’d be just as responsible for\nthe death of the five as if you had killed them yourself. Thus even\nmany deontologists (like W.D. Ross) agree with Sidgwick that in some\ncircumstances you have a moral duty to kill innocent people. (See also\nMTD, 71.) But Anscombe instead held that the consequentialist view of\nresponsibility ultimately rests on a false view of what it is to act\nintentionally.", "\nHere and elsewhere, MMP touched a nerve with the philosophers she\ntargeted. One reason for this was the rather dismissive tone she took\nin some of her criticisms. Another is her rich use of irony. In\naddition to criticizing her contemporaries, she brusquely and perhaps\nuncharitably attacks Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. One might\nsometimes guess that Anscombe is complaining about her colleagues\nbecause they favor new radical ideas, preferring philosophy that\nleaves everything in its place. But in fact she criticizes them on the\ngrounds that the standards from which they begin are, in practice, the\nones that happen to be current in their own society, and so modern\nmoral philosophers wind up being very conventional. This was also the\nthrust of her BBC radio lecture “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy\nCorrupt the Youth?”, which she answered in the negative, on the\ngrounds that English culture was already corrupt, and\ncontemporary moral philosophy merely reflected rather than generated\nor opposed this turpitude.", "\nThe second thesis of MMP is that moral philosophers ought to abandon\nthe concepts of moral obligation, moral duty,\nmoral “ought”, and the like. (The generic\n‘ought’ is fine.) These concepts, Anscombe argues, have a\npoint only in a law-based ethics: if a moral legislator (e.g. God)\ncommands you to do something, then you have a moral obligation or\nmoral duty to do it. But in forms of ethics not based upon such a\nlegislator, talk about moral obligation or moral duty is akin to those\narguing about what is criminal in a society lacking criminal law or\ncourts, or, alternatively, to castaways talking about whether their\nclothing accords with the new company policy – the necessary\nsocial framework for making such talk meaningful is absent. Unlike J.\nL. Mackie, who thought that moral thought and talk was false, Anscombe\nargued that it was nonsense, which is probably worse. She held that\nethicists would do better to classify actions instead as, say,\ntruthful or untruthful, just or unjust, … rather than as\nmorally right or morally wrong.", "\nAnscombe’s thought here resembled that of her contemporaries\nPhilippa Foot and Iris Murdoch. All were opposed to Utilitarianism,\nand were suspicious of its emphasis on ‘thin’ evaluative\nterms. Our moral thought is far richer than that. Of course, their\ncriticism was not restricted to Utilitarianism. Any moral theory\npredominantly employing thin moral concepts such as ‘morally\nright’ and ‘morally wrong’ were subject to this\ncritique. Thin moral concepts are opposed to ‘thick’ ones.\nBernard Williams famously characterized thick concepts this way:", "\nIf a concept of this kind applies, this often provides someone with a\nreason for action … We may say, summarily, that such concepts\nare “action-guiding.” … At the same time, their\napplication is guided by the world. A concept of this sort may be\nrightly or wrongly applied, and people who have acquired it can agree\nthat it applies or fails to apply to some new situation …. We\ncan say, then, that the application of these concepts is at the same\ntime world-guided and action-guiding. (Williams, 1985, 140)\n", "\nTo describe an action as ‘cowardly’ seems to provide much\nmore information than to describe it as ‘wrong’. Further,\nthin terms can lead us astray. In MMP, after describing the\nUtilitarian commitment to be open, in principle, to “…\njudicially punishing a man for what he is clearly understood not to\nhave done …”, which is clearly ‘unjust’, she\nwrites:", "\nAnd here we see the superiority of the term ‘unjust’ over\nthe terms ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’.\nFor in the context of English moral philosophy since Sidgwick it\nappears legitimate to discuss whether it might be ‘morally\nright’ in some circumstances to adopt that procedure; but it\ncannot be argued that the procedure would in any circumstances be\njust. (MMP, 16)\n", "\nNo doubt Anscombe’s claims in MMP inspired some philosophers to\ndevelop modern versions of what’s now known as virtue ethics, a\ntheory designed to be a full-fledged alternative to Kantianism,\nexistentialism, utilitarianism, and other totalizing theories. But it\nis crucially important to notice that Anscombe herself did not\nadvocate this development, and this brings us to the first thesis of\nMMP: it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy\nuntil we have an adequate philosophy of psychology. Even if it would\nbe in some ways “better” to theorize about ethics by using\nvirtue concepts such as ‘truthful’ or ‘just’,\nrather than using concepts that now have no point, our efforts should\nreally be directed to the philosophy of psychology, and not to moral\nphilosophy at all. Even if we do know that some paths (e.g.\nthose which fixate on moral obligation) take us in the wrong\ndirection, we don’t know which of the many remaining paths to\ntake.", "\nWhat did she have in mind by ‘philosophy of psychology’?\nIn MMP, she names several topics we would first need better\nconceptions of: ‘action’, ‘intention’,\n‘pleasure’, ‘wanting’, and maybe one day\n‘virtue’ and ‘flourishing’. She never\ndeveloped an adequate conception of virtue nor of flourishing, and so\nshe was never in a position even to begin doing moral\nphilosophy. But she did, of course, contribute to the development of\nbetter conceptions of action and intention.", "\nThere is some controversy about whether Anscombe was being sincere in\narguing we should stop doing moral philosophy. Crisp 2004 suspected\nthat she was surreptitiously arguing for the superiority of a\nGod-based moral philosophy over any secular moral philosophy,\neven one like Aristotle’s. He worried that Anscombe’s view\nthat moral philosophers should turn to issues in moral psychology\nreally applies only to those who deny divine law, and that Christians\nlike her can continue to do moral philosophy.", "\nIn a sense, Crisp is right. Anscombe did believe in a divine moral\nlaw, and so must have thought that a theistic moral philosophy would\nhave advantages over any other. And Anscombe, of course, did have\nviews about how to live, had arguments for some of these views, and\nrepeatedly opposed the zeitgeist by, say, protesting the use of atomic\nbombs and of abortion.", "\nBut when Anscombe said we (we secular or at least disunified\nphilosophers) should stop doing moral philosophy until we have an\nadequate philosophy of psychology, she did not mean that we should\nabandon all of our ethical thought and talk. This is for two reasons.\nFirst, one need not think it’s profitable to do moral philosophy\nto have views about how to live or to coherently support or oppose\nvarious actions. Her plea to stop doing moral philosophy does\nnot conflict with her having strong views about what to oppose, just\nas one might have all kinds of views about what is and isn’t\nillegal even if one never does any legal philosophy. Echoing\nRousseau, you don’t need to be a philosopher in order to oppose\n(or support!) injustice.", "\nSecond, she did indeed think that some classes of action (e.g. murder)\nwere “absolutely excluded” (MTD 71) for what we\nmight call moral reasons. But most of her argumentative writings on\nsuch topics were aimed at audiences who already shared her view that\none did not need the results of moral philosophy in order to live\nwell. In the preface to a posthumous collection of essays, Luke\nGormally explains that the bulk of her addresses in that volume were\ndelivered to Catholic audiences, where she assumed “acceptance\nof authoritative Church teaching” [FHG, x]. If you and your\naudience trust that God has promised each of you that it is in your\ninterest to avoid injustice, you don’t need to deeply understand\nthe concept of flourishing or of virtue in order to talk to one\nanother about how to live. Compare: if you trust your travel agent\nwhen she says that drinking alcohol on what appears to you to be a\nstateless island is in fact illegal, then you don’t need to do\npolitical philosophy in order to talk with your fellow travelers about\nwhether to leave the alcohol at home.", "\nFinally, as Aquinas exemplified, it’s possible to think that\nmorality is based upon God and also believe that we need to understand\nthe nature of our psychology in order to adequately understand\nmorality. Her call to give moral philosophy a rest until we better\nunderstand the philosophy of psychology was addressed to us all, not\njust to a subset of moral philosophers." ], "section_title": "2. Moral and Political Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSome of Anscombe’s most influential work was on the nature of\ncausation, a concept which is notoriously difficult to analyze. Part\nof her motivation for working on causation was to understand human\nfreedom. Her paper “Causality and Determination” [CAD]\nchallenged some of the empiricist orthodoxy of Hume’s account.\nShe is concerned to distinguish causality from determination, arguing\nthat one event can cause another even if the latter isn’t\ndetermined by its cause. When we note an event’s cause, we note\nfrom what it derived. She writes “Causality consists in the\nderivativeness of an effect from its causes” (CAD, 136). But\nthat Y derives from X does not entail that\nX necessitated Y. So, we need not assume that every\ncause necessitates its effect. If causation always relates\ntypes of events (“Whenever an X-like event\nhappens, a Y-like event happens”), then it might look\nlike a cause necessitates its effect. But she challenged the view that\nthe causal relation is actually characterized by constant conjunction\nof types, and thus whether causation entails necessitation. Discussing\nFeynman’s Geiger counter case, she writes:", "\nAn example of a non-necessitating cause is mentioned by Feynman: a\nbomb is connected to a Geiger counter, so that it will go off if the\nGeiger counter registers a certain reading; whether it will or not is\nnot determined, for it is so placed near some radioactive material\nthat it may or may not register that reading. (CAD, 145)\n", "\nAnd yet, if the bomb explodes it was caused by the Geiger counter\narrangement. Causation thus does not involve determination or\nnecessity. Since the radioactive decay was not sufficient for this\neffect, the case tells against viewing causes as sufficient\nconditions. There need be no general connection between cause and\neffect. This challenge to the Humean account would turn out to be very\ninfluential – it helped push philosophers towards the\ndevelopment of probabilistic accounts of causation to account for the\nabove type of case.", "\nInstead, Anscombe was a singularist about causation, since she further\nrejected the Humean view that causation is not observable in a single\ninstance. In her view, some perceivable events are themselves\ninstances of causation. Anscombe produced examples from ordinary\nlanguage that seem to show that we do perceive causation. Such\nexamples are abundant. “I saw her clean the dishes”\nreports the perception of a causal process.", "\nShe was also an indeterminist about freedom of action. Actions are\nmostly physical movements, and “if these physical movements are\nphysically predetermined by processes which I do not control, then my\nfreedom is perfectly illusory” (CAD, 146). Our actions are\nsurely caused, but not determined, and so there is still room for\nfreedom. Yet she also recognized that indeterminism does not suffice\nfor freedom; more is needed to establish that. We will need to\nunderstand what more is needed when we discuss her views about\naction.", "\nIn her paper “The First Person” [TFP], originally\npublished in 1975, Anscombe argues for a thesis that seems patently\nfalse: the word “I” is not a referring expression. That\nis, while the function of a term like “Elizabeth\nAnscombe”, or “the daughter of Allen Anscombe”, or\n“that woman”, or “she” is\nreferential, the term “I” does not function in the same\nway. “I” thus refers to nothing at all. (Compare with the\nuse of ‘It’ in the thought “It is snowing.”)\n“The First Person” is probably Anscombe’s most\ndifficult article – which is saying something – and even\nsympathetic scholars disagree about what the argument is supposed to\nbe. She was clearly influenced by Geach 1957, and by\nCasteñada’s various papers on the first person. Later,\nLewis 1979 discussed this issue in a distinct but by then familiar\nway.", "\nAnscombe focuses approvingly on some aspects of Descartes’ use\nof ‘I’ in the Meditations. Famously, he cannot\ndoubt ‘I exist.’ But on the same grounds that he can doubt\n‘I have a body’, he also can doubt ‘I am\nDescartes.’ After all, ‘Descartes’ is just the name\nof a human being, and he can doubt that he is any human being\nwhatsoever – he can wonder whether he’s instead a brain in\na vat. So, if the argument indeed establishes the non-identity of\nhimself with this body, it likewise establishes the non-identity of\nhimself with Descartes!", "\nThis may seem strange, for this last thought may seem equivalent to\n“Descartes was not Descartes”, and that\ncan’t be coherently denied. But Anscombe argues that these two\nthoughts are not equivalent. Why’s that?", "\nWe do tend to think of ‘I’ as simply being that\nexpression people use to refer to themselves. However,", "\n“When John Smith spoke of James Robinson he was speaking of his\nbrother, but he did not know this.” That’s a possible\nsituation. So similarly is “When John Smith spoke of John\nHoratio Auberon Smith (named in a will perhaps) he was speaking of\nhimself, but he did not know this.” If so, then ‘speaking\nof’ or ‘referring to’ oneself is compatible with not\nknowing that the object one speaks of is oneself. (TFP, 47)\n", "\nWe might then wish to say “Smith can speak of himself without\nrealizing that he is speaking of himself.” This shows\nthat there are two distinct kinds of reflexive pronouns: the ordinary\nreflexive pronoun and the indirect reflexive pronouns. The first\noccurrence of ‘himself’ immediately above is the ordinary\nreflexive pronoun, and it refers successfully just in case it picks\nout the same object as its antecedent. It doesn’t matter\nhow it does so, nor must the antecedent and pronoun share a\nsense. When above we say “Smith spoke of himself”, we are\nusing the ordinary reflexive pronoun, for the person to whom Smith\nthereby referred was indeed the person who spoke.", "\nThings are different if we are tempted to say “The word\n‘I’ is a word each of us uses in speaking of\nhimself.” This use of ‘himself’ can’t\nbe the ordinary reflexive, because, as we just saw, a person can speak\nof himself in cases where he wouldn’t also use the word\n‘I’ to refer to the same thing. The word\n‘himself’ in this newer attempt at explaining the word\n‘I’ gets its distinctive sense from that of the\nword ‘I’. But since the sense of the indirect reflexive\npronoun ‘himself’ depends upon that of the word\n‘I’, we cannot use the indirect reflexive pronoun, as\nthough we understand it independently, to explain the word\n‘I’. Things instead are the other way around. This\ndiscussion displays the problem that ‘I’ poses, but it\ndoesn’t solve it.", "\nHow do we solve it? Anscombe thinks you can’t. In the\nbulk of the paper, Anscombe argues that the word ‘I’\nisn’t a referring expression in a few steps. First, she argues\nthat ‘I’ isn’t like other referring expressions:\nproper names, other pronouns, demonstratives, definite descriptions,\nand so on. So we can’t assimilate the use of the word\n“I” to other more tractable types of referring\nexpressions. Second, she argues that the only remaining possibility is\nthat the word “I” refers to an immaterial substance (a\nCartesian ego), or at least a stretch of such a substance that exists\nso long as one is thinking a thought. But that would still leave us no\nway to identify the same referent in different\n“I”-thoughts at different times, an\n“intolerable” result. Moreover, Anscombe explicitly denied\nthat there are immaterial substances. She described the very\nconception of an immaterial substance as “a delusive one”\n(IOS, 71).", "\nSo, having ruled out all the standard ways that terms refer, she\nconcludes that the function of the word ‘I’ is\nnon-referential. She says little about what its function is,\nalthough she notes that the word is dispensable – a language\nwhose verbs are conjugated to reflect what we call ‘the first\nperson’ (e.g. Latin, Spanish) can do without such a word. Her\nconclusion could be resisted if one produced a way of referring she\nhadn’t considered, or if one rebutted any of her arguments\nagainst the possibilities she does consider. Important discussions of\nthis paper can be found in Doyle 2018, O’Brien 1994, and many\nother places, and it has clearly inspired the work of Rödl\n2007." ], "section_title": "3. Metaphysics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAnscombe’s Intention is one of the classics of 20th\ncentury philosophy. Indeed, it continues to be a standard point of\nreference for those working in action theory and philosophical\npsychology, so much so that contemporary theories of action are often\ncategorized as either Anscombean or Davidsonian.", "\nOn its back cover, David Velleman aptly quips that Intention\nis “often quoted, sometimes read, rarely understood”. Many\nreaders are indeed puzzled by the significance and the lessons of what\nshe writes. Intention is a work on the nature of agency\nthrough an understanding of the concept of intention. As we saw above,\nAnscombe wrote Intention after opposing supporters of\nTruman:", "\nPerplexed by defenders of Truman she came to the conclusion that they\nhad failed to understand the nature of his actions, and it was this\nthat led her to write Intention, in which she pointed out\nthat in doing one thing (moving one’s hand) one may\nintentionally be doing another (directing the death of human beings).\n(Haldane 2000, 1020)\n", "\nIndeed we have seen many points in her work in moral philosophy where\nshe calls us to understand the concepts of action and of intention\nbetter.", "\nThe best way to understand the argument of the book might be to\nconsider its claims in a different order than the way the book lays\nthem out. For the actual narrative of the books deliberately leads the\nreader into a bunch of dead ends and incomplete solutions before\nforwarding specific positive claims.", "\nIn what might reasonably be considered to be the conclusion of the\nbook’s argument, she writes that “the term\n‘intentional’ has reference to a form of\ndescription of events” (INT, 84). To unpack this cryptic\nthought, note first that the events she has in mind are some of those\nthat we human beings are the subject of. It does not pick out things\nthat merely happen to us.", "\nSecond, note that a single action can be described in various ways. Is\nhe moving his arm up and down? Pumping water? Doing his job? Clicking\nout a steady rhythm? Making a funny shadow on the rock behind him?\nWell, it could be that all of these descriptions are\ntrue.", "\nThird, note that even if the same action can be described in multiple\nways, it usually won’t be intentional in every one of those ways\ndescribed. For example, even though a man is pumping water\nintentionally, he might not be making a funny shadow on the rock\nbehind him intentionally. But what determines which of the\ndescriptions of his action are indeed intentional?", "\nAt first, Anscombe answers this disjunctively: she identifies several\ncases which are not intentional, and several other cases that\nare. If you ask someone “Why are you doing that?”, and\nthey give one of a few types of answers, this establishes that the\naction is not intentional. Such ways of answering can include 1)\n“I didn’t know I was doing that.”, 2) “I\n(merely) observed/inferred that I was doing that”, 3) “I\n(merely) observed/inferred how my physical movement was caused.”\nBy contrast, the following answers show that the action so described\nis indeed intentional: 1) an answer that mentions something future\n(“To end the war”), 2) an answer that interprets it\n(“Out of curiosity”) , 3) an answer that mentions\nsomething past that’s given as the ground for something good or\nbad for the person at whom it is aimed (“They attacked us\nfirst”), or, finally, 4) “No reason” (INT, 24).", "\nSuch a hodgepodge of answers sheds little light upon the concept of\nintention, her quarry. Thus, she shifts methods. She emphasizes that\nin every case of doing something intentionally, you don’t need\nto observe yourself in order to know that that’s what you are up\nto. For example, you know that you are reading this encyclopedia\nentry, and you know this not because somebody told you, nor did you\nmerely infer it, nor did you see yourself in a mirror reading it.\nRather, you know it in some distinctive way, what later writers will\ncall a ‘first-personal’ way. Anscombe calls this knowledge\nof one’s own intentional actions “practical\nknowledge”, which is likewise obscure. But she concludes that\n“the notion of ‘practical knowledge’ can only be\nunderstood if we first understand ‘practical\nreasoning’” (INT, 57). Thus it is only by grasping what it\nis to reason practically that we will understand what practical\nknowledge and the concept of intention are.", "\nWhat, then, is practical reasoning? There are two ways to think about\nit. One familiar way is via deliberation: we have some end, and we\nreason to some sufficient means to that end. Aristotle sketched things\nthis way. Anscombe focuses on another way (although it winds up being\nequivalent to the first). She notes that the various ways to describe\nwhat someone does can bear a particular order to one another.\nA man might be moving his arm up and down because (and not\njust, and) he is operating the pump, which he’s doing because\n(and not just, and) he’s pumping water to the house, and so on.\nThis is an order that really exists among events; it’s not\nmerely the sum of merely physically described events going on in the\nworld and, also somehow, what’s going on in his head.\nThis order is the order of intention.", "\nOf course, the man himself is in a special position to grasp this\nactually-existing order among the ways of describing what he’s\ndoing. Anscombe compared this knowledge to the knowledge had by a man\nwho directs a project like the erection of a building simply by giving\norders for every little thing that anyone does, a project which he\ncan’t see and gets no reports on. If all goes well, the director\nknows what’s done, and his knowledge is practical knowledge. His\npractical knowledge is his grasping the order of the events that\nunfold. Practical knowledge, then, isn’t fundamentally knowledge\nof certain atomic actions, e.g. thinking of a number, blinking.\nIt’s knowledge of the entire means-end order among the things\none does, an order which of course includes the actions\nconstituting it. The man in the earlier example can say\n“I’m moving my arm up and down” because he\ncan say “I’m moving my arm up and down because I’m\npumping water”.", "\nIndeed, many of the very concepts we use to describe movements\ninvolving human beings – e.g. ‘greeting’,\n‘hiring’, ‘sending for’, even\n‘offending’, ‘dropping’, ‘placing’\n– are concepts we’d lack were we to lack the concept of\nintention. So the term ‘intentional’ refers not only to\nthe aforementioned ‘because’ and what it structures, but\nto the very terms by which we conceptualize most human and animal\nmovement. Intention is thus not something ‘added’ on to\nmere behavior we somehow first separately conceptualize. Rather, the\norder of intention is baked into the ways we represent our lives from\nthe very start.", "\nThere are a wealth of other sections from Intention that have\nbeen “often quoted” and yet “rarely\nunderstood”. Consider, for example, this famous passage:", "\nLet us consider a man going round a town with a shopping list in his\nhand. Now it is clear that the relation of this list to the things he\nactually buys is one and the same whether his wife gave him the list\nor it is his own list; and that there is a different relation where a\nlist is made by a detective following him about. If he made the list\nitself, it was an expression of intention; if his wife gave it to him,\nit has the role of an order. What then is the identical relation to\nwhat happens, in the order and the intention, which is not shared by\nthe record? It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the\nman actually buys do not agree, and if this and this alone constitutes\na mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the man’s\nperformance (if his wife were to say: “Look, it says butter and\nyou have bought margarine”, he would hardly reply: “What a\nmistake! we must put that right” and alter the word on the list\nto “margarine”); whereas if the detective’s record\nand what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in\nthe record. (INT, 56).\n", "\nAnscombe draws attention to the fact that when there is a discrepancy\nbetween a piece of paper and what happens, the source of the error\ndepends upon the “role” of the paper. If the paper has the\nrole of a record, the error is in the paper. But if the paper has the\nrole of an order or intention, the error is in what happens. Thus\nthere can be two ways to fail to know what happens: by\nmisrecording, and by misperforming. And one who practically knows\ndoesn’t misperform.", "\nBeginning with Searle (1975), a different thesis gets very widely\nattributed to Anscombe in the literature: one about ‘mental\nstates’ like beliefs and desires, each of which supposedly has a\ndifferent “direction of fit”. Anscombe, however, says\nnothing here about believing or desiring or other kinds of mental\nstates; the example instead displays two ways of knowing. Her\npoint is that you can know something either by believing something\nthat is (already) true, or by intentionally doing something. Both are\nforms of knowledge, and indeed there can be two ways to know one and\nthe same thing. (See Frost 2014.)", "\nAnscombe applied her views on intention to clarify her own positions\non controversial claims, such as the condemnation of contraception.\nOne puzzle in the Catholic doctrine condemning contraception, and yet\nallowing for the ‘rhythm method’ of avoiding pregnancy, is\nto reconcile the rationales in a consistent way. Many charged the\nChurch with inconsistency, since the intention to not get pregnant\nduring intercourse is present in both cases. Anscombe claims there is\nan important difference:", "\nThe reason why people are confused about intention, and why they\nsometimes think there is no difference between contraceptive\nintercourse and the use of infertile times to avoid conception, is\nthis: They don’t notice the difference between\n“intention” when it means the intentionalness of the thing\nyou’re doing – that you’re doing this on\npurpose – and when it means a further or\naccompanying intention with which you do the thing.\n(CAC, 182)\n", "\nHer claim is that the further intentions that accompany these actions\nmay be the same, but there is a significant difference between the\nacts themselves. Her claim is that contraceptive intercourse, unlike\ntiming intercourse to coincide with infertile periods, is a bad sort\nof action because in the case of contraceptive intercourse\n“…to intend such an act is not to intend a marriage act\nat all, whether or not we’re married” (CAC, 183). Having\nintercourse that has purposely been rendered infertile is itself a\ndifferent act from having intercourse at an infertile time. Even\nthough both types of action may have the further aim of, for example,\nlimiting family size, the acts themselves differ. The\n“perversion of the sex act in marriage is, in this one way, like\nwriting a forged check for a good cause”, she claims. The\nfurther intention of, let’s say, helping the needy is a worthy\none but does not vindicate the action of forging the check.", "\nNeedless to say, this view was controversial. Bernard Williams and\nMichael Tanner criticized her argument for failing to consider one of\nher own theses – that actions, including sorts of actions, can\nfall under a variety of descriptions. On their view, she is picking\nand choosing descriptions of actions in order to get the outcome she\nwants – a distinction between the rhythm method and\ncontraception that isn’t just a trivial distinction. But, they\nargue, she cannot do this convincingly. They argue that couples who\nemploy the rhythm method are taking steps to achieve infertility just\nas those who take contraception are. Those steps are central to\nunderstanding the acts themselves, not simply the further purpose of\nthe acts. (Williams and Tanner 1972)" ], "section_title": "4. Action Theory", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWhat is it that we perceive? The world? Or only our ideas or\nsense-data? Something else? Anscombe deployed some of the conceptual\nmachinery she had developed in the philosophy of action to topics in\nthe philosophy of sense-perception. Three relevant theses from the\nphilosophy of action include:", "\nAs we will see shortly, analogous claims can be made about sensation\nor perception.", "\nBut first, note that Anscombe distinguished sharply between two senses\nof the word “object” – one of which is material\n(“There are ten objects on the bowling lane”), while the\nother is intentional (“Immortality was the object of his\ndesire”), which otherwise needn’t exist at all. An\nintentional object is given by a word or phrase which gives a\ndescription under which it is such (IOS, 9). She insists that\nneither sense of the word “object” is deviant nor\nphilosophically uninteresting, but they are easily confused with each\nother.", "\nShe makes a foray into grammatical theory to illustrate the\npossibility of this distinction between senses of\n“object”. Consider the sentence “Luke gave Leia his\nlightsaber”. If asked “What object did Luke give\nLeia?”, we would reply “his lightsaber”. And if\nasked for the direct object of the sentence, we would again reply\n“his lightsaber”. But although “his\nlightsaber” is indeed the direct object of the sentence, Luke\ndid not give Leia a direct object; to think otherwise is to confuse\nthe two senses. Moreover, “his lightsaber” is the direct\nobject of this sentence, even though no lightsaber materially exists.\nIt would be foolish to object to the claim that the direct object of\nthe sentence is “his lightsaber” on the grounds that\nlightsabers aren’t real. Anscombe’s insight is that\nlikewise there are also objects of perception in both a material and\nan intentional sense.", "\nIn light of the three claims above, Anscombe makes three analogous\nclaims about sense-perception:", "\nAnscombe maintained that certain philosophical views look inescapable\nonly if we conflate these two distinct senses. Idealism is the view\nthat we see only sense data, taking what is the intentional object of\nperception also to be the material objection of perception. On the\nother hand, direct realism (or what she calls ‘ordinary language\nphilosophy’) holds that we see only material objects without any\nintermediaries, overlooking or dismissing the legitimate use of saying\nthings like “Now I see stars” after getting hit on the\nhead. They thereby ignore or misunderstand the relevance of the\nintentional sense of sense-perception. Thus neither idealism nor\ndirect realism recognizes the importance of the distinction between\ntwo ways of thinking about verbs of sense-perception. Both views thus\nfail to recognize the distinct intentionality of sensation.", "\nAlthough these two senses are distinct, Anscombe notes that sometimes\npeople use the word “see” and other verbs of\nsense-perception without definitely intending it either only\nmaterially or only intentionally. Only further questioning would nudge\nthem to make their meaning more specific." ], "section_title": "5. Philosophy of Perception", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAmong the very many topics Anscombe worked on, her ideas about the\nrole of testimony have prefigured or influenced much contemporary\nthought on the topic. We will summarize three of her short but\nimportant papers on testimony: “Hume and Julius Caesar”\n(HJC), “What Is It to Believe Someone?” (WBS), and\n“Authority in Morals” (AIM), each of which heralds ideas\nthat gained prominence in philosophy only later.", "\nIn HJC, she considers Hume’s answer to the question, how do we\nknow about historical events? For example, how do we know that Caesar\nwas killed on the Ides of March? How do we even know that Caesar was a\nreal man, and not a mythical figure like Electra? Hume’s answer\nwas essentially that you perceive or remember someone (perhaps your\nschool teacher) telling you about Caesar, and you next infer the cause\nof that – namely, that someone told them – and so on,\nuntil you infer that there were eyewitnesses in the Senate, who then\nwitnessed Caesar’s death. You thus infer the original event\nthrough a series of causes terminating in something you perceive or\nremember perceiving.", "\nAnscombe argued that Hume’s answer cannot be right. First, is it\nreally true that we infer that Caesar was killed on the Ides of March\nfrom the thought there were many observant people in the\nSenate that day? No. If anything, it’s the other way around:\ngiven that we think that Caesar was killed then and there, we\ninfer that there must have been eyewitnesses to his death. It is not\nthat we first establish the presence of these people, and only then\ninfer what caused them to say what they said.", "\nAnscombe also discussed “one of the rare pieces of stupidity in\nthe writings of Wittgenstein” (HJC, 89). He once wrote that if\nwe were to find a piece of writing saying Caesar never existed, and\nwas invented for other ends, this would be some evidence that Caesar\nnever existed. Anscombe pushes us to think further about this. If we\nwere to discover such a document, we would instead immediately\nconclude it to be worthless, this because it conflicts with so much we\nhave been taught about the history of the West. She thus opposed the\nidea that our belief in Caesar’s existence rests upon any\nevidence we have for it, rather than from our directly\ntrusting what we have been taught. A coherentist might reply that any\ndocument alleging Caesar’s nonexistence clashes with the\npreponderance of historical evidence we have about him, and that we\ncan check the claims of this document against these other sources of\nevidence. But Anscombe rejoins that these other sources of\n“evidence” are themselves historians who straightforwardly\nbelieve much of what they have been taught, and we believe them. Thus,\nwe cannot “reduce” testimony to some other source of\njustification. Believing testimony is basic.", "\nShe provocatively concludes the essay", "\n[N]ot everything can be put up for checking. Von Neurath’s image\nof the ship which we repair – and, I suppose, build on to\n– while it is afloat: if this suggests that we can go round\ntapping every plank for rottenness, and so we might end up with a\nwholly different ship, the analogy is not good. For there are things\nthat are on a level. A general epistemological reason for doubting one\nwill be a reason for doubting all, and then none of them would have\nanything to test it(HJC, 92)\n", "\nShe thus opposes epistemological coherentism about justification, or\nat least a certain popular version of it. The many sources of\ninformation about Caesar’s life are themselves equally\nvulnerable to skepticism, and so we cannot actually test the former\nwhile trusting the latter. Without trusting what we have been taught,\nwe have almost no historical knowledge.", "\nWell before C. A. J. Coady’s masterful monograph on testimony\n(1992) that revived widespread interest in the topic, Anscombe\npublished a little essay titled “What Is It to Believe\nSomeone?”, anticipating many points he and others later\ndeveloped. She wrote that the topic of believing someone is not merely\nneglected but actually unknown in the philosophical discussion of her\ntime. Yet she avers that it is “of great importance in\nphilosophy and in life”, for “the greater part of our\nknowledge of reality rests upon the belief that we repose in things we\nhave been taught and told”. What is it, then, for a\nperson, rather than a proposition, to be the object of\nbelief?", "\nAnscombe distinguishes believing a person from believing what a person\nsays, for you can do the latter without the former – both when\nyou already believe what is said, and when you believe that the person\nis both misinformed and yet trying to deceive you. Anscombe describes\nmany “presuppositions” to believing someone: noticing the\nrelevant sound or inscription, understanding it as an attempt to\ncommunicate, noticing that it is addressed to oneself, understanding\nit properly, understanding that it was produced by the person indeed\nproducing it, and many more. Only once all these are in place do we\ncome to the situation where we can ask: “Does he believe\nher?”", "\nIt is no small matter whether people trust you when you tell them\nthings. Anscombe claimed “It is an insult and it may be an\ninjury not to be believed” (WBS, 9). Although she does not\nelaborate upon the nature of the insult and injury, her claim\nforeshadows contemporary discussions of epistemic injustice.\nInterestingly, it can be insulting, she notes, not even to be\nheard as telling one something. For example, if you tell me\np, but I fail to note that you were telling me anything\n– perhaps I thought you were just venting aloud – you\nmight reasonably say that I disrespectfully failed to believe you. We\ncan wrong one another by refusing to accept one another’s word,\nan idea that has recently become widely discussed at the intersection\nof epistemology and ethics.", "\nIn the third paper on testimony, “Authority in Morals”,\nAnscombe again considers a few related questions that only recently\nhave become widely discussed: can one person aptly tell another what\nto think about morality, and can the hearer aptly trust what they are\nthus told? Given that the paper was originally presented at a\nconference in an abbey, much of her discussion involves trusting a\nreligious authority about moral truths. But her points generalize.", "\nAnscombe compares moral teaching to mathematical teaching: in both\ncases, one must do something to truly learn what is being\ntaught, rather than merely accepting something as to be believed.\nTeaching someone either morality or mathematics thus won’t just\ninvolve the formation of belief. Even so, she denies that a proper\nunderstanding of autonomy is incompatible with trusting moral\ntestimony: deciding to trust someone who tells you about a bit of\nmoral truth can be a way of thinking for oneself. A man who\ndoes this and acts on this testimony is still “his own\npilot” (AIM, 49).", "\nYet there are limits to moral testimony. Although she thinks certain\ndogmatic truths are religiously revealed and could not otherwise be\nknown, this is not so for moral truths. Moral truths may be\nreligiously revealed only per accidens. In other words, moral\ntruths can always be known other than by trusting some\nsource. There seems to be no room for moral truths that per\nse can be taken only through trust.", "\nOne way moral truths can be revealed per accidens is when\nsomeone relies on an authority for a moral claim that they in some\nsense could have thought out for themselves, but didn’t.\nAnscombe does not imply that so relying need be a sign of laziness;\nrather, she thinks that different people have already grasped\ndifferent parts of the moral law (AIM, 45), and so seems to think that\nsharing moral truths is much like sharing other truths. For example,\nif you tell me what you ate for lunch, I can reasonably trust you even\nif in principle it’s true that I could have instead spied on you\nto find out. Likewise, I might reasonably believe you when you tell me\nsome moral truth that I hadn’t worked out for myself (but, in\ntheory, could).", "\nThe second way moral truths can be revealed per accidens is\nwhen their factual grounds are knowable only by religious revelation.\nFor example, consider the ascetic life. As Hume noted, there seems to\nbe nothing good about it. And so if someone were to tell you that it\nis indeed good, there would be no question of believing them.", "\nBut now suppose you come to accept certain ordinary (non-moral) truths\nof revealed religion: the doctrine of original sin, and the\npossibility of joining your suffering with that of Christ. Now in\nlight of accepting these ideas, it becomes possible to see for\nyourself that there is indeed something good about the ascetic life.\nSo, you need not accept this moral claim itself on the basis of\nreligious revelation, but you accept it on the basis of other truths\nthemselves accepted as revelation. Moral truths, however,\nalways can in principle be graspable without needing to trust another.\nEven though there need be nothing bad about trusting an authority who\nteaches about morality, their teachings, if true, could be\narrived at otherwise." ], "section_title": "6. Testimony", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nG. E. M. Anscombe’s work ranged over many years and many\ndifferent areas in philosophy. The breadth of her work is impressive.\nShe was systematic in her thinking, seeing and developing connections\nbetween metaphysics, moral psychology, and ethics that exhibited not\nsimply a grasp of one particular problem, but a world view. Much of\nher works remains unpublished, although newly accessible through the\nAnscombe Papers Project at the Collegium Institute for Catholic\nThought & Culture. Anscombe’s legacy is one of the broadest\nand deepest left by a 20th century philosopher." ], "section_title": "7. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "[IWT] An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,\nLondon: Hutchinson, 1959; 2nd edition, 1963; 3rd edition, 1971.", "[INT] Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957; 2nd\nedition, 1963. Reprinted in 2000 by Harvard University Press.", "[THP] Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege, with\nPeter Geach, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2002.", "[FPW] From Parmenides to Wittgenstein (The Collected\nPhilosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume 1),\nMinneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.", "[MPM] Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind (The Collected\nPhilosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume 2),\nMinneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.", "[ERP] Ethics, Religion and Politics (The Collected\nPhilosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume 3),\nMinneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.", "[HAE] Human Life, Action, and Ethics: Essays by G. E. M.\nAnscombe (St. Andrews Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume\nIV), M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds.), Exeter: Imprint Academic,\n2005.", "[FPW] From Plato to Wittgenstein: Essays by G. E. M.\nAnscombe, M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds.), Exeter: Imprint\nAcademic, 2015.", "[LTM] Logic, Truth and Meaning: Writings by G. E. M.\nAnscombe, M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds.), Exeter: Imprint\nAcademic, 2015.", "[MTD] “Mr. Truman’s Degree” (privately produced\npamphlet); reprinted in [MPM], 62–71.", "[WAM] “War and Murder,” in Nuclear Weapons: a\nCatholic Response, Walter Stein (ed.), London: Merlin, 1961,\n43–62; reprinted in [ERP], 51–61.", "[SAS] “On the Source of the Authority of the State,”\nRatio 20 (1978); reprinted in [MPM], 130–155.", "[MMP] “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy\n33 (1958): 1–19; reprinted in [ERP], 26–42. [CAD]\nCausality and Determination: An Inaugural Lecture, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, 1971; reprinted in [MPM],\n133–147.", "[TFP] “The First Person,” in Mind and Language:\nWolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975,\n45–64; reprinted in [MPM], 21–36.", "[IOS] “The Immortality of the Soul” in [FHG],\n69–83; previously unpublished. [CSL] “A Reply to Mr. C.S.\nLewis’s Argument that ‘Naturalism’ is\nSelf-Refuting,” Socratic Digest 4:2 (1948), 7–16;\nreprinted in [MPM], 224–232.", "[CAC] “Contraception and Chastity,” The Human World 9\n(1972): 41–51; reprinted in [FHG], 170–192.", "[IOS] “The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical\nFeature,” Analytical Philosophy (second series), R. J.\nButler (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965; reprinted in\n[MPM], 3–20.", "[HJC] “Hume and Julius Caesar,” Analysis 34\n(1973): 1–7; reprinted in [FPW], 86–93.", "[WBS] “What Is It to Believe Someone?” in\nRationality and Religious Belief, C. F. Delaney (ed.), Notre\nDame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, 141–151;\nreprinted in [FHG], 1–10.", "[AIM] “Authority in Morals” in Problems of\nAuthority, J. Todd (ed.), London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1962;\nreprinted in [ERP], 43–50.", "Descartes, René, Philosophical Writings,\ntranslated by G. E. M. Anscombe and Peter Geach, London: Thomas Nelson\nand Sons, 1954.", "Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations,\ntranslated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953.", "–––, Notebooks 1914–1916,\ntranslated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961.", "–––, On Certainty, translated by Denis\nPaul and G. E. M. Anscombe and edited by G. H. von Wright and G. E. M.\nAnscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969.", "–––, Remarks on the Foundation of\nMathematics, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe and edited by G. H.\nvon Wright and R. Rhees, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956.", "–––, Zettel, translated by G. E. M.\nAnscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.", "Bennett, Jonathan, 1966. “Whatever the Consequences,”\nAnalysis, 26: 83–102.", "–––, 1995. The Act Itself, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Boyle, Joseph, 1980. “Toward Understanding the Principle of\nDouble Effect,” Ethics, 90: 527–538.", "Bratman, Michael, 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical\nReason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Coady, C. A. J., 1995. Testimony: A Philosophical Study,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Crisp, Roger and Michael Slote, 1996. Introduction to Virtue\nEthics, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (eds.), Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Crisp, Roger, 2004. “Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a\nMistake?,” in Modern Moral Philosophy (Royal Institute\nof Philosophy, Supplement 54), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,\n75–94.", "Davidson, Donald, 1963. “Actions, Reasons, and\nCauses,” Journal of Philosophy, 60: 685–700.", "Diamond, Cora, 2019. Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going\non to Ethics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "––– and Jenny Teichman (eds), 1979.\nIntention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M.\nAnscombe, Harvester Press.", "Doyle, James, 2017. No Morality, No Self: Anscombe’s\nRadical Skepticism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Ford, Anton, 2015. “The Arithmetic of Intention,”\nAmerican Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 129–143.", "–––, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland\n(eds.), 2011. Essays on Anscombe’s Intention,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Foot, Philippa, 2002. Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in\nMoral Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.", "Frey, Christopher & Frey, Jennifer A, 2017. “G. E. M.\nAnscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and\nAction,” Analytic Philosophy 58, 3: 202–247.", "Frey, Jennifer A., 2019. “Anscombe on Practical Knowledge\nand the Good,” Ergo: An Open Access Journal of\nPhilosophy, 6.", "Frost, Kim, 2014. “On the Very Idea of Direction of\nFit,” The Philosophical Review 123: 429–484.", "Geach, Peter, 1957. “On Belief About Oneself,”\nAnalysis 18: 23–24.", "–––, 2006. “The Labels,”\nAnalysis, 66: 266–67.", "Gormally, Luke, David Albert Jones, and Roger Teichmann (eds.),\n2016. The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe. Imprint\nAcademic.", "Haldane, John, 2000. “In Memoriam, G. E. M. Anscombe\n(1919–2001),” The Review of Metaphysics, 53:\n1019–1021.", "––– (ed.), 2019. The Life and Philosophy of\nElizabeth Anscombe. Imprint Academic.", "Hlobil, Ulf & Nieswandt, Katharina, 2016. “On\nAnscombe’s Philosophical Method,” Klēsis Revue\nPhilosophique 35: 180–198.", "Hursthouse, Rosalind, 2000. “Intention” in Logic,\nCause and Action: Essays in Honour of Elizabeth Anscombe, ed.\nTeichmann, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 83–105.", "Lavin, Douglas, 2015. “Action as a form of temporal unity:\non Anscombe’s Intention,” Canadian Journal of\nPhilosophy 45:609–629.", "Lewis, C. S., 1960. Miracles: A Preliminary Study, 2nd\nedition. London, Fontana.", "Lewis, David, 1979. “Attitudes de dicto and de se,”\nPhilosophical Review 88: 513–543.", "Mac Cumhaill, Clare & Wiseman, Rachael, 2022. Metaphysical\nAnimals, New York: Doubleday.", "Mackie, J. L., 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,\nHarmondsworth: Penguin.", "Monk, Ray, 1991. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius,\nLondon: Vintage.", "Moran, Richard & Stone, Martin J., 2011. “Anscombe on\nexpression of intention: an exegesis” in Essays on\nAnscombe’s Intention, eds. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby\n& Frederick Stoutland, Harvard University Press.", "Murdoch, Iris, 1971. The Sovereignty of Good.\nRoutledge.", "Nagel, Thomas, 1979. “War and Massacre,” in Mortal\nQuestions, New York: Cambridge University Press,\n53–74.", "O’Brien, Lucy, 1994. “Anscombe and the Self-Reference\nRule,” Analysis 54: 277–281.", "Passmore, John, 1966. A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 2nd\nedition, New York: Basic Books.", "Rödl, Sebastian, 2007. Self-Consciousness,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Schwenkler, John, 2019. Anscombe’s Intention: A\nGuide. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.", "Searle, John R., 1975. “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary\nActs,” In Language, Mind and Knowledge, ed. K.\nGunderson, University of Minnesota Press, 344–369.", "Teichman, Jenny, 2002. “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret\nAnscombe: 1919–2001,” in Biographical Memoirs of\nFellows I (Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 115),\nOxford: Oxford University Press, 31–50.", "Teichmann, Roger (ed.), 2000. Logic, Cause and Action: Essays\nin Honour of Elizabeth Anscombe, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "–––, 2008. The Philosophy of Elizabeth\nAnscombe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Thompson, Michael, 2011. “Anscombe’s Intention and\npractical knowledge,” in Essays on Anscombe’s\nIntention, eds. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick\nStoutland, Harvard University Press.", "Vogler, Candace, 2006. “Modern Moral Philosophy Again:\nIsolating the Promulgation Problem,” Proceedings of the\nAristotelian Society 106: 347–364.", "–––, 2016. “Nothing Added: Intention\n§§19 and 20,” American Catholic Philosophical\nQuarterly 90: 229–247.", "Williams, Bernard, 1985. Ethics and the Limits of\nPhilosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "––– and Michael Tanner, 1972. “Comment on\nContraception and Chastity,” The Human World, 9:\n41–51.", "Wilson, George, 1989. The Intentionality of Human Action,\nStanford: Stanford University Press.", "Wiseman, Rachael, 2016. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to\nAnscombe’s Intention. Routledge.", "Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1980. Philosophical Remarks,\nChicago: University of Chicago Press." ]	[ { "href": "../action/", "text": "action" }, { "href": "../consequentialism/", "text": "consequentialism" }, { "href": "../davidson/", "text": "Davidson, Donald" }, { "href": "../double-effect/", "text": "double effect, doctrine of" }, { "href": "../epistemology-social/", "text": "epistemology: social" }, { "href": "../natural-law-ethics/", "text": "ethics: natural law tradition" }, { "href": "../ethics-virtue/", "text": "ethics: virtue" }, { "href": "../philippa-foot/", "text": "Foot, Philippa" }, { "href": "../moral-psych-emp/", "text": "moral psychology: empirical approaches" }, { "href": "../murdoch/", "text": "Murdoch, Iris" }, { "href": "../war/", "text": "war" }, { "href": "../wittgenstein/", "text": "Wittgenstein, Ludwig" } ]
anselm	Saint Anselm	First published Thu May 18, 2000; substantive revision Tue Dec 8, 2020	[ "\n\nSaint Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) was the outstanding\nChristian philosopher and theologian of the eleventh century. He is\nbest known for the celebrated “ontological argument” for\nthe existence of God in the Proslogion, but his contributions\nto philosophical theology (and indeed to philosophy more generally) go\nwell beyond the ontological argument. In what follows I examine\nAnselm’s theistic proofs, his conception of the divine nature, and his\naccount of human freedom, sin, and redemption.\n" ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Theistic Proofs", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 “Faith Seeking Understanding”: The character and purpose of Anselm’s theistic proofs", "2.2 The arguments of the Monologion", "2.3 The argument of the Proslogion" ] }, { "content_title": "3. The Divine Nature", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Proving the divine attributes", "3.2 The consistency of the divine attributes" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Freedom, Sin, and Redemption", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Truth in statements and in the will", "4.2 Freedom and sin", "4.3 Grace and redemption" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Critical Edition", "Translations", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nAnselm was born in 1033 near Aosta, in those days a Burgundian town on\nthe frontier with Lombardy. Little is known of his early life. He left\nhome at twenty-three, and after three years of apparently aimless\ntravelling through Burgundy and France, he came to Normandy in 1059.\nOnce he was in Normandy, Anselm’s interest was captured by the\nBenedictine abbey at Bec, whose famous school was under the direction\nof Lanfranc, the abbey’s prior. Lanfranc was a scholar and\nteacher of wide reputation, and under his leadership the school at Bec\nhad become an important center of learning, especially in\ndialectic. In 1060 Anselm entered the abbey as a novice. His\nintellectual and spiritual gifts brought him rapid advancement, and\nwhen Lanfranc was appointed abbot of Caen in 1063, Anselm was elected\nto succeed him as prior. He was elected abbot in 1078 upon the death\nof Herluin, the founder and first abbot of Bec. Under Anselm’s\nleadership the reputation of Bec as an intellectual center grew, and\nAnselm managed to write a good deal of philosophy and theology in\naddition to his teaching, administrative duties, and extensive\ncorrespondence as an adviser and counselor to rulers and nobles all\nover Europe and beyond. His works while at Bec include the\nMonologion (1075–76), the Proslogion\n(1077–78), and his four philosophical dialogues: De\ngrammatico (probably 1059–60, though the dating of this\nwork is much disputed), and De veritate, De libertate\narbitrii, and De casu diaboli (1080–86). ", "\n\nIn 1093 Anselm was enthroned as Archbishop of Canterbury. The previous\nArchbishop, Anselm’s old master Lanfranc, had died four years\nearlier, but the King, William Rufus, had left the see vacant in order\nto plunder the archiepiscopal revenues. Anselm was understandably\nreluctant to undertake the primacy of the Church of England under a\nruler as ruthless and venal as William, and his tenure as Archbishop\nproved to be as turbulent and vexatious as he must have\nfeared. William was intent on maintaining royal authority over\necclesiastical affairs and would not be dictated to by Archbishop or\nPope or anyone else. So, for example, when Anselm went to Rome in 1097\nwithout the King’s permission, William would not allow him to\nreturn. When William was killed in 1100, his successor, Henry I,\ninvited Anselm to return to his see. But Henry was as intent as\nWilliam had been on maintaining royal jurisdiction over the Church,\nand Anselm found himself in exile again from 1103 to 1107. Despite\nthese distractions and troubles, Anselm continued to write. His works\nas Archbishop of Canterbury include the Epistola de Incarnatione\nVerbi (1094), Cur Deus Homo (1095–98), De\nconceptu virginali (1099), De processione Spiritus\nSancti (1102), the Epistola de sacrificio azymi et\nfermentati (1106–7), De sacramentis ecclesiae\n(1106–7), and De concordia (1107–8). Anselm died\non 21 April 1109. He was canonized in 1494 and named a Doctor of the\nChurch in 1720." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. The Theistic Proofs", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nAnselm’s motto is “faith seeking understanding”\n(fides quaerens intellectum). This motto lends itself to at\nleast two misunderstandings. First, many philosophers have taken it to\nmean that Anselm hopes to replace faith with\nunderstanding. If one takes ‘faith’ to mean roughly\n‘belief on the basis of testimony’ and\n‘understanding’ to mean ‘belief on the basis of\nphilosophical insight’, one is likely to regard faith as an\nepistemically substandard position; any self-respecting philosopher\nwould surely want to leave faith behind as quickly as possible. The\ntheistic proofs are then interpreted as the means by which we come to\nhave philosophical insight into things we previously believed solely\non testimony. But Anselm is not hoping to replace faith with\nunderstanding. Faith for Anselm is more a volitional state than an\nepistemic state: it is love for God and a drive to act as God\nwills. In fact, Anselm describes the sort of faith that “merely\nbelieves what it ought to believe” as “dead”\n(M 78). (For the abbreviations used in references, see the\nBibliography below.) So “faith seeking understanding”\nmeans something like “an active love of God seeking a deeper\nknowledge of God.”", "\n\nOther philosophers have noted that “faith seeking\nunderstanding” begins with “faith,” not with doubt\nor suspension of belief. Hence, they argue, the theistic\narguments proposed by faith seeking understanding are not really meant\nto convince unbelievers; they are intended solely for the edification\nof those who already believe. This too is a misreading of\nAnselm’s motto. For although the theistic proofs are borne of an\nactive love of God seeking a deeper knowledge of the beloved, the\nproofs themselves are intended to be convincing even to\nunbelievers. Thus Anselm opens the Monologion with these\nwords:", "If anyone does not know, either because he has not heard or\nbecause he does not believe, that there is one nature, supreme among\nall existing things, who alone is self-sufficient in his eternal\nhappiness, who through his omnipotent goodness grants and brings it\nabout that all other things exist or have any sort of well-being, and a\ngreat many other things that we must believe about God or his creation,\nI think he could at least convince himself of most of these things by\nreason alone, if he is even moderately intelligent. (M\n1)", "\n\nAnd in the Proslogion Anselm sets out to convince “the fool,”\nthat is, the person who “has said in his heart, ‘There is no\nGod’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1). " ], "subsection_title": "2.1 “Faith Seeking Understanding”: The character and purpose of Anselm’s theistic proofs" }, { "content": [ "\n\nHaving clarified what Anselm takes himself to be doing in his theistic\nproofs, we can now examine the proofs themselves. In the first chapter\nof the Monologion Anselm argues that there must be some one\nthing that is supremely good, through which all good things have their\ngoodness. For whenever we say that different things are F in\ndifferent degrees, we must understand them as being F through\nF-ness; F-ness itself is the same in each of them.\nThus, for example, all more or less just things “must be more or\nless just through justice, which is not different in diverse\nthings” (M 1). Now we speak of things as being\ngood in different degrees. So by the principle just stated,\nthese things must be good through some one thing. Clearly that thing\nis itself a great good, since it is the source of the goodness of all\nother things. Moreover, that thing is good through itself;\nafter all, if all good things are good through that thing, it follows\ntrivially that that thing, being good, is good through itself. Things\nthat are good through another (i.e., things whose goodness derives\nfrom something other than themselves) cannot be equal to or greater\nthan the good thing that is good through itself, and so that which is\ngood through itself is supremely good. Anselm concludes,\n“Now that which is supremely good is also supremely great. There\nis, therefore, some one thing that is supremely good and supremely\ngreat – in other words, supreme among all existing things”\n(M 1). In chapter 2 he applies the principle of chapter 1 in\norder to derive (again) the conclusion that there is something\nsupremely great. ", "\n\nIn chapter 3 Anselm argues that all existing things exist through\nsome one thing. Every existing thing, he begins, exists either through\nsomething or through nothing. But of course nothing exists through\nnothing, so every existing thing exists through something. There is,\nthen, either some one thing through which all existing things exist, or\nthere is more than one such thing. If there is more than one, either\n(i) they all exist through some one thing, or (ii) each of them exists\nthrough itself, or (iii) they exist through each other. (iii) makes no\nsense. If (ii) is true, then “there is surely some one power or nature\nof self-existing that they have in order to exist through themselves”\n(M 3); in that case, “all things exist more truly through that\none thing than through the several things that cannot exist without\nthat one thing” (M 3). So (ii) collapses into (i), and there\nis some one thing through which all things exist. That one thing, of\ncourse, exists through itself, and so it is greater than all the other\nthings. It is therefore “best and greatest and supreme among all\nexisting things” (M 3).", "\n\nIn chapter 4 Anselm begins with the premise that things “are not all\nof equal dignity; rather, some of them are on different and unequal\nlevels” (M 4). For example, a horse is better than wood, and a\nhuman being is more excellent than a horse. Now it is absurd to think\nthat there is no limit to how high these levels can go, “so that there\nis no level so high that an even higher level cannot be found”\n(M 4). The only question is how many beings occupy that\nhighest level of all. Is there just one, or are there more than one?\nSuppose there are more than one. By hypothesis, they must all be\nequals. If they are equals, they are equals through the same thing.\nThat thing is either identical with them or distinct from them. If it\nis identical with them, then they are not in fact many, but one, since\nthey are all identical with some one thing. On the other hand, if that\nthing is distinct from them, then they do not occupy the highest level\nafter all. Instead, that thing is greater than they are. Either way,\nthere can be only one being occupying the highest level of all.", "\n\nAnselm concludes the first four chapters by summarizing his\nresults:", "Therefore, there is a certain nature or substance or\nessence who through himself is good and great and through himself is\nwhat he is; through whom exists whatever truly is good or great or\nanything at all; and who is the supreme good, the supreme great thing,\nthe supreme being or subsistent, that is, supreme among all existing\nthings. (M 4)", "\n\nHe then goes on (in chapters 5–65) to derive the attributes that must\nbelong to the being who fits this description. But before we look at\nAnselm’s understanding of the divine attributes, we should turn to the\nfamous proof in the Proslogion. " ], "subsection_title": "2.2 The arguments of the Monologion" }, { "content": [ "\n\nLooking back on the sixty-five chapters of complicated argument in the\nMonologion, Anselm found himself wishing for a simpler way to\nestablish all the conclusions he wanted to prove. As he tells us in the\npreface to the Proslogion, he wanted to find ", "a single argument that needed nothing but itself alone for\nproof, that would by itself be enough to show that God really exists;\nthat he is the supreme good, who depends on nothing else, but on whom\nall things depend for their being and for their well-being; and\nwhatever we believe about the divine nature. (P,\npreface)", "\n\nThat “single argument” is the one that appears in chapter\n2 of the Proslogion. (Or so it is commonly said: but some interpreters\nunderstand the “one argument” as extending into chapter 3, and\nHolopainen 1996 argues that it is the formula “that than\nwhich a greater cannot be thought.”)", "\n\nThe proper way to state Anselm’s argument is a matter of dispute, and\nany detailed statement of the argument will beg interpretative\nquestions. But on a fairly neutral or consensus reading of the\nargument (which I shall go on to reject), Anselm’s argument goes like\nthis. God is “that than which a greater cannot be\nthought”; in other words, he is a being so great, so full of\nmetaphysical oomph, that one cannot so much as conceive of a being who\nwould be greater than God. The Psalmist, however, tells us that\n“The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’\n” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1). Is it possible to convince the fool that\nhe is wrong? It is. All we need is the characterization of God as\n“that than which a greater cannot be thought.” The fool\ndoes at least understand that definition. But whatever is understood\nexists in the understanding, just as the plan of a painting he has yet\nto execute already exists in the understanding of the painter. So that\nthan which a greater cannot be thought exists in the\nunderstanding. But if it exists in the understanding, it must also\nexist in reality. For it is greater to exist in reality than to exist\nmerely in the understanding. Therefore, if that than which a greater\ncan be thought existed only in the understanding, it would be possible\nto think of something greater than it (namely, that same being\nexisting in reality as well). It follows, then, that if that than\nwhich a greater cannot be thought existed only in the understanding,\nit would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought; and that,\nobviously, is a contradiction. So that than which a greater cannot be\nthought must exist in reality, not merely in the understanding.", "\n\nVersions of this argument have been defended and criticized by a\nsuccession of philosophers from Anselm’s time through the present day\n(see\n ontological arguments).\n Our concern here is with Anselm’s own version, the\ncriticism he encountered, and his response to that criticism. A monk\nnamed Gaunilo wrote a “Reply on Behalf of the Fool,” contending that\nAnselm’s argument gave the Psalmist’s fool no good reason at all to\nbelieve that that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in\nreality. Gaunilo’s most famous objection is an argument intended to be\nexactly parallel to Anselm’s that generates an obviously absurd\nconclusion. Gaunilo proposes that instead of “that than which a\ngreater cannot be thought” we consider “that island than\nwhich a greater cannot be thought.” We understand what that\nexpression means, so (following Anselm’s reasoning) the greatest\nconceivable island exists in our understanding. But (again following\nAnselm’s reasoning) that island must exist in reality as well; for if\nit did not, we could imagine a greater island – namely, one that\nexisted in reality – and the greatest conceivable island would not\nbe the greatest conceivable island after all. Surely, though, it is\nabsurd to suppose that the greatest conceivable island actually exists\nin reality. Gaunilo concludes that Anselm’s reasoning is\nfallacious.", "\n\nGaunilo’s counterargument is so ingenious that it stands out as by far\nthe most devastating criticism in his catalogue of Anselm’s errors.\nNot surprisingly, then, interpreters have read Anselm’s reply to\nGaunilo primarily in order to find his rejoinder to the Lost Island\nargument. Sympathetic interpreters (such as Klima 2000 and Ward 2018) have offered\nways for Anselm to respond, but at least one commentator (Wolterstorff\n1993) argues that Anselm offers no such rejoinder, precisely because\nhe knew Gaunilo’s criticism was unanswerable but could not bring\nhimself to admit that fact.", "\n\nA more careful look at Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, however, shows that\nAnselm offered no rejoinder to the Lost Island argument because he\nrejected Gaunilo’s interpretation of the original argument of the\nProslogion. Gaunilo had understood the argument in the way I\nstated it above. Anselm understood it quite differently. In\nparticular, Anselm insists that the original argument did not rely on\nany general principle to the effect that a thing is greater when it\nexists in reality than when it exists only in the\nunderstanding.[1] \nAnd since that is the principle that does the mischief in Gaunilo’s\ncounterargument, Anselm sees no need to respond to the Lost Island\nargument in particular.", "\n\nCorrectly understood, Anselm says, the argument of the\nProslogion can be summarized as follows:", "Therefore,", "\n\nAnselm defends (1) by showing how we can form a conception of that\nthan which a greater cannot be thought on the basis of our\nexperience and understanding of those things than which a greater\ncan be thought. For example,", "it is clear to every reasonable mind that by raising our\nthoughts from lesser goods to greater goods, we are quite capable of\nforming an idea of that than which a greater cannot be thought on the\nbasis of that than which a greater can be thought. Who, for example,\nis unable to think … that if something that has a beginning and\nend is good, then something that has a beginning but never ceases to\nexist is much better? And that just as the latter is better than the\nformer, so something that has neither beginning nor end is better\nstill, even if it is always moving from the past through the present\ninto the future? And that something that in no way needs or is\ncompelled to change or move is far better even than that, whether any\nsuch thing exists in reality or not? Can such a thing not be thought?\nCan anything greater than this be thought? Or rather, is not this an\nexample of forming an idea of that than which a greater cannot be\nthought on the basis of those things than which a greater can be\nthought? So there is in fact a way to form an idea of that than which\na greater cannot be thought. (Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo\n8)", "\n\nOnce we have formed this idea of that than which a greater cannot be\nthought, Anselm says, we can see that such a being has features that\ncannot belong to a possible but non-existent object – or, in\nother words, that (2) is true. For example, a being that is capable\nof non-existence is less great than a being that exists necessarily.\nIf that than which a greater cannot be thought does not exist, it is\nobviously capable of non-existence; and if it is capable of\nnon-existence, then even if it were to exist, it would not be that\nthan which a greater cannot be thought after all. So if that than\nwhich a greater cannot be thought can be thought – that is, if\nit is a possible being – it actually exists. (This reading of\nthe argument of the Proslogion is developed at length in\nVisser and Williams 2008, chapter 5.)" ], "subsection_title": "2.3 The argument of the Proslogion" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. The Divine Nature", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nRecall that Anselm’s intention in the Proslogion was to offer\na single argument that would establish not only the existence of God\nbut also the various attributes that Christians believe God possesses.\nIf the argument of chapter 2 proved only the existence of God, leaving\nthe divine attributes to be established piecemeal as in the\nMonologion, Anselm would consider the Proslogion a\nfailure. But in fact the concept of that than which nothing greater can\nbe thought turns out to be marvelously fertile. God must, for example,\nbe omnipotent. For if he were not, we could conceive of a being greater\nthan he. But God is that than which no greater can be thought, so he\nmust be omnipotent. Similarly, God must be just, self-existent,\ninvulnerable to suffering, merciful, timelessly eternal, non-physical,\nnon-composite, and so forth. For if he lacked any of these qualities,\nhe would be less than the greatest conceivable being, which is\nimpossible. ", "\n\nThe ontological argument thus works as a sort of\ndivine-attribute-generating machine. Admittedly, though, the\nappearance of theoretical simplicity is somewhat misleading. The\n“single argument” produces conclusions about the divine attributes\nonly when conjoined with certain beliefs about what is greater or\nbetter. That is, the ontological argument tells us that God has\nwhatever characteristics it is better or greater to have than to lack,\nbut it does not tell us which characteristics those are. We must have\nsome independent way of identifying them before we can plug them into\nthe ontological argument and generate a full-blown conception of the\ndivine nature. Anselm identifies these characteristics in part by\nappeal to intuitions about value, in part by independent argument. To\nillustrate Anselm’s method, I shall examine his discussions of God’s\nimpassibility, timelessness, and simplicity.", "\n\nAccording to the doctrine of divine impassibility, God is invulnerable\nto suffering. Nothing can act upon him; he is in no way passive. He\ntherefore does not feel emotions, since emotions are states that one\nundergoes rather than actions one performs. Anselm does not find it\nnecessary to argue that impassibility is a perfection; he\nthinks it is perfectly obvious that “it is better to be …\nimpassible than not” (P 6), just as it is perfectly\nobvious that it is better to be just than not-just. His intuitions\nabout value are shaped by the Platonic-Augustinian tradition of which\nhe was a part. Augustine took from the Platonists the idea that the\nreally real things, the greatest and best of beings, are stable,\nuniform, and unchanging. He says in On Free Choice of the\nWill 2.10, “And you surely could not deny that the\nuncorrupted is better than the corrupt, the eternal than the temporal,\nand the invulnerable than the vulnerable”; his interlocutor\nreplies simply, “Could anyone?” Through Augustine (and\nothers) these ideas, and the conception of God to which they naturally\nlead, became the common view of Christian theologians for well over a\nmillennium. For Anselm, then, it is obvious that a being who is in no\nway passive, who cannot experience anything of which he is not himself\nthe origin, is better and greater than any being who can be acted upon\nby something outside himself. So God, being that than which nothing\ngreater can be thought, is wholly active; he is impassible.", "\n\nNotice that Augustine also found it obvious that the eternal is better\nthan the temporal. According to Plato’s Timaeus, time is a\n“moving image of eternity” (37d). It is a shifting and\nshadowy reflection of the really real. As later Platonists, including\nAugustine, develop this idea, temporal beings have their existence\npiecemeal; they exist only in this tiny sliver of a now, which is\nconstantly flowing away from them and passing into nothingness. An\neternal being, by contrast, is (to use my earlier description) stable,\nuniform, and unchanging. What it has, it always has; what it is, it\nalways is; what it does, it always does. So it seems intuitively\nobvious to Anselm that if God is to be that than which nothing greater\ncan be thought, he must be eternal. That is, he must be not merely\neverlasting, but outside time \naltogether.[2]\n", "\n\nIn addition to this strong intuitive consideration, Anselm at least\nhints at a further argument for the claim that it is better to be\neternal than temporal. He opens chapter 13 of the Proslogion\nby observing, “Everything that is at all enclosed in a place or time is\nless than that which is subject to no law of place or time” (P\n13). His idea seems to be that if God were in time (or in a place), he\nwould be bound by certain constraints inherent in the nature of time\n(or place). His discussion in Monologion 22 makes the problem\nclear:", "This, then, is the condition of place and time: whatever is\nenclosed within their boundaries does not escape being characterized by\nparts, whether the sort of parts its place receives with respect to\nsize, or the sort its time suffers with respect to duration; nor can it\nin any way be contained as a whole all at once by different places or\ntimes. By contrast, if something is in no way constrained by\nconfinement in a place or time, no law of places or times forces it\ninto a multiplicity of parts or prevents it from being present as a\nwhole all at once in several places or times. (M\n22)", "\n\nSo at least part of the reason for holding that God is timeless is that\nthe nature of time would impose constraints upon God, and of course it\nis better to be subject to no external constraints. ", "\n\nThe other part of the reason, though, is that if God were in place or\ntime he would have parts. But what is so bad about having\nparts? This question brings us naturally to the doctrine of divine\nsimplicity, which is simply the doctrine that God has no parts of any\nkind. Even for an Augustinian like Anselm, the claim that it is better\nto lack parts than to have them is less than intuitively compelling,\nso Anselm offers further arguments for that claim. In the\nProslogion he argues that “whatever is composed of\nparts is not completely one. It is in some sense a plurality and not\nidentical with itself, and it can be broken up either in fact or at\nleast in the understanding” (P 18). The argument in\nthe Monologion goes somewhat differently. “Every\ncomposite,” Anselm argues, “needs the things of which it\nis composed if it is to subsist, and it owes its existence to them,\nsince whatever it is, it is through them, whereas those things are not\nthrough it what they are” (M 17). The argument in\nthe Proslogion, then, seeks to relate simplicity to the\nintuitive considerations that identify what is greatest and best with\nwhat is stable, uniform, and unchanging; the argument in the\nMonologion, by contrast, seeks to show that simplicity is\nnecessary if God is to be – as the theistic proofs have already\nestablished – the ultimate source of his own goodness and existence." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Proving the divine attributes" }, { "content": [ "\n\nAnselm’s success in generating a whole host of divine attributes\nthrough the ontological argument does present him with a\nproblem. He must show that the attributes are consistent with\neach other – in other words, that it is possible for one and the\nsame being to have all of them. For example, there seems at first\nglance to be a conflict between justice and omnipotence. If God is\nperfectly just, he cannot lie. But if God is omnipotent, how can there\nbe something he cannot do? Anselm’s solution is to explain that\nomnipotence does not mean the ability to do everything; instead, it\nmeans the possession of unlimited power. Now the so-called\n“ability” or “power” to lie is not really a\npower at all; it is a kind of weakness. Being omnipotent, God has no\nweakness. So it turns out that omnipotence actually entails\nthe inability to lie. ", "\n\nAnother apparent contradiction is between God’s mercy and his\njustice. If God is just, he will surely punish the wicked as they\ndeserve. But because he is merciful, he spares the wicked. Anselm\ntries to resolve this apparent contradiction by appeal to God’s\ngoodness. It is better, he says, for God “to be good both to the\ngood and to the wicked than to be good only to the good, and it is\nbetter to be good to the wicked both in punishing and in sparing them\nthan to be good only in punishing them” (P 9). So God’s\nsupreme goodness requires that he be both just and merciful. But\nAnselm is not content to resolve the apparent tension between justice\nand mercy by appealing to some other attribute, goodness, that entails\nboth justice and mercy; he goes on to argue that justice itself\nrequires mercy. Justice to sinners obviously requires that God punish\nthem; but God’s justice to himself requires that he exercise\nhis supreme goodness in sparing the wicked. “Thus,” Anselm\nsays to God, “in saving us whom you might justly destroy\n… you are just, not because you give us our due, but because you\ndo what is fitting for you who are supremely good” (P\n10). In spite of these arguments, Anselm acknowledges that there is a\nresidue of mystery here:", "Thus your mercy is born of your justice, since it is just\nfor you to be so good that you are good even in sparing the wicked. And\nperhaps this is why the one who is supremely just can will good things\nfor the wicked. But even if one can somehow grasp why you can will to\nsave the wicked, certainly no reasoning can comprehend why, from those\nwho are alike in wickedness, you save some rather than others through\nyour supreme goodness and condemn some rather than others through your\nsupreme justice. (P 11)", "\n\nIn other words, the philosopher can trace the conceptual relations\namong goodness, justice, and mercy, and show that God not only can but\nmust have all three; but no human reasoning can hope to show why God\ndisplays his justice and mercy in precisely the ways in which he\ndoes. (For a detailed and sympathetic reconstruction of Anselm’s arguments concerning justice and mercy, see Mann 2019.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 The consistency of the divine attributes" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Freedom, Sin, and Redemption", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nIn On Freedom of Choice (De libertate arbitrii)\nAnselm defines freedom of choice as “the power to preserve rectitude of\nwill for its own sake” (DLA 3). He explores the notion of\nrectitude of will most thoroughly in On Truth (De\nveritate), so in order to understand the definition of freedom of\nchoice, we must look first at Anselm’s discussion of truth. Truth\nis a much broader notion for Anselm than for us; he speaks of truth not\nonly in statements and opinions but also in the will, actions, the\nsenses, and even the essences of things. In every case, he argues,\ntruth consists in correctness or “rectitude.” Rectitude, in turn, is\nunderstood teleologically; a thing is correct whenever it is or does\nwhatever it ought, or was designed, to be or do. For example,\nstatements are made for the purpose of “signifying that what-is is”\n(DV 2). A statement therefore is correct (has rectitude) when,\nand only when, it signifies that what-is is. So Anselm holds a\ncorrespondence theory of truth, but it is a somewhat unusual\ncorrespondence theory. Statements are true when they correspond to\nreality, but only because corresponding to reality is what statements\nare for. That is, statements (like anything else) are true\nwhen they do what they were designed to do; and what they were designed\nto do, as it happens, is to correspond to reality. ", "\n\nTruth in the will also turns out to be rectitude, again understood\nteleologically. Rectitude of will means willing what one ought to will\nor (in other words) willing that for the sake of which one was given a\nwill. So, just as the truth or rectitude of a statement is the\nstatement’s doing what statements were made to do, the truth or\nrectitude of a will is the will’s doing what wills were made to do. In\nDV 12 Anselm connects rectitude of will to both justice and\nmoral evaluation. In a broad sense of ‘just’, whatever is\nas it ought to be is just. Thus, an animal is just when it blindly\nfollows its appetites, because that is what animals were meant to do.\nBut in the narrower sense of ‘just’, in which justice is\nwhat deserves moral approval and injustice is what deserves reproach,\njustice is best defined as “rectitude of will preserved for its own\nsake” (DV 12). Such rectitude requires that agents perceive\nthe rectitude of their actions and will them for the sake of that\nrectitude. Anselm takes the second requirement to exclude both coercion\nand “being bribed by an extraneous reward” (DV 12). For an\nagent who is coerced into doing what is right is not willing rectitude\nfor its own sake; and similarly, an agent who must be bribed to do what\nis right is willing rectitude for the sake of the bribe, not for the\nsake of rectitude.", "\n\nSince, as we have already seen, Anselm will define freedom as “the\npower to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake,” the arguments of\nOn Truth imply that freedom is also the capacity for justice\nand the capacity for moral praiseworthiness. Now it is both necessary\nand sufficient for justice, and thus for praiseworthiness, that an\nagent wills what is right, knowing it to be right, because it is right.\nThat an agent wills what is right because it is right entails that he\nis neither compelled nor bribed to perform the act. Freedom, then, must\nbe neither more nor less than the power to perform acts of that\nsort." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Truth in statements and in the will" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThus Anselm takes it to be obvious that freedom is a power for\nsomething: its purpose is to preserve rectitude of will for its own\nsake. God and the good angels cannot sin, but they are still free,\nbecause they can (and do) preserve rectitude of will for its own sake.\nIn fact, they are freer than those who can sin: “someone who has what\nis fitting and expedient in such a way that he cannot lose it is freer\nthan someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it and be\nseduced into what is unfitting and inexpedient” (DLA 1). It\nobviously follows, as Anselm points out, that freedom of choice neither\nis nor entails the power to sin; God and the good angels have freedom\nof choice, but they are incapable of sinning. ", "\n\nBut if free choice is the power to hold on to what is fitting and\nexpedient, and it is not the power to sin, does it make any sense to\nsay that the first human beings and the rebel angels sinned through\nfree choice? Anselm’s reply to this question is both subtle and\nplausible. In order to be able to preserve rectitude of will for its\nown sake, an agent must be able to perform an action that has its\nultimate origin in the agent him- or herself rather than in some\nexternal source. (For convenience I will refer to that power as “the\npower for self-initiated action.”) Any being that has freedom of\nchoice, therefore, will thereby have the power for self-initiated\naction. The first human beings and the rebel angels sinned through an\nexercise of their power for self-initiated action, and so it is\nappropriate to say that they sinned through free choice. \nNonetheless, free choice does not entail the power to sin. For free\nchoice can be perfected by something else, as yet unspecified, that\nrenders it incapable of sinning.", "\n\nIn On the Fall of the Devil (De casu diaboli)\nAnselm extends his account of freedom and sin by discussing the first\nsin of the angels. In order for the angels to have the power to\npreserve rectitude of will for its own sake, they had to have both a\nwill for justice and a will for happiness. If God had given them only a\nwill for happiness, they would have been necessitated to will whatever\nthey thought would make them happy. Their willing of happiness would\nhave had its ultimate origin in God and not in the angels themselves.\nSo they would not have had the power for self-initiated action, which\nmeans that they would not have had free choice. The same thing would\nhave been true, mutatis mutandis, if God had given them only\nthe will for justice.", "\n\nSince God gave them both the will for happiness and the will for justice, however, they had the power for\nself-initiated action. Whether they chose to subject their wills for\nhappiness to the demands of justice or to ignore the demands of justice\nin the interest of happiness, that choice had its ultimate origin in\nthe angels; it was not received from God. The rebel angels chose to\nabandon justice in an attempt to gain happiness for themselves, whereas\nthe good angels chose to persevere in justice even if it meant less\nhappiness. God punished the rebel angels by taking away their\nhappiness; he rewarded the good angels by granting them all the\nhappiness they could possibly want. For this reason, the good angels\nare no longer able to sin. Since there is no further happiness left for\nthem to will, their will for happiness can no longer entice them to\noverstep the bounds of justice. Thus Anselm finally explains what it is\nthat perfects free choice so that it becomes unable to sin." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Freedom and sin" } ] } ]	[ "Niskanen, Samu, 2019. Letters of Anselm of Canterbury, Vol. I: The Bec Letters, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, 1936. “Ein neues\nunvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury,”\nBeiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des\nMittelalters Band 33, Heft 3 (1936): 22–43.", "Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, 1968. S. Anselmi Cantuariensis\nArchiepiscopi Opera Omnia. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich\nFromann Verlag.", "Davies, Brian, and G. R. Evans (ed.), 1998. Anselm of\nCanterbury: The Major Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Williams, Thomas, 2007. Anselm: Basic Writings.\nIndianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. As supplemented by the \nTranslations of Anselm, \n this is the only English translation by a single hand of all of\nAnselm’s treatises; it also includes selected prayers and\nletters and the Meditation on Human Redemption.", "Baker, Lynne Rudder, 2013. “Updating Anselm\nAgain,” Res Philosophica, 90: 23–32.", "Burgess-Jackson, Keith, 2014. “Does Anselm Beg the\nQuestion?,” International Journal for Philosophy of\nReligion, 76: 5–18.", "Campbell, Richard, 2018. Rethinking Anselm’s Arguments: A\nVindication of His Proof for the Existence of God, Leiden:\nBrill.", "Davies, Brian, and Brian Leftow (eds.), 2004. The Cambridge\nCompanion to Anselm, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Ekenberg, Tomas, 2016. “Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in\nAnselm of Canterbury,” International Journal for Philosophy\nof Religion, 24: 215–230.", "Evans, G. R., 1978. Anselm and Talking about God, Oxford:\nClarendon Press.", "–––, 1984. A Concordance to the Works of Saint\nAnselm, Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications.", "–––, 1989. Anselm, London:\nG. Chapman; reprinted 2001, London and New York: Continuum.", "Gasper, G. E. M., and I. Logan (eds.), 2012. Saint Anselm of\nCanterbury and His Legacy, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of\nMedieval Studies.", "Heathwood, Chris, 2011. “The Relevance of Kant’s Objection\nto Anselm’s Ontological Argument,” Religious Studies,\n47: 345–357.", "Henry, Desmond Paul, 1967. The Logic of Saint Anselm,\nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "Holopainen, Toivo, 1996. Dialectic and Theology in the\nEleventh Century, Leiden: E. J. Brill.", "Hopkins, Jasper, 1972. A Companion to the Study of St.\nAnselm, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.", "Klima, Gyula, 2000. “Saint Anselm’s Proof: A Problem\nof Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding”, in\nG. Hintikka (ed.), Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times\n(Proceedings of “Medieval and Modern Philosophy of\nReligion”, Boston University, August 25–27, 1992),\nDordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 69–88.\n [Preprint of Klima 2000 available online]", "Leftow, Brian, 1997. “Anselm on the Cost of Salvation,”\nMedieval Philosophy and Theology, 6: 73–92.", "–––, 2009. “Anselmian Presentism,” \nFaith and Philosophy, 26: 297–319. \n [Leftow 2009 available online.]", "Logan, Ian, 2009. Reading Anselm’s Proslogion: The History of\nAnselm’s Argument and its Significance Today, Aldershot:\nAshgate.", "Mann, William E., 2019. “Anselm on Divine Justice and\nMercy,” Religious Studies, 55: 469–485.", "Nash-Marshall, Siobhan, 2012. “Saint Anselm and the Problem of\nEvil, or On Freeing Evil from the Problem of\nEvil,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 52:\n455–470.", "Oppenheimer, P., and Zalta, E., 1991. “On the Logic of the\nOntological Argument,” Philosophical Perspectives 5:\n509–529; reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual: 1991, XIV\n(1993): 255–275.", "–––, 2007. “Reflections on the Logic of\nthe Ontological Argument,” Studia Neoaristotelica,\n4(1): 28–34.", "–––, 2011. “A Computationally-Discovered\nSimplification of the Ontological Argument,” Australasian\nJournal of Philosophy, 89(2): 333–349.", "Plantinga, Alvin (ed.), 1965. The Ontological Argument,\nGarden City, NY: Anchor Books.", "–––, 1974. God, Freedom, and Evil,\nGrand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans.", "Rogers, Katherin A., 2007. “Anselmian Eternalism: The\nPresence of a Timeless God,” Faith and Philosophy, 24:\n3–27.\n [Rogers 2007 available online.]", "–––, 2009. Anselm on Freedom, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 2012. “Anselm on the Ontological Status of\nChoice,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 52:\n183–198.", "Smith, A.D., 2014. Anselm’s Other Argument, Cambridge,\nMA: Harvard University Press.", "Southern, R. W., 1990. Saint Anselm: A Portrait in\nLandscape, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Special Issue, 2011. International Journal for Philosophy of\nReligion, Volume 69.", "Sweeney, Eileen, 2012. Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for\nthe Word, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America\nPress.", "Uckelman, Sara L., 2010. “The Ontological Argument and\nRussell’s Antinomy,” Logic and Logical Philosophy, 18:\n309–312.", "Visser, Sandra, and Thomas Williams, 2008. Anselm (Great\nMedieval Thinkers), New York: Oxford University Press.", "Ward, Thomas M., 2018. “Losing the Lost Island,”\nInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 83:\n127–134.", "Williams, Thomas, 2016. “Anselm’s Quiet\nRadicalism,” British Journal for the History of\nPhilosophy, doi:10.1080/09608788.2015.1047734,\n [Preprint of Williams 2016 available online]", "Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 1993. “In Defense of Gaunilo’s Defense of\nthe Fool,” in C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal (eds.), Christian\nPerspectives on Religious Knowledge, Grand Rapids, MI: William B.\nEerdmans Publishing Company, pp. 87–111. " ]	[ { "href": "../augustine/", "text": "Augustine, Saint" }, { "href": "../duns-scotus/", "text": "Duns Scotus, John" }, { "href": "../freewill/", "text": "free will" }, { "href": "../medieval-philosophy/", "text": "medieval philosophy" }, { "href": "../ontological-arguments/", "text": "ontological arguments" } ]
moral-anti-realism	Moral Anti-Realism	First published Mon Jul 30, 2007; substantive revision Mon May 24, 2021	[ "\nIt might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for\n“moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other\nentries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral\nrealism” and stipulate the negation of the view described there.\nAlternatively, it could have links to the entries\n“anti-realism” and “morality” and could\nstipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact\nthat neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more\nstrikingly, that following the two procedures would yield\nsubstantively non-equivalent results—reveals the contentious and\nunsettled nature of the topic.", "\n“Anti-realism,” “non-realism,” and\n“irrealism” may for most purposes be treated as\nsynonymous. Occasionally, distinctions have been suggested for local\npedagogic reasons (see, e.g., Wright 1988; Dreier 2004), but no such\ndistinction has generally taken hold. (“Quasi-realism”\ndenotes something very different, to be described below.) All three\nterms are to be defined in opposition to realism, but since there is\nno consensus on how “realism” is to be understood,\n“anti-realism” fares no better. Crispin Wright (1992: 1)\ncomments that “if there ever was a consensus of understanding\nabout ‘realism’, as a philosophical term of art, it has\nundoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various\ndebates—so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a\nrealist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has\nprobably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more\nthan to clear her throat.” This entry doesn’t purport to\ndo justice to the intricacy and subtlety of the topic of realism; it\nshould be acknowledged at the outset that the fragmentation of which\nWright speaks renders it unlikely that the label “moral\nanti-realism” even succeeds in picking out a definite position.\nYet perhaps we can at least make an advance on clearing our\nthroats." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Characterizing Moral Anti-realism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Who Bears the Burden of Proof?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Arguing For and Against Moral Anti-realism", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Noncognitivism", "3.2 Error Theory", "3.3 Non-objectivism" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nTraditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X\nis to hold that X exists objectively. On this view, moral\nanti-realism is the denial of the thesis that moral\nproperties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever\ncategories one is willing to countenance)—exist objectively.\nThis could involve either (1) the denial that moral properties exist\nat all, or (2) the acceptance that they do exist but this existence is\n(in the relevant sense) non-objective. There are broadly two ways of\nendorsing (1): moral noncognitivism and moral error theory. Proponents\nof (2) may be variously thought of as moral non-objectivists, or\nidealists, or constructivists. So understood, moral anti-realism is\nthe disjunction of three theses:", "\nUsing such labels is not a precise science, nor an uncontroversial\nmatter; here they are employed just to situate ourselves roughly. In\nthis spirit of preliminary imprecision, these views can be initially\ncharacterized as follows:", "\nMoral noncognitivism holds that our moral judgments\nare not in the business of aiming at truth. So, for example, A.J. Ayer\ndeclared that when we say “Stealing money is wrong” we do\nnot express a proposition that can be true or false, but rather it is\nas if we say “Stealing money!!” with the tone of\nvoice indicating that a special feeling of disapproval is being\nexpressed (Ayer [1936] 1971: 110). Note how the predicate\n“… is wrong” has disappeared in Ayer’s\ntranslation schema; thus the issues of whether the property of\nwrongness exists, and whether that existence is objective, also\ndisappear.", "\nThe moral error theorist thinks that although our\nmoral judgments aim at the truth, they systematically fail to secure\nit: the world simply doesn’t contain the relevant\n“stuff” to render our moral judgments true. For a more\nfamiliar analogy, compare what an atheist usually claims about\nreligious judgments. On the face of it, religious discourse is\ncognitivist in nature: it would seem that when someone says “God\nexists” or “God loves you” they are usually\nasserting something that purports to be true. However, according to\nthe atheist, the world isn’t furnished with the right kind of\nstuff (gods, afterlife, miracles, etc.) necessary to render these\nassertions true. The moral error theorist claims that when we say\n“Stealing is morally wrong” we are asserting that the act\nof stealing instantiates the property of moral wrongness, but in fact\nthere is no such property, or at least nothing in the world\ninstantiates it, and thus the utterance is untrue.", "\nNon-objectivism (as it will be called here) allows\nthat moral facts exist but holds that they are non-objective. The\nslogan version comes from Hamlet: “there is nothing either good\nor bad, but thinking makes it so.” For a quick example of a\nnon-objective fact, consider the different properties that a\nparticular diamond might have. It is true that the diamond is made of\ncarbon, and also true that the diamond is worth $1000, say. But the\nstatus of these facts seems different. That the diamond is carbon\nseems an objective fact: it doesn’t depend on what we think of\nthe matter. (We could all be under the impression that it is not\ncarbon, and all be wrong.) That the diamond is worth $1000, by\ncontrast, seems to depend on us. If we all thought that it was worth\nmore (or less), then it would be worth more (or less).", "\n[This entry uses the label “non-objectivism” instead of\nthe simple “subjectivism” since there is an entrenched\nusage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in\nmaking a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing)\none’s own mental attitudes (e.g., “Stealing is morally\nwrong” means “I disapprove of stealing”). So\nunderstood, subjectivism is a kind of non-objectivist theory, but\nthere are many other kinds of non-objectivist theory, too.]", "\nIt is tempting to construe this idea of non-objectivity as\n“mind-dependence,” though this, as we will see below, is a\ntricky notion, since something may be mind-independent in one sense\nand mind-dependent in another. Cars, for example, are designed and\nconstructed by creatures with minds, and yet in another sense cars are\nclearly concrete entities whose ongoing existence does not depend on\nour mental activity. Those who feel pessimistic that the notion of\nmind-dependence can be straightened out might prefer to characterize\nmoral realism in a way that makes no reference to objectivity. There\nis also the concern that the objectivity clause threatens to render\nmoral anti-realism trivially true, since there is little room for\ndoubting that the moral status of actions usually (if not always)\ndepends in some manner on mental phenomena, such as the\nintentions with which the action was performed or the episodes of\npleasure and pain that ensue from it. (See Sayre-McCord 1986; also his\nthe entry on\n moral realism.)\n Whether such pessimism is warranted is not something to be decided\nhastily. Perhaps the judicious course is to make a terminological\ndistinction between minimal moral realism—which is the\ndenial of noncognitivism and error theory—and robust moral\nrealism—which in addition asserts the objectivity of moral\nfacts. (See Rosen 1994 for this distinction.) In what follows,\nhowever, “moral realism” will continue to be used to\ndenote the traditional robust version.", "\nIf moral anti-realism is understood in this manner, then there are\nseveral things with which it is important not to confuse it.", "\nFirst, moral anti-realism is not a form of moral\nskepticism. If we take moral skepticism to be the claim that\nthere is no such thing as moral knowledge, and we take knowledge to be\njustified true belief, then there are three ways of being a moral\nskeptic: one can deny that moral judgments are beliefs, one can deny\nthat moral judgments are ever true, or one can deny that moral\njudgments are ever justified. The noncognitivist makes the first of\nthese denials, and the error theorist makes the second, thus\nnoncognitivists and error theorists count as both moral anti-realists\nand moral skeptics. However, since the non-objectivity of some fact\ndoes not pose a particular problem regarding the possibility of\none’s knowing it (I might know that a certain diamond is worth\n$1000, for example), then there is nothing to stop the moral\nnon-objectivist from accepting the existence of moral knowledge. So\nmoral non-objectivism is a form of moral anti-realism that need not be\na form of moral skepticism. Conversely, one might maintain that moral\njudgments are sometimes objectively true—thus being a moral\nrealist—while also maintaining that moral judgments always lack\njustification—thus being a moral skeptic. (See entry for\n moral skepticism.)", "\nSpeaking more generally, moral anti-realism, as it has been defined\nhere, contains no epistemological clause: it is silent on the question\nof whether we are justified in making moral judgments. This is worth\nnoting since moral realists often want to support a view of morality\nthat would guarantee our justified access to a realm of objective\nmoral facts. But any such epistemic guarantee will need to be argued\nfor separately; it is not implied by realism itself. Indeed, if\nobjective facts are those that do not depend on our mental activity,\nthen they are precisely those facts that we can all be mistaken about,\nand thus it seems reasonable to suppose that the desire for moral\nfacts to be objective and the desire for a guarantee of epistemic\naccess to moral facts are desiderata that are in tension with each\nother.", "\nSecond, it is worth stating explicitly that moral anti-realism is not\na form of moral relativism—or, perhaps more\nusefully noted: that moral relativism is not a form of moral\nanti-realism. Moral relativism is a form of cognitivism according to\nwhich moral claims contain an indexical element, such that the truth\nof any such claim requires relativization to some individual or group.\nAccording to a simple form of relativism, the claim “Stealing is\nmorally wrong” might be true when one person utters it, and\nfalse when someone else utters it. The important thing to note is that\nthis would not necessarily make moral wrongness non-objective. For\nexample, suppose someone were to make the relativistic claim that\ndifferent moral values, virtues, and duties apply to different groups\nof people due to, say, their social caste. If this person were asked\nin virtue of what these relativistic moral facts obtain, there is\nnothing to prevent them offering the full-blooded realist answer:\n“It’s just the way the universe objectively is.”\nRelativism does not stand opposite objectivism; it stands opposite\nabsolutism (the form of cognitivism according to which the truth of\nmoral claims does not require relativization to any individual or\ngroup). One can be both a moral relativist and a moral objectivist\n(and thus a moral realist); conversely, one can be both a moral\nnon-objectivist (and thus a moral anti-realist) and a moral\nabsolutist. (See entries for\n relativism\n and\n moral relativism.)", "\nOf course, someone could simply stipulate that moral realism includes\nthe denial of moral relativism, and perhaps the philosophical\ncommunity could be persuaded to adopt this definition (in which case\nthis entry would need to be revised). But it seems reasonable to\nsuspect that the common tendency to think that moral realism and moral\nrelativism are opposed to each other is, more often than not, due a\nconfused conflation of the objectivism/non-objectivism distinction and\nthe absolutism/relativism distinction.", "\nThird and finally, it might be helpful to clarify the relationship\nbetween moral anti-realism and moral naturalism. The\nmoral naturalist believes that moral facts exist and fit within the\nworldview presented by science. (For example, a utilitarian view that\nidentifies moral obligation with the production of happiness will\ncount as a form of moral naturalism, since there is nothing\nparticularly scientifically mysterious about happiness.) A moral\nnaturalist may maintain that moral facts are objective in nature, in\nwhich case this moral naturalist will count as a moral realist. But a\nmoral naturalist may instead maintain that the moral facts are not\nobjective in nature, in which case this moral naturalist will count as\na moral anti-realist. Consider, for example, a simplistic\nnon-objectivist theory that identifies moral goodness (say) with\nwhatever a person approves of. Such a view would be a form of\nanti-realism (in virtue of its non-objectivism), but since the\nphenomenon of people approving of things is something that can be\naccommodated smoothly within a scientific framework, it would also be\na form of moral naturalism. Conversely, if a moral realist maintains\nthat the objective moral facts cannot be accommodated within the\nscientific worldview, then this moral realist will count as a moral\nnon-naturalist. (See entries for\n naturalism\n and\n moral naturalism.)", "\nThe noncognitivist and the error theorist, it should be noted, count\nas neither moral naturalists nor moral non-naturalists, since they do\nnot believe in moral facts at all. These kinds of moral anti-realist,\nhowever, may well be naturalists in a more general sense: they may\nmaintain that the only items that we should admit into our ontology\nare those that fit within the scientific worldview. Indeed, it is\nquite likely that it is their commitment to this more general\nontological naturalism that lies behind the noncognitivist’s and\nthe error theorist’s moral skepticism, since they may deem that\nmoral properties (were they to exist) would have to have\ncharacteristics that cannot be accommodated within a naturalistic\nframework.", "\nSumming up: Some moral anti-realists will count as moral skeptics, but\nsome may believe in moral knowledge. Some moral anti-realists will be\nrelativists, but some may be moral absolutists (and many are neither).\nSome moral anti-realists will be moral naturalists, but some may be\nmoral non-naturalists, and some will be neither moral naturalists nor\nnon-naturalists. These various positions can be combined into a\npotentially bewildering array of possible complex metaethical\npositions (e.g., non-skeptical, relativistic, non-naturalistic moral\nanti-realism)—though, needless to say, these views may vary\ngreatly in plausibility." ], "section_title": "1. Characterizing Moral Anti-realism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIt is widely assumed that moral realism enjoys some sort of\npresumption in its favor that the anti-realist has to work to\novercome. Jonathan Dancy writes that “we take moral value to be\npart of the fabric of the world; … and we should take it in the\nabsence of contrary considerations that actions and agents do have the\nsorts of moral properties we experience in them” (1986: 172). In\na similar vein, David McNaughton claims “The realist’s\ncontention is that he has only to rebut the arguments designed to\npersuade us that moral realism is philosophically untenable in order\nto have made out his case” (1988: 40–41). David Brink\nconcurs: “We begin as (tacit) cognitivists and realists about\nethics.… Moral Realism should be our metaethical starting\npoint, and we should give it up only if it does involve unacceptable\nmetaphysical and epistemological commitments” (1989:\n23–24).", "\nIt may be questioned, however, whether moral realism really does enjoy\nintuitive support, and also questioned whether, if it does, this\nshould burden the anti-realist with extra labor.", "\nOn the first matter, it may be argued that some of the distinctions\ndrawn in distinguishing moral realism from anti-realism are too\nfine-grained or abstruse for “the folk” to have any\ndeterminate opinion. It is, for example, radically unclear to what\nextent common sense embraces the objectivity of moral facts.\nThere have been some empirical investigations ostensibly examining the\nextent to which ordinary people endorse moral objectivism (e.g.,\nGoodwin & Darley 2008; Uttich et al. 2014), but, upon examination,\nmany of these studies seem in fact to examine the extent to which\nordinary people endorse moral absolutism. (See Hopster 2019.)\nAnd if even professional researchers struggle to grasp the concept of\nmoral objectivity, it is difficult to maintain confidently that\n“the folk” have a firm and determinate intuition on the\nsubject. Furthermore, even if empirical investigation of collective\nopinion were to locate strong intuitions in favor of a\nmind-independent morality, there may be other equally robust\nintuitions in favor of morality being mind-dependent. (For\nexample, the fact that we seem unwilling to defer to experts when\nforming moral views appears to count against realism; see McGrath\n2011. Similarly, the fact that we do not expect a person necessarily\nto accept others’ reasons for their moral views seems to reveal\nanti-realist tendencies; see Foot 1958 for discussion.) Given the\ndifficulties in deciding and articulating just what kind of\nobjectivity is relevant to the moral realism/anti-realism division,\nand given the range and potential subtlety of options, it might be\nthought rash to claim that common sense has a firm opinion one way or\nthe other on this subject.", "\nOn the second matter: even if we were to identify a widespread\nunivocal intuition in favor of moral realism, it remains unclear to\nwhat extent we should adopt a methodology that rewards moral realism\nwith a dialectical advantage when it comes to metaethics. By\ncomparison, we do not think that physicists should endeavor to come up\nwith intuitive theories. (There is, for example, a widespread\nerroneous intuition that a fast-moving ball exiting a curved tube will\ncontinue to travel on a curving trajectory (McCloskey et al. 1980).\nThe fact that Newtonian physics predicts that the ball will in fact\ncontinue on a straight trajectory is surely in no sense a mark against\nthe theory.) Moreover, it is important to distinguish between any such\npro-realist intuitions ex ante and ex post. Once\nsomeone has accepted considerations and arguments in favor of moral\nanti-realism, then any counter-intuitiveness that this conclusion\nhas—ex ante—may be considered irrelevant. One noteworthy\ntype of strategy here is the “debunking argument,” which\nseeks to undermine moral intuitions by showing that they are the\nproduct of processes that we have no grounds for thinking are reliable\nindicators of truth. (See Street 2006; O’Neill 2015; Joyce 2013,\n2016.) To the extent that the anti-realist can provide a plausible\nexplanation for why humans would tend to think of morality as\nobjective, even if it is not objective, then any counter-intuitiveness\nin the anti-realist’s failure to accommodate objectivity can no\nlonger be raised as an ongoing consideration against moral\nanti-realism.", "\nA theory’s clashing with common sense is not the only way in\nwhich it can face a burden of proof. Of two theories, A and B, if A\nexplains a range of observable phenomena more readily than B, then\nproponents of B will have to undertake extra labor of squaring their\ntheory with the available evidence—and this may be the case even\nif B strikes people as the more intuitive theory. For example, perhaps\nNewtonian physics is more intuitive than Einsteinian, but there is\nobservable data—e.g., the results of the famous solar eclipse\nexperiments of 1919—that the latter theory is much better\nequipped to explain.", "\nWhat is it, then, that metaethical theories are expected to explain?\nThe range of phenomena is ill-defined and open-ended, but is typically\ntaken to include such things as the manifest features of moral\nlanguage, the importance of morality in our lives, moral practices and\ninstitutions, the way moral considerations engage motivation, the\ncharacter of moral disagreement, and the acquisition of moral\nattitudes.", "\nConsider the first of these explananda: moral language. Here it seems\nreasonable to claim that the noncognitivist shoulders a burden of\nproof. Moral predicates appear to function linguistically like any\nother predicate: Just as the sentence “The cat is brown”\nmay be used as an antecedent of a conditional, as a premise of an\nargument, as the basis of a question (“Is the cat\nbrown?”), have its predicate nominalized (“Brownness is\nhad by the cat”), be embedded in a propositional attitude claim\n(“Mary believes that the cat is brown”), and have the\ntruth predicate applied to it (“‘The cat is brown’\nis true”)—so too can all these things be done, without\nobvious incoherence, with a moral sentence like “Stealing is\nmorally wrong.” This is entirely as the cognitivist would\npredict. By contrast, for a noncognitivist who maintains (as Ayer did)\nthat this moral judgment amounts to nothing more than\n“Stealing!” uttered in a special disapproval-expressing\ntone, all of this linguistic evidence represents a major (and perhaps\ninsurmountable) challenge.", "\nOther explananda, on the other hand, may reveal that it is the moral\nrealist who has the extra explaining to do. If moral properties are\ntaken to have an essential normativity—in terms of, say, placing\npractical demands upon us—then the realist faces the challenge\nof explaining how any such thing could exist objectively. The\nmoral non-objectivist, by contrast, sees moral normativity as\nsomething that we create—that practical demands arise from our\ndesires, emotions, values, judgments, practices, or institutions. Thus\nthe task of providing a moral ontology that accommodates normativity\nseems a much easier one for the non-objectivist than for the moral\nrealist. (The noncognitivist and the error theorist would seem to have\nan even easier time, since for them there is no moral ontology at\nall.)", "\nThere remains a great deal of dispute concerning what the phenomena\nare that a metaethical theory should be expected to explain; and even\nwhen some such phenomenon is roughly agreed upon, there is often\nsignificant disagreement over its exact nature. For example, pretty\nmuch everyone agrees that any decent metaethical theory should be able\nto explain the close connection between moral judgment and\nmotivation—but it is a live question whether that connection\nshould be construed as a necessary one, or whether a reliably\ncontingent connection will suffice. (See Svavardóttir 2006;\nRosati 2021.) Even when such disputes can be settled, there remains\nplenty of room for arguing over the importance of the explanandum in\nquestion (relative to other explananda), and for arguing whether a\ngiven theory does indeed adequately explain the phenomenon.", "\nIn short, attempts to establish the burden of proof are as slippery\nand indecisive in the debate between the moral realist and the moral\nanti-realist as they tend to be generally in philosophy. The matter is\ncomplicated by the fact that there are two kinds of burden-of-proof\ncase that can be pressed, and here they tend to pull against each\nother. On the one hand, it is widely assumed that common sense favors\nthe moral realist. On the other hand, moral realists face a cluster of\nexplanatory challenges concerning the nature of moral facts (how they\nrelate to non-moral facts, how we have access to them, why they have\npractical importance)—challenges that seem much more tractable\nfor the moral non-objectivist and often simply don’t arise for\neither the noncognitivist or the error theorist. This tension between\nwhat is considered to be the intuitive position and what is\nconsidered to be the empirically, metaphysically, and\nepistemologically defensible position, motivates and animates\nmuch of the debate between the moral realist and moral\nanti-realist." ], "section_title": "2. Who Bears the Burden of Proof?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nGiven that moral anti-realism is a disjunction of three views, then\nany argument for any of those views is an argument for moral\nanti-realism. By the same token, any argument against any of the three\nviews can contribute to an argument for moral realism, and if one is\npersuaded by arguments against all three, then one is committed to\nmoral realism. Here is not the place to present such arguments in\ndetail, but offer a flavor of the kinds of considerations that push\nphilosophers to and fro on these matters." ], "section_title": "3. Arguing For and Against Moral Anti-realism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nOn the face of it, when we make a public moral judgment, like\n“That act of stealing was morally wrong,” what we are\ndoing is asserting that the act of stealing in question instantiates a\ncertain property: moral wrongness. This raises a number of extremely\nthorny metaethical questions: What kind of property is moral\nwrongness? How does it relate to the natural properties instantiated\nby the action? How do we have epistemic access to the property? How do\nwe confirm whether something does or does not instantiate the\nproperty? (And so on.) The difficulty of answering such questions may\nlead one to reject the presupposition that prompted them: One might\ndeny that in making a moral judgment we are engaging in the assignment\nof properties at all. Such a rejection is, roughly speaking, the\nnoncognitivist proposal. (See entry for\n moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism.)", "\nIt is impossible to characterize noncognitivism in a way that will\nplease everyone. Sometimes it is presented as a view about mental\nstates and sometimes about moral language. This is because it is a\nclaim about “moral judgments,” and we can consider moral\njudgments either as private mental acts or as public utterances. If we\nare thinking of moral judgments as mental states, then noncognitivism\nis the claim that moral judgments are not beliefs. If we are thinking\nof moral judgments as speech acts, then noncognitivism is the view\nthat moral judgments do not express beliefs—i.e., it is\nthe view that moral judgments are not assertions. Here, for brevity,\nthe latter formulation will be preferred.", "\nIf moral judgments are not assertions, then what are they? Here the\ndifferent kinds of answers give rise to different forms of\nnoncognitivism. Ayer, as was mentioned earlier, maintained that when\nwe make a moral judgment we are expressing certain feelings, such as\napproval or disapproval. Another influential kind of noncognitivism\ncalled “prescriptivism” claims that moral judgments are\nreally veiled commands whose true meaning should be captured using the\nimperative mood: Someone who says “Stealing is morally\nwrong” is really saying something like “Don’t\nsteal!” (see Carnap 1935: 24–25). R.M. Hare (1952, 1963)\nrestricted this to commands that one is willing to universalize.", "\nIf noncognitivism is defined as the negation of cognitivism—as a\ntheory about what moral judgments are not—then the two theories\nare not just contraries but contradictories. However, a degree of\nbenign relaxation of criteria allows for the possibility of\n“mixed” theories. If we consider noncognitivism not as a\npurely negative thesis, but as a range of positive proposals (such as\nthose just mentioned), then it becomes possible that the nature of\nmoral judgments combines both cognitivist and noncognitivist elements.\nFor example, moral judgments (as speech acts) may be two\nthings: They may be assertions and ways of issuing commands.\n(By analogy: To call someone a “kraut” is both to assert\nthat they are German and to express a derogatory attitude toward\npeople of this nationality.) C.L. Stevenson held such a mixed view\n(1944); for modern versions, see Copp 2001; Schroeder 2009; Svoboda\n2011.", "\nAs mentioned, one of the major attractions of noncognitivism is that\nit is a means of sidestepping a number of thorny puzzles about\nmorality. In addition, there are several features of morality that, it\nhas been argued, the noncognitivist can accommodate more readily than\nthe cognitivist. Here are three.", "\nFirst, it has often been argued that noncognitivism does a good job of\naccounting for the motivational efficacy of moral judgment. If, when I\nsay “Stealing is morally wrong,” I am expressing my\ndisapproval of stealing, and if disapproval is a motivation-engaging\nstate, then it seems to follow that when I sincerely judge that\nstealing is morally wrong, I will also be motivated not to steal. By\ncontrast, if a Humean view of psychology is accepted, according to\nwhich beliefs alone can never motivate, then the cognitivist must\nallow that moral judgment alone cannot motivate; it requires\nthe presence of certain desires as well. A number of philosophers have\nargued that the cognitivist view of moral motivation seems inadequate\n(Smith 1994; Toppinen 2004; see also Carbonell 2013). See entry for\n moral motivation.", "\nSecond, it has been argued that moral disagreements have certain\nqualities that are accommodated better by the noncognitivist than the\ncognitivist. The fact that moral disagreements are often both vehement\nand seemingly intractable, for example, might be taken as evidence\nthat what is really going on is a clash of emotional attitudes rather\nthan a clash of beliefs (Stevenson 1948; Gibbard 1992; Blackburn\n1998).", "\nThird, it has often been observed that we are markedly uncomfortable\nwith the idea that anyone should come to hold a moral view on the\nbasis of having deferred to an expert on morality—in contrast to\nthe way that we are perfectly comfortable with the idea that a person\nshould defer to experts when forming beliefs about, say, plate\ntectonics. This reluctance to defer to experts in forming our moral\nviews would make sense if what we are doing when we make a moral\njudgment is expressing our emotional attitudes on the matter. (See\nMcGrath 2009: 322, 2011; Hills 2011.)", "\nStanding against these considerations in favor of noncognitivism are a\nnumber of weighty problems. The most well-known challenge for\nnoncognitivism is the so-called Frege-Geach problem. If\n“Stealing is morally wrong” is not even the kind of thing\nthat can be true or false, then how can we make sense of it when it is\nembedded in logically complex contexts (such as “If stealing is\nmorally wrong, then encouraging your brother to steal is morally\nwrong”), and how are we to make sense of it as a premise in a\nvalid argument (since validity is, by definition, a truth-preserving\nrelation)?", "\nThere have been considerable efforts on behalf of noncognitivism to\nanswer this challenge. Simon Blackburn, for example, has pursued what\nhe calls a “quasi-realist” program (Blackburn 1984, 1993,\n1998). The quasi-realist is someone who endorses an anti-realist\nmetaphysical stance but who seeks, through philosophical maneuvering,\nto earn the right for moral discourse to enjoy all the\ntrappings of realist talk. Such a view may hold that although the\nunderlying logical structure of the sentence “Stealing is\nmorally wrong” is nothing more than “Stealing:\nBoo!”, it is nevertheless legitimate for ordinary speakers to\nsay things like “If stealing is morally wrong, then encouraging\nyour brother to steal is wrong” or “‘Stealing is\nmorally wrong’ is true.” One might, for instance, argue\nthat all that is required to make it acceptable to consider\n“Stealing is morally wrong” true or false (and thus a\nlegitimate antecedent in a conditional) is that it has the appropriate\nsurface propositional grammar (“x is P”); and one might\nmaintain that choosing to employ such grammar to express one’s\nnoncognitive attitudes brings no ontological commitment to any\ntroublesome property of moral wrongness.", "\nOne of the main challenges for the quasi-realist is to maintain a\ntheoretic distance from the moral realist. If the quasi-realist\nprogram succeeds in vindicating the use of the truth predicate for\nmoral sentences, and if in addition it makes it permissible to say\n“It is a fact that stealing is wrong,” “It is a\nmind-independent fact that stealing is wrong,” “Stealing\nwould be wrong even if our attitude toward it were different,”\nand so on—mimicking all and any of the moral realist’s\nassertions—then in what sense is quasi-realism\nquasi-realism?—Why has it not simply collapsed into the\nrobust moral realism that it set out to oppose? (See Wright 1988;\nDreier 2018.) [A quick note on terminology: Although I have here\npresented Blackburn’s quasi-realism as a potential avenue for\nthe noncognitivist to pursue, it should be noted that Blackburn\nhimself eschews the label “noncognitivism” to describe the\nposition he defends (Blackburn 1996); his preferred term is\n“projectivism.” (For discussion of the relation between\nthe two views—noncognitivism and projectivism—see Joyce\n2009.)]" ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Noncognitivism" }, { "content": [ "\nThe error theorist is a cognitivist: maintaining that moral judgment\nconsists of beliefs and assertions. However, the error theorist thinks\nthat these beliefs and assertions are never true. (The error theorist\ncontrasts here with what can be called the “success\ntheorist.”) Moral judgments are never true because the\nproperties that would be necessary to render them\ntrue—properties like moral wrongness, moral goodness, virtue,\nevil, etc.—simply don’t exist, or at least are not\ninstantiated. Defenders of moral error theory include Mackie 1977,\nHinckfuss 1987, Joyce 2001, and Olson 2014.", "\nIf I assert that my dog is a reptile, then I’ve asserted\nsomething false—though in this case there are other things that\nare reptiles. If I assert that my dog is a unicorn then again\nI’ve asserted something false—though in this case\nthere’s nothing in the actual world to which I could attach the\npredicate “… is a unicorn” and end up with a true\nassertion. The error theorist thinks that employing moral discourse is\nrather like talking about unicorns, though in the case of unicorns\nmost people now know that they don’t exist, while in the case of\nmoral properties most people are unaware of the error. To be an error\ntheorist about unicorns doesn’t require that you think unicorns\nare impossible creatures; it’s enough that you think\nthat they simply don’t actually exist. In the same way, to be a\nmoral error theorist doesn’t require that you think that moral\nproperties couldn’t possibly exist; it would be enough to think\nthat they are never actually instantiated. (Note that there may be a\ndifference between saying “Property P is never actually\ninstantiated” and “Property P doesn’t exist,”\nbut that’s a problem for metaphysicians to sort out. Holding\neither view with respect to moral properties is enough to make one a\nmoral error theorist.)", "\nTo be an error theorist about unicorns does not mean that every\nassertion involving the word “unicorn” is false. There\nwould be no error, for example, in asserting “Unicorns do not\nexist,” “The ancient Greeks believed that unicorns lived\nin India,” or “My dog is not a unicorn.” What is\ndistinctive about these three sentences is that one would not, in\nasserting them, be committing oneself to the existence of unicorns.\n(It would be rather troubling if this were not true of the first, in\nparticular!) Similarly, the moral error theorist may allow that the\nfollowing are true: “Moral wrongness does not exist,”\n“Augustine believed that stealing pears was wrong,” and\n“Stealing is not morally wrong.”", "\nThe last example (“Stealing is not morally wrong”) calls\nfor an extra comment. In ordinary conversation—where,\npresumably, the possibility of moral error theory is not considered a\nlive option—someone who claims that X is not wrong\nwould be taken to be implying that X is morally good or at\nleast morally permissible. And if “X” denotes\nsomething awful, like torturing innocent people, then this can be used\nto make the error theorist look awful. But when we are doing\nmetaethics, and the possibility of moral error theory is on the table,\nthen this ordinary implication breaks down. The error theorist\ndoesn’t think that torturing innocent people is morally wrong,\nbut doesn’t think that it is morally good or morally permissible\neither. It is important that criticisms of the moral error theorist do\nnot trade on equivocating between the implications that hold in\nordinary contexts and the implications that hold in metaethical\ncontexts.", "\nThe sentence “Unicorns exist” is false, but there are\nnevertheless various contexts where one might have reason to utter the\nsentence: telling a story, joking, acting, speaking metaphorically,\ngiving an example of a two-word sentence, etc. What is distinctive\nabout these contexts is that one would not be asserting the\nsentence, and thus (as before) one would not, in making these\nutterances, be committing oneself to the existence of unicorns.\nSimilarly, the moral error theorist might propose that we carry on\nsaying things like “Stealing is morally wrong” but in a\nmanner that deprives our utterances of ontological commitment to moral\nproperties and, thus, removes the error from our discourse.\nIf the error theorist proposes to accomplish this by modeling moral\nlanguage on a way that familiar engagement with fictions nullifies\ncommitment, then such a moral error theorist is a\nfictionalist. (See entry for\n fictionalism;\n see also Kalderon 2005; Joyce 2017.) Other moral error theorists may\nthink that we would be better off if we pretty much eliminated moral\ntalk from our thoughts and language. Such moral error theorists are\nknown as “abolitionists” or “eliminativists.”\n(I say “pretty much” since presumably even the\nabolitionist allows that we can carry on using moral language in the\ncontext of plays, jokes, etc.) (For debate between fictionalists and\nabolitionists, see Garner & Joyce 2019.)", "\nError theory is commonly defined as the view that moral judgments are\n(i) truth-evaluable but (ii) always false. But there are various\nreasons for preferring to render (i) as a claim about speech\nacts—that moral judgments aim at the truth (i.e., they\nare assertions)—and (ii) as the broader claim that moral\njudgments are “untrue” rather than “false.”\nOne might, for example, be drawn to error theory because one thinks\nthat there is a sufficient amount of indeterminacy, fragmentation, or\nconfusion surrounding moral concepts that the judgments that employ\nthem, while satisfying the conditions for being beliefs and\nassertions, do not satisfy the conditions for having truth value.\nPerhaps, for example, moral concepts are historically derived from a\ntheistic framework within which they made sense, yet removed from\nwhich they are mere remnants that evoke strong intuitions but, upon\nexamination, make no sense. (See Anscombe 1958; MacIntyre 1984.) If\nthis is so, then it may be argued that the concept moral\nwrongness is just so ill-defined that someone who makes the moral\njudgment “Stealing is morally wrong” fails to put forward\na proposition that could be true; but since the speaker and audience\nare presumably unaware of this fact, the judgment should still count\nas an assertion. (One needs to tread carefully here. The proposal that\nmoral judgments lack truth value is traditionally associated with\nnoncognitivism. But the noncognitivist thinks that moral judgments\nlack truth value because they are not assertions at all. The error\ntheorist, by contrast, thinks that moral judgments are\n(typically) asserted, but that they fail to be true. Failing to have a\ntruth value is one way of failing to be true. Being false is the other\nway.)", "\nMost arguments for moral error theory, however, presuppose that moral\nconcepts do have a reasonably determinate content, but that there is\nsimply nothing in the world to satisfy this content. The traditional\nform of argument for moral error theory, thus, has two steps. First,\nthe error theorist undertakes the conceptual step of\nestablishing that in participating in moral discourse we commit\nourselves to the world being a certain way (that it contains certain\ninstantiated properties, etc.). Then the error theorist undertakes the\nontological step of establishing that the world is not that\nway. The latter may be achieved (in principle, at least) either\nthrough a priori means or through a posteriori\nmethods.", "\nOne example of an argument with this structure is as follows. First it\nis noted that “S morally ought to φ” is true\nonly if S is a moral agent. The further conceptual steps of\nthe argument then seek to establish that in order to be moral agent,\nS must have the capacity to perform actions that are morally\nblameworthy and praiseworthy, and that these capacities presuppose\nthat S has a certain kind of control over their actions. The\nontological step of the argument then seeks to establish that no such\nautonomous control exists in nature; it’s an illusion. (See\nentry for\n skepticism about moral responsibility.)\n A couple of iterations of modus tollens then take us to the\nconclusion that “S morally ought to φ” is\nnever true.", "\nThe argument just sketched would locate the moral error in a mistake\nwe make about the kind of creatures we are. The more widely discussed\narguments, however, locate the moral error in a mistake we make about\nthe kind of world we inhabit. John Mackie (who coined the term\n“error theory” in 1977) argues that when we participate in\nmoral discourse we commit ourselves to the existence of objective\nvalues and objective prescriptions, but there are no such things.\nEssentially, Mackie argues that the moral realist is correct about\nmorality conceptually speaking—we are moral\nrealists—but the moral realist is incorrect about how the world\nactually is. Moral facts place demands upon us, but (Mackie asks) how\ncould such demands exist objectively? This would\nseem to require rules of conduct somehow written into the fabric of\nthe universe, and nothing in our understanding of the objective\nnaturalistic world (Mackie goes on) suggests that anything of the kind\nexists. Mackie famously calls such properties “queer” (in\nwhat seems now an increasingly anachronistic use of the term).", "\nMackie occasionally cashes out his “argument from\nqueerness” in terms of practical reasons. He writes that\n“to say that [objective prescriptions] are intrinsically\naction-guiding [which is one way he sometimes describes the\nnormativity whose existence he denies] is to say that the reasons that\nthey give for doing or for not doing something are independent of that\nagent’s desires or purposes” (Mackie 1982: 115). Surely if\nsomeone is morally required to do something (Mackie thinks), then that\nperson must have a reason to do it. (After all, if one were to deny\nthis, then what kind of “normative teeth” would moral\nproperties have? “Yes, I know that X is morally wrong,\nbut I have no reason to avoid moral wrongness, so the wrongness of\nX is nothing to me” would become, in principle, an\nacceptable thing to say.) But since morality often seems to demand\nthat we do things that we don’t want to do, then morality seems\nto imply the existence of reasons to do things that we don’t\nwant to do. One could, at this point, simply throw up one’s\nhands and claim that such reasons would be too weird to countenance.\nBut one could also go beyond the “argument from queerness”\nby instead arguing methodically that a Humean (instrumentalist) theory\nof reasons for action—according to which reasons ultimately\ndepend on our ends—is superior to any form of practical\nnon-instrumentalism. (See entry for\n reason for action: internal and external.)\n According to such a view, the practical non-instrumentalist is\ncorrect about morality conceptually speaking—in\nengaging in moral discourse, we commit ourselves to\nnon-instrumentalist reasons—but the practical\nnon-instrumentalist is incorrect about how the world actually is: a\nHumean theory of reasons for action is more defensible. (It is worth\nnoting that endorsing Humean instrumentalism about reasons for action\ndoes not in any obvious way commit one to the endorsement of\ninstrumentalism about other kinds of reasons, such as epistemic\nreasons. See Joyce 2019; Cowie 2019.)", "\nIf an argument for moral error theory has two steps—the\nconceptual and the ontological—then there are two places to\nobject. If we consider Mackie’s argument, for example, then one\nkind of opponent will agree that objective values and prescriptions\nwould be too weird to countenance, but maintain that it doesn’t\nmatter because moral discourse is not committed to the existence of\nsuch strange creatures. Another kind of opponent will agree with\nMackie that morality is committed to the existence of objective values\nand prescriptions, but maintain that there is nothing particularly\nstrange about them.", "\nError theorists must be prepared to defend themselves on both fronts.\nThis job is made difficult by the fact that it may be hard to\narticulate precisely what it is that is so troubling about morality.\nThis failure need not be due to a lack of clear thinking or\nimagination on the error theorists’ part, for the thing that is\ntroubling them may be that there is something deeply mysterious about\nmorality. The moral error theorist may, for example, perceive that\nmoral imperatives are imbued with a kind of mystical practical\nauthority—a quality that, being mysterious, of course\ncannot be articulated in terms satisfactory to an analytic\nphilosopher. Such an error theorist is forced to fall back on vague\nmetaphors in presenting their case: Moral properties have a\n“to-be-pursuedness” to them (Mackie 1977: 40), moral facts\nwould require that “the universe takes sides” (Burgess\n[1978] 2007), moral believers are committed to “demands as real\nas trees and as authoritative as orders from headquarters”\n(Garner 1994: 61), and so on. Indeed, it may be the vague, equivocal,\nquasi-mystical, and/or ineliminably metaphorical imponderabilia of\nmoral discourse that so troubles the error theorist. (See Hussain\n2004.)", "\nEven if the error theorist can articulate a clear and determinate\nproblematic feature of morality, the dispute over whether this quality\nshould count as a “non-negotiable component” of morality\nhas a tendency to lead quickly to impasse, for there is no accepted\nmethodology for deciding when a discourse is “centrally\ncommitted” to a given thesis. What is evidently needed is a\nworkable model of the identity criteria for concepts (allowing us\nconfidently to either affirm or deny such claims as “The concept\nof moral obligation is the concept of an objective\nrequirement”)—but we have no such model, and there is no\nconsensus even on what approximate shape such a model would take.", "\nIt is also possible that the most reasonable account of conceptual\ncontent will leave many concepts with significantly indistinct\nborders. There may simply be no fact of the matter about whether moral\ndiscourse is committed to the existence of non-instrumental reasons\n(for example). Thinking along these lines, David Lewis makes use of\nthe distinction between speaking strictly and speaking loosely:\n“Strictly speaking, Mackie is right: genuine values would have\nto meet an impossible condition, so it is an error to think there are\nany. Loosely speaking, the name may go to a claimant that deserves it\nimperfectly … What to make of the situation is mainly a matter\nof temperament” (Lewis [1989] 2000: 93). Lewis’s own\ntemperament leads him to seek to vindicate value discourse, and he\nthinks that this can be done by supporting a dispositional theory of\nvalue (of a kind to be discussed in the next section). But since there\nis no logical or methodological requirement that we should prefer\nspeaking loosely over speaking strictly, or vice versa, then this\nwould leave the dispute between moral error theorists and success\ntheorists a fundamentally undecidable matter—there may simply be\nno fact of the matter about who is correct. (See Joyce 2012.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Error Theory" }, { "content": [ "\nTo deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to\nmake one a minimal moral realist. Traditionally, however, moral\nrealism has required the acceptance of a further thesis: the\nobjectivity of morality. “Moral non-objectivism” denotes\nthe view that moral facts exist and are mind-dependent (in the\nrelevant sense), while “moral objectivism” holds that they\nexist and are mind-independent. (Note that this taxonomy makes the two\ncontraries rather than contradictories; the error theorist and the\nnoncognitivist count as neither objectivists nor non-objectivists. The\nerror theorist may, however, be an objectivist in a different sense:\nin holding that objectivity is a feature of morality\nconceptually speaking.) Let us say that if one is a moral\ncognitivist and a moral success theorist and a moral\nobjectivist, then one is a robust\nmoral realist.", "\nYet this third condition, even more than the first two, introduces a\ngreat deal of messiness into the dialectic, and the line between the\nrealist and the anti-realist becomes obscure (and, one might think,\nless interesting). The basic problem is that there are many\nnon-equivalent ways of understanding the relation of\nmind-(in)dependence, and thus one philosopher’s realism\nbecomes another philosopher’s anti-realism. At least one\nphilosopher, Gideon Rosen, has expressed pessimism that the relevant\nnotion of objectivity can be sharpened to a useful philosophical\npoint:", "\nTo be sure, we do have “intuitions” of a sort about when\nthe rhetoric of objectivity is appropriate and when it isn’t.\nBut these intuitions are fragile, and every effort I know to find the\nprinciple that underlies them collapses. We sense that there\nis a heady metaphysical thesis at stake in these debates over realism\n… [b]ut after a point, when every attempt to say just what the\nissue is has come up empty, we have no real choice but to conclude\nthat despite all the wonderful, suggestive imagery, there is\nultimately nothing in the neighborhood to discuss. (1994: 279. See\nalso Dworkin 1996.)\n", "\nAs Rosen says, metaphors to mark non-objectivism from objectivism are\neasy to come by and easy to motivate in the uninitiated. The\nobjectivist about X likens our X-oriented activity\nto astronomy, geography, or exploration; the non-objectivist likens it\nto sculpture or imaginative writing. (These are Michael\nDummett’s metaphors (1978: xxv).) The objectivist sees the goal\nof our inquiries as being to “carve the beast of reality at the\njoints” (as the popular paraphrase of Plato’s\nPhaedrus puts it); the non-objectivist sees our inquiries as\nthe application of a “cookie cutter”: imposing a\nnoncompulsory conceptual framework onto an undifferentiated reality\n(to use Hilary Putnam’s equally memorable image (1987: 19)). The\nobjectivist sees inquiry as a process of detection, our\njudgments aiming to reflect the extension of the truth\npredicate with respect to a certain subject; the non-objectivist sees\ninquiry as a process of projection, our judgments\ndetermining the extension of the truth predicate regarding\nthat subject.", "\nThe claim “X is mind-(in)dependent” is certainly\ntoo coarse-grained to do serious work in capturing these powerful\nmetaphors; it is, perhaps, better thought of as a slogan or as a piece\nof shorthand. There are two conspicuous points at which the phrase\nrequires precisification. First, we need to decide what exactly the\nword “mind” stands for. It can be construed strictly and\nliterally, to mean mental activity, or it can be understood\nin a more liberal manner, to include such things as conceptual\nschemes, theories, methods of proof, linguistic practices,\nconventions, sentences, institutions, culture, means of epistemic\naccess, etc. Were the moral facts to depend on any of these\nanthropocentric things, the anti-realist imagery of humans as\ninventors of morality may seem more apt than that of humans as\ndiscoverers. Second, we need to decide what kind of relation is\ndenoted by “(in)dependent.” Consider the following\npossibilities, any of which might form the basis of the claim that\ngoodness depends on mental activity (in this case, for\nsimplicity, Mary’s attitude of approval):", "\n\n\nx is good iff Mary approves of x.\n\n\nx is good iff Mary would approve of x (in\nsuch-and-such circumstances).\n\n\nx is good iff x merits Mary’s approval.\n", "\nThe catalog can be made longer, depending on whether the\n“iff” is construed as necessary or contingent, conceptual,\na priori, or a posteriori. To illustrate further the\nubiquity of and variation among mind-dependence relations on the menu\nof moral theories, consider the following:", "\nIndeed, it is difficult to think of any serious version of moral\nsuccess theory for which the moral facts depend in no way on\nmental activity. Yet to conclude that the distinction between minimal\nand robust realism cannot be upheld would be premature. Many\nmetaethicists who reject noncognitivism and the error theory, and thus\ncount as minimal realists, continue to define their position (often\nunder the label “constructivism”) in contrast to a realist\nview. (See Bagnoli 2002; Ronzoni 2010; Street 2010, 2012. See also the\nentry on\n constructivism in metaethics.)\n The challenge is to pick among the various mind-(in)dependence\nrelations in the hope of drawing a distinction that is philosophically\ninteresting and meshes satisfactorily with our preexisting\nphilosophical taxonomy, such that some success theorists count as\nrealists and some do not.", "\nElizabeth Tropman (2018) argues that the best way of understanding\nmoral objectivity is as follows: The fact that x is\nM (where “… is M” is some moral\npredicate) is objective if and only if this fact doesn’t depend\nonly on any actual or hypothetical agent’s (i) belief or\nnoncognitive attitude about x’s being M, or\n(ii) noncognitive attitude about x. According to this view,\nmany of the aforementioned examples of moral theories, although making\nmoral facts dependent in various ways on various kinds of mental\nphenomena, will not count as non-objective. Consider, for example, the\nutilitarian view that what makes a particular action, φ, morally\nobligatory is that it produces maximal happiness. According to this\nview, although some agent’s (or agents’) mental\nstates—in this case, their happiness—may contribute to\nφ’s moral status, they do not exclusively determine it.\nOther factors also contribute to φ’s moral status, such as\nhow φ compares with other potential actions in terms of happiness\nproduction,. Therefore, on Tropman’s view, this form of\nutilitarianism would satisfy the requirements for morality to count as\nobjective.", "\nThe attractions of moral non-objectivism are that it ticks a lot of\nboxes that its competitors fail to tick. Unlike noncognitivism or\nerror theory, moral non-objectivism is a form of moral anti-realism\nthat allows for the existence of moral beliefs, moral facts, and moral\ntruth, and thus also potentially makes conceptual space for such\nthings as moral progress and moral knowledge. Unlike moral realism, by\nmaking the moral facts depend on us, moral non-objectivism seems to\nhave an easier time accounting for a moral ontology that is both\nnaturalistic and normative.", "\nGiven the wide variety of versions of moral non-objectivity,\nidentifying generic problems is not a straightforward task. One way of\nbringing out some potential worries is to see the non-objectivist as\nfacing a dilemma. Moral non-objectivism comes in both relativistic and\nabsolutist flavors, and either way one goes poses challenges.", "\nConsider first an absolutist version on non-objectivism. Here we would\nhave to identify some agent or group of agents whose beliefs or\nnoncognitive attitudes determine the moral facts. Reasonable\ncontenders for this role are not going to be actual particular people.\nIt would not, for example, be a reasonable theory that maintained that\nthe moral facts for everyone throughout all time are determined by\nwhat Richard Joyce thinks on the matter. (The only plausible contender\nfor this role might be God, but such a theory faces its own\narray of problems.) Rather, absolutist non-objectivists are likely to\nplump for idealized hypothetical agents. Roderick Firth (1952), for\nexample, identifies moral properties with dispositions to prompt\nresponsive attitudes in an “ideal observer”—where\nthe ideal observer is defined in terms such as omniscience,\ndisinterestedness, and dispassionateness. (Slightly confusingly for\nour purposes, Firth explicitly characterizes this theory as an\nobjectivist one, but this is because he has in mind a kind of\nexistential mind-dependence relation. The moral status of an\naction, on this view, doesn’t depend on the existence of an\nideal observer’s mental activity; rather, it depends on how such\nan agent counterfactually would respond. We can consider this as\nfurther evidence of the difficulties in nailing down a fixed notion of\nmoral objectivity.) A structurally similar version of\nabsolutist non-objectivism is Ronald Milo’s contractarian\nconstructivism (1995), according to which the moral facts are\ndetermined by the choices that would be made by a hypothetical\nidealized group of rational contractors. (See also Scanlon 1998.)", "\nThe challenge for such theories is to explain why one should\ncare about the moral status of actions. Since the person or\ngroup that determines the moral status of my actions is not\nme, and is not even someone I’ve ever met or\nnecessarily care about, then why should their hypothetical responses\nmatter to me? Any particular proposed action of mine will have an\ninfinity of dispositional properties. My proposed action of, say,\nstealing a newspaper may have the dispositional property that a\nFirthian ideal observer would disapprove of it, while simultaneously\nhaving the dispositional property that a Miloesque idealized group of\nrational contractors would choose to refrain from it. But it also has\na myriad of other dispositions to prompt responses in hypothetical\nagents: it may also be such that drunken Vikings would heartily cheer\nit, be such that zealous medieval samurai would think it dishonorable,\nbe such that Soviet communists seeking to promote the Workers’\nRevolution would regard it as obligatory, and so on. The question is\nwhy I, in trying to decide how to act, should care about any of these\ndispositional properties—or (perhaps more pointedly) why I\nshould care about one of them very much indeed while ignoring all the\nothers. Simply labeling one of these dispositional properties\n“moral wrongness” doesn’t make that property\nmatter.", "\nOne response to this challenge is to make the idealized judges, whose\nbeliefs or noncognitive states determine the moral status of\nagents’ actions, versions of the agents themselves (see Carson\n1984). Perhaps I have reason to care about what I would think\nif I were, say, fully informed and had fully reflected on the matter.\nThis brings us back to the other horn of the dilemma: the relativistic\nversion on non-objectivism. The problem is that securing the practical\nsignificance of moral facts in this manner (something that the\nabsolutist version struggles to secure) comes at a price. If you and I\nare quite different people—with different desires, interests,\nand goals—then the idealized version of me may have a different\nresponse to a situation than the idealized version of you would have\n(see Sobel 1999). In this case, the very same action may be morally\nright relative to me and morally wrong relative to you, and\nthat’s all there is to it: there would be no way for you and me\nto settle our moral disagreement. Indeed, there may not even\nbe a disagreement, since if when I say “X is\nmorally right” I mean … relative to idealized\nme, and when you say “No, X is not morally\nright” you mean … relative to idealized you,\nthen we are not really contradicting each other. (See entry for\n moral relativism.)\n If relativistic non-objectivism makes moral disagreement disappear,\nthen it very probably also makes the notion of moral progress\ndisappear. If the moral views I held in the past were true\nrelative to me then (though false relative to me now), and my\ncurrent very different moral views are true relative to me now (but\nfalse relative to past me), then the best one could say on behalf of\nmoral progress is that there has been progress from my current\npoint of view (something that will be seen as moral deterioration\nfrom my past point of view). To the extent, then, that we do wish to\naccommodate the existence of moral disagreement and moral progress,\nrelativistic non-objectivism has some explaining to do. (Note that the\nversion of relativistic non-objectivism just discussed is\nindividual-relative, but the same problems concerning disagreement and\nmoral progress would arise if a culture-oriented version of relativism\nwere examined instead.)", "\nThe proposal that moral facts are non-objective—that morality is\nsomething created, not discovered—is often rejected in popular\ndiscussion because people have only crude versions of non-objectivism\nin mind, such as views that would make the moral facts for a person be\njust whatever whimsically suits them (e.g., “X is\nmorally wrong” = “I disapprove of X”). But\nno professional philosopher endorses such a view; nobody thinks that\nthe non-objectivity of morality would be like the non-objectivity of\nchoosing your favorite ice cream flavor. Serious forms of moral\nnon-objectivism are sophisticated and subtle. Still, there is a real\nworry that if the non-objectivism is too\nsophisticated—especially if it looks to the responses of highly\nidealized hypothetical agents as being determinative of the moral\nfacts—then the question of why, on this account, morality would\nmatter to non-idealized non-hypothetical agents comes to the\nfore." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Non-objectivism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThis entry has not attempted to adjudicate the rich and noisy debate\nbetween the moral realist and moral anti-realist, but rather has\nattempted to clarify just what their debate is about. But even this\nmuch more modest task is doomed to lead to unsatisfactory results, for\nthere is much confusion—perhaps a hopeless\nconfusion—about how the terms of the debate should be drawn up.\nIt is entirely possible that when subjected to acute critical\nexamination, the traditional dialectic between the moral realist and\nthe moral anti-realist will crumble into a bunch of evocative\nmetaphors from which well-formed philosophical theses cannot be\nextracted. If this is true, it would not follow that metaethics is\nbankrupt; far from it—it may be more accurate to think that\nmodern metaethics has prospered to such an extent that the old terms\nno longer fit its complex landscape.", "\nBut for present, at least, the terms “moral realist” and\n“moral anti-realist” seem firmly entrenched. With so much\nill-defined, however, it would seem close to pointless to conduct\nmetaethical debate under these terms. This latitude means\nthat the terms “moral realist” and “moral\nanti-realist” are free to be bandied with rhetorical\nforce—more as badges of honor or terms of abuse (as the case may\nbe) than as useful descriptive labels. Rather like arguments over\nwhether some avant-garde gallery installation does or does not count\nas “art,” taxonomic bickering over whether a given\nphilosopher is or is not a “moral realist” is an activity\nas tiresome as it is fruitless.", "\nJust as important as gaining a clear and distinct understanding of\nthese labels is gaining an appreciation of what of real consequence\nturns on the debate. This seems particularly pressing here because a\nnatural suspicion is that much of the opposition to moral anti-realism\ndevelops from a nebulous but nagging practical concern about what\nmight happen—to individuals, to the community, to\nsocial order—if moral anti-realism, in one guise or another,\nwere widely adopted. The embrace of moral anti-realism, it is assumed,\nwill have an insidious influence. This concern presupposes that most\nof the folk are already pretheoretically inclined toward\nmoral realism—an assumption that was queried earlier. But even\nif it is true that most people are naive moral realists, the question\nof what would happen if they ceased to be so is an empirical matter,\nconcerning which neither optimism nor pessimism seems prima facie more\nwarranted than the other. As with the opposition to moral\nnon-objectivism, the more general opposition to moral anti-realism is\nfrequently based on an under-estimation of the resources available to\nthe anti-realist—on an unexamined assumption that the silliest,\ncrudest, or most pernicious version will stand as a good\nrepresentative of a whole range of extremely varied and often\nsophisticated theories." ], "section_title": "4. 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Moral Realism and the Foundations of\nEthics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Burgess, J.P., [1978] 2007. “Against ethics,”\nEthical Theory and Moral Practice, 10: 427–439.", "Carbonell, V., 2013. “De dicto desires and morality\nas fetish,” Philosophical Studies, 163:\n459–477.", "Carnap, R., 1935. Philosophy and Logical Syntax, London:\nKegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.", "Carson, T., 1984. The Status of Morality. Boston: D.\nReidel.", "Copp, D., 2001. “Realist-expressivism,” Social\nPhilosophy and Policy, 18: 1–43.", "Cowie, C., 2019. Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The\nArgument from Analogy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Dancy, J., 1986. “Two conceptions of moral realism,”\nProceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary\nVolume), 60: 167–187.", "Dreier, J., 2004. “Meta-ethics and the problem of creeping\nminimalism,” Philosophical Perspectives, 18:\n23–44.", "–––, 2018. “The real and the quasi-real:\nProblems of distinction,” Canadian Journal of\nPhilosophy, 48: 532–547.", "Dummett, M., 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas, London:\nDuckworth.", "Dworkin, R., 1996. “Objectivity and truth: You’d\nbetter believe it,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25:\n87–139.", "Firth, R., 1952. “Ethical absolutism and the ideal\nobserver,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,\n12: 317–345.", "Foot, P., 1958. “Moral arguments,” Mind, 67:\n502–513.", "Garner, R., 1994. Beyond Morality, Philadelphia: Temple\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 2010. “Abolishing morality,” in\nR. Joyce & S. 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What We Owe To Each Other, Cambridge,\nMA: Harvard University Press.", "Schroeder, M., 2009. “Hybrid expressivism: Virtues and\nvices,” Ethics, 119: 257–309.", "Smith, M., 1994, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Sobel, D., 1999. “Do the desires of rational agents\nconverge?” Analysis, 59: 137–147.", "Stevenson, C.L., 1944. Ethics and Language, New Haven:\nYale University Press.", "–––, 1948. “The nature of ethical\ndisagreement,” reprinted in his Facts and Values, New\nHaven: Yale University Press, 1963.", "Street, S., 2006. “A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories\nof value,” Philosophical Studies, 127:\n109–166.", "–––, 2010. “What is constructivism in\nethics and metaethics?” Philosophy Compass, 5:\n363–384.", "–––, 2012. “Coming to terms with\ncontingency: Humean constructivism about practical reason,” in\nJ. Lenman & Y. Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical\nPhilosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 40–59.", "Svavarsdóttir, S., 2006. “How do moral judgments\nmotivate?” in J. Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral\nTheory, Malden, MA: Blackwell 163–181.", "Svoboda, T., 2011. “Hybridizing moral expressivism and moral\nerror theory,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 45:\n37–48.", "Toppinen, T., 2004. “Moral fetishism revisited,”\nProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104:\n307–315.", "Tropman, E., 2018. “Formulating moral objectivity,”\nPhilosophia, 46: 1023–1040.", "Uttich, K., Tsai, G., & Lombrozo, T., 2014. “Exploring\nmetaethical commitments: Moral objectivity and moral progress,”\nin H. Sarkissian & J. Wright (eds.), Advances in Experimental\nMoral Psychology, London: Bloomsbury Academic:\n188–208.", "Wright, C., 1988, “Realism, antirealism, irrealism,\nquasi-realism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12:\n25–49.", "–––, 1992. Truth and Objectivity,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press." ]	[ { "href": "../moral-cognitivism/", "text": "cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, moral" }, { "href": "../constructivism-metaethics/", "text": "constructivism: in metaethics" }, { "href": "../metaethics/", "text": "metaethics" }, { "href": "../moral-non-naturalism/", "text": "moral non-naturalism" }, { "href": "../moral-realism/", "text": "moral realism" }, { "href": "../moral-relativism/", "text": "moral relativism" }, { "href": "../skepticism-moral/", "text": "moral skepticism" }, { "href": "../naturalism-moral/", "text": "naturalism: moral" }, { "href": "../realism/", "text": "realism" } ]
antiochus-ascalon	Antiochus of Ascalon	First published Tue Mar 1, 2005; substantive revision Thu Aug 6, 2020	[ "\n\nAntiochus, who was active in the latter part of the second and the\nearly part of the first centuries B.C.E., was a member of the Academy,\nPlato’s school, during its skeptical phase. After espousing skepticism\nhimself, he became a dogmatist. He defended an epistemological theory\nessentially the same as the Stoics’ and an ethical theory which\nsynthesized elements from the Stoa and Plato and Aristotle. In both\nareas he claimed to be reviving the doctrines of the Old Academy of\nPlato and his earliest successors and\nAristotle.\n" ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life, Works and Background ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Overview of Antiochus’ Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Epistemology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Ethics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Texts", "Secondary Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nAntiochus was born in the latter part of the second century B.C.E. in\nAscalon (whose site is in present-day Israel) and died in 69/8\nB.C.E. (On Antiochus’ life, see Hatzimichali 2012). Early in life he\nmoved to Athens, at this time still the center of the ancient\nphilosophical world, where he became a member of the Academy, the\nphilosophical school founded by Plato in the fourth century B.C.E. He\nmay also have studied with certain of the Stoic philosophers then\nactive in Athens. His membership in the Academy dates from around 110\nB.C.E., the date when Philo of Larissa became the school’s head, or\nscholarch. At this time Philo championed a form of the skepticism that\nhad been defended in the Academy since the scholarchate of \n Arcesilaus,\nin the first half of the third century B.C.E. Antiochus was for many\nyears a student and follower of Philo, whose views he defended in his\nwritings, but at an uncertain point (though before 79 B.C.E.;\nsee Section 3) he broke sharply with Philo and\nrejected skepticism (Cicero, Acad. 2.69).", "\nA measure of caution is in order. “Skeptic” is an ancient\nGreek term meaning inquirer. The Academics did not use it of\nthemselves; The descriptive appellation ‘skeptic[al] ’ was\nfirst applied by Pyrrhonians to their school in order to signal their\ncommitment to open-minded inquiry (see the overview in the entry on\n ancient skepticism). Understood in\nthis way, the term applies at least as well to the skeptical Academy\nas to the Pyrrhonian school, which was founded or revived by\nAenesidemus, an Academic who reacted against what he saw as an\nincreasingly dogmatic tendency in the Academy of his time in the first\ncentury B.C.E. Later in antiquity the term “skeptic” seems\nto have been applied to both schools. A range of arguments that, in\none way or another, call the existence or possibility of knowledge\ninto question, together with the positions or attitudes taken in\nresponse to, or expressed by, these arguments, have been styled\n“skeptical”, and several forms of skepticism were defended\nby different Academics in the course of the school’s history.", "\n\nFrom his break with Philo Antiochus was a dogmatist, who maintained\nthat knowledge was possible and that there were truths known to him\nand other human beings. It is clear that he began a new school of\nthought and attracted followers. Later in antiquity, when different\nphases in the history of the Academy corresponding to changes in\ndoctrine and philosophical approach were distinguished, some people\nspoke of a fourth Academy of Philo and a fifth of Antiochus (Sextus\nEmpiricus [S.E.], Outlines of Pyrrhonism, i.e.,\nPyrrhoneae hypotyposes [PH] 1.220). These\ndistinctions were not meant to correspond to changes in the Academy as\nan institution, and evidence about institutional developments and the\nrelations between them and Antiochus’ change in intellectual direction\nis fragmentary and unclear. It is not plain, e.g., whether he began\nexpounding his new views while still a member of the Academy or after\nforming a group around himself, which he dubbed the ‘Old Academy’ in\norder to signal his allegiance to the original Old Academy of Plato\nand his immediate successors and to contrast it with the ‘New Academy’\nof Philo and his predecessors from the time of Arcesilaus (cf. Polito\n2012) ", "\n\nPolitical instability in Athens led Philo to transfer his activities\nto Rome in 88 B.C.E. We know that Antiochus was in Alexandria the\nfollowing year in the company of Lucullus, a Roman general and\nstatesman, with whom he maintained ties for the rest of his life. He\nalso exerted an influence on other prominent Romans. Cicero, though\nnot a follower of his, studied with Antiochus in Athens in 79. Varro,\napart from Cicero the greatest Roman intellectual of the first century\nB.C.E., and Brutus, the assassin of Caesar, were adherents of\nAntiochus’ philosophy (on Varro, see Blank 2012).", "\n\nNone of Antiochus’ books have survived, but we know something\nabout them. He wrote an epistemological work called Canonica\nin at least two books. The title comes from\n‘kanôn,’ meaning a ruler or straightedge, a\nterm that was used by philosophers in the Hellenistic period for the\nstandard or criterion of truth. It is cited by Sextus Empiricus in his\nsurvey of views about the criterion of truth at Against the\nprofessors, i.e., Adversus Mathematicos [M]\n7.162, 202, and modern scholars have conjectured that it was\nSextus’ source for much of that survey (cf. Tarrant, 1985,\n94–6; Sedley, 1992). The Sosus, possibly a dialogue,\nwas also an epistemological work and belonged to the last phase of\nAntiochus’ controversy with Philo\n(Cicero, Acad. 2.12). He wrote a book about the gods,\nconcerning which we know nothing more. He sent a book to the Roman\nStoic, Balbus, in which he maintained that, despite differences in\nterminology, the Stoics and Peripatetics (as Aristotle’s\nsuccessors in his school, the Peripatos, were called) were largely in\nagreement on matters of substance (Cicero, N.D. 1.16). And\nCicero informs us that he wrote in many places about his view of the\nrelation between happiness and virtue (T.D. 5.22)." ], "section_title": "1. Life, Works and Background ", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAntiochus regarded the criterion of truth and the goal\n(telos, end) of human life as the two most important concerns\nof philosophy (Cicero, Acad. 2.29), and we are best informed\nabout his epistemological and ethical views. As we have seen, the\noccasion for his break from Philo was a disagreement about\nknowledge. After years of loyally defending the skepticism of Philo\nand his Academic predecessors, Antiochus came to embrace the opposing\ndogmatic position that knowledge is possible. What is more, he\nmaintained that the original or Old Academy of Plato and his immediate\nfollowers were of the same opinion. This put him in conflict with his\nmore immediate predecessors, some of whom had argued that Plato should\nalso be interpreted as a skeptic (Cicero, Acad. 1.46). Thus,\naccording to Antiochus, it was not he who was departing from Academic\ntradition, but the institution from the time of Arcesilaus to Philo\nthat had betrayed the true Academic inheritance of the original Old\nAcademy, which he was now restoring.", "\n\nThere is a further complication. The epistemology that Antiochus\ndefended was Stoic in all essential points (Brittain 2012). This was\nobvious to his contemporaries, some of whom charged that, far from\nbeing an Academic of any kind, he was a Stoic and belonged in the Stoa\nrather than in the Academy (Acad. 2.69, 132, cf. 137;\nS.E. PH 1.235). In reply, Antiochus maintained that the Old\nAcademy, the Peripatos and the Stoa were in fundamental\nagreement. According to him, far from being an innovator, Zeno of\nCitium, the founder of Stoicism, was responsible mainly only for a new\nterminology and a handful of corrections to the Old Academic doctrine\n(Cicero,\nAcad. 1.35). Though unconvincing to many of his\ncontemporaries, this historical thesis explains how Antiochus could\ndefend Stoic epistemology against the arguments made by his Academic\npredecessors while claiming to revive the Old Academy. His arguments\nabout both epistemology and ethics were embedded in this\nreinterpretation of Academic history and thus were part of an argument\nabout who was the legitimate heir of the school’s\ntradition.", "\n\nMatters were likely more complicated still, and the state of the\nevidence leaves much room for interpretative disagreement. Some\nscholars have argued that his engagement with Platonism was more\nthoroughgoing than ancient and modern interpreters who have emphasized\nhis debts to Stoicism tend to allow. The tantalizing fact that Zeno\nstudied with the Academic scholarch, Polemo, lends some plausibility\nto the idea that Stoicism was itself indebted to the Old Academy in\ncertain respects. And the case has been made that Antiochus exerted an\ninfluence on, or prefigured, developments in Middle Platonism (see\nBonazzi 2012).", "\nEpistemology and ethics belong respectively to Logic and Ethics which,\ntogether with Physics, were the three parts of philosophy recognized\nin the Hellenistic era (cf. Ac. 1, 19). We are better informed about\nAntiochus’ epistemology and ethical theory than his Physics, which\naccurately reflects his own priorities, though, as we have seen, he\nwrote a book about the gods, a subject that belonged to Physics. For\nfirm evidence about Antiochean Physics we we are largely reliant on\nthe brief exposition of the views of the Old Academics and\nPeripatetics by the Antiochean spokesman, Varro, in Acad. 1\n(24–29), who also mentions a few “corrections” by Zeno,\nwhich Antiochus may have adopted (1. 39). Here as elsewhere it is hard\nto tell whether and to what extent the resemblance between Antiochus’\nview, according to which material reality is constituted by two things\nand their interaction, one active, one passive, and Stoic views\nreflects the influence of the latter on Antiochus or is evidence of an\nOld Academic influence on Stoicism (see Inwood 2012). " ], "section_title": "2. Overview of Antiochus’ Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAcademic skepticism arose out of the debate, initiated by Arcesilaus,\nabout the nature and possibility of knowledge between the Academy and\nrival schools of philosophy, chiefly the Stoics. The Academy’s method\nof argument was, in the first instance at least, dialectical. Their\nmodel was Socrates as depicted in Plato’s Socratic dialogues, where he\nputs questions to his interlocutors and deduces conclusions unwelcome\nto them from their replies. Following Socrates’ example, the Academics\ntook their premises from the doctrines of their Stoic opponents or\nfrom assumptions that the Stoics could reject only at a high cost in\nplausibility. By arguing in this way, the Academics hoped to enhance\ntheir and their opponents’ understanding of the issues and, if\npossible, to progress towards the discovery of the truth that would\nresolve the question in contention. The difficulties that the\nAcademics uncovered in this way were, then, in large part internal to\ntheir interlocutors’ position, and, in drawing them out, the Academics\ndid not necessarily commit themselves to a position of their own.", "\n\nStoic epistemology attempts to show how it is possible for human\nbeings to attain wisdom, which the Stoics take to be a condition\nentirely free of opinion, i.e., false or insecure judgment (see the \nsection on Logic in the entry on\n Stoicism). For this to be possible, they\nmaintain, there must be a criterion of truth (see Striker 1990). In\ntheir theory, it is what they called a cognitive impression that plays\nthis part. This they define as an impression from what is, stamped\nand impressed in exact accordance with what is, and such as could not\nbe from what is not (cf. Annas 1990, Frede 1999, Sedley 2002).\nCognitive impressions, then, are true impressions which are, in\naddition, distinguished by a special character belongs only to true\nimpressions (though not to all of them) and which enables human beings\nto discriminate cognitive from non-cognitive impressions. In the\nparadigm case, which the definition has in view, cognitive impressions\nare perceptual, but in a broader sense of the term, non-perceptual\nimpressions that afford an equally secure grasp of their contents can\nalso be called cognitive. According to the Stoics, by confining assent\nto cognitive impressions, it is possible to avoid error entirely.", "\n\nThe existence of the special character alleged to distinguish\ncognitive impressions from other impressions was the principal target\nof the Academics’ arguments (see Section 3 of the entry on\n Carneades). \n If such impressions do not exist, it follows immediately in the\ncontext of Stoic epistemology that nothing can be known. On the basis\nof this result and the Stoic doctrine that the wise, i.e., human\nbeings as they ought to be, do not hold (mere) opinions\n(S.E. M 7.155–7), the Academics went on to argue that one\nought to suspend judgement about all matters.", "\n\nThese two doctrines—that nothing can be known, or a claim\nthat implied it in the Stoic context, and that one ought to suspend\njudgment—make up the skeptical Academic position, in the sense\nof the position put forward and defended by Academics if not\nnecessarily endorsed by them. The Stoics, followed by Antiochus in his\ndogmatic phase, argued that this position is self-refuting since to\nadopt a position is to assent to its component doctrines and assent is\nimpossible without taking oneself to know. The Stoics also argued,\nagain followed by Antiochus, that the skepticism called for by the\nAcademics’ arguments was a practical impossibility since action\nis impossible without assent.", "\n\nEven though, as previously noted, the Academics were not necessarily\ncommitted to the skeptical position, they defended the possibility of\na life of committed skepticism in order to prevent the Stoics from\nescaping the difficulties raised for their position indirectly by\nmeans of these anti-skeptical arguments. Arcesilaus made a start, but\nit was Carneades, his successor in the 2nd century B.C.E., who did the\nmost, and who was responsible for the version of the defense with\nwhich Antiochus was familiar.", "\n\nCarneades argued that, in the absence of cognitive impressions, a\nbasis for action and inquiry could be found in so-called probable\nimpressions (from probabilis, meaning that which lends itself\nto or invites approval, Cicero’s Latin for the Greek\npithanos, meaning persuasive) (see Section 3 of the entry\n on Carneades).\n ", "\n\nBuilding on this account of probable impressions, Carneades defended\ntwo views about assent. According to one proposal, the wise\nperson will always withhold assent, but will be able to act and\ninquire by following or using probable impressions in a way that does\nnot amount to assent, and so does not involve holding opinions about\nanything (Acad. 2.59, 99, 108). According to the second, the\nwise person will assent to what is probable and so form opinions, but\nprovisionally and on the understanding that he may be wrong\n(Acad. 2.59, 67, 78, 112).", "\n\nIt is a matter of controversy whether Carneades went beyond putting\nthese views forward for the sake of argument and actually subscribed\nto one of them. It appears, however, that some of his successors\nendorsed one or both of the skeptical doctrines. One tendency, led by\nClitomachus, Carneades’ student and eventual successor as scholarch,\nfavored what we may call a radical skeptical position embracing both\ndoctrines. Though Clitomachus rejected assent, he accepted Carneades’\nproposal that we could follow or use impressions without assenting to\nthem and adopted this attitude toward, among other impressions, the\nskeptical doctrines that nothing can be known and that one ought\ntherefore suspend judgment (Acad. 2.109–10). The other\ntendency endorsed a moderate or mitigated form of skepticism. Though\nit accepted the first skeptical doctrine, namely that nothing can be\nknown, this tendency permitted the wise to form opinions by assenting\nto non-cognitive impressions so long as they are sufficiently probable\nand the assent given to them is bestowed in the provisional spirit of\nCarneades’ second proposal. And this tendency took the opinion that\nnothing can be known to be among the impressions to which one should\nassent in this way. The appearance of paradox dissolves when one\nrealizes that in accepting that one does not know anything one is not\ntaking oneself to know this, but only opining that it is highly\nprobable. The most prominent proponent of this view was Antiochus’\nteacher, Philo, and it is this mitigated form of Academic skepticism\nthat Antiochus defended before his conversion to dogmatism.", "\n\nWe are informed about Antiochus’ case against Academic\nskepticism by Cicero’s Academica, substantial parts of which\nhave survived intact. Antiochus seems to have followed the Stoics, who\nproduced a substantial literature defending their position and\nattacking the Academy’s probabilistic alternative, but also to have\nadded some elements of his own to the argument (cf. Striker 1997). He\ndefended the veracity of the senses. He seems to have argued that in\norder even to possess a concept of the truth we must indisputably\napprehend some truths in a way that is possible only if there are\ncognitive impressions (Acad. 2.33). He argued that probable\nimpressions are a wholly inadequate substitute for cognitive\nimpressions (Acad. 2.35–6), so that the charge that by\nabolishing the cognitive impression (as they think) the Academics\ndeprive human beings of a basis for action stands\n(Acad. 2.31, 33, 54, 62, 102–3, 110). And he argued that, in\nmaintaining the skeptical position, the Academics must take themselves\nto know at least one thing, viz., that nothing can be known\n(Acad. 2.28–9, 109; cf. Burnyeat 1997).", "\n\nThere is one more twist in the story, however. After removing to Rome,\nPhilo published a pair of books – the so-called Roman Books –\nwhich, when they came to Antiochus’ attention in Alexandria, seemed to\nhim to represent a radical and intellectually untenable departure from\nhis teacher’s previous position. This was the occasion for\nthe Sosus, which contained a stinging riposte to Philo’s new\nideas. In opposition to Antiochus’ view that there were two Academies,\nan Old and a New, Philo maintained that there had only ever been\none. But he now held that the Academics from Plato to Philo himself\nwere not united by their skepticism, as we have seen some Academics\nbelieved. Rather they had never been skeptics because they had never\nmeant to challenge the possibility of knowledge. Philo did not deny\nthat Arcesilaus and Carneades had argued against the existence of\ncognitive impressions. Rather, he now maintained that these arguments\nshowed, and were always intended to show, not that cognition or\napprehension is impossible, but that it is impossible on the Stoic\nconception of apprehension, which is therefore mistaken\n(Acad. 2.18; S.E. PH 1.235).", "\n\nPhilo’s Roman innovation, then, was to reject the Stoic account of\nknowledge while continuing to accept his predecessors’ arguments that\nthe requirement that cognitive impressions be set apart from other\nimpressions by a special character cannot be satisfied (cf. Barnes\n1989, 70–76). For there to be knowledge, he now held, it was\nenough that there be impressions which are true and accurately formed\n(Cicero Acad. 2.18). It is not hard to see why Antiochus was\ndisturbed, for, if this is right, Philo was the legitimate heir of a\nsingle unbroken Academic tradition stretching back to Plato in which\nthere was no place for alien Stoic doctrines. Cicero, who is our\nprincipal source, chose not to recount the details of this controversy\n(Acad. 2.12). But we know that Antiochus argued that, by\nabandoning the full Stoic account of cognition and its commitment to\ncognitive impressions satisfying the complete Stoic definition, Philo\nsucceeded only in bringing about the result he most wanted to avoid,\nnamely that knowledge is impossible (Acad. 2.18). Presumably\nAntiochus drew on the case he had already brought against Academic\nprobabilism to argue that impressions which fail to satisfy the full\nStoic definition of the cognitive impression cannot provide a basis\nfor judgment of any kind let alone judgments of the kind that deserve\nto be called knowledge." ], "section_title": "3. Epistemology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAntiochus maintained that his ethical theory was that of the\nPeripatetics and original Old Academics just as he had maintained that\nhis Stoicizing epistemology was in substance that of the Old Academy\n(Cicero, Fin. 5.7, 14; Acad. 1.22). He could make\nthis claim about his ethical theory with more justice. On the crucial\nquestion of whether to recognize external and bodily items as goods in\naddition to virtue, he agreed with Aristotle and the Peripatos and\ndisagreed with the Stoics, who made virtue the sole good. Nonetheless,\nhis theory is greatly indebted to the Stoa, and it draws on anti-Stoic\narguments of his predecessors in the Academy that also tend to\npresuppose Stoic ideas. Roughly speaking, Antiochus defended the\nPeripatetic view about goods on the basis of considerations and in the\ncontext of assumptions that belong to a Stoic and not an Aristotelian\nframework (cf. White 1978).", "\n\nCicero expounds and criticizes Antiochus’ theory in book 5 of the\nDe finibus and draws on Antiochus in his critique of Stoic\nethics in book 4 (trans. in Annas and Woolf 2001). The Stoics\nmaintained that only virtue, which is identical with wisdom or the\nperfection of reason, is good and only vice, its opposite, evil,\nwhereas all the so-called goods, like health and strength, and their\nopposites, the so-called evils, were indifferent (see the section\nEthics in the entry on Stoicism).\nNonetheless the Stoics took some indifferents, often those generally\nregarded as goods by others, to be preferred and some, often those\ngenerally regarded as evils, to be dispreferred. This distinction\nfurnished the material or subject matter for rational\nselection. Virtue consists in fully rational selection among them. The\nwise or virtuous person acts with a view to obtaining preferred items\nand avoiding their opposites, but it is as an expression of his\nperfected reason that acts of selection are good, not because they\nsecure, or tend to secure, preferred items for him or protect, or tend\nto protect, him from their dispreferred opposites. According to the\nStoics, the sole necessary and sufficient condition for human good and\ntherefore happiness is the possession of virtue. Indifferent items\ncannot add to or detract from the goodness of such a life by their\npresence or absence.", "\n\nTo judge by Cicero’s evidence from book 4 of the of the De\nfinibus, Antiochus appears to have argued against this position\nby confronting the Stoics with a dilemma. Either the so-called\npreferred indifferents really were absolutely and utterly\nindifferent. In that case, the Stoic position collapsed into that of\nphilosophers like the heterodox Stoic, Ariston of Chios, who refused\nto make distinctions of any kind among the indifferents, thus\nrendering virtue incapable of supplying practical guidance by\ndestroying the basis for rational selection among actions (Cicero,\nFin. 4.47, 60, 69). Or speaking of preferred indifferents\nwas a merely verbal innovation, and the Stoics really regarded the\nitems they called preferred as goods, albeit lesser goods, capable of\nmaking a life better by their presence and worse by their\nabsence. Antiochus favored the latter diagnosis (Cicero,\nFin. 5.74), and his own position was that virtue is the chief\ngood, but not the sole good; this is the Peripatetic view, which he\nmay well have been right to attribute to the original Old Academy as\nwell (Cicero, Fin. 4.60, 61; 5.14; Acad. 1.22).", "\n\nThe way in which Antiochus appeals to human nature and its development\nin the exposition and defense of his ethics is modeled closely on\nStoic theory, however. To be sure, Aristotle assigns an important role\nto the development of character through habituation. But Antiochus\nfollows the Stoics and Epicureans in using what modern scholarship has\nbeen called the “cradle argument” (Fin. 5.55). The idea is\nthat by attending to the behavior of infants, who have not yet been\ncorrupted by contact with society, we will be able to isolate our\noriginal natural impulses and discover what the first objects of\nnatural concern or attachment are. If one accepts a general principle\naccording to which the object or objects with which we are naturally\nconcerned or to which we are attached by nature provide the basis for\ndetermining the human good, the cradle argument can be used to answer\nthe question what is the true goal of human life.", " The Epicureans maintained that infants are naturally impelled to\npleasure, and that the goal for adult humans is a life of\npleasure. The Stoics argued that our first natural impulses were not\ntoward pleasure (and away from pain) but towards the “natural\nadvantages,” things like health and strength, bodily integrity and\nwell-functioning senses (and away from their opposites). But it was\nnot because they thought these items were goods; they insisted that\nthey are indifferent, though preferred. The infant’s natural concern\nfor them is the first stage of a development in which what is truly\ngood only appears later. According to the Stoics, if all goes well, a\nhuman being’s motives undergo a radical transformation from the\ninfant’s. Only at a later point does the human being recognize virtue\nand virtuous activity as the only human goods and act for the sake of\nthe true good. Preferred indifferents are the material or subject\nmatter for the rational selection in which virtue consists, but\nnothing more. Since the objects of our first natural impulses turn\nout not to be good but indifferent, to be the object of a natural\nimpulse, or to be in accord with our nature in the way such objects\nare, is not thereby to be good.", "\n\nAntiochus agrees with the Stoics about the importance of the first\nnatural impulses and, by and large, about which items are the objects\nof those impulses. But unlike them, he accepts the principle that what\nagrees or accords with a creature’s fully developed adult nature, as\nit is expressed in its natural impulses, is good for that creature,\nand that the good life for human beings is therefore the life\ncharacterized by the fullest possible enjoyment of the goods\ncorresponding to our natural impulses (Cicero, Acad. 1.19,\n22; Fin. 5.24–5). He believes that he has an Old\nAcademic authority for this in Polemon (Cicero, Fin. 4.14;\nAcad. 2.131), head of the Academy at the end of the fourth\ncentury B.C.E. Nonetheless, despite admitting other goods, he holds\nthat virtue is the highest human good, and he believes that his theory\ncan explain why it is the chief human good without having to make it\nthe only good as the Stoics had done.", "\n\nOn his view, the development which leads a human being to virtue does\nnot involve a radical transformation of the kind posited by the\nStoics. Rather, if all goes well, a human being comes to value reason,\nand hence virtue as the perfection of reason, above all other things\nbecause reason is the most important part of human nature. It is not\nso much the character of a human being’s motivation that is\ntransformed as he develops, according to Antiochus, but rather the\nself which is the object of his natural concern. As a result, though\nvirtue is the chief human good, there is room for other goods as well,\nbecause they are in accord with human nature too, albeit less\nimportant parts of it. Antiochus’ use of the Stoic framework puts him\nin a position to fault the Stoics for abandoning or forgetting the\nnature from which they set out (Cicero, Fin. 4.26, 43; 5.72)\nand for failing to see the difference between taking reason to be the\nmost important part of human nature—which is correct—and\nthinking that it is the only part (4.41).", "\n\nLike the Stoics, however, Antiochus wants to claim that virtue is\nsufficient for happiness. Stoic ethics ensures this result by denying\nthat there are any goods or evils apart from virtue and vice and\ntherefore any items capable of affecting the goodness of a life except\nvirtue and vice. This option was not open to Antiochus because he\nthinks that there are other goods and evils, which do have this\npower. His solution, which is the most distinctive feature of his\nethical system and the one that seems to have drawn the most\ncriticism, is to distinguish between the happy life (vita\nbeata in Cicero’s Latin), for which virtue is sufficient, and the\ncompletely or entirely happy life (vita beatissima)\n(Fin. 5.71, 95; T.D. 5.22), which requires bodily\nand external goods as well (see Irwin 1992)." ], "section_title": "4. Ethics", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Cicero, De natura deorum, Academica (Loeb Classical\nLibrary), H. Rackham (trans.), Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,\n1933.", "–––, Akademische Abhandlungen,\nLucullus, C. Schäublin (trans.), Hamburg: Meiner, 1996.", "–––, On Academic Scepticism,\nC. Brittain (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.", "–––, De finibus (Loeb Classical\nLibrary), H. Rackham (trans.), Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,\n1914.", "–––, On Moral Ends, J. Annas (ed.),\nR. Woolf (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.", "–––, Tusculan Disputations (Loeb\nClassical Library), J.E. King (trans.), Cambridge MA: Harvard\nUniversity Press, 2nd edition, 1943.", "Long, A.A. and D.N. Sedley (eds. and trans.), The \nHellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge \nUniversity Press, 1987.", "Luck, G., Der Akademiker Antiochos (Noctes Romanae 7),\nBerne: Paul Haupt, 1953.", "Mette, H. J., “Philon von Larissa und Antiochos von\nAskalon”, Lustrum, 28–9 (1986–87):\n9–63.", "Sedley, D., “Appendix: a guide to the testimonies for\nAntiochus”, Sedley (ed.) 2012: 334–36.", "Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Against the\nProfessors (Loeb Classical Library), 4 vols. R.G. Bury (trans.),\nCambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1955.", "–––, Outlines of Scepticism, J. Annas,\nJ. Barnes (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.", "–––, Against the Logicians, R. Bett\n(trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.", "Algra, K., J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld and M. Schofield (eds.),\n1999. The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press.", "Allen, J., 1997. “Carneadean argument in Cicero’s\nAcademic books”, in Inwood and Mansfeld (ed.), 1997: 217–56.", "–––, 2018. “Aporia and the New\nAcademy”, in The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient\nPhilosophy, G. Karamanolis and V. Politis (eds.), Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, 172–91.", "Annas, J., 1990. “Stoic Epistemology”,\nin Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology, S. Everson\n(ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 1993. The Morality of Happiness,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Barnes, J., 1989. “Antiochus of Ascalon”,\nin Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman\nSociety, M. Griffin and J. Barnes (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University\nPress, 51–96.", "Blank, D., 2012. “Varro and Antiochus”, in Sedley\n(ed.), 2012: 250–89.", "Bonazzi, M., 2009. “Antiochus’ Ethics and the Subordination\nof Stoicism”, in The Origins of the Platonic System:\nPlatonisms of the Early Empire, M. Bonazzi and J. Opsomoer (eds.),\nParis: Peeters, 33–54.", "–––, 2012. “Antiochus and\nPlatonism”, in Sedley (ed.), 2012: 307–33.", "Brittain, C., 2001. Philo of Larissa: The Last of the \nAcademic Sceptics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2012. “Antiochus Epistemology”,\nin Medley (ed.) 2012: 104–130.", "Burnyeat, M., 1997. “Antipater and Self-Refutation”,\nin Inwood and Mansfeld (eds.), 1997: 277–310.", "Chiaradonna, R., 2017. “Platonist approaches to Aristotle:\nfrom Antiochus of Ascalon to Eudorus of Alexandria (and\nbeyond)”, in Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the\nFirst Century BC, M. Schofield (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, 28–52.", "Dillon, J., 1996. The Middle Platonists, 2nd edn. Ithaca:\nCornell University Press, Ch. 2.", "Fladerer, L., 1996. Antiochos von Askalon: Hellenist und\nHumanist, Vienna: F Berger & Söhne.", "Frede, M., 1999. “Stoic Epistemology”, in Algra,\nBarnes, Mansfeld and Schofield (eds.) 1999: 295–322.", "Glucker, J., 1978. Antiochus and the Late Academy,\nGöttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.", "Görler, W., 1994. “Älterer Pyrrhonismus,\nJüngere Akademie, §52 Antiochos aus Askalon”,\nin Die Philosophie der Antike (Volume IV), H. Flashar (ed.),\nBasel: Schwabe, 938–967.", "Hatzimichali, M., 2012. “Antiochus’ biography”, in\nSedley (ed.), 2012: 9–30.", "Inwood, B., Mansfeld, J. (eds.) 1997. Assent and Argument:\nStudies in Cicero’s Academic Books, Utrecht: Brill.", "Inwood, B., 2012. “Antiochus on Physics”, in Sedley\n(ed.) 2012: 188–219.", "Irwin, T., 2012. “Antiochus, Aristotle and the Stoics on\ndegrees”, in D. Sedley (ed.), 2012: 151–72.", "Karamanolis, G., 2006. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?\nPlatonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford:\nOxford University Press, Ch. 1.", "Lévy, C., 2000. “Cicero and the New Academy”,\nin The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity\n(Volume 1), L. Gerson (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,\n99–62.", "Polito, R., 2012. “Antiochus and the Academy”, in\nSedley (ed.) 2012, 31–54.", "Prost, F., 2001. “L’éthique d’Antiochus\nd’Ascalon”, Philologus, 145: 244–68.", "Sedley, D., 1992. “Sextus Empiricus and the Atomists’\ncriteria of truth”, Elenchos, 13: 19–56.", "–––, 2002, “Zeno’s Definition of Phantasia\nKatalêptikê”, in Zeno of Citium and his Legacy: The\nPhilosophy of Zeno, T. Scaltsas and A. Mason (eds.), Municipality\nof Larnaca: Larnaka, 137–54.", "––– (ed.), 2012. The Philosophy of\nAntiochus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Striker, G., 1990. “Sceptical Strategies”,\nin Doubt and Dogmatism, M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat,\nand J. Barnes (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 54–83.", "–––, 1990. “The Problem of the\nCriterion”, in Epistemology, S. Everson (ed.),\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 150–65.", "–––, 1997. “Academics fighting\nAcademics”, in Inwood and Mansfeld (eds.) 1997: 257–76.", "Tarrant, H., 1985. Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of\nthe Fourth Academy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2007. “Antiochus: a new\nbeginning?”, in Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC –\n200 AD (Volume 2), R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples (eds.), London:\nInstitute of Classical Studies, 317–32.", "Tsouni, G., 2012. “Antiochus on contemplation and the happy\nlife”, in Sedley (ed.) 2012: 131–50.", "–––, 2019. Antiochus and Peripatetic\nEthics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "White, N., 1978. “The Basis of Stoic\nEthics”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 83:\n143–78." ]	[ { "href": "../arcesilaus/", "text": "Arcesilaus" }, { "href": "../carneades/", "text": "Carneades" }, { "href": "../cicero/", "text": "Cicero" }, { "href": "../ethics-ancient/", "text": "ethics: ancient" }, { "href": "../philo-larissa/", "text": "Philo of Larissa" }, { "href": "../skepticism-ancient/", "text": "skepticism: ancient" }, { "href": "../stoicism/", "text": "Stoicism" } ]
apriori	A Priori Justification and Knowledge	First published Sun Dec 9, 2007; substantive revision Wed May 6, 2020	[ "\nA priori justification is a type of epistemic justification\nthat is, in some sense, independent of experience. Gettier examples\nhave led most philosophers to think that having a justified true\nbelief is not sufficient for knowledge\n (see Section 4.4, below,\n and the examples there), but many still believe that it is necessary.\nIn this entry, it will be assumed, for the most part, that even though\njustification is not sufficient for knowledge it is necessary and that\na priori knowledge is knowledge based on a priori\njustification. So much of the discussion will focus on a\npriori justification.", "\nThere are a variety of views about whether a priori\njustification requires some sort of evidence or whether, instead, some\npropositions can be “default reasonable”, or that a person\ncan be entitled to accept certain propositions independent of any\nevidence, perhaps because they are reasonable presuppositions of some\narea of inquiry. Philosophers who think that a priori\njustification requires evidence differ about the details. Some think\nthat a priori evidence can be defeated (overridden or\nundercut) by other evidence, including evidence from sensory\nobservations. There are a variety of views about whether a\npriori justification, and knowledge, must be only of propositions\nabout what is possible or necessary, and if necessary, only of\nanalytic propositions, that is, propositions that are in some sense\n“true in virtue of their meaning” (as in examples\n 1a–8a,\n below). Those who think that a priori justification requires\nevidence often think that the evidence is provided by rational\nintuitions or insights, but there is disagreement about the nature of\nthose intuitions or insights, and critics deny that they really do\nconstitute evidence.", "\nThe following list indicates the topics that will be presented and\naddressed." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Examples that illustrate the difference between ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. What sorts of propositions can be ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Is ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. What is the nature of ", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 A priori justification is justification that is independent of experience", "4.2 What is the content of intuitive judgments?", "4.3 There is no significant difference between a priori and a posteriori justification and knowledge", "4.4 Rational intuitions or insights as the bases of a priori justification", "4.5 A priori justification does not require any nonexperiential source of evidence" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Should we think that rational intuitions provide evidence for the propositions that are their objects?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Should we doubt the evidential force of intellectual intuitions?", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 What exactly is an intellectual seeming or rational intuition?", "6.2 Experimental philosophy", "6.3 Can intuitions be checked for accuracy?", "6.4 Naturalized epistemology", "6.5 Pragmatism" ] }, { "content_title": "7. Even if intuitions can justify, can they yield knowledge of the external world?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. What is ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nA priori justification is a certain kind of justification\noften contrasted with empirical, or a posteriori,\njustification. Roughly speaking, a priori justification\nprovides reasons for thinking a proposition is true that comes from\nmerely understanding, or thinking about, that proposition. In\ncontrast, a posteriori justification requires more than\nmerely understanding a proposition. Observations based on our senses,\nor introspection about our current mental state, are needed for us to\nbe empirically, or a posteriori, justified in believing that\nsome proposition is true. Examples below bring out the contrast. The\nfirst proposition in each group is a prime candidate for being a\npriori justified, if justified at all, while the other\npropositions are prime candidates for being a posteriori\njustified, if justified at all. Some of the propositions are false,\nbut that does not mean that we could not be justified in believing\nthem before we had evidence that they are false.", "\nIn each example, it is possible for someone to be justified in\nbelieving the first member in a way that is different from how it is\npossible for someone to be justified in believing the other members of\nthe example. The way the first members can be justified is called\na priori; the way the other members can be justified is\ncalled a posteriori (or empirically).", "\nThe first question to discuss is what sorts of propositions can be\na priori justified and known." ], "section_title": "1. Examples that illustrate the difference between a priori and a posteriori (empirical) justification", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nPhilosophers generally agree that we can be justified in believing\n 15bi\n and\n 15biii\n only empirically. Yet many believe that they are necessarily true. If\nthey are necessarily true, that would mean that it’s false that\nwe can be justified in believing necessary truths only a\npriori. But some philosophers think that\n 15bi\n and\n 15biii\n are not necessary truths and the relevant necessary truth that we can\nknow a priori is that the essence of any type of matter is\ngiven by the basic elements of which it is composed. On this view, in\nthe case of water and rubies, we discover empirically what those basic\nelements are and the propositions that state those discoveries are\ncontingent. Philosophers who hold that\n 15bi\n and\n 15biii\n do express necessary truths usually think that there are descriptions\nthat fix the reference of the terms, for example, for water, the\ndescription, ", "\n\n\nthe stuff, whatever it is, that, in the actual world, has the\nproperties of quenching thirst, putting out certain fires, falling\nfrom the clouds as rain, filling the lakes and rivers, etc. \n", "\nWhile the meaning of “water” is given by this\nreference-fixing description, and can be known a priori, the\nessence of water must be discovered empirically. The meaning of\nnatural kind terms does not give the essence of the kind directly in\nthe way it does with “bachelor” and “vixen”.\n", "\nOne might think that\n 15a\n can be justified only empirically, but gemologists seem to think that\nit is conceptually necessary that rubies are red, that is,\nthat the meaning of “ruby” requires that rubies be red. So\ngiven how gemologists use “ruby”,\n 15a\n is knowable a priori. The notion of a ruby seems to be a\nhybrid notion: its color is knowable a priori but its\nmaterial essence as given in\n 15bi\n is knowable only empirically.", "\nWhile it is widely believed that some necessary truths are capable of\njustification and can be known only empirically (e.g., “Water is\nH2O”), some contingent truths also seem justifiable, and\nknowable, a priori. Saul Kripke proposed that “the\nstandard meter stick, S, in Paris is a meter long at\n\$t_0\$” is such an example (Kripke 1972: 274–275).\n“The length of S in the actual world at\n\$t_0\$” rigidly designates that length, that is, it refers to\nlength L in every possible world. The reference of “one\nmeter” is given by that reference-fixing description, so\n“one meter” rigidly designates L. However,\n“the length of S at \$t_0\$” does not rigidly\ndesignate any particular length since at \$t_0\$ in other possible\nworlds S will be longer or shorter than L. So the\nproposition that “S is a meter long at \$t_0\$” is\ncontingent because in other possible worlds that very same stick will\nbe shorter or longer than it was in the actual world at that time.\nStill, we can know a priori, that is, independent of any\nempirical evidence, that “S is a meter long at\n\$t_0\$” is true in the actual world given that we know how the\nreference of “one meter” is fixed by a description that\nrefers to the length of S in the actual world. If empirical\nevidence plays any role, it is only insofar as we need it to know that\nthere really is a stick, S, that was designated as the meter at\nsome particular time and place. ", "\nA second candidate for being a contingent proposition that is knowable\na priori comes from John Turri. He claims that the\nproposition, “The most unlikely possible event is not presently\noccurring”, is contingent yet can be known simply in virtue of\nunderstanding its content, and hence is knowable a priori\n(2011: 337–338). “The most unlikely possible event”\nrefers to an event that is maximally improbable. So we know a\npriori that no one could have sufficient reason to believe that\nan event that fits that description is now occurring. Still, it is\npossible that such an event is presently occurring. Thus we can know\na priori that the contingent proposition that says that a\nmaximally improbable event is now occurring is false, and that its\ndenial is true.", "\nA third candidate for being a contingent proposition that is knowable\na priori is offered by Gareth Evans. He thinks that we can be\na priori justified in believing, and know, propositions of\nthe form, “If actually p, then p”, and particular\ninstantiations of that form. Consider, “if any post is actually\nred, then it is red”. This proposition is contingent because the\npost could be red in the actual world but not red in some other\npossible world. So in some other possible world, \$w_2\$, its\nantecedent can be true (because its antecedent is about the color of\nthe post in the actual world, \$w_1\$) and it’s consequent false\n(because the post is not red in \$w_2\$ and the consequent is\nabout the color of the post in that world). A conditional that is\nnecessarily true cannot have a true antecedent and a false consequent\nin any possible world. However, we can know independently of\nexperience (that is, a priori) that if the post is actually\nred, then it’s red since it is true in the actual world (cf.,\nEvans 1979: 83–85, for his discussion of this topic).", "\nAnother candidate for the contingent a priori is the\nproposition expressed by, “I am here now”. That sentence\nexpresses a contingent proposition, since I do not have to exist, much\nless do I have to be where I actually am at the present time. Yet a\nperson can know it is true wherever and whenever she utters it\nregardless of the experiences she is currently having or has had in\nthe past, and so independently of experience.", "\nLeaving aside now the question of whether there can be contingent\npropositions that are knowable a priori, there seems to be a\ndifference within the class of necessarily true propositions that can\nbe known, or justifiably believed, a priori. The propositions\nexpressed by\n 10a–14a\n seem different from the propositions expressed by\n 1a–8a.\n Each of the latter propositions seem to be analytic, that is, in each\ncase the sentence that expresses the proposition will express a\nlogical truth if relevant terms and expressions in it are replaced by\nappropriate synonyms. So, for instance, “all vixens are\nfemale” will express a logical truth of the form if \$A \\amp\nB\$, then A if we substitute for “vixen”,\n“female fox”, for it will then say: if something is a\nfemale fox, it is a female. But no substitution of synonyms for terms\nor expressions in\n 10a–14a\n will yield a logical truth. The propositions expressed by\n 10a–14a\n are often said to be synthetic a priori propositions because\nthey are not analytic (they are not true in virtue of their meaning,\nas it is sometimes put) but are a priori knowable and\njustifiable. " ], "section_title": "2. What sorts of propositions can be a priori justified and known: all, and only, modal propositions?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nA type of justification (say, via perception) is fallible if and only\nif it is possible to be justified in that way in holding a false\nbelief. A type of justification is defeasible if and only if that\njustification could be overridden by further evidence that goes\nagainst the truth of the proposition or undercut by considerations\nthat call into question whether there really is justification (say,\npoor lighting conditions that call into question whether vision\nprovides evidence in those circumstances).", "\nJust as we can be empirically justified in believing a false\nproposition (e.g.,\n 9b:\n two quarts of water plus two quarts of carbon tetrachloride do not\ncombine to yield four quarts of liquid), philosophers argue that we\ncan also be a priori justified in believing a false\nproposition. Perhaps Kant was a priori justified in believing\nthat every event has a cause. He thought that the proposition had that\nstatus. Yet many physicists believe that there are genuinely random\nevents at the subatomic level, and reasonably believe it false that\nevery event has a cause. You might initially be a priori\njustified in believing that no matter how happiness has been produced\nit is intrinsically good\n (12a),\n or that it is always wrong to punish an innocent person\n (13a).\n You might later think of counterexamples to such claims (e.g., by\nconsidering happiness produced through the suffering of others or\npunishing an innocent person to prevent some evil men from punishing\nhim and many other innocent people). Then your initial a\npriori justification would be defeated. John Hawthorne notes how\neven paradigmatic instances of a priori justification, such\nas someone’s carefully working through a mathematical proof, can\nbe undercut if the person gets empirical evidence that he is mad or\nthat his proof is probably mistaken (based on evidence provided by\nexpert testimony, a bad track record, or of distorting background\nconditions, etc.) (Hawthorne 2013: 2009). These examples seem to show\nthat a priori justification is fallible and defeasible (i.e.,\nit can be defeated by further a priori or empirical\nevidence).", "\nConsider another example that makes this point. A sorites paradox\ninvolving heaps consists of the general claim that if you take one\nbean away from a heap of beans, you still have a heap, and a more\nspecific claim that, say, any cone-shaped stack of a thousand beans is\na heap. These two premises will lead you, bean by bean, to the\nconclusion that one, or even no beans, is a heap! It seems that we are\na priori justified in believing both the general and the more\nspecific claim are true, but at least one of them must not be true\n(perhaps the general claim is false, or even neither true nor false)\nbecause together they lead to an absurd conclusion. So this is another\nreason to think that a priori justification is fallible. (See\nSosa 1998: 258–259, for an example about heaps.) George Bealer\nargues that philosophical paradoxes show that intuition is fallible\n(1998: 202). With a paradox, you are justified in believing each of a\nset of propositions taken separately, but at least one of them must be\nfalse because the set is inconsistent.", "\nWhy have some thought that a proposition that is a priori\njustified cannot be defeated by empirical evidence? Kant said that\na priori knowledge is “knowledge that is absolutely\nindependent of all experience” (Kant 1787 [1965: 43(B3)]). But\nit might be that the requirement that a priori knowledge be\nabsolutely independent of all experience is\ntoo stringent. Enabling experiences may be required. It avoids this\ndifficulty to hold instead that a priori knowledge and\njustification are independent of all experience beyond what is\nneeded to grasp the relevant concepts involved in the relevant\nproposition (see, below,\n sec. 4.1).\n The fact that a priori knowledge is not independent of all\nexperience does not show that it is empirically defeasible, but it\ndoes defeat the argument that it is not empirically defeasible\nbecause it is independent of all experience.", "\nWhen it is just a matter of a priori justification, not\nknowledge, Philip Kitcher thinks that if there is such a thing as all\nthings considered a priori justification, then “a\nperson is entitled to ignore empirical information about the type of\nworld she inhabits” (Kitcher 1983: 30; see, also, 24,\n80–87). This view seems to rest on Kant’s idea but applied\nto justification, not just knowledge. If a priori\njustification is independent of all empirical experience,\nthen no such experience can count either for or against a\nproposition that is justified a priori. Hilary Putnam thinks\nthat if there is a priori justification, then there are\n“truths which it is always rational to believe” (Putnam\n1983: 90). On Kitcher’s understanding of a priori\njustification, it is not defeasible by empirical information;\non Putnam’s, it is not defeasible at all.", "\nIt’s hard to see how either view is defensible in light of the\nobjections by Sosa, Bealer, and Hawthorne. Insofar as justification is\nrelative to the evidence a person has, or should have, it seems\npossible for further evidence, either empirical or from intuition or\nrational insight, to override or undercut a person’s current\nevidence and thereby destroy that person’s current justification\nand knowledge. Nothing in the nature of a priori\njustification rules out that possibility. (See the discussion of\nHartry Field, in\n Section 4.5\n below, for more on why it is possible for empirical evidence\nin particular to defeat a priori justification.)", "\nUp to this point, the discussion has focused on the sorts of\npropositions that can be justified, or known, a priori, and\nwhether a priori justification is fallible and defeasible.\nBut what does it mean to say that someone is a priori\njustified in believing propositions like those expressed by each of\nthe first sentences in the fifteen examples above, that is, by\n 1a–15a?\n The discussion will now focus on that question.", "\nThen I will turn to the three main views about the nature of a\npriori justification. One view is that a priori\njustification is not significantly different from empirical\njustification. A second view is that it rests on a distinct type of\ninternal mental state often called rational intuition or rational\ninsight and that those intuitions or insights can provide evidence for\nor against certain propositions. A third view is that a person can be\na priori entitled to believe certain propositions\nindependently of any evidence, or can be default reasonable in\naccepting a proposition independent of any evidence." ], "section_title": "3. Is a priori justification fallible and defeasible?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. What is the nature of a priori justification?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nA standard answer to the question about the difference between a\npriori and empirical justification is that a priori\njustification is independent of experience and empirical justification\nis not, and this seems to explain the contrasts present in the fifteen\nexamples above. But various things have been meant by\n“experience”. On a narrow account,\n“experience” refers to sense experience, that is, to\nexperiences that come from the use of our five senses: sight, touch,\nhearing, smell, and taste. However, this narrow account implies that\njustification based on introspection, proprioception (our kinesthetic\nsense of the position and movements of our body), memory, and\ntestimony are kinds of a priori justification. And if we had\ndifferent senses, like those of bats (echolocation) and duck-billed\nplatypuses (electrolocation), experiences based on those senses would\nprovide a priori, not empirical, justification on this\naccount which takes a priori justification to be independent\nof experiences based on the senses we have.", "\nGiven these considerations, perhaps “experience” should be\ntaken to mean “sense experience of any sort, introspection,\nproprioception, memory, and testimony”. This sounds like a\nhodgepodge of various sources of justification but perhaps what unites\nthem is that, leaving aside memory and testimony, these sources\nprovide us with information either about the physical world or our\ninner world, either the outer world through perception or the inner\nworld of what we are feeling or thinking, or information about our\nbodies, through introspection and proprioception. Memory and testimony\nare not primary sources of justification; their primary epistemic\nfunction is to transmit either a priori or empirical\njustification. So the proposal should be seen as a way of\ndistinguishing the primary sources of justification into two\ncategories of justification: a priori and empirical.", "\nAs noted above (see,\n sec. 3)\n and below\n (secs. 4.4 and 4.5),\n “independent of experience” should not be taken to mean\nindependent of all experience, but, as a first approximation,\nto mean “independent of all experience beyond what is needed\nto grasp the relevant concepts involved in the\nproposition”. It is sometimes said that a priori\njustification can depend on experience insofar as it enables\nthe person to acquire the concepts needed to grasp the meaning of the\nproposition which is the object of justification, but experience\ncannot play an evidential role in that justification\n(Williamson 2013: 293). Later we will see that the notion of enabling\nexperience might better be expanded to include experience needed to\nacquire certain intellectual skills such as those needed to construct\ncertain proofs or create counterexamples (see,\n secs. 4.4 and 4.5,\n below).", "\nSuppose there is a significant difference between a priori\nand empirical justification. This still does not tell us what the\nbasis of a priori justification is. One view is that rational\nintuitions or insights are the bases of a priori\njustification; experiences, as construed above, the bases of empirical\njustification. Before discussing the nature of rational intuitions or\ninsights, we should first distinguish between intuitions and\nintuitive judgments and consider what the content of\nintuitive judgments evoked in thought experiments is." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 A priori justification is justification that is independent of experience" }, { "content": [ "\nAnna-Sara Malmgren holds that intuitions are certain kinds of\nmental states some of which are candidates as justifiers of\nintuitive judgments that are made in response to\nphilosophical thought experiments (2011: 267–268). What is\nthe content of such intuitive judgments? Malmgren notes that\nthere are several different ways to characterize intuitive judgments,\nbut because they are all controversial, she characterizes them by\nreference to examples. For her, “an intuitive judgment is any\njudgment relevantly similar to certain paradigms or examples”\n(Malmgren 2011: 268). Her paradigm examples are of judgments that are\nevoked in Gettier cases where a person is in some sense lucky to have\na true belief given his evidence, Twin Earth cases where a term or\nphrase does not refer to the same thing in different possible worlds,\nand the trolley case where a heavy man is pushed in front of a trolley\nto stop it from running over five people further down the tracks.\nOthers offer as examples the judgment that it is morally permissible\nto unhook a violinist who has been connected to your kidneys without\nyour consent, even if that will kill him (an example made famous by\nJudith Thomson in the abortion debate), the judgment that it is\nirrational for a man who grants that his life in the future will be\nhappy, not a burden on others, virtuous, productive, with many friends\nand adventures, and will otherwise be worthwhile, to refuse to take a\nlife-saving pill (Derek Parfit’s Early Death 2011:\n270-71), and the judgment that it is irrational for a person now not\nto care about his suffering on any future Tuesday just because\nit’s a Tuesday (Parfit’s Future Tuesday\nIndifference 1984: 124).", "\nMalmgren argues against Timothy Williamson’s view that the\ncontent of intuitive judgments involves counterfactual judgments.\nWilliamson says that in typical Gettier cases we make two judgments: a\njudgment that such a case is possible and a counterfactual judgment\nthat if the case had occurred, it would be a case of a justified true\nbelief without knowledge. These two judgments entail that it is\npossible for a person to have a justified true belief without\nknowledge in a situation like that described in the Gettier example\n(Williamson 2004: 110). While Malmgren agrees that a possibility\njudgment is the content of the intuitive judgments in Gettier cases\n(2011: 281), she denies that it need be reached via the counterfactual\njudgment that Williamson proposes.", "\nMalmgren thinks that descriptions of cases in thought experiments are\nincomplete, and that certain ways of completing them are deviant\nbecause they involve interpretations of the cases that misunderstand\nwhat is intended (2011: 274–275). In the famous Nogot/Havit\nGettier case, the issue is whether Smith knows that someone in his\noffice owns a Ford. Smith sees Nogot driving around in a Ford and,\nsay, believes that Nogot has shown him current ownership papers to a\nFord. But Nogot actually drives a rental car, does not own a Ford, and\nhas shown Smith ownership papers to a Ford he used to own. It would be\na deviant understanding of the example to assume also that Smith has\ngood independent evidence that Havit, who also works in his office,\nowns a Ford. Of course, in that case Smith would know that someone in\nhis office owns a Ford. Malmgren thinks that the interpretation that\nassumes that Smith is hallucinating and has a poor memory of what\npapers he has seen is also deviant. In that case, Smith would not be\njustified in believing that Nogot, and so someone in his office, owns\na Ford.", "\nThe intuitive judgment in the case is: it is possible that a person in\na situation like that described in the example has a justified true\nbelief without knowledge. Williamson thinks that this judgment is\nbased on the counterfactual: if the case had occurred, it would be a\ncase of justified true belief without knowledge. But in the deviant\ncases, it would not be a case of justified true belief without\nknowledge, either because it would be a case of knowledge (the extra\nreasons case where Smith has evidence that Havit owns a Ford) or not a\ncase of justified belief (where Smith is hallucinating, has a poor\nmemory, etc.). However, those deviant cases could occur in the\npossible world that is most similar to the actual world, sometimes\ncalled the “nearest possible world” by philosophers.\nBecause of this, as counterfactuals are usually understood by\nphilosophers, what Williamson takes to be the relevant counterfactual\nwould be false. In the nearest possible world where the standard\ndescription of the case holds, the consequent of the counterfactual\nwould be false. So the case would offer no support for the intuitive\nmodal judgment: it is possible that a person has a justified true\nbelief without knowledge. It seems clear to Malmgren that the case\ndoes support that possibility judgment regardless of whether nearby\nworlds are deviant (making the consequent of the relevant\ncounterfactual false) or not (Malmgren 2011: 278–279). So\nWilliamson must be mistaken in thinking that some counterfactual\njudgment must be the basis of the modal intuitive judgment: it is\npossible to have a justified true belief without knowledge in a case\nlike the one described in the example." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 What is the content of intuitive judgments?" }, { "content": [ "\nOne way to answer the question about the nature of a priori\njustification and knowledge is to adopt a bottom up approach. Start\nwith contrasting examples like the fifteen above and construct a\ntheory that explains the difference. Timothy Williamson objects to\nthis approach on the grounds that it may result “in a\ndistinction of no special significance like a taxonomy of plants and\nanimals based on color” or the classification of plants into\nbushes and non-bushes (2013: 291 and 309). Ultimately, that is what he\nargues: the difference between a priori and a\nposteriori knowledge is insignificant.", "\nWilliamson imagines that through perceptual experiences and relevant\nfeedback a person has acquired the ability to reliably judge distances\nin terms of inches, and separately, by the same means, to judge them\nin terms of centimeters. But she has not yet realized that there is a\nrelationship between distance in inches and distance in centimeters.\nThen one day she uses her perceptual capacity to judge distances in\ninches and centimeters “offline” by forming side-by-side\nvisual images of marks nine inches apart and nineteen centimeters\napart and sees that D is true: If two marks had been nine\ninches apart, they would have been at least nineteen centimeters\napart. She has never measured how far apart the front and back\nlegs of an ant are, but in a similar way she uses her imagination and\nsees that A is true: If two marks had been nine inches\napart, they would have been further apart than the front and back legs\nof an ant.", "\nIn both cases, experience is the basis of a capacity to make judgments\nin imagination and what goes on in imagination is what provides the\njustification for those judgments.", "\nWilliamson’s argument against the significance of the\ndistinction between a priori and a posteriori\njustification rests on comparing how D and A (and other\nsimilar pairs of propositions like 4a and 4b in the examples above)\nare justified. He contends that they are both justified by relevant\nmanipulations in imagination. But on traditional accounts of\njustification, D would be a paradigm case of some proposition\nthat can only be a priori justified and A a paradigm\ncase of some proposition that can only be a posteriori\njustified. Williamson seems happy to concede that there is some sort\nof difference (2013: 294–295, 296–297) between these two\ntypes of justification but to deny that it is a significant difference\ngiven the way that each type relies on manipulations in imagination.\nHe might grant that the difference is like the difference between\nseeing something through a microscope or telescope as opposed to\nseeing something with the naked eye. There is a difference, but it is\nnot a significant difference since these three types of seeing all\nrely on visual perceptions.", "\nDefenders of a significant distinction between a priori and\na posteriori justification could grant that there is no\nsignificant difference insofar as imagination plays the role in\njustification that Williamson proposes. And sometimes it does play\nthat role in a priori justification as Elijah Chudnoff\nillustrates with many examples involving geometric propositions and\naccompanying figures (2011a: 636–38; 2013a: 370–372).\nHowever, there are other ways to justify propositions a\npriori. Some seemingly a priori propositions\ncan be justified by reflection. One example that Chudnoff often\nappeals to involves the proposition: if \$a\\lt 1\$, then \$2 -2a \\gt\n0\$. To justify that proposition, you might first let \$a = 1\$ and\nsee that \$2 - 2a = 0\$. You might then reflect that when\n“a” is a number less than one but greater than or\nequal to zero, \$(2 - 2a)\$ is greater than zero. Finally, you might\nreflect that if “a” is a negative number, \$(-2a)\$\nwill be a positive number, so \$(2 - 2a)\$ will be a number larger\nthan 2, and so greater than zero. So by reflection on a few relevant\ncases, we can come to see a priori that if \$a\\lt 1\$, then\n\$(2 - 2a) \\gt 0\$. This way is much different than the way we might\ncome via imagination to see A = If two marks had been nine\ninches apart, they would have been further apart than the front and\nback legs of an ant.", "\nIn the case of proposition D, we might learn that one inch\nequals 2.54 centimeters, do the math and see that nine inches equals\n22.86 centimeters, and thereby see that nine inches is greater than\nnineteen centimeters. There are other ways to be a priori\njustified in believing some proposition is true than by what\nWilliamson calls the method of simulation. And those ways of\njustifying a proposition a priori are significantly different\nfrom a posteriori ways of justifying a proposition.", "\nIn a forthcoming essay in a book in which Williamson and Paul\nBoghossian debate the a priori (forthcomingb), Boghossian\ndefends three different ways (none of which involve the method of\nsimulation) by which we might be a priori justified in\nbelieving a proposition: two ways in which our understanding might be\nthe source of a priori justification, and a third way that\nappeals to rational intuitions that do not have a distinctive\nphenomenology and, according to Boghossian, are not the product of our\nunderstanding concepts.", "\nIn many essays and a book, Elijah Chudnoff argues that intuitions have\nwhat he calls a “presentational phenomenology” that\nparallels that of perception. For him, intuitions are intellectual\nperceptions that sometimes reveal abstract reality in the way that\nsensory perceptions sometimes reveal concrete reality. So on his view,\na priori justification is similar to, but significantly\ndifferent from, a posteriori justification. For Chudnoff,\nintuitions can be evoked through imagination, reflection, and even\nreasoning from premises to a conclusion, but it is their nature, not\ntheir source, that is the basis of their ability to provide\njustification. His argument parallels an argument that says\nperceptions justify because they are the mental states they are, not\nbecause of their source. That is why they can provide justification in\na demon world or the Matrix, even though their source is a demon or\nsuper computers and not real objects.", "\nLike Boghossian and Chudnoff, and unlike Williamson, Albert Casullo\nthinks that there is a significant difference between a\npriori and a posteriori justification based on the\ndifference between support by nonexperiential and\nexperiential evidence. He also thinks that there is something\nlike justification (namely, positive epistemic status) that does not\nrest on evidence at all (2012c: 318–326). For Casullo and\nothers, positive epistemic status can stem from what you are entitled\nto accept given certain ends or projects. This sort of view will be\ndiscussed in\n Section 4.5\n below." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 There is no significant difference between a priori and a posteriori justification and knowledge" }, { "content": [ "\nSuppose a priori justification rests on output (evidence)\nfrom some nonexperiential source. What sort of evidence could\nthat be? A standard answer is that intuition, or rational insight, is\nthe basis of a priori justification. And what are intuitions,\nor rational insights?", "\nAs we’ve seen, Malmgren distinguishes between intuitions and\nintuitive judgments, where an intuition is a distinctive type of\nmental state that can justify a judgment (2011: 267–268). But\nnot everyone means the same thing by “intuition”. In\nThinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman argues that\nintuitions often lead us to accept false beliefs. He offers Herbert\nSimon’s definition of an intuition, “Intuition is nothing\nmore and nothing less than recognition [of some cue stored in\nmemory]” (2011: 11, 237). But Kahneman is thinking of fast,\nautomatic, immediate judgments when he writes of intuitions and\nintuitive judgments based on them. He often thinks of them as issuing\nfrom “gut feelings”, as in his example of “the chief\ninvestment officer of a large financial firm” who decided to\ninvest tens of millions of dollars in Ford Stock after recently\nattending an auto show where Ford vehicles were on display (2011: 12).\nAnd he describes an intuitive answer as “the first one that\ncomes to mind” (2011: 6). Elijah Chudnoff has a different\nconception of intuitions because he thinks that “there are\nhard-won intuitions which take deliberate effort to have” and\nother intuitions that require an expert to guide a person before she\ncan have them (Chudnoff forthcoming).", "\nPhilosophers do not mean what Kahneman means when they refer to the\nintuitions people typically have when considering Gettier cases and\nthe other paradigmatic cases listed above. While intuitions are\nnon-inferential, some can appear only after much reflection and effort\n(see, again, Chudnoff forthcoming). Nor are they what George Bealer\nmeans by a “physical intuition”, such as the one that\nfounds the intuitive judgment that a house undermined will fall\n(Bealer 1992: 102; 1998: 207, 211). They are some sort of intellectual\nseeming (Bealer) or rational insight (BonJour). For Bealer and\nBonJour, taken in the broadest sense, intuitions are non-inferential\nin that they are not the conclusion of some piece of reasoning. For\nChudnoff, intuitions can be produced by reasoning though their\njustificatory force does not come from that reasoning. The reasoning\njust leads you to a proposition that seems true in itself. Like\nsensations, intuitions must be occurrent, and so are unlike beliefs,\nwhich need not be. You can have a belief that P while not\nconsidering P, but you cannot have an intuition that P\nwhile not considering P. ", "\nWhen it is a matter of perception, in the Mueller-Lyer figure the line\nwith the arrowheads pointing inward appears longer than the\none with them pointing outward even if you know it is not really\nlonger. To some people at least, in the Monty Hall example it\nseems that there is a 50-50 chance that the grand prize is\nbehind either of the two doors that are left unopened after Monty has\nopened one of them, even though they know that the probability it is\nbehind the door the contestant did not choose is 2/3 (see Russell\n2010: 464, for the Monty Hall example). So intuitions are a type of\nappearing; physical and philosophical intuitions have this in common.\nGeorge Bealer characterizes a rational intuition as an\nintellectual seeming that some proposition is\nnecessarily, or possibly, true (Bealer 1998:\n207–208). He contrasts this with the physical intuition that a\nhouse undermined will fall which is not about what is necessarily or\npossibly true. Also, philosophical intuitions are based solely on\nunderstanding the proposition which is their object while physical\nintuitions are based on understanding something about the physical\nworld. Bealer contrasts intuitions with “judgments, guesses, and\nhunches” (1998: 210–211), common sense, belief, and even\nan inclination to believe (1998: 208–209). And, of course, they\nare not just “gut feelings”, which are not based solely on\nunderstanding some proposition,", "\nLaurence BonJour thinks that a rational insight is an immediate,\nnon-inferential grasp, apprehension, or “seeing” that some\nproposition is necessarily true (BonJour 1998: 106). He goes on to\nargue that a proposition’s appearing to be necessarily\ntrue is the foundation of a priori justification, because he\nwants to allow that such justification can be fallible and defeasible.\nSo for BonJour it is apparent rational insights that are the\nevidence on which a priori justification rests, not rational\ninsights themselves (1998: 112–113, 1998: §§4.5, 4.6).\nAfter publishing In Defense of Pure Reason (1998), and in\nresponse to comments by Paul Boghossian (2001), BonJour wrote that\nthese appearances are not propositional, that is, they are not\nappearances that something is the case (BonJour 2001a:\n677–678). In this respect, they are unlike beliefs and more like\nperceptual sensations.", "\nJohn Hawthorne questions whether apparent rational insights or\nrational intuitions as understood by BonJour and Bealer, respectively,\nprovide evidence for the beliefs which are based on them. He assumes\nthat these intellectual seemings manifest themselves to inner\nconsciousness “by a special kind of phenomenology”\n(Hawthorne 2013: 215). He then wonders whether any of the following\nwould provide evidence: a seeming without the relevant phenomenology\nhe calls Glow, a seeming with a Glow of which the person is unaware\n(if this is even possible), a seeming with a known Glow which is\nunreliable. He seems to think that good answers to these questions\nwould require abandoning the “internalist mandate” that\ndrives these views that “allow only that which is\n‘accessible’ from the inside to count as relevant to\njustification” (Hawthorne 2013: 216). As we’ve seen,\nChudnoff thinks that intuitions have a distinctive phenomenology that\nprovides reason to believe that the propositions which are their\nobjects are true (2011b, esp. secs. 6 & 7); others think that they\nneed not have a distinctive phenomenology (Sosa 2013; Boghossian\nforthcomingb). One might maintain that at least in certain\ncircumstance, being in the mental state with the relevant\nphenomenology necessarily gives you prima facie reason to\nbelieve the proposition consideration of which caused that intuition,\nthat is, gives you a reason to believe that proposition even though\nthat reason might be undermined or overridden by further\nconsiderations.", "\nFurther, Bealer may have an answer for those who think that\nreliability is a necessary condition of justification because he\nargues that intellectual seemings are necessarily reliable when had in\ncertain conditions. He calls his view modal reliabilism (1998:\n215–217), which holds that a certain kind of concept possession\n(namely, full understanding of the concept) in ideal conditions\nguarantees the sort of reliability that some think evidence requires.\nOn this view, it does not matter what, if any, phenomenology is\nassociated with the relevant intellectual seemings (cf. Sosa 2013).\nWhat matters is whether the person fully understands the relevant\nconcepts involved. That could even be the basis for justification of\nintuitive mathematical judgments that are not\naccompanied by any intuitions with Glow (a possibility\nmentioned by Hawthorne above (2013: 217)). So a defender of views like\nBonjour’s and Bealer’s can answer Hawthorne’s\nquestions by arguing that the relevant intuitions or insights are\nreliable whether they are accompanied by Glows, unknown Glows, or no\nGlows at all.", "\nThose who hold that intuitions can justify because they are based on\nthe understanding think, for instance, that our understanding the\nconcept knowledge is the source of our intuition that a correct lucky\nguess is not knowledge. Hawthorne’s criticisms of basing a\npriori justification on the understanding (as Boghossian\nforthcomingb proposes) is that there seem to be instances of a\npriori justification that require skill in “sophisticated\nproof techniques that are quite obviously not preconditions of\nanything in the domain” (Hawthorne 2013: 213). For instance,\nsophisticated proof techniques were required to prove Fermat’s\nLast Theorem even though it is easy to understand what the theorem\nsays, namely, that the equation \$x^n + y^n = z^n\$ has no solutions\nwhen n is a positive integer greater than two. A possible\nresponse to this objection is to expand the notion of enabling\nexperiences to include those needed to acquire intellectual\nskills which are needed to employ intellectual seemings in reasoning\n(see, secs.\n 4.1\n above and\n 4.5\n below) and are different from perceptual skills. But possessing those\ntechniques without also understanding the connections between the\npremises would not yield justification. It is possible to hold that\nthe important difference between a priori and a\nposteriori justification is that once the concepts and the\nrelevant techniques are acquired, nothing more is needed for\na priori justification (that is the sense in which a\npriori justification is independent of experience), but further\nexperience is needed for a posteriori justification. Further,\nHawthorne’s criticism seems not to affect whether intellectual\nintuitions that are evoked by thought experiments (as in standard\nGettier cases) can provide evidence since no special techniques are\nrequired there.", "\nWhile Hawthorne questions whether intuitions provide any evidence for\nor against philosophical theories, Brian Weatherson grants that they\ndo but questions how much evidential weight they have. Gettier\nexamples are taken by many to be a conclusive refutation of the view\nthat having a justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge, but\nnot by Weatherson. He says, ", "\n\n\nIn short, the true theory of knowledge is the one that does best at\n(a) accounting for as many as possible of our intuitions about\nknowledge while (b) remaining systematic. (2003: 7) \n", "\nHe thinks that it may be best to accept the JTB theory of knowledge\neven in the face of Gettier examples if no other systematic theory of\nknowledge is available. Systematic theories should not have too many\nunacceptable (that is, counterintuitive) theoretical consequences,\nshould involve the analysis of a theoretically significant concept in\ntheoretically significant terms, and should be simple (2003:\n8–9). Weatherson says that, ", "\n\n\nWhile a theory can be reformist, it can’t be revolutionary. A\ntheory that disagreed with virtually all intuitions about possible\ncases is, for that reason, false.\n", "\nStopped Clock is a case in which a person correctly believes\nthat the time is, say, 1:00 p.m. on the basis of looking at a clock\nthat reads 1:00 o’clock, and which he is justified in thinking\nis working properly. However, the clock stopped working exactly\ntwenty-four hours earlier. Still, that person has a justified true\nbelief that it is 1:00 p.m. Sheep is a case where a jokester\nfarmer breeds poodles to look like sheep, and grooms them so they are\nindistinguishable from real sheep. He puts them in his field for\ntourists to see, and his real sheep are in that field but out of sight\nbehind some large boulders where he feeds them. Jones drives by and\nforms the justified true belief that there are sheep in the field. It\nseems that the intuitions that knowledge is absent, but JTB present,\nin Stopped Clock and Sheep are enough to make it\nreasonable to reject the JTB theory of knowledge. A few really strong\nintuitions seem enough by themselves to make it reasonable to reject a\ntheory. Contra Weatherson, reasonable rejection does not require that\nthe theory disagree with virtually all intuitions.\nTheoretical virtues are not enough to overcome such intuitive\nshortcomings even if there is not a competing virtuous theoretical\nanalysis available. ", "\nA promising account of a priori justification in terms of a\nnonexperiential source of evidence is one that sees\nintellectual intuition, rational insight, or apparent\nrational insight, as providing the relevant a priori evidence\nwith its source being reason. This rational capacity is not some\nspecial faculty of intuition analogous, say, to sight, which is a\nsource of empirical evidence. One function of reason involves\n“seeing” how evidence supports a conclusion, and\nin deductive reasoning, “seeing” how conclusions\nfollow from premises. This same ability is exercised when\nreason “sees” that some proposition is true, or\nnecessarily true, simply in virtue of the person’s understanding\nthe proposition. However, this intellectual “seeing” need\nnot have distinctive conscious qualities, qualia, associated with it,\nunlike perceptual seeing, which does. Apparent rational\ninsights need not be accompanied by appearances, if\n“appearances” necessarily involve qualia. The metaphor of\n“seeing” logical connections or that certain propositions\nare true should not mislead us into thinking that there is a special,\nquasi-perceptual faculty along with sight, touch, hearing, etc. It is\nplausible to hold that reason can “grasp” and\n“see” without there being any analogue to having certain\ntouch or visual sensations. (In several essays, Chudnoff disagrees:\n2011a, 2011b.)" ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Rational intuitions or insights as the bases of a priori justification" }, { "content": [ "\nRecently some philosophers have thought that a person can be justified\nin believing, or accepting, a proposition without having any evidence\nto support it, and so even if there is no nonexperiential\nsource of evidence for that belief or acceptance. As we have\nseen, Timothy Williamson has argued that certain acquired\nskills can be used to provide justification for believing a\nproposition for which the person does not have evidence, namely, the\nskill of bringing ideas together in imagination. His proposal is that\nin the case of the inches/centimeters proposition it is this\nskill at making comparisons of length in imagination, and\nthen observing the results, not a person’s perceptual evidence,\nthat justifies him in believing that proposition.", "\nEven if true, it seems that we can distinguish empirically based from\nunderstanding based employment of a skill. Manipulating in imagination\ntwo circles of unequal radii can bring a person to understand that\nthey cannot intersect in more than two points. Creating an\nimage of a line nine inches long next to an image of a typical ant can\nbring a person to believe that the distance between the front and back\nlegs of a typical ant is less than nine inches, but not that it\nmust be. Science fiction films sometimes depict giant ants that\ncould have been actual. Further, skills at judging, say, that\nin Sheep you do not know that there are sheep in the field is\nbased on your understanding the concept “knowledge”. But\nyour skill in judging that sheep have wool requires more to qualify as\nknowledge than understanding that proposition: you need to know what\nsheep in fact are like. A detective’s skill at deducing via\ndisjunctive syllogism that Jones is the murderer is similar to a\ngeometer’s deducing that a quadrilateral has four interior\nangles or that the Pythagorean Theorem is true, but the nature of the\npremises can make all the difference between whether the reasoning is\na posteriori or a priori. So even if the exercise of\nrelevant skills can provide justification apart from evidence, how the\nskill is used, and in particular on what subject matter, seems to be a\nbasis for distinguishing a priori from a posteriori\n(empirical) justification.", "\nAnother view that rejects the idea that a justified belief must be\nfounded on evidence says that all of our beliefs are\nprima facie justified so all of them are what one might call\n“default reasonable”, that is, justified barring reasons\nto reject them (this is what Gilbert Harman (2001) calls\n“general foundationalism”). On some accounts of a\npriori justification, namely those that hold that a\npriori justification is justification independent of\nempirical evidence, general foundationalism would imply that all\nof a person’s beliefs are prima facie (or weakly) a\npriori justified since that justification would stem merely from\nthe fact that the person believes them, not from any empirical\nevidence that supports them. On this view, and contrary to\ninitial appearances, there is really no difference in the way the\npropositions at the start of this essay are prima facie\njustified since they are all weakly a priori justified if you\naccept them. The general foundationalist view might add that, if some\nare all things considered less justified than others, it is\nbecause of the relationships between them. Coherence considerations\naccount for all things considered justification and are what upset\ninitially equal prima facie justification. Further, this view\nhas the implication that you could be prima facie justified\nin believing extremely bizarre propositions, say, beliefs about what\nhappens on the planet Gliese 581d, a planet scientists have\njudged may be “friendly to life” (Russell 2012: 100), even\nthough you have no empirical or testimonial evidence to support your\nbeliefs about this alien planet. You may, but need not, also believe\nthat the Gliesians are in touch with you (but not others) via\ntelepathy because you are “the chosen one”. Insofar as you\nhave no defeating evidence, you could even be all things\nconsidered justified in believing all those things about the\nGlieseans, despite having no evidence to support your beliefs. But it\nseems that a coherent set of beliefs about Gliese 581d would not\nprovide a priori justification of all of them even if it\nprovided some sort of justification for them. That would be drawing\nthe boundaries of the a priori too broadly.", "\nHartry Field also holds that belief in certain propositions can be\n“default reasonable”, that is, justified but not on the\nbasis of evidence. He seems to think that if a belief’s being\n“default reasonable” were sufficient for its being a\npriori justified, too many beliefs would count as being a\npriori justified. That’s because he thinks, for example,\nthat “People usually tell the truth” is default reasonable\nbut not a priori justified. So he adds the requirement that\nan a priori justified belief cannot be empirically\ndefeasible (Field 2000: 119–120; cited in Casullo 2012c:\n318–320). But we have seen above that paradigm cases of a\npriori justification can be defeated by empirical considerations\n(see above,\n sec. 3).\n So by adding the requirement of no empirical defeat, Field’s\nview will imply that there are no a priori justifiable\npropositions. On the other hand, if he drops that requirement, he\nfaces the same problem as Harman in drawing the boundaries of a\npriori justification too broadly.", "\nA final view of a priori justification according to which it\ndoes not rest on nonexperiential evidence holds that we are\nentitled to accept certain propositions on no evidence and\nthat entitlement on no grounds or evidence is what a priori\njustification amounts to. To be entitled to accept, or trust, some\npresupposition is for it to be rational to accept or trust\nit, though this is supposed to be different from being justified in\nbelieving it. Crispin Wright proposes that the laws of logic\nand the presupposition that we are not now in the midst of a coherent\nand continuing dream, not now brains-in-a vat, etc., are rational\npresuppositions, some of which are standard presuppositions of\nscience. That’s because certain “cognitive projects”\n(i) could not be pursued without presupposing those things, (ii) there\nis no evidence to think that those presuppositions are false (even if\nalso none to think them true), and (iii) nothing will be lost, and\nsomething may be gained, by accepting these presuppositions (see\nJenkins 2007). The gains and losses must not be pragmatic gains and\nlosses such as gains and losses in happiness, prestige,\naccomplishments, wealth and the like. Otherwise all that would follow\nis that it is practically rational to accept the\npresuppositions. The gains and losses must be epistemic, that is,\nhaving to do with truth, or probable truth, or with evidence because\nWright wants the rational acceptance of such presuppositions to be an\nanswer to the skeptic about knowledge and epistemic justification.", "\nCarrie Jenkins has questioned whether the project-relative rationality\nof a presupposition that Wright proposes is enough to make it rational\nto accept that presupposition (Jenkins 2007). For instance, when\nconducting certain inquiries, it might be rational relative to\nsome project or kind of inquiry to accept that the world is a\npretty orderly place, yet not epistemically rational to accept the\npresupposition itself. Maybe we should suspend judgment about that\nuntil we go look at the world.", "\nWe might think of these presuppositions as heuristics, rules that if\nfollowed usually aid us in the pursuit of truth but in certain\ncontexts can be rationally doubted. Perhaps they do not necessarily\ndetermine what it is rational to believe or accept. In moral\nphilosophy, anti-utilitarians often claim that there are many moral\nrules that prohibit lying, cheating, stealing, torturing, etc, and\nthat these rules sometimes require people not to maximize utility. Act\nutilitarians often respond by saying that these are useful guides to\ndoing what has the best consequences, but they are not definitive of\nwhat makes actions right or wrong. Wright’s presuppositions seem\nto be analogous to what act utilitarians see as heuristics or\nsecondary rules.", "\nIn summary, it seems that accounts of a priori justification\nthat do not hold that it rests on evidence provided by a\nnonexperiential source are in danger of counting certain beliefs or\nacceptances as a priori justified that, intuitively, do not\nseem to be. They are in danger of drawing the circle of a\npriori justification too broadly (Harman), to include\npropositions that are “default reasonable” (Field), or are\npresuppositions of science (Wright) that may be justified but do not\nseem to be a priori justified. The attempt by Field to narrow\nthat circle seems to rest on a doubtful assumption, namely, that a\npriori justification cannot be defeated by empirical\nevidence.", "\nIf one thinks that some sort of justification can derive from what is\ndefault reasonable or through relevant entitlements, one might adopt\nCasullo’s view that there are different types of knowledge or\njustification, broadly construed: a priori which rests on\nnonexperiential evidence; a posteriori which rests on\nempirical evidence; and a third type of justification that does not\nrest on any evidence (Casullo 2012c: 324–326). This section has\nraised some problems for this third conception of justification.", "\nWe turn next to considerations that seem to count for the view that\nintellectual intuitions are evidence for the propositions that are\ntheir objects." ], "subsection_title": "4.5 A priori justification does not require any nonexperiential source of evidence" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe answer to this question requires first answering another question:\nwhat are intuitions? As noted above, Bealer distinguishes between\nphysical intuitions, such as the intuition that a house undermined\nwill fall (1998: 207, 211, 213; 1992: 102, 104), and rational\nintuitions. Here are several of Bealer’s examples of rational\nintuitions from (1998): if P, then not not P (207); if\nP or Q, then it is not the case that both not P\nand not Q (210); that Gettier situations are possible (207:\n211–12); that phenomenal colors are incompatible (211); that if\nspatial region x is a part of spatial region y and\nspatial region y is part of spatial region z, then\nspatial region x is part of spatial region z (212). At\none point Bealer says that the difference between a physical and a\nrational intuition is that a rational intuition “presents itself\nas necessary”, but he immediately goes on to say that he does\nnot know exactly how to analyze this notion. A proposal he offers is\nthe following: if x (rationally) intuits P, then it\nseems to x that P and also that necessarily P.\nBut later he says that in Gettier cases there are rational intuitions\nabout the situation described being possible (1998: 206, 207,\n211–12), and he explicitly says, “Without possibility\nintuitions, philosophy would be fatally flawed” (1998: 212;\nmy italics). It seems that what Bealer holds is that a rational\nintuition that P is one where it either seems that P and\nalso necessarily that P, OR it seems that it is possible that\nP. As we have seen, Malmgren argued that in Gettier cases the\nrelevant intuition is that it is possible that a person in\nthe relevant circumstances have a justified true belief but lack\nknowledge. Bealer’s remark about an intuition’s presenting\nitself as necessary was only meant as a way of contrasting the\nphysical intuition that a house undermined will fall with some other\nrational intuitions. For Bealer, rational intuitions involve modal\nseemings, either about what is necessary or possible.", "\nBealer offers a complicated multi-stage argument for why intuitions,\nso understood, provide evidence. Part of his argument involves\ndistinguishing basic from derivative sources of evidence. Some\ncontingent sources of evidence provide justification but only because\nsome basic source justifies their use. Perhaps perception is a basic\nsource of evidence and testimony derivative. But what makes a source\nof evidence basic? For Bealer, a source of evidence is basic if and\nonly if its deliverances have an appropriate kind of modal\ntie to the truth (1998: 218). His view is that a source has the\nappropriate modal tie if and only if, necessarily, its deliverances\nwould be true for the most part, that is, would be reliable, when that\nsource is employed by someone in cognitive conditions of suitable high\nquality (for short, in ideal conditions) (1998: 219). In short, the\nappropriate modal tie to the truth is the source’s being\nnecessarily reliable when the person using it is in ideal cognitive\ncircumstances. This account of a basic source of evidence explains why\nguessing is not a basic source of evidence for a person who happens to\nbe a reliable guesser: guessing in that special world would be\nreliable but not in all other possible worlds. But is rational\nintuition a basic source of evidence on this account?", "\nBealer argues that rational intuitions depend on concept possession\nand if one fully understands a concept, they will be necessarily\nreliable in ideal cognitive conditions in applying that concept. A\nperson can misunderstand a concept such as arthritis and apply it to\npains in the thigh, or incompletely understand it by not knowing\nwhether it applies to a certain case or not. For example, someone\nmight not understand the concept of a contract well enough to know\nwhether it applies to any oral agreements (1998: 221). But full\nunderstanding of concepts is incompatible with any misunderstanding or\nincomplete understanding.", "\nBealer says, “Our intuitions are what seem to be so concerning\nthe applicability of concepts to cases presented to pure\nthought” (1998: 231). And what seems to be so is modal,\nsomething’s being possible or necessary. For instance, if a\nperson who fully understands the concept knowledge is presented a\nGettier case, the relevant intuition for Bealer will be that it seems\npossible for the person in the Gettier scenario to have a\njustified true belief but lack knowledge. If a person who fully\nunderstands “spatial part” is asked whether it’s\ntrue that if x is a part of y, and y a part of\nz, then x is a part of z, the relevant intuition\nfor Bealer will be that it seems necessarily true.", "\nBealer further maintains that we are not now in the relevant ideal\nconditions. However, he does say that, ", "\n\n\nif we limit ourselves to suitably elementary propositions, then\nrelative to them we approximate ideal cognitive conditions,\n\n", "\nand that ", "\n\n\nthe deliverances of our basic sources would provide in an approximate\nway the kind of pathway to the truth they would have generally in\nideal conditions. (1998: 219) \n", "\nHe is saying that even in our current non-ideal cognitive condition\nthe deliverances of our basic sources, which include rational\nintuitions, can be somewhat reliable even if not as reliable as they\nwould be in ideal conditions. He also thinks that for many of us the\nclass of elementary propositions “would not be\ninconsiderable” (1998: 219). Bealer is probably thinking of the\nmany readily accessible conceptual connections such as those in\n 1a–15a\n given near the beginning of this entry.", "\nCasullo recommends a different approach to defending rationalism. He\nthinks rationalists should start from common ground and that they\nshould “enlist empirical support for the existence of a priori\nknowledge” (2012a: 248–249). This may be because he thinks\nthat nonexperiential mental states are the basis of a priori\njustification and “nonexperiential mental state” is a\nnatural kind term. This seems plausible because Casullo thinks that\n“experience” is a natural kind term (see, below,\n sec. 6.4).\n He may think that the reference of all natural kind terms must be\ndiscovered empirically and so think that what he takes as the basis of\na priori justification must be discovered empirically.\nSuppose the nonexperiential mental states that Casullo thinks are the\nbases of a priori justification are what other philosophers\ncall “intuitions”. If a priori knowledge rests\npartly on a priori justification, and that rests on\n“intuitions”, that could explain why Casullo recommends\nempirical inquiry as a means to discover what intuitions are like as a\nfirst step in explaining how they can provide a priori\njustification.", "\nBealer seems to disagree with Casullo about the nature of intuitions.\nHe has written that empirical investigation into people’s\n“intuitions” is irrelevant because they do not investigate\nintuitions in the relevant sense, that is, intuitions understood as\nresponses to fully understanding propositions (1998: 202). Casullo\nseems to understand intuitions differently, as a certain kind of\nmental state whose nature must be discovered empirically. Insofar as a\ndefense of rationalism involves a defense of the epistemic role of\nintuitions, it is not surprising that Bealer and Casullo suggest\ndifferent ways of defending rationalism given that they have different\nviews about the nature of intuitions." ], "section_title": "5. Should we think that rational intuitions provide evidence for the propositions that are their objects?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "6. Should we doubt the evidential force of intellectual intuitions?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nWe have seen that Bealer thinks that a rational intuition is a modal\nseeming: either a seeming to be true and necessarily true, or a\nseeming to be possible. In other places Russell (2017: 232) defines an\na priori intuition as the psychological state people are in\nwhen some proposition seems true to them solely on the basis\nof their understanding that proposition. This definition of an a\npriori intuition allows us to distinguish between what Bealer\ncalled a physical intuition that a house undermined will fall, because\nit does not seem true to us solely on the basis of understanding what\nit says, and the intuition that if P, then not not P, or\nthat if someone knows P, then she believes P and\nP is true. Unlike on Bealer’s account of rational\nintuitions, this account of intuition does not require that the\npropositions that are the objects of intuitions be modal. It provides\na way of distinguishing a priori justifiable necessary\npropositions such as Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried\nmales from empirically justifiable necessary propositions such as\nNecessarily, water is H2O since an intuition that\nthe former proposition is true can be based solely on a person’s\nunderstanding it but an intuition that the latter is true must be\nbased partly on understanding how things are in the external world.\nThis account of intuition also allows that what are called synthetic\na priori proposition (like\n 10a–14a)\n can be the objects of a priori intuitions since they can\nseem true to a person solely on the basis of her understanding\nthem.", "\nSeveral philosophers appeal to the understanding in their accounts of\na priori justification: Bealer in all his many essays;\nBonJour 1998; Jackson 2000; Peacocke 2000; Sosa 2013: 199; Boghossian:\nforthcomingb. But the view also has its critics. Though Paul\nBoghossian thinks that some a priori justification stems from\nthat source, he thinks that a priori intuitions about\nsubstantive normative propositions can provide justification but they\ndo not rest on our understanding those propositions (forthcomingb).\nConsider the proposition that It is always wrong to torture\nchildren just for the fun of it. His argument is that if such\nintuitions were based on understanding the concept\n“wrong”, then it would not make sense to ask whether that\nsort of act merits disapproval or should be punished, assuming for the\nsake of argument that the correct account of the non-substantive\nmeaning of “wrong” is in terms of what merits disapproval\nor should be punished. But he thinks that this question always makes\nsense. So it follows that a priori normative intuitions of\nthis sort are not based on understanding the relevant normative\nconcepts. Boghossian seems to think that this argument generalizes to\napply to all a priori intuitions whose objects are synthetic\npropositions, not just to intuitions about substantive normative\npropositions.", "\nA possible response to Boghossian is that full or\ndeep understanding of normative concepts like\n“wrong” requires understanding that certain paradigm cases\nare wrong, though a more superficial understanding which can be\ncaptured by non-substantive account of wrong does not. An analogy with\ncausation might help. A superficial understanding of why opium causes\nsleep is that it has dormative powers. But a deeper, more detailed\nunderstanding would involve understanding how the chemicals in opium\naffect the neurons in the brain and how those in turn cause sleep.\nProblems will remain with the “lack of deep understanding”\nreply to Boghossian’s argument: how does one explain the fact\nthat professional moral philosophers sometimes have different\nintuitions about substantive claims about what is wrong? One would\nexpect them to have equally deep understanding of the relevant\nnormative concepts and so to have the same a priori\nintuitions on the understanding-based account of intuitions that\nBoghossian argues against. But sometimes they do not, as Boghossian\nnotes (forthcomingb). At the same time, he offers an explanation of\nwhy the intuitions of philosophers diverge: the theories they hold can\naffect the intuitions they have." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 What exactly is an intellectual seeming or rational intuition?" }, { "content": [ "\nA new branch of philosophy called experimental philosophy (X-phi for\nshort) has studied the intuitive judgments of people (often\nstudents) when presented with well-known examples in epistemology and\nethics. They ask these people (often from different ethnic, cultural,\neconomic, and educational backgrounds) whether someone in a\nhypothetical scenario knows, or only believes, that some proposition\nis true, say, in Sheep whether the person knows, or only\nbelieves, that there are sheep in the field. In ethics they may\npresent the subjects with a case and ask them if it is wrong, or not\nwrong, to do what is described. In a case often called\nTransplant, five innocent people are desperately in need of\ncertain vital organs, and the only way to save them is to cut up some\ninnocent person and distribute his organs to the five (transplant\nsurgery has been perfected and our potential donor is a perfect match\nto all five). Experimental philosophers will ask their subjects\nwhether it is wrong, or not wrong, to cut up the one to save the five,\nand then record their intuitive judgments. In another case\noften called Trolley, a runaway trolley is on track A\nand headed for five innocent people who are trapped on that track. All\nperson S can do to keep the trolley from running over the five\nis to turn the trolley down track B where one innocent person\nis trapped. If S does nothing, five will die; if he throws the\nswitch via a remote device, the one on track B will be killed.\nOr what if someone pushed a heavy person in front of the trolley to\nstop it from running over the five? Experimental philosophers ask\nwhether it would be wrong, or not wrong, for S to throw the\nswitch or push the man. They record the data, which they take to be\nintuitive judgments on the cases, and note differences in the\nresponses, say, between different ethnic or economic groups.", "\nSome of the initial studies that seemed to show that there are\ndifferences along ethnic, cultural, and economic lines in response to\nexamples have not been replicated (see Turri 2018; Wykstra 2018 for an\noverview of the work in X-Phi.). Other studies have been criticized\nbecause of their experimental design. Apart from these experimental\nflaws, claims about disagreements in intuition have been criticized as\nepistemically irrelevant because the so-called\n“intuitions” of subjects are not what philosophers have in\nmind when they refer to a priori or rational intuitions\n(Bealer 1998: 202, 213). If what philosophers mean by\n“intuitions” requires that they stem from full\nunderstanding of concepts in ideal cognitive circumstances, then the\n“intuitions” that experimental subjects have do not\nqualify, for they lack full understanding and the cognitive\ncircumstances they are in probably do not qualify as ideal.", "\nOne might think that from an epistemic standpoint, the\n“intuitions” that philosophers have when considering\n“suitably elementary propositions” are what should be\nstudied because, as Bealer said, “if we limit ourselves to\nsuitably elementary propositions, then relative to them we\napproximate ideal cognitive conditions”, and\nphilosophers come nearer to having a full understanding of the\nrelevant concepts. Studies of that sort are being done (see\nSchwitzgebel & Cushman 2012, 2015). Some results suggest that\nphilosophers’ intuitions, like those of non-philosophers, are\naffected by how an example is described (called “framing\neffects”) and by the order in which the examples are presented\n(“ordering effects”). This suggests that the intuitions of\nphilosophers are no more reliable than those of non-philosophers. But\nperhaps the experimental situation is not ideal and that ideal\nconditions are the ordinary settings in which philosophers do their\nwork. (See, Kahneman’s description (2011: 234–235) of the\napproach taken by Gary Klein and his followers who criticize\nartificial experiments and recommend studying “real people doing\nthings that matter” (Kahneman 2011: 235)." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Experimental philosophy" }, { "content": [ "\nA different sort of objection to intuitions as a source of a\npriori evidence assumes that a source of justification must be\ncapable of being calibrated to determine whether it is accurate\n(Cummins 1998: 116–118). What we see through a telescope\njustifies us in believing that the moon has mountains because we have\ndone things like looking through telescopes at distant mountains on\nearth and then gone to them and discovered that the telescopes\npresented an accurate picture of the mountains. But what, the\nobjection goes, can intuitions be checked against? Other intuitions?\nBut that is like checking a crystal ball against itself.", "\nBonJour has argued that many errors involving apparent rational\ninsights (intuitions) can be corrected internally by further\nreflection, or by appealing to coherence (BonJour 1998:\n116–119). Others have replied that neither perception nor memory\n(Goldman 2007: 5) can be checked either, except against themselves,\nbut that does not prevent these sources from providing justification\nin certain circumstances.", "\nIn reply to this sort of response, critics of intuition-based views of\na priori justification have said that at least different\ntypes of perception can be checked against each other, say, vision\nagainst touch (Weatherson 2003: 4). The critics of intuition add that\nwhile we can distinguish circumstances where, say, vision is\nunreliable from circumstance where it is not, nothing similar can be\ndone when it is a matter of intuitions. For instance, we can\ndistinguish conditions where the lighting conditions, or the\nperson’s eyesight, are bad from ones where they are not. We can\nknow whether we are in a desert where optical illusions occur and\nwhether we are not. At least sometimes we can tell whether we are\nhallucinating or not.", "\nFirst, the thought that a potential source of justification must be\ncapable of being calibrated if it is to provide justification seems\nfalse. The people inside Plato’s cave who can only see shadows\ncast on the wall in front of them can be justified in believing that\nthose shadows have a certain shape based on what they see and the\nreports of others. A priori intuitions involve a kind of\nintellectual “seeing”, and they can be checked against\nother people’s reports of their intuitions. That one type of\nperception can be checked against another (say, sight against touch)\ndoes not seem to count for much epistemically. Perhaps a ouija board\ncan be checked against a crystal ball, but without some further\nexplanation, neither agreement, nor disagreement, between them would\nhave significant epistemic implications. Perhaps intellectual or\nrational intuitions produced under certain circumstances should be\ndiscounted, viz., those produced by people who are angry, depressed,\ndrunk, tired, etc., or who are not impartial, have something at stake\nin the outcome, or have not reflected carefully on the relevant\nconcept. But that does not mean that all of them should be discounted.\nCalibration may not be necessary for justification. And in some\ncircumstances it seems insufficient, as when there is good reason to\nthink that agreement is accidental or the result of causes irrelevant\nfrom an epistemic standpoint." ], "subsection_title": "6.3 Can intuitions be checked for accuracy?" }, { "content": [ "\nThere are other objections to the reliance on intuitions in philosophy\nthat do not call into question their reliability. They call into\nquestion their relevance. Casullo (2003) proposes to treat\n“experience” as a natural kind term, and Hilary Kornblith\nand Philip Kitcher propose to treat epistemic terms such as\n“knowledge” and “justification” in that way\ntoo. Kornblith thinks that intuitions can help direct us to the\nappropriate objects, or phenomena, of investigation but not much more.\nFor instance, we have an intuition that knowledge is not a type of\nfurniture so we should not start our empirical investigation into the\nessential nature of knowledge by looking at furniture (Kornblith 1998,\n2005, 2006). If we think of normative terms such as\n“wrong” as natural kind terms, and so as analogous to a\nnatural kind term like “water”, there would be some\nreference-fixing description associated with “wrong” as\nthere is for “water”. For “water” that\ndescription is something like: the stuff, whatever it is,\nthat in the actual world has the properties of quenching\nthirst, putting out certain fires, falling from the clouds as rain,\nfilling the lakes and rivers, etc., on the planet on which we live.\nEmpirical investigation is then needed to discover what this\nreference-fixing description in fact refers to. On Kornblith’s\nview, there is little room for rational intuitions to play in\ndiscovering the essential nature of knowledge or normative kinds. They\ndo not play a role in determining the content of any relevant\nreference-fixing description and, at most, tell us where not\nto look to find what does fulfill a given description.", "\nIt would be a mistake to take “cube” to be a natural kind\nterm understood through some reference-fixing description such as: a\nthree-dimensional solid that looks such-and-such a way when looked at\nfrom various angles and that feels so-and-so when turned around in\nyour hands; is able to fit snugly through square holes cut out of a\nboard, etc. “Cube” is not a natural kind term and we\nunderstand what a cube is through understanding its definition,\nnamely, a three-dimensional solid with six faces all of which are\nsquares.", "\nRational intuitions seem relevant to testing proposed definitions of\n“cube”, but not proposed reference-fixing descriptions of\n“water”. If someone thought that the correct definition of\n“cube” is: a three-dimensional solid with six faces\nall of which are parallelograms with equal sides, we could show\nit is not a correct definition of “cube” by imagining a\n“squished” cube that satisfies that definition but,\nintuitively, is not a cube. None of the properties mentioned in the\nreference-fixing description for water are either necessary, or taken\nsingly or together, sufficient conditions of a liquid’s being\nwater. So it does not seem that rational intuitions could play much of\na role in determining what the essential nature of knowledge is if\n“knowledge” were a natural kind term whose reference is\nfixed by some description. People would have to empirically discover\nthe nature of knowledge with the aid of its reference-fixing\ndescription, just as they had to empirically discover the nature of\nwater. The same thing would seem to apply to normative terms like\n“right” or “what there is most reason to do (or\nbelieve)” if they were natural kind terms.", "\nOn the basis of thinking about these examples involving\n“water” and “cube”, a person might think that\nwhether rational intuitions have a small or a large role in\ndiscovering the essential nature of normative concepts, and other\nconcepts of interest to philosophers, depends on whether those\nconcepts are like the concept of water or instead like that\nof cube. But Peter Railton’s view that normative terms\nare natural kind terms allows for a large role for rational intuitions\nin determining their reference-fixing descriptions.", "\nRailton calls a reference-fixing description a “job\ndescription”. He is interested in normative concepts like\nright and what there is most reason to do, and\ndescribes in general terms what a job description might include.\nRailton says that there may not be much to say about “the\nconcept of a reason full stop”. Perhaps all we can say\nin that regard is that a reason is a consideration that counts in\nfavor of something: an action, a desire, an emotion, a belief, etc.\nBut Railton thinks that the concept most reason to do has\n", "\n\n\na distinctive, all-important role in your conceptual scheme—it\nexpresses “stops the buck” in deliberating and deciding\nwhat we ought to do, what ultimately matters. \n", "\nHe goes on to add that the relevant “job description”\nincludes reference to paradigm cases. For example, it is assumed that\nagony gives everyone some reason to avoid performing actions that\nproduce it, that vengeance is not itself a reason to do something, and\nthat acrophobia sometimes is not a sufficient reason to avoid doing\nsomething that will save your life (Railton 2017a: 51).", "\nIn another essay on Parfit’s On What Matters, Vol III,\nRailton says that the job description of rightness is ", "\n\n\nnecessarily connected to the guidance of deliberation,…,has\nanalytic connections to ought claims about action and\nmotivation,…,has certain paradigm cases, etc. \n", "\nHe thinks that the job description of minimizing suffering is\ncompletely different (Railton 2017b: 118–119). Nevertheless,\nRailton thinks that the two concepts might refer to the same thing in\nthe way that water and H2O refer to the\nsame thing despite being different concepts. That will be true if the\nacts that have the naturalistic property of minimizing suffering\nuniquely (or best) fulfill the job description associated with the\nnormative concept rightness.", "\nRational intuitions might play a role in Railton’s view that\nnormative terms are natural kind terms by supplying the paradigm cases\nthat are elements of the job descriptions associated with normative\nconcepts. He says that it is “inconceivable” that there\nnot be reason to stop prolonged agony that is being inflicted on\nsomeone just for amusement (2017a: 56). On Railton’s view, to\ndetermine what the natures of right, reason, most reason, etc., are\nyou need to consider more than just what rational intuitions might\nreveal. They can help determine what paradigm cases should be included\nin the relevant “job description”, but that description\nincludes more than just paradigm cases. On Railton’s view,\ninsofar as “old style” analytic philosophy only considered\nthe data supplied by rational intuitions, it mistakenly left important\ndata aside. This is true of attempts to analyze normative concepts but\nalso true of attempts to analyze other concepts that have been of\ninterest to philosophers, for example, knowledge, causality,\npersonal identity, justice, being morally responsible, acting\nfreely, etc.", "\nRailton’s view is that normative concepts are hybrid concepts,\nsomewhat like the concept of ruby as a red gemstone\nwith such-and-such chemical structure (see\n example 15)\n or of an ice cube. “Ice” is a natural kind term,\nor at least its definition as “frozen water” is partly\ngiven by the natural kind term, “water”. But, as we have\nseen, “cube” is not a natural kind terms. So “ice\ncube” is partly a natural kind term and partly not." ], "subsection_title": "6.4 Naturalized epistemology" }, { "content": [ "\nAnother approach that discounts the role of intuitions in philosophy,\nespecially in epistemology, is pragmatic. The idea is to first\ndetermine what epistemic goals we want principles to serve, and then\nto discover empirically which epistemic principles, if adhered to,\nwill best serve those goals (Weinberg 2006). For instance, your goal\nmight be to have lots of true beliefs or, alternatively, to have few\nfalse ones. Or your goal might be to have beliefs that make you happy.\nProbably the best set of rules to follow to obtain lots of true\nbeliefs will be different from, and more lenient than, the best set of\nrules to follow to avoid having false beliefs. Probably those sets of\nrules will be different from the set of rules you should adopt if you\nare interested in having beliefs that make you happy. It’s\nreasonable to think that intuitions will have to be appealed to in\ndetermining what makes a goal an epistemic goal rather than\nsome other sort of goal, and what precisely that epistemic goal is.\nLehrer (1986: 6–7) holds that the epistemic goal is not\nto maximize true beliefs or minimize false ones. For him, it is the\nfollowing: for any proposition, P, that a person is\nconsidering, believe P if and only if it is true. Intuition\nmust be relied on to determine what the epistemic goal is.\nIntuitively, Pascal’s Wager is about whether belief in God pays,\nnot about whether there is good evidence to believe that God exists or\ndoes not exist. The goal of the argument is not epistemic but\npragmatic in a narrow sense, namely, to believe what will make your\nlife, including your afterlife, go best for you. Intuitively, the goal\nof having beliefs that will make your life go well is not an epistemic\ngoal. Epistemic goals have to do with truth, fitting your beliefs to\nthe evidence, having evidentially justified beliefs, etc.", "\nThe pragmatic approach that sketched here seems doomed at the outset:\nit cannot avoid appealing to intuitions in order to determine what the\ncorrect epistemic goal is. And if it is appropriate to appeal to\nintuitions to determine the correct epistemic goal, why not also other\nepistemic intuitions to determine what knowledge, justification, etc.,\nare?" ], "subsection_title": "6.5 Pragmatism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSuppose, for the sake of argument, we grant that intuitions\nproperly understood and had under ideal conditions by people with\na deep understanding of the relevant concepts can justify certain\npropositions. But can they yield knowledge about the external\nworld? Carrie Jenkins has argued that they can insofar as the\nconcepts that play a role in a priori justification have been\nshaped by experience. She thinks that for knowledge (not\njustification) our concepts must be grounded. By this she\nmeans that they must accurately and non-accidentally represent the\nworld. So the concept table can be grounded for a person in a\nworld where there are tables but not for a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)\n(Jenkins 2008a: 128–29). For a concept to be\njustified for Jenkins is for it to be\n“respectable” for us to rely on it (by which, I believe,\nshe means that we would be epistemically blameless in relying on it)\nas “a relevantly accurate guide to the world” (Jenkins\n2008a: 129). So a BIV can have a justified, though not a grounded\nconcept, about things existing in the external world.", "\nJenkins thinks that our concepts are grounded. Her argument for\nthinking this is that our basic concepts are useful, and in that\nrespect they are sort of like maps. If they did not fit the world\n(weren’t grounded) even though they are founded on sensory\ninput, their usefulness would be a miracle. They would be like a map\nthat fits the world that was based on a dream. Since we should not\nbelieve in miracles, those concepts must fit the world. The best\nexplanation of the usefulness of our concepts is that they accurately\nrepresent features of the world that produce our sensory inputs that\nallow us to navigate successfully in the world. She thinks that this\nNo-Miracles Argument shows that it is reasonable to think that our\nconcepts (or groups of concepts) mirror the world’s structure\n(Jenkins 2008a: 139). If we have justified concepts, ones we\nhave reason to think fit the world, we can examine them to see what\nthey involve and then have a priori justification for\nbelieving that certain propositions that involve them are true of\nthe world. So, on her view, we (but not BIVs) could know a\npriori, merely on the basis of examining our concepts,\nthat all vixens are female and that there are (or at least\nwere) vixens, and that all bachelors are unmarried and that\nthere are (or at least were) bachelors. If we have grounded\nconcepts, we (but not BIVs) can have a priori knowledge that\nall of these propositions are true. Yet gaining this sort of knowledge\nabout our external environment a priori seems impossible.", "\nFurther, it is not obvious that all a priori knowledge rests\non grounded concepts. Normative or mathematical concepts might map the\nnormative and mathematical domains but not the external world. We can\nknow a priori that it is wrong to torture children just for\nthe fun of it and that two is the only even prime regardless of what\nthe external world is like. Perhaps we can also know a priori\nthat some general normative principles are true, such as the principle\nof inference to the best explanation (IBE). Roughly, this principle\nsays that we are justified in believing some hypothesis if it is the\nbest explanation of what we observe. For instance, it says that we are\njustified in believing that someone recently walked along the beach\nbecause that best explains our observation of footprints in the sand.\nBut we could not be justified in accepting IBE because it is useful\nand the best explanation of its usefulness is that it fits the way the\nworld is. That would be a circular argument for accepting IBE. Lastly,\nit seems possible for even a BIV to know certain conditional\npropositions, for instance, to know that that IF something is a vixen,\nit is a female fox and IF someone is bachelor, he is an unmarried\nmale.", "\nJenkins allows that some concepts can be grounded, even if they are\nnot directly grounded, provided they are constituted by grounded\nconcepts, but it is hard to see how the concepts spiritual\nand immaterial could be so constituted. Still, it seems that\nwe can know a priori that if there are angels, there are\nspiritual beings and if there are immaterial beings, they do\nnot occupy space.", "\nIt is one thing to hold that a priori knowledge requires\nenabling empirical experience to acquire the concepts that are the\nbasis of that sort of knowledge, and quite another thing to hold that\nthose concepts must be grounded in such experience. The latter rules\nout some seemingly obvious kinds of a priori knowledge (viz.,\nsome mathematical and normative knowledge, and knowledge of certain\nconditional propositions which seem merely to be about the\nrelationship of concepts), and so seems too strong. It also seems to\nallow in a priori knowledge of the existence of, say, foxes\nand bachelors, and so seems too weak." ], "section_title": "7. Even if intuitions can justify, can they yield knowledge of the external world?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIt is widely, though not universally, held that knowledge is partly\nanalyzable in terms of justified true belief. But, as we’ve\nseen, Gettier examples show that having a justified true belief is not\nsufficient for knowledge. We need some anti-luck condition in addition\nto JTB to rule out cases where there is a JTB but not knowledge\nbecause, in some sense, the person in the Gettier situation is lucky\nto have a true belief given the way his evidence is related to the\ntruth of his belief.", "\nThe Lottery Paradox suggests that even more than JTB and an anti-luck\ncondition are required for knowledge. The chances that you hold the\nwinning ticket in a one million ticket lottery is one in a million,\nand that you hold a losing ticket, 999,999 in a million. Suppose you\nknow what the probability of your holding a losing ticket is and that\nyou in fact have a losing ticket. Then you seem to have a justified\nbelief that your ticket is a loser (because you know that’s very\nlikely true), and it is true that it is a loser. Assume, also, that\nyou are not in a Gettier situation. Still, you do not seem to know\nthat your ticket is a losing one. It seems that you need further\nconfirmation from a trustworthy source to know your ticket has\nlost.", "\nIf knowledge in general is justified true belief plus some condition\nto handle Gettier cases and another to handle the Lottery Paradox,\nthen on the account of knowledge that requires you to have a justified\ntrue belief, a priori knowledge will be a priori\njustified true belief plus some conditions to deal with Gettier and\nLottery Paradox cases. Specific versions of this view of a\npriori knowledge will depend on specific versions of a\npriori justification.", "\nBut there are rival accounts of knowledge that reject the view that\nknowledge is partly analyzable in terms of justification. One such\nview is called knowledge reliabilism; the other, the “knowledge\nfirst” view. Knowledge reliabilism is the view that a person\nknows P if and only if she has a reliably produced true belief,\nand a priori knowledge reliabilism would say a similar thing\nabout a priori knowledge. Perhaps just having reliable\nintuitions would be enough to have a priori knowledge\nregardless of whether they provided justification or not.", "\nThere are well-known examples that count against the idea that\nreliably produced true belief is sufficient for knowledge. Let\nTruenorth be a person who has true beliefs about what direction is\nnorth, south, etc., even when blindfolded. He has a kind of internal\ncompass like the ones found in migratory birds. But assume that\nTruenorth has no reason to think that his beliefs about compass\ndirections are accurate; he has never received confirmation of their\naccuracy, neither from the testimony of others nor by checking things\nout himself. Nevertheless, he is confident that his beliefs about what\ndirection is north, etc., are correct. Assume, also, that he has no\nreason to think that others in his society have, nor that they lack,\nhis directional ability. In general, assume that there are no\nundefeated defeaters of Truenorth’s beliefs about what direction\nis north, etc. Intuitively, it seems that if he believes that some\ndirection he points to is north, he is not justified in believing,\nnor does he know, that it is north, even if what he believes\nregarding compass directions is always true.", "\nIf this is a problem for reliabilists about empirical\nknowledge, it may also be a problem for reliabilists when it comes to\na priori knowledge. Mere reliability does not seem sufficient\nfor knowledge. What seems missing in the case of Truenorth is any\nreason for him to think that his beliefs about compass directions are\nreliable. Perhaps what is missing on reliabilist accounts of a\npriori knowledge is similar, namely, that the subject lacks any\nreason to think that her a priori intuitions are reliable\neven if they are.", "\nBrian Weatherson offers an example involving a person he calls\n“Tamati”, a young mathematician who has a sudden strong\nconviction that there is no largest prime upon noticing that as primes\nget larger the gap between them also gets larger (2019: 125–26).\nTamati believes that there is no largest prime on the basis of his\nstrong conviction, and Weatherson explains how Tamati’s strong\nconvictions about mathematical propositions are reliable. But,\nintuitively, Tamati is not justified in believing, nor does he know,\nthat there is no largest prime without a proof that it’s true.\nSo reliability is not sufficient for justification or knowledge even\nin the realm of the a priori.", "\nViews that see knowledge as resting on justification, whether\nempirical or a priori, might be said to make justification\nfirst. A “knowledge first” view sees justification as\nderivative at best. It equates one’s total evidence with\none’s total knowledge (Williamson 2014: 8; see, also, 4). If\njustification is a function of evidence, knowledge implies\njustification, but according to Williamson justification is not part\nof what knowledge is. He holds that knowledge is not analyzable even\npartly in terms of justification.", "\nThere seem to be clear counterexamples to the knowledge first view.\nSuppose you are driving out in the country and first pass by one of\nmany fields where sheep are grazing, and then a little later pass by\nthe field with the poodles that look just like sheep. In the first\ncases, you knew there were sheep in the field, but in the last case\nyou did not. Still, weren’t you just as justified, didn’t\nyou have the same sort of evidence, in the last case as in the first\nones? No, says Williamson, a defender of the knowledge first view. You\nare just as epistemically blameless in the last case as in\nthe earlier ones because, for all you know, you are looking at real\nsheep. You have a legitimate excuse for believing that you are looking\nat sheep, but you don’t have evidence, nor are you justified in\nbelieving, that you are looking at sheep when you are looking at\npoodles (Williamson 2014: 4–5).", "\nWilliamson’s criticism of any justified true belief account of\nknowledge would rest on the fact that no one has yet been able to\nsolve the Gettier problem (2014: 1–2), nor give a good account\nof what it is for beliefs to be justified because they fit the\nevidence. According to him, the attempt to analyze knowledge is in a\nshambles, and the knowledge first approach promises to shed light on\nthe nature of indiscriminability, norms of assertion, and epistemic\nlogic (2014: 6–7). So it promises to be fruitful while the old\napproach of analyzing knowledge has left behind a path strewn with\nfailures. This, says Williamson, is a good reason to change horses.\nBut Williamson’s view seems to have its own liabilities. On the\nknowledge-first approach that he develops, you don’t have any\nevidence that there are sheep in the field when you are looking at the\npoodles, and human footprints in the sand are not evidence that\nsomeone recently walked there if they were made by a monkey wearing\nrubber feet. The new horse bucks." ], "section_title": "8. What is a priori knowledge?", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Audi, Robert, 1997, Moral Knowledge and Ethical\nCharacter, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2001, The Architecture of Reason: The\nStructure and Substance of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.001.0001", "Bealer, George, 1987, “The Philosophical Limits of\nScientific Essentialism”, Philosophical Perspectives,\n1: 289–365. doi:10.2307/2214149", "–––, 1992, “The Incoherence of\nEmpiricism”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume,\n66: 99–137. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/66.1.99", "–––, 1996a, “A Priori Knowledge\nand the Scope of Philosophy” and “A Priori\nKnowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa”,\nPhilosophical Studies, 81)2–3): 121–142 and\n163–174, respectively; Bealer’s essay is reprinted in\n2008, Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edition,\nErnest Sosa, et al. (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp.\n612–624. doi:10.1007/BF00372777 doi:10.1007/BF00372780", "–––, 1996b, “On the Possibility of\nPhilosophical Knowledge”, Philosophical Perspectives,\n10: 1–34. doi:10.2307/2216234", "–––, 1998, “Intuition and the Autonomy of\nPhilosophy”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 201–239.", "–––, 1999, “The A Priori”, in Greco\nand Sosa 1999: 243–270.", "Beebe, James R., 2011, “A Priori Skepticism”,\nPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83(3):\n583–602. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00488.x", "–––, 2012, “Experimental\nEpistemology”, in Cullison 2012: 248–269 (Ch. 13).", "Boghossian, Paul, 2001, “Inference and Insight”,\nPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(3):\n633–640. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00130.x", "–––, forthcominga, “Do We Have Reason to\nDoubt the Importance of the Distinction Between A Priori and A\nPosteriori Knowledge? A Reply to Williamson”, in Boghossian and\nWilliamson forthcoming.", "–––, forthcomingb, “Intuition,\nUnderstanding, and the A Priori”, in Boghossian and Williamson\nforthcoming.", "Boghossian, Paul and Christopher Peacocke (eds.), 2000, New\nEssays on the A Priori, Oxford: Clarendon Press.\ndoi:10.1093/0199241279.001.0001", "Boghossian, Paul and Timothy Williamson, forthcoming, Debating\nthe A Priori, New York: Oxford University Press.", "BonJour, Laurence, 1985, The Structure of Empirical\nKnowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "–––, 1998, In Defense of Pure Reason: A\nRationalist Account of A Priori Justification, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511625176", "–––, 2001a, “Précis of In Defense of\nPure Reason” and “Replies”, Philosophy and\nPhenomenological Research, 63(3): 625–631, 673–698.\nPart of a Book Symposium on BonJour’s In Defense of Pure\nReason. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00129.x\ndoi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00135.x", "–––, 2001b, “Review of Rethinking\nIntuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical\nInquiry” (DePaul and Ramsey 1998), The British Journal\nfor the Philosophy of Science, 52(1): 151–158.\ndoi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.151", "–––, 2005a, “In Defense of the A\nPriori”, in Steup and Sosa 2005: 98–105.", "–––, 2005b, “Reply to Devitt”, in\nSteup and Sosa 2005: 115–118.", "–––, 2005c, “Last Rejoinder”, in\nSteup and Sosa 2005: 120–121.", "Butchvarov, Panyot, 1970, The Concept of Knowledge,\nEvanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.", "Cappelen, Herman, 2012, Philosophy Without Intuitions,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Casullo, Albert, 2001, “Experience and A Priori\nJustification”, Philosophy and Phenomenological\nResearch, 63(3): 665–671.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00134.x", "–––, 2002, “A Priori Knowledge”, in\nThe Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul Moser (ed.),\nOxford: Oxford University Press, 95–143. This is a condensed\nversion of Casullo 2003.", "–––, 2003, A Priori Justification,\nOxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195115058.001.0001", "–––, 2009, “Analyzing a Priori\nKnowledge”, Philosophical Studies, 142(1): 77–90.\ndoi:10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5", "–––, 2012a, Essays on A Priori Knowledge and\nJustification, New York: Oxford University Press. This is a\ncollection of Casullo’s previously published essays, plus four\nunpublished essays and an annotated bibliography on a priori\nknowledge. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777860.001.0001", "–––, 2012b, “Intuitions, Thought\nExperiments, and the A Priori”, in Casullo 2012a:\n233–250.", "–––, 2012c, “Articulating the A Priori-A\nPosteriori Distinction”, in Casullo 2012a: 289–327.", "–––, 2013, “Articulating the A Priori-A\nPosteriori Distinction”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013:\n248–271 (Ch. 11).\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0012", "Casullo, Albert and Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), 2013, The A\nPriori in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001", "Chisholm, Roderick, 1989, Theory of Knowledge,\n3rd edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc.", "Christensen, David and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), 2013, The\nEpistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001", "Chudnoff, Elijah, 2011a, “What Intuitions Are Like”,\nPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(3):\n625–654. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00463.x", "–––, 2011b, “The Nature of Intuitive\nJustification”, Philosophical Studies, 153(2):\n313–333. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9495-2", "–––, 2013a, “Intuitive Knowledge”,\nPhilosophical Studies, 162(2): 359–378.\ndoi:10.1007/s11098-011-9770-x", "–––, 2013b, Intuition, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199683000.001.0001", "–––, 2014a, “Intuition in\nMathematics”, in Rational Intuition, Lisa M. Osbeck and\nBarbara S. Held (eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press,\n174–191. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139136419.010", "–––, 2014b, “Is Intuition Based On\nUnderstanding?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological\nResearch, 89(1): 42–67. doi:10.1111/phpr.12001", "–––, 2016, “Intuition, Presentational\nPhenomenology, and Awareness of Abstract Objects: Replies to Manning\nand Witmer”, Florida Philosophical Review, 16(1):\n117–127.", "–––, 2017, “The Reality of the\nIntuitive”, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of\nPhilosophy, 60(4): 371–385.\ndoi:10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220640", "–––, 2018, “Intuition in Gettier”,\nin Classical Philosophical Arguments: The Gettier Problem,\nStephen Hetherington (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "–––, forthcoming, “In Search of\nIntuition”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, first\nonline: 5 November 2019. doi:10.1080/00048402.2019.1658121", "Cullison, Andrew (ed.), 2012, The Continuum Companion to\nEpistemology, London: Continuum Press.", "Cummins, Robert, 1998, “Reflection on Reflective\nEquilibrium”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 113–127.", "DePaul, Michael and William Ramsey (eds.), 1998, Rethinking\nIntuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical\nInquiry, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.", "Devitt, Michael, 2006a, “There is No a\nPriori”, in Steup and Sosa 2005: 105–115.", "–––, 2006b, “Reply to BonJour”, in\nSteup and Sosa 2005: 118–120.", "Donnellan, Keith S., 1977, “The Contingent A Priori\nand Rigid Designators”, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy\nVolume II: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Peter A.\nFrench, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.),\nMorris, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 12–27.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00025.x", "Evans, Gareth, 1979, “Reference and Contingency”:,\nMonist, 62(2): 161–189.\ndoi:10.5840/monist197962220", "Feldman, Richard, 1999, “Methodological Naturalism in\nEpistemology”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 170–186.", "–––, 2003, Epistemology, Upper Saddle\nRiver, NJ: Prentice Hall", "–––, 2006, “Epistemological Puzzles about\nDisagreement”, in Hetherington 2006: 216–236.", "Feldman, Richard and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), 2010,\nDisagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001", "Field, Hartry, 2000, “Aprioricity as an Evaluative\nNotion”, in Boghossian and Peacocke 2000: 117–149.\ndoi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0006", "Gendler, Tamar Szabó, 2000, Thought Experiment: On the Powers\nand Limits of Imaginary Cases, New York: Routledge.", "–––, 2001, “Empiricism, Rationalism and\nthe Limits of Justification”, Philosophy and\nPhenomenological Research, 63(3): 641–648.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00131.x", "Gettier, Edmund L., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief\nKnowledge?”, Analysis, 23(6): 121–123.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121", "Goldberg, Sanford C., 2009, “Reliabilism in\nPhilosophy”, Philosophical Studies, 142(1):\n105–117. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7", "–––, 2013, “Defending Philosophy in the\nFace of Systematic Disagreement”, in Machuca 2013:\n277–294.", "Goldman, Alvin I., 2007, “Philosophical Intuitions: Their\nTarget, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status”, Grazer\nPhilosophische Studien, 74(1): 1–26.\ndoi:10.1163/9789401204651_002", "–––, 2012, “Philosophical Naturalism and\nIntuitional Methodology”, in his Reliabilism and\nContemporary Epistemology: Essays, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress, pp. 280–316 (Ch. 11).", "–––, 2013, “Philosophical Naturalism and\nIntuitional Methodology”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013:\n11–44 (Ch. 1).\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0002", "Goldman, Alvin and Joel Pust, 1998, “Philosophical Theory\nand Intuitional Evidence”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998:\n179–197.", "Greco, John and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 1999, The Blackwell Guide\nto Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.", "Harman, Gilbert, 1994 [1999], “Doubts About Conceptual\nAnalysis”, in Philosophy in Mind, Michaelis Michael and\nJohn O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands,\n43–48. Reprinted in Harman 1999a: 138–143.\ndoi:10.1007/978-94-011-1008-2_4", "–––, 1999, Reasoning, Meaning, and\nMind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. A collection of Harman’s\nearlier essays; chpts. 6 and 7 especially relevant to the issue of\na priori knowledge. doi:10.1093/0198238029.001.0001", "–––, 2001, “General Foundations versus\nRational Insight”, Philosophy and Phenomenological\nResearch, 63(3): 657–663. Discussion of Lawrence\nBonJour’s In Defense of Pure Reason (1998).\ndoi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00133.x", "–––, 2003, “The Future of the A\nPriori”, Journal of Philosophical Research,\n28(supplement): 23–34. doi:10.5840/jpr_2003_1", "Hauser, Marc, 2006, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our\nUniversal Sense of Right and Wrong, New York: Harper Collins.\nSome of the ideas in this book may have been anticipated by John\nMikhail (2011), though published after Hauser’s book; see\nMikhail entry below.", "Hawthorne, John, 2013, “A Priority and Externalism”,\nin Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology,\nSanford Goldberg (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp.\n201–218.", "Hetherington, Stephen (ed.), 2006, Epistemology Futures,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Huston, Mark, 2003, Intuition: A Discussion of Recent\nPhilosophical Views, Ph.D dissertation, Wayne State\nUniversity.", "Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins, “Experimental Philosophy and\nApriority”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 45–66 (Ch. 2).\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0003", "Jackson, Frank, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of\nConceptual Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon Press.\ndoi:10.1093/0198250614.001.0001", "–––, 2000, “Representation, Scepticism,\nand the A Priori”, in Boghossian and Peacock 2000:\n320–332. doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0013", "Jenkins, Carrie S., 2007, “Entitlement and\nRationality”, Synthese, 157(1): 25–45.\ndoi:10.1007/s11229-006-0012-2", "–––, 2008a, Grounding Concepts: An Empirical\nBasis for Arithmetical Knowledge, New York: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.001.0001", "–––, 2008b, “A Priori Knowledge: Debates\nand Developments”, Philosophy Compass, 3(3):\n436–450. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00136.x", "–––, 2010a, “Apriorism About Modality:\nReply to Scott Sturgeon”, in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic,\nand Epistemology, Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffman (eds.), New York:\nOxford University Press, pp. 310–317.", "–––, 2010b, “Concepts, Experience and\nModal Knowledge”, Philosophical Perspectives, 24:\n255–279. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00193.x", "–––, 2012a, “A Priori Knowledge: The\nConceptual Approach”, in Cullison 2012: 180–198.", "–––, 2013, “Naturalistic Challenges to the\nA Priori”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 274–290 (Ch. 12).\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0013", "Kahneman, Daniel, 2011, Thinking, Fast and Slow, London,\nPenguin Books.", "Kant, Immanuel, 1787 [1965], Critique of Pure Reason,\nNorman Kemp Smith (transl.), New York: St. Martin’s Press,\n1965.", "Kitcher, Philip, 1983, The Nature of Mathematical\nKnowledge, New York: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/0195035410.001.0001", "Kornblith, Hilary, 1998, “The Role of Intuition in\nPhilosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural\nIngredients”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 129–141.", "–––, 1999, “In Defense of Naturalized\nEpistemology”, in Greco and Sosa 1999: 158–169.", "–––, 2000, “The Impurity of Reason”,\nPacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81(1): 67–89.\ndoi:10.1111/1468-0114.00095", "–––, 2005, “Précis of Knowledge and\nIts Place in Nature” and “Replies to Alvin Goldman,\nMartin Kusch and William Talbott”, Philosophy and\nPhenomenological Research, 71(2): 399–402 and\n427–441. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00456.x\ndoi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00460.x", "–––, 2006, “Intuitions and\nEpistemology”, in Hetherington 2006: 10–25.", "–––, 2009, “Review: Timothy Williamson’s\nThe Philosophy of Philosophy”, Analysis,\n69(1): 109–116. doi:10.1093/analys/ann039", "–––, 2010, “Belief in the Face of\nControversy”, in Feldman and Warfield 2010: 29–52.", "–––, 2013, “Is Philosophical Knowledge\nPossible?” in Machuca 2013: 260–276 (Ch. 13).", "Kripke, Saul, 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in\nSemantics of Natural Language, Donald Davidson and Gilbert\nHarman (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 253–355.\ndoi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9", "Lehrer, Keith, 1986, “The Coherence Theory of\nKnowledge”:, Philosophical Topics, 14(1): 5–25.\ndoi:10.5840/philtopics198614112", "–––, 1990, Theory of Knowledge,\nBoulder, CO: West View Press, Inc.", "–––, 1996, “Proper Function versus\nSystematic Coherence”, in Warrant in Contemporary\nEpistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of\nKnowledge, Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Lanham, MD: Rowman &\nLittlefield Publishers, Inc., pp. 25–45.", "Lycan, William G., 1996, “Bealer on the Possibility of\nPhilosophical Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies,\n81(2–3): 143–150. doi:10.1007/BF00372778", "–––, 2006, “On the Gettier Problem\nproblem”, in Hetherington 2006: 148–168.", "Machuca, Diego E. (ed.), 2013, Disagreement and\nSkepticism, Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis.\ndoi:10.4324/9780203073346", "Malmgren, Anna-Sara, 2011, “Rationalism and the Content of\nIntuitive Judgements”, Mind, 120(478): 263–327.\ndoi:10.1093/mind/fzr039", "–––, 2013a, “Review of Herman\nCappelen’s Philosophy Without Intuitions (Cappelen\n2012)”, Notre Dame Philosophical Review,\n2013.04.27.", "–––, 2013b, “A Priori Testimony\nRevisited”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 158–185 (Ch. 7).\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0008", "McKinsey, Michael, 1987, “Apriorism in the Philosophy of\nLanguage”, Philosophical Studies, 52(1): 1–32.\ndoi:10.1007/BF00354156", "Mikhail, John, 2011, Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls’\nLinguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal\nJudgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9780511780578", "Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, New York:\nOxford University Press.", "–––, 2011, On What Matters (Volume 2),\nNew York: Oxford University Press.", "Peacocke, Christopher, 2000, “Explaining the A Priori: The\nProgramme of Moderate Rationalism”, in Boghossian and Peacocke\n2000: 255–285. doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0011", "Philosophical Studies, 1998, 92(1–2), guest editor,\nJohn O’Leary-Hawthorne. This entire issue is devoted to the\ntopic of a priori knowledge.", "Plantinga, Alvin, 2011, Where the Conflict Really Lies:\nScience, Religion, and Naturalism, New York: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812097.001.0001", "Putnam, Hilary, 1983, “ ‘Two Dogmas’\nRevisited”, in Realism and Reason: Philosophical\nPapers, vol. 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Quine, Willard Van Orman, 1963, From A Logical Point of\nView, New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbook.", "Railton, Peter, 2017a, “Two Sides of the Meta-Ethical\nMountain”, in Singer 2017: 35–59.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.003.0002", "–––, 2017b, “Railton’s\nCommentary”, in Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Vol.\nIII, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113–127.", "Rey, Georges, 2001, “Digging Deeper for the A Priori”,\nPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(3):\n649–656. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00132.x", "–––, 1998, “A Naturalistic A\nPriori”, Philosophical Studies, 92(1/2): 25–43.\ndoi:10.1023/A:1017155400164", "Russell, Bruce, 2010, “Intuition in Epistemology”, in\nA Companion to Epistemology, 2nd edition, Jonathan\nDancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup (eds.), Malden, MA:\nWiley-Blackwell, pp. 464–68.", "–––, 2012, “Rock Bottom: Coherentism’s\nSoft Spot”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50(1):\n94–111. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00085.x", "–––, 2013, “Moral Intuitionism”, in\nthe International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFollette\n(ed.), New York: Routledge.", "–––, 2017 “A Defense of Moral\nIntuitionism”, in Singer 2017: 231–258.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.003.0011", "–––, 2018, “Philosophical intuition: just\nwhat is ‘a priori’ justification?” Aeon, 2\nMarch 2018. URL =\n <https://aeon.co/ideas/philosophical-intuition-just-what-is-a-priori-justification>", "Russell, Gillian, 2008, Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence\nof the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001", "Schwitzgebel, Eric and Fiery Cushman, 2012, “Expertise in\nMoral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional\nPhilosophers and Non-Philosophers”, Mind &\nLanguage, 27(2): 135–153.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01438.x", "–––, 2015, “Philosophers’ Biased\nJudgments Persist despite Training, Expertise and Reflection”,\nCognition, 141: 127–137.\ndoi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015", "Singer, Peter (ed.), 2017, Does Anything Really Matter? Essays\non Parfit on Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.001.0001", "Sosa, Ernest, 1996, “Rational Intuition: Bealer on Its\nNature and Epistemic Status”, Philosophical Studies,\n81(2–3): 151–162. doi:10.1007/BF00372779", "–––, 1998, “Minimal Intuition”, in\nDePaul and Ramsey 1998: 257–269.", "–––, 2013, “Intuitions and Foundations:\nThe Relevance of Moore and Wittgenstein”, in Casullo and Thurow\n2013: 186–200 (Ch. 8).\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0009", "Sosa, Ernest and Enrique Villanueva (eds.), 2004,\nEpistemology: Philosophical Issues, Volume 14, Malden, MA:\nBlackwell Publishing, Ltd.", "Steup, Matthias and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 2005, Contemporary\nDebates in Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing\nLtd.", "Steup, Matthias, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 2014,\nContemporary Debates in Epistemology,2nd edition,\nMalden, MA: Wiley Blackwell.", "Stratton-Lake, Philip (ed.), 2002, Ethical Intuitionism:\nRe-Evaluations, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1990, “Introduction” to\nThe Realm of Rights, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,\npp. 1–33.", "Thurow, Joshua C., 2013, “The Implicit Conception and\nIntuition Theory of the A Priori, With Implications for Experimental\nPhilosophy”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 67–91 (Ch. 3).\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0004", "Turri, John, 2011, “Contingent A Priori Knowledge”,\nPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83(2):\n327–44.", "–––, 2018, “Experimental Epistomology and\n’Gettier Cases’ ”, in S. Hetherington (ed.),\nThe Gettier Problem, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:\n199–217.", "Unger, Peter, 1996, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion\nof Innocence, New York: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/0195108590.001.0001", "Weatherson, Brian, 2003, “What Good Are\nCounterexamples?”, Philosophical Studies, 115(1):\n1–31. doi:10.1023/A:1024961917413", "–––, 2017, “Analytic–Synthetic and A\nPriori–A Posteriori History”, in The Oxford Handbook\nof Philosophical Methodology, Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó\nGendler, and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,\n231–248. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.24", "–––, 2019, “Normative Externalism”,\nNew York: Oxford University Press.", "Weinberg, Jonathan M., 2003, “Meta-Skepticism in\nEthno-Epistemology”, in The Skeptics: Contemporary\nEssays, Steven Luper (ed.), Aldershot, England: Ashgate\nPublishing, pp. 227–247.", "–––, 2006, “What’s Epistemology For?\nThe Case for Neopragmatism in Normative Metaepistemology” in\nHetherington 2006: 26–47.", "–––, 2013, “The Prospects for an\nExperimentalist Rationalism or Why It’s OK if the A Priori is\nonly 99.44 Percent Empirically Pure”, in Casullo and Thurow\n2013: 92–108 (Ch. 4).\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0005", "–––, 2017, “Intuitions”, in The\nOxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Herman Cappelen,\nTamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, 282–308.\ndoi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.25", "Weinberg, Jonathan M., Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich, 2001,\n“Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophical\nTopics, 29(1): 429–460.\ndoi:10.5840/philtopics2001291/217", "Williamson, Timothy, 2004, “Philosphical ‘Intuitions’\nand Scepticism about Judgement”, Dialectica, 58(1):\n109–153. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00294.x", "–––, 2005, “Armchair Philosophy,\nMetaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking”,\nProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105(1): 1–23.\ndoi:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x", "–––, 2007a, “Philosophical Knowledge and\nKnowledge of Counterfactuals”, Grazer Philosophische\nStudien, 74(1): 89–123. doi:10.1163/9789401204651_006", "–––, 2007b, The Philosophy of\nPhilosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.", "–––, 2013, “How Deep is the Distinction\nbetween A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge”, in Casullo and\nThurow 2013: 291–312 (Ch. 13).\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0014", "–––, 2014, “Should Knowledge Come\nFirst?” and “Knowledge Still First”, in Steup,\nTurri, and Sosa 2014: 1–9 and 22–25.", "Wright, Crispin, 2004a, “Warrant for Nothing (and\nFoundations for Free)?”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary\nVolume, 78: 167–212.\ndoi:10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.x", "–––, 2004, “Intuition, Entitlement and the\nEpistemology of Logical Laws”, Dialectica, 58(1):\n155–175. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00295.x", "Wykstra, Stephanie, 2018, “Out of the Armchair”,\nAeon, 1 May 2018. 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aquinas	Thomas Aquinas	First published Wed Dec 7, 2022	[ "\n[Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Robert Pasnau\nreplaces the\n former entry\n on this topic by the previous authors.] ", "\nBetween antiquity and modernity stands Thomas Aquinas (ca.\n1225–1274). The greatest figure of thirteenth-century Europe in\nthe two preeminent sciences of the era, philosophy and theology, he\nepitomizes the scholastic method of the newly founded universities.\nLike\n Dante\n or Michelangelo, Aquinas takes inspiration from antiquity, especially\n Aristotle,\n and builds something entirely new. Viewed through a theological lens,\nAquinas has often been seen as the summit of the Christian tradition\nthat runs back to\n Augustine\n and the early Church. Viewed as a philosopher, he is a foundational\nfigure of modern thought. His efforts at a systematic reworking of\nAristotelianism reshaped Western philosophy and provoked countless\nelaborations and disputations among later medieval and modern\nphilosophers." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Life", "1.2 Works" ] }, { "content_title": "2. God", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. The Created World", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Form and Matter", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Soul and Body", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Cognitive Theory", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Perception", "6.2 Thought", "6.3 Knowledge and Science" ] }, { "content_title": "7. Will and Freedom", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Ethics", "sub_toc": [ "8.1 Happiness", "8.2 Natural Law", "8.3 Virtue Theory" ] }, { "content_title": "9. Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "A. Aquinas’s Works", "B. Secondary Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThomas Aquinas was born near Aquino, halfway between Rome and Naples,\naround the year 1225. He was the youngest of at least nine children,\nand born into a wealthy family that presided over a prominent castle\nin Roccasecca. As a teenage student in Naples, he fell under the sway\nof the Dominicans, a newly founded order of priests devoted to\npreaching and learning. Joining the order at the age of nineteen, he\nwas assigned to Paris for further study, but his plans were delayed by\nthe intransigency of his parents, who had hoped he would play a\nleading role at the venerable local monastery, Monte Cassino, where he\nhad studied as a child. After confining him to Roccasecca for a year,\nhis parents yielded and Thomas went to Paris as a Dominican friar.", "\nThomas spent three years in Paris, studying philosophy, and then was\nsent to Cologne, in 1248, under the supervision of\n Albert the Great.\n This older Dominican proved to be the ideal mentor. Albert was at the\ntime the leading figure in the newly prominent program of melding\nChristian theology with Greek and Arabic philosophy. He possessed an\nencyclopedic grasp of the sciences of the day, which had been\nexpanding at a dizzying pace thanks to the new availability of the\nAristotelian corpus in Latin translation. It was Albert’s firm\nconviction, which became Aquinas’s own, that the Christian faith\ncould only benefit from a profound engagement with philosophy and\nscience.", "\nThomas evidently flourished under Albert’s influence, for when\nAlbert was asked in 1252 to nominate a student to pursue an advanced\ndegree in theology at the University of Paris, he chose Thomas, even\nthough he was still two years younger than the minimum required age.\nAfter four years as a bachelor of theology, lecturing on the Bible and\non Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Aquinas received his\ndoctorate and was immediately appointed master of theology, once again\nat an earlier age than the statutes officially allowed. From 1256\nuntil 1259, he held the Dominican chair of theology in Paris,\npreaching, lecturing on the Bible, and presiding over various\nphilosophical and theological disputations.", "\nAlthough some masters at the University of Paris spent decades\nteaching there, it was the custom of the Dominican order (as with the\nFranciscans) to rotate scholars through these positions. Accordingly,\nin 1259 Aquinas was sent back to Italy, where he spent most of the\nfollowing decade in several Dominican houses of study, first in\nOrvieto (in Umbria) and then in Rome. During these years, while he\ncontinued to preach, lecture on the Bible, and conduct academic\ndisputations, he found the time to develop his two most important\nworks, the Summa contra gentiles and the Summa\ntheologiae.", "\nIn 1268, Aquinas was asked to return to Paris for an unusual second\nterm as master of theology. Here he put his now venerable reputation\nto work in attempting to steer the philosophical conversation away\nfrom various extreme positions that were dividing scholars. He wrote a\nbrief treatise arguing for a middle ground on the vexed question of\nwhether the world could be proved to be eternal or created in time\n(§3), and a somewhat longer treatise against the view that all\nhuman beings share a single intellect (§6.2). These years were\ndominated, though, by his efforts to complete the Summa\ntheologiae and at the same time write commentaries on all of\nAristotle’s principal works. When his second four-year term in\nParis came to an end he returned to Italy, this time to Naples, in\n1272. During these final years he nearly, but not quite, finished both\nthe Summa theologiae and his commentary series. Instead,\nafter a year and a half in Naples, he stopped writing, famously\nexplaining that “All that I have written seems to me like straw\ncompared with what has now been revealed to me.” A few months\nafter that he died, in the Cistercian abbey of Fossanova, on March 7,\n1274.", "\nThis chronology of Aquinas’s life is fairly well attested. There\nare also many colorful stories about his life, many of which stem from\ntestimony given during his canonization inquiry in 1319. The\nauthenticity of these stories is unknowable. Aquinas himself, in his\nwritings, reveals almost nothing about his personal life. (For\nbiography see Porro 2012 [2016]; Torrell 1993 [2022]; Legge 2022.)" ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Life" }, { "content": [ "\nOver a mere two decades of literary activity, Aquinas left behind more\nthan eight million words (eight times more than has survived, for\ninstance, from Aristotle). It is a measure of Aquinas’s\nimmediate and lasting influence that—quite unlike the situation\nwith other medieval philosophers—essentially everything he wrote\nhas survived and has been lovingly edited and translated into English\nand many other modern languages. In outline, there are five categories\nof works:", "\nThe bibliography below contains further details about individual works\nand their chronology.", "\nThe Summa theologiae (ST) generally represents\nAquinas’s most considered thought on a given topic, and the work\nis comprehensive enough that it contains at least some discussion of\nalmost all of Aquinas’s intellectual concerns. It divides into\nfour parts:", "\nThe treatments in ST are deliberately brief. Aquinas writes\nin the preface that “our intent in this work is to develop those\nissues that concern the Christian religion in a way that suits the\neducation of those who are just beginning.” Today, no one thinks\nof ST as a work for beginners, although its scope and\nconcision make it a useful place to start. A serious engagement with\nAquinas’s work, however, requires comparing ST with\nparallel treatments elsewhere, such as the earlier Summa contra\ngentiles (SCG) and the still earlier commentary on\nLombard’s Sentences. Moreover, since all three of these\nlong works are written as theological treatises, it is useful\nalso to compare these discussions with his accounts in the more\nphilosophically focused and often more detailed disputed questions. In\ngeneral, given how much Aquinas wrote and how often he reconsidered\nthe same issue from a slightly different perspective, a careful study\nof his work requires comparing multiple treatments of the same issue.\nAnd since he did not begin to circulate his work until he was 30, and\nlived for only two decades more, those various treatments tend to\nreinforce rather than conflict with each other. (Naturally, scholars\nhave long debated whether his thought evolves on one topic or another,\non which see Pini 2012.)", "\nMost of Aquinas’s central texts are written in the distinctive\nscholastic style of the disputed question, in which the topic to be\ndiscussed is posed at the start as a question. The dispute begins with\na series of arguments on one side. These, however, almost always\nrepresent the opposite of Aquinas’s own position, and so, after\nthe initial arguments, one or more arguments are posed to the contrary\n(sed contra), and then Aquinas makes his own main reply in\nthe body (corpus) of the article, and finally he responds to\nthe initial arguments (ad 1, ad 2, etc.). This structure is\nbased on actual classroom procedures, even if Aquinas’s\ncarefully composed works are never a literal record of an actual\nclassroom debate. It is a method that lends itself to argumentative\nrigor, but often is best digested by reading the text in something\nother than the order in which it appears on the page. (I myself like\nto begin with the main reply.)", "\nAn important exception to the disputed-question format is\nAquinas’s commentaries. These are often extremely useful for\nunderstanding his own philosophical thought. This is true most\nobviously of the philosophical commentaries, which cover most of\nAristotle’s key works. The point holds true, however, for his\nbiblical commentaries as well, because they regularly contain\ninteresting discussions of wide-ranging philosophical topics (Stump\n2010). One has to approach all of Aquinas’s commentaries with\nsome caution, however, because his principal method of commentary is\nto produce a word-by-word paraphrase. This means that, if one does not\nread these works with one eye on the text being commented upon, a\npassage that may seem to represent Aquinas’s thought may instead\nbe a rephrased version of what Aristotle (or Isaiah or Paul) said.\nWhether or not Aquinas’s paraphrase of a passage from Aristotle\nshould be treated as a reflection of Aquinas’s own thought is a\nmatter of some dispute (Jenkins 1996; Elders 2009), but readers should\nat least be aware of how these commentaries are structured. The\npassages most likely to shed light on Aquinas’s own thought are\nthose where he breaks away from his line-by-line paraphrase to offer a\nbrief lecture on some issue germane to a proper understanding of the\nunderlying text.", "\nIt is tempting, for modern readers, to divide Aquinas’s work\ninto the theological and philosophical, but lines here are difficult\nto draw. The medieval university did formally distinguish between the\nhigher-level discipline of theology and the undergraduate arts\nfaculty, whose curriculum consisted largely in the works of Aristotle.\nBut many of the questions of the theologians—such as the\nworkings of intellect, the nature of freedom, the systematization of\nethical theory—are now seen as paradigmatically philosophical.\nAt the same time, much of Aristotle, and therefore much of the arts\nfaculty curriculum, looks to us more scientific than philosophical.\nAquinas, unlike his teacher Albert the Great, only occasionally\ndwelled on what we now think of as scientific questions. Conversely,\nas a professor of theology, he considered at great length various\nmatters that depend on\n divine revelation, such as the\nnature of the Trinity and the character of Christ’s humanity. A\ncomplete understanding of Aquinas’s thought thus requires\nspending considerable time with such properly theological\nquestions. At the same time, it is appropriate today to number Aquinas\namong the philosophers, because he was particularly interested in and\nhad particularly innovative things to say about what we now think of\nas philosophical questions. The tremendous energy he put into\ncommenting on Aristotle’s works is a testimony both to the\nimportance he gives philosophy for a proper understanding of theology,\nand to his confidence that progress in philosophy will only benefit\nthe Christian faith. As he famously wrote, “if anything is found\nin the words of the philosophers that is contrary to the faith, this\nis not philosophy but rather an abuse of philosophy, due to a failure\nof reason” (Comm. Boethius De trinitate 2.3c). \n\n", "\nFor book-length general surveys of Aquinas's thought see Stump 2003,\nDavies and Stump 2012, Shields and Pasnau 2016, Stump and White\n2022." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Works" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAquinas believes that natural reason can demonstratively prove\nGod’s existence. The first step is to show that, for everything\nin the changeable world around us, there is a first cause, or prime\nmover, in virtue of which all other things have their existence, their\nmotion, their qualities and direction. This is the result he gets in\nhis much discussed “five ways” of proving God’s\nexistence (ST 1a 2.3c). Aquinas denies that Anselm’s\n ontological argument\n has any force as a proof (ST 1a 2.1 ad 2; SCG\nI.10–11). Instead, the first three ways are\n cosmological arguments,\n based on the impossibility of an infinite series of causes.\nCommentators generally agree that what Aquinas means to exclude is an\ninfinite series of simultaneous causes, a “vertical”\nseries as opposed to an infinite “horizontal” series of\ncauses going back in time, which he does not think can be proved to be\nimpossible (§3). Each of the five brief arguments ends with a\nvariation on the formula “this is what everyone calls\nGod.” He puts his claim cautiously at this point, because to\ndemonstrate the existence of a prime mover falls well short of\ndemonstrating the existence of a being worthy of being called God. For\nall we have seen so far, for instance, this first cause might itself\nbe a body. But Aquinas thinks natural reason—what we now call\n natural theology—can\n go well beyond the five ways. ST 1a goes on to establish\nthat this first cause is not a body (3.1), nor composite in any way\nand hence entirely\n simple\n (3.7), perfect in every respect (4.2), the highest good (6.2),\ninfinite (7.1),\n omnipresent\n (8.2), completely unchangeable (9.1), eternal (10.2), supremely one\n(11.4), and possessing\n the most perfect knowledge\n (14.1). These results establish the existence of something worthy of\nbeing called God. (On Aquinas’s natural theology in general see\nKretzmann 1997; Wippel 2000 chs. 10–13; Stump 2003 pt. I. On the\nfive ways see Kenny 1969; MacDonald 1991a; Martin 1997; Pawl 2012;\nCohoe 2013.)", "\nThe successes of natural theology, for Aquinas, have their limit. For\nalthough natural reason can establish the existence of a perfect\nbeing, it is incapable of establishing many of the features that\ndistinctively characterize the Christian God, such as God’s\ntriune nature and God’s incarnation as a human being. Here is a\nplace where philosophy alone, unaided by revelation, fails to yield an\nadequate theology. Since the ultimate goal of human life, salvation in\nthe life to come (§8.1), requires some grasp of these Christian\ntruths, “it was necessary for the sake of human salvation that\ncertain truths that surpass human reason be made known to us through\ndivine revelation” (ST 1a 1.1). The study of revealed\ntheology is important, moreover, not only with respect to these\nso-called mysteries of the faith, but also in cases where the results\nof natural reason are too precarious to be counted on. Without direct\naccess through revelation, “the truth about God investigated by\nreason would be available only to a few people, after a long time, and\nwith the admixture of many errors.” Accordingly, “beyond\nthe philosophical disciplines investigated by human reason, it was\nnecessary to have a sacred teaching through revelation” (ibid.).\nThis sacred teaching (sacra doctrina) is the work of\ntheology.", "\nOne of the most difficult and most discussed issues in Aquinas’s\nnatural theology is the limits he places on our ability to understand\nGod’s nature. A sign of the difficulties to come emerges just\nafter he sets out his initial five-way proof, when he remarks,", "\nOnce it is grasped that something exists, it remains to be\ninvestigated how it exists, in order that what it is may be\nknown. But because it is not possible for us to know what God\nis, but rather what God is not, we cannot consider\nhow God exists, but rather how God does not exist. (ST 1a\n3pr; see Davies 2018)\n", "\nThat Aquinas in fact honors this constraint is far from obvious, given\nthe seemingly positive claims he makes regarding the divine nature. To\nunderstand his approach one must come to grips with his theory of\n analogical predication.\n In a case like God’s goodness, for instance, Aquinas does not\nmean only to deny God’s badness. It can be truly said, he\nthinks, that God is good. The difficulty is that the word\n‘good,’ when truly applied to God, has a different sense\nfrom what it has in cases familiar to our own experience. The two\nsenses are thus not univocal, but nor are they purely equivocal, as if\nGod’s goodness were wholly unrelated to the goodness we\nexperience. Instead, the usages are analogical (ST\n1a 13.5). So, “when we say God is good, the sense is not that\nGod is the cause of goodness or that God is not bad; rather, the sense\nis that what we call good in creatures preexists in God, albeit in a\nhigher mode” (ST 1a 13.2c). We can say with confidence,\non the basis of this analysis, that God is good, indeed preeminently\nso. To the extent that we are good, it is so only by participation in\nGod’s goodness. But our cognitive limitations preclude a more\nadequate account of this “higher mode” in which God is\ngood. (On analogy in Aquinas see McInerny 1996; Montagnes 1963 [2004];\nDewan 2007; Ashworth 2014; Hochschild 2019.)" ], "section_title": "2. God", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe mainstream of philosophical tradition as Aquinas knew it, running\nfrom Aristotle through the Greek commentators and into the Arabic\ntradition, held that the material world, and all the kinds of living\nthings in it, had always existed. These earlier Aristotelians still\nthought there was a place for God, as the first mover, but they\nunderstood God to be the initial, remote source of motions that had\nalways existed, rather than an eternal being who created the universe\nanew. Aquinas understood Christianity to be committed to the latter\nview. He holds that the changeable universe around us has existed for\nonly a finite amount of time; that God, in contrast, has existed\neternally and unchangingly; and that God freely chose to create the\nchangeable universe from nothing (ex nihilo). To bring a\nthing into existence ex nihilo is the defining feature of\n creation,\n in the strict sense of that term, and only God can do it (ST\n1a 45). Everything else in the natural world causes new things to come\ninto existence by modifying what is here already. The proper\nterminology for these natural changes is generation and\ncorruption, which refer to a substance’s coming into or\ngoing out of existence by natural means, and alteration,\nwhich refers to a substance’s undergoing accidental change:\ncontinuing to exist through change to its shape, color, and other\nnon-essential properties.", "\nAristotle and many of his followers believed they could prove that the\nworld had always existed. Conversely, many of Aquinas’s\ncontemporaries thought they could prove the opposite, that the world\nhad to have a beginning in time, and the debate between these rival\nphilosophical accounts was one of the most acrimonious issues in the\nearly medieval university (Dales 1990). Aquinas took up the question\nin detail in his treatise On the Eternity of the World,\nconcluding that no demonstrative argument is possible either way. For\nall we can tell, God could have created the world in such a way that\nit had always existed. That we think otherwise is another deliverance\nof the faith, not susceptible to philosophical proof. This measured\nconclusion is characteristic of his thought in many domains. On the\none hand, he has complete confidence that philosophical reasoning,\nproperly pursued, will not yield results that are a threat to\nChristianity. On the other hand, he thinks it discredits the faith to\ndefend it through dubious attempts at demonstration. The key is to see\nwhere philosophy can be of service, and where it must give way to\nrevealed doctrine (Wippel 1995c; Kretzmann 1999 ch. 5).", "\nIt is not easy to think about God’s relationship to the created\nworld, because without such a world there can be neither space nor\ntime (ST 1a 46.1, 46.3). Not space, because space is nothing\nmore than the existence of bodies, where bodies are beings that\npossess parts outside of parts, and so constitute the\nthree-dimensional extension that we think of as space. Accordingly,\nwhere there are no bodies there is no space. (Aquinas, following\nAristotle, denies that void space is coherent.) Not time, because\nAquinas accepts Aristotle’s definition of time as the measure of\nmotion. In a world without motion, then, there is no time, which means\nthat the first moment of time was the first moment of the created\nworld. Although it is hard to resist thinking of God as having existed\n“before” there was a material universe, God’s mode\nof existence, in a world without bodies, must be an existence outside\nof space and time. This need not entail, however, that God even now\nexists outside of space and time. God’s\n omnipresence\n was commonly understood as a literal presence everywhere (Pasnau 2011\nch. 16), and Aquinas characterizes God’s eternity not as a mode\nof existence outside of time, but as “being present to every\ntime or instant of time” (SCG I.66.8). It is, however,\nfar from clear what “present” amounts to in such a claim\n(Leftow 1990). These difficulties are of a piece with the general\ndifficulty we have in thinking about God using the concepts familiar\nto us from the world around us.", "\nHowever these metaphysical issues are resolved, it is clear that God\nis constantly, everywhere engaged with the world. Because “a\nthing’s existence cannot remain after the cessation of the\naction of the agent causing the effect” (ST 1a 104.1c),\nthe created world must have not just an initial creative cause but\nalso an ongoing cause that\n conserves\n it from moment to moment. Since God is necessarily perfect, the\ncreated world cannot be beneficial for God, and since a universe with\na perfect being is itself already perfect, God’s goodness does\nnot necessitate his creating anything at all. Moreover, since for\neverything God creates he could create something better (ST\n1a 25.6c), there is no sense to be made of the idea of a best of all\npossible worlds. Accordingly, God is free to create otherwise than he\ndid, and free even not to create anything at all: “Since\nGod’s goodness is perfect, and he can exist without other\nthings, … it follows that there is no absolute necessity that\nhe will things other than himself” (ST 1a 19.3c).\nStill, creation has a purpose: God “intends only to share his\nperfection, which is his goodness” (ST 1a 44.4c). Among\ncreatures, those beings who possess intellects—angels and human\nbeings—are preeminent, in virtue of their capacity to love and\nunderstand their creator. Accordingly, the rest of creation is\norganized for their sake (SCG III.112). Ultimately, however,\nthe purpose of the created world is to reflect God’s goodness\nand glory: “the whole universe, with its individual parts, is\nordered to God as its end, inasmuch as, by a kind of imitation, the\nuniverse represents divine goodness for the glory of God”\n(ST 1a 65.2c). So it is that Aquinas takes everything in the\ncreated world to be subject to God’s providential order\n(§7). (For a broad study of Aquinas on creation see Kretzmann\n1999.)" ], "section_title": "3. The Created World", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nGiven the preeminence of intellectual beings in the created order, it\nshould be no surprise that most of God’s creative efforts went\ninto their establishment. This is, primarily, the domain of the\nangels, who “exceed in number, incomparably, material\nsubstances” (ST 1a 50.3c). The angels are wholly\nimmaterial beings, which makes them unlike us (§5) and unlike the\ncreated world with which we are directly acquainted, which is a\nmaterial world. So, if we set aside the realm of immaterial\nminds—God, angels, the human soul—we are left with a world\nof material objects, suitable to be understood in terms of an\nAristotelian hylomorphic (matter–form) analysis.", "\nWithin this material domain, a material substratum underlies all\nchange, and real change typically involves the gain or loss of some\nform. This can be made to look straightforward enough when examples\nare carefully chosen. If a tree’s limbs are bent under the\nweight of an early fall snowstorm, then the tree undergoes alteration\n(accidental change) in virtue of taking on a new shape (a new\naccidental form), while the material substance (the tree itself)\nendures. If the storm in fact kills the tree, then the substance is\ncorrupted (a substantial change), in virtue of losing its substantial\nform, which is the internal principle that gives the substance its\nnature. In cases like this, where the substance is destroyed, Aquinas\nadvances a metaphysical claim that is quite surprising: that all that\nendures through the change is the most basic material substratum,\nprime matter, which lacks all form. (Aquinas’s early\nOn the Principles of Nature summarizes the basic story. For\ngeneral discussions of Aquinas’s metaphysics of material bodies\nsee Wippel 2000 chs. 7–9, Brower 2014. On causation at the level\nof creatures see Frost 2022.)", "\nThe resulting picture seems to postulate, as the constituents of\nsubstances, three types of basic entities: prime matter, substantial\nforms, and accidental forms. How exactly to understand each of these\nhas been subject to a great deal of discussion over the centuries.\nWith respect to accidental forms, one of the chief puzzles is to\ndefine those cases in which we have a genuine change of form. Aquinas\nclearly thinks, for instance, that colors and other proper sensibles\nare accidental forms. But does he think, as the above example of the\ntree implied, that shapes too are accidental forms? It is not entirely\nclear, and depends on difficult questions about how he understands\nAristotle’s theory of the\n categories\n (Wippel 2000 ch. 7; Pasnau 2011 ch. 12). With respect to substantial\nform there is an analogous problem arising from unclarity over what\nexactly the substances are (Pasnau 2002 ch. 3; Rota 2004; Marmodoro\nand Page 2016). He clearly takes all living things to be substances,\nalthough there are puzzles here about how to define the beginning and\nend of life (Van Dyke 2012; Amerini 2009 [2013]). When it comes to\nnonliving things the situation is still less clear. He clearly thinks\nthat artifacts like a house are not substances. Water is a substance,\nbut it is not clear whether a puddle of water is a single substance or\na collection of substances. Aquinas does not discuss these issues in\nthe sort of detail that later medieval authors would, and as a result\nthere is little scholarly consensus about his views. But one important\nguide to his thinking about substances is that they have unity in a\nvery strong sense: “whatever is one in substance is one\nabsolutely (simpliciter)” (ST 1a2ae 17.4c). Of\ncourse, no creature has the sort of unity that God has; God’s\nperfect simplicity precludes even the composition of essence and\nexistence, which is found in all created substances, even in\nimmaterial angels (Wippel 2000 ch. 5). Material substances, being\ncomposites of form and matter, have less unity than the angels. Even\nso, Aquinas thinks there can be complex material substances, unified\nby their substantial form. How does a substantial form unify? An\nimportant part of his answer is that a substantial form actualizes not\nonly the whole substance, but each part: “a form of the whole\nthat does not give existence to the individual parts of the body,\n… such as the form of a house, is an accidental form”\n(ST 1a 76.8c).", "\nSubstantial forms both unify a substance at a given time and\nindividuate a substance over time. To play this role, they must be\nparticulars rather than\n universals.\n In general, it seems that Aquinas thinks that no forms are universals\nexcept inasmuch as we conceive of them in abstraction from\nparticulars. In external reality (in re), “no\ncommonness is found in Socrates; rather, whatever is in him has been\nindividuated” (On Being and Essence 3.80–2;\nLeftow 2003; Brower 2016). The principle of individuation, for forms,\nis matter (King 2000; Klima 2000). The account of individuation, then,\ncomes in two stages: matter individuates the form at the start, when\nthe form first inheres in that matter, and from that point forward the\nform possesses a fixed identity of its own. If it is a substantial\nform, it subsequently individuates the substance as a whole.", "\nFundamental to Aquinas’s hylomorphism is his coordinate\ndistinction between potentiality and actuality. His brief treatise\nOn the Principles of Nature, perhaps his earliest work,\nbegins with this remark:", "\nOne should know that some things can be, although they are not, and\nsome things are. That which can be is said to be in potentiality; that\nwhich is now is said to be in actuality.\n", "\nHe goes on to associate potentiality with matter, and actuality with\nform, and draws the distinctions we would expect between the various\nkinds of matters and forms. He also remarks at this point that being\nis of two kinds, and that the being of a substance is “something\ndifferent” from accidental being. This signals his commitment to\nAristotle’s doctrine of the multivocity (or homonymy) of being.\nWhat it means for a substance to exist is different from what it means\nfor an accidental aggregation of a substance with its accidents (say,\na pale man) to exist. In general, what properly exists is substances,\nwhereas “forms, accidents, and other things of this sort are\ncalled beings not because they themselves exist, but because it is\nby them that something exists” (ST 1a 45.4c).\nMoreover, even among substances, God does not exist in the same way\nthat creatures do, but only in an analogous way (§2). This denial\nof the univocity of being was contentious among later medieval authors\n(most notably\n John Duns Scotus)\n and its correct interpretation remains controversial today (Brower\n2014; Pasnau 2018). Even more problematic is Aquinas’s\nconception of prime matter, which he characterizes as pure\npotentiality: “being in actuality is incompatible with\nmatter’s nature, since matter is a potential existent by its\nvery nature” (Quodlibet III.1.1). Although later\nmedieval Aristotelians accepted that substantial change requires a\nmaterial substratum, hardly anyone endorsed Aquinas’s suggestion\nthat it is pure potentiality, because they were convinced that what\nlacks actuality does not exist. Readers of Aquinas have disputed how\nhe himself could have evaded that outcome (Brower 2014 ch. 5), or\nwhether perhaps it is an outcome he intended (Pasnau 2002 ch. 1)." ], "section_title": "4. Form and Matter", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nFor living things, their substantial form is their soul\n(anima). In saying this, Aquinas should not be understood to\nbe ascribing some special sort of spirituality to plants and animals:\nhe thinks they are material objects just as much as rocks and streams\nare. Rather, he is following the lead of Aristotle’s De\nanima in treating the soul as the first principle of life,\nwhatever that may be. Since Aquinas thinks that the primary internal\nexplanation for the existence of any substance is its substantial form\n(§4), it follows that every living substance has a soul that is\nits substantial form.", "\nAs with any substantial form, the primary function of a soul is to\naccount for the substance’s nature as a certain kind of thing,\npossessed of the unity and persistence that characterizes substances.\nThis actualizing role is what Aquinas calls the soul’s essence\n(ST 1a 77.1c). The ongoing existence of living things also\nrequires that they carry out distinctive operations: taking\nnourishment and reproducing, moving and perceiving (in the case of\nanimals), and reasoning (in the human case). Corresponding to these\noperations are the powers of the soul. Medieval authors had long\npuzzled over the relationship between the soul and its powers. Aquinas\ntakes a strong position that would be the subject of much later\ndispute: that the soul’s powers, being potentialities, are\nreally distinct from the soul’s essence, which is an actuality\n(ST 1a 77, Quest. on the Soul 12).", "\nYet even though Aquinas insists on a distinction between the soul and\nits powers, he rejects the common medieval view that living things\nhave multiple souls or multiple substantial forms. Because of his\ncommitment to the absolute unity of a substance, he thinks that\nnothing could count as a substance unless it possesses a unique\nsubstantial form that provides unity, at a time and over time, to the\nsubstance as a whole.", "\nOne thing simpliciter is produced out of many actually\nexisting things only if there is something uniting and in some way\ntying them to each other. In this way, then, if Socrates were an\nanimal and were rational in virtue of different forms, then these two,\nin order to be united simpliciter, would need something to\nmake them one. Therefore, since nothing is available to do this, the\nresult will be that a human being is one thing only as an aggregate,\nlike a heap. (Quest. on the Soul 11c; also ST 1a\n76.3–4, Quest. on Spiritual Creatures 3)\n", "\nSuch remarks engendered a long dispute between those who favored this\nsort of “unitarian” approach and those who took one or\nanother “pluralist” position. The pluralists argued that\nliving things contain one substantial form for their body (their\nbodily form, forma corporeitatis) and at least one further\ndistinct form, their soul, in virtue of which they have life (Adams\n1987 ch. 15; Cross 1998 ch. 4; Pasnau 2011 ch. 25). The principal\nargument in favor of pluralism was that it explained how the body of a\nliving thing could persist after the departure of the living\nthing’s soul at death. Aquinas and other unitarians claimed that\nsuch persistence was merely apparent, and that strictly speaking the\nonly thing that endures through a substance’s corruption is\nprime matter.", "\nGiven the tight connection that Aquinas describes between form and\nmatter, it is hard to characterize his theory of souls in general as\n dualistic.\n To be sure, in some sense, material substances are a composite of\nsubstantial form and prime matter (with accidents on the outside, so\nto speak, unified only accidentally with the substance). Still,\nAquinas takes pains to stress that it is the substance as a whole that\nproperly exists. And he definitely does not think that material\nsubstances are a composite of form and body, since the\nmaterial substance is the body. His unitarian framework\ndeliberately makes it incoherent to speak of the body of a living\nthing (or of any substance) as something distinct from that\nsubstance.", "\nThe situation is much more complex, however, when we focus on the\nhuman case. If a dualist is someone who thinks that human beings\nconsist in a material body and an immaterial, spiritual mind, then\nAquinas clearly qualifies, even if he works very hard to get the\nresult that these two aspects of human nature are unified as a single\nsubstance (Bazán 1997; Klima 1997 [2002]; Stump 2003 ch. 6).\nAlthough the human soul’s essential role is to actualize a human\nbody, the human soul has a power—its intellect—that\noperates independently of the body. Aquinas has a variety of much\ndiscussed arguments aimed at showing that human thought, given its\nuniversal scope and abstract content, cannot be carried out through\nthe brain or any other bodily instrument (ST 1a 75.2, 75.5;\nQuest. on the Soul 2; Klima 2001; Wood 2020). As a result,\nthe human soul has a unique and puzzling status: it is both the form\nof a body and “an incorporeal and subsistent principle”\n(ST 1a 75.2c). From here, Aquinas further argues that the\nhuman soul is incorruptible (ST 1a 75.6, Quest. on the\nSoul 14). For although ordinary subsistent things—material\nsubstances—routinely come into and go out of existence, with the\ncorruption of their bodies, a subsistent entity that is not a body has\nno natural basis for its ceasing to exist. Hence, once God creates a\nhuman soul (in coordination with the biological process of sexual\nreproduction), that soul exists forever.", "\nGiven that the human body is corrupted at death, the soul’s\nincorruptibility entails that, after death, it will continue to exist\nwithout the body. Aquinas devotes considerable attention to the\nquestion of how it will function in that separated state (ST\n1a 89; Quest. on the Soul 15–20). Prior to the delicate\nbut all-important question of what such lives will be like (a paradise\nor a hell), there is a still more basic question of whether a human\nperson’s separated soul continues to be that same person. Recent\ncommentators have been divided. Aquinas is very clear that, in this\nlife, a human being is the whole composite substance, form and matter\n(ST 1a 75.4). Also clear is that Aquinas thinks our souls\nwill not be separated from their bodies forever; in the fullness of\ntime, on the Day of Judgment, they will be reunited with their\nresurrected bodies (SCG IV.79–97). The situation\nbecomes less clear, however, when Aquinas argues, as he repeatedly\ndoes, that a resurrection of bodies is required because otherwise\nwe would not survive. “Abraham’s soul’s\nhaving life would not suffice for Abraham’s being alive….\nThe life of the whole compound is required, soul and body”\n(Sentences IV.43.1.1.1 ad 2). This seems to show\nthat Aquinas thinks a person’s soul, surviving apart from its\nbody, is not sufficient for that person’s survival, and some\nscholars (the “corruptionists”) read Aquinas in this way\n(Toner 2009; Van Dyke 2012; Nevitt 2014). But to others (the\n“survivalists”) this looks like an incredible result, in\ntension with claims that Aquinas makes elsewhere and with fundamental\nChristian doctrine (Brown 2007; Brower 2014 ch. 12; Stump 2022)." ], "section_title": "5. Soul and Body", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "6. Cognitive Theory", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nBy definition, the living things that we call animals are those that\nhave the power of perception. Aquinas accepts the conventional list of\nthe five senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch—and\nargues that we arrive at this list of five because there are five\ndiscrete kinds of qualities that make an impression on our bodies.\nThese objects are the proper sensibles—color, sound,\nodor, flavor, hot–cold—so-called because they “make\nan impression on the senses primarily and per se”\n(ST 1a 78.3 ad 2). In contrast to these are the common\nsensibles—size, shape, number, motion, rest—which\n“do not move the senses primary and of themselves, but on\naccount of a sensible quality, as a surface does on account of its\ncolor” (ibid.). Whereas each proper sensible is capable of being\nperceived only by its corresponding sense, the common sensibles are\nso-called because they can be grasped by multiple senses, as when we\nboth see and hear a thing move. To these two categories of sense\nobjects Aquinas adds a third category, the accidental\nsensibles, as when I see that someone is alive (Comm. de\nanima II.13.184–90). This is, however, not a purely sensory\noperation, but an act of seeing that occurs in conjunction with a\nconceptual judgment that the observed motions are a sign of life. (For\ndiscussions of the perceptual process see Pasnau 2002 chs. 6, 9;\nLisska 2016; De Haan 2019; Cory 2022.)", "\nBeyond these five external senses are the four internal\nsenses that use the brain as their organ. Following the lead of\n Ibn Sīnā\n (Avicenna), Aquinas puts considerable weight on these sensory powers\nto explain the sophisticated behavior of animals. In contrast to the\nconsensus over the number of external senses, there had been a great\ndeal of historical disagreement over how many internal senses there\nare. Aquinas settles on this list of four:", "\nThe precise role of these four faculties is not easy to evaluate on\nthe basis of Aquinas’s limited and scattered remarks, but\naccording to his most prominent account the common sense is what\nallows us to make cross-modal sensory judgments (seeing something as\nwhite and sweet) and to have second-order awareness, for instance\n“when someone sees that he is seeing” (ST 1a 78.4\nad 2). The imagination—Aquinas uses both imaginatio and\nphantasia to refer to this faculty—retains images\nacquired through the external senses. The estimative power perceives\nwhat the Arabic tradition referred to as the “intentions”\n(maʿānī) that lie behind the sensible\nqualities: for instance, that wolves are dangerous and that straw is\nuseful for nest building. (Aquinas refers to the more sophisticated\nhuman capacity for grasping intentions as the cogitative power.)\nMemory preserves these intentions. All of the internal senses are\nrichly engaged in human cognitive activity, which is to say that the\nbrain—despite not being the power of intellect—plays a\ncritical role in human cognition.", "\nThe senses are not wholly immaterial faculties in the way that the\nintellect is, but the respect in which Aquinas thinks they are\nmaterial is a matter of some dispute. He remarks that the senses\noperate “through a corporeal organ but not through any corporeal\nquality” (ST 1a 78.1c). By this he intends a contrast\nwith ordinary physical causation, as when a fire, through the quality\nof heat, brings water to a boil. In contrast, when we perceive heat,\neven though the skin is heated in the same way that water is, still\nthe perception itself is not the skin’s being made hot. Rather,\n“the senses and intellect receive the forms of things\nspiritually and immaterially, in virtue of a kind of intentional\nexistence” (Comm. de sensu 18.208–10). In\ngeneral, Aquinas treats the ability to receive forms intentionally as\na mark of the mental:", "\nThings that cognize are distinguished from things that do not cognize\nin this: that the non-cognizers have nothing but their own form alone,\nwhereas that which cognizes is naturally suited to have the form of\nanother thing as well. (ST 1a 14.1c)\n", "\nSuch forms, received intentionally in the external senses, are known\nas sensible species. Received in the internal senses, they are known\nas phantasms. Received in the intellect, they are known as\nintelligible species. Such forms—for instance, the sensible\nspecies of heat—are that in virtue of which we perceive, for\ninstance, the heat of external bodies. That such forms do not make\npossessor actually hot (etc.) is perhaps just what it is for a form to\nexist intentionally. But there is scholarly disagreement over what it\nmeans to say that such forms are “spiritual” and\n“immaterial” (Hoffman 2014).", "\nAs these passages make clear, perception (and cognition in general)\nworks through the reception of the very form of the thing that is\nbeing perceived. This has led to much discussion over whether Aquinas\nthereby subscribes to a strong form of direct realism, according to\nwhich what we perceive (and what we think about) is the thing itself.\nIn favor of this reading is that Aquinas seems entirely unconcerned\nabout these intentionally existing species as intermediaries lying\nbetween us and the things themselves. Why should he be concerned, the\nthought goes, since the species just is the form itself of the thing\nout in the world? (see Perler 2000; Băltuță 2013)\nAgainst this reading is that the species (of heat, say) is not\nnumerically the same form as the one that inheres in the fire, and\nthat Aquinas does, at least sometimes, seem to think of these species\nas representations that mediate our access to external things (Pasnau\n1997 ch. 3; Panaccio 2001; see also Brower and Brower-Toland\n2008)." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Perception" }, { "content": [ "\nAquinas thinks that a great deal of complex cognition occurs within\nthe internal senses of the brain, but that those material powers are\nincapable of abstract thought. To be more precise, he thinks that\nmaterial cognitive powers can represent things only as particulars,\nand that universal concepts can be formed only within the immaterial\nintellect. He writes,", "\nIf the intellective soul were composed of form and matter, then the\nforms of things would be received in it as individuals; then it would\ncognize only singular things, as happens in the sensory capacities,\nwhich receive the forms of things in a corporeal organ. (ST\n1a 75.5c)\n", "\nThe senses, both external and internal, can represent only this or\nthat particular cat. It takes the intellect to form the abstract\nconcept of cat. Conversely, Aquinas thinks that the human intellect is\nincapable of grasping particulars (ST 1a 86.1). This means\nthat when we engage in a routine task like apprehending that a thing\nis a cat we are simultaneously using both intellect and sense, using\nthe senses to apprehend the particular, and using the intellect to\nconceptualize what it is. In our more theoretical reflections, we rely\non the internal senses to frame images that aid us in the process of\nabstract reasoning.", "\nFollowing Aristotle’s lead in De anima III.5, Aquinas\ndistinguishes between two distinct intellectual powers, the possible\nintellect and the agent intellect. The first starts out in\npotentiality to all intelligibles, a tabula rasa, “like\na tablet on which nothing has been written” (ST 1a\n79.2c), and gradually becomes actualized, taking in universal concepts\nthat are then stored there as dispositions. But because such concepts\nare not immediately available through sensory experience—one\ncannot grasp what it is to be a cat just by looking at a\ncat—there must also be an active intellectual power, “a\npower on the side of intellect to actualize intelligible things by\nabstracting the species from material conditions” (ST\n1a 79.3c). By Aquinas’s time, generations of Aristotelians had\nalready argued over the correct understanding of these two powers,\nwith some treating the agent intellect as a single higher mind,\nseparate from human beings, and perhaps even to be identified with\nGod.\n Ibn Rushd\n (Averroes), the Spanish philosopher active a half century before\nAquinas, had even proposed treating the possible intellect as\na single higher power to which every human being has shared access.\nAquinas, in contrast, thinks that each human being has their own\nintellect, agent and possible. That we all share in a single agent\nintellect is, he thinks, wrong but not incredible—it has\naffinities with the venerable Augustinian doctrine of\n divine illumination—but\n Aquinas regards the Averroistic doctrine of a separate possible\nintellect as not just contrary to the faith but entirely preposterous,\nsince it would make it impossible to explain how we are each capable\nof individual acts of thought. As he describes the absurd implication\nin his treatise On the Unity of the Intellect against the\nAverroists, “if I think about stone and you do likewise,\nthen it would be necessary that you and I have one and the same\nintellectual operation” (4.101–3; see Ogden 2022).", "\nAquinas distinguishes between three principal stages of intellectual\noperation: first, the formation of concepts; second, the composition\nof judgments (propositions) built from concepts; third, inferential\nreasoning from one judgment to another. These last two stages were the\nsubject of intensive study within medieval logic, but Aquinas has\nrelatively little to say about logic, and is most interested in the\ninitial stage of concept formation. Here, the possible intellect\npassively receives concepts that the agent intellect has abstracted\nfrom sensory impressions (phantasms). The possible intellect starts\nout as a blank slate, which is to say that Aquinas rejects the theory\nof innate ideas, at least as far as the possible intellect is\nconcerned. Moreover, he is very clear that all our concepts arise from\nsensory experience: “the source of our cognition comes from the\nsenses” (ST 1a 84.6sc). From this vantagepoint, he\nlooks more like an empiricist than a rationalist. The role of agent\nintellect, however, complicates the situation. Whereas the possible\nintellect starts out as unformed potentiality, the agent intellect has\nthe actuality to abstract universal concepts from sensory experience.\nIt is not easy to say how abstraction occurs; indeed, for the whole of\nthe Aristotelian tradition, the agent intellect has been something of\na black box whose operation is taken as a brute fact rather than\nanalyzed. Sometimes Aquinas suggests that the transformation of\nsingular content into universal content occurs via the conversion of\nmaterial phantasms into immaterial intelligible species, but the link\nbetween immateriality and universality is not entirely clear. (On\nabstraction see King 1994, Cory 2015)." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Thought" }, { "content": [ "\nAquinas uses a variety of terms to talk about knowledge, including\nscientia, cognitio and notitia. Often he\nseems to use these terms interchangeably, and he shows no interest in\ntrying to define anything like knowledge in its loose and popular\nsense. He is, however, very much interested in articulating what it\nwould be to have an ideal grasp of some subject, and he refers to such\na thing, speaking strictly, as scientia. This is what both\nthe theologian and the philosopher seek, which is to say that this is\nwhat Aquinas himself seeks. Each of these fields, theology and\nphilosophy, can be described as a single complex\nscientia—that is, as a science. We can also refer to\nthe myriad individual conclusions obtained in these fields as\nscientiae—that is, as items of scientific knowledge.\nPhilosophy itself, moreover, can be divided into various discrete\nfields of science: logic, physics, astronomy, biology, metaphysics,\nethics, and so on. Until the seventeenth century the physical sciences\nwere understood to be contained, in this way, within the field of\nphilosophy. Accordingly, the domains of scientia, conceived\nmost widely, were philosophy and theology.", "\nThe fundamentals of Aquinas’s thinking about knowledge in this\nideal sense come from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.\nIn particular, he takes the discussion in Book I chapter 2 to offer a\ndefinition of scientia (in Greek,\nepistēmē), which in his commentary he articulates\nas follows (quotations are from Comm. Post. An. I.4):", "\nEach of these bullet points raises a host of further questions, but,\nin broad outline, Aquinas understands scientia as the\napprehension, with certainty, of an entity, event or proposition,\nbased on a demonstrative proof grounded in the essential nature of the\nthing in question. As befits intellectual understanding (§6.2),\nscientia will concern universal truths. Because it concerns\nthe essences of things, it will concern necessary truths and will get\nat the underlying cause of a thing’s being so (MacDonald\n1993).", "\nEventually, the demand that premises be “better known”\nleads back to the first principles of the science, which are\nself-evident (per se nota) in the sense that they are known\nto be true simply in virtue of their terms (Comm. Post.\nAnalytics I.7.8). Nothing could be better known than such a\nprinciple, but because these principles are self-evident there is also\nno need for any further demonstration. Each science has its own\nstarting points—its own first principles—which are not\nsusceptible to demonstration within that science. But not all such\nfirst principles are strictly self-evident. Within physics, for\ninstance, it is a first principle that there is motion, but that is\nneither absolutely necessary nor strictly self-evident. Accordingly,\nagain following Aristotle, Aquinas orders the various sciences\naccording to relations of “subalternation”, such that\nbiology is subalternate to physics, and physics to metaphysics. In\ngeneral, “the principles of a lower science are proved by the\nprinciples of a higher science” (Comm. Post. Analytics\nI.17.5). Among the natural speculative sciences—that is, setting\ntheology and ethics aside—the preeminent science is metaphysics,\nor first philosophy, “from which all the other sciences follow,\ntaking their principles from it” (Comm. Boethius De\ntrin. 5.1c). (On the structure of the sciences see Maurer 1986;\nWippel 1995a; Dougherty 2004.)", "\nThis sort of foundationalist, infallibilist theory of knowledge is now\nthought of as Cartesian, but\n Descartes\n is simply following the Aristotelian tradition for which Aquinas\nbecame the preeminent spokesman. For Aquinas himself, however, the\naccount just described serves as an aspirational ideal rather than a\ndescription of something we have actually attained. In practice, even\nwhere we have demonstrative knowledge, we usually cannot trace the\nprinciples all the way back to ultimate first principles like the law\nof non-contradiction. Critical questions, like the non-eternity of the\nworld (§3), are contingent on the free choice of God and so have\nto be taken on faith. Even in places where certainty is possible in\nprinciple, large gaps in our knowledge remain. In general, “our\ncognition is so weak that no philosopher could have ever completely\ninvestigated the nature of a single fly” (On the\nApostles’ Creed [Collatio in symbolum\nApostolorum], proem). Accordingly, Aquinas distinguishes among\nvarious non-ideal cases. A demonstration that grasps the cause of a\nthing is a demonstration propter quid, but often—as in\nproving God’s existence—the best we can have is a\ndemonstration quia, which tells us only that a thing\nis so. Much of what we know holds true only for the most part, and so\nfails to be necessary, and often the premises of an argument cannot be\ntraced back to self-evident principles, in which case our argument is\ndialectical rather than demonstrative, yielding a conclusion\nthat is merely plausible (probabilis) rather than\napodictic.", "\nIn all of this, Aquinas is following Aristotle and the later\nAristotelian tradition fairly closely, and thus the framework for\nscience and knowledge just sketched comes to be commonly accepted by\nthe later scholastic tradition all the way into the seventeenth\ncentury." ], "subsection_title": "6.3 Knowledge and Science" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe immaterial human mind, as Aquinas understands it, is not just the\nintellect. The mind is an ensemble of three discrete powers, agent and\npossible intellect working in conjunction with the will. The rise of\nthe will as a faculty of the soul is a distinctively medieval idea,\nbut has strong roots in Augustine and, before him, in late\n Stoicism.\n These late-ancient sources had ascribed a prominent role in human\nagency to desire (appetitus) or volition (voluntas),\nand particularly to those desires that we endorse as our own, and\nwhich thus give rise to voluntary action. Among these earlier authors,\nour will is conceived of as something that we need to control, if we\nare to lead our lives as we should. By Aquinas’s time, however,\nthe will (voluntas) had come to be identified not just as a\npower of the soul but as the power that is principally in control of\nhuman agency, directing both our thoughts and our actions. Thus,\nwhereas Augustine and\n Boethius\n had wondered about how we have free choice (liberum\narbitrium) over our wills, Aquinas identifies the two, concluding\nthat “the will and free choice are not two powers, but\none” (ST 1a 83.4c). He was by no means the first to\nconceive of the power of will in this way, but the cogency and\ninfluence of his account ensured that this framework would dominate\nlater discussions.", "\nThe will is one of three appetitive powers within us, distinguished\nfrom the irascible and concupiscible powers in being not a sensual\nappetite, the source of the passions (King 1998; Miner 2009), but a\nrational appetite, the source of voluntary agency. Its\nrationality consists in the way it is coordinate with intellect,\ntaking as its inputs the intellect’s practical judgments\nregarding what is to be done. Since the will’s function is\nstrictly appetitive, it cannot render its own practical judgments, and\nto that extent can act only on the basis of intellect: “every\nchoice and actual will within us is immediately caused by an\nintelligible apprehension” (SCG III.85.3). But that is\nby no means to say that the will is determined by the\nintellect’s judgment, because ultimately our will has the power\nto control what we think about: “the will moves both itself and\nall other capacities. For I think when I want to, and likewise I use\nall my other capacities and dispositions because I want to”\n(Quest. on Evil 6c). To be sure, by its very nature, the will\ncan desire only what is presented to it as a good (ST 1a2ae\n8.1). Accordingly, since our ultimate happiness (beatitudo)\nis good in every respect, “human beings have an appetite of\nnecessity for happiness” (ST 1a2ae 10.2c; see\n§8.1). But, with regard to any specific course of action, there\nare always multiple perspectives from which the situation can be\njudged, and the will can control how we think about\nthings—whether, for instance, we decide to focus on how\nrewarding a thing would be or on how tiring it would be. Even in the\ncase of our ultimate happiness, moreover, the will can choose not to\nthink about it, and so even in that extreme case the will’s\nchoices are not necessitated. On this basis Aquinas adamantly insists\non human freedom of choice, and treats claims that the will is\nnecessitated as “contrary to the faith and subverting all of the\nprinciples of moral philosophy” (Quest. on Evil\n6c).", "\nUp to this point, Aquinas’s position is fairly clear. There has\nbeen considerable controversy over the centuries, however, regarding\nwhether Aquinas wants to go further and characterize the will’s\nagency as\n nondeterministic—as\n its being, in other words, a first and undetermined cause of free\naction. Within a few years of his death, after the\n Condemnation of 1277,\n views of this sort came to dominate scholastic philosophy, yielding a\nbroad consensus that held until the rise of seventeenth-century\nanti-scholasticism. Readers of Aquinas have been sharply divided,\nhowever, over where he fits into that history. At first glance it\nmight seem obvious that Aquinas is an opponent of determinism, given\nhis adamant opposition to the will’s being necessitated. Yet\nAquinas writes at a time at which the governing form of\nAristotelianism, drawn from the Arabic tradition of Ibn Sīnā\nand Ibn Rushd, is explicitly deterministic. In general, Aquinas\nstrives where he can to harmonize the faith with the mainstream of\nphilosophical opinion, and here in particular he shows signs of\nendorsing causal determinism as applied to the created world. Thus he\nascribes to Ibn Rushd (“the Commentator”) the doctrine\nthat “from that which is open both ways (ad utrumlibet)\nno action follows, unless it is inclined one way by something\nelse” (ST 1a 19.3 obj. 5). He hastens to reject this\nprinciple when applied to God, who is able to determine freely\nGod’s own choices. But outside the case of God he accepts the\nprinciple: “a cause that is of itself contingent must be\ndetermined to its effect by something external” (ibid., ad 5).\nAccordingly, he explicitly insists that the will’s freedom does\nnot require it to be its own first cause. Instead, he characterizes\nthe will’s operations as entwined over time with the operation\nof intellect, running backward through an agent’s history, with\none cause preceding another, all the way back to God’s initial\ncreation of the human soul (Quest. on Evil 6, ST 1a\n83.1 ad 3, ST 1a2ae 9.4c). This insistence on determining\ncauses might seem to fit well with his strict conception of\n divine providence:", "\nEverything that happens here, insofar as it is brought back to the\nfirst divine cause, is found to be ordered rather than to exist\naccidentally, even if in comparison to other causes it is found to\nexist accidentally. This is why the Catholic faith says that nothing\nin the world happens aimlessly or fortuitously, and that all things\nare subject to divine providence. (Comm. Metaphys. VI.3.26;\nsee Goris 1997)\n", "\nOn this reading of Aquinas, causal determinism fits with God’s\npreordained plan for the universe, and freedom is thus compatible with\nboth causal and theological determinism (Hause 1997; Kenny 1993 ch. 6;\nLoughran 1999; Pasnau 2002 ch. 7; Shanley 2007).", "\nMany scholars, however, have denied that Aquinas is any sort of\ncompatibilist. That there is room for doubt is suggested in a passage\nthat, at first, looks to support a compatibilist account:", "\nFreedom does not necessarily require that what is free be the first\ncause of itself, just as one thing’s being the cause of another\ndoes not require that it be the first cause of that other. God, then,\nis the first cause, moving both natural and voluntary causes. And just\nas his moving natural causes does not take away from their acts’\nbeing natural, so his moving voluntary causes does not take away from\ntheir actions’ being voluntary. Instead, he makes this be so for\nthem, because he works within each thing in accord with its own\ncharacter. (ST 1a 83.1 ad 3)\n", "\nAlthough the passage begins in a way that looks friendly to causal\ndeterminism, the passage goes on to suggest the situation is more\ncomplicated. For although God is the first cause of our voluntary\nactions, God’s efficacy there is different from how it is with\nnatural causes: God somehow acts on the will in a way that “does\nnot take away” from its voluntariness. And Aquinas takes just\nthe same line in explaining how divine providence is consistent with\nhuman freedom (ST 1a 23.6c; SCG III.72–73;\nComm. Metaphys. VI.3.30–32; Comm. De interp.\nI.14.22).", "\nAmong those who think that Aquinas’s God leaves room for\nindeterministic human agency, there remains a fundamental difference\nof opinion. Some (e.g., Stump 2003 ch. 9) think that such freedom, for\nAquinas, requires only that the will be an ultimate source, a first\ncreaturely cause. Others think that, in addition to this, Aquinas\nfurther requires the leeway to choose among alternative possibilities\n(e.g., Hoffmann and Michon 2017). Either way, a libertarian reading of\nAquinas is likely to stress his claim that the will is a self-mover:\n“Just as the will moves other capacities, so it also moves\nitself” (Quest. on Evil 6c; Gallagher 1994). This is an\nidea, moreover, that Aquinas had urged from his very first discussion\nof free choice in his Sentences commentary, where he argued\nthat free choice is possessed only by beings who “determine for\nthemselves their end and their action toward that end”\n(Sentences II.25.1c). In some sense, then, the will is free\nbecause it is self-determining. This distinguishes it from natural,\nnon-voluntary agents, whose determination comes from without.\nAquinas’s focus on the will’s role in such\nself-determination—a tendency that becomes more prominent in his\nlater works—makes it reasonable to include him in the\nthirteenth-century movement away from ancient intellectualism and\ntoward a voluntaristic conception of human nature. In emphasizing the\nwill’s overarching control, Aquinas can appeal to the critical\nimportance of the will’s various operations and dispositions.\nThe act of love, foundational to any Christian ethics, is an operation\nof will. The dispositions of justice and charity—the central\nvirtues of philosophy and theology, respectively—are both\nvirtues of the will. But it is not clear that Aquinas goes so\nfar—as\n Peter John Olivi,\n Henry of Ghent, and Scotus, among many others, soon would—as to\nexempt the will from the determinism that was agreed to characterize\nthe rest of the natural world. There remains a lively debate among\nscholars over this issue." ], "section_title": "7. Will and Freedom", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAquinas’s ethics is difficult to study because it is so vast and\nmultifaceted. Around half of the Summa theologiae, the\nmassive second part, is concerned with moral questions, suggesting\nsomething of the importance Aquinas ascribes to ethics in theology. To\nbring some order to this large topic, we can distinguish between three\nparts of the theory:", "\n(For wide-ranging treatments of Aquinas’s ethics see McInerny\n1997; MacDonald and Stump 1998; Pope 2002; Irwin 2007: chs\n16–24; DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke 2009; McCluskey\n2017.)" ], "section_title": "8. Ethics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAquinas’s worldview is thoroughly teleological, inasmuch as he\nholds “it is necessary that all agents act for the sake of an\nend” (ST 1a2ae 1.2c). There is a distinction to be\ndrawn, however, between those agents that are unable to understand\ntheir end and rational agents, who “move themselves to their end\nbecause they have control over their acts through free choice”\n(ibid.). It is for rational agents that ethical questions arise.\nAquinas follows Aristotle in supposing that human choices must be\nordered toward a single ultimate end: “there must be some\nultimate end on account of which all other things are desired, whereas\nthis end itself is not desired on account of anything else”\n(Comm. Nic. Ethics I.1.22). This ultimate end, whatever it\nis, can be referred to as happiness (beatitudo). In the\nTreatise on Happiness from the start of ST 1a2ae, after\nworking through various predictably unsatisfactory candidates for our\nultimate end—not riches, not honor, not pleasure, and so\non—Aquinas arrives at the view that happiness consists primarily\nin intellectual contemplation. And since the highest truth and the\ngreatest good are of course God, our ultimate happiness must lie\nthere: “final and complete happiness can consist in nothing\nother than the vision of the divine essence” (ST 1a2ae\n3.8c). Human beings possess this most fully in the life to come (Brown\n2021), but even in this life Aquinas’s conception of happiness\nis strongly intellectualist: “it is clear that people who give\nthemselves to the contemplation of truth are the happiest a person in\nthis life can be” (Comm. Nic. Ethics X.12.2110).", "\nThis eudaimonistic framework—to use the Greek term for ethical\ntheories aimed at happiness—shapes all of Aquinas’s\nethical thinking. It is perhaps the most striking instance of his\nconfidence in Aristotelianism as the proper philosophical foundation\nfor a Christian worldview. Predictably, that confidence was met with\nvarious sorts of challenges. One concerns his insistence that our\nultimate end is intellectual rather than volitional. For many\nsubsequent theorists, Christian and secular, the ultimate end of human\nlife should not be intellectual contemplation but instead should be\nlove. Aquinas agrees—indeed, he stresses—that love is an\nessential complement to happiness, pulling us toward our end and\nrejoicing in its grasp. Still, the goal of life properly speaking is\nto understand God and God’s creation (ST 1a2ae 3.4).\n(For nuanced discussions see Stenberg 2016a and Stump 2022.)", "\nA second concern, which troubles eudaimonism in all of its forms, is\nthat Aquinas rests the foundations of ethics on a self-directed\nconcern for our own happiness. That is liable to look like a doubtful\nstrategy for any ethical theory, and particularly for\nJudeo–Christian ethics given its radically altruistic\norientation, as epitomized in the twin injunctions to “Love the\nLord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all\nyour mind” and to “Love your neighbor as yourself”\n(Matthew 22:37–39, quoting Deuteronomy 6:5 and Leviticus 19:18).\nOn its face, the eudaimonistic approach might seem to conflict\ndirectly with these injunctions, given the way that it grounds all\nhuman agency in our ultimate pursuit of happiness:", "\nThe will naturally tends towards its ultimate end: for every human\nbeing naturally wills happiness. And this natural willing is the cause\nof all other willings, since whatever a human being wills, he wills\nfor the sake of an end. (ST 1a 60.2c)\n", "\nAquinas is unflinching in his insistence that our final end is our own\nhappiness. But it has to be remembered that ‘happiness’ is\njust a generic label for the human activity that is ultimately best\nfor us. And what is ultimately best for us is not the selfish pursuit\nof our own wellbeing, which is surely an ambition that would make\nanyone miserable. What we should seek, as we have seen already, is an\nunderstanding of the world and its Creator. This, again speaking\nteleologically, is what we were created to do. By pursuing this\nsubstantive goal, and actualizing our intellectual capacities to the\nutmost, we make ourselves as good as we can be, and we contribute to\nthe universe as a whole’s being as good as it can be. How does\nsuch intellectual activity ground a theory of ethics? It does so\nbecause when we understand God and the created order, we understand\nwhy we should love God preeminently and why we should love our\nneighbor. But to see how these ideas get developed, we need to turn to\nhis theory of the moral law. (For general discussions of\nAquinas’s eudaimonistic framework see MacDonald 1991b; Bradley\n1997; Kenny 1998; Osborne 2005; Stenberg 2016b.)" ], "subsection_title": "8.1 Happiness" }, { "content": [ "\nAquinas’s moral theory does not offer the sort of brief and\ncomprehensive criterion for rightness and wrongness that draws\nstudents toward\n consequentialism\n or\n Kant’s moral philosophy.\n What he offers instead is a deep and systematic explanation of where\nmorality comes from, yielding a moral code that is impressively\nresponsive to the changing circumstances of human life.", "\nThe key text for Aquinas’s thinking about the moral law is his\nTreatise on Law (ST 1a2ae 90–108). There he\ndistinguishes between four kinds of law that play a role in guiding\nright human action:", "\nThe eternal law governs everything, but can serve to guide us only\nwhen it is somehow transmitted to us. One way in which it is\ntransmitted is through divine law, preeminently through the Bible, and\nhere Aquinas distinguishes between the old law of the Hebrew Bible\n(qq. 98–105) and the new law described in the Gospel (qq.\n106–8). The other form of transmission, philosophically the most\ninteresting part of his account, is the\n natural law.\n Whereas human law is the contingent result of social and political\norganization, the natural law is innate within us. Since Aquinas\nthinks that God orders everything to its proper end (§8.1), there\nis a sense in which all things follow a natural law by which they\nparticipate in the eternal law. But when Aquinas refers to natural law\nin a moral context, he means the distinctive way in which rational\nagents have been ordered to achieve their proper end; hence he has in\nmind a law that governs the mind. Thus, “the law of nature is\nnothing other than the light of intellect, placed within us by God,\nthrough which we grasp what is to be done and what is to be\navoided” (On the Ten Commandments [Collationes in\ndecem praeceptis] proem).", "\nSo described, natural law might be nothing more than an innate\ninclination to accept a fixed set of moral laws prescribed by God. In\nfact, however, Aquinas’s theory offers something more complex\nand nuanced, because he thinks the moral law arises not out of brutely\ninnate inclination but out of rational reflection on the good (Finnis\n1998 ch. 3; Rhonheimer 1987 [2000]). Mirroring the way he develops\ntheoretical science out of first principles (§6.3), he thinks\nmoral reasoning also rises out of self-evident first principles, the\ngrasp of which is the defining task of the intellect’s power of\nsynderesis (ST 1a 79.12). The most fundamental such precept\nis this:", "\nThe good should be done and pursued, and the bad should be avoided.\n(ST 1a2ae 94.2c)\n", "\nAquinas takes this to be self-evident, because he accepts\nAristotle’s claim at the start of the Nicomachean\nEthics that the good is what all things desire. By beginning\nhere, Aquinas builds into the ground floor of his account a\nsubstantive story about\n moral motivation.\n The story requires tying the ensuing development of his theory to\nfacts about what human beings actually desire; without that tie, the\ntheory would equivocate on what it means by the good. Aquinas\nexplicitly recognizes as much, remarking that “the order of the\nprecepts of natural law accords with the order of natural\ninclinations” (ST 1a2ae 94.2c). At this point, Aquinas\ncould appeal to eudaimonism: that all human beings desire happiness as\ntheir ultimate end (§8.1). A very thin conception of natural law\nmight suppose that human beings are given only this much innate\ndirection, and thereafter left to sort out for themselves what will\nmake them happy. But Aquinas’s conception of natural law is much\nthicker, both in the sense that he articulates a rich and substantive\nnotion of the happiness that is our ultimate end (as above), and in\nthe sense that he thinks we have been given various further innate\ninclinations, intended to provide us with specific guidance toward\nthat ultimate end. Among these are inclinations to preserve our own\nlives, toward sexual activity, toward educating the young, toward\nknowing the truth about God, and toward living in society (ST\n1a2ae 94.2c; see also SCG III.129). These innate\ninclinations, combined with the first practical principle (“The\ngood should be done…”) and Aquinas’s substantive\nconception of happiness, are the foundations from which arises a\ncomprehensive account of the moral law, relying on\n conscience\n as the rational activity of working out what ought to be done from a\nmoral point of view (ST 1a 79.13).", "\nInasmuch as the moral point of view is no different from the point of\nview that seeks our own happiness, Aquinas shares with ancient ethics\nthe conviction that rational self-interest provides an adequate\nfoundation for morality (Irwin 2007: ch. 19). But the weight Aquinas\nputs on our innate inclinations in shaping the moral law gives his\naccount a distinctive character. Among its champions, this approach\nhas been celebrated for the way it grounds traditional values in facts\nabout human nature. To its critics, the view looks intellectually\ndubious twice over: on scientific grounds inasmuch as it makes false\nclaims about the universality of various inclinations (Massey 1999);\nand philosophically inasmuch as it grounds\n normativity in metaethics\n on descriptive facts about human nature. Such criticisms, however,\nmiss the philosophical sophistication of the overarching framework. To\nbe sure, we now understand the diversity of human\ninclinations—for instance, regarding gender and\nsexuality—much better than we did even a century ago.\nAquinas’s theory can survive when we update these assumptions,\nand indeed may generate surprisingly modern results (Oliva 2015). As\nfor the complaint that the theory conflates normativity with nature,\nthat would have real force only supposing that we had some better\naccount of the basis of normative value. As things are, if there is a\nGod, then it seems plausible to suppose that God would want us to be\nhappy and would create our natures to guide us in seeking such\nhappiness. On the other hand, if there is no God, then it is not clear\nwhat foundation for ethics there might be other than facts about the\nnature of human beings and how we best thrive in the world we live in.\n(The literature on the natural law in Aquinas is large and\ncontentious. For a sample see Grisez 1965; Lisska 1996; Murphy 2001;\nJensen 2015; Porter 2018. For an introduction to the variety of recent\nperspectives see Angier 2021. For a sense of the complexity of the\ncontested issues see\n Aquinas’ moral, political, and legal philosophy.)" ], "subsection_title": "8.2 Natural Law" }, { "content": [ "\nThe theory of natural law gives us Aquinas’s moral theory: it\nidentifies the foundations of ethics and frames the general contours\nof the moral law. For us to adhere to that law, however, it is not\nenough to trust to the light of intellect and our natural\ninclinations. Reliably moral agents must, in addition, cultivate the\nright sorts of virtuous dispositions. Accordingly, Aquinas develops a\ncomplex\n virtue ethics\n to frame his account of our moral psychology.", "\nThe virtues are a certain kind of psychological disposition\n(habitus): they are the perfections of those powers of the\nsoul that are under our voluntary control. Aquinas devotes roughly a\nquarter of the Summa theologiae—mainly the\n2a2ae—to his theory of the virtues, and also dedicates a series\nof disputed questions to the subject. He takes from Aristotle the\nfamiliar idea that it is through the repetition of certain kinds of\nactions that we acquire the virtues (as well, of course, as the\nvices): by acting honestly we acquire, over time, the virtue of\nhonesty. Less familiarly, he imposes a very high standard on what\ncounts as a virtue: it must be incapable of giving rise to an immoral\nact.", "\nTwo things are required for an act’s perfection: first, the act\nmust be right; second, the [underlying] disposition must be incapable\nof being the source of a contrary act. For that which is the source of\ngood and bad acts cannot, of itself, be the perfect source of a good\nact. (Quest. on the Virtues in General 2c)\n", "\nThis is not to say that a person with the virtue of honesty cannot be\ndishonest. Just as virtues can be acquired through practice, so they\ncan be lost through the wrong kind of practice, and that loss must\nbegin somewhere. Still, in such a case, the dishonesty will not arise\nthrough the virtue. Any characterization of a virtue that would make\nits possession a mixed blessing would have failed to delimit a true\nvirtue.", "\nThe reason that the virtues are so important to Aquinas’s ethics\nis that he thinks that we cannot, over time, act morally without them.\nHe highlights three reasons why moral activity requires the virtues\n(Quest. on the Virtues in General 1c):", "\nThese are not meant to be necessary conditions on an act’s\ngoodness, but Aquinas thinks they are required for a person’s\nactions to count as wholly praiseworthy. In contrast to the effortful\ncalculations of a utilitarian striving to maximize the beneficial\nconsequences of every act, he thinks moral goodness requires a\ndispositional stability in our underlying psychology. And given\nmorality’s ultimate basis in Aquinas’s overarching theory\nof happiness, it should be no surprise that he thinks happiness, in\nthis life, consists in our acting through these virtues (ST\n1a2ae 5.5–6).", "\nAmong the many fine-grained distinctions that Aquinas makes between\nvarious virtues and vices, he treats as preeminent the traditional\nfour cardinal virtues and the three theological virtues. The cardinal\nvirtues are", "\nUnlike some of his contemporaries, who argued that all the virtues\nshould be dispositions of the will (Kent 1995), Aquinas thinks that\neach of these four virtues perfects a different power of the soul.\nBravery and temperance, indeed, are not perfections of rational powers\nat all. They are, however, defined in terms of right reason, and this\nboth connects his virtue theory to the theory of natural law and helps\nto explain why the virtues cannot be the cause of immoral actions. The\nperson who is “brave” in a foolhardy way would not\nstrictly count as brave. Deepening the connection between these\nvirtues and right reason is that Aquinas treats the intellectual\nvirtue of prudence (prudentia, or phronēsis in\nGreek) as foundational to all the other cardinal virtues:\n“rightness and full goodness in all the other virtues comes from\nprudence” (Quest. on the Virtues in General 6c; see\nWestberg 1994). Without prudence, none of the other virtues are\npossible. Conversely, prudence itself requires the proper disposition\nof our various appetitive powers. Accordingly, Aquinas endorses the\ntraditional doctrine of the unity of the virtues: one cannot have any\nof them without having all of them (ST 1a2ae 65.1).", "\nAlthough the four cardinal virtues, as their name suggests, have\nhistorically been given pride of place within philosophy, Aquinas\ngives greater preeminence to the theological virtues that Paul\ndescribes in 1 Corinthians 13:", "\nFor these to count as theological virtues, rather than as\ngeneric dispositions, they must each be further defined as having God\nas their object. They must also be understood to be infused in us by\nGod, because the humanly attainable versions of these virtues are not\nsufficient for our moral perfection (ST 1a2ae 62.1). Indeed,\nfor similar reasons, moral perfection requires that even the cardinal\nvirtues be infused by God (ST 1a2ae 63.3). To receive the\nvirtues from God requires grace, which is something we can never fully\nmerit, and which God freely chooses to give or to withhold: “no\nmatter how much someone prepares himself, he does not receive grace\nfrom God necessarily” (ST 1a2ae 112.3sc). Only through\nthis grace, and the infused virtues it brings, can we achieve the\nperfect happiness that is our ultimate end. (On the cardinal virtues\nsee Hause 2007; Stump 2011. On the theological virtues see Wawrykow\n2012; Porter 2019. On the infused cardinal virtues see Mattison 2011;\nGoris and Schoot 2017; Knobel 2021. On grace see Torrell 1996 [2003]\nchs. 6–9; Stump 2018 ch. 7; Hoffmann 2022.)" ], "subsection_title": "8.3 Virtue Theory" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDuring his lifetime, Aquinas was recognized as an extraordinary figure\nboth for his intellectual achievements and for his personal sanctity.\nThe immense number of surviving manuscripts and the wide range of his\ninfluence testifies to the first. As for the second, his death in\nFossanova immediately gave rise to the sort of veneration reserved for\nthe saints: claims of miracles at once arose, and a long-running\ndispute began over where the holy relic of his body would be kept.\nThis process culminated in his canonization on July 18, 1323.", "\nThese developments notwithstanding, many of Aquinas’s specific\nviews—particularly in philosophy—were extremely\ncontroversial. Among the 219 articles condemned in Paris in 1277 are a\nsignificant number that seem to implicate Aquinas’s teachings\n(Hissette 1977; Wippel 1995b). It would have been lost on no one at\nthe time that these articles were promulgated three years, to the day,\nafter his death. It seems likely that the authorities in Paris were\nplanning an explicit censure of certain of Aquinas’s core\ntheses—especially his unitarian theory of substantial form\n(§5) and his conception of prime matter as pure potentiality\n(§4)—until higher authorities cut this process short\n(Torrell 1993 [2022] ch. 16). Later in March 1277, in Oxford,\nArchbishop\n Robert Kilwardby\n condemned a series of theses that explicitly includes those two\ndistinctively Aquinian doctrines. Also around this time, the\nFranciscan William de la Mare published a lengthy Correctorium\nfratris Thomae, with verbatim quotations from Aquinas’s\ncorpus paired with putative “corrections”. Soon after,\nvarious disciples of Aquinas rallied to his defense, in a series of\nworks entitled the Correctorium Corruptorii Thomae (Glorieux\n1927; Jordan 1982). For the quarter century after Aquinas’s\ndeath, scholasticism took shape around his Dominican supporters and\nhis Franciscan critics.", "\nIn the early fourteenth century, Aquinas’s influence had to\ncompete against the emergence of two brilliantly original Franciscans:\nfirst Scotus and his expansive realism; then\n William Ockham\n and his parsimonious nominalism. In the face of these and many other\ncomplex crosscurrents, Aquinas’s views came to seem both less\nurgent and less dangerous. Two years after his canonization, the\nbishop of Paris clarified that the 1277 condemnations should not be\nheld to apply to Aquinas’s teaching, though the bishop made\nclear that this should not be taken as an endorsement. Among the many\nemerging rival views, Aquinas continued to have his vociferous\nsupporters, particularly among the Dominicans, who were statutorily\nrequired to promote his teaching. In the early fifteenth century, John\nCapreolus emerged as a champion of Thomism as a systematic philosophy,\nand a century later Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) made further systematic\ndevelopments. In 1567, Pope Pius V numbered Aquinas among the doctors\nof the Church, a title previously reserved for the ancient Church\nfathers. When the Jesuit order came to prominence, around this same\ntime, its members—including\n Francisco Suárez—were\n enjoined to adhere to those views that were safest and best\nestablished, and especially to those of Aquinas, “because of his\nauthority and his more secure and approved teachings” (Pasnau\n2011, 436).", "\nEven as Thomism gradually became ascendant within scholastic\nAristotelianism, that whole tradition started to look more and more\nhidebound, as it moved into its increasingly mannerist and then\nbaroque stages.\n Martin Luther’s\n hostility toward the Roman Catholic Church mirrored his hostility\ntoward scholastic philosophy and theology: “soon no Thomist,\nAlbertist, Scotist, or Ockhamist will be left in the world, but all\nwill be simple children of God and true Christians” (Oberman\n1966, 18–19). The Italian humanists attacked from a different\ndirection, prizing historical scholarship over intricate metaphysics.\nBy the seventeenth century,\n Thomas Hobbes\n and his contemporaries flaunted their scorn for the scholastics, who\n“converse in questions of matters incomprehensible”\n(Leviathan viii.27). It would not be until the eighteenth\ncentury, however, that these “moderns” began to drive the\nThomists and other scholastics out of the universities. (On the\nreception of Aquinas over the centuries see Levering and Plested\n2021.)", "\nIn 1879, Pope Leo XIII called for a revival in the study and teaching\nof Aquinas. One fruit of this encyclical was the founding of the\ndefinitive Leonine edition of Aquinas’s work. Another was a\nrenewal of the old Thomistic picture of Aquinas as standing at the\nsummit of philosophical and theological achievement, leaving\nsubsequent developments—from Scotus to Descartes, Kant and\nbeyond—to be dismissed as just so much decline and decay. Such\nzeal was hardly likely to be sustained for long, however, and the\ntwentieth century witnessed a flourishing of Thomisms of all kinds, in\nscholars like\n Jacques Maritain,\n Etienne Gilson,\n Elizabeth Anscombe,\n and Alasdair MacIntyre. As more recent scholarship has deepened our\nunderstanding both of Aquinas and of his successors, we now have a\nmuch fuller picture of the richness of later medieval philosophy.\nAquinas today, viewed as a philosopher, looks not so much like the\nculmination of an era, but rather like the brilliant beginning of\nEurope’s philosophical renaissance." ], "section_title": "9. Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (The Commentary on Peter\nLombard’s Sentences) (1252–56)\n\n\nA massive and wide-ranging work, composed during Aquinas’s term\nas bachelor of theology and the first part of his first term as master\nof theology. Until the Leonine version is published, the best Latin\ntext is the edition by Pierre Mandonnet and Maria F. Moos (Paris: P.\nLéthielleux, 1929–47), which is complete through book IV\ndistinction 22. The\n Aquinas Institute\n (Wyoming) is producing an online English translation that is nearing\ncompletion and looks to be of high quality. ", "Summa contra gentiles (1259–65)\n\n\nThis is Aquinas’s second-most important work, after the\nSumma theologiae. Remarkably, the autograph manuscript has\nsurvived for much of this work and can be admired\n online\n (although Aquinas’s handwriting is notoriously difficult to\nread, even for experts). The best complete English translation, with\nthe Latin text in a parallel column, is available\n online.\n ", "Summa theologiae (1267–73, unfinished after 3a 90)\n\n\nAquinas’s masterpiece, which he began in Rome and worked on\nuntil near the end his life. The Leonine volumes for this work, from\nthe nineteenth century, are no longer considered adequate, and will\neventually be reedited. The best (and now mostly complete) full\nEnglish translation is that of Alfred Freddoso, available\n online.\n ", "On Truth (1256–59)\n\n\nAquinas’s first and largest set of disputed questions, from his\nfirst term as master in Paris. The title refers to just the first of\nthe 29 questions; the other 28 (making a total of 253 articles) take\nup many wide-ranging topics. ", "On God’s Power (1265–66)", "On the Soul (1266–67)", "On Spiritual Creatures (1267–68)", "On Evil (De malo) (1270–71)", "On the Virtues (1271–72)", "On the Union of the Incarnate Word (1272)", "Quodlibetal Questions (1256–59, 1268–72)\n\n\nBy tradition, masters at Paris participated in disputations during\nAdvent and Lent at which audience members might propose any topic at\nall. Aquinas’s large and varied collection of Quodlibetal\nQuestions is split between his two terms as master, with\nquodlibets 7–11 dating from his first term and quodlibets\n1–6 and 12 dating from his second term. There is now an English\ntranslation by Nevitt and Davies (OUP 2019). ", "On the Principles of Nature (De principiis\nnaturae) (early 1250s)\n\n\nA rather conventional summary of medieval natural philosophy, written\nno later than Aquinas’s term in Paris as a bachelor and perhaps,\njudging from its content, even earlier than that. Its brevity and\nphilosophical focus makes it useful for novices today. Stump and\nChanderbhan translate it in the Hackett Basic Works\nvolume. ", "On Being and Essence (De ente et essentia)\n(1252–56).\n\n\nA famous brief treatise on various foundational questions in\nmetaphysics, dating from Aquinas’s time as bachelor in Paris.\nPeter King translates it in the Hackett Basic Works\nvolume. ", "Compendium theologiae (begun in the early 1260s,\nunfinished)\n\n\nA relatively brief digest of material found at much greater length in\nthe Summa theologiae and elsewhere. ", "On Kingship (De regno, or De regimine principum)\n(1266–67?, unfinished)", "On the Unity of the Intellect (De unitate intellectus contra\nAverroistas) (1270)", "On the Eternity of the World (1271)", "On Separate Substances (1271 or later, unfinished)", "On the Mixture of Elements (1269?)", "On the Hidden Workings of Nature (De occultis operationibus\nnaturae) (1268–72?)", "On the Motion of the Heart (De motu cordis)\n(1273?)", "De anima (1267–68)", "De sensu et sensato (1268–69)", "Physics (1269–70)", "De interpretatione (Peri hermeneias) (1271, unfinished\nfrom ch. 10, 19b26)", "Posterior Analytics (1271–72)", "Nicomachean Ethics (1271–72)", "Politics (around 1269–72, unfinished after III.8,\n1280a7)", "Metaphysics (around 1270–73)", "De caelo et mundo (1272–73, unfinished from III.4,\n302b29)", "Meteorology (1273, unfinished after II.5, 363a20)", "On Generation and Corruption (1272–73, unfinished\nafter I.5, 322a33)", "Boethius’s De trinitate (1257–59,\nunfinished)", "Boethius’s De hebdomadibus (1271–72?)", "Pseudo-Dionysius’s On the Divine Names\n(1266–68)", "Liber de causis (1272)", "Isaiah (1251–52)", "Jeremiah (1251–53)", "Job (1263–65)", "Catena aurea (1263–1268) — a continuous\nexposition of the Gospels, interweaving Patristic glosses", "Matthew (1269–70)", "John (1270–72)", "Paul (1261?–73) — a sequence of commentaries\ncovering all of the Pauline epistles", "Psalms (1272–73, unfinished after Psalm 54)", "Adams, Marilyn McCord, 1987, William Ockham, 2 volumes,\nNotre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.", "Amerini, Fabrizio, 2009 [2013], Tommaso d’Aquino:\nOrigine e fine della vita umana, Pisa: Edizioni ETS. Translated\nas Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, Mark\nHenninger (trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Angier, Tom, 2021, Natural Law Theory, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108580793", "Ashworth, E. Jennifer, 2014, “Aquinas on Analogy”, in\nJeffrey Hause (ed.), Debates in Medieval Philosophy, New\nYork: Routledge, 232–42.", "Băltuță [Baltuta], Elena, 2013, “Aquinas on\nIntellectual Cognition: The Case of Intelligible Species”,\nPhilosophia, 41(3): 589–602.\ndoi:10.1007/s11406-013-9481-y", "Bazán, Bernardo C., 1997, “The Human Soul: From\nand Substance? Thomas Aquinas’s Critique of Eclectic\nAristotelianism”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et\nlittéraire du moyen âge, 64: 95–126.", "Bradley, Denis J. M., 1997, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good:\nReason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science,\nWashington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.", "Brower, Jeffrey E., 2014, Aquinas’s Ontology of the\nMaterial World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects, New\nYork/Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714293.001.0001", "–––, 2016, “Aquinas on the Problem of\nUniversals”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,\n92(3): 715–35. doi:10.1111/phpr.12176", "Brower, Jeffrey E., and Susan Brower-Toland, 2008, “Aquinas\non Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality”,\nPhilosophical Review, 117(2): 193–243.\ndoi:10.1215/00318108-2007-036", "Brown, Christopher M., 2007, “Souls, Ships, and\nSubstances”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly,\n81(4): 655–68. doi:10.5840/acpq20078147", "–––, 2021, Eternal Life and Human Happiness:\nPhilosophical Problems, Thomistic Solutions, Washington, DC:\nCatholic University of America Press.", "Cohoe, Caleb, 2013, “There Must Be a First: Why Thomas\nAquinas Rejects Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Causal Series”,\nBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy, 21(5):\n838–56. doi:10.1080/09608788.2013.816934", "Cory, Therese Scarpelli, 2015, “Rethinking Abstractionism:\nAquinas’s Intellectual Light and Some Arabic Sources”,\nJournal of the History of Philosophy, 53(4): 607–46.\ndoi:10.1353/hph.2015.0074", "–––, 2022, “The Nature of Cognition and\nKnowledge”, in Stump and White (eds) 2022: 153–83 (ch. 7).\ndoi:10.1017/9781009043595.011", "Cross, Richard, 1998, The Physics of Duns Scotus: The\nScientific Context of a Theological Vision, Oxford: Clarendon\nPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269748.001.0001", "Dales, Richard C., 1990, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity\nof the World, Leiden: Brill. doi:10.1163/9789004246676", "Davies, Brian, 2018, “The Summa Theologiae on What\nGod Is Not”, in Hause (ed.) 2018: 47–67.", "Davies, Brian and Eleonore Stump (eds.), 2012, The Oxford\nHandbook of Aquinas, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195326093.001.0001", "De Haan, Daniel, 2019, “Aquinas on Sensing, Perceiving,\nThinking, Understanding, and Cognizing Individuals”, in E.\nBăltuță (ed.), Medieval Perceptual Puzzles:\nTheories of Sense Perception in the 13th and\n14th Centuries, Leiden: Brill, 238–68.", "Dewan, Lawrence, 2007, “St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician\nand the Metaphysician”, in R. E. Houser (ed.), Laudemus\nviros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, Notre Dame,\nIN: University of Notre Dame Press, 132–45.", "DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van\nDyke, 2009, Aquinas’s Ethics: Metaphysical Foundations,\nMoral Theory, and Theological Context, Notre Dame, IN: University\nof Notre Dame Press.", "Dougherty, Michael V., 2004, “On the Alleged Subalternate\nCharacter of Sacra Doctrina in Aquinas”,\nProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical\nAssociation, 77: 101–10. doi:10.5840/acpaproc20037716", "Elders, Leo, 2009, “The Aristotelian Commentaries of St.\nThomas Aquinas”, Review of Metaphysics, 63(1):\n29–53.", "Finnis, John, 1998, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal\nTheory, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.", "Frost, Gloria, 2022, Aquinas on Efficient Causation and Causal\nPowers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/9781009225403", "Gallagher, David M., 1994, “Free Choice and Free Judgment in\nThomas Aquinas”, Archiv für Geschichte der\nPhilosophie, 76(3): 247–77.\ndoi:10.1515/agph.1994.76.3.247", "Glorieux, Palémon, 1927, Les premières\npolémiques Thomistes: le Correctorium Corruptorii\n“Quare”, Kain: Le Saulchoir.", "Goris, Harm J. M. J., 1997, Free Creatures of an Eternal God:\nThomas Aquinas on God’s Infallible Foreknowledge and\nIrresistible Will, Leuven: Peeters.", "Goris, Harm J. M. J and Henk J. M. Schoot, 2017, The Virtuous\nLife: Thomas Aquinas on the Theological Nature of Moral Virtues,\nLeuven: Peeters.", "Grisez, Germain, 1965, “The First Principle of Practical\nReason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1–2,\nQuestion 94, Article 2”, Natural Law Forum, 10:\n168–201.", "Hause, Jeffrey, 1997, “Thomas Aquinas and the\nVoluntarists”, Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 6(2):\n167–82. doi:10.5840/medievalpt1997628", "–––, 2007, “Aquinas on the Function of\nMoral Virtue”, American Catholic Philosophical\nQuarterly, 81(1): 1–20. doi:10.5840/acpq200781145", "––– (ed.), 2018, Aquinas’s Summa\nTheologiae: A Critical Guide,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316271490", "Hissette, Roland, 1977, Enquête sur les 219 articles\ncondamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277, Louvain:\nPublications universitaires.", "Hobbes, Thomas, 1651 [1994], Leviathan, E. Curley (ed.),\nIndianapolis: Hackett.", "Hochschild, Joshua P., 2019, “Aquinas’s Two Concepts\nof Analogy and a Complex Semantics for Naming the Simple God”,\nThomist, 83(2): 155–84. doi:10.1353/tho.2019.0013", "Hoffman, Paul, 2014, “Aquinas on Spiritual Change”, in\nRobert Pasnau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, volume\n2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 98–103.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718468.003.0005", "Hoffmann, Tobias, 2022, “Grace and Free Will”, in\nStump and White (eds.) 2022: 233–56 (ch. 10).\ndoi:10.1017/9781009043595.015", "Hoffmann, Tobias and Cyrille Michon, 2017, “Aquinas on Free\nWill and Intellectual Determinism”, Philosophers’\nImprint, 17(10): 1–36.\n [Hoffmann and Michon 2017 available online]", "Irwin, Terence, 2007, The Development of Ethics: A Historical\nand Critical Study (Volume 1: From Socrates to the\nReformation), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242673.001.0001", "Jenkins, John I., 1996, “Expositions of the Text:\nAquinas’s Aristotelian Commentaries”, Medieval\nPhilosophy and Theology, 5(1): 39–62.\n [Jenkins 1996 available online]", "Jensen, Steven J., 2015, Knowing the Natural Law: From\nPrecepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts, Washington, DC:\nCatholic University of America Press.", "Jordan, Mark D., 1982, “The Controversy of the\nCorrectoria and the Limits of Metaphysics”,\nSpeculum, 57(2): 292–314. doi:10.2307/2847458", "Kenny, Anthony, 1969, The Five Ways: St. Thomas\nAquinas’s Proofs of God’s Existence, London:\nRoutledge.", "–––, 1993, Aquinas on Mind, London/New\nYork: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203004944 ", "–––, 1998, “Aquinas on Aristotelian\nHappiness”, in MacDonald and Stump (eds) 1998: 15–27.", "Kent, Bonnie, 1995, Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of\nEthics in the Late Thirteenth Century, Washington, DC: Catholic\nUniversity of America Press.", "King, Peter, 1994, “Scholasticism and the Philosophy of\nMind: The Failure of Aristotelian Psychology”, in Tamara\nHorowitz and Allen I. Janis (eds.), Scientific Failure,\nLanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 109–38.", "–––, 1998, “Aquinas on the\nPassions”, in MacDonald and Stump (eds) 1998: 101–32.", "–––, 2000, “The Problem of Individuation\nin the Middle Ages”, Theoria, 66: 159–84.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2000.tb01161.x", "Klima, Gyula, 1997 [2002], “Man = Body + Soul:\nAquinas’s Arithmetic of Human Nature”, in Timo Koistinen\nand Tommi Lehtonen (eds.), Philosophical Studies in Religion,\nMetaphysics, and Ethics: Essays in Honour of Heikki Kirjavainen,\nHelsinki: Luther Agricola Society. Reprinted in Brian Davies (ed.),\nThomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives,\nOxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 257–73 (ch. 10).", "–––, 2000, “Aquinas on One and\nMany”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica\nmedievale, 11: 195–215.", "–––, 2001, “Aquinas’ Proofs of the\nImmateriality of the Intellect from the Universality of\nThought”, Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and\nMetaphysics, 1: 19–28.", "Knobel, Angela, 2021, Aquinas and the Infused Moral\nVirtues, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.", "Kretzmann, Norman, 1997, The Metaphysics of Theism:\nAquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra\nGentiles I, Oxford: Clarendon Press.\ndoi:10.1093/019924653X.001.0001", "–––, 1999, The Metaphysics of Creation:\nAquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra\nGentiles II, Oxford: Clarendon Press.\ndoi:10.1093/0199246548.001.0001", "Leftow, Brian, 1990, “Aquinas on Time and Eternity”,\nAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 64(3):\n387–99. doi:10.5840/acpq199064315", "–––, 2003, “Aquinas on Attributes”,\nMedieval Philosophy and Theology, 11(1): 1–41.\ndoi:10.1017/S105706080300001X", "Legge, Dominic, 2022, “Thomas Aquinas: A Life Pursuing\nWisdom”, in Stump and White (eds) 2022: 7–28 (ch. 1).\ndoi:10.1017/9781009043595.003", "Levering, Matthew and Marcus Plested (eds), 2021, The Oxford\nHandbook of the Reception of Aquinas, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198798026.001.0001", "Lisska, Anthony J., 1996, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural\nLaw: An Analytic Reconstruction, Oxford: Clarendon Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.001.0001", "–––, 2016, Aquinas’s Theory of\nPerception: An Analytic Reconstruction, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777908.001.0001", "Loughran, Thomas J., 1999, “Aquinas, Compatibilist”,\nin F. Michael McLain and W. Mark Richardson (eds), Human and\nDivine Agency: Anglican, Catholic, and Lutheran Perspectives, New\nYork: University Press of America, 1–39.", "MacDonald, Scott, 1991a, “Aquinas’s Parasitic\nCosmological Argument”, Medieval Philosophy and\nTheology, 1: 119–55.\n [MacDonald 1991a available online]", "–––, 1991b, “Ultimate Ends in Practical\nReasoning”, Philosophical Review, 100(1): 31–66.\ndoi:10.2307/2185514", "–––, 1993, “Theory of Knowledge”, in\nNorman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (eds.), Cambridge Companion to\nAquinas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 160–95.\ndoi:10.1017/CCOL0521431956.007", "MacDonald, Scott and Eleonore Stump (eds), 1998,\nAquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman\nKretzmann, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.", "Marmodoro, Anna and Ben Page, 2016, “Aquinas on Forms,\nSubstances and Artifacts”, Vivarium, 54(1): 1–21.\ndoi:10.1163/15685349-12341310", "Martin, C. F. J., 1997, Thomas Aquinas: God and\nExplanations, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.", "Massey, Gerald J., 1999, “Medieval Sociobiology: Thomas\nAquinas’s Theory of Sexual Morality”, Philosophical\nTopics, 27(1): 69–86. doi:10.5840/philtopics199927117", "Mattison, William C., 2011, “Can Christians Possess the\nAcquired Cardinal Virtues?” Theological Studies, 72(3):\n558–85. doi:10.1177/004056391107200304", "Maurer, Armand, 1986, “Introduction”, in Thomas\nAquinas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences: Questions V and\nVI of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, 4th revised\nedition, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,\nVII–XLI.", "McCluskey, Colleen, 2017, Thomas Aquinas on Moral\nWrongdoing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/9781316796917", "McInerny, Ralph, 1996, Aquinas and Analogy, Washington,\nDC: Catholic University of America Press.", "–––, 1997, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral\nPhilosophy of Thomas Aquinas, revised edition, Washington, DC:\nCatholic University of America Press.", "Miner, Robert C., 2009, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A\nStudy of Summa theologiae 1a2ae\n22–48, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9780511576560", "Montagnes, Bernard, 1963 [2004], La Doctrine de\nl’analogie de l’être d’après Saint\nThomas D’Aquin, Louvain: Publications universitaires.\nTranslated as The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to\nThomas Aquinas, E. M. Macierowski and Pol Vandevelde (trans),\nAndrew Tallon (ed.), Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004.", "Murphy, Mark C., 2001, Natural Law and Practical\nRationality, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.", "Nevitt, Turner C., 2014, “Survivalism, Corruptionism, and\nIntermittent Existence in Aquinas”, History of Philosophy\nQuarterly, 31(1): 1–19.", "Oberman, Heiko A. (ed.), 1966, Forerunners of the Reformation:\nThe Shape of Late Medieval Thought, New York: Holt, Rinehart and\nWinston.", "Ogden, Stephen R., 2022, Averroes on Intellect: From\nAristotelian Origins to Aquinas’ Critique, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192896117.001.0001", "Oliva, Adriano, 2015, Amours: L’église, les\ndivorcés remariés, les couples homosexuels, Paris:\nCerf.", "Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., 2005, Love of Self and Love of God in\nThirteenth-Century Ethics, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre\nDame Press.", "Panaccio, Claude, 2001, “Aquinas on Intellectual\nRepresentation”, in Dominik Perler (ed.) Ancient and\nMedieval Theories of Intentionality, Leiden: Brill,\n185–202. doi:10.1163/9789004453296_012", "Pasnau, Robert, 1997, Theories of Cognition in the Later\nMiddle Ages, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2002, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A\nPhilosophical Study of Summa theologiae 1a\n75–89, New York: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9780511613180", "–––, 2011, Metaphysical Themes\n1274–1671, Oxford: Clarendon Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567911.001.0001", "–––, 2018, “On What There Is in\nAquinas”, in Hause (ed.) 2018: 10–28.", "Pawl, Timothy, 2012, “The Five Ways”, in Davies and\nStump (eds.) 2012: 115–31 (ch. 9).\ndoi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195326093.013.0010", "Perler, Dominik, 2000, “Essentialism and Direct Realism.\nSome Late Medieval Perspectives”, Topoi, 19(2):\n111–22. doi:10.1023/A:1006425008627", "Pini, Giorgio, 2012, “The Development of Aquinas’s\nThought”, in Davies and Stump (eds) 2012: 491–510 (ch.\n37). doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195326093.013.0038", "Pope, Stephen J. (ed.), 2002, The Ethics of Aquinas,\nWashington, DC: Georgetown University Press.", "Porro, Pasquale, 2012 [2016], Tommaso d’Aquino: Un\nProfile storic-filosofico, Roma: Carocci editore. translated as\nThomas Aquinas: A Historical and Philosophical Profile,\nJoseph G. Trabbic and Roger W. Nutt (trans.), Washington, DC: Catholic\nUniversity of America Press, 2016.", "Porter, Jean, 2018, “The Natural Law”, in Hause (ed.)\n2018: 170–87.", "–––, 2019, “Moral Virtues, Charity, and\nGrace: Why the Infused and Acquired Virtues Cannot Co-Exist”,\nJournal of Moral Theology, 8(2): 40–66.", "Rhonheimer, Martin, 1987 [2000], Natur als Grundlage der\nMoral: die personale Struktur des Naturgesetzes bei Thomas von Aquin:\neine Auseinandersetzung mit autonomer und teleologischer Ethik,\nInnsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag. Translated as Natural Law and Practical\nReason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy, Gerald Malsbary\n(trans.), (Moral Philosophy and Moral Theology 1), New York: Fordham\nUniversity Press, 2000.", "Rota, Michael W., 2004, “Substance and Artifact in Thomas\nAquinas”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 21(3):\n241–59.", "Shanley, Brian J., 2007, “Beyond Libertarianism and\nCompatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom”, in Richard\nVelkley (ed.), Freedom and the Human Person, Washington, DC:\nCatholic University of America Press, 70–89.", "Shields, Christopher and Robert Pasnau, 2016, The Philosophy\nof Aquinas, 2nd edition, New York: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199301232.001.0001", "Stenberg, Joseph, 2016a, “Aquinas on the Relationship\nBetween the Vision and Delight in Perfect Happiness”,\nAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 90(4):\n665–80. doi:10.5840/acpq201691499", "–––, 2016b, “Considerandum est quid\nsit beatitudo: Aquinas on What Happiness Really Is”,\nRes Philosophica, 93(1): 161–84.\ndoi:10.11612/resphil.2016.93.1.11", "Stump, Eleonore, 2003, Aquinas, London: Routledge.\ndoi:10.4324/9780203928356 ", "–––, 2010, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative\nand the Problem of Suffering, Oxford: Clarendon Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277421.001.0001", "–––, 2011, “The Non-Aristotelian Character\nof Aquinas’s Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions”, Faith\nand Philosophy, 28(1): 29–43.\ndoi:10.5840/faithphil201128114", "–––, 2018, Atonement, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198813866.001.0001", "–––, 2022, “The Nature of Human\nBeings”, in Stump and White (eds) 2022: 126–50 (ch. 6).\ndoi:10.1017/9781009043595.009", "Stump, Eleonore and Thomas Joseph White (eds.), 2022, The New\nCambridge Companion to Aquinas, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. doi:10.1017/9781009043595", "Toner, Patrick, 2009, “Personhood and Death in St. Thomas\nAquinas”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 26(2):\n121–38.", "Torrell, Jean-Pierre, 1993 [2022], L’Initiation à\nSaint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa personne et son oeuvre, Paris: Cerf.\nTranslated as Saint Thomas Aquinas (Volume 1: The Person\nand His Work), Matthew K. Minerd and Robert Royal (trans),\n3rd edition, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America\nPress, 2022.", "–––, 1996 [2003], Saint Thomas\nd’Aquin, Maître Spirituel, Paris: Cerf; translated as\nSaint Thomas Aquinas (Volume 2: Spiritual Master),\nRobert Royal (trans.), Washington, DC: Catholic University of America\nPress, 2003.", "Van Dyke, Christina, 2012, “The End of (Human) Life as We\nKnow It: Thomas Aquinas on Persons, Bodies, and Death”,\nModern Schoolman, 89(3): 243–57.\ndoi:10.5840/schoolman2012893/416", "Wawrykow, Joseph P., 2012, “The Theological Virtues”,\nin Davies and Stump (eds.) 2012: 287–307 (ch. 22).\ndoi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195326093.013.0023", "Westberg, Daniel, 1994, Right Practical Reason: Aristotle,\nAction, and Prudence in Aquinas, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Wippel, John F., 1995a, “‘First Philosophy’\naccording to Thomas Aquinas”, in his Metaphysical Themes in\nThomas Aquinas, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America\nPress, 55–67.", "–––, 1995b, “Thomas Aquinas and the\nCondemnations of 1277”, Modern Schoolman, 72(2):\n232–72. doi:10.5840/schoolman1995722/317", "–––, 1995c, “Thomas Aquinas on the\nPossibility of Eternal Creation”, in his Metaphysical Themes\nin Thomas Aquinas, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America\nPress, 191–214.", "–––, 2000, The Metaphysical Thought of\nThomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being, Washington,\nDC: Catholic University of America Press.", "Wood, Adam, 2020, Thomas Aquinas on the Immateriality of the\nHuman Intellect, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America\nPress." ]	[ { "href": "../analogy-medieval/", "text": "analogy: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../aquinas-moral-political/", "text": "Aquinas, Thomas: moral, political, and legal philosophy" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-influence/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West" }, { "href": "../medieval-categories/", "text": "categories: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../condemnation/", "text": "condemnation of 1277" }, { "href": "../conscience-medieval/", "text": "conscience: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../creation-conservation/", "text": "creation and conservation" }, { "href": "../illumination/", "text": "divine: illumination" }, { "href": "../medieval-emotions/", "text": "emotion: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../natural-law-ethics/", "text": "ethics: natural law tradition" }, { "href": "../faith/", "text": "faith" }, { "href": "../medieval-futcont/", "text": "future contingents: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../medieval-philosophy/", "text": "medieval philosophy" }, { "href": "../representation-medieval/", "text": "mental representation: in medieval philosophy" }, { "href": "../natural-law-theories/", "text": "nature of law: natural law theories" }, { "href": "../omnipresence/", "text": "omnipresence" }, { "href": "../practical-reason-med/", "text": "practical reason: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../providence-divine/", "text": "providence, divine" }, { "href": "../relations-medieval/", "text": "relations: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../divine-revelation/", "text": "revelation, divine" }, { "href": "../divine-simplicity/", "text": "simplicity: divine" }, { "href": "../transcendentals-medieval/", "text": "transcendentals, medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../universals-medieval/", "text": "universals: the medieval problem of" } ]
arcesilaus	Arcesilaus	First published Fri Jan 14, 2005; substantive revision Fri Jul 2, 2021	[ "\n\nArcesilaus (315/4–241/40 BCE) was a member and later leader of\nPlato’s Academy. He initiated the skeptical phase of the Platonic\nschool (‘Academic skepticism’) and was an influential\ncritic of the Stoics, especially of their epistemology.", "\n\nThe ancient evidence about Arcesilaus’ philosophy is difficult\nto evaluate and, in some respects, inconsistent. As a result, scholars\ninterpret his skepticism in several ways. Some see his philosophical\nactivity as entirely negative or destructive of all views. Others take\nhim to have held positive views, but not on any philosophical topic,\nincluding the possibility of knowledge. Some regard him as having\nsupposed on the basis of arguments that nothing could be known, while\nstill others view him as someone who refused to accept any\nphilosophical theory or proposition as rationally warranted, insisting\nthat further examination is always required." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and work", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Skepticism: method or doctrine", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Criticism of Stoic epistemology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. ", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 The Non-Rational Non-Belief interpretation", "4.2 The Rational Non-Belief interpretation", "4.3 The Non-Rational Belief interpretation" ] }, { "content_title": "5. The practical criterion", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 The Non-Rational Non-Belief interpretation", "5.2 The Rational Non-Belief interpretation", "5.3 The Non-Rational Belief interpretation" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Priority of method", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Sources", "Arcesilaus’ life and philosophical activity", "Arcesilaus’ skeptical position", "Arcesilaus’ relation to other philosophers" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nAfter an early education in geometry and astronomy in his native\nPitanê (in Aeolis, the northwest Aegean coast of modern Turkey),\nArcesilaus escaped to Athens against his guardian’s wishes. There he is\nsaid to have studied rhetoric in association with Theophrastus\n(Aristotle’s successor) until c. 295–290 BCE, when he abandoned\nit to study philosophy in Plato’s Academy with Crantor (d. 276/5) and\nits leaders Polemo (d. 270/69) and Crates (d.268/7). He became the head\nof the Academy (‘scholarch’) after Crates’ death and\nled the school for more than 25 years until his own death in 241/40\nBCE.", "\n\nLike Socrates, his philosophical model, and Carneades, who carried\nforward his skepticism in the 2nd c. BCE, Arcesilaus did not\nwrite any philosophical works. His arguments were initially preserved\nby his students—including Pythodorus, who wrote up some of\nthem, and Lakydes, his successor as scholarch—and in the work\nof his opponents, most notably, the Stoic Chrysippus, whose\nreformulation of Stoicism was prompted by Arcesilaus’ criticisms\nof the views of the first generation of Stoics. But Arcesilaus’\narguments were later overlaid by Carneadean elaborations and subsumed\ninto the general Academic and anti-Academic traditions; so it is only\nthrough those later traditions that we know about them. Our knowledge\nof his work depends on scraps from the biographical tradition\n(preserved in Diogenes Laertius and Philodemus) and brief general\nreports from later skeptical writers—Cicero and Sextus\nEmpiricus and Plutarch—and their opponents—Antiochus\nand Numenius (preserved in Cicero and Eusebius respectively). But since\nthese offer incompatible interpretations of Arcesilaus’\nphilosophical position, reflecting the writers’ distinctive views\nabout later developments in the skeptical Academy, the precise nature\nof his skepticism remains controversial." ], "section_title": "1. Life and work", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe central question presented by the inconsistent evidence for\nArcesilaus’ skepticism is how to reconcile his Socratic method\nwith the ‘doctrines’ he is reported to have accepted:", "\n\nOur sources agree that Arcesilaus’ dialectical method\nconstituted the core of his philosophical activity (see e.g., Diogenes\nLaertius 4.28). This method presents two basic difficulties for any\nattempt to reconcile it with these doctrines.", "\n\nFirst, his method was dialectical, such that rather than arguing in\nfavor of any doctrine or set of doctrines, Arcesilaus restricted\nhimself to arguing against the views proposed by his opponents or\ninterlocutors. At first sight, this method may not look incompatible\nwith affirming inapprehensibility and universal\nsuspension of assent if the repeated result of practicing it\nwas that the views argued against did not stand up to criticism. Such\nrepeated failures could suggest that in fact nothing can be known and\nthat one should form no beliefs at all.", "\n\nWe can see why Arcesilaus’ dialectical method cautions against\naccepting this suggestion by looking at the model he claimed to be\nfollowing: Socrates’ practice in the dialogues of Plato (see\nCicero, Academica 1.44–5, De oratore 3.67,\nDe finibus 2.2, On the Nature of the Gods 1.11). In\nPlato’s Socratic dialogues, at least, Socrates challenges the\npretensions of his interlocutors to knowledge by showing, through\npremises they accept, that they are committed to inconsistent beliefs.\nTo achieve this result, it is crucial that the arguments—the\npremises, the inferences, and the conclusions—depend entirely on\nthe beliefs of the interlocutors. If they do, the result of a\nsuccessful Socratic encounter will be that the interlocutor is at a\nloss: the interlocutors now recognize that they have inconsistent\nbeliefs, since they have both their initial reasons for the thesis or\nknowledge-claim they made and their newly-discerned reasons against\nit. If they also hold some generally accepted views about knowledge\n(for example, that one can’t know something about which one holds\ninconsistent beliefs), the interlocutors will be rationally\nconstrained to aver that they don’t know whether their thesis is true\nor false, and hence to suspend assent on the thesis while awaiting\nfurther investigation and argument. But no such result holds for\nSocrates. For, although he represents himself as being in the same\naporetic boat—and may in fact be perplexed for exactly the same\nreasons—his method does not commit him to the premises,\ninferences or conclusions of the arguments, or even to the regulating\nideas about knowledge. His views (if he has any) are not at issue in\nthe argument.", "\n\nThere is good evidence that Arcesilaus followed the Socratic model\nconsistently. It is clear that he went to some lengths not to make\npositive affirmations of any sort in his own right in his arguments\n(see Diogenes Laertius 4.36, Philodemus Index Academicorum\n20.1–4, cf. 18.40–19.9). Our sources also confirm that\nArcesilaus took his method to entail that he did not reveal his own\nview on the matter in question in any case, if he had one, including,\nfor instance, the view that the claim argued against is false (see\ne.g., Cicero De oratore 3.67). Further, our most\ndetailed sources actually identify the radical change of position in\nthe Platonic school he introduced—the transition from the Old\nAcademy to the skeptical Academy—in terms of his adoption of\nthis method (see Diogenes Laertius 4.28, Philodemus Index\nAcademicorum 18.7–16 & 21.36–42 and Sextus\nOutlines of Pyrrhonism 1.220–35, esp. 232). And this\nexplains his reputation as a ‘dialectician’ (or, more\nnegatively, as a ‘sophist’ or ‘eristic’ or\n‘magician’), as well as why the skeptical Academy came to\nbe defined primarily by its critical stance towards the doctrines of\nother schools (and particularly towards the energetic philosophical\nprograms of the new movements initiated by Epicurus and Zeno during his\nlifetime). But if Arcesilaus followed this model consistently by\narguing against every philosophical position that came to his notice\nand refraining from making any positive arguments or affirmations on\nany philosophical question, it is hard to see why we should think that\nhe accepted any doctrines, including inapprehensibility and\nuniversal suspension of assent. Thus, the first difficulty is\nthat Arcesilaus’ method in principle obscures any views he may\nhave held.", "\n\nThe second difficulty involved in reconciling Arcesilaus’\ndialectical method with doctrines [i]–[iii] is more\nstraightforward: they are conclusions of some of his best known\narguments, but since these are clearly dialectical anti-Stoic\narguments, they depend crucially on Stoic premises. In epistemology, he\nargued that, despite the Stoics’ commitment to readily accessible\nknowledge, certain premises accepted by the Stoics entail that nothing\nis known and that we should suspend assent universally (see below,\nsect. 3.). Likewise, the theory of action Arcesilaus defended is\nparasitic on the Stoics’ and relies on their ethical premises\n(see below, sect. 5). Given his Socratic method, we only have reason to\nascribe these doctrines to Arcesilaus himself if we have independent\nevidence that he accepted those premises shared by Stoics. But there is\nreason to think that Arcesilaus did not accept anything of Stoic\nepistemology or ethics. The second difficulty, then, is that the\nevidence does not give a consistent picture of which, if any,\nconclusions of his dialectical arguments Arcesilaus may have accepted\nin his own right.", "\n\nThe first question about Arcesilaus’ skepticism is thus\nwhether it involved any commitment to doctrines at all. A negative\nanswer to this question—based on something like the two\ndifficulties given above—yields what is called a\ndialectical interpretation of Arcesilaus (adopted by e.g.,\nCouissin 1929 and Striker 1980; see Castagnoli 2018 on the senses of\n‘dialectical’). The primary drawback to this interpretation\nis that it involves the rejection of a central claim about him in all\nof our major sources except Philodemus: Cicero, Numenius, Sextus,\nDiogenes and Plutarch ascribe some degree of commitment to at least one\nof these doctrines—that of universal suspension ([ii]\nabove). Rejecting this evidence might be justified by the lateness of\nthese sources and their associations with later Academic developments;\nbut this seems hard to maintain when we learn that Arcesilaus’\ncontemporary opponents, including Chrysippus, also ascribed\nuniversal suspension to him (see Plutarch On\nStoic Self-Contradictions 1036a with 1037a, and Against\nColotes 1122a). A dialectical interpretation also risks failing\nas an interpretation: it cannot explain why Arcesilaus argued\nas he did, whether because it denies him any commitments or because it\nclaims they are entirely opaque to us (see Perin 2013).", "\n\nIf we accept that these considerations constrain us to look for a\npositive answer to the first question, at least as regards the\nrecommendation of suspending assent about everything, the second\nquestion is which of the three candidate doctrines—viz., [i]\ninapprehensibility, [ii] universal suspension, and\n[iii] a theory of action without assent—was Arcesilaus\ncommitted to. Since, as numerous sources suggest, universal\nsuspension is the prescriptive claim that one ought not to form\nany beliefs, then Arcesilaus cannot follow it and at the same time\nbelieve it, or anything else, to be true. If we do not wish to saddle\nArcesilaus with a self-defeating skepticism, we are then faced with a\nthird question: what was the nature of Arcesilaus’ commitment to\nhis doctrines? The answers to these two questions remain open. But the\ndominant solutions on offer fall roughly into three groups, each\nidentifying a different kind of commitment compatible with\nuniversal suspension, and so a different answer to the third\nquestion. If the sort of commitment prohibited by universal\nsuspension is rational belief, then three weaker kinds of\ncommitment seem to have been open to Arcesilaus:", "\n\nNRNB supposes that the skeptic universally suspends assent\nas a natural, psychological reaction to equally convincing (or\nequipollent) and opposing arguments. Universal suspension, on\nthis view, is not a prescription justified through the\nargument that one ought to suspend assent about everything because\nknowledge is impossible. Rather, since the skeptic’s belief-forming faculties are\nparalyzed in the face of opposing reasons, she acts by impulse,\npursuing what appears appropriate (see sect. 5.1). On an NRNB\ninterpretation Arcesilaus’ commitments to [ii] universal\nsuspension and [iii] a practical criterion were founded neither on\nbelief nor on a prior consideration of reasons (see e.g., Ioppolo 1986;\n2009; 2018).", "\n\nRNB allows the skeptic to accept doctrines on rational\ngrounds, by distinguishing beliefs from other attitudes that can take the\nplace of beliefs in chains of inference: in particular,\nbelief-like suppositions that function as hypotheses (see Striker 1980,\nBett 1990, and Reinhardt 2018). On the RNB view Arcesilaus\naccepted [i]–[iii] hypothetically (see Schofield 1999, Perin\n2010, and Thorsrud 2018).", "\n\nNRB denies the skeptic accepts doctrines on the basis of\nany premises that purport to warrant them. On this view, [i]\ninapprehensibility and [ii] universal suspension were\nthe residual and rationally unwarranted beliefs Arcesilaus was left\nwith as a result of his philosophical activity (see Frede 1979 &\n1984, Cooper 2004, Brittain 2005 [2008], and Thorsrud 2009).", "\n\nAs we will see in sects. 4–5, these three accounts of\nArcesilaus’ skepticism privilege the evidence for his arguments\nin competing ways. To understand and evaluate their interpretive\nstrategies, we first need to examine Arcesilaus’ principal\narguments against Stoic epistemology." ], "section_title": "2. Skepticism: method or doctrine", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nArcesilaus’ best known arguments, and the only ones that\nsurvive in any detail, are his criticisms of Stoic epistemology (Sextus\nAgainst the Logicians [‘M.’]\n7.150–9, Cicero Academica 2\npassim, esp. 2.66–7 & 2.77).", "\n\nThe Stoic theory of knowledge represented a radical shift in\nepistemology, since it offered an empirically-based route to the kind\nof wisdom Socrates had sought (see Frede 1999). Its basis was three\nnovel claims made by Zeno, the founder of the Stoa (see Cicero\nAcademica 1.40–2). First, Zeno proposed a new\npsychological theory: to form a belief of any kind is to give one’s\nassent to one’s ‘impression’ (or ‘appearance’:\n‘phantasia’ in Greek) about the matter.\nSecondly, he claimed that some of our perceptual impressions are\n‘cognitive’ or self-warranting, so that assenting to them\nconstitutes a cognition or apprehension\n(‘katalêpsis’) of their objects.\nAnd, thirdly, he argued that we ought to restrict our assent to just\ncognitive impressions, since it is contrary to reason to form\n‘opinions’—that is, mere beliefs whether true or\nfalse—by assenting to inadequately warranted, non-cognitive\nimpressions. But, given that there are cognitive impressions, we can\nattain infallible knowledge or wisdom by restricting our assent to\nthem, since our thoughts will then be constituted entirely by\ncognitions derived from perception or from concepts warranted by\nperceptual cognitions.", "\n\nThe focus of Arcesilaus’ attack on Zeno’s theory was its\ncenterpiece, the theory of cognitive impressions. Zeno defined a\ncognitive impression as one that comes from what is, is stamped and\nimpressed exactly in accordance with it, and is such that it could not\nbe false (Sextus M. 7.248, Cicero Academica 2.77).\nThis means, roughly, that an impression is cognitive if and only if\n[a] its propositional content is true, [b] it is caused in the\nappropriate way for correctly representing its object, and [c] its\ntruth is thus warranted by the inimitable richness and detail of the\nrepresentational character guaranteed by its causal history—such\nthat [a] is entailed by [b]. Arcesilaus’ tactic was to grant\nthat conditions [a] and [b] are often met, as Zeno claimed, but to\nargue that condition [c] never obtained (M.\n7.154, Academica 2.77). Although his detailed arguments for\nthis have not survived, it is fairly clear from later Academic and\nStoic arguments that he followed two main lines of attack. One line\ndepended on the existence of indistinguishable—or, at any rate,\nindiscernibly distinct—objects, such as twins, or pairs of eggs,\nmanufactured items (statues or impressions on wax of the same\nletter-seal), and grains of sand (Academica 2.54–8\n& 2.84–6, M. 7.408–10). Any of these could\nbe mistaken for another no matter how good one’s impression of it\nwas. The second depended on abnormal states of mind, such as dreams,\nillusions, and fits of madness (Academica 2.47–53 &\n2.88–90, M. 7.402–8). In either case, Arcesilaus\nargued that, whether the nature of the objects or of our minds is at\nfault, it is always possible to have a false impression with exactly\nthe same propositional content and representational character as a\ntrue one that meets condition [b]. But if so, no impression can be\nself-warranting in virtue of the way in which its content is\nrepresented. So condition [c] never obtains. Hence, on the Stoic view\nof the requirements for cognition, there is no cognition. And if\nknowledge is derived entirely from perceptual cognition and concepts\nwarranted by it, as Zeno supposed, it follows that nothing can be\nknown. (Intricate Stoic-Academic debates on these issues lasted for\nanother 150 years; they can best be traced through the arguments of\nChrysippus and Carneades, preserved in some detail in\nCicero’s Academica and Sextus M. 7.)", "\n\nThe argument is standardly summarized as follows:", "\n\nAnd, since for Zeno knowledge itself depends on assent to cognitive\nimpressions, this argument leads to the further conclusion that nothing\ncan be known (inapprehensibility).", "\n\nArcesilaus followed up this argument against the cognitive\nimpression with a briefer argument against Zeno’s ideal of wisdom:", "\n\nThat is, Arcesilaus pointed out to the Stoics that if his argument\n[1]–[5] against the cognitive\nimpression is successful, they are also committed to the conclusion\nthat it is irrational to assent to anything (universal\nsuspension).", "\n\nThese arguments are presented in two very different ways in our two\nsources. In Sextus’ account (followed above), they are presented\nas explicitly dialectical arguments, relying on clearly marked Stoic\nviews, and leading to the conclusion that the Stoic sage will have no\nbeliefs. In the report of Cicero in Academica 2, however, we\nare informed that Arcesilaus was in some way committed to premises and\nconclusions of both arguments: that is, he agreed that condition [c] of\nthe Stoic definition of the cognitive impression could never be met,\nand hence that nothing can be known; and he maintained premises [5] and\n[6] of the second argument, and hence concluded that assent to any\nimpression was irrational (Academica 2.66–7 & 2.77).\nThis historical interpretation of Arcesilaus’ skepticism is\nsupported elsewhere in Cicero’s dialogues, where we find histories of\nphilosophy that have Arcesilaus following Socrates and Plato (and\nPresocratic philosophers such as Democritus, Parmenides and Empedocles)\nin concluding that nothing can be known by perception or reason, and\nhence adopting a method of argument that would lead others to refrain\nfrom all assent (De oratore 3.67 &\nAcademica 1.43–6; see also Plutarch Against\nColotes 1121f).", "\n\nCicero’s interpretation in Academica 2.66–7 &\n2.77 faces two problems. The first is that the argument against the\nexistence of cognitive impressions depends on many facets of the\nepistemological framework of the Stoics. For the conclusion doesn’t\nfollow unless it is true that there are impressions, that some are\ntrue, that there are no other routes to cognition, that the Stoic\ndefinition of cognition gives necessary and sufficient conditions for\nknowledge, etc. And there is reason to doubt Cicero’s testimony that\nArcesilaus subscribed to these Stoic views, since we have some evidence\nthat he argued against every aspect of Stoic epistemology and\npsychology. Plutarch, for instance, mentions an objection to the Stoic\ntheory of the soul’s interaction with the body, which implies that\nArcesilaus argued against the fundamental mechanism of impression in\nZeno’s account (On Common Conceptions 1078c). Another fragment\nfrom Plutarch suggests that Arcesilaus argued against Zeno’s causal\ntheory of perception (Fragment 215a). And Sextus reports that\nArcesilaus also objected to Zeno’s conception of belief as assent to an\nimpression, on the ground that assent is a matter of reason or thought,\nrather than the acceptance of a physiological item, the impression\n(M. 7.154).", "\n\nIn these cases, as with his argument against the satisfiability of\ncondition [c] of the Stoic definition of the cognitive impression, it\nseems possible to trace a definite strategy behind Arcesilaus’\narguments: he argued against Zeno’s empiricist presuppositions by\ndeploying Platonic objections and theories (see Schofield 1999,\nTrabattoni 2005, Vezzoli 2016, and von Staden 1978). One might\nconclude, as some did in antiquity, that Arcesilaus therefore had a\nhidden objective of undermining Stoic or Epicurean empiricism in favor\nof Platonic doctrine (see Sextus Outlines of Pyrrhonism\n1.234). But Arcesilaus’ method implies that he would argue\nagainst Platonic doctrines as well, if anyone proposed them. So if he\ndid hold the view that nothing can be known, it seems more plausible to\nthink that he held it due to the success of his arguments against all\nconceptions of knowledge, rather than solely as the conclusion of an\nargument relying on a particular epistemological theory. Cicero’s\naccount, then, may give only a partial story of the grounds of\nArcesilaus’ skeptical views.", "\n\nThe second problem with the interpretation of Arcesilaus’\nskepticism in Academica 2.66–7 & 2.77 is that it\nrisks self-defeat. The problem lies not in knowing that nothing can be\nknown, since, on one account\n(Cicero Academica 1.45), Arcesilaus, unlike\nSocrates, explicitly disclaimed such second-order knowledge. It lies\nrather in believing that nothing can be known in conjunction with the\nbelief that it is irrational to hold opinions in the absence of\nknowledge. If the former is true, it is irrational (and so one ought\nnot) to believe the premises of the arguments that support both\ninapprehensibility and universal suspension." ], "section_title": "3. Criticism of Stoic epistemology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThere are two approaches to resolving this second problem, that\naccepting inapprehensibility and universal suspension\nmay be self-defeating. The NRNB view takes a negative route,\ndenying that Arcesilaus was committed to inapprehensibility\nand universal suspension, at least as a prescriptive claim\nabout the irrationality of assent (see [7] in sect. 3). By contrast,\nthe RNB and NRB views positively ascribe\ninapprehensibility and universal suspension to\nArcesilaus, but they maintain that his acceptance of them is not\nexplained in terms of rational belief of the sort which would lead a\nStoic convinced by Arcesilaus to a self-defeating position (see sect.\n2)." ], "section_title": "4. Inapprehensibility and Universal Suspension of Assent", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nThe NRNB view of Arcesilaus argues that he was not\ncommitted to inapprehensibility and universal\nsuspension, as a prescriptive claim about the\nirrationality of assent (see [7] in sect. 3). On this view, the two\nsources for the anti-Stoic arguments still imply that Arcesilaus was\n‘committed’ to universal suspension, but this is\nunderstood as the descriptive claim that the skeptic does not\nassent to anything due to the balance of opposing arguments; and he was\ncommitted to it only in the sense that he acted in accordance with his\nunreflective impressions (see sect. 5.1 below). Thus, there is no\nconflict between the anti-Stoic sources, Sextus and Cicero, and those\nthat report that Arcesilaus’ universal suspension is\ncaused by the equipollence of arguments without mentioning his\ncriticism of Stoic epistemology (viz., Diogenes Laertius 4.28, Cicero\nAcademica 1.45, & Sextus Outlines of Pyrrhonism\n1.232).", "\n\nThis interpretation takes Sextus to imply that Arcesilaus’\ncommitment to a descriptive version of universal suspension is\nprior to his anti-Stoic argument (M. 7.156–7),\noutlined above in sect. 3 (see e.g., Ioppolo 2002; 2009). In this\nargument he holds that the Stoic who concedes the non-existence of\ncognitive impressions is forced to conclude that it is rational to\n‘withhold assent’ (‘asugkatathetein’)\nabout everything (see [10] below). This conclusion is sufficient to\noppose the Stoic thesis that some assents are rational. The full\nversion of the argument outlined in sect. 3 is:", "\n\nThat Arcesilaus used premise [11] to move from withholding assent to\nthe suspension of judgment (‘epochê’)\nindicates, on this account, a commitment to epochê that\nis independent of Stoic notions like assent and the irrationality of\nholding opinions, because it is reached only through the equipollence\nof arguments.", "\n\nThe NRNB view also interprets Cicero as confirming that\nArcesilaus was committed to the descriptive version of universal\nsuspension, even though Cicero Academica 2.66–7\n& 77 reports that Arcesilaus was committed to various components of\nhis anti-Stoic arguments (see sect. 3): that there are no cognitive\nimpressions, that nothing can be known, that it is irrational to hold\nopinions, and that it is rational to suspend assent. Cicero may be\nunreliable here, because he is biased by his own, later conception of\nradical skepticism, and in his text one may yet find an alternative\nview (see Ioppolo 2008): at Academica 2.32, Cicero’s pro-Stoic\ncharacter Lucullus refers to skeptical Academics who concede that\neverything is uncertain (‘adêla’) without\npreferring any views; and these Academics appear to be followers of\nArcesilaus (cf. Academica 2.16 & 59). Since these\nAcademics’ suspension of judgment is based on the notion of\nuncertainty, which is not necessarily Stoic, their skeptical views do\nnot depend on an anti-Stoic critique.", "\n\nHowever, there are strong reasons not to read Sextus and Cicero as\nconfirming that Arcesilaus’ commitment to a descriptive version\nof universal suspension is independent of his anti-Stoic\narguments. Even if Arcesilaus developed a notion of suspension\n(‘epochê’) before his criticisms of the\nStoa, premise [11] above conceptualizes it in Stoic terms. It is true\nthat Arcesilaus in Sextus M. 7.156–7 goes beyond the\npoint sufficient to oppose the Stoic—viz., that the wise person\ndoes not assent to anything (see [9] above). But he continued the\nargument because there is a conceptual difference between not assenting\nand withholding assent (see e.g., Friedman 2013), and because\nepochê refers to the latter. Withholding assent\npresupposes a prior examination of evidence and the recognition of an\nequipollence among the reasons for competing beliefs. (See also Maconi\n1988 and Bénatouïl 2011.) As for the evidence of Cicero,\neven if Lucullus thinks Arcesilaus himself belongs to the group of\nAcademics who say that everything is non-evident, he also accuses\nArcesilaus of appealing to the authority of Presocratics to promote his\nview of inapprehensibility, which crucially presupposes Stoic\nconditions on knowledge (Academica 2.15). So even Lucullus\nthinks Arcesilaus’ skepticism is related to his anti-Stoic\narguments.", "\n\nThere are further problems with the NRNB view, separate\nfrom the issues of interpretation mentioned above. For one, it narrowly\nrestricts the skeptic to a life of unreflective reaction (see sect.\n5.1), and therefore does not seem compatible with the patterns of\nrationality and inquiry that Arcesilaus engaged with. Its narrow\nrestriction on the scope of skeptical action is also overly dogmatic:\nwere the NRNB view true, it seems implausible Arcesilaus would\nsee the need for a theory of skeptical action, let alone use the\nStoic model of non-rational animals." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 The Non-Rational Non-Belief interpretation" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe RNB view of Arcesilaus denies that his acceptance of\ninapprehensibility and universal suspension is\nexplained in terms of belief in the premises and hence in the\nconclusions of his arguments. Rather, on this account Arcesilaus\nguides his rational activity by something like a supposition or\nhypothesis—a set of notions deployed variously in Plato’s\ndialogues, Theophrastus’ dialectic, and geometrical theory (see\nSchofield 1999 and Thorsrud 2018; cf. Bénatouïl & El\nMurr 2010). Even the Stoics distinguished hypotheticals from\nassertions and arguments, such that one can accept hypotheses and what\nfollows from them without asserting them (see Barnes 1997). Arcesilaus\ncould have adapted this kind of theory to account for the rational\nactivities of the skeptic. Accounts of impression and assent also\nafford a distinction between beliefs and belief-like imaginings such\nas suppositions, which may then take the place of beliefs in chains of\ninference. This distinction allows for a reasoned commitment\nthat falls short of assent (see Striker 1980, Bett 1990, and\nReinhardt 2018). Arcesilaus, on this view, supposes that we ought to\nlive without realist commitments that fix our view of the world. His supposition may have been based on\npremises—some of which he shared with Zeno—as well as on a\ngeneralization from his philosophical experience, after repeatedly\nfinding that rational inquiry does not justify assent.", "\n\nHowever, this proposal must address several problems. For instance,\nit seems doubtful that a rational life can be based on hypotheticals\nwithout a large web of background beliefs (see Frede 1979 and Bett\n1989). Without them, the skeptic seems unable to decide which\nhypotheses to suppose and when to suppose them. And even if such a life\nis possible, it is not clear how it would be practically\ndistinguishable from, and so preferable to, a life based wholly on\nbelief. If the skeptic regards as hypothetical the very same things we\nordinarily believe, then skepticism seems unmotivated. (See Thorsrud\n2010 and Perin 2013 for other objections.) Perhaps one could defend\nthe possibility of a radically skeptical life of this kind by saying\nthat, while its development requires starting with beliefs, over time\nan increasing number of background beliefs may be substituted with\nhypotheses, and that the benefits of the skeptical life are of a\nsecond-order, affecting the ease with which the skeptic can change the\nguiding assumptions of her life." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 The Rational Non-Belief interpretation" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe NRB view instead argues that universal\nsuspension isn’t opposed to beliefs per se, but only to\nbeliefs justified through philosophical theory or reasons generally.\nThe Stoics maintain that the mind is essentially rational, so that its\nassent is necessarily reason-responsive (see Coope 2016).\nArcesilaus’ skepticism, on this view, challenges the rationalist\npresupposition that belief is necessarily and explicitly grounded in\nreason. This doesn’t preclude that Arcesilaus found himself—as\na result of the inadequacy of the arguments for any position, and of\nthe equally convincing arguments against it—with the belief\nthat nothing can be known. Thus, inapprehensibility is neither\nthe conclusion of a deductive argument relying on a theory of knowledge\nor of our cognitive faculties, nor an inductive inference from prior\ninvestigations; it is not a theoretical or even rationally warranted\nbelief, but just the way things strike him (see Cooper 2004 and\nThorsrud 2009).", "\n\nBut in the case of universal suspension, it seems that the\nview that it is irrational to hold unwarranted beliefs is\nheld—at least in part—on the basis of a theoretical belief\nthat knowledge is very important to acquire and that mere belief is to\nbe avoided. Cicero, for instance, stresses that Arcesilaus agreed with\nZeno that it is irrational to hold opinions, i.e., inadequately\nwarranted assents (premise [6] in sect. 3, above); and Sextus suggests\nthat he thought that individual cases of suspended\nbelief—presumably in the light of inconclusive\narguments—were good (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.233). And\nthe view that it is irrational to hold mere beliefs (that is,\nopinions) depends on a further set of epistemological beliefs about\nthe nature of belief and knowledge. If Arcesilaus was not rationally\ncommitted to any set of assumptions about the nature and requirements\nof rationality or about belief and knowledge—which he ought not\nto be, given that he had argued against the various views on offer,\nand hence, ex hypothesi, suspended belief about them—it\ndoesn’t look like he can believe that one ought not to take beliefs to\nbe justified.", "\n\nThe NRB view thus takes universal\nsuspension to be a belief that is not rationally warranted, as\nwell as the views on which it causally depends. That is, Arcesilaus\nbegan inquiry motivated by a pre-theoretical belief, that philosophical\nknowledge is important and mere belief inadequate. And his repeated and\nextensive investigations left him with the realization that even these\nregulating assumptions of his philosophical practice have failed to be\nwarranted and that no beliefs are justified.", "\n\nOn this view, the radical skeptic has beliefs but doesn’t take them\nto be justified. This proposal raises problems, too (see Burnyeat\n1983). It seems that a large part of being a rational agent is to\nexercise some control over one’s beliefs. Since this control takes the\nform of a responsiveness to reasons, it does not seem possible for\nrational agents to give up practices of justification. A related\nobjection is to maintain that even having beliefs, which involves the\nuse of concepts, is necessarily responsive to reasons (see Williams\n2004). To have a belief, according to this view, requires making a\nconscious inference about the proper use of concepts, and conscious\ninferences are made in virtue of reasons. One may respond that the\nskeptic isn’t precluding herself from a responsiveness to reasons but\nrather lacks confidence in them, and that such rationalist theories of\nagency and belief are stricter even than the Stoics’, against\nwhich Arcesilaus argued (see sect. 5 below)." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 The Non-Rational Belief interpretation" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe third doctrine we might ascribe to Arcesilaus on the basis of\nhis sources is a so-called practical criterion, i.e., a theory that\nmakes action without assent possible (see [iii] in sect. 2).\n Arcesilaus’ argument for a ‘practical\ncriterion’ responds to two Stoic objections of\n‘inaction’ (apraxia). The first, found in\nPlutarch, is that action is impossible without assent, since action is\ncaused by assent to an impression of something suited to the agent’s\nnature, i.e., ‘oikeion’ (Against\nColotes 1122a–d; cf. Cicero Academica\n2.37–8). The second objection, reported by Sextus, is that a good\nor successful life is impossible without assent, since a good life\nrequires action based on knowledge of what is good and bad, and hence\nassent (M. 7.158; cf. Cicero Academica 2.39).\nArcesilaus’ reported replies to these objections are brief, and\naccordingly difficult to interpret (see Bett 1989). His counter to the\nfirst objection is the suggestion that action is possible without\nassent, since even on the Stoic account animal action is triggered\ndirectly by their impressions of something oikeion: the\naddition of assent, and so a belief that the object is in fact\nnaturally suited to the agent, is redundant and liable to be a\ncause of error. In response to the second objection, Arcesilaus argued\nthat the person who suspends assent universally will successfully guide\ntheir actions in light of their sense of what is\n‘reasonable’ (‘eulogon’).", "\n\nThe three doctrinal interpretations of Arcesilaus’ skepticism under consideration take these arguments in Plutarch and Sextus to support, in different ways, their distinct views of his commitment to inapprehensibility and/or universal suspension." ], "section_title": "5. The practical criterion", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nProponents of the NRNB view take the argument of Plutarch\nto give a general theory of action that supports universal\nsuspension of judgment as a natural reaction to equally balanced\narguments. On this theory all actions are merely impulsive, i.e.,\ncaused just by impressions of what appears suitable\n(‘oikeion’). Since the skeptic doesn’t make\njudgments, the only sense in which she is committed to her impressions\nis that she acts on them. It is unclear how this is compatible with the\nevidence of Sextus on ‘the reasonable’, where the skeptic\nconsiders reasonable justifications in deciding what to do. But some\nadvocates of NRNB combine the two so that a class of impulsive\nactions count as voluntary if, after their performance, one can\nreasonably justify them as successful (e.g., Ioppolo 1981; 1986; 2000).", "\n\nEven allowing for this attenuated sense of the voluntary, it is\nunclear why Arcesilaus would come to accept this impulsivist theory of\naction, if it were true: since—as the theory\nmaintains—theory doesn’t inform action, it is difficult to\nexplain theoretical commitments solely in terms of what appears suited\nto an agent (see Maconi 1988, Trabattoni 2005, and Vezzoli\n2016). An NRNB reading of ‘the reasonable’\ntherefore concedes that Sextus may have elided important details (see\nIoppolo 2018)." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 The Non-Rational Non-Belief interpretation" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe RNB view opens up a more promising way to read the\nbrief counter-arguments in Plutarch and Sextus as a positive theory of\nArcesilaus. His counter in Plutarch is that action isn’t always caused\nby occurrent beliefs—we sometimes act through habit, or by\ninstinct. By itself, this doesn’t go very far, however, since the\nStoics will have objected that, even if this were possible, this\naccount couldn’t describe the voluntary and responsible actions of a\nrational agent. (The Stoics defined responsible or voluntary action in\nterms of assent, since this was the mechanism through which our\nrationality acts on the world.) But one can read the counter-argument\nin Sextus as supplementing that response: there is space for\nrationality and responsibility, on this view, in the production of the\nimpressions or thoughts motivating us when we act. We can act in\naccordance with what strikes us as the reasonable thing to do upon\nreflection, but still refrain from assent, i.e., refrain from forming\nthe belief that this is the right thing to do.", "\n\nThere are two problems facing this interpretation of ‘the\nreasonable’. The first is that it does not look to be supported\nby the evidence to which it appeals. Sextus, the source for the notion\nof ‘the reasonable’ as the criterion, says that Arcesilaus\nand his followers did not define a criterion and that, when they\nseemed to, they did so “a counterblast to that of the\nStoics” (M. 7.150, Bury trans.). (Sextus’ later\naccount of Arcesilaus in another work is also incompatible with his\nhypothesizing such a theory; see Outlines of Pyrrhonism\n1.232–3.) And Cicero and Numenius, our other sources for the\nview that Arcesilas was committed to inapprehensibility\nand universal suspension, do not mention his adoption of a\npractical criterion—in fact, in both authors it is suggested\nthat Arcesilaus did not offer a position on how one might live without\nassent, and that Carneades significantly revised the Academic position\nin this respect (Academica 2.32; Numenius fr. 27.14–32,\ncf. Numenius fr. 26.107–11).", "\n\nThe second problem is that even if the context does not explicitly\ndemand that Arcesilaus’ practical criterion was a dialectical\nploy, the argument Arcesilaus used to support it makes the most sense\nif it is construed dialectically. The argument he gives is something\nlike this (Sextus M. 7.158):", "\n\nTwo difficulties face this non-dialectical reading. One is that\nthere is no other evidence that Arcesilaus was committed to premises\n[13] through [16], and they are also ones that Arcesilaus may have\nargued against, since it is reported that he argued not just against\nthe Stoic theory but against all ethical views (Philodemus Index\nAcademicorum 18.40–19.9, Diogenes Laertius 7.171, Numenius\nfr. 25.154–61, cf. fr. 25.41–5).", "\n\nThe second, more pressing difficulty is that, although these premises\nare adapted to the Arcesilean context in which nothing can be known\nand the wise person does not assent to anything, they are manifestly\nvariants of the Stoic theory. The Stoics claimed that a good life is\nthe result of performing ‘appropriate\nactions’—defined as “those that, once done, have a\nreasonable defense”—from a disposition of wisdom, i.e.,\nknowledge of what is good, bad and neither. But if nothing can be\nknown, as Arcesilaus has already argued ([5]–[7] in sect. 3,\nabove), the wisdom of the sage consists in not having any\nbeliefs. This disposition will still allow the sage to perform\nappropriate actions, however, if, as the Stoics claim, they are\ndefined by reasonable defenses or justifications. The connection\nbetween performing such actions through a wise disposition and success\nis, Arcesilaus suggests, something that the Stoics can’t deny, because\nthey agree that opinion is the cause of error (this is the\njustification for premise [6] in sect. 3, above). Hence, the perfect\nexercise of our rationality—reflection without assent, as\nArcesilaus has argued—will lead us to find the action that is\nappropriate to us as rational animals, i.e., the reasonable thing to\ndo, and this guarantees success. Arcesilaus therefore employs the\nStoic definition of appropriate action to defend acting on views that\nare reasonably justified. But, for the Stoics, what is reasonably\njustified is what conforms with the sage’s knowledge of what is\ngood, bad, and neither. Arcesilaus, it seems, cannot borrow his\nopponents’ theory without also accepting the possibility of\nknowledge." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 The Rational Non-Belief interpretation" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe NRB view can instead deny that Arcesilaus was\npersonally committed to defending the life of universal\nsuspension against Stoic counterattack. The Stoics pointed out\nthat Arcesilaus’ subversive argument for the rationality of\nuniversally suspending assent cannot be true, because it makes action,\nor at least rational and virtuous action, impossible—but these\nare plainly possible (cf. Cicero Academica 2.37–39). But\neven if this objection did not target his own skeptical view,\nArcesilaus was bound by his method to counter it. Hence it is\nunreasonable to think that he was invested in rationalizing the life of\nthe skeptic with a theory of action (see Stopper 1983; for a\ndifferent view of the polemic, see, e.g., Ioppolo 1986, Maconi 1988,\nand Thorsrud 2009)." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 The Non-Rational Belief interpretation" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nSection 2 noted that the central question for the interpretation of\nArcesilaus’ skepticism is how to reconcile his method with his\nskeptical commitments, and sections 4–5 set out three accounts of\nhow his commitments are compatible with his method. A further question\nrelates to the purpose of Arcesilaus’ philosophical activity.\nCompeting histories of Arcesilaus’ intentions in Cicero’s\nAcademica offer different answers (see Allen 2018): at one\npoint Cicero suggests that Arcesilaus adopted a Socratic method\nafter he accepted inapprehensibility and\nuniversal suspension, in order to facilitate suspension of\nassent (Academica 1.44–45; cf. Sextus Outlines of\nPyrrhonism 1.232); but elsewhere he says that Arcesilaus’\naim in questioning Zeno was to discover the truth (Academica\n2.76; cf. Cicero On the Nature of the Gods 1.11). So\nin question is whether Arcesilaus’ method was\nin the service of inquiry—independently of his commitments to\ninapprehensibility or universal suspension—or\na revival of a Socratic methodology that only reflected skeptical\nconclusions he already reached.", "\n\nAn argument in favor of the latter is as follows (see Görler\n1994): if Arcesilaus indeed shared the views that knowledge is\nimpossible and that holding opinions is irrational—as both the\nRNB and NRB interpretations say—then he could\nnot have genuinely been in the business of inquiry, which aims at\nknowledge of the truth; hence the only motivation for dialectical\nargument Arcesilaus might be left with is the promotion of\nuniversal suspension. But this argument ignores the context\nfrom which Arcesilaus’ skeptical views emerged and the effects\nthey could reasonably be expected to have had on his philosophical\npractice.", "\n\nOn the RNB view, the Academic skeptic, at the start of her\nphilosophical career, inherits a rational method of inquiry, as well as\nguiding views about belief and knowledge. But her inheritance is so far\nuntested (at least by her). As she goes about putting it to work, she\nmight at first believe that her method and its norms help her to get at\nthe truth. But she then finds that by arguing in accordance with those\nnorms she is wildly successful at combatting any and all positions. She\ntherefore comes to suppose on rational grounds—which may\ninclude particular arguments against Stoic cognition, the inadequacy of\nall non-skeptical theories of knowledge, and her experiences in\nargument generally—that the norms cannot successfully guide her\nto truths. But she doesn’t quit her life of inquiry because her\nskeptical view of the inadequacy of her method depends on that very\nmethod; it makes little sense for her to act on a view that rejects its\nown grounds. Instead she continues to inquire, now treating her\ninherited norms and guiding views about belief and knowledge only as\nhypotheses rather than as given. On the RNB view, therefore,\nArcesilaus’ skepticism was self-defeating only insofar as it\ncould not justify abandoning reason.", "\n\nA similar story can be told with the NRB view. The skeptic\nlooks for the truth, on the assumption that obtaining it is of crucial\nimportance for her life. But since she consistently fails to find it,\nit begins to strike her that perhaps she never will. Perhaps, it was\nnot, after all, so important for her life to have it: maybe mere\nbelief is all we need. But it doesn’t follow that she should give up\n(as false) her belief that it is irrational to hold opinions, since it\nwould only be correct to give it up if it actually is true that mere\nbelief is all she needs—but this is something that her arguments\ndon’t warrant, any more than they warrant the opposite\nconclusion. An NRB view, then, suggests that\nArcesilaus’ beliefs in the importance of knowledge and the\ninadequacy of opinion were explicitly non-rational, in the sense that\nhe was not persuaded that they were warranted by a rational argument\nor theory, or even by the extensive arguments he devoted his life\nto. He believed that he hadn’t found knowledge and that it is\nirrational to assent to anything without knowledge, but realized, as a\nresult of the unrestricted application of his Socratic method, that\nthere were strong reasons against these beliefs. He was thus not in a\nposition to give his rational assent to the belief that it is\nirrational to hold opinions—he just found that that was how\nthings striked him, i.e., that’s what he believed. The Academic\nskeptic, on this view, is someone whose sustained but pre-theoretical\ncommitment to rational investigation undermines her confidence in\nrationality. The result is not a negative theory—e.g., the\ntheory that we can’t acquire knowledge owing to the limitations of our\ncognitive or rational capacities—but a pervasive lack of theory\nsustained by a dialectical method.", "\n\nIf either of these stories is correct, we don’t need to deny\nArcesilaus seached for the truth, and the basic philosophical puzzle\nabout his radical skepticism is not whether it is possible to live\nwithout rational beliefs, but whether it is possible to be committed to\nrationality and yet sufficiently detached from it to recognise that,\nwhatever it is, it may not work." ], "section_title": "6. Priority of Method", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIt is clear that any interpretation of Arcesilaus must take into\naccount both his reputation as a master dialectician who deployed\nSocrates’ method ruthlessly against his philosophical\ncontemporaries, and his notorious advocacy of\ninapprehensibility and universal suspension. Given\nthe contradictory nature and scarcity of the evidence, it is perhaps\nnot surprising that modern critics do not agree about the success of\nthe ‘dialectical’ or various ‘doctrinal’\ninterpretations of Arcesilaus or about the consistency of the very\ndifferent kinds of skepticism the latter propose. But further progress\nis not ruled out, since it is open to us to offer more sophisticated\nphilosophical elaborations of those forms of skepticism and to test\ntheir historical plausibility by appealing to the diverse, but better\nattested traditions in the later Academy." ], "section_title": "7. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Inwood, Brad and Lloyd Gerson (eds.), 1997, Hellenistic\nPhilosophy: Introductory Readings, second edition, Indianapolis,\nIN: Hackett.\n\n[English translation of several of the sources for\nArcesilaus.]", "Mette, Hans Joachim, 1984, “Zwei Akademiker heute: Krantor\nvon Soloi und Arkesilaos von Pitane,” Lustrum 26:\n7–94.\n\n[The evidence on Arcesilaus in Greek and Latin, with German\ntranslations.]", "Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley (eds.), 1987, The Hellenistic\nPhilosophers, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.\n\n[English translation of several of the sources for\nArcesilaus.]", "Vezzoli, Simone, 2016, Arcesilao di Pitane: l’origine\ndel Platonismo neoaccademico, Turnhout: Brepols, pp.\n149–268.\n\n[The evidence on Arcesilaus in Greek and Latin, with Italian\ntranslations.]\n", "Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, Charles Brittain\n(trans.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2006.\n\n[English translation of Academica.]", "–––, On the Ideal Orator, James May and\nJakob Wisse (trans.), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,\n2001.\n\n[English translation of De oratore.]", "–––, On the Nature of the Gods,\nAcademica (Loeb Classical Library 268/Cicero XIX), H. Rackham\n(trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.\n\n[Loeb edition with English translation.]", "–––, De finibus bonorum et malorum (Loeb\nClassical Library 40/Cicero XVII), H. Rackham (trans.), Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press, 1914.\n\n[Loeb edition with English translation.]", "–––, De Oratore Book III, in On the\nOrator: Book 3. On Fate. Stoic Paradoxes.\nDivisions of Oratory (Loeb Classical Library 349/Cicero IV),\nH. Rackham (trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,\n1942.\n\n[Loeb edition with English translation.]", "–––, On Moral Ends, Raphael Woolf\n(trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9780511803659\n\n[English translation of De finibus.]", "Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers,\nTiziano Dorandi (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9780511843440\n\n[Greek text of Diogenes Laertius.]", "–––, Lives of Eminent Philosophers I\n& II (Loeb Classical Library 184/5), R. Hicks (trans.), Cambridge,\nMA: Harvard University Press, 1925.\n\n[Loeb edition with English translation.]", "–––, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers,\nPamela Mensch (trans.), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,\n2018.\n\n[English translation of Dorandi’s edition.]", "Numenius, Platonist Philosophy 80 BC to AD 250: An Introduction\nand Collection of Sources in Translation, George Boys-Stones (ed.),\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 40–45.\n\n[1F = English translation of Numenius frs. 24–25 Des\nPlaces.]", "–––, Fragments, E. Des Places (ed.),\nParis: Belles Lettres, 1973.\n\n[Greek text with French translation.]", "–––, 1903, Eusebii Pamphili\nEvangelicae Praeparationis Libri XV, 4 vols., E. H.\nGifford (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903.\n\n[Greek text with English translation of Eusebius; book 14.4–9\ncontains Numenius’ fragments.]", "Philodemus, Storia dei filosofi [.] Platone e\nl’Academia, Tiziano Dorandi (ed.), Naples: Bibliopolis, 1991.\n\n[Greek text with Italian translation of Philodemus’ Index\nAcademicorum.]", "–––, “Philodemus’ History of the\nPhilosophers: Plato and the Academy (PHerc. 1021 and 164),”\nPaul Kalligas and Voula Tsouna (trans.), in Paul Kalligas, Chloe Balla, Effie\nBaziotopoulou-Valavani, and Vassilis Karasmanis (eds.),\nPlato’s Academy: Its Workings and Its History,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020, pp. 276–383.\n\n[Greek text, adapted from Dorandi’s edition, with English\ntranslation of Philodemus’ Index Academicorum.]", "Plutarch, Moralia XIII Part 2: Stoic\nEssays (Loeb Classical Library 470), Harold\nCherniss (trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,\n1976.\n\n[Loeb edition with English translation of Plutarch’s\nOn Stoic Self-Contraditions and Common\nConceptions.]", "–––, Moralia XIV (Loeb Classical Library\n428), Benedict Einarson and Phillip De Lacy (eds.), Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press, 1967.\n\n[Loeb edition with English translation of Plutarch’s\nAgainst Colotes.]", "–––, Moralia XV: Fragments (Loeb\nClassical Library 429), F. H. Sandbach (trans.), Cambridge,\nMA: Harvard University Press, 1969.\n\n[Loeb edition with English translation of some of the\ntestimonia for Arcesilaus.]", "Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, Julia Annas and\nJonathan Barnes (trans.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994,\nsecond edition 2000.\n\n[English translation of Outlines of Pyrrhonism.]", "–––, [M] Against the Logicians\n[Adversus Mathematicos 7–8], Richard Bett (trans.),\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.", "–––, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Loeb\nClassical Library 273/Sextus Empiricus I), R. G. Bury (trans.),\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.\n\n[Loeb edition with English translation.]", "–––, Against Logicians (Loeb Classical\nLibrary 291/Sextus Empiricus II), R. G. Bury (trans.), Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press, 1935.\n\n[Loeb edition with English translation.]", "Beghini, Andrea, 2016, “Arcesilao e Numenio: Note a Fr. 25\nDes Places (= Eus. Praep. Ev. XIV, 5, 12–13 Des Places),”\nStudi Classici e Orientali 62: 297–314.", "Dorandi, Tiziano, 1989, “Arcesilas de Pitane,” in\nDictionnaire des philosophes antiques, vol. 1, Richard Goulet\n(ed.), Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, pp.\n326–30 (no. 302).", "Görler, Woldemar, 1994, “Älterer Pyrrhonismus\n– Jüngere Akademie, Antiochos aus Askalon, § 47\nArkesilaos,” in Die Philosophie der Antike 4: Die\nHellenistische Philosophie, Helmut Flashar (ed.), Basel:\nSchwabe & Co., pp. 786–96.", "Habicht, Christian, 1994, “Hellenistic Athens and her\nphilosophers,” in Athen in Hellenistischer Zeit,\nChristian Habicht, Munich: C.H. Beck, pp. 231–47.", "Long, A. A., 1986, “Diogenes Laertius, the Life of\nArcesilaus,” Elenchos 7: 429–49.", "Lurie, Michael, 2014, “Der schiffbrüchige Odysseus oder:\nWie Arkesilaos zum Skeptiker wurde,” Philologus 58:\n183–6.", "Savalli-Lestrade, Ivana, 2017, “Le monde d’Arcésilas\nde Pitanè,” Revue des études anciennes\n119: 521–50.", "von Arnim, Hans, 1895, “Arkesilaos von Pitane,”\nRE 2: 1164–68.", "Allen, James, 2018, “Aporia and the New Academy,” in\nThe Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, George\nKaramanolis and Vasilis Politis (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress, pp. 172–91.", "Annas, Julia, 1988, “The Heirs of Socrates,”\nPhronesis 33: 100–112.", "Bénatouïl, Thomas, 2011, “Anna Maria Ioppolo,\nLa testimonianza di Sesto Empirico sull’ Accademia\nscettica,” Philosophie antique 11:\n229–36.", "Bett, Richard, 1989, “Carneades’ Pithanon: A\nReappraisal of its Role and Status,” Oxford Studies in\nAncient Philosophy 7: 59–94.", "Brittain, Charles, 2005 [2008], “Arcesilaus,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arcesilaus/>.", "Cooper, John, 2004, “Arcesilaus: Socratic and Sceptic,”\nin Knowledge, Nature, and the Good, John Cooper, Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press, pp. 81–103.", "Couissin, Pierre, 1929, “Le Stoicisme de la Nouvelle\nAdadémie,” Revue d’histoire de la\nphilosophie 3: 241–76 [= “The Stoicism of the New\nAcademy,” trans. Jonathan Barnes and Myles Burnyeat, in Myles\nBurnyeat (ed.), 1983, The Skeptical Tradition,\nLondon: University of California Press, pp. 31–63].", "Frede, Michael, 1979, “Des Skeptikers Meinungen,”\nNeue Hefte für Philosophie, Aktualität der\nAntike 15/16: 102–29. Translated as “The Skeptic’s\nBeliefs,” in his, 1987, Essays in Ancient Philosophy,\nMinneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 179–200;\nreprinted as “The Sceptic’s Beliefs” in Myles Burnyeat and\nMichael Frede (eds.), 1997, The Original Sceptics,\nIndianapolis, IN: Hackett, pp. 1–24.]", "–––, 1984, “The Sceptic’s Two Kinds of\nAssent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge,” in Philosophy in History, Richard Rorty, Jerome Schneewind and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 255–278; reprinted as “The Skeptic’s Two Kinds of\nAssent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge,” in his, 1987, Essays in Ancient Philosophy,\nMinneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 201–22; reprinted\nin Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (eds.), 1997, The Original\nSceptics, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, pp. 127–51.", "Friedman, Jane, 2013, “Suspended Judgment,”\nPhilosophical Studies 162: 165–81.", "Görler, Woldemar, 1994, “Älterer Pyrrhonismus\n– Jüngere Akademie, Antiochos aus Askalon, § 47\nArkesilaos,” in Die Philosophie der Antike 4: Die\nHellenistische Philosophie, Helmut Flashar (ed.), Basel:\nSchwabe & Co., pp. 796–824.", "Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, 2014, “Comment se détermine\nle kathekon? Remarques sur la conformité à la\nnature et le raisonnable,” Philosophie antique 14:\n13–39.", "Ioppolo, Anna-Maria, 1981, “Il concetto di\n‘eulogon’ nella filosofia di Arcesilao,” in Lo\nscetticismo antico, Gabriele Giannantoni (ed.), vol. 1, Naples:\nBibliopolis, pp. 143–61.", "–––, 1986, Opinione e scienza, Naples:\nBibliopolis.", "–––, 2000, “Su alcune recenti\ninterpretazioni dello scetticismo dell’Accademia,”\nElenchos 21: 334–60.", "–––, 2008, “Arcésilas dans le\nLucullus de Cicéron,” Revue de\nmétaphysique et de morale 57: 21–44.", "–––, 2009, La testimonianza di Sesto Empirico\nsull’Accademia scettica, Naples: Bibliopolis.", "–––, 2011, “L’epochê chez\nArcésilas: réponse à Thomas\nBénatouïl,” Philosophie antique 11:\n237–45.", "–––, 2018, “Arcesilaus,” in\nSkepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, Diego Machuca and\nBaron Reed (eds.), London: Bloomsbury, pp. 36–50.", "Lévy, Carlos, 1978, “Scepticisme et dogmatisme dans\nl’Académie: l’ésotérisme\nd’Arcésilas,” Revue des études\nlatines 56: 335–348.", "Maconi, Henry, 1988, “Nova non philosophandi\nphilosophia,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6:\n231–53.", "Perin, Casey, 2010, “Scepticism and belief,” in The\nCambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, Richard Bett (ed.),\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 145–64.", "–––, 2013, “Making Sense of\nArcesilaus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 45:\n313–40.", "Schofield, Malcolm, 1999, “Academic epistemology,” in\nThe Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Keimpe Algra,\nJonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, pp. 323–51.", "Sedley, David, 1983, “The Motivation of Greek\nSkepticism,” in The Skeptical Tradition, Myles Burnyeat\n(ed.), London: University of California Press, pp. 9–29.", "Snyder, Charles, 2014, “The Socratic Benevolence of\nArcesilaus’ Dialectic,” Ancient Philosophy 34:\n341–63.", "Striker, Gisela, 1980, “Skeptical Strategies,” in\nDoubt and Dogmatism, Malcolm Schofield, Myles\nBurnyeat and Jonathan Barnes (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.\n54–83; reprinted in Striker, Gisela, 1996, Essays on\nHellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, pp. 92–115.", "Stopper, M. R., 1983, “Schizzi Pirroniani,”\nPhronesis 28: 265–97, pp. 275–78.", "Thorsrud, Harold, 2009, Ancient Scepticism, Stocksfield:\nAcumen, pp. 36–58.", "–––, 2010, “Arcesilaus and\nCarneades,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient\nScepticism, Richard Bett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress, pp. 58–70.", "–––, 2018, “Arcesilaus: Socratic Skepticism\nin Plato’s Academy,” Lexicon Philosophicum 6:\n195–220.", "Vezzoli, Simone, 2016, Arcesilao di Pitane: l’origine\ndel Platonismo neoaccademico, Turnhout: Brepols, pp.\n17–78.", "Annas, Julia, 1992, “Plato the Sceptic,” Oxford\nStudies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol.: 43–72.", "Barnes, Jonathan, 1997, Logic and the Imperial Stoa,\nLeiden: Brill.", "Beghini, Andrea, 2019, “Il caso ‘Crantore’:\nContributo alla storia dell’Academia ellenistica,” Antiquorum\nPhilosophia 13: 101–25.", "Bénatouïl, Thomas and Dimitri El Murr, 2010,\n“L’Académie et les géomètres: usages et\nlimites de la géométrie de Platon à\nCarnéade,” Philosophie antique 10:\n151–62.", "Bett, Richard, 1990,\n“Carneades’ Distinction between Assent and Approval,” The Monist 73.1:\n3–20.", "Brennan, Tad, 1996, “Reasonable Impressions in\nStoicism,” Phronesis 41: 318–34.", "Brittain, Charles, 2001, Philo of Larissa, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "–––, and John Palmer, 2001, “The New\nAcademy’s Appeals to the Presocratics,” Phronesis 46:\n38–72.", "Burnyeat, Myles, 1980, “Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?”, in Doubt and Dogmatism, Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat and Jonathan Barnes (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 20–53; reprinted in Myles Burnyeat (ed.), 1983, The Skeptical Tradition, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 117–48; reprinted in Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (eds.), 1997, The Original Sceptics, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, pp. 25–57.", "Castagnoli, Luca, 2018, “Dialectic in the Hellenistic Academy,” in Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle, Thomas Bénatouïl and Katerina Ierodiakonou (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, pp. 168–217.", "Coope, Ursula, 2016, “Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A\nNeoplatonist Response to the Stoics,” Oxford Studies in\nAncient Philosophy 50: 237–88.", "Couissin, Pierre, 1929, “L’origine et l’évolution de\nl’epoche,” Revue des études grecs 42:\n373–97.", "Decleva Caizzi, Fernanda, 1986, “Pirroniani ed Accademici nel\nIII secolo a.c.,” in Aspects de la philosophie\nHellénistique, Helmut Flashar and Olof Gigon (eds.),\nEntretiens sur l’antiquité classique 32, Geneva: Fondation\nHardt, pp. 147–83.", "Frede, Michael, 1983, “Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and\nDistinct Impressions,” in The Skeptical\nTradition, Myles Burnyeat (ed.), London: University of\nCalifornia Press, pp. 65–93; reprinted in his, 1987,\nEssays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis: University\nof Minnesota Press, pp. 151–76.", "–––, 1999, “Stoic Epistemology,” in\nThe Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Keimpe Algra,\nJonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, pp. 295–322.", "Ioppolo, Anna-Maria, 1990, “Presentation and Assent: A\nPhysical and Cognitive Problem in Early Stoicism,” Classical\nQuarterly 40: 433–49.", "–––, 2002, “Gli Accademici\n“neôteroi” nel secondo secolo d.C.,”\nMéthexis 15: 45–70.", "–––, 2013, “Elenchos socratico e\ngenesi della strategia argomentativa dell’Accademia scettica”, in\nArgument und literarische Form in antiker Philosophie, Michael\nErler and Jan Hessler (eds.), Berlin: De Gruyter, pp.\n355–69.", "Lévy, Carlos, 2007, “The New Academy and its\nRivals,” in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Mary\nLouise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp.\n448–64.", "Long, A. A., 1978, “Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonist and\nSatirist,” PCPS 204 ns 24: 69–91.", "Reinhardt, Tobias, 2018, “Pithana and\nprobabilia,” in Dialectic after Plato and\nAristotle, Thomas Bénatouïl and Katerina Ierodiakonou\n(eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 218–53.", "Sedley, David, 1977, “Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic\nphilosophy,” PCPS ns 23: 74–120.", "Snyder, Charles, 2018, “On the Teaching of Ethics from Polemo\nto Arcesilaus,” Études platoniciennes 14:\n1–25.", "Striker, Gisela, 1981, “Über den Unterschied zwischen\nden Pyrrhoneern und den Akademikern,” Phronesis 26:\n153–71. Translated as “On the difference between the\nPyrrhonists and the Academics,” in Gisela Striker, 1996,\nEssays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135–49.", "Trabattoni, F., 2005, “Arcesilao platonico?” in\nL’eredità platonica: Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a\nProclo, Mauro Bonazzi and Vincenza Celluprica (eds.), Naples:\nBibliopolis, pp. 13–50.", "vander Waerdt, Paul, 1989, “Colotes and the Epicurean\nrefutation of scepticism,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine\nStudies 30: 225–67.", "Vezzoli, Simone, 2016, Arcesilao di Pitane: l’origine\ndel Platonismo neoaccademico, Turnhout: Brepols, pp.\n79–147.", "von Staden, Heinrich, 1978, “The Stoic Theory of Perception\nand its ‘Platonic’ Critics,” in Studies in\nPerception, Peter Machamer and Robert Turnbull (eds.), Columbus,\nOhio: Ohio State University Press, pp. 96–136.", "Williams, Michael, 2004, “The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms\nof Skepticism,” in Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Walter\nSinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.\n121–45." ]	[ { "href": "../belief/", "text": "belief" }, { "href": "../carneades/", "text": "Carneades" }, { "href": "../cicero/", "text": "Cicero" }, { "href": "../dialectical-school/", "text": "Dialectical School" }, { "href": "../philo-larissa/", "text": "Philo of Larissa" }, { "href": "../pyrrho/", "text": "Pyrrho" }, { "href": "../sextus-empiricus/", "text": "Sextus Empiricus" }, { "href": "../skepticism-ancient/", "text": "skepticism: ancient" }, { "href": "../socrates/", "text": "Socrates" }, { "href": "../stoicism/", "text": "Stoicism" } ]
architecture	Philosophy of Architecture	First published Wed Sep 9, 2015	[ "This article offers an overview of issues in the philosophy of\narchitecture. Central issues include foundational matters regarding\nthe nature of:", "Yet other questions engage applied philosophical concerns regarding\narchitecture, such as the character of architectural notation;\nintellectual property rights; and client-architect obligations.", "A far-reaching philosophy of architecture extends beyond even a\nbroadly aesthetics-based assessment, to include considerations of\nethics, social and political philosophy, and philosophical reflections\non psychology and the behavioral sciences. The aesthetics of\narchitecture, by itself, spans traditional issues mooted in philosophy\nof art, as well as aesthetics of the everyday, and environmental\naesthetics. Such traditional issues include the nature of the work;\nthe possibility of classes, kinds, or types in the domain; the\ncharacter and roles of representation, intentionality, and expression;\nand the warranted foundations for criticism. The ethics of\narchitecture also addresses traditional issues, including delineation\nof rights, responsibilities, the good, virtues, and justice in\narchitectural milieus. Still other aspects of philosophy of\narchitecture concern social and technological characteristics." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Architecture as Relatively Neglected by Philosophy ", "1.2 A Word on Terminology" ] }, { "content_title": "2. What is Architecture?", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 The Sort of Enterprise Architecture Is", "2.2 Architecture and Essential Features", "2.3 The Kinds of Things Architecture Makes" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Ontology", "3.2 Part-Whole Relations", "3.3 Causality" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Architectural Language and Notation", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Formalism and Anti-formalism", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Formalism", "5.2 Anti-Formalism and Functional Beauty" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Architectural Experience, Knowledge, and Appreciation", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Experience of Architecture", "6.2 Architectural Knowledge", "6.3 Architectural Appreciation" ] }, { "content_title": "7. Architectural Ethics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Architecture and Social and Political Philosophy", "sub_toc": [ "8.1 Socially Constitutive Features of Architecture", "8.2 Socially Efficacious Features on, and of, Architecture", "8.3 Architecture and the Political" ] }, { "content_title": "9. Further Issues in Philosophy of Architecture", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "Over the course of Western philosophy, including the history of\naesthetics, architecture has largely failed to attract sustained,\ndetailed attention—particularly as compared with other\nartforms. Neither philosophical issues prompted by architecture, nor\nthe fit of architectural phenomena into larger philosophical debates,\nhave captured the philosophical imagination as have, for example,\nliterature or painting. Some contributions across the span of Western\nphilosophy—including those of Wolff and Schopenhauer—rank\nas historically significant; other, more recent accounts are\nbroad-ranging and gravid with conceptual concerns, including those of\nScruton and Harries. Further, some philosophers have even dabbled in\narchitectural projects: Dewey contributed to plans for the Chicago\nLaboratory School, Wittgenstein collaborated on designing a house for\nhis sister, and Bentham sketched the Panopticon design as a plan for\nprison reform. Yet the overall state of philosophical reflection on\narchitecture—even in the present day—is less lively than\nlike discussions focused on artforms of far more recent origin, such\nas film or comics. Some philosophers working in the Continental\ntradition have offered accounts of the experience of architecture or\nits social ramifications; a deficiency is more marked in analytic\naesthetics.", "For more on the background and context of conceptual explorations\nof architecture, see the supplementary documents:", "\nPhilosophy of Architecture in Historical Perspective\nPhilosophy and the Tradition of Architectural Theory\n " ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Architecture as Relatively Neglected by Philosophy" }, { "content": [ " This essay refers generally to the basic creative output of\narchitects, in any (unspecified) form, as “architectural\nobjects”. This is in parallel with the term “art\nobjects” in use, across aesthetics and philosophy of art, to\nrefer to objects created by artists independent of the artform and\nwithout regard to ontological or other discussions where other terms\nmay evoke one or another particular stance. It may turn out that\n“architectural object” proves value-laden. Yet this is\nless likely than with common alternatives in the literature:\n“architectural works”, perhaps wedded to creator intent,\nstatus as extant or integral whole, or aesthetic ranking; or\n“buildings”, certainly wedded to built, hence concrete,\nstructures. “Built structures” is used here (except in\nhistorical reference) to refer to the generic built output resulting\nfrom architectural design, in recognition of a domain some view as\nbroader than buildings per se." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 A Word on Terminology" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "Fundamental questions about the nature of architecture motivate\nmuch of contemporary philosophy of architecture: what sort of\nenterprise architecture is; whether architecture has essential\nfeatures; what kinds of things architecture makes—yielding the\nfurther issue as to whether architecture always, only sometimes, or\nnever is an artform; what renders architecture distinct from other\nartforms (if it is one); and whether architecture includes all built\nstructures." ], "section_title": "2. What is Architecture?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "One approach to grasping the true nature of architecture is to\ndefine it in terms of the discipline. We may embrace the disciplinary\ndeterminism of the British architect Cedric Price: “Architecture\nis what architects do”. Defining the discipline or practice of\narchitecture may seem a simple empirical affair. Even if we have\ndifficulty assessing what architectural objects or products are, we\ncan point to thousands of architects over several millennia around the\nworld engaged in one or another sets of activities that conventionally\nhave been associated with architectural practice, and generate a long\ndisjunctive claim about what architects do. An empirically rooted\napproach has a long history: Vitruvius devises his normative account\nof the virtuous architect on the basis of his familiarity with\nthen-contemporary practice. The same is true of other traditional\naccounts of virtue in architects or builders, as in the sixth to\neighth century Indian Mānasāra\n(मानसार) (Acharya 1928) and\neleventh century Chinese Yingzao fashi\n(營造法式) (Feng 2012). In the present-day,\nsociology of the architectural profession offers a detailed empirical\nperspective (Gutman 1988), and this can be extended to a sociology of\narchitectural worlds, modeled on Becker’s sociology of art\nworlds. ", "A problem arises, though, if we look to history or sociology for a\nunified account with common features of an architectural\ndiscipline. While architectural practice has remained stable in\ncertain respects, change over its history greatly limits common\nfeatures, perhaps, to a core set of basic tools and rudimentary\nprinciples of structural engineering. This suggests that, at root, the\npractice of architecture must involve engineering or related\ndesign. But architecture can’t be reduced to a form of\nengineering, if we think architectural ideals, taste, and expertise\ncontribute something over and above engineering facts, rules, and\npractical knowledge. These further contributions suggest an art or\nart-like role for architectural practice. However, the historical\nrecord is mixed on the matter of whether architects are at the same\ntime pursuing art (or what we now consider as art) or should be\nthought of as artists. Moreover, the historical record and resulting\ndisjunctive claim do not address cases where even the most basic tools\nor structural principles are not deployed. Some such cases of not\nobserving basic structural principles, as fantasy architecture, may be\ndeemed marginal; other such cases, as landscape architecture, are\nnot.", "Another dimension of defining architecture as a practice is\nspecifying the sorts of structures that architects design. At a bare\nminimum, we can say that they feature some connection to human\nuse. But attempts to render this as non-trivial introduce further\npuzzles (see §2.3)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 The Sort of Enterprise Architecture Is" }, { "content": [ "A contrasting definitional approach suggests that, as a matter of\nreasoned judgment, we can attribute to architectural practice—or\nto the domain of architectural objects—core or even essential\nfeatures. A dominant reading of the Vitruvian tradition has it that\narchitecture embodies and is best understood through the three aspects\nof beauty, structural integrity, and utility. An essentialist variant\nsuggests that architects must observe all three aspects or that any\nstructure aspiring to architectural status features all three. Other\nprominent views advance a single aspect, generally function or form,\nas primary. Thus, functionalist architectural doctrine places function\nor utility at the heart of the architectural enterprise, with other\naspects of architecture subordinate thereto.", "A hard-line functional essentialist holds that, if a built\nstructure has no function, then it is not architecture. As a modest\ndissent, Graham (1989) proposes that such a structure is an\narchitectural work—but a failure at such. One brand of\nmore radical rejection suggests that some architectural\nobjects—perhaps including follies, memorials, or\nmonuments—need have no function at all. As a competing\nessentialism, formalist architectural doctrine suggests that an object\nis architectural just in case it features forms proper to the\ndomain. A common interpretation says that forms proper to architecture\ncan be chosen off a stylistic menu (or combination of menus), leaving\narchitects great latitude while upholding the possibility of\ncontrasting, non-architectural forms (this is difficult to square,\nhowever, with some experimental architecture).", "In weighting architecture’s aspects as essential, core, or\nsome lesser status, a related question is whether one or another\naspect is primary or necessary to any of the others. As Graham notes\n(1989), the traditional question in architectural theory of whether\nform trumps or precedes function may be cast in such terms.", "Against these traditional brands of essentialism, two further kinds\nof doubt may be cast. First, it may be that the Vitruvian triad, or\nsome single aspect thereof, does not represent the right list—we\nshould include either further aspects or different aspects\naltogether. Alternatives might include dimensions such as context,\nrelations among architectural objects, systemic features,\nsustainability, and psychological or social features. Some theorists\npropose other candidates as essential architectural aspects, including\nspace (Zevi 1978) or the organizing concept of the parti\n(Malo 1999).", "Second, it may be that essentialism represents a false start. On\none non-essentialist view, the nature of an architectural object is as\nwe experience it, a matter upon which we may agree but which depends\nin part on subjective perception and reception of, and interaction\nwith, the work (Scruton 1979/2013). This leaves open the possibility\nthat architecture has essential aspects but we simply don’t\nexperience them as such. A more determined nominalist has it that\ndiversity among architectural objects is sufficient to quash the\nprospect that they share any essential aspects." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Architecture and Essential Features" }, { "content": [ "Yet another way to pose the question of what architecture is\nfocuses on the sorts of things architectural objects are. In\nparticular, and relative to architecture’s possible status as\nartform, architecture as a domain may be defined variously in terms of\nits objects being art objects (or not), being distinctive sorts of art\nobjects, or belonging exhaustively to a special class of\nbuilt structures (rather than including all such structures). ", "Whether architecture always, only sometimes, or never is an\nartform. At the negative extreme, architecture may be viewed\nlike any engineered artifact that only incidentally bears aesthetic\nvalue. Any view of even slightly more positive valence bows in the\ndirection of intent to generate aesthetic value. The classic Vitruvian\nview, for example, has it that engineered design and aesthetic design\nare conjoint intentional elements of architectural objects. At the\npositive extreme, that is, the suggestion that architecture is always\nand in all ways an art, we may lose any means of discriminating among\nbuilt structures as art or not. This is a troubling prospect to\nexclusivists who see architecture as a high art only (see below). ", "In the negative camp, S. Davies (1994) argues that mere production\nof occasional artworks does not suffice to constitute an\nartform—crafts being a notable example—and the aim of\narchitecture is frequently, or even typically, not the production of\nart but useful items that do not aim at artistic value. In the\npositive camp, Stecker (2010) responds that we can carve out a\nsubclass of architectural objects that are art even if not all are. He\nadds, by way of historical argument, that architecture was included\namong the artforms, by early agreement among aestheticians. We might\nhave grounds for dismissing architecture from the canonical list if\nthe nature of architecture has changed, and in this vein Stecker notes\na rising tide of building design that is functionally oriented without\nsignificant aesthetic investment. A further alternative is to say that\narchitectural objects are all art works, or at least intended as such,\nwithin bounds. To make sense of the term “vernacular\narchitecture” requires that we see architectural objects as\ntypically art objects, while we make allowance for a broad class of\narchitectural objects that are low-art rather than high-art. ", "If the negative view is correct, then we need at least a workable\nset of criteria by which to discriminate architectural objects as\nart. To this end, we may draw on our intuitions, norms, or socially\nexpressed views. Further considerations may include the pertinent\ncultural tradition in which an architectural object is created,\nwhether particular sorts of aesthetic qualities count more towards\nartwork status, or whether there is instrumental benefit in\nconsidering the object as art.", "What renders architecture distinct from other artforms (if\nit is one). If architecture counts among the artforms, we may\nthink that it has distinctive features as such. For example, Scruton\n(1979/2013) suggests that architecture is a\nnon-representational artform since it need not—and\ngenerally does not—represent any content. Despite\narchitecture’s non-representational status, Scruton agrees with\nLanger (1953) (and anticipates Goodman (1985)) that architectural\nobjects can express or refer; in his view, to thoughts associated with\nexpressed properties. Others focus on architecture’s distinctive\ncommitments to creator or user engagement. Winters (2011) sees\narchitecture as a “critical” artform, requiring the\ncreator’s engagement in the environment where other artforms may\ntolerate a creator’s detached stance. Another distinctive mark\nof architecture among the artforms is its nontraditional status as a\nnarrative medium: the design of circulatory pathways allows\narchitectural objects to communicate a sequence of events through the\nmovement of visitors or inhabitants.", "Whether architecture includes all built\nstructures. Among the issues noted here, that of the greatest\nconsequence is the question of what counts among architectural\nobjects. On an inclusivist or expansive conception,\narchitectural objects are those designed objects ranging over the\nwhole of the built environment; on an exclusivist conception,\nthe range describes only some coherent subset of the whole of the\nbuilt environment. Examples of exclusivist subsets include (a) only\nbuilt structures that people can occupy (typically: houses, temples,\noffice buildings, factories, etc.), or (b) only built structures\ndesigned in primarily aesthetic (rather than purely functional)\nterms. An inclusivist conception entails a vastly larger architectural\ndomain of objects—and areas of practice and inquiry.", "Proponents of exclusivity (S. Davies 1994, Scruton 1979/2013) are\neager to protect architecture as the preserve of just those objects in\nthe built environment with abundant, apparent, and appreciable\naesthetic qualities; clear creator’s intentions to generate art;\nor the panache of high art and engagement with art historical\ntrajectories. Stecker (2010) offers a putative variation, allowing\nthat as a broader creative medium architecture has an inclusivist\ncharacter—though, as an artform, architecture is\nexclusivist. Scruton, for his part, identifies a specific intent to\nexalt: architecture as a pursuit has lofty goals or purposes,\nsuch that architectural objects do as well. One commonsense\njustification for exclusivity overlaps with an institutionalist\nperspective: laymen and connoisseurs alike can differentiate between\nthe striking work of an architect and the humdrum, cookie-cutter\nbuilding design of a draftsman.", "Arguments for inclusivity include Carlson’s appeal (1999) to\nconsider the class of architectural objects as of a continuum with the\nbroader class of everyday designed objects, where everything admits of\npossible aesthetic appreciation. Then, contra Stecker, we can\neffortlessly count all built structures as architecture, though some\nsuch things—like garage doors or drainage ditches—will\nneither look like, nor be, art. Another line of attack is to respond\nto exclusivists that architects simply have intentions to create\nobjects that are, in one aspect, art—and that they may fail as\nart is beside the point. Further, it may be that recognizing\nintentions is irrelevant to judging a built structure as architecture,\nas when we judge as architecture the vernacular structures of foreign\ncultures. In response to Scruton’s exaltation criterion, the\ninclusivist may note that for all artforms, there are typically\ninnumerable objects in the domain with no such goals—and\npossibly no goals at all. Finally, inclusivism has its own commonsense\njustification: we standardly refer to a creator of a mundane built\nstructure as the architect, which seems less a linguistic shortcut\nthan recognition of the training and ethos attached to the creator of\narchitectural objects.", "It is not clear how to craft intermediary positions between\ninclusivism and exclusivism, given that the various brands of\nexclusivism are not absolute and test cases are instead subject to\njudgment along any number of parameters. Stecker’s exclusivism\nfor only architecture as art represents one such relativized\nstance. Inclusivism, by contrast—along with any attached views\non, for example, architectural appreciation or the nature of aesthetic\nsuccess in architecture—is an absolutist doctrine. All elements\nof the built environment—and much else besides—must count\nas architectural objects, or else the view fails. " ], "subsection_title": "2.3 The Kinds of Things Architecture Makes" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "The metaphysics of architecture covers a surprising range of\nquestions for those who see in architecture no more than\nmetaphysically mundane built structures or stones, wood, metal, and\nconcrete arranged in a pleasing fashion: the nature of architectural\nobjects and their properties and types, the relations of architectural\nparts and wholes, and the prospect of architectural causality." ], "section_title": "3. Metaphysics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "Given the familiarity of architecture in, and as constitutive of,\nour physical surroundings, it is strongly intuitive to think of\narchitectural objects simply as buildings, in the way we think of the\nobjects of the sculpture artform as sculptures, or the objects of\ncutlery as forks, knives, and spoons. Yet such intuitions may be\nmisguided. For one, though some built structures—including\nroadways, bazaars, and newspaper kiosks—are not buildings\nper se, we may take them to have architectural properties and\nthereby consider them as architectural objects. For another, the\noutputs of architecture are not limited to built structures but\ninclude as well models, sketches, and plans, and this variety prompts\nquestions as to whether these are all reasonably considered\narchitectural objects and which, if any, such form of output\nrepresents a primary sort of object in architecture. A third\nconsideration is the focus in architecture, not solely on whole or\nindividual buildings, but also on parts of buildings and buildings\nconsidered in context, among other buildings and in landscapes\n(downwards and upwards compositionality or modularity). A fourth\nconsideration is that—as with music and photography—where\nmultiple instantiations of a given work are possible, we may dispute\nwhether the work is identical to the instancing built objects or else\nto the common entity (e.g., plan) on which those instances are\nmodeled. In addition to such challenges, the intuitive view must best\nalternative views.", "Instantiating architectural objects. To address\none sort of question about the identity of an architectural object, we\nseek kind-wise criteria that establish when an object is\narchitectural, instead of being non-architectural altogether\nor only derivatively so. To address another sort of identity question,\nwe look for instance-wise criteria that establish when an\nobject is this or that singular object, or an instance of a multiple\nobject. Ready criteria for identifying object instances in\narchitecture include historical, environmental, stylistic, and formal\nfeatures—all of which may be read as signaling intentions to\ndesign particular, self-contained architectural objects. One issue,\nhowever, is whether traditional criteria (or others as may be posed)\nare sufficiently specific so as to skirt vagueness problems that all\nsuch artifacts may face (Thomasson 2005) and provide markers of being\na bona fide instance of a multiple work or a replica of all\nother bona fide instances (Goodman 1968/1976). ", "Architectural objects as ontologically\ndistinctive. Yet another way to pick out architectural\nobjects is to set them apart from other art objects or artifacts.\nAssuming there is more than one art ontology (see\nLivingston 2013), we might look to define a distinctive architectural\nontology by reference to specifically architectural qualities, such as\n“mass” (degrees of heaviness and lightness) or\ndirectedness (in circulatory pathways); or utility considerations,\nsuch as functional design, use, and change; or everyday artifactual\nfeatures. An inclusivist may add features special to the built\nenvironment beyond the realm of buildings.", "Kinds of architectural ontologies.\nArchitecture’s distinctive qualities may help sort among\ncandidate ontologies. One option is concretism, which—in keeping\nwith standard causal efficacy claims and expressed intentions of\narchitects, clients, and users—suggests that architectural\nobjects are either built structures or, on one variant, otherwise\nphysically instantiated designs for such structures (such as\nmodels). Concretism is supported by an artifactual ontology that\nsubsumes architectural objects into the class of objects that are the\nproduct of intentions, designs, and choices (on the view that\nall art objects are best so understood, see Dutton 1979,\nS. Davies 1991, Thomasson 1999, and Levinson 2007.) One version of\narchitectural artifactualism identifies buildings as systems (Handler\n1970). As against concretism, intentionality may be the mark of\nmaterially constituted, designed architectural objects but that need\nnot commit us to their existence alone or their primacy among such\nobjects. Moreover, taking intentions as determinative leaves the\nconcretist with the problem of shifting intentions and unintended\ngoals attached to built structures over time.", "Abstractist alternatives follow a well-worn path in aesthetics\n(Kivy 1983; Dodd 2007; critics include S. Davies 1991; Trivedi 2002;\nKania 2008; D. Davies 2009) and accommodate an expansive architectural\ndomain that includes historical, fantasy, and unbuilt works. Per\nclassic Platonism, abstractism allows identification of an\narchitectural object and concrete counterparts—including\nmultiple replicas—by reference to a single, fixed, and\nunchanging background source of what real world structures (or fantasy\nstructures) are and should look like.", "Against abstractism, some architectural objects are apparently\nsingular because historically and geographically contingent (Ingarden\n1962); it is unclear what an experiential account of\narchitectural abstracta looks like; and abstracta are not created\nwhereas architectural objects are. De Clercq (2012) further proposes\nthat, even if there were abstract architectural objects, we\ndon’t refer to them. If I refer to “10 Downing\nStreet”, my expression picks out the built structure, not the\nplan, nor any other abstract representation or entity to which the\nbuilt structure at 10 Downing Street corresponds. However, a plausible\nalternate interpretation of the referent is as “the abstract\nobject physically instantiated by the structure I am perceiving (or\nhave perceived)”.", "As an alternative to an abstractist-concretist divide, a pluralist\nontology (per Danto 1993), allows “material\nbases” and “aesthetic ideas” as different sorts of\narchitectural objects. Goodman’s account (1968/1976) lends\nitself to a pluralist, or at least aspectual, reading. He suggests\nthat, but for certain conditions unmet, an architectural object could\nbe identified as those structures that perfectly realize a\ncorresponding plan or other suitable architectural notation (see §4). On his nominalist view, the\nobjects turn out to be the built structures but an available realist\ninterpretation—which may better accommodate the multiples that\nare key to his story—takes the objects to be the class of such\nstructures. ", "Another alternative suggests that architecture consists in actions\nor performances (per Currie 1989; D. Davies 2004), rendering\nderivative any concrete structures or “traditional”\nabstract entities. Lopes (2007) proposes the possibility of an events\nor temporal parts ontology for a kind of built structure that passes\nin and out of existence, though De Clercq (2008, 2012) counters that\nsuch can be rendered in a material objects ontology through temporal\nindexing. Yet other ontologies are contextual or social\nconstructivist, proposing that architectural objects exist, beyond\ntheir status as structured materials, in virtue of ways our reality is\nframed, psychologically, socially, or culturally (per\nHartmann 1953, Margolis 1958). A shift in any such frame may bring\nabout shifting identity in an architectural object, in the manner of\nBorgesian art indiscernibles (Danto 1964), and it may count in favor of\nthose ontologies that architectural indiscernibles are all around, in\nthe form of repurposed built structures.", "Picking an ontology has wide-ranging significance, relative to\nquestions of material constitution, composition, part-whole relations,\nproperties, and relations in architecture, as well as the character of\narchitectural notation, language, cognition, or behavior; there are\nalso ramifications for simplicity and complexity, and the nature of\nornament, proportion, context, and style. In architectural practice,\nthe ontology of choice also colors perspectives on such matters as\nintellectual property rights, collaborative work, and preservation of\narchitectural structures. " ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Ontology" }, { "content": [ "On one customary view of architectural objects, individual built\nstructures (or their abstract counterparts) represent the primary unit\nof our aesthetic or, for that matter, any architectural, concern; all\nother ways of carving up the architectural world are derivative. This\nview is consonant with an equally customary perspective identifying\narchitectural objects with architectural works. Alternative views\ninclude a “mereology”, in which parts of built structures\n(or their abstract counterparts) constitute independent architectural\nobjects; and an environmental contextualism, in which collections of\nbuilt structures (or their abstract counterparts) constitute\nindependent objects. Both alternatives share a commitment to some form\nof compositionality among architectural objects, that putting bits\ntogether yields aesthetically meaningful and utility-bearing\ncomposites, and taking them apart yields like results. In this, the\nmereological view represents a downward-compositionalism,\nsuggesting that architectural aesthetics demands our focus on\nstructural or other elements that can be meaningfully\ndistinguished. Environmental contextualism represents an\nupward-compositionalism, suggesting that architectural\naesthetics cannot be pursued entirely separately from the aesthetics\nof cities or towns (per Scruton 1979/2013)." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Part-Whole Relations" }, { "content": [ "Questions about causality may seem out of place in discussions of\nimmobile objects, such as most architecture represents. Yet\narchitectural objects appear to have a role in causing events to\nhappen or other things to come into being. For example,\nsocio-psychological evidence suggests that architectural objects cause\nbehavior, and much of architectural design is predicated on this\nclaim. A further question is whether one architectural object may\n“cause” another. Thus, the presence of one or more\narchitectural objects might have a causal effect on the genesis or\ncharacter of one or more further works by dint of social utility,\nplanning needs, or aesthetic drivers. If true, then—as with\nconsequentialism in ethics—further questions arise regarding the\nrange of causal possibilities. Where ethicists ask whether a bad may\ngenerate a good, we may ask whether the presence or construction of a\nfunctionally or aesthetically impoverished architectural object might\noccasion the presence or construction of a more useful or pleasing\narchitectural object." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Causality" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "The notion that there is or should be an architectural\nlanguage—or more than one—has a provenance dating to\nancient times. In classic form, the architecture-as-language thesis\nruns from the Vitruvian suggestion that the orders present rules for\ncombination and ordering of architectural parts, through\nAlberti’s rhetoric-inspired model for architectural description\n(van Eck 2000), and an analogy common among Renaissance and early\nmodern authors (such as Wren) of architectural rules and expressive\ncapacity with the Latin language. Lavin (1992) suggests that\nQuatremère de Quincy (1803) develops the thesis, from a\ntraditional view of the classical orders as grammatical building\nblocks directly representing primitive structures, to a modern view of\nstructural elements broadly representing social and moral ideas and\nprinciples. Variations of the thesis range over elements of an\narchitectural language, how it may be used, and from whence it may be\nderived.", "The core idea, in its most prominent form, is that architecture as\na corpus of design ideas (realized or otherwise) features a set of\nfundamental design and style elements which can be combined and\nrelated according to a set of rules (syntax), capable of constituting\nor parlaying meaning (semantics), and subject to contextual\nsensitivity and internal or relational constraints on deployment and\nrealization (pragmatics). Beyond these structural parallels with basic\nfacets of natural language, it is held that the purposes and\npossibilities of architecture qua language yield further\nparallels, best explained by the notion that architecture has, or even\nis, a language.", "Proponents of such views tend to subscribe, however, to defenses\nrooted in one or another feature of language. On\nsyntactically-inspired views—the perspectives most indebted to\nthe Vitruvian account—there is at least one architectural\ngrammar or set of rules for guiding proper assemblage of parts and\norientation, relation, and combination of whole architectural\nobjects. Some late twentieth century architectural theory embraced a\ngrammar framework (Alexander et al. 1977; Hillier and Hanson 1984);\nsuch a view also underwrites a formalist vision for CAAD (Mitchell\n1990). Adherents of the\nview (Summerson 1966) assign themselves the central task of\nidentifying such rules. Even if this is achieved, though, a greater\npuzzle is whether there are identifiably preferable\nsyntaxes—and what the criteria should look like. ", "On a semantics-inspired view, architectural objects or their\ncomponent parts bear meanings. A primary motivation for this view is\nthat, like objects of other artforms, architectural objects are\nexpressive, which suggests that what they express is meaning (Donougho\n1987). Proponents point to an array of architectural meanings,\ninternal or external to the object. The former tells us something\nabout the architectural object (its function or internal composition)\nor how it relates to other architectural objects (stylistic\nconventions); the latter tells us something about the world, as for\nexample, national or cultural associations (per\ngeographically variant design vocabularies), theological or spiritual\nsignificance (per religious design vocabularies), or\nper Hegel (1826), the Absolute Spirit. A more ambitious\nproposal (Baird 1969) has it that architectural objects exhibit such\nsemantic phenomena as metaphor, metonymy, or ambiguity.", "Goodman (1985) proposes that buildings have meaning in that they\nfunction symbolically relative to properties, feelings, or ideas,\nsometimes through “standard” denotation, as when\nrepresenting symbolically (whether as building part or whole) some\nother object in the world. Primarily, though, buildings function\nsymbolically through exemplification (literal or explicit denotation)\nor expression (metaphorical exemplification) of properties of ideas,\nsentiments, or objects in the world. Buildings only constitute\narchitecture per se, in Goodman’s view, if they bear\nmeaning in one or more of these ways. While Goodman may have\nidentified a denotative role for buildings, this is not clearly a\nsemantic role. ", "A third approach, rooted in semiotics, emphasizes the role of\narchitectural objects as signs that prompt spectator behavior (Koenig\n1964, 1970) or indicate aspects of themselves, such as function (Eco\n1968). In either case, architectural objects are taken to operate\nas communicative systems (Donougho 1987). A semiotics program was\nembraced by the late 20th century postmodernist movement in\narchitecture (Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour, 1972/1977; Jencks\n1977).", "The architectural language thesis, in its various forms, is widely\ndiscredited in recent philosophy of architecture. To begin with,\narchitecture features some qualities and exhibits some phenomena\nresembling those of natural language, but the parallels are neither\ncomprehensive nor fully compelling. On the syntactic side,\narchitecture may feature some brand of compositionality but different\nparts of architectural objects do not appear to function as do phrases\nor clauses (Donougho 1987). Syntactic “wholes” do no\nbetter, as there are no architectural assertions (Scruton\n1979/2013). As regards semantics, no likely candidate for an\narchitectural vocabulary regularly yields any specific class or\ninstance of meaning. Whereas for Vitruvius the Ionic order connotes\nfemale sensibility, it has a scholarly or deliberative meaning for\nRenaissance architects, “gravitas” for Blondel\n(1675–1683), and good governance for the architects of New\nYork’s City Hall. Nor are there truth conditions such as might\nsupply the meaning of a well-defined architectural sequence (Taurens\n2008). It’s not even clear that architectural communication is\nbest understood as sequential; Langer (1967), for example,\nsuggests that the symbolic communication of architectural objects is\ninstead holistic. As for pragmatics, there is no clear parallel with\nimplicature or related phenomena, hence architecture is incapable of\nthe accuracy or concision of expression we associate with language\n(Clarke and Crossley 2000). Finally, relative to semiotics, not\nall—or even many—buildings signify and we would only\nwant some to do so. ", "On the bright side, it’s not clear that we should want\narchitecture to be more language-like. Regarding semantics, whatever\nwe gain in fixing particular meanings to architectural objects, we\nstand to lose in fungibility of their forms. Regarding syntax,\nadherence to grammars brings the utility of standards and,\nper Scruton and Harries, a template for the community’s\nvoice—but for some may represent stifling constraints on the\naesthetic imagination.", "In the end, it is useful to ask what work we expect the\narchitecture-as-language thesis to do. One view (Alexander et\nal. 1977; Alexander 1979) takes the thesis to underscore the robust\nnature of design patterns and known design solutions and, for a given\nculture, a common vocabulary (Donougho 1987). However, it may be\nsufficient to highlight ways in which architecture is like a\nlanguage, though they do not add up to an architectural language\n(Forty 2000). If so, then the thesis works best as a powerful metaphor\nrather than as literal truth. ", "An alternate take on linguistic phenomena in architecture appears\nin Goodman’s proposal (1968) that we think of notational systems\nor schemes for the arts as symbolic systems with potentially\nlanguage-like features. Goodman suggests that architecture is a\nborderline case of an allographic artform, as its notational\nschemes—in the form of plans—are intended to guarantee\nthat all objects as are compliant are genuine instances of the\nwork. (Said intention, Goodman proposes, is not fulfilled.) That an\nobject instance the work just when compliant with the notation would\nindicate the notation’s satisfaction of syntactic and semantic\ncriteria providing requisite grounds for identity across instances,\nand signal a corresponding insignificance of historical context and\nconditions of production to the object’s identity. Goodman, for\nhis part, balks at taking architecture to be truly allographic given\nthe core role of history and context in generating particular\nstructures, and notational ambiguity that marks the analog medium of\ntraditional plans. Digital design may well resolve the ambiguity\nproblem, however, and allow indexing for history and context,\nrendering architecture allographic per Goodmanian criteria\n(S. Fisher 2000b). The term\n“architectural language” then takes on a\ndifferent—and more plausible—sense." ], "section_title": "4. Architectural Language and Notation", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "5. Formalism and Anti-formalism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "In its most general sense, formalism works in architecture as it\ndoes (or doesn’t) in other artforms. Thus, architectural\nformalism suggests that the sum total of aesthetic properties of an\narchitectural object are or arise from formal properties, such that\nour aesthetic judgments are warranted based on experience and\nassessment of just those properties. As architectural objects are\ntypically non-representational and designed with manipulation and\nrelation of forms as a primary task, it is natural that their formal\nproperties be seen as playing a central role in our aesthetic\nappreciation of them. The question posed to the traditional\n(“hard”) formalist is whether those properties are\nunique or at least dominant drivers of aesthetic properties\nand judgment, a question underlined by important roles of history,\nstyles, and other contexts in our grasp of the architectural\nenterprise and individual architectural objects. Our aesthetic\njudgment of I. M. Pei’s Louvre Pyramids is surely to some degree\nin reaction to their “pure” form but—for the aware\nspectator—perhaps just as much in reaction to their relationship\nto historical context (the Giza pyramids as emblematic of pyramidal\nform in architecture, and of monumental architecture altogether) or\nsetting (in contrast to the ornate neo-Baroque Louvre buildings that\nsurround them, but in keeping with traditional French emphasis on\ngeometric form in design).", "Variants of architectural formalism take formal properties as the\nproperties of (or arising from) the material or physical properties of\nbuilt structures (as consonant with concretism), or as the properties\nof (or arising from) the total properties specified by a set of formal\nparameters we identify with the architectural object (as consonant\nwith abstractism). Further architectural strains are characterized by\nmoderation (per Zangwill 2001), suggesting that some\narchitectural objects are best understood by appealing to their formal\nproperties, others not; or by assimilation of canonically non-formal\nproperties to a formalist scheme (in the manner of Levinson’s\n“indicated structures”; see S. Fisher 2000b); or by a\n“mereological” view wherein some parts of a given\narchitectural object may be best understood and judged by their formal\nproperties, others not. For the merelogico-formalist, it might count\nin favor of considering such parts as independent architectural\nobjects that we can judge those parts on a formal basis alone.", "Formalism appears in some traditional architectural theories as a\nnormative practical or critical guideline, namely, that our best\ndesign thinking takes as central an architectural object’s\nshape, color, and other formal elements. Other, non-formal aspects of\nan architectural object are discounted as contributing to its\nsuccess. Mitrovic (2011, 2013) embraces a normative formalist approach\nto criticism, on the grounds that the deeply visual nature of much\ncognition militates against basing appreciation or evaluation of\narchitectural objects exclusively or primarily on features we\nunderstand through non-visual means (such as context or history\nprovide). " ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Formalism" }, { "content": [ "The anti-formalist traditionally focuses on the importance to\naesthetic judgment about non-formal properties, including historical\ncontext; other, categorial forms of context (Walton 1970); or\nnon-cognitive properties. As an architectural application would have\nit, we likely judge Jefferson’s University of Virginia campus as\nstately or dignified or evocative of democratic ideals because of the\nneo-classical design, the campus’ place in histories of American\narchitecture and university architecture, and its continuous\nrededication through the everyday functioning of an enduring, living\nuniversity. None of this judgment appears to have particular roots in\nforms Jefferson deployed, except as befit a neo-classical\nstyle—which style may be best grasped in historicist terms.", "Aside from historicism, a principal variant of architectural\nanti-formalism derives from functional beauty theory, which has its\nroots in (a) a late modern tradition of judging an object beautiful if\nfit for its intended function (Parsons and Carlson (2008) find this\ntradition in Berkeley's Alciphron (1732) and Hume's related\nsuggestion (Treatise (1739-40)) that beauty of artifacts consists in\ntheir appearing to bear utility), and (b) Kant’s proposal that\narchitecture is an artform capable of generating dependent beauty. (In\nthe latter case, beauty stands in relation to concepts with which we\nassociate architectural objects, which for such objects are typically\nthe ends towards which they are created.) One modern version proposes\ngauging the beauty of a designed object by reference to\ndesigner’s intent in crafting a functional solution; for\nS. Davies (2006), where an object displays functional beauty,\naesthetic considerations and the object’s primary function each\nact to shape the other. Per Parsons and Carlson (2008), the\nproblem with such intentionalist accounts in architecture (or\nelsewhere where functional beauty pertains) is that functions\nchange. To work around this difficulty, they suggest, we need\na theory focused on “proper functions” for the artifacts\nin question. This view is modeled on a selected effects account of\nbiological functions, as translated into a marketplace-driven scheme,\nwhere evolution of design solutions is driven by demand over time.", "Functional beauty faces several challenges. Even in their advocacy,\nParsons and Carlson caution against the suggestion that function\nsolely determines form, as that would neglect other features\nof artifacts not possibly highlighted by their functions. Such\nfeatures include cultural significance or aspects of\nnon-dependent beauty as may be found in, for example, architectural\nornament. (In Davies’ picture, there is no such neglect because\nthe functioning of artifacts—including art and architectural\nobjects—may have a cultural, spiritual, or otherwise\nnon-mechanical cast.) In the architectural realm, another challenge is\nposed by ruins, which may be beautiful but have no functions. To the\ncharge that these represent counterexamples to functional beauty\ntheory, one tack is to answer that if ruins represent architectural\nobjects, they are dysfunctional and their beauty is manifest in\nnon-functional ways (Parsons and Carlson). Functional beauty theory is\nsaved on the whole but not as universally characteristic of\narchitectural objects.", "A further challenge casts doubt on seeing functional beauty as the\nonly variant of dependent beauty, or beauty as the sole aesthetic\nvalence of interest to a viable notion of dependent aesthetic\nproperties. In an architectural vein, those variants may include\nspiritual, emotional, or conceptual frameworks we bring to our grasp\nof such built structures as houses of worship, memorials, or triumphal\narches. We can tell functional stories about these sorts of structures\nin sociological or psychological analyses but not (or not only), as\nfunctional beauty accounts would have it, in terms of their mechanical\nor system-wise functioning. ", "Looking beyond functional beauty—or more broadly, dependent\nbeauty—accounts of architecture, an inclusivist will seek the\nthread that ties together architectural objects with aesthetic\nproperties of all description, be they functional, otherwise\ndependent, or freely (independently) endowed with beauty or other such\nproperties. Thus, a modernist gas station and a Tschumi folie\nmay share an elegance unrelated to functional ascription or\nthe lack thereof. A general theory of architectural objects, along\ninclusivist lines, suggests at least a moderate formalism." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Anti-Formalism and Functional Beauty" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "6. Architectural Experience, Knowledge, and Appreciation", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "A staple of philosophy of art is that our experience of art\nobjects—direct or otherwise—is central to basic belief\nformation about them (first and foremost, aesthetic belief and\nappreciation of art objects). The philosophy of architecture is\ngenerally in agreement, though architectural objects may be of special\ncharacter in this regard, as our experiences of them gives rise to or\ninfluences an extended range of psychological states. Beyond pleasure\nin architectural beauty or other “positive” aesthetic\nproperties, experience of built structures also contributes to neutral\nand less positive states of mind, and shapes how we broadly take in\nour environment. A piece of that environmental understanding is local\nto the built structure itself: the ways we experience architectural\nobjects may contribute to how we comprehend, and interact with, those\nobjects.", "In addition to facilitating understanding, appreciation, or use of\narchitectural objects, experience might also play—or\nreflect—a constitutive role. On Scruton’s view, experience\nconstitutes for us the architectural object as an aesthetic\nobject (1979/2013). For Ingarden (1962), architectural experience\nentails not only our cognitive grasp of the built structure’s\nphysicality but as well our grasp of its designation as a specifically\narchitectural object rather than, say, as an arrangement of\nbricks that happens to have the structure of a house.", "The content and corresponding faculties of architectural experience\nlikely include some mix of the cognitive, emotive, and sensual.\nWhereas an abstractist may claim that experience of architectural\nobjects is solely a matter of intellectual grasp, even an\nanti-abstractist formalist needs the sensory as well to account for\nexperience of concrete shapes. Abstractist intellectualism\nnotwithstanding, accounts of architectural experience typically focus\non multiple content modalities. Sauchelli (2012a) proposes the use of\ncognition in grasping pleasure (“intellectual pleasure”)\nas a central feature of architectural experience. The idea is that\nfully comprehending the pleasure of the experience and thereby\nestablishing its aesthetic value requires cognition, in the form of\nattention to details and understanding of the architectural\nobject. ", "A blend of the cognitive and sensual is also characteristic of\nScruton’s proposed “imaginative\nperception”—the notion that we may perceive the\ndetails of built structures in various ways, depending on directions\nthat our imagination takes us. Scruton (1979/2013) takes this\ncognitive act—reminiscent of seeing-as and free play of the\nimagination—as crucial to architectural experience. We are at\nall turns required to make interpretative choices in parsing ambiguous\nor multiform aspects of the built environment. Scruton focuses on\nvoluntary deployment of the imagination in perception at a\nmacro-level, concerning such matters as whether we see a sequence of\ncolumns as grouped one way or another, or see pilasters as ornamental\nor structural. The voluntary aspect of this account is critical to\nScruton’s emphasis on the importance of taste and discrimination\nto architectural aesthetics. In this, he loosely tracks Geoffrey\nScott’s view of architectural experience as “sensuous\nperception” interpreted through attendant values\n(1914/1924).", "A generalized version of this account looks to perceptual tasks at\na more granular level. Our experiences of space and spatial\npositioning, depth, edge detection, color, and light yield multiple\ninterpretative possibilities across architectural objects, including\nthe simplest forms and smallest or largest parts of objects. These\nperceptual tasks are pervasive and constant; sometimes involuntary and\nin the background, and other times as shaped by our willful\nimagining. If the involuntary tasks also represent or shape\ninterpretative acts, architectural experience by Scruton’s\nmeasure is that much less subject to aesthetic taste or\ndiscrimination.", "The dimensions of architectural experience are even larger when\ntaking into account the full breadth of the sensual. Following a long\ntradition of viewing architecture through art historical lenses,\nScruton focuses on architectural experience as primarily visual and\nstatic. In addition, though, other sensory modalities are factors:\nchanges in aesthetic judgments follow changes in those other sensory\nexperiences (Sauchelli 2012a). Such modalities among the non-visual\ninclude the tactile, aural, and olfactory. Moreover, much\narchitectural experience is proprioceptive, incorporating visual\ninformation into a broader set of stimuli to grasp bodily position and\nmovement in relation to the built environment.", "Sensation of movement might seem irrelevant to experiencing an\nimmobile object, save for the fact that, in architecture (as in\nsculpture) not all facets of a given whole work, or many other\narchitectural objects, can be perceived at the same time. The\nspectator or user must move around or within the object to perceive\nany significant percentage of it, much less the whole. Experience of\nmovement around architectural objects highlights for us the design\nfeature of circulatory paths and contributes to grasping an\nobject’s formal features (such as rhythm in spatial patterns)\nand perhaps, at least derivatively, its aesthetic features (such as\nsomberness) (Sauchelli 2012a; Rasmussen 1959). These aspects of\narchitectural experience capture the immersive nature of a\nspectator’s or user’s relationship to a built\nstructure. Further aspects of our experience may capture the\narchitectural object’s immersion in its larger\nenvironment and surroundings, its “localized nature” or\ncontext and “sense of location” (Carlson 1994). As\narchitectural objects standardly shape our actual, imagined, or\nremembered bodily engagement, so are our richest experiences of\narchitecture informed by such engagement (J. Robinson 2012).", "Central as bodily experience may be, it cannot be the only source\nof architectural beliefs. Considering the great breadth of the\narchitectural enterprise, it may not even be the best source. Other\nsources include access to beliefs about works through standard\nrepresentational modes that are not the works themselves, transmission\nof tacit working knowledge through apprenticeship learning, and\ncollective belief formation through client briefings and studio group\ncritical assessment (“crits”). On these and other bases an\narchitectural knowledge of special character is built." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Experience of Architecture" }, { "content": [ "Knowledge of a building or other architectural objects follows\nwell-worn paths in some aspects of general knowledge of art. In\nparticular, architectural beliefs encompass judgments of aesthetic\nproperties of the built environment, are norm-governed in some\nfashion, and may be transmissible via testimony. Yet other aspects of\nknowing architectural objects diverge from the well-worn path, as\nreflective of special characteristics of the architectural enterprise\nand its products and consumption.", "One traditional division of architectural knowledge promoted by\narchitectural historians, theorists, and practitioners—and\nfocusing squarely on creator’s knowledge—has it that there\nare two basic kinds: the theoretical/historical and the practical\n(J. W. Robinson 2001). Theoretical and historical\nbrands of architectural knowledge encompass viable beliefs about\nfamiliar core concerns of architecture, including basic design\nelements of the built environment; their combinations, relations, and\nproperties; their style; external factors (social, economic, cultural,\netc.) which shape design; and historical contexts into which they\nfit. Some such beliefs are empirically supported; others\nnot. Practical brands of architectural knowledge encompass\nviable beliefs about the engineering and technical means of\nconstructing architectural objects, ensuring structural integrity, and\nguaranteeing mechanical function, socially, industrially, or\necologically beneficial use. Such beliefs—particularly as\nhitched to formalized, experimental, or predictive dimensions of the\nenterprise—are sometimes seen as constituting an\narchitectural science. They are typically (though not\nexclusively) empirical in character and, to some tastes, relegated to\na status of adjunct architectural knowledge, that is, useful\nfor architecture but outside the domain proper. What counts as\npractical knowledge in architecture is often seen as encompassing\nbeliefs of a largely non-aesthetic nature.", "Yet other categories reflect a range of types and sources of\narchitectural knowledge. Another division distinguishes between\narchitectural beliefs associated with creators and users. My\nexperience of a built structure qua creator is perforce\ndifferent than my experience of the same structure qua user,\nand the sorts of beliefs I arrive at may differ accordingly. As\narchitect, Jones believes that an arch of one design but not another\nwill keep the bridge up; as someone strolling underneath the bridge,\nSmith believes that an arch of a different design would have been a\ngreater aesthetic success. This much accords with other artforms\nfeaturing practical functions. Further, architectural beliefs may\ndiffer by their technical or non-technical nature; by perspective and\nrole of the belief-holder; or by facts about physical experience of\nthe work or other modalities of belief acquisition.", "Architectural knowledge in broader context. To see\nhow architectural knowledge may be similar to, or differ from,\naesthetic knowledge generally, consider two dimensions of aesthetic\nknowledge, knowing through art and knowing about art\n(Kieran and Lopes 2006). As concerns knowing through\narchitecture, cognitive content arises in reflecting—to varying\ndegrees—taste and style sensibilities of its creators,\nstructural properties per engineering principles deployed;\nand cultural and social values of historical, communal, and economic\ncontexts. To know a built structure in this regard is to know such\nmatters as the tradition in which it is built; design aspirations of\nthe architect and initial occupants; and intentions relative to\ncontributing to the built or natural landscape. The success of this\nthesis is predicated on successful communication through architectural\nobjects, whether as symbols or otherwise. ", "Architectural belief and knowledge have as well wholly distinctive\nfeatures, reflective of special characteristics of the domain, its\npractice, and its objects. These include:", "Beliefs about systems. Architectural objects (as wholes)\nare systems or system-like, in that they constitute sets of\ninterrelated structural components, with characteristic behavior or\nprocesses yielding outputs from inputs, and where the parts are\nconnected by distinctive structural and behavioral relations (Boyce\n1969). That we take whole architectural objects to be (or to be\nrepresented as) systems or system-like suggests how architectural\nbeliefs are distinctive among beliefs about artworks. In particular,\nwe have beliefs about architectural objects that reflect functions and\ninteractions of (1) components individually and as parts of systemic\nwholes, (2) systems as parts of broader environmental contexts, and\n(3) persons’ behaviors within the systems. Whereas the first\ntwo functional and interactional features are typical to all design,\nthe third feature marks architecture as an artform that, in providing\nan immersive and systemic physical environment, intensely draws on and\nshapes social, psychological, and economic features of experience. Our\nbeliefs about architectural objects and interactions with and in them\nare shaped correspondingly, in ways that do not arise in engagement\nwith other artforms. ", "Partial and full information. Representation in\narchitecture encompasses multiple modes, including built objects,\nphysical models, virtual models, data arrays, plans, sketches,\nphotographs, and drawings. Each such mode may be viable as\nrepresenting an architectural object just in case some\nfeatures of the object are adequately, accurately, regularly, and\noptimally represented through the mode. This view of viable\nrepresentation in architecture is at odds with the standards for such\nin other artforms. Consider a representation of the Mona Lisa. If you\ndo not have complete visual access through the representation (from\nany acceptable angle) to the full tableau, you may be said to lack\nfull acquaintance with the work through the representation, and your\nconsequent aesthetic beliefs about the Mona Lisa may be discounted\naccordingly. By contrast, if architectural beliefs required anything\nlike full acquaintance with the object or fully\ninformed testimony to be viable, our architectural beliefs would\nnot typically or frequently be viable. Rare is the case where\nacquaintance is full or testimony fully informed—even among\nthose whom we might expect to have the greatest acquaintance, such as\na built structure’s architect or developer.", "Socially constructed knowledge. In architecture, as in\nother design fields, design problems are not thoroughly or fully\narticulated all at once or by any particular individual. The primary\ncomponents of design knowledge—problems and their possible\nsolutions—are instead distributed across persons. This fact\nabout architectural production—and, to a degree, its\nuse—suggests that beliefs we form about architectural objects\nare formed amidst, and influenced by, such social relations (see §8.1). Art and architecture worlds\nper se are undoubtedly not a sole source of epistemic\nnorms. Yet social relations and circumstances among\narchitecture’s stakeholders present constitutive conditions for\na wide swath of architectural beliefs, suggesting at least a moderate\nsocial constructivism.", "It may be thought that qualities of architecture such as\nsystematicity and the deeply social character of the discipline are\nimmaterial to aesthetic beliefs. However, architecture is a\nholistic enterprise: a design decision to cantilever a terrace is at\nonce of aesthetic and engineering significance. In like fashion, that\narchitectural objects constitute systems is pertinent in shaping\naesthetic beliefs because there are more and less attractive ways to\nshape the flow of persons, or even electricity, through a built\nstructure. And that architectural objects are designed through social\nprocesses has import for corresponding aesthetic beliefs. For example,\naesthetic properties of a given design are subject to crits, the very\npurpose of which is to influence the creator’s further aesthetic\nbeliefs about the same design." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Architectural Knowledge" }, { "content": [ "As distinct from mere experience of architectural objects,\nappreciation of architectural objects brings to bear\ncognition and other inputs, such as history and context. Appreciation\ngoes beyond knowledge, too, insofar as we may know an\narchitectural object and its qualities without appreciating it. Thus,\nWinters (2007) proposes that appreciating architecture consists in\nenjoyment of architectural objects (from experience, tout\ncourt), as wed to understanding them, where the latter\nconsists in grasping their aesthetic significance in specifically\nvisual fashion, and critically assessing the judgment of architects in\naddressing design challenges. Architectural appreciation may be built\non the judgment of others; it is essential to rendering\njudgment. Accordingly, learning to appreciate architectural objects is\na cornerstone of architectural education. A key contributing feature\nin this last regard is acquiring agility with classifying in the\ndomain (Leder et al. 2004).", "The appreciation and judgment of architectural objects are\ntypically thought to reflect aesthetic and utility-wise\nconsiderations, and engage individual perspective, experience,\nreasoning, and reflection such as we associate with appreciating and\njudging in other artforms. Drivers in appreciation and judgment\nspecial to architecture include social framing and\nenvironmental psychological factors that are a consequence of\narchitecture’s intensely public nature.", "Exceptionalism. One question regarding\nappreciation is whether there is a special mode attached to\narchitectural objects. We might think this is so given that, unlike\nmost arts (though very like other design forms), appreciation in\narchitecture is aesthetic and utility-oriented. A resulting\npuzzle is whether, and under what circumstances, we might have one\nwithout the other. We might think as much if, say, it is possible to\nappreciate the Roman Coliseum’s stately and antique features\nwithout any appreciation of its intended function or actual use. On\nthe other hand, a view of appreciation embracing functional beauty\ntheory may suggest that the Coliseum’s functional and free\nbeauty are on at least equal footing—or that the\nColiseum’s stately aesthetic and its role as amphitheater for\nstaging spectacles (for example) cannot be separated altogether.", "Further questions regarding appreciation concern the relative roles\nin appreciation of individual experience of architecture, as against\nthe social or the environmental.", "Individual Appreciation. The prevailing\nphilosophical view of architectural appreciation is a psychological\naccount with debts to the Kantian tradition: direct, immediate\naesthetic experiences of architectural objects among individuals\nconstitute the basis of appreciation. (Iseminger 1981 provides a\ngeneral aesthetics account in this vein.) A primary variant has it\nthat architectural appreciation is the product of individual cognition\nof the content, form, properties, and relations of architectural\nobjects. A recent variation suggests that, in addition to (or in\nlieu of) cognitive response, physiological experience\n(proprioception) is a central source of beliefs associated with\narchitectural appreciation. On either model, it is experience of\nindividuals that feeds and influences appreciation.", "Social and Environmental Role in Architectural\nAppreciation. Direct, immediate individual experience is not\nthe only source of information shaping architectural\nappreciation. Considering the breadth of the architectural enterprise,\nit may not even be the best source. Others include access to\ninformation about works through standard representational modes that\nare not the works themselves (for example, drawings or photographs),\ntransmission of tacit working knowledge through apprenticeship\nlearning, and collective belief formation through client briefings and\nstudio crits.", "Architectural appreciation is social in building on our\nunderstanding of architectural objects as it develops, and matures, in\nexperience of a built structure with and in relation to other\nindividuals and groups of people. It is also social in that we learn\nmarkers of appreciation among those with whom we share such\nexperiences or (per Scruton 1979/2013) imagine ourselves to\ndo so. Indeed, a central goal of architectural education is structured\nimparting of collective wisdom as to how to best classify\narchitectural objects and, relatedly, what the markers of appreciation\nhave looked like, or should look like—as well as how they\narticulate with practical knowledge.", "Further, architectural appreciation is environmental in\nbuilding on our understanding of architectural objects based on\nexperiences in relation to their natural and built surroundings. On\none view, an architectural object may be more difficult to appreciate\nif we find that relation unexpected, or contrary to normative\nsensibility (Carlson 1999). If, however, appreciation does not require\nenjoyment or satisfaction of any sort—and instead engages our\nunderstanding of, for example, what was intended and why—we may\nwell appreciate in its own right an architectural object that has a\nsurprising, even obnoxious relation to its surroundings." ], "subsection_title": "6.3 Architectural Appreciation" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "Some problems of architectural ethics are characteristic of a range\nof typical moral dilemmas—agent-centered, norms-oriented\nconcerns—as may arise for architects. In addition to a\ntraditional set of questions applied to the architectural domain,\narchitectural ethics also addresses problems special to the discipline\nand practice—as shaped by its social, public, practical, and\nartistic nature. ", "As conceptually prior to a normative ethics of architectural\npractice, a meta-ethics of architecture assesses alternate ethical\nmodalities, such as whether architecture might be considered moral or\nimmoral relative to its objects (built structures) or to its practices\nas a set of institutions or social phenomena. Another meta-ethical\nissue concerns whether moralism or autonomism best characterizes the\nrelationship of aesthetics to ethics, as that plays out in\narchitecture.", "Ethical modalities of architecture. There are\nthree typical candidate modalities of ethics in architecture. For one,\nthere is the establishment of criteria for ethical norms of the\nenterprise such as architects in practice may observe. For example,\narchitects can craft designs in ways that lower the likelihood of cost\noverruns and enhance safety. In an interpersonal vein, architects can\nrepresent their work honestly to clients or contractors. Another\nmodality—beyond enterprise-defined ethical norms—is\npursuit of criteria to gauge architects as moral agents broadly\nproducing or doing good or bad in the world. For example, architects\nmay create objects that uplift or constrain individual users and\ninhabitants; other architects may promote social utility by designing\nhousing for those in need of shelter. Finally, there is the modality\nof seeking criteria to judge architectural objects as morally good or\nbad insofar as they directly produce pleasure or pain. As an\nindirect example, a hospital design is intended to facilitate\nthe minimizing of pain, by fostering environmental conditions\nconducive to excellence in health care and patient well-being. As a\nmore direct case, a bus shelter is intended to reduce exposure to the\nelements and corresponding discomfort. This last candidate may be\nattractive if we see architecture primarily as a product rather than\nas a practice; it is noxious if we are unwilling to assign moral\nvalues to artifacts as we do to actions or their properties. A built\nstructure might be inhumane in that it is bleak or uninhabitable,\nthough it does not follow that the structure itself bears inhumane\nvalues. ", "Value Interaction. Vitruvian principles underlying\nmuch of architectural theory suggest a tendency to link the aesthetic\nand the utility-promoting. So, too, functional beauty theory\nrecommends that aesthetic and ethical considerations are linked in\narchitecture. To crystallize the matter, we may ask if it is possible\nfor a built structure to be good though not aesthetically so. The\nquestion as to how aesthetic and ethical value might be related is a\nsubject of broader concern, with a “moralist” stance that\nsays the two sorts of value are or should be connected (Carroll 1996,\nGaut 1998) and an “autonomist” stance that takes the two\nas (or better off as) independent (Anderson and Dean 1998, Kieran\n2001).", "In this debate, architecture would seem a promising domain in which\nto find robust relations. At a moralist extreme, there is the\nsuggestion—supported by some traditions in architectural theory\n(Pugin 1841, Ruskin 1849)—that aesthetic tasks in architecture\nsimply are ethical tasks, reflecting ethical choices. One\nprominent moralist perspective locates the ethical element of\naesthetic architectural choice in obligations to a sort of honesty, in\ndesigning works that accurately represent underlying structural\nprinciples or operational capacities. Harries (1997) and Scruton\n(1979/2013) arrive at similar ethical commitments to architectural\ndesign as expressive in a particular fashion, though of shared\ncommunity values, rather than of function or structural features.\nFrom another angle, moralists point to the emotional impact of built\nenvironments as indicative of a union of the aesthetically gripping\nand morally compelling (Ginsburg 1994), though it may be noted that\neven where we detect such a union we need not judge the aesthetics of\nthe architectural object on the basis of any ethical import so\ncommunicated.", "At the other extreme, autonomists propose that problems of ethics\nand aesthetics neither need arise at once, nor need be resolved at\nonce, in architectural design. If we see a correlation in some\narchitectural objects of ethically and aesthetically compelling design\nsolutions, we see in other objects no correlation at all. Thus, the\nmodern city is replete with instances of built structures that are\nwell-functioning, high-utility, and facilitate much good in the world\nyet meet no one’s standards of aesthetically worthy design.\nThere is good reason to uncouple these values just in case they\nmust conflict. Suppose there is an ethical premium, for\nexample, on the need to create environmentally sustaining structures,\nand that we identify resolutions of that problem as generally bearing\nthe greatest mark of moral worth. Suppose further that crafting the\noptimal moral solution (vis-à-vis the environment)\nalways generates the most unattractive design—and that the\ninverse holds as well (the better the design aesthetically, the worse\nthe design for the environment). Then a connection between ethics and\naesthetics in architecture seems improbable.", "A third position altogether proposes a pluralism. Sometimes ethical\nand aesthetic value march hand-in-hand, other times not—and\ntheir ways of matching up are diverse and run in various\ndirections. So one architectural design may be aesthetically\ncompelling as it reflects its ethically upstanding character, whereas\nanother design may be aesthetically compelling as it reflects its\nethically deficient character. What is required for cases of this last\nsort is that the evaluator can identify the aesthetic success as\ngrounded, per functional beauty theory, in effective\nexpression of the structure’s ethically deficient function\n(Sauchelli 2012b). An even more generalized pluralism would suggest\nthat a wide range of aesthetic and ethical valences can be matched up\nin different ways; we might value a war memorial for the way it grimly\nexpresses the horrors of war.", "Traditional questions of architectural ethics. One\nreason that architectural ethics is central to philosophy of\narchitecture is that architects’ actions bear great influence\nover other people’s moral lives. Architects design structures\nand environments for people, with concomitant effects on personal\nbehavior, capacity to choose courses of action, and ability to satisfy\npreferences, visit harm, generate benefit, or exercise rights. As\narchitects’ acts shape spaces, boundaries, and pathways that\nstructure individual behaviors and social acts, they prompt normative\nethical exploration along traditional lines.", "To begin with, a traditional architectural ethics requires an\naccount of architectural responsibilities. Any such account\nshould outline architects’ obligations to other persons, ethical\nstandards on which such obligations may be based, how to ensure such\nstandards might be met, and any other sorts of obligations architects\nmight have, as for example, to historic preservation or environmental\nprotection. As concerns obligations to persons, the range of\nstakeholders in architecture is great, hence ethical responsibility is\ndiffuse.", "A further set of questions concerns rights. It is\nrelatively novel to speak of authorial or community rights in\narchitecture; owner or client rights are historically parasitic on\nproperty or sovereign rights. Other possibilities include rights of\ndevelopers, builders, engineers, environments, and societies. As that\nlist grows, two further questions concern the sorts of rights that can\nbe attributed to such parties or entities, and the criteria for\ndistributing and prioritizing them given aesthetic as well as moral\nconsiderations.", "Architectural utility is familiar as a Vitruvian concept\nbut has a wholly other sense in an agent-centered normative ethics,\nwith a possible moral weighting not found in classic architectural\ntheory. Guidelines are needed to determine the usefulness of\narchitectural goods such as built structures, restorations,\nreconstructions, or plans. These might include their social character,\nor individual preferences of the architect, owner, end-users, or\npublic. A utilitarian approach to architectural ethics is attractive\nin capturing the aims of architecture to promote well-being, and\nrelying on a ready marker of architectural value. However, it also\ndiscounts other traditional architectural imperatives such as a\nVitruvian-style pluralist may honor, including beauty and structural\nintegrity (Spector 2001). ", "Finally, a traditionalist picture of architectural ethics requires\nan account of virtues in the domain (though these may be\northogonal to normative ethics). Here is potential consonance with the\nVitruvian tradition (and similarly virtue-oriented non-Western\ntraditions)—if we see the “good”, morally educated\narchitect’s virtue and character as our best guarantee of proper\nand productive weighting of values under differing circumstances\n(Spector 2001).", "Future-Focused Architectural Ethics. The focus of\nethical rights and responsibilities in architecture is typically taken\nas relative to present or past. Thus, we speak of obligations to\ndesign and build in ethically responsible fashion, or preserve past\narchitectural objects. There are future-focused obligations, as\nwell. Sustainable design is forward-looking even as it is centered on\nwhat we design and build today. Further ethical issues may arise\nrelative to future architectural objects. As to obligations to future\narchitectural objects, we see as much in the short-term\ninstance of planning around near-future buildings. More puzzling is\nwhether we might have “long-haul” future-facing\nobligations—apart from utility or prudential\nconsiderations—in planning, for example, new cities or\naccommodations to climate change.", "Special ethical questions of architecture.\nArchitectural practice generates special moral issues as befit its\nproper, idiosyncratic features, distinctive among the arts, the\nprofessions, and social practices. Most notably, an array of ethical\nissues of social import arises from architecture’s commitments\nto creation of a socially beneficial and functional art. Such issues\ninclude the nature of “better” housing (and under varying\nconditions), what (if anything) makes housing an obligation, and ways\nthat such an obligation may accrue to, or be satisfied by,\narchitects. Yet other ethical issues special to architecture range\nover matters of personal and social spaces and the articulations\nthereof, including criteria for designing around concerns related to\nprivacy, accessibility (for the public generally and handicapped in\nparticular), respecting community and neighborly preferences, and\npromoting civic values.", "Other ethical matters special to architecture are particularly\nvisible in global perspective. For example, there is inequitable\ndistribution of housing across the developed and developing nations,\nand part of the solution may be architectural (Caicco 2005). Further,\narchitecture incurs special environmental obligations given that waste\nand degradation affect, and are affected by, architectural design. One\nconceptual challenge of sustainability facing architects is to\ndetermine whether development is, in principle, a countervailing\ninterest. This is to ask, once environmental obligations are defined,\nhow they may be factored into or weighed against infrastructural and\ndesign interests and preferences.", "Professional Ethics. Architectural professional\nethics focuses on architects’ moral choices in the context of\npractice (Wasserman, Sullivan, and Palermo 2000; T. Fisher\n2010). Professional ethical codes govern conduct in (and thereby\nprotect) the architectural profession and avert problems related to\nbusiness, fiduciary, insurance, or liability functions; the design\nfunction is an ethical focus relative to disability. Architectural law\nhighlights professional ethics matters as concern property, liability,\nand honesty. The law clarifies responsibilities among parties to\narchitectural practice; defines who or what in commercial\narchitectural interactions has moral agency—hence rights; and\ndescribes utility-wise or financial measures of distribution in\narchitecture. Legal regulations and judgments prompt conceptual\nquestions regarding such issues as intellectual property in\narchitecture, architects as arbitrators, and architects’\nresponsibilities to others (S. Fisher 2000a).", "Intellectual Property. One conceptual issue concerning\narchitectural intellectual property is how such rights are to be\nweighed against other sorts of property rights, such as domestic or\ncommercial rights. A further issue is determined on the basis of\njudging architecture to be a service or product. Taking architecture\nas service means that architects do not have a stake on\ncopyright, as they would then be creators-by-contract; tradition has\nit that rights to expression of ideas so created accrue to the\ncontracting party. Taking architecture as product supports\narchitects’ claim to copyright, given that expression is their\ncreation—whatever services are performed (Greenstreet 1998;\nCushman and Hedemann 1995). Copyright raises other concerns. Even as\nthe law may license creation of an architectural object reflecting\ncore design aspects found in another object created by a different\narchitect, we may find morally blameworthy any cognizant\n“borrowing” without attribution or\npermission. Alternatively, we might view this as a routine episode in\nthe history of architectural copying without attribution or\npermission. The challenge is to define relevant obligations of one\narchitect to others, present or past.", "Architect as judge in owner-contractor disputes.\nArchitects have a dual role, serving as designer and administrator of\narchitectural projects, and in this capacity may adjudicate between\nowner and contractor in matters of dispute. Standard issues concern\nconflicts of interest, grounds for adjudication, and criteria of\nfairness. Ethical issues of a particularly architectural\nstripe include the degree to which specifications are poorly satisfied\nsuch as warrants reckoning; maintenance of fealty to owners’\ninterests alongside fairness to contractors and to satisfactory\nrealization of one’s own design; and identification of virtues\nappropriate to judgment in design-related disputes, along with facets\nof being an architect that promote (or limit) such virtues.", "Responsibility to others’ design. Architectural\nobjects often develop over time in cumulative and mutable fashion,\nthrough additions and alterations that—perhaps more frequently\nthan not—change the design of a different, original architect\n(or that of a prior alteration). For any particular changes, or in\nconsideration of design changes overall, we may stipulate obligations\nto respect original or prior intent and execution. One brand of such\nobligations, recognized in historic preservation and landmark laws,\nrequires that aesthetic concerns in the public interest trump private\ninterests. Key conceptual questions concern how to determine the\nsource and conditions of any such obligations—and the sorts of\nresponsibilities architects should have to existing structures. Those\nresponsibilities may extend to commitment to the integrity of work by\nfellow architects." ], "section_title": "7. Architectural Ethics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "8. Architecture and Social and Political Philosophy", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "While all artforms admit of a certain social character,\narchitecture enjoys a particularly social nature, and may even be said\nto be an intrinsically social artform. There are two\nprominent candidate reasons as to why this is so. For one, a central\naim of architecture is to design shelter and so meet a variety of\nsocial needs. For another, architecture as practice is a social\nprocess or activity as it engages people in interpersonal relations of\na social cast.", "The first candidate reason stands or falls on whether, in\nfulfilling social needs, architecture is thereby rendered a social\nart. For an artform to be intrinsically social, any such need\nfulfilled should be critical rather than discretionary or\nextravagant. Thus, for example, addressing housing demands overall\nmeets the criticality test—though addressing design demands for\na third home does not. The first reason looks right because architects\noften integrate social needs into design thinking. Armed with socially\nminded intentions, they create built structures which serve myriad\nsocial ends. A difficulty arises, however, in consistently upholding\nsuch intentions as a mark of the social if (a) such intentions are\nunclear from experiencing architectural objects, instantiations, or\nrepresentations thereof, (b) built structures are repurposed, or (c)\nthere are architectural objects with no corresponding relevant\nintentions. (As an instance, we might consider “found”\narchitectural objects like inhabited caves.)", "A second candidate reason that architecture is a social art is that\nprocesses of making architecture are thoroughly and ineluctably social\nphenomena, constituted by interactions of social groupings created and\ngoverned by social conventions and arrangements. On this view, the\nsocial nature of architecture consists in the status of the discipline\nas shaped by social convention—where such convention is\ndesignated by, and guides actions of, architects and other relevant\nagents. (This reason directly links the social nature of architecture\nto its social impact—hence to sociology of architecture; see §8.2.) Architectural phenomena are\nsocial, then, because they occur as a result of contracts, meetings,\nfirms, charettes, crits, juries, projects, competitions, exhibitions,\npartnerships, professional organizations, negotiations, workflow\norganization, division of labor, and myriad other conventional and\nagreement-bound purposive actions and groupings of architects and\nother architectural stakeholders. One might object that, on an\ninstitutional theory, all artforms are social in just these\nways. However, as played out in art worlds, institutional theories\ntell us what counts as an art object rather than how such objects are\nconstituted to begin with. Proponents of this candidate must rule out\na naïve architecture scenario, the possibility of a lone\narchitect who has no socially significant engagements such as shape\nher creations.", "Either view is temporally sensitive. These parameters and how they\nconstitute architecture’s sociality will change over time, along\nwith vicissitudes in social needs, conventions, and relations." ], "subsection_title": "8.1 Socially Constitutive Features of Architecture" }, { "content": [ "Architecture as object and pursuit produces a great range of\neffects on social structures and phenomena, in particularly acute\nfashion in relation to housing, land use, and urban planning. In turn,\narchitecture is shaped by such social concerns as scarcity, justice,\nand social relations and obligations. Some of this shaping results\nfrom social group and institution requirements for space and the\nstructured organization thereof, to promote group or institutional\nfunction and identity (Halbwachs 1938). In addition, other social\nrequirements stem from architecture’s roles in meeting concerns\nand needs for society as a whole.", "Causal direction. We might see social forces as\nprimarily shaping architecture or else architecture as primarily\nshaping social forces. Proponents of architecture as\n“shaper” suggest that architecture provides a means of\norganizing society, a core Modernist claim but also a thesis of\nbroader currency. Detractors counter that we cannot shape society\nthrough the built environment—or we ought not do so. What rests\non directionality is how we parse not only theoretical relations but\nalso practical consequences and perspectives concerning a host of\nsocial phenomena. To take one example, how we gauge and address the\npossibilities that architecture offers relative to social inequality\nis likely a function of whether architecture contributes to, or\ninstead reflects, social classes and social hierarchies. We might\nwonder whether architects can design so as to promote class\nequality—or solidarity, justice, autonomy, or other social\nphenomena as we might foster.", "On a third, holistic option, causality runs in both directions. Two\nexamples of such are (a) systems analyses, which take built structures\nas social systems that contribute to social function, and (b)\nurban sociology, which takes the city en gros as social\nstructuring of space which shapes its habitants, who in turn shape the\ncity (Simmel 1903). As expanded to environmental sociology,\nthe suggestion is that built environments promote patterns of living,\nworking, shopping, and otherwise conducting commerce among groups and\nin relation to other individuals.", "Other social science domains suggest attendant conceptual\nissues. For example, one sociological perspective takes relations of\nindividuals and groups to built structures to be analogous to\nconsumption (Essbach 2004); we may ask whether architectural objects\nenjoy a reception of this particular social sort, a range of such\nsorts (perhaps as context-dependent), or perhaps, on an individualist\nread, no sort we would call “social”. For another,\nsociology of architecture also studies the profession: the backgrounds\nand relations of architects and other stakeholders, norms governing\nbehavior, and social structures of an architecture world constitute a\nspecies of artworld. This last suggestion prompts the question as to\nwhat influence we should attribute to an architecture world on the\nstatus of architectural objects. The architecture world\nraises issues beyond those motivating Danto or Dickie, engaging many\nparties whose interests and preferences are not primarily aesthetic or\neven economic but driven by social, commercial, engineering, planning,\nand various other factors. For a third, a Science and Technology\nStudies perspective (Gieryn 2002) investigates how\narchitecture—primarily in its optimization focus, qua\nengineered technology—shapes knowledge formation (for example,\nin laboratory or university design) and organizes social behavior (for\nexample, in architecture for tourism or retail sales). Conceptual\nissues here include whether there are global principles of\noptimization of architectural design for social advancement, and what\nsorts of moral constraints are appropriate to such optimization." ], "subsection_title": "8.2 Socially Efficacious Features on, and of, Architecture" }, { "content": [ "That architecture has some political aspects is a widely\nheld, if not entirely uncontested thesis, with weaker and stronger\nvariants. One weak version suggests that designing built structures\nentails political engagement through interactions of architects and\nthe public. For example, architects solicit political support of\ngovernment officials for development projects, governments engage\narchitects to design built structures that express political\nprogrammatic messages, and citizens do political battle amongst\nthemselves over architectural designs or preservation decisions. A\nstronger version highlights a possible role for architecture as an\ninstrument of politics. Thus, Sparshott (1994) characterizes\narchitecture as “…above all the coercive organization of\nsocial space”. In other words, designing built structures\nentails political engagement through the control by force of behaviors\nand attitudes of people who interact with those structures.", "That architecture might have any significant role in politics, or\nthe other way around, calls for explanation. One account stresses that\nthe two domains are oriented around utility-maximization. Utility\ncriteria deployed to judge the worth of architectural objects are\nexemplary subjects of democratic debate, policy analysis, or community\nconsensus. The appeal to utility is an advocacy strategy for\narchitectural design that dates to Bentham’s Panopticon\n(1787) or before. Further, traditional architectural promotion of\nurban and social planning may be linked to social utility criteria for\narchitectural quality; that relationship might run in either\ndirection. In distinct progressive and utopian traditions in\narchitectural thought (Eaton 2002), advancement of social utility is a\ncentral motivation in architectural attempts to realize idealistic\nvisions of modes of living and societal organization. (For a critique,\nsee Harries 1997.)", "Power, control, and change. Architecture’s\npolitical cast is also manifest in use as a means of social\ncontrol. This is not an obvious use in societies where individuals\nfreely choose dwellings or other structures with which they\ninteract. The less choice available in this regard, the greater the\npossibility of defining people’s choices (a) concerning the\nbuilt environment they occupy and (b) as a function of that\nenvironment. Prominent such architectural types include prisons and\nrefugee camps. Some see potential in architecture for more globally\npromoting maintenance of power through behavior regulating norms that\nsuch built structures represent (Foucault 1975).", "Even in generally free or open social settings, though, at the\nlevel of urban planning architecture indirectly determines behavior in\npolitically shaped ways. Architects and others planning urban or other\ndensely settled environments take into account such political aims as\nhonoring community values, promoting civic virtues, maximizing social\nutility, fulfilling professional or public responsibilities, and\nrespecting citizen or leadership preferences (Haldane 1990, Paden\n2001, Thompson 2012). The politically hued results of such planning\nand design efforts, whether pursued in authoritative, consultative, or\nparticipatory processes, are architectural objects that change,\nencourage, or reward particular behaviors.", "Ideology and agency. Architecture is also used to\npromote political views, culture, or control, by conveying symbolic\nmessages of power, nationalism, liberation, cooperation, justice, or\nother political themes or notions (Wren c1670s). One issue concerns\nthe architect’s agency in promoting an official political\nideology. In government commissions, the architect generally cedes\ndesign control, at a certain point, to the government. Yet the\narchitect is the creator of record. This leaves open whether\narchitects so engaged are promoting the given ideology—or else\nmerely acting as proxies for such promotion. It may seem odd to\nsuggest that, from an aesthetic standpoint the design is of architect\nX but from a political standpoint the same design is not\nattributable to X.", "Political agency among architects is a special version of the more\ngeneral issue of architect agency relative to clients, including as\nwell corporate and individual clients. Architects have obligations to\nthe client’s aesthetic and utility concerns, and in virtue of\nthose obligations, the responsibility, blame, and praise for a given\narchitectural object cannot be wholly attached to the architect\nalone. One question is what scenarios or conditions would need to\npertain to justify apportioning more or less agency—and,\ncorrespondingly, political or moral responsibility—to the\narchitect or to the client, in design and build phases of realizing an\narchitectural object. The phases matter. The design phase appears, at\nleast initially, to be the agency-wise province of the architect, and\nany post-build phase appears to be generally the province of the\nclient and any relevant user-base (until any such renovation or\nrepurposing as may occur). What happens in phases en route to\npost-build is murkier, though." ], "subsection_title": "8.3 Architecture and the Political" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "Architectural Failure. Failed architecture is not\na straightforward subspecies of failed art or failed\nartifacts. Architectural objects may rate as aesthetic disasters yet\nin some overall sense as successes, unlike non-architecture art\nobjects. And architectural objects may cease to function—or\nnever have functioned at all—yet count as overall successes,\nunlike a range of (though not all) non-architecture artifacts. Another\nfeature of architectural failure—in keeping with general design\nphenomena—is that architectural objects may count as successes\nor failures depending on different states of affairs, context, or\nremarkably small differences. Thus, a given architectural object may\nbe a failure as an active and integral built structure but not as a\nruin (or vice-versa). This suggests that background\nintentions may matter at one early stage, and less so at later stages\nin the life of a built structure—and that failure may have one\ncriterion for architectural abstracta and other criteria for\ncounterpart concreta. Further, among architectural objects with\nstandard, closely related variants, some may fail while others\nsucceed—perhaps because of a minor distinction such as a\ngarishly painted exterior. A viable account of architectural failure\naccommodates such features or else devolves failure to the level of\nsome single dimension of architectural objects, such as their putative\nnature as art objects (failed or otherwise).", "Corruption, Ruins, and Preservation. Architectural\nobjects as physically instantiated are corrupted or fall apart over\ntime, and may develop new forms in disrepair or as ruins. From an\ninclusivist, concretist standpoint, a ruin is not any lesser an\narchitectural object than its corresponding newly built structure. An\ninclusivism is available to the abstractist, too, though she will not\nsee them as the same object—and will rate them both as somehow\nlesser than the originary object. If we take them as the same\narchitectural objects, we need an account as to how they relate to one\nanother—apparently not by reference to intentions. Even if an\narchitect designed a path to a ruin state, the actual ruin-state would\nlikely take on a wholly different shape. Some may take this as an\nargument against inclusivism.", "Architects typically embrace the Vitruvian premium on\nfirmitas and reasonably assume that built objects should\nendure—and that they serve intended functions for as long as is\ndesirable. That pair of assumptions in design thinking is at odds with\nconcretism, given corruption and decay of physical constructions as\nwell as routine repurposing in the lives of built structures. The\nfirst assumption is consistent with an abstractist vision of\neverlasting architectural objects. Endurance of serving intended\nfunctions is another story: for architectural abstracta, stipulation\nof repurposing may not change the nature of a given, selfsame\nobject. Depending on degrees of stringency in defining an\nobject’s parameters, corresponding changes in design may bring\nabout an entirely new object or nearby counterpart.", "Corruption brings not only total destruction and absence of\npreviously intact built structures, but also enduring ruins or flawed,\ndamaged structures. There is a longstanding premium on ruins in\narchitectural culture as promoting historical perspective, nostalgia,\nand at least one style (Romanticism). Yet ruins fit awkwardly, if at\nall, into standard architectural ontologies. The cultural premium is\nhard to explain for the abstractist, for whom ruins represent\ndefective physical instantiations, which are already substandard in\nthe abstractist worldview. They are even harder to match up with a\nconcretist account as there aren’t underlying creative\nintentions to build (except in ironic or kitsch building of “new\nruins”). Corresponding intentions instead typically concern\npreservation, restoration, or elimination. Alternatively, Bicknell\n(2014) suggests we think of ruins as part-objects that, along with\nfull-blown “architectural ghosts”, represent past objects\nin their intact, built glory and as corresponded to creator\nintent. ", "Preservation and conservation possibilities prompt additional\nconsiderations, such as whether restoration or maintenance of a built\nstructure sustains it as an authentic architectural whole—and if\nthis is independent of functional integrity, or holds for wholesale\nreconstructions (Wicks 1994); what conditions warrant preserving or\nconserving a built structure; and what principles guide warranted\nalterations or completions of built structures—and whether other\nconsiderations may include creativity, fancy, or sensitivity to\ncontemporary needs and context (Capdevila-Werning 2013). As concerns\ncompleting unfinished structures, one issue is whether it is possible\nto discern original design intent altogether. Taken together with\ncontemporary norms that shape our understanding of past architecture\n(Spector 2001), preservation and conservation are at least partly\nbound to present-day design conceptions.", "Built Versus Natural Environment. We typically\ntake built and natural environments to be clearly distinct. This\ndistinction does at least two kinds of work in philosophy of\narchitecture. For one, it helps establish what sorts of things we\nwould discount as architecture even on an inclusivist\nconception—and even there, we might accept lived-in caves as\nfound architecture but reject most other elements of the\nnatural environment as non-architecture (because neither built nor\nfound). For another, we get a defined sense of natural contexts into\nwhich built environments fit (or not), without which any such notions\nof fit are incoherent. If this is a viable (and desirable)\ndistinction, it is perhaps less clear in what it consists. One\ncandidate view is that we may distinguish the kinds of environments by\ntheir different sorts of objects and properties: we find columns in\nbuilt environments and trees in natural environments and never the\nother way around. Alternatives highlight the ascribable functions and\nintent that mark built environments but not natural environments; or\ndifferent sorts of behavior and obligations attached to the two kinds\nof environments. While an artifact-centered view of architecture\nweighs in favor of functions and intent as the most relevant\ndistinction, decaying value of design intent over the life of a built\nstructure may give pause.", "Human and Non-Human Architecture. What we\ntypically refer to as “architecture” is human\narchitecture. This raises the question as to whether human\narchitecture is assimilable to a larger class of animal-built\nstructures. That would suggest, in turn, that we could assess human\narchitecture—including settlement patterns, individual\nstructures, and built community environments—in ecological,\nanimal behavioral, and evolutionary terms (Hansell 2007). If these are\nfundamental vantage points for understanding human architecture, that\nwould suggest a need to translate all going accounts—whether\nfocused on aesthetics, utility, or other concerns—into\ncorresponding biological terms. One way to resist this move is to mark\nhuman architecture as a particularly human endeavor and\ncreation—likely by reference to intentionality, as flows into\naesthetic focus. However, this may just forestall the question as to\nhow to account for that wrinkle—a particularly talented\nanimal builder with notable design intent—in the larger story of\nanimal builders most of whom have less or no such intent.", "Environmental Psychology as Magic Pill. Another\nscientific challenge to traditional philosophy of architecture emerges\nin environmental psychology, which identifies ways that environmental\nfactors such as color, shape, light, and circulatory pattern shape our\nvisual reactions and behavioral patterns within and around the built\nenvironment. From such empirical insights, we can fashion constraints\non architectural design principles that guide architectural creation,\nand devise corresponding solutions to particular design problems. As\narchitects learn to exploit this information to advance design, we may\nask whether an architectural object may be optimized by the lights of\nenvironmental psychology yet—and even\nconsequently—deficient in some other, architecturally\ncentral respect. Satisfying an architectural object’s intended\nfunction or maximizing its utility may well include, or be advanced\nby, keen attention to environmental factors that influence attitudes\nto and use of that object. By contrast, moral or aesthetic\ndeficiencies where environmental conditions are optimal seem real\npossibilities. A resulting question is whether, and to what degree, we\ncould or should abandon moral or aesthetic drivers in architectural\ndesign if in the future we could design architectural objects to\noptimize environmental factors and so meet cognitive and emotional\nneeds, thereby enhancing an architectural object’s reception but\nat moral or aesthetic expense." ], "section_title": "9. Further Issues in Philosophy of Architecture", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Acharya, Prasanna Kumar, 1928, Indian Architecture according\nto Mānasāra-śilpaśāstra\n[Mānasāra English trans.] London: Oxford University Press.", "Alberti, Leon Battista, 1485, On the Art of Building in Ten\nBooks (De re aedificatoria, Florence: Niccolò di\nLorenzo), Joseph Rykwert, Robert Tavernor, and Neil Leach (trans.),\nCambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988.", "Alexander, Christopher, 1979, The Timeless Way of\nBuilding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Alexander, Christopher, Sara Ishikawa, and Murray Silverstein,\n1977, A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Anderson, James C. and Jeffrey T. Dean, 1998, “Moderate\nAutonomism”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 38(2):\n150–166.", "Bacon, Francis, 1625, The Essays or Counsels Civil and\nMoral (London: Iohn Haviland for Hanna Barret), Brian Vickers\n(ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.", "Baird, George, 1969, “‘La Dimension Amoureuse’\nin Architecture”, in Jencks and Baird 1969: 78–99.", "Batteux, Charles, 1746, Les Beaux-Arts réduits à\nun même principe (Paris: Durand), reprint of 1746 ed.,\nParis: Amateurs des livres, 1989.", "Beardsley, Monroe, 1958/1981, Aesthetics: Problems in the\nPhilosophy of Criticism, Harcourt, Brace & World,\n1st edition; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,\nInc., 2nd edition.", "Bentham, Jeremy, 1787, “Panopticon; or, The\nInspection-House”, in John Bowring (ed.), The Works of\nJeremy Bentham, 4, Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843; also in Miran\nBožovič (ed.), The Panopticon Writings,\nLondon: Verso, 1995.", "Berkeley, George, 1732, Alciphron, or the Minute\nPhilosopher, in Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher in\nFocus, David Berman (ed.), London: Routledge, 1993.", "Berleant Arnold, 2007, “Cultivating an Urban\nAesthetic”, in Arnold Berleant and Allen Carlson (eds.), The\nAesthetics of Human Environments, Peterborough: Broadview Press,\npp. 79–91.", "Bicknell, Jeanette, 2014, “Architectural Ghosts”,\nJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 72(4):\n435–441.", "Blondel, François, 1675–1683, Cours\nd’architecture enseigné dans l’Académie\nroyale d’architecture, Paris: P. Auboin et\nF. Clouzier.", "Borissavliévitch, Miloutine [Borisavljevic, Milutin], 1923,\nProlégomènes a une Esthétique Scientifique de\nl’Architecture, Paris: Fischbacher.", "–––, 1954, Traite d’Esthétique\nScientifique de l’Architecture, Paris: Albert\nBlanchard.", "Bosse, Abraham, 1643, La manière universelle de Mr.\nDesargues, Lyonnais, Paris: Pierre Des-Hayes.", "Boyce, James R., 1969, “What is the Systems Approach”,\nProgressive Architecture, 50(11): 118–121.", "Buchenau, Stefanie, 2013, The Founding of Aesthetics in the\nGerman Enlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Burry, Jane and Mark Burry, 2012, The New Mathematics of\nArchitecture, London: Thames & Hudson.", "Caicco, Gregory, 2005, “Architectural Ethics”, in Carl\nMitcham (ed.), Encyclopedia of Science, Technology and\nEthics, Detroit: Macmillan Reference, pp. 97–102.", "Capdevila-Werning, Remei, 2013, “Constructing the\nAbsent—Preservation and Restoration of Architecture”,\nProceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics,\n5: 163–177.", "Carlson, Allen, 1994, “Existence, Location, and Function:\nThe Appreciation of Architecture”, in Mitias 1994:\n141–164.", "–––, 1999, “The Aesthetic Appreciation of\nEveryday Architecture”, Architecture and Civilization,\nin Mitias 1999a: 107–121.", "–––, 2000, Aesthetics and the Environment:\nThe Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture, London:\nRoutledge.", "Carroll, Noël, 1996, “Moderate Moralism”,\nBritish Journal of Aesthetics, 36(3): 223–238.", "Clarke, Georgia and Paul Crossley (eds.), 2000, Architecture\nand Language: Constructing Identity in European Architecture c.\n1000–1650, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Currie, Gregory, 1989, An Ontology of Art. 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archytas	Archytas	First published Thu Jun 26, 2003; substantive revision Thu Nov 5, 2020	[ "\nArchytas of Tarentum was a Greek mathematician, political leader and\nphilosopher, active in the first half of the fourth century BC (i.e.,\nduring Plato’s lifetime). He was the last prominent figure in\nthe early Pythagorean tradition and the dominant political figure in\nTarentum, being elected general seven consecutive times. He sent a\nship to rescue Plato from the clutches of the tyrant of Syracuse,\nDionysius II, in 361, but his personal and philosophical connections\nto Plato are complex, and there are many signs of disagreement between\nthe two philosophers. A great number of pseudepigrapha were written in\nArchytas’ name starting in the first century BC, and only four\nfragments of his genuine work survive, although these are supplemented\nby a number of important testimonia. Archytas was the first to solve\none of the most celebrated mathematical problems in antiquity, the\nduplication of the cube. We also have his proof showing that ratios of\nthe form (n+1) : n, which are important in music\ntheory, cannot be divided by a mean proportional. He was the most\nsophisticated of the Pythagorean harmonic theorists and provided\nmathematical accounts of musical scales used by the practicing\nmusicians of his day. Fr. 1 of Archytas may be the earliest text to\nidentify the group of four canonical sciences (logistic [arithmetic],\ngeometry, astronomy and music), which would become known as the\nquadrivium in the middle ages. There are also some\nindications that he contributed to the development of the science of\noptics and laid the mathematical foundations for the science of\nmechanics. He saw the ultimate goal of the sciences as the description\nof individual things in the world in terms of ratio and proportion and\naccordingly regarded logistic, the science of number and proportion,\nas the master science. Rational calculation and an understanding of\nproportion were also the bases of the just state and of the good life\nfor an individual. He gave definitions of things that took account of\nboth their matter and their form. Although we have little information\nabout his cosmology, he developed the most famous argument for the\ninfinity of the universe in antiquity." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Family, Teachers, and Pupils; Date", "1.2 Sources", "1.3 Archytas and Tarentum", "1.4 Archytas and Plato", "1.5 The Authenticity Question", "1.6 Pseudepigrapha Ascribed to Archytas", "1.7 Genuine Works and Testimonia" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Archytas as Mathematician and Harmonic Theorist", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Doubling the Cube", "2.2 Music and Mathematics", "2.3 Evaluation of Archytas as Mathematician" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Archytas and the Sciences", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 The Value of the Sciences", "3.2 “Logistic” as the Master Science", "3.3 Optics and Mechanics" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Definitions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Cosmology and Physics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Ethics and Political Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Importance and Influence", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nArchytas, son of Hestiaeus (see Aristoxenus in Diels-Kranz 1952, chap.\n47, passage A1; abbreviated as DK47 A1), lived in the Greek city of\nTarentum, on the heel of the boot of Italy. The later tradition almost\nuniversally identifies him as a Pythagorean (e.g., A1, A2, A7, A16).\nAristotle and his pupil Eudemus do not explicitly call Archytas a\nPythagorean and appear to treat him as an important independent\nthinker. Plato never refers to Archytas by name except in the\nSeventh Letter, if that is by Plato, and he is not called a\nPythagorean there. In the Republic, however, when Plato\nquotes a sentence which appears in Fr. 1 of Archytas (DK47 B1), he\nexplicitly labels it as part of Pythagorean harmonics (530d). Cicero\n(de Orat. III 34. 139) reports that Archytas was the pupil of\nPhilolaus, and this is not improbable. Philolaus was the most\nprominent Pythagorean of the preceding generation (ca. 470–390)\nand may have taught in Tarentum. Archytas’ achievements in\nmathematics depend on the work of Hippocrates of Chios, but we have no\nevidence that he studied with Hippocrates. The only pupil of Archytas\nwho is more than a name, is Eudoxus (ca. 390–340), the prominent\nmathematician. Eudoxus presumably did not learn his famous hedonism\nfrom Archytas (see DK47 A9), and it is specifically geometry that he\nis said to have studied with Archytas (Diogenes Laertius VIII 86).", "\nArchytas was, roughly speaking, a contemporary of Plato, but it is\ndifficult to be more precise about his dates. Aristotle’s pupil,\nEudemus, presents him as the contemporary of Plato (born 428/7) and\nLeodamas (born ca. 430), on the one hand, and of Theaetetus (born ca.\n415), on the other (A6). Since it would be difficult to call him the\ncontemporary of Theaetetus, if he were born much earlier than 435,\nthis is the earliest he was likely to have been born. On the other\nhand, he could have been born as late as 410 and still be considered a\ncontemporary of Plato. Strabo associates Archytas with the flourishing\nof Tarentum, before a period of decline, in which Tarentum hired\nmercenary generals (A4). Since the mercenaries appear ca. 340, it\nseems likely that Archytas was dead by 350 at the latest. Such a date\nis in accord with other evidence (A5 = [Demosthenes], Erot.\nOr. 61.46), which connects Archytas to Timotheus, who died ca.\n355, and with Plato’s (?) Seventh Letter (350a), which\npresents Archytas as still active in Tarentum in 361. Thus Archytas\nwas born between 435 and 410 and died between 360 and 350.", "\nSome scholars (e.g., Ciaceri 1927–32: III 4) have supposed that\nthe speaker of the Roman poet, Horace’s, Archytas Ode (I 28 =\nA3) is Archytas himself and hence have concluded that Archytas died in\na shipwreck. The standard interpretation, however, rightly recognizes\nthat the speaker is not Archytas but a shipwrecked sailor who\napostrophizes Archytas (Nisbet and Hubbard 1970, 317ff.). The ode\ntells us nothing about Archytas’ death, but it is one of many\npieces of evidence for the fascination with Archytas by Roman authors\nof the first century BC (Propertius IV 1b.77; Varro in B8; Cicero,\nRep. I 38.59, I 10.16; Fin. V 29.87; Tusc.\nIV 36.78, V 23.64, de Orat. III 34.139; Amic. XXIII\n88; Sen. XII 39–41), perhaps because Pythagoreanism had\ncome to be seen as a native Italian philosophy, and not a Greek import\n(Burkert 1961; Powell 1995, 11 ff.)." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Family, Teachers, and Pupils; Date" }, { "content": [ "\nApart from the surviving fragments of his writings, our knowledge of\nArchytas’ life and work depends heavily on authors who wrote in\nthe second half of the fourth century, in the fifty years after\nArchytas’ death. Archytas’ importance both as an\nintellectual and as a political leader is reflected in the number of\nwritings about him in this period, although only fragments of these\nworks have been preserved. Aristotle wrote a work in three volumes on\nthe philosophy of Archytas, more than on any other of his\npredecessors, as well as a second work, consisting of a summary of\nPlato’s Timaeus and the writings of Archytas (A13).\nUnfortunately almost nothing of these works has survived. Scholars\nhave generally regarded them as authentic (Huffman 2005: 583–94)\nbut Schofield has recently raised some doubts (2014: 81–2).\nAristotle’s pupil Eudemus discussed Archytas prominently in his\nhistory of geometry (A6 and A14) and in his work on physics (A23 and\nA24). Another pupil of Aristotle’s, Aristoxenus, wrote a\nLife of Archytas, which is the basis for much of the\nbiographical tradition about him (A1, A7, A9). Aristoxenus (375-ca.\n300) was in a good position to have accurate information about\nArchytas. He was born in Tarentum and grew up during the height of\nArchytas’ prominence in the city. In addition to whatever\npersonal knowledge he had of Archytas, he draws on his own father\nSpintharus, who was a younger contemporary of Archytas, as a source\n(e.g., A7). Aristoxenus began his philosophical career as a\nPythagorean and studied with the Pythagorean Xenophilus at Athens, so\nthat it is not surprising that his portrayal of Archytas is largely\npositive. Nonetheless, Archytas’ opponents are given a fair\nhearing (e.g., Polyarchus in A9), and Archytas himself is represented\nas not without small flaws of character (A7). Other fourth-century\nsources such as the Seventh Letter in the Platonic corpus and\nDemosthenes’ (?) Erotic Oration focus on the connection\nbetween Archytas and Plato (see below)." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Sources" }, { "content": [ "\nArchytas is unique among Greek philosophers for the prominent role he\nplayed in the politics of his native city. He was elected general\n(stratêgos) seven years in succession at one point in\nhis career (A1), a record that reminds us of Pericles at Athens. His\nelection was an exception to a law, which forbade election in\nsuccessive years, and thus attests to his reputation in Tarentum.\nAristoxenus reports that Archytas was never defeated in battle and\nthat, when at one point he was forced to withdraw from his post by the\nenvy of his enemies, the Tarentines immediately suffered defeat (A1).\nHe probably served as part of a board of generals (there was a board\nof ten at Athens). The analogy with Athens suggests that as a general\nhe may also have had special privileges in addressing the assembly at\nTarentum on issues of importance to the city, so that his position as\ngeneral gave him considerable political as well as military power. At\nsome point in his career, he may have been designated as a general\nautokratôr (“plenipotentiary”) (A2), which\ngave him special latitude in dealing with diplomatic and military\nmatters without consulting the assembly, although this was not\ndictatorial power and all arrangements probably required the eventual\napproval of the assembly. We do not know when Archytas served his\nseven successive years as general. Some have supposed that they must\ncoincide with the seven year period which includes Plato’s\nsecond and third visits to Italy and Sicily, 367–361 (e.g.,\nWuilleumier 1939, 68–9), but Archytas need not have been\nstratêgos to play the role assigned to him during these\nyears in the Seventh Letter. The evidence suggests that most\nof Archytas’ military campaigns were directed not at other\nGreeks but at native Italic peoples such as the Messapians and\nLucanians, with whom Tarentum had been in constant conflict since its\nfounding.", "\nIt is important to recognize that the Tarentum in which Archytas\nexercised such influence was not some insignificant backwater. Spartan\ncolonists founded it in 706. It was initially overshadowed by other\nGreek colonies in southern Italy such as Croton, although it had the\nbest harbor on the south coast of Italy and was the natural stopping\npoint for any ships sailing west from mainland Greece. Archytas will\nhave grown up in a Tarentum that, in accord with its foundation by\nSparta, took the Peloponnesian and Syracusan side against Athens in\nthe Peloponnesian War (Thuc. VI 44; VI 104; VII 91). Athens allied\nwith the Messapians (Thuc. VII 33), the long-standing enemy of the\nTarentines, against whom Archytas would later lead expeditions (A7).\nAfter the Peloponnesian War, Tarentum appears to have avoided direct\ninvolvement in the conflict between the tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius\nI, and a league of Greek cities in southern Italy headed by Croton.\nAfter Dionysius crushed the league, Tarentum emerged as the most\npowerful Greek state in southern Italy and probably became the new\nhead of the league of Italiot Greek cities (A2). In the period from\n380–350, when Archytas was in his prime and old age, Tarentum\nwas one of the most powerful cities in the Greek world (Purcell 1994,\n388). Strabo’s description of its military might (VI 3.4)\ncompares favorably with Thucydides’ account of Athens at the\nbeginning of the Peloponnesian war (II. 13).", "\nDespite its ancestral connections to Sparta, which was an oligarchy,\nTarentum appears to have been a democracy during Archytas’\nlifetime. According to Aristotle (Pol. 1303a), the democracy\nwas founded after a large part of the Tarentine aristocracy was killed\nin a battle with a native people, the Iapygians, in 473. Herodotus\nconfirms that this was the greatest slaughter of Greeks of which he\nwas aware (VII 170). There is no evidence that Tarentum was anything\nbut a democracy between the founding of the democracy in 473 and\nArchytas’ death ca. 350. Some scholars have argued that\nTarentum’s ties to Sparta and the supposed predilection of the\nPythagoreans for aristocracy will have insured that Tarentum did not\nremain a democracy long and that it was not a democracy under Archytas\n(Minar 1942, 88–90; Ciaceri 1927–32, II 446–7).\nStrabo, however, explicitly describes Tarentum as a democracy at the\ntime of its flourishing under Archytas (A4), and the descriptions of\nArchytas’ power in Tarentum stress his popularity with the\nmasses and his election as general by the citizens (A1 and A2).\nFinally, Aristotle’s account of the structure of the Tarentine\ngovernment in the fourth century (Pol. 1291b14), while\npossibly consistent with other forms of government, makes most sense\nif Tarentum was a democracy. The same is true of fr. B3 of Archytas,\nwith its emphasis on a more equal distribution of wealth." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Archytas and Tarentum" }, { "content": [ "\nArchytas was most famous in antiquity and is most famous in the modern\nworld for having sent a ship to rescue Plato from the tyrant of\nSyracuse, Dionysius II, in 361. In both the surviving ancient lives of\nArchytas (by Diogenes Laertius, VIII 79–83, and in the\nSuda) the first thing mentioned about him, after the name of\nhis city-state and his father, is his rescue of Plato (A1 and A2).\nThis story is told in greatest detail in the Seventh Letter\nascribed to Plato. It has accordingly been typical to identify\nArchytas as “the friend of Plato” (Mathieu 1987). Archytas\nfirst met Plato over twenty years earlier, when Plato visited southern\nItaly and Sicily for the first time in 388/7, during his travels after\nthe death of Socrates (Pl. [?], Ep. VII 324a, 326b-d; Cicero,\nRep. I 10. 16; Philodemus, Acad. Ind. X 5–11;\ncf. D.L. III 6). Some scholars have seen Archytas as the dominant\nfigure in the relationship (Zhmud 2006, 93) and even as the “new\nmodel philosopher for Plato” (Vlastos 1991, 129) and the\narchetype of Plato’s philosopher-king (Guthrie 1962, 333). The\nactual situation appears to be considerably more complicated. The\nancient evidence, apart from the Seventh Letter, presents the\nrelationship between Archytas and Plato in diametrically opposed ways.\nOne tradition does present Archytas as the Pythagorean master at whose\nfeet Plato sat, after Socrates had died (e.g., Cicero, Rep. I\n10.16), but another tradition makes Archytas the student of Plato, to\nwhom he owed his fame and success in Tarentum (Demosthenes [?],\nErotic Oration 44).", "\nThe Seventh Letter itself is of contested authenticity. Many\nscholars regard it either as the work of Plato himself or of a student\nof Plato who had considerable familiarity with Plato’s\ninvolvement in events in Sicily (see e.g., Brisson 1987; Lloyd 1990;\nSchofield 2000), but grave doubts about this view have been raised by\nBurnyeat and Frede (2015). The letter appears to serve as an apologia\nfor Plato’s involvement in events in Sicily. Lloyd has argued,\nhowever, that the letter also serves to distance Plato from\nPythagoreanism and from Archytas (1990). Nothing in the letter\nsuggests that Plato was ever the pupil of Archytas; instead the\nrelationship is much closer to that presented in the Erotic\nOration. Plato is presented as the dominant figure upon whom\nArchytas depends both philosophically and politically. Archytas writes\nto Plato claiming that Dionysius II has made great progress in\nphilosophy, in order to urge Plato to come to Sicily a third time\n(339d-e). These claims are belied as soon as Plato arrives (340b). The\nletter thus suggests that, far from being the Pythagorean master from\nwhom Plato learned his philosophy, Archytas had a very imperfect\nunderstanding of what Plato considered philosophy to be. The letter\nmakes clear that Plato does have a relationship of xenia,\n“guest-friendship,” with Archytas and others at Tarentum\n(339e, 350a). This relationship could have been established on\nPlato’s first visit in 388/7, since Plato uses it as a basis to\nestablish a similar relationship between Archytas and Dionysius II\nduring his second visit in 367 (338c). It is also the relationship in\nterms of which Plato appeals to Archytas for help, when he is in\ndanger after the third trip to Sicily goes badly (350a). Such a\nfriendship need not imply any close personal intimacy, however.\nAristotle classifies xenia as a friendship for utility and\npoints out that such friends do not necessarily spend much time\ntogether or even find each other’s company pleasant (EN\n1156a26 ff.). Apart from Archytas’ rescue of Plato in 361 (even\nthis is described as devised by Plato [350a]), Plato is clearly the\ndominant figure in the relationship. Archytas is portrayed as\nPlato’s inferior in his understanding of philosophy, and Plato\nis even presented as responsible for some of Archytas’ political\nsuccess, insofar as he establishes the relationship between Archytas\nand Dionysius II, which is described as of considerable political\nimportance (339d).", "\nHow are we to unravel the true nature of the relationship between\nPlato and Archytas in the light of this conflicting evidence? Apart\nfrom the Seventh Letter, Plato never makes a direct reference\nto Archytas. He does, however, virtually quote a sentence from\nArchytas’ book on harmonics in Book VII of the Republic\n(530d), and his discussions of the science of stereometry shortly\nbefore this are likely to have some connections to Archytas’\nwork in solid geometry (528d). It is thus in the context of the\ndiscussion of the sciences that Plato refers to Archytas, and the\nremains of Archytas’ work focus precisely on the sciences (e.g.,\nfr. B1). Both strands of the tradition can be reconciled, if we\nsuppose that Plato’s first visit to Italy and Sicily was at\nleast in part motivated by his desire to meet Archytas, as the first\ntradition claims, but that he sought Archytas out not as a new\n“model philosopher” but rather as an expert in the\nmathematical sciences, in which Plato had developed a deep interest.\nIn Republic VII, Plato is critical of Pythagorean harmonics\nand of current work in solid geometry on philosophical grounds, so\nthat, while he undoubtedly learned a considerable amount of\nmathematics from Archytas, he clearly disagreed with Archytas’\nunderstanding of the philosophical uses of the sciences. In 388\nTarentum had not yet reached the height of its power, and Archytas is\nnot likely to have achieved his political dominance yet, so that there\nmay also be some truth to the claim of the second tradition that\nArchytas did not achieve his great practical success until after his\ncontact with Plato; whether or not that success had any direct\nrelationship to his contact with Plato is more doubtful. On their\nfirst meeting in 388/7, Plato and Archytas established a relationship\nof guest-friendship, which obligated them to further each\nother’s interests, which they did, as the events of\n367–361 show. Plato and Archytas need not have been in agreement\non philosophical issues and are perhaps better seen as competitive\ncolleagues engaged in an ongoing debate as to the value of the\nsciences for philosophy (Huffman 2005, 32–42)." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 Archytas and Plato" }, { "content": [ "\nMore pages of text have been preserved in Archytas’ name than in\nthe name of any other Pythagorean. Unfortunately the vast majority of\nthis material is rightly regarded as spurious. The same is true of the\nPythagorean tradition in general; the vast majority of texts which\npurport to be by early Pythagoreans are, in fact, later forgeries.\nSome of these forgeries were produced for purely monetary reasons; a\ntext of a “rare” work by a famous Pythagorean could fetch\na considerable sum from book collectors. There were characteristics\nunique to the Pythagorean tradition, however, that led to a\nproliferation of forgeries. Starting as early as the later fourth\ncentury BC, Pythagoras came to be regarded, in some circles, as the\nphilosopher par excellence, to whom all truth had been revealed. All\nlater philosophy, insofar as it was true, was a restatement of this\noriginal revelation (see, e.g., O’Meara 1989). In order to\nsupport this view of Pythagoras, texts were forged in the name of\nPythagoras and other early Pythagoreans, to show that they had, in\nfact, anticipated the most important ideas of Plato and Aristotle.\nThese pseudo-Pythagorean texts are thus characterized by the use of\ncentral Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, expressed in the technical\nterminology used by Plato and Aristotle. Some of the forgeries even\nattempt to improve on Plato and Aristotle by adding refinements to\ntheir positions, which were first advanced several hundred years after\ntheir deaths. The date and place of origin of these pseudo-Pythagorean\ntreatises is difficult to determine, but most seem to have been\ncomposed between 150 BC and 100 AD (Burkert 1972b; Centrone 1990;\nMoraux 1984); Rome (Burkert 1972b) and Alexandria (Centrone 1990) are\nthe most likely places of origin. Archytas is the dominant figure in\nthis pseudo-Pythagorean tradition, probably because of his connection\nto Plato (Zhmud 2019). In Thesleff 1965’s collection of the\npseudo-Pythagorean writings, forty-five of the two-hundred and\nforty-five pages (2-48), about 20%, comprising some 1,200 lines, are\ndevoted to texts forged in Archytas’ name. On the other hand,\nthe fragments likely to be genuine, which are collected in DK, fill\nout only a hundred lines of text. Thus, over ten times more spurious\nthan genuine material has been preserved in Archytas’ name. It\nmay well be that the style and Doric dialect of the pseudo-Pythagorean\nwritings were also based on the model of Archytas’ genuine\nwritings." ], "subsection_title": "1.5 The Authenticity Question" }, { "content": [ "\nThe treatises under Archytas’ name collected in Thesleff 1965\nhave been almost universally regarded as not by the historical\nArchytas, except for On Law and Justice, where there has been\nconsiderable controversy. Most are only preserved in fragments,\nalthough there are two brief complete works. The most famous of these\npseudepigrapha is Concerning the Whole System [sc. of\nCategories] or Concerning the Ten Categories (preserved\ncomplete, see Szlezak 1972). This work along with the treatise On\nOpposites (Thesleff 1965, 15.3–19.2) and the much later\nTen Universal Assertions (preserved complete, first ascribed\nto Archytas in the 15th century AD; see Szlezak 1972)\nrepresent the attempt to claim Aristotle’s doctrine of\ncategories for Archytas and the Pythagoreans (see also Griffin 2015).\nThis attempt was to some extent successful; both Simplicius and\nIamblichus regarded the Archytan works on categories as genuine\nanticipations of Aristotle (CAG VIII. 2, 9–25).\nConcerning the Ten Categories and On Opposites are\nvery frequently cited in the ancient commentaries on Aristotle’s\nCategories. Pseudo-Archytas identifies ten categories with\nnames that are virtually identical to those used by Aristotle, and his\nlanguage follows Aristotle closely in many places. The division of\nArchytas’ work into two treatises, Concerning the Ten\nCategories and On Opposites, reflects the work of\nAndronicus of Rhodes, who first separated the last six chapters of\nAristotle’s Categories from the rest. Thus, the works\nin Archytas’ name must have been composed after\nAndronicus’ work in the first century BC. Other pseudepigrapha\nin metaphysics and epistemology include On Principles\n(Thesleff 1965, 19.3 – 20.17) and On Intelligence and\nPerception (Thesleff 1965, 36.12–39.25), which includes a\nparaphrase of the divided line passage in Plato’s\nRepublic. Mansfeld has recently shown that Fragment 1 of the\nlatter work in Thesleff’s collection belongs to the former work\n(Mansfeld 2019). De Cesaris and Horky (2018) provide commentary on\nOn Intelligence and Perception, but much remains obscure in\nthis difficult work. Mansfeld (2019) shows that On Intelligence\nand Perception is not likely to have been an influence on the\naccount of Pythagorean principles in Aetius Placita 1.3.8 as\nhas been suggested by De Cesaris and Horky (2018). Ulacco (2017)\nestablishes new texts (with commentary) for On Principles,\nOn Intelligence and Perception and On Opposites.\nFurther metaphysical and epistemological works include On\nBeing (Thesleff 1965, 40.1–16) and On Wisdom\n(Thesleff 1965, 43.24–45.4). The authenticity of this latter\nwork has recently been defended on the grounds that its admitted\nsimilarities to passages in Aristotle are a result of Archytas’\ninfluence on Aristotle rather than an indication that the work was\nforged on the basis of Aristotle (Johnson 2008, 193–194). It is\nindeed true that Aristotle devoted several lost works to Archytas and\nmust have been familiar with his thought. However, the issue of\nauthenticity within the Pythagorean tradition has a different\ncharacter than is the case with other ancient authors. In the case of\nan author such as Plato, where the vast majority of surviving works\nare surely authentic, the onus of proof is on anyone who wants to\nargue that a work is spurious. In the Pythagorean tradition, on the\nother hand, where surely spurious works far outnumber genuine ones,\nthe situation is reversed. The onus of proof rests on anyone who\nregards a Pythagorean work as genuine to show that it does not fit the\npattern of the forged Pythagorean treatises and that its contents can\nbe corroborated by evidence dating before the third century, when the\nPythagorean pseudepigrapha start to be generated. Since On\nWisdom does share with the pseudepigrapha the characteristic of\nusing important Aristotelian distinctions (Huffman 2005,\n598–599), even if it is not as blatant a copy of\nAristotle’s ideas as the works on categories ascribed to\nArchytas, it is much more likely that it was forged on the basis of\nAristotle than that Aristotle is using On Wisdom without\nattribution. In order for the latter situation to be probable there\nwould need to be fourth-century evidence independent of On\nWisdom which ascribed the ideas found in it to Archytas. Horky\n2015 includes On Wisdom among the pseudepigrapha and provides\nanalysis of it. For recent discussions of the nature of the\npseudepigrapha ascribed to Archytas see Bonazzi 2013 and Centrone\n2014. For the nature of the appropriation of Aristotle in\npseudepigrapha ascribed to Archytas and other early Pythagoreans see\nUlacco 2016.", "\nThere are also fragments of two pseudepigrapha on ethics and politics,\nwhich have recent editions with commentary: On the Good and Happy\nMan (Centrone 1990), which shows connections to Arius Didymus, an\nauthor of the first century BC, and On Moral Education\n(Centrone 1990), which has ties to Carneades (2nd c. BC). The status\nof one final treatise is less clear. The fragments of On Law and\nJustice (Thesleff 1965, 33.1–36.11) were studied in some\ndetail by Delatte (1922), who showed that the treatise deals with the\npolitical conceptions of the fourth century and who came to the modest\nconclusion that the work might be by Archytas, since there were no\npositive indications of late composition. Thesleff similarly concluded\nthat the treatise “may be authentic or at least comparatively\nold” (1961, 112), while Minar maintained that “it has an\nexcellent claim to authenticity” (1942, 111). Its authenticity\nwas supported by Johnson (2008, 194–198) but more recently Horky\nand Johnson argue that it was not written by Archytas himself and\npropose the somewhat Byzantine theory that it was written by an author\nwho based it on a speech which they hypothesize that Aristoxenus\nassigned to Archytas in his Life of Archytas (2020:\n459–460). On the other hand, DK did not include the fragments of\nOn Law and Justice among the genuine fragments, and most\nrecent scholars have argued that the treatise is spurious. Aalders\nprovides the most detailed treatment, although a number of his\narguments are inconclusive (1968, 13–20). Other opponents of\nauthenticity are Burkert (1972a), Moraux (1984, 670–677),\nCentrone (2000) and most recently Schofield (2014). The connections of\nOn Law and Justice to the genuine Fr. B2 of Archytas speak\nfor its authenticity, but its similarities, sometimes word for word,\nto pseudo-Pythagorean treatises by “Diotogenes” (Thesleff\n76.2–3, 71. 21–2), “Damippos” (Thesleff 68.26)\nand “Metopos” (Thesleff 119.28) argue for its\nspuriousness. Moreover, the authentic Fr. 3 of Archytas shows that\ncalculation (logismos) was the key concept in his political\nphilosophy. Its total absence from On Law and Justice, whose\nfocus is political philosophy, along with the absence of other key\nterms in Fr. 3 (e.g., pleonexia, homonoia and\nisotēs) is hard to explain, if On Law and\nJustice is authentic (Huffman 2005, 599–606). For a recent\nargument against the authenticity of On Law and Justice,\nwhich further contrasts it with the authentic Fr. 3, see Schofield\n2014: 82–5. Even if the work belongs among the pseudepigrapha\nHorky and Johnson are surely right that the controversy about its\nauthenticity has led scholars to neglect the philosophic content of\nthe treatise (Horky and Johnson 2020: 487) and they provide a\ncommentary that attempts to elucidate this difficult text. They regard\nthe text as closely tied to genuine fragments of Archytas and suggest\nthat it can help us understand those fragments, but the similarities\nare of a very general sort. As Zhmud has recently argued there is very\nlittle that is genuinely Pythagorean in the pseudepigrapha (Zhmud\n2019) and that also appears to be true of On Law and Justice.\n", "\nSome testimonia suggest that there were even more pseudo-Archytan\ntreatises, which have not survived even in fragments (Thesleff 47.8\nff.). Two spurious letters of Archytas survive. One is the letter to\nwhich the pseudo-Platonic Twelfth Letter is responding (D.L.\nVIII 79–80), and the other is the purported letter of Archytas\nto Dionysius II, which was sent along with the ship in order to secure\nPlato’s release in 361 (D.L. III 21–2). Archytas was a\npopular figure in the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, when works\ncontinued to be written in his name, usually with the spelling\nArchitas or Archita. The Ars geometriae, which is ascribed to\nBoethius, but was in reality composed in the 12th century\n(Folkerts 1970, 105), ascribes discoveries in mathematics to Architas\nwhich are clearly spurious (Burkert 1972a, 406). Several alchemical\nrecipes involving the wax of the left ear of a dog and the heart of a\nwolf are ascribed to Architas in ps.-Albertus Magnus, The Marvels\nof the World (De mirabilibus mundi –\n13th century AD). Numerous selections from a book entitled\nOn Events in Nature (de eventibus in natura, also\ncited as de effectibus in natura and as de eventibus\nfuturorum) by Archita Tharentinus (or Tharentinus, or just\nTharen) are preserved in the medieval texts known as The Light of\nthe Soul (Lumen Animae), which were composed in the\nfourteenth century and circulated widely in Europe in the fifteenth\ncentury as a manual for preachers (Rouse 1971; Thorndike 1934, III\n546–60). An apocryphal work, The Circular Theory of the\nThings in the Heaven, by Archytas Maximus [!], which has never\nbeen published in full, is preserved in Codex Ambrosianus D 27 sup.\n(See Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum, ed. F. Cumont\net al., Vol. III, p. 11). " ], "subsection_title": "1.6 Pseudepigrapha Ascribed to Archytas" }, { "content": [ "\nNo list of Archytas’ works has come down to us from antiquity,\nso that we don’t know how many books he wrote. In the face of\nthe large mass of spurious works, it is disappointing that only a few\nfragments of genuine works have survived. Most scholars accept as\ngenuine the four fragments printed by Diels and Kranz (B1–4).\nBurkert (1972a, 220 n.14 and 379 n. 46) raised some concerns about the\nauthenticity of even some of these fragments, but see the responses of\nBowen (1982) and Huffman (1985 and 2005). Our evidence for the titles\nof Archytas’ genuine writings depends largely on the citations\ngiven by the authors who quote the fragments. Fragments B1 and B2 are\nreported to come from a treatise entitled Harmonics, and the\nmajor testimonia about Archytas’ harmonic theory are likely to\nbe ultimately based on this book (A16–19). This treatise began\nwith a discussion of the basic principles of acoustics (B1), defined\nthe three types of mean which are of importance in music theory (B2),\nand went on to present Archytas’ mathematical descriptions of\nthe tetrachord (the fourth) in the three main genera (chromatic,\ndiatonic, and enharmonic – A16-A19). B3 probably comes from a\nwork On Sciences, which may have been a more general\ndiscussion of the value of mathematics for human life in general and\nfor the establishment of a just state in particular. New support for\nits authenticity has been provided by Schofield (2009). B4 comes from\na work entitled Discourses (Diatribai). The fragment\nitself asserts the priority of the science of calculation (ha\nlogistika, “logistic”) to the other sciences, such as\ngeometry, and thus suggests a technical work of mathematics. The title\nDiatribai would more normally suggest a treatise of ethical\ncontent, however, so that in this work the sciences may have been\nevaluated in terms of their contribution to the wisdom that leads to a\ngood life.", "\nA relatively rich set of testimonia, many from authors of the fourth\ncentury BC, indicate that Archytas wrote other books as well.\nArchytas’ famous argument for the unlimited extent of the\nuniverse (A24), his theory of vision (A25), and his account of motion\n(A23, A23a) all suggest that he may have written a work on cosmology.\nAristotle’s comments in the Metaphysics suggest that\nArchytas may have written a book on definition (A22), and A20 and A21\nmight suggest a work on arithmetic. Perhaps there was a treatise on\ngeometry or solid geometry in which Archytas’ solution to the\nproblem of doubling the cube (A14–15) was published. There is\nalso a tradition of anecdotes about Archytas, which probably\nultimately derives from Aristoxenus’ Life of Archytas\n(A7, A8, A9, A11). It is possible that even the testimonia for\nArchytas’ argument for an unlimited universe and his theory of\nvision were derived from anecdotes preserved by Aristoxenus, and not\nat all from works of Archytas’ own.", "\nIt is uncertain whether the treatises On Flutes (B6), On\nMachines (B1 and B7), and On Agriculture (B1 and B8),\nwhich were in circulation under the name of Archytas, were in fact by\nArchytas of Tarentum or by other men of the same name. Diogenes\nLaertius lists three other writers with the name Archytas (VIII 82).\nThe treatise On the Decad mentioned by Theon (B5) might be by\nArchytas, but the treatise by Philolaus with which it is paired is\nspurious (Huffman 1993, 347–350), thus suggesting that the same\nmay be true of the treatise under Archytas’ name." ], "subsection_title": "1.7 Genuine Works and Testimonia" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Archytas as Mathematician and Harmonic Theorist", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nArchytas was the first person to arrive at a solution to one of the\nmost famous mathematical puzzles in antiquity, the duplication of the\ncube. The most romantic version of the story, which occurs in many\nvariations and ultimately goes back to Eratosthenes (3rd c. BC),\nreports that the inhabitants of the Greek island of Delos were beset\nby a plague and, when they consulted an oracle for advice, were told\nthat, if they doubled the size of a certain altar, which had the form\nof a cube, the plague would stop (Eutocius, in Archim. sphaer. et\ncyl. II [III 88.3–96.27 Heiberg/Stamatis]). The\nsimple-minded response to the oracle, which is actually assigned to\nthe Delians in some versions, is to build a second altar identical to\nthe first one and set it on top of the first (Philoponus, In Anal.\npost., CAG XIII.3, 102.12–22). The resulting altar does\nindeed have a volume twice that of the first altar, but it is no\nlonger a cube. The next simple-minded response is to assume that,\nsince we want an altar that is double in volume, while still remaining\na cube, we should build the new altar with a side that is double the\nlength of the side of the original altar. This approach fails as well.\nDoubling the side of the altar produces a new altar that is not twice\nthe volume of the original altar but eight times the volume. If the\noriginal altar had a side of two, then its volume would be\n23 or 8, while an altar built on a side twice as long will\nhave a volume of 43 or 64. What then is the length of the\nside which will produce a cube with twice the volume of the original\ncube? The Delians were at a loss and presented their problem to Plato\nin the Academy. Plato then posed the “Delian Problem,” as\nit came to be known, to mathematicians associated with the Academy,\nand no less than three solutions were devised, those of Eudoxus,\nMenaechmus, and Archytas.", "\nIt is not clear whether or not the story about the Delians has any\nbasis in fact. Even if it does, it should not be understood to suggest\nthat the problem of doubling the cube first arose in the fourth\ncentury with the Delians. We are told that the mathematician,\nHippocrates of Chios, who was active in the second half of the fifth\ncentury, had already confronted the problem and had reduced it to a\nslightly different problem (Eutocius, in Archim. sphaer. et\ncyl. II [III 88.3–96.27 Heiberg/Stamatis]). Hippocrates\nrecognized that if we could find two mean proportionals between the\nlength of the side of the original cube G, and length D, where D = 2G,\nso that G : x :: x : y :: y : D, then the cube on length x will be\ndouble the cube on length G. Exactly how Hippocrates came to see this\nis conjectural and need not concern us here, but that he was right can\nbe seen relatively easily. Each of the values in the continued\nproportion G : x :: x : y :: y : D is equal to G : x, so we can set\nthem all equal to G : x. If we do this and multiply the three ratios\ntogether we get the value G3 : x3. On the other\nhand, if we take the same continued proportion and carry out the\nmultiplication in the original terms, then G : x times x : y yields G\n: y, and G : y times the remaining term gives G : D. Thus G : D =\nG3 : x3, but D is twice G so x3 is\ntwice G3. Remember that G was the length of the side of the\noriginal cube, so the cube that is twice the cube built on G, will be\nthe cube built on x. The Greeks did not think of the problem as a\nproblem in algebra but rather as a problem in geometry. After\nHippocrates the problem of doubling the cube was always seen as the\nproblem of finding two lines such that they were mean proportionals\nbetween G, the length of the side of the original cube, and D, a\nlength which is double G. It was to this form of the problem that\nArchytas provided the first solution.", "\nArchytas’ solution has been rightly hailed as “the most\nremarkable of all [the solutions]” and as a “bold\nconstruction in three dimensions” (Heath 1921, 246); Mueller\ncalls it “a tour de force of the spatial\nimagination” (1997, 312 n. 23). We owe the preservation of\nArchytas’ solution to Eutocius, who in the sixth century AD\ncollected some eleven solutions to the problem as part of his\ncommentary on the second book of Archimedes’ On the Sphere\nand Cylinder. Eutocius’ source for Archytas’ solution\nwas ultimately Aristotle’s pupil Eudemus, who in the late fourth\ncentury BC wrote a history of geometry. The solution is complex and it\nis not possible to go through it step by step here (see Huffman 2005,\n342–401 for a detailed treatment of the solution). Archytas\nproceeds by constructing a series of four similar triangles (see\nFigure 1 below) and then showing that the sides are proportional so\nthat AM : AI :: AI : AK :: AK : AD, where AM was equal to the side of\nthe original cube (G) and AD was twice AM. Thus the cube double the\nvolume of the cube on AM should be built on AI. The real difficulty\nwas in constructing the four similar triangles, where the given length\nof the side of the original cube and a length double that magnitude\nwere two of the sides in the similar triangles. The key point for the\nconstruction of these triangles, point K, was determined as the\nintersection of two rotating plane figures. The first figure is a\nsemicircle, which is perpendicular to the plane of the circle ABDZ and\nwhich starts on the diameter AED and, with point A remaining fixed,\nrotates to position AKD. The second is the triangle APD, which rotates\nup out of the plane of the circle ABDZ to position ALD. As each of\nthese figures rotates, it traces a line on the surface of a\nsemicylinder, which is perpendicular to the plane of ABDZ and has ABD\nas its base. The boldness and the imagination of the construction lies\nin envisioning the intersection at point K of the line drawn by the\nrotating semicircle on the surface of the semicylinder with the line\ndrawn by the rotating triangle on the same surface. We simply\ndon’t know what led Archytas to produce this amazing feat of\nspatial imagination, in order to construct the triangles with the\nsides in appropriate proportion. For a recent attempt to situate\nArchytas’ solution in the mathematics of his time and make it\nless “miraculous,” see Menn 2015. ", "\n\n\n\n\nFigure 1\n", "\nIn the later tradition, Plato is reported to have criticized\nArchytas’ solution for appealing to “constructions that\nuse instruments and that are mechanical” (Plutarch, Table\nTalk VIII 2.1 [718e]; Marc. XIV 5–6). Plato argued\nthat the value of geometry and of the rest of mathematics resided in\ntheir ability to turn the soul from the sensible to intelligible\nrealm. The cube with which geometry deals is not a physical cube or\neven a drawing of a cube but rather an intelligible cube that fits the\ndefinition of the cube but is not a sense object. By employing\nphysical instruments, which “required much common\nhandicraft,” and in effect constructing machines to determine\nthe two mean proportionals, Archytas was focusing not on the\nintelligible world but on the physical world and hence destroying the\nvalue of geometry. Plato’s quarrel with Archytas is a charming\nstory, but it is hard to reconcile with Archytas’ actual\nsolution, which, as we have seen, makes no appeal to any instruments\nor machines. The story of the quarrel, which is first reported in\nPlutarch in the first century AD, is also hard to reconcile with our\nearliest source for the story of the Delian problem, Eratosthenes.\nEratosthenes had himself invented an instrument to determine mean\nproportionals, the mesolab (“mean-getter”), and\nhe tells the story of the Delian problem precisely to emphasize that\nearlier solutions, including that of Archytas, were in the form of\ngeometrical demonstrations, which could not be employed for practical\npurposes. He specifically labels Archytas’ solution as\ndysmêchana, “hardly mechanical.” Some\nscholars attempt to reconcile Plutarch’s and Eratosthenes’\nversions by focusing on their different literary goals (Knorr 1986,\n22; van der Waerden 1963, 161; Wolfer 1954, 12 ff.; Sachs 1917, 150);\nsome suggest that the rotation of the semicircle and the triangle in\nArchytas’ solution, might be regarded as mechanical, since\nmotion is involved (Knorr 1986, 22). It may be, however, that\nPlutarch’s story of a quarrel between Plato and Archytas over\nthe use of mechanical devices in geometry is an invention of the later\ntradition (Riginos 1976, 146; Zhmud 1998, 217) and perhaps served as a\nsort of foundation myth for the science of mechanics, a myth which\nexplained the separation of mechanics from philosophy as the result of\na quarrel between two philosophers. In the Republic, Plato is\ncritical of the solid geometry of his day, but his criticism makes no\nmention of the use of instruments. His criticism instead focuses on\nthe failure of solid geometry to be developed into a coherent\ndiscipline alongside geometry and astronomy (528b-d). This neglect of\nsolid geometry is ascribed to the failure of the Greek city-states to\nhold these difficult studies in honor, the lack of a director to\norganize the studies, and the arrogance of the current experts in the\nfield, who would not submit to such a director. Since Archytas’\nduplication of the cube shows him to be one of the leading solid\ngeometers of the time, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Plato\nregarded him as one of the arrogant experts, who focused on solving\ncharming problems but failed to produce a coherent discipline of solid\ngeometry. Since Archytas was a leading political figure in Tarentum,\nit is also possible that Plato was criticizing him for not making\nTarentum a state which held solid geometry in esteem. ", "\nBrisson (2013) takes a sceptical stance towards the evidence and\nconcludes that Archytas never solved the problem of the duplication of\nthe cube. He argues that Plato would have mentioned a solution to the\nproblem if one existed in his day and that the mathematics of the\nsolution ascribed to Archytas is impossible for someone of his time,\nsince it employs conic sections, which were not developed until the\nthird century (2013: 220–1). However, while Plato does criticize\nthe state of stereometry (solid geometry) in his day, he also affirms\nthat there are people studying it and that some of their results have\ncharm and beauty (Rep. 528c-d). There is no reason that\nArchytas’ duplication could not be included among these results.\nMoreover, the mathematics used in Archytas’ solution in no way\nrelies on conic sections but relies on mathematics found in\nEuclid’s Elements Books 1, 3, 4, 6, and 11, which rely\non geometry of the fourth century when Archytas was active (Heath\n1921, Knorr 1986, Mueller 1997 and Menn 2015 all regard the\nmathematics as appropriate for Archytas). Menaechmus, who lived two\ngenerations after Archytas, is the first person to solve the problem\nusing conic sections (see Menn 2015: 415–6). Brisson has to\ndiscount the explicit tradition that already in the fourth century\nEudemus knew of Archytas’ solution and assume that the solution\nwas developed by a compiler in the latter tradition, but it is\nimplausible that such a compiler could have developed the\nsophisticated mathematics of the solution and that, if he were such an\naccomplished mathematician, he would ascribe it to Archytas." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Doubling the Cube" }, { "content": [ "\nOne of the most startling discoveries of early Greek science was that\nthe fundamental intervals of music, the octave, the fourth, and the\nfifth, corresponded to whole number ratios of string length. Thus, if\nwe pluck a string of length x and then a string of length\n2x, we will hear the interval of an octave between the two\nsounds. If the two string lengths are in the ratio 4 : 3, we will hear\na fourth, and, if the ratio is 3 : 2, we will hear a fifth. This\ndiscovery that the phenomena of musical sound are governed by whole\nnumber ratios must have played a central role in the Pythagorean\nconception, first expressed by Philolaus, that all things are known\nthrough number (DK 44 B4). The next step in harmonic theory was to\ndescribe an entire octave length scale in terms of mathematical\nratios. The earliest such description of a scale is found in Philolaus\nfr. B6. Philolaus recognizes that, if we go up the interval of a\nfourth from any given note, and then up the interval of a fifth, the\nfinal note will be an octave above the first note. Thus, the octave is\nmade up of a fourth and a fifth. In mathematical terms, the ratios\nthat govern the fifth (3 : 2) and fourth (4 : 3) are added by\nmultiplying the terms and thus produce an octave (3 : 2 × 4 : 3\n= 12 : 6 = 2 : 1). The interval between the note that is a fourth up\nfrom the starting note and the note that is a fifth up was regarded as\nthe basic unit of the scale, the whole tone, which corresponded to the\nratio of 9 : 8 (subtraction of ratios is carried out by dividing the\nterms, or cross multiplying: 3 : 2 / 4 : 3 = 9 : 8). The fifth was\nthus regarded as a fourth plus a whole tone, and the octave can be\nregarded as two fourths plus a whole tone. The fourth consists of two\nwhole tones with a remainder, which has the unlovely ratio of 256 :\n243 (4 : 3 / 9 : 8 = 32 : 27 / 9 : 8 = 256 : 243). Philolaus’\nscale thus consisted of the following intervals: 9 : 8, 9 : 8, 256 :\n243 [these three intervals take us up a fourth], 9 : 8, 9 : 8, 9 : 8,\n256 : 243 [these four intervals make up a fifth and complete the\noctave from our staring note]. This scale is known as the Pythagorean\ndiatonic and is the scale that Plato adopted in the construction of\nthe world soul in the Timaeus (36a-b).", "\nArchytas took harmonic theory to a whole new level of theoretical and\nmathematical sophistication. Ptolemy, writing in the second century\nAD, identifies Archytas as having “engaged in the study of music\nmost of all the Pythagoreans” (A16). First, Archytas provided a\ngeneral explanation of pitch, arguing that the pitch of a sound\ndepends on the speed with which the sound is propagated and travels\n(B1). Thus, if a stick is waved back and forth rapidly, it will\nproduce a sound that travels rapidly through the air, which will be\nperceived as of a higher pitch than the sound produced by a stick\nwaved more slowly. Archytas is correct to associate pitch with speed,\nbut he misunderstood the role of speed. The pitch does not depend on\nthe speed with which a sound reaches us but rather on the frequency of\nimpacts in a given period of time. A string that vibrates more rapidly\nproduces a sound of a higher pitch, but all sounds, regardless of\npitch, travel at an equal velocity, if the medium is the same.\nAlthough Archytas’ account of pitch was ultimately incorrect, it\nwas very influential. It was taken over and adapted by both Plato and\nAristotle and remained the dominant theory throughout antiquity\n(Barker 1989, 41 n. 47; Barker 2014: 187). Second, Archytas introduced\nnew mathematical rigor into Pythagorean harmonics. One of the\nimportant results of the analysis of music in terms of whole number\nratios is the recognition that it is not possible to divide the basic\nmusical intervals in half. The octave is not divided into two equal\nhalves but into a fourth and a fifth, the fourth is not divided into\ntwo equal halves but into two whole tones and a remainder. The whole\ntone cannot be divided into two equal half tones. On the other hand,\nit is possible to divide a double octave in half. Mathematically this\ncan be seen by recognizing that it is possible to insert a mean\nproportional between the terms of the ratio corresponding to the\ndouble octave (4 : 1) so that 4 : 2 :: 2 : 1. The double octave can\nthus be divided into two equal parts each having a ratio of 2 : 1. The\nratios which govern the basic musical intervals (2 : 1, 4 : 3, 3 : 2,\n9 : 8), all belong to a type of ratio known as a superparticular ratio\n– roughly speaking, ratios of the form (n + 1) :\nn. Archytas made a crucial contribution by providing a rigorous\nproof that there is no mean proportional between numbers in\nsuperparticular ratio (A19) and hence that the basic musical intervals\ncannot be divided in half. Archytas’ proof was later taken over\nand modified slightly in the Sectio Canonis ascribed to\nEuclid (Prop. 3; see Barker 1989, 195). On Archytas’ proof see\nHuffman 2005: 451–70 and Barker 2007: 303–5.", "\nArchytas’ final contribution to music theory has to do with the\nstructure of the scale (for a more detailed account than what follows\nsee Huffman 2005: 402–25 and Barker 2007: 292–302). The\nGreeks used a number of different scales, which were distinguished by\nthe way in which the fourth, or tetrachord, was constructed. These\nscales were grouped into three main types or genera. One genus was\ncalled the diatonic; one example of this is the Pythagorean diatonic\ndescribed above, which is built on the tetrachord with the intervals 9\n: 8, 9 : 8 and 256 : 243 and was used by Philolaus and Plato. There is\nno doubt that Archytas knew of this diatonic scale, but his own\ndiatonic tetrachord was somewhat different, being composed of the\nintervals 9 : 8, 8 : 7 and 28 : 27. Archytas also defined scales in\nthe two other major genera, the enharmonic and chromatic.\nArchytas’ enharmonic tetrachord is composed of the intervals 5 :\n4, 36 : 35 and 28 : 27 and his chromatic tetrachord of the intervals\n32 : 27, 243 : 224, and 28 : 27. There are several puzzles about the\ntetrachords which Archytas adopts in each of the genera. First, why\ndoes Archytas reject the Pythagorean diatonic used by Philolaus and\nPlato? Second, Ptolemy, who is our major source for Archytas’\ntetrachords (A16), argues that Archytas adopted as a principle that\nall concordant intervals should correspond to superparticular ratios.\nThe ratios in Archytas’ diatonic and enharmonic tetrachords are\nindeed superparticular, but two of the ratios in his chromatic\ntetrachord are not superparticular (32 : 27 and 243 : 224). Why are\nthese ratios not superparticular as well? Finally, Plato criticizes\nPythagorean harmonics in the Republic for seeking numbers in\nheard harmonies rather than ascending to generalized problems (531c).\nCan any sense be made of this criticism in light of Archytas’\ntetrachords? The basis for an answer to all of these questions is\ncontained in the work of Winnington-Ingram (1932) and Barker (1989,\n46-52). The crucial point is that Archytas’ account of the\ntetrachords in each of the three genera can be shown to correspond to\nthe musical practice of his day; Ptolemy’s criticisms miss the\nmark because of his ignorance of musical practice in Archytas’\nday, some 500 years before Ptolemy (Winnington-Ingram 1932, 207).\nArchytas is giving mathematical descriptions of scales actually in\nuse; although mathematical considerations did play a role (Barker\n2007: 295–302), he arrived at his numbers in part by observation\nof the way in which musicians tuned their instruments (Barker 1989,\n50–51). He did not follow the Pythagorean diatonic scale because\nit did not correspond to any scale actually in use, although it does\ncorrespond to a method of tuning. The unusual numbers in\nArchytas’ chromatic tetrachord do correspond to a chromatic\nscale in use in Archytas’ day. Ptolemy was wrong to suggest that\nArchytas adhered to the principle that all concordant intervals should\nhave superparticular ratios (Huffman 2005: 422–3), although\nBarker suggests that he may have been following a different but\nrelated principle (2007: 301). Archytas thus provides a brilliant\nanalysis of the music of his day, but it is precisely his focus on\nactual musical practice that draws Plato’s ire. Plato does not\nwant him to focus on the music he hears about him (“heard\nharmonies”) but rather to ascend to consider quite abstract\nquestions about which numbers are harmonious with which. Plato might\nwell have welcomed a principle of concordance based solely on\nmathematical considerations, such as the principle that only\nsuperparticular ratios are concordant, but Archytas wanted to explain\nthe numbers of the music he actually heard played. There is an\nimportant metaphysical issue at stake here. Plato is calling for the\nstudy of number in itself, apart from the sensible world, while\nArchytas, like Pythagoreans before him, envisages no split between a\nsensible and an intelligible world and is looking for the numbers\nwhich govern sensible things. For discussions of Archytas as the\ntarget of Plato’s complaints in the Republic see\nHuffman 2005: 423–5 and Barker 2014:192–3." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Music and Mathematics" }, { "content": [ "\nThere have been tendencies both to overvalue and to undervalue\nArchytas’ achievement as a mathematician. Van der Waerden went\nso far as to add to Archytas’ accomplishments both Book VIII of\nEuclid’s Elements and the treatise on the mathematics\nof music known as the Sectio Canonis, which is ascribed to\nEuclid in the ancient tradition (1962, 152–5). Although later\nscholars (e.g., Knorr 1975: 244) repeat these assertions, they are\nbased in part on a very subjective analysis of Archytas’ style.\nArchytas influenced the Sectio Canonis, since Proposition 3\nis based on a proof by Archytas (A19), but the treatise cannot be by\nArchytas, because its theory of pitch and its account of the diatonic\nand enharmonic tetrachords differ from those of Archytas. On the other\nhand, some scholars have cast doubt on Archytas’ prowess as a\nmathematician, arguing that some of his work looks like “mere\narithmology” and “mathematical mystification”\n(Burkert 1972a, 386; Mueller 1997, 289). This judgment rests largely\non a text (A17) that has been mistakenly interpreted as presenting\nArchytas’ own views, whereas, in fact, it presents\nArchytas’ report of his predecessors (Huffman 2005:\n428–37; Barker 2007: 193–5). The duplication of the cube\nand Archytas’ contributions to the mathematics of music (Barker\n2007: 287 calls him “a heroic figure in the early history of\nmathematical harmonics”) show that there can be no doubt that he\nwas one of the leading mathematicians of the first part of the fourth\ncentury BC. This was certainly the judgment of antiquity. In his\nhistory of geometry, Eudemus identified Archytas along with Leodamas\nand Theaetetus as the three most prominent mathematicians of\nPlato’s generation (A6 = Proclus, in Eucl., prol. II\n66, 14). Netz (2014) has recently argued that there were two networks\nthat accounted for most of the progress in ancient Greek mathematics.\nThe later used Archimedes as the paradigmatic figure, while the\nearlier used Archytas. Netz suggests that we should apply Bertrand\nRussell’s description of Pythagoras as “one of the most\nimportant men that ever lived” to Archytas instead both because\nof his mathematical genius and also because of his pivotal position in\nthree different groups: (1) South Italian Pythagoreans, (2) Greek\nmathematicians, and (3) philosophers whose work was in dialogue with\nPlato (2014: 181–2). " ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Evaluation of Archytas as Mathematician" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Archytas on the Sciences", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nArchytas B1 is the beginning of his book on harmonics, and most of it\nis devoted to the basic principles of his theory of acoustics and, in\nparticular, to his theory of pitch described in section 2.2 above. In\nthe first five lines, however, Archytas provides a proem on the value\nof the sciences (mathêmata) in general. There are\nseveral important features of this proem. First, Archytas identifies a\nset of four sciences: astronomy, geometry, “logistic”\n(arithmetic) and music. B1 is thus probably the earliest text to\nidentify the set of sciences that became known as the\nquadrivium in the middle ages and that constitute four of the\nseven liberal arts. Second, Archytas does not present this\nclassification of sciences as his own discovery but instead begins\nwith praise of his predecessors who have worked in these fields. Some\nscholars argue that, when he praises “those concerned with the\nsciences,” he is thinking only of the Pythagoreans (e.g., Zhmud\n1997, 198 and Lasserre 1954, 36), but this is wrongly to assume that\nall early Greek mathematics is Pythagorean. Archytas gives no hint\nthat he is limiting his remarks to Pythagoreans, and, in areas where\nwe can identify those who influenced him most, these figures are not\nlimited to Pythagoreans (e.g., Hippocrates of Chios in geometry, see\nsection 2.1). He praises his predecessors in the sciences, because,\n“having discerned well about the nature of wholes, they were\nlikely also to see well how things are in their parts” and to\n“have correct understanding about individual things as they\nare.” It is here that Archytas is putting forth his own\nunderstanding of the nature and value of the sciences; because of the\nbrevity of the passage, much remains unclear. Archytas appears to be\npraising those concerned with the sciences for their discernment,\ntheir ability to make distinctions (diagignôskein). He\nargues that they begin by distinguishing the nature of wholes, the\nuniversal concepts of a science, and, because they do this well, they\nare able to understand particular objects (the parts). Archytas\nappears to follow exactly this procedure in his Harmonics. He\nbegins by defining the most universal concept of the science, sound,\nand explains it in terms of other concepts such as impact, before\ngoing on to distinguish between audible and inaudible sounds and\nsounds of high and low pitch. The goal of the science is not the\nmaking of these distinctions concerning universal concepts, however,\nbut knowledge of the true nature of individual things. Thus,\nArchytas’ harmonics ends with the mathematical description of\nthe musical intervals that we hear practicing musicians use (see\nsection 2.2 above). Astronomy will end with a mathematical description\nof the periods, risings and settings of the planets. One way to\nunderstand Archytas’ project is to see him as working out the\nprogram suggested by his predecessor in the Pythagorean tradition,\nPhilolaus. One of Philolaus’ central theses was that we only\ngain knowledge of things insofar as we can give an account of them in\nterms of numbers (DK 44 B4). While Philolaus only took the first steps\nin this project, Archytas is much more successful in giving an account\nof individual things in the phenomenal world in terms of numbers, as\nhis description of the musical intervals shows.", "\nPlato’s account of the sciences in Book VII of the\nRepublic can be seen as a response to Archytas’ view of\nthe sciences. First Plato identifies a group of five rather than four\nsciences and decries the neglect of his proposed fifth science,\nstereometry (solid geometry), with a probable allusion to Archytas\n(see section 2.1). Plato quotes with approval Archytas’\nassertion that “these sciences seem to be akin” (B1),\nalthough he applies it just to harmonics and astronomy rather than to\nArchytas’ quadrivium and does not mention him by name.\nIn the same passage, however, Plato pointedly rejects the Pythagorean\nattempt to search for numbers in “heard harmonies.” In\ndoing so Plato is disagreeing with Archytas’ attempt to\ndetermine the numbers that govern things in the sensible world. For\nPlato, the value of the sciences is their ability to turn the eye of\nthe soul from the sensible to the intelligible realm. Book VII of the\nRepublic with its elaborate argument for the distinction\nbetween the intelligible and sensible realm, between the cave and the\nintelligible world outside the cave, may be in large part directed at\nArchytas’ attempt to use mathematics to explain the sensible\nworld. As Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes, the Pythagoreans differed\nfrom Plato precisely in their refusal to separate numbers from things\n(e.g., Metaph. 987b27)." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 The Value of the Sciences" }, { "content": [ "\nIn B4, Archytas asserts that “logistic seems to be far superior\nindeed to the other arts in regard to wisdom.” What does\nArchytas mean by “logistic”? It appears to be\nArchytas’ term for the science of number, which was mentioned as\none of the four sister sciences in B1. There is simply not enough\ncontext in B4 or other texts of Archytas to determine the meaning of\nlogistic from Archytas’ usage alone. It is necessary to rely to\nsome extent on Plato, who is the only other early figure to use the\nterm extensively. A later conception of logistic, as something that\ndeals with numbered things rather than numbers themselves, which is\nfound in, e.g., Geminus, should not be ascribed to Plato or Archytas\n(Klein 1968; Burkert 1972a, 447 n. 119). In Plato,\n“logistic” can refer to everyday calculation, what we\nwould call arithmetic (e.g. 3 × 700 = 2,100; see, Hp.\nMi. 366c). In other passages, however, Plato defines logistic in\nparallel with arithmêtikê, and treats the two of\nthem as together constituting the science of number, on which\npractical manipulation of number is based (Klein 1968, 23–24).\nBoth arithmêtikê and logistic deal with the even\nand the odd. Arithmêtikê focuses not on\nquantities but on kinds of numbers (Grg. 451b), beginning\nwith the even and the odd and presumably continuing with the types we\nfind later in Nicomachus (Ar. 1.8 – 1.13), such as\nprime, composite and even-times even. Logistic, on the other hand,\nfocuses on quantity, the “amount the odd and even have both in\nthemselves and in respect to one another” (Grg. 451c).\nAn example of one part of logistic might be the study of various sorts\nof means and proportions, which focus on the quantitative relations of\nnumbers to one another (e.g., Nicomachus, Ar. II. 21 ff.). In\nB2, Archytas would probably consider himself to be doing logistic,\nwhen he defines the three types of means which are relevant to music\n(geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic). The geometric mean arises\nwhenever three terms are so related that, as the first is to the\nsecond, so the second is to the third (e.g., 8 : 4 :: 4 : 2) and the\narithmetic, when three terms are so related that the first exceeds the\nsecond by the same amount as the second exceeds the third (e.g., 6 : 4\n:: 4 : 2). Archytas, like Plato (R. 525c), uses logistic not\njust in this narrow sense of the study of relative quantity, but also\nto designate the entire science of numbers including\narithmêtikê.", "\nWhy does Archytas think that logistic is superior to the other\nsciences? In B4, he particularly compares it to geometry, arguing that\nlogistic (1) “deals with what it wishes more vividly than\ngeometry” and (2) “completes demonstrations” where\ngeometry cannot, even “if there is any investigation concerning\nshapes.” This last remark is surprising, since the study of\nshapes would appear to be the proper domain of geometry. The most\ncommon way of explaining Archytas’ remark is to suppose that he\nis arguing that logistic is mathematically superior to geometry, in\nthat certain proofs can only be completed by an appeal to logistic.\nBurkert sees this as a reason for doubting the authenticity of the\nfragment, since the exact opposite seems to be true. Archytas could\ndetermine the cube root of two geometrically, through his solution to\nthe duplication of the cube, but could not do so arithmetically, since\nthe cube root of two is an irrational number (1972a, 220 n. 14). Other\nscholars have pointed out, however, that certain proofs in geometry do\nrequire an appeal to logistic (Knorr 1975, 311; Mueller 1992b, 90 n.\n12), e.g., logistic is required to recognize the incomensurability of\nthe diagonal with the side of the square, since incommensurability\narises when two magnitudes “have not to one another the ratio\nwhich number has to number” (Euclid X 7). These\nsuggestions show that logistic can be superior to geometry in certain\ncases, but they do not explain Archytas’ more general assertion\nthat logistic deals with whatever problems it wants more clearly than\ngeometry.", "\nHowever, it may be that B4 is not in fact comparing logistic to the\nother sciences as sciences – in terms of their relative success\nin providing demonstrations. The title of the work from which B4 is\nsaid to come, Discourses (Diatribai), is most\ncommonly used of ethical treatises. Moreover, it is specifically with\nregard to wisdom (sophia) that logistic is said to be\nsuperior, and, while sophia can refer to technical expertise,\nit more commonly refers to the highest sort of intellectual\nexcellence, often the excellence that allows us to live a good life\n(Arist., EN 1141a12; Pl., R. 428d ff.). Is there any\nsense in which logistic makes us wiser than the other sciences? Since\nArchytas evidently agreed with Philolaus that we only understand\nindividual things in the world insofar as we grasp the numbers that\ngovern them, it seems quite plausible that Archytas would regard\nlogistic as the science that makes us wise about the world. It is in\nthis sense that logistic will always be superior to geometry, even\nwhen dealing with shapes. Perhaps the most famous statue of the\nclassical period is the Doryphoros by the Argive sculptor Polyclitus,\nwhich he also referred to as the Canon (i.e., the standard). Although\nPolyclitus undoubtedly made use of geometry in constructing this\nmagnificent shape, in a famous sentence from his book, also entitled\nCanon, he asserts that his statue came to be not through many\nshapes but “through many numbers” (DK40 B2, see\nHuffman 2002a). Geometrical relations alone will not determine the\nform of a given object, we have to assign specific proportions,\nspecific numbers. Archytas also thought that numbers and logistic were\nthe basis of the just state and hence the good life. In B3 he argues\nthat it is rational calculation (logismos) that produces the\nfairness on which the state depends. Justice is a relation that needs\nto be stated numerically and it is through such a statement that rich\nand poor can live together, each seeing that he has what is fair.\nLogistic will always be superior to the other sciences, because those\nsciences will in the end rely on numbers to give us knowledge of the\nsounds we hear, the shapes we see and the movements of the heavenly\nbodies which we observe." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Logistic as the Master Science" }, { "content": [ "\nAristotle is the first Greek author to mention the sciences of optics\nand mechanics, describing optics as a subordinate science to geometry\nand mechanics as a subordinate science to solid geometry\n(APo. 78b34). Archytas does not mention either of these\nsciences in B1, when describing the work of his predecessors in the\nsciences, nor does Plato mention them. This silence suggests that the\ntwo disciplines may have first developed in the first half of the\nfourth century, when Archytas was most active, and it is possible that\nhe played an important role in the development of both of them. In a\nrecently identified fragment from his book on the Pythagoreans\n(Iamblichus, Comm. Math. XXV; see Burkert 1972a, 50 n. 112),\nAristotle assigns a hitherto unrecognized importance to optics in\nPythagoreanism. Just as the Pythagoreans were impressed with the fact\nthat musical intervals were based on whole number ratios, so they were\nimpressed that the phenomena of optics could be explained in terms of\ngeometrical diagrams. In addition to being an accomplished\nmathematician, Archytas had a theory of vision and evidently tried to\nexplain some of the phenomena involved in mirrors. In contrast to\nPlato, who argued that the visual ray, which proceeded from the eye,\nrequires the support of and coalesces with external light, Archytas\nexplained vision in terms of the visual ray alone (A25). It is\ntempting, then, to suppose that Archytas played a major role in the\ndevelopment of the mathematically based Pythagorean optics, to which\nAristotle refers. On the other hand, when Aristotle refers to\nPythagoreans, he generally means Pythagoreans of the fifth century.\nElsewhere he treats Archytas independently of the Pythagorean\ntradition, writing works on Archytas which were distinct from his work\non the Pythagoreans. It would thus be more natural to read\nAristotle’s reference to Pythagorean optics as alluding to\nfifth-century Pythagoreans such as Philolaus. Archytas will then have\nbeen responsible for developing an already existing Pythagorean\noptical tradition into a science, rather than founding such a\ntradition.", "\nDiogenes Laertius reports that Archytas was “the first to\nsystematize mechanics by using mathematical first principles”\n(VIII 83 = A1), and Archytas is accordingly sometimes hailed by modern\nscholars as the founder of the science of mechanics. There is a\npuzzle, however, since, no ancient Greek author in the later\nmechanical tradition (e.g., Heron, Pappus, Archimedes, Philon) ever\nascribes any work in the field to Archytas. What did the ancients mean\nby mechanics? A rough definition would be “the description and\nexplanation of the operation of machines” (Knorr 1996). The\nearliest treatise in mechanics, the Mechanical Problems\nascribed to Aristotle, begins with problems having to do with a simple\nmachine, the lever. Pappus (AD 320) refers to machines used to lift\ngreat weights, machines of war such as the catapult, water lifting\nmachines, amazing devices (automata), and machines that served as\nmodels of the heavens (1024.12 – 1025.4, on Pappus, see Cuomo\n2000). Pappus emphasizes, however, that, in addition to this practical\npart of mechanics, there is a theoretical part that is heavily\nmathematical (1022. 13–15). Given his interest in describing\nphysical phenomena in mathematical terms, it might seem logical that\nArchytas would make important contributions to mechanics. The actual\nevidence is less conclusive. A great part of the tendency to assign\nArchytas a role in the development of mechanics can be traced to\nPlutarch’s story about the quarrel between Plato and Archytas\nover Archytas’ supposed mechanical solution to the problem of\ndoubling the cube. This story is likely to be false (see 2.1 above).\nSome scholars have argued that Archytas devised machines of war (Diels\n1965; Cambiano 1998), as Archimedes did later, but this conclusion is\nbased on questionable inferences and no ancient source ascribes such\nmachines to Archytas. The only mechanical device that can with some\nprobability be assigned to Archytas, apart from the children’s\ntoy known as a “clapper” (A10), is an automaton in the\nform of a wooden dove, which was connected to a pulley and\ncounterweight and “flew” up from a lower perch to a higher\none, when set in motion by a puff of air (A10a). Kingsley is deeply\ncritical of scholars who see these inventions as toys and suggests\nconnections to earlier Chinese inventors who produced a wooden bird\nthat could fly for military purposes (2014: 155–9). Others have\nsuggested that, since ancient siege devices were called by the names\nof animals (e.g., “tortoise” and “crow”),\nArchytas’ “dove” might have been an early catapult\nof his devising, or a projectile hurled by such a catapult, which was\nlater misunderstood to be a mechanical dove (Berryman 2003: 355; 2009:\n78). However, no ancient source explains the dove in this way. A\ncomplicating factor here is that Diogenes Laertius reports (A1) that\nthere was a book on mechanics in circulation, which some thought to be\nby a different Archytas, so that it is possible that the flying dove\nis, in fact, the work of a separate Archytas. Archytas’ solution\nto the duplication of the cube, although it was not mechanical itself,\nwas of enormous importance for mechanics, since the solution to the\nproblem allows one not just to double a cube but also to construct\nbodies that are larger or smaller than a given body in any given\nratio. Thus, the solution permits the construction of a full-scale\nmachine on the basis of a working model. Pappus cites the solution to\nthe duplication of the cube as one of the three most crucial\ngeometrical theorems for practical mechanics (Math. Coll.\n1028. 18–21). It may then be that Archytas’ primary\ncontribution to mechanics was precisely his solution to the\nduplication of the cube and that it is this solution which constituted\nthe mathematical first principles which Archytas provided for\nmechanics. For a recent discussion of these issues seen Berryman 2009:\n87–97. It is more doubtful that Archytas wrote a treatise on\nmechanics. Schofield has recently argued that the evidence for\nArchytas’ work both in optics and in mechanics is so meagre that\nwe should “be skeptical about Archytas’ alleged\nrole” (2014: 86)." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Optics and Mechanics" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn the Metaphysics, Aristotle praises Archytas for having\noffered definitions which took account of both form and matter\n(1043a14–26 = A22). The examples given are\n“windlessness” (nênemia), which is defined\nas “stillness [the form] in a quantity of air [the\nmatter],” and “calm-on-the-ocean”\n(galênê), which is defined as “levelness\n[the form] of sea [the matter].” The terms form and matter are\nAristotle’s, and we cannot be sure how Archytas conceptualized\nthe two parts of his definitions. A plausible suggestion is that he\nfollowed his predecessor Philolaus in adopting limiters and unlimiteds\nas his basic metaphysical principles and that he saw his definitions\nas combinations of limiters, such as levelness and stillness, with\nunlimiteds, such as air and sea. The oddity of\n“windlessness” and “calm-on-the-sea” as\nexamples suggests that they were not the by-products of some other\nsort of investigation, e.g. cosmology, but were chosen precisely to\nillustrate principles of definition. Archytas may thus have devoted a\ntreatise to the topic. Aristotle elsewhere comments on the use of\nproportion in developing definitions and uses these same examples\n(Top. 108a7). The ability to recognize likeness in things of\ndifferent genera is said to be the key. “Windlessness” and\n“calm-on-the-ocean” are recognized as alike, and this\nlikeness can be expressed in the following proportion: as\nnênemia is to the air so galênê is\nto the sea. It is tempting to suppose that Archytas, who saw the world\nas explicable in terms of number and proportion, also saw proportion\nas the key in developing definitions. This would explain another\nreference to Archytas in Aristotle. At Rhetoric\n1412a9–17 (= A12) Aristotle praises Archytas precisely for his\nability to see similarity, even in things which differ greatly, and\ngives as an example Archytas’ assertion that an arbitrator and\nan altar are the same. DK oddly include this text among the testimonia\nfor Archytas’ life, but it clearly is part of Archytas’\nwork on definition. The definitions of both an altar and an arbitrator\nwill appeal to their common functions as a refuge, while recognizing\nthe different context and way in which this function is carried out.\nFor doubts about this reconstruction of Archytas’ theory of\ndefinition, see Barker 2006, 314–318 and Schofield 2014, 80." ], "section_title": "4. Definitions", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWe have very little evidence for Archytas’ cosmology, yet he was\nresponsible for one of the most famous cosmological arguments in\nantiquity, an argument which has been hailed as “the most\ncompelling argument ever produced for the infinity of space”\n(Sorabji 1988, 125). The argument is ascribed to Archytas in a\nfragment of Eudemus preserved by Simplicius (= A24), and it is\nprobably to Archytas that Aristotle is referring when he describes the\nfifth and “most important” reason that people believe in\nthe existence of the unlimited (Ph. 203b22 ff.). Archytas\nasks anyone who argues that the universe is limited to engage in a\nthought experiment (this is one of the first recorded thought\nexperiments in antiquity): “If I arrived at the outermost edge\nof the heaven, could I extend my hand or staff into what is outside or\nnot? It would be paradoxical [given our normal assumptions about the\nnature of space] not to be able to extend it.” The end of the\nstaff, once extended will mark a new limit. Archytas can advance to\nthe new limit and ask the same question again, so that there will\nalways be something, into which his staff can be extended, beyond the\nsupposed limit, and hence that something is clearly unlimited. Neither\nPlato nor Aristotle accepted this argument, and both believed that the\nuniverse was limited. Nonetheless, Archytas’ argument had great\ninfluence and was taken over and adapted by the Stoics, Epicureans\n(Lucretius I 968–983), Locke and Newton, among others, while\neliciting responses from Alexander and Simplicius (Sorabji 1988,\n125–141). For a discussion of the relation between\nArchytas’ thought experiment and other thought experiments in\nantiquity see Ierodiakonou 2011. Not all scholars have been impressed\nby the argument (see Barnes 1982, 362), and modern notions of space\nallow for it to be finite without having an edge, and without an edge\nArchytas’ argument cannot get started (but see Sorabji 1988,\n160–163). Beyond this argument, there is only exiguous evidence\nfor Archytas’ system of the physical world. Eudemus praises\nArchytas for recognizing that the unequal and uneven are not identical\nwith motion as Plato supposed (see Ti. 52e and 57e) but\nrather the causes of motion (A23). Another testimonium suggests that\nArchytas thought that all things are moved in accordance with\nproportion (Arist., Prob. 915a25–32 = A23a). The same\ntestimonium indicates that different sorts of proportion defined\ndifferent sorts of motion. Archytas asserted that “the\nproportion of equality” (arithmetic proportion?) defined natural\nmotion, which he regarded as curved motion (for a different account of\nthe proportion of equality see De Groot 2014: 195–207). This\nexplanation of natural motion is supposed to explain why certain parts\nof plants and animals (e.g. the stem, thighs, arms and trunk) are\nrounded rather than triangular or polygonal. Some scholars argue that\nit was the influence of Archytas that led Plato and Eudemus to\nemphasize uniform circular movement in explaining the heavens (Zhmud\n2006: 97). An explanation of motion in terms of proportion fits well\nwith the rest of evidence for Archytas, but the details remain\nobscure." ], "section_title": "5. Cosmology and Physics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nArchytas’ search for the numbers in things was not limited to\nthe natural world. Political relationships and the moral action of\nindividuals were also explained in terms of number and proportion. In\nFr. 3, rational calculation is identified as the basis of the stable\nstate:", "\nOnce calculation (logismos) was discovered, it stopped\ndiscord and increased concord. For people do not want more than their\nshare, and equality exists, once this has come into being. For by\nmeans of calculation we will seek reconciliation in our dealings with\nothers. Through this, then, the poor receive from the powerful, and\nthe wealthy give to the needy, both in the confidence that they will\nhave what is fair on account of this.", "\nThis glorification of calculation is reminiscent of Plato’s\npraise for “geometrical equality” in the Gorgias\n(507e6–508a8) and Plato may be thinking of Archytas Fr. 3\n(Palmer 2014: 205–6; Huffman 2013: 259–61). The emphasis\non equality (isotas) and fairness (to ison) suggests\nthat Archytas envisages rational calculation (logismos) as\nheavily mathematical. On the other hand, logismos is not\nidentical to the technical science of number (logistic – see 3.2\nabove) but is rather a practical ability to understand numerical\ncalculations, including basic proportions, an ability that is shared\nby most human beings. It is the clarity of calculation and proportion\nthat does away with the constant striving for more\n(pleonexia), which produces discord in the state. Since the\nstate is based on a widely shared human ability to calculate, an\nability that the rich and poor share, Archytas was led to support a\nmore democratic constitution (see 1.3 above) than Plato, who\nemphasizes the expert mathematical knowledge of a few (R.\n546a ff.). Zhmud (2006: 60–76) points out connections between B3\nand Isocrates and argues that Isocrates is referring to Archytas, when\nhe says that some praise the sciences for their utility and others try\nto demonstrate that they contribute greatly to virtue\n(Busiris 23). However, Archytas seems to accept both of these\nviews about the sciences, while Isocrates refers to two different\ngroups of people. Isocrates’ reference is also very general and\nmakes no allusion to the central terms of B3 so that it is doubtful\nthat he has Archytas in mind. For further discussion of the argument\nof B3 see Huffman 2005: 182–224 and Schofield 2008. ", "\nMost of our evidence for Archytas’ ethical views is,\nunfortunately, not based on fragments of his writings but rather on\nanecdotes, which probably ultimately derive from Aristoxenus’\nLife of Archytas. The good life of the individual, no less\nthan the stability of the state, appears to have been founded on\nrational calculation. Aristoxenus presented a confrontation between\nthe Syracusan hedonist, Polyarchus, and Archytas. Polyarchus’\nlong speech is preserved by Athenaeus and Archytas’ response by\nCicero (A9 = Deip. 545a and Sen. XII 39–41\nrespectively). Schofield (2014: 70, n.2) raises doubts about whether\nCicero really preserves Archytas’ response (See Huffman 2005:\n323–37). Horky (2011: 120) assumes without argument that\nAristoxenus presented Archytas as delivering his speech in the\npresence of Plato and the Samnite C. Pontius, but this is part of\nCicero’s frame story and there is no evidence that it derives\nfrom Aristoxenus. Polyarchus’ defense of always striving for\nmore (pleonexia) and of the pursuit of pleasure is\nreminiscent of Plato’s presentations of Callicles and\nThrasymachus, but is not derived from those presentations and is\nbetter seen as an important parallel development (Huffman 2002b).\nArchytas bases his response on the premise that reason (= rational\ncalculation) is the best part of us and the part that should govern\nour actions. Polyarchus might grant such a premise, since his is a\nrational hedonism. Archytas responds once again with a thought\nexperiment. We are to imagine someone in the throes of the greatest\npossible bodily pleasure (sexual orgasm?). Surely we must agree that a\nperson in such a state is not able to engage in rational calculation.\nIt thus appears that bodily pleasure is in itself antithetical to\nreason and that, the more we succeed in obtaining it, the less we are\nable to reason. Aristotle appears to refer to this argument in the\nNicomachean Ethics (1152b16–18). Archytas’\nargument is specifically directed against bodily pleasure and he did\nnot think that all pleasure was disruptive; he enjoyed playing with\nchildren (A8) and recognized that the pleasures of friendship were\npart of a good life (Cicero, Amic. XXIII 88). Other anecdotes\nemphasize that our actions must be governed by reason rather than the\nemotions: Archytas refused to punish the serious misdeeds of his\nslaves, because he had become angry and did not want to act out of\nanger (A7); he restrained himself from swearing aloud by writing his\ncurses on a wall instead (A11). Palmer argues that Archytas was\nworking with a Pythagorean conception of the soul as divided into two\nparts: the intellect and a part responsible for the affective states\nsuch as emotions and appetites (2014: 209). " ], "section_title": "6. Ethics and Political Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nArchytas fits the common stereotype of a Pythagorean better than\nanyone else does. He is by far the most accomplished Pythagorean\nmathematician, making important contributions to geometry,\nlogistic/arithmetic and harmonics. He was more successful as a\npolitical leader than any other ancient philosopher, and there is a\nrich anecdotal tradition about his personal self-control. It is\nstriking, however, that there are essentially no testimonia connecting\nArchytas to metempsychosis or the religious aspect of Pythagoreanism.\nArchytas is a prominent figure in the rebirth of interest in\nPythagoreanism in first century BC Rome: Horace, Propertius and Cicero\nall highlight him. As the last prominent member of the early\nPythagorean tradition, more pseudo-Pythagorean works came to be forged\nin his name than any other Pythagorean, including Pythagoras himself.\nHis name, with the spelling Architas, continued to exert power in\nMedieval and Renaissance texts, although the accomplishments assigned\nto him in those texts are fanciful.", "\nScholars have typically emphasized the continuities between Plato and\nArchytas (e.g., Kahn 2001, 56), but the evidence suggests that\nArchytas and Plato were in serious disagreement on a number of issues.\nPlato’s only certain reference to Archytas is part of a\ncriticism of his approach to harmonics in Book VII of the\nRepublic, where there is probably also a criticism of his\nwork in solid geometry. Plato’s attempt to argue for the split\nbetween the intelligible and sensible world in Books VI and VII of the\nRepublic may well be a protreptic directed at Archytas, who\nrefused to separate numbers from things. It is sometimes thought that\nthe eponymous primary speaker in Plato’s Timaeus, who\nis described as a leading political figure and philosopher from\nsouthern Italy (20a), must be a stand-in for Archytas. The\nTimaeus, however, is a most un-Archytan document (Huffman\n2013: 263-8). It is based on the split between the sensible and\nintelligible world, which Archytas did not accept. Plato argues that\nthe universe is limited, while Archytas is famous for this argument to\nshow that it is unlimited. Plato constructs the world soul according\nto ratios that are important in harmonic theory, but he uses\nPhilolaus’ ratios rather than Archytas’. Plato does adopt\nArchytas’ theory of pitch with some modification, but Archytas\nand Plato disagree on the explanation of sight. For a different view\nof the relation between Plato and Archytas see Kingsley 2014:\n156–7. Archytas’ refusal to split the intelligible from\nthe sensible may have made him a more attractive figure to Aristotle,\nwho devoted four books to him (Huffman 2005: 583–594) and\npraised his definitions for treating the composite of matter and form,\nnot of form separate from matter (Metaph. 1043a14–26).\nArchytas’ vision of the role of mathematics in the state is\ncloser to Aristotle’s mathematical account of distributive and\nredistributive justice (EN 1130b30 ff.) than to Plato’s\nemphasis on the expert mathematical knowledge of the guardians.\nClearly Archytas was an important influence on both Plato and\nAristotle, but the exact nature of those philosophical relationships\nis complex." ], "section_title": "7. Importance and Influence", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Diels, H. and W. Kranz, 1952, Die Fragmente der\nVorsokratiker (in three volumes), 6th edition, Dublin\nand Zürich: Weidmann. The Archytas material is in Volume 1,\nChapter 47, pp. 421–439 (Greek texts of the fragments and\ntestimonia with translations in German). Referred to as DK.", "Huffman, C. A., 2005, Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean,\nPhilosopher and Mathematician King, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press (The most complete and up-to-date collection of\nfragments and testimonia with translations and commentary in\nEnglish).", "Timpanaro Cardini, M., 1958–64, Pitagorici,\nTestimonianze e frammenti, 3 vols., Firenze: La Nuova Italia,\nVol. 2, 262–385 (Greek texts of the fragments and testimonia\nwith translations and commentary in Italian).", "Barker, A. D., 1989, Greek Musical Writings, Vol. II: Harmonic\nand Acoustic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A\ngood account of Archytas’ harmonic theory.)", "–––, 1994, ‘Ptolemy’s Pythagoreans,\nArchytas, and Plato’s conception of mathematics’,\nPhronesis, 39(2): 113–135.", "–––, 2006, ‘Archytas Unbound: A Discussion\nof Carl A. Huffman, Archytas of Tarentum’, Oxford\nStudies in Ancient Philosophy, 31: 297–321.", "–––, 2007, The Science of Harmonics in\nClassical Greece, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2014, ‘Pythagorean Harmonics’,\nin Huffman (ed.), 2014: 185–203.", "Barnes, J., 1982, The Presocratic Philosophers, London:\nRoutledge.", "Berryman, Sylvia, 2003, ‘Ancient Automata and Mechanical\nExplanation’, Phronesis, 48(4): 344–369.", "–––, 2009, The Mechanical Hypothesis in\nAncient Greek Natural Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Blass, F., 1884, ‘De Archytae Tarentini fragmentis\nmathematicis’, in Mélanges Graux, Paris: Ernest\nThorin, pp. 573–584. ", "Bonazzi, M., 2013, ‘Eudorus of Alexandria and the “\nPythagorean” Pseudepigrapha’, in On\nPythagoreanism, G. Cornelli, R. McKirahan and C. Macris (eds.),\nBerlin: De Gruyter, pp. 385–404.", "Bowen, A. C., 1982, ‘The foundations of early Pythagorean\nharmonic science: Archytas, fragment 1’, Ancient\nPhilosophy, 2: 79–104.", "Brisson, Luc, 1987, Platon: Lettres, Paris:\nFlammarion.", "–––, 2013, ‘Archytas and the Duplication\nof the Cube’, in On Pythagoreanism, G. Cornelli, R.\nMcKirahn, and C. Macris (eds.), Berlin: De Gruyter, pp.\n203–33.", "Burkert, W., 1961, ‘Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica’,\nPhilologus, 105: 16–43, 226–246.", "–––, 1972a, Lore and Science in Ancient\nPythagoreanism, E. Minar (tr.), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard\nUniversity Press; 1st German edn., 1962.", "–––, 1972b, ‘Zur geistesgeschichtlichen\nEinordnung einiger Pseudopythagorica’, in Pseudepigrapha\nI, Fondation Hardt Entretiens XVIII, Vandoeuvres-Genève,\npp. 25–55.", "Burnyeat, Myles and Frede, Michael, 2015, The Seventh Platonic\nLetter; A Seminar, Dominic Scott (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Cambiano, Giuseppe, 1998, ‘Archimede Meccanico et La\nMeccanica di Archita’, Elenchos, 19(2):\n291–324.", "Cassio, Albio Cesare, 1988, ‘Nicomachus of Gerasa and the\nDialect of Archytas, Fr. 1’, Classical Quarterly (New\nSeries), 38: 135–139.", "Centrone, Bruno, 1990, Pseudopythagorica Ethica, Naples:\nBibliopolis.", "–––, 1994a, ‘Archytas de Tarente’,\nin Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, vol. 1, Richard\nGoulet (ed.), Paris: CNRS Éditions, pp. 339–342.", "–––, 1994b, ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, in\nDictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, vol. 1, Richard Goulet\n(ed.), Paris: CNRS Éditions, pp. 342–345.", "–––, 2000, ‘Platonism and Pythagoreanism\nin the early empire’, in The Cambridge History of Greek and\nRoman Political Thought, Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield\n(eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 559–584.", "–––, 2014, ‘The pseudo-Pythagorean\nWritings’, in Huffman 2014: 315–40.", "Ciaceri, E., 1927–32, Storia della Magna Grecia,\nI–III, Milan-Rome: Albrighi, Segati & C.", "Cuomo, S., 2000, Pappus of Alexandria and the Mathematics of\nLate Antiquity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "De Cesaris, G. and Horky, P. S., 2018, ‘Hellenistic\nPythagorean Epistemology’, Lexicon Philosophicum,\nSpecial Issue: Hellenistic Theories of Knowledge, F. Verde\nand M. Catapano (eds.), Rome: CNR-ILIESI, pp. 221-262.", " De Groot, J., 2014, Aristotle’s Empiricism, Las\nVegas: Parmenides Publishing.", "Delatte, A., 1922, Essai sur la politique\npythagoricienne, Liège and Paris: H. Vaillant-Carmanne and\nÉdouard Champion.", "Diels, H., 1965, Antike Technik, 3rd edition,\nOsnabrück: Otto Zeller.", "Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, R. D.\nHicks (tr.), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925.", "Eutocius, 1915, Archimedis opera omnia cum commentariis\nEutocii (Volume 3), J. L. Heiberg and E. Stamatis (eds.), Leipzig:\nTeubner; reprinted, Stuttgart, 1972.", "Folkerts, M.,1970, “Boethius” Geometrie II: Ein\nMathematisches Lehrbuch des Mittelalters, Wiesbaden: Franz\nSteiner.", "Frank, E., 1923, Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer: Ein\nKapitel aus der Geschichte des griechischen Geistes, Halle: Max\nNiemeyer.", "Frischer, Bernard, 1984, ‘Horace and the Monuments: A New\nInterpretation of the Archytas Ode (C.1.28)’, Harvard\nStudies in Classical Philology, 88: 71–102.", "Griffin, M. J., 2015, Aristotle’s Categories in\nthe Early Roman Empire, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Gruppe, O. F., 1840, Über die Fragmente des Archytas und\nder ältern Pythagoreer, Berlin: O. Sichler.", "Guthrie, W. K. C., 1962, A History of Greek Philosophy\n(Volume 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Harvey, F. D., 1965–66, ‘Two Kinds of Equality’,\nClassica et Mediaevalia, 26: 101–146.", "Heath, T. L., 1921, A History of Greek Mathematics, 2\nvolumes, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Horky, P. S., 2011, ‘Herennius Pontius: The Construction of\na Samnite Philosopher’, Classical Antiquity, 30(1):\n119–47.", "–––, 2015, ‘Pseudo-Archytas’\nProtreptics? On Wisdom in its Contexts’, in Second\nSailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato, D. Nails and H.\nTarrant (eds.), Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, pp.\n21-39.", "Horky, P. S. and Johnson, M. R., 2020, ‘On Law and\nJustice: Attributed to Archytas of Tarentum’, in Early\nGreek Ethics, D. Wolfsdorf (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University\nPress, pp. 455–490.", "Huffman, C. A., 1985, ‘The Authenticity of Archytas Fr.\n1’, Classical Quarterly, 35(2): 344–348.", "–––, 1993, Philolaus of Croton: Pythagorean\nand Presocratic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2002a, ‘Polyclète et les\nPrésocratiques’, in Qu’ est-ce que la\nPhilosophie Présocratique?, André Laks and Claire\nLouguet (eds.), Villeneuve d’Ascq: Septentrion, pp.\n303–327.", "–––, 2002b, ‘Archytas and the\nSophists’, in Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of\nAlexander Mourelatos, Victor Caston and Daniel W. Graham (eds.),\nAldershot: Ashgate, pp. 251–270.", "–––, 2013, ‘Plato and the\nPythagoreans’, in On Pythagoreanism, G. Cornelli, R.\nMcKirahan and C. Macris (eds.), Berlin: De Gruyter, pp.\n237–70.", "–––, (ed.), 2014, A History of\nPythagoreanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Ierodiakonou, K., 2011, ‘Remarks on the History of an\nAncient Thought Experiment’, in Thought Experiments in\nMethodological and Historical Contexts, K. Ierodiakonou and S.\nRoux (eds.), Leiden: Brill, pp. 37–49.", "Johnson, Monte Ransome, 2008, ‘Sources for the Philosophy of\nArchytas’, Ancient Philosophy, 28: 173–199.", "Kahn, C., 2001, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans,\nIndianapolis: Hackett.", "Kingsley, P., 2010, A Story Waiting to Pierce You, Point\nReyes: Golden Sufi Center.", "Knorr, W. R., 1975, The Evolution of the Euclidean\nElements, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.", "–––, 1986, The Ancient Tradition of\nGeometric Problems, Boston: Birkhäuser.", "–––, 1989, Textual Studies in Ancient and\nMedieval Geometry, Boston: Birkhäuser.", "–––, 1996, “Mechanics”, entry in\nOxford Classical Dictionary (3rd edition), S. Hornblower and\nA. Spawforth (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Krafft, Fritz, 1970, Dynamishce und Statische\nBetrachtungsweise in der Antiken Mechanik, Wiesbaden: Franz\nSteiner.", "Krischer, Tilman (1995) ‘Die Rolle der Magna Graecia in der\nGeschichte der Mechanik’, Antike und Abendland, 41:\n60–71.", "Lloyd, G. E. R., 1979, Magic, Reason, and Experience,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 1987, The Revolutions of Wisdom,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 1990, ‘Plato and Archytas in the\nSeventh Letter’, Phronesis, 35(2): 159–174.", "Mansfeld, J., 2019, ‘Pythagoras’ and ps.-Archytas\nOn Principles’, Elenchos, 40(1):\n123–135.", "Masia, R., 2016, ‘A New Reading of Archytas’ Doubling\nof the Cube and its Implications’, Archive for History of\nExact Sciences, 70: 175–204.", "Mathieu, Bernard, 1987, ‘Archytas de Tarente pythagoricien\net ami de Platon’, Bulletin de l’Association G.\nBudé, 3: 239–255.", " Menn, S., 2015, ‘How Archytas Doubled the Cube’, in\nThe Frontiers of Ancient Science: Essays in Honor of Heinrich von\nStaden, B. Holmes and K.-D. Fisher (eds.), Berlin: De Gruyter,\npp. 407–35.", "Minar, Edwin L., 1942, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice\nand Theory, Baltimore: Waverly Press.", "Moraux, P., 1984, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von\nAndronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Zweiter Band: Der\nAristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., Berlin: Walter De\nGruyter.", "Mueller, I., 1997, ‘Greek arithmetic, geometry and\nharmonics: Thales to Plato’, in Routledge History of\nPhilosophy (Volume I: From the Beginning to Plato),\nC. C. W. Taylor (ed.), London: Routledge, pp. 271–322.", "Netz, R., 1999, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek\nMathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2014, ‘The Problem of Pythagorean\nMathematics’, in Huffman 2014: 167–84.", "Nisbet, R.G.M. and Hubbard, M.A., 1970, A Commentary on\nHorace: Odes, Book 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "O’Meara, D. J., 1989, Pythagoras Revived. Mathematics\nand Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "–––, 2003, Platonopolis: Platonic Political\nPhilosophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2003, third edition, Simon\nHornblower and Antony Spawforth (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Palmer, J. 2014, ‘The Pythagoreans and Plato’, in\nHuffman 2014: 204–226.", "Pappus, 1876–78, Pappi Alexandrini collectionis quae\nsupersunt, F. Hultsch (ed.), Berlin: Weidmann.", "Powell, J. G. F., 1995, Cicero the Philosopher, Oxford:\nClarendon Press.", "Purcell, Nicholas, 1994, ‘South Italy in the Fourth Century\nB. C.’, in The Cambridge Ancient History: Volume VI: The\nFourth Century B.C., D. M. Lewis, John Boardman, Simon Hornblower\nand M. Ostwald (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.\n381–403.", "Riginos, A. S., 1976, Platonica, Leiden: Brill.", "Rouse, M.A. and R. H., 1971, ‘The Texts called Lumen\nAnimae’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 41:\n5–113.", "Sachs, E., 1917, Die fünf Platonischen Körper,\nBerlin: Weidmann.", "Schmidt, W., 1904, ‘Aus der antiken Mechanik’,\nNeue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum, 13:\n329–51.", "Schofield, M., 2000, ‘Plato and Practical Politics’,\nin The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political\nThought, Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.),\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 293–302.", "–––, 2009, ‘Review of C. Huffman,\nArchytas of Tarentum’, Philosophical Review,\n118(1): 108–112.", "–––, 2014, ‘Archytas’, in Huffman\n(ed.), 2014: 69–87.", "Schürmann, Astrid, 1991, Griechische Mechanik und Antike\nGesellschaft, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.", "Sorabji, Richard, 1988, Matter, Space and Motion, Ithaca:\nCornell University Press.", "Strabo, 1917, Geography, Horace Leonard Jones (tr.),\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Szlezak, T. 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An Alternative Theory of Date and Purpose’,\nPseudepigrapha I, Fondation Hardt Entretiens XVIII,\nVandoeuvres-Genève, pp. 59-87.", "Thorndike, Lynn, 1934, A History of Magic and Experimental\nScience, New York: Columbia University Press.", "Ulacco, A., 2016, ‘The Appropriation of Aristotle in the\nPseudopythagorean Treatises’, in Brill’s Companion to\nthe Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, A. Falcon (ed.), Brill:\nLeiden, pp. 202–217.", "–––, 2017, Pseudopythagorica Dorica: I\ntrattati di argomento metafisico, logico ed epistemologico attributi\nad Archita ed Brotino, Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter.", "Vlastos, G., 1991, Socrates: Ironist and Moral\nPhilosopher, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.", "de Vogel, C. J., 1966, Pythagoras and Early\nPythagoreanism, Assen: Van Gorcum.", "van der Waerden, B. L., 1943, ‘Die Harmonielehre der\nPythagoreer’, Hermes, 78: 163–199.", "–––, 1947–9, ‘Die Arithmetik der\nPythagoreer’, Mathematische Annalen, 120:\n127–153, 676–700.", "–––, 1963, Science Awakening, A.\nDresden (tr.), New York: John Wiley & Sons.", "Winnington-Ingram, R. P., 1932, ‘Aristoxenus and the\nIntervals of Greek Music’, Classical Quarterly, 26:\n195–208.", "Wolfer, E. P., 1954, Eratosthenes von Kyrene als Mathematiker\nund Philosoph, Groningen: P. Noordhoff.", "Wuilleumier, Pierre, 1939, Tarente des Origines à la\nConquête Romaine, Paris: E. De Boccard.", "Zhmud, L., 1997, Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion im\nfrühen Pythagoreismus, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.", "–––, 1998, ‘Plato as Architect of\nScience’, Phronesis, 43(3): 210–244.", "–––, 2002, ‘Eudemus’ History of\nMathematics’, in Eudemus of Rhodes, W. W. Fortenbaugh\nand I. Bodnar (eds.), New Brunswick: Transaction, pp.\n263–306.", "–––, 2006, The Origin of the History of\nScience in Classical Antiquity, Berlin: De Gruyter.", "–––, 2012, Pythagoras and the Early\nPythagoreans, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2019, ‘What is Pythagorean in the\nPseudo-Pythagorean Literature’, Philologus, 163(1):\n72–94." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../philolaus/", "text": "Philolaus" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../pythagoras/", "text": "Pythagoras" }, { "href": "../pythagoreanism/", "text": "Pythagoreanism" } ]
arendt	Hannah Arendt	First published Thu Jul 27, 2006; substantive revision Fri Jan 11, 2019	[ "\n\nHannah Arendt (1906–1975) was one of the most influential political\nphilosophers of the twentieth century. Born into a German-Jewish\nfamily, she was forced to leave Germany in 1933 and lived in Paris for\nthe next eight years, working for a number of Jewish refugee\norganisations. In 1941 she immigrated to the United States and soon\nbecame part of a lively intellectual circle in New York. She held a\nnumber of academic positions at various American universities until\nher death in 1975. She is best known for two works that had a major\nimpact both within and outside the academic community. The first,\nThe Origins of Totalitarianism, published in 1951, was a\nstudy of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes that generated a wide-ranging\ndebate on the nature and historical antecedents of the totalitarian\nphenomenon. The second, The Human Condition, published in\n1958, was an original philosophical study that investigated the\nfundamental categories of the vita activa (labor, work,\naction). In addition to these two important works, Arendt published a\nnumber of influential essays on topics such as the nature of\nrevolution, freedom, authority, tradition and the modern age. At the\ntime of her death in 1975, she had completed the first two volumes of\nher last major philosophical work, The Life of the Mind,\nwhich examined the three fundamental faculties of the vita\ncontemplativa (thinking, willing, judging)." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Biographical Sketch", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Introduction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Arendt’s Conception of Modernity", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Arendt’s Theory of Action", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Action, Freedom, and Plurality", "4.2 Action and Speech as Disclosure", "4.3 Action, Narrative, and Remembrance", "4.4 Action, Power, and the Space of Appearance", "4.5 Action, Unpredictability, and Irreversibility" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Arendt’s Theory of Judgment", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Judgment: Two Models", "5.2 Judgment and the Vita Contemplativa", "5.3 Judgment and the Wind of Thought", "5.4 Judgment and Kant’s Aesthetics", "5.5 Judgment and the Vita Activa", "5.6 Judgment and Validity" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Arendt’s Conception of Citizenship", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Citizenship and the Public Sphere", "6.2 Citizenship, Agency, and Collective Identity" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Works by Arendt", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nHannah Arendt, one of the leading political thinkers of the twentieth\ncentury, was born in 1906 in Hanover and died in New York in 1975. In\n1924, after having completed her high school studies, she went to\nMarburg University to study with Martin Heidegger. The encounter with\nHeidegger, with whom she had a brief but intense love-affair, had a\nlasting influence on her thought. After a year of study in Marburg,\nshe moved to Freiburg University where she spent one semester\nattending the lectures of Edmund Husserl. In the spring of 1926 she\nwent to Heidelberg University to study with Karl Jaspers, a\nphilosopher with whom she established a long-lasting intellectual and\npersonal friendship. She completed her doctoral dissertation, entitled\nDer Liebesbegriff bei Augustin (hereafter LA) under Jaspers’s\nsupervision in 1929. She was forced to flee Germany in 1933 as a\nresult of Hitler’s rise to power, and after a brief stay in Prague and\nGeneva she moved to Paris where for six years (1933–39) she worked for\na number of Jewish refugee organisations. In 1936 she separated from\nher first husband, Günther Stern, and started to live with\nHeinrich Blücher, whom she married in 1940. During her stay in\nParis she continued to work on her biography of Rahel\nVarnhagen, which was not published until 1957 (hereafter RV). In\n1941 she was forced to leave France and moved to New York with her\nhusband and mother. In New York she soon became part of an influential\ncircle of writers and intellectuals gathered around the journal\nPartisan Review. During the post-war period she lectured at a\nnumber of American universities, including Princeton, Berkeley and\nChicago, but was most closely associated with the New School for\nSocial Research, where she was a professor of political philosophy\nuntil her death in 1975. In 1951 she published The Origins of\nTotalitarianism (hereafter OT), a major study of the Nazi and\nStalinist regimes that soon became a classic, followed by The\nHuman Condition in 1958 (hereafter HC), her most important\nphilosophical work. In 1961 she attended the trial of Adolf Eichmann\nin Jerusalem as a reporter for The New Yorker magazine, and\ntwo years later published Eichmann in Jerusalem (hereafter\nEJ), which caused a deep controversy in Jewish circles. The same year\nsaw the publication of On Revolution (hereafter OR), a\ncomparative analysis of the American and French revolutions. A number\nof important essays were also published during the 1960s and early\n1970s: a first collection was entitled Between Past and Future\n(hereafter BPF), a second Men in Dark Times (hereafter MDT),\nand a third Crises of the Republic (hereafter CR). At the\ntime of her death in 1975, she had completed the first two volumes on\nThinking and Willing of her last major philosophical\nwork, The Life of the Mind, which was published posthumously\nin 1978 (hereafter LM). The third volume, on Judging, was\nleft unfinished, but some background material and lecture notes were\npublished in 1982 under the title Lectures on Kant’s Political\nPhilosophy (hereafter LKPP)." ], "section_title": "1. Biographical Sketch", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nHannah Arendt was one of the seminal political thinkers of the\ntwentieth century. The power and originality of her thinking was\nevident in works such as The Origins of Totalitarianism,\nThe Human Condition, On Revolution and The Life\nof the Mind. In these works and in numerous essays she grappled\nwith the most crucial political events of her time, trying to grasp\ntheir meaning and historical import, and showing how they affected our\ncategories of moral and political judgment. What was required, in her\nview, was a new framework that could enable us to come to terms with\nthe twin horrors of the twentieth century, Nazism and Stalinism. She\nprovided such framework in her book on totalitarianism, and went on to\ndevelop a new set of philosophical categories that could illuminate\nthe human condition and provide a fresh perspective on the nature of\npolitical life.", "\n\nAlthough some of her works now belong to the classics of the Western\ntradition of political thought, she has always remained difficult to\nclassify. Her political philosophy cannot be characterized in terms of\nthe traditional categories of conservatism, liberalism, and socialism.\nNor can her thinking be assimilated to the recent revival of\ncommunitarian political thought, to be found, for example, in the\nwritings of A. MacIntyre, M. Sandel, C. Taylor and M. Walzer. Her name\nhas been invoked by a number of critics of the liberal tradition, on\nthe grounds that she presented a vision of politics that stood in\nopposition some key liberal principles. There are many strands of\nArendt’s thought that could justify such a claim, in particular, her\ncritique of representative democracy, her stress on civic engagement\nand political deliberation, her separation of morality from politics,\nand her praise of the revolutionary tradition. However, it would be a\nmistake to view Arendt as an anti-liberal thinker. Arendt was in fact\na stern defender of constitutionalism and the rule of law, an advocate\nof fundamental human rights (among which she included not only the\nright to life, liberty, and freedom of expression, but also the right\nto action and to opinion), and a critic of all forms of political\ncommunity based on traditional ties and customs, as well as those\nbased on religious, ethnic, or racial identity.", "\n\nArendt’s political thought cannot, in this sense, be identified either\nwith the liberal tradition or with the claims advanced by a number of\nits critics. Arendt did not conceive of politics as a means for the\nsatisfaction of individual preferences, nor as a way to integrate\nindividuals around a shared conception of the good. Her conception of\npolitics is based instead on the idea of active citizenship, that is,\non the value and importance of civic engagement and collective\ndeliberation about all matters affecting the political community. If\nthere is a tradition of thought with which Arendt can be identified,\nit is the classical tradition of civic republicanism originating in\nAristotle and embodied in the writings of Machiavelli, Montesquieu,\nJefferson, and Tocqueville. According to this tradition politics finds\nits authentic expression whenever citizens gather together in a public\nspace to deliberate and decide about matters of collective\nconcern. Political activity is valued not because it may lead to\nagreement or to a shared conception of the good, but because it\nenables each citizen to exercise his or her powers of agency, to\ndevelop the capacities for judgment and to attain by concerted action\nsome measure of political efficacy.", "\n\nIn what follows, we reconstruct Arendt’s political philosophy\nalong four major themes: (1) her conception of modernity, (2) her\ntheory of action, (3) her theory of judgment, and (4) her conception\nof citizenship." ], "section_title": "2. Introduction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn her major philosophical work, The Human Condition, and in\nsome of the essays collected in Between Past and Future,\nArendt articulated a fairly negative conception of modernity. In these\nwritings Arendt is primarily concerned with the losses incurred as a\nresult of the eclipse of tradition, religion, and authority, but she\noffers a number of illuminating suggestions with respect to the\nresources that the modern age can still provide to address questions\nof meaning, identity, and value.", "\n\nFor Arendt modernity is characterized by the loss of the\nworld, by which she means the restriction or elimination of the\npublic sphere of action and speech in favor of the private world of\nintrospection and the private pursuit of economic interests. Modernity\nis the age of mass society, of the rise of the social out of\na previous distinction between the public and the private, and of the\nvictory of animal laborans over homo faber and the\nclassical conception of man as zoon politikon. Modernity is\nthe age of bureaucratic administration and anonymous labor, rather\nthan politics and action, of elite domination and the manipulation of\npublic opinion. It is the age when totalitarian forms of government,\nsuch as Nazism and Stalinism, have emerged as a result of the\ninstitutionalization of terror and violence. It is the age where\nhistory as a “natural process” has replaced history as a\nfabric of actions and events, where homogeneity and conformity have\nreplaced plurality and freedom, and where isolation and loneliness\nhave eroded human solidarity and all spontaneous forms of living\ntogether. Modernity is the age where the past no longer carries any\ncertainty of evaluation, where individuals, having lost their\ntraditional standards and values, must search for new grounds of human\ncommunity as such.", "\n\nThis is Arendt’s vision of modernity, a vision which, at first sight,\nappears quite stark and unredeeming. It is worth pointing out,\nhowever, that Arendt’s negative appraisal of modernity was shaped by\nher experience of totalitarianism in the twentieth century, and that\nher work provides a number of important insights that may help us to\naddress certain problematic features of the modern age. In her\npolitical writings, and especially in The Origins of\nTotalitarianism, Arendt claimed that the phenomenon of\ntotalitarianism has broken the continuity of Occidental history, and\nhas rendered meaningless most of our moral and political categories.\nThe break in our tradition has become irrevocable after the tragic\nevents of the twentieth century and the triumph of totalitarian\nmovements East and West. In the form of Stalinism and Nazism,\ntotalitarianism has exploded the established categories of political\nthought and the accepted standards of moral judgment, and has thereby\nbroken the continuity of our history. Faced with the tragic events of\nthe Holocaust and the Gulag, we can no longer go back to traditional\nconcepts and values, so as to explain the unprecedented by means of\nprecedents, or to understand the monstrous by means of the familiar.\nThe burden of our time must be faced without the aid of tradition, or\nas Arendt once put it, “without a bannister” (RPW, 336).\nOur inherited concepts and criteria for judgment have been dissolved\nunder the impact of modern political events, and the task now is to\nre-establish the meaning of the past outside the framework of any\ntradition, since none have retained their original validity. It is the\npast, then, and not tradition, that Arendt attempts to preserve from\nthe rupture in modern time-consciousness. Only by reappropriating the\npast by means of what Arendt called “the deadly impact of new\nthoughts” (MDT, 201) can we hope to restore meaning to the\npresent and throw some light on the contemporary situation.", "\n\nThe hermeneutic strategy that Arendt employed to re-establish a link\nwith the past is indebted to both Walter Benjamin and Martin\nHeidegger. From Benjamin she took the idea of a fragmentary\nhistoriography, one that seeks to identify the moments of rupture,\ndisplacement and dislocation in history. Such fragmentary\nhistoriography enables one to recover the lost potentials of the past\nin the hope that they may find actualization in the present. From\nHeidegger she took the idea of a deconstructive reading of the Western\nphilosophical tradition, one that seeks to uncover the original\nmeaning of our categories and to liberate them from the distorting\nincrustations of tradition. Such deconstructive hermeneutics enables\none to recover those primordial experiences (Urphaenomene)\nwhich have been occluded or forgotten by the philosophical tradition,\nand thereby to recover the lost origins of our philosophical concepts\nand categories.", "\n\nBy relying on these two hermeneutic strategies Arendt hopes to redeem\nfrom the past its lost or “forgotten treasure,” that is,\nthose fragments from the past that might still be of significance to\nus. In her view it is no longer possible, after the collapse of\ntradition, to save the past as a whole; the task, rather, is to redeem\nfrom oblivion those elements of the past that are still able to\nilluminate our situation. To re-establish a linkage with the past is\nnot an antiquarian exercise; on the contrary, without the critical\nreappropriation of the past our temporal horizon becomes disrupted,\nour experience precarious, and our identity more fragile. In Arendt’s\nview, then, it is necessary to redeem from the past those moments\nworth preserving, to save those fragments from past treasures that are\nsignificant for us. Only by means of this critical reappropriation can\nwe discover the past anew, endow it with relevance and meaning for the\npresent, and make it a source of inspiration for the future.", "\n\nThis critical reappropriation is facilitated, in part, by the fact\nthat after the rupture in modern time-consciousness the past may\n“open up to us with unexpected freshness and tell us things no\none has yet had ears to hear” (BPF, 94). The breakdown of\ntradition may in fact provide the great chance to look upon the past\n“with eyes undistorted by any tradition, with a directness which\nhas disappeared from Occidental reading and hearing ever since Roman\ncivilization submitted to the authority of Greek thought” (BPF,\n28–9).", "\n\nArendt’s return to the original experience of the Greek polis\nrepresents, in this sense, an attempt to break the fetters of a\nworn-out tradition and to rediscover a past over which tradition has\nno longer a claim. Against tradition Arendt sets the criterion of\ngenuineness, against the authoritative that which is forgotten,\nconcealed, or displaced at the margins of history. Only by operating\nagainst the grain of traditionalism and the claims of conventional\nhistoriography can the past be made meaningful again, provide sources\nof illumination for the present, and yield its treasures to those who\nsearch for them with “new thoughts” and saving acts of\nremembrance.", "\n\nArendt articulates her conception of modernity around a number of key\nfeatures: these are world alienation, earth\nalienation, the rise of the social, and the victory of\nanimal laborans. World alienation refers to the loss of an\nintersubjectively constituted world of experience and action by means\nof which we establish our self-identity and an adequate sense of\nreality. Earth alienation refers to the attempt to escape from the\nconfines of the earth; spurred by modern science and technology, we\nhave searched for ways to overcome our earth-bound condition by\nsetting out on the exploration of space, by attempting to recreate\nlife under laboratory conditions, and by trying to extend our given\nlife-span. The rise of the social refers to the expansion of the\nmarket economy from the early modern period and the ever increasing\naccumulation of capital and social wealth. With the rise of the social\neverything has become an object of production and consumption, of\nacquisition and exchange; moreover, its constant expansion has\nresulted in the blurring of the distinction between the private and\nthe public. The victory of animal laborans refers to the\ntriumph of the values of labor over those of homo faber and\nof man as zoon politikon. All the values characteristic of\nthe world of fabrication — permanence, stability, durability\n— as well as those characteristic of the world of action and\nspeech — freedom, plurality, solidarity — are sacrificed\nin favor of the values of life, productivity and abundance.", "\n\nArendt identifies two main stages in the emergence of modernity: the\nfirst, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, corresponds to\nworld alienation and the rise of the social, the second, from the\nbeginning of the twentieth century, corresponds to earth alienation and\nthe victory of animal laborans. She also identifies a number\nof causes: the discovery of America and the corresponding shrinking of\nthe earth, the waves of expropriation started during the Reformation,\nthe invention of the telescope challenging the adequacy of the senses,\nthe rise of modern science and philosophy and subsequently of a\nconception of man as part of a process of Nature and History, and the\nexpansion of the realm of the economy, of the production and\naccumulation of social wealth.", "\n\nArendt’s interpretation of modernity can be criticized on a\nnumber of grounds. We focus attention here on two categories employed\nby Arendt, those of nature, and the social. With\nrespect to the category of nature, Arendt oscillates between two\ncontrasting accounts. According to the first account, the modern age,\nby elevating labor, the most natural of human activities, to the\nhighest position within the vita activa, has brought us too\nclose to nature. Instead of building and preserving the human artifice\nand creating public spaces for action and deliberation, we are reduced\nto engage in the activity of sheer survival and in the production of\nthings that are by definition perishable. According to the second\naccount, however, the modern age is characterized by a growing\nartificiality, by the rejection of anything that is not\nman-made. Arendt cites the fact that natural processes, including that\nof life itself, have been recreated artificially by means of\nscientific experiment, that our natural environment has been\nextensively transformed and in some instances entirely replaced by\ntechnology, and that we have searched for ways to overcome our natural\ncondition as earth-bound creatures by setting out on the exploration\nof space and envisaging the possibility of inhabiting other\nplanets. All this leads to a situation where nothing around us will be\na naturally given event, object, or process, but will instead be the\nproduct of our instruments and the will to refashion the world in our\nimage.", "\n\nThese two accounts are difficult to reconcile, since in the former we\nhave nature intruding upon and even destroying the human artifice,\nwhile in the latter we have art (techne) expanding upon and\nreplacing everything natural or merely given. The result is to endow\nnature with an ambiguous status, since in the former case the victory\nof animal laborans indicates our subjection to natural\nprocesses, while in the latter case the expansion of scientific\nknowledge and of technological mastery indicates the overcoming of all\nnatural limits. The modern world would thus appear to be too natural\nand too artificial, too much under the dominance of labor and the\nlife-process of the species, as well as too much under the dominance\nof techne.", "\n\nWith respect to the second category, that of the social, Arendt was\nunable to account for certain important features of the modern\nworld. Arendt identifies the social with all those activities formerly\nrestricted to the private sphere of the household and having to do\nwith the necessities of life. Her claim is that, with the tremendous\nexpansion of the economy from the end of the eighteenth century, all\nsuch activities have taken over the public realm and transformed it\ninto a sphere for the satisfaction of our material needs. Society has\nthus invaded and conquered the public realm, turning it into a\nfunction of what previously were private needs and concerns, and has\nthereby destroyed the boundary separating the public and the\nprivate. Arendt also claims that with the expansion of the social\nrealm the tripartite division of human activities has been undermined\nto the point of becoming meaningless. In her view, once the social\nrealm has established its monopoly, the distinction between labor,\nwork and action is lost, since every effort is now expended on\nreproducing our material conditions of existence. Obsessed with life,\nproductivity, and consumption, we have turned into a society of\nlaborers and jobholders who no longer appreciate the values associated\nwith work, nor those associated with action.", "\n\nFrom this brief account it is clear that Arendt’s concept of the\nsocial plays a crucial role in her assessment of modernity. However\nsome have argued that this may have led her to a series of\nquestionable judgments:" ], "section_title": "3. Arendt’s Conception of Modernity", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nArendt’s theory of action and her revival of the ancient notion of\npraxis represent one of the most original contributions to\ntwentieth century political thought. By distinguishing action\n(praxis) from fabrication (poiesis), by linking it\nto freedom and plurality, and by showing its connection to speech and\nremembrance, Arendt is able to articulate a conception of politics in\nwhich questions of meaning and identity can be addressed in a fresh\nand original manner. Moreover, by viewing action as a mode of human\ntogetherness, Arendt is able to develop a conception of participatory\ndemocracy which stands in direct contrast to the bureaucratized and\nelitist forms of politics so characteristic of the modern epoch.", "\n\nIn what follows, we focus on some of the key components of\nArendt’s theory of action, such as freedom, plurality and\ndisclosure. We then examine the links between action and narrative,\nthe importance of remembrance, and of what may be called\n“communities of memory.” We then show the connection\nbetween action, power and the space of appearance. Lastly, we look at\nthe remedies for the unpredictability and irreversibility of action,\nnamely, the power of promise and the power to forgive." ], "section_title": "4. Arendt’s Theory of Action", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nAction, the only activity that goes on directly between men without\nthe intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human\ncondition of plurality … this plurality is specifically the\ncondition — not only the conditio sine qua non, but the\nconditio per quam — of all political life. (HC,\n7)", "\n\nFor Arendt, action is one of the fundamental categories of the human\ncondition and constitutes the highest realization of the vita\nactiva. Arendt analyzes the vita activa via three\ncategories which correspond to the three fundamental activities of our\nbeing-in-the-world: labor, work, and action. Labor is the activity\nwhich is tied to the human condition of life, work the activity which\nis tied to the condition of worldliness, and action the activity tied\nto the condition of plurality. For Arendt each activity is autonomous,\nin the sense of having its own distinctive principles and of being\njudged by different criteria. Labor is judged by its ability to\nsustain human life, to cater to our biological needs of consumption\nand reproduction, work is judged by its ability to build and maintain\na world fit for human use, and action is judged by its ability to\ndisclose the identity of the agent, to affirm the reality of the\nworld, and to actualize our capacity for freedom.", "\n\nAlthough Arendt considers the three activities of labor, work and\naction equally necessary to a complete human life, in the sense that\neach contributes in its distinctive way to the realization of our\nhuman capacities, it is clear from her writings that she takes action\nto be the differentia specifica of human beings, that which\ndistinguishes them from both the life of animals (who are similar to\nus insofar as they need to labor to sustain and reproduce themselves)\nand the life of the gods (with whom we share, intermittently, the\nactivity of contemplation). In this respect the categories of labor\nand work, while significant in themselves, must be seen as\ncounterpoints to the category of action, helping to differentiate and\nhighlight the place of action within the order of the vita\nactiva.", "\n\nThe two central features of action are freedom and\nplurality. By freedom Arendt does not mean the\nability to choose among a set of possible alternatives (the freedom of\nchoice so dear to the liberal tradition) or the faculty of liberum\narbitrium which, according to Christian doctrine, was given to us\nby God. Rather, by freedom Arendt means the capacity to begin, to\nstart something new, to do the unexpected, with which all human beings\nare endowed by virtue of being born. Action as the realization of\nfreedom is therefore rooted in natality, in the fact that\neach birth represents a new beginning and the introduction of novelty\nin the world.", "\n\nTo be sure, Arendt recognizes that all activities are in some way\nrelated to the phenomenon of natality, since both labor and work are\nnecessary to create and preserve a world into which new human beings\nare constantly born. However, of the three activities, action is the\none most closely connected with natality, because by acting\nindividuals re-enact the miracle of beginning inherent in their\nbirth. For Arendt, the beginning that each of us represents by virtue\nof being born is actualized every time we act, that is, every time we\nbegin something new. As she puts it: “the new beginning inherent\nin birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer\npossesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting\n” (HC, 9).", "\n\nArendt also stresses the fact that since action as beginning is rooted\nin natality, since it is the actualization of freedom, it carries with\nit the capacity to perform miracles, that is, to introduce what is\ntotally unexpected. “It is in the nature of beginning”\n— she claims — “that something new is started which\ncannot be expected from whatever may have happened before. This\ncharacter of startling unexpectedness is inherent in all beginnings\n… The fact that man is capable of action means that the\nunexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what\nis infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only because each\nman is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes\ninto the world ” (HC, 177–8).", "\n\nThe birth of every individual is thus the promise of a new beginning:\nto act means to be able to disclose one’s self and to do the\nunanticipated; and it is entirely in keeping with this conception that\nmost of the concrete examples of action in the modern age that Arendt\ndiscusses are cases of revolutions and popular uprisings. Her claim is\nthat “revolutions are the only political events which confront\nus directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning,” (OR,\n21) since they represent the attempt to found a new political space, a\nspace where freedom can appear as a worldly reality. The favorite\nexample for Arendt is the American Revolution, because there the act\nof foundation took the form of a constitution of liberty. Her other\nexamples are the revolutionary clubs of the French Revolution, the\nParis Commune of 1871, the creation of Soviets during the Russian\nRevolution, the French Resistance to Hitler in the Second World War,\nand the Hungarian revolt of 1956. In all these cases individual men\nand women had the courage to interrupt their routine activities, to\nstep forward from their private lives in order to create a public\nspace where freedom could appear, and to act in such a way that the\nmemory of their deeds could become a source of inspiration for the\nfuture. In doing so, according to Arendt, they rediscovered the truth\nknown to the ancient Greeks that action is the supreme blessing of\nhuman life, that which bestows significance to the lives of\nindividuals.", "\n\nIn the book On Revolution Arendt devotes much attention to\nthe rediscovery of this truth by those who participated in the\nAmerican Revolution. In her view the Founding Fathers, although they\nmight have pretended that they longed for private life and engaged in\npolitics only out of a sense of duty, made clear in their letters and\nrecollections that they had discovered unexpected delights in action\nand had acquired a taste for public freedom and for earning\ndistinction among their peers.", "\n\nPlurality, to which we may now turn, is the other\ncentral feature of action. For if to act means to take the initiative,\nto introduce the novum and the unexpected into the world, it\nalso means that it is not something that can be done in isolation from\nothers, that is, independently of the presence of a plurality of\nactors who from their different perspectives can judge the quality of\nwhat is being enacted. In this respect action needs plurality in the\nsame way that performance artists need an audience; without the\npresence and acknowledgment of others, action would cease to be a\nmeaningful activity. Action, to the extent that it requires appearing\nin public, making oneself known through words and deeds, and eliciting\nthe consent of others, can only exist in a context defined by\nplurality.", "\n\nArendt establishes the connection between action and plurality by\nmeans of an anthropological argument. In her view just as\nlife is the condition that corresponds to the activity of\nlabor and worldliness the condition that corresponds to the\nactivity of work, so plurality is the condition that\ncorresponds to action. She defines plurality as “the fact that\nmen, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world,” and says\nthat it is the condition of human action “because we are all the\nsame, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as\nanyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live ” (HC,\n7–8). Plurality thus refers both to equality and\ndistinction, to the fact that all human beings belong to the\nsame species and are sufficiently alike to understand one another, but\nyet no two of them are ever interchangeable, since each of them is an\nindividual endowed with a unique biography and perspective on the\nworld.", "\n\nIt is by virtue of plurality that each of us is capable of acting and\nrelating to others in ways that are unique and distinctive, and in so\ndoing of contributing to a network of actions and relationships that\nis infinitely complex and unpredictable. This network of actions is\nwhat makes up the realm of human affairs, that space where individuals\nrelate directly without the intermediary of things or matter —\nthat is, through language. Let us examine briefly this connection\nbetween action and language.", "\n In The Human Condition Arendt stresses repeatedly that\naction is primarily symbolic in character and that the web of human\nrelationships is sustained by communicative interaction (HC,\n178–9, 184–6, 199–200). We may formulate it as\nfollows. Action entails speech: by means of language we are\nable to articulate the meaning of our actions and to coordinate the\nactions of a plurality of agents. Conversely, speech entails\naction, not only in the sense that speech itself is a form of\naction, or that most acts are performed in the manner of speech, but\nin the sense that action is often the means whereby we check the\nsincerity of the speaker. Thus, just as action without speech runs the\nrisk of being meaningless and would be impossible to coordinate with\nthe actions of others, so speech without action would lack one of the\nmeans by which we may confirm the veracity of the speaker. As we shall\nsee, this link between action and speech is central to Arendt’s\ncharacterization of power, that potential which springs up between\npeople when they act “in concert,” and which is actualized\n“only where word and deed have not parted company, where words\nare not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil\nintentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to\nviolate and destroy but to establish relations and create new\nrealities ” (HC, 200)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Action, Freedom, and Plurality" }, { "content": [ "\n\nLet us now turn to an examination of the disclosing power of action\nand speech. In the opening section of the chapter on action in The\nHuman Condition Arendt discusses one of its central functions,\nnamely, the disclosure of the identity of the agent. In action and\nspeech, she maintains, individuals reveal themselves as the unique\nindividuals they are, disclose to the world their distinct\npersonalities. In terms of Arendt’s distinction, they reveal\n“who” they are as distinct to “what” they are\n— the latter referring to individual abilities and talents, as well as\ndeficiencies and shortcomings, which are traits all human beings\nshare. Neither labor nor work enable individuals to disclose their\nidentities, to reveal “who” they are as distinct from\n“what” they are. In labor the individuality of each person\nis submerged by being bound to a chain of natural necessities, to the\nconstraints imposed by biological survival. When we engage in labor we\ncan only show our sameness, the fact that we all belong to the human\nspecies and must attend to the needs of our bodies. In this sphere we\ndo indeed “behave,” “perform roles,” and\n“fulfill functions,” since we all obey the same\nimperatives. In work there is more scope for individuality, in that\neach work of art or production bears the mark of its maker; but the\nmaker is still subordinate to the end product, both in the sense of\nbeing guided by a model, and in the sense that the product will\ngenerally outlast the maker. Moreover, the end product reveals little\nabout the maker except the fact that he or she was able to make it. It\ndoes not tell us who the creator was, only that he or she had certain\nabilities and talents. It is thus only in action and speech, in\ninteracting with others through words and deeds, that individuals\nreveal who they personally are and can affirm their unique identities.\nAction and speech are in this sense very closely related because both\ncontain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: “Who\nare you?” This disclosure of the “who” is made\npossible by both deeds and words, but of the two it is speech that has\nthe closest affinity to revelation. Without the accompaniment of\nspeech, action would lose its revelatory quality and could no longer\nbe identified with an agent. It would lack, as it were, the conditions\nof ascription of agency." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Action and Speech as Disclosure" }, { "content": [ "\n\nWe have seen, then, how through action and speech individuals are able\nto disclose their identities, to reveal their specific uniqueness\n— their who — as distinct from their personal\nabilities and talents — their what. However, while\nengaging in speech and action individuals can never be sure what kind\nof self they will reveal. Only retrospectively, that is, only through\nthe stories that will arise from their deeds and performances, will\ntheir identity become fully manifest. The function of the storyteller\nis thus crucial not only for the preservation of the doings and\nsayings of actors, but also for the full disclosure of the identity of\nthe actor. The narratives of a storyteller, Arendt claims, “tell\nus more about their subjects, the ‘hero’ in the center of\neach story, than any product of human hands ever tells us about the\nmaster who produced it” (HC, 184). Without a Plato to tell us\nwho Socrates was, what his conversations with fellow Athenian citizens\nwere like, without a Thucydides to set down Pericles’ Funeral\nSpeech and refashion it in his powerful and dramatic style, we would\nnot have known what made Socrates and Pericles such outstanding\npersonalities, nor would the reason for their uniqueness have been\nmade fully manifest. Indeed, it is one of Arendt’s most important\nclaims that the meaning of action itself is dependent upon the\narticulation retrospectively given to it by historians and\nnarrators.", "\n\nStorytelling, or the weaving of a narrative out of the actions and\npronouncements of individuals, is partly constitutive of their\nmeaning, because it enables the retrospective articulation of their\nsignificance and import, both for the actors themselves and for the\nspectators. Being absorbed by their immediate aims and concerns, not\naware of the full implications of their actions, actors are often not\nin a position to assess the true significance of their doings, or to\nbe fully aware of their own motives and intentions. Only when action\nhas run a certain course, and its relationship to other actions has\nunfolded, can its significance be made fully manifest and be embodied\nin a narrative, whether of poets or historians. The fact that this\nnarrative is temporally deferred, that it is at some distance from the\nevents it describes, is one of the reasons why it can provide further\ninsight into the motives and aims of the actors.", "\n\nNarratives can thus provide a measure of truthfulness and a greater\ndegree of significance to the actions of individuals. But they also\npreserve the memory of deeds through time, and in so doing, they\nenable these deeds to become sources of inspiration for the future,\nthat is, models to be imitated, and, if possible, surpassed. One of\nthe principal drawbacks of action, Arendt maintains, is to be\nextremely fragile, to be subject to the erosion of time and to\nforgetfulness; unlike the products of the activity of work, which\nacquire a measure of permanence by virtue of their sheer facticity,\ndeeds and words do not survive their enactment unless they are\nremembered. Remembrance alone, the retelling of deeds as\nstories, can save the lives and deeds of actors from oblivion and\nfutility. And it is precisely for this reason, Arendt points out, that\nthe Greeks valued poetry and history so highly, because they rescued\nthe glorious (as well as the less glorious) deeds of the past for the\nbenefit of future generations (HC, 192 ff; BPF, 63–75). It was\nthe poet’s and the historian’s political function to preserve the\nmemory of past actions and to make them a source of instruction for\nthe future. Homer was known as the “educator of Hellas,”\nsince he immortalized for all those who came after him the events of\nthe Trojan War; Thucydides, in his History of the Peloponnesian\nWar, told a story of human ambition and folly, of courage and\nunchecked greed, of ruthless struggle and inevitable defeat. In their\nwork the past became a repository of instruction, of actions to be\nemulated as well as deeds to be shunned. Through their narratives the\nfragility and perishability of human action was overcome and made to\noutlast the lives of their doers and the limited life-span of their\ncontemporaries.", "\n\nHowever, to be preserved, such narratives needed in turn an audience,\nthat is, a community of hearers who became the transmitters of the\ndeeds that had been immortalized. As Sheldon Wolin has aptly put it,\n“audience is a metaphor for the political community whose nature\nis to be a community of remembrance” (Wolin 1977, 97). In other\nwords, behind the actor stands the storyteller, but behind the\nstoryteller stands a community of memory.", "\n\nIt was one of the primary functions of the polis to be\nprecisely such a community, to preserve the words and deeds of its\ncitizens from oblivion and the ravages of time, and thereby to leave a\ntestament for future generations. The Greek polis, beyond\nmaking possible the sharing of words and deeds and multiplying the\noccasions to win immortal fame, was meant to remedy the frailty of\nhuman affairs. It did this by establishing a framework where action\nand speech could be recorded and transformed into stories, where every\ncitizen could be a witness and thereby a potential narrator. What the\npolis established, then, was a space where organized\nremembrance could take place, and where, as a result, the\nmortality of actors and the fragility of human deeds could be\npartially overcome." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Action, Narrative, and Remembrance" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe metaphor of the polis recurs constantly in the writings\nof Arendt. This is indeed a ‘metaphor’ because in\nemploying this term Arendt is not simply referring to the political\ninstitutions of the Greek city-states, bounded as they were to their\ntime and circumstance, but to all those instances in history where a\npublic realm of action and speech was set up among a community of free\nand equal citizens. “The polis, properly speaking, is\nnot the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of\nthe people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its\ntrue space lies between people living together for this purpose, no\nmatter where they happen to be” (HC, 198). Thus the famous\nmotto: “Wherever you go, you will be a polis”\nexpressed the conviction among the Greek colonists that the kind of\npolitical association they had set up originally could be reproduced\nin their new settlements, that the space created by the “sharing\nof words and deeds” could find its proper location almost\nanywhere.", "\n\nFor Arendt, therefore, the polis stands for the\nspace of appearance, for that space “where I\nappear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely\nlike other living or inanimate things, but to make their appearance\nexplicitly.” Such public space of appearance can be always\nrecreated anew wherever individuals gather together politically, that\nis, “wherever men are together in the manner of speech and\naction” (HC, 198–9). However, since it is a creation of action,\nthis space of appearance is highly fragile and exists only when\nactualized through the performance of deeds or the utterance of words.\nIts peculiarity, as Arendt says, is that “unlike the spaces which\nare the work of our hands, it does not survive the actuality of the\nmovement which brought it into being, but disappears not only with the\ndispersal of men — as in the case of great catastrophes when the body\npolitic of a people is destroyed — but with the disappearance or arrest\nof the activities themselves. Wherever people gather together, it is\npotentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not\nforever” (HC, 199).", "\n\nThe space of appearance must be continually recreated by action; its\nexistence is secured whenever actors gather together for the purpose\nof discussing and deliberating about matters of public concern, and it\ndisappears the moment these activities cease. It is always a potential\nspace that finds its actualization in the actions and speeches of\nindividuals who have come together to undertake some common\nproject. It may arise suddenly, as in the case of revolutions, or it\nmay develop slowly out of the efforts to change some specific piece of\nlegislation or policy. Historically, it has been recreated whenever\npublic spaces of action and deliberation have been set up, from town\nhall meetings to workers’ councils, from demonstrations and\nsit-ins to struggles for justice and equal rights.", "\n\nThis capacity to act in concert for a public-political purpose is what\nArendt calls power. Power needs to be distinguished\nfrom strength, force, and violence (CR, 143–55). Unlike\nstrength, it is not the property of an individual, but of a plurality\nof actors joining together for some common political purpose. Unlike\nforce, it is not a natural phenomenon but a human creation, the\noutcome of collective engagement. And unlike violence, it is based not\non coercion but on consent and rational persuasion.", "\n\nFor Arendt, power is a sui generis phenomenon, since it is a\nproduct of action and rests entirely on persuasion. It is a product of\naction because it arises out of the concerted activities of a\nplurality of agents, and it rests on persuasion because it consists in\nthe ability to secure the consent of others through unconstrained\ndiscussion and debate. Its only limitation is the existence of other\npeople, but this limitation, she notes, “is not accidental,\nbecause human power corresponds to the condition of plurality to begin\nwith” (HC, 201). It is actualized in all those cases where\naction is undertaken for communicative (rather than strategic or\ninstrumental) purposes, and where speech is employed to disclose our\nintentions and to articulate our motives to others.", "\n\nArendt maintains that the legitimacy of power is derived from the\ninitial getting together of people, that is, from the original pact of\nassociation that establishes a political community, and is reaffirmed\nwhenever individuals act in concert through the medium of speech and\npersuasion. For her “power needs no justification, being\ninherent in the very existence of political communities; what it does\nneed is legitimacy ... Power springs up whenever people get together\nand act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial\ngetting together rather than from any action that then may\nfollow” (CR, 151).", "\n\nBeyond appealing to the past, power also relies for its continued\nlegitimacy on the rationally binding commitments that arise out of a\nprocess of free and undistorted communication. Because of this, power\nis highly independent of material factors: it is sustained not by\neconomic, bureaucratic or military means, but by the power of common\nconvictions that result from a process of fair and unconstrained\ndeliberation.", "\n\nPower is also not something that can be relied upon at all times or\naccumulated and stored for future use. Rather, it exists only as a\npotential which is actualized when actors gather together for\npolitical action and public deliberation. It is thus closely connected\nto the space of appearance, that public space which arises out of the\nactions and speeches of individuals. Indeed, for Arendt, “power\nis what keeps the public realm, the potential space of appearance\nbetween acting and speaking men, in existence.” Like the space\nof appearance, power is always “a power potential and not an\nunchangeable, measurable and reliable entity like force or strength\n… [it] springs up between men when they act together and\nvanishes the moment they disperse” (HC, 200).", "\n\nPower, then, lies at the basis of every political community and is the\nexpression of a potential that is always available to actors. It is\nalso the source of legitimacy of political and governmental\ninstitutions, the means whereby they are transformed and adapted to\nnew circumstances and made to respond to the opinions and needs of the\ncitizens. “It is the people’s support that lends power to the\ninstitutions of a country, and this support is but the continuation of\nthe consent that brought the laws into existence to begin with\n… All political institutions are manifestations and\nmaterializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the\nliving power of the people ceases to uphold them” (CR, 140).", "\n\nThe legitimacy of political institutions is dependent on the power,\nthat is, the active consent of the people; and insofar as governments\nmay be viewed as attempts to preserve power for future generations by\ninstitutionalizing it, they require for their vitality the continuing\nsupport and active involvement of all citizens." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Action, Power, and the Space of Appearance" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe discussion of Arendt’s theory of action so far has stressed\na number of features, chief among which is action’s capacity to\ndisclose the identity of the agent, to enable freedom to appear and be\nactualized as a worldly reality, to create and sustain a public space\nof appearance, and to make possible the generation of power. We have\nalso emphasized the importance of narrative and remembrance, of the\nretrospective articulation of the meaning of action by means of\nstorytelling and its preservation through a community of memory. In\nconclusion, we examine two other features of action,\nnamely, unpredictability and\nirreversibility, and their respective remedies, the\npower of promise and the power to forgive.", "\n\nAction is unpredictable because it is a manifestation of freedom, of\nthe capacity to innovate and to alter situations by engaging in them;\nbut also, and primarily, because it takes place within the web of\nhuman relationships, within a context defined by plurality, so that no\nactor can control its final outcome. Each actor sets off processes and\nenters into the inextricable web of actions and events to which all\nother actors also contribute, with the result that the outcome can\nnever be predicted from the intentions of any particular actor. The\nopen and unpredictable nature of action is a consequence of human\nfreedom and plurality: by acting we are free to start processes and\nbring about new events, but no actor has the power to control the\nconsequences of his or her deeds.", "\n\nAnother and related reason for the unpredictability of action is that\nits consequences are boundless: every act sets in motion an unlimited\nnumber of actions and reactions which have literally no end. As\nArendt puts it: “The reason why we are never able to foretell\nwith certainty the outcome and end of any action is simply that action\nhas no end” (HC, 233). This is because action “though it\nmay proceed from nowhere, so to speak, acts into a medium where every\naction becomes a chain reaction and where every process is the cause\nof new processes … the smallest act in the most limited\ncircumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one\ndeed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every\nconstellation” (HC, 190).", "\n\nClosely connected to the boundlessness and unpredictability of action\nis its irreversibility. Every action sets off processes which cannot\nbe undone or retrieved in the way, say, we are able to undo a faulty\nproduct of our hands. If one builds an artifact and is not satisfied\nwith it, it can always be destroyed and recreated again. This is\nimpossible where action is concerned, because action always takes\nplace within an already existing web of human relationships, where\nevery action becomes a reaction, every deed a source of future deeds,\nand none of these can be stopped or subsequently undone. The\nconsequences of each act are thus not only unpredictable but also\nirreversible; the processes started by action can neither be\ncontrolled nor be reversed.", "\n\nThe remedy which the tradition of Western thought has proposed for the\nunpredictability and irreversibility of action has consisted in\nabstaining from action altogether, in the withdrawal from the sphere\nof interaction with others, in the hope that one’s freedom and\nintegrity could thereby be preserved. Platonism, Stoicism and\nChristianity elevated the sphere of contemplation above the sphere of\naction, precisely because in the former one could be free from the\nentanglements and frustrations of action. Arendt’s proposal, by\ncontrast, is not to turn one’s back on the realm of human affairs, but\nto rely on two faculties inherent in action itself, the faculty of\nforgiving and the faculty of\npromising. These two faculties are closely connected,\nthe former mitigating the irreversibility of action by absolving the\nactor from the unintended consequences of his or her deeds, the latter\nmoderating the uncertainty of its outcome by binding actors to certain\ncourses of action and thereby setting some limit to the\nunpredictability of the future. Both faculties are, in this respect,\nconnected to temporality: from the standpoint of the present\nforgiving looks backward to what has happened and absolves the actor\nfrom what was unintentionally done, while promising looks forward as\nit seeks to establish islands of security in an otherwise uncertain\nand unpredictable future.", "\n\nForgiving enables us to come to terms with the past and liberates us\nto some extent from the burden of irreversibility; promising allows us\nto face the future and to set some bounds to its unpredictability. As\nArendt puts it: “Without being forgiven, released from the\nconsequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it\nwere, be confined to one single deed from which we could never\nrecover; we would remain the victims of its consequences\nforever.” On the other hand, “without being bound to the\nfulfillment of promises, we would never be able to keep our\nidentities; we would be condemned to wander helplessly and without\ndirection in the darkness of each man’s lonely heart” (HC,\n237). Both faculties, in this sense, depend on plurality, on\nthe presence and acting of others, for no one can forgive himself and\nno one can feel bound by a promise made only to one’s self. At the\nsame time, both faculties are an expression of human freedom,\nsince without the faculty to undo what we have done in the past, and\nwithout the ability to control at least partially the processes we\nhave started, we would be the victims “of an automatic necessity\nbearing all the marks of inexorable laws” (HC, 246)." ], "subsection_title": "4.5 Action, Unpredictability, and Irreversibility" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nOne of the most enduring contributions of Arendt’s political\nthought is to be found in her reflections on judgment which were to\noccupy the last years of her life. Together with the theory of action,\nher unfinished theory of judgment represents her central legacy to\ntwentieth century political thought. We now explore some of the key\naspects of her theory of judgment, and will examine its place in the\narchitectonic of Arendt’s theory of politics." ], "section_title": "5. Arendt’s Theory of Judgment", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nArendt’s theory of judgment was never developed as systematically or\nextensively as her theory of action. She intended to complete her\nstudy of the life of the mind by devoting the third volume to the\nfaculty of judgment, but was not able to do so because of her untimely\ndeath in 1975. What she left was a number of reflections scattered in\nthe first two volumes on Thinking and Willing (LM,\nvol. I; vol. II), a series of lectures on Kant’s political philosophy\ndelivered at the New School for Social Research in the Fall of 1970\n(LKPP), an essay entitled “Thinking and Moral\nConsiderations” written at the time she was composing The\nLife of the Mind (TMC, 417–46), and two articles included in\nBetween Past and Future where judgment and opinion are\ntreated in relation to culture and taste (“The Crisis in\nCulture” – BPF, 197–226) and with respect to the question\nof truth (“Truth and Politics” – BPF,\n227–64). However, these writings do not present a unified theory of\njudgment but, rather, two distinct models, one based on the standpoint\nof the actor, the other on the standpoint of the spectator, which are\nsomewhat at odds with each other. Arendt’s writings on the theme of\njudgment can be seen to fall into two more or less distinct phases, an\nearly one in which judgment is the faculty of political actors acting\nin the public realm, and a later one in which it is the privilege of\nnon-participating spectators, primarily poets and historians, who seek\nto understand the meaning of the past and to reconcile us to what has\nhappened. In this later formulation Arendt is no longer concerned with\njudging as a feature of political life as such, as the faculty which\nis exercised by actors in order to decide how to act in the public\nrealm, but with judgment as a component in the life of the mind, the\nfaculty through which the privileged spectators can recover meaning\nfrom the past and thereby reconcile themselves to time and,\nretrospectively, to tragedy.", "\n\nIn addition to presenting us with two models of judgment which stand\nin tension with each other, Arendt did not clarify the status of\njudgment with respect to two of its philosophical sources, Aristotle\nand Kant. The two conceptions seem to pull in opposite directions, the\nAristotelian toward a concern with the particular, the Kantian toward\na concern with universality and impartiality.", "\n It would appear, therefore, that Arendt’s theory of judgment not only\nincorporates two models, the actor’s — judging in order to act\n— and the spectator’s — judging in order to cull meaning\nfrom the past — but that the philosophical sources it draws upon\nare somewhat at odds with each other." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Judgment: Two Models" }, { "content": [ "\n\nArendt’s concern with judgment as the faculty of retrospective\nassessment that allows meaning to be redeemed from the past originated\nin her attempt to come to terms with the twin political tragedies of\nthe twentieth century, Nazism and Stalinism. Faced with the horrors of\nthe extermination camps and what is now termed the Gulag, Arendt\nstrove to understand these phenomena in their own terms, neither\ndeducing them from precedents nor placing them in some overarching\nscheme of historical necessity. This need to come to terms with the\ntraumatic events of the twentieth century, and to understand them in a\nmanner that does not explain them away but faces them in all their\nstarkness and unprecedentedness, is something to which Arendt returns\nagain and again. Our inherited framework for judgment fails us\n“as soon as we try to apply it honestly to the central political\nexperiences of our own time” (UP, 379). Even our ordinary\ncommon-sense judgment is rendered ineffective, since “we are\nliving in a topsy-turvy world, a world where we cannot find our way by\nabiding by the rules of what once was common sense” (UP,\n383).", "\n\nThe crisis in understanding is therefore coeval with a crisis in\njudgment, insofar as understanding for Arendt is “so closely\nrelated to and interrelated with judging that one must describe both\nas the subsumption of something particular under a universal\nrule” (UP, 383). Once these rules have lost their validity we\nare no longer able to understand and to judge the particulars, that\nis, we are no longer able to subsume them under our accepted\ncategories of moral and political thought. Arendt, however, does not\nbelieve that the loss of these categories has brought to an end our\ncapacity to judge; on the contrary, since human beings are\ndistinguished by their capacity to begin anew, they are able to\nfashion new categories and to formulate new standards of judgment for\nthe events that have come to pass and for those that may emerge in the\nfuture.", "\n\nFor Arendt, therefore, the enormity and unprecedentedness of\ntotalitarianism have not destroyed, strictly speaking, our ability to\njudge; rather, they have destroyed our accepted standards of judgment\nand our conventional categories of interpretation and assessment, be\nthey moral or political. And in this situation the only recourse is to\nappeal to the imagination, which allows us to view things in\ntheir proper perspective and to judge them without the benefit of a\npre-given rule or universal. For Arendt, the imagination enables us to\ncreate the distance which is necessary for an impartial judgment,\nwhile at the same time allowing for the closeness that makes\nunderstanding possible. In this way it makes possible our\nreconciliation with reality, even with the tragic reality of the\ntwentieth century.", "\n\nArendt’s participation at the trial of Eichmann in the early sixties\nmade her once more aware of the need to come to terms with a reality\nthat initially defied human comprehension. How could such an ordinary,\nlaw-abiding, and all-too-human individual have committed such\natrocities? The impact of the trial also forced her to raise another\nproblem concerning judgment, namely, whether we are entitled to\npresuppose “an independent human faculty, unsupported by law and\npublic opinion, that judges anew in full spontaneity every deed and\nintent whenever the occasion arises” (PRD, 187)." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Judgment and the Vita Contemplativa" }, { "content": [ "\n\nArendt returned to this issue in The Life of the Mind, a work\nwhich was meant to encompass the three faculties of thinking, willing,\nand judging. In the introduction to the first volume she declared that\nthe immediate impulse to write it came from attending the Eichmann\ntrial in Jerusalem, while the second, equally important motive, was to\nprovide an account of our mental activities that was missing from her\nprevious work on the vita activa. It was Eichmann’s absence\nof thinking, his “thoughtlessness,” that struck her most,\nbecause it was responsible in her view for his inability to judge in\nthose circumstances where judgment was most needed. “It was this\nabsence of thinking,” she wrote, “that awakened my\ninterest. Is evil-doing … possible in default of not just\n‘base motives’ ... but of any motives whatever …\nMight the problem of good and evil, our faculty for telling right from\nwrong, be connected with our faculty of thought?” (LM, vol. I,\n4–5).", "\n\nArendt attempted a reply by connecting the activity of thinking to\nthat of judging in a twofold manner. First, thinking — the\nsilent dialogue of me and myself — dissolves our fixed habits of\nthought and the accepted rules of conduct, and thus prepares the way\nfor the activity of judging particulars without the aid of\npre-established universals. It is not that thinking provides judgment\nwith new rules for subsuming the particular under the\nuniversal. Rather, it loosens the grip of the universal over the\nparticular, thereby releasing judgment from ossified categories of\nthought and conventional standards of assessment. It is in times of\nhistorical crisis that thinking ceases to be a marginal affair,\nbecause by undermining all established criteria and values, it\nprepares the individual to judge for him or herself instead of being\ncarried away by the actions and opinions of the majority.", "\n\nThe second way in which Arendt connected the activity of thinking with\nthat of judging is by showing that thinking, by actualizing the\ndialogue of me and myself which is given in consciousness, produces\nconscience as a by-product. This conscience, unlike the voice\nof God or what later thinkers called lumen naturale, gives no\npositive prescriptions; it only tells us what not to do, what\nto avoid in our actions and dealings with others, as well as what to\nrepent of. Arendt notes in this context that Socrates’ dictum\n“It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong,” and his\nproposition that “It would be better for me that my lyre or a\nchorus I directed should be out of tune and loud with discord, and\nthat multitudes of men should disagree with me, rather than that I,\nbeing one, should be out of harmony with myself and\ncontradict me,” derive their validity from the idea that there\nis a silent partner within ourselves to whom we render account of our\nactions (TMC, 29–30; 35). What we fear most is the anticipation of the\npresence of this partner (i.e., our conscience) who awaits us at the\nend of the day.", "\n\nArendt also remarks that thinking, as the actualization of the\ndifference given in consciousness, “is not a prerogative of the\nfew but an ever-present faculty in everybody; by the same token,\ninability to think is not a failing of the many who lack brain power,\nbut an ever-present possibility for everybody” (LM, vol. I,\n191). For those who do engage in thinking, however, conscience emerges\nas an inevitable by-product. As the side-effect of thinking,\nconscience has its counterpart in judgment as the by-product of the\nliberating activity of thought. If conscience represents the inner\ncheck by which we evaluate our actions, judgment represents the outer\nmanifestation of our capacity to think critically. Both faculties\nrelate to the question of right and wrong, but while conscience\ndirects attention to the self, judgment directs attention to the\nworld. In this respect, judgment makes possible what Arendt calls\n“the manifestation of the wind of thought” in the sphere\nof appearance." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Judgment and the Wind of Thought" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe foregoing account has explored the way in which Arendt attempted\nto connect the activity of thinking to our capacity to judge. To be\nsure, this connection of thinking and judging seems to operate only in\nemergencies, in those exceptional moments where individuals, faced\nwith the collapse of traditional standards, must come up with new ones\nand judge according to their own autonomous values. There is, however,\na second, more elaborated view of judgment which does not restrict it\nto moments of crisis, but which identifies it with the capacity to\nthink representatively, that is, from the standpoint of everyone\nelse. Arendt called this capacity to think representatively an\n“enlarged mentality,” adopting the same terms that Kant\nemployed in his Third Critique to characterize aesthetic judgment. It\nis to this work that we must now turn our attention, since Arendt\nbased her theory of political judgment on Kant’s aesthetics rather\nthan on his moral philosophy.", "\n\nAt first sight this might seem a puzzling choice, since Kant himself\nbased his moral and political philosophy on practical reason and not\non our aesthetic faculties. Arendt, however, claimed that the\nCritique of Judgment contained Kant’s unwritten political\nphilosophy, and that the first part of it, the “Critique of\nAesthetic Judgment,” was the most fruitful basis on which to\nbuild a theory of political judgment, since it dealt with the world of\nappearances from the point of view of the judging spectator and took\nas its starting point the faculty of taste, understood as a faculty of\nconcrete and embodied subjects (BPF, 219–20).", "\n\nFor Arendt the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability\ninsofar as it enables individuals to orient themselves in the public\nrealm and to judge the phenomena that are disclosed within it from a\nstandpoint that is relatively detached and impartial. She credits Kant\nwith having dislodged the prejudice that judgments of taste lie\naltogether outside the political realm, since they supposedly concern\nonly aesthetic matters. She believes, in fact, that by linking taste\nto that wider manner of thinking which Kant called an “enlarged\nmentality” the way was opened to a revaluation of judgment as a\nspecific political ability, namely, as the ability to think in the\nplace of everybody else. It is only in Kant’s Critique of\nJudgment that we find a conception of judgment as the ability to\ndeal with particulars in their particularity, that is, without\nsubsuming them under a pre-given universal, but actively searching the\nuniversal out of the particular. Kant formulated this distinction as\nthat between determinant and reflective judgments.\nFor him judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular\nas contained under the universal. If the universal, (the rule,\nprinciple, or law) is given, then the judgment which subsumes the\nparticular under it is determinant. If, however, only the particular\nis given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgment\nis reflective. For Kant determinant judgments were cognitive, while\nreflective judgments were non-cognitive. Reflective judgment is seen\nas the capacity to ascend from the particular to the universal without\nthe mediation of determinate concepts given in advance; it is\nreasoning about particulars in their relation to the universal rather\nthan reasoning about universals in their relation to the\nparticular. In the case of aesthetic judgment this means that one can\nunderstand and apply the universal predicate of beauty only through\nexperiencing a particular object that exemplifies it. Thus, upon\nencountering a flower, a unique landscape, or a particular painting, one\nis able to say that it is an example of beauty, that it possesses\n“exemplary validity.”", "\n\nFor Arendt this notion of exemplary validity is not restricted to\naesthetic objects or to individuals who exemplified certain virtues.\nRather, she wants to extend this notion to events in the past that\ncarry a meaning beyond their sheer enactment, that is, to events that\ncould be seen as exemplary for those who came after. It is here that\naesthetic judgment joins with the retrospective judgment of the\nhistorian. The American and French Revolutions, the Paris Commune, the\nRussian soviets, the German revolutionary councils of 1918–19, the\nHungarian uprising of 1956, all these events possess the kind of\nexemplary validity that makes them of universal significance, while\nstill retaining their own specificity and uniqueness. Thus, by\nattending to these events in their particularity the historian or\njudging spectator is able to illuminate their universal import and\nthereby preserve them as “examples” for posterity.", "\n\nFor Arendt it is the spectators who have the privilege of judging\nimpartially and disinterestedly, and in doing so they exercise two\ncrucial faculties, imagination and common sense.\nImagination is the faculty of representing in one’s mind that which\nhas already appeared to one’s senses. Through the imagination one can\nrepresent objects that are no longer present and thus establish the\ndistance necessary for an impartial judgment. Once this distancing has\noccurred, one is in a position to reflect upon these representations\nfrom a number of different perspectives, and thereby to reach a\njudgment about the proper value of an object.", "\n\nThe other faculty that spectators have to appeal to is common sense or\nsensus communis, since without it they could not share their\njudgments or overcome their individual idiosyncrasies. Kant believed\nthat for our judgments to be valid we must transcend our private or\nsubjective conditions in favor of public and intersubjective ones, and\nwe are able to do this by appealing to our community sense, our\nsensus communis.", "\n\nThe criterion for judgment, then, is communicability, and the\nstandard for deciding whether our judgments are indeed communicable is\nto see whether they could fit with the sensus communis of\nothers. Arendt points out that the emphasis on the communicability of\njudgments of taste, and the correlative notion of an enlarged\nmentality, link up effortlessly with Kant’s idea of a united mankind\nliving in eternal peace. She argues that “It is by virtue of\nthis idea of mankind, present in every single man, that men are human,\nand they can be called civilized or humane to the extent that this\nidea becomes the principle not only of their judgments but of their\nactions. It is at this point that actor and\nspectator become united; the maxim of the actor and the\nmaxim, the ‘standard,’ according to which the spectator\njudges the spectacle of the world, become one” (LKPP, 75).", "\n\nIn her reflections on Kant’s Third Critique Arendt acknowledges the\nlinks between the standpoint of the actor and that of the\nspectator. Let us now examine the way in which judgment operates from\nthe standpoint of the actor." ], "subsection_title": "5.4 Judgment and Kant’s Aesthetics" }, { "content": [ "\n\nArendt presented a model of judgment in the essays “The Crisis\nin Culture” and “Truth and Politics” which could be\ncharacterized as far more ‘political’ than the one\npresented so far. In these essays, in fact, she treated judgment as a\nfaculty that enables political actors to decide what courses of action\nto undertake in the public realm, what kind of objectives are most\nappropriate or worth pursuing, as well as who to praise or blame for\npast actions or for the consequences of past decisions. In this model\njudgment is viewed as a specifically political ability,\nnamely, as “the ability to see things not only from one’s own\npoint of view but from the perspective of all those who happen to be\npresent,” and as being “one of the fundamental abilities\nof man as a political being insofar as it enables him to orient\nhimself in the public realm, in the common world” (BPF,\n221). Arendt claims that “the Greeks called this ability [to\njudge] phronesis, or insight, and they considered it the\nprincipal virtue or excellence of the statesman in distinction from\nthe wisdom of the philosopher. The difference between this judging\ninsight and speculative thought lies in that the former has its roots\nin what we usually call common sense, which the latter constantly\ntranscends. Common sense … discloses to us the nature of the\nworld insofar as it is a common world; we owe to it the fact that our\nstrictly private and ‘subjective’ five senses and their\nsensory data can adjust themselves to a non-subjective and\n‘objective’ world which we have in common and share with\nothers. Judging is one, if not the most, important activity in which\nthis sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass” (BPF,\n221).", "\n\nMoreover, in discussing the non-coercive character of judgment, the\nfact that it can only appeal to but never force the agreement of\nothers, she claims that “this ‘wooing’ or persuading\ncorresponds closely to what the Greeks called peithein, the\nconvincing and persuading speech which they regarded as the typically\npolitical form of people talking with one another” (BPF, 222).\nSome commentators have claimed that there is a contradiction in\nArendt’s employment of the Aristotelian notion of phronesis\nalongside Kant’s idea of an “enlarged mentality,” since\nthey supposedly pull in opposite directions, the former toward a\nconcern with the particular, the latter toward universality and\nimpartiality. However, this contradiction is more apparent than real,\nsince Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment is a theory of\nreflective judgment, that is, of those judgments where the\nuniversal is not given but must be searched out of the particular. In\nthis respect the theory of aesthetic judgment to which Arendt appeals\ndoes have close affinities with Aristotle’s notion of\nphronesis: both are concerned with the judgment of\nparticulars qua particulars, not with their subsumption under\nuniversal rules. If a distinction is to be made, it has more to do\nwith the mode of asserting validity: In Aristotle\nphronesis is the privilege of a few experienced individuals\n(the phronimoi) who, over time, have shown themselves to be\nwise in practical matters; the only criterion of validity is their\nexperience and their past record of judiciuos actions. In the case of\njudgments of taste, on the other hand, individuals have to appeal to\nthe judgments and opinions of others, and thus the validity of their\njudgments rests on the consent they can elicit from a community of\ndifferently situated subjects.", "\n\nFor Arendt the validity of political judgment depends on our ability\nto think “representatively,” that is, from the standpoint\nof everyone else, so that we are able to look at the world from a\nnumber of different perspectives. And this ability, in turn, can only\nbe acquired and tested in a public forum where individuals have the\nopportunity to exchange their opinions on particular matters and see\nwhether they accord with the opinions of others. In this respect the\nprocess of opinion formation is never a solitary activity; rather, it\nrequires a genuine encounter with different opinions so that a\nparticular issue may be examined from every possible standpoint until,\nas she puts it, “it is flooded and made transparent by the full\nlight of human comprehension” (BPF, 242). Debate and discussion,\nand the capacity to enlarge one’s perspective, are indeed crucial to\nthe formation of opinions that can claim more than subjective\nvalidity; individuals may hold personal opinions on many subject\nmatters, but they can form representative opinions only by\nenlarging their standpoint to incorporate those of others. As Arendt\nsays:", "Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by\nconsidering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present\nto my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I\nrepresent them … The more people’s standpoints I have present\nin my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can\nimagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the\nstronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more\nvalid my final conclusions, my opinion. (BPF, 241)", "\nOpinions, in fact, are never self-evident. In matters of opinion, but\nnot in matters of truth, “our thinking is truly discursive,\nrunning, as it were, from place to place, from one part of the world\nto another, through all kinds of conflicting views, until it finally\nascends from these particularities to some impartial generality”\n(BPF, 242). In this respect one is never alone while forming an\nopinion; as Arendt notes, “even if I shun all company or am\ncompletely isolated while forming an opinion, I am not simply together\nonly with myself in the solitude of philosophical thought; I remain in\nthis world of universal interdependence, where I can make myself the\nrepresentative of everybody else” (BPF, 242)." ], "subsection_title": "5.5 Judgment and the Vita Activa" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe representative character of judgment and opinion has important\nimplications for the question of validity. Arendt always stressed that\nthe formation of valid opinions requires a public space where\nindividuals can test and purify their views through a process of\nmutual debate and enlightenment. She was, however, quite opposed to\nthe idea that opinions should be measured by the standard of truth, or\nthat debate should be conducted according to strict scientific\nstandards of validity. In her view, truth belongs to the realm of\ncognition, the realm of logic, mathematics and the strict sciences,\nand carries always an element of coercion, since it precludes debate\nand must be accepted by every individual in possession of her rational\nfaculties. Set against the plurality of opinions, truth has a despotic\ncharacter: it compels universal assent, leaves the mind little freedom\nof movement, eliminates the diversity of views and reduces the\nrichness of human discourse. In this respect, truth is anti-political,\nsince by eliminating debate and diversity it eliminates the very\nprinciples of political life. As Arendt writes, “The trouble is\nthat factual truth, like all other truth, peremptorily claims to be\nacknowledged and precludes debate, and debate constitutes the very\nessence of political life. The modes of thought and communication that\ndeal with truth, if seen from the political perspective, are\nnecessarily domineering; they don’t take into account other people’s\nopinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of all\nstrictly political thinking” (BPF, 241).", "\n\nArendt’s defense of opinion is motivated not just by her belief that\ntruth leaves no room for debate or dissent, or for the acknowledgment\nof difference, but also by her conviction that our reasoning faculties\ncan only flourish in a dialogic context. She cites Kant’s remark that\n“the external power that deprives man of the freedom to\ncommunicate his thoughts publicly deprives him at the same time of his\nfreedom to think,” and underlines the fact that for Kant the\nonly guarantee of the correctness of our thinking is that “we\nthink, as it were, in community with others to whom we communicate our\nthoughts as they communicate theirs to us” (BPF, 234–5). She\nalso quotes Madison’s statement that “the reason of man, like\nman himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires\nfirmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is\nassociated” (BPF, 234).", "\n\nThe appeal to Kant and Madison is meant to vindicate the power and\ndignity of opinion against those thinkers, from Plato to Hobbes, who\nsaw it as mere illusion, as a confused or inadequate grasp of the\ntruth. For Arendt opinion is not a defective form of knowledge that\nshould be transcended or left behind as soon as one is in possession\nof the truth. Rather, it is a distinct form of knowledge which arises\nout of the collective deliberation of citizens, and which requires the\nuse of the imagination and the capacity to think\n“representatively.” By deliberating in common and engaging\nin “representative thinking” citizens are in fact able to\nform opinions that can claim intersubjective validity. It is important\nto stress that Arendt does not want to dismiss the philosophers’\nattempt to find universal or absolute standards of knowledge and\ncognition, but to check their desire to impose those standards upon\nthe sphere of human affairs, since they would eliminate its plurality\nand essential relativity. The imposition of a single or absolute\nstandard into the domain of praxis would do away with the\nneed to persuade others of the relative merits of an opinion, to\nelicit their consent to a specific proposal, or to obtain their\nagreement with respect to a particular policy. Indeed, for Arendt the\nimposition of such a standard would mean that individuals would no\nlonger be required to exercise their judgment, develop their\nimagination, or cultivate an “enlarged mentality,” since\nthey would no longer need to deliberate in common. Strict\ndemonstration, rather than persuasive argumentation, would then become\nthe only legitimate form of discourse.", "\n\nNow, we must be careful not to impute to Arendt the view that truth\nhas no legitimate role to play in politics or in the sphere of human\naffairs. She does indeed assert that “All truths — not\nonly the various kinds of rational truth but also factual truth\n— are opposed to opinion in their mode of asserting\nvalidity” (BPF, 239), since they all carry an element of\ncompulsion. However, she is only preoccupied with the negative\nconsequences of rational truth when applied to the sphere of politics\nand collective deliberation, while she defends the importance of\nfactual truth for the preservation of an accurate account of the past\nand for the very existence of political communities. Factual truth,\nshe writes, “is always related to other people: it concerns\nevents and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established\nby witnesses and depends upon testimony … It is political by\nnature.” It follows, therefore, that “facts and opinions,\nthough they must be kept apart, are not antagonistic to each other;\nthey belong to the same realm. Facts inform opinions, and opinions,\ninspired by different interests and passions, can differ widely and\nstill be legitimate as long as they respect factual truth. Freedom of\nopinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed and the\nfacts themselves are not in dispute. In other words, factual truth\ninforms political thought just as rational truth informs philosophical\nspeculation” (BPF, 238).", "\n\nThe relationship between facts and opinions is thus one of mutual\nentailment: if opinions were not based on correct information and the\nfree access to all relevant facts they could scarcely claim any\nvalidity. And if they were to be based on fantasy, self-deception, or\ndeliberate falsehood, then no possibility of genuine debate and\nargumentation could be sustained. Both factual truth and the general\nhabit of truth-telling are therefore basic to the formation of sound\nopinions and to the flourishing of political debate. Moreover, if the\nrecord of the past were to be destroyed by organized lying, or be\ndistorted by an attempt to rewrite history, political life would be\ndeprived of one of its essential and stabilizing elements. In sum,\nboth factual truth and the practice of truth-telling are essential to\npolitical life. The antagonism for Arendt is between rational\ntruth and well-grounded opinion, since the former does not allow for\ndebate and dissent, while the latter thrives on it. Arendt’s defense\nof opinion must therefore be understood as a defense of political\ndeliberation, and of the role that persuasion and dissuasion play in\nall matters affecting the political community. Against Plato and\nHobbes, who denigrated the role of opinion in political matters,\nArendt reasserts the value and importance of political discourse, of\ndeliberation and persuasion, and thus of a politics that acknowledges\ndifference and the plurality of opinions." ], "subsection_title": "5.6 Judgment and Validity" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn this last section, we reconstruct Arendt’s conception of\ncitizenship around two themes: (1) the public sphere, and (2)\npolitical agency and collective identity, and to highlight the\ncontribution of Arendt’s conception to a theory of democratic\ncitizenship." ], "section_title": "6. Arendt’s Conception of Citizenship", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nFor Arendt the public sphere comprises two distinct but interrelated\ndimensions. The first is the space of appearance, a space of\npolitical freedom and equality which comes into being whenever\ncitizens act in concert through the medium of speech and\npersuasion. The second is the common world, a shared and\npublic world of human artifacts, institutions and settings which\nseparates us from nature and which provides a relatively permanent and\ndurable context for our activities. Both dimensions are essential to\nthe practice of citizenship, the former providing the spaces where it\ncan flourish, the latter providing the stable background from which\npublic spaces of action and deliberation can arise. For Arendt the\nreactivation of citizenship in the modern world depends upon both the\nrecovery of a common, shared world and the creation of numerous spaces\nof appearance in which individuals can disclose their identities and\nestablish relations of reciprocity and solidarity.", "\n\nThere are three features of the public sphere and of the sphere of\npolitics in general that are central to Arendt’s conception of\ncitizenship. These are, first, its artificial or constructed\nquality; second, its spatial quality; and, third, the\ndistinction between public and private\ninterests.", "\n\nAs regards the first feature, Arendt always stressed the artificiality\nof public life and of political activities in general, the fact that\nthey are man-made and constructed rather than natural or given. She\nregarded this artificiality as something to be celebrated rather than\ndeplored. Politics for her was not the result of some natural\npredisposition, or the realization of the inherent traits of human\nnature. Rather, it was a cultural achievement of the first order,\nenabling individuals to transcend the necessities of life and to\nfashion a world within which free political action and discourse could\nflourish.", "\n\nThe stress on the artificiality of politics has a number of important\nconsequences. For example, Arendt emphasized that the principle of\npolitical equality does not rest on a theory of natural rights or on\nsome natural condition that precedes the constitution of the political\nrealm. Rather, it is an attribute of citizenship which individuals\nacquire upon entering the public realm and which can be secured only by\ndemocratic political institutions.", "\n\nAnother consequence of Arendt’s stress on the artificiality of\npolitical life is evident in her rejection of all neo-romantic appeals\nto the volk and to ethnic identity as the basis for political\ncommunity. She maintained that one’s ethnic, religious, or racial\nidentity was irrelevant to one’s identity as a citizen, and that it\nshould never be made the basis of membership in a political\ncommunity.", "\n\nArendt’s emphasis on the formal qualities of citizenship made her\nposition rather distant from those advocates of participation in the\n1960s who saw it in terms of recapturing a sense of intimacy, of\nwarmth and authenticity. For Arendt political participation was\nimportant because it permitted the establishment of relations of\ncivility and solidarity among citizens. She claimed that the ties of\nintimacy and warmth can never become political since they represent\npsychological substitutes for the loss of the common world. The only\ntruly political ties are those of civic friendship and solidarity,\nsince they make political demands and preserve reference to the\nworld. For Arendt, therefore, the danger of trying to recapture the\nsense of intimacy and warmth, of authenticity and communal feelings is\nthat one loses the public values of impartiality, civic friendship,\nand solidarity.", "\n\nThe second feature stressed by Arendt has to do with the\nspatial quality of public life, with the fact that political\nactivities are located in a public space where citizens are able to\nmeet one another, exchange their opinions and debate their\ndifferences, and search for some collective solution to their\nproblems. Politics, for Arendt, is a matter of people sharing a common\nworld and a common space of appearance so that public concerns can\nemerge and be articulated from different perspectives. In her view, it\nis not enough to have a collection of private individuals voting\nseparately and anonymously according to their private\nopinions. Rather, these individuals must be able to see and talk to\none another in public, to meet in a public-political space, so that\ntheir differences as well as their commonalities can emerge and become\nthe subject of democratic debate.", "\n\nThis notion of a common public space helps us to understand how\npolitical opinions can be formed which are neither reducible to\nprivate, idiosyncratic preferences, on the one hand, nor to a\nunanimous collective opinion, on the other. Arendt herself distrusted\nthe term “public opinion,” since it suggested the mindless\nunanimity of mass society. In her view representative opinions could\narise only when citizens actually confronted one another in a public\nspace, so that they could examine an issue from a number of different\nperspectives, modify their views, and enlarge their standpoint to\nincorporate that of others. Political opinions, she claimed, can never\nbe formed in private; rather, they are formed, tested, and enlarged\nonly within a public context of argumentation and debate.", "\n\nAnother implication of Arendt’s stress on the spatial quality of\npolitics has to do with the question of how a collection of distinct\nindividuals can be united to form a political community. For Arendt\nthe unity that may be achieved in a political community is neither the\nresult of religious or ethnic affinity, not the expression of some\ncommon value system. Rather, the unity in question can be attained by\nsharing a public space and a set of political institutions, and\nengaging in the practices and activities which are characteristic of\nthat space and those institutions.", "\n\nA further implication of Arendt’s conception of the spatial quality of\npolitics is that since politics is a public activity, one cannot be\npart of it without in some sense being present in a public space. To\nbe engaged in politics means actively participating in the various\npublic forums where the decisions affecting one’s community are\ntaken. Arendt’s insistence on the importance of direct participation\nin politics is thus based on the idea that, since politics is\nsomething that needs a worldly location and can only happen in a\npublic space, then if one is not present in such a space one is simply\nnot engaged in politics.", "\n\nThis public or world-centered conception of politics lies also at the\nbasis of the third feature stressed by Arendt, the distinction between\npublic and private interests. According to Arendt,\npolitical activity is not a means to an end, but an end in itself; one\ndoes not engage in political action to promote one’s welfare, but to\nrealize the principles intrinsic to political life, such as freedom,\nequality, justice, and solidarity. In a late essay entitled\n“Public Rights and Private Interests” (PRPI) Arendt\ndiscusses the difference between one’s life as an individual and one’s\nlife as a citizen, between the life spent on one’s own and the life\nspent in common with others. She argues that our public interest as\ncitizens is quite distinct from our private interest as\nindividuals. The public interest is not the sum of private interests,\nnor their highest common denominator, nor even the total of\nenlightened self-interests. In fact, it has little to do with our\nprivate interests, since it concerns the world that lies beyond the\nself, that was there before our birth and that will be there after our\ndeath, a world that finds embodiment in activities and institutions\nwith their own intrinsic purposes which might often be at odds with\nour short-term and private interests. The public interest refers,\ntherefore, to the interests of a public world which we share as\ncitizens and which we can pursue and enjoy only by going beyond our\nprivate self-interest." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Citizenship and the Public Sphere" } ] } ]	[ "Aschheim, S. (ed.), 2001, Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem,\nBerkeley: University of California Press.", "Baehr, P., 2010, Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism, and the\nSocial Sciences, Stanford: Stanford University Press.", "Baluch, F., 2014, “Arendt’s Machiavellian\nMoment”, European Journal of Political Theory, 13 (2):\n154–177.", "Barnouw, D., 1990, Visible Spaces: Hannah Arendt and the\nGerman-Jewish Experience, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University\nPress.", "Benhabib, S., 1996, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah\nArendt, London: Sage Publications.", "–––, 2003, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah\nArendt. 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Second edition,\n2004.", "–––, 2006, Why Arendt Matters, New\nHaven, CT: Yale University Press." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../benjamin/", "text": "Benjamin, Walter" }, { "href": "../existentialism/", "text": "existentialism" }, { "href": "../heidegger/", "text": "Heidegger, Martin" }, { "href": "../hobbes/", "text": "Hobbes, Thomas" }, { "href": "../husserl/", "text": "Husserl, Edmund" }, { "href": "../jaspers/", "text": "Jaspers, Karl" }, { "href": "../kant/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel" }, { "href": "../machiavelli/", "text": "Machiavelli, Niccolò" }, { "href": "../phenomenology/", "text": "phenomenology" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" } ]
ethics-ancient	Ancient Ethical Theory	First published Tue Aug 3, 2004; substantive revision Fri Feb 5, 2021	[ "\nWhile moral theory does not invent morality, or even reflection on it,\nit does try to bring systematic thinking to bear on these activities.\nAncient moral theory, however, does not attempt to be a comprehensive\naccount of all the phenomena that fall under the heading of morality.\nRather, assuming piecemeal opinions and practices, it tries to capture\nits underlying essence. It is the nature of such an enterprise to\nevaluate and criticize some of these opinions and practices but that\nis not its primary goal. Ancient moral theory tries to provide a\nreflective account of an essential human activity so one can grasp\nwhat is of fundamental importance in pursuing it. In historical order,\nthe theories to be considered in this article are those of Socrates as\npresented in certain dialogues of Plato; Plato in the\nRepublic; Aristotle; the Cynics; Cyrenaic hedonism; Epicurus;\nthe Stoics; and Pyrrhonian skepticism." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Socrates", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Plato", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Aristotle", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Cynics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Cyrenaics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Epicurus", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Stoics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "9. Pyrrhonian Skeptics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nIn their moral theories, the ancient philosophers depended on several\nimportant notions. These include virtue and the virtues, happiness\n(eudaimonia), and the soul. We can begin with virtue.", "\nVirtue is a general term that translates the Greek word\naretê. Sometimes aretê is also\ntranslated as excellence. Many objects, natural or artificial, have\ntheir particular aretê or kind of excellence. There is\nthe excellence of a horse and the excellence of a knife. Then, of\ncourse, there is human excellence. Conceptions of human excellence\ninclude such disparate figures as the Homeric warrior chieftain and\nthe Athenian statesman of the period of its imperial expansion.\nPlato’s character Meno sums up one important strain of thought\nwhen he says that excellence for a man is managing the business of the\ncity so that he benefits his friends, harms his enemies, and comes to\nno harm himself (Meno 71e). From this description we can see\nthat some versions of human excellence have a problematic relation to\nthe moral virtues.", "\nIn the ancient world, courage, moderation, justice and piety were\nleading instances of moral virtue. A virtue is a settled disposition\nto act in a certain way; justice, for instance, is the settled\ndisposition to act, let’s say, so that each one receives their\ndue. This settled disposition consists in a practical knowledge about\nhow to bring it about, in each situation, that each receives their\ndue. It also includes a strong positive attitude toward bringing it\nabout that each receives their due. Just people, then, are not ones\nwho occasionally act justly, or even who regularly act justly but do\nso out of some other motive; rather they are people who reliably act\nthat way because they place a positive, high intrinsic value on\nrendering to each their due and they are good at it. Courage is a\nsettled disposition that allows one to act reliably to pursue right\nends in fearful situations, because one values so acting\nintrinsically. Moderation is the virtue that deals similarly with\none’s appetites and emotions.", "\nHuman excellence can be conceived in ways that do not include the\nmoral virtues. For instance, someone thought of as excellent for\nbenefiting friends and harming enemies can be cruel, arbitrary,\nrapacious, and ravenous of appetite. Most ancient philosophers,\nhowever, argue that human excellence must include the moral virtues\nand that the excellent human will be, above all, courageous, moderate,\nand just. This argument depends on making a link between the moral\nvirtues and happiness. While most ancient philosophers hold that\nhappiness is the proper goal or end of human life, the notion is both\nsimple and complicated, as Aristotle points out. It seems simple to\nsay everyone wants to be happy; it is complicated to say what\nhappiness is. We can approach the problem by discussing, first, the\nrelation of happiness to human excellence and, then, the relation of\nhuman excellence to the moral virtues.", "\nIt is significant that synonyms for eudaimonia are living\nwell and doing well. These phrases imply certain activities associated\nwith human living. Ancient philosophers argued that whatever\nactivities constitute human living – e.g., those associated with\npleasure – one can engage in those activities in a mediocre or\neven a poor way. One can feel and react to pleasures sometimes\nappropriately and sometimes inappropriately; or one might always act\nshamefully and dishonorably. However, to carry out the activities that\nconstitute human living well over a whole lifetime, or long stretches\nof it, is living well or doing well. At this point the relation of\nhappiness to human excellence should be clear. Human excellence is the\npsychological basis for carrying out the activities of a human life\nwell; to that extent human excellence is also happiness.", "\nSo described, human excellence is general and covers many activities\nof a human life. However, one can see how human excellence might at\nleast include the moral virtues. The moral virtue relevant to fear,\nfor instance, is courage. Courage is a reliable disposition to react\nto fear in an appropriate way. What counts as appropriate entails\nharnessing fear for good or honorable ends. Such ends are not confined\nto one’s own welfare but include, e.g., the welfare of\none’s city. In this way, moral virtues become the kind of human\nexcellence that is other-regarding. The moral virtues, then, are\nexcellent qualities of character – intrinsically valuable for\nthe one who has them; but they are also valuable for others. In rough\noutline, we can see one important way ancient moral theory tries to\nlink happiness to moral virtue by way of human excellence. Happiness\nderives from human excellence; human excellence includes the moral\nvirtues, which are implicitly or explicitly other-regarding.", "\nSince happiness plays such a vital role in ancient moral theory, we\nshould note the difference between the Greek word eudaimonia\nand its usual translation as ‘happiness’. Although its\nusage varies, most often the English word ‘happiness’\nrefers to a feeling. For example, we say, “You can tell he feels\nhappy right now, from the way he looks and how he is behaving.”\nThe feeling is described as one of contentment or satisfaction,\nperhaps with the way one’s life as a whole is going. While some\nthink there is a distinction between feeling happy and feeling\ncontent, still happiness is a good and pleasant feeling. However,\n‘happiness’ has a secondary sense that does not focus on\nfeelings but rather on activities. For instance, one might say,\n“It was a happy time in my life; my work was going well.”\nThe speaker need not be referring to the feelings he or she was\nexperiencing but just to the fact that some important activity was\ngoing well. Of course, if their work is going well, they might feel\ncontentment. But in speaking of their happiness, they might just as\nwell be referring to their absorption in some successful activity. For\nancient philosophers eudaimonia is closer to the secondary\nsense of our own term. Happiness means not so much feeling a certain\nway, or feeling a certain way about how one’s life as a whole is\ngoing, but rather carrying out certain activities or functioning in a\ncertain way. This sort of happiness is an admirable and praiseworthy\naccomplishment, whereas achieving satisfaction or contentment may not\nbe.", "\nIn this way, then, ancient philosophers typically justify moral\nvirtue. Being courageous, just, and moderate is valuable for the\nvirtuous person because these virtues are inextricably linked with\nhappiness. Everyone wants to be happy, so anyone who realizes the link\nbetween virtue and happiness will also want to be virtuous. This\nargument depends on two central ideas. First, human excellence is a\ngood of the soul – not a material or bodily good such as wealth\nor political power. Another way to put this idea is to say happiness\nis not something external, like wealth or political power, but an\ninternal, psychological good. The second central idea is that the most\nimportant good of the soul is moral virtue. By being virtuous one\nenjoys a psychological state whose value outweighs whatever other\nkinds of goods one might have by being vicious.", "\nFinally, a few words about the soul are in order since, typically,\nphilosophers argue that virtue is a good of the soul. In some ways,\nthis claim is found in many traditions. Many thinkers argue that being\nmoral does not necessarily provide physical beauty, health, or\nprosperity. Rather, as something good, virtue must be understood as\nbelonging to the soul; it is a psychological good. However, in order\nto explain virtue as a good of the soul, one does not have to hold\nthat the soul is immortal. While Plato, for example, holds that the\nsoul is immortal and that its virtue is a good that transcends death,\nhis argument for virtue as a psychological good does not depend on the\nimmortality of the soul. He argues that virtue is a psychological good\nin this life. To live a mortal human life with this good is in itself\nhappiness.", "\nThis position that links happiness and virtue is called eudaimonism\n– a word based on the principal Greek word for happiness,\neudaimonia. By eudaimonism, we will mean one of several\ntheses: (a) virtue, together with its active exercise, is identical\nwith happiness; (b) virtue, together with its activities, is the most\nimportant and dominant constituent of happiness; (c) virtue is the\nonly means to happiness. However, one must be cautious not to conclude\nthat ancient theories in general attempt to construe the value of\nvirtue simply as a means to achieving happiness. Each theory, as we\nshall see, has its own approach to the nature of the link between\nvirtue and happiness. It would not be advisable to see ancient\ntheories as concerned with such contemporary issues as whether moral\ndiscourse – i.e., discourse about what one ought to do –\ncan or should be reduced to non-moral discourse – i.e., to\ndiscourse about what is good for one.", "\nThese reflections on virtue can provide an occasion for contrasting\nancient moral theory and modern. One way to put the contrast is to say\nthat ancient moral theory is agent-centered while modern\nmoral theory is action-centered. To say that it is\naction-centered means that, as a theory of morality, it explains\nmorality, to begin with, in terms of actions and their circumstances,\nand the ways in which actions are moral or immoral. We can roughly\ndivide modern thinkers into two groups. Those who judge the morality\nof an action on the basis of its known or expected consequences are\nconsequentialist; those who judge the morality of an action on the\nbasis of its conformity to certain kinds of laws, prohibitions, or\npositive commandments are deontologists. The former include, e.g.,\nthose utilitarians who say an action is moral if it provides the\ngreatest good for the greatest number. Deontologists say an action is\nmoral if it conforms to a moral principle, e.g., the obligation to\ntell the truth. While these thinkers are not uninterested in the moral\ndisposition to produce such actions, or in what disposition is\nrequired if they are to show any moral worth in the persons who do\nthem, their focus is on actions, their consequences, and the rules or\nother principles to which they conform. The result of these ways of\napproaching morality is that moral assessment falls on actions. This\nfocus explains, for instance, contemporary fascination with such\nquestions of casuistry as, e.g., the conditions under which an action\nlike abortion is morally permitted or immoral.", "\nBy contrast, ancient moral theory explains morality in terms that\nfocus on the moral agent. These thinkers are interested in what\nconstitutes, e.g., a just person. They are concerned about the state\nof mind and character, the set of values, the attitudes to oneself and\nto others, and the conception of one’s own place in the common\nlife of a community that belong to just persons simply insofar as they\nare just. A modern might object that this way of proceeding is\nbackwards. Just actions are logically prior to just persons and must\nbe specifiable in advance of any account of what it is to be a just\nperson. Of course, the ancients had a rough idea of what just actions\nwere; and this rough idea certainly contributed to the notion of a\njust person, and his motivation and system of values. Still, the\nnotion of a just person is not exhausted by an account of the\nconsequences of just actions, or any principle for determining which\nactions are and which are not just. For the ancients, the just person\nis compared to a craftsman, e.g., a physician. Acting as a physician\nis not simply a collection of medically effective actions. It is\nknowing when such actions are appropriate, among other things; and\nthis kind of knowledge is not always definable. To understand what\nbeing a physician means one must turn to the physician’s\njudgment and even motivation. These are manifested in particular\nactions but are not reducible to those actions. In the same way, what\nconstitutes a just person is not exhausted by the actions he or she\ndoes nor, for that matter, by any catalogue of possible just actions.\nRather, being a just person entails qualities of character proper to\nthe just person, in the light of which they decide what actions\njustice requires of them and are inclined or disposed to act\naccordingly." ], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn this section we confine ourselves to the character Socrates in\nPlato’s dialogues, and indeed to only certain ones of the\ndialogues in which a Socrates character plays a role. In those\ndialogues in which he plays a major role, Socrates varies considerably\nbetween two extremes. On the one hand, there is the Socrates who\nclaims to know nothing about virtue and confines himself to asking\nother characters questions; this Socrates is found in the\nApology and in certain dialogues most of which end\ninconclusively. These dialogues, e.g., Charmides,\nLaches, Crito, Euthydemus, and\nEuthyphro, are called aporetic. On the other hand, in other\ndialogues we find a Socrates who expounds positive teachings about\nvirtue; this Socrates usually asks questions only to elicit agreement.\nThese dialogues are didactic, and conclusive in tone, e.g.,\nRepublic, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Philebus. However,\nthese distinctions between kinds of dialogues and kinds of Socratic\ncharacters are not exclusive; there are dialogues that mix the\naporetic and conclusive styles, e.g., Protagoras, Meno, and\nGorgias. In observing these distinctions, we refer only to\nthe characteristic style of the dialogue and leave aside controversies\nabout the relative dates of composition of the dialogues. (See the\nentry on\n Plato,\n especially the section on\n Socrates\n and the section on\n the historical Socrates.)", "\nThe significance of this distinction among dialogues is that one can\nisolate a strain of moral teaching in the aporetic and mixed\ndialogues. In spite of their inconclusive nature, in the aporetic\ndialogues the character Socrates maintains principles about morality\nthat he seems to take to be fundamental. In the mixed dialogues we\nfind similar teaching. This strain is distinct enough from the\naccounts of morality in the more didactic dialogues that it has been\ncalled Socratic, as opposed to Platonic, and associated with the\nhistorical personage’s own views. In what follows we limit\nourselves to this “Socratic” moral teaching –\nwithout taking a position about the relation of “Socratic”\nmoral teaching to that of the historical Socrates. For our purposes it\nis sufficient to point out a distinction between kinds of moral\nteaching in the dialogues. We will focus on the aporetic dialogues as\nwell as the mixed dialogues Protagoras, Gorgias, and\nMeno.", "\nThe first feature of Socratic teaching is its heroic quality. In the\nApology, Socrates says that a man worth anything at all does\nnot reckon whether his course of action endangers his life or\nthreatens death. He looks only at one thing – whether what he\ndoes is just or not, the work of a good or of a bad man (28b–c).\nSaid in the context of his trial, this statement is both about himself\nand a fundamental claim of his moral teaching. Socrates puts moral\nconsiderations above all others. If we think of justice as, roughly,\nthe way we treat others, the just actions to which he refers cover a\nwide range. It is unjust to rob temples, betray friends, steal, break\noaths, commit adultery, and mistreat parents (Rep\n443a–b). A similarly strong statement about wrong-doing is found\nin the Crito, where the question is whether Socrates should\nsave his life by escaping from the jail in Athens and aborting the\nsentence of death. Socrates says that whether he should escape or not\nmust be governed only by whether it is just or unjust to do so (48d).\nObviously, by posing wrong-doing against losing one’s life,\nSocrates means to emphasize that nothing outweighs in positive value\nthe disvalue of doing unjust actions. In such passages, then, Socrates\nseems to be a moral hero, willing to sacrifice his very life rather\nthan commit an injustice, and to recommend such heroism to others.", "\nHowever, this heroism also includes an important element of\nself-regard. In the passage from the Apology just quoted\nSocrates goes on to describe his approach to the citizens of Athens.\nHe chides them for being absorbed in the acquisition of wealth,\nreputation, and honor while they do not take care for nor think about\nwisdom, truth, and how to make their souls better (Ap.\n29d–e). As he develops this idea it becomes clear that the\nperfection of the soul, making it better, means acquiring and having\nmoral virtue. Rather than heaping up riches and honor, Athenians\nshould seek to perfect their souls in virtue. From this exhortation we\ncan conclude that for Socrates psychological good outweighs material\ngood and that virtue is a psychological good of the first importance.\nThe Crito gives another perspective on psychological good.\nSocrates says (as something obvious to everyone) that life is not\nworth living if that which is harmed by disease and benefited by\nhealth – i.e., the body – is ruined. But even more so, he\nadds, life is not worth living if that which is harmed by wrong-doing\n(to adikon) and benefited by the right – sc.\nthe soul – is ruined, insofar as the soul is more valuable than\nthe body (47e–48a). We can understand this claim in positive\nterms. Virtue is the chief psychological good; wrong-doing destroys\nvirtue. So Socrates’ strong commitment to virtue reflects his\nbelief in its value for the soul, as well as the importance of the\nsoul’s condition for the quality of our lives.", "\nA second feature of Socratic teaching is its intellectualism. Socratic\nintellectualism is usually expressed in the claim that virtue is\nknowledge, implying that if one knows what is good one will do what is\ngood. We find a clear statement of the claim in Protagoras\n352c; but it underlies a lot of Socratic teaching. The idea is\nparadoxical because it flies in the face of what seems to be the\nordinary experience of knowingly doing what is not good, called\nakrasia or being overcome (sometimes anachronistically\ntranslated as weakness of will). However, Socrates defends the idea\nthat akrasia is impossible. First, he argues that virtue is\nall one needs for happiness. In the Apology (41c), Socrates\nsays that no evil at all can come to a good man either in living or in\ndying (…ouk esti andri agathô(i) kakon ouden oute\nzônti oute teleutêsanti), implying the good\nman’s virtue alone makes him proof against bad fortune. In the\nCrito (48b), he says living well and finely and justly are\nthe same thing (to de eu kai kalôs kai dikaiôs\n[zên] hoti tauton estin…). In turn, in the Meno\n(77c–78b), Socrates argues that everyone desires happiness,\ni.e., one’s own welfare. So, in the first place, one always has\na good reason for acting virtuously; doing so entails one’s own\nhappiness. However, even if the link between virtue and happiness is\ngranted, another problem remains. It is possible that one can,\nknowingly, act against one’s happiness, understood, as it is by\nSocrates, as one’s own welfare. It seems that an individual can\nchoose to do what is not in her own best interest. People can all too\neasily desire and go after the pastry that they know is bad for them.\nSocrates, however, seems to think that once one recognizes (i.e.,\nreally knows and fully appreciates) that the pastry is not good in\nthis way, one will cease to desire it. There is no residual desire\nfor, e.g., pleasure, that might compete with the desire for what is\ngood. This position is called intellectualism because it implies that\nwhat ultimately motivates any action is some cognitive state, rational\nor doxastic: if you know what is good you will do it, and if you do an\naction, and it is bad, that is because you thought somehow that it was\ngood. All error in such choices is due to ignorance.", "\nIn support of the idea that if one knows what happiness is, one will\npursue it, Socrates argues, in the Euthydemus, that wisdom is\nnecessary and sufficient for happiness. While most of this dialogue is\ngiven over to Euthydemus’ and Dionysiodorus’ eristic\ndisplay, there are two Socratic interludes. In the first of these\n– in a passage that has a parallel in Meno (88a ff)\n– Socrates helps the young Cleinias to see that wisdom is a kind\nof knowledge that infallibly brings happiness. He uses an analogy with\ncraft (technê); a carpenter must not only have but know\nhow to use his tools and materials to be successful (Euthyd.\n280b–d). In turn, someone may have such goods as health, wealth,\ngood birth, and beauty, as well as the virtues of justice, moderation,\ncourage, and wisdom (279a–c). Wisdom is the most important,\nhowever, because, like carpentry, for example, it is a kind of\nknowledge, about how to use the other assets so that they are\nbeneficial (281b–c). Moreover, all of these other so-called\ngoods are useless – in fact, even harmful – without\nwisdom, because without it one will misuse any of the other assets one\nmay possess, so as to act not well but badly. Wisdom is the only\nunconditional good (281d–e). Socrates’ argument leaves it\nambiguous whether wisdom (taken together with its exercise) is\nidentical with happiness or whether it is the dominant and essential\ncomponent of happiness (282a–b).", "\nIn this account, the focus is on a kind of knowledge as the active\ningredient in happiness. The other parts of the account are certain\nassets that seem as passive in relation to wisdom as wood and tools\nare to the carpenter. Socratic intellectualism has been criticized for\neither ignoring the non-rational, desiderative and volitional causes\nof human action or providing an implausibly rationalist account of\nthem. In either case, the common charge is that it fails to account\nfor or appreciate the apparent complexities of moral psychology." ], "section_title": "2. Socrates", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIf the objections to intellectualism are warranted, Plato makes\nsignificant progress by having his character Socrates suppose that the\nsoul has desires that are not always for what is good. This allows for\nthe complexities of moral psychology to become an important issue in\nthe account of virtue. That development is found in Plato’s\nmature moral theory. In the Republic, especially in its first\nfour books, Socrates presents the most thorough and detailed account\nof moral psychology and virtue in the dialogues.", "\nIt all begins with the challenge to the very notion of morality,\nunderstood along traditional lines, mounted by Callicles in the second\nhalf of the Gorgias and by Thrasymachus in Republic\nI. Callicles thinks that moral convention is designed by the numerous\nweak people to intimidate the few strong ones, to keep the latter from\ntaking what they could if they would only use their strength. No truly\nstrong person should be taken in by such conventions (Gorg.\n482e ff). Thrasymachus argues that justice is the advantage of the\nmore powerful; he holds that justice is a social practice set up by\nthe powerful, i.e., rulers who require their subjects through that\npractice to act against their own individual and group self-interest\n(Rep. 338d ff). No sensible person should, and no\nstrong-willed person would, accept rules of justice as having any\nlegitimate authority over them. In answer to the latter challenge, in\nRepublic II, Glaucon and Adeimantus repeatedly urge Socrates\nto show what value justice has in itself, apart from its rewards and\nreputation. They gloss the intrinsic value of justice as what value it\nhas in the soul (358b–c), what it does to the soul simply and\nimmediately by its presence therein. Before giving what will be a new\naccount of the soul, Socrates introduces his famous comparison between\nthe soul and the city. As he develops his account of the city,\nhowever, it becomes clear that Socrates is talking about an ideal\ncity, which he proceeds to construct in his discussion.", "\nThis city has three classes (genê) of citizens. The\nrulers are characterized by their knowledge about and devotion to the\nwelfare of the city. The auxiliaries are the warrior class that helps\nthe rulers. These two are collectively the guardians of the city\n(413c–414b; 428c–d). Finally, there are the farmers,\nartisans, and merchants – in general those concerned with the\nproduction of material goods necessary for daily life\n(369b–371e). The importance of this structure is that it allows\nSocrates to define virtues of the city by relations among its parts.\nThese virtues are justice, wisdom, courage, and moderation. For\ninstance, justice in the city is each one performing that function for\nwhich he is suited by nature and not doing the work that belongs to\nothers (433a–b). One’s function, in turn, is determined by\nthe class to which he belongs. So rulers should rule and not amass\nwealth, which is the function of the farmers, artisans, and merchants;\nif the rulers turn from ruling to money-making they are unjust.", "\nCompleting the analogy, Socrates gives an account of the soul. He\nargues that it has three parts, each corresponding to one of the\nclasses in the city. At this point, we should note the difficulty of\ntalking about parts of the soul. In making his argument about conflict\nin the soul, Socrates does not usually use a word that easily\ncorresponds to the English ‘part.’ Sometimes he uses\n‘form’ (eidos) and ‘kind’\n(genos) (435b–c), other times a periphrasis such as\n‘that in the soul that calculates’ (439d–e),\nalthough in the subsequent account of virtue, we do find\nmeros, which means part (442b–d). So, insofar as\nvocabulary is concerned, one should be cautious about taking the\nsubdivisions of the soul to be independent agents. Perhaps the least\nmisleading way of thinking about the parts is as distinct functions.\nReason is the function of calculating, especially about what is good\nfor the soul. The appetites for food, drink, and sex are like the\nproducing class – they are necessary for bodily existence\n(439c–e). These two parts are familiar to the modern reader, who\nwill recognize the psychological capacity for reasoning and\ncalculating, on the one hand, and the bodily desires, on the other.\nLess familiar is the part of the soul that corresponds to the\nauxiliaries, the military class. This is the spirited part\n(thymos or thymoeides). Associated with the heart,\nit is an aggressive drive concerned with honor. Thumos is\nmanifested as anger with those who attack one’s honor. Perhaps\nmore importantly, it is manifested as anger with oneself when failing\nto do what one knows he should do (439e–440d).", "\nThe importance of this account is that it is a moral psychology, an\naccount of the soul which serves as a basis for explaining the\nvirtues. Socrates’ account also introduces the idea that there\nis conflict in the soul. For instance, the appetites can lead one\ntoward pleasure which reason recognizes is not good for the whole\nsoul. In cases of conflict, Socrates says the spirited part sides with\nreason against appetite. Here we see in rough outline the chief\ncharacters in a well-known moral drama. Reason knows what is good both\nfor oneself and in the treatment of others. The appetites,\nshort-sighted and self-centered, pull in the opposite direction. The\nspirited part is the principle that sides with reason and enforces its\ndecrees.", "\nWhile the opposition between reason and appetite establishes their\ndistinctness, it has another, more profound consequence. Most\ncommentators read this section of the argument as implying that reason\nlooks out for what is good for the soul while appetite seeks food,\ndrink, and sex, heedless of their benefit for the soul (437d ff).\nAlthough open to various interpretations, the difference between\nreason and appetite does seem aimed at one of the central paradoxes of\nSocratic intellectualism. Common experience seems to contradict the\nclaim that if one knows what is good he will do it; there seem to be\nobvious instances where someone does what she, in some sense, knows is\nnot good, while having options to act otherwise. By introducing\nnon-rational elements in the soul, the argument in the\nRepublic also introduces the possibility of doing what one\nknows, all things considered, not to be good. In such cases, one is\nmotivated by appetite, which lacks the capacity to conceive of what is\ngood, all things considered.", "\nSome interpret this heedlessness as appetite’s being\ngood-independent, whereas reason is good-dependent. Thus, appetite\npursues what it pursues without reference to whether what it pursues\nis good; reason pursues what it pursues always understanding that what\nit pursues is good. In this kind of interpretation, Socrates in the\nRepublic accepts the possibility of akrasia because\nsome parts of the soul, which are indifferent to the good, can\nmotivate actions that do not aim at what is good. Others interpret\nthis heedlessness as appetite’s operating on a constrained\nnotion of good; for instance, for appetite only pleasure is good. By\ncontrast, reason operates on a larger notion, i.e., what is good, all\nthings considered. In this interpretation, akrasia is also\npossible, but now because some parts of the soul, which motivate\naction, do so with a constrained view of good. In any event, the stage\nis set for conflict in the soul between reason and appetite. If we\nassume that either can motive action on its own, the possibility\nexists for the soul’s pursuing bodily pleasure in spite of\nreason’s determination that doing so is not good, all things\nconsidered. This potential gives rise to a separate strain of thinking\nabout virtue. While, for Socratic intellectualism, virtue just is\nknowledge, in the aftermath of the argument for subdividing the soul,\nvirtue comes to have two aspects. The first is to acquire the\nknowledge which is the basis of virtue; the second is to instill in\nthe appetites and emotions – which cannot grasp the knowledge\n– a docility so that they react in a compliant way to what\nreason knows to be the best thing to do. Thus, non-rational parts of\nthe soul acquire reliable habits on which the moral virtues\ndepend.", "\nGiven the complexity of the differences among the parts, we can now\nunderstand how their relations to one another define virtue in the\nsoul. Virtue reduces the potential for conflict to harmony. The master\nvirtue, justice, is each part doing its function and not interfering\nwith that of another (441d–e; 443d). Since the function of\nreason is to exercise forethought for the whole soul, it should rule.\nThe appetites, which seek only their immediate satisfaction, should\nnot rule. A soul ruled by appetites is the very picture of\npsychological injustice. Still, to fulfill its function of ruling,\nreason needs wisdom, the knowledge of what is beneficial for each of\nthe parts of the soul and for the whole. Moderation is a harmony among\nthe parts based on agreement that reason should rule. Courage is the\nspirited part carrying out the decrees of reason about what is to be\nfeared (442b–d). Any attentive reader of the dialogues must feel\nthat Socrates has now given an answer to the questions that started\nmany of the aporetic dialogues. At this point, we have the fully\ndeveloped moral psychology that allows the definition of the moral\nvirtues. They fall into place around the tripartite structure of the\nsoul.", "\nOne might object, however, that all Socrates has accomplished is to\ndefine justice and the other virtues as they operate within\nthe soul. While each part treats the others justly, so to speak, it is\nnot clear what justice among the parts of someone’s soul has to\ndo with that person treating other people justly. Socrates at first\naddresses this issue rather brusquely, saying that someone with a just\nsoul would not embezzle funds, rob temples, steal, betray friends,\nbreak oaths, commit adultery, neglect parents, nor ignore the gods.\nThe reason for this is that each part in the soul does its own\nfunction in the matter of ruling and being ruled (443a–b).\nSocrates does not explain this connection between psychic harmony and\nmoral virtue. However, if we assume that injustice is based in\noverweening appetite or unbridled anger, then one can see the\nconnection between restrained appetites, well-governed anger and\ntreating others justly. The man whose sexual appetite is not governed\nby reason, e.g., would commit the injustice of adultery.", "\nThis approach to the virtues by way of moral psychology, in fact,\nproves to be remarkably durable in ancient moral theory. In one way or\nanother, the various schools attempt to explain the virtues in terms\nof the soul, although there are, of course, variations in the\naccounts. Indeed, we can treat the theory of the Republic as\none such variation. While the account in Republic IV has\naffinities with that of Aristotle in Nicomachean\nEthics, for instance, further developments in\nRepublic V–VII make Plato’s overall account\naltogether unique. It is in these books that the theory of forms makes\nits appearance.", "\nIn Republic V, Socrates returns to the issue of political\nrule by asking what change in actual cities would bring the ideal city\ncloser to realization. The famous answer is that philosophers should\nrule as kings (473d). Trying to make the scandalous, even ridiculous,\nanswer more palatable, Socrates immediately begins to explain what he\nmeans by philosophers. They are the ones who can distinguish between\nthe many beautiful things and the one beautiful itself. The beautiful\nitself, the good itself, and the just itself are what he calls forms.\nThe ability to understand such forms defines the philosopher\n(476a–c). Fully elaborated, this extraordinary theory holds that\nthere is a set of unchanging and unambiguous entities, collectively\nreferred to as being. These are known directly by reason in a way that\nis separate from the use of sensory perception. The objects of sensory\nperception are collectively referred to as becoming since they are\nchanging and ambiguous (508d). This infallible grasp means that one\nknows what goodness is, what beauty is, and what justice is. Because\nonly philosophers have this knowledge – an infallible grasp of\ngoodness, beauty, and justice – they and only they are fit to be\nrulers in the city.", "\nWhile moral theory occupies a significant portion of the\nRepublic, Socrates does not say a lot about its relation to\nthe epistemology and metaphysics of the central books. For instance,\none might have expected the account to show how, e.g., reason might\nuse knowledge of the forms to govern the other parts of the soul.\nIndeed, in Book VI, Socrates does say that the philosopher will\nimitate in his own soul the order and harmony of the forms out of\nadmiration (500c–d). Since imitation is the heart of the account\nof moral education in Books II–III, the idea that one might\nimitate forms is intriguing; but it is not developed. In fact, the\nrelation between virtues in the soul and the metaphysics and\nepistemology of the forms is not an easy one. For instance, Socrates\nsays that virtue in the soul is happiness (580b–c). However, he\nalso says that knowledge and contemplation of the forms is happiness\n(517c–d). Since having or exercising the virtues of wisdom,\nmoderation, courage, and justice is different from knowledge and\ncontemplation of forms, the questions naturally arises about how to\nbring the two together into an integrated life. In the dialogues, the\nrelation between knowledge of forms and virtues such as moderation,\njustice, and courage is an issue that never seems to be fully resolved\nbecause it receives different treatments.", "\nIn RepublicIX, Socrates offers a sketch of one way to bring\nthese two dimensions together. Toward the end of the book, Socrates\nconducts a three-part contest to show the philosophical, or\naristocratic, man is the happiest. In the second of these contests, he\nclaims that each part of the soul has its peculiar desire and\ncorresponding pleasure. Reason, for instance, desires to learn;\nsatisfying that desire is a pleasure distinct from the pleasure, e.g.,\nof eating (580d–e). One can now see that the functions of each\nof the parts has a new, affective dimension. Then, in the last of the\ncontests, Socrates makes an ontological distinction between true\npleasure of the soul and less true pleasure of the body. The former is\nthe pleasure of knowing being, i.e., the forms, and the latter is the\npleasure of filling bodily appetite. The less true pleasures also give\nrise to illusions and phantoms of pleasure; these illusions and\nphantoms recall the images and shadows in the allegory of the cave\n(583b–586c). Clearly, then, distinctions from the metaphysics\nand epistemology of the central books are being made relevant to the\ndivisions within the soul. Pleasures of reason are on a higher\nontological level than those of the bodily appetites; this difference\ncalls for a modification of the definitions of the virtues from Book\nIV. For instance, in Book IV, justice is each part fulfilling its own\nfunction; in Book IX, that function is specified in terms of the kinds\nof pleasure each part pursues. Reason pursues the true pleasure of\nknowing and the appetites the less true pleasure of the body. Appetite\ncommits injustice if it pursues pleasure not proper to it, i.e., if it\npursues bodily pleasures as though they were true pleasures\n(586d–587a). The result is an account of virtue which\ndiscriminates among pleasures, as any virtue ethics should; but the\ncriterion of discrimination reflects the distinction between being and\nbecoming. Rational pleasures are more real than bodily pleasures,\nalthough bodily pleasures are not negligible. Happiness, in turn,\nintegrates the virtue of managing bodily appetites and pleasures with\nthe pleasures of learning, but definitely gives greater weight to the\nlatter.", "\nHowever, in the Phaedo, we find another approach to the\nrelation between knowledge of forms and virtues in the soul. Socrates\nidentifies wisdom with kowledge of such forms as beauty, justice, and\ngoodness (65d–e). The philosopher can know these only by reason\nthat is detached from the body as much as possible (65e–66a). In\nfact, pure knowledge is found only when the soul is completely\ndetached from the body in death. With such a severe account of the\nknowledge of the forms it is not surprising that courage, justice, and\nmoderation are subordinated to wisdom. When Socrates says the true\nexchange of pleasures, pains, and fears is for wisdom, he invokes\nmoderation, justice, and courage as virtues that serve this exchange\n(68b–69e). This passage suggests, for instance, that moderation\nwould control bodily pleasures and pains and fears so that reason\ncould be free of these disturbances in order to pursue knowledge. This\nnotion of virtues differs from the account in the first books of the\nRepublic in that the latter presents a comprehensive picture\nof the welfare of all the parts of the soul whereas the\nPhaedo, by implication, subordinates to reason those parts\ncharacterized by pleasures, pain, and fears.", "\nIn the Symposium, we find yet another configuration of the\nrelation between virtue and the forms, in which the non-rational parts\nof the soul disappear – or are sublimated. In Diotima’s\ndiscourse on eros, she argues that the real purpose of love\nis to give birth in beauty (206b–c). This idea implies two\ndimensions: inspiration by what is itself beautiful and producing\nbeautiful objects. Although Diotima talks about the way these concepts\nwork in sexual procreation, her real interest is in their\npsychological manifestations. For instance, the lover, inspired by the\nphysical beauty of the beloved, will produce beautiful ideas. In turn,\nthe beauty of a soul will inspire ideas that will improve young men\n(210a–d). Finally, Diotima claims that the true object of erotic\nlove is not the beautiful body or even the beautiful soul – but\nbeauty itself. Unlike the beauty of bodies and of souls, this beauty\ndoes not come to be nor pass away, neither increases nor decreases.\nNor does it vary according to aspect or context. It is not in a face\nor hands but is itself by itself, one in form (211a–c). Since\nthis paradigm of beauty is the true object of eros, it\ninspires its own particular product, i.e., true virtue, distinct from\nthe images of virtue inspired by encounters with beauty in bodies and\nsouls (212a–c). While this passage highlights the relation\nbetween eros and the form of beauty in motivating virtue, it\nis almost silent on what this virtue might be. We do not know whether\nit just is the expression of love of beauty in the lover’s\nactions, or its concretization in the dispositions of the\nlover’s soul, or another manifestation. Clearly, this account in\nthe Symposium works without the elaborate theory about parts\nof the soul and their function in virtue, found in Republic\nI–IV.", "\nAs with other ancient theories, this account of virtue can be called\neudaimonist. Plato’s theory is best represented as holding that\nvirtue, together with its active exercise, is the most important and\nthe dominant constituent of happiness (580b–c). One might object\nthat eudaimonist theories reduce morality to self-interest. We should\nrecall however that eudaimonia in this theory does not refer\nprimarily to a feeling. In the Republic, it refers to a state\nof the soul, and the active life to which it leads, whose value is\nmultifaceted. The order and harmony of the soul is, of course, good\nfor the soul because it provides what is good for each of the parts\nand the whole, and so makes the parts function well, for the benefit\nof each and of the whole person. In this way, the soul has the best\ninternal economy, so to speak. Still, we should not overlook the ways\nin which order and harmony in the soul are paired with order and\nharmony in the city. They are both modeled on the forms. As a\nconsequence, virtue in the soul is not a private concern artificially\njoined to the public function of ruling. Rather, the philosopher who\nimitates forms in ruling her soul is equally motivated to imitate\nforms in ruling the city. So, insofar as virtue consists in imitating\nthe forms, it is also a state of the soul best expressed by exercising\nrule in the city – or at least in the ideal city.\nEudaimonia, then, includes looking after the welfare of\nothers.", "\nIndeed, the very nature of Plato’s account of virtue and\nhappiness leaves some aspects of the link between the two unclear.\nWhile virtue is the dominant factor in happiness, we still cannot tell\nwhether for Plato one can have a reason for being, e.g., courageous\nthat does not depend directly on happiness. Plato, even though he has\nforged a strong link between virtue and happiness, has not addressed\nsuch issues. In his account, it is still possible that one might\nbe courageous just for its own sake while at the same time believing\ncourage is also reliably linked to happiness. In the\nRepublic, Socrates tries to answer the question what value\njustice has by itself in the soul; it does not follow that he is\ntrying to convince Glaucon and Adeimantus that the value of justice is\nexhausted by its connection to one’s own happiness.", "\n(For further developments in Plato’s moral theory in dialogues\nusually thought to postdate the Republic (especially\nPhilebus), see\n Plato\n entry, especially the section on\n Socrates\n and the section on\n Plato’s indirectness.)" ], "section_title": "3. Plato", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe moral theory of Aristotle, like that of Plato, focuses on virtue,\nrecommending the virtuous way of life by its relation to happiness.\nHis most important ethical work, Nicomachean Ethics, devotes\nthe first book to a preliminary account of happiness, which is then\ncompleted in the last chapters of the final book, Book X. This account\nties happiness to excellent activity of the soul. In subsequent books,\nexcellent activity of the soul is tied to the moral virtues and to the\nvirtue of “practical wisdom” – excellence in\nthinking and deciding about how to behave. This approach to moral\ntheory depends on a moral psychology that shares a number of\naffinities with Plato’s. However, while for Plato the theory of\nforms has a role in justifying virtue, Aristotle notoriously rejects\nthat theory. Aristotle grounds his account of virtue in his theory\nabout the soul – a topic to which he devotes a separate\ntreatise, de Anima.", "\nAristotle opens the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics by\npositing some one supreme good as the aim of human actions,\ninvestigations, and crafts (1094a). Identifying this good as\nhappiness, he immediately notes the variations in the notion\n(1095a15–25). Some think the happy life is the life of\nenjoyment; the more refined think it is the life of political\nactivity; others think it is the life of study or theoretical\ncontemplation (1095b10–20). The object of the life of enjoyment\nis bodily pleasure; that of political activity is honor or even\nvirtue. The object of the life of study is philosophical or scientific\nunderstanding. Arguing that the end of human life must be the most\ncomplete, he concludes that happiness is the most complete end.\nWhereas pleasure, honor, virtue, and understanding are choice-worthy\nin themselves, they are also chosen for the sake of happiness.\nHappiness is not chosen for the sake of anything else\n(1097a25–1097b5). That the other choice-worthy ends are chosen\nfor the sake of happiness might suggest that they are chosen only as\ninstrumental means to happiness, as though happiness were a separate\nstate. However, it is more likely that the other choice-worthy ends\nare constituents of happiness. As a consequence, the happy life is\ncomposed of such activities as virtuous pursuits, honorable acts, and\ncontemplation of truth. While conceiving these choice-worthy ends as\nconstituents of happiness might be illuminating, it does, in turn,\nraise the issue of whether happiness is a jumble of activities or\nwhether it requires organization – even prioritization –\nof the constituents.", "\nNext, Aristotle turns to his own account of happiness, the summit of\nBook I. The account depends on an analogy with the notion of function\nor characteristic activity or work (ergon). A flutist has a\nfunction or work, i.e., playing the flute. The key idea for Aristotle\nis that the good of flute players (as such) is found in their\nfunctioning as a flutist. By analogy, if there is a human function,\nthe good for a human is found in this function (1097b20–30).\nAristotle then turns to the human soul. He argues that, in fact, there\nis a human function, to be found in the human soul’s\ncharacteristic activity, i.e., the exercise of reason\n(1098a1–20). Then, without explanation, he makes the claim that\nthis rational function is expressed in two distinct ways: by\ndeliberating and issuing commands, on the one hand, and by obeying\nsuch commands, on the other. The part that has reason in itself\ndeliberates about decisions, both for the short term and the long. The\npart that obeys reason is that aspect of the soul, such as the\nappetites, that functions in a human being under the influence of\nreason. The appetites can fail to obey reason; but they at least have\nthe capacity to obey (as, for example, such autonomic functions as\nnutritive and metabolic ones do not).", "\nAristotle then argues that since the function of a human is to\nexercise the soul’s activities according to reason, the function\nof a good human is to exercise well and finely the soul’s\nactivities according to reason. Given the two aspects of reason that\nAristotle has distinguished, one can see that both can be well or\nbadly done. On the one hand, one can reason well or badly –\nabout what to do within the next five minutes, twenty-four hours, or\nten years. On the other, actions motivated by appetites can be well or\nbadly done, and likewise having an appetite at all can sometimes not\nbe a well done, but a badly done, activity of the soul. Acting on the\ndesire for a drink from the wine cooler at a banquet is not always a\ngood idea, nor is having such a desire. According to Aristotle, the\ngood human being has a soul in which these functions are consistently\ndone well. Thus, good persons reason well about plans, short term or\nlong; and when they satisfy their appetites, and even when they\nhave appetites, it is in conformity with reason. Returning to\nthe question of happiness, Aristotle says the good for a human is to\nlive the way the good human lives, that is, to live with one’s\nlife aimed at and structured by the same thing that the good human\nbeing aims at in his or her life. So, his account of happiness, i.e.,\nthe highest good for a human, is virtuous or excellent activity of the\nsoul. But he has not identified this virtuous activity with that of\nthe moral virtues, at this point. In fact, he says if there are many\nkinds of excellence, then human good is found in the active exercise\nof the highest. He is careful to point out that happiness is not just\nthe ability to function well in this way; it is the activity itself.\nMoreover, this activity must be carried out for a complete life. One\nswallow does not make a spring.", "\nAlthough the reference here to parts or aspects of the soul is\ncursory, it is influenced by Aristotle’s theories in the de\nAnima. Fundamental to the human soul and to all living things,\nincluding plants, is nutrition and growth (415a20 ff). Next is\nsensation and locomotion; these functions are characteristic of\nanimals (416b30 ff). Aristotle associates appetite and desire with\nthis part of the soul (414b1–5). Thus we have a rough sketch of\nanimal life: animals, moved by appetite for food, go toward the\nobjects of desire, which are discerned by sensation. To these\nfunctions is added thought in the case of humans. Thought is both\ntheoretical and practical (427a 15–20). The bulk of the de\nAnima is devoted to explaining the nutritive, sensory, and\nrational functions; Aristotle considers desire and appetite as the\nsource of movement in other animals (432a15 ff), and these plus reason\nas its source in humans. In Nicomachean Ethics he focuses on\nthe role that appetite and desire, together with reason, play in the\nmoral drama of human life.", "\nIn chapter 8 of Book I, Aristotle explicitly identifies human good\nwith psychological good. Dividing goods into external goods, those of\nthe body, and those of the soul, he states that his account of\nhappiness agrees with those who hold it is a good of the soul. In\nfact, in this account, happiness is closely related to traditionally\nconceived psychological goods such as pleasure and moral virtue,\nalthough the nature of the relation has yet to be shown\n(1098b10–30). Still, in Book I Aristotle is laying the\nfoundation in his moral psychology for showing the link between the\nmoral virtues and happiness. In Book II he completes this foundation\nwhen he turns to the question of which condition of the soul is to be\nidentified with (moral) virtue, or virtue of character.", "\nIn II. 5, he says that conditions of the soul are either feelings\n(pathê), capacities for feeling (dynameis) or\ndispositions (hexeis). Feelings are such things as appetite,\nanger, fear and generally those conditions that are accompanied by\npleasure and pain. Capacities are, for example, the simple capacity to\nhave these feelings. Finally, disposition is that condition of the\nsoul whereby we are well or badly off with respect to feelings. For\ninstance, people are badly disposed with respect to anger who\ntypically get angry violently or who typically get angry weakly\n(1105b20–30). Virtue, as a condition of the soul, will be one of\nthese three. After arguing that virtue is neither feeling nor\ncapacity, Aristotle turns to what it means to be well or badly off\nwith respect to feelings. He says that in everything that is\ncontinuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less, or an\nequal amount (1106a25). This remark is puzzling until we realize that\nhe is actually talking about feelings. Feelings are continuous and\ndivisible; so one can take more, less, or an equal amount of them.\nPresumably, when it comes to feeling anger, e.g., one can feel too\nmuch, not enough, or a balanced amount. Aristotle thinks that what\ncounts as too much, not enough, or a balanced amount can vary to some\nextent from individual to individual. At this point he is ready to\ncome back to moral virtue for it is concerned with feelings and\nactions (to which feelings give rise), in which one can have excess,\ndeficiency, or the mean. To have a feeling like anger at the right\ntime, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right\npurpose and in the right manner is to feel the right amount, the mean\nbetween extremes of excess and deficiency; this is the mark of moral\nvirtue (1106a15–20). Finally, virtue is not a question only of\nfeelings since there is a mean between extremes of action. Presumably,\nAristotle means that the appropriate feeling – the mean between\nthe extremes in each situation – gives rise to the appropriate\naction.", "\nAt last Aristotle is ready to discuss particular moral virtues.\nBeginning with courage, he mentions here two feelings, fear and\nconfidence. An excessive disposition to confidence is rashness and an\nexcessive disposition to fear and a deficiency in confidence is\ncowardice. When it comes to certain bodily pleasures and pains, the\nmean is moderation. While the excess is profligacy, deficiency in\nrespect of pleasures almost never occurs. Aristotle gives a fuller\naccount of both of these virtues in Book III; however, the basic idea\nremains. The virtue in each case is a mean between two extremes, the\nextremes being vices. Virtue, then, is a reliable disposition whereby\none reacts in relevant situations with the appropriate feeling –\nneither excessive nor deficient – and acts in the appropriate\nway – neither excessively nor deficiently.", "\nTo complete the notion of moral virtue we must consider the role\nreason plays in moral actions. Summing up at Book II.6, Aristotle says\nvirtue is a disposition to choose, lying in the mean which is relative\nto us, determined by reason (1107a1). Since he is talking about\nchoosing actions, he is focusing on the way moral virtue issues in\nactions. In turn, it is the role of practical wisdom\n(phronêsis) to determine choice. While moral virtues,\nvirtues of character, belong to the part of the soul which can obey\nreason, practical wisdom is a virtue of the part of the soul that\nitself reasons. The virtues of thought, intellectual virtues, are\nknowledge (epistêmê), comprehension\n(nous), wisdom (sophia), craft\n(technê), and practical wisdom (1139b15–25). The\nfirst three grasp the truth about what cannot be otherwise and is not\ncontingent. A good example of knowledge about what cannot be otherwise\nis mathematics. Craft and practical wisdom pursue the truth that can\nbe had about what can be otherwise and is contingent. What can be\notherwise includes what is made – the province of craft –\nand what is done – the province of practical wisdom (1140a1).\nWhile Aristotle’s account of practical wisdom raises several\nproblems, we will focus on only two closely related issues. He says\nthat it is the mark of someone with practical wisdom to deliberate\nwell about what leads to the good for himself (to dunasthai\nkalôs bouleusasthai peri ta hautô(i) agatha). This\ngood is not specific, such as health and strength, but is living well\nin general (1140a25–30). This description of practical wisdom,\nfirst of all, implies that it deliberates about actions; it is a skill\nfor discerning those actions which hit the mean between the two\nextremes. However, the ambiguity of the phrase ‘what leads to\nthe good’ might suggest that practical wisdom deliberates only\nabout instrumental means to living well. Still since practical wisdom\ndetermines which actions hit the mean between two extremes, such\nactions are not instrumental means to living well – as though\nliving well were a separate state. Actions which hit the mean are\nparts of living well; the good life is composed of actions under the\nheadings of, for instance, honor and pleasure, which achieve the mean.\nIn addition, the deliberation of practical wisdom does not have to be\nconfined to determining which actions hit the mean. While Aristotle\nwould deny that anyone deliberates about whether happiness is the end\nof human life, we do deliberate about the constituents of happiness.\nSo, one might well deliberate about the ways in which honor and\npleasure fit into happiness.", "\nNow we can discern the link between morality and happiness. While\nhappiness itself is excellent or virtuous activity of the soul, moral\nvirtue is a disposition to achieve the mean between two extremes in\nfeeling and in action. The missing link is that achieving the mean is\nalso excellent activity of the soul. Activity that expresses the\nvirtue of courage, for example, is also the best kind of activity when\nit comes to the emotion of fear. Activity that expresses the virtue of\nmoderation is also excellent activity when it comes to the bodily\nappetites. In this way, then, the happy person is also the virtuous\nperson. However, in Book I Aristotle has already pointed out the\nproblem of bodily and external goods in relation to happiness. Even if\nhappiness is virtuous activity of the soul, in some cases these goods\nare needed to be virtuous – for example, one must have money to\nbe generous. In fact, the lack of good birth, good children, and\nbeauty can mar one’s happiness for the happy person does not\nappear to be one who is altogether ugly, low born, solitary, or\nchildless, and even less so if he has friends and children who are\nbad, or good friends and children who then die\n(1099a30–1099b10). Aristotle is raising a problem that he does\nnot attempt to solve in this passage. Even if happiness is virtuous\nactivity of the soul, it does not confer immunity to the vicissitudes\nof life.", "\nAristotle’s moral psychology has further implications for his\naccount of happiness. In Book I, chapter 7, he said that human good is\nvirtuous activity of the soul but was indefinite about the virtues. In\nmost of the Nicomachean Ethics he talks about the moral\nvirtues, leaving the impression that virtuous activity is the same as\nactivity associated with moral virtues. In Book X, however, Aristotle\nrevisits the issue of virtuous activity. If happiness, he says, is\nactivity in accordance with virtue, it will be activity in accordance\nwith the highest. The highest virtue belongs to the best part of the\nsoul, i.e., the intellect (nous) or the part that governs in\nthe soul and contemplates the fine and godly, being itself the divine\npart of the soul or that which is closest to the divine\n(1177a10–20). Up to this point, Aristotle has apparently been\ntalking about the man of political action and the happiness that is\nsuitable to rational, embodied human beings. Active in the life of the\ncity, this person exercises courage, moderation, liberality, and\njustice in the public arena. Now, instead of the life of an effective\nand successful citizen, Aristotle is holding up the life of study and\ncontemplation as the one that achieves happiness – that is, the\nhighest human good, the activity of the highest virtue. Such a life\nwould achieve the greatest possible self-sufficiency and\ninvulnerability (1177a30). Indeed, at first he portrays these two\nlives as so opposite that they seem incompatible.", "\nIn the end, however, he palliates the differences, leaving the\npossibility for some way to harmonize the two (1178a30). The\ndifferences between the two lives are rooted in the different aspects\nof the soul. Moral virtues belong to the appetites and desires of the\nsensory soul – the part obviously associated with the active\npolitical life, when its activities are brought under the guidance and\ncontrol of excellent practical thought and judgment. The\n“highest” virtues, those belonging to the scientific or\nphilosophical intellect, belong to theoretical reason. To concentrate\non these activities one must be appropriately disengaged from active\npolitical life. While the latter description leads Aristotle to\nportray as possible a kind of human life that partakes of divine\ndetachment (1178b5 ff), finally human life is an indissolvable\ncomposite of intellect, reason, sensation, desires, and appetites. For\nAristotle, strictly speaking, happiness simply is the\nexercise of the highest virtues, those of theoretical reason and\nunderstanding. But even persons pursuing those activities as their\nhighest good, and making them central to their lives, will need to\nremain connected to daily life, and even to political affairs in the\ncommunity in which they live. Hence, they will possess and exercise\nthe moral virtues and those of practical thought, as well as those\nother, higher, virtues, throughout their lives. Clearly, this\nconception of happiness does not hold all virtue, moral and\nintellectual, to be of equal value. Rather, Aristotle means the\nintellectual virtue of study and contemplation to be the dominant part\nof happiness. However, problems remains since we can understand\ndominance in two ways. In the first version, the activity of\ntheoretical contemplation is the sole, exclusive component of\nhappiness and the exercise of the moral virtues and practical wisdom\nis an instrumental means to happiness, but not integral to it. The\nproblem with this version of dominance is that it undermines what\nAristotle has said about the intrinsic value of the virtuous activity\nof politically and socially engaged human beings, including\nfriendship. In a second version of dominance, we might understand\ncontemplation to be the principal, but not exclusive, constituent of\nhappiness. The problem with this version of dominance lies in\nintegrating such apparently incompatible activities into a coherent\nlife. If we give the proper weight to the divine good of theoretical\ncontemplation it may leave us little interest in the virtuous pursuits\nof the moral goods arising from our political nature, except, again,\nas means for establishing and maintaining the conditions in which we\nmay contemplate.", "\nLike Plato, Aristotle is a eudaimonist in that he argues that virtue\n(including in some way the moral virtues of courage, justice and the\nrest) is the dominant and most important component of happiness.\nHowever, he is not claiming that the only reason to be morally\nvirtuous is that moral virtue is a constituent of happiness. He says\nthat we seek to have virtue and virtuous action for itself as well\n(Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b 1–10); not to do so is to\nfail even to be virtuous. In this regard, it is like\npleasure, which is also a constituent of the happy life. Like\npleasure, virtue is sought for its own sake. Still, as a constituent\nof happiness, virtuous action is grounded in the highest end for a\nhuman being. One can discern in the Nicomachean Ethics two\ndifferent types of argument for the link between virtue and happiness.\nOne is based on Aristotle’s account of human nature and\nculminates in the so-called function argument of Book I. If happiness\nis excellent or virtuous activity of the soul, the latter is\nunderstood by way of the uniquely human function. If one understands\nthe human function then one can understand what it is for that\nfunction to be done excellently (1098a5–15). This sort of\nargument has been criticized because it moves from a premise about\nwhat humans are to a conclusion about what they ought to be. Such\ncriticism reflects the modern claim that there is a fact-value\ndistinction. One defense of Aristotle’s argument holds that his\naccount of human nature is meant both to be objective and to offer the\nbasis for an understanding of excellence. The difference, then,\nbetween modern moral theory and ancient is over what counts as an\nobjective account of human nature. However, even if we accept this\ndefense, we can still ask why a human would consider it good to\nachieve human excellence as it is defined in the function argument. At\nthis point another argument for the link between happiness and virtue\n– one more dispersed in the text of the Nicomachean\nEthics – becomes relevant; it is based on value terms only\nand appeals to what a human might consider it good to achieve.\nAristotle describes virtuous activity of the soul as fine\n(kalos) and excellent (spoudaios). Finally, the link\nbetween virtue and happiness is forged if a human sees that it is good\nto live a life that one considers to be fine and excellent.", "\n(For further detailed discussion, see entry on\n Aristotle’s ethics.)\n " ], "section_title": "4. Aristotle", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAlthough the Cynics had an impact on moral thinking in Athens after\nthe death of Socrates, it is through later, and highly controversial,\nreports of their deeds and sayings – rather than their writings\n– that we know of them. Diogenes the Cynic, the central figure,\nis famous for living in a wine jar (Diogenes Laertius [= DL] VI 23)\nand going about with a lantern looking for ‘a man’ –\ni.e., someone not corrupted (DL VI 41). He claimed to set courage over\nagainst fortune, nature against convention, and reason against passion\n(DL VI 38). Of this trio of opposites, the most characteristic for\nunderstanding the Cynics is nature against convention. Diogenes taught\nthat a life according to nature was better than one that conformed to\nconvention. First of all, natural life is simpler. Diogenes ate,\nslept, or conversed wherever it suited him and carried his food around\nwith him (DL VI 22). When he saw a child drinking out of its hand, he\nthrew away his cup, saying that a child had bested him in frugality\n(DL VI 37). He said the life of humans had been made easy by the gods\nbut that humans had lost sight of this through seeking after honeyed\ncakes, perfumes, and similar things (DL VI 44). With sufficient\ntraining the life according to nature is the happy life (DL VI\n71).", "\nAccordingly Diogenes became famous for behavior that flouted\nconvention (DL VI 69). Still, he thought that the simple life not only\nfreed one from unnecessary concerns but was essential to virtue.\nAlthough he says nothing specific about the virtues, he does commend\ntraining for virtuous behavior (DL VI 70). His frugality certainly\nbespeaks self-control. He condemned love of money, praised good men,\nand held love to be the occupation of the idle (DL VI\n50–51).", "\nBesides his contempt for convention, what is most noteworthy about\nDiogenes as a moral teacher is his emphasis on detachment from those\nthings most people consider good. In this emphasis, Diogenes seems to\nhave intensified a tendency found in Socrates. Certainly Socrates\ncould be heedless of convention and careless about providing for his\nbodily needs. To Plato, however, Diogenes seemed to be Socrates gone\nmad (DL VI 54). Still, in Diogenes’ attitude, we can see at\nleast the beginning of the idea that the end of life is a\npsychological state marked by detachment. Counseling the simple and\nuncomplicated satisfaction of one’s natural instincts and\ndesires, Diogenes urges detachment from those things held out by\nconvention to be good. While he is not so explicit, others develop the\ntheme of detachment into the notion of tranquility. The Stoics and\nEpicureans hold that happiness depends on detachment from vulnerable\nor difficult to obtain bodily and external goods and consists in a\npsychological state more under one’s own direct control. In this\nway, happiness becomes associated (for the Epicureans) with\ntranquility (ataraxia). Finally, in Skepticism, suspension of\njudgment is a kind of epistemic detachment that provides tranquility.\nSo in Diogenes we find the beginnings of an idea that will become\ncentral to later ancient moral theory." ], "section_title": "5. Cynics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe first of the Cyrenaic school was Aristippus, who came from Cyrene,\na Greek city on the north African coast. The account of his teachings,\nin Diogenes Laertius, can seem sometimes inconsistent. Nevertheless,\nAristippus is interesting because, as a thorough hedonist, he is\nsomething of a foil for Epicurus. First of all, pleasure is the end or\nthe goal of life – what everyone should seek in life. However,\nthe pleasure that is the end is not pleasure in general, or pleasure\nover the long term, but immediate, particular pleasures. Thus the end\nvaries situation by situation, action by action. The end is not\nhappiness because happiness is the sum of particular pleasures (DL II\n87–88). Accumulating the pleasures that produce happiness is\ntiresome (DL II 90). Particular pleasures are ones that are close-by\nor sure. Moreover, Aristippus said that pleasures do not differ from\none another, that one pleasure is not more pleasant than another. This\nsort of thinking would encourage one to choose a readily available\npleasure rather than wait for a “better” one in the\nfuture. This conclusion is reinforced by other parts of his teaching.\nHis school says that bodily pleasures are much better than mental\npleasures. While this claim would seem to contradict the idea that\npleasures do not differ, it does show preference for the immediately\nor easily available pleasures of bodily gratification over, e.g., the\nmental pleasure of a self-aware just person. In fact,\nAristippus’ school holds that pleasure is good even if it comes\nfrom the most unseemly things (DL II 88). Aristippus, then, seems to\nhave raised improvidence to the level of a principle.", "\nStill, it is possible that the position is more than an elaborate\njustification for short-sighted pleasure-seeking. Cyrenaics taught\nthat a wise man (sophos) (one who always pursues immediate\ngratification) will in general live more pleasantly than a foolish\nman. That prudence or wisdom (phronêsis) is good, not\nin itself but in its consequences, suggests that some balance, perhaps\neven regarding others, is required in choosing pleasures (DL II 91).\nThe Cyrenaic attitude to punishment seems to be an example of\nprudence. They hold that nothing is just, fine, or base by nature but\nonly by convention and custom; still a good man will do nothing out of\nline through fear of punishment (DL II 93). Finally, they hold that\nfriendship is based in self-interest (DL II 91). These aspects of\nCyrenaic teaching suggest they are egoist hedonists. If so, there are\ngrounds for taking the interest of others into account as long as\ndoing so is based on what best provides an individual pleasure.", "\nNevertheless, Aristippus’ school holds that the end of life is a\npsychological good, pleasure. Still, it is particular pleasures not\nthe accumulation of these that is the end. As a consequence, their\nmoral theory contrasts sharply with others in antiquity. If we take\nthe claims about the wise man, prudence, and friendship to be\nreferences to virtue, then Aristippus’ school denies that virtue\nis indispensable for achieving the end or goal of life. While they\nhold that virtue is good insofar as it leads to the end, they seem\nprepared to dispense with virtue in circumstances where it proves\nineffective. Even if they held virtue in more esteem, the Cyrenaics\nwould nonetheless not be eudaimonists since they deny that happiness\nis the end of life." ], "section_title": "6. Cyrenaics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nEpicurean moral theory is the most prominent hedonistic theory in the\nancient world. While Epicurus holds that pleasure is the sole\nintrinsic good and pain is what is intrinsically bad for humans, he is\nalso very careful about defining these two. Aware of the Cyrenaics who\nhold that pleasures, moral and immoral, are the end or goal of all\naction, Epicurus presents a sustained argument that pleasure,\ncorrectly understood, will coincide with virtue.", "\nIn the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus begins by making a\ndistinction among desires. Some desires are empty or groundless and\nothers are natural; the natural are further subdivided into the merely\nnatural and the necessary. Finally, the necessary are those necessary\nfor happiness, those necessary for the body’s freedom from\ndistress, and those necessary for life itself (Letter to\nMenoeceus 127). A helpful scholiast (cf. Principal\nDoctrines XXIX) gives us some examples; necessary desires are\nones that bring relief from unavoidable pain, such as drinking when\nthirsty – if we don’t drink when we need replenishment, we\nwill just get thirstier and thirstier, a painful experience. The\nnatural but not necessary are the ones that vary pleasure but are not\nneeded in order to motivate us to remove or ward off pain,\nsuch as the desire for expensive food: we do not need to want, or to\neat, expensive food in order to ward off the pain of prolonged hunger.\nFinally, the groundless desires are for such things as crowns and\nstatues bestowed as civic honors – these are things that when\ndesired at all are desired with intense and harmful cravings. Keeping\nthese distinctions in mind is a great help in one’s life because\nit shows us what we need to aim for. The aim of the blessed life is\nthe body’s health and the soul’s freedom from disturbance\n(ataraxia) (128).", "\nAfter this austere introduction, Epicurus makes the bold claim that\npleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life. Then he makes\nan important qualification. Just because pleasure is the good,\nEpicureans do not seek every pleasure. Some lead to greater pain. Just\nso, they do not avoid all pains; some lead to greater pleasures\n(128–29). Such a position sounds, of course, like common-sense\nhedonism. If one’s aim is to have as much pleasure as possible\nover the long term, it makes sense to avoid some smaller pleasures\nthat will be followed by larger pains. If one wants, for example, to\nhave as much pleasure from drinking wine as possible, then it would\nmake sense to exercise some judgment about how much to drink on an\noccasion since the next morning’s hangover will be very\nunpleasant, and might keep one from having wine the next day. However,\nhis distinction among groundless, natural, and necessary desires\nshould make us suspicious that Epicurus is no common-sense hedonist.\nThe aim of life is not maximizing pleasures in the way the above\nexample suggests. Rather, real pleasure, the aim of life, is what we\nexperience through freedom from pain and distress. So it is not the\npains of the hangover or the possible loss of further bouts of wine\ndrinking that should restrain my drinking on this occasion. Rather one\nshould be aiming at the pleasure given by freedom from bodily pain and\nmental distress (131–32).", "\nThe usual way to understand the pleasure of freedom from pain and from\ndistress is by way of the distinction between kinetic pleasures and\nkatastematic, or what are, following Cicero, misleadingly called\n‘static’ ones (Diogenes Laertius X 136). The name of the\nformer implies motion and the name of the latter implies a state or\ncondition. The reason the distinction is important is that freedom\nfrom pain and from distress is a state or condition, not a motion.\nEpicurus holds not only that this state is a kind of pleasure but that\nit is the most complete pleasure (Principal Doctrines III).\nModern commentators have taken various approaches to explaining why\nthis state should be considered a pleasure, as opposed to, e.g., the\nattitude of taking pleasure in the fact that one is free of pain and\ndistress. After all, taking pleasure in a fact is not a feeling in the\nsame sense as the pleasure of drinking when thirsty. Since the latter\nis usually taken to be an example of kinetic pleasure (and is\nassociated with the pain of thirst), sometimes katastematic pleasure\nis said to be just kinetic pleasure free from pain and distress, e.g.,\nthe pleasure of satiety. A somewhat broader conception of katastematic\npleasure holds that it is the enjoyment of one’s natural\nconstitution when one is not distracted by bodily pain or mental\ndistress. Finally, some commentators hold the pleasure of freedom from\npain and from distress to be a feeling available only to the wise\nperson, who properly appreciates simple pleasures. Since eating plain\nbread and drinking water are usually not difficult to achieve, to the\nwise, their enjoyment is not overwhelmed by fear (130–31).\nAccordingly, the pleasure they take in these is free of pain and\ndistress. Of course, the wise do not have to confine themselves to\nsimple pleasures; they can enjoy luxurious ones as well – as\nlong as they avoid needing them, which entails fear.", "\nAt this point, we can see that Epicurus has so refined the account of\npleasure and pain that he is able to tie them to virtue. In the\nLetter to Menoeceus, he claims, as a truth for which he does\nnot argue, that virtue and pleasure are inseparable and that living a\nprudent, honorable, and just life is the necessary and sufficient\nmeans to the pleasure that is the end of life (132). An example of\nwhat he might mean is found in Principal Doctrines, where\nEpicurus holds that justice is a contract among humans to avoid\nsuffering harm from one another. Then he argues that injustice is not\nbad per se but is bad because of the fear that arises from\nthe expectation that one will be punished for his misdeeds. He\nreinforces this claim by arguing that it is impossible for someone who\nviolates the compact to be confident that he will escape detection\n(Principal Doctrines XXXIV–V). While one might doubt\nthis claim about the malfactor’s state of mind, nevertheless, we\ncan see that Epicurus means to ground justice, understood as the rules\ngoverning human intercourse, in his moral psychology, i.e., the need\nto avoid distress.", "\nEpicurus, like his predecessors in the ancient moral tradition,\nidentified the good as something psychological. However, instead of,\nfor example, the complex Aristotelian notion of excellent activity of\nthe soul, Epicurus settled on the fairly obvious psychological good of\npleasure. Of course, Aristotle argues that excellent activity of the\nsoul is intrinsically pleasurable (Nicomachean Ethics\n1099a5). Still, in his account pleasure seems something like a\ndividend of excellent activity (1175b30). By contrast, for Epicurus\npleasure itself is the end of life. However, since Epicureans hold\nfreedom from pain (aponia) and distress (ataraxia)\ngives the preferable pleasure, they emphasize tranquility\n(ataraxia) as the end of life. Modern utilitarians, for whom\nfreedom from pain and distress is not paramount, would include a\nbroader palate of pleasures.", "\nEpicurus’ doctrine can be considered eudaimonist. While Plato\nand Aristotle maintain that virtue is constitutive of happiness,\nEpicurus holds that virtue is the only means to achieve happiness,\nwhere happiness is understood as a continuous experience of the\npleasure that comes from freedom from pain and from mental distress.\nThus, he is a eudaimonist in that he holds virtue is indispensable to\nhappiness; but he does not identify virtuous activity, in whole or in\npart, with happiness. Finally, Epicurus is usually interpreted to have\nheld a version of psychological hedonism – i.e., everything we\ndo is done for the sake of pleasure – rather than ethical\nhedonism – i.e., we ought to do everything for the sake of\npleasure. However, Principal Doctrine XXV suggests the latter\nposition; and when in the Letter to Menoeceus he says that\n“we” do everything in order not to be in pain or in fear,\nhe might mean to be referring to “we” Epicureans. If so,\nthe claim would be normative. Still, once all disturbance of the soul\nis dispelled, he says, one is no longer in need nor is there any other\ngood that could be added (128). Since this claim appears to be\ndescriptive, Epicurus could be taken, as he usually has been, to be\narguing that whatever we do is done for the sake of pleasure. In this\naccount, that aspect of human nature on which virtue is based is\nfairly straightforward. The account is certainly less complex than,\ne.g., Aristotle’s. In turn, Epicurus seems to have argued in\nsuch a way as to make pleasure the only reason for being virtuous. If\npsychological hedonism is true, then when one realizes the necessary\nlink between virtue and pleasure, one has all the reason one needs to\nbe virtuous and the only reason one can have." ], "section_title": "7. Epicurus", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe Stoics are well known for their teaching that the good is to be\nidentified with virtue. Virtues include logic, physics, and ethics\n(Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta [=SVF]II 35), as well as wisdom,\nmoderation, justice, and courage. To our modern ears, the first three\nsound like academic subjects; but for the Stoics, they were virtues of\nthought. However, orthodox Stoics do not follow the Aristotelian\ndistinction between intellectual and moral virtues because – as\nwe shall see – they hold that all human psychological functions,\nincluding the affective and volitional, are rational in a single,\nunified sense. For them, consequently, all virtues form a unity around\nthe core concept of knowledge. Finally, all that is required for\nhappiness (i.e., the secure possession of the good, of what is needed\nto make one’s life a thoroughly good one) – and the only\nthing – is to lead a virtuous life. In this teaching Stoics are\naddressing the problem of bodily and external goods raised by\nAristotle. Their solution takes the radical course of dismissing such\nalleged goods from the account of happiness because they are not\nnecessary for virtue, and are not, in fact, in any way good at\nall.", "\nThey argue that health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, good\nreputation, and noble birth are neither good nor bad. Since they can\nbe used well or badly and the good is invariably good, these assets\nare not good. The virtues, however, are good (DL VII 102–103),\nsince they are perfections of our rationality, and only rationally\nperfected thoughts and decisions can possibly have the features of\nharmony and order in which goodness itself consists. Since possessing\nand exercising virtue is happiness, happiness does not include such\nthings as health, pleasure, and wealth. Still, the Stoics do not\ndismiss these assets altogether since they still have a kind of value.\nThese things are indifferent to happiness in that they do not add to\none’s virtue nor detract from it, and so they do not add to or\ntake away from one’s possession of the good. One is not more\nvirtuous because healthy nor less virtuous because ill. But being\nhealthy generally conforms with nature’s plans for the lives of\nanimals and plants, so it is preferable to be healthy, and one should\ntry to preserve and maintain one’s health. Health is, then, the\nkind of value they call a preferred indifferent; but it is not in any\nway a good, and it makes no contribution to the quality of one’s\nlife as a good or a bad one, happy or miserable.", "\nIn order to understand the Stoic claims about the relation of virtue\nto happiness, we can begin with virtue. Chrysippus says that virtue is\na craft (technê) having to do with the things of life\n(SVF II 909). In other texts, we learn that the things of\nlife include impulse (hormê). Each animal has an\nimpulse for self-preservation; it has an awareness of its constitution\nand strives to preserve its integrity. There is also a natural impulse\nto care for offspring. Humans, then, are naturally inclined toward\npreserving life, health, and children. But then grown-up humans also\ndo these things under the guidance of reason; reason in the adult\nhuman case is the craftsman of impulse (DL VII 85–6). This\nlatter phrase is significant because it implies that just following\nnatural impulse is not enough. In fact, it is not even possible for an\nadult human, whose nature is such as to do everything they do\nby reason, even to follow the sort of natural impulses that\nanimals and immature humans do in their actions. In order to lead a\nvirtuous life, reason must shape our impulses and guide their\nexpression in action.", "\nImpulse is the key to understanding the relation between virtue and\nhappiness. An impulse is a propositional attitude that, when assented\nto, leads to action, e.g., ‘I should eat this bread now.’\nHowever, impulses do not arise in a separate, non-rational part of the\nsoul. Stoics deny there are any non-rational desires of appetite\ncapable of impelling action. The soul, insofar as it provides\nmotivations and is the cause of our actions, consists of the\ncommanding faculty (hêgemonikon) which is also reason\n(SVF I 202). We can distinguish correct impulses into those\nwhich treat virtue as the only good and those which treat things\nindifferent as indifferent. By contrast, emotions or passions (\npathê) are incorrect impulses that treat what is\nindifferent as good. However, they do not come from a non-rational\npart of the soul but are false judgments about the good, where\njudgment is understood as assent to some impulse. Emotions, such as\ndesire, fear, pleasure, and pain, embody such erroneous judgments\n(SVF III 391, 393, 394). For instance, the desire for health\narises from assenting to the impulse that embodies the false judgment\nthat health is good, instead of a preferred indifferent. The sage\n– someone perfected in virtue – would never assent to such\nfalse propositions and thus would never have emotions in this sense,\nno feelings that carried him beyond reason’s true assessment. He\nwould, however, experience feelings attuned to reason, eupatheiai\n –literally good emotions or feelings. For instance, he\nwould feel joy over his virtue, but not pleasure – the latter\nbeing an emotion that treats the actual possession of an indifferent\nas a good.", "\nKnowledge, then, about what is good, bad, and indifferent is the heart\nof virtue. Courage, e.g., is simply knowledge of what is to be\nendured: the impulse to endure or not, and the only impulse\nthat is needed by courage, then follows automatically, as a product or\naspect of that knowledge. This tight unity in the soul is the basis\nfor the Stoic teaching about the unity of the virtues. Zeno (the\nfounder of the school) defines wisdom (phronêsis), or\nrather practical knowledge, in matters requiring distribution\nas justice, in matters requiring choice as moderation, and in matters\nrequiring endurance as courage (Plutarch On Moral Virtue\n440E–441D). Practical knowledge, then, is a single,\ncomprehensive knowledge of what is good and bad in each of these kinds\nof circumstance.", "\nAttending to this identification of virtue and practical knowledge is\na good way to understand the central Stoic teaching that virtue is\nliving in agreement with nature (SVF III 16). Nature includes\nnot only what produces natural impulses but also the rest of the\ngovernment of the cosmos, the natural world. The universe is governed\nby right reason that pervades everything and directs (causes) the way\nit functions – with the exception of the only rational animals\nthere are, the adult human beings: their actions are governed by\nthemselves, i.e., by assenting to, or withholding assent from\nparticular impulses. Nature is even identified with Zeus, who is said\nto be the director of the administration of all that exists (DL VII\n87–9). Since reason governs the universe for the good,\neverything happens of necessity and for the overall good. Virtue,\nthen, includes understanding both one’s individual nature as a\nhuman being and the way nature arranges the whole universe. At this\npoint, we can appreciate the role of logic and physics as virtue since\nthese entail knowledge of the universe. This understanding is the\nbasis for living in agreement with the government of the universe,\ni.e., with nature, by making one’s decisions and actions be such\nas to agree with Zeus’s or nature’s own plans, so far as\none can understand what those are.", "\nIt is in this context that we can best understand the Stoic teaching\nabout indifferents, such as health and wealth. An individual’s\nhealth is vulnerable to being lost if right reason that governs the\nuniverse requires it for the good of the whole. If happiness depended\non having these assets and avoiding their opposites, then, in these\ncases, happiness would be impossible. However, if virtue is living in\nagreement with nature’s government of the universe and if virtue\nis the only good, one’s happiness is entirely determined by his\npatterns of assent and is therefore not vulnerable to being lost. If\none understands that the good of the whole dictates that in a\nparticular case one’s health must be sacrificed, then one\nrecognizes that his happiness does not require health. We should not,\nhowever, see this recognition as tantamount to renunciation. If the\nStoic notion of happiness has any relation at all to the ordinary\nsense, renunciation cannot be a part of it. Rather, the Stoic view of\nliving in accordance with nature should imply not only understanding\nthe way right reason rules the universe but agreeing with it and even\ndesiring that things happen as they do. We can best appreciate the\nnotion that virtue is the good, then, if we take virtue as both\nacknowledging that the universe is well governed and adopting the\npoint of view, so to speak, of the government (DL VII 87–9).", "\nA refinement of the Stoic approach to indifferents gives us a way of\nunderstanding what living in agreement with nature might look like.\nAfter all, such things as health and wealth cannot just be dismissed\nsince they are something like the raw material of virtue. It is in\npursuing and using them that one exercises virtue, for instance. In\nthe attempt to integrate preferred indifferents into the pursuit of\nthe good, Stoics used an analogy with archery (On Ends\nIII.22). Since he aims to hit the target, the archer does everything\nin his power to hit the target. Trying everything in his power\nreflects the idea that such factors as a gust of wind – chance\nhappenings that cannot be controlled or foreseen – can intervene\nand keep him from achieving the goal. To account for this type of\nfactor, it is claimed that the goal of the archer is really trying\neverything in his power to attain the end. The analogy with the art of\nliving focuses on this shift from the goal of hitting the target to\nthe goal of trying everything in one’s power to hit the target\n(On Ends V.17–20). It is the art of trying everything\nin one’s power to attain such preferred indifferents as health\nand wealth. However, if right reason, which governs the universe,\ndecides that one will not have either, then the sage follows right\nreason. At this point the analogy with archery breaks down since, for\nthe sage, trying everything in one’s power does not mean\nstriving until one fails; rather, it means seeking preferred\nindifferents guided by right reason. By this reasoning, one should see\nthat virtue and happiness are not identified with achieving heath and\nwealth but with the way one seeks them and the evaluative propositions\none assents to. Finally, the art of living is best compared to such\nskills as acting and dancing (On Ends V. 24–5).", "\nThis way of relating preferred indifferents to the end, i.e., to\nhappiness, was challenged in antiquity as incoherent. Plutarch, for\ninstance, argues that it is contrary to common understanding to say\nthat the end is different from the reference point of all action. If\nthe reference point of all action – what one does everything to\nachieve – is to have preferred indifferents such as health, then\nthe end is to have preferred indifferents. However, if the end is not\nto have preferred indifferents (but, say, always to act prudently),\nthen the reference point of all action cannot be the preferred\nindifferents (On Common Conceptions 1070F–1071E). The\nStoics are presented with a dilemma: either preferred indifferents are\nintegral to the end or they are not the object of choice.", "\nThe Stoics are extreme eudaimonists compared to Plato or Aristotle,\nalthough they are clearly inspired by Socratic intellectualism. While\nPlato clearly associates virtue and happiness, he never squarely faces\nthe issue whether happiness may require other goods, e.g., wealth and\nhealth. Aristotle holds happiness to be virtuous activity of the soul;\nbut he raises – without solving – the problem of bodily\nand external goods and happiness. For these two, virtue, together with\nits active exercise, is the dominant and most important component of\nhappiness, while Stoics simply identify virtue and the good, and so\nmake it the only thing needed for a happy life. Still, Stoics do not\nreduce happiness to virtue, as though ‘happiness’ is just\na name for being perfectly just, courageous, and moderate. Rather they\nhave independent ways of describing happiness. Following Zeno, all the\nStoics say it is a good flow of life. Seneca says the happy life is\npeacefulness and constant tranquility. However, we should keep in mind\nthat, while they do not reduce happiness to virtue, their account of\nhappiness is not that of the common person. So in recommending virtue\nbecause it secures happiness the Stoics are relying on happiness in a\nspecial, although not idiosyncratic, sense. In fact, their idea of\nhappiness shares an important feature with the Epicurean, which puts a\npremium on tranquil pleasures. In Stoicism as well, deliverance from\nthe vicissitudes of fate leads to a notion of happiness that\nemphasizes tranquility. And, as we shall see, tranquility is a value\nfor the Skeptics.", "\nClearly, the Stoic account of virtue and happiness depends on their\ntheory about human nature. For Aristotle, virtue is perfection of the\nhuman function and the Stoics follow in this line of thinking. While\ntheir notion of virtue builds on their notion of the underlying human\nnature, their account of the perfection of human nature is more\ncomplex than Aristotle’s. It includes accommodation to the\nnature of the universe. Virtue is the perfection of human nature that\nmakes it harmonious with the workings of fate, i.e. with Zeus’s\noverall plan, regarded as the ineluctable, though providential, cause\nof what happens in the world at large." ], "section_title": "8. Stoics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nPyrrho, a murky figure, roughly contemporary with Epicurus and Zeno\nthe Stoic, left no writings. In the late, anecdotal tradition he is\ncredited with introducing suspension of judgment (DL IX 61). He became\nthe eponymous hero for the founding of Pyrrhonian skepticism in the\nfirst century B.C. (See entry on\n Pyrrho\n and on\n Ancient Skepticism.)\n Having discovered that for every argument examined so far there is an\nopposing argument, Pyrrhonian Skeptics expressed no determinate\nopinions (DL IX 74). This attitude would seem to lead to a kind of\nepistemic paralysis. The Skeptics reply that they do not abolish,\ne.g., relying on sight. They do not say that it is unreliable and they\ndo not refuse, personally, ever to rely on it. Rather, they have the\nimpression that there is no reason why we are entitled to rely on it,\nin a given case or in general, even if we go ahead and rely on it\nanyhow (DL IX 103). For example, if one has the visual impression of a\ntower, that appearance is not in dispute. What is in dispute is\nwhether the tower is as it appears to be. For Skeptics, claiming that\nthe tower is as it appears to be is a dogmatic statement about the\nobject or the causal history of the appearance. As far as the Skeptic\nis concerned, all such statements have failed to be adequately\njustified, and all supporting arguments can be opposed by equally\nconvincing counter-arguments. Lacking any grounds on which to prefer\none dogmatic statement or view over another, he suspends judgment.", "\nSuch views have an obvious impact on practical and moral issues. First\nof all, the Skeptics argue that, so far as we have been given any\ncompelling reason by philosophers to believe, there is nothing good or\nbad by nature (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism\n[=PH] III 179–238, Adversus Mathematicos\n[=M] XI 42–109). And just in case he does find such\nreasons compelling, the Skeptic will resist the temptation to assent\nby posing a general counter-argument: what is good by nature would be\nrecognized by everyone, but clearly not everyone agrees – for\ninstance, Epicurus holds that pleasure is good by nature but\nAntisthenes holds that it is not (DL IX 101) – hence there is\nnothing good by nature (see section 4 of the entry on\n Moral Skepticism).\n The practical consequences of suspending judgment are illustrated by\ntwo traditions about the life of Pyrrho. In one, Pyrrho himself did\nnot avoid anything, whether it was wagons, precipices, or dogs. It\nwould appear that, suspending judgment about whether being hit by a\nwagon was naturally good or bad, Pyrrho might walk into its path, or\nnot bother to get out of the way. His less skeptical friends kept him\nalive – presumably by guiding him away from busy roads, vicious\ndogs, and deep gorges. Another tradition, however, says that he only\ntheorized about suspension of judgments, and took action to preserve\nhimself and otherwise lead a normal life, but doing so without any\njudgments as to natural good and bad. Living providently, he reached\nninety years of age (DL IX 62).", "\nIn any event, Pyrrho’s suspension of judgment led to a certain\ndetachment. Not knowing what was good or bad by nature, he was\nindifferent where dogmatists would be unhappy or at least anxious. For\ninstance, he performed household chores usually done by women (DL IX\n63–66). Thus Pyrrho’s skepticism detached him from the\ndogmatic judgments of a culture in which a man’s performing\nwomen’s work was considered demeaning. In turn, his skepticism\nand suspension of judgment led to freedom from disturbance\n(ataraxia) (DL IX 68). It is significant that this\npsychological state, so important for Epicureans as part of the end of\nlife, should play a key role in Pyrrhonian skepticism at its beginning\nwith Pyrrho, but certainly in its development with Sextus\nEmpiricus.", "\nWhile suspension of judgment in moral matters brings freedom from\ndisturbance, it does not lead to immoral behavior – anymore than\nit leads to the foolhardy behavior of the first tradition about\nPyrrho’s life. Sextus generalizes the Skeptic teaching about\nappearances to cover the whole area of practical activity. He says the\nrules of everyday conduct are divided into four parts: (1) the\nguidance from nature, (2) compulsion that comes from bodily states\nlike hunger and thirst, (3) traditional laws and customs about pious\nand good living, (4) the teachings of the crafts (PH, I\n21–24). The Skeptic is guided by all of these as by appearance,\nand thus undogmatically. For instance, he would follow the traditional\nlaws about pious and good living, accepting these laws as the way\nthings appear to him to be in matters of piety and goodness but\nclaiming no knowledge and holding no beliefs.", "\nSextus says that the end of life is freedom from disturbance in\nmatters of belief, plus moderate states in matters of compulsion.\nSuspension of judgment provides the former in that one is not\ndisturbed about which of two opposing claims is true, when (as always\nseems to happen) one cannot rationally decide between them. Matters of\ncompulsion cover such things as bodily needs for food, drink, and\nwarmth. While the Skeptic undeniably suffers when hungry, thirsty, or\ncold, he achieves a moderate state with respect to these sufferings\nwhen compared to the person who both suffers them and believes they\nare naturally bad. The Skeptic’s suspension of judgment about\nwhether his suffering is naturally bad gives him a certain detachment\nfrom the suffering, and puts him in a better condition than those who\nalso believe their suffering is naturally bad (PH I\n25–30).", "\nAs a consequence, the Skeptic conception of the end of life is similar\nin some ways to Epicurean and Stoic beliefs. For Epicureans the end is\nfreedom from pain and distress; the Stoic identification of virtue and\nthe good promises freedom from disturbance. While Pyrrho and Sextus\nhold freedom from disturbance to be the end of life, they differ from\nthe former over the means by which it is achieved. Both the Epicureans\nand Stoics, for example, hold that a tranquil life is impossible in\nthe absence of virtue. By contrast, Sextus does not have a lot to say\nin a positive vein about virtue, although he does recommend following\ntraditional laws about piety and goodness, and he indicates that the\nSkeptic may live virtuously (PH I 17). Rather, it is for the\nSkeptics an epistemic attitude embodied in a distinctive practice, not\nvirtue, that leads to the desired state. This alone would seem to be\nenough to disqualify Pyrrhonism as a form of eudaimonism.", "\nSextus does however offer his skeptical practice as a corrective to\nthe dogmatists’ misleading path to eudaimonia: it is\nnot possible to be happy while supposing things are good or bad by\nnature (M XI 130, 144). It is the person who suspends\njudgment that enjoys the most complete happiness (M XI 160,\n140). It is important to observe that Sextus proposes his skeptical\npractice as an alternative to dogmatic theories. For\nthe Skeptic makes no commitments, or even assertions, regarding the\nsupposedly objective conditions that are supposed by other\nphilosophers to underlie our natural, human telos.\nAccordingly, some have objected that the kind of tranquility and\nhappiness that the Skeptic enjoys could just as well be produced\nthrough pharmacology or, we might add, Experience Machines. More\ngenerally speaking, the objection is that skeptical tranquility and\nhappiness comes at a cost we should not be willing to pay. By refusing\nto accept the world is ever as it appears, the Skeptic becomes a\ndetached, passive spectator, undisturbed by any of the thoughts that\npass through his mind. Such detachment might seem to threaten his\nability to care about other people as he observes all that happens to\nthem with the same tranquil indifference. Also, he would seem to be at\nbest a moral conformist, unable or at least unwilling to engage in any\nmoral deliberation, either hypothetically or as a means to directly\naddress a pressing moral issue.", "\nSextus provides an example of the latter situation when he imagines\nthe Skeptic being compelled by a tyrant to commit some unspeakable\ndeed, or be tortured (M XI 164–66). Critics propose\nthat the Skeptic’s choice will necessarily reveal his evaluative\nconvictions, and thus his inconsistency in claiming to have no such\nconvictions. But Sextus replies that he will simply opt for one or the\nother in accordance with his family’s laws and customs. In other\nwords, he will rely on whatever moral sentiments and dispositions he\nhappens to have. These cognitive states will be neither the product of\nany rational consideration nor will they inform any premises for moral\nreasoning or philosophical deliberation. Like Sartre’s\nexistentialism, Sextus’ skepticism offers a way to respond to\nmoral dilemmas without supposing there is a correct, or even\nobjectively better, choice.", "\nWe should note that it is not entirely fair to ask whether the\nPyrrhonist’s moral life is one that we, non-Skeptics, would deem\ngood or praise-worthy. For, as Sextus would say, we are part of the\ndispute regarding what kind of life is morally good and praise-worthy.\nTo claim that nothing really matters to the Skeptic, for example,\npresupposes some account of the mental state of caring. In the end,\nthe question of how or whether a Skeptic might be morally good is\nequivalent to asking what role belief, or knowledge, plays in the\nmoral goodness of people and their actions. If we suppose that one\nmust, at a minimum, have adequately justified evaluative beliefs\ninforming her actions in order for those actions, and the underlying\ncharacter, to count as morally good, then the Skeptic will be immoral,\nor at least amoral. On the other hand, if the Skeptic manages to\nundermine our confidence in that supposition, we will have to suspend\njudgment regarding whether the Skeptic, or anyone else for that\nmatter, is in fact capable of performing morally good and\npraise-worthy action, or whether their reasoned account of\neudaimonia is true.", "\nThe question we should ask here is whether and in what respect those\nwith strong, rational convictions will be better off than the Skeptic\nwhen confronting moral dilemmas, or even everyday moral choices. If,\nlike the Skeptic, one suspects that the dogmatists’ have no\nknowledge, let alone adequately justified beliefs to guide them, then\nit seems that they are no better or worse off than those who simply\nconform to moral customs and norms." ], "section_title": "9. Pyrrhonian Skeptics", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Arnim, Joachim von (ed.), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta,\nVolumes I–IV, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1903–24.", "Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1 and 2,\nJonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press,\n1984.", "Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum [‘On\nEnds’] (Loeb Classical Library), H. Rackham (trans.), Cambridge:\nHarvard University Press, 1914. (Latin text with old-fashioned and not\nalways philosophically precise English translation.)", "–––, On Moral Ends, R. Woolf (trans.),\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.", "Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volumes\nI and II (Loeb Classical Library), R.D. Hicks (trans.), Cambridge:\nHarvard University Press, 1991.", "Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, Principal\nDoctrines, and Vatican Sayings, in B. Inwood and L.\nGerson (eds.), Hellenistic Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd\nedition, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997, pp.\n28–40.", "Long, A.A., and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic\nPhilosophers, Volumes 1 and 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress, 1987.", "Plato, Plato’s Complete Works, John M. Cooper\n(ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997.", "Plutarch, Moralia, Volume VI (Loeb Classical Library),\nW.C. Helmbold (trans.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press,\n1993.", "Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists (Adversos Mathematicos\nXI), R. Bett (ed. and trans. with commentary) Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, 1997.", "Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Loeb Classical\nLibrary), R.G. Bury (trans.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press,\n1933. (Greek text together with inadequate English translation.)", "Sextus Empiricus, Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of\nScepticism J. Annas, and J. Barnes (eds. and trans.), Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, 1994.", "Annas, Julia, 1993, The Morality of Happiness, New York:\nOxford University Press.", "–––, 1999, Platonic Ethics, Old and\nNew, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.", "Bett, Richard, 2010, “Scepticism and Ethics,” in R.\nBett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2011, “How Ethical Can an Ancient\nSkeptic Be?” in D. Machua (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient,\nModern, and Contemporary Philosophy, Dordecht: Springer", "Bobonich, Christopher (ed.), 2017, The Cambridge Companion to\nAncient Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Brennan, Tad, 2003, “Stoic Moral Psychology,” in\nThe Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, Brad Inwood (ed.),\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2005, The Stoic Life, Oxford:\nClarendon Press.", "Cooper, John M., 1999, Reason and Emotion, Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press.", "–––, 2012, Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of\nLife in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus, Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press.", "Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso, 1994, The Foundations of Socratic\nEthics, Indianapolis: Hackett.", "Gosling, J.C.B., and C.C.W. Taylor, 1982, The Greeks on\nPleasure, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Inwood, Brad, 1985, Ethics and Human Action in Early\nStoicism Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Irwin, Terence, 1995, Plato’s Ethics, New York:\nOxford University Press.", "Kamtekar, Rachana, 2017, Plato’s Moral Psychology,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Lorenz, Hendrik, 2006, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in\nPlato and Aristotle, New York: Oxford University Press.", "Mitsis, Phillip, 1988, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory,\nIthaca: Cornell University Press.", "Moss, Jessica, 2006, “Pleasure and Illusion in Plato,”\nPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(3):\n503–535.", "Nikolsky, Boris, 2001, “Epicurus on Pleasure,”\nPhronesis vol.46.", "Nussbaum, Martha C., 1994, The Therapy of Desire,\nPrinceton: Princeton University Press.", "Reeve, C.D.C., 1988, Philosopher-Kings, Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press.", "Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (ed.), 1980, Essays on\nAristotle’s Ethics, Berkeley: University of California\nPress.", "Rudebusch, George, 1999, Socrates, Pleasure, and Value,\nNew York: Oxford University Press.", "Schofield, Malcolm, 2003, “Stoic Ethics,” in The\nCambridge Companion to the Stoics, Brad Inwood (ed.), Ithaca:\nCornell Univeristy Press.", "Segvic, Heda, 2000, “No One Errs Willingly: The Meaning of\nSocratic Intellectualism,” Oxford Studies in Ancient\nPhilosophy, vol. 19: 1–45.", "Sellars, John, 2003, The Art of Living: the Stoics on the\nNature and Function of Philosophy, Burlington, VT: Ashgate.", "Sorabji, Richard, 2000, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic\nAgitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Vlastos, Gregory, 1991, Socrates, Ironist and Moral\nPhilosopher, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.", "Wolfsdorf, David, 2013, Pleasure in Ancient Greek\nPhilosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Woolf, Raphael, 2009, “Pleasure and Desire,” in\nThe Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, James Warren (ed.),\npp. 158–178, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press." ]	[ { "href": "../aristotle-ethics/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: ethics" }, { "href": "../plato/", "text": "Plato" }, { "href": "../pyrrho/", "text": "Pyrrho" } ]
argument	Argument and Argumentation	First published Fri Jul 16, 2021	[ "\nArgument is a central concept for philosophy. Philosophers rely\nheavily on arguments to justify claims, and these practices have been\nmotivating reflections on what arguments and argumentation are for\nmillennia. Moreover, argumentative practices are also pervasive \nelsewhere; they permeate scientific inquiry, legal procedures,\neducation, and political institutions. The study of argumentation is\nan inter-disciplinary field of inquiry, involving philosophers,\nlanguage theorists, legal scholars, cognitive scientists, computer\nscientists, and political scientists, among many others. This entry\nprovides an overview of the literature on argumentation drawing\nprimarily on philosophical sources, but also engaging extensively with\nrelevant sources from other disciplines." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Terminological Clarifications", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Types of Arguments", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Deduction", "2.2 Induction", "2.3 Abduction", "2.4 Analogy", "2.5 Fallacies" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Types of Argumentation", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Adversarial and cooperative argumentation", "3.2 Argumentation as an epistemic practice", "3.3 Consensus-oriented argumentation", "3.4 Argumentation and conflict management", "3.5 Conclusion" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Argumentation Across Fields of Inquiry and Social Practices", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Argumentation theory", "4.2 Artificial intelligence and computer science", "4.3 Cognitive science and psychology", "4.4 Language and communication", "4.5 Argumentation in specific social practices" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Further Topics", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Argumentative injustice and virtuous argumentation", "5.2 Emotions and argumentation", "5.3 Cross-cultural perspectives on argumentation", "5.4 Argumentation and the Internet" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "References for the Main Text", "References for the Historical Supplement" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAn argument can be defined as a complex symbolic structure where some\nparts, known as the premises, offer support to another part, the\nconclusion. Alternatively, an argument can be viewed as a complex\nspeech act consisting of one or more acts of premising (which assert\npropositions in favor of the conclusion), an act of concluding, and a\nstated or implicit marker (“hence”,\n“therefore”) that indicates that the conclusion follows\nfrom the premises (Hitchcock\n 2007).[1]\n The relation of support between premises and conclusion can be cashed\nout in different ways: the premises may guarantee the truth of the\nconclusion, or make its truth more probable; the premises may imply\nthe conclusion; the premises may make the conclusion more acceptable\n(or assertible).", "\nFor theoretical purposes, arguments may be considered as freestanding\nentities, abstracted from their contexts of use in actual human\nactivities. But depending on one’s explanatory goals, there is\nalso much to be gained from considering arguments as they in fact\noccur in human communicative practices. The term generally used for\ninstances of exchange of arguments is argumentation. In what\nfollows, the convention of using “argument” to refer to\nstructures of premises and conclusion, and “argumentation”\nto refer to human practices and activities where arguments occur as\ncommunicative actions will be adopted.", "\nArgumentation can be defined as the communicative activity of\nproducing and exchanging reasons in order to support claims or\ndefend/challenge positions, especially in situations of doubt or\ndisagreement (Lewiński & Mohammed 2016). It is arguably best\nconceived as a kind of dialogue, even if one can also\n“argue” with oneself, in long speeches or in writing (in\narticles or books) for an intended but silent audience, or in groups\nrather than in dyads (Lewiński & Aakhus 2014). But\nargumentation is a special kind of dialogue: indeed, most of\nthe dialogues we engage in are not instances of argumentation, for\nexample when asking someone if they know what time it is, or when\nsomeone shares details about their vacation. Argumentation only occurs\nwhen, upon making a claim, someone receives a request for further\nsupport for the claim in the form of reasons, or estimates herself\nthat further justification is required (Jackson & Jacobs 1980;\nJackson, 2019). In such cases, dialogues of “giving and asking\nfor reasons” ensue (Brandom, 1994; Bermejo Luque 2011). Since\nmost of what we know we learn from others, argumentation seems to be\nan important mechanism to filter the information we receive, instead\nof accepting what others tell us uncritically (Sperber,\nClément, et al. 2010).", "\nThe study of arguments and argumentation is also closely connected to\nthe study of reasoning, understood as the process of reaching\nconclusions on the basis of careful, reflective consideration of the\navailable information, i.e., by an examination of reasons.\nAccording to a widespread view, reasoning and argumentation are\nrelated (as both concern reasons) but fundamentally different\nphenomena: reasoning would belong to the mental realm of\nthinking—an individual inferring new information from the\navailable information by means of careful consideration of\nreasons—whereas argumentation would belong to the public realm\nof the exchange of reasons, expressed in language or other\nsymbolic media and intended for an audience. However, a number of\nauthors have argued for a different view, namely that reasoning and\nargumentation are in fact two sides of the same coin, and that what is\nknown as reasoning is by and large the internalization of practices of\nargumentation (MacKenzie 1989; Mercier & Sperber 2017; Mercier\n2018). For the purposes of this entry, we can assume a close\nconnection between reasoning and argumentation so that relevant\nresearch on reasoning can be suitably included in the discussions to\ncome." ], "section_title": "1. Terminological Clarifications", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nArguments come in many kinds. In some of them, the truth of the\npremises is supposed to guarantee the truth of the conclusion, and\nthese are known as deductive arguments. In others, the truth\nof the premises should make the truth of the conclusion more likely\nwhile not ensuring complete certainty; two well-known classes of such\narguments are inductive and abductive arguments (a\ndistinction introduced by Peirce, see entry on\n C.S. Peirce).\n Unlike deduction, induction and abduction are thought to be\nampliative: the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) contained\nin the premises. Moreover, a type of argument that features\nprominently across different philosophical traditions, and yet does\nnot fit neatly into any of the categories so far discussed, are\nanalogical arguments. In this section, these four kinds of\narguments are presented. The section closes with a discussion of\nfallacious arguments, that is, arguments that seem legitimate and\n“good”, but in fact are\n not.[2]" ], "section_title": "2. Types of Arguments", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nValid deductive arguments are those where the truth of the premises\nnecessitates the truth of the conclusion: the conclusion cannot\nbut be true if the premises are true. Arguments having this\nproperty are said to be deductively valid. A valid argument\nwhose premises are also true is said to be sound. Examples of\nvalid deductive arguments are the familiar syllogisms, such as:", "\n\n\n\nAll humans are living beings.\n\nAll living beings are mortal.\n\nTherefore, all humans are mortal.\n\n", "\nIn a deductively valid argument, the conclusion will be true in\nall situations where the premises are true, with no\nexceptions. A slightly more technical gloss of this idea goes as\nfollows: in all possible worlds where the premises hold, the\nconclusion will also hold. This means that, if I know the premises of\na deductively valid argument to be true of a given situation, then I\ncan conclude with absolute certainty that the conclusion is also true\nof that situation. An important property typically associated with\ndeductive arguments (but with exceptions, such as in relevant logic),\nand which differentiates them from inductive and abductive arguments,\nis the property of monotonicity: if premises A and\nB deductively imply conclusion C, then the addition of\nany arbitrary premise D will not invalidate the argument. In\nother words, if the argument “A and B; therefore\nC” is deductively valid, then the argument\n“A, B and D; therefore C” is\nequally deductively valid.", "\nDeductive arguments are the objects of study of familiar logical\nsystems such as (classical) propositional and predicate logic, as well\nas of subclassical systems such as intuitionistic and relevant logics\n(although in relevant logic the property of monotonicity does not\nhold, as it may lead to violations of criteria of relevance between\npremises and conclusion—see entry on\n relevance logic).\n In each of these systems, the relation of logical consequence in\nquestion satisfies the property of necessary truth-preservation (see\nentry on\n logical consequence).\n This is not surprising, as these systems were originally designed to\ncapture arguments of a very specific kind, namely\nmathematical arguments (proofs), in the pioneering work of\nFrege, Russell, Hilbert, Gentzen, and others. Following a paradigm\nestablished in ancient Greek mathematics and famously captured in\nEuclid’s Elements, argumentative steps in mathematical\nproofs (in this tradition at least) must have the property of\nnecessary truth preservation (Netz 1999). This paradigm remained\ninfluential for millennia, and still codifies what can be described as\nthe “classical” conception of mathematical proof (Dutilh\nNovaes 2020a), even if practices of proof are ultimately also quite\ndiverse. (In fact, there is much more to argumentation in mathematics\nthan just deductive argumentation [Aberdein & Dove 2013].)", "\nHowever, a number of philosophers have argued that deductive validity\nand necessary truth preservation in fact come apart. Some have reached\nthis conclusion motivated by the familiar logical paradoxes such as\nthe Liar or Curry’s paradox (Beall 2009; Field 2008; see entries\non the\n Liar paradox\n and on\n Curry’s paradox).\n Others have defended the idea that there are such things as\ncontingent logical truths (Kaplan 1989; Nelson & Zalta\n2012), which thus challenge the idea of necessary truth preservation.\nIt has also been suggested that what is preserved in the transition\nfrom premises to conclusions in deductive arguments is in fact\nwarrant or assertibility rather than truth (Restall 2004).\nYet others, such as proponents of preservationist approaches to\nparaconsistent logic, posit that what is preserved by the deductive\nconsequence relation is the coherence, or incoherence, of a set of\npremises (Schotch, Brown, & Jennings 2009; see entry on\n paraconsistent logic).\n Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the view that deductive validity\nis to be understood primarily in terms of necessary truth preservation\nis still the received view.", "\nRelatedly, there are a number of pressing philosophical issues\npertaining to the justification of deduction, such as the exact nature\nof the necessity involved in deduction (metaphysical, logical,\nlinguistic, epistemic; Shapiro 2005), and the possibility of offering\na non-circular foundation for deduction (Dummett 1978). Furthermore,\nit is often remarked that the fact that a deductive argument is not\nampliative may entail that it cannot be informative, which in turn\nwould mean that its usefulness is quite limited; this problem has been\ndescribed as “the scandal of deduction” (Sequoiah-Grayson\n2008).", "\nBe that as it may, deductive arguments have occupied a special place\nin philosophy and the sciences, ever since Aristotle presented the\nfirst fully-fledged theory of deductive argumentation and reasoning in\nthe Prior Analytics (and the corresponding theory of\nscientific demonstration in the Posterior Analytics; see\n Historical Supplement).\n The fascination for deductive arguments is understandable, given\ntheir allure of certainty and indubitability. The more\ngeometrico (a phrase introduced by Spinoza to describe the\nargumentative structure of his Ethics as following “a\ngeometrical style”—see entry on\n Spinoza)\n has been influential in many fields other than mathematics. However,\nthe focus on deductive arguments at the expense of other types of\narguments has arguably skewed investigations on argument and\nargumentation too much in one specific direction (see (Bermejo-Luque\n2020) for a critique of deductivism in the study of\nargumentation).", "\nIn recent decades, the view that everyday reasoning and argumentation\nby and large do not follow the canons of deductive argumentation has\nbeen gaining traction. In psychology of reasoning, Oaksford and Chater\nwere the first to argue already in the 1980s that human reasoning\n“in the wild” is essentially probabilistic, following the\nbasic canons of Bayesian probabilities (Oaksford & Chater 2018;\nElqayam 2018; see\n section 5.3\n below). Computer scientists and artificial intelligence researchers\nhave also developed a strong interest in non-monotonic reasoning and\nargumentation (Reiter 1980), recognizing that, outside specific\nscientific contexts, human reasoning tends to be deeply\ndefeasible (Pollock 1987; see entries on\n non-monotonic logic\n and\n defeasible reasoning).\n Thus seen, deductive argumentation might be considered as the\nexception rather than the rule in human argumentative practices taken\nas a whole (Dutilh Novaes 2020a). But there are others, especially\nphilosophers, who still maintain that the use of deductive reasoning\nand argumentation is widespread and extends beyond niches of\nspecialists (Shapiro 2014; Williamson 2018)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Deduction" }, { "content": [ "\nInductive arguments are arguments where observations about past\ninstances and regularities lead to conclusions about future instances\nand general principles. For example, the observation that the sun has\nrisen in the east every single day until now leads to the conclusion\nthat it will rise in the east tomorrow, and to the general principle\n“the sun always rises in the east”. Generally speaking,\ninductive arguments are based on statistical frequencies, which then\nlead to generalizations beyond the sample of cases initially under\nconsideration: from the observed to the unobserved. In a good, i.e.,\ncogent, inductive argument, the truth of the premises\nprovides some degree of support for the truth of the conclusion. In\ncontrast with a deductively valid argument, in an inductive argument\nthe degree of support will never be maximal, as there is always the\npossibility of the conclusion being false given the truth of the\npremises. A gloss in terms of possible worlds might be that, while in\na deductively valid argument the conclusion will hold in all possible\nworlds where the premises hold, in a good inductive argument the\nconclusion will hold in a significant proportion of the possible\nworlds where the premises hold. The proportion of such worlds may give\na measure of the strength of support of the premises for the\nconclusion (see entry on\n inductive logic).", "\nInductive arguments have been recognized and used in science and\nelsewhere for millennia. The concept of induction (epagoge in\nGreek) was understood by Aristotle as a progression from particulars\nto a universal, and figured prominently both in his conception of the\nscientific method and in dialectical practices (see entry on\n Aristotle’s logic, section 3.1).\n However, a deductivist conception of the scientific method remained\noverall more influential in Aristotelian traditions, inspired by the\ntheory of scientific demonstration of the Posterior\nAnalytics. It is only with the so-called “scientific\nrevolution” of the early modern period that experiments and\nobservation of individual cases became one of the pillars of\nscientific methodology, a transition that is strongly associated with\nthe figure of Francis Bacon (1561–1626; see entry on\n Francis Bacon).", "\nInductive inferences/arguments are ubiquitous both in science and in\neveryday life, and for the most part quite reliable. The functioning\nof the world around us seems to display a fair amount of statistical\nregularity, and this is referred to as the “Uniformity\nPrinciple” in the literature on the problem of induction (to be\ndiscussed shortly). Moreover, it has been argued that generalizing\nfrom previously observed frequencies is the most basic principle of\nhuman cognition (Clark 2016).", "\nHowever, it has long been recognized that inductive\ninferences/arguments are not unproblematic. Hume famously offered the\nfirst influential formulation of what became known as “the\nproblem of induction” in his Treatise of Human Nature\n(see entries on\n David Hume\n and on\n the problem of induction;\n Howson 2000). Hume raises the question of what grounds the\ncorrectness of inductive inferences/arguments, and posits that there\nmust be an argument establishing the validity of the Uniformity\nPrinciple for inductive inferences to be truly justified. He goes on\nto argue that this argument cannot be deductive, as it is not\ninconceivable that the course of nature may change. But it cannot be\nprobable either, as probable arguments already presuppose the validity\nof the Uniformity Principle; circularity would ensue. Since these are\nthe only two options, he concludes that the Uniformity Principle\ncannot be established by rational argument, and hence that induction\ncannot be justified.", "\nA more recent influential critique of inductive arguments is the one\noffered in (Harman 1965). Harman argues that either enumerative\ninduction is not always warranted, or it is always warranted but\nconstitutes an uninteresting special case of the more general category\nof inference to the best explanation (see next section). The upshot is\nthat, for Harman, induction should not be considered a warranted form\nof inference in its own right.", "\nGiven the centrality of induction for scientific practice, there have\nbeen numerous attempts to respond to the critics of induction, with\nvarious degrees of success. Among those, an influential recent\nresponse to the problem of induction is Norton’s material theory\nof induction (Norton 2003). But the problem has not prevented\nscientists and laypeople alike from continuing to use induction\nwidely. More recently, the use of statistical frequencies for social\ncategories to draw conclusions about specific individuals has become a\nmatter of contention, both at the individual level (see entry on\n implicit bias)\n and at the institutional level (e.g., the use of predictive\nalgorithms for law enforcement [Jorgensen Bolinger 2021]). These\ndebates can be seen as reoccurrences of Hume’s problem of\ninduction, now in the domain of social rather than of natural\nphenomena." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Induction" }, { "content": [ "\nAn abductive argument is one where, from the observation of a few\nrelevant facts, a conclusion is drawn as to what could possibly\nexplain the occurrence of these facts (see entry on\n abduction).\n Abduction is widely thought to be ubiquitous both in science and in\neveryday life, as well as in other specific domains such as the law,\nmedical diagnosis, and explainable artificial intelligence (Josephson\n& Josephson 1994). Indeed, a good example of abduction is the\nclosing argument by a prosecutor in a court of law who, after\nsummarizing the available evidence, concludes that the most plausible\nexplanation for it is that the defendant must have committed the crime\nthey are accused of.", "\nLike induction, and unlike deduction, abduction is not necessarily\ntruth-preserving: in the example above, it is still possible that the\ndefendant is not guilty after all, and that some other, unexpected\nphenomena caused the evidence to emerge. But abduction is\nsignificantly different from induction in that it does not only\nconcern the generalization of prior observation for prediction (though\nit may also involve statistical data): rather, abduction is often\nbackward-looking in that it seeks to explain something that has\nalready happened. The key notion is that of bringing together\napparently independent phenomena or events as explanatorily and/or\ncausally connected to each other, something that is absent from a\npurely inductive argument that only appeals to observed frequencies.\nCognitively, abduction taps into the well-known human tendency to seek\n(causal) explanations for phenomena (Keil 2006).", "\nAs noted, deduction and induction have been recognized as important\nclasses of arguments for millennia; the concept of abduction is by\ncomparison a latecomer. It is important to notice though that\nexplanatory arguments as such are not latecomers; indeed,\nAristotle’s very conception of scientific demonstration is based\non the concept of explaining causes (see entry on\n Aristotle).\n What is recent is the conceptualization of abduction as a special\nclass of arguments, and the term itself. The term was introduced by\nPeirce as a third class of inferences distinct from deduction and\ninduction: for Peirce, abduction is understood as the process of\nforming explanatory hypotheses, thus leading to new ideas and concepts\n(whereas for him deduction and induction could not lead to new ideas\nor theories; see the entry on\n Peirce). Thus seen,\nabduction pertains to contexts of discovery, in which case it\nis not clear that it corresponds to instances of arguments, properly\nspeaking. In its modern meaning, however, abduction pertains to\ncontexts of justification, and thus to speak of abductive\narguments becomes appropriate. An abductive argument is now typically\nunderstood as an inference to the best explanation (Lipton\n1971 [2003]), although some authors contend that there are good\nreasons to distinguish the two concepts (Campos 2011).", "\nWhile the main ideas behind abduction may seem simple enough, cashing\nout more precisely how exactly abduction works is a complex matter\n(see entry on\n abduction).\n Moreover, it is not clear that abductive arguments are always or even\ngenerally reliable and cogent. Humans seem to have a tendency to\novershoot in their quest for causal explanations, and often look for\nsimplicity where there is none to be found (Lombrozo 2007; but see\nSober 2015 on the significance of parsimony in scientific reasoning).\nThere are also a number of philosophical worries pertaining to the\njustification of abduction, especially in scientific contexts; one\ninfluential critique of abduction/inference to the best explanation is\nthe one articulated by van Fraassen (Fraassen 1989). A frequent\nconcern pertains to the connection between explanatory superiority and\ntruth: are we entitled to conclude that the conclusion of an abductive\nargument is true solely on the basis of it being a good (or even the\nbest) explanation for the phenomena in question? It seems that no\namount of philosophical a priori theorizing will provide justification\nfor the leap from explanatory superiority to truth. Instead, defenders\nof abduction tend to offer empirical arguments showing that abduction\ntends to be a reliable rule of inference. In this sense, abduction and\ninduction are comparable: they are widely used, grounded in very basic\nhuman cognitive tendencies, but they give rise to a number of\ndifficult philosophical problems." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Abduction" }, { "content": [ "\nArguments by analogy are based on the idea that, if two things are\nsimilar, what is true of one of them is likely to be true of the other\nas well (see entry on\n analogy and analogical reasoning).\n Analogical arguments are widely used across different domains of\nhuman activity, for example in legal contexts (see entry on\n precedent and analogy in legal reasoning).\n As an example, take an argument for the wrongness of farming\nnon-human animals for food consumption: if an alien species farmed\nhumans for food, that would be wrong; so, by analogy, it is wrong for\nus humans to farm non-human animals for food. The general idea is\ncaptured in the following schema (adapted from the entry on\n analogy and analogical reasoning;\n S is the source domain and T the target domain of the\nanalogy):", "\nThe first premise establishes the analogy between two situations,\nobjects, phenomena etc. The second premise states that the source\ndomain has a given property. The conclusion is then that the target\ndomain also has this property, or a suitable counterpart thereof.\nWhile informative, this schema does not differentiate between good and\nbad analogical arguments, and so does not offer much by way of\nexplaining what grounds (good) analogical arguments. Indeed,\ncontentious cases usually pertain to premise 1, and in particular to\nwhether S and T are sufficiently similar in a way that\nis relevant for having or not having feature Q.", "\nAnalogical arguments are widely present in all known philosophical\ntraditions, including three major ancient traditions: Greek, Chinese,\nand Indian (see\n Historical Supplement).\n Analogies abound in ancient Greek philosophical texts, for example in\nPlato’s dialogues. In the Gorgias, for instance, the\nknack of rhetoric is compared to pastry-baking—seductive but\nultimately unhealthy—whereas philosophy would correspond to\nmedicine—potentially painful and unpleasant but good for the\nsoul/body (Irani 2017). Aristotle discussed analogy extensively in the\nPrior Analytics and in the Topics (see\n section 3.2 of the entry on analogy and analogical reasoning).\n In ancient Chinese philosophy, analogy occupies a very prominent\nposition; indeed, it is perhaps the main form of argumentation for\nChinese thinkers. Mohist thinkers were particularly interested in\nanalogical arguments (see entries on\n logic and language in early Chinese philosophy,\n Mohism and the\n Mohist canons).\n In the Latin medieval tradition too analogy received sustained\nattention, in particular in the domains of logic, theology and\nmetaphysics (see entry on\n medieval theories of analogy).", "\nAnalogical arguments continue to occupy a central position in\nphilosophical discussions, and a number of the most prominent\nphilosophical arguments of the last decades are analogical arguments,\ne.g., Jarvis Thomson’s violinist argument purportedly showing\nthe permissibility of abortion (Thomson 1971), and Searle’s\nChinese Room argument purportedly showing that computers cannot\ndisplay real understanding (see entry on the\n Chinese Room argument).\n (Notice that these two arguments are often described as thought\nexperiments [see entry on\n thought experiments],\n but thought experiments are often based on analogical principles when\nseeking to make a point that transcends the thought experiment as\nsuch.) The Achilles’ heel of analogical arguments can be\nillustrated by these two examples: both arguments have been criticized\non the grounds that the purported similarity between the source and\nthe target domains is not sufficient to extrapolate the property of\nthe source domain (the permissibility of disconnecting from the\nviolinist; the absence of understanding in the Chinese room) to the\ntarget domain (abortion; digital computers and artificial\nintelligence).", "\nIn sum, while analogical arguments in general perhaps confer a lesser\ndegree of conviction than the other three kinds of arguments\ndiscussed, they are widely used both in professional circles and in\neveryday life. They have rightly attracted a fair amount of attention\nfrom scholars in different disciplines, and remain an important object\nof study (see entry on\n analogy and analogical reasoning)." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Analogy" }, { "content": [ "\nOne of the most extensively studied types of arguments throughout the\ncenturies are, perhaps surprisingly, arguments that appear legitimate\nbut are not, known as fallacious arguments.\nFrom early on, the investigation of such arguments occupied a\nprominent position in Aristotelian logical traditions, inspired in\nparticular by his book Sophistical Refutations\n(see\n Historical Supplement).\n The thought is that, to argue well, it is not sufficient to be able\nto produce and recognize good arguments; it is equally (or perhaps\neven more) important to be able to recognize bad arguments by others,\nand to avoid producing bad arguments oneself. This is particularly\ntrue of the tricky cases, namely arguments that appear legitimate but\nare not, i.e., fallacies.", "\nSome well-know types of fallacies include (see entry on\n fallacies\n for a more extensive discussion):", "\nBeyond their (presumed?) usefulness in teaching argumentative skills,\nthe literature on fallacies raises a number of important philosophical\ndiscussions, such as: What determines when an argument is fallacious or rather a\nlegitimate argument? (See\n section 4.3\n below on Bayesian accounts of fallacies) What causes certain arguments to be fallacious? Is the focus on fallacies a useful approach to arguments at all?\n(Massey 1981) Despite the occasional criticism, the concept of fallacies remains\ncentral in the study of arguments and argumentation." ], "subsection_title": "2.5 Fallacies" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nJust as there are different types of arguments, there are different\ntypes of argumentative situations, depending on the communicative\ngoals of the persons involved and background conditions. Argumentation\nmay occur when people are trying to reach consensus in a situation of\ndissent, but it may also occur when scientists discuss their findings\nwith each other (to name but two examples). Specific rules of\nargumentative engagement may vary depending on these different types\nof argumentation.", "\nA related point extensively discussed in the recent literature\npertains to the function(s) of\n argumentation.[3]\n What’s the point of arguing? While it is often recognized that\nargumentation may have multiple functions, different authors tend to\nemphasize specific functions for argumentation at the expense of\nothers. This section offers an overview of discussions on types of\nargumentation and its functions, demonstrating that argumentation is a\nmultifaceted phenomenon that has different applications in different\ncircumstances." ], "section_title": "3. Types of Argumentation", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nA question that has received much attention in the literature of the\npast decades pertains to whether the activity of argumentation is\nprimarily adversarial or primarily cooperative. This question in fact\ncorresponds to two sub-questions: the descriptive question of\nwhether instances of argumentation are on the whole primarily\nadversarial or cooperative; and the normative question of\nwhether argumentation should be (primarily) adversarial or\ncooperative. A number of authors have answered “adversarial” to the\ndescriptive question and “cooperative” to the normative\nquestion, thus identifying a discrepancy between practices and\nnormative ideals that must be remedied (or so they claim; Cohen 1995).", "\n\nA case in point: recently, a number of far-right Internet personalities\nhave advocated the idea that argumentation can be used to overpower\none’s opponents, as described in the book The Art of the\nArgument: Western Civilization’s Last Stand (2017) by the\nwhite supremacist S. Molyneux. Such aggressive practices reflect a\nvision of argumentation as a kind of competition or battle, where the\ngoal is to “score points” and “beat the\nopponent”. Authors who have criticized (overly) adversarial\npractices of argumentation include (Moulton 1983; Gilbert 1994; Rooney\n2012; Hundleby 2013; Bailin & Battersby 2016). Many (but not all)\nof these authors formulated their criticism specifically from a\nfeminist perspective (see entry on\n feminist perspectives on argumentation).", "\nFeminist critiques of adversarial argumentation challenge ideals of\nargumentation as a form of competition, where masculine-coded values\nof aggression and violence prevail (Kidd 2020). For these authors,\nsuch ideals encourage argumentative performances where excessive use\nof forcefulness is on display. Instances of aggressive argumentation\nin turn have a number of problematic consequences: epistemic\nconsequences—the pursuit of truth is not best served by\nadversarial argumentation—as well as moral/ethical/political\nconsequences—these practices exclude a number of people from\nparticipating in argumentative encounters, namely those for whom\ndisplays of aggression do not constitute socially acceptable behavior\n(women and other socially disadvantaged groups in particular). These\nauthors defend alternative conceptions of argumentation as a\ncooperative, nurturing activity (Gilbert 1994; Bailin & Battersby\n2016), which are traditionally feminine-coded values. Crucially, they\nview adversarial conceptions of argumentation as optional,\nmaintaining that the alternatives are equally legitimate and that\ncooperative conceptions should be adopted and cultivated.", "\nBy contrast, others have argued that adversariality, when suitably\nunderstood, can be seen as an integral and in fact desirable component\nof argumentation (Govier 1999; Aikin 2011; Casey 2020; but notice that\nthese authors each develop different accounts of adversariality in\nargumentation). Such authors answer “adversarial” both to\nthe descriptive and to the normative questions stated above. One\noverall theme is the need to draw a distinction between (excessive)\naggressiveness and adversariality as such. Govier, for example,\ndistinguishes between ancillary (negative) adversariality and minimal\nadversariality (Govier 1999). The thought is that, while the feminist\ncritique of excessive aggression in argumentation is well taken,\nadversariality conceived and practiced in different ways need not have\nthe detrimental consequences of more extreme versions of belligerent\nargumentation. Moreover, for these authors, adversariality in\nargumentation is simply not optional: it is an intrinsic feature of\nargumentative practices, but these practices also require a background\nof cooperation and agreement regarding, e.g., the accepted rules of\ninference.", "\nBut ultimately, the presumed opposition between adversarial and\ncooperative conceptions of argumentation may well be merely apparent.\nIt may be argued for example that actual argumentative encounters\nought to be adversarial or cooperative to different degrees, as\ndifferent types of argumentation are required for different situations\n(Dutilh Novaes forthcoming). Indeed, perhaps we should not look for a\none-fits-all model of how argumentation ought to be conducted across\ndifferent contexts and situation, given the diversity of uses of\nargumentation." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Adversarial and cooperative argumentation" }, { "content": [ "\nWe speak of argumentation as an epistemic practice when we take its\nprimary purpose to be that of improving our beliefs and increasing\nknowledge, or of fostering understanding. To engage in argumentation\ncan be a way to acquire more accurate beliefs: by examining critically\nreasons for and against a given position, we would be able to weed out\nweaker, poorly justified beliefs (likely to be false) and end up with\nstronger, suitably justified beliefs (likely to be true). From this\nperspective, the goal of engaging in argumentation is to\nlearn, i.e., to improve one’s epistemic position (as\nopposed to argumentation “to win” (Fisher & Keil\n2016)). Indeed, argumentation is often said to be\ntruth-conducive (Betz 2013).", "\nThe idea that argumentation can be an epistemically beneficial process\nis as old as philosophy itself. In every major historical\nphilosophical tradition, argumentation is viewed as an essential\ncomponent of philosophical reflection precisely because it may be used\nto aim at the truth (indeed this is the core of Plato’s critique\nof the Sophists and their excessive focus on persuasion at the expense\nof truth (Irani 2017; see\n Historical Supplement).\n Recent proponents of an epistemological approach to argumentation\ninclude (Goldman 2004; Lumer 2005; Biro & Siegel 2006). Alvin\nGoldman captures this general idea in the following terms:", "\n\n\nNorms of good argumentation are substantially dedicated to the\npromotion of truthful speech and the exposure of falsehood, whether\nintentional or unintentional. […] Norms of good argumentation\nare part of a practice to encourage the exchange of truths through\nsincere, non-negligent, and mutually corrective speech. (Goldman 1994:\n30)\n", "\nOf course, it is at least in theory possible to engage in\nargumentation with oneself along these lines, solitarily weighing the\npros and cons of a position. But a number of philosophers, most\nnotably John Stuart Mill, maintain that interpersonal\nargumentative situations, involving people who truly disagree with\neach other, work best to realize the epistemic potential of\nargumentation to improve our beliefs (a point he developed in On\nLiberty (1859; see entry on\n John Stuart Mill).\n When our ideas are challenged by engagement with those who disagree\nwith us, we are forced to consider our own beliefs more thoroughly and\ncritically. The result is that the remaining beliefs, those that have\nsurvived critical challenge, will be better grounded than those we\nheld before such encounters. Dissenters thus force us to stay\nepistemically alert instead of becoming too comfortable with existing,\nentrenched beliefs. On this conception, arguers cooperate with each\nother precisely by being adversarial, i.e., by adopting a critical\nstance towards the positions one disagrees with.", "\nThe view that argumentation aims at epistemic improvement is in many\nsenses appealing, but it is doubtful that it reflects the actual\noutcomes of argumentation in many real-life situations. Indeed, it\nseems that, more often than not, we are not Millians when arguing: we\ndo not tend to engage with dissenting opinions with an open mind.\nIndeed, there is quite some evidence suggesting that arguments are in\nfact not a very efficient means to change minds in most real-life\nsituations (Gordon-Smith 2019). People typically do not like to change\ntheir minds about firmly entrenched beliefs, and so when confronted\nwith arguments or evidence that contradict these beliefs, they tend to\neither look away or to discredit the source of the argument as\nunreliable (Dutilh Novaes 2020c)—a phenomenon also known as\n“confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998).", "\nIn particular, arguments that threaten our core beliefs and our sense\nof belonging to a group (e.g., political beliefs) typically trigger\nall kinds of motivated reasoning (Taber & Lodge 2006; Kahan 2017)\nwhereby one outright rejects those arguments without properly engaging\nwith their content. Relatedly, when choosing among a vast supply of\noptions, people tend to gravitate towards content and sources that\nconfirm their existing opinions, thus giving rise to so-called\n“echo chambers” and “epistemic bubbles”\n(Nguyen 2020). Furthermore, some arguments can be deceptively\nconvincing in that they look valid but are not (Tindale 2007; see\nentry on\n fallacies).\n Because most of us are arguably not very good at spotting fallacious\narguments, especially if they are arguments that lend support to the\nbeliefs we already hold, engaging in argumentation may in fact\ndecrease the accuracy of our beliefs by persuading us of\nfalse conclusions with incorrect arguments (Fantl 2018).", "\nIn sum, despite the optimism of Mill and many others, it seems that\nengaging in argumentation will not automatically improve our beliefs\n(even if this may occur in some\n circumstances).[4]\n However, it may still be argued that an epistemological approach to\nargumentation can serve the purpose of providing a normative\nideal for argumentative practices, even if it is not always a\ndescriptively accurate account of these practices in the messy real\nworld. Moreover, at least some concrete instances of\nargumentation, in particular argumentation in science (see\n section 4.5\n below) seem to offer successful examples of epistemic-oriented\nargumentative practices." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Argumentation as an epistemic practice" }, { "content": [ "\nAnother important strand in the literature on argumentation are\ntheories that view consensus as the primary goal of\nargumentative processes: to eliminate or resolve a difference of\n(expressed) opinion. The tradition of pragma-dialectics is a prominent\nrecent exponent of this strand (Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004).\nThese consensus-oriented approaches are motivated by the social\ncomplexity of human life, and the attribution of a role of social\ncoordination to argumentation. Because humans are social animals who\nmust often cooperate with other humans to successfully accomplish\ncertain tasks, they must have mechanisms to align their beliefs and\nintentions, and subsequently their actions (Tomasello 2014). The\nthought is that argumentation would be a particularly suitable\nmechanism for such alignment, as an exchange of reasons would make it\nmore likely that differences of opinion would decrease (Norman 2016).\nThis may happen precisely because argumentation would be a good way to\ntrack truths and avoid falsehoods, as discussed in the previous\nsection; by being involved in the same epistemic process of exchanging\nreasons, the participants in an argumentative situation would all come\nto converge towards the truth, and thus the upshot would be that they\nalso come to agree with each other. However, consensus-oriented views\nneed not presuppose that argumentation is truth-conducive: the\nultimate goal of such instances of argumentation is that of social\ncoordination, and for this tracking truth is not a requirement\n(Patterson 2011).", "\nIn particular, the very notion of deliberative democracy is\nviewed as resting crucially on argumentative practices that aim for\nconsensus (Fishkin 2016; see entry on\n democracy).\n (For present purposes, “deliberation” and\n“argumentation” can be treated as roughly synonymous). In\na deliberative democracy, for a decision to be legitimate, it must be\npreceded by authentic public deliberation—a discussion of the\npros and cons of the different options—not merely the\naggregation of preferences that occurs in voting. Moreover, in\ndemocratic deliberation, when full consensus does not emerge, the\nparties involved may opt for a compromise solution, e.g., a\ncoalition-based political system.", "\nA prominent theorist of deliberative democracy thus understood is\nJürgen Habermas, whose “discourse theory of law and\ndemocracy” relies heavily on practices of political\njustification and argumentation taking place in what he calls\n“the public sphere” (Habermas 1992 [1996]; 1981 [1984];\nsee entry on\n Habermas).\n He starts from the idea that politics allows for the collective\norganization of people’s lives, including the common rules they\nwill live by. Political argumentation is a form of communicative\npractice, so general assumptions for communicative practices in\ngeneral apply. However, additional assumptions apply as well (Olson\n2011 [2014]). In particular, deliberating participants must accept\nthat anyone can participate in these discursive practices (democratic\ndeliberation should be inclusive), and that anyone can introduce and\nchallenge claims that are made in the public sphere (democratic\ndeliberation should be free). They must also see one another as having\nequal status, at least for the purposes of deliberation (democratic\ndeliberation should be equal). In turn, critics of Habermas’s\naccount view it as unrealistic, as it presupposes an ideal situation\nwhere all citizens are treated equally and engage in public debates in\ngood faith (Mouffe 1999; Geuss 2019).", "\nMore generally, it seems that it is only under quite specific\nconditions that argumentation reliably leads to consensus (as also\nsuggested by formal modeling of argumentative situations (Betz 2013;\nOlsson 2013; Mäs & Flache 2013)). Consensus-oriented\nargumentation seems to work well in cooperative contexts, but not so much in situations of conflict (Dutilh Novaes forthcoming). In\nparticular, the discussing parties must already have a significant\namount of background agreement—especially agreement on what\ncounts as a legitimate argument or compelling evidence—for\nargumentation and deliberation to lead to consensus. Especially in\nsituations of deep disagreement (Fogelin 1985), it seems that the\npotential of argumentation to lead to consensus is quite limited.\nInstead, in many real-life situations, argumentation often leads to\nthe opposite result; people disagree with each other even more after\nengaging in argumentation (Sunstein 2002). This is the well-documented\nphenomenon of group polarization, which occurs when an\ninitial position or tendency of individual members of a group becomes\nmore extreme after group discussion (Isenberg 1986).", "\nIn fact, it may be argued that argumentation will often create or\nexacerbate conflict and adversariality, rather than leading to the\nresolution of differences of opinions. Furthermore, a focus on\nconsensus may end up reinforcing and perpetuating existing unequal\npower relations in a society. ", "\n\n\nIn an unjust society, what purports to be a cooperative exchange of\nreasons really perpetuates patterns of oppression. (Goodwin 2007: 77)\n\n", "\nThis general point has been made by a number of political thinkers\n(e.g., Young 2000), who have highlighted the exclusionary implications\nof consensus-oriented political deliberation. The upshot is that\nconsensus may not only be an unrealistic goal for argumentation; it\nmay not even be a desirable goal for argumentation in a\nnumber of situations (e.g., when there is great power imbalance).\nDespite these concerns, the view that the primary goal of\nargumentation is to aim for consensus remains influential in the\nliterature." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Consensus-oriented argumentation" }, { "content": [ "\nFinally, a number of authors have attributed to argumentation the\npotential to manage (pre-existing) conflict. In a sense, the\nconsensus-oriented view of argumentation just discussed is a special\ncase of conflict management argumentation, based on the assumption\nthat the best way to manage conflict and disagreement is to aim for\nconsensus and thus eliminate conflict. But conflict can be\nmanaged in different ways, not all of them leading to consensus;\nindeed, some authors maintain that argumentation may help mitigate\nconflict even when the explicit aim is not that of reaching consensus.\nImportantly, authors who identify conflict management (or variations\nthereof) as a function for argumentation differ in their overall\nappreciation of the value of argumentation: some take it to be at best\nfutile and at worst\n destructive,[5]\n while others attribute a more positive role to argumentation in\nconflict management.", "\nTo this category also belong the conceptualizations of\nargumentation-as-war discussed (and criticized) by a number of authors\n(Cohen 1995; Bailin & Battersby 2016); in such cases, conflict is\nnot so much managed but rather enacted (and possibly\nexacerbated) by means of argumentation. Thus seen, the function of\nargumentation would not be fundamentally different from the function\nof organized competitive activities such as sports or even war (with\nsuitable rules of engagement; Aikin 2011).", "\nWhen conflict emerges, people have various options: they may choose\nnot to engage and instead prefer to flee; they may go into full-blown\nfighting mode, which may include physical aggression; or they may opt\nfor approaches somewhere in between the fight-or-flee extremes of the\nspectrum. Argumentation can be plausibly classified as an intermediary\nresponse:", "\n\n\n[A]rgument literally is a form of pacifism—we are using words\ninstead of swords to settle our disputes. With argument, we settle our\ndisputes in ways that are most respectful of those who\ndisagree—we do not buy them off, we do not threaten them, and we\ndo not beat them into submission. Instead, we give them reasons that\nbear on the truth or falsity of their beliefs. However adversarial\nargument may be, it isn’t bombing. […] argument is a\npacifistic replacement for truly violent solutions to\ndisagreements…. (Aikin 2011: 256)\n", "\nThis is not to say that argumentation will always or even typically be\nthe best approach to handle conflict and disagreement; the point is\nrather that argumentation at least has the potential to do so,\nprovided that the background conditions are suitable and that\nprovisions to mitigate escalation are in place (Aikin 2011). Versions\nof this view can be found in the work of proponents of agonistic\nconceptions of democracy and political deliberation (Wenman 2013; see\nentry on\n feminist political philosophy).\n For agonist thinkers, conflict and strife are inevitable features of\nhuman lives, and so cannot be eliminated; but they can be managed. One\nof them is Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 2000), for whom democratic\npractices, including argumentation/deliberation, can serve to contain\nhostility and transform it into more constructive forms of contest.\nHowever, it is far from obvious that argumentation by itself will\nsuffice to manage conflict; typically, other kinds of intervention\nmust be involved (Young 2000), as the risk of argumentation being used\nto exercise power rather than as a tool to manage conflict always\nlooms large (van Laar & Krabbe 2019)." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 Argumentation and conflict management" }, { "content": [ "\nFrom these observations on different types of argumentation, a\npluralistic picture emerges: argumentation, understood as the exchange\nof reasons to justify claims, seems to have different applications in\ndifferent situations. However, it is not clear that some of the goals\noften attributed to argumentation such as epistemic improvement and\nreaching consensus can in fact be reliably achieved in many real life\nsituations. Does this mean that argumentation is useless and futile?\nNot necessarily, but it may mean that engaging in argumentation will\nnot always be the optimal response in a number of contexts." ], "subsection_title": "3.5 Conclusion" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nArgumentation is practiced and studied in many fields of inquiry;\nphilosophers interested in argumentation have much to benefit from\nengaging with these bodies of research as well." ], "section_title": "4. Argumentation Across Fields of Inquiry and Social Practices", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nTo understand the emergence of argumentation theory as a specific\nfield of research in the twentieth century, a brief discussion of\npreceding events is necessary. In the nineteenth century, a number of\ntextbooks aiming to improve everyday reasoning via public education\nemphasized logical and rhetorical concerns, such as those by Richard\nWhately (see entry on\n fallacies).\n As noted in\n section 3.2,\n John Stuart Mill also had a keen interest in argumentation and its\nrole in public discourse (Mill 1859), as well as an interest in logic\nand reasoning (see entries on\n Mill\n and on\n fallacies).\n But with the advent of mathematical logic in the final decades of the nineteenth century,\nlogic and the study of ordinary, everyday argumentation came apart, as\nlogicians such as Frege, Hilbert, Russell etc. were primarily\ninterested in mathematical reasoning and argumentation. As a\nresult, their logical systems are not particularly suitable to study\neveryday argumentation, as this is simply not what they were designed\nto\n do.[6]", "\nNevertheless, in the twentieth century a number of authors took\ninspiration from developments in formal logic and expanded the use of\nlogical tools to the analysis of ordinary argumentation. A pioneer in\nthis tradition is Susan Stebbing, who wrote what can be seen as the\nfirst textbook in analytic philosophy, and then went on to write a\nnumber of books aimed at a general audience addressing everyday and\npublic discourse from a philosophical/logical perspective (see entry\non\n Susan Stebbing).\n Her 1939 book Thinking to Some Purpose, which can be\nconsidered as one of the first textbooks in critical thinking, was\nwidely read at the time, but did not become particularly influential\nfor the development of argumentation theory in the decades to\nfollow.", "\nBy contrast, Stephen Toulmin’s 1958 book The Uses of\nArgument has been tremendously influential in a wide range of\nfields, including critical thinking education, rhetoric, speech\ncommunication, and computer science (perhaps even more so than in\nToulmin’s own original field, philosophy). Toulmin’s aim\nwas to criticize the assumption (widely held by Anglo-American\nphilosophers at the time) that any significant argument can be\nformulated in purely formal, deductive terms, using the formal logical\nsystems that had emerged in the preceding decades (see (Eemeren,\nGarssen, et al. 2014: ch. 4). While this critique was met with much\nhostility among fellow philosophers, it eventually gave rise to an\nalternative way of approaching argumentation, which is often described\nas “informal logic” (see entry on\n informal logic).\n This approach seeks to engage and analyze instances of argumentation\nin everyday life; it recognizes that, while useful, the tools of\ndeductive logic alone do not suffice to investigate argumentation in\nall its complexity and pragmatic import. In a similar vein, Charles\nHamblin’s 1970 book Fallacies reinvigorated the study\nof fallacies in the context of argumentation by re-emphasizing\n(following Aristotle) the importance of a dialectical-dialogical\nbackground when reflecting on fallacies in argumentation (see entry on\n fallacies).", "\nAround the same time as Toulmin, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie\nOlbrechts-Tyteca were developing an approach to argumentation that\nemphasized its persuasive component. To this end, they turned to\nclassical theories of rhetoric, and adapted them to give rise to what\nthey described as the “New Rhetoric”. Their book\nTraité de l’argumentation: La nouvelle\nrhétorique was published in 1958 in French, and translated\ninto English in 1969. Its key idea: ", "\n\n\nsince argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it\nis addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be\ninfluenced. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 [1969: 19]) \n", "\nThey introduced the influential distinction between universal\nand particular audiences: while every argument is directed at\na specific individual or group, the concept of a universal audience\nserves as a normative ideal encapsulating shared standards of\nagreement on what counts as legitimate argumentation (see Eemeren,\nGarssen, et al. 2014: ch. 5).", "\nThe work of these pioneers provided the foundations for subsequent\nresearch in argumentation theory. One approach that became influential\nin the following decades is the pragma-dialectics tradition developed\nby Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (Eemeren & Grootendorst\n1984, 2004). They also founded the journal Argumentation, one\nof the flagship journals in argumentation theory. Pragma-dialectics\nwas developed to study argumentation as a discourse activity, a\ncomplex speech act that occurs as part of interactional linguistic\nactivities with specific communicative goals (“pragma”\nrefers to the functional perspective of goals, and\n“dialectic” to the interactive component). For these\nauthors, argumentative discourse is primarily directed at the\nreasonable resolution of a difference of opinion. Pragma-dialectics\nhas a descriptive as well as a normative component, thus offering\ntools both for the analysis of concrete instances of argumentation and\nfor the evaluation of argumentation correctness and success (see\nEemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 10).", "\nAnother leading author in argumentation theory is Douglas Walton, who\npioneered the argument schemes approach to argumentation that borrows\ntools from formal logic but expands them so as to treat a wider range\nof arguments than those covered by traditional logical systems\n(Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008). Walton also formulated an\ninfluential account of argumentation in dialogue in collaboration with\nErik Krabbe (Walton & Krabbe 1995). Ralph Johnson and Anthony\nBlair further helped to consolidate the field of argumentation theory\nand informal logic by founding the Centre for Research in Reasoning,\nArgumentation, and Rhetoric in Windsor (Ontario, Canada), and by\ninitiating the journal Informal Logic. Their textbook\nLogical Self-Defense (Johnson & Blair 1977) has also been\nparticularly influential." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Argumentation theory" }, { "content": [ "\nThe study of argumentation within computer science and artificial\nintelligence is a thriving field of research, with dedicated journals\nsuch as Argument and Computation and regular conference\nseries such as COMMA (International Conference on Computational Models\nof Argument; see Rahwan & Simari 2009 and Eemeren, Garssen, et al.\n2014: ch. 11 for overviews).", "\nThe historical roots of argumentation research in artificial\nintelligence can be traced back to work on non-monotonic logics (see\nentry on\n non-monotonic logics)\n and defeasible reasoning (see entry on\n defeasible reasoning).\n Since then, three main different perspectives have emerged (Eemeren,\nGarssen, et al. 2014: ch. 11): the theoretical systems perspective,\nwhere the focus is on theoretical and formal models of argumentation\n(following the tradition of philosophical and formal logic); the\nartificial systems perspective, where the aim is to build computer\nprograms that model or support argumentative tasks, for instance, in\nonline dialogue games or in expert systems; the natural systems\nperspective, which investigates argumentation in its natural form with\nthe help of computational tools (e.g., argumentation mining [Peldszus\n& Stede 2013; Habernal & Gurevych 2017], where computational\nmethods are used to identify argumentative structures in large corpora\nof texts).", "\nAn influential approach in this research tradition is that of\nabstract argumentation frameworks, initiated by the\npioneering work of Dung (1995). Before that, argumentation in AI was\nstudied mostly under the inspiration of concepts coming from informal\nlogic such as argumentation schemes, context, stages of dialogues and\nargument moves. By contrast, the key notion in the framework proposed\nby Dung is that of argument attack, understood as an abstract\nformal relation roughly intended to capture the idea that it is\npossible to challenge an argument by means of another argument\n(assertions are understood as a special case of arguments with zero\npremises). Arguments can then be represented in networks of attacks\nand defenses: an argument A can attack an argument B,\nand B in turn may attack further arguments C and\nD (the connection with the notion of defeaters is a\nnatural one, which Dung also addresses).", "\nBesides abstract argumentation, three other important lines of\nresearch in AI are: the (internal) structure of arguments;\nargumentation in multi-agent systems; applications to specific tasks\nand domains (Rahwan & Siwari 2009). The structural approach\ninvestigates formally features such as argument strength/force (e.g.,\na conclusive argument is stronger than a defeasible argument),\nargument schemes (Bex, Prakken, Reed, & Walton 2003) etc.\nArgumentation in multi-agent systems is a thriving subfield with its\nown dedicated conference series (ArgMAS), based on the recognition\nthat argumentation is a particularly suitable vehicle to facilitate\ninteraction in the artificial environments studied by AI researchers\nworking on multi-agent systems (see a special issue of the journal\nArgument & Computation [Atkinson, Cerutti, et al. 2016]).\nFinally, computational approaches in argumentation have also thrived\nwith respect to specific domains and applications, such as legal\nargumentation (Prakken & Sartor 2015). Recently, as a reaction to\nthe machine-learning paradigm, the idea of explainable AI has gotten\ntraction, and the concept of argumentation is thought to play a\nfundamental role for explainable AI (Sklar & Azhar 2018)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Artificial intelligence and computer science" }, { "content": [ "\nArgumentation is also an important topic of investigation within\ncognitive science and psychology. Researchers in these fields are\npredominantly interested in the descriptive question of how people in\nfact engage in argumentation, rather than in the normative question of\nhow they ought to do it (although some of them have also drawn\nnormative conclusions, e.g., Hahn & Oaksford 2006; Hahn &\nHornikx, 2016). Controlled experiments are one of the ways in which the descriptive question can be investigated.", "\nSystematic research specifically on argumentation within\ncognitive science and psychology has significantly increased over the\nlast 10 years. Before that, there had been extensive research on\nreasoning conceived as an individual, internal process, much of which\nhad been conducted using task materials such as syllogistic arguments\n(Dutilh Novaes 2020b). But due to what may be described as an\nindividualist bias in cognitive science and psychology (Mercier 2018),\nthese researchers did not draw explicit connections between their\nfindings and the public acts of “giving and asking for\nreasons”. It is only somewhat recently that argumentation began\nto receive sustained attention from these researchers. The\ninvestigations of Hugo Mercier and colleagues (Mercier & Sperber\n2017; Mercier 2018) and of Ulrike Hahn and colleagues (Hahn &\nOaksford 2007; Hornikx & Hahn 2012; Collins & Hahn 2018) have\nbeen particularly influential. (See also Paglieri, Bonelli, &\nFelletti 2016, an edited volume containing a representative overview\nof research on the psychology of argumentation.) Another interesting\nline of research has been the study of the development of reasoning\nand argumentative skills in young children (Köymen, Mammen, &\nTomasello 2016; Köymen & Tomasello 2020).", "\nMercier and Sperber defend an interactionist account of reasoning,\naccording to which the primary function of reasoning is for social\ninteractions, where reasons are exchanged and receivers of reasons\ndecide whether they find them convincing—in other words, for\nargumentation (Mercier & Sperber 2017). They review a wealth of\nevidence suggesting that reasoning is rather flawed when it comes to\ndrawing conclusions from premises in order to expand one’s\nknowledge. From this they conclude, on the basis of evolutionary\narguments, that the function of reasoning must be a different one,\nindeed one that responds to features of human sociality and the need\nto exercise epistemic vigilance when receiving information from\nothers. This account has inaugurated a rich research program which they have been pursuing with colleagues for over\na decade now, and which has delivered some interesting results—for\nexample, that we seem to be better at evaluating the quality of\narguments proposed by others than at formulating high-quality arguments\nourselves (Mercier 2018).", "\nIn the context of the Bayesian (see entry on\n Bayes’ theorem)\n approach to reasoning that was first developed by Mike Oaksford and\nNick Chater in the 1980s (Oaksford & Chater 2018), Hahn and\ncolleagues have extended the Bayesian framework to the investigation\nof argumentation. They claim that Bayesian probabilities offer an\naccurate descriptive model of how people evaluate the strength of\narguments (Hahn & Oaksford 2007) as well as a solid perspective to\naddress normative questions pertaining to argument strength (Hahn\n& Oaksford 2006; Hahn & Hornikx 2016). The Bayesian approach\nallows for the formulation of probabilistic measures of argument\nstrength, showing that many so-called “fallacies” may\nnevertheless be good arguments in the sense that they considerably\nraise the probability of the conclusion. For example, deductively\ninvalid argument schemes (such as affirming the consequent (AC) and\ndenying the antecedent (DA)) can also provide considerable support for\na conclusion, depending on the contents in question. The extent to\nwhich this is the case depends primarily on the specific informational\ncontext, captured by the prior probability distribution, not on the\nstructure of the argument. This means that some instances of, say, AC,\nmay offer support to a conclusion while others may fail to do so (Eva\n& Hartmann 2018). Thus seen, Bayesian argumentation represents a\nsignificantly different approach to argumentation from those inspired\nby logic (e.g., argument schemes), but they are not necessarily incompatible;\nthey may well be complementary perspectives (see also [Zenker\n2013])." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Cognitive science and psychology" }, { "content": [ "\nArgumentation is primarily (though not exclusively) a linguistic\nphenomenon. Accordingly, argumentation is extensively studied in\nfields dedicated to the study of language, such as rhetoric,\nlinguistics, discourse analysis, communication, and pragmatics, among\nothers (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: chs 8 and 9). Researchers\nin these areas develop general theoretical models of argumentation and\ninvestigate concrete instances of argumentation in specific domains on\nthe basis of linguistic corpora, discourse analysis, and other methods\nused in the language sciences (see the edited volume Oswald, Herman,\n& Jacquin [2018] for a sample of the different lines of research).\nOverall, research on argumentation within the language sciences tends\nto focus primarily on concrete occurrences of arguments in a variety\nof domains, adopting a largely descriptive rather than normative\nperspective (though some of these researchers also tackle normative\nconsiderations).", "\nSome of these analyses approach arguments and argumentation primarily\nas text or self-contained speeches, while others emphasize the\ninterpersonal, communicative nature of “face-to-face”\nargumentation (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: section 8.9). One\nprominent approach in this tradition is due to communication scholars\nSally Jackson and Scott Jacobs. They have drawn on speech act theory\nand conversation analysis to investigate argumentation as a\ndisagreement-relevant expansion of speech acts that, through mutually\nrecognized reasons, allows us to manage disagreements despite the\nchallenges they pose for communication and coordination of activities\n(Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jackson 2019). Moreover, they perceive\ninstitutionalized practices of argumentation and concrete\n“argumentation designs”—such as for example\nrandomized controlled trials in medicine—as interventions aimed\nat improving methods of disagreement management through\nargumentation.", "\nAnother communication scholar, Dale Hample, has further argued for the\nimportance of approaching argumentation as an essentially\ninterpersonal communicative activity (Hample 2006, 2018). This\nperspective allows for the consideration of a broader range of\nfactors, not only the arguments themselves but also (and primarily)\nthe people involved in those processes: their motivations,\npsychological processes, and emotions. It also allows for the\nformulation of questions pertaining to individual as well as cultural\ndifferences in argumentative styles (see\n section 5.3\n below).", "\nAnother illuminating perspective views argumentative practices as\ninherently tied to broader socio-cultural contexts (Amossy 2009). The\nJournal of Argumentation in Context was founded in 2012\nprecisely to promote a contextual approach to argumentation. Once\nargumentation is no longer only considered in abstraction from\nconcrete instances taking place in real-life situations, it becomes\nimperative to recognize that argumentation does not take place in a\nvacuum; typically, argumentative practices are embedded in other kinds\nof practices and institutions, against the background of specific\nsocio-cultural, political structures. The method of discourse analysis\nis particularly suitable for a broader perspective on argumentation,\nas shown by the work of Ruth Amossy (2002) and Marianne Doury (2009),\namong others." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Language and communication" }, { "content": [ "\nArgumentation is crucial in a number of specific organized social\npractices, in particular in politics, science, law, and education. The\nrelevant argumentative practices are studied in each of the\ncorresponding knowledge domains; indeed, while some general principles\nmay govern argumentative practices across the board, some may be\nspecific to particular applications and domains.", "\nAs already mentioned, argumentation is typically viewed as an\nessential component of political democratic practices, and as such it\nis of great interest to political scientists and political theorists\n(Habermas 1992 [1996]; Young 2000; Landemore 2013; Fishkin 2016; see\nentry on\n democracy).\n (The term typically used in this context is\n“deliberation” instead of “argumentation”, but\nthese can be viewed as roughly synonymous for our purposes.) General\ntheories of argumentation such as pragma-dialectic and the Toulmin\nmodel can be applied to political argumentation with illuminating\nresults (Wodak 2016; Mohammed 2016). More generally, political\ndiscourse seems to have a strong argumentative component, in\nparticular if argumentation is understood more broadly as not only\npertaining to rational discourse (logos) but as also\nincluding what rhetoricians refer to as pathos and\nethos (Zarefsky 2014; Amossy 2018). But critics of\nargumentation and deliberation in political contexts also point out\nthe limitations of the classical deliberative model (Sanders 1997;\nTalisse 2019).", "\nMoreover, scientific communities seem to offer good examples of\n(largely) well-functioning argumentative practices. These are\ndisciplined systems of collective epistemic activity, with tacit but\nwidely endorsed norms for argumentative engagement for each domain\n(which does not mean that there are not disagreements on these very\nnorms). The case of mathematics has already been mentioned above:\npractices of mathematical proof are quite naturally understood as\nargumentative practices (Dutilh Novaes 2020a). Furthermore, when a\nscientist presents a new scientific claim, it must be backed by\narguments and evidence that her peers are likely to find convincing,\nas they follow from the application of widely agreed-upon scientific\nmethods (Longino 1990; Weinstein 1990; Rehg 2008; see entry on the\n social dimensions of scientific knowledge).\n Other scientists will in turn critically examine the evidence and\narguments provided, and will voice objections or concerns if they find\naspects of the theory to be insufficiently convincing. Thus seen,\nscience may be viewed as a “game of giving and asking for\nreasons” (Zamora Bonilla 2006). Certain features of scientific\nargumentation seem to ensure its success: scientists see other\nscientists as prima facie peers, and so (typically at least) place a\nfair amount of trust in other scientists by default; science is based\non the principle of “organized skepticism” (a term\nintroduced by the pioneer sociologist of science Robert Merton [Merton, 1942]), which\nmeans that asking for further reasons should not be perceived as a\npersonal attack. These are arguably aspects that distinguish\nargumentation in science from argumentation in other domains in virtue\nof these institutional factors (Mercier & Heintz 2014). But\nultimately, scientists are part of society as a whole, and thus the\nquestion of how scientific and political argumentation intersect\nbecomes particularly relevant (Kitcher 2001).", "\nAnother area where argumentation is essential is the law, which also\ncorresponds to disciplined systems of collective activity with rules\nand principles for what counts as acceptable arguments and evidence.\n \nIn litigation (in particular in adversarial justice systems), there\nare typically two sides disagreeing on what is lawful or just, and the\nbasic idea is that each side will present its strongest arguments; it\nis the comparison between the two sets of arguments that should lead\nto the best judgment (Walton 2002). Legal reasoning and argumentation\nhave been extensively studied within jurisprudence for decades, in\nparticular since Ronald Dworkin’s (1977) and Neil\nMacCormick’s (1978) responses to HLA Hart’s highly\ninfluential The Concept of Law (1961). A number of other\nviews and approaches have been developed, in particular from the\nperspectives of natural law theory, legal positivism, common law, and\nrhetoric (see Feteris 2017 for an overview). Overall, legal\nargumentation is characterized by extensive uses of analogies (Lamond\n2014), abduction (Askeland 2020), and defeasible/non-monotonic\nreasoning (Bex & Verheij 2013). An interesting question is whether\nargumentation in law is fundamentally different from argumentation in\nother domains, or whether it follows the same overall canons and norms\nbut applied to legal topics (Raz 2001).", "\nFinally, the development of argumentative skills is arguably a\nfundamental aspect of (formal) education (Muller Mirza &\nPerret-Clermont 2009). Ideally, when presented with arguments, a\nlearner should not simply accept what is being said at face value, but\nshould instead reflect on the reasons offered and come to her own\nconclusions. Argumentation thus fosters independent, critical\nthinking, which is viewed as an important goal for education (Siegel\n1995; see entry on\n critical thinking).\n A number of education theorists and developmental psychologists have\nempirically investigated the effects of emphasizing argumentative\nskills in educational settings, with encouraging results (Kuhn &\nCrowell 2011). There has been in particular much emphasis on\nargumentation specifically in science education, based on the\nassumption that argumentation is a key component of scientific\npractice (as noted above); the thought is that this feature of\nscientific practice should be reflected in science education (Driver,\nNewton, & Osborne 2000; Erduran & Jiménez-Aleixandre\n2007)." ], "subsection_title": "4.5 Argumentation in specific social practices" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nArgumentation is a multi-faceted phenomenon, and the literature on\narguments and argumentation is massive and varied. This entry can only\nscratch the surface of the richness of this material, and many\ninteresting, relevant topics must be left out for reasons of space. In\nthis final section, a selection of topics that are likely to attract\nconsiderable interest in future research are discussed." ], "section_title": "5. Further Topics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIn recent years, the concept of epistemic injustice has received much\nattention among philosophers (Fricker 2007; McKinnon 2016). Epistemic\ninjustice occurs when a person is unfairly treated qua knower on the\nbasis of prejudices pertaining to social categories such as gender,\nrace, class, ability etc. (see entry on\n feminist epistemology and philosophy of science).\n One of the main categories of epistemic injustice discussed\nin the literature pertains to testimony and is known as testimonial\ninjustice: this occurs when a testifier is not given a degree of\ncredibility commensurate to their actual expertise on the relevant\ntopic, as a result of prejudice. (Whether credibility excess is also a\nform of testimonial injustice is a moot point in the literature\n[Medina 2011].)", "\nSince argumentation can be viewed as an important mechanism for\nsharing knowledge and information, i.e., as having significant\nepistemic import (Goldman 2004), the question arises whether there\nmight be instances of epistemic injustice pertaining specifically to\nargumentation, which may be described as argumentative\ninjustice, and which would be notably different from other\nrecognized forms of epistemic injustice such as testimonial injustice.\nBondy (Bondy 2010) presented a first articulation of the notion of\nargumentative injustice, modeled after Fricker’s notion of\nepistemic injustice and relying on a broadly epistemological\nconception of argumentation. However, Bondy’s analysis does not\ntake into account some of the structural elements that have become\ncentral to the analysis of epistemic injustice since Fricker’s\ninfluential work, so it seems further discussion of epistemic\ninjustice in argumentation is still needed. For example, in situations\nof disagreement, epistemic injustice can give rise to further\nobstacles to rational argumentation, leading to deep disagreement\n(Lagewaard 2021).", "\nMoreover, as often noted by critics of adversarial approaches,\nargumentation can also be used as an instrument of domination and\noppression used to overpower and denigrate an interlocutor (Nozick\n1981), especially an interlocutor of “lower” status in the\ncontext in question (Moulton 1983; see entry on\n feminist approaches to argumentation).\n From this perspective, it is clear that argumentation may also be\nused to reinforce and exacerbate injustice, inequalities and power\ndifferentials (Goodwin 2007). Given this possibility, and in response\nto the perennial risk of excessive aggressiveness in argumentative\nsituations, a normative account of how argumentation ought to\nbe conducted so as to avoid these problematic outcomes seem to be\nrequired.", "\nOne such approach is virtue argumentation theory. Drawing on\nvirtue ethics and virtue epistemology (see entries on\n virtue ethics\n and\n virtue epistemology),\n virtue argumentation theory seeks to theorize how to argue well in\nterms of the dispositions and character of arguers rather than, for\nexample, in terms of properties of arguments considered in abstraction\nfrom arguers (Aberdein & Cohen 2016). Some of the argumentative\nvirtues identified in the literature are: willingness to listen to\nothers (Cohen 2019), willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously\n(Kwong 2016), humility (Kidd 2016), and open-mindedness (Tanesini\n2020).", "\nBy the same token, defective argumentation is conceptualized not\n(only) in terms of structural properties of arguments (e.g.,\nfallacious argument patterns), but in terms of the vices displayed by\narguers such as arrogance and narrow-mindedness, among others\n(Aberdein 2016). Virtue argumentation theory now constitutes a vibrant\nresearch program, as attested by a special issue of Topoi\ndedicated to the topic (see [Aberdein & Cohen 2016] for its Introduction). It allows for\na reconceptualization of classical themes within argumentation theory\nwhile also promising to provide concrete recommendations on how to\nargue better. Whether it can fully counter the risk of epistemic\ninjustice and oppressive uses of argumentation is however debatable,\nat least as long as broader structural factors related to power\ndynamics are not sufficiently taken into account (Kukla 2014)." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Argumentative injustice and virtuous argumentation" }, { "content": [ "\nOn some idealized construals, argumentation is conceived as a purely\nrational, emotionless endeavor. But the strong connection between\nargumentative activities and emotional responses has also long been\nrecognized (in particular in rhetorical analyses of argumentation),\nand more recently has become the object of extensive research (Walton\n1992; Gilbert 2004; Hample 2006: ch. 5). Importantly, the recognition\nof a role for emotions in argumentation does not entail a complete\nrejection of the “rationality” of argumentation; rather,\nit is based on the rejection of a strict dichotomy between reason and\nemotion (see entry on\n emotion),\n and on a more encompassing conception of argumentation as a\nmulti-layered human activity.", "\nRather than dispassionate exchanges of reasons, instances of\nargumentation typically start against the background of existing\nemotional relations, and give rise to further affective\nresponses—often, though not necessarily, negative responses of\naggression and hostility. Indeed, it has been noted that, by itself,\nargumentation can give rise to conflict and friction where there was\nnone to be found prior to the argumentative engagement (Aikin 2011).\nThis occurs in particular because critical engagement and requests for\nreasons are at odds with default norms of credulity in most mundane\ndialogical interactions, thus creating a perception of antagonism. But\nargumentation may also give rise to positive affective responses if\nthe focus is on coalescence and cooperation rather than on hostility\n(Gilbert 1997).", "\nThe descriptive claim that instances of argumentation are typically\nemotionally charged is not particularly controversial, though it\ndeserves to be further investigated; the details of affective\nresponses during instances of argumentation and how to deal with them\nare non-trivial (Krabbe & van Laar 2015). What is potentially more\ncontroversial is the normative claim that instances of\nargumentation may or should be emotionally charged,\ni.e., that emotions may or ought to be involved in argumentative\nprocesses, even if it may be necessary to regulate them in such\nsituations rather than giving them free rein (González,\nGómez, & Lemos 2019). The significance of emotions for\npersuasion has been recognized for millennia (see entry on\n Aristotle’s rhetoric),\n but more recently it has become clear that emotions also have a\nfundamental role to play for choices of what to focus on and what to\ncare about (Sinhababu 2017). This general point seems to apply to\ninstances of argumentation as well. For example, Howes and Hundleby\n(Howes & Hundleby 2018) argue that, contrary to what is often\nthought, anger can in fact make a positive contribution to\nargumentative encounters. Indeed, anger may have an important\nepistemological role in such encounters by drawing attention to\nrelevant premises and information that may otherwise go unnoticed.\n(They recognize that anger may also derail argumentation when the\nencounter becomes a full-on confrontation.)", "\nIn sum, the study of the role of emotions for argumentation, both\ndescriptively and normatively speaking, has attracted the interest of\na number of scholars, traditionally in connection with rhetoric and\nmore recently also from the perspective of argumentation as\ninterpersonal communication (Hample 2006). And yet, much work remains\nto be done on the significance of emotions for argumentation, in\nparticular given that the view that argumentation should be a purely\nrational, dispassionate endeavor remains widely (even if tacitly)\nendorsed." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Emotions and argumentation" }, { "content": [ "\nOnce we adopt the perspective of argumentation as a communicative\npractice, the question of the influence of cultural factors on\nargumentative practices naturally arises. Is there significant\nvariability in how people engage in argumentation depending on their\nsociocultural backgrounds? Or is argumentation largely the same\nphenomenon across different cultures? Actually, we may even ask\nourselves whether argumentation in fact occurs in all human cultures,\nor whether it is the product of specific, contingent background\nconditions, thus not being a human universal. For comparison: it had\nlong been assumed that practices of counting were present in all human\ncultures, even if with different degrees of complexity. But in recent\ndecades it has been shown that some cultures do not engage\nsystematically in practices of counting and basic arithmetic at all,\nsuch as the Pirahã in the Amazon (Gordon 2004; see entry on\n culture and cognitive science).\n By analogy, it seems that the purported universality of argumentative\npractices should not be taken for granted, but rather be treated as a\nlegitimate empirical question. (Incidentally, there is some anecdotal\nevidence that the Pirahã themselves engage in argumentative\nexchanges [Everett 2008], but to date their argumentative skills have\nnot been investigated systematically, as is the case with their\nnumerical skills.)", "\nOf course, how widespread argumentative practices will be also depends\non how the concept of “argumentative practices” is defined\nand operationalized in the first place. If it is narrowly defined as\ncorresponding to regimented practices of reason-giving requiring clear\nmarkers and explicit criteria for what counts as premises, conclusions\nand relations of support between them, then argumentation may well be\nrestricted to cultures and subcultures where such practices have been\nexplicitly codified. By contrast, if argumentation is defined more\nloosely, then a wider range of communicative practices will be\nconsidered as instances of argumentation, and thus presumably more\ncultures will be found to engage in (what is thus viewed as)\nargumentation. This means that the spread of argumentative practices\nacross cultures is not only an empirical question; it also requires\nsignificant conceptual input to be addressed.", "\nBut if (as appears to be the case) argumentation is not a strictly\nWEIRD phenomenon, restricted to Western, Educated, Industrialized,\nRich, and Democratic societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan\n2010), then the issue of cross-cultural variability in argumentative\npractices gives rise to a host of research questions, again both at\nthe descriptive and at the normative level. Indeed, even if at the\ndescriptive level considerable variability in argumentative practices\nis identified, the normative question of whether there should be\nuniversally valid canons for argumentation, or instead specific norms\nfor specific contexts, remains pressing. At the descriptive level, a\nnumber of researchers have investigated argumentative practices in\ndifferent WEIRD as well as non-WEIRD cultures, also addressing\nquestions of cultural variability (Hornikx & Hoeken 2007; Hornikx\n& de Best 2011).", "\nA foundational work in this context is Edwin Hutchins’ 1980 book\nCulture and Inference, a study of the Trobriand\nIslanders’ system of land tenure in Papua New Guinea (Hutchins\n1980). While presented as a study of inference and reasoning among the\nTrobriand Islanders, what Hutchins in fact investigated were instances\nof legal argumentation in land courts by means of ethnographic\nobservation and interviews with litigants. This led to the formulation\nof a set of twelve basic propositions codifying knowledge about land\ntenure, as well as transfer formulas governing how this knowledge can\nbe applied to new disputes. Hutchins’ analysis showed that the\nTrobriand Islanders had a sophisticated argumentation system to\nresolve issues pertaining to land tenure, in many senses resembling\nargumentation and reasoning in so-called WEIRD societies in that it\nseemed to recognize as valid simple logical structures such as\nmodus ponens and modus tollens.", "\nMore recently, Hugo Mercier and colleagues have been conducting\nstudies in countries such as Japan (Mercier, Deguchi, Van der Henst,\n& Yama 2016) and Guatemala (Castelain, Girotto, Jamet, &\nMercier 2016). While recognizing the significance and interest of\ncultural differences (Mercier 2013), Mercier maintains that\nargumentation is a human universal, as argumentative capacities and\ntendencies are a result of natural selection, genetically encoded in\nhuman cognition (Mercier 2011; Mercier & Sperber 2017). He takes\nthe results of the cross-cultural studies conducted so far as\nconfirming the universality of argumentation, even considering\ncultural differences (Mercier 2018).", "\nAnother scholar who has been carrying out an extensive research\nprogram on cultural differences in argumentation is communication\ntheorist Dale Hample. With different sets of colleagues, he has\nconducted studies by means of surveys where participants (typically,\nuniversity undergraduates) self-report on their argumentative\npractices in countries such as China, Japan, Turkey, Chile, the\nNetherlands, Portugal, the United States (among others; Hample 2018:\nch. 7). His results overall show a number of similarities, which may\nbe partially explained by the specific demographic (university\nstudents) from which participants are usually recruited. But\ninteresting differences have also been identified, for example\ndifferent levels of willingness to engage in argumentative\nencounters.", "\nIn a recent book (Tindale 2021), philosopher Chris Tindale adopts an\nanthropological perspective to investigate how argumentative practices\nemerge from the experiences of peoples with diverse backgrounds. He\nemphasizes the argumentative roles of place, orality, myth, narrative,\nand audience, also assessing the impacts of colonialism on the study\nof argumentation. Tindale reviews a wealth of anthropological and\nethnographic studies on argumentative practices in different cultures,\nthus providing what is to date perhaps the most comprehensive study on\nargumentation from an anthropological perspective.", "\nOn the whole, the study of differences and commonalities in\nargumentative practices across cultures is an established line of\nresearch on argumentation, but arguably much work remains to be done\nto investigate these complex phenomena more thoroughly." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Cross-cultural perspectives on argumentation" }, { "content": [ "\nSo far we have not yet considered the question of the different media\nthrough which argumentation can take place. Naturally, argumentation\ncan unfold orally in face-to-face encounters—discussions in\nparliament, political debates, in a court of law—as well as in\nwriting—in scientific articles, on the Internet, in newspaper\neditorials. Moreover, it can happen synchronically, with real-time\nexchanges of reasons, or asynchronically. While it is reasonable to\nexpect that there will be some commonalities across these different\nmedia and environments, it is also plausible that specific features of\ndifferent environments may significantly influence how argumentation\nis conducted: different environments present different kinds of\naffordances for arguers (Halpern & Gibbs 2013; Weger\n& Aakhus 2003; see entry on\n embodied cognition\n for the concept of affordance). Indeed, if the Internet represents a\nfundamentally novel cognitive ecology (Smart, Heersmink, & Clowes\n2017), then it will likely give rise to different forms of\nargumentative engagement (Lewiński 2010). Whether these new forms\nwill represent progress (according to some suitable metric)\nis however a moot point.", "\nIn the early days of the Internet in the 1990s, there was much hope\nthat online spaces would finally realize the Habermasian ideal of a\npublic sphere for political deliberation (Hindman 2009). The Internet\nwas supposed to act as the great equalizer in the worldwide\nmarketplace of ideas, finally attaining the Millian ideal of free\nexchange of ideas (Mill 1859). Online, everyone’s voice would\nhave an equal chance of being heard, everyone could contribute to the\nconversation, and everyone could simultaneously be a journalist, news\nconsumer, engaged citizen, advocate, and activist.", "\nA few decades later, these hopes have not really materialized. It is\nprobably true that most people now argue more—in social\nmedia, blogs, chat rooms, discussion boards etc.—but it is much\nless obvious that they argue better. Indeed, rather than\nenhancing democratic ideals, some have gone as far as claiming that\ninstead, the Internet is “killing democracy” (Bartlett\n2018). There is very little oversight when it comes to the spreading\nof propaganda and disinformation online (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts\n2018), which means that citizens are often being fed faulty\ninformation and arguments. Moreover, it seems that online environments\nmay lead to increased polarization when polemic topics are being\ndiscussed (Yardi & Boyd 2010), and to “intellectual\narrogance” (Lynch 2019). Some have argued that online\ndiscussions lead to more overly emotional engagement when compared to\nother forms of debate (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock 2014). But not\neveryone is convinced that the Internet has only made things worse\nwhen it comes to argumentation, or in any case that it cannot be\nsuitably redesigned so as to foster rather than destroy democratic\nideals and deliberation (Sunstein 2017).", "\nBe that as it may, the Internet is here to stay, and online\nargumentation is a pervasive phenomenon that argumentation theorists\nhave been studying and will continue to study for years to come. In\nfact, if anything, online argumentation is now more often\ninvestigated empirically than other forms of argumentation, among\nother reasons thanks to the development of argument mining techniques\n(see\n section 4.2\n above) which greatly facilitate the study of large corpora of textual\nmaterial such as those produced by online discussions. Beyond the very\nnumerous specific case studies available in the literature, there have\nbeen also attempts to reflect on the phenomenon of online\nargumentation in general, for example in journal special issues\ndedicated to argumentation in digital media such as in\nArgumentation and Advocacy (Volume 47(2), 2010) and\nPhilosophy & Technology (Volume 30(2), 2017). However, a\nsystematic analysis of online argumentation and how it differs from\nother forms of argumentation remains to be produced." ], "subsection_title": "5.4 Argumentation and the Internet" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nArgument and argumentation are multifaceted phenomena that have\nattracted the interest of philosophers as well as scholars in other\nfields for millennia, and continue to be studied extensively in\nvarious domains. This entry presents an overview of the main strands\nin these discussions, while acknowledging the impossibility of fully\ndoing justice to the enormous literature on the topic. But the\nliterature references below should at least provide a useful starting\npoint for the interested reader." ], "section_title": "6. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Aberdein, Andrew, 2016, “The Vices of Argument”,\nTopoi, 35(2): 413–422.\ndoi:10.1007/s11245-015-9346-z", "Aberdein, Andrew and Daniel H. Cohen, 2016, “Introduction:\nVirtues and Arguments”, Topoi, 35(2): 339–343.\ndoi:10.1007/s11245-016-9366-3", "Aberdein, Andrew and Ian J Dove (eds.), 2013, The Argument of\nMathematics, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.\ndoi:10.1007/978-94-007-6534-4", "Aikin, Scott, 2011, “A Defense of War and Sport Metaphors in\nArgument”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, 44(3):\n250–272.", "Amossy, Ruth, 2002, “How to Do Things with Doxa: Toward an\nAnalysis of Argumentation in Discourse”, Poetics Today,\n23(3): 465–487. doi:10.1215/03335372-23-3-465", "–––, 2009, “Argumentation in Discourse: A\nSocio-Discursive Approach to Arguments”, Informal\nLogic, 29(3): 252–267. doi:10.22329/il.v29i3.2843", "–––, 2018, “Understanding Political Issues\nthrough Argumentation Analysis”, in The Routledge Handbook\nof Language and Politics, Ruth Wodak and Bernard Forchtner\n(eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 135–149.", "Askeland, Bjarte, 2020, “The Potential of Abductive Legal\nReasoning”, Ratio Juris, 33(1): 66–81.\ndoi:10.1111/raju.12268", "Atkinson, Katie, Federico Cerutti, Peter McBurney, Simon Parsons,\nand Iyad Rahwan (eds), 2016, Special Issue on Argumentation in\nMulti-Agent Systems, of Argument & Computation,\n7(2–3). ", "Bailin, Sharon and Mark Battersby, 2016, “DAMed If You Do;\nDAMed If You Don’t: Cohen’s ‘Missed\nOpportunities’”, in Proceedings of the Ontario Society\nfor the Study of Argumentation Conference, Vol. 11.\n [Bailin and Battersby 2016 available online]", "Ball, Linden J and Valerie A. Thompson (eds.), 2018,\nInternational Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, London:\nRoutledge. doi:10.4324/9781315725697", "Bartlett, Jamie, 2018, The People vs Tech: How the Internet is\nKilling Democracy (and How We Can Save It), London: Ebury\nPress.", "Beall, Jc, 2009, Spandrels of Truth, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268733.001.0001", "Benkler, Yochai, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts, 2018, Network\nPropaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in\nAmerican Politics, New York: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/oso/9780190923624.001.0001", "Bermejo Luque, Lilian, 2011, Giving Reasons: A\nLinguistic-Pragmatic Approach to Argumentation Theory\n(Argumentation Library 20), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.\ndoi:10.1007/978-94-007-1761-9", "–––, 2020, “What Is Wrong with\nDeductivism?”, Informal Logic, 40(3): 295–316.\ndoi:10.22329/il.v40i30.6214", "Betz, Gregor, 2013, Debate Dynamics: How Controversy Improves\nOur Beliefs, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.\ndoi:10.1007/978-94-007-4599-5", "Bex, Floris, Henry Prakken, Chris Reed, and Douglas Walton, 2003,\n“Towards a Formal Account of Reasoning about Evidence:\nArgumentation Schemes and Generalisations”, Artificial\nIntelligence and Law, 11(2/3): 125–165.\ndoi:10.1023/B:ARTI.0000046007.11806.9a", "Bex, Floris and Bart Verheij, 2013, “Legal Stories and the\nProcess of Proof”, Artificial Intelligence and Law,\n21(3): 253–278. doi:10.1007/s10506-012-9137-4", "Biro, John and Harvey Siegel, 2006, “In Defense of the\nObjective Epistemic Approach to Argumentation”, Informal\nLogic, 26(1): 91–101. doi:10.22329/il.v26i1.432", "Bondy, Patrick, 2010, “Argumentative Injustice”,\nInformal Logic, 30(3): 263–278.\ndoi:10.22329/il.v30i3.3034", "Brandom, Robert B., 1994, Making It Explicit: Reasoning,\nRepresenting, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard\nUniversity Press.", "Campos, Daniel G., 2011, “On the Distinction between\nPeirce’s Abduction and Lipton’s Inference to the Best\nExplanation”, Synthese, 180(3): 419–442.\ndoi:10.1007/s11229-009-9709-3", "Casey, John, 2020, “Adversariality and Argumentation”,\nInformal Logic, 40(1): 77–108.\ndoi:10.22329/il.v40i1.5969", "Castelain, Thomas, Vittorio Girotto, Frank Jamet, and Hugo\nMercier, 2016, “Evidence for Benefits of Argumentation in a\nMayan Indigenous Population”, Evolution and Human\nBehavior, 37(5): 337–342.\ndoi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.02.002", "Clark, Andy, 2016, Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action,\nand the Embodied Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217013.001.0001", "Cohen, Daniel H., 1995, “Argument Is War…and War Is\nHell: Philosophy, Education, and Metaphors for Argumentation”,\nInformal Logic, 17(2): 177–188.\ndoi:10.22329/il.v17i2.2406", "–––, 2019, “Argumentative Virtues as\nConduits for Reason’s Causal Efficacy: Why the Practice of\nGiving Reasons Requires That We Practice Hearing Reasons”,\nTopoi, 38(4): 711–718.\ndoi:10.1007/s11245-015-9364-x", "Collins, Peter J. and Ulrike Hahn, 2018, “Fallacies of\nArgumentation”, in Ball and Thomson 2018: 88–108.", "Doury, Marianne, 2009, “Argument Schemes Typologies in\nPractice: The Case of Comparative Arguments”, in Pondering\non Problems of Argumentation, Frans H. van Eemeren and Bart\nGarssen (eds.), (Argumentation Library 14), Dordrecht: Springer\nNetherlands, pp. 141–155. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9165-0_11", "Driver, Rosalind, Paul Newton, and Jonathan Osborne, 2000,\n“Establishing the Norms of Scientific Argumentation in\nClassrooms”, Science Education, 84(3): 287–312.\n", "Dummett, Michael, 1978, “The Justification of\nDeduction”, in his Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge\nMA: Harvard University Press, pp. 290–318.", "Dung, Phan Minh, 1995, “On the Acceptability of Arguments\nand Its Fundamental Role in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming\nand n-Person Games”, Artificial Intelligence,\n77(2): 321–357. doi:10.1016/0004-3702(94)00041-X", "Dutilh Novaes, Catarina, 2015, “The Formal and the\nFormalized: The Cases of Syllogistic and Supposition Theory”,\nKriterion: Revista de Filosofia, 56(131): 253–270.\ndoi:10.1590/0100-512X2015n13114cdn", "–––, 2020a, The Dialogical Roots of\nDeduction: Historical, Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on\nReasoning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/9781108800792", "–––, 2020b, “Logic and the Psychology of\nReasoning”, in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of\nRelativism, Martin Kusch (ed.), London: Routledge,\npp. 445–454.", "–––, 2020c, “The Role of Trust in\nArgumentation”, Informal Logic, 40(2): 205–236.\ndoi:10.22329/il.v40i2.6328", "–––, forthcoming, “Who’s Afraid of\nAdversariality? Conflict and Cooperation in Argumentation”,\nTopoi, first online: 23 December 2020.\ndoi:10.1007/s11245-020-09736-9", "Dworkin, Ronald, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Eemeren, Frans H. van and Rob Grootendorst, 1984, Speech Acts\nin Argumentative Discussions: A Theoretical Model for the Analysis of\nDiscussions Directed towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion,\nDordrecht: Foris Publications. doi:10.1515/9783110846089", "–––, 2004, A Systematic Theory of\nArgumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511616389", "Eemeren, Frans H. van, Bart Garssen, Erik C. W. Krabbe, A.\nFrancisca Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Verheij, and Jean H. M. Wagemans,\n2014, Handbook of Argumentation Theory, Dordrecht: Springer\nNetherlands. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9473-5", "Eemeren, Frans H. van, Rob Grootendorst, Ralph H. Johnson,\nChristian Plantin, and Charles A. Willard, 1996, Fundamentals of\nArgumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and\nContemporary Developments, Mahwah, NJ: Routledge.\ndoi:10.4324/9780203811306", "Elqayam, Shira, 2018, “The New Paradigm in Psychology of\nReasoning”, in Ball and Thomson 2018: 130–150.", "Erduran, Sibel and María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre\n(eds.), 2007, Argumentation in Science Education: Perspectives\nfrom Classroom-Based Research (Science & Technology Education\nLibrary 35), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.\ndoi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6670-2", "Eva, Benjamin and Stephan Hartmann, 2018, “Bayesian\nArgumentation and the Value of Logical Validity”,\nPsychological Review, 125(5): 806–821.\ndoi:10.1037/rev0000114", "Everett, Daniel Leonard, 2008, Don’t Sleep! There are\nSnakes: Life and Language in the Amazonian Jungle, New York, NY:\nVintage Books.", "Fantl, Jeremy, 2018, The Limitations of the Open Mind,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/oso/9780198807957.001.0001", "Feteris, Eveline T., 2017, Fundamentals of Legal\nArgumentation: A Survey of Theories on the Justification of Judicial\nDecisions, second edition, (Argumentation Library 1), Dordrecht:\nSpringer Netherlands. doi:10.1007/978-94-024-1129-4", "Field, Hartry, 2008, Saving Truth From Paradox, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.001.0001", "Fisher, Matthew and Frank C. Keil, 2016, “The Trajectory of\nArgumentation and Its Multifaceted Functions”, in Paglieri,\nBonelli, and Felletti 2016: 347–362.", "Fishkin, James, 2016, “Deliberative Democracy”, in\nEmerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Robert\nA. Scott and Marlis C. Buchmann, New York: Wiley.", "Fogelin, Robert, 1985, “The Logic of Deep\nDisagreements”, Informal Logic, 7(1): 3–11.\ndoi:10.22329/il.v7i1.2696", "Fraassen, Bas C. van, 1989, Laws and Symmetry, Oxford:\nOxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001", "Fricker, Miranda, 2007, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the\nEthics of Knowing, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001", "Geuss, Raymond, 2019, “A Republic of Discussion: Habermas at\nNinety”, The Point Magazine, 18 June 2019.\n [Geuss 2019 available online]", "Gilbert, Michael A., 1994, “Feminism, Argumentation and\nCoalescence”, Informal Logic, 16(2): 95–113.\ndoi:10.22329/il.v16i2.2444", "–––, 1997, Coalescent Argumentation,\nMahwah, NJ: L. 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J., 2011, “The scope of logic: Soto and Fonseca on dialectic and informal arguments”, in Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500–1500, Margaret Cameron and John Marenbon, Leiden: Brill, pp. 127–145.", "Bazán, B. C., J. W. Wippel, G. Fransen, and D. Jacquart,\n1985, Les Questions Disputées et Les Questions\nQuodlibétiques dans les Facultés de Théologie, de\nDroit et de Médecine, Turnhout: Brepols.", "Castelnérac, Benoît and Mathieu Marion, 2009,\n“Arguing for Inconsistency: Dialectical Games in the\nAcademy”, in Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and\nLogic, Giuseppe Primiero and Shahid Rahman (eds), London: College\nPublications, pp. 37–76.", "DiPasquale, David M., 2019, Alfarabi’s “Book of\nDialectic (Kitāb al-Jadal)”: On the Starting Point of\nIslamic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/9781108277822", "Duncombe, Matthew and Catarina Dutilh Novaes, 2016,\n“Dialectic and logic in Aristotle and his tradition”,\nHistory and Philosophy of Logic, 37: 1–8.", "Dutilh Novaes, Catarina, 2017, “What is logic?”,\nAeon Magazine, 12 January 2017.\n [Dutilh Novaes 2017 available online]", "–––, 2020, The Dialogical Roots of\nDeduction: Historical, Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on\nReasoning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/9781108800792", "El-Rouayheb, Khaled, 2016, “Arabic Logic after\nAvicenna”, in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval\nLogic, Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Stephen Read (eds.), Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, pp. 67–93.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9781107449862.004", "Fink, Jakob L., 2012, “Introduction”, in The\nDevelopment of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle, Jakob Leth Fink\n(ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–24.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9780511997969.001", "Fraser, Chris, 2013, “Distinctions, Judgment, and Reasoning\nin Classical Chinese Thought”, History and Philosophy of\nLogic, 34(1): 1–24. doi:10.1080/01445340.2012.724927", "Ganeri, Dr Jonardon, 2001, “Introduction: Indian Logic and\nthe Colonization of Reason”, in his Indian Logic: A\nReader, London: Routledge, pp. 1–25.", "Hansen, Chad, 1983, Language and Logic in Ancient China,\nAnn Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.", "Hansen, Mogens Herman, 1977–88 [1991], Det Athenske\nDemokrati. Revised and translated as The Athenian Democracy\nin the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology,\nJ.A. Crook (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.", "Irani, Tushar, 2017, Plato on the Value of Philosophy: The Art\nof Argument in the “Gorgias” and\n“Phaedrus”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/9781316855621", "Matilal, Bimal Krishna, 1998, The Character of Logic in\nIndia, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.", "Miller, Larry Benjamin, 2020, Islamic Disputation Theory: The\nUses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam, (Logic,\nArgumentation & Reasoning 21), Cham: Springer International\nPublishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-45012-0", "Nauta, Lodi, 2009, In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo\nValla’s Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Nicholson, Hugh, 2010, “The Shift from Agonistic to\nNon-Agonistic Debate in Early Nyāya”, Journal of Indian\nPhilosophy, 38(1): 75–95.\ndoi:10.1007/s10781-009-9081-0", "Notomi, Noburu, 2014, “The Sophists”, in Routledge\nCompanion to Ancient Philosophy, Frisbee Sheffield and James\nWarren (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 94–110.", "Novikoff, Alex J., 2013, The Medieval Culture of Disputation:\nPedagogy, Practice, and Performance, Philadelphia, PA: University\nof Pennsylvania Press.", "Phillips, Stephen H., 2017, “Fallacies and Defeaters in\nEarly Navya Nyaya”, Indian Epistemology and\nMetaphysics, Joerg Tuske (ed.), London: Bloomsbury Academic,\npp. 33–52.", "Prets, Ernst, 2001, “Futile and False Rejoinders,\nSophistical Arguments and Early Indian Logic”, Journal of\nIndian Philosophy, 29(5/6): 545–558.\ndoi:10.1023/A:1013894810880", "Siderits, Mark, 2003, “Deductive, Inductive, Both or\nNeither?”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 31(1/3):\n303–321. doi:10.1023/A:1024691426770", "Solomon, Esther Abraham, 1976, Indian Dialectics: Methods of\nPhilosophical Discussion, Ahmedabad: B.J. Institute of Learning\nand Research.", "Taber, John A., 2004, “Is Indian Logic Nonmonotonic?”,\nPhilosophy East and West, 54(2): 143–170.\ndoi:10.1353/pew.2004.0009", "Wolfsdorf, David, 2013, “Socratic Philosophizing”, in\nThe Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates, John Bussanich and\nNicholas D. Smith (eds.), London; New York: Continuum,\npp. 34–67.", "Young, Walter Edward, 2017, The Dialectical Forge,\n(Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 9), Cham: Springer International\nPublishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25522-4" ]	[ { "href": "../abduction/", "text": "abduction" }, { "href": "../analogy-medieval/", "text": "analogy: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../reasoning-analogy/", "text": "analogy and analogical reasoning" }, { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../aristotle-logic/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: logic" }, { "href": "../aristotle-rhetoric/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: rhetoric" }, { "href": "../francis-bacon/", "text": "Bacon, Francis" }, { "href": "../bayes-theorem/", "text": "Bayes’ Theorem" }, { "href": "../implicit-bias/", "text": "bias, implicit" }, { "href": "../chinese-logic-language/", "text": "Chinese Philosophy: logic and language in Early Chinese Philosophy" }, { "href": "../mohism/", "text": "Chinese Philosophy: Mohism" }, { "href": "../mohist-canons/", "text": "Chinese Philosophy: Mohist Canons" }, { "href": "../chinese-room/", "text": "Chinese room argument" }, { "href": "../embodied-cognition/", "text": "cognition: embodied" }, { "href": "../critical-thinking/", "text": "critical thinking" }, { "href": "../curry-paradox/", "text": "Curry’s paradox" }, { "href": "../democracy/", "text": "democracy" }, { "href": "../emotion/", "text": "emotion" }, { "href": "../epistemology-virtue/", "text": "epistemology: virtue" }, { "href": "../ethics-virtue/", "text": "ethics: virtue" }, { "href": "../fallacies/", "text": "fallacies" }, { "href": "../feminism-epistemology/", "text": "feminist philosophy, interventions: epistemology and philosophy of science" }, { "href": "../feminism-political/", "text": "feminist philosophy, interventions: political philosophy" }, { "href": "../feminism-argumentation/", "text": "feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on argumentation" }, { "href": "../habermas/", "text": "Habermas, Jürgen" }, { "href": "../hume/", "text": "Hume, David" }, { "href": "../induction-problem/", "text": "induction: problem of" }, { "href": "../legal-reas-prec/", "text": "legal reasoning: precedent and analogy in" }, { "href": "../liar-paradox/", "text": "liar paradox" }, { "href": "../logic-inductive/", "text": "logic: inductive" }, { "href": "../logic-informal/", "text": "logic: informal" }, { "href": "../logic-nonmonotonic/", "text": "logic: non-monotonic" }, { "href": "../logic-paraconsistent/", "text": "logic: paraconsistent" }, { "href": "../logic-relevance/", "text": "logic: relevance" }, { "href": "../logical-consequence/", "text": "logical consequence" }, { "href": "../peirce/", "text": "Peirce, Charles Sanders" }, { "href": "../reasoning-defeasible/", "text": "reasoning: defeasible" }, { "href": "../scientific-knowledge-social/", "text": "scientific knowledge: social dimensions of" }, { "href": "../spinoza/", "text": "Spinoza, Baruch" }, { "href": "../stebbing/", "text": "Stebbing, Susan" }, { "href": "../thought-experiment/", "text": "thought experiments" } ]
aristotle	Aristotle	First published Thu Sep 25, 2008; substantive revision Tue Aug 25, 2020	[ "\n\nAristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) numbers among the greatest\nphilosophers of all time. Judged solely in terms of his philosophical\ninfluence, only Plato is his peer: Aristotle’s works shaped centuries\nof philosophy from Late Antiquity through the Renaissance, and even\ntoday continue to be studied with keen, non-antiquarian interest. A\nprodigious researcher and writer, Aristotle left a great body of work,\nperhaps numbering as many as two-hundred treatises, from which\napproximately thirty-one\n survive.[1] \n His extant writings span a wide range of\ndisciplines, from logic, metaphysics and philosophy of mind, through\nethics, political theory, aesthetics and rhetoric, and into such\nprimarily non-philosophical fields as empirical biology, where he\nexcelled at detailed plant and animal observation and description. \nIn all these areas, Aristotle’s theories have provided\nillumination, met with resistance, sparked debate, and generally\nstimulated the sustained interest of an abiding readership.", "\n\nBecause of its wide range and its remoteness in time,\nAristotle’s philosophy defies easy encapsulation. The long\nhistory of interpretation and appropriation of Aristotelian texts and\nthemes—spanning over two millennia and comprising philosophers\nworking within a variety of religious and secular traditions—has\nrendered even basic points of interpretation controversial. The\nset of entries on Aristotle in this site addresses this situation by\nproceeding in three tiers. First, the present, general entry\noffers a brief account of Aristotle’s life and characterizes his\ncentral philosophical commitments, highlighting his most distinctive\nmethods and most influential\n achievements.[2] \n Second are General Topics, which offer detailed introductions\nto the main areas of Aristotle’s philosophical activity. Finally,\nthere follow Special Topics, which investigate in greater\ndetail more narrowly focused issues, especially those of central\nconcern in recent Aristotelian scholarship. " ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Aristotle’s Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Aristotelian Corpus: Character and Primary Divisions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Logic, Science, and Dialectic", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Logic", "4.2 Science", "4.3 Dialectic" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Essentialism and Homonymy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Category Theory", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. The Four Causal Account of Explanatory Adequacy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Hylomorphism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "9. Aristotelian Teleology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "10. Substance", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "11. Living Beings", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "12. Happiness and Political Association", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "13. Rhetoric and the Arts", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "14. Aristotle’s Legacy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "A. Translations", "B. Translations with Commentaries", "C. General Works", "D. Bibliography of Works Cited" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nBorn in 384 B.C.E. in the Macedonian region of northeastern Greece in\nthe small city of Stagira (whence the moniker ‘the\nStagirite’, which one still occasionally encounters in\nAristotelian scholarship), Aristotle was sent to Athens at about the\nage of seventeen to study in Plato’s Academy, then a pre-eminent\nplace of learning in the Greek world. Once in Athens, Aristotle\nremained associated with the Academy until Plato’s death in 347,\nat which time he left for Assos, in Asia Minor, on the northwest coast\nof present-day Turkey. There he continued the philosophical activity\nhe had begun in the Academy, but in all likelihood also began to\nexpand his researches into marine biology. He remained at Assos for\napproximately three years, when, evidently upon the death of his host\nHermeias, a friend and former Academic who had been the ruler of\nAssos, Aristotle moved to the nearby coastal island of Lesbos. There\nhe continued his philosophical and empirical researches for an\nadditional two years, working in conjunction with Theophrastus, a\nnative of Lesbos who was also reported in antiquity to have been\nassociated with Plato’s Academy. While in Lesbos, Aristotle\nmarried Pythias, the niece of Hermeias, with whom he had a daughter,\nalso named Pythias.", "\n\nIn 343, upon the request of Philip, the king of Macedon, Aristotle\nleft Lesbos for Pella, the Macedonian capital, in order to tutor the\nking’s thirteen-year-old son, Alexander—the boy who was\neventually to become Alexander the Great. Although speculation\nconcerning Aristotle’s influence upon the developing Alexander has\nproven irresistible to historians, in fact little concrete is known\nabout their interaction. On the balance, it seems reasonable to\nconclude that some tuition took place, but that it lasted only two or\nthree years, when Alexander was aged from thirteen to fifteen. By\nfifteen, Alexander was apparently already serving as a deputy military\ncommander for his father, a circumstance undermining, if\ninconclusively, the judgment of those historians who conjecture a\nlonger period of tuition. Be that as it may, some suppose that their\nassociation lasted as long as eight years.", "\n\nIt is difficult to rule out that possibility decisively, since little\nis known about the period of Aristotle’s life from\n341–335. He evidently remained a further five years in Stagira\nor Macedon before returning to Athens for the second and final time,\nin 335. In Athens, Aristotle set up his own school in a public\nexercise area dedicated to the god Apollo Lykeios, whence its name,\nthe Lyceum. Those affiliated with Aristotle’s school\nlater came to be called Peripatetics, probably because of the\nexistence of an ambulatory (peripatos) on the school’s\nproperty adjacent to the exercise ground. Members of the Lyceum\nconducted research into a wide range of subjects, all of which were of\ninterest to Aristotle himself: botany, biology, logic, music,\nmathematics, astronomy, medicine, cosmology, physics, the history of\nphilosophy, metaphysics, psychology, ethics, theology, rhetoric,\npolitical history, government and political theory, and the arts. In\nall these areas, the Lyceum collected manuscripts, thereby, according\nto some ancient accounts, assembling the first great library of\nantiquity. ", "\n\nDuring this period, Aristotle’s wife, Pythias, died and he\ndeveloped a new relationship with Herpyllis, perhaps like him a native\nof Stagira, though her origins are disputed, as is the question of her\nexact relationship to Aristotle. Some suppose that she was merely his\nslave; others infer from the provisions of Aristotle’s will that\nshe was a freed woman and likely his wife at the time of his\ndeath. In any event, they had children together, including a son,\nNicomachus, named for Aristotle’s father and after whom his\nNicomachean Ethics is presumably named.", "\n\nAfter thirteen years in Athens, Aristotle once again found cause to\nretire from the city, in 323. Probably his departure was\noccasioned by a resurgence of the always-simmering anti-Macedonian\nsentiment in Athens, which was free to come to the boil after Alexander\nsuccumbed to disease in Babylon during that same year. Because of\nhis connections to Macedon, Aristotle reasonably feared for his safety\nand left Athens, remarking, as an oft-repeated ancient tale would tell\nit, that he saw no reason to permit Athens to sin twice against\nphilosophy. He withdrew directly to Chalcis, on Euboea, an island\noff the Attic coast, and died there of natural causes the following\nyear, in\n 322.[3]" ], "section_title": "1. Aristotle’s Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n \nAristotle’s writings tend to present formidable difficulties to\nhis novice readers. To begin, he makes heavy use of unexplained\ntechnical terminology, and his sentence structure can at times prove\nfrustrating. Further, on occasion a chapter or even a full\ntreatise coming down to us under his name appears haphazardly\norganized, if organized at all; indeed, in several cases, scholars\ndispute whether a continuous treatise currently arranged under a single\ntitle was ever intended by Aristotle to be published in its present\nform or was rather stitched together by some later editor employing\nwhatever principles of organization he deemed\n suitable.[4] \n This helps explain why\nstudents who turn to Aristotle after first being introduced to the\nsupple and mellifluous prose on display in Plato’s dialogues\noften find the experience frustrating. Aristotle’s prose\nrequires some acclimatization.", "\n \nAll the more puzzling, then, is Cicero’s observation that if\nPlato’s prose was silver, Aristotle’s was a flowing river\nof gold (Ac. Pr. 38.119, cf. Top. 1.3, De\nor. 1.2.49). Cicero was arguably the greatest prose stylist of\nLatin and was also without question an accomplished and fair-minded\ncritic of the prose styles of others writing in both Latin and\nGreek. We must assume, then, that Cicero had before him works of\nAristotle other than those we possess. In fact, we know that\nAristotle wrote dialogues, presumably while still in the Academy, and\nin their few surviving remnants we are afforded a glimpse of the style\nCicero describes. In most of what we possess, unfortunately, we\nfind work of a much less polished character. Rather,\nAristotle’s extant works read like what they very probably are:\nlecture notes, drafts first written and then reworked, ongoing records\nof continuing investigations, and, generally speaking, in-house\ncompilations intended not for a general audience but for an inner\ncircle of auditors. These are to be contrasted with the\n“exoteric” writings Aristotle sometimes mentions, his more\ngraceful compositions intended for a wider audience (Pol.\n1278b30; EE 1217b22, 1218b34). Unfortunately, then, we\nare left for the most part, though certainly not entirely, with\nunfinished works in progress rather than with finished and polished\nproductions. Still, many of those who persist with Aristotle come\nto appreciate the unembellished directness of his style.", "\n\n \nMore importantly, the unvarnished condition of Aristotle’s\nsurviving treatises does not hamper our ability to come to grips with their\nphilosophical content. His thirty-one surviving works (that is,\nthose contained in the “Corpus Aristotelicum” of our\nmedieval manuscripts that are judged to be authentic) all contain\nrecognizably Aristotelian doctrine; and most of these contain theses\nwhose basic purport is clear, even where matters of detail and nuance\nare subject to exegetical controversy. ", "\n\n \nThese works may be categorized in terms of the intuitive\norganizational principles preferred by Aristotle. He refers to the\nbranches of learning as “sciences”\n(epistêmai), best regarded as organized bodies of\nlearning completed for presentation rather than as ongoing records of\nempirical researches. Moreover, again in his terminology, natural\nsciences such as physics are but one branch of theoretical\nscience, which comprises both empirical and non-empirical\npursuits. He distinguishes theoretical science from more practically\noriented studies, some of which concern human conduct and others of\nwhich focus on the productive crafts. Thus, the Aristotelian sciences\ndivide into three: (i) theoretical, (ii) practical, and (iii)\nproductive. The principles of division are straightforward:\ntheoretical science seeks knowledge for its own sake; practical\nscience concerns conduct and goodness in action, both individual and\nsocietal; and productive science aims at the creation of beautiful or\nuseful objects (Top. 145a15–16;\nPhys. 192b8–12; DC 298a27–32,\nDA 403a27–b2; Met. 1025b25, 1026a18–19,\n1064a16–19, b1–3; EN 1139a26–28,\n1141b29–32).", "\n\n(i) The theoretical sciences include prominently what\nAristotle calls first philosophy, or metaphysics as we now\ncall it, but also mathematics, and physics, or\nnatural philosophy. Physics studies the natural universe as a\nwhole, and tends in Aristotle’s hands to concentrate on\nconceptual puzzles pertaining to nature rather than on empirical research;\nbut it reaches further, so that it includes also a theory of causal\nexplanation and finally even a proof of an unmoved mover thought to be\nthe first and final cause of all motion. Many of the puzzles of primary\nconcern to Aristotle have proven perennially attractive to\nphilosophers, mathematicians, and theoretically inclined natural\nscientists. They include, as a small sample, Zeno’s\nparadoxes of motion, puzzles about time, the nature of place, and\ndifficulties encountered in thought about the infinite. ", "\n\nNatural philosophy also incorporates the special sciences, including\nbiology, botany, and astronomical theory. Most contemporary\ncritics think that Aristotle treats psychology as a sub-branch of\nnatural philosophy, because he regards the soul (psuchê)\nas the basic principle of life, including all animal and plant\nlife. In fact, however, the evidence for this conclusion is\ninconclusive at best. It is instructive to note that earlier periods of\nAristotelian scholarship thought this controversial, so that, for\ninstance, even something as innocuous-sounding as the question of the\nproper home of psychology in Aristotle’s division of the sciences\nignited a multi-decade debate in the\n Renaissance.[5] ", "\n\n(ii) Practical sciences are less contentious, at least as\nregards their range. These deal with conduct and action, both\nindividual and societal. Practical science thus contrasts with\ntheoretical science, which seeks knowledge for its own sake, and, less\nobviously, with the productive sciences, which deal with the creation\nof products external to sciences themselves. Both politics and\nethics fall under this branch.", "\n\n(iii) Finally, then, the productive sciences are mainly\ncrafts aimed at the production of artefacts, or of human productions\nmore broadly construed. The productive sciences include, among\nothers, ship-building, agriculture, and medicine, but also the arts of\nmusic, theatre, and dance. Another form of productive science is\nrhetoric, which treats the principles of speech-making appropriate to\nvarious forensic and persuasive settings, including centrally political\nassemblies.", "\n\nSignificantly, Aristotle’s tri-fold division of the sciences\nmakes no mention of logic. Although he did not use the word\n‘logic’ in our sense of the term, Aristotle in fact\ndeveloped the first formalized system of logic and valid\ninference. In Aristotle’s framework—although he is\nnowhere explicit about this—logic belongs to no one science, but\nrather formulates the principles of correct argumentation suitable to\nall areas of inquiry in common. It systematizes the principles\nlicensing acceptable inference, and helps to highlight at an abstract\nlevel seductive patterns of incorrect inference to be avoided by anyone\nwith a primary interest in truth. So, alongside his more\ntechnical work in logic and logical theory, Aristotle investigates\ninformal styles of argumentation and seeks to expose common patterns of\nfallacious reasoning.", "\n\nAristotle’s investigations into logic and the forms of\nargumentation make up part of the group of works coming down to us from\nthe Middle Ages under the heading the Organon\n(organon = tool in Greek). Although not so\ncharacterized in these terms by Aristotle, the name is apt, so long as\nit is borne in mind that intellectual inquiry requires a broad range of\ntools. Thus, in addition to logic and argumentation (treated\nprimarily in the Prior Analytics and Topics), the\nworks included in the Organon deal with category theory, the\ndoctrine of propositions and terms, the structure of scientific theory,\nand to some extent the basic principles of epistemology.", "\n\n \nWhen we slot Aristotle’s most important surviving authentic works\ninto this scheme, we end up with the following basic\ndivisions of his major writings:", "\n\nThe titles in this list are those in most common use today in\nEnglish-language scholarship, followed by standard abbreviations in\nparentheses. For no discernible reason, Latin titles are\ncustomarily employed in some cases, English in others. Where\nLatin titles are in general use, English equivalents are given in\nsquare brackets." ], "section_title": "2. The Aristotelian Corpus: Character and Primary Divisions", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nAristotle’s basic approach to philosophy is best grasped initially by\nway of contrast. Whereas Descartes seeks to place philosophy and\nscience on firm foundations by subjecting all knowledge claims to a\nsearing methodological doubt, Aristotle begins with the conviction\nthat our perceptual and cognitive faculties are basically dependable,\nthat they for the most part put us into direct contact with the\nfeatures and divisions of our world, and that we need not dally with\nsceptical postures before engaging in substantive philosophy.\nAccordingly, he proceeds in all areas of inquiry in the manner of a\nmodern-day natural scientist, who takes it for granted that progress\nfollows the assiduous application of a well-trained mind and so, when\npresented with a problem, simply goes to work. When he goes to work,\nAristotle begins by considering how the world appears, reflecting on\nthe puzzles those appearances throw up, and reviewing what has been\nsaid about those puzzles to date. These methods comprise his twin\nappeals to phainomena and the endoxic method. ", "\n\n \nThese two methods reflect in different ways Aristotle’s deepest\nmotivations for doing philosophy in the first place. “Human\nbeings began to do philosophy,” he says, “even as they do\nnow, because of wonder, at first because they wondered about the\nstrange things right in front of them, and then later, advancing\nlittle by little, because they came to find greater things\npuzzling” (Met. 982b12). Human beings philosophize,\naccording to Aristotle, because they find aspects of their experience\npuzzling. The sorts of puzzles we encounter in thinking about the\nuniverse and our place within it—aporiai, in\nAristotle’s terminology—tax our understanding and induce us to\nphilosophize.", "\n\n \nAccording to Aristotle, it behooves us to begin philosophizing by\nlaying out the phainomena, the appearances, or, more\nfully, things appearing to be the case, and then also\ncollecting the endoxa, the credible opinions handed down\nregarding matters we find puzzling. As a typical example, in a\npassage of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle confronts a\npuzzle of human conduct, the fact that we are apparently sometimes\nakratic or weak-willed. When introducing this puzzle, Aristotle pauses\nto reflect upon a precept governing his approach to many areas of inquiry:", "\n\nAs in other cases, we must set out the appearances\n(phainomena) and run through all the puzzles regarding\nthem. In this way we must prove the credible opinions\n(endoxa) about these sorts of experiences—ideally, all\nthe credible opinions, but if not all, then most of them, those which\nare the most important. For if the objections are answered and\nthe credible opinions remain, we shall have an adequate proof.\n(EN 1145b2–7)", "\n\nScholars dispute concerning the degree to which Aristotle regards\nhimself as beholden to the credible opinions (endoxa) he\nrecounts and the basic appearances (phainomena) to which\n he\n appeals.[6] \n Of course, since the endoxa will sometimes conflict with one\nanother, often precisely because the phainomena generate\naporiai, or puzzles, it is not always possible to respect them\nin their entirety. So, as a group they must be re-interpreted and\nsystematized, and, where that does not suffice, some must be rejected\noutright. It is in any case abundantly clear that Aristotle is\nwilling to abandon some or all of the endoxa and\nphainomena whenever science or philosophy demands that he do\nso (Met. 1073b36, 1074b6; PA 644b5; EN\n1145b2–30).", "\n\nStill, his attitude towards phainomena does betray a\npreference to conserve as many appearances as is practicable in a given\ndomain—not because the appearances are unassailably accurate, but\nrather because, as he supposes, appearances tend to track the\ntruth. We are outfitted with sense organs and powers of\nmind so structured as to put us into contact with the world and\nthus to provide us with data regarding its basic constituents and\ndivisions. While our faculties are not infallible, neither are\nthey systematically deceptive or misdirecting. Since\nphilosophy’s aim is truth and much of what appears to us proves\nupon analysis to be correct, phainomena provide both an\nimpetus to philosophize and a check on some of its more extravagant\nimpulses. ", "\n\nOf course, it is not always clear what constitutes a\nphainomenon; still less is it clear which phainomenon\nis to be respected in the face of bona fide\ndisagreement. This is in part why Aristotle endorses his second\nand related methodological precept, that we ought to begin\nphilosophical discussions by collecting the most stable and entrenched\nopinions regarding the topic of inquiry handed down to us by our\npredecessors. Aristotle’s term for these privileged views,\nendoxa, is variously rendered as ‘reputable\nopinions’, ‘credible opinions’, ‘entrenched\nbeliefs’, ‘credible beliefs’, or ‘common\nbeliefs’. Each of these translations captures at least part of\nwhat Aristotle intends with this word, but it is important to\nappreciate that it is a fairly technical term for\nhim. An endoxon is the sort of opinion we spontaneously\nregard as reputable or worthy of respect, even if upon reflection we\nmay come to question its veracity. (Aristotle appropriates this term\nfrom ordinary Greek, in which an endoxos is a notable or\nhonourable man, a man of high repute whom we would spontaneously\nrespect—though we might, of course, upon closer inspection, find\ncause to criticize him.) As he explains his use of the\nterm, endoxa are widely shared opinions, often ultimately\nissuing from those we esteem most: ‘Endoxa are those\nopinions accepted by everyone, or by the majority, or by the\nwise—and among the wise, by all or most of them, or by those who\nare the most notable and having the highest reputation’\n(Top. 100b21–23). Endoxa play a special role\nin Aristotelian philosophy in part because they form a significant\nsub-class of phainomena (EN 1154b3–8): because they\nare the privileged opinions we find ourselves unreflectively endorsing\nand reaffirming after some reflection, they themselves come to qualify\nas appearances to be preserved where possible.", "\n\nFor this reason, Aristotle’s method of beginning with the\nendoxa is more than a pious platitude to the effect that it\nbehooves us to mind our superiors. He does think this, as far as\nit goes, but he also maintains, more instructively, that we can be led\nastray by the terms within which philosophical problems are bequeathed\nto us. Very often, the puzzles confronting us were given crisp\nformulations by earlier thinkers and we find them puzzling precisely\nfor that reason. Equally often, however, if we reflect upon the\nterms within which the puzzles are cast, we find a way forward; when a\nformulation of a puzzle betrays an untenable structuring assumption, a\nsolution naturally commends itself. This is why in more abstract\ndomains of inquiry we are likely to find ourselves seeking guidance\nfrom our predecessors even as we call into question their\nways of articulating the problems we are confronting. ", "\n\nAristotle applies his method of running through the\nphainomena and collecting the endoxa widely, in\nnearly every area of his philosophy. To take a typical\nillustration, we find the method clearly deployed in his discussion of\ntime in Physics iv 10–14. We begin with a\nphainomenon: we feel sure that time exists\nor at least that time passes. So much is, inescapably,\nhow our world appears: we experience time as passing, as\nunidirectional, as unrecoverable when lost. Yet when we move to\noffer an account of what time might be, we find ourselves\nflummoxed. For guidance, we turn to what has been said about time\nby those who have reflected upon its nature. It emerges directly\nthat both philosophers and natural scientists have raised problems\nabout time. ", "\n\nAs Aristotle sets them out, these problems take the form of puzzles,\nor aporiai, regarding whether and if so how time exists\n(Phys. 218a8–30). If we say that time is the totality of the\npast, present and future, we immediately find someone objecting that\ntime exists but that the past and future do not. According to the\nobjector, only the present exists. If we retort then that time is\nwhat did exist, what exists at present and\nwhat will exist, then we notice first that our account is\ninsufficient: after all, there are many things which did, do, or will\nexist, but these are things that are in time and so not the\nsame as time itself. We further see that our account already threatens\ncircularity, since to say that something did or will\nexist seems only to say that it existed at an earlier time or\nwill come to exist at a later time. Then again we find\nsomeone objecting to our account that even the notion of the\npresent is troubling. After all, either the present is\nconstantly changing or it remains forever the same. If it remains\nforever the same, then the current present is the same as the present\nof 10,000 years ago; yet that is absurd. If it is constantly changing,\nthen no two presents are the same, in which case a past present must\nhave come into and out of existence before the present present. When?\nEither it went out of existence even as it came into existence, which\nseems odd to say the least, or it went out of existence at some\ninstant after it came into existence, in which case, again, two\npresents must have existed at the same instant. Now, Aristotle does\nnot endorse the claims set out in stating these sorts\nof aporiai; in fact, very often he cannot, because\nsome aporiai qualify as aporiai just because they\ncomprise individually plausible arguments generating incompatible\nconclusions. They thus serve as springboards to deeper, more\ndemanding analysis. ", "\n\nIn general, then, in setting such aporiai, Aristotle does not\nmean to endorse any given endoxon on one side or the\nother. Rather, he thinks that such considerations present credible\npuzzles, reflection upon which may steer us towards a defensible\nunderstanding of the nature of time. In this way, aporiai\nbring into sharp relief the issues requiring attention if progress is\nto be made. Thus, by reflecting upon the aporiai regarding\ntime, we are led immediately to think about duration and divisibility,\nabout\nquanta and continua, and about a variety of\ncategorial questions. That is, if time exists, then what sort of\nthing is it? Is it the sort of thing which exists absolutely and\nindependently? Or is it rather the sort of thing which, like a\nsurface, depends upon other things for its existence? When we\nbegin to address these sorts of questions, we also begin to ascertain\nthe sorts of assumptions at play in the endoxa coming down to\nus regarding the nature of time. Consequently, when we\ncollect the endoxa and survey them critically, we learn\nsomething about our quarry, in this case about the nature of\ntime—and crucially also something about the constellation of\nconcepts which must be refined if we are to make genuine philosophical\nprogress with respect to it. What holds in the case of time, Aristotle implies, holds generally. This is why he\ncharacteristically begins a philosophical inquiry by presenting the\nphainomena, collecting the endoxa, and running\nthrough the puzzles to which they give rise. " ], "section_title": "3. Phainomena and the Endoxic Method", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nAristotle’s reliance on endoxa takes on a still greater\nsignificance given the role such opinions play in dialectic,\nwhich he regards as an important form of non-scientific\nreasoning. Dialectic, like science\n(epistêmê), trades in logical inference; but\nscience requires premises of a sort beyond the scope of ordinary\ndialectical reasoning. Whereas science relies upon premises which\nare necessary and known to be so, a dialectical discussion can proceed\nby relying on endoxa, and so can claim only to be as secure as\nthe endoxa upon which it relies. This is not a problem,\nsuggests Aristotle, since we often reason fruitfully and well in\ncircumstances where we cannot claim to have attained scientific\nunderstanding. Minimally, however, all\nreasoning—whether scientific or dialectical—must respect\nthe canons of logic and inference. " ], "section_title": "4. Logic, Science, and Dialectic", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\n \nAmong the great achievements to which Aristotle can lay claim is the\nfirst systematic treatment of the principles of correct reasoning, the\nfirst logic. Although today we recognize many forms of logic\nbeyond Aristotle’s, it remains true that he not only developed a\ntheory of deduction, now called syllogistic, but added to it a modal\nsyllogistic and went a long way towards proving some meta-theorems\npertinent to these systems. Of course, philosophers before\nAristotle reasoned well or reasoned poorly, and the competent among them\nhad a secure working grasp of the principles of validity and\nsoundness in argumentation. No-one before Aristotle, however, developed a\nsystematic treatment of the principles governing correct inference; and\nno-one before him attempted to codify the formal and syntactic\nprinciples at play in such inference. Aristotle somewhat\nuncharacteristically draws attention to this fact at the end of a\ndiscussion of logic inference and fallacy:", "\n\nOnce you have surveyed our work, if it seems to you that our system\nhas developed adequately in comparison with other treatments arising\nfrom the tradition to date—bearing in mind how things were at the\nbeginning of our inquiry—it falls to you, our students, to be\nindulgent with respect to any omissions in our system, and to feel a\ngreat debt of gratitude for the discoveries it contains (Soph.\nRef. 184b2–8).", "\n\nEven if we now regard it as commonplace that his logic is but a\nfraction of the logic we know and use, Aristotle’s accomplishment\nwas so encompassing that no less a figure than Kant, writing over two\nmillennia after the appearance of Aristotle’s treatises on logic,\nfound it easy to offer an appropriately laudatory judgment: ‘That\nfrom the earliest times logic has traveled a secure course can be seen\nfrom the fact that since the time of Aristotle it has not had to go a\nsingle step backwards…What is further remarkable about logic is\nthat until now it has also been unable to take a single step forward,\nand therefore seems to all appearance to be finished and\ncomplete’ (Critique of Pure Reason B vii).", "\n\n \nIn Aristotle’s logic, the basic ingredients of reasoning are\ngiven in terms of inclusion and exclusion relations,\nof the sort graphically captured many years later by the device of Venn\ndiagrams. He begins with the notion of a patently correct sort of\nargument, one whose evident and unassailable acceptability induces\nAristotle to refer to is as a ‘perfect deduction’\n(APr. 24b22–25). Generally, a deduction\n(sullogismon), according to Aristotle, is a valid or\nacceptable argument. More exactly, a deduction is ‘an\nargument in which when certain things are laid down something else\nfollows of necessity in virtue of their being so’ (APr.\n24b18–20). His view of deductions is, then, akin to a notion of\nvalidity, though there are some minor differences. For\nexample, Aristotle maintains that irrelevant premises will ruin a\ndeduction, whereas validity is indifferent to irrelevance or indeed to\nthe addition of premises of any kind to an already valid\nargument. Moreover, Aristotle insists that deductions make\nprogress, whereas every inference from p to p is\ntrivially valid. Still, Aristotle’s general conception of\ndeduction is sufficiently close to validity that we may pass into\nspeaking in terms of valid structures when characterizing his\nsyllogistic. In general, he contends that a deduction is the sort\nof argument whose structure guarantees its validity,\nirrespective of the truth or falsity of its premises. This holds\nintuitively for the following structure:", "\n\nAccordingly, anything taking this form will be a deduction in\nAristotle’s sense. Let the As,\nBs, and Cs be anything at all, and\nif indeed the As are Bs, and\nthe Bs Cs, then of necessity\nthe As will be Cs. This\nparticular deduction is perfect because its validity needs no\nproof, and perhaps because it admits of no proof either: any proof\nwould seem to rely ultimately upon the intuitive validity of this sort\nof argument. ", "\n\nAristotle seeks to exploit the intuitive validity of perfect\ndeductions in a surprisingly bold way, given the infancy of his\nsubject: he thinks he can establish principles of transformation in\nterms of which every deduction (or, more precisely, every\nnon-modal deduction) can be translated into a perfect deduction. He\ncontends that by using such transformations we can place all\ndeduction on a firm footing.", "\n\nIf we focus on just the simplest kinds of deduction,\nAristotle’s procedure comes quickly into view. The\nperfect deduction already presented is an instance of universal\naffirmation: all As are Bs; all\nBs Cs; and so, all\nAs are Cs. Now, contends\nAristotle, it is possible to run through all combinations of simple\npremises and display their basic inferential structures and then to\nrelate them back to this and similarly perfect deductions. Thus,\nif we vary the quantity of a proposition’s subject\n(universal all versus indeterminate some) along with\nthe quality or kind of the predication (positive\nversus negative), we arrive at all the possible combinations\nof the most basic kind of arguments.", "\n\nIt turns out that some of these arguments are deductions, or valid\nsyllogisms, and some are not. Those which are not admit of\ncounterexamples, whereas those which are, of course, do not. There are\ncounterexamples to those, for instance, suffering from what came to be\ncalled undistributed middle terms, e.g.: all As\nare Bs; some\nBs are Cs; so, all\nAs are Cs (all university students are literate;\nsome literate people read poetry; so, all university students read\npoetry). There is no counterexample to the perfect deduction in the\nform of a universal affirmation: if all\nAs are Bs, and all\nBs Cs, then there is no escaping the fact that\nall As are Cs. So, if all the kinds of deductions\npossible can be reduced to the intuitively valid sorts, then the\nvalidity of all can be vouchsafed. ", "\n\nTo effect this sort of reduction, Aristotle relies upon a series of\nmeta-theorems, some of which he proves and others of which he merely\nreports (though it turns out that they do all indeed admit of\nproofs). His principles are meta-theorems in the sense\nthat no argument can run afoul of them and still qualify as a genuine\ndeduction. They include such theorems as: (i) no deduction\ncontains two negative premises; (ii) a deduction with a negative\nconclusion must have a negative premise; (iii) a deduction with a\nuniversal conclusion requires two universal premises; and (iv) a\ndeduction with a negative conclusion requires exactly one negative\npremise. He does, in fact, offer proofs for the most significant of his\nmeta-theorems, so that we can be assured that all deductions in his\nsystem are valid, even when their validity is difficult to grasp\nimmediately.", "\n\nIn developing and proving these meta-theorems of logic, Aristotle\ncharts territory left unexplored before him and unimproved for many\ncenturies after his death. ", "\n\nFor a fuller account of Aristotle’s achievements in logic,\n see the entry on \n Aristotle’s Logic." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Logic" }, { "content": [ "\n \nAristotle approaches the study of logic not as an end in itself, but\nwith a view to its role in human inquiry and explanation. Logic is a\ntool, he thinks, one making an important but incomplete contribution\nto science and dialectic. Its contribution is incomplete because\nscience (epistêmê) employs arguments which are\nmore than mere deductions. A deduction is minimally a valid syllogism,\nand certainly science must employ arguments passing this\nthreshold. Still, science needs more: a science proceeds\nby organizing the data in its domain into a series of\narguments which, beyond being deductions, feature premises which are\nnecessary and, as Aristotle says, “better known by\nnature”, or “more intelligible by nature”\n(gnôrimôteron phusei)\n(APo. 71b33–72a25; Top. 141b3–14;\nPhys. 184a16–23). By this he means that they should\nreveal the genuine, mind-independent natures of things. ", "\n\nHe further insists that science\n(epistêmê)—a comparatively broad term in\nhis usage, since it extends to fields of inquiry like mathematics and\nmetaphysics no less than the empirical sciences—not only reports\nthe facts but also explains them by displaying their priority\nrelations (APo. 78a22–28). That is, science explains what is\nless well known by what is better known and more fundamental, and what\nis explanatorily anemic by what is explanatorily fruitful. ", "\n\nWe may, for instance, wish to know why trees lose their leaves in the\nautumn. We may say, rightly, that this is due to the wind blowing\nthrough them. Still, this is not a deep or general explanation, since\nthe wind blows equally at other times of year without the same\nresult. A deeper explanation—one unavailable to Aristotle but\nillustrating his view nicely—is more general, and also more\ncausal in character: trees shed their leaves because diminished\nsunlight in the autumn inhibits the production of chlorophyll, which\nis required for photosynthesis, and without photosynthesis trees go\ndormant. Importantly, science should not only record these facts but\nalso display them in their correct explanatory order. That is,\nalthough a deciduous tree which fails to photosynthesize is also a\ntree lacking in chlorophyll production, its failing to produce\nchlorophyll explains its inability to photosynthesize and not the\nother way around. This sort of asymmetry must be captured in\nscientific explanation. Aristotle’s method of scientific exposition is\ndesigned precisely to discharge this requirement.", "\n\nScience seeks to capture not only the causal priorities in nature,\nbut also its deep, invariant patterns. Consequently, in addition\nto being explanatorily basic, the first premise in a scientific\ndeduction will be necessary. So, says Aristotle:", "\n\nWe think we understand a thing without qualification, and not in the\nsophistic, accidental way, whenever we think we know the cause in\nvirtue of which something is—that it is the cause of that very\nthing—and also know that this cannot be otherwise. \nClearly, knowledge (epistêmê) is something of this\nsort. After all, both those with knowledge and those without it\nsuppose that this is so—although only those with knowledge are\nactually in this condition. Hence, whatever is known without\nqualification cannot be otherwise. (APo 71b9–16; cf.\nAPo 71b33–72a5; Top. 141b3–14, Phys.\n184a10–23; Met. 1029b3–13) ", "\n\nFor this reason, science requires more than mere deduction.\nAltogether, then, the currency of science is demonstration\n(apodeixis), where a demonstration is a deduction with\npremises revealing the causal structures of the world, set forth so as\nto capture what is necessary and to reveal what is better known and\nmore intelligible by nature (APo\n71b33–72a5, Phys. 184a16–23, EN 1095b2–4). ", "\n \nAristotle’s approach to the appropriate form of scientific explanation\ninvites reflection upon a troubling epistemological question: how does\ndemonstration begin? If we are to lay out demonstrations such that the\nless well known is inferred by means of deduction from the better\nknown, then unless we reach rock-bottom, we will evidently be forced\neither to continue ever backwards towards the increasingly better\nknown, which seems implausibly endless, or lapse into some form of\ncircularity, which seems undesirable. The alternative seems to be\npermanent ignorance. Aristotle contends:", "\n\nSome people think that since knowledge obtained via demonstration\nrequires the knowledge of primary things, there is no knowledge. \nOthers think that there is knowledge and that all knowledge is\ndemonstrable. Neither of these views is either true or\nnecessary. The first group, those supposing that there is\nno knowledge at all, contend that we are confronted with an infinite\nregress. They contend that we cannot know posterior things\nbecause of prior things if none of the prior things is primary. \nHere what they contend is correct: it is indeed impossible to traverse\nan infinite series. Yet, they maintain, if the regress comes to a\nhalt, and there are first principles, they will be unknowable, since\nsurely there will be no demonstration of first principles—given,\nas they maintain, that only what is demonstrated can be known. \nBut if it is not possible to know the primary things, then neither can\nwe know without qualification or in any proper way the things derived\nfrom them. Rather, we can know them instead only on the basis of\na hypothesis, to wit, if the primary things obtain, then so\ntoo do the things derived from them. The other group agrees that\nknowledge results only from demonstration, but believes that nothing\nstands in the way of demonstration, since they admit circular and\nreciprocal demonstration as possible. (APo. 72b5–21)", "\n\nAristotle’s own preferred alternative is clear:", "\n\nWe contend that not all knowledge is demonstrative: knowledge of the\nimmediate premises is indemonstrable. Indeed, the necessity here\nis apparent; for if it is necessary to know the prior things, that is,\nthose things from which the demonstration is derived, and if eventually\nthe regress comes to a standstill, it is necessary that these immediate\npremises be indemonstrable. (APo. 72b21–23)", "\n\nIn sum, if all knowledge requires demonstration, and all\ndemonstration proceeds from what is more intelligible by nature to what\nis less so, then either the process goes on indefinitely or it comes to\na halt in undemonstrated first principles, which are known, and known\nsecurely. Aristotle dismisses the only remaining possibility,\nthat demonstration might be circular, rather curtly, with the remark\nthat this amounts to ‘simply saying that something is the\ncase if it is the case,’ by which device ‘it is easy to\nprove anything’ (APo. 72b32–73a6).", "\n\n \nAristotle’s own preferred alternative, that there are first\nprinciples of the sciences graspable by those willing to engage in\nassiduous study, has caused consternation in many of his readers.\n In Posterior Analytics ii 19, he describes the\nprocess by which knowers move from perception to memory, and from memory\nto experience (empeiria)—which is a fairly technical\nterm in this connection, reflecting the point at which a single\nuniversal comes to take root in the mind—and finally from\nexperience to a grasp of first principles. This final\nintellectual state Aristotle characterizes as a kind of unmediated\nintellectual apprehension (nous) of first principles\n(APo. 100a10–b6).", "\nScholars have understandably queried what seems a casually asserted\npassage from the contingent, given in sense experience, to the\nnecessary, as required for the first principles of science. Perhaps,\nhowever, Aristotle simply envisages a kind of a posteriori\nnecessity for the sciences, including the natural sciences. In any\nevent, he thinks that we can and do have knowledge, so that somehow we\nbegin in sense perception and build up to an understanding of the\nnecessary and invariant features of the world. This is the knowledge\nfeatured in genuine science (epistêmê). In\nreflecting on the sort of progression Aristotle envisages, some\ncommentators have charged him with an epistemological optimism\nbordering on the naïve; others contend that it is rather the\ncharge of naïveté which is itself naïve, betraying as\nit does an unargued and untenable alignment of the necessary and\nthe a\n priori.[7]" ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Science" }, { "content": [ "\n\n \nNot all rigorous reasoning qualifies as scientific. Indeed,\nlittle of Aristotle’s extant writing conforms to the demands for\nscientific presentation laid down in the Posterior\nAnalytics. As he recognizes, we often find ourselves\nreasoning from premises which have the status of endoxa,\nopinions widely believed or endorsed by the wise, even though they are\nnot known to be necessary. Still less often do we reason having\nfirst secured the first principles of our domain of inquiry. So,\nwe need some ‘method by which we will be able to reason\ndeductively about any matter proposed to us on the basis of\nendoxa, and to give an account of ourselves [when we are under\nexamination by an interlocutor] without lapsing into\ncontradiction’ (Top. 100a18–20). This method\nhe characterizes as dialectic. ", "\n\n \nThe suggestion that we often use dialectic when engaged in\nphilosophical exchange reflects Aristotle’s supposition that\nthere are two sorts of dialectic: one negative, or destructive, and the\nother positive, or constructive. In fact, in his work dedicated\nto dialectic, the Topics, he identifies three roles for\ndialectic in intellectual inquiry, the first of which is mainly\npreparatory:", "\n\nDialectic is useful for three purposes: for training, for\nconversational exchange, and for sciences of a philosophical\nsort. That it is useful for training purposes is directly evident\non the basis of these considerations: once we have a direction for our\ninquiry we will more readily be able to engage a subject proposed to\nus. It is useful for conversational exchange because once we have\nenumerated the beliefs of the many, we shall engage them not on the\nbasis of the convictions of others but on the basis of their own; and\nwe shall re-orient them whenever they appear to have said something\nincorrect to us. It is useful for philosophical sorts of sciences\nbecause when we are able to run through the puzzles on both sides of an\nissue we more readily perceive what is true and what is false. \nFurther, it is useful for uncovering what is primary among the\ncommitments of a science. For it is impossible to say anything\nregarding the first principles of a science on the basis of the first\nprinciples proper to the very science under discussion, since among all\nthe commitments of a science, the first principles are the primary\nones. This comes rather, necessarily, from discussion of the\ncredible beliefs (endoxa) belonging to the science. This\nis peculiar to dialectic, or is at least most proper to it. For\nsince it is what cross-examines, dialectic contains the way to the\nfirst principles of all inquiries. (Top. 101a26–b4)", "\n\nThe first two of the three forms of dialectic identified by Aristotle\nare rather limited in scope. By contrast, the third is philosophically\nsignificant.", "\n\n \nIn its third guise, dialectic has a role to play in ‘science\nconducted in a philosophical manner’ (pros tas kata\nphilosphian epistêmas; Top. 101a27–28, 101a34),\nwhere this sort of science includes what we actually find him pursuing\nin his major philosophical treatises. In these contexts,\ndialectic helps to sort the endoxa, relegating some to a\ndisputed status while elevating others; it submits endoxa to\ncross-examination in order to test their staying power; and, most\nnotably, according to Aristotle, dialectic puts us on the road to first\nprinciples (Top. 100a18–b4). If that is so, then\ndialectic plays a significant role in the order of philosophical\ndiscovery: we come to establish first principles in part by determining\nwhich among our initial endoxa withstand sustained\nscrutiny. Here, as elsewhere in his philosophy, Aristotle evinces\na noteworthy confidence in the powers of human reason and\ninvestigation." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Dialectic" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n \nHowever we arrive at secure principles in philosophy and science,\nwhether by some process leading to a rational grasping of necessary\ntruths, or by sustained dialectical investigation operating over\njudiciously selected endoxa, it does turn out, according to\nAristotle, that we can uncover and come to know genuinely necessary\nfeatures of reality. Such features, suggests Aristotle, are those\ncaptured in the essence-specifying definitions used in science (again\nin the broad sense of epistêmê). ", "\n\n \nAristotle’s commitment to essentialism runs deep. He\nrelies upon a host of loosely related locutions when discussing the\nessences of things, and these give some clue to his general\norientation. Among the locutions one finds rendered as\nessence in contemporary translations of Aristotle into English\nare: (i) to ti esti (the what it is); (ii) to einai\n(being); (iii) ousia (being); (iv) hoper esti (precisely\nwhat something is) and, most importantly, (v) to ti ên\neinai (the what it was to be) (APo 83a7; Top.\n141b35; Phys. 190a17, 201a18–21; Gen. et Corr. 319b4;\nDA 424a25, 429b10; Met. 1003b24, 1006a32, 1006b13;\nEN 1102a30, 1130a12–13). Among these, the last locution\n(v) requires explication both because it is the most peculiar and\nbecause it is Aristotle’s favored technical term for\nessence. It is an abbreviated way of saying ‘that which it\nwas for an instance of kind K to be an instance of kind\nK,’ for instance ‘that which it was (all along)\nfor a human being to be a human being’. In speaking this\nway, Aristotle supposes that if we wish to know what a human being is,\nwe cannot identify transient or non-universal features of that kind;\nnor indeed can we identify even universal features which do not run\nexplanatorily deep. Rather, as his preferred locution indicates,\nhe is interested in what makes a human being human—and he\nassumes, first, that there is some feature F which all and only humans\nhave in common and, second, that F explains the other features which we\nfind across the range of humans. ", "\n\n \nImportantly, this second feature of Aristotelian essentialism\ndifferentiates his approach from the now more common modal approach,\naccording to\n which:[8]", "\n\nF is an essential property of\nx =df if x loses F,\nthen x ceases to exist.\n\n", "\n\nAristotle rejects this approach for several reasons, including most\nnotably that he thinks that certain non-essential features satisfy the\ndefinition. Thus, beyond the categorical and logical features\n(everyone is such as to be either identical or not identical with the\nnumber nine), Aristotle recognizes a category of properties which he\ncalls idia (Cat. 3a21, 4a10; Top. 102a18–30,\n134a5–135b6), now usually known by their Medieval Latin rendering\npropria. Propria are non-essential properties which flow\nfrom the essence of a kind, such that they are necessary to that kind\neven without being essential. For instance, if we suppose that\nbeing rational is essential to human beings, then it will\nfollow that every human being is capable of grammar. \nBeing capable of grammar is not the same property as being rational,\nthough it follows from it. Aristotle assumes his readers will\nappreciate that being rational asymmetrically explains\nbeing capable of grammar, even though, necessarily, something\nis rational if and only if it is also capable of grammar. Thus,\nbecause it is explanatorily prior, being rational has a better\nclaim to being the essence of human beings than does being capable\nof grammar. Consequently, Aristotle’s\nessentialism is more fine-grained than mere modal essentialism. \nAristotelian essentialism holds:", "\n\nF is an essential property of x =df (i) if\nx loses F, then x ceases to exist; and\n(ii) F is in an objective sense an explanatorily basic\nfeature of x.\n\n", "\n\n In sum, in Aristotle’s approach, what it is to be, for\ninstance, a human being is just what it always has been and always will\nbe, namely being rational. Accordingly, this is\nthe feature to be captured in an essence-specifying account of human\nbeings (APo 75a42–b2; Met. 103b1–2, 1041a25–32).", "\n\n \nAristotle believes for a broad range of cases that kinds have essences\ndiscoverable by diligent research. He in fact does not devote\nmuch energy to arguing for this contention; still less is he inclined\nto expend energy combating anti-realist challenges to essentialism,\nperhaps in part because he is impressed by the deep regularities he\nfinds, or thinks he finds, underwriting his results in biological\n investigation.[9] \n Still, he cannot be accused of profligacy regarding the prospects\nof essentialism. ", "\n\nOn the contrary, he denies essentialism in many cases where others\nare prepared to embrace it. One finds this sort of denial\nprominently, though not exclusively, in his criticism of Plato. \nIndeed, it becomes a signature criticism of Plato and Platonists for\nAristotle that many of their preferred examples of sameness and\ninvariance in the world are actually cases of multivocity, or\nhomonymy in his technical terminology. In the opening of the\nCategories, Aristotle distinguishes between synonymy\nand homonymy (later called univocity and\nmultivocity). His preferred phrase for multivocity,\nwhich is extremely common in his writings, is ‘being spoken\nof in many ways’, or, more simply, ‘multiply meant’\n(pollachôs legomenon). All these locutions have a\nquasi-technical status for him. The least complex is\nunivocity:", "\n\na and b are univocally F iff (i)\na is F, (ii) b is F, and (iii) the\naccounts of\nF-ness in ‘a is F’ and\n‘b is F’ are the same.\n\n", "\n\nThus, for instance, since the accounts of ‘human’ in\n‘Socrates is human’ and ‘Plato is human’ will\nbe the same, ‘human’ is univocal or synonymous in these\napplications. (Note that Aristotle’s notion of the word ‘synonymy’ is\nnot the same as the contemporary English usage where it applies to\ndifferent words with the same meaning.) In cases of\nunivocity, we expect single, non-disjunctive definitions which capture\nand state the essence of the kinds in question. Let us allow once\nmore for purposes of illustration that the essence-specifying\ndefinition of human is rational animal. Then,\nsince human means rational animal across the range of\nits applications, there is some single essence to all members of the\nkind.", "\n\n \nBy contrast, when synonymy fails we have homonymy. According to\nAristotle:", "\n\na and b are homonymously F iff (i)\na is F, (ii) b is F, (iii) the\naccounts of F-ness in ‘a is F’\nand ‘b is F’ do not completely\noverlap.\n\n", "\n\nTo take an easy example without philosophical significance,\nbank is homonymous in ‘Socrates and Alcibiades had a\npicnic on the bank’ and ‘Socrates and Alcibiades opened a\njoint account at the bank.’ This case is illustrative, if\nuninteresting, because the accounts of bank in these\noccurrences have nothing whatsoever in common. Part of the philosophical \ninterest in Aristotle’s account of homonymy resides in its\nallowing partial overlap. Matters become more interesting if we\nexamine whether—to use an illustration well suited to\nAristotle’s purposes but left largely unexplored by\nhim—conscious is synonymous across ‘Charlene was\nconscious of some awkwardness created by her remarks’ and\n‘Higher vertebrates, unlike mollusks, are conscious.’ \nIn these instances, the situation with respect to synonymy or homonymy\nis perhaps not immediately clear, and so requires reflection and\nphilosophical investigation. ", "\n\n \nVery regularly, according to Aristotle, this sort of reflection leads\nto an interesting discovery, namely that we have been presuming a\nunivocal account where in fact none is forthcoming. This,\naccording to Aristotle, is where the Platonists go wrong: they presume\nunivocity where the world delivers homonymy or multivocity. (For\na vivid illustration of Plato’s univocity assumption at work, see\nMeno 71e1–72a5, where Socrates insists that there is but one\nkind of excellence (aretê) common to all kinds\nof excellent people, not a separate sort for men, women, slaves,\nchildren, and so on.) In one especially important example,\nAristotle parts company with Plato over the univocity of goodness:", "\n\nWe had perhaps better consider the universal good and run through\nthe puzzles concerning what is meant by it—even though this sort\nof investigation is unwelcome to us, because those who introduced the\nForms are friends of ours. Yet presumably it would be the better\ncourse to destroy even what is close to us, as something necessary for\npreserving the truth—and all the more so, given that we are\nphilosophers. For though we love them both, piety bids us to\nhonour the truth before our friends. (EN\n1096a11–16) ", "\n\nAristotle counters that Plato is wrong to assume that goodness is\n‘something universal, common to all good things, and\nsingle’ (EN 1096a28). Rather, goodness is different in\ndifferent cases. If he is right about this, far-reaching consequences\nregarding ethical theory and practice follow.", "\n\n \nTo establish non-univocity, Aristotle’s appeals to a variety of\ntests in his Topics where, again, his idiom is linguistic but\nhis quarry is metaphysical. Consider the following sentences:", "\n\nAmong the tests for non-univocity recommended in the Topics\nis a simple paraphrase test: if paraphrases yield distinct,\nnon-interchangeable accounts, then the predicate is\nmultivocal. So, for example, suitable paraphrases might\nbe:", "\n\nSince we cannot interchange these paraphrases—we cannot say,\nfor instance, that crème brûlée is a just social\nsystem—good must be non-univocal across this range of\napplications. If that is correct, then Platonists are wrong to\nassume univocity in this case, since goodness exhibits complexity\nignored by their assumption.", "\n\n \nSo far, then, Aristotle’s appeals to homonymy or multivocity are\nprimarily destructive, in the sense that they attempt to undermine a\nPlatonic presumption regarded by Aristotle as unsustainable. \nImportantly, just as Aristotle sees a positive as well as a negative\nrole for dialectic in philosophy, so he envisages in addition to its\ndestructive applications a philosophically constructive role for\nhomonymy. To appreciate his basic idea, it serves to reflect upon a\ncontinuum of positions in philosophical analysis ranging from pure\nPlatonic univocity to disaggregated Wittgensteinean family\nresemblance. One might in the face of a successful challenge to\nPlatonic univocity assume that, for instance, the various cases of\ngoodness have nothing in common across all cases, so that good things\nform at best a motley kind, of the sort championed by Wittgensteineans\nenamored of the metaphor of family resemblances: all good things belong\nto a kind only in the limited sense that they manifest a tapestry of\npartially overlapping properties, as every member of a single family is\nunmistakably a member of that family even though there is no one\nphysical attribute shared by all of those family members. ", "\n\n \nAristotle insists that there is a tertium quid between family\nresemblance and pure univocity: he identifies, and trumpets, a kind of\ncore-dependent homonymy (also referred to in the literature,\nwith varying degrees of accuracy, as focal meaning and\nfocal\n connexion).[10] \n Core-dependent homonyms exhibit a kind\nof order in multiplicity: although shy of univocity, because\nhomonymous, such concepts do not devolve into patchwork family\nresemblances either. To rely upon one of Aristotle’s own\nfavorite illustrations, consider:", "\n\nAristotle assumes that his readers will immediately appreciate two\nfeatures of these three predications of healthy. First,\nthey are non-univocal, since the second is paraphraseable roughly as\npromotes health and the third as is indicative of\nhealth, whereas the first means, rather, something more\nfundamental, like is sound of body or is functioning\nwell. Hence, healthy is non-univocal. Second,\neven so, the last two predications rely upon the first for their\nelucidations: each appeals to health in its core sense in an\nasymmetrical way. That is, any account of each of the latter two\npredications must allude to the first, whereas an account of\nthe first makes no reference to the second or third in its\naccount. So, suggests Aristotle, health is not only a\nhomonym, but a core-dependent homonym: while not univocal\nneither is it a case of rank multivocity. ", "\n\n \nAristotle’s illustration does succeed in showing that there is\nconceptual space between mere family resemblance and pure\nunivocity. So, he is right that these are not exhaustive\noptions. The interest in this sort of result resides in its\nexportability to richer, if more abstract philosophical concepts. \nAristotle appeals to homonymy frequently, across a full range of\nphilosophical concepts including justice, causation,\nlove, life, sameness, goodness, and\nbody. His most celebrated appeal to core-dependent homonymy\ncomes in the case of a concept so highly abstract that it is difficult\nto gauge his success without extended metaphysical reflection. This is\nhis appeal to the core-dependent homonymy of being, which has\ninspired both philosophical and scholarly\ncontroversy.[11]\nAristotle denies that there could be a science of being, on the\ngrounds that there is no single genus being under which all\nand only beings fall (SE 11\n172a13–15–15; APr. 92b14; Met. B 3,\n998b22; EE i 8, 1217b33–35). One motivation for his\nreasoning this way may be that he regards the notion of a genus as\n ineliminably taxonomical and contrastive,[12] \n so that it makes ready sense to speak of\na genus of being only if one can equally well speak of a genus of\nnon-being—just as among living beings one can speak of the\nanimals and the non-animals, viz. the plant kingdom. Since there are\nno non-beings, there accordingly can be no genus of non-being, and so,\nultimately, no genus of being either. Consequently, since each\nscience studies one essential kind arrayed under a single genus, there\ncan be no science of being either.", "\n\n \nSubsequently, without expressly reversing his judgment about the\nexistence of a science of being, Aristotle announces that there is\nnonetheless a science of being qua being (Met. iv 4),\nfirst philosophy, which takes as its subject matter beings insofar as\nthey are beings and thus considers all and only those features\npertaining to beings as such—to beings, that is, not insofar as\nthey are mathematical or physical or human beings, but insofar as they\nare beings, full stop. Although the matter is disputed, his\nrecognition of this science evidently turns crucially on his commitment\nto the core-dependent homonymy of being\n itself.[13] \n Although the case is not\nas clear and uncontroversial as Aristotle’s relatively easy\nappeal to health (which is why, after all, he selected it as\nan illustration), we are supposed to be able upon reflection to detect\nan analogous core-dependence in the following instances of\nexists:", "\n\nOf course, the last three items on this list are rather awkward\nlocutions, but this is because they strive to make explicit that we can\nspeak of dependent beings as existing if we wish to do so—but\nonly because of their dependence upon the core instance of being,\nnamely substance. (Here it is noteworthy that ‘primary\nsubstance’ is the conventional and not very happy rendering of\nAristotle’s protê ousia in Greek, which\nmeans, more literally, ‘primary\n being’).[14] \n According to this\napproach, we would not have Socrates’ weighing anything at all or\nfeeling any way today were it not for the prior fact of his\nexistence. So, exists in the first instance serves as\nthe core instance of being, in terms of which the others are to be\nexplicated. If this is correct, then, implies Aristotle,\nbeing is a core-dependent homonym; further, a science of\nbeing—or, rather, a science of being qua\nbeing—becomes possible, even though there is no genus of being,\nsince it is finally possible to study all beings insofar as they are\nrelated to the core instance of being, and then also to study that\ncore instance, namely substance, insofar as it serves as the prime\noccasion of being." ], "section_title": "5. Essentialism and Homonymy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nIn speaking of beings which depend upon substance for their existence,\nAristotle implicitly appeals to a foundational philosophical commitment\nwhich appears early in his thought and remains stable throughout his\nentire philosophical career: his theory of categories. In what is\nusually regarded as an early work, The Categories, Aristotle\nrather abruptly announces:", "\n\nOf things said without combination, each signifies either: (i) a\nsubstance (ousia); (ii) a quantity; (iii) a quality; (iv) a\nrelative; (v) where; (vi) when; (vii) being in a position; (viii)\nhaving; (ix) acting upon; or (x) a being affected. (Cat.\n1b25–27)", "\n\nAristotle does little to frame his theory of categories, offering no\nexplicit derivation of it, nor even specifying overtly what his theory\nof categories categorizes. If librarians categorize books and\nbotanists categorize plants, then what does the philosophical category\ntheorist categorize? ", "\n\n \nAristotle does not say explicitly, but his examples make reasonably\nclear that he means to categorize the basic kinds of beings there may\nbe. If we again take some clues from linguistic data, without\ninferring that the ultimate objects of categorization are themselves\nlinguistic, we can contrast things said “with\ncombination”:", "\n\nwith things said ‘without combination’:", "\n\n‘Man runs’ is truth-evaluable, whereas neither \n‘man’ nor ‘runs’ is. Aristotle says that\nthings of this sort signify entities, evidently\nextra-linguistic entities, which are thus, correlatively, in the first\ncase sufficiently complex to be what makes the sentence ‘Man\nruns’ true, that is a man running, and in the second,\nitems below the level of truth-making, so, e.g., an entity a man,\ntaken by itself, and an action running, taken by itself. \nIf that is correct, the entities categorized by the categories are the\nsorts of basic beings that fall below the level of truth-makers, or\nfacts. Such beings evidently contribute, so to speak, to the\nfacticity of facts, just as, in their linguistic analogues, nouns and\nverbs, things said ‘without combination’, contribute to the\ntruth-evaluability of simple assertions. The constituents of\nfacts contribute to facts as the semantically relevant parts of a\nproposition contribute to its having the truth conditions it has. \nThus, the items categorized in Aristotle’s categories are the\nconstituents of facts. If it is a fact that Socrates is\npale, then the basic beings in view are Socrates and\nbeing pale. In Aristotle’s terms, the first\nis a substance and the second is a quality. ", "\n\nImportantly, these beings may be basic without being\nabsolutely simple. After all, Socrates is made up of all\nmanner of parts—arms and legs, organs and bones, molecules and\natoms, and so on down. As a useful linguistic analogue, we may\nconsider phonemes, which are basic, relative to the morphemes\nof a linguistic theory, and yet also complex, since they are made up of\nsimpler sound components, which are irrelevant from the\nlinguist’s point of view because of their lying beneath the level\nof semantic relevance. ", "\n\n \nThe theory of categories in total recognizes ten sorts of\nextra-linguistic basic beings:", "\n\nAlthough he does not say so overtly in the Categories,\nAristotle evidently presumes that these ten categories of being are\nboth exhaustive and irreducible, so that while there are no other\nbasic beings, it is not possible to eliminate any one of these\ncategories in favor of another.", "\n\n \nBoth claims have come in for criticism, and each surely\n requires\n defense.[15]\nAristotle offers neither conviction a defense in his\nCategories. Nor, indeed, does he offer any principled\ngrounding for just these categories of being, a circumstance which has\nleft him open to further criticism from later philosophers, including\nfamously Kant who, after lauding Aristotle for coming up with the idea\nof category theory, proceeds to excoriate him for selecting his\nparticular categories on no principled basis whatsoever. Kant\nalleges that Aristotle picked his categories of being just as he\nhappened to stumble upon them in his reveries (Critique of Pure\nReason, A81/B107). According to Kant, then,\nAristotle’s categories are ungrounded. \nPhilosophers and scholars both before and after Kant have sought to\nprovide the needed grounding, whereas Aristotle himself mainly tends to\njustify the theory of categories by putting it to work in his various\nphilosophical investigations.", "\n\n \nWe have already implicitly encountered in passing two of\nAristotle’s appeals to category theory: (i) in his approach to\ntime, which he comes to treat as a non-substantial being; and (ii) in his\ncommitment to the core-dependent homonymy of being, which introduces\nsome rather more contentious considerations. These may be\nrevisited briefly to illustrate how Aristotle thinks that his doctrine\nof categories provides philosophical guidance where it is most\nneeded.", "\n\nThinking first of time and its various puzzles, or aporiai,\nwe saw that Aristotle poses a simple question: does time exist? \nHe answers this question in the affirmative, but only because in the\nend he treats it as a categorically circumscribed question. \nHe claims that ‘time is the measure of motion with respect to the\nbefore and after’ (Phys. 219b1–2). By\noffering this definition, Aristotle is able to advance the judgment\nthat time does exist, because it is an entity in the category of\nquantity: time is to motion or change as length is to a line. \nTime thus exists, but like all items in any non-substance category, it\nexists in a dependent sort of way. Just as if there were no lines\nthere would be no length, so if there were no change there would be no\ntime. Now, this feature of Aristotle’s theory of time has\noccasioned both critical and favorable\n reactions.[16] \n In the present context,\nhowever, it is important only that it serves to demonstrate how\nAristotle handles questions of existence: they are, at root, questions\nabout category membership. A question as to whether, e.g.,\nuniversals or places or relations exist, is ultimately, for Aristotle,\nalso a question concerning their category of being, if any.", "\n\n \nAs time is a dependent entity in Aristotle’s theory, so too are\nall entities in categories outside of substance. This helps\nexplain why Aristotle thinks it appropriate to deploy his apparatus of\ncore-dependent homonymy in the case of being. If we ask\nwhether qualities or quantities exist, Aristotle will answer in the\naffirmative, but then point out also that as dependent entities they do\nnot exist in the independent manner of substances. Thus, even in\nthe relatively rarified case of being, the theory of\ncategories provides a reason for uncovering core-dependent\nhomonymy. Since all other categories of being depend upon\nsubstance, it should be the case that an analysis of any one of them\nwill ultimately make asymmetrical reference to substance. Aristotle\ncontends in his Categories, relying on a distinction that\ntracks essential (said-of) and accidental (in)\npredication, that:", "\n\nAll other things are either said-of primary\nsubstances, which are their subjects, or are in them as\nsubjects. Hence, if there were no primary substances, it would be\nimpossible for anything else to exist. (Cat. 2b5–6)\n ", "\n\nIf this is so, then, Aristotle infers, all the non-substance\ncategories rely upon substance as the core of their being. So, he\nconcludes, being qualifies as a case of core-dependent homonymy.", "\n\n \nNow, one may challenge Aristotle’s contentions here, first by\nquerying whether he has established the non-univocity of being\nbefore proceeding to argue for its core-dependence. Be that as it\nmay, if we allow its non-univocity, then, according to Aristotle, the\napparatus of the categories provides ample reason to conclude that\nbeing qualifies as a philosophically significant instance of\ncore-dependent homonymy.", "\n\n \nIn this way, Aristotle’s philosophy of being and substance, like\nmuch else in his philosophy, relies upon an antecedent commitment to\nhis theory of categories. Indeed, the theory of categories\nspans his entire career and serves as a kind of scaffolding for much of\nhis philosophical theorizing, ranging from metaphysics and philosophy\nof nature to psychology and value theory. ", "\n\n \nFor this reason, questions regarding the ultimate tenability of\nAristotle’s doctrine of categories take on a special urgency for\nevaluating much of his philosophy. ", "\n\nFor more detail on the theory of categories and its grounding,\n see the entry on \n Aristotle’s Categories." ], "section_title": "6. Category Theory", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nEqually central to Aristotle’s thought is his four-causal\nexplanatory scheme. Judged in terms of its influence, this\ndoctrine is surely one of his most significant philosophical\ncontributions. Like other philosophers, Aristotle expects the\nexplanations he seeks in philosophy and science to meet certain\ncriteria of adequacy. Unlike some other philosophers, however, he\ntakes care to state his criteria for adequacy explicitly; then, having\ndone so, he finds frequent fault with his predecessors for failing to\nmeet its terms. He states his scheme in a methodological passage\nin the second book of his Physics:", "\n \n One way in which cause is spoken of is that out of which a thing\ncomes to be and which persists, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the\nsilver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver\nare species.\n\n \n In another way cause is spoken of as the form or the pattern, i.e.\nwhat is mentioned in the account (logos) belonging to the\nessence and its genera, e.g. the cause of an octave is a ratio of 2:1,\nor number more generally, as well as the parts mentioned in the account\n(logos).\n\n \n Further, the primary source of the change and rest is spoken of as a\ncause, e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause, the father is the cause\nof the child, and generally the maker is the cause of what is made and\nwhat brings about change is a cause of what is changed.\n\n \n Further, the end (telos) is spoken of as a cause. \nThis is that for the sake of which (hou heneka) a\nthing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. \n‘Why is he walking about?’ We say: ‘To be\nhealthy’—and, having said that, we think we have indicated\nthe cause.\n\n (Phys. 194b23–35)\n\n", "\n\nAlthough some of Aristotle’s illustrations are not immediately\npellucid, his approach to explanation is reasonably\nstraightforward.", "\n\nAristotle’s attitude towards explanation is best understood\nfirst by considering a simple example he proposes in Physics\nii 3. A bronze statue admits of various different dimensions of\nexplanation. If we were to confront a statue without first\nrecognizing what it was, we would, thinks Aristotle, spontaneously ask\na series of questions about it. We would wish to know what it\nis, what it is made of, what brought it about,\nandwhat it is for. In Aristotle’s terms, in\nasking these questions we are seeking knowledge of the statue’s\nfour causes (aitia): the formal, material, efficient,\nand final. According to Aristotle, when we have\nidentified these four causes, we have satisfied a reasonable demand for\nexplanatory adequacy. ", "\n\nMore fully, the four-causal account of explanatory adequacy requires\nan investigator to cite these four causes:", "\n\nIn Physics ii 3, Aristotle makes twin claims about this\nfour-causal schema: (i) that citing all four causes is\nnecessary for adequacy in explanation; and (ii) that these\nfour causes are sufficient for adequacy in explanation. \nEach of these claims requires some elaboration and also some\nqualification. ", "\n\n \nAs for the necessity claim, Aristotle does not suppose that all\nphenomena admit of all four causes. Thus, for example,\ncoincidences lack final causes, since they do not occur for the sake of\nanything; that is, after all, what makes them coincidences. \nIf a debtor is on his way to the market to buy milk and she runs into\nher creditor, who is on his way to the same market to buy bread, then\nshe may agree to pay the money owed immediately. Although\nresulting in a wanted outcome, their meeting was not for the sake of\nsettling the debt; nor indeed was it for the sake of anything at\nall. It was a simple co-incidence. Hence, it lacks a final\ncause. Similarly, if we think that there are mathematical or\ngeometrical abstractions, for instance a triangle existing as an object\nof thought independent of any material realization, then the triangle\nwill trivially lack a material\n cause.[17] \n Still, these significant exceptions\naside, Aristotle expects the vast majority of explanations to conform\nto his four-causal schema. In non-exceptional cases, a failure to\nspecify all four of causes, is, he maintains, a failure in explanatory\nadequacy.", "\n\n \nThe sufficiency claim is exceptionless, though it may yet be misleading\nif one pertinent issue is left unremarked. In providing his\nillustration of the material cause Aristotle first cites the bronze of\na statue and the silver of a bowl, and then mentions also ‘the\ngenera of which the bronze and the silver are species’\n(Phys. 194b25–27). By this he means the types of metal\nto which silver and bronze belong, or more generally still, simply\nmetal. That is, one might specify the material cause of\na statue more or less proximately, by specifying the character of the\nmatter more or less precisely. Hence, when he implies that citing\nall four causes is sufficient for explanation, Aristotle does not\nintend to suggest that a citation at any level of generality\nsuffices. He means to insist rather that there is no fifth kind\nof cause, that his preferred four cases subsume all kinds of\ncause. He does not argue for this conclusion fully, though he\ndoes challenge his readers to identify a kind of cause which qualifies\nas a sort distinct from the four mentioned (Phys.\n195a4–5). ", "\n\n \nSo far, then, Aristotle’s four causal schema has whatever\nintuitive plausibility his illustrations may afford it. He does\nnot rest content there, however. Instead, he thinks he can argue\nforcefully for the four causes as real explanatory factors, that is, as\nfeatures which must be cited not merely because they make for\nsatisfying explanations, but because they are genuinely operative\ncausal factors, the omission of which renders any putative explanation\nobjectively incomplete and so inadequate. ", "\n\n \nIt should be noted that Aristotle’s arguments for the four causes\ntaken individually all proceed against the backdrop of the general\nconnection he forges between causal explanation and knowledge. Because\nhe thinks that the four aitia feature in answers to\nknowledge-seeking questions (Phys. 194b18; A Po. 71 b\n9–11, 94 a 20), some scholars have come to understand them more as\nbecauses than as causes—that is, as\nexplanations rather than as causes narrowly\n construed.[18] \n Most such judgments\nreflect an antecedent commitment to one or another view of causation\nand explanation—that causation relates events rather than\npropositions; that explanations are inquiry-relative; that causation is\nextensional and explanation intensional; that explanations must adhere\nto some manner of nomic-deductive model, whereas causes need not; or\nthat causes must be prior in time to their effects, while explanations,\nespecially intentional explanations, may appeal to states of affairs\nposterior in time to the actions they explain. ", "\n\nGenerally, Aristotle does not respect these sorts of\ncommitments. Thus, to the extent that they are defensible, his\napproach to aitia may be regarded as blurring the canons of\ncausation and explanation. It should certainly not, however, be\nceded up front that Aristotle is guilty of any such conflation, or even\nthat scholars who render his account of the four aitia in\ncausal terms have failed to come to grips with developments in causal\ntheory in the wake of Hume. Rather, because of the lack of\nuniformity in contemporary accounts of causation and explanation, and a\npersistent and justifiable tendency to regard causal explanations as\nfoundational relative to other sorts of explanations, we may\nlegitimately wonder whether Aristotle’s conception of the four\naitia is in any significant way discontinuous with later,\nHumean-inspired approaches, and then again, to the degree that it is,\nwhether Aristotle’s approach suffers for the comparison. Be that\nas it may, we will do well when considering Aristotle’s defense\nof his four aitia to bear in mind that controversy surrounds\nhow best to construe his knowledge-driven approach to causation and\nexplanation relative to some later approaches. ", "\n\nFor more on the four causes in general, see the entry on\n Aristotle on Causality." ], "section_title": "7. The Four Causal Account of Explanatory Adequacy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nCentral to Aristotle’s four-causal account of explanatory\nadequacy are the notions of matter (hulê) and\nform (eidos or morphê). Together, they\nconstitute one of his most fundamental philosophical commitments, to\nhylomorphism:", "\n\nThe appeal in this definition to ‘ordinary objects’\nrequires reflection, but as a first approximation, it serves to rely on\nthe sorts of examples Aristotle himself employs when motivating\nhylomorphism: statues and houses, horses and humans. In general,\nwe may focus on artefacts and familiar living beings. \nHylomorphism holds that no such object is metaphysically simple, but\nrather comprises two distinct metaphysical elements, one formal and one\nmaterial.", "\n\n \nAristotle’s hylomorphism was formulated originally to handle\nvarious puzzles about change. Among the endoxa\nconfronting Aristotle in his Physics are some striking\nchallenges to the coherence of the very notion of change, owing to\n Parmenides\n and\n Zeno. \nAristotle’s initial impulse in the face of such challenges, as we\nhave seen, is to preserve the appearances (phainomena), to\nexplain how change is possible. Key to Aristotle’s response\nto the challenges bequeathed him is his insistence that all change\ninvolves at least two factors: something persisting and something\ngained or lost. Thus, when Socrates goes to the beach and comes\naway sun-tanned, something continues to exist, namely Socrates, even\nwhile something is lost, his pallor, and something else gained, his\ntan. This is a change in the category of quality, whence the\ncommon locution ‘qualitative change’. If he gains\nweight, then again something remains, Socrates, and something is gained,\nin this case a quantity of matter. Accordingly, in this instance we\nhave not a qualitative but a quantitative change. ", "\n\nIn general, argues Aristotle, in whatever category a change occurs,\nsomething is lost and something gained within that category,\neven while something else, a substance, remains in existence, as the\nsubject of that change. Of course, substances can come into or go out of\nexistence, in cases of\ngeneration or destruction; and these are changes in the category of\nsubstance. Evidently even in cases of change in this category, however,\nsomething persists. To take an example favourable to Aristotle,\nin the case of the generation of a statue, the bronze persists, but it\ncomes to acquire a new form, a substantial rather than accidental\nform. In all cases, whether substantial or accidental, the\ntwo-factor analysis obtains: something remains the same and something\nis gained or lost. ", "\n\n \nIn its most rudimentary formulation, hylomorphism simply labels each of\nthe two factors: what persists is matter and what is gained is\nform. Aristotle’s hylomorphism quickly becomes\nmuch more complex, however, as the notions of matter and form are\npressed into philosophical service. Importantly, matter and form\ncome to be paired with another fundamental distinction, that between\npotentiality and actuality. Again in the case\nof the generation of a statue, we may say that the bronze is\npotentially a statue, but that it is an actual statue\nwhen and only when it is informed with the form of a\nstatue. Of course, before being made into a statue, the\nbronze was also in potentiality a fair number of other\nartefacts—a cannon, a steam-engine, or a goal on a football\npitch. Still, it was not in potentiality butter or a beach\nball. This shows that potentiality is not the same as\npossibility: to say that x is potentially F is to say that\nx already has actual features in virtue of which it might be\nmade to be F by the imposition of a F form upon it. So, given\nthese various connections, it becomes possible to define form and\nmatter generically as", "\n\nOf course, these definitions are circular, but that is not in itself\na problem: actuality and potentiality are, for Aristotle, fundamental\nconcepts which admit of explication and description but do not admit of\nreductive analyses.", "\n\n \nEncapsulating Aristotle’s discussions of change in\nPhysics i 7 and 8, and putting the matter more crisply than he\nhimself does, we have the following simple argument for matter and\nform: (1) a necessary condition of there being change is the existence\nof matter and form; (2) there is change; hence (3) there are matter and\nform. The second premise is a phainomenon; so, if that\nis accepted without further defense, only the first requires\njustification. The first premise is justified by the thought that since\nthere is no generation ex nihilo, in every instance of change\nsomething persists while something else is gained or lost. In\nsubstantial generation or destruction, a substantial form is gained or\nlost; in mere accidental change, the form gained or lost is itself\naccidental. Since these two ways of changing exhaust the kinds of\nchange there are, in every instance of change there are two\nfactors present. These are matter and form.", "\n\n \nFor these reasons, Aristotle intends his hylomorphism to be much more\nthan a simple explanatory heuristic. On the contrary, he maintains,\nmatter and form are mind-independent features of the world and must,\ntherefore, be mentioned in any full explanation of its workings." ], "section_title": "8. Hylomorphism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nWe may mainly pass over as uncontroversial the suggestion that there\nare efficient causes in favor of the most controversial and difficult\nof Aristotle four causes, the final\n cause.[19] \n We should note before doing so, however, that Aristotle’s commitment\nto efficient causation does receive a defense in Aristotle’s preferred\nterminology; he thus does more than many other philosophers who take\nit as given that causes of an efficient sort are operative. Partly by\nway of criticizing Plato’s theory of Forms, which he regards as\ninadequate because of its inability to account for change and\ngeneration, Aristotle observes that nothing potential can bring itself\ninto actuality without the agency of an actually operative efficient\ncause. Since what is potential is always in potentiality relative to\nsome range of actualities, and nothing becomes actual of its own\naccord—no pile of bricks, for instance, spontaneously organizes\nitself into a house or a wall—an actually operative agent is\nrequired for every instance of change. This is the efficient\ncause. These sorts of considerations also incline Aristotle to speak\nof the priority of actuality over potentiality: potentialities are\nmade actual by actualities, and indeed are always potentialities for\nsome actuality or other. The operation of some actuality upon some\npotentiality is an instance of efficient causation.", "\nThat said, most of Aristotle’s readers do not find themselves in need\nof a defense of the existence of efficient causation. By contrast,\nmost think that Aristotle does need to provide a defense of final\ncausation. It is natural and easy for us to recognize final causal\nactivity in the products of human craft: computers and can-openers are\ndevices dedicated to the execution of certain tasks, and both their\nformal and material features will be explained by appeal to their\nfunctions. Nor is it a mystery where artefacts obtain their functions:\nwe give artefacts their functions. The ends of artefacts are the results of\nthe designing activities of intentional agents. Aristotle recognizes\nthese kinds of final causation, but also, and more problematically,\nenvisages a much greater role for teleology in natural explanation:\nnature exhibits teleology without design. He thinks, for instance,\nthat living organisms not only have parts which require teleological\nexplanation—that, for instance, kidneys are for\npurifying the blood and teeth are for tearing and chewing\nfood—but that whole organisms, human beings and other animals,\nalso have final causes. ", "\n\nCrucially, Aristotle denies overtly that the causes operative in\nnature are intention-dependent. He thinks, that is, that\norganisms have final causes, but that they did not come to have them by\ndint of the designing activities of some intentional agent or\nother. He thus denies that a necessary condition of\nx’s having a final cause is x’s being\ndesigned. ", "\n\nAlthough he has been persistently criticized for his commitment to\nsuch natural ends, Aristotle is not susceptible to a fair number of\nthe objections standardly made to his view. Indeed, it is evident\nthat whatever the merits of the most penetrating of such criticisms,\nmuch of the contumely directed at Aristotle is stunningly\n illiterate.[20] \n To take but one of any number of mind-numbing examples, the famous\nAmerican psychologist B. F. Skinner reveals that ‘Aristotle\nargued that a falling body accelerated because it grew more jubilant\nas it found itself nearer its home’ (1971, 6). To anyone who has\nactually read Aristotle, it is unsurprising that this ascription comes\nwithout an accompanying textual citation. For Aristotle, as Skinner\nwould portray him, rocks are conscious beings having end states which\nthey so delight in procuring that they accelerate themselves in\nexaltation as they grow ever closer to attaining them. There is no\nexcuse for this sort of intellectual slovenliness, when already by the\nlate-nineteenth century, the German scholar Zeller was able to say\nwith perfect accuracy that ‘The most important feature of the\nAristotelian teleology is the fact that it is neither anthropocentric\nnor is it due to the actions of a creator existing outside the world\nor even of a mere arranger of the world, but is always thought of as\nimmanent in nature’ (1883, §48).", "\n\n \nIndeed, it is hardly necessary to caricature Aristotle’s\nteleological commitments in order to bring them into critical\nfocus. In fact, Aristotle offers two sorts of defenses of\nnon-intentional teleology in nature, the first of which is replete with\ndifficulty. He claims in Physics ii 8:", "For these [viz. teeth and all other parts of natural\nbeings] and all other natural things come about as they do either\nalways or for the most part, whereas nothing which comes about due to\nchance or spontaneity comes about always or for the most part. \n… If, then, these are either the result of coincidence or for the\nsake of something, and they cannot be the result of coincidence or\nspontaneity, it follows that they must be for the sake of\nsomething. Moreover, even those making these sorts of claims\n[viz. that everything comes to be by necessity] will agree that such\nthings are natural. Therefore, that for the sake of which is\npresent among things which come to be and exist by nature.\n(Phys. 198b32–199a8)", "\n\nThe argument here, which has been variously formulated\n by\n scholars,[21]\nseems doubly problematic. ", "\n\n \nIn this argument Aristotle seems to introduce as a phainomenon\nthat nature exhibits regularity, so that the parts of nature come about\nin patterned and regular ways. Thus, for instance, humans\ntend to have teeth arranged in a predictable sort of way, with incisors\nin the front and molars in the back. He then seems to contend, as\nan exhaustive and exclusive disjunction, that things happen either by\nchance or for the sake of something, only to suggest, finally, that\nwhat is ‘always or for the most part’—what happens in\na patterned and predictable way—is not plausibly thought to be\ndue to chance. Hence, he concludes, whatever happens always or\nfor the most part must happen for the sake of something, and so must\nadmit of a teleological cause. Thus, teeth show up always or for\nthe most part with incisors in the front and molars in the back; since\nthis is a regular and predictable occurrence, it cannot be due to\nchance. Given that whatever is not due to chance has a final\ncause, teeth have a final cause.", "\n\n \nIf so much captures Aristotle’s dominant argument for teleology, then\nhis view is unmotivated. The argument is problematic in the first\ninstance because it assumes an exhaustive and exclusive disjunction\nbetween what is by chance and what is for the sake of something. But\nthere are obviously other possibilities. Hearts beat not in order to\nmake noise, but they do so always and not by chance. Second, and this\nis perplexing if we have represented him correctly, Aristotle is\nhimself aware of one sort of counterexample to this view and is indeed\nkeen to point it out himself: although, he insists, bile is regularly\nand predictably yellow, its being yellow is neither due simply to\nchance nor for the sake of anything. Aristotle in fact mentions many\nsuch counterexamples (Part. An. 676b16–677b10,\nGen. An. 778a29–b6). It seems to follow, then, short of\nascribing a straight contradiction to him, either that he is not\ncorrectly represented as we have interpreted this argument or that he\nsimply changed his mind about the grounds of teleology. Taking up\nthe first alternative, one possibility is that Aristotle is not really\ntrying to argue for teleology from the ground up in\nPhysics ii 8, but is taking it as already established that\nthere are teleological causes, and restricting himself to observing\nthat many natural phenomena, namely those which occur always or for the\nmost part, are good candidates for admitting of teleological\nexplanation.", "\n\n \nThat would leave open the possibility of a broader sort of motivation\nfor teleology, perhaps of the sort Aristotle offers elsewhere in the\nPhysics, when speaking about the impulse to find\nnon-intention-dependent teleological causes at work in nature:", "This is most obvious in the case of animals other than man:\nthey make things using neither craft nor on the basis of inquiry nor by\ndeliberation. This is in fact a source of puzzlement for those\nwho wonder whether it is by reason or by some other faculty that these\ncreatures work—spiders, ants and the like. Advancing bit by\nbit in this same direction it becomes apparent that even in plants\nfeatures conducive to an end occur—leaves, for example, grow in\norder to provide shade for the fruit. If then it is both by\nnature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider\nits web, and plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit and send\ntheir roots down rather than up for the sake of nourishment, it is\nplain that this kind of cause is operative in things which come to be\nand are by nature. And since nature is twofold, as matter and as\nform, the form is the end, and since all other things are for sake of\nthe end, the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake\nof which. (Phys. 199a20–32)", "\n\nAs Aristotle quite rightly observes in this passage, we find\nourselves regularly and easily speaking in teleological terms when\ncharacterizing non-human animals and plants. It is consistent\nwith our so speaking, of course, that all of our easy language in these\ncontexts is rather too easy: it is in fact lax and careless, because unwarrantedly\nanthropocentric. We might yet demand that all such language be\nassiduously reduced to some non-teleological idiom when we are being\nscientifically strict and empirically serious, though we would first\nneed to survey the explanatory costs and benefits of our attempting to\ndo so. Aristotle considers and rejects some views hostile to\nteleology in Physics ii 8 and Generation and\nCorruption\n i.[22] " ], "section_title": "9. Aristotelian Teleology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nOnce Aristotle has his four-causal explanatory schema fully on the\nscene, he relies upon it in virtually all of his most advanced\nphilosophical investigation. As he deploys it in various\nframeworks, we find him augmenting and refining the schema even as he\napplies it, sometimes with surprising results. One important\nquestion concerns how his hylomorphism intersects with the theory of\nsubstance advanced in the context of his theory of categories. \n", "\n\nAs we have seen, Aristotle insists upon the primacy of primary\nsubstance in his Categories. According to that work, however,\nstar instances of primary substance are familiar living beings like\nSocrates or an individual horse (Cat. 2a11014). Yet with the\nadvent of hylomorphism, these primary substances are revealed to be\nmetaphysical complexes: Socrates is a compound of matter and form. So,\nnow we have not one but three potential candidates for primary\nsubstance: form, matter, and the compound of matter and form. The\nquestion thus arises: which among them is the primary substance? Is\nit the matter, the form, or the compound? The compound corresponds to\na basic object of experience and seems to be a basic subject of\npredication: we say that Socrates lives in Athens, not that his matter\nlives in Athens. Still, matter underlies the compound and in this way\nseems a more basic subject than the compound, at least in the sense\nthat it can exist before and after it does. On the other hand, the\nmatter is nothing definite at all until enformed; so, perhaps form, as\ndetermining what the compound is, has the best claim on\nsubstantiality. ", "\n\n \nIn the middle books of his Metaphysics, which contain some of\nhis most complex and engaging investigations into basic being,\nAristotle settles on form (Met. vii 17). A\nquestion thus arises as to how form satisfies Aristotle’s final\ncriteria for substantiality. He expects a substance to be, as he says,\nsome particular thing (tode ti), but also to be something\nknowable, some essence or other. These criteria seem to pull in\ndifferent directions, the first in favor of particular substances, as\nthe primary substances of the Categories had been particulars,\nand the second in favor of universals as substances, because they alone\nare knowable. In the lively controversy surrounding these\nmatters, many scholars have concluded that Aristotle adopts a third way\nforward: form is both knowable and particular. This matter,\nhowever, remains very acutely\n disputed.[23] \n ", "\n\n \nVery briefly, and not engaging these controversies, it becomes clear\nthat Aristotle prefers form in virtue of its role in generation and\ndiachronic persistence. When a statue is generated, or when a new\nanimal comes into being, something persists, namely the matter, which\ncomes to realize the substantial form in question. Even so,\ninsists Aristotle, the matter does not by itself provide the identity\nconditions for the new substance. First, as we have seen, the\nmatter is merely potentially some F until such time as it is made\nactually F by the presence of an F form. Further, the matter can\nbe replenished, and is replenished in the case of all\norganisms, and so seems to be form-dependent for its own diachronic\nidentity conditions. For these reasons, Aristotle thinks of the\nform as prior to the matter, and thus more fundamental than the\nmatter. This sort of matter, the form-dependent matter, Aristotle\nregards as proximate matter (Met. 1038b6, 1042b10),\nthus extending the notion of matter beyond its original role as\nmetaphysical substrate. ", "\n\n \nFurther, in Metaphysics vii 17 Aristotle offers a suggestive\nargument to the effect that matter alone cannot be substance. Let the\nvarious bits of matter belonging to Socrates be labeled as a,\nb, c, …, n. Consistent with the\nnon-existence of Socrates is the existence\nof a, b, c, …, n, since\nthese elements exist when they are spread from here to Alpha Centauri,\nbut if that happens, of course, Socrates no longer exists. Heading in the\nother direction, Socrates can exist without just these elements, since\nhe may exist when some one of a, b, c,\n…, n is replaced or goes out of existence. So, in\naddition to his material elements, insists Aristotle, Socrates is also\nsomething else, something more (heteron ti; Met.\n1041b19–20). This something more is form, which is ‘not\nan element…but a primary cause of a thing’s being what it\nis’ (Met. 1041b28–30). The cause of a thing’s being\nthe actual thing it is, as we have seen, is form. Hence, concludes\nAristotle, as the source of being and unity, form is substance. ", "\n\nEven if this much is granted—and to repeat, much of what has\njust been said is unavoidably controversial—many questions\nremain. For example, is form best understood as universal or\nparticular? However that issue is to be resolved, what is the\nrelation of form to the compound and to matter? If form is\nsubstance, then what is the fate of these other two candidates? \nAre they also substances, if to a lesser degree? It seems odd to\nconclude that they are nothing at all, or that the compound in\nparticular is nothing in actuality; yet it is difficult to contend that\nthey might belong to some category other than substance. ", "\n\nFor an approach to some of these questions, see the entry on\n Aristotle’s Metaphysics.\n " ], "section_title": "10. Substance", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nHowever these and like issues are to be resolved, given the primacy of\nform as substance, it is unsurprising to find Aristotle identifying\nthe soul, which he introduces as a principle or source\n(archê) of all life, as the form of a living\ncompound. For Aristotle, in fact, all living things, and not only\nhuman beings, have souls: ‘what is ensouled is distinguished\nfrom what is unensouled by living’ (DA 431a20–22;\ncf. DA 412a13, 423a20–6; De Part. An.\n687a24–690a10; Met. 1075a16–25). It is\nappropriate, then, to treat all ensouled bodies in hylomorphic\nterms: ", "\n\nThe soul is the cause and source of the living body. But\ncause and source are meant in many ways [or are\nhomonymous]. Similarly, the soul is a cause in accordance\nwith the ways delineated, which are three: it is (i) the cause as the\nsource of motion [=the efficient cause], (ii) that for the sake of\nwhich [=the final cause], and (iii) as the substance of ensouled\nbodies. That it is a cause as substance is clear, for substance\nis the cause of being for all things, and for living things, being is\nlife, and the soul is also the cause and source of life. (DA\n415b8–14; cf. PN 467b12–25, Phys. 255a56–10) \n\n", "\n\nSo, the soul and body are simply special cases of form and\nmatter:", "\n\nsoul : body :: form : matter ::\nactuality : potentiality\n\n", "\n\nFurther, the soul, as the end of the compound organism, is also the\nfinal cause of the body. Minimally, this is to be understood as the\nview that any given body is the body that it is because it is\norganized around a function which serves to unify the entire\norganism. In this sense, the body’s unity derives from the fact it has\na single end, or single life directionality, a state of affairs that\nAristotle captures by characterizing the body as the sort of matter\nwhich is organic (organikon; DA 412a28). By\nthis he means that the body serves as a tool for implementing the\ncharacteristic life activities of the kind to which the organism\nbelongs (organon = tool in Greek). Taking all this\ntogether, Aristotle offers the view that the soul is the ‘first\nactuality of a natural organic body’ (DA\n412b5–6), that it is a ‘substance as form of a natural\nbody which has life in potentiality’ (DA \n412a20–1) and, again, that it ‘is a first actuality of a\nnatural body which has life in potentiality’ (DA \n412a27–8).", "\n\nAristotle contends that his hylomorphism provides an attractive middle\nway between what he sees as the mirroring excesses of his\npredecessors. In one direction, he means to reject Presocratic kinds\nof materialism; in the other, he opposes Platonic dualism. He gives\nthe Presocratics credit for identifying the material causes of life,\nbut then faults them for failing to grasp its formal cause. By\ncontrast, Plato earns praise for grasping the formal cause of life;\nunfortunately, as Aristotle sees things, he then proceeds to neglect\nthe material cause, and comes to believe that the soul can exist\nwithout its material basis. Hylomorphism, in Aristotle’s view,\ncaptures what is right in both camps while eschewing the unwarranted\nmono-dimensionality of each. To account for living organisms,\nAristotle contends, the natural scientist must attend to both matter\nand form.", "\n\nAristotle deploys hylomorphic analyses not only to the whole organism,\nbut to the individual faculties of the soul as well. Perception\ninvolves the reception of sensible forms without matter, and thinking,\nby analogy, consists in the mind’s being enformed by intelligible\nforms. With each of these extensions, Aristotle both expands and\ntaxes his basic hylomorphism, sometimes straining its basic framework\nalmost beyond recognition. ", "\n\n \nFor more detail on Aristotle’s hylomorphism in psychological\nexplanation, see the entry on \n Aristotle’s Psychology." ], "section_title": "11. Living Beings", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nAristotle’s basic teleological framework extends to his ethical\nand political theories, which he regards as complementing one\nanother. He takes it as given that most people wish to lead\ngood lives; the question then becomes what the best life for human\nbeings consists in. Because he believes that the best life for a\nhuman being is not a matter of subjective preference, he also believes\nthat people can (and, sadly, often do) choose to lead sub-optimal\nlives. In order to avoid such unhappy eventualities, Aristotle\nrecommends reflection on the criteria any successful candidate for the\nbest life must satisfy. He proceeds to propose one kind of life\nas meeting those criteria uniquely and therefore promotes it as the\nsuperior form of human life. This is a life lived in accordance with\nreason. ", "\n\nWhen stating the general criteria for the final good for human beings,\nAristotle invites his readers to review them (EN\n1094a22–27). This is advisable, since much of the work of\nsorting through candidate lives is in fact accomplished during the\nhigher-order task of determining the criteria appropriate to this\ntask. Once these are set, it becomes relatively straightforward for\nAristotle to dismiss some contenders, including for instance hedonism,\nthe perennially popular view that pleasure is the highest good for\nhuman beings. ", "\n\nAccording to the criteria advanced, the final good for human beings\nmust: (i) be pursued for its own sake (EN 1094a1); (ii) be\nsuch that we wish for other things for its sake (EN 1094a19);\n(iii) be such that we do not wish for it on account of other things\n(EN 1094a21); (iv) be complete (teleion), in the\nsense that it is always choiceworthy and always chosen for itself\n(EN 1097a26–33); and finally (v) be self-sufficient\n(autarkês), in the sense that its presence suffices to\nmake a life lacking in nothing (EN 1097b6–16). Plainly\nsome candidates for the best life fall down in the face of these\ncriteria. According to Aristotle, neither the life of pleasure nor the\nlife of honour satisfies them all.", "\n\n \nWhat does satisfy them all is happiness eudaimonia. Scholars in fact\ndispute whether eudaimonia is best rendered as\n‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’ or ‘living\nwell’ or simply transliterated and left an untranslated\n technical\n term.[24] \n If we have already determined that happiness is some sort of\nsubjective state, perhaps simple desire fulfillment, then\n‘happiness’ will indeed be an inappropriate translation:\neudaimonia is achieved, according to Aristotle, by fully\nrealizing our natures, by actualizing to the highest degree our human\ncapacities, and neither our nature nor our endowment of human\ncapacities is a matter of choice for us. Still, as Aristotle frankly\nacknowledges, people will consent without hesitation to the suggestion\nthat happiness is our best good—even while differing materially\nabout how they understand what happiness is. So, while seeming to\nagree, people in fact disagree about the human good. Consequently, it\nis necessary to reflect on the nature of happiness\n(eudaimonia): ", "\n\nBut perhaps saying that the highest good is happiness\n(eudaimonia) will appear to be a platitude and what is wanted\nis a much clearer expression of what this is. Perhaps this would come\nabout if the function (ergon) of a human being were\nidentified. For just as the good, and doing well, for a flute player,\na sculptor, and every sort of craftsman—and in general, for\nwhatever has a function and a characteristic action—seems to\ndepend upon function, so the same seems true for a human being, if\nindeed a human being has a function. Or do the carpenter and cobbler\nhave their functions, while a human being has none and is rather\nnaturally without a function (argon)? Or rather, just as\nthere seems to be some particular function for the eye and the hand\nand in general for each of the parts of a human being, should one in\nthe same way posit a particular function for the human being in\naddition to all these? Whatever might this be? For living is common\neven to plants, whereas something characteristic (idion) is\nwanted; so, one should set aside the life of nutrition and\ngrowth. Following that would be some sort of life of perception, yet\nthis is also common, to the horse and the bull and to every\nanimal. What remains, therefore, is a life of action belonging to the\nkind of soul that has reason. (EN\n1097b22–1098a4)", "\n\nIn determining what eudaimonia consists in, Aristotle makes a crucial\nappeal to the human function (ergon), and thus to his\noverarching teleological framework. ", "\n\nHe thinks that he can identify the human function in terms of\nreason, which then provides ample grounds for characterizing the happy\nlife as involving centrally the exercise of reason, whether practical\nor theoretical. Happiness turns out to be an activity of the\nrational soul, conducted in accordance with virtue or excellence, or,\nin what comes to the same thing, in rational activity executed\nexcellently (EN 1098a161–17). It bears noting in\nthis regard that Aristotle’s word for virtue,\naretê, is broader than the dominant sense of the English\nword ‘virtue’, since it comprises all manner of\nexcellences, thus including but extending beyond the moral virtues.\nThus when he says that happiness consists in an activity in\n‘accordance with virtue’ (kat’ aretên;\nEN 1098a18), Aristotle means that it is a kind of excellent\nactivity, and not merely morally virtuous activity.", "\n\n \nThe suggestion that only excellently executed or\nvirtuously performed rational activity constitutes human\nhappiness provides the impetus for Aristotle’s virtue\nethics. Strikingly, first, he insists that the good life is a life of\nactivity; no state suffices, since we are commended and\npraised for living good lives, and we are rightly commended or praised\nonly for things we (do) (EN 1105b20–1106a13).\nFurther, given that we must not only act, but act excellently or\nvirtuously, it falls to the ethical theorist to determine what virtue\nor excellence consists in with respect to the individual human\nvirtues, including, for instance, courage and practical\nintelligence. This is why so much of Aristotle’s ethical writing\nis given over to an investigation of virtue, both in general and in\nparticular, and extending to both practical and theoretical forms.", "\n\n For more on Aristotle’s virtue-based ethics, see the entry on \n Aristotle’s Ethics.", "\n\nAristotle concludes his discussion of human happiness in his\nNicomachean Ethics by introducing political theory as a\ncontinuation and completion of ethical theory. Ethical\ntheory characterizes the best form of human life; political theory\ncharacterizes the forms of social organization best suited to its\nrealization (EN 1181b12–23). ", "\n\n \nThe basic political unit for Aristotle is the polis, which is\nboth a state in the sense of being an authority-wielding\nmonopoly and a civil society in the sense of being a series of\norganized communities with varying degrees of converging\ninterest. Aristotle’s political theory is markedly\nunlike some later, liberal theories, in that he does not think that the\npolis requires justification as a body threatening to infringe\non antecedently existing human rights. Rather, he advances a form\nof political naturalism which treats human beings as by nature\npolitical animals, not only in the weak sense of being gregariously\ndisposed, nor even in the sense of their merely benefiting from mutual\ncommercial exchange, but in the strong sense of their flourishing as\nhuman beings at all only within the framework of an organized\npolis. The polis ‘comes into being for the sake\nof living, but it remains in existence for the sake of living\nwell’ (Pol. 1252b29–30; cf. 1253a31–37). ", "\n\nThe polis is thus to be judged against the goal of\npromoting human happiness. A superior form of political organization\nenhances human life; an inferior form hampers and hinders\nit. One major question pursued in Aristotle’s\nPolitics is thus structured by just this question: what sort\nof political arrangement best meets the goal of developing and\naugmenting human flourishing? Aristotle considers a fair\nnumber of differing forms of political organization, and sets most\naside as inimical to the goal human happiness. For example, given\nhis overarching framework, he has no difficulty rejecting\ncontractarianism on the grounds that it treats as merely instrumental\nthose forms of political activity which are in fact partially\nconstitutive of human flourishing (Pol. iii 9). ", "\n\nIn thinking about the possible kinds of political organization,\nAristotle relies on the structural observations that rulers may be one, few,\nor many, and that their forms of rule may be legitimate or\nillegitimate, as measured against the goal of promoting human\nflourishing (Pol. 1279a26–31). Taken together, these factors\nyield six possible forms of government, three correct and three\ndeviant:", "\n\nThe correct are differentiated from the deviant by their relative\nabilities to realize the basic function of the polis: living\nwell. Given that we prize human happiness, we should, insists\nAristotle, prefer forms of political association best suited to this\ngoal. ", "\n\nNecessary to the end of enhancing human flourishing, maintains\nAristotle, is the maintenance of a suitable level of distributive\njustice. Accordingly, he arrives at his classification of better\nand worse governments partly by considerations of distributive\njustice. He contends, in a manner directly analogous to his\nattitude towards eudaimonia, that everyone will find it easy\nto agree to the proposition that we should prefer a just state to an\nunjust state, and even to the formal proposal that the distribution of\njustice requires treating equal claims similarly and unequal claims\ndissimilarly. Still, here too people will differ about what\nconstitutes an equal or an unequal claim or, more generally, an equal\nor an unequal person. A democrat will presume that all citizens\nare equal, whereas an aristocrat will maintain that the best citizens\nare, quite obviously, superior to the inferior. Accordingly, the\ndemocrat will expect the formal constraint of justice to yield equal\ndistribution to all, whereas the aristocrat will take for granted that\nthe best citizens are entitled to more than the worst. ", "\n\nWhen sorting through these claims, Aristotle relies upon his own\naccount of distributive justice, as advanced in Nicomachean\nEthics v 3. That account is deeply meritocratic. He\naccordingly disparages oligarchs, who suppose that justice requires\npreferential claims for the rich, but also democrats, who contend that\nthe state must boost liberty across all citizens irrespective of\nmerit. The best polis has neither function: its goal is\nto enhance human flourishing, an end to which liberty is at best\ninstrumental, and not something to be pursued for its own sake.", "\n\nStill, we should also proceed with a sober eye on what is in fact\npossible for human beings, given our deep and abiding acquisitional\npropensities. Given these tendencies, it turns out that although\ndeviant, democracy may yet play a central role in the sort of mixed\nconstitution which emerges as the best form of political organization\navailable to us. Inferior though it is to polity (that is, rule\nby the many serving the goal of human flourishing), and especially to\naristocracy (government by the best humans, the aristoi, also\ndedicated to the goal of human flourishing), democracy, as the best\namongst the deviant forms of government, may also be the most we can\nrealistically hope to achieve. ", "\n\nFor an in-depth discussion of Aristotle’s political theory,\nincluding his political naturalism, see the entry on \n Aristotle’s Politics." ], "section_title": "12. Happiness and Political Association", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nAristotle regards rhetoric and the arts as belonging to the productive\nsciences. As a family, these differ from the practical sciences\nof ethics and politics, which concern human conduct, and from the\ntheoretical sciences, which aim at truth for its own sake. \nBecause they are concerned with the creation of human products broadly\nconceived, the productive sciences include activities with obvious,\nartefactual products like ships and buildings, but also agriculture and\nmedicine, and even, more nebulously, rhetoric, which aims at the\nproduction of persuasive speech (Rhet. 1355b26; cf.\nTop. 149b5), and tragedy, which aims at\nthe production of edifying drama (Poet.\n1448b16–17). If we bear in mind that Aristotle\napproaches all these activities within the broader context of his\nteleological explanatory framework, then at least some of the highly\npolemicized interpretative difficulties which have grown up around his\nworks in this area, particularly the Poetics, may be sharply\ndelimited. ", "\n\n \nOne such controversy centers on the question of whether\nAristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics are primarily\ndescriptive or prescriptive\n works.[25] \n To the degree that they are indeed\nprescriptive, one may wonder whether Aristotle has presumed in these\ntreatises to dictate to figures of the stature of Sophocles and\nEuripides how best to pursue their crafts. To some\nextent—but only to some extent—it may seem that he\ndoes. There are, at any rate, clearly prescriptive elements in\nboth these texts. Still, he does not arrive at these\nrecommendations a priori. Rather, it is plain that\nAristotle has collected the best works of forensic speech and tragedy\navailable to him, and has studied them to discern their more and less\nsuccessful features. In proceeding in this way, he aims to\ncapture and codify what is best in both rhetorical practice and\ntragedy, in each case relative to its appropriate productive goal.", "\n\nThe general goal of rhetoric is clear. Rhetoric, says Aristotle,\n‘is the power to see, in each case, the possible ways to\npersuade’ (Rhet. 1355b26). Different contexts, however,\nrequire different techniques. Thus, suggests Aristotle, speakers will\nusually find themselves in one of three contexts where persuasion is\nparamount: deliberative (Rhet. i 4–8), epideictic\n(Rhet. i 9), and judicial (Rhet. i 10–14). In each\nof these contexts, speakers will have at their disposal three main\navenues of persuasion: the character of the speaker, the emotional\nconstitution of the audience, and the general argument\n(logos) of the speech itself (Rhet. i 3). Rhetoric\nthus examines techniques of persuasion pursuant to each of these\nareas. ", "\n\nWhen discussing these techniques, Aristotle draws heavily upon topics\ntreated in his logical, ethical, and psychological writings. In this\nway, the Rhetoric illuminates Aristotle’s writings in these\ncomparatively theoretical areas by developing in concrete ways topics\ntreated more abstractly elsewhere. For example, because a successful\npersuasive speech proceeds alert to the emotional state of the\naudience on the occasion of its delivery, Aristotle’s\nRhetoric contains some of his most nuanced and specific\ntreatments of the emotions. Heading in another\ndirection, a close reading of the Rhetoric reveals that\nAristotle treats the art of persuasion as closely akin to dialectic\n(see §4.3 above). Like dialectic, rhetoric trades in\ntechniques that are not scientific in the strict sense (see §4.2\nabove), and though its goal is persuasion, it reaches its end best if\nit recognizes that people naturally find proofs and well-turned\narguments persuasive (Rhet. 1354a1, 1356a25,\n1356a30). Accordingly, rhetoric, again like dialectic,\nbegins with credible opinions (endoxa), though mainly of the\npopular variety rather than those endorsed most readily by the wise\n(Top. 100a29–35; 104a8–20; Rhet.\n1356b34). Finally, rhetoric proceeds from such opinions to\nconclusions which the audience will understand to follow by cogent\npatterns of inference (Rhet. 1354a12–18,\n1355a5–21). For this reason, too, the rhetorician will do\nwell understand the patterns of human reasoning. ", "\n\nFor more on Aristotle’s rhetoric, see the entry on \n Aristotle’s Rhetoric.", "\n\nBy highlighting and refining techniques for successful speech, the\nRhetoric is plainly prescriptive—but only relative to\nthe goal of persuasion. It does not, however, select its\nown goal or in any way dictate the end of persuasive speech: rather,\nthe end of rhetoric is given by the nature of the craft itself. \nIn this sense, the Rhetoric is like both the Nicomachean\nEthics and the Politics in bearing the stamp of\nAristotle’s broad and encompassing teleology. ", "\n\nThe same holds true of the Poetics, but in this case the\nend is not easily or uncontroversially articulated. It is often\nassumed that the goal of tragedy is catharsis—the\npurification or purgation of the emotions aroused in a tragic\nperformance. Despite its prevalence, as an interpretation of what\nAristotle actually says in the Poetics this understanding is\nunderdetermined at best. When defining tragedy in a general way,\nAristotle claims:", "\n\nTragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious and\ncomplete, and which has some greatness about it. It imitates in words\nwith pleasant accompaniments, each type belonging separately to the\ndifferent parts of the work. It imitates people performing actions and\ndoes not rely on narration. It achieves, through pity and fear, the\ncatharsis of these sorts of feelings. (Poet.\n1449b21–29)\n\n", "\n\nAlthough he has been represented in countless works of scholarship\nas contending that tragedy is for the sake of catharsis,\nAristotle is in fact far more circumspect. While he does contend\nthat tragedy will effect or accomplish catharsis, in so speaking he\ndoes not use language which clearly implies that catharsis is in itself\nthe function of tragedy. Although a good blender will achieve a\nblade speed of 36,000 rotations per minute, this is not its function;\nrather, it achieves this speed in service of its function, namely\nblending. Similarly, then, on one approach, tragedy achieves\ncatharsis, though not because it is its function to do so. \nThis remains so, even if it is integral to realizing its function that\ntragedy achieve catharsis—as it is equally integral that it makes\nus of imitation (mimêsis), and does so by using words\nalong with pleasant accompaniments (namely, rhythm, harmony, and song;\nPoet. 1447b27). ", "\n\n \nUnfortunately, Aristotle is not completely forthcoming on the question\nof the function of tragedy. One clue towards his attitude\ncomes from a passage in which he differentiates tragedy from historical\nwriting:", "\n\nThe poet and the historian differ not in that one writes in meter and\nthe other not; for one could put the writings of Herodotus into verse\nand they would be history none the less, with or without meter. The\ndifference resides in this: the one speaks of what has happened, and\nthe other of what might be. Accordingly, poetry is more philosophical\nand more momentous than history. The poet speaks more of the\nuniversal, while the historian speaks of particulars. It is universal\nthat when certain things turn out a certain way someone will in all\nlikelihood or of necessity act or speak in a certain way—which\nis what the poet, though attaching particular names to the situation,\nstrives for (Poet. 1451a38–1451b10).\n\n ", "\n\nIn characterizing poetry as more philosophical, universal, and\nmomentous than history, Aristotle praises poets for their ability to\nassay deep features of human character, to dissect the ways in which\nhuman fortune engages and tests character, and to display how human\nfoibles may be amplified in uncommon circumstances. We do not,\nhowever, reflect on character primarily for entertainment value. \nRather, and in general, Aristotle thinks of the goal of tragedy in\nbroadly intellectualist terms: the function of tragedy is\n‘learning, that is, figuring out what each thing is’\n(Poet. 1448b16–17). In Aristotle’s view,\ntragedy teaches us about ourselves. ", "\n\n \nThat said, catharsis is undoubtedly a key concept in Aristotle’s\nPoetics, one which, along with imitation\n(mimêsis), has generated enormous\n controversy.[26] \n These\ncontroversies center around three poles of interpretation: the\nsubject of catharsis, the matter of the catharsis,\nand the nature of catharsis. To illustrate what is\nmeant: on a naïve understanding of catharsis—which may\nbe correct despite its naïveté—the audience\n(the subject) undergoes catharsis by having the emotions (the\nmatter) of pity and fear it experiences purged (the\nnature). By varying just these three possibilities, scholars have\nproduced a variety of interpretations—that it is the actors or\neven the plot of the tragedy which are the subjects of catharsis, that\nthe purification is cognitive or structural rather than emotional, and\nthat catharsis is purification rather than purgation. On this\nlast contrast, just as we might purify blood by filtering it, rather\nthan purging the body of blood by letting it, so we might refine our\nemotions, by cleansing them of their more unhealthy elements, rather\nthan ridding ourselves of the emotions by purging them\naltogether. The difference is considerable, since on one view the\nemotions are regarded as in themselves destructive and so to be purged,\nwhile on the other, the emotions may be perfectly healthy, even though,\nlike other psychological states, they may be improved by\nrefinement. The immediate context of the Poetics does\nnot by itself settle these disputes conclusively. ", "\n\n \nAristotle says comparatively more about the second main concept of the\nPoetics, imitation (mimêsis). Although\nless controversial than catharsis, Aristotle’s conception of\nmimêsis has also been\n debated.[27] \n Aristotle thinks that\nimitation is a deeply ingrained human proclivity. Like political\nassociation, he contends, mimêsis is\nnatural. We engage in imitation from an early age,\nalready in language learning by aping competent speakers as we learn,\nand then also later, in the acquisition of character by treating others\nas role models. In both these ways, we imitate because we learn\nand grow by imitation, and for humans, learning is both natural and a\ndelight (Poet. 1148b4–24). This same tendency, in\nmore sophisticated and complex ways, leads us into the practice of\ndrama. As we engage in more advanced forms of\nmimêsis, imitation gives way to representation\nand depiction, where we need not be regarded as attempting to\ncopy anyone or anything in any narrow sense of the term. \nFor tragedy does not set out merely to copy what is the case, but\nrather, as we have seen in Aristotle’s differentiation of tragedy\nfrom history, to speak of what might be, to engage universal themes in\na philosophical manner, and to enlighten an audience by their\ndepiction. So, although mimêsis is at root simple\nimitation, as it comes to serve the goals of tragedy, it grows more\nsophisticated and powerful, especially in the hands of those poets able\nto deploy it to good effect. " ], "section_title": "13. Rhetoric and the Arts", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\n \nAristotle’s influence is difficult to overestimate. After\nhis death, his school, the Lyceum, carried on for some period of time,\nthough precisely how long is unclear. In the century immediately\nafter his death, Aristotle’s works seem to have fallen out of\ncirculation; they reappear in the first century B.C.E., after which time\nthey began to be disseminated, at first narrowly, but then much more\nbroadly. They eventually came to form the backbone of some seven\ncenturies of philosophy, in the form of the\n commentary tradition,\n much of it original philosophy carried on in\na broadly Aristotelian framework. They also played a very\nsignificant, if subordinate role, in the Neoplatonic philosophy of\n Plotinus\n and\n Porphyry. \nThereafter, from the sixth through the twelfth centuries, although the\nbulk of Aristotle’s writings were lost to the West, they received\nextensive consideration in\n Byzantine Philosophy,\n and in Arabic Philosophy, where Aristotle was so\nprominent that be became known simply as The First Teacher (see\nthe entry on the\n influence of Arabic and Islamic philosophy on the Latin West).\n In this tradition, the notably rigorous and illuminating commentaries of\nAvicenna and Averroes interpreted and developed Aristotle’s views\nin striking ways. These commentaries in turn proved exceedingly\ninfluential in the earliest reception of the Aristotelian corpus into\nthe Latin West in the twelfth century.", "\n \nAmong Aristotle’s greatest exponents during the early period of\nhis reintroduction to the West,\n Albertus Magnus,\n and above all his student\n Thomas Aquinas,\n sought to reconcile Aristotle’s philosophy with Christian\nthought. Some Aristotelians disdain Aquinas as bastardizing Aristotle,\nwhile some Christians disown Aquinas as pandering to pagan\nphilosophy. Many others in both camps take a much more positive view,\nseeing Thomism as a brilliant synthesis of two towering traditions;\narguably, the incisive commentaries written by Aquinas towards the end\nof his life aim not so much at synthesis as straightforward exegesis\nand exposition, and in these respects they have few equals in any\nperiod of philosophy. Partly due to the attention of Aquinas, but for\nmany other reasons as well, Aristotelian philosophy set the framework\nfor the Christian philosophy of the twelfth through the sixteenth\ncenturies, though, of course, that rich period contains a broad range\nof philosophical activity, some more and some less in sympathy with\nAristotelian themes. To see the extent of Aristotle’s influence, however,\nit is necessary only to recall that the two concepts forming the\nso-called\n binarium famosissimum\n (“the most famous pair”) of that\nperiod, namely universal hylomorphism and the doctrine of the plurality\nof forms, found their first formulations in Aristotle’s\ntexts.", "\n\n \nInterest in Aristotle continued unabated throughout the renaissance in\nthe form of\n Renaissance Aristotelianism.\n The dominant figures of this period overlap\nwith the last flowerings of Medieval Aristotelian Scholasticism, which\nreached a rich and highly influential close in the figure of\nSuárez, whose life in turn overlaps with Descartes. From\nthe end of late Scholasticism, the study of Aristotle has undergone\nvarious periods of relative neglect and intense interest, but has been\ncarried forward unabated down to the present day. ", "\n\nToday, philosophers of various stripes continue to look to Aristotle\nfor guidance and inspiration in many different areas, ranging from the\nphilosophy of mind to theories of the infinite, though perhaps\nAristotle’s influence is seen most overtly and avowedly in the\nresurgence of\n virtue ethics\n which began in the last half of the twentieth century. \nIt seems safe at this stage to predict that Aristotle’s stature\nis unlikely to diminish anytime in the foreseeable future. If it is any\nindication of the direction of things to come, a quick search of the\npresent Encyclopedia turns up more citations to ‘Aristotle’ and\n‘Aristotelianism’ than to any other philosopher or\nphilosophical movement. Only Plato comes close. " ], "section_title": "14. Aristotle’s Legacy", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Barnes, J., ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volumes\nI and II, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.", "Irwin, T. and Fine., G.,\nAristotle: Selections, Translated with Introduction, Notes, and\nGlossary, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995.", "Ackrill, J., Categories and De Interpretatione,\ntranslated with notes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.", "Annas, J., Metaphysics Books M and N, translated with a\ncommentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.", "Balme, D., De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione\nAnimalium I, (with passages from Book II. 1–3), translated with\nan introduction and notes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.", "Barnes, J., Posterior Analytics, second edition,\ntranslated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press,\n1994.", "Bostock, D., Metaphysics Books Z and H, translated with a\ncommentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.", "Charlton, W., Physics Books I and II, translated with\nintroduction, commentary, Note on Recent Work, and revised\nBibliography, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.", "Graham, D., Physics, Book VIII, translated with a\ncommentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.", "Hamlyn, D., De Anima II and III, with Passages from Book\nI, translated with a commentary, and with a review of recent work\nby Christopher Shields, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.", "Hussey, E., Physics Books III and IV, translated with an\nintroduction and notes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983; new\nimpression with supplementary material, 1993.", "Judson, L., Metaphysics Book Λ, edited, translated\nwith an introduction and commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press,\n2019.", "Keyt, D., Politics, Books V and VI Animals, translated\nwith a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.", "Kirwan, C., Metaphysics: Books gamma, delta, and\nepsilon, second edition, translated with notes,\nOxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.", "Kraut, R., Politics Books VII and VIII, translated with a\ncommentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.", "Lennox, J., On the Parts of Animals, translated with a\ncommentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.", "Madigan, A., Aristotle: Metaphysics Books B and K 1–2,\ntranslated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.", "Makin, S., Metaphysics Theta, translated with an\nintroduction and commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.", "Pakaluk, M., Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX,\ntranslated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.", "Robinson, R., Politics: Books III and IV, translated with\na commentary by Richard Robinson; with a supplementary essay by David\nKeyt, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.", "Saunders, T., Politics: Books I and II, translated with a\ncommentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.", "Shields, Christopher, De Anima, translated with an\nintroduction and commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.", "Smith, R., Topics Books I and VIII, With\nexcerpts from related texts, translated with a commentary, Oxford:\nOxford University Press, 2009.", "Striker, G., Prior Analytics,\ntranslated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press,\n1997.", "Taylor, C., Nicomachean Ethics, Books II-IV, translated\nwith an introduction and commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press,\n2006.", "Williams, C., De Generatione et Corruptione, translated\nwith a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.", "Woods, M., Eudemian Ethics Books I, II, and VIII, second\nedition, edited, and translated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, 1992.", "Ackrill, J., Aristotle the Philosopher, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, 1981.", "Jaeger, W., Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his\nDevelopment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934.", "Lear, J., Aristotle: the Desire to Understand, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, 1988.", "Ross, W. D., Aristotle, London: Methuen and Co., 1923.", "Shields, C., Aristotle 2nd edition, London: Routledge, 2014.", "Barnes, J., The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.", "Anagnostopoulos, G., The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle,\nOxford: Blackwell, 2007.", "Shields, C., The Oxford Handbook on Aristotle, Oxford:\nOxford University Press, 2012. ", "Natali, C., Aristotle: His Life and School, D. Hutchinson\n(ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.", "Annas, J., 1982, ‘Aristotle on inefficient causes,’\nPhilosophical Quarterly, 32: 311–326.", "Bakker, Paul J. J. M., 2007, ‘Natural Philosophy,\nMetaphysics, or Something in Between: Agostino Nifo, Pietro\nPompanazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and Place of the\nScience of Soul,’ in J. J. M. Bakker and Johannes\nM. M. H. Thijssen (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Representation: The\nTradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima, London:\nAshgate, pp. 151–177.", "Barnes, Jonathan, 1994, Posterior Analytics,\nsecond edition, translated with a commentary, \nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "Biondi, Paolo C. (ed. and trans.), (2004), Aristotle: Posterior\nAnalytics ii 19, Paris: Librairie-Philosophique-J-Vrin.", "Bostock, David, 1980/2006, ‘Aristotle’s Account of\nTime,‘ in Space, Time, Matter, and Form: Essays on\nAristotle’s Physics, Oxford: Oxford University Press,\npp. 135–157.", "Charles, David, 2001, “Teleological Causation in the\nPhysics,” in L. Judson (ed.), Aristotle’s\nPhysics: A Collection of Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press,\npp. 101–128.", "Cleary, John, 1994, ‘Phainomena in Aristotle’s\nPhilosophic Method,’ International Journal of Philosophical\nStudies, 2: 61–97.", "Coope, Ursula, 2005, Time for Aristotle: Physics IV 10–14,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Duarte, Shane, 2014, ‘Aristotle’s Theology and its\nRelation to the Science of Being qua Being,’\nApeiron, 40: 267–318", "Frede, M., 1980, ‘The Original Notion of Cause,’ in M.\nSchofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (ed.), Doubt and\nDogmatism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, \npp. 217–249.", "Furley, D. J., ‘What Kind of Cause is Aristotle’s Final\nCause?,’ in M. Frede and G. Stricker (eds.), Rationality in\nGreek Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999,\npp. 59–79.", "Gill, M. L., ‘Aristotle’s Metaphysics\nReconsidered,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy, 43\n(2005): 223–251.", "Gotthelf, A., 1987, ‘Aristotle’s Conception of Final\nCausality,’ in A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.),\nPhilosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, pp. 204–242.", "Grote, George, 1880, Aristotle, London: Thoemmes\nContinuum.", "Halliwell, Stephen, 1986, Aristotle’s Poetics,\nChapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.", "Hocutt, M., 1974, ‘Aristotle’s Four Becauses.’\nPhilosophy, 49: 385–399.", "Irwin, Terence, 1981, ‘Homonymy in Aristotle,’\nReview of Metaphysics, 34: 523–544.", "–––, 1988, Aristotle’s First\nPrinciples, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Johnson, Monte Ransom, 2005, Aristotle on Teleology,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Kraut, Richard, 1979, ‘Two Conceptions of Happiness, \nPhilosophical Review, 88: 167–197.", "Lewis, Frank A., 2004, ‘Aristotle on the Homonymy of\nBeing,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68:\n1–36.", "Loux, Michael, 1973, ‘Aristotle on the\nTranscendentals,’ Phronesis, 18: 225–239.", "Moravcsik, J., 1975, ‘“Aitia” as\ngenerative factor in Aristotle’s philosophy,’\nDialogue, 14: 622–638.", "Owen, G. E. L., 1960, ‘Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier\nWorks of Aristotle,’ in I. During and G. E. L. Owen (eds.),\nPlato and Aristotle in the Mid-Fourth Century, Göteborg:\nAlmquist and Wiksell, pp. 163–190.", "–––, 1961/1986, ‘Tithenai ta\nphainomena,’ Logic, Science and Dialectic, London:\nDuckworth, pp. 239–251.", "Owens, Joseph, 1978, The Doctrine of Being in the\nAristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd edition, Toronto: The\nPontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.", "Patzig, Gunther, 1979, ‘Theology and Ontology in\nAristotle’s Metaphysics, in J. Barnes, M. Schofied, and R. Sorabji\n(eds.), Articles on Aristotle, Volume 3: Metaphysics, London:\nDuckworth, pp. 33–49.", "Pellegrin, Pierre, 1996/2003, ‘Aristotle,’ in J.\nBrunschwig and G. E. R. Lloyd (eds.), A Guide to Greek Thought,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 32–53.", "Ross, W. D., 1923, Aristotle, London: Methuen and Co.", "Sauvé Meyer, S., 1992, ‘Aristotle, Teleology, and\nReduction,’ Philosophical Review, 101: 791–825.", "Shields, Christopher, 1999, Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in\nthe Philosophy of Aristotle, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2014, Aristotle, London: Routledge.", "Shute, Richard, 1888, On the Process by which the Aristotelian\nWritings Arrived at their Present Form, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Ward, Julie K., 2008, Aristotle on Homonymy, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press.", "Zeller, Eduard, 1883/1955, Outlines of the History of Greek\nPhilosophy, rev. by W. Nestle, trans. L. Palmer, London:\nRoutledge." ]	[ { "href": "../arabic-islamic-influence/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West" }, { "href": "../aristotle-commentators/", "text": "Aristotle, commentators on" }, { "href": "../aristotle-aesthetics/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../aristotle-biology/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: biology" }, { "href": "../aristotle-categories/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: categories" }, { "href": "../aristotle-ethics/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: ethics" }, { "href": "../aristotle-logic/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: logic" }, { "href": "../aristotle-metaphysics/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: metaphysics" }, { "href": "../aristotle-politics/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: political theory" }, { "href": "../aristotle-psychology/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: psychology" }, { "href": "../aristotle-rhetoric/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: rhetoric" }, { "href": "../aristotle-causality/", "text": "Aristotle, Special Topics: causality" }, { "href": "../aristotle-mathematics/", "text": "Aristotle, Special Topics: mathematics" }, { "href": "../aristotle-natphil/", "text": "Aristotle, Special Topics: natural philosophy" }, { "href": "../aristotle-noncontradiction/", "text": "Aristotle, Special Topics: on non-contradiction" }, { "href": "../essential-accidental/", "text": "essential vs. accidental properties" }, { "href": "../form-matter/", "text": "form vs. matter" }, { "href": "../happiness/", "text": "happiness" }, { "href": "../hegel-dialectics/", "text": "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: dialectics" }, { "href": "../substance/", "text": "substance" } ]
arnauld	Antoine Arnauld	First published Sat Jan 27, 2007; substantive revision Fri Nov 5, 2021	[ "\nAntoine Arnauld (1612–1694) was a powerful figure in the\nintellectual life of seventeenth-century Europe. He had a long and\nhighly controversial career as a theologian, and was an able and\ninfluential philosopher. His writings were published and widely read\nover a period of more than fifty years and were assembled in\n1775–1782 in forty-two large folio volumes.", "\nEvaluations of Arnauld’s work as a theologian vary. Ian Hacking,\nfor example, says that Arnauld was “perhaps the most brilliant\ntheologian of his time” (Hacking 1975a, 25). Ronald Knox, on the\nother hand, says, “It was the fashion among the Jansenists to\nrepresent Antoine Arnauld as a great theologian; he should be\nremembered, rather as a great controversialist… A theologian by\ntrade, Arnauld was a barrister by instinct” (Knox 1950, 196). It\nis agreed on all sides, however, that Arnauld was acute and learned in\ntheology as well as in philosophy.", "\nArnauld was an important participant in the philosophical debates of\nhis century, and carried out famous intellectual exchanges with\nDescartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz. In addition, the Port-Royal\nLogic, l’Art de penser, which he co-authored with\nPierre Nicole, was a standard text in the field for two centuries.\nLess attention has been paid to Arnauld’s lifelong efforts to\nreconcile the doctrine of grâce efficace par\nelle-même with freedom of will, though they have many\nconnections with the debate about determinism and free will that\ncontinues to this day." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Arnauld on the Distinction between Philosophy and Theology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Arnauld’s Cartesianism", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Philosophical method", "3.2 Arnauld’s identification of ideas with perceptions, a new interpretation", "3.3 Mind-body dualism", "3.4 The Creation of the eternal truths", "3.5 Are God’s actions reeasonable?" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Arnauld and Malebranche", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Malebranche’s position in the Treatise of Nature and Grace", "4.2 Two themes in Arnauld’s criticism of the Treatise of Nature and Grace", "4.3 Does God act only by general volitions?", "4.4 Arnauld’s criticism of Malebranche’s occasionalism" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Arnauld and Leibniz", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Leibniz’s notion of an individual substance", "5.2 Arnauld’s criticism of Leibniz’s modal metaphysics; Arnauld’s alternative" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Arnauld’s Compatibilism", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 The Congregationes de Auxiliis and seventeenth-century controversy about grace", "6.2 Bañez, Jansen, and Arnauld on the nature of efficacious actual grace of the will", "6.3 The limits of Arnauld’s compatibilism", "6.4 Arnauld’s late position on the nature of free will", "6.5 The advantages Arnauld claims for his new theory over Jansen’s theory" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Arnauld’s Works", "Related Early Modern Works", "Secondary Works Cited", "Other Recommended Secondary Works" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAntoine Arnauld was born in Paris on February 6, 1612, the twentieth\nand last child of an important French family. He is often referred to\nin the French literature as Le Grand Arnauld. Another famous\nmember of the family was his sister, Mère Angélique\nArnauld. Installed by her wealthy and powerful father as abbess of the\nconvent of Port-Royal in 1602 at the age of eleven, she later reformed\nthe convent and it became a center of intense religious life. Several\nof Arnauld’s sisters were nuns at Port-Royal, where his mother\njoined them after the death of his father in 1621.", "\nThe young Antoine attended the Collège de\nCalvi-Sorbonne, where one of his fellow students was his nephew,\nIsaac Lemaître de Sacy. Arnauld went on to study philosophy at\nthe Collège de Lisieux, and then decided to follow in\nhis father’s steps as a lawyer. However, under the influence of\nhis mother and her confessor, Jean Duvergier, the abbé de\nSaint-Cyran¸ he changed his mind and began studies in\ntheology in 1633.", "\nAbout 1640, he joined a small group of solitaires who lived\nin the countryside near Port-Royal and were associated with the\nconvent. They included Pierre Nicole, Claude Launcelot, and Sacy. The\nsolitaires initiated the petites écoles de\nPort-Royal which continued in various locations from the late\n1630s until 1660. Their students included the dramatist Jean Racine.\nLater on, Arnauld cooperated with Sacy in the first important French\ntranslation of the\n Bible.[1]\n He also co-authored the Grammaire générale et\nraisonnée with Lancelot and La Logique ou l’Art\nde penser (hereinafter Logic), with Nicole. All of these\ncollaborative projects had their origins in the petites\nécoles. Blaise Pascal was closely associated with the\nsolitaires beginning in 1655.", "\nThe year 1641 was an eventful one for Arnauld. He was ordained a\npriest on September 21. During the year, he completed the\n“Fourth Objections” to Descartes’\nMeditations and wrote De la Fréquente\ncommunion (published in 1643). The first work established his\nreputation as a philosopher. The second went through many editions and\nhad an effect on Catholic sacramental practice up to the end of the\nnineteenth century. Jansen’s Augustinus was also\npublished in Paris in 1641, having been published posthumously in the\nNetherlands a year earlier. It was attacked by the official theologian\nof Paris, Isaac Habert, who preached a series of sermons against\nJansen in the cathedral of Paris during Lent, 1643. Arnauld, who had\narrived at an interpretation of Augustine similar to, though not\nidentical with, that of Jansen, undertook, at the request of\nSaint-Cyran, to defend Jansen against the accusation of heresy. This\nhe did in his Première Apologie pour Jansénius,\n1644, and Seconde Apologie, 1645. Although Arnauld did not\nagree with important details of Jansen’s view, he continued to\ndefend Jansen against the charge of heresy off and on for the rest of\nhis life.", "\nIn 1653 the famous five propositions attributed to Jansen were\ndeclared to be heretical by Pope Innocent X in the Constitution\n“Cum Occasione.” Arnauld and most of the\nPort-Royal group claimed that the five propositions, although\nheretical on their most likely interpretation, were not in fact in\nJansen’s work. The dispute led to Arnauld’s expulsion from\nthe Sorbonne after a celebrated trial, which lasted from December 1,\n1655 to January 30, 1656. Pascal came to Arnauld’s defense with\nthe Provincial Letters, published in installments from\nJanuary 23, 1656 to May, 1657. The dispute lasted until 1669, when the\nFrench bishops who supported Arnauld worked out a compromise with Pope\nClement IX, and Arnauld enjoyed almost a decade in the good graces of\nboth the court and the Pope. During this time, Arnauld wrote\nvoluminously on the Eucharist, but he also found time to co-author the\nPort-Royal Grammar and Logic, and to write his\nNouveaux éléments de géométrie.\nHowever, in the late 1670s, the attacks on Port-Royal by civil and\nreligious authorities resumed, and in 1679 Arnauld fled to the\nNetherlands, where he remained until his death, in Liège, on\nAugust 8, 1694.", "\nThe last fifteen years of Arnauld’s life, spent in self-imposed\nexile, were among his most fruitful in philosophy. During this period,\nhe carried on his debates with Malebranche and Leibniz, and also\nreexamined his position on human free will. Arnauld’s published\ncriticism of Malebranche began in 1683 with On True and False\nIdeas (hereinafter Ideas). But the central topic of the\nexchange was Malebranche’s use of occasionalism to explain how\nit is that not all human beings are saved. Arnauld provided a\nsystematic criticism of that position in the three volumes of\nRéflexions philosophiques et théologiques sur le\nnouveau système de la nature et de la grâce\n(hereinafter Réflexions), published in 1685 and 1686.\nArnauld’s famous correspondence with Leibniz was initiated by\nLeibniz in 1686, when he sent Arnauld the section headings of his\nprojected Discourse on Metaphysics." ], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nArnauld considered it important to be clear about the distinction\nbetween philosophy and theology. This concern is present in his work\nfrom the beginning, in 1641, to the end of his published writings.\nThus, he divides the “Fourth Objections” to\nDescartes’ Meditations into “the possible\nphilosophical objections regarding the major issues of the nature of\nour mind and of God” and “the problems which a theologian\nmight come up against in the work as a whole”\n(Descartes, 2:169). One of Arnauld’s criticisms of\nMalebranche is that he does not establish many of the principles in\nhis system of nature and grace either by the proper methods of\nphilosophy or of theology. Again, in Règles du bon\nsens, written the year before his death, Arnauld warns,", "\nBe very careful about the nature of the question in dispute, whether\nit is philosophical or theological. For if it is theological, it must\nbe decided principally by authority, whereas if it is philosophical,\nit must be decided principally by\n reason.[2]\n ", "\nAccording to Arnauld, the chief purpose of theology is to defend the\ntruths revealed by God through Sacred Scripture and the teaching\ntradition of the Church. Part of the ceremony in which he received the\ndoctorate in theology from the Sorbonne was a vow, made before the\naltar of the Holy Martyrs, “that we will give our life before\nleaving the truth undefended.” In the speech he gave on that\noccasion, Arnauld emphasized the vow, which he said was instituted\nbecause", "\nthe obligation to defend the truth with force and courage is so\nindispensable in a theologian that those whose courage in this regard\ncould weaken, should be committed to it by the holiness and piety of a\nsolemn public vow (Traduction du Discours latin prononcé\npar M. Arnauld en recevant le Bonnet de Docteur, OA, 43:12).\n", "\nThis intense religious commitment to his role as a theologian\ncontinued throughout his life. Combined with his combative\npersonality, it helps to explain the passion with which he defended\nindividual theologians, especially Saint-Cyran and Jansen, as well as\nwhat he took to be the truths of revelation.", "\nRegarding philosophy, Arnauld, like Descartes, held that its purpose\nwas to acquire useful knowledge through reason. That reason ought to\nbe employed only in the pursuit of useful knowledge is emphasized in\nthe opening pages of the Logic. Arnauld and Nicole say that\n“speculative sciences, such as geometry, astronomy, and\nphysics” can be used as instruments for perfecting judgment and\nreason. This provides a use for some of the “nooks and\ncrannies” of those sciences, which would otherwise be\n“completely worthless.” They go on to say,", "\nPeople are not born to spend their time measuring lines, examining the\nrelations between angles, or contemplating different motions of\nmatter. The mind is too large, life too short, time too precious to\noccupy oneself with such trivial objects. But they are obligated to be\njust, fair, and judicious in all their speech, their actions, and the\nbusiness they conduct. Above all they ought to train and educate\nthemselves for this (Logic, 5).\n", "\nArnauld did not think, however, that philosophical sciences are useful\nonly as instruments for acquiring virtues. Natural philosophy or\nphysics can be made to serve the good of human life in many ways and\neven metaphysics is useful in that it can help the theologian in the\ntask of defending the truth.", "\nAn outstanding example of that sort of usefulness, in Arnauld’s\nview, was Descartes’ argument for the distinction of the soul or\nmind from the body. Arnauld refers to Descartes as a “Christian\nphilosopher,” echoing Descartes’ own use of the phrase in\nthe letter dedicating the Meditations on First Philosophy to\nthe Faculty of Theology of the Sorbonne, where Descartes says that he\ncarried out the injunction of the Fourth Lateran Council\n(1512–17) that “Christian philosophers” should try\nto prove the immateriality of the soul (Descartes, 2:4).", "\nThe authorities most often cited by Arnauld are Augustine and Aquinas\nin theology, and Augustine, Aquinas, and Descartes in philosophy.\nArnauld’s attitude toward these predecessors is complex. From\nthe outset of his published work in philosophy, he claimed that\nAugustinian themes were present in Descartes. However, in his late\nwork, beginning with On True and False Ideas in 1683, he\nbegan to cite Aquinas frequently, as well as Augustine, both in\nphilosophy and theology. Thus, in the 181 folio pages of\nIdeas, which Arnauld describes as dealing with a purely\nphilosophical topic, he cites Augustine twenty times and Aquinas six\ntimes, always claiming that they agree with Descartes and with his own\nposition. Similarly, in the theological part of\nRéflexions, Arnauld relies heavily on Aquinas’s\nChristology while arguing that Malebranche’s theodicy leads him\ninto heterodox, if not downright heretical, positions (OA\n39:777). Again, in his late work on the problem of human free will and\ngrâce efficace par elle-même, Arnauld took over\nwhat he says is the Thomistic position that the will is free when it\nis a potestas ou facultas ad opposita. And in the controversy\nwith Nicole and others over Nicole’s theory of a grâce\ngénérale, Arnauld relied heavily on Aquinas’s\naccount of cognition. So frequently did Arnauld rely on Thomistic\nformulations in his late work that his friends reproached him for\n“abandoning Augustine in order to follow Aquinas, thus\npreferring the disciple to the master” (Règles du bon\nsens, OA, 10:154). This reproach had to do directly with\nArnauld’s rejection of the “Platonism” in Augustine\nand Jansen. But as shown below, Arnauld, late in his career, also\nparted company with Augustine and Jansen on the nature of human free\nwill, and with Jansen’s account of the nature of actual\ngrace.", "\nArnauld had a scholarly knowledge of the history of philosophy and\ntheology, and was certainly aware of the important differences among\nAugustine, Aquinas, and Descartes on such issues as the role of sense\nperception in human knowledge, the relation of the mind to the body,\nand the nature of human freedom. But Arnauld wanted to emphasize the\ncontinuity of Descartes with the Christian past. Arnauld feared that\nDescartes’ philosophy would be made into a weapon against the\nChristian tradition. Emphasizing those elements in Descartes’\nphilosophy that are in continuity with Augustine and Aquinas was part\nof Arnauld’s effort to make of Cartesianism an ally, rather than\nan enemy, of the faith." ], "section_title": "2. Arnauld on the Distinction between Philosophy and Theology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nUnlike Saint-Cyran, Jansen, and most of the Port-royalists, Arnauld\nhad a positive appreciation of philosophy, and a lively interest in\nthe subject (See Nadler 1989, 18 ff.). His philosophy is typically,\nand correctly, classified as Cartesian. Indeed, Leibniz said, in 1691,\nthat Arnauld had been “in all ways for Descartes for a long\n time.”[3]\n Arnauld enthusiastically endorsed Descartes’ physics and the\napproach to mind-body dualism to which it gave rise. He also adopted\nsome parts of Descartes’ views on philosophical method.", "\nArnauld’s Descartes, however, is unlike the Descartes who is\nseen as the father of the enlightenment and who anticipated many of\nthe preoccupations of recent analytical philosophy. Arnauld claims to\nset forth the gist of Descartes’ philosophy, but he did not\nhesitate to replace parts of Descartes’ philosophy with\ndifferent though related propositions, especially when doing so made\nDescartes a more reliable ally in what Arnauld took to be his primary\ntask, to defend the truths of the faith." ], "section_title": "3. Arnauld’s Cartesianism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIn the Fourth Part of the Logic, “On Method,”\nArnauld and Nicole present an account of the distinction between\nanalysis and synthesis that they say is taken from a manuscript of\nDescartes lent to them by Clerselier. What they present is a free\ntranslation of Rule Thirteen of the Rules for the Direction of the\nMind. They then paraphrase the four rules given by Descartes in\nPart Two of the Discourse on the Method, saying that although\nthe rules are “often difficult to follow,” yet “it\nis always helpful to bear them in mind, and to heed them as much as\npossible whenever we try to find the truth by means of reason”\n(Logic, 234–39). But Arnauld developed the Cartesian\nposition on philosophical method in a distinctive way. In particular,\nhe reshaped the notion of an idea, of a confused idea, of a clear and\ndistinct idea, and of methodic doubt.", "\nAn idea, according to Arnauld, is the same thing as a perception (in\nthe broad sense of the term characteristic of seventeenth-century\nphilosophy), and every perception has an object distinct from the\nperception itself. Every idea, i.e., every perception, is, in\naddition, a consciousness of itself. But this “implicit\nreflexion” makes present to the mind a perception that is, in\nthe first place, of an object distinct from itself. As Arnauld puts\nit, “I know myself in knowing other things”\n(Ideas, 6). It is obviously true, he says, that we can know\nobjects only through the mediation of our perceptions, i.e., our\nideas, of them:", "\nBut if, by not knowing them immediately, is meant being able\nto know them only by representative beings distinct from\nperceptions, I hold that in this sense we can know material things, as\nwell as God and our soul, not only mediately but also\nimmediately, i.e., that we can know them without there being\nany intermediary between our perceptions and the object (Of True\nand False Ideas, hereinafter Ideas, 31).\n", "\nArnauld says that the object of any perception has objective\nbeing in the perception. Furthermore, the object has objective\nbeing in the perception as having properties. If an object\nexists objectively in a given perception as having a given property,\nthen Arnauld says that the perception represents the object\nas having that property, that is, makes the object present to the mind\nas having that\n property.[4]\n Furthermore, an idea (or perception) can represent its object to the\nperceiving mind as having this or that property contingently or\nnecessarily. Arnauld cites the dictum, “it is in the idea of\neach thing that we see its properties,” and takes it to refer to\nan explicit reflection upon an idea that represents its object as\nhaving certain properties necessarily.", "\nArnauld argues at length that this theory of ideas was also held by\nDescartes (Ideas, 26ff.). This claim has puzzled philosophers\nfrom Thomas Reid to the present (Reid 1785, 169). A good example of\nthe more common interpretation of Descartes’ theory is provided\nby Ian Hacking, who also attributes the theory, as he understands it,\nto the Port-Royal Logic. Hacking begins with the first\nsentence of the First Part of the Logic: “We have no\nknowledge of what is outside us except by the mediation of\nthe ideas within us,” and continues,", "\nThe Cartesian ego has set the stage. The ego able to\ncontemplate what is within it ponders what lies outside. There are\nsome objects that we can contemplate without being logically committed\nto the existence of anything other than the ego. These objects are\nideas (Hacking 1975b, 29).\n", "\nBorrowing an example from Elizabeth Anscombe’s comment on\nBerkeley, Hacking says that in the Cartesian (and Port-royalist)\ntheory, “Ideas [in the mind] are paradigm ‘objects’\nand coins [in a man’s pocket] are not” (Hacking 1975b,\n28–30). But the sentence that Hacking quotes from the First Part\nof the Logic does not demand the interpretation he gives it.\nIt is consistent with the position Arnauld develops in Ideas\n(published in the same year as the fifth and last edition of the\nLogic), according to which ideas are primarily perceptions of\nexternal objects distinct from the perceiver, objects like coins in a\nman’s pocket; and only secondarily objects of reflexive\nperception. Arnauld makes a good case for the claim that this position\nwas also held by Descartes, but the claim is not universally\naccepted.", "\nArnauld’s account of clarity and distinctness, obscurity and\nconfusion of ideas can be found in the First Part, Chapter 9, of the\nLogic. The discussion proceeds by way of examples, rather\nthan general definitions, but it can be summarized as follows: The\nbasic properties of ideas are clarity and confusion. Clarity of ideas\nis the same as vividness, and this is a matter of degree; the opposite\nof clarity is obscurity. Confusion of ideas results when a number of\nideas are connected by false judgments, and confusion produces\nobscurity. Opposite to confusedness of ideas is distinctness. Arnauld\nand Nicole apply these distinctions to the idea of pain:", "\nWe can say that all ideas are distinct insofar as they are clear, and\nthat their obscurity derives only from their confusion, just as in\npain the simple sensation which strikes us is clear and also distinct.\nBut what is confused, namely that the sensation is in the hand, is by\nno means clear in us (Logic, 48).\n", "\nAgain, Arnauld and Nicole speak of “the obscure and confused\nideas we have of sensible qualities, the soul adding its false\njudgments to what nature causes us to know” (Logic,\n49–50). The simple idea of pain, for example, is a clear and\ndistinct idea of a sensory state in the mind, and the idea of the pain\nin the hand is a compound and confused idea of something in the hand\nthat exactly resembles pain. Being confused, the idea is also obscure,\nbecause what it is in the hand that exactly resembles pain is\n“by no means clear to us.” Arnauld’s theory of clear\nand confused ideas implies that ideas, as they are given to us by\nnature, and thus by God, are clear and distinct, and therefore cannot\nbe deceptive, or “materially false.” Any deceptiveness in\nour ideas derives from their confusedness and is the result of our\nmisuse of freedom. It is not God who confuses us, but we who confuse\nourselves.", "\nArnauld’s comments on the idea of pain are part of a larger\nposition on “ideas of sensation.” In a famous passage in\nthe “Fourth Objections,” Arnauld objected to\nDescartes’ statement, “If cold is merely the absence of\nheat, the idea of cold which represents it to me as a positive thing\nwill be materially false” (Descartes, 2:145). As part\nof his reply, Descartes says,", "\nIf cold is simply an absence, the idea of cold is not coldness itself\nas it exists objectively in the intellect, but something else, which I\nerroneously mistake for this absence, namely a sensation which in fact\nhas no existence outside the intellect (Descartes, 2:163).\n", "\nArnauld developed a general account of sensory ideas that builds on\nthis part of Descartes’ reply. He sets out his account clearly\nin aIdeas: Sensory ideas, like the idea of pain and the idea\nof cold, are perceptions of mental states. Taken apart from the\njudgments in which we falsely identify these mental states with states\nof material things, sensory ideas are clear and distinct. They become\nconfused, and hence obscure, only as a result of the precipitous,\nfalse judgments of childhood. Arnauld quotes Descartes’\nPrinciples of Philosophy, Part I, #68 in support of his\naccount:", "\nWe know pain, color and the other sensations clearly and distinctly\nwhen we consider them simply as thoughts, but when we would judge that\ncolor, pain, etc., are things which subsist outside our thought, we do\nnot conceive in any way what that color, that pain, etc., is (Quoted\nby Arnauld in Ideas, 132).\n", "\nArnauld also gave a distinctive interpretation of Descartes’\nmethod of doubt. In the “Fourth Objections,” Arnauld\noffers, as the first of “the problems which a theologian might\ncome up against in the work as a whole,” the following: “I\nam afraid that the author’s somewhat free style of\nphilosophizing, which calls everything into doubt, may cause offence\nto some people” (Descartes, 2:151). Arnauld recommends\nthat the First Meditation be “furnished with a brief preface\nwhich explains that there is no serious doubt cast on these matters\nbut that the purpose is to isolate temporarily those matters which\nleave room for even the ‘slightest’ and most\n‘exaggerated’ doubt,” and that the clause\n“since I did not know the author of my being” be replaced\nby “since I was pretending that I did not know the author of my\nbeing.”", "\nArnauld was asking Descartes to make clear that his method did not\ninvolve real doubt, but only a consideration of what would happen\nif one were to doubt. Consider this passage from the\nPort-Royal Logic:", "\nIf there were people able to doubt that they were not sleeping or were\nnot mad, or who could even believe that the existence of everything\nexternal is uncertain … at least no one could doubt, as St.\nAugustine says, that one exists, that one is thinking, or that they\nare alive… From this clear, certain, and indubitable knowledge\none can form a rule for accepting as true all thoughts found to be as\nclear as this one appears to be (Logic, p.\n 228).[5]\n ", "\nThis is as close as Arnauld comes to using methodic doubt, but it does\nnot imply that one can really doubt the existence of an external\nworld, much less that one ought to do so, even once in one’s\nlifetime.", "\nIt is not clear to what extent Descartes would have agreed with that\ninterpretation of methodic doubt. He did not adopt the first of\nArnauld’s two suggested revisions. Perhaps he thought that the\npoint was covered in the “Synopsis” of the\nMeditations. But he did adopt Arnauld’s second\nrecommendation by adding some words in parentheses in the Sixth\nMeditation, thus:", "\nThe second reason for doubt was that since I did not know the author\nof my being (or at least was pretending not to), I saw nothing to rule\nout the possibility that my natural constitution made me prone to\nerror even in matters which seemed to me most true\n(Descartes, 2:53).\n", "\nOn the other hand, Descartes begins the Principles of\nPhilosophy with the remark,", "\nIt seems that the only way of freeing ourselves from these [prejudices\nof childhood] is to make the effort, once in the course of our life,\nto doubt everything which we find to contain even the smallest\nsuspicion of error (Descartes, 1:193).\n", "\nHere Descartes advocates an effort to develop a real doubt on a wide\nscale, the sort of advocacy that had aroused Arnauld’s\ntheological concern in the “Fourth\n Objections.”[6]" ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Philosophical method" }, { "content": [ "\nAs pointed out in 3.1 above, Arnauld identifies an idea with a\nperception (in the broad sense of the term characteristic of\nseventeenth-century philosophy). Kenneth L. Pearce employs the notion\nof an extrinsic denomination to throw new light on that position. In\nPearce’s words, “Arnauld does not intend a straightforward\nidentification of ideas with perceptions, for he draws a semantic\ndistinction between ‘perception’ and\n‘idea;’.” “Careful examination of this\nsemantic distinction,” he says, “will help us …\nachieve a proper understanding of the relationship between perceptions\nand ideas” (Pearce 2016, p. 380). To that end, he makes use of\nthe notion of an “extrinsic denomination,” a notion which\noccurs in Arnauld’s Ideas, in the statement,\n“Being conceived, in regard to the sun that is in the sky, is\nonly an extrinsic denomination, i.e., only a relation to the\nperception which I have of it” (quoted by Pearce on p. 382).\nPearce adds that:", "\nThe Logic defines an ‘extrinsic denomination’ as\na mode “taken from something that is not in the substance, such\nas ‘loved’, ‘seen’, ‘desired’,\nnames derived from the actions of something else” (Pearce, 2016,\np 382).\n", "\nTalking about perceptions and talking about ideas, Pearce says, are\ntwo different ways of describing a situation in which a person\nperceives an object:", "\nSuch a situation is relational, involving a relation of the perceiver\nto the object and a relation of the object to the perceiver. The first\nrelation is a real mode in the perceiver; the second is not a real\nmode, but rather a mere extrinsic denomination in the object (Pearce,\n2016, p. 382).\n", "\nPearce concludes:", "\nThis explains the sense in which the perception and the idea are\nidentical: just as one and the same worldly state of affairs entitles\nMary to the (intrinsic) denomination ‘lover’ and John to\nthe (extrinsic) denomination ‘beloved’, so one and the\nsame worldly state of affairs entitles my mind to the (intrinsic)\ndenomination ‘perception’ [sic] and the sun to\nthe (extrinsic) denomination ‘idea’ (Peatce, 2016, p.\n382–83)\n", "\nPearce suggests that “The reason Arnauld’s ideas are not\nobjectionable intrermediary entities is that they are not really\ndistinct from the external objects they represent” (p. 376). To\nput the point in another way,", "\nArnauld denies that the idea is a distinct third term in perception\nnot by identifying it with the perceptual act, but rather by\nidentifying it with the external object conceived by me\n(Pearce, 2016, p. 389).\n", "\nIn a subsequent article, Pearce shows how Arnauld uses the notion of\nan extrinsic denomination to resolve three apparent contradictions\nbetween what Arnauld says about representation and his", "\nsparce Cartesian ontology on which there are just two kinds of\nsubstance, thinking and extended … [and] every feature of a\nthinking substance is a way of thinking, and every feature of an\nextended substance is a way of being extended (Pearce forthcoming, p.\n1–2).\n", "\nThe first apparent contradiction arises because Arnauld maintains that\nwe directly perceive extended objects and yet that we do so by means\nof ideas in our mind. The solution is that the perception, e.g., of\nthe sun, is a real mode of thinking which essentially makes the sun\npresent to the mind, and in virtue of which the sun deserves the\nextrinsic denomination ‘idea of the sun’ (p. 22). The\nsecond apparent contradiction arises from the Port-Royal theory of\nlanguage. According to the Logic, language consists of sounds\nand visible characters which are signs of ideas. But signs are\nrepresentations and “representing is not a mode of extension and\ntherefore cannot modify an extended object such as a sound [or] a\nwritten word” (p. 19). The solution is that the idea which a\nword signifies “is connected to [the sign] only by a\nhabit,” the habit, namely “of conceiving of a certain\nobject whenever [the mind] perceives the symbol.” Consequently\n“the object is entitled to the name ‘sign’ on\naccount of the state of some mind or minds. In other words,\n‘sign’ is applied to the object by extrinsic\ndenomination” (p. 19–20). The third apparent contradiction\narises in Arnauld’s rejection of Malebranche’s position\nthat “the soul actually becomes red, blue or yellow [and] when\none smells a carcass the soul becomes formally putrid.” Arnauld\nagrees that colors and smells are modifications of the mind and not of\nextension. But this does not imply, Arnauld says, that “our soul\nshould be called either ‘green’, or ‘yellow’,\nor ‘putrid’” (p. 23). Arnauld adds, “There are\ninfinitely many names which suppose no modification in the\nthing to which they are given” (quoted by Pearce on p. 23 from\nArnauld’s Ideas ). Pearce comments, “The\napplication of a name that ‘supposes no modification in the\nthing to which [it is] given’ is extrinsic\ndenomination.”", "\nPearce has also located Arnauld’s account of ideas in the wider\ncontext of early modern philosophy. He classifies accounts of ideas as\ndescriptivist or explanatory. In the explanatory approach,\n“ideas are to be understood as posits in an explanatory\ntheory” (Pearce forthcoming, p. 2). Malebranche is the paradigm\npractitioner of the explanatory approach. In the descriptivist\napproach, by contrast, “claims about ideas are to be justified\nonly by direct introspection, and not by inference to the best\nexplanation” (Pearce, forthcoming, p. 9). Arnauld is the chief\npractitioner of the descriptivist approach. He not only rejects\nMalebranche’s attempt to explain how the mind perceives external\nobjects, but he also maintains that no such explanation is needed. For\nI know clearly by introspection that my nature is to think, and that\nthinking is representational. As Arnauld puts it, “Just as it is\nclear that I think, it is also clear that I think of something, i.e.,\nthat I perceive and know something” (quoted by Pearce from\nIdeas in Pearce, forthcoming, p. 8). It is similarly clear\nwhat it is that I think of, perceive or know, and in particular it is\nclear that I think of, perceive or know extended things. Pearce argues\nthat Locke follows Arnauld in his descriptivism, although not in his\ndirect realism (Pearce, forthcoming, p. 10). Berkeley too adopted the\ndescriptivist approach, a fact which helps to explain the absence of\narguments for Berkeley’s view that we cannot form abstract\ngeneral\n ideas.[7]" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Arnauld’s identification of ideas with perceptions in the light of his notion of an extrinsic denomination" }, { "content": [ "\nIf there is one part of Descartes’ philosophy that met with\nArnauld’s enthusiastic approval, it is Descartes’\nmind-body dualism. Yet even here Arnauld’s version of the\nCartesian philosophy departed in important ways from Descartes’\nown views. Arnauld’s departure did not have to do with the\ndistinction between mind and body; here he largely contents himself\nwith endorsing what Descartes\n says.[8]\n It had to do rather with the union of the mind and body in a human\nbeing. Arnauld rejected a claim at the core of Descartes’\nposition, namely, that the union of a person’s mind and body\nmakes it possible for the mind and the body to exercise real causal\naction on one another. Arnauld explicitly says that a person’s\nbody cannot act causally on his mind, and had at least some difficulty\nwith the notion that a person’s mind can act causally on his\nbody.", "\nIn 1680 Arnauld wrote an extended defense of the “the philosophy\nof Descartes” regarding “the essence of body and the union\nof the soul with the body,” against an attack by Fr. Etienne Le\n Moine.[9]\n Throughout this work, Arnauld quotes Malebranche as representative of\nthe Cartesian position, and what he defends under the heading,\n“the philosophy of Descartes,” is actually a modified\nversion of\n Malebranche.[10]\n According to the Cartesian philosophy, says Arnauld,", "\nAll the union (alliance) of the mind and the body which is\nknown to us consists in a natural and mutual correspondence of\nthoughts in the soul with traces in the brain and of emotions in the\nsoul with movements of the [animal] spirits.… It is not denied\nthat there may be something unknown to us in the union God has brought\nabout between our soul and our body (Examen, OA,\n38:141).\n", "\nwhat we do know, however, suffices to show that the mind is not\nrelated to the body as a pilot to his ship, but rather that the two\nare united in “a greater and more intimate union” by which\nthey form a single whole (Examen, OA, 38:141).", "\nArnauld next takes up a criticism directed by Le Moine against the\nCartesian account of sense perception, and this leads to the\nquestion,", "\nwhether it is the bodily movements [in the eye] that cause the\nperceptions in the soul; or whether they are only the occasion on\nwhich the soul forms [the perceptions] in itself; or whether God gives\n[the perceptions] to [the soul](Examen, OA, 38:146).\n", "\nArnauld says that it is “easy” to eliminate the first\nalternative: “For since the motion of a body can at best have no\nother effect than to move another body (I say at best because\nit may have not even that), who does not see that it can have no\neffect on a spiritual soul?” (Examen, OA,\n38:146). He adds that St. Augustine considered it beyond doubt that a\nbody can have an effect only on our body, and not on our soul. Arnauld\nrules out the second of his three alternatives on the grounds that the\nsoul cannot form sensible perceptions in itself on the occasion of\nparticular motions in the bodily sensory apparatus because the soul is\nnot aware of those motions (Examen, OA, 38: 147).\nThis leaves Arnauld with the third alternative, which he accepts,\nadding that God voluntarily undertakes to cause in our soul\nperceptions of sensible qualities whenever the corresponding motions\noccur in the sensory organs “according to the laws He himself\nhas established in nature” (Examen, OA,\n38:148). He summarizes this conclusion by saying that our body does\nnot act on our soul as a “physical cause (cause\nphysique)” but only as a “moral cause (cause\nmorale)” (Examen, OA, 38:150).", "\nArnauld had a quite different position regarding the causation of\nvoluntary movements in the body. He held that, in general, it is\npossible for immaterial, thinking beings to act causally on material\nthings, and that, in fact, God has on occasion given angels the power\nto do so. He also held that the mind of Adam and of Eve had the power\nto bring about voluntary motions in their bodies before the Fall, and\nthat the minds of the blessed in heaven will enjoy that power. He\nsuggests that the voluntary bodily motions of human beings in this\nlife here below are not caused by the person’s volitions. His\nreason for this negative position is that post-lapsarian human beings\ndo not know how to bring about the movements of the animal spirits\nthat cause the motions of their muscles and limbs. Thus he says,", "\nIf one can say [that God has not given our soul a real power\nto determine the course of the animal spirits toward the muscles of\nthe parts of our body that we want to move], it is not [on the grounds\nof a general occasionalism like Malebranche’s]… It is\nonly because our soul does not know what must be done in order to move\nour arm by means of the animal spirits (emphasis added;\nDissertation sur les Miracles de l’ancienne loi,\nOA, 38:690).\n", "\nSteven Nadler cites this text while arguing that Arnauld was an\n“occasionalist” both about the causation of sensory\nperceptions by bodies, and about the causation of voluntary movements\nby the human mind (Nadler 1995, 138). Nadler recognizes that Arnauld\nhad quite different attitudes toward the two cases, but nevertheless\nsays that Arnauld “alone among Cartesians” recognized\nmind-body interaction as a specific problem in Descartes’\nmetaphysics, and “used an occasionalist solution” (Nadler\n1995, 144).", "\nArnauld’s treatment of the union of mind and body shows that he\nwas not a docile follower of Descartes, and was prepared to develop\n“the philosophy of Descartes” in ways that Descartes would\nprobably not have accepted. It also shows that Arnauld was prepared to\nmodify Descartes’ philosophy in a way that increased its\nsimilarity to Augustine. It is well known that Arnauld pointed out\nsimilarities between Augustine and Descartes from the beginning of his\npublished work, in the “Fourth Objections.” In the present\ncase, however, Arnauld changes the philosophy of Descartes in a way\nthat increases its similarity to Augustine. Arnauld did not mention\nAquinas, though he could have done so, as another authority who held\nthat a material thing cannot produce an immaterial effect. It was only\na few years later, in Ideas, that Arnauld began to claim an\naffinity between the views of Descartes and those of Aquinas. But in\nhis development of the Cartesian position on the union of mind and\nbody, one can already see Arnauld attempting to make of Descartes a\nChristian philosopher standing in continuity with his great patristic\nand scholastic predecessors. (This attempt on Arnauld’s part is\nexplored in the journal Dix-Septieme Sciecle, 2013/2 no.\n259.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Mind-body dualism" }, { "content": [ "\nThere is a continuing discussion of Arnauld’s attitude toward\nthe view which Descartes expressed in answer to Mersenne’s\nquestion “by what kind of causality God established the eternal\ntruths.” Descartes replied, “by the same kind of causality\nas he created all things, that is to say, as their efficient and total\ncause” (Descartes, p.\n 25).[11]\n The debate has been greatly influenced by Jean-Luc Marion’s\ninterpretation, in La théologie blanche de Descartes,\naccording to which Descartes’ position on the matter is\nfundamental to his metaphysics. Consequently, to the extent that\nArnauld, in his mature writings, adopted Descartes’ metaphysics,\nit has seemed reasonable to say that Arnauld agreed with Descartes\nabout “the creation of the eternal truths.” Indeed Denis\nMoreau says, “Arnauld is therefore one of the rare (and if we\ncan grant him the adjective, the only great) post-Cartesian to accept\nthe thesis of the creation of the eternal truths” (Moreau, 1999,\np. 180)." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 The Creation of the eternal truths" }, { "content": [ "\nSteven Nadler accepts Moreau’s conclusion about Arnauld and the\ncreation of the eternal truths. As Nadler puts it,", "\nThere is no need for me to go into this question here in any detail,\nsince Denis Moreau, in his magnificent study of the\nArnauld-Malebranche debate, has, to my mind, persuasively shown that\nArnauld does, in fact – and despite his refusal explicitly to\nendorse (or reject) the doctrine – accept the creation of the\neternal truths (Nadler, 2008, p. 532).\n", "\nBut he faults Moreau for not having gone “far enough along the\npath that Arnauld traces,” and thus having failed “to see\nhow radical Arnauld’s conception of God really is. For\neverything points to Arnauld’s God being an ultimately arbitrary\ndeity who does not act for reasons at all – indeed a deity who,\nin His being, transcends practical rationality altogether” (p.\n533). In Nadler’s view, Arnauld follows Descartes in holding\nthat God is absolutely simple and consequently that in God “will\nand understanding are one and the same thing,” not\ndistinguishable even by a distinction of reason. For Arnauld\n(following Descartes),", "\nthe relationship between will and wisdom in God is so unlike their\nrelationship in human beings – where will and undertanding\nare distinct faculties of the mind, and the former cannot\nfunction unless the latter presents to it ideas for consideration\n– that no analogy can be drawn from the human for the purpose of\nunderstanding the divine (p.\n 532).[12]\n ", "\nMoreau gives a very different account of Arnauld’s concept of\nGod. Invoking the doctrine of divine simplicity, Arnauld says that\nGod’s will is His wisdom, for God’s will\nis God Himself and God’s wisdom is God\nHimself. There can, therefore, be no question of God’s wisdom\nlimiting His will. Nevertheless, far from being a deity who does not\nact reasonably, “God’s action is both reasonable and\nreasoned; it is the action of a wisdom”(Moreau, 1999,\np. 281). Arnauld holds that Gods attributes are\n“integrated” and “unified”; Arnauld speaks of\nthe “reasonable will” of God and “affirms that\n‘God wills nothing except wisely, He wills nothing that His\nwisdom does not will. In God the will wills and reasons, and the\nreason reasons and wills.” But if pressed to give God’s\nreasons for doing what He does, Arnauld can only reply that “God\ndoes what He wills, we do not know why and can give no reason except\nHis will to do what he does” (Moreau, 1999, p. 295). In sum,\nGod’s reasons for what He does are\n“incomprehensible,” but His actions are not\n“irrational” (Moreau, 1999, p. 296, note 2).", "\nIn “Arnauld’s God Reconsidered,” Eric Stencil has\nattempted to adjudicate this disagreement (Stencil, 2019).\nStencil’s attempt is divided into two parts. The first is\nfocussed on the doctrine of divine simplicity, and takes up the\nquestion of whether God’s wisdom is distinct in any way from His\nwill. The second takes up the question of whether God acts for\nreasons.", "\nAs Stencil points out Moreau and Nadler agree that Arnauld subscribes\nto what Stencil calls “the identity thesis,” that God,\nGod’s action, and God’s attributes are identical.\nAccording to Nadler, however, Arnauld goes farther, and denies that\nGod’s wisdom and His will are distinct even by a\n“distinction of reason.” Stencil disagrees. Against the\nbackground of the treatment of abstraction in the Port Royal\nLogic, Stencil maintains that Arnauld holds “the\ndistinctness thesis,” that “God, God’s actions, and\nGod’s attributes are conceptually distinct” (Stencil,\n2019, p. 24–5). Reflection on the clear idea of God. and on the\nclear ideas of His attributes, which we form by abstraction, allows us\nto establish various truths about God and His attributes. But that\nreflection reequires that we distinguish conceptually among the\nvarious attributes. Arnauld also subscribes to “the nonpriority\nthesis,” the thesis “that there are no conceptual\npriorities among God, God’s actions, and God’s\nattributes” (Stencil, 2019, p. 21). To deny the nonpriority\nthesis is, in Arnauld’s view, to “anthropomorphize”\nGod, to make him “operate like a finite being.” Stencil\nconcludes, “So, contra Nadler, I suggest that we treat\nArnauld as allowing for conceptual distinctions – but not\nconceptual priorities – among God’s various\nattributes” (Stencil, 2019, p. 26–7).", "\nStencil points out that his account of divine simplicity “is in\nsome ways a defense of Morearu’s interpretation against\nNadler’s objections” (Stencil, 2019, p.\n 27).[13]\n He then turns to the question of whether Arnauld’s God acts for\nreasons. Here he finds evidence on both sides of the issue:", "\nMoreau has highlighted passages where Arnauld is explicit about not\ndenying that God acts for reasons or that God’s actions have\nends. Nevertheless, Nadler has presented systematic and compelling\nevidence for concluding that Arnauld’s God does not act for\nreasons. (p. 28)\n", "\nStencil claims, nevertheless, that", "\nIn fact, Arnauld offes a consistent position about whether God acts\nfor reasons. Arnauld is ‘agnostic’ about whether God acts\nfor reasons absolutely – whether God acts for reasons\nin any sense at all. (p. 29)\n", "\nArnauld claims to know that “Malebranche’s account of how\nGod acts for reasons … treats God as a finite being – and\nthis makes his account unacceptable and false” (p. 29). But that\nleaves open the question of whether God acts for reasons in some other\nway. On Strencil’s interpretation, Arnauld says that we cannot\nknow the answer. If Stencil is right about Arnauld’s\nagnosticism, then the most that Nadler’s evidence can show is\nthat for Arnauld it is “beyond our epistemic means” to say\nthat God does, or that He does not, act for reasons. As for the\npassages cited by Moreau in which Arnauld refuses to deny that God\nacts for reasons, they do not affirm that God does not act for\nreasons, but simply refuse to deny what we cannot know to be\nfalse.", "\nAn interesting example cited by Moreau is Augustine’s rhetorical\nquestion, “Who would dare to say that God created all things\nwithout reason?” (cited by Moreau on p. 295, note 2). Stencil\ntakes the question to be a way of saying “We dare not state or\ncould not prove a denial that God acts for reasons” (Stencil,\n2019, p. 29). Unfortunately Moreau does not explain the context in\nwhich Arnauld quotes Augustine’s question. The context is\nArnauld’s enthusiastic endorsement of Aquinas’ argument in\nSumma Theologiae, I, 19, 2 and 5 (Réflexions, II, 2,\nOA, XXXIX, 430–31). Article 2 has to do with whether\nGod wills things other than Himself. Aquinas says that “the will\nof God is directed to things other than Himself,” and this is\nbecause", "\nit is a perfection of the will of God to communicate to other things\nthe good He possesses … So God wills that He be what He is and\nalso wills that other things be. But He wills Himself as the end and\nother things as related to the end, insofar as it is appropriate to\nthe divine goodness that other things participate in it. (translation\nof Arnauld’s French rendering of Aquinas by author)\n", "\nArticle 5 addresses the question of whether the will of God has a\ncause. Arnauld comments,", "\n[Aquinas] answers in the negative because it is not with God as it is\nwith men. A man wills an end; he wills to be cured of an illness. His\nwilling that end is the cause of his willing the means suitable for\nobtaining it. That is how [Malebranche] makes God act, not noticing\nthat he falls into the mistake which he often says must be avoided, of\nspeaking about God according to [our] ideas of the way that men act.\n", "\nBecause God wills all things by a single act,", "\nwe cannot say that He wills what is for the end (that is to say, the\ncreatures) because He wills the end, but we should say only that He\nwills that what is for the end be related to the end. He wills\nx to exist for the sake of y, but He does not will x\nfor the sake of y (VULT hoc esse propter hoc, sed non\npropter hoc vult\n hoc.)[14]\n ", "\nAugustine’s rhetorical question is raised as an objection: If\nGod does not will to create things in order to accomplish an end,\nthen, contrary to the import of Augustine’s question, God\ncreates things without reason. Arnauld summarizes Aquinas’\nreply:", "\nThe will of God is reasonable, not because He wills only if there is\nsome reason which causes Him to will (qui le fasse vouloir),\nbut because He wills that among the things He makes some exist for the\nsake of others (OA, XXXIX, 431).\n", "\nHere Arnauld distinguishes the question of whether God’s\ncreative action is reasonable from the question of whether in creating\nGod acts for a reason. He answers the first question, but not the\nsecond, in the affirmative." ], "subsection_title": "3.5 Are God’s actions reasonable?" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nNicolas Malebranche was born in 1638, when Arnauld was twenty-six\nyears old. In 1660, Malebranche joined the Oratory, a center for\npriests in Paris that had many connections with Port-Royal.\nMalebranche and Arnauld were on friendly terms in the early 1670s, but\nlate in the decade they had a falling out over Malebranche’s\nexplanation of the fact that not all men are saved, and related\n matters.[15]\n In 1680, Malebranche published his position, against Arnauld’s\nadvice, in the Treatise of Nature and Grace (hereinafter\nTNG). The ensuing public controversy between the two was a\ncentral event in the intellectual life of Europe in the late\nseventeenth century.", "\nArnauld’s attack on TNG began in a surprising way, with\nthe publication of On True and False Ideas (hereinafter\nIdeas) in 1683. In it, Arnauld presents his own position on\nthe nature of ideas, which was described above, and argues that\nMalebranche’s view that we see all things (or at least all\nbodily things) in God and by means of God’s ideas is not only\nmistaken, but thoroughly confused and wrong-headed. This work\nengendered a preliminary debate that lasted for two years. The\npublication of Réflexions in 1685–86, preceded\nin 1685 by the publication of Arnauld’s Dissertation sur les\nmiracles de l’ancien loi, provoked further exchanges\nbetween the two in 1687, with a last gasp on Arnauld’s part in\n1694, the year of his death, and on Malebranche’s part ten years\nlater, in\n 1704.[16]" ], "section_title": "4. Arnauld and Malebranche", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nTNG provides a general account of God’s reasons for\ncreating a world with the evils that the world contains. But\nMalebranche is mainly interested in one particular evil, namely, that\nnot all men are saved. That not all men are saved he took to be a\ndatum of revelation, plainly expressed in the Scriptures. But he\ndenied that it follows that God does not want all men to be saved.\nIndeed, he says his motive in writing TNG was to refute those\nwho concluded that God did not have a “sincere will” to\nsave all men:", "\nIf there were not in this century people determined to hold that God\ndoes not have a sincere will to save all men, it would not be\nnecessary to establish principles suitable for destroying that unhappy\nopinion. But the need to combat errors brings to light principles\nsuitable to that end. I protest before God that that was the principal\nmotive that made me\n write.[17]\n ", "\nIf God wants to save all men, something must prevent Him from doing\nwhat He wants to do. In the “Troisième\nEclaircissement” to TNG, Malebranche says that\nsince God is omnipotent, He can bring about whatever He wants to bring\nabout. But because His will is “the love He bears for His own\nattributes,” He cannot, by a “practical”\n will,[18]\n will anything or will in any way that is not wise: “The wisdom\nof God renders Him impotent in this sense that it does not permit him\nto will certain things, or to act in certain ways” (OM,\n5:180). What prevents God from carrying out His will to save all men,\nMalebranche concludes, must be that doing so would require ways or\nmanners of willing that are unwise. As he puts it a few pages later,\nGod’s wisdom “holds His volitions in check, in the sense\nthat not all of His volitions are practical volitions”\n(OM, 5:184).", "\nMalebranche argues that God’s wisdom restrains Him from\nsanctifying and saving all men because it directs Him not only to\ncreate a world that is good, but also to create “in a way worthy\nof Him, by ways (par des voyes) that are simple, general,\nconstant, and uniform” (OM, 5:49). More precisely,\nGod’s wisdom directs Him to an act of creating that best\ncombines goodness or perfection of the created world with simplicity\nof ways of creating. An analogy may help explain Malebranche’s\nposition. Suppose that someone sets out to buy a car and wants to do\nthe best possible job of car-buying. Suppose further that the\nsecond-best car is available at a much better price than the best car.\nIn this case, doing the best job of car-buying might require buying\nless than the best car. In a somewhat similar way, Malebranche holds\nthat the best job of creating, the one most worthy of God, involves\ncreating a world less perfect than He might have made it, in\nparticular, a world in which not all human beings are saved.", "\nMalebranche’s notion of the simplicity of God’s ways of\ncreating depends on his occasionalism. According to that theory of\nefficient causality, God is the only true efficient cause. When\ncreatures appear to be efficient causes, they are really only\noccasional causes. That is, the events in which the apparent created\ncauses take part are followed by other events in accordance with laws\nof nature, which are God’s general volitions. But the created\n“causes” do not really cause the events that follow. These\nevents, like every created reality, are really caused by\n God.[19]\n For Malebranche, the simplicity of God’s ways depends on there\nbeing a small number of laws of nature, and on there being few\nexceptions to the laws. Malebranche maintains that in order to do the\njob of creating that best combines goodness of the world created with\nsimplicity of ways of creating, God had to make a world with precisely\nthe natural evils (misshapen animals, human suffering, ugly\nlandscapes, etc.) that that are present in the world as it is.", "\nThe anomalies in the order of grace are explained in a similar way.\nMalebranche divides grace, the divine assistance given to human\nbeings, into two kinds, which he calls “grace of light\n(lumière)” and “grace of feeling\n(sentiment)” (OM, 5:96–97; 131). The\nformer is, quite simply, knowledge. Malebranche also calls it\n“the grace of the Creator,” because it is given, in\ndifferent forms, both to Adam and Eve and to human beings after their\nFall. Grace of feeling is “the grace of Jesus Christ,” and\nwas merited for human beings by the life and death of Jesus.\nMalebranche also describes it as a “pleasure\n(délectation)” which makes a person love God\n(TNG, OM, 5:135). According to Malebranche, the\ngrace of the Creator is “dry, abstract, entirely pure and\nentirely intelligible” and does not lead us to love God. The\ngrace of Christ, in contrast, is “efficace par\nelle-même” in that it “always has its effect, always\ncarries us toward God” (OM, 5:132). Human beings, after\nthe fall of Adam, are unable to grow in holiness, or even to be saved\nfrom damnation, without the grace of Christ. But the love of God\nproduced by grace is a sort of instinctive love, which is not\nmeritorious and is not sufficient for salvation. Whether the person\nwho receives the grace of Christ is saved depends on the\nperson’s free consent to the movement toward God that grace\nproduces, which converts the instinctive love of God into a\n“free and rational” love. This consent is not produced by\ngrace.", "\nNow Malebranche holds that God could give to each person grace that\nwould assure the person’s salvation:", "\nGod is the master of hearts. He can give to the impious a grace such\nthat it will convert him, since God knows what degree of grace to\ngive, and when it must be given, in order that it bring about the\nconversion of the sinner (OM, 5:186).\n", "\nSimilarly, God knows what sort of grace would ensure that any person\nis not only saved, but also attains the maximum holiness of which he\nor she is capable. But many who receive grace do not grow in holiness\nand are not saved. For example, many who enter the Church later fall\naway.", "\nGod often distributes graces, without their having the effect that His\ngoodness makes us believe He would make them have. He makes the piety\nof some people increase right up to the end of their life, but sin\novercomes them at death and throws them into Hell. He makes the rain\nof grace fall upon hardened hearts as well as on earth that is\nprepared: people resist it and make it useless for their salvation.\n… How can that be reconciled with wisdom? (OM, 5:48).\n", "\nMalebranche’s answer is that God’s wisdom dictates that He\nact, in the distribution of both sorts of grace, according general\nvolitions determined by created occasional causes to particular\neffects. In the case of the grace of the Creator, the general\nvolitions are laws of nature, and the occasional causes are “the\ndiverse movements of our will” and “the encounter of\nsensible objects that act on our mind” (TNG, 5:102).\nFor the grace of Jesus Christ, the occasional cause is Jesus Christ,\nin his human nature, and the general volition is that grace be given\nto human beings if and only if Jesus, in his human nature, asks that\nit be given. Jesus’ requests for grace are made in view of the\nneeds of the Church. But Jesus, in his human nature, does not always\nthink of “the future determination of the will” of those\nfor whom he requests grace. The result is that, often enough, people\nreceive grace that does not lead to their holiness and salvation, or\nfail to receive the grace that would have done so (TNG,\nOM, 5:83)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Malebranche’s position in the Treatise of Nature and Grace" }, { "content": [ "\nArnauld thought that Malebranche’s position was dangerous, and\nthat if accepted it would have ruinous consequences for the Catholic\nfaith. He was “furious,” as Denis Moreau has aptly said,\n“and decided to leave nothing standing in a philosophy that\nclearly frightened him” (Moreau 1999, 240). Here only the\ngeneral lines of Arnauld’s attack are set forth. First, two\npervasive themes in Arnauld’s criticism are described: (1) that\nMalebranche often did not proceed by the proper method of either\nphilosophy or theology; and (2) that Malebranche speaks of God in\nanthropomorphic terms, as if He were subject to the limitations of a\nhuman\n agent.[20]\n Then Arnauld’s criticisms of Malebranche’s position that\nGod acts by “general volitions” will be discussed.", "\n1. Throughout Réflexions, beginning with the\n“Avant-Propos” to the work, Arnauld challenges Malebranche\nto make clear whether his claims are based on reason or on Scripture\nand\n tradition.[21]\n He had mounted this sort of challenge even earlier, in\nIdeas:", "\nHe does not say that he learned those grand maxims on which all of\nthat [Treatise of Nature and Grace] turns by the revelation\nof God: that if God wills to act externally, it is because He\nwills to obtain an honor worthy of Himself; that He acts by the\nsimplest ways; that He does not act by particular volitions; but by\ngeneral volitions which are determined by occasional causes\n(Ideas, 174).\n", "\nNor could all of those maxims be demonstrated, in Malebranche’s\nsense of the term. For Malebranche says that only necessary truths can\nbe demonstrated, and yet he admits that God does sometimes act by\nparticular volitions, namely, when He performs miracles. Hence\nMalebranche himself would have to admit that the third maxim, at\nleast, is not demonstrable. In Arnauld’s view, Malebranche came\nto accept such principles because he thought they made God more\nloveable and hence were favorable to the cause of religion. In this\nway Malebranche introduces, on the basis of religious considerations,\nprinciples that are not found in Scripture and tradition.", "\nArnauld thought that this unholy introduction of religion into what\nought to be treated as philosophical questions began with\nMalebranche’s theory of ideas, according to which “we see\nall things in God.” Thus, in the “Conclusion” of his\nDéfense contre la Réponse au livre des vraies et des\nfausses Idées (OA, 38, 367–668; hereinafter\nDéfense), Arnauld takes up “two or three\nobjections” that might be raised against Ideas. The\nsecond objection is one that had been raised by Nicole: “I could\nhave avoided this philosophical topic [of the nature of ideas] so as\nnot to interrupt what I had begun to write about the Treatise of\nNature and Grace.” In reply, Arnauld says,", "\nWhat was at the outset a question of philosophy … is not such\nfor [Malebranche]. For him it is a question of theology, very sublime\nand very elevated. He considers it a religious duty to devote his\nwhole mind to its defense. He finds it bad that others should disagree\nwith him, and even says that anyone who is not of his opinion must be\n‘either an unenlightened philosopher or a man insensitive to his\nduties.’ Thus he has changed the form of the dispute. He has\ninvolved religion, and has become so devoted to his novel thoughts as\nto hold that anyone who does not approve of them lacks respect for the\nwisdom of God Himself. (Défense, OA, 38:666)\n", "\nIn Arnauld’s direct attack on TNG, he says again and\nagain that Malebranche relies on principles that have neither a proper\ntheological basis in Scripture and tradition, nor a proper\nphilosophical basis in reason. Clearly he thought that this criticism\napplied as well to Malebranche’s theory of ideas. But if Arnauld\ntook seriously the remark at the beginning of the Logic,\n“The reflections we can make on our ideas are perhaps the most\nimportant part of logic, since they are the foundation of everything\nelse,” he may well have thought that Malebranche’s theory\nof ideas was an important source of the confusion of theology with\nphilosophy that plagues TNG. That, in turn, would help\nexplain his decision to begin his attack on TNG with a\ntreatise on the nature of\n ideas.[22]", "\n2. Arnauld agreed with Malebranche that God’s will is\nreasonable, but he disagreed with Malebranche’s way of\nconceiving God’s\n reasonableness.[23]\n In both Book I and Book II of Réflexions, he tries to\nshow that Malebranche conceives of God’s reasonableness as if it\nwere the reasonableness of a human being. In the second chapter of\nBook I, he reports a series of arguments given by Malebranche early in\nTNG for the conclusion that God acts in the order of nature\nonly by general volitions. These arguments, says Arnauld, are\n“only comparisons with men, which … cannot prove anything\nwith regard to God; or popular thoughts not worthy … of a\nphilosopher” (OA, 39:188). For example, Malebranche\nsays that God decides to create that which can be produced and\nconserved by the simplest laws because he is an excellent workman, and\n“an excellent workman … does not do by complicated ways\nwhat he could carry out by simpler ones” (TNG,\nOM, 5:28). Arnauld objects that there is no similarity\nbetween an excellent human workman and God,", "\nsince all the ways of executing His plans are equally easy for Him,\nand ‘His power,’ as the author [Malebranche] recognizes,\n‘makes Him so much the master of all things, and so independent\nof help from elsewhere, that it suffices that He will, in order for\nHis volitions to be carried out’ (OA, 39:189–90).\n", "\nHence God’s volitions are not based on reasoning about the means\nto achieve a desired end.", "\nBook II of Réflexions, which deals with God’s\nway of acting in the order of grace, opens with a related criticism.\nArnauld begins by analyzing a line of thought that Malebranche\npresents in the Troisième Eclaircissement to\nTNG (OA, 39:425–51). The line of thought\nbegins with two claims: that “God can act only for Himself. If\nHe wills to act, it is because He wills to procure an honor worthy of\nHimself” and that “God can receive an honor worthy of\nHimself only from Himself.” Yet I am created, so I must be able\nto render to God an honor worthy of Him. This I can do, says\nMalebranche, only by becoming a part of the Church, of which the\nIncarnate Second Person of the Trinity is the cornerstone. More\ngenerally, “God’s great plan is to build in His own honor\na spiritual temple, of which Jesus Christ is the cornerstone …\nHis plan is that this Temple should be as large and perfect as\npossible.” Malebranche then draws an important conclusion:", "\nGod wills that all men enter into this spiritual building, to enlarge\nit. God wills that all men be saved … God also hopes\nthat men will merit outstanding degrees of glory: His will is our\nsanctification. (OM, 5:183)\n", "\nBut although God wants the salvation and sanctification of all men,\n“He loves His wisdom infinitely more,” and His wisdom\nrequires that He act in the way that is wisest and most worthy of\nHimself, that is, in “general, constant and uniform way,”\nwith the result that “He does not save all men, although He\ntruly wills that they all be saved” (OM, 5:185).", "\nArnauld has much to say against that line of thought, and he begins be\nattacking its very first step, the claim that God “can act\nexternally only in order to procure an honor worthy of Himself”\n(OA,\n 39:428–40).[24]\n He objects that this is not a proper way to speak about an infinitely\nperfect being. Once again, Malebranche is guilty of anthropomorphism.\nFor he says, in effect,", "\nthat [God] could resolve to create me, me and the other creatures,\nonly for some advantage He wanted to obtain for Himself by creating\nus…. That is how [Malebranche] lowers [God], by claiming that\nHe cannot decide to create anything externally, except to procure an\nhonor worthy of Himself. (OA, 39:429)\n", "\nArnauld goes on to contrast Malebranche’s way of describing\nGod’s creation with that of St. Thomas, who say that the reason\nGod creates is that His goodness tends to overflow and communicate\nitself to other\n things.[25]", "\nArnauld also says that to speak about God as consulting His\nwisdom before acting is to speak about God as one would about a human\nbeing who wills an end and is thereby caused to will the means to that\nend (OA, 39:432). It is to compare God to a man who consults\nhis wisdom about everything he wants to do “as if he were afraid\nof not acting well, and his will needed to be ruled by something other\nthan itself in order to do only what is good” (OA,\n39:599–600). “Is it an expression of rigorous\nexactitude to say of God that He consults His wisdom,\nand that is how it comes about that everything He wills is\nwise,” Arnauld asks,", "\nas if the word consult is suitable for an infinitely perfect\nbeing when one professes not to speak in popular language? As if God\nneeded to consult His wisdom so that what He wills should be wise? As\nif His will were not His wisdom? As if everything He wills were not\nessentially wise, by virtue of the fact that He wills it?\n(OA, 39:578)\n", "\nGod’s will is not a force that needs to be tamed. The truth,\naccording to Arnauld, is that it is impossible that God should have an\nactual (sincere) will for something that is not in fact wise.", "\nIn a related criticism, Arnauld chides Malebranche for allowing\n“very little freedom and indifference” in God’s\ncreative action. Arnauld quotes Malebranche:", "\nAssuming that God wills to produce outside of Himself a work worthy of\nHimself, He is not indifferent in the choice; He\nought to produce the most perfect work possible by relation to the\nsimplicity of the ways by which He acts; He owes it to Himself to\nfollow the rules of his wisdom. (Quoted by Arnauld at\nRéflexions, OA, 39:598, from TNG,\nOM, 5: 110).\n", "\nMalebranche tries to save for God at least freedom and indifference\nwith regard to creating or not creating. But Arnauld suggests that\nthis move is ruled out by “the way in which he conceives\nGod’s action,” for supposedly, on Malebranche’s\nview, God would consult His wisdom before deciding whether to create\nor not, and just as His wisdom advises Him to create this world rather\nthan a less perfect one, assuming that the two could be created in an\nequally simple way, His wisdom would also advise Him that it is better\nto create than not to create (OA,\n 39:599–600).[26]" ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Two themes in Arnauld’s criticism of the Treatise of Nature and Grace" }, { "content": [ "\nArnauld devoted much of Réflexions to\nMalebranche’s position that God acts by general volitions and\nnot by particular volitions. In Book I of Réflexions,\nhis focus is on the order of nature and he tries to show that\nMalebranche’s claim that God acts only by general volitions is\nconfused and even self-contradictory. In Book II, his focus is on the\norder of grace and he attacks Malebranche’s claim that God does\nnot distribute grace by particular volitions.", "\nArnauld begins his criticism in Book I by claiming that Malebranche\nconfuses acting by general volitions and acting according\nto general laws. Arnauld grants that God acts according to\ngeneral laws. But against the claim that God acts by general\nvolitions, he provides an argument that is simple, and, his view,\ndecisive:", "\nWhatever [God] does, He does in particular, and not in general. But\nsince to will and to do, in God, are the same thing, given\nthat He creates each soul by a particular action, He must also will to\ncreate it by a particular will. (OA, 39:175)\n", "\nIn some passages, Malebranche’s language suggests that\nGod’s wisdom dictates that He engage in the act of creating that\nbest combines the goodness of the world created with the simplicity of\nthe laws according to which the world is created, and not\nwith simplicity of the volition whereby God creates\n(TNG, OM, 5:147). This suggests that for Malebranche\nGod does will particular created effects, though He wills that they\ntake place according to certain laws. But Arnauld did not think that\nthis was Malebranche’s view. For suppose that God creates the\nworld according to a simple set of laws. Let these laws, as regards\nbodies, be the laws of motion. A world created according to such laws\nmight be more perfect than a world not created according to general\nlaws, or created according to a different set of laws. But that would\nbe of no help to Malebranche. For he does not say that a world\nregulated by simpler laws is a more perfect world. Rather he maintains\nthat creating such a world is a simpler act of creation in God\nHimself. But it is not at all clear how simplicity of laws according\nto which the world is created would make God’s way of creating\nsimpler, especially if God’s creative activity includes the will\nto create every particular part of the creative world.\nMalebranche’s real position, according to Arnauld, emerges in\nthose passages in which he identifies the “ways” in which\nthe word is created with the actions whereby God creates. An example\nis the passage, “An excellent workman ought to proportion his\naction to his work; he does not accomplish by highly complex ways\n(voyes) what He can execute by simpler ones” (TNG,\nOM, 5:28). To this Arnauld objects that the volitions by which\nGod creates are particular.", "\nArnauld next points out that Malebranche does not say, without\nqualification, that God creates by general volitions. Rather,\nMalebranche says that God’s creative will is", "\nthe cause of a particular effect; but he calls it general, because he\nholds that God has this will only when He is determined to have it by\nan occasional cause, which must be a creature. (OA, 39:176).\n", "\nIn other words, according to Malebranche, God causes particular\neffects in creation, but the contribution of God’s volition, as\nopposed to the contribution of created occasional causes, is general.\nLater on, Arnauld says that, on Malebranche’s view, it is really\nonly the free volitions of creatures that can be said to determine\nGod, in view of His general volitions, to produce a particular effect.\nFor, according to Malebranche, God is the cause of every bodily event,\nincluding those which, together with the general laws, are supposed to\ndetermine any given consequent event. (OA, 39:230). But\nMalebranche is committed, so Arnauld argues, to the position that the\nfree volitions of creatures are not caused by God (OA,\n 39:248–57).[27]", "\nArnauld goes farther and says that Malebranche’s position on\nGod’s creative will is, in fact, self-contradictory. For\nMalebranche", "\nwas not of the opinion of those philosophers who believe that God\noriginally created all things, gave them the qualities necessary for\ntheir conservation and the powers they needed in order to act, and\nthen left them to act without further involving Himself.\n", "\nOn the contrary, Malebranche insists that “God is the sole cause\nof everything in the world, up to the smallest movement of the\nsmallest atom.” But he also holds that God “acts in the\nworld only as a universal cause, whose general volitions are\ndetermined by the … changes … in creatures, as by so\nmany occasional causes.” Arnauld tries to show that these two\npositions are inconsistent with one another (OA,\n39:231–37).", "\nNear the end of Book II of Réflexions, Arnauld takes\nup Malebranche’s arguments for the claim, “God does not\nact, in the order of grace, by particular volitions,” as\nsummarized by Malebranche in the Premier Eclaircissement to\nTNG (OA, 39:621). Malebranche says that the\nproposition in question can be proved by reason “in two ways;\nà priori & à posteriori; that is, by our\nidea of God, and by the effects of grace.” The chief “a\npriori” argument involves the claim that “to choose\noccasional causes, and to establish general laws for carrying out some\nwork, indicates an infinitely more extensive knowledge than to act by\nparticular volitions.” Arnauld retorts, “Is it something\nto be put up with, that human beings … should have the temerity\nto make themselves judges of what is a sign in God of greater\nintelligence and wisdom?” (OA, 39:624).", "\nArnauld quotes Malebranche’s statement, “The à\npriori proofs are too abstract to convince most people of the\ntruth I am proposing. It is more à propos to prove it\nà posteriori,” and goes on to consider the a\nposteriori arguments (OA, 39:625–43). He is less\nsarcastic in dealing with these arguments than with the a priori ones.\nHe says that there are “three or four of them, but they all\namount to the same thing: There are graces that are inefficacious, and\nthis would not occur if God gave His graces by particular\nvolitions.” He mentions three such arguments, based on the\npremise that graces are given to sinners who are not entirely\nconverted; on the premise that grace often falls upon hearts disposed\nin such a way that the grace does not bear fruit; and, finally, on the\npremise that graces given to sinners sometimes end up making them even\nmore guilty.", "\nArnauld assumes that these arguments have to do with “the true\ngrace of Jesus Christ, as defined by St. Augustine: Inspiratio\ndilectionis, ut cognita sancto amore faciamus, an inspiration of\nlove given to us so that we should do the good with holy\naffection.” Such grace is efficacious if it infallibly has its\neffect. But the effect in question may be either proximate\n(prochain) or remote (éloigné). As in\nthe famous example of Augustine, a grace may be efficacious in that it\nproduces the desire to be chaste, and yet not efficacious in that it\nfails to produces chastity itself. Similarly, Malebranche’s\narguments assume that “Every grace has the effect for which God\ngives it.” But once again, this phrase may refer to the effect\nfor which God gives the grace by His absolute will, or to the effect\nthat grace tends to produce by its nature and for which God gives the\ngrace by His antecedent will. Arnauld grants that if God gives\nefficacious graces by particular volitions, then there are none that\nfail to have the proximate effect, which God intends they have by His\nabsolute will. But they may well fail to have remote effects to which\nthey tend by their nature and which God wills only by His antecedent\nwill. For example, if an efficacious grace has the effect that a\nsinner repents, only to lapse back into sin, then the grace had the\nproximate effect God intended it to have by His absolute will, even\nthough it failed to have all the effect to which it tended by its\nnature and which God willed by His antecedent will. In this way, he\ndisposes of Malebranche’s three a posteriori arguments.", "\nArnauld ends Book II with a consideration of what he takes to be\nMalebranche’s master argument. It is a fourth a posteriori\nargument. He quotes from the Troisième\nEclaircissement:", "\nThere is no other way than [by saying that God does not act by\nparticular volitions] to reconcile the proposition in Holy Scripture,\n‘God wants to save all men,’ with this proposition,\n‘Not all men are saved’. (OA, 39:637)\n", "\nArnauld rejects this argument mainly because, like the other three a\nposteriori ones, it assumes that “God wills, by a true volition,\nthe salvation of all men, and the conversion of sinners”\n(OA, 39:641).", "\nArnauld agreed with Malebranche that God could have brought it about\nthat all men are saved and did not do so. But he favored an\nAugustinian view that “all men” in this context means\n“all sorts of men,” that is, men of all races,\noccupations, etc. He did not entirely reject the Thomistic view that\nGod’s will for the salvation of all men is God’s\n“antecedent will” rather than His “consequent\nwill,” that is, God’s will other things being equal rather\nthan God’s will all things considered. Arnauld points out that\nMalebranche’s position might be thought to be a version of the\nThomistic one, but adds that according to St. Thomas God’s\nantecedent will is a wish rather than an absolute volition (une\nvelleité plutôt qu’une volonté absolue)\n(Réflexions, OA, 39:198, cf.\n 39:576).[28]\n Arnauld firmly rejects any notion that God wills the sanctification\nand salvation of each and every person in a strong sense of\n“will” such that His will would be carried out unless\nthere were something to prevent it, or, in Malebranche’s words,\nto hold it in\n check.[29]" ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Does God act only by general volitions?" }, { "content": [ "\nArnauld opened a different line of attack in his Dissertation sur\nles miracles le l’ancien loi. This new attack is directed\nagainst the occasionalism which is assumed in Malebranche’s\naccount of the wisdom of God’s ways of creating. In a foreword\nto the Dissertation, Arnauld says that he had completed his\ntreatment of the first two books of the Réflexions,\nand was beginning work on the third, when he received the fourth\nedition of the\n Treatise:[30]", "\nI had finished two books examining the new system of nature and grace,\nand there remained only one further book to complete the task, when I\nreceived from Rotterdam a new edition of the Treatise,\npublished that year, 1684, with several additions. The main one was a\nthird Éclaircissement, with the title: The\nfrequent miracles of the Old Law do not at all indicate that God often\nacts by particular volitions. And the only reason which the\nauthor of the system gives is that the miracles were done by the\nministry of the angels, who were their occasional causes.\n", "\nArnauld interrupted his work on the Réflexions to\nwrite the Dissertation, which was published in 1685 together\nwith the first chapter of Book Three of the Reflexions, a\nchapter dealing with Malebranche’s position that Jesus Christ,\nin his human nature, is the occasional cause of the distribution of\ngrace. Arnauld raises theological objections to both positions, but\nalso attacks the underlying occasionalism. The Dissertation\ntouched off a rapid series of replies and ounter-replies in 1685. The\nfirst volume of Reflexions was published later in 1685, and\nthe second and third volumes in 1686.", "\nArnauld begins his attack by citing the opening sentence of the\nDernier Éclaircissement, in which Malebranche says\nthat he expects his readers to agree with the principle that\n“God causes (fait) everything, and hence He\ncommunicates His power to creatures only by establishing them as\noccasional causes…” (OM, 5, 197). Arnauld adds that\nMalebranche", "\ndoes not understand ‘God causes everything’ as ordinary\nphilosophers do, who say that the creature does not act at all unless\nGod acts with it, which they call ‘concurrence’ …\nBut what he means when he says that God causes everything is that He\ncauses everything that one imagines the creature causes, and that the\ncreature causes nothing at all.\n", "\nIt is not difficult, Arnauld says, to show that the first conjunct, so\nunderstood, is false. For “it destroys the nature of intelligent\nbeings, who would not be free if they did not, as real causes, form in\nthemselves the determination of their will toward particular\ngoods”. (As Arnauld points out, the italicized words are\nMalebranche’s.) The second conjunct of the principle is\ndispatched in a similar way:", "\nFor intelligent beings receive from God their power to form the\ndetermination of their will toward particular goods. But it is not\nonly as occasional causes but as real causes that they form in\nthemselves that determination of their will. (OA, 5, 198)\n", "\nHaving established to his satisfaction that the principle “taken\ngenerally” is false, Arnauld goes on to say that there is no\nreason to deny that God has given angels power to move bodies and that\nthey are real, not mere occasional, causes of the miraculous events\nattributed to them. Again, “it is not so easy to\ndemonstrate” that our soul does not have the real power to move\nthe parts of the body to which it is united.", "\nIn the exchange of publications that grew out of the\nDissertation, Arnauld objects in a similar way to\nMalebranche’s use of occasionalism to explain “how grace\nacts in us without wounding [liberty]” (OM, 5, 8). In his\nexplanation, Malebranche distinguishes the effect of grace, which is\nfrom God and is not free, from the recipient’s free response,\nwhich is from the recipient and not from God. Arnauld says that\nMalebranche would have done well to heed Aquinas’s advice that\none should not distinguish “between what is from grace and what\nis from free will, as if the same thing could not be from both”\n(OA, 39, 114).", "\nBoth Malebranche and Arnauld continued to write about divine causality\nand human freedom in their later work. Arnauld’s late work on\nthe topic is describe in Section 6 below. Malebranche’s last\neffort on the topic was his Réflexions sur la Premotion\nPhysique, published in 1715, the year of his death." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Arnauld’s criticism of Malebranche’s occasionalism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nOn February 11, 1686, while the controversy between Arnauld and\nMalebranche was at a peak of intensity, Leibniz wrote to Landgrave\nErnst von Hessen-Rheinfels, asking that the Landgrave send Arnauld a\nsummary of “a short discourse” on “questions of\ngrace, the concourse of God and creatures, the nature of miracles, the\ncause of sin and the origin of evil, the immortality of the soul,\nideas, etc.” (The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence,\nDie Philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz, herausgegeben von K. I.\nGerhardt, Vol. 2, hereinafter LA, 11). The ensuing\ncorrespondence occurred at a crucial point in the development of\nLeibniz’s philosophy. The Discourse on Metaphysics, the\nfinal version of the short discourse, marks the beginning of\nLeibniz’s mature metaphysics, and it shows the influence of the\ncorrespondence with Arnauld.", "\nLeibniz had corresponded with Arnauld some fifteen years earlier, in\nconnection with Leibniz’s efforts to reunite the Christian\nchurches. These efforts took a new turn in March, 1672, when Leibniz,\nthen just 25 years old, left Mainz for Paris on a secret political\nmission for his patron, Baron Johann Christian von Boineburg, who was\nin turn minister to Johann Philipp von Schönborn, the Elector of\nMainz. Both men were converts from Lutheranism to Catholicism.\nLeibniz’s diplomatic mission was a failure, but he had other\nreasons for wanting to visit Paris. He was eager to enter into the\nbrilliant intellectual life of the French capital, and he stayed\nthere, with a brief sojourn in England, until 1676, making the\nacquaintance of a number of leading intellectuals. During this time,\nhe undertook for the first time the serious study of mathematics. But\nhe also continued to work toward a philosophical position that he\nhoped would help reunify the churches.", "\nBefore coming to Paris, he had discussed the project of reunifying the\nchurches with his patron Boineburg, and had corresponded with Arnauld,\nin 1671, about the Eucharist, proposing an account of the real\npresence that he thought would be acceptable to both Lutherans and\nCatholics. But it was Leibniz’s interest in theodicy and related\nproblems about justification that flourished in Paris. There, in 1673,\nhe composed Confessio Philosophi, a dialogue in Latin between\na theologian and a philosopher that is sometimes referred to as\n“his first theodicy.” Thirty-seven years later in the\nTheodicy, Leibniz says,", "\nWhile I was in France, I communicated to M. Arnauld a dialogue I had\nwritten in Latin on the cause of evil and the justice of God. This was\nnot only before his disputes with R. P. Malebranche, but even before\nthe book on The Search after Truth had appeared. The\nprinciple that I here maintain, that sin was permitted because it was\ninvolved in the best plan for the universe, was already employed\nthere, and M. Arnauld did not seem hostile to it. (Theodicy,\n#211).\n", "\nSoon after Leibniz’s arrival in Paris, both Boineborg and von\nSchönborn died, and Leibniz turned for support to another\nimportant German noble and convert from Lutheranism to Catholicism,\nJohann Friedrich von Braunschweig-Lüneberg (Hannover). On 26\nMarch 1673, Leibniz wrote as follows to Johann Friedrich:", "\nThe famous Arnauld is a man of the most profound and wide-ranging\nthought that a true philosopher can have; his aim is not only to\nilluminate hearts with the clarity of religion, but, further, to\nrevive the flame of reason, eclipsed by human passions; not only to\nconvert heretics, but, further, those who are today in the greatest\nheresy—the atheists and libertines; not only to vanquish his\nopponents, but, further, to improve those of his persuasion. His\nthoughts, then, come to seeking how, so far as it is possible, a\nreform of abuses, frankly wide-spread among dissidents, would overcome\nthe cause of the division. In this design, on several points of\nimportance, he has made the first step and, as a prudent man, he goes\nby degrees. I am distressed that we have lost von Boineburg just when\nI have struck up an acquaintance with Arnauld; for I had hoped to\nbring these two minds, so similar in their honest soundness, on the\nroad to a closer agreement, The Church, as well as the Fatherland, has\nsustained a loss with this man (Quoted in Sleigh 1990, 15–16).\n", "\nThere is no record of any response by Arnauld to the Confessio\nPhilosophi, but when Leibniz returned to the problems of\ntheodicy, in 1686, he once again sought Arnauld’s cooperation by\nsending Arnauld the outline of the Discourse on Metaphysics\nthat was mentioned above. The outline sent to Arnauld was no more than\na list of the propositions that were to appear as the titles of the\nthirty-seven sections of the Discourse; the entire\ncorrespondence was carried out through the intermediary of\nHessen-Rheinfels; and the copies of letters received by the two major\ncorrespondents were sometimes defective. These facts, together with\nthe extreme subtlety of the philosophical contents of the letters,\nhave made interpretation of the correspondence very difficult." ], "section_title": "5. Arnauld and Leibniz", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nProposition 8 in Leibniz’s outline is: “In order to\ndistinguish the actions of God from those of creatures, it is\nexplained wherein consists the notion of an individual\nsubstance” (LA,8). The notion of a substance is, for\nLeibniz, the notion of a thing that acts. To explain the notion of a\ncreated individual substance, therefore, he has to explain the notion\nof a created agent, which requires that he distinguish correctly\nbetween the actions of creatures and the actions of God. Part of\nLeibniz’s account of the notion of an individual substance is\ngiven in Proposition 13: “The individual notion of each person\nincludes once and for all everything that will ever happen to\nhim,” so that “one sees in [that notion] a priori\nproofs of the truth of each event, that is, why one [event] has\noccurred rather than another” (LA, 8). The debate\nbetween Arnauld and Leibniz begins here. Proposition 13, Arnauld said\nin his first letter to Leibniz, implies that “once God decided\nto create Adam, everything that has happened since and will ever\nhappen to the human race was and is obliged to happen with a more than\nfatal necessity” (LA, 27). For example, given\nproposition 13, if Adam exists, then necessarily Adam is father of\nCain and Abel as sons, grandfather of their children,\ngreat-grandfather of their children, etc., and everything that will\never happen to all of them is already determined.", "\nAfter a complicated three-way exchange of letters, Arnauld withdrew\nhis complaint in a letter dated September 28, 1686. At the outset,\nArnauld assumed that according to Leibniz whatever is contained in the\nindividual notion of a person is contained there as a necessary\nproperty of the person. But in response to Arnauld, Leibniz says that\nhe does not “ask for more of a connection here” than that\nwhich obtains between an individual substance and its “external\ndenominations” (LA, p. 56). Given this understanding of\nthe way that individual notion of a person contains everything that\nwill ever happen to him, Arnauld was prepared to concede that\nLeibniz’s position did not involve fatalism (LA,\n63–64).", "\nArnauld adds that he continues to have difficulty with Leibniz’s\naccount of “the possibility of things” and his conception\nof God as choosing the actual world out of an infinity of possible\nworlds, a point on which Leibniz agreed with Malebranche, and he asks\nLeibniz to clarify his “hypothesis of concomitance or agreement\nbetween substances,” and his statement that if a material thing\nis not merely an appearance, like a rainbow, or an accidental\naggregation of parts, like a pile of stones, it must have a\n“substantial form.” Leibniz had mentioned both of these\npoints in his immediately preceding letter (LA, 64–66,\n58). According to the hypothesis of concomitance no created substance\never acts upon any other created substance. But every later state of\nany given created substance is caused by an earlier state of the same\nsubstance, and the histories of the individuals are coordinated by God\nso that they fit together into the history of the actual world.\nLeibniz also says that one substance, x, may\n“express” another substance, y, more distinctly\nthan y expresses x, and in that case, one may say\nthat x causes changes to occur in y. He uses this\nposition to explain the relation of mind and body. Arnauld asked him\nto explain his view further by applying it to the example of a man who\nfeels pain when his arm is wounded, and the example of a man wants to\ntake off his hat and raises his arm. Arnauld also raises seven\nobjections to Leibniz’s claims about substantial forms\n(LA, 66–67) and defends the Cartesian view that\nextension is the real nature of matter, which he takes to imply that\nbodies have only varying degrees of “improper unity”\n(LA, 88).", "\nLeibniz provided the further clarification Arnauld requested in\nseveral long letters, which drew two replies from Arnauld. Arnauld\ncontinued to find Leibniz’s position unclear. “I have no\nclear notion,” says Arnauld,", "\nof what you mean by the word ‘expression’, when you say\nthat our soul expresses more distinctly (all other things being equal)\nwhat pertains to its body, since it is an expression even of the whole\nuniverse in a certain sense. (LA, 105)\n", "\nHe takes Leibniz’s views about substantial forms to be a strange\nand unsuccessful attempt “to ascribe true unity to bodies [in\nparticular the bodies of animals] which would not otherwise have\nit” (LA, 107).", "\nArnauld’s last letter to Leibniz is dated August 28, 1687.\nLeibniz tried to get Arnauld to continue the discussion, but Arnauld\nwas fully occupied with other projects. On August 31, 1687, Arnauld\nwrote to Hessen-Rheinfels, saying,", "\nIt would be preferable if [Leibniz] gave up, at least for a time, this\nsort of speculation, and applied himself to the greatest business he\ncan have, the choice of the true religion… a decision that is\nof such importance for his salvation. (LA, 110)\n" ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Leibniz’s notion of an individual substance" }, { "content": [ "\nEric Stencil has provided a general discussion of the disagreement\nbetween Leibniz and Arnauld about Modal Metaphysics. “Modal\nmetaphysics,” Stencil says, “is the theory of possibility,\nnecessity, essence and God’s relation to each” (Stencil.\n2016, p. 2). Arnauld attacks Leibniz’s thesis that the\nindividual concept of each person contains once for all everything\nthat will ever happen to him, Leibniz’s claim that there are\n“purely possible” substances, and his associated view that\nGod creates by choosing one from a multitude of possible worlds.\nStencil argues that Arnauld’s criticisms are based on a positive\nview which Stencil describes as “a sophisticated essence-based\nmodal actualism,” containing three theses: (1) Everything that\nexists is actual (ontological actualism). (2) The actual world is\nirreducibly modal; there is no reductive analysis of modality (modal\nactualism). (3) All true de re counterfactuals are grounded\nin the irreducibly modal essences of actually existing things\n(essence-based modal actualism) (Stencil, 2016, p. 2–3). Stencil\nsays that Arnauld’s view “could be developed into a\nplausible view in its own right” and that,", "\nwhen divorced from its theological motivations and with several\nimportant augmentations, could serve as a foundation for a plausible\nview that deserves to be considered in contemporary debates concerning\nmodal metaphysics. (p. 21)\n" ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Arnauld’s criticism of Leibniz’s Modal Metaphysics; Arnauld’s alternative" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThroughout his enormously active life as a philosopher and theologian,\nArnauld was above all concerned to defend the doctrine that human\nbeings, after the fall of Adam, can perform meritorious actions, but\nonly if the actions are the result of a supernatural grâce\nefficace par elle-même. Arnauld claimed to find this\ndoctrine in the writings of both Augustine and Aquinas and he defended\nJansen’s version of it against the charge of heresy, even though\nJansen’s version was significantly different from that espoused\nby Arnauld himself. But Arnauld, like Augustine, Aquinas, and Jansen,\nalso held that actions are meritorious only if they are free.\nFor this reason, Arnauld is sometimes said to be a\n“compatibilist.” For example, Robert Sleigh says,\n“It is worth noting that Leibniz and Arnauld both ascribed\ncompatibilism to St. Thomas and that both accepted compatibilism as\nwell” (Sleigh 1990, 29).", "\nThe position Arnauld defended and attributed to Augustine and Aquinas\nis, however, quite different from what is nowadays referred to as\n“compatibilism.” The position is connected with\nArnauld’s treatment of free will during the last decade of his\nlife, at the time when he was wrestling with Malebranche’s\ntheory of nature and grace. At that time, Arnauld developd the\nposition that the human will is free when and only when it is a\n“potestas ou facultas ad opposita.” But\nfirst, it is necessary to provide some background for the notion of\ngrâce efficace par elle-même." ], "section_title": "6. Arnauld’s Compatibilism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe point of departure for the disputes about grace and free will in\nseventeenth-century Europe was the inconclusive ending of the\nCongregationes de Auxiliis Divinae\n Gratiae.[31]\n These were ad hoc committees of Cardinals convoked to\nresolve a dispute between the Jesuits and Dominicans about grace,\npredestination, and free will. The dispute was concerned with a work\nby the Jesuit Luis de Molina, whose lengthy title indicates the scope\nand complexity of the dispute: Concordia Liberi Arbitrii\ncum Gratia Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione\net Reprobatione ad Nonnullos Primae Partis Divi Thomae Articulos\n(The Agreement of Free will with the Gift of Grace, Divine\nForeknowledge, Providence, Predestination and Reprobation, according\nto several articles in the First Part of St. Thomas). The work\nwas published in 1588 and was immediately attacked by the Dominican\nschool of Salamanca, led by Domingo Bañez. The\nCongregationes were convoked by Pope Clement VIII with the\naim of resolving what had become a widespread struggle between the two\norders. His hope was frustrated; the meetings began on January 2, 1598\nand were terminated on August 28, 1607 (the feast day of St.\nAugustine!) by Pope Paul V, who declared that neither side was\nheretical and that both sides had merit.", "\nA central question at the meetings of the Congregationes had\nto do with the relation of supernatural grace to free, meritorious\nacts of will. It was assumed on both sides that a human being cannot\nperform a meritorious act of will without supernatural assistance from\nGod, that God sometimes gives such assistance, and that it is\nsometimes part of God’s providential plan that the recipient\nfreely cooperate and thus perform the act in question. Meritorious\nacts of will include, among others, the decision to pray, to seek\nforgiveness for past sins, and to perform a good action for the love\nof God. It was assumed by both Jesuits and Dominicans that God’s\nprovidential plan is infallibly realized. Hence both sides agreed that\nsupernatural grace is, in at least some cases, infallibly\nefficacious (Vansteenberghe 1928, #2140). The issue was\nwhether the supernatural grace in question is efficacious by\nitself, in other words, intrinsically efficacious, or\nwhether it is efficacious only by virtue of the independent, divinely\nforeknown cooperation of the one who receives the grace\n(Vansteenberghe 1928, #2154–65). Several sorts of supernatural\ngrace were distinguished. For our purposes, the most important\ndistinctions are (a) between habitual grace (especially the\ntheological virtues of faith, hope, and charity) and actual grace; (b)\nbetween external actual grace (e.g., hearing a good sermon) and\ninternal actual grace (grace consisting in internal, mental acts); and\n(c) between internal actual grace of the intellect and internal actual\ngrace of the will. The question was whether the actual grace of the\nwill that infallibly produces a meritorious act of will is efficacious\nby itself, or whether instead its efficaciousness is explained in part\nby God’s knowledge that the recipient would cooperate with the\ngrace." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 The Congregationes de Auxiliis and seventeenth-century controversy about grace" }, { "content": [ "\nJansen and Arnauld, like Bañez, defended the position that\nactual grace of the will is sometimes intrinsically\n efficacious.[32]\n But they disagreed about the nature of such grace. According to\nBañez, efficacious grace is the supernatural counterpart of\n“physical premotion.” The elusive notion of physical\npremotion is part of a general account of God’s causation of the\nactions of creatures. According to this account, God is a cause of a\ncreature’s action by bringing about in the creature a\n“premotion” that results in the creature’s carrying\nout the action in question. For Bañez, then, the actual grace\nin question is a sort of supernatural beginning of volition that is\nproduced in the human being by God and that infallibly results in a\nmeritorious act of will. Jansen rejected this notion, arguing that it\nis an obscure hypothesis that explains nothing. He held that\nefficacious grace is, instead, a feeling of love, which he called a\n“delectatio victrix (victorious pleasure)” and\nwhich infallibly leads to a meritorious act.", "\nArnauld accepted neither of those views. In a work published in 1656,\nhe considers two positions on the nature of efficacious grace, in so\nfar as it is the principle of good will: “Some say that such\ngrace consists in the mercy of God and in an inherent form [in the\ncreature],” while others say that it consists “only in the\nmercy of God, which brings about (operatur) the interior\nmovement of the mind.” Arnauld says “I am not far”\nfrom the second position, which he attributes to “Bradwardine,\nEstius, Tiphanius, and many other [Thomists]” (Dissertatio\ntheologica quadripartita, OA, 20:237).", "\nWhen Arnauld returned to questions about efficacious grace and free\nwill toward the end of his life, he was more categorical:", "\nThe true opinion of St. Augustine, St. Bernard, and St. Thomas\nconcerning actual grace, is that of Estius, who posits nothing created\nby God in the will in between the will of God, which he calls\nuncreated grace, and the free movement of the human will which the\nuncreated grace produces in the human will.\n", "\nJansen was “surely mistaken,” Arnauld adds, when he\ndefined actual grace as a non-deliberate “victorious\npleasure” (Letter to du Vaucel, 8 May 1693, OA,\n 3:636).[33]\n In a short treatise on human freedom written almost a decade earlier,\nArnauld illustrates his criticism of Jansen (without mentioning him by\nname) with an example: “Suppose that a man who is not very\ngenerous is approached by a beggar who asks him for alms. He\ndeliberates, proposes to himself the commandment of Christ, and gives\nalms for the sake of God” (De la liberté de\nl’homme, OA, 10:620, hereinafter\nLiberté). Jansen assumes that there is a\nnon-deliberate act of victorious pleasure in between the man’s\ndeliberation and his decision to give alms for the sake of God, and\nthat this non-deliberate pleasure is the actual grace that enables him\nto act in a meritorious way. Arnauld rejects this position and instead\nidentifies the efficacious grace with God’s merciful will that\nthe man arrive at the deliberate decision to give alms for the sake of\nGod.", "\nYet Arnauld also assumed that the man’s decision, like any\nmeritorious act of will, was free. Arnauld’s basic position on\nthe compatibility of the intrinsic efficacy of grace with the freedom\nof the volitions produced by the grace, is that we know from Scripture\nand Tradition, supported by philosophical reflection on God’s\nomnipotence (a) that the grace of Christ is intrinsically efficacious;\nand we know “from our own experience” (b) that our\nvolitions of the relevant kind are free. Hence we know that (a) and\n(b) are consistent, even though we have “great difficulty”\nin seeing how they fit together (OA, 10:436)." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Bañez, Jansen, and Arnauld on the nature of efficacious actual grace of the will" }, { "content": [ "\nArnauld was, then, a compatibilist of sorts. The compatibilism he\nespoused and attributed to Aquinas, however, was limited, and differs\nin a number ways from the sort of position philosophers now label\n“compatibilism.”", "\n1. Arnauld was not a determinist, nor did he attribute determinism to\nSt. Thomas. Arnauld cites Aquinas (Summa Theologicae I, 19,\n3) as an authority in favor of his own view that God’s will with\nregard to creatures is not necessary (OA, 39:598).", "\n2. Arnauld held that freedom of human volitions is\nincompatible with the determination of the choices by laws of\nnature together with temporally antecedent events. Thus he responds to\nMalebranche’s statement that the destruction of Jerusalem by the\nRomans some seventy years after the death of Jesus was “a\nnecessary outcome of the laws of nature,” by saying, “It\nis clear … that a long series of diverse events, that depended\non an infinity of free movements of the wills of men, could have been,\nand indeed were, regulated by the providence of Him who has an\nalmighty power to move the hearts of men, and to direct them as He\npleases … But it cannot be said that it was a necessary\nconsequence of the laws of nature without degrading human beings,\nmaking them act like lower animals, and depriving them of their\nliberty, a position that has been declared anathema by the\nCouncil of Trent” (OA, 39:301). He repeats the\ncriticism a few pages later:", "\nAs I have shown above, to hold that events that depended on an\ninfinity of free volitions of human beings were a necessary\nconsequence of laws of nature is to deprive human beings of their\nfreedom, after the example of Wycliffe. (OA,\n 39:316).[34]\n ", "\n3. According to the position Arnauld attributes to Aquinas, the\nsinful choices of human beings are not determined by any\ncause exterior to the sinner. Arnauld agreed with Aquinas that God is\nthe sole exterior cause of the volitions of a human being, that is,\nthe only efficient cause of volitions outside the human being himself\nor herself, but God never causes a person to sin. Arnauld cites\nSumma Theologiae, I–IIae, 9, 6, ad 3, in which Aquinas\nanswers the objection that God cannot be the sole exterior cause of\nsinful choices. Aquinas says,", "\nGod, as the universal mover, moves the will of man to the universal\nobject of the will, which is the good. And without this universal\nmovement man cannot will anything; but man through reason determines\nhimself to will this or that, whether it be a true or only an apparent\ngood. Nevertheless God sometimes moves some men especially to will\nsomething determinate that is good (interdum movet Deus\nspecialiter aliquos ad aliquid determinatè volendum quod est\nbonum), as in those He moves by grace. (Vera S. Thomae de\ngratia sufficiente et efficaci doctrina dilucide explanata,\nOA,\n 20:63).[35]\n ", "\nArnauld’s purpose in citing this text is to show that, according\nto Aquinas, when one sins, one is not moved by\n grace.[36]\n But the text, together with the premise that there is no exterior\ncause of human volition other than God, implies that sinful choices\nare not determined by any cause outside the sinner." ], "subsection_title": "6.3 The limits of Arnauld’s compatibilism" }, { "content": [ "\nIn several letters toward the end of his life, Arnauld recommends a\n“little Latin text” on human freedom that he wrote at the\ntime he was wrestling with Malebranche’s theory of nature and\ngrace, saying that it is particularly helpful in connection with the\nproblem of reconciling intrinsically efficacious grace with freedom of\n will.[37]\n The core of Arnauld’s new theory is that the human soul has\nfreedom of will with respect to a true or apparent good when it has\nthe power to will that good and the power not to will it. In such\ncases, the soul “determines itself” to will or not will\nthe good in question. The human soul is said to have this power with\nrespect to any particular good it apprehends, as long as the\nparticular good does not encompass all the good toward which the will\ntends. Arnauld cites I–IIae, 13, 6 as part of the Thomistic origin of\nhis theory:", "\nMan does not choose of necessity. And this is because that which is\npossible not to be, is not of necessity…. For man can will and\nnot will, act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do\nthis or that. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the\nreason. For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as\ngood. Now the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz.\n“to will” or “to act,” but also this, viz.\n“not to will” or “not to act.” Again, in all\nparticular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and\nthe lack of some good, which has the aspect of evil: and in this\nrespect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen\nor to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which is happiness, cannot\nbe apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way.\nConsequently man wills happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to\nbe happy, or to be unhappy… Therefore man chooses not of\nnecessity, but freely. (cited at OA, 10:630–31)\n", "\nArnauld follows Aquinas in saying that the will is not free with\nregard to two objects, first, happiness, apprehended as the ultimate\nobject of volition, and, second, God, seen face to face by the blessed\nin heaven. In these two cases, one wills (or loves) the object with\n“necessity of nature,” and hence not freely. In all other\ncases, the will is free, and when one wills, one does so\n freely.[38]\n Arnauld provides a compact formula for this theory: “The best\nand shortest notion one can have of free will is to say with St.\nThomas that it is a potestas ou facultas ad opposita”\n(Letter to Bossuet, juillet 1693, OA,\n 3:662).[39]" ], "subsection_title": "6.4 Arnauld’s late position on the nature of free will" } ] } ]	[ "Arnauld, Antoine, Oeuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld (43\nvols.) (edited by G. Du Pac De Bellegarde and J. Hautefage, with a\nVie de Messire Antoine Arnauld by N. De Larrière)\nParis-Lausanne: Sigismond D’Arnay et Cie 1775-83. Cited as\nOA.", "Oeuvres Philosophiques d’Arnauld (6 vols.) (edited\nand introduced by Elmar J. Kremer and Denis Moreau) Bristol: Thoemmes\nPress, 2003.", "Des vraies et des fausses idées, Librairie\nArthème Fayard, 1986. (A reprinting of the original 1683 text,\nbut without the pagination of the original)", "Des vraies et des fausses idées, a critical\nedition by Denis Moreau, Paris, J. Vrin, 2011.", "Examen d’un Ecrit qui a pour titre: Traité de\nl’essence du corps, et de l’union de l’ame avec le\ncorps contre la philosophie de M. Descartes, Texte revu par\nEmmanuel Faye, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1999.", "Nouveau éléments de géometrie\nd’Arnauld, critical edition by Dominique Descotes, in\nGéometries du Port-Royal, Paris, Champion, 2009.", "La logique ou l’Art de penser, Édition\ncritique par Pierre Clair et François Girbal, Seconde\nédition revue,", "La Logique ou l’art de penser, critical edition by\nDominique Descartes, Paris, Champion, 2011.", "Arnauld, Antoine, and Lancelot, Claude, General and Rational\nGrammar: The Port-Royal Grammar, translated by Jacques Rieux and\nBernard E. Rollin, The Hague: Mouton, 1975.", "Arnauld, Antoine, The Art of Thinking, Port-Royal Logic,\ntranslated by James Dickhoff and Patricia James, New York: Library of\nLiberal Arts, 1964.", "Arnauld, Antoine and Nicole, Pierre, Logic or the Art of\nThinking, translated by Jill Vance Buroker, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, 1996.", "Arnauld, Antoine, On True and False Ideas, translated by\nElmar J. Kremer, Lewiston/Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press,\n1990.", "Arnauld, Antoine, On True and False Ideas, translated by\nStephen Gaukroger, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.", "Arnauld, Textes philosophiques, Introduction, traduction\net notes par Denis Moreau, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,\n2001.", "Défense contre la Réponse au Livre des vraies et\ndes fausses Idées, OA, 38: 367–671.", "De la fréquente communion, OA, 27:\n71–673.", "Des vraies et des fausses idées, OA, 38:\n177–365.", "Dissertation sur les Miracles de l’ancienne loi,\nOA, 38: 673–741.", "Dissertatio theologica quadripartita, OA, 20:\n159–314.", "Examen d’un Ecrit qui a pour titre: Traité de\nl’essence du corps, et de l’union de l’âme\navec le corps contre la philosophie de M. Descartes, OA,\n38: 89–176.", "Grammaire génerale et raisonnée,\nOA, 16: 3–82.", "Instruction, par demandes & par réponses touchant\nl’accord de la Grace avec la liberté, OA,\n10: 435–41.", "Humanae Libertatis Notio, in Kremer and Moreau,\nOeuvres Philosophiques d’Arnauld, 2003, end of Volume\n6; and Moreau, Arnauld, Textes philosophiques, 2001, pp.\n236–59.", "De la liberté de l’homme, OA, 10:\n610–14. (A French translation, by Pasquier Quesnel, of\nHumanae Libertatis Notio.)", "La Logique ou l’Art de penser, OA, 16:\n99–416.", "Nouvelle Défense de la Traduction du Nouveau Testament\nimprimée a Mons contre M. Mallet, OA, 7:\n67–915.", "Nouveaux éléments de\ngéométrie, OA, 42: 1–342.", "Neuf lettres de M. Arnauld au R.P. Malebranche sur les\nidées génerales, la grâce et\nl’étendue intelligible, OA, 39:\n1–153.", "Première Apologie pour Jansénius,\nOA, 16: 39–323.", "Réflexions philosophiques et théologiques sur le\nnouveau système de la nature et de la grâce,\nOA, 39: 155–848.", "Règles du bon sens, OA, 40:\n153–260.", "Traduction du Discours latin prononcé par M. Arnauld en\nrecevant le Bonnet de Docteur, OA, 43: 11–13.", "Seconde Apologie pour Jansénius, OA, 17:\n1–637.", "Vera S. Thomae de gratia sufficiente et efficaci doctrina\ndilucide explanatae, OA, 20: 39–77.", "La Bible, traduction de LeMaître De Sacy,\n(préface et textes d’introduction établis par\nPhilippe Sellier) Paris: Robert Laffont, 1990.", "The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (translated by\nJohn Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch) 2 volumes,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984–85. Cited as\nDescartes.", "Briefwechsel Leibniz, Arnauld und dem Landgrafen Ernst von\nHessen-Rheinfels, in Die philosophischen schriften von\nGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, herausgegeben von C. I. Gerhardt,\nBerlin, 1875–1890, reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965, volume\n2. Cited as LA.", "Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Discourse on Metaphysics,\nCorrespondence with Arnauld, Monadology, (translated by George R.\nMontgomery), LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1950", "–––, Theodicy, Essays on the Goodness of\nGod, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil (translated by E.\nM. Huggard and edited with an introduction by Austin Farrer) La Salle,\nIL: Open Court Press, 1985.", "Malebranche, Nicolas, Oeuvres complètes de\nMalebranche, (direction: André Robinet) 20 volumes, Paris:\nJ. Vrin, 1958–74. Cited as OM.", "–––, Treatise on Nature and Grace\n(translated by Patrick Riley) Oxford: Clarendon University Press,\n1992. (Riley translates an early edition of the\nTraité, which does not contain some texts on which\nArnauld comments. Hence, the translations of the text found in volume\n5 of OM are by the author of this entry.)", "Molina, Luis de, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the\nConcordia), (translated, with an introduction and notes, by\nAlfred J. Freddoso), Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,\n1988.", "Reid, Thomas, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man\n(1785), (edited by Derek R. Brookes) Edinburgh: Edinburgh University\nPress, 2002.", "Faye, Emmanuel, 2005, “The Cartesianism of Desgabets and\nArnauld and the Problem of Eternal Truths,” in D. Garber and S.\nNadler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosphy,\nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "Hacking, Ian, 1975a, The Emergence of Probability,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Hacking, Ian, 1975b, Why Does Language Matter to\nPhilosophy?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Knox, R.A., 1950, Enthusiasm, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Kremer, Elmar J., 1995, “L’Accord de la Grace avec la\nLiberte selon Arnauld,” Chroniques de Port-Royal, Antoine\nArnauld (1612–1694) Philosophe, Ecrivain, Theologien,\nParis: Bibliotheque Mazarine.", "Kremer, Elmar J., 2000, “Malebranche on Human\nFreedom,” in S. Nadler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to\nMalebranche, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "––– (ed.), 1996, Interpreting Arnauld,\nToronto: University of Toronto Press.", "Moreau, Denis, 1999, Deux Cartésiens, Paris: J.\nVrin.", "–––, 2011, “La ‘Philosophie\nd’Antoine Arnauld’: Un Bilan,” in Chroniques de\nPort-royal, 115-128.", "Moreau, Denis, 2004, Malebranche, Paris: J. Vrin.", "Marion, Jean-Luc, 1981, Sur la théologie blanche de\nDescartes, Paris: PUF.", "Marušić, Jennifer Smalligan, 2014, “Propositions\nand Judgments in Locke and Arnauld: A Monstrous and Unholy\nUnion?” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 52(2):\n255–80.", "Nadler, Steven, 1989, Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of\nIdeas, Princeton: Princeton University Press.", "–––, 1995, “Occasionalism and the Question\nof Arnauld’s Cartesianism,” in Ariew, Roger and Grene,\nMarjorie, editors, Descartes and His Contemporaries, Chicago:\nUniversity of Chicago Press, pp. 129–144.", "–––, 2008, “Arnauld’s God,”\nJournal of the History of Philosophy, 46(4):\n517–38.", "–––, 2011, “Conceptions of God,” in\nThe Oxford Hndbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe,\nedited by Desmond M. Clarke and Catherine Wilson, 2011.", "Nelson, Alan, 1996, “The Falsity in Sensory Ideas: Descartes\nand Arnauld,” in Kremer (ed.) 1996, pp. 13–32.", "Pearce, Kenneth L., 2016, “Arnauld’s Verbal\nDistinction between Ideas and Perceptions,” History and\nPbilosophy of Logic, 37(4): 375–90.", "–––, 2019, “Locke, Arnauld, and Abstract\nIdeas,” British. Journal for the History of Philosophy,\n27(1): 75–94.", "–––, 2021, “Ideas and Explanation in Early\nModern Philosophy”, Archiv für Geschichte der\nPhilosophie, 103(2): 252–80.", "–––, forthcoming, “Thinking with the\nCartesians and Speaking with the Vulgar,” Journal of the\nHistory of Philosophy.", "Sleigh, Jr., R.C., 1996, “Arnauld on Efficacious Grace and\nFree Choice,” in Kremer (ed.) 1996, pp. 164–75.", "–––, 1990, Leibniz and Arnauld, a Commentary\non Their Correspondence, New Haven: Yale University Press.", "Stencil, Eric, 2016, “Essence and Possibility in the\nLeibniz-Arnauld Correspendence,” Pacific Philosophical\nQuarterly, 97(1): 2–26.", "–––, 2019, “Arnauld’s God\nReconsidered,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 36(1):\n19–38.", "Stencil, Eric and Walsh, Julie, (2016), “Arnauld, Power, and\nthe Fallibility of Infallible Determination,” History of\nPhilosophy Quarterly, 33(3): 237–56", "van der Schaar, Maria, 2008, “Locke and Arnauld on Judgments\nand Propositions,” History and Philosophy of Logic,\n29(4): 327–41.", "Vansteenberghe, E., 1929, “Molinism,” in the\nDictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, sous la\ndirection de A. Vacant, E. Mangenot et É. Aman, Tome\nDixième Paris-VI: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, cols.\n2094–2187.", "Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694), Philosophe,\nÉcrivain, Théologien, Chroniques de Port-Royal,\nNuméro 44, Paris: Bibliothèqie Mazarine, 1995.", "Port-Royal et l’Oratoire, Chroniques de Port-Royal,\nNuméro 50, Paris: Bibliothèque Mazarine, 2001.", "Cook, Monte, 1991, “Malebranche vs. Arnauld,”\nJournal of the History of Philosophy, 29(2):\n183–99.", "Kilcullen, John, 1988, Sincerity and Truth: Essays on Arnauld,\nBayle and Toleration, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Kremer, Elmar J. (ed.), 1994, The Great Arnauld and Some of\nHis Philosophical Correspondents, Toronto: University of Toronto\nPress.", "Kremer, Elmar J. (ed.), 1996, Interpreting Arnauld,\nToronto: University of Toronto Press.", "Laporte, Jean, 1922, La Doctrine de la Grace chez\nArnauld, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.", "Martin, John N., 2011, “Existential Import in Cartesian\nSemantics,” History and Philosophy of Logic, 32(3):\n211–039.", "–––, 2012, “Existential Commitment and the\nCartesian Semantics of the Port-Royal Logic,” in The Square\nof Opposition: A General Framework for Cognition, edited by\nJean-Yves Beziau and Gillman Payette, Bern: Peter Lang.", "–––, 2017, “Extension in the Port-Royal\nLogic,” South American Journal of Logic, 3:\n291–311.", "–––, 2020, The Cartesian Semantics of the\nPort-Royal Logic, New York: Routledge.", "Michon, Cyrille, 2013, “Le compatibilisme thomiste\nd’Antoine Arnauld,” Dix-septième\nsiècle, 2(259): 265–279.", "Ndiaye, A.-R., 1991, La Philosophie d’Antoine\nArnauld, Paris: J. Vrin.", "Paola, Nicolas, 2013, “Arnauld et la foi implicite: un\nrefuge cartésien,” Dix-septième\nsiècle, 2(259): 249–63.", "Pariente, Jean-Claude, 1995, Arnauld, Philosophie du langage\net de la connaissance, Paris: J. Vrin.", "–––, 1985, L’analyse du langage\nà Port-Royal, Paris: Les Editions du Minuit.", "Schmaltz, Tad M., 2002, Radical Cartesianism, The French\nReception of Descartes, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress", "Van Cleve, James, “Arnauld’s Silence on the Creation\nof the Eternal Truths,” Res Philosophica, 96(4):\n445–70.", "Yolton, John, 1984, Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to\nReid, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press." ]	[ { "href": "../aquinas/", "text": "Aquinas, Thomas" }, { "href": "../augustine/", "text": "Augustine, Saint" }, { "href": "../consciousness-17th/", "text": "consciousness: seventeenth-century theories of" }, { "href": "../descartes/", "text": "Descartes, René" }, { "href": "../leibniz/", "text": "Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm" }, { "href": "../malebranche/", "text": "Malebranche, Nicolas" }, { "href": "../pascal/", "text": "Pascal, Blaise" }, { "href": "../port-royal-logic/", "text": "Port Royal Logic" }, { "href": "../reid/", "text": "Reid, Thomas" } ]
voltaire	Voltaire	First published Mon Aug 31, 2009; substantive revision Fri May 29, 2020	[ "François-Marie d’Arouet (1694–1778), better known by his pen name Voltaire, was a French writer and public activist who played a singular role in defining the eighteenth-century movement called the Enlightenment. At the center of his work was a new conception of philosophy and the philosopher that in several crucial respects influenced the modern concept of each. Yet in other ways Voltaire was not a philosopher at all in the modern sense of the term. He wrote as many plays, stories, and poems as patently philosophical tracts, and he in fact directed many of his critical writings against the philosophical pretensions of recognized philosophers such as Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. He was, however, a vigorous defender of a conception of natural science that served in his mind as the antidote to vain and fruitless philosophical investigation. In clarifying this new distinction between science and philosophy, and especially in fighting vigorously for it in public campaigns directed against the perceived enemies of fanaticism and superstition, Voltaire pointed modern philosophy down several paths that it subsequently followed.", "To capture Voltaire’s unconventional place in the history of philosophy, this article will be structured in a particular way. First, a full account of Voltaire’s life is offered, not merely as background context for his philosophical work, but as an argument about the way that his particular career produced his particular contributions to European philosophy. Second, a survey of Voltaire’s philosophical views is offered so as to attach the legacy of what Voltaire did with the intellectual viewpoints that his activities reinforced." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Voltaire’s Life: The Philosopher as Critic and Public Activist", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Voltaire’s Early Years (1694–1726)", "1.2 The English Period (1726–1729)", "1.3 Becoming a Philosophe", "1.4 The Newton Wars (1732–1745)", "1.5 From French Newtonian to Enlightenment Philosophe (1745–1755)", "1.6 Fighting for Philosophie (1755–1778)", "1.7 Voltaire, Philosophe Icon of Enlightenment Philosophie (1778–Present)" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Voltaire’s Enlightenment Philosophy", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Liberty", "2.2 Hedonism", "2.3 Skepticism", "2.4 Newtonian Empirical Science", "2.5 Toward Science without Metaphysics" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Literature", "Primary Literature in Translation", "Secondary Literature " ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "Voltaire only began to identify himself with philosophy and the philosophe identity during middle age. His work Lettres philosophiques, published in 1734 when he was forty years old, was the key turning point in this transformation. Before this date, Voltaire’s life in no way pointed him toward the philosophical destiny that he was later to assume. His early orientation toward literature and libertine sociability, however, shaped his philosophical identity in crucial ways." ], "section_title": "1. Voltaire’s Life: The Philosopher as Critic and Public Activist", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "François-Marie d’Arouet was born in 1694, the fourth of five children, to a well-to-do public official and his well bred aristocratic wife. In its fusion of traditional French aristocratic pedigree with the new wealth and power of royal bureaucratic administration, the d’Arouet family was representative of elite society in France during the reign of Louis XIV. The young François-Marie acquired from his parents the benefits of prosperity and political favor, and from the Jesuits at the prestigious Collège Louis-le-Grand in Paris he also acquired a first-class education. François-Marie also acquired an introduction to modern letters from his father who was active in the literary culture of the period both in Paris and at the royal court of Versailles. François senior appears to have enjoyed the company of men of letters, yet his frustration with his son’s ambition to become a writer is notorious. From early in his youth, Voltaire aspired to emulate his idols Molière, Racine, and Corneille and become a playwright, yet Voltaire’s father strenuously opposed the idea, hoping to install his son instead in a position of public authority. First as a law student, then as a lawyer’s apprentice, and finally as a secretary to a French diplomat, Voltaire attempted to fulfill his father’s wishes. But in each case, he ended up abandoning his posts, sometimes amidst scandal.", "Escaping from the burdens of these public obligations, Voltaire would retreat into the libertine sociability of Paris. It was here in the 1720s, during the culturally vibrant period of the Regency government between the reigns of Louis XIV and XV (1715–1723), that Voltaire established one dimension of his identity. His wit and congeniality were legendary even as a youth, so he had few difficulties establishing himself as a popular figure in Regency literary circles. He also learned how to play the patronage game so important to those with writerly ambitions. Thanks, therefore, to some artfully composed writings, a couple of well-made contacts, more than a few bon mots, and a little successful investing, especially during John Law’s Mississippi Bubble fiasco, Voltaire was able to establish himself as an independent man of letters in Paris. His literary debut occurred in 1718 with the publication of his Oedipe, a reworking of the ancient tragedy that evoked the French classicism of Racine and Corneille. The play was first performed at the home of the Duchesse du Maine at Sceaux, a sign of Voltaire’s quick ascent to the very pinnacle of elite literary society. Its published title page also announced the new pen name that Voltaire would ever after deploy.", "During the Regency, Voltaire circulated widely in elite circles such as those that congregated at Sceaux, but he also cultivated more illicit and libertine sociability as well. This pairing was not at all uncommon during this time, and Voltaire’s intellectual work in the 1720s—a mix of poems and plays that shifted between playful libertinism and serious classicism seemingly without pause—illustrated perfectly the values of pleasure, honnêteté, and good taste that were the watchwords of this cultural milieu. Philosophy was also a part of this mix, and during the Regency the young Voltaire was especially shaped by his contacts with the English aristocrat, freethinker,and Jacobite Lord Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke lived in exile in France during the Regency period, and Voltaire was a frequent visitor to La Source, the Englishman’s estate near Orléans. The chateau served as a reunion point for a wide range of intellectuals, and many believe that Voltaire was first introduced to natural philosophy generally, and to the work of Locke and the English Newtonians specifically, at Bolingbroke’s estate. It was certainly true that these ideas, especially in their more deistic and libertine configurations, were at the heart of Bolingbroke’s identity." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Voltaire’s Early Years (1694–1726)" }, { "content": [ "Yet even if Voltaire was introduced to English philosophy in this way, its influence on his thought was most shaped by his brief exile in England between 1726–29. The occasion for his departure was an affair of honor. A very powerful aristocrat, the Duc de Rohan, accused Voltaire of defamation, and in the face of this charge the untitled writer chose to save face and avoid more serious prosecution by leaving the country indefinitely. In the spring of 1726, therefore, Voltaire left Paris for England.", "It was during his English period that Voltaire’s transition into his mature philosophe identity began. Bolingbroke, whose address Voltaire left in Paris as his own forwarding address, was one conduit of influence. In particular, Voltaire met through Bolingbroke Jonathan Swift, Alexander Pope, and John Gay, writers who were at that moment beginning to experiment with the use of literary forms such as the novel and theater in the creation of a new kind of critical public politics. Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, which appeared only months before Voltaire’s arrival, is the most famous exemplar of this new fusion of writing with political criticism. Later the same year Bolingbroke also brought out the first issue of the Craftsman, a political journal that served as the public platform for his circle’s Tory opposition to the Whig oligarchy in England. The Craftsman helped to create English political journalism in the grand style, and for the next three years Voltaire moved in Bolingbroke’s circle, absorbing the culture and sharing in the public political contestation that was percolating all around him.", "Voltaire did not restrict himself to Bolingbroke’s circle alone, however. After Bolingbroke, his primary contact in England was a merchant by the name of Everard Fawkener. Fawkener introduced Voltaire to a side of London life entirely different from that offered by Bolingbroke’s circle of Tory intellectuals. This included the Whig circles that Bolingbroke’s group opposed. It also included figures such as Samuel Clarke and other self-proclaimed Newtonians. Voltaire did not meet Newton himself before Sir Isaac’s death in March, 1727, but he did meet his sister—learning from her the famous myth of Newton’s apple, which Voltaire would play a major role in making famous. Voltaire also came to know the other Newtonians in Clarke’s circle, and since he became proficient enough with English to write letters and even fiction in the language, it is very likely that he immersed himself in their writings as well. Voltaire also visited Holland during these years, forming important contacts with Dutch journalists and publishers and meeting Willem’s Gravesande and other Dutch Newtonian savants. Given his other activities, it is also likely that Voltaire frequented the coffeehouses of London even if no firm evidence survives confirming that he did. It would not be surprising, therefore, to learn that Voltaire attended the Newtonian public lectures of John Theophilus Desaguliers or those of one of his rivals. Whatever the precise conduits, all of his encounters in England made Voltaire into a very knowledgeable student of English natural philosophy." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 The English Period (1726–1729)" }, { "content": [ "When French officials granted Voltaire permission to re-enter Paris in 1729, he was devoid of pensions and banned from the royal court at Versailles. But he was also a different kind of writer and thinker. It is no doubt overly grandiose to say with Lord Morley that, “Voltaire left France a poet and returned to it a sage.” It is also an exaggeration to say that he was transformed from a poet into a philosophe while in England. For one, these two sides of Voltaire’s intellectual identity were forever intertwined, and he never experienced an absolute transformation from one into the other at any point in his life. But the English years did trigger a transformation in him.", "After his return to France, Voltaire worked hard to restore his sources of financial and political support. The financial problems were the easiest to solve. In 1729, the French government staged a sort of lottery to help amortize some of the royal debt. A friend perceived an opportunity for investors in the structure of the government’s offering, and at a dinner attended by Voltaire he formed a society to purchase shares. Voltaire participated, and in the fall of that year when the returns were posted he had made a fortune. Voltaire’s inheritance from his father also became available to him at the same time, and from this date forward Voltaire never again struggled financially. This result was no insignificant development since Voltaire’s financial independence effectively freed him from one dimension of the patronage system so necessary to aspiring writers and intellectuals in the period. In particular, while other writers were required to appeal to powerful financial patrons in order to secure the livelihood that made possible their intellectual careers, Voltaire was never again beholden to these imperatives.", "The patronage structures of Old Regime France provided more than economic support to writers, however, and restoring the crédit upon which his reputation as a writer and thinker depended was far less simple. Gradually, however, through a combination of artfully written plays, poems, and essays and careful self-presentation in Parisian society, Voltaire began to regain his public stature. In the fall of 1732, when the next stage in his career began to unfold, Voltaire was residing at the royal court of Versailles, a sign that his re-establishment in French society was all but complete.", "During this rehabilitation, Voltaire also formed a new relationship that was to prove profoundly influential in the subsequent decades. He became reacquainted with Emilie Le Tonnier de Breteuil,the daughter of one of his earliest patrons, who married in 1722 to become the Marquise du Châtelet. Emilie du Châtelet was twenty-nine years old in the spring of 1733 when Voltaire began his relationship with her. She was also a uniquely accomplished woman. Du Châtelet’s father, the Baron de Breteuil, hosted a regular gathering of men of letters that included Voltaire, and his daughter, ten years younger than Voltaire, shared in these associations. Her father also ensured that Emilie received an education that was exceptional for girls at the time. She studied Greek and Latin and trained in mathematics, and when Voltaire reconnected with her in 1733 she was a very knowledgeable thinker in her own right even if her own intellectual career, which would include an original treatise in natural philosophy and a complete French translation of Newton’s Principia Mathematica—still the only complete French translation ever published—had not yet begun. Her intellectual talents combined with her vivacious personality drew Voltaire to her, and although Du Châtelet was a titled aristocrat married to an important military officer, the couple was able to form a lasting partnership that did not interfere with Du Châtelet’s marriage. This arrangement proved especially beneficial to Voltaire when scandal forced him to flee Paris and to establish himself permanently at the Du Châtelet family estate at Cirey. From 1734, when this arrangement began, to 1749, when Du Châtelet died during childbirth, Cirey was the home to each along with the site of an intense intellectual collaboration. It was during this period that both Voltaire and Du Châtelet became widely known philosophical figures, and the intellectual history of each before 1749 is most accurately described as the history of the couple’s joint intellectual endeavors." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Becoming a Philosophe" }, { "content": [ "For Voltaire, the events that sent him fleeing to Cirey were also the impetus for much of his work while there. While in England, Voltaire had begun to compose a set of letters framed according to the well-established genre of a traveler reporting to friends back home about foreign lands. Montesquieu’s 1721 Lettres Persanes, which offered a set of fictionalized letters by Persians allegedly traveling in France, and Swift’s 1726 Gulliver’s Travels were clear influences when Voltaire conceived his work. But unlike the authors of these overtly fictionalized accounts, Voltaire innovated by adopting a journalistic stance instead, one that offered readers an empirically recognizable account of several aspects of English society. Originally titled Letters on England, Voltaire left a draft of the text with a London publisher before returning home in 1729. Once in France, he began to expand the work, adding to the letters drafted while in England, which focused largely on the different religious sects of England and the English Parliament, several new letters including some on English philosophy. The new text, which included letters on Bacon, Locke, Newton and the details of Newtonian natural philosophy along with an account of the English practice of inoculation for smallpox, also acquired a new title when it was first published in France in 1734: Lettres philosophiques.", "Before it appeared, Voltaire attempted to get official permission for the book from the royal censors, a requirement in France at the time. His publisher, however, ultimately released the book without these approvals and without Voltaire’s permission. This made the first edition of the Lettres philosophiques illicit, a fact that contributed to the scandal that it triggered, but one that in no way explains the furor the book caused. Historians in fact still scratch their heads when trying to understand why Voltaire’s Lettres philosophiques proved to be so controversial. The only thing that is clear is that the work did cause a sensation that subsequently triggered a rapid and overwhelming response on the part of the French authorities. The book was publicly burned by the royal hangman several months after its release, and this act turned Voltaire into a widely known intellectual outlaw. Had it been executed, a royal lettre de cachet would have sent Voltaire to the royal prison of the Bastille as a result of his authorship of Lettres philosophiques; instead, he was able to flee with Du Châtelet to Cirey where the couple used the sovereignty granted by her aristocratic title to create a safe haven and base for Voltaire’s new position as a philosophical rebel and writer in exile.", "Had Voltaire been able to avoid the scandal triggered by the Lettres philosophiques, it is highly likely that he would have chosen to do so. Yet once it was thrust upon him, he adopted the identity of the philosophical exile and outlaw writer with conviction, using it to create a new identity for himself, one that was to have far reaching consequences for the history of Western philosophy. At first, Newtonian science served as the vehicle for this transformation. In the decades before 1734, a series of controversies had erupted, especially in France, about the character and legitimacy of Newtonian science, especially the theory of universal gravitation and the physics of gravitational attraction through empty space. Voltaire positioned his Lettres philosophiques as an intervention into these controversies, drafting a famous and widely cited letter that used an opposition between Newton and Descartes to frame a set of fundamental differences between English and French philosophy at the time. He also included other letters about Newtonian science in the work while linking (or so he claimed) the philosophies of Bacon, Locke, and Newton into an English philosophical complex that he championed as a remedy for the perceived errors and illusions perpetuated on the French by René Descartes and Nicolas Malebranche. Voltaire did not invent this framework, but he did use it to enflame a set of debates that were then raging, debates that placed him and a small group of young members of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris into apparent opposition to the older and more established members of this bastion of official French science. Once installed at Cirey, both Voltaire and Du Châtelet further exploited this apparent division by engaging in a campaign on behalf of Newtonianism, one that continually targeted an imagined monolith called French Academic Cartesianism as the enemy against which they in the name of Newtonianism were fighting.", "The centerpiece of this campaign was Voltaire’s Éléments de la Philosophie de Newton, which was first published in 1738 and then again in 1745 in a new and definitive edition that included a new section, first published in 1740, devoted to Newton’s metaphysics. Voltaire offered this book as a clear, accurate, and accessible account of Newton’s philosophy suitable for ignorant Frenchman (a group that he imagined to be large). But he also conceived of it as a machine de guerre directed against the Cartesian establishment, which he believed was holding France back from the modern light of scientific truth. Vociferous criticism of Voltaire and his work quickly erupted, with some critics emphasizing his rebellious and immoral proclivities while others focused on his precise scientific views. Voltaire collapsed both challenges into a singular vision of his enemy as “backward Cartesianism”. As he fought fiercely to defend his positions, an unprecedented culture war erupted in France centered on the character and value of Newtonian natural philosophy. Du Châtelet contributed to this campaign by writing a celebratory review of Voltaire’s Éléments in the Journal des savants, the most authoritative French learned periodical of the day. The couple also added to their scientific credibility by receiving separate honorable mentions in the 1738 Paris Academy prize contest on the nature of fire. Voltaire likewise worked tirelessly rebutting critics and advancing his positions in pamphlets and contributions to learned periodicals. By 1745, when the definitive edition of Voltaire’s Éléments was published, the tides of thought were turning his way, and by 1750 the perception had become widespread that France had been converted from backward, erroneous Cartesianism to modern, Enlightened Newtonianism thanks to the heroic intellectual efforts of figures like Voltaire." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 The Newton Wars (1732–1745)" }, { "content": [ "This apparent victory in the Newton Wars of the 1730s and 1740s allowed Voltaire’s new philosophical identity to solidify. Especially crucial was the way that it allowed Voltaire’s outlaw status, which he had never fully repudiated, to be rehabilitated in the public mind as a necessary and heroic defense of philosophical truth against the enemies of error and prejudice. From this perspective, Voltaire’s critical stance could be reintegrated into traditional Old Regime society as a new kind of legitimate intellectual martyrdom. Since Voltaire also coupled his explicitly philosophical writings and polemics during the 1730s and 1740s with an equally extensive stream of plays, poems, stories, and narrative histories, many of which were orthogonal in both tone and content to the explicit campaigns of the Newton Wars, Voltaire was further able to reestablish his old identity as an Old Regime man of letters despite the scandals of these years. In 1745, Voltaire was named the Royal Historiographer of France, a title bestowed upon him as a result of his histories of Louis XIV and the Swedish King Charles II. This royal office also triggered the writing of arguably Voltaire’s most widely read and influential book, at least in the eighteenth century, Essais sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations (1751), a pioneering work of universal history. The position also legitimated him as an officially sanctioned savant. In 1749, after the death of du Châtelet, Voltaire reinforced this impression by accepting an invitation to join the court of the young Frederick the Great in Prussia, a move that further assimilated him into the power structures of Old Regime society.", "Had this assimilationist trajectory continued during the remainder of Voltaire’s life, his legacy in the history of Western philosophy might not have been so great. Yet during the 1750s, a set of new developments pulled Voltaire back toward his more radical and controversial identity and allowed him to rekindle the critical philosophe persona that he had innovated during the Newton Wars. The first step in this direction involved a dispute with his onetime colleague and ally, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis. Maupertuis had preceded Voltaire as the first aggressive advocate for Newtonian science in France. When Voltaire was preparing his own Newtonian intervention in the Lettres philosophiques in 1732, he consulted with Maupertuis, who was by this date a pensioner in the French Royal Academy of Sciences. It was largely around Maupertuis that the young cohort of French academic Newtonians gathered during the Newton wars of 1730s and 40s, and with Voltaire fighting his own public campaigns on behalf of this same cause during the same period, the two men became the most visible faces of French Newtonianism even if they never really worked as a team in this effort. Like Voltaire, Maupertuis also shared a relationship with Emilie du Châtelet, one that included mathematical collaborations that far exceeded Voltaire’s capacities. Maupertuis was also an occasional guest at Cirey, and a correspondent with both du Châtelet and Voltaire throughout these years. But in 1745 Maupertuis surprised all of French society by moving to Berlin to accept the directorship of Frederick the Great’s newly reformed Berlin Academy of Sciences.", "Maupertuis’s thought at the time of his departure for Prussia was turning toward the metaphysics and rationalist epistemology of Leibniz as a solution to certain questions in natural philosophy. Du Châtelet also shared this tendency, producing in 1740 her Institutions de physiques, a systematic attempt to wed Newtonian mechanics with Leibnizian rationalism and metaphysics. Voltaire found this Leibnizian turn dyspeptic, and he began to craft an anti-Leibnizian discourse in the 1740s that became a bulwark of his brand of Newtonianism. This placed him in opposition to Du Châtelet, even if this intellectual rift in no way soured their relationship. Yet after she died in 1749, and Voltaire joined Maupertuis at Frederick the Great’s court in Berlin, this anti-Leibnizianism became the centerpiece of a rift with Maupertuis. Voltaire’s public satire of the President of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin published in late 1752, which presented Maupertuis as a despotic philosophical buffoon, forced Frederick to make a choice. He sided with Maupertuis, ordering Voltaire to either retract his libelous text or leave Berlin. Voltaire chose the latter, falling once again into the role of scandalous rebel and exile as a result of his writings." ], "subsection_title": "1.5 From French Newtonian to Enlightenment Philosophe (1745–1755)" }, { "content": [ "This event proved to be Voltaire’s last official rupture with establishment authority. Rather than returning home to Paris and restoring his reputation, Voltaire instead settled in Geneva. When this austere Calvinist enclave proved completely unwelcoming, he took further steps toward independence by using his personal fortune to buy a chateau of his own in the hinterlands between France and Switzerland. Voltaire installed himself permanently at Ferney in early 1759, and from this date until his death in 1778 he made the chateau his permanent home and capital, at least in the minds of his intellectual allies, of the emerging French Enlightenment.", "During this period, Voltaire also adopted what would become his most famous and influential intellectual stance, announcing himself as a member of the “party of humanity” and devoting himself toward waging war against the twin hydras of fanaticism and superstition. While the singular defense of Newtonian science had focused Voltaire’s polemical energies in the 1730s and 1740s, after 1750 the program became the defense of philosophie tout court and the defeat of its perceived enemies within the ecclesiastical and aristo-monarchical establishment. In this way, Enlightenment philosophie became associated through Voltaire with the cultural and political program encapsulated in his famous motto, “Écrasez l’infâme!” (“Crush the infamy!”). This entanglement of philosophy with social criticism and reformist political action, a contingent historical outcome of Voltaire’s particular intellectual career, would become his most lasting contribution to the history of philosophy.", "The first cause to galvanize this new program was Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie. The first volume of this compendium of definitions appeared in 1751, and almost instantly the work became buried in the kind of scandal to which Voltaire had grown accustomed. Voltaire saw in the controversy a new call to action, and he joined forces with the project soon after its appearance, penning numerous articles that began to appear with volume 5 in 1755. Scandal continued to chase the Encyclopédie, however, and in 1759 the work’s publication privilege was revoked in France, an act that did not kill the project but forced it into illicit production in Switzerland. During these scandals, Voltaire fought vigorously alongside the project’s editors to defend the work, fusing the Encyclopédie’s enemies, particularly the Parisian Jesuits who edited the monthly periodical the Journal de Trevoux, into a monolithic “infamy” devoted to eradicating truth and light from the world. This framing was recapitulated by the opponents of the Encyclopédie, who began to speak of the loose assemblage of authors who contributed articles to the work as a subversive coterie of philosophes devoted to undermining legitimate social and moral order.", "As this polemic crystallized and grew in both energy and influence, Voltaire embraced its terms and made them his cause. He formed particularly close ties with d’Alembert, and with him began to generalize a broad program for Enlightenment centered on rallying the newly self-conscious philosophes (a term often used synonymously with the Encyclopédistes) toward political and intellectual change. In this program, the philosophes were not unified by any shared philosophy but through a commitment to the program of defending philosophie itself against its perceived enemies. They were also imagined as activists fighting to eradicate error and superstition from the world. The ongoing defense of the Encyclopédie was one rallying point, and soon the removal of the Jesuits—the great enemies of Enlightenment, the philosophes proclaimed—became a second unifying cause. This effort achieved victory in 1763, and soon the philosophes were attempting to infiltrate the academies and other institutions of knowledge in France. One climax in this effort was reached in 1774 when the Encyclopédiste and friend of Voltaire and the philosophes, Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot, was named Controller-General of France, the most powerful ministerial position in the kingdom, by the newly crowned King Louis XVI. Voltaire and his allies had paved the way for this victory through a barrage of writings throughout the 1760s and 1770s that presented philosophie like that espoused by Turgot as an agent of enlightened reform and its critics as prejudicial defenders of an ossified tradition.", "Voltaire did bring out one explicitly philosophical book in support this campaign, his Dictionnaire philosophique of 1764–1770. This book republished his articles from the original Encyclopédie while adding new entries conceived in the spirit of the original work. Yet to fully understand the brand of philosophie that Voltaire made foundational to the Enlightenment, one needs to recognize that it just as often circulated in fictional stories, satires, poems, pamphlets, and other less obviously philosophical genres. Voltaire’s most widely known text, for instance, Candide, ou l’Optimisme, first published in 1759, is a fictional story of a wandering traveler engaged in a set of farcical adventures. Yet contained in the text is a serious attack on Leibnizian philosophy, one that in many ways marks the culmination of Voltaire’s decades long attack on this philosophy started during the Newton wars. Philosophie à la Voltaire also came in the form of political activism, such as his public defense of Jean Calas who, Voltaire argued, was a victim of a despotic state and an irrational and brutal judicial system. Voltaire often attached philosophical reflection to this political advocacy, such as when he facilitated a French translation of Cesare Beccaria’s treatise on humanitarian justice and penal reform and then prefaced the work with his own essay on justice and religious toleration (Calas was a French protestant persecuted by a Catholic monarchy). Public philosophic campaigns such as these that channeled critical reason in a direct, oppositionalist way against the perceived injustices and absurdities of Old Regime life were the hallmark of philosophie as Voltaire understood the term." ], "subsection_title": "1.6 Fighting for Philosophie (1755–1778)" }, { "content": [ "Voltaire lived long enough to see some of his long-term legacies start to concretize. With the ascension of Louis XVI in 1774 and the appointment of Turgot as Controller-General, the French establishment began to embrace the philosophes and their agenda in a new way. Critics of Voltaire and his program for philosophie remained powerful, however, and they would continue to survive as the necessary backdrop to the positive image of the Enlightenment philosophe as a modernizer, progressive reformer, and courageous scourge against traditional authority that Voltaire bequeathed to later generations. During Voltaire’s lifetime, this new acceptance translated into a final return to Paris in early 1778. Here, as a frail and sickly octogenarian, Voltaire was welcomed by the city as the hero of the Enlightenment that he now personified. A statue was commissioned as a permanent shrine to his legacy, and a public performance of his play Irène was performed in a way that allowed its author to be celebrated as a national hero. Voltaire died several weeks after these events, but the canonization that they initiated has continued right up until the present.", "Western philosophy was profoundly shaped by the conception of the philosophe and the program for Enlightenment philosophie that Voltaire came to personify. The model he offered of the philosophe as critical public citizen and advocate first and foremost, and as abstruse and systematic thinker only when absolutely necessary, was especially influential in the subsequent development of the European philosophy. Also influential was the example he offered of the philosopher measuring the value of any philosophy according by its ability to effect social change. In this respect, Karl Marx’s famous thesis that philosophy should aspire to change the world, not merely interpret it, owes more than a little debt Voltaire. The link between Voltaire and Marx was also established through the French revolutionary tradition, which similarly adopted Voltaire as one of its founding heroes. Voltaire was the first person to be honored with re-burial in the newly created Pantheon of the Great Men of France that the new revolutionary government created in 1791. This act served as a tribute to the connections that the revolutionaries saw between Voltaire’s philosophical program and the cause of revolutionary modernization as a whole. In a similar way, Voltaire remains today an iconic hero for everyone who sees a positive linkage between critical reason and political resistance in projects of progressive, modernizing reform." ], "subsection_title": "1.7 Voltaire, Philosophe Icon of Enlightenment Philosophie (1778–Present)" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "Voltaire’s philosophical legacy ultimately resides as much in how he practiced philosophy, and in the ends toward which he directed his philosophical activity, as in any specific doctrine or original idea. Yet the particular philosophical positions he took, and the way that he used his wider philosophical campaigns to champion certain understandings while disparaging others, did create a constellation appropriately called Voltaire’s Enlightenment philosophy. True to Voltaire’s character, this constellation is best described as a set of intellectual stances and orientations rather than as a set of doctrines or systematically defended positions. Nevertheless, others found in Voltaire both a model of the well-oriented philosophe and a set of particular philosophical positions appropriate to this stance. Each side of this equation played a key role in defining the Enlightenment philosophie that Voltaire came to personify." ], "section_title": "2. Voltaire’s Enlightenment Philosophy", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "Central to this complex is Voltaire’s conception of liberty. Around this category, Voltaire’s social activism and his relatively rare excursions into systematic philosophy also converged. In 1734, in the wake of the scandals triggered by the Lettres philosophiques, Voltaire wrote, but left unfinished at Cirey, a Traité de metaphysique that explored the question of human freedom in philosophical terms. The question was particularly central to European philosophical discussions at the time, and Voltaire’s work explicitly referenced thinkers like Hobbes and Leibniz while wrestling with the questions of materialism, determinism, and providential purpose that were then central to the writings of the so-called deists, figures such as John Toland and Anthony Collins. The great debate between Samuel Clarke and Leibniz over the principles of Newtonian natural philosophy was also influential as Voltaire struggled to understand the nature of human existence and ethics within a cosmos governed by rational principles and impersonal laws.", "Voltaire adopted a stance in this text somewhere between the strict determinism of rationalist materialists and the transcendent spiritualism and voluntarism of contemporary Christian natural theologians. For Voltaire, humans are not deterministic machines of matter and motion, and free will thus exists. But humans are also natural beings governed by inexorable natural laws, and his ethics anchored right action in a self that possessed the natural light of reason immanently. This stance distanced him from more radical deists like Toland, and he reinforced this position by also adopting an elitist understanding of the role of religion in society. For Voltaire, those equipped to understand their own reason could find the proper course of free action themselves. But since many were incapable of such self-knowledge and self-control, religion, he claimed, was a necessary guarantor of social order. This stance distanced Voltaire from the republican politics of Toland and other materialists, and Voltaire echoed these ideas in his political musings, where he remained throughout his life a liberal, reform-minded monarchist and a skeptic with respect to republican and democratic ideas.", "In the Lettres philosophiques, Voltaire had suggested a more radical position with respect to human determinism, especially in his letter on Locke, which emphasized the materialist reading of the Lockean soul that was then a popular figure in radical philosophical discourse. Some readers singled out this part of the book as the major source of its controversy, and in a similar vein the very materialist account of “Âme,” or the soul, which appeared in volume 1 of Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, was also a flashpoint of controversy. Voltaire also defined his own understanding of the soul in similar terms in his own Dictionnaire philosophique. What these examples point to is Voltaire’s willingness, even eagerness, to publicly defend controversial views even when his own, more private and more considered writings often complicated the understanding that his more public and polemical writings insisted upon. In these cases, one often sees Voltaire defending less a carefully reasoned position on a complex philosophical problem than adopting a political position designed to assert his conviction that liberty of speech, no matter what the topic, is sacred and cannot be violated.", "Voltaire never actually said “I disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” Yet the myth that associates this dictum with his name remains very powerful, and one still hears his legacy invoked through the redeclaration of this pronouncement that he never actually declared. Part of the deep cultural tie that joins Voltaire to this dictum is the fact that even while he did not write these precise words, they do capture, however imprecisely, the spirit of his philosophy of liberty. In his voluminous correspondence especially, and in the details of many of his more polemical public texts, one does find Voltaire articulating a view of intellectual and civil liberty that makes him an unquestioned forerunner of modern civil libertarianism. He never authored any single philosophical treatise on this topic, however, yet the memory of his life and philosophical campaigns was influential in advancing these ideas nevertheless. Voltaire’s influence is palpably present, for example, in Kant’s famous argument in his essay “What is Enlightenment?” that Enlightenment stems from the free and public use of critical reason, and from the liberty that allows such critical debate to proceed untrammeled. The absence of a singular text that anchors this linkage in Voltaire’s collected works in no way removes the unmistakable presence of Voltaire’s influence upon Kant’s formulation." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Liberty" }, { "content": [ "Voltaire’s notion of liberty also anchored his hedonistic morality, another key feature of Voltaire’s Enlightenment philosophy. One vehicle for this philosophy was Voltaire’s salacious poetry, a genre that both reflected in its eroticism and sexual innuendo the lived culture of libertinism that was an important feature of Voltaire’s biography. But Voltaire also contributed to philosophical libertinism and hedonism through his celebration of moral freedom through sexual liberty. Voltaire’s avowed hedonism became a central feature of his wider philosophical identity since his libertine writings and conduct were always invoked by those who wanted to indict him for being a reckless subversive devoted to undermining legitimate social order. Voltaire’s refusal to defer to such charges, and his vigor in opposing them through a defense of the very libertinism that was used against him, also injected a positive philosophical program into these public struggles that was very influential. In particular, through his cultivation of a happily libertine persona, and his application of philosophical reason toward the moral defense of this identity, often through the widely accessible vehicles of poetry and witty prose, Voltaire became a leading force in the wider Enlightenment articulation of a morality grounded in the positive valuation of personal, and especially bodily, pleasure, and an ethics rooted in a hedonistic calculus of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. He also advanced this cause by sustaining an unending attack upon the repressive and, to his mind, anti-human demands of traditional Christian asceticism, especially priestly celibacy, and the moral codes of sexual restraint and bodily self-abnegation that were still central to the traditional moral teachings of the day.", "This same hedonistic ethics was also crucial to the development of liberal political economy during the Enlightenment, and Voltaire applied his own libertinism toward this project as well. In the wake of the scandals triggered by Mandeville’s famous argument in The Fable of the Bees (a poem, it should be remembered) that the pursuit of private vice, namely greed, leads to public benefits, namely economic prosperity, a French debate about the value of luxury as a moral good erupted that drew Voltaire’s pen. In the 1730s, he drafted a poem called Le Mondain that celebrated hedonistic worldly living as a positive force for society, and not as the corrupting element that traditional Christian morality held it to be. In his Essay sur les moeurs he also joined with other Enlightenment historians in celebrating the role of material acquisition and commerce in advancing the progress of civilization. Adam Smith would famously make similar arguments in his founding tract of Enlightenment liberalism, On the Wealth of Nations, published in 1776. Voltaire was certainly no great contributor to the political economic science that Smith practiced, but he did contribute to the wider philosophical campaigns that made the concepts of liberty and hedonistic morality central to their work both widely known and more generally accepted.", "The ineradicable good of personal and philosophical liberty is arguably the master theme in Voltaire’s philosophy, and if it is, then two other themes are closely related to it. One is the importance of skepticism, and the second is the importance of empirical science as a solvent to dogmatism and the pernicious authority it engenders." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Hedonism" }, { "content": [ "Voltaire’s skepticism descended directly from the neo-Pyrrhonian revival of the Renaissance, and owes a debt in particular to Montaigne, whose essays wedded the stance of doubt with the positive construction of a self grounded in philosophical skepticism. Pierre Bayle’s skepticism was equally influential, and what Voltaire shared with these forerunners, and what separated him from other strands of skepticism, such as the one manifest in Descartes, is the insistence upon the value of the skeptical position in its own right as a final and complete philosophical stance. Among the philosophical tendencies that Voltaire most deplored, in fact, were those that he associated most powerfully with Descartes who, he believed, began in skepticism but then left it behind in the name of some positive philosophical project designed to eradicate or resolve it. Such urges usually led to the production of what Voltaire liked to call “philosophical romances,” which is to say systematic accounts that overcome doubt by appealing to the imagination and its need for coherent explanations. Such explanations, Voltaire argued, are fictions, not philosophy, and the philosopher needs to recognize that very often the most philosophical explanation of all is to offer no explanation at all.", "Such skepticism often acted as bulwark for Voltaire’s defense of liberty since he argued that no authority, no matter how sacred, should be immune to challenge by critical reason. Voltaire’s views on religion as manifest in his private writings are complex, and based on the evidence of these texts it would be wrong to call Voltaire an atheist, or even an anti-Christian so long as one accepts a broad understanding of what Christianity can entail. But even if his personal religious views were subtle, Voltaire was unwavering in his hostility to church authority and the power of the clergy. For similar reasons, he also grew as he matured ever more hostile toward the sacred mysteries upon which monarchs and Old Regime aristocratic society based their authority. In these cases, Voltaire’s skepticism was harnessed to his libertarian convictions through his continual effort to use critical reason as a solvent for these “superstitions” and the authority they anchored. The philosophical authority of romanciers such as Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz was similarly subjected to the same critique, and here one sees how the defense of skepticism and liberty, more than any deeply held opposition to religiosity per se, was often the most powerful motivator for Voltaire.", "From this perspective, Voltaire might fruitfully be compared with Socrates, another founding figure in Western philosophy who made a refusal to declaim systematic philosophical positions a central feature of his philosophical identity. Socrates’s repeated assertion that he knew nothing was echoed in Voltaire’s insistence that the true philosopher is the one who dares not to know and then has the courage to admit his ignorance publicly. Voltaire was also, like Socrates, a public critic and controversialist who defined philosophy primarily in terms of its power to liberate individuals from domination at the hands of authoritarian dogmatism and irrational prejudice. Yet while Socrates championed rigorous philosophical dialectic as the agent of this emancipation, Voltaire saw this same dialectical rationalism at the heart of the dogmatism that he sought to overcome. Voltaire often used satire, mockery and wit to undermine the alleged rigor of philosophical dialectic, and while Socrates saw this kind of rhetorical word play as the very essence of the erroneous sophism that he sought to alleviate, Voltaire cultivated linguistic cleverness as a solvent to the false and deceptive dialectic that anchored traditional philosophy." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Skepticism" }, { "content": [ "Against the acceptance of ignorance that rigorous skepticism often demanded, and against the false escape from it found in sophistical knowledge—or what Voltaire called imaginative philosophical romances—Voltaire offered a different solution than the rigorous dialectical reasoning of Socrates: namely, the power and value of careful empirical science. Here one sees the debt that Voltaire owed to the currents of Newtonianism that played such a strong role in launching his career. Voltaire’s own critical discourse against imaginative philosophical romances originated, in fact, with English and Dutch Newtonians, many of whom were expatriate French Huguenots, who developed these tropes as rhetorical weapons in their battles with Leibniz and European Cartesians who challenged the innovations of Newtonian natural philosophy. In his Principia Mathematica (1687; 2nd rev. edition 1713), Newton had offered a complete mathematical and empirical description of how celestial and terrestrial bodies behaved. Yet when asked to explain how bodies were able to act in the way that he mathematically and empirically demonstrated that they did, Newton famously replied “I feign no hypotheses.” From the perspective of traditional natural philosophy, this was tantamount to hand waving since offering rigorous causal accounts of the nature of bodies in motion was the very essence of this branch of the sciences. Newton’s major philosophical innovation rested, however, in challenging this very epistemological foundation, and the assertion and defense of Newton’s position against its many critics, not least by Voltaire, became arguably the central dynamic of philosophical change in the first half of the eighteenth century.", "While Newtonian epistemology admitted of many variations, at its core rested a new skepticism about the validity of apriori rationalist accounts of nature and a new assertion of brute empirical fact as a valid philosophical understanding in its own right. European Natural philosophers in the second half of the seventeenth century had thrown out the metaphysics and physics of Aristotle with its four part causality and teleological understanding of bodies, motion and the cosmic order. In its place, however, a new mechanical causality was introduced that attempted to explain the world in equally comprehensive terms through the mechanisms of an inert matter acting by direct contact and action alone. This approach lead to the vortical account of celestial mechanics, a view that held material bodies to be swimming in an ethereal sea whose action pushed and pulled objects in the manner we observe. What could not be observed, however, was the ethereal sea itself, or the other agents of this supposedly comprehensive mechanical cosmos. Yet rationality nevertheless dictated that such mechanisms must exist since without them philosophy would be returned to the occult causes of the Aristotelian natural tendencies and teleological principles. Figuring out what these point-contact mechanisms were and how they worked was, therefore, the charge of the new mechanical natural philosophy of the late seventeenth century. Figures such as Descartes, Huygens, and Leibniz established their scientific reputations through efforts to realize this goal.", "Newton pointed natural philosophy in a new direction. He offered mathematical analysis anchored in inescapable empirical fact as the new foundation for a rigorous account of the cosmos. From this perspective, the great error of both Aristotelian and the new mechanical natural philosophy was its failure to adhere strictly enough to empirical facts. Vortical mechanics, for example, claimed that matter was moved by the action of an invisible agent, yet this, the Newtonians began to argue, was not to explain what is really happening but to imagine a fiction that gives us a speciously satisfactory rational explanation of it. Natural philosophy needs to resist the allure of such rational imaginings and to instead deal only with the empirically provable. Moreover, the Newtonians argued, if a set of irrefutable facts cannot be explained other then by accepting the brute facticity of their truth, this is not a failure of philosophical explanation so much as a devotion to appropriate rigor. Such epistemological battles became especially intense around Newton’s theory of universal gravitation. Few questioned that Newton had demonstrated an irrefutable mathematical law whereby bodies appear to attract one another in relation to their masses and in inverse relation to the square of the distance between them. But was this rigorous mathematical and empirical description a philosophical account of bodies in motion? Critics such as Leibniz said no, since mathematical description was not the same thing as philosophical explanation, and Newton refused to offer an explanation of how and why gravity operated the way that it did. The Newtonians countered that phenomenal descriptions were scientifically adequate so long as they were grounded in empirical facts, and since no facts had yet been discerned that explained what gravity is or how it works, no scientific account of it was yet possible. They further insisted that it was enough that gravity did operate the way that Newton said it did, and that this was its own justification for accepting his theory. They further mocked those who insisted on dreaming up chimeras like the celestial vortices as explanations for phenomena when no empirical evidence existed to support of such theories.", "The previous summary describes the general core of the Newtonian position in the intense philosophical contests of the first decades of the eighteenth century. It also describes Voltaire’s own stance in these same battles. His contribution, therefore, was not centered on any innovation within these very familiar Newtonian themes; rather, it was his accomplishment to become a leading evangelist for this new Newtonian epistemology, and by consequence a major reason for its widespread dissemination and acceptance in France and throughout Europe. A comparison with David Hume’s role in this same development might help to illuminate the distinct contributions of each. Both Hume and Voltaire began with the same skepticism about rationalist philosophy, and each embraced the Newtonian criterion that made empirical fact the only guarantor of truth in philosophy. Yet Hume’s target remained traditional philosophy, and his contribution was to extend skepticism all the way to the point of denying the feasibility of transcendental philosophy itself. This argument would famously awake Kant’s dogmatic slumbers and lead to the reconstitution of transcendental philosophy in new terms, but Voltaire had different fish to fry. His attachment was to the new Newtonian empirical scientists, and while he was never more than a dilettante scientist himself, his devotion to this form of natural inquiry made him in some respects the leading philosophical advocate and ideologist for the new empirico-scientific conception of philosophy that Newton initiated.", "For Voltaire (and many other eighteenth-century Newtonians) the most important project was defending empirical science as an alternative to traditional natural philosophy. This involved sharing in Hume’s critique of abstract rationalist systems, but it also involved the very different project of defending empirical induction and experimental reasoning as the new epistemology appropriate for a modern Enlightened philosophy. In particular, Voltaire fought vigorously against the rationalist epistemology that critics used to challenge Newtonian reasoning. His famous conclusion in Candide, for example, that optimism was a philosophical chimera produced when dialectical reason remains detached from brute empirical facts owed a great debt to his Newtonian convictions. His alternative offered in the same text of a life devoted to simple tasks with clear, tangible, and most importantly useful ends was also derived from the utilitarian discourse that Newtonians also used to justify their science. Voltaire’s campaign on behalf of smallpox inoculation, which began with his letter on the topic in the Lettres philosophiques, was similarly grounded in an appeal to the facts of the case as an antidote to the fears generated by logical deductions from seemingly sound axiomatic principles. All of Voltaire’s public campaigns, in fact, deployed empirical fact as the ultimate solvent for irrational prejudice and blind adherence to preexisting understandings. In this respect, his philosophy as manifest in each was deeply indebted to the epistemological convictions he gleaned from Newtonianism." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Newtonian Empirical Science" } ] } ]	[ "Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, edited by A. Beuchot. 72 vols. Paris: Lefevre, 1829–1840.", "Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, edited by L.E.D. Moland and G. Bengesco. 52 vols. Paris: Garnier Frères, 1877–1885.", "Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, edited by Theodore Besterman. 135 vols. (projected) Geneva, Banbury, and Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1968–.", "The Works of Voltaire: A Contemporary Version, William F. Fleming (ed. and tr.), 21 vols., New York: E.R. Du Mont, 1901. [Complete edition available at the Online Library of Liberty]", "The Portable Voltaire, Ben Ray Redman (ed.), New York: Penguin Books, 1977.", "Selected Works of Voltaire, Joseph McCabe (ed.), London: Watts, 2007.", "Shorter Writings of Voltaire, J.I. Rodale (ed.), New York: A.S. Barnes, 1960.", "Voltaire in his Letters, Being a Selection of his Correspondence, S.G. Tallentyre (tr.), Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2004.", "Voltaire on Religion: Selected Writings, Kenneth W. Applegate (ed.), New York: F. Ungar, 1974.", "Voltaire: Selected Writings, Christopher Thacker (ed.), London: Dent, 1995.", "Voltaire: Selections, Paul Edwards (ed.), New York: Macmillan, 1989.", "Translations of Voltaire’s major plays are found in: The Works of Voltaire: A Contemporary Version, William F. Fleming (ed. and tr.), New York: E.R. Du Mont, 1901. [Complete edition available at the Online Library of Liberty]", "Seven Plays (Mérope (1737), Olympia (1761), Alzire (1734), Orestes (1749), Oedipus (1718), Zaire, Caesar), William Fleming (tr.), New York: Howard Fertig, 1988.", "The Age of Louis XIV (1733) and other Selected Writings, J.H. Brumfitt (ed.), New York: Twayne, 1963.", "The Age of Louis XIV (1733), Martyn P. Pollack (tr.), London and New York: Dutton, 1978.", "History of Charles XII, King of Sweden (1727), Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2002.", "History of Charles XII, King of Sweden (1727), Antonia White and Ragnhild Marie Hatton (eds.), New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1993.", "The Philosophy of History (1764), New York: The Philosophical Library, 1965.", "The Complete Tales of Voltaire, William Walton (tr.), 3 vols., New York: Howard Fertig, 1990.\n\n\t\n\t\tVol. 1: The Huron (1771), The History of Jenni (1774), The One-eyed Street Porter, Cosi-sancta (1715), An Incident of Memory (1773), The Travels of Reason (1774), The Man with Forty Crowns (1768), Timon (1755), The King of Boutan (1761), and The City of Cashmere (1760).\n\t\tVol. 2: The Letters of Amabed (1769), The Blind Judges of Colors (1766), The Princess of Babylon (1768), The Ears of Lord Chesterfield and Chaplain Goudman (1775), Story of a Good Brahman (1759), An Indian Adventure (1764), and Zadig, or, Destiny (1757).\n\t\tVol. 3: Micromegas (1738), Candide, or Optimism (1758), The World as it Goes (1750), The White and the Black (1764), Jeannot and Colin (1764), The Travels of Scarmentado (1756), The White Bull (1772), Memnon (1750), Plato’s Dream (1737), Bababec and the Fakirs (1750), and The Two Consoled Ones (1756).\n\t\n\t", "Vol. 1: The Huron (1771), The History of Jenni (1774), The One-eyed Street Porter, Cosi-sancta (1715), An Incident of Memory (1773), The Travels of Reason (1774), The Man with Forty Crowns (1768), Timon (1755), The King of Boutan (1761), and The City of Cashmere (1760).", "Vol. 2: The Letters of Amabed (1769), The Blind Judges of Colors (1766), The Princess of Babylon (1768), The Ears of Lord Chesterfield and Chaplain Goudman (1775), Story of a Good Brahman (1759), An Indian Adventure (1764), and Zadig, or, Destiny (1757).", "Vol. 3: Micromegas (1738), Candide, or Optimism (1758), The World as it Goes (1750), The White and the Black (1764), Jeannot and Colin (1764), The Travels of Scarmentado (1756), The White Bull (1772), Memnon (1750), Plato’s Dream (1737), Bababec and the Fakirs (1750), and The Two Consoled Ones (1756).", "The English Essays of 1727, David Williams and Richard Walker (eds.), Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1996.", "Epistle of M. Voltaire to the King of Prussia (1738), Glasgow, 1967.", "The History of the Travels of Scarmentado (1756), Glasgow: The College Press, 1969.", "Micromégas and other Short Fictions (1738), Theo Cuffe and Haydn Mason (eds.), London and New York: Penguin Books, 2002.", "The Princess of Babylon (1768), London: Signet Books, 1969.", "The Virgin of Orleans, or Joan of Arc (1755), Howard Nelson (tr.), Denver: A. Swallow, 1965.", "Voltaire. Essay on Milton (1727), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954.", "Voltaire’s Romances, New York: P. Eckler, 1986.", "Zadig, or L’Ingénu (1757), London: Penguin Books, 1984.", "Zadig, or the Book of Fate (1757), New York: Garland, 1974.", "Zadig, or The Book of Fate an Oriental History (1757), Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications, 1982.", "The Calas Affair: A Treatise on Tolerance (1762), Brian Masters (ed.), London: The Folio Society, 1994.", "The Sermon of the Fifty (1759), J.A.R. Séguin (ed.), Jersey City, NJ: R. Paxton, 1963.", "A Treatise on Toleration and Other Essays, Joseph McCabe (ed.), Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994.", "A Treatise on Tolerance and other Writings, edited by Brian Masters, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994", "Voltaire. Political Writings, edited by David Williams, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994", "The Elements of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy (1738; 2nd expanded edition, 1745)\n\n\t\n\t\tTranslated John Hanna. London: Cass, 1967.\n\t\tBirmingham, AL: Gryphon Editions, 1991.\n\t\n\t", "Translated John Hanna. London: Cass, 1967.", "Birmingham, AL: Gryphon Editions, 1991.", "Philosophical Dictionary (1752)\n\t\n\t\tEdited by Theodore Besterman. London: Penguin Books, 2002.\n\t\tTranslated by Peter Gay. New York: Basic Books, 1962.\n\t\tPhilosophical Dictionary: A Compendium, Wade Baskin (ed.), New York: Philosophical Library, 1961.\n\t\tPhilosophical Dictionary: Selections, Chicago: The Great Books Foundation, 1965.\n\t\n\t", "Edited by Theodore Besterman. London: Penguin Books, 2002.", "Translated by Peter Gay. New York: Basic Books, 1962.", "Philosophical Dictionary: A Compendium, Wade Baskin (ed.), New York: Philosophical Library, 1961.", "Philosophical Dictionary: Selections, Chicago: The Great Books Foundation, 1965.", "Philosophical Letters (Letters on the English Nation, Letters on England) (1734)\n\t\n\t\tJohn Leigh and Prudence L. Steiner (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2007.\n\t\tLeonard Tancock (ed.), London and New York: Penguin Books, 2003.\n\t\tErnest Dilworth (ed.), Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003.\n\t\tNicholas Cronk (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.\n\t\tF.A. Taylor (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946.\n\t\tHarvard Classics, Vol. 34, Part 2. [Available online from Bartleby.com]\n\t\n\t", "John Leigh and Prudence L. Steiner (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2007.", "Leonard Tancock (ed.), London and New York: Penguin Books, 2003.", "Ernest Dilworth (ed.), Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003.", "Nicholas Cronk (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.", "F.A. Taylor (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946.", "Harvard Classics, Vol. 34, Part 2. [Available online from Bartleby.com]", "Voltaire’s Letters on the Quakers (1727), Philadelphia: William H. Allen, 1953.", "Candide, or Optimism (1758). Hundreds of English editions of this text have been published, so this list is restricted to the most important scholarly editions published since 1960.\n\t\n\t\tC.H.R. Niven (ed.), London: Longman, 1980.\n\t\tCandide and other Writings, Haskell M. Block (ed.), New York: Modern Library, 1985.\n\t\tRichard Aldington, Ernest Dilworth, and others (eds.), New York: Modern Library, 1992.\n\t\tShane Weller (ed.), New York: Dover, 1993.\n\t\tCandide: A Dual Language Book, New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1993.\n\t\tRobert Martin Adams (ed.), New York: W.W. Norton, 1996.\n\t\tElectronic Scholarly Publishing Project, 1998. [Available online at Electronic Scholarly Publishing Project]\n\t\tDaniel Gordon (ed.), Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999.\n\t\tCandide and Related Texts, David Wooton (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000.\n\t\tLowell Bair (ed.), New York: Bantam Books, 2003.\n\t\tCandide & Zadig, Lester G. Crocker (ed.), New York: Pocket Books, 2005.\n\t\tRaffael Burton (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.\n\t\tTheo Cuffe (ed.), London and New York: Penguin Books, 2007.\n\t\tCandide and other Stories, Roger Pearson (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.\n\t\tCandide, Zadig, and Selected Stories, Donald Frame (tr. and ed.), New York: Signet Classic, 2009.\n\t\n\t", "C.H.R. Niven (ed.), London: Longman, 1980.", "Candide and other Writings, Haskell M. Block (ed.), New York: Modern Library, 1985.", "Richard Aldington, Ernest Dilworth, and others (eds.), New York: Modern Library, 1992.", "Shane Weller (ed.), New York: Dover, 1993.", "Candide: A Dual Language Book, New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1993.", "Robert Martin Adams (ed.), New York: W.W. Norton, 1996.", "Electronic Scholarly Publishing Project, 1998. [Available online at Electronic Scholarly Publishing Project]", "Daniel Gordon (ed.), Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999.", "Candide and Related Texts, David Wooton (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000.", "Lowell Bair (ed.), New York: Bantam Books, 2003.", "Candide & Zadig, Lester G. Crocker (ed.), New York: Pocket Books, 2005.", "Raffael Burton (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.", "Theo Cuffe (ed.), London and New York: Penguin Books, 2007.", "Candide and other Stories, Roger Pearson (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.", "Candide, Zadig, and Selected Stories, Donald Frame (tr. and ed.), New York: Signet Classic, 2009.", "Aldridge, Alfred Owen, 1975, Voltaire and the Century of Light, Princeton: Princeton University Press.", "Badinter, Elizabeth, 1983, Émilie, Émilie, l’ambition féminine au XVIIIe siècle, Paris: Flammarion.", "–––, 1999–2002, Les Passions intellectuelles, 2 volumes, Paris: Fayard.", "Barber, W.H., 1955, Leibniz in France from Arnauld to Voltaire: A Study in French Reactions to Leibnizianism 1670–1760, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Barrell, Rex A., 1988, Bolingbroke and France, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.", "Besterman, Theodore, 1969, Voltaire, New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World.", "Bird, Stephen, 2000, Reinventing Voltaire: The Politics of Commemoration in Nineteenth-century France, Oxford: Oxford University Studies on Enlightenment.", "Brooks, Richard A., 1964, Voltaire and Leibniz, Geneva: Droz.", "Brown, Harcourt, 1947, Voltaire and the Royal Society of London, Toronto: University of Toronto Quarterly.", "Brumfitt, J.H., 1970, Voltaire: historian, London: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 1973, The French Enlightenment, Cambridge: Schenkman Pub. Co.", "Brunel, Lucien, 1967, Les Philosophes et l’académie française au dix-huitième siècle, Genève: Slatkine Reprints.", "Brunet, Pierre, 1931, L’introduction des théories de Newton en France au XVIIIe siècle, Paris: A. Blanchard.", "Collins, J. Churton, 1908, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau in England, London: E. Nash.", "Conlon, Pierre M., 1961, Voltaire’s literary career from 1728 to 1750, Genève: Institut et Musée Voltaire.", "Cottret, Bernard, 1992, Bolingbroke: exil et écriture au siècle des Lumières, Paris: Klincksieck.", "Cronk, Nicolas, 2009, The Cambridge Companion to Voltaire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2014, Voltaire: a very short introduction, Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation.", "Darnton, Robert, 1979, The Business of Enlightenment: The Publishing History of the Encyclopédie, 1775–1800, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.", "–––, 1982, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.", "Dickinson, H.T., 1970, Bolingbroke, London: Constable.", "Dieckmann, Herbert, 1943, Le Philosophe: Texts and Interpretations, (Washington University Studies, New Series, Language and Literature, no. 18), St. Louis: Washington University Press.", "Duchet, Michèle, 1971, Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des lumières Buffon, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, Diderot, Paris: F. 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Du Châtelet’s Institutions de physiques, 1737–1740”, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 201: 85–113.", "Gay, Peter, 1954, The Party of Humanity: Essays in the French Enlightenment, New York: Knopf.", "Gay, Peter, 1969, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (Volume 1: The Science of Freedom), New York: Knopf.", "–––, 1977, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (Volume 2: The Rise of Modern Paganism), New York: Knopf 1977.", "–––, 1988, Voltaire’s Politics: The Poet as Realist, New Haven: Yale University Press.", "Guerlac, Henry, 1981,Newton on the Continent, Ithaca.", "Gurrado, Antonio, 2013, Voltaire cattolico, Torino: Lindau.", "Hagengruber, Ruth (ed.), 2011, Emilie du Châtelet between Leibniz and Newton, Dordrecht: Springer.", "Ḥadīd, Javādī, 2012, Voltaire et l’Islam, Ozoir la Ferriere : Albouraq.", "Hellman, Lilian, 1980, Dorothy Parker, John La Touche, Richard Wilbur, and Leonard Bernstein, 1956–1957, Candide, An Operetta in Two Acts, New York: Jaini Publications.", "Hutchison, Ross, 1991, Locke in France: 1688–1734, Oxford: Voltaire Foundation.", "Iltis, Carolyn, 1977, “Madame du Châtelet’s metaphysics and mechanics”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 8: 29–48.", "Israel, Jonathan, 2000, The Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2006, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2009, A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2011, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750–1790, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2014, Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French Revolution from The Rights of Man to Robespierre, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Jacob, Margaret, 1981, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons, and Republicans, London: Cornerstone Book Publishers.", "Kramnick, Isaac, 1968, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.", "Lanson, Gustave, 1894, Histoire de la littérature française, Paris: Hachette.", "Lanson, Gustave, 1906, Voltaire, Paris: Hachette.", "Libby, Margaret Sherwood, 1935, The Attitude of Voltaire to Magic and the Sciences, New York: Columbia University Press, 1935.", "Lilti, Antoine, 2005, Le monde des salons. 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arrows-theorem	Arrow’s Theorem	First published Mon Oct 13, 2014; substantive revision Tue Nov 26, 2019	[ "\nKenneth Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem—or\n“general possibility” theorem, as he called\nit—answers a very basic question in the theory of collective\ndecision-making. Say there are some alternatives to choose among. They\ncould be policies, public projects, candidates in an election,\ndistributions of income and labour requirements among the members of a\nsociety, or just about anything else. There are some people whose\npreferences will inform this choice, and the question is: which\nprocedures are there for deriving, from what is known or can be found\nout about their preferences, a collective or “social”\nordering of the alternatives from better to worse? The answer is\nstartling. Arrow’s theorem says there are no such procedures\nwhatsoever—none, anyway, that satisfy certain apparently quite\nreasonable assumptions concerning the autonomy of the people and the\nrationality of their preferences. The technical framework in which\nArrow gave the question of social orderings a precise sense and its\nrigorous answer is now widely used for studying problems in welfare\neconomics. The impossibility theorem itself set much of the agenda for\ncontemporary social choice theory. Arrow accomplished this while still\na graduate student. In 1972, he received the Nobel Prize in economics\nfor his contributions." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The Will of the People?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Arrow’s Framework", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Individual Preferences", "2.2 Multiple Profiles", "2.3 Social Welfare Functions" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Impossibility", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 These Conditions…", "3.2 …are Incompatible" ] }, { "content_title": "4. The Conditions, again", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Unrestricted Domain", "4.2 Social Ordering", "4.3 Weak Pareto", "4.4 Non-Dictatorship", "4.5 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Possibilities", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Domain Restrictions", "5.2 More Ordinal Information", "5.3 Even More Ordinal Information: Scores and Grades", "5.4 Cardinal Information" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Reinterpretations", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Judgment Aggregation", "6.2 Multi-Criterial Decision", "6.3 Overall Similarity" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "Some of the trouble with social orderings is visible in a simple\nbut important example. Say there are three\nalternatives \$A\$, \$B\$ and \$C\$ to choose\namong. There is a group of three people 1, 2 and 3 whose preferences\nare to inform this choice, and they are asked to rank the alternatives\nby their own lights from better to worse. Their individual preference\norderings turn out to be:", "That is, person 1 prefers \$A\$ to \$B\$,\nprefers \$B\$ to \$C\$, and prefers \$A\$\nto \$C\$; person 2 prefers \$B\$ to \$C\$, and so\non. Now, we might hope somehow to arrive at a single\n“social” ordering of the alternatives that reflects the\npreferences of all three. Then we could choose whichever alternative\nis, socially, best—or, if there is a tie for first place, we\ncould choose some alternative that is as good as any other. Suppose,\ntaking the alternatives pair by pair, we put the matter to a vote: we\ncount one alternative as socially preferred to another if\nthere are more voters who prefer it than there are who prefer the\nother one. We determine in this way that \$A\$ is socially\npreferred to \$B\$, since two voters (1 and 3) prefer \$A\$\nto \$B\$, but only one (voter 2) prefers \$B\$\nto \$A\$. Similarly, there is a social preference for \$B\$\nto \$C\$. We might therefore expect to find that \$A\$ is\nsocially preferred to \$C\$. By this reckoning, though, it is\njust the other way around, since there are two voters who\nprefer \$C\$ to \$A\$. We do not have a\nsocial ordering of the alternatives at all. We have\na cycle. Starting from any alternative, moving to a socially\npreferred one, and from there to the next, you soon find\nyourself back where you \nstarted.[1]", "This is the “paradox of voting”. Discovered by the\nMarquis de Condorcet (1785), it shows that possibilities for\nchoosing rationally can be lost when individual preferences are\naggregated into social preferences. Voter 1 has \$A\$ at the top\nof his individual ordering. This voter’s preferences can\nbe maximized, by choosing \$A\$. The preferences of 2 or\n3 can also be maximized, by choosing instead their maxima, \$B\$\nor \$C\$. Pairwise majority decision doesn’t result in a social\nmaximum, though. \$A\$ isn’t one because a majority prefers\nsomething else, \$C\$. Likewise, \$B\$ and \$C\$ are\nnot social maxima. The individual preferences lend themselves to\nmaximization; but, because they cycle, the social preferences do\nnot.", "Are there other aggregation procedures that are better than\npairwise majority decision, or do the different ones have shortcomings\nof their own? Condorcet, his contemporary Jean Charles de Borda\n(1781), and later Charles Dodgson (1844) and Duncan Black (1948),\namong others, all addressed this question by studying various\nprocedures and comparing their properties. Arrow broke new ground by\ncoming at it from the opposite direction. Starting with various\nrequirements that aggregation procedures might be expected to meet, he\nasked which procedures fill the bill. Among his requirements\nis Social Ordering, which insists that the result of\naggregation is always an ordering of the alternatives, never a\ncycle. After the introduction in\n Section 2 of\nthe technical framework that Arrow set up in order to study social\nchoice,\n Section 3.1 sets out further conditions\nthat he imposed. Briefly, these are: Unrestricted Domain\nwhich says that aggregation procedures must be able to handle any\nindividual preferences at all; Weak Pareto, which requires\nthem to respect unanimous individual\npreferences; Non-Dictatorship, which rules out procedures by\nwhich social preferences always agree with the strict preferences of\nsome one individual; and finally Independence of Irrelevant\nAlternatives, which says that the social comparison among any two\ngiven alternatives is to depend on individual preferences among only\nthat pair. Arrow’s theorem, stated in\n Section 3.2, tells us that, except in\n the very simplest of cases, no\naggregation procedure whatsoever meets all the requirements.", "The tenor of Arrow’s theorem is deeply antithetical to the\npolitical ideals of the Enlightenment. It turns out that Condorcet’s\nparadox is indeed not an isolated anomaly, the failure of one specific\nvoting method. Rather, it manifests a much wider problem with the very\nidea of collecting many individual preferences into one. On the face\nof it, anyway, there simply cannot be a common will of all the people\nconcerning collective decisions, that assimilates the tastes and\nvalues of all the individual men and women who make up a society.", "There are some who, following Riker (1982), take Arrow’s theorem to\nshow that democracy, conceived as government by the will of the\npeople, is an incoherent illusion. Others argue that some conditions\nof the theorem are unreasonable, and from their point of view the\nprospects for collective choice look much brighter. After presenting\nthe theorem itself, this entry will take up some main points of\ncritical discussion. Section 4 considers the\nmeaning and scope of Arrow’s conditions. Section 5\ndiscusses aggregation procedures that are available when not all of\nArrows conditions need be satisfied, or when different underlying\nassumptions are made about the nature of social\nchoice. Section 6 concludes with an overview of\nproposals to study within Arrow’s technical framework certain\naggregation problems other than the one that concerned him. ", "Amartya Sen once expressed regret that the theory of social choice\ndoes not share with poetry the amiable characteristic of communicating\nbefore it is understood (Sen 1986). Arrow’s theorem is not especially\ndifficult to understand and much about it is readily communicated, if\nnot in poetry, then at least in plain English. Informal presentations\ngo only so far, though, and where they stop sometimes\nmisunderstandings start. This exposition uses a minimum of technical\nlanguage for the sake of clarity." ], "section_title": "1. The Will of the People?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "The problem of finding an aggregation procedure arises, as Arrow\nframed it, in connection with some given alternatives between which\nthere is a choice is to be made. The nature of these alternatives\ndepends on the kind of choice problem that is being studied. In the\ntheory of elections, the alternatives are people who might stand as\ncandidates in an election. In welfare economics they are different\nstates of a society, such as distributions of income and labour\nrequirements. The alternatives conventionally are referred to using\nlower case letters from the end of the alphabet\nas \$x, y, z, \\ldots\$; the set of all\nthese alternatives is \$X\$. The people whose tastes and values\nwill inform the choice are assumed to be finite in number, and they\nare enumerated \$1, \\ldots, n\$.", "Arrow’s problem arises, then, only after some alternatives\nand people have been fixed. It is for them that an aggregation\nprocedure is sought. Crucially, though, this problem\narises before relevant information about the people’s\npreferences among the alternatives has been gathered, whether that is\nby polling or some other method for eliciting or determining\npreferences. The question that Arrow’s theorem answers is, more\nprecisely, this: Which procedures are there for arriving at a social\nordering of some given alternatives, on the basis of some given\npeople’s preferences among them, no matter what these preferences turn\nout to be?", "In practice, meanwhile, we sometimes must select a procedure for\nmaking social decisions without knowing for which alternatives and\npeople it will be used. In recurring elections for some public office,\nfor instance, there is a different slate of candidates each time, and\na different population of voters, and we must use the same voting\nmethod to determine the winner, no matter who the candidates and\nvoters are and no matter how many of them there happen to be. Such\nprocedures are not directly available for study within Arrow’s\nframework, with its fixed set \$X\$ of alternatives and people\n\$1, \\ldots, n\$. Arrow’s theorem is still relevant to them,\nthough. It tells us that even when the alternatives and\npeople are held fixed, then still there is no “good”\nmethod for deriving social orderings. Now, if there is no good method\nfor voting even once, with the particular candidates and voters who\nare involved on that occasion, then nor, presumably, is there a good\nmethod that can be used repeatedly, with different candidates and\nvoters each time." ], "section_title": "2. Arrow’s Framework", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "Arrow assumed that social orderings will be derived, if at all,\nfrom information about people’s preferences. This information is, in\nhis framework, merely ordinal. It is the kind of information\nthat is implicated in Condorcet’s paradox of voting,\nin Section 1, where each person ranks the\nalternatives from better to worse but there is nothing beyond this\nabout how strong anybody’s preferences are, or about how the\npreferences of one person compare in strength to those of another. In\nconfining aggregation procedures to ordinal information, Arrow argued\nthat:\n", " [I]t seems to make no sense to add the utility of\none individual, a psychic magnitude in his mind, with the utility of\nanother individual. (Arrow 1951 [1963]: 11)\n", " His point was that even if people do have\nstronger and weaker preferences, and even if the strengths of their\npreferences can somehow be measured and made available as a basis for\nsocial decisions, nevertheless ordinal information is all that\nmatters because preferences are “interpersonally\nincomparable”. Intuitively, what this means is that there is no\nsaying how much more strongly someone must prefer one thing to\nanother in order to make up for the fact that someone else’s\npreference is just the other way around. Arrow saw no reason to\nprovide aggregation procedures with information about the strength of preferences\nbecause he thought that they cannot put such information to\nmeaningful use. ", "Accordingly, the preferences of individual people are represented\nin Arrow’s framework by binary relations \$R_{i}\$ among the\nalternatives: \$xR_{i}y\$ means that individual \$i\$ weakly\nprefers alternative \$x\$ to alternative \$y\$. That is, either\n\$i\$ strictly prefers \$x\$ to \$y\$, or else \$i\$\nis indifferent between them, finding them equally good. Each\nindividual preference relation \$R_{i}\$ is assumed to\nbe connected (for all alternatives \$x\$ and \$y\$, either\n\$xR_{i}y\$, or \$yR_{i}x\$, or both) and transitive (for all\n\$x\$, \$y\$ and \$z\$, if \$xR_{i}y\$ and \$yR_{i}z\$, then\n\$xR_{i}z\$). That these relations have these structural properties\nwas, for Arrow, a matter of the “rationality” of the\npreferences they represent; for further discussion, see the entries on\nPreferences and Philosophy of Economics. Connected, transitive\nrelations are called weak orderings. They are\n“weak” in that they allow ties—in this connection,\nindifference.\n", "A preference profile is a list \$\\langle R_{1}, \\ldots,\nR_{n}\\rangle\$ of weak orderings of the set \$X\$ of alternatives, one\nfor each of the people \$1, \\ldots, n\$. The list of three\nindividual orderings in the paradox of voting is an example of a\npreference profile for the alternatives \$A\$, \$B\$, and \$C\$ and people\n1, 2, and 3. A profile is a representation of the individual\npreferences of everybody who will be consulted in the choice among the\nalternatives. It is in the form of profiles that Arrow’s aggregation\nprocedures receive information about individual preferences. Often it\nis convenient to write \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ instead of \$\\langle\nR_{1}, \\ldots, R_{n}\\rangle\$. Other profiles are written \$\\langle\nR^_{i}\\rangle\$, and so on.", "In restricting individual inputs to weak orderings of the\nalternatives, Arrow overlooked the possibility that people could input\ninformation about their preferences in the form of ordinal scores or\ngrades. Graded inputs enable an “escape” from Arrow’s\nimpossibility that is explained in Section\n5.3. Amartya Sen extended Arrow’s framework to take into account\nnot only ordinal information about people’s preferences among pairs of\nalternatives, but also cardinal information about the utility\nthey derive from each one. In this way he was able to investigate the\nconsequences of other assumptions than Arrow’s about the measurability\nand interpersonal comparability of individual\npreferences. See Section 5.4 and the\nentry social choice theory for details\nand references." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Individual Preferences" }, { "content": [ "Arrow required aggregation procedures to derive social orderings\nfrom more than just a single profile, representing\neveryone’s actual preferences. In his framework they must\nreckon with many profiles, representing preferences that the\npeople could have.", "Variety among preferences is the result, in Arrow’s account, of the\ndifferent standards by which we assess our options. Our preferences\ndepend on our “tastes” in personal consumption but\nimportantly, for social choice, they also depend on our socially\ndirected “values”. Now, we are to some extent free to have\nvarious tastes, values, and preferences; and we are free, also, to\nhave these independently of one another. Any individual can have a\nrange of preferences, then, and for any given sets of people and\nalternatives there are many possible preference profiles. One profile\n\$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ represents the preferences of these people\namong their alternatives in, if you will, one possible world. Another\nprofile \$\\langle\nR^_{i}\\rangle\$ represents preferences of the same\npeople, and among the same alternatives, but in another possible world\nwhere their tastes and values are different.", "Arrow’s rationale for requiring aggregation procedures to handle\nmany profiles was epistemic. As he framed the question of collective\nchoice, a procedure is sought for deriving a social ordering of some\ngiven alternatives on the basis of some given people’s tastes and\nvalues. It is sought, though, before it is known just what these\ntastes and values happen to be. The variety among profiles to be\nreckoned with is a measure, in Arrow’s account of the matter, of how\nmuch is known or assumed about everybody’s preferences a\npriori, which is to say before these have been elicited. When\nless is known, there are more profiles from which a social ordering\nmight have to be derived. When more is known, there are fewer of\nthem.", "There are other reasons for working with many profiles, even when\npeople’s actual preferences are known fully in advance. Serge Kolm (1996)\nsuggested that counterfactual preferences are relevant when we\ncome to justify the use of some given procedure.\nSensitivity analysis, used to manage uncertainty about errors in the\ninput, and to determine which information is critical in the sense\nthat the output turns on it, also requires that procedures handle a\nrange of inputs.", "With many profiles in play there can be “interprofile”\nconditions on aggregation procedures. These coordinate the results of\naggregation at several profiles at once. One such condition that plays\na crucial role in Arrow’s theorem is Independence of Irrelevant\nAlternatives. It requires that whenever everybody’s preferences\namong two alternatives are in one profile the same as in another, the\ncollective ordering must also be the same at the two profiles, as far\nas these alternatives are concerned. There is to be this much\nsimilarity among social orderings even as people’s tastes and values\nchange. Sections 3.1\nand 4.5 discuss in more detail the meaning of\nthis controversial requirement, and the extent to which it is\nreasonable to impose it on aggregation procedures.", "Ian Little raised the following objection in an early discussion\nof (Arrow 1951):", "\nIf tastes change, we may expect a new ordering of all the\nconceivable states; but we do not require that the difference between\nthe new and the old ordering should bear any particular relation to\nthe changes of taste which have occurred. We have, so to speak, a new\nworld and a new order; and we do not demand correspondence between the\nchange in the world and the change in the order (Little 1952:\n423–424).\n", "Little apparently agreed with Arrow that there might be a different\nsocial ordering were people’s tastes different, but unlike Arrow he\nthought that it wouldn’t have to be similar to the actual or current\nordering in any special way. Little’s objection was taken to support\nthe “single profile” approach to social welfare judgments\nof Abram Bergson (1938) and Paul Samuelson (1947), and there was a\ndebate about which approach was best, theirs or Arrow’s. Arguably,\nwhat was at issue in this debate was not—or should not have\nbeen—whether aggregation procedures must handle more than a\nsingle preference profile, but instead whether there should be any\ncoordination of the output at different profiles. Among others Sen\n(1977) and Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) have made this point. If they\nare right then the substance of Little’s objection can be accommodated\nwithin Arrow’s multi-profile framework simply by not imposing any\ninterprofile constraints. Be this as it may, Arrow’s framework is\nnowadays the dominant one. " ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Multiple Profiles" }, { "content": [ "Sometimes a certain amount is known about everybody’s preferences\nbefore these have been elicited. Profiles that are compatible with\nwhat is known represent preferences that the people could have, and\nmight turn out actually to have, and it is from these\n“admissible” profiles that we may hope to derive social\norderings. Technically, a domain, in Arrow’s framework, is a\nset of admissible profiles, each concerning the same alternatives \$X\$\nand people \$1, \\ldots, n\$. A social welfare function \$f\$\nassigns to each profile \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ in some domain a binary\nrelation \$f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ on \$X\$. Intuitively, \$f\$ is an\naggregation procedure and \$f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ represents the\nsocial preferences that it derives from \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$.\nArrow’s social welfare functions are sometimes called\n“constitutions”.", "Arrow incorporated into the notion of a social welfare function the\nfurther requirement that \$f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ is always a weak\nordering of the set \$X\$ of alternatives. Informally speaking, this\nmeans that the output of the social welfare function must always be a\nranking of the alternatives from better to worse, perhaps with\nties. It may never be a cycle. This requirement will appear here, as\nit does in other contemporary presentations of Arrow’s theorem, as a\nseparate condition of Social Ordering that social welfare\nfunctions might be required to meet. See\n Section 3.1. This way, we can consider the\n consequences of dropping this\ncondition without changing any basic parts of the framework.\nSee Section 4.2.", "Arrow established a convention that is still widely observed of\nusing ‘\$R\$’ to denote the social preference derived from\n“\$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$”. The social welfare function used to derive it\nis, in his notation, left implicit. One advantage of writing\n‘\$f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$’ instead of ‘\$R\$’ is\nthat when we state the conditions of the impossibility theorem, in the\nnext section, the social welfare function will figure explicitly in\nthem. This makes it quite clear that what these conditions constrain\nis the functional relationship between individual and social\npreferences. Focusing attention on this was an important innovation of\nArrow’s approach." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Social Welfare Functions" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "With the conceptual framework now in\nplace, Section 3.1 sets out the\n“conditions” or constraints that Arrow imposed on social\nwelfare functions, and Section 3.2 states the\ntheorem itself. Section 4 explains the\nconditions more fully, discusses reasons that Arrow gave for imposing\nthem, and considers whether it is proper to do so. ", "Arrow’s conditions often are called axioms, and his approach is\nsaid to be axiomatic. This might be found misleading. Unlike axioms of\nlogic or geometry, Arrow’s conditions are not supposed to express more\nor less indubitable truths, or to constitute an implicit definition of\nthe object of study. Arrow himself took them to be questionable\n“value judgments” that “express the doctrines of\ncitizens’ sovereignty and rationality in a very general form”\n(Arrow 1951 [1963]: 31). Indeed, as we will see\nin Section 4, and as Arrow himself recognized,\nsometimes it is not even desirable that social welfare functions\nshould satisfy all conditions of the impossibility theorem.", "Arrow restated the conditions in the second edition of Social\nChoice and Individual Values (Arrow 1963). They appear here in\nthe canonical form into which they have settled since then." ], "section_title": "3. Impossibility", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "A first requirement is that the social welfare function \$f\$ can\nhandle any combination of any individual preferences at all:", "\nUnrestricted Domain (U): The domain of \$f\$\nincludes every list \$\\langle R_{1}, \\ldots, R_{n}\\rangle\$ of \$n\$\nweak orderings of \$X\$.\n", "Condition U requires that \$f\$ is defined for each\n“logically possible” profile of individual preferences. A\nsecond requirement is that, in each case, \$f\$ produces an ordering of\nthe alternatives, perhaps with ties:", "\nSocial Ordering (SO): For any profile \$\\langle\nR_{i}\\rangle\$ in the domain, \$f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ is a weak\nordering of \$X\$.\n", "Notice that, as the paradox of voting in\n Section 1 shows, these two conditions\n U and SO by\nthemselves already rule out aggregating preferences by pairwise\nmajority decision, if there are at least three alternatives to choose\nbetween, and three people whose preferences are to be taken into\naccount.", "To state the next requirements it is convenient to use some\nshorthand. For any given individual ordering \$R_{i}\$, let \$P_{i}\$ be\nthe strict or asymmetrical part of \$R_{i}: xP_{i}y\$\nif \$xR_{i}y\$ but not \$yR_{i}x\$. Intuitively, \$xP_{i}y\$ means\nthat \$i\$ really does prefer \$x\$ to \$y\$, in that \$i\$ is not indifferent\nbetween them. Similarly, let \$P\$ be the strict part of \$f\\langle\nR_{i}\\rangle\$. The next condition of Arrow’s theorem is: ", "\nWeak Pareto (WP): For any profile \$\\langle\nR_{i}\\rangle\$ in the domain of \$f\$, and any alternatives \$x\$\nand \$y\$, if for all \$i\$, \$xP_{i}y\$,\nthen \$xPy\$. \n", "WP requires \$f\$ to respect unanimous strict\npreferences. That is, whenever everyone strictly prefers one\nalternative to another, the social ordering that \$f\$ derives must\nagree. Pairwise majority decision\nsatisfies \nWP.[2]\n Many other well-known voting methods such\nas Borda counting satisfy it as well (see\n Section 5.2). So WP requires\n that \$f\$ is to this extent like\nthem.", "The next condition ensures that social preferences are not based\nentirely on the preferences of any one person. Person \$d\$ is\na dictator of \$f\$ if for any alternatives \$x\$ and \$y\$, and\nfor any profile \$\\langle\\ldots, R_{d},\\ldots\\rangle\$ in the domain of\n\$f\$: if \$xP_{d}y\$, then \$xPy\$. When a dictator strictly prefers one\nthing to another, the society always does as well. Other people’s\npreferences can still influence social preferences. So can\n“non-welfare” features of the alternatives such as, in\nthe case of social states, the extent to which people are equal,\ntheir rights are respected, and so on. But all these can make a\ndifference only when the dictator is indifferent between two\nalternatives, having no strict preference one way or the other. The\ncondition is now simply:", "\nNondictatorship (D): \$f\$ has no dictator.\n", "To illustrate, pick some person \$d\$, any one at all, and from each\nprofile \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ in the domain take the ordering \$R_{d}\$\nrepresenting the preferences of \$d\$. Now, in each case, let the social\npreference be that. In other words, for each profile \$\\langle\nR_{i}\\rangle\$, let \$f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ be \$R_{d}\$. This social\nwelfare function \$f\$ bases the social ordering entirely on the\npreferences of \$d\$, its dictator. It is intuitively undemocratic\nand D rules it out.", "To state the last condition of Arrow’s theorem, another piece of\nshorthand is handy. For any given relation \$R\$, and any set \$S\$, let\n\$R\|S\$ be the restriction of \$R\$ to \$S\$. It is that part of \$R\$\nconcerning just the elements of \n\$S\$.[3]\n The restriction of \$\\langle\nR_{1}, \\ldots, R_{n}\\rangle\$ to \$S\$, written \$\\langle\nR_{1}, \\ldots, R_{n}\\rangle\|S\$, is just \$\\langle R_{1}\|S,\n\\ldots, R_{n}\|S\\rangle\$. Take for instance the profile from the\nparadox of voting in Section 1:", "Its restriction to the set \$\\{A,C\\}\$ of alternatives is:", "Now the remaining condition can be stated: ", "\nIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (I): For\nall alternatives \$x\$ and \$y\$ in \$X\$, and all profiles \$\\langle\nR_{i}\\rangle\$ and \$\\langle R^_{i}\\rangle\$ in the domain of \$f\$, if\n\$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\|\\{x,y\\} = \\langle R^_{i}\\rangle\|\\{x,y\\}\$, then\n\$f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle \|\\{x,y\\} = f\\langle R^_{i}\\rangle\n\|\\{x,y\\}\$.\n", "I says that whenever two profiles \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$\nand \$\\langle R^_{i}\\rangle\$ are identical, as far as some\nalternatives \$x\$ and \$y\$ are concerned, so too must the social\npreference relations \$f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ and \$f\\langle\nR^_{i}\\rangle\$ be identical, as far as \$x\$ and \$y\$ are concerned. For\nexample, consider the profile:", "Its restriction to the pair {\$A\$,\$C\$} is identical to that of the\nprofile of the paradox of voting. Suppose the domain of a social\nwelfare function includes both of these profiles. Then, to\nsatisfy I, it must derive from each one the same social\npreference among \$A\$ and \$C\$. The social preference among \$A\$ and \$C\$\nis, in this sense, to be “independent” of anybody’s\npreferences among either of them and the remaining\n“irrelevant” alternative \$B\$. The same is to hold for any\ntwo profiles in the domain, and for any other pair taken from the set\n\$X\$ = {\$A\$, \$B\$, \$C\$} of all alternatives. Some voting methods do not\nsatisfy I (see Section 5.2), but\npairwise majority decision does. To see whether \$x\$ is socially\npreferred to \$y\$, by this method, you need look no further than the\nindividual preferences among \$x\$ and \$y\$. " ], "subsection_title": "3.1 These Conditions…" }, { "content": [ "Arrow discovered that, except in the very simplest of cases, the\nfive conditions of Section 3.1 are\nincompatible.", "\nArrow’s Theorem: Suppose there are more than two\nalternatives. Then no social welfare function \$f\$\nsatisfies U, SO, WP, D,\nand I.\n", "Arrow (1951) has the original proof of this\n“impossibility” theorem. See among many other works Kelly\n1978, Campbell and Kelly 2002, Geanakoplos 2005 and Gaertner 2009 for\nvariants and different proofs." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 …are Incompatible" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "Taken separately, the conditions of Arrow’s theorem do not seem\nsevere. Apparently, they ask of an aggregation procedure only that it\nwill come up with a social preference ordering no matter what\neverybody prefers (U and SO), that it will resemble\ncertain democratic arrangements in some ways (WP\nand I), and that it will not resemble certain undemocratic\narrangements in another way (D). Taken together, though,\nthese conditions exclude all possibility of deriving social\npreferences. It is time to consider them more closely. " ], "section_title": "4. The Conditions, again", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "Arrow’s domain condition U says that the domain of the\nsocial welfare function includes every list of \$n\$ weak orderings of\n\$X\$. For example, suppose the alternatives are \$A\$, \$B\$, and \$C\$, and\nthat the people are 1, 2, and 3. There are 13 weak orderings of three\nalternatives, so the unrestricted domain contains 2197 (that is,\n\$13^{3}\$) lists of weak orderings of \$A\$, \$B\$, and \$C\$. A social\nwelfare function \$f\$ for these alternatives and people, if it\nsatisfies U, maps each one of these “logically\npossible” preference profiles onto a collective preference among\n\$A\$, \$B\$, and \$C\$.", "In Arrow’s account, the different profiles in a domain represent\npreferences that the people might turn out to have. To\nimpose U, on his epistemic rationale, amounts to assuming\nthat they might have any preferences at all: it is only when their\npreferences could be anything that it makes sense to require the\nsocial welfare function to be ready for everything. Arrow wrote in\nsupport of U:\n", " If we do not wish to require any prior knowledge\nof the tastes of individuals before specifying our social welfare\nfunction, that function will have to be defined for every logically\npossible set of individual orderings. (Arrow 1951 [1963]: 24)\n", "There have been misunderstandings. Some think U requires\nof social welfare functions that they can handle “any old”\nalternatives. It does nothing of the sort. What it requires is that the\nsocial welfare function can handle the widest possible range\nof preferences among whichever alternatives there are to\nchoose among, and whether there happen to be many of these or only a\nfew of them is beside the point: the domain of a social welfare\nfunction can be completely unrestricted even if there are in \$X\$ just\ntwo alternatives. One way to sustain this unorthodox understanding\nof U is, perhaps, to think of Arrow’s \$x, y, z, \\ldots\$ not as alternatives properly\nspeaking—not as candidates in elections, social states, or what\nhave you—but as names or labels that represent these on\ndifferent occasions for choosing. Then, it might be thought, variety\namong the alternatives to which the labels can be attached will generate\nvariety among the profiles that an aggregation procedure might be\nexpected to handle. Blackorby et al. (2006) toy with this idea at one\npoint, but they quickly set it aside. It does not seem to have been\nexplored in the literature.", "Of course, there is nothing to keep anyone from reinterpreting\nArrow’s basic notions, including the set \$X\$ of alternatives, in any\nway they like; a theorem is a theorem no matter what interpretation\nit is given. It is important to realize, though, that to interpret\n\$x, y, z, \\ldots\$ as labels is not standard, and can\nonly make nonsense of much of the theory of social choice to which\nArrow’s theorem has given \nrise.[4]", "Arrow already knew that U is a stronger domain condition\nthan is needed for an impossibility result. The free triple\nproperty and the chain property are weaker conditions\nthat replace U in some versions of Arrow’s theorem (Campbell\nand Kelly 2002). These versions, being more informative, are, from a\nlogical point of view, better. U is simpler to state than\ntheir domain conditions, though, and might be found more\nintuitive. Notice that the weaker domain conditions still require a\nlot of variety among profiles. A typical proof of an Arrow-style\nimpossibility theorem requires that the domain is unrestricted with\nrespect to some three alternatives. In this case there is always a\npreference profile like the one implicated in the paradox of voting\nin Section 1, from which pairwise majority\ndecision derives a cycle.", "Whether it is sensible to impose U or any other domain\ncondition on a social welfare function depends very much on the\nparticulars of the choice problem being studied. Sometimes, in the\nnature of the alternatives under consideration, and the way in which\nindividual preferences among them are determined, imposing U\ncertainly is not appropriate. If for instance the alternatives are\ndifferent ways of dividing up a pie among some people, and it is known\nprior to selecting a social welfare function that these people are\nselfish, each caring only about the size of his own piece, then it\nmakes no obvious sense to require of a suitable function that it can\nhandle cases in which some people prefer to have less for themselves\nthan to have more. The social welfare function will never be called on\nto handle such cases for the simple reason that they will never arise.\nArrow made this point as follows:", "\n[I]t has frequently been assumed or implied in welfare economics\nthat each individual values different social states solely according\nto his consumption under them. If this be the case, we should only\nrequire that our social welfare function be defined for those sets of\nindividual orderings which are of the type described; only such should\nbe admissible (Arrow 1951 [1963]: 24).\n", "Section 5.1 considers some of the\npossibilities that open up when there is no need to reckon with all\n“logically possible” individual preferences." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Unrestricted Domain" }, { "content": [ "Condition SO requires that the result of aggregating\nindividual preferences is always a weak ordering of the alternatives,\na binary relation among them that is both transitive and connected.\nIntuitively, the result has to be a ranking of the\nalternatives from better to worse, perhaps with ties. There is never\nto be a cycle of social preferences, like the one derived by pairwise\nmajority decision in the paradox of voting,\nin Section 1.", "Arrow did not state SO as a separate\ncondition. He built it into the very notion of a social\nwelfare function, arguing that the result of aggregating\npreferences will have to be an ordering if it is to “reflect\nrational choice-making” (Arrow 1951 [1963]: 19). Criticized by\nBuchanan (1954) for transferring properties of individual\nchoice to collective choice, Arrow in the second edition of Social\nChoice and Individual Values gave a different rationale. There he\nargued that transitivity is important because it ensures that\ncollective choices are independent of the path taken to them (Arrow\n1951 [1963]: 120). He did not develop this idea further.", "Charles Plott (1973) elaborated a suitable notion of path\nindependence. Suppose we arrive at our choice by what he\ncalled divide and conquer: first we divide the alternatives\ninto some smaller sets—say, because these are more\nmanageable—and we choose from each one. Then we gather together\nall the alternatives that we have chosen from the smaller sets, and we\nchoose again from among these. There are many ways of making the\ninitial division, and a choice procedure is said to be path\nindependent if the choice we arrive at in the end is independent\nof which division we start with (Plott 1973: 1080). In Arrow’s\naccount, social choices are made from some given\n“environment” \$S\$ of feasible alternatives by maximizing a\nsocial ordering \$R\$: the choice \$C(S)\$ from among \$S\$ is the set of\nthose \$x\$ within \$S\$ such that for any \$y\$ within \$S, xRy\$. It is not\ndifficult to see how intransitivity of \$R\$ can result in path\ndependence. Consider again the paradox of voting\nof Section 1. \$A\$ is strictly favoured above\n\$B\$, and \$B\$ above \$C\$; but, contrary to transitivity, \$C\$ is strictly\nfavoured above \$A\$. Starting with the division \$\\{\\{A,B\\}, \\{B,C\\}\\}\$,\nour choice from among \$\\{A,B,C\\}\$ will be \$\\{A\\}\$; but starting\ninstead with \$\\{\\{A,C\\}, \\{B,C\\}\\}\$ we will arrive in the end at\n\$\\{B\\}\$.", "Plott’s analysis reveals a subtlety. The full strength\nof SO is not needed to secure path independence of\nchoice. It is sufficient that social preference is a (complete\nand) quasi-transitive relation, having a strict component\nthat is transitive but an indifference component that, perhaps, is\nnot transitive. Sen (1969: Theorem V) demonstrated the compatibility\nof this weaker requirement with all of Arrow’s other conditions, but\nnoted that the aggregation function he came up with would not\ngenerally be found attractive. Its unattractiveness was no\naccident. Allan Gibbard showed that the only social welfare functions\nmade available by allowing intransitivity of social indifference,\nwhile keeping Arrow’s other requirements in place, are what he\ncalled liberum veto oligarchies (Gibbard 1969, 2014). There\nhas in every case to be some group of individuals, the oligarchs,\nsuch that the society always strictly prefers one alternative to\nanother if all of the oligarchs strictly prefer it, but never does so\nif that would go against the strict preference of any\noligarch.[5] A\ndictatorship, in Arrow’s sense, is a liberum veto oligarchy of\none. Relaxing SO by limiting the transitivity requirement to\nstrict social preferences therefore does not seem a promising way of\nsecuring, in spite of Arrow’s theorem, the existence of acceptable\nsocial welfare functions.\n" ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Social Ordering" }, { "content": [ "Condition WP requires that whenever everybody ranks one\nalternative strictly above another the social ordering agrees. This\nhas long been a basic assumption in welfare economics and might seem\ncompletely uncontroversial. That the community should prefer one\nsocial state to another whenever each individual does, Arrow argued in\nconnection with compensation, is “not debatable except perhaps\non a philosophy of systematically denying people whatever they\nwant” (Arrow 1951 [1963]: 34).", "But WP is not as harmless as it might seem, and in\ncombination with U it tightly constrains the possibilities\nfor social choice. This is evident from Sen’s (1970) demonstration\nthat these two conditions conflict with the idea that for each person\nthere is a personal domain of states of affairs, within which his\npreferences must prevail in case of conflict with others’. This\nimportant problem of the “Paretian libertarian” meanwhile\nhas its own extensive literature. For further discussion, see the\nentry social choice theory.", "We may think of WP as a vestige of what Sen called:", "\nWelfarism: The judgement of the relative goodness of\nalternative states of affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken\nas an increasing function of, the respective collections of\nindividual utilities in these states (Sen 1979: 468).\n", "In Arrow’s ordinal framework, welfarism insists that individual\npreference orderings are the only basis for deriving social\npreferences. Non-welfare factors—physical characteristics of\nsocial states, people’s motives in having the preferences they do,\nrespect for rights, equality—none of these are to make any\ndifference except indirectly, through their reflections in individual\npreferences. WP asserts the demands of welfarism in the\nspecial case in which everybody’s strict preferences coincide. Sen\nargued that even these limited demands might be found excessive on\nmoral grounds (Sen 1979: Section IV). Section 4.5 \nhas further discussion of welfarism.\n\n" ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Weak Pareto" }, { "content": [ "Someone is a dictator, in Arrow’s sense, if whenever he strictly\nprefers one alternative to another the society always prefers it as\nwell. The preferences of people other than the dictator can still make\na difference, and so can non-welfare factors, but only when the\ndictator is indifferent between two alternatives, having no strict\npreference one way or the other. Arrow’s non-dictatorship\ncondition D says that there is to be no dictator. Plainly it\nrules out many undemocratic arrangements, such as identifying social\npreferences in every case with the individual preferences of some one\nperson. This apparently straightforward condition has attracted very\nlittle attention in the literature. ", "In fact there is more to the non-dictatorship condition than meets\nthe eye. An Arrovian dictator is just someone whose strict preferences\ninvariably are a subset of the society’s strict preferences, and that\nby itself doesn’t mean that his preferences form a basis for social\npreferences, or that the dictator has any power or control over\nthese. Aanund Hylland once made a related point while objecting to the\nunreflective imposition of D in single profile analyses of\nsocial choice:", "\nIn the single-profile model, a dictator is a\nperson whose individual preferences coincide with the social ones in\nthe one and only profile under consideration. Nothing is necessarily\nwrong with that; the decision process can be perfectly democratic, and\none person simply turns out to be on the winning side on all\nissues. (Hylland 1986: 51, footnote 10) ", "The non-dictatorship condition for this reason sometimes goes too\nfar. Even pairwise majority voting, that paradigm of a democratic\nprocedure, is in Arrow’s sense sometimes a dictatorship. Consider\nZelig. He has no tastes, values or preferences of his own but\ntemporarily takes on those of another, whoever is close at hand. He is\na human chameleon, the ultimate\nconformist.[6]\nZelig one day finds himself on a committee of three that will choose\namong several options using the method of pairwise majority voting\nand, given his peculiar character, the range of individual orderings\nthat can arise is somewhat restricted. In each admissible profile, two\nof the three individual orderings are identical: Zelig’s and that of\nwhoever is seated closest to him at the committee\nmeeting.[7] Now\nsuppose it so happens that Zelig strictly prefers one option \$x\$ to\nanother, \$y\$. Then someone else does too; that makes two of the\nthree and so, when they vote, the result is a strict collective\npreference for \$x\$ above \$y\$. The committee’s decision procedure\nis, in Arrow’s sense, a dictatorship, and Zelig is the dictator. But\nof course really Zelig is a follower, not a leader, and majority\nvoting is as democratic as can be. It’s just that this one mad little\nfellow has a way of always ending up on the winning side.", "Arrow imposed D in conjunction with the\nrequirement U that the domain is completely\nunrestricted. Perhaps this condition expresses something closer to its\nintended meaning then. With an unrestricted domain, a dictator, unlike\nZelig, is someone whose preferences conflict with everybody else’s in\na range of cases, and it is in each instance his preferences that\nagree with social preferences, not theirs. However this may be, the\nexample of Zelig shows that whether it is appropriate to\nimpose D on social welfare functions depends on the details\nof the choice problem at hand. The name of this condition is\nmisleading. Sometimes there is nothing undemocratic about having a\n“dictator”, in Arrow’s technical sense." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Non-Dictatorship" }, { "content": [ "Arrow’s independence condition requires that whenever all\nindividual preferences among a pair of alternatives are the same in\none profile as they are in another, the social preference among these\nalternatives must also be the same for the two profiles. Speaking\nfiguratively, what this means is that when the social welfare function\ngoes about the work of aggregating individual orderings, it has to\ntake each pair of alternatives separately, paying no attention to\npreferences for alternatives other than them. Some aggregation\nprocedures work this way. Pairwise majority decision does: it counts\n\$x\$ as weakly preferred to \$y\$, socially, if as many people weakly\nprefer \$x\$ to \$y\$ as the other way around, and plainly there is no\nneed to look beyond \$x\$ and \$y\$ to find this out.", "Condition I is not Arrow’s formulation. It is a simpler\none that has since become the standard in expositions of the\nimpossibility theorem. Arrow’s formulation concerns choices made from\nwithin various “environments” \$S\$ of feasible options by\nmaximizing social orderings:", "\nIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (choice\nversion): For all environments \$S\$ within \$X\$, and all profiles\n\$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ and \$\\langle R^_{i}\\rangle\$ in the domain of\n\$f\$, if \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\|S = \\langle R^_{i}\\rangle\|S\$, then\n\$C(S)= C^(S)\$.\n", "Here \$C(S)\$ is the set of those options from \$S\$ that are, in\nthe sense of the social ordering \$f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$, as good as\nany other; and \$C^(S)\$ stands for the maxima by \$f\\langle\nR^_{i}\\rangle\$. This is Arrow’s Condition 3 (Arrow 1951 [1963]:\n27).[8] ", "Iain McLean (2003) finds a first statement\nof Independence, and appreciation of its significance,\nalready in (Condorcet 1785). Meanwhile much controversy has surrounded\nthis condition, and not a little confusion. Some of each can be traced\nto an example with which Arrow sought to\nmotivate it. When one candidate in an election dies\nafter polling, he wrote,", "\n[…] the choice to be made among the set \$S\$ of surviving\ncandidates should be independent of the preferences of individuals for\ncandidates not in \$S\$. […] Therefore, we may require of our\nsocial welfare function that the choice made by society from a given\nenvironment depend only on the orderings of individuals among the\nalternatives in that environment (Arrow 1951 [1963]: 26).\n", "Evidently Arrow took this for his choice version\nof the independence condition. He continued:", "\nAlternatively stated, if we consider two sets of individual\norderings such that, for each individual, his ordering of those\nparticular alternatives in a given environment is the same each time,\nthen we require that the choice made by society from that environment\nbe the same when individual values are given by the first set of\norderings as they are when given by the second (Arrow 1951 [1963]:\n26–27).\n", "It is not clear why Arrow thought the case of the dead candidate\ninvolves different values and preference profiles. As he set the\nexample up, it is natural to imagine that everybody’s values and\npreferences stay the same while one candidate becomes unfeasible\n(“we’d all still prefer \$A\$, but sadly he’s not with us any\nmore”). Apparently, then, Arrow’s example misses its mark. There\nhas been much discussion of this point in the literature. Hansson\n(1973) argues that Arrow confused his independence condition for\nanother; compare Bordes and Tideman (1991) for a contrary view. For\ndiscussion of several notions of independence whose differences have\nnot always been appreciated, see Ray (1973).", "The following condition has also been called Independence\nof Irrelevant Alternatives:", "\n(\$I^\$) For all \$x\$ and \$y\$, and all \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ and\n\$\\langle R_{i}^\\rangle\$ in the domain of \$f\$, if for all \$i: xR_{i}y\$\nif and only if \$xR^_{i}y\$, then \$x f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle y\$ if and\nonly if \$x f\\langle R_{i}^\\rangle y\$.\n", "If the intention is to express Arrow’s independence condition this\nis a mistake because \$I^\$, though similar in appearance\nto I, has a different content. I says that whenever\neverybody’s preferences concerning a pair of options are the same in\none profile as they are in another, the social preference must also be\nthe same at the two profiles, as far as this pair is concerned. This\nis not what \$I^\$ says because the embedded antecedent ‘for\nall \$i: xR_{i}y\$ if and only if \$xR^_{i}y\$’ is satisfied\nnot only when everybody’s preferences among \$x\$ and \$y\$ are the\nsame in \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ as they are in \$\\langle\nR_{i}^\\rangle\$, but in other instances as well. For example,\nsuppose that in \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ everybody is indifferent\nbetween some social state \$T\$ and another state \$S\$ (in which case\nfor all \$i\$, both \$T R_{i} S\$ and \$S R_{i} T\$), while in\n\$\\langle R_{i}^\\rangle\$ everybody strictly prefers \$T\$ to \$S\$\n(for all \$i\$, \$T R^_{i} S\$ but not \$S R^_{i} T\$). Then the\nantecedent ‘for all \$i: T R_{i} S\$ if and only if \$T R^_{i}\nS\$’ is satisfied, although individual preferences among \$T\$\nand \$S\$ are not the same in the two profiles. \$I^\$ sometimes\nconstrains \$f\$ though \$I\$ does not and it is a more demanding\ncondition.", "The additional demands of \$I^\$ are sometimes excessive. Let \$T\$ be\nthe result of reforming some tried and true status quo, \$S\$. Now\nsuppose we favor reform if it is generally thought that change will be\nfor the better, but not otherwise. Then we will be on the lookout for\na social welfare function \$f\$ that derives a strict social preference\nfor \$T\$ above \$S\$ when everybody strictly prefers \$T\$ to \$S\$, but a\nstrict preference for \$S\$ above \$T\$ when everyone is indifferent\nbetween these states. \$I^\$ rules out\nevery \$f\$ that conforms to this desideratum because it requires a weak\nsocial preference for \$T\$ to \$S\$ in both cases or in neither.", "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives might be said to\nrequire that the social comparison among any given pair of\nalternatives, say social states, depends only on individual\npreferences among this pair. This is correct but it leaves some room\nfor misunderstanding. I says that the\nonly preferences that count are those concerning just these\ntwo social states. That doesn’t mean that preferences are the only\nthing that counts, though. And, indeed, as far as I is\nconcerned, non-welfare features of the two states may also make a\ndifference. ", "The doctrine that individual preferences are the only\nbasis for comparing the goodness of social states is welfarism\n(mentioned already in Section 4.3). An example\nillustrates how nasty it can be:", "In the status quo \$S\$, Peter is filthy rich and Paul is abjectly\npoor. Would it be better to take from Peter and give to Paul? Let \$T\$\nbe the social state resulting from transferring a little of Peter’s\nvast wealth to Paul. Paul prefers \$T\$ to \$S\$ (“I need to\neat”) and Peter prefers \$S\$ to \$T\$ (“not my\nproblem”). This is one case. Compare it to another. Social state\n\$T^\$ arises from a different status quo \$S^\$, also by taking from\nPeter and giving to Paul. This time, though, their fortunes are\nreversed. In \$S^\$ it is Peter who is poor and Paul is the rich one,\nso this is a matter of taking from the poor to give to the rich. Even\nso, we may assume, the pattern of Peter’s and Paul’s preferences is\nthe same in the second case as it is in the first, because each of\nthem prefers to have more for himself than to have less. Paul prefers\n\$T^\$ to \$S^\$ (“I need another Bugatti”) and Peter\nprefers \$S^\$ to \$T^\$ (“wish it were my problem”). Since\neverybody’s preferences are the same in the two cases, welfarism\nrequires that the relative social goodness is the same as well. In\nparticular, it allows us to count \$T\$ socially better than \$S\$ only if\nwe also count \$T^\$ better than \$S^\$. Whatever we think about taking\nfrom the rich to give to the poor, though, taking from the poor to\ngive to the rich is quite another thing. As Samuelson said of a\nsimilar case, “[o]ne need not be a doctrinaire egalitarian to be\nspeechless at this requirement” (Samuelson 1977: 83).", "Condition I does not express welfarism. Applied to this\nexample, I states that there is to be no change in the social\ncomparison among the status quo \$S\$ and the result \$T\$ of\nredistribution unless Peter’s preferences among these states change,\nor Paul’s do (assume they are the only people involved). In this\nsense, the social preference among these states may be said to depend\n“only” on individual preferences among them. I\nsays the same about \$S^\$ and \$T^\$ or about any other pair of\nalternatives. But I is silent about any relationship between\nthe social comparison among \$S\$ and \$T\$, on the one hand, and the\nsocial comparison among \$S^\$ and \$T^\$, on the other. In particular,\nit leaves a social welfare function free to count \$T\$ socially better\nthan \$S\$ (for increasing equality), while also counting \$T^\$\nworse than \$S^\$ (for decreasing equality). Intuitively\nspeaking, I allows a social welfare function to “shift\ngears” as we go from one pair of social states to the next,\ndepending on the non-welfare features encountered there. ", "The condition that expresses welfarism is:", "\nStrong Neutrality (SN): For all alternatives \$x\$,\n\$y\$, \$z\$ and \$w\$, and all profiles \$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ and \$\\langle\nR_{i}^\\rangle\$: IF for all \$i\$: \$xR_{i}y\$ if and only if \$zR^_{i}w\$,\nand \$yR_{i}x\$ if and only if \$wR^_{i}z\$, THEN \$x f\\langle\nR_{i}\\rangle y\$ if and only if \$z f\\langle R_{i}^\\rangle w\$, and \$y\nf\\langle R_{i}\\rangle x\$ if and only if \$w f\\langle R_{i}^\\rangle\nz\$.\n", " SN is more demanding than \nI.[9]\n I requires consistency for each\npair of alternatives separately, as we go from one profile in the\ndomain to the next. SN also requires this, but in addition it requires consistency as\nwe go from one pair to the next, whether that is within a\nsingle profile or among several different ones. This is\nhow SN keeps non-welfare features from making any difference:\nby compelling the social welfare function to treat any two pairs of\nalternatives the same way, if the pattern of individual preference is\nthe same for both.", "Since \$I^\$ and SN are logically stronger than I,\nobviously a version of Arrow’s theorem can be had using either one of\nthem instead of I. Such a theorem will be less interesting,\nthough—not only because it is logically weaker but also because,\nas we have seen, these more demanding conditions often are unreasonable.", "The meaning of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is\nnot easily grasped, and its ramifications are not immediately obvious.\nIt is therefore surprising to see just how little has been said, over\nthe many decades that have passed since Arrow published his famous\ntheorem, to justify imposing this condition on social welfare\nfunctions. Let us turn, now, to some arguments for and against.", "We have discussed Arrow’s attempt to motivate I using the\nexample of the dead candidate in an election. In the second edition\nof Social Choice and Individual Values he offered another\nrationale. Independence, he argued, embodies the principle\nthat welfare judgments are to be based on observable behavior. Having\nexpressed approval for Bergson’s use of indifference maps, Arrow\ncontinued:", "\nThe Condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives extends\nthe requirement of observability one step farther. Given the set of\nalternatives available for society to choose among, it could be\nexpected that, ideally, one could observe all preferences among the\navailable alternatives, but there would be no way to observe\npreferences among alternatives not feasible for society. (Arrow 1963:\n110)\n", "Arrow seems to be saying that social decisions have to be made on\nthe basis of preferences for feasible alternatives because these are\nthe only ones that are observable. Arguably, though, this is\ninsufficient support. Arrow’s choice version of Independence,\nas we have seen, concerns all environments \$S\$. The\nobservability argument, though, apparently just concerns some\n“given” feasible alternatives. See Hansson (1973: 38) on\nthis point.", "Gerry Mackie (2003) argues that there has been equivocation on the\nnotion of irrelevance. It is true that we often take nonfeasible\nalternatives to be irrelevant. That presumably is why, in elections,\nwe do not ordinarily put the names of dead people on ballots, along\nwith those of the live candidates. But I also excludes from\nconsideration information on preferences for alternatives that, in an\nordinary sense, are relevant. An example illustrates Mackie’s\npoint. George W. Bush, Al Gore, and Ralph Nader ran in the United\nStates presidential election of 2000. Say we want to know whether\nthere was a social preference for Gore above Bush. I\nrequires that this question be answerable independently of whether the\npeople preferred either of them to, say, Abraham Lincoln, or preferred\nGeorge Washington to Lincoln. This seems right. Neither Lincoln nor\nWashington ran for President that year. They were, intuitively,\nirrelevant alternatives. But I also requires that the\nranking of Gore with respect to Bush should be independent of voters’\npreferences for Nader, and this does not seem right because\nhe was on the ballot and, in the ordinary sense, he was a\nrelevant alternative to them. Certainly Arrow’s observability\ncriterion does not rule out using information on preferences for\nNader. They were as observable as any in that election.", "A different rationale has been suggested for\nimposing I specifically\nin the case of voting. Many voting procedures are known to present\nopportunities for voters to manipulate outcomes by misrepresenting\ntheir preferences. Section 5.2 discusses the\nexample of Borda counting, which allows voters to promote their own\nfavorite candidates by strategically putting others’ favorites at the\nbottom of their lists. Borda counting, it will be seen,\nviolates I. Proofs of the Gibbard-Sattherthwaite theorem\n(Gibbard 1973, Sattherthwaite 1975) associate vulnerability to\nstrategic voting systematically with violation of I, and Iain\nMcLean argues on this ground that voting methods ought to satisfy this\ncondition: “Take out [I] and you have gross\nmanipulability” (McLean 2003: 16). This matter of strategic\nvoting did not play a part in Arrow’s presentation of the\nimpossibility theorem, though, and was not dealt with seriously in\nthe literature until after its publication. See the entry\non social choice theory for discussion\nof this important theme in contemporary theory of social choice." ], "subsection_title": "4.5 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "Arrow’s theorem, it has been said, is about the impossibility of\ntrying to do too much with too little information. This remark directs\nattention towards two main avenues leading from Arrow-inspired gloom\ntoward a sunnier view of the possibilities for collective decision\nmaking: not trying to do so much, and using more information. One way\nof not trying to do so much is to relax the requirement, it is a part\nof SO, that all social preferences are\ntransitive. Section 4.2 briefly considered this\nidea but found it unpromising. Another way is to soften the demand\nof U that there be a social ordering for each\n“logically possible” preference profile. That is, we can\nrestrict the domains of social welfare\nfunctions. Section 5.1 discusses this important\n“escape route” from Arrow’s theorem in some detail. One\nway of using more information is to loosen the independence\nconstraint I. This allows social welfare functions to make\nuse of more of the information that is carried by individual\npreference orderings. See Section 5.2. Another\nway is to extend Arrow’s framework so as to allow individuals to\ncontribute richer information than is carried by preference\norderings. This information can come in the form of scores or grades,\nas discussed in Section 5.3, or in the form of\ncardinal measurements of individual utilities,\nin Section 5.4." ], "section_title": "5. Possibilities", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "Sometimes, in the nature of the alternatives under consideration\nand how individual preferences among them are determined, not all\nindividual preferences can arise. When studying such a case within\nArrow’s framework there is no need for a social welfare function that\ncan handle each and every \$n\$-tuple of individual orderings. Some but\nnot all profiles are admissible, and the domain is said to\nbe restricted. In fortunate cases, it is then possible to find a\nsocial welfare function that meets all assumptions and conditions of\nArrow’s theorem—apart, of course, from U. Such domains\nare said to be Arrow consistent. This Section considers some\nimportant examples of Arrow consistent domains.", "For a simple illustration, consider the following profile: ", "Here, two of the three people have the same strict preference\nordering. Reckoning the collective preference by pairwise majority\ndecision, it is easy to see that the result is the ordering of this\nmajority: ABC. Consider now a domain made up entirely of\nsuch profiles, in which most of the three voters share the same\nstrict preferences. On such a domain, pairwise majority decision\nalways derives an ordering and so it satisfies SO. This\nsocial welfare function is nondictatorial as well provided the\ndomain, though restricted, still retains a certain variety. In the\nabove profile, voter \$3\$ strictly prefers \$B\$ to \$A\$. Both of the\nothers strictly prefer \$A\$ to \$B\$, though, and that is the\nsocial preference: with this profile in the domain, \$3\$ is no\ndictator. Pairwise majority\ndecision satisfies \nD if each of the voters disagrees in this way with both of\nthe others, in some or other profile.[10]\nIt always satisfies WP\nand I. On such a domain, we have now seen, this aggregation\nprocedure satisfies all of Arrow’s non-domain conditions. Such a\ndomain is Arrow consistent.", "Full identity of preferences is not needed for Arrow\nconsistency. It can be enough that everybody’s preferences are\nsimilar, even if they never entirely agree. An example illustrates the\ncase of single peaked domains.", "Suppose three bears get together to decide how hot their common pot\nof porridge will be. Papa bear likes hot porridge, the hotter the\nbetter. Mama bear likes cold porridge, the colder the better. Baby\nbear most likes warm porridge; hot porridge is next best as far as he\nis concerned (“it will always cool off”), and he doesn’t\nlike cold porridge at all. These preferences among hot, warm and cold\nporridge can be represented as a preference profile:", "Or else they can be pictured like this:", "This preference profile is single peaked. Each bear has a\n“bliss point” somewhere along the ordering of the options\nby their temperature, and each bear likes options less and less as we\nmove along this common ordering away from the bliss point, on either\nside. Single peaked preferences arise with respect to the\nleft-right orientation of political candidates, the cost of\nalternative public projects, and other salient attributes of\noptions. Single peaked profiles, in which everybody’s\npreferences are single peaked with respect to a common ordering, arise\nnaturally when everybody cares about the same thing in the options\nunder consideration—temperature, left-right orientation, cost,\nor what have you—even if, as with the bears, there is no further\nconsensus about which options are better than which.", "Duncan Black (1948) showed that if the number of\nvoters is odd, and their preference profile is single peaked,\npairwise majority decision always delivers up an\nordering.[11]\nFurthermore, he showed, the maximum of this ordering is the bliss\npoint of the median voter—the voter whose bliss point\nhas, on the common ordering, as many voters’ bliss points to one side\nas it has to the other. In the example this is Baby bear, and warm\nporridge is the collective maximum. This example illustrates the way\nin which single peakedness can facilitate compromise.", "Say the number of voters is odd. Now consider a\nsingle-peaked domain—one that is made up entirely of\nsingle peaked profiles. Black’s result tells us that pairwise\nmajority decision on this domain satisfies SO. Provided the\ndomain is sufficiently inclusive (so that for each \$i\$ there is\nwithin the domain some profile in which \$i\$ is not the median voter)\nit also satisfies D. Pairwise majority decision always\nsatisfies WP and I, so such a domain is Arrow\nconsistent.", "With an even number of voters, single peakedness\ndoes not ensure satisfaction of SO. For example, suppose\nthere are just two voters and that their individual orderings are:", "Pairwise majority decision derives from this profile a weak social\npreference for \$A\$ to \$B\$, since there is one who weakly prefers \$A\$\nto \$B\$, and one who weakly prefers \$B\$ to \$A\$. Similarly, it derives\na weak social preference for \$B\$ to \$C\$. Transitivity requires a weak\nsocial preference for \$A\$ to \$C\$, but there is none. On the contrary,\nthere is a strict social preference for \$C\$ above \$A\$, since that is\nthe unanimous preference of the voters. Still, this profile is\nsingle peaked with respect to the common ordering \$BCA\$:", "Majority decision with “phantom” voters can be used to\nestablish Arrow consistency when the number of people is even. Let\nthere be \$2n\$ people, and let each profile in the domain be single\npeaked with respect to one and the same ordering of the\nalternatives. Let \$R_{2n+1}\$ be an ordering that also is single peaked\nwith respect to this common ordering. \$R_{2n+1}\$ represents the\npreferences of a “phantom” voter. Now take each profile\n\$\\langle R_{1},\\ldots, R_{2n}\\rangle\$ in the domain and expand it\ninto \$\\langle R_{1},\\ldots, R_{2n}, R_{2n+1}\\rangle\$, by adding\n\$R_{2n+1}\$. The set of all the expanded profiles is a single peaked\ndomain and, because the real voters together with the phantom are odd\nin number, Black’s result applies to it. Let \$g\$ be pairwise majority\ndecision for the expanded domain. We obtain a social welfare function\n\$f\$ for the original domain by assigning to each profile the ordering\nthat \$g\$ assigns to its expansion. That is, we put:", "This \$f\$ satisfies SO because \$g\$ does. It\nsatisfies WP because there are more real voters than\nphantoms (\$2n\$ to \$1\$; we could have used any odd number of phantoms\nsmaller than \$2n\$). \$f\$ satisfies I because the phantom\nordering is the same in all profiles of the expanded domain. If the\ndomain includes sufficient variety among profiles then \$f\$ also\nsatisfies D and is Arrow consistent. This nice idea of\nphantom voters was introduced by Moulin (1980), who used it to\ncharacterize a class of voting schemes that are non-manipulable, in\nthat they do not provide opportunities for strategic\nvoting. ", "Domain restrictions have been the focus of much\nresearch in recent decades. Gaertner (2001) provides a general\noverview. Le Breton and Weymark (2006) survey work on domain\nrestrictions that arise naturally when analyzing economic problems in\nArrow’s framework. Miller (1992) suggests that deliberation can\nfacilitate rational social choice by transforming initial preferences\ninto single peaked preferences. List and Dryzek (2003) argue that\ndeliberation can bring about a “structuration” of\nindividual preferences that facilitates democratic decision making\neven without achieving full single-peakedness. List et al. (2013)\npresent empirical evidence that deliberation sometimes does have this\neffect.", "As Samuelson described it, the single profile approach might seem\nto amount to the most severe of domain restrictions:", "\n\n[O]ne and only one of the […] possible\npatterns of individuals’ orderings is needed. […]\nFrom it (not from each of them all) comes a social\nordering. (Samuelson 1967: 48–49)\n", " According to Sen (1977), though, the\nBergson-Samuelson social welfare function has more than a single\nprofile in its domain. It has in fact a completely unrestricted\ndomain, for while according to Samuelson only one profile is needed\n“it could be any one” (Samuelson 1967: 49). What\ndistinguishes the single profile approach, on Sen’s way of\nunderstanding it, is that there is to be no coordinating the behavior\nof the social welfare function at several different profiles, by\nimposing on it interprofile conditions such as I\nand SN (see Section 4.5). Either\nway, though, and just as Samuelson insisted, Arrow’s theorem does not\nlimit the single profile approach because one of its conditions is\ninappropriate in connection with it. Either U is\ninappropriate (if there is a single profile in the domain) or\nelse I is inappropriate (if there are no interprofile\nconstraints).", "Certain impossibility theorems that are closely related to Arrow’s\nhave been thought relevant to single-profile choice even so. These\ntheorems do not use Arrow’s interprofile condition \$I\$ but\nuse instead an intraprofile neutrality condition. This\ncondition says that whenever within any single profile the\npattern of individual preferences for one pair \$x\$,\$y\$ of options is\nthe same as for another pair \$z,w\$, the social ordering derived\nfrom this profile must also be the same for \$x\$, \$y\$ as it is for \$z\$,\n\$w\$:", "\nSingle-Profile Neutrality (SPN): For any \$\\langle\nR_{i}\\rangle\$, and any alternatives \$x\$, \$y\$, \$z\$ and \$w\$: IF for all\n\$i: xR_{i}y\$ if and only if \$zR_{i}w\$, and \$yR_{i}x\$ if and only if\n\$wR_{i}z\$, THEN \$x f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle y\$ if and only if \$z f\\langle\nR_{i}\\rangle w\$, and \$y f\\langle R_{i}\\rangle x\$ if and only if \$w\nf\\langle R_{i}\\rangle z\$.\n", "SPN follows from the strong neutrality (SN)\ncondition of Section 4.5, on identifying\n\$\\langle R_{i}\\rangle\$ with \$\\langle R_{i}^\\rangle\$. Parks (1976),\nand independently Kemp and Ng (1976), showed that there are\n“single profile” versions of Arrow’s theorem\nusing SPN instead of I. These theorems were\nsupposed to block the Bergson-Samuelson approach. In fact,\ncondition SPN is just as easily set aside as SN,\nand for the same reason: both exclude non-welfare information that is\nrelevant to the comparison of social states from an ethical\nstandpoint. Samuelson (1977) ridiculed SPN using an example\nabout redistributing chocolate. It is similar in structure to the\nexample of Peter and Paul, in\n Section 4.5." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Domain Restrictions" }, { "content": [ "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives severely limits\nwhich information about individual preferences may be used for\nwhat. It requires a social welfare function, when assembling the\nsocial preference among a pair of alternatives, to take into account\nonly those of people’s preferences that concern just this pair. This\nSection discusses two kinds of information that is implicit in\npreferences for other alternatives, and illustrates their use in social\ndecision making: information about the positions of alternatives in\nindividual orderings, and information about the fairness of social\nstates. ", "Positional voting methods take into account where the\ncandidates come in the different individual orderings—whether it\nis first, or second, … or last. Borda counting is an\nimportant example. Named after Jean-Charles de Borda, a contemporary\nof Condorcet, it had already been proposed in the 13th\nCentury by the pioneering writer and social theorist Ramon\nLull. Nicholas of Cusa in the 15th Century recommended it\nfor electing Holy Roman Emperors. Borda counting is used in some\npolitical elections and on many other occasions for voting, in clubs\nand other organizations. Consider the profile:", "Let each candidate receive four points for coming first in some\nvoter’s ordering, three for coming second, two for a third place and a\nsingle point for coming last; the alternatives then are ordered by the\ntotal number of points they receive, from all the voters. The Borda\ncount of \$A\$ is then 10 (or \$4+3+3\$) and that of \$B\$ is 11 \$(3+4+4)\$,\nso \$B\$ outranks \$A\$ in the social ordering. This method\napplies with the obvious adaptation to any election with a finite\nnumber of candidates.", "Now suppose voter \$1\$ moves \$B\$ from second place to last on his\nown list, and we have the profile:", "Then \$B\$ will receive just 9 points \$(1+4+4)\$. \$A\$ receives\nthe same 10 as before, though, and now outranks \$B\$. This example\nillustrates two important points. First, Borda counting does not\nsatisfy Arrow’s condition I, since while each voter’s ranking\nof \$A\$ with respect to \$B\$ is the same in the two profiles, the\nsocial ordering of this pair is different. Second, Borda counting\nprovides opportunities for voters to manipulate the outcome of an\nelection by strategic voting. If everybody’s preferences are as in the\nfirst profile, voter \$1\$ might do well to misrepresent his\npreferences by putting \$B\$ at the bottom of his list. In this way,\nhe can promote his own favorite, \$A\$, to the top of the social\nordering (he will get away with this, of course, only if the other\nvoters do not see what he is up to and adjust their own rankings\naccordingly, by putting his favorite \$A\$ at the bottom). The\nsusceptibility of Borda counting to strategic voting has long been\nknown. When this was raised as an objection, Borda’s indignant\nresponse is said to have been that his scheme was intended for honest\npeople. Lull and Nicholas of Cusa recommended, before voting by this\nmethod, earnest oaths to tell the truth and stripping oneself of all\nsins.\n", "For further discussion of positionalist voting methods, see the\nentries voting methods\nand social choice theory; for an\nanalytical overview, see Pattanaik’s (2002) handbook article. Barberà\n(2010) reviews what is known about strategic voting. ", "Mark Fleurbaey (2007) has shown that social welfare functions need\nmore ordinal information than I allows them if they are to\nrespond appropriately to a certain fairness of social states. He gives\nthe example of Ann, who has ten apples and two oranges, and Bob, with\nthree apples and eleven oranges. This allocation is said to be\n“envy free” if, intuitively, she is at least as happy with\nher own basket of fruit as she would be with his and, similarly, he is\nas happy with his own basket as he would be with hers. Let the\ndistribution of fruit in one social state \$S\$ be as described, and\nconsider the state \$S^\$ in which the allocations are reversed. That\nis, in \$S^\$ it is Ann that has three apples and eleven oranges,\nwhile Bob has ten apples and two oranges. More technically, \$S\$\nis envy free if Ann weakly prefers \$S\$ to \$S^\$, and Bob\ndoes too. We might expect that, other things being equal, the envy\nfreeness of a social state will promote it in the social ordering\nabove an alternative state that is not envy free. But I does\nnot allow this.", "\nTo see why not, consider whether it would be socially preferable,\nstarting from the status quo \$S\$, to take one apple and one orange\nfrom Bob and give both of them to Ann. Let \$T\$ be the state arising\nfrom this transfer. We assume for the sake of the example that Ann\nalways strictly prefers having more of everything for herself to\nhaving less, and that Bob’s preferences are similarly self-interested,\nso that in all admissible profiles Ann strictly prefers \$T\$ to\n\$S\$, while Bob strictly prefers \$S\$ to \$T\$. Their preferences\namong these states are opposite and do not by themselves entail a\nsocial preference one way or the other. Now, consider first a profile\nin which the status quo \$S\$ is envy free but \$T\$ is not. (Let both\nAnn and Bob be indifferent between the baskets each one has in \$S\$\nbut not between those in \$T\$, in which both agree that Bob is worse\noff.) Relative to this profile, a social welfare function promoting\nenvy freeness comes out against the transfer from Bob to Ann by\nranking \$S\$ strictly above \$T\$. But consider another profile, in\nwhich it is \$T\$ that is envy free (now Ann and Bob are indifferent\nbetween the baskets in \$T\$, and agree that in \$S\$ Ann is worse off\nthan Bob). Relative to this second profile, \$T\$ outranks \$S\$ in\nthe social ordering. In direct conflict with I, the social\npreference among \$S\$ and \$T\$ switches as we go from one profile to\nthe other, although the individual preferences among \$S\$ and \$T\$\nstay the same. The social ranking of \$S\$ and \$T\$ turns on\npreferences among these states and the “irrelevant”\n\$S^\$ and similarly defined \$T^\$, because the fairness of \$S\$\nand \$T\$ does.", "Fleurbaey recommends a weaker condition, attributing it to Hansson\n(1973) and to Pazner (1979):", "\nWeak Independence: Social preferences on a pair of options\nshould only depend on the population’s preferences on these two\noptions and on what options are indifferent to each of these options\nfor each individual (Fleurbaey 2007: 23).\n", "Fleurbaey (2007) discusses social welfare functions satisfying weak\nindependence together with Arrow’s conditions apart, of course,\nfrom I. The approach to social welfare that is sketched there\nis developed at length in (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011)." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 More Ordinal Information" }, { "content": [ "\nAnother way to have social orderings in spite of Arrow’s theorem is to\nallow people to contribute more ordinal information about their\npreferences than is admissible within Arrow’s framework. Arrow’s\npurpose in limiting individual inputs to weak orderings of the\nalternatives was to exclude cardinal information about utilities. This\nlimitation, though, is too tight for its purpose. One way for people\nto communicate their preferences is to grade their\nalternatives. Now, although in general grades do not carry cardinal\ninformation, Arrow’s framework has no provision for people to input\ntheir preferences using them. This might seeem a small oversight on\nArrow’s part but it is critical, because there are ways of aggregating\ngraded inputs that are not avaliable for preferance orderings, and\nwith them comes another “escape” from Arrow’s\nimpossibility. Showing how it goes requires a slight extension of\nArrow’s framework.", "\nLet a grade language \$L\$ be a strictly ordered collection\nof expressions, the grades. The grades could be adjectival expressions\nof a natural language, such as excellent, \ngood, acceptable, poor and terrible,\nor they could be characters such as the familiar letter grades of\nacademic evaluation. They could be numerals (then often\ncalled scores) or the strings of stars commonly used to\nevaluate hotels and restaurants. They could be any symbols that come\nin some fixed order (from “top” to\n“bottom”).", "\nA grade function \$G_{i}\$ maps the set \$X\$ of alternatives\ninto some given grade language \$L\$. Intuitively, \$G_{i}(x)\$ is\n\$i\$’s grade for alternative \$x\$. A grade function \$G_{i}\$\ncontains as much information as some weak ordering \$R_{i}\$\nof the alternatives. This can be seen by putting \$xR_{i}y\$ if\n\$G_{i}(x) \\ge G_{i}(y)\$: \$i\$ weakly prefers \$x\$ to \$y\$ if\n\$i\$’s grade for \$x\$ is at least as high as \$i\$’s grade for\n\$y\$. In general \$G_{i}\$ contains more information than\nthe corresponding ordering because we cannot always go in reverse:\ndifferent grade functions correspond to the same ordering. For\ninstance, one way to convey that \$A\$ is preferable to \$B\$ is to\nsay that whereas \$A\$ is good, \$B\$ is\nmerely acceptable; another is to say that whereas \$A\$\nis good, \$B\$ is terrible, but this doesn’t come to\nthe same thing because acceptable and terrible\ndon’t. The additional information in grades is in general not cardinal\ninformation because for instance the expressions \ngood, acceptable and terrible, ordinary\nadjectives of English, do not carry cardinal information about how\ngood \$A\$ and \$B\$ are.", "\nA grade profile is a list \$\\langle G_{1}, \\ldots,\nG_{n}\\rangle\$ of grade functions, one for each of the people \$1,\n\\ldots, n\$. Notions of a multiprofile domain and a social welfare\nfunction \$f\$ are defined as in Arrow’s framework, putting grade\nprofiles instead of Arrow’s profiles of weak orders (the output of a\nsocial welfare function is not a social grading of the alternatives\nbut a social ordering of them, just in Arrow’s original\nframework). The conditions of Arrow’s theorem are reformulated\naccordingly; for instance, the reformulated domain assumption is: ", "\nUnrestricted Domain (U): The domain of \$f\$\nincludes every list \$\\langle G_{1}, \\ldots, G_{n}\\rangle\$ of \$n\$\ngrade functions defined on \$X\$. \n", " Arrow’s independence condition becomes:", "\nIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (I): For\nall alternatives \$x\$ and \$y\$ in \$X\$, and all profiles \$\\langle\nG_{i}\\rangle\$ and \$\\langle G^_{i}\\rangle\$ in the domain of \$f\$, if\n\$\\langle G_{i}\\rangle\|\\{x,y\\} = \\langle G^_{i}\\rangle\|\\{x,y\\}\$, then\n\$f\\langle G_{i}\\rangle \|\\{x,y\\} = f\\langle G^_{i}\\rangle\n\|\\{x,y\\}\$.\n", "\nIntuitively, the reformulated independence assumption says that\nwhether one alternative ranks higher than another in the social\nordering depends only on everybody’s grades for these two\nalternatives. Other alternatives are in this matter\n“irrelevant.”", "\nThere are social welfare functions that satisfy all conditions of\nArrow’s theorem, reformulated for graded inputs. With an odd number\n\$n\$ of people, for instance, the social welfare function median\ngrading fills the bill. Given a profile \$\\langle G_{i}\\rangle\$\nof grade functions, the median grade for an alternative \$x\$\nis the grade that is in the middle, when we list all the grades\n\$G_{1}(x), \\ldots, G_{n}(x)\$ for \$x\$ in order, from top to\nbottom. The social ordering associated with this profile goes by the\nalternatives’ median grades: \$x f\\langle G_{i}\\rangle y\$ means that\nthe median grade for \$x\$ is either the same as the median grade for\n\$y\$, or else it is higher.", "\nTo verify that median grading satisfies the reformulated conditions,\ntake for instance the nondictatorship condition. A person \$d\$ is\na dictator of \$f\$ if for any alternatives \$x\$ and \$y\$,\nand for any profile \$\\langle\\ldots, G_{d},\\ldots\\rangle\$ in the\ndomain of \$f\$: if \$xP_{d}y\$, then \$xPy\$. When \$f\$ is median\ngrading, this means that whenever a dictator expresses a strict\npreference for one alternative over another, by giving it a higher\ngrade, this alternative also ranks strictly higher in the social\nordering, having a higher median grade. Except in the trivial case of\na language with only a single grade (which makes it impossible to\nexpress strict preferences, giving everybody vacuous dictatorial\npowers), and provided there are at least two alternatives and three\npeople, median grading on an unrestricted domain has no dictator. To\nsee that it is so, consider any given person \$p\$, and any two\nalternatives \$A\$ and \$B\$. In an unrestricted domain there is some\nprofile in which \$p\$’s grade for \$A\$ is higher than \$p\$’s grade\nfor \$B\$, but in which everybody else’s grades for these alternatives\nare just the other way around: everybody other than \$p\$ gives to\n\$B\$ the same grade that \$p\$ gives to \$A\$, and gives to \$A\$ the\nsame grade that \$p\$ gives to \$B\$. In this profile, the median\ngrade for \$A\$ is \$p\$’s grade for \$B\$, and the median grade for\n\$B\$ is \$p\$’s grade for \$A\$, which is higher. So although \$p\$\nstrictly prefers \$A\$ to \$B\$, \$B\$ ranks strictly higher than\n\$A\$ in the social ordering, and \$p\$ is not a dictator. Repeating\nthis demonstration for each person, no one else is a dictator\neither. Satisfaction of the other reformulated conditions on the\nunrestricted domain of grade profiles is similarly\nstraightforward.", "\nMichel Balinski and Rida Laraki (2007) showed that scoring and grading\nenable an “escape” from Arrow’s impossibility while\nstaying within an ordinal framework. Their theory of majority\njudgment is a generalization of median grading that makes more\nuse than it does of the ordinal information in grade profiles\n(Balinski and Laraki 2010). Balinski and Laraki insist that people\nmust share what they call a “common language” of grades,\nwithout giving this notion a precise sense. Indeed it can be shown\nthat, when different people might have very different thresholds for\nawarding grades, there is in grade profiles no more information than\nin the corresponding profiles of weak orderings. Then a close relative\nof Arrow’s impossibility returns (Morreau 2016).", "\nArrow came to realize, late in his life, that scoring and grading\ncreate possibilities for democracy that his framework unnecessarily\nrules out of consideration. In a 2012 interview he noted:", "\nNow there’s another possible way of thinking about it, which is not\nincluded in my theorem \$\\ldots\$ [E]ach voter does not just give a\nranking. But says, this is good. And this is not good. Or this is very\ngood. And this is bad. So I have three or four classes \$\\ldots\$ This\nchanges the nature of voting.\n", "\nFor a transcript of this interview, see the Other Internet Resources." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Even More Ordinal Information: Scores and Grades" }, { "content": [ "\nAmartya Sen (1970) extended Arrow’s framework by representing the\npreferences of individuals \$i\$ as utility functions \$U_{i}\$ that\nmap the alternatives onto real numbers: \$U_{i}(x)\$ is the utility\nthat \$i\$ obtains from \$x\$. A preference profile in Sen’s\nframework is a list \$\\langle U_{1}, \\ldots, U_{n}\\rangle\$ of utility\nfunctions, and a domain is a set of these. An aggregation function,\nnow a social welfare functional, maps each profile in some\ndomain onto a weak ordering of the alternatives.", "Sen showed how to study various assumptions concerning the\nmeasurability and interpersonal comparability of utilities by\ncoordinating the social orderings derived from profiles that,\ndepending on these assumptions, carry the same information. For\ninstance, ordinal measurement with interpersonal\nnoncomparability—built by Arrow right into his technical\nframework—amounts, in Sen’s more flexible set up, to a\nrequirement that the same social ordering is to be derived from any\nutility profiles that reduce to the same list of orderings. At the\nother extreme, utilities are measured on a ratio scale with full\ninterpersonal comparability if those profiles yield the same social\nordering that can be obtained from each other by rescaling, or\nmultiplying all utility functions by the same positive real number.\nSen explored different combinations of such assumptions.", "One important finding was that having cardinal utilities is not by\nitself enough to avoid an impossibility result. In addition, utilities\nhave to be interpersonally comparable. Intuitively speaking, to put\ninformation about preference strengths to good use it has to be\npossible to compare the strengths of different individuals’\npreferences. See Sen (1970: Theorem 82). Interpersonal comparability\nopens up many possibilities for aggregating utilities and preferences.\nTwo important ones can be read off from classical utilitarianism and\nRawls’s difference principle. For details, see the entry\non social choice theory." ], "subsection_title": "5.4 Cardinal Information" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe Arrow-Sen framework lends itself to the study of a range of\naggregation problems other than those for which it was originally\ndeveloped. This Section briefly discusses some of them. " ], "section_title": "6. Reinterpretations", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nOn an epistemic conception, the value of democratic institutions lies,\nin part, in their tendency to arrive at the truth in matters relevant\nto public decisions (see Estlund 2008, but compare Peter 2011). This\nidea receives some support from Condorcet’s jury theorem. It tells us,\nsimply put, that if individual people are more likely than not to\njudge correctly in some matter of fact, independently of one another,\nthen the collective judgment of a sufficiently large group, arrived at\nby majority voting, is almost certain to be correct (Condorcet\n1785). The phenomenon of the “wisdom of crowds”,\nfacilitated by cognitive diversity among individuals, provides further\nand arguably better support for the epistemic conception (Page 2007,\nLandemore 2012). But there are theoretical limits to the possibilities\nfor collective judgment on matters of fact. Starting with Kornhauser\nand Sager’s (1986) discussion of group deliberation in legal settings,\nwork on the theory of judgment aggregation has explored paradoxes and\nimpossibility theorems closely related to those that Condorcet and\nArrow discovered in connection with preference aggregation. See List\n(2012) and the entry social choice\ntheory for overviews." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Judgment Aggregation" }, { "content": [ "In many decision problems there are several criteria by which to\ncompare alternatives and, putting these criteria in place of people,\nit is natural to study such problems within the Arrow-Sen framework.\nArrow’s theorem, if analogues of its various assumptions and\nconditions are appropriate, then tells us that there is no procedure\nfor arriving at an “overall” ordering that assimilates\ndifferent criterial comparisons.", "The Arrow-Sen framework has been used to study multi-criterial\nevaluation in industrial decision making (Arrow and Raynaud 1986) and\nin engineering design (Scott and Antonsson 2000; compare Franssen\n2005). Anandi Hattiangadi (forthcoming) argues that Arrow’s theorem\nlimits the possibilities for an interpretationist metasemantics, in\nwhich the correct interpretation of linguistic expressions is the one\nthat is, judging by relevant criteria, overall best.", "Kenneth May (1954) used Arrow’s framework to study the\ndetermination of individual preferences. It had been found\nexperimentally that people’s preferences, elicited separately for\ndifferent pairs of options, often are cyclical. May explained this by\nanalogy with the paradox of voting as the result of preferring one\nalternative to another when it is better by more criteria than not.\nMore generally, he reinterpreted Arrow’s theorem as an argument that\nintransitivity of individual preferences is to be expected when\ndifferent criteria “pull in different directions”. Susan\nHurley (1985, 1989) considered a similar problem in practical\ndeliberation when the criteria are moral values. She argued that\nArrow’s theorem does not apply in this case. One strand of her\nargument is that, unlike a person, a moral criterion can rank any\ngiven alternatives just one way. It cannot “change its\nmind” about them (Hurley 1985: 511), and this makes it\ninappropriate to impose the analogue of the domain\ncondition U on procedures for weighing moral reasons. ", "There are multicriterial problems in theoretical deliberation as\nwell. Okasha (2011) uses the Arrow-Sen framework to study the problem\nof choosing among rival scientific theories by criteria including fit\nto data, simplicity, and scope. He argues that the impossibility\ntheorem threatens the rationality of theory choice. See Morreau (2015)\nfor a reason to think that it does not apply to this problem, and\nMorreau (2014) for a demonstration that impossibility theorems\nrelevant to single profile choice (see \nSections 2.2 and 5.1) \nmight sometimes apply even so. In related work, Jacob Stegenga (2013)\nargues that Arrow’s theorem limits the possibilities for combining\ndifferent kinds of evidence. Eleonora Cresto and Diego Tajer\n(forthcoming) counter that confirmational holism requires a\nrestriction on the domains of evidence-aggregation functions that\nblocks Stegenga’s argument: they cast the Duhem problem in a positive\nlight as one aspect of a phenomenon that makes evidence aggregation\npossible." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Multi-Criterial Decision" } ] } ]	[ "Arrow, K.J., 1950, “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social\nWelfare”, Journal of Political Economy, 58:\n328–346.", "–––, 1951 [1963], Social Choice and\nIndividual Values, New York: Wiley. 2nd ed.,\n1963.", "Arrow, K.J. and H. Raynaud, 1986, Social Choice and\nMulticriterion Decision-Making, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.", "Arrow, K.J., A.K. Sen, and K. 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Tajer, forthcoming, “Confirmational Holism\nand Theory Choice: Arrow meets Duhem”, Mind, first\nonline 30 January 2019. doi:10.1093/mind/fzy062", "Dodgson, C.L. (Lewis Carroll), 1884, The Principles of\nParliamentary Representation, London: Harrison and Sons.", "Elster, J. and Aa. Hylland (eds.), 1986, Foundations of\nSocial Choice Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.", "Estlund D., 1994, “Opinion Leaders, Independence, and\nCondorcet’s Jury Theorem”, Theory and Decision, 36:\n131–162.", "–––, 2008, Democratic Authority: a\nPhilosophical Framework, Princeton: Princeton University\nPress.", "Fleurbaey, M., 2007, “Social Choice and Just Institutions:\nnew perspectives”, Economics and Philosophy, 23:\n15–43.", "Fleurbaey, M. and F. Maniquet, 2011, A Theory of Fairness and\nSocial Welfare, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Fleurbaey, M. and P. Mongin, 2005, “The News of the Death\nof Welfare Economics is Greatly Exaggerated”, Social Choice\nand Welfare, 25: 381–418.", "Franssen, M., 2005, “Arrow’s Theorem, Multi-criteria\nDecision Problems and Multi-Attribute Preferences in Engineering\nDesign”, Research in Engineering Design, 16:\n42–56.", "Gaertner, W., 2001, Domain Conditions in Social Choice\nTheory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2009, A Primer in Social Choice\nTheory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rev. ed.", "Geanakoplos, J., 2005, “Three Brief Proofs of Arrow’s\nImpossibility Theorem”, Economic Theory, 26:\n211–215.", "Gibbard, A., 1969, “Social Choice and the Arrow\nConditions”, unpublished manuscript. The main result is\navailable in Gibbard 2014.", "–––, 1973, “Manipulation of Voting\nSchemes: A General Result”, Econometrica, 41:\n587–601.", "–––, 2014, “Intransitive Social\nIndifference and the Arrow Dilemma”, Review of Economic\nDesign, 18: 3–10. ", "Hansson, B., 1973, “The Independence Condition in the Theory\nof Social Choice”, Theory and Decision, 4:\n25–49.", "Hattiangadi, A., forthcoming, “Radical Interpretation and\nThe Aggregation Problem”, Philosophy and Phenomenological\nResearch, first online 21 February 2019.\ndoi:10.1111/phpr.12578", "Hurley, S., 1985, “Supervenience and the Possibility of\nCoherence”, Mind, 94: 501–525.", "–––, 1989, Natural Reasons, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Hylland, Aa., 1986, “The Purpose and Significance of Social\nChoice Theory: some general remarks and an application to the\n‘Lady Chatterley problem’”, in Elster and Hylland\n1986: 45–73.", "Kelly, J.S., 1978, Arrow Impossibility Theorems, New\nYork: Academic Press.", "Kemp, M.C. and Y.K. Ng, 1976, “On the Existence of Social\nWelfare Functions, Social Orderings and Social Decision\nFunctions”, Economica, 43: 59–66.", "Kolm, Serge-Christophe 1996, “Rational Just Social\nChoice”, in Arrow, Sen and Suzumura 1996: 167–196.", "Kornhauser, L. and L Sager 1986, “Unpacking the\nCourt”, The Yale Law Journal, 96: 82–117.", "Kroedel, T. and F. Huber, 2013, “Counterfactual Dependence\nand Arrow”, Noûs, 47: 453–466. \n [available online]", "Landemore, H. 2012, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective\nIntelligence, and the Rule of the Many, Princeton: Princeton\nUniversity Press.", "Le Breton, M. and J.A. 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McLean, 2013,\n“Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of\nMeaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls”,\nJournal of Politics, 75: 80–95.", "Little, I.M.D., 1952, “Social Choice and Individual\nValues”, Journal of Political Economy, 60:\n422–432.", "Mackie, G., 2003, Democracy Defended, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press.", "May, K., 1954, “Intransitivity, Utility, and the Aggregation\nof Preference Patterns”, Econometrica, 22:\n1–13.", "McLean, I., 2003, “The Reasonableness of Independence: A\nConversation from Condorcet and Borda to Arrow and Saari”,\nNuffield College Working Paper 2003-W6, University of Oxford,\n[available online].", "Miller, D., 1992, “Deliberative Democracy and Social\nChoice”, Political Studies, 40, 54–67.", "Morreau, M., 2010, “It Simply Does Not Add Up: Trouble with\nOverall Similarity”, The Journal of Philosophy, 107:\n469–490.", "–––, 2014, “Mr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and\nMr. Scope: From Social Choice to Theory Choice”,\nErkenntnis, 79: 1253–1268.", "–––, 2015, “Theory Choice and Social\nChoice: Kuhn Vindicated”, Mind, 124: 239–262.", "–––, 2016, “Grading in Groups”,\nEconomics & Philosophy, 32: 323–352.", "Moulin, H., 1980, “On Strategy-Proofness and Single\nPeakedness”, Public Choice, 35: 437–455.", "Murakami Y., 1968, Logic and Social Choice, London:\nRoutledge and Kegan Paul.", "Oddie, G., 2013, “The Content, Consequence and Likeness\nApproaches to Verisimilitude: Compatibility, Trivialization, and\nUnderdetermination”, Synthese, 190:\n1647–1687.", "Okasha, S., 2011, “Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn\nversus Arrow”, Mind, 120: 83–115.", "Page, S.E., 2007, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity\nCreates Better Groups, Firms, Schools and Societies, Princeton,\nNJ: Princeton University Press.", "Parks, R.P., 1976, “An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed\nPreferences: a Dictatorial Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function”,\nReview of Economic Studies, 43: 447–450.", "Pattanaik. P.K., 2002, “Positional Rules of Collective\nDecision Making”, in Arrow, Sen and Suzumura 2002:\n361–394.", "Pazner, E., 1979, “Equity, Nonfeasible Alternatives and\nSocial Choice: a Reconsideration of the Concept of Social\nWelfare”, in J.J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation\nof Preferences, Amsterdam: North Holland.", "Peter, F., 2011, Democratic Legitimacy, New York, London:\nRoutledge.", "Plott, C. R. 1973, “Path Independence, Rationality, and\nSocial Choice”, Econometrica, 41: 1075–1091.", "Popper, K. R., 1963, Conjectures and Refutations, London:\nRoutledge.", "Ray, P., 1973, “Independence of Irrelevant\nAlternatives”, Econometrica, 44: 987–991.", "Riker, W.H., 1982, Liberalism against Populism, San\nFrancisco: W.H. Freeman.", "Roberts, K.W.S., 1980, “Social Choice Theory: The Single-\nand Multi-Profile Approaches”, The Review of Economic Studies,\n47: 441–450.", "Samuelson, P., 1947, Foundations of Economic Analysis,\nCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "–––, 1967, “Arrow’s Mathematical\nPolitics”, in S. Hook (ed.), Human Values and Economic\nPolicy, New York: New York University Press: 41–52.", "–––, 1977, “Reaffirming the Existence of\n‘Reasonable’ Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare\nFunctions”, Economica, 44: 81–88.", "Sattherthwaite, M., 1975, “Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s\nConditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting\nProcedures and Social Welfare Functions”, Journal of\nEconomic Theory, 10: 187–217.", "Schurz, G. and P. Weingartner, 2010, “Zwart and Franssen’s\nImpossibility Theorem holds for Possible-World-Accounts but not for\nConsequence-Accounts to Versimilitude”, Synthese, 172:\n415–436.", "Scott M.J. and E.K. Antonsson, 2000, “Arrow’s Theorem and\nEngineering Design Decision Making”, Research in Engineering\nDesign, 11: 218–228.", "Sen, A., 1969, “Quasi-transitivity, Rational Choice and\nCollective Decisions”, Review of Economic Studies, 36:\n381–393.", "–––, 1970, Collective Choice and Social\nWelfare, San Francisco: Holden-Day.", "–––, 1976, “Liberty, Unanimity and\nRights”, Economica, 43: 217–245.", "–––, 1977, “On Weights and Measures:\nInformational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis”,\nEconometrica, 45: 1539–1572.", "–––, 1979, “Utiliarianism and\nWelfarism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 76:\n463–489.", "–––, 1986, “Foundations of Social Choice\nTheory: An Epilogue”, in Elster and Hylland 1986:\n213–248.", "–––, 1999, “The Possibility of Social\nChoice”, American Economic Review, 89:\n349–378.", "–––, 2010, “The Informational Basis of\nSocial Choice”, in Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura 2010:\n29–46.", "Stegenga, J. 2013, “An Impossibility Theorem for\nAmalgamating Evidence”, Synthese, 190:\n2391–2411.", "Weymark, J. A., 1984, “Arrow’s Theorem with Social\nQuasi-Orderings”, Public Choice, 42: 235–246.", "–––, 2014, “An Introduction to Allan\nGibbard’s Oligarchy Theorem Paper”, Review of Economic\nDesign, 18: 1–2.", "Zwart, S. D. and M. Franssen 2007, “An Impossibility Theorem\nfor Verisimilitude”, Synthese, 158: 75–92." ]	[ { "href": "../economics/", "text": "economics: philosophy of" }, { "href": "../economic-justice/", "text": "economics [normative] and economic justice" }, { "href": "../collective-intentionality/", "text": "intentionality: collective" }, { "href": "../preferences/", "text": "preferences" }, { "href": "../social-choice/", "text": "social choice theory" }, { "href": "../truthlikeness/", "text": "truthlikeness" }, { "href": "../voting-methods/", "text": "voting: methods" } ]
conceptual-art	Conceptual Art	First published Thu Jun 7, 2007; substantive revision Wed Mar 23, 2022	[ "\nThe philosophy of art addresses a broad spectrum of theoretical issues\narising from a wide variety of objects of attention. These range from\nPaleolithic cave painting to postmodern poetry, and from the problem\nof how music can convey emotion to that of the metaphysical status of\nfictional characters. Until recently, however, philosophical interest\nin conceptual art, or conceptualism, has been notably sparse. Why?\nAfter all, both philosophy and the myriad kinds and styles of art and\nart-making that fall under the conceptual tradition all have one thing\nin common: they are both intended to make you think and ask pressing\nquestions. What are those questions and how do we go about answering\nthem?" ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Conceptual Art – What Is It?", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Introduction", "1.2 The Limits of Art and the Role of Artists", "1.3 Artistic Media", "1.4 Art as Idea", "1.5 Semantic Representation" ] }, { "content_title": "2. The Philosophy of Conceptual Art – What is it?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Five Philosophical Themes", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 The Definition of Art", "3.2 The Ontology and Media of Art", "3.3 The Aesthetic Value of Art", "3.4 The Interpretation of Art", "3.5 The Cognitive Value of Art" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Further Questions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Conceptual Art – What Is It?", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nFew artistic movements have attracted so much controversy and debate\nas conceptual art. By its nature, conceptual art has a tendency to\nprovoke intense and perhaps even extreme reactions in its audiences.\nWhile some people find conceptual art very refreshing and relevant,\nmany others consider it shocking, distasteful, and conspicuously\nlacking in craftsmanship. Some even simply deny that it is art at all.\nConceptual art, it seems, is something that we either love or\nhate.", "\nThis divisive character is, however, far from accidental. Most\nconceptual art actively sets out to be controversial in so far as it\nseeks to challenge and probe us about what we tend to take as given in\nthe domain of art. In fact, this capacity to evoke argument and debate\nlies at the very heart of what conceptual art sets out to do, namely\nto make us question our assumptions not only about what may properly\nqualify as art and what the function of the artist should be, but also\nabout what our role as spectators should involve. It should come as no\nsurprise, then, that conceptual art can cause frustration or vexation\n– to raise difficult and sometimes even annoying questions is\nprecisely what conceptual art in general aspires to do. In reacting\nstrongly to conceptual art we are, in some important sense, playing\nright into its hands.", "\nThe first difficulty that a philosophical investigation of conceptual\nart encounters has to do with identifying the object of examination,\nor at least the category of objects under scrutiny. In the words of\nthe art historian Paul Wood,", "\n[i]t is not at all clear where the boundaries of ‘conceptual\nart’ are to be drawn, which artists and which works to include.\nLooked at in one way, conceptual art gets to be like Lewis\nCarroll’s Cheshire cat, dissolving away until nothing is left\nbut a grin: a handful of works made over a few short years by a small\nnumber of artists… Then again, regarded under a different\naspect, conceptual art can seem like nothing less than the hinge\naround which the past turned into the present. (Wood 2002, 6)\n", "\nOn a strict historical reading, the expression ‘conceptual\nart’ refers to the artistic movement that reached its pinnacle\nbetween 1966 and 1972 (Lippard\n 1973).[1]\n Among its most famous adherents at its early stage we find artists\nsuch as Joseph Kosuth, Robert Morris, Joseph Beuys, Adrian Piper, to\nname but a few. What unites the conceptual art of this period is the\nabsorption of the lessons learnt from other twentieth-century art\nmovements such as Dadaism, Surrealism, Suprematism, Abstract\nExpressionism and the Fluxus group, together with the ambition once\nand for all to ‘free’ art of the Modernist paradigm. Most\nimportantly, perhaps, conceptual art of the 1960s and 70s sought to\novercome a backdrop against which art’s principal aim is to\nproduce something beautiful or aesthetically pleasing. Art, early\nconceptual artists held, is redundant if it does not make us think. In\ntheir belief that most artistic institutions were not conducive to\nreflection but merely promoted a conservative and even consumerist\nconception of art and artists, conceptual artists in the mid-1960s to\nthe early 1970s instead tried to encourage a revisionary understanding\nof art, the artist, and artistic experience.", "\nWhile conceptual art in its purest form might arguably be limited to\nworks produced during these five or six years half a century ago, it\nseems overly narrow – certainly from a philosophical perspective\n– to limit our inquiry to works produced during that period\nalone. For although the work created during that time might generally\nbe conceived as more directly anti-establishment and anti-consumerist\nthan later conceptual art, the spirit of early conceptual art seems to\nhave carried on relatively undiluted into the very late twentieth and\ntwenty-first centuries, as witnessed by pieces such as Tracey\nEmin’s Unmade Bed, Damian Hirst’s The\nPhysical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living,\nand Ai Weiwei’s Surveillance Camera.", "\nThe highly individualised character of the intellectual exploration\nthat conceptual art urges us to engage in has always been such that\nany attempt to pinpoint a specific common denominator other than this\ngeneral vision and approach to art, art-making and society at large\ninvariably fails to catch its very essence. The means of artistic\nexpression, we are told, are infinite and the topics available for\nquestioning and discussion are limitless. It belongs to the very\nnature of conceptual art, then, to be – like Lewis’\nCheshire cat – elusive and slippery. Conceptual artists, be it\nJoseph Beuys or Marina Abramovic, pursue artistic originality and\nrepresentation in every possible way. For that reason, one\nmight find oneself obliged to replace the slightly lofty cliché\naccording to which there are as many definitions of conceptual art as\nthere are conceptual artists, with an even more extreme version of the\nclaim, namely, that there are as many definitions of conceptual art as\nthere are conceptual artworks.", "\nNevertheless, in the midst of this deliberately produced uncertainty\nabout the nature of conceptual art, a handful of characteristics and\ngeneral aims do seem to recur, and although they should not be seen as\ncriteria for conceptual art strictly speaking, they may be considered\ntenets fundamental to (most) conceptual art." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Introduction" }, { "content": [ "\nFirst and foremost, conceptual art challenges our intuitions\nconcerning the limits of what may count as art and what it is an\nartist does. It does so, on the one hand, by postulating ever more\ncomplex objects as candidates for the status of ‘artwork’,\nand, on the other hand, by distancing the task of the artist from the\nactual making and manipulating of the artistic material.", "\nA characteristic way in which conceptual art explores the boundaries\nof the artwork is by a process of questioning where the realm of the\nartistic ends and that of utility begins. Continuing the tradition of\nMarcel Duchamp’s readymades such as Fountain, or\nBottlerack, it sets out to overthrow our traditional\nconceptions of what an art object should be made of and what it should\nlook like. The artwork is a process rather than a\nmaterial thing, and as such it is no longer something that\ncan be grasped merely by seeing, hearing or touching the end product\nof that process. The notion of agency in art-making is thus\nparticularly emphasised. In many cases, the ‘art-making’\nand the ‘artwork’ come together, because what is sought is\nan identification of the notion of the work of art with the conceptual\nactivity of the artist. Conceptual art, politicised and influenced by\nevents such as the ‘May Days’ in Paris (1968), the\n‘Hot Autumn’ in Italy (1969), the Vietnam War, and the\nrise of feminism, promotes a rapprochement between art-making\nand criticism – both artistic and social – by raising\nquestions about the products of artistic activities and the very\npurpose of art. To use the words of Joseph Kosuth, it ‘annexes\nthe functions of the critic, and makes a middle-man\nunnecessary.’ (Guercio 1999, 39)." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 The Limits of Art and the Role of Artists" }, { "content": [ "\nAs a direct result of its examination of what may properly qualify as\nart, and of the markedly broad conception of what may constitute an\nart object resulting from this examination, conceptual art tends to\nreject traditional artistic media such as conventional painting or\nsculpture. Instead, it has found itself drawn to alternative means of\nexpression, including performances, photography, films, videos,\nevents, bodies, new ready-mades and new mixed media. In a nutshell,\nnothing can be ruled out in principle for use as possible artistic\nmedia, as can be seen, for example, in Richard Long’s photograph\nof a line made in the grass by\n walking[2],\n Bruce Nauman’s nine minute film of the artist himself playing\none note on a violin whilst walking around in his\n studio[3],\n Janine Antoni’s use of chocolate and soap, Marina\nAbramovic’s display of an array of everyday objects, including\nknives, torches and feathers, which the audience is invited to apply\ndirectly on to the artist’s body, and Piero Manzoni’s act\nof signing a woman’s\n arm[4]." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Artistic Media" }, { "content": [ "\nThe most fundamentally revisionary feature of conceptual art is the\nway in which it proclaims itself to be an art of the mind rather than\nthe senses: it rejects traditional artistic media because it locates\nthe artwork at the level of ideas rather than that of\nobjects. Because more weight tends to given to creative\nprocess than physical material, and because art should be about\nintellectual inquiry and reflection rather than beauty and aesthetic\npleasure (as traditionally conceived), the identity of the work of art\nis said to lie in the idea at the heart of the piece in question. In\nthe words of Kosuth, ‘[t]he actual works of art are ideas’\n(Lippard 1973, 25). For conceptual art, ‘the idea or concept is\nthe most important aspect of the work’ (LeWitt 1967, 166). Art\nis ‘de-materialised’, and in this sense held to be prior\nto its materialisation in any given object.", "\nThe claim that the conceptual artwork is to be identified with an idea\nthat may be seen to underlie it has far-reaching ramifications. It not\nonly affects the ontology of the conceptual artwork but also\nprofoundly alters the role of the artist by casting her in the role of\nthinker rather than object-maker. Moreover, it calls for a thorough\nreview of the way in which we perceive, engage and appreciate\nartworks. Further still, it links art so intimately to ideas and\nconcepts that even a principled distinction between the domain of art\nand the realm of thought seems difficult to preserve." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 Art as Idea" }, { "content": [ "\nFor all these reasons, the kind of representation employed in\nconceptual artworks is best described in terms of the transmission of\nideas. In conceptual art, the representation at work can generally be\nseen as semantic rather than illustrative. That is\nto say, it sets out to have and convey a specific meaning rather than\nto depict a scene, person or event. Even in cases where a work makes\nuse of illustrative representation, conceptual art is still putting\nthat representation to a distinctively semantic use, in the sense of\nthere being an intention to represent something one cannot see with\nthe naked eye. Accordingly, the conceptual artist’s task is to\ncontemplate and formulate this meaning – to be a\n‘meaning-maker’." ], "subsection_title": "1.5 Semantic Representation" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nOn the whole, the philosophical concerns raised by conceptual art can\nbe divided into two main categories. First, there are specific\nquestions to do with conceptual art itself, and the claims which\nunderpin the project that drives it. Philosophical investigations\nmight thus be called for not only in relation to the internal\nconsistency and coherence of the project and its set goals, but also\nwith regards to the particular tenets outlined above. For example,\nwhat does it mean to say that every single thing, person or event is a\npossible candidate for an artistic medium and does that suggestion not\nrender the category of art, as we know it, redundant?", "\nSecond, conceptual art poses philosophical problems from a wider\nperspective, in so far as one might expect philosophy to provide us\nwith unitary accounts of the nature of art, the role of the artist,\nand artistic experience. In many important respects, conceptual art\nsits very uncomfortably with other, often more traditional artforms\nand artworks, and this tension highlights a pressing issue for anyone\ninterested in the possibility of a universal theory of art. For if\nthere is to be one rule for conceptual art and another for all other\nkinds of art, are there still good grounds for thinking of conceptual\nart as a kind of art? Moreover, could not every particular kind of\nartform or artwork demand a separate theory of art, artist and\nartistic experience?", "\nIf we are to sidestep such an intrinsic division between conceptual\nart on the one hand, and other kinds of art on the other, then\ntheories concerned mainly with art that is not conceptual will have to\nmake many significant concessions in order to incorporate the\nproblematic case that conceptual artworks present. At the very least,\na compromise will have to be reached concerning what we mean by the\nterm ‘artwork’.", "\nOne of the over-riding concerns that beset the philosophy of\nconceptual art is thus whether and, if so, why one should actively\npursue unified accounts in the philosophy of art. Whether one comes\nout of that investigation embracing a broader – albeit perhaps\nvaguer – set of concepts and tools than one started off with, or\nwhether one considers oneself forced to abandon any hope of anything\nbut very specific theories of art, artist, and artistic experience,\nconceptual art obliges us to think about where we stand on these\nissues.", "\nPhilosophizing about conceptual art is, then, not merely\nphilosophizing about one specific artform. It is philosophizing about\nthe most revisionary kind of art, one that sees its own task as being\nprofoundly philosophical in nature. Let us now turn to five more\nspecific philosophical themes that conceptual art urges us to\nconsider." ], "section_title": "2. The Philosophy of Conceptual Art – What is it?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Five Philosophical Themes", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe problem of defining art is by no means a problem for conceptual\nart alone. Two principal difficulties immediately arise in the context\nof any attempt to form a definition. First, the category of art is\nparticularly heterogeneous. Simply put, there seems to be an infinite\nvariety of things, or kinds of thing, that need to fall under its\njurisdiction. Second, there is great variety of opinion on what any\nputative definition of art should actually consist of.", "\nOn the standard conception, a definition is something that provides us\nwith necessary and sufficient conditions for some thing x to\nbe F, so that, for example, it is a necessary and sufficient condition\nfor a number to be an even number that it is (i) an integer and (ii)\ndivisible by two. Accordingly, a definition of art must be capable of\noutlining a clear set of conditions that must be satisfied.", "\nThere have been no shortages of attempts to define art in this manner.\nMost prominently perhaps, it has been suggested that art ought to be\ndefined in terms of its aesthetic character, so that, roughly,\nx is an artwork if and only if x gives rise to an\naesthetic experience (e.g., Beardsley 1958). Notwithstanding the\ndifficulties that this particular suggestion entails (we shall return\nto this in §3.3), the advent of a kind of art that is as\nprofoundly revisionary and difficult to classify as conceptual art\nrenders the attempt to provide a general definition applicable to\nall art particularly complex. It is no coincidence, then,\nthat a neo-Wittgensteinian approach came to dominate the philosophy of\nart in the late 1950s and 1960s. Drawing support from\nanti-essentialist theories of language, it was suggested that art was\nnumbered among the various concepts that are, by their very nature,\n‘essentially contested’ (Gallie 1948; see also Weitz\n1956). That is to say, some concepts – such as that pertaining\nto sports, for example– simply do not allow for definitions in\nterms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and art is best as\nunderstood as one of them. In the words of Morris Weitz, art may\nbe", "\nan open concept. New conditions have constantly arisen and will\nundoubtedly constantly arise; new art forms, new movements will\nemerge, which will demand decisions on the part of those\ninterested… as to whether the concept should be extended or\nnot. (Weitz 1956, 32)\n", "\nThe act of proposing a definition of art thus becomes a less stringent\nexercise of conceptual analysis. The alternative method proposed by\nneo-Wittgensteinians such as Weitz in attempting to identify art and\nexplain how we are to distinguish it from non-art is the notion of\nfamily resemblance (see Wittgenstein 1953,\n§66–71). Faced with the question ‘Is X an\nartwork?’, what we should do is try to detect strands of\nresemblance with paradigmatic instances of an artwork. If some\nsignificant resemblance to such a paradigmatic case is observed, we\ncan rightly call the object of our scrutiny a work of art.", "\nThe proposal, though interesting, is not without its own difficulties.\nOne problem that immediately arises relates to the idea of resemblance\nitself, and the way it rapidly expands in such a way as to render it\nclose to useless. This is for the simple reason that we can always\nfind some way in which some given thing may be said to resemble any\nother given thing. This kind of openness, it is important to note, is\nnot something that fits in with the programme of conceptual\nart. Whilst conceptual art does hold that any kind of object could be\na work of art, it is not saying that every object is a work\nof art. Far from it. Much conceptual art, in exploring the boundaries\nbetween the realms of the artistic and that of function and utility,\nis perceptually indistinguishable from non-art, such as Andy\nWarhol’s Brillo Boxes. In that sense, conceptual art\npresents a particularly difficult case for the neo-Wittgensteinian\nmethod of identification. After all, the only way in which\nWarhol’s Brillo Boxes does not resemble any other stack\nof Brillo Boxes is the sense in which the former is a work of art and\nthe latter is not. The notion of resemblance is clearly of little use\nhere.", "\nPicking up on this concern, Arthur Danto has famously suggested that\nit is in fact a non-manifest relation that makes something an artwork\nrather than an observable property (Danto 1981). That is to say,\nartworks acquire that status in virtue of their relations to the\nhistorical and social setting constituted by the practices and\nconventions of art, our artistic heritage, the intentions of artists,\nand so on — the ‘artworld’ (see also Dickie\n1974). The general idea here is that artworks are generated within a\nsocial and artistic context, and so being an artwork is a function of\ncertain social relations. Conceptual art reinforces the idea that art\nand non-art can be perceptually indistinguishable and so cannot be\nmarked off from each other by ‘exhibited’ properties\n alone.[5]", "\nSetting aside the details of such an account, one of the things\nconceptual art has helped philosophers to grasp more fully is that any\nsuccessful general definition, or indeed principled theory of the\nidentification of art, will need to have the non-manifest properties\nof artworks at its centre. It is the meaning that the artist infuses\ninto the work and the meaning that we as audience stand to gain from\nit that contains the key to its status as art (more on this in\n§3.4). To use the example of Warhol’s Brillo Boxes\nagain, the work of the conceptual artist seems primarily to be the\nwork of imbuing objects with a particular kind of meaning.", "\nA more promising line of enquiry has been developed by David Davies.\nTaking his cue from the problems posed by conceptual art, Davies\nargues that a unified definition of art can only be found if we think\nof art primarily in terms of the creative process or series of actions\nresulting in a material thing or other ‘focus of\nappreciation’. In that sense, the artwork is primarily\nidentified with the intentional acts through which it comes into being\nrather than with the end-product of that process (Davies 2004). Art,\non this view, is better understood as a kind of performance than as a\nmanifest object. By shifting the focus of our attention in this way,\nwe can overcome many of the difficulties associated with defining art,\nmost notably that of its heterogeneity. It may be, then, that the most\nenduring lesson to be learnt from conceptual art with regards to the\ndefinition of art is not so much that a conceptual analysis of art is\ncompletely unattainable, as that we simply have been looking in the\nwrong place." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 The Definition of Art" }, { "content": [ "\nThe claim that conceptual art is to be identified less with a\nperceivable object than with the meaning or idea it aims to convey,\ngives rise to a host of complex ontological questions. The rejection\nof traditional artistic media, together with the de-materialisation of\nthe art object, forces us to reconsider what seemed to be relatively\nuncomplicated aspects of artistic experience. The answers to questions\nsuch as ‘Is there in fact any one thing (or set of things) that\nwe must perceive in artistic appreciation?’, and ‘Is it a\nnecessary condition for the existence of an artwork that it have a\nmedium?’ suddenly become a good deal less obvious.", "\nIn the first instance, conceptual art drives us to review the common\nassumption that appropriate appreciation and engagement with an\nartwork must involve a direct first-hand experience of that piece\nitself. The idea here, to use Frank Sibley’s words, is that", "\n[p]eople have to see the grace or unity of a work,\nhear the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music,\nnotice the gaudiness of colour scheme, feel the\npower of a novel, its mood, or its uncertainty of tone. They may be\nstruck by these qualities at once, or they may come to perceive them\nonly after repeated viewings, hearings, or readings, and with the help\nof critics. But unless they do perceive them for themselves, aesthetic\nenjoyment, appreciation, and judgement are beyond them… the\ncrucial thing is to see, hear, or feel. (Sibley 1965, 137).\n", "\nThe assumption in question is, then, that although we seem to gain\nsomething from looking at, for example, a postcard or poster of\nKatsushika Hokusai's Fine Wine, Clear Morning or\nÉlisabeth Vigée Le Brun’s Self-Portrait in a\nStraw Hat , a genuine judgement about its artistic character\nnecessitates one’s own un-mediated perceptual experience of it.\nBut – and herein lies the crux of the problem for conceptual art\n– what if there is nothing for us to get a first-hand perceptual\nexperience of? In the case of Walter De Maria’s Vertical\nEarth Kilometer\n (1977)[6],\n a kilometre-long metal shaft plunged into the surface of the earth so\nthat only the very top is visible, first-hand perceptual experience is\nsimply not something that can be had. More pertinently, what does it\neven mean to have a perceptual engagement with an artwork that claims,\nbasically, to be an idea?", "\nPerhaps the most pressing question, however, has to do with the extent\nto which we are to take conceptual art’s claim of\nde-materialisation seriously. Does the de-materialisation of such art\nnot suggest that there is not only a rejection of traditional artistic\nmedia in conceptual art, but an outright refutation of artistic media\nin general? One possible way of making sense of this idea is with a\ndistinction outlined by Davies, namely that between physical\nmedium and vehicular medium (Davies 2004). Crucially, a\nvehicular medium is said to incorporate not only physical objects\n(such as paintings and sculptures, say) but also actions, events, and\ngenerally more complex entities. In Davies’ words, ‘[t]he\nproduct of an artist’s manipulation of a vehicular medium will\nthen be the vehicle whereby a particular artistic statement\nis articulated… The vehicle may, as in the case of\nPicasso’s Guernica, be a physical object, or, as in the\ncase of Coleridge’s Kubla Kahn, a linguistic\nstructure-type, or, as arguably in the case of Duchamp’s\nFountain, an action of a particular kind.’ (Davies\n2004, 59). Adhering to this vehicular medium in art, may then at least\nequip philosophers with a notion that can deflate the concern of\nwhether conceptual art, by rejecting physical media, denies the need\nfor all artistic media.", "\nClearly, conceptual art is not the first kind of art to raise\nontological concerns of this kind. After all, music and literary art,\nbe it traditional or avant-garde, hardly present\nstraightforward cases either. The question of what exactly\nconstitutes, say, a novel or a musical work have been widely discussed\nfor some time (e.g. Davies 2001; Ingarden 1973; Wollheim 1980)\nBuilding on the suggestion that artworks such as musical pieces and\nliterary works are best understood in terms of universals or\n‘types’, one view that has been widely discussed in the\nlast two decades or so is based on the idea that not only musical and\nliterary artworks, but all artworks, are types. More\nspecifically, they are to be conceived of as ‘event- or\naction-types’ (Currie 1988). According to this theory, the\nartwork is thus not the material thing itself but, rather, the way in\nwhich the artist arrived at the underlying structure shared by all\ninstances or performances of that work.", "\nWhilst the general approach fostered by both Currie and Davies is\nclearly congenial to some aspects of conceptual art, it might\nnevertheless still be the case that further work needs to be done if\nthe view that artworks are basically event- or action-types is to\naccommodate all art in the conceptual tradition. Further questions\ninclude what role, if any, is played by the (set of) material thing(s)\nthat many conceptual artists undeniably do present us with.\nWhat, in other words, are we to make of the object (be it a human body\nor a video-recording) that is supposed to transmit the idea which, in\nturn, is said to be the genuine artwork? A good philosophical\nexplanation needs to be given as to how the material thing that is\nregularly presented to the audience is, in fact, relevant to the\nartwork itself. Is the vehicular medium constitutive of the artwork,\nand if so, how exactly does that square with the claim of\nde-materialisation?" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 The Ontology and Media of Art" }, { "content": [ "\nUnderlying the claim that we need to have a direct experiential\nencounter with an artwork in order to appreciate it appropriately is\nthe fact that some of the properties that bear on the value of a work\ncan only be grasped in this way. The properties in question here are\ngenerally aesthetic properties, and the assumption motivating\nthe experiential requirement is that the appreciation of artworks\nnecessarily involves an aesthetic element (i.e. not necessarily beauty\nper se, but something aesthetically pleasing or\nrewarding).", "\nHowever, one of the most distinguishing features of conceptual art,\nsetting out as it does to replace illustrative representation with\nsemantic representation, is that it does not prioritise aesthetic\nexperience in a traditional sense. Conceptual art is intended as an\nart of the mind: it generally appeals to matters of the intellect and\nemphasises art’s cognitive rather than\naesthetic value. In the words of Timothy Binkley, traditional\naesthetics is preoccupied ‘with perceptual entities’ and\nthis ‘leads aesthetics to extol and examine the “work of\nart”, while averting its attention almost entirely from the\nmyriad other aspects of that complex cultural activity we call\n“art” ’ (Binkley 1977, 271).", "\nWe can now see that the experiential requirement may well fail to have\nany bite with regards to conceptual artworks because the\nartist’s aim does not necessarily involve conferring to the work\nof art properties that must be experienced directly in order to be\ngrasped and fully appreciated. If there is to be any kind of\nfirst-hand experiential requirement for the appropriate appreciation\nof conceptual artworks, it will perhaps be of a kind that focuses on\nan imaginative engagement with the idea central to the artwork rather\nthan a perceptual experience of its aesthetic properties (see\nSchellekens 2007)", "\nThe main philosophical question highlighted by conceptual art in this\ncontext, then, is the following: ‘Does art really need to be\naesthetic, and, if so, in what sense?’. In Binkley’s\nopinion, and in support of conceptual art, one does not necessarily\nhave to think of art in terms of aesthetic value –whilst a lot\nof ‘art has chosen to articulate in the medium of an aesthetic\nspace’, there is ‘no a priori reason why art must confine\nitself to the creation of aesthetic objects. It might opt for\narticulation in a semantic space instead of an aesthetic one so that\nartistic meaning is not embodied in a physical object or event’\n(Binkley 1977, 273).", "\nHowever, not everyone has endorsed such a liberal view about the\nseparation between the aesthetic and the\n artistic[7].\n If art does not aim at having aesthetic value, what, one might argue,\nwill set it apart from non-art? Which view one decides to favour on\nthis point may well end up being an issue about definition. If one\nwishes to define art in terms of aesthetic experience, the question\nfinds a clear-cut answer, namely that conceptual art simply cannot be\nconsidered a kind of art. The down-side of that position is, however,\na whole set of difficult concerns to do with things, such as nature or\npersons, that hardly qualify as art even though they invite aesthetic\nexperiences. If one is impressed by these worries and cannot see any\ndecisive philosophical reason to uphold the aesthetic view, there is\nlittle, if anything, to block a conception of art which is not\nnecessarily aesthetic. One may, then, think of aesthetic value as\none kind of artistic value that, alongside with moral,\nreligious, political, historical and financial value, some artworks\nhave and others do\n not.[8]", "\nNow, even if it is granted that art need not be aesthetic, it is still\npossible to hold that conceptual art does not qualify as good\nart because it does not (aim to) yield aesthetic experiences. But\nwhile this may be a viable position to hold in relation to the project\nof conceptual art in general, it cannot be used to attack conceptual\nart on its own grounds. Saying, for example, of Michael\nCraig-Martin’s An Oak Tree that one cannot consider it\na great work of art because it fails to give rise to a distinctively\naesthetic kind of pleasure does not actually undermine the project.\nConceptual art, as we now know, is more about conveying meaning\nthrough a vehicular medium than about furnishing its audiences with\nexperiences of, say, beauty. Any attack on this fundamental feature of\nconceptual art targets not so much an individual work of art but\nrather finds fault with the artistic tradition itself." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 The Aesthetic Value of Art" }, { "content": [ "\nAt the most basic level of inquiry, two queries arise about\ninterpretation in art: (i) what ‘tools’ do we use to\ninterpret artworks?, and (ii) what is it we do when we interpret\nartworks? In the case of conceptual art, a satisfactory answer to (i)\nwill most probably appeal to elements such as the narrative aids\nprovided by artists or curators (e.g. catalogues, titles, exhibited\nexplanations, labels, etc.); the appropriate mode of perception (i.e.\nlooking or listening); and what we know about the artwork’s and\nartist’s social, historical, political or artistic context.\nDepending on the ontological status of the particular piece (if it is,\nsay, a ready-made or a performance), these elements can be combined in\ndifferent ways to explain our interpretative habits and practices.", "\nIn addressing (ii) we will most likely need to refer to the various\nmental abilities we put to use in such interpretative exercises (e.g.\nimagination, empathy); and also to ask precisely what the target of\nour interpretation is. This latter task is not as unproblematic as it\nmay seem, for it is not always clear whether it is the object itself\nthat should be under scrutiny, the object’s perceptual\nproperties (and, if so, which), the idea at the heart of the work, or\nthe artist’s intentions in making the piece. It seems unlikely\nthat the question will find an adequate answer until we find an\nacceptable solution to the problem mentioned above, namely ‘Is\nthe vehicular medium a constitutive part of the conceptual artwork or\nnot, and if so how?’.", "\nTwo further philosophical questions about the notion of artistic\ninterpretation take on a particularly complex dimension in relation to\nconceptual art. First, exactly what information is relevant in\nartistic interpretation? And, more importantly, to what extent should\nthe artist’s intention be allowed to determine the\nappropriate interpretation? Views differ widely on this topic. In\ntheir article, ‘The Intentional Fallacy’, William Wimsatt\nand Monroe Beardsley famously argue in relation to the literary arts\nthat the only kind of evidence that is relevant to interpretation is\nthat which is internal to the work in question. (Wimsatt &\nBeardsley 1946). An artist’s intention or design is of no\ninterpretative significance. Obviously, this position seems difficult\nto defend in the case of conceptual art: when we are dealing with\npieces such as Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, where the\ninternal evidence is clearly insufficient to discern that it is an\nartwork in the first place, it seems that we need to know that Warhol\nintended the boxes to be viewed qua art, at the very\nleast.", "\nNow, even if we do wish to defend the view that the artist’s\nintention needs to be taken into account somehow in the interpretation\nof conceptual art, further questions still require our attention here.\nMost centrally, should the artist’s intention always be\nconsidered the decisive factor in interpretation and\nmust it always be involved? Generally speaking, there are two\nmain strands of intentionalist positions available. On the one hand,\nthere is an approach which holds that the artist’s intention\ndetermines an artwork’s meaning, and thus cannot be overlooked\n– or indeed superseded – in artistic interpretation (e.g.,\nCarroll 1992). On the other hand, there is a view that the interpreter\nought to construct the best hypothesis concerning the artist’s\nactual intention with the help of, say, the text and biographical\nnotes, and that this hypothesis confers meaning on the work in\nquestion (e.g., Levinson 1992).", "\nAt least at a first glance, it may seem that conceptual art presents a\nstronger case for the first approach to interpretation, since the\nartist’s intention is all we have to go by, quite literally, in\nworks such as Robert Barry’s simple statement entitled All\nthe Things I Know But of which I am Not at the Moment Thinking\n(1969) (see, e.g., Maes 2010 and Gover 2012). Nevertheless, the\nquestion cannot be settled quite so easily, for many conceptual\nartists make a point of putting all the interpretative onus on the\nspectator. How often are we told, after all, that a specific\nartwork’s meaning rests entirely in our hands; that ‘it\nmeans whatever you want it to mean’?", "\nThis leads us to the second question that is especially pertinent for\na kind of art that sets out to convey an idea or meaning, namely\nwhether there can be more than one correct or appropriate\ninterpretation of an artwork. Again, several theories present\nthemselves as eligible candidates in relation to this problem. One\nsuggestion has centred around the idea that there can be a\nmultiplicity of appropriate or correct divergent interpretations of\none and the same artwork which cannot be reduced to one underlying\ninterpretation or ranked in relation to each other (e.g., Margolis\n1991; Goldman 1990). In opposition to this view, however, another\napproach has it that there is in fact always a single best\ninterpretation which is better than any other (e.g., Beardsley 1970).\nThe aim of artistic interpretation is, then, in Matthew Kieran’s\nwords, ‘restricted to discovering the one true meaning of an\nartwork.’ (Kieran 1996, 239). Whilst conceptual art certainly\nseems to rest on something like the interpretative plurality of the\nfirst view, it is not obvious how a kind of art that presents itself\nas an idea can, in reality, accommodate such indeterminacy.", "\nThere are good reasons to believe that of all the questions conceptual\nart gives rise to, interpretation is the most problematic from an\ninternal point of view. The conundrum can be put in the following\nterms. If the conceptual work is the idea, it seems reasonable to\nassume that artistic interpretation will consist primarily in coming\nto understand that idea (which is conceded by the artist to the\nartwork considered as such). In other words, if we take conceptual\nart’s de-materialisation claim seriously, we are left with a\nnotion of interpretation which is relatively constrained to the\nartist’s intention and to the claim that that intention\ndetermines the appropriate or correct interpretation for that\nparticular work.", "\nAs we have seen, though, we are often encouraged by conceptual artists\nto take the interpretative exercise into our own hands, so to speak,\nand not be shy to use features about ourselves and our own lives as\ninterpretive tools. We are, in other words, asked to combine the idea\nof art as idea with the claim that we can, as spectators, convey an\nentirely new and fresh interpretation onto an artwork that is nothing\nbut an idea which, by definition, needs to be about or concerned with\nsomething. So, if the idea is the art, then how can my idiosyncratic\ninterpretation of that idea be anywhere near valid? It seems, then\nthat in order to be coherent, conceptual art must give up either the\nclaim that the actual artwork is nothing other than the idea, or the\nclaim that the interpretative onus lies on the viewer." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 The Interpretation of Art" }, { "content": [ "\nIn seeking to convey a semantic representation through a vehicular\nmedium, conceptual art arguably aims to have cognitive – rather\nthan aesthetic – value. By cognitive value, what is meant is\nsimply the value an artwork may have in virtue of enhancing or\nincreasing our understanding of some topic, notion or event.\nInterestingly, conceptual art seems to assume that the aesthetic\ndetracts from or divests art of its possible cognitive value in such a\nway as to render the two kinds of value close to mutually exclusive\n(Schellekens 2007).", "\nThe attempt to separate the aesthetic from the cognitive is far from a\nrecent investigative endeavour in philosophical circles. In the very\nfirst section of Kant’s Critique of the Power of\nJudgement, a clear-cut distinction is outlined between aesthetic\nand cognitive (or ‘logical’) judgements. However, few\nartistic movements have pressed these questions about the division\nbetween aesthetic value on the one hand, and cognitive value on the\nother, as scrupulously and explicitly as conceptual art. In fact,\nconceptual art makes things very difficult for itself by holding that\nthe only kind of artistic value that is entirely legitimate\nis cognitive value.", "\nClearly, conceptual art is not the only kind of art that may have\ncognitive value – many other artforms aim to have cognitive\nvalue in addition to aesthetic value – and most of us\nwould agree that part of why we find art rewarding is precisely\nbecause it often yields some kind of understanding. That is to say, we\nread novels, look at paintings and listen to music not only because of\nthe pleasure it may afford, but also because it tends to make us\nricher human beings, better able to make sense of the world around\nus.", "\nUncontroversial as this claim may seem, some philosophers have denied\nthat art should either have or seek to have cognitive value. Most\nfamously perhaps, expressivists such as Clive Bell and Roger Fry held\nthat art should only seek to express and arouse emotions (Bell 1914;\nFry 1920). James Young has defended a view whereby\navant-garde art, like conceptual art, cannot yield any\nsignificant knowledge or understanding (Young 2001, 77).", "\nYoung’s argument focuses on the notion of exemplification which\nhe locates at the heart of the only kind of semantic representation\nand cognitive value that can be ascribed to artworks such as\nconceptual ones. Exemplification is a form of reference to properties\nby means of a sample (or exemplar). An exemplar ‘stands for some\nproperty by [non-metaphorically, literally] possessing the\nproperty’ (Young 2001, 72). In the case of conceptual art, a\nwork then exemplifies an idea or concept. So, for example, Tom\nMarioni’s The Act of Drinking Beer with One’s Friends\nis the Highest Form of Art\n (1970)[9]\n – a piece involving the artist and his friends drinking beer\ntogether – is an exemplar of the idea at the heart of the work,\nnamely that drinking beer with one’s friends is the highest\nart-form of all. This is the work’s statement. However, as Young\npoints out, it doesn’t follow from the fact that something\nexpresses a statement or has meaning that it has significant cognitive\nvalue. All things considered, the kind of statement that conceptual\nartworks and their like are typically able to make, according to\nYoung, are merely truisms. If conceptual art yields cognitive value,\nthat is to say, it tends to be so trivial that it barely deserves the\nname.", "\nThe argument puts a finger on an experience shared by many spectators\nof conceptual art who feel conned or deceived by it. Not only are\nconceptual artworks not beautiful, one might object, they don’t\neven tell us anything over and beyond banal clichés. What,\nthen, is conceptual art really good for?", "\nIf there is to be a way out of this difficulty, we will have to take\nthe bull by the horns and discuss exactly what (kind of) understanding\none may gain from it. This answer will have to be cashed out in terms\nof two concerns: one about the content of the knowledge, and\nanother about the kind of knowledge in question. First,\nknowledge yielded by art can be about the artwork – not only the\ntechniques employed, the work’s history and tradition, and so\non, but also the meaning and thoughts that the work conveys. Second,\nart can yield either propositional knowledge or knowledge by\nacquaintance. Whereas the first consists of knowledge given to us in\nterms of propositions and can either be concerned with the artwork\nitself (e.g. knowledge ‘that [Manet's famous painting]\nrepresents the Emperor Maximilan’s execution') or a reality\nbeyond that work (e.g. knowledge ‘that horrible things are often\ndone in the name of political revolutions’), the second kind of\nknowledge has the potential to enable one to imagine what it would be\nlike to be in a certain position or situation, to empathize, to come\nvery close to experiencing what it would be like to have that kind of\nexperience first-hand (e.g. what it is like to witness the execution\nof a dishonoured Emperor).", "\nThe notions of knowledge and cognitive value, whilst at the very heart\nof the conceptual project, raise a manifold of important questions\nthat require solid and cogent philosophical answers. Perhaps\nexemplification can still serve an epistemological purpose by inviting\nus to engage with the issues raised by a work of art in a richer and\nmore imaginative way; in a way that makes us think about questions of\nphilosophical interest in particular way – a way that\npropositions alone cannot do? Perhaps the key to conceptual\nart’s value lies in a more challenging intellectual relationship\nwith the work, a genuine engagement with the idea in question.\nExploring this avenue may yet help us see what kind of non-trivial\ncognitive value conceptual art is capable of yielding." ], "subsection_title": "3.5 The Cognitive Value of Art" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nMany more questions centred around these five philosophical themes\nremain to be examined in relation to conceptual art. With regards to\nconcerns about defining art, we need to address the increasing number\nof worries to do with exactly how we are to distinguish art from\nnon-art, and indeed whether there really is a distinction (if only\ntheoretical) to be drawn here. That is to say, if conceptual art is at\ntimes not only perceptually indistinguishable from non-art but it is\nalso the case that everything is alleged to be (part of) a potential\nartwork, perhaps the inevitable outcome is that there simply cannot be\na principled distinction between art and non-art. So, does the\nconceptual project lead to the end of the category of art as such?", "\nFrom the ontological perspective, this set of concerns acquires an\neven more aggressive flavour: if art should be all about putting\nforward ideas and making statements, why, one might wonder, do we need\nthe conceptual artwork at all? Can we not merely ask the same\nquestions and make the same statements directly?", "\nIn addition to these questions, the host of issues that have been\nraised about interpretation, intention, appreciation and the way they\nare (or should be) related have not yet been silenced. For art that is\nas discourse-dependent as most conceptual art is, it is not always\nclear whether there is anything more to interpreting conceptual art\nthan just being told what the idea in question is. And if so, can we\nstill call this interpretation?", "\nFinally, what are we to make of the relation between aesthetic and\ncognitive value in conceptual art – should they be considered as\nin opposition or even as mutually exclusive? If the only kind of value\nthat is of genuine artistic importance is cognitive value, it will be\ndifficult to avoid the definitional and ontological concerns mentioned\nabove. Also, it will call for a deeply revisionary conception of art,\none fundamentally hostile to the very notions we are probably most\nused to associating with art, namely beauty and aesthetic\npleasure.", "\nCentral to the philosophy of conceptual art is thus the provocative\nspirit of the project under investigation – conceptual art\nthrows down the gauntlet by challenging us to reconsider every aspect\nof artistic experience, and it may well be up to philosophy to pick it\nup and address some of the questions conceptual art makes its business\nto raise. Conceptual art actively aims to be thought-provoking,\nstimulating and inspiring, and if only for that reason, philosophers\ninterested in art should not pass it by unaffected." ], "section_title": "4. Further Questions", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Alberro, Alexander & Blake, Stimson (eds.), 1999.\nConceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, Cambridge, MA: MIT\nPress.", "Alberro, Alexander& Buchmann, Sabeth (eds.), 2006. Art\nafter Conceptual Art, Cambridge, MA & Vienna: MIT\nPress/General Foundation.", "Beardsley, Monroe, 1970. The Possibility of Criticism,\nDetroit: Wayne State University Press.", "Bell, Clive, 1914. Art, London.", "Binkley, Timothy, 1977. ‘Piece: Contra Aesthetics’,\nJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 35:\n265–277.", "Budd, Malcolm, 1995. Values of Art: Painting, Poetry, and\nMusic, London: Penguin.", "Caldarola, Elisa, 2021. ‘On Tags and Conceptual Street\nArt’, Philosophical Inquiries, IX(2):\n93–114.", "–––, 2021. ‘Exemplification,\nKnowledge, and Education of the Emotions through Conceptual\nArt’, Discipline Filosofiche, XXXI(1):\n179–195.", "Carroll, Noel, 1992. ‘Art, Intention, and\nConversation’, Intention and Interpretation, G.\nIseminger (ed.), Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp.\n97–131.", "Corris, Michael (ed.), 2004. Conceptual Art: Theory, Myth, and\nPractice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Cray, Wesley, 2014. ‘Conceptual Art, Ideas and\nOntology’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 72:\n265–277.", "Currie, Gregory, 1988. An Ontology of Art, New York: St\nMartin’s Press.", "Dal Sasso, David & Schellekens, Elisabeth,\n2022. Aesthetics, Philosophy and Conceptual Art. London:\nBloomsbury. ", "Danto, Arthur C., 1964. ‘The Artworld’, Journal of\nPhilosophy, 61: 571–584.", "–––, 1981. The Transfiguration of the\nCommonplace, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.", "Davies, David, 2004. Art as Performance, Oxford:\nBlackwells.", "Davies, Stephen, 2001. Musical Works and Performances: A\nPhilosophical Exploration, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Dickie, George, 1973. ‘The Institutional Conception of\nArt’, in Tilghman, Benjamin (ed.). Language and\nAesthetics, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, pp.\n21–30.", "–––, 1974, Art and the Aesthetic: An\nInstitutional Analysis, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University\nPress.", "Fry, R., 1920. Vision and Design, London: Chatto &\nWindus.", "Godfrey, Tony, 1998. Conceptual Art, London: Phaidon\nPress.", "Goldie, Peter & Schellekens, Elisabeth (eds.), 2007.\nPhilosophy and Conceptual Art, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "–––, 2009. Who’s Afraid of Conceptual\nArt?, London: Routledge.", "Goldman, Alan, 1990. ‘Interpreting Art and\nLiterature’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,\n48: 205–14.", "Gover, Karen, 2012. ‘What is Humpty Dumptyism in\nContemporary Art? A Reply to Maes’, British Journal of\nAesthetics, 52: 169–181.", "Hanson, Louise. 2015. “Conceptual Art and the Acquaintance\nPrinciple.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art\nCriticism, 73(3): 247–258.", "Harrison, Charles, 1991. Essays on Art and Language,\nCambridge, MA: MIT Press.", "Ingarden, Roman, 1973. The Literary Work of Art, G.G.\nGrabowicz (trans.), Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University\nPress.", "Irvin, Sherri & Dodd, Julian, 2017. ‘In Advance of the\nBroken Theory: Philosophy and Contemporary Art’, Journal of\nAesthetics and Art Criticism, 75(4): 375–386.", "Kieran, Matthew, 1996. ‘In Defence of Critical\nPluralism’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 36:\n239–251.", "Kosuth, Joseph, 1969. Art After Philosophy and After:\nCollected Writings, 1966–1990, Cambridge, MA: MIT\nPress.", "Lewitt, Sol, 1967. ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’,\nArtforum, 5(10): 79–83.", "–––, 1969. ‘Sentences on Conceptual\nArt’, Art-Language: The Journal of Conceptual Art, 1\n(May): 11–13. Reprinted in Osborne, 2002.", "Levinson, Jerrold, 1979. ‘Defining Art Historically’,\nBritish Journal of Aesthetics, 19: 232–250.", "–––, 1992. ‘Intention and Interpretation:\nA Last Look’, Intention and Interpretation, G.\nIseminger (ed.), Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp.\n221–256.", "Lippard, Lucy, 1973. Six Years: The Dematerialization of the\nArt Object 1966–1972, New York: Praeger.", "Maes, Hans, 2010. ‘Intention, Interpretation, and\nContemporary Visual Art’, British Journal of\nAesthetics, 50: 121–138.", "Margolis, Joseph, 1991. The Truth About Relativism,\nOxford: Blackwell.", "Meyer, Ursula, 1972. Conceptual Art, New York: Dutton\nPress.", "Morgan, Robert C., 1996. Art into Ideas: Essays on Conceptual\nArt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Newman, M. & Bird, J. (eds.), 1999. Rewriting Conceptual\nArt, London: Reaktion Books.", "Osborne, Peter (ed.), 2002. Conceptual Art: Themes and\nMovements, London & New York: Phaidon Press.", "Pakes, Anna, 2019. ‘Can There Be Conceptual\nDance?’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 44:\n195–212.", "Piper, Adrian, 1993. ‘The Logic of Modernism’,\nFlash Art, 26: 56–58.", "Sauchelli, Andrea, 2016. ‘The Acquaintance Principle,\nAesthetic Judgments and Conceptual Art’, Journal of\nAesthetic Education, 50: 1–15.", "Schellekens, Elisabeth, 2005. ‘“Seeing is\nBelieving” and “Believing is Seeing”‘,\nActa Analytica, 20: 10–23.", "–––, 2007. ‘The Aesthetic Value of\nIdeas’, Philosophy and Conceptual Art, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press, pp. 71–91.", "Shelley, James, 2003. ‘The Problem of Non-Perceptual\nArt’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 43:\n363–78.", "Sibley, Frank, 1965. ‘Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic’,\nPhilosophical Review, 74: 135–59", "Young, James, 2001. Art and Knowledge, London:\nRoutledge.", "Walton, Kendall, 1970. ‘Categories of Art’,\nPhilosophical Review, 79: 334–67.", "Weitz, Morris, 1956. ‘The Role of Theory in\nAesthetics’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,\n15: 27–35.", "Wimsatt, W. K. & Beardsley M. C., 1946. ‘The Intentional\nFallacy’, Sewanee Review, LIV: 468–488.", "Wollheim, Richard, 1980. Art and Its Objects, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press.", "Wood, Paul, 2002. Conceptual Art, London: Tate\nPublishing. Series: Movements in Modern Art." ]	[ { "href": "../aesthetic-concept/", "text": "aesthetic, concept of the" }, { "href": "../aesthetic-experience/", "text": "aesthetic experience" }, { "href": "../aesthetic-judgment/", "text": "aesthetics: aesthetic judgment" }, { "href": "../art-definition/", "text": "art, definition of" }, { "href": "../beardsley-aesthetics/", "text": "Beardsley, Monroe C.: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../kant-aesthetics/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel: aesthetics and teleology" }, { "href": "../wittgenstein-aesthetics/", "text": "Wittgenstein, Ludwig: aesthetics" } ]
art-definition	The Definition of Art	First published Tue Oct 23, 2007; substantive revision Tue Aug 14, 2018	[ "\nThe definition of art is controversial in contemporary philosophy.\nWhether art can be defined has also been a matter of controversy. The\nphilosophical usefulness of a definition of art has also been\ndebated.", " Contemporary definitions can be classified with respect to the\ndimensions of art they emphasize. One distinctively modern,\nconventionalist, sort of definition focuses on art’s\ninstitutional features, emphasizing the way art changes over time,\nmodern works that appear to break radically with all traditional art,\nthe relational properties of artworks that depend on works’\nrelations to art history, art genres, etc. – more broadly, on\nthe undeniable heterogeneity of the class of artworks. The more\ntraditional, less conventionalist sort of definition defended in\ncontemporary philosophy makes use of a broader, more traditional\nconcept of aesthetic properties that includes more than art-relational\nones, and puts more emphasis on art’s pan-cultural and\ntrans-historical characteristics – in sum, on commonalities\nacross the class of artworks. Hybrid definitions aim to do justice to\nboth the traditional aesthetic dimension as well as to the\ninstitutional and art-historical dimensions of art, while privileging\nneither." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Constraints on Definitions of Art", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Definitions from the History of Philosophy", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Some examples" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Skepticism about Definitions", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Skepticisms inspired by views of concepts, history, Marxism, feminism", "3.2 Some descendants of skepticism" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Contemporary Definitions", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Conventionalist Definitions: Institutional and Historical", "4.2 Institutional Definitions", "4.3 Historical Definitions", "4.4 Functional (mainly aesthetic) definitions", "4.5 Hybrid (Disjunctive) Definitions" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ " Any definition of art has to square with the following\nuncontroversial facts: (i) entities (artifacts or performances)\nintentionally endowed by their makers with a significant degree of\naesthetic interest, often greatly surpassing that of most everyday\nobjects, first appeared hundreds of thousands of years ago and exist\nin virtually every known human culture (Davies 2012); (ii) such\nentities are partially comprehensible to cultural outsiders –\nthey are neither opaque nor completely transparent; (iii) such\nentities sometimes have non-aesthetic – ceremonial or religious or\npropagandistic – functions, and sometimes do not; (iv) such\nentities might conceivably be produced by non-human species,\nterrestrial or otherwise; and it seems at least in principle possible\nthat they be extraspecifically recognizable as such; (v)\ntraditionally, artworks are intentionally endowed by their makers with\nproperties, often sensory, having a significant degree of aesthetic\ninterest, usually surpassing that of most everyday objects; (vi) art’s\nnormative dimension – the high value placed on making and\nconsuming art – appears to be essential to it, and artworks can\nhave considerable moral and political as well as aesthetic power;\n(vii) the arts are always changing, just as the rest of culture is: as\nartists experiment creatively, new genres, art-forms, and styles\ndevelop; standards of taste and sensibilities evolve; understandings\nof aesthetic properties, aesthetic experience, and the nature of art\nevolve; (viii) there are institutions in some but not all cultures\nwhich involve a focus on artifacts and performances that have a high\ndegree of aesthetic interest but lack any practical, ceremonial, or\nreligious use; (ix) entities seemingly lacking aesthetic interest, and\nentities having a high degree of aesthetic interest, are not\ninfrequently grouped together as artworks by such institutions; (x)\nlots of things besides artworks – for example, natural entities\n(sunsets, landscapes, flowers, shadows), human beings, and abstract\nentities (theories, proofs, mathematical entities) – have\ninteresting aesthetic properties. ", " Of these facts, those having to do with art’s contingent\ncultural and historical features are emphasized by some definitions of\nart. Other definitions of art give priority to explaining those facts\nthat reflect art’s universality and continuity with other\naesthetic phenomena. Still other definitions attempt to explain both\nart’s contingent characteristics and its more abiding ones while\ngiving priority to neither. ", "\n\nTwo general constraints on definitions are particularly relevant to\ndefinitions of art. First, given that accepting that something is\ninexplicable is generally a philosophical last resort, and granting\nthe importance of extensional adequacy, list-like or enumerative\ndefinitions are if possible to be avoided. Enumerative definitions,\nlacking principles that explain why what is on the list is on the\nlist, don’t, notoriously, apply to definienda that\nevolve, and provide no clue to the next or general case\n(Tarski’s definition of truth, for example, is standardly\ncriticized as unenlightening because it rests on a list-like\ndefinition of primitive denotation; see Field 1972; Devitt 2001;\nDavidson 2005). Corollary: when everything else is equal (and it is\ncontroversial whether and when that condition is satisfied in the case\nof definitions of art), non-disjunctive definitions are preferable to\ndisjunctive ones. Second, given that most classes outside of\nmathematics are vague, and that the existence of borderline cases is\ncharacteristic of vague classes, definitions that take the class of\nartworks to have borderline cases are preferable to definitions that\ndon’t (Davies 1991 and 2006; Stecker 2005).", "\n\nWhether any definition of art does account for these facts and satisfy\nthese constraints, or could account for these facts and\nsatisfy these constraints, are key questions for aesthetics and the\nphilosophy of art." ], "section_title": "1. Constraints on Definitions of Art", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nClassical definitions, at least as they are portrayed in\ncontemporary discussions of the definition of art, take artworks to be\ncharacterized by a single type of property. The standard candidates are\nrepresentational properties, expressive properties, and formal\nproperties. So there are representational or mimetic definitions,\nexpressive definitions, and formalist definitions, which hold that\nartworks are characterized by their possession of, respectively,\nrepresentational, expressive, and formal properties. It is not\ndifficult to find fault with these simple definitions. For example,\npossessing representational, expressive, and formal properties cannot\nbe sufficient conditions, since, obviously, instructional manuals are\nrepresentations, but not typically artworks, human faces and gestures\nhave expressive properties without being works of art, and both natural\nobjects and artifacts produced solely for homely utilitarian purposes\nhave formal properties but are not artworks.", " The ease of these dismissals, though, serves as a reminder of the\nfact that classical definitions of art are significantly less\nphilosophically self-contained or freestanding than are most\ncontemporary definitions of art. Each classical definition stands in\nclose and complicated relationships to its system’s other\ncomplexly interwoven parts – epistemology, ontology, value theory,\nphilosophy of mind, etc. Relatedly, great philosophers\ncharacteristically analyze the key theoretical components of their\ndefinitions of art in distinctive and subtle ways. For these reasons,\nunderstanding such definitions in isolation from the systems or\ncorpuses of which they are parts is difficult, and brief summaries are\ninvariably somewhat misleading. Nevertheless, some representative\nexamples of historically influential definitions of art offered by\nmajor figures in the history of philosophy should be mentioned." ], "section_title": "2. Definitions From the History of Philosophy", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nPlato holds in the Republic and elsewhere that the arts are\nrepresentational, or mimetic (sometimes translated\n“imitative”). Artworks are ontologically dependent on,\nimitations of, and therefore inferior to, ordinary physical\nobjects. Physical objects in turn are ontologically dependent on, and\nimitations of, and hence inferior to, what is most real, the\nnon-physical unchanging Forms. Grasped perceptually, artworks present\nonly an appearance of an appearance of the Forms, which are grasped by\nreason alone. Consequently, artistic experience cannot yield\nknowledge. Nor do the makers of artworks work from knowledge. Because\nartworks engage an unstable, lower part of the soul, art should be\nsubservient to moral realities, which, along with truth, are more\nmetaphysically fundamental and, properly understood, more humanly\nimportant than, beauty. The arts are not, for Plato, the primary\nsphere in which beauty operates. The Platonic conception of beauty is\nextremely wide and metaphysical: there is a Form of Beauty, which can\nonly be known non-perceptually, but it is more closely related to the\nerotic than to the arts. (See Janaway 1998, the entry on\n Plato’s aesthetics, and the entry on\n Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry.)", " Kant has a definition of art, and of fine art; the latter, which\nKant calls the art of genius, is “a kind of representation that\nis purposive in itself and, though without an end, nevertheless\npromotes the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable\ncommunication” (Kant, Critique of the Power of\nJudgment, Guyer translation, section 44, 46).) When fully\nunpacked, the definition has representational, formalist and\nexpressivist elements, and focuses as much on the creative activity of\nthe artistic genius (who, according to Kant, possesses an “innate\nmental aptitude through which nature gives the rule to art”) as on the\nartworks produced by that activity. Kant’s aesthetic theory is, for\narchitectonic reasons, not focused on art. Art for Kant falls under\nthe broader topic of aesthetic judgment, which covers judgments of the\nbeautiful, judgments of the sublime, and teleological judgments of\nnatural organisms and of nature itself. So Kant’s definition of art is\na relatively small part of his theory of aesthetic judgment. And\nKant’s theory of aesthetic judgment is itself situated in a hugely\nambitious theoretical structure that, famously, aims, to account for,\nand work out the interconnections between, scientific knowledge,\nmorality, and religious faith. (See the entry on\n Kant’s Aesthetics and Teleology \nand the general entry on \n Immanuel Kant.)", "\n\nHegel’s account of art incorporates his view of beauty; he\ndefines beauty as the sensuous/perceptual appearance or expression of\nabsolute truth. The best artworks convey, by sensory/perceptual means,\nthe deepest metaphysical truth. The deepest metaphysical truth,\naccording to Hegel, is that the universe is the concrete realization\nof what is conceptual or rational. That is, what is conceptual or\nrational is real, and is the imminent force that animates and propels\nthe self-consciously developing universe. The universe is the concrete\nrealization of what is conceptual or rational, and the rational or\nconceptual is superior to the sensory. So, as the mind and its\nproducts alone are capable of truth, artistic beauty is metaphysically\nsuperior to natural beauty (Hegel, Lectures, [1886, 4]). A\ncentral and defining feature of beautiful works of art is that,\nthrough the medium of sensation, each one presents the most\nfundamental values of its\ncivilization.[1]\nArt, therefore, as a cultural expression, operates in the same sphere\nas religion and philosophy, and expresses the same content as\nthey. But art “reveals to consciousness the deepest interests of\nhumanity” in a different manner than do religion and philosophy,\nbecause art alone, of the three, works by sensuous means. So, given\nthe superiority of the conceptual to the non-conceptual, and the fact\nthat art’s medium for expressing/presenting culture’s\ndeepest values is the sensual or perceptual, art’s medium is\nlimited and inferior in comparison with the medium that religion uses\nto express the same content, viz., mental imagery. Art and religion in\nturn are, in this respect, inferior to philosophy, which employs a\nconceptual medium to present its content. Art initially predominates,\nin each civilization, as the supreme mode of cultural expression,\nfollowed, successively, by religion and philosophy. Similarly, because\nthe broadly “logical” relations between art, religion and\nphilosophy determine the actual structure of art, religion, and\nphilosophy, and because cultural ideas about what is intrinsically\nvaluable develop from sensuous to non-sensuous conceptions, history is\ndivided into periods that reflect the teleological development from\nthe sensuous to the conceptual. Art in general, too, develops in\naccord with the historical growth of non-sensuous or conceptual\nconceptions from sensuous conceptions, and each individual art-form\ndevelops historically in the same way (Hegel, Lectures; Wicks\n1993, see also the entries on\n Hegel and on \n Hegel’s Aesthetics). ", "\nFor treatments of other influential definitions\nof art, inseparable from the complex philosophical systems or corpuses in which\nthey occur, see, for example, the entries on\n 18th Century German Aesthetics,\n Arthur Schopenhauer,\n Friedrich Nietzsche,\n and Dewey’s Aesthetics." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Some examples" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nSkeptical doubts about the possibility and value of a definition of\nart have figured importantly in the discussion in aesthetics since the\n1950s, and though their influence has subsided somewhat, uneasiness\nabout the definitional project persists. (See section 4, below, and\nalso Kivy 1997, Brand 2000, and Walton 2007)." ], "section_title": "3. Skepticism about Definitions of Art ", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nA common family of arguments, inspired by Wittgenstein’s\nfamous remarks about games (Wittgenstein 1953), has it that the\nphenomena of art are, by their nature, too diverse to admit of the\nunification that a satisfactory definition strives for, or that a\ndefinition of art, were there to be such a thing, would exert a\nstifling influence on artistic creativity. One expression of this\nimpulse is Weitz’s Open Concept Argument: any concept is\nopen if a case can be imagined which would call for some sort of\ndecision on our part to extend the use of the concept to cover it, or\nto close the concept and invent a new one to deal with the new case;\nall open concepts are indefinable; and there are cases calling for a\ndecision about whether to extend or close the concept of art. Hence art\nis indefinable (Weitz 1956). Against this it is claimed that\nchange does not, in general, rule out the preservation of identity over\ntime, that decisions about concept-expansion may be principled rather\nthan capricious, and that nothing bars a definition of art from\nincorporating a novelty requirement.", "\n\nA second sort of argument, less common today than in the\nheyday of a certain form of extreme Wittgensteinianism, urges that the\nconcepts that make up the stuff of most definitions of art\n(expressiveness, form) are embedded in general philosophical theories\nwhich incorporate traditional metaphysics and epistemology. But since\ntraditional metaphysics and epistemology are prime instances of\nlanguage gone on conceptually confused holiday, definitions of art\nshare in the conceptual confusions of traditional\nphilosophy (Tilghman 1984).", "\n\nA third sort of argument, more historically inflected than the first,\ntakes off from an influential study by the historian of philosophy\nPaul Kristeller, in which he argued that the modern system of the five\nmajor arts [painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, and music]\nwhich underlies all modern aesthetics … is of comparatively\nrecent origin and did not assume definite shape before the eighteenth\ncentury, although it had many ingredients which go back to classical,\nmediaeval, and Renaissance thought. (Kristeller, 1951) Since that list of five arts is\nsomewhat arbitrary, and since even those five do not share a single\ncommon nature, but rather are united, at best, only by several\noverlapping features, and since the number of art forms has increased\nsince the eighteenth century, Kristeller’s work may be taken to\nsuggest that our concept of art differs from that of the eighteenth\ncentury. As a matter of historical fact, there simply is no stable\ndefiniendum for a definition of art to capture.", "\n\nA fourth sort of argument suggests that a definition of art stating\nindividually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a thing to\nbe an artwork, is likely to be discoverable only if cognitive science\nmakes it plausible to think that humans categorize things in terms of\nnecessary and sufficient conditions. But, the argument continues,\ncognitive science actually supports the view that the structure of\nconcepts mirrors the way humans categorize things – which is with\nrespect to their similarity to prototypes (or exemplars), and not in\nterms of necessary and sufficient conditions. So the quest for a\ndefinition of art that states individually necessary and jointly\nsufficient conditions is misguided and not likely to succeed (Dean\n2003). Against this it has been urged that psychological theories\nof concepts like the prototype theory and its relatives can provide at\nbest an account of how people in fact classify things, but not\nan account of correct classifications of extra-psychological\nphenomena, and that, even if relevant, prototype theory and other\npsychological theories of concepts are at present too controversial to\ndraw substantive philosophical morals from (Rey 1983; Adajian 2005).", "\n\nA fifth argument against defining art, with a normative tinge that is\npsychologistic rather than sociopolitical, takes the fact that there\nis no philosophical consensus about the definition of art as reason to\nhold that no unitary concept of art exists. Concepts of art, like all\nconcepts, after all, should be used for the purpose(s) they best\nserve. But not all concepts of art serve all purposes equally\nwell. So not all art concepts should be used for the same purposes.\nArt should be defined only if there is a unitary concept of art that\nserves all of art’s various purposes – historical,\nconventional, aesthetic, appreciative, communicative, and so on. So,\nsince there is no purpose-independent use of the concept of art, art\nshould not be defined (Mag Uidhir and Magnus 2011; cf. Meskin 2008).\nIn response, it is noted that some account of what makes various\nconcepts of art concepts of art is still required; this\nleaves open the possibility of some degree of unity beneath the\napparent multiplicity. The fact (if it is one) that different concepts\nof art are used for different purposes does not itself imply that they\nare not connected in ordered, to-some-degree systematic ways. The\nrelation between (say) the historical concept of art and the\nappreciative concept of art is not an accidental, unsystematic\nrelation, like that between river banks and savings banks, but is\nsomething like the relation between Socrates’ healthiness and\nthe healthiness of Socrates’ diet. That is, it is not evident\nthat there exist a mere arbitrary heap or disjunction of art concepts,\nconstituting an unsystematic patchwork. Perhaps there is a single\nconcept of art with different facets that interlock in an ordered way,\nor else a multiplicity of concepts that constitute a unity because one\nis at the core, and the others depend asymmetrically on it. (The last\nis an instance of core-dependent homonymy; see the entry on\n Aristotle, section on Essentialism and\nHomonymy.) Multiplicity alone doesn’t entail pluralism.", "\nA sixth, broadly Marxian sort of objection rejects the project of\ndefining art as an unwitting (and confused) expression of a harmful\nideology. On this view, the search for a definition of art\npresupposes, wrongly, that the concept of the aesthetic is a\ncreditable one. But since the concept of the aesthetic necessarily\ninvolves the equally bankrupt concept of disinterestedness, its use\nadvances the illusion that what is most real about things can and\nshould be grasped or contemplated without attending to the social and\neconomic conditions of their production. Definitions of art,\nconsequently, spuriously confer ontological dignity and respectability\non social phenomena that probably in fact call more properly for\nrigorous social criticism and change. Their real function is\nideological, not philosophical (Eagleton 1990).", "\n\nSeventh, the members of a complex of skeptically-flavored arguments,\nfrom feminist philosophy of art, begin with premises to the effect\nthat art and art-related concepts and practices have been\nsystematically skewed by sex or gender. Such premises are supported\nby a variety of considerations. (a) The artworks the Western artistic\ncanon recognizes as great are dominated by male-centered perspectives\nand stereotypes, and almost all the artists the canon recognizes as\ngreat are men – unsurprisingly, given economic, social, and\ninstitutional impediments that prevented women from making art at all.\nMoreover, the concept of genius developed historically in such a way\nas to exclude women artists (Battersby, 1989, Korsmeyer 2004). (b) The\nfine arts’ focus on purely aesthetic, non-utilitarian value resulted\nin the marginalization as mere “crafts” of items of considerable\naesthetic interest made and used by women for domestic practical\npurposes. Moreover, because all aesthetic judgments are situated and\nparticular, there can be no such thing as disinterested taste. If\nthere is no such thing as disinterested taste, then it is hard to see\nhow there could be universal standards of aesthetic excellence. The\nnon-existence of universal standards of aesthetic excellence\nundermines the idea of an artistic canon (and with it the project of\ndefining art). Art as historically constituted, and art-related\npractices and concepts, then, reflect views and practices that\npresuppose and perpetuate the subordination of women. The data that\ndefinitions of art are supposed to explain are biased, corrupt and\nincomplete. As a consequence, present definitions of art,\nincorporating or presupposing as they do a framework that incorporates\na history of systematically biased, hierarchical, fragmentary, and\nmistaken understandings of art and art-related phenomena and concepts,\nmay be so androcentric as to be untenable. Some theorists have\nsuggested that different genders have systematically unique artistic\nstyles, methods, or modes of appreciating and valuing art. If so,\nthen a separate canon and gynocentric definitions of art are indicated\n(Battersby 1989, Frueh 1991). In any case, in the face of these\nfacts, the project of defining art in anything like the traditional\nway is to be regarded with suspicion (Brand, 2000).", "\n\nAn eighth argument sort of skeptical argument concludes that, insofar\nas almost all contemporary definitions foreground the nature of\nartworks, rather than the individual arts to which\n(most? all?) artworks belong, they are philosophically unproductive\n(Lopes, \n2014).[2]\n The grounds for this conclusion concern disagreements among standard\ndefinitions as to the artistic status of entities whose status is for\ntheoretical reasons unclear – e.g., things like ordinary bottleracks\n(Duchamp’s Bottlerack) and silence (John Cage’s 4′33″).\nIf these hard cases are artworks, what makes them so, given their\napparent lack of any of the traditional properties of artworks? Are,\nthey, at best, marginal cases? On the other hand, if they are not\nartworks, then why have generations of experts – art historians,\ncritics, and collectors – classified them as such? And to whom else\nshould one look to determine the true nature of art? (There are, it is\nclaimed, few or no empirical studies of art full stop, though\nempirical studies of the individual arts abound.) Such disputes\ninevitably end in stalemate. Stalemate results because (a) standard\nartwork-focused definitions of art endorse different criteria of\ntheory choice, and (b) on the basis of their preferred criteria,\nappeal to incompatible intuitions about the status of such\ntheoretically-vexed cases. In consequence, disagreements between\nstandard definitions of art that foreground artworks are\nunresolvable. To avoid this stalemate, an alternative definitional\nstrategy that foregrounds the arts rather than individual artworks, is\nindicated. (See section 4.5.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Skepticisms inspired by views of concepts, history, Marxism, feminism" }, { "content": [ "\n\nPhilosophers influenced by the moderate Wittgensteinian strictures\ndiscussed above have offered family resemblance accounts of art, which,\nas they purport to be non-definitions, may be usefully considered at\nthis point. Two species of family resemblance views will be considered:\nthe resemblance-to-a-paradigm version, and the cluster\nversion.", "\n\nOn the resemblance-to-a-paradigm version, something is, or is\nidentifiable as, an artwork if it resembles, in the right way, certain\nparadigm artworks, which possess most although not necessarily all of\nart’s typical features. (The “is identifiable”\nqualification is intended to make the family resemblance view something\nmore epistemological than a definition, although it is unclear that\nthis really avoids a commitment to constitutive claims about\nart’s nature.) Against this view: since things do not\nresemble each other simpliciter, but only in at least one\nrespect or other, the account is either far too inclusive, since\neverything resembles everything else in some respect or other, or, if\nthe variety of resemblance is specified, tantamount to a definition,\nsince resemblance in that respect will be either a necessary or\nsufficient condition for being an artwork. The family resemblance\nview raises questions, moreover, about the membership and unity of the\nclass of paradigm artworks. If the account lacks an explanation of why\nsome items and not others go on the list of paradigm works, it seems\nexplanatorily deficient. But if it includes a principle that governs\nmembership on the list, or if expertise is required to constitute the\nlist, then the principle, or whatever properties the experts’\njudgments track, seem to be doing the philosophical work.", "\n\nThe cluster version of the family resemblance view has been defended\nby a number of philosophers (Bond 1975, Dissanayake 1990, Dutton\n2006, Gaut 2000). The view typically provides a list of properties, no one of\nwhich is a necessary condition for being a work of art, but which are\njointly sufficient for being a work of art, and which is such that at\nleast one proper subset thereof is sufficient for being a work of\nart. Lists offered vary, but overlap considerably. Here is one, due to Gaut: (1)\npossessing positive aesthetic properties; (2) being expressive of\nemotion; (3) being intellectually challenging; (4) being formally\ncomplex and coherent; (5) having the capacity to convey complex\nmeanings; (6) exhibiting an individual point of view; (7) being\noriginal; (8) being an artifact or performance which is the product of\na high degree of skill; (9) belonging to an established artistic form;\n(10) being the product of an intention to make a work of art (Gaut\n2000). The cluster account has been criticized on several grounds.\nFirst, given its logical structure, it is in fact equivalent to a\nlong, complicated, but finite, disjunction, which makes it difficult\nto see why it isn’t a definition (Davies 2006). Second, if the list\nof properties is incomplete, as some cluster theorists hold, then some\njustification or principle would be needed for extending it. Third,\nthe inclusion of the ninth property on the list, belonging to an\nestablished art form, seems to regenerate (or duck), rather than answer, the\ndefinitional question. Finally, it is worth noting that, although\ncluster theorists stress what they take to be the motley heterogeneity of the\nclass of artworks, they tend with surprising regularity to tacitly\ngive the aesthetic a special, perhaps unifying, status among the\nproperties they put forward as merely disjunctive. One cluster\ntheorist, for example, gives a list very similar to the one discussed\nabove (it includes representational properties, expressiveness,\ncreativity, exhibiting a high degree of skill, belonging to an\nestablished artform), but omits aesthetic properties on the grounds\nthat it is the combination of the other items on the list which,\ncombined in the experience of the work of art, are precisely the\naesthetic qualities of the work (Dutton 2006). Gaut, whose list is\ncited above, includes aesthetic properties as a separate item on the\nlist, but construes them very narrowly; the difference between these\nways of formulating the cluster view appears to be mainly nominal. And\nan earlier cluster theorist defines artworks as all and only those\nthings that belong to any instantiation of an artform, offers a list\nof seven properties all of which together are intended to capture the\ncore of what it is to be an artform, though none is either necessary\nor sufficient, and then claims that having aesthetic value (of the\nsame sort as mountains, sunsets, mathematical theorems) is “what\nart is for” (Bond 1975). " ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Some descendants of skepticism" } ] }, { "main_content": [ " Definitions of art attempt to make sense of two different sorts of\nfacts: art has important historically contingent cultural features, as\nwell as trans-historical, pan-cultural characteristics that point in\nthe direction of a relatively stable aesthetic core. (Theorists who\nregard art as an invention of eighteenth-century Europe will, of\ncourse, regard this way of putting the matter as tendentious, on the\ngrounds that entities produced outside that culturally distinctive\ninstitution do not fall under the extension of “art” and\nhence are irrelevant to the art-defining project (Shiner\n2001). Whether the concept of art is precise enough to justify this\nmuch confidence about what falls under its extension claim is\nunclear.) Conventionalist definitions take art’s contingent\ncultural features to be explanatorily fundamental, and aim to capture\nthe phenomena – revolutionary modern art, the traditional close\nconnection of art with the aesthetic, the possibility of autonomous\nart traditions, etc. – in social/historical\nterms. Classically-flavored or traditional definitions (also sometimes\ncalled “functionalist”) definitions reverse this\nexplanatory order. Such classically-flavored definitions take\ntraditional concepts like the aesthetic (or allied concepts like the\nformal, or the expressive) as basic, and aim to account for the\nphenomena by making those concepts harder – for example, by\nendorsing a concept of the aesthetic rich enough to include\nnon-perceptual properties, or by attempting an integration of those\nconcepts (e.g., Eldridge, section 4.4 below) ." ], "section_title": "4. Contemporary Definitions", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nConventionalist definitions deny that art has essential connection to\naesthetic properties, or to formal properties, or to expressive\nproperties, or to any type of property taken by traditional\ndefinitions to be essential to art. Conventionalist definitions have\nbeen strongly influenced by the emergence, in the twentieth century,\nof artworks that seem to differ radically from all previous\nartworks. Avant-garde works like Marcel Duchamp’s\n“ready-mades” – ordinary unaltered objects like\nsnow-shovels (In Advance of the Broken Arm) and \nbottle-racks – conceptual works like Robert Barry’s All the things I know\nbut of which I am not at the moment thinking – 1:36 PM; June 15,\n1969, and John Cage’s 4′33″, have seemed to\nmany philosophers to lack or even, somehow, repudiate, the traditional\nproperties of art: intended aesthetic interest, artifactuality, even\nperceivability. Conventionalist definitions have also been strongly\ninfluenced by the work of a number of historically-minded\nphilosophers, who have documented the rise and development of modern\nideas of the fine arts, the individual arts, the work of art, and the\naesthetic (Kristeller, Shiner, Carroll, Goehr, Kivy).", "\n\nConventionalist definitions come in two varieties, institutional and\nhistorical. Institutionalist conventionalism, or institutionalism, a\nsynchronic view, typically hold that to be a work of art is to be an\nartifact of a kind created, by an artist, to be presented to an\nartworld public (Dickie 1984). Historical conventionalism, a\ndiachronic view, holds that artworks necessarily stand in an\nart-historical relation to some set of earlier artworks." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Conventionalist Definitions: Institutional and Historical" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe groundwork for institutional definitions was laid by Arthur Danto,\nbetter known to non-philosophers as the long-time influential art\ncritic for the Nation. Danto coined the term\n“artworld”, by which he meant “an atmosphere of art\ntheory.” Danto’s definition has been glossed as follows:\nsomething is a work of art if and only if (i) it has a subject (ii)\nabout which it projects some attitude or point of view (has a style)\n(iii) by means of rhetorical ellipsis (usually metaphorical) which\nellipsis engages audience participation in filling in what is missing,\nand (iv) where the work in question and the interpretations thereof\nrequire an art historical context (Danto, Carroll). Clause (iv) is\nwhat makes the definition institutionalist. The view has been\ncriticized for entailing that art criticism written in a highly\nrhetorical style is art, lacking but requiring an independent account\nof what makes a context art historical, and for not applying\nto music. ", "\n\nThe most prominent and influential institutionalism is that of George\nDickie. Dickie’s institutionalism has evolved over\ntime. According to an early version, a work of art is an artifact upon\nwhich some person(s) acting on behalf of the artworld has conferred\nthe status of candidate for appreciation (Dickie 1974). Dickie’s more\nrecent version consists of an interlocking set of five definitions:\n(1) An artist is a person who participates with understanding in the\nmaking of a work of art. (2) A work of art is an artifact of a kind\ncreated to be presented to an artworld public. (3) A public is a set\nof persons the members of which are prepared in some degree to\nunderstand an object which is presented to them. (4) The artworld is\nthe totality of all artworld systems. (5) An artworld system is a\nframework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an\nartworld public (Dickie 1984). Both versions have been widely\ncriticized. Philosophers have objected that art created outside any\ninstitution seems possible, although the definition rules it out, and\nthat the artworld, like any institution, seems capable of error. It\nhas also been urged that the definition’s obvious circularity is\nvicious, and that, given the inter-definition of the key concepts\n(artwork, artworld system, artist, artworld public) it lacks any\ninformative way of distinguishing art institutions systems\nfrom other, structurally similar, social institutions (D. Davies 2004,\npp. 248–249, notes that both the artworld and the\n“commerceworld” seem to fall under that definition). Early\non, Dickie claimed that anyone who sees herself as a member of the\nartworld is a member of the artworld: if this is true, then\nunless there are constraints on the kinds of things the artworld can\nput forward as artworks or candidate artworks, any entity can be an\nartwork (though not all are), which appears overly expansive. Finally,\nMatravers has helpfully distinguished strong and\nweak institutionalism. Strong institutionalism holds that\nthere is some reason that is always the reason the art institution has\nfor saying that something is a work of art. Weak institutionalism\nholds that, for every work of art, there is some reason or other that\nthe institution has for saying that it is a work of art (Matravers\n2000). Weak institutionalism, in particular, raises questions about\nart’s unity: if absolutely nothing unifies the reasons that the\nartworld gives for conferring art-hood on things, then the unity of\nthe class of artworks is vanishingly small. Conventionalist views,\nwith their emphasis on art’s heterogeneity, swallow this\nimplication. From the perspective of traditional definitions, doings\nso underplays art’s substantial if incomplete unity, while leaving it\na puzzle why art would be worth caring about. ", " Some recent versions of institutionalism depart from Dickie’s by\naccepting the burden, which Dickie rejected, of providing a\nsubstantive, non-circular account of what it is to be an art\ninstitution or an artworld. One, due to David Davies, does so by\nbuilding in Nelson Goodman’s account of aesthetic symbolic\nfunctions. Another, due to Abell, combines Searle’s account of social\ninstitutions with Gaut’s characterization of art-making properties,\nand builds an account of artistic value on that coupling.", "\nDavies’ neo-institutionalism holds that making an artwork\nrequires articulating an artistic statement, which requires specifying\nartistic properties, which in turn requires the manipulation of an\nartistic vehicle. Goodman’s “symptoms of the\naesthetic” are utilized to clarify the conditions under which a\npractice of making is a practice of artistic making: on\nGoodman’s view, a symbol functions aesthetically when it is\nsyntactically dense, semantically dense, relatively replete, and\ncharacterized by multiple and complex reference (D. Davies 2004;\nGoodman 1968; see the entry on\n Goodman’s aesthetics).\nManipulating an artistic vehicle is in turn possible only if the\nartist consciously operates with reference to shared understandings\nembodied in the practices of a community of receivers. So art’s\nnature is institutional in the broad sense (or, perhaps better,\nsocio-cultural). By way of criticism, Davies’\nneo-institutionalism may be questioned on the grounds that, since all\npictorial symbols are syntactically dense, semantically dense,\nrelatively replete, and often exemplify the properties they represent,\nit seems to entail that every colored picture, including those in any\ncatalog of industrial products, is an artwork (Abell 2012).", "\n\nAbell’s institutional definition adapts Searle’s view of social kinds:\nwhat it is for some social kind, F, to be F is for it to be\ncollectively believed to be F (Abell 2012; Searle 1995, 2010;\nand see the entry on\n social institutions).\nOn Abell’s view, more specifically, an institution’s type is\ndetermined by the valued function(s) that it was collectively believed\nat its inception to promote. The valued functions collective belief in\nwhich make an institution an art institution are those spelled out by\nGaut in his cluster account (see section 3.1, above). That is,\nsomething is an art institution if and only if it is an institution\nwhose existence is due to its being perceived to perform certain\nfunctions, which functions form a significant subset of the following:\npromoting positive aesthetic qualities; promoting the expression of\nemotion; facilitating the posing of intellectual challenges, and the\nrest of Gaut’s list. Plugging in Gaut’s list yields the final\ndefinition: something is an artwork if and only if it is the product\nof an art institution (as just defined) and it directly effects the effectiveness with which that institution performs the perceived functions to which\nits existence is due. One worry is whether Searle’s account of\ninstitutions is up to the task required of it. Some institutional\nsocial kinds have this trait: something can fail to be a token of that\nkind even if there is collective agreement that it counts as a token\nof that kind. Suppose someone gives a big cocktail party, to which\neveryone in Paris invited, and things get so out of hand that the\ncasualty rate is greater than the Battle of Austerlitz. Even if\neveryone thinks the event was a cocktail party, it is possible\n(contrary to Searle) that they are mistaken: it may have been a war or\nbattle. It’s not clear that art isn’t like this. If so, then the fact\nthat an institution is collectively believed to be an art institution\nneedn’t suffice to make it so (Khalidi 2013; see also the entry on\n social \ninstitutions).[3]\nA second worry: if its failure to specify which subsets of the ten\ncluster properties suffice to make something an artwork significantly\nflaws Gaut’s cluster account, then failure to specify which subsets of\nGaut’s ten properties suffice to make something an art institution\nsignificantly flaws Abellian institutionalism." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Institutional Definitions" }, { "content": [ "\n\nHistorical definitions hold that what characterizes artworks is\nstanding in some specified art-historical relation to some specified\nearlier artworks, and disavow any commitment to a trans-historical\nconcept of art, or the “artish.” Historical definitions\ncome in several varieties. All of them are, or resemble, inductive\ndefinitions: they claim that certain entities belong unconditionally\nto the class of artworks, while others do so because they stand in the\nappropriate relations thereto. According to the best known version,\nLevinson’s intentional-historical definition, an artwork is a thing\nthat has been seriously intended for regard in any way preexisting or\nprior artworks are or were correctly regarded (Levinson 1990). A\nsecond version, historical narrativism, comes in several varieties. On\none, a sufficient but not necessary condition for the identification\nof a candidate as a work of art is the construction of a true\nhistorical narrative according to which the candidate was created by\nan artist in an artistic context with a recognized and live artistic\nmotivation, and as a result of being so created, it resembles at least\none acknowledged artwork (Carroll 1993). On another, more ambitious\nand overtly nominalistic version of historical narrativism, something\nis an artwork if and only if (1) there are internal historical\nrelations between it and already established artworks; (2) these\nrelations are correctly identified in a narrative; and (3) that\nnarrative is accepted by the relevant experts. The experts do\nnot detect that certain entities are artworks; rather, the\nfact that the experts assert that certain properties are significant\nin particular cases is constitutive of art (Stock 2003).", "\n\nThe similarity of these views to institutionalism is obvious, and\nthe criticisms offered parallel those urged against institutionalism.\nFirst, historical definitions appear to require, but lack, any\ninformative characterization of art traditions (art functions, artistic\ncontexts, etc.) and hence any way of informatively distinguishing them\n(and likewise art functions, or artistic predecessors) from\nnon-art traditions (non-art functions, non-artistic\npredecessors). Correlatively, non-Western art, or alien, autonomous\nart of any kind appears to pose a problem for historical views: any\nautonomous art tradition or artworks – terrestrial,\nextra-terrestrial, or merely possible – causally isolated from\nour art tradition, is either ruled out by the definition, which seems\nto be a reductio, or included, which concedes the existence\nof a supra-historical concept of art. So, too, there could be entities\nthat for adventitious reasons are not correctly identified in\nhistorical narratives, although in actual fact they stand in relations\nto established artworks that make them correctly describable\nin narratives of the appropriate sort. Historical definitions entail\nthat such entities aren’t artworks, but it seems at least as \nplausible to say that they are artworks that are not identified as such. Second,\nhistorical definitions also require, but do not provide a\nsatisfactory, informative account of the basis case – the first\nartworks, or ur-artworks, in the case of the intentional-historical\ndefinitions, or the first or central art-forms, in the case of\nhistorical functionalism. Third, nominalistic historical definitions\nseem to face a version of the Euthyphro dilemma. For either\nsuch definitions include substantive characterizations of what it is\nto be an expert, or they don’t. If, on one hand, they include no\ncharacterization of what it is to be an expert, and hence no\nexplanation as to why the list of experts contains the people it does,\nthen they imply that what makes things artworks is inexplicable. On\nthe other hand, suppose such definitions provide a substantive account\nof what it is to be an expert, so that to be an expert is to possess\nsome ability lacked by non-experts (taste, say) in virtue of the\npossession of which they are able to discern historical connections\nbetween established artworks and candidate artworks. Then the\ndefinition’s claim to be interestingly historical is\nquestionable, because it makes art status a function of whatever\nability it is that permits experts to discern the art-making\nproperties. ", "\n\nDefenders of historical definitions have replies. First, as regards\nautonomous art traditions, it can be held that anything we would\nrecognize as an art tradition or an artistic\npractice would display aesthetic concerns, because aesthetic concerns\nhave been central from the start, and persisted centrally for\nthousands of years, in the Western art tradition. Hence it is an\nhistorical, not a conceptual truth that anything we recognize as an\nart practice will centrally involve the aesthetic; it is just that\naesthetic concerns that have always dominated our art tradition\n(Levinson 2002). The idea here is that if the reason that anything\nwe’d take to be a Φ-tradition would have Ψ-concerns is\nthat our Φ-tradition has focused on Ψ-concerns since its\ninception, then it is not essential to Φ-traditions that they have\nΨ-concerns, and Φ is a purely historical concept. But\nthis principle entails, implausibly, that every concept is purely\nhistorical. Suppose that we discovered a new civilization whose\ninhabitants could predict how the physical world works with great\nprecision, on the basis of a substantial body of empirically acquired\nknowledge that they had accumulated over centuries. The reason we\nwould credit them with having a scientific tradition might\nwell be that our own scientific tradition has since its inception\nfocused on explaining things. It does not seem to follow that science\nis a purely historical concept with no essential connection to\nexplanatory aims. (Other theorists hold that it is historically\nnecessary that art begins with the aesthetic, but deny that\nart’s nature is to be defined in terms of its historical\nunfolding (Davies 1997).) Second, as to the first artworks, or the\ncentral art-forms or functions, some theorists hold that an account of\nthem can only take the form of an enumeration. Stecker takes this\napproach: he says that the account of what makes something a central\nart form at a given time is, at its core, institutional, and that the\ncentral artforms can only be listed (Stecker 1997 and 2005). Whether\nrelocating the list at a different, albeit deeper, level in the\ndefinition renders the definition sufficiently informative is an open\nquestion. Third, as to the Euthyphro-style dilemma, it might\nbe held that the categorial distinction between artworks and\n“mere real things” (Danto 1981) explains the distinction\nbetween experts and non-experts. Experts are able, it is said, to\ncreate new categories of art. When created, new categories bring with\nthem new universes of discourse. New universes of discourse in turn\nmake reasons available that otherwise would not be available. Hence,\non this view, it is both the case that the experts’ say-so alone\nsuffices to make mere real things into artworks, and also true that\nexperts’ conferrals of art-status have reasons (McFee\n2011). " ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Historical Definitions" }, { "content": [ "\n\nTraditional definitions take some function(s) or intended function(s)\nto be definitive of artworks. Here only aesthetic definitions, which\nconnect art essentially with the aesthetic – aesthetic judgments,\nexperience, or properties – will be considered. Different\naesthetic definitions incorporate different views of aesthetic\nproperties and judgments. See the entry on \n aesthetic judgment.", "\n\nAs noted above, some philosophers lean heavily on a distinction\nbetween aesthetic properties and artistic properties, taking the\nformer to be perceptually striking qualities that can be directly\nperceived in works, without knowledge of their origin and purpose, and\nthe latter to be relational properties that works possess in virtue of\ntheir relations to art history, art genres, etc. It is also, of\ncourse, possible to hold a less restrictive view of aesthetic\nproperties, on which aesthetic properties need not be perceptual; on\nthis broader view, it is unnecessary to deny what it seems pointless\nto deny, that abstracta like mathematical entities and scientific laws\npossess aesthetic properties.)", "\n\nMonroe Beardsley’s definition holds that an artwork:\n“either an arrangement of conditions intended to be capable of\naffording an experience with marked aesthetic character or\n(incidentally) an arrangement belonging to a class or type of\narrangements that is typically intended to have this capacity”\n(Beardsley 1982, 299). (For more on Beardsley, see the entry on \n Beardsley’s aesthetics.) \nBeardsley’s conception of aesthetic experience is Deweyan:\naesthetic experiences are experiences that are complete, unified,\nintense experiences of the way things appear to us, and are, moreover,\nexperiences which are controlled by the things experienced (see the\nentry on\n Dewey’s aesthetics).\nZangwill’s aesthetic definition of art says that something is a\nwork of art if and only if someone had an insight that certain\naesthetic properties would be determined by certain nonaesthetic\nproperties, and for this reason the thing was intentionally endowed\nwith the aesthetic properties in virtue of the nonaesthetic properties\nas envisaged in the insight (Zangwill 1995a,b). Aesthetic properties\nfor Zangwill are those judgments that are the subject of\n“verdictive aesthetic judgments” (judgements of beauty and\nugliness) and “substantive aesthetic judgements” (e.g., of\ndaintiness, elegance, delicacy, etc.). The latter are ways of being\nbeautiful or ugly; aesthetic in virtue of a special close relation to\nverdictive judgments, which are subjectively universal. Other\naesthetic definitions build in different accounts of the\naesthetic. Eldridge’s aesthetic definition holds that the satisfying appropriateness to one another of a thing’s form and content is the aesthetic quality possession of which is necessary and sufficient for\na thing’s being art (Eldridge 1985). Or one might define aesthetic\nproperties as those having an evaluative component, whose perception\ninvolves the perception of certain formal base properties, such as\nshape and color (De Clercq 2002), and construct an aesthetic\ndefinition incorporating that view.", "\n\nViews which combine features of institutional and aesthetic\ndefinitions also exist. Iseminger, for example, builds a definition on\nan account of appreciation, on which to appreciate a thing’s\nbeing F is to find experiencing its being F to be\nvaluable in itself, and an account of aesthetic communication (which it\nis the function of the artworld to promote) (Iseminger 2004).", "\n\nAesthetic definitions have been criticized for being both too narrow\nand too broad. They are held to be too narrow because they are unable\nto cover influential modern works like Duchamp’s ready-mades and\nconceptual works like Robert Barry’s All the things I know but of\nwhich I am not at the moment thinking – 1:36 PM; June 15, 1969,\nwhich appear to lack aesthetic properties. (Duchamp famously asserted\nthat his urinal, Fountain, was selected for its lack of\naesthetic features.) Aesthetic definitions are held to be too broad\nbecause beautifully designed automobiles, neatly manicured lawns, and\nproducts of commercial design are often created with the intention of\nbeing objects of aesthetic appreciation, but are not artworks.\nMoreover, aesthetic views have been held to have trouble making sense\nof bad art (see Dickie 2001; Davies 2006, p. 37). Finally, more\nradical doubts about aesthetic definitions center on the\nintelligibility and usefulness of the aesthetic. Beardsley’s view, for\nexample, has been criticized by Dickie, who has also offered\ninfluential criticisms of the idea of an aesthetic attitude (Dickie\n1965, Cohen 1973, Kivy 1975).", "\n\nTo these criticisms several responses have been offered. First, the\nless restrictive conception of aesthetic properties mentioned above,\non which they may be based on non-perceptual formal properties, can be\ndeployed. On this view, conceptual works would have aesthetic\nfeatures, much the same way that mathematical entities are often\nclaimed to (Shelley 2003, Carroll 2004). Second, a distinction may be\ndrawn between time-sensitive properties, whose standard observation\nconditions include an essential reference to the temporal location of\nthe observer, and non-time-sensitive properties, which do not.\nHigher-order aesthetic properties like drama, humor, and irony, which\naccount for a significant part of the appeal of Duchamp’s and\nCage’s works, on this view, would derive from time-sensitive\nproperties (Zemach 1997). Third, it might be held that it is the\ncreative act of presenting something that is in the\nrelevant sense unfamiliar, into a new context, the artworld, which has\naesthetic properties. Or, fourth, it might be held that\n(Zangwill’s “second-order” strategy) works like\nready-mades lack aesthetic functions, but are parasitic upon, because\nmeant to be considered in the context of, works that do have aesthetic\nfunctions, and therefore constitute marginal borderline cases of art\nthat do not merit the theoretical primacy they are often\ngiven. Finally, it can be flatly denied that the ready-mades were\nworks of art (Beardsley 1982).", "\n\nAs to the over-inclusiveness of aesthetic definitions, a distinction\nmight be drawn between primary and secondary functions. Or it may be\nmaintained that some cars, lawns, and products of industrial design are\non the art/non-art borderline, and so don’t constitute clear\nand decisive counter-examples. Or, if the claim that aesthetic theories\nfail to account for bad art depends on holding that some works have\nabsolutely no aesthetic value whatsoever, as opposed to some\nnon-zero amount, however infinitesimal, it may be wondered what\njustifies that assumption. " ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Traditional (mainly aesthetic) definitions" }, { "content": [ "\n\nHybrid definitions characteristically disjoin at least one\ninstitutional component with at least one aesthetic component, aiming\nthereby to accommodate both more traditional art and avant-garde art\nthat appears to lack any significant aesthetic dimension. (Such\ndefinitions could also be classified as institutional, on the grounds\nthat they make provenance sufficient for being a work of art.) Hence\nthey inherit a feature of conventionalist definitions: in appealing to\nart institutions, artworlds, arts, art functions, and so on, they\neither include substantive accounts of what it is to be an\nartinstitution/world/genre/-form/function, or are\nuninformatively circular.", "\n\nOne such disjunctive definition, Longworth and Scarantino’s, adapts\nGaut’s list of ten clustering properties, where that list (see 3.5\nabove) includes institutional properties (e.g., belonging to an\nestablished art form) and traditional ones (e.g., possessing positive\naesthetic properties); see also Longworth and Scarantino 2010. The\ncore idea is that art is defined by a disjunction of minimally\nsufficient and disjunctively necessary conditions; to say that a\ndisjunct is a minimally sufficient constitutive condition for\nart-hood, is to say that every proper subset of it is insufficient for\nart-hood. An account of what it is for a concept to have disjunctive\ndefining conditions is also supplied. The definition of art itself is\nas follows: ∃Z∃Y (Art iff (Z ∨\nY)), where (a) Z and Y, formed from properties on\nGaut’s cluster list, are either non-empty conjunctions or non-empty\ndisjunctions of conjunctions or individual properties; (b) there is\nsome indeterminacy over exactly which disjuncts are sufficient; (c)\nZ does not entail Y and Y does not entail\nZ; (d) Z does not entail Art and Y does not\nentail Art. Instantiation of either Z or Y suffices for\nart-hood; something can be art only if at least one of Z,\nY is instantiated; and the third condition is included to\nprevent the definition from collapsing into a classical one. The\naccount of what it is for concept C to have disjunctive\ndefining conditions is as follows: C iff (Z ∨\nY), where (i) Z and Y are non-empty conjunctions\nor non-empty disjunctions of conjunctions or individual properties;\n(ii) Z does not entail Y and Y does not entail\nZ; (iii) Z does not entail C and Y does not\nentail C. A worry concerns condition (iii): as written, it seems to\nrender the account of disjunctive defining conditions\nself-contradictory. For if Z and Y are each minimally\nsufficient for C, it is impossible that Z does not\nentail C and that Y does not entail C. If so,\nthen nothing can satisfy the conditions said to be necessary and\nsufficient for a concept to have disjunctive defining conditions.", "\n\nA second disjunctive hybrid definition, with an historical cast,\nRobert Stecker’s historical functionalism, holds that an item is an\nartwork at time t, where t is not earlier than the\ntime at which the item is made, if and only if it is in one of the\ncentral art forms at t and is made with the intention of\nfulfilling a function art has at t or it is an artifact that\nachieves excellence in achieving such a function (Stecker 2005). A\nquestion for Stecker’s view is whether or not it provides an adequate\naccount of what it is for a function to be an art function, and\nwhether, consequently, it can accommodate anti-aesthetic or\nnon-aesthetic art. The grounds given for thinking that it can are\nthat, while art’s original functions were aesthetic, those functions,\nand the intentions with which art is made, can change in unforeseeable\nways. Moreover, aesthetic properties are not always preeminent in\nart’s predecessor concepts (Stecker 2000). A worry is that if the\noperative assumption is that if x belongs to a predecessor\ntradition of T then x belongs to T, the\npossibility is not ruled out that if, for example, the tradition of\nmagic is a predecessor tradition of the scientific tradition, then\nentities that belong to the magic tradition but lacking any of the\nstandard hallmarks of science are scientific entities.", "\n\nA third hybrid definition, also disjunctive, is the cladistic\ndefinition defended by Stephen Davies. who holds that something is\nart (a) if it shows excellence of skill and achievement in realizing\nsignificant aesthetic goals, and either doing so is its primary,\nidentifying function or doing so makes a vital contribution to the\nrealization of its primary, identifying function, or (b) if it falls\nunder an art genre or art form established and publicly recognized\nwithin an art tradition, or (c) if it is intended by its\nmaker/presenter to be art and its maker/presenter does what is\nnecessary and appropriate to realizing that intention (Davies, 2015).\n(In biology, a clade is a segment in the tree of life: a group\nof organisms and the common ancestor they share.) Artworlds are to be\ncharacterized in terms of their origins: they begin with prehistoric\nart ancestors, and grow into artworlds. Hence all artworks occupy a\nline of descent from their prehistoric art ancestors; that line of\ndescent comprises an art tradition that grows into an artworld. So\nthe definition is bottom-up and resolutely anthropocentric. A worry:\nthe view seems to entail that art traditions can undergo any changes\nwhatsoever and remain art traditions, since, no matter how distant,\nevery occupant of the right line of descent is part of the art\ntradition. This seems to amount to saying that as long as they remain\ntraditions at all, art traditions cannot die. Whether art is immortal\nin this sense seems open to question. A second worry is that the\nrequirement that every art tradition and artworld stand in some line\nof descent from prehistoric humanoids makes it in principle impossible\nfor any nonhuman species to make art, as long as that species fails to\noccupy the right location in the tree of life. While the\nepistemological challenges that identifying artworks made by nonhumans\nmight pose could be very considerable, this consequence of the\ncladistic definition’s emphasis on lineage rather than traits raises a\nconcern about excessively insularity.", "\nA fourth hybrid definition is the “buck-passing” view of Lopes, which\nattempts an escape from the stalemate between artwork-focused\ndefinitions over avant-garde anti-aesthetic cases by adopting a\nstrategy that shifts the focus of the definition of art away from\nartworks. The strategy is to recenter philosophical efforts on\ndifferent problems, which require attention anyway: (a) the problem of\ngiving an account of each individual art, and (b) the problem of\ndefining what it is to be an art, the latter by giving an account of\nthe larger class of normative/appreciative kinds to which the arts\n(and some non-arts) belong. For, given definitions of the individual\narts, and a definition of what it is to be an art, if every artwork\nbelongs to at least one art (if it belongs to no existing art, then it\npioneers a new art), then a definition of artwork falls out: x\nis a work of art if and only if x is a work of K, where K is an\nart (Lopes 2014). When fully spelled out, the definition is\ndisjunctive: x is a work of art if and only if x is a\nwork belonging to art1 or x is a work belonging to\nart2 or x is a work belonging to art3\n…. Most of the explanatory work is done by the theories of the\nindividual arts, since, given the assumption that every artwork\nbelongs to at least one art, possession of theories of the individual\narts would be necessary and sufficient for settling the artistic or\nnon-artistic status of any hard case, once it is determined what art a\ngiven work belongs to. As to what makes a practice an art, Lopes’\npreferred answer seems to be institutionalism of a Dickiean variety:\nan art is an institution in which artists (persons who participate\nwith understanding in the making of artworks) make artworks to be\npresented to an artworld public. (Lopes 2014, Dickie 1984) Thus, on\nthis view, it is arbitrary which activities are artworld systems:\nthere is no deeper answer to the question of what makes music an art\nthan that it has the right institutional\n structure.[4] \nSo it is arbitrary which activities are arts. Two worries. First, the\nkey claim that every work of art belonging to no extant art pioneers a\nnew art may be defended on the grounds that any reason to say that a\nwork belonging to no extant artform is an artwork is a reason to say\nthat it pioneers a new artform. In response, it is noted that the\nquestion of whether or not a thing belongs to an art arises only when,\nand because, there is a prior reason for thinking that the thing is an\nartwork. So it seems that what it is to be an artwork is prior, in\nsome sense, to what it is to be an art. Second, on the buck-passing\ntheory’s institutional theory of the arts, which activities are arts\nis arbitrary. This raises a version of the question that was raised\nabout the cladistic definition’s ability to account for the existence\nof art outside our (Hominin) tradition. Suppose the connection\nbetween a practice’s traits and its status as an art are wholly\ncontingent. Then the fact that a practice in another culture that\nalthough not part of our tradition had most of the traits of one of\nour own arts would be no reason to think that practice was an art, and\nno reason to think that the objects belonging to it were artworks. It\nis not clear that we are really so in the dark when it comes to\ndetermining whether practices in alien cultures or traditions are\narts. " ], "subsection_title": "4.5 Hybrid (Disjunctive) Definitions" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nConventionalist definitions account well for modern art, but have\ndifficulty accounting for art’s universality – especially\nthe fact that there can be art disconnected from “our”\n(Western) institutions and traditions, and our species. They also\nstruggle to account for the fact that the same aesthetic terms are\nroutinely applied to artworks, natural objects, humans, and abstracta.\nAesthetic definitions do better accounting for art’s\ntraditional, universal features, but less well, at least according to\ntheir critics, with revolutionary modern art; their further defense\nrequires an account of the aesthetic which can be extended in a\nprincipled way to conceptual and other radical art. (An aesthetic\ndefinition and a conventionalist one could simply be conjoined. But\nthat would merely raise, without answering, the fundamental question\nof the unity or disunity of the class of artworks.) Which defect is\nthe more serious one depends on which explananda are the more\nimportant. Arguments at this level are hard to come by, because\npositions are hard to motivate in ways that do not depend on prior\nconventionalist and functionalist sympathies. If list-like definitions\nare flawed because uninformative, then so are conventionalist\ndefinitions, whether institutional or historical. Of course, if the\nclass of artworks, or of the arts, is a mere chaotic heap, lacking any\ngenuine unity, then enumerative definitions cannot be faulted for\nbeing uninformative: they do all the explaining that it is possible to\ndo, because they capture all the unity that there is to capture. In\nthat case the worry articulated by one prominent aesthetician, who\nwrote earlier of the “bloated, unwieldy” concept of art\nwhich institutional definitions aim to capture, needs to be taken\nseriously, even if it turns out to be ungrounded: “It is not at\nall clear that these words – ‘What is\nart?’ – express anything like a single question, to which\ncompeting answers are given, or whether philosophers proposing answers\nare even engaged in the same debate…. The sheer variety of\nproposed definitions should give us pause. One cannot help wondering\nwhether there is any sense in which they are attempts to …\nclarify the same cultural practices, or address the same issue”\n(Walton 2007). " ], "section_title": "5. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Abell, Catharine, 2012, “Art: What It Is and Why It Matters,”\nPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85: 671–691.", "Adajian, Thomas, 2005, “On the Prototype Theory of Concepts\nand the Definition of Art,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art\nCriticism, 63: 231–236.", "–––, 2012, “Defining Art,” in\nA. Ribeiro (ed.) 2012, pp. 39–56.", "Battersby, Christine, 1989, Gender and Genius: Towards a\nFeminist Aesthetics, London: The Women’s Press.", "Beardsley, Monroe, 1982, The Aesthetic Point of\nView, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.", "Bond, E. J., 1975, “The Essential Nature of\nArt.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 12:\n177–183.", "Brand, Peggy Zeglin, 2000, “Glaring Omissions in Traditional\nTheories of Art,” in N. 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", "Eagleton, Terry, 1990,The Ideology of the Aesthetic,\nLondon: Basil Blackwell.", "Eldridge, Richard, 1985, “Form and Content: An Aesthetic Theory\nof Art,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 25(4): 303–316.", "Field, Hartry, 1972, “Tarski’s Theory of\nTruth,” The Journal of Philosophy, 69:\n347–375.", "Frueh, Joanna, 1991, “Towards a Feminist Theory of Art,” in\nFeminist Art Criticism: An Anthology, A. Raven, C. Langer and\nJ. Frueh (eds.), Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 153–165.", "Gaut, Berys, 2000, “The Cluster Account of Art,” in\nN. 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Anscombe (trans.), Oxford:\nBlackwell.", "–––, 1968, Philosophical\nInvestigations, Oxford: Blackwell.", "Weitz, Morris, 1956, “The Role of Theory in\nAesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,\n15: 27–35.", "Zangwill, Nick, 1995a, “Groundrules in the Philosophy of\nArt,” Philosophy, 70: 533–544.", "–––, 1995b, “The Creative Theory of Art,”\nAmerican Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 315–332", "–––, 2001, The Metaphysics of Beauty,\nIthaca: Cornell University Press.", "Zemach, Eddy, 1997, Real Beauty, University Park, PA:\nPennsylvania State University Press." ]	[ { "href": "../aesthetic-judgment/", "text": "aesthetics: aesthetic judgment" }, { "href": "../aesthetics-18th-german/", "text": "aesthetics: German, in the 18th century" }, { "href": "../aristotle-aesthetics/", "text": "Aristotle, General Topics: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../dewey-aesthetics/", "text": "Dewey, John: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../kant-aesthetics/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel: aesthetics and teleology" }, { "href": "../nietzsche/", "text": "Nietzsche, Friedrich" }, { "href": "../plato-rhetoric/", "text": "Plato: rhetoric and poetry" }, { "href": "../schopenhauer/", "text": "Schopenhauer, Arthur" } ]
artifact	Artifact	First published Wed Jul 18, 2018; substantive revision Mon Oct 3, 2022	[ "\nThe contemporary world is pervasively artifactual. Even our most\nmundane, biologically based activities, such as eating, sleeping, and\nsex, depend on engagement with artifacts. Moreover, many of the plants\nand animals we encounter on a daily basis qualify as biological\nartifacts (Sperber 2007). But unlike language—which also\npervades human life from top to bottom—artifacts as such are not\nthe subject matter of any well-defined area of philosophical research.\nThis is as much the case today as it has been throughout the history\nof Western philosophy (Dipert 1993).", "\nPhilosophy of technology might have played this role, but historically\nit has not done so. Although its roots reach back to the\n19th century, philosophy of technology became a widely\nrecognized specialization only in the second half of the\n20th century. This early phase was dominated by so-called\n“humanities philosophy of technology” (Mitcham 1994).\nHeavily influenced by Martin Heidegger’s (1954 [1977]) seminal\nessay, “The Question Concerning Technology”, this strain\nof philosophy of technology focuses primarily on the cultural and\nsocial effects of industrial and post-industrial technologies. In the\nlast few decades, a companion strain of philosophy of technology,\nvariously denominated “analytic” (Franssen, Lokhorst,\n& van de Poel 2018) or “engineering” (Mitcham 1994)\nphilosophy of technology has come to prominence. It is focused on\nthe genesis of technologies in the practices of modern science and\nengineering. Thus the net effect has been to focus philosophy of\ntechnology almost exclusively on modern and emerging technologies,\nrather than on artifacts in general.", "\nThe aim of this article, then, is to bring together discussions of\nartifacts occurring in sometimes far-flung areas of philosophy, as\nwell as related discussions in other disciplines. Section 1 concerns\nquestions of definition. Section 2 focuses on the metaphysics of\nartifacts. Section 3 turns to epistemological issues. There are also\nimportant normative issues concerning artifacts, but these are covered\nin other articles in this Encyclopedia, listed in the Related Entries\nsection below." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Definition", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Do Artifacts Exist?", "2.2 Artifact Kinds", "2.3 Artifact Functions" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Epistemology", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Methodology", "3.2 Knowing Artifacts", "3.3 Thinking and Acting With Artifacts" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nA standard philosophical definition of\n“artifact”—often assumed even when not explicitly\nstated—is that artifacts are objects made intentionally, in\norder to accomplish some purpose (Hilpinen 1992; 2011). This\ndefinition is rooted ultimately in Aristotle’s distinction\nbetween things that exist by nature and things that exist by craft\n(Metaphysics 1033a ff., Nicomachean Ethics 1140a\nff., Physics 192b ff.). Those that exist by nature have their\norigin in themselves, whereas those that exist by craft have their\norigin in the craftsperson—specifically, in the form of the\nthing as it exists in the mind of the maker. Both Aristotle and his\ncontemporary descendants are primarily concerned to distinguish\nartifacts from objects that occur naturally, without any human\nintervention.", "\nOn this standard definition, artifacts must satisfy three conditions.\nThey must be intentionally produced, thus ruling out unintended\nby-products of intentional actions, such as the shavings that result\nfrom woodcarving, as well as all naturally occurring objects, such as\nsalamanders and stars. They must involve modification of materials,\nthus ruling out naturally occurring objects even when used\nintentionally for a purpose, such as sticks thrown to amuse your dog.\nAnd they must be produced for a purpose. This rules out intentionally\nmodified objects that are nevertheless not intended to accomplish any\nfurther goal, such as the scraps produced when you intentionally, but\nfor no particular reason, tear up a piece of paper before throwing it\naway. Presumably, then, these three conditions are intended to be\nindividually necessary and jointly sufficient to distinguish artifacts\nfrom naturally occurring objects.", "\nThree remarks about this definition are in order. First, it does not\nrule out the possibility that at least some things made by non-human\nanimals are artifacts. Spider webs do have a purpose, for instance,\nand are clearly made rather than naturally occurring. But we may\nhesitate to attribute intention to the spiders, given the instinctive\nnature of their web-weaving behavior. Beavers, on the other hand,\nmight be thought to intentionally construct dams in order to create\nponds. This implication of the standard definition fits well with the\nburgeoning evidence for sophisticated cognition among non-human\nanimals in general, and their ability to manufacture and use tools and\nother structures in particular (Shumaker, Walkup, & Beck 2011;\nGould & Gould 2007). This is an important area of research in\nethology and comparative psychology. However, for the purposes of this\narticle we will focus on human artifacts.", "\nSecond, many things we would not ordinarily label as artifacts in\nEnglish might nevertheless count under this definition. We usually\nreserve the term “artifact” for tangible, durable objects\nsuch as an archaeologist might unearth. But objects made intentionally\nfor a purpose include many that are ephemeral or abstract. Candidates\ninclude musical performances (Dipert 1993), belief systems\n(Hilpinen 1995), actions and languages (Evnine 2016), software (Irmak\n2012), normativity (Frugé 2022), establishments such as\nrestaurants (Korman 2020), and artifact types (Reicher\n2022). ", "\nFinally, this definition is peculiar to philosophers (Hilpinen 2011;\nDipert 2014). In other disciplines the concern is more to investigate\ncognition and behavior involving objects quite generally, without\ncarving out a domain of artifacts having special ontological status.\nPsychologists, for instance, are interested in how children develop\ncategorizations of things, including artifacts as opposed to\nnon-artifacts. But there is some evidence that notions of intention or\nfunction enter into this development only at quite a late stage, and\nthat young children make relevant distinctions more on the basis of\nperceptual features such as shape or movement patterns (Keil, Greif,\n& Kerner 2007). Thus the standard philosophical definition of\n“artifact” might well be more of a hindrance than a help\nin the context of such investigations. Archaeologists and\nanthropologists, on the other hand, are concerned with the roles\nobjects play in cultural processes quite generally. From this point of\nview, a discarded flint chip is just as important as the hide scraper\nfrom which it was struck, because debitage analysis—the study of\nsuch chips and other production debris—is invaluable for\nreconstructing knapping techniques and other aspects of production\nprocesses, including their cognitive underpinnings (Shott 2015; Schick\n& Toth 1993). Similarly, a sharp-edged shell used without\nmodification as a hide scraper is just as important as the\npurpose-made flint scraper for understanding the culture in question.\nIn these disciplines “artifact” tends to be absorbed into\n“material culture”—a much broader category—and\nis usually understood to include anything made and/or used by\nhumans (Preston 2013; Kipfer 2007). As the examples above demonstrate,\nthe making need not be intentional and the use need not involve\nmodification of the object used. And if any objects of cultural\nsignificance are devoid of purpose or function, that condition of the\nphilosophical definition, too, would fall by the wayside.\nConsequently, as the anthropologist Daniel Miller notes:", "\n\n\nThere is little point in attempting to distinguish systematically\nbetween a natural world and an artefactual one, except when we are\nconcerned with the ways in which terms such as “natural”\nmay have particular consequences or entailments, as when a commodity\nin the shops is labelled “natural” simply because a single\ningredient, such as a chemical dye, has been deleted, or when\nsomething as apparently natural as radiation is taken to be\nantithetical to true “nature”. (Miller 1994, 398)\n", "\nFrom the perspective of other disciplines, then, the philosophical\ninsistence on a strict definition of “artifact” aimed at a\nbright-line distinction between naturally occurring objects and\nartifacts may well appear parochial.", "\nThis extra-disciplinary observation points us directly to the central\nproblem for the standard philosophical definition of\n“artifact”. Along all three definitional dimensions we\nencounter a continuum of cases (Koslicki 2018; Grandy 2007;\nSperber 2007). Paths, for example, are often created unintentionally\njust in virtue of people repeatedly traveling along the same straight\nline between points A and B—your kitchen and\nyour vegetable garden, say. But what is the point of saying that such\na path is not an artifact, whereas an identical one that was created\nintentionally by exactly the same process is? Moreover, what would it\ntake to make the erstwhile non-artifactual path into an artifact?\nWould it be enough to notice and approve it? Or would I have to\nintentionally maintain it, by sweeping it clean of leaves, for\ninstance?", "\nSimilar difficulties arise with regard to modification, which is\nclearly a matter of degree. If I bring an attractive shell home from a\nwalk on the beach and put it to use as a paperweight, does the\ntransport count as modification? If not, would washing the shell\nbefore using it be enough? Or polishing it to bring out the color of\nits markings? A further complication is that many uses to which\nnaturally occurring objects are put cause modifications. An unmodified\nstone used as a hammer soon acquires a spherical shape (Schick &\nToth 1993, 130 ff.). At what point did it first count as\nmodified, since even the first strike would break off some fragments?\nOr do these use-induced modifications not count for satisfying the\ndefinition at all? If not, why not? The stone is certainly being used\nintentionally for a purpose, so the rest of the definition is\nsatisfied.", "\nFinally, Dan Sperber (2007) argues that even function is continuous\nbetween nature and culture. He begins with the observation that what\nhe calls biological artifacts—domesticated plants and animals,\nfor the most part—have both biological and cultural functions.\nBut they carry out their cultural functions in virtue of carrying out\ntheir biological functions, and vice versa. Take seedless\ngrapes. Their seedlessness might seem to make them purely artifactual,\nsince the reproductive function of the fruit appears to be lost along\nwith the seeds. But in fact, Sperber argues, the fruit retains the\nbiological function of attracting us to eat the fruit and then spread\nthe plant—not by dispersing seeds, as with seeded grapes, but by\npropagating the grapevines vegetatively. This coincidence of\nbiological and cultural functions in domesticates shows that far from\nbeing the locus of a divide between nature and culture, the realm of\ndomestication is the locus of their imperceptible merger.", "\nSperber concludes that “artifact” as a theoretical term\ncannot be usefully defined, as any attempt to do so will be\nfrustrated by the continua detailed above. We may call this the\ncontinuum problem. This concern is echoed by Kathrin Koslicki (2018),\nwho notes that the common reliance on creators’ intentional activity\nto distinguish artifacts from naturally occurring objects inevitably\nleaves us with objects such as unintended by-products and naturally\noccurring objects pressed into service for human purposes which\ndo not seem to fall readily into either category. She does not\nthink that current approaches in metaphysics have the resources\nto deal with such puzzles about artifacts, and concludes that further\ndevelopment of these approaches is necessary. For\nSperber—whose training is in anthropology—the lesson is\nthat the social sciences simply do not need “artifact” as\na term of art. But philosophers, and some other social scientists,\nhave reacted to the continuum problem by doubling down on their\nclassification efforts. Risto Hilpinen (2011), following the\nanthropologist Wendell Oswalt (1973; 1976), uses the term\n“naturefact” for naturally occurring objects used\nintentionally, but without modification, for some purpose. Naturefacts\nthus lie between naturally occurring objects and artifacts on the\ncontinuum. Hilpinen also suggests that what he calls\n“residue”—modified but unintended by-products of\nproductive activity, such as sawdust—are a conceptually distinct\ncategory of objects also lying somewhere between artifacts and\nnaturally occurring objects. (A terminological note: in archaeology,\n“naturefact” is more usually used to mean an object that\nis in fact the result of purely natural processes, but is difficult to\ndistinguish from an intentionally modified object. This is a problem\nthat bedevils paleoarchaeologists studying stone tools, in particular\n(Schnurrenberger & Bryan 1985). Archaeologists also\nsometimes distinguish artifacts from ecofacts—organic or\ninorganic remains of archaeological significance that have undergone\nno, or minimal, modification by humans, such as animal bones, stored\ngrain, pollen, charcoal, and the like. Naturefacts and residues in\nHilpinen’s sense are usually included in the ecofact\ncategory.)", "\nRandall Dipert (1993) proposes a slightly different, triadic\nclassification.", "\nThis continuum problem for artifacts is really just a version of a\nwell-known problem besetting classification schemes in the natural and\nsocial sciences. The traditional assumption was that classification is\nan exclusively ontological operation. What we are doing, it is often\nsaid, is carving the world at its joints. On this assumption, a\ncontinuum is a problem because it suggests that there are no joints to\nguide our carving efforts. A continuum is thus incompatible with\nclassification schemes understood as grounded solely in objective\nfeatures of the world, and with essentialist understandings of natural\nkinds. We can, of course, carve the continuum up any way we like, but\nthis must be understood as in part a pragmatic operation, not a\nstrictly ontological one reflecting only the fixed essences of things.\nThis problem has loomed large in discussions of natural kinds in\nphilosophy of science, as bothersome continua are increasingly\nidentified in both natural and social sciences. Muhammad Khalidi\n(2013, Chapter 5) details cases in the chemical, biological,\nphysiological and social sciences where widely accepted kinds are\n“fuzzy”, or have graded membership, for instance. In\nresponse, he advocates an account of natural kinds that incorporates\nthe influence of human interests and epistemic concerns, while still\ninsisting that these interests and concerns are constrained by\nobjective features of the world identifiable by science.\nKhalidi’s account joins a growing list of non-essentialist\naccounts of natural kinds, according to which kinds are real, but\ntheir reality does not require that they be defined in total isolation\nfrom human beings, their activities, interests, epistemic projects,\npragmatic concerns, and so on (Dupré 1993; Boyd 1999; Reydon\n2014; Kendig 2016).", "\nUnderstood in this way, classification schemes such as those proposed\nby Hilpinen and Dipert could, in principle, constitute a perfectly\nadequate response to the continuum problem. It would, of course, be\nnice to have a commonly accepted scheme in philosophy—or better\nyet, a scheme shared with the other disciplines that study artifacts\nand material culture. But even failing that, classification schemes\ngrounded in clear methodological considerations would be helpful, even\nif the methodological considerations varied from scheme to scheme.\nUnfortunately, it appears that the main consideration driving the\nschemes proposed so far is merely the desire to shore up the\ntraditional ontological distinction between artifacts and naturally\noccurring objects. This leaves the methodological challenge voiced by\nSperber and Miller unanswered. What do we need this distinction for?\nDoes it help us understand how objects function in human life and\nculture, or does it actually hinder this understanding? If the latter,\nwould other distinctions serve us better? The continuum problem does\nnot, pace Sperber, prove that there are no good\nmethodological considerations in favor of maintaining the ontological\ndivide between artifacts and naturally occurring objects. But in light\nof the “epistemological” (Reydon 2014) or\n“practice” (Kendig 2016) turn in the recent literature on\nnatural kinds, it does show that we cannot assume that\n“artifact” itself is a pure, natural kind, identifiable on\nontological grounds alone. In short, there is no guarantee that the\nstandard definition of “artifact” with which we started\nthis section expresses anything like a traditional essence. We are\nthus left with more questions than answers in the matter of\ndefinition." ], "section_title": "1. Definition", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDiscussions of the metaphysics of artifacts have typically\narisen only in broader investigative contexts in which they are\nnot the primary focus of attention. In particular, the metaphysics of\nordinary objects has generated a significant literature in recent\nyears, and the puzzles about existence around which it revolves do\napply to artifacts, but equally to the vast array of other ordinary\nobjects, like stones, stars, trees, jellyfish and deer. Similarly,\nreflection on artifact kinds has been largely overshadowed by the vast\nliterature on natural kinds, and discussions of artifact function\nexist on the periphery of the much more prominent discussions of\nbiological function. Finally, questions about the existence of\nabstract artifacts have arisen in the context of investigations into\nthe ontology of works of art. We will take up these topics in\nturn." ], "section_title": "2. Metaphysics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nSkepticism about the existence of artifacts goes back at least to\nAristotle. For him, the primary existents are\nsubstances—independent things on which all other things depend.\nIndividual things, such as horses or houses, are compounds of matter\nand form, but it is not entirely clear whether the substance of the\nthing is the form, the matter, or the compound (Shields 2022). That\nsaid, Aristotle is clearly ambivalent as to whether artifacts have\nwhat it takes. In the Physics (192b8–39), for instance,\nhe says that some things, such as chipmunks or geraniums, exist by\nnature and that each such thing is a substance. He follows this up in\nthe Metaphysics (1043b15–25), saying that perhaps\nonly such things as exist by nature are substances, thus\nimplying that things made by art, such as pots or pincushions, are\nnot. Exactly why Aristotle thinks artifacts are not substances is not\nentirely clear—he suggests different reasons in different places\n(Katayama 1999, 18–19). But it is clear that he doubts that\nthey really exist in the full sense enjoyed by things that exist by\nnature.", "\nAristotle’s invidious ontological downgrading of artifacts fed\nstraight into 20th century trends in metaphysics that\ntended to downgrade ordinary objects in general (Thomasson 2009). Even\nafter the baleful anti-metaphysical influence of logical positivism\nwaned, metaphysics took itself to be merely working out the details of\nwhat the dominant scientific theories, particularly in physics and\nbiology, say exists. Since there is no science of artifacts, let alone\nof sticks and stones and rivers, such ordinary objects had to be\neliminated from our ontologies. On the radical left fringe of the\neliminativist spectrum is a startling long list of theorists who deny\nthe existence of ordinary objects tout court, including even\nliving organisms and persons (for the list, see Korman\n2015, 19–23). In the moderate middle are theorists such as\nTrenton Merricks (2001), who denies the existence of artifacts and\nother inanimate macrophysical objects, as well as living organisms,\nwith the exception of humans; Peter van Inwagen (1990), who denies the\nexistence of artifacts and other inanimate macrophysical objects, but\naccepts the existence of living organisms, including humans; and Simon\nEvnine (2016), who denies the existence of inanimate natural objects,\nbut accepts the existence of artifacts and living organisms.", "\nThe arguments for these varieties of eliminativism are themselves\nvarious, but they revolve around what Daniel Korman\n(2015, 4–7) calls debunking arguments. Why do we think that\nordinary objects exist? Only because they correspond to our human\nneeds and interests, as embodied in our biology and enshrined in our\ncultural practices. But there is no good reason to think that the\nobjects we pick out in accordance with our needs and interests\ncorrespond to the objects that actually exist in reality. Debunking\narguments go back to the very beginning of Western philosophy.\nParmenides declared that what truly is—Being, or the\nOne—cannot be multiple, changing and transient after the fashion\nof ordinary objects. Plato followed up with the doctrine of the\neternal and unchanging Forms, which truly exist, and of which ordinary\nobjects are at best ontologically deficient copies. Thus the idea that\nwe have no good reason to think that ordinary objects exist is\nentrenched in our metaphysical tradition.", "\nOn the other hand, prima facie grounds for rehabilitating\nordinary objects also have ancient roots in atomism, which holds that\nmacrophysical objects are composed of particles which, while multiple,\ndo meet the other criteria for true being laid down by Parmenides. On\nthe assumption that composition follows regular principles, then,\nordinary objects may be said to exist insofar as they are wholes\ncomposed of existing proper parts. This brings us face to face with\nwhat Peter van Inwagen (1990, 21 ff.) calls the Special\nComposition Question—under what conditions do unified\nwholes arise out of parts? Answering this question has turned out to\nbe far from simple, and has latterly given rise to mereology, a\nspecial area of metaphysics devoted to investigating the principles of\ncomposition. Most of the other main arguments against the existence of\nartifacts and other ordinary objects reflect problems arising in the\ncourse of these investigations. For example, there is the material\nconstitution problem. An artifact such as a cookie is made out of\ndough. So everywhere there is a cookie there is a coincident lump of\n(baked) dough, which shares all of its parts with the cookie. But this\ncoincidence violates our intuitions about the identity of ordinary\nobjects. Considerations of this sort have been used by van Inwagen\n(1990, 124 ff.) and others to argue that there are no artifacts.\nCookie makers do not bring anything new into existence; they merely\nmove pre-existing elementary things around. Thus, while debunking\narguments show that we have no good reason to believe ordinary objects\ndo exist, mereological problems show that we have good\nreasons to believe they do not.", "\nA growing chorus of voices has been raised against this ontological\ndowngrading of ordinary objects, several of whom have been especially\nconcerned to rehabilitate artifacts. Lynne Rudder Baker’s\nMetaphysics of Everyday Life (2007) foregrounds artifacts as\nparadigmatic examples of existing ordinary objects. Baker subscribes\nto a constitution view, according to which material things are\nnon-reductively made up of other material things.", "\n\n\nThe fundamental idea of constitution is this: when a thing of one\nprimary kind is in certain circumstances, a thing of another primary\nkind—a new thing, with new causal powers—comes to exist.\nWhen an octagonal piece of metal is in circumstances of being painted\nred with white marks of the shape S-T-O-P, and is in an environment\nthat has certain conventions and laws, a new thing—a traffic\nsign—comes into existence. (Baker 2007, 32)\n", "\nImportantly, for Baker artifacts are intention-dependent (ID)\nobjects—they cannot exist in the absence of beings with relevant\nintentional states. Thus the cosmic ray striking a sheet of scrap\nmetal in the proverbial swamp and turning it red with white lettering\nhas not created any artifact at all, let alone a stop sign. Baker\nbuilds the intentional states into the specification of the required\ncircumstances in terms of a relationship between the construction\nmaterials and the intentions and knowledge of the constructor. For a\nstop sign to exist, for example, it must be constructed from metal and\npaint by someone who understands the function of stop signs, knows how\nto construct one, intends to construct one to fulfill this function,\nand is reasonably successful in executing her intentions\n(2007, 53–55). This view puts Baker at odds with\nAristotle’s view that only things with an internal principle of\nmovement truly exist, as well as with the common view that ID objects\ndo not truly exist. Both of these views are aimed at first\ndistinguishing natural from artificial objects and then downgrading\nthe latter. Baker argues that the distinction itself is suspect, both\nin light of technologies such as genetic engineering and the natural\nstatus of the beings with intentional states who create artifacts\n(2007, 59–66). In short, the whole process of making\nartifacts is internal to nature and cannot be legitimately considered\nseparate from it by those inclined to be judgmental in ontological\nmatters.", "\nSimon Evnine (2016) argues for a version of hylomorphism that is very\nsimilar to the constitution view espoused by Baker. Evnine abandons\ntraditional notions of form and focuses instead on the intertwining of\nthe causes that bring a thing into existence and make it the thing it\nis. Artifacts thus take pride of place in his metaphysics, because, he\nclaims, they typically have a specifiable origin in the intentions of\na maker who chooses material and works it up in accordance with an\nenvisioned function and shape. Evnine’s account of organisms as\nexistents rests on an analogy between this paradigmatic intentional\nmaking and organic development. But he does not try to account for\nnon-living natural objects, whose existence he denies. On the other\nhand, Evnine deploys his account of artifacts in an interesting way to\nargue that actions are artifacts—artifactual events rather than\nartifactual objects. Higher-level actions such as turning on a light\nare governed by the agent’s intention and constructed ultimately\nout of the “matter” of basic, bodily actions.", "\nAmie Thomasson (2007a; and for a succinct summary, 2009) takes a\ndifferent tack, arguing that the existence of artifacts and other\nordinary objects is established by the connection between our terms on\nthe one hand, and facts about the world on the other. On her view, the\nmeaning of our terms includes a specification of the conditions for\ntheir application. If we then determine empirically that the\napplication conditions of a term are met, the thing to which it refers\nexists. For example, “spoon” refers to a utensil\nintentionally made by humans for the purposes of stirring, serving and\neating food, consisting of a shallow bowl with a long handle. A quick\ncheck of any kitchen will assure you that these conditions are in fact\nsatisfied, and that spoons therefore exist. On the other hand,\n“devil’s tuning fork” refers to an implement\nconsisting of three cylindrical prongs on one end and two rectangular\nprongs on the other, intentionally made by devils for the purpose of\ntuning their instruments, one would suppose. Check the music studios\nand the concert halls as thoroughly as you like, you will not find\nthese conditions satisfied. So devil’s tuning forks do not\nexist. Thomasson’s approach does not privilege artifacts as\nparadigmatic existents the way Baker’s and Evnine’s\naccounts do. But she makes the intention-dependent status of artifacts\nequally comprehensible, since the intentional states of makers figure\nprominently in the application conditions of concepts." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Do Artifacts Exist?" }, { "content": [ "\nIf artifacts do not exist, then the kinds into which we classify\nthem—pillow, book, painting, flowerpot—are not real kinds\non a par with natural kinds, such as oak, owl or anole. But questions\nabout the reality and nature of artifact kinds also arise for those\nwho do take artifacts to exist. As we have seen, these theorists\nresist the objection that the mind-dependence of artifacts compromises\ntheir ontological status. But this objection resurfaces with regard to\nartifact kinds. The mind-dependence of artifacts implies, at a\nminimum, that an account of artifact kinds will be very different from\nan account of natural kinds. This implication is resisted by Crawford\nElder (2004; 2007), who seeks to establish the existence of\nartifacts on the basis of a realist account of kinds. On Elder’s\nview, artifact kinds and many natural kinds are equally copied kinds,\nand equally mind-independent. A copied kind is defined by a set of\nproperties that naturally cluster together—a distinctive shape\nor make-up, a proper function established by a mechanism that copies\nthings of that shape on the basis of successful performance, and a\nhistorically proper placement. For example, cats’ whiskers are\ndistinctively shaped organs that are copied from cat to cat by a\nbiologically based reproductive mechanism because they help cats get\naround in the dark by performing successfully as touch receptors\nstrategically located with respect to the cat’s other bodily\nparts. Similarly, floor lamps are distinctively shaped artifacts that\nare copied from household to household by a socially based\nreproductive mechanism because they help humans get around in the dark\nby performing successfully as light sources strategically located with\nrespect to other household furniture. Human intentional states do, of\ncourse, figure in the copying process for artifacts. However, Elder\nargues:", "\n\n\n[C]reation does not begin with the artisan’s intending what he\ndoes. Rather, the essential properties that his product will inherit\nstem from a history of function and of copying that began well before\nthe artisan undertook his work. This history reaches forward through\nthe artisan’s motions—it shapes his shaping. Its existence\nand its efficacy are independent, largely or even entirely, of the\nartisan’s will. (Elder 2004, 142–143)\n", "\nAll copied kinds are thus natural, mind-independent kinds whose\nclustered features we discover rather than invent.", "\nOne acknowledged problem with Elder’s account is that many\nerstwhile artifact kinds turn out not to be copied kinds. Neckties,\nfor example, do not qualify because they do not appear to have a\nproper function (Elder 2004, 158–159). But his account does\nhave the virtue of drawing out useful analogies between natural kinds\nand artifact kinds. A number of other accounts also focus on analogies\nbetween (at least some) natural kinds and (at least some) artifact\nkinds (Lowe 2014; Franssen & Kroes 2014). The underlying motive\nfor pushing this analogy, clearly, is the fear that artifact kinds are\nnot real if human intentional states and/or classificatory practices\nare constitutive of what kinds there are.", "\nAmie Thomasson does not share this fear. In a series of important\npapers (2003; 2007b; 2014), she points out that realists\nabout kinds are not, in fact, forced to choose between showing that\nartifact kinds can be understood on the mind-independent model of\nnatural kinds, or denying that artifact kinds are real. There is a\nthird option—denying that mind-independence is the touchstone of\nreality. Thomasson then builds human intentions and their historical\nconnections into her account of artifact kinds.", "\n\n\nNecessarily, for all x and all artifactual kinds K,\nx is a K only if x is the product of a\nlargely successful intention that (Kx), where one intends\n(Kx) only if one has a substantive concept of the nature of\nKs that largely matches that of some group of prior makers of\nKs (if there are any) and intends to realize that concept by\nimposing K-relevant features on the object. (Thomasson\n2003, 600)\n", "\nThus for Thomasson, human intentions and concepts are actually\nconstitutive of artifact kinds. Thomasson (2014) also objects to the\ncommon assumption that concepts of artifact kinds revolve exclusively\naround intended function. While it is true that in\nEnglish we often label artifact kinds in accordance with\nfunction—flashlight, bedspread, pincushion, frying pan, and so\non—artifacts actually have an array of features that figure in\ntheir concepts. These include structural or perceptible features, for\nexample, that are also often reflected in our terms—armchair,\ntripod, zebra crossing (definitely not a function designation!), fork,\nand so on. Most importantly for Thomasson, they also include normative\nfeatures concerned with how that kind of artifact is to be treated or\nregarded. Although sponges and paper towels can both be used to wipe\nup spills, it is normal to dispose of the paper towel, but to clean\nthe sponge and reuse it.", "\nA distinct approach to artifact kinds is proposed by Thomas Reydon\n(2014). He points out that the nature of natural kinds is currently in\nplay in philosophy of science. Their mind-independence is\ntraditionally predicated on their having essences. But essentialism\nran into trouble when Darwin showed that species—up to that\npoint the very paradigm of natural kinds—are historically fluid\nand have no clear boundaries. Similar problems have now been\nrecognized even in the kinds of chemistry and physics (Khalidi 2013).\nNevertheless, grouping natural objects into kinds does license useful\ninferences and ground successful explanations. This has led to what\nReydon calls an “epistemological turn”.", "\n\n\nThe principal criteria for being a natural kind used to be\nmetaphysical: a kind is a natural kind if and only if it really exists\nin the world…independently of human consciousness, human\ninterests, and human practices, and is associated with a particular\nkind essence…. On the alternative approach the principal\ncriteria for being a natural kind no longer are metaphysical but\nepistemological: what counts is being useful in human\nepistemic practices, such as inference and explanation, by\ncorresponding in some way (which is still to be explicated)\nto the state of affairs in nature. (Reydon 2014, 132)\n", "\nRather than assimilating artifact kinds to natural kinds by showing\nthat artifacts are actually mind-independent in some way, as Elder and\nothers have tried to do, the epistemological turn suggests that since\nnatural kinds were never mind-independent to begin with, there is in\nprinciple no barrier to a unified account of artifact and natural\nkinds.", "\nFinally, we should note that questions have been raised about the\nlegitimacy of the kind—or perhaps more precisely, the\ncategory—“artifact” itself. We have already touched\non this in\n Section 1\n above, in the context of the definitional issues raised by the\ncontinuum problem. This discussion clearly reflects Reydon’s\nepistemological turn in that it foregrounds methodological\nconsiderations and lets the ontological chips fall where they may. We\nwill discuss methodological issues in\n Section 3." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Artifact Kinds" }, { "content": [ "\nFunction is a salient feature of artifacts. Clearly there would be no\ngood reason to keep so many of them around unless they did something\nfor us. Function is also a salient feature of biological traits.\nAccounts of biological function, which now comprise a large\nliterature, have inspired many accounts of artifact function. But\nunlike organisms, artifacts are made to serve human purposes, so human\nintentional states must be considered. Accounts of artifact function\ncan be usefully categorized in terms of the role they give to\nintentions in the establishment of functions (Preston 2009; Houkes\n& Vermaas 2010). At one end of the spectrum are accounts that\nrevolve around human intentions, while at the other end are accounts\nthat focus on non-intentional factors; in between are a variety of\naccounts that mix intentional and non-intentional factors in various\nproportions.", "\nKaren Neander (1991) distinguishes artifact function sharply from\nbiological function. Natural selection acting over the long course of\nevolutionary history establishes specific effects of biological traits\nas their functions, in virtue of the reproduction of those traits for\nthose effects. For example, the wings of birds are the result of eons\nof selection for their effect as airfoils. In contrast, intentional\nhuman selection, acting with knowledge and foresight, establishes\nspecific effects of artifacts as their functions immediately, without\nany reference to a history of reproduction for those effects.", "\n\n\nIt is enough, in the case of intentional selection, if the designer\nbelieves or hopes that the artifact will have the desired effect and\nselects it for that purpose. (Neander 1991, 462)\n", "\nFor example, an individual who designs a hammer, or who uses the heel\nof her shoe to pound in a nail, believing these items to have the\ncapacity to deliver a hard blow and intending to use that effect for\nher purposes, endows them with the relevant function forthwith. John\nSearle (1995) calls such artifact functions “agentive”\nfunctions to distinguish them from the “non-agentive”\nfunctions of biological traits. Searle also distinguishes a special\nsub-category of agentive functions which he terms “status”\nfunctions. These are related in a relatively arbitrary way to the\nphysical structure of the artifact. Money, for example, runs the gamut\nfrom gold ingots to bitcoin. Its functions—medium of exchange,\nmeasure of value, and so on—are imposed on these physical\nbearers by our collective acceptance of them as money. According to\nSearle, the intentional states constituting this collective acceptance\ncreate an “institutional fact” that would not exist\nwithout collective human agency. Status functions thus illustrate not\nonly the creative capacity of human intentionality already\nforegrounded in Neander’s account, but also its typically\ncollective nature in the case of artifact function. Searle supplies an\naccount of collective intentionality to underwrite this feature. Other\nauthors who subscribe to intentionalist theories of artifact function\ninclude Randall Dipert (1993), Peter McLaughlin (2001), Lynne Rudder\nBaker (2007), and Simon Evnine (2016).", "\nRuth Millikan (1984) offers a general theory of function that, in the\ncase of artifacts, mixes intentional and non-intentional elements. Her\nmain interest is in proper functions—what a biological trait or\nartifact is supposed to do, and is malfunctioning if it cannot do. On\nMillikan’s view, what she calls direct proper functions, whether\nbiological or artifactual, are established by a history of selection\nand reproduction for the effect constituting the function. So what is\nessential for the establishment of an artifact’s function is\nwhether or not its ancestors—artifacts of that kind—were\nreproduced for that effect. This is what the artifact is supposed to\ndo, even if it is not able to do it because of damage or an\nunfavorable environment. Thus far Millikan’s account is\nnon-intentional, for the role of human intentional states is merely\none factor in the implementation of the reproduction process. However,\nthe other half of Millikan’s account concerns what she calls\nderived proper functions. These are functions that are established by\nsomething that has the direct proper function of producing something\nelse to accomplish a purpose. Millikan’s favored example of\nbiological derived proper function is a novel shade of brown sported\nby a chameleon. It has no history of selection and reproduction for\nthe effect of camouflaging the chameleon, and yet we want to say that\nthat is its proper function. And we can say so, according to Millikan,\nbecause the color-alteration mechanism possessed by chameleons has the\ndirect proper function of changing chameleons’ skin color to\ncamouflage them by matching their surroundings. Thus this novel shade\nof brown does have the derived proper function of\ncamouflaging the chameleon. Derived proper functions in the realm of\nartifacts bring intention back to the fore. On Millikan’s view,\nintentional states have evolutionarily established direct proper\nfunctions. The direct proper function of intentions is to produce\nsomething else to accomplish whatever purpose the intention\nincorporates. Thus, if you intend to produce a can opener, the\nexecution of your intention brings into existence a device having the\nderived proper function of opening cans. Even if this device works in\na completely novel way, and even if it is not capable of performing as\nenvisioned, opening cans is still what it is supposed to do. Usually,\nthe direct and derived proper functions of artifacts coincide—in\nthe case of a standard can opener, for instance, we have both a\nhistory of selection and reproduction and a current intention to\nreproduce yet another can opener. But in the case of novel prototypes,\nespecially, it is intention alone that establishes the (derived)\nproper function.", "\nWybo Houkes and Pieter Vermaas (Houkes & Vermaas 2004; 2010;\nVermaas & Houkes 2003) also have a mixed theory, although\nintentionalist factors predominate, in contrast to Millikan’s\nfocus on non-intentionalist history of reproduction. Their approach is\nto derive a theory of artifact function from a theory of artifact use\nand design.", "\n\n\nOn our theory, an artifact function is a capacity, supposed or actual,\nwhich has a preferential status in the context of certain actions and\nbeliefs. It is therefore a highly relational property, which\nsupervenes on both the actual physical makeup of an artifact and on\nthe beliefs and actions of human agents, designers as well as users.\n(Houkes & Vermaas 2004, 67)\n", "\nHoukes and Vermaas focus on the use plan formulated by designers as\nestablishing the function of the artifact in the first instance. This\nis the predominant intentionalist element in their account. But on\ntheir view, this use plan must be supported by a justification that\nthe plan will realize the function, and this requires knowledge of the\ncausal roles of the physicochemical capacities of the artifact.\nThrough this required justification the actual physical structure of\nthe artifact constrains the intentions articulated in the use plan.\nThis is a non-intentionalist element. In addition, they require a\nhistorical element in the form of the communication of the use plan\nfrom designer to user and subsequently from user to user. They refer\nto this element as “evolutionary”, in an apparent\nreference to cultural evolution, but clearly this element, too, is\nprimarily intentional since the evolution is carried out in a series\nof intentional communications. Houkes and Vermaas refer to their\ntheory as the ICE (Intention, Causal role, Evolution) theory of\nartifact function. Other mixed theories include those of Paul\nGriffiths (1993) and Philip Kitcher (1993).", "\nAt the lonelier, non-intentionalist end of the spectrum is Beth\nPreston’s (1998; 2013) account. Her initial concern is to\nadvance a pluralist theory of artifact function according to which\nartifacts have both proper functions and what Preston calls system\nfunctions. For example, the proper function of plates is to hold food\nfor serving or eating. But they function equally well as saucers for\npotted plants, or in a stack to weight down tofu or eggplant slices to\nextract the moisture. For proper function, Preston relies on\nMillikan’s account of direct proper function, but without the\nadded element of derived proper function that brings intention back\nin. For system function, she relies on Robert Cummins’ (1975)\ntheory of biological function, according to which function is\nestablished by the causal role a component plays in a system. Neither\nMillikan’s nor Cummins’ account is intrinsically\nintentionalist, since they are designed to fit both the biological and\nthe artifactual cases. Preston resists reformulating them in\nintentionalist terms, while acknowledging that in the artifact case\nhuman intentions and other intentional states do play a role in\nimplementing the history of selective reproduction and the system\ncontext, respectively. In support of this resolutely\nnon-intentionalist stance, Preston argues that human intentions do not\narise in a vacuum, but are reproduced in and through the process by\nwhich material culture, with its myriad of functional artifacts, is\nreproduced. Intentions to make plates are reproduced in plate cultures\nas surely as the plates themselves; and only in cultures with both\npotted plants and plates can intentions to use plates as pot\nsaucers form.", "\n\n\nThe only viable view is one that sees human purposes and the proper\nfunctions of items of material culture indissolubly linked in patterns\nof use and reproduction. Thus, it no longer seems reasonable to ask\nwhich came first, the purpose or the proper function. Both are\nproduced and reproduced through the self-same social process. (Preston\n2013, 206)\n", "\nPreston is joined here by Crawford Elder (2004), whose account of\ncopied kinds, as we noted above, similarly characterizes human\nintentions as themselves dependent on the copying process rather than\ninitiating and controlling it.", "\nThe theories discussed in this section encounter a number of important\nproblems in accounting for function phenomena in the artifact realm.\nOne such problematic phenomenon is the distinction between proper and\nnon-proper functions. This does occur in the biological\nrealm—pigeon beaks did not evolve to peck buttons for a food\nreward, for example—but it is relatively rare. In material\nculture, it is ubiquitous. Humans are just very good at adopting\nwhatever artifact will accomplish their purposes, regardless of its\nproper function. Stop a random person in the street and ask—she\nwill have a story. Intentionalist approaches have more difficulty\nmaking this distinction, because for these views human intentions are\nthe only mechanism for establishing functions, and this elides the\ndistinction unless some difference can be discerned in the intentions\nthemselves. Authors who have discussed this issue recently include\nWybo Houkes and Pieter Vermaas (2010), Beth Preston (2013) and Simon\nEvnine (2016). Another problem is accounting for malfunction. Just as\nany theory of representation must account for misrepresentation, any\ntheory of function must say something about cases of failure to\nperform, and whether or not that failure is a malfunction or something\nelse. Addressing this issue depends to some extent on the distinction\nbetween proper and non-proper functions, because malfunction only\nseems an appropriate designation in the case of failure to perform a\nproper function—failure to do what the artifact is supposed to\ndo, in other words. This issue is especially important for the\nphilosophy of technology and engineering side of the artifact debates,\nwhere understanding the epistemology of problem solving and innovation\ndepends in part on understanding failure to function and how to learn\nfrom and deal with it. Authors who have covered this issue include\nNeander (1995), Baker (2007), Franssen (2006; 2009), Houkes and\nVermaas (2010) and Kroes (2012).", "\nA third problem is how to account for the functions—if\nany—of novel prototypes. Non-intentional accounts have more\ndifficulty in this case, for a truly novel prototype has no history of\nselection and reproduction; and if it does not work, as many\nprototypes in fact do not, then function established in terms of\nsystemic causal role or physicochemical capacities is not possible\neither. This problem is one of the main motivations for\nMillikan’s (1984) introduction of derived proper function, since\ndesigner intention seems to be the only way unsuccessful novel\nprototypes could acquire any kind of function at all. The\nnon-intentionalist then is caught between biting the\nbullet—unsuccessful novel prototypes just do not have\nfunctions—or introducing an ad hoc intentionalist\nelement. This issue has been canvassed by Preston\n(1998; 2003; 2013), Millikan (1999), Vermaas and Houkes\n(2003) and Kroes (2012). A related problem is how to account for\nso-called phantom functions (Preston 2013)—the functions of\nartifacts that are constitutionally incapable of ever fulfilling them.\nTalismans to ensure fertility, for example, are now widely believed in\nWestern culture to have no efficacy, but it is difficult to escape the\nintuition that ensuring fertility is nevertheless their proper\nfunction. Here again, it is the non-intentionalist who is caught\nflatfooted. Although artifacts like fertility talismans are indeed\nreproduced for a purpose, the standard requirement for establishing\nproper function is that the artifact be selected for reproduction on\nthe basis of successful performance. Similarly, function established\nby systemic causal role requires that the artifact actually perform\nthe relevant causal role. Worse yet, the option of just biting the\nbullet and agreeing that such artifacts have no functions is nowhere\nnear as plausible as in the case of unsuccessful novel prototypes\nbecause of the prevalence of talismans, amulets, religious artifacts,\ninefficacious medicines and supplements, and the like. Authors who\nhave addressed this issue include Griffiths (1993), Preston\n(1998; 2013), Thomasson (2009), Parsons (2016) and Holm\n(2017)." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Artifact Functions" }, { "content": [ "\nMany works of art are typical artifacts, ontologically no more or less\nmysterious than hats or hacksaws. Vermeer’s Girl with a\nPearl Earring has extraordinary aesthetic qualities, but\notherwise it is just a concrete, spatiotemporal object, created by\nsomeone and straightforwardly subject to change and destruction. Not\nso with Amy Beach’s Gaelic Symphony, which we hesitate\nto identify with its performances, singly or collectively, and which\ntherefore does not appear to be located in time and space. However, it\ndoes purport to have a creator, and may perhaps be destroyed if all\ntraces of its performances and scores are wiped away. A symphony is a\nso-called repeatable work of art, that is, a work with multiple\ninstances. Performance arts of all kinds fall into this category, but\nso do cast sculptures, limited edition prints, art photographs, films,\nand the like. So understanding the ontology of repeatable works is a\ncentral task for philosophy of art.", "\nThe initial difficulty is that such works do not fit neatly into the\nstandard ontological bifurcation between concrete, spatiotemporal\nobjects such as hats and hacksaws and abstract, eternal objects such\nas numbers and sets. Like concrete objects, but unlike abstract\nobjects, repeatable works of art appear to be created and may change\nor be destroyed. Unlike concrete objects, but like abstract objects,\nthey do not appear to be located in space and time. Amie Thomasson\n(1999; 2004; 2006) sought to resolve this difficulty by proposing an\nintermediate ontological category of abstract artifacts—abstract\nin that they are not located in space and time; artifactual in that\nthey are intentionally created and can be destroyed. Thomasson\noriginally proposed this new category as part of her theory of\nfictional characters, but she noted its usefulness to the analysis of\nthe literary works those characters inhabit, repeatable works of art\nin general, and perhaps other social objects as well. (For application\nto repeatable works of art, see the essays in Art and Abstract\nObjects (Mag Uidhir 2012). Applications to other social objects\ninclude software (Irmak 2012), establishments (Korman 2020), and\nnormativity (Frugé 2022).)", "\nHowever, further difficulties beset the positing of abstract\nartifacts. It is commonly thought that abstract objects are not just\nnon-spatiotemporal, but non-causal. Our causal commerce is with their\ninstances, not with the abstract objects themselves. But this makes it\nhard to understand how abstract objects could possibly be created.\nErik Satie could certainly create an instance of his\nGymnopédies by playing it on his piano, but it is\nunclear in what sense he could be the author of this musical work as\nan abstract object separate from its instances. According to Jerrold\nLevinson (1980), the last decades of the 20th century saw a\nnear consensus that musical works are abstract objects of a more\nfamiliar sort—structural types that exist eternally and without\nchange, independent of their instances in the causally governed,\nspatiotemporal realm. A leading objection to this consensus is that\ncomposers cannot then bring their works into existence, contrary to\ncommon sense. So the music ontologist faces a dilemma—give up on\nthe idea that musical works are abstract structural types, or explain\nhow the composer can reasonably be said to create musical works even\nthough the abstract structural types that comprise them are already in\nexistence. This difficulty generalizes to other repeatable types of\nartworks that are held to be abstract objects. But most importantly,\ncharacterizing repeatable artworks as abstract artifacts does not\nallow the ontologist to escape this difficulty. Abstract artifacts do\nnot belong to the causal realm of space and time any more than their\neternal and changeless cousins do. So simply saying that they are\nartifacts, and therefore created and destroyed like all other\nartifacts, does not by itself explain how this creation and\ndestruction is possible.", "\nResponses run the gamut. Julian Dodd (2000) bites the bullet and\nargues that musical works are discovered, not created. Levinson (1980)\nfamously proposes that composers create musical works by selecting\namong and indicating pre-existing abstract sound structures and\npreferred performance means. In western classical music, for example,\nthese indications are embodied in the written score for the work,\nwhich guides the production of instances. However, abstract artifacts,\nby hypothesis, do not pre-exist the creative acts of authors, so they\ncannot be created by Levinson’s selection-and-indication\nprocess. A popular alternative involves the metaphysical relationship\nof existential dependence. On this view, repeatable works of art have\na dependence base, typically consisting of an author’s mental\nand physical acts which bring an initial instance of the work into\nexistence, subsequent copies of that instance that sustain the work,\nand an audience capable of appreciating and interpreting those\ninstances. The work itself is an abstract artifact, dependent on, but\nexisting separately from, these acts and instances. It begins when\nthey begin and ends when they all cease or are destroyed. Nurbay Irmak\n(2021) argues that existential dependence allows for a non-causal type\nof creation. The artist engages in causal relations with concrete\nobjects and by so doing non-causally creates the dependent abstract\nartifact. Lee Walters (2013), on the other hand, argues that some\nabstract objects can enter into causal relationships, so the process\nof creating an existentially dependent abstract artifact might\nconceivably qualify as ordinary causal creation.", "\nThese difficulties have prompted some philosophers to avoid the moves\nthat generate them. An early such attempt is Guy Rohrbaugh’s\n(2003) view that works of art are not abstract objects at all, but\nrather historical individuals—non-physical entities\nontologically dependent on a physical series of historically and\ncausally linked physical objects. For example, a photograph is a\nnon-physical entity dependent on its “embodiments” in a negative\nand subsequent prints. In a more recent proposal, Christy Mag\nUidhir (2013) argues that works of art must have authors, but that\nneither discovery, nor indication of abstract structures, nor\nexistential dependence satisfies the requirements for authorship. He\nconcludes that repeatable works of art cannot be abstract objects of\nany kind, but must rather be ordinary concrete objects. Their apparent\nrepeatability does not mean that they are instances of an abstract\nwork, but only that they bear relevant similarity to one another. In a\nrelated vein, Allan Hazlett (2012) claims that there are no repeatable\nartworks. If there were, he says, they would have to be abstract\nobjects. But abstract objects have all their intrinsic properties\nessentially, whereas artworks typically do not. For example, Alvin\nAiley’s major work, Revelations, premiered as a 10\nsection work lasting an hour, but evolved into a half hour long piece\nin three sections. So, clearly, many of its original properties were\nnot essential to it. Hazlett concludes that apparent repetitions are\nnot instances of an abstract object. They are either separate, similar\nartworks, or copies of an original.", "\nThe discussion of abstract artifacts has been largely confined to the\nontology of art. But as some of the participants have noted (e.g.,\nLevinson 1980, 21–22), repeatable works are not confined to\nworks of art. This is particularly clear for named artifacts such as\nChanel No. 5, the Ford F-150, Campbell’s tomato soup, Earl Grey\ntea, the Hepplewhite chair, or the Washington quarter. It is possible\nto see each bottle of Chanel No. 5 or each quarter not as a\ndistinctive artifact in its own right, but as an instance of an\nabstract artifact—Chanel No. 5 tout court, or the\nWashington quarter. Apart from marketing and branding concerns, what\ndoes the naming of such ordinary artifacts accomplish? It highlights\ntheir standardization, and often designates the entity responsible for\nmaintaining it—Ford, in the case of the F-150, for instance. But\nstandardization is a virtually universal feature of human artifacts,\nfrom the Acheulean handaxe to the Apple MacBook Air. There are\nvanishingly few artifacts that are unique in the way non-repeatable\nartworks like paintings are supposed to be. Failed prototypes that\nwere never reproduced might be an example. This means that we are\npotentially swimming in abstract artifacts, with all the philosophical\ndifficulties that would entail. This, in turn, highlights views\nopposed to the positing of abstract artifacts, which are more\nplausible in the case of everyday artifacts. We resist thinking of\nperformances of Beach’s Gaelic Symphony as separate,\nrelevantly similar artifacts because we are used to thinking of\nsymphonies as unique, individual works. But the Washington\nquarter does not seem like a work in the same sense, and there is thus\nless reason to resist the idea that individual quarters are just\nrelevantly similar artifacts produced by a copying process managed by\nthe United States Mint. In this regard, we might consider that the\nnotion of the work, functioning as a regulatory concept for the arts,\nis arguably neither universal nor of ancient lineage, even in the\nwestern tradition (Goehr 1993). In short, the time may be ripe\nfor the discussion of abstract artifacts to be expanded to cover\nartifacts in general, perhaps with different outcomes than in its\nnative context." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Abstract Artifacts" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe metaphysics of artifacts is a fairly well delineated set of\ndiscussions, carried out by a fairly cohesive group of philosophers.\nIn contrast, the epistemology of artifacts is more interdisciplinary\nin nature, ranging over anthropology, archaeology, cognitive science,\nand psychology, in addition to philosophy. Within philosophy it runs\nthe gamut from environmental philosophy to philosophy of mind.\n Section 3.1\n returns in more detail to the methodological considerations already\nbroached in\n Section 2.2.\n Section 3.2 takes up issues concerning artifacts as objects of\nknowledge. Finally,\n Section 3.3\n covers issues arising in studies of cognition in which artifacts are\npresented as playing significant and sometimes controversial roles in\ncognitive processes themselves." ], "section_title": "3. Epistemology", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nReydon’s identification of an epistemological turn in our\nunderstanding of kinds and categories leads to a new question about\nthe category “artifact”. Rather than only asking whether\nit carves the world at a joint, we can also ask: Is it serving our\nepistemic purposes well? A number of authors have argued that\n“artifact” is methodologically counterproductive. Dan\nSperber (2007, 136–137) claims that it is not a useful\ncategory for the purposes of a naturalistic social science.", "\n\n\nI have tried to cast doubt on the idea that a theoretically useful\nnotion of artifact can be built around its usual prototypes:\nbracelets, jars, hammers, and other inert objects, or that it can be\ndefined in a more systematic way…. There is no good reason why\na naturalistic social science should treat separately, or even give\npride of place to, cultural productions that are both more clearly\nintended for a purpose and more thoroughly designed by humans, that\nis, to prototypical artifacts. (Sperber 2007, 137)\n", "\nSperber’s main argument for this conclusion, as we noted in\n Section 1,\n is based on the continuum problem. But Sperber also suggests that in\nfocusing on paradigmatic artifacts as the basis for our\ncategorization, we are allowing ourselves to be epistemologically\ndisadvantaged by “a doubly obsolete industrial-age revival of a\nPaleolithic categorization” (2007, 136). In the\nPaleolithic, before there were any domesticates other than dogs, the\n(few) technologies people used in their daily lives were\nparadigmatic artifacts—stone tools, baskets, beads, and so on.\nSo, Sperber speculates, we evolved a psychological disposition to\nclassify things in accordance with the predominance of such artifacts.\nWe then retained this disposition right through the Neolithic\ntransition to agriculture 12,000 years ago, which made biological\nartifacts (as Sperber calls domesticates) proportionally the most\ncommon type of artifact in human experience until the Industrial\ntransition of only a couple of centuries ago. This is the first sense\nin which our “artifact” category is obsolete. Second,\nSperber argues, information technology has increasingly contributed to\nour environment artifacts that would have astonished Aristotle with\ntheir ability to act on their own, beyond any intention their creators\nmay have. Simultaneously, biotechnology has made impressing our\nintentions on our biological artifacts increasingly effective. These\ncountervailing trends further reduce the dominance of erstwhile\nparadigmatic artifacts in our lives. This is the second sense in which\nour “artifact” category is obsolete. In short, Sperber\nseems to suggest, if we cannot shake the Paleolithic urge to center\nthe “artifact” category on the paradigmatic bracelets and\njars, we should jettison the category altogether, for the sake of an\nepistemologically adequate social science.", "\nBeth Preston (2013, 4–7) declines to use the term\n“artifact”, opting instead for the more open-ended\n“material culture”. The initial problem she identifies is\nthat phenomena of interest from the point of view of human interaction\nwith the environment do not divide naturally into interactions with\nartifacts and interactions with other sorts of things. We noted an\nexample of this in\n Section 1—intentionally\n made paths, which do qualify as artifacts, are used in the same way\nas unintentionally made paths. It thus seems methodologically\nwrongheaded to rule the unintentionally made path out of consideration\non a definitional technicality. Similarly, residues such as sawdust,\nwhey, or fingerprints often enter into human practices in important\nways, but a focus on artifacts as traditionally defined may leave\nthese phenomena out of account as well. Preston also argues that it is\nprecisely the central concepts in a field of investigation that should\nbe left open-ended, on pain of epistemic distortion of the results.\nFor example, defining “mind” very strictly might have\nruled the extended mind debate out in advance.", "\nSteven Vogel (2003; 2015) argues that no good sense can be made\nof the artifact-nature distinction, making it unfit for the purposes\nof environmental philosophy. His argument unrolls against the backdrop\nof a longstanding controversy in environmental philosophy about the\nvalue of ecological restoration—the practice of restoring areas\ndamaged by mining, industrial waste and the like to something as close\nas possible to the condition they were in before the damage was done.\nThe ontological status of such sites has been challenged on the\ngrounds that such restoration does not actually restore nature but\nrather creates an artifact (Katz 1997). Worse yet, this artifact is\npassed off as nature, so it is a fake (Elliot 1997). This casts doubt\non the ethical and political value of ecological restoration as an\nenvironmental practice. Vogel responds by questioning the unspoken\nassumption that environmental philosophy is about nature, and\nenvironmental activism about protecting nature from human activity. He\nargues that nature conceived as pristine and independent in this way\ndoes not exist—certainly not now that human activity is global\nin its effects, as Bill McKibben (1989) noted long ago, but in\nprinciple, since humans, like all other living things, change their\nenvironment simply by living in it. On Vogel’s view,\nenvironmental philosophy is about just that—the environment,\nboth built and not-so-built, and what we should do to ensure that it\nis the environment we want and need, not only for ourselves but for\nother beings as well.", "\nThe important point for our purposes, though, is that Vogel’s\npost-nature environmental philosophy rests on a full-throated\nrejection of the nature-artifact categorization. He begins with the\nclaim that our concepts of nature—already multiple, and not\nalways carefully distinguished—are riddled with\nantinomy-generating ambiguities. The epistemological backwash leaves\nus mired in nostalgia, unable to see and address environmental\nproblems as they actually exist. In particular, we are unable to see\nthat ecological restoration does not produce artifacts by the\ntraditional definition, since restored areas are designed precisely to\nescape our designs and outrun our intentions. They are thus\n“wild” in a perfectly straightforward sense. Furthermore,\nVogel argues, all human productions, including artifacts, are wild in\nthis sense. Rather than focusing on unintentional creations, as\nPreston and Sperber tend to do, Vogel emphasizes the ways in which\nartifacts outrun all our creative intentions.", "\n\n\nBuilding an artifact requires black boxes all the way down: to\ndesign and build anything requires presupposing a whole set of\nprocesses that one does not design, and whose operation beyond\none’s understanding and intention is necessary for building to\ntake place. There is a gap, in the construction of every\nartifact, between the intention with which the builder acts and the\nconsequences of her acts, a gap that is ineliminable and indeed\nconstitutive of what it is to construct something, and in this gap\nresides something like what I earlier called wildness. (Vogel\n2015, 113)\n", "\nThus the traditional definition of\n“artifact”—something intentionally made for a\npurpose—while true as far as it goes, merely skates over the\nsurface, leaving us at an epistemological disadvantage with regard to\nthe full range and depth of the phenomena." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Methodology" }, { "content": [ "\nVogel’s position on environmental ethics resonates in an\ninteresting way with a much earlier dispute about\nreference—specifically, about whether our capacity to refer to\ndifferent kinds of artifacts is grounded in a definite description of\nwhat being a member of that kind requires, or rather in a historical\nconnection to a “baptismal” event in which someone slapped\na label on something and declared that label henceforth applicable to\nthings of that sort. Hilary Putnam (1975) famously favors the\nbaptismal account for both natural kinds and artifact kinds. Steven\nSchwartz (1978) challenges Putnam’s account in the case of\nartifacts. He agrees with Putnam that the “baptismal”\naccount is correct for natural kinds, because they have hidden natures\nto which we are not necessarily privy. Thus if we are to refer to\nnatural objects reliably at all, it cannot be by way of definite\ndescription. But artifacts, Schwartz says, have publicly accessible\nnatures based on form and function, so reference to them is grounded\nin description rather than a baptismal event. Amie Thomasson\n(2003; 2007b) carves out a nuanced position based on her view\nthat the intentions and concepts of human makers are constitutive of\nartifact kinds\n (Section 2.2\n above). If so, then some makers are in an epistemically privileged\nposition with regard to given artifacts, and so do refer to them in\nvirtue of having a substantive concept of what being an artifact of\nthat kind involves. Thomasson acknowledges that most speakers are not\nin this epistemically privileged position. Users are not, and even\nmany who qualify as makers in the causal sense—workers on a\nproduction line, for instance—may not be. So Thomasson’s\nview, unlike Schwartz’s, is not a return to a purely descriptive\ntheory of reference for artifact terms, but rather a hybrid theory.\nHilary Kornblith (2007) argues against Thomasson that she has still\nnot demonstrated any essential connection between makers’\nsubstantive concepts of artifacts and reference. On the one hand, in\ncases where a type of artifact is no longer used for the purpose the\nmaker intended, the users’ concept would seem decisive. On the\nother hand, having the concept is arguably the result of familiarity\nwith the artifact rather than any special semantic capacity enjoyed by\nmakers. Similarly, Kornblith (1980) argues against Schwartz that the\nfunction of artifacts is not necessarily accessible—a problem\nfaced frequently by archaeologists, for instance—and thus that\neven in cases of objects where the form and function are familiar, it\nis not this familiarity that grounds the ability to refer. The\nbaptismal account of reference therefore must apply to both artifacts\nand natural objects, just as Putnam said. Such semantic parity between\nartifacts and natural objects, which rejects any privilege for\nmakers’ intentions, echoes Vogel’s view that artifacts and\nnatural objects are equally “wild”, because artifacts\noutrun their makers’ intentions in practice, just as surely as\nnatural objects outrun human intentions in principle.", "\nMuch of the epistemology of artifacts is, in the first instance, the\nprovince of cognitive psychology, not philosophy. Artifact kinds, for\ninstance, can be approached from the side of psychology rather than\nmetaphysics, yielding theories about the psychological mechanisms by\nmeans of which we group artifacts together, apart from any question of\nwhether these groupings represent reality (Malt & Sloman 2007a).\nIn an influential article, Paul Bloom (1996) argues that we cannot\ncategorize artifacts based on form, use, or function. Form and use are\nboth too variable to be reliable. Beanbag chairs do not look much like\nother chairs, and even if every flatiron in existence were currently\nbeing used as a doorstop, we would not want to categorize them as\ndoorstops. Experiments show that even intended function is neither\nnecessary nor sufficient for categorization (Malt & Johnson 1992).\nVary the form of something sufficiently, and people will decline to\ncategorize it as a chair even if it is made to be sat on. On the other\nhand, present them with something that looks like a chair but is made\nto be a plant stand, and they will still categorize it as a chair. In\nresponse, Bloom proposes an intentional-historical theory, according\nto which categorization of artifacts depends on our being able to\ninfer that an artifact was successfully made with the intention that\nit belong to a particular category. Form and use are good grounds for\nsuch inferences, and this explains our intuition that these factors\nhave something to do with how we categorize artifacts. So if something\nlooks like a chair and we regularly observe people sitting on it, we\nreasonably infer it was made with the intention that it be a chair,\nand we categorize it accordingly. (Bloom’s view is clearly\nancestral to Amie Thomasson’s account of artifact kinds\n (Section 2.2),\n but he is concerned only to explain how we group artifacts, and does\nnot claim, as Thomasson does, that makers’ intentions and\nconcepts are ontologically constitutive of artifact kinds.) Barbara\nMalt and Eric Johnson (1998) criticize Bloom for failing to make clear\neither why we would need to resort to creator’s intention to\ncategorize artifacts, or exactly how we might assess that intention.\nMore recently, Malt and Steven Sloman (2007a; 2007b) have argued\nthat the kind of essentialist approach represented by Bloom’s\ntheory is misguided, and have proposed an alternative, pragmatic\napproach. In a series of experiments, they show that artifact\ncategorization is sensitive to communicative goals in specific\nsituations. Creators’ intentions are important with regard to\nsome goals and situations; unimportant with regard to others. If this\napproach is on the right track, artifact kinds are not psychologically\nstable or clearly demarcated groupings. Moreover, this raises the\npossibility that “categorization” itself is not a\npsychological natural kind. It may be that this label is used for what\nis actually a heterogeneous collection of processes.", "\nDevelopmental issues with regard to our concepts of\n“artifact” and specific kinds of artifacts also loom large\nin cognitive psychology. As philosophers might anticipate, the\nunderlying general issue is between empiricist and nativist approaches\nto concept acquisition. But the now vast experimental literature on\nchild development means that theories in this area are both numerous\nand highly sophisticated. An empiricist-oriented theory that stands\nout is Jean Mandler’s (2004; 2007) comprehensive perceptual\nmeaning analysis view, according to which children construct abstract\nimage schemas on the basis of their perceptual experience, especially\ntheir experience of motion. Since artifacts and animals move in\ncharacteristically different ways, the first level of differentiation\nthese image schemas provide is vague, global concepts of these two\ntypes of objects. Mandler holds that there is no good reason to think\nthese concepts are innate, nor is there any good reason to think that\nthe perceptual meaning analysis mechanisms that produce them are\ndomain specific. All that is innate, on her view, is a domain-general\nmechanism that enables the child to analyze her perceptual input.\nMandler’s work also indicates that artifacts may be first\ndifferentiated into indoor and outdoor, and only then into more\nspecific kinds such as furniture and kitchen utensils, on the one\nhand, and vehicles and buildings, on the other. The nativist\nalternative to Mandler’s theory is best represented by Susan\nCarey’s equally comprehensive “core cognition”\ntheory. Carey (2009, 194–196) has a characteristically\nnativist critique of Mandler. On the face of it, Mandler’s image\nschemas represent features of motion and the paths motions describe\nthrough space. However, Carey argues, there is no explanation of how\nthe child gets from these representations to a representation of\nagency, for example. No matter how distinctive the motions of animals,\nthey do not by themselves yield concepts of intention, attention, or\ngoal-directedness. On Carey’s view, these concepts must be\ninnate in the form of “core knowledge” (Spelke 2000), or\n“core cognition”, as Carey prefers to call it in her more\nrecent work. Core cognition is characterized by innate,\ndomain-specific mechanisms for the analysis of perceptual input,\ndesigned by natural selection to construct domain-specific\nrepresentations of the world, such as intention in the agent domain,\nor causality in the object domain. Both of these domains of core\ncognition are essential for the development of artifact concepts,\nbecause on Carey’s view (Kelemen & Carey 2007) we\nconceptualize artifacts as objects that have been intentionally\ndesigned to carry out a specific function. The developmental issue,\nthen, boils down to the question of whether we can construct artifact\nconcepts with only a single, domain-general mechanism for analyzing\nperceptual input, or whether we need at least two domain-specific\nmechanisms with quite different output." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Knowing Artifacts" } ] } ]	[ "Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Metaphysics, Physics, in\nJonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle,\nVolumes I and II, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.", "Baker, Lynne Rudder, 2007, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life:\nAn Essay in Practical Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511487545", "Bloom, Paul, 1996, “Intention, History, and Artifact\nConcepts”, Cognition, 60(1): 1–29.\ndoi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00699-0", "Boyd, Richard, 1999, “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher\nTaxa”, in Robert A. 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artificial-intelligence	Artificial Intelligence	First published Thu Jul 12, 2018	[ "\nArtificial intelligence (AI) is the field devoted to building\nartificial animals (or at least artificial creatures that – in\nsuitable contexts – appear to be animals) and, for\nmany, artificial persons (or at least artificial creatures that\n– in suitable contexts – appear to be\n persons).[1]\n Such goals immediately ensure that AI is a discipline of considerable\ninterest to many philosophers, and this has been confirmed (e.g.) by\nthe energetic attempt, on the part of numerous philosophers, to show\nthat these goals are in fact un/attainable. On the constructive side,\nmany of the core formalisms and techniques used in AI come out of, and\nare indeed still much used and refined in, philosophy: first-order\nlogic and its extensions; intensional logics suitable for the modeling\nof doxastic attitudes and deontic reasoning; inductive logic,\nprobability theory, and probabilistic reasoning; practical reasoning\nand planning, and so on. In light of this, some philosophers conduct\nAI research and development as philosophy. ", "\nIn the present entry, the history of AI is briefly recounted, proposed\ndefinitions of the field are discussed, and an overview of the field\nis provided. In addition, both philosophical AI (AI pursued as and out\nof philosophy) and philosophy of AI are discussed, via\nexamples of both. The entry ends with some de rigueur\nspeculative commentary regarding the future of AI. " ]	[ { "content_title": "1. The History of AI", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. What Exactly ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Approaches to AI", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 The Intelligent Agent Continuum", "3.2 Logic-Based AI: Some Surgical Points", "3.3 Non-Logicist AI: A Summary", "3.4 AI Beyond the Clash of Paradigms " ] }, { "content_title": "4. The Explosive Growth of AI", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Bloom in Machine Learning ", "4.2 The Resurgence of Neurocomputational Techniques", "4.3 The Resurgence of Probabilistic Techniques" ] }, { "content_title": "5. AI in the Wild", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Moral AI", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Philosophical AI", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence", "sub_toc": [ "8.1 “Strong” versus “Weak” AI", "8.2 The Chinese Room Argument Against “Strong AI”", "8.3 The Gödelian Argument Against “Strong AI”", "8.4 Additional Topics and Readings in Philosophy of AI" ] }, { "content_title": "9. The Future", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [ " Online Courses on AI " ] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe field of artificial intelligence (AI) officially started in 1956,\nlaunched by a small but now-famous\n DARPA-sponsored\n summer conference at Dartmouth College, in Hanover, New Hampshire.\n(The 50-year celebration of this conference,\n AI@50,\n was held in July 2006 at Dartmouth, with five of the original\nparticipants making it\n back.[2]\n What happened at this historic conference figures in the final\nsection of this entry.) Ten thinkers attended, including John McCarthy\n(who was working at Dartmouth in 1956), Claude Shannon, Marvin Minsky,\nArthur Samuel, Trenchard Moore (apparently the lone note-taker at the\noriginal conference), Ray Solomonoff, Oliver Selfridge, Allen Newell,\nand Herbert Simon. From where we stand now, into the start of the new\nmillennium, the Dartmouth conference is memorable for many reasons,\nincluding this pair: one, the term ‘artificial\nintelligence’ was coined there (and has long been firmly\nentrenched, despite being disliked by some of the attendees, e.g.,\nMoore); two, Newell and Simon revealed a program – Logic\nTheorist (LT) – agreed by the attendees (and, indeed, by nearly\nall those who learned of and about it soon after the conference) to be\na remarkable achievement. LT was capable of proving elementary\ntheorems in the propositional\n calculus.[3][4]", "\nThough the term ‘artificial intelligence’ made\nits advent at the 1956 conference, certainly the field of AI,\noperationally defined (defined, i.e., as a field constituted by\npractitioners who think and act in certain ways), was in operation\nbefore 1956. For example, in a famous Mind paper of 1950,\nAlan Turing argues that the question “Can a machine\nthink?” (and here Turing is talking about standard computing\nmachines: machines capable of computing functions from the natural\nnumbers (or pairs, triples, … thereof) to the natural numbers\nthat a Turing machine or equivalent can handle) should be replaced\nwith the question “Can a machine be linguistically\nindistinguishable from a human?.” Specifically, he proposes a\ntest, the\n “Turing Test”\n (TT) as it’s now known. In the TT, a woman and a computer are\nsequestered in sealed rooms, and a human judge, in the dark as to\nwhich of the two rooms contains which contestant, asks questions by\nemail (actually, by teletype, to use the original term) of the\ntwo. If, on the strength of returned answers, the judge can do no\nbetter than 50/50 when delivering a verdict as to which room houses\nwhich player, we say that the computer in question has passed\nthe TT. Passing in this sense operationalizes linguistic\nindistinguishability. Later, we shall discuss the role that TT has\nplayed, and indeed continues to play, in attempts to define AI. At the\nmoment, though, the point is that in his paper, Turing explicitly lays\ndown the call for building machines that would provide an existence\nproof of an affirmative answer to his question. The call even includes\na suggestion for how such construction should proceed. (He suggests\nthat “child machines” be built, and that these machines\ncould then gradually grow up on their own to learn to communicate in\nnatural language at the level of adult humans. This suggestion has\narguably been followed by Rodney Brooks and the philosopher Daniel\nDennett (1994) in the Cog Project. In addition, the Spielberg/Kubrick\nmovie A.I. is at least in part a cinematic exploration of\nTuring’s\n suggestion.[5])\n The TT continues to be at the heart of AI and discussions of its\nfoundations, as confirmed by the appearance of (Moor 2003). In fact,\nthe TT continues to be used to define the field, as in\nNilsson’s (1998) position, expressed in his textbook for the\nfield, that AI simply is the field devoted to building an artifact\nable to negotiate this test. Energy supplied by the dream of\nengineering a computer that can pass TT, or by controversy surrounding\nclaims that it has already been passed, is if anything\nstronger than ever, and the reader has only to do an internet search\nvia the string ", "\nturing test passed ", "\nto find up-to-the-minute attempts at reaching this dream, and attempts\n(sometimes made by philosophers) to debunk claims that some such\nattempt has succeeded.", "\nReturning to the issue of the historical record, even if one bolsters\nthe claim that AI started at the 1956 conference by adding the proviso\nthat ‘artificial intelligence’ refers to a nuts-and-bolts\nengineering pursuit (in which case Turing’s\nphilosophical discussion, despite calls for a child machine,\nwouldn’t exactly count as AI per se), one must confront the fact\nthat Turing, and indeed many predecessors, did attempt to build\nintelligent artifacts. In Turing’s case, such building was\nsurprisingly well-understood before the advent of programmable\ncomputers: Turing wrote a program for playing chess before there were\ncomputers to run such programs on, by slavishly following the code\nhimself. He did this well before 1950, and long before Newell (1973)\ngave thought in print to the possibility of a sustained, serious\nattempt at building a good chess-playing\n computer.[6]", "\nFrom the perspective of philosophy, which views the systematic\ninvestigation of mechanical intelligence as meaningful and productive\nseparate from the specific logicist formalisms (e.g., first-order\nlogic) and problems (e.g., the Entscheidungsproblem) that gave\nbirth to computer science, neither the 1956 conference, nor\nTuring’s Mind paper, come close to marking the start of\nAI. This is easy enough to see. For example, Descartes proposed TT\n(not the TT by name, of course) long before Turing was\n born.[7]\n Here’s the relevant passage: ", "\nIf there were machines which bore a resemblance to our body and\nimitated our actions as far as it was morally possible to do so, we\nshould always have two very certain tests by which to recognise that,\nfor all that, they were not real men. The first is, that they could\nnever use speech or other signs as we do when placing our thoughts on\nrecord for the benefit of others. For we can easily understand a\nmachine’s being constituted so that it can utter words, and even\nemit some responses to action on it of a corporeal kind, which brings\nabout a change in its organs; for instance, if it is touched in a\nparticular part it may ask what we wish to say to it; if in another\npart it may exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on. But it never\nhappens that it arranges its speech in various ways, in order to reply\nappropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even\nthe lowest type of man can do. And the second difference is, that\nalthough machines can perform certain things as well as or perhaps\nbetter than any of us can do, they infallibly fall short in others, by\nwhich means we may discover that they did not act from knowledge, but\nonly for the disposition of their organs. For while reason is a\nuniversal instrument which can serve for all contingencies, these\norgans have need of some special adaptation for every particular\naction. From this it follows that it is morally impossible that there\nshould be sufficient diversity in any machine to allow it to act in\nall the events of life in the same way as our reason causes us to act.\n(Descartes 1637, p. 116)\n", "\nAt the moment, Descartes is certainly carrying the\n day.[8]\n Turing predicted that his test would be passed by 2000, but the\nfireworks across the globe at the start of the new millennium have\nlong since died down, and the most articulate of computers still\ncan’t meaningfully debate a sharp toddler. Moreover, while in\ncertain focussed areas machines out-perform minds (IBM’s famous\nDeep Blue prevailed in chess over Gary Kasparov, e.g.; and more\nrecently, AI systems have prevailed in other games, e.g.\nJeopardy! and Go, about which more will momentarily be said),\nminds have a (Cartesian) capacity for cultivating their expertise in\nvirtually any sphere. (If it were announced to Deep Blue, or\nany current successor, that chess was no longer to be the game of\nchoice, but rather a heretofore unplayed variant of chess, the machine\nwould be trounced by human children of average intelligence having no\nchess expertise.) AI simply hasn’t managed to create\ngeneral intelligence; it hasn’t even managed to produce\nan artifact indicating that eventually it will create such a\nthing. ", "\nBut what about IBM Watson’s famous nail-biting victory in the\nJeopardy! game-show\n contest?[9]\n That certainly seems to be a machine triumph over humans on their\n“home field,” since Jeopardy! delivers a\nhuman-level linguistic challenge ranging across many domains. Indeed,\namong many AI cognoscenti, Watson’s success is considered to be\nmuch more impressive than Deep Blue’s, for numerous reasons. One\nreason is that while chess is generally considered to be\nwell-understood from the formal-computational perspective (after all,\nit’s well-known that there exists a perfect strategy for playing\nchess), in open-domain question-answering (QA), as in any\nsignificant natural-language processing task, there is no consensus as\nto what problem, formally speaking, one is trying to solve. Briefly,\nquestion-answering (QA) is what the reader would think it is: one asks\na question of a machine, and gets an answer, where the answer has to\nbe produced via some “significant” computational process.\n(See Strzalkowski & Harabagiu (2006) for an overview of what QA,\nhistorically, has been as a field.) A bit more precisely, there is no\nagreement as to what underlying function, formally speaking,\nquestion-answering capability computes. This lack of agreement stems\nquite naturally from the fact that there is of course no consensus as\nto what natural languages are, formally\n speaking.[10]\n Despite this murkiness, and in the face of an almost universal belief\nthat open-domain question-answering would remain unsolved for a decade\nor more, Watson decisively beat the two top human Jeopardy!\nchampions on the planet. During the contest, Watson had to answer\nquestions that required not only command of simple factoids\n(Question1), but also of some amount of rudimentary\nreasoning (in the form of temporal reasoning) and commonsense\n(Question2):", "\nQuestion1: The only two consecutive U.S. presidents\nwith the same first name. ", "\nQuestion2: In May 1898, Portugal celebrated the\n400th anniversary of this explorer’s arrival in India. ", "\nWhile Watson is demonstrably better than humans in\nJeopardy!-style quizzing (a new human Jeopardy! master\ncould arrive on the scene, but as for chess, AI now assumes that a\nsecond round of IBM-level investment would vanquish the new human\nopponent), this approach does not work for the kind of NLP challenge\nthat Descartes described; that is, Watson can’t converse on the\nfly. After all, some questions don’t hinge on sophisticated\ninformation retrieval and machine learning over pre-existing data, but\nrather on intricate reasoning right on the spot. Such questions may\nfor instance involve anaphora resolution, which require even deeper\ndegrees of commonsensical understanding of time, space, history, folk\npsychology, and so on. Levesque (2013) has catalogued some alarmingly\nsimple questions which fall in this category. (Marcus, 2013, gives an\naccount of Levesque’s challenges that is accessible to a wider\naudience.) The other class of question-answering tasks on which Watson\nfails can be characterized as dynamic question-answering. These\nare questions for which answers may not be recorded in textual form\nanywhere at the time of questioning, or for which answers are\ndependent on factors that change with time. Two questions that fall in\nthis category are given below (Govindarajulu et al. 2013):", "\nQuestion3: If I have 4 foos and 5 bars, and if foos\nare not the same as bars, how many foos will I have if I get 3 bazes\nwhich just happen to be foos?", "\nQuestion4: What was IBM’s Sharpe ratio in the\nlast 60 days of trading? ", "\nClosely following Watson’s victory, in March 2016,\n Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo\n defeated one of Go’s top-ranked players, Lee Seedol, in four\nout of five matches. This was considered a landmark achievement within\nAI, as it was widely believed in the AI community that computer\nvictory in Go was at least a few decades away, partly due to the\nenormous number of valid sequences of moves in Go compared to that in\n Chess.[11]\n While this is a remarkable achievement, it should be noted that,\ndespite breathless coverage in the popular\n press,[12]\n AlphaGo, while indisputably a great Go player, is just that. For\nexample, neither AlphaGo nor Watson can understand the rules of Go\nwritten in plain-and-simple English and produce a computer program\nthat can play the game. It’s interesting that there is one\nendeavor in AI that tackles a narrow version of this very problem: In\ngeneral game playing, a machine is given a description of a\nbrand new game just before it has to play the game (Genesereth et al.\n2005). However, the description in question is expressed in a formal\nlanguage, and the machine has to manage to play the game from this\ndescription. Note that this is still far from understanding even a\nsimple description of a game in English well enough to play it. ", "\nBut what if we consider the history of AI not from the perspective of\nphilosophy, but rather from the perspective of the field with which,\ntoday, it is most closely connected? The reference here is to computer\nscience. From this perspective, does AI run back to well before\nTuring? Interestingly enough, the results are the same: we find that\nAI runs deep into the past, and has always had philosophy in its\nveins. This is true for the simple reason that computer science grew\nout of logic and probability\n theory,[13]\n which in turn grew out of (and is still intertwined with) philosophy.\nComputer science, today, is shot through and through with logic; the\ntwo fields cannot be separated. This phenomenon has become an object\nof study unto itself (Halpern et al. 2001). The situation is no\ndifferent when we are talking not about traditional logic, but rather\nabout probabilistic formalisms, also a significant component of\nmodern-day AI: These formalisms also grew out of philosophy, as nicely\nchronicled, in part, by Glymour (1992). For example, in the one mind\nof Pascal was born a method of rigorously calculating probabilities,\nconditional probability (which plays a particularly large role in AI,\ncurrently), and such fertile philosophico-probabilistic arguments as\n Pascal’s wager,\n according to which it is irrational not to become a Christian. ", "\nThat modern-day AI has its roots in philosophy, and in fact that these\nhistorical roots are temporally deeper than even Descartes’\ndistant day, can be seen by looking to the clever, revealing cover of\nthe second edition (the third edition is the current one) of the\ncomprehensive textbook\n Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach\n (known in the AI community as simply AIMA2e for Russell &\nNorvig, 2002).", "\nWhat you see there is an eclectic collection of memorabilia that might\nbe on and around the desk of some imaginary AI researcher. For\nexample, if you look carefully, you will specifically see: a picture\nof Turing, a view of Big Ben through a window (perhaps R&N are\naware of the fact that Turing famously held at one point that a\nphysical machine with the power of a universal Turing machine is\nphysically impossible: he quipped that it would have to be the size of\nBig Ben), a planning algorithm described in Aristotle’s De\nMotu Animalium,\n Frege’s fascinating notation for first-order logic,\n a glimpse of Lewis Carroll’s (1958) pictorial representation of\nsyllogistic reasoning, Ramon Lull’s concept-generating wheel\nfrom his 13th-century Ars Magna, and a number of\nother pregnant items (including, in a clever, recursive, and\nbordering-on-self-congratulatory touch, a copy of AIMA itself).\nThough there is insufficient space here to make all the historical\nconnections, we can safely infer from the appearance of these items\n(and here we of course refer to the ancient ones: Aristotle conceived\nof planning as information-processing over two-and-a-half millennia\nback; and in addition, as Glymour (1992) notes, Artistotle can also be\ncredited with devising the first knowledge-bases and ontologies, two\ntypes of representation schemes that have long been central to AI)\nthat AI is indeed very, very old. Even those who insist that AI is at\nleast in part an artifact-building enterprise must concede that, in\nlight of these objects, AI is ancient, for it isn’t just\ntheorizing from the perspective that intelligence is at bottom\ncomputational that runs back into the remote past of human history:\nLull’s wheel, for example, marks an attempt to capture\nintelligence not only in computation, but in a physical artifact that\nembodies that\n computation.[14]\n ", "\nAIMA has now reached its the third edition, and those interested in\nthe history of AI, and for that matter the history of philosophy of\nmind, will not be disappointed by examination of the cover of the\nthird installment (the cover of the second edition is almost exactly\nlike the first edition). (All the elements of the cover, separately\nlisted and annotated, can be found\n online.)\n One significant addition to the cover of the third edition is a\ndrawing of Thomas Bayes; his appearance reflects the recent rise in\nthe popularity of probabilistic techniques in AI, which we discuss\nlater.", "\nOne final point about the history of AI seems worth making. ", "\nIt is generally assumed that the birth of modern-day AI in the 1950s\ncame in large part because of and through the advent of the modern\nhigh-speed digital computer. This assumption accords with\ncommon-sense. After all, AI (and, for that matter, to some degree its\ncousin, cognitive science, particularly computational cognitive\nmodeling, the sub-field of cognitive science devoted to producing\ncomputational simulations of human cognition) is aimed at implementing\nintelligence in a computer, and it stands to reason that such a goal\nwould be inseparably linked with the advent of such devices. However,\nthis is only part of the story: the part that reaches back but to\nTuring and others (e.g., von Neuman) responsible for the first\nelectronic computers. The other part is that, as already mentioned, AI\nhas a particularly strong tie, historically speaking, to reasoning\n(logic-based and, in the need to deal with uncertainty,\ninductive/probabilistic reasoning). In this story, nicely told by\nGlymour (1992), a search for an answer to the question “What is\na proof?” eventually led to an answer based on Frege’s\nversion of first-order logic (FOL): a (finitary) mathematical proof\nconsists in a series of step-by-step inferences from one formula of\nfirst-order logic to the next. The obvious extension of this answer\n(and it isn’t a complete answer, given that lots of classical\nmathematics, despite conventional wisdom, clearly can’t be\nexpressed in FOL; even the Peano Axioms, to be expressed as a finite\nset of formulae, require SOL) is to say that not only\nmathematical thinking, but thinking, period, can be expressed in FOL.\n(This extension was entertained by many logicians long before the\nstart of information-processing psychology and cognitive science\n– a fact some cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists\noften seem to forget.) Today, logic-based AI is only part of\nAI, but the point is that this part still lives (with help from logics\nmuch more powerful, but much more complicated, than FOL), and it can\nbe traced all the way back to Aristotle’s theory of the\n syllogism.[15]\n In the case of uncertain reasoning, the question isn’t\n“What is a proof?”, but rather questions such as\n“What is it rational to believe, in light of certain\nobservations and probabilities?” This is a question posed and\ntackled long before the arrival of digital computers. " ], "section_title": "1. The History of AI", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSo far we have been proceeding as if we have a firm and precise grasp\nof the nature of AI. But what exactly is AI? Philosophers\narguably know better than anyone that precisely defining a particular\ndiscipline to the satisfaction of all relevant parties (including\nthose working in the discipline itself) can be acutely challenging.\nPhilosophers of science certainly have proposed credible accounts of\nwhat constitutes at least the general shape and texture of a given\nfield of science and/or engineering, but what exactly is the\nagreed-upon definition of physics? What about biology? What, for that\nmatter, is philosophy, exactly? These are remarkably difficult, maybe\neven eternally unanswerable, questions, especially if the target is a\nconsensus definition. Perhaps the most prudent course we can\nmanage here under obvious space constraints is to present in\nencapsulated form some proposed definitions of AI. We do\ninclude a glimpse of recent attempts to define AI in detailed,\nrigorous fashion (and we suspect that such attempts will be of\ninterest to philosophers of science, and those interested in this\nsub-area of philosophy). ", "\nRussell and Norvig (1995, 2002, 2009), in their aforementioned\nAIMA text, provide a set of possible answers to the “What\nis AI?” question that has considerable currency in the field\nitself. These answers all assume that AI should be defined in terms of\nits goals: a candidate definition thus has the form “AI is the\nfield that aims at building …” The answers all fall under\na quartet of types placed along two dimensions. One dimension is\nwhether the goal is to match human performance, or, instead, ideal\nrationality. The other dimension is whether the goal is to build\nsystems that reason/think, or rather systems that act. The situation\nis summed up in this table:", "\nPlease note that this quartet of possibilities does reflect (at least\na significant portion of) the relevant literature. For example,\nphilosopher John Haugeland (1985) falls into the Human/Reasoning\nquadrant when he says that AI is “The exciting new effort to\nmake computers think … machines with minds, in the\nfull and literal sense.” (By far, this is the quadrant that most\npopular narratives affirm and explore. The recent\n Westworld\n TV series is a powerful case in point.) Luger and Stubblefield (1993)\nseem to fall into the Ideal/Act quadrant when they write: “The\nbranch of computer science that is concerned with the automation of\nintelligent behavior.” The Human/Act position is occupied most\nprominently by Turing, whose test is passed only by those systems able\nto act sufficiently like a human. The “thinking\nrationally” position is defended (e.g.) by Winston (1992). While\nit might not be entirely uncontroversial to assert that the four bins\ngiven here are exhaustive, such an assertion appears to be quite\nplausible, even when the literature up to the present moment is\ncanvassed. ", "\nIt’s important to know that the contrast between the focus on\nsystems that think/reason versus systems that act, while found, as we\nhave seen, at the heart of the AIMA texts, and at the heart of\nAI itself, should not be interpreted as implying that AI researchers\nview their work as falling all and only within one of these two\ncompartments. Researchers who focus more or less exclusively on\nknowledge representation and reasoning, are also quite prepared to\nacknowledge that they are working on (what they take to be) a central\ncomponent or capability within any one of a family of larger systems\nspanning the reason/act distinction. The clearest case may come from\nthe work on planning – an AI area traditionally making central\nuse of representation and reasoning. For good or ill, much of this\nresearch is done in abstraction (in vitro, as opposed to in vivo), but\nthe researchers involved certainly intend or at least hope that the\nresults of their work can be embedded into systems that actually do\nthings, such as, for example, execute the plans. ", "\nWhat about Russell and Norvig themselves? What is their answer to the\nWhat is AI? question? They are firmly in the the “acting\nrationally” camp. In fact, it’s safe to say both that they\nare the chief proponents of this answer, and that they have been\nremarkably successful evangelists. Their extremely influential\nAIMA series can be viewed as a book-length defense and\nspecification of the Ideal/Act category. We will look a bit later at\nhow Russell and Norvig lay out all of AI in terms of intelligent\nagents, which are systems that act in accordance with various\nideal standards for rationality. But first let’s look a bit\ncloser at the view of intelligence underlying the AIMA text. We\ncan do so by turning to Russell (1997). Here Russell recasts the\n“What is AI?” question as the question “What is\nintelligence?” (presumably under the assumption that we have a\ngood grasp of what an artifact is), and then he identifies\nintelligence with rationality. More specifically, Russell sees\nAI as the field devoted to building intelligent agents, which\nare functions taking as input tuples of percepts from the external\nenvironment, and producing behavior (actions) on the basis of these\npercepts. Russell’s overall picture is this one:", "\nLet’s unpack this diagram a bit, and take a look, first, at the\naccount of perfect rationality that can be derived from it. The\nbehavior of the agent in the environment \$E\$ (from a class \$\\bE\$\nof environments) produces a sequence of states or snapshots of that\nenvironment. A performance measure \$U\$ evaluates this sequence;\nnotice the box labeled “Performance Measure” in the above\nfigure. We let \$V(f,\\bE,U)\$ denote the expected utility\naccording to \$U\$ of the agent function \$f\$ operating on\n \$\\bE\$.[16]\n Now we identify a perfectly rational agent with the agent function:\n", "\nAccording to the above equation, a perfectly rational agent can be\ntaken to be the function \$f_{opt}\$ which produces the maximum\nexpected utility in the environment under consideration. Of course, as\nRussell points out, it’s usually not possible to actually build\nperfectly rational agents. For example, though it’s easy enough\nto specify an algorithm for playing invincible chess, it’s not\nfeasible to implement this algorithm. What traditionally happens in AI\nis that programs that are – to use Russell’s apt\nterminology – calculatively rational are constructed\ninstead: these are programs that, if executed infinitely fast,\nwould result in perfectly rational behavior. In the case of chess,\nthis would mean that we strive to write a program that runs an\nalgorithm capable, in principle, of finding a flawless move, but we\nadd features that truncate the search for this move in order to play\nwithin intervals of digestible duration. ", "\nRussell himself champions a new brand of intelligence/rationality for\nAI; he calls this brand bounded optimality. To understand\nRussell’s view, first we follow him in introducing a\ndistinction: We say that agents have two components: a program, and a\nmachine upon which the program runs. We write \$Agent(P, M)\$ to\ndenote the agent function implemented by program \$P\$ running on\nmachine \$M\$. Now, let \$\\mathcal{P}(M)\$ denote the set of all\nprograms \$P\$ that can run on machine \$M\$. The bounded\noptimal program \$P_{\\opt,M}\$ then is:", "\nYou can understand this equation in terms of any of the mathematical\nidealizations for standard computation. For example, machines can be\nidentified with Turing machines minus instructions (i.e., TMs are here\nviewed architecturally only: as having tapes divided into squares upon\nwhich symbols can be written, read/write heads capable of moving up\nand down the tape to write and erase, and control units which are in\none of a finite number of states at any time), and programs can be\nidentified with instructions in the Turing-machine model (telling the\nmachine to write and erase symbols, depending upon what state the\nmachine is in). So, if you are told that you must\n“program” within the constraints of a 22-state Turing\nmachine, you could search for the “best” program given\nthose constraints. In other words, you could strive to find the\noptimal program within the bounds of the 22-state architecture.\nRussell’s (1997) view is thus that AI is the field devoted to\ncreating optimal programs for intelligent agents, under time and space\nconstraints on the machines implementing these\n programs.[17]\n ", "\nThe reader must have noticed that in the equation for \$P_{\\opt,M}\$\nwe have not elaborated on \$\\bE\$ and \$U\$ and how equation\n\\eqref{eq1} might be used to construct an agent if the class of\nenvironments \$\\bE\$ is quite general, or if the true environment\n\$E\$ is simply unknown. Depending on the task for which one is\nconstructing an artificial agent, \$E\$ and \$U\$ would vary. The\nmathematical form of the environment \$E\$ and the utility function\n\$U\$ would vary wildly from, say, chess to Jeopardy!. Of\ncourse, if we were to design a globally intelligent agent, and not\njust a chess-playing agent, we could get away with having just one\npair of \$E\$ and \$U\$. What would \$E\$ look like if we were\nbuilding a generally intelligent agent and not just an agent that is\ngood at a single task? \$E\$ would be a model of not just a single\ngame or a task, but the entire physical-social-virtual universe\nconsisting of many games, tasks, situations, problems, etc. This\nproject is (at least currently) hopelessly difficult as, obviously, we\nare nowhere near to having such a comprehensive theory-of-everything\nmodel. For further discussion of a theoretical architecture put\nforward for this problem, see the\n Supplement on the AIXI architecture.\n ", "\nIt should be mentioned that there is a different, much more\nstraightforward answer to the “What is AI?” question. This\nanswer, which goes back to the days of the original Dartmouth\nconference, was expressed by, among others, Newell (1973), one of the\ngrandfathers of modern-day AI (recall that he attended the 1956\nconference); it is: ", "\nAI is the field devoted to building artifacts that are intelligent,\nwhere ‘intelligent’ is operationalized through\nintelligence tests (such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale),\nand other tests of mental ability (including, e.g., tests of\nmechanical ability, creativity, and so on).\n", "\nThe above definition can be seen as fully specifying a concrete\nversion of Russell and Norvig’s four possible goals. Though few\nare aware of this now, this answer was taken quite seriously for a\nwhile, and in fact underlied one of the most famous programs in the\nhistory of AI: the ANALOGY program of Evans (1968), which solved\ngeometric analogy problems of a type seen in many intelligence tests.\nAn attempt to rigorously define this forgotten form of AI (as what\nthey dub Psychometric AI), and to resurrect it from the days of\nNewell and Evans, is provided by Bringsjord and Schimanski (2003) [see\nalso e.g. (Bringsjord 2011)]. A sizable private investment has been\nmade in the ongoing attempt, now known as\n Project Aristo,\n to build a “digital Aristotle”, in the form of a machine\nable to excel on standardized tests such at the AP exams tackled by US\nhigh school students (Friedland et al. 2004). (Vibrant work in this\ndirection continues today at the\n Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence.)[18]\n In addition, researchers at Northwestern have forged a connection\nbetween AI and tests of mechanical ability (Klenk et al. 2005). ", "\nIn the end, as is the case with any discipline, to really know\nprecisely what that discipline is requires you to, at least to some\ndegree, dive in and do, or at least dive in and read. Two decades ago\nsuch a dive was quite manageable. Today, because the content that has\ncome to constitute AI has mushroomed, the dive (or at least the swim\nafter it) is a bit more demanding." ], "section_title": "2. What Exactly is AI?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThere are a number of ways of “carving up” AI. By far the\nmost prudent and productive way to summarize the field is to turn yet\nagain to the AIMA text given its comprehensive overview of the\nfield. " ], "section_title": "3. Approaches to AI", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAs Russell and Norvig (2009) tell us in the Preface of AIMA:\n", "\nThe main unifying theme is the idea of an intelligent agent. We define\nAI as the study of agents that receive percepts from the environment\nand perform actions. Each such agent implements a function that maps\npercept sequences to actions, and we cover different ways to represent\nthese functions… (Russell & Norvig 2009, vii)\n", "\nThe basic picture is thus summed up in this figure:", "\nThe content of AIMA derives, essentially, from fleshing out\nthis picture; that is, the above figure corresponds to the different\nways of representing the overall function that intelligent agents\nimplement. And there is a progression from the least powerful agents\nup to the more powerful ones. The following figure gives a high-level\nview of a simple kind of agent discussed early in the book. (Though\nsimple, this sort of agent corresponds to the architecture of\nrepresentation-free agents designed and implemented by Rodney Brooks,\n1991.)", "\nAs the book progresses, agents get increasingly sophisticated, and the\nimplementation of the function they represent thus draws from more and\nmore of what AI can currently muster. The following figure gives an\noverview of an agent that is a bit smarter than the simple reflex\nagent. This smarter agent has the ability to internally model the\noutside world, and is therefore not simply at the mercy of what can at\nthe moment be directly sensed.", "\nThere are seven parts to AIMA. As the reader passes through\nthese parts, she is introduced to agents that take on the powers\ndiscussed in each part. Part I is an introduction to the agent-based\nview. Part II is concerned with giving an intelligent agent the\ncapacity to think ahead a few steps in clearly defined environments.\nExamples here include agents able to successfully play games of\nperfect information, such as chess. Part III deals with agents that\nhave declarative knowledge and can reason in ways that will be quite\nfamiliar to most philosophers and logicians (e.g., knowledge-based\nagents deduce what actions should be taken to secure their goals).\nPart IV of the book outfits agents with the power to handle\nuncertainty by reasoning in probabilistic\n fashion.[19]\n In Part V, agents are given a capacity to learn. The following figure\nshows the overall structure of a learning agent.", "\nThe final set of powers agents are given allow them to communicate.\nThese powers are covered in Part VI. ", "\nPhilosophers who patiently travel the entire progression of\nincreasingly smart agents will no doubt ask, when reaching the end of\nPart VII, if anything is missing. Are we given enough, in general, to\nbuild an artificial person, or is there enough only to build a mere\nanimal? This question is implicit in the following from Charniak and\nMcDermott (1985): ", "\nThe ultimate goal of AI (which we are very far from achieving) is to\nbuild a person, or, more humbly, an animal. (Charniak & McDermott\n1985, 7)\n", "\nTo their credit, Russell & Norvig, in AIMA’s Chapter\n27, “AI: Present and Future,” consider this question, at\nleast to some\n degree.[]\n They do so by considering some challenges to AI that have hitherto\nnot been met. One of these challenges is described by R&N as\nfollows: ", "\n[M]achine learning has made very little progress on the important\nproblem of constructing new representations at levels of abstraction\nhigher than the input vocabulary. In computer vision, for example,\nlearning complex concepts such as Classroom and Cafeteria would be\nmade unnecessarily difficult if the agent were forced to work from\npixels as the input representation; instead, the agent needs to be\nable to form intermediate concepts first, such as Desk and Tray,\nwithout explicit human supervision. Similar concepts apply to learning\nbehavior: HavingACupOfTea is a very important high-level step\nin many plans, but how does it get into an action library that\ninitially contains much simpler actions such as RaiseArm and Swallow?\nPerhaps this will incorporate deep belief networks –\nBayesian networks that have multiple layers of hidden variables, as in\nthe work of Hinton et al. (2006), Hawkins and Blakeslee (2004),\nand Bengio and LeCun (2007). … Unless we understand such\nissues, we are faced with the daunting task of constructing large\ncommonsense knowledge bases by hand, and approach that has not fared\nwell to date. (Russell & Norvig 2009, Ch. 27.1)\n", "\nWhile there has seen some advances in addressing this challenge (in\nthe form of deep learning or representation learning),\nthis specific challenge is actually merely a foothill before a range\nof dizzyingly high mountains that AI must eventually somehow manage to\nclimb. One of those mountains, put simply, is\n reading.[21]\n Despite the fact that, as noted, Part V of AIMA is devoted to\nmachine learning, AI, as it stands, offers next to nothing in the way\nof a mechanization of learning by reading. Yet when you think about\nit, reading is probably the dominant way you learn at this stage in\nyour life. Consider what you’re doing at this very moment.\nIt’s a good bet that you are reading this sentence because,\nearlier, you set yourself the goal of learning about the field of AI.\n Yet\n the formal models of learning provided in AIMA’s Part IV\n(which are all and only the models at play in AI) cannot be applied to\nlearning by\n reading.[22]\n These models all start with a function-based view of learning.\nAccording to this view, to learn is almost invariably to produce an\nunderlying function \$\\ff\$ on the basis of a restricted set of\npairs", "\nFor example, consider receiving inputs consisting of 1, 2, 3, 4, and\n5, and corresponding range values of 1, 4, 9, 16, and 25; the goal is\nto “learn” the underlying mapping from natural numbers to\nnatural numbers. In this case, assume that the underlying function is\n\$n^2\$, and that you do “learn” it. While this narrow\nmodel of learning can be productively applied to a number of\nprocesses, the process of reading isn’t one of them. Learning by\nreading cannot (at least for the foreseeable future) be modeled as\ndivining a function that produces argument-value pairs. Instead, your\nreading about AI can pay dividends only if your knowledge has\nincreased in the right way, and if that knowledge leaves you\npoised to be able to produce behavior taken to confirm sufficient\nmastery of the subject area in question. This behavior can range from\ncorrectly answering and justifying test questions regarding AI, to\nproducing a robust, compelling presentation or paper that signals your\nachievement. ", "\nTwo points deserve to be made about machine reading. First, it may not\nbe clear to all readers that reading is an ability that is central to\nintelligence. The centrality derives from the fact that intelligence\nrequires vast knowledge. We have no other means of getting systematic\nknowledge into a system than to get it in from text, whether text on\nthe web, text in libraries, newspapers, and so on. You might even say\nthat the big problem with AI has been that machines really don’t\nknow much compared to humans. That can only be because of the fact\nthat humans read (or hear: illiterate people can listen to text being\nuttered and learn that way). Either machines gain knowledge by humans\nmanually encoding and inserting knowledge, or by reading and\nlistening. These are brute facts. (We leave aside supernatural\ntechniques, of course. Oddly enough, Turing didn’t: he seemed to\nthink ESP should be discussed in connection with the powers of minds\nand machines. See Turing,\n 1950.)[23]", "\nNow for the second point. Humans able to read have invariably also\nlearned a language, and learning languages has been modeled in\nconformity to the function-based approach adumbrated just above\n(Osherson et al. 1986). However, this doesn’t entail that an\nartificial agent able to read, at least to a significant degree, must\nhave really and truly learned a natural language. AI is first and\nforemost concerned with engineering computational artifacts that\nmeasure up to some test (where, yes, sometimes that test is from the\nhuman sphere), not with whether these artifacts process information in\nways that match those present in the human case. It may or may not be\nnecessary, when engineering a machine that can read, to imbue that\nmachine with human-level linguistic competence. The issue is\nempirical, and as time unfolds, and the engineering is pursued, we\nshall no doubt see the issue settled. ", "\nTwo additional high mountains facing AI are subjective consciousness\nand creativity, yet it would seem that these great challenges are ones\nthe field apparently hasn’t even come to grips with. Mental\nphenomena of paramount importance to many philosophers of mind and\nneuroscience are simply missing from AIMA. For example,\nconsciousness is only mentioned in passing in AIMA, but\nsubjective consciousness is the most important thing in our lives\n– indeed we only desire to go on living because we wish to go on\nenjoying subjective states of certain types. Moreover, if human minds\nare the product of evolution, then presumably phenomenal consciousness\nhas great survival value, and would be of tremendous help to a robot\nintended to have at least the behavioral repertoire of the first\ncreatures with brains that match our own (hunter-gatherers; see Pinker\n1997). Of course, subjective consciousness is largely missing from the\nsister fields of cognitive psychology and computational cognitive\nmodeling as well. We discuss some of these challenges in the\n Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence\n section below. For a list of similar challenges to cognitive science,\nsee the relevant\n section of the entry on cognitive science.[24]\n ", "\nTo some readers, it might seem in the very least tendentious to point\nto subjective consciousness as a major challenge to AI that it has yet\nto address. These readers might be of the view that pointing to this\nproblem is to look at AI through a distinctively philosophical prism,\nand indeed a controversial philosophical standpoint. ", "\nBut as its literature makes clear, AI measures itself by looking to\nanimals and humans and picking out in them remarkable mental powers,\nand by then seeing if these powers can be mechanized. Arguably the\npower most important to humans (the capacity to experience) is nowhere\nto be found on the target list of most AI researchers. There may be a\ngood reason for this (no formalism is at hand, perhaps), but there is\nno denying the state of affairs in question obtains, and that, in\nlight of how AI measures itself, that it’s worrisome. ", "\nAs to creativity, it’s quite remarkable that the power we most\npraise in human minds is nowhere to be found in AIMA. Just as\nin (Charniak & McDermott 1985) one cannot find\n‘neural’ in the index, ‘creativity’\ncan’t be found in the index of AIMA. This is particularly\nodd because many AI researchers have in fact worked on creativity\n(especially those coming out of philosophy; e.g., Boden 1994,\nBringsjord & Ferrucci 2000). ", "\nAlthough the focus has been on AIMA, any of its counterparts\ncould have been used. As an example, consider Artificial\nIntelligence: A New Synthesis, by Nils Nilsson. As in the case of\nAIMA, everything here revolves around a gradual progression\nfrom the simplest of agents (in Nilsson’s case, reactive\nagents), to ones having more and more of those powers that\ndistinguish persons. Energetic readers can verify that there is a\nstriking parallel between the main sections of Nilsson’s book\nand AIMA. In addition, Nilsson, like Russell and Norvig,\nignores phenomenal consciousness, reading, and creativity. None of the\nthree are even mentioned. Likewise, a recent comprehensive AI textbook\nby Luger (2008) follows the same pattern. ", "\nA final point to wrap up this section. It seems quite plausible to\nhold that there is a certain inevitability to the structure of an AI\ntextbook, and the apparent reason is perhaps rather interesting. In\npersonal conversation, Jim Hendler, a well-known AI researcher who is\none of the main innovators behind Semantic Web (Berners-Lee, Hendler,\nLassila 2001), an under-development “AI-ready” version of\nthe World Wide Web, has said that this inevitability can be rather\neasily displayed when teaching Introduction to AI; here’s how.\nBegin by asking students what they think AI is. Invariably, many\nstudents will volunteer that AI is the field devoted to building\nartificial creatures that are intelligent. Next, ask for examples of\nintelligent creatures. Students always respond by giving examples\nacross a continuum: simple multi-cellular organisms, insects, rodents,\nlower mammals, higher mammals (culminating in the great apes), and\nfinally human persons. When students are asked to describe the\ndifferences between the creatures they have cited, they end up\nessentially describing the progression from simple agents to ones\nhaving our (e.g.) communicative powers. This progression gives the\nskeleton of every comprehensive AI textbook. Why does this happen? The\nanswer seems clear: it happens because we can’t resist\nconceiving of AI in terms of the powers of extant creatures with which\nwe are familiar. At least at present, persons, and the creatures who\nenjoy only bits and pieces of personhood, are – to repeat\n– the measure of\n AI.[25]\n " ], "subsection_title": "3.1 The Intelligent Agent Continuum" }, { "content": [ "\nReasoning based on classical deductive logic is monotonic; that is, if\n\$\\Phi\\vdash\\phi\$, then for all \$\\psi\$, \$\\Phi\\cup\n\\{\\psi\\}\\vdash\\phi\$. Commonsense reasoning is not monotonic. While\nyou may currently believe on the basis of reasoning that your house is\nstill standing, if while at work you see on your computer screen that\na vast tornado is moving through the location of your house, you will\ndrop this belief. The addition of new information causes previous\ninferences to fail. In the simpler example that has become an AI\nstaple, if I tell you that Tweety is a bird, you will infer that\nTweety can fly, but if I then inform you that Tweety is a penguin, the\ninference evaporates, as well it should. Nonmonotonic (or defeasible)\nlogic includes formalisms designed to capture the mechanisms\nunderlying these kinds of examples. See the separate entry on\n logic and artificial intelligence,\n which is focused on nonmonotonic reasoning, and reasoning about time\nand change. It also provides a history of the early days of\nlogic-based AI, making clear the contributions of those who founded\nthe tradition (e.g., John McCarthy and Pat Hayes; see their seminal\n1969 paper). ", "\nThe formalisms and techniques of logic-based AI have reached a level\nof impressive maturity – so much so that in various academic and\ncorporate laboratories, implementations of these formalisms and\ntechniques can be used to engineer robust, real-world software. It is\nstrongly recommend that readers who have an interest to learn where AI\nstands in these areas consult (Mueller 2006), which provides, in one\nvolume, integrated coverage of nonmonotonic reasoning (in the form,\nspecifically, of circumscription), and reasoning about time and change\nin the situation and event calculi. (The former calculus is also\nintroduced by Thomason. In the second, timepoints are included, among\nother things.) The other nice thing about (Mueller 2006) is that the\nlogic used is multi-sorted first-order logic (MSL), which has\nunificatory power that will be known to and appreciated by many\ntechnical philosophers and logicians (Manzano 1996). ", "\nWe now turn to three further topics of importance in AI. They are:", "\nThis trio is covered in order, beginning with the first.", "\nDetailed accounts of logicist AI that fall under the agent-based\nscheme can be found in (Lenat 1983, Lenat & Guha 1990, Nilsson\n1991, Bringsjord & Ferrucci\n 1998).[26].\n The core idea is that an intelligent agent receives percepts from the\nexternal world in the form of formulae in some logical system (e.g.,\nfirst-order logic), and infers, on the basis of these percepts and its\nknowledge base, what actions should be performed to secure the\nagent’s goals. (This is of course a barbaric simplification.\nInformation from the external world is encoded in formulae,\nand transducers to accomplish this feat may be components of the\nagent.) ", "\nTo clarify things a bit, we consider, briefly, the logicist view in\nconnection with arbitrary logical systems\n \$\\mathcal{L}_{X}\$.[27]\n We obtain a particular logical system by setting \$X\$ in the\nappropriate way. Some examples: If \$X=I\$, then we have a system at\nthe level of FOL [following the standard notation from model theory;\nsee e.g. (Ebbinghaus et al. 1984)]. \$\\mathcal{L}_{II}\$ is\nsecond-order logic, and \$\\mathcal{L}_{\\omega_I\\omega}\$ is a\n“small system” of infinitary logic (countably infinite\nconjunctions and disjunctions are permitted). These logical systems\nare all extensional, but there are intensional ones as\nwell. For example, we can have logical systems corresponding to those\nseen in standard propositional modal logic (Chellas 1980). One\npossibility, familiar to many philosophers, would be propositional\nKT45, or\n \$\\mathcal{L}_{KT45}\$.[28]\n In each case, the system in question includes a relevant alphabet\nfrom which well-formed formulae are constructed by way of a formal\ngrammar, a reasoning (or proof) theory, a formal semantics, and at\nleast some meta-theoretical results (soundness, completeness, etc.).\nTaking off from standard notation, we can thus say that a set of\nformulas in some particular logical system \$\\mathcal{L}_X\$,\n\$\\Phi_{\\mathcal{L}_X}\$, can be used, in conjunction with some\nreasoning theory, to infer some particular formula\n\$\\phi_{\\mathcal{L}_X}\$. (The reasoning may be deductive, inductive,\nabductive, and so on. Logicist AI isn’t in the least restricted\nto any particular mode of reasoning.) To say that such a situation\nholds, we write \n\n \\[\n \\Phi_{\\mathcal{L}_X} \\vdash_{\\mathcal{L}_X} \\phi_{\\mathcal{L}_X}\n \\]\n\n ", "\nWhen the logical system referred to is clear from context, or when we\ndon’t care about which logical system is involved, we can simply\nwrite \n\n \\[\n \\Phi \\vdash \\phi\n \\]\n\n ", "\nEach logical system, in its formal semantics, will include objects\ndesigned to represent ways the world pointed to by formulae in this\nsystem can be. Let these ways be denoted by \$W^i_{{\\mathcal{L}_X}}\$.\nWhen we aren’t concerned with which logical system is involved,\nwe can simply write \$W^i\$. To say that such a way models a formula\n\$\\phi\$ we write \n\n \\[\n W_i \\models \\phi\n \\]\n\n ", "\nWe extend this to a set of formulas in the natural way:\n\$W^i\\models\\Phi\$ means that all the elements of \$\\Phi\$ are true on\n\$W^i\$. Now, using the simple machinery we’ve established, we\ncan describe, in broad strokes, the life of an intelligent agent that\nconforms to the logicist point of view. This life conforms to the\nbasic cycle that undergirds intelligent agents in the AIMA\nsense. ", "\nTo begin, we assume that the human designer, after studying the world,\nuses the language of a particular logical system to give to our agent\nan initial set of beliefs \$\\Delta_0\$ about what this world is like.\nIn doing so, the designer works with a formal model of this world,\n\$W\$, and ensures that \$W\\models\\Delta_0\$. Following tradition, we\nrefer to \$\\Delta_0\$ as the agent’s (starting) knowledge\nbase. (This terminology, given that we are talking about the\nagent’s beliefs, is known to be peculiar, but it\npersists.) Next, the agent ADJUSTS its knowlege base to produce\na new one, \$\\Delta_1\$. We say that adjustment is carried out by way\nof an operation \$\\mathcal{A}\$; so\n\$\\mathcal{A}[\\Delta_0]=\\Delta_1\$. How does the adjustment process,\n\$\\mathcal{A}\$, work? There are many possibilities. Unfortunately,\nmany believe that the simplest possibility (viz.,\n\$\\mathcal{A}[\\Delta_i]\$ equals the set of all formulas that can be\ndeduced in some elementary manner from \$\\Delta_i\$) exhausts\nall the possibilities. The reality is that adjustment, as\nindicated above, can come by way of any mode of reasoning\n– induction, abduction, and yes, various forms of deduction\ncorresponding to the logical system in play. For present purposes,\nit’s not important that we carefully enumerate all the options.\n", "\nThe cycle continues when the agent ACTS on the environment, in\nan attempt to secure its goals. Acting, of course, can cause changes\nto the environment. At this point, the agent SENSES the\nenvironment, and this new information \$\\Gamma_1\$ factors into the\nprocess of adjustment, so that\n\$\\mathcal{A}[\\Delta_1\\cup\\Gamma_1]=\\Delta_2\$. The cycle of SENSES\n\$\\Rightarrow\$ ADJUSTS \$\\Rightarrow\$ ACTS continues to produce\nthe life \$\\Delta_0,\\Delta_1,\\Delta_2,\\Delta_3,\\ldots,\$ … of\nour agent. ", "\nIt may strike you as preposterous that logicist AI be touted as an\napproach taken to replicate all of cognition. Reasoning over\nformulae in some logical system might be appropriate for\ncomputationally capturing high-level tasks like trying to solve a math\nproblem (or devising an outline for an entry in the Stanford\nEncyclopedia of Philosophy), but how could such reasoning apply to\ntasks like those a hawk tackles when swooping down to capture\nscurrying prey? In the human sphere, the task successfully negotiated\nby athletes would seem to be in the same category. Surely, some will\ndeclare, an outfielder chasing down a fly ball doesn’t prove\ntheorems to figure out how to pull off a diving catch to save the\ngame! Two brutally reductionistic arguments can be given in support of\nthis “logicist theory of everything” approach towards\ncognition. The first stems from the fact that a complete proof\ncalculus for just first-order logic can simulate all of Turing-level\ncomputation (Chapter 11, Boolos et al. 2007). The second justification\ncomes from the role logic plays in foundational theories of\nmathematics and mathematical reasoning. Not only are foundational\ntheories of mathematics cast in logic (Potter 2004), but there have\nbeen successful projects resulting in machine verification of ordinary\nnon-trivial theorems, e.g., in the\n Mizar project\n alone around 50,000 theorems have been verified (Naumowicz and\nKornilowicz 2009). The argument goes that if any approach to AI can be\ncast mathematically, then it can be cast in a logicist form. ", "\nNeedless to say, such a declaration has been carefully considered by\nlogicists beyond the reductionistic argument given above. For example,\nRosenschein and Kaelbling (1986) describe a method in which logic is\nused to specify finite state machines. These machines are used at\n“run time” for rapid, reactive processing. In this\napproach, though the finite state machines contain no logic in the\ntraditional sense, they are produced by logic and inference. Real\nrobot control via first-order theorem proving has been demonstrated by\nAmir and Maynard-Reid (1999, 2000, 2001). In fact, you can\n download\n version 2.0 of the software that makes this approach real for a Nomad\n200 mobile robot in an office environment. Of course, negotiating an\noffice environment is a far cry from the rapid adjustments an\noutfielder for the Yankees routinely puts on display, but certainly\nit’s an open question as to whether future machines will be able\nto mimic such feats through rapid reasoning. The question is open if\nfor no other reason than that all must concede that the constant\nincrease in reasoning speed of first-order theorem provers is\nbreathtaking. (For up-to-date news on this increase, visit and monitor\nthe\n TPTP site.)\n There is no known reason why the software engineering in question\ncannot continue to produce speed gains that would eventually allow an\nartificial creature to catch a fly ball by processing information in\npurely logicist fashion. ", "\nNow we come to the second topic related to logicist AI that warrants\nmention herein: common logic and the intensifying quest for\ninteroperability between logic-based systems using different logics.\nOnly a few brief comments are\n offered.[29]\n Readers wanting more can explore the links provided in the course of\nthe summary. ", "\nOne standardization is through what is known as\n Common Logic\n (CL), and variants thereof. (CL is published as an\n ISO standard\n – ISO is the International Standards Organization.)\nPhilosophers interested in logic, and of course logicians, will find\nCL to be quite fascinating. From an historical perspective, the advent\nof CL is interesting in no small part because the person spearheading\nit is none other than Pat Hayes, the same Hayes who, as we have seen,\nworked with McCarthy to establish logicist AI in the 1960s. Though\nHayes was not at the original 1956 Dartmouth conference, he certainly\nmust be regarded as one of the founders of contemporary AI.) One of\nthe interesting things about CL, at least as we see it, is that it\nsignifies a trend toward the marriage of logics, and programming\nlanguages and environments. Another system that is a logic/programming\nhybrid is\n Athena,\n which can be used as a programming language, and is at the same time\na form of MSL. Athena is based on formal systems known as\ndenotational proof languages (Arkoudas 2000). ", "\nHow is interoperability between two systems to be enabled by CL?\nSuppose one of these systems is based on logic \$L\$, and the other on\n\$L'\$. (To ease exposition, assume that both logics are first-order.)\nThe idea is that a theory \$\\Phi_L\$, that is, a set of formulae in\n\$L\$, can be translated into CL, producing \$\\Phi_{CL}\$, and then\nthis theory can be translated into \$\\Phi_L'\$. CL thus becomes an\ninter lingua. Note that what counts as a well-formed formula in\n\$L\$ can be different than what counts as one in \$L'\$. The two\nlogics might also have different proof theories. For example,\ninference in \$L\$ might be based on resolution, while inference in\n\$L'\$ is of the natural deduction variety. Finally, the symbol sets\nwill be different. Despite these differences, courtesy of the\ntranslations, desired behavior can be produced across the translation.\nThat, at any rate, is the hope. The technical challenges here are\nimmense, but federal monies are increasingly available for attacks on\nthe problem of interoperability.", "\nNow for the third topic in this section: what can be called\nencoding down. The technique is easy to understand. Suppose\nthat we have on hand a set \$\\Phi\$ of first-order axioms. As is\nwell-known, the problem of deciding, for arbitrary formula \$\\phi\$,\nwhether or not it’s deducible from \$\\Phi\$ is\nTuring-undecidable: there is no Turing machine or equivalent that can\ncorrectly return “Yes” or “No” in the general\ncase. However, if the domain in question is finite, we can encode this\nproblem down to the propositional calculus. An assertion that all\nthings have \$F\$ is of course equivalent to the assertion that\n\$Fa\$, \$Fb\$, \$Fc\$, as long as the domain contains only these\nthree objects. So here a first-order quantified formula becomes a\nconjunction in the propositional calculus. Determining whether such\nconjunctions are provable from axioms themselves expressed in the\npropositional calculus is Turing-decidable, and in addition, in\ncertain clusters of cases, the check can be done very quickly in the\npropositional case; very quickly. Readers interested in\nencoding down to the propositional calculus should consult recent\n DARPA-sponsored work by Bart Selman.\n Please note that the target of encoding down doesn’t need to be\nthe propositional calculus. Because it’s generally harder for\nmachines to find proofs in an intensional logic than in straight\nfirst-order logic, it is often expedient to encode down the former to\nthe latter. For example, propositional modal logic can be encoded in\nmulti-sorted logic (a variant of FOL); see (Arkoudas & Bringsjord\n2005). Prominent usage of such an encoding down can be found in a set\nof systems known as Description Logics, which are a set of\nlogics less expressive than first-order logic but more expressive than\npropositional logic (Baader et al. 2003). Description logics are used\nto reason about ontologies in a given domain and have been\nsuccessfully used, for example, in the biomedical domain (Smith et al.\n2007). " ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Logic-Based AI: Some Surgical Points" }, { "content": [ "\nIt’s tempting to define non-logicist AI by negation: an approach\nto building intelligent agents that rejects the distinguishing\nfeatures of logicist AI. Such a shortcut would imply that the agents\nengineered by non-logicist AI researchers and developers, whatever the\nvirtues of such agents might be, cannot be said to know that \$\\phi\$;\n– for the simple reason that, by negation, the non-logicist\nparadigm would have not even a single declarative proposition that is\na candidate for \$\\phi\$;. However, this isn’t a particularly\nenlightening way to define non-symbolic AI. A more productive approach\nis to say that non-symbolic AI is AI carried out on the basis of\nparticular formalisms other than logical systems, and to then\nenumerate those formalisms. It will turn out, of course, that these\nformalisms fail to include knowledge in the normal sense. (In\nphilosophy, as is well-known, the normal sense is one according to\nwhich if \$p\$ is known, \$p\$ is a declarative statement.) ", "\nFrom the standpoint of formalisms other than logical systems,\nnon-logicist AI can be partitioned into symbolic but non-logicist\napproaches, and connectionist/neurocomputational approaches. (AI\ncarried out on the basis of symbolic, declarative structures that, for\nreadability and ease of use, are not treated directly by researchers\nas elements of formal logics, does not count. In this category fall\ntraditional semantic networks, Schank’s (1972) conceptual\ndependency scheme, frame-based schemes, and other such schemes.) The\nformer approaches, today, are probabilistic, and are based on the\nformalisms (Bayesian networks) covered\n below.\n The latter approaches are based, as we have noted, on formalisms that\ncan be broadly termed “neurocomputational.” Given our\nspace constraints, only one of the formalisms in this category is\ndescribed here (and briefly at that): the aforementioned artificial\nneural\n networks.[30].\n Though artificial neural networks, with an appropriate architecture,\ncould be used for arbitrary computation, they are almost exclusively\nused for building learning systems. ", "\nNeural nets are composed of units or nodes designed to\nrepresent neurons, which are connected by links designed to\nrepresent dendrites, each of which has a numeric weight.", "\nIt is usually assumed that some of the units work in symbiosis with\nthe external environment; these units form the sets of input\nand output units. Each unit has a current activation\nlevel, which is its output, and can compute, based on its inputs\nand weights on those inputs, its activation level at the next moment\nin time. This computation is entirely local: a unit takes account of\nbut its neighbors in the net. This local computation is calculated in\ntwo stages. First, the input function, \$in_i\$, gives the\nweighted sum of the unit’s input values, that is, the sum of the\ninput activations multiplied by their weights: ", "\nIn the second stage, the activation function, \$g\$, takes the\ninput from the first stage as argument and generates the output, or\nactivation level, \$a_i\$: ", "\nOne common (and confessedly elementary) choice for the activation\nfunction (which usually governs all units in a given net) is the step\nfunction, which usually has a threshold \$t\$ that sees to it that a 1\nis output when the input is greater than \$t\$, and that 0 is output\notherwise. This is supposed to be “brain-like” to some\ndegree, given that 1 represents the firing of a pulse from a neuron\nthrough an axon, and 0 represents no firing. A simple three-layer\nneural net is shown in the following picture.", "\nAs you might imagine, there are many different kinds of neural\nnetworks. The main distinction is between feed-forward and\nrecurrent networks. In feed-forward networks like the one\npictured immediately above, as their name suggests, links move\ninformation in one direction, and there are no cycles; recurrent\nnetworks allow for cycling back, and can become rather complicated.\nFor a more detailed presentation, see the", "\n\n Supplement on Neural Nets.\n ", "\nNeural networks were fundamentally plagued by the fact that while they\nare simple and have theoretically efficient learning algorithms, when\nthey are multi-layered and thus sufficiently expressive to represent\nnon-linear functions, they were very hard to train in practice. This\nchanged in the mid 2000s with the advent of methods that exploit\nstate-of-the-art hardware better (Rajat et al. 2009). The\nbackpropagation method for training multi-layered neural networks can\nbe translated into a sequence of repeated simple arithmetic operations\non a large set of numbers. The general trend in computing hardware has\nfavored algorithms that are able to do a large of number of simple\noperations that are not that dependent on each other, versus a small\nof number of complex and intricate operations.", "\nAnother key recent observation is that deep neural networks can be\npre-trained first in an unsupervised phase where they are just fed\ndata without any labels for the data. Each hidden layer is forced to\nrepresent the outputs of the layer below. The outcome of this training\nis a series of layers which represent the input domain with increasing\nlevels of abstraction. For example, if we pre-train the network with\nimages of faces, we would get a first layer which is good at detecting\nedges in images, a second layer which can combine edges to form facial\nfeatures such as eyes, noses etc., a third layer which responds to\ngroups of features, and so on (LeCun et al. 2015).", "\nPerhaps the best technique for teaching students about neural networks\nin the context of other statistical learning formalisms and methods is\nto focus on a specific problem, preferably one that seems unnatural to\ntackle using logicist techniques. The task is then to seek to engineer\na solution to the problem, using any and all techniques\navailable. One nice problem is handwriting recognition (which\nalso happens to have a rich philosophical dimension; see e.g.\nHofstadter & McGraw 1995). For example, consider the problem of\nassigning, given as input a handwritten digit \$d\$, the correct\ndigit, 0 through 9. Because there is a database of 60,000 labeled\ndigits available to researchers (from the National Institute of\nScience and Technology), this problem has evolved into a benchmark\nproblem for comparing learning algorithms. It turns out that neural\nnetworks currently reign as the best approach to the problem according\nto a recent ranking by Benenson (2016).", "\nReaders interested in AI (and computational cognitive science) pursued\nfrom an overtly brain-based orientation are encouraged to explore the\nwork of Rick Granger (2004a, 2004b) and researchers in his\n Brain Engineering Laboratory\n and\n W. H. Neukom Institute for Computational Sciences.\n The contrast between the “dry”, logicist AI started at\nthe original 1956 conference, and the approach taken here by Granger\nand associates (in which brain circuitry is directly modeled) is\nremarkable. For those interested in computational properties of neural\nnetworks, Hornik et al. (1989) address the general representation\ncapability of neural networks independent of learning. " ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Non-Logicist AI: A Summary" }, { "content": [ "\nAt this point the reader has been exposed to the chief formalisms in\nAI, and may wonder about heterogeneous approaches that bridge them. Is\nthere such research and development in AI? Yes. From an\nengineering standpoint, such work makes irresistibly good\nsense. There is now an understanding that, in order to build\napplications that get the job done, one should choose from a toolbox\nthat includes logicist, probabilistic/Bayesian, and neurocomputational\ntechniques. Given that the original top-down logicist paradigm is\nalive and thriving (e.g., see Brachman & Levesque 2004, Mueller\n2006), and that, as noted, a resurgence of Bayesian and\nneurocomputational approaches has placed these two paradigms on solid,\nfertile footing as well, AI now moves forward, armed with this\nfundamental triad, and it is a virtual certainty that applications\n(e.g., robots) will be engineered by drawing from elements of all\nthree. Watson’s DeepQA architecture is one recent example of an\nengineering system that leverages multiple paradigms. For a detailed\ndiscussion, see the", "\n\n Supplement on Watson’s DeepQA Architecture.\n ", "\nGoogle DeepMind’s AlphaGo is another example of a multi-paradigm\nsystem, although in a much narrower form than Watson. The central\nalgorithmic problem in games such as Go or Chess is to search through\na vast sequence of valid moves. For most non-trivial games, this is\nnot feasible to do so exhaustively. The Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS)\nalgorithm gets around this obstacle by searching through an enormous\nspace of valid moves in a statistical fashion (Browne et al. 2012).\nWhile MCTS is the central algorithm in AlpaGo, there are two neural\nnetworks which help evaluate states in the game and help model how\nexpert opponents play (Silver et al. 2016). It should be noted that\nMCTS is behind almost all the winning submissions in general game\nplaying (Finnsson 2012).", "\nWhat, though, about deep, theoretical integration of the main\nparadigms in AI? Such integration is at present only a possibility for\nthe future, but readers are directed to the research of some striving\nfor such integration. For example: Sun (1994, 2002) has been working\nto demonstrate that human cognition that is on its face symbolic in\nnature (e.g., professional philosophizing in the analytic tradition,\nwhich deals explicitly with arguments and definitions carefully\nsymbolized) can arise from cognition that is neurocomputational in\nnature. Koller (1997) has investigated the marriage between\nprobability theory and logic. And, in general, the very recent arrival\nof so-called human-level AI is being led by theorists seeking\nto genuinely integrate the three paradigms set out above (e.g.,\nCassimatis 2006).", "\nFinally, we note that cognitive architectures such as Soar\n(Laird 2012) and PolyScheme (Cassimatis 2006) are another area where\nintegration of different fields of AI can be found. For example, one\nsuch endeavor striving to build human-level AI is the Companions\nproject (Forbus and Hinrichs 2006). Companions are long-lived systems\nthat strive to be human-level AI systems that function as\ncollaborators with humans. The Companions architecture tries to solve\nmultiple AI problems such as reasoning and learning, interactivity,\nand longevity in one unifying system." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 AI Beyond the Clash of Paradigms" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAs we noted above, work on AI has mushroomed over the past couple of\ndecades. Now that we have looked a bit at the content that composes\nAI, we take a quick look at the explosive growth of AI.", "\nFirst, a point of clarification. The growth of which we speak is not a\nshallow sort correlated with amount of funding provided for a given\nsub-field of AI. That kind of thing happens all the time in all\nfields, and can be triggered by entirely political and financial\nchanges designed to grow certain areas, and diminish others. Along the\nsame line, the growth of which we speak is not correlated with the\namount of industrial activity revolving around AI (or a sub-field\nthereof); for this sort of growth too can be driven by forces quite\noutside an expansion in the scientific breadth of\n AI.[31]\n Rather, we are speaking of an explosion of deep content: new\nmaterial which someone intending to be conversant with the field needs\nto know. Relative to other fields, the size of the explosion may or\nmay not be unprecedented. (Though it should perhaps be noted that an\nanalogous increase in philosophy would be marked by the development of\nentirely new formalisms for reasoning, reflected in the fact that,\nsay, longstanding philosophy textbooks like Copi’s (2004)\nIntroduction to Logic are dramatically rewritten and enlarged\nto include these formalisms, rather than remaining anchored to\nessentially immutable core formalisms, with incremental refinement\naround the edges through the years.) But it certainly appears to be\nquite remarkable, and is worth taking note of here, if for no other\nreason than that AI’s near-future will revolve in significant\npart around whether or not the new content in question forms a\nfoundation for new long-lived research and development that would not\notherwise\n obtain.[32]", "\nAI has also witnessed an explosion in its usage in various artifacts\nand applications. While we are nowhere near building a machine with\ncapabilities of a human or one that acts rationally in all scenarios\naccording to the Russell/Hutter definition above, algorithms that have\ntheir origins in AI research are now widely deployed for many tasks in\na variety of domains. " ], "section_title": "4. The Explosive Growth of AI", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nA huge part of AI’s growth in applications has been made\npossible through invention of new algorithms in the subfield of\nmachine learning. Machine learning is concerned with building\nsystems that improve their performance on a task when given examples\nof ideal performance on the task, or improve their performance with\nrepeated experience on the task. Algorithms from machine learning have\nbeen used in speech recognition systems, spam filters, online\nfraud-detection systems, product-recommendation systems, etc. The\ncurrent state-of-the-art in machine learning can be divided into three\nareas (Murphy 2013, Alpaydin 2014):", "\nIn addition to being used in domains that are traditionally the ken of\nAI, machine-learning algorithms have also been used in all stages of\nthe scientific process. For example, machine-learning techniques are\nnow routinely applied to analyze large volumes of data generated from\nparticle accelerators. CERN, for instance, generates a petabyte\n(\$10^{15}\$ bytes) per second, and statistical algorithms that have\ntheir origins in AI are used to filter and analyze this data. Particle\naccelerators are used in fundamental experimental research in physics\nto probe the structure of our physical universe. They work by\ncolliding larger particles together to create much finer particles.\nNot all such events are fruitful. Machine-learning methods have been\nused to select events which are then analyzed further (Whiteson &\nWhiteson 2009 and Baldi et al. 2014). More recently, researchers at\nCERN launched a machine learning\n competition\n to aid in the analysis of the Higgs Boson. The goal of this challenge\nwas to develop algorithms that separate meaningful events from\nbackground noise given data from the Large Hadron Collider, a particle\naccelerator at CERN.", "\nIn the past few decades, there has been an explosion in data that does\nnot have any explicit semantics attached to it. This data is generated\nby both humans and machines. Most of this data is not easily\nmachine-processable; for example, images, text, video (as opposed to\ncarefully curated data in a knowledge- or data-base). This has given\nrise to a huge industry that applies AI techniques to get usable\ninformation from such enormous data. This field of applying techniques\nderived from AI to large volumes of data goes by names such as\n“data mining,” “big data,”\n“analytics,” etc. This field is too vast to even\nmoderately cover in the present article, but we note that there is no\nfull agreement on what constitutes such a “big-data”\nproblem. One definition, from Madden (2012), is that big data differs\nfrom traditional machine-processable data in that it is too big (for\nmost of the existing state-of-the-art hardware), too quick (generated\nat a fast rate, e.g. online email transactions), or too hard. It is in\nthe too-hard part that AI techniques work quite well. While this\nuniverse is quite varied, we use the Watson’s system later in\nthis article as an AI-relevant exemplar. As we will see later, while\nmost of this new explosion is powered by learning, it isn’t\nentirely limited to just learning. This bloom in learning algorithms\nhas been supported by both a resurgence in neurocomputational\ntechniques and probabilistic techniques." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Bloom in Machine Learning" }, { "content": [ "\nOne of the remarkable aspects of (Charniak & McDermott 1985) is\nthis: The authors say the central dogma of AI is that “What the\nbrain does may be thought of at some level as a kind of\ncomputation” (p. 6). And yet nowhere in the book is brain-like\ncomputation discussed. In fact, you will search the index in vain for\nthe term ‘neural’ and its variants. Please note that the\nauthors are not to blame for this. A large part of AI’s growth\nhas come from formalisms, tools, and techniques that are, in some\nsense, brain-based, not logic-based. A paper that conveys the\nimportance and maturity of neurocomputation is (Litt et al. 2006).\n(Growth has also come from a return of probabilistic techniques that\nhad withered by the mid-70s and 80s. More about that momentarily, in\nthe next “resurgence”\n section.)\n ", "\nOne very prominent class of non-logicist formalism does make an\nexplicit nod in the direction of the brain: viz., artificial neural\nnetworks (or as they are often simply called, neural\nnetworks, or even just neural nets). (The structure of\nneural networks and more recent developments are discussed\n above).\n Because Minsky and Pappert’s (1969) Perceptrons led many\n(including, specifically, many sponsors of AI research and\ndevelopment) to conclude that neural networks didn’t have\nsufficient information-processing power to model human cognition, the\nformalism was pretty much universally dropped from AI. However, Minsky\nand Pappert had only considered very limited neural networks.\nConnectionism, the view that intelligence consists not in\nsymbolic processing, but rather non-symbolic processing at\nleast somewhat like what we find in the brain (at least at the\ncellular level), approximated specifically by artificial neural\nnetworks, came roaring back in the early 1980s on the strength of more\nsophisticated forms of such networks, and soon the situation was (to\nuse a metaphor introduced by John McCarthy) that of two horses in a\nrace toward building truly intelligent agents.", "\nIf one had to pick a year at which connectionism was resurrected, it\nwould certainly be 1986, the year Parallel Distributed\nProcessing (Rumelhart & McClelland 1986) appeared in print.\nThe rebirth of connectionism was specifically fueled by the\nback-propagation (backpropagation) algorithm over neural networks,\nnicely covered in Chapter 20 of AIMA. The\nsymbolicist/connectionist race led to a spate of lively debate in the\nliterature (e.g., Smolensky 1988, Bringsjord 1991), and some AI\nengineers have explicitly championed a methodology marked by a\nrejection of knowledge representation and reasoning. For example,\nRodney Brooks was such an engineer; he wrote the well-known\n“Intelligence Without Representation” (1991), and his Cog\nProject, to which we referred above, is arguably an incarnation of the\npremeditatedly non-logicist approach. Increasingly, however, those in\nthe business of building sophisticated systems find that both\nlogicist and more neurocomputational techniques are required (Wermter\n& Sun\n 2001).[33]\n In addition, the neurocomputational paradigm today includes\nconnectionism only as a proper part, in light of the fact that some of\nthose working on building intelligent systems strive to do so by\nengineering brain-based computation outside the neural network-based\napproach (e.g., Granger 2004a, 2004b). ", "\nAnother recent resurgence in neurocomputational techniques has\noccurred in machine learning. The modus operandi in machine learning\nis that given a problem, say recognizing handwritten digits\n\$\\{0,1,\\ldots,9\\}\$ or faces, from a 2D matrix representing an image\nof the digits or faces, a machine learning or a domain expert would\nconstruct a feature vector representation function for the\ntask. This function is a transformation of the input into a format\nthat tries to throw away irrelevant information in the input and keep\nonly information useful for the task. Inputs transformed by \$\\rr\$\nare termed features. For recognizing faces, irrelevant\ninformation could be the amount of lighting in the scene and relevant\ninformation could be information about facial features. The machine is\nthen fed a sequence of inputs represented by the features and the\nideal or ground truth output values for those inputs. This converts\nthe learning challenge from that of having to learn the function\n\$\\ff\$ from the examples: \$\\left\\{\\left\\langle x_1,\n\\ff(x_1)\\right\\rangle,\\left\\langle x_2, \\ff(x_2)\\right\\rangle, \\ldots,\n\\left\\langle x_n, \\ff(x_n)\\right\\rangle \\right\\}\$ to having to learn\nfrom possibly easier data: \$\\left\\{\\left\\langle \\rr(x_1),\n\\ff(x_1)\\right\\rangle,\\left\\langle \\rr(x_2), \\ff(x_2)\\right\\rangle,\n\\ldots, \\left\\langle \\rr(x_n), \\ff(x_n)\\right\\rangle \\right\\}\$. Here\nthe function \$\\rr\$ is the function that computes the feature vector\nrepresentation of the input. Formally, \$\\ff\$ is assumed to be a\ncomposition of the functions \$\\gg\$ and \$\\rr\$. That is, for any\ninput \$x\$, \$f(x) = \\gg\\left(\\rr\\left(x\\right)\\right)\$. This is\ndenoted by \$\\ff=\\gg\\circ \\rr\$. For any input, the features are first\ncomputed, and then the function \$\\gg\$ is applied. If the feature\nrepresentation \$\\rr\$ is provided by the domain expert, the learning\nproblem becomes simpler to the extent the feature representation takes\non the difficulty of the task. At one extreme, the feature vector\ncould hide an easily extractable form of the answer in the input and\nin the other extreme the feature representation could be just the\nplain input.", "\nFor non-trivial problems, choosing the right representation is vital.\nFor instance, one of the drastic changes in the AI landscape was due\nto Minsky and Papert’s (1969) demonstration that the perceptron\ncannot learn even the binary XOR function, but this function\ncan be learnt by the perceptron if we have the right representation.\nFeature engineering has grown to be one of the most labor intensive\ntasks of machine learning, so much so that it is considered to be one\nof the “black arts” of machine learning. The other\nsignificant black art of learning methods is choosing the right\nparameters. These black arts require significant human expertise and\nexperience, which can be quite difficult to obtain without significant\napprenticeship (Domingos 2012). Another bigger issue is that the task\nof feature engineering is just knowledge representation in a new skin.\n", "\nGiven this state of affairs, there has been a recent resurgence in\nmethods for automatically learning a feature representation function\n\$\\rr\$; such methods potentially bypass a large part of human labor\nthat is traditionally required. Such methods are based mostly on what\nare now termed deep neural networks. Such networks are simply\nneural networks with two or more hidden layers. These networks allow\nus to learn a feature function \$\\rr\$ by using one or more of the\nhidden layers to learn \$\\rr\$. The general form of learning in which\none learns from the raw sensory data without much hand-based feature\nengineering has now its own term: deep learning. A general and\nyet concise definition (Bengio et al. 2015) is: ", "\nDeep learning can safely be regarded as the study of models that\neither involve a greater amount of composition of learned functions or\nlearned concepts than traditional machine learning does. (Bengio et\nal. 2015, Chapter 1)\n", "\nThough the idea has been around for decades, recent innovations\nleading to more efficient learning techniques have made the approach\nmore feasible (Bengio et al. 2013). Deep-learning methods have\nrecently produced state-of-the-art results in image recognition (given\nan image containing various objects, label the objects from a given\nset of labels), speech recognition (from audio input, generate a\ntextual representation), and the analysis of data from particle\naccelerators (LeCun et al. 2015). Despite impressive results in tasks\nsuch as these, minor and major issues remain unresolved. A minor issue\nis that significant human expertise is still needed to choose an\narchitecture and set up the right parameters for the architecture; a\nmajor issue is the existence of so-called adversarial inputs,\nwhich are indistinguishable from normal inputs to humans but are\ncomputed in a special manner that makes a neural network regard them\nas different than similar inputs in the training data. The existence\nof such adversarial inputs, which remain stable across training data,\nhas raised doubts about how well performance on benchmarks can\ntranslate into performance in real-world systems with sensory noise\n(Szegedy et al. 2014)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 The Resurgence of Neurocomputational Techniques" }, { "content": [ "\nThere is a second dimension to the explosive growth of AI: the\nexplosion in popularity of probabilistic methods that aren’t\nneurocomputational in nature, in order to formalize and mechanize a\nform of non-logicist reasoning in the face of uncertainty.\nInterestingly enough, it is Eugene Charniak himself who can be safely\nconsidered one of the leading proponents of an explicit, premeditated\nturn away from logic to statistical techniques. His area of\nspecialization is natural language processing, and whereas his\nintroductory textbook of 1985 gave an accurate sense of his approach\nto parsing at the time (as we have seen, write computer programs that,\ngiven English text as input, ultimately infer meaning expressed in\nFOL), this approach was abandoned in favor of purely statistical\napproaches (Charniak 1993). At the\n AI@50\n conference, Charniak boldly proclaimed, in a talk tellingly entitled\n“Why Natural Language Processing is Now Statistical Natural\nLanguage Processing,” that logicist AI is moribund, and that the\nstatistical approach is the only promising game in town – for\nthe next 50\n years.[34]", "\nThe chief source of energy and debate at the conference flowed from\nthe clash between Charniak’s probabilistic orientation, and the\noriginal logicist orientation, upheld at the conference in question by\nJohn McCarthy and others.", "\nAI’s use of probability theory grows out of the standard form of\nthis theory, which grew directly out of technical philosophy and\nlogic. This form will be familiar to many philosophers, but\nlet’s review it quickly now, in order to set a firm stage for\nmaking points about the new probabilistic techniques that have\nenergized AI. ", "\nJust as in the case of FOL, in probability theory we are concerned\nwith declarative statements, or propositions, to which degrees\nof belief are applied; we can thus say that both logicist and\nprobabilistic approaches are symbolic in nature. Both approaches also\nagree that statements can either be true or false in the world. In\nbuilding agents, a simplistic logic-based approach requires agents to\nknow the truth-value of all possible statements. This is not\nrealistic, as an agent may not know the truth-value of some\nproposition \$p\$ due to either ignorance, non-determinism in the\nphysical world, or just plain vagueness in the meaning of the\nstatement. More specifically, the fundamental proposition in\nprobability theory is a random variable, which can be conceived\nof as an aspect of the world whose status is initially unknown to the\nagent. We usually capitalize the names of random variables, though we\nreserve \$p,q,r, \\ldots\$ as such names as well. For example, in a\nparticular murder investigation centered on whether or not Mr. Barolo\ncommitted the crime, the random variable \$Guilty\$ might be of\nconcern. The detective may be interested as well in whether or not the\nmurder weapon – a particular knife, let us assume –\nbelongs to Barolo. In light of this, we might say that \$\\Weapon =\n\\true\$ if it does, and \$\\Weapon = \\false\$ if it doesn’t. As a\nnotational convenience, we can write \$weapon\$ and \$\\lnot weapon\$\nand for these two cases, respectively; and we can use this convention\nfor other variables of this type. ", "\nThe kind of variables we have described so far are\n\$\\mathbf{Boolean}\$, because their \$\\mathbf{domain}\$ is simply\n\$\\{true,false\\}.\$ But we can generalize and allow\n\$\\mathbf{discrete}\$ random variables, whose values are from any\ncountable domain. For example, \$\\PriceTChina\$ might be a variable\nfor the price of (a particular, presumably) tea in China, and its\ndomain might be \$\\{1,2,3,4,5\\}\$, where each number here is in US\ndollars. A third type of variable is \$\\mathbf{continous}\$; its\ndomain is either the reals, or some subset thereof. ", "\nWe say that an atomic event is an assignment of particular\nvalues from the appropriate domains to all the variables composing the\n(idealized) world. For example, in the simple murder investigation\nworld introduced just above, we have two Boolean variables,\n\$\\Guilty\$ and \$\\Weapon\$, and there are just four atomic events.\nNote that atomic events have some obvious properties. For example,\nthey are mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and logically entail the\ntruth or falsity of every proposition. Usually not obvious to\nbeginning students is a fourth property, namely, any proposition is\nlogically equivalent to the disjunction of all atomic events that\nentail that proposition. ", "\nPrior probabilities correspond to a degree of belief accorded to a\nproposition in the complete absence of any other information. For\nexample, if the prior probability of Barolo’s guilt is \$0.2\$,\nwe write \n\n \\[\n P\\left(\\Guilty=true\\right)=0.2\n \\]\n\n ", "\nor simply \$\\P(guilty)=0.2\$. It is often convenient to have a\nnotation allowing one to refer economically to the probabilities of\nall the possible values for a random variable. For example,\nwe can write \n\n \\[\n \\P\\left(\\PriceTChina\\right)\n \\]\n\n ", "\nas an abbreviation for the five equations listing all the possible\nprices for tea in China. We can also write \n\n \\[\n \\P\\left(\\PriceTChina\\right)=\\langle 1,2,3,4,5\\rangle\n \\]\n\n ", "\nIn addition, as further convenient notation, we can write \$\n\\mathbf{P}\\left(\\Guilty, \\Weapon\\right)\$ to denote the probabilities\nof all combinations of values of the relevant set of random variables.\nThis is referred to as the joint probability distribution of\n\$\\Guilty\$ and \$\\Weapon\$. The full joint probability\ndistribution covers the distribution for all the random variables used\nto describe a world. Given our simple murder world, we have 20 atomic\nevents summed up in the equation \n\n \\[\n \\mathbf{P}\\left(\\Guilty, \\Weapon, \\PriceTChina\\right)\n \\]\n\n ", "\nThe final piece of the basic language of probability theory\ncorresponds to conditional probabilities. Where \$p\$ and \$q\$\nare any propositions, the relevant expression is \$P\\!\\left(p\\given\nq\\right)\$, which can be interpreted as “the probability of\n\$p\$, given that all we know is \$q\$.” For example,\n\n \\[\n P\\left(guilty\\ggiven weapon\\right)=0.7\n \\]\n\n ", "\nsays that if the murder weapon belongs to Barolo, and no other\ninformation is available, the probability that Barolo is guilty is\n\$0.7.\$ ", "\nAndrei Kolmogorov showed how to construct probability theory from\nthree axioms that make use of the machinery now introduced, viz., ", "\nThese axioms are clearly at bottom logicist. The remainder of\nprobability theory can be erected from this foundation (conditional\nprobabilities are easily defined in terms of prior probabilities). We\ncan thus say that logic is in some fundamental sense still being used\nto characterize the set of beliefs that a rational agent can have. But\nwhere does probabilistic inference enter the picture on this\naccount, since traditional deduction is not used for inference in\nprobability theory?", "\nProbabilistic inference consists in computing, from observed evidence\nexpressed in terms of probability theory, posterior probabilities of\npropositions of interest. For a good long while, there have been\nalgorithms for carrying out such computation. These algorithms precede\nthe resurgence of probabilistic techniques in the 1990s. (Chapter 13\nof AIMA presents a number of them.) For example, given the\nKolmogorov axioms, here is a straightforward way of computing the\nprobability of any proposition, using the full joint distribution\ngiving the probabilities of all atomic events: Where \$p\$ is some\nproposition, let \$\\alpha(p)\$ be the disjunction of all atomic events\nin which \$p\$ holds. Since the probability of a proposition (i.e.,\n\$P(p)\$) is equal to the sum of the probabilities of the atomic\nevents in which it holds, we have an equation that provides a method\nfor computing the probability of any proposition \$p\$, viz., ", "\nUnfortunately, there were two serious problems infecting this original\nprobabilistic approach: One, the processing in question needed to take\nplace over paralyzingly large amounts of information (enumeration over\nthe entire distribution is required). And two, the expressivity of the\napproach was merely propositional. (It was by the way the philosopher\nHilary Putnam (1963) who pointed out that there was a price to pay in\nmoving to the first-order level. The issue is not discussed herein.)\nEverything changed with the advent of a new formalism that marks the\nmarriage of probabilism and graph theory: Bayesian networks\n(also called belief nets). The pivotal text was (Pearl 1988).\nFor a more detailed discussion, see the", "\n\n Supplement on Bayesian Networks.\n ", "\nBefore concluding this section, it is probably worth noting that, from\nthe standpoint of philosophy, a situation such as the murder\ninvestigation we have exploited above would often be analyzed into\narguments, and strength factors, not into numbers to be\ncrunched by purely arithmetical procedures. For example, in the\nepistemology of Roderick Chisholm, as presented his Theory of\nKnowledge (1966, 1977), Detective Holmes might classify a\nproposition like Barolo committed the murder. as\ncounterbalanced if he was unable to find a compelling argument\neither way, or perhaps probable if the murder weapon turned out\nto belong to Barolo. Such categories cannot be found on a continuum\nfrom 0 to 1, and they are used in articulating arguments for or\nagainst Barolo’s guilt. Argument-based approaches to uncertain\nand defeasible reasoning are virtually non-existent in AI. One\nexception is Pollock’s approach, covered below. This approach is\nChisholmian in nature. ", "\nIt should also be noted that there have been well-established\nformalisms for dealing with probabilistic reasoning as an instance of\nlogic-based reasoning. E.g., the activity a researcher in\nprobabilistic reasoning undertakes when she proves a theorem \$\\phi\$\nabout their domain (e.g. any theorem in (Pearl 1988)) is purely within\nthe realm of traditional logic. Readers interested in logic-flavored\napproaches to probabilistic reasoning can consult (Adams 1996,\nHailperin 1996 & 2010, Halpern 1998). Formalisms marrying\nprobability theory, induction and deductive reasoning, placing them on\nan equal footing, have been on the rise, with Markov logic (Richardson\nand Domingos 2006) being salient among these approaches. ", "\nProbabilistic Machine Learning", "\nMachine learning, in the sense given\n above,\n has been associated with probabilistic techniques. Probabilistic\ntechniques have been associated with both the learning of functions\n(e.g. Naive Bayes classification) and the modeling of theoretical\nproperties of learning algorithms. For example, a standard\nreformulation of supervised learning casts it as a Bayesian\nproblem. Assume that we are looking at recognizing digits\n\$[0{-}9]\$ from a given image. One way to cast this problem is to ask\nwhat the probability that the hypothesis \$H_x\$: “the digit\nis \$x\$” is true given the image \$d\$ from a sensor. Bayes\ntheorem gives us: ", "\n\$P(d\\given H_x)\$ and \$P(H_x)\$ can be estimated from the given\ntraining dataset. Then the hypothesis with the highest posterior\nprobability is then given as the answer and is given by:\n\$\\argmax_{x}P\\left(d\\ggiven H_x\\right)*P\\left(H_x\\right) \$ In\naddition to probabilistic methods being used to build algorithms,\nprobability theory has also been used to analyze algorithms which\nmight not have an overt probabilistic or logical formulation. For\nexample, one of the central classes of meta-theorems in learning,\nprobably approximately correct (PAC) theorems, are cast in\nterms of lower bounds of the probability that the mismatch between the\ninduced/learnt fL function and the true function\nfT being less than a certain amount, given that the\nlearnt function fL works well for a certain number\nof cases (see Chapter 18, AIMA). " ], "subsection_title": "4.3 The Resurgence of Probabilistic Techniques" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nFrom at least its modern inception, AI has always been connected to\ngadgets, often ones produced by corporations, and it would be remiss\nof us not to say a few words about this phenomenon. While there have\nbeen a large number of commercial in-the-wild success stories for AI\nand its sister fields, such as optimization and decision-making, some\napplications are more visible and have been thoroughly battle-tested\nin the wild. In 2014, one of the most visible such domains (one in\nwhich AI has been strikingly successful) is information retrieval,\nincarnated as web search. Another recent success story is pattern\nrecognition. The state-of-the-art in applied pattern recognition\n(e.g., fingerprint/face verification, speech recognition, and\nhandwriting recognition) is robust enough to allow\n“high-stakes” deployment outside the laboratory. As of mid\n2018, several corporations and research laboratories have begun\ntesting autonomous vehicles on public roads, with even a handful of\njurisdictions making self-driving cars legal to operate. For example,\nGoogle’s autonomous cars have navigated hundreds of thousands of\nmiles in California with minimal human help under non-trivial\nconditions (Guizzo 2011). ", "\nComputer games provide a robust test bed for AI techniques as they can\ncapture important parts that might be necessary to test an AI\ntechnique while abstracting or removing details that might beyond the\nscope of core AI research, for example, designing better hardware or\ndealing with legal issues (Laird and VanLent 2001). One subclass of\ngames that has seen quite fruitful for commercial deployment of AI is\nreal-time strategy games. Real-time strategy games are games in which\nplayers manage an army given limited resources. One objective is to\nconstantly battle other players and reduce an opponent’s forces.\nReal-time strategy games differ from strategy games in that players\nplan their actions simultaneously in real-time and do not have to take\nturns playing. Such games have a number of challenges that are\ntantalizing within the grasp of the state-of-the-art. This makes such\ngames an attractive venue in which to deploy simple AI agents. An\noverview of AI used in real-time strategy games can be found in\n(Robertson and Watson 2015). ", "\nSome other ventures in AI, despite significant success, have been only\nchugging slowly and humbly along, quietly. For instance, AI-related\nmethods have achieved triumphs in solving open problems in mathematics\nthat have resisted any solution for decades. The most noteworthy\ninstance of such a problem is perhaps a proof of the statement that\n“All Robbins algebras are Boolean algebras.” This\nwas conjectured in the 1930s, and the proof was finally discovered by\nthe Otter automatic theorem-prover in 1996 after just a few months of\neffort (Kolata 1996, Wos 2013). Sister fields like formal verification\nhave also bloomed to the extent that it is now not too difficult to\nsemi-automatically verify vital hardware/software components (Kaufmann\net al. 2000 and Chajed et al. 2017).", "\nOther related areas, such as (natural) language translation, still\nhave a long way to go, but are good enough to let us use them under\nrestricted conditions. The jury is out on tasks such as machine\ntranslation, which seems to require both statistical methods (Lopez\n2008) and symbolic methods (España-Bonet 2011). Both\nmethods now have comparable but limited success in the wild. A\ndeployed translation system at Ford that was initially developed for\ntranslating manufacturing process instructions from English to other\nlanguages initially started out as rule-based system with Ford and\ndomain-specific vocabulary and language. This system then evolved to\nincorporate statistical techniques along with rule-based techniques as\nit gained new uses beyond translating manuals, for example, lay users\nwithin Ford translating their own documents (Rychtyckyj and Plesco\n2012). ", "\nAI’s great achievements mentioned above so far have all been in\nlimited, narrow domains. This lack of any success in the unrestricted\ngeneral case has caused a small set of researchers to break away into\nwhat is now called\n artificial general intelligence\n (Goertzel and Pennachin 2007). The stated goals of this movement\ninclude shifting the focus again to building artifacts that are\ngenerally intelligent and not just capable in one narrow domain. " ], "section_title": "5. AI in the Wild", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nComputer Ethics has been around for a long time. In this\nsub-field, typically one would consider how one ought to act in a\ncertain class of situations involving computer technology, where the\n“one” here refers to a human being (Moor 1985). So-called\n“robot ethics” is different. In this sub-field (which goes\nby names such as “moral AI,” “ethical AI,”\n“machine ethics,” “moral robots,” etc.) one is\nconfronted with such prospects as robots being able to make autonomous\nand weighty decisions – decisions that might or might not be\nmorally permissible (Wallach & Allen 2010). If one were to attempt\nto engineer a robot with a capacity for sophisticated ethical\nreasoning and decision-making, one would also be doing Philosophical\nAI, as that concept is characterized\n elsewhere\n in the present entry. There can be many different flavors of\napproaches toward Moral AI. Wallach and Allen (2010) provide a\nhigh-level overview of the different approaches. Moral reasoning is\nobviously needed in robots that have the capability for lethal action.\nArkin (2009) provides an introduction to how we can control and\nregulate machines that have the capacity for lethal behavior. Moral AI\ngoes beyond obviously lethal situations, and we can have a spectrum of\nmoral machines. Moor (2006) provides one such spectrum of possible\nmoral agents. An example of a non-lethal but ethically-charged machine\nwould be a lying machine. Clark (2010) uses a computational theory\nof the mind, the ability to represent and reason about other\nagents, to build a lying machine that successfully persuades people\ninto believing falsehoods. Bello & Bringsjord (2013) give a\ngeneral overview of what might be required to build a moral machine,\none of the ingredients being a theory of mind. ", "\nThe most general framework for building machines that can reason\nethically consists in endowing the machines with a moral code.\nThis requires that the formal framework used for reasoning by the\nmachine be expressive enough to receive such codes. The field of Moral\nAI, for now, is not concerned with the source or provenance of such\ncodes. The source could be humans, and the machine could receive the\ncode directly (via explicit encoding) or indirectly (reading). Another\npossibility is that the code is inferred by the machine from a more\nbasic set of laws. We assume that the robot has access to some such\ncode, and we then try to engineer the robot to follow that code under\nall circumstances while making sure that the moral code and its\nrepresentation do not lead to unintended consequences. Deontic\nlogics are a class of formal logics that have been studied the\nmost for this purpose. Abstractly, such logics are concerned mainly\nwith what follows from a given moral code. Engineering then studies\nthe match of a given deontic logic to a moral code (i.e., is the logic\nexpressive enough) which has to be balanced with the ease of\nautomation. Bringsjord et al. (2006) provide a blueprint for using\ndeontic logics to build systems that can perform actions in accordance\nwith a moral code. The role deontic logics play in the framework\noffered by Bringsjord et al (which can be considered to be\nrepresentative of the field of deontic logic for moral AI) can be best\nunderstood as striving towards Leibniz’s dream of a universal\nmoral calculus: ", "\nWhen controversies arise, there will be no more need for a disputation\nbetween two philosophers than there would be between two accountants\n[computistas]. It would be enough for them to pick up their pens and\nsit at their abacuses, and say to each other (perhaps having summoned\na mutual friend): ‘Let us calculate.’\n", "\nDeontic logic-based frameworks can also be used in a fashion that is\nanalogous to moral self-reflection. In this mode, logic-based\nverification of the robot’s internal modules can done before the\nrobot ventures out into the real world. Govindarajulu and Bringsjord\n(2015) present an approach, drawing from formal-program\nverification, in which a deontic-logic based system could be used\nto verify that a robot acts in a certain ethically-sanctioned manner\nunder certain conditions. Since formal-verification approaches can be\nused to assert statements about an infinite number of situations and\nconditions, such approaches might be preferred to having the robot\nroam around in an ethically-charged test environment and make a finite\nset of decisions that are then judged for their ethical correctness.\nMore recently, Govindarajulu and Bringsjord (2017) use a deontic logic\nto present a computational model of the\n Doctrine of Double Effect,\n an ethical principle for moral dilemmas that has been studied\nempirically and analyzed extensively by\n philosophers.[35]\n The principle is usually presented and motivated via dilemmas using\ntrolleys and was first presented in this fashion by Foot (1967). ", "\nWhile there has been substantial theoretical and philosophical work,\nthe field of machine ethics is still in its infancy. There has been\nsome embryonic work in building ethical machines. One recent such\nexample would be Pereira and Saptawijaya (2016) who use logic\nprogramming and base their work in machine ethics on the ethical\ntheory known as contractualism, set out by Scanlon (1982). And\nwhat about the future? Since artificial agents are bound to get\nsmarter and smarter, and to have more and more autonomy and\nresponsibility, robot ethics is almost certainly going to grow in\nimportance. This endeavor might not be a straightforward application\nof classical ethics. For example, experimental results suggest that\nhumans hold robots to different ethical standards than they expect\nfrom humans under similar conditions (Malle et al.\n 2015).[36]\n " ], "section_title": "6. Moral AI", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nNotice that the heading for this section isn’t Philosophy\nof AI. We’ll get to that category momentarily. (For now\nit can be identified with the attempt to answer such questions as\nwhether artificial agents created in AI can ever reach the full\nheights of human intelligence.) Philosophical AI is AI, not\nphilosophy; but it’s AI rooted in and flowing from, philosophy.\nFor example, one could engage, using the tools and techniques of\nphilosophy, a paradox, work out a proposed solution, and then proceed\nto a step that is surely optional for philosophers: expressing the\nsolution in terms that can be translated into a computer program that,\nwhen executed, allows an artificial agent to surmount concrete\ninstances of the original\n paradox.[37]\n Before we ostensively characterize Philosophical AI of this sort\ncourtesy of a particular research program, let us consider first the\nview that AI is in fact simply philosophy, or a part thereof. ", "\nDaniel Dennett (1979) has famously claimed not just that there are\nparts of AI intimately bound up with philosophy, but that AI\nis philosophy (and psychology, at least of the cognitive\nsort). (He has made a parallel claim about Artificial Life (Dennett\n1998)). This view will turn out to be incorrect, but the reasons why\nit’s wrong will prove illuminating, and our discussion will pave\nthe way for a discussion of Philosophical AI. ", "\nWhat does Dennett say, exactly? This: ", "\nI want to claim that AI is better viewed as sharing with traditional\nepistemology the status of being a most general, most abstract asking\nof the top-down question: how is knowledge possible? (Dennett 1979,\n60)\n", "\nElsewhere he says his view is that AI should be viewed “as a\nmost abstract inquiry into the possibility of intelligence or\nknowledge” (Dennett 1979, 64). ", "\nIn short, Dennett holds that AI is the attempt to explain\nintelligence, not by studying the brain in the hopes of identifying\ncomponents to which cognition can be reduced, and not by engineering\nsmall information-processing units from which one can build in\nbottom-up fashion to high-level cognitive processes, but rather by\n– and this is why he says the approach is top-down\n– designing and implementing abstract algorithms that capture\ncognition. Leaving aside the fact that, at least starting in the early\n1980s, AI includes an approach that is in some sense bottom-up (see\nthe neurocomputational paradigm discussed above, in\n Non-Logicist AI: A Summary;\n and see, specifically, Granger’s (2004a, 2004b) work,\nhyperlinked in text immediately above, a specific counterexample), a\nfatal flaw infects Dennett’s view. Dennett sees the potential\nflaw, as reflected in: ", "\nIt has seemed to some philosophers that AI cannot plausibly be so\nconstrued because it takes on an additional burden: it restricts\nitself to mechanistic solutions, and hence its domain is not\nthe Kantian domain of all possible modes of intelligence, but just all\npossible mechanistically realizable modes of intelligence. This, it is\nclaimed, would beg the question against vitalists, dualists, and other\nanti-mechanists. (Dennett 1979, 61)\n", "\nDennett has a ready answer to this objection. He writes: ", "\nBut … the mechanism requirement of AI is not an additional\nconstraint of any moment, for if psychology is possible at all, and if\nChurch’s thesis is true, the constraint of mechanism is no more\nsevere than the constraint against begging the question in psychology,\nand who would wish to evade that? (Dennett 1979, 61)\n", "\nUnfortunately, this is acutely problematic; and examination of the\nproblems throws light on the nature of AI. ", "\nFirst, insofar as philosophy and psychology are concerned with the\nnature of mind, they aren’t in the least trammeled by the\npresupposition that mentation consists in computation. AI, at least of\nthe “Strong” variety (we’ll discuss\n“Strong” versus “Weak” AI\n below)\n is indeed an attempt to substantiate, through engineering certain\nimpressive artifacts, the thesis that intelligence is at bottom\ncomputational (at the level of Turing machines and their equivalents,\ne.g., Register machines). So there is a philosophical claim, for sure.\nBut this doesn’t make AI philosophy, any more than some of the\ndeeper, more aggressive claims of some physicists (e.g., that the\n universe is ultimately digital in nature)\n make their field philosophy. Philosophy of physics certainly\nentertains the proposition that the physical universe can be\nperfectly modeled in digital terms (in a series of cellular automata,\ne.g.), but of course philosophy of physics can’t be\nidentified with this doctrine. ", "\nSecond, we now know well (and those familiar with the relevant formal\nterrain knew at the time of Dennett’s writing) that information\nprocessing can exceed standard computation, that is, can exceed\ncomputation at and below the level of what a Turing machine can muster\n(Turing-computation, we shall say). (Such information\nprocessing is known as hypercomputation, a term coined by\nphilosopher Jack Copeland, who has himself defined such machines\n(e.g., Copeland 1998). The first machines capable of hypercomputation\nwere trial-and-error machines, introduced in the same famous\nissue of the Journal of Symbolic Logic (Gold 1965; Putnam\n1965). A new hypercomputer is the infinite time Turing machine\n(Hamkins & Lewis 2000).) Dennett’s appeal to Church’s\nthesis thus flies in the face of the mathematical facts: some\nvarieties of information processing exceed standard computation (or\nTuring-computation). Church’s thesis, or more precisely, the\nChurch-Turing thesis, is the view that a function \$f\$ is effectively\ncomputable if and only if \$f\$ is Turing-computable (i.e., some\nTuring machine can compute \$f\$). Thus, this thesis has nothing to\nsay about information processing that is more demanding than what a\nTuring machine can achieve. (Put another way, there is no\ncounter-example to CTT to be automatically found in an\ninformation-processing device capable of feats beyond the reach of\nTMs.) For all philosophy and psychology know, intelligence, even if\ntied to information processing, exceeds what is Turing-computational\nor\n Turing-mechanical.[38]\n This is especially true because philosophy and psychology, unlike AI,\nare in no way fundamentally charged with engineering artifacts, which\nmakes the physical realizability of hypercomputation irrelevant from\ntheir perspectives. Therefore, contra Dennett, to consider AI\nas psychology or philosophy is to commit a serious error, precisely\nbecause so doing would box these fields into only a speck of the\nentire space of functions from the natural numbers (including tuples\ntherefrom) to the natural numbers. (Only a tiny portion of the\nfunctions in this space are Turing-computable.) AI is without question\nmuch, much narrower than this pair of fields. Of course, it’s\npossible that AI could be replaced by a field devoted not to building\ncomputational artifacts by writing computer programs and running them\non embodied Turing machines. But this new field, by definition, would\nnot be AI. Our exploration of AIMA and other textbooks provide\ndirect empirical confirmation of this. ", "\nThird, most AI researchers and developers, in point of fact, are\nsimply concerned with building useful, profitable artifacts, and\ndon’t spend much time reflecting upon the kinds of abstract\ndefinitions of intelligence explored in this entry (e.g.,\n What Exactly is AI?).\n ", "\nThough AI isn’t philosophy, there are certainly ways of doing\nreal implementation-focussed AI of the highest caliber that are\nintimately bound up with philosophy. The best way to demonstrate this\nis to simply present such research and development, or at least a\nrepresentative example thereof. While there have been many examples of\nsuch work, the most prominent example in AI is John Pollock’s\nOSCAR project, which stretched over a considerable portion of his\nlifetime. For a detailed presentation and further discussion, see\nthe", "\n\n Supplement on the OSCAR Project.\n ", "\nIt’s important to note at this juncture that the OSCAR project,\nand the information processing that underlies it, are without question\nat once philosophy and technical AI. Given that the work in\nquestion has appeared in the pages of Artificial Intelligence,\na first-rank journal devoted to that field, and not to philosophy,\nthis is undeniable (see, e.g., Pollock 2001, 1992). This point is\nimportant because while it’s certainly appropriate, in the\npresent venue, to emphasize connections between AI and philosophy,\nsome readers may suspect that this emphasis is contrived: they may\nsuspect that the truth of the matter is that page after page of AI\njournals are filled with narrow, technical content far from\nphilosophy. Many such papers do exist. But we must distinguish between\nwritings designed to present the nature of AI, and its core methods\nand goals, versus writings designed to present progress on specific\ntechnical issues. ", "\nWritings in the latter category are more often than not quite narrow,\nbut, as the example of Pollock shows, sometimes these specific issues\nare inextricably linked to philosophy. And of course Pollock’s\nwork is a representative example (albeit the most substantive one).\nOne could just as easily have selected work by folks who don’t\nhappen to also produce straight philosophy. For example, for an entire\nbook written within the confines of AI and computer science, but which\nis epistemic logic in action in many ways, suitable for use in\nseminars on that topic, see (Fagin et al. 2004). (It is hard to find\ntechnical work that isn’t bound up with philosophy in some\ndirect way. E.g., AI research on learning is all intimately bound up\nwith philosophical treatments of induction, of how genuinely new\nconcepts not simply defined in terms of prior ones can be learned. One\npossible partial answer offered by AI is inductive logic\nprogramming, discussed in Chapter 19 of AIMA.) ", "\nWhat of writings in the former category? Writings in this category,\nwhile by definition in AI venues, not philosophy ones, are nonetheless\nphilosophical. Most textbooks include plenty of material that falls\ninto this latter category, and hence they include discussion of the\nphilosophical nature of AI (e.g., that AI is aimed at building\nartificial intelligences, and that’s why, after all, it’s\ncalled ‘AI’). " ], "section_title": "7. Philosophical AI", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "8. Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nRecall that we earlier discussed proposed definitions of AI, and\nrecall specifically that these proposals were couched in terms of the\ngoals of the field. We can follow this pattern here: We can\ndistinguish between “Strong” and “Weak” AI by\ntaking note of the different goals that these two versions of AI\nstrive to reach. “Strong” AI seeks to create artificial\npersons: machines that have all the mental powers we have, including\nphenomenal consciousness. “Weak” AI, on the other hand,\nseeks to build information-processing machines that appear to\nhave the full mental repertoire of human persons (Searle 1997).\n“Weak” AI can also be defined as the form of AI that aims\nat a system able to pass not just the Turing Test (again, abbreviated\nas TT), but the Total Turing Test (Harnad 1991). In TTT, a\nmachine must muster more than linguistic indistinguishability: it must\npass for a human in all behaviors – throwing a baseball, eating,\nteaching a class, etc. ", "\nIt would certainly seem to be exceedingly difficult for philosophers\nto overthrow “Weak” AI (Bringsjord and Xiao 2000). After\nall, what philosophical reason stands in the way of AI\nproducing artifacts that appear to be animals or even humans?\nHowever, some philosophers have aimed to do in “Strong”\nAI, and we turn now to the most prominent case in point. " ], "subsection_title": "8.1 “Strong” versus “Weak” AI" }, { "content": [ "\nWithout question, the most famous argument in the philosophy of AI is\nJohn Searle’s (1980) Chinese Room Argument (CRA), designed to\noverthrow “Strong” AI. We present a quick summary here and\na “report from the trenches” as to how AI practitioners\nregard the argument. Readers wanting to further study CRA will find an\nexcellent next step in the entry on\n the Chinese Room Argument\n and (Bishop & Preston 2002). ", "\nCRA is based on a thought-experiment in which Searle himself stars. He\nis inside a room; outside the room are native Chinese speakers who\ndon’t know that Searle is inside it. Searle-in-the-box, like\nSearle-in-real-life, doesn’t know any Chinese, but is fluent in\nEnglish. The Chinese speakers send cards into the room through a slot;\non these cards are written questions in Chinese. The box, courtesy of\nSearle’s secret work therein, returns cards to the native\nChinese speakers as output. Searle’s output is produced by\nconsulting a rulebook: this book is a lookup table that tells him what\nChinese to produce based on what is sent in. To Searle, the Chinese is\nall just a bunch of – to use Searle’s language –\nsquiggle-squoggles. The following schematic picture sums up the\nsituation. The labels should be obvious. \$O\$ denotes the outside\nobservers, in this case the Chinese speakers. Input is denoted by\n\$i\$ and output by \$o\$. As you can see, there is an icon for the\nrulebook, and Searle himself is denoted by \$P\$.", "\nNow, what is the argument based on this thought-experiment? Even if\nyou’ve never heard of CRA before, you doubtless can see the\nbasic idea: that Searle (in the box) is supposed to be everything a\ncomputer can be, and because he doesn’t understand Chinese, no\ncomputer could have such understanding. Searle is mindlessly moving\nsquiggle-squoggles around, and (according to the argument)\nthat’s all computers do,\n fundamentally.[39]", "\nWhere does CRA stand today? As we’ve already indicated, the\nargument would still seem to be alive and well; witness (Bishop &\nPreston 2002). However, there is little doubt that at least among AI\npractitioners, CRA is generally rejected. (This is of course\nthoroughly unsurprising.) Among these practitioners, the philosopher\nwho has offered the most formidable response out of AI itself is\nRapaport (1988), who argues that while AI systems are indeed\nsyntactic, the right syntax can constitute semantics. It should be\nsaid that a common attitude among proponents of “Strong”\nAI is that CRA is not only unsound, but silly, based as it is on a\nfanciful story (CR) far removed from the practice of AI\n– practice which is year by year moving ineluctably toward\nsophisticated robots that will once and for all silence CRA and its\nproponents. For example, John Pollock (as we’ve noted,\nphilosopher and practitioner of AI) writes: ", "\nOnce [my intelligent system] OSCAR is fully functional, the argument\nfrom analogy will lead us inexorably to attribute thoughts and\nfeelings to OSCAR with precisely the same credentials with which we\nattribute them to human beings. Philosophical arguments to the\ncontrary will be passé. (Pollock 1995, p. 6)\n", "\nTo wrap up discussion of CRA, we make two quick points, to wit: ", "\nReaders may wonder if there are philosophical debates that AI\nresearchers engage in, in the course of working in their field (as\nopposed to when they might attend a philosophy conference). Surely, AI\nresearchers have philosophical discussions amongst themselves, right?\n", "\nGenerally, one finds that AI researchers do discuss among themselves\ntopics in philosophy of AI, and these topics are usually the very same\nones that occupy philosophers of AI. However, the attitude reflected\nin the quote from Pollock immediately above is by far the dominant\none. That is, in general, the attitude of AI researchers is that\nphilosophizing is sometimes fun, but the upward march of AI\nengineering cannot be stopped, will not fail, and will eventually\nrender such philosophizing otiose. ", "\nWe will return to the issue of the future of AI in the\n final section\n of this entry. " ], "subsection_title": "8.2 The Chinese Room Argument Against “Strong AI”" }, { "content": [ "\nFour decades ago, J.R. Lucas (1964) argued that Gödel’s\nfirst incompleteness theorem entails that no machine can ever reach\nhuman-level intelligence. His argument has not proved to be\ncompelling, but Lucas initiated a debate that has produced more\nformidable arguments. One of Lucas’ indefatigable defenders is\nthe physicist Roger Penrose, whose first attempt to vindicate Lucas\nwas a Gödelian attack on “Strong” AI articulated in\nhis The Emperor’s New Mind (1989). This first attempt\nfell short, and Penrose published a more elaborate and more fastidious\nGödelian case, expressed in Chapters 2 and 3 of his Shadows of\nthe Mind (1994). ", "\nIn light of the fact that readers can turn to the\n entry on the Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems,\n a full review here is not needed. Instead, readers will be given a\ndecent sense of the argument by turning to an online paper in which\nPenrose, writing in response to critics (e.g., the philosopher David\nChalmers, the logician Solomon Feferman, and the computer scientist\nDrew McDermott) of his Shadows of the Mind, distills the\nargument to a couple of\n paragraphs.[40]\n Indeed, in this paper Penrose gives what he takes to be the perfected\nversion of the core Gödelian case given in SOTM. Here is\nthis version, verbatim: ", "\nWe try to suppose that the totality of methods of (unassailable)\nmathematical reasoning that are in principle humanly accessible can be\nencapsulated in some (not necessarily computational) sound formal\nsystem \$F\$. A human mathematician, if presented with \$F\$, could\nargue as follows (bearing in mind that the phrase “I am\n\$F\$” is merely a shorthand for “\$F\$ encapsulates all\nthe humanly accessible methods of mathematical proof”):\n\n\n(A) “Though I don’t know that I necessarily am \$F\$, I\nconclude that if I were, then the system \$F\$ would have to be sound\nand, more to the point, \$F'\$ would have to be sound, where \$F'\$ is\n\$F\$ supplemented by the further assertion “I am \$F\$.”\nI perceive that it follows from the assumption that I am \$F\$ that\nthe Gödel statement \$G(F')\$ would have to be true and,\nfurthermore, that it would not be a consequence of \$F'\$. But I have\njust perceived that “If I happened to be \$F\$, then \$G(F')\$\nwould have to be true,” and perceptions of this nature would be\nprecisely what \$F'\$ is supposed to achieve. Since I am therefore\ncapable of perceiving something beyond the powers of \$F'\$, I deduce\nthat I cannot be \$F\$ after all. Moreover, this applies to any other\n(Gödelizable) system, in place of \$F\$.” (Penrose 1996,\n3.2)\n\n", "\nDoes this argument succeed? A firm answer to this question is not\nappropriate to seek in the present entry. Interested readers are\nencouraged to consult four full-scale treatments of the argument\n(LaForte et. al 1998; Bringsjord and Xiao 2000; Shapiro 2003; Bowie\n1982)." ], "subsection_title": "8.3 The Gödelian Argument Against “Strong AI”" }, { "content": [ "\nIn addition to the Gödelian and Searlean arguments covered\nbriefly above, a third attack on “Strong” AI (of the\nsymbolic variety) has been widely discussed (though with the rise of\nstatistical machine learning has come a corresponding decrease in the\nattention paid to it), namely, one given by the philosopher Hubert\nDreyfus (1972, 1992), some incarnations of which have been\nco-articulated with his brother, Stuart Dreyfus (1987), a computer\nscientist. Put crudely, the core idea in this attack is that human\nexpertise is not based on the explicit, disembodied, mechanical\nmanipulation of symbolic information (such as formulae in some logic,\nor probabilities in some Bayesian network), and that AI’s\nefforts to build machines with such expertise are doomed if based on\nthe symbolic paradigm. The genesis of the Dreyfusian attack was a\nbelief that the critique of (if you will) symbol-based philosophy\n(e.g., philosophy in the logic-based, rationalist tradition, as\nopposed to what is called the Continental tradition) from such\nthinkers as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty could be made against the\nrationalist tradition in AI. After further reading and study of\nDreyfus’ writings, readers may judge whether this critique is\ncompelling, in an information-driven world increasingly managed by\nintelligent agents that carry out symbolic reasoning (albeit not even\nclose to the human level). ", "\nFor readers interested in exploring philosophy of AI beyond what Jim\nMoor (in a recent address – “The Next Fifty Years of AI:\nFuture Scientific Research vs. Past Philosophical Criticisms”\n– as the 2006 Barwise Award winner at the annual eastern\nAmerican Philosophical Association meeting) has called the “the\nbig three” criticisms of AI, there is no shortage of additional\nmaterial, much of it available on the Web. The last chapter of\nAIMA provides a compressed overview of some additional\narguments against “Strong” AI, and is in general not a bad\nnext step. Needless to say, Philosophy of AI today involves much more\nthan the three well-known arguments discussed above, and, inevitably,\nPhilosophy of AI tomorrow will include new debates and problems we\ncan’t see now. Because machines, inevitably, will get smarter\nand smarter (regardless of just how smart they get),\nPhilosophy of AI, pure and simple, is a growth industry. With every\nhuman activity that machines match, the “big” questions\nwill only attract more attention. " ], "subsection_title": "8.4 Additional Topics and Readings in Philosophy of AI" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIf past predictions are any indication, the only thing we know today\nabout tomorrow’s science and technology is that it will be\nradically different than whatever we predict it will be like.\nArguably, in the case of AI, we may also specifically know today that\nprogress will be much slower than what most expect. After all, at the\n1956 kickoff conference (discussed at the start of this entry), Herb\nSimon predicted that thinking machines able to match the human mind\nwere “just around the corner” (for the relevant quotes and\ninformative discussion, see the first chapter of AIMA). As it\nturned out, the new century would arrive without a single machine able\nto converse at even the toddler level. (Recall that when it comes to\nthe building of machines capable of displaying human-level\nintelligence, Descartes, not Turing, seems today to be the better\nprophet.) Nonetheless, astonishing though it may be, serious thinkers\nin the late 20th century have continued to issue incredibly optimistic\npredictions regarding the progress of AI. For example, Hans Moravec\n(1999), in his Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind,\ninforms us that because the speed of computer hardware doubles every\n18 months (in accordance with Moore’s Law, which has\napparently held in the past), “fourth generation”\nrobots will soon enough exceed humans in all respects, from running\ncompanies to writing novels. These robots, so the story goes, will\nevolve to such lofty cognitive heights that we will stand to them as\nsingle-cell organisms stand to us\n today.[41]\n ", "\nMoravec is by no means singularly Pollyannaish: Many others in AI\npredict the same sensational future unfolding on about the same rapid\nschedule. In fact, at the aforementioned AI@50 conference, Jim Moor\nposed the question “Will human-level AI be achieved within the\nnext 50 years?” to five thinkers who attended the original 1956\nconference: John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Oliver Selfridge, Ray\nSolomonoff, and Trenchard Moore. McCarthy and Minsky gave firm,\nunhesitating affirmatives, and Solomonoff seemed to suggest that AI\nprovided the one ray of hope in the face of fact that our species\nseems bent on destroying itself. (Selfridge’s reply was a bit\ncryptic. Moore returned a firm, unambiguous negative, and declared\nthat once his computer is smart enough to interact with him\nconversationally about mathematical problems, he might take this whole\nenterprise more seriously.) It is left to the reader to judge the\naccuracy of such risky predictions as have been given by Moravec,\nMcCarthy, and\n Minsky.[42]\n ", "\nThe judgment of the reader in this regard ought to factor in the\nstunning resurgence, very recently, of serious reflection on what is\nknown as “The Singularity,” (denoted by us simply as\nS) the future point at which artificial intelligence exceeds\nhuman intelligence, whereupon immediately thereafter (as the story\ngoes) the machines make themselves rapidly smarter and smarter and\nsmarter, reaching a superhuman level of intelligence that, stuck as we\nare in the mud of our limited mentation, we can’t fathom. For\nextensive, balanced analysis of S, see Eden et al. (2013).", "\nReaders unfamiliar with the literature on S may be quite\nsurprised to learn the degree to which, among learned folks, this\nhypothetical event is not only taken seriously, but has in fact become\na target for extensive and frequent philosophizing [for a mordant tour\nof the recent thought in question, see Floridi (2015)]. What\narguments support the belief that S is in our future?\nThere are two main arguments at this point: the familiar\nhardware-based one [championed by Moravec, as noted above, and again\nmore recently by Kurzweil (2006)]; and the – as far as we know\n– original argument given by mathematician I. J. Good (1965). In\naddition, there is a recent and related doomsayer argument advanced by\nBostrom (2014), which seems to presuppose that S will occur.\nGood’s argument, nicely amplified and adjusted by Chalmers\n(2010), who affirms the tidied-up version of the argument, runs as\nfollows:", "\nIn this argument, ‘AI’ is artificial intelligence at the\nlevel of, and created by, human persons, ‘AI\$^+\$’\nartificial intelligence above the level of human persons, and\n‘AI\$^{++}\$’ super-intelligence constitutive of S.\nThe key process is presumably the creation of one class of\nmachine by another. We have added for convenience ‘HI’ for\nhuman intelligence; the central idea is then: HI will create AI, the\nlatter at the same level of intelligence as the former; AI will create\nAI\$^+\$; AI\$^+\$ will create AI\$^{++}\$; with the ascension\nproceeding perhaps forever, but at any rate proceeding long enough for\nus to be as ants outstripped by gods. ", "\nThe argument certainly appears to be formally valid. Are its three\npremises true? Taking up such a question would fling us far beyond the\nscope of this entry. We point out only that the concept of one class\nof machines creating another, more powerful class of machines is not a\ntransparent one, and neither Good nor Chalmers provides a rigorous\naccount of the concept, which is ripe for philosophical analysis. (As\nto mathematical analysis, some exists, of course. It is for example\nwell-known that a computing machine at level \$L\$ cannot possibly\ncreate another machine at a higher level \$L'\$. For instance, a\nlinear-bounded automaton can’t create a Turing machine.)", "\nThe Good-Chalmers argument has a rather clinical air about it; the\nargument doesn’t say anything regarding whether machines in\nthe AI\$^{++}\$ category will be benign, malicious, or munificent.\nMany others gladly fill this gap with dark, dark pessimism. The\nlocus classicus here is without question a widely read paper by\nBill Joy (2000): “Why The Future Doesn’t Need Us.”\nJoy believes that the human race is doomed, in no small part because\nit’s busy building smart machines. He writes: ", "\n\n\nThe 21st-century technologies – genetics, nanotechnology, and\nrobotics (GNR) – are so powerful that they can spawn whole new\nclasses of accidents and abuses. Most dangerously, for the first time,\nthese accidents and abuses are widely within the reach of individuals\nor small groups. They will not require large facilities or rare raw\nmaterials. Knowledge alone will enable the use of them.\n\n\nThus we have the possibility not just of weapons of mass destruction\nbut of knowledge-enabled mass destruction (KMD), this destructiveness\nhugely amplified by the power of self-replication. \n\n\nI think it is no exaggeration to say we are on the cusp of the further\nperfection of extreme evil, an evil whose possibility spreads well\nbeyond that which weapons of mass destruction bequeathed to the\nnation-states, on to a surprising and terrible empowerment of extreme\n individuals.[43]\n \n", "\nPhilosophers would be most interested in arguments for this\nview. What are Joy’s? Well, no small reason for the attention\nlavished on his paper is that, like Raymond Kurzweil (2000), Joy\nrelies heavily on an argument given by none other than the Unabomber\n(Theodore Kaczynski). The idea is that, assuming we succeed in\nbuilding intelligent machines, we will have them do most (if not all)\nwork for us. If we further allow the machines to make decisions for us\n– even if we retain oversight over the machines –, we will\neventually depend on them to the point where we must simply accept\ntheir decisions. But even if we don’t allow the machines to make\ndecisions, the control of such machines is likely to be held by a\nsmall elite who will view the rest of humanity as unnecessary –\nsince the machines can do any needed work (Joy 2000).", "\nThis isn’t the place to assess this argument. (Having said that,\nthe pattern pushed by the Unabomber and his supporters certainly\nappears to be flatly\n invalid.[44])\n In fact, many readers will doubtless feel that no such place exists\nor will exist, because the reasoning here is amateurish. So then, what\nabout the reasoning of professional philosophers on the matter? ", "\nBostrom has recently painted an exceedingly dark picture of a possible\nfuture. He points out that the “first superintelligence”\ncould have the capability", "\nto shape the future of Earth-originating life, could easily have\nnon-anthropomorphic final goals, and would likely have instrumental\nreasons to pursue open-ended resource acquisition. If we now reflect\nthat human beings consist of useful resources (such as conveniently\nlocated atoms) and that we depend on many more local resources, we can\nsee that the outcome could easily be one in which humanity quickly\nbecomes extinct. (Bostrom 2014, p. 416)\n", "\n Clearly, the most vulnerable premise in this sort of argument\nis that the “first superintelligence” will arrive indeed\narrive. Here perhaps the Good-Chalmers argument provides a basis.\n", "\nSearle (2014) thinks Bostrom’s book is misguided and\nfundamentally mistaken, and that we needn’t worry. His rationale\nis dirt-simple: Machines aren’t conscious; Bostrom is alarmed at\nthe prospect of malicious machines who do us in; a malicious machine\nis by definition a conscious machine; ergo, Bostrom’s argument\ndoesn’t work. Searle writes: ", "\nIf the computer can fly airplanes, drive cars, and win at chess, who\ncares if it is totally nonconscious? But if we are worried about a\nmaliciously motivated superintelligence destroying us, then it is\nimportant that the malicious motivation should be real. Without\nconsciousness, there is no possibiity of its being real.\n", "\nThe positively remarkable thing here, it seems to us, is that Searle\nappears to be unaware of the brute fact that most AI engineers are\nperfectly content to build machines on the basis of the AIMA\nview of AI we presented and explained above: the view according to\nwhich machines simply map percepts to actions. On this view, it\ndoesn’t matter whether the machine really has desires;\nwhat matters is whether it acts suitably on the basis of how AI\nscientists engineer formal correlates to desire. An\nautonomous machine with overwhelming destructive power that\nnon-consciously “decides” to kill doesn’t become\njust a nuisance because genuine, human-level, subjective desire is\nabsent from the machine. If an AI can play the game of chess, and the\ngame of Jeopardy!, it can certainly play the game of war. Just\nas it does little good for a human loser to point out that the\nvictorious machine in a game of chess isn’t conscious, it will\ndo little good for humans being killed by machines to point out that\nthese machines aren’t conscious. (It is interesting to note that\nthe genesis of Joy’s paper was an informal conversation with\nJohn Searle and Raymond Kurzweil. According to Joy, Searle\ndidn’t think there was much to worry about, since he was (and\nis) quite confident that tomorrow’s robots can’t be\n conscious.[45])\n ", "\nThere are some things we can safely say about tomorrow.\nCertainly, barring some cataclysmic events (nuclear or biological\nwarfare, global economic depression, a meteorite smashing into Earth,\netc.), we now know that AI will succeed in producing artificial\nanimals. Since even some natural animals (mules, e.g.) can be\neasily trained to work for humans, it stands to reason that artificial\nanimals, designed from scratch with our purposes in mind, will be\ndeployed to work for us. In fact, many jobs currently done by humans\nwill certainly be done by appropriately programmed artificial animals.\nTo pick an arbitrary example, it is difficult to believe that\ncommercial drivers won’t be artificial in the future. (Indeed,\nDaimler is already running commercials in which they tout the ability\nof their automobiles to drive “autonomously,” allowing\nhuman occupants of these vehicles to ignore the road and read.) Other\nexamples would include: cleaners, mail carriers, clerical workers,\nmilitary scouts, surgeons, and pilots. (As to cleaners, probably a\nsignificant number of readers, at this very moment, have robots from\niRobot cleaning the carpets in their homes.) It is hard to see how\nsuch jobs are inseparably bound up with the attributes often taken to\nbe at the core of personhood – attributes that would be the most\ndifficult for AI to\n replicate.[46]\n ", "\nAndy Clark (2003) has another prediction: Humans will gradually\nbecome, at least to an appreciable degree, cyborgs, courtesy of\nartificial limbs and sense organs, and implants. The main driver of\nthis trend will be that while standalone AIs are often desirable, they\nare hard to engineer when the desired level of intelligence is high.\nBut to let humans “pilot” less intelligent machines is a\ngood deal easier, and still very attractive for concrete reasons.\nAnother related prediction is that AI would play the role of a\ncognitive prosthesis for humans (Ford et al. 1997; Hoffman et al.\n2001). The prosthesis view sees AI as a “great equalizer”\nthat would lead to less stratification in society, perhaps similar to\nhow the Hindu-Arabic numeral system made arithmetic available to the\nmasses, and to how the Guttenberg press contributed to literacy\nbecoming more universal. ", "\nEven if the argument is formally invalid, it leaves us with a question\n– the cornerstone question about AI and the future: Will AI\nproduce artificial creatures that replicate and exceed human cognition\n(as Kurzweil and Joy believe)? Or is this merely an interesting\nsupposition? ", "\nThis is a question not just for scientists and engineers; it is also a\nquestion for philosophers. This is so for two reasons. One, research\nand development designed to validate an affirmative answer must\ninclude philosophy – for reasons rooted in earlier parts of the\npresent entry. (E.g., philosophy is the place to turn to for robust\nformalisms to model human propositional attitudes in machine terms.)\nTwo, philosophers might well be able to provide arguments that answer\nthe cornerstone question now, definitively. If a version of either of\nthe three arguments against “Strong” AI alluded to above\n(Searle’s CRA; the Gödelian attack; the Dreyfus argument)\nare sound, then of course AI will not manage to produce machines\nhaving the mental powers of persons. No doubt the future holds not\nonly ever-smarter machines, but new arguments pro and con on the\nquestion of whether this progress can reach the human level that\nDescartes declared to be unreachable. 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", " Wallach, W. & Allen, C., 2010, Moral Machines: Teaching\nRobots Right from Wrong, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.\n", " Wermter, S. & Sun, R., 2001 (Spring), “The Present and\nthe Future of Hybrid Neural Symbolic Systems: Some Reflections from\nthe Neural Information Processing Systems Workshop,” AI\nMagazine, 22.1: 123–125. ", " Suppes, P., 1972, Axiomatic Set Theory, New York, NY:\nDover. ", " Whiteson, S. & Whiteson, D., 2009, “Machine Learning\nfor Event Selection in High Energy Physics,” Engineering\nApplications of Artificial Intelligence 22.8: 1203–1217.\n", " Williams, D. E., Hinton G. E., & Williams R. J., 1986\n“Learning Representations by Back-propagating Errors,”\nNature, 323.10: 533–536. ", " Winston, P., 1992, Artificial Intelligence, Reading, MA:\nAddison-Wesley. ", " Wos, L., Overbeek, R., Lusk R. & Boyle, J., 1992,\nAutomated Reasoning: Introduction and Applications (2nd\nedition), New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. ", " Wos, L., 2013, “The Legacy of a Great Researcher,” in\nAutomated Reasoning and Mathematics: Essays in Memory of William\nMcCune, Bonacina, M.P. & Stickel, M.E., eds., 1–14.\nBerlin: Springer. ", " Zalta, E., 1988, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of\nIntentionality, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books. 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tense-aspect	Tense and Aspect	First published Tue Jan 7, 2014; substantive revision Mon Sep 17, 2018	[ "\nMany languages have grammatical means to indicate the time when an\naction or event occurs, or when a state or process holds. This\nphenomenon is called tense. In English, for example, adding\nthe morpheme -ed to the verb walk, to form\nwalked, indicates that the event denoted by the verb occurred\nbefore the present time. What is called aspect, on the other\nhand, deals with the internal constituency of actions, events, states,\nprocesses or situations. For instance, it may indicate that an action\nis completed or still ongoing. English typically uses the\n-ing form of verbs to indicate ongoing processes, as in\nHe is building a house. ", "\nAfter a short introduction to basic notions of tense and aspect we\nbriefly discuss temporal logic, and then Reichenbach’s famous\ndistinction between speech time, event time and reference\ntime. Event-based semantic theories treat events as ontological\nprimitives, so in the following section we show how time can be\nconstructed from event structures, as exemplified by the Russell-Kamp\nconstruction. These sections are followed by a discussion of the most\nimportant observations concerning lexical and grammatical aspect,\nincluding the famous imperfective paradox. Next we introduce two\nwidely discussed theories of temporality and show how they cope with\nthe imperfective paradox. This section is followed by one that shows\nhow temporal information is expressed in Artificial Intelligence\n(AI). We use the event calculus from AI to present a solution of the\nimperfective paradox, by viewing it as an instance of the frame\nproblem. The last section is devoted to gathering psycholinguistic\nevidence showing that at least some of the philosophical and semantic\nconcepts discussed in this article may be cognitively real. " ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Temporal Logic", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Speech Time, Event Time and Reference Time", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. From Events to Time", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Lexical and Grammatical Aspect", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Intensionality versus Events", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Nominal Reference and Temporal Constitution" ] }, { "content_title": "7. Event Calculus", "sub_toc": [ "7.1 The Yale Shooting Scenario", "7.2 The completion of a program", "7.3 Introducing tense information", "7.4 The imperfective paradox reconsidered" ] }, { "content_title": "8. Cognitive aspects", "sub_toc": [ "8.1 Lexical Aspect", "8.2 Grammatical Aspect" ] }, { "content_title": "9. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nTense roughly means reference to the time at which events\ntake place, or at which processes or states hold. English, for\nexample, clearly distinguishes between past and non-past tense as in\n(1a) and (1b) and (1c). ", "\nIn English, verb forms are typically used to signal the time\nwhen an action or event occurs or a state holds. Thus in (1a), John’s\npromise was given before the present time, in (1b) the promising is\nsimultaneous with the present time and (1c) says that the student’s\nwork on his thesis will occur at some time after the present. It\nshould be noted that the verb forms used to express temporal\ninformation may also be used to signal information that is not purely\ntemporal. For instance, the present tense form in John walks\n\n\ncharacterizes a certain habit of John. And in the statement The\ntrain departs at five o’clock tomorrow, the present verb form\nclearly has a futurate meaning. So English distinguishes between past\nand non-past but not between future and non-future. Moreover, many\nlinguists exclude future as a pure tense, because the auxiliary\nwill may be used to express volition as in He will go\nswimming in dangerous\n water.[1]", "\nApart from absolute tense—exemplified by\n(1a)–(1c)—where the reference point from which the\nlocation in time is evaluated is the present, there is also\n\nrelative tense where the reference point is not necessarily\nthe present but may be given by context. Thus in a sentence like\nThe student had worked on his thesis the student’s work took\nplace at a time before a reference point in the past, in contrast to\n(1c) where the reference point is the present. Other instances of\nrelative tense in English are the present perfect and the future\nperfect in (2a) respectively (2b). ", "\nThe notion of aspect according to Comrie refers to\n“[the] different ways of viewing the internal temporal\nconstituency of a situation” (1976: 3). It is customary to\ndistinguish between lexical and grammatical aspect.\nThe following are examples concerning lexical aspect. Since Vendler\n(1967) linguists distinguish at least four aspectual classes. These\nare states like know, activities like run,\naccomplishments like cross the street and achievements\nexemplified by a verb like recognize. Accomplishments\ndescribe the internal temporal constituency of a situation in a more\ndetailed way than (say) activities. Crossing the street, for\nexample, includes the starting of a crossing activity which goes on\nfor some time and involves a result state that is characterized by\nbeing on the other side of the street. No such elaborate descriptions\nare necessary for activities or achievements. There are grammatical\nmeans of distinguishing between these aspectual classes. For example,\nstates and achievements cannot occur with the progressive while\nactivities and accomplishments can; more about this below in\n Section 5.\n\n\n These differences are customarily considered to be lexical\ndifferences and this area is therefore dubbed lexical aspect.\n", "\nA further crucial aspectual difference is that between perfective and\nimperfective aspect. Comrie characterizes these notions as follows.\n", "\n\n…perfectivity indicates the view of the situation as a single\nwhole, without distinction of the various separate phases that make up\nthat situation, while the imperfective pays essential attention to the\ninternal structure of the situation. (Comrie 1976: 16) \n", "\nIn English this difference is often expressed by grammatical\nmeans, for instance by past tense versus past progressive. This is an\ninstance of grammatical aspect. Slavic language often have an\nelaborate grammatical system to signal the difference between\nimperfectivity (ipv) and perfectivity (pv). Here is an example from Russian. ", "\nSentence (3b) presents the writing of a letter as a single whole and\nit is clear that this activity was finished when the letter was brought to the\npost office. By contrast, (3a) focuses on an ongoing activity of\nletter writing in the past which is not completed because of the\ninterruption. In fact it is consistent with the truth of (3a) that the\nletter was never completely written. ", "\nThe natural language categories tense and aspect\n\n\nembody the linguistic encoding of time. From a typological point of\nview these categories are typical verbal\n categories.[2]\n This means that if these categories are morphologically realized in a\nlanguage then these morphemes attach to the verb. Verbs usually\nexpress events, processes, actions or\n states[3]\n and the temporal morphemes locate these eventualities in time. Of\ncourse this does not mean that languages that lack such morphemes are\nnot able to express temporal relations. They just have to choose other\nmeans for this purpose. One famous example of a language not\ncontaining temporal morphology is Mandarin Chinese. Often tense and\naspect cannot be clearly separated. For example the Quiché\nprefix \$x-\$ denotes a completed (aspect) action in the past\n (tense).[4]\n\n\n ", "\nTypologists also observed an asymmetry between past and future. Most\nlanguages that possess temporal morphology use these means to\ndifferentiate between past and non-past. There are, however, a few\nlanguages which use temporal morphology to distinguish between future\nand non-future. ", "\nWe will not go into further details concerning the linguistic\nrealization of tense and aspect, but present a brief and necessarily\nincomplete review of major philosophical and semantic theories of\nthese notions. " ], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nTemporal logic was introduced by Arthur Prior (see for instance Prior\n1967). Here we will sketch only propositional temporal logic (for a\nmore thorough introduction the reader is advised to consult Gamut\n1991: chapters 2 and 3) and the entry on\n temporal logic.\n\n\n Temporal logic introduces operators \$\\bG\$, \$\\bH\$, \$\\bF\$ and\n\$\\bP\$, which are similar to the modal operators \$\\Box\$ and \$\\Diamond\$.\nWe summarize the intuitive meaning of these operators in Table 1. ", "\nBy adding the above operators to propositional logic we extend\npropositional logic to propositional temporal logic. Let \$q\$\nabbreviate the sentence Sam is working, then we are able to\nexpress the following verb tenses in temporal logic: ", "\nA model \$\\sM\$ for propositional temporal logic consists of a\nnonempty set \$T\$ of moments of time, an earlier than relation\n\$\\prec\$ and a valuation function \$I\$ which for each moment of\ntime and each proposition letter \$q\$ assigns a truth value\n\$I_{\\sM ,t}(q)\$. The following\ndefinition characterizes \$I_{\\sM ,t}(\\phi)\$\nfor the temporal operators. ", "\nThese clauses are analogous to the clauses which define the modal\noperators \$\\Box\$ and \$\\Diamond\$—with \$\\bG\$ and \$\\bH\$\ncorresponding to \$\\Box\$, and \$\\bF\$ and \$\\bP\$ to \$\\Diamond\$—but\ninstead of possible worlds the valuation function takes moments of\ntime as arguments. Therefore principle (5) is valid in any model,\nsince the modal analogue is valid for \$\\Box\$ independently of the\naccessibility relation. ", "\nHowever, principle (6), which is often considered as valid for\n\$\\Box\$, is presumably not valid for \$\\bG\$. ", "\nFormula (6) is equivalent to \$\\phi \\rightarrow \\bF\\phi\$. The latter\nformula says that if \$\\phi\$ is the case then \$\\phi\$ will be the case,\nwhich is intuitively incorrect. Suppose that \$\\prec\$ is irreflexive;\nthis assumption makes sense since it means that no time point is\nearlier than itself. But under this assumption, Principle (6) is\nobviously wrong. For extensions of temporal logic and more examples\nconcerning the correspondence between properties of models and the\nvalidity or invalidity of formulas see Gamut 1991: chapter 2.", "\nThis concludes our brief remarks about temporal logic. We now turn to\nan alternative approach due to the philosopher Hans Reichenbach. " ], "section_title": "2. Temporal Logic", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe notions speech time, event time, and\n\nreference time were introduced by Reichenbach (1947) in order\nto distinguish simple past and present perfect or, more generally,\nabsolute and relative tense. According to Comrie (1985), who refined\nReichenbach’s system (in Chapter 6 of his book on tense) speech time\nand event time are sufficient for the analysis of absolute\ntime; i.e., present, (simple) past and future. But for\nrelative tense—of which the present perfect is but one\nexample—reference time is required. Let us explain these notions\nby applying them to distinguish between past and present perfect. ", "\nConsider the following examples from Steedman (1997). ", "\nIt has often been observed that the present perfect in English has\npresent relevance. For instance the continuation of (7a) with but\nI have found it again is infelicitous in English; the German\ntranslation of this sequence is acceptable, showing that the German\nperfect is more like a past tense (but see Kamp et al. 2015 for an\nextensive discussion, in Other Internet Resources). The same\ncontinuation is fine for sentence (7b). In this sense the perfect is a\nrelative tense and the past an absolute tense in English. Let \$E\$\nbe short for event time and let \$S, R\$ stand for speech\ntime and reference time respectively. ", "\nFor the simple past, both event time and reference time are situated\non the time line before speech time. In case of the perfect, R and S\nare simultaneous and E is earlier than both R and S. Intuitively,\nreference time represents the perspective from which an eventuality is\nperceived on the time line. This is not a purely semantic theory of\ntense like temporal logic, rather it is a pragmatic theory of tense.\nIn particular, reference time (in contrast to event time) has to be\nmutually known by communication partners. When using the present\nperfect, reference time is known since it coincides with speech time.\nHowever, reference time is not necessarily known when the past tense\nis used, since it is just required to be earlier than speech time and\nto coincide with event time. This may explain why sentences in the\npast sound strange when uttered out of the blue. Steedman (1997)\npresents the following examples: ", "\nThe past-tensed sentence (8a) uttered out of the blue is infelicitous,\nwhile sentence (8b) is fine, since in this case the\nwhen-clause introduces the reference time.", "\nThis is by no means the complete story of the perfect. For example,\nComrie (1976) distinguishes four typical uses of the perfect: the\nperfect of result, the experiential perfect, the perfect of persistent\nsituation and the perfect of recent past. For an extensive recent\ndiscussion the reader is advised to consult Kamp et al. 2015 (in Other\nInternet Resources). ", "\n\n\nThe following table summarizes the positions of event time, reference\ntime and speech time for other tenses: ", "\nComrie (1985) and Gamut (1991) point out that this cannot be a\ncomplete account for temporal constructions that occur in natural\nlanguages. For instance the temporal profile of the sentence Sam\nwould have worked cannot be analyzed by using a single reference\ntime. This is one reason for the extended requirements for a formal\ntheory of tense proposed by Comrie (1985: chapter 6). Furthermore, \nBlackburn and Jørgensen (2016) combine the key insights of Prior \nand Reichenbach in the framework of hybrid tense logic suggesting that \nthe two approaches are fully compatible with each other." ], "section_title": "3. Speech Time, Event Time and Reference Time", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "In event semantics following Davidson (1967) events are commonly\ntaken as ontological primitives. This raises the philosophical\nquestion how events and times relate to each other. A construction,\ndue to Russell, Wiener and Kamp, shows that the time line can be\nconstructed from events. We will briefly sketch this construction\nbefore we move on to lexical and grammatical aspect.", "Russell remarked:", "\n\n\n\nEven if there be a physical world such as the mathematical theory of\nmotion presupposes, impressions on our sense-organs produce sensations\nwhich are not merely and strictly instantaneous, and therefore the\nobjects of sense of which we are immediately conscious are not\nstrictly instantaneous. Instants, therefore, are not among the data of\nexperience and must be either inferred or constructed. It is difficult\nto see how they can be validly inferred; thus we are left with the\nalternative that they must be constructed. (Russell 1914: lecture\nIV)\n", "Kamp (1979)\ntook up Russell’s ideas and slightly modified them. The construction\ntakes event structures as primitives from which the structure of time,\ni.e., a total order, can be derived. ", "\nAn event structure \$\\langle E, P, O\\rangle\$ simply\nconsists of a set of events \$E\$ and the relations \$P\$\n(precedes) and \$O\$ (overlaps) and is\ncharacterized by axioms A1–7. ", "\nGiven an event structure satisfying these axioms, the set of instants\nand their strict linear ordering can be constructed according to\ndefinition 2. The idea is to identify an instant with the maximal set\nof pairwise overlapping events. Instants are thus conceived of as\nabstractions over events that happen (or go on) simultaneously. Events\nlinked by the precedence relation will give rise to distinct instants.\n", "\n\nWe will first illustrate the Russell-Kamp construction by way of an\nexample and then show that \$\\langle I,\\lt \\rangle\$ has the\nproperties specified in Theorem 1: it is a strict linear ordering\nwhich gives rise to an interval structure. ", "\nExample 1. Let \$E = \\{a, b, c, d, e\\}\$ and \$P\$ be the\nset of ordered pairs \$\\{(a, c), (a, d), (a, e), (b, e), (c,\ne)\\}\$. Given A7, the relation \$O\$ consists of the set of pairs\n\$\\{(a, b), (b, c), (b, d), (c, d), (d, e)\\}\$. \$E\$ contains three\nmaximal subsets of pairwise overlapping events, that is, instants\n\$i_1 = \\{a, b\\}\$, \$i_2 = \\{b, c, d\\}\$ and \$i_3 = \\{d,\ne\\}\$. Furthermore, \$i_1\$, \$i_2\$ and \$i_3\$ are linearly ordered\nas \$i_1 \\lt i_2 \\lt i_3\$ because \$a \\in i_1\$, \$c \\in i_2\$ and\n\$P(a, c)\$ hence \$i_1 \\lt i_2\$, and \$c \\in i_2\$, \$e \\in i_3\$\nand \$P(c, e)\$ hence \$i_2 \\lt i_3\$, and similarly for \$i_1 \\lt\ni_3.\$ \n", "\nA proof of the following theorem can be found in (Kamp 1979: 379).\n", "\nOnce having constructed the set \$I\$ it is possible to define time\nintervals and these, in turn, can be used to measure the temporal\nextent of an event. In Example 1, for example, \$a\$ goes\non in the interval [\$i_1], b\$ in\n[\$i_1, i_2], c\$ in\n[\$i_2], d\$ in [\$i_2,\ni_3\$] and \$e\$ in [\$i_3\$].\nCorollary 1 guarantees that these intervals can be constructed (Kamp\n1979: 379). ", "\nProof: If \$i_1, i_2 \\in e'\$ and \$i_1 \\lt i \\lt i_2\$, it has to be\nshown that \$e \\in i\$, too. Suppose it is not. Then there is \$d \\in\ni\$ such that \$\\neg O(d, e)\$, hence \$P(d, e)\$ or \$P(e, d)\$. In\nthe first case \$i \\lt i_1\$ and in the second case \$i_2 \\lt\ni\$. Both yield a contradiction.\$\\Box\$ ", "\nWe cannot give further details here, but refer the interested reader\nto Thomason (1986) who discusses how to construct time as a\ncontinuum—isomorphic to the real numbers—and uses a\ndifferent construction originally proposed by Walker (1947). Empirical\nevidence for events being ontological primitives will be presented in\n section 8\nwhere we review psychological studies on event perception. We will now\nmove to lexical and grammatical aspect, that is the expression of event\ntypes and how a given event is conceptualized, which form basic\nconcepts in linguistic theory." ], "section_title": "4. From Events to Time", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nLinguists distinguish four or five lexical aspectual classes or\nAktionsarten. The following four were introduced by the\nphilosopher Zeno Vendler (1967: chapter four) on the basis of earlier\nwork by philosophers such as Kenny, Ryle and Aristotle (see also the\n entry on events). For a formal\ndefinition of Aktionsart the reader is referred to van\nLambalgen and Hamm (2005: 85 ff). ", "\nIn addition, linguists often assume that verbs like flash,\nspot and blink form an extra class—the class\nof semelfactives or points (see Smith 1991). ", "\nA useful notion for distinguishing Aktionarten is the\nevent nucleus introduced by Moens and Steedman (1988). The\nevent nucleus is constructed from a preparatory phase, a culminating\nevent and a consequent phase. Activities only refer to the preparatory\nphase, states only to the consequent phase, achievements to the\nculminating event and to the consequent phase and finally\naccomplishments to all three parts of the event nucleus. ", "\n\nVendler proposed several linguistic tests for distinguishing these\nverb classes. We will present only the most important ones here; for a\nmuch more comprehensive list the reader is referred to Dowty (1979: 60).\nThe first test separates non-statives from statives. Only non-statives\noccur in the progressive. ", "\nAccomplishment verbs prefer \$in\$-adverbials as temporal\nmodifiers, whereas activity verbs allow only\nfor-adverbials.", "\nAchievement verbs are usually infelicitous with\n\nfor-adverbials but allow the combination with\n\$in\$-adverbials. ", "\nThe last test we mention here concerns the different entailment\npatterns of activities and accomplishments in the progressive.\nActivities in the past progressive entail their past reading but\naccomplishments in the past progressive don’t. ", "\nThis is an instance of the famous imperfective paradox. Of course,\ntaken literally this is not a paradox. Nevertheless the entailment\npatterns (12) and (13) pose a significant problem for any formal\ntheory of tense and aspect. For instance, the first formal proposal\nfor truth conditions of sentences in the past progressive stated that\na sentence S in the past progressive is true if and only if there\nexists an open interval before the speech time at which the sentence\nwithout the progressive is true. According to definition 1.4 this\nimmediately validates pattern (12) but without qualifications this\ntruth definition does not account for pattern (13). Sections\n 6\n and\n 7\ncontain extensive discussion of the imperfective paradox. ", "\nVendler thought of the Aktionarten as lexical properties of\nverbs. That this position is dubious was pointed out by many\nlinguists, in particular by Dowty (1979) and Verkuyl (1993). For a\nsimple case, consider the verb drink. If we assume that being\nan activity is a lexical property of this verb, then surely by\ncombining it with the noun wine this property is preserved\nfor the complex phrase drink wine. However, if we combine the\nverb drink with the noun phrase a bottle of wine we\nturn an activity into an accomplishment. The converse problem arises\nif we assume that being an accomplishment is a lexical property of\n\ndrink. This phenomenon of aspectual reinterpretation was\ndubbed coercion in Moens and Steedman (1988). In\n Section 6.1 \nwe will sketch a systematic solution for these types of coercion\n in mereological semantics (Krifka 1989, 1992). ", "\nAktionsart is not even definitely fixed at the VP-level. The\nverb arrive in ", "\nis an achievement, as demonstrated by the ungrammaticality of (14-b).\nBut if we choose a bare plural as subject it is turned into an\nactivity and sentence (15) is grammatical. ", "\nTherefore a final decision about aspectual class cannot be reached\nbelow the sentence level. Steedman’s famous sentence (16) ", "\nshows that coercion can be iterated and that aspectual class can\nswitch back and forth in this iteration process. We close this section\nwith two further examples of aspectual coercion. In the first one a\nstative verb is transformed into an activity.", "\nThe verb resemble is a stative verb and therefore (17a) is\nunacceptable but (17b) is fine. ", "\nHowever, if we add more and more every day to (17a) thus\nforming ", "\n\nwe get an acceptable result. This is due to the phrase more and\nmore every day which coerces a state into an activity. Our last\nexample is about temporal modification with for-adverbials.\nAs pointed out above accomplishments are usually rather bad with\nfor-adverbials. They require \$in\$-adverbials. But\nconsider sentence (19) from van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005). ", "\nThis sentence seems to be fine. However it is not interpreted as an\naccomplishment any more but is reinterpreted as an iterated activity.\nTo get this reading, a lot of non-linguistic knowledge is required.\nFirst, one has to guess that Opus 111 refers to Beethoven’s last piano\nsonata and moreover one has to be aware that this piece lasts about 25\nminutes. Under these assumptions, sentence (19) says that Pollini\nplayed Opus 111 repeatedly within a time span of two weeks. Formal\naccounts of coercion phenomena are contained in Egg (2005), van\nLambalgen and Hamm (2005) and Steedman (1997) among others. The reader\nis also advised to consult Steedman’s updated manuscript, The\nProductions of Time (see the Other Internet Resources).\nProcessing studies of coercion are reviewed in Bott (2010); see also\n Section 8.\n\n " ], "section_title": "5. Lexical and Grammatical Aspect", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe most influential approach to solving the imperfective paradox is\ndue to Dowty (1979). The basic idea is to treat the progressive as a\nmodal operator \$(\\Box)\$ but restrict its domain to inertia worlds.\nThe notion of an inertia world is characterized informally.\nAn inertia world is exactly like the real world up to the time of\nevaluation; after this it may differ from the real world but is\nassumed to be as similar to the real world as possible. Given this\nnotion, the following definition introduces truth conditions for\nsentences in the progressive. ", "\nDefinition 3 does not yet account for the different entailment\npatterns of activities and accomplishments. Two additional assumptions\nare required. The first concerns activities; the second,\naccomplishments. ", "\nAccomplishments like Mary draw a circle are split up into two\nparts, an activity part Mary draw that satisfies principle\n(20) and a result part which is characterized by the existence of a\ncircle. Both parts are connected by a causality relation\n\nCAUSE. ", "\nThus an accomplishment has a richer internal structure than an\nactivity. ", "\nWith these additional requirements, the inference patterns for\nactivities and accomplishments follow. Let us first show that Mary\nwas pushing a cart implies Mary pushed a cart. Assume\nthat the first sentence is true in \$w\$ with respect to speech time\n\$S\$. Then Mary be pushing a cart is true in \$w\$ with\nrespect to an interval \$I\$ before \$S\$. According to Definition 3,\nMary push a cart is then true in every inertia world \$w' \\in\nIE(w)\$ with respect to an interval \$I' \\supseteq I\$. Because of\npostulate (20), Mary push a cart is true in every \$w' \\in\nIE(w)\$ with respect to interval \$I \\ (I\$ is a subinterval of\n\$I')\$. Now, the definition of inertia worlds implies that\n\nMary push a cart is true in \$w\$ with respect to interval\n\$I\$. This means that Mary pushed a cart is true in\n\$w\$ with respect to speech time \$S\$. ", "\nA completely analogous argument shows that Mary was drawing a\ncircle implies Mary drew. But postulate (20) only holds\nfor the first part of accomplishments; the result part is only\nrequired to hold in every inertia world \$w'\$ with respect\nto a larger interval \$I'\$, normally one after speech time.\nSince the inertia worlds after \$S\$ may differ from \$w\$ and\nsince the subinterval property (20) is not required to hold for the\nresult parts of accomplishments, the stronger conclusion that Mary\ndrew a circle does not follow. ", "\nMany researchers assume that inertia worlds introduce a notion of\nnormality for the semantic analysis of the progressive. The\nthunderbolt in example (22) from Landman (1992) seems to break the\nnormal development of the real world. Dowty’s analysis seems to be\ntailored for cases like this one. ", "\n\nHowever, objections have been raised to the normality interpretation\nof inertia. The first one is attributed to Frank Vlach in Ogihara\n(1990). Consider sentence (23) ", "\nand a situation in which the truck is only a few centimeters away from\nJohn. Moreover the truck’s speed is such that it is impossible for it\nto stop before hitting John. In this situation, the normal course of\nevents is such that John will never reach the other side of the\nstreet. Therefore, given definition 3, sentence (23) should be false\nunder these circumstances. This is intuitively incorrect. A similar\nobjection was raised by Bonomi (1997).", "\nOn the other hand, the normality interpretation seems to be at least\nquestionable. Consider the following example from Naumann and\nPiñón (1997). ", "\nThis does presumably not mean that when you are running across a\nminefield, you normally will eventually get to the other side.", "\nNote that these objections all make use of a particular informal\ninterpretation of the notion inertia. Judging the validity of\nthese objections to Dowty’s theory in a precise way therefore requires\nan explicit theory of this notion with exact empirical predictions.\n", "\nDowty analyzes the progressive as an intensional construction. Does\nthe progressive satisfy the standard philosophical tests for\nintensional constructions, that is, the invalidity of substitution of\nco-designative proper names and the impossibility of pulling the\nexistential quantifier out of the context created by the intensional\nconstruction (see Bealer and Mönnich (1989) for a more detailed\ndiscussion)? Let us consider accomplishments, for example sentence\n(25). ", "\nGiven that Ruth Rendel and Barbara Vine are co-designative proper\nnames, sentence (25) implies that Jackson Pollock was painting\nBarbara Vine. Therefore the first test fails. Co-designative\nproper names are substitutable salva veritate in progressive\nconstructions. The second one, however, applies, since ", "\ndoes not imply that there is a house that Carlos was building. These\ntests therefore don’t provide a clear answer to the question whether\nthe progressive is an intensional construction. Even if the answer is\nyes, the progressive is certainly a different type of intensional\nconstruction than, for example, propositional attitudes like\nbelieve or doubt. ", "\nAn extensional alternative was developed by Parsons (1989, 1990).\nParsons, like Davidson (1967), assumes that first-order quantification\nover events is possible. But unlike Davidson, Parsons assumes\nquantification over eventualities in the sense of Bach (1986), which\nincludes events proper but also states, processes and so on. Like\nDowty, Parsons supposes that eventualities are split up into a\ndevelopment phase and a culmination phase. In order to represent this\ndifference in first-order logic two new predicates are introduced,\nCul\$(e, t)\$ and Hold\$(e,\nt)\$. The intuitive meaning of the first is that eventuality\n\$e\$ culminates at time \$t\$. The second one says that\n\$e\$ is either an eventuality in its development phase or that\n\$e\$ is a state. Given these assumptions a sentence like Mary\ndrew a circle is translated into first-order formula (27),\n\$S\$ is again short for speech time. ", "\nThe semantic effect of the progressive consists in transforming events\ninto states. ", "\nIf ‘\$A\$’ is an event verb, then ‘be\n\$A\$-ing’ is to be treated semantically as a state verb;\notherwise, ‘be \$A\$-ing’ is to be treated the same as\n‘\$A\$’. (Parsons 1989: 222) ", "\nWith this assumption the logical representation of Mary was\ndrawing a circle is (28). ", "\nObviously (27) does not follow from (28). But (28) does imply that\nthere is a circle Mary was drawing. Of course this circle may not be\ncomplete. This means that Parson’s ontology is bound to include\nincomplete objects. For a discussion of incomplete objects see for\ninstance Baggio and van Lambalgen (2007).", "\nAccording to the quotation above, the progressive doesn’t change\nanything in the case of activities. Therefore Mary pushed a\ncart and Mary was pushing a cart are predicted to be\nequivalent. ", "\nParsons’ theory rests on the difference between the predicates\n\nCul and Hold. This difference is left to intuition.\nNo axiomatisation of these predicates is given. This is one of the\nobjections made in Zucchi (1999). Zucchi also notes that under certain\ncircumstances it is possible to derive a specific version of the\nimperfective paradox in Parsons’ theory. A careful discussion of\nDowty’ and Parsons’ approaches and a combination of the two systems is\ncontained in Landman (1992).", "Another approach to the imperfective paradox and - more generally -\nnon-culminating accomplishments was proposed by Copley and Harley\n(2015). They abandon event semantics and propose instead a framework\nusing situations and forces as primitives. Forces lead to transitions\nbetween situations. Their theory is motivated by the observation that\nacross languages, non-culminating accomplishments are\ncrosslinguistically in fact a very common phenomenon. Interestingly,\nthese non-culminating readings are per default conveyed by less complex\nexpressions than complete events. Often, it is the perfective and not\nthe imperfective that is marked linguistically. Prima facie, this is a\nproblem for analyses such as Dowty's which assume that the imperfective\nparadox in accomplishments hinges on an additional operator such as\nPROG. This is where Copley and Harley's causal analysis comes into\nplay. Their force-theoretic account does not run into this problem\nbecause causally efficacious forces always take effects ceteris\nparibus, for instance, an effect may not occur do to the occurrence of a\ncounter force preventing the effect. They develop a compositional\nsemantic framework linking forces to the argument structure of the\nsentence. At the present stage of the theory, however, some of the\nbasic concepts also call for axiomatisation. For instance, it is\ncrucial to gain a proper understanding of what it means for a situation\nto be a ceteribus paribus successor situation for some initial\nsituation. For this purpose, their semantic framework must be connected\nto a theory of causality connecting linguistic meaning to cognition and\ncausal reasoning via a conceptual level integrating the two.", "We will come back to the imperfective\nparadox in\n Section 7\n where we combine linguistic theory with event theories from artificial\n intelligence. This will give us a formalization of\n ceteris paribus from which a\n new solution to the imperfective paradox will follow." ], "section_title": "6. Intensionality versus Events", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "Let us now show that events are also useful for a systematic\naccount of certain types of coercion that were mentioned\nabove in Section 5.", "Intuitively\nthere is a close link between the nominal predicates wine and a bottle\nof wine and their verbal counterparts (29-a), (29-b).", " \nWhenever there are two entities to which wine applies, this\npredicate applies to their collection as well. The predicate a\nbottle of wine does not have this property. Whenever there are\ntwo different entities to which a bottle of wine applies,\nthis predicate does not apply to their collection. The first predicate\nis cumulative (see Definition 4) the second is\nquantized (see Definition 5). A similar argumentation applies\nto the difference between the activity drink wine and the\naccomplishment drink a bottle of wine. It was observed by\nmany linguists that the combination of a verb like drink with\na cumulative predicate like wine yields an atelic predicate\nlike (29-a), whereas its combination with a quantized predicate yields\na telic predicate like in (29-b).", "\nIn order to account for these intuitions in a precise way Krifka assumes\nthat the parts of the structure \$\\mathcal{M} = (\\mathfrak{O},\n\\mathfrak{E}, \\mathfrak{T})\$ consisting of objects \$\\mathfrak{O}\$,\nevents \$\\mathfrak{E}\$ and times \$\\mathfrak{T}\$ are each structured\nas complete join semi-lattices without a bottom element (see Grätzer,\n1978). This means that we have a two place relation \$\\sqcup\$ (join)\nand relations \$\\sqsubseteq\$, \$\\sqsubset\$, and \$\\bigcirc\$ (part,\nproper part and overlap) that impose part-whole relations (mereologies,\nsee the entry mereology)\non the sets of objects, events and times. We cannot list all the\nproperties that must hold for these structures to serve as admissible\ninterpretations of natural language but we illustrate these properties\nby giving two examples.", "\nDefinitions 4 and 5 now allow for a formal descripion of the\nreferential difference between wine and a bottle of\nwine.", "For verbal predicates Krifka assumes that they are event denoting\nand moreover that thematic relations\nlike agent, theme, etc are represented as in\n(31-b). Thematic roles of verbs are crucial since they determine which\nverbs give raise to the drink wine versus drink a bottle\nof wine\n distinction.[5]", "It\nis now straightforward to fix the reference of the verbal predicates in\na way that exhibits their simlarity to the respective nominal\npredicates.", "\nCumulativity of nominal predicates corresponds to atelicity in the\nverbal domain and a quantized nominal predicate corresponds to a telic\nverbal predicate.", "\nThere is still something missing. How can the impact of the reference\nof the nominal predicates on the aspectual class be derived formally?\nWe will present only the basic idea of Krifka's construction here. Let\n\$w\$ be the predicate corresponding to wine and let \$e\$ be the event predicate representing drink wine. The basic idea is that an object is changed by the influence of such an event in a gradual\nmanner. Since we know that \$w\$ is cumulative this predicate also\napplies to proper parts of \$w\$, say \$w'\$. Then given that drink wine\ncan be applied to \$e\$ it should also be possible to apply it to a\nproper part of \$e\$, say \$e'\$. Quantized predicates show a different\nbehaviour. Since a bottle of wine is quantized no proper part of it is a bottle of wine and therefore no proper part of \$e\$ can be described as drink a bottle of wine.\nTo account for this intuitive explanation in formal terms it is\nnecessary to specify certain preservation properties for thematic roles\nsince these roles relate the algebraic structure of events and the\nalgebraic structure of objects. This means that notions like summativity, uniqueness of objects etc. have to be defined for relations between events and objects; i.e. thematic roles.", "\nHere we will illustrate these concepts with only one example, summativity (SUM).", "\nSummativity says that the sum-operation \$\\sqcup\$ on\nevents and objects is preserved under summative relations on events and\nobjects. For instance if we have two distinct events of drinking a bottle of wine we get an event of drinking two bottles of wine.", "\nWith this formal background it is now possible to state exactly when a\npredicate of events corresponding to a verb-phrase is cumulative, telic\netc.. Again we will just state one result. Let \$\\phi = \\{ e\|\\exists\nx(\\alpha(e) \\wedge \\delta(x) \\wedge \\theta(e, x))\\}\$ be such a\npredicate where \$\\alpha\$ represents a verb - say draw - \$\\delta\$ the nominal predicate - pictures - and \$\\theta\$ a thematic relation - say theme.\nIt then follows that one set of conditions for \$\\phi\$ being\ncumulative is that \$\\delta\$ is cumulative and \$\\theta\$ is\nsummative. An example is the verb phrase draw pictures. Similar results characterize, iterative, telic, atelic etc. readings.", "\nThis concludes our glimpse of events in linguistic semantics; Readers interested in a more comprehensive treatment of this issue may find Champollion (2014, see Other Internet Resources) a useful contemporary source. We now come back to the imperfective paradox and turn to an\nevent calculus that was developed in artificial intelligence." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Nominal Reference and Temporal Constitution" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn the following section we will show that the imperfective paradox is\nan instance of the frame problem prominent in Artificial Intelligence\n(AI). To this end we will explain the event calculus, which is an\nextension of McCarthy’s situation calculus (McCarthy 1977) developed\nby Kowalski and Sergot (1986). Then we will indicate how the event\ncalculus leads to a formalization of natural language tense and aspect\nby analysing the imperfective paradox. ", "\nConsider narrative (33). ", "\nAssuming that shooting at somebody with a loaded gun will lead to the\ndeath of that person, we will interpret the discourse in a way that\nFred eventually gets killed. Arriving at this inference is, however,\nnot a trivial task. In (33) the frame problem is exemplified in the\nform of the Yale Shooting Scenario (Hanks and McDermott 1986). To\ndemonstrate this, we will start with a very simple calculus—a\nvariant of the Simple Event Calculus by Shanahan (1997) which\nonly incorporates a very basic notion of instantaneous change. Later\nwe will add axioms in order to deal with continuous change and then\nreturn to the imperfective paradox. In short, we will argue that the\nparadox can be viewed as an instance of the frame problem. " ], "section_title": "7. Event Calculus", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nSuppose we have three kinds of actions/events—Load,\nSmoke and Shoot—and three time dependent\nproperties, the fluents Alive, Loaded and\n Dead.[6]\n Besides actions and fluents we will also need instants of time in our\nbasic ontology. The predicates listed in Table 4 are used to express\nactions and their effects and to locate them in time. ", "\nThe predicates are related to each other by a set of four simple\naxioms (34)–(37). In these axioms, all variables are assumed to be universally\nquantified with maximal scope. We will come to the semantics of the\nimplication when we have introduced the complete scenario. ", "\n The first three axioms state the conditions\nunder which a fluent can hold at a time \$t\$: either it holds\nright from the start or it is initiated at a time \$t_1\$\nbefore \$t\$ without a terminating action occurring in between the\ntwo. The fourth axiom defines the predicate Clipped\$(t_1,\nf,\nt_2)\$ saying that a fluent \$f\$ is clipped\nbetween times \$t_1\$ and \$t_2\$ if it is\nterminated by some action \$a\$ happening between\n\$t_1\$ and \$t_2\$. Simplifying a whole\nlot, the axioms (30)–(33) formalize the notion of instantaneous\nchange, such as two balls colliding or somebody dying. Moreover, they\nembody a notion of inertia: fluents continue to hold unless\nterminated.\n\n", "\n\nNext, we have to translate the discourse (33) into the Simple Event\nCalculus. The first set of formulas (38)–(40) states what the\nmentioned actions do. These formulas provide a crude sketch of the\nlexical meaning of load, smoke and shoot.\nThe effect of a Load action is to make the fluent\nLoaded hold, a Shoot action makes Dead hold\n(and Alive not hold) with Loaded being a\nprecondition. Finally, Smoke is assumed to have no effects\n(thus, there are no rules involving Smoke). ", "\n(33) comprises a Load action followed by a Smoke\naction followed by a Shoot action. Using four arbitrarily\nchosen time points \$T_1\$–\$T_4\$ the\ndiscourse can be represented as follows: ", "\n\nFrom this little theory we want to derive\nHoldsAt(Dead, \$T_4)\$. Unfortunately,\nthis sequent is not valid in the classical sense of being true in all\nmodels which satisfy the theory. Think for example of a situation in\nwhich the gun obscurely becomes unloaded while Vincent is smoking. In\nsuch a model, the precondition of the shooting action is clearly not\nmet and thus the action will lack any effects. Note that nothing rules\nout such a model since it is entirely consistent with our theory. We\nthus have to further constrain the models under consideration.\nCrucially, we have to find a way to deal with the non-effects of\nactions; this is the famous frame problem. ", "\nHow to proceed? From the fact that no terminating action was\nmentioned, we want to conclude that no terminating event occurred. To\ndo so, we have to strengthen the assumptions of the theory in a way\nthat only those events are assumed to occur which have been explicitly\nstated in the discourse. The discourse model should be minimal,\nlinking discourse understanding intimately to closed world\nreasoning. It is important to note that this strategy forces\nreasoning to be non-monotonic: adding further premises to a theory can\nmake inferences invalid that were valid before (see the entry on \nnon-monotonic logic). " ], "subsection_title": "7.1 The Yale Shooting Scenario" }, { "content": [ "\nThere are different techniques for formalizing this line of reasoning;\none is circumscription (e.g., Shanahan 1997). Here, we will use the\ncompletion of a logic program technique, adopting the\n\nEvent Calculus of van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005). Taking a\ncloser look at the formulas of the theory\n\$((34) \\wedge \\ldots \\wedge (45))\$, an important feature to notice is that\nformulas come in two variants: they are either facts\nconsisting of a simple predicate expression or they express\nrules with a conjunction of potentially negated formulas to\nthe left of the implication sign and a single positive atomic\nexpression to its right (in logic programming the former is called the\n\nbody and the latter is called the head of a clause).\nWe will now illustrate how the completion of a simple logic program is\ncomputed. Consider the description of a situation where the gun gets\nloaded at time 1 and a shooting event happens at time 10. This\nsituation is stated in the following program: ", "\nThe uncompleted program does not yet rule out intervening events. It\nis, for example, consistent with an Unload event occurring at\ntime instant 9. The completion of the program should tell us that (46)\nand (47) were the only events. The completion is computed according to\nthe following\n procedure.[7]\n We start with the facts in (46) and (47). Both of these are\nHappens formulae. The completion of the program intuitively\ncorresponds to an assertion that, given this program,\nHappens\$(e, t)\$ can only mean Load\noccurring at 1 or Shoot occurring at 10. We therefore first\nsubstitute variables for the constants and write the following\ndisjunction: ", "\nThen, we universally quantify over the variables \$e\$ and \$t\$\nand strengthen the implication to a bi-implication: ", "\nFrom (49) it follows that there were no intervening events.\nStrengthening the implications to bi-implications makes it impossible\nthat a head can be true without the enabling conditions being\n met.[8]\n The uniquely determined model of (49) is the minimal model of the\nlogic program consisting of (46) and (47). ", "\nWe can now come back to the Yale Shooting Problem in discourse (33).\nFrom the completion of the logic program\n((34))\$\\wedge \\ldots \\wedge\$((45)) it follows (non-monotonically) that\nHoldsAt(Dead, \$T_4)\$. Enriching the\nprogram with further information and computing the new completion,\nhowever, could clearly lead to cancellation of this inference. " ], "subsection_title": "7.2 The completion of a program" }, { "content": [ "\nIf we want to use these ideas to model natural language discourse, we\nneed to incorporate tense. In van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005) this is\ndone by adopting the classic tripartition into reference\ntime, event time and speech time due to\nReichenbach (see\n section 3).\n ", "\nRecall that above, when we translated discourse (33) into Shanahan’s\nEvent Calculus, we arbitrarily chose instants of time\n\$T_1 ,\\ldots ,T_4\$ to locate actions\nin time. This is not how it is done in natural language discourse. The\nfirst sentence (Yesterday morning Vincent loaded the gun)\nstates that within some time interval \$(=\$ reference time) before now \$(=\$\nspeech time) there was a time \$t'\$ at which a loading event\nhappened \$(=\$ event time). The second sentence (Then he smoked a\ncigarette) is linked to this event by the connective\nthen, stating that at some later time \$t''\$ a\nsmoking event happened with \$t''\$ also being temporally\nlocated before now. Analogously for the third sentence: there\nis an event time \$t'''\$ at which Shoot happens and\n\$t'' \\lt t''' \\lt\$\nnow. Note that when locating events in time it is\nalways done by existential statements of the form there is a\ntime. So far, however, we have only been dealing with universally\nquantified variables. Clearly, a formula like \$\\forall t\$.Happens(Load,\n\$t)\n\\wedge t \\lt\$ now cannot be used to represent\ntense since it would state that Load happens at all times in\nthe past. We have to find a way to introduce existentially quantified\ninformation. ", "\nIntuitively, it suffices to introduce new entities into the domain of\ndiscourse. This approach lies at the heart of dynamic semantic\ntheories such as Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993,\nand see also the entry on\n Discourse Representation Theory)\n or File Change Semantics (Heim 1982). We will need an update\nprocedure that introduces new actions/events into the discourse model\nbut is compatible with the non-monotonic semantics introduced so far.\nFollowing van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005) we will use integrity\nconstraints—a device from database theory (for a more\ncomplete and formal treatment the reader is referred to Kowalski 1995\nand van Lambalgen and Hamm 2005: ch. 8)—to implement the notion\nof a minimal update of a discourse model. Consider discourse (50).\n", "\nIn interpreting the first sentence, we want to update the situation\nmodel in a way that makes the sentence true. The tense information\nwill be interpreted as a goal to minimally update the situation model\nwith a fluent Loaded that holds now. In our framework\nsemantic interpretation is thus closely linked to planning, in that\nfinding an interpretation for a sentences requires coming up with a\nsequence of actions that makes the goal succeed. ", "\n\nTo resolve this integrity constraint we will use the axioms of the\nSimple Event Calculus plus the world knowledge about the consequences\nof a load action stated in (52). ", "\n\nIn logic programming, the sort of reasoning required to resolve (51)\nis carried out by a derivation procedure called resolution.\nWe will use resolution here in a non-standard way, i.e. logic\nprogramming combined with integrity constraints (for details see van\nLambalgen and Hamm 2005). It starts with the formula that has to be\nmade true in the discourse model. Resolution proceeds by identifying\nrules which have the query as their consequent and substituting the\nconsequent with the antecedent conditions of the rule, making the\nantecedent formulas new queries themselves. The resolution stops when\nthe query cannot be further resolved, that is, when a plan has been\ncomputed whose preconditions are all fulfilled given an appropriate\nupdate of the discourse model. To get an impression of how this works\nwe will illustrate the resolution of (51). First, we have to compute\nthe completion of the program and whenever possible substitute the\nvariables with constants, in our case Loaded and\n\nnow. In logic programming this substitution is done\nautomatically via unification. Here is the completion of the\nHoldsAt predicate which forms the head of two\naxioms—(35) and (36). ", "\n\nSince the theory doesn’t contain the statement\nInitially(Loaded), closed world reasoning yields\nthat at time 0 the gun is not loaded\n\$(\\neg\$Initially(Loaded)). No matter how we update\nthe discourse representation the first disjunct can never succeed. We\nthus have to move on to the second disjunct. In this case, the\ndatabase is searched for an action \$a\$ and a time \$s\$ such\nthat Initiates\$(a, f, s)\$,\n\nHappens\$(a, s)\$ and\n\$\\neg\$Clipped\$(s\$, Loaded, \$t)\$. On the\nsole basis of the information provided in the discourse the subquery\n?Happens\$(a, s)\$ will fail, because in discourse\n(50) there is no information about a load action. However, since\nintegrity constraints are intended to be made true, the database will\nbe updated with a clause Happens(Load,\n\$s) \\wedge s \\lt\$\n\nnow which makes the second disjunct true and the query\nsucceed. " ], "subsection_title": "7.3 Introducing tense information" }, { "content": [ "\nIn the following, we will analyze the imperfective paradox as an\ninstance of the frame problem (cf. Stenning and van Lambalgen 2005;\nvan Lambalgen and Hamm 2005; Stenning and van Lambalgen 2008; Baggio\nand van Lambalgen 2007; Baggio et al. 2008). Both activities and\naccomplishments involve continuous change and we therefore have to add\nadditional predicates and axioms to properly deal with gradually\nchanging objects which are under the influence of an external force.\nTable 5 introduces two new predicates; axioms A1–A5 provide a\ngeneral theory of instantaneous and continuous change (from van\nLambalgen and Hamm 2005: 40). As can be easily seen, the axiom system\nextends that of Shanahan (1997). ", "\nAxioms 4 and 5 define continuous change. Axiom 4 defines the\nTrajectory predicate. To see what it says, let’s consider a\nsituation of running a mile where \$f_1\$ is\ninstantiated by running and \$f_2\$ by\ndistance\$(x)\$. Should running be true during\nthe whole interval from \$t\$ until \$t'\$ then distance\$(a + 1)\$ will be true\nat \$t'\$. The value of \$x\$, that is, the actual\ndistance actually run at each time instant will be determined by the\nlaw of the process under consideration (here, running speed). Axiom 5\ndefines the predicate Clipped\$(t,\nf, t')\$\nwhich is true if \$f\$ is terminated or released by an event\n\$e\$ which happens in the time interval between \$t\$ and\n\$t'\$. Thus Clipped covers both instantaneous and\ncontinuous change. The axioms provide a general theory of what can\nchange and what stays constant.", "\nFor concrete situations, we also need the specific temporal and causal\nrelationships. This kind of information is specified in so called\nscenarios representing lexical meaning. The lexical meaning\nof the accomplishment run a mile corresponds to scenario\n(54). Like the axioms, the scenario takes the form of a logic program.\nAll variables are universally quantified. ", "\nScenarios formalize the event nucleus of Moens and Steedman (1988).\nEvery accomplishment takes the same form of scenario, the only\ndifferences being that the individual scenarios involve different\npreparatory processes (run, build, etc.), incremental\nthemes (distance\$(x)\$, house\$(x)\$, etc.)\nand resultant states. Furthermore, it is obvious that the preparatory\nprocess run, an activity, is a proper part of scenario (54).\nThe simpler activity scenario can be easily arrived at if we remove\nclauses (d)–(f) from (54). We are now in the position to solve\nthe imperfective paradox avoiding the problems discussed in\n section 6.\n Both a past progressive activity sentence as in (55a) and a past\nprogressive accomplishment sentence (55b) will trigger a discourse\nupdate as stated in integrity constraint (55c). ", "\nThe discourse update of the completed program (54) yields that at some\npoint after \$t\$ John will achieve the culmination and will have\nrun one mile (see van Lambalgen and Hamm 2005: 61ff. for a proof).\nObviously, the same integrity constraint in combination with the\nactivity in (55a) only licenses the inferences that there was some\npast running activity. In the case of an accomplishment the course of\nevents dramatically changes if we add information to the\nrepresentation as in (56b). Now, both (56a) and (56b) only allow the\ninference that there was a running event but, arguably, John didn’t\nreach his goal in (56b). Without going into further details it should\nbe clear how this non-monotonic inference works. The derivation works\nanalogously to the simpler instances of the frame problem discussed\nabove. ", "\nThe solution to the imperfective paradox just outlined makes reference\nto the intentions of the agent involved in the event; therefore the\nnotion of a goal or intention is built into the system right from the\nstart. Note, however, it does not involve possible worlds, or\nprimitive notions like inertia worlds; instead it is based upon\nminimal models and non-monotonic reasoning. This yields additional\nbenefits. Firstly, the Event Calculus will compute a minimal model in\ncases where an integrity constraint can be satisfied. Moreover, the\nnumber of construction steps required for this yields a precise\ncomplexity measure which (for example) allows us to derive predictions\nfor cognitive processing. Secondly, the non-monotonic nature of the\nEvent Calculus can be used to model the incremental construction of a\ntemporal model with inferences which hold locally at a discourse\nsegment \$s_n\$ but which can be undone at some\nlater discourse unit \$s_{n+1}\$. This is a\nnecessary prerequisite if we think of interpreting sentences like\n(56b) from left to right assuming incremental interpretation (see\ne.g., Baggio and van Lambalgen 2007 and Bott 2010 for implementations\nof the Event Calculus as a processing model). In the next section we\nwill review psychological and psycholinguistic work on the\ninterpretation of aspect which will provide empirical motivation for\nthe outlined analysis. " ], "subsection_title": "7.4 The imperfective paradox reconsidered" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDue to limitations of space, we will not discuss psychological and\npsycholinguistic studies of tense but will focus solely on processing\nstudies of aspect. Moreover, within this topic we limit ourselves to\nstudies of the adult system. The interested reader is referred to\nDickey (2001) and the references therein for psycholinguistic work on\ntense as well as to the entry on\n the experience and perception of time\n\n and the contributions in Grondin (2008) for psychology of time in\ngeneral. ", "\nPsychologists have recently begun studying event perception and its\nneural basis (e.g., Zacks and Tversky 2001; Zacks, Tversky, and Iyer\n2001; Zacks et al. 2006). The underlying question behind this line of\nresearch is whether events play a role in how we cognitively structure\nand remember changing states of affairs and how they are represented.\nZacks, Tversky, and Iyer (2001) use an analogy from the domain of\nobjects to the domain of events to define an event as a “segment\nin time at a given location that is conceived by an observer to have a\nbeginning and an end” (p.30). They claim that “the ability\nto identify the parts of events and their relationships constitutes a\ndistinct perceptual process” (p.30) which they call event\nstructure perception. Just as an object is an ontological\nprimitive in the spatial domain, so an event is an ontological\nprimitive in the spatio-temporal\n domain.[9]\n Objects are recognized by shape, color etc. and have boundaries in\nspace. Analogously, events have boundaries in time, but are also\nbounded in space. An event of buttering toast, for instance, happens\nat a particular time, but also in a particular location in space and\nis therefore spatially bounded. Continuing the analogy, both objects\nand events can be identified and categorized using hierarchical\nrelations. ", "\n\nIn Zacks, Tversky, and Iyer’s experiments, participants segmented an\nongoing activity (like washing dishes) while watching it on\nfilm by pressing a key to mark “natural and meaningful”\nunit boundaries. The grain at which participants segmented the\nactivity was manipulated between subjects: one group was asked to mark\nthe largest meaningful units (coarse grain size), the other group the\nsmallest units (fine grain size) which still could be considered to be\ncomplete events. The placement of perceived event boundaries provides\ninformation about the psychological status of events and their\npartonomic hierarchy. If the stream of action is perceived as\nconsisting of discrete events, participants should place event\nboundaries consistently and this is what Zacks, Tversky, and Iyer\n(2001) found. Further, if participants make use of partonomic\nhierarchies, coarse event boundaries should be aligned with fine\nboundaries, since the end of each superordinate event is also the end\nof its last subevent. Again, this hypothesis was corroborated by a\nstrong hierarchical bias effect. Events thus seem to be\npsychologically real and to be hierarchically structured. " ], "section_title": "8. Cognitive aspects", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nDuring the last decade psycholinguists have started to investigate the\ncognitive reality of lexical aspect and how it is processed. The\nexisting studies can be sub-classified into studies concerning\nAktionsart simpliciter and those concerned with shifts from\none aspectual class to an other, i.e., aspectual coercion. In\nthe following, we will provide a brief overview of both areas of\nresearch. ", "\nMcKoon and Macfarland (2002) were among the first to study processing\nconsequences of decompositional analyses along the lines of Dowty\n(1979). They provided evidence from reading times and lexical decision\ntimes that accomplishments \$(\\alpha\$ CAUSE \$x\$ BECOME IN-STATE)\nare inherently more complex than achievements \$(x\$ BECOME\nIN-STATE). Similarly, Gennari and Poeppel (2003) compared eventive\npredicates (which included accomplishments, achievements and\nactivities) to statives and found that the former were more complex to\nprocess than the latter. Brennan and Pylkkänen (2010) extended\nthis line of research to psychological verbs and compared\naccomplishments (e.g., scare) with statives (e.g.,\n\ncherish) using reading time methods and\nmagnetoencephalography (MEG). They also included a comparison of the\nsimple psychological statives with modified sentences that required\ncoercion (e.g., within half an hour, the child cherished the\nprecious kitten). Reading times and MEG data indicated that\naccomplishments were more complex to comprehend than statives and,\nmoreover, that the enhanced semantic complexity led to different MEG\ncomponents than aspectual coercion. Finally, Coll-Florit and Gennari\n(2011) compared durative states and punctual event predicates (mostly\nachievements) and observed longer reading times of statives than of\nevent predicates. They attributed this effect—which runs counter\nto what would be expected under a decomposition analysis—to the\nfact that durative situations occur in semantically more diverse\ncontexts and elicit more diverse associations than event predicates\nwhich may modulate the required processing effort. Taken together, the\nexisting studies provide evidence for complexity differences between\nthe aspectual classes, lending support to decompositional analyses.\nHowever, not all issues are entirely solved yet and further research\nis required. ", "\nThe second line of research concerns aspectual coercion. Here, the\nmain research question has been whether aspectual coercion is a costly\noperation. Existing research has almost exclusively focused on one\ncoercion type, i.e., coercion of point action verbs into an iterative\ninterpretation (but see Brennan and Pylkkänen 2010 and Bott 2010\nfor exceptions). Again, the findings are mixed. Early studies have\nprovided evidence for coercion costs employing secondary tasks such as\ncross-modal lexical decision or stop making sense\njudgments (Piñango, Zurif, and Jackendoff 1999; Todorova\net al. 2000). Pickering et al. (2006) used the same materials as in\nthe experiments mentioned above, but tested a coerced meaning during\nordinary reading without an additional task. In two self-paced reading\nand two eyetracking experiments, they found aspectual coercion to be\nno more difficult than their aspectual control conditions. This lack\nof effect let them propose the aspectual underspecification\nhypothesis, stating that the aspectual representation stays\nunderspecified during normal reading. Brennan and Pylkkänen\n(2008) challenged this view and reported a coercion effect of coercion\nsentences like (57a) as compared to aspectual controls (57b) both in\nself-paced reading and in MEG; on the basis of a rating study they had\ncarefully selected clear instances of point action verbs. Their MEG\nstudy revealed activation in the anterior midline field, a MEG\ncomponent that has been observed for other non-aspectual cases of\ncoercion, too. ", "\nComplicating matters, Bott (2008, 2010) applied the same norming\nprocedures, but did not find evidence of coercion cost in iterative\npoint action verbs in German. With other types of aspectual coercion,\nhowever, there were clear indications of processing difficulty\nindicating that the underlying processes differ between coercion\ntypes. Furthermore, the study provided evidence that at least in some\ncases (achievement ⇝ accomplishment) coercion operations are not\ntriggered by an aspectual mismatch, but can proceed smoothly by\nenriching the aspectual representation with additional eventualities.\nThis was shown in an event-related potentials (ERP) study in which a\ndouble dissociation of ERP components was elicited by sentences with\naspectual coercion as compared to sentences that contained an\naspectual mismatch." ], "subsection_title": "8.1 Lexical Aspect" }, { "content": [ "\nGrammatical aspect has recently received increased interest in\npsycholinguistics (for a comprehensive review see Madden and Ferretti\n2009). One line of studies has investigated (e.g., Ferretti\net al. 2007) the accessibility of event participants in English\nprogressive and simple sentences. They provide evidence that, in line\nwith the linguistic description provided above, the progressive\npresents an event from the inside, making participants, instruments\nand places fully accessible, whereas the simple forms present events\nas complete units and the event participants are less accessible.\nUsing picture selection/verification, Madden and Zwaan (2003) found\nthat participants were faster and more likely to choose a picture\nshowing a complete event, rather than a picture depicting an ongoing\nevent, after they had read a sentence with an accomplishment verb in\nthe simple past. This indicates that English speakers encode\naccomplishments in the simple past as complete events. This finding\nwas supported by a study by Anderson et al. (2008). They compared\naccomplishments describing a path such as Tom jogged/was jogging\nto the woods and then stretched when he got there. Participants\nlistened to these sentences while using a computer mouse to drag and\ndrop a human character in a visual scene. When hearing a sentence in\nthe past progressive, many drops took place at the beginning and the\ncenter of the path, whereas in the simple past most drops were at the\nend of the path. Interestingly, the differences were by no means\ncategorical. Even in the simple past condition, the character was in\nsome trials positioned well before the end of the path. This indicates\nthat accomplishments in the simple past are consistent with incomplete\nevents. ", "\nAnother study relevant for the discussion in the previous sections is\nan ERP study on the imperfective paradox by Baggio et al. (2008). They\ninvestigated the processing of Dutch imperfective sentences such as\nhet meisje was een brief aan het schrijven (the girl was\nwriting a letter) which were either followed by a\n\nwhen-clause that made the culmination unlikely (when her\nfriend spilled coffee on the paper) or by a sentence which was\ncompatible with the attainment of the goal (when her friend spilled\ncoffee on the tablecloth). The first kind of sentences elicited larger\nsustained anterior negativities compared to sentences that were\ncompatible with the culmination. Moreover, the amplitude of the\nnegativity was correlated with the frequency with which participants\nresponded that the culmination was not reached. These findings\nindicate that a progressive sentence triggers a default inference to a\ncomplete event which can be canceled again, if the context so\nrequires. ", "\nGrammatical aspect is subject to clear crosslinguistic differences.\nThis raises the question of whether the grammatical system has an\ninfluence on how we process language. In von Stutterheim et al. (2009)\nthe authors reported findings of a production study comparing event\ndescriptions of English, German and Dutch speakers that were elicited\nwhile they were watching and describing a silent video clip. Their\nstudy revealed clear differences between productions from the three\nlanguages. English speakers used the progressive to start event\ndescriptions well before the endpoint was visible (e.g., A car is\ngoing down a lane … to a farmhouse). Germans showed a\ndifferent behavior, relating their descriptions to the endpoint of a\nmotion event. It thus seems as if production is constrained by the\nlanguage in which it is realized. Recently, von Stutterheim et al.\n(2012) extended this line of research to a sample of seven languages\nand showed that the aspectual properties of a language influence how\nspeakers conceptualize events. It’s not only that speakers of\ndifferent languages talked differently about motion events (e.g.,\nmention of endpoints), their language also had a clear influence on\ntheir viewing behavior while watching the movies and influenced their\nmemory capacity for those parts of the scene corresponding to\nendpoints. ", "As for comprehension, Bott and Hamm (2014)\ninvestigated how the aspectual system of a language influences\nprocessing difficulty. They compared coercion of German and English\naccomplishments which were modified by for \$x\$ time\nadverbials. (58) is a sample item. ", "\nIn the German experiments, condition (58a) was read as fast as a\nnon-coercing control condition with an in x time adverbial.\nThis was different in English where the authors found coercion to\ncause a substantial slowdown of reading speed. They interpret this\ncrosslinguistic difference as follows: languages which have the\ngrammatical means to express an aspectual difference via alternative\nforms—the progressive vs. simple forms in English—enforce\nimmediate aspectual commitment, whereas languages that lack this\ngrammatical feature have to leave it underspecified. In other words,\nGerman readers will leave it to the context whether an accomplishment\nexpresses a complete or incomplete event, whereas English readers\nimmediately strengthen an accomplishment in the simple form into a\ncomplete event interpretation. They take this strengthening to be a\npragmatic process that is due to competition between alternative\ngrammatical forms.", "In an eyetracking during reading study, Bott and Gattnar (2015)\nfollowed up on the observed cross-linguistic variation in the\nprocessing of grammatical aspect comparing an aspect language, Russian,\nwith the non-aspect language German. They investigated whether the\ndifferences in the aspectual systems of the two languages affected the\ntime course of mismatch detection in the case of lexical aspectual\nmismatch.All test sentences contained clear instances of (in Russian always perfective) transitive achievement verbs such as win, find, reach, notice, etc. which were modified by a semantically mismatching for-adverbial (e.g., for three hours) or a semantically fitting ago-adverbial (e.g., three hours ago)\nin aspectual control conditions. Crucially, both Russian and German\nhave relatively free word order making it possible to test for effects\nof mismatching vs. matchingadverbials in the word order subject verb object adverbial but also in the order adverbial verb subject object. The results show that Russian readers immediately detect the aspectual mismatch\nirrespective of whether they have seen the subject or the object\nargument yet. This is different in German where aspectual mismatch\ndetection only started after the verb plus all its obligary arguments\nhad been encountered. This result was modeled by Bott and Sternefeld\n(2017) in an incremental event semantics drawing on insights from\nmereological semantics as proposed by Krifka (1989, 1992); see\n also\n section 6.1 (and the entry\n mereology).\nThe incremental semantic derivations show that in a non-aspect language\nlike German, lexical aspect really is a property of whole sentences and\nstrongly depends on the compositional interpretation of the verb, its\narguments, and their thematic roles. In an aspect language like\nRussian, on the other hand, the grammatical aspect imposes itself\nstrong constraints on lexical aspectual interpretation. These\npsycholinguistic results thus nicely fit semantic proposals for\ngrammatical aspect that have been proposed in the framework of\nmereological semantics (see, e.g., Filip 2008, a.o.).", "\nTo summarize, the existing studies lend empirical support to the\naspectual distinctions made in the semantic and philosophic\nliterature. Moreover, the grammatical system of a language influences\nthe way language is processed and may even influence the way we\nexperience the world. " ], "subsection_title": "8.2 Grammatical Aspect" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWe introduced and discussed several important semantic, philosophical\nand technical concepts and theories of temporality and at least\nindicated how these concepts and theories are related to cognition.\nHowever, we did this exclusively from a sentence internal perspective.\nTense and aspect are important means for organizing discourse as\n well.[10]\n To conclude our overview, we present French examples due to Kamp and\nRohrer (see van Lambalgen and Hamm 2005, ch. 9) and indicate the role\ntense and aspect play in discourse organization. Consider sentence\n(59) in which the passé simple (PS) occurs four times.\n\n", "\nFirst the PS in (59) provides temporal information; all events are\nlocated in the past. But the PS conveys aspectual information too. It\nsays that the internal constitution of the events is not important and\nthis means that PS expresses perfectivity. PS imposes a view of the\nevents “from the outside”. This is then taken to explain\nwhy multiple uses of the PS imply a succession of the events described\nas witnessed in example (59). This means that Pierre getting up\nprecedes his going up to his room and this event precedes closing the\ndoor which finally precedes turning the radio on. Thus, the PS\nstructures the above little discourse in a particular way. Early\ndiscourse representation theory explains this effect by assuming that\nthe PS introduces a new reference point after a previously introduced\none.", "\nThe discourse function of the French imparfait is different. Example\n(60a) shows that, like the past in English, the\n imparfait[11]\n is not felicitous when uttered out of the blue. ", "\nKamp explains these facts in the following way. The imparfait does not\nintroduce its own reference time and in (60a) there is no previous\nreference point given. Therefore (60a) is out. In (60b) the sentence\nin the passé simple Jean ôta sa veste introduces\na reference time that can be used to anchor If faisait chaud.\nThe imperfective aspect of the imparfait is then explained by the fact\nthat the PS event happens while the sentence in the imparfait holds.\nThus passé simple and imparfait not only provide temporal\ninformation but they also serve as means to structure discourse in\ndifferent ways.", "\nOf course these brief remarks about the discourse function of tense\nand aspect barely touch the tip of the iceberg. For more information\non the discourse semantics of French tense and discourse organization\nin general, the reader is advised to consult de Swart and Corblin\n(2002), Asher and Lascarides (2003) and van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005,\nespecially chapter 9). This short note on discourse structure\ncompletes our article on tense and aspect. " ], "section_title": "9. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Anderson, S., T. Matlock, C. Fausey, and M. Spivey, 2008,\n“On the path to understanding the on-line processing of\ngrammatical aspect”, in Proceedings of the 30th CogSci\nconference, 2253–2258. ", "Asher, N. and A. Lascarides, 2003, Logics of Conversation.\nStudies in Natural Language Processing, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press. ", "Bach, E., 1986, “The algebra of events”,\nLinguistics and Philosophy, 9(1): 5–16. ", "Baggio, G., M. van Lambalgen, and P. Hagoort, 2008,\n“Computing and recomputing discourse models: an ERP\nstudy”, Journal of Memory and Language, 59(1):\n36–53. ", "Baggio, G. and M. van Lambalgen, 2007, “The processing\nconsequences of the imperfective paradox”, Journal of\nSemantics, 24(4): 307–330. ", "Bealer, G. and U. Mönnich, 1989, “Property\ntheories”, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic (Volume\nIV), D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel. ", "Blackburn, P. and K.F. Jørgensen, 2016, “Reichenbach,\nPrior and hybrid tense logic”, Synthese, 193(11):\n3677–3689.", "Bonomi, A., 1997, “The progressive and the structure of\nevents”, Journal of Semantics, 14(2): 173–205.\n", "Bott, O., 2008, “Doing it again and again may be\ndifficult—but it depends on what you are doing”, in\nProceedings of the 27th WCCFL conference, N. Abner and J.\nBishop (eds.), Sommerville, MA: Cascadilla Press, 63–71. ", "–––, 2010, The processing of events,\nvol. 162 of Linguistics Today, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.\n", "Bott, O. and F. Hamm, 2014, “Crosslinguistic variation in\nthe processing of aspect”, in Meaning and Understanding\nacross Languages (Studies in Theoretical Psycholinguistics),\nB. Hemforth, B. Mertins, and C. Fabricius-Hansen (eds.), Cham:\nSpringer International Publishing.", "Bott, O. and Gattnar, A., 2015, “The cross-linguistic\nprocessing of aspect: An eyetracking study on the time course of\naspectual interpretation in German and Russian”, Language,\nCognition and Neuroscience, 30(7): 877–898.", "Brennan, J. and L. Pylkkänen, 2008, “Processing events:\nBehavioral and neuromagnetic correlates of aspectual coercion”,\nBrain & Language, 106(2): 132–143. ", "–––, 2010, “Processing psych verbs:\nBehavioural and MEG measures of two different types of semantic\ncomplexity”, Language and cognitive processes, 25(6):\n777–807. ", "Coll-Florit, M. and S. P. Gennari, 2011, “Time in language:\nEvent duration in language comprehension”, Cognitive\nPsychology, 62(1): 41–79. ", "Comrie, B., 1976, Aspect, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. 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", "Heim, I., 1982, The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun\nPhrases, Ph.D. thesis, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.\n", "Kamp, H., 1979, “Events, instants and temporal\nreference”, in Semantics from Different Points of View,\nR. Bäuerle, U. Egli, and A. von Stechow (eds.), Berlin: Springer.\n", "–––, 1991, “The perfect and other tenses\nin French and English”, in Tense and Aspect in English and\nFrench, Dyana Deliverable R2. 3B, 41–64. ", "Kamp, H. and U. Reyle, 1993, From Discourse to Logic,\nDordrecht: Reidel. ", "Kowalski, R., 1995, “How to reconcile reactive and rational\nagents”, in Meta-Logic and Logic Programming, Apt and\nTurini (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ", "Kowalski, R. A. and M. Sergot, 1986, “A logic-based calculus\nof events”, New Generation Computing, 4(1):\n67–95.", "Krifka, M., 1989, Nominalreferenz und Zeitkonstitution,\nMunich: Fink. 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Macfarland, 2002, “Event templates in the\nlexical representations of verbs”, Cognitive\nPsychology, 45(1): 1–44. ", "Moens, M. and M. Steedman, 1988, “Temporal ontology and\ntemporal reference”, Computational Linguistics, 14:\n15–28. ", "Naumann, R. and Ch. Piñón, 1997, “Decomposing\nthe progressive”, in Proceedings of the 11th\nAmsterdam Colloquium, P. Dekker, M. Stokhof, and Y. Venema (eds.),\nAmsterdam: University of Amsterdam. ", "Nienhuys-Cheng, S-H. and R. de Wolf, 1997, Foundations of\nInductive Logic Programming, New York, Berlin: Springer. ", "Oettinger, A., 1966, “The Uses of Computers in\nScience”, Scientific American, 215: 166–169.", "Ogihara, T., 1990, “Semantics of the progressive and the\nperfect in English”, in Dyana–Report R.2.5.A, H.\nKamp (ed.), ESPRIT Basic Research Project 6852. ", "Parsons, T., 1989, “The progressive in English: Events,\nstates and processes”, Linguistics and Philosophy,\n12(2): 213–241. ", "–––, 1990, Events in the Semantics of\nEnglish, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. ", "Pickering, M.J., B. McElree, S. Frisson, L. Chen, and M.J.\nTraxler, 2006, “Underspecification and coercion”,\nDiscourse Processes, 42(2): 131–155. ", "Piñango, M.M., E. Zurif, and R. Jackendoff, 1999,\n“Real-time processing implications of enriched composition at\nthe syntax-semantics interface”, Journal of Psycholinguistic\nResearch, 28(4): 395–414. ", "Prior, A., 1967, Past, Present, and Future, Oxford:\nOxford University Press. ", "Reichenbach, H., 1947, Elements of Symbolic Logic, New\nYork: Dover Publications, Inc. ", "Russell, B., 1914, Our Knowledge of the External World,\nLondon: Allen and Unwin. ", "Shanahan, M., 1997, Solving the Frame Problem: A Mathematical\nInvestigation of the Common Sense Law of Inertia, Cambridge, MA:\nMIT Press. ", "Smith, C. S., 1991, The Parameter of Aspect, Dordrecht:\nKluwer. ", "Spencer, A., 1991, Morphological Theory, Oxford:\nBlackwell. ", "Steedman, M., 1997, “Temporality”, in Handbook of\nLogic and Language, J. van Benthem and A. ter Meulen (eds.),\nAmsterdam: Elsevier. ", "Stenning, K. and M. van Lambalgen, 2005, “Semantic\ninterpretation as computation in nonmonotonic logic: The real meaning\nof the suppression task”, Cognitive Science, 29(6):\n919–960. ", "–––, 2008, Human Reasoning and Cognitive\nScience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ", "Thomason, S., 1986, “On constructing instants from\nevents”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 13(1):\n85–96. ", "Todorova, M., K. Straub, W. Badecker, and R. Frank, 2000,\n“Aspectual coercion and the online computation of sentential\naspect”, Proceedings of the CogSci 2000 Conference.\n", "van Lambalgen, M. and F. Hamm, 2005, The Proper Treatment of\nEvents, Malden: Blackwell. ", "Vendler, Z., 1967, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca, New\nYork: Cornell University Press. ", "Verkuyl, H., 1993, A Theory of Aspectability. The Interaction\nbetween Temporal and Atemporal Structure, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press. ", "von Stutterheim, C., M. Andermann, M. Carroll, M. Flecken, and B.\nSchmiedtová, 2012, “How grammaticized concepts shape\nevent conceptualization in language production: Insights from\nlinguistic analysis, eye tracking data, and memory performance”,\nLinguistics, 50(4): 833–867. ", "von Stutterheim, C., M. Carroll, and W. Klein, 2009, “New\nperspectives in analyzing aspectual distinctions across\nlanguages”, in The expression of time, W. Klein and P.\nLi (eds.), Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 195–216. ", "Walker, A. G., 1947, “Durées et instants”,\nRevue Scientifique, 85: 131–134. ", "Zacks, J., K.M. Swallow, J.M. Vettel, and M.P. McAvoy, 2006,\n“Visual motion and the neural correlates of event\nperception”, Brain Research, 1076: 150–162. ", "Zacks, J. and B. Tversky, 2001, “Event structure in\nperception and conception”, Psychological Bulletin,\n127: 3–21. ", "Zacks, J., B. Tversky, and G. Iyer, 2001, “Perceiving,\nremembering and communicating structure in events”, Journal\nof Experimental Psychology: General, 130: 29–58. ", "Zucchi, S., 1999, “Incomplete events, intensionality and\nimperfective aspect”, Natural Language Semantics, 7(2):\n179–215. " ]	[ { "href": "../discourse-representation-theory/", "text": "discourse representation theory" }, { "href": "../events/", "text": "events" }, { "href": "../logic-nonmonotonic/", "text": "logic: non-monotonic" }, { "href": "../logic-temporal/", "text": "logic: temporal" }, { "href": "../mereology/", "text": "mereology" }, { "href": "../time-experience/", "text": "time: the experience and perception of" } ]
assertion	Assertion	First published Mon Jan 22, 2007; substantive revision Wed Nov 17, 2021	[ "\nAsserting is the act of claiming that something is the case—for\ninstance, that oranges are citruses, or that there is a\ntraffic congestion on Brooklyn Bridge (at some time). We make\nassertions to share information, coordinate our actions, defend\narguments, and communicate our beliefs and desires. Because of its\ncentral role in communication, assertion has been investigated in\nseveral disciplines. Linguists, philosophers of language, and\nlogicians rely heavily on the notion of assertion in theorizing about\nmeaning, truth and inference.", "\nThe nature of assertion and its relation to other speech acts and\nlinguistic phenomena (implicatures, presuppositions, etc.) have been\nsubject to much controversy. This entry will situate assertion within\nspeech act theory and pragmatics more generally, and then go on to\npresent the current main accounts of\n assertion.[1]", "\nBy an account of assertion is here meant a theory of what\na speaker does (e.g., expresses a belief) in making an\nassertion. According to such accounts, there are deep properties of\nassertion: specifying those properties is specifying what asserting\nconsists in. There must also be surface properties, which are\nthe properties by which a competent speaker can tell whether an\nutterance is an assertion, for instance that it is made by means of\nuttering a sentence in the indicative mood.", "\nWe shall classify accounts according two parameters. Firstly, we\ndistinguish between normative and descriptive\naccounts. Normative accounts rely on the existence of norms or\nnormative relations that are essential to assertoric practice.\nDescriptive accounts don’t. Secondly, we distinguish between\ncontent-directed and hearer-directed accounts.\nContent-directed accounts focus on the relation between the speaker\nand the content of the proposition asserted, while hearer-directed\naccounts focus on the relations between speaker and hearer. Some\ntheories have both normative and descriptive components. The entry is\nstructured as follows" ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Speech Acts", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Pragmatics", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Presupposition", "2.2 Implicature", "2.3 Indirect assertions", "2.4 Explicitness" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Descriptive Accounts, Content-Directed", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Relation to truth", "3.2 Cognitive models of communication" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Descriptive Accounts, Hearer-Directed", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Self-representation", "4.2 Communicative intentions" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Normative Accounts, Content-Directed", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Norms of assertion", "5.2 Conventions" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Normative Accounts, Hearer-Directed", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Commitment" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nConsider typical utterances made by means of the following\nsentences", "\nSentence (1a) would typically be used to make an assertion. The\nspeaker would tell or inform a hearer that there is\na beer in the fridge. Such an utterance of is called\nassertoric, or assertive. By contrast, (1b) would be\nused to ask a question (and the utterance would then be\ninterrogative), (1c) to express a wish (optative),\nand (1d) to make a command, or a request (imperative). This\nentry is about utterances of the first kind, and about the speech acts\nperformed by means of them.", "\nGottlob Frege emphasized the distinction between judging a thought\ncontent (what Frege called a Thought) to be true, and merely\nthinking/entertaining that content. Both are distinct from the content\nitself. Analogously, he distinguished between utterances with\nassertoric quality, or force (see below), and utterances\nwithout assertoric force. For instance, an assertoric\nutterance of", "\nas a whole, by which the conditional proposition is asserted, contains\nas a proper part an utterance or the antecedent ‘it is\nraining’. But the utterance of “it is raining” is\nnot itself assertoric. The conditional can be true whether the\nantecedent is true or false, and hence the speaker’s belief\nabout rain is left open by the assertion", "\nLike Frege, C.S. Peirce stressed the importance of distinguishing\n“between a proposition and what one does with it”. He also\nadopted, albeit implicitly, a distinction between force and\ncontent:", "\n\n\none and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted,\ninwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for,\neffectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not\nthereby become a different proposition (Peirce [NEM]:\n 248).[2]\n ", "\nFrege characterized the assertoric quality of an utterance as an\nassertoric force (“behauptende Kraft”;\nFrege 1918a [TFR: 330]) of the utterance. This idea was later taken\nover by J. L. Austin (1962 [1975: 99–100]), the founding father\nof the general theory of speech acts. Austin distinguished between\nseveral levels of speech act, including these: the locutionary act,\nthe illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act. The locutionary act\nis the act of “ ‘saying something’ in the full\nnormal sense” (1962 [1975: 94]), which is the utterance of\ncertain words with certain meanings in a certain grammatical\nconstruction, such as uttering ‘I like ice’ as a sentence\nof English.", "\nThe notion of an illocutionary act was introduced by Austin by means\nof examples (1962 [1975: 98–102]), and that is the normal\nprocedure. Illocutionary acts are such acts as asserting, asking a\nquestion, warning, threatening, announcing a verdict or intention,\nmaking an appointment, giving an order, expressing a wish, making a\nrequest. An utterance of a sentence, i.e., a locutionary act, by means\nof which a question is asked is thus an utterance with\ninterrogative force, an if an assertion is made, it has\nassertoric force.", "\nThe perlocutionary act is made by means of an illocutionary act, and\ndepends entirely on the hearer’s reaction. For instance, by\nmeans of arguing the speaker may convince the hearer, and by\nmeans of warning the speaker may frighten the hearer. In\nthese examples, convincing and frightening are perlocutionary\nacts.", "\nThe illocutionary act does not depend on the hearer’s reaction\nto the utterance. Still, according to Austin (1962 [1975:\n116–7]) it does depend on the hearer’s being aware of the\nutterance and understanding it in a certain way: I haven’t\nwarned someone unless he heard what I said. In this sense, the\nperformance of an illocutionary act depends on the “securing of\nuptake” (Austin 1962 [1975: 117]). However, although\nAustin’s view is intuitively plausible for speech acts verbs\nwith speaker-hearer argument structure (like x congratulates\ny) or speaker-hearer-content argument structure (x\ntells y that p), it is less plausible when the\nstructure is speaker-content (“Bill asserted that\np”). It may be said that Bill failed to tell\nLisa that the station was closed, since she had already left\nthe room when he said so, but that Bill still asserted that\nit was closed, since Bill believed she was still\n there.[3]", "\nAustin had earlier (1956) initiated the development of speech act\ntaxonomy by means of the distinction between constative and\nperformative utterances. Roughly, whereas in a constative\nutterance you report an already obtaining state of affairs—you\nsay something—in a performative utterance you create\nsomething new: you do something (Austin 1956 [1979: 235]).\nAssertion is the paradigm of a constative utterance. Paradigm examples\nof performatives are utterances by means of which actions such as\nbaptizing, congratulating and greeting are performed. However, when\ndeveloping his general theory of speech acts, Austin abandoned the\nconstative/performative distinction, the reason being that it is not\nso clear in what sense something is done for instance by\nmeans of an optative utterance, whereas nothing is done by means of an\nassertoric one.", "\nAustin noted, e.g., that assertions are subject both to infelicities\nand to various kinds of appraisal, just like performatives (Austin\n1962 [1975: 13–66]). For instance, an assertion is\ninsincere in case of lying as a promise is insincere when the\nappropriate intention is lacking (Austin 1962 [1975: 40]). This is an\ninfelicity of the abuse kind. Also, an assertion is,\naccording to Austin, void in case of a failed referential\npresupposition, such as in Russell’s", "\n(Austin 1962 [1975: 20]). This is then an infelicity of the same\nkind—flaw-type misexecutions—as the use of the\nwrong formula in a legal procedure (Austin 1962 [1975: 36]), or of the\nsame kind—misinvocations—as when the requirements\nof a naming procedure aren’t met (Austin 1962 [1975: 51]).", "\nFurther, Austin noted that when it comes to appraisals, there is not a\nsharp difference between acts that are simply true and false, and acts\nthat are assessed in other respects (Austin 1962 [1975: 140–7]).\nOn the one hand, a warning can be objectively proper or improper,\ndepending on the facts. On the other hand, assertions (statements) can\nbe assessed as suitable in some contexts and not in others, and are\nnot simply true or\n false.[4]", "\nAs an alternative to the constative/performative distinction, Austin\nsuggested five classes of illocutionary types (or illocutionary\nverbs): verdictives, exercitives,\ncommissives, behabitives and expositives\n(Austin 1962 [1975: 151–64]). You exemplify a verdictive, e.g.,\nwhen as a judge you pronounce a verdict; an exercitive by appointing,\nvoting or advising; a commissive by promising, undertaking or\ndeclaring that you will do something; a behabitive by apologizing,\ncriticizing, cursing or congratulating; an expositive by acts\nappropriately prefixed by phrases like ‘I reply’, ‘I\nargue’, ‘I concede’ etc., of a general expository\nnature.", "\nIn this classification, assertion would best be placed under\nexpositives, since the prefix “I assert” is or may be of\nan expository nature. Austin explicitly includes the verbs\n“affirm”, “deny”, and “state”, in\nhis first group of expositives (1962 [1975: 162]). Marina Sbisà\n(2020) argues that assertion belongs to both expositives and to\nverdictives, insofar as assertion expresses a judgment/verdict.", "\nOther taxonomies have been proposed, for instance by Stephen Schiffer\n(1972), John Searle (1975b), Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish (1979),\nFrancois Recanati (1987), and William P. Alston\n (2000).[5]" ], "section_title": "1. Speech Acts", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAssertion is generally thought of being open, explicit and direct, as\nopposed for instance to implying something without explicitly saying\nit. In this respect, assertion is contrasted with\npresupposition and implicature. The contrast is,\nhowever, not altogether sharp, partly because of the idea of indirect\nspeech acts, including indirect assertions." ], "section_title": "2. Pragmatics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nA sentence such as", "\nis not true unless the singular term ‘Kepler’ has\nreference. Still, Frege argued that a speaker asserting that Kepler\ndied in misery, by means of (4) does not also assert that\n‘Kepler’ has reference (Frege 1892 [TPW: 69]). That Kepler\nhas reference is not part of the sense of the sentence. Frege’s\nreason was that if it had been, the sense of its negation", "\nwould have been that Kepler did not die in misery or\n‘Kepler’ does not have reference, which is absurd.\nAccording to Frege, that ‘Kepler’ has reference is rather\npresupposed, both in an assertion of\n (4)\n and in an assertion of its negation.", "\nThe modern treatment of presupposition has followed Frege in treating\nsurvival under negation as the most important test for presupposition.\nThat is, if it is implied that p, both in an assertion of a\nsentence s and in an assertion of the negation of s,\nthen it is presupposed that p in those assertions (unless\nthat p is entailed by all sentences). Other typical examples\nof presupposition (Levinson 1983: 178–181) include", "\nimplying that John tried to stop in time, and", "\nimplying that Martha drank John’s home brew.", "\nIn the case of\n (4),\n the presupposition is clearly of a semantic nature, since the\nsentence “Someone is identical with Kepler”, which is true\njust if ‘Kepler’ has reference, is a logical consequence\nof\n (4)\n and (under a standard interpretation) of (5). By contrast, in the\nnegated forms of\n (6)\n and\n (7),\n the presupposition can be canceled by context, e.g., as in", "\nThis indicates that in this case the presupposition is rather a\npragmatic phenomenon; it is the speaker or speech act rather than the\nsentence or the proposition expressed that presupposes something.", "\nHowever, the issue of separating semantic from pragmatic aspects of\npresupposition is complex, and regarded differently in different\napproaches to presupposition (for an overview, see Simons\n 2006).[6]" ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Presupposition" }, { "content": [ "\nFrege noted (1879: [TPW:10]) that there is no difference in truth\nconditional content between sentences such as", "\n“and” and “but” contribute the same way to\ntruth and falsity. However, when using\n (9b),\n but not when using\n (9a),\n the speaker indicates that there is a contrast of some kind between\nworking with real estate and liking fishing. The speaker is not\nasserting that there is a contrast. We can test this, for\ninstance, by forming a conditional with\n (9b).\n The antecedent of (10) preserves the contrast rather than make it\nhypothetical, showing that the contrast is not asserted, forming a\nconditional with\n (9b)\n in the antecedent preserves the contrast rather than make it\nhypothetical:", "\nIt is usually said that the speaker in cases like\n (9b)\n and\n (10)\n implicates that there is a contrast. These are examples of\nimplicature. H. Paul Grice (1975, 1989) developed a general\ntheory of implicature. Grice called implicatures of the kind\nexemplified conventional, since it is a standing feature of\nthe word “but” to give rise to them.", "\nMost of Grice’s theory is concerned with the complementing kind,\nthe conversational implicatures. These are subdivided into\nthe particularized ones, which depend on features of the\nconversational context, and the generalized ones, which\ndon’t (Grice 1975: 37–8). The particularized\nconversational implicature rely on general conversational maxims, not\non features of expressions. These maxims are thought to be in force in\nordinary conversation. For instance, the maxim Be orderly!\nrequires of the speaker to recount events in the order they took\nplace. This is meant to account for the intuitive difference in\ncontent between", "\nAccording to Grice’s account, the speaker doesn’t assert,\nonly implicates that the events took place in the order recounted.\nWhat is asserted is just that both events did take place.", "\nReal or apparent violations of the maxims generate implicatures, on\nthe assumption that the participants obey the over-arching\nCooperative Principle. For instance, in the conversation", "\nB implicates that he doesn’t know where in Canada John\nspends the summer. The reasoning is as follows: B violates\nthe Maxim of Quantity to be as informative as required. Since\nB is assumed to be cooperative, we can infer that he cannot\nsatisfy the Maxim of Quantity without violating some other maxim. The\nbest candidate is the sub-maxim of the Maxim of Quality, which\nrequires you not to say anything for which you lack sufficient\nevidence. Hence, one can infer that B doesn’t know.\nAgain, B has not asserted that he doesn’t know, but\nstill managed to convey it in an indirect\n manner.[7]" ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Implicature" }, { "content": [ "\nThe distinction between assertion and implicature is to some extent\nundermined by acknowledging indirect assertion as a kind of\nassertion proper. A standard example of an indirect speech act is\ngiven by", "\nBy means of uttering an interrogative sentence the speaker requests\nthe addressee to pass the salt. The request is indirect. The question,\nliterally concerning the addressee’s ability to pass the salt,\nis direct. As defined by John Searle (1975b: 59–60), and also by\nBach and Harnish (1979: 70), an indirect illocutionary act is\nsubordinate to another, more primary act and depends on the success of\nthe first. An alternative definition, given by Sadock (1974: 73), is\nthat an act is indirect just if it has a different illocutionary force\nfrom the one standardly correlated with the sentence-type used.", "\nExamples of indirect assertions by means of questions and\ncommands/requests are given by", "\n(Levinson 1983: 266). Rhetorical questions also have the force of\nassertions:", "\nAnother candidate type is irony:", "\nassuming the speaker does mean the negation of what is literally said.\nHowever, although in a sense the act is indirect, since the speaker\nasserts something different from what she would do on a normal, direct\nuse of the sentence, and relies on the hearer to realize this, it is\nnot an indirect assertion by either definition. It isn’t on the\nfirst, since the primary act (the literal assertion) isn’t even\nmade, and it isn’t on the second, since there is no discrepancy\nbetween force and sentence\n type.[8]", "\nThe very idea of indirect speech acts is, however, controversial. It\nis not universally agreed that an ordinary utterance of\n (13)\n is indirect, since it has been denied, e.g., by Levinson (1983:\n273–6) that a question has really been asked, over and above the\nrequest. Similarly, Levinson have questioned the idea of a standard\ncorrelation between force and sentence form, by which a request would\ncount as indirect on Sadock’s criterion.", "\nCommon to all conceptions of indirect assertions is that they are not\nexplicit: what is expressed, or literally said, is not the same as\nwhat is asserted. One question is whether an utterance is an assertion\nproper that p if that content is not exactly what is\nexpressed, or whether it is an act of a related kind, perhaps an\n implicature.[9]" ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Indirect assertions" }, { "content": [ "\nA related question is how far an utterance may deviate from\nexplicitness and yet be counted as an assertion, proper or indirect.\nAccording to one intuition, as soon as it is not fully determinate to\nthe hearer what the intended content of an utterance is, or what force\nit is made with, the utterance fails to be assertoric.\nUnderdetermination is the crucial issue. This has been argued by\nElizabeth Fricker (2012). But the issue is controversial, and\nobjections of several kinds have been made, for instance by John\nHawthorne (2012), Andrew Peet (2015, forthcoming) and Manuel\nGarcía-Carpintero (2016,\n 2019b).[10]" ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Explicitness" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nDescriptive accounts characterize assertion in terms of its\npsychological, social, and linguistic features, without appeal to\nnormative notions. The content-directed accounts focus on the\nrelations between the speaker and content and between hearer and\ncontent." ], "section_title": "3. Descriptive Accounts, Content-Directed", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nFrege (1918a [TFR: 329]) held that an assertion is an outward sign of\na judgment (Urteil). A judgment in turn, in\nFrege’s view, is a step from entertaining a Thought to\nacknowledging its truth (Frege 1892 [TPW:\n 64]).[11]\n The subject first merely thinks the Thought that p, and\nthen, at the judgment stage, moves on to acknowledge it as true. Since\nfor Frege, the truth value is the reference (Bedeutung) of a\nsentence, a judgment is an advance from the sense of a sentence to its\nreference. In case the subject makes a mistake, it is not the actual\nreference, but the reference the subject takes it to\nhave.", "\nFor Frege, truth is not relative. There is exactly one point of\nevaluation of a Thought, the world itself. If instead we accept more\nthan one point of evaluation, such as different possible worlds, truth\nsimpliciter is equated with truth at the actual world. We can\nthen adapt Frege’s view to say that judging that p is\nadvancing to reference at the actual world, or again,\nevaluating as true in the actual world.", "\nOn this picture, what holds for judgment carries over to assertion. It\nis in the force of an utterance that the step is taken from the\ncontent to the actual point of evaluation. This view has been stated\nby Recanati with respect to the actual world:", "\n\n\n[…] a content is not enough; we need to connect that content\nwith the actual world, via the assertive force of the utterance, in\nvirtue of which the content is presented as characterizing that world.\n(Recanati 2007: 37)\n", "\nIn Pagin (2016a: 276–278), this idea is generalized. If contents\nare possible-worlds propositions, the points of evaluation are\npossible worlds. All actual judgments are then applications of\npropositions to the actual world. If contents are\ntemporal propositions, true or false with respect to\nworld-time pairs, then all actual judgments are applications to the\nordered pair of the actual world and a relevant time, usually the time\nat which the judgment is made. This is the point with respect to which\na sentence, used in a context of utterance, has its truth value (cf.\nKaplan 1989: 522). Again, the relation is general: if the content of a\njudgment is a function from indices of some type to truth\nvalues, then a judgment is the very step of taking the content to be\ntrue at the actual/current index, or again applying the\ncontent to that index. The force of an assertion, on this\nview, connects the content of the assertion with the relevant index.\nThe assertion indicates that the content is true at the\nindex.", "\nOn the more social side, it is often said that in asserting a\nproposition the speaker “presents the proposition as true”\n(cf. Wright 1992: 34). Prima facie, this characterizes\nassertion well. However, there are problems with the idea. One is that\nit should generalize to other speech act types, but does not seem to\ndo so. For instance, does a question present a proposition as one the\nspeaker would like to know the truth value of? If so, it does\nnot seem that this way of presenting the proposition distinguishes\nbetween the interrogative force in\n (17a),\n the optative force in\n (17b),\n and the imperative force in\n (17c).", "\nIf other speech act types could be characterized in ways analogous to\nassertion, that would strengthen the proposal. If not, it appears to\nbe a weakness.", "\nAnother problem is that it remains unclear what\n“presenting” amounts to. It must be a sense of the word\ndifferent from that in which the proposition is presented as true in\nthe sentence", "\neven if the sentence is not uttered assertorically. That is,\n“present as true” must not refer to a feature simply of\ncontent. Since there is a sense of “present as\nsuch-and-such” that does refer to representational\ncontent, there is a need to specify, in a non-question-begging way,\nthe other sense of “present” that is relevant.", "\nIn addition, there is a question of distinguishing the assertoric way\nof presenting something as true from weaker illocutionary\nalternatives, such as guesses and conjectures, which also in some\nsense present their contents as being true.", "\nThere are therefore weaker senses of “present as true”,\nwhich do not require that the presentation itself is made with\nassertoric force (like an obsolete label on a bottle), and these\nsenses are too weak. There is clearly also a stronger sense that\ndoes require assertoric force (for cases when the label is\ntaken to apply), but that is just what we want to have\n(non-circularly) explained. Simply using the phrase “present as\ntrue” does not by itself help.", "\nAnother idea for characterizing assertion in terms of truth-related\nattitudes is that assertion aims at truth. This is stated for\ninstance both by Bernard Williams (1966), by Michael Dummett (1973\n[1981]), and more recently by Marsili (2018). The notion of\n“aiming at truth” can be understood in rather different\nways (for some ways of understanding what it could be for\nbelief to aim at truth, see Engel 2004 and Glüer &\nWikforss\n 2013).[12]", "\nWilliams (1966) characterizes assertion’s aim in different\nterms. For him, the property of aiming at truth is what characterizes\nfact-stating discourse, as opposed to, e.g., evaluative or\ndirective discourse. It is natural to think of", "\nas stating a fact, and of", "\nas expressing an evaluation, not corresponding to any fact of the\nmatter. On Williams’s view, to regard a sincere utterance of", "\nas a moral assertion, is to take a realistic\nattitude to moral discourse: there are moral facts, making moral\nstatements objectively true or false. This view again comes in two\nversions. On the first alternative, the existence of moral facts\nrenders the discourse fact-stating, whether the speaker thinks so or\nnot, and the non-existence renders it evaluative, again whether the\nspeaker thinks so or not. On the second alternative, an utterance of\n (21)\n is an assertion if the speaker has a realistic attitude towards moral\ndiscourse and otherwise not.", "\nOn these views, it is assumed that truth is a substantial property\n(Williams 1966: 202), not a concept that can be characterized in some\ndeflationary way. As a consequence, the sentence", "\nis to be regarded as false, since\n (22)\n is objectively neither true nor false; there is no fact of the\n matter.[13]" ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Relation to truth" }, { "content": [ "\nPerhaps the best way of capturing the cognitive nature of assertion is\nto give a theory of the cognitive features of normal communication by\nmeans of assertion. A classic theory is Stalnaker’s (1974,\n1978). Stalnaker provides a model of a conversation in which assertion\nand presupposition dynamically interact. On Stalnaker’s model,\npropositions are presupposed in a conversation if they are on record\nas belonging to the common ground between the speakers. When an\nassertion is made and accepted in the conversation, its content is\nadded to the common ground, and the truth of the proposition in\nquestion will be presupposed in later stages. What is presupposed at a\ngiven stage has an effect on the interpretation of new utterances made\nat that stage. For Stalnaker, the common ground is a set of\npropositions. He models this with the set of worlds in which all\ncommon ground propositions are true, the context set.", "\nIn this framework Stalnaker (1978: 88–89) proposes three rules\nfor assertion:", "\nStalnaker comments on the first rule:", "\n\n\nTo assert something incompatible with what is presupposed is\nself-defeating […] And to assert something which already\npresupposed is to attempt to do something that is already done.\n", "\nOn such an approach, the satisfaction of a presupposition is an\nadmittance condition of an assertion (cf. Karttunen 1974;\nHeim 1988). This idea connects with Austin’s more general idea\nof felicity conditions of speech\n acts.[14]\n Does Stalnaker offer an account of assertion itself? The answer is\nno, for the role of assertion is shared by other speech acts such as\nassuming and conjecturing (Stalnaker 1978: 153).\nWhat is added to the common ground is only for the purpose of\nconversation, and need not be actually believed by the\nparticipants. It is only required that it be accepted (cf.\nStalnaker 2002: 716).", "\nStalnaker has not (as far as we are aware) attempted to add a\ndistinguishing feature of assertion to the model. This has, however,\nbeen attempted by Schaffer (2008), Kölbel (2011: 68–70),\nand Stokke\n (2013).[15]", "\nAnother cognitive account is offered by Pagin (2011, 2020). The\naccount is summarized by the phrase: “an assertion is an\nutterance that is prima facie informative”. For an utterance to\nbe informative is for it to be made in part “because it is\ntrue”. What this amounts to is different, but complementary, for\nspeaker and hearer. For the speaker, part of the reason for\nusing a particular sentence is that it is true (in context); that is,\nthe speaker believes, with a sufficient strength, that the sentence\nexpresses a true proposition, and utters it partly because of that.\nFor the hearer, taking the utterance as informative, means, by\ndefault, to update their credence in the proposition as a response to\nthe utterance, both in the upwards direction and to a level above\n0.5.", "\nThe prima facie element of the account means that the typical\nproperties on the speaker and hearer side are only default\nproperties associated with surface features of the utterance: the\ndeclarative sentence type, a typical intonation pattern, etc. There\nare many possible reasons why a speaker may utter such a sentence\nwithout believing the proposition, and why a hearer may not adjust\ntheir credence in the typical manner. For example, the speaker may be\nlying, the hearer may distrust the speaker, or may already have given\nthe proposition a very high credence before the utterance. On\nPagin’s picture, it is the cognitive patterns associated with\nsurface features, on the production and comprehension sides, that\ncharacterize assertion. This way of dividing the account between\nspeaker and hearer is somewhat controversial.", "\nYet another cognitive account is elaborated in Jary (2010).\nJary’s account is situated within Relevance Theory, a\nmore general account of cognition and communication. As a typical\ningredient of this general framework, when an assertion is made, the\nproposition expressed by the utterance is presented as “relevant\nto the hearer” (2010: 163), where ‘relevant’ is a\ntechnical term (Sperber & Wilson 1986 [1995: 265]).", "\nWhat distinguishes assertion from other speech act types is something\ndifferent:", "\n\n\nAssertion cannot be defined thus, though. In order for an utterance to\nhave assertoric force, it must also be subject to the cognitive and\nsocial safeguards that distinguish assertion. […] It is the\napplicability of these safeguards that distinguishes assertion both\nfrom other illocutionary acts and from other forms of information\ntransfer. (Jary 2010: 163–164)\n", "\nSocial safeguards consist in sanctions against misleading assertions,\nwhile cognitive safeguards consist in the ability of the hearer to not\nsimply accept what is said but meta-represent the speaker as\nexpressing certain beliefs and intentions (2010: 160). It is part of a\nfull account of assertion, according to Jary, that assertions are\nsubject to these safeguards. This also distinguishes assertions from\npromises and commands, where the proposition is not presented as\nsubject to the hearer’s safeguards; “rejection is not\npresented as an option for the hearer” (2010: 73)." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Cognitive models of communication" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nHearer-directed accounts of assertion are primarily concerned with the\nspeaker’s thoughts and intentions about their audience." ], "section_title": "4. Descriptive Accounts, Hearer-Directed", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAccording to Frege (1918a [TFR: 329]), as noted, an assertion is an\noutward sign of a judgment (Urteil). The term\n“judgment” has been used in several ways. If it is used to\nmean either belief, or act by which a belief is formed or\nreinforced, then Frege’s view is pretty close to the view\nthat assertion is the expression of belief.", "\nThis idea, that assertion is the expression of belief, has a longer\nhistory, going back to at least Kant. How should one understand the\nidea of expressing here? It is natural to think of a belief state,\nthat is, a mental state of the speaker, as causally co-responsible for\nthe making of the assertion. The speaker has a belief and wants to\ncommunicate it, which motivates an assertoric utterance. But what\nabout the cases when the speaker does not believe what he asserts? Can\nwe still say, even of insincere assertions, that they express belief?\nIf so, in what sense?", "\nWithin the communicative intentions tradition, Bach and Harnish have\nemphasized that an assertion gives the hearer evidence for\nthe corresponding belief, and that what is common to the sincere and\ninsincere case is the intention of providing such evidence:", "\n\n\nFor S to express an attitude is for S to\nR-intend the hearer to take S’s utterance as\nreason to think S has that attitude. (Bach & Harnish\n1979: 15, italics in the original)\n", "\n(‘R-intend’ is, as above, short for “reflexively\nintend”). On this view, expressing is wholly a matter of\nhearer-directed intentions.", "\nThis proposal has the advantage of covering both the sincere and the\ninsincere case, but has the drawback of requiring a high level of\nsophistication. By contrast, Bernard Williams (2002: 74) has claimed\nthat a sincere assertion is simply the direct expression of\nbelief, in a more primitive and unsophisticated way. Insincere\nassertions are different. According to Williams (2002: 74), in an\nassertion, the speaker either gives a direct expression of\nbelief, or he intends the addressee to “take it”\nthat he has the belief (cf. Owens 2006).", "\nPresumably, the intention mentioned is an intention about what the\nhearer is to believe about the speaker. In this case the objection\nthat too much sophistication is required is less pressing, since it\nonly concerns insincere assertions. However, Williams’s idea (as\nin Grice 1969) has the opposite defect of not taking more\nsophistication into account. The idea, that the alternative to\nsincerity is the intention to make the hearer believe that the speaker\nbelieves what he asserts, is not general enough. For instance, there\nis double bluffing, where the speaker asserts what is true in order to\ndeceive the hearer, whom the speaker believes will expect the speaker\nto lie. Again, an insincere speaker S who asserts that\np may know that the hearer A knows that\nS does not believe that p, but may still intend to\nmake A believe that S does not know about\nA’s knowledge, precisely by making the assertion that\np. There is no definitive upper limit to the sophistication\nof the deceiving speaker’s calculations. In addition, the\nspeaker may simply be stonewalling, reiterating an assertion without\nany hope of convincing the addressee of anything.", "\nA more neutral way of trying to capture the relation between assertion\nand believing was suggested both by Max Black (1952) and by Davidson\n(1984: 268): in asserting that p the speaker\nrepresents herself as believing that p. This\nsuggestion appears to avoid the difficulties with the appeal to\nhearer-directed intentions.", "\nA somewhat related approach is taken by Mitchell S. Green (2007), who\nappeals to “expressive conventions”. Grammatical moods can\nhave such conventions (2007: 150). According to Green (2007: 160), an\nassertion that p invokes a set of conventions according to\nwhich the speaker “can be represented as bearing the\nbelief-relation to p”.", "\nAs one can represent oneself as believing, one can also represent\noneself as knowing. Inspired by Davidson’s proposal, Peter Unger\n(1975: 253–270) and Michael Slote (1979: 185) made the stronger\nclaim that in asserting that p the speaker represents\nherself as knowing that p. To a small extent this idea had been\nanticipated by G. E. Moore when claiming that the speaker\nimplies that she knows that p (1912 [1966: 63]).", "\nHowever, it is not so clear what representing oneself amounts to. It\nmust be a sense different from that in which one represents the\nworld as having certain features. The speaker who asserts", "\ndoes not also claim that she believes that there are black\nswans. It must apparently be some weaker sense of\n“represent”, since it is not just a matter of\nbeing, as opposed to not being, fully explicit. If I am asked what I\nbelieve and I answer by uttering\n (23),\n I do represent myself as believing that there are black swans, just\nas I would have done by explicitly saying that I believe that\nthere are black swans. I do represent myself as believing that there\nare black swans, equivalently with asserting that I do. What I assert\nthen is false if I don’t have the belief, despite the existence\nof black swans.", "\nOn the other hand, it must also be stronger than the sense of\n“represent” by which an actor can be said to represent\nhimself as believing something on stage. The actor says", "\nthereby representing himself as asserting that he is in the biology\ndepartment, since he represents himself as being a man who honestly\nasserts that he is in the biology department. By means of that, he in\none sense represents himself as believing that he is in the biology\ndepartment. But the audience not invited to believe that the\nspeaker, that is, the actor, has that belief.", "\nApparently, the relevant sense of “represent” is not easy\nto specify. That it nevertheless tracks a real phenomenon is often\nclaimed to be shown by Moore’s Paradox. This is the paradox that\nassertoric utterances of sentences such as", "\n(the omissive type of Moorean sentences) are distinctly odd, and even\nprima facie self-defeating, despite the fact that they may\nwell be true. Among the different types of account of Moore’s\nParadox, Moore’s own emphasizes the connection between asserting\nand believing. Moore’s idea (1944: 175–176; 1912 [1966:\n63]) was that the speaker in some sense implies that she\nbelieves what she asserts. So by asserting\n (25)\n the speaker induces a contradiction between what she asserts and what\nshe implies. This contradiction is then supposed to explain the\n oddity.[16]" ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Self-representation" }, { "content": [ "\nTypically, the speaker who makes an assertion has hearer-directed\nintentions in performing a speech act. The speaker may intend\nthe hearer to come to believe something or other about the speaker, or\nabout something else, or intend the hearer to come to desire or intend\nto do something. Such intentions can concern institutional changes,\nbut need not. Intentions that are immediately concerned with\ncommunication itself, as opposed to ulterior goals, are called\ncommunicative intentions.", "\nThe idea of communicative intentions derives from Grice’s (1957)\narticle ‘Meaning’, where Grice defined what it is for a\nspeaker to non-naturally mean something. Although Grice did\nnot explicitly attempt to define assertion, his ideas can be\nstraightforwardly transposed to provide a definition:", "\nIn the early to mid 1960s Austin’s speech act theory and\nGrice’s account of communicative intentions began to merge. The\nconnection is discussed in Strawson 1964. Strawson inquired whether\nillocutionary force could be made overt by means of communicative\nintentions. He concluded that when it comes to highly conventionalized\nutterances, communicative intentions are largely irrelevant, but that\non the other hand, convention does not play much role for ordinary\nillocutionary types. Strawson also pointed out a difficulty with\nGrice’s analysis: it may be the case that all three conditions\n(i-iii) are fulfilled, but that the speaker intends the hearer to\nbelieve that they aren’t (for instance, if the speaker\nwants the hearer to believe that p for reasons altogether\nindependent from his making the statement).", "\nSuch intentions to mislead came to be called sneaky\nintentions (Grice 1969), and they constituted a problem for\nspeech act analyses based on communicative intentions. The idea was\nthat genuine communication is essentially open: the speaker’s\ncommunicative intentions are meant to be fully accessible to the\nhearer. Sneaky intentions violate this requirement of openness, and\ntherefore apparently they must be ruled out one way or another.\nStrawson’s own solution was to add a fourth clause about the\nspeaker’s intention that the hearer recognize the third\nintention. However, that solution only invited a sneaky intention one\nlevel up (cf. Schiffer 1972: 17–42; Vlach 1981; Davis 1999).", "\nAnother solution was to make the intention reflexive. This\nwas proposed by Searle (1969), in the first full-blown analysis of\nillocutionary types made by appeal to communicative intentions. Searle\ncombined this with an appeal to social institutions as created by\nrules. We return to these in\n section 5.1.", "\nSearle criticized Grice for requiring the speaker to intend\nperlocutionary effects, such as what the speaker shall come\nto do or believe, pointing out that such intentions aren’t\nessential (1969: 46–7). Instead, according to Searle, the\nspeaker intends to be understood, and also intends to achieve\nthis by means of the hearer’s recognition of this very intention\nitself. Moreover, if the intention is recognized, it is also\nfulfilled: “we achieve what we try to do by getting our audience\nto recognize what we try to do” (Searle 1969: 47). This\nreflexive intention is formally spelled out as follows:", "\nThe illocutionary effect IE is the effect of generating the state\nspecified in the constitutive rule. In the case of assertion, the\nspeaker intends that her utterance counts as an undertaking\nthat p represents an actual state of affairs, depending on\nthe constitutive rule (cf.\n section 5.1).", "\nBach and Harnish follow Searle in appealing to reflexive communicative\nintentions. On their analysis (1979: 42), assuming a speaker\nS and a hearer H,", "\nAccording to Bach and Harnish’s understanding, a speaker\nS expresses an attitude just in case S\nR-intends (reflexively intends) the hearer to take\nS’s utterance as reason to think S has that\nattitude. They understand the reflexive nature of the intention pretty\nmuch like Searle. They say (1979: 15) that the intended effect of an\nact of communication is not just any effect produced by means of\nrecognition of the intention to produce a certain effect, it is\nthe recognition of that intention.", "\nThese appeals to reflexive intentions were later criticized, in\nparticular by Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995:256–257]). Their\npoint is that if an intention I has as sub-intentions both\nthe intention J and the intention that the hearer recognize\nI, this will yield an infinitely long sequence: the intention\nthat: J and the hearer recognize the intention that:\nJ and the hearer recognize the intention that: J and\n…). If this is an intention content at all, it is not humanly\n graspable.[17]", "\nApart from the communicative intentions accounts of assertion, there\nare more general questions about what intentions are required of a\nspeaker in order for his utterance to qualify as an assertion. For\ninstance, must he intend it to be an assertion? Must it be\nmade voluntarily?" ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Communicative intentions" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "5. Normative Accounts, Content-Directed", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nMost of the discussion on assertion during the past twenty years has\nconcerned norms of assertability. Simply put, philosophers aim to\ndetermine under which conditions it is epistemically permissible (or\nproper, warranted, correct, appropriate) to make an assertion.", "\nPhilosophers have long been interested in analyzing what we mean when\nwe characterize an assertion as “correct”,\n“justified”, “proper”,\n“warranted”, “assertible”, or\n“warrantedly assertible”. The latter notion was taken on\nboard in pragmatism, and in later forms of anti-realism. Dewey (1938)\nseems to have been the first to characterize truth in terms of\nassertoric correctness, with his notion of warranted\nassertibility, even though this idea had a clear affinity with\nthe verifiability principle of Moritz Schlick (1936). Dewey, following\nPeirce, regarded truth as the ideal limit of scientific inquiry (1938:\n345), and a proposition warrantedly asserted only when known\nin virtue of such an inquiry. Warranted assertibility is the property\nof a proposition for which such knowledge potentially exists\n(1938: 9). Dewey was later followed by, notably, Dummett (1976) and\nPutnam (1981). Common to them is the position that there cannot be\nanything more to truth than being supported by the best available\nevidence. In these early discussions, the strategy was that of getting\na handle on truth by means of an appeal to the notion of the\ncorrectness of an assertion, which was taken as more fundamental. On\nDummett’s view, we do get a notion of truth distinct\nfrom the notion of a correct assertion only because of the\nsemantics of compound sentences (1976: 50–52). The\nquestion of what the correctness of an assertion consists in was not\nitself much discussed in earlier work, but became subject of\ndiscussion already in the 1980s, with the work of Boghossian and\nothers.", "\nThe contemporary wave of discussion about assertoric normativity is\nalmost exclusively content-directed; the norms concern the epistemic\nrelation between the speaker and the content of their\n assertion.[18]\n Williamson (1996, 2000) initiated this debate by proposing that\nassertion is governed by a single norm, of the format:", "\nAccording to this hypothesis, you are entitled to assert a proposition\nonly if that proposition has a certain unspecified property\nC. The (N)-schema formalizes the key philosophical question\nabout assertability: which epistemic property C that makes a\nproposition assertable?", "\nWilliamson’s answer is that property C must be\nknowledge, i.e., being known by the speaker. If this is\nright, you can properly assert only what you know: assertion is\ngoverned by the knowledge-norm\n (KNA):", "\n(Williamson 2000: 243). (KNA) is proposed as part of an account of\nassertion. Other norms have been proposed: the most prominent\nalternatives are the truth norm (TNA), the justification norm (JNA)\nand the belief norm (BNA):", "\nDetermining which of these norms governs assertion depends (at least\nin part) on what we mean by hypothesizing that assertion is governed\nby a simple norm by N. In the next section\n (5.1.3),\n we clarify what philosophers typically mean when they say that\nN governs assertions. In the subsequent section\n (5.1.4),\n we review the various accounts of which specific norm governs\nassertion (i.e., the different views as to which property\nC makes a proposition assertable).", "\nWilliamson’s initial framing of the debate on the norm of\nassertion takes for granted a number of assumptions: for instance,\nthat there is a single norm, that it is constitutive of assertion,\nthat all and only assertions are subject to it. In subsequent work,\nsome of these assumptions have been questioned. Here we limit\nourselves to list each assumption (ignoring the numerous objections\nthat affect them). The interested reader will find a discussion of the\ncase for and against each assumption in the supplementary document\n Which Kind of Norm?.", "\nBy Specificity, N is a norm that regulates only one\nspecies of action: asserting. In this sense, it is specific to\nassertion. It governs the making of assertions in general, and nothing\nelse. Directness is closely connected to\nSpecificity. It clarifies that assertions are subject to\nN only in virtue of the fact that they are assertions.", "\nThe “uniqueness assumption” holds that assertion is\nsubject to a single norm. Indirectness specifies that\nUniqueness is compatible with recognizing that there are\nother norms that apply to assertion, albeit only indirectly\n(Williamson 1996: 489). For instance, an assertion can follow\nN (e.g., satisfy the Justification Norm JNA) and violate\nstandard of politeness, morality, legality, etc. Unlike N,\nthese other normative standards are not specific to assertion, since\nthey apply also to other actions (questions, orders, as well as\nnon-linguistic actions).", "\nAn important corollary of Indirectness is that whether an\nassertion is all-things-considered permissible or not may depend on\nfactors that are independent of N. When you say something\noffensive, or reveal a secret that you agreed to keep, you may follow\nN and yet make an (all-things-considered) impermissible\nassertion. And when you lie to save a life, you may violate N\nand make an assertion that is (all-things-considered) permissible.", "\nAccording to the Individuation assumption, the norm of\nassertion is individuating: assertion can be defined as the unique\nspeech act who is subject to this unique norm (Williamson 2000: 241;\nGoldberg 2015: 25; Montminy 2013a). It should be emphasized here that\nit is being subject to the norm that characterizes assertion,\nnot conforming to the norm. An assertion that violates the\nnorm is still an assertion. A definition of assertion in terms of its\nnorm would read as:", "\nIf\n (A3)\n holds, an important motivation for identifying N is that it\nwill provide us with a definition of assertion. Once we determine what\nN is (say, JNA), we can disambiguate the content of this\ndefinition (say, “the only speech act who is only subject to\nJNA”).", "\nThe Essentiality assumption goes beyond\nIndividuation: Individuation allows that assertion\nis only actually individuated by N, and that it could have\nbeen governed by some other norm. By contrast,\n (A4)\n holds that assertions could not exist and be governed by a different\nnorm: if assertion were subject to a different norm, it would be a\ndifferent speech act. Nothing but an assertion could violate the norm,\nif the\n (A3)\n and\n (A4)\n properties hold.", "\nBy\n (A5),\n an assertion is permissible (appropriate, epistemically proper,\nwarranted, correct—depending on one’s favorite\nterminology) only if it meets condition C, and impermissible\nif it does not meet C. Permission is related to the negative\nevaluation of assertions: assertions who violate N are\nprima facie faulty, and criticizable (qua violations of\nN). Permissibility only establishes what is\nnecessary for permissible assertion, not what is\n sufficient.[19]", "\nMost theorists take for granted that N is the\n“constitutive” norm of assertion, and some explicitly\nadvocate\n (A6).[20]", "\nHowever, there is substantial (and often unacknowledged) disagreement\nabout what constitutivity amounts to (for more the debate surrounding\neach of these assumptions, see the supplementary document\n Which Kind of Norm?).", "\nFor the most part, the literature on norms of assertion has concerned\nthe question of which specific norm governs assertion, and\nwhat are the reasons for favoring one candidate norm over another.\nBelow, we briefly go through the main candidates from the\nliterature.", "\nOver and above Williamson,\n (KNA)\n has been favored by DeRose (2002), Reynolds (2002), Adler (2002:\n275), Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), Engel (2008), Schaffer (2008),\nand Turri (2010), among others.", "\nIn addition to direct intuitions about the appropriateness of specific\nsentences, proponents of the knowledge norm have adduced indirect\nevidence in the form of intuitions about conversational patterns,\nclaiming that these patterns are best explained by the acceptance of\nthe knowledge norm. Williamson himself appeals to such patterns, such\nas those arising from Moorean Assertions\n (26),\n Lottery Assertions\n (27),\n and Challenges\n (28):", "\nConcerning the first, Williamson (2000: 253) claims that an utterance\nof\n (26)\n is just as odd as any ordinary Moorean sentence involving belief,\nsuch as\n (25)\n above. The oddity of\n (26)\n can be explained by appeal to the knowledge norm, and this is taken\nby supporters of\n (KNA)\n to be a datum in its favor. By\n (KNA),\n (26) is proper only if the speaker knows that the proposition\nexpressed by\n (26)\n is true. Since knowledge distributes over conjunction, this means\nthat the speaker should know that it is raining and also that she does\nnot know that it is raining. Since knowledge is factive, this\ngenerates a contradiction: it follows that an assertion of\n (26)\n cannot be proper, and this explains its oddity.", "\nSimilarly,\n (KNA)\n seems well positioned to explain the oddity of asserting\n (27)\n merely on probabilistic grounds. Suppose that a (fair) lottery with a\nlarge number of tickets has been held; only one ticket has won.\nB has a ticket, but neither A nor B knows\nthe result. A asserts\n (27)\n on merely probabilistic grounds. Although the probability that the\nticket has won is very low (and one can get it arbitrarily low, short\nof zero, by increasing the number of tickets in the lottery), it is\nintuitively incorrect for A to tell\n (27)\n to B (Williamson 2000: 246–249). No probability short\nof 1 seems to authorize A’s utterance of\n (27).\n Since A does not know that\n (27)\n is true,\n (KNA)\n explains the unacceptability of A’s utterance.", "\nFinally, in standard contexts, it is perfectly appropriate to\nchallenge an assertion with questions like\n (28),\n but\n (28)\n presupposes that the speaker knows that what she says is true.\n (KNA)\n is well positioned to explain why this presupposition is appropriate:\nif speakers are only entitled to assert what they know, then it is\nwithin the hearer’s conversational rights to assume (and\npresuppose) that the speaker knows that what they say is true. Further\nconversational patterns supporting\n (KNA)\n have been proposed, e.g., by Benton (2011).", "\nThe claim that\n (KNA)\n is supported by these conversational patterns has been extensively\ncriticized. The most common line is that the available data can be\nexplained equally well (if not better) by competing accounts. For\ninstance, several authors argue that the oddity of Moorean Assertions\nand Lottery Assertions can be explained by appeal to a justification\n norm.[21]\n Others have noted that these conversational patterns may be explained\nby appealing to more general principles, rather than assertoric norms\nspecifically. For instance, it has been argued that Lottery Assertions\nand Moorean Assertions are improper because they violate more general\n(Gricean) conversational\n principles.[22]", "\nA different criticism comes from Sosa (2009), who notes that\n (KNA)’s\n explanation of Moorean assertions fails to generalize as it should,\nbecause\n (KNA)\n is unable to explain “dubious assertions”: cases in which\nthe speaker asserts p while admitting that he doesn’t\nknow whether he knows that p (but see Benton 2013, Montminy\n2013a). Finally, several authors have questioned the assumption that\nit is always improper to assert that one’s ticket is a loser on\npurely probabilistic\n grounds.[23]", "\nThe argument from challenges like\n (28)\n is surely the least compelling. First, to meet the challenge raised\nby\n (28),\n it would be sufficient for the speaker to show that she has good\nreasons to believe that what she said is true (Lackey 2007:\n610; Kvanvig 2009: 143; McKinnon & Turri 2013). It does not seem,\nby contrast, that the speaker has to prove that she knows (rather than\nmerely believe) that what she said is true. Second, taking the\nargument seriously proves too much. Consider\n (29):", "\nSince\n (29)\n and\n (30)\n are also natural ways to challenge an assertion, by the same logic,\nwe should conclude that assertion is also governed by a certainty\nrule. We could extend this to other challenges (Is that true?). So the\nchallenge argument doesn’t seem to show a primacy of knowledge\nover alternative rules.", "\nA general problem with the appeal to conversational patterns is that\nthey don’t seem to favor specifically normative views over\ncorresponding non-normative views. For instance, it appears that any\nlinguistic phenomenon that can be explained by appeal to a knowledge\nnorm can be equally well explained by appeal to the view that\nasserters represent themselves as knowing what they say, although\nthere is no norm (cf. Pagin 2016b; D. Black 2018). Combine this with\nextraneous, non-assertion-specific norms. That A’s lottery\nassertion\n (27)\n is bad can then be explained by appeal to self-representation of\nknowledge, together with the general moral norm that it is wrong to\nmislead hearers.", "\nMany objections against\n (KNA)\n are based on the idea that its requirements are too strong. First,\nGettiered assertions. Suppose that you have a justified true\nbelief that falls short of knowledge. For instance, you walk into a\ncafé, look at the clock, and conclude that it’s 4.35; but\nyour belief is only accidentally true because (unbeknownst to you) the\nclock has been stuck at 4.35 for several days. If someone asks you the\ntime, it seems perfectly appropriate for you to respond “4.35\npm”. However, by making such an assertion, you would be\nviolating\n (KNA),\n which intuitively speaks against it (Lackey 2007: 596; Kvanvig 2009:\n146–7; Coffman 2014: 36).", "\nSimilar objections arise in relation to the intuitive permissibility\nof unlucky assertions: assertions that you have excellent\nreasons to believe to be true, but that happen to be false. Since the\nproblem with unlucky assertions is that\n (KNA)\n entails\n (TNA)\n (it only allows true assertions), we will discuss it below, as we\nconsider objections to\n (TNA).", "\nLackey objects that\n (KNA)\n fails to accommodate selfless assertions. She presents\nseveral examples: one involves a teacher, Stella, who firmly believes\nin creationism, but is aware that the scientific consensus is that\nhumans evolved from apes. Stella recognizes that Darwinism is\nsupported by stronger empirical evidence, but this is not enough to\nshake her firm belief in creationism. Suppose that she tells her\nstudents:", "\nIntuitively, it would be appropriate for Stella, as a teacher, to\nassert\n (31).\n However,\n (KNA)\n predicts that\n (31)\n is incorrect, because Stella does not believe, and therefore does not\nknow, that\n (31)\n is true. Selfless assertion have generated a lively debate, mostly\ninvolving attempts to explain their propriety within a\n (KNA)-framework\n (see Montminy 2013a, Turri 2015, Milić 2017).", "\nFurther objections concern so-called unsafe assertions, where\nthe speaker does know what is asserted, but would easily have made the\nassertion in a similar situation without\n knowledge.[24]", "\nA few authors who sympathize with\n (KNA)\n have emphasized the role of the hearer. Their proposals are similar\nto\n (KNA),\n but set the condition in relation to the transmission of knowledge to\nthe hearer. An example is García-Carpintero (2004:\n156):", "\nSimilar norms have also been proposed by Pelling (2013a) and by\nHinchman (2013). García-Carpintero suggests that his version is\npreferable to Williamson’s because it brings out the social,\ncommunicative function of language (but see Willard-Kyle forthcoming\nfor objections to KNA-T).\n [25]", "\nMost alternatives to the knowledge norm that are weaker than\n (KNA):\n they require less than knowledge for proper assertion. Weiner (2005)\nand Whiting (2013, 2015) propose a truth norm (cf. also Alston\n2000):", "\nJust like the knowledge norm, the truth norm is factive: both entail\nthat you can assert a proposition only if it is true. This generates a\nproblem concerning the intuitive appropriateness of unlucky\nassertions. To illustrate, imagine that you have had a cat for\nseveral years. During a conversation, a friend asks you if you have\nany pets at home, and you reply:", "\nUnbeknownst to you, however, some thieves broke into your house and\nstole everything you have, including your cat. Since you could not\npossibly have foreseen the eventuality of such an absurd theft, it\nseems that your assertion is appropriate: in response to your\nfriend’s question,\n (32)\n is simply the right thing to say. However,\n (KNA)\n and\n (TNA)\n give a different verdict: they predict that\n (32)\n is an inappropriate response. What’s more,\n (TNA)\n (but not\n (KNA))\n predicts that the appropriate reply would have been to assert the\nnegation of\n (32),\n namely that you don’t have a cat at home. But again, such a\n“lucky assertion” would be intuitively inappropriate:\nsince you have no reason to believe that your cat was stolen, in\nsaying that you don’t have a pet you would be\n lying.[26]", "\nProponents of\n (KNA)\n and\n (TNA)\n tend to concede that unlucky assertions (and Gettiered\nassertions) are intuitively appropriate, and that lucky assertions are\nintuitively inappropriate. Their standard defense strategy is to\ninvoke some distinctions that explain away their incorrect\npredictions. Williamson (2000: 256–257) suggests that making\nunlucky and Gettiered assertions is reasonable, and this is why\nassertions like\n (32)\n usually don’t warrant criticism. However, here the prediction\nthat uttering\n (32)\n is reasonable is made by general observations about rationality, and\nnot by\n (KNA)\n itself. If\n (KNA)’s\n job is to tell us which assertions are appropriate and which are not,\nit is not clear how these observations really help its case, since\nthere are other norms (such as\n (JNA))\n that are able to make this prediction without appeal to independent\nepistemic standards.", "\nA parallel solution has been delineated by DeRose, who draws a\ndistinction between primary and secondary propriety. Primary\npropriety is just what a rule says: when a rule prescribes to\nf only if C, it is primarily proper to f if\nC, and primarily improper to f if not C.\nSecondary propriety is dictated by whether you have reasons to think\nyou are following the rule. If you f because you reasonably\nbelieve that C, but C is accidentally false, your\naction is primarily improper but secondarily proper, and doesn’t\ndeserve blame. If you f although you reasonably believe that\nC is false, but C is accidentally true, your\nassertion is primarily proper but secondarily improper, and\ndoesn’t deserve praise. This strategy helps defend\n (TNA)\n and\n (KNA)\n against the devised counterexamples. Unlucky and Gettiered assertions\nare primarily improper but secondarily proper, and that’s why\nthey don’t deserve blame. Lucky assertions are primarily proper\nbut secondarily improper, and that’s why they don’t\ndeserve praise.", "\nSeveral authors reject this distinction between primary and secondary\n propriety.[27]\n Most of them think that this distinction is spurious. If the job of\nan epistemic norm is to identify the one epistemic standard C\nfrom which it is appropriate to assert, then it is not clear that\nappealing to secondary propriety, epistemic excuses or reasonableness\nis a legitimate move, given that more economic alternatives are\navailable. Reasonably thinking that you are in C (secondarily\nfollowing the rule) is itself an epistemic state; if being in such a\nstate epistemically entitles you to assert, such permissibility should\nbe built into the\n norm.[28]", "\nAccepting the distinction between primary and secondary propriety\ninduces a problem for the intuitive support for the various theories.\nA large part of the intuitions that serve to support one or the other\nnorm theory relies on raw intuitions about what one should or\nshouldn’t assert in some situation, or what is proper or\nimproper to assert there. If there are several ways an assertion can\nbe proper or improper, then it is not easy to see which concept of\npropriety is being tracked by these intuitions. The idea is that a\nparticular intuition that seems to disconfirm a particular normative\ntheory can be explained away by saying that it does not in fact track\nthe primary propriety, but instead only some secondary propriety.\nSince intuitions don’t come labeled as “primary” and\n“secondary”, there is a risk of a substantial\nunderdetermination of theory by data (stressed by Pagin 2016b): two\ntheorists need not agree about whether or not an intuition about a\nparticular case supports a certain theory.", "\nA problem persists even if we reject the primary/secondary\ndistinction. As noted, everyone agrees that assertions are governed by\nvarious norms: moral, prudential, conversational, rules of etiquette.\nWhen does an intuition track the intended notion of a proper\nassertion, and when something else altogether? Kvanvig (2011: 235) and\nEngel (2008: 52–54) have drawn attention to this. According to\nKvanvig, intuitions typically concern whether assertions are\nall-things-considered appropriate. But an assertion may be\n“all-things-considered appropriate” without being\n“epistemic appropriate” (or the other way around). Since\nwe do not have a reliable method for telling apart intuitions about\n“overall appropriateness” from intuitions about\n“epistemic appropriateness”, it is often unclear to which\nextent a given set of intuitions supports or undermines a given theory\n(cf. Hawthorne & Stanley 2008: 585–6). To address this\nproblem, Greenberg (forthcoming) proposes to reframe the debate in\nterms of epistemic norms constraining action, rather than\nassertion.", "\nComplex refinements of\n (TNA)\n have been proposed, too. MacFarlane (2014: 103) adopts a truth norm,\nbut requires it to be qualified as being reflective. This\nmeans, in the context of MacFarlane’s relativism, that\nthe proposition should be true in the context of utterance, as\nassessed from the same context of\n utterance.[29]\n According to MacFarlane, the truth norm needs to be complemented by a\nretraction rule that enjoins the speaker to retract the\nassertion if it turns out not be true (cf. Dummett 1991: 165), in a\ncontext of assessment:", "\nThis rule is also stated in the context of MacFarlane’s\nrelativism, with respect to a context of use and a context of\nassessment. According to the resulting view, assertion is governed\njointly by the (reflective) truth norm and the retraction rule.\nRescorla (2009a), who defends a commitment account of assertion (see\n section 6.1),\n argues there is no norm at all for proper making of\nassertions. There are only norms that govern later reactions. He\nproposes three alternatives to\n (RNA),\n which share the idea that when a speaker is challenged with respect\nto an assertion he has made, he must either defend the assertion or\nelse retract it (Rescorla 2009a: 103–105; cf. Rescorla\n2009b).", "\nSeveral authors have argued that assertability requires justification,\nrather than belief or knowledge. A standard formulation would be:", "\nWhat “justification” is taken to refer to varies between\nauthors. Douven (2006, 2009) and Lackey (2007, 2008) argue for a norm\nof rational belief. Note that\n (JNA)\n does not require that you believe what you say: all that it\nrequires is that it is (or would be) rational for you to\nbelieve it. As such,\n (JNA)\n classifies selfless assertions (which are disbelieved, but\nrational to believe) as appropriate, a prediction that Lackey (2007)\ntakes to be a crucial advantage of\n (JNA).", "\nDifferent conversational contexts may require different degrees of\njustification. For instance, suppose that you are serving your friend\na curry that you just defrosted. You remember that you prepared it for\na vegan dinner over a month ago, but you’re not absolutely sure.\nIf your friend has a mild dislike for cheese,\n (33)\n may be an appropriate thing to say; not so much if your friend has a\ndeadly allergy to lactose:", "\nTo accommodate this sort of intuitions, some authors have proposed\ncontext-sensitive versions of\n (JNA).\n Gerken (2012, 2014, 2017) says that an assertion must be based\n“on a degree of discursive justification for believing that\np that is adequate” relative to the conversational\ncontext. He also argues that the notion of justification is best\nunderstood in internalist terms: a speaker asserting p is\njustified only if they would be able to consciously articulate their\nreasons in support of p. McKinnon (2013, 2015) also defends a\nversion of\n (JNA)\n that is context-sensitive. She argues that one may assert that\np only if (i) the speaker has supportive reasons for\np, and (ii) the relevant conventional and pragmatic elements\nof the context of assertion are present. On this view, the pragmatic\nfeatures of the context have an effect on which epistemic support is\nneeded. Pragmatic features can regard the stakes involved\n(how much depends practically on the truth of what is asserted) or\npedagogical requirements (in case the speaker is a teacher\nwho is required to teach what is rational to believe; McKinnon 2015:\nSection 4.4).", "\nIf justification comes in degrees, perhaps some propositions are more\nassertable than others. According to an influential view (Jackson\n1974, 565, cf. Lewis 1976, 297), the degree to which a proposition is\nassertable is a function of its probability. But Sam Carter\n(forthcoming) shows that this view makes systematically incorrect\npredictions. He suggests that assertability is a matter of\nnormality instead: “asserting p is more\nappropriate than asserting q, for a speaker in evidential\nstate E, iff amongst the worlds compatible with E, p is more\nnormal than q” (in turn, normality has to do with what\nis compatible with our evidence-based expectations; cf. Carter\nforthcoming: §5 for a formal definition).", "\n\n (JNA)\n does not explicitly forbid insincere assertions (assertions that are\nbelieved to be false). Some find this feature unattractive, and prefer\nto amend\n (JNA)\n so as to introduce a belief-requirement, as in\n (JBNA):", "\nSince\n (JBNA)\n requires both justification and belief, it entails that both\n (JNA)\n and\n (BNA)\n are true. But how should we characterize justification for\nthe purpose of this more demanding norm? For Kvanvig (2009, 2011), the\nrelevant notion is knowledge-level justification: “the kind [of\njustification] that is sufficient for knowledge in the presence of\nungettiered true belief” (2009: 156); a stronger version of this\nrequirement (would-be-knowledge) is defended by Coffman (2014).", "\nA datum that justification rules may have trouble explaining is the\nwrongness of false assertions. There seems to be something inherently\ndefective about false assertions, and there is clearly a sense in\nwhich true, justified assertions are more valuable than false, equally\njustified ones. But\n (JNA)\n and\n (JBNA)\n have no resources to explain what is defective about falsity. In\nresponse, Marsili (2018) notes that proponents of non-factive accounts\ncan avail themselves of the notion of an assertion’s aim: when\nwe make an assertion, we purport to describe the world as it is; our\nassertion’s purported goal is met only if the assertion is true.\nOn this view, false assertions are not impermissible, but are still\ndefective, because they fail to meet their purported aim.", "\nThere are views that come very close to justification rules. Maitra\nand Weatherson (2010: 112) propose what they call The Evidence\nResponsiveness Rule: that one assert that p only if\none’s attitude towards p is properly responsive to the\nevidence (they also propose to complement it with an action\nrule, that it is proper to assert that p only if acting\nas if p is “the thing for you to do”). Smithies\n(2012) defends the view that p is assertable only if you have\na justification to believe that you are in a position to know that\np (cf. Koethe 2009, Rosenkranz forthcoming). This version of\n (JNA)\n restores a guiding normative role for knowledge, while accommodating\nmany of the intuitions that motivate a preference for\n (JNA)\n or\n (KNA)\n (for a critique, see M. Smith 2012).", "\nBelief norms are the weakest norms on the market:", "\nThe belief norm is explicitly stated by Hindriks (2007) and Bach\n(2008: 77). If one substitutes ‘say’ for\n‘assert’, this is close to a reformulations of\nGrice’s second submaxim of Quality (“Do not say what you\nbelieve to be false” (Grice 1989: 27).", "\nIntuitively,\n (BNA)\n is too permissive: it allows us to assert whatever we believe, even\nif we have no evidence but a hunch to support our claim. To explain\naway this prediction, advocates of\n (BNA)\n typically add that while\n (BNA)\n is the only norm that is specific to assertion (and regulates\nassertion directly, cf.\n (A1)\n and\n (A2)),\n it is not the only norm that regulates it. Since assertions\nnecessarily express a belief, and appropriate belief (and/or\npractical action) is allegedly governed by a knowledge-norm,\n (KNA)\n ultimately determines which assertions all-things-considered\nappropriate (Hindriks 2007; Bach 2008; Montminy 2013a).", "\nAll the alternatives to the knowledge norm considered so far require\nless than knowledge for proper assertion. A stronger\nrequirement has been suggested by Stanley (2008):", "\nHere one is epistemically certain of a proposition p", "\n\n\nif and only if one knows that p (or is in a position to know\nthat p) on the basis of evidence that gives one the highest\ndegree of justification for one’s belief that p. (2008:\n35)\n", "\nAccording to Stanley, since the certainty norm requires more than just\nknowledge, everything that can be explained by appeal to the knowledge\nnorm can also be explained by appeal to the certainty\n norm.[30]", "\nGoldberg (2015) argues that the norm of assertion hypothesis can\nexplain why we have a (pro tanto) epistemic entitlement believe what\nwe are told. He identifies some requirements that are needed to meet\nthis desideratum. One is that the norm of assertion is robustly\nepistemic, and strong enough to warrant testimonial belief (2015: 96).\nAnother is that it must be common knowledge between speaker\nand hearer that the speaker’s assertion is subject to this norm.\nA further requirement (2015: 8) is that the speaker\nauthorizes the hearer to defer back to the speaker the\nresponsibility of meeting challenges to the assertion. Together, these\nassumptions should be able to explain why beliefs based on testimony\nare pro tanto justified.", "\nMost authors who write about the norm of assertion appeal to their own\nintuitions. However, this is an area where experimental data is highly\nrelevant. If the aim is to describe a real-word communicative act,\nrather than a purely idealized philosopher’s construct, it\nfollows a good theory of assertion should make predictions that are\nconsistent with our actual practice: it should deem appropriate the\nassertions that ordinary speakers deem appropriate, and inappropriate\nthe ones that they criticize as inappropriate. If this is right,\ncompeting accounts can be tested empirically against the intuitions of\ncompetent speakers of the language.", "\nEmpirical research on the norm of assertion was initiated by Turri.\nHis (2013) study aims to determine whether people’s\nassertability judgments are better predicted by a factive norm, like\n (KNA)\n or\n (TNA),\n or a non-factive one, like\n (JNA)\n or\n (BNA).\n Turri reports the results of six experiments, primarily investigating\njudgments about unlucky assertions (false assertions that the speaker\nreasonably believes to be true). In the first experiment, Maria\nincorrectly thinks that she has a 1990 Rolex in her watch collection,\nbecause this is what her inventory says. When a friend asks Maria if\nshe has that particular Rolex, participants are asked: “Should\nMaria tell her guest that she has a 1990 Rolex in her\ncollection?” [Yes/No]. Participants overwhelmingly selected the\nnegative option (No), even when different factors were manipulated\n(the control questions, what is at stake, the response options, etc.),\napparently providing robust evidential support for factive accounts.\nTurri has since conducted several more studies, accumulating an\nimpressive body of evidence supporting factive accounts of assertion\nin general and the knowledge-norm in particular (for a review, see\nTurri 2017), including studies on other potential counterexamples to\n (KNA),\n like selfless assertions (2015a), and Gettiered\nassertions (2016).", "\nIt seemed that the debate was settled in favor of the knowledge rule,\nuntil new studies came out that pointed in the opposite direction.\nReuter and Brössel (2019) argue that two factors likely skewed\nthe results in favor of factive accounts in Turri’s (2013)\nseminal study. First, the protagonist (Maria) has a defeater against\nher belief: she is aware that her inventory is occasionally\nmistaken. Second, participants were asked what Maria should\nsay, but it would seem more appropriate to ask whether her assertion\nwas permissible. Manipulating these factors reverted the\nresults: a majority of participants gave responses aligning with\nnon-factive accounts. The authors then conducted new experiments\ninvolving both lucky assertions (true, but not justified) and\nunlucky assertions (false, but justified), finding that\n (JNA)\n was reliably a better predictor of assertability than any of its\nfactive rivals\n (TNA,\n KNA).", "\nKneer (2017) also found solid evidence that\n (JNA)\n is a better predictor of assertability judgments than\n (KNA),\n TNA, and\n (BNA).\n In a first experiment, he tested Gettiered assertions and\nunlucky assertions, measuring assertability with different\nprompts: he asked whether the protagonist “should say\np”, whether she “is permitted to say\np”, and if saying p is\n“appropriate”. In both the Gettiered condition\nand the unlucky condition, the overwhelming majority of\nparticipants considered p assertable, but not known. Kneer\nconcludes that “knowledge quite clearly doesn’t constitute\nthe norm of assertion”. The other experiments were therefore\ndesigned to verify whether\n (JNA) makes\n more reliable predictions. Experiments 2 and 3 found robust evidence\nthat\n (JNA) is\n a better predictor of assertability judgments than\n (KNA),\n both in Gettier assertions and unlucky assertions,\neven when different factors (like the response options or the kind of\nepistemic support) are manipulated. Experiment 4 shows that\n (JNA) is\n a better predictor of assertability judgments than\n (BNA):\n people judge that “having a hunch” that p is\ntrue is not good enough ground to assert p. Like Reuter and\nBrössel, Kneer concludes that\n (JNA),\n rather than\n (KNA),\n is better supported by the empirical evidence. In a subsequent study,\nKneer (2021) found that these results are stable across different\ncultures.", "\nThese results are at odds with the initial findings by Turri and\ncolleagues. Given the contrasting data available, how can we determine\nwhich account is best supported by empirical evidence? To answer this\nquestion, Marsili and Wiegmann (2021) note that, in all their\ndifferences, Turri’s studies share a central methodological\naspect: they explore laypeople intuitions by asking a sample of\nsubjects to judge what a particular agent should do in a\ngiven scenario, before the protagonist makes the assertion;\nKneer, Reuter and Brössel adopt instead different prompts and\ntense structures. Marsili and Wiegmann argue that the divergent\nresults are the predictable bi-product of a flaw in the questioning\nmethod employed in the former set of studies. They note that\n“should” can be interpreted in two ways:\nteleologically (or instrumentally), when it indicates what\nyou should do to achieve your aims, and deontologically, when\nit indicates what you should do to live up to some norms or\nobligations. The authors found experimental evidence that participants\nin Turri’s studies interpreted the test questions\nteleologically, which undermines a factive interpretation of the\nresults. Furthermore, they identify measures that can be introduced to\nprompt the intended (deontological) reading of the test question,\nfinding that when these measures are implemented into Turri’s\nvignettes, participants’ judgments overwhelmingly align with\nnon-factive views like\n (JNA).", "\nIt would therefore seem that the latest studies have tipped the scale\nin favor of non-factive views like\n (JNA).\n However, further research will be needed to settle the disagreement\non empirical grounds." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Norms of assertion" }, { "content": [ "\nAustin held that illocutionary acts as opposed to perlocutionary acts\nare conventional, in the sense that they can be made explicit\nby the so-called performative formula (Austin 1962: 103). According to\nAustin, one can say “I argue that” or “I warn you\nthat” but not “I convince you that” or “I\nalarm you that”. Presumably, the idea was that a speech act type\nis conventional just if there exists a convention by which an\nutterance of a sentence of a certain kind ensures (if uptake is\nsecured) that a speech act of that type is performed. Austin probably\nthought that in virtue of the performative formulas this condition is\nmet by illocutionary but not by perlocutionary act types.", "\nThe more general claim that illocutionary force is correlated by\nconvention with sentence type has been advocated by Dummett (1973\n[1981: 302, 311]). On this view, it is a convention that declarative\nsentences are used for assertion, interrogative for questions and\nimperative for commands and requests. Similar views have been put\nforward by Searle (1969) and Kot’átko (1998), and the\nidea has been more recently defended by Kölbel (2010). According\nto Searle (1969: 38, 40), illocutionary acts are conventional, and the\nconventions in question govern the use of so-called force-indicating\ndevices (Searle 1969: 64) specific to each\n language.[31]", "\nHowever, the view that illocutionary acts types are conventional in\nthis sense has met with much opposition. Strawson (1964:\n153–154) objected early on that ordinary illocutionary acts can\nbe performed without relying on any convention to identify the force,\nfor instance when using a declarative sentence like “The ice\nover there is very thin” for a warning. This kind of criticism,\ndirected against Dummett, has later been reinforced by Robert J.\nStainton (1996, 2006), stressing that in appropriate contexts,\nsub-sentential phrases like “John’s father”\n(pointing at a man) or “very fast” (looking at a car) can\nbe used to make assertions, and gives linguistic arguments why not all\nsuch uses can be treated as cases of ellipsis (that is, as cases of\nleaving out parts of a well-formed sentence that speaker and hearer\ntacitly aware of). If Strawson and Stainton are right, convention\nisn’t necessary for making assertions.", "\nMoreover, Davidson (1979, 1984) stressed that no conventional sign\ncould work as a force indicator in this sense, since any conventional\nsign could be used (and would be used) in insincere utterances, where\nthe corresponding force was missing, including cases of deception,\njokes, impersonation and other theatrical performances. Basically the\nsame point is made by Bach and Harnish (1979: 122–127). If\nDavidson, and Bach and Harnish are right, then conventions are also\nnot sufficient (but see Kölbel 2010 for an argument against this\nview).", "\nWilliamson (1996, 239) has argued that that speech acts defined by\nconstitutive rules (like assertion, in his own view) cannot be\nconventional. However, García-Carpintero (2019) has shown that\nthis position is controversial. The situation is complicated by the\nfact that the general question of when a convention, or rule of any\nkind, is in force for a speaker, is substantial and complex\n(for more on the relation of assertion to convention, Green\n2020a)." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Conventions" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "6. 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Układ Prawny i Norma\nPrawna (The Basic Concepts of the Theory of Law, Part I: Legal\nSystem and Legal Norm), Fiszer i Majewski, Poznań." ]	[ { "href": "../austin-jl/", "text": "Austin, John Langshaw" }, { "href": "../belief/", "text": "belief" }, { "href": "../convention/", "text": "convention" }, { "href": "../definitions/", "text": "definitions" }, { "href": "../evidence/", "text": "evidence" }, { "href": "../frege/", "text": "Frege, Gottlob" }, { "href": "../grice/", "text": "Grice, Paul" }, { "href": "../implicature/", "text": "implicature" }, { "href": "../information/", "text": "information" }, { "href": "../meaning-normativity/", "text": "meaning: normativity of" }, { "href": "../peirce/", "text": "Peirce, Charles Sanders" }, { "href": "../presupposition/", "text": "presupposition" }, { "href": "../speech-acts/", "text": "speech acts" }, { "href": "../testimony-episprob/", "text": "testimony: epistemological problems of" }, { "href": "../truth/", "text": "truth" } ]
associationist-thought	Associationist Theories of Thought	First published Tue Mar 17, 2015; substantive revision Wed Jun 24, 2020	[ "Associationism is one of the oldest, and, in some form or another,\nmost widely held theories of thought. Associationism has been the\nengine behind empiricism for centuries, from the British Empiricists\nthrough the Behaviorists and modern day Connectionists. Nevertheless,\n“associationism” does not refer to one particular theory\nof cognition per se, but rather a constellation of related\nthough separable theses. What ties these theses together is a\ncommitment to a certain arationality of thought: a creature’s\nmental states are associated because of some facts about its causal\nhistory, and having these mental states associated entails that\nbringing one of a pair of associates to mind will, ceteris\nparibus, ensure that the other also becomes activated." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. What is Associationism?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Associationism as a Theory of Mental Processes: The Empiricist Connection", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Associationism as a Theory of Learning", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Associationism as a Theory of Mental Structure", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Associative Symmetry", "4.2 Activation Maps of Associative Structure ", "4.3 Relation Between Associative Learning and Associative Structures", "4.4 Extinction and Counterconditioning" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Associative Transitions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Associative Instantiation", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. Relation between the Varieties of Association and Related Positions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Associationism in Social Psychology", "sub_toc": [ "8.1 Implicit Attitudes", "8.2 Dual Process Theories" ] }, { "content_title": "9. Criticisms of Associationism", "sub_toc": [ "9.1 Learning Curves", "9.2 The Problem of Predication", "9.3 Word Learning", "9.4 Against the Contiguity Analysis of Associationism", "9.5 Coextensionality" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "Associationism is a theory that connects learning to thought based\non principles of the organism’s causal history. Since its early\nroots, associationists have sought to use the history of an\norganism’s experience as the main sculptor of cognitive\narchitecture. In its most basic form, associationism has claimed that\npairs of thoughts become associated based on the organism’s past\nexperience. So, for example, a basic form of associationism (such as\nHume’s) might claim that the frequency with which an organism\nhas come into contact with Xs and Ys in one’s\nenvironment determines the frequency with which thoughts\nabout Xs and thoughts about Ys will arise together\nin the organism’s future.", "Associationism’s popularity is in part due to how many\ndifferent masters it can serve. In particular, associationism can be\nused as a theory of learning (e.g., as in behaviorist theorizing), a\ntheory of thinking (as in Jamesian “streams of thought”),\na theory of mental structures (e.g., as in concept pairs), and a theory\nof the implementation of thought (e.g., as in connectionism). All these\ntheories are separable, but share a related, empiricist-friendly\ncore. As used here, a “pure associationist” will refer to\none who holds associationist theories of learning, thinking, mental\nstructure, and implementation. The “pure associationist”\nis a somewhat idealized position, one that no particular theorist may\nhave ever held, but many have approximated to differing degrees (e.g.,\nLocke 1690/1975; Hume 1738/1975; Thorndike 1911; Skinner 1953; Hull\n1943; Churchland 1986, 1989; Churchland and Sejnowski 1990; Smolensky\n1988; Elman 1991; Elman et al. 1996; McClelland et al. 2010; Rydell\nand McConnell 2006; Fazio 2007).", "Outside of these core uses of associationism the movement has also\nbeen closely aligned with a number of different doctrines over the\nyears: empiricism, behaviorism, anti-representationalism (i.e.,\nskepticism about the necessity of representational realism in\npsychological explanation), gradual learning, and domain-general\nlearning. All of these theses are dissociable from core associationist\n thought (see section 7). While one\ncan be an associationist without holding those theses, some of those\ntheses imply associationism to differing degrees. These extra\ntheses’ historical and sociological ties to associationism are\nstrong, and so will be intermittently discussed below." ], "section_title": "1. What is Associationism?", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "Empiricism is a general theoretical outlook, which tends to offer a\ntheory of learning to explain as much of our mental life as possible.\nFrom the British empiricists through Skinner and the behaviorists\n (see the entry on behaviorism) the main focus\nhas been arguing for the acquisition of concepts (for the\nempiricists’ “Ideas”, for the behaviorists\n“responses”) through learning. However, the mental\nprocesses that underwrite such learning are almost never themselves\n posited to be learned.[1]\nSo winnowing down the amount of mental\nprocesses one has to posit limits the amount of innate machinery with which the\ntheorist is saddled. Associationism, in its original form as in\nHume (1738/1975), was put forward as a theory of mental processes.\nAssociationists’ attempt to answer the question of how many\nmental processes there are by positing only a single mental\n process: the ability to associate \nideas.[2]", "Of course, thinkers execute many different types of cognitive acts,\nso if there is only one mental process, the ability to associate, that\nprocess must be flexible enough to accomplish a wide range of\ncognitive work. In particular, it must be able to account for learning\nand thinking. Accordingly, associationism has been utilized on both\nfronts. We will first discuss the theory of learning and then, after\nanalyzing that theory and seeing what is putatively learned, we will\nreturn to the associationist theory of thinking." ], "section_title": "2. Associationism as a Theory of Mental Processes: The Empiricist Connection", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "In one of its senses, “associationism” refers to a\ntheory of how organisms acquire concepts, associative structures,\nresponse biases, and even propositional knowledge. It is commonly\nacknowledged that associationism took hold after the publishing of\nJohn Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding\n (1690/1975).[3]\nHowever, Locke’s comments on associationism were terse (though\nfertile), and did not address learning to any great degree. The first\nserious attempt to detail associationism as a theory of learning was\ngiven by Hume in the Treatise of Human Nature\n (1738/1975).[4]\nHume’s associationism was, first and foremost, a theory\nconnecting how perceptions (“Impressions”) determined\ntrains of thought (successions of “Ideas”). Hume’s\nempiricism, as enshrined in the Copy\n Principle,[5]\ndemanded that there were no Ideas in the mind that were not first\ngiven in experience. For Hume, the principles of association\nconstrained the functional role of Ideas once they were copied from\nImpressions: if Impressions IM1 and IM2 were associated in\nperception, then their corresponding Ideas, ID1 and ID2 would also\nbecome associated. In other words, the ordering of Ideas was\ndetermined by the ordering of the Impressions that caused the Ideas\nto arise.", "Hume’s theory then needs to analyze what types of associative\nrelations between Impressions mattered for determining the ordering\nof Ideas. Hume’s analysis consisted of three types of\nassociative relations: cause and effect, contiguity, and\nresemblance. If two Impressions instantiated one of these associative\nrelations, then their corresponding Ideas would mimic the same\n instantiation.[6]\nFor instance, if Impression IM1 was cotemporaneous with Impression\nIM2, then (ceteris paribus) their corresponding Ideas, ID1\nand ID2, would become associated.", "As stated, Hume’s associationism was mostly a way of\ndetermining the functional profile of Ideas. But we have not yet said\nwhat it is for two Ideas to be associated (for that\n see section 4). Instead, one can see\nHume’s contribution as introducing a very influential type of\nlearning—associative learning—for Hume’s theory\npurports to explain how we learn to associate certain Ideas. We\ncan abstract away from Hume’s framework of ideas and his\naccount of the specific relations that underlie associative learning,\nand state the theory of associative learning more generally: if two\ncontents of experiences, X and Y, instantiate some\nassociative relation, R, then those contents will become\nassociated, so that future activations of X will tend to\nbring about activations of Y. The associationist then has\nto explain what relation R amounts to. The Humean form of\nassociative learning (where R is equated with cause and\neffect, contiguity, or resemblance) has been hugely influential,\ninforming the accounts of those such as Jeremy Bentham, J.S. Mill,\n and Alexander Bain (see, e.g., the entries on\n John Stuart Mill and\n 19th Century Scottish Philosophy).[7]", "Associative learning didn’t hit its stride until the work of\nIvan Pavlov, which spurred the subsequent rise of the behaviorist\nmovement in psychology. Pavlov introduced the concept of classical\nconditioning as a modernized version of associative learning. For\nPavlov, classical conditioning was in part an experimental paradigm\nfor teaching animals to learn new associations between stimuli. The\ngeneral method of learning was to pair an unconditioned stimulus (US)\nwith a novel stimulus. An unconditioned stimulus is just a stimulus\nthat instinctively, without training, provokes a response in an\norganism. Since this response is not itself learned, the response is\nreferred to as an “unconditioned response” (UR). In\nPavlov’s canonical experiment, the US was a meat powder, as the\nsmell of meat automatically brought about salivation (UR) in his\ncanine subjects. The US is then paired with a neutral stimulus, such\nas a bell. Over time, the contiguity between the US and the neutral\nstimulus causes the neutral stimulus to provoke the same response as\nthe US. Once the bell starts to provoke salivation, the bell has\nbecome a “conditioned stimulus” (CS) and the salivating,\nwhen prompted by the bell alone, a “conditioned response”\n(CR). The associative learning here is learning to form new\nstimulus-response pairs between the bell and the\n salivation.[8]", "Classical conditioning is a fairly circumscribed process. It is a\n“stimulus substitution” paradigm where one stimulus can\nbe swapped for another to provoke a\n response.[9]\nHowever, the responses that are provoked are supposed to remain unchanged; all that\nchanges is the stimulus that gets associated with the response. Thus,\nclassical conditioning seemed to some to be too restrictive to\nexplain the panoply of novel behavior organisms appear to\n execute.[10]", "Edward Thorndike’s research with cats in puzzle boxes\nbroadened the theory of associative learning by introducing the notion\nof consequences to associative learning. Thorndike expanded the notion\nof associative learning beyond instinctual behaviors and sensory\nsubstitution to genuinely novel behaviors. Thorndike’s\nexperiments initially probed, e.g., how cats learned to lift a lever\nto escape the “puzzle boxes” (the forbearer to\n“Skinner boxes”) that they were trapped in. The\ncats’ behaviors, such as attempting to lift a lever, were not\nthemselves instinctual behaviors like the URs of Pavlov’s\nexperiments. Additionally, the cats’ behaviors were shaped by\nthe consequences that they brought on. For Thorndike it was because\nlifting the lever caused the door to open that the cats learned the\nconnection between the lever and the door. This new view of learning,\noperant conditioning (for the organism is “operating” on\nits environment), was not merely the passive learning of Pavlov, but a\nspecies-nonspecific, general, active theory of learning.", "This research culminated in Thorndike’s famous “Law of\nEffect” (1911), the first canonical psychological law of\nassociationist learning. It asserted that responses that are\naccompanied by the organism feeling satisfied will, ceteris\nparibus, be more likely to be associated with the situation in\nwhich the behavior was executed, whereas responses that are\naccompanied with a feeling of discomfort to the animal\nwill, ceteris paribus, make the response less likely to\noccur when the organism encounters the same\n situation.[11]\nThe greater the positive or negative feelings produced, the greater\nthe likelihood that the behavior will be evinced. To this Thorndike\nadded the “Law of Exercise”, that responses to situations\nwill, ceteris paribus, be more connected to those situations\nin proportion to the frequency of past pairings between situation and\nresponse. Thorndike’s paradigm was popularized and extended by\nB.F. Skinner (see, e.g., Skinner 1953) who stressed the notion not\njust of consequences but of reinforcement as the basis of\nforming associations. For Skinner, a behavior would get associated\nwith a situation according to the frequency and strength of\nreinforcement that would arise as a consequence of the behavior.", "Since the days of Skinner, associative learning has come in many\ndifferent variations. But what all varieties should share with their\nhistorical predecessors is that associative learning is supposed to\nmirror the contingencies in the world without adding additional\nstructure to them (see section 9 for some examples of when supposedly associative theories smuggle in extra structure). The question of what contingencies associative\nlearning detects (that is, one’s preferred analysis of what the\nassociative relation R is), is up for debate and changes\nbetween theorists.", "The final widely shared, though less central, property of\nassociative learning concerns the domain generality of associative\nlearning. Domain generality’s prevalence among associationists\nis due in large part to their traditional empiricist allegiances:\nexcising domain-specific learning mechanisms constrains the amount of\ninnate mental processes one has to posit. Thus it is no surprise to\nfind that both Hume and Pavlov assumed that associative learning could\nbe used to acquire associations between any contents, regardless of\nthe types of contents they were. For example, Pavlov writes,", "Any natural phenomenon chosen at will may be converted\ninto a conditioned stimulus. Any ocular stimulus, any desired sound,\nany odor, and the stimulation of any portion of the skin, whether by\nmechanical means or by the application of heat or cold never failed to\nstimulate the salivary glands. (Pavlov 1906: 615)", "For Pavlov the content of the CS\ndoesn’t matter. Any content will do, as long as it bears the\nright functional relationship in the organism’s learning\nhistory. In that sense, the learning is domain general—it\nmatters not what the content is, just the role it plays (for more on\nthis topic, see\n section 9.4).[12]" ], "section_title": "3. Associationism as a Theory of Learning", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "Associative learning amounts to a constellation of related views\nthat interprets learning as associating stimuli with responses (in\noperant conditioning), or stimuli with other stimuli (in classical\nconditioning), or stimuli with valences (in evaluative\nconditioning).[13] Associative learning accounts raise the question: when\none learns to associate contents X and Y because,\ne.g., previous experiences with Xs and Ys\ninstantiated R, how does one store the information\nthat X and Y are associated?[14] A highly contrived\nsample answer to this question would be that a thinker learns an\nexplicitly represented unconscious conditional rule that states\n“when a token of x is activated, then also activate a\ntoken of y”. Instead of such a highly intellectualized\nresponse, associationists have found a natural (though by no means\n necessary, see section 4.2) complementary\nview that the information is stored in an associative\nstructure.", "An associative structure describes the type of bond that connects\n two distinct mental states.[15]\n An example of such a structure is the\n associative pair \nsalt/pepper.[16]\n The associative structure is defined, in\nthe first instance, functionally: if X and Y form\nan associative structure, then, ceteris paribus, activations\nof mental state X bring about mental state Y\nand vice versa without the mediation of any other\npsychological states (such as an explicitly represented rule telling\nthe system to activate a concept because its associate has been\n activated).[17]\nIn other words, saying that two concepts are associated amounts to\nsaying that there is a reliable, psychologically basic causal\nrelation that holds between them—the activation of one of\nthe concepts causes the activation of the other. So, saying that\nsomeone harbors the structure\n salt/pepper amounts to saying that\nactivations of salt will cause activations of\n pepper (and vice\nversa) without the aid of any other cognitive states.", "Associative structures are most naturally contrasted with\npropositional structures. A pure associationist is opposed to\npropositional structures—strings of mental representations that\nexpress a proposition—because propositionally structured mental\nrepresentations have structure over and above the mere associative\nbond between two concepts. Take, for example, the associative\nstructure\n green/toucan. This structure does not predicate green onto\ntoucan. If we know that a mind has an associative bond between\n green\nand\n toucan, then we know that activating one of those concepts leads\nto the activation of the other. A pure associative theory rules out\npredication, for propositional structures aren’t just strings of\nassociations. “Association” (in associative structures)\njust denotes a causal relation among mental representations, whereas\npredication (roughly) expresses a relation between things in the world\n(or intentional contents that specify external relations). Saying that\nsomeone has an associative thought\n green/toucan tells you something\nabout the causal and temporal sequences of the activation of concepts\nin one’s mind; saying that someone has the thought\n\n there is a green toucan\n tells you that a person is predicating greenness of a\nparticular toucan (see Fodor 2003: 91–94, for an expansion of\nthis point).", "Associative structures needn’t just hold between simple\nconcepts. One might have reason to posit associative structures\n between propositional elements (see section 5)\n or between concepts and valences (see section 8). \nBut none of the proceeding is meant to imply that all\nstructures are associative or propositional—there are other\nrepresentational formats that the mind might harbor (e.g., analog\nmagnitudes or iconic structures; see Camp 2007; Quilty-Dunn forthcoming). For instance, not all semantically\nrelated concepts are harbored in associative structures. Semantically\nrelated concepts may in fact also be directly associated (as in\ndoctor/nurse) or they may not\n (as in\n horse/zebra; see Perea and Rosa\n2002). The\ndifference in structure is not just a theoretical possibility, as these\ndifferent structures have different functional profiles: for example,\nconditioned associations appear to last longer than semantic\nassociations do in subjects with dementia (Glosser and Friedman\n1991)." ], "section_title": "4. Associationism as a Theory of Mental Structure", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "The analysis of associative structures implies that, ceteris\nparibus, associations are symmetric in their causal effects: if a\nthinker has a bond between\n salt/pepper,\n then\n salt should bring about\npepper just as well as\n\n pepper brings about\n salt (for extensive discussion of the symmetry point see Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 2019). But all else is\nrarely equal. For example, behaviorists such as Thorndike, Hull, and\nSkinner knew that the order of learning affected the causal sequence\nof recall: if one is always hearing “salt and pepper” then\nsalt will be more poised to\n activate\n pepper than\n pepper to activate\nsalt. So, included in the ceteris paribus clause in the\nanalysis of associative structures is the idealization that the\nlearning of the associative elements was equally well randomized in\norder.", "Similarly, associative symmetry is violated when there are\ndiffering amounts of associative connections between the individual\nassociated elements. For example, in the\n green/toucan case, most\nthinkers will have many more associations stemming from\n green than\nstemming from\n toucan. Suppose we have a thinker that only associates\ntoucan with\n green,\n but associates\n green with a large host of other\nconcepts (e.g.,\n grass,\n\n vegetables,\n tea,\n\n kermit,\n seasickness,\n\n moss,\nmold,\n lantern,\n\n ireland, etc). In this case one can expect that\n\n toucan\nwill more quickly activate\n green than\n\n green will activate\n toucan, for\nthe former bond will have its activation strength less weakened\namongst other associates than the latter will." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Associative Symmetry" }, { "content": [ "An associative activation map (sometimes called a “spreading\nactivation” map, Collins and Luftus 1975) is a mapping for a\nsingle thinker of all the associative connections between\n concepts.[18]\nThere are many ways of operationalizing associative connections. In\nthe abstract, a psychologist will attempt to probe which concepts (or\nother mental elements) activate which other concepts (or\nelements). Imagine a subject who is asked to say whether a string of\nletters constitutes a word or not, which is the typical goal given to\nsubjects in a “lexical decision task”. If a subject has\njust seen the word “mouse”, we assume that the concept mouse was activated. If the subject is then quicker to say that, e.g.,\n“cursor” is a word than the subject is to say that\n“toaster” is, then we can infer that\n cursor was primed,\nand is thus associatively related to \n mouse, in this thinker. Likewise,\nif we find that “rodent” is also responded to\nquicker, then we know that\n rodent is associatively related to\nmouse. Using this procedure, one can generate an\nassociative mapping of a thinker’s mind. Such a mapping would\nconstitute a mapping of the associative structures one harbors.\nHowever, to be a true activation map—a true mapping of what\nconcepts facilitate what—the mapping would also need to include\ninformation about the violations of symmetry between concepts." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Activation Maps of Associative Structure" }, { "content": [ "The British Empiricists desired to have a thoroughgoing pure\nassociationist theory, for it allowed them to lessen the load of\ninnate machinery they needed to posit. Likewise, the behaviorists also\ntended to want a pure associationist theory (sometimes out of a\nsimilar empiricist tendency, other times because they were radical\nbehaviorists like Skinner, who banned all discussion of mental\nrepresentations). Pure associationists tend to be partial to a\nconnection that Fodor (2003) refers to as “Bare-Boned\nAssociation”. The idea is that the current strength of an\nassociation connection between X and Y is\ndetermined, ceteris paribus, by the frequency of the past\nassociations of X and Y. As stated, Bare-Boned\nAssociation assumes that associative structures encode, at least\nimplicitly, the frequency of past associations of X\nand Y, and the strength of that associative bond is\ndetermined by the organism’s previous history of\nexperiencing Xs and\n Ys.[19]\n In other words, the learning history of\npast associations determines the current functional profile of the\n corresponding associative \nstructures.[20]", "Although the picture sketched\nabove, where associative learning eventuates in associative\nstructure, is appealing for many, it is not forced upon\none, as there is no a priori reason to bar any type of\nstructure to arise from a particular type of learning. One may, for\nexample, gain propositional structures from associative learning (see\nMitchell et al. 2009 and Mandelbaum 2016 for arguments that\nthis is more than a mere logical possibility). This can happen in two\nways. In the first, one may gain an associative structure that has a\nproposition as one of its associates. Assume that every time\none’s father came home he immediately made dinner. In such a\ncase one might associate the proposition\n daddy is home with the\nconcept\n dinner (that is one might acquire: \ndaddy is home/dinner). However,\n one might also just have a propositional\nstructure result from associative learning. If every time one’s\nfather came home he made dinner, then one might just end up learning\nif daddy is home then dinner will come soon, which is a propositional\nstructure." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Relation Between Associative Learning and Associative Structures" }, { "content": [ "There is a different, tighter relationship between associative\nlearning and associative structures concerning how to modulate an\nassociation. Associative theorists, especially from Pavlov onward,\nhave been clear on the functional characteristics necessary to\nmodulate an already created association. There have been two generally\nagreed upon routes: extinction\nand counterconditioning. Suppose that, through associative\nlearning, you have learned to associate a CS with a US. How do we\nbreak that association? Associationists have posited that one breaks\nan associative structure via two different types of\nassociative learning (/unlearning). Extinction is the name\nfor one such process. During extinction one decouples the external\npresentation of the CS and the US by presenting the CS without the US\n(and sometimes the US without the CS). Over time, the organism will\nlearn to disconnect the CS and US.", "Counterconditioning names a similar process to extinction,\nthough one which proceeds via a slightly different method.\nCounterconditioning can only occur when an organism has an\nassociation between a mental representation and a valence, as\nacquired in an evaluative conditioning paradigm. Suppose that one\nassociates\n ducks with a positive valence. To break this association\nvia counterconditioning one introduces ducks not with a lack of\npositive valence (as would happen in extinction) but with the\nopposite valence, a negative valence. Over multiple\nexposures, the initial representation/valence association weakens,\n and is perhaps completely \nbroken.[21]", "How successful extinction and counterconditioning are, and how they\nwork, is the source of some controversy, and some reason to see both methods as highly ineffectual (Bouton 2004). Although the traditional\nview is that extinction breaks associative bonds, it is an open\nempirical question whether extinction proceeds by breaking the\npreviously created associative bonds, or whether it proceeds by\nleaving that bond alone but creating new, more salient (and perhaps\ncontext-specific) associations between the CS and other mental states (Bouton 2002, Bendana and Mandelbaum forthcoming). Additionally, reinstatement, the spontaneous\nreappearance of an associative bond after seemingly successful\nextinction, has been observed in many contexts (see, e.g., Dirikx et\nal. 2004 for\n reinstatement of fear in \nhumans).[22]", "One fixed point in this debate is that one reverses associative\nstructures via these two types of associative learning/unlearning, and\nonly via these two pathways. What one does not do is try to\nbreak an associative structure by using practical or theoretical\nreasoning. If you associate\n salt with\n pepper, then telling you that\nsalt has nothing to do with pepper or giving you very good reasons\nnot to associate the two (say, someone will give you $50,000 for not\nassociating them) won’t affect the association. This much has at\nleast been clear since Locke. In the Essay concerning Human\nUnderstanding, in his chapter “On the Association of\nIdeas” (chapter XXIII) he writes,", "\nWhen this combination is settled, and while it lasts, it is not in\nthe power of reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it.\nIdeas in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to\ntheir natures and circumstances. And here we see the cause why time\ncures certain affections, which reason, though in the right, and\nallowed to be so, has not power over, nor is able against them to\nprevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other\ncases. (2.23.13)\n", "Likewise, say one has just eaten lutefisk and then vomited. The\nsmell and taste of lutefisk will then be associated with feeling\nnauseated, and no amount of telling one that they shouldn’t be\nnauseated will be very effective. Say the lutefisk that made one\nvomit was covered in poison, so that we know that the lutefisk\nwasn’t the root cause of the\n sickness.[23]\nHaving this knowledge won’t dislodge the association. In\nessence, associative structures are functionally defined as being\nfungible based on counterconditioning, extinction, and nothing\nelse. Thus, assuming one sees counterconditioning and extinction as\ntypes of associative learning, we can say that associative learning\ndoes not necessarily eventuate in associative structures, but\nassociative structures can only be modified by associative\nlearning." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Extinction and Counterconditioning" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "So far we’ve discussed learning and mental structures, but\nhave yet to discuss thinking. The pure associationist will\nwant a theory that covers not just acquisition and cognitive\nstructure, but also the transition between thoughts. Associative\ntransitions are a particular type of thinking, akin to what William\nJames called “The Stream of Thought” (James\n1890). Associative transitions are movements between thoughts that are\nnot predicated on a prior logical relationship between the elements of\nthe thoughts that one connects. In this sense, associative transitions\nare contrasted with computational transitions as analyzed by the\nComputational Theory of Mind (Fodor 2001; Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 2018,2019; see\n the entry on Computational Theory of Mind). \nCTM understands inferences as truth preserving\nmovements in thought that are underwritten by the formal/syntactic\nproperties of thoughts. For example inferring the conclusion\nin modus ponens from the premises is possible just based on\nthe form of the major and minor premise, and not on the content of the\npremises. Associative transitions are transitions in thought that are\nnot based on the logico-syntactic properties of thoughts. Rather, they\nare transitions in thought that occur based on the associative\nrelations among the separate thoughts.", "Imagine an impure associationist model of the mind, one that\ncontains both propositional and associative structures. A\ncomputational inference might be one such as inferring \nyou are a g from the thoughts \nif you are an f, then you are a g, and \nyou are an f. However, an associative\ntransition is just a stream of ideas that needn’t have any\nformal, or even rational, relation between them, such as the\ntransition from \nthis coffee shop is cold to russia should annex idaho, \nwithout there being any intervening thoughts. This transition\ncould be subserved merely by one’s association of\n idaho and\ncold, or it could happen because the two thoughts have tended to\nco-occur in the past, and their close temporal proximity caused an\nassociation between the two thoughts to arise (or for many other\nreasons). Regardless of the etiology, the transition doesn’t\noccur on the basis of the formal properties of the\n thoughts.[24]", "According to this taxonomy, talk of an “associative\ninference” (e.g., Anderson et al. 1994; Armstrong et al. 2012)\nis a borderline oxymoron. The easiest way to give sense to the idea of\nan associative inference is for it to involve transitions in thought\nthat began because they were purely inferential (as understood by the\ncomputational theory of mind) but then became associated over\ntime. For example, at first one might make the modus ponens\ninference because a particular series of thoughts instantiates\nthe modus ponens form. Over time the premises and conclusion of that\nparticular token of a modus ponens argument become associated\nwith each other through their continued use in that inference and now\nthe thinker merely associates the premises with the conclusion. That\nis, the constant contiguity between the premises and the conclusion\noccurred because the inference was made so frequently, but the\ninference was originally made so frequently not because of the\nassociative relations between the premises and conclusion, but because\nthe form of the thoughts (and the particular motivations of the\nthinker). This constant contiguity then formed the basis for an\nassociative linkage between the premises and the conclusion. [25]", "As was the case for associative structures, associative transitions\nin thought are not just a logical possibility. There are particular\nempirical differences associated with associative transitions versus\ninferential transitions. Associative transitions tend to move across\ndifferent content domains, whereas inferential transitions tend to\nstay on a more focused set of contents. These differences have been\nseen to result in measurable differences in mood: associative thinking\nacross topics bolsters mood when compared to logical thinking on a\nsingle topic (Mason and Bar 2012)." ], "section_title": "5. Associative Transitions", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "The associationist position so far has been neutral on how\nassociations are to be implemented. Implementation can be seen at a\nrepresentational (that is psychological) level of explanation, or at\nthe neural level. A pure associationist picture would posit an\nassociative implementation base at one, or both, of these\n levels.[26]", "The most well-known associative instantiation base is a class of\nnetworks called Connectionist networks (see\n the entry on connectionism). \nConnectionist networks are sometimes pitched at the\npsychological level (see, e.g., Elman 1991; Elman et al. 1996;\nSmolensky 1988). This amounts to the claim that models of algorithms\nembedded in the networks capture the essence of certain mental\nprocesses, such as associative learning. Other times connectionist\nnetworks are said to be models of neural activity (“neural\nnetworks”). Connectionist networks consist in sets of nodes,\ngenerally input nodes, hidden nodes, and output nodes. Input nodes\nare taken to be analogs of sensory neurons (or sub-symbolic sensory\nrepresentations), output nodes the analog of motor neurons (or\nsub-symbolic behavioral representations), and hidden nodes are\n stand-ins for all other\n neurons.[27]\n The network consists in these nodes\nbeing connected to each other with varying strengths. The topology of\nthe connections gives one an associative mapping of the system, with\nthe associative weights understood as the differing strengths of\nconnections. On the psychological reading, these associations are\nfunctionally defined; on the neurological reading, they are generally\nunderstood to be representing synaptic conductance (and are the\nanalogs of dendrites).[28] Prima facie, these networks are\npurely associative and do not contain propositional elements, and the\nnodes themselves are not to be equated with single representational\nstates (such as concepts; see, e.g., Gallistel and King 2009).", "However, a connectionist network can implement a classical Turing\nmachine architecture (see, e.g., Fodor and McLaughlin\n1990; Chalmers 1993). Many, if not most, of the\nadherents of classical computation, for example proponents of CTM,\nthink that the brain is an associative network, one which implements a\nclassical computational program. Some adherents of CTM do deny that\nthe brain runs an associative network (see, e.g., Gallistel and King\n2009, who appear to deny that there is any scientific level of\nexplanation that association is intimately involved in), but they do\nso on separate empirical grounds and not because of any logical\ninconsistency with an associative brain implementing a classical\nmind.", "When discussing an associative implementation base it is important\nto distinguish questions of associationist structure from questions of\nrepresentational reality. Connectionists have often been followers of\nthe Skinnerian anti-representationalist tradition (Skinner 1938).\nBecause of the distributed nature of the nodes in connectionist\nnetworks, the networks have tended to be analyzed as associative\nstimulus/response chains of subsymbolic elements. However, the\nquestion of whether connectionist networks have representations which\nare distributed in patterns of activity throughout different nodes of\nthe network, or whether connectionist networks are best understood as\ncontaining no representational structures at all, is orthogonal to\nboth the question of whether the networks are purely associative or\ncomputational, and whether the networks can implement classical\narchitectures." ], "section_title": "6. Associative Instantiation", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "These four types of associationism share a certain empiricist\nspiritual similarity, but are logically, and empirically, separable.\nThe pure associationist who wants to posit the smallest number of\ndomain-general mental processes will theorize that the mind consists\nof associative structures acquired by associative learning which enter\ninto associative transitions and are implemented in an associative\ninstantiation base. However, many hybrid views are available and\nfrequently different associationist positions become mixed and\nmatched, especially once issues of empiricism, domain-specificity, and\ngradual learning arise. Below is a partial taxonomy of where some\nwell-known theorists lie in terms of associationism and these other,\noften related doctrines.", "Prinz (2002) and Karmiloff-Smith\n(1995) are examples of\nempiricist non-associationists. It is rare to find an associationist\nwho is a nativist, but plenty of nativists have aspects of\nassociationism in their own work. For example, even the arch-nativist\nJerry Fodor maintains that intramodular lexicons contain associative\nstructures (Fodor 1983). Similarly, there are many non-behaviorist\n(at least non-radical, analytic, or methodological behaviorist)\nassociationists, such as Elman (1991), Smolensky (1988), Baeyens (De\nHouwer and Baeyens 2001), and modern day dual process theorists such as\nEvans and Stanovich (2013). It is quite difficult to find a\nnon-associationist behaviorist, though Tolman approximates one\n(Tolman 1948). Elman and Smolensky also qualify as\nrepresentationalist associationists, and Van Gelder (1995) as an\nanti-representationalist non-associationist. Karmiloff-Smith\n(1995) can be\ninterpreted as, for some areas of learning, a proponent of gradual\nlearning without being associationist (some might also read\ncontemporary Bayesian theorists, e.g., Tenenbaum et al. 2011 and\nChater et al. 2006 as holding a similar position for some areas of\nlearning). Rescorla (1988) and Heyes (2012) claim to be\nassociationists who are pro step-wise, one shot learning (though\nRescorla sees his project as a continuation of the classical\nconditioning program, others see his data as grist for the\nanti-associationist, pro-computationalist mill, see Gallistel and\nKing 2009; Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 2019). Lastly, Tenenbaum and his contemporary Bayesians\ncolleagues sometimes qualify as holding a domain-general learning\nposition without it being\n associationist.[29]" ], "section_title": "7. Relation between the Varieties of Association and Related Positions", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "Since the cognitive revolution, associationism’s influence\nhas mostly died out in cognitive psychology and\npsycholinguistics. This is not to say that all aspects of associative\ntheorizing are dead in these areas; rather, they have just taken on\nmuch smaller, more peripheral roles (for example, it has often been suggested that\nmental lexicons are structured, in part, associatively, which is why\nlexical decision tasks are taken to be facilitation maps of\none’s lexicon). In other areas of cognitive psychology (for\nexample, the study of causal cognition), associationism is no longer\nthe dominant theoretical paradigm, but vestiges of associationism still persist (see Shanks 2010 for an overview of associationism\nin causal cognition). Associationism is also still alive in the\nconnectionist literature, as well as in the animal cognition\ntradition.", "But the biggest contemporary stronghold of associationist\ntheorizing resides in social psychology, an area which has\ntraditionally been hostile to associationism (see, e.g., Asch 1962,\n1969). The ascendance of associationism in social psychology has been\na fairly modern development, and has caused a revival of\nassociationist theories in philosophy (e.g., Madva and Brownstein 2019). The two\nareas of social psychology that have seen the greatest renaissance of\nassociationism are the implicit attitude and dual-process theory\nliterature. However, in the late 2010s social psychology has begun to take a critical look at associationist theories (e.g., Mann et al. 2019)." ], "section_title": "8. Associationism in Social Psychology", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "Implicit attitudes are generally operationally defined as the attitudes tested on implicit tests such as the Implicit Association Test\n(Greenwald et al. 1998), the Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne et\nal. 2005), the Sorted Paired Feature Task (Bar-Annan et al. 2009) and\nthe Go/No-Go Association Task (Nosek and Banaji 2001). Implicit attitudes are contrasted with explicit attitudes, attitudes operationalized as the one’s being probed when one gives an explicit response like a marking on a Likert scale, feeling thermometer, or in free report. Such operationalizations leave open the question of whether there are any natural kinds to which explicit and implicit attitudes refer. In general implicit attitudes are characterized as being mental\nrepresentations that are unavailable for explicit report and inaccessible to consciousness (cf. Hahn et al. 2014; Berger 2020).", "\nThe default position among social psychologists is to treat implicit attitudes as\nif they are associations among mental representations (Fazio 2007), or\namong pairs of mental representations and valences. In particular,\nthey treat implicit attitudes as associative structures which enter\ninto associative transitions. Recently this issue has come under much\ndebate. In an ever expanding series of studies De Houwer and his collaborators have taken to show that associative learning is, at base, relational, propositional contingency learning; i.e., that all putatively associative learning is in fact a nonautomatic learning process that generates and evaluates propositional hypotheses (Mitchell et al. 2009; De Houwer 2009, 2011, 2014 2019; Hughes et al. 2019). Other researchers have approached the question also using learning as the entrance point to the debate, demonstrating effects that non-associative acquisition creates stronger attitudes than associative acquisition (Hughes et al. 2019). For example, one might demonstrate that learning through merely reading an evaluative statement creates a stronger implicit attitude than repeated associative exposures (Kurdi and Banaji 2017, 2019; Mann et al. 2019). Other researchers have championed propositional models not based on learning, but instead based on how implicit attitudes change regardless of how they are acquired. For instance, Mandelbaum (2016) argued that logical/evidential interventions modulate implicit attitudes in predictable ways (e.g., using double negation to cancel each other out), while others have used diagnosticity to show that implicit attitudes update in a non-associationistic, propositional way (e.g., after reading a story about a man who broke into a building and appeared to ransack it you learn that we jumped into save people from a fire and immediately change your opinion of the man from negative to positive; Mann and Ferguson 2015; Mann et al. 2017; Van Dessel et al. 2019). (For more on implicit attitudes see the entry\non\n implicit bias)." ], "subsection_title": "8.1 Implicit Attitudes" }, { "content": [ "Associative structures and transitions are widely implicated in a\nparticular type of influential dual-process theory. Though there are\nmany dual-process theories in social psychology (see, e.g., the papers\nin Chaiken and Trope 1999, or the discussion in Evans and Stanovich\n2013), the one most germane to associationism is also the most\npopular. It originates from work in the psychology of reasoning and\nis often also invoked in the heuristics and biases tradition (see,\ne.g., Kahneman 2011). It has been developed by many different\npsychological theorists (Sloman 1996; Smith and Decoster 2000; Wilson\net al. 2000;\nEvans and Stanovich 2013) and, in parts, taken up by\nphilosophers too (see, e.g., Gendler 2008; Frankish 2009; see also\nsome of the essays in Evans and Frankish 2009).", "The dual-process strain most relevant to the current discussion\nposits two systems, one evolutionarily ancient intuitive system\nunderlying unconscious, automatic, fast, parallel and associative\nprocessing, the other an evolutionarily recent reflective system\ncharacterized by conscious, controlled, slow,\n“rule-governed” serial processes (see, e.g., Evans and\nStanovich 2013). The\nancient system, sometimes called “System 1”, is often\nunderstood to include a collection of autonomous, distinct\nsubsystems, each of which is recruited to deal with distinct types of\nproblems (see Stanovich 2011 for a discussion of\n“TASS—the autonomous set of systems”). Although\ntheories differ on how System 1 interacts with System\n 2,[30] the\ntheoretical core of System 1 is arguing that its processing is\nessentially associative. As in the implicit attitude debate, dual\nsystems models have recently come under fire (see Kruglanski 2013;\nOsman 2013; Mandelbaum 2016; De Houwer 2019), though they remain very\npopular." ], "subsection_title": "8.2 Dual Process Theories" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "Associationism has been a dominant theme in mental theorizing for\ncenturies. As such, it has garnered an appreciable amount of\ncriticism." ], "section_title": "9. Criticisms of Associationism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "The basic associative learning theories imply, either explicitly or\nimplicitly, slow, gradual learning of associations (Baeyens et al.\n1995). The learning process can be summarized in a learning curve\nwhich plots the frequency (or magnitude) of the conditioned response\nas a function of the number of reinforcements (Gallistel et al. 2004:\n13124). Mappings between CRs and USs are gradually built up over\nnumerous trials (in the lab) or experiences (in the world). Gradual,\nslow learning has come under fire from a variety of areas (see sections 9.3 and 9.4.1). However, here we just\nfocus on the behavioral data. In a series of works re-analyzing animal\nbehavior, Gallistel (Gallistel et al. 2004; Gallistel and King 2009)\nhas argued that although group-level learning curves do\ndisplay the properties of being negatively accelerated and gradually\ndeveloping, these curves are misleading because\nno individual’s learning curve has these\nproperties. Gallistel has argued that learning for individuals is\ngenerally step-like, rapid, and abrupt. An individual’s learning\nfrom a low-level of responding to asymptotic responding is very quick.\nSometimes, the learning is so quick that it is literally one-shot\nlearning. For example, after analyzing multiple experiments of animal\nlearning of spatial location Gallistel writes", "The learning of a spatial location generally\nrequires but a single experience. Several trials may, however, be\nrequired to convince the subject that the location is predictable from\ntrial to trial. (Gallistel et al. 2004: 13130)", "Gallistel argues that the reason the group learning curves look to\nbe smooth and gradual is that there are large individual differences\nbetween subjects in terms of when the onset latency of the step-wise\ncurves begin (Gallistel et al. 2004: 13125); in other words, different\nanimals take different amounts of time for the learning to\ncommence. The differences between individual subject’s learning\ncurves are predicated on when the steps begin and not by the speed of\nthe individual animal’s learning process. All individuals appear\nto show rapid rises in learning, but since each begins their learning\nat a different time, when we average over the group, the rapid step-wise\nlearning appears to look like slow, gradual learning (Gallistel et\nal. 2004: 13124)." ], "subsection_title": "9.1 Learning Curves" }, { "content": [ "The problem of predication is, at its core, a problem of how an\nassociative mechanism can result in the acquisition of\nsubject/predicate structures, structures which many theorists believe\nappear in language, thought, and judgment. The first major discussion\nof the problem appears in Kant (1781/1787), but variants of the basic\nKantian criticism can be seen across the contemporary literature (see,\ne.g., Chomsky 1959; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Fodor 2003; Mandelbaum\n2013a; for the details of the Kantian argument see the entry\n on Kant’s Transcendental Argument).", "For a pure associationist, association is “semantically\ntransparent” (see Fodor 2003), in that it purports to add no\nadditional structure to thoughts. When a simple concept, X\nand a simple concept Y, become associated one acquires the\nassociative structure X/Y. But X/Y\nhas no additional structure on top of their contents. Knowing\nthat X and Y are associated amounts to knowing a\ncausal fact: that activating Xs will bring about the\nactivation of Ys and vice versa. However, so the\nargument goes, some of our thoughts appear to have more structure than\nthis: the thought\n birds fly predicates the property of flying onto\nbirds. The task for the associationist is to explain how associative\nstructures can distinguish a thinker who has a single (complex)\nthought\n birds fly from a thinker who conjoins two simple thoughts in\nan associative structure where one thought,\n birds, is immediately\nfollowed by another,\n fly. As long as the two simple thoughts are\nreliably causally correlated so that, for a thinker, activations of\nbirds regularly brings about\n fly, then that thinker has the\nassociative structure\n birds/fly. Yet it appears that thinker\nhasn’t yet had the thought\n birds fly. The problem of predication\nis explaining how a purely associative mechanism could eventuate in\ncomplex thoughts. In Fodor’s terms the problem boils down to how\nassociation, a causal relation among mental representations, can\naffect predication, a relation among intentional contents (Fodor\n2003).", "A family of related objections to associationism can be interpreted\nas variations on this theme. For example, problems of productivity,\ncompositionality, and systematicity for associationist theorizing\nappear to be variants of the problem of predication (for more on these\n specific issues see the entries on the\n Language of Thought Hypothesis and\n on compositionality). If\nassociation doesn’t add any additional structure to the mental\nrepresentations that get associated, then it is hard to see how it can\nexplain the compositionality of thought, which relies on structures\nthat specify relations among intentional contents. Compositionality\nrequires that the meaning of a complex thought is determined by the\nmeanings of its simple constituents along with their syntactic\narrangements. The challenge to associationism is to explain how an\nassociative mechanism can give rise to the syntactic structures\nnecessary to distinguish a complex thought like\n\n birds fly from the\ntemporal succession of two simple thoughts\n\n birds and\n fly. Since the\ncompositionality of thought is posited to undergird the productivity\nof thought (thinkers’ abilities to think novel sentences of\narbitrary lengths, e.g.,\n green birds fly,\n giant green birds fly,\ncuddly giant green birds fly, etc.), associationism has problems\nexplaining productivity.", "Systematicity is the thesis that there are predictable patterns\namong which thoughts a thinker is capable of entertaining. Thinkers\nthat can entertain thoughts of certain structures can always entertain\ndistinct thoughts that have related structure. For instance, any\nthinker who can think a complex thought of the form “X\ntransitive verb Y” can think “Y\ntransitive verb X”.[31] Systematicity entails that we\nwon’t find any thinker that can only think one of those\ntwo thoughts, in which case we could not find a person who could think\naudrey wronged max, but not\n\n max wronged audrey. Of course, these two\nthoughts have very different effects in one’s cognitive\neconomy. The challenge for the associationist is to explain how the\nassociative structure\n audrey/wronged/max can be distinguished from the\nstructure\n max/wronged/audrey, while capturing the differences in those\nthoughts’ effects.", "Associationists have had different responses to the problem. Some\nhave denied that human thought is actually compositional, productive,\nand systematic, and other non-associationists have agreed with this\ncritique. For example, Prinz and Clark claim “concepts do not\ncompose most of the time” (2002: 62), and Johnson (2004) argues\nthat the systematicity criterion is wrongheaded (see Aydede 1997 for\nextended discussion of these issues). Rumelhart et al. offer a\nconnectionist interpretation of “schemata”, one which is\nintended to cover some of the phenomenon mentioned in this section\n(Rumelhart et al. 1986). Others have worked to show that classical\nconditioning can indeed give rise to complex associative structures\n(Rescorla 1988). In defense of the associationist construal of complex\nassociations Rescorla writes,", "Clearly, the animals had not simply coded the RH\n[complex] compound in terms of parallel associations with its\nelements. Rather they had engaged in some more hierarchical\nstructuring of the situation, forming a representation of the compound\nand using it as an associate. (Rescorla 1988: 156)", "\n\nWhether or not associationism has the theoretical\ntools to explain such complex compounds by itself is still debated\n(see, e.g., Fodor 2003; Mitchell 2009; Gallistel and King 2009; Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 2019)." ], "subsection_title": "9.2 The Problem of Predication" }, { "content": [ "Multiple issues in the acquisition of the lexicon appear to cause\nproblems for associationism. Some of the most well known examples are\nreviewed below (for further discussion of word learning and\nassociationism see Bloom 2000).", "Children learn words at an incredible rate, acquiring around 6,000\nwords by age 6 (Carey 2010: 184). If gradual learning is the rule,\nthen words too should be learned gradually across this time. However,\nthis does not appear to be the case. Susan Carey\ndiscovered the phenomenon of “fast mapping”, which is\none-shot learning of a word (Carey 1978a, 1978b; Carey and Bartlett\n1978). Her most influential example investigated children’s\nacquisition of “chromium” (a color word referring to olive\ngreen). Children were shown one of two otherwise identical objects,\nwhich only differed in color and asked, “Can you get me the\nchromium tray, not the red one, the chromium one” (recited in\nCarey 2010: 2). All of the children handed over the correct tray at\nthat time. When the children were later tested in differing contexts,\nmore than half remembered the referent of\n“chromium”. These findings have been extended—for\nexample, Markson and Bloom (1997) showed that they are not specific to\nthe remembering of novel words, but also hold for novel facts.", "Fast mapping poses two problems for associationism. The first is\nthat the learning of a new word did not develop slowly, as would be\npredicted by proponents of gradual learning. The second is that in\norder for the word learning to proceed, the mind must have been aided\nby additional principles not given by the environment. Some of these\nprinciples such as Markman’s (1989) taxonomic, whole object, and\nmutual exclusivity constraints, and Gleitman’s syntactic\nbootstrapping (Gleitman et al. 2005), imply that the mind does add structure to what is\nlearned. Consequently, the associationist claim that learning is just\nmapping external contingencies without adding structure is\nimperiled.", "“Motherese”, the name of the type of language that\ninfants generally hear, consists of simple sentences such as\n“Nora want a bottle?” and “Are you tired?”.\nThese sentences almost always contain a noun and a verb. Yet, the\ninfant’s vocabulary massively over-represents nouns in the first\n100 words or so, while massively under-representing the verbs (never\nmind adjectives or adverbs, which almost never appear in the first 100\nwords infants produce; see, e.g., Goldin-Meadow, Seligman, and Gelman\n1976). Even more surprising is that the over-representation of\nnouns to verbs holds even though", "the incidence of each word (that is, the token\nfrequency) is higher for the verbs than for the nouns in the common\nset used by mothers. (Snedeker and Gleitman 2004: 259, citing data\nfrom Sandhoffer, Smith, and Luo 2000)\n", "Moreover, children hear a preponderance of\ndeterminers (“the” and “a”) but don’t\nproduce them (Bloom 2000). These facts are not specific to English,\nbut hold cross-culturally (see, e.g., Caselli et al. 1995). The\ndisparity between the variation of the syntactic categories infants\nreceive as input and produce as output is troublesome to\nassociationism, insofar as associationism is committed to the learned\nstructures (and the behaviors that follow from them) merely\npatterning what is given in experience." ], "subsection_title": "9.3 Word Learning" }, { "content": [ "Contiguity has been a central part of associationist analyses since\nthe British Empiricists. In the experimental literature, the problem\nof figuring out the parameters needed for acquiring an association due to the contiguity of its relata has sometimes\nbeen termed the problem of the “Window of Association”\n(e.g., Gallistel and King 2009). Every associationist theory has to specify what temporal window two properties must instantiate in order for those properties to be associated.[32]\nA related problem for contiguity theorists is that if the domain\ngenerality of associative learning is desired, then the window needs\nto be homogenous across content domains. The late 1960s saw\npersuasive attacks on domain generality, as well as the necessity and\nsufficiency of the contiguity criterion in general.", "Research on “taste aversions” and\n“bait-shyness” provided a variety of problems with\ncontiguity in the associative learning tradition of classical\nconditioning. Garcia observed that a gustatory stimulus (e.g.,\ndrinking water or eating a hot dog) but not an audiovisual stimulus (a\nlight and a sound) would naturally become associated with feeling\nnauseated. For instance, Garcia and Koelling (1966) paired an\naudiovisual stimulus (a light and a sound) with a gustatory stimulus\n(flavored water). The two stimuli were then paired with the rats\nreceiving radiation, which made the rats feel nauseated. The rats\nassociated the feeling of nausea with the water and not with the\nsound, even though the sound was contiguous with the water. Moreover,\nthe delay between ingesting the gustatory stimulus and feeling\nnauseated could be quite long, with the feeling not coming on until 12\nhours later (Roll and Smith 1972), and the organism needn’t even\nbe conscious when the negative feeling arises. (For a review, see\nSeligman 1970; Garcia et al. 1974). The temporal delay shows that the\nCS (the flavored water) needn’t be contiguous with the US (the\nfeeling of nausea) in order for learning to occur, thus showing that\ncontiguity isn’t necessary for associative learning.", "Garcia’s work also laid bare the problems with the domain\ngeneral aspect of associationism. In the above study the rat was\nprepared to associate the nausea with the gustatory stimulus, but\nwould not associate it with the audiovisual stimulus. However, if one\nchanges the US from feeling nauseated to receiving shocks in perfect\ncontiguity with the audiovisual and gustatory stimuli, then the rats\nwill associate the shocks with the audiovisual stimulus but not with\nthe gustatory stimulus. That is, rats are prepared to associate\naudiovisual stimuli with the shock but are contraprepared to associate\nthe shocks with the gustatory stimulus. Thus, learning does not seem\nto be entirely domain general (for similar content specificity\neffects in humans, see Baeyens et al.\n 1990).[33]", "Lastly, “The Garcia effect” has also been used to show\n problems in the learning curve (see section 9.1). \n“Taste aversions” are the phenomena whereby an\norganism gets sick from ingesting the stimulus and the taste (or odor,\nGarcia et al. 1974) of that stimulus gets associated with the feeling\nof sickness. As anyone who has had food poisoning can attest, this\nlearning can proceed in a one-shot fashion, and needn’t have a\ngradual rise over many trials (taste aversions have also been observed\nin humans, see, e.g., Bernstein and Webster 1980; Bernsetin 1985;\nLogue et al. 1981; Rozin 1986).", "Kamin’s famous blocking experiments (1969) showed that not\nall contiguous structures lead to classical conditioning. A rat that\nhas already learned that CS1 predicts a US, will not learn that a\nsubsequent CS2 predicts the US, if the CS2 is always paired with the\nCS1. Suppose that a rat has learned that a light predicts a shock\nbecause of the constant contiguity of the light and shock. After\nlearning this, the rat has a sound introduced which only arises in\nconjunction with the light and the shock. As long as the rat had\npreviously learned that the light predicts the shock, it will not\nlearn that the sound does (as can be seen on later trials that have\nthe sound alone). In sum, having learned that the CS1 predicts the US\nblocks the organism from learning that the CS2 predicts the\n US.[34] So even\nthough CS2 is perfectly contiguous with the US, the association\nbetween CS2 and the US remains unlearned, thus serving as a\ncounterexample to sufficiency of\n contiguity.[35]", "Similarly Rescorla (1968) demonstrated that a CS can appear only\nwhen the US appears and yet still have the association between them be\nunlearnable. If a tone is arranged to bellow only when there are\nshocks, but there are still shocks when there are no tones (that is,\nthe CS only appears with the US, but the US sometimes appears without\nthe CS), no associative learning between the CS and the US will occur.\nInstead, subjects (in Rescorla 1968, rats) will only learn a\nconnection between the shock and the experimental\nsituation—e.g., the room in which the experiment is carried\nout.", "In large part because of the problems discussed in 9.4, many\nclassical conditioning theorists gave up the traditional\nprogram. Some, like Garcia, appeared to give up the classical\ntheoretical framework altogether (Garcia et al. 1974), others, such\nas Rescorla and Wagner, tried to usher the framework into the modern\nera (see, Rescorla and Wagner 1972; Rescorla 1988), where\nconditioning is seen as sensitive to base rates and driven by\ninformational \npick-up.[36] \nWhether this movement is interpreted as\na substantive revision of classical conditioning (Rescorla 1988;\nHeyes 2012) or a wholesale abandoning of it (Gallistel and King 2009)\nis debatable." ], "subsection_title": "9.4 Against the Contiguity Analysis of Associationism" } ] } ]	[ "Anderson, J., K. Spoehr, and D. Bennett, 1994, “A Study in\nNumerical Perversity: Teaching Arithmetic to a Neural Network”,\nin Neural Networks for Knowledge Representation and\nInference, D. Levine and M. Aparicio IV (eds.), East Sussex:\nPsychology Press, pp. 311–335.", "Armstrong, K., S. Kose, L. Williams, A. Woolard, and S. 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astell	Mary Astell	First published Fri Jul 1, 2005; substantive revision Wed Dec 9, 2015	[ "\nMary Astell (1666–1731) was an English philosopher. She was born\nin Newcastle, and lived her adult life in London. Her patrons were\nLady Ann Coventry, Lady Elizabeth Hastings, and Catherine Jones, and\namong those in her intellectual circle were Lady Mary Chudleigh,\nJudith Drake, Elizabeth Elstob, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, and John\nNorris. In addition to a number of pamphlets, she wrote the following\nbooks: ", "\n Today she is best known for her theories on the education of women\nand her critiques of Norris and John Locke." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 God", "1.2 Individuation among Beings", "1.3 The Relation between God and His Creatures" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Epistemology", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Mind and Ideas", "2.2 Knowledge and Belief", "2.3 Method" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Sources", "Secondary Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nMary Astell designed her metaphysics around an account of God and his\ncreation. She was a dualist, maintaining that the two kinds of\nbeings—minds and bodies—come in various degrees of\nfinitude and corruptibility: God is the infinite and incorruptible\nmind; human minds and corporeal particles are finite, naturally\nincorruptible beings; and human bodies and physical objects are\nfinite, naturally corruptible beings." ], "section_title": "1. Metaphysics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAccording to Astell, God is the “First Intelligence,” the\nbeing whose nature is to be infinite in all perfections. Among his\nperfections, Astell often lists wisdom, goodness, justice, holiness,\nintelligence, presence, power, and self-existence. In keeping with\nrationalist views of the period, Astell maintains that the correct\nunderstanding of metaphysics turns on the correct understanding of\nGod. For this reason, much of her work is dedicated to demonstrating\nnot only what God is, but also how a correct understanding of him can\nbe attained.", "\nHer earliest such account is in A Serious Proposal to the\nLadies, where she demonstrates the existence, perfection, and\nnecessary creative power of God. She begins by giving an example of\nthe correct method for attaining knowledge, one similar to those\ndeveloped by Descartes in Discourse on the Method and Arnauld\nand Nicole in Logic or the Art of Thinking (see section 2.3\nof this entry). Her proof of God’s existence includes an account of\nsimple and composed ideas; clear and distinct perceptions, and obscure\nand confused perceptions; adequate and inadequate ideas; proofs by\nintuition and proofs by comparison of ideas; God’s perfections and our\nideas of God’s perfections; and the relation between ideas and terms\n(Astell 2002, 176–182). In Christian Religion, she\nframes other arguments for God’s existence in terms of what we can and\ncannot doubt; God’s perfections and our ideas of God’s perfections;\ncausality; and the beauty of the created universe (Astell 1705,\n7–10 [sections 7–10]).", "\nAt times, Astell privileges some of God’s perfections over others. In\nChristian Religion, when stating her ontological argument for\nGod’s existence, she notes that “I find that the notion I have\nof GOD, contains those and all other perfections. Among which\nSelf-existence is most remarkable, as being the original and basis of\nall the rest” (Astell 1705, 8 [section 7]). This claim is about\nthe order of ideas: her idea of God’s self-existence allows her\nto understand his other perfections. A few lines later, she makes the\nanalogous claim about the order of reality: “And Self-existence\nis such a Perfection as necessarily includes all other\nperfections” (Astell 1705, 8 [section 8]).", "\nBroad (2002a, 103) reveals evidence that Astell privileges God’s\nwisdom and goodness over his omnipotence. There are two ways that\nphilosophers of the period thought about God’s attributes of wisdom,\npower, and goodness. Some held “intellectualist” theories,\naccording to which God exercises his will in accordance with the true\nnature of things; others held “voluntarist”\ntheories, according to which God exercises his will to create both\nthings and the truth of things. In showing that Astell maintains an\nintellectualist theology, Broad refers to a number of passages, one of\nwhich is the following:", "\n This is then the sum of the matter; GOD who is Infinite in all\n Perfections, in Justice and Holiness, as well as in Goodness and\n Mercy, always does what is best and most becoming His Perfections,\n and cannot act but according to the Essential Nature and Reason of\n things; nor is it possible that our Wishes or Actions shou’d make\n any alteration in the immutable Rectitude of His Conduct. (Astell\n 1705, 95 [section 105]; see also Astell 2002, 205; Astell 1705, 416\n [section 407])\n" ], "subsection_title": "1.1 God" }, { "content": [ "\nThroughout her texts, Astell is concerned with giving an account of\nhow created beings are individuated from each other. Ultimately, she\nmaintains that there are four kinds of created beings: minds, bodies,\nmind–body unions, and the particles that compose bodies.", "\nAbout finite minds considered on their own, Astell differs quite\nradically from Descartes. In Discourse on the Method,\nDescartes remarks that all minds have the same ability to reason (AT\n2; CSM 111). According to Astell, on the other hand, God creates minds\nwith intrinsic differences. She gives a number of reasons for this\nview. One has to do with the relationships that God wants minds to\nhave with each other: humans form community only if their minds have\ndifferent intellectual capacities. Another concerns the relationship\nbetween created minds and God: minds were made to contemplate and\nenjoy God, and God needs their adoration and love. But each mind is\nlimited and, thus, can only love God by adoring a limited amount of\nhis works. So God creates many minds, each with an ability to\nunderstand a certain collection of truths, and in this way all of his\ncreation is attended to (Astell 2002, 144–146,\n154–155).", "\nThough Astell discusses minds as if they are sometimes isolated from\nbodies, she maintains that human beings are mind–body\nunions. She notes that we cannot comprehend the connection between the\nmind and body: “We know and feel the Union between our Soul and\nBody, but who amongst us sees so clearly, as to find out with\nCertitude and Exactness, the secret ties which unite two such\ndifferent Substances, or how they are able to act upon each\nother?” (Astell 2002, 148) The union between the mind and body\nis mysterious; though we “know and feel” it, we\ndon’t have perfect knowledge of it or of how the mind and body\ninteract causally. In Christian Religion, Astell presents\nthis same position by way of a parallel between, on the one hand, our\nlack of knowledge of the mind–body union, and, on the other\nhand, our lack of knowledge about the relation between God and humans:\n“Again, tho’ I do not understand the Philosophy of the\nUnion between the Divine and Human Nature; (neither do I comprehend\nthe Vital Union between my Soul and Body, nor how and in what manner\nthey are joyn’d, tho’ I am sure that so it is)\n…” (Astell 1705, 51 [section 62]).", "\nAbout how mind–body unions differ from each other with respect\nto their abilities to reason, Astell sometimes implies that\nexperience, construed in a Lockean framework, may be the cause:", "\n For as the Diligent-hand maketh Rich, whil’st the Slothful and\n Prodigal come to nothing, so the Use of our Powers improves and\n Encreases them, and the most Observing and Considerate is the Wisest\n Person: For she lays up in her Mind as in a Store-house, ready to\n produce on all Occasions, a Clear and Simple Idea of every Object\n that has at any time presented itself. And perhaps the difference\n between one Womans Reason and anothers may consist only in this,\n that the one has amass’d a greater number of such Ideas than the\n other, and dispos’d them more Orderly in her Understanding so that\n they are at hand, ready to be apply’d to those Complex Ideas whose\n Agreement or Disagreement cannot be found out by the means of some\n of ‘em. (Astell 2002, 175–176)\n", "\nHer more common view, however, is a rationalist one, according to\nwhich bodies impede minds from having perfect ideas: “For did we\nconsider what we Are, that Humane Nature consists in the Union of a\nRational Soul with a Mortal Body, that the Body very often Clogs the\nMind in its noblest Operations, especially when indulg’d”\n(Astell 2002, 210). She also presents this view in the following\npassage:", "\n The Primary Cause of this is that Limitation which all Created Minds\n are Subject to, which Limitation appears more visible in some than\n in others, either because some Minds are endow’d by their Creator\n with a larger Capacity than the rest, or if you are not inclin’d to\n think so, then by reason of the Indisposition of the Bodily Organs,\n which cramps and contracts the Operations of the Mind. (Astell 2002,\n 159)\n", "\nHere Astell, like other rationalists, valorizes the mind over the\nbody. The following passage illustrates another way Astell emphasizes\nthis point:", "\n For I question not but that we shoul’d be convinc’d that the Body is\n the Instrument of the Mind and no more, that it is of such a much\n Inferiour Nature, and therefore ought to be kept in such a Case as\n to be ready on all occasions to serve the Mind. That the true and\n proper Pleasure of Human Nature consists in the exercise of that\n Dominion which the Soul has over the Body, in governing every\n Passion and Motion according to Right Reason, by which we most truly\n pursue the real good of both, it being a mistake as well of our Duty\n as our Happiness to consider either part of us singly, so as to\n neglect what is due to the other. For if we disregard the Body\n wholly, we pretend to live like Angels whilst we are but Mortals;\n and if we prefer or equal it to the Mind we degenerate into\n Brutes. (Astell 2002, 210–211)\n", "\nWhereas the body has merely an “instrumental” role with\nrespect to the mind, the mind has “dominion” over the\nbody, and a governing role over the passions. Humans should correctly\nemploy their minds and bodies so that they do not degenerate into\nbrutes, or conduct their lives as if they were angels.", "\nAstell’s account of the mind–body union allows her to argue\nagainst the popular view of the period about women, according to which\nwomen do not demonstrate the same kinds of intellectual abilities as\ndo men because women are inherently more closely united to their\nbodies than are men (Broad 2002a, 109). Equip with the rationalist\naccount of the mind–body union, Astell can show that the\nuniformity of women’s inabilities is rooted not in their natures, but\narises because of social practices. Thus the difference between the\nabilities of women and men should be explained not metaphysically, but\nepistemologically. For this reason, I will leave a discussion of this\nissue to section 2.3 of this entry.", "\nIn addition to developing an account of the mind–body union,\nAstell also maintains that the mind and body are “really\ndistinct.” As she had a social reason for developing her account\nof the mind–body union—namely, to argue against the popular\naccount of women’s nature—she also had a social reason for\nconstructing arguments about the real distinction between the mind and\nbody: by showing that the mind, unlike the body, is immortal, she can\nillustrate to people, especially those who believe in the existence of\nGod, how God’s existence is important to them (Astell 1705, CR\n246–247 [section 256]).", "\nIn presenting this account of the real distinction between the mind\nand body in Christian Religion, Astell demonstrates first that\nthe mind is immaterial and then that it is immortal. She maintains\nthat the mind is immaterial in that it has no parts, and so is\nindivisible. Given that it is indivisible, it is incorruptible, and so\nimmortal (Astell 1705, 247 [section 257]). Having ruled out the natural\nannihilation of minds, Astell turns to the question of whether God\nwould supernaturally annihilate them. She argues that he would not, for\nGod does nothing in vain, thus he would not create something only to\nannihilate it (Astell 1705, 248–249 [section 257–258]).", "\nWithin her discussion about the immortality of minds, Astell\ncontrasts minds with bodies, and different kinds of bodies with each\nother. Unlike minds, human bodies and other physical objects have\nparts, and so are corruptible. Such bodies differ from the particles\nthat make them up, which do not corrupt:", "\n Because, tho’ this System of Bones, Flesh, and Skin, &. which I\n call my body, shall within Threescore Years; and this Wood which is\n now upon the Fire, shall in an Hour or two; and all other Material\n Beings shall in their proper Seasons be no more; yet not the least\n Particle doth totally perish. (Astell 1705, 247–248 [section\n 257])\n", "\nHere Astell embraces a view according to which physical objects and\nhuman bodies are not ‘beings’ in the same sense that particles of\nbodies are. In the next passage, she also reveals her view about the\nindividuality of physical objects: their ‘being’ is based on\nappearances, not anything intrinsic within the objects themselves:", "\n So that a Being is Mortal and Corruptible, or ceases to Be, when\n those parts of which it consists, and whose particular Composition and\n Figure is that which denominates it this or that\n Being, and which distinguishes it from all other Beings, are no longer\n thus or United, but ceasing to appear under their first Texture and\n Figure, are therefore very properly said to Be no more. (Astell 1705,\n 248 [section 257])\n", "\nIn the next passages, Astell presents a proof of the real\ndistinction between the mind and body. Her argument is similar to\nDescartes’s insofar as she maintains that the nature of the mind\nis thought and the nature of the body is extension (Astell 1705,\n249–252 [sections 259–261]). (See Atherton, 1993, for a\ndiscussion of Astell’s account of thought as the nature of the\nmind.) In the sections that follow these, she uses her account of the\nreal distinction between the mind and body to formulate a critique of\nLocke’s view about the possibility of thinking matter. Bryson\n(1988), Squadrito (1987; 1991), Taylor (2001), O’Neill (1998a,\n528–529), and Broad (2002a, 151–153) discuss these\narguments in detail." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Individuation among Beings" }, { "content": [ "\nIn Letters Concerning the Love of God, Astell and John\nNorris debate occasionalist and Cambridge Platonist accounts of the\nrelation between God and his creation. (See Wilson, 2004, for a\ndetailed discussion of this text.) The central issue at stake is the\nclaim made by Norris in Practical Discourses upon Several Divine\nSubjects (1693) that we should love God because he alone is the\nsource of our sensation, and so the source of our pleasure, and so the\nsource of our good. Astell objects: our reason for loving God should\nnot depend on the occasionalist tenet about God’s direct causal\nrole in the universe. The issues in their discussion are the extent of\nGod’s causal role in creation, the causal powers of physical\nobjects, the workings of human sense perception, the mind–body\nunion, and the ways humans can and should love God and his\ncreation.", "\nAstell and Norris agree on an account of human love, holding that\nas bodies have motion so minds have love. A remnant of this parallel\nis still with us in the twenty-first century, for we say metaphorically\nthat we are “moved” when we experience a shift in our\nemotions toward a kind of tenderness. Broad notes that Astell and\nNorris also agree that there are two basic kinds of love and that they are\ndifferentiated in part with respect to the objects on which the love is\nfocused. On the one hand, creatures deserve “benevolence,”\nwhich is marked by its disinterestedness and motivated by altruism and\ncharity; created things, after all, lack the causal power to ultimately\nsatisfy the desires of other created beings. On the other hand, God\nmerits “desire,” which is a love of something as our good.\nUltimately, he is the only one who has the causal power to ultimately\nsatisfy our desires. God does not need our benevolence, for he cannot\nlack anything that we could give him (Broad 2002a, 119–120).", "\nAstell and Norris’s shared views on love relate to their views on\ncausality. Occasionalists and Cambridge Platonists developed accounts\nof causality in order to remedy a purported problem with Descartes’s\nontology. According to Descartes, God created two different kinds of\nsubstances—mental and corporeal—that, on the one hand, are\n“really distinct” from each other in virtue of their\nessences, and, on the other hand, are sometimes united to form\nmind–body unions. When so united, minds and bodies interact with\neach other, for instance during sensation. The purported problem is\nthis: how can two substances that have completely different\nessences—essences that render them “really distinct”\nsubstances—interact with each other?", "\nWith an eye toward resolving this problem, Cambridge Platonists\nretained an account of the interaction between the mind and body, and\npresented a quite different interpretation of the number and nature of\nsubstances that exist. Henry More, for example, maintained that, in\naddition to the souls of God and living creatures, there is the\n“Spirit of Nature,” which is the causal agent that allows\nhuman minds and bodies to interact.", "\nThe occasionalist philosophers resolved the problem another way:\nthey agreed with Descartes that the mind and body are really distinct\nbecause of their quite different natures, but they denied that there is\nany interaction between them. Instead, they maintained that God\norchestrates a harmonious correlation between events of the mind and\nevents of the body, and he is the efficient (and so direct) cause of\nhuman sensations.", "\nThroughout Letters, Norris defends his occasionalism against\nAstell’s critiques, which were based on Cambridge Platonist views\nabout the nature of the mind–body union. In the\nappendix—written after Norris convinced Astell to allow him to\npublish the letters as a volume—Astell presents two final\ncriticisms of Norris’s account. First, occasionalism makes much of\nGod’s creation vain: if God is the efficient cause of all of our sense\nperceptions, then his creation of material objects is superfluous, for\nthey play no direct role in our sense perceptions (Astell, Norris\n1695, 278–80). Second, occasionalism offends God’s majesty, for\naccording to it he repeatedly interferes in creation in order to move\nbodies and create mental events. (Astell, Norris 1695, 278). See\nO’Neill (2007) for a history of these arguments in St. Thomas’\ncritiques of medieval Islamic occasionalists.", "\nAstell’s own view about the causation of sensation involves an account\nof a “sensible congruity” between features of external\nbodies and powers of the soul that are employed in sensations. For\ndiscussions of her account, as well as arguments about whether its\nroots are in Descartes, Malebranche, or Norris, see Acworth (1979,\n174, 178), Taylor (2001, 511–2), Broad (2002a, 109), and O’Neill\n(2007)." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 The Relation between God and His Creatures" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAstell develops three themes common to rationalism: an emphasis of the\nmind over the body; a theory of innate ideas as the origin of\nknowledge; and a methodology that leads the novice from confusion to\nclarity. In the section above on metaphysics, I addressed\nAstell’s emphasis of the mind over body. In this section I will\nreconstruct her accounts of mind, ideas, knowledge, belief, and\nmethod." ], "section_title": "2. Epistemology", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAstell holds that the mind has two faculties: the understanding and\nthe will. The understanding is the capacity to receive and compare\nideas, and the will is the power of preferring and directing thoughts\nand motions (Astell 2002, 205). Each faculty has a proper object: the\nproper object of the understanding is truth, which has “being\nfrom Eternity in the Divine Ideas” (Astell 2002, 137); the\nproper object of the will is the good, which is God’s will\n(Astell 2002, 206). When the understanding is healthy, it has\nknowledge (Astell 2002, 130); when the will is healthy, it is\nregular—that is, it is guided by the understanding (Astell\n2002,205, 209). The task of the understanding is to govern the will\n(Astell 2002, 130). ", "\nAstell holds a nativism according to which there are not merely innate\nideas, but also innate inclinations. She explains that the innate\nideas are “rudiments of knowledge” (Astell 2002, 128) that\nare “inseparable” from the understanding and are the\nsources of our other ideas (Astell 2002, 205). In addition, she states\nthat we are born with inclinations that are “inseparable”\nfrom the will (Astell 2002, 205). She explains that our innate ideas\nmake us rational creatures. Irrational creatures, on the other hand,\nact according to the will of God and by mechanism. But equipped with\nreason, humans are voluntary agents: we choose our actions according\nto principles in the understanding, and we determine our wills (Astell\n2002, 128). (For a further discussion of these passages, see Atherton\n1993, 29–35, and Sowaal 2007, 228–31.)", "\nAstell provides two accounts of ideas, one\ngeneral and one strict. In doing so, she presents her views on\nknowledge and clear and distinct perceptions. Here is the general\naccount of idea:", "\n By Ideas we sometimes understand in general all that which is the\n immediate Object of the Mind, whatever it Perceives; and in this large\n Sense it may take in all Thought, all that we are any ways capable of\n Discerning: So when we have no Idea of a thing, ’tis as much as\n to say we know nothing of the matter. (Astell 2002, 168)\n", "\nIn the general sense ideas—the immediate objects of the\nmind—are required for knowledge. Here is the strict account of\nidea:", "\n Again, it is more strictly taken for that which represents to the\n Mind some object distinct from it, whether Clearly or Confusedly;\n when this is its import, our Knowledge is said to be as Clear as our\n Ideas are. For that Idea which represents a thing so Clearly, that\n by an Attent and Simple View we may discern its Properties and\n Modifications, at least so far as they can be Known, is never false;\n for our Certainty and Evidence depends on it, if we Know not Truly\n what is thus represented to our Minds we know nothing. (Astell 2002,\n 168)\n", "\nIdeas in the strict sense represent what is distinct from the idea.\nAs such, ideas must be clear in order for them to afford knowledge. In\nthe following passage, Astell employs Descartes’s account of clear and\ndistinct perceptions from Principles of Philosophy, Part I,\nsection 45 (AT VIIIA 21–2; CSM I 207):", "\n That (to use the words of a Celebrated Author) may be said to be\n “Clear which is Present and Manifest to an attentive\n Mind;” so as we say we see Objects Clearly, when being present\n to our Eyes they sufficiently Act on ’em, and our Eyes are\n dispos’d to regard ’em. And that Distinct, which is so\n Clear, Particular, and Different from all other things, that it\n contains not any thing in it self which appears not manifestly to\n him who considers it as he ought. (Astell 2002, 172)\n", "\nAstell differs from Descartes, however, in maintaining that we have\nclear but not distinct (or perfect) ideas of God and souls. She holds\nthat though we can know some of the attributes of these substances, we\ncannot know their true natures (Astell 2002, 173).", "\nFor Astell, though ideas can be confused, they are not the sources of\nerror. Rather, Astell locates falsity and error in judgments, and\noften in language (Astell 2002, 169, 171). She holds that judgment\ninvolves the comparison of two ideas and that sometimes we lack an\n“intermediate idea” (a “middle term”) in order\nto make a judgment (Astell 2002, 146–7, 172–3).", "\nOn this view, we can avoid error in judgment when we are careful in\nseparating and uniting ideas; we can avoid equivocation in language\nwhen we only use words that have distinct ideas attached to them. To\ndo this kind of work, we need to first examine ideas about morality\nand religion, separating what we find through metaphysical reflection\nfrom what we have adopted by custom. Ultimately all reasonings and\ndeductions should begin from ideas that are clear and are “as\ndistinct as the nature of the subject will permit” (Astell 2002,\n169–72)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Mind and Ideas" }, { "content": [ "\nAstell does not hold a “traditional” account of knowledge\nas true, justified belief. Rather, on her view knowledge and belief\nare ideas that are distinguished by origin, clarity, distinctness, and\nthe means by which they are affirmed. What follows is a reconstruction\nof her discussion of these issues in Serious Proposal\n(Astell 2002, 146–153).", "\nGiven the finitude of the human mind, it is limited with respect to\nits reach, and it is diverse in its modes of thinking. Astell states the\nfollowing about the reach of the mind:", "\n Truth in general is the Object of the Understanding, but all Truths\n are not equally Evident, because of the Limitation of the Humane Mind,\n which tho’ it can gradually take in many Truths, yet cannot any\n more than our sight attend to many things at once…. (Astell\n 2002, 146)\n", "\nAbout the modes of thinking, she writes:", "\n Tho the Human Intellect has a large extent, yet being limited as we\n have already said, this Limitation is the Cause of those different\n Modes of Thinking, which for distinction sake we call Faith, Science\n and Opinion. (Astell 2002, 149)\n", "\nIn addition to faith, science, and opinion, Astell also discusses\nmoral certainty and sensation. She notes that sensation is not so much\na mode of knowledge as it is a kind of being conscious (Astell 2002,\n152).", "\nAstell’s account of the modes of thinking is related to her view\nabout how we come to hold truths, of which there are two ways. The\nfirst is marked by passivity: some truths are delivered to us. They\ncan be delivered to us by our own understandings, that is, by\nintuition; or they can be delivered to us by authority. When truths\nare delivered by intuition, we have ideas that are clear and distinct,\nself-evident, indubitable, compel the will, and serve as first\nprinciples. When they are delivered by authority they are dubitable,\nconfused, and lack self-evidence. The second way we come to hold\ntruths is marked by activity: such truths are drawn by demonstration\nfrom other truths.", "\nScience is our mode of thinking when we intuit a truth and when we\nhold that truth because we have derived it (by reasoning and\ndeduction) from an intuition. In the latter case, we hold\n“objects of science.” In both cases, we have\n“knowledge.”", "\nFaith is our mode of thinking when we hold a truth given to us by\nauthority and when we derive additional truths from such truths. In\nboth cases we hold “objects of faith” and we have\n“belief.”", "\n“Moral certainty” is our mode of thinking when we draw\nideas by demonstration from premises that are a mix of knowledge and\nbelief; “opinion” is our mode of thinking when we hold\nideas drawn either by bad argument or by an argument in which confused\nideas serve as premises.", "\nIdeas attained through intuition are the highest form of knowledge.\nThese ideas are clear and distinct, self-evident, and indubitable;\nfurther, these ideas compel the will. The “objects of\nscience” that are derived by demonstration from intuitions have\na very high epistemic status and command a firm assent. Though Astell\nmaintains that all beliefs are dubitable, as they lack self-evidence\nas well as clarity and distinctness, she holds that objects of faith\ncan share the elevated epistemic status maintained by intuitions and\nobjects of science:", "\n The Objects of Faith are as Certain and as truly Intelligible in\n themselves as those of Science, as has been said already, only we\n become persuaded of the Truth of them by another Method, we do not\n See them so clearly and distinctly as to be unable to\n disbelieve them. Faith has a mixture of the Will that it may be\n rewardable, for who will thank us for giving our Assent where it was\n impossible to withhold it? Faith then may be said to be the sort of\n Knowledge capable of Reward, and Men are Infidels not for want of\n Conviction, but thro an unwillingness to Believe. (Astell\n 2002, 151)\n", "\nFor Astell, the will, which is involved whenever we hold a truth, is\nmoved in different ways depending on the situation and the kind of\ntruth involved. When we hold a self-evident truth, our wills are\ncompelled by the clarity and distinctness of the idea: we\n“see” the truth so clearly and distinctly that we cannot\ndoubt it; that is, we cannot but assent to it. On the other hand, when\na truth is delivered to us from an authority, and we do not have a\nclear and distinct perception of the truth, then our wills are not\ncompelled by the idea. In such cases, if we are to affirm the idea, we\nmust move our wills ourselves. What is striking about Astell’s view is\nthat she maintains that we are as certain when we move our wills to\naffirm objects of faith as when our wills are compelled to affirm\nintuitions and objects of science.", "\nHowever, this is not to say that we should intentionally move our\nwills to affirm truths about which we can have clear and\ndistinct ideas when we do not currently have such clear and distinct\nideas. That is, those truths that are candidates for knowledge\n(intuitions or objects of science) should known and not merely\nbelieved. This is especially true with respect to what she calls\n“the ideas of the philosophers”:", "\n [H]ow many of us daily make that a matter of Faith which indeed\n belongs to Science, by adhering blindly to the Dictates of some famous\n Philosopher in Physical Truths, the Principles of which we have as much\n right to examine, and to make deductions from ’em as he had?\n (Astell 2002, 152)\n", "\nThis connects to Astell’s view on wisdom: “to Know what is to be\nKnown, and to Believe what is to be Believ’d is the property of\na Wise person” (Astell 2002, 152). It also provides one of the\ntheoretical bases for Astell’s views on education." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Knowledge and Belief" } ] } ]	[ "Arnauld, A. and Nicole, P., Logic or the Art of Thinking:\nContaining, besides rules, several new observations appropriate for\nforming judgment, J. V. Buroker (tr. and ed.), Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, 1996.", "Astell, M., The Christian Religion, As Profess’d by a\nDaughter of the Church of England. In a Letter to the Right Honourable,\nT.L. C.I., London: R. Wilkin, 1705.", "–––, Astell: Political Writings,\nP. Springborg (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.", "–––, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies.\nParts I and II, P. Springborg (ed.), Ontario: Broadview Literary\nTexts, 2002.", "–––, The Christian Religion, As\nProfessed by a Daughter of the Church of England, J. Broad (ed.),\nToronto, ON: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies and Iter\nPublishing, 2013.", "Astell, M. and Norris, J., Letters Concerning the Love of\nGod, Between the Author of the Proposal to the Ladies and Mr. John\nNorris: Wherein his late Discourse, shewing That it ought to be intire\nand exclusive of all other Loves, is further cleared and\njustified, London: J. Norris, 1695.", "–––, Letters Concerning the Love of\nGod, E. D. Taylor and M. New (ed.), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.", "Descartes, R., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,\nJ. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (eds. and trs.),\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, Vol. I (abbreviated as\n‘CSM’ and cited by page number).", "–––, Oeuvres de Descartes, C. Adam and\nP. Tannery (eds.), Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1996,\nVol. VI (abbreviated as ‘AT’ and cited by page\nnumber).", "Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,\nP. H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.", "Norris, J., Practical Discourses Upon several Divine\nSubjects, London: S. Manship, 1693.", "Achinstein, S., 2007, “Mary Astell. Religion and Feminism:\nTexts in Motion”, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith,\nW. Kolbrener & M. Michelson, Burlington, VT: Ashgate,\npp. 17–30.", "Acworth, R., 1979, The Philosophy of John Norris of Bemerton\n(1657–1712), Hildesheim/New York: Georg Olms Verlag.", "Alvarez, D. P., 2011, “Reason and Religious Tolerance: Mary\nAstell’s Critique of Shaftesbury”, Eighteenth Century\nStudies, 44(4): 475–494.", "Apetrei, S., 2008a, “‘Call no man master upon earth’:\nMary Astell’s Tory Feminism and an Unknown\nCorrespondence”, Eighteenth-Century\nStudies, 41(4): 507–23.", "–––, 2008b, Women, Feminism and Religion in\nEarly Enlightenment England, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Atherton, M., 1993, “Cartesian Reason and Gendered\nReason”, in A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason\nand Objectivity, L.M. Antony and C. Witt (eds.), Boulder and\nOxford: Westview Press, pp. 19–34.", "Broad, J., 2002a, Women Philosophers of the\n Seventeenth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Broad, J., 2002b, “Mary Astell (1666–1731)”,\nin British Philosophers 1500–1899, P.B. Dematteis and\nP.S. Fosl (eds.), Dictionary of Literary Biography 252, pp.\n3–10.", "–––, 2003, “Adversaries or Allies?\nOccasional Thoughts on the Masham-Astell\nExchange”, Eighteenth-Century Thought, 1:\n123–49.", "–––, 2007, “Astell, Cartesian Ethics, and\nthe Critique of Custom”, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender,\nFaith, W. Kolbrener and M. Michelson (eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate,\npp. 165–179.", "–––, 2009, “Mary Astell on Virtuous\nFriendship”, Parergon: Journal of the Australian and New\nZealand Association for Medieval and Early Modern\nStudies, 26(2): 65–86.", "–––, 2014, “Mary Astell on Marriage and\nLockean Slavery”, History of Political Thought, 35(4):\n717–738.", "Broad, J. and K. Green, 2009, A History of Women’s Political\nThought in Europe, 1400–1700, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Bryson, C.B., 1988, “Mary Astell: Defended of the\n‘Disembodied Mind’”, Hypatia, 13(4):\n40–62.", "Carroll, B. A., 1990, “The Politics of\n‘Originality’: Women and the Class System of the\nIntellect,”, Journal of Women’s\nHistory, 2(2): 136–63.", "Duran, J., 2000, “Mary Astell: A Pre-Humean Christian\nEmpiricist and Feminist”, in Presenting Women Philosophers, C.\nTougas and S. Ebenreck (eds.), Philadelphia: Temple University Press,\npp. 147–154.", "–––, 2006, Eight Women Philosophers: Theory,\nPolitics, and Feminism, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.", "–––, 2014, “Christianity and Women’s\nEducation: Anna Maria van Schurman and Mary\nAstell,” Philosophy & Theology, 26(1):\n3–18.", "Dussinger, J. A., 2013, “Mary Astell’s Revisions of Some\nReflections upon Marriage (1730)”, The Papers of the\nBibliographical Society of America, 107(1): 49–79.", "Ellenzwig, S., 2003, “The Love of God and the Radical\nEnlightenment: Mary Astell’s Brush with\nSpinoza”, Journal of the History of\nIdeas, 63(3): 379–87.", "Ezell, M. J. M., 1993, Writing Women’s Literary History,\nBaltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.", "Goldie, M., 2007, “Mary Astell and John Locke”,\nin Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith, W. Kolbrener and\nM. Michelson, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp. 17–30.", "Harris, J., 2012, “Philosophy and sexual politics in Mary\nAstell and Samuel Richardson”, Intellectual History\nReview, 22(3): 445–63.", "Hartmann, Van. C., 1998, “Tory Feminism in Mary Astell’s\nBart’lemy Fair”, Journal of Narrative\nTechnique, 28(3): 243–65.", "Herberg, E., 1999, “Mary Astell’s Rhetorical Theory: A\nWoman’s Viewpoint”, in The Changing Tradition: Women in the\nHistory of Rhetoric, C. M. Sutherland and R. Sutcliffe (eds.),\nCalgary: University of Calgary Press, pp. 147–157.", "Hill, B., 1986, The First English Feminist: “Reflections upon\nMarriage” and Other Writings by Mary Astell, Aldershot, Hants:\nGrower Publishing.", "–––, 1987, “A Refuge from Men: The Idea of\na Protestant Nunnery”, Past & Present, 117:\n107–130.", "James, R., 1976, “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary, Or, Mary\nAstell and Mary Wollstonecraft Compared”, Studies in\nEighteenth Century Culture, Ronald C. Rosbottom (ed.), 5:\n121–139.", "Johns, A., 1996, “Mary Astell’s ‘Excited\nneedles’: Theorizing Feminist Utopia in Seventeenth-Century\nEngland”, Utopian Studies, 7(1):\n60–74.", "Kinnaird, J. K., 1979, “Mary Astell and the Conservative\nContribution to English Feminism”, Journal of British\nStudies, 19(1): 53–75.", "Kolbrener, W., 2003, “Gendering the Modern, Mary Astell’s\nFeminist Historiography”, The Eighteenth\nCentury, 44(1): 1–24.", "–––, 2007, “Astell’s ‘Design of\nFriendship’ in Letters and A Serious Proposal, Part I”, In\nMary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith, W. Kolbrener and M. Michelson\n(eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 49–64.", "–––, 2014, “Slander, Conversation and the\nMaking of the Christian Public Sphere in Mary Astell’s A Serious\nProposal to the Ladies and The Christian Religion as Profess’d\nby a Daughter of the Church of England”, in Religion and\nWomen in Britain, c. 1660-1760, S. Apetrei and H. Smith (eds.),\nFarnham Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate,\npp. 131–144.", "Kolbrener W. and M. Michelson, 2007, Mary Astell: Reason,\nGender, Faith, Aldershot: Ashgate. [Reprint of the introduction is\navailable online.]", "Lister, A., 2004, “Marriage and Misogyny: The Place of Mary\nAstell in the History of Political Thought”, History of\nPolitical Thought, 25(1): 44–72.", "McCrystal, J., 1992, “A Lady’s Calling: Mary Astell’s Notion\nof Women”, Political Theory Newsletter, 4:\n156–70.", "–––, 1993, “Revolting Women The Use of\nRevolutionary Discourse in Mary Astell and Mary Wollstonecraft\nCompared”, History of Political Thought, 14(2):\n189–203.", "Miller, S., 2008, Engendering the Fall: John Milton and\nSeventeenth-Century Women Writers, Philadelphia: University of\nPennsylvania Press.", "Myers, J. E., 2012, “Enthusiastic Improvement: Mary Astell\nand Damaris Masham on Sociability”, Hypatia, 28(3):\n533–550.", "Nadelhaft, J., 1982, “The Englishwoman’s Sexual Civil War:\nFeminist Attitudes Towards Men, Women, and Marriage”,\nJournal of the History of Ideas, 43(4): 555–579.", "Nelson, A., 2005, “The Rationalist Impulse”, in A\nCompanion to Rationalism, A. Nelson (ed.), Malden, MA: Blackwell,\npp. 3–11.", "O’Donnell, S., 1978, “Mr. Locke and the Ladies: The\nIndelible Words on the Tabula Rasa”, Studies in\nEighteenth Century Culture, 8: 151–64.", "O’Neill, E., 1998, “Astell, Mary (1666–1731)”,\nin Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1, E. Craig (ed.),\nNew York: Routledge, pp. 527–30.", "––&ndahs;, 1998b, “Disappearing Ink: Early\nModern Women Philosophers and their Fate in History,”\nin Philosophy in a Feminist Voice: Critiques and\nReconstructions, J. A. Kournay (ed.), Princeton: Princeton\nUniversity Press, pp. 17–62.", "–––, 1999, “Women Cartesians,\n‘Feminine Philosophy’, and Historical\nExclusion”, in Feminist Interpretations of René\nDescartes, S. Bordo (ed.), University Park, Pennsylvania:\nPennsylvania State University Press, pp. 232–57.", "–––, 2005, “Early Modern Women\nPhilosophers and the History of Philosophy,”\nHypatia, 20(3): 185–97.", "–––, 2007, “Mary Astell on the Causation\nof Sensation”, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith,\nW. Kolbrener and M. Michelson (eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate,\npp. 145–64.", "Perry, R., 1981, “Two Forgotten Wits”, The Antioch\nReview, 39(4): 431–438.", "–––, 1982, “Mary Astell’s\nPoetry”, Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature, 1(2):\n201–202.", "–––, 1984, “Mary Astell’s Response to the\nEnlightenment”, in Women and the Enlightenment,\nM. Hunt, M. Jacob, P. Mack, and R. Perry (eds.), New York: The Haworth\nPress, Inc., pp. 13–40.", "–––, 1985, “Radical Doubt and the\nLiberation of Women”, Eighteenth-Century\nStudies, 18(4): 472–93.", "–––, 1986, The Celebrated Mary Astell: An\nEarly English Feminist, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "–––, 1990, “Mary Astell and the Feminist\nCritique of Possessive\nIndividualism”, Eighteenth-Century\nStudies, 23(4): 444–57.", "Pickard, C. “Great in Humilitie’: A Consideration of\nMary Astell’s Poetry”, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender,\nFaith, W. Kolbrener and M. Michelson (eds.), Aldershot, England:\nAshgate, 115–126.", "Ruether, R. R., 1990, “Prophets and Humanists: Types of\nReligious Feminism in Stuart England”, The Journal of\nReligion, 70(1): 1–18.", "Schillace, B. L., 2013, “Reproducing Custom: Mechanical\nHabits and Female Machines in Augustan Women’s\nEducation”, Feminist Formations, 25(1):\n111–137.", "Shapiro, L., 2013, “The Outward and Inward Beauty of Early\nModern Women”, Review Philosophique de la France et de\nl’Étranger, T.: Penser au Féminin Au XVIIe Siécle, 203(3):\n327–346.", "Sharrock, C., 1992, “De-ciphering Women and De-scribing\nAuthority: The Writings of Mary Astell”, in Women, Writing,\nHistory 1640-1740, I. Grundy and S. Wiseman (eds.), Athens:\nUniversity of Georgia Press, pp. 109–124.", "Smith, F., 1916, Mary Astell, Columbia: Columbia University\nPress.", "Smith, H. L., 1982, Reason’s Disciples: Seventeenth-Century\nEnglish Feminists, Urbana: University of Illinois\nPress.", "–––, 2007, “‘Cry up liberty’:\nThe Political Context for Mary Astell’s Feminism”, in Mary\nAstell: Reason, Gender, Faith, W. Kolbrener and M. Michelson\n(eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 193–204.", "Sowaal, A., 2007, “Mary Astell’s Serious Proposal: Mind,\nMethod, and Custom”, Philosophy Compass, 2(2):\n227–43.", "Spender, D., 1982, Women of Ideas and What Men Have Done to\nThem: From Aphra Behn to Adrienne Rich, London: Routledge and Kegan\nPaul.", "Springborg, P., 1995, “Mary Astell (1666-1731), Critic of\nLocke”, American Political Science\nReview, 89(3): 621-633.", "–––, 1996,\n“Introduction”, Astell: Political Writings,\nP. Springborg (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,\npp. xi–xlviii.", "–––, 2002, “Introduction”, A Serious\nProposal to the Ladies, Parts I and II, Ontario: Broadview Literary\nTexts.", "–––, 2005, Mary Astell: Theorist of Freedom\nfrom Domination, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Squadrito, K.M., 1987, “Mary Astell’s Critique of Locke’s\nView of Thinking Matter”, Journal of History of\nPhilosophy, 25: 433–439.", "–––, 1991, “Mary Astell”, A\nHistory of Women Philosophers. Vol. III: 1600–1800,\nM.E. Waithe (ed.), Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.", "Stanton, K. S., 2007, “‘Affliction, The Sincerest\nFriend’”, Prose Studies: History, Theory,\nCriticism, 29(1): 104–114.", "Staves, S., 2002, “Church of England Clergy and Women\nWriters”, Huntington Library Quarterly: Reconsidering the\nBluestockings, 65(1/2): 81–103.", "Sutherland, C. M., 1991, “Outside the Rhetorical Tradition:\nMary Astell’s Advice to Women in Seventeenth-Century\nEngland”, Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of\nRhetoric, 9(2): 147–63.", "–––, 1995, “Mary Astell: Reclaiming\nRhetorica in the Seventeenth Century”, in Reclaiming\nRhetoria: Women in the Rhetorical Tradition, A. Lunsford (ed.),\nPittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 93–116.", "–––, 2005, The Eloquence of Mary Astell,\nCalgary: University of Calgary Press.", "–––, 2009, Reason and Religion in\nClarissa: Samuel Richardson and “The Famous Mr. Norris, of\nBemerton”, Farnham: Ashgate.", "Sutherland, C. M. and R. Sutcliffe, 1999, The Changing\nTradition: Women in the History of Rhetoric, Calgary: University\nof Calgary Press.", "Taylor, E. D., 2001, “Mary Astell’s Ironic Assault on John\nLocke’s Theory of Thinking Matter”, Journal of the History\nof Ideas, 62(3): 505–522.", "––, 2005a, “Introduction Mary Astell and John\nNorris: A Correspondence”, in Mary Astell And John Norris:\nLetters Concerning The Love Of God, E. D. Taylor and M. New\n(eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 1–41. [Reprint available\nonline.]", "–––, 2005b–6, “Mary Astell’s Work\ntoward a New Edition of ‘A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part\nII’”, Studies in Bibliography, 57:\n197–232.", "Thickstun, M. O., 1991, “‘This was a Woman that\ntaught’: Feminist Scriptural Exegesis in the Seventeenth\nCentury”, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 21:\n149–58.", "Waters, K., 2002, “Sources of Political Authority: John\nLocke and Mary Astell”, in Introduction, Women and Men Political\nTheorists: Enlightened Conversations, Malden, Massachusetts:\nBlackwell, pp. 5–19.", "Weiss, P., 2004, “Mary Astell: Including Women’s Voices in\nPolitical Theory”, Hypatia, 19(3): 63–84.", "–––, 1996, “Wollstonecraft and Rousseau:\nThe Gendered Fate of Political Theorists”, in Feminist\nInterpretations of Mary Wollstonecraft (Series: Re-Reading the\nCanon), M. J. Falco (ed.), University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania\nState University Press, pp. 15–32.", "–––, 2009, Canon Fodder: Historical Women\nPolitical Thinkers, University Park: Penn State University\nPress.", "Wilson, C., 2004, “Love of God and Love of Creatures”,\nHistory of Philosophy Quarterly, 21(3):\n281–298.", "Zook, M., 2007, “Religious Nonconformity and the Problem of\nDissent in the Works of Aphra Behn and Mary Astell”, in Mary\nAstell: Reason, Gender, Faith, W. Kolbrener and M. Michelson\n(eds.), Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, pp. 99–113." ]	[ { "href": "../cambridge-platonists/", "text": "Cambridge Platonists" }, { "href": "../descartes/", "text": "Descartes, René" }, { "href": "../locke/", "text": "Locke, John" }, { "href": "../john-norris/", "text": "Norris, John" }, { "href": "../occasionalism/", "text": "occasionalism" } ]
attention	Attention	First published Tue Sep 8, 2009; substantive revision Tue Oct 26, 2021	[ "\nAttention is involved in the selective directedness of our mental\nlives. The nature of this selectivity is one of the principal points\nof disagreement between the extant theories of attention. Some of the\nmost influential theories treat the selectivity of attention as\nresulting from limitations in the brain’s capacity to process\nthe complex properties of multiple perceivable stimuli. Other theories\ntake the selectivity of attention to be the result of limitations in\nthe thinking subject’s capacity to consciously entertain\nmultiple trains of thought. A third group attempt to account for\nattention’s selectivity in ways that need not make any reference\nto limitations in capacity. These latter theories relate the\nselectivity of attention to the selectivity required to maintain a\nsingle coherent course of action, to the weighting of sensory\ninformation in accordance with its expected precision, or to\ncompetition between mutually inhibitory streams of processing.", "\nThe instances of attention differ along several dimensions of\nvariation. In some of its instances attention is a perceptual\nphenomenon. In other instances it is a phenomenon related to\naction. In some instances the selectivity of attention is\nvoluntary. In other instances it is driven, quite\nindependently of the subject’s volition, by the high salience of\nattention-grabbing items in the perceptual field. The difficulty of\ngiving a unified theory of attention that applies to attention’s\nvoluntary and involuntary instances, and to its perceptual and\nenactive instances, makes attention a topic of philosophical interest\nin its own right.", "\nAttention is also a topic of philosophical interest because of its\napparent relations to a number of other philosophically puzzling\nphenomena. There are empirical and theoretical considerations\nsuggesting that attention is closely related to\nconsciousness, and there are controversies over whether this\nrelationship is one of necessity, or sufficiency (or both or neither).\nThere are also controversies – thought to be important to the\nviability of representationism about consciousness – over the\nways in which the phenomenal character of a conscious experience can\nbe modulated by attention. Different considerations link attention to\ndemonstrative reference, to the development of an\nunderstanding of other minds, and to the exercise of the\nwill. Some work in the tradition of virtue ethics takes\nattention to be morally important, since there are at least\nsome virtues that require one to attend appropriately. Attention has\nalso been given a prominent role in some theories about the epistemic\nsignificance of emotion, and in some discussions of the\nepistemic peculiarities of self-attributed mental states.", "\nThe controversies concerning attention’s relation to these other\nphenomena often include debates about the philosophical significance\nof theories that have been developed through the empirical study of\nattention at the neuropsychological and cognitive levels.\nAttention’s cultural and economic aspects have also become a\npoint of philosophical interest, with some theorists suggesting that\nthe social significance of new media is primarily a consequence of the\nnovel ways in which those media engage and compete for our\nattention." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Historical Overview", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Descartes: Attention and Epistemology", "1.2 Berkeley: Attention and Abstraction", "1.3 Locke: Attention as a Mode of Thought", "1.4 The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Attention in Perception, in Action, and in Reflective Thought", "1.5 William James and His Contemporaries: Deflationary Theories", "1.6 The Twentieth Century: Locating Attention at a Bottleneck in Information Processing" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Theories of Attention", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Capacity-Limitation Theories", "2.2 Feature Integration Theory ", "2.3 Coherence Theories", "2.4 General-Purpose Prioritization", "2.5 Precision Optimization Theories and Prediction Error Coding", "2.6 Competition Theories and Cognitive Unison", "2.7 Spotlight Theories", "2.8 Motor Theories" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Explanatory Roles for Attention", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Attention and Consciousness", "3.2 Attention and Demonstrative Reference", "3.3 Attention and Other Minds", "3.4 Attention and Knowledge", "3.5 Attention and Voluntary Action" ] }, { "content_title": "4 Attention and Value", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Attention in Aesthetics", "4.2 Attention in Ethics", "4.3 Attention in Social and Political Theory " ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Historical Overview", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIn the early modern period a variety of explanatory roles were\nassigned to attention by a number of different writers.\nDescartes’ Meditations provides one prominent example.\nThe result of Descartes’ First Meditation—that everything\ncan be doubted—is in apparent tension with his Third\nMeditation’s claim that clear and distinct ideas are beyond\ndoubt. Descartes introduces a claim about attention to resolve this\napparent conflict. He says, in reply to the seventh set of objections,\nthat it is only when we pay attention to them that clear and distinct\nideas provide a place where doubt does not take hold:", "\nSo long as we attend to a truth which we perceive very clearly, we\ncannot doubt it. But when, as often happens, we are not attending to\nany truth in this way, then even though we remember that we have\npreviously perceived many things clearly, nevertheless there will be\nnothing which we may not justly doubt so long as we do not know that\nwhatever we clearly perceive is true. (‘Replies to\nObjections’, 309)\n", "\nThis passage is usually cited for the point that it makes about\nmemory, but the picture that Descartes is here outlining is also one\nin which attention has an important epistemic role to play: clarity\nand distinctness realize their epistemic potential only when attention\nis being paid to the ideas that have them. Those ideas can be doubted,\nas, in accordance with the policy of the First Meditation they must\nbe, but that doubt cannot be maintained by a properly attentive\nthinker. The crucial first move in Descartes’\nepistemology—the move from radical doubt to certainty about the\ntruth of particular clear and distinct ideas—is, therefore, a\ntransition that is mediated by attention." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Descartes: Attention and Epistemology" }, { "content": [ "\nA quite different explanatory role is assigned to attention in Bishop\nBerkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge, although here\nagain we find that it is in order to remove an epistemological glitch\nthat the notion of attention is brought in. In the Introduction to\nPrinciples of Human Knowledge Berkeley rejects Locke’s\nclaim that there exist such things as Abstract Ideas. But Berkeley\nretains Locke’s commitment to the core empiricist claim that the\nthinking of thoughts is always a matter of handling ideas received\nfrom experience. This would seem to lead to the conclusion that it is\nnot possible to think about abstractia, but Berkeley realizes that\nthat conclusion is unacceptable. It is, as he says, perfectly possible\nto think about the properties of triangles in general.", "\nIn the second edition of the Principles Berkeley added a\ncouple of sentences to the Introduction that make it clear that it is\nattention and, in particular, the withholding of attention, that is\nsupposed to explain the possibility of thinking about abstractia\nwithout the need to postulate Abstract Ideas. These added sentences\ntell us that:", "\n[It] must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely\nas triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the\nangles or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract, but\nthis will never prove that he can frame an abstract general,\ninconsistent idea of a triangle. (1710, Introduction to 2nd edn.\n§16. emphasis added)\n", "\nIn these sentences Berkeley is not attempting to elaborate a theory of\nattention. He says nothing more about the idea that attention might\nenable thought about abstractia. It is nonetheless clear that he\nrequires attention to play an important role in his picture of the\nmind.", "\nBerkeley’s idea that attention and abstraction are linked was\ntaken up in the second half of the nineteenth century by William\nHamilton. Hamilton did not, however, think that the link between\nattention and abstraction provided the starting point for an\nexplanation of attention, nor of abstraction. That is because he took\nit that the relationship between the two phenomena was too intimate to\nbe explanatory. He writes that:", "\nAttention and Abstraction are only the same process viewed in\ndifferent relations. They are, as it were, the positive and negative\npoles of the same act. (1876, 88)\n" ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Berkeley: Attention and Abstraction" }, { "content": [ "\nDescartes and Berkeley treat attention very briefly, but each assigns\nattention to a particular explanatory role. Locke’s treatment of\nattention is also brief, but he has his own theory of the explanatory\nrole that attention plays, and goes further than either Descartes or\nBerkeley in giving us a positive account of what attention is. His\naccount is given as part of the catalogue of ‘Modes of\nThinking’, which Locke sets out towards the beginning of Chapter\nNineteen of Book Two of the Essay Concerning Human\nUnderstanding:", "\n[W]hen ideas float in our mind without any reflection or regard of the\nunderstanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language\nhas scarce a name for it: when the ideas that offer themselves\n(for, as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there\nwill always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds)\nare taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is\nattention: when the mind with great earnestness, and of choice,\nfixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be\ncalled off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas, it is that we\ncall “intention,” or “study.” (1689, II, 19\n§1 emphasis added)\n", "\nIn addition to providing these quick theories of\n‘reverie’, ‘attention’ and ‘intention or\nstudy’, the very same sentence of Locke’s Essay\nprovides theories of ‘remembrance’,\n‘recollection’, ‘contemplation’,\n‘sleep’, ‘dreaming’, and\n‘ecstasy’. It is significant that Locke’s account of\nattention is given so briefly, and that it goes by as part of a crowd\nof theories of these various other mental phenomena. Locke is not here\nengaging in an uncharacteristically slapdash piece of rapid-fire\ntheorizing. His intention in going through this catalogue is to\nestablish that these are topics for which no new substantive theory is\nneeded. These are, in Locke’s theory, simply ‘modes of\nthinking’: ‘reverie’, ‘study’ etc. are\nnot names for independent phenomena, existing in their own right.\nInstead they are the various names that thinking is given when it\ntakes place in various ways.", "\nOne consequence of Locke’s treatment of attention as a mode of\nthinking is that, once we have a theory of thinking before us, we need\nno further theory to account for the possibility of attention,\ncontemplation, study, etc. (Just as, to use the classic example of\n‘modes’, we need no substantive independent theory, once\nwe have a theory of walking, to explain the possibility of limping,\npacing or ambling.) We need to say something in giving an\nanalysis of the nature of modes, but—once the\nthing-to-be-modified has been accounted for—our analysis can\nsimply say something brief, along the lines indicated by Locke. We do\nnot need to give a theory that postulates any substances or processes\nspecific to the explanation of attention.", "\nLocke’s modal view of attention has the consequence that no very\nsubstantive theory of attention is needed once our theory of thinking\nis in place. It also entails, and for the same reason, that attention\ncannot figure in the explanation of how thinking itself is possible\n(for any explanation in which it did figure would be analogous to an\nexplanation of walking that takes strolling to already be possible; it\nwould get its explanatory priorities backwards)." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Locke: Attention as a Mode of Thought" }, { "content": [ "\nLocke viewed attention as an explanatorily slight phenomenon—a\nmode of thought that is not in need of much explanation, nor capable\nof providing much. Theories of attention moved away from that view\nover the course of the eighteenth century. Attention was increasingly\ntreated as a phenomenon with explanatory work to do, and so as a\nphenomenon for which a substantive independent theory needed to be\ngiven. The attempt to provide such a theory got properly underway in\n1738, when Christian Wolff’s textbook on psychology was the\nfirst to devote a whole chapter to the topic of attention (see\nHatfield, 1995, for an excellent discussion).", "\nDuring this period the explanatory remit for theories of attention\nbroadened in two directions. The first move was away from the idea\nthat attention acts on already-received ideas and towards the idea\nthat attention is involved in the initial reception of those ideas.\nLocke had characterized attention as the registration of\nalready-received ideas into memory. But by 1769, when Henry Home Kames\nadded the appendix of ‘Terms Defined or Explained’ to his\nElements of Criticism, attention’s role as a regulator\nof cognitive input was regarded as definitive of it:", "\nAttention is that state of mind which prepares one to receive\nimpressions. According to the degree of attention objects make a\nstrong or weak impression. Attention is requisite even to the simple\nact of seeing. (1769, 18)\n", "\nAs well as beginning to assign to attention a role in the explanation\nof the reception of ideas, eighteenth century theories also moved\ntowards including a role for attention in the production of\nbehaviour. This is particularly clear in Dugald\nStewart’s 1792 Elements of the Philosophy of the Human\nMind. Stewart retains Locke’s view that attention has an\nessential role to play in determining which things get stored in\nmemory. He adds to that view the claim that attention has a role in\ndetermining which particular memories get recalled, writing that\n“Some attention [is] necessary for any act of memory\nwhatever.” (1792, 53). Stewart also claims that attention has a\nrole in the explanation of the development and deployment of at least\nsome skilled behaviours. The example that Stewart gives here is that\nof “the dexterity of jugglers” which, he says,\n“merits a greater degree of attention from philosophers than it\nhas yet attracted” (62).", "\nIn the century between Locke’s Essay and\nStewart’s Elements, then, attention ceases to be seen\nmerely as a certain mode of idea-handling, and comes to be seen as a\nphenomenon in need of its own explanation, and with a role to play in\nthe explanation of perception, in the explanation of skilled action,\nand in the explanation of memory (both in its storage and in its\nrecall).", "\nIn the century after Stewart’s Elements the diversity\namong the phenomena that attention was expected to explain continued\nto grow, and it continued to include phenomena from across the\npsychological spectrum from perception, to thought, to action. By the\nend of the nineteenth century, in what was a crucial period in the\ndevelopment of scientific psychology, there were some psychologists,\nsuch as E.B. Titchener, who took the role of attention in perception\nand in ‘sensory clearness’ to be its most essential\nfeature (see Titchener, 1908, 1910); others, such as Alexander Bain,\nwho thought that the essential feature of attention was its role in\naction, (Bain, 1888); and a third group, of whom G.F. Stout was the\nmost prominent example, who argued that the primary job for a theory\nof attention was to explain attention’s role in reflective\nthought (see Stout, 1891).", "\nAs a result of this diversity in their conceptions of\nattention’s explanatory remit (and as a result of the lack of\nany established methodology for empirical psychology) the debates\nbetween exponents of these various psychological theories of attention\ngot themselves into what was acknowledged to be a ‘chaotic\nstate’ (Pillsbury, 1906)." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Attention in Perception, in Action and in Reflective Thought" }, { "content": [ "\nThe diversity of explanatory roles assigned to attention in the\neighteenth and nineteenth centuries meant that theorizing about\nattention at the end of the nineteenth century was in a chaotic state.\nThe ambition for theorists of attention writing at the end of the\nnineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries was to get\nthis chaos into order. The theories of attention proposed in this\nperiod therefore tended to take the form of attempts to reveal\nattention as something less mysterious and less complex than earlier\nwriters had supposed. This ambition to give a ‘nothing\nbut…’ reduction of attention can be seen in the most\ninfluential work from this period: William James’ The\nPrinciples of Psychology (1890).", "\nOne aspect of James’ approach is to play down the more complex\nperceptual aspects of attention. His chapter on attention includes a\ndiscussion of experiments into what we now call\n‘subitizing’—that is, into the ability to perceive\nthe cardinality of small stimulus sets without needing to count their\nmembers—but James writes of these experiments that it “is\nobvious that such observations decide nothing at all about our\nattention, properly so called” (407).", "\nAlthough James plays down attention’s role in complex perceptual\nphenomena, he does assign attention to an important explanatory role\nin the production of behaviour. He claims, for example, that\n‘Volition is nothing but attention’ (424). But when James\nmakes such claims it is as part of a general project that seeks always\nto be deflationary where possible. When James associates attention\nwith volition it is as a way of suggesting how volition could be given\na deflationary treatment, not as a way of inflating attention’s\nexplanatory role.", "\nThis deflationary approach to attention’s explanatory remit\nmeans that, when it comes to giving an account of the ‘intimate\nnature of the attention process’, James can identify two fairly\nsimple processes which, he claims, ‘probably coexist in all our\nconcrete attentive acts’. and which ‘possibly form in\ncombination a complete reply’ to the question of\nattention’s ‘intimate nature’ (1890, 411). The\nprocesses that James identifies are:", "\nThe first of these processes is reasonably familiar. By ‘the\naccommodation or adjustment of the sensory organs’ James means\nsuch processes as pointing one’s ears in the right direction,\nbringing one’s eyes into focus, taking a sniff, and so on.", "\nJames’s talk of ‘anticipatory preparation’ of\n‘ideation centres’ is a little less clear, but the point\nis again a quite straightforward one. What James has in mind here is\nsimply imagination. His claim is that when attention does not\ninvolve adjusting one’s sense organs it consists in imagining\nthe things or actions that one is attending to, or looking for.", "\nJames illustrates his claim about attention’s link to\nimagination with an example from Hermann von Helmholtz. This example\nis an important one for James, and it illustrates some important\nfeatures of attention that subsequent theorists have tended to\nneglect. The example involves the variety of attention that needs to\nbe paid when trying to discern the overtones in a note played on the\npiano. Helmholtz asks us to sit at the piano and to play a G, then,\nimagining the sound that we have just heard, to play a low C. Doing\nthis, it is claimed, enables one to hear that G is discernibly there\n(as the third overtone) within the sound produced when C is played.\nHelmholtz’s claim, which James endorses, is that the kind of\nattention that is paid when listening for an overtone is constituted\nby the imagining of what that overtone would sound like. James goes\nonto claim that there is a wide range of cases in which paying\nattention to what one is doing consists in this same sort of\npreparatory imaginative engagement.", "\nHere, as in his more frequently discussed treatment of emotion, it is\ndistinctive of James’s approach that he tries to account for a\nlarge-scale personal-level psychological phenomenon in a realist but\nsomewhat revisionary way, so as to be able to give his account using\nrelatively simple and unmysterious explanatory resources. An\nalternative deflationary approach—one which James explicitly\ncontrasted with his own—is the approach taken in 1886 by F.H.\nBradley.", "\nBradley advocated a view according to which attention is not the sort\nof phenomenon for which an independent and substantive theory can or\nneeds to be given. Bradley does not develop this point in much detail,\nand it is a point on which he would later change his mind, but in his\n1886 article, ‘Is there a special activity of attention?’,\nBradley was concerned with arguing that a project such as\nJames’s one of identifying particular processes as the\nattention-constituting ones was wrongheaded. He claims that no\nparticular attention-processes can be identified since:", "\nAny function whatever of the body or the mind will be active attention\nif it is prompted by an interest and brings about the result of our\nengrossment with its product. There is no primary act of attention,\nthere is no specific act of attention, there is no one kind of act of\nattention at all. (1886, 316)\n", "\nAlthough Bradley does not use the Lockean vocabulary (and although\nJames himself does not seem to have taken Bradley in this way),\nBradley’s position here has much in common with Locke’s\nclaim that attention is a mode. Bradley’s position,\nlike Locke’s, is that what is essential to an instance of\nattention is not the matter of which processes are taking\nplace, but the facts about how the things that happen happen.\nHe therefore takes the ennumeration of processes to be the wrong form\nfor a theory of attention to take.", "\nOther writers who were contemporary with Bradley and James took\ndifferent approaches to the project of giving a deflationary\nexplanation of attention. In Théodule Ribot’s 1888 book\nLa Psychologie De L’Attention the attempt to explain\nattention took an approach that we would now classify as behaviourist.\nIn 1888 behaviourism had not yet been established as a general\napproach in philosophical or psychological theories of the mind, but\nRibot’s suggestion that attention’s behavioural\nmanifestations are essential to it is nonetheless recognizable as an\nearly articulation of behaviourism in a strong form:", "\nAre the movements of the face, the body, and the limbs and the\nrespiratory modifications that accompany attention, simple effects,\noutward marks, as is usually supposed? Or are they, on the contrary,\nthe necessary conditions, the constituent elements, the\nindispensable factors of attention? Without hesitation we accept\nthe second thesis. (1888, 19)\n", "\nA somewhat more moderate version of this behaviour-centred approach\nwas taken by Alexander Bain, who identified attention, not with its\nbehavioural manifestations themselves, but with truncated versions of\nthe motor-control processes that typically bring about those\nbehavioural manifestations: processes ‘stopping short of the\nactual movement performed by the organ’ (Bain, 1888, 371). Much\nas Ribot’s view can be seen as an early version of behaviourism,\nBain’s view can be seen as an early version of the motor-based\napproaches to attention that can be found in the literature of the\npresent century (see\n Section 2.8\n below)." ], "subsection_title": "1.5 William James and His Contemporaries: Deflationary Theories" }, { "content": [ "\nThe variety among the deflationary explanatory approaches that\ncharacterized the theories of attention offered in the nineteenth\ncentury gave way in the early twentieth century to a period in which\none such explanatory tactic was dominant: the tactic of behaviourism.\nBehaviourists tended to neglect attention, but did not ignore it\nentirely. John Dashiell’s 1928 Fundamentals of Objective\nPsychology, for example, is a behaviourist work that attempts to\naccount for attention “as a form of posturing” (Ch. 10,\n§3). The project of identifying a behaviour with which to explain\nattention was, nonetheless, an understandably unpopular one. As\nGilbert Ryle notes, it is not only attention, but also ‘heed\nconcepts’ more generally, that resist simple behaviourist\nanalysis:", "\n[W]hen a man is described as driving carefully, whistling with\nconcentration or eating absent-mindedly the special character of his\nactivity seem to elude the observer, the camera and the Dictaphone.\nPerhaps knitted brows, taciturnity and fixed gaze may be evidence of\nintentness; but these can be simulated, or they can be purely\nhabitual. (1949, 133)\n", "\nIn the middle of the twentieth century behaviourism’s dominance\nwaned, cognitive psychology established itself, and a new theoretical\napproach to the explanation of attention was developed. These three\ndevelopments were intimately related to one another. Instrumental to\nall three was the publication in 1958 of Donald Broadbent’s\nPerception and Communication.", "\nThe year prior to Perception and Communication’s\npublication had seen B.F. Skinner’s attempt, in Verbal\nBehaviour (1957), to apply a behaviourist explanatory approach to\ndistinctively human aspects of cognition. Skinner’s project in\nthat book failed, and Noam Chomsky’s famous 1959 review of the\nbook made its failure conspicuous. Chomsky’s own work in\nSyntactic Structures (1957) went some way towards\nestablishing the new cognitive paradigm for psychology by showing how\ninternal processing could be theorized by describing transformations\non representations in abstraction from the question of how those\nrepresentations were realized. Donald Broadbent’s distinctive\ncontribution to the overthrow of behaviourism was to show how the move\nfrom behavioural data to the postulation of a particular cognitive\narchitecture could be disciplined by the then-new strategy of\nimporting into psychology the intellectual resources used in thinking\nabout information technology. The year in which Broadbent’s book\nwas published was an important year for the development of such\ntechnologies, being the year in which (inter alia) the integrated\ncircuit chip was invented (see Mole, 2012). It was also the year in\nwhich Subscriber Trunk Dialling was introduced to UK telephone\nexchanges. The technology of the telephone exchange was what most\nnaturally suggested itself as a metaphor for attention at the time\nwhen Broadbent was writing.", "\nTowards the end of Perception and Communication Broadbent\nexplicitly sets out the claim that the theoretical resources developed\nin thinking about the transmission of information through telephone\nexchanges provide the basis for an alternative to behaviourism. He\nalso attacks the positivistic methodological principles that had given\nmany behaviourists their motivation. But the central lesson from\nBroadbent’s work, so far as the theory of attention goes, is a\nlesson that he takes to be independent of this attack on behaviourism\nand its positivist foundations. At an early stage in Perception\nand Communication he remarks that:", "\nPerhaps the point of permanent value which will remain in psychology\nif the fashion for communication theory wanes, will be the emphasis on\nproblems of capacity. […] The fact that any given channel has a\nlimit is a matter of central importance to communication engineers,\nand it is correspondingly forced on the attention of psychologists who\nuse their terms. (1958, 5)\n", "\nThis introduction of the notion of capacity limitations into\ndiscussions of perception and attention was, as Broadbent here\npredicted, hugely and permanently influential.", "\nBroadbent claimed not only that the human brain is subject to capacity\nlimitations of the sort that communications engineers had learnt to\ntheorize, he claimed also that these limitations are clustered so that\nthere is a single bottleneck in capacity that is especially critical\nto the brain’s handling of perceptual information. This\nbottleneck was said to occur at the junction of two systems operating\nin series, with the first system having a large capacity for\ninformation processing, and operating automatically on all of the\nstimuli with which the perceiving subject is presented, while the\nsecond has a much smaller capacity, and therefore needs to be deployed\nselectively.", "\nThose who followed Broadbent took it that the bottleneck that results\nfrom the connection of these two systems corresponds to attention in\nthe sense that, when a representation of a stimulus passes through\nthat bottleneck, the stimulus ipso facto counts as one to\nwhich attention has been paid.", "\nBroadbent himself was cautious about presenting his claims about\ncapacity-bottlenecks as a theory of attention. The word\n‘attention’ occurs rarely in Perception and\nCommunication. Broadbent’s later book, Decision and\nStress (1971), does describe his earlier experiments as\n‘studies of attention’, but here too Broadbent prefers to\ntalk about ‘selective perception’ (chapter V) or\n‘vigilance’ (chapters II and III). In an article from\n1982, entitled, ‘Task Combination and Selective Intake of\nInformation’, he admits that: “The topic of this paper is\none that is often termed ‘attention’, and it may seem\nunduly artificial to have given it a more cumbrous title.” But\nhe goes on to reassert his qualms:", "\n‘Attention’ is a word in ordinary language, that can\nreasonably be used as a label for experiments in a particular area.\nYet it has also been used as a theoretical concept, a mysterious asset\nor energy which is sometimes attached to human functions and sometimes\nnot. This use of attention […] is not very helpful, and\navoiding the word in the title is a step towards clarity. (1982, 253)\n", "\nWhen Broadbent does use the word ‘attention’ it is mostly\nin discussions of attention shifting. His view, at least in\nhis early work, seems to have been that where there is a bottleneck in\nour information processing capacity there need to be additional\nmechanisms that control how our limited capacity resources will be\ndeployed. These additional mechanisms of bottleneck-control\nseem to have been what Broadbent thought of as the attention\nmechanisms. He never took himself to have given a theory of them, only\nto have given a theory of where they would be needed. Nor were these\nmechanisms the topic that was at issue in the debates about attention\nthat Broadbent prompted. Those debates were concerned with questions\nabout the nature and location of the bottleneck itself, not about the\nfactors that determine what, on any particular occasion, gets to pass\nthrough it.", "\nIn the decades following Broadbent a great many psychologists devoted\nthemselves to the task of locating the attentional bottleneck that he\nhad postulated. Almost all psychologists writing at this time were\nguided to some degree by Broadbent’s\ntwo-serial-systems-and-a-bottleneck picture of perceptual processing.\nThe question of whether a given task is attention demanding was\ntherefore understood to depend on the question of whether the\nperformance of that task requires the engagement of the small-capacity\nsystem that comes after the bottleneck of attention. Research\ninto the attention-related demands of particular tasks therefore\nbecame another route by which to approach the issue of where the\nattentional bottleneck is located. Broadbent’s\ntwo-systems-and-a-bottleneck model was frequently questioned, but for\nmost research into attention in the second half of the twentieth\ncentury it was very much the orthodox view. This has now changed. In\npsychology’s current paradigm, only a few aspects of\nBroadbent’s picture remain orthodox." ], "subsection_title": "1.6 The Twentieth Century: Locating Attention at a Bottleneck in Information Processing" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Theories of Attention", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nPsychologists attempting to produce a theory of attention in the\nnineteen sixties and seventies were highly influenced by Donald\nBroadbent’s picture of attention as corresponding to a\nbottleneck in information processing capacity resulting from the\nconnection of two separate perceptual processing systems. The first\npiece of business for these psychologists was to locate this\nattentional bottleneck, by determining which sorts of processing are\ndone by the large capacity, pre-bottleneck system, and which by the\nsmall capacity, post-bottleneck system. Debates between these\npsychologists gave rise to various theories in which the selectivity\nof attention was characterized with a claim about the location of this\nbottleneck.", "\nBroadbent’s own account of the distribution of processing\nbetween the pre-attentional system and the post-attentional system\ndefines the ‘early selection’ theory of attention. He\nclaimed that only very simple properties are detected by the large\ncapacity system, and that any semantic properties, or any properties\nrelating to the particular identity of a stimulus, are\ndetected only after representations of the stimulus have passed\nthrough the attentional-bottleneck and into the smaller capacity\nsystem.", "\nThe personal-level consequences of this early selection theory are\nthat we can recognize what things are and what they mean only if we\nare paying attention to them, but can detect the simple physical\nproperties of things even when paying no attention to them. The theory\ncan be thought of as a communication-theoretic rendering of two\nintuitive ideas, which Broadbent’s own research had put on an\nempirically sound footing. The first is that one has no immediate\ncontrol over one’s awareness of simple features of one’s\nenvironment, such as the fact that there are people talking in the\nnext room. Whatever one is paying attention to, one will continue to\nhear some chatter to be going on, if any is. The second idea is that\nthe details of things—such as the semantic content of that\nchatter—can be detected only for the one or two things to which\none is paying attention: If one wants to know what the chatter is\nabout, one has to listen, and this involves disengaging one’s\nattention from other things that might be happening.", "\nThe early selection theory also entails, more problematically, that\nthe semantic properties of an unattended item must remain\nunrepresented in the nervous system, and so entails that those\nproperties can have no psychological effects. According to this view\nthe semantic features of unattended items cannot explain why those\nitems attract attention to themselves, on the occasions when they do.\nIt was to this aspect of the theory that its opponents most frequently\nobjected.", "\nThe chief rivals of Broadbent’s early selection theory were the\n‘late selectionists’, who claimed that all (or almost all)\nperceivable properties are detected automatically, by a large capacity\nsystem that operates on all of the stimuli with which the perceiving\nsubject is presented. According to this late selection theory of\nattention the consequences of passing through the bottleneck of\nattention into the post-attentive small capacity system are only (1)\nthat the subject comes to be conscious of the contents that the large\ncapacity system has already succeeded in encoding and (2) that those\ncontents come to be stored in working memory (Deutsch and Deutsch,\n1963).", "\nAlthough it was originally proposed against the background of\nBroadbent’s now superseded theoretical framework, it would be\ntoo quick to dismiss the late selection theory as an obsolete one. The\ntheory has much in common with some plausible and empirically\nwell-supported views found in the more recent literature. Jesse Prinz,\nfor example, shares the late selectionists’ view that\nattention’s primary role is not in managing limited perceptual\nprocessing resources, but in projecting already-processed\nrepresentations to working memory. Prinz’s view, varying a theme\nfrom the work of Stanislas Dehaene, is that this projection to working\nmemory is what makes it the case that the content represented comes to\nconscious awareness. (Prinz, 2005, 2012, Dehaene et al.,\n2006).", "\nIt should be noted that Prinz’s main philosophical business is\nwith the explanation of consciousness. Objections have been\nraised as to whether the process of projection to working\nmemory—which Prinz refers to as\n‘attention’—can adequately account for the various\nthings that attention does (Wu, 2014, §6.3.2). If it cannot then\nPrinz is willing to allow that this process is not the sole referent\nof the English word ‘attention’, writing that ‘other\nresearchers may choose to define attention differently’, and\nthat ‘those who disagree with my analysis of attention could\nsimply drop the term “attention”’ (Prinz, 2012, p.\n95).", "\nThe central component of the late-selection theory, as it was\noriginally understood, was that the effect of withdrawing attention\nfrom a stimulus is to make it the case that that stimulus is processed\nwithout the subject’s awareness, rather than not being processed\nat all. This component of the view has, to some extent, been\nvindicated. The claim that unattended stimuli are subjected to some\nprocessing of which the subject lacks awareness, including some\nprocessing of those stimuli’s semantic properties, is now\nuncontroversial. Since we know that the semantic properties of\nunattended stimuli can, for example, produce negative priming effects\n(Tipper and Driver, 1988), we know that unattended stimuli are\nprocessed in a way that allows at least some of their semantic\nproperties to be encoded. The semantic properties of unattended items\nhave such effects despite the fact that experimental participants are\ntypically unaware of what those properties are.", "\nThe traditional late selection theory is right in taking it that\ninattention can lead to properties being encoded without our\nawareness, rather than not being encoded at all, but that theory is\nalso committed to the claim that attention’s only\neffects are in determining what gets remembered and experienced, so\nthat the direction of attention has no effects on the initial\nperceptual processing to which stimuli are subjected. These latter\nclaims we now know to be false. An important experiment by\nO’Connor et al. used fMRI to compare neural activity in\nparticipants who, in various task conditions, were presented with high\nand low contrast checkerboard patterns in one or other half of their\nvisual field (O’Connor et al. 2002). In some conditions\nthese participants had to perform a task involving these checkerboard\npatterns. In other conditions the patterns were irrelevant to the task\nthat the participants were performing (and in a third condition no\npattern was presented, but the participants were attending to the\nscreen in anticipation of a pattern that was about to be presented).\nThe results of these comparisons reveal that even in the first parts\nof the neural circuitry through which information from the retina\npasses, on its way to the visual cortex—even, that is, in the\nLateral Geniculate Nuclei—there is a difference in the baserate\nof neural activity, and a difference in the response that stimuli\nelicit, depending on what the participant is attending to. These\nfindings indicate that attention’s effects are not limited to\ncortical loci that are upstream from a late process of attentional\nselection. They therefore refute any version of the late-selection\ntheory according to which the selectivity of attention is entirely a\n‘late process’, occurring only after initial perceptual\nencoding is complete.", "\nThe findings of O’Connor et al. create fewer problems\nfor some recent theories in which elements of the late selection view\nare retained. Nilli Lavie and her collaborators have proposed one such\ntheory, which attempts to combine some aspects of the late selection\ntheory with some aspects of its early selectionist rival. According to\nLavie’s ‘load theory’, attention does\ncorrespond to a capacity bottleneck—much as Broadbent\nthought—but the differing demands of the task that is at hand\nlead to differences as to where that bottleneck restricts the\nprocessing of a stimulus: in conditions where the processing demands\nof perception are high the available resources will soon be exhausted,\nand the bottleneck will operate at an early stage, with the result\nthat unattended stimuli will be processed rather little; in conditions\nwhere the processing load of perception is lower the bottleneck will\noperate at a later stage, with the result that unattended stimuli will\nbe processed rather more (Lavie & Tsal, 1994, Lavie et\nal. 2004). This load theory predicts that peripheral stimuli will\nelicit less neural activation, and will be less distracting, when the\nsubject’s task is a perceptually demanding one. These\npredictions have been borne out by behavioural and neurological\nobservations (Lavie, 2005). The theory’s theoretical apparatus\nhas also provided a useful framework for the philosophical treatment\nof attention’s relationship to consciousness (Hine, 2010). Many\npsychologists nonetheless continue to be wary of Lavie’s\nrehabilitation of elements from the Broadbentian framework.", "\nOther theories have been proposed that also retain the Broadbentian\nidea that attentional selectivity is the result of capacity\nlimitations, while retreating further than Lavie from the picture of\nattention that Broadbent introduced. These theories reject the terms\nof the debate between early and late selectionists because they reject\nthe idea that the capacity limitations responsible for attention are\nclustered into a single bottleneck. In some cases this is because the\nselectivity of attention is taken to be the result of\nmultiple bottlenecks in processing capacity (see, e.g.,\nJohnston and McCann, 2006). In other cases it is because these\ntheorists see capacity limitations as occurring throughout the\nprocessing stream, and not as clustered into bottlenecks at all (see\nDriver, 2001, for a suggestion along these lines, and Allport, Antonis\n& Reynolds, 1972, for an earlier indication of it).", "\nThe early and late selection theories dominated discussions of\nattention in the decades following Broadbent’s seminal work, but\nby the beginning of the nineteen nineties it had become clear that the\ndebate between advocates of the early selection theory and advocates\nof the late selection theory had become fruitless. Those debates were\ntherefore thought to have been predicated on some sort of mistaken\nassumption. Several different diagnoses have been proposed as to what\nthat mistaken assumption might have been. Little consensus has been\nreached as to which of these diagnoses is correct, with the result\nthat some theorists—such as those discussed at the end of the\npreceding section—retain ideas from the early and late selection\ntheories, while others regard this as a wrong-headedly retrograde\nstep.", "\nOne diagnosis is that the early/late debate was fruitless because the\nterms ‘early’ and ‘late’ are themselves\nproblematic. If perceptual processing occurs in a parallel processing\narchitecture without any prevailing direction of information flow then\nthere can be no sense in labeling one part of that architecture as\nearlier or later than any other. If the attentional bottleneck is\nlocated in a system that has such an architecture then it may be this\nthat explains why there was no satisfactory answer to the question of\nwhether attentional selection is early or late. It seems to have been\nwith this thought in mind that some writers have suggested that the\nfailure of the debate between early and late selection theories was\nowing to the fact that that debate requires us to make an assumption\nabout the linearity of the processing stream in which\nselection occurs (see, e.g., Prinz and Hommel, 2002, 3). This is a\nthought that needs to be treated with care.", "\nThe claim that it was a problematic assumption about linearity that\nled the early/late selection debate into fruitlessness received its\nmost influential treatment in an important paper by Alan Allport\n(Allport, 1992). Allport identifies several problematic assumptions\nthat the early/late selection debate requires. His characterization of\nwhat he takes to be the problematic assumption about linearity is as\nthe claim that:", "\n[T]he processing of nonsemantic attributes (i.e. the processing of\nattributes other than symbolic or categorical identity) occurs earlier\nin a logical/causal sequence of operations than does any semantic or\ncategorical processing. (1992, 187)\n", "\nDespite Allport’s qualms, this assumption about linearity does not\nseem, on the face of it, to be a problematic one. There is nothing to\nbe objected to in the claim that the situations in which we encounter\na written word and come to be in a position to know what that word\nmeans are typically situations in which our sensory transducers\nrespond firstly to simple nonsemantic properties of the word. In order\nfor creatures like us to detect the semantic properties of written\nwords, it is necessary for our information processing systems\nto first encode some information about the simple spatial properties\nof the lines on the page. This information does then get passed on to\nsubsequent processing stages in which more complex properties,\nconcerned with semantics and stimulus identity, get processed. If this\nsort of linearity is what Allport was taking issue with then it seems\nhe must have been mistaken, since there is nothing problematic about\nthe idea that there is this much linearity in the processing to which\nstimuli are subjected.", "\nNor is there anything unscientific about that idea. It continues to be\nentirely normal for neuroscientists to refer to the processing that\ntakes place in occipital brain areas as ‘early’ and the\nprocessing in frontal areas as ‘late’. Such thinking can\nbe seen in a much-cited review of neuroimaging work on attention, in\nwhich Sabine Kastner and Leslie Ungerleider speak of:", "\n… an increase in the complexity of processing as activity\nproceeds anteriorly through the ventral stream into the temporal lobe.\nWhereas posterior regions in cortex are preferentially activated\nduring the processing of object attributes, such as colors or\nscrambled objects and faces, more anterior regions are activated\nselectively during the processing of intact objects and faces. (2000,\n319)\n", "\nThe orthodox view, expressed here by Kastner and Ungerleider, is\nsubject to differing interpretations. Those who believe that\nperception and cognition are best thought of as arising from a\nhierarchical Bayesian process might reject the idea that information\nprogresses through the nervous system in a bottom-up fashion, with the\ndetection of simple properties happening at an early stage, and the\ndetection of more complex properties happening at a later one. Current\nadvocates of such hierarchical Bayesian theories place great emphasis\non the idea that the prior hypotheses required by a Bayesian inference\ncan be generated in a top-down fashion, and can then be tested against\nincoming signals which contain information only about the ways in\nwhich the predictions generated by those hypotheses are in error\n(Hohwy, 2013). Such theories break from the tradition of thinking\nabout the information flow in the brain as being largely one-way, but\nthey retain the idea that information is organized into a structure\nwith earlier and later stages, with these stages now being understood\nas corresponding to the more or less abstract layers in an\nhierarchically organized Bayesian inference. They therefore retain the\nidea that there are earlier and later stages in the processing of any\ngiven stimulus, while rejecting the idea that there is one predominant\ndirection of information flow in the brain. Since this much linearity\nremains in our current thinking about the architecture of perceptual\nprocessing, we cannot coherently blame an assumption about this much\nlinearity for the troubles that led to the fruitlessness of the debate\nbetween early and late selectionists.", "\nThat is not to say that the early/late selection debate was entirely\nfree of problematic assumptions relating to linearity—only that\npsychology has not yet settled upon a satisfactory account of the way\nin which assumptions about linearity led the early/late debate into\ntrouble.", "\nA reason why assumptions about linearity may have been problematic is\nthat when, following Broadbent, we think about hierarchical perceptual\nprocessing while bearing in mind the communications\nengineer’s concerns about capacity limitations, it then\nbecomes natural to make some additional assumptions about the way in\nwhich this hierarchically organized architecture supports\npersonal-level cognition. The early/late debate’s problems are\nmore plausibly blamed on these additional assumptions, rather than on\nany assumptions about linear or hierarchical organization per\nse. Given that some physical properties of a thing must first be\nrepresented in order for a person to become aware of that thing’s\nsemantic properties, it is natural for the communications engineer to\nsuppose that no further representation of these physical properties\nneeds to be generated in order for that person to also be aware of\nthose properties, so that a person who is experiencing the semantic\nproperties of a stimulus must have been through a process that already\ngives them an experience of that stimulus’s simple spatial\nproperties. This additional supposition would be a mistake, since the\nbrain represents the physical properties of stimuli in multiple,\nparallel, somewhat overlapping systems, only some of which put the\nsubject in a position to think about the properties that they\nrepresent. In order to get to a representation of the meaning of the\nword on a page, the subject’s brain must represent that\nword’s physical properties, but it turns out that the\nbrain’s representation of these physical properties need not put\nthis perceiver in a position to form thoughts about them. Their access\nto these properties might require that the properties be represented\nall over again, in some parallel system. From the point of view\nintroduced by Broadbent – that of a communications engineer who\nis concerned with the management of limited capacity channels –\nthis seems strangely profligate. At least some of the problems with\nthe early/late debate can be attributed to this: not an assumption\nabout linearity per se, but an assumption about the linearity\nof the processes that support personal level thinking.", "\nOnce the problematic assumption about linearity has been made precise,\nhowever, we see that it cannot be satisfactory to credit the entire\ncollapse of the early/late debate to this assumption. The falsity of\nthe assumption about the linearity of the processes supporting\npersonal-level awareness does not undermine the very idea that the\nearly/late debate is a meaningful one. The problems that it creates\nare largely methodological. The falsity of that assumption means that\none cannot make an inference from a lack of personal-level awareness\nof some content to the absence of representations encoding that\ncontent. It also means that Broadbent was wrong to suppose that the\npsychological effects of unattended stimuli can only depend on those\nproperties of which the inattentive perceiver can be aware. But these\nare methodological problems. They do not, by themselves, imply that\nthe debate between the early selection theory and the late selection\ntheory must have been misconceived.", "\nThe situation that we find ourselves in is, then, a somewhat unhappy\none. Everybody agrees that there was something misconceived about the\ndebate between the two theories of attention that dominated the\ndecades following Broadbent’s reintroduction of attention to the\npsychological agenda. The ongoing influence of Broadbent’s\nselection theory, and of the early/late debate, has often been noted,\nand sometimes lamented (Driver, 2001, 56). But nobody is clear about\nwhether the elements of those theories that are retained in current\ntheorizing are problematic ones." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Capacity-Limitation Theories" }, { "content": [ "\nIn the early nineteen eighties, Anne Treisman and her collaborators\nidentified the existence of ‘the binding problem’, and\ndescribed a process that could solve that problem. Treisman proposed\nthat attention be identified with this process. This proposal is known\nas the Feature Integration Theory of attention. It has been hugely\ninfluential, not only as a theory of attention, but also as the\nframework that introduced and regimented research into the\nindependently interesting question of the binding problem (for more on\nwhich, see\n ‘The Unity of Consciousness’\n esp.\n §2.2).", "\nTreisman describes the way in which the binding problem arises like\nthis:", "\nSensory information arrives in parallel as a variety of heterogeneous\nhints, (shapes, colors, motions, smells and sounds) encoded in partly\nmodular systems. Typically many objects are present at once. The\nresult is an urgent case of what has been labelled the binding\nproblem. We must collect the hints, bind them into the right spatial\nand temporal bundles, and then interpret them to specify their real\nworld origins. (2003, 97)\n", "\nWe can illustrate this problem with an example. Suppose we have a\nsubject who is presented, at one time, with a red tomato and a green\napple. This visual input is, Treisman says, initially broken up for\nspecialized distributed processing—so that, for example, one\npart of the brain is responsible for detecting the shapes of things, a\ndifferent part is responsible for detecting their colours. The\nshape-detecting centres represent the fact that a tomato-shaped thing\nis present, and they represent the fact that an apple-shaped thing is\npresent. The colour-detecting centres represent the fact that a red\nthing is present, and the fact that a green thing is present. But the\nsubject, if he is a normal human, knows more than is implied by these\nfour facts: He knows that the red thing is the tomato-shaped thing and\nthe green thing the apple-shaped thing. To know this he must have a\nway of ‘binding’ the representation of red in the colour\ncentre with the representation of the tomato shape in the shape\ncentre. The binding problem is the problem of knowing how to put\ntogether the properties that have been detected in separate\nspecialized detection centres.", "\nTreisman’s proposed solution exploits the fact that\nspatial representations are ubiquitous, and the idea that\nthere is only one thing to be seen in any one place at any one time.\nIf the centre for detecting colours detects red at place one\nand green at place two, and if the centre for detecting shape\ndetects a tomato shape at place one and an apple shape at\nplace two, then, given the principle that there is a maximum of\none visible object per place per time, the binding problem can be\nsolved. Treisman therefore proposes that we achieve a correctly bound\nrepresentation by moving a variously sized ‘window’ from\none location in the perceptual scene to another. This window blocks\nout the information from all but a single location, and all the\nfeatures found at that location can then be ‘bound’ as\nbeing features of the same object. The area covered by the window\nwithin which features are bound is taken to correspond to the region\nto which attention is being paid.", "\nThere is more than one way to understand the explanatory import of\nTreisman’s claim that the window of attention corresponds to the\nwindow within which features are bound. Treisman’s early work\npresents that claim as an attempt to identify the processes of\nattention (by telling us that they are the processes of feature\nintegration). In her later work the explanation being offered is no\nlonger simply one in which it is attention that occupies the role of\nexplanandum and binding processes that occupy the role of explanans.\nHer later claim is that solving the binding problem is one role for\nthe kind of selectivity that attention enables.", "\nThere is some work in which the Feature Integration Theory has been\npressed into the service of more ambitious explanatory goals. That\ntheory plays an important role in John Campbell’s 2002 attempt,\nin Reference and Consciousness, to use attention to explain\nhow the reference of demonstrative expressions gets fixed by their\nproducers, and understood by their consumers (see section\n 3.2).\n Treisman herself suggests, albeit tentatively, that descendants of\nthe Feature Integration Theory may provide part of the explanation for\n“the bound, unitary, interpreted, personal view of the world of\nsubjective experience” (Treisman, 2003, 111). She goes on to\nsuggest, again tentatively, that the sort of explanation that such a\ntheory provides “should give us all the information there is\nabout the conditions that create consciousness” (op\ncit).", "\nOpposed to those who think that a theory of feature binding will be a\nlarge component in our theory of attention, of the unity of\nconsciousness, or of anything else, are a number of philosophers (and\na smaller number of psychologists) who deny that feature binding\ncreates a problem that needs any serious cognitive apparatus for its\nsolution. Such claims have been made for a variety of reasons. They\nare generally made as part of large-scale revisionary proposals for\nthe conceptual framework of cognitive neuroscience. Kevin\nO’Regan and Alva Noë’s rejection of the binding\nproblem ‘as, in essence, a pseudo-problem’ (O’Regan\nand Noë, 2001, 967) comes as part of their general attack on the\nidea that perception requires the representation of the thing\nperceived. Vincent Di Lollo has suggested that the assumptions about\nneural coding that generate the binding problem have been superseded,\nwith the result that the binding problem is an ill-defined one (Di\nLollo, 2012). And M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker, in their book-length\ncritique of the philosophical foundations of neuroscience, claim that\nthe notions of representation and information that enjoy currency in\nneuroscience are subject to various confusions, and that these\nconfusions lead to it being ‘widespread’ for\nneuroscientists to make “confused statements of the so-called\nbinding problem” (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, 14). These debates\nabout the status of the binding problem (reviewed by Plate, 2007) turn\non foundational issues for the cognitive sciences generally. They have\nceased to be specifically concerned with the explanation of\nattention.", "\nEven if these philosophical critics of the binding problem are right\nto suggest that a perceiver can typically experience several\nproperties as belonging to a single object without the need for any\nspecial binding process to integrate the representations of those\nproperties, it may nonetheless be true that, in some particular cases,\nattention does play a role in determining the way in which different\nstreams of sensory information come to be combined. Even in these\ncircumscribed cases, the question of how this binding-like role for\nattention should be characterized may raise its own philosophical\ndifficulties. Several psychologists studying the integration of\ninformation from across different sensory modalities have found\nthemselves running into such difficulties, claiming that the role of\nattention in integrated multisensory perception is\n‘curious’, and ‘a paradox’, especially in\ncases that involve the perception of speech (Tiippana, Andersen and\nSams, 2004; Macaluso et al., 2016). Philosophers who have\ninterrogated the assumptions leading to the idea there is a general\nbinding problem have not yet extended their critique to these more\nspecific cases. A preliminary philosophical examination suggests that\nthese may be cases in which the appearance of paradox derives from\ncertain questionable assumptions about the predominantly bottom-up\nnature of perceptual processing, or from assumptions of a more\nmetaphysical sort, concerning the localizable way in which\nattention’s causal influence is exerted (Mole, 2020)." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Feature Integration Theory" }, { "content": [ "\nThe view that the function of attention is the management of\nlimitations in the brain’s information processing capacity has\nbeen an orthodox one among psychologists since Donald Broadbent\nintroduced it in the nineteen fifties, but it has sometimes been\ncalled into question. The theories of attention proposed by\nphilosophers have tended not to endorse any straightforward version of\nthe capacity-limitation view, and there are empirical reasons to think\nthat the simplest versions of such a view are mistaken. In the\nnineteen seventies Ulric Neisser and his collaborators carried out a\nseries of experiments showing that, when appropriately trained, a\nsubject can perform two attention-involving tasks concurrently,\nwithout much interference between them (Hirst et al., 1980,\nNeisser, 1976). Neisser interpreted these experiments as suggesting\nthat, insofar as there is a bottleneck that attention is needed to\nmanage, it must often be a bottleneck in behavioural coordination,\nrather than in information processing capacity. Simple bodily\nlimitations are what prevent us from looking in two directions at one\ntime, or from throwing a ball and writing with the same hand.\nNeisser’s suggestion was that in many cases cognitive processing\nwas selective, not as a result of limitations in processing capacity,\nbut only in so far as such bodily limitations required it to be.", "\nIn two papers from 1987, authored individually but published in the\nsame volume, Odmar Neumann and Alan Allport developed a similar idea.\nWhereas Neisser emphasized the constraints that are imposed on\ncognition by the need to manage a single body, Neumann and Allport\nboth emphasized the constraints that are placed on cognition by the\nneed to maintain a coherent course of goal-directed action. They\ndescribe their position as a ‘selection-for-action’\ntheory.", "\nIf we think of ‘action’ as here referring to bodily\nbehaviour then the selection-for-action theory is very similar to\nNeisser’s view. But Neumann and Allport’s point retains\nits force if we extend the notion of action to include deliberate\nmental activities, such as puzzle-solving, for which no bodily\nlimitations are in play. There is here an “analogy between\npractical and theoretical and activity”, which was noted in an\n1891 paper by G. F. Stout:", "\nThinking is action directed towards intellectual ends. Intellectual\nends are attained by an appropriate combination of movements of\nattention just as practical ends are attained by an appropriate\ncombination of movements of the body. If, therefore, we desire to\nexplain the process of Thinking, we must clearly determine the nature\nof active Attention. (Stout, 1891, p. 23)\n", "\nAs Stout and the later generations of action-oriented theorists\nindicate, the need to select among several possible sources of\ninformation, and to select among several possible things that might be\ndone with the information that has then been selected, is a\ncharacteristic of almost all deliberately executed thoughts and\nactions, whether those actions are bodily or intellectual. This\nubiquitous need for selectivity has been emphasized in a series of\nworks by Wayne Wu, where it is referred to as the “many many\nproblem”(Wu, 2011a, 2014, 2019).", "\nIn Wu’s handling of it, the idea that Neumann and Allport\nemphasized becomes part of a larger attempt to understand the\nessential connections between attention and agency (Wu, 2011b). For\nWu, attention’s role in action is more fundamental than its role\nin perception. Stout is not the only precedent for this idea. The same\nconnection was noted by William James when he claimed that\n“Volition is nothing but attention”, (see Section\n 1.5,\n above). As with these earlier authors, Wu’s point is not just\nthat, by treating attention as a purely perceptual phenomenon, we\nignore many of its other instances. Instead Wu wants to suggest that\nany division we might attempt to draw between perceptual attention and\nthe attentional selectivity required by agency would be an artificial\none. Even the involuntary capture of attention by perceptually salient\nstimuli should, Wu thinks, be understood as involving a kind of\nreadiness to act on the things to which we involuntarily attend\n(op cit, §3). Wu’s selection-for-action theory of\nattention is therefore intended as a step towards a unification of our\nphilosophical account of ourselves as agents and our philosophical\naccount of ourselves as perceivers.", "\nAccording to selection-for-action type views, the function of\nattention is not the management of capacity limitations. It is,\ninstead, the management of capacity excess. It is because we\ncan process multiple stimuli that we can be distracted by them, and\nbecause we can be distracted by them, not because we cannot process\nthem, that we need mechanisms of attention to provide selectivity and\nfocus. Attention, on this view, serves to lend coherence to, and to\nprevent interference between, the activity of several components in a\nsystem that has the capacity to handle far more stimuli than those\npertaining to the subject’s current task. Such a view contrasts\nsharply with Broadbent’s conception of attentional selectivity\nas capacity-bottleneck management." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Coherence Theories" }, { "content": [ "\nIn the tradition perpetuated by Wu, the selectivity of attention is\nunderstood as providing a solution to one particular problem, created\nby the fact that there are multiple courses of action that might be\ntaken at any time, with the taking of any one requiring the others to\nbe suppressed. The solving of this particular problem is not the only\ncognitive need that could be served by an operation of selectivity,\neven in a mind without bottlenecks of processing capacity. The\nselection-for-action theory is therefore not the only alternative to\nBroadbent’s bottleneck theory. Other functions for attentional\nselectivity might also be proposed. Alternatively—rather than\nelecting any one of these functions of cognitive selectivity as being\nthe function that is essentially served by attention—we might\ninstead characterize attention as a quite general process of\nselectivity, recruitable on any of the various occasions when one\nthing needs to prioritized over another, whether this prioritization\nis required by the presence of a processing bottleneck, required in\norder for a coherent action-plan to be executed, or required for some\nquite different reason. The work of Sebastian Watzl develops the idea\nthat attention might be such a non-specific process of prioritization\n(Watzl, 2017).", "\nIn Watzl’s treatment of it, this idea places particular emphasis\non the fact that, just as a binary ‘is greater than’\nrelation can introduce a partial ordering on a set, so a number of\nthese binary prioritizations can be considered in sum, as introducing\na prioritization structure on the several items that together\nconstitute one’s mental life. For Watzl, attention is the\nprocess by which one’s life comes to have such a structure.", "\nWatzl also claims that any mind which lacked such a structure would\ntherefore be lacking a particular perspective on the world, and so\nwould not be the mind of a creature with the subjective point of view\nthat is characteristic of conscious experiences. From this he derives\nthe claim that every conscious creature is attentive. Carolyn Jennings\nhas suggested that certain kinds of highly engaged expert performance\nmay be a counterexample to this (Jennings, 2015)." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 General-Purpose Prioritization" }, { "content": [ "\nThe idea that there might be reasons for attentional selection that\nhave nothing to do with processing bottlenecks has also been a theme\nin the work of psychologists hoping to understand perception as a\nprocess of Bayesian inference (Friston et al. 2006,\nSummerfield & Egner, 2013), and in the work of those philosophers\nwho have been influenced by them (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2013, 2017).", "\nIn what has come to be the most philosophically developed version of\nthis Bayesian approach to the mind (Hohwy, 2013, Clark, 2013),\ncognition as a whole is understood to be a process of Bayesian\nupdating, in which a hierarchically-organized series of hypotheses is\nconstantly being tested, with each hypothesis being updated in the\nlight of evidence coming from the level below. Advocates of this\ntheory attempt to find room within this hierarchical framework for all\naspects of cognition, including perception, thought, and action. A\ncentral claim of their theory is that the information that gets passed\nup through this hierarchy is encoded in the form of signals\nrepresenting the errors in the predictions that have been\nmade by hypotheses at the hierarchy’s next level up, with the\ncontent of one’s experience at any time being given by whichever\nhypothesis makes the least erroneous predictions. (Different versions\nof the theory use different techniques to calculate the relative size\nof these prediction errors.) Given their commitment to\nprediction-error coding, a central claim of these theories is that the\nrole of our sensory encounter with the world is to provide information\nabout the way in which our prior hypotheses get things wrong: instead\nof providing us with the information that it has started to rain, our\nsenses provide only the information that it is more rainy than we had\nexpected.", "\nAdvocates of this theory claim that it “allows us to see\nattention in a new light and to provide alternative conceptualizations\nof its functional role in our overall mental economy” (Hohwy,\n2014, p. 191). According to these ‘alternative\nconceptions’, attention adjusts the weighting of incoming\nprediction error signals, in accordance with their expected\nprecision (Hohwy, 2012). ‘Precision’ is to be\nunderstood here in the sense that contrasts precision with accuracy.\n‘Accuracy’, in the intended sense, is a measure of the\ndifference between the value indicated by a signal and the actual\nvalue, whereas ‘precision’ is a measure of the random\nfluctuation in that signal, even when the actual input is held\nconstant. A miscalibrated instrument might, in this sense, be highly\nprecise, without being especially accurate.", "\nVarious empirical results make it plausible that the brain takes\naccount of expected precisions when it is processing perceptual\nsignals. In the ventriloquist illusion, for example, it is plausible\nthat expectations of precision have a role to play: It is because\nvision is expected to give a more precise indication of location than\naudition that sounds are heard to come from the location where their\nsource is apparently seen. Other considerations make it equally\nplausible that attention plays a role in accommodating the variations\nin these expected precisions, as we move from one context to another.\nIf we expect that the signal from vision is likely to be a noisy\none—perhaps because a thick fog has started to\ndescend—then we may place more weight than usual on the\ninformation that is present in the signal coming from audition. It\nseems likely that there is a role for attention in bringing about this\nchange of weighting. It is more controversial to claim, as the\nadvocates of this theory do, that “attention is nothing but\nprecision optimization in hierarchical inference.” (Hohwy, 1014,\np.244, citing Feldman & Friston, 2010). Ransom et al.\nhave suggested that, by taking attention always to be\nprecision optimization, this theory struggles to account for certain\nforms of voluntary attention (Ransom et al. 2017). Clark has\nsuggested that this challenge can be met if the sources of voluntary\nattention are identified with beliefs, rather than desires (Clark,\n2017)." ], "subsection_title": "2.5 Precision Optimization Theories and Prediction Error Coding" }, { "content": [ "\nLike the precision-optimization theories that have been advocated by\nHohwy and Clark, from within the framework of the prediction-error\ncoding theory, the Coherence theories advocated by Neisser, Neumann,\nAllport, and Wu have also suggested functions for attention other than\nthe management of limitations in processing capacity. Despite the\navailability of these non-Broadbentian conceptions of\nattention’s function, the Broadbentian idea that\nattention’s selectivity serves to manage limitations in\nprocessing capacity continues to be regarded by many psychologists as\nincontrovertible. The claim that “Because the visual system does\nnot have the capacity to process all inputs simultaneously, there must\nexist attentional processes that help the visual system select some\ninputs” continues to be treated as a platitude of the sort that\ncan be used as an uncontroversial opening sentence when introducing\none’s research. (The example just given comes from the beginning\nof Vecera (2000), but many more examples of the same claim can easily\nbe found.)", "\nFor those who reject this platitude, and think that the\nfunction of attention is something other than the management\nof limitations in processing capacity, it is natural to think that the\nmechanisms of attentional selection may be something other\nthan capacity bottlenecks.", "\nThe clearest non-bottleneck mechanisms for achieving selectivity are\ncompetitions. Since well-organized competitions can always\nselect one winner, however good and however numerous the competitors,\nthe selectivity of a competitive mechanism need not have anything to\ndo with bottlenecks, or with any other limitations of processing\ncapacity.", "\nCompetition-based mechanisms for achieving selectivity come in at\nleast two varieties: In a simple race mechanism each of the\ncompetitors independently completes a process that is comparable,\nalong some dimension of variation, with the processes that are\ncompleted by each of the other competitors. The competitor that\nachieves the highest value on the relevant dimension of variation is\nselected as the winner. In a struggle the competitors do not\njust get on with their own processing in the hope that they will do it\nbetter than each of the other competitors. Instead the active\nsuppression of other competitors is a part of the process that each\ncompetitor carries out. Simple race models of attention have been\nproposed (Shibuya and Bundesen, 1988, Bundesen, 1987), but our best\ncurrent theories supplement the simple race mechanism with some\ncomponents of mutual struggle, or with additional processes of\ntop-down control (see, for example, Bundesen and Habekost, 2008).", "\nOne suggestion for a supplemented-competition mechanism for\nattentional selectivity is the biased-competition model, elaborated in\nseveral works by Robert Desimone, John Duncan and John Reynolds. The\nbiased-competition model accounts for various attention-involving\neffects, at the personal and at the sub-personal level, as being\neffects that arise from numerous struggles between the different\nstimuli that fall within the variously sized receptive fields of\nneurons throughout the perceptual processing hierarchy. It is\nhypothesized that each one of these struggles is biased, although not\nsettled outright, by a top-down attention-specific signal (Desimone\nand Duncan, 1995, Reynolds and Desimone, 2001).", "\nWe have said that competitions are selective in ways that do not\ninvolve limitations in capacity, and that competition-based theories\nof attention’s underlying mechanisms are therefore natural\naccompaniments to selection-for-action type views of attention’s\nfunction (Section\n 2.3),\n and perhaps to other views that involve a break from the Broadbentian\nview according to which attention’s function is the management of\ncapacity limitations. Competition views of attention’s\nmechanisms do not, however, require us to take a non-Broadbentian view\nof attention’s function. Although the biased competition view\nsits naturally with a non-Broadbentian view of that function, Reynolds\nand Desimone continue to introduce the biased competition theory as an\nattempt to understand attention in recognizably Broadbentian terms,\nwriting that:", "\nThe visual system is limited in its capacity to process information.\nHowever, it is equipped to overcome this constraint because it can\ndirect this limited capacity channel to locations or objects of\ninterest. (2001, 233)\n", "\nSome advocates of the biased competition view emphasize the particular\nimportance of the top-down biasing signals that the theory postulates\n(e.g., Beck and Kastner, 2009, p. 1156), taking the source of\nthese signals to be the true locus of attentional selection. Others\nsuggest that the biased competition theory is better understood as a\ntheory that refuses to identify any such locus, and that it should\ninstead be read (as suggested in Duncan’s original presentation\nof the theory, (Duncan 1996)) as attributing the selectivity of\nattention to the totality of an integrated competition, involving\nprocesses of various sorts at various levels, any part of which can\nbias any other (Mole, 2011, §6.7, 2015).", "\nWhen it is understood in this second way the biased-competition theory\naccords with the proposal that attention should be taken to have a\nmetaphysical status analogous to that of unison in an orchestra.\nAccording to this view it is always a mistake to identify any one\nprocess as the attention process (or any set of processes as the\nattention processes); attention requires the unified activity of\nwhichever processes happen to be relevant to a person’s current\ntask, but, since these vary from one task to the next, it does not\nrequire any particular processes to be taking place. Such a\nview has been developed in work by Christopher Mole, who dubs it the\n‘Cognitive Unison Theory’. Metaphysically speaking, such a\ntheory can be understood as a revival of John Locke and F.H.\nBradley’s view that attention is a mode of thinking (see\n Section 1.3\n above). Phenomenologically the view has a precedent in Ribot’s\nsuggestion that attention be identified with ‘monoideism’\n(Ribot, 1889, p. 10). It also draws on some ideas about the\n‘polymorphousness’ of attention, which were advocated in a\n1964 monograph by Alan White, on the basis of considerations drawn\nfrom the examination of various ‘heed concepts’ in natural\nlanguage.", "\nBecause operating in unison requires an absence of task-irrelevant\nprocessing, the most straightforward version of the unison theory\nentails that full attention is a rare achievement, with most cases of\nattentiveness involving what is, strictly speaking, only partial or\ndivided attention. Mole (like Ribot) accepts this implication. Yair\nLevy has suggested that doing so prevents him from giving an adequate\naccount of phenomena such a listening, or observing, which always\nrequire some attention to be paid, but which can nonetheless be done\nmore or less attentively (Levy, 2019). Work by Philipp Koralus has\nsuggested that a more satisfactory treatment of divided attention can\nbe given if the attentive pursuit of a task is understood to share\ncertain formal properties with the answering of a question (Koralus,\n2014). This characterization of attention as “the means by which\nwe answer questions about the environment” has been argued for\non phenomenological and epistemological grounds by Naomi Eilan (Eilan,\n1998). (Eilan credits the thought to Rowland Stout, whose treatment of\nit can be found in Chapter 9 §5 of Stout 2006.) Koralus draws on\nHamblin’s 1958 semantics of questions to provide a formal model\nof such questioning (Hamblin, 1958).", "\nThere are philosophical issues, independent of the cognitive unison\ntheory, about the way in which partial or divided attention relates to\nfull attention, and about whether a distinction should be drawn\nbetween the attention that is given to things by which we are merely\ndistracted and the attention that is given to things on which we\nremain concertedly focused. Aaron Henry considers these questions as\npart of a more general enquiry into attention and control, using the\nnotion of constitutive norms to provide an account in which\ndistraction always does involve a certain sort of shortcoming, while\nnonetheless qualifying as a case of genuine attention, rather than\nmerely being a defective approximation of it (Henry, 2019). Zachary\nIrving has suggested that the wandering of a distracted mind presents\nphilosophical puzzles of its own, and has worked towards giving an\nempirically-informed account of mind-wandering that avoids these\npuzzles. His account takes such wandering to be attentive but unguided\n(Irving, 2016). Theories such as the Cognitive Unison Theory, in which\nattention essentially depends on the performance of an\nunderstanding-guided task, will need to find some alternative account\nof the phenomena that Irving identifies." ], "subsection_title": "2.6 Competition Theories and Cognitive Unison" }, { "content": [ "\nWhereas bottleneck metaphors have traditionally guided the\ntheories that attempt to locate the cognitive resources that operate\nonly on attended stimuli, it has been spotlight metaphors\nthat have guided the theories that attempt to say which features of a\nstimulus determine whether attention is being paid to that stimulus at\nany given moment (e.g., Watchel, 1967; Woodman and Luck, 1999; see\nFernandez-Duque and Johnson, 2002, for discussion). The idea suggested\nby the spotlight metaphor is that a stimulus’s location\nultimately determines whether or not that stimulus receives attention:\nthe point here is not to deny that one can pay attention to something\non account of it being brightly coloured, or on account of it being\ninteresting. The point is, instead, that one pays attention to\nbrightly coloured or interesting things only by directing one’s\nattention to the location of those things.", "\nOne can easily see why the spotlight metaphor has been appealing. If\nwe are presented with an array of differently coloured shapes,\nappearing and disappearing in various places, then there will be any\nnumber of attention-demanding tasks that we might perform regarding\nthat array. Some tasks might require us to attend to whatever is going\non at the top of the screen, others might require us to attend to all\nthe red shapes, or to all the triangles, or to something else. Some of\nthese ways of attending seem to be more basic than others. It seems,\nfor example, that attending to things in the top part of the screen\nmight be a primitive task, whereas attending to the triangles could\nnot be primitive in the same way: we cannot simply attend to\nthe triangles. If we want to attend to the triangles, we need first to\nwork out where the triangles are. If, on the other hand, we\nwant to attend to the things in the top part of the screen we do not\nneed to work out whether they are triangles. It is therefore plausible\nthat when we attend to the triangles we do so by attending to\ntheir locations. In this sense attending on the basis of location\nseems to be more basic than attending on the basis of shape.", "\nThe idea that attending to a location is more basic than attending to\na shape might tempt one to think that attending on the basis of\nlocation is absolutely basic, so that attention is always and only\nallocated on the basis of location. If that were right then a theory\nof the spatial allocation of attention—a theory about the moving\nand focusing of an ‘attentional spotlight’—would be\na large and central component in an account of how attention works.\nThis would be good news for those who want to give a single unified\ntheory of attention, and it would be good news for the scientific\nproject of explaining attention more generally, since\nattention’s spotlight-like behaviours are some of its best\nunderstood aspects (see Logan, 1996).", "\nThere are reasons to think that location does play a special role in\nthe allocation of attention, as the spotlight metaphor suggests. But\nthe role of location in the allocation of attention is probably not as\nstraightforward as would be required by the most parsimonious of\nspotlight-based theories. Location does have a special role to play\nhere, but (1) location is not the only property to have such a role,\nand (2) the role of location is more complicated than a simple\nspotlight metaphor suggests.", "\nEmpirical debates about the direction of the spotlight of attention\nhave focussed mostly on the second of these points. An important\nsource of data here is case studies contrasting the different patterns\nof attention failure that are shown by different unilateral neglect\npatients. Such studies suggest that various frames of reference are\ninvolved in the spatial allocation of attention (Behrmann and Tipper,\n1999). This indicates that there is no single map of\nlocations determining which items get attention: attention is\nsometimes allocated on the basis of location in egocentric space,\nsometimes on the basis of location in more complex frames of reference\n(a point that was among those raised by Allport, in his influential\ncritique of the Broadbentian debates (see Allport, 1992, p. 197)).", "\nThere are also some well-known experimental effects suggesting that\nattention is allocated, not on the basis of straightforward spatial\ncoordinates, but in ways that are constrained by the distribution of\nobjects in space. The classic work in this area is John\nDuncan’s demonstration that attention shifts more readily\nbetween two locations that fall within the bounds of a single object\nthan between equidistant locations that are separated by an object\nboundary (Duncan, 1984). Equally important here are findings from\nexperiments using three-dimensional stimuli, and using virtual\nthree-dimensional displays. These studies suggest that experimental\nparticipants are unable to differentially attend to depths in an empty\nspace, but that these participants start to be able to shift their\nattention forwards and backward (to a place in front of or behind the\npoint that their eyes are fixating) when the relevant locations are\nones in which there are objects (see Yantis, 1998).", "\nThese converging sources of data indicate that the spotlight of\nattention is not allocated simply on the basis of coordinates in any\nsingle spatial frame of reference. That is an important finding for\nthose attempting to localize mechanisms for the allocation of\nattention within the brain (since different brain areas differ in\ntheir mapping of space, and in their representation of spatial\ninformation about the objects within it). It has been influential in\nleading psychologists to turn away from simple spotlight metaphors. It\nshould be noted, however, that these findings do not threaten the core\nof the idea that was suggested by the spotlight metaphor: the facts\nabout what a person is attending to might still supervene on the facts\nabout where that person is attending, even if quite numerous\nand sometimes complex factors are responsible for determining which\nlocation that is.", "\nOther effects are somewhat more damaging for a pure spotlight view,\nalthough they also stop short of refuting it entirely. The\nmore-than-merely-spatial complexity of the way in which attention is\nallocated has been nicely demonstrated in a series of experiments by\nDwight Kravitz and Marlene Behrmann (Kravitz and Behrmann, 2011). The\nparticipants in these experiments have their attention cued by a brief\nstimulus that is presented at one end of a shape that is shown on a\ncomputer screen. This shape might be a simple rectangle, a rectangle\nwith bulbous ends, or a more complex ‘H’ or\n‘h’ shape. It is presented alongside another shape, which\nin some cases has the same shape and colour, and in other cases is\ndifferent. The resulting allocation of attention is then probed by\nmeasuring the reaction times to stimuli that are presented on and near\nthese objects. Kravitz and Behrmann find that all the different\nproperties of their stimuli interact to determine the way in\nwhich attention is allocated to the screen on which those stimuli\nappear. Most strikingly of all, they find a difference in the\nallocation of attention between trials in which the shapes on the\nscreen are an upper and a lower case ‘H’, and trials in\nwhich the shapes are an upper case H and number 4, even though this\nnumber 4 shape is exactly the same as the lower case h, but presented\nupside down. Such findings suggest that attention, even when triggered\nby a simple spatial cue, is not allocated merely on the basis of\nlocation, but also on the basis of shape, colour, and arbitrary\nlearned meaning.", "\nThe discovery that attention can preferentially modulate the\nprocessing of stimuli on account of their colours, shapes, and\nmeanings does not prevent us from maintaining that the location of a\nstimulus has a special role to play in the process by which attention\nis allocated to it. More than one line of research in psychology has\nsought to identify some one representation in the brain in which items\nare encoded in a way that determines the extent to which attention\nwill be allocated to them. In the longest established of these lines\nof research—beginning with the work of Koch and Ullman\n(1985)—this representation has been taken to be a map,\nin some quite literal sense of ‘map’: the representation\nis taken to be one in which every location in some region is\nrepresented, and the representation of these locations is taken to be\nin some format that immediately encodes the spatial relations between\nthem. Every object that is represented is taken to be represented as\nbeing at some location, and the properties assigned to these located\nobjects are taken to determine the likelihood that attention will be\npaid to the location that the objects occupy. According to the theory\nthat postulates these ‘salience maps’, location does play\na unique role in determining the way in which attention is allocated,\ndespite the fact that other properties also contribute to that\nallocation.", "\nIn more recent treatments of this idea (Pessoa, 2013) such maps are\ntaken to include representations, not merely of the objective\nproperties that give an item salience, but also of subjective\nproperties, such as emotional-valence and\ncurrent-motivational-relevance. The more we think of these maps as\nbeing augmented with additional, non-spatial information, the less\nspotlight-like the allocation of attention represented in them will\nseem to be, but, provided the representation in question is still\nunderstood to be map-like, location can still be understood to have an\nimportant role, and perhaps even a uniquely important one.", "\nDebates about the role of such maps, and about the variety of\nsubjective and objective properties that are represented within them,\nmay have some wide-ranging philosophical consequences, concerning more\nthan just the aptness of the spotlight metaphor. Aaron Henry has\nsuggested that the viability of some recent philosophical theories\ndepends on the outcome of these debates. Since the recent\nphilosophical theories of attention have tended to emphasize the role\nof agency in attention, they face potential counterexamples from\ninstances of involuntary attention. Henry suggests that the threat of\nsuch counterexamples can be defused if the mechanisms of involuntary\nattention capture are understood to involve attention being allocated\non the basis of a map in which the agent’s own priorities for\naction are represented (Henry, 2017).", "\nAlthough the psychological debates about salience maps are ongoing, an\nargument against pure spotlight views can also be made on more\ntraditional, phenomenological grounds. A pure spotlight theory,\naccording to which attention is always allocated on the basis of\nlocation, seems unable to account for the sort of case that Hermann\nvon Helmholtz and William James were concerned with (see section\n 1.5).\n There is, as their example suggests, a difference between attending\nto the pitch of a note and attending to its timbre, or to its\novertones. This difference in attention does not seem to correspond to\nany difference in the location attended. Nor does any purely\nlocation-based theory of attention allocation seem able to account for\nthe sort attention that one must pay in order to perform a time-based\ntask, such as finding out which of a group of shapes appears on screen\nfor longest. Such temporal aspects of attention have been a relatively\nlate addition to the psychological research agenda (see the papers\ncollected in Nobre and Coull, 2010). The research concerning them is\nbeginning to reveal a diverse range of effects, with a range of\nsimilarly diverse neural underpinnings (Nobre and van Ede, 2018). Some\nphilosophical work has been devoted to the exploration of these\ntemporal aspects of attention (see Phillips, 2011), but it is work\nthat has tended to address questions that further our understanding of\nthe experience and perception of time, without attempting to\ncontribute directly to our philosophical understanding of attention\nitself (see the entry on\n The Experience and Perception of Time).", "\nSince some shifts of attention are not shifts in the location\nattended, a theory of the factors that determine which locations a\nsubject is attending to cannot tell us the whole story about the\nallocation of attention. It might nonetheless be a central component\nin a theory of some of attention’s forms (see Wright and Ward,\n2008)." ], "subsection_title": "2.7 Spotlight Theories" }, { "content": [ "\nWork in which electrodes are used in vivo to stimulate areas\nof the macaque brain known to be associated with eye-movement\ncoordination has provided strong evidence for the existence of an\nanatomical overlap between brain areas involved in eye-movement\ncontrol and those involved in determining which stimuli elicit the\nstrongest responses in visual cortex. There is also evidence that this\nanatomical fact has some functional significance. One suggestive\nfinding is that the links between frontal eye-movement-control areas\nand attention-like effects in occipital visual areas are spatially\nspecific: an electrode that is placed so that it elicits an eye\nmovement to a particular part of the visual field when activated at\none level will, if activated at a lower level, elicit changes in\nneural responsiveness that are exactly similar to the changes that are\nseen when attention is shifted to that same location (Moore and\nArmstrong, 2003, Armstrong and Moore, 2007).", "\nThese facts have been taken to be suggestive of a ‘motor\ntheory’ of attention, according to which the processes\nunderpinning attention are, in at least some cases, truncated versions\nof the processes underpinning the coordination of movements of sensory\norientation.", "\nThe central idea of such a theory is that “the program for\norienting attention either overtly or covertly is the same, but in the\nlatter case the eyes are blocked at a certain peripheral stage”\n(Rizzolatti et al, 1987, 37). Advocates of motor theories\n(such as Moore, Armstrong and Fallah, 2003) have characterised their\nwork as a revival of the picture that Alexander Bain proposed at the\nend of the nineteenth century. Bain (as we saw in Section\n 1.5,\n above) identified attention with truncated versions of the\nmotor-control processes that typically bring about attention’s\nbehavioural manifestations — processes “stopping short of\nthe actual movement performed by the organ” (Bain, 1888,\n371).", "\nThese versions of the motor theory should be distinguished from\ntheories that regard attention and motor control as intimately linked,\nbut that place no emphasis on the fact that the motor control\nprocesses that have been implicated in attention are processes that\ncontrol the movement of sensory organs. In these theories\n(which are natural but not obligatory concomitants of the\n‘selection-for-action’ views discussed in\n section 2.5)\n attention stands in an intimate relation to motor control more\ngenerally. One line of experimental evidence in support of such a\ngeneral connection comes from work by Heiner Deubel and his\ncollaborators, in which various changes to the way in which an object\nfigures in action are shown to have an attention-indicating influence\non the perceptual discrimination of stimuli that are presented on or\nnear that object. In one striking example of this, Deubel and\nSchneider found that the way in which attention is allocated to the\nspace around a 6.5cm wooden X shape depended on whether the subject\nwas reaching with her left hand to grasp the shape by the top-left and\nbottom right arms, or reaching with her right hand to grasp the shape\nby the arms at its top-right and bottom left (Deubel & Schneider,\n2004). In each case attention was allocated not only to the shape, but\nto the to-be-gripped parts of it. (For other evidence of interactions\nbetween attention and action-targeting, see Tipper, Howard, and\nHoughton, 1998.)", "\nMotor theories and other action-based theories give a plausible\naccount of some of attention’s instances, but they have\nlimitations that prevent them from applying with full generality:\nSince movement of the eyes, or of the limbs, is always movement to\na location motor theories will struggle to account for the\nallocation of attention on the basis of anything other than location.\nThey therefore face the limitations that we saw when considering pure\nspotlight theories, of being unable to account for shifts in attention\nthat do not correspond to differences in the location attended. Nor is\nit clear how motor theories should be applied to spatial attention in\nthose sensory modalities where the orientation of the sense organs is\nless straightforward than it is in the visual case. The motor theory\ndoes, nonetheless, provide a plausible and well-supported account of\nthe location-based variety of visual attention that is displayed in\ntypical attention-lab experiments.", "\nThe success of motor theories in accounting for the sorts of attention\nthat are found in some typical attention-lab experiments can be given\neither an optimistic or a pessimistic interpretation. The optimistic\ninterpretation sees the motor theory as providing a successful account\nof the processing underpinning some of attention’s simpler and\nmore central varieties. The pessimistic interpretation sees the motor\ntheory as revealing a problem with our usual experimental\nparadigms. The participants in typical laboratory tasks direct\ntheir attention to different parts of their visual field, while\nkeeping their eyes fixated on a central spot. The behavioural\nsignatures of attention in such tasks are usually reductions in\nreaction time to the attended stimuli. The neural correlates of these\nbehavioural signatures are certain biases as to which stimuli most\nstrongly drive the neural circuitry that processes them. The central\nfinding of the motor-theorists is that these neural and behavioural\neffects can result from attenuated versions of the activity\nresponsible for directing eye movements. The pessimistic\ninterpretation of this finding is as revealing that signs that have\ntraditionally been taken to indicate the direction of attention are\nactually no more than consequences of the truncated eye-movements that\nour experimental paradigms induce, by imposing the restriction that\nexperimental participants fixate their gaze on a single location. If\nthat is right then the phenomenon studied in attention labs may not be\nthe psychologically important one that it has been taken for.", "\nMotor theorists are not the only ones who might be accused of\nelevating a theory of some circumscribed subset of attention-related\nphenomena into a spuriously general theory of attention in its\nentirety. Henry Taylor has shown that, although the ambition to give a\ngeneral theory of attention is widespread among the philosophers who\nhave recently written on this subject, it is seldom found in the\nrecent psychological literature, where it has proven fruitful to\nfollow the influential example of Michael Posner by giving somewhat\nseparate treatments of attention’s roles in vigilance, in\nperceptual orientation, and in the focalized deployment of processing\nresources (Taylor, 2015, 2018; Posner and Boies, 1971). Taylor\nsuggests that the psychologists’ tolerance for pluralism here\nshould be reflected in our philosophical theories." ], "subsection_title": "2.8 Motor Theories" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Explanatory Roles for Attention", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe question of whether attention is necessary for consciousness has\nbeen answered in various ways. One answer is given by those who think\nthat lots of unattended items appear in consciousness. A different\nanswer is given by those who think that only some unattended items\nfigure in consciousness. A third answer is given if we think that\nunattended items figure in consciousness only in special\ncircumstances. There is some evidence that, independently of any\nphilosophical commitments, people differ as to which of these views\nthey find plausible (Schwitzgebel, 2007). There are also some theories\n(e.g., Watzl, 2017) in which attention is necessary for\n‘creature consciousness’ in the sense that every conscious\ncreature must be an attentive one. Such views need not entail that\nattention to an object is necessary for the conscious perception of\nthat object.", "\nAt one extreme end of this spectrum is the view according to which\nattention to a thing is strictly necessary for consciousness of it, so\nthat the things to which we are not paying attention do not figure in\nour consciousness at all. A number of psychologists endorse this view\n(e.g., Cohen et al. 2012), as do some philosophers (e.g.,\nPrinz, 2012, Carruthers, 2015, Montemayor & Haladjian, 2015). It\nhas historical precedent in James’s remark, at the beginning of\nhis chapter on attention, that “my experience is what I agree to\nattend to”(James, 1890, ch. 11), and in Kames’ remark that\n“Attention is requisite even to the simple act of seeing”\n(Kames, 1769, see Sect\n 1.4,\n above).", "\nThe evidence that is proffered in support of the view that attention\nis strictly necessary for consciousness comes from a range of\nexperiments showing the surprising extent to which experimental\nparticipants are ignorant of the items to which they have paid no\nattention. In Arien Mack and Irvin Rock’s ‘inattentional\nblindness’ paradigm, for example, participants who are given an\nattention-demanding task pertaining to a stimulus in one part of their\nvisual field frequently fail to notice shapes or words that are\nflashed up elsewhere (Mack & Rock, 1998). In Rensink et\nal.’s ‘change blindness’ paradigm the\nparticipants need to see an alternating pair of pictures between ten\nand twenty times before they can identify a large but narratively\ninconsequential difference between them (Rensink et al.,\n1997, Rensink, 2002). In the most memorable of these experiments a\nlarge number of participants fail to notice the central appearance of\na man in a gorilla suit when their attention is taken up with the\nbusiness of counting the number of passes made by one of two teams in\na concurrent basketball-type game (Simons & Chabdris, 1999).", "\nNo single one of these experiments can establish the claim that\nattention is always necessary for consciousness. That claim is a\nuniversally quantified one, and is not entailed by any one of its\ninstances. Nor is it clear that what we see in these experiments\nreally are instances in which unattended objects drop out of\nconsciousness altogether. The participants’ ignorance of the\ngorilla’s appearance, for example, is compatible with it being\nthe case that the presence of the gorilla does make a\nphenomenal difference to their inattentive experience. To explain\nthose participants’ ignorance we need only say that any\nphenomenal difference that the unattended gorilla makes is a\ndifference that the participants are unable to use in answering the\nexperimenter’s question about whether anything strange happened\nin the scene. It may be a phenomenal difference that is epistemically\nunusable because it is immediately forgotten (see Wolfe, 1998) or it\nmay, alternatively, be a difference that is unusable because it is too\nunstructured and inchoate to be epistemically mobilizable. In that\ncase the effect of inattention would be inattentional\nagnosia, rather than inattentional blindness (see\nSimons, 2000).", "\nAbsolute amnesia for unattended items, or thoroughgoing agnosia for\nthem, may be indistinguishable from inattentional blindness, both\nbehaviourally and from the point of view of retrospective\nintrospection. For that reason it is not a straightforward matter for\nthe advocates of any of these interpretations of the inattentional\nblindness and change blindness effects to rule out the alternative\ninterpretations. Subpersonal sources of data (such as experiments\nusing neuroimaging) may be the only sources of data that we have to go\non. (See Rees, et al. 1999, for an example in which fMRI data\nis used to argue against the amnesia interpretation of inattentional\nblindness effects involving written words).", "\nIt is only narratively insignificant differences that go unnoticed in\nthe change-blindness paradigm. Change blindness effects might\ntherefore be taken as showing, not that there is no consciousness in\nthe absence of attention, but that there is consciousness in\nthe absence of attention, the contents of which are restricted to the\nscene’s overall gist. There are difficulties in adjudicating\nbetween these two interpretations experimentally. When features of\ngist do seem to be perceived, in the apparent absence of attention,\nthe defender of the claim that attention is necessary for\nconsciousness may reply by claiming that attention has been paid to\nthese items, either in a dispersed, non-focal way (Prettyman, 2013),\nor because these features are briefly and involuntarily\nattention-catching (Prinz, 2012, p. 119). Without an experimental\noperationalization of complete inattention, these rival\ninterpretations cannot be ruled out, with the result that empirical\ndebates about the extent of consciousness beyond attention are\ncurrently in something of deadlock, with experimenters being able to\nclaim only to have demonstrated perception in the ‘near\nabsence’ of attention (Li et al., 2002, Reddy et\nal., 2004, Reddy et al., 2006), and so providing only\ninconclusive support to the hypothesis that attention and\nconsciousness are dissociable (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007).", "\nThe methodological puzzle that we face when trying to settle the\ndispute between different interpretations of the inattentional and\nchange blindness effects raises the question of whether our\ncommonsense beliefs about the conscious status of unattended items are\nwell founded. Such beliefs seem to vary from person to person\n(Schwitzgebel, 2007), and to vary with certain features of the context\nin which they are probed (De Brigard, 2010). To the extent that we\nfind it natural to suppose that unattended items do figure in\nconsciousness, this may simply be owing to a version of the\n‘refrigerator-light illusion’: If our reason for believing\nthat we are conscious of the things to which we pay no attention is a\nreason that depends on our finding that we are conscious of those\nthings whenever we check on them then that belief is on shaky ground.\nA checking procedure cannot provide us with good evidence about the\nstatus of unattended items since the act of checking is itself an act\nthat involves a shift in attention to the things checked\n(O’Regan & Noë, 2001).", "\nSince a direct checking procedure is ruled out we need a more\ntheory-driven way of assessing the dispute between those who claim\nthat the consequence of not attending to an item is that the item\ndrops out of conscious experience and those who claim that inattention\nsimply puts the subject in a poor epistemic position vis-à-vis\nthese unattended items. The current state of our theories is such that\nit would be premature to try to settle this dispute by an inference to\nthe best explanation, since neither side of the dispute has a theory\nof the attention/consciousness relation that has been worked out to a\ndegree that would allow the different explanations to be compared. We\ncan, however, see some of the considerations that the two sides in\nthis debate might invoke. Those who endorse the idea that attention is\nnecessary for consciousness can point to the fact that this view\naccords well with theories in which attention features prominently in\nthe explanation of consciousness (e.g., Prinz, 2005, 2012). They may\nalso be able to develop arguments based on theories of the way in\nwhich consciousness and attention evolved (Montemayor & Haladjian,\n2015). Those who prefer the epistemic-deficit interpretation of the\ninattentional blindness effects (Mole, 2011, §7.3.7) can point to\nthe fact that that interpretation flows naturally from the view\naccording to which attention to an item provides the sort of\nacquaintance that is needed for the use of a demonstrative concept\nthat refers to that item (a view advocated by Campbell, 2002, and\ndiscussed in section\n 3.2\n below): If attention to the gorilla is necessary for the forming of a\ndemonstrative-involving thought (such as ‘That’s a\ngorilla’) then there is an immediate explanation, consistent\nwith the idea that unattended items nonetheless feature in\nconsciousness, for the fact that inattentive people are unable to\nanswer questions such as ‘Was there a gorilla?’.", "\nThe difficulty in the case of the unnoticed gorilla is to discern\nwhether unattended items are present to consciousness but present only\nas unindividuated items to which no demonstrative reference has yet\nbeen directed, or whether those unattended items are instead absent\nfrom consciousness altogether. Part of this difficulty originates in\nthe fact that, although most people give no attention to the gorilla,\nthey could attend to him, and would have done so if anything\nhad prompted them to do so. More data may be available, both to\nintrospection and to laboratory measurement, in cases where our\nfailure to attend has some more systemic explanation. Ned Block has\nsuggested that one such case is found in our perception of peripheral\nstimuli, when these are subject to the phenomenon of ‘identity\ncrowding’ (Block, 2013a). An individual ‘T’ or\n‘F’ can be seen reasonably clearly, even when presented in\na peripheral part of the visual field. But if additional characters\nare presented alongside this individual character, then the properties\nof those characters become prone to perceptual confusion. Attention\nseems to bind together properties from all of the characters in the\nvicinity of the one individual that we are trying to pick out. It\ntherefore seems that, in the perceptual periphery, attention cannot be\ndirected onto a region that fits an individual character tightly. Due\nto this ‘crowding’ effect, individual letters or shapes\nbecome impossible to individuate from the others with which they are\nclustered, when they fall into parts of the visual field that are\noutside of the high-definition centre. The properties of objects that\nare crowded in this way can nonetheless be seen, and the fact that\nseveral items are present can be reliably reported. On the basis of\nempirical and introspective considerations, Block claims that, even in\ncases where the crowded characters share all of their features with\nthe others by which they are crowded, these crowded characters are\nconsciously discriminated from their surroundings. He claims that\nthese characters figure as objects in consciousness. Since attention\ncannot be allocated to anything more fine-grained than the crowd of\nwhich these characters are a part, the characters are not themselves\nobjects to which attention is paid. Block therefore takes\n‘identity crowding’ to give counterexamples to the claim\nthat we are conscious of objects only when paying attention to\nthem.", "\nBlock’s claim that the crowded characters figure in\nconsciousness as individuated objects, rather than as parts of some\nfeature-rich texture, has been contested (Taylor, 2013, Richards,\n2013). In response, Block has suggested that an inference the best\nexplanation of several related phenomena favours his interpretation of\nthe effect (Block, 2013b).", "\nInference to the best explanation is always a hazardous business,\nespecially in the vicinity of an explanatory gap. In the\ninterpretation of identity crowding, as in the interpretation of\ninattentional blindness, the inescapability of abductive\nconsiderations suggests that our answer to the question of whether\nattention is necessary for consciousness may have to wait until we\nhave a better understanding of the relation of attention to\ndemonstrative reference (of the sort that is involved in thinking\n‘That’s a gorilla’), and perhaps until we have a\nbetter understanding of attention’s role in epistemology more\ngenerally. (See\n sections 3.3 & 3.4 ,\n below.)", "\nIn addition to disputes about whether we are conscious of\nonly those things to which we attend, there are also disputes\nabout whether we are conscious of everything to which we\nattend. If we were then a complete theory of attention might be given\nby giving an account of the way in which attention modulates\nconsciousness.", "\nDeclan Smithies has argued in favour of a position according to which\neverything that is attended to is consciously attended to. He claims\nthat all instances of attention must be consciousness-involving, on\nthe grounds that (1) all such instances must have a connection with\ntheir subject’s ‘rational-access’ to the contents of\nher experience, and (2) there is no connection to rationality in the\ncase of processing that is wholly unconscious. Smithies’ view\nis, therefore, that attention is essentially involved in the\n‘rational-access’ of consciously experienced contents\n(Smithies, 2011). The nature of any such connection between attention\nto an experience and the justificatory force of that experience is\nitself a source of ongoing controversy: Johannes Roesller has argued\nthat John McDowell’s theory of perceptual experience’s\nreason-giving force cannot account for the role played by attention in\nexperience (Roessler, 2011); Susanna Siegel and Nicholas Silins have\nclaimed that the doxastic influence of an experience can be an\ninstance of rational access even when that experience receives no\nattention (Siegel & Silins, 2014); Terry Horgan and Matjaž\nPotrč have argued that the justification of beliefs by experience\nmust outrun both the contents of attention and the contents of\nconsciousness (Horgan and Potrč 2011). Here, as above,\none’s understanding of attention and one’s understanding\nof epistemology constrain one another, and may provide a theory-driven\nroute by which to settle questions about the possibility of\nunconscious attentiveness.", "\nThe claim that all attention is conscious attention sits uneasily with\ncertain empirical results indicating that consciousness is not\nrequired for the operation of those psychological processes that are\nresponsible for certain effects that are usually taken to be\nsignatures of attention. In an experiment by Yi Jiang et al.,\n(2006), for example, participants are presented with\nattention-attracting stimuli in such a way that, thanks to an\narrangement of mirrors, these stimuli are given to just one eye.\nBecause a more vivid stimulus is presented to the other eye, and\nbecause this more vivid stimulus wins the competition for\nconsciousness that occurs in such cases of binocular rivalry, these\nexperimental participants do not consciously experience the less vivid\nstimulus. Those unconsciously processed stimuli include erotic\nphotographs. And those photographs do seem to elicit shifts of\nattention, despite being unseen, as is evidenced by the fact that\nconsciously experienced stimuli that are presented in the same\nlocation as these unseen attention-grabbers are more accurately\nresponded to in an attention demanding task (involving detecting the\norientation of gabor-patches). One striking finding from Jiang et\nal.’s experiments is that the way in which these unseen\nphotographs attract and repel attention depends on the sexual\norientation of the experimental participants.", "\nA natural interpretation of these experiments is as showing that the\nerotic pictures capture the participants’ attention, despite the\nfact that those participants have no conscious experience of them.\nThis suggests—although it does not conclusively\ndemonstrate—that one may be attending to a thing without being\nconscious of it. The same conclusion is suggested by a quite different\nset of experiments involving a patient with blindsight. These\nexperiments show that, even though the blindsighted patient has no\nexperience of cues presented in his scotoma, those cues can elicit the\nfacilitation of processing and reduction of reaction times that are\nusually taken to be the signatures of attention (Kentridge &\nHeywood, 2001, Kentridge et al., 2004).", "\nOne complaint against both these lines of evidence is that they do not\nenable us to distinguish between attention to a thing and attention\nthat is directed to a part of space (in which that thing happens to\nbe), with the result that they cannot demonstrate attention to a\nthing in the absence of consciousness of that same thing (Mole,\n2008a). Research by Liam Norman, Charles Heywood and Robert Kentridge\ngoes some way towards addressing this complaint. Norman, Heywood and\nKentridge present normal participants with a screen showing an array\nof small, rapidly flickering Gabor patches. Objects the boundaries of\nwhich are defined by changes in the orientations of these patches are\nnot consciously experienced: Participants merely see the whole screen\nas a flickering array of patches. Cues that direct the attention of\nthose participants do nonetheless seem to draw attention to these\nunseen objects, as indicated by differences in the response times to\nitems that are subsequently presented in and outside of their\nboundaries (Norman, Heywood & Kentridge, 2013).", "\nSuch experiments show that there is an influence operating between\nunconscious processing and the direction of attention, and perhaps\nindicate that attention can be paid to objects that make no showing in\nconscious experience (Mole, 2014a). They therefore place a limit on\nthe closeness of the relationship that can be claimed to exist between\nattention and consciousness.", "\nThe disputes about whether attention is sufficient for consciousness,\nnecessary for consciousness, or both, are related to questions about\nattention’s metaphysics. The claim that attention is not\nsufficient for consciousness is typically made as part of a defence of\nthe idea that attention and consciousness are underpinned by two\ndistinct brain processes, which can occur independently (see, e.g.,\nKoch and Tsuchiya, 2007). The claim that the things to which we attend\nare a proper subset of the things that appear in our consciousness is\nrequired by those who, like Locke (see Section\n 1.3),\n think that there is a process of conscious thinking, and that this\nconstitutes attention when it happens in a certain way. \nAnd the claim that attention is both necessary and sufficient for\nconsciousness is required by those who think that the process by which\nthings come to consciousness is identical to the process by which\nattention is allocated (Prinz, 2005, 2011). Some scientific theories\nof consciousness also carry strong commitments concerning its\nrelationship to attention: Taylor Webb and Michael Graziano emphasize\nthese commitments in making the empirical case for their\n‘Attention-Schema’ theory, according to which\nconsciousness emerges from processes in which the control of attention\nrequires a schematic representation of the way in which attention is\nbeing allocated (Graziano and Webb, 2014; Webb and Graziano,\n2015).", "\nWhether or not one thinks that attention is always responsible for\nbringing things into our consciousness, there are good reasons to\nthink that changes in the direction of our attention can make some\ndifference to the character of conscious experience. Phenomenologists\nand Gestalt psychologists have characterized this difference in\nvarious ways, with Maurice Merleau-Ponty emphasizing the way in which\nattention can configure the figure/ground structure of perceived space\n(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, Chp.3–4), and Aron Gurwitsch (Gurwitsch,\n1964) elaborating a theory in which the configuration given by\nattention has a more complex, three-part structure (explained in\nArvidson, 2006). In the second half of his 2017 book, Sebastian Watzl\ndevelops a similar suggestion, on the basis of his claim that the role\nof attention is to impose a priority structure on our mental lives\n(see above\n §2.4),\n (Watzl, 2011, 2017).", "\nThere is currently some dispute about whether the differences made by\nshifts of attention can be adequately characterized as differences in\nthe content of the attended experience. If, as Watzl\ncontends, they cannot, then phenomena of attention create a serious\ndifficulty for any fully general attempts to explain the character of\nconscious experience by reference to the contents represented in it\n(Chalmers, 2004). Such explanations might still be viable in\ncircumscribed domains (Speaks, 2010).", "\nA series of studies by Marisa Carrasco and her collaborators have\nexamined the influence of attention on the character of conscious\nexperience. These have revealed that the phenomenal differences\nproduced by shifts of attention include differences of perceived\nbrightness, contrast, and saturation of colours, but do not include\ndifferences of hue (Carrasco, Ling & Read, 2004, Fuller &\nCarrasco, 2006). Ned Block has suggested that these perceived\ndifferences should not be thought of as differences in the\ncontent of experience, since to characterize them in that way\nwould be to take it that attending to an item creates an illusion as\nto its brightness, contrast, etc.; a result which he takes to be\nimplausible. Block therefore interprets Carrasco’s findings as\nindicating an aspect of experience that cannot be accounted for with a\ntheory in which the phenomenal character of an experience is a\nfunction of that experience’s content (Block 2010).", "\nThere have been similar disputes, transacted on the basis of more\nintrospective considerations, concerning the effects of attention on\nthe perception of ambiguous figures (such as the Necker Cube). In\nresponse to some considerations that were first raised by Fiona\nMacpherson (Macpherson, 2006), Bence Nanay has suggested that the\neffects of attention on the perception of such figures can be\nexplained by those who maintain that every difference in consciousness\nis a difference of content (Nanay, 2010, 2011). His contention is that\nthe effects of attention on the character of conscious experience\nshould be understood as including a modulation of the specificity of\nan experience’s content, in which the representations of\ndeterminable properties are made more or less determinate. The issues\nhere are similar to those concerning the way in which blurriness\nshould be thought to enter into visual experience (see Section 4.4 of\nthe entry on\n representational theories of consciousness).", "\nMattia Riccardi casts attention in a rather different phenomenological\nrole, suggesting (in opposition to the proposal of Matthen, 2010) that\nattention explains the presentness that differentiates\none’s perceptual experiences of real objects in one’s\nimmediate environment from one’s experiences of objects that are seen\nin photographs, or that are pictured by the mind’s eye during\nepisodes of vivid imagination (Riccardi, 2019)." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Attention and Consciousness" }, { "content": [ "\nConsciousness is only one of the philosophically puzzling mental\nphenomena that have been thought to be related to attention in ways\nthat may prove to be explanatorily revealing. Demonstrative\nreference is another. One advocate of the idea that attention\ncontributes to the explanation of demonstrative reference is John\nCampbell, who writes that:", "\n… the notion of conscious attention to an object has an\nexplanatory role to play: it has to explain how it is that we have\nknowledge of the reference of a demonstrative. (2002, 45)\n", "\nA similar idea was explored in the manuscript on Theory of Knowledge\nthat Bertrand Russell abandoned (under the influence of Wittgenstein)\nin the summer in 1913. In that work Russell gives the following\nstatement of the idea that reference to particulars requires attention\nto them:", "\nAt any moment of my conscious life, there is one object (or at most\nsome very small number of objects) to which I am attending. All\nknowledge of particulars radiates out from this object. (1913, 40)\n", "\nIn support of the Russellian claim that there is an explanatory\nrelation between attention and demonstrative reference, Campbell\ndevelops two lines of thought.", "\nHis first line of thought comes from reflection on examples concerning\nthe requirements that have to be met in order to understand\ndemonstrative expressions in conversational contexts where one of the\nparticipants in the conversation uses expressions such as ‘that\nwoman’, but where various women are present, all of whom are\npossible referents for this demonstrative. Knowing which women is\nmeant, according to Campbell, requires attending to the woman in\nquestion and knowing that it is to her that the speaker was attending.\nThis is intended to show more than just that the direction of the\nspeaker’s attention is a possible source of evidence for what\nthat speaker means. It is intended as showing that attention and\nreference stand in a particularly intimate relationship—a\nrelationship that Campbell characterizes by saying that\n‘knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative is provided by\nconscious attention to the object’ (p. 22).", "\nThe second line of thought that Campbell develops in support of the\nview that attention explains demonstrative reference is one pertaining\nto deductive arguments in which the premises refer to items that are\npicked out by demonstratives: Arguments such as ‘(1) That is F.\n(2) That is G. Therefore (3) That is F and G’. Campbell’s\nthought here is that such arguments depend for their validity on there\nbeing no possibility of equivocating on the meaning of\n‘that’, as it occurs in the two separate premises. Such\narguments can only figure in rationally-entitling reasoning so long as\nthere is a single fixing of the referent of ‘that’ in both\npremises. This reference fixing, Campbell thinks, is achieved if and\nonly if there is no redirection of attention between the premises.\nAgain this is intended to show more than just that there is some\ncausal or evidential relation between attending and referring. It is\nintended to show that the role played by attention in fixing the\nreference of a demonstrative is analogous to the role played by a\nFregean Sense in fixing the reference of a proper name (Campbell,\n2002, Chapter 5).", "\nThe explanatory approach that Campbell advocates, and that Russell\nconsidered, has traditionally been thought to suffer from a problem of\ncircularity. This problem was urged by Peter Geach in Mental\nActs (1957). Geach considers the suggestion that we can use\nattention to explain our ability to make reference to the things that\nwe perceive, but thinks that no such suggestion can provide a genuine\nexplanation of reference because:", "\n… it is quite useless to say the relevant sense-perceptions\nmust be attended to, either this does not give a sufficient condition,\nor else “attended to” is a mere word for the very relation\nof judgment to sense perception that requires analysis. (1957, 64)\n", "\nGeach’s threat of circularity can be avoided if an independently\ngiven theory of how attention is constituted can be shown to\nilluminate the way in which reference is fixed by it. Imogen Dickie\nhas attempted to show just this. In a 2011 paper Dickie shows that\ncognitive psychology provides us with a theory of the role played by\nattention in tracking objects over time. She suggests that such a\ntheory can be used to account for the way in which attending to an\nobject removes any knowledge-defeating component of luck from our\ninferences involving it, thereby establishing the attended object as a\npossible topic of demonstrative thoughts (Dickie, 2011, 2015). This\ntreatment of attention exemplifies some of the central themes in\nDickie’s more general attempt to explain how thoughts come to be\nabout ordinary objects (and so how singular terms come to refer to\nthose objects). The explanation that she offers is one in which a\nthought comes to be about a thing when the justificatory practices in\nwhich that thought figures are anchored to the object in question (in\na sense of ‘anchoring’ that Dickie spells out in detail\n(Dickie, 2015)).", "\nWhether or not a theory of attention can be turned into a non-circular\nexplanation of demonstrative reference, the idea that attention and\nreference are related does seem to cast light on what goes on when we\nunderstand referring expressions. Campbell’s examples succeed in\nsuggesting that what we attend to and what we refer to are often the\nsame. There is also some empirical evidence, coming from developmental\npsychology, indicating that attention-related abilities play a crucial\nrole in the infant’s development of an understanding of its\ncaregiver’s demonstrative use (see\n Section 3.3).\n Lessons have been drawn from this that are not only about the\ncomprehension of linguistic expressions. This developmental work has\nalso been taken to imply something about our grasp on directly\nreferring thoughts. The idea here – as in the work of\nDickie and Campbell – is not only that attention contributes to\nour production and comprehension of linguistic expressions that have\nparticular referents, but that it also contributes to the\nestablishment of those referents as the contents of our thoughts. In\naddition to these developmental considerations, Michael Barkasi has\nsuggested that the nature of attention’s contribution to fixing\nthe reference of thoughts can be illuminated by considering the\npattern of neural projections to the frontal eye fields. Whereas\nCampbell characterizes attention in epistemic terms, Barkasi\nfavours a sub-doxastic characterization, in which attention\n‘sets targets’ and thereby regulates the flow of visual\ninformation (Barkasi, 2019)." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Attention and Demonstrative Reference" }, { "content": [ "\nThere are empirical results, coming from developmental psychology,\nwhich are suggestive of an intimate link between the development of\nvarious abilities related to attention and the development of various\ncapacities that are involved in understanding the mental states that\nare expressed in interactions between the infant and its\ncaregiver.", "\nAn ability to appreciate what others are attending to appears to be a\ncrucial stage in a normal infant’s development towards\nunderstanding the fact that its caregivers’ utterances have\nreferential intentions behind them. More generally, capacities for\nattention develop at important milestones on the route to the\nacquisition of some distinctively human cognitive capacities (Moore\nand Dunham, 1995). There is a distinctive developmental pathway in\nwhich normal human infants develop an ability and a willingness to\nattend to their mother, an ability and willingness to attend to the\nthing that she is attending to, and then, most importantly, an ability\nand willingness to enter into episodes in which there is a third\nobject that mother and child are attending to jointly, with\nmutual understanding of the fact that their attention is shared\n(Reddy, 2010, Trevarthen, 2011). In these episodes infants and\ncaregivers employ complex cues, involving speech, gaze-following, and\npointing.", "\nThere is good evidence that the child’s progression along this\npathway is related to its development of abilities to respond\nappropriately to the mental states of others, and to the development\nof its ability to acquire new vocabulary on the basis of an\nunderstanding of what the words used by its mother refer to. A\nlongitudinal study suggests that the earlier stages in this pathway\nare predictive of the age at which infants reach the later ones\n– thereby providing some evidence for the hypothesis that this\nsequence is a causal one – with the mastery at twelve months of\npointing as a means to direct the attention of others being predictive\nof false belief understanding at the age of fifty months, even when\nfactors relating to temperament and language are factored out (Sodian\n& Kristen-Antonow, 2015). Another source of evidence comes from\nthe fact that the arrested development of these attention-involving\nabilities is a revealing marker of the impairments suffered by\nautistic children (Kanner, 1943, Hobson and Hobson, 2011). \nFurther evidence may also come from the fact that a lack of such\nabilities is related to limitations in the mental-state attribution\nabilities of non-human primates, although this last claim is more\ncontroversial (Call & Tomasello, 2005).", "\nSome progress has been made towards extracting philosophical lessons\nfrom the empirical work indicating that joint attention has a role to\nplay here, in the explanation of distinctively human aspects of\ncognitive and social development, and also – once that\ndevelopment is complete – in the explanation of the way in which\nsome elementary social phenomena are transacted. (For several\ndevelopmental examples, see the papers collected in Eilan, et\nal. 2005, and Seemann 2011; for a discussion of joint attention\nin adult cases of shared intention, see Fiebich and Gallagher, 2012,\nwho argue that jointly attending has a basic, elementary status, as\nthe most minimal instance of a joint action.)", "\nOne of the points at which philosophical difficulties arise is in\ncharacterizing the sharedness of the attention that is\nimplicated in this developmental trajectory. Christopher Peacocke has\nargued that the way in which joint attention episodes are shared\ninvolves a kind of reciprocal recognition of the other’s\nrecognition of one’s own attention, and that it therefore\ninvolves a kind of mutual openness that is analogous to the openness\nof ‘common knowledge’, as that notion figures in\nphilosophical analyses of communication and convention (see the entry\non\n convention).\n Since joint attention is achieved by young children, its achievement\ncannot plausibly be thought to make any sophisticated intellectual\ndemands. Peacocke therefore argues that awareness of reciprocated\nopenness must be more fundamental than the intellectual achievement of\ncommon knowledge. He suggests that it should instead be\nunderstood as a variety of perceptual awareness that makes\nsuch common knowledge possible (Peacocke, 2005). John Campbell shares\nPeacocke’s view of joint attention as being a perceptual\nphenomenon, as opposed to a phenomenon that is achieved when\none’s perception is reflected on in a certain way, but Campbell\ndiffers from Peacocke in taking the person with whom attention is\nshared to be fellow subject of the joint experience, not an\nobject who figures in the content of the experience that each\njoint-attender individually has (Campbell, 2002, Ch. 8).\nCampbell’s attempt to shift the explanation of sharedness from\nthe cognitive to the perceptual domain is rejected by Lucas Battich\nand Bart Geurts (Battich and Guerts, 2020), who suggest that\nCampbell’s view suffers from problems that originate in his\nrelational conception of perception. They therefore claim that the\nissues here cast light on the long-running debates between\nrepresentation-based and relation-based theories of perception (see\nthe entry on\n the problem of perception)." ], "subsection_title": "3.3 Attention and Other Minds" }, { "content": [ "\nThe apparent links between attention and demonstrative reference (see\nsection\n 3.2)\n and attention and knowledge of other minds (see section\n 3.3)\n might be special instances of a more general connection between\nattention and the making of epistemic moves. A general connection of\nthat sort may have been what Descartes had in mind when he suggested\nthat attention to clear and distinct ideas is a necessary condition\nfor those ideas to realize their special epistemic potential (see\nSection\n 1.1).\n It might also be what Stewart had in mind when he suggested that\n“Some attention [is] necessary for any act of memory\nwhatever” (see Section\n 1.4).\n Kant’s anthropological writings also cast attention in a\ncrucial epistemic role, as explaining the control that one can exert\nover representations in thought and in imagination, where this perhaps\nincludes the kind of imagination that Kant takes to be involved in\nmaking one’s experiences into experiences of an objective\nspatiotemporal world (Merritt & Valaris, 2017).", "\nAlthough each of these philosophers have tended to frame it in a way\nthat reflects their other theoretical commitments, some version of the\nidea that attention is always involved in the making of epistemic\nmoves can be made pre-theoretically plausible. The inattentional\nblindness experiments, in which participants are visually presented\nwith large changes while attending to something else, show that\ninattentive people can fail to notice all sorts of perceivable things\nthat attentive people would find obvious. Something exactly similar\nseems to be true in the case of a priori reasoning: just as no item is\nso large, so central, and so well-lit that no conscious and sighted\nobserver could miss it, so there is no step in reasoning that is so\nsimple, so compelling, and so obvious, that every thinker, whether\nattentive or inattentive, can be expected to recognise it. Just as the\ninattentional blindness effects might seem to show that there are\nattentional demands that a thinker has to meet before his perceptual\nencounter with things can provide him with knowledge of them, so it is\nplausible that there are similar attentional demands that have to be\nmet before the thinker’s grasp of a thought gives her a\njustified belief in that thought’s consequences. This\ninterpretation of the inattentional blindness effects is, however,\ncontroversial. Nicholas Silins and Susanna Siegel have suggested that\n– even if inattention does sometimes explain a perceiving\nperson’s failure to form a belief about the things happening in\ntheir visual field – unattended aspects of experience are\nnonetheless capable of providing justification for such beliefs\n(Silins and Sigel, 2019). Émile Thalbard argues to the contrary\n(Thalabard, 2020).", "\nIn both the a priori case and the perceptual case, the acquisition of\nknowledge seems to require attention on at least some occasions, and\nin both of these cases that requirement seems to be a\npractical one. It may be that knowledge of some propositions\nis required if one’s experience with a gorilla is to provide one\nwith knowledge of the gorilla’s presence (with the propositions\nhere being of a sort that could serve as a major premise in an\ninference by which one’s perceptual experience was interpreted),\nbut the requirement on gaining knowledge from experience cannot be\nthat one must be bearing such propositions in mind. The same is true\nin the a priori domain. What is required before an a priori\nentitlement can be recognized cannot be that one has to entertain some\nprior knowledge of a proposition from which that entitlement can be\ndeduced. To suppose that occurrent propositional knowledge is what is\nnecessary for such moves would be to embark on the regress set by\nLewis Carroll’s tortoise to Achilles (Carroll, 1895). What\nepistemic move-making requires is not occurrent knowledge of a\nproposition. The thing that it requires is the right sort of active\nattention.", "\nThe attentional requirements that have to be met before one can\nacquire knowledge from experience or recognize an a priori entitlement\nare not requirements merely for alertness. They are not captured\nmerely by saying that, in order to gain knowledge, the thinker has to\npay some attention to the relevant ideas. A thinker may be attending\nto a syllogism, but, if he is attending to its rhythm, he may still be\nunable to see that the conclusion follows. A non-question begging\ncharacterisation of the attentional requirements of knowledge\nacquisition in general would be an important contribution to\nepistemology. Current work on attention, focussing as it does on\nattention as a perceptual phenomenon, may give us only part of the\ngeneral theory that we need. Work on the purely intellectual forms of\nattention continues to be scarce. This shortcoming has been emphasized\nby Mark Fortney, who argues that the neglect of intellectual attention\nhas led philosophers to misinterpret some of the claims made in the\nempirical literature on attention and consciousness (Fortney, 2019).\nFortney also claims that considerations pertaining to intellectual\nattention should have a central role in debates about the transparency\nof phenomenology, and about the consequences of this transparency for\nthe epistemology of self-attributed thoughts (debates that are\nexemplified, in Fortney’s discussion, by Byrne, 2018). Fortney\nsuggests that, when attention is given this role, certain results from\ncognitive psychology cast light on these debates. He thinks, when seen\nin this light, some of the claims that have been made about the\ntransparency of occurrent thought start to seem dubious (Fortney,\n2020)." ], "subsection_title": "3.4 Attention and Knowledge" }, { "content": [ "\nAttention’s involvement in voluntary action is a lot\nharder to study in a controlled experiment than its involvement in\nperception. The theories of attention emerging from experimental\npsychology have, as a result, focused almost exclusively on\nattention’s perceptual instances. In this respect they contrast\nwith theories that were developed in the period before psychology and\nphilosophy split, in which the action-involving aspects of attention\nwere much more prominent. William James, for example, suggests in the\nPrinciples of Psychology that ‘volition is nothing but\nattention’ (James, 1890 p. 424), and at one time (in what might\nbe read as an anticipation of the competition-based theories discussed\nabove, in\n §2.6)\n he proposed that “Attention, belief, affirmation, and motor\nvolition, are […] four names for an identical process,\nincidental to the conflict of ideas alone, the survival of one in\nspite of the opposition of the others.” (1880).", "\nThe issues surrounding attention’s relationship to the\nvoluntariness of action are parallel to some of the issues surrounding\nattention’s relationship to the consciousness of perception. It\nseems natural to think that attention is necessary for the voluntary\nperformance of finely tuned behaviours, much as it seems necessary for\nthe conscious perception of fine detail. But it does not seem natural\nto think that we must be paying attention to the execution of every\nact that we voluntarily perform, any more than it seem natural to\nsuppose that we must pay attention in order to be consciously\nperceiving anything at all. A case could therefore be made, on\ncommonsense grounds, for claiming that attention figures in the\nproduction of some but not all voluntary behaviours. One can imagine\nthis view being challenged by a theorist who claimed that attention is\nnecessary for any action to be voluntary, arguing that there is an\nillusion (analogous to the refrigerator light illusion) that gives us\nthe mistaken impression that our inattentive acts are voluntary too.\nAs in the case of attention and consciousness, there is a\nmethodological puzzle (with epistemologically deep roots) about the\nsort of evidence that could settle this issue. This may be a topic for\nfuture research. While resisting the idea that attention is either\nnecessary or sufficient for an act to be voluntary, Denis Buehler has\nargued that there is a central role for attention in the explanation\nof flexible goal-directed behaviour (Buehler, 2019). In cases where\nthat behaviour involves the exercise of a skill, Alex Dayer and\nCarolyn Jennings have argued against the idea that any simple account\nof attention’s role in it can be given, claiming that a theory\nof attention’s role in skilled performance must instead be\n‘pluralist’ (Dayer & Jennings, 2021).", "\nThe separation of attention’s role in action from\nattention’s role in perception is somewhat artificial,\nespecially when the perception in question is perception of\none’s own moving body. Psychological research into that\nparticular form of perception has been largely independent of research\ninto the role of attention in vision and audition. A 2016 paper by\nGregor Hochstetter reviews the research into this bodily case, and\nargues, following Marcel Kinsbourne (1995, 2002) that internal\nrepresentation of a ‘body image’ must play some role in\nguiding attention during normal bodily awareness (Hochstetter,\n2016)." ], "subsection_title": "3.5 Attention and Voluntary Action" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAttention’s contribution to our understanding of values has been\nrelatively underexplored in the recent literature. The range of\nvalue-theoretic contexts in which attention makes an explanatorily\nsignificant appearance is nonetheless broad." ], "section_title": "4 Attention and Value", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe subject matter of aesthetics can be demarcated in various ways,\neach of which is somewhat controversial (see Lopes, 2014). A natural\nthought here is that aesthetics might be identified as the branch of\nphilosophy that is concerned with one particular sort of experience.\nIf this proposal is to be informative then it obviously needs to be\nsupplemented with some specification of which sort of experience that\nis. It is clear that this specification cannot be given via an\nextensional specification of the objects that are experienced: the\nsame wine might be experienced by the connoisseur and the thirsty man,\nwith only one of their experiences being aesthetic; the same painting\nmight be seen aesthetically by the art lover, and from a purely\nfinancial point of view by its dealer.", "\nOne response to this would be individuate experiences more finely than\ntheir objects, by instead identifying some particular set of\nproperties that are experienced as belonging to those objects\nin the aesthetic case (see the section on aesthetic objects in the\nentry on\n the concept of the aesthetic).\n An alternative response would be to consider not only the contents\nthat are experienced, but also the way in which the subject\nexperiences them, perhaps by identifying some particular\nattitude that characterises the subject in the aesthetic\ncase, or perhaps by identifying some mode of attention that that\nsubject instantiates (see the section on the aesthetic attitude in the\nentry on\n the concept of the aesthetic).", "\nAttempts to identify such an aesthetic mode of attention are\nwell-represented in the philosophical tradition. Kant’s famous\nclaims about judgements of beauty having a first moment of\ndisinterested pleasure are usually read as a paradigm of the\nattitude-identifying approach (see the entry on\n Kant’s aesthetics and teleology),\n but Jessica Williams has argued that Kant must also be operating with\na notion of aesthetic attention, as being a mode of attention\ninvolving a distinctive combination of imagination and understanding\n(Williams, 2021).", "\nSome such notion of attention also plays a central role in R.G.\nCollingwood’s account of the way in which art (and, in\nparticular, literature) contributes positively to a society’s\nculture. Collingwood describes attention as “the assertion of\nourselves as the owners of our feelings”, and takes this\nself-assertion to be crucial in enabling us to exercise volition over\nthose feelings, so that “Their brute power over us is thus\nreplaced by our power over them” (Collingwood, 1938, p. 222).\nCollingwood therefore takes the diminution of a society’s\nartistic culture to make it vulnerable to emotive influences (while\nhimself suggesting that this might best read, not as a broad\nphilosophical claim, but as a point about Europe in the nineteen\nthirties).", "\nAttempts to demarcate the aesthetic via the identification of an\naesthetic attitude, or of an aesthetic mode of attention, have been\nattacked — for their details, and for their more general\norientation (most famously by George Dickie, in his 1964 paper). Those\nlines of attack have led to a widespread acceptance of the idea that\nthere is something wrongheaded about specifying necessary and\nsufficient conditions for qualifying as aesthetic via the\nidentification of some particular aesthetic attitude. Many\nphilosophers nonetheless retain the idea that there are informative\nthings that can be said, in the service of less strictly defined\ntheoretical ends, about the sorts of attitudes that are often found to\nbe exemplified in aesthetic cases. It is in this spirit that some\nideas about distinctive forms of aesthetic attention have recently\nbeen revived.", "\nServaas van der Berg suggests that a distinctive mode of attention can\nbe seen in cases of aesthetic appreciation (van der Berg, 2019). He\nclaims that this mode of attention is distinguished by its\nmotivational structure, which has a form that is similar to the\nmotivational structure of game playing, as theorised by Bernard Suits\n(Suits, 1978) and Thi Nguyen (Nguyen, 2020). This structure is one\nthat inverts the normal order of priorities between means and ends: in\nnormal actions one’s means are typically taken in order to bring\nabout one’s ends, but the game-playing golfer (for example)\ninstead adopts the end of getting his ball into a hole in order that\nhe can take the means to reaching that end. Van der Berg argues that a\nsimilar inversion is seen in aesthetic appreciation, where the\ncognitive means that are required in order to reach understanding\nprovide the reasons for adopting the end of understanding an item that\nis being appreciated aesthetically.", "\nBence Nanay has set out a position with similar aims — not\naspiring to give necessary or sufficient conditions for the aesthetic,\nbut aiming to cast some light on the way in which certain central\ncases of aesthetic experience operate. He does this by giving a theory\nof the distinctive way in which our attention is engaged in the course\nof these experiences. Nanay emphasizes the psychological distinction\nbetween focused and distributed attention, and uses examples from a\nrange of arts to suggest that aesthetic experiences often require\nattention of both sorts. He also suggests this contributes to\nthe value that we place on such experiences (Nanay, 2015, 2016)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Attention in Aesthetics" }, { "content": [ "\nSimone Weil suggests that attention has an absolutely central role in\nethics, and in value theory more broadly, writing that:", "\nThe authentic and pure values – truth, beauty and goodness\n– in the activity of a human being are the result of one and the\nsame act, a certain application of the full attention to the object.\n(Weil, 1986, p. 214)\n", "\nThis apotheosizing of attention provides the basis for Weil’s\nclaims about priorities for education. On these points, her position\nis shared by a number of other figures whose work sits at the\ninterface of philosophy and literature (see Mole, 2017). Christopher\nThomas has suggested that the role played by attention in Weil’s\n‘ethics of affliction’ can be interpreted as an attempt to\nput some central notions from Kant’s aesthetic theory to ethical\nwork (Thomas, 2020).", "\nThe influence of Kant was in the foreground, together with the\ninteractions between ethics and aesthetics, when Weil’s claims\nabout attention’s import were developed in the work of Iris\nMurdoch. Murdoch suggests that there are certain forms of attention\nthat play an essential role in the exercise of the virtues (Murdoch,\n1970, see Bagnoli, 2003, Mole, 2006). She implies that a capacity for\nthese forms of attention can be cultivated through experiences of\nbeauty. These themes have been taken up by Dorothea Debus, who places\nparticular emphasis on Weil’s claim that it is full\nattention to which cardinal value is attributed (Debus, 2015). Antony\nFredriksson and Silvia Panizza suggest that the aspects of attention\nthat Murdoch takes to be important are seen with particular clarity if\none adopts the perspective of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s account of\nattention, in which the openness of the attentive mind is\nemphasized (Fredriksson & Panizza, 2020). Nicolas Bommarito has\ndeveloped an account of modesty along broadly Murdochian lines, as\nbeing a ‘virtue of attention’. He argues that this avoids\nepistemic difficulties that other accounts of modesty face, if they\ninstead characterize modesty as requiring false beliefs about the\nextent of one’s strengths (Bommarito, 2013).", "\nSimilar issues are approached from a somewhat different direction by\nPeter Goldie (Goldie, 2004), and Michael Brady (Brady, 2010), both of\nwho relate attention and virtue to the epistemic significance of a\nperson’s emotional life. Both Goldie and Brady suggest that the\nattention-modulating profile of an emotion is essential to it, and\nboth claim that this modulation of attention by emotion plays an\nineliminable role in our having a full appreciation of the evaluative\nproperties that we encounter in the world around us. Goldie and Brady\ndisagree as to how this epistemic role should be characterized, with\nGoldie taking the experience of one’s own emotion to itself be a\nreason-giving experience, with an epistemic authority analogous to\none’s experiences of the things in one’s visual field,\nwhereas Brady takes the emotional subject’s experience of items\nin the world to have an epistemic authority that is not shared by the\nsubject’s experience of their own emotional state, so that that\nstate’s epistemic significance must instead be exhausted by its\ninfluence on our outwardly-directed attention (Brady, 2013)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Attention in Ethics" } ] } ]	[ "Allport, A., 1987, “Selection for action: Some behavioural\nand neurophysiological considerations of attention and action”,\nin Perspectives on perception and action, A. 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Analysis, 79(4): 693–703.", "Yantis, S., 1998, “Control of Visual Attention”, in H.\nPashler (ed.), Attention, New York: Psychology Press" ]	[ { "href": "../behaviorism/", "text": "behaviorism" }, { "href": "../bradley/", "text": "Bradley, Francis Herbert" }, { "href": "../cognitive-science/", "text": "cognitive science" }, { "href": "../collingwood-aesthetics/", "text": "Collingwood, Robin George: aesthetics" }, { "href": "../common-knowledge/", "text": "common knowledge" }, { "href": "../consciousness/", "text": "consciousness" }, { "href": "../consciousness-intentionality/", "text": "consciousness: and intentionality" }, { "href": "../freewill/", "text": "free will" }, { "href": "../hermann-helmholtz/", "text": "Helmholtz, Hermann von" }, { "href": "../james/", "text": "James, William" }, { "href": "../locke/", "text": "Locke, John" }, { "href": "../computational-mind/", "text": "mind: computational theory of" }, { "href": "../ryle/", "text": "Ryle, Gilbert" } ]
properties	Properties	First published Thu Sep 23, 1999; substantive revision Wed Nov 25, 2020	[ "\nProperties are those entities that can be predicated of\nthings or, in other words, attributed to them. Thus,\nproperties are often called predicables. Other terms for them\nare “attributes”, “qualities”,\n“features”, “characteristics”,\n“types”. Properties are also ways things are, entities\nthat things exemplify or instantiate. For example,\nif we say that this is a leaf and is green, we are attributing the\nproperties leaf and green to it, and, if the\npredication is veridical, the thing in question exemplifies these\nproperties. Hence, properties can also be characterized as\nexemplifiables, with the controversial exception of those\nthat cannot be instantiated, e.g., some would say, round and\nsquare. It is typically assumed that no other entities can be\npredicated and exemplified (Aristotle, Categories, 2a). For\nexample, ordinary objects like apples and chairs cannot be predicated\nof, and are not exemplified by, anything.", "\nThe nature and existence of properties have always been central and\ncontroversial issues in philosophy since its origin, and interest in\nthem keeps flourishing, as Allen’s (2016) recent introductory\ntext well testifies (see also surveys or anthologies such as Loux\n1972; Oliver 1996; Mellor and Oliver 1997; Koons and Pickavance 2017;\nMarmodoro and Mayr 2019). At least since Plato, who called them\n“ideas” or “forms”, properties are viewed as\nuniversals, i.e., as capable, (in typical cases) of being\ninstantiated by different objects, “shared” by them, as it\nwere; consequently, in contrast with particulars, or\nindividuals, of being somehow at once in different\n places.[1]\n For example, if there are two potatoes each of which weighs 300\ngrams, the property weighing 300 grams is instantiated by two\nparticulars and is therefore multi-located. According to a different\nconception, however, properties are themselves particulars, though\nabstract ones. As so conceived, properties are nowadays\ncommonly called\n tropes,\n and are the subject of another entry. Here we shall focus on\nproperties as universals. Relations, e.g., loving and\nbetween, can also be considered properties: they are\npredicable, exemplifiable, and viewable as universals. Accordingly, we\nuse “property” as a generic term that also covers them,\nunless the context suggests otherwise. However, we shall consider\ntheir peculiarity only to a minimum extent, since they are discussed\nin detail in the entry on\n relations.", "\nIn §1 we consider some most fundamental themes, including the\nmain motivations and arguments for including properties in one’s\nontology. In §2 we deal with the central topic of what it is for\nproperties to be exemplified. In §3 we tackle the intertwined\nissues of the existence and identity conditions for properties. In\n§4 we consider different senses in which properties may be\nstructurally complex. In §5 we survey the frequent appeal to\nproperties in current metaphysics of science. In §6 we conclude\nwith a review of formal accounts of properties and their applications\nin natural language semantics and the foundations of mathematics,\nwhich provide additional motivations for an ontological commitment to\nproperties." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Properties: Basic Ideas", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 How We Speak of Properties", "1.2 Arguments for Properties", "1.3 Traditional Views about the Existence of Universals", "1.4 Properties in Propositions and States of Affairs", "1.5 Relations", "1.6 Universals versus Tropes", "1.7 Kinds of Properties" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Exemplification", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Monist vs. Pluralist Accounts", "2.2 Compresence and Partial Identity", "2.3 Bradley’s Regress", "2.4 Self-exemplification" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Existence and Identity Conditions for Properties", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 From Extensionality to Hyperintensionality", "3.2 The Sparse and the Abundant Conceptions" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Complex Properties", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Logically Compound Properties", "4.2 Structural Properties" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Properties in the Metaphysics of Science", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Miscellaneous Topics", "5.2. Essentially Categorical vs. Essentially Dispositional Properties" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Formal Property Theories and their applications", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Logical Systems for Properties", "6.2 Semantics and Logical Form", "6.3 Foundations of Mathematics" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThere are some crucial terminological and conceptual distinctions that\nare typically made in talking of properties. There are also various\nsorts of reasons that have been adduced for the existence of\nproperties and different traditional views about whether and in what\nsense properties should be acknowledged. We shall focus on such\nmatters in the following subsections." ], "section_title": "1. Properties: Basic Ideas", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nProperties are expressed, as meanings, by\npredicates. In the past “predicate” was often\nused as synonym of “property”, but nowadays predicates are\nlinguistic entities, typically contrasted with singular\nterms, i.e., simple or complex noun phrases such as\n“Daniel”, “this horse” or “the President\nof France”, which can occupy subject positions in sentences and\npurport to denote, or refer to, a single thing.\nFollowing Frege, predicates are verbal phrases such as\n“is French” or “drinks”. Alternatively,\npredicates are general terms such as “French”,\nwith the copula “is” (or verbal inflection) taken to\nconvey an exemplification link (P. Strawson 1959; Bergmann 1960). We\nshall conveniently use “predicate” in both ways.\nPredicates are predicated of singular terms, thereby\ngenerating sentences such as “Daniel is French”. In the\nfamiliar formal language of first-order logic, this would be rendered,\nsay, as “\$F(d)\$”, thus representing the predicate with a\ncapital letter. The set or class of objects to which a predicate\nveridically applies is often called the extension of the\npredicate, or of the corresponding property. This property, in\ncontrast, is called the intension of the predicate, i.e., its\nmeaning. This terminology traces back to the Middle Age and in the\nlast century has led to the habit of calling sets and properties\nextensional and intensional entities, respectively.\nExtensions and intensions can hardly be identified; this is\nimmediately suggested by paradigmatic examples of co-extensional\npredicates that appear to differ in meaning, such as “has a\nheart”, and “has kidneys” (see\n §3.1).", "\nProperties can also be referred to by singular terms, or so it seems.\nFirst of all, there are singular terms, e.g., “being\nhonest” or “honesty”, that result from the\nnominalization of predicates, such as “is honest”\nor “honest” (some think that “being \$F\$” and\n“\$F\$-ness” stand for different kinds of property\n(Levinson 1991). Further, there are definite descriptions, such as\n“Mary’s favorite property”. Finally, though more\ncontroversially, there are demonstratives, such as “that shade\nof red”, deployed while pointing to a red object (Heal\n1997).", "\nFrege (1892) and Russell (1903) had different opinions regarding the\nontological import of nominalization. According to the former,\nnominalized predicates stand for a “correlate” of the\n“unsaturated” entity that the predicate stands for (in\nFrege’s terminology they are a “concept correlate”\nand a “concept”, respectively). According to the latter,\nwho speaks of “inextricable difficulties” in Frege’s\nview (Russell 1903: §49), they stand for exactly the same entity.\nMutatis mutandis, they similarly disagreed about other\nsingular terms that seemingly refer to properties. The ontological\ndistinction put forward by Frege is mainly motivated by the fact that\ngrammar indeed forbids the use of predicates in subject position. But\nthis hardly suffices for the distinction and it is dubious that other\nmotivations can be marshalled (Parsons 1986). We shall thus take for\ngranted Russell’s line here, although many philosophers support\nFrege’s view or at least take it very seriously\n(Castañeda 1976; Cocchiarella 1986a; Landini 2008)." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 How We Speak of Properties" }, { "content": [ "\nProperties are typically invoked to explain phenomena of philosophical\ninterest. The most traditional task for which properties have been\nappealed to is to provide a solution to the so-called “one over\nmany problem” via a corresponding “one over many\nargument”. This traces back at least to Socrates and Plato\n(e.g., Phaedo, 100 c-d) and keeps being rehearsed (Russell\n1912: ch. 9; Butchvarov 1966; Armstrong 1978a: ch. 7; Loux 1998:\nch.1). The problem is that certain things are many, they are\nnumerically different, and yet they are somehow one: they appear to be\nsimilar, in a way that suggests a uniform classification, their being\ngrouped together into a single class. For example, some objects have\nthe same shape, certain others have the same color, and still others\nthe same weight. Hence, the argument goes, something is needed to\nexplain this phenomenon and properties fill the bill: the objects in\nthe first group, say, all have the property spherical, those\nin the second red, and those in the third weighing 200\ngrams.", "\nRelatedly, properties have been called for to explain our use of\ngeneral terms. How is it, e.g., that we apply “spherical”\nto those balls over there and refuse to do it for the nearby bench? It\ndoes not seem to be due to an arbitrary decision concerning where, or\nwhere not, to stick a certain label. It seems rather the case that the\nrecognition of a certain property in some objects but not in others\nelicits the need for a label, “spherical”, which is then\nused for objects having that property and not for others. Properties\nare thus invoked as meanings of general terms and\npredicates (Plato, Phaedo, 78e; Russell 1912: ch.\n9). In contrast with this, Quine (1948; 1953 [1980: 11, 21, 131] )\ninfluentially argued that the use of general terms and predicates in\nitself does not involve an ontological commitment to entities\ncorresponding to them, since it is by deploying singular terms that we\npurport to refer to something (see also Sellars 1960). However, as\nnoted, predicates can be nominalized and thus occur as singular terms.\nHence, even if one agrees with Quine, nominalized predicates still\nsuggest the existence of properties as their referents, at least to\nthe extent that the use of nominalized predicates cannot be\nparaphrased away (Loux 2006: 25–34; entry on\n platonism in metaphysics, §4).", "\nAfter Quine (1948), quantificational idiom is the landmark of\nontological commitment. We can thus press the point even more by\nnoting that we make claims and construct arguments that appear to\ninvolve quantification over properties, with quantifiers reaching (i)\nover predicate positions, or even (ii) over both subject and predicate\npositions (Castañeda\n 1976).[2]\n As regards (i), consider: this apple is red; this tomato is red;\nhence, there is something that this apple is and this tomato also is.\nAs for (ii), consider: wisdom is more important than beauty; Mary is\nwise and Elisabeth is beautiful; hence, there is something that Mary\nis which is more important than something that Elisabeth is.", "\nQuantification over properties seems ubiquitous not just in ordinary\ndiscourse but in science as well. For example, the inverse square law\nfor dynamics and the reduction of temperature to mean molecular energy\ncan be taken to involve quantification over properties such as masses,\ndistances and temperatures: the former tells us that the attraction\nforce between any two bodies depends on such bodies’ having\ncertain masses and being at a certain distance, and the latter informs\nus that the fact that a sample of gas has a given temperature depends\non its having such and such mean kinetic energy.", "\nSwoyer (1999: §3.2) considers these points within a long list of\narguments that have been, or can be, put forward to motivate an\nontological commitment to properties. He touches on topics such as\na priori knowledge, change, causation, measurement, laws of\nnature, intensional logic, natural language semantics, numbers (we\nshall cover some of this territory in\n §5\n and\n §6).", "\nDespite all this, whether, and in what sense, properties should be\nadmitted in one’s ontology appears to be a perennial issue,\ntraditionally shaped as a controversy about the existence of\nuniversals." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Arguments for Properties" }, { "content": [ "\nDo universals really exist? There are three long-standing answers to\nthis question: realism, nominalism, and\nconceptualism.", "\nAccording to realists, universals exist as mind-independent entities.\nIn transcendent realism, put forward by Plato, they exist\neven if uninstantiated and are thus “transcendent” or\n“ante res” (“before the things”). In\nimmanent realism, defended by Aristotle in opposition to his\nmaster, they are “immanent” or “in\nrebus” (“in things”), as they exist only if\ninstantiated by objects. Contemporary notable supporters are Russell\n(1912) for the former and Armstrong (1978a) for the latter (for recent\ntakes on this old dispute see the essays by Loux, Van Inwagen, Lowe\nand Galluzzo in Galluzzo & Loux 2015). Transcendentism is of\ncourse a less economical position and elicits epistemological worries\nregarding our capacity to grasp ante res universals.\nNevertheless, such worries may be countered in various ways (cf. entry\non\n platonism in metaphysics, §5;\n Bealer 1982: 19–20; 1998: §2; Linsky & Zalta 1995),\nand uninstantiated properties may well have work to do, particularly\nin capturing the intuitive idea that there are unrealized\npossibilities and in dealing with cognitive content (see\n §3).\n A good summary of pro-transcendentist arguments and immanentist\nrejoinders is offered by Allen (2016: §2.3). See also Costa\nforthcoming for a new criticism of immanentism, based on the\nnotion of grounding.", "\nNominalists eschew mind-independent universals. They may either resort\nto tropes in their stead, or accept predicate nominalism,\nwhich tries to make it without mind-independent properties at all, by\ntaking the predicates themselves to do the classifying job that\nproperties are supposed to do. This is especially indigestible to a\nrealist, since it seems to put the cart before the horse by making\nlanguage and mind responsible for the similarities we find in the rich\nvarieties of things surrounding us. Some even say that this involves\nan idealist rejection of a mind-independent world (Hochberg 2013).\nConceptualists also deny that there are mind-independent universals,\nand because of this they are often assimilated to nominalists. Still,\nthey can be distinguished insofar as they replace such universals with\nconcepts, understood as non-linguistic mind-dependent entities,\ntypically functioning as meanings of predicates. The mind-dependence\nof concepts however makes conceptualism liable to the same kind of\ncart/horse worry just voiced above in relation to predicate\n nominalism.[3]", "\nThe arguments considered in\n §1.2\n constitute the typical motivation for realism, which is the stance\nthat we take for granted here. They may be configured as an abductive\ninference to the best explanation (Swoyer 1999). Thus, of course, they\nare not foolproof, and in fact nominalism is still a popular view,\nwhich is discussed in detail in the entry on\n nominalism in metaphysics,\n as well as in the entry on\n tropes.\n Conceptualism appears to be less common nowadays, although it still\nhas supporters (cf. Cocchiarella 1986a: ch. 3; 2007), and it is worth\nnoting that empirical research on concepts is flourishing." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Traditional Views about the Existence of Universals" }, { "content": [ "\nWe have talked above in a way that might give the impression that\npredication is an activity that we perform, e.g., when we say\nor think that a certain apple is red. Although some philosophers might\nthink of it in this way, predication, or attribution, may\nalso be viewed as a special link that connects a property to a thing\nin a way that gives rise to a\n proposition,\n understood as a complex\nfeaturing the property and the thing (or concepts of them) as\nconstituents with different roles: the latter occurs in the\nproposition as logical subject or argument, as is\noften said, and the former as attributed to such an argument.\nIf the proposition is true (the predication is veridical), the\nargument exemplifies the property, viz. the former is an instance of\nthe latter. The idea that properties yield propositions when\nappropriately connected to an argument motivates Russell’s\n(1903) introduction of the term\n“propositional\nfunction” to speak of properties. We\ntake for granted here that predication is univocal. However, according\nto some neo-Meinongian philosophers, there are two modes of\npredication, sometimes characterized as “external” and\n“internal” (Castañeda 1972; Rapaport 1978; Zalta\n1983; see entry on\n nonexistent objects).\n Zalta (1983) traces back the distinction to Mally and uses\n“exemplification” to characterize the former and\n“encoding” to characterize the latter. Roughly, the idea\nis that non-existent objects may encode properties that existent\nobjects exemplify. For instance, winged is exemplified by\nthat bird over there and is encoded by the winged horse.", "\nIt is often assumed nowadays that, when an object exemplifies a\nproperty, there is a further, complex, entity, a fact or state of\naffairs (Bergmann 1960; Armstrong 1997, entries on\n facts\n and\n states of affairs),\n having the property (qua attributed) and the object\n(qua argument) as constituents (this compositional conception\nis not always accepted; see, e.g., Bynoe 2011 for a dissenting voice).\nFacts are typically taken to fulfill the theoretical roles of\ntruthmakers (the entities that make true propositions true, see entry\non\n truthmakers)\n and causal relata (the entities connected by causal\nrelations; see entry on\n the metaphysics of causation, §1).\n Not all philosophers, however, distinguish between propositions and\nstates of affairs; Russell (1903) acknowledges only propositions and,\nfor a more recent example, so does Gaskin (2008).", "\nIt appears that properties can have a double role that no other\nentities can have: they can occur in propositions and facts both as\narguments and as attributed (Russell 1903: §48). For example, in\ntruly saying that this apple is red and that red is a color, we\nexpress a proposition wherein red occurs as attributed, and\nanother proposition wherein red occurs as argument.\nCorrespondingly, there are two facts with red in both roles,\nrespectively. This duplicity grounds the common distinction between\ndifferent orders or types of properties:\nfirst-order ones are properties of things that are not\nthemselves predicables; second-order ones are properties of\nfirst-order properties; and so on. Even though the formal and\nontological issues behind this terminology are controversial, it is\nwidely used and is often connected to the subdivision between\nfirst-order and higher-order logics (see, e.g., Thomason 1974; Oliver\n1996; Williamson 2013; entry on\n type theory).\n It originates from Frege’s and Russell’s logical\ntheories, especially Russell’s type theory, wherein distinctions\nof types and orders are rigidly regimented in order to circumvent the\nlogical paradoxes (see\n §6)." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 Properties in Propositions and States of Affairs" }, { "content": [ "\nA relation is typically attributed to a plurality of objects. These\njointly instantiate the relation in question, if the\nattribution is veridical. In this case, the relata (as\narguments) and the relation (as attributed) are constituents of a\nstate of affairs. Depending on the number of objects that it can\nrelate, a relation is usually taken to have a number of\n“places” or a “degree” (“adicity”,\n“arity”), and is thus called “dyadic”\n(“two-place”), “triadic”\n(“three-place”), etc. For example, before and\nbetween are dyadic (of degree 2) and triadic (of degree 3),\nrespectively. In line with this, properties and propositions are\n“monadic” and “zero-adic” predicables, as they\nare predicated of one, and of no, object, respectively, and may then\nbe seen as limiting cases of relations (Bealer 1982, where properties,\nrelations and propositions are suggestively grouped under the acronym\n“PRP;” Dixon 2018; Menzel 1986; 1993; Swoyer 1998; Orilia\n1999; Van Inwagen 2004; 2015; Zalta 1983). This terminology is also\napplied to predicates and sentences; for example, the predicate\n“between” is triadic, and the sentence “Peter is\nbetween Tom and May” is zero-adic. Accordingly, standard\nfirst-order logic employs predicates with a fixed degree, typically\nindicated by a superscript, e.g., \$P^1\$, \$Q^2\$, \$R^3\$, etc.", "\nIn natural language, however, many predicates appear to be\nmultigrade or variably polyadic; i.e., they can be\nused with different numbers of arguments, as they can be true of\nvarious numbers of things. For example, we say “John is lifting\na table”, with “lifting” used as dyadic, as well as\n“John and Mary are lifting a table”, with\n“lifting” used as triadic. Moreover, there is a kind of\ninference, called “argument deletion”, which also suggests\nthat many predicates that prima facie could be assigned a\ncertain fixed degree are in fact multigrade. For example, “John\nis eating a cake” suggests that “is eating” is\ndyadic, but since, by argument deletion, it entails “John is\neating”, one could conclude that it is also monadic and thus\nmultigrade. Often one can resist the conclusion that there are\nmultigrade predicates. For example, it could be said that “John\nis eating” is simply short for “John is eating\nsomething”. But it seems hard to find a systematic and\nconvincing strategy that allows us to maintain that natural language\npredicates have a fixed degree. This has motivated the construction of\nlogical languages that feature multigrade predicates in order to\nprovide a more appropriate formal account of natural language (Grandy\n1976; Graves 1993; Orilia 2000a). Since natural language predicates\nappear to be multigrade, one may be tempted to take the properties and\nrelations that they express to also be multigrade, and the metaphysics\nof science may lend support to this conclusion (Mundy 1989).", "\nSeemingly, relations are not jointly instantiated\nsimpliciter; how the instantiation occurs also plays\na role. This comes to the fore in particular with non-symmetric\nrelations such as loving. For example, if John loves Mary,\nthen loving is jointly instantiated by John and Mary in a\ncertain way, whereas if it is Mary who loves John, then\nloving is instantiated by John and Mary in another way.\nAccordingly, relations pose a special problem: explicating the\ndifference between facts, such as Abelard loves Eloise and\nEloise loves Abelard, that at least prima facie\ninvolve exactly the same constituents, namely a non-symmetric relation\nand two other items (loving, Abelard, Eloise). Such facts are\noften said to differ in “relational order” or in the\n“differential application” of the non-symmetric relation\nin question, and the problem then is that of characterizing what this\nrelational order or differential application amounts to.", "\nRussell (1903: §218) attributed an enormous importance to this\nissue and attacked it repeatedly. Despite this, it has been pretty\nmuch neglected until the end of last century, with only few others\nconfronting it systematically (e.g., Bergmann 1992; Hochberg 1987).\nHowever, Fine (2000) has forcefully brought it again on the\nontological agenda and proposed a novel approach that has received\nsome attention. Fine identifies standard and\npositionalist views (analogous to two approaches defended by\nRussell at different times (1903; 1984); cf. Orilia 2008). According\nto the former, relations are intrinsically endowed with a\n“direction”, which allows us to distinguish, e.g.,\nloving and being loved: Abelard loves\nEloise and Eloise loves Abelard differ, because they\ninvolve two relations that differ in direction (e.g., the former\ninvolves loving and the latter being loved).\nAccording to the latter, relations have different\n“positions” that can somehow host relata:\nAbelard loves Eloise and Eloise loves Abelard\ndiffer, because the two positions of the very same loving\nrelation are differently occupied (by Abelard and Eloise in one case\nand by Eloise and Abelard in the other case). Fine goes on to propose\nand endorse an alternative, “anti-positionalist”\nstandpoint, according to which relations have neither direction nor\npositions. The literature on this topic keeps growing and there are\nnow various proposals on the market, including new versions of\npositionalism (Orilia 2014; Donnelly 2016; Dixon 2018), and\nprimitivism, according to which differential application\ncannot be analyzed (MacBride 2014).", "\nRussell (1903: ch. 26) also had a key role in leading philosophers to\nacknowledge that at least some relations, in particular\nspatio-temporal ones, are external, i.e., cannot be reduced\nto monadic properties, or the mere existence, of the relata,\nin contrast to internal relations that can be so reduced. This was a\nbreakthrough after a long tradition tracing back at least to Aristotle\nand the Scholastics wherein there seems to be hardly any place for\nexternal relations (see entry on\n medieval theories of relations).[4]" ], "subsection_title": "1.5 Relations" }, { "content": [ "\nAccording to some philosophers, universals and tropes may coexist in\none ontological framework (see, e.g., Lowe 2006 for a well-known\ngeneral system of this kind, and Orilia 2006a, for a proposal based on\nempirical data from quantum mechanics). However, nowadays they are\ntypically seen as alternatives, with the typical supporter of\nuniversals (“universalist”) trying to do without tropes\n(e.g., Armstrong 1997) and the typical supporter of tropes\n(“tropist”) trying to dispense with universals (e.g.,\nMaurin\n 2002).[5]\n In order to clarify how differently they see matters, we may take\nadvantage of states of affairs. Both parties may agree, say, that\nthere are two red apples, \$a\$ and \$b\$. They will immediately\ndisagree, however, for the universalist will add that", "\nThe tropist will reject these states of affairs with universals as\nconstituents and rather urge that there are two distinct tropes, the\nredness of \$a\$ and the redness of \$b\$, which play a theoretical\nrole analogous to the one that the universalist would invoke for such\nstates of affairs. Hence, tropists claim that tropes can be causal\nrelata (D. Williams 1953) and truthmakers (Mulligan, Simons, &\nSmith 1984).", "\nTropes are typically taken to be simple, i.e., without any\nsubconstituent (see Section 2.2 of the entry on\n tropes).\n Their playing the role of states of affairs with universals as\nconstituents depends on this: universals combine two functions, only\none of which is fulfilled by tropes. On the one hand, universals are\ncharacterizers, inasmuch as they characterize concrete\nobjects. On the other hand, they are also unifiers, to the\nextent that different concrete objects may be characterized by the\nvery same universal, which is thus somehow shared by all of them; when\nthis is the case, there is, according to the universalist, an\nobjective similarity among the different objects (see\n §1.2).\n In contrast, tropes are only characterizers, for, at least as\ntypically understood, they cannot be shared by distinct concrete\nobjects. Given its dependency on one specific object, say, the apple\n\$a\$, a trope can do the work of a state of affairs with \$a\$ as\nconstituent. But for tropes to play this role, the tropist will have\nto pay a price and introduce additional theoretical machinery to\naccount for objective similarities among concrete objects. To this\nend, she will typically resort to the idea that there are objective\nresemblances among tropes, which can then be grouped together in\nresemblance classes. These resemblance classes play the role of\nunifiers for the tropist. Hence, from the tropist’s point of\nview “property” is ambiguous, since it may stand for the\ncharacterizers (tropes) or for the unifiers (resemblance classes) (cf.\nentry on\n mental causation, §6.5).\n Similarly, “exemplification” and related words may be\nregarded as ambiguous insofar as they can be used either to indicate\nthat an object exemplifies a certain trope or to indicate that the\nobject relates to a certain resemblance class by virtue of\nexemplifying a trope in that\n class.[6]" ], "subsection_title": "1.6 Universals versus Tropes" }, { "content": [ "\nMany important and often controversial distinctions among different\nkinds of properties have been made throughout the whole history of\nphilosophy until now, often playing key roles in all sorts of disputes\nand arguments, especially in metaphysics. Here we shall briefly review\nsome of these distinctions and others will surface in the following\nsections. More details can be found in other more specialized entries,\nto which we shall refer.", "\nLocke influentially distinguished between primary and\nsecondary qualities; the former are objective features of\nthings, such as shapes, sizes and weights, whereas the latter are\nmind-dependent, e.g., colors, tastes,\nsounds, and smells. This contrast was already\nemphasized by the Greek atomists and was revived in modern times by\nGalileo, Descartes, and Boyle.", "\nAt least since Aristotle, the essential properties of an\nobject have been contrasted with its accidental properties;\nthe object could not exist without the former, whereas it could fail\nto have the latter (see entry on\n essential vs. accidental properties).\n Among essential properties, some acknowledge individual\nessences (also called “haecceities” or\n“thisnesses”), which univocally characterize a certain\nindividual. Adams (1979) conceives of such properties as involving,\nvia the identity relation, the very individual in question, e.g.,\nSocrates: being identical to Socrates, which cannot exist if\nSocrates does not exist. In contrast, Plantinga (1974) views them as\ncapable of existing without the individuals of which they are\nessences, e.g., Socratizing, which could have existed even if\nSocrates had not existed. See\n §5.2\n on the issue of the essences of properties themselves.", "\n Sortal properties are typically\nexpressed by count nouns like “desk” and “cat”\nand are taken to encode principles of individuation and persistence\nthat allow us to objectively count objects. For example, there is a\nfact of the matter regarding how many things in this room instantiate\nbeing a desk and being a cat. On the other hand,\nnon-sortal properties such as red or water do not\nallow us to count in a similarly obvious way. This distinction is\noften appealed to in contemporary metaphysics (P. Strawson 1959: ch.\n5, §2; Armstrong 1978a: ch. 11, §4), where, in contrast, the\ntraditional one between genus and\n species\n plays a relatively small role. The latter figured conspicuously in\nAristotle and in much subsequent philosophy inspired by him. We can\nview a genus as a property more general than a corresponding species\nproperty, in a hierarchically relative manner. For example, being\na mammal is a genus relative to the species being a\nhuman, but it is a species relative to the genus being an\nanimal. The possession of a property called differentia\nis appealed to in order to distinguish between different species\nfalling under a common genus; e.g., as the tradition has it, the\ndifferentia for being human is being rational (Aristotle,\nCategories, 3a). Similar hierarchies of properties, however\nwithout anything like differentiae, come with the distinction of\n determinables and determinates,\n which appears to be\nmore prominent in current metaphysics. Color properties provide\ntypical examples of such hierarchies, e.g., with red and\nscarlet as determinable and determinate, respectively." ], "subsection_title": "1.7 Kinds of Properties" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWe saw right at the outset that objects exemplify, or instantiate,\nproperties. More generally, items of all sorts, including properties\nthemselves, exemplify properties, or, in different terminology,\nbear, have or possess properties. Reversing\norder, we can also say that properties characterize, or\ninhere in, the items that exemplify them. There is then a\nvery general phenomenon of exemplification to investigate, which has\nbeen labeled in various ways, as the variety of terms of art just\ndisplayed testifies. All such terms have often been given special\ntechnical senses in the rich array of different explorations of this\nterritory since Ancient and Medieval times up to the present age (see,\ne.g., Lowe 2006: 77). These explorations can hardly be disentangled\nfrom the task of providing a general ontological picture with its own\ncategorial distinctions. In line with what most philosophers do\nnowadays, we choose “exemplification”, or, equivalently,\n“instantiation” (and their cognates), to discuss this\nphenomenon in general and to approach some different accounts that\nhave been given of it in recent times. This sweeping use of these\nterms is to be kept distinct from the more specialized uses of them\nthat will surface below (and to some extent have already surfaced\nabove) in describing specific approaches by different philosophers\nwith their own terminologies." ], "section_title": "2. Exemplification", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nWe have taken for granted that there is just one kind of\nexemplification, applying indifferently to different categories of\nentities. This monist option may indeed be considered the\ndefault one. A typical recent case of a philosopher who endorses it is\nArmstrong (1997). He distinguishes three basic\ncategories, particulars, properties or relations, and states of\naffairs, and takes exemplification as cutting across them: properties\nand relations are exemplified not only by particulars, but by\nproperties or relations and states of affairs as well. But some\nphilosophers are pluralist: they distinguish different kinds\nof exemplification, in relation to categorial distinctions in their\nontology.", "\nOne may perhaps attribute different kinds of exemplification to the\nabove-considered Meinongians in view of the different sorts of\npredication that they admit (see, e.g., Monaghan’s (2011)\ndiscussion of Zalta’s theory). A more typical example of the\npluralist alternative is however provided by Lowe (2006), who\ndistinguishes “instantiation”,\n“characterization” and “exemplification” in\nhis account of four fundamental categories: objects, and three\ndifferent sorts of properties, namely kinds (substantial universals),\nattributes and modes\n (tropes).[7]\n To illustrate, Fido is a dog insofar as it instantiates the\nkind dog, \$D\$, which in turn is characterized by\nthe attribute of barking, \$B\$. Hence, when Fido is barking, it\nexemplifies \$B\$ occurrently by virtue of being\ncharacterized by a barking mode, \$b\$, that instantiates \$B\$; and,\nwhen Fido is silent, it exemplifies \$B\$ dispositionally,\nsince \$D\$, which Fido instantiates, is characterized by\n\$B\$ (see Gorman 2014 for a critical discussion of this sort of\nview)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Monist vs. Pluralist Accounts" }, { "content": [ "\nMost philosophers, whether tacitly or overtly, appear to take\nexemplification as primitive and unanalyzable. However, on certain\nviews of particulars, it might seem that exemplification is reduced to\nsomething more fundamental.", "\nA well-known such approach is the bundle theory, which takes\nparticulars to be nothing more than “bundles” of\nuniversals connected by a special relation, commonly called\ncompresence, after Russell (1948: Pt. IV, ch.\n 8)[8].\n Despite well-known problems (Van Cleve 1985), this view, or\napproaches in its vicinity, keep having supporters (Casullo 1988;\nCurtis 2014; Dasgupta 2009; Paul 2002; Shiver 2014; J. Russell 2018;\nsee Sider 2020, ch. 3, for a recent critical analysis). From this\nperspective, that a particular exemplifies a property amounts to the\nproperty’s being compresent with the properties that constitute\nthe bundle with which the particular in question is identified. It\nthus looks as if exemplification is reduced to compresence.\nNevertheless, compresence itself is presumably jointly exemplified by\nthe properties that constitute a given bundle, and thus at most there\nis a reduction, to compresence, of exemplification by a\nparticular (understood as a bundle), and not an elimination of\nexemplification in general.", "\nAnother, more recent, approach is based on partial identity.\nBaxter (2001) and, inspired by him, Armstrong (2004), have proposed\nrelated assays of exemplification, which seem to analyze it in terms\nof such partial identity. These views have captured some interest and\ntriggered discussions (see, e.g., Mumford 2007; Baxter’s (2013)\nreply to critics and Baxter’s (2018) rejoinder to Brown\n2017).", "\nBaxter (2001) relies on the notion of aspect and on the\nrelativization of numerical identity to counts. In his view,\nboth particulars and properties have aspects, which can be\nsimilar to distinct aspects of other particulars or properties. The\nnumerical identity of aspects is relative to standards for counting,\ncounts, which group items in count collections: aspects of\nparticulars in the particular collection, and aspects of\nuniversals, in the universal collection. There can then be a\ncross-count identity, which holds between an aspect in the\nparticular collection, and an aspect in the universal collection,\ne.g., the aspects Hume as human and humanity as had by\nHume. In this case, the universal and the particular in question\n(humanity and Hume, in our example) are partially identical.\nInstantiation, e.g., that Hume instantiates humanity, then amounts to\nthis partial identity of a universal and a particular. One may have\nthe feeling, as Baxter himself worries (2001: 449), that in this\napproach instantiation has been traded for something definitely more\nobscure, such as aspects and an idiosyncratic view of identity. It can\nalso be suspected that particulars’ and properties’\nhaving aspects is presupposed in this analysis, where this\nhaving is a relation rather close to exemplification\nitself.", "\nArmstrong (2004) tries to do without aspects. At first glance it seems\nas if he analyzes exemplification, for he takes the exemplification of\na property (a universal) by a particular to be a partial identity of\nthe property and the particular; as he puts it (2004: 47), “[i]t\nis not a mere mereological overlap, as when two streets intersect, but\nit is a partial identity”. However, when we see more closely\nwhat this partial identity amounts to, the suspicion arises that it\npresupposes exemplification. For Armstrong appears to identify a\nparticular via the properties that it instantiates and\nsimilarly a property via the particulars that instantiate it.\nSo that we may identify a particular, \$x\$, via a collection of\nproperties qua instantiated by \$x\$, say \$\\{F_x,\$ \$G_x,\$\n\$H_x,\$ …, \$P_x,\$ \$Q_x,\$ \$\\ldots\\};\$ and a property,\n\$P\$, via a collection of particulars qua instantiating\n\$P\$, say \$\\{P_a, P_b , \\ldots ,P_x, P_y , \\ldots \\}\$. By putting\nthings in this way, we can then say that a particular is partially\nidentical to a property when the collection that identifies the\nparticular has an element in common with the collection that\nidentifies the property. To illustrate, the \$x\$ and the \$P\$ of our\nexample are partially identical because they have the element \$P_x\$\nin common. Now, the elements of these collections are neither\nproperties tout court nor particulars tout court,\nwhich led us to talk of properties qua instantiated and\nparticulars qua\n instantiating.[9]\n But this of course presupposes instantiation. Moreover, there is the\nunwelcome consequence that the world becomes dramatically less\ncontingent than we would have thought at first sight, for neither a\nconcrete particular nor a property can exist without it being the case\nthat the former has the properties it happens to have, and that the\nlatter is instantiated by the same particulars that actually\ninstantiate it; we get, as Mumford puts it (2007: 185), “a major\nnew kind of necessity in the world”." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Compresence and Partial Identity" }, { "content": [ "\nOne important motivation, possibly the main one, behind attempts at\nanalysis such as the ones we have just seen is the worry to avoid the\nso-called Bradley’s regress\nregarding\nexemplification (Baxter 2001: 449; Mumford 2007: 185), which goes as\nfollows. Suppose that the individual \$a\$ has the property \$F\$. For\n\$a\$ to instantiate \$F\$ it must be linked to \$F\$ by a\n(dyadic) relation of instantiation, \$I_1\$. But this requires a\nfurther (triadic) relation of instantiation, \$I_2\$, that connects\n\$I_1, F\$ and \$a\$, and so on without end. At each stage a further\nconnecting relation is required, and thus it seems that nothing\never gets connected to anything else (it is not clear to what\nextent Bradley had this version in mind; for references to analogous\nregresses prior to Bradley’s, see Gaskin 2008: ch. 5,\n§70).", "\nThis regress has traditionally been regarded as vicious (see, e.g.,\nBergmann 1960), although philosophers such as Russell (1903: §55)\nand Armstrong (1997: 18–19) have argued that it is not. In doing\nso, however, they seem to take for granted the fact that \$a\$ has the\nproperty \$F\$ (pretty much as in the brute fact approach;\nsee below) and go on to see \$a\$’s and \$F\$’s\ninstantiating \$I_1\$ as a further fact that is merely\nentailed by the former, which in turn entails \$a\$’s,\n\$F\$’s and \$I_1\$’s instantiating \$I_2\$, and so on.\nThis way of looking at the matter tends to be regarded as a standard\nresponse to the regress. But those who see the regress as vicious\nassume that the various exemplification relations are introduced in an\neffort to explain the very existence of the fact that \$a\$\nhas the property \$F\$. Hence, from their explanatory standpoint,\ntaking the fact in question as an unquestioned ground for a chain of\nentailments is beside the point (cf. Loux 1998: 31–36;\nVallicella 2002).", "\nIt should be noted, however, that this perspective suggests a\ndistinction between an “internalist” and an\n“externalist” version of the regress (in the terminology\nof Orilia 2006a). In the former, at each stage we postulate a new\nconstituent of the fact, or state of affairs, \$s\$, that exists\ninsofar as \$a\$ has the property \$F\$, and there is viciousness\nbecause \$s\$ can never be appropriately\n characterized.[10]\n In the latter, at each stage we postulate a new, distinct, state of\naffairs, whose existence is required by the existence of the state of\naffairs of the previous stage. This amounts to admitting infinite\nexplanatory and metaphysical dependence chains. However, according to\nOrilia (2006b: §7), since no decisive arguments against such\nchains exist, the externalist regress should not be viewed as vicious\n(for criticisms, see Maurin 2015 and Allen 2016: §2.4.1; for a\nsimilar view about predication, see Gaskin 2008).", "\nA typical line for those convinced that the regress is vicious has\nconsisted in proposing that instantiation is not a relation, or at\nleast not a normal one. Some philosophers hold that it is a sui\ngeneris linkage that hooks things up without intermediaries.\nPeter Strawson (1959) calls it a non-relational tie and\nBergmann (1960) calls it a nexus. Broad (1933: 85) likened\ninstantiation to glue, which just sticks two sheets of paper\ntogether, without needing anything additional; similarly,\ninstantiation just relates. An alternative line has been to\nreject instantiation altogether. According to Frege, it is not needed,\nbecause properties have “gaps” that can be filled, and\naccording to a reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,\nbecause objects and properties can be connected like links in a chain.\nHowever, both strategies are problematic, as argued by Vallicella\n(2002). His basic point is that, if \$a\$ has property \$F\$, we need\nan ontological explanation of why \$F\$ and \$a\$ happen to be\nconnected in such a way that \$a\$ has \$F\$ as one of its properties\n(unless \$F\$ is a property that \$a\$ has necessarily). But none of\nthese strategies can provide this explanation. For example, the appeal\nto gaps is pointless: \$F\$ has a gap whether or not it is filled by\n\$a\$ (for example, it could be filled in by another object), and thus\nthe gap cannot explain the fact that \$a\$ has \$F\$ as one of its\nproperties.", "\nBefore turning to exemplification as partial identity, Armstrong\n(1997: 118) has claimed that Bradley’s regress can be avoided by\ntaking a state of affairs, say \$x\$’s being \$P\$, as capable\nby itself of holding together its constituents, i.e., the object \$x\$\nand the property \$P\$ (see also Perovic 2016). Thus, there is no need\nto invoke a relation of exemplification linking \$x\$ and \$P\$ in\norder to explain how \$x\$ and \$P\$ succeed in giving rise to a\nunitary item, namely the state of affairs in question. There seems to\nbe a circularity here for it appears that we want to explain how an\nobject and a property come to be united in a state of affairs by\nappealing to the result of this unification, namely the state of\naffairs itself. But perhaps this view can be interpreted as simply the\nidea that states of affairs should be taken for granted in a\nprimitivist fashion without seeking an explanation of their unity by\nappealing to exemplification or otherwise; this is the brute fact\napproach, as we may call it (for supporters, see Van Inwagen\n(1993: 37) and Oliver (1996: 33); for criticisms and a possible\ndefense, see Vallicella 2002, and Orilia 2016, respectively).", "\nLowe (2006) has tried to tackle Bradley’s regress within his\npluralist approach to exemplification. In his view, characterization,\ninstantiation and exemplification are “formal” and thus\nquite different from garden-variety relations such giving or\nloving. This guarantees that these three relations escape\nBradley’s regress (Lowe 2006: 30, 80,\n 90).[11]\n Let us illustrate how, by turning back to the Fido example of\n §2.1.\n What a mode instantiates and what it characterizes belong to its\nessence. In other words, a mode cannot exist without instantiating the\nattribute it instantiates and characterizing the object it\ncharacterizes. Hence, mode \$b\$, by simply existing, instantiates\nattribute \$B\$ and characterizes Fido. Moreover, since\nexemplification (the occurrent one, in this case) results from\n“composing” characterization and instantiation,\n\$b\$’s existence also guarantees that Fido exemplifies \$B\$.\nAccording to Lowe, we thus have some truths, that \$b\$ characterizes\nFido, that \$b\$ instantiates \$B\$, and that Fido exemplifies \$B\$\n(i.e., is barking), all of which are made true by \$b\$. Hence, there\nis no need to postulate as truthmakers states of affairs with\nconstituents, Fido and \$b\$, related by characterization, or \$b\$\nand \$B\$, related by exemplification, or Fido and \$B\$, related by\nexemplification. This, in Lowe’s opinion, eschews\nBradley’s regress, since this arises precisely because we appeal\nto states of affairs with constituents in need of a glue that\ncontingently keep them together. Nevertheless, there is no loss of\ncontingency in Lowe’s world picture, for an object need not be\ncharacterized by the modes that happen to characterize it. Thus, for\nexample, mode \$b\$ might have failed to exist and there could have\nbeen a Fido silence mode in its stead, in which case the proposition\nthat Fido is barking would have been false and the proposition that\nFido is silent would have been true. One may wonder however what makes\nit the case that a certain mode is a mode of just a certain object and\nnot of another one, say another barking dog. Even granting that it is\nessential for \$b\$ to be a mode of Fido, rather than of another dog,\nit remains true that it is of Fido, rather than of the other\ndog, and one may still think that this being of is also glue\nof some sort, perhaps with a contingency inherited from the\ncontingency of \$b\$ (which might have failed to exist). The suspicion\nthen is that the problem of accounting for the relation between a mode\nand an object has replaced the Armstrongian one of what makes it the\ncase that a universal \$P\$ and an object \$x\$ make up the state of\naffairs \$x\$’s being \$P\$. But the former problem,\none may urge, is no less thorny than the latter, and some\nuniversalists like Armstrong may consider uneconomical Lowe’s\nacceptance of tropes in addition to universals (for accounts of\nBradley’s regress analogous to Lowe’s, but within a\nthoroughly tropist ontology, see Section 3.2 of the entry on\n tropes.)", "\nAs it should be clear from this far from exhaustive survey,\nBradley’s regress deeply worries ontologists and the attempts to\ntame it keep\n flowing.[12]" ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Bradley’s Regress" }, { "content": [ "\nPresumably, properties exemplify properties. For example, if\nproperties are abstract objects, as is usually thought, then seemingly\nevery property exemplifies abstractness. But then we should also grant\nthat there is self-exemplification, i.e., a property exemplifying\nitself. For example, abstractness is itself abstract and thus\nexemplifies itself. Self-exemplification however has raised severe\nperplexities at least since Plato.", "\nPlato appears to hold that all properties exemplify\nthemselves, when he claims that forms participate in themselves. This\nclaim is crucially involved in his so-called third man\nargument, which led him to worry that his theory of forms is\nincoherent (Parmenides, 132 ff.). As we see matters now, it\nis not clear why we should hold that all properties exemplify\nthemselves (Armstrong 1978a: 71); for instance, people are honest, but\nhonesty itself is not honest (see, however, the entry on\n Plato’s Parmenides,\n and Marmodoro forthcoming).", "\nNowadays, a more serious worry related to self-exemplification is\nRussell’s famous paradox, constructed as regarding the property\nof non-self-exemplification, which appears to exemplify itself iff it\ndoes not, thus defying the laws of logic, at least classical logic.\nThe discovery of his paradox (and then the awareness of related\npuzzles) led Russell to introduce a theory of types, which institutes\na total ban on self-predication by a rigid segregation of properties\ninto a hierarchy of types (more on this in\n §6.1).\n The account became more complex and rigid, as Russell moved from\nsimple to ramified type theory, which involves a\ndistinction of orders within types (see entries on\n type theory\n and\n Russell’s paradox,\n and, for a detailed reconstruction of how Russell reacted to the\nparadox, Landini 1998).", "\nIn type theory all properties are, we may say, typed. This\napproach has never gained unanimous consensus and its many problematic\naspects are well-known (see, e.g., Fitch 1952: Appendix C; Bealer\n1989). Just to mention a few, the type-theoretical hierarchy imposed\non properties appears to be highly artificial and multiplies\nproperties ad infinitum (e.g., since presumably properties\nare abstract, for any property \$P\$ of type \$n\$, there is an\nabstractness of type \$n+1\$ that \$P\$ exemplifies). Moreover, many\ncases of self-exemplification are innocuous and common. For example,\nthe property of being a property is itself a property, so it\nexemplifies itself. Accordingly, many recent proposals are type-free\n(see\n §6.1)\n and thus view properties as untyped, capable of being\nself-predicated, sometimes veridically. An additional motivation to\nmove in this direction is a new paradox proposed by Orilia and Landini\n(2019), which affects simple type theory. It is\n“contingent” in that it is derived from a contingent\nassumption, namely that someone, say John, is thinking just about the\nproperty of being a property \$P\$ such that John is thinking of\nsomething that is not exemplified by \$P\$." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Self-exemplification" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nQuine (1957 [1969: 23]) famously claimed that there should be no\nentity without identity. His paradigmatic case concerns sets: two of\nthem are identical iff they have exactly the same members. Since then\nit has been customary in ontology to search for identity conditions\nfor given categories of entities and to rule out categories for want\nof identity conditions (against this, see Lowe 1989). Quine started\nthis trend precisely by arguing against properties and this has\nstrictly intertwined the issues of which properties there are and of\ntheir identity\n conditions.[13]" ], "section_title": "3. Existence and Identity Conditions for Properties", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIn an effort to provide identity conditions for properties, one could\nmimic those for sets, or equate the former with the latter (as in\nclass nominalism; see note 3), and provide the following\nextensionalist identity conditions: two properties are\nidentical iff they are co-extensional. This criterion can hardly work,\nhowever, since there are seemingly distinct properties with the same\nextension, such as having a heart and having\nkidneys, and even wildly different properties such as\nspherical and weighing 2 kilos could by accident be\nco-extensive.", "\nOne could then try the following intensional identity\nconditions: two properties are identical iff they are\nco-intensional, i.e., necessarily co-extensional, where the\nnecessity in question is logical necessity. This guarantees that\nspherical and weighing 2 kilos are different even if\nthey happen to be co-extensional. Following this line, one may take\nproperties to be intensions, understood as, roughly,\nfunctions that assign extensions (sets of objects) to predicates at\nlogically possible worlds. Thus, for instance, the predicates\n“has a heart” and “has kidneys” stand for\ndifferent intensions, for even if they have the same extension in the\nactual world they have different extensions at worlds where there are\ncreatures with heart and no kidneys or vice versa. This approach is\nfollowed by Montague (1974) in his pioneering work in natural language\nsemantics, and in a similar way by Lewis (1986b), who reduces\nproperties to sets of possible objects in his modal realism,\nexplicitly committed to possible worlds and mere possibilia\ninhabiting them. Most philosophers find this commitment unappealing.\nMoreover, one may wonder how properties can do their causal work if\nthey are conceived of in this way (for further criticisms see Bealer\n1982: 13–19, and 1998: §4; Egan 2004). However, the\ncriterion of co-intensionality may be accepted without also buying the\nreduction of properties to sets of possibilia (Bealer views\nthis as the identity condition for his conception 1 properties; see\nbelow). Still, co-intensionality must face two challenges coming from\nopposite fronts.", "\nOn the one hand, from the perspective of empirical science,\nco-intensionality may appear too strong as a criterion of identity.\nFor the identity statements of scientific reductions, such as that of\ntemperature to mean kinetic energy, could suggest that some properties\nare identical even if not co-intensional. For example, one may accept\nthat having absolute temperature of 300K is having mean\nmolecular kinetic energy of \$6.21 \\times 10^{-21}\$ (Achinstein\n1974: 259; Putnam (1970: §1) and Causey (1972) speak of\n“synthetic identity” and “contingent\nidentity”, respectively). Rather than logical necessity, it is\nnomological necessity, necessity on the basis of the causal\nlaws of nature, that becomes central in this line of thought.\nFollowing it, some have focused on the causal and\nnomological roles of properties, i.e., roughly, the causes\nand effects of their being instantiated, and their involvement in laws\nof nature, respectively. They have thus advanced causal or\nnomic criteria. According to them, two properties are identical\niff they have the same causal (Achinstein 1974: §XI; Shoemaker\n1980) or nomological role (Swoyer 1982; Kistler 2002). This line has\nbeen influential, as it connects to the “pure\ndispositionalism” discussed in\n §5.2.\n There is however a suspicion of circularity here, since causal and\nnomological roles may be viewed as higher-order properties (see entry\non\n dispositions, §3).", "\nOn the other hand, once matters of meaning and mental content are\ntaken into account, co-intensionality might seem too weak, for it\nmakes a property \$P\$ identical to any logically equivalent property,\ne.g., assuming classical logic, \$P\$ and (\$Q\$ or not\n\$Q\$). And with a sufficiently broad notion of logical\nnecessity, even, for example, being triangular and being\ntrilateral are identical. However, one could insist that\n“trilateral” and “triangular” appear to have\ndifferent meanings, which somehow involve the different geometrical\nproperties having a side, and having an angle,\nrespectively. And if being triangular were really identical\nto being trilateral, from the fact that John believes that a\ncertain object has the former property, one should be able to infer\nthat John also believes that such an object has the latter property.\nYet, John’s ignorance may make this conclusion unwarranted. In\nthe light of this, borrowing a term from Cresswell (1975), one may\nmove from intensional to hyperintensional identity\nconditions, according to which two properties, such as trilaterality\nand triangularity, may be different even if they are co-intensional.\nIn order to implement this idea, Bealer (1982) take two properties to\nbe identical iff they have the same analysis, i.e., roughly, they\nresult from the same ultimate primitive properties and the same\nlogical operations applied to them (see also Menzel 1986; 1993). Zalta\n(1983; 1988) has developed an alternative available to those who admit\ntwo modes of predication (see\n §1.4):\n two properties are identical iff they are (necessarily) encoded by\nthe same objects.", "\nHyperintensional conditions make of course for finer distinctions\namong entities than the other criteria we considered. Accordingly, the\nformer are often called “fine-grained” and the latter\n“coarse-grained”, and the same denominations are\ncorrespondingly reserved for the entities that obey the conditions in\nquestion. Coarse- or fine-grainedness is a relative matter. The\nextensional criterion is more coarse-grained than the intensional or\ncausal/nomological ones. And hyperintensional conditions themselves\nmay be more or less fine-grained: properties could be individuated\nalmost as finely as the predicates expressing them, to the point that,\ne.g., even being \$P\$ and \$Q\$ and being \$Q\$ and\n\$P\$ are kept distinct, but one may also envisage less stringent\nconditions that make for the identification of properties of that sort\n(Bealer 1982: 54). It is conceivable, however, that one could be\nlogically obtuse to the point of believing that something has a\ncertain property without believing that it has a trivially equivalent\nproperty. Thus, to properly account for mental content,\nmaximal hyperintensionality appears to be required, and it is\nin fact preferred by Bealer. Even so, the paradox of analysis\nraises a serious issue.\nOne could say, for example, that being a circle is being\na locus of points equidistant from a point, since the latter\nprovides the analysis of the former. In reply, Bealer distinguishes\nbetween “being a circle” as designating a simple\n“undefined” property, which is an analysandum\ndistinct from the analysans, being a locus of points\nequidistant from a point, and “being a circle” as\ndesignating a complex “defined” property, which is indeed\nidentical to that analysans. Orilia (1999: §5.5)\nsimilarly distinguishes between the simple analysans and the\ncomplex analysandum, without admitting that expressions for\nproperties such as “being a circle” could be ambiguous in\nthe way Bealer suggests. Orilia rather argues that the\n“is” of analysis does not express identity but a weaker\nrelation, which is asymmetrical in that analysans and\nanalysandum play different roles in it. The matter keeps\nbeing discussed. Rosen (2015) appeals to grounding to characterize the\ndifferent role played by the analysans. Dorr (2016) provides\na formal account of the “is” used in identity statements\ninvolving properties, according to which it stands for a symmetric\n“identification” relation." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 From Extensionality to Hyperintensionality" }, { "content": [ "\nBealer (1982) distinguishes between conception 1 properties,\nor qualities, and conception 2 properties, or\nconcepts (understood as mind-independent). With a different\nand now widespread terminology, Lewis (1983, 1986b) followed suit,\nspeaking of a sparse and an abundant conception of\nproperties. According to the former, there are relatively few\nproperties, namely just those responsible for the objective\nresemblances and causal powers of things; they cut nature at its\njoints, and science is supposed to individuate them a\nposteriori. According to the latter, there are immensely many\nproperties, corresponding to all meaningful predicates we could\npossibly imagine and to all sets of objects, and they can be assumed\na priori. (It should be clear that “few” and\n“many” are used in a comparative sense, for the number of\nsparse properties may be very high, possibly infinite). To illustrate,\nthe sparse conception admits properties currently accepted by\nempirical science such as having negative charge or\nhaving spin up and rejects those that are no longer supported\nsuch as having a certain amount of caloric, which featured in\neighteenth century chemistry; in contrast, the abundant conception may\nacknowledge the latter property and all sorts of other properties,\nstrange as they may be, e.g., negatively charged or disliked by\nSocrates, round and square or Goodman’s (1983)\nnotorious grue and bleen. Lewis (1986b: 60) tries to\nfurther characterize the distinction by taking the sparse properties\nto be intrinsic, rather than extrinsic (e.g.,\nbeing 6 feet tall, rather than being taller than\nTom), and natural, where naturalness is something that\nadmits of degrees (for example, he says, masses and charges are\nperfectly natural, colors are less natural and grue and\nbleen are paradigms of unnaturalness). Much work on such\nissues has been done since then (see entries on\n intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties\n and\n natural properties).", "\nDepending on how sparse or abundant properties are, we can have two\nextreme positions and other more moderate views in between.", "\nAt one end of the spectrum, there is the most extreme version of the\nsparse conception, minimalism, which accepts all of these\nprinciples:", "\nThis approach is typically motivated by physicalism and\nepistemological qualms regarding transcendent universals. The\nbest-known contemporary supporter of minimalism is Armstrong (1978a,b,\n1984). Another minimalist is Swoyer (1996).", "\nBy dropping or mitigating some of the above principles, we get less\nminimalist versions of the sparse conception. For example, some have\nurged uninstantiated properties to account for features of measurement\n(Mundy 1987), vectors (Bigelow & Pargetter 1991: 77), or natural\nlaws (Tooley 1987), and some even that there are all the properties\nthat can be possibly exemplified, where the possibility in question is\ncausal or nomic (Cocchiarella 2007: ch. 12). In line with\npositions traditionally found in emergentism (see\n §5.1),\n Schaffer (2004) proposes that there are sparse properties as\nfundamental, and in addition, as grounded on them, the properties that\nneed be postulated at all levels of scientific explanations, e.g.,\nchemical, biological and psychological ones. Even Armstrong goes\nbeyond minimalist strictures, when in his later work (1997)\ndistinguishes between “first-class properties”\n(universals), identified from a minimalist perspective, and\n“second-class properties” (supervening on universals). All\nthese positions appear to be primarily concerned with issues in the\nmetaphysics of science (see\n §5)\n and typically display too short a supply of properties to deal with\nmeaning and mental content, and thus with natural language semantics\nand the foundations of mathematics (see\n §6).\n However, minimalists might want to resort to concepts, understood as\nmind-dependent entities, in dealing with such issues (e.g., along the\nlines proposed in Cocchiarella 2007).", "\nMatters of meaning and mental content are instead what typically\nmotivate the views at the opposite end of the spectrum. To begin with,\nmaximalism, i.e., the abundant conception in all its glory\n(Bealer 1982; 1993; Carmichael 2010; Castañeda 1976; Jubien\n1989; Lewis 1986b; Orilia 1999; Zalta 1988; Van Inwagen 2004):\nproperties are fine-grained necessary entities that exist even if\nuninstantiated, or even impossible to be instantiated. In its most\nextreme version, maximalism adopts identity conditions that\ndifferentiate properties as much as possible, but more moderate\nversions can be obtained by slightly relaxing such conditions. Views\nof this sort are hardly concerned with physicalist constraints or the\nlike and rather focus on the explanatory advantages of\nhyperintensionality. These may well go beyond the typical motivations\nconsidered above: Nolan (2014) argues that hyperintensionality is\nincreasingly important in metaphysics in dealing with issues such as\ncounter-possible conditionals, explanation, essences, grounding,\ncausation, confirmation and chance.", "\nRather than choosing between the sparse and abundant conceptions, the\nvery promoters of this distinction have opted in different ways for a\ndualism of properties, according to which there are\nproperties of both kinds. Lewis endorses abundant properties as\nreduced to sets of possibilia, and sparse properties either\nviewed as universals, and corresponding to some of the abundant\nproperties (1983), or as themselves sets of possibilia (1986b: 60).\nBealer (1982) proposes a systematic account wherein qualities are the\ncoarse-grained properties that “provide the world with its\ncausal and phenomenal order” (1982: 183) and concepts are the\nfine-grained properties that can function as meanings and as\nconstituents of mental contents. He admits a stock of simple\nproperties, which are both qualities and concepts (1982: 186),\nwherefrom complex qualities and complex concepts are differently\nconstructed: on the one hand, by thought-building operations,\nwhich give rise to fine-grained qualities; on the other hand, by\ncondition-building operations, which give rise to\ncoarse-grained qualities. Orilia (1999) has followed Bealer’s\nlead in also endorsing both coarse-grained qualities and fine-grained\nconcepts, without however identifying simple concepts and simple\nqualities. In Orilia’s account concepts are never identical to\nqualities, but may correspond to them; in particular, the identity\nstatements of intertheoretic reductions should be taken to express the\nfact that two different concepts correspond to the same quality.\nDespite its advantages in dealing with a disparate range of phenomena,\ndualism has not gained any explicit consensus. Its implicit presence\nmay however be widespread. For example, Putnam’s (1970: §1)\ndistinction between predicates and physical\nproperties, and Armstrong’s above-mentioned recognition of\nsecond-class properties may be seen as forms of dualism." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 The Sparse and the Abundant Conceptions" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIt is customary to distinguish between simple and\ncomplex properties, even though some philosophers take all\nproperties to be simple (Grossmann 1983: §§58–61). The\nformer are not characterizable in terms of other properties, are\nprimitive and unanalyzable and thus have no internal structure,\nwhereas the latter somehow have a structure, wherein other properties,\nor more generally entities, are parts or constituents. It is not\nobvious that there are simple properties, since one may imagine that\nall properties are analyzable into constituents ad infinitum\n(Armstrong 1978b: 67). Even setting this aside, to provide examples is\nnot easy. Traditionally, determinate colors are cited, but nowadays\nmany would rather appeal to fundamental physical properties such as\nhaving a certain electric charge. It is easier to provide\nputative examples of complex properties, once some other properties\nare taken for granted, e.g., blue and spherical or blue\nor non-spherical. These logically compound properties,\nwhich involve logical operations, will be considered in\n §4.1.\n Next, in\n §4.2\n we shall discuss other kinds of complex properties, called\nstructural (after Armstrong 1978b), which are eliciting a\ngrowing interest, as a recent survey testifies (Fisher 2018). Their\ncomplexity has to do with the subdivisions of their instances into\nsubcomponents. Typical examples come from chemistry, e.g.,\nH2O and methane understood as properties\nof molecules.", "\nIt should be noted that it is not generally taken for granted that\ncomplex properties literally have parts or constituents. Some\nphilosophers take this line (Armstrong 1978a: 36–39, 67ff.;\nBigelow & Pargetter 1989; Orilia 1999), whereas others demur, and\nrather think that talk in terms of structures with constituents is\nmetaphorical and dependent on our reliance on structured terms such as\n“blue and spherical” (Bealer 1982; Cocchiarella 1986a;\nSwoyer 1998: §1.2)." ], "section_title": "4. Complex Properties", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAt least prima facie, our use of complex predicates suggests\nthat there are corresponding complex properties involving all sorts of\nlogical operations. Thus, one can envisage conjunctive\nproperties such as blue and spherical, negative properties\nsuch as non-spherical, disjunctive properties such\nas blue or non-spherical, existentially or\nuniversally quantified properties such as loving\nsomeone or loved by everyone, reflexive\nproperties such as loving oneself, etc. Moreover, one could\nadd to the list properties with individuals as constituents, which are\nthen denied the status of a purely qualitative property,\ne.g., taller than Obama.", "\nIt is easy to construct complex predicates. But whether there really\nare corresponding properties of this kind is a much more difficult and\ncontroversial issue, tightly bound to the sparse/abundant distinction.\nIn the sparse conception the tendency is to dispense with them. This\nis understandable since in this camp one typically postulates\nproperties in rebus for empirical explanatory reasons. But\nthen, if we explain some phenomena by attributing properties \$F\$ and\n\$G\$ to an object, while denying that it does not exemplify \$H\$, it\nseems of no value to add that it also has, say, F and G,\nF or H, and non-H. Nevertheless, Armstrong, the\nleading supporter of sparseness, has defended over the years a mixed\nstance without disjunctive and negative properties, but with\nconjunctive ones. Armstrong’s line has of course its opponents\n(see, e.g., Paolini Paoletti 2014; 2017a; 2020a; Zangwill 2011 argues\nthat there are negative properties, but they are less real than\npositive ones). On the other hand, in the abundant conception, all\nsorts of logically compound properties are acknowledged. Since the\nfocus now is on meaning and mental content, it appears natural to\npostulate such properties to account for our understanding of complex\npredicates and of how they differ from simple ones. Even here,\nhowever, there are disagreements, when it comes to problematic\npredicates such the “does not exemplify itself” of\nRussell’s paradox. Some suggest that in this case one should\ndeny there is a corresponding property, in order to avoid the paradox\n(Van Inwagen 2006). However, we understand this predicate and thus it\nseems ad hoc that the general strategy of postulating a\nproperty fails. It seems better to confront the paradox with other\nmeans (see\n §6)." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Logically Compound Properties" }, { "content": [ "\nFollowing Armstrong (1978b: 68–71; see also Fisher 2018:\n§2), a structural property \$F\$ is typically viewed as a\nuniversal, and can be characterized thus:", "\nFor instance, a molecule \$w\$ exemplifying H2O\nhas as parts two atoms \$h_1\$ and \$h_2\$ and an atom \$o\$ that do\nnot exemplify H2O; this property involves\nhydrogen and oxygen, which are not exemplified by\n\$w\$; \$h_1\$ and \$h_2\$ exemplify hydrogen, and \$o\$\nexemplifies oxygen. For relational structural\nproperties, there is the further condition that", "\nH2O is a case in point: the relevant (chemical)\nrelation is bonding, which links the three atoms in question.\nAnother, often considered, example is methane as a structural\nproperty of methane-molecules (CH4), which\ninvolves a bonding relation between atoms and the joint\ninstantiation of hydrogen (by four atoms) and carbon\n(by one atom). Non-relational structural properties do not\nrequire condition (iv). For instance, mass 1 kg involves many\nrelevant properties of the kind mass n kg, for \$n \\lt 1\$,\nwhich are instantiated by relevant proper parts of any object that is\n1 kg in mass, and these proper parts are not linked by any relevant\nrelation (Armstrong 1978b: 70).", "\nIn most approaches, including Armstrong’s, the relevant\nproperties and the relevant relation, if any, are conceived of as\nparts, or constituents, of the structural property in question, and\nthus their being involved in the latter is a parthood relation. For\ninstance, hydrogen, oxygen and bonding are\nconstituents of H2O. Moreover, the composition of\nstructural properties is isomorphic to that of the complexes\nexemplifying them. These two theses characterize what Lewis (1986a)\ncalls the “pictorial conception”. It is worth noting that\nstructural properties differ from conjunctive properties such as\nhuman and musician, in that the constituents of the latter\n(i.e., human and musician) are instantiated by\nwhatever entity exemplifies the conjunctive property (i.e., a human\nbeing who is also a musician), whereas the constituents of a\nstructural property (e.g., hydrogen, oxygen and\nbonding) are not instantiated by the entities that\ninstantiate it (e.g., H2O molecules).", "\nStructural properties have been invoked for many reasons. Armstrong\n(1978b: ch. 22) appeals to them to explain the resemblance of\nuniversals belonging to a common class, e.g., lengths and colors.\nArmstrong (1988; 1989) also treats physical quantities and numbers\nthrough structural properties. The former involve, as in the above\nmass 1 kg example, smaller quantities such as mass 0.1\nkg and mass 0.2 kg (this view is criticized by Eddon\n2007). The latter are internal proportion relations between structural\nproperties (e.g., being a nineteen-electrons aggregate) and\nunit-properties (e.g., being an electron). Moreover,\nstructural properties have been appealed to in treatments of laws of\nnature (Armstrong 1989; Lewis 1986a), some natural kinds (Armstrong\n1978b, 1997; Hawley & Bird 2011), possible worlds (Forrest 1986),\nersatz times (Parsons 2005), emergent properties\n(O’Connor & Wong 2005), linguistic types (Davis 2014), ontic\nstructural realism (Psillos 2012). However, structural universals have\nalso been questioned on various grounds, as we shall now see.", "\nLewis (1986a) raises two problems for the pictorial conception. First,\nit is not clear how one and the same universal (e.g.,\nhydrogen) can recur more than once in a structural universal.\nLet us dub this “multiple recurrence problem”. Secondly,\nstructural universals violate the Principle of Uniqueness of\nComposition of classical\n mereology.\n According to this principle, given a certain collection of parts,\nthere is only one whole that they compose. Consider isomers, namely,\nmolecules that have the same number and types of atoms but different\nstructures, e.g., butane and isobutane\n(C4H10). Here, butane and\nisobutane are different structural universals. Yet, they\narise from the same universals recurring the same number of times. Let\nus dub this “isomer problem.”", "\nTwo further problems may be pointed out. First, even molecules with\nthe same number and types of atoms and the same structures may vary in\nvirtue of their spatial orientation (Kalhat 2008). This phenomenon is\nknown as chirality. How can structural properties account for\nit? Secondly, the composition of structural properties is restricted:\nnot every collection of properties gives rise to a structural\nproperty. This violates another principle of classical mereology: the\nPrinciple of Unrestricted Composition.", "\nLewis dismisses alternatives to the pictorial conception, such as the\n“linguistic conception” (in which structural universals\nare set-theoretic constructions out of simple universals) and the\n“magic conception” (in which structural universals\nare not complex and are primitively connected to the relevant\nproperties). Moreover, he also rejects the possibility of there being\namphibians, i.e., particularized universals lying between\nparticulars and full-fledged universals. Amphibians would solve the\nmultiple recurrence problem, as they would be identical with multiple\nrecurrences of single universals. For example, in methane,\nthere would be four amphibians of hydrogen.", "\nTo reply to Lewis’ challenges, two main strategies have been\nadopted on behalf of the pictorial conception: a non-mereological\ncomposition strategy, according to which structural properties do not\nobey the principles of classical mereology, and a mereology-friendly\nstrategy. Let us start with the former.", "\nArmstrong (1986) admits that the composition of structural universals\nis non-mereological. In his 1997, he emphasizes that states of affairs\ndo not have a mereological kind of composition, and views universals,\nincluding structural ones, as states of affairs-types which,\nas such, are not mereological in their composition. Structural\nuniversals themselves turn out to be state of affairs-types of a\nconjunctive sort (1997: 34 ff.). To illustrate, let us go back to the\nabove example with H2O exemplified by the water\nmolecule \$w\$. It involves the conjunction of these states of\naffairs:", "\nThis conjunction of states of affairs provides an example of a\nstate of affairs-type identifiable with the structural universal\nH2O.", "\nIn pursuit of the non-mereological composition strategy, Forrest\n(1986; 2006; 2016) relies on logically compound properties, in\nparticular (in his 2016) conjunctive, existentially quantified and\nreflexive ones. Bennett (2013) argues that entities are part of\nfurther entities by occupying specific slots within the latter.\nParthood slots are distinct from each other. Therefore, which entity\noccupies which slot matters to the composition of the resultant\ncomplex entity. Hawley (2010) defends the possibility of there being\nmultiple composition relations. In a more general way, McDaniel (2009)\npoints out that the relation of structure-making does not obey some of\nthe principles of classical mereology. Mormann (2010) argues that\ndistinct categories (to be understood as in\n category theory)\n come together with distinct parthood and composition relations.", "\nAs regards the mereology-friendly strategy, it has been suggested that\nstructural properties actually include extra components accounting for\nstructures, so that the Principle of Uniqueness of Composition is\nsafe. Considering methane, Pagès (2002) claims that\nsuch a structural property is composed of the properties\ncarbon and hydrogen, a bonding relation and\na peculiar first-order, formal relation between the atoms. According\nto Kalhat (2008), the extra component is a second-order arrangement\nrelation between the first-order properties. Ordering formal\nrelations—together with causally individuated\nproperties—are also invoked by McFarland (2018).", "\nAt the intersection of these strategies, Bigelow and Pargetter (1989,\n1991) claim that structural universals are internally relational\nproperties that supervene on first-order properties and relations and\non second-order proportion relations. Second-order proportion\nrelations are relations such as having four times as. They\nrelate first-order properties and relations. For example, in\nmethane, the relation having four times as relates\ntwo conjunctive properties: (i) hydrogen and being part of this\nmolecule; (ii) carbon and being part of this\nmolecule.", "\nCampbell (1990) solves the multiple recurrence problem and the isomer\nproblem by appealing to tropes. In methane, there are\nmultiple hydrogen tropes. In butane and isobutane,\ndistinct tropes entertain distinct structural relations.", "\nDespite Lewis’ dismissal, a number of theories appeal to\namphibians (i.e., particularized universals lying between particulars\nand full-fledged universals) or, more precisely, to entities similar\nto amphibians. Fine (2017) suggests that structural properties should\nbe treated by invoking arbitrary objects (Fine 1985). Davis’\n(2014) account of linguistic types as structural properties confronts\nthe problem of the multiple occurrence of one type, e.g.,\n“dog”, in another (e.g., “every dog likes another\ndog”) (Wetzel 2009). In general, the idea that types are\nproperties of tokens is a natural one, although there are also\nalternative views on the matter (see entry on\n types and tokens).\n Be this as it may, Davis proposes that types cannot occur within\nfurther types as tokens: they can only occur as subtypes.\nTherefore, subtypes lie, like amphibians, between types and tokens.\nSubtypes are individuated by their positions in asymmetric wholes,\nwhereas they are primitively and non-qualitatively distinct in\nsymmetric ones. The approach could be extended to properties such as\nmethane, which would be taken to have four distinct\nhydrogen subtypes." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Structural Properties" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWhen it comes to the metaphysical underpinnings of scientific\ntheories, properties play a prominent role: it appears that science\ncan hardly be done without appealing to them. This adds up to the case\nfor realism about properties and to our understanding of them. We\nshall illustrate this here first by dwelling on some miscellaneous\ntopics and then by focusing on a debate regarding the very nature of\nthe properties invoked in science, namely whether or not they are\nessentially dispositional. Roughly, an object exemplifies a\ndispositional property, such as soluble or\nfragile, by having a power or disposition to act or being\nacted upon in a certain way in certain conditions. For example, a\nglass’ disposition of being fragile consists in its\npossibly shattering in certain conditions (e.g., if struck with a\ncertain force). In contrast, something exemplifies a\ncategorical property, e.g., made of salt or\nspherical, by merely being in a certain way (see entry on\n dispositions)." ], "section_title": "5. Properties in the Metaphysics of Science", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nMany predicates in scientific theories (e.g., “being a\ngene” and “being a belief”) are functionally\ndefined. Namely, their meaning is fixed by appealing to some function\nor set of functions (e.g., encoding and transmitting genetic\ninformation). To make sense of functions, properties are needed.\nFirst, functions can be thought of as webs of causal relationships\nbetween properties or property-instances. Secondly, predicates such as\n“being a gene” may be taken to refer to\nhigher-level properties, or at least to something that has\nsuch properties. In this case, the property of being a gene\nwould be the higher-level property of possessing some further\nproperties (e.g., biochemical ones) that play the relevant\nfunctions (i.e., encoding and transmitting genetic information).\nAlternatively, being a gene would be a property that\nsatisfies the former higher-level property. Thirdly, the ensuing\nrealization relationships between higher-level and function-playing\nproperties can only be defined by appealing to properties (see entry\non\n functionalism).", "\nMore generally, many ontological\ndependence and reduction\nrelationships primarily concern properties: type-identity (Place 1956;\nSmart 1959; Lewis 1966) and token-identity (Davidson 1980) (see entry\non\n the mind/brain identity theory),\n supervenience (Horgan 1982; Kim 1993; entry on\n supervenience);\n realization (Putnam 1975; Wilson 1999; Shoemaker 2007), \nscientific reduction\n(Nagel 1961). Moreover,\na non-reductive relation such as ontological emergence (Bedau 1997;\nPaolini Paoletti 2017b) is typically characterized as a relation\nbetween emergent properties\nand more fundamental\nproperties. Even mechanistic explanations often appeal to properties\nand relations in characterizing the organization, the components, the\npowers and the phenomena displayed by mechanisms (Glennan & Illari\n2018; entry on\n mechanisms in science).", "\nEntities in nature are typified by\n natural kinds.\n These are mostly thought of as properties or property-like entities\nthat carve nature at its joints (Campbell, O'Rourke, & Slater\n2011) at distinct layers of the universe: microphysical (e.g.,\nbeing a neutron), chemical (e.g., being gold),\nbiological (e.g., being a horse).", "\nPhysical quantities such as mass or length are typically treated as\nproperties, specifiable in terms of a magnitude, a certain number, and\na unit measure, e.g., kg or meter, which can itself be specified in\nterms of properties (Mundy 1987; Swoyer 1987). Following Eddon’s\n(2013) overview, it is possible to distinguish two main strands here:\nrelational and monadic properties theories (see also\nDasgupta 2013). In relational theories (Bigelow & Pargetter 1988;\n1991), quantities arise from proportion relations, which may in turn\nbe related by higher-order proportion relations. Consider a certain\nquantity, e.g., mass 3 kg. Here the thrice as massive\nas proportion relation is relevant, which holds of certain pairs\nof objects \$a\$ and \$b\$ such that \$a\$ is thrice as massive as\n\$b\$. By virtue of such relational facts, the first members of such\npairs have a mass of 3 kg. Another relational approach is by Mundy\n(1988), who claims that mass 3 kg is a relation between\n(ordered pairs of) objects and numbers. For example, mass 3\nkg is a relation holding between the ordered pair \$\\langle a,\nb\\rangle\$ (assuming that \$a\$ is thrice as massive as \$b\$, and not\nthe other way round) and the number 3; or—if relations have\nbuilt-in relational order—between \$a, b\$ and 3. Knowles (2015)\nholds a similar view, wherein physical quantities are relations that\nobjects bear to numbers. According to the monadic properties approach,\nquantities are intrinsic properties of objects (Swoyer 1987; Armstrong\n1988; 1989). As we saw, Armstrong develops such a view by taking\nquantities to be structural properties. Related metaphysical inquiries\nconcern the dimensions of quantities (Skow 2017) and the status of\nforces (Massin 2009).", "\nLastly, properties play a prominent role in two well-known accounts of\nthe\n laws of nature:\n the nomological necessitation account and law\ndispositionalism. The former has been expounded by Tooley (1977;\n1987), Dretske (1977) and Armstrong (1983). Roughly, following\nArmstrong, a law of nature consists in a second-order and external\nnomological necessitation relation \$\\rN\$, contingently holding\nbetween first-order universals \$P\$ and \$Q\$: \$\\rN(P, Q)\$. Such a\nhigher-order fact necessitates certain lower-order regularities, i.e.,\nall the objects that have \$P\$ also have \$Q\$ (by nomological\nnecessity, in virtue of \$\\rN(P, Q))\$. Law dispositionalism\ninterprets laws of nature by appealing to dispositional properties.\nAccording to it, laws of nature “flow” from the essence of\nsuch properties. This implies that laws of nature hold with\nmetaphysical necessity: whenever the dispositions are in place, the\nrelevant laws must be in place too (Cartwright 1983; Ellis 2001; Bird\n2007; Chakravartty 2007; Fischer 2018; see also Schrenk 2017 and\nDumsday 2019). (For criticisms, see, e.g., van Fraassen 1989 as\nregards the former approach, and McKitrick 2018 and Paolini Paoletti\n2020b, as regards the latter)." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Miscellaneous Topics" }, { "content": [ "\nThere is a domestic dispute among supporters of properties in the\nmetaphysics of science, regarding the very nature of such properties\n(or at least the fundamental ones). We may distinguish two extreme\nviews, pure dispositionalism and pure\ncategoricalism. According to the former, all properties are\nessentially dispositional (“dispositional”, for\nbrevity’s sake, from now on), since they are nothing more than\ncausal powers; their causative roles, i.e., which effects\ntheir instantiations can cause, exhaust their essences. According to\npure categoricalism, all properties are essentially categorical (in\nbrief, “categorical”, in the following), because their\ncausative roles are not essential to them. If anything is essential to\na property, it is rather a non-dispositional and intrinsic aspect\ncalled “quiddity” (after Armstrong 1989), which need not\nbe seen as an additional entity over and above the property itself\n(Locke 2012, in response to Hawthorne 2001). Between such views there\nlie a number of intermediate positions.", "\nPure dispositionalism has been widely supported in the last few\ndecades (Mellor 1974; 2000; Shoemaker 1984: ch. 10 and 11 [in terms of\ncausal roles]; Mumford 1998; 2004; Bird 2005; 2007; Chakravartty 2007;\nWhittle 2008; see Tugby 2013 for an attempt to argue from this sort of\nview to a Platonist conception of properties). There are three main\narguments in favor of it. First, pure dispositionalism easily accounts\nfor the natural necessity of the laws of nature, insofar as such a\nnecessity just “flows” from the essence of the\ndispositional properties involved. Secondly, dispositional properties\ncan be easily known as they really are, because it is part of their\nessence that they affect us in certain ways. Thirdly, at the\n(presumably fundamental) micro-physical level, properties are only\ndescribed dispositionally, which is best explained by their being\ndispositional (Ellis & Lierse 1994; N. Williams 2011).", "\nNevertheless, pure dispositionalism is affected by several problems.\nFirst, some authors believe that it is not easy to provide a clear-cut\ndistinction between dispositional and would-be non-dispositional\nproperties (Cross 2005). Secondly, it seems that the essence of\ncertain properties does not include, or is not exhausted by, their\ncausative roles: qualia, inert and epiphenomenal\n properties,[14]\n structural and geometrical properties, spatio-temporal properties\n(Prior 1982; Armstrong 1999; for some responses, see Mellor 1974 and\nBird 2007; 2009). Thirdly, there can be symmetrical causative\nroles. Consider three distinct properties \$A\$, \$B\$ and \$C\$ such\nthat \$A\$ can cause \$B\$, \$B\$ can cause \$A\$, \$A\$ and \$B\$ can\ntogether cause \$C\$ and nothing else characterizes \$A\$ and \$B\$.\n\$A\$ and \$B\$ have the same causative role. Therefore, in pure\ndispositionalism, they turn out to be identical, against the\nhypothesis (Hawthorne 2001; see also Contessa 2019). Fourthly,\naccording to some, pure dispositionalism falls prey to (at least)\nthree distinct regresses (for a fourth regress, see Psillos 2006).\nSuch regresses arise from the fact that the essential causative role\nof a dispositional property \$P\$ “points towards” further\nproperties \$S\$, \$T\$, etc. qua possible effects. The\nessential causative roles of the latter “point towards”\nstill other properties, and so on. The first regress concerns the\nidentity of \$P\$, which is never fixed, as it depends on the identity\nof further properties, which depend for their identity on still other\nproperties, and so on (Lowe 2006; Barker 2009; 2013). The second\nregress concerns the knowability of \$P\$ (Swinburne 1980). \$P\$ is\nonly knowable through its possible effects (i.e., the instantiation of\n\$S\$, \$T\$, etc.), included in its causative role. Yet, such\npossible effects are only knowable through their possible effects, and\nso on. The third regress concerns the actuality of \$P\$ (Armstrong\n1997). \$P\$’s actuality is never reached, since \$P\$ is\nnothing but the power to give rise to \$S\$, \$T\$, etc., which are\nnothing but the powers to give rise to further properties, and so on.\nFor responses to these regresses, see Molnar 2003; Marmodoro 2009;\nBauer 2012; McKitrick 2013; see also Ingthorsson 2013.", "\nPure categoricalism seems to imply that causative roles are only\ncontingently associated to a property. Therefore, on pure\ncategoricalism, a property can possibly have distinct causative roles,\nwhich allows it to explain—among other things—the apparent\ncontingency of causative roles and the possibility of recombining a\nproperty with distinct causative roles. Its supporters include Lewis\n(1986b, 2009), Armstrong (1999), Schaffer (2005), and more recently\nLivanios (2017), who provides further arguments based on the\nmetaphysics of science. Kelly (2009) and Smith (2016) may be added to\nthe list, although they take roles to be non-essential and necessary\n(for further options, see also Kimpton-Nye 2018, Yates 2018a, Coates\nforthcoming and Tugby forthcoming).", "\nHowever, pure categoricalism falls prey to two sorts of difficulties.\nFirst, the contingency of causative roles has some unpalatable\nconsequences: unbeknownst to us, two distinct properties can swap\ntheir roles; they can play the same role at the same time; the same\nrole can be played by one property at one time and by another property\nat a later time; an “alien” property can replace a\nfamiliar one by playing its role (Black 2000). Secondly, and more\ngenerally, we are never able to know which properties play which\nroles, nor are we able to know the intrinsic nature of such\nproperties. This consequence should be accepted with “Ramseyan\nhumility” (Lewis 2009; see also Langton 1998 for a related,\nKantian, sort of humility) or it should be countered in the same way\nas we decide to counter any broader version of skepticism (Schaffer\n2005). On this issue, see also Whittle (2006); Locke (2009); Kelly\n(2013); Yates (2018b).", "\nLet us now turn to some intermediate positions.", "\nAccording to dualism (Ellis 2001; Molnar 2003), there are\nboth dispositional and categorical properties. Dualism is meant to\ncombine the virtues of pure dispositionalism and pure categoricalism.\nIt then faces the charge of adopting a less parsimonious ontology,\nsince it accepts two classes of properties rather than one, i.e.,\ndispositional and categorical ones.", "\nAccording to the identity theory (Heil 2003; 2012; Jaworski\n2016; Martin 2008; G. Strawson 2008; see also N. Williams 2019), every\nproperty is both dispositional and categorical (or qualitative). The\nmain problem here is how to characterize the distinction and relation\nof these two “sides”. Martin and Heil suggest that they\nare two distinct ways of partially considering one and the same\nproperty, whereas Mumford (1998) explores the possibility of seeing\nthem as two distinct ways of conceptualizing the property in question.\nHeil claims that the qualitative and the dispositional sides need to\nbe identified with one another and with the whole property. Jacobs\n(2011) holds that the qualitative side consists in the possession of\nsome qualitative nature by the property, whereas the dispositional\nside consists in that property being (part of) a sufficient truthmaker\nfor certain counterfactuals. Dispositional and qualitative sides may\nalso be seen as essential, higher-order properties of properties, as\nsupervenient and ontologically innocent aspects of properties\n(Giannotti 2019), or as constituents of the essence of properties\n(Taylor 2018). In general, the identity theory is between Scylla and\nCharybdis. If it reifies the dispositional and qualitative sides, it\nruns the risk of implying some sort of dualism. If it insists on the\nidentity between them, it runs the opposite risk of turning into a\npure dispositionalist theory (Taylor 2018)." ], "subsection_title": "5.2. Essentially Categorical vs. Essentially Dispositional Properties" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nFormal property theories are logical systems that aim at formulating\n“general noncontingent laws that deal with properties”\n(Bealer & Mönnich 1989: 133). In the next subsection we shall\noutline how they work. In the two subsequent subsections we shall\nbriefly consider their deployment in natural language semantics and\nthe foundations of mathematics, which can be taken to provide further\nreasons for the acknowledgment of properties in one’s ontology,\nor at least of certain kinds of properties." ], "section_title": "6. Formal Property Theories and their applications", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThese systems allow for terms corresponding to properties, in\nparticular variables that are meant to range over properties and that\ncan be quantified over. This can be achieved in two ways. Either\n(option 1; Cocchiarella 1986a) the terms standing for properties are\npredicates or (option 2; Bealer 1982) such terms are subject terms\nthat can be linked to other subject terms by a special predicate that\nis meant to express a predication relation (let us use\n“pred”) pretty much as in standard set theory a special\npredicate, “\$\\in\$”, is used to express the membership\nrelation. To illustrate, given the former option, an assertion such as\n“there is a property that both John and Mary have” can be\nrendered as", "\\[\\notag \\exists P(P(j) \\amp P(m)).\\]", "\nGiven the second option, it can be rendered as", "\\[\\notag \\exists x(\\textrm{pred}(x, j) \\amp \\textrm{pred}(x, m)).\\]", "\n(The two options can be combined as in Menzel 1986; see Menzel 1993\nfor further discussion).", "\nWhatever option one follows, in spelling out such theories one\ntypically postulates a rich realm of properties. Traditionally, this\nis done by a so-called comprehension principle which, intuitively,\nasserts that, for any well-formed formula (“wff”) \$A\$,\nwith \$n\$ free variables, \$x_1 , \\ldots ,x_n\$, there is a\ncorresponding \$n\$-adic property. Following option 1, it goes as\nfollows:", "\\[\\tag{CP} \\exists R^n \\forall x_1 \\ldots \\forall x_n(R^n(x_1 ,\n\\ldots ,x_n) \\leftrightarrow A). \\]", "\nAlternatively, one can use a variable-binding operator, \$\\lambda\$,\nthat, given an open wff, generates a term (called a “lambda\nabstract”) that is meant to stand for a property. This way to\nproceed is more flexible and is followed in the most recent versions\nof property theory. We shall thus stick to it in the following. To\nillustrate, we can apply “\$\\lambda\$” to the open\nformula, “\$(R(x) \\amp S(x))\$” to form the one-place\ncomplex predicate “[\$\\lambda x (R(x) \\amp S(x))\$]”; if\n“\$R\$” denotes being red and “\$S\$”\ndenotes being square, then this complex predicate denotes the\ncompound, conjunctive property being red and square.\nSimilarly, we can apply the operator to the open formula\n“\$\\exists y(L(x, y))\$” to form the one-place predicate\n“[\$\\lambda x \\exists y(L(x, y))\$]”; if\n“\$L\$” stands for loves, this complex predicate\ndenotes the compound property loving someone (whereas\n“[\$\\lambda y \\exists x(L(x, y))\$]” would denote\nbeing loved by someone). To ensure that lambda abstracts\ndesignate the intended property, one should assume a “principle\nof lambda conversion”. Given option 1, it can be stated\nthus:", "\\[\\tag{\$\\lambda\$-conv} [\\lambda x_1\\ldots x_n A](t_1 , \\ldots\n,t_n) \\leftrightarrow A(x_1 /t_1 , \\ldots ,x_n /t_n).\\]", "\n\$A(x_1 /t_1 , \\ldots ,x_n /t_n)\$ is the wff resulting from\nsimultaneously replacing each \$x_i\$ in \$A\$ with \$t_i\$ (for \$1\n\\le i \\le n)\$, provided \$t_i\$ is free for \$x_i\$ in \$A\$). For\nexample, given this principle, [\$\\lambda x (R(x) \\amp S(x))](j)\$ is\nthe case iff \$(R(j) \\amp S(j))\$ is also the case.", "\nStandard second-order logic allows for predicate variables bound by\nquantifiers. Hence, to the extent that these variables are taken to\nrange over properties, this system could be seen as a formal theory of\nproperties. Its expressive power is however limited, since it does not\nallow for subject terms that stand for properties. Thus, for example,\none cannot even say of a property \$F\$ that \$F = F\$. This is a\nserious limitation if one wants a formal tool for a realm of\nproperties whose laws one is trying to explore. Standard higher order\nlogics beyond the second order obviate this limitation by allowing for\npredicates in subject position, provided that the predicates that are\npredicated of them belong to a higher type. This presupposes a grammar\nin which predicates are assigned types of increasing levels, which can\nbe taken to mean that the properties themselves, for which the\npredicates stand for, are arranged into a hierarchy of types. Thus,\nsuch logics appropriate one version or another of the type theory\nconcocted by Russell to tame his own paradox and related conundrums.\nIf a predicate can be predicated of another predicate only if the\nformer is of a type higher than the latter, then self-predication is\nbanished and Russell’s paradox cannot even be formulated.\nFollowing this line, we can construct a type-theoretical formal\nproperty theory. The simple theory of types, as presented, e.g., in\nCopi (1971), can be seen as a prototypical version of such a property\ntheory (if we neglect the principle of extensionality assumed by\nCopi). The type-theoretical approach keeps having supporters. For\nexample, it is followed in the property theories embedded in\nZalta’s (1983) theory of abstract objects and more recently in\nthe metaphysical systems proposed by Williamson (2013) and Hale\n(2013).", "\nHowever, for reasons sketched in\n §2.4,\n type theory is hardly satisfactory. Accordingly, many type-free\nversions of property theory have been developed over the years and no\nconsensus on what the right strategy is appears to be in sight. Of\ncourse, without type-theoretical constraints, given \$(\\lambda\$-conv)\nand classical logic (CL), paradoxes such as Russell’s\nimmediately follow (to see this, consider this instance of\n\$(\\lambda\\textrm{-conv}): [\\lambda x {\\sim}x(x)]([\\lambda x\n{\\sim}x(x)]) \\leftrightarrow{\\sim}[\\lambda x {\\sim}x(x)]([\\lambda x\n{\\sim}x(x)])\$). In formal systems where abstract singular terms or\npredicates may (but need not) denote properties (Swoyer 1998), formal\ncounterparts of (complex) predicates like “being a property that\ndoes not exemplify itself” (formally, “[\$\\lambda x\n{\\sim}x(x)\$]”) could exist in the object language without\ndenoting properties; from this perspective, Russell’s paradox\nmerely shows that such predicates do not stand for properties\n(similarly, according to Schnieder 2017, it shows that it is not\npossible that a certain property exists). But we would like to have\ngeneral criteria to decide when a predicate stands for a property and\nwhen it does not. Moreover, one may wonder what gives these predicates\nany significance at all if they do not stand for properties. There are\nthen motivations for building type-free property theories in which all\npredicates stand for properties. We can distinguish two main strands\nof them: those that weaken CL and those that circumscribe\n\$(\\lambda\$-conv) (some of the proposals to be mentioned below are\nformulated in relation to set theory, but can be easily translated\ninto proposals for property theory).", "\nAn early example of the former approach was offered in a 1938 paper by\nthe Russian logician D. A. Bochvar (Bochvar 1938 [1981]), where the\nprinciple of excluded middle is sacrificed as a consequence of the\nadoption of what is now known as Kleene’s weak three-valued\nscheme. An interesting recent attempt based on giving up excluded\nmiddle is Field 2004. A rather radical alternative proposal is to\nembrace a paraconsistent logic and give up the principle of\nnon-contradiction (Priest 1987). A different way of giving up CL is by\nquestioning its structural rules and turn to a substructural logic, as\nin Mares and Paoli (2014). The problem with all these approaches is\nwhether their underlying logic is strong enough for all the intended\napplications of property theory, in particular to natural language\nsemantics and the foundations of mathematics.", "\nAs for the second strand (based on circumscribing \$(\\lambda\$-conv)),\nit has been proposed to read the axioms of a standard set theory such\nas ZFC, minus extensionality, as if they were about properties rather\nthan sets (Schock 1969; Bealer 1982; Jubien 1989). The problem with\nthis is that these axioms, understood as talking about sets, can be\nmotivated by the iterative conception of sets, but they seem rather\nad hoc when understood as talking about properties\n(Cocchiarella 1985). An alternative can be found in Cocchiarella\n1986a, where \$(\\lambda\$-conv) is circumscribed by adapting to\nproperties the notion of stratification used by Quine for sets. This\napproach is however subject to a version of Russell’s paradox\nderivable from contingent but intuitively possible facts (Orilia 1996)\nand to a paradox of hyperintensionality (Bozon 2004) (see Landini 2009\nand Cocchiarella 2009 for a discussion of both). Orilia (2000; Orilia\n& Landini 2019) has proposed another strategy for circumscribing\n\$(\\lambda\$-conv), based on applying to exemplification Gupta’s\nand Belnap’s theory of circular definitions.", "\nIndependently of the paradoxes (Bealer & Mönnich 1989: 198\nff.), there is the issue of providing identity conditions for\nproperties, specifying when it is the case that two properties are\nidentical. If one thinks of properties as meanings of natural language\npredicates and tries to account for intensional contexts, one will be\ninclined to assume rather fine-grained identity conditions, possibly\neven allowing that [\$\\lambda x(R(x) \\amp S(x))\$] and [\$\\lambda\nx(S(x) \\amp R(x))\$] are distinct (see Fox & Lappin 2015 for an\napproach based on operational distinctions among computable\nfunctions). On the other hand, if one thinks of properties as causally\noperative entities in the physical world, one will want to provide\nrather coarse-grained identity conditions. For instance, one might\nrequire that [\$\\lambda x A\$] and [\$\\lambda x B\$] are the same\nproperty iff it is physically necessary that \$\\forall x(A\n\\leftrightarrow B)\$. Bealer (1982) tries to combine the two\napproaches (see also Bealer & Mönnich\n 1989)[15]." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Logical Systems for Properties" }, { "content": [ "\nThe formal study of natural language semantics started with Montague\nand gave rise to a flourishing field of inquiry (see entry on\n Montague semantics).\n The basic idea in this field is to associate to natural language\nsentences wffs of a formal language, in order to represent sentence\nmeanings in a logically perspicuous manner. The association reflects\nthe compositionality of meanings: different syntactic subcomponents of\nsentences correspond systematically to syntactic subcomponents of the\nwffs; subcomponents of wffs thus represent the meanings of the\nsubcomponents of the sentences. The formal language eschews\nambiguities and has its own formal semantics, which grants that\nformulas have logical properties and relations, such as logical truth\nand entailments, so that in particular certain sequences of formulas\ncount as logically valid arguments. The ambiguities we normally find\nin natural language sentences and the entailment relations that link\nthem are captured by associating ambiguous sentences to different\nunambiguous wffs, in such a way that when a natural language argument\nis felt to be valid there is a corresponding sequence of wffs that\ncount as a logically valid argument. In order to achieve all this,\nMontague appealed to a higher-order logic. To see why this was\nnecessary, one may focus on this valid argument:", "\ntherefore,", "\nTo grant compositionality in a way that respects the syntactic\nsimilarity of the three sentences (they all have the same\nsubject-predicate form), and the validity of the argument, Montague\nassociates (1)–(3) to formulas such as these:", "\\[ \\tag{1a} [\\lambda F \\forall x(\\mathrm{G}(x) \\rightarrow\nF(x)](\\mathrm{M}); \\] \\[ \\tag{2a} [\\lambda F \\exists x(\\forall y(P(x)\n\\rightarrow x = y) \\amp F(x))](G); \\] \\[ \\tag{3a} [\\lambda F \\exists\nx(\\forall y(P(x) \\rightarrow x = y) \\amp F(x))](\\mathrm{M}). \\]", "\nThe three lambda abstracts in (1a)–(3a) represent, respectively,\nthe meanings of the three noun phrases in (1)–(3). These\nlambda-abstracts occur in predicate position, as predicates of\npredicates, so that (1a)–(3a) can be read, respectively, as:\nevery Greek is instantiated by being mortal; the\npresident of Greece is instantiated by being Greek;\nthe president of Greece is instantiated by being\nmortal. Given lambda-conversion plus quantifier and propositional\nlogic, the argument is valid, as desired. It should be noted that\nlambda abstracts such as these can be taken to stand for peculiar\nproperties of properties, classifiable as denoting concepts\n(after Russell 1903; see Cocchiarella 1989). One may then say then\nthis approach to semantics makes a case for the postulation of\ndenoting concepts, in addition to the more obvious and general fact\nthat it grants properties as meanings of natural language predicates\n(represented by symbols of the formal language).", "\nThis in itself says nothing about the nature of such properties. As we\nsaw in\n §3.1,\n Montague took them to be intensions as set-theoretically\ncharacterized in terms of possible worlds. Moreover, he took them to\nbe typed, since, to avoid logical paradoxes, he relied on type theory.\nAfter Montague, these two assumptions have been typically taken for\ngranted in natural language semantics, though with attempts to recover\nhyperintensionality somehow (Cresswell 1985) in order to capture the\nsemantics of propositional attitudes verbs such as\n“believe”, affected by the phenomena regarding mental\ncontent hinted at in\n §3.1.\n However, the development of type-free property theories has suggested\nthe radically different road of relying on them to provide logical\nforms for natural language semantics (Chierchia 1985; Chierchia &\nTurner 1988; Orilia 2000b; Orilia & Landini 2019). This allows one\nto capture straightforwardly natural language inferences that appear\nto presuppose type-freedom, as they feature quantifiers that bind\nsimultaneously subject and predicate positions (recall the example of\n §1.2).\n Moreover, by endowing the selected type-free property theory with\nfine-grained identity conditions, one also accounts for propositional\nattitude verbs (Bealer 1989). Thus, we may say that this line makes a\ncase for properties understood as untyped and highly fine-grained." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Semantics and Logical Form" } ] } ]	[ "Achinstein, Peter, 1974, “The Identity of Properties”,\nAmerican Philosophical Quarterly, 11(4): 257–275.", "Adams, Robert Merrihew, 1979, “Primitive Thisness and\nPrimitive Identity”, The Journal of Philosophy, 76(1):\n5–26. doi:10.2307/2025812", "Ainsworth, Peter Mark, 2010, “What Is Ontic Structural\nRealism?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part\nB: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41(1):\n50–57. doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.11.001", "Allen, Sophie R., 2016, A Critical Introduction to\nProperties, London: Bloomsbury. doi:10.5040/9781474276979", "Aristotle, Categories, in The Complete Works of\nAristotle, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University\nPress, 1998.", "Armstrong, David M., 1978, Universals and Scientific\nRealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press\n\n\n\n1978a, Volume I, Nominalism and Realism\n\n1978b, Volume II, A Theory of Universals\n ", "1978a, Volume I, Nominalism and Realism", "1978b, Volume II, A Theory of Universals", "–––, 1980, “Against ‘Ostrich’\nNominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt”, Pacific\nPhilosophical Quarterly, 61(4): 440–449.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1980.tb00032.x", "–––, 1983, What Is a Law of Nature?,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9781316499030", "–––, 1984, “Replies”, in D.M.\nArmstrong: Profiles, Radu J. 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Reidel.\ndoi:10.1007/978-94-009-6980-3", "–––, 1988, Intensional Logic and the\nMetaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.", "Zangwill, Nick, 2011, “Negative Properties”,\nNoûs, 45(3): 528–556.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00776.x" ]	[ { "href": "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/", "text": "species" }, { "href": "../analysis/", "text": "analysis" }, { "href": "../bradley-regress/", "text": "Bradley, Francis Herbert: Regress" }, { "href": "../category-theory/", "text": "category theory" }, { "href": "../causation-metaphysics/", "text": "causation: the metaphysics of" }, { "href": "../color/", "text": "color" }, { "href": "../concepts/", "text": "concepts" }, { "href": "../definitions/", "text": "definitions" }, { "href": "../dependence-ontological/", "text": "dependence, ontological" }, { "href": "../determinate-determinables/", "text": "determinates vs. determinables" }, { "href": "../dispositions/", "text": "dispositions" }, { "href": "../properties-emergent/", "text": "emergent properties" }, { "href": "../essential-accidental/", "text": "essential vs. accidental properties" }, { "href": "../facts/", "text": "facts" }, { "href": "../functionalism/", "text": "functionalism" }, { "href": "../intrinsic-extrinsic/", "text": "intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties" }, { "href": "../laws-of-nature/", "text": "laws of nature" }, { "href": "../logical-atomism/", "text": "logical atomism: Russell’s" }, { "href": "../logicism/", "text": "logicism and neologicism" }, { "href": "../science-mechanisms/", "text": "mechanism in science" }, { "href": "../mental-causation/", "text": "mental causation" }, { "href": "../mereology/", "text": "mereology" }, { "href": "../mind-identity/", "text": "mind/brain identity theory" }, { "href": "../natural-kinds/", "text": "natural kinds" }, { "href": "../nominalism-metaphysics/", "text": "nominalism: in metaphysics" }, { "href": "../nonexistent-objects/", "text": "nonexistent objects" }, { "href": "../plato-parmenides/", "text": "Plato: Parmenides" }, { "href": "../platonism/", "text": "Platonism: in metaphysics" }, { "href": "../natural-properties/", "text": "properties: natural" }, { "href": "../propositional-function/", "text": "propositional function" }, { "href": "../propositions/", "text": "propositions" }, { "href": "../scientific-reduction/", "text": "reduction, scientific" }, { "href": "../relations/", "text": "relations" }, { "href": "../relations-medieval/", "text": "relations: medieval theories of" }, { "href": "../russell-paradox/", "text": "Russell’s paradox" }, { "href": "../montague-semantics/", "text": "semantics: Montague" }, { "href": "../set-theory/", "text": "set theory" }, { "href": "../sortals/", "text": "sortals" }, { "href": "../states-of-affairs/", "text": "states of affairs" }, { "href": "../supervenience/", "text": "supervenience" }, { "href": "../tropes/", "text": "tropes" }, { "href": "../truthmakers/", "text": "truthmakers" }, { "href": "../types-tokens/", "text": "types and tokens" }, { "href": "../type-theory/", "text": "type theory" } ]
perception-auditory	Auditory Perception	First published Thu May 14, 2009; substantive revision Tue Apr 7, 2020	[ "\nAuditory perception raises a variety of challenging philosophical\nquestions. What do we hear? What are the objects of auditory\nawareness? What is the content of audition? Is hearing spatial? How\ndoes audition differ from vision and other sense modalities? How does\nthe perception of sounds differ from that of colors and ordinary\nobjects? This entry presents the main debates in this developing area\nand discusses promising avenues for future inquiry. It discusses the\nmotivation for exploring non-visual modalities, how audition bears on\ntheorizing about perception, and questions concerning the objects,\ncontents, phenomenology, varieties, and bounds of auditory\nperception." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Other Modalities and the Philosophy of Perception", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Objects of Auditory Perception", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Sounds", "2.2 Auditory Objects", "2.3 Sound Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "3. The Contents of Auditory Perception", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Spatial Hearing", "3.2 Audible Qualities" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Varieties of Auditory Perception", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Musical Listening", "4.2 Speech Perception", "4.3 Crossmodal Influences" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Conclusion and Future Directions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nThe philosophy of sounds and auditory perception is one area of the\nphilosophy of perception that reaches beyond vision for insights about\nthe nature, objects, contents, and varieties of perception. This entry\ncharacterizes central issues in the philosophy of auditory perception,\nmany of which bear upon theorizing about perception more generally,\nand it mentions outstanding questions and promising future areas for\ninquiry in this developing literature. Before beginning the\nsubstantive discussion of audition itself, it is worthwhile to discuss\nthe motivation and rationale for this kind of work.", "\nPhilosophical thinking about perception has focused predominantly on\nvision. The philosophical puzzle of perception and its proposed\nsolutions have been shaped by a concern for visual experience and\nvisual illusions. Questions and proposals about the nature of\nperceptual content have been framed and evaluated in visual terms, and\ndetailed accounts of what we perceive frequently address just the\nvisual case. Vision informs our understanding of perception’s\nepistemological role and of its role in guiding action. It is not a\ngreat exaggeration to say that much of the philosophy of perception\ntranslates roughly as philosophy of visual perception.", "\nRecently, however, other perceptual modalities have attracted\nattention (see, e.g., Stokes et al. 2015, Matthen 2015). In addition\nto auditory perception and the experience of sound, touch and tactile\nawareness have generated philosophical interest concerning, for\ninstance, the tactile and proprioceptive experience of space, the\nobjects of touch, whether contact is required for touch, and whether\ndistinct modalities detect pressure, heat, and pain (see, e.g.,\nO’Shaughnessy 1989, Martin 1993, Scott 2001, Fulkerson 2013,\n2016). The unique phenomenology of olfaction and smells has been used\nto argue that vision is atypical in supporting the transparency of\nperceptual experience (Lycan 2000, 282; cf. Batty 2010) and that\nperceptual objectivity does not require spatiality (Smith 2002, ch 5).\nLycan (2000) even suggests that the philosophy of perception would\nhave taken a different course had it focused upon olfaction instead of\nvision (see also Batty 2011). Some authors have appealed to taste and\nflavor to challenge traditional ways of dividing and counting senses\n(Smith 2015; cf. Richardson 2013).", "\nThis kind of work is philosophically interesting in its own right. But\nit is also worthwhile because theorizing about perception commonly\naims to address general questions about perception, rather than\nconcerns specific to vision. Hope for a comprehensive and general\nunderstanding of perception rests upon extending and testing claims,\narguments, and theories beyond vision. One might view work on\nnon-visual modalities as filling out the particulars required for a\nthoroughly detailed account of perceiving that applies not just to\nvision but across the modalities. At least three approaches might be\nadopted, with potential for increasingly revisionist outcomes.", "\nFirst, one might take work on non-visual modalities as\ntranslating what we have learned from the visual case into\nterms that apply to other modalities. This approach is relatively\nconservative. It assumes that vision is representative or paradigmatic\nand that we have a good understanding of perception that is derived\nfrom the case of vision. One example of this kind of approach would be\nto develop an account of the representational content of auditory\nexperience.", "\nSecond, considering other modalities might extend our\nvision-based understanding of perception. Non-visual cases might draw\nattention to new kinds of phenomena that are missing from or not\nsalient in vision. If so, a vision-based account of perception is\nsatisfactory as far as it goes, but it leaves out critical pieces. For\nexample, speech perception, multimodal perception, and flavor\nperception might involve novel kinds of perceptual phenomena absent\nfrom the visual case.", "\nThird, considering other modalities might challenge\nvision-based claims about perception. If falsifying evidence is\ndiscovered in non-visual cases, then theorizing beyond vision may\nforce revision of general claims about perception that are supported\nby vision. For example, if olfactory experience is not diaphanous, but\nolfactory experience is perceptual, the transparency thesis for\nperceptual experience fails.", "\nFinally, we might attempt to determine whether any unified\naccount exists that applies generally to all of the perceptual\nmodalities. We can ask this question either at the level of quite\nspecific claims, such as those concerning the objects of perception or\nthe nature and structure of content. We can ask it about the\nrelationships among perceiving, believing, and acting. Or we can ask\nit about the general theory of necessary and sufficient conditions for\nperceiving. Some philosophers, impressed by findings concerning\nnon-visual modalities, express skepticism whether a unified theory\nexists (e.g., Martin 1992).", "\nWhatever the approach, extending our knowledge about perception beyond\nthe visual requires systematic attention to individual modalities as\nwell as careful accounting in order to determine how the results bear\non general questions about perception. Whatever the outcome, audition\nis a rich subject matter in its own right, and investigating this\nsubject matter is crucial to our overall understanding of\nperception." ], "section_title": "1. Other Modalities and the Philosophy of Perception", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWhat do we hear? One way to address this question concerns the\nobjects of auditory perception." ], "section_title": "2. The Objects of Auditory Perception", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIn the first instance, typical human perceivers hear sounds. It\nis plausible that sounds are objects of auditory perception.", "\nWhat are sounds? Sounds traditionally have been counted with colors,\nsmells, and tastes as secondary, sensible, or\nsensory qualities (see, e.g., Locke 1689/1975, Pasnau\n1999, 2000, Leddington 2019). However, recently it has been proposed\nthat sounds are individuals to which sensible features are\nattributed. In particular, several philosophers have proposed that\nsounds are public, distally-located, event-like individuals (Casati\nand Dokic 1994, 2005, O’Callaghan 2007, Matthen 2010).", "\nFour questions about audition’s objects define the debate and\nconstrain theories of sound (see also the entry on\n sounds,\n for extensive discussion).", "\nAre sounds private or public? Maclachlan (1989) argues that the sounds\nwe hear are sensations (rather than, for instance, the pressure\nwaves that cause auditory experiences). Such sensations are internal\nand private, and we experience them directly, or without apparent\nmediation. On Maclachlan’s account, we hear the ordinary things\nand happenings that are the sources of sounds only\nindirectly, by means of inference from auditory data.", "\nMaclachlan’s story is noteworthy partly because he uses hearing\nand sounds to motivate a general claim about perception. He claims\nthat what seems perfectly intuitive and obvious in the case of sounds\nand hearing—that something other than material objects are the\ndirect objects of hearing; that the direct objects of audition are\ninternal; and that we indirectly hear things in the world by hearing\ntheir sounds—helps us to discover what is true of all\nperception. According to Maclachlan, for instance, seeing involves\ndirect awareness of sensations of patterns of light, while surfaces\nand ordinary objects figure only indirectly and thanks to inference\namong the intentional objects of sight. The case of sounds and\naudition is important because it reveals that perceiving involves\nawareness of sensations in the first instance, and of the external\nworld only indirectly.", "\nMaclachlan’s description of sounds and auditory experience has\nsome attractions. First, sounds are among the things we hear. And\nsounds are among the direct or immediate objects of audition in the\nrelatively innocuous sense that hearing a sound does not seem to\nrequire hearing as of something else. Hearing a collision, on the\nother hand, may seem to require awareness as of a sound. Furthermore,\nsounds are unlike the ordinary material objects (e.g., bottles and\nstaplers) we see. You cannot reach out and grab a sound, or determine\nits temperature. Instead, sounds may strike us as byproducts or\neffects of such ordinary things and their transactions. Sounds result\nfrom activities or interactions of material bodies and thus are\nexperienced as distinct or independent from them (cf. Nudds 2001).\nNevertheless, audition does afford some variety of awareness of the\nsources of sounds, or at least provides information about them.", "\nHowever, the claim that sounds are sensations is unattractive. Good\nreasons suggest that sounds are public rather than private, even if\nsounds are not identical with ordinary objects and events such as\nclothespins and collisions. Suppose I am near the stage in a hall\nlistening to some music, and that I have a headache. It is a confusion\nto think you could feel my headache, but I assume you hear the sounds\nI hear. Suppose I move to the back of the hall, and the headache then\ngets better. My experience of the sounds of the music differs once I\nam at the back of the room, and my experience of the headache differs.\nThe sound of the music itself need not differ (the musicians could\nmake the same sounds), but the headache itself changes. The sounds can\ncontinue once I leave the room, but if I stop experiencing the\nheadache, it is gone. Moreover, the notion of an unfelt headache is\npuzzling, but it makes good sense to say that a tree makes a sound\nwhen it falls in the woods without being heard. Finally, tinnitus, or\nringing of the ears, is an illusory or hallucinatory experience as of\na sound, but received wisdom maintains that there are no illusory\nheadaches.", "\nThis suggests that audition does not provide special reasons to\nbelieve that the objects of perception are private sensations. Sounds,\nconstrued as objects of auditory perception, plausibly inhabit the\npublic world. (See the section\n 3.1 Spatial Hearing\n for further discussion.)", "\nAre sounds proximal or distal? The customary science-based view holds\nthat sounds are pressure waves that travel through a medium (see also\nSorensen 2008). On this account, sounds are caused by objects and\nevents such as collisions, and sounds cause auditory experiences.\nHowever, sounds are not auditorily experienced to travel through the\nsurrounding medium as waves do. Thus, if sounds are waves, then the\nsounds we hear may be proximal, located at the ear of the hearer.", "\nAlternatively, some have argued that audition presents sounds as being\nlocated in some direction at a distance (Pasnau 1999,\nO’Callaghan 2007, ch. 3, 2010). On such an account, sounds\ncommonly appear auditorily to be in the neighborhood of their sources\nand thereby furnish useful information about the locations of those\nsources. The sound of the drumming across the street seems to come\nfrom across the street but does not seem audibly to travel. When\nsounds do appear to fill a room, sound seems located all around.\nSounds that seem to “bounce” around a room appear\nintermittently at different locations rather than as traveling\ncontinuously from place to place. Experiencing a missile-like sound\nspeeding towards your ears illustrates the contrast with ordinary\nhearing (O’Callaghan 2007, 35). Sounds, according to this\nconception, ordinarily appear to have distal locations and to remain\nstationary relative to their sources.", "\nIf sounds are not usually experienced to travel, then unless auditory\nexperience is illusory with respect to the apparent locations of\nsounds, sounds themselves do not travel. Sounds thus are not identical\nwith and do not supervene locally upon the waves, since waves travel\n(Pasnau 1999). Several philosophers have argued on these and related\ngrounds that sounds are located distally, near their sources (Pasnau\n1999, Casati and Dokic 2005, O’Callaghan 2007). On this view,\npressure waves bear information about sounds and are the proximal\ncauses of auditory experiences, but are not identical with sounds.", "\nOne might object by resisting the phenomenological claim that we\nexperience sounds as distally located, for instance by suggesting that\naudition is aspatial, or that audition is spatial but sound\nsources rather than sounds are auditorily localized (see\nsection\n 3.1 Spatial Hearing\n for further discussion). Or, one might accept some measure of\nillusion. Another possibility is that we experience only a small\nsubset of the locations sounds occupy during their lifetimes (for\ninstance, while at their sources), and simply fail to experience where\nthey are at other times. This avoids ascribing illusion. Finally,\nFowler (2013) argues indirectly on the basis of echoes against distal\ntheories of sound.", "\nAre sounds properties or individuals? Among both proximal and distal\ntheories, disagreement exists concerning the ontological category to\nwhich sounds belong. Philosophers traditionally have understood sounds\nas properties—either as sensible or secondary qualities, or as\nthe categorical or physical properties that ground powers to affect\nsubjects. Commonly, sounds are attributed to the medium that\nintervenes between sources and perceivers. More recently, however,\nsome distal theorists have argued that sounds are properties of what\nwe ordinarily understand as sound sources—bells and whistles\nhave or possess rather than make or\nproduce sounds. Pasnau (1999), for instance, claims that sounds\nare transient properties that are identical with or supervene upon\nvibrations of objects. Kulvicki (2008) argues against transience in an\nattempt to subsume sounds to the model of colors, and claims that\nsounds are persistent, stable dispositional properties of objects to\nvibrate in response to being “thwacked”. He distinguishes\n“having” a stable sound from “making” a sound\non some occasion (manifesting the stable disposition). This account\nimplies that sounds sometimes make sounds they do not have, and that\nthey have sounds when silent. One also might ask whether events such\nas collisions and strummings, rather than objects, bear sounds.\nLeddington (2019) recently has defended such an account.", "\nA revisionist challenge comes from those who argue that sounds are\nindividuals rather than properties. Several arguments support\nthis understanding. First, empirical work on auditory scene\nanalysis suggests that one primary task of audition is to carve up\nthe acoustic scene into distinct sounds, each of which may possess its\nown pitch, timbre, and loudness (Bregman 1990). Multiple distinct\nsounds with different audible attributes can be heard simultaneously.\nAn analog of Jackson’s (1977, see also Clark 2000) many\nproperties problem thus arises for audition since feature\nawareness alone cannot explain the bundling or grouping of audible\nattributes into distinct sounds. Such bundling or grouping of audible\nfeatures suggests that sounds are perceptible individuals to which\nthese features are attributed.", "\nFurthermore, the temporal characteristics of experienced sounds\nsuggest that sounds are not simple qualities. Sounds audibly seem to\npersist through time and to survive change. A particular sound, such\nas that of an emergency siren, might begin high-pitched and loud and\nend low-pitched and soft. This suggests that sounds are individuals\nthat bear different features at different times, rather than sensible\nqualities.", "\nSeveral responses to these arguments are available (see Cohen 2009 for\nthe most developed reply). One might argue that sounds are complex\nproperties, such as pitch-timbre-loudness complexes, instantiated at a\ntime. To account for feature binding, one might hold that such complex\nproperties are ascribed to ordinary objects such as bells and\nwhistles. Or, one might hold that they are particularized properties,\nsuch as tropes. To accommodate sounds that survive change through\ntime, a property account could hold that sounds are yet more complex\nproperties that have patterns of change built into their identity\nconditions. However, any such view differs a great deal from the\nfamiliar secondary or sensible quality view pioneered by Locke. Pitch,\ntimbre, and loudness are better candidates for simple sensible\nfeatures in audition (see section\n 3.2 Audible Qualities).\n ", "\nIf sounds are individuals, are they object-like or event-like\nindividuals? Intuitively, the material objects we see are capable of\nexisting wholly at any given moment, and all that is required to\nperceptually recognize such individuals is present at a moment. On the\nother hand, event-like individuals occupy time and need not exist\nwholly at any given moment. Their individuation and recognition\nfrequently appeal to patterns of features over time. Event-like\nindividuals intuitively comprise temporal parts, while object-like\nindividuals intuitively do not. The issue here is not the truth of\nendurantism or perdurantism as an account of the persistence of\nobjects or events. Instead, the issue concerns a difference in how we\nperceptually individuate, experience, and recognize individuals.", "\nNo contemporary philosopher has yet claimed that sounds are objects\nin the ordinary sense. Those who argue that sounds are\nindividuals commonly point out that sounds not only persist and\nsurvive change (as do ordinary material objects), but also\nrequire time to occur or unfold. It is difficult to imagine an\ninstantaneous sound, or one that lacks duration. Sounds are not\ncommonly treated as existing wholly at a given moment during their\nduration. Indeed, the identities of many common sounds are tied to\npatterns of change in qualities through time. The sound of an\nambulance siren differs from that of a police siren precisely because\nthe two differ in patterns of qualitative change through time. The\nsound of the spoken word ‘team’ differs from that of\n‘meat’ because each instantiates a common set of audible\nqualities in a different temporal pattern. These considerations\nsupport the view that sounds are event-like individuals (see Casati\nand Dokic 1994, 2005, Scruton 1997, O’Callaghan 2007, Matthen\n2010).", "\nThis may bear on debates about persistence in the following way.\nDifferences in the intuitive plausibility of endurantism and\nperdurantism may be grounded in facts about perception. In particular,\nvision may treat objects as persisting by enduring or being wholly\npresent at each time at which they exist, while audition may treat its\nobjects as persisting by perduring or having temporal parts. This may\nstem from differences in perceptual organization. For instance,\nexhibiting a visible property profile at a time may suffice for being\na visual object of a given sort, while being an audible object of a\ngiven sort may require exhibiting an audible property profile over\ntime." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Sounds" }, { "content": [ "\nThough most philosophers construe sounds either as properties or as\nevent-like individuals (see section\n 2.1 Sounds),\n psychologists commonly have discussed auditory objects (see,\ne.g., Kubovy and Van Valkenburg 2001, Griffiths and Warren 2004, Heald\net al. 2017). The target of such discussion is not simply\naudition’s intentional objects or proper (specific\nto audition) objects. The intended analogy is with visual\nobjects. Talk of auditory objects gestures at the visual processes\ninvolved in perceptually discriminating, attentively tracking,\nrecognizing and categorizing ordinary material objects. What justifies\ntalk of object perception in audition?", "\nFirst of all, humans typically do not auditorily perceive\nthree-dimensional, bounded material objects as such, though it\nis plausible to think we visually perceive them. Hearing does not\nresolve the edges, boundaries, and filled volumes in space that I see,\nand I do not hear audible items to complete spatially behind occluders\nas do visible surfaces of objects. If perceiving a three-dimensional\nobject requires awareness of its edges, boundaries, and extension,\nperhaps in order to discriminate it from its surroundings, humans\ntypically do not auditorily perceive such objects.", "\nNevertheless, striking and illuminating parallels do exist between the\nperceptual processes and experiences that take place in vision and\naudition. Such parallels may warrant talk of object perception in a\nmore general sense that is common to both vision and audition\n(O’Callaghan 2008a).", "\nPerceiving objects requires parsing a perceptual scene into distinct\nunits that one can attend to and distinguish from each other\nand from a background. In vision, bounded, cohesive collections of\nsurfaces that are extended in space and that persist through time play\nthis role (see, e.g., Spelke 1990, Nakayama et al. 1995, Leslie et al.\n1998, Scholl 2001, Matthen 2005). In audition, as in vision, multiple\ndistinct perceptible individuals might exist simultaneously, and each\nmight persist and survive change (see the discussion of auditory scene\nanalysis in section\n 2.1 Sounds).\n A critical difference, however, is that while vision’s objects\nare extended in space, and are individuated and recognized primarily\nin virtue of spatial characteristics, audible individuals are extended\nin time, and are perceptually individuated and recognized primarily in\nvirtue of pitch and temporal characteristics (see, e.g., Bregman 1990,\nKubovy and Van Valkenburg 2001). For instance, audible individuals\nhave temporal edges and boundaries, and boundary elements can belong\nonly to a single audible individual. They also are susceptible to\nfigure-ground effects over time. One can, for instance, shift\nattention among continuous audible individuals that differ in pitch.\nFurthermore, they are susceptible to completion effects over time in\nmuch the same way that visible objects are perceptually completed in\nspace. Seeing a single visible region to continue behind a barrier is\nanalogous to hearing a sound stream to continue through masking noise,\nwhich may take place even when there is no corresponding signal\n(Bregman 1990, 28). Finally, multiple distinct, discrete audible\nindividuals, such as the temporally bounded notes in a tune, can form\naudible streams that comprise a single perceptible unit. Such\nstreams are subject to figure-ground shifts, and, like collections of\nsurfaces, they can be attentively tracked through changes to their\nfeatures and to one’s perspective. Though such complex audible\nindividuals include sounds, they comprise temporally unified\ncollections of sounds and silence that are analogous to spatially\ncomplex visible objects, such as tractors.", "\nSuch audible individuals are temporally extended and bounded, serve as\nthe locus for auditory attention, prompt completion effects, and are\nsubject to figure-ground distinctions in pitch space. For these\nreasons, the auditory processes involved in their perception parallel\nthose involved in the visual perception of ordinary three-dimensional\nobjects. The parallels suggest a shared sense in which vision and\naudition involve a more general form of object perception (see, e.g.,\nKubovy and Van Valkenburg 2001, Scholl 2001, Griffiths and Warren\n2004, O’Callaghan 2008a, Matthen 2010).", "\nWhat is the shared sense in which both visible and audible individuals\ndeserve to be called ‘objects’? Kubovy and Van Valkenburg\n(2001, 2003) define objecthood in terms of figure-ground segregation,\nwhich requires perceptual grouping. They propose the theory of\nindispensable attributes as an account of the necessary conditions\non perceptual grouping (see also Kubovy 1981). Indispensable\nattributes for a modality are those without which perceptual\nnumerosity is impossible. They claim that while space and time are\nindispensable attributes for vision (and color is not), pitch and time\nare indispensable attributes for auditory objects. Though they are\nmore skeptical about whether audition parallels vision, Griffiths and\nWarren (2004) sympathize with a figure-ground characterization but\nsuggest a working notion of an auditory object defined in terms of\n“an acoustic experience that produces a two-dimensional image\nwith frequency and time dimensions” (Griffiths and Warren 2004,\n891).", "\nO’Callaghan (2008a) proposes that both visible and audible\nobjects are mereologically complex individuals, though their mereology\ndiffers in noteworthy respects. While vision’s objects possess a\nspatial mereology and are individuated and tracked in terms of spatial\nfeatures, audition’s objects have a temporal mereology and are\nindividuated and tracked in terms of both pitch and temporal\ncharacteristics. Discussion of auditory objects thus draws attention\nto two roles that space plays in vision. First, there is the role of\nspace in determining the structure internal to visible objects, which\nfacilitates identifying and recognizing visible objects. Second, space\nserves as the external structure among visible objects, and is\ncritical in distinguishing objects from each other. In audition, time\nplays a role similar to space in vision in determining the structure\ninternal to auditory objects. Pitch, on the other hand, serves as an\nexternal structural framework, along with space, that helps to\ndistinguish among audible individuals.", "\nWhy is it useful to perceive such individuals in audition? One\npromising account is that they provide useful information about the\nhappenings that produce sounds. Carving the acoustic world into\nmereologically complex individuals informs us about what is going on\nin the extra-acoustic environment. It provides ecologically\nsignificant information about what the furniture is doing, rather than\njust how it is arranged. It is one thing to perceive a tree; it is\nanother to hear that it is falling behind you.", "\nDiscussion of auditory objects and accounts of their nature and\nperception is relatively new among philosophers (see, e.g.,\nO’Callaghan 2008a, and essays in Bullot and Egré 2010,\nincluding Matthen 2010, Nudds 2010). Such work has led to the\ndevelopment of general accounts of perceptual objects designed to\navoid visuocentrism (see, e.g., O’Callaghan 2016, Green 2019).\nThis area is ripe for philosophical contributions." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Auditory Objects" }, { "content": [ "\nSounds are among the objects of audition. Plausibly, so are complex,\ntemporally extended individuals composed of sounds. Do we hear\nanything else? Reflection suggests we hear things beyond sounds\nand sound complexes. In hearing sounds, one may seem to experience the\nbackfiring of the car or the banging of the drum. One might hold that\na primary part of audition’s function is to reveal sound\nsources, the things and happenings that make sounds.", "\nIf sounds were internal sensations or sense-data, then, as Maclachlan\n(1989) observes, we would hear sound sources only indirectly, in an\nepistemological sense, perhaps thanks to something akin to inference.\nAcquiring beliefs about the environment would require mediation by\npropositions connecting experienced internal sounds with environmental\ncauses.", "\nIf, however, sounds are properties attributed either to ordinary\nobjects, as Pasnau (1999) and Kulvicki (2008) hold, or to events, as\nLeddington (2019) holds, then hearing a tuba or the playing of a tuba\nmight only require hearing its sounds. Perceptually ascribing such\naudible attributes to their sources might ground epistemically\nunmediated awareness of tubas or their playings.", "\nHowever, the individuals to which audible attributes are perceptually\nattributed need not be identical with ordinary objects or events.\nInstead, audible attributes may belong in the first instance to\nsounds. Sounds plausibly are distinct from ordinary or extra-acoustic\nindividuals (O’Callaghan 2007, 2011). Suppose then that one\ncould not hear an ordinary object or event without there existing an\naudible sound, as well as that sounds can mislead about their sources\n(it might sound like drumming but be hammering).", "\nGiven this, forming beliefs about ordinary things and happenings\nconnected with sounds might seem to require inference, association, or\nsome otherwise cognitive process, and so awareness of a sound source\nmight appear to always involve more than perceptual awareness.\nAccording to such an account, awareness of environmental things and\nhappenings thanks to audition is epistemically mediated by awareness\nas of sounds and auditory objects, but does not itself constitute\nauditory perceptual awareness as of those things and happenings. You\nare inclined to think you hear the source because your representing or\nbeing aware of it co-occurs with, but is no more than a downstream\nconsequence triggered by, your auditory experience.", "\nSuch an account is not wholly satisfactory. First, the phenomenology\nof audition suggests something stronger than indirect, epistemically\nmediated awareness of things such as collisions or guitar strummings\nor lions roaring. Reflection suggests auditory awareness as of\ncollisions, strummings, and lions. Second, the capacity to refer\ndemonstratively to such things and events on auditory grounds also\nsuggests genuine perceptual awareness of them. Third, we commonly\nperceptually individuate sounds in terms of their apparent sources,\nand our taxonomy reflects this. “What did you hear?”\n“I heard paper ripping,” or, “The sound of a\ndripping faucet.” We distinguish two quite similar rattles once\nwe hear one as of a muffler clamp and the other as of a loose fender.\nFurthermore, characterizing certain audible features and explaining\nperceptual constancy effects involving such features requires appeal\nto sound sources. Handel says of timbre: “At this point, no\nknown acoustic invariants can be said to underlie timbre... The cues\nthat determine timbre quality are interdependent because all are\ndetermined by the method of sound production and the physical\nconstruction of the instrument” (Handel 1995, 441). Explaining\nloudness constancy—why moving to the back of the room does not\nchange how loudly the lecturer seems to speak—appeals to facts\nabout the sources of sounds (Zahorik and Wightman 2001). Auditory\nprocessing proceeds in accordance with natural constraints concerning\ncharacteristics of sound sources, and information concerning sources\nshapes how auditory experiences are organized. This is to say that\nprocesses responsible for auditory experience proceed as if acoustic\ninformation is information about sound sources. Finally,\naudition-guided action supports the claim that we hear such things and\nevents. Turning to look toward the source of a sound or ducking out of\nthe way of something we hear to be approaching—behaviors guided\nby auditory experience—would make little sense if we heard only\nsounds. In the first place, these reasons ground a case for thinking\nthat auditory perceptual experience does not strictly end with sounds\nand auditory objects. In particular, awareness as of a source, even if\ndependent upon awareness as of a sound, may be constitutive of\none’s auditory perceptual experience.", "\nThe main barrier to an alternative is that the relation between sounds\nand ordinary things or happenings is commonly understood as\ncausal (see, e.g., Nudds 2001). Awareness as of an effect does\nnot itself typically furnish epistemically unmediated awareness of its\ncause. Seeing smoke is not seeing fire. The right sort of dependence\nbetween characteristics of the experience and the cause is not\napparent, and awareness as of an effect does not by itself ground\nperceptual demonstratives that concern the cause. The metaphysical\nindirectness of the causal relation appears to block epistemic\ndirectness (see O’Callaghan 2011a for further discussion).", "\nIs there another explanatory route? Suppose that instead of a causal\nrelation, we understand the relationship between sounds and sources\nmereologically, or as one of part to whole (see\nO’Callaghan 2011a). Parthood frequently does ground perceptual\nawareness. For instance, seeing distinct parts of a surface\ninterrupted by an occluder leads to perceptual experience as of a\nsingle surface (imagine seeing a dog behind a picket fence). Seeing\nthe facing surfaces of a cube affords awareness as of a cube, and we\ncan attentively track that same cube as it rotates and reveals\ndifferent surfaces. Suppose, then, that a sound is an event-like\nindividual (recall, property accounts escape the worry). This event is\npart of a more encompassing event, such as a collision or the playing\nof a trumpet, that occurs in the environment and that includes the\nsound. So, the typical horse race includes the sounds, and you might\nauditorily perceive the racing in hearing some of its proper parts:\nthe sounds. More specifically, you may hear the galloping thanks to\nhearing the sounds it includes. You may fail to hear certain parts of\nthe racing event, such as the jockey’s glance back after\ncrossing the wire, but you also fail to see parts of the race, such as\nthe misstep of the horse in second place. If the sounds are akin to\nthe audible “profile” of the event, analogous to the\nvisible surfaces of objects and visible parts of events, you might\nthen enjoy auditory awareness as of the galloping of the horses in\nvirtue of your awareness as of the sounds of the hooves. The sound is\nnot identical with the galloping, and it is not just a property or a\ncausal byproduct of the galloping. It is a part of a particular event\nof galloping. The metaphysical relation of part to whole, in contrast\nto that between effect and cause, might ground the sort of\nepistemically unmediated awareness of interest (cf. Nakayama et al.\n1995, Bermúdez 2000, Noë 2004). Auditory perceptual\nawareness as of the whole may occur thanks to experiencing the\npart.", "\nOne objection is that this mereological account of the relation\nbetween sounds and sources cannot account for hearing ordinary\nobjects by hearing their sounds. You could not strictly hear a\ntuba by hearing its sound because a tuba is not an event of which a\nsound is a part. However, the sound is part of the event of playing\nthe tuba, and the tuba is a participant in that playing. So, though\nyou are not aware as of a tuba, you are aware as of an event that\ninvolves a tuba. That perhaps is enough to explain talk of hearing\ntubas and to assuage the worry (for further discussion, see Young\n2018).", "\nAnother more serious objection contends that the events we seem to\nhear are ones that do not constitutively involve sounds or that might\nhave taken place without sounds. For instance, we hear the collision,\nbut the collision is something that could have occurred in a vacuum\nand not made a sound. (Note that this differs from the claim discussed\nbelow according to which sounds are identical with source events and\nso inaudibly exist in vacuums.) If so, the collision and the sound\ndiffer and the collision does not strictly include a sound. The\ncollision therefore must have made the sound as a causal byproduct.\nThis suggests that, strictly speaking, you could not hear that very\ncollision event (since it causes the sound). The best response is to\nbite the bullet and accept that events that do occur or that could\noccur in vacuums cannot be heard since they include no sounds. This is\nnot so bad, since you could hear a different, more encompassing event\nthat includes a sound along with a collision. Alternatively, one might\nsay the very same event that occurs in a vacuum also could occur in\nair, but that it would have involved a sound had it occurred in air.\nIn that case, one can only hear such events when they occur in air and\ninclude a sound. The choice depends upon one’s metaphysics of\nevents. In either case, it seems reasonable that token events that do\nnot include sounds are inaudible.", "\nCasati et al. (2013) sidestep some of these concerns by rejecting the\ndistinction between sounds and events that are typically understood as\nsound sources. They propose to “Ockhamize” the\n“event sources” of sounds by identifying sounds with\nevents such as collisions and vibrations. The sound just is the\ncollision or the vibrating, whether or not it occurs in air. This\naccount implies that sounds could exist in vacuums.", "\nWhat hinges on the debate about hearing sources? The first upshot is\nepistemological and concerns the nature of the justification for\nempirical beliefs grounded in perceptual experience. The evidential\nstatus of beliefs about what one perceptually experiences differs from\nthat of beliefs about what is causally responsible for what one\nperceptually experiences. So, whether or not we hear sound sources\nimpacts the epistemology of audition. The second upshot concerns the\nrelation between audition and certain actions. If we hear only sounds\nand auditory objects, what appears to be effortless, auditorily guided\naction to avoid or orient toward sound sources requires another\nexplanation (because sounds are invisible and usually do no harm).\nFinally, it affects how we understand the adaptive significance of\naudition. Did audition evolve so as to furnish awareness of sounds\nalone, while leaving their environmental significance to\nextra-perceptual cognition, or did it evolve so as to furnish\nperceptual responsiveness to the sources of sounds?" ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Sound Sources" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAnother way to address the question, “What do we hear?”\nconcerns the contents of auditory perception. Two topics are\nespecially noteworthy in the context of related debates about vision\nand its contents. The first concerns the whether audition has spatial\ncontent. The second concerns the perception of audible qualities.\nParallel questions can be raised without relying on the perceptual\ncontent framework, though important complications arise." ], "section_title": "3. The Contents of Auditory Perception", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nOne topic where the contrast between vision and audition has been\nthought to be particularly philosophically significant concerns space.\nVision is a robustly spatial perceptual modality. Vision furnishes\nawareness of space and spatial features. Some claim vision has an\ninherently spatial structure, or, further, that vision’s spatial\nstructure is a necessary condition on being visually aware of things\nas independent from oneself.", "\nHearing also provides information about space—humans learn about\nspace on the basis of hearing. If audition represents space or spatial\nfeatures, there is a natural account of being so informed. We might\nform beliefs about spatial features of environments on the basis of\nauditory perceptual experiences simply by accepting or endorsing what\nis apparent in having those experiences.", "\nBut learning about spatial features on the basis of audition and\naudition’s bearing information about space both are consistent\nwith entirely aspatial auditory phenomenology. For instance, volume\nmight bear information about distance, and differences in volume at\nthe two ears might bear information about direction. In that case,\naudition bears information about space, and learning about space on\nthe basis of audition is possible, but it does not follow that\nauditory experience is spatial or that audition represents space.", "\nNotably, a tradition of skepticism about audition’s spatiality\nexists in philosophy. Certainly, our capacity to glean information\nabout space is less acute in audition than in vision. Vision reveals\nfine-grained spatial details that audition cannot convey, such as\npatterns and textures. But philosophers who are skeptical about\nspatial audition are not just concerned about a difference in spatial\nacuity between audition and vision. Malpas says of the\nexpression, ‘the location of sound’:", "\nI do not mean by ‘location’ ‘locality’, but\n‘the act of locating’, and by ‘the act of\nlocating’ I do not mean ‘the act of establishing in a\nplace’, but ‘the act of discovering the place of’.\nEven so ‘location’ is misleading, because it implies that\nthere is such a thing as discovering the place of sounds. Since sounds\ndo not have places there is no such act. (Malpas 1965, 131)\n", "\nO’Shaughnessy states, “…We absolutely never\nimmediately perceive sounds to be at any place. (Inference from\nauditory data being another thing)” (O’Shaughnessy 2002,\n446). The claim is that, in contrast to visible objects, audible\nsounds are not experienced as having locations. Rather, we determine\nthe places of sounds and sources from acoustic features, such as\nloudness and interaural differences, that bear information about\ndistance and direction. We do not auditorily experience spatial\nfeatures.", "\nThis debate, and the purported contrast between vision and audition,\nhas consequences for perceptual theorizing. One route to the\nconclusion that hearing sounds involves auditory awareness of\nsensations involves denying that audition satisfies spatial\nprerequisites on experiencing sounds as objective or public. For\ninstance, Maclachlan (1989) claims that audition’s\nphenomenology—in particular, its aspatial\nphenomenology—provides reasons to think sounds are sensations.\nComparing sounds with pains, which we readily recognize as sensations,\nhe says, “[A]lthough the sounds we hear are just as much effects\nproduced in us as are the pains produced by pins and mosquitoes,\nthere is no variety in the location of these effects [the\nsounds]. Because of the lack of contrast, we are not even aware that\nthe sounds we hear are bodily sensations” (Maclachlan 1989, 31,\nmy emphasis). Maclachlan means that, in contrast even to the case of\npains, which are felt at different bodily locations, sounds are not\nexperienced to be at differing locations, and so we are not even\ninclined to recognize that they are bodily sensations. Maclachlan then\nsuggests that we associate sounds with things and happenings\noutside the body rather than appreciate that they are effects in us.\nGiven the lack of spatial variation among experienced sounds,\nwe projectively associate sounds with distal sources. This explanation\nassumes that experienced sounds exhibit no audibly apparent spatial\nvariation: sounds seem located at the ears or lack apparent location\naltogether. Denying that auditory experiences present sounds at\nvarying locations beyond the ears invites difficulty in finding a\nplace for sounds in the world. If audition is wholly aspatial, this\nmay encourage a retreat to the view that sounds lack locations outside\nthe mind.", "\nThis kind of strategy has companions and precursors. Lycan’s\nsuggestion that olfactory experiences are apparent as modifications of\none’s own consciousness depends heavily on the aspatial\nphenomenology of olfactory experience (Lycan 2000, 278–82). Each\nrecalls the Kantian claim that objectivity requires space, or that\ngrasping something as independent from oneself requires the experience\nof space, a version of which is deployed by Strawson (1959, ch 2) in\nhis famous discussion of sounds.", "\nTwo lines of response are open. The first appeals to the thriving\nempirical research program in “spatial hearing”\n(see, e.g., Blauert 1997). Scientists aim to discover the cues and\nperceptual mechanisms that ground spatial audition, such as interaural\ntime and level differences, secondary and reverberant signals, and\nhead-related transfer functions. Audition clearly cannot match\nvision’s singular acuity—vision’s resolution limit\nis nearly two orders of magnitude better than audition’s\n(Blauert 1997, 38–9). Nevertheless, this research strongly\nsupports the claim that human subjects auditorily perceive such\nspatial characteristics as direction and distance.", "\nSecond, a number of philosophers have objected on\nphenomenological grounds. Audition, they argue, involves\nexperiencing or perceptually representing such spatial characteristics\nas direction and distance (Pasnau 1999, Casati and Dokic 2005, Matthen\n2005, O’Callaghan 2007, 2010). Introspection and performance\nsupport the claim that sounds or sound sources are in many ordinary\ncases perceptually experienced as located in the environment at a\ndistance in some direction. We hear the sound of the knocking over\nnear the door; we hear footsteps approaching from behind and to the\nleft; hearing sound to “fill” a room is itself a form of\nspatial hearing. Though hearing is more error prone than vision, we\nfrequently do not need to work out the locations of sounds or\nsources—we simply hear them.", "\nA subtler form of skepticism about spatial audition aims just to block\nthe requirements on objectivity. Strawson (1959) famously argues in\nChapter 2 of Individuals that because auditory experience is\nnot intrinsically spatial—spatial concepts have no\nintrinsic auditory significance—a purely auditory experience\nwould be non-spatial. Thus, it would not satisfy the requirements on\nnon-solipsistic consciousness. Others have endorsed versions of\nStrawson’s claim. “[T]he truth of a proposition to the\neffect that there is a sound at such-and-such a position must consist\nin this: if someone was to go to that position, he would have certain\nauditory experiences,” states Evans (1980, 274).", "\nThe claim that audition is not intrinsically spatial admits at least\ntwo readings. First, since Strawson suggests that audition might\ninherit spatial content from other sense modalities, such as vision or\ntouch, it could mean that audition depends for its spatial\ncontent upon that of other modalities. If, unlike vision and touch,\naudition’s spatial capacities are parasitic upon those of other\nmodalities, audition is spatial only thanks to its relations to other\nintrinsically spatial modalities. Second, it might be understood as a\nclaim about the objects of audition. Strawson indicates that\nsounds themselves are not intrinsically spatial. He says that although\nsounds have pitch, timbre, and loudness, they lack “intrinsic\nspatial characteristics” (1959, 65). Since these interpretations\nare not clearly distinguished by Strawson, it is helpful to consider\nhis master argument.", "\nStrawson claims that a purely auditory experience would be\nnon-spatial. By “purely auditory experience” Strawson\nmeans an exclusively auditory experience, or an auditory experience in\nabsence of experience associated with any other modality. However, if\nany modality in isolation ever could ground spatial experience,\naudition could. On one hand, given the mechanisms of spatial hearing,\nit is empirically implausible that a normal acoustic environment with\nrich spatial cues would fail to produce even a minimally spatial\npurely auditory experience. Even listening only to stereo headphones\ncould produce a directional auditory experience. On the other hand, it\ndoes seem possible that there could be a non-spatial but\nimpoverished exclusively auditory experience if no binaural or\nother spatial cues were present. But similarly impoverished,\nnon-spatial experiences seem possible for other modalities. Consider\nvisually experiencing a uniform gray ganzfeld, or floating\nweightlessly in a uniformly warm bath. Neither provides the materials\nfor spatial concepts, so neither differs from audition in this\nrespect. One might contend that we therefore lack a good reason to\nthink that, in contrast to a purely visual or tactile\nexperience, a purely auditory experience would be an entirely\nnon-spatial experience (see O’Callaghan 2010).", "\nNudds (2001) suggests another way to understand the claim, and\ninterprets Strawson as making an observation about the internal\nstructure of audition:", "\nWhen we see (or seem to see) something, we see it as occupying or as\nlocated within a region of space; when we hear (or appear to hear) a\nsound we simply hear the sound, and we don’t experience it as\nstanding in any relation to the space it may in fact occupy. (Nudds\n2001, 213–14)\n", "\nAudition, unlike vision, lacks a spatial structure or field, claims\nNudds. A purely auditory experience thus would not comprise a spatial\nfield into which individuals independent from oneself might figure.\nFollowing an example from Martin (1992), Nudds argues that while\nvision involves awareness of unoccupied locations, audition does not\ninvolve awareness of regions of space as empty or unoccupied.\nMartin’s example is seeing the space in the center of a ring\nas empty. In audition, Nudds claims, one never experiences a\nspace as empty or unoccupied.", "\nIn response, one might simply deny a difference between vision and\naudition in this respect. If one can attend to a location near the\ncenter of the visible ring as empty, one can attend to the location\nbetween the sounding alarm clock and the slamming door as a place\nwhere there is no audible sound—as acoustically empty space. Of\ncourse, auditory space generally is less replete than visual space,\nbut this is contingent. Consider seeing just a few stars flickering on\nand off against a dark sky. Since such an experience may have spatial\nstructure, and since it is analogous to audition, one might on these\ngrounds defend the claim that audition has spatial structure (see also\nYoung 2017).", "\nWhat about the second way mentioned above to understand\nStrawson’s claim? Though audition’s status as\nintrinsically spatial may not differ from that of vision or touch,\nperhaps sounds are not intrinsically spatial. But without further\nargument, or a commitment to a theory of sounds, it is difficult to\nstate confidently the intrinsic features of sounds and thus whether\nthey include spatial features. If, for instance, wavelength is among a\nsound’s intrinsic features, sounds are intrinsically\nspatial.", "\nNonetheless, the claim might be that, as they are perceptually\nexperienced to be, sounds lack apparent intrinsic or non-relational\nspatial features. Roughly, independent from spatial relations to other\nsounds, experienced sounds seem to lack internal spatial\nstructure. That is why you cannot auditorily experience the empty\nspace at the center of a sound or hear its edges. Interpreted as\nsuch—that sounds are not experienced or perceptually represented\nto have inherent spatial features—the claim is plausible (though\nconsider diffuse or spread out sounds in contrast to focused or\npinpoint sounds). It certainly marks an important difference from\nvision, whose objects frequently not only seem to have rich internal\nspatial structure, but also are individuated in terms of inherent\nspatial features.", "\nThis difference, however, does not ground an argument that any purely\nauditory experience is non-spatial or that sounds fail to satisfy the\nrequirement on objectivity, since sounds’ being experienced to\nhave internal, intrinsic, or inherent spatial characteristics is\nnecessary neither for spatial auditory experience nor to experience\nsounds as objective. Since sounds phenomenologically seem to be\nlocated in space and to bear extrinsic spatial relations to each\nother, auditory experience satisfies the requirements for objectivity,\nwhich need only secure the materials for a conception of a place for\nsounds to exist when not experienced.", "\nSo, vision and audition differ with respect to space in two ways.\nFirst, vision’s spatial acuity surpasses that of\naudition. Second, vision’s objects are perceptually experienced\nto have rich internal spatial structure, and audition’s\nare not. However, given the spatial characteristics evident in\naudition, such as direction and distance, the spatial status of\naudition presents no barrier to understanding its objects as\nperceiver-independent. The spatial aspects of auditory phenomenology\nthus may fail to ground an argument to the conclusion that sounds are\nmodifications of one’s consciousness. If that is the case, then\naudition provides no special intuitive support for accounts on which\nprivate entities are the direct objects of perception." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Spatial Hearing" }, { "content": [ "\nAccording to theories in which sounds are individuals, sounds are not\nsecondary or sensible qualities. But, humans hear audible qualities,\nsuch as pitch, loudness, and timbre, that are analogous to colors,\ntastes, and scents. Thus, familiar accounts of colors and other\nsensible attributes or secondary qualities might apply to the audible\nqualities. For instance, pitches might be either dispositions to cause\ncertain kinds of experiences in suitable subjects, the physical or\ncategorical bases of such dispositions, sensations or projected\nfeatures of auditory experiences, or simple primitive properties of\n(actual or edenic) sounds.", "\nTradition suggests that the form of a philosophical account of visible\nqualities, such as color, and their perception applies to other\nsensible qualities, such as pitch, flavor, and smell, and their\nperception. Thus, according to tradition, if dispositionalism,\nphysicalism, projectivism, or primitivism about sensible qualities is\ntrue for features associated with one modality, it is true for\nfeatures associated with others. Despite tradition, we should be wary\nto accept that a theory of sensible qualities translates plausibly\nacross the senses.", "\nDebates about sensible qualities and their perception begin with\nconcerns about whether sensible features can be identified with or\nreduced to any objective physical features. What follows has two aims.\nThe first is to give a sense of how such debates might go in the case\nof audible qualities. The focus is on pitch, since pitch is often\ncompared to color, and the case of color is well known (for discussion\nof similar questions concerning timbre, see Isaac 2017). The second is\nto point out the most salient differences and similarities between the\ncases of color and pitch that impact the plausibility of arguments\ntranslated from one case to the other.", "\nFirst, I consider two noteworthy arguments that are founded on aspects\nof color perception. Each aims to establish that the colors we\nperceive cannot be identified with objective physical features.\nNeither argument transposes neatly to the case of pitch. Thus, we\nshould not assume arguments that are effective in the case of color\nhave equal force when applied to other sensible qualities. Color\nperhaps is a uniquely difficult case.", "\nSecond, however, I discuss two respects in which pitch experience is\nsimilar to color experience. It is instructive that these aspects of\npitch experience do raise difficulties for an objective physical\naccount of pitch that are familiar from the case of color.", "\nWhat are pitch, timbre, and loudness? Pitch is a dimension along which\ntones can be ordered according to apparent “height”. The\npitch of fingernails scratching a blackboard generally is higher than\nthat of thumping a washtub. Loudness can be glossed as the volume,\nintensity, or quantity of sound. A jet plane makes louder sounds than\na model plane. Timbre is more difficult to describe. Timbre is a\nquality in which sounds that share pitch and loudness might differ.\nSo, a violin, a cello, and a piano all playing the same note differ in\ntimbre. Sometimes timbre is called “tone color”.", "\nPhysics and psychoacoustics show that properties including frequency,\namplitude, and wave shape determine the audible qualities sounds\n(auditorily) appear to have. To simplify, take the case of pitch,\nsince pitch often is compared to color. Not all sounds appear to have\npitch. Some sounds appear to have pitch thanks to a simple,\nsinusoidal pattern of vibration at some frequency in an object\nor in the air. Some sounds appear pitched thanks to a complex pattern\nof vibration that can be decomposed into sinusoidal constituents at\nmultiple frequencies, since any pattern of vibration can be analyzed\nas some combination of simple sinusoids. Sounds appear pitched,\nhowever, just when they have sinusoidal constituents, or\npartials, that all are integer multiples of a common\nfundamental frequency. Sounds with pitch thus correspond to\nregular or periodic patterns of vibration that differ in\nfundamental frequency and complexity. Simple sinusoids and complex\nwaveforms match in pitch (though they typically differ in timbre) when\nthey share fundamental frequency. This is true even when the complex\ntone lacks a sinusoidal constituent at the fundamental frequency,\nwhich is referred to as the phenomenon of the missing\nfundamental.", "\nA straightforward account identifies pitch with periodicity (perhaps\nwithin some range). Having pitch is being periodic (see\nO’Callaghan 2007, ch. 6). Periodicity can be expressed in terms\nof fundamental frequency, so individual pitches are fundamental\nfrequencies. This has advantages as an account of pitch. It captures\nthe linear ordering of pitches. It also explains the musical\nintervals, such as the octave, fifth, and fourth, for example, which\nare pitch relations that hold among periodic tones. Musical intervals\ncorrespond to whole-number ratios between fundamental frequencies.\nSounds that differ by an octave have fundamental frequencies that\nstand in 1:2 ratios. Fifths involve a 2:3 relationship, fourths are\n3:4, and so on. This also allows us to revise the linear pitch\nordering to accommodate the auditory sense in which tones that differ\nby an octave nonetheless are the same pitch. If the pitch ordering is\nrepresented as a helix, upon which successive octave-related tones\nfall at a common angular position, each full rotation represents\ndoubling frequency.", "\nIs the periodicity theory of pitch plausible as an account of the\naudible features we perceive when hearing sounds? If so, then\nobjective physicalism about at least some sensible qualities might\nsucceed.", "\nThe periodicity theory of pitch fares better on two counts than\ntheories that identify colors with objective physical properties.", "\nFirst, consider the phenomenological distinction between unique\nand binary hues. Some colors appear to incorporate other\ncolors, and some do not. Purple, for instance, appears both reddish\nand bluish; red just looks red. Some philosophers contend that the\nleading physical theories of color cannot explain the unique-binary\ndistinction without essentially invoking the color experiences of\nsubjects. How, for instance, do reflectance classes identified with\nunique hues differ from those associated with binary hues?", "\nConsider a related issue concerning pitch. Some tones with pitch sound\nsimple, while other pitched tones, such as sounds of musical\ninstruments, auditorily appear to be complex and to have\ndiscernible components. However, the difference between audibly simple\nand audibly complex pitched tones is captured by the simplicity\nor complexity of a sound’s partials. Simple tones are sinusoids,\nand complex tones have multiple overtones. So, one response is to hold\nthat the unique-binary color distinction and the simple-complex pitch\ndistinction are disanalogous. Unlike the case of color, one might\ncontend, no pitch that is essentially a mixture of other pitches\nsolely occupies a distinctive place in pitch space.", "\nSecond, consider metamerism. Some surfaces with very different\nreflectance characteristics match in color. Metameric pairs share no\nobvious objective physical property. Some philosophers argue that\nunless color experience fails to distinguish distinct colors, metamers\npreclude identifying colors with natural physical properties of\nsurfaces (see the entry on\n color).", "\nNow consider the case of pitch. Are there pitch metamers? Some sounds\nwith very different spectral frequency profiles match in pitch. A\nsimple sinusoidal tone at a given frequency matches the pitch of each\ncomplex tone with that fundamental frequency (even those that lack a\nconstituent at the fundamental). But, again, the case of pitch differs\nfrom the case of color. For each matching pitch, a single natural\nproperty does unify the class. The tones all share a fundamental\nfrequency.", "\nTwo kinds of argument familiar from the case of color are equally\npressing when applied to the case of pitch.", "\nFirst, arguments from intersubjective variation transpose.\nActual variations in frequency sensitivity exist among perceivers; for\ninstance, subjects differ in which frequency they identify as middle\nC. If there is no principled way to legislate whose experience is\nveridical, pitch might be subjective or perceiver-relative. One\nresponse is that, in contrast to the case of unique red, there is an\nobjective standard for middle C: fundamental frequency. But, whose\npitch experience has the normative significance to settle the\nfrequency of middle C?", "\nSome might wonder whether there is a pitch analog of the trouble posed\nby the kind of variation associated with spectrum inversion in\nthe case of color (see the entry on\n inverted qualia).\n Spectral shift in pitch, sometimes dramatic, commonly occurs after\ncochlear implant surgery. This is not spectral inversion for pitch;\nbut, a dramatic shift makes most of the same trouble as inversion. Not\nquite all the trouble, since cochlear implants preserve the pitch\nordering and its direction. But, there could be a cochlear implant\nthat switched the placement of electrodes sensitive to 100 hertz and\n1000 hertz, respectively; and there could be one that reversed the\nentire electrode ordering. This goes some distance to grounding the\nconceivability of a pitch inversion that reverses the height ordering\nof tones.", "\nSecond, consider an argument that frequencies cannot capture the\nrelational structure among the pitches. This is loosely\nanalogous to the argument that physicalism about color fails to\ncapture the relational structure of the hues—for instance, that\nred is more similar to orange than either is to green. In the case of\npitch, psychoacoustics experiments show that perceived pitch does not\nmap straightforwardly onto frequency. Though each unique pitch\ncorresponds to a unique frequency (or small frequency range), the\nrelations among apparent pitches do not match those among\nfrequencies. In particular, equivalent pitch intervals do not\ncorrespond to equal frequency intervals. For example, the effect upon\nperceived pitch of a 100 hertz change in frequency varies dramatically\nacross the frequency range. It is dramatic at low frequency and barely\ndetectable at high frequency. Similarly, doubling frequency does not\nmake for equivalent pitch intervals. A 1000 hertz tone must be tripled\nin frequency to produce the same increase in pitch as that produced by\nquadrupling the frequency of a 2000 hertz tone. Apparent pitch is a\ncomplex function of frequency; it is neither linear nor logarithmic\n(see, e.g., Hartmann 1997, ch 12, Gelfand 2004, ch 12, Zwicker and\nFastl 2006, ch 5). Pitch scales that capture the psychoacoustic data\nassign equal magnitudes, commonly measured in units called\nmels, to equal pitch intervals. The mel scale of pitch\nthus is an extensive or numerical pitch scale, in contrast to the\nintensive frequency scale for pitch. The former, but not the latter,\npreserves ratios among pitches.", "\nS. S. Stevens famously argued on the basis of results drawn from\npsychoacoustic experiments that pitch is not frequency (see, e.g.,\nStevens et al. 1937, Stevens and Volkmann 1940). In light of similar\nresults, contemporary psychoacoustics researchers commonly reject the\nidentification of pitch with frequency or periodicity. The received\nscientific view thus holds that pitch is a subjective or psychological\nquality that is no more than correlated with objective frequency (see,\ne.g., Gelfand 2004, Houtsma 1995). Pitch, on this understanding,\nbelongs only to experiences. The received view of pitch therefore\nimplies an error theory according to which pitch experience involves a\nwidespread projective illusion.", "\nWhat is the argument against the periodicity theory of pitch? Compare\nan argument against reflectance physicalism about color. Reflectance\nphysicalism identifies each hue with a class of reflectances.\nPeriodicity physicalism identifies each pitch with a fundamental\nfrequency. In both cases, each determinate sensible feature is\nidentified with a determinate physical property. In the color case, it\nis objected that reflectance classes do not bear the relations to each\nother that the colors bear. In the pitch case, the frequencies do not\nbear the relations to each other that the pitches bear. Thus, if the\nrelational features among a class of sensible qualities are essential\nto them, an account that does not accurately capture those relations\nfails. Frequencies, according to this line of argument, do not stand\nin the relations essential to pitch.", "\nThis, of course, is a quite general phenomenon among sensible\nqualities. Brightness and loudness vary logarithmically with simple\nphysical quantities. Even if we identified candidate molecules for\nsmells, nothing suggests physical similarities would mirror their\nolfactory similarities.", "\nIn the case of pitch and other sensible features that can be put in a\nlinear ordering, one might respond that the relational order is\nessential while the magnitudes are not. In that case, if pitch is\nfrequency, pitch experience has the right structure, but distorts\nmagnitudes of difference in pitch. This retains the periodicity theory\nand explains away the results in terms of pitch experiences.", "\nNonetheless, Pautz (2014, 3.5) has replied that this partial error\naccount cannot be reconciled with certain types of possible\nintersubjective difference. So, suppose instead we accept that the mel\nscale is well-founded and that it accurately captures essential\nrelationships among pitches. This does not by itself imply a\nprojective or subjective theory of pitch. Pitches might be\ndispositions to produce certain kinds of experiences, or they might be\nsimple or primitive properties. It also is open to seek a more\nadequate physical candidate for pitch. For instance, pitches might be\nfar more complex physical properties than frequencies. Such physical\nproperties may be of no interest in developing the simplest, most\ncomplete natural physical theory, but they may be anthropocentrically\ninteresting.", "\nIt is an important question whether a physical theory of sensible\nfeatures should just provide a physical candidate for each determinate\nsensible feature, or whether the physical relationships among those\nphysical candidates should capture the structural relations among\nsensible qualities (and, if so, which structural relations it should\ncapture). This is an example of how considering in detail the nature\nand the experience of sensible qualities other than color promises\ninsights into traditional debates concerning the sensible qualities.\nPautz (2014) offers an empirically-grounded argument concerning a\nvariety of sensible qualities, including audible qualities, that\nadvances such discussion." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Audible Qualities" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Varieties of Auditory Perception", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nMusical listening is a topic that bears on questions about the\nrelationship between hearing sounds and hearing sources. While the\nphilosophy of music has its own vast literature (see the entry on\n the philosophy of music),\n musical experience has not been used as extensively to explore\ngeneral philosophical questions about auditory perception. This\nsection discusses links that are relevant to advancing philosophical\nwork on auditory perception.", "\nAn account of listening to pure or non-vocal music should capture the\naesthetic significance of musical listening. Appreciating music\nis appreciating sounds and sequences, arrangements, or structures of\nsounds. Thus, the temporal aspects of auditory experiences are\ncritical to appreciatively listening to music.", "\nOne might go further and hold that sounds are all that matters in\nmusic. In particular, some have argued that appreciatively listening\nto music demands listening in a way that abstracts from the\nenvironmental significance, and thus from the specific sources, of the\nsounds it includes (Scruton 1997, 2–3). Such acousmatic\nlistening involves experiencing sounds in a way that is\n“detached from the circumstances of their production,”\nrather than “as having a certain worldly cause” (Hamilton\n2007, 58; see also Hamilton 2009). Listening to music and being\nreceptive to its aesthetically relevant features requires not\nlistening to violins, horns, or brushes on snare drums. It requires\nhearing sounds and grasping them in a way removed from their common\nsources. Hearing a high fidelity recording thus furnishes an\naesthetically identical musical experience despite having a speaker\ncone rather than a violin as source. “The acousmatic experience\nof sound is precisely what is exploited by the art of music”\n(Scruton 1997, 3).", "\nThis suggests an intuitive difference between music and visual arts\nsuch as painting and sculpture. As Kivy (1991) explains, it is\ndifficult even with the most abstract paintings and sculptures to see\nthem in a way that takes them to be entirely formal or abstract. That\nis, it is difficult to avoid seeing pictures and sculptures as\nrepresentational. In contrast, it seems easier to listen attentively\nto the formal acoustical features of musical sounds, without being\ncompelled to think of what makes them.", "\nMusical listening thus may be thought to provide a prima facie\nargument against the claim that in hearing sounds one typically hears\nsound sources such as the strumming of guitars and bowing of violins.\nIf such “interested” audition were the rule, musical\nlistening would be far more challenging.", "\nAcousmatic experience, however, may be a matter of attention.\nNothing prevents focusing one’s attention on the sounds and\naudible qualities without attending to the instruments, acts, and\nevents that are their sources, even if each is auditorily available.\nThat musical listening requires effort and training supports the idea\nthat one can direct attention differently in auditory experience,\ndepending on one’s interests. Caring for an infant and safely\ncrossing the street require attending to sound sources, while\nlistening with aesthetic appreciation to a symphony may require\nabstracting from the circumstances of its production, such as the\nfinger movements of the oboist. This response holds that musical\nlistening is a matter of auditorily attending in a certain way. It is\nattending to features of sounds themselves, but does not imply failing\nto hear sound sources.", "\nThe acousmatic thesis is a limited view about which aspects of the\nthings one can auditory experience are aesthetically significant.\nThese include audible aspects of sounds themselves, but exclude, for\nexample, other contents of auditory experience. However, room exists\nfor debate over the aesthetically significant aspects of what you hear\n(see Hamilton 2007, 2009). For example, one might argue that live\nperformances have aesthetic advantages over recordings because one\nhears the performance of the sounds and songs, rather than\ntheir reproduction by loudspeakers (cf. Mag Uidhir 2007).\nCircumstances of sound production, such as that skillful gestures\ngenerate a certain passage, or that a particularly rare wood accounts\nfor a violin’s sounds, might be aesthetically relevant in a way\nthat outstrips the sounds, and some such features may be audible in\naddition to sounds. For instance, hearing the spatial characteristics\nof a performance may hold aesthetic significance beyond the tones and\nstructures admitted by traditional accounts of musical listening.\nComposers may even intend “spatial gestures” among aspects\nessential for the appreciation of a piece (see, e.g., Solomon 2007).\nTo imagine auditorily experiencing the spatial characteristics of\nmusic in a way entirely divorced from the environmental significance\nof the sounds is difficult. Appreciating the relationship between\nexperiences of sounds and of sources makes room for a view of the\naesthetic value of musical listening that is more liberal than\nacousmatic experience allows." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Musical Listening" }, { "content": [ "\nSpeech perception presents uniquely difficult twists, and few\nphilosophers have confronted it directly (Appelbaum 1999, Trout 2001a,\nMatthen 2005, ch 9, and Remez and Trout 2009 are recent exceptions).\nSomething striking and qualitatively distinctive—perhaps\nuniquely human—seems to set the perception of speech apart from\nordinary hearing. The main philosophical issues about speech\nperception concern versions of the question, Is speech special? (See\nO’Callaghan 2015 for a comprehensive review and discussion.)", "\nHow does perceiving speech differ from perceiving ordinary\nnon-linguistic sounds? Listening to music and listening to speech each\ndiffer from listening to other environmental sounds in the following\nrespect. In each case, one’s interest in listening is to some\ndegree distanced from the specific environmental happenings involved\nin the production of sounds.", "\nBut this is true of listening to music and of listening to speech for\ndifferent reasons. In music, it is plausible that one’s interest\nis in the sounds themselves, rather than in the sources of their\nproduction. However, speech is a vehicle for conventional linguistic\nmeaning. In listening to speech, one’s main interest is in the\nmeanings, rather than in the sources of sound. Ultimately, the\ninformation conveyed is what matters.", "\nNevertheless, according to the most common philosophical\nunderstanding, perceiving spoken utterances is just a matter of\nhearing sounds. The sounds of speech are complex audible sound\nstructures. Listening to speech in a language you know typically\ninvolves grasping meanings, but grasping meanings requires\nfirst hearing the sounds of speech. According to this account,\ngrasping meanings itself is a matter of extra-perceptual\ncognition.", "\nThe commonplace view—that perceiving speech is a variety of\nordinary auditory perception that just involves hearing the sounds of\nspeech—has been challenged in a number of ways. The challenges\ndiffer in respect of how speech perception is held to differ from\nnon-linguistic audition.", "\nFirst, consider the objects of speech perception. What are the\nobjects of speech perception, and do they differ from those of\nordinary or non-linguistic auditory perception? According to the\ncommonplace understanding, hearing speech involves hearing sounds.\nThus, hearing spoken language shares perceptual objects with ordinary\naudition. Alternatively, one might hold that the objects of speech\nperception are not ordinary sounds at all. Perhaps they are\nlanguage-specific entities, such as phonemes or words.\nPerhaps, as some have argued, perceiving speech involves perceiving\narticulatory gestures or movements of the mouth and vocal\norgans (see the supplement on\n Speech Perception: Empirical and Theoretical Considerations).\n Note that if audition’s objects typically include distal\nevents, speech in this respect is not special, since its objects do\nnot belong to an entirely different kind from ordinary sounds. ", "\nSecond, consider the contents of speech perception. Does the\ncontent of speech perception differ from that of ordinary audition? If\nit does, how does the experience of perceiving speech differ from that\nof hearing ordinary sounds? Perceiving speech might involve hearing\nordinary sounds but auditorily ascribing distinctive features\nto them. These features might simply be, or comprise, finer grained\nqualitative and temporal acoustical details than non-linguistic sounds\naudibly possess. But perceiving speech also might involve perceiving\nsounds as belonging to language-specific types, such as\nphonemes, words, or other syntactic categories.", "\nFurthermore, speech perception’s contents might differ in a more\ndramatic way from those of non-linguistic audition. Listening with\nunderstanding to speech involves grasping meanings. The\ncommonplace view is conservative. It holds that grasping meanings is\nan act of the understanding rather than of audition. Thus, the\ndifference between the experience of listening to speech in a language\nyou know and the experience of listening to speech in a language you\ndo not know is entirely cognitive.", "\nBut one might think that there also is a perceptual difference.\nA liberal account of this perceptual difference holds that perceiving\nspeech in a language you know may involve hearing sounds as\nmeaningful or auditorily representing them as having semantic\nproperties (see, e.g., Siegel 2006, Bayne 2009, Azzouni 2013, Brogaard\n2018; cf. O’Callaghan 2011b, Reiland 2015). Alternatively, a\nmoderately liberal account holds that the perceptual experience of\nspeech in a language you know involves perceptually experiencing\nlanguage-specific but nevertheless non-semantic features. For\ninstance, O’Callaghan (2011b) argues that listening to speech in\na familiar language typical involves perceiving its phonological\nfeatures.", "\nThird, consider the processes responsible for speech\nperception. To what extent does perceiving speech implicate processes\nthat are continuous with those of ordinary or general audition, and to\nwhat extent does perceiving speech involve separate, distinctive, or\nmodular processes? While some defend general auditory accounts\nof speech perception (see, e.g, Holt and Lotto 2008), some argue that\nperceiving speech involves dedicated perceptual resources, or even an\nencapsulated perceptual system distinct from ordinary non-linguistic\naudition (see, e.g., Fodor 1983, Pinker 1994, Liberman 1996, Trout\n2001b). These arguments typically are grounded in several types of\nphenomena, including the multimodality of speech\nperception—visual cues about the movements of the mouth and\ntongue impact the experience of speech, as demonstrated by the McGurk\neffect (see the section\n 4.3 Crossmodal Influences);\n duplex perception—a particular stimulus sometimes\ncontributes simultaneously both to the experience of an ordinary sound\nand to that of a speech sound (Rand 1974); and the top-down\ninfluence of linguistic knowledge upon the experience of speech. A\nreasonable challenge is that each of these\ncharacteristics—multimodality, duplex perception, and top-down\ninfluence—also is displayed in general audition. ", "\nSee the supplement on\n Speech Perception: Empirical and Theoretical Considerations.\n " ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Speech Perception" }, { "content": [ "\nAuditory perception of speech is influenced by cues from vision and\ntouch (see Gick et al. 2008). The McGurk effect in speech perception\nleads to an illusory auditory experience caused by a visual stimulus\n(McGurk and Macdonald 1976). Do such multimodal effects occur in\nordinary audition? Visual and tactile cues commonly do shape auditory\nexperience. The ventriloquist illusion is an illusory auditory\nexperience of location that is produced by an apparent visible sound\nsource (see, e.g., Bertelson 1999). Audition even impacts experience\nin other modalities. The sound-induced flash effect involves a visual\nillusion as of seeing two consecutive flashes that is produced when a\nsingle flash is accompanied by two consecutive beeps (Shams et al.\n2000, 2002). Such crossmodal illusions demonstrate that auditory\nexperience is impacted by other modalities and that audition\ninfluences other modalities. In general, experiences associated with\none perceptual modality are influenced by stimulation to other sensory\nsystems.", "\nAn important question is whether the impact is merely causal, or\nwhether perception in one modality is somehow constitutively tied to\nother modalities. If, for instance, vision merely causally impacts\nyour auditory experience of a given sound, then processes associated\nwith audition might be proprietary and characterizable in terms that\ndo not appeal to other modalities. Relying on information from vision\nor touch could simply improve the existing capacity to perceive space,\ntime, or spoken language auditorily. On the other hand, coordination\nbetween audition and other senses could enable a new perceptual\ncapacity. In that case, audition might rely constitutively on another\nsense.", "\nA first step in resolving this question is recognizing that crossmodal\nillusions are not mere accidents. Instead, they are intelligible as\nthe results of adaptive perceptual strategies. In ordinary\ncircumstances, crossmodal processes serve to reduce or resolve\napparent conflicts in information drawn from several senses. In doing\nso, they tend to make perception more reliable overall. Thus,\ncrossmodal illusions differ from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is\njust a kind of accident. It results from mere quirks of processing,\nand it always involves illusion (or else is accidentally veridical).\nCrossmodal recalibrations, in contrast, are best understood as\nattempts “to maintain a perceptual experience consonant with a\nunitary event” (Welch and Warren 1980, 638).", "\nIn the first place, the principled reconciliation of information drawn\nfrom different sensory sources suggests that audition is governed by\nextra-auditory perceptual constraints. Moreover, since conflict\nrequires a common subject matter, such constraints must concern common\nsources of stimulation to multiple senses. If so, audition and vision\nshare a perceptual concern for a common subject matter. And that\nconcern is reflected in the organization of auditory experience. But\nthis by itself does not establish constitutive dependence of audition\non another sense.", "\nHowever, the perceptual concern for a common subject matter could be\nreflected as such in certain forms of auditory experience. For\ninstance, the commonality may be experientially evident in jointly\nperceiving shared spatio-temporal features, or in the perceptual\nexperience of audio-visual intermodal feature binding. If so, some\nforms of auditory perceptual experience may share with vision a common\nmultimodal or amodal content or character (see O’Callaghan\n2008b, Clark 2011). More to the point, if coordination with another\nsense enables a new auditory capacity, then vision or touch could have\na constitutive rather than merely causal impact upon corresponding\nauditory experiences.", "\nWhat hangs on this? First, it bears on questions about\naudition’s content. If we cannot exhaustively characterize\nauditory experience in terms that are modality-specific or distinctive\nto audition, then we might hear as of things we can see or\nexperience with other senses. This is related to one puzzling question\nabout hearing sound sources: How could you hear as of something you\ncould see? Rather than just a claim about audition’s content\nthat requires further explanation, we now have a story about why\nthings like sound sources figure in the content of auditory\nexperience. Second, all of this may bear on how to delineate what\ncounts as auditory perception, as opposed to visual or even amodal\nperception. If hearing is systematically impacted by visual processes,\nand if it shares content and phenomenology with other sense\nexperiences, what are the boundaries of auditory perception?\nMultimodal perception may bear on the question of whether there are\nclear and significant distinctions among the sense modalities (cf.\nNudds 2003). Finally, multimodal perceptual experiences, illusions,\nand explanatory strategies may illuminate the phenomenological\nunity of experiences in different modalities, or the sense in\nwhich, for instance, an auditory experience and a visual experience of\nsome happening comprise a single encompassing experience (see the\nentry on\n the unity of consciousness).\n ", "\nWe can ask questions about the relationships among modalities in\ndifferent areas of explanatory concern. Worthwhile areas for attention\ninclude the objects, contents, and phenomenology of perception, as\nwell as perceptual processes and their architecture. Crossmodal and\nmultimodal considerations might shed doubt on whether vision-based\ntheorizing alone can deliver a complete understanding of perception\nand its contents. This approach constitutes an important\nmethodological advance in the philosophical study of perception (for\nfurther discussion, see O’Callaghan 2012, 2019, Matthen 2015,\nStokes et al. 2015)." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Crossmodal Influences" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nConsidering modalities other than vision enhances our understanding of\nperception. It is necessary to developing and vetting an adequate\ncomprehensive and general account of perception and its roles.\nAuditory perception is a rich territory for philosophical exploration\nin its own right, but it also provides a useful contrast case in which\nto evaluate claims about perception proposed in the context of vision.\nOne of the most promising directions for future work concerns the\nnature of the relationships among perceptual modalities, how these\nrelationships shape experience across modalities, and how they may\nprove essential to understanding perception itself. Philosophical work\non auditory perception thus is part of the advance beyond considering\nmodalities in isolation from each other." ], "section_title": "5. 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M., 1970, “The grammars of speech and\nlanguage,” Cognitive Psychology, 1(4):\n301–323.", "–––, 1996, Speech: A Special Code,\nCambridge, MA: MIT Press.", "Liberman, A. M., F. S. Cooper, D. P. Shankweiler, and M.\nStuddert-Kennedy, 1967, “Perception of the speech code,”\nPsychological Review, 74(6): 431–461.", "Liberman, A. M. and I. G. Mattingly, 1985, “The motor theory\nof speech perception revised,” Cognition, 21:\n1–36.", "–––, 1989, “A specialization for speech\nperception,” Science, 243(4890): 489–494.", "Locke, J., 1689/1975, An Essay Concerning Human\nUnderstanding, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Lotto, A. J., K. R. Kluender, and L. L. Holt, 1997, “Animal\nmodels of speech perception phenomena,” in K. Singer, R. Eggert,\nand G. Anderson (eds.), Chicago Linguistic Society, 33,\nChicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, pp. 357–367. ", "Lycan, W., 2000, “The slighting of smell,” in N.\nBhushan and S. Rosenfeld (eds.), Of Minds and Molecules: New\nPhilosophical Perspectives on Chemistry, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress, pp. 273–89.", "Maclachlan, D. L. C., 1989, Philosophy of Perception,\nEnglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. ", "Mag Uidhir, C., 2007, “Recordings as performances,”\nBritish Journal of Aesthetics, 47(3): 298–314.", "Malpas, R. M. P., 1965, “The location of sound,” in R.\nJ. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, Second Series, Oxford:\nBasil Blackwell, pp. 131–144.", "Martin, M. G. F., 1992, “Sight and touch,” in T. Crane\n(ed.), The Contents of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 1993, “Sense modalities and spatial\nproperties,” in N. Eilan, R. McCarthy, and B. 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augustine	Saint Augustine	First published Wed Sep 25, 2019	[ "\nAugustine was perhaps the greatest Christian philosopher of Antiquity\nand certainly the one who exerted the deepest and most lasting\ninfluence. He is a saint of the Catholic Church, and his authority in\ntheological matters was universally accepted in the Latin Middle Ages\nand remained, in the Western Christian tradition, virtually\nuncontested till the nineteenth century. The impact of his views on\nsin, grace, freedom and sexuality on Western culture can hardly be\noverrated. These views, deeply at variance with the ancient\nphilosophical and cultural tradition, provoked however fierce\ncriticism in Augustine’s lifetime and have, again, been\nvigorously opposed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries from\nvarious (e.g., humanist, liberal, feminist) standpoints. Philosophers\nkeep however being fascinated by his often innovative ideas on\nlanguage, on skepticism and knowledge, on will and the emotions, on\nfreedom and determinism and on the structure of the human mind and,\nlast but not least, by his way of doing philosophy, which\nis—though of course committed to the truth of biblical\nrevelation—surprisingly undogmatic and marked by a spirit of\nrelentless inquiry. His most famous work, the Confessiones,\nis unique in the ancient literary tradition but greatly influenced the\nmodern tradition of autobiography; it is an intriguing piece of\nphilosophy from a first-person perspective. Because of his importance\nfor the philosophical tradition of the Middle Ages he is often listed\nas the first medieval philosopher. But even though he was born several\ndecades after the emperor Constantine I had terminated the\nanti-Christian persecutions and, in his mature years, saw the\nanti-pagan and anti-heretic legislation of Theodosius I and his sons,\nwhich virtually made Catholic (i.e., Nicene) Christianity the official\nreligion of the Roman Empire, Augustine did not live in a\n“medieval” Christian world. Pagan religious, cultural and\nsocial traditions were much alive in his congregation, as he often\ndeplores in his sermons, and his own cultural outlook was, like that\nof most of his learned upper-class contemporaries, shaped by the\nclassical Latin authors, poets and philosophers whom he studied in the\nschools of grammar and rhetoric long before he encountered the Bible\nand Christian writers. Throughout his work he engages with pre- and\nnon-Christian philosophy, much of which he knew from firsthand.\nPlatonism in particular remained a decisive ingredient of his thought.\nHe is therefore best read as a Christian philosopher of late antiquity\nshaped by and in constant dialogue with the classical tradition.", "Translations from Greek or Latin texts in this entry are by the\nauthor, unless otherwise stated. Biblical quotations are translated\nfrom Augustine’s Latin version; these may differ from the Greek\nor Hebrew original and/or from the Latin Vulgate." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Work", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Augustine and Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. The Philosophical Tradition; Augustine’s Platonism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Theory of Knowledge", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Skepticism and Certainty", "5.2 Illumination", "5.3 Faith and Reason", "5.4 Language and Signs" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Anthropology: God and the Soul; Soul and Body", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Soul as a Created Being", "6.2 The Human Mind as an Image of God" ] }, { "content_title": "7. Ethics", "sub_toc": [ "7.1 Happiness", "7.2 Virtue", "7.3 Love", "7.4 Will and Freedom", "7.5 Will and Evil", "7.6 Grace, Predestination and Original Sin" ] }, { "content_title": "8. History and Political Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "9. Gender, Women, and Sexuality", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "10. Creation and Time", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "11. Legacy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Editions", "Translations", "Commentaries", "Reference Works", "Introductory and General", "Greek and Latin Authors Cited", "Selected Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAugustine (Aurelius Augustinus) lived from 13 November 354 to 28\nAugust 430. He was born in Thagaste in Roman Africa (modern Souk Ahras\nin Algeria). His mother Monnica (d. 388), a devout Christian, seems to\nhave exerted a deep but not wholly unambiguous influence on his\nreligious development. His father Patricius (d. 372) was baptized on\nhis deathbed. Augustine himself was made a catechumen early in his\nlife. His studies of grammar and rhetoric in the provincial centers of\nMadauros and Carthage, which strained the financial resources of his\nmiddle-class parents, were hoped to pave his way for a future career\nin the higher imperial administration. In Carthage at the age of ca.\n18, he found a mistress with whom he lived in a monogamous union for\nca. 14 years and who bore him a son, Adeodatus, who was baptized\ntogether with his father in Milan and died a little later (ca. 390)\naged 18. Ca. 373 Augustine became a “hearer”\n(auditor) of Manicheism, a dualistic religion with Persian\norigins that, in Northern Africa, had developed into a variety of\nChristianity (and was persecuted by the state as a heresy). His\nadherence to Manicheism lasted for nine years and was strongly opposed\nby Monnica. Though probably active as a Manichean apologist and\nmissionary, he never became one of the sect’s\n“elect” (electi), who were committed to\nasceticism and sexual abstinence. In 383 he moved to Milan, then the\ncapital of the western half of the Empire, to become a publicly paid\nprofessor of rhetoric of the city and an official panegyrist at the\nImperial court. Here he sent away his mistress to free the way for an\nadvantageous marriage (a behavior presumably common for young\ncareerists at that epoch). At Milan he underwent the influence of\nBishop Ambrose (339–397), who taught him the allegorical method\nof Scriptural exegesis, and of some Neoplatonically inclined\nChristians who acquainted him with an understanding of Christianity\nthat was philosophically informed and, to Augustine, intellectually\nmore satisfactory than Manicheism, from which he had already begun to\ndistance himself. The ensuing period of uncertainty and\ndoubt—depicted in the Confessiones as a crisis in the\nmedical sense—ended in summer 386, when Augustine converted to\nascetic Christianity and gave up both his chair of rhetoric and his\nfurther career prospects. After a winter of philosophical leisure at\nthe rural estate of Cassiciacum near Milan, Augustine was baptized by\nAmbrose at Easter 387 and returned to Africa, accompanied by his son,\nsome friends and his mother, who died on the journey (Ostia, 388). In\n391 he was, apparently against his will, ordained a priest in the\ndiocese of the maritime city of Hippo Regius (modern Annaba/Bône\nin Algeria). About five years later (ca. 396) he succeeded the local\nbishop. This ecclesiastical function involved new pastoral, political,\nadministrative and juridical duties, and his responsibility for and\nexperiences with an ordinary Christian congregation may have\ncontributed to modify his views on grace and original sin (Brown 2000:\nch. 15). But his rhetorical skills equipped him well for his daily\npreaching and for religious disputes. Throughout his life as a bishop\nhe was involved in religious controversies with Manicheans, Donatists,\nPelagians and, to a lesser extent, pagans. Most of the numerous books\nand letters he wrote in that period were part of these controversies\nor at least inspired by them, and even those that were not (e.g.,\nDe Genesi ad litteram, De trinitate) combine\nphilosophical or theological teaching with rhetorical persuasion\n(Tornau 2006a). Polemics against his former co-religionists, the\nManicheans, looms large in his work until about 400; the debate with\nthem helped to shape his ideas on the non-substantiality of evil and\non human responsibility. The Donatist schism had its roots in the last\ngreat persecution at the beginning of the fourth century. The\nDonatists saw themselves as the legitimate successors of those who had\nremained steadfast during the persecution and claimed to represent the\nAfrican tradition of a Christian “church of the pure”.\nSince 405 the Donatists were subsumed under the imperial laws against\nheresy and forced to re-enter the Catholic church by legal means;\nthese measures were intensified after a conference at Carthage (411)\nhad marked the official end of Donatism in Africa (Lancel &\nAlexander 1996–2002). By way of his assiduous writing against\nthe Donatists, Augustine sharpened his ecclesiological ideas and\ndeveloped a theory of religious coercion based on an intentionalist\nunderstanding of Christian love. Pelagianism (named after the British\nascetic Pelagius) was a movement Augustine became aware of around 412.\nHe and his African fellow-bishops managed to get it condemned as a\nheresy in 418. While not denying the importance of divine grace,\nPelagius and his followers insisted that the human being was by nature\nfree and able not to sin (possibilitas). Against this view,\nAugustine vigorously defended his doctrine of the human being’s\nradical dependence on grace, a conviction already voiced in the\nConfessiones but refined and hardened during the controversy.\nThe last decade of Augustine’s life is marked by a vitriolic\ndebate with the Pelagianist ex-bishop Julian of Aeclanum who accused\nAugustine of crypto-Manicheism and of denying free will while\nAugustine blamed him and the Pelagianists for evacuating\nChrist’s sacrifice by denying original sin (Drecoll\n2012–2018). Controversy with pagan traditionalists seems to have\nreached a peak after 400, when Augustine refuted a series of\nobjections against Christianity apparently extracted from\nPorphyry’s treatise Against the Christians\n(Letter 102; Bochet 2011), and after 410, when the city of\nRome had been sacked by Alaric and his Goths. The City of\nGod, Augustine’s great apology, was prompted by this\nsymbolic event, though it is by no means just a response to pagan\npolemics.\n Augustine’s life ended when the Vandals besieged Hippo; he is\nsaid to have died with a word of Plotinus on his lips (Possidius,\nVita Augustini 28.11, after Plotinus, Enneads I\n4.7.23–24)." ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAugustine’s literary output surpasses the preserved work of\nalmost all other ancient writers in quantity. In the\nRetractationes (“Revisions”, a critical survey of\nhis writings in chronological order down to 428 CE) he suggests a\nthreefold division of his work into books, letters and sermons\n(Retractationes 1, prologue 1); about 100 books, 300 letters,\nand 500 sermons have survived. Augustine’s literary career after\nhis conversion began with philosophical dialogues. The first of these,\nwritten in Cassiciacum in 386/7, deal with traditional topics such as\nskepticism (Contra Academicos), happiness (De beata\nvita), evil (De ordine) and the immortality of the soul\n(Soliloquia, De immortalitate animae). Augustine continued to\npursue these issues in dialogues on the immateriality of the soul\n(De quantitate animae, 388), language and learning (De\nmagistro, 388–391), freedom of choice and human\nresponsibility (De libero arbitrio, begun in 388 and\ncompleted perhaps as late as 395) and the numeric structure of reality\n(De musica, 388–390). The treatise De vera\nreligione (389–391) is a kind of summa of Augustine’s\nearly Christian philosophy. After the start of his ecclesiastical\ncareer he abandoned the dialogue form, perhaps because he realized its\nelitist and potentially misleading character (G. Clark 2009; Catapano\n2013). Of the works from his priesthood and episcopate, many are\ncontroversial writings against the Manicheans (e.g., Contra\nFaustum Manichaeum, around 400), the Donatists (e.g., Contra\nlitteras Petiliani, 401–405; De baptismo, 404) and\nthe Pelagians (e.g., De spiritu et littera, 412; Contra\nIulianum, 422; De gratia et libero arbitrio,\n424–427; and his last and unfinished work Contra Iulianum\nopus imperfectum, which preserves a substantial portion of the\notherwise lost treatise Ad Florum by his Pelagian adversary\nJulian of Aeclanum). Among the philosophically most interesting of\nthese works are De utilitate credendi (391–392, a\ndefense of faith/belief against Manichean rationalism), De natura\nboni (399, a concise anti-Manichean argument for the doctrine\nthat evil is a privation of goodness rather than an independent\nsubstance), De natura et gratia (413–417, a reply to\nPelagius’ treatise De natura) and De correptione et\ngratia (426/427, refuting a Christian version of the Stoic\n‘Lazy Argument’ that had been put forward against Augustine’s\ndoctrine of grace). Augustine is however most famous for the five long\ntreatises with a wider scope he composed between 396 and 426. The\nConfessiones (ca. 396–400), probably his most original\nwork, is “philosophy in autobiography” (Mann 2014) rather\nthan an autobiography in a modern sense. It shows how an individual\nlife—Augustine’s own—is made sense of by God’s\nprovidence and grace as well as by his creation and economy of\nsalvation. De doctrina christiana (begun in 396/7 but\ncompleted only in 426/7) is a handbook of biblical hermeneutics and\nChristian rhetoric; it delineates the semiotic dichotomy of\n“things” (res) and—especially\nlinguistic—“signs” (signa) and critically\nassesses the importance of the classical disciplines for the biblical\nexegete. De trinitate (begun in 399 and completed in 419 or\nperhaps as late as 426) has impressed modern philosophical readers by\nits probing analyses of the human mind as an “image” of\nthe Divine Trinity. De Genesi ad litteram (401/2–416)\nis an attempt at winning a philosophically justifiable cosmology from\nthe opening chapters of Genesis. Here as in most of Augustine’s\nworks philosophy is inseparable from biblical exegesis. The monumental\napologetic treatise De civitate dei (begun in 412, two years\nafter the sack of Rome, and completed in 426) argues that happiness\ncan be found neither in the Roman nor the philosophical tradition but\nonly through membership in the city of God whose founder is Christ.\nAmong many other things, it has interesting reflections on the secular\nstate and on the Christian’s life in a secular society. The\nsermons document Augustine’s ability to adapt complex ideas to a\nlarge and not overly learned audience. Two long series on the Psalms\n(Enarrationes in Psalmos, ca. 392–422) and the Gospel\nof John (In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, ca. 406–420)\nstand out; a series of sermons on the First Letter of John (In\nepistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem, 407) is\nAugustine’s most sustained discussion of Christian love. The\nletters are not personal or intimate documents but public writings\nthat are part of Augustine’s teaching and of his ecclesiastical\npolitics. Some of them reach the length of full treatises and offer\nexcellent philosophical discussions (Letter 155 on virtue;\nLetter 120 on faith and reason; Letter 147 on the\n“seeing” of God)." ], "section_title": "2. Work", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nFrom ancient thought Augustine inherited the notion that philosophy is\n“love of wisdom” (Confessiones 3.8; De\ncivitate dei 8.1), i.e., an attempt to pursue happiness—or,\nas late-antique thinkers, both pagan and Christian, liked to put it,\nsalvation—by seeking insight into the true nature of things and\nliving accordingly. This kind of philosophy he emphatically endorses,\nespecially in his early work (cf., e.g., Contra Academicos\n1.1). He is convinced that the true philosopher is a lover of God\nbecause true wisdom is, in the last resort, identical with God, a\npoint on which he feels in agreement with both Paul (1 Corinthians\n1:24) and Plato (cf. De civitate dei 8.8). This is why he\nthinks that Christianity is “the true philosophy”\n(Contra Iulianum 4.72; the view is common among ancient,\nespecially Greek, Christian thinkers) and that true philosophy and\ntrue (cultic) religion are identical (De vera religione 8).\nIn case of doubt, practice takes precedence over theory: in the\nCassiciacum dialogues Monnica, who represents the saintly but\nuneducated, is credited with a philosophy of her own (De\nordine 1,31–32; 2.45). At the same time, Augustine sharply\ncriticizes the “philosophy of this world” censured in the\nNew Testament that distracts from Christ (Colossians 2:8). In his\nearly work he usually limits this verdict to the Hellenistic\nmaterialist systems (Contra Academicos 3.42; De\nordine 1.32); later he extends it even to Platonism because the\nlatter denies the possibility of a history of salvation (De\ncivitate dei 12.14). The main error he faults the philosophers\nwith is arrogance or pride (superbia), a reproach that does\nnot weigh lightly given that arrogance is, in Augustine’s view,\nthe root of all sins. Out of arrogance the philosophers presume to be\nable to reach happiness through their own virtue (De civitate\ndei 19.4, a criticism primarily directed against the Stoics), and\neven those among them who have gained insight into the true nature of\nGod and his Word (i.e., the Platonists) are incapable of\n“returning” to their divine “homeland” because\nthey proudly reject the mediation of Christ incarnate and resort to\nproud and malevolent demons instead, i.e., to the traditional pagan\ncults and to theurgy (Confessiones 7.27; In evangelium\nIohannis tractatus 2.2–4; De civitate dei\n10.24–29; Madec 1989). In his first works Augustine epitomizes\nhis own philosophical program with the phrase “to know God and\nthe soul” (Soliloquia 1.7; De ordine 2.47) and\npromises to pursue it with the means provided by Platonic philosophy\nas long as these are not in conflict with the authority of biblical\nrevelation (Contra Academicos 3.43). He thereby restates the\nold philosophical questions about the true nature of the human being\nand about the first principle of reality, and he adumbrates the key\nNeoplatonic idea that knowledge of our true self entails knowledge of\nour divine origin and will enable us to return to it (cf. Plotinus,\nEnneads VI.9.7.33–34). While these remain the basic\ncharacteristics of Augustine’s philosophy throughout his career,\nthey are considerably differentiated and modified as his engagement\nwith biblical thought intensifies and the notions of creation, sin and\ngrace acquire greater significance. Augustine is entirely unaware of\nthe medieval and modern distinction of “philosophy” and\n“theology”; both are inextricably intertwined in his\nthought, and it is unadvisable to try to disentangle them by focusing\nexclusively on elements that are deemed “philosophical”\nfrom a modern point of view." ], "section_title": "3. Augustine and Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAugustine tells us that at the age of eighteen Cicero’s (now\nlost) protreptic dialogue Hortensius enflamed him for\nphilosophy (Confessiones 3.7), that as a young man he read\nAristotle’s Categories (ib. 4.28) and that his\nconversion was greatly furthered by his Neoplatonic readings (ib.\n7.13) as well as by the letters of Paul (ib. 7.27; Contra\nAcademicos 2.5). He is more reticent about Manichean texts, of\nwhich he must have known a great deal (van Oort 2012). From the 390s\nonwards the Bible becomes decisive for his thought, in particular\nGenesis, the Psalms and the Pauline and Johannine writings (even\nthough his exegesis remains philosophically impregnated), and his\nmature doctrine of grace seems to have grown from a fresh reading of\nPaul ca. 395 (see\n 7.6 Grace, Predestination and Original Sin).", "\nThe most lasting philosophical influence on Augustine is Neoplatonism.\nHe does not specify the authors and the exact subjects of the\n“books of the Platonists” (Confessiones 7.13)\ntranslated into Latin by the fourth century Christian Neoplatonist\nMarius Victorinus (ib. 8.3) he read in 386. In the twentieth century\nthere was an ongoing and sometimes heated debate on whether to\nprivilege Plotinus (who is mentioned in De beata vita 4) or\nPorphyry (who is named first in De consensus evangelistarum\n1.23 ca. 400) as the main Neoplatonic influence on Augustine (for\nsummaries of the debate see O’Donnell 1992: II 421–424;\nKany 2007: 50–61). Today most scholars accept the compromise\nthat the “books of the Platonists” comprised some\ntreatises of Plotinus (e.g., Enneads I.6, I.2, V.1,\nVI.4–5) and a selection from Porphyry (Sententiae and,\nperhaps, Symmikta Zetemata). In any event, the importance of\nthis problem should not be overrated because Augustine seems to have\ncontinued his Neoplatonic readings after 386. Around 400 he had\nPorphyry’s Philosophy from the Oracles at his disposal;\nin De civitate dei 10 (ca. 417) he quotes from his Letter\nto Anebo and from an otherwise unattested anagogic treatise\ntitled, in the translation used by Augustine, De regressu\nanimae, the influence of which some have suspected already in\nAugustine’s earliest works. For the philosophy of mind in the\nsecond half of De trinitate he may have turned to Neoplatonic\ntexts on psychology. While the exact sources of Augustine’s\nNeoplatonism elude us, source criticism has been able to determine\nsome pervasive features of his thought that are doubtlessly\nNeoplatonic in origin: the transcendence and immateriality of God; the\nsuperiority of the unchangeable over the changeable (cf. Plato,\nTimaeus 28d); the ontological hierarchy of God, soul and body\n(Letter 18.2); the incorporeality and immortality of the\nsoul; the dichotomy of the intelligible and the sensible realms\n(attributed to Plato in Contra Academicos 3.37); the\nnon-spatial omnipresence of the intelligible in the sensible\n(Confessiones 1.2–4; Letter 137.4) and the\ncausal presence of God in his creation (De immortalitate\nanimae 14–15; De Genesi ad litteram 4.12.22); the\nexistence of intelligible (Platonic) Forms that are located in the\nmind of God and work as paradigms of the sensible things (De\ndiversis quaestionibus 46); the inwardness of the intelligible\nand the idea that we find God and Truth by turning inwards (De\nvera religione 72); the doctrine of evil as lack or privation of\ngoodness; the understanding of the soul’s love of God as a\nquasi-erotic desire for true beauty (Confessiones 10.38; cf.\nRist 1994: 155). A distinctly Platonic element is the notion of\nintellectual or spiritual ascent. Augustine thinks that by turning\ninwards and upwards from bodies to soul (i.e., from knowledge of\nobjects to self-knowledge) and from the sensible to the intelligible\nwe will finally be able to transcend ourselves and get in touch with\nthe supreme being that is none other than God and Truth and that is\nmore internal to us than our innermost self (Confessiones\n3.11; MacDonald 2014: 22–26; Augustine’s biblical proof\ntext is Romans 1:20, quoted, e.g., ib. 7.16). Ascents of this kind are\nubiquitous in Augustine’s work (e.g., De libero\narbitrio 2.7–39; Confessiones 10.8–38;\nDe trinitate 8–15). Whether the condensed versions in\nthe Confessiones (7.16; 7.23; 9.24–26) should be read\nas reports of mystical experiences is difficult to determine (Cassin\n2017). An early version of the Augustinian ascent is the\nproject—outlined in De ordine (2.24–52) but soon\nabandoned and virtually retracted in De doctrina\nchristiana—of turning the mind to the intelligible and to\nGod by means of a cursus in the liberal (especially mathematical)\ndisciplines (Pollmann & Vessey 2005). It is remotely inspired by\nPlato’s Republic and may have had a Neoplatonic precedent\n(Hadot 2005), though use of Varro’s work on the disciplines\ncannot be excluded (Shanzer 2005). As late as De civitate dei\n8 (ca. 417) he grants, in a brief doxography organized according to\nthe traditional fields of physics, ethics and epistemology, that\nPlatonism and Christianity share some basic philosophical insights,\nviz. that God is the first principle, that he is the supreme good and\nthat he is the criterion of knowledge (De civitate dei\n8.5–8; cf. already De vera religione 3–7). In\nspite of these important insights, Platonism cannot however lead to\nsalvation because it is unable or unwilling to accept the mediation of\nChrist. It is, therefore, also philosophically defective (De\ncivitate dei 10.32).", "\nCicero is Augustine’s main source for the Hellenistic\nphilosophies, notably Academic skepticism and Stoicism. As a part of\nhis cultural heritage, Augustine quotes him and the other Latin\nclassics as it suits his argumentative purposes (Hagendahl 1967). His\nearly ideal of the sage who is independent of all goods that one can\nlose against one’s will is inherited from Stoic ethics (De\nbeata vita 11; De moribus 1.5; Wetzel 1992:\n42–55). Though the implication that the sage’s virtue\nguarantees his happiness already in this life is later rejected as\nillusory (De trinitate 13.10; De civitate dei 19.4;\nRetractationes 1.2; Wolterstorff 2012), the Christian martyr\ncan be styled in the manner of the Stoic sage whose happiness is\nimmune to torture (Letter 155.16; Tornau 2015: 278).\nAugustine’s Manichean past was constantly on his mind, as his\nincessant polemics shows; its precise impact on his thought is however\ndifficult to assess (van Oort (ed.) 2012; Fuhrer 2013; BeDuhn 2010 and\n2013). The claim of Julian of Aeclanum that with his doctrine of\npredestination and grace Augustine had fallen back into Manichean\ndualism has appealed to some modern critics, but Julian must ignore\nessential features of Augustine’s thought (e.g., the notion of\nevil as privatio boni) to make his claim plausible\n(Lamberigts 2001)." ], "section_title": "4. The Philosophical Tradition; Augustine’s Platonism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "5. Theory of Knowledge", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAugustine’s earliest surviving work is a dialogue on Academic\nskepticism (Contra Academicos or De Academicis, 386;\nFuhrer 1997). He wrote it at the beginning of his career as a\nChristian philosopher in order to save himself and his readers from\nthe “despair” that would have resulted if it could not be\nproven that, against the skeptic challenge, truth is attainable and\nknowledge and wisdom possible (cf. Retractationes 1.1.1). The\nsense of despair must have been very real to him when, after having\nbroken with Manicheism but still being unable to see the truth of\nCatholic Christianity, he decided to “withhold assent until some\ncertainty lighted up” (Confessiones 5.25). His\ninformation about skepticism does not come from a contemporary skeptic\n“school”, which hardly existed, but from Cicero’s\nAcademica and Hortensius. Much of the discussion in\nContra Academicos is thus devoted to the debate between\nHellenistic Stoics and skeptics about the so-called\n“grasping” or kataleptic appearance, i.e., the problem\nwhether there are appearances about the truth of which one cannot be\nmistaken because they are evident by themselves (Bermon 2001:\n105–191). Unlike the original Stoics and Academics, Augustine\nlimits the discussion to sense impressions because he wants to present\nPlatonism as a solution to the skeptic problem and to point out a\nsource of true knowledge unavailable to the Hellenistic\nmaterialists.", "\nUnlike modern anti-skeptical lines of argumentation, Augustine’s\nrefutation of skepticism does not aim at justifying our ordinary\npractices and beliefs. To refute the Academic claim that, since the\nwise person can never be sure whether she has grasped the truth, she\nwill consistently withhold assent in order not to succumb to empty\nopinion, he thinks it sufficient to demonstrate the existence of some\nkind of knowledge that is immune to skeptical doubt. His strategy\ntherefore consists in pointing out 1) the certainty of\nself-referential knowledge (the wise person “knows\nwisdom”, Contra Academicos 3.6; the Academic skeptic\n“knows” the Stoic criterion of truth, ib. 3.18–21);\n2) the certainty of private or subjective knowledge (I am certain that\nsomething appears white to me even if I am ignorant\nwhether it is really white, ib. 3.26); 3) the certainty of formal,\nlogical or mathematical, structures (ib. 3.24–29), knowledge of\nwhich is possible independently of the mental state of the knower,\nwhereas the reliability of sense impressions differs according as we\nare awake or dreaming, sane or insane. Modern critics have not been\nvery impressed by these arguments (e.g., Kirwan 1989: 15–34),\nand an ancient skeptic would rightly have objected that being limited\nto subjective or formal knowledge, they could not justify the\ndogmatists’ claim to objective knowledge of reality (cf. Sextus\nEmpiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.13). Yet this is not\nAugustine’s point. To him it matters to have shown that even if\nmaximal concessions are made to skepticism concerning the\nunknowability of the external world attainable by the senses, there\nremains an internal area of cognition that allows for and even\nguarantees certainty. This is why Contra Academicos ends with\na sketch of Platonic epistemology and ontology and with an\nidiosyncratic if not wholly unparalleled reconstruction of the history\nof the Academy according to which the Academics were in fact\ncrypto-Platonists who hid their insight into transcendent reality and\nrestricted themselves to skeptical arguments to combat the materialist\nand sensualist schools dominant in Hellenistic times until authentic\nPlatonism emerged again with Plotinus (Contra Academicos\n3.37–43; the story is still told in Letter 118 of 410,\nwhere the renaissance of Platonism is however connected with the rise\nof Christianity). The only realities that meet the Hellenistic\ncriterion of truth and guarantee absolute certainty by being\nself-evident are the Platonic Forms (Contra Academicos 3.39;\ncf. De diversis quaestionibus 9; Cary 2008a: 55–60).\nThe “objects” of knowledge that appear in\nAugustine’s anti-skeptical arguments thus either are the\nPlatonic Forms themselves or at least point out the way of accessing\nthem. This squares with the early Augustine’s tendency to\ninterpret the Forms, or at any rate the most basic among them, as\n“numbers”, i.e., as the formal and normative structures\nand standards that govern all reality and enable us to understand and\nevaluate it (De ordine 2.14; 16; De musica\n6.57–58; O’Daly 1987: 101–102; see also\n 5.2 Illumination).\n Strictly speaking, Augustine’s anti-skeptical arguments do not\njustify the claim that knowledge can be derived from the senses;\nhaving sensible and mutable objects, they cannot but yield opinion or,\nat best, true belief. The later Augustine, in a more generous way of\nspeaking, widens the term “knowledge” (scientia,\nto be distinguished from “wisdom”, sapientia) so\nas to include what we learn through sense perception and from reliable\nwitnesses (De trinitate 15.21; cf. De civitate dei\n8.7; Retractationes 1.14.3; Siebert 2018; see\n 5.3 Faith and Reason).", "\nAugustine’s most famous anti-skeptical argument is what is\ncommonly called his “cogito-like” argument because it is\nsimilar to (and probably inspired) the Cogito of Descartes (Matthews\n1992; Menn 1998; Fuchs 2010). Like Descartes’, Augustine’s\ncogito establishes an area immune to skeptical doubt by inferring from\nmy awareness of my own existence the truth of the proposition “I\nexist”. Even if I were in error in uttering this proposition, it\nwould still be true that I, who am in error, exist (De civitate\ndei 11.26: si enim fallor, sum; for the exact\nreconstruction of this argument cf. Horn 1995: 81–87; Matthews\n2005: 34–42). The argument does not yet appear in Contra\nAcademicos but is easily recognized as a development of the\nargument from subjective knowledge (Contra Academicos 3.26);\nAugustine considers it a valid refutation of skepticism from his\nearliest (De beata vita 7) to his latest works (De\ntrinitate 15.21; for further attestations see Soliloquia\n2.1; De duabus animabus 13; De libero arbitrio 2.7;\nDe vera religione 73; Confessiones 7.5; 13.12). The\nscope of the argument in Augustine is both wider and narrower than in\nDescartes. The Augustinian cogito lacks the systematic importance of\nits Cartesian counterpart; there is no attempt to found a coherent and\ncomprehensive philosophy on it. On some occasions, however, it works\nas a starting point for the Augustinian ascent to God (De libero\narbitrio 2.7, where the ascent leads to an understanding of God\nas immutable truth and wisdom; for a condensed version, cf. De\nvera religione 72–73, where Augustine even makes\nsupra-rational Truth the source and criterion of the truth of the\ncogito itself). The most impressive example is the second half of De\ntrinitate. Here the attempt to reach a rational understanding of\nthe mystery of the Trinity by means of an inquiry into the structure\nof the human mind starts with an analysis of the mind’s\ninalienable self-love and self-awareness (see\n 6.2 The Human Mind as an Image of God;\n Augustine does not, however, claim that the mind’s certainty\nabout itself entails a similar certainty about the nature of God).\nAugustine’s cogito argument is not limited to epistemology but\ncan also be employed in an ethical context because it proves not only\nmy existence and my thinking (and, by implication, my being alive) but\nalso my loving and willing. I am as certain that I will as I am\ncertain that I exist and live, and my will is as undeniably mine as is\nmy existence and my life. Therefore, my volitions are imputable to me,\nand it is I who am responsible for my choices (and not some evil\nsubstance present in my soul but foreign to my own self, as, on\nAugustine’s interpretation, Manichean dualism would have it; cf.\nDe duabus animabus 13; Confessiones 7.5; De\ncivitate dei 5.10)." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Skepticism and Certainty" }, { "content": [ "\nAugustine’s theory of knowledge—his so-called doctrine of\nillumination—is a distinctly non-empiricist epistemology based\non a probably Neoplatonic reading of Plato’s doctrine of\nrecollection (Burnyeat 1987; MacDonald 2012b; King 2014a:\n147–152; Karfíková 2017). Like Plato and his\nfollowers, Augustine thinks that true knowledge requires first-hand\nacquaintance; second-hand information, e.g., from reliable testimony,\nmay yield true and even justifiable belief, but not knowledge in the\nstrict sense.\n In the case of sensible objects—which, strictly speaking, do\nnot admit of knowledge at all but only opinion—such\n first-hand acquaintance is possible through sense perception.\nCognition of intelligible objects, however, can be neither reached\nempirically by means of abstraction nor transmitted to us\nlinguistically by a human teacher (see\n 5.4 Language and Signs);\n rather, such cognition requires personal intellectual activity that\nresults in an intellectual insight, which we judge by a criterion we\nfind nowhere but in ourselves. The paradigm of this kind of cognition\nare mathematical and logical truths and fundamental moral intuitions,\nwhich we understand not because we believe a teacher or a book but\nbecause we see them for ourselves (De magistro 40, cf. De\nlibero arbitrio 2.34). The condition of possibility and the\ncriterion of truth of this intellectual insight is none other than God\n(a view attributed, with explicit approval, to the Platonists in\nDe civitate dei 8.7), who, in the manner of a Neoplatonic\nimmaterial principle, is both immanent and transcendent in relation to\nour soul. Augustine mostly explains this Platonizing theory of a\npriori knowledge by means of two striking images: the inner teacher\nand illumination. The former is introduced in the dialogue De\nmagistro (ca. 390) and remains frequent especially in the sermons\n(e.g., In epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem 3.13;\nFuhrer 2018b); according to it, Christ is present in our souls and by\n“presiding over” them like a teacher guarantees the\ntruthfulness of our understanding (De magistro 38–39,\ncf. Ephesians 3:17 for the image and, for the idea that truth\n“lives in the inner man”, De vera religione 72).\nThe latter appears first in the Soliloquia (1.12–15)\nand is ubiquitous in Augustine’s writings (cf. esp. De\ntrinitate 12.24). It is ultimately derived from the Analogy of\nthe Sun in Plato’s Republic (508a-509b; cf. Rist 1994:\n78–79). In the Soliloquia Augustine says, in a manner\nstrongly reminiscent of Plato, that just as the sun is both visible\nitself and illumines the objects of sight so as to enable the eye to\nsee them, God is intelligible himself and illumines the intelligible\nobjects (which are here identified with the objects of the liberal\ndisciplines and subordinated to God) so as to enable reason (the\n“eye” of the soul) to activate its capacity for\nintellection. The later version in De trinitate explicitly\npresents divine illumination as an alternative to Platonic\nrecollection and situates it in the framework of a theory of creation.\nHere Augustine says that the human mind has been created by God in\nsuch a way as to be “connected” to intelligible reality\n“from below” (subiuncta) and with a capacity\n(capacitas) that enables it to “see” the\nintelligibles in the light of intelligible truth, just as the eye is\nby nature able to see colors in the light of the sun. Obviously,\n“capacity” in this case does not mean pure potentiality\n(as in the tabula rasa theory endorsed by Augustine’s\ninterlocutor Euodius in De quantitate animae 34) but\ncomprises at least implicit or latent knowledge of moral and\nepistemological standards. Both images, if properly read, should\npreclude the misunderstanding that Augustine’s gnoseology makes\nhuman knowledge entirely dependent on divine agency, with the human\nbeing becoming merely a passive recipient of revelation (cf. Gilson\n1943: ch. 4 and Lagouanère 2012: 158–180 for the debates\nabout Augustinian illumination in medieval and modern philosophy).\nCognition does not simply result from the presence of Christ in our\nsoul but from our “consulting” the inner teacher, i.e.,\nour testing propositions that claim to convey a truth about\nintelligible reality (or even a general truth about sensible objects,\ncf. Letter 13.3–4) against the inner standards we\npossess thanks to the presence of Christ (De magistro\n37–38; this way of “consulting” the inner truth is\nrepeatedly dramatized in the Confessiones, e.g., 11.10;\n11.31; Cary 2008b: 100). And while every human being is\n“illumined” by the divine light at least from behind so as\nto be able to pass true judgments about right and wrong or good and\nevil, in order to develop these natural intuitions to full knowledge\nor wisdom and to be able actually to lead a virtuous life, we need to\nconvert to God, the “source” of the light (De\ntrinitate 14.21). Thus, while all human beings are by nature\ncapable of accessing intelligible truth, only those succeed in doing\nso who have a sufficiently good will (De magistro\n38)—presumably those who endorse Christian religion and live\naccordingly. This strong voluntary element intimately connects\nAugustine’s epistemology with his ethics and, ultimately, with\nhis doctrine of grace (on the parallel structure of cognition and grace in Augustine\nsee Lorenz 1964). Like all human agency, striving for wisdom takes place\nunder the conditions of a fallen world and meets the difficulties and\nhindrances humanity is subject to because of original sin.", "\nIn order to illustrate what he means by “seeing things by\nourselves” “in the light of truth”, Augustine often\ncites the example of the Socratic maieutic dialogue (De\nmagistro 40; cf. De immortalitate animae 6; De\ntrinitate 12.24), and in some passages of his early work he seems\nto subscribe to the Platonic doctrine of recollection (familiar to him\nfrom Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 1.57) in such a way as to\nimply the preexistence of the soul (Soliloquia 2.35,\nretracted in Retractationes 1.4.4; De immortalitate\nanimae 6; De quantitate animae 34, retracted in\nRetractationes 1.8.2). It is difficult to tell whether the\nearly Augustine literally believed in recollection and preexistence\n(Karfíková 2017; O’Daly 1987: 70–75;\n199–207), not least because he was aware that some Neoplatonists\ninterpreted Platonic recollection as an actualization of our\never-present but latent knowledge of the intelligible rather than as a\nremembrance of our past acquaintance with it (Letter 7.2, cf.\nPlotinus, Enneads IV.3.25.31–33; O’Daly 1976).\nIf, as in De immortalitate animae 6, recollection is taken to\nprove the immortality of the soul (as it did in the Phaedo),\nit is hard to see how preexistence should not be implied. In any\nevent, it is imprecise to say, as it is sometimes done, that Augustine\ngave up the theory of recollection because he realized that\npreexistence was at variance with Christian faith. In De civitate\ndei (12.14 etc.) Augustine emphatically rejects\nPlatonic-Pythagorean metempsychosis or the transmigration of souls as\nincompatible with eternal happiness and the economy of salvation, and\nin De trinitate (12.24) the Meno version of the\nrecollection theory, which implies transmigration, is rejected in\nfavor of illumination. Yet it is a fallacy to claim that recollection\nentails transmigration. The early Augustine may have believed in\npreexistence (perhaps simply as a corollary of the immortality of the\nsoul), but there is no evidence that he believed in the transmigration\nof souls; conversely, his rejection of transmigration did not prevent\neven the late Augustine from considering preexistence—at least\ntheoretically—an option for the origin of the soul\n(Letter 143.6 from 412; cf.\n 6.1 Soul as a Created Being)." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Illumination" }, { "content": [ "\nWhereas modern discussion tends to regard faith and reason as\nalternative or even mutually exclusive ways to (religious) truth, in\nAugustine’s epistemological and exegetical program the two are\ninseparable. He rejects the rationalism of the philosophers and,\nespecially, the Manicheans as an unwarranted over-confidence into the\nabilities of human reason resulting from sinful pride and as an\narrogant neglect of the revelation of Christ in Scripture (De\nlibero arbitrio 3.56; 60; Confessiones 3.10–12).\nAgainst the fideism he encountered in some Christian circles (cf.\nLetter 119 from Consentius to Augustine) he insisted that it\nwas good and natural to employ the rational capacity we have been\ncreated with to search for an understanding of the truths we accept\nfrom the authority of the biblical revelation, even though a true\nunderstanding of God will only be possible after this life when we see\nhim “face to face” (Letter 120.3–4). In\nthis epistemological and exegetical program, which since Anselm of\nCanterbury has aptly been labeled as “faith seeking\nunderstanding” (cf. De trinitate 15.2: fides\nquaerit, intellectus invenit) or “understanding of\nfaith” (intellectus fidei), faith is prior to\nunderstanding in time but posterior to it in importance and value\n(De ordine 2.26; De vera religione 45;\nLetter 120.3; van Fleteren 2010). The first step toward\nperfection is to believe the words of Scripture; the second is to\nrealize that the words are outward signs of an internal and\nintelligible reality and that they admonish us to turn to and to\n“consult” inner truth so as to reach true understanding\nand, accordingly, the good life (cf.\n 5.2 Illumination;\n 5.4 Language and Signs). \nPhilosophical argument may be of help in this process;\nyet as Augustine notes as early as in Contra Academicos\n(3.43), it needs to be tied to the authority of Scripture and the\nCreed to prevent the frailty of human reason from going astray (cf.\nConfessiones 7.13). The Augustine of the earliest dialogues\nseems to have entertained the elitist idea that those educated in the\nliberal arts and capable of the Neoplatonic intellectual ascent may\nactually outgrow authority and achieve a full understanding of the\ndivine already in this life (De ordine 2.26, but contrast ib.\n2.45 on Monnica). In his later work, he abandons this hope and\nemphasizes that during this life, inevitably characterized by sin and\nweakness, every human being remains in need of the guidance of the\nrevealed authority of Christ (Cary 2008b: 109–120). Faith is\nthus not just an epistemological but also an ethical category; it is\nessential for the moral purification we need to undergo before we can\nhope for even a glimpse of true understanding (Soliloquia\n1.12; De diversis quaestionibus 48; De trinitate\n4.24; Rist 2001). To a great extent, Augustine’s defense of\nfaith as a valid epistemic category rests on a rehabilitation of true\nbelief against the philosophical (Platonic and Hellenistic) tradition.\nAugustine neatly distinguishes “belief” (fides,\nthe word he also uses for religious faith), which entails the\nbeliever’s awareness that he does not know, from\n“opinion” (opinio), defined by the philosophers\nas the illusion of knowing what one in fact does not know (De\nutilitate credendi 25; Letter 120.3). Without belief in\nthe former sense, we would have to admit that we are ignorant of our\nown lineage (Confessiones 6.7) and of the objects of the\nhistorical and empirical sciences, of which, as Augustine asserts in a\ncritique of Platonism, first-hand knowledge is rarely possible (De\ntrinitate 4.21). The belief that a person we have not seen was or\nis just may trigger our fraternal love for him (De trinitate\n8.7; Bouton-Touboulic 2012: 182–187; conversely, Augustine asks\nthose who are united with him in fraternal love to believe what he\ntells them about his life, Confessiones 10.3). And obviously,\nthe crucial events of the history of salvation, Jesus’ death on\nthe cross and his resurrection, cannot be known but only believed qua\nhistorical events, even though qua signs they may lead to\nunderstanding by prompting us to an intelligible truth (De\ntrinitate 13.2). Thus, while no doubt faith in revelation\nprecedes rational insight into its true meaning, the decision about\nwhose authority to believe and whom to accept as a reliable witness is\nitself reasonable (De vera religione 45; Letter\n120.3). Even so, belief may of course be deceived (De\ntrinitate 8.6). In ordinary life, this is inevitable and mostly\nunproblematic. A more serious problem is the justification of belief\nin Scripture, which, for Augustine, is the tradition and authority\n(auctoritas, not potestas) of the Church (Contra\nepistulam fundamenti 5.6; Rist 1994: 245)." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Faith and Reason" }, { "content": [ "\nAugustine’s philosophy of language is both indebted to the\nStoic-influenced Hellenistic and Roman theories of grammar and highly\ninnovative (Rist 1994: 23–40; King 2014b). He follows the Stoics\nin distinguishing between the sound of a word, its meaning and the\nthing it signifies (De dialectica 5; De quantitate animae 66; cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus\nmathematicos 8.11–12 = 33B Long-Sedley), but he seems to\nhave been the first to interpret language as such as a system of signs\nand to integrate it into a general semiotics (Fuhrer 2018a: 1696; Cary\n2008b; Mayer 1969 and 1974). In his handbook of biblical exegesis and\nChristian rhetoric, De doctrina christiana (1.2;\n2.1–4), Augustine divides the world into “things”\nand “signs” (i.e., things that, apart from being what they\nare, signify other things) and furthermore distinguishes between\n“natural” or involuntary signs (e.g., smoke signifying\nfire) and voluntary or “given” signs (a distinction akin,\nbut not equivalent, to the older discussion about nature or convention\nas the origin of language). Language is defined as a system of given\nsigns by means of which the speaker signifies either things or her\nthoughts and emotions (Enchiridion 22). In the exegetical\nframework of De doctrina christiana, the “thing”\nsignified by the verbal signs of Scripture is God, the Supreme Being.\nAugustine therefore begins with a sketch of his theology and ethics\ncentered around the notions of love of God and neighbor before he sets out his biblical hermeneutics which,\nagain, posits love as the criterion of exegetical adequacy (Pollmann\n1996; Williams 2001). The words of the Bible are external signs\ndesigned to prompt us to the more inward phenomenon of love and,\nultimately, to God who is beyond all language and thought. This may be\ngeneralized to the principle that external—verbal and\nnon-verbal—signs operate on a lower ontological level than the\ninward and intelligible truth they attempt to signify and that they\nare superseded in true knowledge which is knowledge not of signs but\nof things. This holds not only for words, even the words of Scripture,\nbut also for the sacraments and for the Incarnation of Christ\n(Contra epistulam fundamenti 36.41). Augustine’s most\nsustained discussion of language, the early dialogue De\nmagistro, asks how we learn things from words and relates\nlinguistic signification to the epistemology of illumination (Nawar\n2015). After a long discussion of how verbal signs signify things or\nstates of mind and how they relate to other signs, it turns out,\nrather surprisingly, that we do not learn things from signs at all\nbecause in order to understand the meaning of a sign we already have\nto be acquainted with the thing signified. This is ultimately a\nversion of Meno’s paradox, and Augustine solves it by\nintroducing the metaphors of the inner teacher and of illumination,\ni.e., by means of an internalist theory of learning recognizable as a\nNeoplatonic interpretation of Platonic anamnesis (De magistro\n38–40).\n This does not mean that words are useless. They inform us about\nthings that are inaccessible to direct acquaintance and thus generate\ntrue belief; most importantly, they admonish us to\n“consult” the inner teacher and to understand things by\nourselves (this, according to Augustine, is the whole point of the\nSocratic dialogue). This goes even for the acquisition of language\nitself: We understand the sign “bird-catching”, not simply\nby being shown a person engaged in that activity and being told that\nhe is signified by that name, but by observing him and figuring out\nfor ourselves what “bird-catching” means (ib. 32; on this\nand Wittgenstein’s criticism of what he took to be\nAugustine’s view of language acquisition, see Matthews 2005:\n23–33). In the later books of De trinitate and in the\nsermons on the Trinity, Augustine frequently refers to a phenomenon\ncalled “inner word”, which he uses to explain the relation\nof the inner-Trinitarian Word or Logos from the Prologue of John (John\n1:1) to Christ incarnate. Just as the spoken word signifies a concept\nthat we have formed within our mind and communicates it to others, so\nChrist incarnate signifies the divine Logos and admonishes and assists\nus to turn to it (cf. De trinitate 15.20; De doctrina\nchristiana 1.12; Sermon 119.7; 187.3). In De\ntrinitate Augustine expands this to a theory about how the inner\nword or concept is formed (14.10; 15.25; cf. 15.43). The inner word is\ngenerated when we actualize some latent or implicit knowledge that is\nstored in our memory. It is not a sign, nor of linguistic nature\n(Augustine insists that it is neither Latin nor Greek nor Hebrew), but\nrather seems to be a kind of a-temporal intellectual insight that\ntranscends language (cf. De catechizandis rudibus 3).\nProperly speaking, then, the theory of the inner word is not a\nlinguistic theory at all." ], "subsection_title": "5.4 Language and Signs" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "6. Anthropology: God and the Soul; Soul and Body", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nLike most ancient philosophers, Augustine thinks that the human being\nis a compound of body and soul and that, within this compound, the\nsoul—conceived as both the life-giving element and the center of\nconsciousness, perception and thought—is, or ought to be, the\nruling part. The rational soul should control the sensual desires and\npassions; it can become wise if it turns to God, who is at the same\ntime the Supreme Being and the Supreme Good.\n In his Manichean phase, he conceived of both God and the soul as\nmaterial entities, the soul being in fact a portion of God that had\nfallen into the corporeal world where it remained a foreigner, even to\nits own body (De duabus animabus 1; Confessiones\n8.22). After his Platonist readings in Milan had provided him with the\nadequate philosophical means to think about immaterial, non-spatial\nreality (Confessiones 7.1–2; 7.16), he replaced this\nview, which he later represents as a rather crude dualism, with an\nontological hierarchy in which the soul, which is mutable in time but\nimmutable in space, occupies a middle position between God, who is\ntotally unchangeable immaterial being (cf. MacDonald 2014), and\nbodies, which are subject to temporal and spatial change\n(Letter 18.2). The soul is of divine origin and even god-like\n(De quantitate animae 2–3); it is not divine itself but\ncreated by God (the talk about divinity of the soul in the Cassiciacum\ndialogues seems to be a traditional Ciceronian element, cf. Cary 2000:\n77–89; for a Plotinian interpretation see O’Connell 1968:\n112–131). In De quantitate animae, Augustine broadly\nargues that the “greatness” of the soul does not refer to\nspatial extension but to its vivifying, perceptive, rational and\ncontemplative powers that enable it to move close to God and are\ncompatible with and even presuppose immateriality (esp. ib.\n70–76; Brittain 2003). An early definition of soul as “a\nrational substance fitted for rule over a body” (ib. 22) echoes\nPlatonic views (cf. the definition of the human being as “a\nrational soul with a body” in In Iohannis evangelium\ntractatus 19.15; O’Daly 1987: 54–60). Later on, when\nthe resurrection of the body becomes more important to him, Augustine\nemphasizes—against Porphyry’s alleged claim that in order\nto be happy, the soul must free itself from anything\ncorporeal—that it is natural and even desirable for a soul to\ngovern a body (De Genesi ad litteram 12.35.68), but he\nnevertheless remains convinced that soul is an incorporeal and\nimmortal substance that can, in principle, exist independently of a\nbody. In the Soliloquia (2.24), following the tradition of\nPlato and of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, he\nproposes a proof for the immortality of the soul which he expressly\nintroduces as an alternative to the final proof of the Phaedo\n(Soliloquia 2.23, cf. Phaedo 102d-103c). The proof\nis constructed from elements from Porphyry’s Isagoge\nand his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (rather\nelementary texts that Augustine would have encountered long before his\nPlatonic readings at Milan) and seems to be original with him (Tornau\n2017). It says that since truth is both eternal and in the soul as its\nsubject, it follows that soul, the subject of truth, is eternal too.\nThis is fallacious, because if truth is eternal independently of the\nsoul it cannot be in the soul as in its subject (i.e., as a property),\nand if it is a property of the soul, it cannot ensure its eternity. In\nthe incomplete draft of a third book of the Soliloquia\npreserved under the title De immortalitate animae, Augustine\ntherefore modifies the proof and argues that soul is immortal because\nof the inalienable causal presence of God (= Truth) in it. It turns\nout however that even if this version of the proof is successful, it\nonly demonstrates the soul’s eternal existence as a (rational)\nsoul but not its eternal wisdom (De immortalitate animae 19;\nZum Brunn 1969: 17–41 [1988: 9–34]), in the hope of which the\ninterlocutors had set out to prove the immortality of the soul in the\nfirst place (Soliloquia 2.1). After De immortalitate\nanimae, Augustine never returned to his proof. But neither did he\ndisown it; as late as De trinitate (13.12), he endorses the\nPlatonic axiom that soul is by nature immortal and that its\nimmortality can, in principle, be proven by philosophical means. He\nalso sticks to his conviction that immortality is a necessary\ncondition of happiness but insists that it is not a sufficient\ncondition, given that immortality and misery are compatible (cf.\nDe civitate dei 9.15 on the misery of the wicked demons).\nTrue happiness will only be realized in the afterlife as a gift of\nGod’s grace, when, thanks to the resurrection of the body, not\njust the soul but the human being as a whole will live forever.\nResurrection, however, is not susceptible of rational proof; it is a\npromise of God that must be believed on Scriptural authority (De\ntrinitate ib.).", "\nTogether with an essentially Platonic notion of the soul, Augustine\ninherits the classical problems of Platonic soul-body dualism. How can\nsoul fulfil its task of “governing” the body (cf. De quantitate\nanimae 22) if it is incorporeal itself? And how are\ncorporeal and psychic aspects related to each other in phenomena that\ninvolve both body and soul, especially if, like passions and desires,\nthese are morally relevant? These problems are further complicated by\nthe Platonic axiom that incorporeal entities, being ontologically\nprior to corporeal ones, cannot be causally affected by them.\nAugustine’s solution is indebted to Plotinus’ strategy of\nmaking the relation of the soul to the bodily affections an\nessentially cognitive one (O’Daly 1987, 84–87;\nHölscher 1986, ch. 2.2.1; Nash 1969, 39–59; Bermon 2001:\n239–281). With Plotinus, he insists that sense perception is not\nan affection which the soul passively undergoes (as Stoic materialism\nwould have it, where sensory perception was interpreted as a kind of\nimprint in the soul) but its active awareness of affections undergone\nby the body (De quantitate animae 41; 48; De Genesi ad\nlitteram 7.14.20; Plotinus, Enneads I.4.2.3–4;\nBrittain 2002: 274–282). In De quantitate animae, the\nframework of this theory is the general argument that the relation of\nsoul to body must be conceived of not in terms of space but of\n“power” (see above). In De musica (6.11), this is\ndeveloped into the idea that sense perception is the soul’s\nawareness of modifications of its own formative and vivifying\nactivities that result from its reacting to the external impulses\nundergone by the body. In addition to the usual five senses, Augustine\nidentifies a sensory faculty that relates the data of the senses to\neach other and judges them aesthetically (but not morally; De musica 6.5; 19);\nin De libero arbitrio (2.8–13) he calls this the\n“inner sense” (on the Aristotelian background cf.\nO’Daly 1987: 102–105).", "\nIn Neoplatonism it was disputed how soul, being immortal, immaterial\nand ontologically superior to body, came to be incorporated\nnevertheless. The basic options, present already in Plato’s\ndialogues, were either that the disembodied soul had\n“fallen” into the corporeal world because of some error\n(as in the Phaedrus myth) or that it had been sent into the\ncosmos by God to impart life and order to it (as in the\nTimaeus; for harmonizing Neoplatonic exegeses, see Plotinus,\nEnneads IV.8, and Macrobius, Commentary on Cicero’s\nSomnium Scipionis 1.10–14). Augustine addresses the issue\nin the horizon of his doctrine of creation and, in the period of the\nPelagian Controversy, of the debate about the transmission of original\nsin (see\n 9. Gender, Women and Sexuality).\n In De libero arbitrio (3.56–59), he distinguishes the\nthree options of creationism (God creates a new soul for every newborn\nbody), traducianism (the soul is transmitted from the parents to the\nchild like corporeal properties), and preexistence, which is\nsubdivided into the Platonic options of voluntary or god-sent descent.\nAfter 412 all these options come to the fore again (Letters\n143.5–11; 166; 190; and the treatise De anima et eius\norigine). Augustine discards none of them officially except for\nthe notion, wrongly associated with Origenism, which was considered a\nheresy at the time, that incorporation was a punishment for a sin\ncommitted by the pre-existent soul (De civitate dei 11.23).\nIn practice, he narrows the debate down to the alternative between\ncreationism and traducianism, which appear to have been the only\noptions taken seriously by his Christian contemporaries. Augustine\nrefused to take a stand till the end of his life, probably because\nneither option really suited his purposes (Rist 1994: 317–320;\nO’Connell 1987; Mendelson 1998): Creationism made original sin\nvery difficult to explain; traducianism was functional in this\nrespect, but it was a materialist and even biologist theory that ran\ncounter to Augustine’s Platonism and was further compromised\nbecause it had been brought up by his African predecessor Tertullian\n(d. c. 220 CE), a Stoicizing corporealist who had ended his life as a\nheretic (Rist 1994: 123)." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Soul as a Created Being" }, { "content": [ "\nAugustine deploys what we may call his philosophy of the mind most\nfully in his great work on Nicene Trinitarian theology, De\ntrinitate. Having removed apparent Scriptural obstacles to the\nequality and consubstantiality of the three divine persons (bks.\n1–4) and having set out the grammar, as it were, of adequate\nspeaking about the Trinity by distinguishing absolute and relative\npropositions about God and the three Persons (bks. 5–7; King\n2012), he turns to an analysis of the human mind as an image of God\n(bks. 8–15; Brachtendorf 2000; Ayres 2010; Bermon &\nO’Daly (eds.) 2012). The basis for this move is, of course,\nGenesis 1:26–27. Augustine follows a long-standing Jewish and\nPatristic tradition, familiar to him from Ambrose, according to which\nthe biblical qualification of the human being as an image of God\nreferred not to the living body (a literalist reading vulnerable to\nthe Manichean charge of anthropomorphism, cf. Confessiones\n6.4) but to what is specifically human, i.e., the “inner\nman” (2 Corinthians 4:16, quoted, e.g., in De trinitate\n11.1) or the mind (mens). Assuming, in a Platonist manner,\nthat “image” in this case does not merely mean an analogy\nbut a causal effect of the original that reflects the essential\nfeatures of the latter on a lower ontological level,\nhe scrutinizes the human mind for triadic structures that meet the\nNicene requirements of equality and consubstantiality and may thus\ngive a—however faint—understanding of the Triune God. The\ngeneral pattern of his argument is the Augustinian ascent from the\nexternal to the internal and from the senses to God; but since human\nreason is, whether by nature or due to its fallen state, hardly\ncapable of knowing God, Augustine this time is obliged to interrupt\nand re-start the ascent several times. The final book shows that the\nexercise of analyzing the human mind does have preparatory value for\nour thinking about the Trinity but does not yield insight into the\ndivine by being simply transferred to it (De trinitate\n15.10–11). The three elements Augustine discerns in all our\ncognitive acts from sense perception to theoretical reason or\ncontemplation are: [1] an object that is either external to the mind\n(as in sense perception) or internal to it, in which case it is an\nimage or a concept stored in our memory; [2] a cognitive faculty that\nmust be activated or “formed” by the object if cognition\nis to come about; [3] a voluntary or intentional element that makes\nthe cognitive faculty turn to its object so as to be actually formed\nby it. The last element ensures the active character of perception and\nintellection\n but also gives weight to the idea that we do not cognize an object\nunless we consciously direct our attention to it (MacDonald 2012b).\nThough this triadic pattern is operative on all levels of human\ncognition, Augustine contends that only the mind’s intellectual\nself-knowledge on the level of contemplative reason (its “memory\nof itself, knowledge of itself and love of itself”) qualifies as\nan image of God because only here are the three elements as closely\nrelated to each other as in the Nicene dogma and because they are as\ninalienable as the mind’s immediate presence to itself (De\ntrinitate 14.19). This idea is carefully prepared in Book 10,\nwhich contains one of Augustine’s most remarkable arguments for\nthe substantiality of the mind and its independence of the body\n(Stróżyński 2013; Brittain 2012a; Matthews 2005:\n43–52; Bermon 2001, 357–404). Augustine begins by arguing\n(in a manner reminiscent of his cogito-like argument; see\n 5.1 Skepticism and Certainty)\n that the mind always already knows itself because it is always\npresent to and hence aware of itself. This pre-reflexive\nself-awareness is presupposed by every act of conscious cognition. If\nso, however, the Delphic command “Know thyself” cannot\nmean that the mind is to become acquainted with itself as if it had\nbeen unknown to itself before, but rather that it must become\nconscious of what it knew about itself all along and distinguish it\nfrom what it does not know about itself. As the mind in its fallen\nstate is deeply immersed in sensible reality, it tends to forget what\nit really is and what it knows it is and confounds itself with the\nthings it attaches the greatest importance to, i.e., sensible objects\nthat give it pleasure. The result are materialist theories about the\nsoul, which thus derive from flawed morality (De trinitate\n10.11–12). If it follows the Delphic command, however, the mind\nwill realize that it knows with certainty that it exists, thinks,\nwills etc., whereas it can at best merely believe that it is air, fire\nor brain (ib. 10.13).\n And as the substance or essence of the mind cannot be anything other\nthan what it knows with certainty about itself, it follows that\nnothing material is essential to the mind and that its essence must be\nsought in its mental acts (ib. 10.16). Full self-knowledge is reached,\nthen, when the mind’s inalienable self-awareness (se\nnosse, “to be acquainted with oneself”) is actualized\nto conscious “self-thinking” (se cogitare). How\nthis relates to the mind’s pre-reflexive presence to itself is\nnot entirely clear (for problems of interpretation, see, e.g., Horn\n2012; Brittain 2012b), but Augustine seems to think that not only the\nmind’s intellectual self-thinking but already its immediate\nself-awareness is triadically structured and an image of the Triune\nGod (De trinitate 14.7–14). Again, the ethical side of\nthe theory should not be overlooked. As a strong voluntary element is\npresent in and necessary for an act of cognition, what objects\n(imaginations, thoughts) we cognize is morally relevant and indicative\nof our loves and desires. And while the triadic structure of the mind\nis its very essence and hence inalienable, Augustine insists that the\nmind is created in the image of God, not because it is capable of\nself-knowledge, but because it has the potential to become wise, i.e.,\nto remember, know and love God, its creator (ib. 14.21–22)." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 The Human Mind as an Image of God" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "7. Ethics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nThe basic structure of Augustine’s ethics is that of ancient\neudaimonism (Holte 1962), but he defers happiness to the afterlife and\nblames the ancient ethicists for their arrogant\nconviction—resulting from their ignorance of the fallen\ncondition of humankind—that they could reach happiness in this\nlife by philosophical endeavor (De civitate dei 19.4;\nWolterstorff 2012; for a more optimistic view, cf. the early De\nordine 2.26). He takes it as axiomatic that happiness is the\nultimate goal pursued by all human beings (e.g., De beata\nvita 10; De civitate dei 10.1; De trinitate\n13.7, quoting Cicero’s Hortensius; for an interesting\ndiscussion of how the desire for happiness relates to our equally\nnatural desires for pleasure and for truth cf. Confessiones\n10.29–34; Matthews 2005: 134–145; Menn 2014: 80–95).\nHappiness or the good life is brought about by the possession of the\ngreatest good in nature that humans can attain and that one cannot\nlose against one’s will (e.g., lib. arb. 1.10–12;\nespecially in his early work Augustine shares the Stoics’\nconcern about the self-sufficiency and independence of the wise and\nhappy person, cf. Wetzel 1992, 42–55). This structure Augustine\ninscribes into his Neoplatonically inspired three-tiered ontological\nhierarchy (Letter 18.2)\n and concludes that the only thing able to fulfil the requirements for\nthe supreme good set by eudaimonism is the immutable God himself. The\nSupreme Being is also the greatest good; the desire of created being\nfor happiness can only be satisfied by the creator. As Augustine puts\nin concisely in De beata vita (11): “Happy is he who\nhas God”. Alternative formulations are “enjoyment of\nGod” (De civitate dei 8.8; De trinitate\n13.10), “contemplation of God” or “enjoyment of\ntruth” (De libero arbitrio 2.35). To “have”\nGod means in fact to know and, especially, to love God; Augustine\ntherefore interprets Psalm 72:28 (“For me it is good to cling to\nGod”) as a biblical telos formula or definition of the\nsupreme and beatifying good (De civitate dei 10.18; Tornau\n2015: 265–266). We are, in other words, happy, wise and virtuous\nif we turn to or “convert” to God. If we turn away from\nhim and direct our attention and love to the bodies—which are\nnot per se bad, as in Manicheism, but an infinitely lesser good than\nGod—or to ourselves, who are a great good but still subordinate\nto God, we become miserable, foolish and wicked (Letter 18.2;\nDe libero arbitrio 2.52–54; In Iohannis evangelium\ntractatus 20.11). Virtue is “love that knows its\npriorities” (ordo amoris, De civitate dei 15.22)\nwhereas vice or sin perverts the natural order. Just as after the Fall\nall human beings are inevitably tainted by sin, we need to be purified\nthrough faith in order to live well and to restore our ability to know\nand love God (De diversis quaestionibus 68.3; Cary 2008a:\n12–13). Augustine does not discard the intellectual element\ninherited from the ancient (Socratic) ethical tradition, and his\nnotion of conversion is certainly inspired by Neoplatonist\n“return” (epistrophe), but Augustine enhances the\nethical relevance of conversion and aversion by emphasizing their\nvoluntary character (cf. already De immortalitate animae\n11–12).\n The element of will or love is also crucial to the distinction between\n“enjoyment” (frui) and “use”\n(uti) that is first fully developed in De doctrina\nchristiana, bk. 1 (c. 396) and remains basic for his ethical\nthought. Following the ancient insight that we pursue some goods for\ntheir own sake and others for the sake of other and greater goods,\nAugustine states that to “enjoy” a thing means to cling to\nit with love for its own sake whereas to “use” it means to\nlove it for the sake of another thing which we want to enjoy. We love\nabsolutely only what we enjoy, whereas our love for things we use is\nrelative and even instrumental (De doctrina christiana 1.4).\nThe only proper object of enjoyment is God (cf. De civitate\ndei 8.8 where the same view is attributed to the Platonists).\nWickedness and confusion of the moral order results from a reversal of\nuse and enjoyment, when we want to enjoy what we ought to use (all\ncreated things, e.g., wealth, bodies or ourselves) and to use what we\nought to enjoy (this probably refers to the “carnal”\nunderstanding of religion of which Augustine often accuses the Jews).\nAn obvious problem of this system is the categorization of the\nbiblically prescribed love of the neighbor. Are we to enjoy our\nneighbor or to use her? Whereas natural moral intuition suggests the\nformer, Augustine’s systematic seems to require the latter. The\nproblem is inherited from ancient eudaimonism, where it takes some\nphilosophical effort to reconcile the intuition that concern for\nothers is morally relevant with the assumption that ethics is\nprimarily about the virtue and happiness of the individual. Augustine\nis aware of the problem and gives a differentiated answer. In De\ndoctrina christiana (1.20–21) he somewhat tentatively\nsuggests that to love our neighbor means to use him, not because he is\nmerely instrumental to our happiness but because we are enjoined to\nlove him as ourselves and because we love ourselves rightly only if we\nrefer our self-love to our desire to enjoy God. Love of the neighbor\nthus means to desire his true happiness in the same way as we desire\nour own. In substance, this remains Augustine’s view also in his\nlater work (cf., e.g., In epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus\ndecem 1.9), but he then prefers to avoid the counter-intuitive\nand potentially misleading talk about “using” fellow\nhumans and replaces it by a description of fraternal love as\n“mutual enjoyment in God” (e.g., De trinitate\n9.13; cf. already De doctrina christiana 1.35; 3.16; Rist\n1994: 159–168; O’Donovan 1980: 32–36;\n112–136). “In God” is presumably added to prevent\nthe misunderstanding that we are to enjoy the neighbor “in\nherself” or “in ourselves” without reference to God.\nThis would mean that we expect our true happiness from her, which no\nhuman can give; the result of this misdirection would be extreme\nmisery in the case of the neighbor’s loss (cf.\nConfessiones 4.9–11 on Augustine’s excessive\ngrief after the death of his friend; Nawar 2014)." ], "subsection_title": "7.1 Happiness" }, { "content": [ "\nIn principle Augustine follows the view of the ancient eudaimonists\nthat virtue is sufficient or at least relevant for happiness. There\nare however several important modifications. (1) The entire structure\nis made dependent on God’s prevenient grace. True virtue\nguarantees true happiness, but there is no true virtue that is not a\ngift of grace.\n (2) Augustine accepts Cicero’s definition of virtue as the art\nof “living well” but emphatically rejects his equation of\nliving well and living happily, i.e., the Stoicizing claim that a\nvirtuous disposition is equivalent to happiness (De libero\narbitrio 2.50; De civitate dei 4.21; De moribus\n1.10; contrast Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.53). Our\npostlapsarian life on earth is inevitably the locus of sin and\npunishment, and even the saints are unable to overcome the permanent\ninner conflict between “the spirit” and “the\nflesh”, i.e., between good and evil volitions or rational and\nirrational desires in this life (De civitate dei 19.4,\nquoting Galatians 5:17). The perfect inner tranquility virtue strives\nfor will only be achieved in the afterlife. (3) Augustine replaces the\nancient definition of virtue as “right reason” (as in\nStoicism) or “activity in accordance with reason” (as in\nthe Aristotelian tradition) with a definition of virtue as love of God\nor, in later texts, as love of God and neighbor. Virtue is an inner\ndisposition or motivational habit that enables us to perform every\naction we perform out of right love.\n There are several catalogues of the traditional four cardinal virtues\nprudence, justice, courage and temperance that redefine these as\nvarieties of the love of God either in this life or in the eschaton\n(De moribus 1.25; Letter 155.12; cf. Letter\n155.16 for the cardinal virtues as varieties of love of the neighbor;\nDe libero arbitrio 1.27 for descriptions of the virtues in\nterms of good will). His briefest definition of virtue is\n“ordered love” (De civitate dei 15.22). This does\nnot mean that virtue becomes non-rational (for Augustine love and will\nare essential features of the rational mind; see\n 6.2 The Human Mind as an Image of God),\n but it does mean that it becomes essentially intentional. The\ncriterion of true virtue is that it is oriented toward God. Even if\nAugustine occasionally talks as if the four cardinal virtues could be\nadded to the Pauline or theological virtues of love, faith and hope to\nmake a sum of seven (Letter 171A.2), they are best taken as a\nsubdivision of love, the only one of the Pauline virtues that persists\nin the eschaton (Soliloquia 1.14).", "\nThese modifications have several interesting consequences. Even though\nAugustine postpones the happiness that is the reward of virtue to the\nafterlife, he does not make virtue a means to an end in the sense that\nvirtue becomes superfluous when happiness is reached. To the contrary,\nhe insists that virtue will persist in the eschaton where it will be\ntransformed into eternal unimpeded fruition of God and of the neighbor\nin God. Then it will indeed be its own reward and identical with\nhappiness (Letter 155.2; 12). Both eschatological virtue and\nvirtue in this life are thus love of God; they only differ in that the\nlatter is subject to hindrances and temptation. For this reason, those\nwho have true love of God—e.g., Christian martyrs—are\nhappy already in this life, at least in hope (e.g.,\nConfessiones 10.29; Tornau 2015). Augustine’s\ndescription of eschatological and non-eschatological virtues\n(Letter 155) is partly modelled on the Neoplatonic doctrine\nof the scale of virtues with its ascending hierarchy of social or\ncivic, purificatory and contemplative virtues (Tornau 2013; Dodaro\n2004a: 206–212; Dodaro 2004b). When analyzing virtue in this\nlife, Augustine takes up the Stoic distinction, familiar to him from\nCicero (De officiis 1.7–8), between a virtue’s\nfinal end (finis) and its appropriate action\n(officium; cf., e.g., Contra Iulianum 4.21; De\ncivitate dei 10.18). The appropriate action that characterizes\nvirtue in this life but is no longer needed in eternal bliss is to\nsubdue the lower parts of soul to reason and to resist the temptations\nthat emerge from the permanent conflict between good and bad volitions\n(as it were, a permanent “akratic” state; see\n 7.4 Will and Freedom)\n that results from our fallen condition (De civitate dei\n19.4). As the examples of the best philosophers and the heroes of\nRome’s glorious past teach, whom Augustine regularly accuses of\nlove of glory, these actions may easily spring from other motivations\nthan the true love of God. Augustine therefore distinguishes between\ntrue (i.e., Christian) virtue that is motivated by love of God and\n“virtue as such” (virtus ipsa: De civitate dei\n5.19) that performs the same appropriate actions but is, in the last\nresort, guided by self-love or pride (ib. 5.12; 19.25). Among other\nthings, this distinction underpins his solution of the so-called\nproblem of pagan virtue (Harding 2008; Tornau 2006b; Dodaro 2004a: 27–71; Rist 1994:\n168–173) because it permits ascribing virtue in a meaningful\nsense to pagan and pre-Christian paradigms of virtue like Socrates\nwithout having to admit that they were eligible for salvation. If a\n“teleological” perspective on virtue is adopted that\nexclusively focuses on ends, the virtues of the pagan must be judged\nvices rather than virtues and will be punished accordingly (De\ncivitate dei 19.25, the passage from which the non-Augustinian\nphrase that pagan virtues are “splendid vices” seems to be\nderived; see Irwin 1999). An “operative” perspective\nhowever reveals that as far as appropriate actions are concerned,\nvirtuous non-Christians differ from the foolish and wicked but are\nindistinguishable from virtuous Christians. From this point of view,\nSocrates is closer to Paul than to Nero, even though his virtue will\nnot bring him happiness, i.e., eternal bliss. That he envisages a\nperspective on virtue that abstracts from the causal nexus of virtue\nand happiness is perhaps Augustine’s most significant departure\nfrom ancient eudaimonism." ], "subsection_title": "7.2 Virtue" }, { "content": [ "\nLove is a crucial and overarching notion in Augustine’s ethics.\nIt is closely related to virtue\n and often used synonymously with will (e.g., De trinitate\n15.38; in the cogito-like arguments, love and will are\ninterchangeable, cf. De civitate dei 11.27 with\nConfessiones 13.12) or intention (intentio).\nAugustine’s basic text is, of course, the biblical command to\nlove God and neighbor (Matthew 22.37; 39), which he is however\nprepared, throughout his life, to interpret in terms of Platonic\nerotic love (Rist 1994: 148–202). As in the Symposium\nand in Plotinus (Enneads I.6), love is a force in our souls\nthat attracts us to the true beauty we find nowhere else but in and\nabove ourselves; it drives us to ascend from the sensible to the\nintelligible world and to the cognition and contemplation of God\n(Confessiones 10.8–38, esp. 38). Even Christian\nfraternal love can be described, in a manner reminiscent of the\nPhaedrus, as a kind of seduction through another’s real\nor assumed righteousness (De trinitate 9.11). In a more\ngeneral way, love means the overall direction of our will (positively)\ntoward God or (negatively) toward ourselves or corporeal creature\n(De civitate dei 14.7; Byers 2013: 88–99;\n217–231). The former is called love in a good sense\n(caritas), the latter cupidity or concupiscence\n(cupiditas), i.e., misdirected and sinful love (De\ndoctrina christiana 3.16). The root of sin is excessive self-love\nthat wants to put the self in the position of God and is equivalent\nwith pride (De civitate dei 14.28). It must be distinguished\nfrom the legitimate self-love that is part of the biblical commandment\nand strives for true happiness by subordinating the self to God\n(O’Donovan 1980). In his earlier work, Augustine has some\ndifficulties incorporating love of neighbor into the Platonic and\neudaimonist framework of his thinking (De doctrina christiana\n1.20–21, see\n 7.1 Happiness).\n After 400, in the context of his reflections on the Trinity and his\nexegesis of the First Epistle of John (esp. 1 John 4:8; 16, “God\nis love”), he finds the solution that love is by its very nature\nself-reflexive. In loving our neighbors, we of necessity love that\nlove which enables us to do so itself, which is none other than God;\nlove of God and love of neighbor are, accordingly, co-extensive and,\nultimately, identical (De trinitate 8.12; In epistulam\nIohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem 9.10). Right and perverse\nlove or intention—charity or concupiscence—thus becomes\nthe predominant and even the single criterion of moral evaluation;\nAugustine’s ethics may in this sense be labeled intentionalist\n(cf. Mann 1999 on Augustine’s “inner-life ethics”).\nHe keenly insists that each and every action, even if it is externally\ngood and impressive, can be motivated either by a good or an evil\nintention, by right or perverse love, by charity or pride. This goes\nfor the actions prescribed by the Sermon of the Mount and even for\nmartyrdom (In epistulam Iohannis tractatus decem 8.9, partly\nrelying on 1 Corinthians 13:3). It is therefore impossible to give\ncasuistic rules for external moral behavior. The only thing possible\nis the general recommendation to “Love and do what you\nwill” (ib. 7.8), i.e., to take care that the inner disposition\nor intention behind one’s actions is love of God and neighbor\nand not self-love or pride. It is important not to misunderstand this\nas moral subjectivism, which Augustine’s ontological and ethical\nassumptions exclude. He never excuses evil deeds done “with the\nbest intentions” or with a subjectively pure conscience, and he\ndoes allow for actions that are always condemnable because they cannot\npossibly result from love, such as heresy. In a sense, his ideal agent\nis a successor of the Stoic and Neoplatonic sage, who always acts out\nof inner virtue or perfect rationality (the latter Augustine replaces\nwith true love) but adapts his outward actions to the external\ncircumstances (cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos\n11.200–201 = 59 G Long-Sedley; Diogenes Laertius 7.121;\nPorphyry, Sententiae 32). Augustine’s intentionalism\nhas, however, the ambivalent implication that, since love and will\ninevitably belong to the privacy of the mind, the inner motives for a\nperson’s external agency are unknowable to anyone except the\nagent herself and God. On the one hand, this limits the authority of\nother people—including those endowed with worldly power or an\necclesiastical office—to pass moral judgments. Augustine\nrepeatedly recommends withholding judgment so as to preserve humility\n(De civitate dei 1.26; Sermon 30.3–4). On the\nother hand, Augustine makes our inner motivational and moral life\nopaque even to ourselves and fully transparent only to God\n(Confessiones 10.7; In Iohannis evangelium tractatus\n32.5). We can never be fully sure about the purity of our intentions,\nand even if we were, we could not be sure that we will persist in\nthem. All human beings are therefore called to constantly scrutinize\nthe moral status of their inner selves in a prayerful dialogue with\nGod (as it is dramatized in the Confessiones). Such\nself-scrutiny may well be self-tormenting; the obsession of Western\nChristianity with inner latent guilt here has its Augustinian roots.\nThe public staging of Augustine’s confession before God in the\nConfessiones may, among many other things, represent an\nattempt to remedy the loneliness of Christian self-scrutiny (cf.\nConfessiones 10.1–7).", "\nAugustine’s intentionalism also provides him with arguments in\nfavor of religious coercion. As the objective of right fraternal love\nis not the neighbor’s temporal well-being but his eternal\nhappiness or salvation, we must not passively tolerate our\nfellow-humans’ sins but should actively correct them if we can;\notherwise, our motivation would be inertia rather than love (In\nepistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem 7.11; cf.\nLetter 151.11; Ad Simplicianum 1.2.18). Catholic\nbishops are therefore obliged to compel heretics and schismatics to\nre-enter the Catholic church even forcibly, just as a father beats his\nchildren when he sees them playing with snakes or as we bind a madman\nwho otherwise would fling himself down a precipice (Letter\n93.8; 185.7; and Letter 93.1–10 in general). Obviously,\nthis is a paternalistic argument that presupposes superior insight in\nthose who legitimately wield coercive power. While this may be\nacceptable in the case of the Church, which according to\nAugustine’s ecclesiology is the body of Christ and the\nembodiment of fraternal love, it turns out to be problematic when it\nis transferred to secular rulers (Augustine rarely does this, but cf.\nLetter 138.14–15). And as even the Church in this world\nis a mixed body of sinners and saints (see\n 8. History and Political Philosophy),\n it may be asked how individual bishops can be sure of their good\nintentions when they use religious force (Rist 1994: 242–245).\nAugustine does not address this problem, presumably because most of\nhis relevant texts are propagandistic defenses of coercion against the\nDonatists." ], "subsection_title": "7.3 Love" }, { "content": [ "\nThough other Latin philosophers, especially Seneca, had made use of\nthe concept of will (voluntas) before Augustine, it has a\nmuch wider application in his ethics and moral psychology than in any\npredecessor and covers a broader range of phenomena than either\nAristotelian boulesis (roughly, rational choice) or Stoic\nprohairesis (roughly, the fundamental decision to lead a good\nlife). Augustine comes closer than any earlier philosopher to positing\nwill as a faculty of choice that is reducible neither to reason nor to\nnon-rational desire. It has therefore been claimed that Augustine\n“discovered” the will (Dihle 1982: ch. 6; Kahn 1988;\ncontrast Frede 2011: 153–174 who, mainly on the basis of De\nlibero arbitrio, emphasizes Augustine’s indebtedness to\nStoicism). Augustine admits both first-order and second-order\nvolitions, the latter being acts of the liberum voluntatis\narbitrium, the ability to choose between conflicting first-order\nvolitions (Stump 2001; Horn 1996; den Bok 1994). Like desires,\nfirst-order volitions are intentional or object-directed and operate\non all levels of the soul. Like memory and thought, will is a\nconstitutive element of the mind (see\n 6.2 The Human Mind as an Image of God).\n It is closely related to love and, accordingly, the locus of moral\nevaluation. We act well or badly if and only if our actions spring\nfrom a good or evil will, which is equivalent to saying that they are\nmotivated by right (i.e., God-directed) or perverse (i.e.,\nself-directed) love (De civitate dei 14.7).\n With this basic idea in view, Augustine defends the passions or\nemotions against their Stoic condemnation as malfunctions of rational\njudgment by redefining them more neutrally as volitions\n(voluntates) that may be good or bad depending on their\nintentional objects (De civitate dei 9.4–5; 14.9;\nWetzel 1992: 98–111; Byers 2012b). The mechanics of the will in\nAugustine’s moral psychology is strongly indebted to the Stoic\ntheory of assent, which it however modifies in at least one respect.\nAs in Stoicism, the will to act is triggered by an impression\ngenerated by an external object (visum). To\nthis the mind responds with an appetitive motion that urges us to\npursue or to avoid the object (e.g., delight or fear). But only when\nwe give our inner consent to this impulse or withhold it, does a will\nemerge that, circumstances permitting, results in a corresponding\naction. The will is the proper locus of our moral responsibility\nbecause it is neither in our power whether an object presents itself\nto our senses or intellect nor whether we take delight in it (De\nlibero arbitrio 3.74; Ad Simplicianum 1.2.21), and our\nattempts to act externally may succeed or fail for reasons beyond our\ncontrol. The only element that is in our power is our will or inner\nconsent, for which we are therefore fully responsible. Thus, a person\nwho has consented to adultery is guilty even if his attempt actually\nto commit it is unsuccessful, and a victim of rape who does not\nconsent to the deed keeps her will free of sin even if she feels\nphysical pleasure (De civitate dei 1.16–28). Augustine\ntherefore defines sin as “the will to keep or pursue something\nunjustly” (De duabus animabus 15). The second stage in\nthe above structure, the involuntary appetitive motion of the soul, is\nreminiscent of the Stoic “first motions”, but it also\ncorresponds to the “impulse”, which in Stoicism does not\nprecede consent but follows it and immediately results in action.\nTemptations of this kind are, in Augustine, not personal sins but due to\noriginal sin, and they haunt even the saints. Our will must be freed\nby divine grace to resist them (Contra Iulianum 6.70; see, on\nthis theory and its Stoic and Platonic background, Byers 2013:\n100–150; J. Müller 2009: 157–161; Sorabji 2000:\n372–384; Rist 1994: 176–177).", "\nAugustine’s thinking about free will (liberum arbitrium\nor liberum voluntatis arbitrium) undergoes some development\nduring his career. In the 390s, opposing the dualistic fatalism of the\nManicheans, he uses the cogito-like argument (see\n 5.1 Skepticism and Certainty)\n to demonstrate that we are responsible for our volitions because we\nare as certain that we will as we are certain that we exist and think\n(De duabus animabus 13; De libero arbitrio 3.3;\nConfessiones 7.5; S. Harrison 1999). A contemporaneous\ndefinition of will as a movement of soul toward some object of desire\nemphasizes the absence of external constraint, and the ensuing\ndefinition of sin as an unjust volition (see above) seems to endorse\nthe principle of alternative possibilities (De duabus\nanimabus 14–15). In De libero arbitrio, free will\nappears as the condition of possibility of moral goodness and hence as\na great good itself; but as it is not an absolute good (which is God\nalone) but only an intermediate one, it is liable to misuse and,\nhence, also the source of moral evil (De libero arbitrio\n2.47–53). In his early exegesis of Paul’s chapter on\ndivine election (Romans 9), Augustine is keen to establish that Paul\ndid not abolish free will (Expositio quarundam propositionum ex\nepistula apostoli ad Romanos 13–18). With all this,\nAugustine is basically in harmony with the traditional view of early\nChristian theology and exegesis, which is still adopted in the 420s by\nJulian of Aeclanum when he blames Augustine for having fallen back\ninto Manichean fatalism and quotes his early definitions against him\n(Julian, Ad Florum, in Contra Iulianum opus\nimperfectum 1.44–47). Things change with Ad\nSimplicianum 1.2 and the Confessiones. By c. 400 CE,\nAugustine had come to the conclusion that our ability to make choices\nwas seriously impaired by the fallen condition of humankind and that\nit made little sense to talk about free will without reference to\ngrace. The optimistic-sounding claim in the first book of De\nlibero arbitrio (1.25–26; 29) that it is in our power to be\ngood as soon as we choose to be good because “nothing is as\ncompletely in our will as will itself” was probably never the\nwhole story; already in book 3 of the same work Augustine says that\nthe cognitive and motivational deficiencies caused by Adam’s sin\n(“ignorance and difficulty”, ib. 3.52; S. Harrison 2006:\n112–130) seriously compromise our natural ability to choose the\ngood, and in his later, especially anti-Pelagian work he radicalizes\nthis to the idea that original sin makes us unable to completely\nsubdue our sinful volitions as long as we live, so that we live in a\npermanent state of “akrasia” or weakness of will (De\nnatura et gratia 61–67; De civitate dei 19.4;\nDe nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.35). But he never questions\nthe principle that we have been created with the natural ability to\nfreely and voluntarily choose the good, nor does he ever deny the\napplicability of the cogito argument to the will (cf. De civitate\ndei 5.10) or doubt that our volitions are imputable to us. What\ngrace does is to restore our natural freedom; it does not compel us to\nact against our will. What this means is best illustrated by the\nnarrative of Confessiones 8 (for particularly lucid\ninterpretations, see Wetzel 1992: 126–138; J. Müller 2009:\n323–335). Immediately before his conversion Augustine suffers\nfrom a “divided will”, feeling torn apart between the will\nto lead an ascetic Christian life and the will to continue his\nprevious, sexually active life. Though he identifies with the former,\nbetter will rather than with the latter that actually torments him, he\nis unable to opt for it because of his bad habits, which he once\nacquired voluntarily but which have by now transformed into a kind of\naddictive necessity (ib. 8.10–12). Earlier philosophical\ntraditions would have interpreted this “akratic” state as\na conflict of reason and desire, and Manichean dualism would have\nattributed Augustine’s bad will to an evil substance present in\nbut foreign to the soul, but Augustine insists that both wills were\nindeed his own. Using medical metaphors reminiscent of Hellenistic\nmoral philosophy, he argues that his will lacked the power of free\nchoice because the disease of being divided between conflicting\nvolitions had weakened it (ib. 8.19; 21). His ability to choose is\nonly restored when, in the garden scene at the end of the book, his\nwill is reintegrated and healed by God’s call, which immediately\nfrees him to opt for the ascetic life (ib. 8.29–30). Before,\nwhen he had just continued his habitual way of life, this had been a\nnon-choice rather than a choice, even though, as Augustine insists, he\nhad done so voluntarily. In substance, this remained his line of\ndefense when, in the Pelagian controversy, he was confronted with the\ncharge that his doctrine of grace abolished free will (De spiritu\net littera 52–60; cf. De correptione et gratia 6).\nWhile the Pelagians thought that the principle of alternative\npossibilities was indispensable for human responsibility and divine\njustice, Augustine accepts that principle only for the first humans in\nparadise (Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum 1.47; 5.28;\n5.40–42 etc.). In a way, by choosing wrongly Adam and Eve have\nabandoned free will both for themselves and for all humankind.\nOriginal sin transformed our initial ability not to sin into an\ninability not to sin; grace can restore ability not to sin in this\nlife and will transform it into inability to sin in the next (De\ncivitate dei 22.30; De correptione et gratia 33)." ], "subsection_title": "7.4 Will and Freedom" }, { "content": [ "\nAugustine’s notion of will is closely related to his thinking on\nevil. The problem of the origin of evil (unde malum), he\nclaims, had haunted him from his youth (Confessiones 7.7). At\nfirst, he accepted the dualist solution of the Manicheans, which freed\nGod from the responsibility for evil but compromised his omnipotence\n(ib. 3.12; 7.3). After having encountered the books of the Platonists,\nAugustine rejected the existence of an evil substance and endorsed the\nNeoplatonic view (argued e.g., in Plotinus, Enneads I.8) that\nevil is in fact unsubstantial and a privation or corruption of\ngoodness. In his mature view, which was largely developed during his\nanti-Manichean polemics, everything that has being is good insofar as\nit has been created by God. There are of course different degrees of\ngoodness as well as of being (Letter 18.2),\n but everything that is real is good “in its degree”, and\nthe hierarchical order of reality is itself a good creation of God\n(Bouton-Touboulic 2004). Augustine therefore rejects Plotinus’\nview that prime matter is equivalent to prime evil, because the\nformlessness of matter is not pure negativity but a positive, and\nhence divinely created, capacity to receive forms\n(Confessiones 12.6; see\n 10. Creation and Time).\n A created being can be said to be evil if and only if it falls short\nof its natural goodness by being corrupted or vitiated; strictly\nspeaking, only corruption itself is evil, whereas the nature or\nsubstance or essence (for the equivalence of the terms see De\nmoribus 2.2) of the thing itself remains good\n(Confessiones 7.18; Contra epistulam fundamenti\n35.39 etc.; for a systematic account, De natura boni\n1–23; Schäfer 2002: 219–239). While this theory can\nexplain physical evil relatively easily either as a necessary feature\nof hierarchically ordered (corporeal) reality (De ordine\n2.51), as a just punishment of sin, or as part of God’s pedagogy\nof salvation (Letter 138.14), it leaves open the question of\nmoral evil or sin itself. Augustine answers by equating moral evil\nwith evil will\n and claims that the seemingly natural question of what causes evil\nwill is unanswerable. His most sustained argument to this effect is\nfound in his explanation of the fall of the devil and the evil angels,\na case that, being the very first occurrence of evil in the created\nworld, allows him to analyze the problem in its most abstract terms\n(De civitate dei 12.1–9; cf. already De libero\narbitrio 3.37–49; Schäfer 2002: 242–300;\nMacDonald 1999). The cause can neither be a substance (which, qua\nsubstance, is good and unable to cause anything evil) nor a will\n(which would in turn have to be an evil will in need of explanation).\nTherefore, an evil will has no “efficient” but only a\n“deficient” cause, which is none other than the\nwill’s spontaneous defection from God. The fact that evil agents\nare created from nothing and hence are not, unlike God, intrinsically\nunable to sin is a necessary condition of evil but not a sufficient\none (after all the good angels successfully kept their good will). In\nthis context Augustine, in an interesting thought experiment, imagines\ntwo persons of equal intellectual and emotional disposition of whom\none gives in to a temptation while the other resists it; from this he\nconcludes that the difference must be due to a free, spontaneous and\nirreducible choice of the will (De civitate dei 12.6). Here\nat least Augustine virtually posits the will as an independent mental\nfaculty." ], "subsection_title": "7.5 Will and Evil" }, { "content": [ "\nFrom the Middle Ages onwards, Augustine’s theology of grace has\nbeen regarded as the heart of his Christian teaching, and with good\nreason. As he points out himself, his conviction that human beings in\ntheir present condition are unable to do or even to will the good by\ntheir own efforts is his most fundamental disagreement with ancient,\nespecially Stoic, virtue ethics (De civitate dei 19.4;\nWolterstorff 2012). After and because of the disobedience of Adam and\nEve, we have lost our natural ability of self-determination, which can\nonly be repaired and restored by the divine grace that has manifested\nitself in the incarnation and sacrifice of Christ and works inwardly\nto free our will from its enslavement to sin.\n Confession of sins and humility are, therefore, basic Christian\nvirtues and attitudes; the philosophers’ confidence in their own\nvirtue that prevents them from accepting the grace of Christ is an\nexample of the sinful pride that puts the self in the place of God and\nwas at the core of the evil angels’ primal sin (De civitate\ndei 10.29).", "\nThe main inspiration for Augustine’s doctrine of grace is, of\ncourse, Paul (even though remarks on human weakness and divine help\nare not absent from the ancient philosophical tradition and especially\nfrom Platonism which had had a strong religious side from the\nbeginning; Augustine claims that with such utterances the Platonists\ninadvertently “confess” grace, cf. De civitate\ndei 10.29; 22.22). The radical view that the gifts of grace\ninclude not only external good works and the internal volitional\ndisposition that allows us to perform them but even the very first\nbeginnings of faith—in later technical terminology: that grace\nis not “cooperative” but radically\n“prevenient”—is however his own, and it took several\nyears to take shape in his thought. There is some debate on the stages\nof this development (for diverging reconstructions, see\nKarfíková 2012; Cary 2008a; Drecoll 2004–2010;\nDrecoll 1999; emphasis on the shifts in Augustine’s thinking:\nLettieri 2001; Flasch 1995; emphasis on continuity: C. Harrison 2006),\nbut it is generally agreed that Augustine’s doctrine of grace\nreached its mature form c. 395–397 with Ad Simplicianum\n1.2, after several years of intense reading and exegesis of Paul, and\ngained higher profile during the Pelagian controversy after 412.\nAugustine emphasizes the necessity of grace for both intellectual\nunderstanding and moral purification already in his earliest works\n(cf. esp. Soliloquia 1.2–6), but seems to have been\nconcerned to leave room for human initiative at least with respect to\nfaith and will (which would be in line with his concern, prominent\nthroughout the 390s, to safeguard human responsibility against\nManichean fatalism). In his early exegesis of Paul, he explains\nGod’s apparently gratuitous election of Jacob and rejection of\nEsau (Romans 9:10–13) with God’s foreknowledge of\nJacob’s faith and Esau’s infidelity (De diversis\nquaestionibus 68.5; Expositio quarundam propositionum ex\nepistula apostoli ad Romanos 60), a “synergistic”\nreading that relies on the assumption that salvation results from the\ncooperation of divine grace and human initiative and that had been\nstandard in early Christianity since Origen. This explanation is\nexplicitly rejected in Ad Simplicianum (1.2.5–6; 8;\n11). In this pivotal text, Augustine, true to his program of\n“faith seeking understanding”,\n attempts an exegesis of Romans 9:9–29 that satisfies the\nphilosophical requirements of God’s justice and benevolence\nwhile taking seriously the Pauline point that God’s election is\nentirely gratuitous and not occasioned by any human merit. The guiding\nintention of Romans 9, Augustine now says, is to preclude vainglory\nand pride (ib. 1.2.2) rather than to safeguard human responsibility\n(as had been his view in Expositio quarundam propositionum ex\nepistula apostoli ad Romanos 13–18). Augustine rehearses\nall possible reasons for God’s election of Jacob—his good\nworks, his good will, his faith and God’s foreknowledge of\neach—and discounts them all as amounting to an election from\nmerit rather than from grace. Starting from the primordial willingness\nto heed God’s call to faith, then, everything that is good in\nJacob must be considered a gift of divine grace. Free will has nothing\nto do with the reception of that gift because nobody can will to\nreceive a divine call to faith nor to respond positively to it so as\nto act accordingly and perform good works out of love (Ad\nSimplicianum 1.2.21; for the Stoically-inspired theory of agency\nbehind this see\n 7.4 Will and Freedom).\n While gratuitous election is, apart from being consoling,\ncomparatively easily squared with the axioms of divine benevolence,\njustice and omnipotence, its corollary, the equally gratuitous\nreprobation and damnation of Esau, is a serious philosophical problem\n(ib. 1.2.8). If it is not to violate the principle of God’s\njustice, it obliges us to assume some kind of evil in Esau, which is\nhowever excluded by Paul’s explicit statement to the contrary\n(Romans 9:11). Augustine’s solution is his doctrine of original\nsin. Both Jacob and Esau have inherited Adam’s guilt that his\nsin has spread over all humankind—a debt that God remits for\nJacob but exacts from Esau for reasons that, Augustine admits,\nnecessarily elude human understanding but are certainly just. Since\nthe Fall, humankind is nothing but a “lump of sin” that\nGod might justly have damned as a whole but from which he has chosen\nto save some individuals and to transform them into “vessels of\nmercy” (ib. 1.2.16, cf. Romans 9:23). The notion of original sin\nwas not invented by Augustine but had a tradition in African\nChristianity, especially in Tertullian.\n The view that original sin is a personally imputable guilt that\njustifies eternal damnation is, however, new with Ad\nSimplicianum and follows with logical necessity from the\nexegetical and philosophical claims made there about divine grace and\nelection (Flasch 1995; contrast De libero arbitrio\n3.52–55). The theory of Ad Simplicianum is illustrated,\nwith great philosophical acumen and psychological plausibility, in the\nConfessiones (especially bk. 8) and remains in place during\nthe Pelagian controversy till the end of Augustine’s life.\nCuriously, however, there are passages even in his anti-Pelagian work\nthat seem aimed at safeguarding freedom of choice and, accordingly,\nadmit of a “synergistic” reading (De spiritu et\nlittera 60; Cary 2008a: 82–86 and, for a different\ninterpretation, Drecoll 2004–2010: 207–208). After 412,\npressed by his Pelagian opponents, Augustine paid increasing attention\nto the mechanics of the transmission of original sin. The result was a\nquasi-biological theory that associated original sin closely with\nsexual concupiscence (see\n 9. Gender, Women and Sexuality).", "\nAn obvious implication of Augustine’s theory of grace and\nelection is predestination, a subject prominent in his last treatises\nagainst the Pelagians (e.g., De praedestinatione sanctorum,\nwritten after 426) but already implied in Ad Simplicianum.\nGod decides “before the constitution of the world”\n(Ephesians 1:4), i.e., (in Neoplatonic terms) in the non-temporal way\nthat matches his transcendent, eternal being (De civitate dei\n11.21; see also\n 10. Creation and Time),\n who will be exempted from the damnation that awaits fallen humankind\nand who will not (“double predestination”). This knowledge\nis however hidden to human beings, to whom it will only be revealed at\nthe end of times (De correptione et gratia 49).\n Until then, nobody, not even a baptized Christian, can be sure\nwhether grace has given her true faith and a good will and, if so,\nwhether she will persevere in it till the end of her life so as to be\nactually saved (De correptione et gratia 10–25; cf.\n 7.3 Love).\n Like the Stoic determinists before him, Augustine was confronted with\nthe objection that his doctrine of predestination made all human\nactivity pointless (“Lazy Argument”). While in Hellenism\nthis had largely been a theoretical issue, it acquired practical\nrelevance under the circumstances of monastic life: some North African\nmonks objected to being rebuked for their misbehavior with the\nargument that they were not responsible for not (yet) enjoying the\ngift of divine grace (De correptione et gratia 6). Taking up\nideas from De magistro\n and from Ad Simplicianum, Augustine replies that rebuke may\nwork as an external admonition, even as a divine calling, that helps\npeople turn to God inwardly and hence must not be withheld (De\ncorreptione et gratia 7–9). To the query that\npredestination undermines free will, Augustine gives his usual answer\nthat our freedom of choice has been damaged by original sin and must\nbe liberated by grace if we are to develop the good will necessary for\nvirtue and happiness. The medieval and modern debate on whether grace is\n“irresistible” is, therefore, to some extent\nun-Augustinian (cf. Wetzel 1992: 197–206); some, especially\nlater, texts do however present prevenient grace as converting the\nwill with coercive force (Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum\n1.36–37; cf. already Ad Simplicianum 1.2.22; Cary\n2008a: 105–110). A problem related to predestination but not\nequivalent to it is divine foreknowledge (Matthews 2005: 96–104;\nWetzel 2001; for general discussion, Zagzebski 1991). Augustine\ninherits it from the Hellenistic discussion on future contingents and\nlogical determinism that is best documented in Cicero’s De\nfato. His solution is that while external actions may be\ndetermined, inner volitions are not. These are certainly foreknown by\nGod but exactly as what they are, i.e., as ours and as volitions and\nnot as external compulsions (De civitate dei 5.9–10;\ncf. De libero arbitrio 3.4–11). This argument is\nindependent of the doctrine of grace and original sin; it applies not\njust to fallen humankind but also to Adam and Eve and even to the\ndevil, whose transgression God had, of course, foreseen (De\ncivitate dei 11.17; 14.11)." ], "subsection_title": "7.6 Grace, Predestination and Original Sin" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAugustine’s City of God is not a treatise of political\nor social philosophy. It is an extended plea designed to persuade\npeople “to enter the city of God or to persist in it”\n(Letter 2*.3). The criterion of membership in the city of God\n(a metaphor Augustine takes from the Psalms, cf. Psalm 86:3 quoted,\ne.g., in De civitate dei 11.1) and its antagonist, the\nearthly city, is right or wrong love.\n A person belongs to the city of God if and only if he directs his\nlove towards God even at the expense of self-love, and he belongs to\nthe earthly city or city of the devil if and only if he postpones love\nof God for self-love, proudly making himself his greatest good (De\ncivitate dei 14.28). The main argument of the work is that true\nhappiness, which is sought by every human being (ib. 10.1),\n cannot be found outside the city of God founded by Christ (cf. ib. 1,\nprologue). The first ten books deconstruct, in a manner reminiscent of\ntraditional Christian apologetics, the alternative conceptions of\nhappiness in the Roman political tradition (which equates happiness\nwith the prosperity of the Empire, thus falling prey to evil demons\nwho posed as the defenders of Rome but in fact ruined it morally and\npolitically) and in Greek, especially Platonic, philosophy (which,\ndespite its insight into the true nature of God, failed to accept the\nmediation of Christ incarnate out of pride and turned to false\nmediators, i.e., deceptive demons; bks. 8–10 have an interesting\ndisquisition on Platonic demonology). Augustine’s approach in\nthe second, positive half is Scriptural, creationist and\neschatological; this fact accounts for the specific character of its\nhistorical dimension. The history of the two cities begins with the\ncreation of the world and the defection of the devil and the sin of\nAdam and Eve (bks. 11–14); it continues with the\nprovidentially-governed vicissitudes of the People of Israel (the\nfirst earthly representative of the city of God) and, after the coming\nof Christ, of the Church (bks. 15–17, supplemented by a survey\nof the concurrent secular history from the earliest Eastern empires to\ncontemporary Rome in bk. 18); and it ends with the final destination\n(finis, to be understood both ethically as “ultimate\ngoal” and eschatologically as “end of times”) of the\ntwo cities in eternal damnation and eternal bliss (bks. 19–22;\nfor the structure and basic ideas of the City of God see\nO’Daly 1999). To a great extent, Augustine’s approach is\nexegetical; for him, the history of the city of God is, in substance,\nsacred history as laid down in Scripture (Markus 1970: 1–21).\nObviously, however, the heavenly and earthly cities must not be\nconfounded with the worldly institutions of the church and the state.\nIn history, each of these, and the Church in particular, is a mixed\nbody in which members of the city of God and the earthly city coexist,\ntheir distinction being clear only to God, who will separate the two\ncities at the end of times (ib. 1.35; 10.32 etc.). While the city of\nGod is a stranger or, at best, a resident alien (peregrinus:\nib. 15.1; 15.15) in this world and yearns for its celestial homeland,\nthe earthly city is not a unified body at all but lies in continuous\nstrife with itself because it is dominated by lust for power, the most\nwidespread form of the archetypal sin of pride in political and social\nlife (ib. 18.2). All this is in agreement with Augustine’s ideas\non predestination and grace;\n the history of the two cities is essentially the history of fallen\nhumanity. This dualistic account is however qualified when, in the\npart of the work that moves closest to social philosophy, Augustine\nanalyzes the attitude a Christian ought to adopt to the earthly\nsociety she inevitably lives in during her existence in this world.\nStarting, again, from the axiom that all human beings naturally desire\nwhat is good for them, he innovatively determines the goal that every\nindividual and every community in fact pursues as “peace”\n(pax), which, in his view, is largely equivalent with natural order and subordination. There are higher and lesser degrees of both individual\nand collective peace, e.g., the control of the emotions through\nreason, the subordination of body to soul, the subordination of\nchildren to parents in the family or a functioning hierarchical order\nin the state; at the top is “peace with God” or the\nsubordination of the human mind to God (ib. 19.13; Weissenberg 2005).\nThe lower forms of peace are relative goods and, as such, legitimately\npursued as long as they are not mistaken for the absolute good.\nPolitical peace and order is sought by members of the city of God and\nthe earthly city alike, but whereas the latter “enjoy” it\nbecause it is the greatest good they can attain and conceive of, the\nformer “use” it for the sake of their peace with God,\ni.e., in order that they and others may enjoy an unhindered Christian\nreligious life (ib. 19.17; 19.26; for “enjoyment” and\n“use” see\n 7.1 Happiness).\n Political peace is thus morally neutral insofar as it is a goal\ncommon to Christians and non-Christians. Augustine criticizes Cicero\nbecause he included justice in his definition of the state (Cicero,\nDe re publica 1.39) and thereby gave the earthly state an\ninherent moral quality that in reality is the privilege of the city of\nGod (De civitate dei 19.21). He himself prefers a more\npragmatic definition that makes the consensus about a common object of\n“love” (i.e., a common good agreed on by all members of\nthe community) the criterion of a state; the moral evaluation is not a\nmatter of the definition but depends on the evaluation of the goal it\npursues (cf.\n 7.3 Love).\n The early Roman Empire, which strove for glory, was more tolerable\nthan the Oriental empires that were driven by naked lust for power;\nthe best imaginable goal pursued by an earthly society would be\nperfect earthly peace (ib. 19.24; Weithman 2001: 243–4).\nChristians are allowed and even called to work for the well-being of\nthe societies they live in as long as they promote earthly peace for\nthe sake of their citizens’ and their own true happiness; in\npractice, this will usually mean furthering Christian religion (ib.\n5.25–6, on the Christian emperors Constantine and Theodosius;\nLetter 155.12; 16; Dodaro 2004b; Tornau 2013). But the doctrine\nof the two cities deliberately precludes any promotion of\nthe emperor or the empire to a providential and quasi-sacred rank. Not\neven Christians in power will be able to overcome the inherent\nwretchedness of fallen humanity (De civitate dei 19.6). Like\nthe vast majority of ancient Christian theologians, Augustine has\nlittle or no interest in social reform. Slavery, meaning unnatural\ndomination of humans over humans, is a characteristic stain of\npostlapsarian human life and, at the same time, an evil that is put to\ngood effects when it secures social order (ib. 19.15; Rist 1994:\n236–239). War results from sin and is the privileged means of\nsatisfying lust for power (ib. 18.2; 19.7). Nevertheless, Augustine\nwrote a letter to refute the claim that Christianity advocated a\npolitically impracticable pacifism (Letter 138). His\nChristian reinterpretation of the traditional Roman Just War Theory\nshould be read in the framework of his general theory of virtue and\npeace (Holmes 1999). To be truly just according to Augustinian\nstandards, a war would have to be waged for the benefit of the\nadversary and without any vindictiveness, in short, out of love of\nneighbor, which, in a fallen world, seems utopian (Letter\n138.14). Wars may however be relatively just if they are defensive and\nproperly declared (cf. Cicero, De officiis 1.36–37) or\ncommanded by a just authority even short of the special case of the\nwars of the People of Israel that were commanded by God himself\n(Contra Faustum 22.74–78)." ], "section_title": "8. History and Political Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nOutright misogyny is rare in Augustine, but he lived in a society and\nworked from a tradition—both Greco-Roman and\nJudeo-Christian—that took the natural and social subordination\nof women to men largely for granted (cf. Børresen 2013: 135\nand, for a sketch of the social and familial realities of late-antique\nRoman Africa, Rist 1994: 210–213; 246–247). Augustine\ninterprets the Genesis tale of the creation of woman (Genesis\n2:18–22) to mean that, Eve having been created as a helper to\nAdam and for the sake of reproduction, she was subordinate to him\nalready in paradise (De Genesi ad litteram 6.5.7; 9.5.9).\nThis situation is exacerbated by the Fall; under the conditions of\nfallen humankind, marriage is, for the wives, a kind of slavery that\nthey should accept with obedience and humility (as Monnica did; cf.\nConfessiones 9.19–20 and, on marriage in Augustine in\ngeneral, E. Clark 1996). In his early anti-Manichean exegesis of\nGenesis, he allegorizes man as the rational and woman as the\nnon-rational, appetitive parts of the soul (De Genesi contra\nManichaeos 2.15, cf. De vera religione 78; De Genesi\nad litteram 8.23.44; the pattern is well attested in the\nphilosophical tradition). On the other hand, he insists—as until\nthen few Christian theologians had done—that the meaning of the\nGenesis tale was not purely allegorical but that sexual\ndifferentiation had begun to exist in paradise and would persist in\nthe resurrected bodies of the blessed because it was a natural part of\nGod’s creation (De civitate dei 22.17). Following the\nGreek philosophical (in particular, Platonic) conviction that the soul\nand especially its highest, intellectual part is not gendered as well\nas the Pauline eschatological promise that in Christ “there is\nneither male nor female” (Galatians 3:28), Augustine argues that\nthe words of Genesis 1:26–27 on the human being having been\ncreated in the image of God imply that woman is human like man because\nshe has an intellectual soul and because it is not the gendered body\nbut the intellectual soul that makes the human being an image of God\n(De Genesi ad litteram 3.22.34; Børresen 2013:\n136–137; cf. also\n 6.2 The Human Mind as an Image of God;\n the view that woman is made in the image of God is far from\nuncontroversial in ancient Christianity). The inner tension of the\nview that woman is intellectually equal and, at the same time, by\nnature socially inferior to man makes itself felt in Augustine’s\nexegesis of Paul’s saying that women, but not men, should veil\nthemselves because man is made in the image of God (1 Corinthians\n11:7). Augustine compares man with theoretical and woman (the\n“helper” of Genesis 2:18) with practical reason and claims\nthat while theoretical and practical reason together or reason in its\nentirety is an image of God just as the human being as such is, in virtue\nof its reason, an image of God, practical reason alone, being directed toward corporeal\nthings and but a “helper” of theoretical reason, is not. (By implication, woman is an image of God qua human being, but not qua woman.) The\npractice enjoined by Paul is meant to signify this difference (De\ntrinitate 12.10–13). This exegesis safeguards the\ngodlikeness of woman against a widespread patristic consensus and, it\nappears, against Paul himself, but at the same time defends social\ninequality and even endows it with metaphysical and religious\nsignificance (Stark 2007a).", "\nTwo women figure prominently in Augustine’s literary output\n(Power 1995; G. Clark 2015): his mother, Monnica (her name appears\nonly in Confessiones 9.37), and his partner for fourteen years,\nthe mother of Adeodatus. In the dialogues of Cassiciacum, Monnica\nrepresents a philosophical way of life based on the natural intuitions\nof reason and on an unshakable Christian faith together with a life\naccording to the precepts of Christian morality (De beata\nvita 10; De ordine 1.31–32). She, and the\nuneducated but faithful in general, may not be able to reach happiness\nin this life by means of an ascent to the divine with the help of the\nliberal arts, but they will certainly see God “from face to\nface” in eternal bliss (De ordine 2.45–46).\nBehind this idealization may be the male Christian philosopher’s\nnostalgic desire for a “natural” holiness untainted by\nsecular occupation and learning (Brown 1988: ch. 13, on the Greek\ntheologians and bishops of the fourth century). Monnica’s\nprominence and idealization in the Confessiones has provoked\nmuch, and mostly fruitless, psychological speculation. Augustine\nrepresents her influence on his religious life as pervasive from his\nearliest years onwards and even compares her to the Mother Church\n(Confessiones 1.17). She embodies ideal Christian love of the\nneighbor (see\n 7.3 Love)\n in that she furthers Augustine’s Catholic faith with all her\nmeans (mostly, tears and prayer) and never indulges his Manicheism\ndespite her motherly affection (e.g., Confessiones 3.19).\nWith this she however combines, especially in the earlier books, more\nmundane motives, e.g., when she arranges a marriage for Augustine in\nthe hope of both fencing his sexual concupiscence and assisting his\nworldly career (ib. 6.23). Like the other human influences on\nAugustine reported in the Confessiones, she is used by God as\nan instrument of his grace in a way she neither foresees nor wills.\nOnly after Augustine’s conversion does she rise to saintly\nperfection, especially in the “vision of Ostia” when,\nshortly before her death, mother and son, after a long\nphilosophico-theological conversation, reach a sudden insight into\nwhat contemplation of the transcendent God in eternal bliss must be\nlike (ib. 9.24–25). The chapter on the dismissal of\nAdeodatus’ mother for the sake of an advantageous marriage (ib.\n6.25; Shanzer 2002; Miles 2007) has been unpalatable for many modern\nreaders. Yet what is unusual about it is not Augustine’s\nbehavior but the fact that he mentions it at all and, from hindsight,\nreflects on the pain it caused him. True to the deliberately\ncounter-intuitive and often provocative procedure of the\nConfessiones, he singles out an emotion that, then as now,\nmost people would have easily understood but which he nevertheless\ninterprets as a mark of his sinful state because it resulted from the\nloss of a female body he had, in a kind of mutual sexual exploitation,\nenjoyed for the sake of pleasure (Confessiones 4.2; for the\nunderlying defective view, common in antiquity, of erotic\nrelationships cf. Rist 1994: 249) instead of “enjoying”\nhis female neighbor “in God” and relating their mutual\nlove to him (cf.\n 7.1 Happiness;\n compare Augustine’s excessive grief about the friend of his\nyouth in Confessiones 4.9–11 and contrast his\npost-conversion mourning of Monnica, ib. 9.30–33).", "\nAugustine’s views on sexuality are most prominent in his\nanti-Pelagian treatises, where he develops a theory about the\ntransmission of original sin from the first couple in paradise to\nevery human being born since, making sexual concupiscence the prime\nfactor in the process (cf. E. Clark 1996 and 2000, who also takes into\naccount Augustine’s Manichean past). In Augustine’s\nethics, concupiscence (concupiscentia) does not have a\nspecifically sexual meaning but is an umbrella term that covers all\nvolitions or intentions opposed to right love (see\n\n Nisula 2012). The transgression of Adam and Eve did not consist\nin sexual concupiscence but in their disobedience, which, like the\nevil angels’ primal sin, was rooted in pride (see\n 7.5 Will and Evil).\n For this disobedience they, and all humankind with them, were\npunished with the disobedience of their own selves, i.e., the\nimpossibility of fully controlling their own appetites and volitions\nand the permanent akratic state (the “coveting of the flesh\nagainst the spirit”, in the words of Galatians 5:17) that marks\nfallen humanity. The inability of human beings to control their sexual\ndesires and even their sexual organs (witness the shameful experiences\nof involuntary male erection or of impotence: De civitate dei\n14.15–16) is just an especially obvious example. Unlike most\nearlier Christian writers, Augustine thought that there was sexual\nintercourse in paradise and that there would have been procreation\neven without the fall; he did not share the encratic ideas of some\nascetic circles who hoped to make good for the first sin through\nsexual abstinence, and he had comparatively moderate views on\nvirginity and sexual continence (De sancta virginitate;\nBørresen 2013: 138; Brown 1988: ch. 19). But he thought that\nAdam and Eve had been able to control their sexual organs voluntarily\nso as to limit their use to the natural purpose of procreation; in\nparadise, there had been sexuality but no concupiscence (De\ncivitate dei 14.21–23). Original sin had destroyed this\nideal state, and since then sexual concupiscence is an inevitable\nconcomitant of procreation—an evil that may be put to good use\nin legitimate marriage, where the purpose of sexual intercourse is the\nprocreation of children rather than bodily pleasure (De nuptiis et\nconcupiscentia 1.16; Contra Iulianum 3.15–16), but\nthat nevertheless subjects every newborn human being to the domination\nof the devil from which they need to be freed through baptism (De\nnuptiis et concupiscentia 1.25–26; for energetic criticism\nof Augustine’s views on concupiscence, inter alia\nbecause of their impact on the sex morals of modern Christianity, see\nPagels 1989, for moderate defense Lamberigts 2000)." ], "section_title": "9. Gender, Women, and Sexuality", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nJust as the late-antique Platonists developed their cosmological\nthinking by commenting on Plato’s Timaeus,\nAugustine’s natural philosophy is largely a theory of creation\nbased on an exegesis of the opening chapters of Genesis, on which he\nwrote five extended, and occasionally diverging, commentaries (De\nGenesi contra Manichaeos; De Genesi ad litteram liber\nimperfectus; Confessiones 11–13; De Genesi ad\nlitteram; De civitate dei 11–14). The longest and\nmost important of them is the Literal Commentary on Genesis\n(De Genesi ad litteram). “Literal” does not mean\n“literalist” but denotes the hermeneutic assumption that\nthe text is really about the creation of the world (as opposed to a\nmoralist or prophetic allegorical reading of the kind proposed in\nAugustine’s early De Genesi contra Manichaeos; the two\napproaches are compatible because Augustine, like Origen and the\nJewish exegete Philo before him, believes in the existence of multiple\nlayers of meaning in Scripture; see De Genesi ad litteram\n1.1.1 and, in general, De doctrina christiana, bk. 3). In\nline with his epistemology of illumination and his theory of verbal\nsigns,\n Augustine takes the biblical creation tale as an\n“admonition” that prompts him to devise, with the help of\nthe “inner teacher”, a rational theistic cosmology based\non Trinitarian theology (for rejection of explanations that contradict\nthe findings of the natural philosophers or the laws of nature cf.,\ne.g., De Genesi ad litteram 2.9.21). In De Genesi ad\nlitteram, in the Confessiones and, to a lesser extent,\nin De civitate dei Augustine presents his exegesis in a\nquestioning manner and keeps the results open to revision. The reason\nis that, according to the hermeneutics developed especially in bk. 12\nof the Confessiones, the authorial intention of the\nScriptural text, or indeed of any text, cannot be recovered, so\nthat—given that the truthfulness of Scripture can be taken for\ngranted—different and even incompatible readings must be\nconsidered as adequate if they agree with what the text says and if\nthey are sanctioned by the truth which we access inwardly through\nreason and which is, ultimately, God himself (see esp.\nConfessiones 12.27; 43; De doctrina christiana 3.38\nwhere Augustine claims that the Holy Spirit providentially allowed for\na plenitude of Scriptural meanings in order to prompt different people\nto different aspects of the truth; Williams 2001; van Riel 2007; Dutton 2014: 175–179;\nand, on the epistemological foundations of this hermeneutics, Cary\n2008b: 135–138). The basic and recurrent features of\nAugustine’s cosmological thought are these (cf. Knuuttila 2001:\n103–109; Mayer 1996–2002, each with references): God does\nnot create in time but creates time together with changeable being\nwhile resting in timeless eternity himself (Confessiones\n11.16; De Genesi ad litteram 5.5.12; the distinction of\neternity and time is Platonic, cf. Timaeus 37c-38b; Plotinus,\nEnneads III.7.1). Creation occurs instantaneously; the seven\ndays of creation are not to be taken literally but are a didactic\nmeans to make plain the intrinsic order of reality\n(Confessiones 12.40; De Genesi ad litteram 1.15.29).\nLike the demiurge in the Timaeus, God creates out of\ngoodness, i.e., out of his good will and his gratuitous love for his\ncreation (De civitate dei 11.24). In creation, all three\npersons of the Trinity are active, with, roughly, the Father\naccounting for the existence, the Son (to whom, in Augustine’s\nreading, the opening words of Genesis, in principio, refer)\nfor the form or essence and the Holy Spirit for the goodness and\norderliness of every created being (Confessiones 11.11;\nDe civitate dei 11.24). As the causality of the Trinity makes\nitself felt everywhere in creation, Augustine likes to describe\ncreated beings in their relation to the divine cause in a triadic\nmanner, using, e.g., the categories “measure”,\n“form” and “peace/order” (e.g., De vera\nreligione 13; De natura boni 3; De civitate dei\n12.5; cf. Schäfer 2000 and, for a very thorough discussion, du\nRoy 1966). These “traces” of the Trinity in creation must\nnot be confused with the Trinitarian structure of the human intellect,\nwhich, alone among all created beings, is an image of God.\n Changeable being is not generated from God (which, according to the\nNicene Creed, is true only of the Son) but created out of nothing, a\nfact that partly accounts for its susceptibility for evil.\n More precisely, God “first” creates formless matter out\nof nothing (which is why matter in Augustine, unlike in the\nNeoplatonists, has a minimal ontological status; cf.\nConfessiones 12.6; Tornau 2014: 189–194) and\n“then” forms it by conveying to it the rational principles\n(rationes) that eternally exist in his mind (De diversis\nquaestionibus 46.2) or, as Augustine prefers to put it, in his\nWord, i.e., the Second Person of the Trinity. This formative process\nis Augustine’s exegesis of the biblical “word” of\nGod (Genesis 1:1 and John 1:1). Incorporeal and purely intellectual\nbeings, i.e., the angels, are created from intelligible matter which\nis created out of nothing and converted to the creator so as to be\nformed through the “hearing” of God’s word, i.e., by\ntheir contemplation of the Forms contained in God (De Genesi ad\nlitteram 1.4.9–1.5.11, an idea inspired by the Neoplatonic\npattern of abiding, procession and return). Corporeal being is created\nwhen the Forms or rational principles contained in God and\ncontemplated by the angels are even further externalized so as to\ninform not only intelligible but also physical matter (De Genesi\nad litteram 2.8.16; 4.22.39).", "\nAll this is the framework of Augustine’s famous meditation about\ntime in the Confessiones (11.17–41), whose context is\nan exegesis of Genesis and which constantly presupposes the\ndistinction of time and eternity (much has been written on this text,\nbut particularly illuminating treatments are Flasch 1993; Mesch 1998:\n295–343; Matthews 2005: 76–85; Helm 2014; Hoffmann 2017).\nAugustine opens the section with the question, “What is\ntime?” (Confessiones 11.17) but in fact has no\nintention of giving a definition of time. Whereas his accounts outside\nthe Confessiones center on cosmic or physical time, he here\nfocuses on how we experience time from a first-person perspective and\nwhat it means for us and our relationship to ourselves and to God to\nexist temporally. In this sense, the purpose of the book is ethical\nrather than cosmological. Augustine begins by observing that though of\nthe three familiar “parts” of time, past, present and\nfuture, none really exists (the past having ceased to exist, the\nfuture not existing yet, and the present being without extension),\ntime doubtless has reality for us. This is so because time is present\nto us in the form of our present memory of the past, our present\nattention to the present and our present expectation of the future\n(ib. 11.26). The phenomenal proof of this claim is the experience of\nmeasuring time by comparing remembered or expected portions of time to\neach other or of repeating a poem we know by heart, when, as we\nproceed, the words traverse our attention (the present), passing from\nexpectation (the future) to memory (the past; ib. 11.38). We would\nthus be unable to relate past, present and future events, to remember\nthe history of our own lives and even to be aware of our personal\nidentity if our being in time was not divided into memory, attention\nand expectation and, at the same time, unified by the connectedness\nand the simultaneous presence of these. This ambivalent state\nAugustine calls “a distention of the soul” (ib. 11.33;\n38–39, perhaps echoing Plotinus, Enneads III.7.11.41);\nthis is the closest Confessiones 11 comes to a definition of\ntime. The stability of this precarious unity is however dependent on\nthe higher unity of the eternal God—as the whole narrative of\nthe Confessiones teaches, we cannot make sense of the memory\nof our life unless we perceive the ceaseless presence of God’s\nprovidence and grace in it. Toward the end of the book, Augustine\nintroduces the Pauline “straining forward to what lies\nahead” (Philippians 3:12–14)—as he reads it, the\norientation or “intention” of the soul toward God—as\na counterpoint to the soul’s distention in time and concludes\nwith an exhortation to turn from the dispersion of temporal existence\nto the timeless eternity of God which alone guarantees truth and\nstability (ib. 11.39–41)." ], "section_title": "10. Creation and Time", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAugustine’s impact on later philosophy is as enormous as it is\nambivalent (for an overview, see Fuhrer 2018a: 1742–1750; for\nall questions of detail, Pollmann (ed.) 2013; for De\ntrinitate, Kany 2007). Although he was soon accepted as a\ntheological authority and consensus with him was regarded as a\nstandard of orthodoxy throughout the Middle Ages and beyond, his\nviews—or more precisely, the right way of interpreting\nthem—continued to trigger controversies. In the ninth century\nthe monk Gottschalk took Augustine’s doctrine of grace to imply\ndouble predestination (a term coined by him); he was opposed by John\nScotus Eriugena. The philosophical discourse of early scholasticism\n(11th–12th centuries) largely centered on\nAugustinian themes. Anselm’s proof of the existence of God\ndevelops the argument of De libero arbitrio, bk. 2; the\nethicists’ debates on will and conscience rest on the\nassumptions of Augustine’s moral intentionalism, and\nAbelard’s view that ethics is universal and applicable to both\nhuman and divine agency may be read as a response to the problems in\nAugustine’s theory of divine election. With the growing\ninfluence of Aristotle from the thirteenth century onwards, Augustine\ncame to be interpreted in Aristotelian terms that had largely been\nunknown to himself. Thomas Aquinas and others had little interest in\nAugustine’s Platonism, and there was a certain tension between\nthe medieval tendency to look for a teachable philosophical and\ntheological system in his texts and his own way of philosophical\ninquiry that was shaped by the ancient tradition and left room for\ntentative argument and was open to revision. Medieval political\nAugustinianism projected the conflict of the Two Cities onto the\nChurch and the State. Martin Luther (1483–1546) agrees with\nAugustine on the absolute gratuitousness of grace but does not follow\nthe Augustinian (and scholastic) ideal of intellectus fidei\nand makes faith in the Gospel the decisive condition of salvation. In\nhis debate with Erasmus on free will, he voices a quite Augustinian\npessimism about human freedom. The variety of Protestantism that was\ninaugurated by Jean Calvin (1509–1564) accepts double\npredestination. In the seventeenth century Descartes’ cogito was\nsoon recognized as an Augustinian idea and triggered a refreshed\ninterest in Augustine’s epistemology. In the same epoch, the\nJansenist movement put forward a radical interpretation of\nAugustine’s theology of grace and justification that was\nfiercely combated by the Catholic Church. In the eighteenth and\nnineteenth centuries, the leading philosophers of Enlightenment,\nGerman Idealism and Romanticism showed little interest in Augustine,\nand even, in the case of Nietzsche, outright contempt. He remained,\nhowever, an important figure in Neoscholasticism or Neothomism, a\nphilosophical reaction of Catholic philosophers against Enlightenment\nand Idealism which continued to inform Catholic theological\nscholarship on Augustine till the 1950s and beyond. In the twentieth\ncentury, Augustine’s philosophy of time (Confessiones\n11) received enormous and unprecedented philosophical attention from\nthinkers like Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), Martin Heidegger\n(1889–1976) and Paul Ricœur (1913–2005), some of\nwhom credited Augustine with their own subjectivist understanding of\ntime. Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) wrote her doctoral dissertation\non Augustine’s philosophy of love and blamed him, not uncommonly\nfor her epoch, for degrading love of neighbor to an instrument of\npersonal happiness. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) takes issue\nwith what he considers Augustine’s view of language and language\nacquisition throughout his analysis of language in the\nPhilosophical Investigations. Postmodernist thinkers\n(Jean-Luc Marion, John Milbank) have set Augustine’s notion of\nself, in which love is perceived as an integral part, against the\npurported egoism and isolation of the Cartesian subject, which is\nconsidered the hallmark and, as it were, the birth defect of\nmodernity. Like their medieval predecessors, modern and postmodern\nappropriations of Augustine are selective and inevitably conditioned\nby contemporary concerns, sometimes resulting in secularized readings.\nContemporary Western culture has little sympathy for Augustine’s\nyearning for an inner divine light or for his less than optimistic\nviews about human autonomy and the secular. Nevertheless, the richness\nof his thought continues to fascinate readers. " ], "section_title": "11. Legacy", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "[CSEL] Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum\nLatinorum (Wien: Holder, Pichler, Tempsky, latest volumes Berlin:\nDe Gruyter) and", "[CCL] Corpus Christianorum Series Latina\n(Turnhout: Brepols). New critical editions are continually being\nprepared and older ones replaced.", "Augustinus-Lexikon 4 (2012–2018), pp.\nXI–XXXIV (available online);\n Fitzgerald (ed.) 1999, xxxv–il.", "[WSA] The Works of Saint Augustine. A Translation for\nthe 21st Century, 46 vols., John E. Rotelle et al. (eds.), New\nYork: New City Press, 1991–2019. Reliable and modern, but almost\nwithout annotation.", "[FC] The Fathers of the Church, Ludwig Schopp et\nal. (eds.), New York: Cima Publishing, 1947ff.", "[ACW] Ancient Christian Writers. The Works of the\nFathers in Translation, Johannes Quasten et al. (eds.), New York:\nNewman Press 1946ff.", "[BA] Bibliothèque Augustinienne. Œuvres\nde saint Augustin, Paris: Études Augustiniennes 1936ff.\nBilingual editions with rich annotation that often comes close to a\ncommentary. Especially important are the volumes on\n\n\n\nConfessiones (BA 13–14, edited by\nAimé Solignac et al., 1962), \n\nDe civitate dei (BA 33–37, edited by\nGuillaume Bardy and Guillaume Combès, 1959–1960), \n\nDe Genesi ad litteram (BA 48–49, edited by\nPaul Agaësse and Aimé Solignac, 1972) and \n\nLetters 1–30 (BA 40/A, edited by Serge\nLancel, Emmanuel Bermon et al., 2011). \n ", "Confessiones (BA 13–14, edited by\nAimé Solignac et al., 1962), ", "De civitate dei (BA 33–37, edited by\nGuillaume Bardy and Guillaume Combès, 1959–1960), ", "De Genesi ad litteram (BA 48–49, edited by\nPaul Agaësse and Aimé Solignac, 1972) and ", "Letters 1–30 (BA 40/A, edited by Serge\nLancel, Emmanuel Bermon et al., 2011). ", "[AOW] Augustinus: Opera—Werke, Wilhelm\nGeerlings, Johannes Brachtendorf, and Volker Henning Drecoll (eds.),\nPaderborn: Schöningh, 2002ff. 82 volumes planned, 13\ncompleted.", "Kopp, Sebastian, Thomas Gerhard Ring, and Adolar Zumkeller (eds.),\n1955–1997, Sankt Augustinus—Der Lehrer der Gnade.\nGesamtausgabe seiner antipelagianischen Schriften, 8 vols. (6\ncompleted), Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag.", " [NBA] Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana. Opere di\nSant’Agostino. Edizione latino-italiana, 44 vols., Agostino\nTrapé et al. (eds.), Roma: Città Nuova Editrice,\n1965–2010. Complete.", "O’Donnell; James J., 1992, Augustine: Confessions,\n3 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction, text and\ncommentary.\n [O’Donnell 1992 available online]", "Simonetti, Manlio et al. (eds.), 1992–1997,\nSant’Agostino. Confessioni. 5 vols., Milano: Mondadori.\nCritically revised text, translation and commentary.", "Flasch, Kurt, 1993, Was ist Zeit? Augustinus von Hippo. Das\nXI. Buch der Confessiones, Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann\n(2nd edition 2004).", "Fuhrer, Therese, 1997, Augustin, Contra Academicos (vel De\nAcademicis), Bücher 2 und 3, Einleitung und Kommentar,\nBerlin/New York: De Gruyter.", "Watson, Gerard, 1990, Saint Augustine. Soliloquies and\nImmortality of the Soul, with an Introduction, translation and\nCommentary, Warminster: Aris & Phillips.", "Bermon, Emmanuel, 2007, La signification et\nl’enseignement. Texte latin, traduction française et\ncommentaire du ‘De magistro’ de Saint Augustin,\nParis: Vrin.", "Augustinus-Lexikon, edited by Cornelius Mayer et al.,\nBasel: Schwabe, 1986ff. Four volumes out of five completed (down to\n“Sacrificium”). Articles in English, French and German,\nlemmata in Latin. Also available online (license required).", "Corpus Augustinianum Gissense, a Cornelio Mayer editum\n3.0 (CAG-online), Basel: Schwabe. Searchable database of\nAugustine’s complete works in Latin, based on the most recent\neditions (including quotation search), and bibliographical database\nwith over 50,000 titles. License required. Free access to the\nbibliographical database at the “Literatur-Portal” of\nZentrum für Augustinusforschung, Würzburg\n(available online).", "Drecoll, Volker Henning (ed.), 2007, Augustin Handbuch,\nTübingen: Mohr Siebeck.", "Fitzgerald, Allan D. (ed.), 1999, Augustine through the Ages.\nAn Encyclopedia, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 1999. Encyclopedia in\none volume, translated into\n\n\n\nFrench: Saint Augustin. La Méditerranée et\nl’Europe, IVe–XXIe siècle, Paris:\nÉdition du Cerf, 2005\n\nItalian: Agostino. Dizionario enciclopedico, Roma:\nCittà Nuova Editrice, 2007.\n", "French: Saint Augustin. La Méditerranée et\nl’Europe, IVe–XXIe siècle, Paris:\nÉdition du Cerf, 2005", "Italian: Agostino. Dizionario enciclopedico, Roma:\nCittà Nuova Editrice, 2007.", "Fuhrer, Therese, 2018a, “§ 144. Augustinus von\nHippo”, in Christoph Riedweg, Christoph Horn, and Dietmar Wyrwa (eds.),\nDie Philosophie der Antike 5.2: Philosophie der\nKaiserzeit und der Spätantike, Basel: Schwabe, pp.\n1672–1750. With full bibliography down to 2018 (ib. pp.\n1828–1853).", "Pollmann, Karla (ed.), 2013, The Oxford Guide to the\nHistorical Reception of Augustine, 3 vols., Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Brown, Peter, 2000, Augustine of Hippo. A Biography. A New\nEdition with an Epilogue, second edition, London: Faber &\nFaber (first edition 1967). Translated into\n\n\n\nGerman: Augustinus von Hippo. Eine Biographie, Frankfurt:\nSocietäts-Verlag, 1973, second edition 2000. \n\nFrench: La vie de saint Augustin, Paris: Éditions\ndu Seuil, 1971.\n", "German: Augustinus von Hippo. Eine Biographie, Frankfurt:\nSocietäts-Verlag, 1973, second edition 2000. ", "French: La vie de saint Augustin, Paris: Éditions\ndu Seuil, 1971.", "Catapano, Giovanni, 2010a, Agostino, Roma: Carocci.", "Gilson, Étienne, 1943, Introduction à\nl’étude de saint Augustin, second edition, Paris:\nVrin. English translation: The Christian Philosophy of Saint\nAugustine, L.E.M. Lynch (trans.), New York: Random House,\n1960.", "Horn, Christoph, 1995, Augustinus, München:\nBeck.", "Kirwan, Christopher, 1989, Augustine, New York:\nRoutledge.", "Matthews, Gareth B., 2005, Augustine, Malden:\nBlackwell.", "Meconi, David Vincent and Eleonore Stump (eds.), 2014, The\nCambridge Companion to Augustine, second edition, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press 2014. Revised and enlarged edition of Stump\nand Kretzmann (eds.) 2001. doi:10.1017/CCO9781139178044", "O’Donnell, James J., 2005, Augustine. A New\nBiography, New York: HarperCollins.", "Rist, John M., 1994, Augustine. Ancient Thought Baptized,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Stump, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann (eds.), 2001, The\nCambridge Companion to Augustine, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521650186", "Vessey, Mark (ed.), 2012, A Companion to Augustine,\nChichester: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118255483", "Wetzel, James, 2010, Augustine. A Guide for the\nPerplexed, London/New York: Bloomsbury.", "Cicero, De officiis, Michael Winterbottom (ed.), Oxford:\nOxford University Press, 1994.", "–––, Tusculanae disputationes, Max\nPohlenz (ed.), Leipzig: Teubner, 1918.", "Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers, Tiziano\nDorandi (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.", "Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis –\nCommentaire au songe de Scipion, Mireille Armisen-Marchetti (ed.\ntrans.), 2 vols., Paris, 2003.", "Plato, Opera, Elizabeth A. Duke, et al. (eds.), Oxford:\nOxford University Press, 1995 (vol. 1); John Burnet (ed.), Oxford:\nOxford University Press 1901–1907 (vols. 2–5).", "Plotinus, Opera, Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer\n(eds.), 3 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964–1982.", "Porphyry, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, Erich\nLamberz (ed.), Leipzig: Teubner, 1975.", "Possidius, Sancti Augustini vita, Herbert T. Weiskotten\n(ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1919.", "Sextus Empiricus, Opera, Hermann Mutschmann et al. (eds.),\n4 vols., Leipzig: Teubner, 1914–1962.", "Long, Anthony A. and David N. Sedley (eds.), 1987, The\nHellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Ayres, Lewis, 2010, Augustine and the Trinity, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511780301", "BeDuhn, Jason D., 2010, Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma 1:\nConversion and Apostasy, 373–388 C.E., Philadelphia:\nUniversity of Pennsylvania Press.", "–––, 2013, Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma 2.\nMaking a “Catholic” Self, 388–401 C.E.,\nPhiladelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.", "Bermon, Emmanuel, 2001, Le cogito dans la pensée de\nsaint Augustin, Paris: Vrin.", "Bermon, Emmanuel and Gerard O’Daly (eds.), 2012, Le De\nTrinitate de saint Augustin. Exégèse, logique et\nnoétique. Actes du colloque international de Bordeaux,\n16–19 juin 2010, Paris: Études Augustiniennes.", "Bittner, Rüdiger, 1999, “Augustine’s Philosophy\nof History”, in Matthews 1999: 345–360.", "Bochet, Isabelle, 2011, “Les quaestiones\nattribuées à Porphyre dans la Lettre 102\nd’Augustin”, in Sébastien Morlet (ed.), Le\ntraité de Porphyre Contre les chrétiens. Un\nsiècle de recherches, nouvelles questions. Actes du colloque\ninternational organisé les 8 et 9 septembre 2009 à\nl’Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne, Paris: Études\nAugustiniennes, pp. 371–394.", "Børresen, Kari E., 2013, “Challenging Augustine in\nFeminist Theology and Gender Studies”, in Pollmann 2013:\n135–141.", "Bouton-Touboulic, Anne-Isabelle, 2004, L’ordre\ncaché. La notion d’ordre chez saint Augustin, Paris:\nÉtudes Augustiniennes.", "–––, 2012, “Qu’il n’y a pas\nd’amour sans connaissance: étude d’un argument du\nDe Trinitate, livres VIII–XV”, in Bermon and\nO’Daly 2012: 181–203.", "Brachtendorf, Johannes, 2000, Die Struktur des menschlichen\nGeistes nach Augustinus. Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in De\ntrinitate, Hamburg: Meiner.", "–––, 2005, Augustins\n‘Confessiones’, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche\nBuchgesellschaft.", "–––, 2012, “Time, Memory, and Selfhood in\nDe Trinitate”, in Bermon and O’Daly 2012:\n221–233.", "Brittain, Charles, 2002, “Non-Rational Perception in the\nStoics and Augustine”, Oxford Studies in Ancient\nPhilosophy, 22: 253–308.", "–––, 2003, “Colloquium 7: Attention\nDeficit in Plotinus and Augustine: Psychological Problems in Christian\nand Platonist Theories of the Grades of Virtue”, Proceedings\nof the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 18:\n223–275. doi:10.1163/22134417-90000043", "–––, 2012a, “Self-Knowledge in Cicero and\nAugustine (De trinitate, X, 5, 7–10, 16)”, in\nCatapano and Cillerai 2012: 107–135.", "–––, 2012b, “Intellectual Self-Knowledge\nin Augustine (De Trinitate 14.7–14)”, in Bermon\nand O’Daly 2012: 313–330.", "Brown, Peter, 1988, The Body and Society. Men, Women and\nSexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, New York: Columbia\nUniversity Press. Translated into\n\n\n\nGerman: Die Keuschheit der Engel. Sexuelle Entsagung, Askese\nund Körperlichkeit im frühen Christentum, München:\nHanser, 1991.\n\nFrench: Le Renoncement à la chair. Virginité,\ncélibat et continence dans le christianisme primitif,\nParis: Gallimard, 1995.\n", "German: Die Keuschheit der Engel. Sexuelle Entsagung, Askese\nund Körperlichkeit im frühen Christentum, München:\nHanser, 1991.", "French: Le Renoncement à la chair. Virginité,\ncélibat et continence dans le christianisme primitif,\nParis: Gallimard, 1995.", "Bubacz, Bruce, 1981, St. Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge. A\nContemporary Analysis, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.", "Burnell, Peter J., 1992, “The Status of Politics in St.\nAugustine’s ‘City of God’”, History of Political\nThought, 13(1): 13–29.", "–––, 1995, “Concupiscence and Moral\nFreedom in Augustine and before Augustine”:, Augustinian\nStudies, 26(1): 49–63. doi:10.5840/augstudies19952612", "Burnyeat, Myles F., 1987, “Wittgenstein and Augustine De\nMagistro”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume,\n61: 1–24. Reprinted in Matthews 1999: 286–303.\ndoi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/61.1.1", "Byers, Sarah, 2012a, “Augustine and the Philosophers”,\nin Vessey 2012: 175–187. doi:10.1002/9781118255483.ch14", "–––, 2012b, “The Psychology of Compassion:\nStoicism in City of God 9.5”, in Wetzel 2012:\n130–148. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139014144.008", "–––, 2013, Perception, Sensibility, and\nMoral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9781139086110", "Cary, Phillip, 2000, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner\nSelf. The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 2008a, Inner Grace: Augustine in the\nTraditions of Plato and Paul, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195336481.001.0001", "–––, 2008b, Outward Signs: The Powerlessness\nof External Things in Augustine’s Thought, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195336498.001.0001", "Cary, Phillip, John Doody, and Kim Paffenroth (eds.), 2010,\nAugustine and Philosophy, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.", "Cassin, Mireille, 2017, Augustin est-il mystique?, Paris:\nLes éditions du Cerf.", "Castagnoli, Luca, 2010, Ancient Self-Refutation: The Logic and\nHistory of the Self-Refutation Argument from Democritus to\nAugustine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Catapano, Giovanni, 2010, “Augustine”, in The\nCambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Lloyd Gerson\n(ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1:552–581.\ndoi:10.1017/CHOL9780521764407.038", "–––, 2013, “The Epistemological Background\nof Augustine’s Dialogues”, in Sabine Föllinger and Gernot\nM. Müller (eds.), Der Dialog in der Antike. Formen und\nFunktionen einer literarischen Gattung zwischen Philosophie,\nWissensvermittlung und dramatischer Inszenierung, Berlin/Boston:\nDe Gruyter, pp. 107–122.", "–––, 2012–2018a,\n“Philosophia”, Augustinus-Lexikon, 4:\n719–742.", "–––, 2012–2018b, “Ratio”,\nAugustinus-Lexikon, 4: 1069–1084.", "–––, forthcoming,\n“Signum—res”, Augustinus-Lexikon, 5.", "Catapano, Giovanni and Beatrice Cillerai (eds.), 2012, Il De\ntrinitate di Agostino e la sua fortuna nella filosofia\nmedievale/Augustine’s De trinitate and Its Fortune in Medieval\nPhilosophy (= Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia\nmedievale 27), Padova: Il Poligrafo.", "Chappell, Timothy D.J., 1995, Aristotle and Augustine on\nFreedom. Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia,\nNew York: St. Martin’s Press.", "Cillerai, Beatrice, 2008, La memoria come ‘capacitas\nDei’ secondo Agostino. Unità e complessità,\nPisa: Edizioni ETS.", "–––, 2012, “La mens-imago et la «\nmémoire métaphysique » dans la réflexion\ntrinitaire de saint Augustin”, in Bermon and O’Daly 2012:\n291–312.", "Clark, Elizabeth A., 1996, St. Augustine on Marriage and\nSexuality, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America\nPress.", "–––, 2000, “Vitiated Seeds and Holy\nVessels. Augustine’s Manichean Past”, in Karen L. King\n(ed.), Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism, Harrisburg, PA:\nTrinity Press International, pp. 367–401.", "Clark, Gillian, 2009, “Can We Talk? Augustine and the\nPossibility of Dialogue”, in The End of Dialogue in\nAntiquity, Simon Goldhill (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress, 117–134. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511575464.007", "–––, 2015, Monica. An Ordinary Saint,\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Colish, Marcia L., 1980, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to\nthe Early Middle Ages II: Stoicism in Latin Christian Thought through\nthe Sixth Century, Leiden: Brill.", "den Bok, Nico W., 1994, “Freedom of the Will: A Systematic\nand Biographical Sounding of Augustine’s Thoughts on Human\nWilling”, Augustiniana, 44(3/4): 237–270.", "Dihle, Albrecht, 1982, The Theory of Will in Classical\nAntiquity, Berkeley: University of California Press 1982. German\ntranslation: Die Vorstellung vom Willen in der Antike,\nGöttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985.", "Dobell, Brian, 2009, Augustine’s Intellectual\nConversion: The Journey from Platonism to Christianity,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9780511691744", "Dodaro, Robert, 2004a, Christ and the Just Society in the\nThought of Augustine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9780511487668", "–––, 2004b, “Political and Theological\nVirtues in Augustine, Letter 155 to Macedonius”,\nAugustiniana, 54(1/4): 431–474.", "–––, 2009, “Ecclesia and Res\npublica. How Augustinian are Neo-Augustinian Politics?”,\nin: Lieven Boeve, Mathijs Lamberigts, and Maarten Wisse (eds.),\nAugustine and Postmodern Thought. A New Alliance against\nModernity? Leuven: Peeters, pp. 237–271.", "–––, 2012, “Augustine on the Statesman and\nthe Two Cities”, in Vessey 2012: 386–397.\ndoi:10.1002/9781118255483.ch30", "Doody, John, Kevin L. Hughes, and Kim Paffenroth (eds.), 2005,\nAugustine and Politics, Lanham: Lexington Books.", "Drecoll, Volker Henning, 1999, Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre\nAugustins, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.", "–––, 2004–2010, “Gratia”,\nAugustinus-Lexikon, 3. 182–242.", "–––, 2012–2018, “Pelagius,\nPelagiani”, Augustinus-Lexikon, 4: 624–666.", "du Roy, Olivier, 1966, L’intelligence de la foi en la\nTrinité selon saint Augustin. Genèse de sa\nthéologie trinitaire jusqu’en 391, Paris:\nÉtudes Augustiniennes.", "Dutton, Blake D., 2014, “The Privacy of the Mind and the\nFully Approvable Reading of Scripture”, in Mann 2014: 155–180.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577552.003.0008", "Dyson, Robert W., 2001, The Pilgrim City. Social and Political\nIdeas in the Writings of St. Augustine of Hippo, Woodbridge:\nBoydell.", "Flasch, Kurt, 1995, Logik des Schreckens. Aurelius Augustinus,\nDe diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum I 2, Deutsche\nErstübersetzung von Walter Schäfer. Herausgegeben und\nerklärt von Kurt Flasch, second edition, Mainz: Dieterich (first\nedition 1990).", "Frede, Michael, 2011, A Free Will. Origins of the Notion in\nAncient Thought, Anthony A. Long (ed.), Berkeley: University of\nCalifornia Press.", "Fuchs, Marko J., 2010, Sum und cogito. Grundfiguren endlichen\nSelbstseins bei Augustinus und Descartes, Paderborn:\nSchöningh.", "Fuhrer, Therese, 1999, “Zum erkenntnistheoretischen\nHintergrund von Augustins Glaubensbegriff”, in Fuhrer and Erler\n1999: 191–211.", "–––, 2013, “Augustine’s Moulding of the\nManichaean Idea of God in the Confessions”,\nVigiliae Christianae, 67(5): 531–547.\ndoi:10.1163/15700720-12341155", "–––, 2018b, “Ille intus magister.\nOn Augustine’s didactic concept of interiority”, in Peter\nGemeinhardt et al. (eds.), Teachers in late antique\nChristianity, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp.\n129–146.", "Fuhrer, Therese and Michael Erler (eds.), 1999, Zur Rezeption\nder hellenistischen Philosophie in der Spätantike,\nStuttgart: Teubner.", "Gioia, Luigi, 2007, The Theological Epistemology of\nAugustine’s De Trinitate, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199553464.001.0001", "Hadot, Ilsetraut, 2005, Arts libéraux et philosophie\ndans la pensée antique, second edition, Paris: Vrin (first\nedition 1984).", "Hagendahl, Harald, 1967, Augustine and the Latin\nClassics, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.", "Harding, Brian, 2008, Augustine and Roman Virtue,\nLondon/New York: Bloomsbury.", "Harrison, Carol, 2006, Rethinking Augustine’s Early\nTheology: An Argument for Continuity, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress. doi:10.1093/0199281661.001.0001", "Harrison, Simon, 1999, “Do We Have a Will? Augustine’s\nWay in to the Will”, in Matthews 1999: 195–205.", "–––, 2006, Augustine’s Way into the Will:\nThe Theological and Philosophical Significance of De Libero\nArbitrio, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.001.0001", "Helm, Paul, 2014, “Thinking Eternally*”, in Mann 2014:\n135–154. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577552.003.0007", "Hoffmann, Philippe, 2017, “Temps et éternité\ndans le livre XI des Confessions : Augustin, Plotin, Porphyre et\nSaint Paul”, Revue d’Etudes Augustiniennes et\nPatristiques, 63(1): 31–79. doi:10.1484/J.REA.4.2017072", "Holmes, Robert L., 1999, “St. Augustine and the Just War\nTheory”, in Matthews 1999: 323–344.", "Hölscher, Ludger, 1986, The Reality of Mind.\nAugustine’s Philosophical Arguments for the Human Soul as a\nSpiritual Substance, London/New York: Routledge. German\ntranslation: Die Realität des Geistes. Eine Darstellung und\nphänomenologische Neubegründung der Argumente Augustins\nfür die geistige Substantialität der Seele, Heidelberg:\nWinter 1999.", "Holte, Ragnar, 1962, Béatitude et sagesse. Saint\nAugustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la\nphilosophie ancienne, Paris: Études Augustiniennes.", "Horn, Christoph, 1996, “Augustinus und die Entstehung des\nphilosophischen Willensbegriffs”, Zeitschrift für\nphilosophische Forschung 50(1/2): 113–132.", "––– (ed.), 1997, Augustinus. De civitate\ndei, (Klassiker Auslegen, 11), Berlin: Akademie\nVerlag.", "–––, 1999, “Augustinus über Tugend,\nMoralität und das höchste Gut”, in Fuhrer and Erler\n1999: 173–190.", "–––, 2012, “Augustine’s Theory of\nMind and Self-Knowledge: Some Fundamental Problems”, in Bermon\nand O’Daly 2012: 205–219.", "Irwin, Terence H., 1999, “Splendid Vices? Augustine For and\nAgainst Pagan Virtues”, Medieval Philosophy and\nTheology, 8(2): 105–127. doi:10.1017/S1057060899082018", "Kahn, Charles H., 1988, “Discovering the Will. From\nAristotle to Augustine”, in John M. Dillon and Anthony A. Long\n(eds.), The Question of ‘Eclecticism’. Studies in\nLater Greek Philosophy, Berkeley, CA: The University of\nCalifornia Press, pp. 234–259.", "Kany, Roland, 2007, Augustins Trinitätsdenken. Bilanz,\nKritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu ‘De\ntrinitate’, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.", "Karfíková, Lenka, 2012, Grace and the Will\n\nAccording to Augustine, Markéta Janebová (trans.),\n\nLeiden/Boston: Brill. doi:10.1163/9789004229211", "–––, 2017, “Augustine on Recollection\n\nbetween Plato and Plotinus”, in Markus Vinzent (ed.), Studia\nPatristica 75. Papers presented at the Seventeenth International\nConference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2015, Leuven:\n\nPeeters, pp. 81–102.", "King, Peter, 2012, “The Semantics of Augustine’s\nTrinitarian Analysis in De Trinitate 5–7”, in\nBermon and O’Daly 201: 123–135.", "–––, 2014a, “Augustine on\nKnowledge”, in Meconi and Stump 2014: 142–165.\ndoi:10.1017/CCO9781139178044.013", "–––, 2014b, “Augustine on Language”,\nin Meconi and Stump 2014: 292–310.\n\ndoi:10.1017/CCO9781139178044.023", "Kirwan, Christopher, 2001, “Augustine’s Philosophy of\nLanguage”, in Stump and Kretzmann 2001: 186–204.\ndoi:10.1017/CCOL0521650186.015", "Knuuttila, Simo, 2001, “Time and Creation in\nAugustine”, in Stump and Kretzmann 2001: 103–115. Reprinted in\nMeconi and Stump 2014: 81–97. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521650186.009\ndoi:10.1017/CCO9781139178044.008", "Lagouanère, Jérôme, 2012,\nIntériorité et réflexivité dans la\npensée de saint Augustin. Formes et genèse d’une\n\nconceptualization, Paris: Études Augustiniennes.", "Lamberigts, Mathijs, 2000, “A Critical Evaluation of\nCritiques of Augustine’s View of Sexuality”, in Robert\nDodaro and George Lawless (eds.), Augustine and his Critics.\nEssays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, London/New York: Routledge,\npp. 176–197.", "–––, 2001, “Was Augustine a Manichaean?\nThe Assessment of Julian of Aeclanum”, in Johannes van Oort et\nal. (eds.), Augustine and Manicheism in the Latin West,\nLeiden: Brill, pp. 113–136.", "–––, 2004, “Augustine on Predestination.\nSome Quaestiones Disputatae Revisited”,\nAugustiniana, 54(1/4): 279–305.", "Lancel, Serge and James S. Alexander, 1996–2002,\n“Donatistae”, Augustinus-Lexikon, 2: \n606–638.", "Lettieri, Gaetano, 2001, L’altro Agostino. Ermeneutica e\nretorica della grazia dalla crisi alla metamorfosi del De doctrina\nchristiana, Brescia: Morcelliana.", "Lössl, Josef, 2002, “Augustine on Predestination:\nConsequences for the Reception”, Augustiniana, 52(2/4):\n241–272.", "Lorenz, Rudolf, 1964, “Gnade und Erkenntnis bei\nAugustinus”, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte,\n75: 21–78. Reprinted in Carl Andresen (ed.), Zum\nAugustin-Gespräch der Gegenwart II, Darmstadt:\nWissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1981, pp. 43–125.", "MacDonald, Scott, 1999, “Primal Sin”, in Matthews\n1999: 110–139.", "–––, 2012a, “Revisiting the Intelligibles:\nThe Theory of Illumination in De trinitate, XII”, in\nCatapano and Cillerai 2012: 137–160.", "–––, 2012b, “Augustine’s Cognitive\nVoluntarism in De trinitate 11”, in Bermon and\nO’Daly 2012: 235–250.", "–––, 2014, “The Divine Nature: Being and\nGoodness”, in Meconi and Stump 2014: 17–36.\ndoi:10.1017/CCO9781139178044.004", "Madec, Goulven, 1989, La patrie et la voie. Le Christ dans la\nvie et la pensée de saint Augustin, Paris:\nDesclée.", "–––, 1996, Saint Augustin et la philosophie.\nNotes critiques, second edition, Paris: Études\nAugustiniennes.", "Mann, William E., 1999, “Inner-Life Ethics”, in\nMatthews 1999: 140–165.", "––– (ed.), 2006, Augustine’s\nConfessions. Critical Essays, Lanham: Rowman &\nLittlefield.", "–––, 2014, “Augustine on Evil and Original\nSin”, in Meconi and Stump 2014: 98–107.\ndoi:10.1017/CCO9781139178044.009", "––– (ed.), 2014, Augustine’s Confessions:\nPhilosophy in Autobiography, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577552.001.0001", "Markus, Robert A., 1970, Saeculum. History and Society in the\nTheology of St Augustine, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "––– (ed.), 1972, Augustine. A Collection of\nCritical Essays, New York: Anchor Books. Anthology of older\nessays.", "–––, 2006, Christianity and the\nSecular, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.", "Matthews, Gareth B., 1992, Thought’s Ego in Augustine\nand Descartes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.", "––– (ed.), 1999, The Augustinian\nTradition, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.", "–––, 2010, “Augustine’s First-Person\nPerspective”, in Cary, Doody, and Paffenroth 2010:\n41–60.", "Mayer, Cornelius Petrus, 1969, Die Zeichen in der geistigen\nEntwicklung und in der Theologie des jungen Augustinus,\nWürzburg: Augustinus-Verlag.", "–––, 1974, Die Zeichen in der geistigen\nEntwicklung und in der Theologie Augustins. II. Teil: Die\nantimanichäische Epoche, Würzburg:\nAugustinus-Verlag.", "–––, 1996–2002, “Creatio, creator,\ncreatura”, Augustinus-Lexikon, 2: 56–116.", "Mendelson, Michael, 1998, “‘The Business of Those\nAbsent’: The Origin of the Soul in Augustine’s De Genesi Ad\nLitteram 10.6-26”, Augustinian Studies, 29(1):\n25–81. doi:10.5840/augstudies19982918", "Menn, Stephen, 1998, Descartes and Augustine, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511608995", "–––, 2014, “The Desire for God and the\nAporetic Method in Augustine’s Confessions”, in Mann 2014:\n71–107. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577552.003.0005", "Mesch, Walter, 1998, Reflektierte Gegenwart. Eine Studie\nüber Zeit und Ewigkeit bei Platon, Aristoteles, Plotin und\nAugustinus, Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann.", "Miles, Margaret R., 2007, “Not Nameless but Unnamed. The\nWoman torn from Augustine’s Side”, in Stark 2007b:\n167–188.", "–––, 2012, “From Rape to Resurrection:\nSin, Sexual Difference, and Politics”, in Wetzel 2012: 75–92.\ndoi:10.1017/CBO9781139014144.005", "Müller, Christof, 1996–2002, “Femina”,\nAugustinus-Lexikon, 2: 1266–1281.", "Müller, Jörn, 2009, Willensschwäche in Antike\nund Mittelalter. Eine Problemgeschichte von Sokrates bis Johannes Duns\nScotus, Leuven: Peeters.", "Nash, Ronald H., 1969, The Light of the Mind. St.\nAugustine’s Theory of Knowledge, Lexington: University\nPress of Kentucky.", "Nawar, Tamer, 2014, “Adiutrix Virtutum? Augustine\non Friendship and Virtue”, in Suzanne Stern-Gillet and Gary M.\nGurtler (eds.), Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship,\nAlbany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 197–226.", "–––, 2015, “Augustine on the Varieties of\nUnderstanding and Why There is No Learning from Words”,\nOxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, 3: 1–31.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743798.003.0001", "Nisula, Timo, 2012, Augustine and the Functions of\nConcupiscence, Leiden/Boston: Brill.", "O’Connell, Robert J., 1968, St. Augustine’s Early\nTheory of Man, A.D. 386–391, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap\nPress.", "–––, 1987, The Origin of the Soul in St.\nAugustine’s Later Works, New York: Fordham University\nPress.", "O’Daly, Gerard, 1976, “Memory in Plotinus and two\nearly texts of St. Augustine”, Studia Patristica 14. Papers\npresented to the Sixth International Conference on Patristic Studies\nheld in Oxford 1971, Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1976, pp.\n461–469. Reprinted in O’Daly 2001: no. III.", "–––, 1987 Augustine’s Philosophy of\nMind, London: Duckworth.", "–––, 1986–1994, “Anima,\nanimus”, Augustinus-Lexikon, 1: 315–340.", "–––, 1999, Augustine’s City of God. A\nReader’s Guide, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "–––, 2001, Platonism Pagan and Christian.\nStudies in Plotinus and Augustine, Aldershot: Variorum.", "O’Donovan, O., 1980, The Problem of Self-Love in St.\nAugustine, New Haven: Yale University Press.", "Paffenroth, Kim and Robert P. Kennedy (eds.), 2003, A\nReader’s Companion to Augustine’s Confessions,\nLouisville: Westminster John Knox Press.", "Pagels, Elaine, 1989, Adam, Eve and the Serpent, New\nYork: Vintage Books. German translation: Adam, Eva und die\nSchlange, Hamburg: Rowohlt 1991.", "Pépin, Jean, 1977, Ex Platonicorum persona.\nÉtudes sur les lectures philosophiques de saint Augustin,\nAmsterdam: Hakkert. Reprint of earlier studies.", "Pollmann, Karla, 1996, Doctrina christiana. Untersuchungen zu\nden Anfängen der christlichen Hermeneutik unter besonderer\nBerücksichtigung von Augustinus, De doctrina christiana,\nFreiburg/Schweiz: Unversitäts-Verlag.", "Pollmann, Karla and Mark Vessey (eds.), 2005, Augustine and\nthe Disciplines. From Cassiciacum to Confessions, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230044.001.0001", "Power, Kim, 1996, Veiled Desire. Augustine on Women, New\nYork: Continuum Books.", "Rist, John, 2001, “Faith and Reason”, in Stump and\nKretzmann 2001: 26–39. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521650186.003", "Schäfer, Christian, 2000, “Augustine on Mode, Form, and\nNatural Order”:, Augustinian Studies, 31(1): 59–77.\ndoi:10.5840/augstudies20003111", "–––, 2002, Unde malum. Die Frage nach dem\nWoher des Bösen bei Plotin, Augustinus und Dionysius,\nWürzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.", "Seelbach, Larissa Carina, 2002, Das weibliche Geschlecht ist\nja kein Gebrechen. 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Emilsson, Hallvard Fossheim, and Miira Tuominen\n(eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 265–280.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746980.003.0015", "–––, 2017, “Ratio in Subiecto?\nThe Sources of Augustine’s Proof for the Immortality of the Soul in\nthe Soliloquia and Its Defense in De Immortalitate\nAnimae”, Phronesis, 62(3): 319–354.\ndoi:10.1163/15685284-12341330", "van Dusen, David, 2014, The Space of Time. A Sensualist\nInterpretation of Time in Augustine, Confessions X to XII,\nLeiden/Boston: Brill.", "van Fleteren, Frederick, 2010, “Augustine and Philosophy:\nIntellectus Fidei”, in Cary, Doody, and Paffenroth\n2010: 23–40.", "van Oort, Johannes, 2012, “Augustine and the Books of the\nManicheans”, in Vessey 2012: 188–199.\ndoi:10.1002/9781118255483.ch15", "––– (ed.), 2013, Augustine and Manichaean\nChristianity. Selected Papers from the First South African Conference\non Augustine of Hippo. University of Pretoria, 24–26 April\n2012, Leiden/Boston: Brill.", "–––, 2016, “Once Again: Augustine’s\nManichaean Dilemma”, Augustiniana, 66(1/4):\n233–245.", "–––, forthcoming, Augustine and Mani,\nLeiden/Boston: Brill. Collected papers on Augustine and\nManicheism.", "van Riel, Gerd, 2007, “Augustine’s Exegesis of ‘Heaven and Earth’ in Conf. XII: Finding Truth amidst Philosophers, Heretics and Exegetes”, Quaestio, 7: 191–228.\ndoi: 10.1484/J.QUAESTIO.1.100154", "Vessey, Mark, Karla Pollmann, and Allan D. Fitzgerald (eds.),\n1999, History, Apocalypse, and the Secular Imagination. 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Des\npremiers dialogues aux Confessions”, Recherches\naugustiniennes, 6: 3–102. Translated as St. Augustine.\nBeing and Nothingness, New York: Paragon House Publishers 1988.\n" ]	[ { "href": "../christiantheology-philosophy/", "text": "Christian theology, philosophy and" }, { "href": "../illumination/", "text": "divine: illumination" }, { "href": "../emotion-Christian-tradition/", "text": "emotion: in the Christian tradition" }, { "href": "../ethics-virtue/", "text": "ethics: virtue" }, { "href": "../freewill/", "text": "free will" }, { "href": "../free-will-foreknowledge/", "text": "free will: divine foreknowledge and" }, { "href": "../medieval-philosophy/", "text": "medieval philosophy" }, { "href": "../moral-responsibility/", "text": "moral responsibility" }, { "href": "../neoplatonism/", "text": "Neoplatonism" }, { "href": "../plotinus/", "text": "Plotinus" }, { "href": "../ancient-political/", "text": "political philosophy: ancient" }, { "href": "../porphyry/", "text": "Porphyry" }, { "href": "../skepticism-ancient/", "text": "skepticism: ancient" }, { "href": "../stoicism/", "text": "Stoicism" } ]
auriol	Peter Auriol	First published Wed Nov 6, 2002; substantive revision Tue Sep 8, 2015	[ "\nWhile the French Franciscan Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322) has not\nattracted as much attention as has his slightly younger contemporary\nWilliam Ockham, nevertheless on many topics Auriol was probably just\nas influential among fourteenth century thinkers as was the Venerable\nInceptor. Often explicitly rejecting the ideas of Thomas Aquinas,\nHenry of Ghent, and most importantly John Duns Scotus, Auriol created\ninteresting, innovative, and frequently controversial positions over a\nwhole range of philosophical and theological issues — not least\nin his theory of cognition — and many of his positions set the\nterms of debate for later thinkers like Gregory of Rimini and John\nCapreolus." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. The Character of Auriol’s Thought and Some Noteworthy Positions", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 The Categories", "2.2 The Concept of Being", "2.3 Future Contingents and Divine Foreknowledge", "2.4 Predestination and Free Will" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Cognition and Reality: Conceptualism and the ", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition and the Limits of Human Cognitive Abilities", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Literature", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAs with many of his contemporaries, we know very few dates with\ncertainty in the life of Peter Auriol (a.k.a. Peter Auriole, Peter\nAureol, Petrus Aureoli, the Doctor Facundus). On the basis of\nhis later career it seems reasonable to suppose that Auriol was born\naround 1280, and we have evidence that he originated in the region\nnear the city of Cahors in France. We know that Auriol joined the\nFranciscan order in the order’s province of Aquitania, and we\nsurmise that this took place sometime before 1300. From the structure\nof the contemporary Franciscan educational system we can deduce that\nhe studied in Paris sometime in the first decade of the fourteenth\ncentury, but evidence that some scholars have presented that Auriol\nheard Scotus in Paris or was definitely in Paris in 1304 is\ninconclusive. Auriol’s first written work, dealing with the\nissue of Franciscan poverty (Tractatus de paupertate et usu\npaupere), seems to have been composed in 1311 or at latest early\n1312. In the latter year we know that Auriol was teaching in Bologna,\npresumably at the Franciscan convent in that city. It was here that he\nauthored his Tractatus de principiis naturae (Treatise on\nthe principles of nature), his only non-theological work. By the\nend of 1314, Auriol was in Toulouse, again apparently teaching at the\nFranciscan convent, and it seems that the two treatises that he\nauthored in support of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary\n(and in opposition to Dominican critics of that view) stem from this\ntime (Tractatus de conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis and\nRepercussorium). In one or both of these cities, Auriol must\nhave also been lecturing on the standard medieval theological\ntextbook, the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and his massive\ncommentary on the first book of the Sentences, his\nScriptum super primum Sententiarum — more than 1100\nfolio pages in its early modern printing (Rome 1596) — was\nalmost certainly substantially finished by the autumn of 1316 when\nAuriol arrived in Paris, sent by the Franciscan order to earn his\ndoctorate. We used to think that Auriol read the Sentences at\nParis 1316–18, but new research has shown that he did this there\nover the sole academic year 1317-18 (Duba and Schabel 2017, esp. pp.\n159-165). No less a figure than Pope John XXII, Auriol’s mentor,\nwrote to the Chancellor of Paris in a letter dated July 14, 1318,\nasking that Auriol be granted the doctorate. The letter served its\npurpose, and by late 1318 he was the Franciscan regent master in\ntheology there. Auriol served as regent master in Paris until 1320 or\n1321, lecturing on the Bible (from which resulted several extant\nbiblical commentaries), and holding at least one series of quodlibetal\ndisputations. In 1321, he was elevated by John XXII to the position of\nArchbishop of Aix-en-Provence, but Auriol died soon after taking\noffice, probably on January 22, 1322. (See, for more details, Teetaert\n1935, and esp. Buytaert 1952).", "\nAs should be clear from the above, Auriol’s extant works are\npredominantly theological in nature, having been composed in\nconnection with his duties as a theological student and teacher.\nNevertheless, especially his commentary on Peter Lombard’s\nSentences is a treasure trove of philosophical thought\nspanning a vast range of issues in metaphysics, epistemology and\nphilosophy of mind, natural philosophy, and ethics; it is in addition\nhis most important and influential work. We possess several versions\nof Auriol’s Sentences commentary. Besides the\nScriptum, which, as mentioned above, was mostly composed\nbefore Auriol arrived in Paris in the autumn of 1316, we have\nreportationes (student transcripts) of lectures that Auriol\nheld on all four books of the Sentences, some of which have\nobviously been reworked to one degree or another by Auriol himself and\nsome of which are still found only in medieval manuscripts. A version\nof his commentary on books II-IV was published in Rome in 1605 (along\nwith Auriol’s single Quodlibet of sixteen questions).\nIn part because the project to critically edit all of Auriol’s\nworks has been initiated only recently, the complex relationship\nbetween these published texts and other versions, found only in\nmanuscripts, as well as the relationship between the published\nScriptum and the extant reportationes on book I of\nthe Sentences, is not entirely clear. (See however, Nielsen\n2002; Schabel 2000a, pp. 67–76; Schabel 2000b; Duba 2000; for\nmore information on Auriol’s works, see the bibliography on the\nPeter Auriol Homepage (Other Internet Resources).)" ], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAuriol’s thought is relentlessly systematic; one finds certain\nbasic ideas or devices that crop up time and again in extremely varied\nphilosophical and theological contexts. Given this, it seems clear\nthat at an early stage in his career Auriol settled on these basic\nideas and devices as those best representing his fundamental\nconvictions, and then applied them rigorously, so that his philosophy\nand theology emerge from them like spokes from a hub. As a\nconsequence, Auriol’s thought has the appearance of being\nextremely unified.", "\nAuriol also exhibits throughout his works a pronounced historical\nbent. That is to say, when dealing with nearly every philosophical or\ntheological issue, he takes as his point of departure a detailed\nanalysis of earlier and contemporary ideas on the matter at hand,\noffering for the most part accurate summaries of other positions and\ngenerally perceptive critiques. On the basis of this analysis of\nearlier positions, Auriol’s own thought often takes shape as he\nproposes positions that have the goal of avoiding the pitfalls he sees\nin his predecessors’ ideas. A recent study of Auriol’s\ncitation practice in his Scriptum (Schabel 2009) has shown\nthat the top five university authors explicitly cited are, in reverse\norder: Durand of St. Pourcain, Hervaeus Natalis, Henry of Ghent,\nThomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus. While these were the authors who\nclearly had the greatest impact on Auriol’s thought, he\nresponded throughout his works to many other theologians, including\nWilliam of Ware, Godfrey of Fontaines, Bonaventure, Richard of\nMediavilla (Middleton), Thomas Wylton, and Giles of Rome. Moreover,\nAuriol is clearly extremely well-versed in ancient and Arabic thought.\n(See e.g., Duba 2001.)", "\nFinally, Auriol is well known for proposing unusual and sometimes\nradical solutions to traditional problems. This was one of the reasons\nwhy Auriol’s thought was so provocative to his contemporaries\nand to readers right into the seventeenth century. Recent research has\npointed to several areas of Auriol’s thought as particularly\ninnovative. Among these areas can be mentioned the following." ], "section_title": "2. The Character of Auriol’s Thought and Some Noteworthy Positions", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAuriol maintained that only five of the ten Aristotelian categories\nactually exist in the extra-mental world (substance, quality,\nquantity, action, and passion), the other five (relation, place, time,\nposition, and state/habit) being merely conceptual or mind-dependent,\ni.e. resulting from an intellect conceiving one of the actual\ncategories to be other than it is in extra-mental reality. Thus, the\nconceptual categories exist only potentially, but not actually, in\nextra-mental reality; it is possible for the intellect, upon\nacquaintance with one of the actual categories in extra-mental\nreality, to form the concept of the corresponding conceptual category\n(on Auriol’s ideas on the category most broadly, see Amerini\n2014). This theory has been studied most thoroughly with regard to\nAuriol’s ideas concerning the category of relation (cf. e.g.,\nHenninger 1989, pp. 150–73; Brower 2018, sections 3.1 and 3.2;\nFriedman 2013, pp. 550–56). In this context, Auriol maintains\nthat real relations are conceptual in nature, not existing in\nextra-mental reality, and hence dependent upon the activity of the\nmind; the three types of real relation originate from the\nintellect’s acquaintance with respectively quantity (e.g., a\nrelation of equality), quality (e.g., a relation of similarity), and\naction and passion (e.g., a relation of causality). Moreover, Auriol,\nin stark contrast to the medieval tradition before him, thinks of\nrelations as being between two terms, and not in a subject\ntowards a term. While the impact of Auriol’s ideas on the\ncategories has not been studied in any depth, nevertheless it is\ninteresting that Gregory of Rimini devotes a great deal of his\ndiscussion of the category of relation to a thorough attack on\nAuriol’s view (Henninger 1989, p. 173; for Auriol’s more\ngeneral views on the ontology of accidents as well as some reaction to\nthose views, see Pasnau 2008, Pasnau 2011, pp. 213-220)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 The Categories" }, { "content": [ "\nAuriol modified Scotus’ view on the univocity of the concept of\nbeing. While accepting Scotus’ view that ‘being’ is\nunivocal both between God and creatures and between substance and\naccidents, Auriol nevertheless heavily criticized Scotus for\nmaintaining that being was contracted to the most general genera\nthrough various “qualitative differences” that themselves\nwere not included under the concept of being; on Scotus’ view,\nbeing itself became like a genus that was contracted through an\noutside difference. Auriol rejected this view on the grounds that this\n“outside difference” was an illusion; according to Auriol,\nnothing escapes the concept of being. Instead Auriol maintains that\nthe concept of being is an indeterminate concept that grasps\nall beings at once and equally. This concept of being itself has no\ndeterminate content; instead it contains within itself implicitly all\nother concepts that the intellect could possibly form. Being, then,\nfor Auriol is not contracted to its inferiors through any added\ndifference, but merely through explicating what is already contained\nimplicitly and indeterminately in the concept of being (Brown 1964;\nBrown 1965; Goris 2002; Pickavé 2004; Aertsen 2012, pp.\n433–56). As with many other topics, the history of the reception\nof Auriol’s view on the univocity of the concept of being\nremains to be written, but the important fifteenth century Thomist,\nJohn Capreolus, copied half of his eleven page treatment of this issue\nverbatim from Auriol’s Scriptum only to reject\nAuriol’s view in favor of a more Thomistic one. (See Brown 1964,\np. 6, esp. n. 10.)" ], "subsection_title": "2.2 The Concept of Being" }, { "content": [ "\nAuriol developed influential theories on future contingents and divine\nforeknowledge. These take their starting point in two convictions that\nAuriol firmly holds. First, he maintains that immutability and\nnecessity are mutually implicative, and thus, since God is immutable,\nif he were to know the future, the future would be necessary. (This\nsame conviction led Auriol to reject, at least in some contexts, the\nuse of the popular later-medieval distinction between God’s\nabsolute and ordained powers. For Auriol, there is no genuine\npossibility in God to will other than he does.) Second, Auriol took as\na fundamental principle the existence of human free will (on\nAuriol’s theory of free will, see Hoffmann 2015; Alliney 2015).\nThese two principles lead Auriol to theorize that God does know the\nfuture, but not as future; rather God knows the future\nindistantly, as abstracted from all time; it is therefore\nthis special way of knowing the future that preserves human freedom\nand avoids divine necessitarianism. In accordance with this view,\nAuriol develops a three-valued logic, in which future-tensed\npropositions are neutral, admitting of neither truth nor falsity,\nthereby discarding the principle of bivalence (the principle claiming\nthat any proposition can have only one of two truth values).\nAuriol’s position on future contingents and divine foreknowledge\nhad a great deal of impact in the later Middle Ages, since it often\ninspired refutations that nevertheless took into account the\ncriticisms that Auriol had made of, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Henry of\nGhent, and John Duns Scotus (Schabel 2000a). When Auriol’s view\nactually found an adherent in Peter de Rivo at the University of\nLouvain (Leuven) in the period 1465–74, it occasioned a major\ndebate involving in the end Pope Sixtus IV, who in 1474 officially\ncondemned aspects of Auriol’s view. Despite this condemnation,\nhowever, it appears that Auriol’s critique of earlier scholastic\nviews and some elements of his own theory on the topic influenced the\nhumanist Pietro Pomponazzi around 1520, and perhaps as well the\nreformer Martin Luther (Schabel 2003)." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Future Contingents and Divine Foreknowledge" }, { "content": [ "\nIn the related area of predestination, human free will is again a\nmotive force behind Auriol’s ideas. Believing that earlier\nexplanations of the way God elected some to salvation and damned\nothers to eternal punishment left all too little room for human free\nwill, Auriol proposed a theory on which God offers his grace freely to\nall human beings. Salvation comes to those who passively accept this\nfree offer of grace. Those whom God knows offer an obstacle to grace,\ni.e. those who actively reject it, God damns to eternal punishment.\nThus, for Auriol, the central issue in predestination is how human\nbeings choose to react to God’s free offer of grace: they are\njudged on their reaction. Auriol believes that he has avoided any hint\nof Pelagianism — where human beings can merit salvation on their\nown account — because individuals do not do anything\nactively in order to earn their salvation on his theory; they are only\nrequired to passively accept grace by not offering an obstacle to it,\nand this passive acceptance is, according to Auriol, a negative cause\nof the person’s salvation. Auriol’s theory when first\nproposed was an extremely innovative way of explaining the mechanics\nof salvation, and it came in for scathing criticism from, among\nothers, Gregory of Rimini; but, whether through direct influence or\nnot, elements of Auriol’s theory appear in the works of such\nthinkers as William Ockham, Robert Holcot, and, on the eve of the\nReformation, Gabriel Biel (Halverson 1998).", "\nIn the rest of this entry, we’ll look at two areas in which\nAuriol provoked a significant response in part on account of his\nradical solutions, two areas that also illustrate the systematic and\nhistorical nature of his thought: his ideas on the relation between\ncognition and reality (including his conceptualism) and his ideas on\nintuitive and abstractive cognition." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 Predestination and Free Will" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIf there is one thing that is known about Peter Auriol, it is that he\nwas a “conceptualist.” Indeed, Auriol has often been\nviewed as a forerunner of William Ockham precisely on account of his\nconceptualism. What is probably the very first monograph ever devoted\nto Auriol (Dreiling 1913) deals with his conceptualism. Thus,\nunderstanding Auriol’s conceptualism is a good place to start\nwhen dealing with Auriol’s thought.", "\nIn fact, Auriol is a conceptualist. By this it is merely\nmeant that, for Auriol, only singulars (i.e. individuals) have real,\nextra-mental existence. As Auriol writes: “every thing, insofar\nas it exists, exists as a singular” (omnis res, eo quod est,\nsingulariter est). Moreover, Auriol states explicitly that there\nis no principle of individuation — individuals just are\nindividuals and their individuality needs no further explanation. This\nis one of the most basic of Auriol’s metaphysical principles,\nand it necessarily entails that universality and universals are mental\nphenomena, fabricated in some way by the intellect. Thus, for Auriol,\nthe individuality of singular things does not need explaining, but the\nformation of universal concepts on the basis of these individuals does\nneed explaining. What is important for understanding Auriol’s\nconceptualism, then, is explicating his theory of intellectual\ncognition: determining the process by which the intellect fabricates\nthese universal concepts, determining what these universal concepts\nare, and what relation they have to really existing singulars in the\nworld.", "\nWhile only individuals have real, extra-mental existence, every\nindividual by its very nature has several different ontological or\nquidditative aspects. Auriol calls these quidditative aspects\nrationes (a term that will remain untranslated in the rest of\nthis entry). Thus, Auriol claims that, e.g., Socrates has the\nrationes substance, corporeality, sensitivity, rationality.\nMoreover, rationes of the same kind found in different\nindividuals are “maximally similar” (simillimae).\ne.g., Socrates’ corporeality is totally like Plato’s\ncorporeality, which is totally like the donkey Brunellus’\ncorporeality. It should be noted that these rationes are\nnon-universal characteristics, i.e. a ratio belongs to one\nand only one individual. This is why Auriol emphasizes the maximal\nsimilarity of rationes of the same kind: they are not the\nsame and they are not shared, they are merely as alike as they can be.\nWhat is most important about these rationes in the present\ncontext is that they are the basic unit of intellectual acquaintance:\nevery ratio of its very nature is able to serve as the basis\nfor a concept, although the concept that results from the intellection\nof a ratio can be modified by the way that we conceive it\n(our modus concipiendi), a purely psychological difference\nwith no immediate grounds in extra-mental reality. We might say that a\nratio directs our intellect to form one certain concept, this\ncore concept undergoing modification according to the way we conceive\nit. Our universal concepts, then, have in these rationes a\ndirect basis in extra-mental individuals. (See, for more on this,\nFriedman 1999, Wöller 2015, pp. 36–79; for the term\n‘maximally similar’ [as it is used in Ockham], see\nPanaccio 1992, pp. 258–67.) What universal concept we actually\nform, according to Auriol, depends on how closely our will makes the\nintellect focus on the information we receive from the object of\ncognition, and hence how strong an impression the object makes on the\nintellect: the more closely focused, the stronger the impression, the\nmore specific the universal concept that is formed.", "\nTo understand further what universal concepts are, we need to know\nwhat Auriol thinks concepts in general are. Central to this is\nAuriol’s theory of apparent existence or esse apparens,\nthat, at all levels, our cognitive faculties, in the very process of\ncognizing, put the object of cognition into a special type of\nexistence, termed by Auriol “apparent existence” (esse\napparens). For Auriol, in line with the general medieval view,\nour cognitive apparatus is divided into a sensory part (including the\nfive external senses, the common sense, which puts the sense data from\nthe five external senses together, and the imagination, which stores,\nretrieves, and sometimes manipulates the sense data, as well as sends\nthem on to the intellect) and an intellectual part (including the\nagent and the possible intellect). According to Auriol, in any\ncognitive act — whether sensory or intellectual — the\ncognitive power puts the object of cognition into this special type of\nexistence, and the object of cognition in this special type of\nexistence is the object as perceived. Thus concepts as well\nas sensations are simply cognized things themselves in a type of\nexistence different from that which they have in extra-mental reality.\nAuriol employs at least two different approaches to argue for this\nview: one based on intellectual cognition, the other based on sensory\ncognition. (Auriol’s trinitarian theology provides further\narguments for this view; see Friedman 2013, esp. Ch. 9, section 4.)\nWe’ll look at each of these in turn, in the process sketching\nwhat it was about the theory of esse apparens that made it\nquite radical and disturbing to Auriol’s medieval readers. (For\nthe sake of precision, esse apparens will go untranslated\nhereafter.)", "\nIntellectual cognition (see Friedman 1999;\nAdriaenssen 2014, esp. pp. 85–95; Friedman 2015; Adriaenssen\n2017a, pp. 82–99): Auriol’s solution to the question of\nwhat a concept is takes its point of departure in the necessity of\nexplaining three things at once: essential predication; intellectual\nacquaintance with extra-mental objects; and necessary, scientific\nknowledge. Auriol holds that the first of these explanatory\nrequirements would not be fulfilled by any theory of concepts\naccording to which the concept is a type of representation or token of\nthe thing, if this representation has real — albeit mental\n— being. Examples that he gives of solutions of this sort are\nthat a concept might be the intellectual act or an intelligible\nspecies or any type of accident terminating an act of the\nunderstanding. All of these representations have some real being of\ntheir own. According to Auriol, these types of representational\ntheories of concepts would make explaining essential predication\nimpossible, since, assuming any of them, when I predicated, e.g.,\nanimal of human being, I would make a false predication, inasmuch as\nthe concept human being would not be the concept animal. The\nultimate problem with theories of universals of this sort, according\nto Auriol, is that if they were correct, then universals would not be\nuniversals at all, but would be particulars with their own real being.\nMoreover, not only these same types of representational views of\nconcepts, but also any theory that holds concepts to be Platonic\nIdeas, would hinder us in having intellectual acquaintance with\nextra-mental objects, Auriol’s second explanatory requirement.\nOn both these types of theories, our knowledge would extend only to\nthese really existing entities. We would, according to Auriol, be\nintellectually blind to extra-mental reality. On the other hand, we\ncould certainly have intellectual acquaintance with extra-mental\nobjects, if our concepts were particular things in the extra-mental\nworld as they exist extra-mentally — a final position Auriol\ncriticizes — but we would be unable to have necessary,\nscientific knowledge, Auriol’s third explanatory requirement. In\nfact, we would be unable to make universal judgments of any kind,\nsince there would be nothing universal about our knowledge; instead of\nknowing that all mules are sterile, we would know only that this mule\nis sterile and that that mule is sterile.", "\nHaving considered all these views and found them wanting, Auriol\noffers his own alternative: the only way to explain at once essential\npredication, intellectual acquaintance with extra-mental objects, and\nnecessary, scientific knowledge is to maintain that concepts\nare extra-mental particulars, but having a different type of\nexistence (modus essendi) from the real existence they have\nextra-mentally. This special type of existence Auriol terms esse\napparens, apparent being, but he uses many synonyms for it,\nincluding “intentional” or “objective”\nexistence. (For other synonyms, see Tachau 1988, p. 90.) What\ncharacterizes this type of existence is that it is a particular\nextra-mental object, e.g., Socrates, but indistinguishably mixed\ntogether (indistinguibiliter immiscetur) with\npassive conception, i.e. the formation of a concept of Socrates. A\nconcept of Socrates is Socrates as conceived.", "\nFor Auriol, Socrates and a concept grasping Socrates, then, are the\nsame thing with differing types of existence. That they are “the\nsame thing” Auriol means quite literally. He says that “a\nthing and its intention do not differ numerically with respect to\nanything absolute”; they are the same thing strictly speaking.\nWhat thing and intention differ by is a respect or a relation. And\nthis is no ordinary respect “fixed to or superimposed upon that\nthing, as are other relations, rather it is utterly intrinsic and\nindistinguishably joined to it.” This intrinsic relation, Auriol\ntells us, is the appearance of the thing as an object of perception\n(apparere) to a perceiver (hence the term esse\napparens). For Auriol, then, it is intrinsic to each and every\nthing to have two different types of being: real or extra-mental being\non the one hand, and intentional or objective being on the other.\nUnlike real being, the thing’s intentional being needs a\nperceiver in order to actualize it. This is only to say that it is\nthrough the act of conceiving that a thing is put into intentional\nbeing.", "\nIn fact — and here we return to conceptualism — on the\nbasis of what Auriol has said, we can deduce that every particular\nthing, e.g. Socrates, has several potential intentional existences:\none for each of Socrates’ rationes, those basic units\nof intellectual acquaintance that direct the mind to form certain\nconcepts of him. And, according to Auriol, all of these different\nconcepts of Socrates are Socrates. On Auriol’s account,\nthis makes good sense: rationes are quidditative or essential\naspects without which a particular thing would not be the particular\nthing that it in fact is. Thus, Socrates is not Socrates without being\na rational animal, i.e. without having the rationes\nsensitivity and rationality. Socrates is every bit as much a human\nbeing as he is Socrates, and on Auriol’s theory the concept\n‘human being’ is every bit as much Socrates as is the\nconcept ‘Socrates’. Thus upon intellectual acquaintance,\nSocrates (and in particular his ratio of rationality) directs\nus to form the concept ‘human being’, and that concept\nis Socrates, one of Socrates’ several potential\nintentional existences.", "\nIn this way Auriol attempts to deal with the problems he saw in other\ntheories of concepts. On the one hand, he attempts to get our\nknowledge grounded as firmly as possible on extra-mental things: a\nconcept simply is the intellected extra-mental particular in\na different type of being from that which it has extra-mentally, a\ntype of being that is nevertheless intrinsic to the extra-mental\nparticular; the concept offers no barrier whatsoever between\nconceiving mind and conceived object. At the same time, however,\nAuriol wants to preserve the universality of universal concepts and\ntheir use in essential predications and necessary, scientific\nknowledge, and he thinks that his theory of concepts does just that.\nBecause rationes of the same kind found in different\nindividuals are “maximally similar,” they all direct the\nmind to form the same concept. Thus the concept ‘human\nbeing’ arising from Socrates is the same as the concept\n‘human being’ arising from Plato, since they are both\nbased on the maximally similar ratio of rationality. Auriol\nis clear that a universal concept is all of its particulars,\nrose is all particular roses, animal is all\nparticular animals. That is to say, animal is the concept and every\nreally existing animal at the same time.", "\nSensory Cognition (Wood 1982, pp. 214–17,\n220–23; Tachau 1988, pp. 89–100; Denery 1998, pp.\n28–39; Lička 2016; Pickavé 2017; Bolyard 2021,\nsection 4.2.2): The intellect is not the only cognitive faculty that\nfunctions by putting the cognized thing into esse apparens:\nthe sensitive faculties also work in this way according to Auriol. In\nfact, Auriol uses sensory cognition, and his claim that the senses\nform esse apparens, as further proof that the intellect does\nso as well. In a famous passage in Auriol’s works\n(Scriptum, d. 3, q. 3, a.1, ed. Buytaert, vol. 2, pp.\n696–99), one that was known to and criticized by William Ockham,\nAuriol creates an account of sensory cognition that takes its point of\ndeparture in a group of “experiences” that Auriol thinks\nprove that the senses cognize by actively placing the object sensed in\nesse apparens. Thus, if someone were on a ship moving down a\nriver, it would appear to that person that the trees on the shore were\nmoving; when a baton is twirled extremely rapidly, it appears to the\nviewer that a colored circle hovers in the air; a stick placed halfway\ninto a bucket of water appears to be broken; if I press on my eye\nwhile looking at a candle, it will appear that I see two candles; upon\nlooking directly at the sun, an afterimage appears. Auriol gives eight\nexperiences like these, but for him all of them lead to the same\nconclusion: that in each of these cases, what appears to us\n(i.e. our erroneous perception) does not correspond directly to\nreality but is a result of the senses’ putting the object into\nesse apparens. Take the case of the twirling baton: what is\nthe circle that appears in the air? It can’t be anything real\nexisting in the baton itself, since the baton is straight. Nor,\nclearly, is the circle something real hovering in the air. Finally,\nthe circle is not something in vision or in the eye, since we are\nseeing the circle and not our vision of it, and also since the circle\nappears to be in the air. For Auriol, the only possible explanation\nfor the circle is that it appears to us because our sense of sight has\nactively put the baton into esse apparens. More generally,\nwhat we see in these cases is “only the appearance of the thing\nor the thing in esse apparens.” Sensory error, for\nAuriol, is explained by appealing to the fundamental activity of the\nsenses. And Auriol insists that the senses are just as active in cases\nwhere they function correctly; this is because, since activity is a\nnoble trait to have, if in erroneous visions our sense of sight\nactively places the thing seen in esse apparens, it will\ncertainly do so in veridical visions. The difference between a\nveridical sensory experience and an erroneous one is that in a\nveridical one the way the object of cognition appears and the\nway it is in extra-mental reality coincide. So in veridical\nsensory experience we have no way to tell that the senses are placing\nthe thing into esse apparens. Thus, these experiences of\nsensory error are of immense importance, since it is only through them\nthat we can discern the necessary role that esse apparens and\nthe activity of the senses play in all sensory cognition.", "\nFor Auriol, then, the senses necessarily put the cognized object into\nesse apparens or intentional being; this is a condition of\nour perceiving. Moreover, Auriol makes clear in this context that this\nesse apparens is not a representation of the thing with its\nown real being; rather it is the thing itself merely placed\nin another type of existence. The esse apparens of a sensed\nobject is merely that object as sensed. (See on this particularly\nDenery 1998, pp. 34–39.) Obviously, this corresponds to the\ntheory we have already seen Auriol holds concerning esse\napparens in intellectual cognition, and Auriol makes the\ncorrespondence explicit. To go from sensory perception to intellectual\ncognition, Auriol uses a common scholastic principle called by\nPhilotheus Boehner “The Principle of Hierarchy” (Boehner\n1949, p. 298): given two faculties, one lower and one higher (like\nsense and intellect), if the lower faculty can do something noble,\nthen the higher faculty can certainly do the same. The activity of the\nsenses, then, i.e. the fact that the senses put the object into\nesse apparens, since it is noble, shows that the intellect\nalso puts its object into esse apparens. (Auriol’s\ntheory of sensory perception is complicated by the fact that Auriol\nseems to claim that some of the illusory sensory experiences he\nmentions exist outside the mind, e.g., that the colored circle is\n“in” the air and not “in” the mind. For\napproaches to this complication, see Pasnau 1997, pp. 69–76;\nDenery 1998, pp. 36–37; Lička 2016).", "\nThree general claims can be made on the basis of this examination of\nAuriol’s ideas on cognition and reality. First, Auriol is a\nconceptualist, holding that universals are nothing more than concepts\nformed by the mind, although these universal concepts do have a direct\nbasis in the particular thing cognized (the rationes).\nSecond, a principle underlying Auriol’s theory of cognition is\nthat cognitive faculties are fundamentally active. All cognition takes\nplace because a cognitive faculty places the object of\ncognition into esse apparens, which is merely the object of\ncognition in a different type of being than it has extra-mentally, the\nbeing of being perceived. Thus, Auriol is part of one pronounced\nstrain of medieval thought (deriving from Augustine and ultimately\nfrom Plato) that rejects that the soul and its powers are passively\naffected by extra-mental objects. (See on this Tachau 1988, Friedman\n2000.) Cognitive powers are, for Auriol, active. A third point, and\none that has been noted in a great deal of the secondary literature\n(e.g., Tachau 1988; Denery 1998; Bolyard 2000; Friedman 2000) is that\nby appealing to erroneous visions to show that both sense and\nintellect produce esse apparens or make things appear, Auriol\nhas given error a central place in his account of cognition. To put\nthis in another way, Auriol does not have a real problem explaining\nhow we can have erroneous perception and intellection (in contrast to\nmany theories of knowledge); rather he needs to explain how we can\nhave veridical ones and just as importantly how we can know when we\nare having veridical ones. This is roughly one of the functions that\nthe distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition served for\nsome medieval authors (in e.g., John Duns Scotus and William Ockham),\nalthough as we will see, Auriol does not use it in this way. Indeed it\nseems best to describe Auriol as a “reliabilist,” holding\nas a type of axiomatic principle that under normal circumstances our\nGod-given cognitive faculties represent the world in an adequate\nmanner. (See Bolyard 2000, p. 175; that Auriol is not the only\nmedieval thinker with this reliabilist attitude, see e.g., Stump 1998,\npp. 306–07.) No matter what Auriol thought, however, the\nskeptical implications of Auriol’s theory of esse\napparens did worry many of his medieval readers, and the theory\nelicited a critical response because some thought that it posed too\nsharp a break between cognition and reality. (For examples, see Wood\n1982, Tachau 1988, Adriaenssen 2017b)" ], "section_title": "3. Cognition and Reality: Conceptualism and the esse apparens", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nJohn Duns Scotus, who introduced the distinction between intuitive and\nabstractive cognition, took the view that intuitive and abstractive\ncognition were distinct because they had different objects. Thus, for\nScotus, we have an abstractive cognition of an object when it is not\ndirectly present to us, on account of there being some intervening\nrepresentation; an intuitive cognition can only come about when the\nobject of cognition is existing and directly present to us. For\nScotus, then, intuitive cognition carries along with it the guarantee\nthat the object of cognition exists; not so for abstractive cognition.\n(See Tachau 1988, esp. pp. 68–81; Dumont 1989; Pini 2014.) It is\nwell known that William Ockham took exception to this view, holding\nthat we can, in certain extraordinary (i.e. supernatural) cases, have\nintuitive cognition of non-existent objects. Auriol too objects to\nScotus’ view.", "\nFor Auriol, in contrast to Scotus, intuitive cognition is possible\nwhether the object of cognition is present or absent. Likewise, an\nabstractive cognition of an object that is actually present is\npossible. The distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition\ndoes not depend on the object at all; the very same object can be\ncognized in both an intuitive and an abstractive way. According to\nAuriol, whether we are having the one type of cognition or the other\ndepends exclusively on the characteristics of the cognition that we\nare having, how the object appears to us. Auriol says explicitly that\nintuitive and abstractive cognition are in fact simply two\nfundamentally different ways that the esse apparens created\nby the cognitive faculties can appear to us: “abstractive and\nintuitive cognition differ … for there are two modes of formal\nappearance … by which things appear objectively” (trans.\nPasnau 2002, p. 201, n. 111). In order to illustrate this, Auriol\nclaims that ocular cognition, i.e. the sense of sight, is fully\nintuitive, while imaginary cognition, i.e. cognizing something through\nthe internal sense of the imagination, is fully abstractive. This is\nthe governing metaphor in Auriol’s attempt to distinguish the\ntwo types of cognition: sight is intuitive, imagination is\nabstractive. Thus, describing sensory cognition, Auriol gives four\ntraits that together enable us to determine whether any particular\ncognition is intuitive or abstractive. First, an intuitive cognition\nis characterized by being immediate or direct, as\nwhen we see an object before us. Not so abstractive or imaginary\ncognition; it is mediate, requiring some type of discursive process.\nAuriol gives the following example: an astronomer sitting in his room\ncan predict an eclipse through calculation, and he can even imagine it\non that basis, but this is something entirely different from seeing\nthe eclipse directly. A second characteristic of ocular or intuitive\ncognition is the presentness of the object. The object of an\nintuitive cognition seems to be present (whether it actually is or\nnot), whereas the object of an abstractive cognition does not have\nthis appearance of presence. Take the astronomer again. He can imagine\nthe eclipse, but in the very act of doing so he knows that the eclipse\nis not present before him. The third and fourth characteristics that\nAuriol mentions are roughly equivalent: an intuitive cognition carries\nwith it the actualization and existence of its\nobject; not so an imaginary, abstractive cognition. The astronomer can\nimagine an eclipse, and even imagine an eclipse taking place right\nnow, but again, the very fact that he is imagining the eclipse bears\nwith it the recognition that it is not in fact actualized and\nexisting. Auriol sums up:", "\nTherefore, it is rightly said that an intuitive cognition is a direct\ncognition as opposed to a discursive one, that it is present as\nopposed to the absent mode in which the imagination reaches even\ntoward things that are present, and that it actualizes the object and\nposits its existence, since it makes the object’s real existence\nand actual position appear, even if the object does not exist. And in\ncontrast it is clear that an imaginary cognition lacks and abstracts\nfrom these four conditions. It extends to its object neither directly\nnor presently, nor by actualizing or positing existence, even if one\nimagines the object to exist and be actual and even if it is present.\n(trans. Pasnau 2002, pp. 206–07, n. 109).\n", "\n(The most complete discussion of Auriol on intuitive and abstractive\ncognition is Boehner 1949; for the background and reception of\nAuriol’s view, see particularly Tachau 1988; for a translation\ninto English of Auriol’s major text on intuitive and abstractive\ncognition, his Scriptum, Prologue (aka Prooemium), q. 2, see\nPasnau 2002, pp. 178–218.)", "\nThus, what is central to Auriol’s distinction between intuitive\nand abstractive cognition is the character of the cognition as it\nappears to us. The distinction between them is phenomenologically\ndetermined. As mentioned above, in this way Auriol rejected\nScotus’ view that intuitive cognitions are only of objects\npresent and existing. Auriol’s rejection of Scotus’\ndistinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition takes as one\nof its starting points several “experiences” that recall\nthe experiences he employed to show that the senses put the object of\nsensitive cognition into esse apparens. For example, upon\nlooking directly at the sun or any other luminous object, an\nafterimage appears; thus a vision of the sun remains in the eye even\nwhen the object itself is absent. In dreams, we can experience sights,\nsounds, and tactile sensations, in the real absence of the objects of\nsensation. Persons who are deceived by illusions often see things that\nare not really there. In all of these sensations the object appears to\nbe actually present and existing, when it is not. Auriol concludes\nthat we can have an intuitive sensory cognition of non-existent\nobjects.", "\nThat was the characterization of intuitive sensory cognition\nas opposed to abstractive cognition. What about intellectual\ncognition? Auriol makes clear that the human intellect can have\nintuitive cognition. To show this he first appeals to the Principle of\nHierarchy mentioned above: because the lower faculties, the senses,\ncan have intuitive cognition, therefore it is certain that the higher\nfaculty, intellect, can have intuitive cognition, since it is more\nnoble than the abstractive cognition that we know the intellect does\nhave. Moreover, on the basis of a famous passage from St. Paul’s\nI Corinthians (13:12 “For now we see in a mirror dimly,\nbut then face to face”), Auriol maintains that we are assured\nthat the beatific vision of God is an intuitive intellectual\ncognition.", "\nAlthough intuitive cognition is possible for an intellect,\nAuriol, in contrast to William Ockham, nevertheless denies that we\nexperience intuitive cognition in this life. Because the\nintellect of the wayfarer (viator — the person in this\nlife) is dependent upon the senses and their cognition of particulars,\nAuriol denies that we can have (or at least that we can know that we\nhave) intellectual cognition with the direct and present, ocular-like\ncognition that is characteristic of intuitive cognition. Auriol says:\n“Thus each of these cognitions should be posited within\nintellect, although we do not experience intuitive cognition in this\nlife because of its conjunction with sensory intuition” (trans.\nPasnau 2002, pp. 210–11, n. 121.) Intuitive intellectual\ncognition is reserved for the angels and for the blessed in heaven,\nunencumbered by bodily senses. All of our intellectual cognition in\nthis life is characterized by the discursivity and mediacy that is the\nmark of an abstractive cognition.", "\nAbove, it was mentioned that Auriol seems ultimately to be best\ndescribed as a reliabilist; he does not question that, given normal\nconditions, our God-given cognitive faculties work as they should and\nthat they are self-correcting. He does not seem to have been concerned\nabout possible skeptical ramifications of his theory of esse\napparens. But with this said, by denying that human beings in\nthis life have intuitive intellectual cognition, he set the stage for\nsomewhat strictly limiting human intellectual abilities in his\nphilosophy.", "\nThis last point explains some interesting features of Auriol’s\nattitude towards human knowledge. In particular, despite the fact that\nAuriol maintains that God could give a person in this life an\nabstractive cognition of the divine essence, and that this abstractive\ncognition would be able to serve as the basis for demonstrative\nknowledge of all articles of the Christian faith (Scriptum,\nPrologue, q. 2, ed. Buytaert, vol. 1, pp. 211–14; trans. Pasnau\n2002, p. 213, n. 130 and p. 214, n. 133), nevertheless Auriol often\nexhibits a noticeable pessimism when it comes to human cognitive\nabilities. Thus, Auriol argues at length that in this life we are\nunable to decide such issues as whether the universe is eternal or\ncreated in time. (We know, of course, through Scripture that the world\nis not eternal, but we could never decisively prove this by means of\nunaided human reason.) Auriol argues that this is the case because we\ndo not have direct intellectual cognition of, e.g., temporal instants;\nsuch cognition would allow us to resolve this problem. (See esp.\nNielsen 1996, esp. pp. 223–26, 232–35, 239–41; see\nalso Nielsen 1999.) Here we see that Auriol’s rejection of\nintuitive intellectual cognition in this life lies at the heart of a\nsomewhat pessimistic view of the reach of human reason: we do not have\ndirect intuitive knowledge of the world (much less of God), only\nindirect abstractive knowledge, and this places fairly strict\nlimitations on just what our intellect can achieve unaided. The\ndisembodied soul of the blessed, having direct intuitive intellectual\ncognition, will fare much better.", "\nAuriol’s theory of human intellectual cognition of singulars\nalso shows the influence of his rejection of intuitive intellectual\ncognition in this life. Auriol is explicit that universal concepts\n(formed through the Aristotelian process of abstraction) always appear\nto us as abstractive cognitions, since what is universal abstracts\nfrom any presentness and directness of the object of cognition (see\ne.g. Scriptum, Prologue, q. 2, ed. Buytaert, p. 206, n. 111,\nl. 87, Pasnau 2002, p. 207; cf. Friedman 1997, pp. 310–14).\nThere were, however, a number of members of the Franciscan order,\nincluding John Duns Scotus, who was sometimes understood by\ncontemporaries to have claimed that singulars could be cognized as\nsingular by the intellect. (On this aspect of Scotus thought see,\ne.g., Boler 1982, esp. Pini 2008.) Auriol rejects this Franciscan\ntradition; because true intuitive intellectual cognition is barred to\nus in this lifetime, we can have no direct intellectual cognition of\nsingulars at all. Auriol maintains in his theory of intellectual\ncognition of singulars that we only form concepts of singulars through\nthe mediation of the senses and by means of a discursive process. (By\nrecognizing that the senses are now sensing a singular, the intellect\ncan reason that a singular must now exist and be present, but we have\nno direct intellectual knowledge or concept of any singular.) Auriol\nexplicitly claims, however, that angels and the blessed, lacking\nbodies and bodily senses, would have direct intellectual cognition of\nsingulars, just as God does by seeing his own essence. (On\nAuriol’s theory, see Friedman 2000.) A mild pessimism about\nhuman cognitive abilities is thus systemic in Auriol’s thought,\nand has its most clear expression in his claim that we do not\nexperience intuitive intellectual cognition in this life." ], "section_title": "4. Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition and the Limits of Human Cognitive Abilities", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in primum librum Sententiarum\nPars Prima, Rome: Ex typographia Vaticana, 1596.", "Peter Auriol, Scriptum super primum sententiarum, E.M.\nBuytaert (ed.), 2 volumes, St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute,\n1952–56.", "Adriaenssen, H.T., 2014, ‘Peter John Olivi and Peter Auriol\non Conceptual Thought’, Oxford Studies in Medieval\nPhilosophy, 2: 67–97.", "–––, 2017a, Representation and Scepticism\nfrom Aquinas to Descartes, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 2017b, ‘Peter Auriol on the Intuitive\nCognition of Nonexistents. Revisiting the Charge of Skepticism in\nWalter Chatton and Adam Wodeham’, Oxford Studies in Medieval\nPhilosophy, 5: 151–176.", "Aertsen, J., 2012, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental\nThought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco\nSuárez, Leiden: Brill.", "Alliney, G., 2015, ‘Landolfo Caracciolo, Peter Auriol, and\nJohn Duns Scotus on Freedom and Contingency’, Recherches de\nthéologie et philosophie médiévales, 82(2):\n271–300.", "Amerini, F., 2014, ‘Peter Auriol on Categories’,\nDocumenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 25:\n493–535.", "Boehner, P., 1949, ‘Notitia Intuitiva of Non Existents\nAccording to Peter Aureoli, O.F.M. (1322)’, Rivista di\nfilosofia neo-scolastica, 41: 289–307; also published in\nFranciscan Studies, 8 (1948): 388–416.", "Boler, J., 1982, ‘Intuitive and Abstractive\nCognition’, in Norman Kretzmann, et al. (eds.), The\nCambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press, 460–78.", "Bolyard, C., 2000, ‘Knowing naturaliter:\nAuriol’s propositional foundations’, Vivarium,\n38(1): 162–76.", "–––, 2021, ‘Medieval Skepticism’, in\nThe Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophy, Spring 2021 Edition,\nEdward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/skepticism-medieval/>", "Brower, J. E., 2018, ‘Medieval Theories of Relations’,\nin The Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophy, Winter 2018 Edition,\nEdward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/relations-medieval/>", "Brown, S. F., 1964, ‘The Unity of the Concept of Being in\nPeter Aureoli’s Scriptum and Commentarium’, Ph.D.\ndissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain.", "–––, 1965, ‘Avicenna and the Unity of the\nConcept of Being: The Interpretation of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus,\nGerard of Bologna and Peter Aureoli’, Franciscan\nStudies, 25: 117–50.", "Denery, D. G., 1998, ‘The Appearance of Reality: Peter\nAureol and the Experience of Perceptual Error’, Franciscan\nStudies, 55: 27–52.", "Dreiling, R., 1913, Der Konzeptualismus in der\nUniversalienlehre des Petrus Aureoli, Münster i. W:\nAschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.", "Duba, W., 2000, ‘The Immaculate Conception in the Works of\nPeter Auriol’, Vivarium, 38(1): 5–34.", "–––, 2001, ‘Aristotle’s\nMetaphysics in Peter Auriol’s Commentary on the\nSentences’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione\nfilosofica medievale, 12: 549–72.", "Duba, W. and C. Schabel 2017, ‘Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and\nthe Myth of the Two-Year Sentences Lecture at Paris’,\nRecherches de Théologie et Philosophie\nmédiévales, 84(1): 143–179.", "Dumont, S. D., 1989, ‘Theology as a Science and Duns\nScotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive\nCognition’, Speculum, 64: 579–99.", "Friedman, R. L., 1997, ‘Conceiving and Modifying Reality:\nSome Modist Roots of Peter Auriol’s Theory of Concept\nFormation’, in C. Marmo (ed.), Vestigia, Imagines,\nVerba, Turnhout: Brepols, 305–21.", "–––, 1999, ‘Peter Auriol on Intentions and\nEssential Predication’, in S. Ebbesen and R. L. Friedman (eds.),\nMedieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, Copenhagen: C.A.\nRietzel (commissioned by Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and\nLetters), 415–430.", "–––, 2000, ‘Peter Auriol on Intellectual\nCognition of Singulars’, Vivarium, 38(1):\n177–193.", "–––, 2013, Intellectual Traditions in the\nMedieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in\nTrinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans,\n1250–1350, Leiden: Brill.", "–––, 2015, ‘Act, Species, and Appearance:\nPeter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition and Consciousness’, in G.\nKlima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation\nin Medieval Philosophy, New York: Fordham University Press,\n141–165.", "Goris, W., 2002, ‘Implicit Knowledge – Being as First\nKnown in Peter of Oriel’, Recherches de théologie et\nphilosophie médiévales, 69(1): 33–65.", "Halverson, J. L., 1998, Peter Aureol on Predestination. A\nChallenge to Late Medieval Thought, Leiden: Brill.", "Henninger, M., 1989, Relations: Medieval Theories\n1250–1325, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Hoffmann, T., 2015, ‘Peter Auriol on Free Choice and Free\nJudgment’, Vivarium, 53(1): 65–89.", "Lička, L., 2016, ‘Perception and Objective Being: Peter\nAuriol on Perceptual Acts and their Objects’, American\nCatholic Philosophical Quarterly, 90(2): 49–76.", "Nielsen, L. O., 1996, ‘Dictates of Faith versus Dictates of\nReason: Peter Auriole on Divine Power, Creation, and Human\nRationality’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica\nmedievale, 7: 213–41.", "–––, 1999, ‘The Intelligibility of Faith\nand the Nature of Theology: Peter Auriole’s Theological\nProgramme’, Studia Theologica, 53(1): 26–39.", "–––, 2002, ‘Peter Auriol’s Way with\nWords: The Genesis of Peter Auriol’s Commentaries on Peter\nLombard’s First and Fourth Books of the Sentences’, in G.\nEvans (ed.) Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of\nPeter Lombard, Leiden: Brill, 149–219.", "Panaccio, C., 1992, Les mots, les concepts, et les\nchoses, Paris-Montreal: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. ", "Pasnau, R., 1997, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle\nAges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2002, The Cambridge Translations of\nMedieval Philosophical Texts, (Volume 3: Mind and\nKnowledge), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "–––, 2008, ‘Id Quo Cognoscimus’, in\nS. Knuuttila and P. Kärkkäin (eds.), Theories of\nPerception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, Dordrecht:\nSpringer Science.", "–––, 2011, Metaphysical Themes\n1274–1671, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Pickavé, M., 2004, ‘Metaphysics as First Science: the\nCase of Peter Auriol’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione\nfilosofica medievale, 15: 487–516.", "–––, 2017, ‘Peter Auriol and William of\nOckham on a Medieval Version of the Argument from Illusion’, in\nJ. Pelletier and M. Roques (eds.), The Language of Thought in Late\nMedieval Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Claude Panaccio, Cham:\nSpringer, 183–99.", "Pini, G., 2008, ‘Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive\nActs’, Franciscan Studies, 66: 281–315.", "–––, 2014, ‘Scotus on Intuitive and\nAbstractive Cognition’, in J. Hause (ed.), Debates in\nMedieval Philosophy. Essential Readings and Contemporary\nResponses, London: Routledge, 348–65.", "Schabel, C., 2000a, Theology at Paris, 1316–1345. Peter\nAuriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future\nContingents, Aldershot: Ashgate.", "–––, 2000b, ‘Place, Space, and the Physics\nof Grace in Auriol’s Sentences Commentary’,\nVivarium, 38(1): 117–61.", "–––, 2003, ‘Divine Foreknowledge and Human\nFreedom: Auriol, Pomponazzi, and Luther on “Scholastic\nSubtleties”’, in R. L. Friedman and L. O. Nielsen (eds.),\nThe Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Logic,\n1400–1800, Dordrecht: Springer, 165–89.", "–––, 2009, ‘Auriol’s Rubrics:\nCitations of University Theologians in Peter Auriol’s\nScriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum’, in S. F.\nBrown, T. Dewender, and T. Kobusch (eds.), Philosophical Debates\nat Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, Leiden: Brill,\n3–38.", "Stump, E., 1998, ‘Aquinas’s Account of the Mechanisms\nof Intellective Cognition’, Revue Internationale de\nPhilosophie, 204: 287–307.", "Tachau, K. H., 1988, Vision and Certitude in the Age of\nOckham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundation of Semantics,\n1250–1345, Leiden: Brill.", "Teetaert, A., 1935, ‘Pierre Auriol ou Oriol’, in\nDictionnaire de théologie catholique, XII/2,\nParis: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, cols. 1810–81.", "Wöller, F., 2015, Theologie und Wissenschaft bei Petrus\nAureoli. Ein scholastischer Entwurf aus dem frühen 14.\nJahrhundert, Leiden: Brill.", "Wood, R., 1982, ‘Adam Wodeham on Sensory Illusions’,\nTraditio, 38: 213–52." ]	[ { "href": "../duns-scotus/", "text": "Duns Scotus, John" }, { "href": "../gregory-rimini/", "text": "Gregory of Rimini" }, { "href": "../ockham/", "text": "Ockham [Occam], William" }, { "href": "../relations-medieval/", "text": "relations: medieval theories of" } ]
austin-john	John Austin	First published Sat Feb 24, 2001; substantive revision Fri Jan 14, 2022	[ "\nJohn Austin is considered by many to be the creator of the school of\nanalytical jurisprudence, as well as, more specifically, the approach\nto law known as “legal positivism.” Austin’s\nparticular command theory of law has been subject to pervasive\ncriticism, but its simplicity gives it an evocative power that\ncontinues to attract adherents." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Analytical Jurisprudence and Legal Positivism", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Austin’s Views", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Criticisms", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. A Revisionist View?", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Sources", "Secondary Sources" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nJohn Austin’s life (1790–1859) was filled with\ndisappointment and unfulfilled expectations. His influential friends\n(who included Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill and Thomas\nCarlyle) were impressed by his intellect and his conversation, and\npredicted he would go far. However, in public dealings, Austin’s\nnervous disposition, shaky health, tendency towards melancholy, and\nperfectionism combined to end quickly careers at the Bar, in academia,\nand in government service (Hamburger 1985, 1992).", "\nAustin was born to a Suffolk merchant family, and served briefly in\nthe military before beginning his legal training. He was called to the\nBar in 1818, but he took on few cases, and quit the practice of law in\n1825. Austin shortly thereafter obtained an appointment to the first\nChair of Jurisprudence at the recently established University of\nLondon. He prepared for his lectures by study in Bonn, and evidence of\nthe influence of continental legal and political ideas can be found\nscattered throughout Austin’s writings. Commentators have found\nevidence in Austin’s writings of the German Pandectist treatment\nof Roman Law, in particular, its approach to law as something that is,\nor should be, systematic and coherent (Schwarz 1934; Stein 1988: pp.\n223–229, 238–244; Lobban 1991: pp. 223–256, Lobban\n2013).", "\nLectures from the course he gave were eventually published in 1832 as\n“Province of Jurisprudence Determined” (Austin 1832).\nHowever, attendance at his courses was small and getting smaller, and\nhe gave his last lecture in 1833. A short-lived effort to give a\nsimilar course of lectures at the Inner Temple met the same result.\nAustin resigned his University of London Chair in 1835. He later\nbriefly served on the Criminal Law Commission, and as a Royal\nCommissioner to Malta, but he never found either success or\ncontentment. He did some occasional writing on political themes, but\nhis plans for longer works never came to anything during his lifetime,\ndue apparently to some combination of perfectionism, melancholy, and\nwriter’s block. His changing views on moral, political, and\nlegal matters also apparently hindered both the publication of a\nrevised edition of “Province of Jurisprudence Determined,”\nand the completion of a longer project started when his views had been\ndifferent.", "\n(Some scholars have argued that Austin may have moved away from\nanalytical jurisprudence (see below) towards something more\napproximating the historical jurisprudence school; cf. Hamburger 1985:\npp. 178–91, arguing for Austin’s views having changed\nsignificantly, with Rumble 2013, arguing against that view.)", "\nMuch of whatever success Austin found during his life, and after, must\nbe attributed to his wife Sarah, for her tireless support, both moral\nand economic (during the later years of their marriage, they lived\nprimarily off her efforts as a translator and reviewer), and her work\nto publicize his writings after his death (including the publication\nof a more complete set of his Lectures on Jurisprudence) (Austin\n1879). Credit should also be given to Austin’s influential\nfriends, who not only helped him to secure many of the positions he\nheld during his lifetime, but also gave important support for his\nwritings after his death (Hamburger 1985: pp. 33, 197; Morison 1982:\np. 17; Mill 1863).", "\nAustin’s work was influential in the decades after his passing\naway (Rumble 2005); this influence was in part due to the restatement\nof is ideas by other thinkers, like T. E. Holland (Postema 2011: p.\n4). E. C. Clark wrote in the late 19th century that Austin’s\nwork “is undoubtedly forming a school of English jurists,\npossibly of English legislators also. It is the staple of\njurisprudence in all our systems of legal education” (Clark\n1883: pp. 4–5). A similar assessment is made by H.L.A. Hart,\nlooking back nearly a century later: “within a few years of his\ndeath it was clear that his work had established the study of\njurisprudence in England” (Hart 1955: p. xvi). As will be\ndiscussed, Austin’s influence can be seen at a number of levels,\nincluding the general level of how legal theory, and law generally,\nwere taught (Stein 1988: pp. 238–244), and the use of an\nanalytical approach in legal theory. At such levels, Austin’s\nimpact is felt to this day. Hart could write that\n“Austin’s influence on the development of England of\n[Jurisprudence] has been greater than that of any other writer,”\n(Hart 1955: p. xvi) even while Austin’s particular command\ntheory of law became almost friendless, and is today probably best\nknown from Hart’s use of it (1958: 602–606, 2012:\n18–25) as a foil for the elaboration of Hart’s own, more\nnuanced approach to legal theory. In recent decades, some theorists\nhave revisited Austin’s command theory (and other works),\noffering new characterizations and defenses of his ideas (e.g.,\nMorison 1982, Rumble 1985, see generally Freeman & Mindus\n2013)." ], "section_title": "1. Life", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nEarly in his career, Austin came under the influence of Jeremy\nBentham, and Bentham’s utilitarianism is evident (though with\nsome differences) in the work for which Austin is best known today. On\nAustin’s reading of utilitarianism, Divine will is equated with\nUtilitarian principles: “The commands which God has revealed we\nmust gather from the terms wherein they are promulg[ate]d. The command\nwhich he has not revealed, we must construe by the principle of\nutility” (Austin 1873: Lecture IV, p. 160; see also Austin 1832:\nLecture II, p. 41). This particular reading of utilitarianism,\nhowever, has had little long-term influence, though it seems to have\nbeen the part of his work that received the most attention in his own\nday (Rumble 1995: p. xx). Some have also seen Austin as being one of\nthe early advocates of “rule utilitarianism” (e.g.,\nAustin 1832: Lecture II, p. 42, where Austin urges that we analyze not\nthe utility of particular acts, but that of “class[es] of\naction”). Additionally, Austin early on shared many of the ideas\nof the Benthamite philosophical radicals; he was “a strong\nproponent of modern political economy, a believer in Hartleian\nmetaphysics, and a most enthusiastic Malthusian” (Rumble 1985:\npp. 16–17). Austin was to lose most of his “radical”\ninclinations as he grew older.", "\nAustin’s importance to legal theory lies elsewhere—his\ntheorizing about law was novel at four different levels of generality.\nFirst, he was arguably the first writer to approach the theory of law\nanalytically (as contrasted with approaches to law more grounded in\nhistory or sociology, or arguments about law that were secondary to\nmore general moral and political theories). Analytical jurisprudence\nemphasizes the analysis of key concepts, including “law,”\n“(legal) right,” “(legal) duty,” and\n“legal validity.” Though analytical jurisprudence has been\nchallenged by some in recent years (e.g., Leiter 2007, Leiter and\nEtchemendy 2021, Postema 2021 [Other Internet Resources]), it remains\nthe dominant approach to discussing the nature of law. Analytical\njurisprudence, an approach to theorizing about law, has sometimes been\nconfused with what the American legal realists (an influential group\nof theorists prominent in the early decades of the 20th century)\ncalled “legal formalism”—a narrow approach to how\njudges should decide cases. The American legal realists saw Austin in\nparticular, and analytical jurisprudence in general, as their\nopponents in their critical and reform-minded efforts (e.g., Sebok\n1998: pp. 65–69). In this, the realists were simply mistaken;\nunfortunately, it is a mistake that can still be found in some\ncontemporary legal commentators (see Bix 1999, 903–919, for\ndocumentation).", "\nSecond, Austin’s work should be seen against a background where\nmost English judges and commentators saw common-law reasoning (the\nincremental creation or modification of law through judicial\nresolution of particular disputes) as supreme, as declaring existing\nlaw, as discovering the requirements of “Reason,” as the\nimmemorial wisdom of popular “custom.” Such\n(Anglo-American) theories about common law reasoning fit with a larger\ntradition of theorizing about law (which had strong roots in\ncontinental European thought—e.g., the historical jurisprudence\nof theorists like Karl Friedrich von Savigny (1975)): the idea that\ngenerally law did or should reflect community mores,\n“spirit,” or custom. In general, one might look at many of\nthe theorists prior to Austin as exemplifying an approach that was\nmore “community-oriented”—law as arising from\nsocietal values or needs, or expressive of societal customs or\nmorality. By contrast, Austin’s is one of the first, and one of\nthe most distinctive, theories that views law as being “imperium\noriented”—viewing law as mostly the rules imposed from\nabove from certain authorized (pedigreed) sources. More\n“top-down” theories of law, like that of Austin, better\nfit the more centralized governments (and the modern political\ntheories about government) of modern times (Cotterrell 2003: pp.\n21–77).", "\nThird, within analytical jurisprudence, Austin was the first\nsystematic exponent of a view of law known as “legal\npositivism.” Most of the important theoretical work on law prior\nto Austin had treated jurisprudence as though it were merely a branch\nof moral theory or political theory: asking how should the state\ngovern? (and when were governments legitimate?), and under what\ncircumstances did citizens have an obligation to obey the law? Austin\nspecifically, and legal positivism generally, offered a quite\ndifferent approach to law: as an object of “scientific”\nstudy (Austin 1879: pp. 1107–1108), dominated neither by\nprescription nor by moral evaluation. Subtle jurisprudential questions\naside, Austin’s efforts to treat law systematically gained\npopularity in the late 19th century among English lawyers who wanted\nto approach their profession, and their professional training, in a\nmore serious and rigorous manner (Hart 1955: pp. xvi–xviii;\nCotterrell 2003: pp. 74–77; Stein 1988: pp. 231–244).", "\nLegal positivism asserts (or assumes) that it is both possible and\nvaluable to have a morally neutral descriptive (or\n“conceptual”—though this is not a term Austin used)\ntheory of law. (The main competitor to legal positivism, in\nAustin’s day as in our own, has been natural law theory.) Legal\npositivism does not deny that moral and political criticism of legal\nsystems is important, but insists that a descriptive or conceptual\napproach to law is valuable, both on its own terms and as a necessary\nprelude to criticism.", "\n(The term “legal positivism” is sometimes used more\nbroadly to include the position that we should construct or modify our\nconcept of law to remove moral criteria of legal validity; or to\ninclude a prescription that moral values should not be used in\njudicial decision-making (Schauer 2010—see the Other Internet\nResources). I do not think anything turns on whether the term is used\nmore broadly or more narrowly, as long as it is clear which sense is\nbeing used. Additionally, while Schauer claims (2010) that Austin\ncould be seen as supporting some of the views associated with the\nbroader understanding of “legal positivism”, there is need\nfor more evidence and argument before the point should be\ngranted.)", "\nThere were theorists prior to Austin who arguably offered views\nsimilar to legal positivism or who at least foreshadowed legal\npositivism in some way. Among these would be Thomas Hobbes, with his\namoral view of laws as the product of Leviathan (Hobbes 1996); David\nHume, with his argument for separating “is” and\n“ought” (which has been taken by some as a sharp criticism\nfor some forms of natural law theory, those views that purported to\nderive moral truths from statements about human nature, Hume 1739,\nSection 3.1.1, but see Chilovi and Wodak 2021, raising questions about\nthe relevance of Hume’s views here for either natural law theory\nor legal positivism); and Jeremy Bentham, with his attacks on judicial\nlawmaking and on those commentators, like Sir William Blackstone, who\njustified such lawmaking with natural-law-like justifications (Bentham\n1789).", "\nAustin’s famous formulation of what could be called the\n“dogma” of legal positivism is as follows:", "\nThe existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.\nWhether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not\nconformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law,\nwhich actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or\nthough it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and\ndisapprobation. (Austin 1832: Lecture V, p. 157)\n", "\n(While Austin saw himself as criticizing natural law theory, a view\nshared by most of the legal positivists who followed him, the extent\nto which the two schools disagree, and the location of their\ndisagreement, remains a matter sharply contested (e.g., Finnis 2000a,\n2000b.))", "\nAndrew Halpin has argued (Halpin 2013) that Austin shaped the nature\nof modern analytical jurisprudence and legal positivism by his choice\nto exclude legal reasoning from his discussion of\n“jurisprudence.” A greater focus on legal reasoning,\nHalpin argues, would have made it harder to claim a clear separation\nof law “as it is” and law “as it ought to be.”\nHalpin points out that prominent later legal positivists have followed\nAustin, either in speaking little about legal reasoning (Hans Kelsen,\nand, to some extent, H. L. A. Hart), or speaking about the topic at\nlength, but treating the issue as sharply separate from their theories\nof (the nature of) law.", "\nFourth, Austin’s version of legal positivism, a “command\ntheory of law” (which will be detailed in the next section), was\nalso, for a time, quite influential. Austin’s theory had\nsimilarities with views developed by Jeremy Bentham, whose theory\ncould also be characterized as a “command theory.”\nBentham, in a posthumously published work, defined law as an:", "\nassemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived or adopted by\nthe sovereign in a state, concerning the conduct to be\nobserved in a certain case by a certain person or class of\npersons, who in the case in question are or are supposed to be subject\nto his power: such volition trusting for its accomplishment to the\nexpectation of certain events which it is intended such declaration\nshould upon occasion be a means of bringing to pass, and the prospect\nof which it is intended should act as a motive upon those whose\nconduct is in question (Bentham 1970: p. 1).\n", "\nHowever, Austin’s command theory was more influential than\nBentham’s, because the latter’s jurisprudential writings\ndid not appear in an even-roughly systematic form until well after\nAustin’s work had already been published, with Bentham’s\nmost systematic discussion only appearing posthumously, late in the\n20th century (Bentham 1970, 1996; Cotterrell 2003: p. 50)." ], "section_title": "2. Analytical Jurisprudence and Legal Positivism", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAustin’s basic approach was to ascertain what can be said\ngenerally, but still with interest, about all laws. Austin’s\nanalysis can be seen as either a paradigm of, or a caricature of,\nanalytical philosophy, in that his discussions are dryly full of\ndistinctions, but are thin in argument. The modern reader is forced to\nfill in much of the meta-theoretical, justificatory work, as it cannot\nbe found in the text. Where Austin does articulate his methodology and\nobjective, it is a fairly traditional one: he “endeavored to\nresolve a law (taken with the largest signification which can\nbe given to that term properly) into the necessary and\nessential elements of which it is composed” (Austin 1832:\nLecture V, p. 117).", "\nAs to what is the core nature of law, Austin’s answer is that\nlaws (“properly so called”) are commands of a sovereign.\nHe clarifies the concept of positive law (that is, man-made law) by\nanalyzing the constituent concepts of his definition, and by\ndistinguishing law from other concepts that are similar:", "\nAustin also included within “the province of\njurisprudence” certain “exceptions,” items which did\nnot fit his criteria but which should nonetheless be studied with\nother “laws properly so called”: repealing laws,\ndeclarative laws, and “imperfect laws”—laws\nprescribing action but without sanctions (a concept Austin ascribes to\n“Roman [law] jurists”) (Austin 1832: Lecture I, p.\n36).", "\nIn the criteria set out above, Austin succeeded in delimiting law and\nlegal rules from religion, morality, convention, and custom. However,\nalso excluded from “the province of jurisprudence” were\ncustomary law (except to the extent that the sovereign had, directly\nor indirectly, adopted such customs as law), public international law,\nand parts of constitutional law. (These exclusions alone would make\nAustin’s theory problematic for most modern readers.)", "\nWithin Austin’s approach, whether something is or is not\n“law” depends on which people have done what: the question\nturns on an empirical investigation, and it is a matter mostly of\npower, not of morality. Of course, Austin is not arguing that law\nshould not be moral, nor is he implying that it rarely is. Austin is\nnot playing the nihilist or the skeptic. He is merely pointing out\nthat there is much that is law that is not moral, and what makes\nsomething law does nothing to guarantee its moral value. “The\nmost pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to\nthe will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by\njudicial tribunals” (Austin 1832: Lecture V, p. 158).", "\nIn contrast to his mentor Bentham, Austin, in his early lectures,\naccepted judicial lawmaking as “highly beneficial and even\nabsolutely necessary” (Austin, 1832: Lecture V, p. 163). Nor did\nAustin find any difficulty incorporating judicial lawmaking into his\ncommand theory: he characterized that form of lawmaking, along with\nthe occasional legal/judicial recognition of customs by judges, as the\n“tacit commands” of the sovereign, the sovereign’s\naffirming the “orders” by its acquiescence (Austin 1832:\nLecture 1, pp. 35–36). It should be noted, however, that one of\nAustin’s later lectures listed the many problems that can come\nwith judicial legislation, and recommended codification of the law\ninstead (Austin 1879: vol. 2, Lecture XXXIX, pp. 669–704)." ], "section_title": "3. Austin’s Views", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAs many readers come to Austin’s theory mostly through its\ncriticism by other writers (prominently, that of H.L.A. Hart; see also\nKelsen 1941: 54–66), the weaknesses of the theory are almost\nbetter known than the theory itself:", "\nFirst, in many societies, it is hard to identify a\n“sovereign” in Austin’s sense of the word (a\ndifficulty Austin himself experienced, when he was forced to describe\nthe British “sovereign” awkwardly as the combination of\nthe King, the House of Lords, and all the electors of the House of\nCommons). Additionally, a focus on a “sovereign” makes it\ndifficult to explain the continuity of legal systems: a new ruler will\nnot come in with the kind of “habit of obedience” that\nAustin sets as a criterion for a system’s rule-maker.", "\nA few responses are available to those who would defend Austin. First,\nsome commentators have argued that Austin is here misunderstood, in\nthat he always meant “by the sovereign the office or\ninstitution which embodies supreme authority; never the\nindividuals who happen to hold that office or embody that institution\nat any given time” (Cotterrell 2003: p. 63, footnote omitted);\nthere are certainly parts of Austin’s lectures that support this\nreading (e.g., Austin 1832: Lecture V, pp. 128–29; Lecture VI,\np. 218).", "\nSecondly, one could argue (see Harris 1977) that the sovereign is best\nunderstood as a constructive metaphor: that law should be viewed as if\nit reflected the view of a single will (a similar view, that law\nshould be interpreted as if it derived from a single will, can be\nfound in Ronald Dworkin’s work (1986: pp. 176–190)).", "\nThirdly, one could argue that Austin’s reference to a sovereign\nwhom others are in the habit of obeying but who is not in the habit of\nobeying anyone else, captures what a “realist” or\n“cynic” would call a basic fact of political life. There\nis, the claim goes, entities or factions in society that are not\neffectively constrained, or could act in an unconstrained way if they\nso chose. For one type of example, one could point out that if there\nwas a sufficiently large and persistent majority among the United\nStates electorate, nothing could contain them: they could elect\nPresidents and legislators who would amend the Constitution and,\nthrough those same officials, appoint judges who would interpret the\n(revised or original) Constitution in a way amenable to their\ninterests. A different sort of example (and some would say that there\nare recent real-life examples of this type) would be a President who\nignored the constraints of statutory law, constitutional law, and\ninternational treaty commitments, while the public and other officials\nlacked the will or the means to hold that President to the legal norms\nthat purported to constrain his or her actions.", "\nAs regards Austin’s “command” model, it seems to fit\nsome aspects of law poorly (e.g., rules which grant powers to\nofficials and to private citizens—of the latter, the rules for\nmaking wills, trusts, and contracts are examples), while excluding\nother matters (e.g., international law) which we are not inclined to\nexclude from the category “law.”", "\nMore generally, it seems more distorting than enlightening to reduce\nall legal rules to one type. For example, rules that empower people to\nmake wills and contracts perhaps can be re-characterized as\npart of a long chain of reasoning for eventually imposing a sanction\n(Austin spoke in this context of the sanction of “nullity”\n(Austin 1879: 522, 523, 923)) on those who fail to comply with the\nrelevant provisions. However, such a re-characterization misses the\nbasic purpose of those sorts of laws—they are arguably about\ngranting power and autonomy, not punishing wrongdoing.", "\nA different criticism of Austin’s command theory is that a\ntheory which portrays law solely in terms of power fails to\ndistinguish rules of terror from forms of governance sufficiently just\nthat they are accepted as legitimate (or at least as reasons for\naction) by their own citizens.", "\nFinally, one might note that the constitutive rules that determine who\nthe legal officials are and what procedures must be followed in\ncreating new legal rules, “are not commands habitually obeyed,\nnor can they be expressed as habits of obedience to persons”\n(Hart 1958: p. 603).", "\nAustin was aware of some of these lines of attack, and had responses\nready; it is another matter whether his responses were adequate. It\nshould also be noted that Austin’s work shows a silence on\nquestions of methodology, though this may be forgivable, given the\nearly stage of jurisprudence. As discussed in an earlier section, in\nmany ways, Austin was blazing a new path. On matters of methodology,\nlater commentators on Austin’s work have had difficulty\ndetermining whether he is best understood as making empirical claims\nabout the law or conceptual claims; elements of each sort of approach\ncan be found in his writings (Lobban 1991: pp. 224–225;\nCotterrell 2003: pp. 81–83).", "\nWhen H.L.A. Hart revived legal positivism in the middle of the\n20th century (Hart 1958, 2012), he did it by criticizing\nand building on Austin’s theory: for example, Hart’s\ntheory did not try to reduce all legal rules to one kind of rule, but\nemphasized the varying types and functions of legal rules; and\nHart’s theory, grounded partly on the distinction between\n“obligation” and “being obliged,” was built\naround the fact that some participants within legal systems\n“accepted” the legal rules as reasons for action, above\nand beyond the fear of sanctions. Hart’s\n“hermeneutic” approach, building on the “internal\npoint of view” of participants who accepted the legal system,\ndiverged sharply from Austin’s approach to law." ], "section_title": "4. Criticisms", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nSome modern commentators appreciate in Austin elements that were\nprobably not foremost in his mind (or that of his contemporary\nreaders). For example, one occasionally sees Austin portrayed as the\nfirst “realist”: in contrast both to the theorists that\ncame before Austin and to some modern writers on law, Austin is seen\nas having a keener sense of the connection of law and power, and the\nimportance of keeping that connection at the forefront of analysis\n(cf. Cotterrell 2003: pp. 49–77). One commentator wrote:", "\nAustin’s theory is not a theory of the Rule of Law: of\ngovernment subject to law. It is a theory of the ‘rule of\nmen’: of government using law as an instrument of power. Such a\nview may be considered realistic or merely cynical. But it is, in its\nbroad outlines, essentially coherent. (Cotterrell 2003: p. 70)\n", "\nWhen circumstances seem to warrant a more critical, skeptical or\ncynical approach to law and government, Austin’s equation of law\nand force will be attractive—however distant such a reading may\nbe from Austin’s own liberal-utilitarian views at the time of\nhis writing, or his more conservative political views later in his\nlife (Hamburger, 1985)." ], "section_title": "5. A Revisionist View?", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Austin, John, 1832, The Province of Jurisprudence\nDetermined, W. Rumble (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress, 1995.", "–––, 1879, Lectures on Jurisprudence,\nor The Philosophy of Positive Law, 2 volumes, R. Campbell\n(ed.), 4th edition, revised, London: John Murray; reprinted, Bristol:\nThoemmes Press, 2002.", "Bentham, Jeremy, 1789, An Introduction to the Principles of\nMorals and Legislation, J. H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart (eds.),\nOxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.", "–––, 1970, Of Laws in General, H.L.A.\nHart (ed.), London: Athlone Press.", "Bix, Brian H., 1999, “Positively Positivism,”\nVirginia Law Review, 75: 1613–1624.", "Chilovi, Samuele and Wodak, Daniel, 2021, “On the\n(In)significance of Hume’s Law,” Philosophical\nStudies, first online 29 June 2021.\ndoi:10.1007/s11098-021-01674-5", "Clark, E. C., 1883, Practical Jurisprudence: A Comment on\nAustin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Cliffe Leslie, T. E., 1864, “Modern Phases of Jurisprudence\nin England,” Westminster Review, 26: 261–76 [U.S.\nedition, 162: 125–132].", "Cosgrove, Richard A., 1996, Scholars of the Law: English\nJurisprudence from Blackstone to Hart, New York: New York\nUniversity Press.", "Cotterrell, Roger, 2003, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A\nCritical Introduction to Legal Philosophy, 2nd edition, London:\nLexisNexis.", "Dewey, James, 1894, “Austin’s Theory of\nSovereignty,” Political Science Quarterly, 9:\n31–52.", "Duxbury, Neil, 2005, “English Jurisprudence Between Austin\nand Hart,” Virginia Law Review, 91: 1–91.", "Dworkin, Ronald, 1986, Law’s Empire, Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press.", "Finnis, John, 2000a, “On the Incoherence of Legal\nPositivism,” Notre Dame Law Review, 75:\n1597–1611.", "–––, 2000b, “The Truth in Legal\nPositivism,” in The Autonomy of Law, Robert P. George\n(ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 195–214.", "Freeman, Michael & Mindus, Patricia (eds.) 2013, The\nLegacy of John Austin’s Jurisprudence, Dordrecht:\nSpringer.", "Halpin, Andrew, 2013, “Austin’s Methodology? His\nBequest to Jurisprudence,” in Michael Freeman & Patricia\nMindus (eds.) 2013, The Legacy of John Austin’s\nJurisprudence, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 15–40.", "Hamburger, Lotte & Joseph, 1985, Troubled Lives: John and\nSarah Austin, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.", "–––, 1992, Contemplating Adultery: The\nSecret Life of a Victorian Woman, London: Macmillan.", "Harris, J.W., 1977, “The Concept of Sovereign Will,”\nActa Juridica (Essays in Honour of Ben Beinart, Volume II),\nCape Town: Juta & Co., 1979, pp. 1–15.", "Hart, H.L.A., 1954, “Introduction” to John Austin,\nThe Province of Jurisprudence Determined, H.L.A. Hart (ed.),\nLondon: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. vii–xxi.", "–––, 1958, “Positivism and the Separation\nof Law and Morals,”Harvard Law Review, 71:\n593–629.", "–––, 2012, The Concept of Law, 3rd\nedition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Hobbes, Thomas, 1651, Leviathan, Richard Tuck (ed.),\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.", "Hume, David, 1739, A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate\nNorton & Mary J. Norton (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,\n2000.", "Kelsen, Hans, 1941, “The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical\nJurisprudence,” Harvard Law Review, 55:\n44–70.", "Leiter, Brian, 2007, Naturalizing Jurisprudence, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Leiter, Brian and Etchemendy, Matthew X., “Naturalism in\nLegal Philosophy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of\nPhilosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/lawphil-naturalism/>.", "Lobban, Michael, 1991, The Common Law and English\nJurisprudence 1760–1850, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "–––, 2013, “Austin and the Germans,”\nin Michael Freeman & Patricia Mindus (eds.), The Legacy of\nJohn Austin’s Jurisprudence, Dordrecht: Springer, pp.\n255–270.", "Mill, John Stuart, 1863, “Austin on Jurisprudence,”\nEdinburgh Review, 118 (October): 439–82 [U.S. edition,\n118: 222–244].", "Moles, Robert N., 1987, Definition and Rule in Legal Theory: A\nReassessment of H.L.A. Hart and the Positivist Tradition, Oxford:\nBasil Blackwell.", "Morison, W. L., 1982, John Austin, Stanford: Stanford\nUniversity Press.", "Postema, Gerald J., 2011, Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth\nCentury: The Common Law World, Dordrecht: Springer.", "Rumble, W. E., 1985, The Thought of John Austin:\nJurisprudence, Colonial Reform, and the British Constitution,\nLondon: Athlone Press.", "–––, 1995, “Introduction,” in W.\nRumble (ed.), Austin: The Province of Jurisprudence\nDetermined, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.\nvii–xxiv.", "–––, 2005, Doing Austin Justice: The\nReception of John Austin’s Philosophy of Law in\nNineteenth-Century England, London: Continuum.", "–––, 2013, “Did Austin Remain an\nAustinian?,” in Michael Freeman & Patricia Mindus (eds.)\n2013, The Legacy of John Austin’s Jurisprudence,\nDordrecht: Springer, pp. 131–153.", "Savigny, Friedrich Karl von, 1975, On the Vocation of Our Age\nfor Legislation and Jurisprudence, Abraham Hayward (trans.), New\nYork: Arno Press.", "Schauer, Frederick, 2010, “Was Austin Right After\nAll?,” Ratio Juris, 23: 1–21.", "Schwarz, Andreas B., 1934, “John Austin and the German\nJurisprudence of His Time,” Politica, 1:\n178–199.", "Sebok, Anthony J., 1998, Legal Positivism in American\nJurisprudence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Stein, Peter, 1988, The Character and Influence of the Roman\nCivil Law: Historical Essays, London: The Hambledon Press.", "Tapper, Colin, 1965, “Austin on Sanctions,”\nCambridge Law Journal, 23(2): 271–287." ]	[ { "href": "../bentham/", "text": "Bentham, Jeremy" }, { "href": "../law-language/", "text": "law: and language" }, { "href": "../legal-obligation/", "text": "legal obligation and authority" }, { "href": "../lawphil-naturalism/", "text": "naturalism: in legal philosophy" }, { "href": "../lawphil-nature/", "text": "nature of law" }, { "href": "../legal-positivism/", "text": "nature of law: legal positivism" } ]
austin-jl	John Langshaw Austin	First published Tue Dec 11, 2012; substantive revision Wed Jun 30, 2021	[ "\nJohn Langshaw Austin (1911–1960) was White’s Professor of\nMoral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He made a number of\ncontributions in various areas of philosophy, including important work\non knowledge, perception, action, freedom, truth, language, and the\nuse of language in speech acts. Distinctions that Austin draws in his\nwork on speech acts—in particular his distinction between\nlocutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts—have assumed\nsomething like canonical status in more recent work. His work on\nknowledge and perception places him in a broad tradition of\n“Oxford Realism”, running from Cook Wilson and Harold\nArthur Prichard through to J.M. Hinton, M.G.F. Martin, John McDowell,\nPaul Snowdon, Charles Travis, and Timothy Williamson. His work on\ntruth has played an important role in recent discussions of the extent\nto which sentence meaning can be accounted for in terms of\ntruth-conditions." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Work", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. Language and Truth", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Language and Philosophy", "2.2 Language and Truth", "2.3 Speech Acts and Truth" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Knowledge and Perception", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Knowledge", "3.2 Sensory perception" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Action and Freedom", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Actions and Excuses", "4.2 Freedom and Ability" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Primary Literature", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nAustin was born in Lancaster, England 26 March 1911 to Geoffrey\nLangshaw Austin and his wife Mary Austin (née Bowes-Wilson).\nThe family moved to Scotland in 1922, where Austin’s father\nwas Secretary of St. Leonard’s School, St. Andrews.", "\nAustin took up a scholarship in Classics at Shrewsbury School in 1924,\nand, in 1929, went on to study Classics at Balliol College, Oxford. In\n1933, he received a First in Literae Humaniores (Classics and\nPhilosophy) in 1933 and was elected to a Fellowship at All Souls\nCollege, Oxford. He undertook his first teaching position in 1935, as\nfellow and tutor at Magdalen College, Oxford.", "\nAustin’s early interests included Aristotle, Kant, Leibniz, and\nPlato (especially Theaetetus). His more contemporary\ninfluences included especially G.E. Moore, John Cook Wilson, and H.A.\nPrichard. (Austin attended Prichard’s undergraduate lectures\nwith such vigour that Prichard is reported to have made an\nunsuccessful attempt to exclude him.) It’s plausible that some\naspects of Austin’s distinctive approach to philosophical\nquestions derived from his engagement with the last three. All three\nphilosophers shaped their views about general philosophical questions\non the basis of careful attention to the more specific judgments we\nmake. And they took our specific judgments (for instance, in\nMoore’s case, “I know that I have hands”) to be, in\ngeneral, more secure than more general judgments (for instance, again\nin Moore’s case, “I know things about external\nreality”). Moreover, there are some continuities of doctrine,\nespecially with Cook Wilson and Prichard, which align Austin with an\n“Oxford Realist” school of philosophy. The core components\nof the latter view are, first, that perception and knowledge are\nprimitive forms of apprehension and, second, that what we apprehend\nare ordinary elements of our environments that are independent of our\napprehending them. (All three thinkers were at one or another time\ncommitted to versions of both components of the position but for\ncomplex reasons sometimes wavered about the second. See e.g., Travis\nand Kalderon 2013.)", "\nDuring the Second World War, Austin served in the British Intelligence\nCorps. It has been said of him that, “he more than anybody was\nresponsible for the life-saving accuracy of the D-Day\nintelligence” (reported in Warnock 1963: 9). Austin left the\narmy in September 1945 with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was\nhonoured for his intelligence work with an Order of the British\nEmpire, the French Croix de Guerre, and the U.S. Officer of the Legion\nof Merit. ", "\nAustin married Jean Coutts in 1941. They had four children, two girls\nand two boys.", "\nAfter the War, Austin returned to Oxford. He became White’s\nProfessor of Moral Philosophy in 1952. In the same year, he took on\nthe role of delegate to Oxford University Press, becoming Chairman of\nthe Finance Committee in 1957. His other administrative work for the\nUniversity included the role of Junior Proctor (1949–50), and\nChairman of the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy (1953–55). He was\npresident of the Aristotelian Society 1956–57. He gave the\nWilliam James Lectures in Harvard in 1955 (a version of the lectures\nwas published as How to Do Things With Words – see\n1962b in the Bibliography). He invented the card game CASE in 1951.", "\nDuring this period, Austin edited H.W.B. Joseph Lectures on the\nPhilosophy of Leibniz (1949) and produced a translation of\nGottlob Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik, so that it\ncould be set as an exam (1950). Austin wrote little and published\nless. Much of his influence was through teaching and other forms of\nsmall-scale engagement with philosophers. He also instituted a series\nof “Saturday Morning” discussion sessions, which involved\ndetailed discussions of a number of philosophical topics and works,\nincluding Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics,\nFrege’s Grundlagen, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s\nPhilosophical Investigations, Merleau-Ponty’s\nPhenomenology of Perception, and Noam Chomsky’s\nSyntactic Structures.", "\nAustin died in Oxford on 8 February 1960.", "\n(For more detail about Austin’s life, work, and influences see\nAyer 1978; Baldwin 2010; Berlin 1973b; Dancy 2010; Garvey 2014;\nGustaffson 2011; Hacker 2004; Hampshire 1960; Travis and Kalderon\n2013; Marion 2000a,b, 2009; Passmore 1957; Pears 1962; Pitcher 1973;\nSearle 2014; Urmson and Warnock 1961; Urmson 1967; Warnock 1963,\n1973a; Warnock 1989: 1–10.)" ], "section_title": "1. Life and Work", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "2. Language and Truth", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIn this section, we’ll look at Austin’s views about the\nrole of the study of language in philosophy more generally. It is\ncommon to count Austin as an “Ordinary Language\nPhilosopher”, along with, for example, Gilbert Ryle, P.F.\nStrawson, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. However, although each of these\nthinkers was sometimes concerned, in one or another way, with our use\nof ordinary language, it is far from clear what in addition to that\nthe label is supposed to entail. And it is equally unclear that the\nvarious thinkers so-labelled deserve to be grouped together.", "\nAustin cared about language for two main reasons. First, language use\nis a central part of human activity, so it’s an important topic\nin its own right. Second, the study of language is an\naide—indeed, for some topics, an important preliminary—to\nthe pursuit of philosophical topics. Many of Austin’s most\ndistinctive reflections on the use of language arise in the course of\ndiscussion of other topics (see especially his “A Plea for\nExcuses” 1957).", "\nOne route to understanding Austin’s general approach to\nphilosophy is provided by reflection on the following comment by\nStuart Hampshire:", "\n\n\n[Austin] was constitutionally unable to refrain from applying the same\nstandards of truth and accuracy to a philosophical argument, sentence\nby sentence, as he would have applied to any other serious\nsubject-matter. He could not have adopted a special tone of voice, or\nattitude of mind, for philosophical questions. (Hampshire 1960:\n34)\n", "\nIn short, it mattered to Austin that, in attempting to make out\npositions and arguments, philosophers should meet ordinary standards\nof truth, accuracy, and so forth. On the one hand, this presented a\ngeneral challenge to philosophers, a challenge that they might easily\nfail to meet. The challenge is either to make use of an ordinary\nvocabulary, or ordinary concepts, in order to make claims or judgments\nthat are, according to ordinary standards, at least true (or accurate,\netc.); or to do the serious work required to set up an appropriate\ntechnical vocabulary and then use it to say things that are by\nappropriate standards true (accurate, etc.). On the other hand, it\nprovided Austin with what he took to be a reasonably secure approach\nto general philosophical questions: first, find a connection between\nthose general philosophical questions and the more specific claims or\njudgments that we ordinarily make and take ourselves to be secure in\nmaking; second, make sufficiently many of the relevant claims or\njudgments, in a sufficient variety of circumstances, in order to\naddress the general philosophical questions.", "\nAustin held that, in their hurry to address general philosophical\nquestions, philosophers have a tendency to ignore the nuances involved\nin making and assessing ordinary claims and judgments. Among the risks\nassociated with insensitivity to the nuances, two stand out. First,\nphilosophers are liable to miss distinctions that are made in our\nordinary use of language and that are relevant to our concerns and\nclaims. Second, failure to exploit fully the resources of ordinary\nlanguage can make philosophers susceptible to seemingly forced choices\nbetween unacceptable alternatives. Here Austin warns:", "\n\n\nIt is worth bearing in mind…the general rule that we must not\nexpect to find simple labels for complicated cases…however\nwell-equipped our language, it can never be forearmed against all\npossible cases that may arise and call for description: fact is richer\nthan diction. (1957: 195)\n", "\nOn Austin’s view, language is likely to be well designed for the\nends to which it is ordinarily put. But special, or especially\ncomplicated, cases may require special treatment. This is apt to be an\nespecial liability when it comes to the question whether a sentence\ncan be used in a particular circumstance to state something true or\nfalse:", "\n\n\nWe say, for example, that a certain statement is exaggerated or vague\nor bold, a description somewhat rough or misleading or not very good,\nan account rather general or too concise. In cases like these it is\npointless to insist on deciding in simple terms whether the statement\nis “true or false”. Is it true or false that Belfast is\nnorth of London? That the galaxy is the shape of a fried egg? That\nBeethoven was a drunkard? That Wellington won the battle of Waterloo?\nThere are various degrees and dimensions of success in making\nstatements: the statements fit the facts always more or less loosely,\nin different ways on different occasions for different intents and\npurposes. (1950a: 129–130)\n", "\nAustin makes two points here. First, when faced with a putative choice\nof this sort, we should not insist on deciding in simple\nterms whether a statement is true or false (or whether an\nexpression applies or fails to apply to something). Some cases are\ncomplicated, and, in some of those cases, we are capable of meeting\nsome of the complications by saying more: “Well, it is true that\nBelfast is north of London if you understand that claim in the\nfollowing way….” Second, the complications can take\ndifferent forms, and can matter in different ways, on different\noccasions. Given the prior course of our conversation, and our\nspecific intents and purposes in discussing the issue, it might be\nmanifest that, on that particular occasion, we will\nunderstand the complications, without a need for their\narticulation, so that the following is fine as it stands: “Yes,\nit is true that Belfast is north of London.”", "\nAustin’s summarised his view of the role of attention to\nordinary language in philosophy thus:", "\n\n\nFirst, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean\ntools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must\nforearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly,\nwords are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we\nneed therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from\nand against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and\narbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly,\nand more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the\ndistinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they\nhave found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations: these\nsurely are likely to be more sound, since they have stood up to the\nlong test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in\nall ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I\nare likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the\nmost favoured alternative method. (1957:\n 181–182)[1]\n ", "\nAustin holds, then, that an important preliminary to philosophising on\nat least some topics—for instance, where the topic is\n“ordinary and reasonably practical”—would be the\ndetailed study of the language we use to speak on that topic, and of\nthe way that we use it.", "\nAustin didn’t think that the investigation of language was more\nthan a preliminary to theorising, either in philosophy or science. He\nwasn’t averse to theory construction, even if its outcome were\npotentially revisionary (see e.g., 1957: 189). His concern was only\nthat such theorising should be properly grounded, and that it should\nnot be driven, for example, by an initial failure to keep track of\ndistinctions that we mark in our ordinary use of language. Further,\nAustin draws an important distinction between “words and facts\nor things,” and he seems to suggest that we have ways of\ninvestigating the world—that is, facts and things—which\ncan bypass the “blinkers” sometimes imposed on us by our\nwords. We’ll return to Austin’s distinction between the world,\nincluding facts—which Austin thinks of as particular or\nconcrete—and words, including the statements we make in using\nwords, in \n section 2.2. \n And we’ll return to Austin’s idea that we can\nhave unblinkered awareness of the world—unblinkered, that is, by\nthe linguistic or judgmental capacities that we bring to bear on what\nwe experience—in \n section 3.1.", "\nIt’s fair to say that Austin’s work has been caught up in\nthe stampede away from broadly ordinary language-based approaches to\nphilosophical questions. The work of Paul Grice, collected in his\nStudies in the Way of Words (1989), has played an important\nrole in the negative assessment of such approaches, including aspects\nof Austin’s work. One central idea in Grice’s work is that\nthe ways in which we use language—crudely, the pairings of\nsituations and sentences that we find appropriate or inappropriate, or\nwhat we would or wouldn’t say in those situations—is not a\nsimple function of the nature of the respective situations and the\ncorrectness conditions with which the sentences are associated.\nRather, judgments about appropriateness are driven also by, for\nexample, our sensitivities to the demands of rational co-operation\nwith our conversational partners. And it has been thought that, in one\nor another way, ordinary language philosophers, including Austin, have\nbeen insensitive to the additional parameters to which judgments of\nappropriateness are beholden (for early attacks of this sort, see Ayer\n1967 and Searle 1966). It is beyond the scope of this entry to attempt\nto assess either the extent to which Austin should really be seen as a\ntarget of such objections or, if he should, whether they demonstrate\nweaknesses in his work. However, in pursuing any such assessment, it\nis important to note that Austin’s exploitation of ordinary\nlanguage is never driven by simple appeal to whether, in a situation\nconsidered as a whole, we would take it to be simply appropriate or\ninappropriate to use some sentence or other. Rather, Austin\nis—as we are—sensitive to more fine-grained appraisals of\nuses of bits of language and, when he judges that an utterance on an\noccasion would be false or nonsensical, he intends that judgment to\ncontrast with less damaging negative appraisals—for example,\nabout what it would be merely inappropriate or impolite to say.\nMoreover, Austin is sensitive to the specific features of situations\nupon which we base one or another more fine-grained appraisal of uses\nof sentences. As he stresses, “It takes two to make a\ntruth” (1950a: 124 fn.1). And Austin is sensitive to the details\nof both participants in that and other forms of transaction between\nword and\n world.[2]", "\n(For discussion of Austin’s approach to philosophical questions,\nwith reference to his classification as an ordinary language\nphilosopher, see Berlin 1973b; Cavell 1965; Garvey 2014; Grice 1989:\n3–21; Gustafsson 2011; Hampshire 1960, 1965; Kaplan 2018: 1–39; Longworth 2018a; Marion 2009; Martin\nms (Other Internet Resources); Pears 1962; Pitcher 1973; Putnam 1994;\nQuine 1965; Reimer 2018; Searle 1966; Soames 2003: 171–219; Travis 1991;\nUrmson 1965, 1967; Urmson and Warnock 1961; Warnock 1973a, 1989:\n2–10; White 1967.)" ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Language and Philosophy" }, { "content": [ "\nThe topic of this section is Austin’s views about truth.\nAustin’s views about truth are scattered throughout his work,\nbut his most explicit discussion of the topic is in the paper\n“Truth” (1950a) (see also 1953, 1954ms, 1956b, 1962b,\n1962c). Amongst the distinctive claims Austin makes about truth are\nthe following:", "\nLet’s start with (1)–(3). Austin 1950a is ostensibly\nresponding to a proposal in Strawson 1949 according to which the\nfunction of the predicate “is true” is to facilitate the\nperformance of acts of affirmation or agreement, and not to describe\nthings—e.g., statements—as possessing the property of\ntruth. For short, Strawson claimed that “is true” has a\nperformative rather than a descriptive function. And\nhe accused his opponents of committing the descriptive\nfallacy: the alleged fallacy of treating expressions, or aspects\nof the use of expressions, that really serve performative purposes as\nhaving (only) a descriptive\n purpose.[4]\n One of Austin’s aims was to defend the view that the predicate\n“is true” has a descriptive function (perhaps in addition\nto its having one or more performative functions). In pursuing that\naim, Austin also made a number of distinctive proposals about the\ndescriptive function of the truth\n predicate.[5]", "\nLet’s turn, then, to the core of Austin’s account of\ntruth. Austin presents his account of truth as an account of truth for\nstatements. However, “statement” is at least two\nways ambiguous, covering both historical episodes in which something\nis stated—what I’ll refer to as\nstatings—and also the things or propositions that are\nstated therein—which I’ll refer to as what is\nstated. Austin isn’t especially careful about the\ndistinction, but it’s possible to reconstruct much of what he\nsays in a way that respects it (for discussion of the distinction see\ne.g., Cartwright 1962).", "\nAustin’s primary interest appears to be the truth of\nstatings. He writes of “statement” that it has\n“the merit of clearly referring to the historic use of a\nsentence by an utterer” (1950a: 121). However, statings are not\nordinarily said to be true or false, except derivatively insofar as\nwhat is stated in them is true or false. Rather, statings are assessed\nas, for example, correct or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate,\nand so forth. However, it is plausible that stating correctly is\nclosely associated with making a statement that is true. And\nAustin’s account can be understood as an account of the\nconditions in which statings are such that what is stated in them is\n true.[6]", "\nAustin presents the core of his account of truth in the following\nway:", "\n\n\nWhen is a statement true? The temptation is to answer (at least if we\nconfine ourselves to “straightforward” statements):\n“When it corresponds to the facts”. And as a piece of\nstandard English this can hardly be wrong. Indeed, I must confess I do\nnot really think it is wrong at all: the theory of truth is a series\nof truisms. Still, it can at least be misleading. (1950a: 121)\n", "\nThe two obvious sources of potential misdirection in the formula that\nAustin endorses here are its appeal to correspondence and its\nappeal to\n facts.[7]\n Austin attempts to prevent our being misled by explaining how those\ntwo appeals ought to be understood. Austin’s focus in his\n“Truth” (1950a) is mainly on the nature of correspondence.\nHe deals more fully with facts in his “Unfair to Facts”\n(1954ms).", "\nIn giving an account of correspondence, Austin makes appeal to two\ntypes of (what he calls) conventions\n (as per (3) above):[8]", "\nThe descriptive conventions associate sentences with (types\nof) ways for things to be: ways for situations, things, events, etc.\nto be. For instance, the sentence “The cat is on the mat”\nis associated with a type of way for things to be in which the cat is\non the mat. A variety of different historic situations might be of\nthat type. For instance, one historic situation of that type might\ninvolve Logos (Derrida’s cat), while a different historic\nsituation of the same type might involve Nothing (Sartre’s cat).\nSimilarly, cat-mat pairings that took place at different times would\nbe different historic situations or events and yet might be of the\nsame type.", "\nThe demonstrative conventions, by contrast, associate\nparticular statings—themselves historic events—with some\namongst the accessible historic situations, things, events, etc.\nConsider, for example, the following simplified case. There are two\naccessible situations, one of which is of the cat-on-mat type and one\nof which is of the dog-on-linoleum type. The descriptive conventions\ngoverning the English sentence “The cat is on the mat” do\nnot, and cannot, determine which of the two accessible situations a\nspeaker aims to talk about on a particular occasion. In order to\nachieve that, the speaker must find a way of making manifest that\ntheir goal is to select, say, the dog-on-linoleum situation. They\nmight achieve this by, for example, their use on a particular occasion\nof the present tense, or by pointing, etc. (1950a:\n 121–126).[10]", "\nWith this machinery in place, Austin continues:", "\n\n\nA statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs [or\ne.g., situation, thing, event] to which it is correlated by the\ndemonstrative conventions (the one to which it “refers”)\nis of a type [footnote omitted] with which the sentence used in making\nit is correlated by the descriptive conventions. (1950a: 122)\n", "\nWhat does “is of a type with which” mean? Austin expands\non his account in the omitted footnote:", "\n\n\n“Is of a type with which” means “is sufficiently\nlike those standard states of affairs with which”. Thus, for a\nstatement to be true one state of affairs must be like\ncertain others, which is a natural relation, but also\nsufficiently like to merit the same\n“description”, which is no longer a purely natural\nrelation. To say “This is red” is not the same as to say\n“This is like those”, nor even as to say “This is\nlike those which were called red”. That things are\nsimilar, or even “exactly” similar, I may\nliterally see, but that they are the same I cannot literally\nsee—in calling them the same colour a convention is involved\nadditional to the conventional choice of the name to be given to the\ncolour which they are said to be. (1950a: 122 fn.2)\n", "\nThe English sentence “This is red” is correlated by the\ndescriptive conventions with a type of way for things to be: a type\ninstanced by all and only those historic situations or states of\naffairs in which a selected thing is red. According to Austin, a\nstating by use of that sentence would be correct if the thing selected\nin the stating via the demonstrative conventions were sufficiently\nlike standard situations or states of affairs in which a selected\nthing is red. So, we rely on the existence of a range of standard\ninstances that are assumed to be of the required type. We can see that\nthe thing selected in this stating, via the demonstrative conventions,\nis now in various ways similar and dissimilar from those standard\ninstances. The question we need to answer is this: Is this thing of\nthe same type as the standard instances with respect to its\ncolour? That is, is it the same colour as they are? According to\nAustin, we cannot answer that question simply by looking. In an at\nleast attenuated sense we must make a decision as to whether the\npresent instance is, in relevant respects, sufficiently\nsimilar to the standard instances as to mandate treating it as of the\nvery same\n type.[11]", "\nNotice that, on Austin’s view, states of affairs (etc.) do not\nper se mandate that they belong to one or another type. To\nthat extent, they do not alone determine which propositional\nstatements are true of them. The things to which true statings\ncorrespond, then, are (in at least that sense) particulars\n (see (2) above).\n The things to which statings correspond, then, appear to be quite\ndifferent from facts as the latter are commonly understood by\nphilosophers. For facts are often thought of as\nproposition-like—as exhaustively captured by instances of the\nform “The fact that p”. And it seems that\nelements of that type would mandate the correctness of one or another\nclassification. Austin’s views about facts are developed a bit\nmore fully in his “Unfair to Facts” (1954ms). There Austin\nmakes clear, first, that he uses “facts”, with\netymological precedent, to speak of particulars. Second, Austin\nsketches a view of propositional fact talk on which it is used as a\nway of indirectly denoting particulars as the elements that make the\nspecified propositions true. However, Austin’s basic account of\ntruth can for the most part be detached from his views about facts and\n fact-talk.[12]", "\nThe role for human judgment or decision in mediating the\nclassification of particulars leaves open that their correct\nclassification as to type might vary depending on specific features of\nthe occasion for so classifying them\n (see (4) above).\n It may be, for example, that for certain purposes an historic state\nof affairs involving a rose is sufficiently like standard situations\ninvolving red things as to warrant sameness of classification, while\nfor different purposes its likeness is outweighed by its\ndissimilarities from the standard cases. Moreover, what are counted as\nstandard cases may vary with the purposes operative in attempting to\nclassify, and may shift as new cases come to be counted as of a\nspecific\n type.[13]", "\nThe precise ways in which our statings depend for their correctness or\nincorrectness on the facts can vary with variation in specific\nfeatures of the occasion, in particular with variation in the intents\nand purposes of conversational participants. As Austin puts it,", "\n\n\nIt seems to be fairly generally realized nowadays that, if you just\ntake a bunch of sentences…impeccably formulated in some\nlanguage or other, there can be no question of sorting them out into\nthose that are true and those that are false; for (leaving out of\naccount so-called “analytic” sentences) the question of\ntruth and falsehood does not turn only on what a sentence is,\nnor yet on what it means, but on, speaking very broadly, the\n\ncircumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences as such are\nnot either true or false. (1962a: 110–111. See also 40–41,\n65)\n", "\nAnd the circumstances can matter in a variety of ways, not simply by\nsupplying, or failing to supply, an appropriate array of facts:", "\n\n\n…in the case of stating truly or falsely, just as in the case\nof advising well or badly, the intents and purposes of the utterance\nand its context are important; what is judged true in a school book\nmay not be so judged in a work of historical research. Consider\n… “Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma”, remembering\nthat Alma was a soldier’s battle if ever there was one and that\nLord Raglan’s orders were never transmitted to some of his\nsubordinates. Did Lord Raglan then win the battle of Alma or did he\nnot? Of course in some contexts, perhaps in a school book, it is\nperfectly justifiable to say so—it is something of an\nexaggeration, maybe, and there would be no question of giving Raglan a\nmedal for it…“Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma”\nis exaggerated and suitable to some contexts and not to others; it\nwould be pointless to insist on its [i.e., the\nsentence’s] truth or falsehood. (1962b: 143–144,\ninterpolation added)\n", "\nIt’s important here to separate two questions. First, is the\nsentence “Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma”\ntrue? Second, is what is stated in using that sentence on a\nparticular occasion, true? In order for the first question to get an\naffirmative answer, every use of the sentence would have to\nbe—or issue in a statement that\n is—true.[14]\n But although the sentence can be used in a schoolbook to make a\nstatement that is true, it might also be used in a work of historical\nresearch, or in support of Raglan’s decoration, in making a\nfalse statement. Hence, the sentence doesn’t take the same\ntruth-value on every occasion: the sentence per se\nis neither true nor false. By contrast, there is no reason to deny\nthat the things that are stated in using the sentence on occasions are\ntrue: in particular, there is no reason to deny that what is stated by\nthe schoolbook occurrence of the sentence is true. So, the second\nquestion can be given an affirmative answer, as long as we are willing\nto allow that a sentence can be used to make different statements on\ndifferent occasions (see also Austin’s discussion of\n“real” in Sense and Sensibilia (1962a:\n62–77) for an array of relevant examples).", "\nWe should avoid a possible misunderstanding of Austin here. His\nargument shows, at most, that whatever combines with the facts to\ndetermine a particular truth-value varies from occasion to occasion.\nThat does nothing to dislodge the natural view that a sentence can\ncarry its meaning with it from occasion to occasion, and thus\npossess a literal meaning. However, if we wish to retain that idea, we\nmust give up on the idea that sentence meaning simply combines with\nthe facts that are being spoken about to determine truth-value: we\nmust reject the idea that sentence meanings determine\ntruth-conditions. Plausibly, we should also give up the idea that\nmeaning alone determines what is stated (at least insofar as the\nlatter determines truth-conditions). In taking this line, we would\nreject views of meaning according to which it is given by appeal to\n truth-conditions.[15]", "\nAustin’s account gives rise to the possibility of utterances in\nwhich no truth-evaluable statement is produced:", "\n\n\nSuppose that we confront “France is hexagonal” with the\nfacts, in this case, I suppose, with France, is it true or false?\nWell, if you like, up to a point; of course I can see what you mean by\nsaying that it is true for certain intents and purposes. It is good\nenough for a top-ranking general, perhaps, but not for a\ngeographer… How can one answer this question, whether it is\ntrue or false that France is hexagonal? It is just rough, and that is\nthe right and final answer to the question of the relation of\n“France is hexagonal” to France. It is a rough\ndescription; it is not a true or a false one. (1962a: 143)\n", "\nWhat Austin characterises in his final denial is the sentence\n“France is hexagonal”, in relation to France. He\nneedn’t, and doesn’t, deny that on occasion, for\nparticular intents and purposes, one might use the sentence to\nstate a truth. However, he suggests that, in some cases, the\ncircumstances of utterance may be such that no truth-evaluable\nstatement is made by the use of a sentence.", "\nSuppose, for example, that someone uttered “France is\nhexagonal” out of the blue, without making manifest any intents\nand purposes. In that case, there would be nothing to go on, in\nseeking to establish whether the utterance was true or false, other\nthan the words used, given their meanings. But those words might have\nbeen used to make a variety of statements, statements whose truth or\nfalsehood depends on the facts in a variety of ways. Hence, unless we\nare willing to allow that the utterance is both true and false, we\nshould withhold that mode of assessment: although such an utterance\nwould involve a perfectly meaningful sentence, it would fail\nto be either true or false. Austin thought that our uses of words are\nalways liable to that sort of failure, especially when we are doing\nphilosophy. When used in cases that are out of the ordinary, or in the\nabsence of the background required to sustain the statement of truths\nor falsehoods, words might—in that sense—fail us.", "\nAustin makes no claims to generality for the account of truth that he\nsketches. However, it’s natural to wonder to what extent the\naccount can naturally be extended in order to take in types of\nstatement that he doesn’t explicitly attempt to bring within its\npurview. Potential pressure points here include statements whose\nexpression involves negation (see 1950a: 128–129, 129 fn.1),\nquantification (see 1962b: 144), or conditionals, and statements of\nnecessary truths. The three main options open to the defender of\nAustin here are the following. First, an attempt might be made to\nbring some cases within the purview of a natural generalization of\nAustin’s account (see, for example, Warnock 1989: 56–61).\nSecond, it might be allowed that some such cases require distinctive\ntreatment, but argued that they can still be connected with the\naccount Austin offers as further species of the truth-genus. Third, an\nattempt might be made to argue that some such cases are so distinctive\nthat the forms of positive appraisal that are appropriate to them are\nnot really forms of appraisal as to\n truth.[16]", "\nLet’s turn to\n (5),\n the question of the extent to which Austin endorses a deflationary\naccount of truth. The promiscuity of the classifier\n“deflationist” has a tendency to render the question\ndifficult to discuss in a useful way. However, we can at least\nconsider some ways in which Austin might be thought to give an\nexplanatory role to truth, or to deny it such a role. It’s clear\nthat Austin wishes to reject Strawson’s very strong form of\ndeflationism, according to which the function of truth is exhaustively\nperformative: saying that a statement is true amounts, precisely, to\nendorsing that statement oneself. Moreover, there is no sign that\nAustin thinks an account can be given of the expression of statements\nby statings that isn’t bound up with consideration of the\nconditions in which their stating would be subject to one or another\nform of positive appraisal—at the most general level,\nconsideration of their correctness-conditions. However, Austin often\ncharacterizes truth and falsity themselves as, in effect, mere labels\nfor positive and negative poles, respectively, in a variety of more\nspecific forms of appraisal.", "\n\n\nWe become obsessed with “truth” when discussing\nstatements, just as we become obsessed with “freedom” when\ndiscussing conduct. So long as we think that what has always and alone\nto be decided is whether a certain action was done freely or was not,\nwe get nowhere: but so soon as we turn instead to the numerous other\nadverbs used in the same connexion (“accidentally”,\n“unwillingly”, “inadvertently”, &c.),\nthings become easier, and we come to see that no concluding inference\nof the form “Ergo, it was done freely (or not freely)” is\nrequired. Like freedom, truth is a bare minimum or an illusory ideal\n(the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about, say, the\nbattle of Waterloo or the Primavera). (1950a: 130; see also\n1956b: 250–251, 1957: 180)\n", "\nAustin’s idea here seems to be the following. There are numerous\nspecific forms of positive appraisal that we employ with respect to\nstatings: they might be fair, reasonable, accurate, precise, adequate,\nsatisfactory and so forth. (Recall that Austin would have taken each\nform of assessment to be occasion-bound: a matter, for example, of\nwhat would be fair and reasonable to judge on this particular\noccasion.) In saying that what is stated in a stating is\ntrue, we are in effect saying that the stating meets the\n“bare minimum” condition of being susceptible to one or\nanother of those specific forms of positive appraisal. It’s\nconsistent with this type of view that our conception of the natures\nof what we state, and of how our statings come to be expressions of\nthose things, is bound up with our conception of the conditions in\nwhich our statings, and what we thereby state, are susceptible to one\nor another form of positive appraisal. To that extent, it differs from\nsome stronger forms of deflationism on which no truth-related mode of\npositive appraisal plays a non-derivative explanatory role. Moreover,\nthe view can take more or less radical forms. Its most radical form\ntreats truth as a mere disjunction of the more specific modes of\npositive appraisal, with no uniform underlying commonality amongst\nthose specific modes. That view would be a distinctive form of\ndeflationism about truth, since it would reject the idea that truth\nper se plays an essential role in explanation. Its less\nradical form allows that truth might impose a uniform necessary\ncondition on the specific modes of positive appraisal, and thereby\nplay an essential role, through its government of the specific modes,\nin the explanation of what is stated in statings. The latter form of\nview wouldn’t count as an interesting form of\ndeflationism, although it might well be an interesting\nposition in its own right.", "\nAustin discusses an important range of ways in which assessment as to\ntruth can cover a variety of more fine-grained modes of appraisal in\nhis “How to Talk” (1953). See also the discussions of this\npaper in Chisholm 1964 and Warnock 1989: 47–56.", "\n(For discussion of Austin’s account of truth, see Barwise and\nEtchemendy 1987; Bennett 1966; Crary 2002; Davidson 1969; Grice 1989:\n3–40; Hansen 2014; Kirkham 1995: 124–140; Mates 1974;\nNarboux 2011; Putnam 1994; Recanati 1994: 1–5, 121–130,\n141–153; Searle 1966; Strawson 1950, 1965; Travis 1991, 2005,\n2008: 1–18, 2011; Warnock 1973c, 1989: 45–64,\n135–145, 163–4 fn.74; White 1967; C.J.F. Williams\n1973.)" ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Language and Truth" }, { "content": [ "\nIn this section, we’ll consider some aspects of Austin’s\ntreatment of speech acts—things done with words (the main\nsources here are: 1962b, 1956b, and 1963; see also 1946: 97–103,\n1950a: 130–133, 1953). The topics we’ll consider are the\nfollowing.", "\nA topic that has figured in some recent discussions, but that we\nwon’t discuss here, is this:", "\nAustin presents the second reason for why sentences do not conspire\nwith the facts to determine truth-values in considering whether there\nis a useful distinction to be drawn between (indicative) sentences\nthat are used to make statements—which Austin labels\nconstatives—and sentences that are useable in the\nperformance of some act—which Austin labels\nperformatives (or sometimes performatory)\n (topic (2) above).[17]\n Austin’s opening list of examples of putative performatives\nincludes: “I take … to be my lawfully wedded\n…”—as uttered in the course of the marriage\nceremony; “I name this ship the Queen\nElizabeth”—as uttered when smashing a bottle against\nthe stern; “I give and bequeath my watch to my\nbrother”—as occurring in a will; “I bet you sixpence\nit will rain tomorrow” (1962b: 5). About these examples, Austin\nwrites:", "\n\n\nIn these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of\ncourse, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my\ndoing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing…[fn.\nStill less anything that I have already done or have yet to\ndo.]…or to state that I am doing it. None of the utterances\ncited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not\nargue it. (1962b: 6)\n", "\nAustin is sometimes read as seeking to defend this view of\nperformatives. However, four features of his presentation suggest that\nhis view is not so straightforward. First, Austin presents the issue\nas concerning the classification by use of utterances of types of\nsentence, and we have already seen that he is in general\nsceptical about alleged associations between sentences and their\noccasional uses. Second, Austin fails here, and elsewhere, to offer\nserious arguments for his assertion that none of the cited utterances\nis either true or false. Third, Austin’s assertion is made using\nthe apparently performative form, “I assert …\n”—a form that appears, moreover, to falsify the\ngeneralisation that performatives lack truth-values. Finally, Austin\nissues the following warning in a footnote, two pages earlier:\n“Everything said in these sections is provisional, and subject\nto revision in the light of later sections” (1962b: 4 fn.1).", "\nAustin goes on to discuss two apparently quite different modes of\nassessment for utterances of the two apparently different types.\nConstatives, as already noted, are assessed along the dimension of\ntruth and falsehood. By contrast, performatives are assessed along\ndimensions of happiness and unhappiness, or\nfelicity and infelicity. Taking the example of an\nutterance of “I take … to be my lawfully wedded …\n”, and simplifying Austin’s discussion, there are two main\nsorts of unhappiness, or infelicity, to which this performative is\nliable. First, there are misfires:", "\n\n\n…if we…utter the formula incorrectly, or if…we\nare not in a position to do the act because we are…married\nalready, or it is the purser and not the captain who is conducting the\nceremony, then the act in question, …marrying, is not\nsuccessfully performed at all, …[it] is not achieved. (1962b:\n15–16)\n", "\nSecond, there are abuses: in these cases, the act is\nperformed, but insincerely, perhaps for example in instituting a\nmarriage of convenience.", "\nIt’s important to see that, even if it were true, in general,\nthat some things done using performatives—e.g., marrying,\nnaming, bequeathing, and betting—are neither true nor false, but\nrather are subject to assessment as happy or unhappy, it would not\nfollow that truth is out of the picture. That would depend, not only\non the basic claim that actions of those types per se are not\ntrue or false, but also on the claim that particular actions of those\ntypes are not also of other types that are assessable as true\nor false. And Austin recognised that actions can be of more than one\ntype (or, perhaps, that distinct actions might be performed\nsimultaneously):", "\n\n\nTo say that I believe you ‘is’ on occasion to accept your\nstatement; but it is also to make an assertion, which is not made by\nthe strictly performatory utterance “I accept your\nstatement”. (1950a: 133)\n", "\nIn the examples that Austin cites, things are done that are not\nassessable as true or false—marrying, naming, betting, etc. But\nas Austin points out, those examples might also involve other things\nbeing done—e.g., the making of statements—that are, or\ninvolve things that are, assessable as true or false. However, even\nthough this undermines Austin’s provisional characterisation of\nperformatives, the possibility that we might sometimes do more than\none thing in using a performative puts pressure on the idea that there\nis a simple connection between sentences and the various things we do\nin using them.", "\nI’ve suggested that Austin’s view of the putative\ndistinction between performatives and constatives is less\nstraightforward than it might at first seem. And the structure of\nAustin (1962b) bears out that assessment. Although much of the book\nseems to be devoted to pursuit of a distinction between performatives\nand constatives, none of the attempts succeeds. It is possible, but\nimplausible, that in the course of the lectures Austin found that he\nwas unable to draw a distinction that he thought should be drawn. A\nmore plausible interpretation is that Austin’s purpose is not to\ndraw such a distinction. Rather it is to argue—through the\nfailures of various attempts to draw the distinction—that there\nis no such simple distinction—no sorting of sentences into those\napt for performative, and those apt for constative, use.", "\nAustin argues against the distinction by appeal to the fact that the\nsame forms of assessment are applicable to utterances apparently of\nboth sorts:", "\n\n\n…unhappiness…seems to characterize both kinds of\nutterance, not merely the performative; and…the requirement of\nconforming or bearing some relation to the facts, different in\ndifferent cases, seems to characterize performatives… (1962b:\n91)\n", "\nAttempts to make a statement are liable both to misfires and abuses.\nFor example, an attempt to make a statement using “France is\nhexagonal” might misfire if there were no such country as\nFrance, or (as discussed above) if no suitable intents and purposes\nwere manifest (1962b: 47–52). And an attempt might be an abuse\nif the speaker failed to believe that France was hexagonal. Attempts\nat performative utterance are liable to assessment either in terms of\ntruth or falsehood, or in terms similarly dependent on conformity with\nthe facts: my utterance of “I warn you that the bull is about to\ncharge” may be liable to criticism as mistaken rather\nthan unhappy if the bull is not about to charge (1962b: 55). More\ngenerally, it is often impossible to decide, just from the words a\nspeaker uses, whether their utterance is susceptible to one or another\nform of assessment. And there are cases like “I state that\n…” which seem to satisfy all formal and lexical\nrequirements for being performative, and yet are used in utterances\n“…which surely are the making of statements, and surely\nare essentially true or false” (1962b: 91). (Austin’s\nideas here also bear on\n topic (4) above.)", "\n(For discussion of Austin’s views about performative utterances,\nsee Bach 1975; G. Bird 1981; Black 1963; Cohen 1964, 1974; Forguson\n1966; Heal 1974; Hornsby 1988, 2006; Jack 1981; Lemmon 1962; Lewis\n1972; Schiffer 1972; Sinnott-Armstrong 1994; Tsohatzidis 2018; Urmson 1977; Warnock\n1973b, 1989: 105–151.)", "\nFrom the wreckage of the initial distinction, Austin assembles a new\nmodel\n (topic (3) above).\n The new model is founded on distinctions among various kinds of thing\nspeakers do—various acts they perform—when they\nproduce an utterance.", "\nAustin’s interest in the types of act so distinguished was\n“…essentially to fasten on the second, illocutionary act\nand contrast it with the other two…” (1962b: 103). What\ndid Austin think was important about the illocutionary act? And what\ndid he think were the dangers inherent in failing to mark it off from\nthe other types?", "\nAustin appears to have thought that the various modes of assessment\nthat he discusses—e.g., true/false, happy/unhappy—apply\nmost fundamentally to the illocutionary act, rather than the\nlocutionary or the perlocutionary\n act.[18]\n One point is that Austin thought that philosophers have had a\ntendency to view some assessments as to happiness (or felicity) as\nreally applying to perlocutionary acts, so as not bearing on the\nspecifically linguistic things that speakers are up to. Another\npoint—and perhaps the point of primary importance—is that\nAustin thought that philosophers have had a tendency to view\nassessments as to truth as applying most fundamentally to locutionary\nacts. Moreover, he thought that philosophers had conceived locutionary\nacts, not as abstractions from illocutionary acts, but rather as\nthings that might be done without any illocutionary purpose, just by\nvirtue of the linguistic expressions employed or their meanings. By\ncontrast, Austin held that locutionary acts are abstracted from\ninstances of illocutionary acts, and that assessment as to truth is\ndirected most fundamentally to the illocutionary act. (We’ll\nconsider below a stronger and a weaker reading of the idea that\nassessment as to truth applies most fundamentally to the illocutionary\nact.)", "\nFor Austin, then, assessment as to truth is of a piece with various\nforms of assessment as to happiness, etc., and like those forms it is\nthe assessment of an act with respect to its goodness or badness. Thus\nAustin’s discussion of illocutionary acts is bound up with his\nother discussions of the ways in which assessment of utterances as to\ntruth is dependent upon specific features of the circumstances of\nutterance. He writes:", "\n\n\nThe truth or falsity of statements is affected by what they leave out\nor put in and by their being misleading, and so on. Thus, for example,\ndescriptions, which are said to be true or false or, if you like, are\n“statements”, are surely liable to these criticisms, since\nthey are selective and uttered for a purpose. It is essential to\nrealize that “true” and false’, like\n“free” and “unfree”, do not stand for anything\nsimple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right and\nproper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these\ncircumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these\nintentions. (1962b: 144–145)\n", "\nAccording to Austin, there is more involved in any such assessment\nthan a simple comparison of requirements imposed by linguistic meaning\nwith the facts. Reflection on the assessment of actions in which we\nspeak and the speech acts that classify them indicates two things:\nfirst, the distinction between assessment as to happiness and\nassessment as to truth is ultimately unprincipled; and, second, some\nmixture of various types of assessment applies to all, or nearly all,\nutterances. These ideas appear to be the basis for a cryptic claim of\nAustin’s\n (mentioned above as topic (4)).\n Exploiting the various modes of appraisal to distinguish five very\ngeneral classes of speech act verbs, Austin writes that", "\n\n\nThey are…quite enough to play Old Harry with two fetishes which\nI admit to an inclination to play Old Harry with, viz. (1) the\ntrue/false fetish, (2) the value/fact fetish. (1962b: 151)\n", "\nAustin’s cryptic suggestion appears to be to the effect that, in\none or another way, classifications of utterances along the true-false\ndimension, or according to whether they are expressions of fact or\nexpressions of value, is—for at least some purposes—too\ncrude. The suggestion is susceptible of a weaker and a stronger\nreading. On the weaker reading, the suggestion is to the effect that,\nwhen the assessment of an utterance is at issue, it is\nessential to consider the force or forces that attach to the\nillocutionary act or acts thereby performed. Since various such acts\nmay have been performed, and since assessment of each act involves\nconsideration of a mix of facts and values, there is no clean way of\nsorting utterances on the basis either of whether or not their primary\nmode of assessment is on the true-false dimension, or of whether their\nprimary function is the expression of fact, rather than the expression\nof value. That leaves open that, with respect to at least some speech\nacts, a locutionary core—a proposition, or propositions, or\npropositional-like element—may be assessed in a way that makes\nno reference to force, for example, along the true-false dimension. On\nthe stronger reading, the claim would be that it is not possible to\ndetach a locutionary core from the force with which it is expressed in\nsuch a way that that core can be assessed without reference to force.\nOn its stronger reading, Austin’s suggestion would have to\ncontend with an aspect of what is known as the Frege-Geach\nproblem: the challenge of explaining logical connections amongst\nspeech acts with different forces where those connections appear to\ndepend upon their sharing (elements of) a locutionary core (see Geach\n1965).", "\n(For discussion of Austin’s distinction amongst locutionary,\nillocutionary, and perlocutionary acts see Bach 1975; Bach and Harnish\n1979; G. Bird 1981; Black 1963; Cerf 1966; Chisholm 1964; Cohen 1964,\n1974; Fiengo 2018; Forguson 1966, 1973; Furberg 1969; Garvey 2014; Geach 1965;\nHornsby 1988, 1994, 2006; Katz 1986; Moltmann 2018; Schiffer 1972; Searle 1968, 1969;\nStrawson 1964a, 1973; Urmson 1977; Vendler 1972; Warnock 1973b, 1989:\n105–151. For discussion specifically of the interaction of\nAustin’s views about the natures of speech acts with his views\nabout truth, see Crary 2002; Quine 1965; Travis 2011; Warnock 1989:\n140–150, 163–164 fn. 74.)" ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Speech Acts and Truth" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAustin’s main discussions of knowledge and perception take place\nin “Other Minds” (1946) and Sense and Sensibilia\n(1962a; see also “Unfair to Facts” [1954ms], which\noverlaps with parts of the lecture series on which Sense and\nSensibilia was based that are excised from the book, and\n“Ifs and Cans” [1956a:\n 230]).[19]\n Stated more baldly than would have been acceptable to Austin, and\nreconstructing slightly, his distinctive views in this area include\nthe following.", "\nA consequence of (3) and (4) is that foundationalism is\nundercut: there are no foundational claims that are especially\ninfallible; and there are no non-foundational claims that are\ndistinctively fallible. It is possible for our judgmental capacities\nto misfire with respect to any subject matter, including e.g., our own\nfeelings or experiences. And it’s possible for their exercise to\nbe sufficiently reliable to give rise to knowledge about ordinary\nmatters, e.g., that there is a pig before one.", "\nThree further side claims that have assumed some importance in recent\nwork are the following." ], "section_title": "3. Knowledge and Perception", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nLet’s begin with some of what Austin says in support of\n (1).\n In his “Other Minds” (1946), Austin sketches a\ndistinction between knowing and believing through appeal to the\ndifferent kinds of challenges that are appropriate to claims to know\nversus claims to believe. First, Austin points out that one who claims\nto know may be challenged to explain how they know, while\nsomeone who claims to believe may be challenged to explain\nwhy they believe. The consequences of failing adequately to\nmeet those challenges are also different: in the first case, the\nconsequences might include that the subject does not know; in\nthe second, the consequence might include, not the subject\ndoesn’t believe, but that they oughtn’t\nto believe. Later, Austin indicates a further basis for the\ndistinction between knowing and believing:", "\n\n…saying “I know”…is not saying\n“I have performed a specially striking feat of cognition,\nsuperior, in the same scale as believing and being sure, even to being\nquite sure”: for there is nothing in that scale\nsuperior to being quite sure. (1946: 99)\n", "\nImportantly, and moving on to claim\n (2),\n Austin holds that knowledge is the upshot of the successful exercise\nof judgmental capacities—which he thinks of as essentially\nlanguage involving—in appropriate circumstances: the successful\nexercise of (judgmental) acumen given (perception- or\ntestimony-based) opportunity. The following two passages are\ncentral to understanding Austin’s views in this area:", "\n\n\nAny description of a taste or sound or smell (or colour) or of a\nfeeling, involves (is) saying that it is like one or some that we have\nexperienced before: any descriptive word is classificatory, involves\nrecognition and in that sense memory, and only when we use such words\n(or names or descriptions, which come down to the same) are we knowing\nanything, or believing anything. But memory and recognition are often\nuncertain and unreliable. (1946: 92).\n\n\n…sensa [the things we sense or perceive] are dumb, and only\nprevious experience enables us to identify them. If we choose\nto say that they “identify themselves” (and certainly\n“recognizing” is not a highly voluntary act of ours), then\nit must be admitted that they share the birthright of all speakers,\nthat of speaking unclearly and untruly. (1946: 97)\n", "\nWe perceive various things, features, events, and states of affairs.\nThe things we perceive are not presented to us as already classified\ninto types. Yet propositional knowledge essentially involves\nclassification: for example, we know that that thing is a\npig. In order to know, we must exercise judgmental capacities,\ntaking stands with respect to the ways the things, features, events,\nand states of affairs are. We must classify the elements into types\nbased on their similarities with elements that we have already\nclassified into types. (Notice that Austin’s view that these\nelements are particulars, articulated in his “Truth”\n(1950a) and “Unfair to Facts” (1954ms), figures\nessentially here.)", "\nReturning to\n (1),\n let’s consider what Austin says about the conditions in which a\nsubject would fail to know. Austin’s discussion is\nhaunted by the following condition: “If I know, I\ncan’t be wrong”. He never quite endorses the\ncondition. He admits at one point that its third person counterpart\nmakes sense, but characterizes the sense it makes by appeal\nto a prohibition on saying “I know it is so, but I may\nbe wrong” (1946: 98).", "\nIt’s clear that Austin would reject the claim that it is a\nnecessary condition on knowing that it be impossible for one\nto have been wrong—impossible, that is, for one to have\nexercised the same capacities in the same circumstances and to have\njudged incorrectly. For given that he holds that judgmental capacities\nare inherently fallible\n ((3) above),\n it would follow that we can never know anything.", "\n\n\nThe human intellect and senses are, indeed, inherently\nfallible and delusive, but not inveterately so. Machines are\ninherently liable to break down, but good machines don’t\n(often). It is futile to embark on a “theory of knowledge”\nwhich denies this liability: such theories constantly end up by\nadmitting the liability after all, and denying the existence of\n“knowledge”. (1946: 98)\n", "\nWhat Austin says here is consistent with the operation of the\ncapacities being reliable in some circumstances, and with their\nreliable operation being such as to give rise to knowledge. So it is\nopen to Austin to hold a view on which knowledge requires that the\nparticular exercises of the capacity to judge on which they\nare based couldn’t have occurred and yet the output judgment be\nmistaken. And it is open to him to hold that if the exercise of\njudgmental capacities is to give rise to knowledge, those capacities\nmust be reliable in the circumstances in which they are\nexercised and given the way they are exercised on that occasion (e.g.,\ncarefully). However, Austin doesn’t make fully explicit that his\nview about knowledge includes either component. And some of what he\nsays—especially in discussion of his performative proposal about\nthe use of “I know”—is in tension with the first\nclaim, on which knowing is incompatible with being\n mistaken.[20]\n (It’s possible that Austin viewed his “Ifs and\nCans” (1956a) discussion of abilities as providing further\nillumination concerning the proper understanding of the formula\n“If one knows, one can’t be wrong”.)", "\nOne potential consequence of Austin’s account concerns\nfoundationalism. Foundationalism typically involves the following\nthree claims. First, many of the ordinary judgments that we\nmake—for example, judgments to the effect that there is a pig\nhere—are inherently risky in the following sense. It’s\npossible for us to make such judgments mistakenly, even in cases in\nwhich we operate as carefully as possible. Second, some of the\njudgments we make, or could make, are not inherently risky: for\nexample, where we are careful only to judge about how things presently\nappear to us, the judgments we make carry no risk of error. Third,\nthen, if our aim is to achieve absolute security, we should avoid\njudgments of the first sort except insofar as they are securely based\nupon judgments of the second sort. (On one view of this type, the\nsecond sort of judgment would be taken to provide evidence on\nwhich judgments of the first sort are based.) Austin’s account\nundermines the first two components of this view. The first component\nis undermined because, although it is always possible to\njudge incorrectly, there are ordinary cases in which our judgments\nabout our environment are, in fact, absolutely secure\n ((4) above):", "\n\n\n…if I watch or some time an animal a few feet in front of me,\nin a good light, if I prod it perhaps, and sniff, and take note of the\nnoises it makes, I may say, “That”s a pig’; and this\ntoo will be “incorrigible”, nothing could be produced that\nwould show that I had made a mistake…if the animal then emerges\nand stands there plainly in view, there is no longer any question of\ncollecting evidence; its coming into view doesn’t provide me\nwith more evidence that it’s a pig, I can now just see\nthat it is, the question is settled. (1962a: 114–115)\n", "\nThe second component is undermined because there is no type\nof judgment, and no type of subject matter, with respect to\nwhich error is impossible\n ((3) above).\n In order to have propositional knowledge even about what I am\nexperiencing right now, I must classify it together with other things\nof the same type. And that requires the exercise of capacities that\nare inherently fallible: I may not have had enough experiences of\nthings of the same sort to classify this one securely; I may not have\nattended to what I am experiencing with sufficient care; I may fail\nadequately to remember similar things that I experienced earlier; and\nso forth (1946: 90–97; 1962a: 104–131).", "\nOrdinary challenges to judgments or claims, including claims to know,\nare sometimes invitations to detail our credentials—our\npossession of appropriate acumen in making judgments of the type in\nquestion. Sometimes, however, they are invitations to detail our\nfacts—the features of the circumstance that figure in\nour judging in the way that we do. For example, we might claim to know\nthat that presented thing is a goldfinch “by the shape of its\nhead”. If we were to detail our facts in that sort of way, then\nwe might be open to further challenge: someone might claim that\nthat’s not enough of a basis on which to judge that the\npresented thing is a goldfinch. In addition to emphasizing the role of\nspecial acumen in this type of case—not just anyone can tell a\ngoldfinch by the shape of its head—Austin makes two important\nclaims about such potential challenges to our facts. First, Austin\nclaims that, in order for such a challenge to be appropriate, the\nchallenger must have in mind some more or less definite lack, for\nexample by pointing out that birds other than goldfinches have heads\nof that shape. Second, Austin writes:", "\n\n\nEnough is enough: it doesn’t mean everything. Enough means\nenough to show that (within reason, and for present intents and\npurposes) it “can’t” be anything else, there is no\nroom for an alternative, competing description of it. It does not\nmean, for example, enough to show it isn’t a stuffed\ngoldfinch. (1946: 84.)\n", "\nThere are at least three, non-exclusive ways of reading Austin’s\nclaim here. The first is as the claim that what suffices for this\nhere to be a goldfinch may not be enough with respect to anything\nin any circumstance. There may be other birds, or other things, with\nheads of the same shape. However, we might still know full well that\nthere are no such birds, and no such things, here; or we may know\nenough about this thing to know it isn’t a bird of that sort, or\none of those other things, even though we haven’t specified how\nwe know in answer to the initial challenge. That is, we may know that\nthis isn’t a stuffed goldfinch—given the rest of\nwhat we know, and the circumstances in which we judge—even\nthough what we explicitly point to in answer to challenges\ndoesn’t alone rule out the possibility. The second way of\nreading Austin here is as allowing that we can know that this is a\ngoldfinch, even though we know that if it’s a stuffed goldfinch,\nthen it is not a goldfinch, and we don’t know that it\nisn’t a stuffed goldfinch. We are entitled—either in\ngeneral, or in circumstances of this sort—to assume or rely upon\nits not being a stuffed goldfinch, even though that is something we\ncan’t rule out and don’t know (see Kaplan 2011 for\ndevelopment of the second way of reading Austin’s views in this\narea). The third way of reading the passage is as claiming that the\nrange of possibilities can vary from occasion to occasion for\njudging or claiming that one knows that this is a goldfinch. On the\nthird reading, it might be impossible, on this occasion, for\nthe presented thing to be a stuffed goldfinch, even though there are\nother occasions on which it would be a possibility. Hence, our facts\ndo not need to foreclose on that possibility on this occasion,\nalthough there might be other occasions on which our facts would need\nto do so. (Travis 2005 develops the third approach. See Millar 2005\nfor objections.)", "\nLet’s turn, then, to\n (7)–(9),\n focusing attention on\n (9),\n the view that utterances of the form “I know that\nsuch-and-such” serve a performative and not a descriptive\nfunction. This is puzzling for at least two reasons: first, the claim\nthat “I know” lacks a descriptive function is apt to seem\nobviously false; and second, it is unclear what, if any, function the\nclaim has in Austin’s account as a whole.", "\nThe main focus of objection to Austin here isn’t the claim that\n“I know that such-and-such” can, on occasion, serve\ndistinctive performative functions. Rather, the concern with\nAustin’s proposal is focused on two more specific claims. First,\nit is focused on the claim that “I know that\nsuch-and-such” always and only serves a distinctive performative\nfunction and so is never at the service of self-description. Second,\nit is focused on the claim that, in cases in which “I know that\nsuch-and-such” is used to serve a performative function, neither\nthe felicity conditions of using the sentence in that way, nor the\ntruth of what, if anything, one thereby states, depend in turn on\nwhether the speaker knows that such-and-such.", "\nAustin is misled here, I think, due to three factors. First, he is\nmisled by similarities between saying “I know that\nsuch-and-such” and saying “I promise that\nsuch-and-such” or “I swear that such-and-such”. But\nthe cases are importantly different. For example, unlike the case of\npromising, in which saying “I promise…” in\nappropriate circumstances makes it so that one has promised…,\nsaying “I know that such-and-such” does not make it so\nthat one knows. Now, as Austin later saw, it is possible to develop an\naccount on which saying “I know that such-and-such” can\nserve more than one purpose and so can function well with respect to\none such purpose while functioning poorly with respect to others (see\ne.g., 1950a: 133 and 1962b). Accordingly, it would be possible to\ndevelop a view on which, for example, saying “I know that\nsuch-and-such” in cases in which one does not know\nwould be improper qua statement (since saying it\ndoesn’t remove the deficit by making it so that one knows),\nwhile properly serving the purpose of giving an audience one’s\nassurance. However, and this is the second reason for which Austin is\nmisled, he had not in “Other Minds” (1946) yet attained\nthe later perspective on which that is a clear possibility. Since he\nnonetheless believes that “I know that such-and-such”\nserves purposes other than statement making, he is forced to efface\nits statement-making function. Finally, and more speculatively, it\nseems that Austin is misled due to his attempting to build into his\naccount a response to a doctrine, common to his Oxford Realist\npredecessors Cook Wilson and Prichard, according to which whether one\nknows or merely believes something is transparent to one. (For\ndiscussion of that feature of Cook Wilson’s and Prichard’s\nviews, see Longworth 2018b, Travis and Kalderon 2013 and Travis 2005.) Although Austin\nrejects the letter of the doctrine, he retains its spirit in\nattempting to provide an account on which avowals of the form “I\nknow that such-and-such” can never be false. (For further\ndiscussion of Austin’s performative proposal, see Warnock 1989:\n24–33, Lawlor 2013.)", "\n(For critical engagement with Austin’s work on knowledge, see\nAyer 1967; Baz 2011; Chisholm 1964; Hetherington 2018; Kaplan 2011, 2018; Lawlor 2013, 2018; Leite 2011; Longworth 2018b, Marion 2000a,b; Martin ms (Other\nInternet Resources); Millar 2005; Putnam 1994; Soames 2003:\n171–193; Stroud 1984: 39–82; Travis 2005; Travis and Kalderon 2013; Warnock 1989:\n32–44; M. Williams 1996: 135–171.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Knowledge" }, { "content": [ "\nLet’s turn now to Austin’s views specifically about\nperception\n ((5) and (6) above).\n Once we have detailed the facts on which a perception-based judgment\nof ours relies, a more general challenge arises concerning our access\nto those facts. In order to exploit the bird’s head shape as the\nbasis for our judgment that it is a goldfinch, it is arguable that we\nmust be able to see (or perhaps feel) the bird and its shape. On some\nviews of perception, however, birds and their shapes are not amongst\nthe things that one can perceive. Austin’s main aim in Sense\n& Sensibilia is to undermine considerations that have been\noffered in favour of the general doctrine that, as he puts it,", "\n\n\n…we never see or otherwise perceive (or “sense”),\nor anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material\nobjects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas,\nimpressions, sense, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.). (1962a:\n2)\n", "\nCentral to those considerations are those organized by versions of\nwhat is known as the argument from illusion\n ((6) above).[21]\n The version of the argument that Austin criticizes can be\nreconstructed as follows. (i) There are cases of illusion in which we\nhave a sensory experience as of seeing something of some sort with\nspecific features but in which nothing has those specific features.\nThis might be because, although we experience something of the sort in\nquestion, the thing we experience lacks the features in question; or\nit might be because we don’t experience a thing of the sort in\nquestion at all. (ii) In those cases, there must be something we\nexperience that has the features in question. Call the things we\nexperience in such cases sense-data. (iii) Since the cases in\nwhich we experience sense-data include cases in which no material\nthings of the sort in question, or with the features in question, are\nexperienced, it follows that sense-data are not (in general) material\nthings, or elements in the environment independent of the individual\nexperiencer. It follows that, in the cases in question, we experience\nthings (or directly experience things) that are distinct from\nmaterial things and we do not thereby experience (or directly\nexperience) material things. (iv) Now it is a general principle about\nexperiences that if we cannot discriminate the objects of two\nexperiences on the basis of introspection, then those experiences must\nhave objects of the same sort. Hence, if one experience has only\nsense-data as its objects, and not material things, and a second\nexperience has as its objects something that we cannot discriminate on\nthe basis of introspection from the objects of the first experience,\nthen the second experience also has sense-data rather than material\nthings as its objects. (v) Since every experience stands in the\nrequired relation to an experience with only sense-data as its\nobjects, every experience has sense-data rather than material things\nas its objects. Hence, we never experience—or never\ndirectly experience—material things", "\nAustin objects to every step in the argument just reconstructed.\nAmongst other complaints, he argues that key terms in the argument\nhave not been properly defined or explained—for instance,\n“material thing” and “sense-data” (1962a: 4,\n7–14, 55), and “directly” (1962a: 14–19). And\nhe objects to the general principle, to which appeal was made in (iv),\npointing out that there are no grounds for thinking that we cannot\nhave experiences with different kinds of object that we nonetheless\ncan’t discriminate on the basis of introspection. For instance,\nwe might experience a bar of soap that looks just like a lemon, and be\nin a position where we couldn’t discriminate the soap from the\nlemon on the basis of introspection. Nonetheless, we would hold that\nthe two experiences have different kinds of objects (1962a:\n 50–52).[22]\n However, what are perhaps his most important complaints target (i)\nand (ii) by exploiting the distinction, initially articulated in\n“Other Minds” (1946), between two elements in perceptually\nbased judgment: the opportunity afforded by sensory perception and\njudgmental acumen.", "\nThe distinction between sensory perception and judgmental acumen\nenables Austin to distinguish between central cases of\nillusion and central cases of delusion, and also to\nsketch explanations of what is going on in those cases that do not\nmake appeal to sense-data. Austin takes the defender of (i) and (ii)\nto argue as follows. First, consider an illusion, for example a stick\nthat looks bent but really isn’t. Such an illusion has two key\nfeatures. First, it clearly involves a distinctive sensory experience.\nSecond, the distinctive sensory experience that it involves is apt to\ngive rise to an erroneous perceptual judgment, to the effect that the\nstick is bent. Now one way of explaining the erroneous perceptual\njudgment is to view it as dictated by the sensory\nexperience—that is, to view it as accurately representing\nfeatures presented in the experience: the bent-ness of that which is\nexperienced. Since the stick is not in fact bent, and that\nwhich is experienced is bent, we have reason to claim that\nthat which is experienced is not identical with the stick. What we\nexperience is sense-data rather than a stick. Moreover, we\nmight also consider more extreme cases in which we make erroneous\nperceptual judgments: cases of delusion or hallucination. For example,\nthere is the case in which an alcoholic person judges that pink rats\nare visible, when in fact there are none. Now, given the proposed\naccount of the case of illusion, that case cannot be distinguished\nfrom the case of delusion by appeal to the fact that, in the former,\nan environmental feature is experienced while, in the latter, there is\nno suitable environmental feature to be experienced. It therefore\nseems natural to treat the two cases as of the same basic type, and to\noffer the same type of explanation for both. Thus, one might be\ntempted to view the rat-delusion as having the following three\nfeatures. First, it involves a distinctive sensory experience. Second,\nthe distinctive sensory experience that it involves dictates\nan erroneous perceptual judgment to the effect that pink rats are\nvisible. Third, that judgment is dictated because it accurately\nrepresents features present in the experience.", "\nAustin responds as follows. First, he exploits the role of judgmental\nacumen in perceptual judgment in order to provide an alternative\nexplanation of cases of illusion (or more generally of things looking\nways that they are not). He allows that some things really do\nlook the way they are sometimes taken to be—the stick\nlooks bent, even though it is not in fact bent. But he holds that\nthose looks are not private features of individual’s\nexperiences. For example, they are available to other perceivers and\nmight be recorded in a photograph. (Austin discusses talk about how\nthings look, and distinguishes it from talk about how things\nseem—which he associates with judgment rather than with\nexperience, in Sense and Sensibilia (1962a: 33–43). See\nalso Jackson 1977: 30–49; Martin 2010; Travis 2004.) However,\nthe way the stick looks, just as much as features like the\nstick’s straightness, can be the basis for perceptual judgments.\nWe can explain why someone is prone to judge that the stick is bent by\nappeal to the stick’s looking bent, rather to\nanything’s being bent, together with the ways in which exercises\nof judgmental acumen can respond erroneously to looks. More generally,\nthere needn’t be anything in particular—any specific\nfeature of what is experienced or any specific look—that figures\nin explaining why individuals are prone to make a specific type of\njudgment on the basis of the experience. For the explanation for each\nindividual’s judgment will depend, not only on what they\nexperience, but also on the types of judgmental capacities that they\nhave. In support of this form of explanation, Austin notes that not\neveryone would be inclined to judge that the stick is bent. For\nexample, noting the presence of water, those whose judgmental\ncapacities are sufficiently well trained might withhold judgment about\nthe stick’s shape (Hinton 1973: 114ff includes a useful\ndiscussion of some of Austin’s claims about illusions).", "\nStandard cases of illusion or misleading appearance of the sort\nwe’ve just considered involve sensory experiences of ordinary\nthings and their features, including their looks, feels, and so forth.\nHowever, because the connection between what is experienced and what\none judges on its basis is not straightforward—because\njudgmental acumen is involved in moving from one to the\nother—there is no general way to read back from the judgments\nsomeone is prone to make to specific features of their sensory\nexperiences. Because such cases of illusion involve experience of\nordinary things, while standard cases of delusion do not, we thus have\na ground on which to distinguish the two sorts of case. For example,\nwe have grounds to distinguish the case in which someone erroneously\njudges that a submerged stick is bent from the case of the alcoholic\nperson who judges that pink rats are visible. But having distinguished\nthe cases in that way, we are liable to become open to two new\nquestions. First, should we allow that the judgment in the delusory\ncase is based on sensory experience? Perhaps, for example, some cases\nof delusion involve dysfunction in the systems responsible for\nperceptual judgment of a sort that give rise to perceptual judgments\nin the absence of any sense-experiential basis for those judgments.\nSecond, even if we allow that a particular delusory judgment is based\nupon sensory experience, should we allow that it involves sensory\nexperience of anything other than elements that are present in the\ndeluded subject’s environment? Perhaps some cases of delusion\ninvolve dysfunctional judgmental responses to what is seen or heard.\nFor example, an alcoholic subject judgment that a pink rat is visible\nmight be a disordered response to an experience of a shadow. Unless we\nare forced to answer both questions affirmatively, we lack the basis\nfor an argument that the deluded subject experiences anything distinct\nfrom the ordinary things and features that they can see, hear,\netc.", "\nAustin doesn’t suggest that there could be no grounds for giving\naffirmative answers to either of those questions. Moreover, it is very\nplausible that such grounds can be provided. It is plausible,\nfor example, that there are distinctive sensory experiences involved\nin what we call seeing double, or seeing afterimages, that cannot be\nexplained simply by appeal to what is present in subjects’\nenvironments. And it is plausible that genuine sensory hallucinations\nare possible—indeed, it is plausible that such hallucinations\nmight figure in explaining the alcoholic person’s judgment.\nHowever, although the style of response just considered is indecisive\nagainst such additional developments of the argument, the resources\nthat it deploys will surely figure in serious engagement with those\ndevelopments. Austin sketches an approach to issues raised by such\nexperiences by attempting to give an account of the reports we are\ninclined to make in such cases—“I see two pieces of\npaper”, “I see pink rats”. Austin’s sketch\naims to explain how such reports can be non-committal about the nature\nof the experiences so-reported, and in particular about whether such\nexperiences have objects at all (1962a: 84–103). It is here in\nparticular that Austin comes close to endorsing a form of\ndisjunctivism about perception (see Soteriou 2009).", "\n(For critical engagement with Austin’s work on perception, see\nAyer 1967, 1969; Burnyeat 1979; Firth 1964; Forguson 1969b; Garvey\n2014; Hinton 1973: 114ff; Hirst 1963; Jackson 1977; Travis and\nKalderon 2013; Leite 2011; Longworth 2019, Marion 2000a,b; Martin ms (Other Internet\nResources), 2000, 2010; Pears 1979; Putnam 1994; Schwartz 2004, 2018;\nSnowdon 2014; Soames 2003: 171–193; Thau 2004; Travis 2004; van\nHulst and Cresswell 2016; Warnock 1989: 11–31.)" ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Sensory perception" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe core of Austin’s work on freedom and action is contained in\n“A Plea for Excuses” (1957) and developed in “Ifs\nand Cans” (1956a), “Three Ways of Spilling Ink”\n(1966), and “Pretending” (1958a). The three most\ndistinctive features of his views in this area are the following." ], "section_title": "4. Action and Freedom", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nLet’s begin with\n (1).\n Austin holds that we can make progress on questions about freedom and\naction by descending from reflection at the general level—i.e.,\nreflection on freedom and action, per se—to reflection\non the more specific ways in which we characterize and appraise\nactions. Austin’s view about the general notions of acting, and\nof acting freely or responsibly, is structurally similar to his view\nabout the general notion of truth: he thinks of such general notions\nas dimension words, grouping a range of more specific\ncharacterizations. The basic range here consists in the various\nspecific ways in which we can characterize happenings as\nactions—for example, as someone running to the shop, or as their\nreading a book. In addition to that basic range are what Austin calls\naggravations: the various specific ways in which we\ncharacterize someone as distinctively responsible for\nsomething that happens—for example, when we characterize someone\nas having done something on purpose, intentionally, or deliberately.\nThe latter three aggravations are the topic of his “Three Ways\nof Spilling Ink” (1966).", "\nIn his “A Plea for Excuses” (1957), Austin argues that the\nminimal requirement for an agent to be responsible for an action of\ntheirs is that it be incorrect to characterize the action in\none or another way as something for which they were not fully\nresponsible—as something for which they have an excuse.\nWe might, for example, characterize a happening as an accident, a\nmistake, involuntary, unintentional, inadvertent, or as due (in part)\nto clumsiness, lack of appreciation of circumstances, or incompetence.\nWhere an act is performed, and where no excuse is available, the\naction is one for which the actor counts as fully responsible. Where\none or another type of excuse is available, the specific type\nof excuses that are available mitigate in one or another specific way\nthe subject’s responsibility for the occurrence of an action or\nits consequences, and so the extent to which the action is to be\ncounted as free. An excuse may do this by mitigating in various ways\nthe subject’s responsibility either for an action considered as\na whole, or for proper sub-components of the action, or for\nconsequences of the action, or by indicating ways in which a happening\nis not (a paradigmatic case of) an action. The varieties of\npretending that Austin discusses in his\n“Pretending” (1958a) are of importance to him, at least in\npart, because they provide for some distinctive forms of excuse. For\ninstance, one might seek to excuse what appeared to be an action of\ntype A by claiming that the agent was only pretending to\nA, pretending to be A-ing, or pretending that they\nwere A-ing. (One of Austin’s aims in the paper is to\ndistinguish those ways of pretending.)", "\nOne of Austin’s central aims in considering the variety of\nexcuses and aggravations is to shed light on the inner composition of\nresponsible action: the division between an action and its\nconsequences; the decomposition of an action into its various\nsub-components or phases; and what Austin calls the machinery of\naction:", "\n\n\n…the detail of the complicated internal machinery we use in\n“acting”—the receipt of intelligence, the\nappreciation of the situation, the invocation of principles, the\nplanning, the control of execution and the rest. (1957: 179)\n", "\nTurning now to\n (2),\n Austin thinks that there is a range of normal or standard cases of\nattributions of action with respect to which modification, by appeal\neither to aggravations or excuses, is impermissible. With respect to\nsuch normal or standard cases, it suffices, in order to characterize\nthe agent’s role within them, simply to say what the agent did.\nTo add that the agent did the thing, for example, either voluntarily\nor involuntarily would be inappropriate, incorrect, or even\nsenseless. Austin summarizes this idea in the slogan, “No\nmodification without aberration”. Amongst the supporting\nexamples he gives are the following:", "\n\n\nI sit in my chair, in the usual way—I am not in a daze or\ninfluenced by threats or the like: here, it will not do to say either\nthat I sit in it intentionally or that I did not sit in it\nintentionally, nor yet that I sat in it automatically or from habit or\nwhat you will. It is bedtime, I am alone, I yawn: but I do not yawn\ninvoluntarily (or voluntarily!), nor yet deliberately. To yawn in any\nsuch peculiar way is just not to just yawn. (1957:\n 190)[23]\n ", "\nAustin holds that modifiers like “voluntarily” and\n“involuntarily” are used to assert the respective presence\nand absence of specific elements in the general machinery of action.\n(He suggests that such apparent pairs do not invariably target the\nvery same specific elements. See 1957: 189–193.) Austin thinks\nthat philosophers have tended to assume that, given that someone has\ndone a specific thing, it will always be a further question whether\nthose pieces of machinery are present or absent. Moreover,\nphilosophers have aligned that question with the question whether the\nactor was responsible for what they did or acted freely. Those\nphilosophers have in effect been making the following pair of\nassumptions. They’ve assumed, first, that there is a single type\nof piece of machinery such that for any action, the action\nwill be free and responsible just in case it involves that machinery.\nSecond, they’ve assumed that the various aggravations serve\nindiscriminately to mark the presence of the required type of\nmachinery, while the various excuses serve to mark its absence.", "\nCharacteristically, Austin suggests that the situation is more\ncomplicated. In particular, although he thinks that, in normal or\nstandard cases, actors are responsible for what they do and act\nfreely, he holds that what makes that so can vary from case to case:\ndifferent types of machinery can account for freedom and\nresponsibility with respect to different types of action. He holds\nmoreover that different aggravating and excusing modifiers target\ndifferent pieces of machinery. And, finally, he holds that the\nappropriate use of a modifier doesn’t depend only upon the\npresence or absence of instances of the type of action-machinery that\nit targets. In addition, it depends upon whether the targeted\nmachinery figures in normal cases of actions of the type in\n question.[24]", "\n(For discussion of Austin’s views about actions and excuses see\nForguson 1969a; Heintz 1981; Holdcroft 1969; Laugier 2018; Narboux 2011; New 1966;\nPetrie 1971; Searle 1966; Zimmerman 2004; Warnock 1989: 65–79;\nWhite 1967.)" ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Actions and Excuses" } ] } ]	[ "Austin, J.L., 1930s–1940s, “The Line and the Cave in\nPlato’s Republic”, reconstructed from notes by\nJ.O. Urmson, in Austin 1979: 288–304.\ndoi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0013", "–––, 1939ms/1967, “Agathon and Eudaimonia\nin the Ethics of Aristotle”, in J.M.E. Moravcsik (ed.)\nAristotle, New York: Doubleday: 261–296; reprinted in\nAustin 1979: 1–31. doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0001", "–––, 1939, “Are There A Priori\nConcepts”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,\nSupplementary Volume 18: 83–105; reprinted in Austin 1979:\n32–54. doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0002", "–––, 1940ms, “The Meaning of a\nWord”, in Austin 1979: 55–75.\ndoi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0003", "–––, 1946, “Symposium: Other Minds\nII”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,\nSupplementary Volume 20: 148–187; reprinted as “Other\nMinds 1” in Austin 1979: 76–116.\ndoi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0004", "–––, 1950a, “Truth”, Proceedings\nof the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24:\n111–128; reprinted in Austin 1979: 117–133.\ndoi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0005", "–––, 1950b, “Intelligent Behaviour: A\nCritical Review of The Concept of Mind”, Times\nLiterary Supplement, Supplementary Volume 24: 111–128;\nreprinted in Oscar P. Wood and George Pitcher (eds.), 1970, Ryle:\nA Collection of Critical Essays, New York: Doubleday, pp.\n48–51.", "–––, 1952a, “Critical Notice:\nAristotle’s Syllogistic by Jan Łukasiewicz”,\nMind, 61(243): 395–404.\ndoi:10.1093/mind/LXI.243.395", "–––, 1952b, “Report on Analysis\n‘Problem’ no. 1: ‘What sort of ‘if’ is\nthe ‘if’ in ‘I can if I choose’?’”\nAnalysis, 12(6): 125–126.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/12.6.125a", "–––, 1953, “How to Talk—some simple\nways”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 53:\n227–246; reprinted in Austin 1979: 134–153.\ndoi:10.1093/aristotelian/53.1.227 and\ndoi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0006", "–––, 1954ms, “Unfair to Facts”, in\nAustin 1979: 154–174. doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0007", "–––, 1956a, “Ifs and Cans”,\nProceedings of the British Academy 42: 109–132;\nreprinted in Austin 1979: 205–232.\ndoi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0009", "–––, 1956b, “Performative\nUtterances”, corrected transcript of an unscripted radio talk\ndelivered in the Third Programme of the BBC, in Austin 1979:\n233–252. doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0010", "–––, 1957, “A Plea for Excuses: The\nPresidential Address”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian\nSociety, 57: 1–30; reprinted in Austin 1979: 175–204.\ndoi:10.1093/aristotelian/57.1.1 and\ndoi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0008", "–––, 1958a, “Pretending”,\nProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume\n32: 261–278; reprinted in Austin 1979: 253–271.\ndoi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0011", "–––, 1958b, “Report on Analysis\n‘Problem’ no. 12: ‘All swans are white or\nblack.’ Does this refer to possible swans on canals on\nMars?’” Analysis, 18(5): 97–98.\ndoi:10.1093/analys/18.5.97", "–––, 1962a, Sense and Sensibilia,\nreconstructed from the manuscript notes by G.J. Warnock, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "–––, 1962b, How to Do Things with\nWords, 2nd edn., M. Sbisà and J.O. Urmson\n(eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.", "–––, 1962c, “Performatif-Constatif”,\nin Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie No. IV, La Philosophie\nAnalytique, Les Editions de Minuit: 271–304.", "–––, 1963, “Performative-Constative”\n(a translation of Austin 1962c by G.J. Warnock) in Charles E. Caton\n(ed.), Philosophy and Ordinary Language, University of\nIllinois Press: 22–54.", "–––, 1966, “Three Ways of Spilling\nInk”, L.W. Forguson (ed.), Philosophical Review, 75(4):\n427–440; reprinted in Austin 1979: 272–287.\ndoi:10.2307/2183222 and doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0012", "–––, 1979, Philosophical Papers,\n3rd edn., J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (eds.), Oxford:\nOxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019283021X.001.0001", "Frege, Gottlob, 1884/1950, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik,\ntranslated by J.L. Austin as The Foundations of Arithmetic: A\nLogico-mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number, Oxford:\nBlackwell.", "Joseph, H.W.B., 1949, Lectures on the Philosophy of\nLeibniz, J.L. Austin (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Ayer, A.J., 1940, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge,\nLondon: Macmillan.", "–––, 1967, “Has Austin Refuted the\nSense-Datum Theory?” Synthese, 17(2): 117–140;\nreprinted in Fann 1969: 284–308. doi:10.1007/BF00485023", "–––, 1969, “Rejoinder to Professor\nForguson”, in Fann 1969: 342–348.", "–––, 1978, Part of My Life, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Ayers, M.R., 1966, “Austin on ‘Could’ and\n‘Could Have’”, Philosophical Quarterly,\n16(63): 113–120. doi:10.2307/2218447", "Bach, Kent, 1975, “Performatives are Statements too”,\nPhilosophical Studies, 28(4): 229–36; reprinted in Bach\nand Harnish 1979. doi:10.1007/BF00353970", "Bach, Kent and Robert M. Harnish, 1979, Linguistic\nCommunication and Speech Acts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.", "Baldwin, Tom, 2010, “George Edward Moore”, The\nStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward\nN. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/moore/>", "Barwise, Jon and John Etchemendy, 1987, The Liar: An Essay on\nTruth and Circularity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Baz, Avner, 2011, “Knowing Knowing (that Such and\nSuch)”, in Gustafsson and Sørli 2011: 146–174.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0006", "Bennett, Jonathan, 1966, “‘Real’”,\nMind, 75(300): 501–515; reprinted in Fann 1969:\n267–283. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXV.300.501", "Berlin, Isaiah, and others, 1973a, Essays on J.L. Austin,\nOxford: Clarendon Press.", "–––, 1973b, “Austin and the Early\nBeginnings of Oxford Philosophy”, in Berlin and others 1973a:\n1–16.", "Bird, Alexander, 1998, “Dispositions and Antidotes”,\nPhilosophical Quarterly, 48(191): 227–34.\ndoi:10.1111/1467-9213.00098", "Bird, Graham, 1981, “Austin’s Theory of Illocutionary\nForce”, in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling Jr., and H.K. Wettstein\n(eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume VI),\nMinneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 345–370.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00445.x", "Black, Max, 1963, “Austin on Performatives”,\nPhilosophy, 38(145): 217–226; reprinted in Fann 1969:\n401–411. doi:10.1017/S003181910006174X", "Burnyeat, Myles, 1979, “Conflicting Appearances”,\nProceedings of the British Academy, 65: 69–111.", "Cartwright, Richard L., 1962, “Propositions”, in R.J.\nButler (ed.) Analytical Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell:\n179–203; reprinted in Cartwright 1987 Philosophical\nEssays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.", "Cavell, Stanley, 1965, “Austin at Criticism”,\nPhilosophical Review, 74(2): 204–219; reprinted in Fann\n1969: 59–75. doi:10.2307/2183265 ", "Cerf, Walter, 1966, “Critical Review of How to Do Things\nwith Words”, Mind, 75(298): 262–285;\nreprinted in Fann 1969: 351–379.\ndoi:10.1093/mind/LXXV.298.262", "Chisholm, Roderick M., 1964, “Austin’s\nPhilosophical Papers”, Mind, 73(289):\n1–26; reprinted in Fann 1969: 101–126.\ndoi:10.1093/mind/LXXIII.289.1", "Clarke, Randolph, 2009, “Dispositions, Abilities to Acts,\nand Free Will: The New Dispositionalism”, Mind,\n118(470): 323–351. doi:10.1093/mind/fzp034", "Cohen, L. Jonathan, 1964, “Do Illocutionary Forces\nExist?” Philosophical Quarterly, 14(55): 118–137;\nreprinted in Fann 1969: 420–444. doi:10.2307/2955549", "–––, 1974, “Speech Acts”, T. Sebcok\n(ed.) Current Trends in Linguistics XII, The Hague: Mouten de\nGruyter.", "Crary, Alice, 2002, “The Happy Truth: J.L. Austin’s\nHow to Do Things with Words”, Inquiry, 45(1):\n59–80. doi:10.1080/002017402753556616", "Dancy, J., 2010, “Harold Arthur Prichard”, The\nStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward\nN. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/prichard/>.", "Davidson, Donald, 1969, “True to the Facts”,\nJournal of Philosophy, 66(21): 748–764.\ndoi:10.2307/2023778 ", "de Gaynesford, Maximilian, 2009, “Incense and Insensibility: Austin\non the ‘Non-Seriousness’ of Poetry”, Ratio,\n22(4): 463–485. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00445.x", "–––, 2018, “Uptake in Action”,\nin Savas L. Tsohatzidis ed. Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical\nEssays, pp. 79–95, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. doi:10.1017/9781316421840.005", "Derrida, Jacques, 1977, “Signature, Event, Context”,\nGlyph 1, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press: 172–197;\nreproduced in Alan Bass (trans.) 1982 Margins of Philosophy,\nBrighton: Harvester Press: 307–330. References to\nreproduction.", "Fann, K.T. (ed.), 1969, Symposium on J.L. Austin, London:\nRoutledge & Kegan Paul.", "Fara, Michael, 2008, “Masked Abilities and\nCompatibilism”, Mind, 117(468): 843–865.\ndoi:10.1093/mind/fzn078", "Fiengo, Robert, 2018, “On the Representation of Form and\nFunction: Imperative Sentences”, in Savas L. Tsohatzidis\ned. Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays,\npp. 60–78, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. doi:10.1017/9781316421840.004", "Firth, Roderick, 1964, “Austin and the Argument from\nIllusion”, Philosophical Review, 73(3): 372–382;\nreprinted in Fann 1969: 254–266. doi:10.2307/2183663 ", "Forguson, L.W., 1966, “In Pursuit of Performatives”,\nPhilosophy, 41(158): 341–347; reprinted in Fann 1969:\n412–419. doi:10.1017/S0031819100058885", "–––, 1969a, “Austin’s Philosophy of\nAction”, in Fann 1969: 127–147.", "–––, 1969b, “Has Ayer Vindicated the\nSense-Datum Theory?” in Fann 1969: 309–341.", "–––, 1973, “Locutionary and Illocutionary\nActs”, in Berlin 1973a: 160–185.", "Furberg, M., 1969, “Meaning and Illocutionary Force”,\nin Fann 1969: 445–468.", "Garvey, B. (ed.), 2014, J.L. 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Austin, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.001.0001", "Gustafsson, Martin, 2011, “Introduction: Inheriting\nAustin”, in Gustafsson and Sørli 2011: 1–31.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0001", "Hacker, P.M.S., 2004, “Austin, John Langshaw\n(1911–1960)”, Oxford Dictionary of National\nBiography, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\ndoi:10.1093/ref:odnb/30505 ", "Hampshire, Stuart, 1960, “J.L. Austin,\n1911–1960”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian\nSociety, 60: 1–14; reprinted in Fann 1969: 33–48.\ndoi:10.1093/aristotelian/60.1.ib", "–––, 1965, “A Symposium on Austin’s\nMethods: J.L. Austin and Philosophy”, Journal of\nPhilosophy, 62(19): 511–513 (abstract only). Printed in\nfull for the first time as part of “A Symposium on Austin’s\nMethod” in Fann 1969: 76–98. doi:10.2307/2023744 ", "Hansen, Nat, 2014, “J.L. Austin and Literal Meaning”,\nEuropean Journal of Philosophy, 22(4): 617–632.\ndoi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00510.x", "Heal, Jane, 1974, “Explicit Performative Utterances and\nStatements”, Philosophical Quarterly, 24(95):\n106–121. doi:10.2307/2217715", "Heintz, Lawrence L., 1981, “The Logic of Defenses”,\nAmerican Philosophical Quarterly, 18(3): 243–248.", "Hetherington, Stephen, 2018, “Knowledge and\nKnowledge-Claims: Austin and Beyond”, in Savas L. Tsohatzidis\ned. Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays,\npp. 206–222, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. 10.1017/9781316421840.011", "Hinton, J.M., 1973, Experiences: An Inquiry into Some\nAmbiguities, Oxford: Clarendon Press.", "Hirst, R.J., 1963, “A Critical Study of Sense and\nSensibilia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 13(51):\n162–170; reprinted in Fann 1969: 243–253.\ndoi:10.2307/2217192", "Holdcroft, David, 1969, “A Plea for Excuses?”\nPhilosophy, 44(170): 314–330.\ndoi:10.1017/S003181910000944X", "Hornsby, Jennifer, 1988, “Things Done with Words”, in\nJ. Dancy, J.M.E. Moravcsik, and C.C.W. Taylor (eds.), Human\nAgency: Language, Duty, and Value, Stanford, CA: Stanford\nUniversity Press: 27–46.", "–––, 1994, “Illocution and Its\nSignificance”, in Savas L. Tsohatzdis (ed.) Foundations of\nSpeech Act Theory, London: Routledge: 187–207.", "–––, 2006, “Speech Acts and\nPerformatives”, in Ernest Lepore and Barry .C. 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Tsohatzidis\ned. Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays,\npp. 119–142, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. doi:10.1017/9781316421840.007", "Lawlor, Krista, 2013, Assurance: An Austinian View of\nKnowledge and Knowledge Claims, Oxford: Oxford University\nPress.", "Lawlor, Krista, 2018, “Austin on Perception, Knowledge, and\nMeaning”, in Savas L. Tsohatzidis ed. Interpreting\nJ. L. Austin: Critical Essays, pp. 165–185, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316421840.009", "Leite, Adam, 2011, “Austin, Dreams, and Scepticism”,\nin Gustafsson and Sørli 2011: 78–113.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0004", "Lemmon, E.J., 1962, “On Sentences Verifiable by their\nUse”, Analysis, 22(4): 86–9. doi:10.2307/3327029\n", "Lewis, David K., 1972, “General Semantics”, in D.\nDavidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics for Natural\nLanguage, Dordrecht: Reidel: 169–218; reprinted with\npostscripts in Lewis, 1983, Philosophical Papers (Volume 1),\nOxford: Oxford University Press.", "Locke, Don, 1962, “Ifs and Cans Revisited”,\nPhilosophy, 37(141): 245–256.\ndoi:10.1017/S0031819100061982", "Longworth, Guy, 2018a, “The Ordinary and the Experimental: Cook Wilson and Austin on Method in Philosophy”,\nBritish Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26(5): 939–960.\ndoi:10.1080/09608788.2017.1413539", "–––, 2018b, “Enough is Enough: Austin on\nKnowing”, in Savas L. Tsohatzidis ed. Interpreting\nJ. L. Austin: Critical Essays, pp. 186–205, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316421840.010", "–––, 2019, “Settling a Question: Austin and Disjunctivism”, in Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn, and Duncan Pritchard eds. New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. London: Routledge.", "Marion, Mathieu, 2000a, “Oxford Realism: Knowledge and\nPerception I”, British Journal for the History of\nPhilosophy, 8(2): 299–338.\ndoi:10.1080/09608780050043235", "–––, 2000b, “Oxford Realism: Knowledge and\nPerception II”, British Journal for the History of\nPhilosophy, 8(3): 485–519. doi:10.1080/096087800442156", "–––, 2009, “John Cook Wilson”,\nThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010\nEdition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/wilson/>.", "Martin, M.G.F., 1997, “The Reality of Appearances”, in\n\nThought and Ontology, M. 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Austin: Critical Essays,\npp. 34–59, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress. doi:10.1017/9781316421840.003", "Moore, A.W., 2000, “Arguing with Derrida”,\nRatio, 13(4): 355–80. doi:10.1111/1467-9329.00134", "Moore, G.E., 1912, Ethics, Oxford: Oxford: University\nPress.", "Narboux, J.-P., 2011, “‘There’s Many a Slip\nbetween Cup and Lip’: Dimension and Negation in Austin”,\nin Gustafsson and Sørli 2011: 204–240.\ndoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0008", "New, C.G., 1966, “A Plea for Linguistics”,\nMind, 75(299): 368–384; reprinted in Fann 1969:\n148–165. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXV.299.368", "Nowell-Smith, Patrick H., 1954, Ethics, Harmondsworth:\nPelican Books.", "–––, 1960, “Ifs and Cans”,\nTheoria, 26(2): 85–101; reprinted in Fann 1969:\n166–181. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1960.tb00557.x", "Passmore, John, 1957, A Hundred Years of Philosophy,\nLondon: Duckworth.", "Pears, David, 1962, “An Original Philosopher”,\nTimes Literary Supplement, Febrary 9(3128): 81–83;\nreprinted in Fann 1969: 49–58.", "–––, 1973, “Ifs and Cans”, in Berlin\n1973a: 90–140.", "–––, 1979, “A Comparison between\nAyer’s Views about the Privilege of Sense-Datum Statements and\nthe Views of Russell and Austin”, in Graham F. Macdonald (ed.),\nPerception and Identity, London: Macmillan: 61–83.", "Petrie, Hugh G., 1971, “Austin’s Usage of\n‘Intentional’”, Mind, 80(319):\n441–444. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXX.319.441", "Pitcher, George (ed.), 1964, Truth, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:\nPrentice Hall.", "–––, 1973, “Austin: a personal\nmemoir”, in Berlin 1973a: 17–30.", "Price, H.H., 1932, Perception, London: Methuen.", "Prichard, H.A., 1979, Moral Obligation, Oxford: Clarendon\nPress.", "Putnam, Hilary, 1962, “The Analytic and the\nSynthetic”, in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota\nStudies in the Philosophy of Science 3, Minneapolis: University\nof Minnesota Press: 358–397.", "–––, 1994, “Sense, Nonsense, and the\nSenses: An Inquiry Into the Power of the Human Mind”,\nJournal of Philosophy, 91(9): 445–517.\ndoi:10.2307/2940978 ", "Quine, W.V.O., 1965, “J.L. Austin: Comment”,\nJournal of Philosophy, 62(19): 509–510 (abstract only).\nPrinted in full for the first time as part of “A Symposium on\nAustin’s Method” in Fann 1969: 76–98. doi:10.2307/2023743\n", "Recanati, François, 1994, Literal Meaning,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Reimer, Marga, 2018, “Exploring Austin’s Galaxy: Searching\nfor Truth through the Lens of Ordinary Language”, in Savas\nL. Tsohatzidis ed. Interpreting J. L. 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Austin: Critical Essays, pp. 143–164, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316421840.008", "Searle, John R., 1966, “Assertions and Aberrations”,\nin Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore (eds.), British Analytical\nPhilosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 41–54;\nreprinted in Fann 1969: 205–218.", "–––, 1968, “Austin on Locutionary and\nIllocutionary Acts”, Philosophical Review, 77(4):\n405–424; reprinted in Berlin 1973a: 141–159.\ndoi:10.2307/2183008 ", "–––, 1969, Speech Acts, Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press.", "–––, 1977, “Reiterating the Differences: A\nReply to Derrida”, Glyph 2, Baltimore, MD: Johns\nHopkins Press: 198–208.", "–––, 2005, “J.L. Austin\n(1911–1960)”, in A.P. 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Austin, London:\nRoutledge.", "Wheatley, Jon, 1969, “Austin on Truth”, in Fann 1969:\n226–240.", "White, Alan R., 1967, “Mentioning the Unmentionable”,\nAnalysis, 27(4): 113–118; reprinted in Fann 1969:\n219–225. doi:10.2307/3327002 ", "Williams, C.J.F., 1973, “Truth: or Bristol Revisited\nI”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,\nSupplementary Volume 47: 121–134.", "Williams, Michael, 1996, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological\nRealism and the Basis of Skepticism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton\nUniversity Press.", "Williamson, Timothy, 2000, Knowledge and its Limits,\nOxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019925656X.001.0001", "Wisdom, J., 1946, “Symposium: Other Minds I”,\nProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume\n20: 122–147.", "Zimmerman, Michael J., 2004, “Another Plea for\nExcuses”, American Philosophy Quarterly, 41(3):\n259–266." ]	[ { "href": "../abilities/", "text": "abilities" }, { "href": "../action/", "text": "action" }, { "href": "../ayer/", "text": "Ayer, Alfred Jules" }, { "href": "../compatibilism/", "text": "compatibilism" }, { "href": "../contextualism-epistemology/", "text": "contextualism, epistemic" }, { "href": "../closure-epistemic/", "text": "epistemic closure" }, { "href": "../freewill/", "text": "free will" }, { "href": "../grice/", "text": "Grice, Paul" }, { "href": "../incompatibilism-arguments/", "text": "incompatibilism: arguments for" }, { "href": "../knowledge-analysis/", "text": "knowledge: analysis of" }, { "href": "../moore/", "text": "Moore, George Edward" }, { "href": "../moral-responsibility/", "text": "moral responsibility" }, { "href": "../perception-disjunctive/", "text": "perception: the disjunctive theory of" }, { "href": "../perception-problem/", "text": "perception: the problem of" }, { "href": "../pragmatics/", "text": "pragmatics" }, { "href": "../prichard/", "text": "Prichard, Harold Arthur" }, { "href": "../sense-data/", "text": "sense data" }, { "href": "../speech-acts/", "text": "speech acts" }, { "href": "../states-of-affairs/", "text": "states of affairs" }, { "href": "../strawson/", "text": "Strawson, Peter Frederick" }, { "href": "../tropes/", "text": "tropes" }, { "href": "../truth/", "text": "truth" }, { "href": "../truth-deflationary/", "text": "truth: deflationation about" }, { "href": "../wilson/", "text": "Wilson, John Cook" } ]
authenticity	Authenticity	First published Thu Sep 11, 2014; substantive revision Thu Feb 20, 2020	[ " The term ‘authentic’ is used either in the strong sense\nof being “of undisputed origin or authorship”, or in a\nweaker sense of being “faithful to an original” or a\n“reliable, accurate representation”. To say that something\nis authentic is to say that it is what it professes to be, or what it\nis reputed to be, in origin or authorship. But the distinction between\nauthentic and derivative is more complicated when discussing\nauthenticity as a characteristic attributed to human beings. For in\nthis case, the question arises: What is it to be oneself, at one with\noneself, or truly representing one’s self? The multiplicity of puzzles\nthat arise in conjunction with the conception of authenticity connects\nwith metaphysical, epistemological, and moral issues (for recent discussion, see Newman and Smith 2016; Heldke and Thomsen 2014). On the one hand,\nbeing oneself is inescapable, since whenever one makes a choice or\nacts, it is oneself who is doing these things. But on the other hand,\nwe are sometimes inclined to say that some of the thoughts, decisions\nand actions that we undertake are not really one’s own and\nare therefore not genuinely expressive of who one is. Here, the issue\nis no longer of metaphysical nature, but rather about\nmoral-psychology, identity and responsibility.", "When used in this latter sense, the characterization describes a\nperson who acts in accordance with desires, motives, ideals or beliefs\nthat are not only hers (as opposed to someone else’s), but that also\nexpress who she really is. Bernard Williams captures this when he\nspecifies authenticity as “the idea that some things are in some\nsense really you, or express what you are, and others aren’t”\n(quoted in Guignon 2004: viii).", "Besides being a topic in philosophical debates, authenticity is\nalso a pervasive ideal that impacts social and political\nthinking. In fact, one distinctive feature of recent Western\nintellectual developments has been a shift to what is called the\n“age of authenticity” (Taylor 2007; Ferrarra 1998).\nTherefore, understanding the concept also involves investigating its\nhistorical and philosophical sources and on the way it impacts the\nsocio-political outlook of contemporary societies." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Origins and Meaning of the Concept of Authenticity", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Sincerity and Authenticity", "1.2 Autonomy and Authenticity", "1.3 Authenticity and the self" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Critique of Authenticity", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Conceptions of Authenticity", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Kierkegaard and Heidegger", "3.2 Sartre and de Beauvoir" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Recent Accounts of Authenticity", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Origins and Meaning of the Concept of Authenticity", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "A number of significant cultural changes in the seventeenth and\neighteenth centuries led to the emergence of a new ideal in the\nWestern world (Trilling 1972). During this period, human beings came to be\nthought of more as individuals than as placeholders in systems of\nsocial relations. This emphasis on the importance of the individual is\nseen in the prevalence of autobiographies and self-portraits, where\nthe individual becomes the centre of attention not because of\nextraordinary feats or access to special knowledge, but because he or\nshe is an individual.", "In the same period, society comes to be seen not as an organic\nwhole of interacting components, but as an aggregate of individual\nhuman beings, a social system with a life of its own, which presents\nitself to the individual as not itself quite human but rather as\nartificial, the result of a “social contract”. Being human\nis understood as being best achieved through being unique and\ndistinctive, even when these collide with certain social norms. At the\nsame time, there is an increasing awareness of what Charles Taylor\n(1989) calls “inwardness” or “internal\nspace”. The result is a distinction between one’s private and\nunique individuality, and one’s public self (Taylor 1991; Trilling\n1972).", "With these social changes there is a sharp shift in the conceptions\nof approbation and disapproval that are commonly used in judging\nothers and oneself. For instance, concepts like sincerity and honor\nbecome obsolescent (Berger 1970). In earlier times, a sincere person\nwas seen as someone who honestly attempts to neither violate the\nexpectations that follow from the position he holds in society, nor to\nstrive to appear otherwise than he ought to. However, by the time of\nHegel, the ideal of sincerity had lost its normative appeal. Hegel\npolemically refers to sincerity as “the heroism of dumb\nservice” (Hegel 2002 [1807]: 515) and launches an attack on the\nbourgeois “honest man,” who passively internalizes a\nparticular conventional social ethos. In the condition of sincerity,\nthe individual is uncritically obedient to the power of\nsociety—a conformity that for Hegel leads to subjugation and a\ndeterioration of the individual (Hegel 2002 [1807]; Golomb 1995: 9;\nTrilling 1972). For Hegel, in the progress of “spirit”,\nthe individual consciousness will eventually move from this condition\nof sincerity to a condition of baseness, in which the individual\nbecomes antagonistic to external societal powers and achieves a\nmeasure of autonomy. Hegel shows this clearly in a comment on\nDiderot’s Rameau’s Nephew, a story in which the narrator\n(supposedly Diderot himself) is portrayed as the reasonable, sincere\nman who respects the prevailing order and who has achieved bourgeois\nrespectability. In contrast, the nephew is full of contempt for the\nsociety in which he figures as a worthless person. However, he is in\nopposition to himself, because he still aspires to a better standing\nin a society, which he believes has nothing but emptiness to offer\n(Despland 1975: 360; Golomb 1995: 13–15). For Hegel, the\nnarrator is an example of the sincere, honest soul, while the nephew\nfigures as the “disintegrated,” alienated\nconsciousness. The nephew is clearly alienated, but for Hegel this\nalienation is a step in the progression towards autonomous existence\n(Williams 2002: 190).", "In the midst of this conceptual change, the term\n‘authenticity’ becomes applicable in demarcating a\nsomewhat new set of virtues. The older concept of sincerity, referring\nto being truthful in order to be honest in one’s dealings with others,\ncomes to be replaced by a relatively new concept of authenticity,\nunderstood as being true to oneself for one’s own benefit. Earlier,\nthe moral advice to be authentic recommended that one should be true\nto oneself in order thereby to be true to others. Thus,\nbeing true to oneself is seen as a means to the end of\nsuccessful social relations. In contrast, in our contemporary\nthinking, authenticity as a virtue term is seen as referring to a way\nof acting that is choiceworthy in itself (Ferrara 1993; Varga\n2011a; Varga 2011b)." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Sincerity and Authenticity" }, { "content": [ "The growing appeal of the idea of authenticity has led to the\nemergence of a highly influential modern “ethic of\nauthenticity” (Ferrara 1993; Ferrara 2017). This ethic acknowledges the value\nof the dominant “ethic of autonomy” that shapes modern\nmoral thought (Schneewind 1998; Dworkin 1988). The idea of autonomy\nemphasizes the individual’s self-governing abilities, the independence\nof one’s deliberation from manipulation and the capacity to decide for\noneself. It is connected to the view that moral principles and the\nlegitimacy of political authority should be grounded in the\nself-governing individual who is free from diverse cultural and social\npressures. According to the ethic of autonomy, each individual should\nfollow those norms he or she can will on the basis of rational\nreflective endorsement. To some extent, authenticity and autonomy\nagree in supposing that one should strive to lead one’s life according\nto one’s own reasons and motives, relying on one’s capacity to\nfollow self-imposed guidelines. In both cases, it is crucial\nthat one has the ability to put one’s own behavior under reflexive\nscrutiny and make it dependent on self-determined goals (Honneth\n1994).", "One crucial difference is that the ethic of authenticity introduces\nthe idea that there are motives, desires and commitments that\nsometimes should outweigh the restrictions of rational\nreflection. This is because those motives are so fundamental to the\ncohesion of one’s own identity that overriding them would mean\ndisintegrating the very self which is necessary to be a moral\nagent. The point is that there are types of moral philosophical\nreasoning that can be repressive if they arise from “an\nautonomous moral conscience not complemented by sensitivity to the\nequilibrium of identity and by authenticity” (Ferrara 1993:\n102). Besides leading an autonomous life, guided by one’s own,\nnon-constrained reasons and motives, authenticity requires that these\nmotives and reasons should be expressive of one’s\nself-identity. Authenticity guides the moral agent to follow only\nthose “moral sources outside the subject [that speak in\na language] which resonate[s] within him or her”, in\nother words, moral sources that accord with “an order which is\ninseparably indexed to a personal vision” (Taylor 1989:\n510). Hence, authenticity entails an aspect that lies beyond the scope\nof autonomy, namely, a “language of personal resonance”\n(Taylor 1991: 90). This points to the gap between (Kantian) autonomy\nand authenticity: one can lead an autonomous life, even if this way of\nliving fails to express a person’s self-understanding.", " In recent years, more attention has been devoted to highlighting how autonomy and authenticity can come apart (e.g. Oshana 2007; Roessler 2012; MacKay forthcoming). Some argue that authenticity demands more than is necessary for autonomy: a person does not have to reflectively endorse key aspects of her identity in order to qualify as autonomous (Oshana 2007). If she acknowledges that aspects of her identity contradict her self-conception, she might still be autonomous, even if this acknowledgement injects ambivalence into her life.", " In all, the ideal of authenticity does not object to the importance\nof the self-given law, but disagrees that full freedom consists in\nmaking and following such a law (Menke 2005: 308). It is not just\nabout being involved in the authorship of such a law, but about how\nthis law fits with the wholeness of a person’s life, and how or\nwhether it expresses who the person is. In this sense, the idea of\nautonomy already represents a counterposition to an ethic that is\nsolely concerned with strict adherence to social norms." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Autonomy and Authenticity" }, { "content": [ "Another decisive factor in the development of the ideal of\nauthenticity was that it emerged together with a distinctively modern\nconception of the self. This is visible in the work of Rousseau, who\nargues that the orientation toward life that should guide the conduct\none chooses should come from a source within. This led to questions\nabout inwardness, self-reflection and introspection, many of them\naddressed in his Confessions (1770). When the space of\ninteriority becomes a guiding authority, the individual must detect\nand distinguish central impulses, feelings and wishes from ones that\nare less central or conflict with one’s central motives. In other\nwords, interiority must be divided into what is at the core and what\nis peripheral. In this picture, the measure of one’s actions is\nwhether they spring from and express essential aspects of one’s\nidentity or whether they come from a peripheral place.", "Such a conception of the self exhibits decisive parallels to the\ntradition of “religious individualism” that centers\nreligious life on the individual and stresses the importance of\ninwardness and the introspective examination of one’s inner motives,\nintentions and conscience. Investigating the characteristics of the\nmodern subject of inwardness, Foucault (1980: 58–60) suggests\nthat “it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret\nnature, ‘demands’ only to surface.” For Foucault,\nconfession—the look inward to monitor one’s interior life and to\ntell certain “truths” about oneself—has become a\npart of a cultural life, reaching from religious contexts to\npsychological therapy. The radicalization of the distinction between\ntrue and false interiority has led to new possibilities; inner states,\nmotivations and feelings are now increasingly thought of as\nobjectifiable and malleable in different contexts.", " Rousseau also adds that acting on motives that spring from the\nperiphery of the self, while ignoring or denying essential aspects of\none’s self, simply amounts to self-betrayal and annihilation of the\nself. Rousseau’s The New Heloise (1997 [1761]) emphasizes\nthis aspect by showing how the novel accentuates the significant costs\nand the potential self-alienation involved in suppressing one’s\ndeepest motivations. But, in addition, in the Discourse on the\nOrigin of Inequality, Rousseau argues that, with the emergence of\na competitive public sphere, the ability to turn inward is\nincreasingly compromised, because competitive relations require\nintense role-playing, which Rousseau calls an “excessive\nlabor” (Rousseau 1992 [1754]: 22). The ongoing instrumental\nrole-playing not only causes alienation, but ultimately inequality and\ninjustice, since it destroys the immanent moral understanding with\nwhich, according to Rousseau, humans are hard-wired. Social life requires identification with social roles, but because role identity is determined by other people’s normative expectations, role-playing leads to a tension that might be understood as a matter of politics more than anything else (Schmid 2017). \n" ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Authenticity and the self" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "The idea of autonomy—the view that each individual must\ndecide how to act based on his or her own rational deliberations about\nthe best course of action—has in many ways paved the way for the\nidea of authenticity. However, authenticity goes beyond autonomy by\nholding that an individual’s feelings and deepest desires can outweigh\nboth the outcome of rational deliberation in making decisions, and our\nwillingness to immerse ourselves into the reigning norms and values of\nsociety. Whereas sincerity generally seems to accept a given social\norder, authenticity becomes an implicitly critical concept, often\ncalling into question the reigning social order and public opinion. In\nRousseau’s optic, one of our most important projects is to avert from\nthe social sphere and to unearth what is truly us underneath\nthe ‘masks’ that society forces on us. But when\nauthenticity comes to be regarded as something like sincerity for its\nown sake (Ferrara 1993: 86), it becomes increasingly hard to see what\nthe moral good is that it is supposed to bring into being.", "A frequently mentioned worry with the ideal of authenticity is that\nthe focus on one’s own inner feelings and attitudes may breed a\nself-centered preoccupation with oneself that is anti-social and\ndestructive of altruism and compassion toward others. Christopher\nLasch (1979)\npoints out similarities between the clinical disorder referred to as\nNarcissistic Personality Disorder and authenticity. According to\nLasch, narcissism and authenticity are both characterized by deficient\nempathic skills, self-indulgence and self-absorbed\nbehavior. Similarly, Allan Bloom (1987: 61) maintains that the culture\nof authenticity has made the minds of the youth “narrower and\nflatter,” leading to self-centeredness and the collapse of the\npublic self. While Lasch and Bloom worry about the threat that the\nself-centeredness and narcissism of the “culture of\nauthenticity” poses to morality and political coherence, Daniel\nBell voices worries about its economic viability. What Bell fears is\nthat the “megalomania of self-infinitization” that comes\nwith the culture of authenticity will erode the foundations of market\nmechanisms that are “based on a moral system of reward rooted in\nthe Protestant sanctification of work” (Bell 1976: 84).\nMore recently, critics have argued that when properly analyzed, authenticity demands positing the existence of a “true self.” It requires positing an essentialist structure leading to metaphysical problems that current accounts of authenticity fail to solve (Bialystok 2014). Correspondingly, Feldman (2014) argues in favor of abandoning the ideal of authenticity because it builds on confused assumptions about the self, the value of one’s “gut feelings” in revealing one’s values, and the supposedly corrupting influence of the “external” social realm (for a critique of this position, see Bauer 2017; Ferrara 2009)\n", "However, one might argue that this only becomes a problem if one\nthinks of authenticity as entirely a personal virtue. In other words,\nthere is only a clash between morality and social life and being\nauthentic if the “true” self is regarded as fundamentally\nprone to anti-social behaviour. But many thinkers at this time\nunderstood human nature as fundamentally disposed toward beneficence,\nso that evil was seen as arising from socialization and upbringing\nrather than from deep drives within the human being. For instance,\nRousseau holds that certain immoral characteristics are immanent in\nman but were produced by the dynamics of modern society, which is\ncharacterized by a competitive way of relating to others and striving\nfor acknowledgement in the public sphere. Rousseau thus externalizes\nthe origins of societal evil and alienation from the original nature\nof man. The undistorted self-relation of natural man inspires sympathy\nand considerate relations with others, sensitive to “seeing any\nsentient being, especially our fellow-man, perish or suffer,\nprincipally those like ourselves” (Rousseau 1992 [1754]: 14). In\nsomewhat the same way, economic theorists of the time supposed that\nunregulated markets are self-correcting, as human beings are naturally\ninclined to engage in mutually advantageous commercial activities\n(Taylor 2007: 221–269). On this view, authenticity does not\namount to egoism or self-absorption. On the contrary, the prevailing\nview seems to have been that, by turning inward and accessing the\n“true” self, one is simultaneously led towards a deeper\nengagement with the social world. This is why Taylor (1989:\n419–455) describes the trajectory of the project of authenticity\nis “inward and upward”.", "It might however be objected that supposing that the\n“inner” is a morally worthy guide is deeply misguided and\nbuilds upon an overly optimistic idea of human nature. It may be\nargued that once the idea of rational deliberation is set aside, the\npowerful impact of the non-rational becomes apparent. Thinkers such as\nNietzsche and Freud have put in question the conception of human\nnature, and especially of our “inner” nature, as\nfundamentally good. Following their “hermeneutics of\nsuspicion” (Ricoeur 1970), human nature comes to be seen as\nincluding forces of violence, disorder and unreason as well as\ntendencies toward beneficence and altruism. In that case, any idea of\nan ethic based primarily on the ideal of authenticity is simply\nuntenable.", "Others have expressed serious concerns not about the optimistic\nview of human nature, but about the conception of the self that\nunderlies the idea of authenticity. Some argued that the dichotomies\nthat the concept authenticity was built on, like conformity\nvs. independence, individual vs. society, or inner-directedness\nvs. other-directedness, were entirely misguided. The underlying\nassumption that considers the individual separate from the environment\nis an absurd assumption that erodes that bond between the individual\nand community, which ultimately is the source of the authentic self\n(Slater 1970: 15; Sisk 1973). In agreement with Slater (1970) and Yankelovich\n(1981), Bellah et al. (1985) and Fairlie (1978) contend\nthat such a pursuit of authenticity is self-defeating, for with the\nloss of the bond with community, the sense of self is also\ndiminished.", "Additionally, in The Jargon of Authenticity, Adorno\ncontended that the “liturgy of inwardness” is founded on\nthe flawed idea of a self-transparent individual who is capable of\nchoosing herself (Adorno 1973: 70). The doubtful picture of the\nself-centered individual covers up the constitutive alterity and\nmimetic nature of the self. In the concluding part of The Order of\nThings, Foucault maintained that present society was witnessing a\ncrisis, not only of authenticity but also of the whole idea of the\nsubject in its temporary historically contingent constitution,\nforeseeing that “man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand\nat the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1994: 387). Foucault clearly\nopposed the idea of a hidden authentic self, which he critically\nreferred to as the “Californian cult of the self” (1983:\n266). The recognition that the subject is not given to itself in\nadvance leads him to the practical consequence that it must create\nitself as a work of art (Foucault 1983: 392). Rather than searching for a hidden true\nself, one should attempt to shape one’s life as a work of art,\nproceeding without recourse to any fixed rules or permanent truths in\na process of unending becoming (Foucault 1988: 49). In a similar vein,\nRichard Rorty has argued that the idea of coming to “know a\ntruth which was out there (or in here) all the time” (Rorty\n1989: 27) is simply a myth. Postmodern thought raises questions about\nthe existence of an underlying subject with essential properties\naccessible through introspection. The whole idea of the authentic as\nthat which is “original”, “essential”,\n“proper”, and so forth now seems doubtful. If we are\nself-constituting beings who make ourselves up from one moment to the\nnext, it appears that the term “authenticity” can refer\nonly to whatever feels right at some particular moment.", "Yet others have based their criticism of authenticity especially on\nthe emergence of a pervasive “culture of\nauthenticity”. Cultural critics have argued that the ostensible\n“decline” of modern society might not primarily be a\nresult of economical or structural transformations, but as the outcome\nof an increasingly ubiquitous ideal of authenticity. Before we turn to\nthese critiques, it is helpful to understand how the ideal of\nauthenticity became so widespread. First, we should mention that\nRousseau’s work, made a significant contribution to the popularization\nof authenticity. Indeed, some argue that authenticity can be seen as a “keystone” in Rousseau’s work, giving unity to his reflections on sociality, political order, and education (Ferrara 2017: 2). Particularly The New Heloise (1997 [1761])\nwas enormously influential, with at least 70 editions in print before\n1800 (Darnton 1984: 242). This dispersion of the ideal of authenticity\ninto popular culture was further strengthened by several factors. For\ninstance, a wide array of intellectuals of the nineteenth and the\nearly twentieth century had embraced the idea of authenticity, and\neven radicalized it by resisting established codes and publicly\ndefending alternative, “artistic” or\n“bohemian” modes of life.", " The reception of the work of Sartre and Heidegger has surely\ncontributed to the popularization of the idea of authenticity, and the\ndecisive impact of this idea first began to manifest itself after the\nSecond World War (Taylor 2007: 475). Rossinow contends that the\npolitics of the 1960s were centered on questions of authenticity.\nFollowing his account, the main driving force towards political and\nsocial changes of the New Left movement in the 1960s was “a\nsearch for authenticity in industrial American life” (Rossinow\n1998: 345). Both J. Farrell (1997) and Rossinow argue that the New\nLeft emerged partly as a reaction to traditional American liberalism\nand Christian existentialism, replacing the negative concept of\n“sin” with “alienation” and the positive goal\nof “salvation” with that of\n“authenticity”. Confronted with what they understood as\nalienation that “isn’t restricted to the poor” (Rossinow\n1998: 194), New Left activism reached beyond civil rights to moral\nrights and attempted to bring about a recovery of a sense of personal\nwholeness and authenticity by curing the institutions of American\nsociety.", "The emerging youth culture was characterized by a severe\ndissatisfaction with the “morass of conformity” of the\nparental generation (Gray 1965: 57). The critique of the growing\nconformity of life got more persistent during the 1950s, and a number\nof social scientists in widely read books criticized what they saw as\nwidespread conformity and inauthenticity. Among these, The Lonely\nCrowd (1950) by Riesman and The Organization Man (1956)\nby Whyte received the most attention. Riesman points out that the\nefficacious functioning of modern organizations requires\nother-directed individuals who smoothly adjust to their\nenvironment. However, he also notes that such people compromised\nthemselves, and a society consisting mostly of other-directed\nindividuals faces substantial deficiencies in leadership and human\npotential.", "On the background of this development, it seems that at a time when\nrelativism appears difficult to surmount, authenticity has become a\nlast measure of value and a common currency in contemporary cultural\nlife (Jay 2004). So, under the impact of existentialism on Western\nculture, the ubiquitous desire for authenticity has emerged in modern\nsociety as “one of the most politically explosive of human\nimpulses,” as Marshall Berman argues (1970: xix). " ], "section_title": "2. Critique of Authenticity", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Conceptions of Authenticity", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "Kierkegaard’s work on authenticity and his suggestion that\neach of us is to “become what one is” (1992 [1846]: 130),\nis best seen as linked to his critical stance towards a certain social\nreality and a certain essentialist trend in philosophical and\nscientific thought. On the one hand, he (1962 [1846]) condemned\naspects of his contemporary social world, claiming that many people\nhave come to function as merely place-holders in a society that\nconstantly levels down possibilities to the lowest common\ndenominator. In more contemporary terms, we can say that Kierkegaard\nprovides a criticism of modern society as causing\n“inauthenticity”. Living in a society characterized by\nsuch “massification” lead to what he refers to as\nwidespread “despair” that comes to the fore as\nspiritlessness, denial, and defiance. On the other hand, he rejected\nthe view that a human being should be regarded as an object,\nas a substance with certain essential attributes. Rather than\nbeing an item among others, Kierkegaard proposes to understand the\nself in relational terms: “The self is a relation that relates\nitself to itself…” (Kierkegaard 1980 [1849]:13). This\nrelation consists in the unfolding project of taking what we find\nourselves with as beings in the world and imparting some meaning or\nconcrete identity to our own life course. Thus, the self is defined by\nconcrete expressions through which one manifests oneself in\nthe world and thereby constitutes one’s identity over time. In\nKierkegaard’s view, “becoming what one is” and evading\ndespair and hollowness is not a matter of solitary introspection, but\nrather a matter of passionate commitment to a relation to something\noutside oneself that bestows one’s life with meaning. For Kierkegaard,\nas a religious thinker, this ultimate commitment was his defining\nrelation to God. The idea is that passionate care about something\noutside ourselves gives diachronic coherence in our lives and provides\nthe basis for the narrative unity of the self (Davenport 2012).", "Heidegger’s conception of human existence (or, as calls it,\nDasein, ‘being-there’) echoes Kierkegaard’s\nconception of the “self”. Rather than being an object\namong others, Dasein is a “relation of being”\n(Seinsverhältnis; Heidegger 1962 [1927]: 12)—a\nrelation that obtains between what one is at any moment and what one\ncan and will be as the temporally extended unfolding of life into a\nrealm of possibilities. To conceive Dasein as relational means that in\nliving out our lives, we always already care: for each of us,\nour being is always at issue and this is made concrete in the\nspecific actions we undertake and the roles we enact. Over the course\nof our lives, our identities are always in question: we are always\nprojections into the future, incessantly taking a stand on who we\nare.", "The most familiar conception of “authenticity” comes to\nus mainly from Heidegger’s Being and Time of 1927. The word\nwe translate as ‘authenticity’ is actually a neologism\ninvented by Heidegger, the word Eigentlichkeit, which comes\nfrom an ordinary term, eigentlich, meaning\n‘really’ or ‘truly’, but is built on the\nstem eigen, meaning ‘own’ or\n‘proper’. So the word might be more literally translated\nas ‘ownedness’, or ‘being owned’, or even\n‘being one’s own’, implying the idea of owning up to and\nowning what one is and does (for a stimulating recent interpretation, see McManus 2019). Nevertheless, the word\n‘authenticity’ has become closely associated with\nHeidegger as a result of early translations of Being and Time\ninto English, and was adopted by Sartre and Beauvoir as well as by\nexistentialist therapists and cultural theorists who followed\nthem.[1]", "Heidegger’s conception of ownedness as the most fully realized\nhuman form of life emerges from his view of what it is to be a human\nbeing. This conception of human Dasein echoes Kierkegaard’s\ndescription of a “self”. On Heidegger’s account, Dasein is\nnot a type of object among others in the totality of what is on hand\nin the universe. Instead, human being is a “relation of\nbeing”, a relation\nthat obtains between what one is at any moment (the immediacy of the\nconcrete present as it has evolved) and what one can and will be as\nthe temporally extended unfolding or happening of life into\nan open realm of possibilities. To say that human being is a relation\nis to say that, in living out our lives, we always care about\nwho and what we are. Heidegger expresses this by saying that, for each\nof us, our being (what our lives will amount to overall) is\nalways at issue. This “being at stake” or\n“being in question for oneself” is made concrete in the\nspecific stands we take—that is, in the roles we\nenact—over the course of our lives. It is because our being (our\nidentity) is in question for us that we are always taking a stand on\nwho we are. Since the German word for\n‘understanding’, Verstehen, is etymologically\nderived from the idea of ‘taking a stand’, Heidegger can\ncall the projection into the future by which we shape our identity\n‘understanding’. And because any stand one takes is\ninescapably “being-in-the-world”, understanding carries\nwith it some degree of competence in coping with the world around us.\nAn understanding of being in general is therefore built into human\nagency.", "To the extent that all our actions contribute to realizing an\noverarching project or set of projects, our active lives can be seen\nas embodying a life-project of some sort. On Heidegger’s view, we\nexist for the sake of ourselves: enacting roles and\nexpressing character traits contribute to realizing some image of what\nit is to be human in our own cases. Existence has a directedness or\npurposiveness that imparts a degree of connection to our life\nstories. For the most part, having such a life-plan requires very\nlittle conscious formulation of goals or deliberation about means. It\nresults from our competence in being members of a historical culture\nthat we have mastered to a great extent in growing up into a shared\nworld. This tacit “pre-understanding” makes possible our\nfamiliar dwelling with things and others in the familiar, everyday\nworld.", "Heidegger holds that all possibilities of concrete understanding\nand action are made possible by a background of shared practices\nopened up by the social context in which we find ourselves, by what he\ncalls the ‘They’ (das Man). Far from it being the\ncase that social existence is something alien to and opposed to our\nhumanity, Heidegger holds that we are always essentially and\ninescapably social beings. As he says,", "They itself prescribes that way of interpreting\nthe world that lies closest. Dasein is for the sake of the They in an\neveryday manner… In terms of the They, and as the They, I am\n‘given’ proximally to ‘myself’…. (1962\n[1927]: 167, translation modified)", "To be a teacher, for instance, I must adopt (and\nperhaps blend) some set of the ready-made styles of classroom\npresentation and of dealing with students laid out in advance by\nexisting norms and conventions of professional conduct.", " To say that we are always the They is not to say we are automata,\nhowever. Heidegger suggests that even in the bland conformism of\n“average everydayness” we are constantly making choices\nthat reflect our understanding of who we are. Nevertheless, in average\neverydayness, we are as a rule adrift, acting as one of the\n“herd” or “crowd”—a form of life\nHeidegger calls “falling” (Verfallen). Heidegger\n(1962 [1927]: 220) emphasizes that calling this way of living\n“falling” does not imply that it is “a bad or\ndeplorable ontical property of which, perhaps, more advanced stages of\nhuman culture might be able to rid themselves” (1962 [1927]:\n220). On the contrary, since there is no exit from the social\nworld—since it is the “only game in town”—it\nplays a positive role in creating the background of shared\nintelligibility that lets us be fully human in the first\nplace. Nevertheless, Heidegger is aware that there is something deeply\nproblematic about this falling mode of existence. In “doing what\none does”, he suggests, we fail to own up to who we are. We do\nnot take over our own choices as our own and, as a result, we are not\nreally the authors of our own lives. To the extent that our lives are\nunowned or disowned, existence is inauthentic (uneigentlich),\nnot our own (eigen).", "Our condition as They-selves is one of dispersal, distraction and\nforgetfulness. But this “downward plunge” captures only\none aspect of Dasein, Heidegger says. In order to be able to realize\nthe capacity for authenticity, one must undergo a personal\ntransformation, one that tears us away from falling. This is possible\nonly given certain fundamental insights arising in a life. The first\nmajor shift can occur when one experiences an intense bout of\nanxiety. In anxiety, the familiar world that seemed to assure one’s\nsecurity suddenly breaks down, and in this world-collapse one finds\nthat the significance of things is “completely lacking”\n(1962 [1927]: 186). One finds oneself alone, with no worldly supports\nfor one’s existence. In anxiety, Dasein encounters itself as\nan individual, ultimately alone. In Heidegger’s words,\n“Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as\n‘solus ipse’” (1962 [1927]: 188). The\nsecond transformative event is the encounter with one’s\n“ownmost” possibility, the possibility of death as the\npossible loss of all possibilities. In facing our own finitude, we\nfind that we are always future-directed happenings or projects, where\nwhat is crucial to that ongoing forward movement is not its\nactualization of possibilities, but the “How” with which\none undertakes one’s life. Heidegger tries to envision a way of life\nhe calls anticipatory running-forward (Vorlaufen) as\na life that clear-sightedly and intensely carries out its projects, no\nmatter what they may be. The third transformative event is hearing the\ncall of conscience. What conscience calls out to us is the fact that\nwe are “guilty” in the German sense of that word, which\nmeans that we have a debt (Schuld) and are\nresponsible for ourselves. Conscience tells us that we are falling\nshort of what we can be, and that we are obliged to take up the task\nof living with resoluteness and full engagement. Such resoluteness is\nseen clearly in the case of vocational commitments, where one has\nheard a calling and feels pulled toward pursuing that\ncalling.[2]", "The three “existentialia” that structure Dasein’s\nBeing-in-the-world make up the “formal existential totality of\nDasein’s structural whole”, what Heidegger\ncalls care. To be Dasein, an entity must have some sense of\nwhat it is “coming toward” (Zu-kunft, the German\nfor “future”), what has “come before” (what is\n“passed”, Vorbei), and what one is dealing with\nin one’s current situation (“making present”). The\ndefining characteristics of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being are\ndisplayed in the transformative events that lead to the possibility of\nbeing authentic (eigentlich, as we saw, from the stem meaning\n“proper” or “own”). When Dasein confronts and\ngrasps its authentic possibility of being, it becomes possible to see\nthe whole of Dasein, including both its being as a They-self\nand as authentic being-one’s-self. “Dasein is authentically\nitself in [its] primordial individualization”, where the\n“constancy [Ständigkeit] of the Self\n… gets clarified” (1962 [1927]: 322). What defines the\nwholeness and unity of Dasein is determined not by an underlying\nsubstance (e.g., the sub-ject, that which underlies), but by the\n“steadiness and steadfastness” (beständigen\nStandfestigkeit, ibid) of authenticity.", "The key to understanding authenticity lies, as we have seen, in the\ncharacterization of Dasein’s being as a relation between two\naspects or dimensions making up human existence. On the one hand, we\nfind ourselves thrown into a world and a situation not of our\nown making, already disposed by moods and particular commitments, with\na past behind us that constrains our choices. With respect to this\ndimension of human life, we are generally absorbed in practical\naffairs, taking care of business, striving to get things done as they\ncrop up from time to time. This “being-in-a-situation”\nnaturally inclines us to everyday falling as Heidegger describes\nit.", "At the same time, however, to be human is to be underway toward\nachieving ends that are understood as integral to one’s overarching\nlife-project. My actions at any moment, though typically aimed at\naccomplishing tasks laid out by the demands of circumstances, are also\ncumulatively creating me as a person of a particular sort. In this\nsense, my futural projection as “understanding” has the\nstructure of being a projection onto one’s ownmost possibility of\nbeing. So, for example, when I attend a boring parent/teacher\nconference, I do so as part of handling my current duties. But this\nact is also part of being a parent insofar as it contributes\nto determining “that for the sake of which” I understand\nmyself as existing. Given this distinction between current means/ends\nstrategic actions and long-range life-defining undertakings, it is\npossible to see that there are two senses of freedom in play in\nHeidegger’s account of human existence. There is freedom in the\nhumdrum sense of doing what I choose to do under ordinary conditions,\na freedom Heidegger presumably interprets in an agent-libertarian way.\nBut there is also freedom in an ethically more robust sense. In\naddition to choosing courses of action among options, Dasein is\ncapable of “choosing to choose a kind of being-one’s-self”\n(1962 [1927]: 314) through its ongoing constitution of that identity\nfor the sake of which it exists. Thus, I attend the parent/teacher\nconference and behave in a particular way because I care about being a\nparent and a citizen of a particular sort. I understand this stance as\nhaving repercussions for my life as a whole, and I grasp the need\nfor resoluteness in holding steady to undertakings of this\nsort if I am to shape my identity in the way I can care about. For\nHeidegger, the resolute commitment that is made concrete and defined\nin one’s day-to-day actions is what imparts steadiness\nand steadfastness to a life. It is also the condition for\nbeing responsible for one’s own existence: “Only so can\n[one] be responsible [verantwortlich]”,\nHeidegger says (1962 [1927]: 334, translation modified). Authenticity,\ndefined as standing up for and standing behind what one\ndoes—as owning and owning up to one’s deeds as\nan agent in the world—becomes possible in this sort of resolute\ncommitment to the “for the sake of which” of one’s\nexistence.", "It should be obvious that this conception of authenticity has very\nlittle to do with the older idea of being true to one’s own pregiven\nfeelings and desires. But there is still a clear respect in which the\nidea of “being true to oneself” has a role to play\nhere. What distinguishes this conception from the conceptions of pop\npsychology and romantic views of authenticity is the fact that the\n“true self” to which we are to be true is not some\npre-given set of substantive feelings, opinions and desires to be\nconsulted through inward-turning or introspection. On the contrary,\nthe “true self” alluded to here is an on-going narrative\nconstruction: the composition of one’s own autobiography through one’s\nconcrete ways of acting over the course of a life as a whole. Feelings\nand desires are, of course, profoundly important, as are the features\nof one’s situation and one’s concrete connections to others. Heidegger\nwants to recover a firm sense of the wholeness of the existing\nindividual. But this wholeness is found in the connectedness of what\nHeidegger calls the “happening” or “movement”\nof a life—that is, in the unfolding and constantly\n“in-progress” storyizing that continues until death. What\nis at stake in the ideal of authenticity is not being true to some\nantecedently given nature, then, but being a person of a\nparticular sort. Heidegger emphasizes that being authentic presupposes\nthat one instantiate such virtues as perseverance, integrity,\nclear-sightedness, flexibility, openness, and so forth. It should be\nobvious that such a life is not necessarily opposed to an ethical and\nsocially engaged existence. On the contrary, authenticity seems to be\nregarded as a “executive virtue” that provides the condition\nfor the possibility of being a moral agent in any meaningful sense\nwhatsoever.", "Others argue that Heidegger uses authenticity in both\nevaluative-normative and purely descriptive senses. In the descriptive\nuse of the term, inauthenticity is simply the default condition of\neveryday life, in which our self-relations are mediated by others. In\nthis sense, authenticity involves no judgment about which mode of\nbeing is superior for Dasein. But sometimes Heidegger’s language turns\nnormative (Carman 2003), and the seemingly neutral inauthentic form of\nrelating transforms into something negative. Inauthentic Dasein is now\n“not itself”, loses itself (Selbstverlorenheit), and\nbecomes self-alienated. At this point, it is argued that when\nintroducing the normative-evaluative sense, Heidegger presents three\nmodes of life: authentic—average(ness)—inauthentic, where\nthe authentic and inauthentic modes are existential modifications of\naverage everydayness (Blattner 2006: 130; Dreyfus\n1991). In this\npicture, an authentic way of life is owned, an inauthentic disowned,\nand the middle one—which is how we live much of the\ntime—is simply one that is unowned. Dasein and authenticity\nemerge in contrast to this background and out of this background, so\nthat the primordially indifferent mode is the condition of possibility\nfor authenticity or inauthenticity. In addition, Carman (2003: 295)\nargues that Heidegger’s notion of conscience can help us further\nillustrate his account of authenticity and shows how the “call\nof conscience” may be interpreted as expressive responsiveness\nto one’s own particularity." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Kierkegaard and Heidegger" }, { "content": [ "Published in 1943, Sartre’s opus magnum, Being and\nNothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, had a\nsignificant influence on philosophical thought and intellectual life\nin the second half of the twentieth century. His principal goal in\nthis book is to “repudiate the spirit of\nseriousness” of traditional philosophy as well as of\nbourgeois culture (Sartre 1992a [1943]: 796). The spirit of\nseriousness assumes (1) that there are transcendent values that exist\nantecedently to humans, and (2) that the value of a thing is part of\nthe actual being of the valued thing. Sartre’s view, in contrast, is\nthat all values are generated by human interactions in situations, so\nthat value is a human construct with no extra-human existence in\nthings.", "To address the question of human existence, Sartre scrutinizes our\neveryday lives, focusing on two particular aspects. He notes that\nhuman beings, like other entities in the world, have certain concrete\ncharacteristics that make up what he calls their\n“facticity” or what they are “in themselves”\n(en soi). Facticity makes up the element of\n“givenness” we must work with: I find myself with a past,\na body and a social situation that constrains me in what I can\ndo. This “just being there” is above all contingent: there\nis no prior justification or reason for the existence of my being. On\nSartre’s view, the “in itself” does not even have any\ndeterminate characteristics, since every determination (every\n“this, not that”) is first introduced into the\ntotality of being by our specific interpretations of things.", "While human beings share their “facticity” with other\nentities in the world, they are unique among the totality of entities\ninsofar as they are capable of distancing themselves from what is\n“in itself” through reflection and self-awareness. Rather\nthan being an item in the world with relatively fixed attributes, what\nis distinctive about me as a human being is that I am capable of putting\nmy own being in question by asking myself, for example, whether I want\nto be a person of a particular sort. This capacity for gaining\ndistance inserts a “not” or a “nonbeing” into\nthe totality of what is, which allows me to organize what surrounds me\ninto a meaningfully differentiated whole. In addition, human\nconsciousness is the source of the “not” because it is\nitself a “nothingness”. In other words, a human being is\nnot just an “in itself” but also a “for itself\n(pour soi), thus characterized by what Sartre calls\n“transcendence”. As transcendence, I am always more than I\nam as facticity because, as surpassing my brute being, I stand before\nan open range of possibilities for self-definition in the future.", "Sartre’s notion of transcendence is closely linked with the idea of\nfreedom. Humans are free in the sense that they have the\nability to choose how they are going to interpret things, and in these\ninterpretations they are deciding how things are to count or\nmatter. We constitute the world through our freedom to the extent that\nour ways of taking things determine how reality will be sorted out and\nmatter to us. At the same time, we constitute ourselves\nthrough our own choices: though the facticity of my situation creates\nsome constraints on my possible self-interpretations, it is always up\nto me to decide the meaning of those constraints, and this means that\nwhat I take to be limitations are in fact produced by my own\ninterpretations or meaning-giving activities. Such limitations are\ngrasped in light of antecedent commitments, on the background of which\nsituations becomes intelligible, as affording certain actions and/or\nmodes of evaluation. It is our antecedent commitments that shape our\nworld, making situations and objects intelligible as threatening or\nfavorable, easy or full of obstacles, or more generally, as affording\ncertain actions (Sartre 1992a [1943]: 489). Our engagements provide a\nhermeneutic structure within which our situations and motives become\ncomprehensible and reveal themselves in the way situations appear to\nus—as significant, requiring our attention, etc. (1992a [1943]:\n485).", "It is important to note that Sartre’s notion of freedom is\nradical. Freedom is absolute to the extent that each person decides\nthe significance of the constraints in his or her facticity: “I\nfind an absolute responsibility for the fact that my facticity\n… is directly inapprehensible”, because supposed\n“facts” about me are never brute facts, “but always\nappear across a projective reconstruction of my for-itself”\n(Sartre 1992a [1943]: 710). For Sartre, only our choices and their\nprojected ends define our situations as meaningful, as threatening or\nfavorable, as affording certain actions etc. The resistances and\nobstacles that one encounters in a situation acquire meaning only in\nand through the free choice. Thus, individuals are responsible not\nonly for their identities, but for the way the world presents itself\nin their experiences. Even others are just\n“opportunities and chances” for my free\ncreative activity. According to this early formulation, it is up to us\nto interpret how other people are to matter to us relative to\nsituations in which we find ourselves engaged (Sartre 1992a [1943]:\n711).", "But human beings are not merely characterized by facticity and\ntranscendence; they are also seen as embodying a deep and\nirreconcilable tension between facticity and transcendence. This\ntension comes to the fore in Sartre’s account of “bad\nfaith”. Bad faith, a kind of self-deception, involves believing\nor taking oneself to be an X while all along one is (and knows\noneself to be) actually a Y. The most familiar form of bad\nfaith is acting as if one were a mere thing—solely\nfacticity—and thereby denying one’s own freedom to make oneself\ninto something very different. Thus, the person who thinks she is a\ncoward “just as a matter of fact” is excluding from view\nthe ability to transform her existence through changed ways of\nbehaving. Such bad faith is a denial of transcendence or freedom.", "At first, it might seem that one could escape bad faith by making a\nsincere, deep commitment to something and abiding by that\ncommitment—for example, a total, resolute engagement of the self\ncomparable to Kierkegaard’s notion of an “infinite\npassion”. In this regard, Sartre considers a person who tries to\nwholeheartedly believe that his friend really likes\nhim. “I believe it”, he says, “I decide to\nbelieve in it and maintain myself in this decision…”\n(Sartre 1992a [1943]: 114). My belief will be steady and solid, like\nsomething “in itself” that informs my being and cuts\nthrough all the tenuousness and unsteadiness of my subjective\nlife. I know I believe it, I will say. If I could\nmake myself believe something in this way, then to achieve this might\nbe what we could call “good faith:” to\nactually be something, without the questionability of the\n“not” creeping in. However, Sartre doubts that such an\nabsolute, being-determining commitment is possible. In fact, Sartre\nclaims that any such sort of “good faith” would actually\namount to little more than another form of self-deception. For if my\ndecision to believe is in fact a decision, it must always be something\nthat to some extent distances me from what is decided. That is why we\nuse the word ‘believe’ to imply some degree of\nuncertainty, as when we say, “Is he my friend? Well,\nI believe he is”. Lucid self-awareness shows us that in\nmaking a choice, we can never attain the condition of the “in\nitself”, because what we are is always in question for us. This\nis what Sartre means when he says human being is always\n“previously corrupted” and that “bad faith [always]\nreapprehends good faith” (Sartre 1992a [1943]: 116). Thus, the\nproject of being in good faith seems impossible, as we are always\nnecessarily in bad faith.", "The inescapable nature of bad faith seems to leave no room for the\npossibility of authenticity. This might be why the word translated as\n“authentic” only appears twice in this vast tome. On one\noccasion, Sartre attacks Heidegger for introducing the idea of\nauthenticity as a way of providing something foundational in an\notherwise totally contingent world. The concept of authenticity\n“shows all too clearly [Heidegger’s] anxiety to establish an\nontological foundation for an Ethics…” (Sartre 1992a\n[1943]: 128). A second and more obscure appearance of the word comes\nat the end of the discussion of bad faith early in the book. Here\nSartre acknowledges that his account of bad faith seems to have the\nconsequence that there can be no such thing as good faith, so that\n“it is indifferent whether one is in good faith or in bad\nfaith”, and that in turn seems to imply that “we can never\nradically escape bad faith”. Nevertheless, he goes on, there may\nbe a “self-recovery of being which has been previously\ncorrupted”, a recovery “we shall call authenticity, the\ndescription of which has no place here” (Sartre 1992a [1943]:\n116n).", "One might thus conclude that there is no way to be true to what one\nis, because there is nothing that one is. However, such a negative\nconclusion would be reached only by someone who embraced from the\noutset the “spirit of seriousness” Sartre sets out to\nattack. Seriousness would lead us to think that there is simply a fact\nof the matter about a person: the person is either a believer or he is\nnot. But, as Linda A. Bell (1989: 45) has noted, there is another\npossibility. If one rejects the spirit of seriousness, one might\nlucidly acknowledge that, as transcendence, one’s belief is\nalways in question and so not really a secure belief. Yet, at the same\ntime, one might also recognize that, as facticity, one\ngenuinely holds a belief, and that the belief is central to one’s\nbeing as an engaged agent in this situation. In Sartre’s convoluted\nstyle of formulation, “he would be right if he recognized\nhimself as a being that is what it is not and is not what it is”\n(Bell 1989: 45). On this account, I believe, but I also acknowledge my\nability to retract the belief, since nothing is ever fixed in\nstone.", "What is suggested here is that a correlate of authenticity can be\nfound in the idea of being true to the inescapable tension at the core\nof the human self. This would be attained if one clear-sightedly\nacknowledged the fundamental ambiguity of the human\ncondition. Authenticity would then be what Sartre calls a\n“self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted”\n(1992a [1943]: 116). In a sense, humans can never really be\nanything in the way brute objects can be things with determinate\nattributes. In Bell’s words, authenticity would be “the\nawareness and acceptance of—this basic ambiguity” (1989:\n46). This conclusion is supported by Sartre’s later\nwork, Anti-Semite and Jew where he writes,", "Authenticity, it is almost needless to say,\nconsists in having a true and lucid consciousness of the situation, in\nassuming the responsibilities and risks it involves, in accepting it\n… sometimes in horror and hate. (1948: 90)", "Lucid recognition of the ambiguity of the human condition is the\nleading idea behind Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity.\nBeauvoir takes over Sartre’s characterization of the human condition\nand expands on ideas only hinted at in Sartre’s famous lecture,\n“The Humanism of Existentialism” (1946), in developing a\nconception of authenticity. According to Beauvoir, Sartre’s conception\nof the human being as “engaged freedom” implies not just\nthat each individual finds his or her “reason for being”\nin concrete realizations of freedom, but that willing one’s own\nfreedom necessarily involves willing the freedom of all humans. In\nachieving one’s own freedom, she writes, freedom must also will\n“an open future, by seeking to extend itself by means of the\nfreedom of others” (1948: 60). The point here is that a\ndedication to freedom, when clearly grasped in its full implications,\nwill be seen to call for a future in which an unrestricted range of\npossibilities is open to all.", "Beauvoir also builds on Sartre’s notion of engagement to\nextend the idea of authenticity. Following Sartre, we are always\nalready engaged in the affairs of the world, whether we realize it or\nnot. To be human is to be already caught up in the midst of social and\nconcrete situations that call for commitments of certain sorts on our\npart. Sartre takes this ground-level fact of engagement as the basis\nfor exhorting us to be engaged in a deeper sense, where this implies\nthat we decisively and wholeheartedly involve ourselves in what the\ncurrent situation demands. Of course, once we have abandoned the\nspirit of seriousness, we will recognize that there are no\nantecedently given principles or values that dictate the proper course\nfor our existential engagement, so that any commitment will be tenuous\nand groundless. But the authentic individual will be the one who takes\nup the terrifying freedom of being the ultimate source of values,\nembraces it, and acts with a clarity and firmness suitable to his or\nher best understanding of what is right in this context. In this way,\nthe conception of authenticity is continuous with the ideal of being\ntrue to ourselves: we are called upon to become, in our concrete\nlives, what we already are in the ontological structure of our\nbeing.", "This is in agreement with the manner in which Sartre describes the\nconsequences of acting against one’s deepest commitments.", "There is no doubt that I could have done\notherwise, but that is not the problem. It ought to be formulated like\nthis: could I have done otherwise without perceptibly modifying the\norganic totality of the projects that make up who I am?", "Sartre goes on to say that the character of the\nact may be such that", "instead of remaining a purely local and accidental\nmodification of my behavior, it could be effected only by means of a\nradical transformation of my being-in-the-world… In other\nwords: I could have acted otherwise. Agreed. But at what price?\n(Sartre 1992a [1943]: 454)", "Thus, acting otherwise or, more precisely,\nfailing to act on one’s fundamental commitments, comes at the price of\ntransforming who one is. This change effectively precludes one from\ncarrying on with an unchanged self-conception." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Sartre and de Beauvoir" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "In the last three decades, authors like Taylor (1989, 1991, 1995,\n2007), Ferrara (1993; 1998), Jacob Golomb (1995), Guignon (2004, 2008) and\nVarga (2011a) have attempted to reconstruct authenticity by\nmaintaining that the justified criticism of self-indulgent forms of\nthe idea does not justify the total condemnation of the idea itself\n(see Taylor 1991: 56). Instead of abandoning the notion of\nauthenticity, they attempt to reconstruct it in a manner that leads\nneither to aestheticism nor to atomistic self-indulgence.", " In The Ethics of Authenticity, and the more fully\narticulated Sources of the Self, Taylor makes a case for\nretaining the concept of authenticity (and the practices associated\nwith it) on the grounds that the original and undistorted idea of\nauthenticity contains an important element of self-transcendence\n(Taylor 1991: 15; Anderson 1995). Unsatisfied with the widespread\ncriticism of authenticity as an adequate ethical orientation, Taylor\nsets out to prove that authenticity does not necessarily lead to\naestheticism or self-indulgence: the justified criticism of\nself-indulgent forms of the ideal does not justify the complete\ncondemnation of the ideal itself (Taylor 1991: 56). This would mean\nextricating aestheticism, subjectivism, individualism, and\nself-indulgent interpretations of this ideal from what Taylor (Ibid.:\n15) holds to be an original understanding of that concept as achieving\nself-transcendence (Anderson 1995). Restoring an undistorted version,\nTaylor says, could guard against meaninglessness, which is one of the\n“malaises of modernity” that Taylor regards as tied to\ntrivialized forms of the culture of authenticity. Self-transcendence,\nwhich once was a crucial element in the ideal of authenticity, is\npractically lost from the contemporary version, giving rise to\ncultures of self-absorption, which ultimately deteriorate into the\nmalaise of absurdity.", "Already in Sources of the Self, Taylor draws attention to\nhow modernism gives birth to a new kind of inward turn that not only\nattempts to overcome the mechanistic conception of the self linked to\ndisengaged reason but also the Romantic ideal of a faultless alignment\nof inner nature and reason. Instead, for the modernists, a turn inward\ndid not mean a turn towards a self that needs articulation.", "On the contrary, the turn inward may take us\nbeyond the self as usually understood, to a fragmentation of\nexperience which calls our ordinary notions of identity into\nquestion. (Taylor 1989: 462)", "While in modernism, the turn inward still contained a\nself-transcending moment, the critical point where the ideal of\nauthenticity becomes flattened is when it becomes\n‘contaminated’ by a certain form of\n‘self-determining freedom’ that also contains elements of\ninwardness and unconventionality (Taylor 1991: 38). Self-determining\nfreedom", "\nis the idea that I am free when I decide for myself what concerns\nme, rather than being shaped by external influences. It is a standard\nof freedom that obviously goes beyond what has been called negative\nliberty (being free to do what I want without interference by others)\nbecause that is compatible with one’s being shaped and influenced by\nsociety and its laws of conformity. Instead, self-determining freedom\ndemands that one break free of all such external impositions and\ndecide for oneself alone. (Taylor 1991: 27)", "Not only is self-determining freedom not a necessary part of\nauthenticity, it is also counterproductive because its\nself-centeredness flattens the meanings of lives and fragments\nidentities. For Taylor, the process of articulating an identity\ninvolves adopting a relationship to the good or to what is important,\nwhich is connected to one’s membership in a language community (Taylor\n1989: 34–35). As he clearly states, “authenticity is not\nthe enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it presupposes\nsuch demands” (Taylor 1991: 41). It cannot be up to me to decide\nwhat is important, since this would be self-defeating. Instead,\nwhatever is important for me must connect to an inter-subjective\nnotion of the good, wherefrom a good part of its normative force\nlastly emanates. In this sense, authenticity simply requires\nmaintaining bonds to collective questions of worth that point beyond\none’s own preferences. Taylor wants to show that modes of contemporary\nculture that opt for self-fulfillment without regard", "(a) to the demands of our ties with others, or (b)\nto demands of any kind emanating from something more or other than\nhuman desires or aspirations are self-defeating, that they destroy the\nconditions for realizing authenticity itself. (Taylor 1991:\n35)", "Thus, not only do we need the recognition of concrete others in\norder to form our identities, but we must also (critically) engage\nwith a common vocabulary of shared value orientations. In other words,\nTaylor points out that authenticity needs the appropriation of values\nthat make up our collective horizons.", "In his Reflective Authenticity, Alessandro Ferrara also\nsets out to defend authenticity as an ideal, but in contrast to Taylor\nhe is interested in the social and philosophical issues of the\nrelation between authenticity and validity. According to Ferrara’s\ndiagnosis, we are currently witnessing a profound transition that,\nbesides affecting cultures, values and norms, also touch on the\n“foundations of validity,” thereby affecting the\n“bedrock of the symbolic network through which we relate to\nreality and reproduce our life-forms” (Ferrara 1998: 1). At the\ncore of this transformation is the reformulation of\n“well-being” (eudaimonia) as the normative ideal\nof authenticity, which can be of help in reconstructing a contemporary\nunderstanding of normativity. For Ferrara, it can ground a new ideal\nof universal validity “ultimately linked with the model of\nexemplary uniqueness or enlightening singularity thus far associated\nwith ‘aesthetics’” (Ferrara 1998: 10). Authenticity\nis then characterized by the “self-congruency” of an\nindividual, collective or symbolic identity (Ferrara 1998: 70), and is\nthought of as providing a new universal validity that does not build\non the generalizable but rather on the exemplary. Ferrara views\nSimmel’s idea of an individual law as an instructive example of such\nan anti-generalizing universalism, and it is exactly this\ncharacteristic that makes it better suited to the pluralist contexts\nfaced by modern Western societies. More recently, Ferrara (2019) has argued that authenticity currently faces a “dual paradox” and is misconstrued by many critics advocating its deconstructionist dismissal.", "Golomb (1995) provides an informative historical overview of the\ngenesis and development of the concept of authenticity, paying\nattention to both literary and philosophical sources. While\ncontinuously reminding us of the inherently social dimension of\nauthenticity, one of the achievements here is the focus on boundary\nsituations where authenticity “is best forged and\nrevealed” (Ibid.: 201). Golomb takes a neutral position on the\nethical value of authenticity, maintaining that “there is no\nreason to suppose that it is any better or any more valuable to be\nauthentic than to act inauthentically” (Ibid.: 202).", "Guignon (2004) explores both the philosophical roots of\nauthenticity and its contemporary manifestations in popular\nculture. He thoughtfully criticizes pop-psychological literature that\ndeals with the authentic life by making recourse to the subdued\n‘inner child’. Since Rousseau, the dichotomy between\nauthentic and inauthentic has often been interpreted akin to the\ndistinction between child and adult (Guignon 2004: 43). Like the inner\nchild, the authentic self is depicted as not yet corrupted by the\npressures, competitiveness, and conformity of modern public\nlife. Guignon draws on the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Jung\nto remind us of less romanticized visions of the inner\nchild. Additionally, Guignon (2004: 151) aims to identify the manner\nin which authenticity can be understood as being at the same time a\npersonal and a “fundamentally and irreducibly” social\nvirtue. Authenticity then involves reflectively discerning what is\nreally worth pursuing in the social context in which the agent is\nsituated (Ibid.: 155). If the ideal of authenticity is possible only\nin a free society with a solid foundation of established social\nvirtues, it would seem that trying to be authentic, if it is to be\ncoherent, must involve a commitment to sustaining and nurturing the\ntype of society in which such an ideal is possible. A reflection on\nthe social embodiment of virtues therefore suggests that authenticity,\nlike many other character ideals, carries with it an obligation to\ncontribute to the maintenance and well-being of a particular type of\nsocial organization and way of life (Guignon 2008: 288; 2004: 161). On\nthe other hand, Guignon (2004, 2008) argues that in a democratic\nsociety, in which the authority of government—in setting the\npolitical course—stems from the consent of the governed, there\nis good reason to promote virtues like authenticity that sustain such\nan organization of government. To be authentic is to be clear about\none’s own most basic feelings, desires and convictions, and to openly\nexpress one’s stance in the public arena. But that capacity is\nprecisely the character trait that is needed in order to be an\neffective member of a democratic society (Guignon 2008: 288).", " Varga (2011a) shares the fundamental assumption that authenticity\nhas a certain potential (and therefore deserves to be reformulated),\nbut he also thinks that it could be used for a critical inquiry into\nthe practices of the self in contemporary life. By way of an analysis\nof self-help and self-management literature, Varga detects a\n“paradoxical transformation:” the ideal of authenticity\nthat once provided an antidote to hierarchical institutions and\nrequirements of capitalism, now seems to function both as an\ninstitutionalized demand towards subjects to match the systemic\ndemands of contemporary capitalism and as a factor in the economic\nutilization of subjective capacities. Varga argues that it is in\n“existential” choices that we express who we are, and that\nthese have a complex phenomenology characterized by a sense of\nnecessity. In such choices, described as “alternativeless\nchoices”, we articulate who we are, bringing into reality some\ntacit intuitions that often only take on a gestalt-like formation. In\nthese cases, we both discover who we are “on the inside”,\nand actively constitute ourselves. Varga’s examination of the\nstructure of our commitments culminates in the claim that the internal\nstructure of our commitments commits us to more than what we happen to\ncare about. In many cases it may actually commit us to publicly\nintelligible values that we take our commitments to embody—an\naspect that may constrain the manner of our practical deliberation and\nthe way in which we can pursue our commitments (Varga 2011a,b).", "Along similar lines, Bauer (2017) defends authenticity as an ethical ideal, arguing that the ideal should understood as the combination of the ideal of expressing one’s individual personality and the ideal of being an autonomous and morally responsible person. Others have argued that authenticity might require more than living in accord with commitments that one wholeheartedly endorses. For example, Rings (2017) highlights an epistemic criterion. The point is that the commitments in question have to be chosen in light of an acknowledgment of facts concerning one’s personal history and present context. Thus, self-knowledge might matter more than hitherto recognized, even if the self-relation most pertinent to authenticity is not primarily of an epistemic nature. \n" ], "section_title": "4. Recent Accounts of Authenticity", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Adorno, Theodor W., 1973, The Jargon of Authenticity,\ntrans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will, Evanston, IL: Northwestern\nUniversity Press.", "–––, 1974, Minima Moralia: Reflections from\nDamaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott. London: NLB.", "Aho, Kevin, 2014, Existentialism: An Introduction, \nCambridge: Polity.", "Anderson, Joel, 1995, “Review Essay: The Persistence of\nAuthenticity”, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 21(1):\n101–109.", "Augustine, St., 1953, De vera religione, (On True\nReligion), trans. by J.H.S. Burleigh, South Bend, Indiana:\nGateway.", "–––, 1988, Tractates on the Gospel of\nJohn 1–10, translated by John W. Rettig. (The Fathers of\nthe Church, 78), Washington, DC: Catholic University of America\nPress.", "Bauer, K., 2017, “To be or Not to be Authentic. 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MacIntyre, eds., Revisions:\nChanging Perspectives in Moral Philosophy, Notre Dame University\nPress, 1983.", "Berman, Marshall, 1970, The Politics of Authenticity: Radical\nIndividualism and the Emergence of Modern Society, New York:\nAtheneum.", "Bialystok, L., 2014, “Authenticity and the Limits of Philosophy”, Dialogue, 53(2): 271–298.", "Blattner, William, 2006, Heidegger’s Being and Time, New\nYork: Continuum.", "Bloom, Allan, 1987, The Closing of the American Mind, New\nYork: Simon and Schuster.", "Calhoun, Cheshire, 1995, “Standing for\nsomething”, The Journal of Philosophy, 92:\n235–60.", "Carman, Taylor, 2003, Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation,\nDiscourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time, New York:\nCambridge University Press.", "Carnegie, Dale, 1948, How to Stop Worrying and Start\nLiving, New York: Simon & Schuster.", "Darnton, Robert, 1984, The Great Cat Massacre and Other\nEpisodes in French Cultural History, New York: Viking.", "Davenport, John J., 2012, Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and\nMorality: From Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard, New York:\nRoutledge.", "Despland, Michel, 1975, “Can Conscience Be Hypocritical? 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", "Yankelovich, Daniel, 1981, New Rules: Searching for\nSelf-Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside Down, New York: Random\nHouse." ]	[ { "href": "../beauvoir/", "text": "Beauvoir, Simone de" }, { "href": "../existentialism/", "text": "existentialism" }, { "href": "../heidegger/", "text": "Heidegger, Martin" }, { "href": "../integrity/", "text": "integrity" }, { "href": "../kierkegaard/", "text": "Kierkegaard, Søren" }, { "href": "../sartre/", "text": "Sartre, Jean-Paul" }, { "href": "../self-knowledge/", "text": "self-knowledge" } ]
authority	Authority	First published Fri Jul 2, 2004; substantive revision Wed Jan 11, 2012	[ "\n\nWhen is political authority legitimate? This is one of the\nfundamental questions of political philosophy. Depending on how one\nunderstands political authority this question may be the same as, when\nis coercion by the state legitimate? Or, when do we have duties to\nobey the state? Or, when and who has a right to rule through the\nstate? ", "This entry is concerned with the philosophical issues that arise in\nthe justification of political authority. First, this entry will\nexamine some of the main conceptual issues that arise relating to\npolitical authority. What do we mean by political authority? This\nentry distinguishes political authority from political power, and the\nidea of morally legitimate political authority from descriptive ideas\nof authority. It also distinguishes between authority in the sense of\nmorally justified coercion and authority in the sense of capacity to\nimpose duties on others and finally from authority as right to rule.\nFurther distinctions concern the nature of the duties that political\nauthority imposes on subjects. ", "The main part of the entry (section\n 4) \n concerns the nature and merits of different accounts of the\nlegitimacy of political authority. Under what conditions is political\nauthority legitimate? This entry discusses five different views of\nthe legitimacy of political authority. It discusses the\ninstrumentalist theory according to which authority is legitimate to\nthe extent that it gets people to do what they already have a duty to\ndo. It discusses the consent theory of authority according to which\nauthority is legitimate only if the subjects have consented to it. It\ndiscusses the theory advanced by John Rawls that authority is\nlegitimate if and only if it acts in accord with principles the\nsubjects agree to. It discusses Ronald Dworkin's view according to\nwhich legitimate political authority is akin to the basis of\nobligations to friendships, families and other associations. Finally\nit discusses the democratic conception of authority according to which\nthe democratic assembly has legitimate political authority within\ncertains limits because it treats every citizen as an equal in the\nprocess of making law." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Legitimate Authority, de facto Authority and Political Power", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Legitimate Political Authority: Some Conceptual Distinctions", "1.2 Political Authority and Different Kinds of Duties of Obedience", "1.3 Political Authority without Duties of Obedience", "1.4 The Diversity of Holders of Political Authority" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Conceptions of the Legitimacy of Political Authority", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. The Puzzle of Political Authority: Philosophical Anarchism", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Instrumentalism about Legitimate Political Authority", "3.2 A Worry about the Instrumentalist Account of Practical Reason" ] }, { "content_title": "4. A Second Form of Philosophical Anarchism", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 The Consent Theory of Political Authority: The Natural Right to Freedom Argument", "4.2 The Instrumentalist Critique of the Natural Right Argument", "4.3 The Consent Theory: The Options Argument", "4.4 The Instrumentalist Critique of the Option and Natural Right Arguments", "4.5 The Consent Theory of Political Authority: The Argument from Personal Reasons", "4.6 Consent Theory: The Argument from Disagreement", "4.7 The Problems of Irrational, Immoral Failures of Consent", "4.8 Tacit Consent", "4.9 The Humean Attack on Tacit Consent", "4.10 How Can Tacit Consent Be A Basis of Political Authority?", "4.11 The Basic Objection of Consent Theorists to Tacit Consent", "4.12 Normative Consent" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Reasonable Consensus Conceptions of Legitimate Political Authority", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Problems of Reasonableness and Consensus" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Political Authority as Grounded in Associative Obligations", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 Do Communities of Principle Satisfy the Four Conditions of Genuine Association?" ] }, { "content_title": "7. A Democratic Conception of Legitimate Political Authority", "sub_toc": [ "7.1 How Can Democracy Make Unjust Laws Legitimate?", "7.2 Limits to Democratic Authority" ] }, { "content_title": "8. Legitimate Political Authority in International Institutions", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nLet us start with the distinctions between political authority as a\nnormative notion (or morally legitimate authority) and political\nauthority as a non-normative notion (or de facto authority)\nand between political authority in either of these senses and political\npower. To say that a state has authority in the normative sense is to\nsay something normative about the relationship between the state and\nits subjects. This is the relationship that we will concentrate on in\nwhat follows.", "\n\nFor most contemporary theorists to say that the state has authority in\nthe descriptive sense is to say that the state maintains public order\nand that it issues commands and makes rules that are generally obeyed\nby subjects because many of them (or some important subset of them\nsuch as the officials of the state) think of it as having authority in\nthe normative sense (Hart 1961) (Some thinkers have understood the\nidea of legitimate authority in this descriptive sense as well (Weber\n1970); in what follows, we will use the term “legitimate\nauthority” in a normative sense only.) We should note here that\nthe attitudinal component of de facto authority is not\naccepted by everyone. For both Thomas Hobbes and John Austin,\npolitical authority in the de facto sense simply amounts to\nthe capacity of a person or group of persons to maintain public order\nand secure the obedience of most people by issuing commands backed by\nsanctions. Subjects need not think of the authority as a legitimate\nauthority, on this account.", "\n\nAlso, the distinction between de facto and morally\nlegitimate authority is not universally accepted or at least it is not\naccepted that the distinction makes a difference. Hobbes insists that\nany entity capable of performing the function of de facto\nauthority is necessarily justified and deserves the obedience of the\nde facto subjects (Hobbes 1668). But most have argued that\nthere is an important distinction between de facto authority\nand legitimate authority. We will explore in what follows the\nconceptions political and legal philosophers have had of legitimate\npolitical authority.", "\n\nDe facto authority, on anyone's account, is distinct from\npolitical power. The latter is concerned with the state's or any\nagent's ability to get others to act in ways that they desire even when\nthe subject does not want to do what the agent wants him to do.\nPolitical power does not require any kind of pro attitude toward the\nagent on the part of the subject, nor does it require that the state is\nactually successful at securing public order. It operates completely in\nthe realm of threats and offers. No doubt for the state to have de\nfacto authority or legitimate authority requires that the state\nhave the power to compel those subjects who do not wish to go along.\nThis is necessary for the state's ability to maintain public order and\nto assure those who do see it as an authority that it will be able to\ndo what it is supposed to do." ], "section_title": "1. Legitimate Authority, de facto Authority and Political Power", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nThe rubric under which the normative notion of political authority\nis normally known is the idea of legitimate political authority. In\nthis section, we will review a number of different ideas that have been\nunderstood to come under this idea of legitimate political\nauthority.", "\n\nIt is important here to note the distinction between theoretical and\npractical authority. A theoretical authority in some area of\nintellectual inquiry is one that is an expert in that area. Theoretical\nauthorities operate primarily by giving advice to the layman, which\nadvice the layman is free to take or not. The judgments of theoretical\nauthorities give people reasons for belief while the judgments of\npolitical authorities are normally thought to give people reasons for\naction. Theoretical authorities do not normally impose duties on\nothers, although they might give advice on what a person's duty is.", "\n\nMost theorists of political authority view it as a species of\npractical authority rather than theoretical authority, though this\nview is not held by all . Those who hold that political authority is a\nspecies of practical authority maintain that political authorities\nissue directives that give people reasons for action and not reason\nfor belief. The thought is that political authorities impose duties on\ntheir subjects and thereby give them reasons for action. These\ntheorists argue that it is the function of political authorities to\nget people to act in certain ways so as to solve various collective\naction problems such as a variety of different types of coordination\nproblems, assurance problems and free rider problems. There have been\nsome dissenting views on this of late. Some have argued that the\naccount of practical reason required by the idea that political\nauthority is a practical authority is incoherent and so they have\nopted for the idea that political authorities, when legitimate, are\ntheoretical authorities regarding the existence and nature of the\nduties and reasons for action that people have (Hurd 2001). Since this\nview is unusual this entry will concentrate on conceptions of\npolitical authority that treat it as a species of practical\nauthority.", "\n\nThe rest of this section will discuss a number of different analyses\nof political authority. There are three basic types of conceptual\naccount of legitimate political authority: legitimate political\nauthority as justified coercion, legitimate political authority as the\ncapacity to impose duties, and legitimate political authority as the\nright to rule. First, many people have understood legitimate political\nauthority as a political authority that is justified in coercing the\nsubjects of its authority. The notion of justification here is a moral\none. The thought is that a political authority might have moral\njustification in coercing those who come under its authority. This is\na particularly thin conception of legitimate authority. For instance,\na state can have this kind of authority when it legitimately occupies\na territory as a result of a just war. It is morally justified in\ncoercing the inhabitants of the occupied territory.", "\n\nThe moral justification of a group of people in coercing others may\nbe more or less systematic. For instance, a group of people may be\nmorally justified in engaging in just a few actions of coercing others.\nOr a group may be morally justified in engaging in coercion more\ngenerally as in the case of a morally justified military\noccupation.", "\n\nThis notion of authority need not involve duties on the part of the\npopulation that is being coerced. Indeed, they may be justified in\ntrying to escape coercion. This could be the case in a military\noccupation of a country that is justified on the grounds that it is\nnecessary to stop a third country from engaging in morally indefensible\naggression. This conception of morally justified coercion therefore\ninvolves no conception of a moral community among persons. In this\nfirst conception of authority as justified coercion, the authority may\nnot even issue commands let alone make laws. It may simply justifiably\nissue threats and offers. The difference between legitimate and\nillegitimate political authority on this account is that the actions of\nthe illegitimate political authority are not morally justified while\nthe coercive actions of the legitimate authority are justified.", "\n\nA second conceptual account of legitimate political authority\nimplies that those over whom authority is exercised have some kind of\nduty with regard to the authority. Or the authority has the moral power to\nimpose duties on the subjects. This duty can be merely a duty not to\ninterfere with the activities of the political authority. Or it can\ninvolve the more significant duty to obey the authority. This\nconception of authority involves the authority and the subjects in a\nweak kind of moral relationship. The authority is justified in issuing\nthe commands and attempting to force people to comply with the commands\nwhile the subjects have some kind of duty not to interfere with these\nactivities or comply with the commands.", "\n\nThe duty of the subjects need not be owed to the authority. It may\nmerely be that the subjects have a duty to obey where that duty is not\nowed to anyone in particular or where that duty is owed ultimately to\npeople who are not the authority. For instance, if one thinks that one\nis likely better to respect others' rights by complying with the\nauthority's directives, the action is ultimately owed to those\nothers.", "\n\nSome have stressed the idea that the holding of justified political\nauthority may only involve a duty on the part of others not to\ninterfere with the political authority and they argue that the duty of\nnon-interference is much weaker than a duty to obey (Morris 1998). It\nis not clear how great the difference between these two duties is in\npractice at least as far as citizens are concerned. For many cases of\nfailing to obey an authority are cases of interference with the\nauthority. An analogy may be helpful here. If one is playing a game of\nbaseball with an umpire and one refuses to comply with the directives\nof the umpire, one is in effect interfering with the umpire's carrying\nout of his duties by not complying with the directives of the\numpire.", "\n\nWhile a duty to obey seems to imply a duty not to interfere, there\nare cases of duties of non-interference that are not duties to obey,\nsuch as the duties of foreign powers not to interfere in the activities\nof a legitimate state. Furthermore, the duty to obey is clearly the\nmore contentious issue in the question of authority since it requires\nthat one make one's actions conform to the specific directives of the\nauthority.", "\n\nA third conceptual account of authority or set of conceptions of\nlegitimate authority involves the idea that the authority has a right\nto rule. Strictly speaking, an authority can have a right to rule\nwithout the subjects having a duty to comply. The authority may have a\n“justification” right to rule (Ladenson 1980). This means\nthat the authority has a permission to issue commands and make rules\nand coerce others to comply and its possession of this right is\njustified on moral grounds. This “justification right” is\nnot much more than the first notion we discussed above.", "\n\nA more robust right to rule includes a duty owed to the authority on\nthe part of the subjects not to interfere with the activities of the\nauthority. The subjects owe it to the authority not to interfere with\nit. This is connected with the right of the authority to rule. Finally,\nan authority can have a right to rule in the sense that it may issue\ncommands and make rules and require subjects to comply with these rules\nand commands and the subjects have duties, which they owe to the\nauthority, to comply with the rules and commands.", "\n\nThe distinction between a right to rule that is correlated with a\nduty not to interfere and one that is correlated with a duty to comply\ncomes in handy when we consider the difference between the duties owed\nto a legitimate political authority by the subjects of that authority\nand the duties owed to it by other states and persons who are not\nsubject to that authority. A state with a right to rule in the\nstrongest sense may be owed obedience by its subjects but it is usually\nowed only a duty of non-interference by those who are not a part of the\nstate such as other states and persons in other states. It is\nworthwhile drawing a distinction here between internal legitimacy and\nexternal legitimacy (Buchanan 2004).", "\n\nIt is not a useful aim of philosophers or political thinkers to\ndetermine which one of these conceptual accounts of political\nauthority is the right one. Each one of them grasps a kind of\nlegitimacy of political authority that is worth taking into account\nand distinguishing from the others. The idea of legitimate authority\nas justified coercive power is a suitable way of getting at the\nauthority of hostile but justified occupation powers. And the idea of\nlegitimate authority as an authority that has a right to rule over\nsubjects who owe obedience to the authority and that has a right not\nto be interfered with by foreigners is surely an importantly distinct\nand perhaps ideal type of authority, which is rarely implemented. The\nkind of legitimacy that is merely correlated with duties to obey or\nnot to interfere is a useful intermediate category between those\ntwo.", "\n\nWhat is worth noting is that the idea of legitimate authority as a\nright to rule in the strong sense described above does describe a kind\nof ideal of political community. The idea of legitimate authority as a\nright to rule to which citizens owe obedience gives each citizen a\nmoral duty to obey, which it owes to the authority. So this form of\nlegitimacy is grounded in a moral relationship between the parties that\ngoes beyond the fact that they are fellow human beings. The\nestablishment of a robust right to rule depends on the fact that each\ncitizen rightly takes as a reason for obedience that it has a moral\nduty owed to the authority. Since a legitimate political authority with\na right to rule is predicated on the fact that citizens have moral\nreasons grounded in the right to rule to obey it, the right to rule\nengages citizens at a deep moral level. The exercise of political power\nis founded in a moral relationship between moral persons that\nrecognizes and affirms the moral personality of each citizen.", "\n\nBy contrast, a society in which it is merely the case that\ncoercion is justified is one in which the subjects are permissibly\ntreated as means to morally defensible purposes. The subjects do not\nowe anything to the authority or have any duties to obey it. So, in the\ncase of an authority as merely justified coercion, the subjects'\nreasons for obedience are merely their desires to avoid punishment. And\nthat is the level at which the authority deals with them. Such a\nsociety does not engage the subjects as moral persons, it merely\nattempts to administer the activities of persons so as to bring about\nin a morally justified way a desirable outcome. At the extreme, a\nprisoner of war camp or even a hostile but justified military\noccupation gives the authorities justification for coercion. The people\nwho are subjected to that treatment often have no duties to obey and\nthey do not regard each other or the authorities as members of a\nunified political community. They are merely fellow human beings. To\nthe extent that a political society is best when it involves the mutual\nrecognition and affirmation of the moral status of each person, the\nkind of society that involves merely justified coercion of some by\nothers is a pale shadow.", "\n\nAnd the intermediate form of political authority is incomplete in\nthe respect in which the exercise of political power involves the\nmutual recognition and affirmation of the status of each person. It is\nthe case that subjects have duties but those duties are not essentially\nconnected to anything in the authority. The subjects instead act more\nin accordance with reasons that are independent of the authority when\nthey obey the authority. So to the extent that a society ruled by an\nauthority that has the right to rule is an ideal of a moral community,\nthe other types of authority are lesser forms of a morally ideal\npolitical community." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Legitimate Political Authority: Some Conceptual Distinctions" }, { "content": [ "\n\nTo the extent that a duty of obedience is included in the concept of\npolitical authority, there can be different forms of obedience on the\npart of subjects. This implies a very distinct dimension of political\nauthority. When a political authority issues a command and the subject\nhas a duty to obey, what is the nature of this duty? One might have a\nduty to obey a command merely because it commands the subject to do\nsomething that is just and any alternative action would be unjust. Here\nthe duty to obey would depend on the content of the command. Commands\nthat are unjust or perhaps even commands that require actions that are\nnot exclusively just may not involve duties at all.", "\n\nThe commands of a legitimate political authority are usually thought\nto involve something more than this. The duty of the subject is\ngrounded not in the content of the command itself but in the nature of\nthe source issuing the command. The duty to obey is then automatically\ngenerated when the command is issued by the appropriate authority and\nwhen it has the right form and provenance. In this respect, the duty to\nobey is content independent or independent of the content of the\nparticular command. One must obey because one has been commanded and\nnot because of the particular content of the command. One must do it\nbecause one has been told to do it. This kind of duty seems to be the\nmost central kind of duty involved in the duty to obey. It is the idea\nthat one must obey the authority because it is the authority. It does\nnot imply of itself that one owes the duty of obedience to the\nauthority so it does not imply that there is a right to rule on the\npart of the authority.", "\n\nHere we must distinguish a duty that is owed to the authority and a\nduty that is merely the result of the authoritative command. The duty\nthat is owed to the authority is grounded in the fact that the\nauthority possesses a feature that gives it a right to command and that\nit is in virtue of that right that one owes obedience. The idea is that\nthere is something just in itself that the authority be obeyed.", "\n\nOne other distinction that is worth making in this connection is the\ndistinction between a preemptive duty to obey and a duty that is not\npreemptive. A preemptive duty is one that replaces other duties. It\nputs other duties out of play when it comes into play. A preemptive\nduty is not weighed against other duties that might relate to what one\nis thinking of doing. Of course, a preemptive duty may not preempt all\nother considerations, its preemption may operate only with a limited\nscope and thus preempt only some limited set of considerations.", "\n\nAn example of a preemptive duty is the case of a promissory\nobligation. If I have agreed to do something for you and I suddenly see\nsome pleasurable alternative to fulfilling my obligation, most people\nwould think that I ought to exclude the consideration of pleasure\naltogether from my deliberations even though the pleasure would be a\nconsideration had I made no promise. It is simply not something that I\ncan legitimately weigh in the balance against the promissory\nobligation. So if an authority issues a command and the duty to obey is\na preemptive duty, then the subject does not weigh the other duties\nthat might otherwise apply to him in the balance with the preemptive\nduty. The preemptive duty simply excludes the other duties. By\ncontrast, if a duty is not preemptive, then when it comes time to\ncomply with it, one must balance it with other duties that weigh for\nand against acting in accord with the duty.", "\n\nMost think that the duties associated with authority are content\nindependent in the sense that one must do what one is told even if one\nis skeptical about the merits of the command. There is some\nskepticism, however, about the claim that legitimate political\nauthorities impose preemptive duties on subjects. These people have\nquestioned the rationality of preemptive duties or reasons for\naction. Surely, there are times when what appear to be preempted\nconsiderations all add up to a consideration that outweighs the\npreempting consideration. How can this be understood on the preemption\nmodel? Some have argued that authoritative commands simply give\nespecially weighty content independent duties, which can be balanced\nagainst other duties (Shapiro 2002). The discussion of instrumentalism\nwill say a bit more about these criticisms below.", "\n\nThe most demanding notion of authority is the idea of a political\nauthority that has a right to rule that correlates with a duty to obey\nthat is owed to the authority and that is a content independent and\npreemptive duty." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Political Authority and Different Kinds of Duties of Obedience" }, { "content": [ "\n\nMost who think of legitimate authority as a kind of moral power to\nchange the moral situation of others think of it as creating duties in\nothers. And this is certainly the most prominent and striking\nexercise of authority. But political authorities do not only create\nduties in others in and some cases do not purport to create such\nduties at all. The most prominent instances of this can be found in\ninternational institutions. The Security Council of the United\nNations exercises authority in a variety of ways: sometimes acting as\na kind of legislative body and sometimes acting as a kind of executive\nbody. Its executive authority is its traditional role in\ninternational law. But this executive authority is quite distinct\nfrom the kind of executive authority we see in the state. The\nSecurity Council exercises its executive authority primarily by\nauthorizing actions and not by carrying them out by itself or by\nrequiring them. One way to describe the moral power of the Security\nCouncil is that it gives a liberty to states to prosecute wars. It\ndoes this against a background of a general prohibition of all war\nexcept in the case of self-defense. It suspends that prohibition for\ncertain states. It does not require them to act, it only permits them\nto act in a warlike way. This is because the agent of enforcement in\nthe international system is a decentralized one.", "\n\nFurthermore the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade\nOrganization functions in very much the same way. The dispute\nsettlement system first determines whether a state has in fact\nviolated its agreements on trade and tariffs with another state. And\nwhen it determines this, it permits the plaintiff state to act in a\nway that would normally be in violation of its agreements. It permits\nretaliation through the system of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. It\ncannot require this retaliation.", " \n\nHence the two most effective and authoritative institutions in the\ninternational system do not impose duties at all in many cases, they\nexercise a moral power to alter the moral situation of states but the\nalteration is from duty to permission in many cases. To be sure, they\ndo this against the background of treaties and agreements that have a\nkind of legislative force and that do purport to impose genuine\nduties. And there are duties not to interfere with the authorized\nactivity, but the point remains that the primary exercise is one of\nchanging duties to permissions. This may confirm Applebaum's idea\nthat authority need not impose duties." ], "subsection_title": "1.3 Political Authority without Duties of Obedience" }, { "content": [ "\n\nOne reason for keeping our minds open to different accounts of\npolitical authority is that there are different kinds of political\nauthority. Different accounts may be suitable to different kinds of\nauthority. Indeed, different principles grounding authority may be\nsuitable to different kinds of authority. One thing that is not often\nenough discussed in treatments of political authority is the fact that\nthere are very different kinds of political authority. Within the\nstate alone there is legislative authority, executive authority,\njudicial authority, and administrative authority; these different\nkinds of authority can have distinct sub-branches of authority. And\nthere are political authorities outside of the modern state, namely\ninternational institutions. These have a very distinct kind of\nauthority at least in the contemporary world and the authority of\nthese different agencies is grounded in different principles.", "\n\nAs an illustration of different forms of authority for different\npolitical entities consider the different parts of the modern state.\nWe might think that a democratic legislative assembly has a genuine\nright to rule in the sense that citizens owe obedience to it. They\nmight owe this obedience because the assembly pools all the democratic\nrights of all the citizens and so citizens treat each other as equals\nby complying with the assembly's directives. But citizens do not owe\nit to courts to respect their judgments about the law. The courts may\ncreate duties but the duties are not owed to them. The same\npresumably goes for policemen and adminstrators as well. They seem to\nhave moral powers to create duties but these duties are not owed to\nthem. Furthermore, the grounds of authority might be distinct for\nthese two kinds of entities. The democratic conception might provide\nthe basis of the authority of the assembly while the authority of\ncourts and administrators may be more instrumentally grounded." ], "subsection_title": "1.4 The Diversity of Holders of Political Authority" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nFew theorists after Thomas Hobbes and David Hume have argued that\nthere is a general duty to obey the law or that political authority is\ngenerally legitimate (Hobbes 1668; Hume 1965). Most theorists have\nargued that the legitimacy of political authority is one that holds\nonly when the political authority satisfies certain normatively\nimportant conditions. What we will review here are some of the main\ntheories that attempt to explain when a political authority has\nlegitimacy.", "\n\nGeneral theories are theories that identify general properties that\nvirtually any kind of political regime can have that gives them\nlegitimacy. Special theories are ones that mark off particular classes\nof regimes that have legitimacy or that have a particularly high level\nof legitimacy. There are really four types of general theory of\npolitical authority and then there are a variety of special theories of\npolitical authority. The four types of general theory of legitimacy are\nconsent theories, reasonable consensus theories, associative obligation\ntheories and instrumentalist theories. The two historically important\nforms of special theory in the West have been the Divine Right of Kings\ntheories and democratic theories." ], "section_title": "2. Conceptions of the Legitimacy of Political Authority", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAt the root of all contemporary discussions of the legitimacy of\nauthority is the problem posed by Robert Paul Wolff concerning the\nincompatibility of moral autonomy and political authority. The problem\nis really only connected with the kinds of political authority that\nimply content independent duties to comply with authoritative commands.\nThe basic idea is that it is incompatible for a subject to comply with\nthe commands of an authority merely because it is the command of the\nauthority and for the subject to be acting morally autonomously. Wolff\nthinks that each person has a duty to act on the basis of his own moral\nassessment of right and wrong and has the duty to reflect on what is\nright and wrong in each particular instance of action. Such a person\nwould be violating his duty to act autonomously if he complies with\nauthoritative commands on grounds that are independent of the content\nof the commands. So the duty of autonomy is incompatible with the duty\nof obeying political authority. This is the challenge of philosophical\nanarchism (Wolff 1970).", "\n\nThe worry is that authority is never legitimate because the kind of\nobedience associated with authority is inconsistent with the autonomy\nof the subject. We can see, however, that this worry applies only to\ncertain accounts of authority, which imply duties to obey on the part\nof the subjects. The account of authority as justified coercion is not\naffected by this argument nor is the account of legitimate authority\nconsisting of a justification right affected by this worry. Still, most\naccounts of the nature of authority do imply content independent duties\non the part of the subjects. We can see that any content independent\nduty, whether it is a duty not to interfere with the authority's\ncommand or it is a duty to obey the authority, is called into question\nby this argument." ], "section_title": "3. The Puzzle of Political Authority: Philosophical Anarchism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nOne can see different accounts of the legitimacy of political\nauthority as responses to the anarchist challenge. Let us start with\nthe instrumentalist account of legitimacy. The canonical statement of\nthis notion of legitimate authority is provided by Joseph Raz. He calls\nit the Normal Justification Thesis. It asserts that “the normal\nway to establish that a person has authority over another person\ninvolves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply\nwith reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative\ndirectives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as\nauthoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying\nto follow the reasons which apply to him directly.” (Raz\n1986)", "\n\nThis conception of the legitimacy of authority flows from the idea\nthat “authoritative directives should be based on reasons which\nalready independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are\nrelevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the\ndirective” (Raz 1986.) According to Raz, what should guide\ngovernment decisions about what commands to give subjects is what the\nsubjects already have reason to do. For instance, subjects already have\nreason to give a fair share of resources for the common good.\nAuthorities merely help them comply with these reasons by establishing\nan efficient and fair system of taxation. Subjects have reason to\ndefend their fellow countrymen and authorities help them do this by\nestablishing an army in an efficient and fair way. Authorities do these\nthings by issuing commands to subjects that are meant to replace the\nreasons that already apply to the subjects. Instead of the subject\ntrying to figure out exactly how much he owes and who to give it to by\ncoordinating it with many other people, the authority simply takes over\nthese tasks, determines what the subject has reason to do and expects\nthe subject to take its authoritative command as a reason instead of\nthe reasons that directly apply to the action. An authority does its\njob well and is therefore legitimate when it enables subjects to act\nbetter on the reasons that apply to them when they take the commands as\ngiving them preemptive reasons.", "\n\nAn instrumentalist attempts to meet Wolff's challenge by saying that\nan authority is legitimate when one complies better with one's duty\noverall by submission to authority than by trying to act on the basis\nof one's own assessments of what is right and wrong in each instance.\nThis amounts to a rejection of the duty of autonomy that is central to\nthe anarchist idea. Or at least it is a rejection of the idea that the\nduty of autonomy is the most fundamental duty. But it does get at\nsomething important. Wolff's challenge states in a rather general way\nthe worry that there is something immoral about failing to critically\nreflect about what one ought to do in each instance of action. And he\nstates that submitting to the commands of the state is precisely a case\nof failing to act on one's critical assessment of a situation. The\ninstrumentalist suggests a way in which it is not immoral to fail to\ncritically reflect on one's prospective actions in each instance.\nIndeed, the instrumentalist can argue that it is sometimes immoral to\ninsist on critically reflecting and acting autonomously when one may\nactually act worse as a result of consistently critically reflecting.\nWe frequently act on the basis of rules of action, without considering\nall the details of the circumstances in which we act on the grounds\nthat trying to take all the details of each situation into account for\neach action would produce bad decisions. The instrumentalist argues\nthat we ought to take this kind of attitude to the commands of the\nstate when we will better act in accordance with our duty overall by\ndoing so than by attempting to make independent assessments of the\nworth of our actions in every case (see Raz 1986, ch. 3.)", "\n\nThis response to the philosophical anarchist challenge establishes\nonly a piecemeal duty to obey the state. The instrumentalist argues\nthat some states some of the time issue commands that we (or at least\nsome individuals) ought to submit to without critical reflection on\neach command. It does not imply that the duty to obey the state extends\nto all commands of the state and to all subjects. It only applies when\nthe subject would likely better comply with duties overall by treating\nthe commands as authoritative (i.e. establishing content independent\nand preemptive duties to obey the commands) than by acting on the basis\nof an independent assessment of the rightness of each action. Whether\nthe commands impose duties or not depends on features of the subject\nsuch as his or her knowledge of the issues related to the commands and\nso forth.", "\n\nOf course, it is important to note that not every act of obedience\nwill ensure better compliance with reason, there will be cases when the\ncommands of the state do not accord with the best reasons. Raz's\nconception of authority depends for its cogency on the thought that as\nlong as the subject does better by reason overall by obeying certain\nclasses of commands, the subject has a duty to obey every one of the\ncommands: the correct as well as the incorrect. In some sense, the\nobedience to the commands has a greater likelihood of ensuring\nconformity with reason. Finally, this particular account of the duty to\nobey does not assert that the discharging of the duties is owed to the\nstate. This account does not establish any fundamental right to rule on\nthe part of the state." ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Instrumentalism about Legitimate Political Authority" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe power of this account of political authority and the duty to\nobey depends essentially on the account of practical reasoning that\nlies at its base. Many have argued that this conception of practical\nreasoning is flawed. They have worried that the indirect form of\npractical reasoning that it requires is not legitimate. The worry can\nbe stated fairly easily. The form of practical reasoning this account\nof authority includes requires that we ignore the reasons that apply\ndirectly to the action we are about to undertake even though sometimes\nthose reasons will count against the action. The question arises, when\nare the reasons that directly apply to the action so strongly opposed\nto the action that we must override the preemptive reason?", "\n\nIn the case of rule following, we sometimes encounter particular\ninstances in which following the rule is counterproductive. How do we\ndetermine when we ought to follow the rule and when we ought not to\nfollow the rule? Does such determination involve the very deliberation\nabout particular instances that was meant to be excluded by the rule?\nSome have argued that rule following cannot be rational since it cannot\nbe rational to ignore the particular facts of each case (Hurd\n2001).", "\n\nRaz's main response to this criticism has been to say that we look\nfor clear cases in which the rule is to be overridden and ignore the\nother cases and that only by doing this do we best comply with reason.\nLimiting exceptions to the rule to clear cases obviates the need for\ndeliberation in every case." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 A Worry about the Instrumentalist Account of Practical Reason" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nAnother version of the philosophical anarchist challenge may seem to\navoid the critical edge of the above approach. This approach, defended\nby A. John Simmons (Simmons 2001) and Leslie Green (Green 1989) asserts\nthat each person has a right not to be bound by the state's commands.\nThis thesis is quite different from the kind of anarchism defended by\nWolff. The latter asserts that each individual has a duty to be\nautonomous. The present theory asserts merely that a person has a right\nnot be subjected to another's imposition of duties. The philosophical\nanarchist then argues that only if a person consents to being bound to\nthe political authority can the person actually be bound. The final\npremise in the philosophical anarchist argument is that it is either\npractically impossible or at least actually untrue that states can be\nset up in such a way that they can demand the obedience of all and only\nthose who have consented to their authority. So, the anarchist\nconcludes, no state is legitimate and perhaps no state can ever be\nlegitimate.", "\n\nIt is important to note that this view does not imply that one must\nnever obey the state. It merely implies that one does not have content\nindependent duties to obey the state and that the state does not have a\nright to rule. A reasonably just state will command one to do things\nthat are reasonably just and in many cases one must obey those commands\nbecause they are just. What one is not required to do on the\nphilosophical anarchist view is obey any state just because it has\ncommanded one to do certain things.", "\n\nTo discuss this view, we will first discuss the arguments people\nhave given for the consent theory of political authority. We will also\ndiscuss some counterarguments. Then we will discuss a popular\nmodification of the consent theory that is designed to avoid\nphilosophical anarchism." ], "section_title": "4. A Second Form of Philosophical Anarchism", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nThe consent theory of political authority states only a necessary\ncondition of the legitimacy of political authority. It states that a\npolitical authority is legitimate only if it has the consent of those\nwho are subject to its commands. Many have argued that in addition to\nconsent, a state must be minimally just for it to be legitimate (Locke\n1990).", "\n\nA number of arguments have been presented in favor of this view.\nLocke's argument is that each person has an equal natural right to\nfreedom and that this implies that at the age of maturity no one may be\nsubordinated to anyone else's commands by nature (Locke 1990). Let us\ncall this the natural right argument. Such subordination would\nviolate the equal freedom of the subordinated person. To the extent\nthat political authority involves issuing commands and requiring others\nto follow the commands, it seems to involve subordinating one person to\nthe commands of another and thus violates the natural right to freedom\nof the subordinated person." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 The Consent Theory of Political Authority: The Natural Right to Freedom Argument" }, { "content": [ "\n\nA natural objection to this line of reasoning is to state that\npolitical authority is actually necessary to protecting each person's\nequal freedom. Locke himself argued that the state of nature would be\nquite threatening to each person's ability to live freely because there\nare likely to be many disagreements about what rights each person has\nand so people are likely to trespass on each other's rights.\nFurthermore he argued that when there is such disagreement, we need an\nimpartial judge to determine when rights have been violated. And\nagainst criminals we need a police power to enforce the rights that\npeople have. Locke argues that only by establishing political society\nwith a legislature that makes known and settled laws and establishing a\njudiciary that resolves remaining controversies between people and\nhaving an executive power that enforces the laws can people's rights\nand freedoms be protected.", "\n\nOnce we have the above argument in mind, it is hard to see the force\nof the natural right argument for no political authority without\nconsent. We might think that the very liberty that is being invoked to\nsupport the case for the necessity of consent is better protected by a\nreasonably just political authority. The instrumentalist can then argue\nthat one protects the liberty of each and every person better by\ninstituting political authority and by treating its commands as\nauthoritative. And so the instrumentalist could argue that insofar as\nliberty is a fundamental value, it would be immoral not to support a\nreasonably just political authority and treat its commands as\nauthoritative.", "\n\nThe natural right theorist might argue in response that the above\nargument seems to involve a kind of utilitarianism of rights. Such a\nview says that it is justified to violate one person's right in order\nto protect the rights of others. But, such a theorist might say, the\nnatural rights of persons are side constraints against actions; they\nare not to be violated even if others' rights are better protected as\na consequence. This entry will not go into the many issues that arise\nin the discussion of deontology and consequentialism here. We will\nreturn to the issue of side constraints after the discussion of the\nnext argument." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 The Instrumentalist Critique of the Natural Right Argument" }, { "content": [ "\n\nSome have proposed what this entry will call the options\nargument against the kind of considerations the instrumentalist\nadduces. The instrumentalist argues that I have natural duties of\njustice to promote just institutions and that these duties are best\nsatisfied by complying with the authority of a reasonably just\nstate. But the philosophical anarchist could argue that though I may\nhave a duty of justice, it does not entail that I must obey any\nparticular institution for promoting justice. The idea here is that\njust as Amnesty International may not require me to pay dues to it\nregardless of my membership even though these dues would clearly\nadvance the protection of human rights throughout the world, so the\nstate may not require me to comply with its commands even though such\ncompliance would advance the purposes of justice in the world. Let us\nsuppose that the reasons clearly favor my support of Amnesty\nInternational. Intuitively, it still may not require me to lend it\nsupport. Only if I have voluntarily joined and voluntarily remain in\nAmnesty do I have a duty to do what the conditions of membership\nrequire. And I am under no obligation to join Amnesty; I may join\nother organizations to fulfill whatever duties of aid that I have. So\nwhether I ought to join Amnesty and be subject to membership dues is\nup to me. The consent theorist seems to think that, in the same way,\nonly if I voluntarily transact to obligate myself to comply with the\nstate's commands can I be said to have a duty to comply with the\nstate. I must somehow enlist myself in the project of promoting the\ngood causes that the state promotes (Simmons 2001)." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 The Consent Theory: The Options Argument" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThis argument may miss a central idea in the instrumentalist account\nof authority. The instrumentalist account is premised on the view that\nnot only does the state help one discharge one's duties of justice; it\nasserts that compliance with the state is necessary to the discharge of\none's duties. Hence, one acts unjustly if one fails to comply with the\nstate's commands.", "\n\nTo understand this, we need to introduce another concept. The idea\nis that the state does not only promote justice, it\nestablishes justice. What does this mean? It means that for a\nparticular community, the state determines what justice requires in the\nrelations between individuals. It does this by defining the relations\nof property and exchange as well as the institutions of the criminal\nlaw and tort law. To say that the state's legislative activity\nestablishes justice is not the same as saying that the state's activity\nconstitutes justice. Justice is still an independent standard of\nassessment on this account.", "\n\nThe reason for saying that the state establishes justice is that, in\nJoseph Raz's words, justice and morality more generally, underdetermine\nthe legislation necessary to bring about justice in a community. This\nmeans that one can implement the same principles of justice by means of\nmany different sets of rules. But one can treat others justly only if\none is on the same page as the others. So what is just in a particular\ncircumstance will depend in part on the set of rules that the others\nare acting on. To the extent that the state determines the basic\nframework of rules, it determines which actions are just and which are\nnot. One does not act justly, on this account, by deciding not to\ncomply with the state one lives in and sending money to another state\nor association. If one fails to comply with the rules of property or\nthe rules of exchange, one treats others unjustly. The options argument\nsuggests that somehow there is a way that one can discharge one's duty\nto others by doing something other than obeying the law. Instead of\nobeying the law of property of the society in which I live, I may\nsimply decide to send money to another part of the world where property\nrights are enforced. But this argument fails to appreciate the central\nimportance of law to defining justice among persons. Though not all\nlaws are just, justice among persons in any even moderately complex\nsociety requires law and obedience to law." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 The Instrumentalist Critique of the Option and Natural Right Arguments" }, { "content": [ "\n\nOne argument for consent theory essayed by Simmons asserts that a\nperson ought to be free to act on the basis of personal reasons as\nopposed to impersonal reasons. So even if the state does help each\nperson act more on the basis of impersonal reasons that apply to them\nindependent of the state, a person may refuse, on the basis of personal\nreasons, to accept the directives of the state. And so, it is argued,\nthe state's imposition of duties on the individual may occur only if\nthe individual has consented to the state's authority (Simmons\n2001).", "\n\nThe idea that one can have personal reasons not to obey the commands\nof a reasonably just state is unclear. It might be referring to the\nidea that each person has a kind of personal prerogative that permits\nhim to avoid the demands of morality generally. This idea was proposed\nby critics of utilitarianism as a way to avoid the excessive\ndemandingness of utilitarianism while keeping most of the view intact.\nUtilitarianism supplies exclusively impersonal reasons for action to\nindividuals. These seem to undermine the personal projects and\ninterests of individuals. Some have proposed that utilitarianism be\nmodified to accommodate the projects of individuals by including a\npersonal prerogative to act on the basis of personal reasons. Others\nhave argued that there ought to be a personal prerogative to ignore the\nimpersonal reasons of any set of moral requirements.", "\n\nBut this role for personal reasons does not seem to provide much in\nthe way of defense of the consent theory. One reason for this is that\nthese are reasons to avoid some of the demands of morality. But the\nissue at stake in the justification of authority is whether morality\ndemands obedience or not. If we think of these personal reasons as part\nof the structure of morality, on the other hand, then it would seem\nthat these personal reasons are best protected by a reasonably just\nstate that protects individual freedom. So the response to the claim\nthat individuals have personal reasons to evade the commands of the\nstate seems to fall prey to the same argument that undermines the\nnatural right approach." ], "subsection_title": "4.5 The Consent Theory of Political Authority: The Argument from Personal Reasons" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThere is another way to think of this personal reasons criticism of\ninstrumentalist approaches to political authority. The instrumentalist\napproach seems to be committed to the idea that an authority can be\nlegitimate even if most of the members of the society do not agree with\nwhat it is doing. As long as the state is requiring people to act as\nthey should act, the subjects have a duty to obey, even if they do not\nsee that they have this duty. Now one can see how this may be true in\nsome circumstances, where the members are deeply immoral or irrational.\nBut it seems perverse to think that whether the state has legitimate\nauthority is completely independent of the considered opinions of its\nsubjects. Here is the reason behind the appearance. The state, being a\ngroup of people, owes the subjects some kind of duty of respect for the\njudgments of those members. This duty of respect requires at least some\ndegree of responsiveness on the part of the state in making decisions.\nFurthermore the state, in part, is an institution that is grounded in\nthe need for decisions against a background of disagreement about what\nought to be done. For the state to make decisions against this\nbackground that completely ignores the views of the many dissenters\nseems a particularly egregious violation of the duty to accord some\nrespect to the opinions of reasonable adult human beings.", "\n\nConsent theories, reasonable consensus theories, associative\nobligation theories and democratic theories make these observations\npart of the foundation of their accounts of the legitimacy of\nauthority. The consent theory of political authority requires that for\nthe state to have authority over any person, the state must have the\nconsent of the person to that authority. Consent, on this account, is a\nnecessary condition of the legitimacy of authority though it need not\nbe a sufficient condition. The consent theory clearly makes an attempt\nto make political authority compatible with a due respect for the\nopinions of subjects." ], "subsection_title": "4.6 Consent Theory: The Argument from Disagreement" }, { "content": [ "\n\nBut we might wonder if it doesn't go too far. For if consent is a\ngenuinely necessary condition of political authority, then it appears\nthat individuals may have the option of not obeying a perfectly just\nstate that has jurisdiction over the area in which they live. And they\nmay do this on perverse grounds or they may simply wish to free ride on\nthe benefits that the state confers without having to undertake any of\nthe burdens. How can this be legitimate and how can it undermine the\nauthority of a just state? It seems that in the effort to express\nrespect for the reasonable opinions of people, consent theory seems to\nhave gone too far in giving respect to immoral, irrational and\nunprincipled failures of consent (Raz 1986).", "\n\nThe consent theorist could respond to this difficulty with the claim\nthat it is only the state's claim to authority that is being held\nhostage, not the state's just activities. For if it is the case that\nthe person is merely free riding on desirable activities and that this\nis unjust then the person is acting wrongly. Hence, the justice of the\nactions of the state may be sufficient to condemn the actions of the\nfree rider and this can be done without attributing the right to rule\nto the state.", "\n\nBut now the instrumentalist could argue that obedience to the\nauthoritative commands of the state may be necessary to acting justly\nin many instances. The thought is that only if people treat the\ncommands of the state as providing content independent reasons for\nobedience can a reasonably just state actually perform the tasks that\nmake it just. If people are constantly second guessing the state's\ndecisions, the central roles of coordination, collective action and\nassurance in the establishment of justice by the state will be\nundermined. These are collective effects of second guessing. But the\ninstrumentalist will also argue that individuals will often act less in\naccordance with the reasons that apply to them if they fail to take the\ncommands of a reasonably just state as offering content independent\nreasons because only the state's commands can clue them in to what the\nrules that establish justice are in their particular community. The\ninstrumentalist may then argue that it is therefore wrong for the\nperson not to take the commands of the state as authoritative, at least\nin many circumstances." ], "subsection_title": "4.7 The Problems of Irrational, Immoral Failures of Consent" }, { "content": [ "\n\nLocke, in part desiring to avoid these obvious difficulties or\nirrational and immoral failures of consent, introduced the notion of\ntacit consent (Locke 1990). The possibility of tacit consent allows\nthat one may consent without having to go through the usual motions\nassociated with expression of consent. For example, at a board meeting,\none consents tacitly to the chairman's scheduling a meeting if one says\nnothing when the chair asks for objections to the proposal. And that\ntacit consent is valid to the extent that the failure to object is\nunderstood as a kind of consent and is voluntary.", "\n\nThe main problem with tacit consent is the problem of\ninterpretation. How does one interpret the actions of another so as to\nthink of them as consenting though they did not explicitly do so?\nTheorists differ on the constraints that must be placed on the\ninterpretation of the behaviors of others. Simmons argues that for\nbehavior to count as tacit consent it the behavior must be explicitly\nunderstood by all to be a kind of consent, it must be clear how when to\nperform the act or omission that constitutes tacit consent, it is not\ndifficult to consent and the costs of dissent are not prohibitive. But\nit is not obvious that Locke had this in mind. Locke thought that the\nmere residing in a territory and voluntarily benefiting from the\nactions of a minimally just state were sufficient conditions of tacit\nconsent. One might think that Locke thought the following. If a person\nvoluntarily resides in a territory over which the state has\njurisdiction and that person benefits from the establishment of the\nrule of law and all the other amenities the state provides then that\nperson must know or ought to know that the state's provision of these\nbenefits depends on the obedience of the members of the society. But if\nthe person now continues to reside voluntarily in the state, that\nperson must know that others expect obedience from him unless he is\nunder some special exemption. He must know or ought to know, in other\nwords, that others can reasonably interpret his voluntary residence as\ncommitting him to obedience to the laws of the state. So, we have\nadequate reason to interpret a person's continued voluntary residence\nas a form of consenting to abide by the laws of the state." ], "subsection_title": "4.8 Tacit Consent" }, { "content": [ "\n\nDavid Hume criticized this interpretive move (Hume 1965). He argued\nthat given the extraordinary costs to most people of moving out of the\ncountry of their birth, no one can sensibly interpret the voluntary\ncontinued residence of a person in a state as a case of tacit consent.\nHe draws an analogy with a person who has been carried involuntarily\nonto a ship by others and who now finds himself on the ship subject to\nthe commands of the captain and whose only alternative is to throw\nhimself into a stormy sea. Hume argues that such a person's remaining\non the ship can not be interpreted to be consenting to the authority of\nthe captain. The person is merely attempting to avoid the terrible cost\nof getting off the ship.", "\n\nBut it is not clear why Hume's argument is supposed to work. It\nsounds like the argument challenges the voluntariness of the consent.\nBut this cannot be a conclusive argument here. After all, many people\nconsent to things in order to avoid the terrible costs of not\nconsenting. People consent to pay their insurance premiums in order not\nto end up without health care when the time comes that they need it.\nPromises made on the battlefield to lay down arms on the condition that\nthe opponent will not harm one are also made under severe duress. But\nwe do not think that these promises are invalid or that they fail to\nobligate. So the fact that the alternative would be terrible is not a\nreason to think that those who choose to remain in a state are not\nthereby bound.", "\n\nOf course, Hume's example includes the fact that the person was\ncarried forcibly onto the ship. This may be doing more work that it\nshould be. For few people would say that the state has necessarily done\nsomething wrong by imposing its jurisdiction over a territory on which\na person is born. We need, then, to change Hume's example so that the\nperson who is on the boat is on it through no fault of anyone on the\nboat, though he may have ended up there involuntarily.", "\n\nOne possibility is that Hume thinks that we cannot interpret the\ncontinuing residence of a person in a state as a case of consent to the\nauthority of the state because we have no reason to think that the\ncontinuing residence was chosen as a result of reflection on whether it\nconstituted consent. The impoverished person who remains in the state\nin which he finds himself gave no thought whatsoever to any\nconsideration other than that to move would be highly costly or\notherwise unpleasant. We have no reason to think that he gave any\nthought to the question of consent and so it is illegitimate to\ninterpret his behavior in that way.", "\n\nBut it is not obvious that this reasoning succeeds. If a person\nbenefits by residing in a territory and everyone knows that the\nbenefit only arises because of the obedience to law of the members,\nshouldn't it be clear to this person that his compliance is expected\nof him if he remains in the territory? And does his remaining in the\nterritory thereby imply that he consents to the authority of the\nterritory?", "\n\nOf course it is true of any particular person that his\ncompliance is not necessary to the maintenance of the benefits of\npublic order. But at the same time it is clear that unless there is\nsome special reason for this person not to be subject to the rules\neveryone else is subject to, elementary norms of fairness will suggest\nto him and everyone else that compliance is expected of him just as it\nis of everyone else.", "\n\nThis would seem to be a basis for interpreting the person's behavior\nas a case of consent. Anyone can see that the compliance of each person\nis expected of those who reside in a territory as long as the law is\nreasonably just. If someone has not considered these facts, perhaps he\nshould be held responsible for consenting anyway. After all, if we look\nat Simmons's central board room case we might have the same reaction to\nsomeone who, having been told that failure to object implies consent to\na policy, fails to object but only because he doesn't want to anger his\ngirlfriend in the group and really gives no thought to the question of\nconsent. Surely he has tacitly consented, despite his irresponsible\nattitude. So why not think that the person who continues to reside\nvoluntarily in a reasonably just state?" ], "subsection_title": "4.9 The Humean Attack on Tacit Consent" }, { "content": [ "\n\nAn important objection to the idea of tacit consent is that it begs\nthe question about how a state gets its authority. Some argue that a\ngroup of persons that has no authority to issue commands in the first\nplace cannot require people submit to their commands or leave a piece\nof territory they are falsely claim as under their jurisdiction\n(Brilmayer 1989; Wellman 2001). In a variation on the boardroom example\ndescribed above, Brilmayer imagines that instead of the chairman\nproposing a date for a meeting, a window washer swings in and makes the\nsame proposal and asks for objections. Clearly in that case, failure to\nregister objections would not constitute consent to the proposed\nschedule. The reason for this is that only a duly constituted authority\ncan have the right to make such a proposal. But, the claim to authority\nis precisely what tacit consent is supposed to support. So as an\naccount of authority the tacit consent view seems to beg the\nquestion.", "\n\nThis criticism is right as far as it goes. But there are four points\nto note about it. First, it applies to explicit consent as well as\ntacit consent. My consent to a person's doing something does not\nlegitimate that person's doing it nor does it obligate me to respect\nhis doing it unless he already has a right to make the proposal. In the\ncase of political authorities, my consent to someone's issuing commands\nover a piece of territory that she has no right to rule over does not\nlegitimate her commands nor does it obligate me.", "\n\nSecond, it is not a criticism of Locke since he clearly thinks that\ntacit consent only legitimates and obligates under conditions where\nthere is a duly constituted authority. Locke thinks that the right to\nrule of an authority must be traced back to an original act of consent\nin the state of nature (where there is no prior political authority) to\nform a political body. That political body then confers, by the consent\nof all the members, authority on a particular institutional arrangement\n(as long as it is minimally just). The function of tacit consent as\nwell as the consent of new members is simply to renew this already\ncreated authority.", "\n\nThird, if Locke is right and consent can create authority out of the\nstate of nature, it may be possible for tacit consent to do the same.\nWe can imagine a state of nature scenario where a highly persuasive\nperson gets up amid the chaos and makes a proposal to create the\ninitial political body from the state of nature and then states very\nclearly that if there are objections, they should be raised without\nfear. And we can imagine the very same person making a proposal to\ncreate the particular structure of authority over the political body\nand calling for objections in the same way as before. There is no\nobvious reason why this could not work. Locke did not suggest this but\nit does not seem impossible.", "\n\nThese last two points defeat the argument that tacit consent\nrequires a prior duly constituted authority. What Locke's picture\nsuggests is that valid consent or tacit consent do not require that the\nconsented to proposal be made by someone already in authority; they can\nbe valid as long as the proposal is made when there is no authority\nalready in place. The proposals can be drawn up by someone who has the\nright to make the proposal. In the state of nature, anyone presumably\nhas this right.", "\n\nFourth, even if tacit consent cannot establish authority it may\nstill be a necessary condition on the legitimacy of authority. For if a\npolitical authority is duly constituted in the way Locke describes but\nfails to offer its citizens a right of exit or imposes severe burdens\non people who wish to exit, it will become illegitimate over time,\naccording to Locke.", "\n\nStill, this criticism is quite important because it shows that\nneither consent nor tacit consent can stand alone as bases of political\nlegitimacy. An exclusively consent based theory of political authority\nseems to require that the original consent take place in a state of\nnature prior to political authority. And this further requirement seems\nto weaken the plausibility of the view." ], "subsection_title": "4.10 How Can Tacit Consent Be A Basis of Political Authority?" }, { "content": [ "\n\nWhat is worrisome about this kind of approach from the standpoint of\nconsent theory is that it seems to ignore all the particular reasons\nthat people may have for not consenting. Indeed, it seems to rely on\nthe premise that anyone should see that if they reside within the\nterritory of a reasonably just state, they are properly expected to\ncomply with the law, at least insofar as it is reasonably just. Consent\ntheory, by contrast, seems to rely on the thought that individuals may\nproperly reject these kinds of obligations for purely personal\nreasons.", "\n\nWe can see a dilemma that arises from the above considerations. If\ntacit consent genuinely arises from voluntary residence in a\nreasonably just state, then it appears that the interpretation of the\nperson's residence does not take account of what many consent\ntheorists have thought was essential to consent theory, namely the\npersonal reasons of the subject in deciding whether to consent or\nnot. On the other hand, if those personal reasons are ones that the\nsubject may properly take into account in deciding whether to consent,\nthen the interpretive move required for voluntary residence to\ngenerate obligations in all subjects of a reasonably just state cannot\nwork. It cannot work because subjects may have personal reasons for\nnot consenting, which voluntary residence does not rule out.", "\n\nHence, it appears that tacit consent theory cannot conform to what\nmany have taken to be the highly individualistic spirit of consent\ntheory. So fans of consent theory are not likely to agree to the idea\nthat people generally tacitly consent to the state's authority when\nthey voluntarily reside in its territory. Critics of consent theory are\nlikely, however, to question that highly individualistic approach in\nthe manner sketched above." ], "subsection_title": "4.11 The Basic Objection of Consent Theorists to Tacit Consent" }, { "content": [ "\n\nDavid Estlund has tentatively advanced a new and intriguing suggestion\nfor shoring up an essentially voluntarist account of\nauthority. Estlund argues that even in the absence of explicit or\ntacit consent in some cases persons may be said to have consented to\npolitical authority. He describes this as “normative\nconsent”. The idea is motivated in the following way. Estlund\nnotes that actual explicit cases of consenting can fail to produce\nobligations if what is consented to is seriously immoral. The consent\nis nullified (in its obligation producing effect) by the evident\nimmorality of its content. Estlund then enquires as to whether the\nlack of consent under certain circumstances mightn't similarly be\nnullified in cases where it is plainly wrong not to consent. Why\naren't these symmetrical he asks? Estlund envisions a case in which a\npassenger airplane has crashed and in which there is still a\nsignificant chance of saving many passengers through a very well\ncoordinated effort. As it happens an airline attendant stands up and\n“takes control” by giving commands to various people thus\norganizing the relief effort. Let us suppose that this is evidently\nreasonably successful but that it really does require the cooperation\nof (nearly) everyone to whom the airline attendant chooses to give\ndirectives. And let us suppose that the attendant is not giving any\nclearly immoral commands. Estlund notes that it would be clearly\nimmoral for someone in a position to give essential help not to agree\nto go along with the attendant's commands. Now suppose that someone\nin such a situation refuses to consent to the arrangement. Estlund\nasks whether their non-consent isn't nullified in the light of the\nfact that it is immoral not to consent. And if the non-consent is\nnullified, then its normal effect in preserving the liberty of the\nagent is not produced. In this case the person is no longer free to\nact independent of the purported authority. Since his non-consent is\nnullified, he has, in effect, consented and he is therefore under an\nobligation to the authority. This is normative consent.", "\n\nEstlund is anxious to distinguish this idea from hypothetical consent\nor what you would have consented to had you been a better person. Yet\nhe does want to say that this normative consent has a genuine\nconnection to the will.", "\n\nOne might wonder here if there is any genuine connection to the will\nof the normative consenter and so whether this really does shore up\nthe voluntarist view. But a further issue that might be raised here\nis whether Estlund has genuinely identified the fallback point of\ninvalidated consent and non-consent. Perhaps the proper description\nof the fall back point is neither consent nor non-consent. A person\nwho has consented to something deeply immoral doesn't thereby refuse\nconsent to that action, the person simply has failed to do anything\nmorally productive. Perhaps the idea in the case of the seriously\nimmoral non-consent is that the person has simply not done anything\nmorally productive. What happens in both cases is that the previous\nmoral situation of the agent remains in place. In the nullified\nconsent case you still have an obligation not to do what you consented\nto do and in the nullified non-consent case you still have an\nobligation to do what you refuse to consent to do. This would suggest\nthat the decision between consent and non-consent has here no\nnormative effect: whatever the agent decides, the previous moral\nsituation remains in place. Hence there is a kind of symmetry that\nholds here between the two cases. It is just that the default\nposition is neither consent nor non-consent. The one implication this\nmight have is that one may ask the person again until he agrees,\nwhereas normally if a person refuses to consent to something you must\nleave them alone. " ], "subsection_title": "4.12 Normative Consent" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nReasonable consensus views of political authority attempt to find a\nkind of mean between the extreme individualism of consent theory and\nthe lack of respect for people's opinions of the instrumentalist views.\nJohn Rawls argues that the liberal principle of political legitimacy\nrequires that coercive institutions be so structured that they accord\nwith the reasonable views of the members of the society. As long as\nthey do so they have the right to impose duties on their members. The\nmembers may not demur on the basis of unreasonable views. Furthermore,\nit is not necessary on this view that the persons over whom authority\nis wielded have voluntarily acted or given any sign of agreement. All\nthat need be the case is that the basic principles that regulate the\ncoercive institutions be ones that the reasonable members can agree to\n(Rawls 1996).", "\n\nThis view seems to be a kind of middle position between consent\ntheory and the instrumentalist views. It does not allow individuals to\ndivest themselves of obligations on spurious or merely self-interested\nbases because it specifies what is and is not a reasonable basis for\nagreement to the basic principles of the society. At the same time it\nevinces a respect for the opinions of the members of society since it\nrequires that the basic principles that regulate the society accord\nwith the reasonable views of the members.", "\n\nThis account of legitimacy is based on an adherence to a principle of\nreasonableness. The basic principle asserts that reasonable persons\nwill propose fair terms of cooperation with other reasonable persons\nonly on condition that the terms can be justified to those others on\nthe basis of premises that they can reasonably accept. There has been\nmuch discussion of this principle and its underpinnings but this entry\nwill focus on a central worry concerning this idea." ], "section_title": "5. Reasonable Consensus Conceptions of Legitimate Political Authority", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nA number of criticisms have been made against this kind of view.\nMany have argued that the relevant notion of reasonableness is likely\nto be very difficult to specify in a way that is both plausible and\ncompatible with possible consensus. The key difficulty with reasonable\nconsensus theories is that they rely on the possibility of consensus on\nat least a sufficient number of basic norms to say that there is\nconsensus on the basic principles that regulate a society. So if one\nattempts to come up with a notion of reasonableness that is\nsufficiently robust to generate agreement of this sort, then one is\nlikely to have a notion that is quite controversial. And then the view\ndoes not seem to take a sufficiently respectful view of the opinions of\nthe members of society since so many are likely to disagree with the\nconception of the reasonable. On the other hand, if one elaborates a\nconception of the reasonable that is sufficiently weak for most persons\nin the society to satisfy it, then one is not likely to generate\nagreement on the basic principles of the society.", "\n\nThe main worry is that the idea demands a level of consensus among\nmembers of society that is incompatible with the ordinary conditions of\npolitical societies (Christiano 1996; Waldron 1999). The principle\ndemands that there be a kind of consensus among citizens on the basic\nprinciples that underpin the operation of political society.", "\n\nThis consensus seems to be unattainable under the conditions of\nmodern society. One way, however, in which Rawls has argued in favor of\nthe attainability of the consensus is to say that it need only be an\noverlapping consensus. The idea here is that citizens do not have to\nagree on everything but only on those principles that apply to the\nbasic structure of society. And even here, when citizens disagree on\nsome issue of social justice, the opposing views are taken off the\ntable. So citizens can disagree on what the nature of the good life is\nand on religious questions and even different issues relating to social\njustice. As long as there are certain principles that everyone agrees\nto, which apply to the basic structure of society, full consensus is\nnot necessary. Hence, the consensus need only be an overlapping\none.", "\n\nThough this idea goes some way towards alleviating the worry that\ntoo much consensus is required by Rawls's theory, it does not go nearly\nfar enough. There is one main way in which the overlapping consensus\nfails to provide the kind of consensus that Rawls requires. If a group\nof citizens agrees on a set of principles for regulating society and\nsome of the citizens also think that some other principles apply, the\noverlapping consensus idea is that the citizens who hold the\nidiosyncratic views must take those particular demands off the table\nand must argue only on the basis of the shared principles. The idea is\nthat everyone appeals only to those principles that lie in the overlap\nand not to those that do not lie in the overlap. A legitimate exercise\nof political power is one that is grounded only in those principles\nthat lie in the overlap. This seems to diminish the amount of agreement\nnecessary to make a society legitimate.", "\n\nBut this appearance is an illusion. To see this we need only think\nof those people who hold idiosyncratic views. If the society they live\nin is exclusively grounded in principles that lie in the overlap of\nprinciples, then these people will have reason to complain that the\nsociety is unjust to the extent that the idiosyncratic principles are\nignored. For instance, if someone holds the idiosyncratic view that\npeople ought to receive in accordance with their desert then a society\nthat does not act to make sure that this principle is respected is one\nthat will be considered unjust by that person. They will live in a\nsociety that is unacceptable to them in a certain important respect\nrelevant to justice.", "\n\nOf course, if the desert principle is used to ground the basic\ninstitutions of society even though it does not lie in the overlap then\nthose who think that desert is not a proper principle of justice will\nlikely think that they are living in a society that they regard as\nunjust. The principle of legitimacy will imply in this context that the\nbasic institutions of society are illegitimate because they are not\nbased on principles everyone accepts. But surely the same can be said\nof those who hold the idiosyncratic principles. They can complain that\nthey are required to go along with institutions that are unjust by\ntheir lights. The imposition on them implied by the basic institutions\nthat fail to distribute in accordance with desert is as great as would\nbe the imposition on the others implied by institutions that do\ndistribute goods in accordance with desert. There is a complete\nsymmetry here. Indeed, one way to put this point is to say that those\nwho hold that desert is not a genuine principle of justice are\nthemselves holding an idiosyncratic view when we take into account the\nfact that many think that desert is a genuine principle of justice.", "\n\nAs a consequence of these considerations, only a complete consensus\nof political principles will satisfy the principle of legitimacy that\nRawls defends. But complete consensus on political principles is\nimpossible to achieve given the conditions of ordinary political\nsocieties. And so to the extent that this principle of legitimacy is\nunsatisfiable in ordinary political societies, it appears to be an\nunacceptably utopian principle. In particular, it seems to be an\nunacceptable principle of political legitimacy because a principle of\npolitical legitimacy is partly framed for the purpose of according\nmoral credentials to a society in the circumstances of political\ndisagreement." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Problems of Reasonableness and Consensus" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nOne classical account of political authority has modeled political\nauthority and the attendant obligations on the obligations of family\nand the authority of the parents. Plato gives this account of authority\nand obligation among others in the Crito (Plato 1948). A recent attempt\nto ground the legitimacy of political authority in this way is Ronald\nDworkin's (Dworkin 1986). This view is meant to capture the idea that a\npolitical society can have legitimate authority even if it is not a\nvoluntary association and even if there is disagreement on many\npolitical principles.", "\n\nIf we take the family as a model here, we can see that children\nacquire obligations to obey their parents and to love and support their\nparents and siblings without having voluntarily entered into the\nrelationships. And there may be some relation of authority between\nparents and children at least till the latter reach the age of\nmaturity. Another model Dworkin invokes is that of friendship. He\nargues that though friendship does have an important voluntary\ncomponent, it is not the case that people voluntarily agree to the\nterms of a friendship. They find themselves acquiring obligations of\nfriendship as the friendship grows. Of course there is little in the\nway of authority in friendship and even in the family there is little\nauthority once the children reach maturity.", "\n\nThe analogy between obligations of family, friendship and political\nsociety is grounded in the idea that in all three of these, individuals\nare obligated to abide by the rules or norms of the community. Dworkin\nargues that legitimate political authority arises as a consequence of\nthe acquisition on the part of members of a political society of\nobligations to obey the rules of a genuine associative community. This\ngives the putative authority justification for coercing the members\ninto obedience of the rules, which is the key element of authority on\nDworkin's account.", "\n\nDworkin attempts to discern the basis of obligation in friendships\nand families by the process of interpretation of these social\npractices. His thesis is that communities that satisfy four conditions\nfor being genuine communities thereby generate obligations to go along\nwith the terms of the association. The four conditions are: one, each\nmember of the community sees herself as having special obligations to\nthe other members; two, they see the obligations as owed to each of the\nothers personally; three, these obligations are understood to flow from\na concern for the well being of each of the members; and four, the\nobligations are understood as flowing from a plausible version of equal\nconcern for all the members. Any community that satisfies these four\nconditions is a genuine community and thereby generates obligations in\neach of the members to comply with the terms of the association.", "\n\nDworkin thinks that families and friendships satisfy these\nconstraints in many cases and that only when they satisfy them do they\ngenerate obligations. He also thinks that a certain kind of political\nsociety can satisfy these conditions, which he calls a community of\nprinciple, i.e., a community wherein each member sees himself or\nherself as bound by common principles to all the others.", "\n\nOne might worry that a political society cannot be expected to\ngenerate the kinds of emotional bonds people have towards one another\nin families or friendships (Simmons 2001). And one might think that in\nthe absence of such bonds, the four conditions will not be satisfied.\nDworkin denies this. He agrees that political societies do not generate\nthese kinds of emotional bonds, but he asserts that emotional bonds are\nnot necessary either causally or conceptually to the satisfaction of\nthe four conditions.", "\n\nDworkin argues that the attribution of the four conditions to a\nrelationship occurs through an interpretation of that relationship so\nit need not be the case that each person is aware of satisfying any of\nthe four conditions when they do. Consider a person who appeals to his\nfellow citizens on the basis of a principle of freedom of speech on the\ngrounds that it is part of their constitution. This person is committed\nto legal principles that he shares with other citizens. He will be\ncommitted to the principles underlying the other elements of the\nconstitution and the legal history of his country. He will be committed\nto a principle of equality to the extent that it is part of the\nconstitution. We can interpret this person's behavior and the similar\nbehavior of others as committed to special obligations to their fellow\ncountrymen to the extent that it is the shared constitution they are\nappealing to. We can interpret this person as expressing a kind of\nequal concern for his fellow countrymen to the extent that he is\nappealing to legal principles that protect all. And we can interpret\nhim in this way even if he himself would not have asserted it. And to\nthe extent that people conform to this kind of practice more generally,\nwe can interpret their behavior generally as satisfying the four\nconditions of associative obligation.", "\n\nThe community of principle satisfies the four conditions. Dworkin\nattempts to show how a political community can generate special\nobligations of citizens to each other. A community of principle is\nregulated by principles that have been elaborated in a distinctive way\nin the particular community. Citizens see themselves as obligated to\nabide by those principles only in relation to the others who have\nparticipated in elaborating them. The principles do require that\neveryone be included and that everyone's well being counts and counts\nequally.", "\n\nThe idea of a community of principle is meant to accommodate\nsignificant disagreement in the society in two ways. First, people may\nnot think that the principles in the society are the best ones. They\nmay simply be the best interpretation of their shared legal culture and\nhistory. So people may try to advance their own conceptions of the best\nprinciples. Second, people will disagree about the best interpretations\nof the shared legal culture and thus may think that the society is\ngrounded in different principles." ], "section_title": "6. Political Authority as Grounded in Associative Obligations", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nBut surely, the satisfaction of some of the conditions must depend\non exactly what principles are in the community. Principles that are\nfocused on liberty and that avoid any reference to well being, such as\nKant would require of political principles, presumably would not\nsatisfy the last two conditions. Principles that are not egalitarian,\nsuch as those that governed the United States during the first century\nof its existence and probably longer, would not satisfy the last\ncondition. So it is not clear that being a community of principle is a\nsufficient condition for satisfying the four conditions.", "\n\nIt is also not obvious that it is necessary that a community be a\ncommunity of principle in order for it to satisfy the four conditions\nin Dworkin's sense. For one can imagine a community in which\nindividuals are committed to democratic resolution of the disagreements\non justice that arise and thereby are committed to the equal importance\nof the well being of each member. They attempt to advance opposing\nprinciples of justice and conceptions of the common good and make\ncompromises when they cannot secure sufficient majorities for these.\nIndeed, this seems much closer to the character of modern democracies\nthan Dworkin's view. Such a society would satisfy the four conditions\nbut it is not clear that it is a community of principle.", "\n\nDworkin's idea that modern political societies can be seen as\ncommunities of principle is grounded in his emphasis on judicial\ninstitutions as the core institutions of modern political societies and\nhis account of legal interpretation. His view is that judges interpret\nthe law by creating a coherent account of as much of the black letter\nlaw as possible and by interpreting that black letter law in terms of\nprinciples that make the law be the best that it can be. Hence, judges\naim at producing a coherent account of the law overall by grounding it\nin the best basic moral principles that it can be grounded in. From\nthis he thinks of modern societies as being concerned to elaborate\ncommon principles by which the society can be guided.", "\n\nBut his emphasis on judicial decision making seems excessive. In the\ndemocratic legislative process, citizens often do not see themselves as\nbeing guided by common principles. They see themselves as disagreeing\nwith each other about what principles the society ought to be guided\nby. They also often see themselves as disagreeing with and trying to\nchange the principles they see embodied in the law. They may look at\nthe legislation in their community as negotiated compromises between\ndifferent principles and not as deriving from a common set of\nprinciples. And yet they do see themselves as members of a common\ndemocratic community. This aspect of democratic rivalry does not seem\nto be very well accommodated by Dworkin's view of modern societies as\ncommunities of principle." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 Do Communities of Principle Satisfy the Four Conditions of Genuine Association?" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nThe basic idea behind the democratic conception of legitimate\nauthority is that when there are disagreements among persons about how\nto structure their shared world together and it is important to\nstructure that world together, the way to choose the shared aspects of\nsociety is by means of a decision making process that is fair to the\ninterests and opinions of each of the members. When there is\ndisagreement about how to organize the shared system of law, property,\npublic education and the provision of public goods, no one can have his\nway entirely in this context without someone else not getting her way.\nEach person thinks that the ideas about justice and the common good\nwith which the others wish to organize their shared world are mistaken\nin some way. Yet there is a need for collective action. The only way to\ndo this that is reasonably fair to all the members is to make the\ndecision democratically.", "\n\nThe thought is that when an outcome is democratically chosen and\nsome people disagree with the outcome, as some inevitably will, they\nstill have a duty to go along with the decision because otherwise they\nwould be treating the others unfairly. If they refuse to go along and\ndisrupt the democratically chosen arrangements, they are assuming for\nthemselves a right to determine how things should go that overrides the\nequal rights of all the others. They are, in Peter Singer's words,\nassuming the positions of dictators in relation to the others. For if\nthey turned out to be in the majority, they would demand the compliance\nof the others.", "\n\nThe idea of fairness that underpins the democratic process is\ngrounded in different ways in different theories. The basic idea of\nequality is shared by most democratic theorists. Some argue that there\nis a fundamental duty of equal respect for the opinions of others that\ngrounds democratic decision making in the context of pervasive\ndisagreement (Singer 1974; Waldron 1999). Others wish to ground this\nduty of respect for the opinions of others in a deeper principle of\nequal concern for the interests of each member of society (Christiano\n1996).", "\n\nOn this kind of view the democratic assembly has a right to rule and\nto the obedience of its members. This right of the democratic assembly\nis grounded in the right of each member of the assembly to be accorded\nequal respect. The duty of equal respect requires that the collective\ndecision process gives each a vote in a broadly majoritarian process\nand a robustly equal opportunity to participate in the deliberations\nand negotiations leading to decisions. The equal rights of each of the\nmembers are in effect pooled in the democratic assembly so that because\none owes each person equal respect, and the democratic way of making\ndecisions embodies this equal respect, one owes the democratic assembly\nrespect.", "\n\nThe democratic assembly can be understood as the assembly of all\nadult citizens or better as the assembly of all the democratically\nchosen representatives of citizens. A conception of a democratic\nassembly requires, on this view, an account of the appropriate form of\ndemocratic representation (Christiano 1996). In addition, the\ndemocratic assembly is only one part of the complete system of\ngovernment. It is concerned with legislation only. In addition to this\na government requires executive and judicial functions whose legitimacy\nmay depend in part on other factors better grasped by the\ninstrumentalist view.", "\n\nThe duties that are owed the democratic assembly are content\nindependent and preemptive duties. They are content independent duties\nbecause each member has the duty, with a class of exceptions we will\nreview in a moment, just because the assembly has made a decision. The\nduties are preemptive because the citizen must put aside the\nconsiderations she initially planned on acting on in order to treat the\nrest of her fellow citizens with proper respect. The idea of equal\nrespect requires, on this account, deference to the decision of the\nmajority and not acting on one's own judgment when the majority\ndisagrees. So the decision of the majority gives a reason to obey that\npreempts or replaces the considerations one might act on were there no\nmajority decision.", "\n\nIt is important to note that this conception of authority is what was\ndescribed as a special conception above. The fact that democratic\nassemblies have authority does not imply that all other forms of\nregime never have authority. One might go along with a regime on the\nbasis of the instrumentalist conception of authority or even the\nconsent approach even if it is not democratic. It is clear\nnevertheless that democratic assemblies have a special kind of\nauthority." ], "section_title": "7. A Democratic Conception of Legitimate Political Authority", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nDemocratic decision making on this account can be evaluated from two\nvery different angles. On the one hand, one can evaluate a democratic\ndecision in terms of the justice or efficiency of the outcome of the\ndecision. One can ask whether the legislation is just or for the common\ngood. This is the standpoint of the citizen who argues in favor of\nlegislation and against others and tries to put together a coalition of\nlike minded people to advance the legislation. On the other hand,\ndemocratic decision making can be evaluated in terms of the way in\nwhich the decision was made. Did the process of decision making treat\nall of its members fairly or with equal respect? Are the institutions\nof legislative representation and of campaign finance, among others,\nfair?", "\n\nBut why should the equality embodied in the democratic assembly trump\nother considerations of justice? The democratic conception of\nauthority requires each person to submit issues to a democratic vote.\nSo if they advocate some policy on the grounds that it conforms with\nwhat they take to be the correct principle of justice J, and\nthe majority chooses a different policy on the grounds of an\nincompatible principle L, the democratic theory says that\nthey ought to accept the policy that is grounded in L because\nonly in this way do they accord the proper equal respect to their\nfellow citizens.", "\n\nBut someone might ask, why should the principle of equal respect take\nprecedence over the principle J? They are both principles of\njustice so we need some reason for favoring the equal respect\nprinciple in general over the others.", "\n\nOne answer to this is to say that social justice demands that\nprinciples of justice be public in the sense that they involve\nprinciples that can be shown to be implemented to everyone who is\nreasonably conscientious and aware of some basic facts of political\nlife (such as disagreement, fallibility and cognitive bias). This is a\nversion of the basic maxim of justice that justice must not only be\ndone, it must be seen to be done. The thought then is that to the\nextent that there is significant disagreement about the substantive\nprinciples of justice in play when policy is being decided, a just\nsociety requires some way in which publicly to embody the equal\ntreatment of all the individuals in society. The controversial\nprinciples guiding the formulation of policy do not generally satisfy\nthis constraint of publicity. Indeed, given the controversies over\njustice, individuals will think that the policies do not accord with\ntheir favored conception of equality. The democratic process does seem\npublicly to embody the equal standing of all citizens and the equal\nworth of their interests against the background of disagreement and\nfallibility and all the facts that attend these phenomena. So the\ndemocratic process seems uniquely capable of publicly embodying the\nprinciple of the equal importance of each person and the equal\nimportance of the advancement of their interests (Christiano 2004).", "\n\nCritics of this view might still take issue with the thesis that\nsocial justice requires that principles be public and that this gives\npriority to the principles that underpin democracy over those that\nunderpin substantive policy proposals. The question must be, why is\npublicity, in the sense sketched above, so important?" ], "subsection_title": "7.1 How Can Democracy Make Unjust Laws Legitimate?" }, { "content": [ "\n\nThe question that arises for a democratic theory of authority is,\nwhen do the considerations of the justice or injustice of the outcome\noverride the considerations connected with the fairness of the process\nof decision making?", "\n\nThe claim that a democratic assembly has a right to rule is not\nincompatible with the idea that there are limits to that right. Indeed,\ntheorists have argued that the very same principle that grounds\ndemocratic authority also ground limits to that authority (Christiano\n2004.) The principle of public equality on which the argument for\ndemocracy is founded also grounds a set of liberal rights (freedom of\nconscience, association, speech and private pursuits). The reason for\nthis is that democratic assembly that fundamentally denied these\nliberal rights to individuals would publicly violate the duty of equal\nrespect to those individuals. Those who violate the basic liberal\nrights of others are publicly treating them as inferiors. To the extent\nthat the democratic assembly's claim of authority is grounded in the\npublic realization of the principle of equal respect, the authority\nwould run out when the democratic assembly makes law that undermines\nequal respect. This establishes, at least for one conception of\ndemocratic authority, a substantive set of limits to that\nauthority." ], "subsection_title": "7.2 Limits to Democratic Authority" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nInternational Institutions have acquired political authority over the\nlast half century or so. They are quite diverse in character. For\nsome, their authority has a somewhat different form than the authority\nassociated with the organs of the state. And the grounds of the\nauthority of international institutions may be distinct as\nwell. Overall, these are complex institutions with a number of parts\nand so different principles may apply to the different parts. For\nexample, with regard to the World Trade Organization, some principle\nof state consent may be the ultimate basis of the legitimacy of its\nlaw making function, while a very different kind of standard would be\nrelevant to judging the legitimacy of the dispute settlement\nmechanism.", "\n\nBecause global institutions operate in the context of a lack of\noverarching and centralized political power, the form and grounds of\nauthority are likely often to be distinct. As I noted above, some of\nthe most powerful global institutions have powers to create\npermissions rather than duties as in Security Council of the United\nNations authorizations of the use of force. Another example is when\nthe World Trade Organization's dispute settlement mechanism rules that\na state may restrict trade with another state in what would normally\nbe a violation of their agreements in order to retaliate against a\nstate that has violated the trade agreements.", "\n\nAnother interesting feature of international institutions is that\nstate consent appears to be a possible basis for the legitimacy of\ninternational institutions. To be sure many would argue that\ninternational institutions ought to be evaluated solely on an\ninstrumental basis and others would argue that only democratic\ninternational institutions can be legitimate. But state consent does\nhave a fighting chance of playing a large role in underpinning these\ninstitutions. The international system is highly decentralized and\nstates are by far the most important instruments for making power\naccountable to persons that we know of.", "\n\nTo be sure, the state consent doctrine raises many questions. For one\nthing, we must ask whether the consent of states that do not represent\ntheir peoples is a genuinely legitimating act. Second, we must ask\nabout the fairness of the conditions under which consent is given. If\nthe conditions are unfair and more powerful states take advantage of\nthe vulnerabilities of the weaker state, what impact does this have on\nthe legitimacy of the state? Third, what normative weight, if any,\nattaches to a state's refusal of consent when it's cooperation is\nnecessary to the achievement of morally mandatory aims such as the\nprevention or mitigation of global warming?" ], "section_title": "8. Legitimate Political Authority in International Institutions", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Applebaum, Arthur Isak, 2010, “Legitimacy without the Duty\nto Obey,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 38:\n215–239.", "Austin, John, 1832, The Province of Jurisprudence\nDetermined, H. L. A. Hart (ed.), London: Weidenfeld &\nNickolson, 1955.", "Beran, Harry, 1987, The Consent Theory of Political\nObligation, London: Croon Helm.", "Brilmayer, Lea, 1989, Justifying International Acts,\nIthaca, NY: Cornell University Press.", "Buchanan, Allen, 2004, Justice, Legitimacy and\nSelf-Determination, Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Buchanan, Allen and Robert O. Keohane, 2006, “The Legitimacy\nof Global Governance Institutions,”\nEthics and International Affairs, 20 (4): 405–437.", "Christiano, Thomas, 2004, “The Authority of Democracy,”\nJournal of Political Philosophy, 12(3): 245–270.", "Christiano, Thomas, 2011, “Democratic Legitimacy and\nInternational Institutions,” in The Philosophy of\nInternational Law, Samantha Besson and John Tasiolas (eds.), Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Christiano, Thomas, 1996, The Rule of the Many, Boulder,\nCO: Westview Press.", "Dworkin, Ronald, 1986, Law's Empire, Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press.", "Estlund, David, 2007, Democratic Authority,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Edmundson, William, 1998, Three Anarchical Fallacies,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Green, Leslie, 1989, The Authority of the State, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Hart, H.L.A., 1961, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon\nPress.", "Hobbes, Thomas, 1668, Leviathan, Edwin Curley (ed.),\nIndianapolis: Hackett Publishers, 1992.", "Hume, David, 1748, “Of the Original Contract,” in\nHume's Ethical Writings, Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.), London:\nUniversity of Notre Dame Press, 1965.", "Hurd, Heidi, 2001, Moral Combat, Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press.", "Ladenson, Robert, 1980, “In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception\nof Law,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9: 134–159.", "Locke, John, 1690, Second Treatise on Civil Government,\n C. B MacPherson (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1990.", "Morris, Christopher, 1998, An Essay on the Modern State,\nCambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Plato, Euthyphro, Apology and Crito,\nF. J. Church (trans.), New York: Macmillan, 1948.", "Rawls, John, 1996, Political Liberalism, New York:\nColumbia University Press.", "Raz, Joseph, 1986, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Raz, Joseph (ed.), 1990, Authority, New York: New York\nUniversity Press.", "Shapiro, Scott, 2002, “Authority,” in The Oxford\nHandbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Jules Coleman\nand Scott Shapiro (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.", "Simmons, A. John, 2001, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on\nRights and Obligations, Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Singer, Peter, 1974, Democracy and Disobedience, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Waldron, Jeremy, 1999, Law and Disagreement, Oxford:\nOxford University Press.", "Weber, Max, 1918, “Politics as a Vocation,” in\nFrom Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, H. H. Gerth and\nC. Wright Mills (eds.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.", "Wellman, Christopher, 2001, “Toward a Liberal Theory of\nPolitical Obligation,” Ethics, 111 (4): 735–759.", "Wolff, Robert Paul, 1970, In Defense of Anarchism, New\nYork: Harper & Row." ]	[ { "href": "../aquinas/", "text": "Aquinas, Thomas" }, { "href": "../autonomy-moral/", "text": "autonomy: in moral and political philosophy" }, { "href": "../bentham/", "text": "Bentham, Jeremy" }, { "href": "../citizenship/", "text": "citizenship" }, { "href": "../communitarianism/", "text": "communitarianism" }, { "href": "../constitutionalism/", "text": "constitutionalism" }, { "href": "../contractarianism/", "text": "contractarianism" }, { "href": "../democracy/", "text": "democracy" }, { "href": "../egalitarianism/", "text": "egalitarianism" }, { "href": "../equality/", "text": "equality" }, { "href": "../free-rider/", "text": "free rider problem" }, { "href": "../habermas/", "text": "Habermas, Jürgen" }, { "href": "../hobbes-moral/", "text": "Hobbes, Thomas: moral and political philosophy" }, { "href": "../hume/", "text": "Hume, David" }, { "href": "../kant-social-political/", "text": "Kant, Immanuel: social and political philosophy" }, { "href": "../legal-obligation/", "text": "legal obligation and authority" }, { "href": "../liberalism/", "text": "liberalism" }, { "href": "../locke-political/", "text": "Locke, John: political philosophy" }, { "href": "../plato-ethics-politics/", "text": "Plato: ethics and politics in The Republic" }, { "href": "../political-obligation/", "text": "political obligation" }, { "href": "../rawls/", "text": "Rawls, John" }, { "href": "../sovereignty/", "text": "sovereignty" } ]
reasoning-automated	Automated Reasoning	First published Wed Jul 18, 2001; substantive revision Sat Mar 2, 2019	[ "\nReasoning is the ability to make inferences, and automated reasoning\nis concerned with the building of computing systems that automate this\nprocess. Although the overall goal is to mechanize different forms of\nreasoning, the term has largely been identified with valid deductive\nreasoning as practiced in mathematics and formal logic. In this\nrespect, automated reasoning is akin to mechanical theorem proving.\nBuilding an automated reasoning program means providing an algorithmic\ndescription to a formal calculus so that it can be implemented on a\ncomputer to prove theorems of the calculus in an efficient manner.\nImportant aspects of this exercise involve defining the class of\nproblems the program will be required to solve, deciding what language\nwill be used by the program to represent the information given to it\nas well as new information inferred by the program, specifying the\nmechanism that the program will use to conduct deductive inferences,\nand figuring out how to perform all these computations efficiently.\nWhile basic research work continues in order to provide the necessary\ntheoretical framework, the field has reached a point where automated\nreasoning programs are being used by researchers to attack open\nquestions in mathematics and logic, provide important applications in\ncomputing science, solve problems in engineering, and find novel\napproaches to questions in exact philosophy. " ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Introduction", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Problem Domain", "1.2 Language Representation" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Deduction Calculi", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Resolution", "2.2 Sequent Deduction", "2.3 Natural Deduction", "2.4 The Matrix Connection Method", "2.5 Term Rewriting", "2.6 Mathematical Induction" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Other Logics", "sub_toc": [ "3.1 Higher-Order Logic", "3.2 Non-classical Logics" ] }, { "content_title": "4. Applications", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Logic Programming", "4.2 SAT Solvers", "4.3 Deductive Computer Algebra", "4.4 Formal Verification of Hardware", "4.5 Formal Verification of Software", "4.6 Logic and Philosophy", "4.7 Mathematics", "4.8 Artificial Intelligence" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Conclusion", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\nA problem being presented to an automated reasoning program consists\nof two main items, namely a statement expressing the particular\nquestion being asked called the problem’s conclusion,\nand a collection of statements expressing all the relevant information\navailable to the program—the problem’s\nassumptions. Solving a problem means proving the conclusion\nfrom the given assumptions by the systematic application of rules of\ndeduction embedded within the reasoning program. The problem solving\nprocess ends when one such proof is found, when the program is able to\ndetect the non-existence of a proof, or when it simply runs out of\nresources." ], "section_title": "1. Introduction", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nA first important consideration in the design of an automated\nreasoning program is to delineate the class of problems that the\nprogram will be required to solve—the problem\ndomain. The domain can be very large, as would be the case\nfor a general-purpose theorem prover for first-order logic, or be more\nrestricted in scope as in a special-purpose theorem prover for\nTarski’s geometry, or the modal logic K. A typical approach in the\ndesign of an automated reasoning program is to provide it first with\nsufficient logical power (e.g., first-order logic) and then further\ndemarcate its scope to the particular domain of interest defined by a\nset of domain axioms. To illustrate, EQP, a\ntheorem-proving program for equational logic, was used to solve an\nopen question in Robbins algebra (McCune 1997): Are all Robbins\nalgebras Boolean? For this, the program was provided with the\naxioms defining a Robbins algebra:", "\n\n\n\n (A1)\n x + y = y + x\n (commutativity) \n\n (A2)\n (x + y) + z = x +\n(y + z)\n (associativity) \n\n (A3)\n −(−(x + y) + −(x +\n−y)) = x\n (Robbins equation) \n\n", "\nThe program was then used to show that a characterization of Boolean\nalgebra that uses Huntington’s equation,", "\n−(−x + y) + −(−x +\n−y) = x,\n", "\nfollows from the axioms. We should remark that this problem is\nnon-trivial since deciding whether a finite set of equations provides\na basis for Boolean algebra is undecidable, that is, it does not\npermit an algorithmic representation; also, the problem was attacked\nby Robbins, Huntington, Tarski and many of his students with no\nsuccess. The key step was to establish that all Robbins algebras\nsatisfy ", "\n∃x∃y(x + y =\nx),\n", "\nsince it was known that this formula is a sufficient condition for a\nRobbins algebra to be Boolean. When EQP was supplied with this piece\nof information, the program provided invaluable assistance by\ncompleting the proof automatically. ", "\nA special-purpose theorem prover does not draw its main benefit by\nrestricting its attention to the domain axioms but from the fact that\nthe domain may enjoy particular theorem-proving techniques which can\nbe hardwired—coded—within the reasoning program itself and\nwhich may result in a more efficient logic implementation. Much of\nEQP’s success at settling the Robbins question can be attributed to\nits built-in associative-commutative inference mechanisms." ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Problem Domain" }, { "content": [ "\nA second important consideration in the building of an automated\nreasoning program is to decide (1) how problems in its domain will be\npresented to the reasoning program; (2) how they will actually be\nrepresented internally within the program; and, (3) how the solutions\nfound—completed proofs—will be displayed back to the user.\nThere are several formalisms available for this, and the choice is\ndependent on the problem domain and the underlying deduction calculus\nused by the reasoning program. The most commonly used formalisms\ninclude standard first-order logic, typed λ-calculus, and\nclausal logic. We take up clausal logic here and assume that the\nreader is familiar with the rudiments of first-order logic; for the\ntyped λ-calculus the reader may want to check Church 1940.\nClausal logic is a quantifier-free variation of first-order logic and\nhas been the most widely used notation within the automated reasoning\ncommunity. Some definitions are in order: A term is a\nconstant, a variable, or a function whose arguments are themselves\nterms. For example, a, x, f(x),\nand h(c,f(z),y) are all\nterms. A literal is either an atomic formula, e.g.\nF(x), or the negation of an atomic formula, e.g.\n~R(x,f(a)). Two literals are\ncomplementary if one is the negation of the other. A\nclause is a (possibly empty) finite disjunction of\nliterals l1∨ … ∨\nln where no literal appears more than once in the\nclause (that is, clauses can be alternatively treated as sets of\nliterals). Ground terms, ground literals, and ground\nclauses have no variables. The empty clause,\n[ ], is the clause having no literals and, hence, is\nunsatisfiable—false under any interpretation. Some examples:\n~R(a,b), and F(a) ∨\n~R(f(x),b) ∨\nF(z) are both examples of clauses but only the\nformer is ground. The general idea is to be able to express a\nproblem’s formulation as a set of clauses or, equivalently, as a\nformula in conjunctive normal form (CNF), that is, as\na conjunction of clauses.", "\nFor formulas already expressed in standard logic notation, there is a\nsystematic two-step procedure for transforming them into conjunctive\nnormal form. The first step consists in re-expressing a formula into a\nsemantically equivalent formula in prenex normal\nform,\n(Θx1)…(Θxn)α(x1,…,xn), consisting of a\nstring of quantifiers\n(Θx1)…(Θxn)\nfollowed by a quantifier-free expression\nα(x1,…,xn) called\nthe matrix. The second step in the transformation\nfirst converts the matrix into conjunctive normal form by using\nwell-known logical equivalences such as DeMorgan’s laws, distribution,\ndouble-negation, and others; then, the quantifiers in front of the\nmatrix, which is now in conjunctive normal form, are dropped according\nto certain rules. In the presence of existential quantifiers, this\nlatter step does not always preserve equivalence and requires the\nintroduction of Skolem functions whose role is to\n“simulate” the behaviour of existentially quantified\nvariables. For example, applying the skolemizing process to the\nformula", "\n∀x∃y∀z∃u∀v[R(x,y,v)\n∨ ~K(x,z,u,v)]\n", "\nrequires the introduction of a one-place and two-place Skolem\nfunctions, f and g respectively, resulting in the\nformula", "\n∀x∀z∀v[R(x,f(x),v)\n∨\n~K(x,z,g(x,z),v)]\n", "\nThe universal quantifiers can then be removed to obtain the final\nclause, R(x,f(x),v) ∨\n~K(x,z,g(x,z),v)\nin our example. The Skolemizing process may not preserve equivalence\nbut maintains satisfiability, which is enough for clause-based\nautomated reasoning.", "\nAlthough clausal form provides a more uniform and economical\nnotation—there are no quantifiers and all formulas are\ndisjunctions—it has certain disadvantages. One drawback is the\nincrease in the size of the resulting formula when transformed from\nstandard logic notation into clausal form. The increase in size is\naccompanied by an increase in cognitive complexity that makes it\nharder for humans to read proofs written with clauses. Another\ndisadvantage is that the syntactic structure of a formula in standard\nlogic notation can be used to guide the construction of a proof but\nthis information is completely lost in the transformation into clausal\nform." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Language Representation" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nA third important consideration in the building of an automated\nreasoning program is the selection of the actual deduction calculus\nthat will be used by the program to perform its inferences. As\nindicated before, the choice is highly dependent on the nature of the\nproblem domain and there is a fair range of options available:\nGeneral-purpose theorem proving and problem solving (first-order\nlogic, simple type theory), program verification (first-order logic),\ndistributed and concurrent systems (modal and temporal logics),\nprogram specification (intuitionistic logic), hardware verification\n(higher-order logic), logic programming (Horn logic), constraint\nsatisfaction (propositional clausal logic), computational metaphysics\n(higher-order modal logic), and others.", "\nA deduction calculus consists of a set of logical axioms and a\ncollection of deduction rules for deriving new formulas from\npreviously derived formulas. Solving a problem in the program’s\nproblem domain then really means establishing a particular formula\nα—the problem’s conclusion—from the extended set\nΓ consisting of the logical axioms, the domain axioms, and the\nproblem assumptions. That is, the program needs to determine if\nΓ entails α, Γ⊨ α. How the program\ngoes about establishing this semantic fact depends, of course, on the\ncalculus it implements. Some programs may take a very\ndirect route and attempt to establish that\nΓ ⊨ α by actually constructing a\nstep-by-step proof of α from Γ. If successful, this shows\nof course that Γ derives—proves—α, a fact we\ndenote by writing Γ ⊢ α. Other reasoning\nprograms may instead opt for a more indirect approach\nand try to establish that Γ ⊨ α by showing\nthat Γ ∪ {~α} is inconsistent which, in turn, is shown\nby deriving a contradiction, ⊥, from the set Γ ∪\n{~α}. Automated systems that implement the former approach\ninclude natural deduction systems; the latter approach is used by\nsystems based on resolution, sequent deduction, and matrix connection\nmethods.", "\nSoundness and completeness are two (metatheoretical) properties of a\ncalculus that are particularly important for automated deduction.\nSoundness states that the rules of the calculus are\ntruth-preserving. For a direct calculus this means that if\nΓ ⊢ α then\nΓ ⊨ α. For indirect calculi, soundness\nmeans that if Γ∪{~α} ⊢ ⊥ then\nΓ ⊨ α. Completeness in a\ndirect calculus states that if Γ ⊨ α then\nΓ ⊢ α. For indirect calculi, the\ncompleteness property is expressed in terms of\nrefutations since one establishes that\nΓ ⊨ α by showing the existence of a proof,\nnot of α from Γ, but of ⊥ from\nΓ∪{~α}. Thus, an indirect calculus is\nrefutation complete if Γ ⊨ α\nimplies Γ∪{~α} ⊢ ⊥. Of the two\nproperties, soundness is the most desirable. An incomplete calculus\nindicates that there are entailment relations that cannot be\nestablished within the calculus. For an automated reasoning program\nthis means, informally, that there are true statements that the\nprogram cannot prove. Incompleteness may be an unfortunate affair but\nlack of soundness is a truly problematic situation since an unsound\nreasoning program would be able to generate false conclusions from\nperfectly true information.", "\nIt is important to appreciate the difference between a logical\ncalculus and its corresponding implementation in a reasoning program.\nThe implementation of a calculus invariably involves making some\nmodifications to the calculus and this results, strictly speaking, in\na new calculus. The most important modification to the original\ncalculus is the “mechanization” of its deduction rules,\nthat is, the specification of the systematic way in which the rules\nare to be applied. In the process of doing so, one must exercise care\nto preserve the metatheoretical properties of the original\ncalculus.", "\nTwo other metatheoretical properties of importance to automated\ndeduction are decidability and complexity. A calculus is\ndecidable if it admits an algorithmic representation,\nthat is, if there is an algorithm that, for any given Γ and\nα, it can determine in a finite amount of time the answer,\n“Yes” or “No”, to the question “Does\nΓ ⊨ α?” A calculus may be\nundecidable in which case one needs to determine which decidable\nfragment to implement. The time-space complexity of a\ncalculus specifies how efficient its algorithmic representation is.\nAutomated reasoning is made the more challenging because many calculi\nof interest are not decidable and have poor complexity measures\nforcing researchers to seek tradeoffs between deductive power versus\nalgorithmic efficiency." ], "section_title": "2. Deduction Calculi", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nOf the many calculi used in the implementation of reasoning programs,\nthe ones based on the resolution principle have been\nthe most popular. Resolution is modeled after the chain rule (of which\nModus Ponens is a special case) and essentially states that from\np ∨ q and ~q ∨ r one can\ninfer p ∨ r. More formally, let C\n− l denote the clause C with the literal\nl removed. Assume that C1 and\nC2 are ground clauses containing, respectively, a\npositive literal l1 and a negative literal\n~l2 such that l1 and\n~l2 are complementary. Then, the rule of\nground resolution states that, as a result of\nresolving C1 and\nC2, one can infer (C1 −\nl1) ∨ (C2 −\n~l2):", "\n\n\n\n \nC1 C2\n\n (ground resolution) \n\n (C1 − l1) ∨\n(C2 − ~l2) \n\n", "\nHerbrand’s theorem (Herbrand 1930) assures us that\nthe non-satisfiability of any set of clauses, ground or not,\ncan be established by using ground resolution. This is a very\nsignificant result for automated deduction since it tells us that if a\nset Γ is not satisfied by any of the infinitely many\ninterpretations, this fact can be determined in finitely many\nsteps. Unfortunately, a direct implementation of ground resolution\nusing Herbrand’s theorem requires the generation of a vast number of\nground terms making this approach hopelessly inefficient. This issue\nwas effectively addressed by generalizing the ground resolution rule\nto binary resolution and by introducing the notion of\nunification (Robinson 1965a). Unification allows resolution proofs to\nbe “lifted” and be conducted at a more general level;\nclauses only need to be instantiated at the moment where they are to\nbe resolved. Moreover, the clauses resulting from the instantiation\nprocess do not have to be ground instances and may still contain\nvariables. The introduction of binary resolution and unification is\nconsidered one of the most important developments in the field of\nautomated reasoning.", "\nA unifier of two expressions—terms or\nclauses—is a substitution that when applied to the expressions\nmakes them equal. For example, the substitution σ given by", "\nσ := {x ← b, y ←\nb, z ← f(a,b)}\n", "\nis a unifier for ", "\nR(x,f(a,y)) and\nR(b,z)\n", "\nsince when applied to both expressions it makes them equal: ", "\n\n\n\n R(x,f(a,y))σ\n\n \n =\n \n R(b,f(a,b))\n\n\n \n \n =\n \n R(b,z)σ \n\n", "\nA most general unifier (mgu) produces the most\ngeneral instance shared by two unifiable expressions. In the previous\nexample, the substitution {x ← b, y\n← b, z ←\nf(a,b)} is a unifier but not an mgu;\nhowever, {x ← b, z ←\nf(a,y)} is an mgu. Note that unification\nattempts to “match” two expressions and this fundamental\nprocess has become a central component of most automated deduction\nprograms, resolution-based and otherwise.\nTheory-unification is an extension of the unification\nmechanism that includes built-in inference capabilities. For example,\nthe clauses R(g(a,b),x)\nand R(g(b,a),d) do not\nunify but they AC-unify, where AC-unification is unification with\nbuilt-in associative and commutative rules such as\ng(a,b) = g(b,a).\nShifting inference capabilities into the unification mechanism adds\npower but at a price: The existence of an mgu for two unifiable\nexpressions may not be unique (there could actually be infinitely\nmany), and the unification process becomes undecidable in general.\n", "\nLet C1 and C2 be two clauses\ncontaining, respectively, a positive literal l1\nand a negative literal ~l2 such that\nl1 and l2 unify with mgu\nθ. Then, ", "\n\n\n\n \nC1 C2\n\n (binary resolution) \n\n (C1θ −\nl1θ) ∨ (C2θ\n− ~l2θ) \n\n", "\nby binary resolution; the clause (C1θ\n− l1θ) ∨\n(C2θ − ~l2θ)\nis called a binary resolvent of\nC1 and C2. ", "\nIf two or more literals occurring in a clause C share an mgu\nθ then Cθ is a factor of\nC. For example, in R(x,a) ∨\n~K(f(x),b) ∨\nR(c,y) the literals\nR(x,a) and\nR(c,y) unify with mgu {x ←\nc, y ← a} and, hence,\nR(c,a) ∨\n~K(f(c),b) is a factor of the\noriginal clause. ", "\nLet C1and C2 be two clauses.\nThen, a resolvent obtained by\nresolution from C1 and\nC2 is defined as: (a) a binary resolvent of\nC1 and C2; (b) a binary\nresolvent of C1 and a factor of\nC2; (c) a binary resolvent of a factor of\nC1 and C2; or, (d) a binary\nresolvent of a factor of C1 and a factor of\nC2. ", "\nResolution proofs, more precisely refutations, are constructed by\nderiving the empty clause [ ] from Γ ∪ {~α} using\nresolution; this will always be possible if Γ ∪ {~α}\nis unsatisfiable since resolution is refutation complete (Robinson\n1965a). As an example of a resolution proof, we show that the set\n{∀x(P(x) ∨\nQ(x)), ∀x(P(x)\n⊃\nR(x)),∀x(Q(x)\n⊃ R(x))}, denoted by Γ, entails the\nformula ∃xR(x). The first step is to\nfind the clausal form of Γ ∪\n{~∃xR(x)}; the resulting clause set,\ndenoted by S0, is shown in steps 1 to 4 in the\nrefutation below. The refutation is constructed by using a\nlevel-saturation method: Compute all the resolvents of the initial\nset, S0, add them to the set and repeat the\nprocess until the empty clause is derived. (This produces the sequence\nof increasingly larger sets: S0,\nS1, S2,…) The only\nconstraint that we impose is that we do not resolve the same two\nclauses more than once.", "\n\n\n\n S0\n 1\n P(x) ∨ Q(x)\n Assumption \n\n \n 2\n ~P(x) ∨ R(x)\n Assumption \n\n \n 3\n ~Q(x) ∨ R(x)\n Assumption \n\n \n 4\n ~R(a)\n Negate conclusion \n\n S1\n 5\n Q(x) ∨ R(x)\n Res 1 2 \n\n \n 6\n P(x) ∨ R(x)\n Res 1 3 \n\n \n 7\n ~P(a)\n Res 2 4 \n\n \n 8\n ~Q(a)\n Res 3 4 \n\n S2\n 9\n Q(a)\n Res 1 7 \n\n \n 10\n P(a)\n Res 1 8 \n\n \n 11\n R(x)\n Res 2 6 \n\n \n 12\n R(x)\n Res 3 5 \n\n \n 13\n Q(a)\n Res 4 5 \n\n \n 14\n P(a)\n Res 4 6 \n\n \n 15\n R(a)\n Res 5 8 \n\n \n 16\n R(a)\n Res 6 7 \n\n S3 \n 17\n R(a)\n Res 2 10 \n\n \n 18\n R(a)\n Res 2 14 \n\n \n 19\n R(a)\n Res 3 9 \n\n \n 20\n R(a)\n Res 3 13 \n\n \n 21 \n [ ]\n Res 4 11 \n\n", "\nAlthough the resolution proof is successful in deriving [ ], it\nhas some significant drawbacks. To start with, the refutation is too\nlong as it takes 21 steps to reach the contradiction, [ ]. This\nis due to the naïve brute-force nature of the implementation. The\napproach not only generates too many formulas but some are clearly\nredundant. Note how R(a) is derived six times; also,\nR(x) has more “information content” than\nR(a) and one should keep the former and disregard\nthe latter. Resolution, like all other automated deduction methods,\nmust be supplemented by strategies aimed at improving the efficiency\nof the deduction process. The above sample derivation has 21 steps but\nresearch-type problems command derivations with thousands or hundreds\nof thousands of steps.", "\nThe successful implementation of a deduction calculus in an automated\nreasoning program requires the integration of search strategies that\nreduce the search space by pruning unnecessary deduction paths. Some\nstrategies remove redundant clauses or tautologies as soon as they\nappear in a derivation. Another strategy is to remove more specific\nclauses in the presence of more general ones by a process known as\nsubsumption (Robinson 1965a). Unrestricted\nsubsumption, however, does not preserve the refutation completeness of\nresolution and, hence, there is a need to restrict its applicability\n(Loveland 1978). Model elimination (Loveland 1969)\ncan discard a sentence by showing that it is false in some model of\nthe axioms. The subject of model generation has received much\nattention as a complementary process to theorem proving. The method\nhas been used successfully by automated reasoning programs to show the\nindependence of axioms sets and to determine the existence of discrete\nmathematical structures meeting some given criteria. ", "\nInstead of removing redundant clauses, some strategies prevent the\ngeneration of useless clauses in the first place. The\nset-of-support strategy (Wos, Carson & Robinson\n1965) is one of the most powerful strategies of this kind. A subset\nT of the set S, where S is initially\nΓ ∪ {~α}, is called a set of support\nof S iff S − T is satisfiable.\nSet-of-support resolution dictates that the resolved clauses are not\nboth from S − T. The motivation behind\nset-of-support is that since the set Γ is usually satisfiable it\nmight be wise not to resolve two clauses from Γ against each\nother. Hyperresolution (Robinson 1965b) reduces the\nnumber of intermediate resolvents by combining several resolution\nsteps into a single inference step.", "\nIndependently co-discovered, linear resolution\n(Loveland 1970, Luckham 1970) always resolves a clause against the\nmost recently derived resolvent. This gives the deduction a simple\n“linear” structure affording a straightforward\nimplementation; yet, linear resolution preserves refutation\ncompleteness. Using linear resolution we can derive the empty clause\nin the above example in only eight steps:", "\n\n\n\n 1 \n P(x) ∨ Q(x)\n Assumption \n\n 2\n ~P(x) ∨ R(x)\n Assumption \n\n 3\n ~Q(x) ∨ R(x)\n Assumption \n\n 4\n ~R(a)\n Negated conclusion \n\n 5\n ~P(a)\n Res 2 4 \n\n 6\n Q(a)\n Res 1 5 \n\n 7\n R(a)\n Res 3 6 \n\n 8\n [ ]\n Res 4 7 \n\n", "\nWith the exception of unrestricted subsumption, all the strategies\nmentioned so far preserve refutation completeness. Efficiency is an\nimportant consideration in automated reasoning and one may sometimes\nbe willing to trade completeness for speed. Unit\nresolution and input resolution are two such\nrefinements of linear resolution. In the former, one of the resolved\nclauses is always a literal; in the latter, one of the resolved\nclauses is always selected from the original set to be refuted. Albeit\nefficient, neither strategy is complete. Ordering strategies impose\nsome form of partial ordering on the predicate symbols, terms,\nliterals, or clauses occurring in the deduction. Ordered\nresolution treats clauses not as sets of literals but as\nsequences—linear orders—of literals. Ordered resolution is\nextremely efficient but, like unit and input resolution, is not\nrefutation complete. To end, it must be noted that some strategies\nimprove certain aspects of the deduction process at the expense of\nothers. For instance, a strategy may reduce the size of the proof\nsearch space at the expense of increasing, say, the length of the\nshortest refutations. A taxonomy and detailed presentation of\ntheorem-proving strategies can be found in (Bonacina 1999).", "\nThere are several automated reasoning programs that are based on\nresolution, or refinements of resolution. Otter (succeeded by Prover4)\nwas a driving force in the development of automated reasoning (Wos,\nOverbeek, Lusk & Boyle 1984) but it has been superseded by more\ncapable programs like Vampire (Voronkov 1995, Kovács &\nVoronkov 2013). Resolution also provides the underlying\nlogico-computational mechanism for the popular logic programming\nlanguage Prolog (Clocksin & Mellish 1981)." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Resolution" }, { "content": [ "\nHilbert-style calculi (Hilbert and Ackermann 1928) have been\ntraditionally used to characterize logic systems. These calculi\nusually consist of a few axiom schemata and a small number of rules\nthat typically include modus ponens and the rule of substitution.\nAlthough they meet the required theoretical requisites (soundness,\ncompleteness, etc.) the approach at proof construction in these\ncalculi is difficult and does not reflect standard practice. It was\nGentzen’s goal “to set up a formalism that reflects as\naccurately as possible the actual logical reasoning involved in\nmathematical proofs” (Gentzen 1935). To carry out this task,\nGentzen analyzed the proof-construction process and then devised two\ndeduction calculi for classical logic: the natural deduction calculus,\nNK, and the sequent calculus, LK.\n(Gentzen actually designed NK first and then introduced LK to pursue\nmetatheoretical investigations). The calculi met his goal to a large\nextent while at the same time managing to secure soundness and\ncompleteness. Both calculi are characterized by a relatively larger\nnumber of deduction rules and a simple axiom schema. Of the two\ncalculi, LK is the one that has been most widely used in\nimplementations of automated reasoning programs, and it is the one\nthat we will discuss first; NK will be discussed in the next\nsection.", "\nAlthough the application of the LK rules affect logic formulas, the\nrules are seen as manipulating not logic formulas themselves but\nsequents. Sequents are expressions of the form\nΓ → Δ, where both Γ and Δ are (possibly\nempty) sets of formulas. Γ is the sequent’s\nantecedent and Δ its\nsuccedent. Sequents can be interpreted thus: Let\nI be an interpretation. Then,", "\nI satisfies the sequent Γ →\nΔ (written as: I\n⊨ Γ→Δ) iff\n\neither I ⊭ α (for some\nα ∈ Γ) or I ⊨\nβ (for some β ∈ Δ).\n", "\nIn other words, ", "\nI ⊨Γ → Δ iff\nI ⊨ (α1\n& … & αn) ⊃\n(β1 ∨ … ∨ βn),\nwhere α1 & … &\nαn is the iterated conjunction of the\nformulas in Γ and β1 ∨ … ∨\nβn is the iterated disjunction of those in\nΔ.\n", "\nIf Γ or Δ are empty then they are respectively valid or\nunsatisfiable. An axiom of LK is a sequent Γ\n→ Δ where Γ ∩ Δ ≠ ∅. Thus, the\nrequirement that the same formula occurs at each side of the →\nsign means that the axioms of LK are valid, for no interpretation can\nthen make all the formulas in Γ true and, simultaneously, make\nall those in Δ false. LK has two rules per logical connective,\nplus one extra rule: the cut rule. ", "\nThe sequents above a rule’s line are called the rule’s\npremises and the sequent below the line is the rule’s\nconclusion. The quantification rules ∃→ and\n→∀ have an eigenvariable condition that restricts their\napplicability, namely that a must not occur in Γ,\nΔ or in the quantified sentence. The purpose of this restriction\nis to ensure that the choice of parameter, a, used in the\nsubstitution process is completely “arbitrary”.", "\nProofs in LK are represented as trees where each node in the tree is\nlabeled with a sequent, and where the original sequent sits at the\nroot of the tree. The children of a node are the premises of the rule\nbeing applied at that node. The leaves of the tree are labeled with\naxioms. Here is the LK-proof of\n∃xR(x) from the set\n{∀x(P(x) ∨\nQ(x)), ∀x(P(x)\n⊃\nR(x)),∀x(Q(x)\n⊃ R(x))}. In the tree below, Γ stands for\nthis set:", "\nIn our example, all the leaves in the proof tree are labeled with\naxioms. This establishes the validity of Γ →\n∃xR(x) and, hence, the fact that\nΓ ⊨ ∃xR(x). LK\ntakes an indirect approach at proving the conclusion and this is an\nimportant difference between LK and NK. While NK constructs an actual\nproof (of the conclusion from the given assumptions), LK instead\nconstructs a proof that proves the existence of a proof (of the\nconclusion from the assumptions). For instance, to prove that α\nis entailed by Γ, NK constructs a step-by-step proof of α\nfrom Γ (assuming that one exists); in contrast, LK first\nconstructs the sequent Γ → α which then attempts to\nprove valid by showing that it cannot be made false. This is done by\nsearching for a counterexample that makes (all the sentences in)\nΓ true and makes α false: If the search fails then a\ncounterexample does not exist and the sequent is therefore valid. In\nthis respect, proof trees in LK are actually refutation proofs. Like\nresolution, LK is refutation complete: If\nΓ ⊨ α then the sequent Γ →\nα has a proof tree.", "\nAs it stands, LK is unsuitable for automated deduction and there are\nsome obstacles that must be overcome before it can be efficiently\nimplemented. The reason is, of course, that the statement of the\ncompleteness of LK only has to assert, for each entailment relation,\nthe existence of a proof tree but a reasoning program has the more\ndifficult task of actually having to construct one. Some of the main\nobstacles: First, LK does not specify the order in which the rules\nmust be applied in the construction of a proof tree. Second, and as a\nparticular case of the first problem, the premises in the rules\n∀→ and →∃ rules inherit the quantificational\nformula to which the rule is applied, meaning that the rules can be\napplied repeatedly to the same formula sending the proof search into\nan endless loop. Third, LK does not indicate which formula must be\nselected next in the application of a rule. Fourth, the quantifier\nrules provide no indication as to what terms or free variables must be\nused in their deployment. Fifth, and as a particular case of the\nprevious problem, the application of a quantifier rule can lead into\nan infinitely long tree branch because the proper term to be used in\nthe instantiation never gets chosen. Fortunately, as we will hint at\nbelow each of these problems can be successfully addressed.", "\nAxiom sequents in LK are valid, and the conclusion of a rule is valid\niff its premises are. This fact allows us to apply the LK rules in\neither direction, forwards from axioms to conclusion, or backwards\nfrom conclusion to axioms. Also, with the exception of the cut rule,\nall the rules’ premises are subformulas of their respective\nconclusions. For the purposes of automated deduction this is a\nsignificant fact and we would want to dispense with the cut rule;\nfortunately, the cut-free version of LK preserves its refutation\ncompleteness (Gentzen 1935). These results provide a strong case for\nconstructing proof trees in a backwards fashion; indeed, by working\nthis way a refutation in cut-free LK gets increasingly simpler as it\nprogresses since subformulas are simpler than their parent formulas.\nMoreover, and as far as propositional rules go, the new subformulas\nentered into the tree are completely dictated by the cut-free LK\nrules. Furthermore, and assuming the proof tree can be brought to\ncompletion, branches eventually end up with atoms and the presence of\naxioms can be quickly determined. Another reason for working backwards\nis that the truth-functional fragment of cut-free LK is\nconfluent in the sense that the order in which the\nnon-quantifier rules are applied is irrelevant: If there is a proof,\nregardless of what you do, you will run into it! To bring the\nquantifier rules into the picture, things can be arranged so that all\nrules have a fair chance of being deployed: Apply, as far as possible,\nall the non-quantifier rules before applying any of the quantifier\nrules. This takes care of the first and second obstacles, and it is no\ntoo difficult to see how the third one would now be handled. The\nfourth and fifth obstacles can be addressed by requiring that the\nterms to be used in the substitutions be suitably selected from the\nHerbrand universe (Herbrand 1930).", "\nThe use of sequent-type calculi in automated theorem proving was\ninitiated by efforts to mechanize mathematics (Wang 1960). At the\ntime, resolution captured most of the attention of the automated\nreasoning community but during the 1970s some researchers started to\nfurther investigate non-resolution methods (Bledsoe 1977), prompting a\nfrutiful and sustained effort to develop more human-oriented theorem\nproving systems (Bledsoe 1975, Nevins 1974). Eventually, sequent-type\ndeduction gained momentum again, particularly in its re-incarnation as\nanalytic tableaux (Fitting 1990). The method of\ndeduction used in tableaux is essentially cut-free LK’s with sets used\nin lieu of sequents." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Sequent Deduction" }, { "content": [ "\nAlthough LK and NK are both commonly labeled as “natural\ndeduction” systems, it is the latter which better deserves the\ntitle due to its more natural, human-like, approach to proof\nconstruction. The rules of NK are typically presented as acting on\nstandard logic formulas in an implicitly understood context, but they\nare also commonly given in the literature as acting more explicitly on\n“judgements”, that is, expressions of the form\nΓ ⊢ α where Γ is a set of formulas\nand α is a formula. This form is typically understood as making\nthe metastatement that there is a proof of α from Γ\n(Kleene 1962). Following Gentzen 1935 and Prawitz 1965 here we take\nthe former approach. The system NK has no logical axioms and provides\ntwo introduction-elimination rules for each logical connective:", "\nA few remarks: First, the expression\n[α — γ] represents the fact that α\nis an auxiliary assumption in the proof of γ that eventually\ngets discharged, i.e. discarded. For example, ∃E tells us that\nif in the process of constructing a proof one has already derived\n∃xα(x) and also β with\nα(a/x) as an auxiliary assumption then the\ninference to β is allowed. Second, the eigenparameter,\na, in ∃E and ∀I must be foreign to the premises,\nundischarged—“active”—assumptions, to the\nrule’s conclusion and, in the case of ∃E, to\n∃xα(x). Third, ⊥ is shorthand for\ntwo contradictory formulas, β and ~β. Finally, NK is\ncomplete: If Γ ⊨ α then there is a\nproof of α from Γ using the rules of NK.", "\nAs in LK, proofs constructed in NK are represented as trees with the\nproof’s conclusion sitting at the root of the tree, and the problem’s\nassumptions sitting at the leaves. (Proofs are also typically given as\nsequences of judgements, Γ ⊢ α, running\nfrom the top to the bottom of the printed page.) Here is a natural\ndeduction proof tree of ∃xR(x) from\n∀x(P(x) ∨\nQ(x)), ∀x(P(x)\n⊃ R(x)) and\n∀x(Q(x) ⊃\nR(x)):", "\nAs in LK, a forward-chaining strategy for proof construction is not\nwell focused. So, although proofs are read forwards, that is,\nfrom leaves to root or, logically speaking, from assumptions to\nconclusion, that is not the way in which they are typically\nconstructed. A backward-chaining strategy implemented by\napplying the rules in reverse order is more effective. Many of the\nobstacles that were discussed above in the implementation of sequent\ndeduction are applicable to natural deduction as well. These issues\ncan be handled in a similar way, but natural deduction introduces some\nissues of its own. For example, as suggested by the ⊃-Introduction\nrule, to prove a goal of the form α ⊃ β one could\nattempt to prove β on the assumption that α. But note that\nalthough the goal α ⊃ β does not match the conclusion\nof any other introduction rule, it matches the conclusion of all\nelimination rules and the reasoning program would need to\nconsider those routes too. Similarly to forward-chaining, here there\nis the risk of setting goals that are irrelevant to the proof and that\ncould lead the program astray. To wit: What prevents a program from\nentering the never-ending process of building, say, larger and larger\nconjunctions? Or, what is there to prevent an uncontrolled chain of\nbackward applications of, say, ⊃-Elimination? Fortunately, NK\nenjoys the subformula property in the sense that each\nformula entering into a natural deduction proof can be restricted to\nbeing a subformula of Γ ∪ Δ ∪ {α}, where\nΔ is the set of auxiliary assumptions made by the ~-Elimination\nrule. By exploiting the subformula property a natural deduction\nautomated theorem prover can drastically reduce its search space and\nbring the backward application of the elimination rules under control\n(Portoraro 1998, Sieg & Byrnes 1996). Further gains can be realized\nif one is willing to restrict the scope of NK’s logic to its\nintuitionistic fragment where every proof has a normal form in the\nsense that no formula is obtained by an introduction rule and then is\neliminated by an elimination rule (Prawitz 1965).", "\nImplementations of automated theorem proving systems using NK\ndeduction have been motivated by the desire to have the program reason\nwith precisely the same proof format and methods employed by the human\nuser. This has been particularly true in the area of education where\nthe student is engaged in the interactive construction of formal\nproofs in an NK-like calculus working under the guidance of a theorem\nprover ready to provide assistance when needed (Portoraro 1994, Suppes\n1981). Other, research-oriented, theorem provers true to the spirit of\nNK exist (Pelletier 1998) but are rare." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Natural Deduction" }, { "content": [ "\nThe name of the matrix connection method (Bibel 1981) is indicative of\nthe way it operates. The term “matrix” refers to the form\nin which the set of logic formulas expressing the problem is\nrepresented; the term “connection” refers to the way the\nmethod operates on these formulas. To illustrate the method at work,\nwe will use an example from propositional logic and show that\nR is entailed by P ∨ Q, P ⊃\nR and Q ⊃ R. This is done by\nestablishing that the formula", "\n(P ∨ Q) & (P ⊃ R) &\n(Q ⊃ R) & ~R\n", "\nis unsatisfiable. To do this, we begin by transforming it into\nconjunctive normal form: ", "\n(P ∨ Q) & (~P ∨ R) &\n(~Q ∨ R) & ~R\n", "\nThis formula is then represented as a matrix, one conjunct per row\nand, within a row, one disjunct per column:", "\nThe idea now is to explore all the possible vertical paths running\nthrough this matrix. A vertical path is a set of\nliterals selected from each row in the matrix such that each literal\ncomes from a different row. The vertical paths:", "\nA path is complementary if it contains two literals\nwhich are complementary. For example, Path 2 is complementary since it\nhas both P and ~P but so is Path 6 since it contains\nboth R and ~R. Note that as soon as a path includes\ntwo complementary literals there is no point in pursuing the path\nsince it has itself become complementary. This typically allows for a\nlarge reduction in the number of paths to be inspected. In any event,\nall the paths in the above matrix are complementary and this fact\nestablishes the unsatisfiability of the original formula. This is the\nessence of the matrix connection method. The method can be extended to\npredicate logic but this demands additional logical apparatus:\nSkolemnization, variable renaming, quantifier duplication,\ncomplementarity of paths via unification, and simultaneous\nsubstitution across all matrix paths (Bibel 1981, Andrews 1981).\nVariations of the method have been implemented in reasoning programs\nin higher-order logic (Andrews 1981) and non-classical logics (Wallen\n1990)." ], "subsection_title": "2.4 The Matrix Connection Method" }, { "content": [ "\nEquality is an important logical relation whose behavior within\nautomated deduction deserves its own separate treatment.\nEquational logic and, more generally, term\nrewriting treat equality-like equations as rewrite\nrules, also known as reduction or\ndemodulation rules. An equality statement like\nf(a)= a allows the simplification of a term\nlike g(c,f(a)) to\ng(c,a). However, the same equation also has\nthe potential to generate an unboundedly large term:\ng(c,f(a)),\ng(c,f(f(a))),\ng(c,f(f(f(a)))),\n… . What distinguishes term rewriting from equational logic is\nthat in term rewriting equations are used as unidirectional reduction\nrules as opposed to equality which works in both directions. Rewrite\nrules have the form t1 ⇒\nt2 and the basic idea is to look for terms\nt occurring in expressions e such that t\nunifies with t1 with unifier θ so that the\noccurrence t1θ in eθ can be\nreplaced by t2θ. For example, the rewrite\nrule x + 0 ⇒ x allows the rewriting of\nsucc(succ(0) + 0) as\nsucc(succ(0)).", "\nTo illustrate the main ideas in term rewriting, let us explore an\nexample involving symbolic differentiation (the example and ensuing\ndiscussion are adapted from Chapter 1 of Baader & Nipkow 1998). Let\nder denote the derivative respect to x, let\ny be a variable different from x, and let u\nand v be variables ranging over expressions. We define the\nrewrite system:", "\nAgain, the symbol ⇒ indicates that a term matching the left-hand\nside of a rewrite rule should be replaced by the rule’s right-hand\nside. To see the differentiation system at work, let us compute the\nderivative of x × x respect to x,\nder(x × x):", "\nAt this point, since none of the rules (R1)–(R4) applies, no\nfurther reduction is possible and the rewriting process ends. The\nfinal expression obtained is called a normal form,\nand its existence motivates the following question: Is there an\nexpression whose reduction process will never terminate when applying\nthe rules (R1)–(R4)? Or, more generally: Under what conditions a\nset of rewrite rules will always stop, for any given expression, at a\nnormal form after finitely many applications of the rules? This\nfundamental question is called the termination\nproblem of a rewrite system, and we state without proof that the\nsystem (R1)–(R4) meets the termination condition.", "\nThere is the possibility that when reducing an expression, the set of\nrules of a rewrite system could be applied in more than one way. This\nis actually the case in the system (R1)–(R4) where in the\nreduction of der(x × x) we could have\napplied R1 first to the second sub-expression in (x ×\nder(x)) + (der(x) ×\nx), as shown below:", "\nFollowing this alternative course of action, the reduction terminates\nwith the same normal form as in the previous case. This fact, however,\nshould not be taken for granted: A rewriting system is said to be\n(globally) confluent if and only if independently of\nthe order in which its rules are applied every expression always ends\nup being reduced to its one and only normal form. It can be shown that\n(R1)–(R4) is confluent and, hence, we are entitled to say:\n“Compute the derivative of an expression” (as\nopposed to simply “a” derivative). Adding more\nrules to a system in an effort to make it more practical can have\nundesired consequences. For example, if we add the rule", "\nto (R1)–(R4) then we will be able to further reduce certain\nexpressions but at the price of losing confluency. The following\nreductions show that der(x + 0) now has two normal\nforms: the computation", "\ngives one normal form, and", "\ngives another. Adding the rule", "\nwould allow the further reduction of 1 + der(0) to 1 + 0 and\nthen, by R5, to 1. Although the presence of this new rule actually\nincreases the number of alternative\npaths—der(x + 0) can now be reduced in four\npossible ways—they all end up with the same normal form, namely\n1. This is no coincidence as it can be shown that (R6) actually\nrestores confluency. This motivates another fundamental question:\nUnder what conditions can a non-confluent system be made into an\nequivalent confluent one? The Knuth-Bendix completion\nalgorithm (Knuth & Bendix 1970) gives a partial answer to this\nquestion.", "\nTerm rewriting, like any other automated deduction method, needs\nstrategies to direct its application. Rippling (Bundy, Stevens &\nHarmelen 1993, Basin & Walsh 1996) is a heuristic that has its\norigins in inductive theorem-proving that uses annotations to\nselectively restrict the rewriting process. The superposition calculus\nis a calculus of equational first-order logic that combines notions\nfrom first-order resolution and Knuth-Bendix ordering equality.\nSuperposition is refutation complete (Bachmair & Ganzinger 1994) and\nis at the heart of a number of theorem provers, most notably the E\nequational theorem prover (Schulz 2004) and Vampire (Voronkov\n1995)." ], "subsection_title": "2.5 Term Rewriting" }, { "content": [ "\nMathematical induction is a very important technique of theorem\nproving in mathematics and computer science. Problems stated in terms\nof objects or structures that involve recursive definitions or some\nform of repetition invariably require mathematical induction for their\nsolving. In particular, reasoning about the correctness of computer\nsystems requires induction and an automated reasoning program that\neffectively implements induction will have important applications.", "\nTo illustrate the need for mathematical induction, assume that a\nproperty φ is true of the number zero and also that if true of a\nnumber then is true of its successor. Then, with our deductive\nsystems, we can deduce that for any given number n, φ is\ntrue of it, φ(n). But we cannot deduce that φ is true\nof all numbers, ∀xφ(x); this inference\nstep requires the rule of mathematical induction:", "\nIn other words, to prove that ∀xα(x)\none proves that α(0) is the case, and that\nα(succ(n)) follows from the assumption that\nα(n). The implementation of induction in a reasoning\nsystem presents very challenging search control problems. The most\nimportant of these is the ability to determine the particular way in\nwhich induction will be applied during the proof, that is, finding the\nappropriate induction schema. Related issues include selecting the\nproper variable of induction, and recognizing all the possible cases\nfor the base and the inductive steps.", "\nNqthm (Boyer & Moore 1979) has been one of the most successful\nimplementations of automated inductive theorem proving. In the spirit\nof Gentzen, Boyer and Moore were interested in how people prove\ntheorems by induction. Their theorem prover is written in the\nfunctional programming language Lisp which is also the language in\nwhich theorems are represented. For instance, to express the\ncommutativity of addition the user would enter the Lisp expression\n(EQUAL (PLUS X Y) (PLUS Y X)). Everything\ndefined in the system is a functional term, including its basic\n“predicates”: T, F,\nEQUAL X Y, IF\nX Y Z, AND, NOT,\netc. The program operates largely as a black\nbox, that is, the inner working details are hidden from the user;\nproofs are conducted by rewriting terms that posses recursive\ndefinitions, ultimately reducing the conclusion’s statement to the\nT predicate. The Boyer-Moore theorem prover\nhas been used to check the proofs of some quite deep theorems (Boyer,\nKaufmann & Moore 1995). Lemma caching, problem statement\ngeneralization, and proof planning are techniques particularly useful\nin inductive theorem proving (Bundy, Harmelen & Hesketh 1991)." ], "subsection_title": "2.6 Mathematical Induction" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "3. Other Logics", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nHigher-order logic differs from first-order logic in that\nquantification over functions and predicates is allowed. The statement\n“Any two people are related to each other in one way or\nanother” can be legally expressed in higher-order logic as\n∀x∀y∃RR(x,y)\nbut not in first-order logic. Higher-order logic is inherently more\nexpressive than first-order logic and is closer in spirit to actual\nmathematical reasoning. For example, the notion of set finiteness\ncannot be expressed as a first-order concept. Due to its richer\nexpressiveness, it should not come as a surprise that implementing an\nautomated theorem prover for higher-order logic is more challenging\nthan for first-order logic. This is largely due to the fact that\nunification in higher-order logic is more complex than in the\nfirst-order case: unifiable terms do not always posess a most general\nunifier, and higher-order unification is itself undecidable. Finally,\ngiven that higher-order logic is incomplete, there are always proofs\nthat will be entirely out of reach for any automated reasoning\nprogram.", "\nMethods used to automate first-order deduction can be adapted to\nhigher-order logic. TPS (Andrews et al. 1996, Andrews et\nal. 2006) is a theorem proving system for higher-order logic that\nuses Church’s typed λ-calculus as its logical representation\nlanguage and is based on a connection-type deduction mechanism that\nincorporates Huet’s unification algorithm (Huet 1975). As a sample of\nthe capabilities of TPS, the program has proved automatically that a\nsubset of a finite set is finite, the equivalence among several\nformulations of the Axiom of Choice, and Cantor’s Theorem that a set\nhas more subsets than members. The latter was proved by the program by\nasserting that there is no onto function from individuals to sets of\nindividuals, with the proof proceeding by a diagonal argument. HOL\n(Gordon & Melham 1993) is another higher-order proof development\nsystem primarily used as an aid in the development of hardware and\nsoftware safety-critical systems. HOL is based on the LCF approach to\ninteractive theorem proving (Gordon, Milner & Wadsworth 1979), and\nit is built on the strongly typed functional programming language ML.\nHOL, like TPS, can operate in automatic and interactive mode.\nAvailability of the latter mode is welcomed since the most useful\nautomated reasoning systems may well be those which place an emphasis\non interactive theorem proving (Farmer, Guttman & Thayer 1993) and\ncan be used as assistants operating under human guidance. (Harrison\n2000) discusses the verification of floating-point algorithms and the\nnon-trivial mathematical properties that are proved by HOL Light under\nthe guidance of the user. Isabelle (Paulson 1994) is a generic,\nhigher-order, framework for rapid prototyping of deductive systems.\nObject logics can be formulated within Isabelle’s metalogic by using\nits many syntactic and deductive tools. Isabelle also provides some\nready-made theorem proving environments, including Isabelle/HOL,\nIsabelle/ZF and Isabelle/FOL, which can be used as starting points for\napplications and further development by the user (Paulson 1990, Nipkow\n& Paulson 2002). Isabelle/ZF has been used to prove equivalent\nformulations of the Axiom of Choice, formulations of the Well-Ordering\nPrinciple, as well as the key result about cardinal arithmetic that,\nfor any infinite cardinal κ, κ · κ = κ\n(Paulson & Grabczewski 1996).", "\nTo help prove higher-order theorems and discharge goals arising in\ninteractive proofs, the user can ask Isabelle/HOL to invoke external\nfirst-order provers through Sledgehammer (Paulson 2010), a subsystem\naimed at combining the complementary capabilities of automated\nreasoning systems of different types, including SMT solvers (see\n4.2 SAT Solvers, in this article; Blanchette et al. 2013).\nLEO-II (Benzmüller et al. 2015) is also a resolution-based\nautomated theorem prover for higher-order logic that has been applied\nin a wide array of problems, most notably in the automation of\nGödel’s ontological proof of God’s existence (see 4.6 Logic\nand Philosophy, in this article). " ], "subsection_title": "3.1 Higher-Order Logic" }, { "content": [ "\nNon-classical logics (Haack 1978) such as modal logics, intuitionsitic\nlogic, multi-valued logics, autoepistemic logics, non-monotonic\nreasoning, commonsense and default reasoning, relevance logic,\nparaconsistent logic, and so on, have been increasingly gaining the\nattention of the automated reasoning community. One of the reasons has\nbeen the natural desire to extend automated deduction techniques to\nnew domains of logic. Another reason has been the need to mechanize\nnon-classical logics as an attempt to provide a suitable foundation\nfor artificial intelligence. A third reason has been the desire to\nattack some problems that are combinatorially too large to be handled\nby paper and pencil. Indeed, some of the work in automated\nnon-classical logic provides a prime example of automated reasoning\nprograms at work. To illustrate, the Ackerman Constant Problem asks\nfor the number of non-equivalent formulas in the relevance logic R.\nThere are actually 3,088 such formulas (Slaney 1984) and the number\nwas found by “sandwiching” it between a lower and an upper\nlimit, a task that involved constraining a vast universe of\n20400 20-element models in search of those models that\nrejected non-theorems in R. It is safe to say that this result would\nhave been impossible to obtain without the assistance of an automated\nreasoning program.", "\nThere have been three basic approaches to automate the solving of\nproblems in non-classical logic (McRobie 1991). One approach has been,\nof course, to try to mechanize the non-classical deductive calculi.\nAnother has been to simply provide an equivalent formulation of the\nproblem in first-order logic and let a classical theorem prover handle\nit. A third approach has been to formulate the semantics of the\nnon-classical logic in a first-order framework where resolution or\nconnection-matrix methods would apply. (Pelletier et al.\n2017) describes an automated reasoning system for a paraconsistent\nlogic that takes both “indirect” approaches, the\ntranslational and the truth-value approach, to prove its theorems.", "\nModal logics find extensive use in computing science as logics of\nknowledge and belief, logics of programs, and in the specification of\ndistributed and concurrent systems. Thus, a program that automates\nreasoning in a modal logic such as K, K4, T, S4, or S5 would have\nimportant applications. With the exception of S5, these logics share\nsome of the important metatheoretical results of classical logic, such\nas cut-elimination, and hence cut-free (modal) sequent calculi can be\nprovided for them, along with techniques for their automation.\nConnection methods (Andrews 1981, Bibel 1981) have played an important\nrole in helping to understand the source of redundancies in the search\nspace induced by these modal sequent calculi and have provided a\nunifying framework not only for modal logics but also for\nintuitionistic and classical logic as well (Wallen 1990). Current\nefforts to automate modal logic reasoning revolve around the\ntranslational approach mentioned above, namely to embed modal logic\ninto classical logic and then use an existing automated reasoning\nsystem for the latter to prove theorems of the former.\n(Benzmüller & Paulson 2013) shows how to embed quantified modal\nlogic into simple type theory, proves the soundness and completeness\nof the embedding, and demonstrates with simple experiments how\nexisting higher-order theorem provers can be used to automate proofs\nin modal logic. The approach can be extended to higher-order modal\nlogic as well (Benzmüller & Paleo 2015).", "\nThere are different ways in which intuitionsitic logic can be\nautomated. One is to directly implement the intuitionistic versions of\nGentzen’s sequent and natural deduction calculi, LJ and NJ\nrespectively. This approach inherits the stronger normalization\nresults enjoyed by these calculi allowing for a more compact\nmechanization than their classical counterparts. Another approach at\nmechanizing intuitionistic logic is to exploit its semantic\nsimilarities with the modal logic S4 and piggy back on an automated\nimplementation of S4. Automating intuitionistic logic has applications\nin software development since writing a program that meets a\nspecification corresponds to the problem of proving the specification\nwithin an intuitionistic logic (Martin-Löf 1982). A system that\nautomated the proof construction process would have important\napplications in algorithm design but also in constructive mathematics.\nNuprl (Constable et al. 1986) is a computer system supporting\na particular mathematical theory, namely constructive type theory, and\nwhose aim is to provide assistance in the proof development process.\nThe focus is on logic-based tools to support programming and on\nimplementing formal computational mathematics. Over the years the\nscope of the Nuprl project has expanded from\n“proofs-as-programs” to “systems-as-theories”.\nSimilar in spirit and based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism, the Coq\nsystem formalizes its proofs in the Calculus of Inductive\nConstructions, a λ-calculus with a rich system of types\nincluding dependent types (Coquand & Huet 1988, Coquand &\nPaulin-Mohring 1988). Like Nuprl, Coq is designed to assist in the\ndevelopment of mathematical proofs as well as computer programs from\ntheir formal specifications." ], "subsection_title": "3.2 Non-classical Logics" } ] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "4. Applications", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nLogic programming, particularly represented by the language\nProlog (Colmerauer et al. 1973), is probably\nthe most important and widespread application of automated theorem\nproving. During the early 1970s, it was discovered that logic could be\nused as a programming language (Kowalski 1974). What distinguishes\nlogic programming from other traditional forms of programming is that\nlogic programs, in order to solve a problem, do not explicitly state\nhow a specific computation is to be performed; instead, a\nlogic program states what the problem is and then delegates\nthe task of actually solving it to an underlying theorem prover. In\nProlog, the theorem prover is based on a refinement of resolution\nknown as SLD-resolution. SLD-resolution is a\nvariation of linear input resolution that incorporates a special rule\nfor selecting the next literal to be resolved upon; SLD-resolution\nalso takes into consideration the fact that, in the computer’s memory,\nthe literals in a clause are actually ordered, that is, they form a\nsequence as opposed to a set. A Prolog program\nconsists of clauses stating known facts and rules. For example, the\nfollowing clauses make some assertions about flight connections:", "\nflight(toronto, london).\n\nflight(london,rome).\n\nflight(chicago,london).\n\nflight(X,Y) :– flight(X,Z) ,\nflight(Z,Y).\n", "\nThe clause flight(toronto, london) is a fact while\nflight(X,Y) :– flight(X,Z)\n,\nflight(Z,Y) is a rule, written by convention as a\nreversed conditional (the symbol “:–” means\n“if”; the comma means “and”; terms starting in\nuppercase are variables). The former states that there is flight\nconnection between Toronto and London; the latter states that there is\na flight between cities X and Y if, for some city\nZ, there is a flight between X and Z and\none between Z and Y. Clauses in Prolog programs are\na special type of Horn clauses having precisely one positive literal:\nFacts are program clauses with no negative literals\nwhile rules have at least one negative literal. (Note\nthat in standard clause notation the program rule in the previous\nexample would be written as flight(X,Y) ∨\n~flight(X,Z) ∨ ~flight(Z,Y).)\nThe specific form of the program rules is to effectively express\nstatements of the form: “If these conditions over here are\njointly met then this other fact will follow”. Finally, a\ngoal is a Horn clause with no positive literals. The\nidea is that, once a Prolog program Π has been written, we can then\ntry to determine if a new clause γ, the goal, is entailed by\nΠ, Π ⊨ γ; the Prolog prover does this by attempting\nto derive a contradiction from Π ∪ {~γ}. We should remark\nthat program facts and rules alone cannot produce a contradiction; a\ngoal must enter into the process. Like input resolution,\nSLD-resolution is not refutation complete for first-order logic but it\nis complete for the Horn logic of Prolog programs. The fundamental\ntheorem: If Π is a Prolog program and γ is the goal clause\nthen Π ⊨ γ iff Π ∪ {~γ} ⊢\n[ ] by SLD-resolution (Lloyd 1984).", "\nFor instance, to find out if there is a flight from Toronto to Rome\none asks the Prolog prover to see if the clause flight(toronto, rome)\nfollows from the given program. To do this, the prover adds\n~flight(toronto,rome) to the program clauses and attempts to derive\nthe empty clause, [ ], by SLD-resolution:", "\nThe conditional form of rules in Prolog programs adds to their\nreadability and also allows reasoning about the underlying refutations\nin a more friendly way: To prove that there is a flight between\nToronto and Rome, flight(toronto,rome), unify this clause with the\nconsequent flight(X,Y) of the fourth clause in the\nprogram which itself becomes provable if both\nflight(toronto,Z) and flight(Z,rome) can be proved.\nThis can be seen to be the case under the substitution {Z\n← london} since both flight(toronto,london) and\nflight(london,rome) are themselves provable. Note that the theorem\nprover not only establishes that there is a flight between Toronto and\nRome but it can also come up with an actual itinerary,\nToronto-London-Rome, by extracting it from the unifications used in\nthe proof.", "\nThere are at least two broad problems that Prolog must address in\norder to achieve the ideal of a logic programming language. Logic\nprograms consist of facts and rules describing what is true; anything\nthat is not provable from a program is deemed to be false. In regards\nto our previous example, flight(toronto,\nboston) is not true since this literal cannot be deduced from\nthe program. The identification of falsity with non-provability is\nfurther exploited in most Prolog implementations by incorporating an\noperator, not, that allows programmers to explicitly\nexpress the negation of literals (or even subclauses) within a\nprogram. By definition, not l succeeds if the literal\nl itself fails to be deduced. This mechanism, known as\nnegation-by-failure, has been the target of\ncriticism. Negation-by-failure does not fully capture the standard\nnotion of negation and there are significant logical differences\nbetween the two. Standard logic, including Horn logic, is monotonic\nwhich means that enlarging an axiom set by adding new axioms simply\nenlarges the set of theorems derivable from it; negation-by-failure,\nhowever, is non-monotonic and the addition of new\nprogram clauses to an existing Prolog program may cause some goals to\ncease from being theorems. A second issue is the control\nproblem. Currently, programmers need to provide a fair amount\nof control information if a program is to achieve acceptable levels of\nefficiency. For example, a programmer must be careful with the order\nin which the clauses are listed within a program, or how the literals\nare ordered within a clause. Failure to do a proper job can result in\nan inefficient or, worse, non-terminating program. Programmers must\nalso embed hints within the program clauses to prevent the prover from\nrevisiting certain paths in the search space (by using the\ncut operator) or to prune them altogether (by using\nfail). Last but not least, in order to improve their\nefficiency, many implementations of Prolog do not implement\nunification fully and bypass a time-consuming yet critical\ntest—the so-called\noccurs-check—responsible for checking the\nsuitability of the unifiers being computed. This results in an unsound\ncalculus and may cause a goal to be entailed by a Prolog program (from\na computational point of view) when in fact it should not (from a\nlogical point of view).", "\nThere are variations of Prolog intended to extend its scope. By\nimplementing a model elimination procedure, the Prolog Technology\nTheorem Prover (PTTP) (Stickel 1992) extends Prolog into full\nfirst-order logic. The implementation achieves both soundness and\ncompleteness. Moving beyond first-order logic, λProlog (Miller\n& Nadathur 1988) bases the language on higher-order constructive\nlogic." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Logic Programming" }, { "content": [ "\nThe problem of determining the satisfiability of logic formulas has\nreceived much attention by the automated reasoning community due to\nits important applicability in industry. A propositional formula is\nsatisfiable if there is an assignment of truth-values\nto its variables that makes the formula true. For example, the\nassignment (P ← true, Q ← true, R\n← false) does not make (P ∨R) &\n~Q true but (P ← true, Q ← false,\nR ← false) does and, hence, the formula is satisfiable.\nDetermining whether a formula is satisfiable or not is called the\nBoolean Satisfiability Problem—SAT for\nshort—and for a formula with n variables SAT can be\nsettled thus: Inspect each of the 2n possible\nassignments to see if there is at least one assignment that satisfies\nthe formula, i.e. makes it true. This method is clearly complete: If\nthe original formula is satisfiable then we will eventually find one\nsuch satisfying assignment; but if the formula is contradictory (i.e.\nnon-satisfiable), we will be able to determine this too. Just as\nclearly, and particularly in this latter case, this search takes an\nexponential amount of time, and the desire to conceive more efficient\nalgorithms is well justified particularly because many computing\nproblems of great practical importance such as graph-theoretic\nproblems, network design, storage and retrieval, scheduling, program\noptimization, and many others (Garey & Johnson 1979) can be\nexpressed as SAT instances, i.e. as the SAT question of some\npropositional formula representing the problem. Given that SAT is\nNP-complete (Cook 1971) it is very unlikely that a polynomial\nalgorithm exists for it; however, this does not preclude the existence\nof sufficiently efficient algorithms for particular cases of SAT\nproblems.", "\nThe Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) algorithm\nwas one of the first SAT search algorithms (Davis & Putnam 1960;\nDavis, Logemman & Loveland 1962) and is still considered one of the\nbest complete SAT solvers; many of the complete SAT procedures in\nexistence today can be considered optimizations and generalizations of\nDPLL. In essence, DPLL search procedures proceed by considering ways\nin which assignments can be chosen to make the original formula true.\nFor example, consider the formula in CNF", "\nP & ~Q & (~P ∨ Q ∨\nR) & (P ∨ ~S)\n", "\nSince P is a conjunct, but also a unit clause, P\nmust be true if the entire formula is to be true. Moreover, the value\nof ~P does not contribute to the truth of ~P ∨\nQ ∨ R and P ∨ ~S is true\nregardless of S. Thus, the whole formula reduces to", "\n~Q & (Q ∨ R)\n", "\nSimilarly, ~Q must be true and the formula further reduces\nto", "\nR\n", "\nwhich forces R to be true. From this process we can recover\nthe assignment (P ← true, Q ← false,\nR ← true, S ← false) proving that the\noriginal formula is satisfiable. A formula may cause the algorithm to\nbranch; the search through a branch reaches a dead end the moment a\nclause is deemed false—a conflicting\nclause—and all variations of the assignment that has\nbeen partially constructed up to this point can be discarded. To\nillustrate:", "\nHence, the formula is satisfiable by the existence of (P\n← false, Q ← true, R ← true). DPLL\nalgorithms are made more efficient by strategies such as term\nindexing (ordering of the formula variables in an\nadvantageous way), chronological backtracking\n(undoing work to a previous branching point if the process leads to a\nconflicting clause), and conflict-driven learning\n(determining the information to keep and where to backtrack). The\ncombination of these strategies results in a large prune of the search\nspace; for a more extensive discussion the interested reader is\ndirected to Zhang & Malik 2002.", "\nA quick back-envelope calculation reveals the staggering computing\ntimes of (algorithms for) SAT-type problems represented by formulas\nwith as little as, say, 60 variables. To wit: A problem represented as\na Boolean formula with 10 variables that affords a linear solution\ntaking one hundredth of a second to complete would take just four\nhundredths and six hundredths of a second to complete if the formula\nhad instead 40 and 60 variables respectively. In dramatic contrast, if\nthe solution to the problem were exponential (say\n2n) then the times to complete the job for 10, 40\nand 60 variables would be respectively one thousandth of a second, 13\ndays, and 365 centuries. It is a true testament to the ingenuity of\nthe automated reasoning community and the power of current SAT-based\nsearch algorithms that real-world problems with thousands of variables\ncan be handled with reasonable efficency. Küchlin & Sinz 2000\ndiscuss a SAT application in the realm of industrial automotive\nproduct data management where 18,000 (elementary) Boolean formulas and\n17,000 variables are used to express constraints on orders placed by\ncustomers. As another example, Massacci & Marraro 2000 discuss\nan application in logical cryptanalysis, that is, the verification of\nproperties of cryptographic algorithms expressed as SAT problems. They\ndemonstrate how finding a key with a cryptographic attack is analogous\nto finding a model—assignment—for a Boolean formula; the\nformula in their application encodes the commercial version of the U.S\nData Encryption Standard (DES) with the encoding requiring 60,000\nclauses and 10,000 variables.", "\nAlthough SAT is conceptually very simple, its inner nature is not well\nunderstood—there are no criteria that can be generally applied\nto answer as to why one SAT problem is harder than another. It should\nthen come as no surprise that algorithms that tend to do well on some\nSAT instances do not perform so well on others, and efforts are being\nspent in designing hybrid algorithmic solutions that combine the\nstrength of complementary approaches—see Prasad, Biere &\nGupta 2005 for an application of this hybrid approach in the\nverification of hardware design.", "\nRecent advances in SAT hybrid strategies coupled with supercomputing\npower has allowed a team of three computing scientists to solve the\nBoolean Pythagorean Triples Problem, a long-standing open question in\nRamsey Theory: Can the set {1, 2,...} of natural numbers be divided\ninto two parts with no part containing a triple\n(a, b, c) such that a2\n+ b2 = c2? Heule, Kullmann\n& Marek 2016 proved that this cannot be done by showing that the\nset {1, 2, … , n} can be so partitioned for n\n= 7824 but that this is impossible for n ≥\n7825. Expressing this deceptively simple question as a SAT problem\nrequired close to 38,000 clauses and 13,000 variables with about half\nof these going to represent that the problem is satisfiable when n =\n7824 and the other half to represent that it is not when n = 7825; of\nthe two, proving the latter was far more challenging since it demanded\na proof of unsatisfiability, i.e. that no such partition exists. A\nnaïve brute-force approach considering all 27825\npossible two-part partitions was clearly out of the question and the\nproblem was attacked by using “clever” algorithms within a\nmulti-stage SAT-based framework for solving hard problems in\ncombinatorics, consisting of five phases: Encode (encoding\nthe problem as SAT formulas), Transform (optimizing the\nencoding using clause elimination and symmetry breaking\ntechniques), Split (dividing the problem effectively into\nsubproblems using splitting heuristics), Solve (searching for\nsatisfying assignments or their lack thereof using fast processing),\nand Validate (validating the results of the earlier\nphases). Of special importance was the application\nof cube-and-conquer, a hybrid SAT strategy\nparticularly effective for hard combinatorial problems. The strategy\ncombines look-ahead with conflict-driven\nclause-learning (CDCL), with the former\naiming to construct small binary search trees using global heuristics\nand the latter aiming to find short refutations using local\nheuristics.", "\nAfter splitting the problem into 106 hard subproblems\n(known as “cubes”), these were handed down to 800 cores\nworking in parallel on a Stampede supercomputer which, after\n2 days of further splitting and CDCL clause-crunching, settled the\nquestion and delivered a 200-terabyte proof validating the work. After\ndeservedly celebrating this significant accomplishment of automated\nreasoning, and after entertaining all the new applications that the\nenhanced SAT method would afford (particularly in the areas of\nhardware and software verification), we should then ask some questions\nthat are of especial importance to mathematicians: Is there a more\ninsightful way to establish this result that would involve more\ntraditional and intellectually satisfying mathematical proof methods?\nOr, as far as increasing our understanding of a given field\n(combinatorics in this case), what is the value of settling a question\nwhen no human can inspect the proof and hence get no insight from it?\nEven the team responsible for the result admits that “the proofs\nof unsatisfiability coming from SAT solvers are, from a human point of\nview, a giant heap of random information (no direct understanding is\ninvolved)”. The conjecture has been settled but we basically\nhave no underlying idea what makes 7825 so special. Perhaps the real\nvalue to be drawn from these considerations is that they lead us to\nthink about the deeper question: What is it about the structure of a\nspecific problem that makes it amenable to standard mathematical\ntreatment as opposed to requiring a mindless brute-force approach?\nWhile this question is being contemplated, SAT may provide the best line of attack on certain mathematical problems.", "\nThe DPLL search procedure has been extended to quantified logic. MACE\nis a popular program based on the DPLL algorithm that searches for\nfinite models of first-order formulas with equality. As an example\n(McCune 2001), to show that not all groups are commutative one can\ndirect MACE to look for a model of the group axioms that also\nfalsifies the commutation law or, equivalently, to look for a model\nof:", "\n\n\n\n (G1)\n e · x = x\n (left identity) \n\n (G2)\n i (x) · x =\ne\n (left inverse) \n\n (G3)\n (x · y) · z =\nx · (y · z)\n (associativity) \n\n (DC)\n a · b ≠ b ·\na\n (denial of commutativity) \n\n", "\nMACE finds a six-element model of these axioms, where · is\ndefined as:", "\nand where i are defined as:", "\nThis example also illustrates, once again, the benefits of using an automated\ndeduction system: How long would have taken the human researcher to\ncome up with the above or a similar model? For more challenging\nproblems, the program is being used as a practical complement to the\nresolution-based theorem prover Prover9 (formerly Otter), with Prover9\nsearching for proofs and MACE jointly looking for (counter) models. To\nfind such models, MACE converts the first-order problem into a set of\n\"flattened\" clauses which, for increasing model sizes, are\ninstantiated into propositional clauses and solved as a SAT problem.\nThe method has been implemented in other automated reasoning systems\nas well, most notably in the Paradox model finder where the MACE-style\napproach has been enhanced by four additional techniques resulting in\nsome significant efficiency improvements (Claessen & Sörensson\n2003): term definitions (to reduce the number of variables in\nflattened clauses), static symmetric reduction (to reduce the number\nof isomorphic models), sort inference (to apply symmetric reduction at\na finer level) and incremental SAT (to reuse search information\nbetween consecutive model sizes). The strategy of pairing the\ncomplementary capabilities of separate automated reasoning systems has\nbeen applied to higher-order logic too as exemplified by Nitpick, a\ncounterexample generator for Isabelle/HOL (Blanchette & Nipkow\n2010). Brown 2013 describes a theorem proving procedure for\nhigher-order logic that uses SAT-solving to do most of the work; the\nprocedure is a complete, cut-free, ground refutation calculus that\nincorporates restrictions on instantiations and has been implemented\nin the Satallax theorem prover (Brown 2012).", "\nAn approach of great interest at solving SAT problems in first-order\nlogic is Satisfiability Modulo Theory\n(SMT) where the interpretation of symbols in the\nproblem’s formulation is constrained by a background\ntheory. For example, in linear arithmetic the function\nsymbols are restricted to + and −. As another example, in the\nextensional theory of arrays (McCarthy 1962) the array function\nread(a, i) returns the value of the array\na at index i, and write(a,\ni, x) returns the array identical to a but\nwhere the value of a at i is x. More\nformally,", "\n\n\n\n ∀a : Array .\n∀i,j : Index . ∀x :\nValue . i = j →\n\n read(write(a, i,\nx), j) = x (read-write\naxiom 1) \n\n ∀a : Array .\n∀i,j : Index . ∀x :\nValue . i ≠ j →\n\n read(write(a, i,\nx), j) = read(a, j) (read-write\naxiom 2) \n\n ∀a,b : Array .\n∀i : Index . a = b →\nread(a, i) = read(b,\ni) \n\n (extensionality) \n\n", "\nIn the context of these axioms, an SMT solver would attempt to\nestablish the satisfiability (or, dually, the validity) of a given\nfirst-order formula, or thousands of formulas for that matter, such\nas", "\ni − j = 1 &\nf(read(write(a, i, 2),\nj + 1) = read(write(a, i,\nf(i − j + 1)), i)\n", "\n(Ganzinger et al. 2004) discusses an approach to SMT called\nDPLL(T) consisting of a general\nDPLL(X) engine that works in conjunction with a solver\nSolverT for background theory T. Bofill\net al. (2008) present the approach in the setting of the theory of\narrays, where the DPLL engine is responsible for enumerating\npropositional models for the given formula whereas\nSolverT checks whether these models are consistent\nwith the theory of arrays. Their approach is sound and complete, and\ncan be smoothly extended to multidimensional arrays.", "\nSMT is particularly successful in verification applications, most\nnotably software verification. Having improved the efficiency of SAT\nsolvers with SMT, the effort is now on designing more efficient SMT\nsolvers (de Moura 2007)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 SAT Solvers" }, { "content": [ "\nTo prove automatically even the simplest mathematical facts requires a\nsignificant amount of domain knowledge. As a rule, automated theorem\nprovers lack such rich knowledge and attempt to construct proofs from\nfirst principles by the application of elementary deduction rules.\nThis approach results in very lengthy proofs (assuming a proof is\nfound) with each step being justified at a most basic logical level.\nLarger inference steps and a significant improvement in mathematical\nreasoning capability can be obtained, however, by having a theorem\nprover interact with a computer algebra system, also known as a\nsymbolic computation system. A computer algebra\nsystem is a computer program that assists the user with the\nsymbolic manipulation and numeric evaluation of mathematical\nexpressions. For example, when asked to compute the improper\nintegral", "\n\n\n\n ∞\n\n∫\n\n0 \n \ne−a2t2cos2bt\ndt \n\n", "\na competent computer algebra system would quickly reply with the\nanswer", "\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n √π\n\n\n 2a \n \n \ne−b2/a2\n\n\n", "\nEssentially, the computer algebra system operates by taking the input\nexpression entered by the user and successively applies to it a series\nof transformation rules until the result no longer changes (see the\nsection Term Rewriting in this article for more details).\nThese transformation rules encode a significant amount of domain\n(mathematical) knowledge making symbolic systems powerful tools in the\nhands of applied mathematicians, scientists, and engineers trying to\nattack problems in a wide variety of fields ranging from calculus and\nthe solving of equations to combinatorics and number theory.", "\nProblem solving in mathematics involves the interplay of deduction and\ncalculation, with decision procedures being a reminder of the fuzzy\ndivision between the two; hence, the integration of deductive and\nsymbolic systems, which we coin here as Deductive Computer\nAlgebra (DCA), is bound to be a fruitful combination.\nAnalytica (Bauer, Clarke & Zhao 1998) is a theorem prover built on\ntop of Mathematica, a powerful and popular computer algebra system.\nBesides supplying the deductive engine, Analytica also extends\nMathematica’s capabilities by defining a number of rewrite\nrules—more precisely, identities about summations and\ninequalities—that are missing in the system, as well as\nproviding an implementation of Gosper’s algorithm for finding closed\nforms of indefinite hypergeometric summations. Equipped with this\nextended knowledge, Analytica can prove semi-automatically some\nnontrivial theorems from real analysis, including a series of lemmas\ndirectly leading to a proof of the Bernstein Approximation Theorem.\nHere is the statement of the theorem simply to give the reader a sense\nof the level of the mathematical richness we are dealing with:", "\nBernstein Approximation Theorem.\n\nLet I = [0, 1] be the closed unit interval, f a real\ncontinuous function on I, and\nBn(x,f) the\nnth Bernstein polynomial for f defined as\n\n\n\n Bn(x, f)\n = \n n\n\n∑\n\nk=0 \n (\n n\n\nk\n )\n f(k/n)xk(1\n− x)n−k \n Then, on the interval I, the sequence of Bernstein\npolynomials for f converges uniformly to f.\n", "\nTo be frank, the program is supplied with key information to establish\nthe lemmas that lead to this theorem but the amount and type of\ndeductive work done by the program is certainly nontrivial. (Clarke\n& Zhao 1994) provides examples of fully automated proofs using\nproblems in Chapter 2 of Ramanujan’s Notebooks (Berndt 1985)\nincluding the following example that the reader is invited to try.\nShow that:", "\n\n\n\n Ar\n\n∑\n\nk=n+1 \n \n\n\n\n 1\n\n\n k \n \n = \n r + 2\n (\n r\n\n∑\n\nk=1 \n (r − k)\n (\n Ak\n\n∑\n\nj=Ak−1+1\n\n \n\n\n\n 1\n\n\n (3j)3−3j\n\n \n )\n )\n + 2rφ(3,A0) \n\n", "\nwhere A0=1,\nAn+1=3An+1 and\nφ(x,n) is Ramanujan’s abbreviation for", "\n\n\n\n φ(x,n)\n =df \n n\n\n∑\n\nk=1 \n \n\n\n\n 1\n\n\n −(kx)+k3x3\n\n \n\n", "\nAnalytica’s proof of this identity proceeds by simplifying both the\nleft- and right-hand sides of the equality and showing that both sides\nreduce to the same expression, −Hn +\nHAr. The simplification uses the added summation\nidentities mentioned before as well as some elementary properties of\nthe harmonic numbers,", "\n\n\n\n Hn\n = \n n\n\n∑\n\nk=1 \n \n\n\n\n 1\n\n\n k \n \n\n", "\nThe resulting proof has 28 steps (some of which are nontrivial) taking\nabout 2 minutes to find.", "\nKerber, Kohlhase & Sorge 1998 use the Ωmega planning\nsystem as the overall way to integrate theorem proving and symbolic\ncomputation. In Harrison & Théry 1998, we find an example\nof the integration of a higher-order logic theorem proving system\n(HOL) with a computer algebra system (Maple).", "\nTheir great power notwithstanding, symbolic algebra systems do not\nenforce the same level of rigor and formality that is the essence of\nautomated deduction systems. In fact, the mathematical semantics of\nsome of the knowledge rules in most algebra systems is not entirely\nclear and are, in cases, logically unsound (Harrison & Théry\n1998). The main reason for this is an over-aggressiveness to provide\nthe user with an answer in a timely fashion at whatever cost,\nbypassing the checking of required assumptions even if it means\nsacrificing the soundness of the calculation. (This is strongly\nreminiscent of most Prolog implementations that bypass the so-called\n“occurs-check” also abandoning logical soundness in the\nname of efficiency.) This serious problem opens the opportunity for a\ndeduction system to provide a service to the computer algebra system:\nUse its deductive capabilities to verify that the computer algebra’s\ncomputational steps meet the required assumptions. There is a catch in\nthis, however: For sufficiently large calculation steps, verifying is\ntantamount to proving and, to check these steps, the deduction system\nmay well need the assistance of the very same system that is in need\nof verification! The solution to the soundness problem may then well\nrequire an extensive modification of the chosen symbolic algebra\nsystem to make it sound; an alternative approach is to develop a new\nsystem, entirely from scratch, in conjunction with the development of\nthe automated theorem prover. In either case, the resulting combined\ndeductive computer algebra system should display a much improved\nability for automated mathematical reasoning." ], "subsection_title": "4.3 Deductive Computer Algebra" }, { "content": [ "\nAutomated reasoning has reached the level of maturity where theorem\nproving systems and techniques are being used for industrial-strength\napplications. One such application area is the formal verification of\nhardware and software systems. The cost of defects in hardware can\neasily run into the millions. In 1994, the Pentium processor was\nshipped with a defect in its floating-point unit and the subsequent\noffer by Intel to replace the flawed chip (which was taken up only by\na small fraction of all Pentium owners) cost the company close to $500\nmillion. To guard against situations like this, the practice of\ntesting chip designs is now considered insufficient and more formal\nmethods of verification have not only gained large attention in the\nmicroprocessor industry but have become a necessity. The idea behind\nformal verification is to rigorously prove with mathematical certainty\nthat the system functions as specified. Common applications to\nhardware design include formally establish that the system functions\ncorrectly on all inputs, or that two different circuits are\nfunctionally equivalent.", "\nDepending on the task at hand, one can draw from a number of automated\nformal verification techniques, including SAT solvers in propositional\nlogic, symbolic simulation using binary decision diagrams (BDDs),\nmodel checking in temporal logic, or conducting proofs in higher-order\nlogic. In the latter case, using an automated theorem prover like\nHOL—see Section 10—has shown to be invaluable in practice.\nProof construction in a system like HOL proceeds semi-automatically\nwith the user providing a fair amount of guidance as to how the proof\nshould proceed: The user tries to find a proof while being assisted by\nthe theorem prover which, on request, can either automatically fill in\na proof segment or verify proof steps given to it. Although some of\nthe techniques mentioned above provide decision procedures which\nhigher-order logic lacks, higher-order logic has the advantage of\nbeing very expressive. The tradeoff is justified since proving facts\nabout floating-point arithmetic requires the\nformalization of a large body of real analysis, including many\nelementary statements such as:", "\nThis statement from Harrison 2000 written in HOL says that if a\nfunction f is differentiable with derivative\nf′ in an interval [a, b] then a\nsufficient condition for f(x) ≤ K\nthroughout the interval is that f(x) ≤ K\nat the endpoints a, b and at all points of zero\nderivative. The result is used to determine error bounds when\napproximating transcendental functions by truncated power series.\nConducting proofs in such a “painstakingly foundational\nsystem” (Harrison 2006) has some significant benefits. First,\none achieves a high degree of assurance that the proofs are valid\nsince (admitedly lengthy) they are composed of small error-free\ndeductive steps. Second, the formalization of these elementary\nstatements and intermediate results can be reused in other tasks or\nprojects. For example, a library of formal statements and proven\nresults in floating-point division can be reused when proving other\nresults of floating-point algorithms for square roots or\ntranscendental functions. To further illustrate, different versions of\nthe square root algorithm for the Intel Itanium share many\nsimilarities and the proof of correctness for one version of the\nalgorithm can be carried over to another version after minor tweaking\nof the proof. A third benefit of using a prover like HOL is, of\ncourse, that such lengthy proofs are carried out mechanically and are\ndeductively certain; the likelihood of introducing a human error if\nthey were carried out manually would be just as certain." ], "subsection_title": "4.4 Formal Verification of Hardware" }, { "content": [ "\nSociety is becoming increasingly dependent on software systems for\ncritical services such as safety and security. Serious adverse effects\nof malfunctioning software include loss of human life, threats to\nsecurity, unauthorized access to sensitive information, large\nfinancial losses, denial of critical services, and risk to safety. One\nway to increase the quality of critical software is to supplement\ntraditional methods of testing and validation with techniques of\nformal verification. The basic approach to formal verification is to\ngenerate a number of conditions that the software must meet and to\nverify—establish—them by mathematical proof. As with\nhardware, automated formal verification (simply formal verification,\nhereafter) is concerned with discharging these proof obligations using\nan automated theorem prover.", "\nThe formal verification of security protocols is an\nalmost ideal application of automated theorem proving in industry.\nSecurity protocols are small distributed programs aimed at ensuring\nthat transactions take place securely over public networks. The\nspecification of a security protocol is relatively small and well\ndefined but its verification is certainly non-trivial. We have already\nmentioned in a previous section the use of SAT-based theorem provers\nin the verification of the U.S Data Encryption Standard (DES). As\nanother example, the Mondex “electronic purse” is a smart\ncard electronic cash system that was originally developed by National\nWestminster Bank and subsequently sold to MasterCard International.\nSchmitt & Tonin 2007 describe a Java Card implementation of the\nMondex protocol for which the security properties were reformulated in\nthe Java Modeling Language (JML) following closely the original Z\nspecification. Proof of correctness was conducted using the KeY tool\n(Beckert, Hanle & Schmitt 2007), an interactive theorem proving\nenvironment for first-order dynamic logic that allows the user to\nprove properties of imperative and object-oriented sequential\nprograms. This application of automated reasoning demonstrates, in the\nwords of the authors, that “it is possible to bridge the gap\nbetween specification and implementation ensuring a fully verified\nresult”.", "\nDenney, Fischer & Schumann 2004 describe a system to automate the\ncertification of safety properties of data-analysis aerospace\nsoftware at NASA. Using Hoare-style program verification\ntechniques, their system generates proof obligations that are then\nhandled by an automated theorem prover. The process is not fully\nautomated, however, since many of the obligations must be simplified\nfirst in order to improve the ability of the theorem prover to solve\nthe proof tasks. For example, one such class of obligations makes a\nstatement about a matrix, r, that needs to remain symmetric\nafter updates along its diagonal have been made, and has the form:", "\nOriginal form:\n\nsymm(r) →\nsymm(diag-updates(r))", "\nSimplified form (when r is 2x2):", "\nEven after the simplification, current theorem provers find the proof\ntask challenging. The task becomes intractable for larger matrices and\nnumber of updates (e.g. a 6×6 matrix with 36 updates) and\nfurther preprocessing and simplification on the obligation is required\nbefore the task eventually falls within the reach of state-of-art\ntheorem provers. But it is worth remarking that proofs are found\nwithout using any specific features or configuration parameters of the\ntheorem provers which would improve their chances at completing the\nproofs. This is important since the everyday application of theorem\nprovers in industry cannot presuppose such deep knowledge of the\nprover from their users. The formal verification of software remains a\ndemanding task but it is difficult to see how the certification of\nproperties could happen without the assistance of automated deduction\nwhen one faces the humanly impossible task of establishing thousands\nof such obligations.", "\nIn the field of nuclear engineering, techniques of\nautomated reasoning are deemed mature enough to assist in the formal\nverification of the safety-critical software responsible for\ncontrolling a nuclear power plant’s reactor prevention systems (RPS).\nThe RPS component of the digital control system of the APR-1400\nnuclear reactor is specified using NuSCR, a formal specification\nlanguage customized for nuclear applications (Yoo, Jee & Cha 2009).\nModel checking in computation tree logic is used to check the\nspecifications for completeness and consistency. After this, nuclear\nengineers generate function block designs via a process of automatic\nsynthesis and formally verify the designs also using techniques of\nmodel checking in linear temporal logic; the techniques are also used\nto verify the equivalence of the multiple revisions and releases of\nthe design. These model-checking tools were implemented to make their\nuse as easy and intuitive as possible, in a way that did not require a\ndeep knowledge of the techniques, and used notations familiar to\nnuclear engineers. The use of automated reasoning tools not only helps\nthe design engineers to establish the desired results but it also\nraises the confidence of the government’s regulatory personnel that\nneed to approve the RPS software before the reactor can be certified\nfor operation." ], "subsection_title": "4.5 Formal Verification of Software" }, { "content": [ "\nIn the spirit of Wos, Overbeek, Lusk & Boyle 1992, we pose the\nquestion: What do the following statements about different systems of\nformal logic and exact philosophy have in common?", "\nWe ask again, what do these results have in common? The answer is that\neach has been proved with the help of an automated reasoning program.\nHaving disclosed the answer to this question prompts a new one: How\nmuch longer would have taken to settle these open problems without the\napplication of such an automated reasoning tool? ", "\nThe strict implicational fragments of the logical systems S4 and S5 of\nmodal logic are known as C4 and C5, respectively, and\ntheir Hilbert-style axiomatizations presuppose condensed detachment as\ntheir sole rule of inference. With insight from Kripke’s work,\nAnderson & Belnap (1962) published the first axiomatization of C4\nusing the following 3-axiom basis, where the Polish notation\n‘Cpq’ stands for ‘p\n→ q’. ", "\nA question was posed sometime after: Is there a shorter such\naxiomatization for C4, using a 2-axiom basis or even a single axiom?\nUsing the automated reasoning program Otter, the authors Ernst,\nFitelson, Harris & Wos (2001) settled both questions in the\naffirmative. In fact, several 2-axiom bases were discovered of which\nthe following turned out to be shortest: ", "\nFurther rounds of automated reasoning work were rewarded with the\ndiscovery of a single axiom for C4; the axiom is 21 symbols long and\nit was also proved that it is the shortest such axiom: ", "\nTo show that each of (2) and (3) is necessary and sufficient for (1),\na circle of proofs was produced using the automated reasoning tool:\n(1) ⇒ (3) ⇒ (2) ⇒ (1). As for C5, its axiomatization\nwas originally published in a paper by Lemmon, A. Meredith, D. Meredith,\nPrior & Thomas (1957) giving several 4-, 3-, 2- and 1-axiom bases\nfor C5, including the following 3-axiom basis: ", "\nThe publication also included the shortest known 2-axiom bases for C5\n(actually two of them, containing 20 symbols each) but the shortest\nsingle axiom for C5 was later discovered by (Meredith and Prior 1964)\nand having 21 symbols: ", "\nApplying automated reasoning strategies again, Ernst, Fitelson,\nHarris & Wos 2001) discovered several new bases, including the\nfollowing 2-axiom basis of length 18 and six 1-axiom bases matching\nMeredith’s length of 21 (only one of these is given below): ", "\nTo show that each of (6) and (7) is necessary and sufficient for (4),\na circle of proofs was also produced with the theorem prover: (6)\n⇒ (4) ⇒ (7) ⇒ (6). ", "\nA charming foray into combinatory logic is presented\nin Smullyan 1985 and Glickfeld & Overbeek 1986, where we learn\nabout a certain enchanted forest inhabited by talking birds. Given any\nbirds A and B, if the name of bird B is\nspoken to bird A then A will respond with the name\nof some bird in the forest, AB, and this response to\nB from A will always be the same. Here are some\ndefinitions about enchanted birds: ", "\n\n\n\n B1\n A mockingbird M mimics any bird in\nthe sense that M’s response to a bird x is the same\nas x’s response to itself, Mx = xx.\n\n\n B2\n A bird C composes birds A and\nB if A(Bx) = Cx, for any bird\nx. In other words, C’s response to x is the\nsame as A’s response to B’s response to\nx. \n\n B3\n A bird A is fond of a bird B if A’s\nresponse to B is B; that is, AB =\nB. \n\n", "\nAnd here are two facts about this enchanted forest: ", "\n\n\n\n F1\n For any birds A and B in the forest there is a\nbird C that composes them. \n\n F2\n There is a mockingbird in the forest. \n\n", "\nThere have been rumors that every bird in the forest is fond of at\nleast one bird, and also that there is at least one bird that is not\nfond of any bird. The challenge to the reader now is, of course, to\nsettle these rumors using only F1 and F2, and the given definitions\n(B1)–(B3). Glickfeld & Overbeek 1986 do this in mere\nseconds with an automated reasoning system using paramodulation,\ndemodulation and subsumption. For a more challenging problem, consider\nthe additional definitions: ", "\n\n\n\n B4\n A bird is egocentric if it is fond of itself: EE =\nE. \n\n B5\n A bird L is a lark if for any birds x and\ny the following holds: (Lx)y =\nx(yy). \n\n", "\nSmullyan challenges us to prove a most surprising thing about larks:\nSuppose we are not given any other information except that the forest\ncontains a lark. Then, show that at least one bird in the forest must\nbe egocentric! Below we give the salient steps in the proof found by\nthe automated reasoning system, where ‘S(x,\ny)’ stands for ‘xy’ and where\nclauses (2) and (3) are, respectively, the definition of a lark and\nthe denial of the theorem; numbers on the right are applications of\nparamodulation: ", "\n\n\n\n 1\n (x1 = x1)\n \n\n 2\n (S(S(L, x1), x2) = S(x1, S(x2, x2)))\n \n\n 3\n -(S(x1, x1) = x1)\n \n\n 6\n (S(x1, S(S(L, S(x2, x2)), x2)) = S(S(L,\nx1), S(x2, x2)))\n 2 2 \n\n 8\n (S(x1, S(S(x2, x2), S(x2, x2))) =\nS(S(L, S(L, x1)), x2))\n 2 2 \n\n 9\n (S(S(S(L, L), x1), x2) = S(S(x1, x1),\nS(x2, x2)))\n 2 2 \n\n 18\n -(S(S(L, S(S(L, S(L, L)), x1)), x1) =\nS(S(L, S(x1,x1)), x1))\n 6 3 6 9 8 8 \n\n 19\n []\n 18 1 \n\n", "\nCloser inspection of the left and right hand sides of (18) under the\napplication of unification revealed the discovery of a 10-L\nbird, i.e. a 10-symbol bird expressed solely in terms of larks, which\nwas a strong candidate for egocentricity. This discovery was exciting\nbecause the shortest egocentric L-bird known to Smullyan was\nof length 12. A subsequent run of the automated reasoning system\nproduced a proof of this fact as well as another new significant bird:\nA possible egocentric 8-L bird! A few more runs of the system\neventually produced a 22-line proof (with terms with as many as 50\nsymbols, excluding commas and parentheses) of the fact that\n((LL)(L(LL)))(L(LL)) is\nindeed egocentric. The natural questions to ask next are, of course,\nwhether there are other 8-L egocentric birds and whether\nthere are shorter ones. The reader may want to attempt this with paper\nand pencil but, given that there are 429 such birds, it may be wiser\nto try it instead (or in conjunction) with an automated reasoning\nprogram; both approaches are explored in Glickfeld & Overbeek\n1986. For a more formal, but admittedly less colorful, introduction\nto combinatory logic and lambda-conversion the reader is referred to\nHindley & Seldin 1986. ", "\nFormulas in the classical equivalential calculus are\nwritten using sentential variables and a two-place function symbol,\ne, for equivalence. The calculus has two rules of inference,\ndetachment (modus ponens) and substitution; the rules can be combined\ninto the single rule of condensed detachment: Obtain tθ\nfrom e(s,t) and r where\nsθ = rθ with mgu θ. The calculus\ncan be axiomatized with the formulas: ", "\nWe can dispense with reflexivity since it is derivable from the other\ntwo formulas. This brings the number of axioms down to two and a\nnatural question to ask is whether there is a single axiom for the\nequivalential calculus. In 1933, Łukasiewicz found three formulas\nof length eleven that each could act as a single axiom for the\ncalculus—here’s one of them:\ne(e(x,y),e(e(z,y),e(x,z)))—and\nhe also showed that no shorter single axiom existed. Over time, other\nsingle axioms also of length eleven were found and the list kept\ngrowing with additions by Meredith, Kalman and Peterson to a total of\n14 formulas of which 13 were known to be single axioms and one formula\nwith a yet undetermined status: the formula XCB =\ne(x, e(e(e(x,\ny), e(z, y)), z)).\n(Actually, the list grew to 18 formulas but Wos, Winker, Veroff,\nSmith & Henschen 1983 reduced it to 14.) Resisting the intense\nstudy of various researchers, it remained as an open question for many\nyears whether the 14th formula, XCB, was a single axiom for\nthe equivalential calculus (Peterson 1977). One way to answer the\nquestion in the affirmative would be to show that at least one of the\n13 known single axioms is derivable from XCB alone; another\napproach would be to derive from XCB the 3-axiom set\n(E1)–(E3). While Wos, Ulrich & Fitelson 2002 take shots at\nthe former, their line of attack concentrates on the latter with the\nmost challenging task being the proving of symmetry. Working with the\nassistance of a powerful automated reasoning program, Otter, they\nconducted a concerted, persistent and very aggressive assault on the\nopen question. (Their article sometimes reads like a military briefing\nfrom the front lines!) For simpler problems, proofs can be found by\nthe reasoning program automatically; deeper and more challenging ones\nlike the one at hand require the guidance of the user. The relentless\napplication of the reasoning tool involved much guidance in the\nsetting of lemmas as targets and the deployment of an arsenal of\nstrategies, including the set of support, forward and backward\nsubsumption, lemma adjunction, formula complexity, hints strategy,\nratio strategy, term avoidance, level saturation, and others. After\nmuch effort and CPU time, the open question finally succumbed to the\ncombined effort of man and machine and a 61-step proof of symmetry was\nfound, followed by one for transitivity after 10 more applications of\ncondensed detachment. Subsequent runs of the theorem prover using\ndemodulation blocking and the so-called cramming strategy delivered\nshorter proofs. Here are the last lines of their 25-step proof which\nin this case proves transitivity first followed by symmetry: ", "\nWith an effective methodology and a strategy that included the\nassistance of an automated reasoning program in a crucial way, the\nsearch for shortest single axioms for the equivalent calculus came to\nan end. ", "\nFitelson & Zalta 2007, Oppenheimer & Zalta 2011, and Alama,\nOppenheimer, & Zalta 2015 describe several applications of\nautomated reasoning in computational metaphysics. By\nrepresenting formal metaphysical claims as axioms and premises in an\nautomated reasoning environment using programs like Prover9, Mace4,\nthe E-prover system and Paradox, the logical status of metaphysical\narguments is investigated. After the suitable formalization of axioms\nand premises, the model finder program Mace4 is used to help verify\ntheir consistency. Then, using Prover9, proofs are automatically\ngenerated for a number of theorems of the Theory of Plato’s Forms,\ntwenty five fundamental theorems of the Theory of Possible Worlds, the\ntheorems described in Leibniz’s unpublished paper of 1690 and in his\nmodal metaphysics, and a fully automated construction of Saint\nAnselm’s Ontological Argument. In the latter application, Saint Anselm\nis understood in Oppenheimer & Zalta 2011 as having found a way of\ninferring God’s existence from His mere being as opposed to inferring\nGod’s actuality from His mere possibility. This allows for a\nformalization that is free of modal operators, involving an underlying\nlogic of descriptions, three non-logical premises, and a definition of\nGod. Here are two key definitions in the formalization, as inputted\ninto Prover9, that helped express the concept of God: ", "\n\n\n\n\n\n Definition of none_greater: \n\n all x (Object(x) -> (Ex1(none_greater,x)\n<-> \n\n (Ex1(conceivable,x) & \n\n -(exists y (Object(y) &\nEx2(greater_than,y,x) & \n\n Ex1(conceivable,y)))))).\n\n\n \n\n Definition of God: \n\n Is_the(g,none_greater). \n\n\n\n", "\nPart of the challenge when representing in Prover9 these and other\nstatements from axiomatic metaphysics was to circumvent some of the\nprover’s linguistic limitations. For example, Prover9 does not have\ndefinite descriptions so statements of this kind as well as\nsecond-order concepts had to be expressed in terms of Prover9’s\nexisting first-order logic. But the return is worth the investment\nsince Prover9 not only delivered a proof\nof Ex1(e,g)—there is one and only one\nGod—but does so with an added bonus. A close inspection of the\noutput provides yet another example of an automated theorem prover\n\"outreasoning\" its users, revealing that some of the logical machinery\nis actually redundant: The proof can be constructed only using two of\nthe logical theorems of the theory of descriptions (called \"Theorem 2\"\nand \"Theorem 3\" in their article), one of the non-logical premises\n(called \"Premise 2\"), and the definition of God. We cannot help but to\ninclude here Prover9’s shorter proof, written in the more elegant\nnotation of standard logic (from Oppenheimer & Zalta 2011): ", "\nIn the same tradition as St. Anselm’s, Gödel also provided an\nontological proof of God’s existence (Gödel 1970, Scott 1972). An\nimportant difference between the two is Gödel’s use of modal\noperators to represent metaphysical possibility and necessity and, of\ncourse, his use of symbolic logic for added reasoning precision. In\nhis proof, Gödel begins by framing the concept of “positive\nproperty” using two axioms, and he introduces a definition\nstating that “A God-like being possesses all positive\nproperties”. This is enough logical machinery to prove as a\ntheorem the possibility of God’s existence,\n◊∃xG(x); three more axioms and\ntwo additional definitions allow Gödel to further his proof to\nestablish not only that God exists,\n∃xG(x), but that this is so by\nnecessity, □∃xG(x).\nGödel’s proof is in the formalism of higher-order modal logic\n(HOML) using modal operators and quantification over properties.\nGödel never published his proof but he shared it with Dana Scott\nwho produced the version presented below, which is taken from\n(Benzmüller & Paleo 2014) along with its English annotation to\naid the reader with its intended interpretation: ", "\n\n\nAxiom A1\n\n∀ϕ[P(~ϕ) ≡ ~P(ϕ)]\n\n Either a property or its negation is positive, but not\nboth)\n\n\nAxiom A2\n\n∀ϕ∀ψ[(P(ϕ) ∧ □∀x[ϕ(x) → ψ(x)]) ⊃ P(ψ)]\n\n A property necessarily implied by a positive property\nis positive\n\n\nTheorem T1\n\n∀ϕ[P(ϕ) ⊃ ◊∃xϕ(x)]\n\n Positive properties are possibly exemplified\n\n\nDefinition D1\n\nG(x) ≡ ∀ϕ[P(ϕ) ⊃ ϕ(x)]\n\n A God-like being possesses all positive\nproperties\n\n\nAxiom A3\n\nP(G)\n\n The property of being God-like is positive\n\n\nCorollary C\n\n◊∃xG(x)\n\n Possibly, God exists\n\n\nAxiom A4\n\n∀ϕ[P(ϕ) ⊃ □P(ϕ)]\n\n Positive properties are necessarily positive\n\n\nDefinition D2\n\nϕ ess\nx ≡ ϕ(x) ∧\n∀ψ(ψ(x) ⊃\n□∀y(ϕ(y) ⊃\nψ(y)))\n\n An essence of an individual is a property possessed by\nit and\n\n necessarily implying any of its properties\n\n\nTheorem T2\n\n∀x[G(x) ⊃ G ess\nx]\n\n Being God-like is an essence of any God-like\nbeing\n\n\nDefinition D3\n\nNE(x) ≡ ∀ϕ[ϕ\ness x ⊃ □∃yϕ(y)]\n\n Necessary existence of an individual is the necessary\n\n exemplification of all its essences\n\n\nAxiom A5\n\nP(NE)\n\n Necessary existence is a positive property\n\n\nTheorem T3\n\n□∃xG(x)\n\n Necessarily, God exists\n", "\nThe proof has recently been analysed to an unprecedented degree of\ndetail and precision by Benzmüller & Paleo 2014 with the help\nof automated theorem provers. A major challenge faced by these authors\nwas the lack of a HOML-based theorem prover that could carry out the\nwork but this was circumvented by embedding the logic into the\nclassical higher-order logic (HOL) already offered by existing theorem\nprovers like LEO-II, Satallax and the countermodel finder Nitpick.\nDetails of the syntactic and semantic embedding are given in their\npaper and it consists of encoding HOML formulas as HOL predicates via\nmappings, expansions, and βη-conversions. The\nmapping associates HOML types α, terms\nsα, and logical operators θ with\ncorresponding HOL “raised” types\n⌈α⌉, type-raised terms\n⌈sα⌉, and type-raised logical\noperators θ•. If μ\nand ο are, respectively, the types of individuals and\nBooleans then ⌈μ⌉ = μ and\n⌈ο⌉ = σ\nwhere σ is shorthand\nfor ι → ο\nwith ι as the type of possible worlds; as for function\ntypes, ⌈β→γ⌉ =\n⌈β⌉→⌈γ⌉. For\ntype-raised terms, ⌈sα⌉\nis defined inductively on the structure\nof sα as the following example\nillustrates:", "\nType-raised logical connectives, θ•, are defined below where r is a new constant symbol in HOL associated with the accessibility relation of HOML:\n", "\nThe other connectives can be defined in the usual way. Validity is\nexpressed as a λ-term,\nλsι→ο∀wι sw,\nthat when applied to a term sσ we write as\n[sσ]. For example, under the embedding,\nproving in HOML the possibility of God’s existence,\n◊ο→ο∃(μ→ο)→ο Xμ . gμ→ο X,\nis tantamount to proving its validity in HOL:\n[◊•σ→σ∃•(μ→σ)→σ Xμ . gμ→σ X]μ→ο.\nTo prove so, the type-raised HOL expression\n[◊•∃•Xμ . gμ→σ X]\nis then encoded in the so-called THF0 syntax (Sutcliffe &\nBenzmüller 2010) prior to being fed, along with the above set of\nequality rules, to the provers that were used in completing the proof:\n", "\nThe proof in Benzmüller & Paleo 2014 is presented here,\nincluding the axioms and definitions as well as the derivation of its\nfour main results—T1, C, T2, T3—all written in the\ntype-decorated type-raised higher-order logic notation resulting from\nthe embedding. The proof steps are not fully expanded—note the\npresence of type-raised connectives—and the inferential moves\nare not broken down to lower levels of detail. Borrowing a phrase from\nBertrand Russell (Urquhart 1994), this was done to spare the reader of\nthe “kind of nausea” that the fully detailed automated\nproof would cause: ", "\nBesides helping in the completion of the proof, the automated theorem\nprovers were also very instrumental in the finding of some novel\nresults. First, Gödel’s set of original assumptions was shown to\nbe inconsistent by LEO-II by proving that self-difference becomes an\nessential property of every entity; a re-formulation of the definition\nof essence due to Dana Scott—this involved the addition of a\nmissing conjunct, ϕX, in the definition—was shown\nby Nitpick to be consistent. Second, LEO-II and Satallax managed to\nprove C, T1 and T2 using only the logic system K and, moreover,\nNitpick found a counter-model for T3 in K thus showing that more\nlogical power is required to complete the rest of the proof. Third,\nusing LEO-II and Satallax, it is shown that the logic system KB\n(system K with the Brouwer axiom) is sufficient to establish the\nnecessity of God’s existence,\n□•∃•Xμ . gμ→σ X,\nwhich is a double-win for automated reasoning: a gain in logical\neconomy, and the deeper philosophical result of having effectively\ndismissed a major criticism against Gödel’s proof, namely his use\nof the stronger logic system S5. Fourth, the authors also prove in KB\nthat:", "\n∀•ϕμ→σ .∀•Xμ . (gμ→σ X ⊃• (~•(p(μ→σ)→σ ϕ) ⊃• ~•(ϕX)))\n", "\nas well as:", "\n∀•Xμ .∀•Yμ . (gμ→σ X ⊃• (gμ→σ Y ⊃• X =• Y)),\n", "\nthat is, that God is flawless and that monotheism holds, respectively.\nAt this point, it would be fair to say that any of these results would\nbe enough to vindicate the application of automated reasoning in exact\nphilosophy. Now, for the bad news followed by good news: Fifth, the\nformula\nsσ ⊃• □•sσ\ncan also be formally derived which is unfortunate since it implies\nthat there are no contingent truths and that everything is determined,\ni.e. there is no free will. However, the issue has been addressed by\nfollow-up work based on Fitting’s and Anderson’s variants of the\nontological argument (Fuenmayor & Benzmüller 2017, Fitting\n2002, Anderson 1990). ", "\nLeibniz’s dream was to have a charateristica universalis and\ncalculus ratiocinator that would allow us to reason in\nmetaphysics and morals in much the same way as we do in geometry and\nanalysis; that is to say, to settle disputes between philosophers as\naccountants do: “To take pen in hand, sit down at the abacus\nand, having called in a friend if they want, say to each other: Let us\ncalculate!” From the above applications of automated reasoning,\none would agree with the researchers when they imply that these\nresults achieve, to some extent, Leibniz’s goal of a computational\nmetaphysics (Fitelson & Zalta 2007, Benzmüller & Paleo\n2014).\n", "\nA nonmonotonic theorem prover can provide the basis for a\n“computational laboratory” in which to explore and\nexperiment with different models of artificial rationality; the\ntheorem prover can be used to equip an artificial rational agent with\nan inference engine to reason and gain information about the world. In\nsuch procedural epistemology, a rational agent is\ndefeasible (i.e. nonmonotonic) in the sense that new reasoning leads\nto the acceptance of new beliefs but also to the retraction of\npreviously held beliefs in the presence of new information. At any\ngiven point in time, the agent holds a set of justified beliefs but\nthis set is open to revision and is in a continuous set of flux as\nfurther reasoning is conducted. This model better reflects our\naccepted notion of rationality than a model in which all the beliefs\nare warranted, i.e. beliefs that once are attained are never\nretracted. Actually, a set of warranted beliefs can be seen as\njustified beliefs “in the limit”, that is, as the ultimate\nepistemic goal in the agent’s search for true knowledge about its\nworld. (Pollock 1995) offers the following definition: ", "\nA set is defeasible enumerable iff there is an effective computable\nfunction f such that for each n,\nf(n) is a recursive set and the following two\nconditions hold ", "\nTo compare the concepts, if A is recursively enumerable then\nthere is a sequence of recursive sets Ai such that\neach Ai is a subset of A with each\nAi growing monotonically, approaching A\nin the limit. But if A is only defeasibly enumerable then the\nAi’s still approach A in the limit but\nmay not be subsets of A and approach A\nintermittently from above and below. The goal of the OSCAR Project\n(Pollock 1989) is to construct a general theory of rationality and\nimplement it in an artificial computer-based rational agent. As such,\nthe system uses a defeasible automated reasoner that operates\naccording to the maxim that the set of warranted beliefs should be\ndefeasible enumerable. OSCAR has been in the making for some time and\nthe application of automated nonmonotonic reasoning has also been used\nto extend its capabilities to reason defeasibly about perception and\ntime, causation, and decision-theoretic planning (Pollock 2006). " ], "subsection_title": "4.6 Logic and Philosophy" }, { "content": [ "\nOne of the main goals of automated reasoning has been the automation\nof mathematics. An early attempt at this was Automath (de Bruijn 1968)\nwhich was the first computer system used to check the correctness of\nproofs and whole books of mathematics, including Landau’s\nGrundlagen der Analysis (van Benthem Jutting 1977). Automath\nhas been superseded by more modern and capable systems, most notably\nMizar. The Mizar system (Trybulec 1979, Muzalewski 1993) is based on\nTarski-Grothendieck set theory and, like Automath, consists of a\nformal language which is used to write mathematical theorems and their\nproofs. Once a proof is written in the language, it can be checked\nautomatically by Mizar for correctness. Mizar proofs are formal but\nquite readable, can refer to definitions and previously proved\ntheorems and, once formally checked, can be added to the growing Mizar\nMathematical Library (MML) (Bancerek & Rudnicki 2003, Bancerek\net al. 2018). As of June 2018, MML contained about 12,000\ndefinitions and 59,000 theorems. The Mizar language is a subset of\nstandard English as used in mathematical texts and is highly\nstructured to ensure the production of rigorous and semantically\nunambiguous texts. Here’s a sample proof in Mizar of the existence of\na rational number xy where x and\ny are irrational: ", "\nExamples of proofs that have been checked by Mizar include the\nHahn-Banach theorem, the Brouwer fixed-point theorem, Kőnig’s lemma,\nthe Jordan curve theorem, and Gödel’s completeness theorem.\nRudnicki (2004) discusses the challenges of formalizing Witt’s proof\nof the Wedderburn theorem: Every finite division ring is commutative.\nThe theorem was formulated easily using the existing formalizations\navailable in MML but the proof demanded further entries into the\nlibrary to formalize notions and facts from algebra, complex numbers,\nintegers, roots of unity, cyclotomic polynomials, and polynomials in\ngeneral. It took several months of effort to supply the missing\nmaterial to the MML library but, once in place, the proof was\nformalized and checked correct in a matter of days. Clearly, a\nrepository of formalized mathematical facts and definitions is a\nprerequisite for more advanced applications. The QED Manifesto (Boyer\net al. 1994, Wiedijk 2007) has such aim in mind and there is\nmuch work to do: Mizar has the largest such repository but even after\n30 years of work “it is minuscule with respect to the body of\nestablished mathematics” (Rudnicki 2004). This last remark\nshould be construed as a call to increase the effort toward this\nimportant aspect in the automation of mathematics. ", "\nMizar’s goal is to assist the practitioner in the formalization of\nproofs and to help check their correctness; other systems aim at\nfinding the proofs themselves. Geometry has been a target of early\nautomated proof-finding efforts. Chou (1987) proves over 500 geometry\ntheorems using the algebraic approach offered by Wu’s method and the\nGröbner basis method by representing hypotheses and conclusions\nas polynomial equations. Quaife (1992) provides another early effort\nto find proofs in first-order mathematics: over 400 theorems in\nNeumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory, over 1,000 theorems in\narithmetic, a number of theorems in Euclidian geometry, and\nGödel’s incompleteness theorems. The approach is best described\nas semi-automatic or “interactive” with the user providing\na significant amount of input to guide the theorem-proving effort.\nThis is no surprise since, as one applies automated reasoning systems\ninto richer areas of mathematics, the systems take more on the role of\nproof assistants than theorem provers. This is because in richer\nmathematical domains the systems need to reason about theories and\nhigher-order objects which in general takes them deeper into the\nundecidable. Interactive theorem proving is arguably\nthe “killer” application of automated reasoning in\nmathematics and much effort is being expended in the building of\nincreasingly capable reasoning systems that can act as assistants to\nprofessional mathematicians. The proof assistant Isabelle/HOL provides\nthe user with an environment in which to conduct proofs expressed in a\nstructured, yet human-readable, higher-order logic language and which\nincorporates a number of facilities that increase the user’s\nproductivity, automates proof-verification and proof-finding tasks,\nand provides a modular way for the user to build and manage theory\nhierarchies (Ballarin 2014). ", "\nDifferent proof assistants offer different capabilities measured by\ntheir power at automating reasoning tasks, supported logic, object\ntyping, size of mathematical library, and readability of input and\noutput. A “canonical” proof which is not too trivial but\nnot too complex either can be used as a baseline for system\ncomparison, as done in (Wiedijk 2006) where the authors of seventeen\nreasoning systems are tasked with establishing the irrationality of\n√2. The systems discussed are certainly more capable than this\nand some have been used to assist in the formalization of far more\nadvanced proofs such as Erdös-Selberg’s proof of the Prime Number\nTheorem (about 30,000 lines in Isabelle), the formalization of the\nFour Color Theorem (60,000 lines in Coq), and the Jordan Curve Theorem\n(75,000 lines in HOL Light). A milestone in interactive theorem\nproving was reached in 2012 when, after six-years of effort and using\nthe Coq proof assistant, George Gonthier and his team completed the\nformal verification of the 255-page proof of the Feit-Thompson\ntheorem, also known as the Odd Order Theorem, a major step in the\nclassification of finite simple groups. ", "\nThe above notwithstanding, automated reasoning has had a small impact\non the practice of doing mathematics and there is a number of reasons\ngiven for this. One reason is that automated theorem provers are not\nsufficiently powerful to attempt the kind of problems mathematicians\ntypically deal with; that their current power is, at best, at the\nlevel of first-year undergraduate mathematics and still far from\nleading edge mathematical research. While it is true that current\nsystems cannot prove completely on their own problems at this level of\ndifficulty we should remember that the goal is to build reasoning\nsystems so that “eventually machines are to be an aid to\nmathematical research and not a substitute for it” (Wang 1960).\nWith this in mind, and while the automated reasoning community\ncontinues to try to meet the grand challenge of building increasingly\npowerful theorem provers, mathematicians can draw now some of the\nbenefits offered by current systems, including assistance in\ncompleting proof gaps or formalizing and checking the correctness of\nproposed proofs. Indeed, the latter may be an application that could\nhelp address some real issues currently being faced by the\nmathematical community. Consider the announcement by Daniel Goldston\nand Cem Yildrim of a proof of the Twin Prime Conjecture where,\nalthough experts initially agreed that the proof was correct, an\ninsurmountable error was found shortly after. Or, think about the case\nof Hales’ proof of the Kepler Conjecture which asserts that no packing\nof congruent balls in Euclidean 3-space has density greater than the\nface-centered cubic packing. Hales’ proof consists of about 300 pages\nof text and a large number of computer calculations. After four years\nof hard work, the 12-person panel assigned by Annals of\nMathematics to the task of verifying the proof still had genuine\ndoubts about its correctness. Thomas Hales, for one, took upon himself\nto formalize his proof and have it checked by an automated proof\nassistant with the aim of convincing others of its correctness (Hales\n2005b, in Other Internet Resources). His task was admittedly heavy but\nthe outcome is potentially very significant to both the mathematical\nand automated reasoning communities. All eyes were on Hales and his\nformal proof as he announced the completion of the Flyspeck\nproject (Hales 2014, in Other Internet Resources; Hales 2015) having\nconstructed a formal proof of the conjecture using the Isabelle and\nHOL Light automated proof assistants: “In truth, my motivations\nfor the project are far more complex than a simple hope of removing\nresidual doubt from the minds of few referees. Indeed, I see formal\nmethods as fundamental to the long-term growth of mathematics.”\n(Hales 2006).", "\nChurch 1936a, 1936b and Turing 1936 imply the existence of\ntheorems whose shortest proof is very large, and the proof of the Four\nColor Theorem in (Appel & Haken 1977), the Classification of Simple\nGroups in (Gorenstein 1982), and the proof of the Kepler Conjecture in\n(Hales 2005a) may well be just samples of what is yet to come. As\n(Bundy 2011) puts it: “As important theorems requiring larger\nand larger proofs emerge, mathematics faces a dilemma: either these\ntheorems must be ignored or computers must be used to assist with\ntheir proofs.”", "\nThe above remarks also counter another argument given for not using\nautomated theorem provers: Mathematicians enjoy proving theorems, so\nwhy let machines take away the fun? The answer to this is, of course,\nthat mathematicians can have even more fun by letting the machine do\nthe more tedious and menial tasks: “It is unworthy of excellent\nmen to lose hours like slaves in the labour of calculation which could\nsafely be relegated to anyone else if machines were used” (G. W.\nLeibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding). If still\nnot convinced, just consider the sobering prospect of having to\nmanually check the 23,000 inequalities used in Hales’ proof!", "\nAnother reason that is given for the weak acceptance of automated\nreasoning by the mathematical community is that the programs are not\nto be trusted since they may contain bugs—software\ndefects—and hence may produce erroneous results. Formally\nverifying automated reasoning programs will help ameliorate this,\nparticularly in the case of proof checkers. Proving programs correct\nis no easy task but the same is true about proving theorems in\nadvanced mathematics: Gonthier proved correct the programs used in the\nformalization of his proof of the Four Color Theorem, but he spent far\nmore effort formalizing all the graph theory that was part of the\nproof. So ironically enough, it turns out that at least in this case,\nand surely there are others, “it is actually easier to verify\nthe correctness of the program than to verify the correctness of the\npen-and-paper mathematics” (Wiedijk 2006). For theorem provers\nand model finders, a complementary strategy would be to verify the\nprograms’ results as opposed to the programs themselves. Paraphrasing\n(Slaney 1994): It does not matter to the mathematician how many\ndefects a program may have as long as the proof (or model) it outputs\nis correct. So, the onus is in the verification of results, whether\nproduced by machine or man, and checking them by independent parties\n(where of course the effort may well use automated checkers) should\nincrease the confidence on the validity of the proofs. ", "\nIt is often argued that automated proofs are too long and detailed.\nThat a proof can be expressed in more elementary steps is in principle\nvery beneficial since this allows a mathematician to request a proof\nassistant justify its steps in terms of simpler ones. But proof\nassistants should also allow the opposite, namely to abstract detail\nand present results and their justifications using the higher-level\nconcepts, language, and notation mathematicians are accustomed to.\nExploiting the hierarchical structure of proofs as done in (Denney\n2006) is a step in this direction but more work along these lines is\nneeded. Having the proof assistant work at the desired level of\ngranularity provides more opportunity for insight during the proof\ndiscovery process. This is an important consideration since\nmathematicians are equally interested in gaining understanding from\ntheir proofs as in establishing facts. ", "\n(Bundy 2011) alludes to a deadlock that is preventing the wider\nadoption of theorem provers by the mathematical community: On the one\nhand, the mathematicians need to use the proof assistants to build a\nlarge formal library of mathematical results. But, on the other hand,\nthey do not want to use the provers since there is no such library of\npreviously proved results they can build upon. To break the impasse, a\nnumber of applications are proposed of which assisting the\nmathematician in the search of previously proved theorems is of\nparticular promise. During its history, mathematics has accumulated a\nhuge number of theorems and the number of mathematical results\ncontinues to grow dramatically. In 2010, Zentralblatt MATH\ncovered about 120,000 new publications (Wegner 2011). Clearly, no\nindividual researcher can be acquainted with all this mathematical\nknowledge and it will be increasingly difficult to cope with one’s\never-growing area of specialty unless assisted with automated\ntheorem-proving tools that can search in intelligent ways for\npreviously proved results of interest. An alternative approach to this\nproblem is for mathematicians to tap into each other’s knowledge as\nenabled in computational social systems like polymath and\nmathoverflow. The integration of automated reasoning tools\ninto such social systems would increase the effectiveness of their\ncollective intelligence by supporting “the combination of\nprecise formal deductions and the more informal loose interaction seen\nin mathematical practice” (Martin & Pease 2013, in Other\nInternet Resources). ", "\nDue to real pressing needs from industry, some applications of\nautomated reasoning in pure and applied mathematics are more of\nnecessity than choice. After having worked on the formalization of\nsome elementary real analysis to verify hardware-based floating point\ntrigonometric functions, (Harrison 2006, Harrison 2000) mentions the\nfurther need to formalize more pure mathematics—italics\nare his—to extend his formalization to power series for\ntrigonometric functions and basic theorems about Diophantine\napproximations. Harrison finds it surprising that “such\nextensive mathematical developments are used simply to verify that a\nfloating point tangent function satisfies a certain error bound”\nand, from this remark, one would expect there are other industrial\napplications that will demand more extensive formalizations.", "\nAlbeit not at the rate originally anticipated, automated reasoning is\nfinding applications in mathematics. Of these, formal verification of\nproofs is of special significance since it not only provides a viable\nmechanism to check proofs that humans alone could not but it also has,\nas a side effect, the potential to redefine what it would take for a\nproof to be accepted as such. As the use of automated reasoning\nassistants becomes more widespread one can envision their use\nfollowing a certain methodical order: First, automated reasoning tools\nare used for theory exploration and discovery. Then, having identified\nsome target problem, the practitioner works interactively with an\nautomated assistant to find proofs and establish facts. Finally, an\nautomated proof checker is used to check the correctness of all final\nproofs prior to being submitted for publication and being made\navailable to the rest of the mathematical community via the creation\nof new entries in a repository of formalized mathematics. It is indeed\na matter of time before the application of automated proof assistants\nbecomes an everyday affair in the life of the mathematician; it is the\ngrand challenge of the automated reasoning community to make it happen\nsooner than later." ], "subsection_title": "4.7 Mathematics" }, { "content": [ "\nSince its inception, the field of automated theorem proving has had\nimportant applications in the larger field of artificial intelligence\n(AI). Automated deduction is at the heart of AI applications like\nlogic programming (see section 4.1 Logic Programming, in this\narticle) where computation is equated with deduction; robotics and\nproblem solving (Green 1969) where the steps to achieve goals are\nsteps extracted from proofs; deductive databases (Minker et\nal. 2014) where factual knowledge is expressed as atomic clauses\nand inference rules, and new facts are inferred by deduction; expert\nsystems (Giarratano & Riley 2004) where human expertise in a given\ndomain (e.g. blood infections) is captured as a collection of IF-THEN\ndeduction rules and where conclusions (e.g. diagnoses) are obtained by\nthe application of the inference rules; and many others. An\napplication of automated reasoning in AI which is bound to have deep\nphilosophical implications is the increased use of BDI computational\nlogics for describing the beliefs, desires, and intentions of\nintelligent agents and multi-agent systems (Meyer 2014) and, in\nparticular, endowing future intelligent systems, such as\ndecision-support systems or robots, with legal and ethical behaviour.\nDeontic logic can be automated for the task (Furbach et al.\n2014) but given that there is no agreement on a universal system of\ndeontic logic, ethics “code designers” need a way to\nexperiment with the different deontic systems (i.e., to lay out axioms\nand see what conclusions follow from them) to help them identify the\ndesired ethic code for the specific application at hand;\n(Benzmüller et al. 2018) discusses an environment for this. If\nactual, physical, robots were to be used in these experiments, the\nterm “deontic laboratory” would be quite descriptive\nalbeit somewhat eerie.", "\nRestricting the proof search space has always been a key consideration\nin the implementation of automated deduction, and traditional\nAI-approaches to search have been an integral part of theorem provers.\nThe main idea is to prevent the prover from pursuing unfruitful\nreasoning paths. A dual aspect of search is to try to look for a\npreviously proved result that could be useful in the completion of the\ncurrent proof. Automatically identifying those results is no easy task\nand it becomes less easy as the size of the problem domain, and the\nnumber of already established results, grows. This is not a happy\nsituation particularly in light of the growing trend to build large\nlibraries of theorems such as the Mizar Problems for Theorem Proving\n(MPTP) (Urban et al. 2010, Bancerek & Rudnicki 2003) or the\nIsabelle/HOL mathematical library (Meng & Paulson 2008), so\ndeveloping techniques for the discovery, evaluation, and selection of\nexisting suitable definitions, premises and lemmas in large libraries\nof formal mathematics as discussed in (Kühlwein et al.\n2012) is an important line of research. ", "\nAmong many other methods, and in stark contrast to automated provers,\nmathematicians combine induction heuristics with deductive techniques\nwhen attacking a problem. The former helps them guide the\nproof-finding effort while the latter allows them to close proof gaps.\nAnd of course all this happens in the presence of the very large body\nof knowledge that the human possesses. For an automated prover, the\nanalogous counterpart to the mathematician’s body of knowledge is a\nlarge library like MPTP. An analogous approach to using inductive\nheuristics would be to endow the theorem prover with inductive,\ndata-driven, machine learning abilities. Urban & Vyskocil 2012\nrun a number of experiments to determine any gains that may result\nfrom such an approach. For this, they use MPTP and theorem provers\nlike E and SPASS enhanced with symbol-based machine learning\nmechanisms. A detailed presentation and statistical results can be\nfound in the above reference but in summary, and quoting the authors,\n“this experiment demonstrates a very real and quite unique\nbenefit of large formal mathematical libraries for conducting novel\nintegration of AI methods. As the machine learner is trained on\nprevious proofs, it recommends relevant premises from the large\nlibrary that (according to the past experience) should be useful for\nproving new conjectures.” Urban 2007 discusses MaLARea (a\nMachine Learner for Automated Reasoning), a meta-system that also\ncombines inductive and deductive reasoning methods. MaLARea is\nintended to be used in large theories, i.e. problems with a large\nnumber of symbols, definitions, premises, lemmas, and theorems. The\nsystem works in cycles where results proved deductively in a given\niteration are then used by the inductive machine-learning component to\nplace restrictions in the search space for the next theorem-proving\ncycle. Albeit simple in design, the first version of MaLARea solved\n142 problems out of 252 in the MPTP Challenge, outperforming the more\nseasoned provers E (89 problems solved) and SPASS (81 problems\nsolved).", "\nBesides using large mathematical libraries, tapping into web-based\nsemantic ontologies is another possible source of knowledge. Pease\n& Sutcliffe 2007 discuss ways for making the SUMO ontology\nsuitable for first-order theorem proving, and describes work on\ntranslating SUMO into TPTP. An added benefit of successfully reasoning\nover large semantic ontologies is that this promotes the application\nof automated reasoning into other fields of science. Tapping into its\nfull potential, however, will require a closer alignment of methods\nfrom automated reasoning and artificial intelligence." ], "subsection_title": "4.8 Artificial Intelligence" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nAutomated reasoning is a growing field that provides a healthy\ninterplay between basic research and application. Automated deduction\nis being conducted using a multiplicity of theorem-proving methods,\nincluding resolution, sequent calculi, natural deduction, matrix\nconnection methods, term rewriting, mathematical induction, and\nothers. These methods are implemented using a variety of logic\nformalisms such as first-order logic, type theory and higher-order\nlogic, clause and Horn logic, non-classical logics, and so on.\nAutomated reasoning programs are being applied to solve a growing\nnumber of problems in formal logic, mathematics and computer science,\nlogic programming, software and hardware verification, circuit design,\nexact philosophy, and many others. One of the results of this variety\nof formalisms and automated deduction methods has been the\nproliferation of a large number of theorem proving programs. To test\nthe capabilities of these different programs, selections of problems\nhave been proposed against which their performance can be measured\n(McCharen, Overbeek & Wos 1976, Pelletier 1986). The TPTP\n(Sutcliffe & Suttner 1998) is a library of such problems that is\nupdated on a regular basis. There is also a competition among\nautomated theorem provers held regularly at the CADE conference\n(Pelletier, Sutcliffe & Suttner 2002; Sutcliffe 2016, in Other\nInternet Resources); the problems for the competition are selected\nfrom the TPTP library. There is a similar library and competition for\nSMT solvers (Barret et al. 2013).", "\nInitially, computers were used to aid scientists with their complex\nand often tedious numerical calculations. The power of the machines\nwas then extended from the numeric into the symbolic domain where\ninfinite-precision computations performed by computer algebra programs\nhave become an everyday affair. The goal of automated reasoning has\nbeen to further extend the machine’s reach into the realm of deduction\nwhere they can be used as reasoning assistants in helping their users\nestablish truth through proof." ], "section_title": "5. Conclusion", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "Alama, J., P. Oppenheimer, and E. 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ibn-rushd	Ibn Rushd [Averroes]	First published Wed Jun 23, 2021	[ "\nThe Andalusian philosopher, physician and judge Ibn Rushd\n(1126–1198) is one of the great figures of philosophy within the\nMuslim contexts, and a foundational source for post-classical European\nthought.", "\nThe hallmarks of Ibn Rushd’s work are his convictions that\nphilosophy is capable of demonstrative certainty in many domains, that\nit is Aristotle who should be our preeminent guide in philosophy, and\nthat philosophy should play a central role within religious inquiry,\nrather than being an alternative to religion. But part of what gives\nhis ideas their enduring interest is the subtle way in which he\npromotes other methods of reasoning and persuasion in contexts where\nthe rigors of Aristotelian demonstration are not a practical option.\nTo grasp Ibn Rushd’s thought in full requires attending not only\nto the Aristotelian commentaries where he attempts to develop\nphilosophy as a demonstrative science, but also to areas like\nreligion, medicine, and law, where constraints of both subject-matter\nand audience require other argumentative and rhetorical\ntechniques.", "\nOften improperly referred to as Averroes—the corrupted form his\nname took in Latin—Ibn Rushd quickly achieved such prominence in\nlater European thought as to rival the influence of Aristotle himself,\nwhose works Ibn Rushd tirelessly championed. Most modern scholarship\norients itself around his reception in Christian Europe, where he was\nknown simply as “the Commentator,” and so fails to\nappreciate Ibn Rushd’s own distinctive philosophical\nachievements." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Life and Works", "sub_toc": [ "1.1 Life", "1.2 Works" ] }, { "content_title": "2. Logic and Methodology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "3. Metaphysics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. Natural Philosophy", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "5. Psychology", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "6. Religion", "sub_toc": [ "6.1 God", "6.2 Law" ] }, { "content_title": "7. Medicine", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "8. Ethics and Politics", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "9. Reception", "sub_toc": [ "9.1 Arabic", "9.2 Hebrew", "9.3 Latin" ] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "A. Works of Ibn Rushd", "B. Other Works" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [], "section_title": "1. Life and Works", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nAbū al-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd was born in\nCordova in 1126. He belonged to an influential Andalusian family,\nfamous for its judicial power and for its scholarship in the religious\nsciences. His father was a prominent judge, but the most important\nfigure in the family was his grandfather, who also bears his name, Ibn\nRushd, and so the philosopher is called “the grandson”\n(al-ḥafīd) to distinguish him from his grandfather\n(al-jadd). The latter was both a well-known judge and a famed\njurist, being the author of many books in jurisprudence following the\nMālikī school.", "\nUnlike\n Ibn Sīnā\n and\n al-Ghazālī,\n Ibn Rushd did not write an autobiography, and as a result many\naspects of his life are obscure and will remain so unless new\ndocuments are discovered. The limited information we have from his\nbiographers unanimously agrees on his good conduct, his diligence in\nscience, and his fairness as a judge, while noting his interests in\nphilosophy and his adoption of certain “audacious” views.\nThe surviving historical sources tell us much about his teachers in\nthe religious sciences, but, with the exception of medicine, we know\nlittle about those who taught him in other fields. He was certainly\nnot a disciple of either of his famous Andalusian contemporaries,\n Ibn Bājja\n or Ibn Tufayl, although he read their philosophical works. (Puig 1992\nand Ben Sharīfa 1999 discuss the intellectual circles around Ibn\nRushd.)", "\nIbn Rushd was 22 when the Almohads came to power in the western\nMaghreb and Andalusia. Given that the Ibn Rushds had been prominent in\ncircles close to the previous Almoravid dynasty, it was imperative for\nthe grandson to express in his writings, and perhaps even in person,\nhis commitment to the new rulers and the Almohad creed\n(daʿwa) conceptualized by Muḥammad Ibn\nTūmart (d. 1130). Some surviving testimonies suggest that Ibn\nRushd did in fact adopt Ibn Tūmart’s creed at some point in\nhis life (see Ben Sharīfa 1999).", "\nGiven the social position of his family, Ibn Rushd soon found himself\nin the ruling circles of Marrakesh and close to the princes, or at\nleast some of them, in Andalusia. He engaged in debates on\nphilosophical and theological issues with this inner circle, and there\nis a record of a meeting with Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf (r.\n1163–84), the second Almohad ruler, who officially asked Ibn\nRushd to comment on Aristotle’s works and render them\naccessible. Later he became chief physician to the caliph in\nMarrakesh.", "\nNevertheless, Ibn Rushd’s relationship with the Almohad creed\nwas complex and seems to have evolved (Geoffroy 1999; Ben Ahmed\n2020c). Recently discovered revisions to his al-Kashf ʿan\nmanāhij al-adilla contain paragraphs where Ibn Rushd shows a\nsort of critical distance towards Ibn Tumart’s creed. These\nparagraphs, when added to his harsh criticism of the Almohads in his\ncommentary on Plato’s Republic, may help us understand\nthe evolution he underwent during his intellectual life. They may shed\nlight in particular on the disgrace he suffered at the end of his\ncareer, when, for reasons that remain unclear, he fell out of favor\nwith the Almohads and was exiled in Lucena, 60 km southeast of\nCordova. According to one account, his death took place while he was\nconfined to a residence in Marrakesh in 1198. (The definitive\nbiography, in Arabic, is Ben Sharīfa 1999. For more on the\nhistorical context see Urvoy 1998 and Ben Ahmed 2020c.)" ], "subsection_title": "1.1 Life" }, { "content": [ "\nIbn Rushd remained productive for at least four decades. He was the\nauthor of a large corpus that extends over medicine, logic and\nphilosophy in all its branches, including natural philosophy,\nastronomy, metaphysics, psychology, politics, and ethics. His work\nalso includes the sciences of Islamic religion: jurisprudence\n(fiqh), the foundations of Islamic law (usūl\nal-fiqh), the foundations of religion (usūl\nal-dīn), and the science of the Arabic language, including\ngrammar. With important exceptions, most of his works are available in\nthe original Arabic. For those works that have been lost, while\nreaders await the day of their rediscovery, they must generally make\ndo with medieval translations in Hebrew or Latin.", "\nIbn Rushd’s work deploys various methods and styles. Many\ntreatises are in the form of a commentary, most famously and\nextensively on Aristotle—covering nearly the whole Aristotelian\ncorpus—but also on Galen’s medical treatises, as\nwell as on other philosophers such as Plato, Ibn Sīnā and\nIbn Bājja. Many other treatises, devoted to specific issues, are\nnot in commentary form. (For a detailed inventory of texts and\ntranslations see §10.1.)", "\nThe focus of his commentaries was Aristotle because no one has yet\nsurpassed his achievement: “no one who has come after him to\nthis our time—and this is close to 1500 years later—has\nbeen able to add a word worthy of attention to what he said”\n(LongPhys proem; Harvey 1985, 83). Scholarship going back to\nthe nineteenth-century has divided the commentaries into three\nkinds:", "\nInasmuch as Ibn Rushd routinely wrote different kinds of commentaries\non the same Aristotelian treatise, some such distinction seems\nnecessary. But recent scholarship has doubted whether this neat\nthreefold distinction adequately captures Ibn Rushd’s complexly\nvaried approach (Al-ʿAlawī 1986a; Druart 1994; Gutas 1993).\nAt a minimum, it omits important categories of work, such as compendia\n(mukhtaṣarat), treatises (maqālāt),\nand answers to questions (masāʾil), to say nothing\nof the important treatises that focus on religious questions.", "\nThe most prominent of those independent religious treatises are", "\nThese works, which seem to have had little influence on medieval\nChristian thought, have traditionally been seen as\n“theological” and contrasted with his supposedly\n“philosophical” works: the commentaries on Aristotle that\ncirculated throughout medieval and Renaissance Europe in Latin and\nHebrew translation. The latter were thought to be demonstrative, and\naimed at the elites, whereas the former were said to be merely\ndialectical, and so aimed at a popular audience. Accordingly Ibn\nRushd’s true position supposedly had to be sought in these\nAristotelian commentaries.", "\nThis distinction has affected the direction of scholarship, causing\ngreat attention to be given to the “philosophical” works,\nwhich were thought to represent most truly his thought, and leaving\nthe “theological” treatises to be comparatively neglected.\nEven where the latter are widely taught, they are set apart from his\nsupposedly more philosophical commentaries. The result, ever since the\ninitial research of Renan (1852), has been a segmented and fragmentary\nview of the Rushdian corpus that marginalizes important aspects of his\nthought.", "\nAn important correction to this tendency appears in Jamal Al-Dīn\nAl-ʿAlawī (1986a), who defends the unity and coherence of\nthe Rushdian corpus. He proposes that Ibn Rushd’s works form a\nunity where there is no room to distinguish between what is a\ncommentary on another text and what is an ostensibly original work.\nWith this, Al-ʿAlawī attempted to close a gap in a body of\nwork that should rightly be seen as continuous, and to reconnect texts\nthat have been disassociated from their contexts." ], "subsection_title": "1.2 Works" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe general character of Ibn Rushd’s philosophy is illuminated\nby his overarching picture of logic. Most broadly, he understands it\nas the study of the conditions and rules that rightly guide the mind\ntoward the conception (taṣawwur) of essences and the\nassent (taṣdīq) to propositions\n(CompLogic 1.1). Glossing Aristotle’s famous remark\nthat “it is the mark of the educated person” to seek the\nappropriate level of precision in any inquiry, Ibn Rushd clarifies\nthat the educated person is “one who has been instructed in the\nart of logic” (ParaEthics I.3, 3C).", "\nIn keeping with the weight he accords the subject, Ibn Rushd commented\nseveral times on each work in Aristotle’s logical\nOrganon. Near the start of his career, he wrote a\nCompendium of Logic that includes Porphyry’s\nIsagoge and follows the usual Arabic practice of including\nthe Rhetoric and Poetics as part of an expanded\nOrganon (Black 1990). Later, he wrote a series of longer\nparaphrases of this same corpus (but treated the Isagoge\nseparately, on the grounds that it is neither an introduction to nor\neven a part of logic). Toward the end of his life, he devoted one of\nhis five long commentaries to the Posterior Analytics.", "\nIn line with the approach of his predecessors, Ibn Rushd divided\nlogical processes into five types of argument: demonstrative,\ndialectical, rhetorical, poetical, and fallacious. These inferences\nare not distinguished by their forms, which are the same, but by their\nmatter, that is, by their premises. The premises of demonstrative\narguments are necessary (Thom 2019), the premises of dialectical\narguments are generally accepted, the premises of rhetoric are\ngenerally received, the premises of poetic arguments are imaginative,\nand the premises of sophistical arguments are deceiving.", "\nFor Ibn Rushd, the center of logic and its very purpose is\ndemonstration, for it is the only procedure that leads to certainty in\nphilosophy: it is “the most perfect kind of reflection\n(naẓar), using the most perfect kind of inference\n(qiyās)” (Decisive Treatise 3).\nAccordingly, even in the context of Plato’s Republic,\nhe begins his commentary by announcing that his goal is “to\nabstract such scientific arguments attributable to Plato as are\ncontained in the Republic by removing from it its dialectical\narguments.” However, this does not mean that non-demonstrative\narguments are useless. Generally, where one kind of argument is not\neffective, other kinds of arguments should be used. Dialectic offers a\npath toward demonstration and to science, which, although it does not\nobtain certainty, is close to it. Rhetoric contributes, through its\nparadigms and enthymemes, to reinforcing and promoting demonstrative\nevidence. The study of sophistical reasoning is useful in assessing\nthe faulty argumentative methods of the theologians (the\nmutakallimūn, that is, practitioners of\nkalām).", "\nIn light of the high status of demonstration, Ibn Rushd considered it\nwith great care in his commentaries. He devoted a compendium, a\nparaphrase and a long commentary to the Posterior\nAnalytics—which he calls the Book of Demonstration\n(Kitāb al-Burhān)—and wrote separate\ntreatises on various special issues. The long commentary is probably\nthe most appropriate text for his positions on the components of\ndemonstration, its types, and its role in producing scientific\nknowledge. That commentary is also the occasion for a critical and\nsevere interaction with the two Islamic authorities in logic before\nhim, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.", "\nThe purpose of examining demonstrative arguments is to understand the\nabsolute demonstration that gives complete certainty and constitutes a\nscience (LongPostAn I.7 {180}). There are, however, other\nkinds of demonstration, less certain than the absolute one, but still\ndemonstrative. In all, Ibn Rushd distinguishes three types\n(LongPostAn I.95 {348}):", "\nIn mathematics, it is generally possible to frame absolute\ndemonstrations, because the premises both supply the cause and are\nbetter known than their conclusions. In the natural sciences, however,\nand even in metaphysics, this ideal situation is generally not\nachievable. Here we begin with the accidental sensible features of\nthings, and so extensive use must be made of the demonstration of\nexistence (EpiPhys 1.105 {9}; Sylla 1979; Cerami 2014). Ibn\nSīnā, whose views are often the target of Ibn Rushd’s\nlogic, had denied that these count as a demonstration at all, on the\ngrounds that they establish no substantial connection between the\nposterior cause and the prior effect. Ibn Rushd rejects this view\n(LongPostAn I.95 {349}), but admits that the demonstration of\nexistence is less reliable than the other demonstrations. Certainty\ncomes in degrees, and the differentiation in certainty between these\ndemonstrations is one of the reasons why some sciences are superior to\nothers (ParaPostAn §88–9).", "\nIbn Rushd’s enthusiasm for demonstration does not prevent him\nfrom valuing other logical arts, and he was particularly concerned\nwith the place of dialectic. Broadly speaking, according to Aristotle,\ndialectic has three main uses: as intellectual training, as a path\ninto the demonstrative sciences of philosophy, and as a means of\nconversing with ordinary people (Topics I.2). But Ibn Rushd\ndevotes less space and shows less interest in this third feature of\ndialectic, and one wonders whether this is due to his critical\nreaction to the discursive practices of the\nmutakallimūn. Despite the many considerations that make\ndialectic more suitable when dealing with ordinary people, Ibn Rushd\nsuggests that rhetorical and poetic statements are preferable\n(ParaTop I.5C {31}; Ben Ahmed 2010-2011, 299–302,\n307–17). Hence their inclusion in the expanded Organon.\nThe significance of rhetoric and poetics is a result he establishes in\npolitical science, but maintains even when it comes to teaching and\nanchoring theological truths. The bad example set by the dialectical\nsyllogisms of the mutakallimūn shows how dialectical\nmethods, in discussion with ordinary people, are actually\ndisadvantageous.", "\nUnder the influence of al-Fārābī, Ibn Rushd puts\nemphasis on the need to introduce dialectic as a method\n(ṭarīq), a set of rules, techniques, and warnings\n(Ben Ahmed 2020a, 262–7). This conception of dialectic makes it\ndistinct from both demonstration and sophistical reasoning, as well as\nfrom ordinary conversations. When used well, dialectic is a communal\nenterprise and so again different from other arts, such as\ndemonstration, where there is no need for more than one party. A\nsuccessful “partnership” in dialectic is one where each\nparty does their best to commit themselves to the rules. From this\nperspective, it becomes evident that the questioner is not simply an\nadversary seeking to defeat his opponent, but rather a partner and a\ncollaborator with the respondent in the search for knowledge. Any\ndebate that is motivated by the pursuit of victory or by deriving\npleasure from defeating one’s opponent is a debate that cannot\nfall under the method of dialectic. He writes, “the communal\nenterprise (al-ʿamal al-mushtarak) can be achieved in\nits utmost perfection only by both partners. They can have something\nin common when their aim is the assessment and the deduction of the\ntruth, or the realization of their training. Thus, the respondent\nshould perfect his response if he intends that aim, because the basest\nof the partners is the one who aims at the obstruction of the communal\nenterprise. But if their aim is to struggle against and defeat the\nother, then they will have nothing in common…. This is not the\nmethod of dialectic” (ParaTop 8.132D {233}; Ben Ahmed\n2020a, 267)", "\nAt the far reaches of the logical arts, the connection to the genuine\nsyllogism becomes remote. So, even while Ibn Rushd recognizes that\npoetics is a syllogistic art, he says that it lacks the power of a\nreal syllogism and is thus unproductive (CompLogic 12.3). In\nhis paraphrase of the Poetics, he avoids using the term\n“poetic syllogism” altogether.", "\nIn the realm of jurisprudence, Ibn Rushd is famous for his position on\nthe logical and epistemological value of juridical inferences, which\nin his view produce nothing more than opinion\n(ẓann). Even when confronted with the\nsurprising insertion of the word for jurisprudence (fiqh)\ninto the Arabic translation of the Prior Analytics 68b10, Ibn\nRushd chooses totally to ignore it. In his juridical writings, he\nopenly denies the accuracy of the term ‘syllogism’\n(qiyās) for what jurists had become accustomed to\ncalling their juridical inferences (al-maqāyīs\nal-fiqhiyya or qiyās sharʿī).\nWhen jurists speak of qiyās, it is important to\nrecognize that the term bears quite a different meaning\n(Abridgement 299 {130–1}; Bou Akl 2019). In particular,\ncontrary to what happens in the syllogism, the qiyās of\nthe jurists does not have the power to deduce the unknown from the\nknown. And even in those cases where Ibn Rushd seems to accept\njuridical inference, he does not make use of logical vocabulary, but\ninstead deploys the terms used by most of the jurists before him.\nRather than engage in a “syllogistification” of the\njuridical inference, he focuses on the semantic and linguistic origins\nof juridical rules. For Ibn Rushd, every science has its own\ncharacteristics; therefore, anyone who tried to study logic while\nstudying jurisprudence would fail at studying both\n(Abridgement 123 {37–38})." ], "section_title": "2. Logic and Methodology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe divisions between metaphysics, natural philosophy, psychology, and\ntheology are permeable for Ibn Rushd, and the systematic character of\nhis thought makes it difficult to treat any part in isolation. (See\nthe start of EpiMeta for his division of the sciences.) Here\nour method of proceeding is to begin with the most general principles\nof being, and then to turn, in the next section, to their causal\nrelationships.", "\nOf the various kinds of being, substances are what exist in the most\nproper sense (EpiMeta 4.138 {125}). Among substances, the\nmost familiar are concrete individuals like dogs and stones\n(EpiMeta 2.58 {43}). But these are composite entities, and\nsince the principles of a substance are themselves even more properly\nconsidered to be substances (EpiMeta 1.31 {15–16};\nLongAnima II.8), the most fundamental substances in the\nsensible realm are the metaphysical ingredients of composite\nsubstances, matter and form (LongMeta VII.44 {960}).", "\nUnderlying all change, and enduring through it, is homogeneous matter,\ndefined simply by its potentiality—that is, its potential to\nserve as subject for any earthly form (SubstOrb 1.50).\nConceived of without form, it is perpetually enduring and numerically\none everywhere: “all transient bodies share this body that is\nnumerically one” (SubstOrb 2.87), because it is\n“deprived of the divisions of individual forms”\n(LongMeta XII.14 {1473}). Ibn Rushd worries in predictable\nways about the reality of this so-called prime matter (mādda\nʾūlā). On the one hand, he consistently counts it\nas a substance (e.g., ParaAnima 2.115). On the other hand,\nmatter so-conceived is a “pure privation” and “does\nnot exist outside of the soul” (LongMeta XII.14\n{1473–4}). He offers the less-than-perspicuous compromise\nformula that prime matter lies “halfway, as it were, between\nabsolute non-being and actual being” (quasi medium inter\nnon-esse simpliciter et esse in actu) (LongPhys I.70;\nParaPhys I.3.3.276).", "\nMatter exists only when actualized by form, but the first form it\nreceives is not the nature of the composite substance (dog, stone,\netc.) but instead the “indeterminate dimensions”\n(al-abʿād ghayr al-maḥdūdat) that give\nmatter its corporeal character: “the three dimensions that\nconstitute the nature of body are the first state in matter, and\nmatter cannot be devoid of them in any instance of generation: not\nthat they exist in matter in actuality, but rather in some kind of\npotentiality different from the potentiality in which matter is\nconstituted” (ParaGC I.4.26 {32}; SubstOrb\n1.55). In postulating a persisting extended substratum beneath all\nphysical change, Ibn Rushd has been said to take a step toward the\nres extensa of seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy\n(Hyman 1965). But his conception of matter, far from making further\nforms unnecessary, explains how multiple forms can be instantiated in\nthe same material stuff: “the presence of dimension in prime\nmatter is a prerequisite for the existence of contraries”\n(EpiMeta 3.126 {112}). Since forms, by their nature, are\nalways individuals—universals, Ibn Rushd insists, do not exist\noutside the soul (EpiMeta 2.73–5\n{57–9})—the theory does not require a “principle of\nindividuation” for form. Extended matter does, however, serve as\nwhat might be called a principle of multiplication. If the material\nrealm were not extended, “there would exist in it only one form\nat a given time” (SubstOrb 1.60; Di Giovanni 2007).", "\nAlongside matter, the other internal principle of composite substances\nis form, and so form too counts as a substance (LongAnima\nII.2), and indeed is substance in the most proper sense of the term\n(Amerini 2008; Di Giovanni 2012). Substantial forms can be\ndistinguished from accidents in that a subject (a dog, a stone)\nendures through the gain and loss of its accidents, whereas when the\nsubstantial form of the subject departs, the subject ceases to exist\nor exists only homonymously (ParaAnima 2.120)—as one\nmight speak of cremating one’s grandfather. Interpreters have\ndisagreed on whether Ibn Rushd allows a single substance to have\nmultiple substantial forms. But at least sometimes he seems to suppose\nthat one substance has just one form, as when he holds that “if\nprime matter were to have its own form, it would receive no other\nform, while enduring, but would immediately be corrupted as soon as\nthat other form were generated” (LongPhys I.69; see\nSubstOrb 1.50). If elsewhere he seems to suggest that any\nnecessary feature of a thing will count as a substantial form of it,\nthis may mean merely that a substantial form is a composite of\nmultiple discrete, incomplete constituents (Di Giovanni 2011; Cerami\n2015, 521–4). Ibn Rushd is clear, at any rate, that the essence\n(dhāt) or quiddity (māhiyya) of a thing is\naccounted for entirely by its form, rather than by its form and matter\n(LongMeta VII.34 {896}). Thus, “form is the primary\nsubstance only because it is the cause of the determinate substance\nand the determinate substances come to be substance only by it”\n(LongMeta VII.5 {761k}).", "\nAccidents, which can come and go from a substance, are inseparable\nfrom that substance, and are caused by it (EpiMeta 2.56 {42};\nLongMeta XII.25 {1532–3}), but are not themselves a\npart of the substance (LongAnima II.4; Tahāfut\nI.6.216 {359}). They do not have existence in an absolute sense, but\nonly relationally (LongMeta XII.3 {1415}; EpiMeta\n1.28 {12}), and indeed Ibn Rushd generally does not refer to them as a\nform (ṣūra), preferring to reserve that term for\nthe substantial form.", "\nThe earthly realm we have been describing is just one small and\nrelatively insignificant part of what there is. Much more exalted, and\na much worthier subject of intellectual contemplation, is the eternal\nheavenly domain. Here Ibn Rushd broadly follows standard premodern\ncosmology in describing the eight celestial spheres of the moon, the\nsun, the five planets, and the fixed stars. These spheres are solid,\ntransparent bodies, spinning around the earth, luminous only at those\npoints where the sphere thickens (SubstOrb 2.92). Celestial\nbodies are composites of matter and form, but of an utterly different\nkind. Their matter is actually existent, incorruptible and\nindivisible, with a determinate size and shape (SubstOrb\n2.82; LongMeta XII.10 {1447}). Celestial matter is in\npotentiality only with regard to motion, and that motion, although\ngenerally circular, is extremely complex, with as many as 55 distinct\nmotions identifiable among the eight spheres (LongMeta XII.48\n{1679}). Each of these distinct motions requires a distinct\nactualizing form (EpiMeta 4.147 {135}; LongMeta\nXII.43 {1645}), but these are not material forms, inhering in the\ncelestial matter (since that matter is already actualized). Instead,\nthese celestial forms are separate and, like all forms not inhering in\nmatter, they are therefore intellectual: “if there are these\nforms that have existence inasmuch as they are not in matter, then\nthese are necessarily separate intellects, since there is no third\nkind of existence for forms qua forms”\n(EpiMeta 4.150 {139}; Incoherence I.6 {338}). In\naddition to intellects, these forms have desires, and indeed are aptly\nreferred to as souls (LongMeta XII.36 {1593};\nSubstOrb 1.71, 2.81). It is this desire, rather than any sort\nof physical contact, that moves the spheres, with the beauty of its\ncelestial intelligence serving as a final cause, and its desire\nefficiently moving the sphere. Far from being cold bodies in empty\nspace, these spheres are “alive, full of pleasure, and delighted\nin themselves” (EpiMeta 4.162 {152}). Adding to their\ndelight is their partial understanding of and desire for the first and\nunmoved mover, which moves all of the spheres through their desire for\nthis highest cause (LongMeta XII.44 {1649–50};\nEpiMeta 4.154 {142}). (For this cosmology in its historical\ncontext, see Wolfson 1962 and Endress 1995.)" ], "section_title": "3. Metaphysics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe previous section followed the order of discovery, beginning with\nwhat is better known to us. Here we start with what is causally prior,\nand so begin with the First Cause. (On Ibn Rushd’s method of\ninquiry see Cerami 2015 ch. 7.) Although the existence of some kind of\nFirst Cause was undisputed, religious and philosophical authorities\ndisagreed about the nature of creation. The most common view was that\nthe world came into existence, from God, after having not existed, but\nIbn Rushd follows Aristotle in supposing that the world has always\nexisted, eternally. His strategy for explaining how an eternal world\ncan have a First Cause turns on distinguishing between two kinds of\ncausal orderings, essential and accidental.", "\nCauses that are essentially ordered are simultaneous, such that the\nprior stages are a condition for the effect’s ongoing existence,\nas when waves move a ship, the wind moves the waves, and the wind is\nmoved by elemental forces (QPhys 7.25 {235};\nIncoherence I.1 {59}). In such a series there must be a first\ncause, because an endless such series would be actually infinite all\nat once, which Ibn Rushd regards as impossible (Incoherence\nI.4 {275}). The series could, moreover, never reach its end, since\ncausal agency cannot pass through an infinitely long series in a\nfinite time (LongPhys VII.6; QPhys 7.25 {235}). This\nFirst Cause cannot itself be something in motion, given the\nAristotelian dictum that everything that is in motion must be moved by\nanother (LongPhys VII.1; QPhys 7.30 {236}). In\nprinciple, Ibn Rushd allows that there could be many unmoved movers\n(QPhys 7.35 {238}), but at a minimum there must be one such\nthing that is immovable, and eternally so, because otherwise some\nstill prior mover would be required to move the supposedly first\nmover, and this would lead again to an essentially ordered infinity of\nmovers (EpiMeta 4.139 {126}). (For the intricate details see\nTwetten 2007.)", "\nAn accidental ordering takes place over time, as when rain comes from\na cloud, the cloud comes from vapor, and vapor comes from a prior rain\n(Incoherence I.4 {268}). Such an ordering is circular,\ninasmuch as the materials from one stage are corrupted and reused in a\nlater stage, and so there is no threat of an actual infinity. There is\nthus nothing incoherent about such a series extending infinitely far\ninto the past and infinitely far into the future, and indeed Ibn Rushd\nargues that such an infinity can be proved in various ways (Davidson\n1987). One fundamental proof arises from the nature of the First\nCause. Since it is itself unmoved—that is, wholly\nchangeless—its causal agency must likewise be eternal. “A\nthing lacking the potential for change and alteration cannot be\nchanged at any time, since if it were then its alteration would be by\ncause of itself, and so there would be alteration without the\npossibility for it” (LongCaelo I.103). It is, for Ibn\nRushd, incoherent to posit an eternally existing, changeless\nactuality, which suddenly springs into agency after having not acted\nfor an eternity. In general, “the effect of a cause cannot be\ndelayed after the causation” (Incoherence I.1 {15}).\nSimilar considerations show that the world’s future existence\nmust likewise be eternal (Incoherence 1.1 {22}).", "\nFor the reasons just rehearsed, an eternal and unchanging First Mover\nentails an eternal and unchanging first thing moved, and observation\nsuggests that this must be the outermost sphere of the stars, whose\ndiurnal rotation in turn moves everything within its ambit:\n“there is a moved thing that is first by nature, which moves the\nwhole, and which terminates every movement whose mover is\nexternal…. The mover of this [first] moved thing is, of itself,\nnot a body and is absolutely and essentially unmoved”\n(EpiPhys 8.242 {141}). Past this first ceaseless motion, the\ncausal story becomes increasingly complex, under the influence of the\ncelestial intelligences. Ibn Rushd is suspicious of the unrealistic\nconvolutions of Ptolemaic cosmology, preferring to honor the\nprinciples of Aristotelian physics even where that leaves a gap\nbetween theory and observation (Sabra 1984; Endress 1995). A\nstrikingly personal remark describes how he had once aspired to close\nthat gap, but has now, in his old age, abandoned the project\n(LongMeta XII.45 {1664}). Anticipating the modern rise of\nscientific specialization, he yields the field to those who devote\nthemselves solely to this one science (LongMeta XII.48\n{1679}).", "\nThe spheres move eternally in majestic circles simply because it\nbefits their lofty existence to do so (EpiMeta 4.152 {140},\nLongMeta XII.36 {1595}, Incoherence I.15 {484}), but\nthese motions have a subordinate effect of signal importance to us:\nthey sustain the very existence of our sublunary world. Most\nbasically, the motion of the celestial spheres—although they are\nnot themselves hot (SubstOrb 2.95)—gives rise to heat\nin the fiery region immediately beneath the lunar sphere, and from\nheat and its contrary, cold, arise the four elements: earth, air,\nfire, water. “The existence of the celestial body entails\nnecessarily the existence of the elements … as preserving,\nefficient, formal, and final cause” (EpiMeta 4.171\n{161}; Incoherence I.3 {261}). The bodies that furnish our\nsublunary realm are various elemental mixtures, in which the elements\nthemselves endure in an attenuated state, as the material strata above\nprime matter (EpiMeta 1.48 {32}; LongCaelo III.67;\nEpiGC I.121 {22–3}; see Maier 1982 ch. 6). The\nqualities of these elements—hot, cold, wet, dry—“are\nthe causes of all natural things that come into being and pass\naway” (Incoherence II.1 {525}). The entire system so\ndepends on the celestial spheres that “if the motion of the\nheavens were destroyed, … the world in its totality would be\ndestroyed” (SubstOrb 4.117; Kashf 5.112\n{191}).", "\nMatter is, at least potentially, infinitely divisible, but at the\nlevel of elements and mixed bodies we can refer to the smallest body\ncapable of still being a body of that kind—the minimum\nnaturale—e.g., “the minimal possible magnitude of\nfire” (EpiPhys 7.212 {114}, Glasner 2009 ch. 8; Cerami\n2015, 429–36). Any sort of mixed body requires a substantial\nform to actualize it, but Ibn Rushd’s view of how such forms\nemerge evolves. His early works hold that, at least at the level of\nliving things, substantial forms cannot be generated by wholly natural\nprocesses, but require a celestial “giver of forms,” the\nAgent Intellect (EpiMeta 4.171 {162}). His later view is more\nthoroughly naturalistic, and argues that prime matter contains the\npotentiality for all substantial forms, which need only be actualized\nby a natural agent, along with the usual cooperation of the celestial\nbodies (LongMeta VII.31 {883}, XII.18.109 {1499}; see\nDavidson 1992 ch. 6; Freudenthal 2002; Cerami 2015 chs.\n8–9).", "\nIbn Rushd’s naturalistic conception of generation and corruption\nis of a piece with one of his most famous philosophical stances, his\nrejection of al-Ghazālī’s occasionalism. On this\ntheological tradition, “when a man moves a stone by leaning\nagainst it and pushing it, he does not push it, but it is the Agent\nwho creates the motion” (LongMeta XII.18.112 {1504}).\nIbn Rushd heaps scorn on this view in the Incoherence,\nresting his case most fundamentally on the link between a\nthing’s causal role and its defining nature: “it is\nself-evident that things have essences and attributes that determine\nthe special functions of each thing and through which the essences and\nnames of things are differentiated. If a thing did not have its\nspecific nature, it would not have a special name nor a definition,\nand all things would be one” (II.1 {520}). (For discussion of\nthis argument see Kogan 1985 ch. 3.)", "\nFor further details see the entry on\n Ibn Rushd’s natural philosophy\n and the entry on\n causation in Arabic and Islamic thought." ], "section_title": "4. Natural Philosophy", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nIn the Aristotelian tradition, Ibn Rushd postulates a special sort of\nsubstantial form—a soul—to account for living substances.\nEven in the mundane case of plants, the complexities of their\noperations require a special principle beyond what would be adequate\nfor nonliving things: nutrition, for instance, “is ascribed to\nthe soul because it is impossible for it to be ascribed to the powers\nof the elements” (LongAnima II.14). His theory of the\nsoul’s operations distinguishes, most basically, between the\nnutritive, sensory, and rational levels. Judging from his casually\nflexible terminology, he sees no real difference between treating\nthese as different souls within a single living thing or as parts of a\nsingle soul—parts characterized as a power (quwwa) or\nprinciple (mabdaʾ). Judging again from his varying\nformulations, he thinks there can be no definitive list of how many\nsuch powers of the soul there are. The question he does regard as\nmeaningful is whether a power is distinguished solely in terms of its\nfunction, or also in terms of its substrate—as he puts it,\nwhether it “differs from the other powers in subject as well as\nin intention (maʿnā), or only in intention”\n(LongAnima III.1; ParaAnima ¶276). Each of the\nfive external senses, for instance, has its own subject, a sensory\norgan, whereas some of the higher sensory operations have dedicated\norgans, in the brain, whereas other operations, such as recollection\n(Black 1996) and choice (Phillipson 2013), are mere functions produced\nby multiple powers working in conjunction. This question of\n“subject” is particularly vexed, as we will see, for the\npowers of intellect.", "\nThe “foundation” of cognition at all levels is its\npassivity (LongAnima II.54). This is particularly clear for\nthe five external senses, which have as their objects the material\nqualities of the external world. Color, for instance, the proper\nobject of sight, is an elemental mixture on the surface of bodies\n(ParaParv I.10 {15}), which acts on an illuminated medium and\nthen the organ of the eye, making its recipient at each stage be like\nthe color itself. The general (although not perfect) reliability of\nthe process—that a sense with respect to its proper sense object\n“does not err in regard to it for the most part”\n(LongAnima II.63)—is a product of the natural\nworld’s causal regularity. Indeed, the passivity of the five\nsenses is such that Ibn Rushd, when speaking most carefully, seems to\ntreat these organs as themselves simply the corporeal media through\nwhich sensible qualities are conveyed to the one true principle of\nsensation, the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak). He\nwrites, for instance, that “through the innermost of all the\ncurtains of the eye, the common sense can perceive the form”\n(ParaParv I.19 {30}); here is where we pass from a purely\ncorporeal stage to “the first of the spiritual stages”\n(ParaParv II.26 {42–3}). The lesson he draws from\nAristotle’s notoriously obscure treatment of common sense\n(De anima 425b12ff) is that the principle of sensation is\n“one in number and multiple in extremities and organs,”\nlike a point at the center of a circle (ParaAnima ¶260).\nOnly here is perception both self-aware and capable of assimilating\nthe objects of multiple sensory modalities. All subsequent cognition\nis dependent on the information collected at this stage. (See Black\n2019 for the theory’s strict empiricism.)", "\nTo account for the functional role of common sense, Ibn Rushd accepts\nits traditional—even antiquated—location at the heart,\nwith the concession that common sense has its origin there, but\nterminates in the brain (ParaParv II.36 {59}). This brings\nsensible forms to the higher sensory powers, of which he recognizes\nthree that are distinct within the human brain both in function and in\nsubject:", "\nThese faculties, listed in order from the anterior to the posterior of\nthe brain’s supposed three chambers (ParaParv II.26\n{42}), account for much of human cognition. Most basically (for\ndetails see LongAnima II.63, III.6; Blaustein 1984;\nHansberger 2019), imagination allows us to form sensory images taken\nfrom sensation even when we are not presently sensing an object. The\ncogitative power refines these images so as to allow a distinct grasp\nof the “individual contents” (al-maʿānī\nal-shakhṣiya, known in the Latin tradition as\n“intentions”) that are confusedly contained within sensory\nexperience. Memory stores and recalls these images. Ibn Rushd\nexplicitly argues (Incoherence II.2 {546-7}) that the\ncogitative power can do all the work that Ibn Sīnā had split\nbetween a cogitative power and a further estimative power\n(al-quwwa al-wahmiyya). The overall process\nis compared to the gradual “abstracting and cleansing” of\nthe rind, eventually leaving just the fruit itself (ParaParv\nII.26 {43}), these fruits being the “substantial\ndifferences” between individuals (LongAnima II.65).\nNonhuman animals, because they lack a cogitative power entirely, are\nincapable of moving beyond superficial sensory appearances\n(LongAnima III.57).", "\nIn keeping with his broadly naturalistic orientation, Ibn Rushd allows\nthe brain a much larger share of the cognitive load than one finds in\nmost premodern philosophers. But the “fruit” these\ncorporeal powers yield is always a representation of a particular\nindividual. To think abstractly—to have universal\nconcepts—requires the powers of intellect, and here is where his\nnaturalism notoriously comes to an end. Ibn Rushd, though he deploys a\nbewildering variety of terms for different aspects of intellect,\nultimately endorses just two intellectual powers distinct both in\nfunction and subject:", "\nFollowing what was then the dominant Aristotelian view, he treats the\nagent intellect as a single, separate, eternal substance, and spends\nlittle time arguing for this doctrine, or even explaining how it\n“illuminates” imagined intentions (LongAnima\nIII.17–18; Davidson 1992, pp. 315–18). In contrast, he\ndiscusses the material intellect at length in various treatises, with\nhis views evolving dramatically over time (see Taylor 2009). Here we\nfocus only on his final considered view of the subject, as set out in\nthe Long Commentary, according to which the material\nintellect, like the agent intellect, is a single, separate, eternal\nsubstance (LongAnima III.5).", "\nIbn Rushd recognized the audacity of supposing that human beings share\nin a single intellect, writing that “this claim came to me after\nlong reflection and intense care, and I have not seen it in anyone\nelse before me” (CommAlex, p. 30). Indeed, he himself\nhad once called such a view “repulsive”\n(ParaAnima ¶282). Still, we can understand why he was\neventually drawn to it in light of his commitment to three\npropositions:", "\nAlthough the trio is jointly contradictory, each claim is individually\nplausible: (A) seems obvious; (B) follows from the familiar\nAristotelian argument that a power capable of understanding all bodies\nmust itself contain the nature of no body (LongAnima III.4);\n(C) is a consequence of Ibn Rushd’s eventual conclusion that the\nvarious strategies for situating an immaterial power within a human\nbeing—his own and that of earlier commentators—were all\nfailures. The genius of his ultimate position was to find a way for\nall three claims to be embraced. In one sense, human beings are\nindividual composites of matter and substantial form, and so wholly\ncorporeal. Although he consistently describes both the material and\nthe agent intellect as parts of the human soul (e.g.,\nLongAnima III.5 {406}), they are souls and actualities only\nequivocally: they are not the actuality of a body (LongAnima\nII.7, II.21, III.5 {396–7}). When human beings are conceived in\nthis narrow way, (C) is true and (A) is false.", "\nBut of course there must be some sense in which (A) is true. Ibn Rushd\ninsists that, even though we all share the material intellect, its\nthinking can count as my thinking. To explain this, he\nappeals to Aristotle’s doctrine that “the soul never\nthinks without an image” (De anima III.7, 431a17;\nWirmer 2008, 367–75). The material intellect, although separate,\nis dependent both for its function and for its very existence on\nreceiving imagined intentions from individual human beings\n(CommAlex p. 29); it is eternal only because the human\nspecies is eternal (LongAnima III.5 {407}). Each of us,\ntherefore, partially controls the operation of this separate material\nintellect. Its operation is to think, but inasmuch as we each\ncontrol our imagination, and the imagination is what triggers thought,\nit is appropriate to think of the thoughts we trigger as our\nthoughts, and to think of the two shared intellects, agent and\nmaterial, as each a part of our soul (LongAnima II.60,\nIII.18, III.36 {500}). With this, Ibn Rushd offers the first developed\nstatement of the\n extended-mind\n thesis: that a being’s cognitive system extends beyond the\nindividual organism. When human beings are conceived in this extended\nway, (A) is true and (C) is false.", "\nEven if this extended conception of a human being is allowed, that\nstill leaves a question about why these two separated intellects must\neach be singular, and so shared by all human beings. Ibn Rushd’s\nanswer depends in part on an argument against private concepts: that\nwithout concepts that are literally shared, teachers could not convey\nknowledge to students (LongAnima III.5 {411–12}; Ogden\nforthcoming). He also argues that an intellect individuated by a\ncorporeal subject would receive individualized forms\n(LongAnima III.5 {402}; Ogden 2016). Accordingly, he thinks\nthe domain of actually intelligible concepts, and of the intellects in\nwhich those objects exist, must be entirely separate from the material\nrealm, and cannot be individuated by matter. And, as we have seen in\nthe previous two sections, he is for independent reasons committed to\nthe existence of such a realm, among the celestial spheres.\nAccordingly, the human intellectual powers can be identified as the\nlowest members of this hierarchy (LongAnima III.19; Davidson\n1992, 223–31; Taylor 1998).", "\nFor further information see the entry on\n Arabic and Islamic psychology and philosophy of mind." ], "section_title": "5. Psychology", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [], "section_title": "6. Religion", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIbn Rushd believes that God’s existence can be demonstrated\nthrough a complex argument from Aristotelian physics, establishing the\nexistence of a first cause (see §5). As with physical arguments\nin general, the argument is a mere sign (dalīl),\nstarting from empirical features of the world that are better known to\nus even if causally posterior (LongMeta 12.5 {1423}; see\n§2) He rejects the a priori metaphysical arguments of\nIbn Sīnā (Davidson 1987 ch. 10; Bertolacci 2007) and of the\nAshʿarite theologians (Kashf 1), all of which he thinks\nnot only fall short of being demonstrative but also fail to be\npersuasive to ordinary people. For them, one should follow the example\nof the Qurʾān and deploy arguments from design\n(Kashf 1.33–38 {118–22}).", "\nIn keeping with Aristotle’s remarks in Metaphysics\nXII.7, Ibn Rushd suggests that God serves not as an efficient cause,\nbut only as a final and formal cause. Efficient causality prevails\namong natural bodies, when one actually moving body brings another\nbody from potential to actual motion. The heavenly bodies, however,\nare already actual, and eternally so, and so in this domain efficient\ncausation has no place (PossibConj 14.86). The relationship\nof First Cause to the celestial spheres, then, is that of intelligible\nto intellect—that is, the eternal thoughts of the First Cause\nare the forms that serve as final causes inspiring the celestial\nintelligences (LongMeta XII.36 {1592}; XII.44 {1652};\nLongCaelo IV.1.654; Incoherence I.14 {481};\nConjunction Epistle 1, par. 3-4). God, being wholly\nimmaterial, cannot directly act on the sublunary material realm at\nall, but plays a causal role only through the mediation of the\ncelestial spheres: “the temporal cannot proceed from an\nabsolutely eternal being, but only from an eternal being which is\neternal in its substance but temporal in its movements, namely, the\ncelestial body” (Incoherence I.13 {467}).\n(Interpretation here is more contentious than this brief summary\nsuggests. For various approaches see Kogan 1985 ch. 5; Davidson 1992,\n227–30; Adamson 2019; Twetten forthcoming.)", "\nGod alone, among intellectual beings, has no further object of\nintellectual contemplation that might serve as his final cause. On the\ncontrary, “the First Form thinks of nothing outside\nitself” (LongAnima III.5 {410}; EpiAnima 219\n{93}; EpiMeta 4.158 {147}; LongMeta XII.51 {1700}).\nThis helps account for God’s unique simplicity as a pure mind,\nalways fully actualized by nothing other than God. It leads to\nquestions, however, about the sense in which God can be said to have\nknowledge of the created world. This is “the most powerful\ndoubt” regarding this conception of God (EpiMeta 4.159\n{148}), and it threatens to lead to the view al-Ghazālī had\nbranded as heretical: that God does not know particulars\n(Incoherence II.4 {587}). Ibn Rushd denies that he is\ncommitted to this consequence. God has knowledge of the created world\nin his own manner, neither in universal nor particular, not as if his\nthoughts are caused by the world, but rather as the cause of the world\n(Incoherence I.3 {226-7}, I.13 {462};\nḌamīma 7; LongMeta XII.51\n{1707–8}). The divine mind’s “thinking its own self\nis identical with its thinking all existence”\n(Incoherence I.11 {435}).", "\nFor terms to apply to God and creatures in a non-univocal way\n(bi-ishtirāk) is a common state of affairs for Ibn Rushd\n(LongMeta XII.39 {1620–4}). It arises, for instance,\nnot just in the case of knowledge but also in the case of will. For,\nsince God “is exempt from passivity and change,” He does\nnot exercise will in the usual sense of the term (Incoherence\nI.3 {148}). Still, in another sense God is “an intending and\nwilling agent” (Kashf 5.80 {163}) in virtue of the\nspecial causal relationship that God has to the world. Similarly, Ibn\nRushd affirms, in a special sense, that God is the creator of the\nworld (QPhys 3; Kashf 5.78–91\n{161–173}), and that God exercises providence\n(ʿināya) over all existent beings, though he denies\nthat any individual enjoys a special divine providence\n(LongMeta XII.37 {1607}, XII.52; EpiMeta\n4.176–81 {166–71}). It is difficult to assess the degree\nto which, on this account, either God’s will or the world is\nnecessitated (Belo 2007; Hourani 1962; Taylor 2014).", "\nThe various strands of Ibn Rushd’s conception of God are set out\non one hand against Ibn Sīnā’s insufficiently\nAristotelian philosophy, and on the other hand against Ashʿarite\ntheology (kalām). His systematic examination of the\nAshʿarites in al-Kashf establishes at length that their methods\nare sophistical and delusional, drawing on two basic resources: the\nintention of Islamic law and Aristotle’s philosophy (Arfa Mensia\n2019). But even where Ibn Rushd is examining the\nmutakallimūn and offering rival interpretations of\nreligious texts, it is not his intention to set philosophy at the\nservice of any kind of theology. Instead these writings are more\nappropriately classified as philosophical considerations on religious\ntexts and theological issues.", "\nProphecy is a good example of how Ibn Rushd distinguishes himself both\nfrom the theologians and from previous philosophical approaches\n(Taylor 2018). The trustworthiness of prophecy is foundational to\nIslam: “the sending forth of prophets is based on the fact that\nrevelation comes down to them from heaven, and on this our religion is\nbased” (Kashf 4.58 {142}). The Ashʿarites had\nrelied primarily on miracles to establish the veracity of the Prophet\nMuhammed. Ibn Rushd evaluates this approach from his Aristotelian\nbackground. His first step is to situate the miraculous\n(muʿjiz) as a tool of persuasion belonging to the art of\nrhetoric, standing to the prophetic claim as an extrinsic argument\n(Ben Ahmed 2012). Analogously, when I swear that something is true,\nthe oath I advance has no intrinsic connection to what is claimed as\nbeing true. The Ashʿarites conceive of the relation between being\nprophetic and a miracle as that of a quality to its act. The miracle\nmust be, in principle, an act that is generated from that quality,\njust as the act of healing the sick emanates from the quality of being\na physician (Kashf 5.95–6 {177}). Accordingly, the\nproof that I am a prophet is that I can produce an extra-ordinary act,\nsuch as walking on water, turning a stick into a snake, or splitting\nthe moon. Ibn Rushd responds by identifying a miracle as merely\n“an external sign” of prophecy. The act that more closely\ndemonstrates prophecy is to establish a law that is useful for people.\nThus it is the Qurʾān that proves Muhammad’s veracity:\n“Because of the universality of the teaching of the Precious\nBook and the universality of the laws contained in it—by which I\nmean their liability to promote the happiness of all\nmankind—this religion is common to all mankind”\n(Kashf 5.103 {184}). A miracle alone, in contrast, is at best\ncomplementary, and an argument from miracles is merely persuasive or\nrhetorical. (See further Arfa Mensia 1999, Ben Ahmed 2012)." ], "subsection_title": "6.1 God" }, { "content": [ "\nThe Decisive Treatise argues forcefully that philosophy\nshould have a prominent place in religious reflection, and\nspecifically in Islamic law (sharīʿa). This stance,\nalongside his devotion to Aristotelian demonstration (see §2),\nmight raise the question of Ibn Rushd’s\n“rationalism”: Does he regard philosophy as having some\nkind of priority in religious contexts? But this question is not Ibn\nRushd’s, inasmuch as he establishes no hierarchy between\nphilosophy and true religion. The law can serve as a kind of preamble\nto philosophy, addressed to a much wider audience and containing clues\nto guide the philosopher in theoretical matters. But there is no\nquestion of priority. As he famously writes, in a passage that\n(perhaps tellingly) echoes Aristotle’s Prior Analytics\nI.32, “Since the law is true, … we, the Muslim community,\nknow firmly that demonstrative reasoning does not lead to disagreement\nwith what the law sets down. For truth does not oppose truth, but\nrather agrees with and bears witness to it” (Decisive\nTreatise 12; see Taylor 2000).", "\nThe implicit target of the Decisive Treatise is\nal-Ghazālī’s notorious fatwa against metaphysics. By\ncharacterizing philosophy in narrowly metaphysical terms, as a science\nthat leads from artifacts back to the Artisan through demonstrative\nmethods, Ibn Rushd means to show that God cannot be demonstrably known\nwithout these methods. To prohibit this path to knowledge from those\nwho are capable of it is an injustice both to God and to these\nscholars. In his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics (I.2\n{10}), he goes so far as to distinguish between two types of\nsharīʿa, one general for everyone or most people,\nand the other “specific” to the philosophers. This might\nsuggest that philosophy, for those capable of it, transcends the\nteachings of Islamic law (Taylor 2012), but it is not at all clear\nthat Ibn Rushd ever commits himself to such a claim. Here in\nLongMeta, he may be speaking of sharīʿa\nonly loosely, as a “way” or “method.” And even\nif he does mean that philosophy is literally a\nsharīʿa, it does not follow that it is a law that\ncompetes against religion. After all, the specific stands to the\ngeneral as something that is complementary, not conflicting.", "\nTo be sure, the general sharīʿa of Islam is\npartially subject to the interpretation of philosophers, since they\nare the only ones who have the arsenal, namely demonstration, to bring\nout its hidden meanings, allegories, signs, and symbols. In the end,\nhowever, this serves sharīʿa itself, and cannot do otherwise\nsince, as Ibn Rushd never tires of declaring, Islamic Law is true and\nit calls on everyone, including philosophers, to follow its\nprescriptions (e.g., Incoherence II.4; Decisive\nTreatise 11). Philosophers pursue one path to this\ntruth—the most exalted path available to human beings—but\nthere are other paths, such as the rhetorical and dialectical, that\nalso arrive at this truth.", "\nFor all of Ibn Rushd’s involvement in esoteric questions of\nAristotelianism, he was, at the same time, a practicing judge, deeply\nconcerned with jurisprudential theory. Ibn Rushd’s principal\nwork in this domain is the Distinguished Jurist’s\nPrimer, a lengthy handbook on the causes of the jurists’\ndisputes and a comparison between the rationales for decision-making\nby different Sunni schools of jurisprudence. Its originality lies in\nthe rational mechanisms that Ibn Rushd employs to establish general\nrules for understanding agreements and disagreements among jurists. He\nwrites that “our intention in these matters is only the rules\ngoverning the law, not an enumeration of the branches, which would\nhave no end” (Jurist’s Primer 26.241 {ii.202}).\nSo rather than focus on counting the differences that exist between\njurists and schools of jurisprudence, Ibn Rushd attempts to explain\nthese differences by referring them to their principles, rules, and\nthe causes that regulate them. By following the points of disagreement\nbetween the jurists and deducing the causes of this disagreement, and\nthen bringing them back to the general principles and rules equivalent\nto a general maxim rooted in his soul (Jurist’s Primer\n24.179, 220–1 {ii.148, 184-5}), the assiduous jurist\n(al-mujtahid) becomes capable of deciding about the unknown\nsituations he will face.", "\nWhat makes these general rules so important is the imitative and\nrepetitive style of jurisprudence in Ibn Rushd’s day, which had\nbeen overwhelmed by a focus on individual cases and the endless\nbranching of views. Thus, either the jurist works according to a rule\nthat distinguishes similar cases from others, or he works according to\nordinary common sense to produce controversial answers. This is what\nthe writings of the Malikites suffered from in his time. Ibn Rushd\ninsists on establishing jurisprudential maxims that make\nunderstandable the disagreement among schools of jurisprudence and\njurists and provide the diligent jurist with basic mechanism for\nmaking decisions regarding emerging problems and cases." ], "subsection_title": "6.2 Law" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\nWritings in medicine occupy an important place in Ibn Rushd’s\ncareer. The practice of medicine was not his profession: “it is\nthis part of medicine that I believe restrains me from being perfect\nin this art. And that I haven’t had much practice”\n(Kulliyyāt VII.517). Even so, he left many interesting\ntexts: a Commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s Medical\nPoem, his al-Kulliyyāt (General Principles of\nMedicine), and various writings and commentaries on Galen.\nIndeed, it has been suggested that, near the end of Ibn Rushd’s\ncareer, he was forced to set aside his philosophical project of\nwriting the long commentaries on Aristotle’s texts, and turn\ninstead to Galen’s text on medicine (Al-ʿAlawī\n1986a).", "\nThe commentary on Ibn Sīnā challenges the usual conception\nof a rivalry between the two great Islamic philosophers. He says that\nhe chose to comment on Ibn Sīnā’s Poem\nbecause it is “better than many of the introductions written in\nmedicine” (CommIbnSīnā 40). Even so, during\nthe last decade of Ibn Rushd’s life, it is Galen who becomes one\nof his principal authorities. Still, Galen is often a target of\ncriticism. In al-Kulliyyāt, for example, a work that he\nrepeatedly revised (Gätje 1986), the revisions often move in a\ndirection that is increasingly critical of Galen\n(Kulliyyāt II.162, II.184, etc.).", "\nMedicine, for Ibn Rushd, is an art rather than a science, concerned\nwith practice rather than theory (Chandelier 2019). According to the\nprologue of al-Kulliyyāt,", "\nThe art of medicine is an art that acts (sināʿa\nfāʿila) based on true principles; we seek through it to\npreserve the health of the human body and to eliminate disease as much\nas possible in each body. So the goal of this art is not to heal\nwithout fail (lā budda), but rather to act\nappropriately, to the appropriate extent and time, while waiting to\nachieve its goal, as with the art of navigation and the command of an\narmy. (prol. 127)\n", "\nThis definition is based on the famous division of the arts into what\nbelongs to the sphere of necessity and what belongs to the sphere of\npossibility. The art of medicine does not belong to the sphere where\nconsequences follow actions necessarily, as with arts like carpentry.\nIn medicine, even if the physician acts based on scientific\nprinciples, the intended end does not necessarily follow. As he puts\nit, “Apparently, we do not have any of the premises that bring\nus certainty in many of these pursuits. But even so we must try,\ninsofar as we are able” (Kulliyyāt II.208). The\npractical dimension of medicine is similarly central to his commentary\non Ibn Sīnā, which begins with Ibn Sīnā’s\nstatement that “Medicine is preserving health and curing\ndisease,” and comments: “This is the definition of\nmedicine, and its completion would be to say that medicine is an art\nwhose action is preserving health and curing disease, based on science\nand experience” (CommIbnSīnā 46; see also\nKulliyyāt prol.131). As one may notice, Ibn Rushd\ninsists on acting in both texts.", "\nThe purpose of al-Kulliyyāt, according to its prologue,\nis to draw from the art of medicine", "\na summary (jumla), sufficiently concise and brief to serve as\nan introduction for those who would like to explore the parts of the\nart, and also as a memorandum (tadhkira) for those who would\nlike to reflect on the art. We seek those statements that correspond\nto the truth, even if they contradict the opinions of people who\nbelong to the art. (prol. 127)\n", "\nHowever, al-Kulliyyāt is not a book of medical\ngeneralities, as some translations tend to suggest. It is rather a\nbook on the universals of medicine (kulliyyāt fī\nal-ṭibb), as its title suggests—that is, on the\nfoundations, principles, and basic rules that regulate medical theory\nand practice. It thus provides the foundations\n(usṭuqsāt) of the medical art\n(Kulliyyāt III.282).", "\nIn the same vein, al-Kulliyyāt is far from being a\ntextbook (kunnāsh); it is rather written against the\ntradition of textbooks that prevailed in the art of medicine. It is a\ndefense of the art of “syllogistic” medicine against\nexperiential medicine. He says: “As for those who limit\nthemselves to the method of the textbooks without knowing the\nuniversal method, they will certainly make mistakes, as do the doctors\nof our time. As for limiting oneself to universal matters, this may be\npossible if the doctor is very skilled. Therefore, one of the\nconsidered conditions of perfection in the arts is that the craftsman\nhave the power to deduce what he needs to deduce”\n(Kulliyyāt VII.552). The status of experience in\nmedicine is limited but not entirely excluded: “Once the\nuniversals of the art of medicine are acquired, one needs the\nexperience from which particular premises are acquired in order to be\nused in each particular case. These premises cannot be written in a\nbook, because they are unlimited” (Kulliyyāt\nVII.517). Ibn Rushd makes an exception, however, in criticizing the\nmanuals and textbooks on medical particulars, for Abū Marwān\nIbn Zuhr, whose al-Taysīr can be trusted because the\nparticulars it contains conform to the universal teachings of\ntheoretical medicine (Kulliyyāt VII.583).", "\nIn sum, al-Kulliyyāt is an attempt to advance medical\npractice from the level of the infinite particulars, which cannot be\nassembled in a book, to the level of the rules\n(qānūn) and established principles\n(dustūr) that govern them (Kulliyyāt\nIII.282). It is an attempt to upgrade medical discourse to the level\nof a science, linking its premises and principles to the Aristotelian\nnatural sciences (Al-ʿAlawī 1986a, 180). This holistic\nmethodology is characteristic of how Ibn Rushd approached the arts and\nsciences of his time. It shows his inclination to organize them in a\nway that protects them from chaos and elevates them to the level of\nscientific practice, established on the basis of universal principles\nand foundations. Particular cases, since they are unlimited, cannot be\ndealt with unless there are general laws that help us to deduce\ndecisions about particulars on the basis of principles and\nfoundations." ], "section_title": "7. Medicine", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nThe sciences, for Ibn Rushd, fundamentally divide into the theoretical\n(naẓarīya), which is aimed at knowledge\n(ʿilm), and the practical (ʿamalīya),\nwhich is concerned with voluntary action (Republic I.21;\nLongPhys proem). The chief practical science is politics,\nwhich Ibn Rushd sees as dividing, much like medicine, into a more\ntheoretical and a more practical part. The first and more theoretical\npart examines voluntary actions in general, their associated\ndispositions (the virtues and vices), and the relationships between\nthese elements. The second, more practical part examines how these\ndispositions become established within souls and how they are\nperfected and impeded (Republic I.21). The first part is\nfound in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and the second\npart in his Politics. Although Ibn Rushd composed a\ncommentary on the first of these, and although he knew the second was\navailable in Arabic elsewhere, he complains that it “has not yet\nreached us on this peninsula” (ParaEthics X.160G).\nAccordingly, he chose to comment on Plato’s Republic as\nan alternative source for the second part of political science.", "\nFollowing the Nicomachean Ethics, Ibn Rushd takes the goal of\nhuman life to be happiness (Hourani 1962). For ordinary people, the\nultimate guide to happiness is the Qurʾān, which exhibits\nmiraculous wisdom in the rules it sets out to promote human\nflourishing (see §6.1). But the ultimate human happiness, for\nthose who are capable of it, is to become perfect in the theoretical\nsciences (LongPhys proem). Such perfection arrives when human\nbeings conjoin themselves to the separate Agent Intellect, which is to\nsay that they pass from a partial conception of intelligible objects\nto a conception of the Agent Intellect itself. At this point a human\nbeing in some sense takes on an “eternal existence”\n(PossibConj 5.41; LongPhys proem), and is\n“made like unto God” (LongAnima III.36 {501}),\nand even “becomes one of the eternal, incorporeal beings”\n(PossibConj 5.40). This notion of conjunction\n(ittiṣāl) had a complex history among earlier\nAristotelians, and Ibn Rushd’s views about what it involves, and\nwhether it is possible, developed over time (Davidson 1992,\n321–56; Black 1999). The texts here are complicated, but suggest\nthat he rejected al-Fārābī’s complaint that\nconjunction is nothing other than “an old woman’s\ntale” (PossibConj 14.85; Epistle 1 par. 40),\nand that he accepted it as, in some sense, the goal of human life, one\nthat would be achieved through contemplation, with the assistance of\nprayer and the Qurʾān (PossibConj\n15.103–4).", "\nA perfect, conjoined grasp of the theoretical sciences carries with\nit, necessarily, the complete possession of the moral virtues. One so\npossessed will be perfect both in intellectual understanding and in\n“the activity proper to him” (LongAnima III.36\n{500, 501}). If this sort of moral excellence is not much on display\nin those we see make the greatest claims to the possession of science,\nthis only testifies to the poverty of their achievements\n(LongPhys proem). The perfection Ibn Rushd describes,\nhowever, through conjunction with the Agent Intellect, seems to entail\nsomething other than personal immortality. For he expressly refuses,\nagainst al-Ghazālī, to endorse bodily resurrection\n(Incoherence II.4 {580–6}), and yet he also insists\nthat the human soul is individuated in virtue of its body. So, as he\nexplicitly concludes, “if the soul does not die when the body\ndies, or if there is anything of this kind within the soul, then it\nmust, once it has left the bodies, be one in number”\n(Incoherence I.1 {29}). So—although scholarship is not\nunanimous on this point—it seems that Ibn Rushd, whatever he\nmight have thought about conjunction, did not mean for the promise of\nthe soul’s immortality to extend to each of us as\nindividuals (Taylor 1998).", "\nJust as the theoretical part of medicine has as its aim the more\npractical business of preserving health and curing disease, so too, in\nthe political sphere, the first part has as its end the perfection of\nthe second part. This is to say that the goal of ethical inquiry is\nultimately “the governance of cities” (ParaEthics\nI.3, 3F). This instrumental conception of ethics looks strange from\nthe perspective of later European philosophy, but it is what Aristotle\nhimself expressly affirms at Nicomachean Ethics I.2, and it\ncomports well with Ibn Rushd’s orientation away from individual\nhuman beings as the ultimate locus of value in the universe.", "\nFrom the start, Ibn Rushd announces that the goal of his commentary on\nthe Republic will be to strip away the parts that are merely\ndialectical, so as to identify the claims that achieve the level of\ndemonstrative science (Republic I.21). Accordingly, he\nattends very selectively to the ten books that comprise Plato’s\nRepublic, dispensing entirely with the first and tenth books\nand the first half of the second book, and merging the rest into three\nbooks. The first presents political science and reflects on the\ncomponents of the virtuous city, especially the guards. The second\nconsiders virtuous governments and the qualities of the ruler of the\nvirtuous city and the philosopher. The third is devoted to\nnon-virtuous governments, comparisons between them, and the transition\nfrom one to another.", "\nThe Platonic text is subjected to two parallel frameworks. The first\nis Aristotelian, both in its overarching theoretical\nframework—replacing the dialectical and dialogical character of\nthe Platonic text with Aristotle’s ethical and logical framework\n(Butterworth 1986)—and in its particular details, as when Ibn\nRushd emphasizes the role of logic rather than mathematics in the\ntraining of the guards and the ruler of the virtuous city\n(Republic II.76–7). The second is the contextualization\nof this text in the Islamic and Andalusian environment. Ibn Rushd\ntakes the Umayyad, Almoravid, and Almohad dynasties as examples of\nmany of the issues he deals with in the text, and harshly criticizes\nthe current Almohad reign (e.g., Republic III.103) as well as\nthe position of the philosopher at the time, which he compares to\nbeing surrounded by ferocious monsters (Republic II.64). This\ncritical attitude is particularly notable when he discusses how women,\nsharing the same natures as men, are suited to the same activities,\nfit to serve as guardians, philosophers, and rulers. Yet, as things\nare, these capacities are not fostered: “since women in these\ncities are not prepared with respect to any of the human virtues, they\nfrequently resemble plants. Their being a burden upon the men in these\ncities is one of the causes of poverty” (Republic\nI.54).", "\nIt is clear that Ibn Rushd comments on the Republic only for\nlack of Aristotle’s superior work. At the end of his paraphrase\non the Nicomachean Ethics, he describes the shortcomings in\nPlato’s treatise, and criticizes Ibn Bājja for having\njudged the Republic as the perfect treatise on the virtuous\ncity. What is less clear is exactly what Ibn Rushd’s own textual\nsources were. Did he deal directly with Plato’s text, with the\nassistance of Galen, al-Fārābī, and Aristotle’s\nRhetoric? Or was the Platonic text not in his hands, which\nmeans that he was commenting on Galen’s Compendium on\nPlato’s Politics, with the help of al-Fārābī\nand Aristotle? While the use of Aristotle’s and\nal-Fārābī’s texts is clear, the question of his\naccess to Plato remains obscure (Mahdi 2016)." ], "section_title": "8. Ethics and Politics", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\nOur focus has been Ibn Rushd. But in studying this subject one cannot\nhelp but notice the strange way in which modern scholarship has\nconcerned itself more with the later reception of his ideas than\naround Ibn Rushd himself. Here we briefly consider the reception of\nhis thought in Muslim, Jewish, and Christian contexts." ], "section_title": "9. Reception", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\nIbn Rushd is often described as a philosopher who failed to attract\nthe attention of his first audience, resulting in the death of his\nphilosophy at the hands of its intended Islamic readers, a state of\naffairs that is said to have continued until its revival in the\nideological debates of the Arab Renaissance (nahḍa)\n(Kügelgen 1994, al-Jābirī 1998). To be sure, Ibn\nRushd’s influence in Muslim contexts cannot compare to the\noverwhelming influence of Ibn Sīnā, nor even to Ibn\nRushd’s own influence in Europe. Still, the commonly heard claim\nthat he had no influence on Islamic thought is false.", "\nFirst, recent scholarship has shown that Ibn Rushd had successors. Ben\nSharīfa (1999) identifies 39 direct disciples of Ibn Rushd, most\nof whom were faithful, and some of whom continued his work in\nphilosophy and related sciences.", "\nSecond, after Ibn Rushd’s death, his works were hardly ignored\nby the leading scholars in Andalusia and Morocco. Theologians,\nmathematicians, sufīs, historians, physicians, philosophers and\nliterary figures used Ibn Rushd’s works extensively. In medicine\nand logic, his influence on Ibn Ṭumlūs has recently become\napparent (Ibn Ṭumlūs 2020; Ben Ahmed 2016, 2017, 2019c,\n2020a). His influence also extended to Ashʿarite theology, as\nwhen Abū al-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf al-Miklātī\nquoted Ibn Rushd’s epitome on the Metaphysics and the\nIncoherence of the Incoherence to refute the philosophers\n(Ḥamdān 2005). The same can be said of certain Maghrebi\nmathematicians who benefited from the conceptual arsenal provided by\nIbn Rushd’s philosophical writings. In this context, one can\ncite the example of Ibn Haydūr al-Tādilī, who put\nforward the concept of “the one” (al-wāhid)\nas crystallized by Ibn Rushd (Ibn Haydūr 2018). Ibn\nṬumlūs, al-Miklāti, Ibn ʿAmīra\nal-Makhzūmī, and Ibn Haydūr, among others, appropriate\nIbn Rushd’s philosophical analysis without naming him, whereas\nIbn Sabʿīn on occasion uses Ibn Rushd’s writings\nwithout name even while in other places he criticizes him by\nname—thus complicating the task of identifying the texts used.\nSome of these texts, in particular in jurisprudence and religion, were\npart of the curriculum in Andalusia until its fall (Ben Sharīfa\n1999; Akasoy 2008; Ben Ahmed 2019b). Indeed, in Muslim contexts, some\nof Ibn Rushd’s works have been in constant use from the\nlatter’s lifetime until today. They formed part of the training\nof scholars such as Ibn al-Tilimsānī and Ibn Khaldūn,\nas well as part of the curriculum of important teachers such as\nAbū ʿAbd al-Lāh al-Ābilī (Ibn\nal-Khaṭīb 1975, iii: 507; Ibn Khaldūn 2004).", "\nThird, evidence has emerged that some of Ibn Rushd’s books were\ntransmitted east, to Egypt and the Levant, and used by philosophers\nand scholars there. In addition to copies of the Kashf and\nthe Incoherence found in Turkey, Egypt, and India, and the\ntestimony of\n Maimonides,\n who from Egypt was able to acquire most of Ibn Rushd’s\ncommentaries (Davidson 2005, 108–10), we can identify the spread\nof Ibn Rushd’s ideas among some philosophers, as is the case\nwith the theory of the unity of truth adopted by\n Abd al-Latīf al-Baghdādī\n (Ben Ahmed 2019a). Moreover, some of Ibn Rushd’s philosophical\nand metaphysical positions concerning causality and location were\nadopted by thinkers who were generally regarded as enemies of\nphilosophical and rational thought, as is the case with Ibn Taymiyya,\nwho made extensive and explicit use of Ibn Rushd’s texts and\nadopted some of his positions in his crystallization of his conception\nof the history of philosophy and kalām (Ben Ahmed 2019b,\n2020b, 2020d; Hoover 2018).", "\nFourth, we now also have evidence that Ibn Rushd’s texts reached\nIran in the sixteenth century and became widely known to scholars in\nthe seventeenth century. The catalogues indicate that dozens of them\nwere transcribed during this time. The large number of copies reflects\nanother phenomenon that we should not continue to ignore: the demand\nfor the teaching of these books and their use by students and teachers\nin madrasas in Safavid Iran. Some thinkers and philosophers used them\nin their debates and teaching. Suffice it to mention here Abd\nal-Razzāq al-Lāhījī, Mullah Rajab ʿAlī\nTabrīzī, and Muḥammad Ṭāhir\nWaḥīd al-Zamān Qazwīnī (Endress 1999, 2001,\n2006; Pourjavady and Schmidtke, 2015; Ben Ahmed forthcoming)." ], "subsection_title": "9.1 Arabic" }, { "content": [ "\nIbn Rushd’s philosophy quickly found a second home in Judaism,\nwhere it became so prominent as even to supplant Aristotle as the\nparamount authority in philosophy and science (Harvey 2000). The first\nand critical event was Maimonides’ acquisition of Ibn\nRushd’s commentaries, perhaps around 1190. His subsequent praise\nof this work precipitated a four-century fascination with Ibn Rushd\namong Jewish philosophers (Harvey 1992), especially focusing on his\ncommentaries but even extending to some of his religious\ntreatises.", "\nAs Jewish authors began to write increasingly in Hebrew, Ibn\nRushd’s texts followed, thanks to a series of Arabic-to-Hebrew\ntranslations from 1230 onward (see Zonta 2010 and, in more detail,\nTamani and Zonta 1997, 31–49). By 1340, virtually all of the\ncommentaries were available in Hebrew, even while very little of\nAristotle himself was translated. In parallel with this process,\nJewish authors began to write commentaries on Ibn Rushd, giving rise\nto a extensive series of “supercommentaries” (Glasner\n2011). The leading example of this phenomenon is\n Gersonides’\n series of supercommentaries on Ibn Rushd in the 1320s (Glasner\n1995).", "\nThe extent to which Ibn Rushd took precedence over other sources of\nAristotelianism is quite startling. A typical example is Shem Tov Ibn\nFalaquera, whose introduction to his thirteenth-century encyclopedia\nclarifies that “all that I write are the words of Aristotle as\nexplained in the commentaries of the scholar Averroes, for he was the\nlast of the commentators and he incorporated what was best from the\n[earlier] commentaries” (in\n Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera §4).\n Each of the various types of Rushdian commentary had their champions\nat different times. Here is the advice of Moses Almosnino from the\nsixteenth-century: “do not squander your time with the epitomes\nand middle commentaries of Averroes, but read only the long\ncommentaries, for if you read the long commentaries carefully you will\nhave no need to read any other book in order to understand anything of\nnatural science” (in Harvey 1985, 61).", "\nOther important figures from the thirteenth century are\n Isaac Albalag\n and\n Isaac Polqar.\n Prominent fourteenth-century figures are Gersonides and Moses Narboni\n(see Hayoun 2005), whose commentary on Ibn Rushd’s theory of\nconjunction has been translated into English along with Ibn\nRushd’s epistle. Prominent names from the fifteenth century\ninclude Abraham Bibago and\n Elijah Del Medigo\n (see Hayoun 2005). Sixteenth-century figures such Abraham de Balmes\nattempt more accurate Latin translations of Ibn Rushd, drawing on\nearlier Arabic-to-Hebrew translations (Ivry 1983, Hasse 2016).", "\nSee also the entries on the\n influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on Judaic thought\n and the\n influence of Islamic thought on Maimonides." ], "subsection_title": "9.2 Hebrew" } ] } ]	[ "Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis (Venice:\nJunta, 1562), \n available online.", "Georges C. Anawati, Bibliographie d’Averroes (Ibn\nRushd) (Algiers: Jāmiʻat al-Duwal\nal-ʻArabīyah, 1978).", "Philipp W. Rosemann. “Averroes: A Catalogue of Editions and\nWritings from 1821 Onwards,” Bulletin de philosophie\nmédiévale 30 (1988) 153–221.", "Majid Fakhry. Averroes (Ibn Rushd): His Life, Works and\nInfluence (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001).", "Matteo Di Giovanni. 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Renaissance\nAverroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern\nEurope (Dordrecht: Springer).", "Al-ʿAlawī, Jamal Al-Dīn (1986a).\nAl-Matn al-Rushdī: Madkhal li-qirāʾa\njadīda [The Rushdian Corpus: An Introduction to a New\nReading] (Casablanca: Dār Tubqāl).", "––– (1986b). “Naẓariyyat\nal-burhān wa dalālatuhā fī al-khiṭāb\nal-falsafiy ʿinda Ibn Rushd,” in Un Trait d’union\nentre l’Orient et l’Occident: al-Ghazzali et Ibn\nMaimoun (Rabat: Maṭbaʿat al-maʿārif\nal-jadīda), 43–101.", "Amerini, Fabrizio (2008). “The Semantics of Substantial\nNames: The Tradition of the Commentaries on Aristotle’s\nMetaphysics,” Recherches de théologie et\nphilosophie médiévale 75: 395–440.", "Arfa Mensia, Mokdad (1999). “Malāmiḥ min\nnaẓariyyat Ibn Rushd fī al-nubuwwa,” in M. Arfa\nMensia (ed.), Ibn Rushd faylasūf al-sharq wa-l-gharb\n(Tunis: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī), I:219–57.", "––– (2019). “Dogmatics, Theology, and\nPhilosophy in Averroes,” in Adamson and Di Giovanni (2019),\n27–44.", "Belo, Catarina (2007). Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and\nAverroes (Leiden: Brill).", "Ben Ahmed, Fouad (2010–11). “Averroes’\nPhilosophical Approach to Dialectics: Values, Usages, and\nLimits,” Mélanges de l’Université\nSaint-Joseph 63: 259–322.", "Ben Ahmed, Fouad (2012). “Al-Tamthīl tadlīlan\nfī naẓariyyat al-nubuwwa,” in Tamthilāt wa\nIstiʿārāt Ibn Rushd: min manṭiq al-burhān\nilā manṭiq al-Khaṭāba (Beirut, Algeria,\nRabat: Manshurāt Ḍifāf, Manshurāt\nal-Ikhtilāf, Dār al-Amān), 133–70.", "––– (2016). “Three Masters and One\nDisciple: Ibn Ṭumlūs Critical Incorporation of\nAl-Farābī, al-Ġazālī, Ibn Rushd,” in\nAndreas Speer and Thomas Jescke (eds.), Schüler und Meister,\n39th Kölner Mediaevistentagung (Berlin: De Gruyter),\n537–56.", "––– (2017). Ibn Ṭumlūs\nal-faylasūf wa al- ṭabīb (620/1223): Sīrat\nbībliyūgrafiyya, with an introduction in\nEnglish (Beirut, Rabat, Alger, Tunis: Manshūrat\nḌifāf, Dār al-Amān, Manshūrāt\nal-Ikhtilāf, Kalima li al-Nashr).", "––– (2019a). “Fī\nmunāhaḍat Ibn Sīnā wa as-sīnawiyya:\nʿAbd-Allaṭīf al-Baghdādī wa\niṣlāḥ al-falsafa fī al-qarn at-thālith\nʿashar al-mīlādī,”\nHespéris-Tamuda 54: 129–64.", "––– (2019b). “Ibn Rushd in the\nḤanbali Tradition: Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and\nthe Continuity of Philosophy in Muslim Contexts,” The Muslim\nWorld 19: 561–81.", "––– (2019c). “Ibn Tumlūs’ Logic\nand Medicine: An Overview of the Current State of Scholarship,”\nin Jean-Baptiste Brenet and Olga L. Lizzini (eds.), La philosophie\narabe à l’étude: sens, limites et défis\nd’une discipline moderne / Studying Arabic Philosophy: Meaning,\nLimits and Challenges of a Modern Discipline (Paris: Vrin),\n705–21.", "––– (2020a). “Ibn Ṭumlūs on\nDialectic Reasoning: The Extent of His Reliance on\nal-Fārābī and Ibn Rušd,” in Nadja Germann\nand Steven Harvey (eds.), The Origin and Nature of Language and\nLogic in Medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought\n(Turnhout: Brepols).", "––– (2020b). “Re-writing the History of\nPhilosophy in Sunni Muslim contexts: Ibn Taymiyyah and the Impact of\nIbn Rushd,” Hespéris-Tamuda 55:\n303–54.", "––– (2020c). “Fī murājaʿat\nʿalāqat Ibn Rushd bi al-maḏhab al-Ashʿarī wa\nbi al-ʿaqīda al-muwaḥḥidiyya,” in\nJamāl ʿAllāl al-Bakhtī (ed.), al-Fikr\nal-Ashʿarī bi al-Andalus: Tārīkh wa\nishkālāt (Tetouan: Markaz Abū al-Ḥasan\nal-Ashʿarī), 477-539.", "––– (2020d). “What Were Ibn Rushd’s\nWorks Doing in Egypt and the Levant in the 14th Century? Ibn Rushd in\nthe Library of Ibn Taymiyya,” Al-Ibānat 6:\n183–233.", "––– (forthcoming). “Ibn Rushd in\nIrān: «En Orient, après\nAverroès…» Revisited,” in Science,\nPhilosophy and Kalām in Islamic Civilisation: The Old and the\nNew (International colloquium organized by the\nSociété internationale d’histoire des sciences et\nde la philosophie arabes et islamiques, Naples, 9–11 September\n2019).", "Ben Sharīfa, Muḥammad (1999). Ibn Rushd\nal-Ḥafīd: Sīra wathāʾiqīyya\n(Casablanca: Maṭbaʿat al-Najāḥ\nal-Jadīda).", "Bertolacci, Amos (2007). “Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof\nof God’s Existence and the Subject Matter of Metaphysics,”\nMedioevo 32: 61–97.", "Black, Deborah L. (1990). Logic and Aristotle’s\nRhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy\n(Leiden: Brill).", "––– (1996). “Memory, Individuals, and the\nPast in Averroes’ Psychology,” Medieval Philosophy and\nTheology 5: 161–87.", "––– (1999). “Conjunction and the Identity\nof Knower and Known in Averroes,” American Catholic\nPhilosophical Quarterly 73: 159–84.", "––– (2019). “Constructing Averroes’\nEpistemology,” in Adamson and Di Giovanni (2019),\n96–115.", "Blaustein, Michael A. (1984). Averroes on the Imagination and\nthe Intellect (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).", "Bou Akl, Ziad (2019). “Averroes on Judicial\nReasoning,” in Adamson and Di Giovanni (2019), 45–63.", "Brenet, Jean-Baptiste (2003). Transferts du sujet: la\nnoétique d’Averroès selon Jean de Jandun\n(Paris: Vrin).", "––– (2015). 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Medieval Discussions of the Eternity\nof the World (Leiden: Brill).", "Davidson, Herbert A. (1987). Proofs for Eternity, Creation and\nthe Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy\n(New York: Oxford University Press).", "––– (1992). Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes\non Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and\nTheories of Human Intellect (New York: Oxford University Press,\n1992).", "––– (2005). Moses Maimonides: The Man and\nHis Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press).", "Di Giovanni, Matteo (2006). “Averroes on the Species of\nCelestial Bodies,” Miscellanea mediaevalia 33:\n438–64.", "––– (2007). “Individuation by Matter in\nAverroes’ Metaphysics,” Documenti e studi sulla\ntradizione filosofica medievale 18: 187–210.", "––– (2011). “Substantial Form in\nAverroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics,” in P.\nAdamson (ed.), In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the\nSixth/Twelfth Century (London: Warburg Institute)\n175–94.", "––– (2012). “Averroes’ Notion of\nPrimary Substance,” in A. Musco et al. (ed.), Universality\nof Reason: Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages (Palermo:\nOfficina di Studi Medievali, 2012) III: 55–65.", "––– (2019). “Averroes, Philosopher of\nIslam,” in Adamson and Di Giovanni (2019), 9–26.", "Druart, Thérèse-Anne (1994). “Averroes: The\nCommentator and the Commentators,” in Lawrence P. Schrenk (ed.),\nAristotle in Late Antiquity (Washington: Catholic University\nof America Press) 184–202.", "Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali (2000). “La demonstration du signe\n(burhān al-dalīl) selon Ibn Rushd\n(Averroès),” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione\nfilosofica medievale 11: 113–31.", "Endress, Gerhard (1995). “Averroes’ De caelo:\nIbn Rushd’s Cosmology in His Commentaries on Aristotle’s\nOn the Heavens,” Arabic Sciences and\nPhilosophy 5 (1995) 9–49.", "––– (1999). “Le projet\nd’Averroès: constitution, réception et\nédition du corpus des œuvres d’Ibn\nRušd,” in Gerhard Endress and Jan A. Aertsen (ed.),\nAverroes and the Aristotelian Tradition: Sources, Constitution and\nReception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126–1198)\n(Leiden: Brill), 3–31.", "––– (2001). “Philosophische\nein-Band-Bibliotheken aus Isfahan,” Oriens 36:\n10–58.", "––– (2006). “Reading Avicenna in the\nMadrasa: Intellectual Genealogies and Chains of Transmission of\nPhilosophy and the Sciences in the Islamic East,” in James E.\nMontgomery (ed.), Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the\nMany to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank\n(Leuven: Peeters), 371–422.", "Freudenthal, Gad (2002). “The Medieval Astrologization of\nAristotle’s Biology: Averroes on the Role of the Celestial\nBodies in the Generation of Animate Beings,” Arabic Sciences\nand Philosophy 12: 111–37.", "Gätje, Helmut (1986). “Die Vorworte zum\nColliget des Averroes,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen\nMorgenländischen Gesellschaft 136: 402–27.", "Gauthier, René-Antoine (1982). “Notes sur les\ndébuts (1225–1240) du premier\n‘averroïsme’,” in Revue des sciences\nphilosophiques et théologiques 66: 321–74.", "Geoffroy, Marc (1999). “L’Almohadisme\nthéologique d’Averroès (Ibn Rušd),”\nArchives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen\nÂge 66: 9–47.", "Glasner, Ruth (1995). “Levi ben Gershom and the Study of Ibn\nRushd in the Fourteenth Century,” Jewish Quarterly\nReview 86: 51–90.", "––– (2009). Averroes’ Physics: A\nTurning Point in Medieval Natural Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press).", "––– (2011). “The Evolution of the Genre of\nPhilosophical-Scientific Commentary: Hebrew Supercommentaries on\nAristotle’s Physics,” in G. Freudenthal (ed.), Science\nin Medieval Jewish Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress), 182–206.", "Gutas, Dimitri (1993). “Aspects of Literary Form and Genre\nin Arabic Logical Works,” in Charles Burnett (ed.), Glosses\nand Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and\nMedieval Latin Traditions (London: Warburg Institute),\n29–76.", "Ḥamdān, Aḥmad ʿAlamī (2005).\n“Istīʿāb al-laḥẓa al-rushdiyya\nfī naqd al-Miklātī li al-falsafa,” in\nʿAlī al-Idrīsī (ed.), al-Ittijāhāt\nal-kalāmiyya fī al-Gharb al-Islāmī (Rabat:\nManshūrat Kulliyat al-Adāb wa al-ʿulūm\nal-Insāniyya), 237–59.", "Hansberger, Rotraud (2019). “Averroes and the\n‘Internal Senses,’” in Adamson and Di Giovanni\n(2019), 138–57.", "Harvey, Steven (1985). “The Hebrew Translation of\nAverroes’ Prooemium to his Long Commentary on\nAristotle’s Physics,” Proceedings of the American\nAcademy for Jewish Research 52: 55–84.", "––– (1992). “Did Maimonides Letter to\nSamuel ibn Tibbon Determine Which Philosophers Would Be Studied by\nLater Jewish Thinkers?” Jewish Quarterly Review 83:\n51–70.", "––– (2000). “On the Nature and Extent of\nJewish Averroism: Renan’s Averroès et\nl’averroïsme Revisited,” Jewish Studies\nQuarterly 7: 100–19.", "Hasse, Dag Nikolaus (2016). Success and Suppression: Arabic\nSciences and Philosophy in the Renaissance (Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press).", "Hayoun, Maurice-Ruben (2005). “L’averroïsme dans\nles milieu intellectuels du judaisme: Moïse de Narbonne\n(1300–1362) et Eliya Delmédigo (v.\n1460–1493),” in André Bazzana, Nicole\nBériou, and Pierre Guichard (eds.), Averroès et\nl’averroïsme (XIIe–XVe\nsiècle): un itinéraire historique du Haut Atlas à\nParis et à Padoue (Lyon: Presses Universitaires),\n275–305.", "Hoover, Jon (2018). “Ibn Taymiyya’s Use of Ibn Rushd\nto Refute the Incorporealism of Fakhr al-Dīn\nal-Rāzī,” in Abdelkader al-Ghouz (ed.), Islamic\nPhilosophy from the 12th to the 14th Century (Göttingen:\nV&R Unipress), 469–91.", "Hourani, George F. (1962). “Averroes on Good and\nEvil,” Studia Islamica 16: 13–40.", "Hyman, Arthur (1965). “Aristotle’s ‘First\nMatter’ and Avicenna’s and Averroes’\n‘Corporeal Form’,” in Saul Lieberman et al. (eds.)\nHarry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume (Jerusalem: American\nAcademy for Jewish Research) 385–406.", "Ibn Haydūr, ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Lāh\nal-Tādilī (2018). Tuḥfat al-ṭullāb wa\numniyyat al-ḥussāb fī sharḥ mā ashkal min\nrafʿ al-ḥijāb, in Aḥmad Muṣliḥ\n(ed.), Al-Riyāḍiyāt fī Maġrib al-qarn\nal-rābiʿ ʿashar: Tuḥfat al-ṭullāb li\nIbn Hadūr al-Tādilī (d. 816/1413) (Rabat: Dār\nNashr al-Maʿrifa).", "Ibn al-Khaṭīb, Lisān al-Dīn (1975).\nAl-Iḥāṭa fī akhbār\nGharnāṭa [History of Granada], 4 vols.: vol.3\ned. ʿAbd al-Lāh ʿInān (Cairo: Maktabat\nal-Khānjī).", "Ibn Khaldūn, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (2004).\nRiḥlat Ibn Khaldūn [Autobiography], ed.\nM. Ben Tāwīt al-Ṭanjī (Beirut: Dar al-kutub\nal-ʿilmiyya).", "Ibn Ṭumlūs (2020). Compendium on Logic\n(al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-Mantiq), ed.\nF. Ben Ahmed (Leiden: Brill).", "Ivry, Alfred L. (1983). “Remnants of Jewish Averroism in the\nRenaissance,” in Bernard Dov Cooperman (ed.), Jewish Thought\nin the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University\nCenter for Jewish Studies), 243–65.", "Al-Jābirī, Muḥammad ʿĀbid (1998).\nIbn Rushd: Sīra wa fikr (Beirut: Markaz\nDirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya).", "Klima, Gyula (1998). “Ancilla theologiae vs domina\nphilosophorum: Thomas Aquinas, Latin Averroism and the Autonomy\nof Philosophy,” in Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (eds.),\nWas ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? (Berlin: De Gruyter),\n393–402.", "Kogan, Barry S. (1985). Averroes and the Metaphysics of\nCausation (Albany: SUNY Press).", "Kügelgen, Anke von (1994). Averroes und die arabische\nModerne: Ansätze zu einer Neubegründung des Rationalismus im\nIslam (Leiden: Brill).", "Kuksewicz, Zdzisław (1968). La thèorie de\nl’intellect chez les averroistes latins des XIIIe et XIVe\nsiècles: de Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance\n(Wrocław: Ossolineum).", "Mahdi, Muhsin (2016). “Averroes’ Commentary on\nPlato’s Republic,” in Mokdad Arfa Mensia (ed.),\nPolitical Philosophy and Philosophy of History: Proceedings of the\nColloquium Dedicated to Muhsin Mahdi (Tunis: Dār\nal-tanwīr), 27–42.", "Mahoney, Edward (1988). “Aristotle as ‘The Worst\nNatural Philosophy’ (pessimus naturalis) and ‘The\nWorst Metaphysician’ (pessimus metaphysicus): His\nReputation among Some Franciscan Philosophers (Bonaventure, Francis of\nMeyronnes, Antonius Andreas, and Joannes Canonicus) and Later\nReactions,” in O. Pluta (ed.), Die Philosophie im 14. und\n15. Jahrhundert (Amsterdam: Gruener), 261–73.", "Maier, Anneliese (1982). On the Threshold of Exact Science:\nSelected Writings of Anneliese Maier on Late Medieval Natural\nPhilosophy, tr. Steven D. Sargent (Philadelphia: University of\nPennsylvania Press).", "Marenbon, John (2007). “Latin Averroism,” in Anna\nAkasoy, James E. Montgomery, and Peter E. Pormann (eds.), Islamic\nCrosspollinations: Interactions in the Medieval Middle East\n(Exeter: Gibb Memorial Trust), 135–47.", "Martin, Craig (2015). “Providence and Seventeenth-Century\nAttacks on Averroes,” in Paul J. J. M. Bakker (ed.),\nAverroes’ Natural Philosophy and Its Reception in the\nWest (Leuven: Leuven University Press), 193–212.", "Niewöhner, Friedrich and Loris Sturlese (1994).\nAverroismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance (Zurich:\nSpur).", "Normore, Calvin G. (1995). “Who Was Condemned in\n1277?” Modern Schoolman 72: 273–81.", "Ogden, Stephen (2016). “On a Possible Argument for\nAverroes’s Single Separate Intellect,” Oxford Studies\nin Medieval Philosophy 4: 27–63.", "––– (forthcoming). “Averroes’s Unity\nArgument against Multiple Intellects,” Archiv für\nGeschichte der Philosophie.", "Pasnau, Robert, with Christina Van Dyke (eds.) (2010). The\nCambridge History of Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press).", "Phillipson, Traci (2013). “The Will in Averroes and\nAquinas,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical\nAssociation 87: 231–47.", "Pourjavady, Reza and Sabine Schmidtke (2015). “An Eastern\nRenaissance? Greek Philosophy under the Safavids\n(16th–18th Centuries AD),”\nIntellectual History of the Islamicate World 3:\n248–90.", "Puig, Josep (1992). “Materials on Averroes’s\nCircle,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 51:\n241–60.", "Putallaz, François-Xavier (2010). “Censorship,”\nin Pasnau and Van Dyke (2010), 99–113.", "Rahman, Fazlur (1958). Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and\nOrthodoxy (London: Allen and Unwin).", "Renan, Ernest (1852). Averroès et\nl’averroīsme: essai historique (Paris: Auguste Durand,\n1852). A revised and expanded second edition was published in Paris by\nMichel Lévy in 1861.", "Sabra, Abdelhamid I. (1984). “The Andalusian Revolt against\nPtolemaic Astronomy. Averroes and al-Bitruji,” in E. Mendelsohn\n(ed.), Transformation and Tradition in the Sciences: Essays in\nHonor of I. Bernard Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress), 133–53.", "Sylla, Edith Dudley (1979). “The A Posteriori Foundations of\nNatural Science,” Synthese 40 (1979) 147–87.", "Tamani, Giuliano and Mauro Zonta (1997). Aristoteles\nHebraicus: versioni, commenti e compendi del Corpus Aristotelicum nei\nmanoscritti ebraici delle biblioteche italiane (Venice:\nSupernova, 1997), 31–49.", "Taylor, Richard C. (1998). “Personal Immortality in\nAverroes’ Mature Philosophical Psychology,” Documenti\ne studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 9:\n87–110.", "––– (2000). “‘Truth Does Not\nContradict Truth’: Averroes and the Unity of Truth,”\nTopoi 19: 3–16.", "––– (2009). “Introduction,” in\nAverroes, Long Commentary on the De anima of\nAristotle (New Haven: Yale University Press), xv–cix.", "––– (2012). “Averroes on the\nSharīʿah of the Philosophers,” in R. C. Taylor and I.\nA. Omar (eds.), The Judeo-Christian-Islamic Heritage:\nPhilosophical and Theological Perspectives (Milwaukee: Marquette\nUniversity Press), 283–304.", "––– (2014). “Providence in\nAverroes,” in P. d’Hoine and G. Van Riel (eds.),\nFaith, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval\nand Early Modern Thought: Studies in Honour of Carlos Steel\n(Leuven: Leuven University Press), 455–72.", "––– (2018). “Averroes and the\nPhilosophical Account of Prophecy,” Studia\ngraeco-arabica 8: 387–304.", "Thom, Paul (2019). “Averroes’ Logic,” in Adamson\nand Di Giovanni (2019), 81–95.", "Twetten, David (2007). “Averroes’ Prime Mover\nArgument,” in Jean-Baptiste Brenet (ed.), Averroès et\nles averroïsmes juif et latin (Turnhout: Brepols),\n9–75.", "––– (forthcoming). “Aristotle Less\nTransformed: Averroes and the Prime Mover Not as Artist but as\nArt,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica\nmedievale.", "Urvoy, Dominique (1998). Averroès: les ambitions\nd’un intellectuel musulman (Paris: Flammarion). (There is a\n1991 edition in English, but the 1998 French edition is significantly\nimproved.)", "Van Steenberghen, Fernand (1980). St. Thomas Aquinas and\nRadical Aristotelianism (Washington: Catholic University of\nAmerica Press, 1980).", "Wippel, John F. (1995). Mediaeval Reactions to the Encounter\nBetween Faith and Reason (Milwaukee: Marquette University\nPress).", "Wirmer, David (2008). Über den Intellekt: Auszüge\naus seinen drei Kommentaren zu Aristoteles’ De anima.\nArabisch–Lateinisch–Deutsch (Freiburg:\nHerder).", "Wolfson, Harry Austryn (1962). “The Problem of the Souls of\nthe Spheres, from the Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle through the\nArabs and St. Thomas to Kepler,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers\n16: 67–93.", "Zonta, Mauro (2010). “Ancient Philosophical Works and\nCommentaries Translated into Hebrew,” in Pasnau and Van Dyke\n(2010), 826–32." ]	[ { "href": "../arabic-islamic-metaphysics/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in: metaphysics" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-natural/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in: natural philosophy and natural science" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-language/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in: philosophy of language and logic" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-mind/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in: psychology and philosophy of mind" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-greek/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: Greek sources" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-judaic/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on Judaic thought" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-influence/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-causation/", "text": "causation: in Arabic and Islamic thought" }, { "href": "../ibn-rushd-natural/", "text": "Ibn Rushd [Averroes]: natural philosophy" } ]
ibn-gabirol	Solomon Ibn Gabirol [Avicebron]	First published Thu Sep 23, 2010	[ "\n\nA prolific poet and the author of the Fons Vitae, Ibn Gabirol\nis well known in the history of philosophy for the doctrine that all\nthings —including soul and intellect—are comprised of\nmatter and form (“Universal Hylomorphism”), and for his\nemphasis on Divine Will. Ibn Gabirol is moved first and foremost by\nthe Neoplatonic theological sense that God's reality infuses all\nthings, and by the concomitant ethical and existential ideal of\nNeoplatonic Return—the notion that we must strive, through mind\nand deed, to reclaim our own truest being and likeness to our\nsource. Thought wrongly by centuries of Christian scholastics to be\neither a Christian defender of Augustine or a Muslim misreader of\nAristotle, Ibn Gabirol is in fact a Jewish Neoplatonist who, under the\nadditional influence of Pseudo Empedoclean ideas, paints for us a\nmodified Plotinian universe in which all things are rooted in various\n“layers” of matters and forms which reveal the mediating\ngraces of God's own Will/Wisdom/Word. For Ibn Gabirol, everything\n(even the simple unity of intellect itself) reveals a matter+form\ncomplexity, mirroring in this way the complex unity of God's own\n“essential” and “active” moments. Where God\nreveals himself as the “Fountain of Life,” our material\ncore acts as the river through which we may return always to our\nsource." ]	[ { "content_title": "1. Bio, Works, Sources and Influences", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "2. A Word on Method: Moving Beyond Aristotle, Augustine, and ", "sub_toc": [ "2.1 Aristotelian Lenses in the Study of Ibn Gabirol", "2.2 Augustinian Lenses in the Study of Ibn Gabirol", "2.3 Kabbalistic Lenses in the Study of Ibn Gabirol" ] }, { "content_title": "3. Knowledge and Deeds: the Purpose of Human Being", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "4. The Divine Creative Act", "sub_toc": [ "4.1 Creation ex nihilo and the Fountain of Life", "4.2 Will, Wisdom, Word, Intellect and the Cosmos", "4.3 God, Matter and the Omnipresence of Desire" ] }, { "content_title": "5. Matter, Form and “Universal Hylomorphism”", "sub_toc": [ "5.1 Ibn Gabirol's Neoplatonic Hylomorphism 1: Plato's Participation Revised", "5.2 Ibn Gabirol's Neoplatonic Hylomorphism 2: Aristotelian Substance Revised", "5.3 Ibn Gabirol's Neoplatonic Hylomorphism 3: Plurality of Forms" ] }, { "content_title": "6. Cosmic Landscape, Soul Landscape: From Heavenly Circuits to Human Return", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "7. The Poet", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Bibliography", "sub_toc": [ "Works by Ibn Gabirol", "Some Related Primary Texts", "Secondary Literature" ] }, { "content_title": "Academic Tools", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Other Internet Resources", "sub_toc": [] }, { "content_title": "Related Entries", "sub_toc": [] } ]	[ { "main_content": [ "\n\nJewish Neoplatonist Solomon ben Judah Ibn Gabirol (Shelomoh ben\nYehudah Ibn Gabirol in Hebrew; Abu Ayyub Sulaiman ibn Yahya Ibn\nJubayrol (or Ibn\n Jabirul)[1]\nin Arabic; Avicebron / Avicembron / Avicenbrol /\nAvencebrol in Latin) was born in Málaga Spain in 1021/2 (Guttman\noffers 1026) and died, most likely in Valencia, most likely in 1057/8\n(Guttman offers 1050; Sirat offers 1054–8; Joseph Ibn Zaddik\noffers\n 1070).[2]\nFrom his own\nautobiographical remarks in his poems, it appears that this important\npoet-philosopher was orphaned, infirm and unattractive (it seems he\nsuffered a disfiguring skin\n ailment).[3]\nWhile there was a time during which he was\ninvolved with a circle of Jewish intellectuals in Saragossa, and while\nhe did enjoy the patronage of a respected (though, eventually murdered)\nJewish patron for a short while, it is also clear that Ibn Gabirol had\nan anti-social\n disposition[4]\nand a mostly strained relationship with the Jewish community. This\nlatter point has perhaps been overemphasized to full blown misanthropy\ndue to a translation error: in his sharp criticism of Ibn Gabirol's\nphilosophy (as repetitive, wrong-headed and unconvincing), Ibn Daud\nconcludes (in his ha-Emûnah ha-Ramah) that through his\nphilosophy Ibn Gabirol “led the Jewish people into error,”\nwhich through a mistranslation of the Arabic into Hebrew got wrongly\nconveyed as the claim that he slandered the Jewish people\n(dîber sarah gedôlah al ha-ûma) (see Pines\n1977a; for brief discussion in English, see Sirat 1985, p. 81). That\naside, a poem he wrote upon leaving Saragossa does lambast the\ncommunity (“…giants they deem themselves, for me to rate\nno more than grasshoppers…I am away, beneath my feet like mire\nI stamp them hard…”) (for translation and references for\nthis poem, see Loewe 1989, p. 21, and footnote 9, p. 170), and it does\nseem that he had a hard time finding patrons and friends (legend tells\nof his having created some sort of female automaton for house chores\n[apparently this story circulated in the 17th century; see Ashkenazi\n1629, part 1, 9; see Bargebuhr 1976, p. 62; Loewe 1989 fn. 9\np. 170]—perhaps a legend built on his reputation as having had\nfew companions). Perhaps we may root his generally surly disposition\nin his rather hard life or, on the other hand, in his self-assured\nsense of what was, to be sure, his own keen intellect and poetic\ngenius. On this latter point, we might consider another Ibn Gabirol\nlegend—a mythic tale of his death: killed by a jealous poet, Ibn\nGabirol's remains are discovered when curious townsmen dig under a fig\ntree to determine why its flowers, fruit, and fragrance exceed the\nbeauty of anything they've ever experienced (see Loewe 1989, p. 23\nwith reference details in footnote 14, p. 170).", "\n\nComplementing a vast corpus of Hebrew poetry (see section 7 below),\nIbn Gabirol's most expansive work is his philosophical treatise,\nthe Fons Vitae (The Fountain of Life, or\nyanbû‘ al-hayâh in\n Arabic,[5]\nand the meqôr\nhayyîm in its later Hebrew\n translation).[6]\nOriginally written in Arabic in\nthe 11th century in the form of a dialogue between a teacher and his\nstudent, the Fons Vitae was translated into Latin in the 12th\ncentury by the translation team of Dominicus Gundissalinus and John of\nSpain (Johannes\n Hispanus),[7]\nand made into an abridged Hebrew version (one\nwhich loses the dialogue format and is something more of a summary of\nthe original) by Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera in the 13th century. The\noriginal Arabic text is lost to us, though we do have some extant\nfragments in the form of citations of the original Arabic version in\nthe Arabic language texts of other Jewish medieval\n philosophers.[8]\nBecause the Arabic\nfragments are sparse, the main version of the text is the Latin 12th\ncentury translation—it is considered more true to the original\nthan the later 13th century Hebrew translation both because it is an\nearlier translation, but also because unlike the Hebrew summary\ntranslation, the Latin edition is (ostensibly) a complete translation,\nmaintaining—as the Hebrew summary does not—the original\ndialogue format of Ibn Gabirol's original text. That said, it is\nworth noting that sometimes the 13th century Hebrew translation is more\nhelpful than the Latin because it is able to resonate with various\nHebrew terms at play in Ibn Gabirol's own vast corpus of Hebrew\npoetry which is often helpful in shedding light on some given\nphilosophical point in the Fons Vitae.", "\n\nIbn Gabirol also authored (in Arabic) On the Improvement of the\nMoral Qualities (islâh al-’akhlâq in\nthe Arabic, or tîkkûn mîdôt ha-nefesh,\nthe Hebrew title of the translation by Judah Ibn Tibbon) a blend of\nphysiological and philosophical insights on the nature of the human\nsoul. We also have evidence in other medieval Jewish authors of what\nmight be part of an allegorical commentary on the Bible by Ibn Gabirol\n(as found in Abraham ibn Ezra's commentary on the Bible; see\nFriedlaender 1877, p. 40; Kaufmann 1899, p. 63ff.; for English see\nSirat 1985, p. 79), and it is debated whether he might also be the\nauthor of Choice of Pearls (mukhtâr\nal-jawâhir, lit. Choice (or: Selection) of Jewels;\nor Mivhar ha-Penînîm, Choice of Pearls, in its\nHebrew\n translation),[9]\na collection of maxims aimed at cultivating a\nvirtuous soul. It might be further noted that there are medieval lists\nby later thinkers enumerating a total 21 treatises by Ibn Gabirol (see\nLoewe 1989, pp. 24–5) including an entire [non-extant] treatise on\nDivine Will to which Ibn Gabirol himself alludes in his Fons\nVitae. All this, of course, in addition to his having authored a\nvast corpus of Hebrew poetry, including a number of lengthy\nphilosophical poems (see section 7).", "\n\nAlthough we are not certain of what traditions most influenced his\nwork, we might certainly see in the pages of his philosophy and poetry\na unique blend of Jewish, Islamic, Neoplatonic, Pythagorean,\nphilosophical, Biblical, and mystical (Jewish and Islamic) source\nmaterials. We find overt use of Biblical quotes throughout his poetry,\nthough (and this is something for which other Jewish thinkers\ncriticized him) no overt references to the Bible or Jewish tradition in\nhis Fons Vitae (though the title arguably references\nPsalms 36:10). In his notion of a Divine Word (in the Fons\nVitae), we might hear resonances of the Longer Theology of\nAristotle; in his interest in a Divine Throne (in the Fons\nVitae and in his Keter Malkhût [Kingdom's\nCrown] poem), we might hear resonances of Muslim and Jewish\n“Throne\n theologies”;[10]\nin his reference to God creating out of letters, we might hear resonances of the\nSêfer Yezîrah (The Book of Formation,\npossibly known to Ibn Gabirol through the commentary edition of Saadya\nGaon; for discussion of Sêfer Yezîrah and Ibn\nGabirol, see Schlanger 1965 and Liebes 1987); in his causal\nmetaphysical hierarchy we might discern the influence of the Liber\n de Causis;[11]\nand in his emphasis on a principle called “al-‘unsur\nal-awwal” in his Arabic writing (generally translated as\nfirst matter) and called “yesôd”\n(foundation) in his Hebrew poetry, we might hear resonances of a\ntradition which scholars have dubbed “Pseudo Empedoclean”—an \nimprecisely understood tradition of ideas found in an\neclectic array of medieval Jewish and Islamic texts (where authors\nsometimes refer overtly to Empedocles by name) in which there emerges a\nnotable focus on a principle of pure supernal matter\n(al-‘unsur al-awwal, literally “the first\nelement”) at the core of being which is itself either coupled\nwith a principle of first form or described as itself composite of the\nduality of “love and strife.” The exact nature of this\ntradition or traditions remains unclear, but can be found in\nal-Shahrastani, al-Shahrazuri, Ps. Ammonius, and al-Amiri (for\nreferences, see the entry on “anbaduklîs”—the \nArabic transliteration of “Empedocles”—in \nEncyclopedia of Islam), in some medieval Hebrew\nKabbalistic\n traditions,[12]\nand has been linked to ideas in Ibn Masarra (see Asín-Palacios\n1978), Isaac Israeli and Ibn Hasday (See Stern 1983a). Linking Ibn\nGabirol to this tradition seems warranted not only in light of his own\nemphasis on al-‘unsur al-awwal (followed in turn by an\nunusual focus on the role of matter/s in the cosmos), but in light of\na claim by his 13th century translator Shem Tov Ibn\nFalaquera who in the introduction to his Hebrew edition\nof Meqôr Hayyîm (Fons Vitae) writes that\nIbn Gabirol seems to have been influenced by\n“Empedocles' Book of the Five Substances”\n(cf. Falaquera in Fons Vitae 1962, p. 435). Leaving aside what\nthis might refer to (scholars debate both the title as well as what it\nrefers to), it does seem that Ibn Falaquera was right to note some\nlink between Ibn Gabirol's Fons Vitae and some set of ideas\ncirculating under the name of\n Empedocles.[13]", "\n\nWhile some later medieval Jewish thinkers—such as Shem Tov\nIbn Falaquera, Moses Ibn Ezra, Abraham Ibn Daud, Joseph ibn Zaddik and\nIsaac and Judah Abrabanel—were familiar with his philosophy,\nIbn Gabirol is probably most well-known among medieval and modern\nJewish authors for his Hebrew poetry, the best known of which being the\nKeter Malkhût (variously translated as\nKingdom's Crown, The Kingly Crown, The\nRoyal Crown, et\n al.),[14]\na long devotional poem exploring the ineffable\nsplendor of the divine and tracing God's presence throughout the\nvarious cosmological spheres which make up the universe. In fact, this\npoem is included in many Jewish prayer books for recitation on\nYôm Kippûr (The Day of Atonement), the highest of\nJewish holy days.", "\n\nThe Fons Vitae is arguably the most influential of his\nworks, though mostly among medieval Christians. Available in Hebrew\nsummary form by the 13th century, and quoted in Arabic in\nMoses Ibn Ezra's\n work,[15]\nthe Fons Vitae left its strongest\nimprint not on medieval Jews but on the medieval Christian world.\nTranslated into Latin in the 12th century, and circulating\nno longer under Ibn Gabirol's name per se, but now under the\nLatinized version of his name (variously as Avicebron, Avicembron,\nAvicenbrol and Avencebrol), the Fons Vitae was engaged\n(variously criticized and hallowed) by centuries of medieval Christian\nscholars, who either assumed the author to be a Muslim or a Christian,\nnone suspecting the author to be the accomplished medieval Jewish poet,\nSolomon Ibn Gabirol.", "\n\nFollowing the Christian reception of Ibn Gabirol's text\nfurther, we might note that whole groups of medieval Christian\nphilosophers assumed the text to have been written in particular by an\nAugustinian Christian. Taken up by many Franciscan philosophers in just\nthis way, Ibn Gabirol's Fons Vitae text became a\ncornerstone in many theologically charged debates between Franciscans\nand Dominicans, the Franciscans pointing to many of the Fons\nVitae doctrines in support of what they took to be true, untainted\nChristian ideas as laid out by Augustine—in contrast to the\nmore heavily Aristotelianized ideas of Dominicans like St. Thomas\nAquinas. It was not until the middle of the 19th century\nthat the Fons Vitae began its return to its Jewish roots when\nSolomon Munk uncovered the 13th century Hebrew summary by\nShem Tov Ibn Falaquera in which the text is attributed to Solomon Ibn\nGabirol. In this way, Munk recognized the Fons Vitae to have\nin fact been penned by the 11th century Jewish poet.", "\n\nIt is worth noting that in spite of this discovery, many scholars\ncontinue to tacitly read Ibn Gabirol's Fons Vitae\nthrough Augustinian and other inappropriate lenses. (See section 2 on\nmethodology below)." ], "section_title": "1. Bio, Works, Sources and Influences", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nWhile there is no neutral lens through which to engage the history\nof ideas, it is important to guard against three particularly\ndistorting lenses in the study of Ibn Gabirol: Aristotelian,\nAugustinian, and Kabbalistic." ], "section_title": "2. A Word on Method: Moving Beyond Aristotle, Augustine, and Kabbalah", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nOne of Ibn Gabirol's key interests in his Fons Vitae is a\nstudy of matter and form (and in particular a doctrine which later\nthinkers have called “Universal Hylomorphism”). While\nthere is no question that Ibn Gabirol is in some sense influenced by\nAristotelian concepts of form, matter, substance, categories, etc.,\nthere is no reason to think that he is generally using those concepts\nin anything even close to an Aristotelian way. As hopefully will\nbecome clear in this study, the primary notions of matter and of\nsubstance in Ibn Gabirol are deeply (and obviously)\nnon-Aristotelian [see sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3], revealing instead deeply\nPlatonic and Neoplatonic sensibilities, and—even more\nuniquely—deeply “Empedoclean” influence. (In this\nregard, Pessin 2009 (pp. 287–288) uses the novel term\n“Grounding Element” to replace the Latin\n“materia prima” and its English translation as\n“prime matter” as a translation for Ibn Gabirol's Arabic\n“al-‘unsur al-awwal”; see too Pessin\n2004). It is critical to note that “prime matter” is a\nmisleading term to use in a study of Ibn Gabirol as it at imports\nundue Aristotelian resonances to—and masks Pseudo (henceforth,\n“Ps.”) Empedoclean resonances at play in—Ibn\nGabirol's Arabic terminology.", "\n\nNoting that Ibn Gabirol is not an Aristotelian goes a long way to\ninvalidating the deepest grounds (as opposed to the details) of Thomas\nAquinas' and other medieval thinkers' criticisms of Ibn\nGabirol's metaphysics as essentially being some kind of\nmisunderstanding of Aristotle. Since Ibn Gabirol is not trying—tacitly \nor otherwise—to do what many scholastics are trying to\ndo (viz. to “get Aristotle right”), it is methodologically\nstrained to critique Ibn Gabirol from an Aristotelian vantage point. An\nAristotelian lens does not open us to understanding the metaphysical\npicture that Ibn Gabirol is trying to paint for us." ], "subsection_title": "2.1 Aristotelian Lenses in the Study of Ibn Gabirol" }, { "content": [ "\n\nAnother of Ibn Gabirol's key interests in the Fons\nVitae is the Divine Will. This focus in part explains why many\nChristian Franciscans thought the Fons Vitae to have been\nauthored not only by a Christian but by what they would have seen as a\nright-minded Augustinian Christian. While we have known since the\n19th century that the Fons Vitae was in fact\nauthored by a Jewish poet, this has arguably not altered much of the\nAugustinian-lensed scholarship on the Fons Vitae. Some\nscholars, for example, have concluded simply on the basis of the idea\nof a Divine Will in Ibn Gabirol that he (like Augustine) must mean by\nthis some divine power at odds with emanation. While the details of Ibn\nGabirol's cosmogony are complex, and while it is indeed possible\nthat his notion of Will rules out emanation, another equally strong\noption is that he uses the term “Divine Will” in a way that\n(contra Augustine) is deeply compatible with Plotinian emanation. My\npoint here is simply to caution the reader: just because something\nsounds Augustinian does not mean that it is, and if it is not, we need\nto keep all our conceptual options open. Certainly “will”\nis consistent with emanation in the pages of Plotinus; we should not\nstart out—tacitly wearing Augustinian lenses—with any\nassumptions to the contrary in the Fons\n Vitae.[16]\n(In this regard, Pessin 2009, p. 286 with note 54, \nuses the term “Divine Desire” to replace the\nLatin “voluntas” and the English\n“Will” as a translation of Ibn Gabirol's Arabic\n“al-irâda”).", "\n\nFor our current purposes, we must at least bear in mind that since\nIbn Gabirol is not a Christian Augustinian, it is methodologically\nstrained to read Ibn Gabirol from an Augustinian vantage point. An\nAugustinian lens does not open us to understanding the metaphysical\npicture that Ibn Gabirol is trying to paint for us." ], "subsection_title": "2.2 Augustinian Lenses in the Study of Ibn Gabirol" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIn his elaboration on the metaphysics of matter, Ibn Gabirol\nfrequently uses the Arabic term “al-‘unsur”\n(instead of the more common Arabic terms\n“al-hayûlâ” and\n“al-madda”) for matter. In fact, as outlined in\nsection 1, this is one of the key pieces of evidence for identifying a\nuniquely “Empedoclean” strain in his thinking. That said,\nmany readers instead simplistically fall into a Kabbalistic reading of\nIbn Gabirol since the Arabic “al-‘unsur” is\ncorrelated to the Hebrew term “yesôd” both\nin Ibn Gabirol's own Hebrew poetry as well as in\nFalaquera's 13th century Hebrew translation of the\nFons Vitae. While to be sure, the Hebrew term\n“yesôd” (literally “foundation”)\nis a cornerstone term and concept in Jewish mysticism, the desire to\nread Ibn Gabirol Kabbalistically (as a proto-Zoharian) is simply\nunder-supported by the mere fact that he (and his Hebrew translator)\nuse the term “yesôd”. While there might be\nKabbalistic traces in Ibn Gabirol, it is methodologically inadvisable—and \ndistorting—to simply start out assuming there are.\nWe might note, for example, F. E. Peters' boldly claiming—with\nno stated evidence—in his “Avicebron” entry in\nthe New Catholic Encyclopedia: “The true philosophical home of\nAvicebron is in the Zohar and in the speculative sections of the\nCabala” (see Peters 1967, volume 1, p. 1130). Such a claim is not\nprima facie evident. In an obviously more methodologically careful\nspirit, there are scholars of Jewish mysticism who recommend\nconnections to Ibn Gabirol (usually with reference to Ibn\nGabirol's poems, not his Fons Vitae) (see, for example,\nIdel, who offers the suggestion of mystical overtones in an Ibn Gabirol\npoetic reference to “ten sefirôt” (Idel\n1982, p. 278); see too: Idel 1992; Liebes 1987; Heller-Wilensky 1967).\nWhile we needn't dismiss the idea of links between Ibn Gabirol\nand Jewish mysticism (he was most likely familiar with the\nSêfer Yetzîrah tradition, and possibly other\ntraditions, of sefîrôt), we must be\nmethodologically cautious to not over-Kabbalize Ibn Gabirol (and\nespecially his Fons Vitae): use of terms like\n“sefîrôt,”\n“yesôd,” et al. do not necessarily reveal\nJewish mystical overtones or influence. Scholem reminds us (in his\nstudy of Ibn Gabirol's influence on Kabbalah) that even after\nmany studies of the link between Ibn Gabirol and the Kabbalah, we have\nno clear conclusions (Scholem 1939, p. 160). (Avoiding reading Ibn\nGabirol as a proto-Zoharist is not to deny any impact of Ibn Gabirol on\nlater Kabbalists; but even this question of forward-influence must be\ntreated with care; as Scholem also notes, the mere use of the term\n“Divine Will” in Kabbalistic thinkers after Ibn\nGabirol does not necessarily reveal a Gabirolean influence (Scholem\n1939, p. 161)).", "\n\nSince we have strong reason to claim that Ibn Gabirol's use of\nthe term “yesôd” reflects a Ps. Empedoclean\ntradition, it is methodologically strained to read Ibn Gabirol from a\nKabbalistic vantage point. A Kabbalistic lens does not open us to\nunderstanding the metaphysical picture that Ibn Gabirol is trying to\npaint for us." ], "subsection_title": "2.3 Kabbalistic Lenses in the Study of Ibn Gabirol" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nLike any engaged Neoplatonist, Ibn Gabirol is first and foremost\ninterested in understanding the nature and purpose of human being: we\nmust understand what we are (our nature) so that we know how to live\n(our purpose). This set of interconnected human questions is what Ibn\nGabirol is interested in even in the midst of what might sometimes seem\nto be rather laborious cosmological and metaphysical explorations. Ibn\nGabirol, like other Neoplatonists, explores layers of cosmological and\nmetaphysical realities in an attempt to understand how to live the best\nhuman life possible.", "\n\nEmphasizing that this is Ibn Gabirol's main concern, we find\nin the opening pages of his Fons Vitae text a reminder that\nthe goal of the entire inquiry is to understand why human beings were\nmade (“Quare factus est homo?,” “Why was man\nmade?”—Fons Vitae 1.1, p. 2, line 8)—which \nis to say, to understand the ends (or purpose) of human being\n(the Fons Vitae teaches that a human ought to “pursue\nknowledge of his final cause [or: purpose] according to which he was\ncomposed,” Fons Vitae 1.2, p. 4, lines 8–9). In spelling\nout the true, divinely ordained goal of human life (the purpose of the\nhuman life is described as a product of God's Will\nat Fons Vitae 1.2, p. 4, lines 10–12), the text describes a\ntwofold endeavor: the pursuit of knowledge and the doing of good deeds\n(Fons Vitae 1.2, p. 4, line 27).", "\n\nWhile the remaining hundreds of pages of the Fons Vitae go\non to offer highly obscure elaborations on matter and form, the overall\npoint of the entire study (and one might argue, of Ibn Gabirol's\nentire oeuvre of poetry as well) is not obscure at all: his\ngoal is to understand the nature of being and human being so that he\nmight better understand and better inspire the pursuit of knowledge and\nthe doing of good deeds:", "\n\nKnowledge indeed leads to deeds, and deeds separate the soul from\nthe contraries which harm it…In every way, knowledge and deeds\nliberate the soul from the captivity of nature and purge it of its\ndarkness and obscurity, and in this way the soul returns to its higher\nworld. (Fons Vitae 1.2, p. 5, line 27–p. 6, line 4)", "\n\n“And in this way, the soul returns to its higher world.”\nThe ends of humanity (reached through the pursuit of truth and\ngoodness) are imagined by Ibn Gabirol—as we find is the case\namong Neoplatonists more generally—through the evocative image\nof a “return” coupled with the image of a “higher\nworld”:", "\nStudent: What is the purpose of man?\n\nTeacher: The inclination [applicatio] of his soul to the\nhigher world in order that everyone might return to his like.\n\n(Fons Vitae 1.2, p. 4, lines 23–25)\n", "\n\nThe joint imagery of a “return” and a “higher\nworld” are themselves part of a conceptual framework in which all\nof existence is seen to follow a principle of similitude whereby lesser\nbeings mirror higher beings. This idea, often expressed as the idea\nthat “the microcosm mirrors the macrocosm”—a common\nPlatonic, Pythagorean, and Neoplatonic trope—has a strongly\nprescriptive overtone: it's not simply that lesser things mirror\ngreater things, but that in this mirroring, we find the purpose of the\nlesser things, viz. to be just like the greater things. Depending on\nthe context, the “lesser things” and “greater\nthings” might vary, but the most popular version of this\n“microcosm mirrors the macrocosm” idea, and the one at play\nin the above Ibn Gabirol passage, envisions the human being (sometimes\nhuman soul, sometimes human intellect) as the “lesser\nthing” and the wisely ordered cosmos (and sometimes, relatedly,\nthe mind of God or, alternatively, the cosmic Intellect) as the\n“greater thing.” In this descriptive idea that humans\nmirror something greater there emerges the strongly prescriptive\nreminder that we ought to emulate that which is better than ourselves\n(viz. through the pursuit of knowledge and good deeds). This\nprescriptive call to human perfection through truth and goodness is the\nessence of the idea of Neoplatonic Return, and it is this idea which\nlies at the core of Ibn Gabirol's claim that we ought purge our\nsouls of darkness and “return to our like[ness]”.", "\n\nIn one especially important Fons Vitae passage, we find a\ndescription of this Neoplatonic return which very much reflects\nPlotinus' own famous ascent passage (at Enneads 4.8.1),\na passage reproduced (with important changes) in what misleadingly\nbecame known as the Theology of Aristotle, an Arabic\ncompilation-edition of books 4–6 of Plotinus'\n Enneads.[17]\nHere is the final part of Ibn Gabirol's version:", "\n\n…But if you should lift yourself to the first universal\nmatter and [are] illumined by its shadow, you will then see the most\nwondrous of wonders. Devote yourself to this and be filled with love\nfor it, since here lies the meaning for which the human soul exists,\nand here lies too amazing delight and utmost happiness (Fons\nVitae 3.56; my translation from the Arabic and Latin; for Wedeck\ntranslation, see his Fountain of Life (Ibn Gabirol 1962/2008),\npp. 110–111)", "\n\nIn addition to many other changes from Plotinus and the Theology\nof Aristotle, one special point of difference is the reference\nhere to universal matter (see section 5). It is precisely Ibn\nGabirol's unique focus on “universal matter” (a grade\nof spiritual materiality at the very core of existence) which leads him\nto uniquely envision the ultimate moment of Neoplatonic return as a\nmoment of “illuminated shadow”: since there is a material\nelement just “above” Intellect for Ibn Gabirol, the return\nto Intellect will be characterized by the light of Wisdom set within\nthe shade of the supernal first matter.", "\n\nIn the closing sentences of the Fons Vitae, Ibn Gabirol\nfurther describes this state of “return” as a liberation\nfrom death and a cleaving to the source of life (“Evasio\nmortis et applicatio ad originem vitae,” Fons Vitae\n5.43, p. 338, line 21). Following on general Neoplatonic intuitions,\nthis means that when one has attained the heights of truth and\ngoodness, one will have reverted to one's truest life, a pure\nstate of soul which transcends mortal life—we might describe it\nas a kind of immortality while in the mortal body. This directly\nresonates with what A.H. Armstrong, in his study of Plotinus, has\ndescribed as the Neoplatonic doctrine of “Double Selfhood,”\na sensitivity to the human condition being at one and the same time (1)\nalready fully imbued with the fullest state of intellect, but somewhat\nparadoxically also (2) fallen from—and needing to return to—the \nfullest state of intellect.", "\n\nWhile Ibn Gabirol's quest towards the Neoplatonic Return\ncenters, as we have seen, on the pursuit of truth and goodness, it also\nincludes an attempt to know the unknowable God. In laying out the kinds\nof truth that the human soul must aim to acquire, the Fons\nVitae speaks of “the knowledge of all things according to\nwhat they are” (Fons Vitae 1.4, p. 6, lines 13–14), and\nmost of all of the knowledge of the First Essence [Latin, essentia\nprima, Arabic, adh-dhât\nal-’ûlâ, as evidenced in some\nof the extant Arabic fragments of the Fons Vitae; see Pines\n1958/77 and Fenton 1976] that sustains and moves all things. While we\nare asked to know God—understood by Ibn Gabirol in tripart\nterms as a hidden First Essence and as an active, manifesting Will and\nWisdom—we are cautioned a few lines later that it is impossible\nto truly know the First Essence, and that we can only aspire to know\nthe things which He makes and sustains (Fons Vitae 1.4, p. 6,\nlines 19–22). As it relates to Ibn Gabirol's more general\ncharacterization of God in the Fons Vitae in tripart terms as\nan essential hidden reality and an active manifesting Will and Wisdom,\nwe might say that for Ibn Gabirol, we can only know God through the\nmanifestation of his Will and Wisdom in the ordered structure of\nexistents in the universe (i.e. through the things which He makes and\nsustains, and in particular, through the wisdom revealed by them)." ], "section_title": "3. Knowledge and Deeds: the Purpose of Human Being", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIbn Gabirol describes God's creative act in many ways across\nhis philosophical and poetic writings. While it is certainly possible\nto find a single overall theological picture emerging from across Ibn\nGabirol's work, it is at least worth noting a degree of tension\nbetween a range of different and sometimes seemingly conflicting ideas.\nIn what follows, we will look at the complex play of creation,\nemanation, Will, Wisdom, Word, and desire in Ibn Gabirol's\ncosmo-ontology." ], "section_title": "4. The Divine Creative Act", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nTo begin with, Ibn Gabirol's God is described as a Creator God\nwho is an absolute simple unity—so simple as to exceed the\ngrasp of the human mind and tongue. This apophatic theme (a theme which\nin any philosopher highlights the absolute unity of God) can be seen\nfor example, in the very first canto of his Keter\nMalkhût [Kingdom's Crown] depiction of God:\n“Yours is the name hidden from the wise…” God, for\nIbn Gabirol, is, in proper Neoplatonic fashion, an absolute unity. That\nsaid, God is nonetheless described in the Fons Vitae by Ibn\nGabirol in dual—and in some sense, tripart—terms:\nGod's unity consists on the one hand in a purely hidden Essence\nand on the other hand in the manifesting activity of a Divine Will. We\nalso learn (thirdly) of God's Wisdom (and in related fashion, of\nthe Divine Word). Emphasizing more of a dual—and less of a\ntripart—vision of this absolutely simple Creator, Ibn Gabirol\nsometimes directly identifies the Divine Will with the divine Wisdom\n(though that does not always seem clear throughout Ibn Gabirol's\nwritings).", "\n\nWhile God's creative act is described by Ibn Gabirol as a\ncreation ex nihilo (see Fons Vitae 3.3, p. 79, line\n18; FV 3.25, p. 139, lines 24–25) a view normally seen in opposition to\ndoctrines of emanation, he also uses common emanation metaphors—the \nflow of light and the flow of water—to describe the origins\nof the cosmos. For example, drawing on the Psalms 36:10 image\nof a “fountain of life,” in the very title of his Fons\nVitae\n text[18]\nIbn Gabirol seems to at least beckon to Greek and Muslim Neoplatonic\nvisions of an emanating\n God.[19]\nSimilarly stressing an emanating cosmos (though\nnot necessarily the idea of an emanating God per se), Ibn Gabirol—in \nwhat appears to be part of a commentary on Genesis—likens \nthe material core of being (to which we will return in\nsection 5) to a river. Allegorically rendering the Garden of Eden\nwaters to the pure matter which sits at the root of the unfolding\ncosmos, Ibn Gabirol envisions the pulse of existence as a River of Life—a \nvibrant outpouring which links all of existence to a single\noverflowing source (see Sirat 1985, p. 79). Of course, this particular\nimage does not necessarily suggest that God Himself emanates (i.e. the\nidea that existence emanates forth from matter is still consistent with\nGod creating that matter ex nihilo, and not via\nemanation).", "\n\nAttempting to put all the pieces of Ibn Gabirol's complex\ncosmogony together, we can find pieces of creation ex nihilo,\nemanation, and creation ex aliquo; God's formative act\nbegins with creating matter and form (possibly a creation ex\nnihilo, but described fluidly enough as to leave open other\ninterpretations), and He then draws out, in an emanating flow, the\nremainder of existence from these dual starting points (emanation, but\nalso creation ex aliquo in the sense that all of existence is\nbeing formed through the mediation of matter, as opposed to each\nexistent being created directly—in the sense of\n‘unmediated’—by God as in other versions of\ncreation ex nihilo\n accounts).[20]\nIn the end, Ibn Gabirol's conceptual play—with \nnotions of creation and emanation side by side—ought \nleave us open to various interpretations of how precisely to\nunderstand his cosmogony.", "\n\nIn his Keter Malkhût poem (Kingdom's\nCrown), Ibn Gabirol further describes God's creative act as\na splitting open of nothingness: “…ve-qara el\nha-’ayîn ve-nivqa…,” (“…and\nHe called out to the nothing and it split open…”; in\nGabirol's poem, Keter Malkhût, canto 9; See\nSchirmann 1967, p. 262, line 82; for a treatment of this line, see\nPines 1980). Here, the void of precreation—the pre-existent\n’ayîn, or “nothingness”—is\nsplit open by God's own voice in the moment of creation—a\nmoment arguably described by Ibn Gabirol in his poem\nahavtîkha (“I Love You”) as the material\n“proto-existence” (kemô-yêsh) awaiting\nits fulfillment through\n form,[21]\nand described in the Fons Vitae as a\ncomplex unfolding of and downward manifesting of a first pure matter\nthrough the introduction of (or unfolding of) forms by the Divine Will.\nThe material nothing—in all three images—is the ground\nof existence, as it is at once the site of desire, a yearning to be\nen-formed, which is to say, to become more and more manifest. We will\nsay more about this emphasis on desire below (see section 4.3).", "\n\nCentral to Ibn Gabirol's cosmogony is also the notion of the\nDivine Will, an emphasis for which the Fons Vitae is\nhighlighted in the history of ideas." ], "subsection_title": "4.1 Creation ex nihilo and the Fountain of Life" }, { "content": [ "\n\nEarly on in the Fons Vitae, we learn that the Divine Will\nis one of three central concepts that the human mind must set out to\ngrasp (the workings of matter and form, and the reality of a divine\nEssence as primal cause are the other two central concepts). We also\nlearn of Will that it is some sort of cosmic “intermediary\nbetween the extremes,” a role described as central to the basic\nunderpinning of the universe (Fons Vitae 1.7, p. 9, lines\n28–30; see too Fons Vitae 5.36, p 322, line 20–p. 323, line 1\nfor another statement of the three divisions of knowledge; in this\nlatter context, Will is identified with Word). We learn that Will is\nthe power of God infused in and penetrating through all things, that it\nis the power of unity in the universe, and that it is that which both\nbrings forth and moves all of existence. It is also described as the\ndivine force that maintains and sustains the essence of all things (see\nFons Vitae 5.39, p. 327, lines 14–15: Will is the power\n[virtus] of God infused in and penetrating all things; 5.39,\np. 327, lines 26–27: Will is the power [virtus] of unity; 1.2, p. 4,\nlines 14–15: Will is the divine power [virtus] bringing forth\nand moving all things; 1.5, p. 7, line 15: Will maintains and sustains\nthe essence of all things).", "\n\nTurning further to Will's mediating cosmic role, while the\nLatin text translates “intermediary between the extremes,”\nthe Arabic text uses a dual grammatical form, translating more\nspecifically as “intermediary between the two extremes.” In\nthe context of this claim, the “intermediation” role\nbetween the “two extremes” is ambiguous between two\ndifferent claims which are both equally true within the context of Ibn\nGabirol's worldview: on the one hand, Ibn Gabirol might mean that\nWill intermediates between (1) matter and form on the one hand and (2)\ndivine Essence on the other (the items corresponding to two of the\nthree “divisions of knowledge” which he describes [see\nsection 5]); on the other hand, Ibn Gabirol might mean that Will\nintermediates between (1) matter and (2) form, the two cosmic\n“building blocks” out of which all reality is\ncomprised.", "\n\nWill is further described as taking its own root in God's\nEssence, and is sometimes (but not always) described as the immediate\ncreative source of (and not just intermediary between) matter\nand\n form.[22]\nComplicating this picture of Will's creation of matter and form,\nwe also learn on the contrary that Will is the direct source only of\nform (and not\n matter)[23]—a \npoint supported further by the claim\nthat Will is (1) identical to Wisdom (and the source of form; see\nFons Vitae 5.42, p. 335, lines 4–5), and (2) that Wisdom is\nthe source only of form (and not matter), with the divine Essence\nitself being the direct source of matter: “…materia\nest creata ab essentia, et forma est a proprietate essentiae, id est\nsapientia et unitate…” (“…matter is\ncreated from Essence, and form is from the property of Essence, viz.,\nfrom Wisdom and Unity…”; Fons Vitae 5.42, p.333,\nlines 4–5; see too 5.42, p. 335, lines 4–5).", "\n\nLeaving the complexities of these competing claims aside in the\ncontext of this study, it is sufficient here to emphasize that Ibn\nGabirol's theology includes a Divine Will not only responsible\nfor the generation of one or both of matter and form, but responsible\nin some way for the “connection between matter and form” in\nall things, and, as such, responsible for sustaining all existing\nthings (all of which are, for Ibn Gabirol, form and matter composites;\nsee section 5). By sustaining the matter and form composition of all\nthings, Divine Will signifies the permeation of God's creative\nforce at the core of Being itself, and as such at the core of every\nindividual being.", "\n\nIn addition to identifying Will with Wisdom, Ibn Gabirol also\nidentifies Will with Word (Fons Vitae 5.36, p. 323, line 17).\nFollowing on this identification, in a rather evocative set of\npassages, Ibn Gabirol likens the act of creation to God's\nutterance of word (Fons Vitae 5.43). While this theme is\ncertainly not new within the history of Neoplatonic and Jewish ideas\n(suggesting resonance with the Longer Theology of\nAristotle's reference to the Word [Ar. kalima], as\nwell as resonance with Sêfer Yezîrah's\nemphasis on God's creation via Hebrew\n letters[24]),\nwhat is new is Ibn\nGabirol's unique way of fleshing that idea out in light of his\noverall metaphysics: Creation, writes Ibn Gabirol, is like a word that\nGod utters, and that word is itself the coming together of voice (the\nuniversal matter), the audible sounds that make up a given word\n(manifest forms), and the actual meaning of the word (the hidden\nuniversal form which contains and sustains all manifest forms). For Ibn\nGabirol, this analogy helps highlight his view of the unfolding divine\nWisdom / Will giving way to a cosmos which is a complex blend of\nmatters and forms, with a principle of pure universal matter and pure\nuniversal form at the very root of all existence.", "\n\nHere, we may speak of a revised Neoplatonic cosmos in which\nprinciples of form, matter and Will (if we are to think of that as\nsomething separate from God's Essence) emerge\n“between” God and the principle of Intellect (the principle\nwhich follows directly upon God in standard chartings of the\nNeoplatonic cosmos):", "\n\nIn Ibn Gabirol's cosmology, Intellect is highlighted as the\n first created being, as the Divine Glory\n (Kavod),[25]\nand as the first\noccurrence of “form in matter” composition (see Fons\nVitae 5.10, p. 274, line 19; 5.11, p. 277, line 4; for the related\nidea that God creates esse in a composite way out of matter\nand form, cf. Fons Vitae 5.40, p. 329, line 4). At times, Ibn\nGabirol emphasizes that this matter is pre-existent (that it does not\nhave existence on its own without form), and at times, he can be taken,\non the contrary, as emphasizing the “per se\nexistens” nature of matter (as for example in his very\ndefinition of matter at Fons Vitae 1.10, p. 13, lines 15–17\nand 5.22, p. 298, lines 13–7). While the precise meaning of Ibn\nGabirol's idea is open for interpretation, Schlanger suggests\nthat matter per se exists for Ibn Gabirol only as an idea in\nthe mind of God, and not as an actual reality prior to Intellect (see\nSchlanger 1968, p. 294). In this vein, we may note Ibn Gairol's\nclaim that the existence (esse) of matter is in the wisdom of\nGod (Fons Vitae 5.10, p. 275).", "\n\nReflecting on Ibn Gabirol's idea of some kind of “form\nand matter before Intellect” (either in an actual or in some\nconceptual sense), it is worth considering to what extent this suggests\n(as the above two discrete charts seem to suggest) a genuine departure\nfrom Plotinian Neoplatonism. On the face of it, Plotinus does not\nemphasize a principle of matter and form prior to Intellect. As such,\nwe may say that Ibn Gabirol's emphasis introduces a Ps.\nEmpedoclean change (either an actual ontological change or a\nconceptual “shift in focus”) into the standard Plotinian\npicture. That said, Plotinus certainly is sensitive to the duality of\nthe unity of Intellect (as compared with the unity of the One), and\neven occasionally overtly emphasizes the notion of Intellect's\ncomposition out of “intelligible matter” (See\nEnneads 2.4.1–5, 5.4.2 and 5.5.4; on the conceptual resonance\nof “intelligible matter” in Plotinus and Ibn Gabirol, see\nDillon 1992). While these sections of the Enneads in which\nPlotinus overtly emphasizes this theme are not part of the Arabic\nPlotinus materials which we would presume Ibn Gabirol to have had\naccess, it is worth noting that Ibn Gabirol's emphasis on\n“form and matter prior to intellect” does not necessarily\nrepresent any conceptual departure from Plotinus (or, we might add,\nfrom Platonic and Pythagorean sensitivities to the principle of an\nindefinite dyad at the core of reality). Clearly Plotinus is sensitive\nto the “duality” of any grade of reality outside of the\nOne: while Intellect is for Plotinus a unity, it is clearly a\n“dual” (or even plural) sort of unity as compared with the\nutter unity of the One. In this sense, Plotinus is deeply sensitive to\nthe “duality” outside of God (and, as such, the duality of\nIntellect), even in passages where he is not overtly referencing the\ncomposition of Intellect/Being out of intelligible matter (which is to\nsay, even in passages where he is not emphasizing the dual nature of\nIntellect). In this sense, it is arguably conceptually appropriate to\nalign even Ibn Gabirol's most emphatic sense of the dual\n“matter-with-form” composition of Intellect (or, relatedly,\nhis emphasis on a grade of matter “prior to” Intellect)\nwith even Plotinus' staunchest insistence on the unity of\nIntellect (as for Plotinus, the unity of Intellect, as compared with\nthe unity of the One, is dual by nature)." ], "subsection_title": "4.2 Will, Wisdom, Word, Intellect and the Cosmos" }, { "content": [ "\n\nReturning to our earlier discussion, Ibn Gabirol describes pure\nmatter as stemming directly from the Divine Essence itself, with form,\non the contrary, arising somewhat secondarily\nfrom the Divine Will. While this is not to suggest that God is Himself\nmade up of matter (as concluded by some fans of Ibn Gabirol such as\nDavid of Dinant in the history of Christian philosophy who ran into\ntrouble with the Church for theorizing God as matter), there is\narguably in Ibn Gabirol an intimate link between God and matter. Such a\nlink between materiality and God is not much of a conceptual stretch\n(though in standard Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Aristotelian contexts we\nwould tend to link God with form): both matter and God are utterly\nhidden and utterly grounding for all else, while form (and the\nWill/Wisdom with which it is associated) mark the lesser\n“active” or “manifesting” mode of divinity and\nof the cosmos. While of course for Ibn Gabirol God is an utter unity,\nwe may nonetheless theorize with Ibn Gabirol as follows: As God's\nessential hiddenness moves forward into action (Wisdom/Will/Word), so\ntoo pure material pre-existence moves forward into manifest being (i.e.\nbecomes more and more en-formed). Here, in an important sense, the\nimages of “darkness and the hidden” trump the images of\n“light and the manifest” both as they relate to God and to\nthe cosmos: as God's hidden Essence precedes and grounds his\nacts, so too matter precedes and grounds enformed being (and as such,\nall existents). Here, God and matter—in their dark / hidden\nrespects—have something very important in common. (See Pessin\n2009, p. 290, for chart mapping the superiority in this regard of the\nmaterial over the formal).", "\n\nIt ought be noted that herein lies a paradox found in one form or\nanother in all versions of Neoplatonism: on the one hand, there is a\nsense that moving forward (or downward) in the great chain of being is\na tragic fall away from the purity of divine unity; on the other hand,\nthere is a sense (not, for example, found in Gnostic materials) that\nthere is beauty and light in the creation, which is to say that in the\ncontinual downward manifesting of being we find the trace of Divine\nWill. In the context of Ibn Gabirol's conceptual space in which\n(as we will see in more detail in section 5) reality is seen as the\nprocess of moving from a more hidden / material to a more manifest /\nformal reality, the result is at once (1) a sense of loss in the move\naway from God's own hiddenness (with a sense that darkness is\nsublime) and (2) a sense of beauty and increasing grace as more and\nmore forms continue to manifest (“joining” to matter\nthrough the intermediation of the Divine Will), resulting ultimately in\nthe fullness of the cosmos (with a sense that light is sublime). These\ndueling images of the sublimity of unity (or pre-creation) on the one\nhand and manifestness (or creation) on the other (here in terms of the\nsublimity of darkness on the one hand and light on the other) offer an\ninsight into what we may call a Neoplatonic “theology of\nparadox” which is very much at play in Ibn Gabirol.", "\n\nIn his conception of God's relation to matter in the act of\ncreation, we must also emphasize Ibn Gabirol's focus on desire.\nProviding a bit more context to (and a different translation of) Ibn\nGabirol's Keter Malkhût [Kingdom's\nCrown] rehearsing of God's “splitting of the\nnothing” (see section 4.1), consider:", "\n\nYou are wise, and your wisdom gave rise to an endless desire in the\nworld as within an artist or worker—to bring out the stream of\nexistence from Nothing…He called to Nothing—which split;\nto existence—pitched like a tent…With desire's span\nhe established the heavens… (Canto 9 of the Keter\nMalkhût; translation from Cole 2001, p. 149)", "\n\nIn these poetic lines, as elsewhere throughout his writing, Ibn\nGabirol emphasizes the central motion of desire at the core of the\nuniverse. This can be seen throughout the Fons Vitae\nin the dual reminders that (1) all things have matter at their core,\nand (2) matter's own reality consists essentially in desire (viz.\na desiring-after-form). These two simple ideas lead to a much more\narresting insight, viz. inasmuch as all things are grounded in matter,\nand inasmuch as matter is a marker of desire, it follows that all\nreality is grounded in desire. Desire—in the guise of matter—is \nin this sense a central principle of Ibn\nGabirol's\n universe.[26]" ], "subsection_title": "4.3 God, Matter and the Omnipresence of Desire" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn his vision of the world, Ibn Gabirol's focus is on God,\nDivine Will, and the duality of form and matter. From an early section\nin his Fons Vitae, we learn:", "\n\nIn the whole of existence, there are three divisions of knowledge:\n(1) the knowledge of matter (al-‘unsur) and form\n(as-sûra), (2) the knowledge of Will\n(al-irâda), and (3) the knowledge of the First Essence.\nAmong substances, there is nothing other than these three. First\nEssence is cause; matter and form, effect; and Will is the intermediary\nbetween the two extremes (Fons Vitae 1.7; for Arabic, see\nPines 1958/77, p. 71; for slightly different translation with reference\nto “The All of Existence,” see Pessin 2009, p. 286 and note\n53 in that study)", "\n\nMatter and form—referred to in his Hebrew poetry under the\nalluring Hebrew labels of “yesôd”\n(foundation) and “sôd” (secret)—are,\nalong with the doctrine of Divine Will, cornerstones of the Fons\nVitae. In particular, the Fons Vitae teaches (rather\nunusually within the history of ideas) that all things—including \nspiritual simples such as soul and intellect (but not God)—are \ncomprised of matter and form. This doctrine is called\n“Universal Hylomorphism” by later scholastics in contrast\nto ordinary Aristotelian hylomorphism in which all substances\nother than soul/intellect are said to be comprised of matter\n(Greek: hûlê) and form (Greek:\nmorphê). This doctrine of Universal Hylomorphism emerges\nas a central theological and philosophical point of contention between\nAugustinian Franciscans (who embrace it) and Aristotelian Dominicans\n(who reject it). (It might be noted that one popular way that the\nFons Vitae doctrine comes up in medieval Christian debates is\non the question of whether angels (the separate intellects) are made up\nof matter and form, or just\n form).[27]", "\n\nHand in hand with the doctrine that all things (including spiritual\nsimples) are matter+form composites is Ibn Gabirol's idea of a\npure spiritual matter at the core of being which grounds even Universal\nIntellect in the great Neoplatonic chain of being. In the extant\nArabic, we find that Ibn Gabirol uses the term\n“al-‘unsur”, or the more descriptive\n“al-‘unsur al-awwal,” first matter (in\ncontrast to other more common Arabic philosophical terms for matter\nwhich Ibn Gabirol himself uses at other points in his\n work).[28]\nIn spite of the\nfact that this term is translated as “materia\nprima” in the Latin, and is as such often translated as\n“prime matter” in English, we need to keep in mind that\nwhatever Ibn Gabirol is talking about is not best thought of as\nAristotelian prime matter (which is what may readers undoubtedly\novertly or covertly think of when they hear the term “prime\nmatter”; see section 2). First of all, Ibn Gabirol's pure\nmatter is part of an overtly Neoplatonic world-view which, contra\nAristotle, privileges spiritual/intelligible substances over\nsensible/corporeal reality, and which, contra Aristotle and Plato,\nemphasizes the emanation of the sensible realm from the spiritual\nrealm. Further emphasizing that we are not talking of Aristotelian\nprime matter is the fact that Ibn Gabirol's use of the Arabic\nterm al-‘unsur (literally “the element,” and\ntranslated by the 13th century Hebrew editor as\n“yesôd” (foundation)) expressly mirrors a\nPs. Empedoclean tradition of a spiritual matter (called\nal-‘unsur) immediately outside of God. For these\nreasons, it is important to avoid Aristotelian resonances when\nconstructing Ibn Gabirol's ontology, and as such, one ought use\nthe term First Matter over “prime matter.”", "\n\nOf this first pure matter we learn at the very start of the Fons\nVitae that it is “…per se existens, unius\nessentiae, sustinens diversitatem, dans omnibus essentiam suam et\nnomen” (“…existent in and of itself, of a\nsingle essence, sustaining diversity, and giving to everything its\nessence and name”; Fons Vitae 1.10, p. 13, lines 15–17).\nAnd, in similar manner we learn at the very close of the Fons\nVitae that it is: “…substantia existens per se,\nsustentatrix diversitatis, una numero; et…est substantia\nreceptibilis omnium formarum” (“…a substance\nexistent in and of itself, the sustainer of diversity, one in number;\n…it is a substance receptive to all forms”; Fons\nVitae 5.22, p. 298, lines 13–7; compare with facing Arabic text at\nPines 1958/77, p. 53, section 9:2). Related to its status as the\n“sustainer of diversity,” pure matter is presented as the\nfundamental receiver that always seeks to receive its partner, viz.\nform. Pure universal matter is thus coupled—in a process\noverseen by Divine Will—with a pure universal form to yield the\nfirst fully existing substance, Universal Intellect. In their coupling,\nmatter and form thus mark the permeating presence of Divine Will in the\nuniverse. Related to his vision of a matter-to-form coupling through\nWill, Ibn Gabirol envisions the Neoplatonic emanating chain of being as\nan ever-descending series of matter-to-form couplings, and so:", "\nIntellect (matter + form)1\n\nSoul (matter + form)2\n\nCelestial Body (matter + form)3\n\nTerrestrial Body (mater + form)4\n", "\n\nHere, a hylomorphic lens is put onto the standard Neoplatonic\nhierarchy emphasizing the composition of all things (spiritual simples\nas well as bodies) in terms of matters and forms (and highlighting\nthree kinds of matter: spiritual, celestial, and\n terrestrial).[29]\nAnd with this\nhylomorphic lens emerges too the emphasis on Divine Will, the active\npresence of God responsible in some way for “mediating”\nbetween these matters and forms.", "\n\nIn the context of this hylomorphic vision, we find a confounding\nflipping in the Fons Vitae between ordinary negative and\nunexpected positive descriptions of the notion of\n matter.[30] \n The universal pure matter certainly has a positive set of associations\nwith it in Ibn Gabirol as compared with “corporeal” (or\n“lower”) matter: in contrast to “lower” matter\nwhich carries the 9 Aristotelian categories, “higher”\nmatter is the matter of pure spiritual simples and carries no quantity\nor quality (or any of the 9 categories). Again, mindful of the\nEmpedoclean tie-in and of his Hebrew terminology of\n“yesôd” (foundation), we are looking at\nsomething quite sublime, a reality which sits, as it were, directly\noutside of God prior even to Intellect, which he likens to a Divine\nThrone (see Fons Vitae 5.42, p. 335, lines 23–4), and which\nhe correlates to the more essential (and hidden) reality of God. In\nthese and related contexts in Ibn Gabirol, matter often emerges\n(somewhat unexpectedly within the history of ideas) as more sublime\n than even pure form.\nAnd yet, there are plenty of passages in\nthe Fons Vitae in which it is form which reigns supreme (as\nwe would expect in standard Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic\ntraditions): for example, form is identified as the cosmic source of\nunity and light, and it is form which is said to perfect or complete\nmatter by bringing being to it (although, as we have emphasized, it is\nstill plausible that for Ibn Gabirol matter per se still has\nsome kind of pre-existent—and perhaps superior—subsistence \nprior to and independent of this gift of being from\nform). Further highlighting form's supremacy, Ibn Gabirol\nargues, for example, that the substance of Intellect is superior to\nthe substance of body precisely because the former contains all forms\nand the latter contains only some forms (see Fons Vitae 3.9,\np. 98, line 24– p. 99, line 3), an argument which relies on the\nintuition that formality (not materiality) is the ontological marker\nof supremacy (and an argument which seems directly at odds with the\nintuitions behind another of his ideas, viz. that we ought call\na higher substance “matter” with respect to a lower\nsubstance). In the final account, we can see Ibn Gabirol as\nuniquely sensitive to the equal importance of both matter and form,\ntheir intimate interdependence one upon the other, and, ultimately,\ntheir unity as a single whole—a dynamic arguably mirroring his\nvision of God's own reality in terms of essential and active\n“moments” which are ultimately one inseparable unity." ], "section_title": "5. Matter, Form and “Universal Hylomorphism”", "subsections": [ { "content": [ "\n\nOne way to think of Ibn Gabirol's hylomorphic levels of\nreality (although Ibn Gabirol does not himself theorize it in this way\novertly) is in terms of his Neoplatonizing the Platonic notion of\nparticipation. For Plato, participation is in a form, and a highest\nform—participated in by all—is the form of being. For\nthe Neoplatonist, as for Ibn Gabirol, the focus on the form is replaced\n(or amplified) by the focus on the Universal Intellect that contains\nall forms (simultaneously, in potency, as one nested in the next).\nImagine the conceptual implication of this Neoplatonic focus on\nIntellect (versus a Platonic focus on the form of being) for a\nparticipation theory—if we think of it carefully, we will find\nthat the Neoplatonic model can quite organically gives rise to the kind\nof hylomorphic focus we find in Ibn Gabirol: In a Neoplatonic\nIntellect, all the forms are “in” Intellect, a notion which\ncan easily be seen as emphasizing Intellect's material role as\nsustainer. This would mean that the move from Platonic talk of forms to\nNeoplatonic talk of Intellect organically invites a new focus on the\nrole of [spiritual] matter (viz. the matter of Intellect by which it\nreceives or holds all the forms). This immediately transforms the\nPlatonic concept of participating in form/s to the concept of\nparticipating in matter (the receiver) (or, we might say, participating\nin matter as the means to participating in forms). And so, whereas for\nPlato all things participate in the form of being, for Ibn Gabirol, all\nthings are grounded in / have as their underlying “true\nsubstrate” the substance of Intellect which is to say, they\nparticipate in matter (viz. the spiritual matter of pure intellect)\nplus forms." ], "subsection_title": "5.1 Ibn Gabirol's Neoplatonic Hylomorphism 1: Plato's Participation Revised" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIbn Gabirol's metaphysics are obviously influenced by\nAristotle's talk of substance and its 9 categories. And yet, it\nwould be a mistake to think of Ibn Gabirol as an Aristotelian in much\nof his use of the term “substance.”", "\n\nTo confuse things, Ibn Gabirol does use the term substance in an at\nleast somewhat Aristotelian sense when he talks of corporeal substance—the \nsubstance which, a la Aristotle, receives the 9 categories.\nIbn Gabirol argues that this substance is first enformed by the form of\ncorporeity, or quantity (one approach among many ancient and medieval\ninterpretations of Aristotle, even if not actually\nAristotle's\n view).[31]\nMoving\nalready, though, from anything even loosely Aristotelian and\nmanifesting a more Platonic impulse, this substance is seen by Ibn\nGabirol as “lower substance” marking the lowest extremity\nof reality. Continuing on this Platonic move away from Aristotle, Ibn\nGabirol's main talk of “substance” refers, contra\nAristotle, to “simple substances,” by which he means the\nNeoplatonic Universal Intellect and Soul(s), each understood by Ibn\nGabirol as a joining of spiritual matter to spiritual form, and each\ndevoid of any of the 9 categories plaguing the “lower”\ncorporeal (i.e. Aristotelian) substance. These simple substances\n(exemplified in the simple substance of Intellect) are theorized as the\nintermediaries between God and lower substance.", "\n\nWe may begin to understand this sense of substance by noting that\nwith other Platonists and Neoplatonists, and deviating from\nAristotelian sensibilities, Ibn Gabirol envisions a “higher\nrealm” as that which is most real. However, whereas standard\nPlatonisms identify forms as the truest realities within that realm,\nIbn Gabirol adopts a hylomorphic (but by no means\nAristotelian) sensibility in his conception of the higher\nrealities: unlike Aristotle for whom only items in the corporeal realm\nare form+matter composites, for Ibn Gabirol, the realities in the\n“higher realm” (a Platonic idea avoided by Aristotle) are\nalso comprised of form+matter. This move turns a number of standard\nAristotelian, Platonic and Neoplatonic sensibilities on their heads in\na Gabirolean metaphysics, including the notion of substance.", "\n\nSpeaking of substance in the sense of “true substance”\nseparate from (and higher than) corporeal substance, Ibn Gabirol, in\nline with other Platonisms and contra Aristotle, is referring to a\n“higher realm.” However, unlike Plato, Ibn Gabirol focuses\n(with Neoplatonists) on the substances of Intellect and Soul(s)—which \nis to say, the reality of all forms “in” the simple\nspiritual substances (of Intellect and Soul), not on forms per se (see\nsection 5.1 above). In this sense, the spiritual simples are primarily\nnot the forms (as we might expect in Plato), but (in Neoplatonic\nspirit) the Universal Intellect and Soul. Relatedly, unlike other\nPlatonisms, Ibn Gabirol's higher realm is not theorized as a\nrealm of forms but as a realm of form and matter (again see section 5.1\non how the talk of Intellect leads us to the talk of forms\n“in” matter). This also means that with Aristotle, Ibn\nGabirol employs a lot more hylomorphic talk than Platonists (though\napplied to a completely non-Aristotelian “higher\nrealm”).", "\n\nThis also means that contra the standard Neoplatonic (and Platonic)\nrhetorics of “matter as evil,” there emerges in Ibn Gabirol\na concurrent discourse of “matter as supreme”: for Ibn\nGabirol, both form and matter in the “higher realm” carry\nwith them all the positive associations which form carries in standard\nPlatonic pictures (including a trajectory of thought in Ibn Gabirol on\nwhich pure matter arguably emerges as more sublime than pure form)." ], "subsection_title": "5.2 Ibn Gabirol's Neoplatonic Hylomorphism 2: Aristotelian Substance Revised" }, { "content": [ "\n\nIn the context of this analysis, we might also say a word about the\ndoctrine of “the plurality of forms,” a doctrine associated\nwith the Fons Vitae by later Christian scholastics. Taken in\ncontrast to the Aristotelian doctrine that each existent has a single\nsubstantial form (ensuring its unity as a substance), “the\nplurality of forms” doctrine describes the Universal Hylomorphic\nsense in which each existent has a number of essential forms (and\nmatters). In our highly Neoplatonic Gabirolean context (but less so in\nRoger Bacon and other Christian Universal Hylomorphists), we can simply\ntake this doctrine as an extension of the standard Plotinian idea that,\nas part of the great chain of being, any given existent is saturated\nthrough with the reality of the hypostases Soul and Intellect: in this\nsense, each existent has a number of essences, corresponding to the\nvarious “layers” (for Ibn Gabirol,\n“form+matter” spiritual simples) in the great chain of\nbeing." ], "subsection_title": "5.3 Ibn Gabirol's Neoplatonic Hylomorphism 3: Plurality of Forms" } ] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIbn Gabirol can be seen as offering us a revised version of the\nNeoplatonic great chain of being, adding an emphasis on Will, matter\nand form (and, in light of section 5, we might say a number of levels\nof matters and forms). With other Jewish Neoplatonists (see Isaac\nIsraeli for example), Ibn Gabirol also envisions not one but three\nWorld Souls, and a Universal Intellect which he describes in his\nKeter Malkhut [Kingdom's Crown] as “the\nSphere of Intellect” (in his Hebrew, galgal\nha-sâkhel), an odd and creative locution which blurs\nastronomical and metaphysical conceptions: generally the languages of\n“sphere” and “intellect” do not mix, the former\nreferring to the celestial realm, and the latter referring to\nsomething well beyond the celestial realm. To these Neoplatonic layers\nof Intellect and Souls, and following mostly in the spirit of astronomy\nof his day (with the exception, that is, of his positing Intellect as a\nso-called “10th sphere” in contrast to the more\naccepted Ptolemaic system of 9 spheres; see Tanenbaum 1996 and Loewe\n1979), Ibn Gabirol also envisions a hierarchy of star fields and\nplanetary orbs, a cosmic picture which he lays out in great detail in\nhis Keter Malkhut poem. Moving from God outward, we find the\nlayers as follows:", "\n(God)\n10. “Sphere of Intellect” (galgal ha-sêkhel) (cantos 24–25)\n9. Encompassing Sphere (canto 23)\n8. Zodiac / Fixed Stars (cantos 21–22)\n7. Saturn (canto 20)\n6. Jupiter (canto 19)\n5. Mars (canto 18)\n4. Sun (cantos 15–17)\n3. Venus (canto 14)\n2. Mercury (canto 13)\n1. Moon (cantos 11–12)\n(Earth)\n", "\n\nAbove even the “Sphere of Intellect” is the Divine\nThrone, which we know from the Fons Vitae refers to pure\nuniversal matter “between” God and Intellect (on matter as\nThrone, see Fons Vitae 5.42, p. 335, lines 23–4; for a great\ndiagram see Loewe 1989, p. 114).", "\n\nIt should be noted that it is in reference to the above chart of the\ncelestial levels of stars and planets that we find in various medieval\nMuslim and Jewish thinkers—for example in al-Farabi and in\nMaimonides—a Neoplatonized Aristotelian focus on a hierarchy of\n“separate intellects,” the last of which (generally\nconstrued as the 10th intellect lowest down—with God\nconceived either as the first such Intellect or as an Intellect above\nthis enumeration altogether) being described as the “Active Intellect”\nwhich governs the sublunar realm, and is that to which human minds\n“conjoin” (through the process of\n ittisâl).[32]\nIt is important to\ndistinguish this system from the one at play in Ibn Gabirol: whereas\nal-Farabi, Maimonides, and others focus their attention on a Return to\n(or a “conjunction with”) the 10th lowest down\nof the separate intellects (the Active Intellect as the intellect\nassociated with our earthly realm below the moon), Ibn Gabirol's\nfocus is, as in Plotinus, on an Intellect at the very heights of the\ncelestial world, and just outside of God's own being: Whereas Ibn\nGabirol's “10th sphere” is a Sphere of Intellect just\noutside of God, Maimonides' “10th\nIntellect” corresponds to the sphere of Moon (just above Earth).\nThis point is often confused in secondary literature, and can lead to\nproblematic misunderstandings and misconstrued correlations between\nphilosophical systems.", "\n\nReturning full circle to our start (see section 3), Ibn\nGabirol's emphasis even in his elaboration on a celestial\nhierarchy centers on the Neoplatonic concern with the cultivation of\nthe human soul—its Return to its highest fullness in Intellect:\nfrom a series of planets, we immediately move to Intellect\n(“galgal ha-sêkhel”), the ground and goal of\nthe virtuous human life.", "\nStudent: What is the purpose of man?\n\nTeacher: The inclination of his soul to the higher world in order\nthat everyone might return to his like.\n\n(Fons Vitae 1.2, p. 4, lines 23–5)\n" ], "section_title": "6. Cosmic Landscape, Soul Landscape: From Heavenly Circuits to Human Return", "subsections": [] }, { "main_content": [ "\n\nIn addition to his philosophical writing, Ibn Gabirol is\nauthor to an extensive corpus of Hebrew poems (generally categorized\ninto “religious” and “secular” poems) which it\nis beyond the scope of this entry to\n address.[33]", "\n\nAside from Ibn Gabirol's technical prowess as a poet, it is\nworth noting that Ibn Gabirol's own self-conception as a poet (a\ntheme overtly and self-referentially explored in many of his poems)\nopens important philosophical questions about the nature of language,\nselfhood and divinity. In, for example, drawing parallels between\nGod's act of creation (by Word), and the poet's /\nphilosopher's own act of writing, Ibn Gabirol arguably invites us\nto reconceptualize human subjectivity, the sacred, and the relationship\nbetween philosophical theory-building and imagino-poetic play." ], "section_title": "7. The Poet", "subsections": [] } ]	[ "For Arabic fragments of Fons Vitae, see main bibliography:\nPines 1958/77 and Fenton 1976.", "1892. Avencebrolis (Ibn Gabirol) Fons\nVitae, ex Arabico in Latinum Translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico\nGundissalino, edited by Baeumker. Münster. In\nBeiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters,\nTexte und Untersuchungen, edited by Baeumker and Hertling.\nMünster.\n\nContains the Latin text of the Fons Vitae as\ntranslated from Arabic in the 12th century by Dominicus\nGundissalinus and John of Spain", "1950. La source de vie; livre III, translated with commentary\nby Fernand Brunner. Paris: Librairie Philosophique\nJ. Vrin.\n\nFrench translation of book three of the Fons Vitae, with\ncommentary by Brunner.", "1954. Fountain of Life, translated by A. B.\nJacob. Philadelphia.\n\nThis is a full English translation of the Fons\nVitae, but its idiosyncratic terminology greatly obscures\nphilosophical points in the text (e.g. matter and form are translated\nas “material and structure”).", "1962. Ozar Ha-Mahshavah shel Ha-Yahadut,\nedited by Abraham Sifroni. Israel: Mosad Ha-Rav Kuk.\n\n This volume includes a contemporary Hebrew\ntranslation by Blovstein of the Latin Baeumker text (see\npp. 3–432): Rabbi Shlomo ben Gabirol, Sefer Meqor\nHayyim, translated [into Hebrew from Latin] by Yaakov\nBlovstein. ", "1962/2008. The Fountain of Life, (Book 3), translated by\nHenry E. Wedeck. New York: Philosophical Library. [Reprinted\nas Solomon Ibn Gabirol, The Fountain of Life. Bibliobazaar,\n2008.]", "1853/1955. Extraits de la source de\nvie de Salomon Ibn Gebirol. In Solomon Munk,\nMélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe.\nParis: Chez A. Franck, Libraire. (Reprinted Paris, 1955).\n\nContains text of Falaquera's 13th century Hebrew summary\nof the Fons Vitae, as well as Munk's French translation and\ncommentary.", "1962. Ozar Ha-Mahshavah shel Ha-Yahadut,\nedited by Abraham Sifroni. Israel: Mosad Ha-Rav Kuk.\n\nThe volume includes Shem Tov ibn Falaquera's 13th century Hebrew\nsummary translation of the original Arabic text; see pp.\n433–532. ", "2001. Shelomoh ibn Gabirol, Fons Vitae, by Roberto\nGatti. Genova: Il Melangolo. \nA new edition of Falaquera's 13th century Hebrew summary\nof the Fons Vitae (based on new\nmanuscripts not used by Munk) and Italian translation.", "2008. “Solomon Ibn Gabirol and Shem Tov b. Joseph\nFalaquera, Excerpts from ‘The Source of\nLife’ ”, in Medieval Jewish Philosophical\nWritings, edited by Charles Manekin. Cambridge: Cambridge\nUniversity Press, pp. 23–87. \n English translation of selections of Falaquera's\nHebrew excerpts by Charles Manekin.", "1484. Mibhar ha-Peninim (Choice of\nPearls: Maxims, Proverbs, and Moral Reflections)\n[microform]. Soncino (Italian books before 1601); roll 352, item\n5; Cambridge, Mass., General Microfilm Co.", "1925. Solomon Ibn Gabirol's Choice of Pearls (Library of\nJewish Classics, Volume IV), translated from the Hebrew with\nintroduction and annotation, A. Cohen (trans.). New York: Bloch\nPublishing Co., Inc., 1925.", "1947. Sefer Mivhar ha-Peninim. A. Habermann, (ed.),\nJerusalem: Sifriyat haPo'alim.", "1962. Ozar Ha-Mahshavah shel Ha-Yahadut,\nedited by Abraham Sifroni. Israel: Mosad Ha-Rav Kuk.\n\nContains contemporary Hebrew translation by Bar-On\nof the Arabic text; see second half of the volume after p. 549\n(i.e. after the Blovstein and the Falaquera Hebrew translations\nof Fons Vitae), pagination starts again from p. 1; see\npp. 1–112. Also contains Hebrew translation of Ibn Tibbon; see\nthird section of the volume after the Bar-On translation; pagination\nstarts again from p. 1; see pp. 1–85.", "1966. The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, Columbia\nUniversity Oriental Studies, Vol. I, Stephen S. Wise (trans.). New\nYork: AMS Press.\n\nArabic text and English translation of Gabirol's\nSefer Tiqun Midot ha-Nefesh", "Bialik and Ravnitsky, eds. 1924/1925. Shirei Shlomo ben Yehudah Ibn\nGevirol, Vol. I–II (Shirei Hol). Tel Aviv; Berlin:\nDwir-Verlags-Gesellschaft.", "Schirmann, Y., ed. 1967. Ibn Gabirol: Shirim\nNivharim. Jerusalem; Tel Aviv: Schocken.", "Yarden, Dov, ed. 1975. Shirei ha-Hol le-Rabbi Shlomo\nIbn Gevirol. Jerusalem: Kiryat Noar.", "al-Shahrastânî (Abu’ l-Fath Muhammad). 1923.\nKitâb al-Milal wal-Nihal (Book of Religious and\nPhilosophical Sects), Part II, edited by W. Cureton (Leipzig), pp.\n260–65. [This is a reprint of 1846 edition; also see 2002 reprint:\nThe Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects, Al-Shahrastani.\nEdited by W. Cureton. Piscataway: Gorgias Press].", "Plotinus. The Enneads, translated with notes by\nA.H. Armstrong. The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard\nUniversity Press, 1966.", "Plotinus, Die sogenannte Theologie des Aristoteles: aus\narabischen Handschriften (Theology of Aristotle),\nF. Dieterici (ed.), Leipzig, 1882. [Reprint: Amsterdam: Rodopi,\n1965.]", "Proclus. Liber de Causis (The Book of Causes)/ (in\nArabic: kalâm fî mahd al-khayr /\nDiscourse on Pure Goodness)\n \n\n Bardenhewer, Otto, (ed.). Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift\nUeber das reine gute: bekannt unter dem Namen Liber De Causis\n[Arabic text]. Freiberg-im-Breisgau: Herder, 1882 / Frankfurt am\nMain: Minerva, 1957.\n\n Badawi, A (ed.). Liber (Pseudo-Aristotelis) de\nexpositione bonitatis purae. In Neoplatonici apud Arabes.\nIslamica 19 [Arabic text]. Cairo, 1955; pp. 1–33.\n\n St. Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Book of Causes,\ntranslated and annotated by Vincent A. Guagliardo, Charles Hess, and\nRichard C. Taylor. Washington: Catholic University of America Press,\n1996.\n \n", "Bardenhewer, Otto, (ed.). Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift\nUeber das reine gute: bekannt unter dem Namen Liber De Causis\n[Arabic text]. Freiberg-im-Breisgau: Herder, 1882 / Frankfurt am\nMain: Minerva, 1957.", "Badawi, A (ed.). Liber (Pseudo-Aristotelis) de\nexpositione bonitatis purae. In Neoplatonici apud Arabes.\nIslamica 19 [Arabic text]. Cairo, 1955; pp. 1–33.", "St. Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Book of Causes,\ntranslated and annotated by Vincent A. Guagliardo, Charles Hess, and\nRichard C. Taylor. Washington: Catholic University of America Press,\n1996.", "Proclus, De Philosophia Chaldaica:\n \n 1971. De Philosophia Chaldaica, ed. É. des Places.\nParis (Oracles Chaldaïques, text établi et traduit, pp.\n202–12)\n\n 1988. The exhortation to philosophy. Including the Letters of\nIamblichus and Proclus' commentary on the Chaldean oracles.\nIamblichus, Johnson, T. M., Neuville, S., & Proclus. [EST: De\nphilosophia Chaldaica <engl.>]. Grand Rapids, Mich: Phanes\nPress.\n \n", "1971. De Philosophia Chaldaica, ed. É. des Places.\nParis (Oracles Chaldaïques, text établi et traduit, pp.\n202–12)", "1988. The exhortation to philosophy. Including the Letters of\nIamblichus and Proclus' commentary on the Chaldean oracles.\nIamblichus, Johnson, T. M., Neuville, S., & Proclus. [EST: De\nphilosophia Chaldaica <engl.>]. Grand Rapids, Mich: Phanes\nPress.", "Simplicius, 1882. Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros\nquattuor priores commentaria, edited by Herman Diels. Berlin.", "Altmann, Alexander. 1979. “Creation and Emanation in Isaac\nIsraeli: A Reappraisal,” \nStudies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, 1: 1–15.", "Altmann, Alexander, and Stern, S. M. 1958/2009. Isaac Israeli.\nOxford: Oxford University Press. [Reprinted 2009 by University of Chicago Press.]", "Asín-Palacios, Miguel. 1978. The Mystical Philosophy of\nIbn Masarra and his Followers. Leiden: E. J. Brill.", "Bargebuhr, Frederick P. 1976. Salomo Ibn Gabirol,\nOstwestliches Dichtertum. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.", "Brunner, Fernand. 1965. Platonisme et\naristotélisme—la critique d'Ibn Gabirol par St.\nThomas d'Aquin. Louvain: Publications universitaires de\nLouvain.", "–––. 1956 / 1997. “La doctrine de la\nmatière chez Avicébron,” Revue de\nThéologie et de Philosophie, trois. série, 6:\n261—79. Reprinted in\nFernand Brunner, Métaphysique d'Ibn Gabirol\net de la tradition platonicienne. Great Britain; USA:\nAshgate, Variorum.", "–––. 1965. Platonisme et\nAristotélisme: la critique d'Ibn Gabirol par Saint\nThomas D'Aquin. Louvain: Publications\nUniversitaires de Louvain.", "–––. Fernand Brunner,\nMétaphysique d'Ibn Gabirol et de la tradition\nplatonicienne. Great Britain; USA: Ashgate,\nVariorum.", "Cole, Peter. 2007. The Dream of the Poem: Hebrew Poetry from\nMuslim and Christian Spain, 950–1492. Lockert Library of Poetry in\nTranslation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.", "–––. 2001. Selected Poems of Solomon Ibn\nGabirol. Princeton University Press.", "Crowley, Theodore. 1950. Roger Bacon: The Problem of the\nSoul in his Philosophical Commentaries. Louvain; Dublin: James\nDuffy and Co., Ltd.", "Damascius. 1889. Dubitationes et Solutiones,\nC. É. Ruelle (ed.), Paris: Klincksieck.", "Davidson, Herbert A. 1992. Alfarabi, Avicenna, and\nAverroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active\nIntellect and Theories of Human Intellect. Oxford University\nPress.", "–––. 1972. “Alfarabi and Avicenna\non the Active Intellect,” Viator, \n3: 109–78.", "Dillon, John. 1992. “Solomon Ibn Gabirol's Doctrine of\nIntelligible Matter,” in L. Goodman (ed.), Neoplatonism\nand Jewish Thought, pp. 43–59. Albany: SUNY Press.", "Fenton, Paul. 1976. “Gleanings from Môseh Ibn\n‘Ezra's Maqâlat\nal-Hadîqa,” Sefarad, 36: 285–298.", "–––. Philosophie et\nexégèse dans le Jardin de la méthaphore [sic] de\nMoïse IbnʻEzra, philosophe et poète andalou du XIIe\nsiècle. Leiden; New York: Brill.", "Friedlaender, M. 1877. Essays on the Writings of Abraham Ibn\nEzra. London. [Reprinted: Jerusalem, 1964].\n\nContains (in Hebrew) Abraham ibn Ezra's recounted\nversion of Gabirol's commentary on Genesis.", "Frank, Daniel H. 1998. “Ibn Gabirol, Solomon\n(1021/2–57/8),” s.v. Routledge Encyclopedia of\nPhilosophy, Version 1.0. London and New York: Routledge.", "Gersh, Stephen. 1978. From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An\nInvestigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian\nTradition. Leiden: E.J. Brill.", "Gibb, H.A.R., et al. (ed.),\n1954. “anbaduklîs,” s.v. Encyclopedia\nof Islam, New Edition, Volume I, pp. 483–4. Leiden:\nBrill", "–––, 1954. hayûlâ,”\ns.v. Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, Leiden: Brill.", "–––, 1954. “Kursî,”\ns.v. Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, Volume V, p. 509,\nLeiden: Brill.", "Gilson, Etienne. 1955. History of Christian Philosophy in the\nMiddle Ages, New York: Random House.", "Gluck, Andrew. 2003. The Kingly Crown, Keter Malkhut,\ntranslation and notes by Bernard Lewis. Indiana: University of Notre\nDame.", "Gracia and Newton. 2010. “Medieval Theories of the\nCategories,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy\n(Summer 2010 Edition),\nEdward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/medieval-categories/>.", "Guttmann, Julius. 1973. Philosophies of Judaism: A History of\nJewish Philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenzweig. New\nYork: Schocken Books.", "Heller-Wilensky, Sara O. 1967. “Isaac Ibn Latif—Philosopher \nor Kabbalist,” in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance\nStudies, edited by Alexander Altmann. Cambridge: Harvard\nUniversity Press.", "Husik, Isaac. 1916/1958. A History of Medieval Jewish\nPhilosophy. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of\nAmerica.", "Idel, Moshe. 1982. “Ha-sefirot she-me‘al ha-sefirot:\nlahkor meqorotehem shel rishone he-mequbalim,”\nTarbiz 51, pp. 239–280.", "–––. 1992. “Jewish Kabbalah and Platonism\nin the Middle Ages and Renaissance,” in L. E. Goodman, (ed.),\nNeoplatonism and Jewish Thought, pp. 319–51. Albany:\nSUNY Press.", "Ikhwân as-safâ’ (Brethren of\nPurity). 1928. Rasâ’il Ikhwân\nas-safâ’. Volume 2. Cairo.", "Karamanolis, George E. 2006. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?:\nPlatonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. Oxford\nUniversity Press.", "Kaufmann, David. 1877/1964. “Ha-Pseudo Empedocles ka-Mekor\nle-R’ Shlomo ibn Gabirol,” Mehkarim ba-Sifrut\nha-Ivrit, pp. 78–164, Jerusalem: Mosad Ha-Ruv Kuk.", "–––. 1880. Die Spuren al-Batlajûsi's,\nStudien Über Salomon ibn Gabirol and Die Sinne,\nBudapest. [Reprint with an introduction by Louis Jacobs: London: Gregg\nInternational Publishers Ltd., 1972.]", "–––. 1899. Studien über\nSalomon Ibn Gabirol (Jahresberichte der\nLandes-Rabbinerschule zu Budapest für das Schuljahr\n1898/99). Budapest. [Reprint: New York : Arno Press, 1980]", "Lewis, Bernard, tr., 1961. Solomon ibn Gabirol: The Kingly\nCrown. London: Vallentine, Mitchell. [See edition of Gluck\n2003].", "Liebes, Yehudah. 1987. “Sefer Yezirah ezel R. Shlomo\nIbn Gevirol u-perush ha-shir ‘Ahavtikha.” In The\nBeginnings of Jewish Mysticism in Medieval Europe, edited by\nJ. Dan. [Also In\nJerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 6: 73–123.]", "Loewe, Raphael. 1989. Ibn Gabirol. London: Peter\nHalban.", "–––. 1979. “Ibn Gabirol's Treatment of\nSources in the Kether Malkhuth,” in Studies in\nJewish Religious and Intellectual History (Presented to Alexander\nAltmann on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday), edited by\nS. Stein and R. Loewe, pp. 183–194. Tuscaloosa: The University\nof Alabama Press.", "Mathis II, C. K. 1992. “Parallel Structures in the Metaphysics\nof Iamblichus and Ibn Gabirol,” in L. E. Goodman, Ed.\nNeoplatonism and Jewish Thought, pp. 61–76. Albany:\nSUNY Press.", "Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1993. An Introduction to Islamic\nCosmological Doctrines. Albany: State University of New York\nPress.", "Pessin, Sarah. 2003. “Jewish Neoplatonism: Being\nAbove Being and Divine Emanation in Solomon Ibn Gabirol and Isaac\nIsraeli,” in Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish\nPhilosophy, edited by Dan Frank and Oliver Leaman,\npp. 91–110. Cambridge University Press.", "–––. 2004. “Loss, Presence, and Gabirol's\nDesire: Medieval Jewish Philosophy and the Possibility of a Feminist\nGround,” in Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy,\nedited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, pp. 27–50. Bloomington: Indiana\nUniversity Press.", "–––. 2005a. “The Manifest Image: Revealing the\nHidden in Halevi, Saadya and Gabirol,” in History of\nPlatonism: Plato Redivivus, edited by John Finamore and Robert\nBerchman, pp. 253–270. New Orleans: University Press of the South.", "–––. 2005b. “The Influence of Islamic\nThought on Maimonides,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of\nPhilosophy (Fall 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =\n<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/maimonides-islamic/>.", "–––. 2009. “Matter, Form and the Corporeal\nWorld,” in The Cambridge History of Jewish Philosophy: From\nAntiquity to the Seventeenth Century, edited by Tamar Rudavsky\nand Steven Nadler, pp. 269–301. Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Peters, F. E. 1967. “Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol, Solomon ben\nJudah),” s.v. New Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 1, p.\n1130. [New York: McGraw-Hill]", "Pines, S. 1955. “A Tenth Century Philosophical\nCorrespondence,” Proceedings of the American Academy for\nJewish Research, 24, pp. 103–136.", "–––. 1958/1977. “Sefer\n‘Arûgat ha-Bôsem: ha-Qeta‘im mi-tôkh\nSêfer ‘Meqôr\nHayyîm’,” Tarbiz 27. [Reprinted in\nShlomo Pines, Bêyn Mahshevet Yisrôel\nle-Mahshevet ha-‘Amîm: Mehkarîm\nbe-Tôldôt ha-Fîlôsôfiya\nha-Yehûdit (Bialik: Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 44–60 [in\nHebrew].", "–––. 1977a. “ha-’im dîber\nShlômô Ibn Gabîrôl sarah al\nha-ûma?,” in Bêyn Mahshevet Yisrôel\nle-Mahshevet ha-‘Amîm: Mehkarîm\nbe-Tôldôt ha-Fîlôsôfiya\nha-Yehûdit (Bialik: Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 61–7 [in\nHebrew].", "–––. 1980. “Ve-qara el ha-Ayin\nve-Nivqa,” Tarbiz, 50: 339–47.", "Rudavksy, T. M. 1978. “Conflicting Motifs: Ibn Gabirol on\nMatter and Evil.” The New Scholasticism, 52 (1): 54–71.", "–––. 1991. “Ibn Gabirol\n(Avicebron or Avicebrol),” s.v. Dictionary of Literary\nBiography (Medieval Volume, Vol. 115), pp. 248–252. Detroit: Gale.", "Samuelson, Norbert. 1987. “Ibn Gabirol, Shelomoh,” s.v.\nThe Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Mircea Eliade. New\nYork: The MacMillan Publishing Co.", "Schechter, Solomon. 1909/1961. Aspects of Rabbinic Theology:\nMajor Concepts of the Talmud. New York: Schocken Books.", "Scheindlin, Raymond. 1986. Wine, Women and Death: Medieval\nHebrew Poems on the Good Life. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication\nSociety.", "–––. 1991. The Gazelle: Medieval Hebrew\nPoems on God, Israel, and the Soul. Philadelphia: Jewish\nPublication Society.", "Schirmann-Fleischer. 1995. The History of Hebrew Poetry in\nMuslim Spain. Jerusalem: Magnes and Ben-Zvi.", "Schlanger, Jacques. 1965. “Sur le role du\n‘tout’ dans la création selon Ibn\nGabirol,” Revue des Études Juives,\nVol. IV: 125–35.", "–––. 1968. Le philosophie de Salomon Ibn\nGabirol. Leiden: E.J. Brill.", "Scholem, G. 1939. “Iqvatov shel Gevirol\nba-Qabbalah.” In E. Steiman and A.A. Kovak,\nEds. Measef Sofrei Eretz Yisroel, pp.\n160–78. Tel Aviv.", "Sharp, D. E. 1930. Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the\nThirteenth Century. London: Oxford University Press.", "Skolnik, Fred (ed.). 1996. “Merkabah\nMysticism,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica (1996\nedition). Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House.", "–––. 1996. “Shekhina,”\nin Encyclopaedia Judaica (1996 edition). Jerusalem: Keter\nPublishing House.", "–––. 1996. “Throne of God,”\nin Encyclopaedia Judaica (1996 edition). Jerusalem: Keter\nPublishing House.", "Sirat, Colette. 1985. A History of Jewish Philosophy in the\nMiddle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.", "Stern, S. M. 1983a. “Ibn Hasday's Neoplatonist,”\nreprinted in F.W. Zimmerman ed. Medieval Arabic and Hebrew\nThought. London: Variorum Reprints, pp. 58–120.", "–––. 1983b. “Ibn Masarra—A\nMyth?” reprinted in F.W. Zimmerman ed.\nMedieval Arabic and Hebrew Thought. London: Variorum\nReprints.", "Taylor, Richard C. 1979. “St. Thomas and the Liber de causis on the\nHylomorphic Composition of Separate Substances,” Mediaeval\nStudies XLI, pp. 506–13.", "–––. 1981. The Liber de Causis (Kalâm\nfî mahd al-khair): A Study of Medieval Neoplatonism.\nDoctoral Thesis, University of Toronto.", "Tanenbaum, Adena. 1996. “Nine Spheres or Ten? A Medieval Gloss\non Moses Ibn Ezra's ‘Be-Shem El Asher\nAmar’,” Journal of Jewish Studies, Vol.\nXLVII, No. 2, pp. 294–303.", "Tzemah, Adi. 1985. Essay in Mehkarim bi-yetsirat\nShelomoh Ibn Gevirol, edited by Zvi Malachi. Tel-Aviv:\nMekhon Kats le-heker ha-sifrut ha-‘ivrit, Universitat\nTel-Aviv.", "Tzur, Reuven. 1985. “‘Ahavtikha ki-ahavat ish\nyehido’ li-Ibn Gevirol—Shir Philosophi o Philosophia\nbe-haruzim?,” in Mehkarim bi-yetsirat Shelomoh Ibn\nGevirol, edited by Zvi Malachi. Tel-Aviv: Mekhon Kats\nle-heker ha-sifrut ha-‘ivrit, Universitat Tel-Aviv.", "Weisheipl, James A. 1979. “Albertus Magnus and Universal\nHylomorphism: Avicebron,” in Southwestern Journal of\nPhilosophy 10, pp. 239–260.", "Wensinck, A. J. 1932. The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and\nHistorical Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress.", "Wolfson, Elliot R. 1990. “God, the Demiurge and the Intellect:\nOn the Usage of the Word Kol in Abraham ibn Ezra,”\nRevue des Études Juives 149, pp. 77-111.", "Wolfson, H. A. 1973. “The meaning of ex nihilo in\nIsaac Israeli,” reprinted in Studies in the History of\nPhilosophy and Religion, Harry Austryn Wolfson, edited by Twersky\nand Williams, Vol I, pp. 222–33. Cambridge: Harvard University\nPress.", "–––. 1979. Repercussions of the Kalam in\nJewish Philosophy. Mass.: Cambridge University Press." ]	[ { "href": "../arabic-islamic-greek/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: Greek sources" }, { "href": "../arabic-islamic-judaic/", "text": "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on Judaic thought" }, { "href": "../aristotle/", "text": "Aristotle" }, { "href": "../binarium/", "text": "binarium famosissimum [= most famous pair]" }, { "href": "../maimonides-islamic/", "text": "Maimonides: the influence of Islamic thought on" }, { "href": "../plotinus/", "text": "Plotinus" }, { "href": "../theology-aristotle/", "text": "Theology of Aristotle" } ]

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